{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_61729/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_61729","id":"gutenberg_61729","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61729","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Gender & Sexuality Studies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Character","Sex","Sex (Psychology)","Sexual ethics"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Notes\n\n  Text printed in italics has been transcribed _between underscores_.\n  Small capitals have been replaced with ALL CAPITALS. A caret followed\n  by a character represents a superscript character (as in f^t).\n\n  More Transcriber\u2019s Notes may be found at the end of this text.\n\n\n\n\nSEX & CHARACTER\n\n\n\n\nTHE GERMAN PRESS\n\nON \u201cSEX AND CHARACTER.\u201d\n\n\n_Die Umschau._--\u201cDr. Otto Weininger\u2019s book is destined to place the\nrelation of the sexes in a new light. He traces the contrast between man\nand woman to a single principle, and makes an attempt to reduce the\nspiritual differences of the sexes to a system.\u201d\n\n_Allgemeine Wiener Medizinische Zeitung._--\u201cAn extraordinary book, that\ncalled forth the learned criticism of two faculties, and had appeared in\na third edition a few months after its publication, before the\nscientific world had been able to pronounce upon it seriously, not to\nsay finally.... A book that will henceforth be in the hands of every\ndoctor who has occasion to study the antithetical character of the two\nsexes.\u201d\n\n_Der Volkserzieher._--\u201cThere is no aspect of modern thought which he\n(Weininger) has not touched upon in the course of his investigations, no\nrecess of the labyrinthine modern soul into which he does not invite us\nto glance with him, no question on which he has not touched, or to which\nhe has not, indeed, offered a solution in accordance with his own\nphilosophy.\u201d\n\n_Allgemeine Zeitung._--\u201cThis book... is a sensational work, both by\nreason of its contents and of the tragic fate of its author. Weininger,\nas is commonly known, shot himself in the autumn of 1903 at the early\nage of twenty-three, in the house in Vienna where Beethoven had died....\nBut it is the book itself, even more than its author\u2019s individuality,\nwhich is abnormal. It is nothing less than an attempt to construct a\nsystem of sexual characterology on the broadest scientific basis, with\nall the resources of the most modern philosophy.\u201d\n\n_M\u00fcnchener Neueste Nachrichten._--\u201c\u2018Sex and Character,\u2019 by Dr.\nWeininger, has none of the character of a youthful work. The learning\nrevealed in this book, and indeed its whole conception, are such that we\nmight take it for the strenuous achievement of a lifetime.\u201d\n\n_Neues Wiener Tageblatt._--\u201cA great philosophical, biological, and\nsocial question is here treated by a gifted and learned author with\nperfect freedom and breadth, yet with a seriousness, a wealth of\nscientific knowledge, that would ensure the book a place in the front\nrank, even were the style less excellent, vivacious, and individual than\nit is.\u201d\n\n_Die Wage._--\u201cThe author is a brilliant stylist. On every page I find\naphorisms, in which the form fits the thought like a veil of silver. And\nthese thoughts are no ordinary ones. The writer goes his own way, he\nknows secret paths which no man has yet trodden, and he shrinks from no\nobstacles. He lets himself down cautiously into the abyss, for he has\ndetermined to sound the deepest depths; from time to time, however, he\nlooks up from the pit and rejoices in the light of the eternal stars,\neven though they lie hid from his mortal vision. He carries his\narguments to their ultimate conclusion. We rebel against these\nconclusions, but we admire the uncompromising logic of the thinker.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n  SEX & CHARACTER\n\n  BY\n  OTTO WEININGER\n\n  AUTHORISED TRANSLATION FROM THE\n  SIXTH GERMAN EDITION\n\n  [Illustration]\n\n  LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN\n  NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM\u2019S SONS\n  1906\n\n\n\n\n  _All rights reserved_\n\n  _Copyright, London: William Heinemann, 1906_\n\n  _Copyright, New York: G. P. Putnam\u2019s Sons, 1906_\n\n\n\n\nPUBLISHER\u2019S NOTE\n\n\nOn October 4, 1903, Otto Weininger died by his own hand, at the age of\ntwenty-three and a half years. There is perhaps in all history no other\ninstance of a man who had produced a work so mature in its scientific\ncharacter, and so original in its philosophical aspect as \u201cSex and\nCharacter\u201d when he was no more than twenty-one years old. We will not\nattempt to decide whether this was the case of a genius, who, instead of\ndeveloping his intellectual powers gradually in the course of a\nlifetime, concentrated them in one mighty achievement, and then cast off\nthe worn-out husk of the flesh, or of an unhappy youth, who could no\nlonger bear the burden of his own ghastly knowledge.\n\n\u201cSex and Character\u201d is undoubtedly one of those rare books that will be\nstudied long after its own times, and whose influence will not pass\naway, but will penetrate deeper and deeper, compelling amazement and\ninviting reflection in steadily expanding circles. It may be noted with\nsatisfaction that the book is by no means in harmony with contemporary\nthought. The discussions, so much in favour nowadays, concerning the\nemancipation of women, sexuality, the relation of women to culture, and\nso forth, are deprived of their data by this publication; for here, laid\ndown with all the penetrating acumen of the trained logician, is a\ncharacterisation of sexual types, \u201cM\u201d (the ideal man), and \u201cW\u201d (the\nideal woman), which traces all the much discussed psychological\nphenomena back to a final source, and actually gives a definitive\nsolution to the feminine problem, a solution altogether alien to the\nfield of inquiry wherein the answer has hitherto been sought. In the\nscience of characterology, here formulated for the first time, we have a\nstrenuous scientific achievement of the first importance. All former\npsychologies have been the psychology of the male, written by men, and\nmore or less consciously applicable only to man as distinguished from\nhumanity. \u201cWoman does not betray her secret,\u201d said Kant, and this has\nbeen true till now. But now she has revealed it--by the voice of a man.\nThe things women say about themselves have been suggested by men; they\nrepeat the discoveries, more or less real, which men have made about\nthem. By a highly original method of analysis, a man has succeeded for\nthe first time in giving scientific and abstract utterance to that which\nonly some few great artists have suggested by concrete images hitherto.\nWeininger, working out an original system of characterology\n(psychological typology) rich in prospective possibilities, undertook\nthe construction of a universal psychology of woman which penetrates to\nthe nethermost depths, and is based not only on a vast systematic\nmastery of scientific knowledge, but on what can only be described as an\nappalling comprehension of the feminine soul in its most secret\nrecesses. This newly created method embraces the whole domain of human\nconsciousness; research must be carried out on the lines laid down by\nNature--in three stages, and from three distinct points of view: the\nbiologico-physiological, the psychologically descriptive, and the\nphilosophically appreciative. I will not dwell here on the equipment\nessential for such a task, the necessary combination of a comprehensive\nknowledge of natural history with a minute and exhaustive mastery of\npsychological and philosophical science--a combination destined,\nperhaps, to prove unique.\n\nThe general characterisation of the ideal woman, \u201cW,\u201d is followed by the\nconstruction of individual types, which are finally resolved into two\nelemental figures (Platonic conceptions to some extent), the Courtesan\nand the Mother. These are differentiated by their pre-occupation with\nthe sexual act (the main, and in the ultimate sense, sole interest of\n\u201cW\u201d), in the first case, as an end in itself, in the second as the\nprocess which results in the possession of a child. The abnormal type,\nthe hysterical woman, leads up to a masterly psychological (not\nphysiological) theory of hysteria, which is acutely and convincingly\ndefined as \u201cthe organic mendacity of woman.\u201d\n\nWeininger himself attached the highest importance to the\nethico-philosophical chapters that conclude his work, in which he passes\nfrom the special problem of sexuality to the problems of individual\ntalent, genius, \u00e6sthetics, memory, the _ego_, the Jewish race, and many\nothers, rising finally to the ultimate logical and moral principles of\njudgment. From his most universal standpoint he succeeds in estimating\nwoman as a part of humanity, and, above all, subjectively. Here he\ndeliberately comes into sharp conflict with the fashionable tendencies\ntowards an unscientific monism and its accompanying phenomena,\npan-sexuality and the ethics of species, and characterises very aptly\nthe customary superficialities of the many non-philosophical modern\napostles, of whom Wilhelm B\u00f6lsche and Ellen Key are perhaps the most\nrepresentative types. Weininger, in defiance of all reigning fashions,\nrepresents a consolidated dualism, closely related to the eternal\nsystems of Plato, of Christianity, and of Kant, which finds an original\nissue in a bitterly tragic conception of the universe. Richard Wagner\n(whom Weininger calls the greatest of human beings after Jesus) gives\nartistic expression in his _Parsifal_ to the conception Weininger sets\nforth scientifically. It is, in fact, the old doctrine of the divine\nlife and of redemption to which the whole book, with its array of\ndetail, is consecrated. In Kundry, Weininger recognises the most\nprofound conception of woman in all literature. In her redemption by the\nspotless Parsifal, the young philosopher sees the way of mankind marked\nout; he contrasts with this the programme of the modern feminist\nmovement, with its superficialities and its lies; and so, in conclusion,\nthe book returns to the problem, which, in spite of all its wealth of\nthought, remains its governing idea: the problem of the sexes and the\npossibility of a moral relation between them--a moral relation\nfundamentally different from what is commonly understood by the term, of\ncourse. In the two chapters: \u201cThe Nature of Woman and her significance\nin the Universe,\u201d and \u201cWoman and Mankind,\u201d we drink from a fountain of\nthe ripest wisdom. A tragic and most unhappy mind reveals itself here,\nand no thoughtful man will lay down this book without deep emotion and\nadmiration; many, indeed, will close it with almost religious\nreverence.\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR\u2019S PREFACE\n\n\nThis book is an attempt to place the relations of Sex in a new and\ndecisive light. It is an attempt not to collect the greatest possible\nnumber of distinguishing characters, or to arrange into a system all the\nresults of scientific measuring and experiment, but to refer to a single\nprinciple the whole contrast between man and woman. In this respect the\nbook differs from all other works on the same subject. It does not\nlinger over this or that detail, but presses on to its ultimate goal; it\ndoes not heap investigation on investigation, but combines the psychical\ndifferences between the sexes into a system; it deals not with women,\nbut with woman. It sets out, indeed, from the most common and obvious\nfacts, but intends to reach a single, concrete principle. This is not\n\u201cinductive metaphysics\u201d; it is a gradual approach to the heart of\npsychology.\n\nThe investigation is not of details, but of principles; it does not\ndespise the laboratory, although the help of the laboratory, with regard\nto the deeper problems, is limited as compared with the results of\nintrospective analysis. An artist who wishes to represent the female\nform can construct a type without actually giving formal proof by a\nseries of measurements. The artist does not despise experimental\nresults; on the contrary, he regards it as a duty to gain experience;\nbut for him the collection of experimental knowledge is merely a\nstarting-point for self-exploration, and in art self-exploration is\nexploration of the world.\n\nThe psychology used in this exposition is purely philosophical, although\nits characteristic method, justified by the subject, is to set out from\nthe most trivial details of experience. The task of the philosopher\ndiffers from that of the artist in one important respect. The one deals\nin symbols, the other in ideas. Art and philosophy stand to one another\nas expression and meaning. The artist has breathed in the world to\nbreathe it out again; the philosopher has the world outside him and he\nhas to absorb it.\n\nThere is always something pretentious in theory; and the real\nmeaning--which in a work of art is Nature herself and in a philosophical\nsystem is a much condensed generalisation, a thesis going to the root of\nthe matter and proving itself--appears to strike against us harshly,\nalmost offensively. Where my exposition is anti-feminine, and that is\nnearly everywhere, men themselves will receive it with little heartiness\nor conviction; their sexual egoism makes them prefer to see woman as\nthey would like to have her, as they would like her to be.\n\nI need not say that I am prepared for the answer women will have to the\njudgment I have passed on their sex. My investigation, indeed, turns\nagainst man in the end, and although in a deeper sense than the\nadvocates of women\u2019s rights could anticipate, assigns to man the\nheaviest and most real blame. But this will help me little and is of\nsuch a nature that it cannot in the smallest way rehabilitate me in the\nminds of women.\n\nThe analysis, however, goes further than the assignment of blame; it\nrises beyond simple and superficial phenomena to heights from which\nthere opens not only a view into the nature of woman and its meaning in\nthe universe, but also the relation to mankind and to the ultimate and\nmost lofty problems. A definite relation to the problem of Culture is\nattained, and we reach the part to be played by woman in the sphere of\nideal aims. There, also, where the problems of Culture and of Mankind\ncoincide, I try not merely to explain but to assign values, for, indeed,\nin that region explanation and valuation are identical.\n\nTo such a wide outlook my investigation was as it were driven, not\ndeliberately steered, from the outset. The inadequacy of all empirical\npsychological philosophy follows directly from empirical psychology\nitself. The respect for empirical knowledge will not be injured, but\nrather will the meaning of such knowledge be deepened, if man recognises\nin phenomena, and it is from phenomena that he sets out, any elements\nassuring him that there is something behind phenomena, if he espies the\nsigns that prove the existence of something higher than phenomena,\nsomething that supports phenomena. We may be assured of such a first\nprinciple, although no living man can reach it. Towards such a principle\nthis book presses and will not flag.\n\nWithin the narrow limits to which as yet the problem of woman and of\nwoman\u2019s rights has been confined, there has been no place for the\nventure to reach so high a goal. None the less the problem is bound\nintimately with the deepest riddles of existence. It can be solved,\npractically or theoretically, morally or metaphysically, only in\nrelation to an interpretation of the cosmos.\n\nComprehension of the universe, or what passes for such, stands in no\nopposition to knowledge of details; on the other hand all special\nknowledge acquires a deeper meaning because of it. Comprehension of the\nuniverse is self-creative; it cannot arise, although the empirical\nknowledge of every age expects it, as a synthesis of however great a sum\nof empirical knowledge.\n\nIn this book there lie only the germs of a world-scheme, and these are\nallied most closely with the conceptions of Plato, Kant and\nChristianity. I have been compelled for the most part to fashion for\nmyself the scientific, psychological, philosophical, logical, ethical\ngroundwork. I think that at the least I have laid the foundations of\nmany things into which I could not go fully. I call special attention to\nthe defects of this part of my work because I attach more importance to\nappreciation of what I have tried to say about the deepest and most\ngeneral problems than to the interest which will certainly be aroused by\nmy special investigation of the problem of woman.\n\nThe philosophical reader may take it amiss to find a treatment of the\nloftiest and ultimate problems coinciding with the investigation of a\nspecial problem of no great dignity; I share with him this distaste. I\nmay say, however, that I have treated throughout the contrast between\nthe sexes as the starting-point rather than the goal of my research. The\ninvestigation has yielded a harvest rich in its bearing on the\nfundamental problems of logic and their relations to the axioms of\nthought, on the theory of \u00e6sthetics, of love, and of the beautiful and\nthe good, and on problems such as individuality and morality and their\nrelations, on the phenomena of genius, the craving for immortality and\nHebraism. Naturally these comprehensive interrelations aid the special\nproblem, for, as it is considered from so many points of view, its scope\nenlarges. And if in this wider sense it be proved that culture can give\nonly the smallest hope for the nature of woman, if the final results are\na depreciation, even a negation of womanhood, there will be no attempt\nin this to destroy what exists, to humble what has a value of its own.\nHorror of my own deed would overtake me were I here only destructive and\nhad I left only a clean sheet. Perhaps the affirmations in my book are\nless articulate, but he that has ears to hear will hear them.\n\nThe treatise falls into two parts, the first biological-psychological,\nthe second logical-philosophical. It may be objected that I should have\ndone better to make two books, the one treating of purely physical\nscience, the other introspective. It was necessary to be done with\nbiology before turning to psychology. The second part treats of certain\npsychical problems in a fashion totally different from the method of any\ncontemporary naturalist, and for that reason I think that the removal of\nthe first part of the book would have been at some risk to many readers.\nMoreover, the first part of the book challenges an attention and\ncriticism from natural science possible in a few places only in the\nsecond part, which is chiefly introspective. Because the second part\nstarts from a conception of the universe that is anti-positivistic, many\nwill think it unscientific (although there is given a strong proof\nagainst Positivism). For the present I must be content with the\nconviction that I have rendered its due to Biology, and that I have\nestablished an enduring position for non-biological, non-physiological\npsychology.\n\nMy investigation may be objected to as in certain points not being\nsupported by enough proof, but I see little force in such an objection.\nFor in these matters what can \u201cproof\u201d mean? I am not dealing with\nmathematics or with the theory of cognition (except with the latter in\ntwo cases); I am dealing with empirical knowledge, and in that one can\ndo no more than point to what exists; in this region proof means no more\nthan the agreement of new experience with old experience, and it is much\nthe same whether the new phenomena have been produced experimentally by\nmen, or have come straight from the creative hand of nature. Of such\nlatter proofs my book contains many.\n\nFinally, I should like to say that my book, if I may be allowed to judge\nit, is for the most part not of a quality to be understood and absorbed\nat the first glance. I point out this myself, to guide and protect the\nreader.\n\nThe less I found myself able in both parts of the book (and especially\nin the second) to confirm what now passes for knowledge, the more\nanxious I have been to point out coincidences where I found myself in\nagreement with what has already been known and said.\n\nI have to thank Professor Dr. Laurenz M\u00fcllner for the great assistance\nhe has given me, and Professor Dr. Friedrich Jodl for the kindly\ninterest he has taken in my work from the beginning. I am specially\nindebted to the kind friends who have helped me with correction of the\nproofs.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                                  _Page_\n\n  AUTHOR\u2019S PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION                        ix\n\n\n  FIRST OR PREPARATORY PART\n\n  SEXUAL COMPLEXITY\n\n  INTRODUCTION                                                         1\n\n  On the development of general conceptions -- Male and female --\n  Contradictions -- Transitional forms -- Anatomy and natural\n  endowment -- Uncertainty of anatomy\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n\n  MALES AND FEMALES                                                    5\n\n  Embryonic neutral condition -- Rudiments in the adult -- Degrees\n  of \u201cgonochorism\u201d -- Principle of intermediate forms -- Male and\n  female -- Need for typical conceptions -- Resum\u00e9 -- Early\n  anticipations\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n\n  MALE AND FEMALE PLASMAS                                             11\n\n  Position of sexuality -- Steenstrup\u2019s view adopted -- Sexual\n  characters -- Internal secretions -- Idioplasm -- Arrhenoplasm\n  -- Thelyplasm -- Variations -- Proofs from the effects of\n  castration -- Transplantation and transfusion -- Organotherapy\n  -- Individual differences between cells -- Origin of\n  intermediate sexual conditions -- Brain -- Excess of male births\n  -- Determination of sex -- Comparative pathology\n\n\n  CHAPTER III\n\n  THE LAWS OF SEXUAL ATTRACTION                                       26\n\n  Sexual preference -- Probability of these being controlled by a\n  law -- First formula -- First interpretation -- Proofs --\n  Heterostylism -- Interpretation of heterostylism -- Animal\n  kingdom -- Further laws -- Second formula -- Chemotaxis --\n  Resemblances and differences -- Goethe, \u201celective affinities\u201d --\n  Marriage and free love -- Effects on progeny\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n\n  HOMO-SEXUALITY AND PEDERASTY                                        45\n\n  Homo-sexuals as intermediate forms -- Inborn or acquired,\n  healthy or diseased? -- A special instance of the law of\n  attraction -- All men have the rudiments of homo-sexuality --\n  Friendship and sexuality -- Animals -- Failure of medical\n  treatment -- Homo-sexuality, punishment and ethics --\n  Distinction between homo-sexuality and pederasty\n\n\n  CHAPTER V\n\n  THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER AND THE SCIENCE OF FORM                    53\n\n  Principle of sexually intermediate forms as fundamental\n  principle of the psychology of individuals -- Simultaneity or\n  periodicity? -- Methods of psychological investigation --\n  Examples -- Individualised education -- Conventionalising --\n  Parallelism between morphology and characterology -- Physiognomy\n  and the principles of psycho-physics -- Method of the doctrine\n  of variation -- A new way of stating the problem -- Deductive\n  morphology -- Correlation -- Outlook\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI\n\n  EMANCIPATED WOMEN                                                   64\n\n  The woman question -- Claim for emancipation and maleness --\n  Emancipation and homo-sexuality -- Sexual preferences of\n  emancipated women -- Physiognomy of emancipated women -- Other\n  celebrated women -- Femaleness and emancipation -- Practical\n  rules -- Genius essentially male -- Movements of women in\n  historical times -- Periodicity -- Biology and the conception of\n  history -- Outlook of the woman movement -- Its fundamental\n  error\n\n\n  SECOND OR PRINCIPAL PART\n\n  THE SEXUAL TYPES\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n\n  MAN AND WOMAN                                                       79\n\n  Bisexuality and unisexuality -- Man or woman, male or female --\n  Fundamental difficulty in characterology -- Experiment, analysis\n  of sensation and psychology -- Dilthey -- Conception of\n  empirical character -- What is and what is not the object of\n  psychology -- Character and individuality -- Problem of\n  characterology and the problem of the sexes\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n\n  MALE AND FEMALE SEXUALITY                                           85\n\n  The problem of a female psychology -- Man as the interpreter of\n  female psychology -- Differences in the sexual impulse -- The\n  absorbing and liberating factors -- Intensity and activity --\n  Sexual irritability of women -- Larger field of the sexual life\n  in woman -- Local differences in the perception of sexuality --\n  Local and periodical cessation of male sexuality -- Differences\n  in the degrees of consciousness of sexuality\n\n\n  CHAPTER III\n\n  MALE AND FEMALE CONSCIOUSNESS                                       93\n\n  Sensation and feeling -- Avenarius\u2019 division into \u201celement\u201d and\n  \u201ccharacter\u201d -- These inseparable at the earliest stage --\n  Process of \u201cclarification\u201d -- Presentiments -- Grades of\n  understanding -- Forgetting -- Paths and organisation --\n  Conception of \u201chenids\u201d -- The henid as the simplest, psychical\n  datum -- Sexual differences in the organisation of the contents\n  of the mind -- Sensibility -- Certainty of judgment -- Developed\n  consciousness as a male character\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n\n  TALENT AND GENIUS                                                  103\n\n  Genius and talent -- Genius and giftedness -- Methods --\n  Comprehension of many men -- What is meant by comprehending men\n  -- Great complexity of genius -- Periods in psychic life -- No\n  disparagement of famous men -- Understanding and noticing --\n  Universal consciousness of genius -- Greatest distance from the\n  henid stage -- A higher grade of maleness -- Genius always\n  universal -- The female devoid of genius or of hero-worship --\n  Giftedness and sex\n\n\n  CHAPTER V\n\n  TALENT AND MEMORY                                                  114\n\n  Organisation and the power of reproducing thoughts -- Memory of\n  experiences a sign of genius -- Remarks and conclusions --\n  Remembrance and apperception -- Capacity for comparison and\n  acquisition -- Reasons for the masculinity of music, drawing and\n  painting -- Degrees of genius -- Relation of genius to ordinary\n  men -- Autobiography -- Fixed ideas -- Remembrance of personal\n  creations -- Continuous and discontinuance memory -- Continuity\n  and piety -- Past and present -- Past and future -- Desire for\n  immortality -- Existing psychological explanations -- True\n  origin -- Inner development of man until death -- Ontogenetic\n  psychology or theoretical biography -- Woman lacking in the\n  desire for immortality -- Further extension of relation of\n  memory to genius -- Memory and time -- Postulate of timelessness\n  -- Value as a timeless quality -- First law of the theory of\n  value -- Proofs -- Individuation and duration constituents of\n  value -- Desire for immortality a special case -- Desire for\n  immortality in genius connected with timelessness, by his\n  universal memory and the duration of his creations -- Genius and\n  history -- Genius and nations -- Genius and language -- Men of\n  action and men of science, not to be called men of genius --\n  Philosophers, founders of religion and artists have genius\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI\n\n  MEMORY, LOGIC AND ETHICS                                           142\n\n  Psychology and \u201cpsychologismus\u201d -- Value of memory -- Theory of\n  memory -- Doctrines of practice and of association -- Confusion\n  with recognition -- Memory peculiar to man -- Moral significance\n  -- Lies -- Transition to logic -- Memory and the principle of\n  identity -- Memory and the syllogism -- Woman non-logical and\n  non-ethical -- Intellectual and moral knowledge -- The\n  intelligible ego\n\n\n  CHAPTER VII\n\n  LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO                                          153\n\n  Critics of the conception of the Ego -- Hume: Lichtenberg, Mach\n  -- The ego of Mach and biology -- Individuation and\n  individuality -- Logic and ethics as witnesses for the existence\n  of the ego -- Logic -- Laws of identity and of contraries --\n  Their use and significance -- Logical axioms as the laws of\n  essence -- Kant and Fichte -- Freedom of thought and freedom of\n  the will -- Ethics -- Relation to logic -- The psychology of the\n  Kantian ethics -- Kant and Nietzsche\n\n\n  CHAPTER VIII\n\n  THE \u201cI\u201d PROBLEM AND GENIUS                                         163\n\n  Characterology and the belief in the \u201cI\u201d -- Awakening of the ego\n  -- Jean Paul, Novalis, Schelling -- The awakening of the ego and\n  the view of the world -- Self-consciousness and arrogance -- The\n  view of the genius to be more highly valued than that of other\n  men -- Final statements as to the idea of genius -- The\n  personality of the genius as the perfectly-conscious microcosm\n  -- The naturally-synthetic activity of genius -- Significant and\n  symbolical -- Definition of the genius in relation to ordinary\n  men -- Universality as freedom -- Morality or immorality of\n  genius? -- Duties towards self and others -- What duty to\n  another is -- Criticism of moral sympathy and social ethics --\n  Understanding of other men as the one requirement of morality\n  and knowledge -- I and thou -- Individualism and universalism --\n  Morality only in monads -- The man of greatest genius as the\n  most moral man -- Why man is \u03b6\u03c9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd -- Consciousness and\n  morality -- The great criminal -- Genius as duty and submission\n  -- Genius and crime -- Genius and insanity -- Man as his own\n  creator\n\n\n  CHAPTER IX\n\n  MALE AND FEMALE PSYCHOLOGY                                         186\n\n  Soullessness of woman -- History of this knowledge -- Woman\n  devoid of genius -- No masculine women in the true sense -- The\n  unconnectedness of woman\u2019s nature due to her want of an ego --\n  Revision of the henid-theory -- Female \u201cthought\u201d -- Idea and\n  object -- Freedom of the object -- Idea and judgment -- Nature\n  of judgment -- Woman and truth as a criterion of thought --\n  Woman and logic -- Woman non-moral, not immoral -- Woman and\n  solitude -- Womanly sympathy and modesty -- The ego of women --\n  Female vanity -- Lack of true self-appreciation -- Memory for\n  compliments -- Introspection and repentance -- Justice and\n  jealousy -- Name and individuality -- Radical difference between\n  male and female mental life -- Psychology with and without soul\n  -- Is psychology a science? -- Soul and psychology -- Problem of\n  the influence of the psychical sexual characters of the male or\n  the female\n\n\n  CHAPTER X\n\n  MOTHERHOOD AND PROSTITUTION                                        214\n\n  Special characterology of woman -- Mother and prostitute --\n  Relation of two types to the child -- Woman polygamous --\n  Analogies between motherhood and sexuality -- Motherhood and the\n  race -- Maternal love ethically indifferent -- The prostitute\n  careless of the race -- The prostitute, the criminal and the\n  conqueror -- Emperor and prostitute -- Motive of the prostitute\n  -- Coitus an end in itself -- Coquetry -- The sensations of the\n  woman in coitus in relation to the rest of her life -- The\n  prostitute as the enemy -- The friend of life and its enemy --\n  No prostitution amongst animals -- Its origin a mystery\n\n\n  CHAPTER XI\n\n  EROTICS AND \u00c6STHETICS                                              236\n\n  Women, and the hatred of women -- Erotics and sexuality --\n  Platonic love -- The idea of love -- Beauty of women -- Relation\n  to sexual impulse -- Love and beauty -- Difference between\n  \u00e6sthetics, logic and ethics -- Modes of love -- Projection\n  phenomena -- Beauty and morality -- Nature and ethics -- Natural\n  and artistic beauty -- Sexual love as guilt -- Hate, love and\n  morality -- Creation of the devil -- Love and sympathy -- Love\n  and shyness -- Love and vanity -- Love of woman as a means to an\n  end -- Relation between the child and love, the child and\n  sexuality -- Love and murder -- Madonna-worship -- Madonna, a\n  male idea, without basis in womanhood -- Woman sexual, not\n  erotic -- Sense of beauty in women -- How man acts on woman --\n  The fate of the woman -- Why man loves woman\n\n\n  CHAPTER XII\n\n  THE NATURE OF WOMAN AND HER SIGNIFICANCE IN THE UNIVERSE           252\n\n  Meaning of womanhood -- Instinct for pairing or matchmaking --\n  Man, and matchmaking -- High valuation of coitus -- Individual\n  sexual impulse, a special case -- Womanhood as pairing or\n  universal sexuality -- Organic falseness of woman -- Hysteria --\n  Difference between man and beast, woman and man -- The higher\n  and lower life -- Birth and death -- Freedom and happiness --\n  Happiness and man -- Happiness and woman -- Woman and the\n  problem of existence -- Non-existence of woman -- Male and\n  female friendship -- Pairing identical with womanhood -- Why\n  women must be regarded as human -- Contrast between subject --\n  Object, matter, form, man, woman -- Meaning of henids --\n  Formation of woman by man -- Significance of woman in the\n  universe -- Man as something, woman as nothing -- Psychological\n  problem of the fear of woman -- Womanhood and crime -- Creation\n  of woman by man\u2019s crime -- Woman as his own sexuality accepted\n  by man -- Woman as the guilt of man -- What man\u2019s love of woman\n  is, in its deepest significance\n\n\n  CHAPTER XIII\n\n  JUDAISM                                                            301\n\n  Differences amongst men -- Intermediate forms and racial\n  anthropology -- Comparison of Judaism and femaleness -- Judaism\n  as an idea -- Antisemitism -- Richard Wagner -- Similarities\n  between Jews and women -- Judaism in science -- The Jew not a\n  monad -- The Jew and the Englishman -- Nature of humour --\n  Humour and satire -- The Jewess -- Deepest significance of\n  Judaism -- Want of faith -- The Jew not non-mystical, yet\n  impious -- Want of earnestness, and pride -- The Jew as opposed\n  to the hero -- Judaism and Christianity -- Origin of\n  Christianity -- Problem of the founders of religion -- Christ as\n  the conqueror of the Judaism in Himself -- The founders of\n  religions as the greatest of men -- Conquest of inherent Judaism\n  necessary for all founders of religion -- Judaism and the\n  present time -- Judaism, femaleness, culture and humanity\n\n\n  CHAPTER XIV\n\n  WOMAN AND MANKIND                                                  331\n\n  The idea of humanity, and woman as the match-maker --\n  Goethe-worship -- Womanising of man -- Virginity and purity --\n  Male origin of these ideas -- Failure of woman to understand the\n  erotic -- Woman\u2019s relation to sexuality -- Coitus and love --\n  Woman as the enemy of her own emancipation -- Asceticism immoral\n  -- Sexual impulse as a want of respect -- Problem of the Jew --\n  Problem of the woman -- Problem of slavery -- Moral relation to\n  women -- Man as the opponent of emancipation -- Ethical\n  postulates -- Two possibilities -- The problem of women as the\n  problem of humanity -- Subjection of women -- Persistence or\n  disappearance of the human race -- True ground of the immorality\n  of the sexual impulse -- Earthly paternity -- Inclusion of women\n  in the conception of humanity -- The mother and the education of\n  the human race -- Last questions\n\n\n  INDEX                                                              351\n\n\n\n\n  FIRST OR PREPARATORY PART\n\n  SEXUAL COMPLEXITY\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nAll thought begins with conceptions to a certain extent generalised, and\nthence is developed in two directions. On the one hand, generalisations\nbecome wider and wider, binding together by common properties a larger\nand larger number of phenomena, and so embracing a wider field of the\nworld of facts. On the other hand, thought approaches more closely the\nmeeting-point of all conceptions, the individual, the concrete complex\nunit towards which we approach only by thinking in an ever-narrowing\ncircle, and by continually being able to add new specific and\ndifferentiating attributes to the general idea, \u201cthing,\u201d or \u201csomething.\u201d\nIt was known that fishes formed a class of the animal kingdom distinct\nfrom mammals, birds, or invertebrates, long before it was recognised on\nthe one hand that fishes might be bony or cartilaginous, or on the other\nthat fishes, birds and mammals composed a group differing from the\ninvertebrates by many common characters.\n\nThe self-assertion of the mind over the world of facts in all its\ncomplexity of innumerable resemblances and differences has been compared\nwith the rule of the struggle for existence among living beings. Our\nconceptions stand between us and reality. It is only step by step that\nwe can control them. As in the case of a madman, we may first have to\nthrow a net over the whole body so that some limit may be set to his\nstruggles; and only after the whole has been thus secured, is it\npossible to attend to the proper restraint of each limb.\n\nTwo general conceptions have come down to us from primitive mankind, and\nfrom the earliest times have held our mental processes in their leash.\nMany a time these conceptions have undergone trivial corrections; they\nhave been sent to the workshop and patched in head and limbs; they have\nbeen lopped and added to, expanded here, contracted there, as when new\nneeds pierce through and through an old law of suffrage, bursting bond\nafter bond. None the less, in spite of all amendment and alteration, we\nhave still to reckon with the primitive conceptions, male and female.\n\nIt is true that among those we call women are some who are meagre,\nnarrow-hipped, angular, muscular, energetic, highly mentalised; there\nare \u201cwomen\u201d with short hair and deep voices, just as there are \u201cmen\u201d who\nare beardless and gossiping. We know, in fact, that there are unwomanly\nwomen, man-like women, and unmanly, womanish, woman-like men. We assign\nsex to human beings from their birth on one character only, and so come\nto add contradictory ideas to our conceptions. Such a course is\nillogical.\n\nIn private conversation or in society, in scientific or general\nmeetings, we have all taken part in frothy discussions on \u201cMan and\nWoman,\u201d or on the \u201cEmancipation of Women.\u201d There is a pitiful monotony\nin the fashion according to which, on such occasions, \u201cmen\u201d and \u201cwomen\u201d\nhave been treated as if, like red and white balls, they were alike in\nall respects save colour. In no case has the discussion been confined to\nan individual case, and as every one had different individuals in their\nmind, a real agreement was impossible. As people meant different things\nby the same words, there was a complete disharmony between language and\nideas. Is it really the case that all women and men are marked off\nsharply from each other, the women, on the one hand, alike in all\npoints, the men on the other? It is certainly the case that all previous\ntreatment of the sexual differences, perhaps unconsciously, has implied\nthis view. And yet nowhere else in nature is there such a yawning\ndiscontinuity. There are transitional forms between the metals and\nnon-metals, between chemical combinations and mixtures, between animals\nand plants, between phanerogams and cryptogams, and between mammals and\nbirds. It is only in obedience to the most general, practical demand for\na superficial view that we classify, make sharp divisions, pick out a\nsingle tune from the continuous melody of nature. But the old\nconceptions of the mind, like the customs of primitive commerce, become\nfoolish in a new age. From the analogies I have given, the improbability\nmay henceforward be taken for granted of finding in nature a sharp\ncleavage between all that is masculine on the one side and all that is\nfeminine on the other; or that a living being is so simple in this\nrespect that it can be put wholly on one side or the other of the line.\nMatters are not so clear.\n\nIn the controversy as to the woman question, appeal has been made to the\narbitration of anatomy, in the hope that by that aid a line could be\ndrawn between those characters of males or females that are unalterable\nbecause inborn, and those that are acquired. (It was a strange adventure\nto attempt to decide the differences between the natural endowment of\nmen and women on anatomical results; to suppose that if all other\ninvestigation failed to establish the difference, the matter could be\nsettled by a few more grains of brain-weight on the one side.) However,\nthe answer of the anatomists is clear enough, whether it refer to the\nbrain or to any other portion of the body; absolute sexual distinctions\nbetween all men on the one side and all women on the other do not exist.\nAlthough the skeleton of the hand of most men is different from that of\nmost women yet the sex cannot be determined with certainty either from\nthe skeleton or from an isolated part with its muscles, tendons, skin,\nblood and nerves. The same is true of the chest, sacrum or skull. And\nwhat are we to say of the pelvis, that part of the skeleton in which, if\nanywhere, striking sexual differences exist? It is almost universally\nbelieved that in the one case the pelvis is adapted for the act of\nparturition, in the other case is not so adapted. And yet the character\nof the pelvis cannot be taken as an absolute criterion of sex. There are\nto be found, and the wayfarer knows this as well as the anatomist, many\nwomen with narrow male-like pelves and many men with the broad pelves\nof women. Are we then to make nothing of sexual differences? That would\nimply, almost, that we could not distinguish between men and women.\n\nFrom what quarter are we to seek help in our problem? The old doctrine\nis insufficient, and yet we cannot make shift without it. If the\nreceived ideas do not suffice, it must be our task to seek out new and\nbetter guides.\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\u201cMALES\u201d AND \u201cFEMALES\u201d\n\nIn the widest treatment of most living things, a blunt separation of\nthem into males or females no longer suffices for the known facts. The\nlimitations of these conceptions have been felt more or less by many\nwriters. The first purpose of this work is to make this point clear.\n\nI agree with other authors who, in a recent treatment of the facts\nconnected with this subject, have taken as a starting-point what has\nbeen established by embryology regarding the existence in human beings,\nplants, and animals of an embryonic stage neutral as regards sex.\n\nIn the case of a human embryo of less than five weeks, for instance, the\nsex to which it would afterwards belong cannot be recognised. In the\nfifth week of f\u0153tal life processes begin which, by the end of the fifth\nmonth of pregnancy, have turned the genital rudiments, at first alike in\nthe sexes, into one sex and have determined the sex of the whole\norganism. The details of these processes need not be described more\nfully here. It can be shown that however distinctly unisexual an adult\nplant, animal or human being may be, there is always a certain\npersistence of the bisexual character, never a complete disappearance of\nthe characters of the undeveloped sex. Sexual differentiation, in fact,\nis never complete. All the peculiarities of the male sex may be present\nin the female in some form, however weakly developed; and so also the\nsexual characteristics of the woman persist in the man, although perhaps\nthey are not so completely rudimentary. The characters of the other sex\noccur in the one sex in a vestigial form. Thus, in the case of human\nbeings, in which our interest is greatest, to take an example, it will\nbe found that the most womanly woman has a growth of colourless hair,\nknown as \u201clanugo\u201d in the position of the male beard; and in the most\nmanly man there are developed under the skin of the breast masses of\nglandular tissue connected with the nipples. This condition of things\nhas been minutely investigated in the true genital organs and ducts, the\nregion called the \u201curino-genital tract,\u201d and in each sex there has been\nfound a complete but rudimentary set of parallels to the organs of the\nother sex.\n\nThese embryological conclusions can be brought into relation with\nanother set of facts. Haeckel has used the word \u201cgonochorism\u201d for the\nseparation of the sexes, and in different classes and groups of\ncreatures different degrees of gonochorism may be noted. Different kinds\nof animals and plants may be distinguished by the extent to which the\ncharacters of one sex are rudimentary in the other. The most extreme\ncase of sexual differentiation, the sharpest gonochorism, occurs in\nsexual dimorphism, that is to say, in that condition of affairs in which\n(as for instance in some water-fleas) the males and females of the same\nspecies differ as much or even more from each other as the members of\ndifferent species, or genera. There is not so sharply marked gonochorism\namongst vertebrates as in the case of crustacea or insects. Amongst the\nformer there does not exist a distinction between males and females so\ncomplete as to reach sexual dimorphism. A condition much more frequent\namongst them is the occurrence of forms intermediate in regard to sex,\nwhat is called abnormal hermaphroditism; whilst in certain fishes\nhermaphroditism is the normal condition.\n\nI must point out here that it must not be assumed that there exist only\nextreme males with scanty remnants of the female condition, extreme\nfemales with traces of the male, hermaphrodite or transitional forms,\nand wide gaps between these conditions. I am dealing specially with\nhuman beings, but what I have to say of them might be applied, with\nmore or less modification, to nearly all creatures in which sexual\nreproduction takes place.\n\nAmongst human beings the state of the case is as follows: There exist\nall sorts of intermediate conditions between male and female--sexual\ntransitional forms. In physical inquiries an \u201cideal gas\u201d is assumed,\nthat is to say, a gas, the behaviour of which follows the law of\nBoyle-Gay-Lussac exactly, although, in fact, no such gas exists, and\nlaws are deduced from this so that the deviations from the ideal laws\nmay be established in the case of actually existing gases. In the same\nfashion we may suppose the existence of an ideal man, M, and of an ideal\nwoman, W, as sexual types although these types do not actually exist.\nSuch types not only can be constructed, but must be constructed. As in\nart so in science, the real purpose is to reach the type, the Platonic\nIdea. The science of physics investigates the behaviour of bodies that\nare absolutely rigid or absolutely elastic, in the full knowledge that\nneither the one nor the other actually exists. The intermediate\nconditions actually existing between the two absolute states of matter\nserve merely as a starting-point for investigation of the \u201ctypes\u201d and in\nthe practical application of the theory are treated as mixtures and\nexhaustively analysed. So also there exist only the intermediate stages\nbetween absolute males and females, the absolute conditions never\npresenting themselves.\n\nLet it be noted clearly that I am discussing the existence not merely of\nembryonic sexual neutrality, but of a permanent bisexual condition. Nor\nam I taking into consideration merely those intermediate sexual\nconditions, those bodily or psychical hermaphrodites upon which, up to\nthe present, attention has been concentrated. In another respect my\nconception is new. Until now, in dealing with sexual intermediates, only\nhermaphrodites were considered; as if, to use a physical analogy, there\nwere in between the two extremes a single group of intermediate forms,\nand not an intervening tract equally beset with stages in different\ndegrees of transition.\n\nThe fact is that males and females are like two substances combined in\ndifferent proportions, but with either element never wholly missing. We\nfind, so to speak, never either a man or a woman, but only the male\ncondition and the female condition. Any individual, \u201cA\u201d or \u201cB,\u201d is never\nto be designated merely as a man or a woman, but by a formula showing\nthat it is a composite of male and female characters in different\nproportions, for instance, as follows:\n\n      { \u03b1 M        { \u03b2 W\n  A = {        B = {\n      { \u03b1\u00b4W        { \u03b2\u00b4M\n\nalways remembering that each of the factors \u03b1, \u03b1\u00b4, \u03b2, \u03b2\u00b4 must be greater\nthan 0 and less than unity.\n\nFurther proofs of the validity of this conception are numerous, and I\nhave already given, in the preface, a few of the most general. We may\nrecall the existence of \u201cmen\u201d with female pelves and female breasts,\nwith narrow waists, overgrowth of the hair of the head; or of \u201cwomen\u201d\nwith small hips and flat breasts, with deep bass voices and beards (the\npresence of hair on the chin is more common than is supposed, as women\nnaturally are at pains to remove it; I am not speaking of the special\ngrowth that often appears on the faces of women who have reached middle\nage). All such peculiarities, many of them coinciding in the same\nindividuals, are well known to doctors and anatomists, although their\ngeneral significance has not been understood.\n\nOne of the most striking proofs of the view that I have been unfolding\nis presented by the great range of numerical variation to be found where\nsexual characters have been measured either by the same or by different\nanthropological or anatomical workers. The figures obtained by measuring\nfemale characters do not begin where those got from males leave off, but\nthe two sets overlap. The more obvious this uncertainty in the theory of\nsexual intermediate forms may be, the more is it to be deplored in the\ninterests of true science. Anatomists and anthropologists of the\nordinary type have by no means striven against the scientific\nrepresentation of the sexual types, but as for the most part they\nregarded measurements as the best indications, they were overwhelmed\nwith the number of exceptions, and thus, so far, measurement has brought\nonly vague and indefinite results.\n\nThe course of statistical science, which marks off our industrial age\nfrom earlier times, although perhaps on account of its distant relation\nto mathematics it has been regarded as specially scientific, has in\nreality hindered the progress of knowledge. It has dealt with averages,\nnot with types. It has not been recognised that in pure, as opposed to\napplied, science it is the type that must be studied. And so those who\nare concerned with the type must turn their backs on the methods and\nconclusions of current morphology and physiology. The real measurements\nand investigations of details have yet to be made. Those that now exist\nare inapplicable to true science.\n\nKnowledge must be obtained of male and female by means of a right\nconstruction of the ideal man and the ideal woman, using the word ideal\nin the sense of typical, excluding judgment as to value. When these\ntypes have been recognised and built up we shall be in a position to\nconsider individual cases, and their analysis as mixtures in different\nproportions will be neither difficult not fruitless.\n\nI shall now give a summary of the contents of this chapter. Living\nbeings cannot be described bluntly as of one sex or the other. The real\nworld from the point of view of sex may be regarded as swaying between\ntwo points, no actual individual being at either point, but somewhere\nbetween the two. The task of science is to define the position of any\nindividual between these two points. The absolute conditions at the two\nextremes are not metaphysical abstractions above or outside the world of\nexperience, but their construction is necessary as a philosophical and\npractical mode of describing the actual world.\n\nA presentiment of this bisexuality of life (derived from the actual\nabsence of complete sexual differentiation) is very old. Traces of it\nmay be found in Chinese myths, but it became active in Greek thought. We\nmay recall the mythical personification of bisexuality in the\nHermaphroditos, the narrative of Aristophanes in the Platonic dialogue,\nor in later times the suggestion of a Gnostic sect (Theophites) that\nprimitive man was a \u201cman-woman.\u201d\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nMALE AND FEMALE PLASMAS\n\nThe first thing expected of a book like this, the avowed object of which\nis a complete revision of facts hitherto accepted, is that it should\nexpound a new and satisfactory account of the anatomical and\nphysiological characters of the sexual types. Quite apart from the\nabstract question as to whether the complete survey of a subject so\nenormous is not beyond the powers of one individual, I must at once\ndisclaim any intention of making the attempt. I do not pretend to have\nmade sufficient independent investigations in a field so wide, nor do I\nthink such a review necessary for the purpose of this book. Nor is it\nnecessary to give a compilation of the results set out by other authors,\nfor Havelock Ellis has already done this very well. Were I to attempt to\nreach the sexual types by means of the probable inferences drawn from\nhis collected results, my work would be a mere hypothesis and science\nmight have been spared a new book. The arguments in this chapter,\ntherefore, will be of a rather formal and general nature; they will\nrelate to biological principles, but to a certain extent will lay stress\non the need for a closer investigation of certain definite points, work\nwhich must be left to the future, but which may be rendered more easy by\nmy indications.\n\nThose who know little of Biology may scan this section hastily, and yet\nrun little risk of failing to understand what follows.\n\nThe doctrine of the existence of different degrees of masculinity and\nfemininity may be treated, in the first place, on purely anatomical\nlines. Not only the anatomical form, but the anatomical position of\nmale and female characters must be discussed. The examples already given\nof sexual differences in other parts of the body showed that sexuality\nis not limited to the genital organs and glands. But where are the\nlimits to be placed? Do they not reach beyond the primary and secondary\nsexual characters? In other words, where does sex display itself, and\nwhere is it without influence?\n\nMany points came to light in the last decade, which bring fresh support\nto a theory first put forward in 1840, but which at the time found\nlittle support since it appeared to be in direct opposition to facts\nheld as established alike by the author of the theory and by his\nopponents. The theory in question, first suggested by the zoologist J.\nJ. S. Steenstrup, of Copenhagen, but since supported by many others, is\nthat sexual characters are present in every part of the body.\n\nEllis has collected the results of investigations on almost every tissue\nof the body, which serve to show the universal presence of sexual\ndifferences. It is plain that there is a striking difference in the\ncoloration of the typical male and female. This fact establishes the\nexistence of sexual differences in the skin (cutis) and in the\nblood-vessels, and also in the bulk of the colouring-matter in the blood\nand in the number of red corpuscles to the cubic centimetre of the blood\nfluid. Bischoff and Rudinger have proved the existence of sexual\ndifferences in brain weight, and more recently Justus and Alice Gaule\nhave obtained a similar result with regard to such vegetative organs as\nthe liver, lungs and spleen. In fact, all parts of a woman, although in\ndifferent degrees in different zones, have a sexual stimulus for the\nmale organism, and similarly all parts of the male have their effect on\nthe female.\n\nThe direct logical inference may be drawn, and is supported by abundant\nfacts, that every cell in the body is sexually characteristic and has\nits definite sexual significance. I may now add to the principle already\nlaid down in this book, of the universal presence of sexually\nintermediate conditions, that these conditions may present different\ndegrees of development. Such a conception of the existence of different\ndegrees of development in sexuality makes it easy to understand cases of\nfalse hermaphroditism or even of the true hermaphroditism, which, since\nthe time of Steenstrup, has been established for so many plants and\nanimals, although not certainly in the case of man. Steenstrup wrote:\n\u201cIf the sex of an animal has its seat only in the genital organs, then\none might think it possible for an animal really to be bisexual, if it\nhad at the same time two sets of sexual organs. But sex is not limited\nto one region, it manifests itself not merely by the presence of certain\norgans; it pervades the whole being and shows itself in every point. In\na male body, everything down to the smallest part is male, however much\nit may resemble the corresponding female part, and so also in the female\nthe smallest part is female. The presence of male and female sexual\norgans in the same body would make the body bisexual only if both sexes\nruled the whole body and made themselves manifest in every point, and\nsuch a condition, as the manifestations of the sexes are opposing\nforces, would result simply in the negation of sex in the body in\nquestion.\u201d If, however, the principle of the existence of innumerable\nsexually transitional conditions be extended to all the cells of the\nbody, and empirical knowledge supports such a view, Steenstrup\u2019s\ndifficulty is resolved, and hermaphroditism no longer appears to be\nunnatural. There may be conceived for every cell all conditions, from\ncomplete masculinity through all stages of diminishing masculinity to\nits complete absence and the consequent presence of complete femininity.\nWhether we are to think of these gradations in the scale of sexual\ndifferentiation as depending on two real substances united in different\nproportions, or as a single kind of protoplasm modified in different\nways (as, for instance, by different spatial dispositions of its\nmolecules), it were wiser not to guess. The first conception is\ndifficult to apply physiologically; it is extremely difficult to imagine\nthat two sets of conditions should be able to produce the essential\nphysiological similarities of two bodies, one with a male and the other\na female diathesis. The second view recalls too vividly certain\nunfortunate speculations on heredity. Perhaps both views are equally far\nfrom the truth. At present empirical knowledge does not enable us to say\nwherein the masculinity or the femininity of a cell really lies, or to\ndefine the histological, molecular or chemical differences which\ndistinguish every cell of a male from every cell of a female. Without\nanticipating any discovery of the future (it is plain already, however,\nthat the specific phenomena of living matter are not going to be\nreferred to chemistry and physics), it may be taken for granted that\nindividual cells possess sexuality in different degrees quite apart from\nthe sexuality of the whole body. Womanish men usually have the skin\nsofter, and in them the cells of the male organs have a lessened power\nof division upon which depends directly the poorer development of the\nmale macroscopic characters.\n\nThe distribution of sexual characters affords an important proof of the\nappearance of sexuality in different degrees. Such characters (at least\nin the animal kingdom) may be arranged according to the strength of\ntheir exciting influence on the opposite sex. To avoid confusion, I\nshall make use of John Hunter\u2019s terms for classifying sexual characters.\nThe primordial sexual characters are the male and female genital glands\n(testes and epididymis, ovaries and epoophoron); the primary sexual\ncharacters are the internal appendages of the sexual glands (vasa\ndeferentia vesicul\u00e6 seminales, oviducts and uterus), which may have\nsexual characters quite distinct from those of the glands and the\nexternal sexual organs, according to which alone the sex of human beings\nis reckoned at birth (sometimes quite erroneously, as I shall show) and\ntheir consequent fate in life decided. After the primary, come all those\nsexual characters not directly necessary to reproduction. Such secondary\nsexual characters are best defined as those which begin to appear at\npuberty, and which cannot be developed except under the influence on the\nsystem of the internal secretions of the genital glands. Examples of\nthese are the beards in men, the luxuriant growth of hair in women, the\ndevelopment of the mammary glands, the character of the voice. As a\nconvenient mode of treatment, and for practical rather than theoretical\nreasons, certain inherited characters, such as the development of\nmuscular strength or of mental obstinacy may be reckoned as tertiary\nsexual characters. Under the designation \u201cquaternary sexual characters\u201d\nmay be placed such accessories as relative social position, difference\nin habit, mode of livelihood, the smoking and drinking habit in man, and\nthe domestic duties of women. All these characters possess a potent and\ndirect sexual influence, and in my opinion often may be reckoned with\nthe tertiary characters or even with the secondary. This classification\nof sexual characters must not be taken as implying a definite chain of\nsequence, nor must it be assumed that the mental sexual characters\neither determine the bodily characters or are determined by them in some\ncausal nexus. The classification relates only to the strength of the\nexciting influence on the other sex, to the order in time in which this\ninfluence is exerted, and to the degree of certainty with which the\nextent of the influence may be predicted.\n\nStudy of secondary sexual characters is bound up with consideration of\nthe effect of internal secretions of the genital glands on general\nmetabolism. The relation of this influence or its absence (as in the\ncase of artificially castrated animals) has been traced out in the\ndegree of development of the secondary characters. The internal\nsecretions, however, undoubtedly have an influence on all the cells of\nthe body. This is clearly shown by the changes which occur at puberty in\nall parts of the body, and not only in the seats of the secondary sexual\ncharacters. As a matter of fact, the internal secretions of all the\nglands must be regarded as affecting all the tissues.\n\nThe internal secretions of the genital glands must be regarded as\ncompleting the sexuality of the individual. Every cell must be\nconsidered as possessing an original sexuality, to which the influence\nof the internal secretion in sufficient quantity is the final\ndetermining condition under the influence of which the cell acquires its\nfinal determinate character as male or female.\n\nThe genital glands are the organs in which the sex of the individual is\nmost obvious, and in the component cells of which it is most\nconspicuously visible. At the same time it must be noted that the\ndistinguishing characters of the species, race and family to which an\norganism belongs are also best marked in the genital cells. Just as\nSteenstrup, on the one hand, was right in teaching that sex extends all\nover the body and is not confined to the genital organs, so, on the\nother hand, Naegeli, de Vries, Oskar Hertwig and others have propounded\nthe important theory, and supported it by weighty arguments, that every\ncell in a multi-cellular organism possesses a combination of the\ncharacters of its species and race, but that these characters are, as it\nwere, specially condensed in the sexual cells. Probably this view of the\ncase will come to be accepted by all investigators, since every living\nbeing owes its origin to the cleavage and multiplication of a single\ncell.\n\nMany phenomena, amongst which may be noticed specially experiments on\nthe regeneration of lost parts and investigations into the chemical\ndifferences between the corresponding tissues of nearly allied animals,\nhave led the investigators to whom I have just referred to conceive the\nexistence of an \u201cIdioplasm,\u201d which is the bearer of the specific\ncharacters, and which exists in all the cells of a multi-cellular\nanimal, quite apart from the purposes of reproduction. In a similar\nfashion I have been led to the conception of an \u201cArrhenoplasm\u201d (male\nplasm) and a \u201cThelyplasm\u201d (female plasm) as the two modes in which the\nidioplasm of every bisexual organism may appear, and which are to be\nconsidered, because of reasons which I shall explain, as ideal\nconditions between which the actual conditions always lie. Actually\nexisting protoplasm is to be thought of as moving from an ideal\narrhenoplasm through a real or imaginary indifferent condition (true\nhermaphroditism) towards a protoplasm that approaches, but never\nactually reaches, an ideal thelyplasm. This conception brings to a point\nwhat I have been trying to say. I apologise for the new terms, but they\nare more than devices to call attention to a new idea.\n\nThe proof that every single organ, and further, that every single cell\npossesses a sexuality lying somewhere between arrhenoplasm and\nthelyplasm, and further, that every cell received an original sexual\nendowment definite in kind and degree, is to be found in the fact that\neven in the same organism the different cells do not always possess\ntheir sexuality identical in kind and degree. In fact each cell of a\nbody neither contains the same proportion of M and W nor is at the same\napproximation to arrhenoplasm or thelyplasm; similar cells of the same\nbody may indeed lie on different sides of the sexually neutral point.\nIf, instead of writing \u201cmasculinity\u201d and \u201cfemininity\u201d at length, we\nchoose signs to express these, and without any malicious intention\nchoose the positive sign (+) for M and the negative (-) for W, then our\nproposition may be expressed as follows: The sexuality of the different\ncells of the same organism differs not only in absolute quantity but is\nto be expressed by a different sign. There are many men with a poor\ngrowth of beard and a weak muscular development who are otherwise\ntypically males; and so also many women with badly developed breasts are\notherwise typically womanly. There are womanish men with strong beards\nand masculine women with abnormally short hair who none the less possess\nwell-developed breasts and broad pelves. I know several men who have the\nupper part of the thigh of a female with a normally male under part, and\nsome with the right hip of a male and the left of a female. In most\ncases these local variations of the sexual character affect both sides\nof the body, although of course it is only in ideal bodies that there is\ncomplete symmetry about the middle line. The degree to which sexuality\ndisplays itself, however, as, for instance, in the growth of hair, is\nvery often unsymmetrical. This want of uniformity (and the sexual\nmanifestations never show complete uniformity) can hardly depend on\ndifferences of the internal secretion; for the blood goes to all the\norgans, having in it the same amount of the internal secretion; although\ndifferent organs may receive different quantities of blood, in all\nnormal cases its quality and quantity being proportioned to the needs of\nthe part.\n\nWere we not to assume as the cause of these variations the presence of a\nsexual determinant generally different in every cell but stable from its\nearliest embryonic development, then it would be simple to describe the\nsexuality of any individual by estimating how far its sexual glands\nconformed to the normal type of its sex, and the facts would be much\nsimpler than they really are. Sexuality, however, cannot be regarded as\noccurring in an imaginary normal quantity distributed equally all over\nan individual so that the sexual character of any cell would be a\nmeasure of the sexual characters of any other cells. Whilst, as an\nexception, there may occur wide differences in the sexual characters of\ndifferent cells or organs of the same body, still as a rule there is the\nsame specific sexuality for all the cells. In fact it may be taken as\ncertain that an approximation to a complete uniformity of sexual\ncharacter over the whole body is much more common than the tendency to\nany considerable divergences amongst the different organs or still more\namongst the different cells. How far these possible variations may go\ncan be determined only by the investigation of individual cases.\n\nThere is a popular view, dating back to Aristotle and supported by many\ndoctors and zoologists, that the castration of an animal is followed by\nthe sudden appearance of the characters of the other sex; if the gelding\nof a male were to bring about the appearance of female characteristics\nthen doubt would be thrown on the existence in every cell of a\nprimordial sexuality independent of the genital glands. The most recent\nexperimental results of Sellheim and Foges, however, have shown that the\ntype of a gelded male is distinct from the female type, that gelding\ndoes not induce the feminine character. It is better to avoid too\nfar-reaching and radical conclusions on this matter; it may be that a\nsecond latent gland of the other sex may awake into activity and\nsexually dominate the deteriorating organism after the removal or\natrophy of the normal gland. There are many cases (too readily\ninterpreted as instances of complete assumption of the male character)\nin which after the involution of the female sexual glands at the\nclimacteric the secondary sexual characters of the male are acquired.\nInstances of this are the beard of the human grandam, the occasional\nappearance of short antlers in old does, or of a cock\u2019s plumage in an\nold hen. But such changes are practically never seen except in\nassociation with senile decay or with operative interference.\n\nIn the case of certain crustacean parasites of fish, however (the genera\n_Cymothoa_, _Anilocra_ and _Nerocila_ of the family _Cymothoid\u00e6_), the\nchanges I have just mentioned are part of the normal life history. These\ncreatures are hermaphrodites of a peculiar kind; the male and female\norgans co-exist in them but are not functional at the same period. A\nsort of protandry exists; each individual exercises first the functions\nof a male and afterwards those of the female. During the time of their\nactivity as males they possess ordinary male reproductive organs which\nare cast off when the female genital ducts and brood organs develop.\nThat similar conditions may exist in man has been shown by those cases\nof \u201ceviratio\u201d and \u201ceffeminatio\u201d which the sexual pathology of the old\nage of men has brought to light. So also we cannot deny altogether the\nactual occurrence of a certain degree of effeminacy when the crucial\noperation of extirpation of the human testes has been performed.[1] On\nthe other hand, the fact that the relation is not universal or\ninevitable, that the castration of an individual does not certainly\nresult in the appearance of the characters of the other sex, may be\ntaken as a proof that it is necessary to assume the original presence\nthroughout the body of cells determined by arrhenoplasm or thelyplasm.\n\n  [1] So also in the opposite case; it cannot be wholly denied that\n  ovariotomy is followed by the appearance of masculine characters.\n\nThe possession by every cell of primitive sexuality on which the\nsecretion of the sexual glands has little effect might be shown further\nby consideration of the effects of grafting male genital glands on\nfemale organisms. For such an experiment to be accurate it would be\nnecessary that the animal from which the testis was to be transplanted\nshould be as near akin as possible to the female on which the testis was\nto be grafted, as, for instance, in the case of a brother and sister;\nthe idioplasm of the two should be as alike as possible. In this\nexperiment much would depend on limiting the conditions of the\nexperiment as much as possible so that the results would not be confused\nby conflicting factors. Experiments made in Vienna have shown that when\nan exchange of the ovaries has been made between unrelated female\nanimals (chosen at random) the atrophy of the ovaries follows, but that\nthere is no failure of the secondary sexual characters (_e.g._,\ndegeneration of the mamm\u00e6). Moreover, when the genital glands of an\nanimal are removed from their natural position and grafted in a new\nposition in the same animal (so that it still retains its own tissues)\nthe full development of the secondary sexual characters goes on\nprecisely as if there had been no interference, at least in cases where\nthe operation is successful. The failure of the transplantation of\novaries from one animal to another may be due to the absence of family\nrelationship between the tissues; the influence of the idioplasm\nprobably is of primary importance.\n\nThese experiments closely resemble those made in the transfusion of\nalien blood. It is a practical rule with surgeons that when a dangerous\nloss of blood has to be made good, the blood required for transfusion\nmust be obtained from an individual not only of the same species and\nfamily, but also of the same sex as that of the patient. The parallel\nbetween transfusion and transplantation is at once evident. If I am\ncorrect in my views, when surgeons seek to transfuse blood, instead of\nbeing content with injections of normal salt solution they must take\nthe blood not merely from one of the same species, family and sex, but\nof a similar degree of masculinity or femininity.\n\nExperiments on transfusion not only lend support to my belief in the\nexistence of sex characters in the blood corpuscles, but they furnish\nadditional explanations of the failure of experiments in grafting\novaries or testis on individuals of the opposite sex. The internal\nsecretions of the genital glands are operative only in their appropriate\nenvironment of arrhenoplasm or thelyplasm.\n\nIn this connection, I may say a word as to the curative value of\norganotherapy. Although, as I have shown to be the case, the\ntransplantation of freshly extirpated genital glands into subjects of\nthe opposite sex has no effect, it does not follow that the injection of\nthe ovarian secretion into the blood of a male might not have a most\ninjurious effect. On the other hand, the principle of organotherapy has\nbeen opposed on the ground that organic preparations procured from\nnon-allied species could not possibly be expected to yield good results.\nIt is more than likely that the medical exponents of organotherapy have\nlost many valuable discoveries in healing because of their neglect of\nthe biological theory of idioplasm.\n\nThe theory of an idioplasm, the presence of which gives the specific\nrace characters to those tissues and cells which have lost the\nreproductive faculty, is by no means generally accepted. But at the\nleast all must admit that the race characters are collected in the\ngenital glands, and that if experiments with extracts from these are to\nprovide more than a good tonic, the nearest possible relationship\nbetween the animals experimented upon must be observed. Parallel\nexperiments might be made as to the effect of transplantation of the\ngenital glands and injections of their extracts on two castrated cocks\nof the same strain. For instance, the effects of the transplantation of\nthe testes of one of them into any other part of its own body or\nperitoneal cavity or into any similar part of the other cock might be\ncompared with the effects of intravenous injection of testis extract of\nthe one on the other. Such parallel investigations would also increase\nour knowledge as to the most suitable media and quantities of the\nextracts. It is also to be desired, from the theoretical point of view,\nthat knowledge may be gained as to whether the internal secretion of the\ngenital glands enters into chemical union with the protoplasm of the\ncells or whether it acts as a physiological stimulus independent of the\nquantity supplied. So far we know nothing that would enable us to come\nto a definite opinion on this point.\n\nThe limited influence of the internal secretions of the sexual glands in\nforming the sexual characters must be realised to warrant the theory of\na primary, generally slight, difference in each cell, but still\ndeterminate sexual influence.[2] If the existence of distinct\ngraduations of these primary characteristics in all the cells and\ntissues can be recognised, there follow many important and far-reaching\nconclusions. The individual egg-cells and spermatozoa may be found to\npossess different degrees of maleness and femaleness, not only in\ndifferent individuals, but in the ovaries and testes of the same\nindividual, especially at different times; for instance, the spermatozoa\ndiffer in size and activity. We are still quite ignorant on these\nmatters, as no one has worked on the requisite lines.\n\n  [2] The existence of sexual distinctions before puberty shows that the\n  power of the internal secretions of the sexual glands does not account\n  for everything.\n\nIt is extremely interesting to recall in this connection that many times\ndifferent investigators have observed in the testes of amphibia not only\nthe different stages in the development of spermatozoa, but mature eggs.\nThis interpretation of the observations was at first disputed, and it\nwas suggested that the presence of unusually large cells in the tubes of\nthe testes had given rise to the error, but the matter has now been\nfully confirmed. Moreover, in these Amphibia, sexually intermediate\nconditions are very common, and this should lead us to be careful in\nmaking statements as to the uniform presence of arrhenoplasm or\nthelyplasm in a body. The methods of assigning sex to a new-born infant\nseem most unsatisfactory in the light of these facts. If the child is\nobserved to possess a male organ, even although there may be complete\nepi- or hypo-spadism, or a double failure of descent of the testes, it\nis at once described as a boy and is henceforth treated as one, although\nin other parts of the body, for instance in the brain, the sexual\ndeterminant may be much nearer thelyplasm than arrhenoplasm. The sooner\na more exact method of sex discrimination is insisted upon the better.\n\nAs a result of these long inductions and deductions we may rest assured\nthat all the cells possess a definite primary sexual determinant which\nmust not be assumed to be alike or nearly alike throughout the same\nbody. Every cell, every cell-complex, and every organ have their\ndistinctive indices on the scale between thelyplasm and arrhenoplasm.\nFor the exact definition of the sex, an estimation of the indices over\nthe whole body would be necessary. I should be content to bear the blame\nof all the theoretical and practical errors in this book did I believe\nmyself to have made the working out of a single case possible.\n\nDifferences in the primary sexual determinants, together with the\nvarying internal secretions (which differ in quantity and quality in\ndifferent individuals) produce the phenomena of sexually intermediate\nforms. Arrhenoplasm and thelyplasm, in their countless modifications,\nare the microscopic agencies which, in co-operation with the internal\nsecretions, give rise to the macroscopic differences cited in the last\nchapter.\n\nIf the correctness of the conclusions so far stated may be assumed, the\nnecessity is at once evident for a whole series of anatomical,\nphysiological, histological and histo-chemical investigations into those\ndifferences between male and female types, in the structure and function\nof the individual organs by which the dowers of arrhenoplasm and\nthelyplasm express themselves in the tissues. The knowledge we possess\nat the present time on these matters comes from the study of averages,\nbut averages fail to satisfy the modern statistician, and their\nscientific value is very small. Investigations into the sex-differences\nin the weight of the brain, for instance, have so far proved very\nlittle, probably because no care was taken to choose typical conditions,\nthe assignment of sex being dependent on baptismal certificates or on\nsuperficial glances at the outward appearance. As if every \u201cJohn\u201d or\n\u201cMary\u201d were representative of their sexes because they had been dubbed\n\u201cmale\u201d and \u201cfemale!\u201d It would have been well, even if exact\nphysiological data were thought unnecessary, at least to make certain as\nto a few facts as to the general condition of the body, which might\nserve as guides to the male or female condition, such as, for instance,\nthe distance between the great trochanters, the iliac spines, and so\nforth, for a sexual harmony in the different parts of the body is\ncertainly more common than great sexual divergence.\n\nThis source of error, the careless acceptance of sexually intermediate\nforms as representative subjects for measurement, has maimed other\ninvestigations and seriously retarded the attainment of genuine and\nuseful results. Those, for instance, who wish to speculate about the\ncause of the superfluity of male births have to reckon with this source\nof error. In a special way this carelessness will revenge itself on\nthose who are investigating the ultimate causes that determine sex.\nUntil the exact degree of maleness or femaleness of all the living\nindividuals of the group on which he is working can be determined, the\ninvestigator will have reason to distrust both his methods and his\nhypotheses. If he classify sexually intermediate forms, for instance,\naccording to their external appearance, as has been done hitherto, he\nwill come across cases which fuller investigation would show to be on\nthe wrong side of his results, whilst other instances, apparently on the\nwrong side, would right themselves. Without the conception of an ideal\nmale and an ideal female, he lacks a standard according to which to\nestimate his real cases, and he gropes forward to a superficial and\ndoubtful conclusion. Maupas, for instance, who made experiments on the\ndetermination of sex in _Hydatina senta_, a Rotifer, found that there\nwas always an experimental error of from three to five per cent. At low\ntemperatures the production of females was expected, but always about\nthe above proportion of males appeared; so also at the higher\ntemperatures a similar proportion of females appeared. It is probable\nthat this error was due to sexually intermediate stages, arrhenoplasmic\nfemales at the high temperature, thelyplasmic males at the low\ntemperature. Where the problem is more complicated, as in the case of\ncattle, to say nothing of human beings, the process of investigation\nwill yield still less harmonious results, and the correction of the\ninterpretation which will have to be made by allowing for the\ndisturbance due to the existence of sexually intermediate forms will be\nmuch more difficult.\n\nThe study of comparative pathology of the sexual types is as necessary\nas their morphology, physiology and development. In this region of\ninquiry as elsewhere, statistics would yield certain results. Diseases\nmanifestly much more abundant in one sex might be described as peculiar\nto or idiopathic of thelyplasm or arrhenoplasm. Myx\u0153dema, for instance,\nis idiopathic of the female, hydrocele of the male.\n\nBut no statistics, however numerous and accurate, can be regarded as\navoiding a source of theoretical error until it has been shown from the\nnature of any particular affection dealt with that it is in\nindissoluble, functional relation with maleness or femaleness. The\ntheory of such associated diseases must supply a reason why they occur\nalmost exclusively in the one sex, that is to say, in the phrase of this\ntreatise, why they are thelyplasmic or arrhenoplasmic.\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE LAWS OF SEXUAL ATTRACTION\n\n  CARMEN:\n\n  \u201cL\u2019amour est un oiseau rebelle,\n  Que nul ne peut apprivoiser:\n  Et c\u2019est bien en vain qu\u2019on l\u2019appelle\n  S\u2019il lui convient de refuser.\n  Rien n\u2019y fait; menace ou pri\u00e8re:\n  L\u2019un parle, l\u2019autre se tait;\n  Et c\u2019est l\u2019autre que je pr\u00e9f\u00e8re;\n  Il n\u2019a rien dit, mais il me pla\u00eet.\n\n         *       *       *       *       *\n\n  L\u2019amour est enfant de Boh\u00eame\n  Il n\u2019a jamais connu de loi.\u201d\n\nIt has been recognised from time immemorial that, in all forms of\nsexually differentiated life, there exists an attraction between males\nand females, between the male and the female, the object of which is\nprocreation. But as the male and the female are merely abstract\nconceptions which never appear in the real world, we cannot speak of\nsexual attraction as a simple attempt of the masculine and the feminine\nto come together. The theory which I am developing must take into\naccount all the facts of sexual relations if it is to be complete;\nindeed, if it is to be accepted instead of the older views, it must give\na better interpretation of all these sexual phenomena. My recognition of\nthe fact that M and F (maleness and femaleness) are distributed in the\nliving world in every possible proportion has led me to the discovery of\nan unknown natural law, of a law not yet suspected by any philosopher, a\nlaw of sexual attraction. As observations on human beings first led me\nto my results, I shall begin with this side of the subject.\n\nEvery one possesses a definite, individual taste of his own with regard\nto the other sex. If we compare the portrait of the women which some\nfamous man has been known to love, we shall nearly always find that they\nare all closely alike, the similarity being most obvious in the contour\n(more precisely in the \u201cfigure\u201d) or in the face, but on closer\nexamination being found to extend to the minutest details, _ad unguem_,\nto the finger-tips. It is precisely the same with every one else. So,\nalso, every girl who strongly attracts a man recalls to him the other\ngirls he has loved before. We see another side of the same phenomenon\nwhen we recall how often we have said of some acquaintance or another,\n\u201cI can\u2019t imagine how that type of woman pleases him.\u201d Darwin, in the\n\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d collected many instances of the existence of this\nindividuality of the sexual taste amongst animals, and I shall be able\nto show that there are analogous phenomena even amongst plants.\n\nSexual attraction is nearly always, as in the case of gravitation,\nreciprocal. Where there appear to be exceptions to this rule, there is\nnearly always evidence of the presence of special influences which have\nbeen capable of preventing the direct action of the special taste, which\nis almost always reciprocal, or which have left an unsatisfied craving,\nif the direct taste were not allowed its play.\n\nThe common saying, \u201cWaiting for Mr. Right,\u201d or statements such as that\n\u201cSo-and-so are quite unsuitable for one another,\u201d show the existence of\nan obscure presentiment of the fact that every man or woman possesses\ncertain individual peculiarities which qualify or disqualify him or her\nfor marriage with any particular member of the opposite sex; and that\nthis man cannot be substituted for that, or this woman for the other\nwithout creating a disharmony.\n\nIt is a common personal experience that certain individuals of the\nopposite sex are distasteful to us, that others leave us cold; whilst\nothers again may stimulate us until, at last, some one appears who\nseems so desirable that everything in the world is worthless and empty\ncompared with union with such a one. What are the qualifications of that\nperson? What are his or her peculiarities? If it really be the case--and\nI think it is--that every male type has its female counterpart with\nregard to sexual affinity, it looks as if there were some definite law.\nWhat is this law? How does it act? \u201cLike poles repel, unlike attract,\u201d\nwas what I was told when, already armed with my own answer, I resolutely\nimportuned different kinds of men for a statement, and submitted\ninstances to their power of generalisation. The formula, no doubt, is\ntrue in a limited sense and for a certain number of cases. But it is at\nonce too general and too vague; it would be applied differently by\ndifferent persons, and it is incapable of being stated in mathematical\nterms.\n\nThis book does not claim to state all the laws of sexual affinity, for\nthere are many; nor does it pretend to be able to tell every one exactly\nwhich individual of the opposite sex will best suit his taste, for that\nwould imply a complete knowledge of all the laws in question. In this\nchapter only one of these laws will be considered--the law which stands\nin organic relation to the rest of the book. I am working at a number of\nother laws, but the following is that to which I have given most\ninvestigation, and which is most elaborated. In criticising this work,\nallowance must be made for the incomplete nature of the material\nconsequent on the novelty and difficulty of the subject.\n\nFortunately it is not necessary for me to cite at length either the\nfacts from which I originally derived this law of sexual affinity or to\nset out in detail the evidence I obtained from personal statements. I\nasked each of those who helped me, to make out his own case first, and\nthen to carry out observations in his circle of acquaintances. I have\npaid special attention to those cases which have been noticed and\nremembered, in which the taste of a friend has not been understood, or\nappeared not to be present, or was different from that of the observer.\nThe minute degree of knowledge of the external form of the human body\nwhich is necessary for the investigation is possessed by every one.\n\nI have come to the law which I shall now formulate by a method the\nvalidity of which I shall now have to prove.\n\nThe law runs as follows: \u201cFor true sexual union it is necessary that\nthere come together a complete male (M) and a complete female (F), even\nalthough in different cases the M and F are distributed between the two\nindividuals in different proportions.\u201d\n\nThe law may be expressed otherwise as follows:\n\nIf we take \u03bc, any individual regarded in the ordinary way as a male, and\ndenote his real sexual constitution as M\u03bc, so many parts really male,\nplus W\u03bc, so many parts really female; if we also take \u03c9, any individual\nregarded in the ordinary way as a female, and denote _her_ real sexual\nconstitution as W\u03c9, so many parts really female, plus M\u03c9, so many parts\nreally male; then, if there be complete sexual affinity, the greatest\npossible sexual attraction between the two individuals, \u03bc and \u03c9,\n\n  (1) M\u03bc (the truly male part in the \u201cmale\u201d) + M\u03c9 (the truly male part\n  in the \u201cfemale\u201d) will equal a constant quantity, M, the ideal male;\n  and\n\n  (2) W\u03bc + W\u03c9 (the ideal female parts in respectively the \u201cmale\u201d and the\n  \u201cfemale\u201d) will equal a second constant quantity, W, the ideal female.\n\nThis statement must not be misunderstood. Both formulas refer to one\ncase, to a single sexual relation, the second following directly from\nthe first and adding nothing to it, as I set out from the point of view\nof an individual possessing just as much femaleness as he lacks of\nmaleness. Were he completely male, his requisite complement would be a\ncomplete female, and _vice vers\u00e2_. If, however, he is composed of a\ndefinite inheritance of maleness, and also an inheritance of femaleness\n(which must not be neglected), then, to complete the individual, his\nmaleness must be completed to make a unit; but so also must his\nfemaleness be completed.\n\nIf, for instance, an individual be composed thus:\n\n    { \u00b3\u2044\u2084 M\n  \u03bc { and\n    { \u00b9\u2044\u2084 W,\n\nthen the best sexual complement of that individual will be another\ncompound as follows:\n\n    { \u00b9\u2044\u2084 M\n  \u03c9 { and\n    { \u00b3\u2044\u2084 W.\n\nIt can be seen at once that this view is wider in its reach than the\ncommon statement of the case. That male and female, as sexual types,\nattract each other is only one instance of my general law, an instance\nin which an imaginary individual,\n\n    { 1 M\n  \u03c7 {\n    { 0 W,\n\nfinds its complement in an equally imaginary individual,\n\n    { 0 M\n  \u03b3 {\n    { 1 W.\n\nThere can be no hesitation in admitting the existence of definite,\nindividual sexual preferences, and such an admission carries with it\napproval of the necessity of investigating the laws of the preference,\nand its relation to the rest of the bodily and mental characters of an\nindividual. The law, as I have stated it, can encounter no initial sense\nof impossibility, and is contrary neither to scientific nor common\nexperience. But it is not self-evident. It might be that the law, which\ncannot yet be regarded as fully worked out, might run as follows:\n\n  M\u03bc - M\u03c9 = a constant;\n\nthat is to say, it may be the difference between the degrees of\nmasculinity and not the sum of the degrees of masculinity that is a\nconstant quality, so that the most masculine man would stand just as far\nremoved from his complement (who in this case would lie nearly midway\nbetween masculinity and femininity) as the most feminine man would be\nremoved from his complement who would be near the extreme of femininity.\nAlthough, as I have said, this is conceivable, it is not borne out by\nexperience. Recognising that we have to do here with an empirical law,\nand trying to observe a wise scientific restraint, we shall do well to\navoid speaking as if there were any \u201cforce\u201d pulling the two individuals\ntogether as if they were puppets; the law is no more than the statement\nthat an identical relation can be made out in each case of maximum\nsexual attraction. We are dealing, in fact, with what Ostwald termed an\n\u201cinvariant\u201d and Avenarius a \u201cmultiponible\u201d; and this is the constant sum\nformed by the total masculinity and the total femininity in all cases\nwhere a pair of living beings come together with the maximum sexual\nattraction.\n\nIn this matter we may neglect altogether the so-called \u00e6sthetic factor,\nthe stimulus of beauty. For does it not frequently happen that one man\nis completely captivated by a particular woman and raves about her\nbeauty, whilst another, who is not the sexual complement of the woman in\nquestion, cannot imagine what his friend sees in her to admire. Without\ndiscussing the laws of \u00e6sthetics or attempting to gather together\nexamples of relative values, it may readily be admitted that a man may\nconsider a woman beautiful who, from the \u00e6sthetic standpoint, is not\nmerely indifferent but actually ugly, that in fact pure \u00e6sthetics deal\nnot with absolute beauty, but merely with conceptions of beauty from\nwhich the sexual factor has been eliminated.\n\nI have myself worked out the law in, at the lowest, many hundred cases,\nand I have found that the exceptions were only apparent. Almost every\ncouple one meets in the street furnishes a new proof. The exceptions\nwere specially instructive, as they not only suggested but led to the\ninvestigation of other laws of sexuality. I myself made special\ninvestigations in the following way. I obtained a set of photographs of\n\u00e6sthetically beautiful women of blameless character, each of which was\na good example of some definite proportion of femininity, and I asked a\nnumber of my friends to inspect these and select the most beautiful. The\nselection made was invariably that which I had predicted. With other\nmale friends, who knew on what I was engaged, I set about in another\nfashion. They provided me with photographs from amongst which I was to\nchoose the one I should expect them to think most beautiful. Here, too,\nI was uniformly successful. With others, I was able to describe most\naccurately their ideal of the opposite sex, independently of any\nsuggestions unconsciously given by them, often in minuter detail than\nthey had realised. Sometimes, too, I was able to point out to them, for\nthe first time, the qualities that repelled them in individuals of the\nopposite sex, although for the most part men realise more readily the\ncharacters that repel them than the characters that attract them.\n\nI believe that with a little practice any one could readily acquire and\nexercise this art on any circle of friends. A knowledge of other laws of\nsexual affinity would be of great importance. A number of special\nconstants might be taken as tests of the existence of complementary\nindividuals. For instance, the law might be caricatured so as to require\nthat the sum of the length of the hairs of any two perfect lovers should\nalways be the same. But, as I have already shown in chapter ii., this\nresult is not to be expected, because all the organs of the same body do\nnot necessarily possess the same degree of maleness or femaleness. Such\nheuristic rules would soon multiply and bring the whole subject into\nridicule, and I shall therefore abstain from further suggestions of the\nkind.\n\nI do not deny that my exposition of the law is somewhat dogmatical and\nlacks confirmation by exact detail. But I am not so anxious to claim\nfinished results as to incite others to the study, the more so as the\nmeans for scientific investigations are lacking in my own case. But even\nif much remains theoretical, I hope that I shall have firmly riveted the\nchief beams in my edifice of theory by showing how it explains much\nthat hitherto has found no explanation, and so shall have, in a fashion,\nproved it retrospectively by showing how much it would explain if it\nwere true.\n\nA most remarkable confirmation of my law may be found in the vegetable\nkingdom, in a group of facts hitherto regarded as isolated and to be so\nstrange as to have no parallel. Every botanist must have guessed already\nthat I have in mind the phenomena of heterostylism, first discovered by\nPersoon, then described by Darwin and named by Hildebrand. Many\nDicotyledons, and a few Monocotyledons, for instance, species of\nPrimulace\u00e6 and Geraneace\u00e6 and many Rubiace\u00e6, phanerogams in the flowers\nof which both the pollen and the stigma are functional, although only in\ncross-fertilisation, so that the flowers are hermaphrodite in structure\nbut unisexual physiologically, display the peculiarity that in different\nindividuals the stamens and the stigma have different lengths. The\nindividuals, all the flowers of which have long styles and therefore\nhigh stigmas and short anthers, are, in my judgment, the more female,\nwhilst the individuals with short styles and long anthers are more male.\nIn addition to such dimorphic plants, there are also trimorphic plants,\nsuch as _Lythrum salicaria_, in which the sexual organs display three\nforms differing in length. There are not only long-styled and\nshort-styled forms, but flowers with styles of a medium length.\n\nAlthough only dimorphism and trimorphism have been recognised in the\nbooks, these conditions do not exhaust the actual complexities of\nstructure. Darwin himself pointed out that if small differences were\ntaken into account, no less than five different situations of the\nanthers could be distinguished. Alongside such plain cases of\ndiscontinuity, of the separation of the different degrees of maleness\nand femaleness in plainly distinct individuals, there are also cases in\nwhich the different degrees grade into each other without breaks in the\nseries. There are analogous cases of discontinuity in the animal\nkingdom, although they have always been thought of as unique and\nisolated phenomena, as the parallel with heterostylism had not been\nsuggested. In several genera of insects, as, for instance, some Earwigs\n(_Forficul\u00e6_) and Lamellicorn Beetles (_Lucanus cervus_), the\nStag-beetle (_Dynastes Hercules_), and _Xylotrupes gideon_, there are\nsome males in which the antenn\u00e6, the secondary sexual characters by\nwhich they differ most markedly from the females, are extremely long,\nand others in which they are very short. Bateson, who has written most\non this subject, distinguishes the two forms as \u201chigh males\u201d and \u201clow\nmales.\u201d It is true that a continuous series of intermediate forms links\nthe extreme types, but, none the less, the vast majority of the\nindividuals are at one extreme or the other. Unfortunately, Bateson did\nnot investigate the relations between these different types of males and\nthe females, and so it is not known if there be female types with\nspecial sexual affinity for these male types. Thus these observations\ncan be taken only as a morphological parallel to heterostylism and not\nas cases of the law of complementary sexual attraction.\n\nHeterostylous plants may possibly be the means of establishing my view\nthat the law of sexual complements holds good for every kind of living\nthing. Darwin first, and after him many other investigators have proved\nthat in heterostylous plants fertilisation has the best results, or,\nindeed, may be possible only when the pollen from a macrostylous flower\n(a flower with the shortest form of anthers and longest pistil) falls on\nthe stigma of a microstylous blossom (one where the pistil is the\nshortest possible and the stamens at their greatest length), or _vice\nvers\u00e2_. In other words, if the best result is to be attained by the\ncross-fertilisation of a pair of flowers, one flower with a long pistil,\nand therefore high degree of femaleness, and short stamens must be mated\nwith another possessing a correspondingly short pistil, and so, with the\namount of femaleness complementary to the first flower, and with long\nstamens complementary to the short stamens of the first flower. In the\ncase of flowers where there are three pistil lengths, the best results\nmay be expected when the pollen of one blossom is transmitted to another\nblossom in which the stigma is the nearest complement of the stigma of\nthe flower from which the pollen came; if another combination is made,\neither naturally or by artificial fertilisation, then, if a result\nfollows at all, the seedlings are scanty, dwarfed and sometimes\ninfertile, much as when hybrids between species are formed.\n\nIt is to be noticed that the authors who have discussed heterostylism\nare not satisfied with the usual explanation, which is that the insects\nwhich visit the flowers carry the pollen at different relative positions\non their bodies corresponding to the different lengths of the sexual\norgans and so produce the wonderful result. Darwin, moreover, admits\nthat bees carry all sorts of pollen on every part of their bodies; so\nthat it has still to be made clear how the female organs dusted with two\nor three kinds of pollen make their choice of the most suitable. The\nsupposition of a power of choice, however interesting and wonderful it\nis, does not account for the bad results which follow artificial dusting\nwith the wrong kind of pollen (so-called \u201cillegitimate fertilisation\u201d).\nThe theory that the stigmas can only make use of, or are capable of\nreceiving only \u201clegitimate pollen\u201d has been proved by Darwin to be\nerroneous, inasmuch as the insects which act as fertilisers certainly\nsometimes start various cross-breedings.\n\nThe hypothesis that the reason for this selective retention on the part\nof individuals is a special quality, deep-seated in the flowers\nthemselves, seems more probable. We have probably here to do with the\npresence, just as in human beings, of a maximum degree of sexual\nattraction between individuals, one of which possesses just as much\nfemaleness as the other possesses maleness, and this is merely another\nmode of stating my sexual law. The probability of this interpretation is\nincreased by the fact that in the short-styled, long-anthered, more male\nflowers, the pollen grains are larger and the papill\u00e6 on the stigmas are\nsmaller than the corresponding parts of the long-styled, short-anthered,\nmore female flowers. Here we have certainly to do with different degrees\nof maleness and femaleness. These circumstances supply a strong\ncorroboration of my law of sexual affinity, that in the vegetable\nkingdom as well as in the animal kingdom (I shall return later to this\npoint) fertilisation has the best results when it occurs between parents\nwith maximum sexual affinity.[3]\n\n  [3] For special purposes the breeder, whose object frequently is to\n  modify natural tendencies, will often disregard this law.\n\nConsideration of sexual aversion affords the readiest proof that the law\nholds good throughout the animal kingdom. I should like to suggest here\nthat it would be extremely interesting to make observations as to\nwhether the larger, heavier and less active egg-cells exert a special\nattraction on the smaller and more active spermatozoa, whilst those\negg-cells with less food-yolk attract more strongly the larger and less\nactive spermatozoa. It may be the case, as L. Weill has already\nsuggested in a speculation as to the factors that determine sex, that\nthere is a correlation between the rates of motion or kinetic energies\nof conjugating sexual cells. It has not yet been determined, although\nindeed it would be difficult to determine, if the sexual cells, apart\nfrom the streams and eddies of their fluid medium, approach each other\nwith equal velocities or sometimes display special activity. There is a\nwide field for investigation here.\n\nAs I have repeatedly remarked, my law is not the only law of sexual\naffinity, otherwise, no doubt, it would have been discovered long ago.\nJust because so many other actors are bound up with it,[4] because\nanother, perhaps many other laws sometimes overshadow it, cases of\nundisturbed action of sexual affinity are rare. As the necessary\ninvestigations have not yet been finished, I will not speak at length of\nsuch laws, but rather by way of illustration I shall refer to a few\nfactors which as yet cannot be demonstrated mathematically.\n\n  [4] In speaking of the sexual taste in men and women, one thinks at\n  once of the usual but not invariable preference individuals show for a\n  particular colour of hair. It would certainly seem as if the reason\n  for so strongly marked a preference must lie deep in human nature.\n\nI shall begin with some phenomena which are pretty generally\nrecognised. Men when quite young, say under twenty, are attracted by\nmuch older women (say those of thirty-five and so on), whilst men of\nthirty-five are attracted by women much younger than themselves. So\nalso, on the other hand, quite young girls (sweet seventeen) generally\nprefer much older men, but, later in life, may marry striplings. The\nwhole subject deserves close attention and is both popular and easily\nnoticed.\n\nIn spite of the necessary limitation of this work to the consideration\nof a single law, it will make for exactness if I try to state the\nformula in a more definite fashion, without the deceptive element of\nsimplicity. Even without being able to state in definite quantities the\nother factors and the co-operating laws, we may reach a satisfactory\nexactness by the use of a variable factor.\n\nThe first formula was only an abstract general statement of what is\ncommon to all cases of maximum sexual attraction so far as the sexual\nrelation is governed by the law. I must now try to find an expression\nfor the strength of the sexual affinity in any conceivable case, an\nexpression which on account of its general form, can be used to describe\nthe relationship between any two living beings, even if these belong to\ndifferent species or to the same sex.\n\nIf\n\n    { \u03b1 M          { \u03b2 W\n  \u03c7 {       and  \u03b3 {\n    { \u03b1\u00b4 W         { \u03b2\u00b4 M\n\n(where \u03b1, \u03b1\u00b4, \u03b2, and \u03b2\u00b4 are each greater than 0 and less than unity)\ndefine the sexual constitutions of any two living beings between which\nthere is an attraction, then the strength of the attraction may be\nexpressed thus:\n\n        K\n  A = -----_f^t_\n      \u03b1 - \u03b2\n\nwhere _f^t_ is an empirical or analytical function of the period during\nwhich it is possible for the individuals to act upon one another, what\nmay be called the \u201creaction-time\u201d; whilst K is the variable factor in\nwhich we place all the known and unknown laws of sexual affinity, and\nwhich also varies with the degree of specific, racial and family\nrelationship, and with the health and absence of deformity in the two\nindividuals, and which, finally, will become smaller as the actual\nspacial distance between the two is greater, and which can be determined\nin any individual case.\n\nWhen in this formula \u03b1 = \u03b2 A must be infinity; this is the extreme case;\nit is sexual attraction as an elemental force, as it has been described\nwith a weird mastercraft by Lynkeus in the novel \u201cIm Postwagen.\u201d Such\nsexual attraction is as much a natural law as the downward growth of a\nrootlet towards the earth, or the migration of bacteria to the oxygen at\nthe edge of a microscopic cover-glass. But it takes some time to grow\naccustomed to such a view. I shall refer to this point again.\n\nIf \u03b1 - \u03b2 has its maximum value, which is when it equals unity, then A =\nK. _f^t_.\n\nThis would be the extreme case of the action of all the sympathetic and\nantipathetic relations between human beings (leaving out of account\nsocial relations in their narrowest sense, which are merely the\nsafeguards of communities) which are not included in the law of sexual\naffinity. As K generally increases with the strength of congenital\nrelationship, A has a greater value when the individuals are of the same\nnationality than when they belong to different nationalities. The value\nof _f^t_ is great in this case, and one can investigate its\nfluctuations, as, for instance, when two domestic animals of different\nspecies are in association; at first it usually stands for violent\nenmity, or fear of each other (and A has a negative value), whilst later\non a friendship may come about.\n\nWhen K = 0 in the formula\n\n      K . _f^t_\n  A = ---------,\n        \u03b1 - \u03b2\n\nthen A = 0, which means that between two living beings of origin too\nremote there may be no trace of sexual attraction.\n\nThe provisions of the criminal statute-books, however, in reference to\nsodomy and bestiality show plainly that even in the case of very remote\nspecies K has a value greater than nothing. The formula may apply to two\nindividuals not only not of the same species, but even not of the same\norder.\n\nIt is a new theory that the union of male and female organisms is no\nmere matter of chance, but is guided by a definite law; and the actual\ncomplexities which I have merely suggested show the need for complete\ninvestigation into the mysterious nature of sexual attraction.\n\nThe experiments of Wilhelm Pfeffer have shown that the male cells of\nmany cryptogams are naturally attracted not merely by the female cells,\nbut also by substances which they have come in contact with under\nnatural conditions, or which have been introduced to them\nexperimentally, in the latter case the substances being sometimes of a\nkind with which they could not possibly have come in contact, except\nunder the conditions of experiment. Thus the male cells of ferns are\nattracted not only by the malic acid secreted naturally by the\narchegonia, but by synthetically prepared malic acid, whilst the male\ncells of mosses are attracted either by the natural acid of the female\ncells or by acid prepared from cane sugar. A male cell, which, we know\nnot how, is influenced by the degree of concentration of a solution,\nmoves towards the most concentrated part of the fluid. Pfeffer named\nsuch movements \u201cchemotactic\u201d and coined the word \u201cchemotropism\u201d to\ninclude these and many other asexual cases of motion stimulated by\nchemical bodies. There is much to support the view that the attraction\nexercised by females on males which perceive them at a distance by sense\norgans is to be regarded as analogous in certain respects with\nchemotropism.\n\nIt seems highly probable that chemotropism is also the explanation of\nthe restless and persistent energy with which for days together the\nmammalian spermatozoa seek the entrance to the uterus, although the\nnatural current produced from the mucous membrane of the uterus is from\nwithin outwards. The spermatozoon, in spite of all mechanical and other\nhindrances, makes for the egg-cell with an almost incredible certainty.\nIn this connection we may call to mind the prodigious journeys made by\nmany fish; salmon travel for months together, practically without taking\nany food, from the open sea to the sources of the Rhine, against the\ncurrent of the river, in order to spawn in localities that are safe and\nwell provided with food.\n\nI have recently been looking at the beautiful sketches which P.\nFalkenberg has made of the processes of fertilisation in some of the\nMediterranean seaweeds. When we speak of the lines of force between the\nopposite poles of magnets we are dealing with a force no more natural\nthan that which irresistibly attracts the spermatozoon and the egg-cell.\nThe chief difference seems to be that in the case of the attraction\nbetween the inorganic substances, strains are set up in the media\nbetween the two poles, whilst in the living matter the forces seem\nconfined to the organisms themselves. According to Falkenberg\u2019s\nobservations, the spermatozoa, in moving towards the egg-cells, are able\nto overcome the force which otherwise would be exercised upon them by a\nsource of light. The sexual attraction, the chemotactic force, is\nstronger than the phototactic force.\n\nWhen a union has taken place between two individuals who, according to\nmy formula, are not adapted to each other, if later, the natural\ncomplement of either appears the inclination to desert the makeshift at\nonce asserts itself in accordance with an inevitable law of nature. A\ndivorce takes place, as much constitutional, depending on the nature of\nthings, as when, if iron sulphate and caustic potash are brought\ntogether, the SO\u2084 ions leave the iron to unite with the potassium. When\nin nature an adjustment of such differences of potential is about to\ntake place, he who would approve or disapprove of the process from the\nmoral point of view would appear to most to play a ridiculous part.\n\nThis is the fundamental idea in Goethe\u2019s \u201cWahlverwandtschaften\u201d\n(Elective Affinities), and in the fourth chapter of the first part of\nthat work he makes it the subject of a playful introduction which was\nfull of undreamed of future significance, and the full force of which he\nwas fated himself to experience in later life. I must confess to being\nproud that this book is the first work to take up his ideas. None the\nless, it is as little my intention as it was the intention of Goethe to\nadvocate divorce; I hope only to explain it. There are human motives\nwhich indispose man to divorce and enable him to withstand it. This I\nshall discuss later on. The physical side of sex in man is less\ncompletely ruled by natural law than is the case with lower animals. We\nget an indication of this in the fact that man is sexual throughout the\nyear, and that in him there is less trace than even in domestic animals\nof the existence of a special spring breeding-season.\n\nThe law of sexual affinity is analogous in another respect to a\nwell-known law of theoretical chemistry, although, indeed, there are\nmarked differences. The violence of a chemical reaction is proportionate\nto the mass of the substances involved, as, for instance, a stronger\nacid solution unites with a stronger basic solution with greater\navidity, just as in the case of the union of a pair of living beings\nwith strong maleness and femaleness. But there is an essential\ndifference between the living process and the reaction of the lifeless\nchemical substances. The living organism is not homogeneous and\nisotropic in its composition; it is not divisible into a number of small\nparts of identical properties. The difference depends on the principle\nof individuality, on the fact that every living thing is an individual,\nand that its individuality is essentially structural. And so in the\nvital process it is not as in inorganic chemistry; there is no\npossibility of a larger proportion forming one compound, a smaller\nproportion forming another. The organic chemotropism, moreover, may be\nnegative. In certain cases the value of A may result in a negative\nquantity, that is to say, the sexual attraction may appear in the form\nof sexual repulsion. It is true that in purely chemical processes the\nsame reaction may take place at different rates. Taking, however, the\ntotal failure of some reaction by catalytic interference as the\nequivalent of a sexual repulsion, it never happens, according to the\nlatest investigations at least, that the interference merely induces the\nreaction after a longer or shorter interval. On the other hand, it\nhappens frequently that a compound which is formed at one temperature\nbreaks up at another temperature. Here the \u201cdirection\u201d of the reaction\nis a function of the temperature, as, in the vital process, it may be a\nfunction of time.\n\nIn the value of the factor \u201c_t_,\u201d the time of reaction, a final analogy\nof sexual attraction with chemical processes may be found, if we are\nwilling to trace the comparison without laying too much stress upon it.\nConsider the formula for the rapidity of the reaction, the different\ndegrees of rapidity with which a sexual attraction between two\nindividuals is established, and reflect how the value of \u201cA\u201d varies with\nthe value of \u201c_t_.\u201d However, what Kant termed mathematical vanity must\nnot tempt us to read into our equations complicated and difficult\nprocesses, the validity of which is uncertain. All that can be implied\nis simple enough; sensual desire increases with the time during which\ntwo individuals are in propinquity; if they were shut up together, it\nwould develop if there were no repulsion, or practically no repulsion\nbetween them, in the fashion of some slow chemical process which takes\nmuch time before its result is visible. Such a case is the confidence\nwith which it is said of a marriage arranged without love, \u201cLove will\ncome later; time will bring it.\u201d\n\nIt is plain that too much stress must not be laid on the analogy between\nsexual affinity and purely chemical processes. None the less, I thought\nit illuminating to make the comparison. It is not yet quite clear if the\nsexual attraction is to be ranked with the \u201ctropisms,\u201d and the matter\ncannot be settled without going beyond mere sexuality to discuss the\ngeneral problem of erotics. The phenomena of love require a different\ntreatment, and I shall return to them in the second part of this book.\nNone the less, there are analogies that cannot be denied when human\nattractions and chemotropism are compared. I may refer as an instance to\nthe relation between Edward and Ottilie in Goethe\u2019s\n\u201cWahlverwandtschaften.\u201d\n\nMention of Goethe\u2019s romance leads naturally to a discussion of the\nmarriage problem, and I may here give a few of the practical inferences\nwhich would seem to follow from the theoretical considerations of this\nchapter. It is clear that a natural law, not dissimilar to other natural\nlaws, exists with regard to sexual attraction; this law shows that,\nwhilst innumerable gradations of sexuality exist, there always may be\nfound pairs of beings the members of which are almost perfectly adapted\nto one another. So far, marriage has its justification, and, from the\nstandpoint of biology, free love is condemned. Monogamy, however, is a\nmore difficult problem, the solution of which involves other\nconsiderations, such as periodicity, to which I shall refer later, and\nthe change of the sexual taste with advancing years.\n\nA second conclusion may be derived from heterostylism, especially with\nreference to the fact that \u201cillegitimate fertilisation\u201d almost\ninvariably produces less fertile offspring. This leads to the\nconsideration that amongst other forms of life the strongest and\nhealthiest offspring will result from unions in which there is the\nmaximum of sexual suitability. As the old saying has it, \u201clove-children\u201d\nturn out to be the finest, strongest, and most vigorous of human beings.\nThose who are interested in the improvement of mankind must therefore,\non purely hygienic grounds, oppose the ordinary mercenary marriages of\nconvenience.\n\nIt is more than probable that the law of sexual attraction may yield\nuseful results when applied to the breeding of animals. More attention\nwill have to be given to the secondary sexual characters of the animals\nwhich it is proposed to mate. The artificial methods made use of to\nsecure the serving of mares by stallions unattractive to them do not\nalways fail, but are followed by indifferent results. Probably an\nobvious result of the use of a substituted stallion in impregnating a\nmare is the extreme nervousness of the progeny, which must be treated\nwith bromide and other drugs. So, also, the degeneration of modern Jews\nmay be traced in part to the fact that amongst them marriages for other\nreasons than love are specially common.\n\nAmongst the many fundamental principles established by the careful\nobservations and experiments of Darwin, and since confirmed by other\ninvestigators, is the fact that both very closely related individuals,\nand those whose specific characters are too unlike, have little sexual\nattraction for each other, and that if in spite of this sexual union\noccurs, the offspring usually die at an early stage or are very feeble,\nor are practically infertile. So also, in heterostylous plants\n\u201clegitimate fertilisation\u201d brings about more numerous and vigorous seeds\nthan come from other unions.\n\nIt may be said in general that the offspring of those parents which\nshowed the greatest sexual attraction succeed best.\n\nThis rule, which is certainly universal, implies the correctness of a\nconclusion which might be drawn from the earlier part of this book. When\na marriage has taken place and children have been produced, these have\ngained nothing from the conquest of sexual repulsion by the parents, for\nsuch a conquest could not take place without damage to the mental and\nbodily characters of the children that would come of it. It is certain,\nhowever, that many childless marriages have been loveless marriages. The\nold idea that the chance of conception is increased where there is a\nmutual participation in the sexual act is closely connected with what we\nhave been considering as to the greater intensity of the sexual\nattraction between two complementary individuals.\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nHOMO-SEXUALITY AND PEDERASTY\n\nThe law of Sexual Attraction gives the long-sought-for explanation of\nsexual inversion, of sexual inclination towards members of the same sex,\nwhether or no that be accompanied by aversion from members of the\nopposite sex. Without reference to a distinction which I shall deal with\nlater on, I may say at once that it is exceedingly probable that, in all\ncases of sexual inversion, there will be found indications of the\nanatomical characters of the other sex. There is no such thing as a\ngenuine \u201cpsycho-sexual hermaphroditism\u201d; the men who are sexually\nattracted by men have outward marks of effeminacy, just as women of a\nsimilar disposition to those of their own sex exhibit male characters.\nThat this should be so is quite intelligible if we admit the close\nparallelism between body and mind, and further light is thrown upon it\nby the facts explained in the second chapter of this book; the facts as\nto the male or female principle not being uniformly present all over the\nsame body, but distributed in different amounts in different organs. In\nall cases of sexual inversion, there is invariably an anatomical\napproximation to the opposite sex.\n\nSuch a view is directly opposed to that of those who would maintain that\nsexual inversion is an acquired character, and one that has superseded\nnormal sexual impulses. Schrenk-Notzing, Kraepelin, and F\u00e9r\u00e9 are amongst\nthose writers who have urged the view that sexual inversion is an\nacquired habit, the result of abstinence from normal intercourse and\nparticularly induced by example. But what about the first offender? Did\nthe god Hermaphroditos teach him? It might equally be sought to prove\nthat the sexual inclination of a normal man for a normal woman was an\nunnatural, acquired habit--a habit, as some ancient writers have\nsuggested, that arose from some accidental discovery of its agreeable\nnature. Just as a normal man discovers for himself what a woman is, so\nalso, in the case of a sexual \u201cinvert\u201d the attraction exercised on him\nby a person of his own sex is a normal product of his development from\nhis birth. Naturally the opportunity must come in which the individual\nmay put in practice his desire for inverted sexuality, but the\nopportunity will be taken only when his natural constitution has made\nthe individual ready for it. That sexual abstinence (to take the second\nsupposed cause of inversion) should result in anything more than\nmasturbation may be explained by the supposition that inversion is\nacquired, but that it should be coveted and eagerly sought can only\nhappen when the demand for it is rooted in the constitution. In the same\nfashion normal sexual attraction might be said to be an acquired\ncharacter, if it could be proved definitely that, to fall in love, a\nnormal man must first see a woman or a picture of a woman. Those who\nassert that sexual inversion is an acquired character, are making a\nmerely incidental or accessory factor responsible for the whole\nconstitution of an organism.\n\nThere is little reason for saying that sexual inversion is acquired, and\nthere is just as little for regarding it as inherited from parents or\ngrandparents. Such an assertion, it is true, has not been made, and\nseems contrary to all experience; but it has been suggested that it is\ndue to a neuropathic diathesis, and that general constitutional weakness\nis to be found in the descendants of those who have displayed sexual\ninversion. In fact sexual inversion has usually been regarded as\npsycho-pathological, as a symptom of degeneration, and those who exhibit\nit have been considered as physically unfit. This view, however, is\nfalling into disrepute, especially as Krafft-Ebing, its principal\nchampion, abandoned it in the later editions of his work. None the\nless, it is not generally recognised that sexual inverts may be\notherwise perfectly healthy, and with regard to other social matters\nquite normal. When they have been asked if they would have wished\nmatters to be different with them in this respect, almost invariably\nthey answer in the negative.\n\nIt is due to the erroneous conceptions that I have mentioned that\nhomo-sexuality has not been considered in relation with other facts. Let\nthose who regard sexual inversion as pathological, as a hideous anomaly\nof mental development (the view accepted by the populace), or believe it\nto be an acquired vice, the result of an execrable seduction, remember\nthat there exist all transitional stages reaching from the most\nmasculine male to the most effeminate male and so on to the sexual\ninvert, the false and true hermaphrodite; and then, on the other side,\nsuccessively through the sapphist to the virago and so on until the most\nfeminine virgin is reached. In the interpretation of this volume, sexual\ninverts of both sexes are to be defined as individuals in whom the\nfactor \u03b1 (see page 8, chap. i.) is very nearly 0.5 and so is practically\nequal to \u03b1\u00b4; in other words, individuals in whom there is as much\nmaleness as femaleness, or indeed who, although reckoned as men, may\ncontain an excess of femaleness, or as women and yet be more male than\nfemale. Because of the want of uniformity in the sexual characters of\nthe body, it is fairly certain that many individuals have their sex\nassigned them on account of the existence of the primary male sexual\ncharacteristic, even although there may be delayed _descensus\ntesticulorum_, or epi- or hypo-spadism, or, later on, absence of active\nspermatozoa, or even, in the case of assignment of the female sex,\nabsence of the vagina, and thus male avocations (such as compulsory\nmilitary service) may come to be assigned to those in whom \u03b1 is less\nthan 0.5 and \u03b1\u00b4 greater than 0.5. The sexual complement of such\nindividuals really is to be found on their own side of the sexual line,\nthat is to say, on the side on which they are reckoned, although in\nreality they may belong to the other.\n\nMoreover, and this not only supports my view but can be explained only\nby it, there are no inverts who are completely sexually inverted. In all\nof them there is from the beginning an inclination to both sexes; they\nare, in fact, bisexual. It may be that later on they may actively\nencourage a slight leaning towards one sex or the other, and so become\npractically unisexual either in the normal or in the inverted sense, or\nsurrounding influence may bring about this result for them. But in such\nprocesses the fundamental bisexuality is never obliterated and may at\nany time give evidence of its suppressed presence.\n\nReference has often been made, and in recent years has increasingly been\nmade, to the relation between homo-sexuality and the presence of\nbisexual rudiments in the embryonic stages of animals and plants. What\nis new in my view is that according to it, homo-sexuality cannot be\nregarded as an atavism or as due to arrested embryonic development, or\nincomplete differentiation of sex; it cannot be regarded as an anomaly\nof rare occurrence interpolating itself in customary complete separation\nof the sexes. Homo-sexuality is merely the sexual condition of these\nintermediate sexual forms that stretch from one ideally sexual condition\nto the other sexual condition. In my view all actual organisms have both\nhomo-sexuality and hetero-sexuality.\n\nThat the rudiment of homo-sexuality, in however weak a form, exists in\nevery human being, corresponding to the greater or smaller development\nof the characters of the opposite sex, is proved conclusively from the\nfact that in the adolescent stage, while there is still a considerable\namount of undifferentiated sexuality, and before the internal secretions\nhave exerted their stimulating force, passionate attachments with a\nsensual side are the rule amongst boys as well as amongst girls.\n\nA person who retains from that age onwards a marked tendency to\n\u201cfriendship\u201d with a person of his own sex must have a strong taint of\nthe other sex in him. Those, however, are still more obviously\nintermediate sexual forms, who, after association with both sexes, fail\nto have aroused in them the normal passion for the opposite sex, but\nstill endeavour to maintain confidential, devoted affection with those\nof their own sex.\n\nThere is no friendship between men that has not an element of sexuality\nin it, however little accentuated it may be in the nature of the\nfriendship, and however painful the idea of the sexual element would be.\nBut it is enough to remember that there can be no friendship unless\nthere has been some attraction to draw the men together. Much of the\naffection, protection, and nepotism between men is due to the presence\nof unsuspected sexual compatibility.\n\nAn analogy with the sexual friendship of youth may be traced in the case\nof old men, when, for instance, with the involution following old age,\nthe latent amphisexuality of man appears. This may be the reason why so\nmany men of fifty years and upwards are guilty of indecency.\n\nHomo-sexuality has been observed amongst animals to a considerable\nextent. F. Karsch has made a wide, if not complete, compilation from\nother authors. Unfortunately, practically no observations were made as\nto the grades of maleness or femaleness to be observed in such cases.\nBut we may be reasonably certain that the law holds good in the animal\nworld. If bulls are kept apart from cows for a considerable time,\nhomo-sexual acts occur amongst them; the most female are the first to\nbecome corrupted, the others later, some perhaps never. (It is amongst\ncattle that the greatest number of sexually intermediate forms have been\nrecorded.) This shows that the tendency was latent in them, but that at\nother times the sexual demand was satisfied in normal fashion. Cattle in\ncaptivity behave precisely as prisoners and convicts in these matters.\nAnimals exhibit not merely onanism (which is known to them as to human\nbeings), but also homo-sexuality; and this fact, together with the fact\nthat sexually intermediate forms are known to occur amongst them, I\nregard as strong evidence for my law of sexual attraction.\n\nInverted sexual attraction, then, is no exception to my law of sexual\nattraction, but is merely a special case of it. An individual who is\nhalf-man, half-woman, requires as sexual complement a being similarly\nequipped with a share of both sexes in order to fulfil the requirements\nof the law. This explains the fact that sexual inverts usually associate\nonly with persons of similar character, and rarely admit to intimacy\nthose who are normal. The sexual attraction is mutual, and this explains\nwhy sexual inverts so readily recognise each other. This being so, the\nnormal element in human society has very little idea of the extent to\nwhich homo-sexuality is practised, and when a case becomes public\nproperty, every normal young profligate thinks that he has a right to\ncondemn such \u201catrocities.\u201d So recently as the year 1900 a professor of\npsychiatry in a German university urged that those who practised\nhomo-sexuality should be castrated.\n\nThe therapeutical remedies which have been used to combat\nhomo-sexuality, in cases where such treatment has been attempted, are\ncertainly less radical than the advice of the professor; but they serve\nto show only how little the nature of homo-sexuality was understood. The\nmethod used at present is hypnotism, and this can rest only on the\ntheory that homo-sexuality is an acquired character. By suggesting the\nidea of the female form and of normal congress, it is sought to accustom\nthose under treatment to normal relations. But the acknowledged results\nare very few.\n\nThe failure is to be expected from our standpoint. The hypnotiser\nsuggests to the subject the image of a \u201ctypical\u201d woman, ignorant of the\ninnate differences in the subject and unaware that such a type is\nnaturally repulsive to him. And as the normal typical woman is not his\ncomplement, it is fruitless of the doctor to advise the services of any\ncasual Venus, however attractive, to complete the cure of a man who has\nlong shunned normal intercourse. If our formula were used to discover\nthe complement of the male invert, it would point to the most man-like\nwoman, the Lesbian or Sapphist type. Probably such is the only type of\nwoman who would attract the sexual invert or please him. If a cure for\nsexual inversion must be sought because it cannot be left to its own\nextinction, then this theory offers the following solution. Sexual\ninverts must be brought to sexual inverts, from homo-sexualists to\nSapphists, each in their grades. Knowledge of such a solution should\nlead to repeal of the ridiculous laws of England, Germany and Austria\ndirected against homo-sexuality, so far at least as to make the\npunishments the lightest possible. In the second part of this book it\nwill be made clear why both the active and the passive parts in male\nhomo-sexuality appear disgraceful, although the desire is greater than\nin the case of the normal relation of a man and woman. In the abstract\nthere is no ethical difference between the two.\n\nIn spite of all the present-day clamour about the existence of different\nrights for different individualities, there is only one law that governs\nmankind, just as there is only one logic and not several logics. It is\nin opposition to that law, as well as to the theory of punishment\naccording to which the legal offence, not the moral offence, is\npunished, that we forbid the homo-sexualist to carry on his practices\nwhilst we allow the hetero-sexualist full play, so long as both avoid\nopen scandal. Speaking from the standpoint of a purer state of humanity\nand of a criminal law untainted by the pedagogic idea of punishment as a\ndeterrent, the only logical and rational method of treatment for sexual\ninverts would be to allow them to seek and obtain what they require\nwhere they can, that is to say, amongst other inverts.\n\nMy theory appears to me quite incontrovertible and conclusive, and to\nafford a complete explanation of the entire set of phenomena. The\nexposition, however, must now face a set of facts which appear quite\nopposed to it, and which seem absolutely to contradict my reference of\nsexual inversion to the existence of sexually intermediate types, and my\nexplanation of the law governing the attraction of these types for each\nother. It is probably the case that my explanation is sufficient for all\nfemale sexual inverts, but it is certainly true that there are men with\nvery little taint of femaleness about them who yet exert a very strong\ninfluence on members of their own sex, a stronger influence than that of\nother men who may have more femaleness--an influence which can be\nexerted even on very male men, and an influence which, finally, often\nappears to be much greater than the influence any woman can exert on\nthese men. Albert Moll is justified in saying as follows: \u201cThere exist\npsycho-sexual hermaphrodites who are attracted by members of both sexes,\nbut who in the case of each sex appear to care only for the characters\npeculiar to that sex; and, on the other hand, there are also\npsycho-sexual (?) hermaphrodites who, in the case of each sex, are\nattracted, not by the characteristics peculiar to that sex, but by those\nwhich are either sexually indifferent or even antagonistic to the sex in\nquestion.\u201d Upon this distinction depends the difference between the two\nsets of phenomena indicated in the title of this chapter--Homo-sexuality\nand Pederasty. The distinction may be expressed as follows: The\nhomo-sexualist is that type of sexual invert who prefers very female men\nor very male women, in accordance with the general law of sexual\nattraction. The pederast, on the other hand, may be attracted either by\nvery male men or by very female women, but in the latter case only in so\nfar as he is not pederastic. Moreover, his inclination for the male sex\nis stronger than for the female sex, and is more deeply seated in his\nnature. The origin of pederasty is a problem in itself and remains\nunsolved by this investigation.\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER AND THE SCIENCE OF FORM\n\nIn view of the admitted close correspondence between matter and mind, we\nmay expect to find that the conception of sexually intermediate forms,\nif applied to mental facts, will yield a rich crop of results. The\nexistence of a female mental type and a male mental type can readily be\nimagined (and the quest of these types has been made by many\ninvestigators), but such perfect types never occur as actual\nindividuals, simply because in the mind, as in the body, all sorts of\nsexually intermediate conditions exist. My conception will also be of\ngreat service in helping us to discriminate between the different mental\nqualities, and to throw some light into what has always been a dark\ncorner for psychologists--the differences between different individuals.\nA great step will be made if we are able to supply graded categories for\nthe mental diathesis of individuals; if it shall cease to be scientific\nto say that the character of an individual is merely male or female; but\nif we can make a measured judgment and say that such and such an one is\nso many parts male and so many parts female. Which element in any\nparticular individual has done, said, or thought this or the other? By\nmaking the answer to such a question possible, we shall have done much\ntowards the definite description of the individual, and the new method\nwill determine the direction of future investigation. The knowledge of\nthe past, which set out from conceptions which were really confused\naverages, has been equally far from reaching the broadest truths as from\nsearching out the most intimate detailed knowledge. This failure of\npast methods gives us hope that the principle of sexually intermediate\nforms may serve as the foundation of a scientific study of character and\njustifies the attempt to make of it an illuminating principle for the\npsychology of individual differences. Its application to the science of\ncharacter, which, so far, has been in the hands of merely literary\nauthors, and is from the scientific point of view an untouched field, is\nto be greeted more warmly as it is capable of being used quantitatively,\nso that we venture to estimate the percentage of maleness and femaleness\nwhich an individual possesses even in the mental qualities. The answer\nto this question is not given even if we know the exact anatomical\nposition of an organism on the scale stretching from male to female,\nalthough as a matter of fact congruity between bodily and mental\nsexuality is more common than incongruity. But we must remember what was\nstated in chap. ii. as to the uneven distribution of sexuality over the\nbody.\n\nThe proportion of the male to the female principle in the same human\nbeing must not be assumed to be a constant quantity. An important new\nconclusion must be taken into account, a conclusion which is necessary\nto the right application of the principle which clears up in a striking\nfashion earlier psychological work. The fact is that every human being\nvaries or oscillates between the maleness and the femaleness of his\nconstitution. In some cases these oscillations are abnormally large, in\nother cases so small as to escape observation, but they are always\npresent, and when they are great they may even reveal themselves in the\noutward aspect of the body. Like the variations in the magnetism of the\nearth, these sexual oscillations are either regular or irregular. The\nregular forms are sometimes minute; for instance, many men feel more\nmale at night. The large and regular oscillations correspond to the\ngreat divisions of organic life to which attention is only now being\ndirected, and they may throw light upon many puzzling phenomena. The\nirregular oscillations probably depend chiefly upon the environment, as\nfor instance on the sexuality of surrounding human beings. They may\nhelp to explain some curious points in the psychology of a crowd which\nhave not yet received sufficient attention.\n\nIn short, bi-sexuality cannot be properly observed in a single moment,\nbut must be studied through successive periods of time. This\ntime-element in psychological differences of sexuality may be regularly\nperiodic or not. The swing towards one pole of sexuality may be greater\nthan the following swing to the other side. Although theoretically\npossible, it seems to be extremely rare for the swing to the male side\nto be exactly equal to the swing towards the female side.\n\nIt may be admitted in principle, before proceeding to detailed\ninvestigation, that the conception of sexually intermediate forms makes\npossible a more accurate description of individual characters in so far\nas it aids in determining the proportion of male and female in each\nindividual, and of measuring the oscillations to each side of which any\nindividual is capable. A point of method must be decided at once, as\nupon it depends the course the investigation will pursue. Are we to\nbegin by an empirical investigation of the almost innumerable\nintermediate conditions in mental sexuality, or are we to set out with\nthe abstract sexual types, the ideal psychological man and woman, and\nthen investigate deductively how far such ideal pictures correspond with\nconcrete cases? The former method is that which the development of\npsychological knowledge has pursued; ideals have been derived from\nfacts, sexual types constructed from observation of the manifold\ncomplexity of nature; it would be inductive and analytic. The latter\nmode, deductive and synthetic, is more in accordance with formal logic.\n\nI have been unwilling to pursue the second method as fully as is\npossible, because every one can apply for himself to concrete facts the\ntwo well-defined extreme types; once it is understood that actual\nindividuals are mixtures of the types, it is simple to apply theory to\npractice, and the actual pursuit of detailed cases would involve much\nrepetition and bring little theoretical advantage. The second method,\nhowever, is impracticable. The collection of the long series of details\nfrom which the inductions would be made would simply weary the reader.\n\nIn the first or biological part of my work, I give little attention to\nthe extreme types, but devote myself to the fullest investigation of the\nintermediate stages. In the second part, I shall endeavour to make as\nfull a psychological analysis as possible of the characters of the male\nand female types, and will touch only lightly on concrete instances.\n\nI shall first mention, without laying too much stress on them, some of\nthe more obvious mental characteristics of the intermediate conditions.\n\nWomanish men are usually extremely anxious to marry, at least (I mention\nthis to prevent misconception) if a sufficiently brilliant opportunity\noffers itself. When it is possible, they nearly always marry whilst they\nare still quite young. It is especially gratifying to them to get as\nwives famous women, artists or poets, or singers and actresses.\n\nWomanish men are physically lazier than other men in proportion to the\ndegree of their womanishness. There are \u201cmen\u201d who go out walking with\nthe sole object of displaying their faces like the faces of women,\nhoping that they will be admired, after which they return contentedly\nhome. The ancient \u201cNarcissus\u201d was a prototype of such persons. These\npeople are naturally fastidious about the dressing of their hair, their\napparel, shoes, and linen; they are concerned as to their personal\nappearance at all times, and about the minutest details of their toilet.\nThey are conscious of every glance thrown on them by other men, and\nbecause of the female element in them, they are coquettish in gait and\ndemeanour. Viragoes, on the other hand, frequently are careless about\ntheir toilet, and even about the personal care of their bodies; they\ntake less time in dressing than many womanish men. The dandyism of men\non the one hand, and much of what is called the emancipation of women,\nare due to the increase in the numbers of these epicene creatures, and\nnot merely to a passing fashion.\n\nIndeed, if one inquires why anything becomes the fashion it will be\nfound that there is a true cause for it.\n\nThe more femaleness a woman possesses the less will she understand a\nman, and the sexual characters of a man will have the greater influence\non her. This is more than a mere application of the law of sexual\nattraction, as I have already stated it. So also the more manly a man is\nthe less will he understand women, but the more readily be influenced by\nthem as women. Those men who claim to understand women are themselves\nvery nearly women. Womanish men often know how to treat women much\nbetter than manly men. Manly men, except in most rare cases, learn how\nto deal with women only after long experience, and even then most\nimperfectly.\n\nAlthough I have been touching here in a most superficial way on what are\nno more than tertiary sexual characters, I wish to point out an\napplication of my conclusions to pedagogy. I am convinced that the more\nthese views are understood the more certainly will they lead to an\nindividual treatment in education. At the present time shoemakers, who\nmake shoes to measure, deal more rationally with individuals than our\nteachers and schoolmasters in their application of moral principles. At\npresent the sexually intermediate forms of individuals (especially on\nthe female side) are treated exactly as if they were good examples of\nthe ideal male or female types. There is wanted an \u201corthop\u00e6dic\u201d\ntreatment of the soul instead of the torture caused by the application\nof ready-made conventional shapes. The present system stamps out much\nthat is original, uproots much that is truly natural, and distorts much\ninto artificial and unnatural forms.\n\nFrom time immemorial there have been only two systems of education; one\nfor those who come into the world designated by one set of characters as\nmales, and another for those who are similarly assumed to be females.\nAlmost at once the \u201cboys\u201d and the \u201cgirls\u201d are dressed differently, learn\nto play different games, go through different courses of instruction,\nthe girls being put to stitching and so forth. The intermediate\nindividuals are placed at a great disadvantage. And yet the instincts\nnatural to their condition reveal themselves quickly enough, often even\nbefore puberty. There are boys who like to play with dolls, who learn to\nknit and sew with their sisters, and who are pleased to be given girls\u2019\nnames. There are girls who delight in the noisier sports of their\nbrothers, and who make chums and playmates of them. After puberty, there\nis a still stronger display of the innate differences. Manlike women\nwear their hair short, affect manly dress, study, drink, smoke, are fond\nof mountaineering, or devote themselves passionately to sport. Womanish\nmen grow their hair long, wear corsets, are experts in the toilet\ndevices of women, and show the greatest readiness to become friendly and\nintimate with them, preferring their society to that of men.\n\nLater on, the different laws and customs to which the so-called sexes\nare subjected press them as by a vice into distinctive moulds. The\nproposals which should follow from my conclusions will encounter more\npassive resistance, I fear, in the case of girls than in that of boys. I\nmust here contradict, in the most positive fashion, a dogma that is\nauthoritatively and widely maintained at the present time, the idea that\nall women are alike, that no individuals exist amongst women. It is true\nthat amongst those individuals whose constitutions lie nearer the female\nside than the male side, the differences and possibilities are not so\ngreat as amongst those on the male side; the greater variability of\nmales is true not only for the human race but for the living world, and\nis related to the principles established by Darwin. None the less, there\nare plenty of differences amongst women. The psychological origin of\nthis common error depends chiefly on a fact that I explained in chap.\niii., the fact that every man in his life becomes intimate only with a\ngroup of women defined by his own constitution, and so naturally he\nfinds them much alike. For the same reason, and in the same way, one may\noften hear a woman say that all men are alike. And the narrow uniform\nview about men, displayed by most of the leaders of the women\u2019s rights\nmovement depends on precisely the same cause.\n\nIt is clear that the principle of the existence of innumerable\nindividual proportions of the male and female principles is a basis of\nthe study of character which must be applied in any rational scheme of\npedagogy.\n\nThe science of character must be associated with some form of psychology\nthat takes into account some theory of the real existence of mental\nphenomena in the same fashion that anatomy is related to physiology. And\nso it is necessary, quite apart from theoretical reasons, to attempt to\npursue a psychology of individual differences. This attempt will be\nreadily enough followed by those who believe in the parallelism between\nmind and matter, for they will see in psychology no more than the\nphysiology of the central nervous system, and will readily admit that\nthe science of character must be a sister of morphology. As a matter of\nfact there is great hope that in future characterology and morphology\nwill each greatly help the other. The principle of sexually intermediate\nforms, and still more the parallelism between characterology and\nmorphology in the widest application, make us look forward to the time\nwhen physiognomy will take its honourable place amongst the sciences, a\nplace which so many have attempted to gain for it but as yet\nunsuccessfully.\n\nThe problem of physiognomy is the problem of the relation between the\nstatic mental forces and the static bodily forces, just as the problem\nof physiological psychology deals with the dynamic aspect of the same\nrelations. It is a great error in method, and in fact, to treat the\nstudy of physiognomy, because of its difficulty, as impracticable. And\nyet this is the attitude of contemporary scientific circles,\nunconsciously perhaps rather than consciously, but occasionally becoming\nobvious as for instance in the case of the attempt of von M\u00f6bius to\npursue the work of Gall with regard to the physiognomy of those with a\nnatural aptitude for mathematics. If it be possible, and many have shown\nthat it is possible, to judge correctly much of the character of an\nindividual merely from the examination of his external appearance,\nwithout the aid of cross-examination or guessing, it cannot be\nimpossible to reduce such modes of observation to an exact method. There\nis little more required than an exact study of the expression of the\ncharacteristic emotions and the tracking (to use a rough analogy) of the\nroutes of the cables passing to the speech centres.\n\nNone the less it will be long before official science ceases to regard\nthe study of physiognomy as illegitimate. Although people will still\nbelieve in the parallelism of mind and body, they will continue to treat\nthe physiognomist as as much of a charlatan as until quite recently the\nhypnotist was thought to be. None the less, all mankind at least\nunconsciously, and intelligent persons consciously, will continue to be\nphysiognomists, people will continue to judge character from the nose,\nalthough they will not admit the existence of a science of physiognomy,\nand the portraits of celebrated men and of murderers will continue to\ninterest every one.\n\nI am inclined to believe that the assumption of a universally acquired\ncorrespondence between mind and body may be a hitherto neglected\nfundamental function of our mind. It is certainly the case that every\none believes in physiognomy and actually practises it. The principle of\nthe existence of a definite relation between mind and body must be\naccepted as an illuminating axiom for psychological research, and it\nwill be for religion and metaphysics to work out the details of a\nrelationship which must be accepted as existing.\n\nWhether or no the science of character can be linked with morphology, it\nwill be valuable not only to these sciences but to physiognomy if we can\npenetrate a little deeper into the confusion that now reigns in order to\nfind if wrong methods have not been responsible for it. I hope that the\nattempt I am about to make will lead some little way into the labyrinth,\nand will prove to be of general application.\n\nSome men are fond of dogs and detest cats; others are devoted to cats\nand dislike dogs. Inquiring minds have delighted to ask in such cases,\nWhy are cats attractive to one person, dogs to another? Why?\n\nI do not think that this is the most fruitful way of stating the\nproblem. I believe it to be more important to ask in what other respects\nlovers of dogs and of cats differ from one another. The habit, where one\ndifference has been detected, of seeking for the associated differences,\nwill prove extremely useful not only to pure morphology and to the\nscience of character, but ultimately to physiognomy, the meeting-point\nof the two sciences. Aristotle pointed out long ago that many\ncharacteristics of animals do not vary independently of each other.\nLater on Cuvier, in particular, but also Geoffrey St. Hilaire and Darwin\nmade a special study of these \u201ccorrelations.\u201d Occasionally the\nassociation of the characters is easy to understand on obvious\nutilitarian principles; where for instance the alimentary canal is\nadapted to the digestion of flesh, the jaws and body must be adapted for\nthe capture of the prey. But association such as that between ruminant\nstomachs and the presence of cloven hoofs and of horns in the male, or\nof immunity to certain poisons with particular colouring of the hair, or\namong domestic pigeons of short bills with small feet, of long bills\nwith large feet, or in cats of deafness with white fur and blue\neyes--such are extremely difficult to refer to a single purpose.\n\nI do not in the least mean to assert that science must be content with\nno more than the mere discovery of correlations. Such a position would\nbe little better than that of a person who was satisfied by finding out\nthat the placing of a penny in the slot of a particular automatic\nmachine always was followed by the release of a box of matches. It would\nbe making resignation the leading principle of metaphysics. We shall get\na good deal further by such correlations, as, for instance, that of long\nhair and normal ovaries; but these are within the sphere of physiology,\nnot of morphology. Probably the goal of an ideal morphology could be\nreached best not by deductions from an attempted synthesis of\nobservations on all the animals that creep on the land or swim in the\nsea (in the fashion of collectors of postage stamps), but by a complete\nstudy of a few organisms. Cuvier by a kind of guess-work used to\nreconstruct an entire animal from a single bone: full knowledge would\nenable us to do this in a complete, definite, qualitative and\nquantitative fashion. When such a knowledge has been attained, each\nsingle character will at once define and limit for us the possibilities\nof the other characters. Such a true and logical extension of the\nprinciple of correlation in morphology is really an application of the\ntheory of functions to the living world. It would not exclude the study\nof causation, but limit it to its proper sphere. No doubt the \u201ccauses\u201d\nof the correlations of organisms must be sought for in the idioplasm.\n\nThe possibility of applying the principle of correlated variation to\npsychology depends on differential psychology, the study of\npsychological variation. I believe, moreover, that a combination of\nstudy of the anatomical \u201chabit,\u201d and the mental characteristics will\nlead to a statical psycho-physics, a true science of physiognomy. The\nrule of investigation in all the three sciences will have to be that the\nquestion is posed as follows; given that two organisms are known to\ndiffer in one respect, in what other respects are they different? This\nwill be the golden rule of discovery, and, following it, we shall no\nlonger lose ourselves hopelessly in the dark maze that surrounds the\nanswer to the question \u201cWhy?\u201d As soon as we are informed as to one\ndifference, we must diligently seek out the others, and the mere putting\nof the question in this form will directly bring about many discoveries.\n\nThe conscious pursuit of this rule of investigation will be particularly\nvaluable in dealing with problems of the mind. Mental actions are not\nco-existent in the sense of physical characters, and it has been only by\naccidental and fortunate chances, when the phenomena have presented\nthemselves in rapid succession in an individual, that discoveries of\ncorrelation in mental phenomena have been noticed. The correlated mental\nphenomena may be very different in kind, and it is only when we know\nwhat we are after and deliberately seek for them that we shall be able\nto transcend the special difficulties of the kind of material we are\ninvestigating, and so secure for psychology what is comparatively simple\nin anatomy.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nEMANCIPATED WOMEN\n\nAs an immediate application of the attempt to establish the principle of\nintermediate sexual forms by means of a differential psychology, we must\nnow come to the question which it is the special object of this book to\nanswer, theoretically and practically, I mean the woman question,\ntheoretically so far as it is not a matter of ethnology and national\neconomics, and practically in so far as it is not merely a matter of law\nand domestic economy, that is to say, of social science in the widest\nsense. The answer which this chapter is about to give must not be\nconsidered as final or as exhaustive. It is rather a necessary\npreliminary investigation, and does not go beyond deductions from the\nprinciples that I have established. It will deal with the exploration of\nindividual cases and will not attempt to found on these any laws of\ngeneral significance. The practical indications that it will give are\nnot moral maxims that could or would guide the future; they are no more\nthan technical rules abstracted from past cases. The idea of male and\nfemale types will not be discussed here; that is reserved for the second\npart of my book. This preliminary investigation will deal with only\nthose charactero-logical conclusions from the principle of sexually\nintermediate forms that are of significance in the woman question.\n\nThe general direction of the investigation is easy to understand from\nwhat has already been stated. A woman\u2019s demand for emancipation and her\nqualification for it are in direct proportion to the amount of maleness\nin her. The idea of emancipation, however, is many-sided, and its\nindefiniteness is increased by its association with many practical\ncustoms which have nothing to do with the theory of emancipation. By the\nterm emancipation of a woman I imply neither her mastery at home nor her\nsubjection of her husband. I have not in mind the courage which enables\nher to go freely by night or by day unaccompanied in public places, or\nthe disregard of social rules which prohibit bachelor women from\nreceiving visits from men, or discussing or listening to discussions of\nsexual matters. I exclude from my view the desire for economic\nindependence, the becoming fit for positions in technical schools,\nuniversities and conservatoires or teachers\u2019 institutes. And there may\nbe many other similar movements associated with the word emancipation\nwhich I do not intend to deal with. Emancipation, as I mean to discuss\nit, is not the wish for an outward equality with man, but what is of\nreal importance in the woman question, the deep-seated craving to\nacquire man\u2019s character, to attain his mental and moral freedom, to\nreach his real interests and his creative power. I maintain that the\nreal female element has neither the desire nor the capacity for\nemancipation in this sense. All those who are striving for this real\nemancipation, all women who are truly famous and are of conspicuous\nmental ability, to the first glance of an expert reveal some of the\nanatomical characters of the male, some external bodily resemblance to a\nman. Those so-called \u201cwomen\u201d who have been held up to admiration in the\npast and present, by the advocates of woman\u2019s rights, as examples of\nwhat women can do, have almost invariably been what I have described as\nsexually intermediate forms. The very first of the historical examples,\nSappho herself, has been handed down to us as an example of the sexual\ninvert, and from her name has been derived the accepted terms for\nperverted sexual relations between women. The contents of the second and\nthird chapter thus at once become important with regard to the woman\nquestion. The characterological material at our disposal with regard to\ncelebrated and emancipated women is too vague to serve as the\nfoundation of any satisfactory theory. What is wanted is some principle\nwhich would enable us to determine at what point between male and female\nsuch individuals were placed. My law of sexual affinity is such a\nprinciple. Its application to the facts of homo-sexuality showed that\nthe woman who attracts and is attracted by other women is herself half\nmale. Interpreting the historical evidence at our disposal in the light\nof this principle, we find that the degree of emancipation and the\nproportion of maleness in the composition of a woman are practically\nidentical. Sappho was only the forerunner of a long line of famous women\nwho were either homo-sexually or bisexually inclined. Classical scholars\nhave defended Sappho warmly against the implication that there was\nanything more than mere friendship in her relations with her own sex, as\nif the accusation were necessarily degrading. In the second part of my\nbook, however, I shall show reasons in favour of the possibility that\nhomo-sexuality is a higher form than hetero-sexuality. For the present,\nit is enough to say that homo-sexuality in a woman is the outcome of her\nmasculinity and presupposes a higher degree of development. Catherine\nII. of Russia, and Queen Christina of Sweden, the highly gifted although\ndeaf, dumb and blind, Laura Bridgman, George Sand, and a very large\nnumber of highly gifted women and girls concerning whom I myself have\nbeen able to collect information, were partly bisexual, partly\nhomo-sexual.\n\nI shall now turn to other indications in the case of the large number of\nemancipated women regarding whom there is no evidence as to\nhomo-sexuality, and I shall show that my attribution of maleness is no\ncaprice, no egotistical wish of a man to associate all the higher\nmanifestations of intelligence with the male sex. Just as homo-sexual or\nbisexual women reveal their maleness by their preference either for\nwomen or for womanish men, so hetero-sexual women display maleness in\ntheir choice of a male partner who is not preponderatingly male. The\nmost famous of George Sand\u2019s many affairs were those with de Musset, the\nmost effeminate and sentimental poet, and with Chopin, who might be\ndescribed almost as the only female musician, so effeminate are his\ncompositions.[5] Vittoria Colonna is less known because of her own\npoetic compositions than because of the infatuation for her shown by\nMichael Angelo, whose earlier friendships had been with youths. The\nauthoress, Daniel Stern, was the mistress of Franz Liszt, whose life and\ncompositions were extremely effeminate, and who had a dubious friendship\nwith Wagner, the interpretation of which was made plain by his later\ndevotion to King Ludwig II. of Bavaria. Madame de Staal, whose work on\nGermany is probably the greatest book ever produced by a woman, is\nsupposed to have been intimate with August Wilhelm Schlegel, who was a\nhomo-sexualist, and who had been tutor to her children. At certain\nperiods of his life, the face of the husband of Clara Schumann might\nhave been taken as that of a woman, and a good deal of his music,\nalthough certainly not all, was effeminate.\n\n  [5] Chopin\u2019s portraits show his effeminacy plainly. Merim\u00e9e describes\n  George Sand as being as thin as a nail. At the first meeting of the\n  two, the lady behaved like a man, and the man like a girl. He blushed\n  when she looked at him and began to pay him compliments in her bass\n  voice.\n\nWhen there is no evidence as to the sexual relations of famous women, we\ncan still obtain important conclusions from the details of their\npersonal appearance. Such data support my general proposition.\n\nGeorge Eliot had a broad, massive forehead; her movements, like her\nexpression, were quick and decided, and lacked all womanly grace. The\nface of Lavinia Fontana was intellectual and decided, very rarely\ncharming; whilst that of Rachel Ruysch was almost wholly masculine. The\nbiography of that original poetess, Annette von Droste-H\u00fclshoff, speaks\nof her wiry, unwomanly frame, and of her face as being masculine, and\nrecalling that of Dante. The authoress and mathematician, Sonia\nKowalevska, like Sappho, had an abnormally scanty growth of hair, still\nless than is the fashion amongst the poetesses and female students of\nthe present day. It would be a serious omission to forget Rosa Bonheur,\nthe very distinguished painter; and it would be difficult to point to a\nsingle female trait in her appearance or character. The notorious Madame\nBlavatsky is extremely masculine in her appearance.\n\nI might refer to many other emancipated women at present well known to\nthe public, consideration of whom has provided me with much material for\nthe support of my proposition that the true female element, the abstract\n\u201cwoman,\u201d has nothing to do with emancipation. There is some historical\njustification for the saying \u201cthe longer the hair the smaller the\nbrain,\u201d but the reservations made in chap. ii. must be taken into\naccount.\n\nIt is only the male element in emancipated women that craves for\nemancipation.\n\nThere is, then, a stronger reason than has generally been supposed for\nthe familiar assumption of male pseudonyms by women writers. Their\nchoice is a mode of giving expression to the inherent maleness they\nfeel; and this is still more marked in the case of those who, like\nGeorge Sand, have a preference for male attire and masculine pursuits.\nThe motive for choosing a man\u2019s name springs from the feeling that it\ncorresponds with their own character much more than from any desire for\nincreased notice from the public. As a matter of fact, up to the\npresent, partly owing to interest in the sex question, women\u2019s writings\nhave aroused more interest, _ceteris paribus_, than those of men; and,\nowing to the issues involved, have always received a fuller\nconsideration and, if there were any justification, a greater meed of\npraise than has been accorded to a man\u2019s work of equal merit. At the\npresent time especially many women have attained celebrity by work\nwhich, if it had been produced by a man, would have passed almost\nunnoticed. Let us pause and examine this more closely.\n\nIf we attempt to apply a standard taken from the names of men who are of\nacknowledged value in philosophy, science, literature and art, to the\nlong list of women who have achieved some kind of fame, there will at\nonce be a miserable collapse. Judged in this way, it is difficult to\ngrant any real degree of merit to women like Angelica Kaufmann or Madame\nLebrun, Fernan Caballero or Hroswitha von Gandersheim, Mary Somerville\nor George Egerton, Elizabeth Barrett Browning or Sophie Germain, Anna\nMaria Schurmann or Sybilla Merian. I will not speak of names (such as\nthat of Droste-H\u00fclshoff) formerly so over-rated in the annals of\nfeminism, nor will I refer to the measure of fame claimed for or by\nliving women. It is enough to make the general statement that there is\nnot a single woman in the history of thought, not even the most manlike,\nwho can be truthfully compared with men of fifth or sixth-rate genius,\nfor instance with R\u00fcckert as a poet, Van Dyck as a painter, or\nScheirmacher as a philosopher. If we eliminate hysterical\nvisionaries,[6] such as the Sybils, the Priestesses of Delphi,\nBourignon, Kettenberg, Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon, Joanna Southcote, Beate\nSturmin, St. Teresa, there still remain cases like that of Marie\nBashkirtseff. So far as I can remember from her portrait, she at least\nseemed to be quite womanly in face and figure, although her forehead was\nrather masculine. But to any one who studies her pictures in the Salle\ndes Etrangers in the Luxemburg Gallery in Paris, and compares them with\nthose of her adored master, Bastien Lepage, it is plain that she simply\nhad assimilated the style of the latter, as in Goethe\u2019s \u201cElective\nAffinities\u201d Ottilie acquired the handwriting of Eduard.\n\n  [6] Hysteria is the principal cause of much of the intellectual\n  activity of many of the women above mentioned. But the usual view,\n  that these cases are pathological, is too limited an interpretation,\n  as I shall show in the second part of this work.\n\nThere remain the interesting and not infrequent cases where the talent\nof a clever family seems to reach its maximum in a female member of the\nfamily. But it is only talent that is transmitted in this way, not\ngenius. Margarethe van Eyck and Sabina von Steinbach form the best\nillustrations of the kind of artists who, according to Ernst Guhl, an\nauthor with a great admiration for women-workers, \u201chave been undoubtedly\ninfluenced in their choice of an artistic calling by their fathers,\nmothers, or brothers. In other words, they found their incentive in\ntheir own families. There are two or three hundred of such cases on\nrecord, and probably many hundreds more could be added without\nexhausting the numbers of similar instances.\u201d In order to give due\nweight to these statistics it may be mentioned that Guhl had just been\nspeaking of \u201croughly, a thousand names of women artists known to us.\u201d\n\nThis concludes my historical review of the emancipated women. It has\njustified the assertion that real desire for emancipation and real\nfitness for it are the outcome of a woman\u2019s maleness.\n\nThe vast majority of women have never paid special attention to art or\nto science, and regard such occupations merely as higher branches of\nmanual labour, or if they profess a certain devotion to such subjects,\nit is chiefly as a mode of attracting a particular person or group of\npersons of the opposite sex. Apart from these, a close investigation\nshows that women really interested in intellectual matters are sexually\nintermediate forms.\n\nIf it be the case that the desire for freedom and equality with man\noccurs only in masculine women, the inductive conclusion follows that\nthe female principle is not conscious of a necessity for emancipation;\nand the argument becomes stronger if we remember that it is based on an\nexamination of the accounts of individual cases and not on psychical\ninvestigation of an \u201cabstract woman.\u201d\n\nIf we now look at the question of emancipation from the point of view of\nhygiene (not morality) there is no doubt as to the harm in it. The\nundesirability of emancipation lies in the excitement and agitation\ninvolved. It induces women who have no real original capacity but\nundoubted imitative powers to attempt to study or write, from various\nmotives, such as vanity or the desire to attract admirers. Whilst it\ncannot be denied that there are a good many women with a real craving\nfor emancipation and for higher education, these set the fashion and are\nfollowed by a host of others who get up a ridiculous agitation to\nconvince themselves of the reality of their views. And many otherwise\nestimable and worthy wives use the cry to assert themselves against\ntheir husbands, whilst daughters take it as a method of rebelling\nagainst maternal authority. The practical outcome of the whole matter\nwould be as follows; it being remembered that the issues are too mutable\nfor the establishment of uniform rules or laws. Let there be the freest\nscope given to, and the fewest hindrances put in the way of all women\nwith masculine dispositions who feel a psychical necessity to devote\nthemselves to masculine occupations and are physically fit to undertake\nthem. But the idea of making an emancipation party, of aiming at a\nsocial revolution, must be abandoned. Away with the whole \u201cwoman\u2019s\nmovement,\u201d with its unnaturalness and artificiality and its fundamental\nerrors.\n\nIt is most important to have done with the senseless cry for \u201cfull\nequality,\u201d for even the malest woman is scarcely more than 50 per cent.\nmale, and it is only to that male part of her that she owes her special\ncapacity or whatever importance she may eventually gain. It is absurd to\nmake comparisons between the few really intellectual women and one\u2019s\naverage experience of men, and to deduce, as has been done, even the\nsuperiority of the female sex. As Darwin pointed out, the proper\ncomparison is between the most highly developed individuals of two\nstocks. \u201cIf two lists,\u201d Darwin wrote in the \u201cDescent of Man,\u201d \u201cwere made\nof the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture,\nmusic--comprising composition and performance, history, science, and\nphilosophy, with half a dozen names under each subject, the two lists\nwould not bear comparison.\u201d Moreover, if these lists were carefully\nexamined it would be seen that the women\u2019s list would prove the\nsoundness of my theory of the maleness of their genius, and the\ncomparison would be still less pleasing to the champions of woman\u2019s\nrights.\n\nIt is frequently urged that it is necessary to create a public feeling\nin favour of the full and unchecked mental development of women. Such an\nargument overlooks the fact that \u201cemancipation,\u201d the \u201cwoman question,\u201d\n\u201cwomen\u2019s rights movements,\u201d are no new things in history, but have\nalways been with us, although with varying prominence at different times\nin history. It also largely exaggerates the difficulties men place in\nthe way of the mental development of women, especially at the present\ntime.[7] Furthermore it neglects the fact that at the present time it is\nnot the true woman who clamours for emancipation, but only the masculine\ntype of woman, who misconstrues her own character and the motives that\nactuate her when she formulates her demands in the name of woman.\n\n  [7] There have been many celebrities amongst men who received\n  practically no education--for instance, Robert Burns and Wolfram von\n  Eschenbach; but there are no similar cases amongst women to compare\n  with them.\n\nAs has been the case with every other movement in history, so also it\nhas been with the contemporary woman\u2019s movement. Its originators were\nconvinced that it was being put forward for the first time, and that\nsuch a thing had never been thought of before. They maintained that\nwomen had hitherto been held in bondage and enveloped in darkness by\nman, and that it was high time for her to assert herself and claim her\nnatural rights.\n\nBut the prototype of this movement, as of other movements, occurred in\nthe earliest times. Ancient history and medi\u00e6val times alike give us\ninstances of women who, in social relations and intellectual matters,\nfought for such emancipation, and of male and female apologists of the\nfemale sex. It is totally erroneous to suggest that hitherto women have\nhad no opportunity for the undisturbed development of their mental\npowers.\n\nJacob Burckhardt, speaking of the Renaissance, says: \u201cThe greatest\npossible praise which could be given to the Italian women-celebrities of\nthe time was to say that they were like men in brains and disposition!\u201d\nThe virile deeds of women recorded in the epics, especially those of\nBoiardo and Ariosto, show the ideal of the time. To call a woman a\n\u201cvirago\u201d nowadays would be a doubtful compliment, but it originally\nmeant an honour.\n\nWomen were first allowed on the stage in the sixteenth century, and\nactresses date from that time. \u201cAt that period it was admitted that\nwomen were just as capable as men of embodying the highest possible\nartistic ideals.\u201d It was the period when panegyrics on the female sex\nwere rife; Sir Thomas More claimed for it full equality with the male\nsex, and Agrippa von Nettesheim goes so far as to represent women as\nsuperior to men! And yet this was all lost for the fair sex, and the\nwhole question sank into the oblivion from which the nineteenth century\nrecalled it.\n\nIs it not very remarkable that the agitation for the emancipation of\nwomen seems to repeat itself at certain intervals in the world\u2019s\nhistory, and lasts for a definite period?\n\nIt has been noticed that in the tenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth, and now\nagain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the agitation for the\nemancipation of women has been more marked, and the woman\u2019s movement\nmore vigorous than in the intervening periods. It would be premature to\nfound a hypothesis on the data at our disposal, but the possibility of a\nvastly important periodicity must be borne in mind, of regularly\nrecurring periods in which it may be that there is an excess of\nproduction of hermaphrodite and sexually intermediate forms. Such a\nstate of affairs is not unknown in the animal kingdom.\n\nAccording to my interpretation, such a period would be one of minimum\n\u201cgonochorism,\u201d cleavage of the sexes; and it would be marked, on the one\nhand, by an increased production of male women, and on the other, by a\nsimilar increase in female men. There is strong evidence in favour of\nsuch a periodicity; if it occurs it may be associated with the\n\u201csecessionist taste,\u201d which idealised tall, lanky women with flat chests\nand narrow hips. The enormous recent increase in a kind of dandified\nhomo-sexuality may be due to the increasing effeminacy of the age, and\nthe peculiarities of the Pre-Raphaelite movement may have a similar\nexplanation.\n\nThe existence of such periods in organic life, comparable with stages in\nindividual life, but extending over several generations, would, if\nproved, throw much light on many obscure points in human history,\nconcerning which the so-called \u201chistorical solutions,\u201d and especially\nthe economic-materialistic views now in vogue have proved so futile. The\nhistory of the world from the biological standpoint has still to be\nwritten; it lies in the future. Here I can do little more than indicate\nthe direction which future work should take.\n\nWere it proved that at certain periods fewer hermaphrodite beings were\nproduced, and at certain other periods more, it would appear that the\nrising and falling, the periodic occurrence and disappearance of the\nwoman movement in an unfailing rhythm of ebb and flow, was one of the\nexpressions of the preponderance of masculine and feminine women with\nthe concomitant greater or lesser desire for emancipation.\n\nObviously I do not take into account in relation to the woman question\nthe large number of womanly women, the wives of the prolific artisan\nclass whom economic pressure forces to factory or field labour. The\nconnection between industrial progress and the woman question is much\nless close than is usually realised, especially by the Social Democratic\nGroup. The relation between the mental energy required for intellectual\nand for industrial pursuits is even less. France, for instance, although\nit can boast three of the most famous women, has never had a successful\nwoman\u2019s movement, and yet in no other European country are there so many\nreally businesslike, capable women. The struggle for the material\nnecessities of life has nothing to do with the struggle for intellectual\ndevelopment, and a sharp distinction must be made between the two.\n\nThe prospects of the movement for intellectual advance on the part of\nwomen are not very promising; but still less promising is another view,\nsometimes discussed in the same connection, the view that the human race\nis moving towards a complete sexual differentiation, a definite sexual\ndimorphism.\n\nThe latter view seems to me fundamentally untenable, because in the\nhigher groups of the animal kingdom there is no evidence for the\nincrease of sexual dimorphism. Worms and rotifers, many birds and the\nmandrills amongst the apes, have more advanced sexual dimorphism than\nman. On the view that such an increased sexual dimorphism were to be\nexpected, the necessity for emancipation would gradually disappear as\nmankind became separated into the completely male and the completely\nfemale. On the other hand, the view that there will be periodical\nresurrections of the woman\u2019s movement would reduce the whole affair to\nridiculous impotence, making it only an ephemeral phase in the history\nof mankind.\n\nA complete obliteration will be the fate of any emancipation movement\nwhich attempts to place the whole sex in a new relation to society, and\nto see in man its perpetual oppressor. A corps of Amazons might be\nformed, but as time went on the material for the corps would cease to\noccur. The history of the woman movement during the Renaissance and its\ncomplete disappearance contains a lesson for the advocates of women\u2019s\nrights. Real intellectual freedom cannot be attained by an agitated\nmass; it must be fought for by the individual. Who is the enemy? What\nare the retarding influences?\n\nThe greatest, the one enemy of the emancipation of women is woman\nherself. It is left to the second part of my work to prove this.\n\n\n\n\n  SECOND OR PRINCIPAL PART\n\n  THE SEXUAL TYPES\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nMAN AND WOMAN\n\n  \u201cAll that a man does is physiognomical of him.\u201d\n\n  CARLYLE.\n\nA free field for the investigation of the actual contrasts between the\nsexes is gained when we recognise that male and female, man and woman,\nmust be considered only as types, and that the existing individuals,\nupon whose qualities there has been so much controversy, are mixtures of\nthe types in different proportions. Sexually intermediate forms, which\nare the only actually existing individuals, were dealt with in a more or\nless schematic fashion in the first part of this book. Consideration of\nthe general biological application of my theory was entered upon there;\nbut now I have to make mankind the special subject of my investigation,\nand to show the defects of the results gained by the method of\nintrospective analysis, as these results must be qualified by the\nuniversal existence of sexually intermediate conditions. In plants and\nanimals the presence of hermaphroditism is an undisputed fact; but in\nthem it appears more to be the juxtaposition of the male and female\ngenital glands in the same individual than an actual fusion of the two\nsexes, more the co-existence of the two extremes than a quite neutral\ncondition. In the case of human beings, however, it appears to be\npsychologically true that an individual, at least at one and the same\nmoment, is always either man or woman. This is in harmony with the fact\nthat each individual, whether superficially regarded as male or female,\nat once can recognise his sexual complement in another individual\n\u201cwoman\u201d or \u201cman.\u201d[8] This uni-sexuality is demonstrated by the fact, the\ntheoretical value of which can hardly be over-estimated, that, in the\nrelations of two homo-sexual men one always plays the physical and\npsychical roll of the man, and in cases of prolonged intercourse retains\nhis male first-name, or takes one, whilst the other, who plays the part\nof the woman, either assumes a woman\u2019s name or calls himself by it,\nor--and this is sufficiently characteristic--receives it from the\nformer.\n\n  [8] I once heard a bi-sexual man exclaim, when he saw a bi-sexual\n  actress with a slight tendency to a beard, a deep sonorous voice, and\n  very little hair on her head, \u201cThere is a fine woman.\u201d \u201cWoman\u201d means\n  something different for every man or for every poet, and yet it is\n  always the same, the sexual complement of their own constitution.\n\nIn the same way, in the sexual relations of two women, one always plays\nthe male and the other the female part, a fact of deepest significance.\nHere we encounter, in a most unexpected fashion, the fundamental\nrelationship between the male and female elements. In spite of all\nsexually intermediate conditions, human beings are always one of two\nthings, either male or female. There is a deep truth underlying the old\nempirical sexual duality, and this must not be neglected, even although\nin concrete cases there is not a necessary harmony in the anatomical and\nmorphological conditions. To realise this is to make a great step\nforward and to advance towards most important results. In this way we\nreach a conception of a real \u201cbeing.\u201d The task of the rest of this book\nis to set forth the significance of this \u201cexistence.\u201d As, however, this\nexistence is bound up with the most difficult side of characterology, it\nwill be well, before setting out on our adventurous task, to attempt\nsome preliminary orientation.\n\nThe obstacles in the way of characterological investigation are very\ngreat, if only on account of the complexity of the material. Often and\noften it happens that when the path through the jungle appears to have\nbeen cleared, it is lost again in impenetrable thickets, and it seems\nimpossible to recover it. But the greatest difficulty is that when the\nsystematic method of setting out the complex material has been proceeded\nwith and seems about to lead to good results, then at once objections of\nthe most serious kind arise and almost forbid the attempt to make types.\nWith regard to the differences between the sexes, for instance, the most\nuseful theory that has been put forward is the existence of a kind of\npolarity, two extremes separated by a multitude of intermediate\nconditions. The characterological differences appear to follow this rule\nin a fashion not dissimilar to the suggestion of the Pythagorean,\nAlcm\u00e6on of Kroton, and recalling the recent chemical resurrection of\nSchelling\u2019s \u201cNatur-philosophie.\u201d\n\nBut even if we are able to determine the exact point occupied by an\nindividual on the line between two extremes, and multiply this\ndetermination by discovering it for a great many characters, would this\ncomplex system of co-ordinate lines really give us a conception of the\nindividual? Would it not be a relapse to the dogmatic scepticism of Mach\nand Hume, were we to expect that an analysis could be a full description\nof the human individual? And in a fashion it would be a sort of\nWeismannistic doctrine of particulate determinants, a mosaic psychology.\n\nThis brings us in a new way directly against the old, over-ripe problem.\nIs there in a man a single and simple existence, and, if so, in what\nrelation does that stand to the complex psychical phenomena? Has man,\nindeed, a soul? It is easy to understand why there has never been a\nscience of character. The object of such a science, the character\nitself, is problematical. The problem of all metaphysics and theories of\nknowledge, the fundamental problem of psychology, is also the problem of\ncharacterology. At the least, characterology will have to take into\naccount the theory of knowledge itself with regard to its postulates,\nclaims, and objects, and will have to attempt to obtain information as\nto all the differences in the nature of men.\n\nThis unlimited science of character will be something more than the\n\u201cpsychology of individual differences,\u201d the renewed insistence upon\nwhich as a goal of science we owe to L. William Stern; it will be more\nthan a sort of polity of the motor and sensory reactions of the\nindividual, and in so far will not sink so low as the usual \u201cresults\u201d of\nthe modern experimental psychologists, which, indeed, are little more\nthan statistics of physical experiments. It will hope to retain some\nkind of contact with the actualities of the soul which the modern school\nof psychology seems to have forgotten, and will not have to fear that it\nwill have to offer to ardent students of psychology no more than\nprofound studies of words of one syllable, or of the results on the mind\nof small doses of caffein. It is a lamentable testimony to the\ninsufficiency of modern psychology that distinguished men of science,\nwho have not been content with the study of perception and association,\nhave yet had to hand over to poetry the explanation of such fundamental\nfacts as heroism and self-sacrifice.\n\nNo science will become shallow so quickly as psychology if it deserts\nphilosophy. Its separation from philosophy is the true cause of its\nimpotency. Psychology will have to discover that the doctrine of\nsensations is practically useless to it. The empirical psychologists of\nto-day, in their search for the development of character, begin with\ninvestigation of touch and the common sensations. But the analysis of\nsensations is simply a part of the physiology of sense, and any attempt\nto bring it into relation with the real problems of psychology must\nfail.\n\nIt is a misfortune of the scientific psychology of the day that it has\nbeen influenced so deeply by two physicists, Fechner and von Helmholtz,\nwith the result that it has failed to recognise that only the external\nand not the internal world can be reconstructed from sensations. The two\nmost intelligent of the empirical psychologists of recent times, William\nJames and R. Avenarius, have felt almost instinctively that psychology\ncannot really rest upon sensations of the skin and muscles, although,\nindeed, all modern psychology does depend upon study of sensations.\nDilthey did not lay enough stress on his argument that existing\npsychology does nothing towards problems that are eminently\npsychological, such as murder, friendship, loneliness, and so forth. If\nanything is to be gained in the future there must be a demand for a\nreally psychological psychology, and its first battle-cry must be: \u201cAway\nwith the study of sensations.\u201d\n\nIn attempting the broad and deep characterology that I have indicated, I\nmust set out with a conception of character itself as a unit existence.\nAs in the fifth chapter of Part I., I tried to show that behind the\nfleeting physiological changes there is a permanent morphological form,\nso in characterology we must seek the permanent, existing something\nthrough the fleeting changes.\n\nThe character, however, is not something seated behind the thoughts and\nfeelings of the individual, but something revealing itself in every\nthought and feeling. \u201cAll that a man does is physiognomical of him.\u201d\nJust as every cell bears within it the characters of the whole\nindividual, so every psychical manifestation of a man involves not\nmerely a few little characteristic traits, but his whole being, of which\nat one moment one quality, at another moment another quality, comes into\nprominence.\n\nJust as no sensation is ever isolated, but is set in a complete field of\nsensation, the world of the Ego, of which now one part and now the\nother, stands out more plainly, so the whole man is manifest in every\nmoment of the psychical life, although, now one side, now the other, is\nmore visible. This existence, manifest in every moment of the psychical\nlife, is the object of characterology. By accepting this, there will be\ncompleted for the first time a real psychology, existing psychology, in\nmanifest contradiction of the meaning of the word, having concerned\nitself almost entirely with the motley world, the changing field of\nsensations, and overlooked the ruling force of the Ego. The new\npsychology would be a doctrine of the whole, and would become fresh and\nfertile inasmuch as it would combine the complexity of the subject and\nof the object, two spheres which can be separated only in abstraction.\nMany disputed points of psychology (perhaps the most important) would\nbe settled by an application of such characterology, as that would\nexplain why so many different views have been held on the same subject.\nThe same psychical process appears from time to time in different\naspects, merely because it takes tone and colouring from the individual\ncharacter. And so it well may be that the doctrine of differential\npsychology may receive its completion in the domain of general\npsychology.\n\nThe confusion of characterology with the doctrine of the soul has been a\ngreat misfortune, but because this has occurred in actual history, is no\nreason why it should continue. The absolute sceptic differs only in a\nword from the absolute dogmatist. The man who dogmatically accepts the\nposition of absolute phenomenalism, believing it to relieve him of all\nthe burden of proof that the mere entering on another standpoint would\nitself entail, will be ready to dismiss without proof the existence\nwhich characterology posits, and which has nothing to do with a\nmetaphysical \u201cessence.\u201d\n\nCharacterology has to defend itself against two great enemies. The one\nassumes that character is something ultimate, and as little the\nsubject-matter of science as is the art of a painter. The other looks on\nthe sensations as the only realities, on sensation as the ground-work of\nthe world of the Ego, and denies the existence of character. What is\nleft for characterology, the science of character? On the one hand,\nthere are those who cry, \u201cDe individuo nulla scientia,\u201d and \u201cIndividuum\nest ineffabile\u201d; on the other hand, there are those sworn to science,\nwho maintain that science has nothing to do with character.\n\nIn such a cross-fire, characterology has to take its place, and it may\nwell be feared that it may share the fate of its sisters and remain a\ntrivial subject like physiognomy or a diviner\u2019s art like graphology.\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nMALE AND FEMALE SEXUALITY\n\n  \u201cWoman does not betray her secret.\u201d\n\n  KANT.\n\n  \u201cFrom a woman you can learn nothing of women.\u201d\n\n  NIETZSCHE.\n\nBy psychology, as a whole, we generally understand the psychology of the\npsychologists, and these are exclusively men! Never since human history\nbegan have we heard of a female psychology! None the less the psychology\nof woman constitutes a chapter as important with regard to general\npsychology as that of the child. And inasmuch as the psychology of man\nhas always been written with unconscious but definite reference to man,\ngeneral psychology has become simply the psychology of men, and the\nproblem of the psychology of the sexes will be raised as soon as the\nexistence of a separate psychology of women has been realised. Kant said\nthat in anthropology the peculiarities of the female were more a study\nfor the philosopher than those of the male, and it may be that the\npsychology of the sexes will disappear in a psychology of the female.\n\nNone the less the psychology of women will have to be written by men. It\nis easy to suggest that such an attempt is foredoomed to failure,\ninasmuch as the conclusions must be drawn from an alien sex and cannot\nbe verified by introspection. Granted the possibility that woman could\ndescribe herself with sufficient exactness, it by no means follows that\nshe would be interested in the sides of her character that would\ninterest us. Moreover, even if she could and would explore herself\nfully, it is doubtful if she could bring herself to talk about herself.\nI shall show that these three improbabilities spring from the same\nsource in the nature of woman.\n\nThis investigation, therefore, lays itself open to the charge that no\none who is not female can be in a position to make accurate statements\nabout women. In the meantime the objection must stand, although, later,\nI shall have more to say of it. I will say only this much--up to now,\nand is this only a consequence of man\u2019s suppression?--we have no account\nfrom a pregnant woman of her sensations and feelings, neither in poetry\nnor in memoirs, nor even in a gyn\u00e6cological treatise. This cannot be on\naccount of excessive modesty, for, as Schopenhauer rightly pointed out,\nthere is nothing so far removed from a pregnant woman as shame as to her\ncondition. Besides, there would still remain to them the possibility of,\nafter the birth, confessing from memory the psychical life during the\ntime; if a sense of shame had prevented them from such communication\nduring the time, it would be gone afterwards, and the varied interests\nof such a disclosure ought to have induced some one to break silence.\nBut this has not been done. Just as we have always been indebted to men\nfor really trustworthy expositions of the psychical side of women, so\nalso it is to men that we owe descriptions of the sensations of pregnant\nwomen. What is the meaning of this?\n\nAlthough in recent times we have had revelations of the psychical life\nof half-women and three-quarter women, it is practically only about the\nmale side of them that they have written. We have really only one clue;\nwe have to rely upon the female element in men. The principle of\nsexually intermediate forms is the authority for what we know about\nwomen through men. I shall define and complete the application of this\nprinciple later on. In its indefinite form, the principle would seem to\nimply that the most womanish man would be best able to describe woman,\nand that the description might be completed by the real woman. This,\nhowever, is extremely doubtful. I must point out that a man can have a\nconsiderable proportion of femaleness in him without necessarily, to the\nsame extent, being able to portray intermediate forms. It is the more\nremarkable that the male can give a faithful account of the nature of\nthe female; since, indeed, it must be admitted from the extreme maleness\nof successful portrayers of women that we cannot dispute the existence\nof this capacity in the abstract male; this power of the male over the\nfemale is a most remarkable problem, and we shall have to consider it\nlater. For the present we must take it as a fact, and proceed to inquire\nin what lies the actual psychological difference between male and\nfemale.\n\nIt has been sought to attribute the fundamental difference of the sexes\nto the existence of a stronger sexual impulse in man, and to derive\neverything else from that. Apart from the question as to whether the\nphrase \u201csexual instinct\u201d denotes a simple and real thing, it is to be\ndoubted if there is proof of such a difference. It is not more probable\nthan the ancient theories as to the influence of the \u201cunsatisfied womb\u201d\nin the female, or of the \u201csemen retentum\u201d in men, and we have to be on\nguard against the current tendency to refer nearly everything to\nsublimated sexual instinct. No systematic theory could be founded on a\ngeneralisation so vague. It is most improbable that the greater or\nlesser strength of the sexual impulse determines other qualities.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the statements that men have stronger sexual\nimpulses than women, or that women have them stronger than men, are\nfalse. The strength of the sexual impulse in a man does not depend upon\nthe proportion of masculinity in his composition, and in the same way\nthe degree of femininity of a woman does not determine her sexual\nimpulse. These differences in mankind still await classification.\n\nContrary to the general opinion, there is no difference in the total\nsexual impulses of the sexes. However, if we examine the matter in\nrespect to the two component forces into which Albert Moll analysed the\nimpulse, we shall find that a difference does exist. These forces may be\ntermed the \u201cliberating\u201d and the \u201cuniting\u201d impulses. The first appears in\nthe form of the discomfort caused by the accumulation of ripe sexual\ncells; the second is the desire of the ripe individual for sexual\ncompletion. Both impulses are possessed by the male; in the female only\nthe latter is present. The anatomy and the physiological processes of\nthe sexes bear out the distinction.\n\nIn this connection it may be noted that only the most male youths are\naddicted to masturbation, and although it is often disputed, I believe\nthat similar vices occur only among the maler of women, and are absent\nfrom the female nature.\n\nI must now discuss the \u201cuniting\u201d impulse of woman, for that plays the\nchief, if not the sole part in her sexuality. But it must not be\nsupposed that this is greater in one sex than the other. Any such idea\ncomes from a confusion between the desire for a thing and the stimulus\ntowards the active part in securing what is desired. Throughout the\nanimal and plant kingdoms, the male reproductive cells are the motile,\nactive agents, which move through space to seek out the passive female\ncells, and this physiological difference is sometimes confused with the\nactual wish for, or stimulus to, sexual union. And to add to the\nconfusion, it happens, in the animal kingdom particularly, that the\nmale, in addition to the directly sexual stimulus, has the instinct to\npursue and bodily capture the female, whilst the latter has only the\npassive part to be taken possession of. These differences of habit must\nnot be mistaken for real differences of desire.\n\nIt can be shown, moreover, that woman is sexually much more excitable\n(not more sensitive) physiologically than man.\n\nThe condition of sexual excitement is the supreme moment of a woman\u2019s\nlife. The woman is devoted wholly to sexual matters, that is to say, to\nthe spheres of begetting and of reproduction. Her relations to her\nhusband and children complete her life, whereas the male is something\nmore than sexual. In this respect, rather than in the relative strength\nof the sexual impulses, there is a real difference between the sexes. It\nis important to distinguish between the intensity with which sexual\nmatters are pursued and the proportion of the total activities of life\nthat are devoted to them and to their accessory cares. The greater\nabsorption of the human female by the sphere of sexual activities is the\nmost significant difference between the sexes.\n\nThe female, moreover, is completely occupied and content with sexual\nmatters, whilst the male is interested in much else, in war and sport,\nin social affairs and feasting, in philosophy and science, in business\nand politics, in religion and art. I do not mean to imply that this\ndifference has always existed, as I do not think that important. As in\nthe case of the Jewish question, it may be said that the Jews have their\npresent character because it has been forced upon them, and that at one\ntime they were different. It is now impossible to prove this, and we may\nleave it to those who believe in the modification by the environment to\naccept it. The historical evidence is equivocal on the point. In the\nquestion of women, we have to take people as they exist to-day. If,\nhowever, we happen to come on attributes that could not possibly have\nbeen grafted on them from without, we may believe that such have always\nbeen with them. Of contemporary women at least one thing is certain.\nApart from an exception to be noted in chap. xii., it is certain that\nwhen the female occupies herself with matters outside the interests of\nsex, it is for the man that she loves or by whom she wishes to be loved.\nShe takes no real interest in the things for themselves. It may happen\nthat a real female learns Latin; if so, it is for some such purpose as\nto help her son who is at school. Desire for a subject and ability for\nit, interest in it, and the facility for acquiring it, are usually\nproportional. He who has slight muscles has no desire to wield an axe;\nthose without the faculty for mathematics do not desire to study that\nsubject. Talent seems to be rare and feeble in the real female (although\npossibly it is merely that the dominant sexuality prevents its\ndevelopment), with the result that woman has no power of forming the\ncombinations which, although they do not actually make the\nindividuality, certainly shape it.\n\nCorresponding to true women, there are extremely female men who are to\nbe found always in the apartments of the women, and who are interested\nin nothing but love and sexual matters. Such men, however, are not the\nDon Juans.\n\nThe female principle is, then, nothing more than sexuality; the male\nprinciple is sexual and something more. This difference is notable in\nthe different way in which men and women enter the period of puberty. In\nthe case of the male the onset of puberty is a crisis; he feels that\nsomething new and strange has come into his being, that something has\nbeen added to his powers and feelings independently of his will. The\nphysiological stimulus to sexual activity appears to come from outside\nhis being, to be independent of his will, and many men remember the\ndisturbing event throughout their after lives. The woman, on the other\nhand, not only is not disturbed by the onset of puberty, but feels that\nher importance has been increased by it. The male, as a youth, has no\nlonging for the onset of sexual maturity; the female, from the time when\nshe is still quite a young girl, looks forward to that time as one from\nwhich everything is to be expected. Man\u2019s arrival at maturity is\nfrequently accompanied by feelings of repulsion and disgust; the young\nfemale watches the development of her body at the approach of puberty\nwith excitement and impatient delight. It seems as if the onset of\npuberty were a side path in the normal development of man, whereas in\nthe case of woman it is the direct conclusion. There are few boys\napproaching puberty to whom the idea that they would marry (in the\ngeneral sense, not a particular girl) would not appear ridiculous,\nwhilst the smallest girl is almost invariably excited and interested in\nthe question of her future marriage. For such reasons a woman assigns\npositive value only to her period of maturity in her own case and in\nthat of other women; in childhood, as in old age, she has no real\nrelation to the world. The thought of her childhood is for her, later\non, only the remembrance of her stupidity; she faces the approach of\nold age with dislike and abhorrence. The only real memories of her\nchildhood are connected with sex, and these fade away in the intensely\ngreater significance of her maturity. The passage of a woman from\nvirginity is the great dividing point of her life, whilst the\ncorresponding event in the case of a male has very little relation to\nthe course of his life.\n\nWoman is only sexual, man is partly sexual, and this difference reveals\nitself in various ways. The parts of the male body by stimulation of\nwhich sexuality is excited are limited in area, and are strongly\nlocalised, whilst in the case of the woman, they are diffused over her\nwhole body, so that stimulation may take place almost from any part.\nWhen in the second chapter of Part I., I explained that sexuality is\ndistributed over the whole body in both sexes, I did not mean that,\ntherefore, the sense organs, through which the definite impulses are\nstimulated, were equally distributed. There are, certainly, areas of\ngreater excitability, even in the case of the woman, but there is not,\nas in the man, a sharp division between the sexual areas and the body\ngenerally.\n\nThe morphological isolation of the sexual area from the rest of the body\nin the case of man, may be taken as symbolical of the relation of sex to\nhis whole nature. Just as there is a contrast between the sexual and the\nsexless parts of a man\u2019s body, so there is a time-change in his\nsexuality. The female is always sexual, the male is sexual only\nintermittently. The sexual instinct is always active in woman (as to the\napparent exceptions to this sexuality of women, I shall have to speak\nlater on), whilst in man it is at rest from time to time. And thus it\nhappens that the sexual impulse of the male is eruptive in character and\nso appears stronger. The real difference between the sexes is that in\nthe male the desire is periodical, in the female continuous.\n\nThis exclusive and persisting sexuality of the female has important\nphysical and psychical consequences. As the sexuality of the male is an\nadjunct to his life, it is possible for him to keep it in the\nphysiological background, and out of his consciousness. And so a man\ncan lay aside his sexuality and not have to reckon with it. A woman has\nnot her sexuality limited to periods of time, nor to localised organs.\nAnd so it happens that a man can know about his sexuality, whilst a\nwoman is unconscious of it and can in all good faith deny it, because\nshe is nothing but sexuality, because she is sexuality itself.\n\nIt is impossible for women, because they are only sexual, to recognise\ntheir sexuality, because recognition of anything requires duality. With\nman it is not only that he is not merely sexual, but anatomically and\nphysiologically he can \u201cdetach\u201d himself from it. That is why he has the\npower to enter into whatever sexual relations he desires; if he likes he\ncan limit or increase such relations; he can refuse or assent to them.\nHe can play the part of a Don Juan or a monk. He can assume which he\nwill. To put it bluntly, man possesses sexual organs; her sexual organs\npossess woman.\n\nWe may, therefore, deduce from the previous arguments that man has the\npower of consciousness of his sexuality and so can act against it,\nwhilst the woman appears to be without this power. This implies,\nmoreover, that there is greater differentiation in man, as in him the\nsexual and the unsexual parts of his nature are sharply separated. The\npossibility or impossibility of being aware of a particular definite\nobject is, however, hardly a part of the customary meaning of the word\nconsciousness, which is generally used as implying that if a being is\nconscious he can be conscious of any object. This brings me to consider\nthe nature of the female consciousness, and I must take a long _d\u00e9tour_\nto consider it.\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nMALE AND FEMALE CONSCIOUSNESS\n\nBefore proceeding to consider the main difference between the psychical\nlife of the sexes, so far as the latter takes subjective and objective\nthings as its contents, a few psychological soundings must be taken, and\nconceptions formulated. As the views and principles of prevailing\nsystems of psychology have been formed without consideration of the\nsubject of this book, it is not surprising that they contain little that\nI am able to use. At present there is no psychology but many\npsychologists, and it would really be a matter of caprice on my part to\nchoose any particular school and attempt to apply its principles to my\nsubject. I shall rather try to lay down a few useful principles on my\nown account.\n\nThe endeavours to reach a comprehensive and unifying conception of the\nwhole psychical process by referring it to a single principle have been\nparticularly evident in the relations between perceptions and sensations\nsuggested by different psychologists. Herbart, for instance, derived the\nsensations from elementary ideas, whilst Horwicz supposed them to come\nfrom perceptions. Most modern psychologists have insisted that such\nmonistic attempts must be fruitless. None the less there was some truth\nin the view.\n\nTo discover this truth, however, it is necessary to make a distinction\nthat has been overlooked by modern workers. We must distinguish between\nthe perceiving of a perception, feeling of a sensation, thinking a\nthought from the later repetitions of the process in which recognition\nplays a part. In many cases this distinction is of fundamental\nimportance.\n\nEvery simple, clear, plastic perception and every distinct idea, before\nit could be put into words, passes through a stage (which may indeed be\nvery short) of indistinctness. So also in the case of association; for a\nlonger or shorter time before the elements about to be grouped have\nactually come together, there is a sort of vague, generalised\nexpectation or presentiment of association. Leibnitz, in particular, has\nworked at kindred processes, and I believe them to underlie the attempts\nof Herbart and Horwicz.\n\nThe common acceptance of pleasure and pain as the fundamental\nsensations, even with Wundt\u2019s addition of the sensations of tension and\nrelaxation, of rest and stimulation, makes the division of psychical\nphenomena into sensations and perceptions too narrow for due treatment\nof the vague preliminary stages to which I have referred. I shall go\nback therefore to the widest classification of psychical phenomena that\nI know of, that of Avenarius into \u201celements\u201d and \u201ccharacters.\u201d The word\n\u201ccharacter\u201d in this connection, of course, has nothing to do with the\nsubject of characterology.\n\nAvenarius added to the difficulty of applying his theories by his use of\na practically new terminology (which is certainly most striking and\nindispensable for some of the new views he expounded). But what stands\nmost in the way of accepting some of his conclusions is his desire to\nderive his psychology from the physiology of the brain, a physiology\nwhich he evolved himself out of his inner consciousness with only a\nslight general acquaintance with actual biological facts. The\npsychological, or second part of his \u201cCritique of Pure Experience,\u201d was\nreally the source from which he derived the first or physiological part,\nwith the result that the latter appears to its readers as an account of\nsome discovery in Atlantis. Because of these difficulties I shall give\nhere a short account of the system of Avenarius, as I find it useful for\nmy thesis.\n\nAn \u201cElement\u201d in the sense of Avenarius represents what the usual\npsychology terms a perception, or the content of a perception, what\nSchopenhauer called a presentation, what in England is called an\n\u201cimpression\u201d or \u201cidea,\u201d the \u201cthing,\u201d \u201cfact,\u201d or \u201cobject\u201d of ordinary\nlanguage; and the word is used independently of the presence or absence\nof a special sense-organ stimulation--a most important and novel\naddition. In the sense of Avenarius, and for our purpose, it is a matter\nof indifference to the terminology how far what is called \u201canalysis\u201d\ntakes place, the whole tree may be taken as the \u201celement,\u201d or each\nsingle leaf, or each hair, or (where most people would stop), the\ncolours, sizes, weights, temperatures, resistances, and so forth. Still,\nthe analysis may go yet further, and the colour of the leaf may be taken\nas merely the resultant of its quality, intensity, luminosity, and so\nforth, these being the elements. Or we may go still further and take\nmodern ultimate conceptions reaching units incapable of sub-division.\n\nIn the sense of Avenarius, then, elements are such ideas as \u201cgreen,\u201d\n\u201cblue,\u201d \u201ccold,\u201d \u201cwarm,\u201d \u201csoft,\u201d \u201chard,\u201d \u201csweet,\u201d \u201cbitter,\u201d and their\n\u201ccharacter\u201d is the particular kind of quality with which they appear,\nnot merely their pleasantness or unpleasantness, but also such modes of\npresentation as \u201csurprising,\u201d \u201cexpected,\u201d \u201cnovel,\u201d \u201cindifferent,\u201d\n\u201crecognised,\u201d \u201cknown,\u201d \u201cactual,\u201d \u201cdoubtful,\u201d categories which Avenarius\nfirst recognised as being psychological. For instance, what I guess,\nbelieve, or know is an \u201celement\u201d; the fact that I guess it, not believe\nit or know it, is the \u201ccharacter\u201d in which it presents itself\npsychologically (not logically).\n\nNow there is a stage in mental activity in which this sub-division of\npsychical phenomena cannot be made, which is too early for it. All\n\u201celements\u201d at their first appearance are merged with the floating\nbackground, the whole being vaguely tinged by \u201ccharacter.\u201d To follow my\nmeaning, think of what takes place, when for the first time at a\ndistance one sees something in the landscape, such as a shrub or a heap\nof wood, at the moment when one does not yet know what \u201cit\u201d is.\n\nAt this moment \u201celement\u201d and \u201ccharacter\u201d are absolutely\nindistinguishable (they are always inseparable as Petzoldt ingeniously\npointed out), so improving the original statement of Avenarius.\n\nIn a dense crowd I perceive, for instance, a face which attracts me\nacross the swaying mass by its expression. I have no idea what the face\nis like, and should be quite unable to describe it or give an idea of\nit; but it has appealed to me in the most disturbing manner, and I find\nmyself asking with keen curiosity, \u201cWhere have I seen that face before?\u201d\n\nA man may see the head of a woman for a moment, and this may make a very\nstrong impression on him, and yet he may be unable to say exactly what\nhe has seen, or, for instance, be able to remember the colour of her\nhair. The retina must be exposed to the object sufficiently long, if\nonly a fraction of a second, for a photographic impression to be made.\n\nIf one looks at any object from a considerable distance one has at first\nonly the vaguest impression of its outlines; and as one comes nearer and\nsees the details more clearly, lively sensations, at first lost in the\ngeneral mass, are received. Think, for instance, of the first general\nimpression of, say, the sphenoid bone disarticulated from a skull, or of\nmany pictures seen a little too closely or a little too far away. I\nmyself have a remembrance of having had strong impressions from sonatas\nof Beethoven before I knew anything of the musical notes. Avenarius and\nPetzoldt have overlooked the fact that the coming into consciousness of\nthe elements is accompanied by a kind of secretion of characterisation.\n\nSome of the simple experiments of physiological psychology illustrate\nthe point to which I have been referring. If one stays in a dark room\nuntil the eye has adapted itself to the absence of light, and then for a\nsecond subjects oneself to a ray of coloured light, a sensation of\nillumination will be received, although it is impossible to recognise\nthe quality of the illumination; something has been perceived, but what\nthe something is cannot be apprehended unless the stimulation lasts a\ndefinite time.\n\nIn the same way every scientific discovery, every technical invention,\nevery artistic creation passes through a preliminary phase of\nindistinctness. The process is similar to the series of impressions that\nwould be got as a statue was gradually unwrapped from a series of\nswathings. The same kind of sequence occurs, although, perhaps, in a\nvery brief space of time, when one is trying to recall a piece of music.\nEvery thought is preceded by a kind of half-thought, a condition in\nwhich vague geometrical figures, shifting masks, a swaying and\nindistinct background hover in the mind. The beginning and the end of\nthe whole process, which I may term \u201cclarification,\u201d are what take place\nwhen a short-sighted person proceeds to look through properly adapted\nlenses.\n\nJust as this process occurs in the life of the individual (and he,\nindeed, may die long before it is complete), so it occurs in history.\nDefinite scientific conceptions are preceded by anticipations. The\nprocess of clarification is spread over many generations. There were\nancient and modern vague anticipations of the theory of Darwin and\nLamarck, anticipations which we are now apt to overvalue. Mayer and\nHelmholtz had their predecessors, and Goethe and Leonardo da Vinci,\nperhaps two of the most many-sided intellects known to us, anticipated\nin a vague way many of the conclusions of modern science. The whole\nhistory of thought is a continuous \u201cclarification,\u201d a more and more\naccurate description or realisation of details. The enormous number of\nstages between light and darkness, the minute gradations of detail that\nfollow each other in the development of thought can be realised best if\none follows historically some complicated modern piece of knowledge,\nsuch as, for instance, the theory of elliptical functions.\n\nThe process of clarification may be reversed, and the act of forgetting\nis such a reversal. This may take a considerable time, and is usually\nnoticed only by accident at some point or other of its course. The\nprocess is similar to the gradual obliteration of well-made roads, for\nthe maintenance of which no provision has been made. The faint\nanticipations of a thought are very like the faint recollections of it,\nand the latter gradually become blurred as in the case of a neglected\nroad over the boundaries of which animals stray, slowly obliterating it.\nIn this connection a practical rule for memorising, discovered and\napplied by a friend of mine, is interesting. It generally happens that\nif one wants to learn, say, a piece of music, or a section from the\nhistory of philosophy, one has to go over parts of it again and again.\nThe problem was, how long should the intervals be between these\nsuccessive attempts to commit to memory? The answer was that they should\nnot be so long as to make it possible to take a fresh interest in the\nsubject again, to be interested and curious about it. If the interval\nhas produced that state of mind, then the process of clarification must\nbegin from the beginning again. The rather popular physiological theory\nof Sigismund Exner as to the formation of \u201cpaths\u201d in the nervous system\nmay perhaps be taken as a physical parallel of the process of\nclarification. According to the theory, the nerves, or rather the\nfibrils, make paths easy for the stimulations to travel along, if these\nstimulations last sufficiently long or are repeated sufficiently often.\nSo also in the case of forgetting; what happens is that these paths or\nprocesses of the nerve-cells atrophy from disuse. Avenarius would have\nexplained the above processes by his theory of the articulation of the\nfibres of the brain, but his physical doctrine was rather too crude and\ntoo simple for application to psycho-physics. None the less his\nconception of articulation or jointing is both convenient and\nappropriate in its application to the process of clarification, and I\nshall employ it in that connection.\n\nThe process of clarification must be traced thoroughly in order to\nrealise its importance, but for the moment, it is important to consider\nonly the initial stage. The distinction of Avenarius between \u201celement\u201d\nand \u201ccharacter,\u201d which later on will become evident in a process of\nclarification, is not applicable to the very earliest moments of the\nprocess. It is necessary to coin a name for those minds to which the\nduality of element and character becomes appreciable at no stage of the\nprocess. I propose for psychical data at this earliest stage of their\nexistence the word Henid (from the Greek \u1f11\u03bd, because in them it is\nimpossible to distinguish perception and sensation as two analytically\nseparable factors, and because, therefore, there is no trace of duality\nin them).\n\nNaturally the \u201chenid\u201d is an abstract conception and may not occur in the\nabsolute form. How often psychical data in human beings actually stand\nat this absolute extreme of undifferentiation is uncertain and\nunimportant; but the theory does not need to concern itself with the\npossibility of such an extreme. A common example from what has happened\nto all of us may serve to illustrate what a henid is. I may have a\ndefinite wish to say something particular, and then something distracts\nme, and the \u201cit\u201d I wanted to say or think has gone. Later on, by some\nprocess of association, the \u201cit\u201d is quite suddenly reproduced, and I\nknow at once that it was what was on my tongue, but, so to speak, in a\nmore perfect stage of development.\n\nI fear lest some one may expect me to describe exactly what I mean by\n\u201chenid.\u201d The wish can come only from a misconception. The very idea of a\nhenid forbids its description; it is merely a something. Later on\nidentification will come with the complete articulation of the contents\nof the henid; but the henid is not the whole of this detailed content,\nbut is distinguished from it by a lower grade of consciousness, by an\nabsence of, so to speak, relief, by a blending of the die and the\nimpression, by the absence of a central point in the field of vision.\n\nAnd so one cannot describe particular henids; one can only be conscious\nof their existence.\n\nNone the less henids are things as vital as elements and characters.\nEach henid is an individual and can be distinguished from other henids.\nLater on I shall show that probably the mental data of early childhood\n(certainly of the first fourteen months) are all henids, although\nperhaps not in the absolute sense. Throughout childhood these data do\nnot reach far from the henid stage; in adults there is always a certain\nprocess of development going on. Probably the perceptions of some plants\nand animals are henids. In the case of mankind the development from the\nhenid to the completely differentiated perception and idea is always\npossible, although such an ideal condition may seldom be attained.\nWhilst expression in words is impossible in the case of the absolute\nhenid, as words imply articulated thoughts, there are also in the\nhighest stages of the intellect possible to man some things still\nunclarified and, therefore, unspeakable.\n\nThe theory of henids will help in the old quarrel between the spheres of\nperception and sensation, and will replace by a developmental conception\nthe ideas of element and character which Avenarius and Petzoldt deduced\nfrom the process of clarification. It is only when the elements become\ndistinct that they can be distinguished from the characters. Man is\ndisposed to humours and sentimentalities only so long as the contours of\nhis ideas are vague; when he sees things in the light instead of the\ndark his process of thinking will become different.\n\nNow what is the relation between the investigation I have been making\nand the psychology of the sexes? What is the distinction between the\nmale and the female (and to reach this has been the object of my\ndigression) in the process of clarification?\n\nHere is my answer:\n\nThe male has the same psychical data as the female, but in a more\narticulated form; where she thinks more or less in henids, he thinks in\nmore or less clear and detailed presentations in which the elements are\ndistinct from the tones of feeling. With the woman, thinking and feeling\nare identical, for man they are in opposition. The woman has many of her\nmental experiences as henids, whilst in man these have passed through a\nprocess of clarification. Woman is sentimental, and knows emotion but\nnot mental excitement.\n\nThe greater articulation of the mental data in man is reflected in the\nmore marked character of his body and face, as compared with the\nroundness and vagueness of the woman. In the same connection it is to be\nremembered that, notwithstanding the popular belief, the senses of the\nmale are much more acute than those of the woman. The only exception is\nthe sense of touch, an exception of great interest to which I shall\nrefer later. It has been established, moreover, that the sensibility to\npain is much more acute in man, and we have now learned to distinguish\nbetween that and the tactile sensations.\n\nA weaker sensibility is likely to retard the passage of mental data\nthrough the process of clarification, although we cannot quite take it\nfor granted that it must be so. Perhaps a more trustworthy proof of the\nless degree of articulation in the mental data of the woman may be drawn\nfrom consideration of the greater decision in the judgments made by men,\nalthough indeed it may be the case that this distinction rests on a\ndeeper basis. It is certainly the case that whilst we are still near the\nhenid stage we know much more certainly what a thing is not than what it\nis. What Mach has called instinctive experience depends on henids. While\nwe are near the henid stage we think round about a subject, correct\nourselves at each new attempt, and say that that was not yet the right\nword. Naturally that condition implies uncertainty and indecision in\njudgment. Judgment comes towards the end of the process of\nclarification; the act of judgment is in itself a departure from the\nhenid stage.\n\nThe most decisive proof for the correctness of the view that attributes\nhenids to woman and differentiated thoughts to man, and that sees in\nthis a fundamental sexual distinction, lies in the fact that wherever a\nnew judgment is to be made, (not merely something already settled to be\nput into proverbial form) it is always the case that the female expects\nfrom man the clarification of her data, the interpretation of her\nhenids. It is almost a tertiary sexual character of the male, and\ncertainly it acts on the female as such, that she expects from him the\ninterpretation and illumination of her thoughts. It is from this reason\nthat so many girls say that they could only marry, or, at least, only\nlove a man who was cleverer than themselves; that they would be\nrepelled by a man who said that all they thought was right, and did not\nknow better than they did. In short, the woman makes it a criterion of\nmanliness that the man should be superior to herself mentally, that she\nshould be influenced and dominated by the man; and this in itself is\nenough to ridicule all ideas of sexual equality.\n\nThe male lives consciously, the female lives unconsciously. This is\ncertainly the necessary conclusion for the extreme cases. The woman\nreceives her consciousness from the man; the function to bring into\nconsciousness what was outside it is a sexual function of the typical\nman with regard to the typical woman, and is a necessary part of his\nideal completeness.\n\nAnd now we are brought up against the problem of talent; the whole\nmodern woman question appears to be resolving itself into a dispute as\nto whether men or women are more highly gifted. As the question is\ngenerally propounded there is no attempt to distinguish between the pure\ntypes of sex; the conclusions with regard to these that I have been able\nto set forth have an important bearing on the answer to the question.\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTALENT AND GENIUS\n\nThere has been so much written about the nature of genius that, to avoid\nmisunderstanding, it will be better to make a few general remarks before\ngoing into the subject.\n\nAnd the first thing to do is to settle the question of talent. Genius\nand talent are nearly always connected in the popular idea, as if the\nfirst were a higher, or the highest, grade of the latter, and as if a\nman of very high and varied talents might be a sort of intermediate\nbetween the two. This view is entirely erroneous. Even if there were\ndifferent degrees or grades of genius, they would have absolutely\nnothing to do with so-called \u201ctalent.\u201d A talent, for instance the\nmathematical talent, may be possessed by some one in a very high degree\nfrom birth; and he will be able to master the most difficult problems of\nthat science with ease; but for this he will require no genius, which is\nthe same as originality, individuality, and a condition of general\nproductiveness.\n\nOn the other hand, there are men of great genius who have shown no\nspecial talent in any marked degree; for instance, men like Novalis or\nJean Paul. Genius is distinctly not the superlative of talent; there is\na world-wide difference between the two; they are of absolutely unlike\nnature; they can neither be measured by one another or compared to each\nother.\n\nTalent is hereditary; it may be the common possession of a whole family\n(_e.g._, the Bach family); genius is not transmitted; it is never\ndiffused, but is strictly individual.\n\nMany ill-balanced people, and in particular women, regard genius and\ntalent as identical. Women, indeed, have not the faculty of appreciating\ngenius, although this is not the common view. Any extravagance that\ndistinguishes a man from other men appeals equally to their sexual\nambition; they confuse the dramatist with the actor, and make no\ndistinction between the virtuoso and the artist. For them the talented\nman is the man of genius, and Nietzsche is the type of what they\nconsider genius. What has been called the French type of thought, which\nso strongly appeals to them, has nothing to do with the highest\npossibilities of the mind. Great men take themselves and the world too\nseriously to become what is called merely intellectual. Men who are\nmerely intellectual are insincere; they are people who have never really\nbeen deeply engrossed by things and who do not feel an overpowering\ndesire for production. All that they care about is that their work\nshould glitter and sparkle like a well-cut stone, not that it should\nilluminate anything. They are more occupied with what will be said of\nwhat they think than by the thoughts themselves. There are men who are\nwilling to marry a woman they do not care about merely because she is\nadmired by other men. Such a relation exists between many men and their\nthoughts. I cannot help thinking of one particular living author, a\nblaring, outrageous person, who fancies that he is roaring when he is\nonly snarling. Unfortunately, Nietzsche (however superior he is to the\nman I have in mind) seems to have devoted himself chiefly to what he\nthought would shock the public. He is at his best when he is most\nunmindful of effect. His was the vanity of the mirror, saying to what it\nreflects, \u201cSee how faithfully I show you your image.\u201d In youth when a\nman is not yet certain of himself he may try to secure his own position\nby jostling others. Great men, however, are painfully aggressive only\nfrom necessity. They are not like a girl who is most pleased about a new\ndress because she knows that it will annoy her friends.\n\nGenius! genius! how much mental disturbance and discomfort, hatred and\nenvy, jealousy and pettiness, has it not aroused in the majority of\nmen, and how much counterfeit and tinsel has the desire for it not\noccasioned?\n\nI turn gladly from the imitations of genius to the thing itself and its\ntrue embodiment. But where can I begin? All the qualities that go to\nmake genius are in so intimate connection that to begin with any one of\nthem seems to lead to premature conclusions.\n\nAll discussions on the nature of genius are either biological-clinical,\nand serve only to show the absurd presumption of present knowledge of\nthis kind in its hope to solve a problem so difficult; or they descend\nfrom the heights of a metaphysical system for the sole purpose of\nincluding genius in their purview. If the road that I am about to take\ndoes not lead to every goal at once, it is only because that is the\nnature of roads.\n\nConsider how much deeper a great poet can reach into the nature of man\nthan an average person. Think of the extraordinary number of characters\ndepicted by Shakespeare or Euripides, or the marvellous assortment of\nhuman beings that fill the pages of Zola. After the Penthesilea,\nHeinrich von Kleist created K\u00e4tchen von Heilbronn, and Michael Angelo\nembodied from his imagination the Delphic Sibyls and the Leda. There\nhave been few men so little devoted to art as Kant and Schelling, and\nyet these have written most profoundly and truly about it. In order to\ndepict a man one must understand him, and to understand him one must be\nlike him; in order to portray his psychological activities one must be\nable to reproduce them in oneself. To understand a man one must have his\nnature in oneself. One must be like the mind one tries to grasp. It\ntakes a thief to know a thief, and only an innocent man can understand\nanother innocent man. The poseur only understands other poseurs, and\nsees nothing but pose in the actions of others; whilst the simple-minded\nfails to understand the most flagrant pose. To understand a man is\nreally to be that man.\n\nIt would seem to follow that a man can best understand himself--a\nconclusion plainly absurd. No one can understand himself, for to do\nthat he would have to get outside himself; the subject of the knowing\nand willing activity would have to become its own object. To grasp the\nuniverse it would be necessary to get a standpoint outside the universe,\nand the possibility of such a standpoint is incompatible with the idea\nof a universe. He who could understand himself could understand the\nworld. I do not make the statement merely as an explanation: it contains\nan important truth, to the significance of which I shall recur. For the\npresent I am content to assert that no one can understand his deepest,\nmost intimate nature. This happens in actual practice; when one wishes\nto understand in a general way, it is always from other persons, never\nfrom oneself, that one gets one\u2019s materials. The other person chosen\nmust be similar in some respect, however different as a whole; and,\nmaking use of this similarity, he can recognise, represent, comprehend.\nSo far as one understands a man, one is that man.\n\nThe man of genius takes his place in the above argument as he who\nunderstands incomparably more other beings than the average man. Goethe\nis said to have said of himself that there was no vice or crime of which\nhe could not trace the tendency in himself, and that at some period of\nhis life he could not have understood fully. The genius, therefore, is a\nmore complicated, more richly endowed, more varied man; and a man is the\ncloser to being a genius the more men he has in his personality, and the\nmore really and strongly he has these others within him. If\ncomprehension of those about him only flickers in him like a poor\ncandle, then he is unable, like the great poet, to kindle a mighty flame\nin his heroes, to give distinction and character to his creations. The\nideal of an artistic genius is to live in all men, to lose himself in\nall men, to reveal himself in multitudes; and so also the aim of the\nphilosopher is to discover all others in himself, to fuse them into a\nunit which is his own unit.\n\nThis protean character of genius is no more simultaneous than the\nbi-sexuality of which I have spoken. Even the greatest genius cannot\nunderstand the nature of all men at the same time, on one and the same\nday. The comprehensive and manifold rudiments which a man possesses in\nhis mind can develop only slowly and by degrees with the gradual\nunfolding of his whole life. It appears almost as if there were a\ndefinite periodicity in his development. These periods, when they recur,\nhowever, are not exactly alike; they are not mere repetitions, but are\nintensifications of their predecessors, on a higher plane. No two\nmoments in the life of an individual are exactly alike; there is between\nthe later and the earlier periods only the similarity of the higher and\nlower parts of a spiral ascent. Thus it has frequently happened that\nfamous men have conceived a piece of work in their early youth, laid it\naside during manhood, and resumed and completed it in old age. Periods\nexist in every man, but in different degrees and with varying\n\u201camplitude.\u201d Just as the genius is the man who contains in himself the\ngreatest number of others in the most active way, so the amplitude of a\nman\u2019s periods will be the greater the wider his mental relations may be.\nIllustrious men have often been told, by their teachers, in their youth\n\u201cthat they were always in one extreme or another.\u201d As if they could be\nanything else! These transitions in the case of unusual men often assume\nthe character of a crisis. Goethe once spoke of the \u201crecurrence of\npuberty\u201d in an artist. The idea is obviously to be associated with the\nmatter under discussion.\n\nIt results from their periodicity that, in men of genius, sterile years\nprecede productive years, these again to be followed by sterility, the\nbarren periods being marked by psychological self-depreciation, by the\nfeeling that they are less than other men; times in which the\nremembrance of the creative periods is a torment, and when they envy\nthose who go about undisturbed by such penalties. Just as his moments of\necstasy are more poignant, so are the periods of depression of a man of\ngenius more intense than those of other men. Every great man has such\nperiods, of longer or shorter duration, times in which he loses\nself-confidence, in which he thinks of suicide; times in which, indeed,\nhe may be sowing the seeds of a future harvest, but which are devoid of\nthe stimulus to production; times which call forth the blind criticisms\n\u201cHow such a genius is degenerating!\u201d \u201cHow he has played himself out!\u201d\n\u201cHow he repeats himself!\u201d and so forth.\n\nIt is just the same with other characteristics of the man of genius. Not\nonly the material, but also the spirit, of his work is subject to\nperiodic change. At one time he is inclined to a philosophical and\nscientific view; at another time the artistic influence is strongest; at\none time his intervals are altogether in the direction of history and\nthe growth of civilisation; later on it is \u201cnature\u201d (compare Nietzsche\u2019s\n\u201cStudies in Infinity\u201d with his \u201cZarathustra\u201d); at another time he is a\nmystic, at yet another simplicity itself! (Bj\u00f6rnson and Maurice\nMaeterlinck are good modern examples.) In fact, the \u201camplitude\u201d of the\nperiods of famous men is so great, the different revelations of their\nnature so various, so many different individuals appear in them, that\nthe periodicity of their mental life may be taken almost as diagnostic.\nI must make a remark sufficiently obvious from all this, as to the\nexistence of almost incredibly great changes in the personal appearance\nof men of genius from time to time. Comparison of the portraits at\ndifferent times of Goethe, Beethoven, Kant, or Schopenhauer are enough\nto establish this. The number of different aspects that the face of a\nman has assumed may be taken almost as a physiognomical measure of his\ntalent.[9]\n\n  [9] I cannot help using the word \u201ctalent\u201d from time to time when I\n  really mean genius; but I wish it to be remembered that I am convinced\n  of the existence of a fundamental distinction between \u201ctalent,\u201d or\n  \u201cgiftedness,\u201d and \u201cgenius.\u201d\n\nPeople with an unchanging expression are low in the intellectual scale.\nPhysiognomists, therefore, must not be surprised that men of genius, in\nwhose faces a new side of their minds is continually being revealed, are\ndifficult to classify, and that their individualities leave little\npermanent mark on their features.\n\nIt is possible that my introductory description of genius will be\nrepudiated indignantly, because it would imply that a Shakespeare has\nthe vulgarity of his Falstaff, the rascality of his Iago, the\nboorishness of his Caliban, and because it identifies great men with all\nthe low and contemptible things that they have described. As a matter of\nfact, men of genius do conform to my description, and as their\nbiographies show, are liable to the strangest passions and the most\nrepulsive instincts. And yet the objection is invalid, as the fuller\nexposition of the thesis will reveal. Only the most superficial survey\nof the argument could support it, whilst the exactly opposite conclusion\nis a much more likely inference. Zola, who has so faithfully described\nthe impulse to commit murder, did not himself commit a murder, because\nthere were so many other characters in him. The actual murderer is in\nthe grasp of his own disposition: the author describing the murder is\nswayed by a whole kingdom of impulses. Zola would know the desire for\nmurder much better than the actual murderer would know it, he would\nrecognise it in himself, if it really came to the surface in him, and he\nwould be prepared for it. In such ways the criminal instincts in great\nmen are intellectualised and turned to artistic purposes as in the case\nof Zola, or to philosophic purposes as with Kant, but not to actual\ncrime.\n\nThe presence of a multitude of possibilities in great men has important\nconsequences connected with the theory of henids that I elaborated in\nthe last chapter. A man understands what he already has within himself\nmuch more quickly than what is foreign to him (were it otherwise there\nwould be no intercourse possible: as it is we do not realise how often\nwe fail to understand one another). To the genius, who understands so\nmuch more than the average man, much more will be apparent.\n\nThe schemer will readily recognise his fellow; an impassioned player\neasily reads the same power in another person; whilst those with no\nspecial powers will observe nothing. Art discerns itself best, as Wagner\nsaid. In the case of complex personalities the matter stands thus: one\nof these can understand other men better than they can understand\nthemselves, because within himself he has not only the character he is\ngrasping, but also its opposite. Duality is necessary for observation\nand comprehension; if we inquire from psychology what is the most\nnecessary condition for becoming conscious of a thing, for grasping it,\nwe shall find the answer in \u201ccontrast.\u201d If everything were a uniform\ngrey we should have no idea of colour; absolute unison of sound would\nsoon produce sleep in all mankind; duality, the power which can\ndifferentiate, is the origin of the alert consciousness. Thus it happens\nthat no one can understand himself were he to think of nothing else all\nhis life, but he can understand another to whom he is partly alike, and\nfrom whom he is also partly quite different. Such a distribution of\nqualities is the condition most favourable for understanding. In short,\nto understand a man means to have equal parts of himself and of his\nopposite in one.\n\nThat things must be present in pairs of contrasts if we are to be\nconscious of one member of the pair is shown by the facts of\ncolour-vision. Colour-blindness always extends to the complementary\ncolours. Those who are red blind are also green blind; those who are\nblind to blue have no consciousness of yellow. This law holds good for\nall mental phenomena; it is a fundamental condition of consciousness.\nThe most high-spirited people understand and experience depression much\nmore than those who are of level disposition. Any one with so keen a\nsense of delicacy and subtilty as Shakespeare must also be capable of\nextreme grossness.\n\nThe more types and their contrasts a man unites in his own mind the less\nwill escape him, since observation follows comprehension, and the more\nhe will see and understand what other men feel, think, and wish. There\nhas never been a genius who was not a great discerner of men. The great\nman sees through the simpler man often at a glance, and would be able to\ncharacterise him completely.\n\nMost men have this, that, or the other faculty or sense\ndisproportionately developed. One man knows all the birds and tells\ntheir different voices most accurately. Another has a love for plants\nand is devoted to botany from his childhood. One man pores lovingly into\nthe many layered rocks of the earth, and has only the vaguest\nappreciation of the skies; to another the attraction of cold, star-sown\nspace is supreme. One man is repelled by the mountains and seeks the\nrestless sea; another, like Nietzsche, gets no help from the tossing\nwaters and hungers for the peace of the hills. Every man, however simple\nhe may be, has some side of nature with which he is in special sympathy\nand for which his faculties are specially alert. And so the ideal\ngenius, who has all men within him, has also all their preferences and\nall their dislikes. There is in him not only the universality of men,\nbut of all nature. He is the man to whom all things tell their secrets,\nto whom most happens, and whom least escapes. He understands most\nthings, and those most deeply, because he has the greatest number of\nthings to contrast and compare them with. The genius is he who is\nconscious of most, and of that most acutely. And so without doubt his\nsensations must be most acute; but this must not be understood as\nimplying, say, in the artist the keenest power of vision, in the\ncomposer the most acute hearing; the measure of genius is not to be\ntaken from the acuteness of the sense organ but from that of the\nperceiving brain.\n\nThe consciousness of the genius is, then, the furthest removed from the\nhenid stage. It has the greatest, most limpid clearness and\ndistinctness. In this way genius declares itself to be a kind of higher\nmasculinity, and thus the female cannot be possessed of genius. The\nconclusion of this chapter and the last is simply that the life of the\nmale is a more highly conscious life than that of the female, and genius\nis identical with the highest and widest consciousness. This extremely\ncomprehensive consciousness of the highest types of mankind is due to\nthe enormous number of contrasting elements in their natures.\n\nUniversality is the distinguishing mark of genius. There is no such\nthing as a special genius, a genius for mathematics, or for music, or\neven for chess, but only a universal genius. The genius is a man who\nknows everything without having learned it.\n\nIt stands to reason that this infinite knowledge does not include\ntheories and systems which have been formulated by science from facts,\nneither the history of the Spanish war of succession nor experiments in\ndia-magnetism.\n\nThe artist does not acquire his knowledge of the colours reflected on\nwater by cloudy or sunny skies, by a course of optics, any more than it\nrequires a deep study of characterology to judge other men. But the more\ngifted a man is, the more he has studied on his own account, and the\nmore subjects he has made his own.\n\nThe theory of special genius, according to which, for instance, it is\nsupposed that a musical \u201cgenius\u201d should be a fool at other subjects,\nconfuses genius with talent. A musician, if truly great, is just as well\nable to be universal in his knowledge as a philosopher or a poet. Such\nan one was Beethoven. On the other hand, a musician may be as limited in\nthe sphere of his activity as any average man of science. Such an one\nwas Johann Strauss, who, in spite of his beautiful melodies, cannot be\nregarded as a genius if only because of the absence of constructive\nfaculty in him. To come back to the main point; there are many kinds of\ntalent, but only one kind of genius, and that is able to choose any kind\nof talent and master it. There is something in genius common to all\nthose who possess it; however much difference there may seem to be\nbetween the great philosopher, painter, musician, poet, or religious\nteacher. The particular talent through the medium of which the spirit of\na man develops is of less importance than has generally been thought.\nThe limits of the different arts can easily be passed, and much besides\nnative inborn gifts have to be taken into account. The history of one\nart should be studied along with the history of other arts, and in that\nway many obscure events might be explained. It is outside my present\npurpose, however, to go into the question of what determines a genius to\nbecome, say, a mystic, or, say, a great delineator.\n\nFrom genius itself, the common quality of all the different\nmanifestations of genius, woman is debarred. I will discuss later as to\nwhether such things are possible as pure scientific or technical genius\nas well as artistic and philosophical genius. There is good reason for a\ngreater exactness in the use of the word. But that may come, and however\nclearly we may yet be able to describe it woman will have to be excluded\nfrom it. I am glad that the course of my inquiry has been such as to\nmake it impossible for me to be charged with having framed such a\ndefinition of genius as necessarily to exclude woman from it.\n\nI may now sum up the conclusions of this chapter. Whilst woman has no\nconsciousness of genius, except as manifested in one particular person,\nwho imposes his personality on her, man has a deep capacity for\nrealising it, a capacity which Carlyle, in his still little understood\nbook on \u201cHero-Worship,\u201d has described so fully and permanently. In\n\u201cHero-Worship,\u201d moreover, the idea is definitely insisted on that genius\nis linked with manhood, that it represents an ideal masculinity in the\nhighest form. Woman has no direct consciousness of it; she borrows a\nkind of imperfect consciousness from man. Woman, in short, has an\nunconscious life, man a conscious life, and the genius the most\nconscious life.\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTALENT AND MEMORY\n\nThe following observation bears on my henid theory:\n\nI made a note, half mechanically, of a page in a botanical work from\nwhich later on I was going to make an extract. Something was in my mind\nin henid form. What I thought, how I thought it, what was then knocking\nat the door of my consciousness, I could not remember a minute\nafterwards, in spite of the hardest effort. I take this case as a\ntypical example of the henid.\n\nThe more deeply impressed, the more detailed a complex perception may be\nthe more easily does it reproduce itself. Clearness of the consciousness\nis the preliminary condition for remembering, and the memory of the\nmental stimulation is proportional to the intensity of the\nconsciousness. \u201cI shall not forget that\u201d; \u201cI shall remember that all my\nlife\u201d; \u201cThat will never escape my memory again.\u201d Such phrases men use\nwhen things have made a deep impression on them, of moments in which\nthey have gained wisdom or have become richer by an important\nexperience. As the power of being reproduced is directly proportionate\nto the organisation of a mental impression, it is clear that there can\nbe no recollection of an absolute henid.\n\nAs the mental endowment of a man varies with the organisation of his\naccumulated experiences, the better endowed he is, the more readily will\nhe be able to remember his whole past, everything that he has ever\nthought or heard, seen or done, perceived or felt, the more completely\nin fact will he be able to reproduce his whole life. Universal\nremembrance of all its experiences, therefore, is the sure, most\ngeneral, and most easily proved mark of a genius. If a common theory,\nespecially popular with the philosophers of the coffee-house, be true,\nthat productive men (because they are always covering new ground) have\nno memory, it is often because they are productive only from being on\nnew ground.\n\nThe great extent and acuteness of the memory of men of genius, which I\npropose to lay down dogmatically as a necessary inference from my\ntheory, without attempting to prove it further, is not incompatible with\ntheir rapid loss of the facts impressed on them in school, the tables of\nGreek verbs, and so forth. Their memory is of what they have\nexperienced, not of what they have learned. Of all that was acquired for\nexamination purposes only so much will be retained as was in harmony\nwith the natural talent of the pupil. Thus a house-painter may have a\nbetter memory for colours than a great philosopher; the most narrow\nphilologist may remember Greek aorists that he has learned by heart\nbetter than his teacher, who may none the less be a great poet. The\nuselessness of the experimental school of psychology (notwithstanding\ntheir marvellous arsenal of instruments of experimental precision) is\nshown by their expectation of getting results as to memory from tests\nwith letters, unconnected words, long rows of figures. These experiments\nhave so little bearing on the true memory of man, on the memory by which\nhe recalls the experiences of his life, that one wonders if such\npsychologists have realised that such a thing as the mind exists. The\ncustomary experiments place the most different subjects under the same\nconditions, pay no attention to the individuality of these subjects, and\ntreat them merely as good or bad registering apparatus. There is a\nparable in the fact that the two German words \u201cbemerken\u201d (take notice\nof) and \u201cmerken\u201d (remember) come from the same root. Only what is\nharmonious with some inborn quality will be retained. When a man\nremembers a thing, it is because he was capable of taking some interest\nin the thing; when he forgets, it is because he was uninterested. The\nreligious man will surely and exactly remember texts, the poet verses\nand the mathematician equations.\n\nThis brings us in another fashion to the subject of the last chapter,\nand to another reason for the great memories of genius. The more\nsignificant a man is, the more different personalities he unites in\nhimself, the more interests that are contained in him, the more wide his\nmemory must be. All men have practically the same opportunities of\nperception, but the vast majority of men apprehend only an infinitesimal\npart of what they have perceived. The ideal genius is one in whom\nperception and apprehension are identical in their field. Of course no\nsuch being actually exists. On the other hand, there is no man who has\napprehended nothing that he has perceived. In this way we may take it\nthat all degrees of genius (not talent) exist; no male is quite without\na trace of genius. Complete genius is an ideal; no man is absolutely\nwithout the quality, and no man possesses it completely. Apprehension or\nabsorption, and memory or retention, vary together in their extent and\ntheir permanence. There is an uninterrupted gradation from the man whose\nmentality is unconnected from moment to moment, and to whom no incidents\ncan signify anything because there is within him nothing to compare them\nwith (such an extreme, of course, does not exist) to the fully developed\nminds for which everything is unforgettable, because of the firm\nimpressions made and the sureness with which they are absorbed. The\nextreme of genius also does not exist, because even the greatest genius\nis not wholly a genius at every moment of his life.\n\nWhat is at once a deduction from the necessary connection between memory\nand genius, and a proof of the actuality of the connection, lies in the\nextraordinary memory for minute details shown by the man of genius.\nBecause of the universality of his mind, everything has only one\ninterpretation for him, an interpretation often unsuspected at the time;\nand so things cling obstinately in his memory and remain there\ninextinguishably, although he may have taken not the smallest trouble to\ntake note of them. And so one may almost take as another mark of the\ngenius that the phrase \u201cthis is no longer true\u201d has no meaning for him.\nThere is nothing that is no longer true for him, probably just because\nhe has a clearer idea than other men of the changes that come with time.\n\nThe following appears to be one of the best means for the objective\nexamination of the endowment of a man: If after a long separation from\nhim we resume the new intercourse with the circumstances of the last,\nthen we shall find that the highly endowed man has forgotten nothing,\nthat he vividly and completely takes up the subject from where it was\nleft off with the fullest recollection of the details. How much ordinary\nmen forget of their lives any one can prove to his astonishment and\nhorror. It may happen that we have been for hours importantly engaged\nwith a man a few weeks before, and we may find that he has forgotten all\nabout it. It is true that if one recalls all the circumstances to his\nmind, he begins to remember, and, finally, with sufficient help, may\nremember almost completely. Such experience has made me think that there\nmay be an empirical proof of the hypothesis that no absolute forgetting\never occurs; that if the right method with the individual be chosen\nrecollection may always be induced.\n\nIt follows also that from one\u2019s own experience, from what one has\nthought or said, heard or read, felt or done, one can give the smallest\npossible to another, that the other does not already know. Consideration\nof the amount that a man can take in from another would seem to serve as\na sort of objective measure of his genius, a measure that does not have\nto wait for an estimation of his actual creative efforts. I am not going\nto discuss the extent to which this theory opposes current views on\neducation, but I recommend parents and teachers to pay attention to it.\nThe extent to which a man can detect differences and resemblances must\ndepend on his memories. This faculty will be best developed in those\nwhose past permeates their present, all the moments of the life of whom\nare amalgamated. Such persons will have the greatest opportunities of\ndetecting resemblances and so finding the material for comparisons. They\nwill always seize hold of from the past what has the greatest\nresemblance to the present experience, and the two experiences will be\ncombined in such a way that no similarities or differences will be\nconcealed. And so they are able to maintain the past against the\ninfluence of the present. It is not without reason that from time\nimmemorial the special merit of poetry has been considered to be its\nrichness in beautiful comparisons and pictures, or that we turn to again\nand again, or await our favourite images with impatience when we read\nHomer or Shakespeare or Klopstock. To-day when, for the first time for a\ncentury and a half, Germany is without great poets or painters, and when\nnone the less it is impossible to find any one who is not an \u201cauthor,\u201d\nthe power of clear and beautiful comparison seems to have gone. A period\nthe nature of which can best be described in vague and dubious words,\nthe philosophy of which has become in more than one sense the philosophy\nof the unconscious can contain nothing great. Consciousness is the mark\nof greatness, and before it the unconscious is dispersed as the sun\ndisperses a mist. If only consciousness were to come to this age, how\nquickly voices that are now famous would become silent. It is only in\nfull consciousness, in which the experience of the present assumes\ngreater intensity by its union with all the experiences of the past,\nthat imagination, the necessary quality for all philosophical as for all\nartistic effort, can find a place. It is untrue, therefore, that women\nhave more imagination than men. The experiences on account of which men\nhave assigned higher powers of imagination to women come entirely from\nthe imaginative sexual life of women. The only inferences that can be\ndrawn from this do not belong to the present section of my work.\n\nThe absence of women from the history of music must be referred to\ndeeper causes; but it also supports my contention that women are devoid\nof imagination. To produce music requires a great deal more imagination\nthan the malest woman possesses, and much more than is required for\nother kinds of artistic or for scientific effort. There is nothing in\nnature, nothing in the sphere of the senses, corresponding directly with\nsound pictures. Music has no relation to the world of experience; there\nis no \u201cmusic,\u201d no chords or melodies in the natural world; these have to\nbe evolved from the imagination of the composer. Every other art has\nmore definite relations to empirical art. Even architecture, which has\nbeen compared with music, has definite relations to matter, although,\nlike music, it has no anticipations in the senses. Architecture, too, is\nan entirely masculine occupation. The very idea of a female architect\nexcites compassion.\n\nThe so-called stupefying effect of music on the creative or practical\nmusician (especially instrumental music) depends on the fact that even\nthe sense of smell is a better guide to man in the world of experience\nthan the contents of a musical work. And it is just this complete\nabsence of all relation to the world of sight, taste, and smell, that\nmakes music specially unfitted to express the female nature. It also\nexplains why this peculiarity of his art demands the highest grade of\nimagination from a musician, and why those to whom musical compositions\n\u201ccome\u201d seem stranger to their fellow men than painters or sculptors. The\nso-called \u201cimagination\u201d of women must be very different from that of\nmen, since there is no woman with even the same position in the history\nof music that Angelica Kaufmann had in art.\n\nWhere anything obviously depends on strong moulding women have not the\nsmallest leaning towards its production, neither in philosophy nor in\nmusic, in the plastic arts nor in architecture. Where, however, a weak\nand vague sentimentality can be expressed with little effort, as in\npainting or verse-making, or in pseudo-mysticism and theosophy, women\nhave sought and found a suitable field for their efforts. Their lack of\nproductiveness in the former sphere is in harmony with the vagueness of\nthe psychical life of women. Music is the nearest possible approach to\nthe organisation of a sensation. Nothing is more definite,\ncharacteristic, and impressive than a melody, nothing that will more\nstrongly resist obliteration. One remembers much longer what is sung\nthan what is spoken, and the arias better than the recitatives.\n\nLet us note specially here that the usual phrases of the defenders of\nwomen do not apply to the case of women. Music is not one of the arts to\nwhich women have had access only so recently that it is too soon to\nexpect fruits; from the remotest antiquity women have sung and played.\nAnd yet....\n\nIt is to be remembered that even in the case of drawing and painting\nwomen have now had opportunities for at least two centuries. Every one\nknows how many girls learn to draw and sketch, and it cannot be said\nthat there has not yet been time for results were results possible. As\nthere are so few female painters with the smallest importance in the\nhistory of art, it must be that there is something in the nature of\nthings against it. As a matter of fact, the painting and etching of\nwomen is no more than a sort of elegant, luxurious handiwork. The\nsensuous, physical element of colour is more suitable for them than the\nintellectual work of formal line-drawing, and hence it is, that whereas\nwomen have acquired some small distinction in painting they have gained\nnone in drawing. The power of giving form to chaos is with those in whom\nthe most universal memory has made the widest comprehension possible; it\nis a quality of the masculine genius.\n\nI regret that I must so continually use the word genius, as if that\nshould apply only to a caste as well defined from those below as\nincome-tax payers are from the untaxed. The word genius was very\nprobably invented by a man who had small claims on it himself; greater\nmen would have understood better what to be a genius really was, and\nprobably they would have come to see that the word could be applied to\nmost people. Goethe said that perhaps only a genius is able to\nunderstand a genius.\n\nThere are probably very few people who have not at some time of their\nlives had some quality of genius. If they have not had such, it is\nprobable that they have also been without great sorrow or great pain.\nThey would have needed only to live sufficiently intently for a time for\nsome quality to reveal itself. The poems of first love are a case in\npoint, and certainly such love is a sufficient stimulus.\n\nIt must not be forgotten that quite ordinary men in moments of\nexcitement, in anger at some underhanded deed, have found words with\nwhich they never would have been credited. The greater part of what is\ncalled expression in art as in language depends (if the reader will\nremember what I have said about the process of \u201cclarification\u201d) on the\nfact that some individual more richly endowed clarifies, organises, and\nexhibits some idea almost instantaneously, an idea which to a less\nendowed person was still in the henid form. The course of clarification\nis much shortened in the mind of the second person.\n\nIf it really were the case, as popular opinion has tried to establish,\nthat the genius were separated from ordinary men by a thick wall through\nwhich no sound could penetrate, then all understanding of the efforts of\ngenius would be denied to ordinary men, and their works would fail to\nmake any impression on them. All hopes of progress depend on this being\nuntrue. And it is untrue. The difference between men of genius and the\nothers is quantitative not qualitative, of degree not of kind.\n\nThere is, moreover, very little sense in preventing young people from\ngiving expression to their ideas on the pretext that they have less\nexperience than have older persons. There are many who may live a\nthousand years without encountering experience of any value. It could\nonly be in a society of persons equally gifted that such an idea could\nhave any meaning.\n\nBecause the life of the genius is more intense even in his earliest\nyears than that of other children, his memory can go further back. In\nextreme cases the memory may be complete and vivid back to the third\nyear of life, whereas in most recollection begins much later. I know\nsome people whose earliest recollections date only from their eighth\nyear, and there are instances of an even later beginning of the\nconscious life. I do not maintain that the date at which active memory\nbegins can be taken as a measure of relative genius, that he who\nremembers from his second year is so much the more of a genius than he\nwho can go back only to his fourth or fifth year. But in a general way,\nI believe the parallel to hold good.\n\nEven in the cases of the greatest men, some time, greater or shorter,\nelapsed between the date of their earliest recollection and the time\nfrom which onwards they remember everything, from the time, in fact, in\nwhich their genius was ripe. But in the case of most men there is\nforgetfulness of the greater part of their lives; they are conscious\nonly that they themselves and none other have lived their lives. Out of\ntheir whole lives there only remain certain moments, and scattered\nrecollections, which serve as sign-posts. If they are asked about any\nparticular thing they can only tell, for instance, because in such and\nsuch a month they were so old, or they wore such and such clothes, they\nlived at this place, or that their income was so much.\n\nIf one has lived with them in former years, it is only after great\ntrouble that the past can be brought to their mind. In such cases one is\nsurely justified in saying that such a person is ungifted, or at least\nin not considering him conspicuously able.\n\nThe request for an autobiography would put most men into a most painful\nposition; they could scarcely tell if they were asked what they had done\nthe day before. Memory with most people is quite spasmodic and purely\nassociative. In the case of the man of genius every impression that he\nhas received endures; he is always under the influence of impressions;\nand so nearly all men of genius tend to suffer from fixed ideas. The\npsychical condition of men\u2019s minds may be compared with a set of bells\nclose together, and so arranged that in the ordinary man a bell rings\nonly when one beside it sounds, and the vibration lasts only a moment.\nIn the genius, when a bell sounds it vibrates so strongly that it sets\nin action the whole series, and remains in action throughout life. The\nlatter kind of movement often gives rise to extraordinary conditions and\nabsurd impulses, that may last for weeks together and that form the\nbasis of the supposed kinship of genius with insanity.\n\nFor similar reasons gratitude is apparently the rarest human virtue.\nPeople are often very conscious of how much they have borrowed, but they\nneither can nor will try to remember the necessity in which they stood,\nnor the freedom which that help brought them. Even if want of memory\nwere really the cause of ingratitude, it would not be sufficient for a\nman to possess a marvellous memory to have a like spirit of gratitude. A\nspecial condition is also necessary, but its description cannot be\nundertaken here.\n\nFrom the connection between giftedness and memory which is so often\nmistaken and denied because it is not sought where it is to be found,\nfrom the power of self recollection, a further fact is to be deduced.\nThe poet who feels urged to write without premeditation, without\nreflection, without having willingly pressed the pedal; the musician to\nwhom the desire to compose has come, so that he must create whether he\nwill or no, even if he feels more inclined to sleep or to rest; these,\nin such moments, will simply reproduce thoughts they have carried in\ntheir heads all their lives. A composer who can remember none of his\nsongs or subjects by heart, or a poet who cannot recollect any of his\npoems--without having carefully learned them--such men are in no sense\nreally great.\n\nBefore we apply these remarks to the consideration of the mental\ndifferences of the sexes, we must make yet one more distinction between\ndifferent kinds of memory. The individual moments in the life of a\ngifted man are not remembered as disconnected points, not as different\nparticles of time, each one separated and defined from the following\none, as the numerals one, two, and so on.\n\nThe result of self-observation shows that sleep, the limitations of\nconsciousness, the gaps in memory, even special experiences, appear to\nbe in some mysterious way one great whole; incidents do not follow each\nother like the tickings of a watch, but they pass along in a single\nunbroken stream. With ordinary men the moments which are united in a\nclose continuity out of the original discrete multiplicity are very few,\nand the course of their lives resembles a little brook, whereas with the\ngenius it is more like a mighty river into which all the little rivulets\nflow from afar; that is to say, the universal comprehension of genius\nvibrates to no experience in which all the individual moments have not\nbeen gathered up and stored.\n\nThis peculiar continuity by which a man first realises that he exists,\nthat he is, and that he is in the world, is all comprehensive in the\ngenius, limited to a few important moments in the mediocre, _and\naltogether lacking in woman_. When a woman looks back over her life and\nlives again her experiences, there is presented no continuous, unbroken\nstream, but only a few scattered points. And what kind of points? They\nare just those which accord with woman\u2019s natural instincts. Of what\nthese interests exclusively consist the second chapter gave a\npreliminary idea; and those who remember the ideas in question will not\nbe astonished at the following facts: The female is concerned altogether\nwith one class of recollections--those connected with the sexual impulse\nand reproduction. She thinks of her lovers and proposals, of her\nmarriage day, of every child as if it were a doll; of the flowers which\nshe received at every ball, the number, size, and price of the bouquets;\nof every serenade; of every verse which (as she fondly imagines) was\nwritten for her; of every phrase by which a lover has impressed her; but\nabove all--with an exactness which is as contemptible as it is\ndisquieting to herself--of every compliment without exception that has\never been paid her.\n\nThat is _all_ that the _real_ woman recalls of her life. But it is just\nthose things which human beings never forget, and those they cannot\nremember that give the clue to knowledge of their life and character. It\nbelongs to a later period of the book to go more thoroughly into the\nreason why the female has precisely the remembrances she has. Some\nimportant conclusion may be expected from reflection on the incredible\nmemory with which women recall all the adulation and flattery, all the\nproofs of gallantry, which have happened to them since childhood.\n\nWhatever may be urged against the present complete limitation of the\nfemale memory to the sphere of sexuality and conjugal life, it is to me\nquite evident. Various arguments about girls\u2019 schools, and so forth, I\nam prepared for. These difficulties will have to be cleared away later.\nBut I must just say again that all memory, which is to be used as a\nmeans of psychological definition of the individual, can include only\nthe memory of what has been learnt when learning means actual\nexperience.\n\nThe explanation of the discontinuity in the psychical life of women\n(reference to which is introduced here, only because it is a necessary\npsychological factor in the problem of memory, and without reference to\nits spiritualistic or idealistic significance) can be reached only when\nthe nature of continuity is studied with reference to the deepest\nproblems of philosophy and psychology.\n\nAs a proof of the fact I will at present quote nothing more than the\nstatement of Lotze, which has so often caused astonishment, that women\nmuch more readily submit themselves to new relationships and more easily\naccommodate themselves to them than men, in whom the parvenu can be seen\nmuch longer, whereas one might not be able to tell the peasant from the\npeeress, the woman brought up in poor surroundings from the patrician\u2019s\ndaughter. Later on I shall deal more exhaustively with this subject.\n\nAt any rate, it will now be seen why (if neither vanity, desire for\ngossip, nor imitation drives them to it) only the better men write down\nrecollections of their lives, and how I perceive in this a strong\nevidence of the connection between memory and giftedness. It is not as\nif every man of genius wished to write an autobiography: the incitement\nto autobiography comes from special, very deep-seated psychological\nconditions. But on the other hand, the writing of a full autobiography,\nif it is the outcome of a genuine desire, is always the sign of a\nsuperior man. For real faithful memory is the source of reverence. The\nreally great would resist any temptation to give up his past in exchange\nfor material advantage or mental health; the greatest treasures of the\nworld, even happiness itself, he would not take in exchange for his\nmemories.\n\nThe desire for a draught of the waters of Lethe is the trait of mediocre\nor inferior natures. And however much a really great man, as Goethe\nsays, may condemn and abhor his past failings, and although he sees\nothers clinging fast to theirs, he will never smile at those past\nactions and failings of his own, or make merry over his early mode of\nlife and thought.\n\nThe class of persons, now so much in evidence, who claim to have\n\u201cconquered\u201d their pasts, have the smallest possible claim to the word\n\u201cconquer.\u201d They are those who idly relate that they formerly believed\nthis or the other, but have now \u201covercome\u201d their beliefs, whereas they\nare as little in earnest about the present as they were about the past.\nThey see only the mechanism, not the soul of things, and at no stage\nwhat they believe themselves to have conquered was deep in their\nnatures.\n\nIn contrast with these it may be noticed with what painful care great\nmen render even the, apparently, most minute details in their own\nbiographies: for them the past and present are equal; with others\nneither of the two are real.\n\nThe famous man realises how everything, even the smallest, most\nsecondary, matters played an important part in his life, how they have\nhelped his development, and to this fact is due his extraordinary\nreverence for his own memoirs. And such an autobiography is not written\nall at once, as it were, with one event treated like another, and\nwithout meditation; nor does the idea of it suddenly occur to a man; the\nmaterial for such a work by a great man, so to speak, is always at hand.\n\nHis new experiences acquire a deeper significance because of the past,\nwhich is always present to him, and hence the great man and only the\ngreat man, feels that he himself is in very truth a \u201cman of destiny.\u201d\nAnd so it comes that great men are always more \u201csuperstitious\u201d than\naverage men. To sum up, I may say:\n\nA man is himself important precisely in proportion that all things seem\nimportant to him.\n\nIn the course of further investigation this dictum will be seen to have\na deep significance even apart from its bearing on the universality,\ncomprehension, and comparison exhibited by the genius.\n\nThe position of woman in these matters is not difficult to explain. A\nreal woman never becomes conscious of a destiny, of her own destiny; she\nis not heroic; she fights most for her possessions, and there is nothing\ntragic in the struggle as her own fate is decided with the fate of her\npossessions.\n\nInasmuch as woman is without continuity, she can have no true reverence;\nas a fact, reverence is a purely male virtue. A man is first reverent\nabout himself, and self-respect is the first stage in reverence for all\nthings. But it costs a woman very little to break off with her past; if\nthe word irony could be fittingly used here, one might say that a man\ndoes not easily regard his past with irony and superiority as women\nappear to do--and not only after marriage.\n\nLater on I shall show how women are exactly the opposite of that which\nreverence means. I would rather be silent about the reverence of widows.\n\nThe superstition of women is psychologically absolutely different from\nthe superstitions of famous men.\n\nThe reverent relation to one\u2019s own past, which depends on a real\ncontinuity of memory, and which is possible only by comprehension, can\nbe shown in relation to a still wider and deeper subject.\n\nWhether a man has a real relationship to his own past or not, involves\nthe question as to whether he has a desire for immortality, or if the\nidea of death is indifferent to him.\n\nThe desire for immortality is to-day, as a rule, treated shamefully, and\nin a very different spirit.\n\nNot only is the problem treated as merely ontological, but the\npsychological side of it is only trifled with. It has been held that it\nis connected, like the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, with the\nfeeling that we have all experienced, when, in doing something certainly\nfor the first time, we seem to remember having gone through the same\nexperience before. Another generally adopted view is to derive the idea\nof immortality from the belief in spirits, as has been done by Tylor,\nSpencer, Avenarius, and others, although in any other age than this age\nof experimental psychology it would have been dismissed _a priori_. I am\nsure that it must seem impossible to the majority of thinking men to\nregard a belief so important to mankind, about which there has been so\nmuch strife, as merely the last stage in a syllogism of which the first\npremiss is the midnight dream of a dead man. How can phenomena of that\nkind explain the belief in the continuity of their lives after death\nheld so firmly by Goethe or Bach, or the desire for immortality which\nspeaks to us in Beethoven\u2019s last sonatas? The desire for the persistence\nof the conscious self must spring from sources mightier than these\nfeeble rationalistic guesses.\n\nThe deeper source of the belief depends on the relation of a man to his\nown past. Our consciousness and vision of the past is the strongest\nground for our desire to be conscious in the future. The man who values\nhis past, who holds his mental life in greater respect than his\ncorporeal life, is not willing to give up his consciousness at death.\nAnd so this organic primary desire for immortality is strongest in men\nof genius, in the men whose pasts are richest. This connection between\nthe desire for immortality and memory receives strong support from what\nis related by those who have been rescued from sudden death. Even if\nthey had not thought it out before they relive their past in a few\nmoments, at once and with frantic rapidity. The feeling of what is\nimpending brings in violent contrast the intensity of the present\nconsciousness and the idea that it may cease for ever. In reality we\nknow very little of the mental state of the dying. It takes more than\nan ordinary person to interpret it, and for reasons connected with what\nI have been saying men of genius usually avoid death-beds. But it is\nquite wrong to ascribe the sudden appearance of religion in so many\npeople who are fatally ill, to a desire to make sure of their future\nstate. It is extremely superficial to assume that the doctrine of hell\ncan for the first time assume such an importance to the dying as to make\nthem afraid to pass away \u201cwith a lie on their lips.\u201d[10]\n\n  [10] I venture to remind readers how often at the approach of death\n  those who have been occupied with purely scientific matters have\n  turned to religious problems, _e.g._, Newton, Gauss, Riemann, Weber.\n\nThe important point is this: Why do men who have lived throughout a\nlying life feel towards the end a sudden desire for truth? And why are\nothers so horrified, although they do not believe in punishment in the\nnext world, when they hear of a man dying with a lie on his lips or with\nan unrepented action? And why have both the hardness of heart until the\nend and the death-bed repentance appealed so forcibly to the imagination\nof poets? The discussion as to the \u201ceuthanasia\u201d of atheists, which was\nso popular in the eighteenth century, is more than a mere historical\ncuriosity as F. A. Lange considered it.\n\nI adduce these considerations not merely to suggest a possibility which\nis hardly more than a guess. It seems to be unthinkable that it is not\nthe case that many more people than actual geniuses have some trace of\ngenius. The quantitative difference in natural endowment will be most\nmarked at the moment when the endowment becomes active. And for most men\nthis moment is the point of death. If we were not accustomed to regard\nmen of genius as a separate class shut off from the others like the\npayers of income-tax, we should find less difficulty in grafting these\nnew ideas on the old. And just as the earliest recollections of\nchildhood which a man has are not the result of some external event\nbreaking through the continuity of the past course of his life, but are\nthe result of his internal development, there comes to every one a day\non which his consciousness is so intensified that remembrance remains,\nand from that time onwards, according to his endowment, more or fewer\nremembrances are formed (a factor which by itself upsets the whole of\nmodern psychology), so in different men there are many different\nstimulants of the consciousness of which the last is the hour of death,\nand from the point of view of their degree of genius men might almost be\nclassified by the number of things that excite their consciousness. I\ntake this opportunity of again urging the falseness of a doctrine of\nmodern psychology (which treats men simply as better or worse pieces of\nregistering apparatus and takes no notice of the internal, ontogenetic\ndevelopment of the mind); I mean the idea that in youth we retain the\ngreatest number of impressions. We must not confuse really experienced\nimpressions with the mere material on which to exercise memorising. Such\nstuff a child learns more easily simply because it is not weighted with\nmental impressions. A psychology which is opposed to experience in\nmatters so fundamental must be rejected. What I am attempting at present\nis no more than to give the faintest indication of that ontogenetic\npsychology or theoretical biography which sooner or later will replace\nwhat now passes for the science of mind. Every programme represents some\ndefinite conviction; before we wish to reach a goal we have some\ndefinite conception of what the goal is to be. The name \u201ctheoretical\nbiography\u201d will define the new subject from philosophy and physiology,\nand the biological method of treatment introduced by Darwin, Spencer,\nand others will be widened until it becomes a science capable of giving\na rational orderly account of the whole course of the mental life from\nthe cradle to the grave. It is to be called biography, not biology,\nbecause it is to deal with the investigation of the permanent laws that\nrule the mental development of an individual, whereas biology itself\nconcerns itself with individuals themselves. The new knowledge will\nseek general points of view and the establishment of types. Psychology\nmust try to become theoretical biography. Existing psychology would find\nits place in the branches of the new science, and in this way only would\nWundt\u2019s desire to establish the foundations of a science of the mind be\nfulfilled. It would be absurd to despair of this simply because of the\nuselessness of the existing science of the mind which has not yet even\ngrasped its own object. In this way a justification for experimental\npsychology might yet be found, in spite of the important results of the\ninvestigations by Windelband and Rickert on the relation between natural\nand psychical science, or the old dichotomy between the physical and\nmental sciences.\n\nThe relation between the continuity of memory and the desire for\nimmortality is borne out by the fact that woman is devoid of the desire\nfor immortality. It is to be noted that those persons are quite wrong\nwho have attributed the desire for immortality to the fear of death.\nWomen are as much afraid of death as are men, but they have not the\nlonging for immortality.\n\nMy attempted explanation of the psychological desire for immortality is\nas yet more an indication of the connection between the desire and\nmemory than a deduction from a higher natural law. It will always be\nfound that the connection actually exists; the more a man lives in his\npast (not, as a superficial reader might guess, in his future) the more\nintense will be his longing for immortality. The lack of the desire for\nimmortality in women is to be associated with the lack in them of\nreverence for their own personality. It seems, however, that the absence\nof both reverence and desire for immortality in woman is due to a more\ngeneral principle, and in the same fashion in the case of man the\nco-existence of a higher form of memory and the desire for immortality\nmay be traced to some deeper root. So far, I have attempted only to show\nthe coincidence of the two, how the deep respect for their own past and\nthe deep desire for their own future are to be found in the same\nindividuals. It will now be my task to find the common origin of these\ntwo factors of the mind.\n\nLet us take as a starting-point what we were able to lay down as to the\nuniversality of the memory of great men. To such everything is equally\nreal: what took place long ago and the most recent experience. Thus it\nhappens that a single experience does not end with the moment of time in\nwhich it happened, does not disappear as this moment of time disappears,\nbut through the memory is wrested from the grasp of time. Memory makes\nexperience timeless; the essence of it is that it should transcend time.\nA man can only remember the past because memory is free from the control\nof time, because events which in nature are functions of time, in the\nspirit have conquered time.\n\nBut here a difficulty crops up. How can memory be a negation of time if,\non the other hand, it is certain that if we had no memory we should be\nunconscious of time? It is certainly true that we shall always be\nconscious of the passing of time by our memory of the past. If the two\nare in so intimate a relation how can the one be the negation of the\nother?\n\nThe difficulty is easy to resolve. It is just because a living\ncreature--not necessarily a human being--by being endowed with memory is\nnot wholly absorbed by the experiences of the moment that it can, so to\nspeak, oppose itself to time, take cognisance of it, and make it the\nsubject of observation. Were the being wholly abandoned to the\nexperience of the moment and not saved from it by memory then it would\nchange with time and be a floating bubble in the stream of events; it\ncould never be conscious of time, for consciousness implies duality. The\nmind must have transcended time to grasp it, it must have stood outside\nit in order to be able to reflect upon it. This does not apply merely to\nspecial moments of time, as, for instance, to the case that we cannot be\nconscious of sorrow until the sorrow is over, but it is a part of the\nconception of time. If we could not free ourselves from time, we could\nhave no knowledge of time.\n\nIn order to understand the condition of timelessness let us reflect on\nwhat memory rescues from time. What transcends time is only what is of\ninterest to the individual, what has meaning for him; in fact, all that\nhe assigns value to. We remember only the things that have some value\nfor us even if we are unconscious of the value. It is the value that\ncreates the timelessness. We forget everything that has no value for us\neven if we are unconscious of that absence of value.\n\nWhat has value, then, is timeless; or, to put it the other way, a thing\nhas the more value the less it is a function of time. In all the world\nvalue is in proportion to independence of time; only things that are\ntimeless have a positive value. Although this is not what I take to be\nthe deepest and fullest meaning of value, it is, at least, the first\nspecial law of the theory of values.\n\nA hasty survey of common facts will suffice to prove this relation\nbetween value and duration. We are always inclined to pay little\nattention to the views of those whom we have known only for a short\ntime, and, as a rule, we think little of the hasty judgments of those\nwho easily change their ideas. On the other hand, uncompromising\nfixedness gains respect, even if it assume the form of vindictiveness or\nobstinacy. The _\u00e6re perennius_ of the Roman poets and the Egyptian\npyramids lasting for forty centuries are favourite images. The\nreputation a man leaves behind him would soon be depreciated were it\nsuspected that it would soon disappear instead of being handed down the\ncenturies. A man dislikes to be told that he is always changing; but let\nit be put that he is simply showing new sides of his character and he\nwill be proud of the permanence through the changes. He who is tired of\nlife, for whom life has ceased to be of interest, is interesting to no\none. The fear of the extinction of a name or of a family is well known.\n\nSo also statute laws and customs lose in value if their validity is\nexpressly limited in time; and if two people are making a bargain, they\nwill be the more ready to distrust one another if the bargain is to be\nonly of short duration. In fact, the value that we attach to things\ndepends to a large extent on our estimate of their durability.\n\nThis law of values is the chief reason why men are interested in their\ndeath and their future. The desire for value shows itself in the efforts\nto free things from time, and this pressure is exerted even in the case\nof things which sooner or later must change, as, for instance, riches\nand position and everything that we call the goods of this world. Here\nlies the psychological motive for the making of wills and the bestowal\nof property. The motive is not care for relatives, because a man without\nrelatives very often is more anxious to settle his goods, not feeling,\nperhaps, like the head of a family, that in any event his existence will\nhave some kind of permanence, that traces of him will be left after his\nown death.\n\nThe great politician or ruler, and especially the despot, whose rule\nends with his death, seeks to increase his own value by making it\nindependent of time. He may attempt it through a code of laws or a\nbiography like that of Julius C\u00e6sar, by some great philosophical\nundertaking, by the founding of museums or collections, or (and this\nperhaps is the favourite way) by alterations of the calendar. And he\nseeks to extend his power to the utmost during his life-time, to\npreserve it and make it stable by enduring contracts and diplomatic\nmarriages, and most of all by attacking and removing everything that\ncould endanger the permanence of his kingdom. And so the politician\nbecomes a conqueror.\n\nPsychological and philosophical investigations of the theory of values\nhave neglected the time element. Perhaps this is because they have been\nvery much under the influence of political economy. I believe, however,\nthat the application of my principle to political economy would be of\nconsiderable value. Very slight reflection will lead one to see that in\ncommercial affairs the time element is a most important factor in\nestimating value. The common definition of value, that it is in\nproportion to the power of the thing valued to relieve our wants, is\nquite incomplete without the element of time. Such things as air and\nwater have no value only in so far as they are not localised and\nindividualised; but as soon as they have been localised and\nindividualised, and so received form, they have received a quality that\nmay not last, and with the idea of duration comes the idea of value.\nForm and timelessness, or individuation and duration, are the two\nfactors which compose value.\n\nThus it can be shown that the fundamental law of the theory of value\napplies both to individual psychology and to social psychology. And now\nI can return to what is, after all, the special task of this chapter.\n\nThe first general conclusion to be made is that the desire for\ntimelessness, a craving for value, pervades all spheres of human\nactivity. And this desire for real value, which is deeply bound up with\nthe desire for power, is completely absent in the woman. It is only in\ncomparatively rare cases that old women trouble to make exact directions\nabout the disposition of their property, a fact in obvious relation with\nthe absence in them of the desire for immortality.\n\nOver the dispositions of a man there is the weight of something solemn\nand impressive--something which makes him respected by other men.\n\nThe desire for immortality itself is merely a specific case of the\ngeneral law that only timeless things have a positive value. On this is\nfounded its connection with memory. The permanence with which\nexperiences stay with a man is proportional to the significance which\nthey had for him. Putting it in a paradoxical form, I may say: Value is\ncreated by the past. Only that which has a positive value remains\nprotected by memory from the jaws of time; and so it may be with the\nindividual psychical life as a whole. If it is to have a positive value,\nit must not be a function of time, but must subdue time by eternal\nduration after physical death. This draws us incomparably nearer the\ninnermost motive of the desire for immortality. The complete loss of\nsignificance which a rich, individual, fully-lived life would suffer if\nit were all to end with death, and the consequent senselessness of\neverything, as Goethe said, in other words, to Eckermann (February 14,\n1829) lead to the demand for immortality. The strongest craving for\nimmortality is possessed by the genius, and this is explained by all the\nother facts which have been discussed as to his nature.\n\nMemory only fully vanquishes time when it appears in a universal form,\nas in universal men.\n\nThe genius is thus the only timeless man--at least, this and nothing\nelse is his ideal of himself; he is, as is proved by his passionate and\nurgent desire for immortality, just the man with the strongest demand\nfor timelessness, with the greatest desire for value.[11]\n\n  [11] It is often a cause for astonishment that men with quite\n  ordinary, even vulgar, natures experience no fear of death. But it is\n  quite explicable: it is not the fear of death which creates the desire\n  for immortality, but the desire for immortality which causes fear of\n  death.\n\nAnd now we are face to face with an almost astonishing coincidence. The\ntimelessness of the genius will not only be manifest in relation to the\nsingle moments of his life, but also in his relation to what is known as\n\u201chis generation,\u201d or, in a narrower sense, \u201chis time.\u201d As a matter of\nfact, he has no relations at all with it. The age does not create the\ngenius it requires. The genius is not the product of his age, is not to\nbe explained by it, and we do him no honour if we attempt to account for\nhim by it.\n\nCarlyle justly noted how many epochs had called for great men, how badly\nthey had needed them, and how they still did not obtain them.\n\nThe coming of genius remains a mystery, and men reverently abandon their\nefforts to explain it. And as the causes of its appearance do not lie in\nany one age, so also the consequences are not limited by time. The\nachievements of genius live for ever, and time cannot change them. By\nhis works a man of genius is granted immortality on the earth, and thus\nin a threefold manner he has transcended time. His universal\ncomprehension and memory forbid the annihilation of his experiences with\nthe passing of the moment in which each occurred; his birth is\nindependent of his age, and his work never dies.\n\nHere is the best place to consider a question which, strangely enough,\nappears to have received no attention. The question is, if there be\nanything akin to genius in the world of animals and plants? Although it\nmust be admitted that exceptional forms occur amongst animals and\nplants, these cannot be regarded as coming under our definition of\ngenius. Talent may exist amongst them as amongst men below the standard\nof genius. But the special gift, what Moreau, Lombroso, and others have\ncalled the \u201cdivine spark,\u201d we must deny to animals. This limitation is\nnot jealousy nor the anxious guarding of a privilege, but is founded on\ngood grounds.\n\nIs there anything unexplained by the assumption that the first\nappearance of genius was in man! In the first place, it is because of\nthis that the human race has an objective mind; in other words, that man\nis the only organism with a history.\n\nThe history of the human race (naturally I mean the history of its mind\nand not merely of its wars) is readily intelligible on the theory of the\nappearance of genius, and of the imitation by the more monkey-like\nindividuals of the conduct of those with genius. The chief stages, no\ndoubt, were house-building, agriculture, and, above all, speech. Every\nsingle word has been the invention of a single man, as, indeed, we still\nsee, if we leave out of consideration the merely technical terms. How\nelse could language have arisen? The earliest words were\n\u201conomatopoetic\u201d; a sound similar to the exciting cause was evolved\nalmost without the will of the speaker, in direct response to the\nsensuous stimulation. All the other words were originally metaphors, or\ncomparisons, a kind of primitive poetry, for all prose has come from\npoetry. Many, perhaps the majority of the greatest geniuses, have\nremained unknown. Think of the proverbs, now almost commonplaces, such\nas \u201cone good turn deserves another.\u201d These were said for the first time\nby some great man. How many quotations from the classics, or sayings of\nChrist, have passed into the common language, so that we have to think\ntwice before we can remember who were the authors of them. Language is\nas little the work of the multitude as our ballads. Every form of speech\nowes much that is not acknowledged to individuals of another language.\nBecause of the universality of genius, the words and phrases that he\ninvents are useful not only to those who use the language in which he\nwrote them. A nation orients itself by its own geniuses, and derives\nfrom them its ideas of its own ideals, but the guiding star serves also\nas a light to other nations. As speech has been created by a few great\nmen, the most extraordinary wisdom lies concealed in it, a wisdom which\nreveals itself to a few ardent explorers but which is usually overlooked\nby the stupid professional philologists.\n\nThe genius is not a critic of language, but its creator, as he is the\ncreator of all the mental achievements which are the material of culture\nand which make up the objective mind, the spirit of the peoples. The\n\u201ctimeless\u201d men are those who make history, for history can be made only\nby those who are not floating with the stream. It is only those who are\nunconditioned by time who have real value, and whose productions have an\nenduring force. And the events that become forces of culture become so\nonly because they have an enduring value.\n\nIf we make a criterion of genius the exhibition of this threefold\n\u201ctimelessness\u201d we shall have a measure by which it is easy to test all\nclaimants. Lombroso and T\u00fcrck have expanded the popular view which\nascribes genius to all whose intellectual or practical achievements are\nmuch above the average. Kant and Schelling have insisted on the more\nexclusive doctrine that genius can be predicated only of the great\ncreative artists. The truth probably lies between the two. I am inclined\nto think that only great artists and great philosophers (amongst the\nlatter, I include, above all, the great religious teachers) have proved\na claim to genius. Neither the \u201cman of action\u201d nor \u201cthe man of science\u201d\nhas any claim.\n\nMen of action, famous politicians and generals, may possess a few traits\nresembling genius (particularly a specially good knowledge of men and an\nenormous capacity for remembering people). The psychology of such traits\nwill be dealt with later; they are confused with genius only by those\nwhom the externals of greatness dazzle. The man of genius almost\ntypically renounces such external greatness because of the real\ngreatness within him. The really great man has the strongest sense of\nvalues; the distinguished general is absorbed by the desire for power.\nThe former seeks to link power with real value; the latter desires that\npower itself should be valued. Great generals and great politicians,\nlike the bird Ph\u0153nix, are born out of fiery chaos and like it disappear\nagain in chaos. The great emperor or the great demagogue is the only man\nwho lives entirely in the present; he does not dream of a more\nbeautiful, better future; his mind does not dwell on his own past which\nhas already passed, and so in the two ways most possible to man, he does\nnot transcend time, but lives only in the moment. The great genius does\nnot let his work be determined by the concrete finite conditions that\nsurround him, whilst it is from these that the work of the statesman\ntakes its direction and its termination. And so the great emperor is no\nmore than a phenomenon of nature, whereas the genius is outside nature\nand is an incorporation of the mind. The works of men of action crumble\nat the death of their authors, if indeed they have not already decayed,\nor they survive only a brief time leaving no traces behind them except\nwhat the chronicles record as having been done and later undone. The\nemperor creates no works that survive time, passing into eternity; such\ncreations come from genius. It is the genius in reality and not the\nother who is the creator of history, for it is only the genius who is\noutside and unconditioned by history. The great man has a history, the\nemperor is only a part of history. The great man transcends time; time\ncreates and time destroys the emperor.\n\nThe great man of science, unless he is also a philosopher (I think of\nsuch names as Newton and Gauss, Linn\u00e6us and Darwin, Copernicus and\nGalileo), deserves the title of genius as little as the man of action.\nMen of science are not universal; they deal only with a branch or\nbranches of knowledge. This is not due, as is sometimes said, merely to\nthe extreme modern specialisation that makes it impossible to master\neverything. Even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there are\nstill amongst the learned men individuals with a knowledge as many-sided\nas that of Aristotle or Leibnitz; the names of von Humboldt and William\nWundt at once come to my mind. The absence of genius comes from\nsomething much more deeply seated in the men of science, and in science\nitself, from a cause which I shall explain in the eighth chapter.\nProbably some one may be disposed to argue that if even the most\ndistinguished men of science have not a knowledge so universal as that\nof the philosopher, there are some who stand on the outermost fringes of\nphilosophy, and to whom it is yet difficult to deny the word genius. I\nthink of such men as Fichte, Schleiermacher, Carlyle, and Nietzsche.\nWhich of the merely scientific has felt in himself an unconditioned\ncomprehension of all men and of all things, or even the capacity to\nverify any single thing in his mind and by his mind? On the contrary,\nhas not the whole history of the science of the last thousand years been\ndirected against this? This is the reason why men of science are\nnecessarily one-sided. No man of science, unless he is also a\nphilosopher, however eminent his achievements, has that continuous\nunforgetting life that the genius exhibits, and this is because of his\nwant of universality.\n\nFinally, it is to be observed that the investigations of the scientific\nare always in definite relation to the knowledge of their day. The\nscientific man takes possession of a definite store of experimental or\nobserved knowledge, increases or alters it more or less, and then hands\nit on. And much will be taken away from his achievements, much will\nsilently disappear; his treatises may make a brave show in the\nlibraries, but they cease to be actively alive. On the other hand, we\ncan ascribe to the work of the great philosopher, as to that of the\ngreat artist, an imperishable, unchangeable presentation of the world,\nnot disappearing with time, and which, because it was the expression of\na great mind, will always find a school of men to adhere to it. There\nstill exist disciples of Plato and Aristotle, of Spinoza and Berkeley\nand Bruno, but there are now none who denote themselves as followers of\nGalileo or Helmholtz, of Ptolemy or Copernicus. It is a misuse of terms,\ndue to erroneous ideas, to speak of the \u201cclassics\u201d of science or of\npedagogy in the sense that we speak of the classics of philosophy and\nart.\n\nThe great philosopher bears the name of genius deservedly and with\nhonour. And if it will always be the greatest pain to the philosopher\nthat he is not an artist, so the artist envies the philosopher his\ntenacious and controlled strength of systematic thought, and it is not\nsurprising that the artist has taken pleasure in depicting Prometheus\nand Faust, Prospera and Cyprian, Paul the Apostle and Il Penseroso. The\nphilosopher and the artist are alternate sides of one another.\n\nWe must not be too lavish in attributing genius to those who are\nphilosophers or we shall not escape the reproach of being merely\npartisans of philosophy against science. Such a partisanship is foreign\nto my purpose, and, I hope, to this book. It would only be absurd to\ndiscuss the claims to genius of such men as Anaxagoras, Geulincx,\nBaader, or Emerson. I deny genius either to such unoriginally profound\nwriters as Angelus Silesius, Philo and Jacobi, or to original yet\nsuperficial persons such as Comte, Feuerbach, Hume, Herbart, Locke and\nKarneades. The history of art is equally full of preposterous\nvaluations, whilst, on the other hand, the history of science is\nextremely free from false estimations. The history of science busies\nitself very little with the biographies of its protagonists; its object\nis a system of objective, collective knowledge in which the individual\nis swept away. The service of science demands the greatest sacrifice,\nfor in it the individual human being renounces all claim to eternity as\nsuch.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nMEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS\n\nThe title that I have given to this chapter at once opens the way to\nmisinterpretation. It might appear as if the author supported the view\nthat logical and ethical values were the objects exclusively of\nempirical psychology, psychical phenomena, like perception and\nsensation, and that logic and ethics, therefore, were subsections of\npsychology and based upon psychology.\n\nI declare at once that I call this view, the so-called psychologismus,\nat once false and injurious. It is false because it can lead to nothing;\nand injurious because, while it hardly touches logic and ethics, it\noverthrows psychology itself. The exclusion of logic and ethics from the\nfoundations of psychology, and the insertion of them in an appendix, is\none of the results of the overgrowth of the doctrine of empirical\nperception, of that strange heap of dead, fleshless bones which is known\nas empirical psychology, and from which all real experience has been\nexcluded. I have nothing to do with the empirical school, and in this\nmatter lean towards the transcendentalism of Kant.\n\nAs the object of my work, however, is to discover the differences\nbetween different members of humanity, and not to discuss categories\nthat would hold good for the angels in heaven, I shall not follow Kant\nclosely, but remain more directly in psychological paths.\n\nThe justification of the title of this chapter must be reached along\nother lines. The tedious, because entirely new, demonstration of the\nearlier part of my work has shown that the human memory stands in\nintimate relation with things hitherto supposed unconnected with\nit--such things as time, value, genius, immortality. I have attempted to\nshow that memory stands in intimate connection with all these. There\nmust be some strong reason for the complete absence of earlier allusions\nto this side of the subject. I believe the reason to be no more than the\ninadequacy and slovenliness which hitherto have spoiled theories of\nmemory.\n\nI must here call attention to a theory first propounded by Charles\nBonnet in the middle of the eighteenth century and towards the end of\nthe nineteenth century, specially insisted upon by Ewald Hering and E.\nMach. This theory regarded the human memory as being only a special case\nof a property common to all organised matter, the property that makes\nthe path of new stimuli rather easier if these resemble stimuli that\nhave acted at some former time. The theory really makes the human memory\nan adaptation in the sense of Lamarck, the result on the living organism\nof repeated stimulation. It is true that there is a point in common\nbetween the human memory and the increase of sensitiveness caused by the\nrepeated application of a stimulus; that identical element consists in\nthe permanence of the effect of the first stimulation. There is,\nhowever, a fundamental difference between the growth of a muscle that is\nmuch used or the adaptation of the eater of arsenic or morphia to\nincreased doses, and the recollection of past experiences by human\nbeings. In the one case the trace of the old is just to be felt in the\nnew stimulation; in the other case, by means of the consciousness, the\nold situations are actually reproduced with all their individuation. The\nidentification of the two is so superficial that it is a waste of time\nto dwell longer on it.\n\nThe doctrine of association as the theory of memory is linked with the\nforegoing physiological theory as a matter of history, through Hartley,\nand, as a matter of fact, because the idea of habit is shared by the\ntwo. The association theory attributes memory to the mechanical play of\nthe linking of presentations according to four laws. It overlooks the\nfact that memory (the continuous memory of man) is a function of the\nwill. I can remember a thing if I really _will_. In the case of\nhypnosis, when the recollection of all that has been forgotten is\ninduced, an outside will replaces the will of the subject. It is will\nthat sets in action the chains of association, and we have to deal here\nwith something deeper than a mechanical principle.\n\nIn the association psychology, which first splits up the psychic life,\nand then vainly imagines that it can weld the re-assorted pieces\ntogether again, there is another confusion, the confusion between memory\nand recollection, which has persisted in spite of the well-founded\nobjections of Avenarius and von H\u00f6ffding. The recognition of a\ncircumstance does not necessarily involve the special reproduction of\nthe former impression, even although there seems to be a tendency for\nthe new impression, at least, partly to recall the old one. But there is\nanother kind of recognition, perhaps as common, in which the new\nimpression does not appear to be directly linked with an association,\nbut in which it comes, so to speak, \u201ccoloured\u201d (James would say\n\u201ctinged\u201d) with that character that would be called by von H\u00f6ffding the\n\u201cfamiliarity quality.\u201d To him who returns to his native place the roads\nand streets seem familiar, even although he has forgotten the names, has\nto ask his way, and can think of no special occasion on which he went\nalong them. A melody may seem \u201cfamiliar\u201d and yet I may be unable to say\nwhere I heard it. The \u201ccharacter\u201d (in the sense of Avenarius) of\nfamiliarity, of intimacy, hovers over the sense-impression itself, and\nanalysis can detect no associations, none of the fusing of the old and\nnew, which, according to the assertion of a presumptuous\npseudo-psychology, produces the feeling; these cases are quite easy to\ndistinguish from cases in which there is a real although vague\nassociation with an older experience in henid form.\n\nIn individual psychology this distinction is of great importance. In the\nhighest types of mankind the consciousness of the continuous past is\npresent in so active a form that the moment such a one sees an\nacquaintance in the street he is at once able to reproduce the last\nmeeting as a complete experience, whereas in the case of the less gifted\nperson, the feeling of familiarity that makes recognition possible,\noccurs when he is able to recall the past connection in all its details.\n\nIf we now, in conclusion, ask whether or no other animals than man\npossess a similar faculty for remembering and reviving their earlier\nlives in their entirety it is most probable that the answer must be in\nthe negative. Animals could not, as they do, remain for hours at a time,\nmotionless and peaceful on one spot, if they were capable of thinking of\nthe future or of remembering the past. Animals have the feeling of\nfamiliarity and the sense of expectation (as we find from the\nrecognition of his master by a dog after twenty years\u2019 absence); but\nthey possess no memory and no hope. They are capable of recognition\nthrough the sense of familiarity, but they have no memory.\n\nAs memory has been shown to be a special character unconnected with the\nlower spheres of psychical life, and the exclusive property of human\nbeings, it is not surprising that it is closely related to such higher\nthings as the idea of value and of time, and the craving for\nimmortality, which is absent in animals, and possible to men only in so\nfar as they possess the quality of genius. If memory be an essentially\nhuman thing, part of the deepest being of humanity, finding expression\nin mankind\u2019s most peculiar qualities, then it will not be surprising if\nmemory be also related to the phenomena of logic and ethics. I have now\nto explore this relationship.\n\nI may set out from the old proverb that liars have bad memories. It is\ncertain that the pathological liar has practically no memory. About male\nliars I shall have more to say; they are not common, however. But if we\nremember what was said as to the absence of memory amongst women we\nshall not be surprised at the existence of the numerous proverbs and\ncommon sayings about the untruthfulness of women. It is evident that a\nbeing whose memory is very slight, and who can recall only in the most\nimperfect fashion what it has said or done, or suffered, must lie\neasily if it has the gift of speech. The impulse to untruthfulness will\nbe hard to resist if there is a practical object to be gained, and if\nthe influence that comes from a full conscious reality of the past be\nnot present. The impulse to lie is stronger in woman, because, unlike\nthat of man, her memory is not continuous, whilst her life is discrete,\nunconnected, discontinuous, swayed by the sensations and perceptions of\nthe moment instead of dominating them. Unlike man, her experiences float\npast without being referred, so to speak, to a definite, permanent\ncentre; she does not feel herself, past and present, to be one and the\nsame throughout all her life. It happens almost to every man that\nsometimes he \u201cdoes not understand himself\u201d; indeed, with very many men,\nit happens (leaving out of the question the facts of psychical\nperiodicity) that if they think over their pasts in their minds they\nfind it very difficult to refer all the events to a single conscious\npersonality; they do not grasp how it could have been that they, being\nwhat they feel themselves at the time to be, could ever have done or\nfelt or thought this, that, or the other. And yet in spite of the\ndifficulty, they know that they had gone through these experiences. The\nfeeling of identity in all circumstances of life is quite wanting in the\ntrue woman, because her memory, even if exceptionally good, is devoid of\ncontinuity. The consciousness of identity of the male, even although he\nmay fail to understand his own past, manifests itself in the very desire\nto understand that past. Women, if they look back on their earlier\nlives, never understand themselves, and do not even wish to understand\nthemselves, and this reveals itself in the scanty interest they give to\nthe attempts of man to understand them. The woman does not interest\nherself about herself, and hence there have been no female\npsychologists, no psychology of women written by a woman, and she is\nincapable of grasping the anxious desire of the man to understand the\nbeginning, middle, and end of his individual life in their relation to\neach other, and to interpret the whole as a continual, logical,\nnecessary sequence.\n\nAt this point there is a natural transition to logic. A creature like\nwoman, the absolute woman, who is not conscious of her own identity at\ndifferent stages of her life, has no evidence of the identity of the\nsubject-matter of thought at different times. If in her mind the two\nstages of a change cannot be present simultaneously by means of memory,\nit is impossible for her to make the comparison and note the change. A\nbeing whose memory is never sufficiently good as to make it\npsychologically possible to perceive identity through the lapse of time,\nso as to enable her, for instance, to pursue a quantity through a long\nmathematical reckoning; such a creature in the extreme case would be\nunable to control her memory for even the moment of time required to say\nthat A will be still A in the next moment, to pronounce judgment on the\nidentity A = A, or on the opposite proposition that A is not equal to A,\nfor that proposition also requires a continuous memory of A to make the\ncomparison possible.\n\nI have been making no mere joke, no facetious sophism or paradoxical\nproposition. I assert that the judgment of identity depends on\nconceptions, never on mere perceptions and complexes of perceptions, and\nthe conceptions, as logical conceptions, are independent of time,\nretaining their constancy, whether I, as a psychological entity, think\nthem constant or not. But man never has a conception in the purely\nlogical form, for he is a psychological being, affected by the condition\nof sensations; he is able only to form a general idea (a typical,\nconnotative, representative conception) out of his individual\nexperiences by a reciprocal effacing of the differences and\nstrengthening of the similarities, thus, however, very closely\napproximating to an abstract conception, and in a most wonderful fashion\nusing it as such. He must also be able to preserve this idea which he\nthinks clear, although in reality it is confused, and it is memory alone\nthat brings about the possibility of that. Were he deprived of memory he\nwould lose the possibility of thinking logically, for this possibility\nis incarnated, so to speak, only in a psychological medium.\n\nMemory, then, is a necessary part of the logical faculty. The\npropositions of logic are not conditioned by the existence of memory,\nbut only the power to use them. The proposition A = A must have a\npsychological relation to time, otherwise it would be At\u2081 = At\u2082.\nOf course this is not the case in pure logic, but man has no special\nfaculty of pure logic, and must act as a psychological being.\n\nI have already shown that the continuous memory is the vanquisher of\ntime, and, indeed, is necessary even for the idea of time to be formed.\nAnd so the continuous memory is the psychological expression of the\nlogical proposition of identity. The absolute woman, in whom memory is\nabsent, cannot take the proposition of identity, or its contradictory,\nor the exclusion of the alternative, as axiomatic.\n\nBesides these three conditions of logical thought, the fourth condition,\nthe containing of the conclusion in the major premiss, is possible only\nthrough memory. That proposition is the groundwork of the syllogism. The\npremisses psychologically precede the conclusion, and must be retained\nby the thinking person whilst the minor premiss applies the law of\nidentity or of non-identity. The grounds for the conclusion must lie in\nthe past. And for this reason continuity which dominates the mental\nprocesses of man is bound up with causality. Every psychological\napplication of the relation of a conclusion to its premisses implies the\ncontinuity of memory to guarantee the identity of the propositions. As\nwoman has no continuous memory she can have no _principium rationis\nsufficientis_.\n\nAnd so it appears that woman is without logic.\n\nGeorge Simmel has held this familiar statement to be erroneous, inasmuch\nas women have been known to draw conclusions with the strongest\nconsistency. That a woman in a concrete case can unrelentingly pursue a\ngiven course at the stimulation of some object is no more a proof that\nshe understands the syllogism, than is her habit of perpetually\nrecurring to disproved arguments a proof that the law of identity is an\naxiom for her. The point at issue is whether or no they recognise the\nlogical axioms as the criteria of the validity of their thoughts, as\nthe directors of their process of thinking, whether they make or do not\nmake these the rule of conduct and the principle of judgment. A woman\ncannot grasp that one must act from principle; as she has no continuity\nshe does not experience the necessity for logical support of her mental\nprocesses. Hence the ease with which women assume opinions. If a woman\ngives vent to an opinion, or statement, and a man is so foolish as to\ntake it seriously and to ask her for the proof of it, she regards the\nrequest as unkind and offensive, and as impugning her character. A man\nfeels ashamed of himself, feels himself guilty if he has neglected to\nverify a thought, whether or no that thought has been uttered by him; he\nfeels the obligation to keep to the logical standard which he has set up\nfor himself. Woman resents any attempt to require from her that her\nthoughts should be logical. She may be regarded as \u201clogically insane.\u201d\n\nThe most common defect which one could discover in the conversation of a\nwoman, if one really wished to apply to it the standard of logic (a feat\nthat man habitually shuns, so showing his contempt for a woman\u2019s logic)\nis the _quaternio terminorum_, that form of equivocation which is the\nresult of an incapacity to retain definite presentations; in other words\nthe result of a failure to grasp the law of identity. Woman is unaware\nof this; she does not realise the law nor make it a criterion of\nthought. Man feels himself bound to logic; the woman is without this\nfeeling. It is only this feeling of guilt that guarantees man\u2019s efforts\nto think logically. Probably the most profound saying of Descartes, and\nyet one that has been widely misunderstood, is that all errors are\ncrimes.\n\nThe source of all error in life is failure of memory. Thus logic and\nethics, both of which deal with the furtherance of truth and join in its\nhighest service, are dependent on memory. The conception dawns on us\nthat Plato was not so far wrong when he connected discernment with\nmemory. Memory, it is true, is not a logical and ethical act, but it is\na logical and ethical phenomenon. A man who has had a vivid and deep\nperception regards it as a fault, if some half-hour afterwards he is\nthinking of something different, even if external influences have\nintervened. A man thinks himself unconscientious and blameworthy if he\nnotices that he has not thought of a particular portion of his life for\na long time. Memory, moreover, is linked with morality, because it is\nonly through memory that repentance is possible. All forgetfulness is in\nitself immoral. And so reverence is a moral exercise; it is a duty to\nforget nothing, and for this reason we should reverence the dead.\nEqually from logical and ethical motives, man tries to carry logic into\nhis past, in order that past and present may become one.\n\nIt is with something of a shock that we realise here that we approach\nthe deep connection between logic and ethics, long ago suggested by\nSocrates and Plato, discovered anew by Kant and Fichte, but lost sight\nof by living workers.\n\nA creature that cannot grasp the mutual exclusiveness of A and not A has\nno difficulty in lying; more than that, such a creature has not even any\nconsciousness of lying, being without a standard of truth. Such a\ncreature if endowed with speech will lie without knowing it, without the\npossibility of knowing it; _Veritas norma sui et falsa est_. There is\nnothing more upsetting to a man than to find, when he has discovered a\nwoman in a lie, and has asked her, \u201cWhy did you lie about it?\u201d that she\nsimply does not understand the question, but simply looks at him and\nlaughingly tries to soothe him, or bursts into tears.\n\nThe subject does not end with the part played by memory. Lying is common\nenough amongst men. And lies can be told in spite of a full remembrance\nof the subject which for some purpose some one wishes to be informed\nabout. Indeed, it might almost be said that the only persons who can lie\nare those who misrepresent facts in spite of a superior knowledge and\nconsciousness of them.\n\nTruth must first be regarded as the real value of logic and ethics\nbefore it is correct to speak of deviations from truth for special\nmotives as lies from the moral point of view. Those who have not this\nhigh conception should be adjudged as guilty rather of vagueness and\nexaggeration than of lying; they are not immoral but non-moral. And in\nthis sense the woman is non-moral.\n\nThe root of such an absolute misconception of truth must lie deep. The\ncontinuous memory against which alone a man can be false, is not the\nreal source of the effort for truth, the desire for truth, the basal\nethical-logical phenomenon, but only stands in intimate relation with\nit.\n\nThat which enables man to have a real relation to truth and which\nremoves his temptation to lie, must be something independent of all\ntime, something absolutely unchangeable, which as faithfully reproduces\nthe old as if it were new, because it is permanent itself; it can only\nbe that source in which all discrete experiences unite and which creates\nfrom the first a continuous existence. It is what produces the feeling\nof responsibility which oppresses all men, young and old, as to their\nactions, which makes them know that they are responsible, which leads to\nthe phenomena of repentance and consciousness of sin, which calls to\naccount before an eternal and ever present self things that are long\npast, its judgment being subtler and more comprehensive than that of any\ncourt of law or of the laws of society, and which is exerted by the\nindividual himself quite independently of all social codes (so\ncondemning the moral psychology which would derive morality from the\nsocial life of man). Society recognises the idea of illegality, but not\nof sin; it presses for punishment without wishing to produce repentance;\nlying is punished by the law only in its ceremonious form of perjury,\nand error has never been placed under its ban. Social ethics with its\nconception of duty to our neighbour and to society, and practical\nexclusion from consideration of the other fifteen hundred million human\nbeings, cannot extend the realm of morality, when it begins by limiting\nit in this arbitrary fashion.\n\nWhat is this \u201ccentre of apperception\u201d that is superior to time and\nchange?\n\nIt can be nothing less than what raises man above himself (as a part of\nthe world of sense) which joins him to an order of things that only the\nreason can grasp, and that puts the whole world of sense at his feet. It\nis nothing else than personality.\n\nThe most sublime book in the world, the \u201cCriticism of Practical Reason,\u201d\nhas referred morality to an intelligent ego, distinct from all empirical\nconsciousness. I must now turn to that side of my subject.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nLOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO\n\nDavid Hume is well known to have abolished the conception of the ego by\nseeing in it only a bundle of different perceptions in continual ebb and\nflow. However completely Hume thought himself to have compromised the\nego, at least he explained his view relatively moderately. He proposed\nto say nothing about a few metaphysicians who appeared to rejoice in\nanother kind of ego; for himself he was quite certain that he had none,\nand he dared to suppose that the majority of mankind, leaving the few\npeculiar metaphysicians out of the question, were, like himself, mere\nbundles. So the polite man expressed himself. In the next chapter I\nshall show how his irony recoils on himself. That his view became so\nfamous depends partly on the over-estimation in which Hume is held and\nwhich is largely due to Kant. Hume was a most distinguished empirical\npsychologist, but he cannot be regarded as a genius, the popular view\nnotwithstanding. It is not very much to be the first of English\nphilosophers, but Hume has not even a claim to that position. I do not\nthink that Kant would have given so much praise to Hume if he had been\nfully acquainted with all Hume\u2019s work and not merely with the \u201cEnquiry,\u201d\nas he certainly rejected the position of Spinoza, according to which men\nwere not \u201csubstances,\u201d but merely accidents.\n\nLichtenberg, who took the field against the ego later than Hume, was\nstill bolder. He is the philosopher of impersonality, and calmly\ncorrects the conversational \u201cI think\u201d into an actual \u201cit thinks\u201d; he\nregards the ego as a creation of the grammarian. In this Hume had\nanticipated him, inasmuch as he also had declared, at the end of his\nanalysis, all disputes as to the identity of the person to be merely a\nbattle of words.\n\nE. Mach has recently represented the universe as a coherent mass, and\nthe egos as points in which the coherent mass has greater consistency.\nThe only realities are the perceptions, which are connected in one\nindividual strongly, but which are weaker in another individual who is\nthus differentiated from the first.\n\nThe contents of the perceptions are the realities, and they persist\nexternally to the worthless personal recollections. The ego is not a\nreal but only a practical entity and cannot be isolated, and, therefore,\nthe idea of individual immortality must be rejected. None the less the\nidea of an ego is not wholly to be rejected; here and there, as, for\ninstance, in Darwin\u2019s struggle for existence, it appears to have some\nvalidity.\n\nIt is extraordinary how an investigator who has accomplished so much,\nnot only as a historian of his special branch and as a critic of ideas,\nbut who is also fully equipped with knowledge of biology, should have\npaid no heed to the fact that every organic being is indivisible from\nthe first, and is not composed of anything like atoms, monads, &c. The\nfirst distinctive mark of the living as opposed to inorganic matter is\nthat the former is always differentiated into dissimilar, mutually\ndependent parts, and is not homogeneous like a crystal. And so it should\nhave been borne in mind that it was at least possible that\nindividuation, the fact that organic beings are not united, like Siamese\ntwins, would prove to have importance in psychical matters, and the ego,\ntherefore, was more than Mach\u2019s idea of it as a mere waiting-hall of\nperceptions.\n\nIt may be that there exists a psychical correlation even amongst\nanimals. Everything that an animal feels and perceives has a different\n\u201cnote\u201d or \u201ccolour\u201d in every individual. This individual quality is not\nonly characteristic of the class, genus, species, race, and family, but\nalso is different in every individual of the same family, &c. The\nidioplasm is the physiological equivalent of this specific individual\nquality of the sensations and perceptions, and there are reasons\nanalogous with those in favour of the supposition of an idioplasm for\nthe supposition of an individual character amongst animals. The\nsportsman who has to do with dogs, the trainer with horses, and the\nkeeper with animals will readily admit the existence of this\nindividuality as a constant element. It is clear that we have to do here\nwith something more than a mere rendezvous of perceptions.\n\nBut even if this psychical analogue of the idioplasm were proved to\nexist in the case of animals, it could not be ranked with the\nintelligible character, the existence of which in any living creature\nexcept man cannot be maintained. The intelligible character of men,\ntheir individuation, has the same relation to empirical character that\nmemory has to the simple power of recognition. And finally we come to\nidentity, by which the structure, form, law, and cosmos persist even\nthrough the change of contents. The considerations from which is drawn\nthe proof of the existence in man of such a noumenal, trans-empirical\nsubject must now be stated briefly. They come from logic and ethics.\n\nLogic deals with the true significance of the principle of identity\n(also with that of contradiction; the exact relation of these two, and\nthe various modes of stating it are controversial matters outside the\npresent subject). The proposition A = A is axiomatic and self-evident.\nIt is the primitive measure of truth for all other propositions; however\nmuch we may think over it we must return to this fundamental\nproposition. It is the principle of the distinction between truth and\nerror; and he who regards it as meaningless tautology, as was the case\nwith Hegel and many of the later empiricists (this being not the only\nsurprising point of contact between two schools apparently so different)\nis right in a fashion, but has misunderstood the nature of the\nproposition. A = A, the principle of all truth, cannot itself be a\nspecial truth. He who finds the proposition of identity or that of\nnon-identity meaningless does so by his own fault. He must have expected\nto find in these propositions special ideas, a source of positive\nknowledge. But they are not in themselves knowledge, separate acts of\nthought, but the common standard for all acts of thought. And so they\ncannot be compared with other acts of thought. The rule of the process\nof thought must be outside thought. The proposition of identity does not\nadd to our knowledge; it does not increase but rather founds a kingdom.\nThe proposition of identity is either meaningless or means everything.\nUpon what do the propositions of identity and of non-identity depend?\nThe common view is that they are judgments. Sigwart, for instance, who\nhas recently discussed the matter, puts it as follows: The two judgments\nA is B and A is not B cannot be true at the same time because the\njudgment \u201cAn unlearned man is learned\u201d would involve a contradiction\nbecause the predicate \u201clearned\u201d is affirmed of a subject of which the\njudgment has been made implicitly that he is unlearned, so that in\nreality two judgments are made, X is learned and X is unlearned. The\n\u201cpsychologismus\u201d of this method of argument is plain. It has recourse to\na temporary judgment preceding the formation of the conception\n\u201cunlearned man.\u201d The proposition, however, A is not A claims validity\nquite apart from the past, present, or future existence of other\njudgments. It depends on the conception \u201cunlearned man.\u201d It makes the\nconception more certain by excluding contradictory instances.\n\nThis, then, gives us the true function of the principles of identity and\nnon-identity. They are materials for conceptions.\n\nThis function concerns only logical conceptions, but not what have been\ncalled psychological conceptions. The conception is always represented\npsychologically by a generalisation; and this presentation in a certain\nfashion is included in the conception. The generalisation represents the\nconception psychologically, but is not identical with it. It can, so to\nspeak, be richer (as when I think of a triangle) or it can be poorer\n(the conception of a lion contains more than my generalisation of\nlions). The logical conception is the plumb-line which the attention\ntries to follow; it is the goal and pole-star of the psychological\ngeneralisation.\n\nPure logical thought cannot occur in the case of men; it would be an\nattribute of deity. A human being must always think partly\npsychologically because he possesses not only reason but also senses,\nand his thought cannot free itself from temporal experiences but must\nremain bound by them. Logic, however, is the supreme standard by which\nthe individual can test his own psychological ideas and those of others.\nWhen two men are discussing anything it is the conception and not the\nvarying individual presentations of it that they aim at. The conception,\nthen, is the standard of value for the individual presentations. The\nmode in which the psychological generalisation comes into existence is\nquite independent of the conception and has no significance in respect\nto it. The logical character which invests the conception with dignity\nand power is not derived from experience, for experience can give only\nvague and wavering generalisations. Absolute constancy and absolute\ncoherence which cannot come from experience are the essence of the\nconception of that power concealed in the depths of the human mind whose\nhandiwork we try hard but in vain to see in nature. Conceptions are the\nonly true realities, and the conception is not in nature; it is the rule\nof the essence not of the actual existence.\n\nWhen I enunciate the proposition A = A, the meaning of the proposition\nis not that a special individual A of experience or of thought is like\nitself. The judgment of identity does not depend on the existence of an\nA. It means only that if an A exists, or even if it does not exist, then\nA = A. Something is posited, the existence of A = A whether or no A\nitself exists. It cannot be the result of experience, as Mill supposed,\nfor it is independent of the existence of A. But an existence has been\nposited; it is not the existence of the object; it must be the existence\nof the subject. The reality of the existence is not in the first A or\nthe second A, but in the simultaneous identity of the two. And so the\nproposition A = A is no other than the proposition \u201cI am.\u201d\n\nFrom the psychological point of view, the real meaning of the\nproposition of identity is not so difficult to interpret. It is clear\nthat to be able to say A = A, to establish the permanence of the\nconception through the changes of experience, there must be something\nunchangeable, and this can be only the subject. Were I part of the\nstream of change I could not verify that the A had remained unchanged,\nhad remained itself. Were I part of the change, I could not recognise\nthe change. Fichte was right when he stated that the existence of the\nego was to be found concealed in pure logic, inasmuch as the ego is the\ncondition of intelligible existence.\n\nThe logical axioms are the principle of all truth. These posit an\nexistence towards which all cognition serves. Logic is a law which must\nbe obeyed, and man realises himself only in so far as he is logical. He\nfinds himself in cognition.\n\nAll error must be felt to be crime. And so man must not err. He _must_\nfind the truth, and so he can find it. The duty of cognition involves\nthe possibility of cognition, the freedom of thought, and the hope of\nascertaining truth. In the fact that logic is the condition of the mind\nlies the proof that thought is free and can reach its goal.\n\nI can treat ethics briefly and in another fashion, inasmuch as what I\nhave to say is founded on Kant\u2019s moral philosophy. The deepest, the\nintelligible, part of the nature of man is that part which does not take\nrefuge in causality, but which chooses in freedom the good or the bad.\nThis is manifest in consciousness of sin and in repentance. No one has\nattempted to explain these facts otherwise; and no one allows himself to\nbe persuaded that he must commit this or that act. In the shall there\nlies the possibility of the can. The causal determining factors, the\nlower motives that act upon him, he is fully aware of, but he remains\nconscious of an intelligible ego free to act in a different way from\nother egos.\n\nTruth, purity, faithfulness, uprightness, with reference to oneself;\nthese give the only conceivable ethics. Duty is only duty to oneself,\nduty of the empirical ego to the intelligible ego. These appear in the\nform of two imperatives that will always put to shame every kind of\npsychologismus--the logical law and the moral law. The internal\ndirection, the categorical imperatives of logic and morality which\ndominate all the codes of social utilitarianism are factors that no\nempiricism can explain. All empiricism and scepticism, positivism and\nrelativism, instinctively feel that their principal difficulties lie in\nlogic and ethics. And so perpetually renewed and fruitless efforts are\nmade to explain this inward discipline empirically and psychologically.\n\nLogic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are no more than duty\nto oneself. They celebrate their union by the highest service of truth,\nwhich is overshadowed in the one case by error, in the other by untruth.\nAll ethics are possible only by the laws of logic, and logic is no more\nthan the ethical side of law. Not only virtue, but also insight, not\nonly sanctity but also wisdom, are the duties and tasks of mankind.\nThrough the union of these alone comes perfection.\n\nEthics, however, the laws of which are postulates, cannot be made the\nbasis of a logical proof of existence. Ethics are not logical in the\nsame sense that logic is ethical. Logic proves the absolute actual\nexistence of the ego; ethics control the form which the actuality\nassumes. Ethics dominate logic and make logic part of their contents.\n\nIn thinking of the famous passage in the \u201cCritique of Practical Reason,\u201d\nwhere Kant introduces man as a part of the intelligible cosmos, it may\nbe asked how Kant assured himself that the moral law was inherent in\npersonality. The answer Kant gave was simply that no other and no nobler\norigin could be found for it. He goes no further than to say that the\ncategorical imperative is the law of the noumenon, belonging to it and\ninherent in it from the beginning. That, however, is the nature of\nethics. Ethics make it possible for the intelligible ego to act free\nfrom the shackles of empiricism, and so through ethics, the existence of\nwhose possibilities logic assures us, is able to become actual in all\nits purity.\n\nThere remains a most important point in which the Kantian system is\noften misunderstood. It reveals itself plainly in every case of\nwrong-doing.\n\nDuty is only towards oneself; Kant must have realised this in his\nearlier days when first he felt an impulse to lie. Except for a few\nindications in Nietzsche, and in Stirner, and a few others, Ibsen alone\nseems to have grasped the principle of the Kantian ethics (notably in\n\u201cBrand\u201d and \u201cPeer Gynt\u201d). The following two quotations also give the\nKantian view in a general way:\n\nFirst Hebbel\u2019s epigram, \u201cLies and Truth.\u201d\n\n\u201cWhich do you pay dearer for, lies or the truth? The former costs you\nyourself, the latter at most your happiness.\u201d\n\nNext, the well-known words of Sleika from the \u201cWest\u00f6stlichen Diwan\u201d:\n\n  All sorts go to make a world,\n  The crowd and the rogue and the hero;\n  But the highest fortune of earth\u2019s children\n  Is always in their own personality.\n\n  It matters little how a man lives\n  If only he is true to himself;\n  It matters nothing what a man may lose\n  If he remains what he really is.\n\nIt is certainly true that most men need some kind of a God. A few, and\nthey are the men of genius, do not bow to an alien law. The rest try to\njustify their doings and misdoings, their thinking and existence (at\nleast the mental side of it), to some one else, whether it be the\npersonal God of the Jews, or a beloved, respected, and revered human\nbeing. It is only in this way that they can bring their lives under the\nsocial law.\n\nKant was permeated with his conviction, as is conspicuous in the\nminutest details of his chosen life-work, that man was responsible only\nto himself, to such an extent that he regarded this side of his theory\nas self-evident and least likely to be disputed. This silence of Kant\nhas brought about a misunderstanding of his ethics--the only ethics\ntenable from the psychologically introspective standpoint, the only\nsystem according to which the insistent strong inner voice of the one is\nto be heard through the noise of the many.\n\nI gather from a passage in his \u201cAnthropology\u201d that even in the case of\nKant some incident in his actual earthly life preceded the \u201cformation of\nhis character.\u201d The birth of the Kantian ethics, the noblest event in\nthe history of the world, was the moment when for the first time the\ndazzling awful conception came to him, \u201cI am responsible only to myself;\nI must follow none other; I must not forget myself even in my work; I am\nalone; I am free; I am lord of myself.\u201d\n\n\u201cTwo things fill my mind with ever renewed wonder and awe the more often\nand the deeper I dwell on them--the starry vault above me and the moral\nlaw within me. I must not look on them both as veiled in mystery or\nthink that their majesty places them beyond me. I see them before me,\nand they are part of the consciousness of my existence. The first arises\nfrom my position in the outer world of the senses, and links me with the\nimmeasurable space in which worlds and worlds and systems and systems,\nalthough in immeasurable time, have their ebbs and flows, their\nbeginnings and ends. The second arises from my invisible self, my\npersonality, and places me in a world that has true infinity, but which\nis evident only to the reason and with which I recognise myself as being\nbound, not accidentally as in the other case but in a universal and\nnecessary union. On the one hand, the consciousness of an endless series\nof worlds destroys my sense of importance, making me only one of the\nanimal creatures which must return its substance again to the planet\n(that, too, being no more than a point in space) from whence it came,\nafter having been in some unknown way endowed with life for a brief\nspace. The second point of view enhances my importance, makes me an\nintelligence, infinite and unconditioned through my personality, the\nmoral law in which separates me from the animals and from the world of\nsense, removes me from the limits of time and space, and links me with\ninfinity.\u201d\n\nThe secret of the critique of practical reason is that man is alone in\nthe world, in tremendous eternal isolation.\n\nHe has no object outside himself; lives for nothing else; he is far\nremoved from being the slave of his wishes, of his abilities, of his\nnecessities; he stands far above social ethics; he is alone.\n\nThus he becomes one and all; he has the law in him, and so he himself is\nthe law, and no mere changing caprice. The desire is in him to be only\nthe law, to be the law that is himself, without afterthought or\nforethought. This is the awful conclusion, he has no longer the sense\nthat there can be duty for him. Nothing is superior to him, to the\nisolated absolute unity. But there are no alternatives for him; he must\nrespond to his own categorical imperatives, absolutely, impartially.\n\u201cFreedom,\u201d he cries (for instance, Wagner, or Schopenhauer), \u201crest,\npeace from the enemy; peace, not this endless striving\u201d; and he is\nterrified. Even in this wish for freedom there is cowardice; in the\nignominious lament there is desertion as if he were too small for the\nfight. What is the use of it all, he cries to the universe; and is at\nonce ashamed, for he is demanding happiness, and that his own burden\nshould rest on other shoulders. Kant\u2019s lonely man does not dance or\nlaugh; he neither brawls nor makes merry; he feels no need to make a\nnoise, because the universe is so silent around him. To acquiesce in his\nloneliness is the splendid supremacy of the Kantian.\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE \u201cI\u201d PROBLEM AND GENIUS\n\n  \u201cIn the beginning the world was nothing but the \u00c2tman, in the form of\n  a man. It looked around and saw nothing different to itself. Then it\n  cried out once, \u2018It is I.\u2019 That is how the word \u2018I\u2019 came to be. That\n  is why even at the present day, if any one is called, he answers, \u2018It\n  is I,\u2019 and then recalls his other name, the one he\n  bears.\u201d--(Brihad\u00e2ranyata-Upanishad.)\n\nMany disputations about principles in psychology arise from individual\ncharacterological differences in the disputants. Thus, in the mode that\nI have already suggested, characterology might play an important part.\nWhen one person thinks to have discovered this, the other that, by\nintrospection, characterology would have to show why the results in the\none case should differ from those in the other, or, at least, to point\nout in what other respects the persons in question were unlike. I see no\nother possible way of clearing up the disputed points of psychology.\nPsychology is a science of experiences, and, therefore, it must\nproceed from the individual to the general, and not, as in the\nsupra-individualistic laws of logic and ethics, proceed from the\nuniversal to the individual case. There is no such thing as an empirical\ngeneral psychology; and it would be a mistake to approach such without\nhaving fully reckoned with differential psychology.\n\nIt is a great pity that psychology has been placed between philosophy\nand the analysis of perceptions. From whichever side psychologists\napproached the subject, they have always been assured of the general\nvalidity of their results. Perhaps even so fundamental a question as to\nwhether or no perception itself implies an actual and spontaneous act of\nconsciousness cannot be solved without a consideration of\ncharacterological differences.\n\nThe purpose of this work is to apply characterology to the solution of a\nfew of these doubtful matters, with special reference to the\ndistinctions between the sexes. The different conceptions of the\nI-problem, however, depend not so much on differences of sex as on\ndifferences in giftedness. The dispute between Hume and Kant receives\nits characterological explanation much in the same way as if I were to\ndistinguish two men in so far as the one held in the highest esteem the\nworks of Makart and Gounod, the other those of Rembrandt and Beethoven.\nI would simply distinguish the two by their giftedness. So also the\njudgments about the \u201cI\u201d must be very different in the cases of\ndifferently gifted men. There have been no truly great men who were not\npersuaded of the existence of the \u201cI\u201d; a man who denies it cannot be a\ngreat man.\n\nIn the course of the following pages this proposition will be taken as\nabsolutely binding, and will be used really as a means of valuing\ngenius.\n\nThere has been no famous man who, at least some time in the course of\nhis life, and generally earlier in proportion to his greatness, has not\nhad a moment in which he was absolutely convinced of the possession of\nan ego in the highest sense.\n\nLet us compare the following utterances of three very great geniuses.\n\nJean Paul relates in his autobiographical sketch, \u201cTruths from my own\nLife\u201d:\n\n\u201cI can never forget a circumstance which, so far, has been related by no\none--the birth of my own self-consciousness, the time and place of which\nI can tell. One morning I was standing, as a very young child, at the\nfront door, and looking towards the wood-shed I suddenly saw, all at\nonce my inner likeness. \u2018I\u2019 am \u2018I\u2019 flashed like lightning from the skies\nacross me, and since then has remained. I saw myself then for the first\ntime and for ever. This cannot be explained as a confusion of memory,\nfor no alien narrative could have blended itself with this sacred event,\npreserved permanently in my memory by its vividness and novelty.\u201d\n\nNovalis, in his \u201cMiscellaneous Fragments,\u201d refers to an identical\nexperience:\n\n\u201cThis factor every one must experience for himself. It is a factor of\nthe higher order, and reveals itself only to higher men; but men should\nstrive to induce it in themselves. Philosophy is the exercise of this\nfactor, it is a true self-revelation, the stimulation of the real ego by\nthe ideal ego. It is the foundation of all other revelations; the\nresolution to philosophise is a challenge to the actual ego, to become\nconscious of itself, to grow and to become a soul.\u201d\n\nSchelling discusses the same phenomenon in his \u201cPhilosophical Letters\nupon Dogmatism and Criticism,\u201d a little known early work, in which occur\nthe following beautiful words:\n\n\u201cIn all of us there dwells a secret marvellous power of freeing\nourselves from the changes of time, of withdrawing to our secret selves\naway from external things, and of so discovering to ourselves the\neternal in us in the form of unchangeability. This presentation of\nourselves to ourselves is the most truly personal experience upon which\ndepends everything that we know of the supra-sensual world. This\npresentation shows us for the first time what real existence is, whilst\nall else only appears to be. It differs from every presentation of the\nsense in its perfect freedom, whilst all other presentations are bound,\nbeing overweighted by the burden of the object. Still there exists for\nthose who have not this perfect freedom of the inner sense some approach\nto it, experiences approaching it from which they may gain some faint\nidea of it.... This intellectual presentation occurs when we cease to be\nour own object, when, withdrawing into ourselves, the perceiving self\nmerges in the self-perceived. At that moment we annihilate time and\nduration of time; we are no longer in time, but time, or rather\neternity itself, is in us. The external world is no longer an object for\nus, but is lost in us.\u201d\n\nThe positivist will perhaps only laugh at the self-deceived deceiver,\nthe philosopher who asserts that he has had such experiences. Well, it\nis not easy to prevent it. It is also unnecessary. But I am by no means\nof the opinion that this \u201cfactor of a higher order\u201d plays the same part\nin all men of genius of a mystical identity of subject and object as\nSchelling describes it.\n\nWhether there are undivided experiences in which the dualism of actual\nlife is overcome, as is indicated by Plotin and the Indian Mahatmas, or\nwhether this is only the highest intensification of experience, but in\nprinciple similar to all others--does not signify here, the coincidence\nof subject and object, of time and eternity, the representing of God\nthrough living men, will neither be demonstrated as possible nor denied\nas impossible. The experiencing of one\u2019s own \u201cI\u201d is not to be begun by\ntheoretical knowledge, and no one has ever, so far, tried to put it in\nthe position of a systematic philosophy. I shall, therefore, not call\nthis factor of a higher order, which manifests itself in some men in one\nway and in other men in another way, an essential manifestation of the\ntrue ego, but only a phase of it.\n\nEvery great man knows this phase of the ego. He may become conscious of\nit first through the love of a woman, for the great man loves more\nintensely than the ordinary man; or it may be from the contrast given by\na sense of guilt or the knowledge of having failed; these, too, the\ngreat man feels more intensely than smaller-minded people. It may lead\nhim to a sense of unity with the all, to the seeing of all things in\nGod, or, and this is more likely, it may reveal to him the frightful\ndualism of nature and spirit in the universe, and produce in him the\nneed, the craving, for a solution of it, for the secret inner wonder.\nBut always it leads the great man to the beginning of a presentation of\nthe world for himself and by himself, without the help of the thought of\nothers.\n\nThis intuitive vision of the world is not a great synthesis elaborated\nat his writing-table in his library from all the books that have been\nwritten; it is something that has been experienced, and as a whole it is\nclear and intelligible, although details may still be obscure and\ncontradictory. The excitation of the ego is the only source of this\nintuitive vision of the world as a whole in the case of the artist as in\nthat of the philosopher. And, however different they may be, if they are\nreally intuitive visions of the cosmos, they have this in common,\nsomething that comes only from the excitation of the ego, the faith that\nevery great man possesses, the conviction of his possession of an \u201cI\u201d or\nsoul, which is solitary in the universe, which faces the universe and\ncomprehends it.\n\nFrom the time of this first excitation of his ego, the great man, in\nspite of lapses due to the most terrible feeling, the feeling of\nmortality, will live in and by his soul.\n\nAnd it is for this reason, as well as from the sense of his creative\npowers, that the great man has so intense a self-consciousness. Nothing\ncan be more unintelligent than to talk of the modesty of great men, of\ntheir inability to recognise what is within them. There is no great man\nwho does not well know how far he differs from others (except during\nthese periodical fits of depression to which I have already alluded).\nEvery great man feels himself to be great as soon as he has created\nsomething; his vanity and ambition are, in fact, always so great that he\nover-estimates himself. Schopenhauer believed himself to be greater than\nKant. Nietzsche declared that \u201cThus spake Zarathustra\u201d was the greatest\nbook in the world.\n\nThere is, however, a side of truth in the assertion that great men are\nmodest. They are never arrogant. Arrogance and self-realisation are\ncontradictories, and should never be confused although this is often\ndone. A man has just as much arrogance as he lacks of self-realisation,\nand uses it to increase his own self-consciousness by artificially\nlowering his estimation of others. Of course the foregoing holds true\nonly of what may be called physiological, unconscious arrogance; the\ngreat man must occasionally comport himself with what seems rudeness to\ncontemptible persons.\n\nAll great men, then, have a conviction, really independent of external\nproof, that they have a soul. The absurd fear must be laid aside that\nthe soul is a hyperempirical reality and that belief in it leads us to\nthe position of the theologists. Belief in a soul is anything rather\nthan a superstition and is no mere handmaid of religious systems.\nArtists speak of their souls although they have not studied philosophy\nor theology; atheists like Shelley use the expression and know very well\nwhat they mean by it.\n\nOthers have suggested that the \u201csoul\u201d is only a beautiful empty word,\nwhich people ascribe to others without having felt its need for\nthemselves. This is like saying that great artists use symbols to\nexpress the highest form of reality without being assured as to the\nexistence of that reality. The mere empiricist and the pure physiologist\nno doubt will consider that all this is nonsense, and that Lucretius is\nthe only great poet. No doubt there has been much misuse of the word,\nbut if great artists speak of their soul they know what they are about.\nArtists, like philosophers, know well when they approach the greatest\npossible reality, but Hume had no sense of this.\n\nThe scientific man ranks, as I have already said, and as I shall\npresently prove, below the artist and the philosopher. The two latter\nmay earn the title of genius which must always be denied to the\nscientific man. Without any good reason having been assigned for it, it\nhas usually been the case that the voice of genius on any particular\nproblem is listened to before the voice of science. Is there justice in\nthis preference? Can the genius explain things as to which the man of\nscience, as such, can say nothing? Can he peer into depths where the man\nof science is blind?\n\nThe conception genius concludes universality. If there were an absolute\ngenius (a convenient fiction) there would be nothing to which he could\nnot have a vivid, intimate, and complete relation. Genius, as I have\nalready shown, would have universal comprehension, and through its\nperfect memory would be independent of time. To comprehend anything one\nmust have within one something similar. A man notices, understands, and\ncomprehends only those things with which he has some kinship. The genius\nis the man with the most intense, most vivid, most conscious, most\ncontinuous, and most individual ego. The ego is the central point, the\nunit of comprehension, the synthesis of all manifoldness.\n\nThe ego of the genius accordingly is simply itself universal\ncomprehension, the centre of infinite space; the great man contains the\nwhole universe within himself; genius is the living microcosm. He is not\nan intricate mosaic, a chemical combination of an infinite number of\nelements; the argument in chap. iv. as to his relation to other men and\nthings must not be taken in that sense; he is everything. In him and\nthrough him all psychical manifestations cohere and are real\nexperiences, not an elaborate piece-work, a whole put together from\nparts in the fashion of science. For the genius the ego is the all,\nlives as the all; the genius sees nature and all existences as whole;\nthe relations of things flash on him intuitively; he has not to build\nbridges of stones between them. And so the genius cannot be an empirical\npsychologist slowly collecting details and linking them by associations;\nhe cannot be a physicist, envisaging the world as a compound of atoms\nand molecules.\n\nIt is absolutely from his vision of the whole, in which the genius\nalways lives, that he gets his sense of the parts. He values everything\nwithin him or without him by the standard of this vision, a vision that\nfor him is no function of time, but a part of eternity. And so the man\nof genius is the profound man, and profound only in proportion to his\ngenius. That is why his views are more valuable than those of all\nothers. He constructs from everything his ego that holds the universe,\nwhilst others never reach a full consciousness of this inner self, and\nso, for him, all things have significance, all things are symbolical.\nFor him breathing is something more than the coming and going of gases\nthrough the walls of the capillaries; the blue of the sky is more than\nthe partial polarisation of diffused and reflected light; snakes are not\nmerely reptiles that have lost limbs. If it were possible for one single\nman to have achieved all the scientific discoveries that have ever been\nmade, if everything that has been done by the following: Archimedes and\nLagrange, Johannes M\u00fcller and Karl Ernst von Baer, Newton and Laplace,\nKonrad Sprengel and Cuvier, Thucydides and Niebuhr, Friedrich August\nWolf and Franz Bopp, and by many more famous men of science, could have\nbeen achieved by one man in the short span of human life, he would still\nnot be entitled to the denomination of genius, for none of these have\npierced the depths. The scientist takes phenomena for what they\nobviously are; the great man or the genius for what they signify. Sea\nand mountain, light and darkness, spring and autumn, cypress and palm,\ndove and swan are symbols to him, he not only thinks that there is, but\nhe recognises in them something deeper. The ride of the Valkyrie is not\nproduced by atmospheric pressure and the magic fire is not the outcome\nof a process of oxidation.\n\nAnd all this is possible for him because the outer world is as full and\nstrongly connected as the inner in him, the external world in fact seems\nto be only a special aspect of his inner life; the universe and the ego\nhave become one in him, and he is not obliged to set his experience\ntogether piece by piece according to rule. The greatest poly-historian,\non the contrary, does nothing but add branch to branch and yet creates\nno completed structure. That is another reason why the great scientist\nis lower than the great artist, the great philosopher. The infinity of\nthe universe is responded to in the genius by a true sense of infinity\nin his own breast; he holds chaos and cosmos, all details and all\ntotality, all plurality, and all singularity in himself. Although these\nremarks apply more to genius than to the nature of the productions of\ngenius, although the occurrence of artistic ecstasy, philosophic\nconceptions, religious fervour remain as puzzling as ever, if merely the\nconditions, not the actual process of a really great achievement has\nbeen made clearer, yet this is nevertheless to be the final definition\nof genius:\n\nA man may be called a genius when he lives in conscious connection with\nthe whole universe. It is only then that the genius becomes the really\ndivine spark in mankind.\n\nThe great idea of the soul of man as the microcosm, the most important\ndiscovery of the philosophy of the Renaissance--although traces of the\nidea are to be found in Plato and Aristotle--appears to be quite\ndisregarded by modern thinkers since the death of Leibnitz. It has\nhitherto been held as only holding good for genius, as the prerogative\nof those masters of men.\n\nBut the incongruity is only apparent. All mankind have some of the\nquality of genius, and no man has it entirely. Genius is a condition to\nwhich one man draws close whilst another is further away, which is\nattained by some in early days, but with others only at the end of life.\n\nThe man to whom we have accorded the possession of genius, is only he\nwho has begun to see, and to open the eyes of others. That they then can\nsee with their own eyes proves that they were only standing before the\ndoor.\n\nEven the ordinary man, even as such, can stand in an indirect\nrelationship to everything: his idea of the \u201cwhole\u201d is only a glimpse,\nhe does not succeed in identifying himself with it. But he is not\nwithout the possibility of following this identification in another, and\nso attaining a composite image. Through some vision of the world he can\nbind himself to the universal, and by diligent cultivation he can make\neach detail a part of himself. Nothing is quite strange to him, and in\nall a band of sympathy exists between him and the things of the world.\nIt is not so with plants or animals. They are limited, they do not know\nthe whole but only one element; they do not populate the whole earth,\nand where they are widely dispersed it is in the service of man, who has\nallotted to them everywhere the same task. They may have a relation to\nthe sun or to the moon, but they certainly are wanting in respect of the\n\u201cstarry vault\u201d and \u201cthe moral law.\u201d For the latter originates in the\nsoul of man, in which is hidden all totality, which can see everything\nbecause it is universal itself: the starry heavens and the moral law are\nfundamentally one and the same. The universalism of the categorical\nimperative is the universalism of the universe.\n\nThe infinity of the universe is only the \u201cthought-picture\u201d of the\ninfinity of the moral volition.\n\nThis was taught, the microcosm in man, by Empedocles that mighty\nmagician.\n\n  \u0393\u03b1\u03af\u1fc3 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd \u1f40\u03c0\u03ce\u03c0\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f55\u03b4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1,\n  \u0391\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c4\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f00\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd,\n  \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03bd, \u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03c7\u03b5\u03ca \u03bb\u03c5\u03b3\u03c1\u1ff7.\n\nAnd Plotinus;\n\n                \u039f\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c0\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\n  \u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n\nwhich Goethe imitated in the famous verse:\n\n  \u201cW\u00e4r\u2019 nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,\n  Die Sonne k\u00f6nnt\u2019 es nie erblicken;\n  L\u00e4g\u2019 nicht in uns des Gottes eig\u2019ne Kraft,\n  Wie k\u00f6nnt uns G\u00f6ttliches entz\u00fccken?\u201d\n\nMan is the only creature, he is _the_ creature in Nature, that has in\nhimself a relation to every thing.\n\nHe to whom this relationship brings understanding and the most complete\nconsciousness, not to many things or to few things, but to all things,\nthe man who of his own individuality has thought out everything, is\ncalled a genius. He in whom the possibility of this is present, in whom\nan interest in everything could be aroused, yet who only, of his own\naccord, concerns himself with a few, we call merely a man.\n\nThe theory of Leibnitz, which is seldom rightly understood, that the\nlower monads are a mirror of the world without being conscious of this\ncapacity of theirs, expresses the same idea. The man of genius lives in\na state of complete understanding, an understanding of the whole; the\nwhole world is also in ordinary men, but not in a condition that can\nbecome creative. The one lives in conscious active relation with the\nwhole, the other in an unconscious relation; the man of genius is the\nactual, the common man the potential, microcosm. The genius is the\ncomplete man; the manhood that is latent in all men is in him fully\ndeveloped.\n\nMan himself is the All, and so unlike a mere part, dependent on other\nparts; he is not assigned a definite place in a system of natural laws,\nbut he himself is the meaning of the law and is therefore free, just as\nthe world whole being itself, the All does not condition itself but is\nunconditioned. The man of genius is he who forgets nothing because he\ndoes not forget himself, and because forgetting, being a functional\nsubjection to time, is neither free nor ethical. He is not brought\nforward on the wave of a historical movement as its child, to be\nswallowed up by the next wave, because all, all the past and all the\nfuture is contained in his inward vision. He it is whose consciousness\nof immortality is most strong because the fear of death has no terror\nfor him. He it is who lives in the most sympathetic relation to symbols\nand values because he weighs and interprets by these all that is within\nhim and all that is outside him. He is the freest and the wisest and the\nmost moral of men, and for these reasons he suffers most of all from\nwhat is still unconscious, what is chaos, what is fatality within him.\n\nHow does the morality of great men reveal itself in their relations to\nother men? This, according to the popular view, is the only form which\nmorality can assume, apart from contraventions of the penal code. And\ncertainly in this respect, great men have displayed the most dubious\nqualities. Have they not laid themselves open to accusations of base\ningratitude, extreme harshness, and much worse faults?\n\nIt is certainly true that the greater an artist or philosopher may be,\nthe more ruthless he will be in keeping faith with himself, in this very\nway often disappointing the expectations of those with whom he comes in\ncontact in every-day life; these cannot follow his higher flights and\nso try to bind the eagle to earth (Goethe and Lavater) and in this way\nmany great men have been branded as immoral.\n\nGoethe, fortunately for himself, preserved a silence about himself so\ncomplete that modern people who think that they understand him\ncompletely as the light-living Olympian, only know a few specks of him\ntaken from his marvellous delineation of Faust; we may be certain, none\nthe less, that he judged himself severely, and suffered in full measure\nfor the guilt he found in himself. And when an envious N\u00f6rgler, who\nnever grasped Schopenhauer\u2019s doctrine of detachment and the meaning of\nhis Nirwana, throws the reproach at the latter that he got the last\nvalue out of his property, such a mean yelping requires no answer.\n\nThe statement that a great man is most moral towards himself stands on\nsure ground; he will not allow alien views to be imposed on him, so\nobscuring the judgment of his own ego; he will not passively accept the\ninterpretation of another, of an alien ego, quite different from his\nown, and if ever he has allowed himself to be influenced, the thought\nwill always be painful to him. A conscious lie that he has told will\nharass him throughout his life, and he will be unable to shake off the\nmemory in Dionysian fashion. But men of genius will suffer most when\nthey become aware afterwards that they have unconsciously helped to\nspread a lie in their talk or conduct with others. Other men, who do not\npossess this organic thirst for truth, are always deeply involved in\nlies and errors, and so do not understand the bitter revolt of great men\nagainst the \u201clies of life.\u201d\n\nThe great man, he who stands high, he in whom the ego, unconditioned by\ntime, is dominant, seeks to maintain his own value in the presence of\nhis intelligible ego by his intellectual and moral conscience. His pride\nis towards himself; there is the desire in him to impress his own self\nby his thoughts, actions, and creations. This pride is the pride\npeculiar to genius, possessing its own standard of value, and it is\nindependent of the judgment of others, since it possesses in itself a\nhigher tribunal. Soft and ascetic natures (Pascal is an example)\nsometimes suffer from this self-pride, and yet try in vain to shake it\noff. This self-pride will always be associated with pride before others,\nbut the two forms are really in perpetual conflict.\n\nCan it be said that this strong adaptation to duty towards oneself\nprejudices the sense of duty towards one\u2019s neighbours? Do not the two\nstand as alternatives, so that he who always keeps faith with himself\nmust break it with others? By no means. As there is only one truth, so\nthere can be only one desire for truth--what Carlyle called\nsincerity--that a man has or has not with regard both to himself and to\nthe world; it is never one of two, a view of the world differing from a\nview of oneself, a self-study without a world-study; there is only one\nduty and only one morality. Man acts either morally or immorally, and if\nhe is moral towards himself he is moral towards others.\n\nThere are few regions of thought, however, so full of false ideas, as\nthe conception of moral duty towards one\u2019s neighbours and how it is to\nbe fulfilled. Leaving out of consideration, for the moment, the\ntheoretical systems of morality which are based on the maintenance of\nhuman society, and which attach less importance to the concrete feelings\nand motives at the moment of action than to the effect on the general\nsystem of morality, we come at once to the popular idea which defines\nthe morality of a man by his \u201cgoodness,\u201d the degree to which his\ncompassionate disposition is developed. From the philosophical point of\nview, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith saw in sympathy the nature and source\nof all ethical conduct, and this view received a very strong support\nfrom Schopenhauer\u2019s sympathetic morality. Schopenhauer\u2019s \u201cEssay on the\nFoundations of Morality\u201d shows in its motto \u201cIt is easy to preach\nmorality, difficult to find a basis for it,\u201d the fundamental error of\nthe sympathetic ethics which always fails to recognise that the science\nof ethics is not merely an explanation and description of conduct, but a\nsearch for a guide to it. Whoever will be at the pains diligently to\nlisten to the inner voice of man, in order to establish what he ought\nto do, will certainly reject every system of ethics, the aim of which is\nto be a doctrine of the requirements which man has invented for himself\nand others instead of being a relation of what he actually does in\nfurthering these requirements or in stifling them. The object of all\nmoral science is not what is happening but what ought to happen.\n\nAll attempts to explain ethics by psychology overlook the fact that\nevery psychic event in man is appraised by man himself, and the\nappraiser of the psychic event cannot be a psychic event. This standard\ncan only be an idea, or a value which is never fully realised, and which\ncannot be altered by any experience because it remains constant, even if\nall experience is in opposition to it. Moral conduct can be only conduct\ncontrolled by an idea. And so we can choose only from systems of\nmorality which set up some idea or maxim for the regulation of conduct,\nand there are only two to choose from, the ethical socialism or social\nethics, founded by Bentham and Mill, but imported to the Continent and\ndiligently propagated in Germany and Norway, and ethical individualism\nsuch as is taught by Christianity and German idealism.\n\nThe second failure of all the systems of ethics founded on sympathy is\nthat they attempt to find a foundation for morality, to explain\nmorality, whilst the very conception of morality is that it should be\nthe ultimate standard of human conduct, and so must be inexplicable and\nnon-derivative, must be its own purpose, and cannot be brought into\nrelation of cause and effect with anything outside itself. This\nattempted derivation of morality is simply another aspect of the purely\ndescriptive, and therefore necessarily, relative, ethics, and is\nuntenable from the fact that however diligently the search be made, it\nis impossible to find in the sphere of causes and effects a high aim\nthat would be applicable to every moral action. The inspiring motive of\nan action cannot come from any nexus of cause and effect; it is much\nmore in the nature of things for cause and effect to be linked with an\ninspiring moral aim. Outside the domain of first causes there lies a\ndomain of moral aims, and this latter domain is the inheritance of\nmankind. The complete science of existence is a linking together of\nfirst causes until the first cause of all is reached, and a complete\nscience of \u201coughts\u201d leads to a union of all in one great aim, the\nculminating moral imperative.\n\nHe who rates sympathy as a positive moral factor has treated as moral\nsomething that is a feeling, not an act. Sympathy may be an ethical\nphenomenon, the expression of something ethical, but it is no more an\nethical act than are the senses of shame and pride; we must clearly\ndistinguish between an ethical act and an ethical phenomenon. Nothing\nmust be considered an ethical act that is not a confirmation of the\nethical idea by action; ethical phenomena are unpremeditated,\ninvoluntary signs of a permanent tendency of the disposition towards the\nmoral idea. It is in the struggle between motives that the idea presses\nin and seeks to make the decision; the empirical mixture of ethical and\nunethical feelings, sympathy and malice, self-confidence and\npresumption, gives no help towards a conclusion. Sympathy is, perhaps,\nthe surest sign of a disposition, but it is not the moral purpose\ninspiring an action. Morality must imply conscious knowledge of the\nmoral purpose and of value as opposed to worthlessness. Socrates was\nright in this, and Kant is the only modern philosopher who has followed\nhim. Sympathy is a non-logical sensation, and has no claim to respect.\n\nThe question now before us is to consider how far a man can act morally\nwith regard to his fellow men.\n\nIt is certainly not by unsolicited help which obtrudes itself on the\nsolitude of another and pierces the limits that he has set for himself;\nnot by compassion but rather by respect. This respect we owe only to\nman, as Kant showed; for man is the only creature in the universe who is\na purpose to himself.\n\nBut how can I show a man my contempt, and how prove to him my respect?\nThe first by ignoring him, the second by being friendly with him.\n\nHow can I use him as a means to an end, and how can I honour him by\nregarding him himself as an end? In the first case, by looking upon him\nas a link in the chain of circumstances with which I have to deal; in\nthe second, by endeavouring to understand him. It is only by interesting\noneself in a man, without exactly telling him so, by thinking of him, by\ngrasping his work, by sympathising with his fate, and by seeking to\nunderstand him, that one can respect one\u2019s neighbour. Only he who,\nthrough his own afflictions, has become unselfish, who forgets small\nwranglings with his fellow man, who can repress his impatience, and who\nendeavours to understand him, is really disinterested with regard to his\nneighbour; and he behaves morally because he triumphs over the strongest\nenemy to his understanding of his neighbour--selfishness.\n\nHow does the famous man stand in this respect? He who understands the\nmost men, because he is most universal in disposition, and who lives in\nthe closest relation to the universe at large, who most earnestly\ndesires to understand its purpose, will be most likely to act well\ntowards his neighbour.\n\nAs a matter of fact, no one thinks so much or so intently as he about\nother people (even although he has only seen them for a moment), and no\none tries so hard to understand them if he does not feel that he already\nhas them within him in all their significance. Inasmuch as he has a\ncontinuous past, a complete ego of his own, he can create the past which\nhe did not know for others. He follows the strongest bent of his inner\nbeing if he thinks about them, for he seeks only to come to the truth\nabout them by understanding them. He sees that human beings are all\nmembers of an intelligible world, in which there is no narrow egoism or\naltruism. This is the only explanation of how it is that great men stand\nin vital, understanding relationship, not only with those round about\nthem, but with all the personalities of history who have preceded them;\nthis is the only reason why great artists have grasped historical\npersonalities so much better and more intensively than scientific\nhistorians. There has been no great man who has not stood in a personal\nrelationship to Napoleon, Plato, or Mahomet. It is in this way that he\nshows his respect and true reverence for those who have lived before\nhim. When many of those who have been intimate with artists feel\naggrieved when later on they recognise themselves in their works; when\nwriters are reproached for treating everything as copy, it is easy\nenough to understand the feeling. But the artist or author who does not\nheed the littlenesses of mankind has committed no crime, he has simply\nemployed his creative act of understanding with regard to them, by a\nsingle-minded representation and reproduction of the world around him,\nand there can be no higher relation between men than this. The following\nwords of Pascal, which have already been mentioned, are specially\napplicable here: \u201cA mesure qu\u2019on a plus d\u2019esprit, on trouve qu\u2019il y a\nplus d\u2019hommes originaux. Les gens du commun ne trouvent pas de\ndiff\u00e9rence entre les hommes.\u201d It follows from the foregoing that the\ngreater a man is the greater efforts he will make to understand things\nthat are most strange to him, whilst the ordinary man readily thinks\nthat he understands a thing, although it may be something he does not at\nall understand, so that he fails to perceive the unfamiliar spirit which\nis appealing to him from some object of art or from a philosophy, and at\nmost attains a superficial relation to the subject, but does not rise to\nthe inspiration of its creator. The great man who attains to the highest\nrungs of consciousness does not easily identify himself and his opinion\nwith anything he reads, whilst those with a lesser clarity of mind\nadopt, and imagine that they absorb, things that in reality are very\ndifferent. The man of genius is he whose ego has acquired consciousness.\nHe is enabled by it to distinguish the fact that others are different,\nto perceive the \u201cego\u201d of other men, even when it is not pronounced\nenough for them to be conscious of it themselves. But it is only he who\nfeels that every other man is also an ego, a monad, an individual\ncentre of the universe, with specific manner of feeling and thinking and\na distinct past, he alone is in a position to avoid making use of his\nneighbours as means to an end, he, according to the ethics of Kant, will\ntrace, anticipate, and therefore respect the personality in his\ncompanion (as part of the intelligible universe), and will not merely be\nscandalised by him. The psychological condition of all practical\naltruism, therefore, is theoretical individualism.\n\nHere lies the bridge between moral conduct towards oneself and moral\nconduct towards one\u2019s neighbour, the apparent want of which in the\nKantian philosophy Schopenhauer unjustly regarded as a fault, and\nasserted to arise necessarily out of Kant\u2019s first principles.\n\nIt is easy to give proofs. Only brutalised criminals and insane persons\ntake absolutely no interest in their fellow men; they live as if they\nwere alone in the world, and the presence of strangers has no effect on\nthem. But for him who possesses a self there is a self in his neighbour,\nand only the man who has lost the logical and ethical centre of his\nbeing behaves to a second man as if the latter were not a man and had no\npersonality of his own. \u201cI\u201d and \u201cthou\u201d are complementary terms. A man\nsoonest gains consciousness of himself when he is with other men. This\nis why a man is prouder in the presence of other men than when he is\nalone, whilst it is in his hours of solitude that his self-confidence is\ndamped. Lastly, he who destroys himself destroys at the same time the\nwhole universe, and he who murders another commits the greatest crime\nbecause he murders himself in his victim. Absolute selfishness is, in\npractice, a horror, which should rather be called nihilism; if there is\nno \u201cthou,\u201d there is certainly no \u201cI,\u201d and that would mean there is\nnothing.\n\nThere is in the psychological disposition of the man of genius that\nwhich makes it impossible to use other men as a means to an end. And\nthis is it: he who feels his own personality, feels it also in others.\nFor him the Tat-tvam-asi is no beautiful hypothesis, but a reality. The\nhighest individualism is the highest universalism. Ernest Mach is in\ngreat error when he denies the subject, and thinks it is only after the\nrenunciation of the individual \u201cI\u201d that an ethical relation, which\nexcludes neglect of the strange \u201cI\u201d and over-estimation of the\nindividual \u201cI,\u201d may be expected. It has already been seen where the want\nof one\u2019s own I leads in relation to one\u2019s neighbour. The I is the\nfundamental ground of all social morality. I should never be able to\nplace myself, as an actual psychological being, in an ethical relation\nto a mere bundle of elements. It is possible to imagine such a\nrelationship; but it is entirely opposed to practical conduct; because\nit eliminates the psychological condition necessary for making the moral\nidea an actual reality.\n\nWe are preparing for a real ethical relation to our fellow men when we\nmake them conscious that each of them possesses a higher self, a soul,\nand that they must realise the souls in others.\n\nThis relation is, however, manifested in the most curious manner in the\nman of genius. No one suffers so much as he with the people, and,\ntherefore, for the people, with whom he lives. For, in a certain sense,\nit is certainly only \u201cby suffering\u201d that a man knows. If compassion is\nnot itself clear, abstractly conceivable or visibly symbolic knowledge,\nit is, at any rate, the strongest impulse for the acquisition of\nknowledge. It is only by suffering that the genius understands men. And\nthe genius suffers most because he suffers with and in each and all; but\nhe suffers most through his understanding.\n\nAlthough I tried to show in an earlier chapter that genius is the factor\nwhich primarily elevates man above the animals, and in connection with\nthat fact that it is man alone who has a history (this being explained\nby the presence in all men of some degree of the quality of genius), I\nmust return to that earlier side of my argument. Genius involves the\nliving actuality of the intelligible subject. History manifests itself\nonly as a social thing, as the \u201cobjective spirit,\u201d the individuals as\nsuch playing no part in it, being, in fact, non-historical. Here we see\nthe threads of our argument converging. If it be the case, and I do not\nthink that I am wrong, that the timeless, human personality is the\nnecessary condition of every real ethical relation to our fellow men,\nand if individuality is the necessary preliminary to the collective\nspirit, then it is clear why the \u201cmetaphysical animal\u201d and the\n\u201cpolitical animal,\u201d the possessor of genius and the maker of history,\nare one and the same, are humanity. And the old controversy is settled;\nwhich comes first, the individual or the community? Both must be equal\nand simultaneous.\n\nI think that I have proved at every point that genius is simply the\nhigher morality. The great man is not only the truest to himself, the\nmost unforgetful, the one to whom errors and lies are most hateful and\nintolerable; he is also the most social, at the same time the most\nself-contained, and the most open man. The genius is altogether a higher\nform, not merely intellectually, but also morally. In his own person,\nthe genius reveals the idea of mankind. He represents what man is; he is\nthe subject whose object is the whole universe which he makes endure for\nall time.\n\nLet there be no mistake. Consciousness and consciousness alone is in\nitself moral; all unconsciousness is immoral, and all immorality is\nunconscious. The \u201cimmoral genius,\u201d the \u201cgreat wicked man,\u201d is,\ntherefore, a mythical animal, invented by great men in certain moments\nof their lives as a possibility, in order (very much against the will of\nthe Creator) to serve as a bogey for nervous and timid natures, with\nwhich they frighten themselves and other children. No criminal who\nprided himself in his deed would speak like Hagen in the\n\u201cG\u00f6tterd\u00e4mmerung\u201d over Siegfried\u2019s dead body: \u201cHa, ha, I have slain him;\nI, Hagen, gave him his death blow.\u201d\n\nNapoleon and Bacon, who are given as counter-instances, were\nintellectually much over-rated or wrongly represented. And Nietzsche is\nthe least reliable in these matters, when he begins to discuss the\nBorgia type. The conception of the diabolical, of the anti-Christ, of\nAhriman, of the \u201cradical evil in human nature,\u201d is exceedingly powerful,\nyet it concerns genius only inasmuch as it is the opposite of it. It is\na fiction, created in the hours in which great men have struggled\nagainst the evil in themselves.\n\nUniversal comprehension, full consciousness, and perfect timelessness\nare an ideal condition, ideal even for gifted men; genius is an innate\nimperative, which never becomes a fully accomplished fact in human\nbeings. Hence it is that a man of genius will be the last man to feel\nhimself in the position to say of himself: \u201cI am a genius.\u201d Genius is,\nin its essence, nothing but the full completion of the idea of a man,\nand, therefore, every man ought to have some quality of it, and it\nshould be regarded as a possible principle for every one.\n\nGenius is the highest morality, and, therefore, it is every one\u2019s duty.\nGenius is to be attained by a supreme act of the will, in which the\nwhole universe is affirmed in the individual. Genius is something which\n\u201cmen of genius\u201d take upon themselves; it is the greatest exertion and\nthe greatest pride, the greatest misery and the greatest ecstasy to a\nman. A man may become a genius if he wishes to.\n\nBut at once it will certainly be said: \u201cVery many men would like very\nmuch to be \u2018original geniuses,\u2019\u201d and their wish has no effect. But if\nthese men who \u201cwould like very much\u201d had a livelier sense of what is\nsignified by their wish, if they were aware that genius is identical\nwith universal responsibility--and until that is grasped it will only be\na wish and not a determination--it is highly probable that a very large\nnumber of these men would cease to wish to become geniuses.\n\nThe reason why madness overtakes so many men of genius--fools believe it\ncomes from the influence of Venus, or the spinal degeneration of\nneurasthenics--is that for many the burden becomes too heavy, the task\nof bearing the whole world on the shoulders, like Atlas, intolerable for\nthe smaller, but never for the really mighty minds. But the higher a man\nmounts, the greater may be his fall; all genius is a conquering of\nchaos, mystery, and darkness, and if it degenerates and goes to pieces,\nthe ruin is greater in proportion to the success. The genius which runs\nto madness is no longer genius; it has chosen happiness instead of\nmorality. All madness is the outcome of the insupportability of\nsuffering attached to all consciousness. Sophocles derived his idea that\na man might wish to become mad for this reason, and lets Aias, whose\nmind finally gives way, give utterance to these words:\n\n  \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2.\n\nI shall conclude this chapter with the solemn words, similar to the best\nmoments of Kant\u2019s style, of Johann Pico von Mirandola, to whom I may\nbring some measure of recognition. In his address \u201con the dignity of\nman\u201d the Supreme Being addresses the following words to man:\n\n\u201cNec certam sedem, nec propriam faciem, nec munus ullum peculiare tibi\ndedimus, O Adam: ut quam sedem, quam faciem, quae munera tute optaveris,\nea pro voto, pro tua sententia, habeas et possideas. Definita caeteris\nnatura intra praescriptas a nobis leges coercetur; tu nullis angustiis\ncoercitus, pro tuo arbitrio, in cuius manu te posui, tibi illam\npraefinies. Medium te mundi posui, ut circumspiceres inde commodius\nquicquid est in mundo. Nec te caelestem, neque terrenum, neque mortalem,\nneque immortalem fecimus, ut tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque\nplastes et fictor in quam malueris tute formam effingas. Poteris in\ninferiora quae sunt bruta degenerare, poteris in superiora quae sunt\ndivina, ex tui animi sententia regenerari.\n\nO summam Dei Patris liberalitatem, summam et admirandam hominis\nfelicitatem: cui datum id habere quod optat, id esse quod velit. Bruta\nsimul atque nascuntur id secum afferunt e bulga matris, quod possessura\nsunt. Supremi spiritus aut ab initio aut paulo mox id fuerunt, quod sunt\nfuturi in perpetuas aeternitates. _Nascenti homini omniferaria semina et\nomnigenae vitae germina indidit Pater_; quae quisque excoluerit, illa\nadolescent et fructus suos ferent in illo: si vegetalia, planta fiet,\nsi sensualia, obbrutescet, si rationalia, caeleste evadet animal, si\nintellectualia, angelus erit et Dei filius. _Et si nulla creaturarum\nsorte contentus in unitatis centrum suac se receperit, unus cum Deo\nspiritus factus, in solitaria Patris caligine qui est super omnia\nconstitutus omnibus antestabit\u201d._\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nMALE AND FEMALE PSYCHOLOGY\n\nIt is now time to return to the actual subject of this investigation in\norder to see how far its explanation has been helped by the lengthy\ndigressions, which must often have seemed wide of the mark.\n\nThe consequences of the fundamental principles that have been developed\nare of such radical importance to the psychology of the sexes that, even\nif the former deductions have been assented to, the present conclusions\nmay find no acceptance. This is not the place to analyse such a\npossibility; but in order to protect the theory I am now going to set\nup, from all objections, I shall fully substantiate it in the fullest\npossible manner by convincing arguments.\n\nShortly speaking the matter stands as follows: I have shown that logical\nand ethical phenomena come together in the conception of truth as the\nultimate good, and posit the existence of an intelligible ego or a soul,\nas a form of being of the highest super-empirical reality. In such a\nbeing as the absolute female there are no logical and ethical phenomena,\nand, therefore, the ground for the assumption of a soul is absent. The\nabsolute female knows neither the logical nor the moral imperative, and\nthe words law and duty, duty towards herself, are words which are least\nfamiliar to her. The inference that she is wanting in supersensual\npersonality is fully justified. The absolute female has no ego.\n\nIn a certain sense this is an end of the investigation, a final\nconclusion to which all analysis of the female leads. And although this\nconclusion, put thus concisely, seems harsh and intolerant, paradoxical\nand too abrupt in its novelty, it must be remembered that the author is\nnot the first who has taken such a view; he is more in the position of\none who has discovered the philosophical grounds for an opinion of long\nstanding.\n\nThe Chinese from time immemorial have denied that women possess a\npersonal soul. If a Chinaman is asked how many children he has, he\ncounts only the boys, and will say none if he has only daughters.\nMahomet excluded women from Paradise for the same reason, and on this\nview depends the degraded position of women in Oriental countries.\n\nAmongst the philosophers, the opinions of Aristotle must first be\nconsidered. He held that in procreation the male principle was the\nformative active agent, the \u201clogos,\u201d whilst the female was the passive\nmaterial. When we remember that Aristotle uses the word \u201csoul\u201d for the\nactive, formative, causative principle, it is plain that his idea was\nakin to mine, although, as he actually expressed it, it related only to\nthe reproductive process; it is clear, moreover, that he, like all the\nGreek philosophers except Euripides, paid no heed to woman, and did not\nconsider her qualities from any other point of view than that of her\nshare in reproduction.\n\nAmongst the fathers of the Church, Tertullian and Origen certainly had a\nvery low opinion of woman, and St. Augustine, except for his relations\nwith his mother, seems to have shared their view. At the Renaissance the\nAristotelian conceptions gained many new adherents, amongst whom Jean\nWier (1518-1588) may be cited specially. At that period there was a\ngeneral, more sensible and intuitive understanding on the subject, which\nis now treated as merely curious, contemporary science having bowed the\nknee to other than Aristotelian gods.\n\nIn recent years Henrik Ibsen (in the characters of Anitra, Rita, and\nIrene) and August Strindberg have given utterance to this view. But the\npopularity of the idea of the soullessness of woman has been most\nattained by the wonderful fairy tales of Fouqu\u00e9, who obtained the\nmaterial for them from Paracelsus, after deep study, and which have been\nset to music by E. T. A. Hoffman, Girschner, and Albert Lorzing.\n\nUndine, the soulless Undine, is the platonic idea of woman. In spite of\nall bi-sexuality she most really resembles the actuality. The well-known\nphrase, \u201cWomen have no character,\u201d really means the same thing.\nPersonality and individuality (intelligible), ego and soul, will and\n(intelligible) character, all these are different expressions of the\nsame actuality, an actuality the male of mankind attains, the female\nlacks.\n\nBut since the soul of man is the microcosm, and great men are those who\nlive entirely in and through their souls, the whole universe thus having\nits being in them, the female must be described as absolutely without\nthe quality of genius. The male has everything within him, and, as Pico\nof Mirandola put it, only specialises in this or that part of himself.\nIt is possible for him to attain to the loftiest heights, or to sink to\nthe lowest depths; he can become like animals, or plants, or even like\nwomen, and so there exist woman-like female men.\n\nThe woman, on the other hand, can never become a man. In this consists\nthe most important limitation to the assertions in the first part of\nthis work. Whilst I know of many men who are practically completely\npsychically female, not merely half so, and have seen a considerable\nnumber of women with masculine traits, I have never yet seen a single\nwoman who was not fundamentally female, even when this femaleness has\nbeen concealed by various accessories from the person herself, not to\nspeak of others. One must _be_ (_cf._ chap. i. part I.) either man or\nwoman, however many peculiarities of both sexes one may have, and this\n\u201c_being_,\u201d the problem of this work from the start, is determined by\none\u2019s relation to ethics and logic; but whilst there are people who are\nanatomically men and psychically women, there is no such thing as a\nperson who is physically female and psychically male, notwithstanding\nthe extreme maleness of their outward appearance and the unwomanliness\nof their expression.\n\nWe may now give, with certainty, a conclusive answer to the question as\nto the giftedness of the sexes: there are women with undoubted traits of\ngenius, but there is no female genius, and there never has been one (not\neven amongst those masculine women of history which were dealt with in\nthe first part), _and there never can be one_. Those who are in favour\nof laxity in these matters, and are anxious to extend and enlarge the\nidea of genius in order to make it possible to include women, would\nsimply by such action destroy the conception of genius. If it is in any\nway possible to frame a definition of genius that would thoroughly cover\nthe ground, I believe that my definition succeeds. And how, then, could\na soulless being possess genius? The possession of genius is identical\nwith profundity; and if any one were to try to combine woman and\nprofundity as subject and predicate, he would be contradicted on all\nsides. A female genius is a contradiction in terms, for genius is simply\nintensified, perfectly developed, universally conscious maleness.\n\nThe man of genius possesses, like everything else, the complete female\nin himself; but woman herself is only a part of the Universe, and the\npart can never be the whole; femaleness can never include genius. This\nlack of genius on the part of woman is inevitable because woman is not a\nmonad, and cannot reflect the Universe.[12]\n\n  [12] It would be a simple matter to introduce at this point a list of\n  the works of the most famous women, and show by a few examples how\n  little they deserve the title of genius. But it would be a wearisome\n  task, and any one who would make use of such a list can easily procure\n  it for himself, so that I shall not do so.\n\nThe proof of the soullessness of woman is closely connected with much of\nwhat was contained in the earlier chapters. The third chapter explained\nthat woman has her experiences in the form of henids, whilst those of\nmen are in an organised form, so that the consciousness of the female is\nlower in grade than that of the male. Consciousness, however, is\npsychologically a fundamental part of the theory of knowledge. From the\npoint of view of the theory of knowledge, consciousness and the\npossession of a continuous ego, of a transcendental subjective soul, are\nidentical conceptions. Every ego exists only so far as it is\nself-conscious, conscious of the contents of its own thoughts; all real\nexistence is conscious existence. I can now make an important addition\nto the theory of henids. The organised contents of the thoughts of the\nmale are not merely those of the female articulated and formed, they are\nnot what was potential in the female becoming actual; from the very\nfirst there is a qualitative difference. The psychical contents of the\nmale, even whilst they are still in the henid stage that they always try\nto emerge from, are already partly conceptual, and it is probable that\neven perceptions in the male have a direct tendency towards conceptions.\nIn the female, on the other hand, there is no trace of conception either\nin recognition or in thinking.\n\nThe logical axioms are the foundation of all formation of mental\nconceptions, and women are devoid of these; the principle of identity is\nnot for them an inevitable standard, nor do they fence off all other\npossibilities from their conception by using the principle of\ncontradictories. This want of definiteness in the ideas of women is the\nsource of that \u201csensitiveness\u201d which gives the widest scope to vague\nassociations and allows the most radically different things to be\ngrouped together. And even women with the best and least limited\nmemories never free themselves from this kind of association by\nfeelings. For instance, if they \u201cfeel reminded\u201d by a word of some\ndefinite colour, or by a human being of some definite thing to\neat--forms of association common with women--they rest content with the\nsubjective association, and do not try to find out the source of the\ncomparison, and if there is any relation in it to actual fact. The\ncomplacency and self-satisfaction of women corresponds with what has\nbeen called their intellectual unscrupulousness, and will be referred to\nagain in connection with their want of the power to form concepts. This\nsubjection to waves of feeling, this want of respect for conceptions,\nthis self-appreciation without any attempt to avoid shallowness,\ncharacterise as essentially female the changeable styles of many modern\npainters and novelists. Male thought is fundamentally different from\nfemale thought in its craving for definite form, and all art that\nconsists of moods is essentially a formless art.\n\nThe psychical contents of man\u2019s thoughts, therefore, are more than the\nexplicit realisation of what women think in henids. Woman\u2019s thought is a\nsliding and gliding through subjects, a superficial tasting of things\nthat a man, who studies the depths, would scarcely notice; it is an\nextravagant and dainty method of skimming which has no grasp of\naccuracy. A woman\u2019s thought is superficial, and touch is the most highly\ndeveloped of the female senses, the most notable characteristic of the\nwoman which she can bring to a high state by her unaided efforts. Touch\nnecessitates a limiting of the interest to superficialities, it is a\nvague effect of the whole and does not depend on definite details. When\na woman \u201cunderstands\u201d a man (of the possibility or impossibility of any\nreal understanding I shall speak later) she is simply, so to speak\ntasting (however wanting in taste the comparison may be) what he has\nthought about her. Since, on her own part, there is no sharp\ndifferentiation, it is plain that she will often think that she herself\nhas been understood when there is no more present than a vague\nsimilarity of perceptions. The incongruity between the man and woman\ndepends, in a special measure, on the fact that the contents of the\nthoughts of the man are not merely those of the woman in a higher state\nof differentiation, but that the two have totally distinct sequences of\nthought applied to the same object, conceptual thought in the one and\nindistinct sensing in the other; and when what is called \u201cunderstanding\u201d\nin the two cases is compared, the comparison is not between a fully\norganised integrated thought and a lower stage of the same process; but\nin the understanding of man and woman there is on the one side a\nconceptual thought, on the other side an unconceptual \u201cfeeling,\u201d a\nhenid.\n\nThe unconceptual nature of the thinking of a woman is simply the result\nof her less perfect consciousness, of her want of an ego. It is the\nconception that unites the mere complex of perceptions into an object,\nand this it does independently of the presence of an actual perception.\nThe existence of the complex of perceptions is dependent on the will;\nthe will can shut the eyes and stop the ears so that the person no\nlonger sees nor hears, but may get drunk or go to sleep and forget. It\nis the conception which brings freedom from the eternally subjective,\neternally psychological relativity of the actual perceptions, and which\ncreates the things in themselves. By its power of forming conceptions\nthe intellect can spontaneously separate itself from the object;\nconversely, it is only when there is a comprehending function that\nsubject and object can be separated and so distinguished; in all other\ncases there is only a mass of like and unlike images present mingling\ntogether without law and order. The conception creates definite\nrealities from the floating images, the object from the perception, the\nobject which stands like an enemy opposite the subject that the subject\nmay measure its strength upon it. The conception is thus the creator of\nreality; it is the \u201ctranscendental object\u201d of Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of\nReason,\u201d but it always involves a transcendental \u201csubject.\u201d\n\nIt is impossible to say of a mere complex of perceptions that it is like\nitself; in the moment that I have made the judgment of identity, the\ncomplex of perceptions has become a concept. And so the conception gives\ntheir value to all processes of verification and all syllogisms; the\nconception makes the contents of thought free by binding them. It gives\nfreedom both to the subject and object; for the two freedoms involve\neach other. All freedom is in reality self-binding, both in logic and in\nethics. Man is free only when he himself is the law. And so the function\nof making concepts is the power by which man gives himself dignity; he\nhonours himself by giving freedom to the objective world, by making it\npart of the objective body of knowledge to which recourse may be had\nwhen two men differ. The woman cannot in this way set herself over\nagainst realities, she and they swing together capriciously; she cannot\ngive freedom to her objects as she herself is not free.\n\nThe mode in which perceptions acquire independence in conceptions is the\nmeans of getting free from subjectivity. The conception is that about\nwhich I think, write, and speak. And in this way there comes the belief\nthat I can make judgments concerning it. Hume, Huxley, and other\n\u201cimmanent\u201d psychologists, tried to identify the conception with a mere\ngeneralisation, so making no distinction between logical and\npsychological thought. In doing this they ignored the power of making\njudgments. In every judgment there is an act of verification or of\ncontradiction, an approval or rejection, and the standard for these\njudgments, the idea of truth, must be something external to that on what\nit is acting. If there are nothing but perceptions, then all perceptions\nmust have an equal validity, and there can be no standard by which to\nform a real world. Empiricism in this fashion really destroys the\nreality of experience, and what is called positivism is no more than\nnihilism. The idea of a standard of truth, the idea of truth, cannot lie\nin experience. In every judgment this idea of the existence of truth is\nimplicit. The claim to real knowledge depends on this capacity to judge,\ninvolves the conception of the possibility of truth in the judgment.\n\nThis claim to be able to reach knowledge is no more than to say that the\nsubject can judge of the object, can say that the object is true. The\nobjects on which we make judgments are conceptions; the conception is\nwhat we know. The conception places a subject and an object against one\nanother, and the judgment then creates a relation between the two. The\nattainment of truth simply means that the subject can judge rightly of\nthe object, and so the function of making judgments is what places the\nego in relation to the all, is what makes a real unity of the ego and\nthe all possible. And thus we reach an answer to the old problem as to\nwhether conception or judgment has precedence; the answer is that the\ntwo are necessary to one another. The faculty of making conceptions\ncleaves subject and object and unites them again.\n\nA being like the female, without the power of making concepts, is unable\nto make judgments. In her \u201cmind\u201d subjective and objective are not\nseparated; there is no possibility of making judgments, and no\npossibility of reaching, or of desiring, truth. No woman is really\ninterested in science; she may deceive herself and many good men, but\nbad psychologists, by thinking so. It may be taken as certain, that\nwhenever a woman has done something of any little importance in the\nscientific world (Sophie Germain, Mary Somerville, &c.) it is always\nbecause of some man in the background whom they desire to please in this\nway; and it is more often justifiable to say \u201ccherchez l\u2019homme\u201d where\nwomen are concerned than \u201ccherchez la femme\u201d in the case of men.\n\nBut there have never been any great discoveries in the world of science\nmade by women, because the facility for truth only proceeds from a\ndesire for truth, and the former is always in proportion to the latter.\nWoman\u2019s sense of reality is much less than man\u2019s, in spite of much\nrepetition of the contrary opinion. With women the pursuit of knowledge\nis always subordinated to something else, and if this alien impulse is\nsufficiently strong they can see sharply and unerringly, but woman will\nnever be able to see the value of truth in itself and in relation to her\nown self. Where there is some check to what she wishes (perhaps\nunconsciously) a woman becomes quite uncritical and loses all touch with\nreality. This is why women so often believe themselves to have been the\nvictims of sexual overtures; this is the reason of extreme frequency of\nhallucinations of the sense of touch in women, of the intensive reality\nof which it is almost impossible for a man to form an idea. This also is\nwhy the imagination of women is composed of lies and errors, whilst the\nimagination of the philosopher is the highest form of truth.\n\nThe idea of truth is the foundation of everything that deserves the name\nof judgment. Knowledge is simply the making of judgments, and thought\nitself is simply another name for judgment. Deduction is the necessary\nprocess in making judgments, and involves the propositions of identity\nand of contradictories, and, as I have shown, these propositions are not\naxiomatic for women.\n\nA psychological proof that the power of making judgments is a masculine\ntrait lies in the fact that the woman recognises it as such, and that it\nacts on her as a tertiary sexual character of the male. A woman always\nexpects definite convictions in a man, and appropriates them; she has no\nunderstanding of indecision in a man. She always expects a man to talk,\nand a man\u2019s speech is to her a sign of his manliness. It is true that\nwoman has the gift of speech, but she has not the art of talking; she\nconverses (flirts) or chatters, but she does not talk. She is most\ndangerous, however, when she is dumb, for men are only too inclined to\ntake her quiescence for silence.\n\nThe absolute female, then, is devoid not only of the logical rules, but\nof the functions of making concepts and judgments which depend on them.\nAs the very nature of the conceptual faculty consists in posing subject\nagainst object, and as the subject takes its deepest and fullest meaning\nfrom its power of forming judgments on its objects, it is clear that\nwomen cannot be recognised as possessing even the subject.\n\nI must add to the exposition of the non-logical nature of the female\nsome statements as to her non-moral nature. The profound falseness of\nwoman, the result of the want in her of a permanent relation to the idea\nof truth or to the idea of value, would prove a subject of discussion so\nexhaustive that I must go to work another way. There are such endless\nimitations of ethics, such confusing copies of morality, that women are\noften said to be on a moral plane higher than that of man. I have\nalready pointed out the need to distinguish between the non-moral and\nthe immoral, and I now repeat that with regard to women we can talk only\nof the non-moral, of the complete absence of a moral sense. It is a\nwell-known fact of criminal statistics and of daily life that there are\nvery few female criminals. The apologists of the morality of women\nalways point to this fact.\n\nBut in deciding the question as to the morality of women we have to\nconsider not if a particular person has objectively sinned against the\nidea, but if the person has or has not a subjective centre of being that\ncan enter into a relation with the idea, a relation the value of which\nis lowered when a sin is committed. No doubt the male criminal inherits\nhis criminal instincts, but none the less he is conscious--in spite of\ntheories of \u201cmoral insanity\u201d--that by his action he has lowered the\nvalue of his claim on life. All criminals are cowardly in this matter,\nand there is none of them that thinks he has raised his value and his\nself-consciousness by his crime, or that would try to justify it to\nhimself.\n\nThe male criminal has from birth a relation to the idea of value just\nlike any other man, but the criminal impulse, when it succeeds in\ndominating him, destroys this almost completely. Woman, on the contrary,\noften believes herself to have acted justly when, as a matter of fact,\nshe has just done the greatest possible act of meanness; whilst the true\ncriminal remains mute before reproach, a woman can at once give\nindignant expression to her astonishment and anger that any one should\nquestion her perfect right to act in this or that way. Women are\nconvinced of their own integrity without ever having sat in judgment on\nit. The criminal does not, it is true, reflect on himself, but he never\nurges his own integrity; he is much more inclined to get rid of the\nthought of his integrity,[13] because it might remind him of his guilt:\nand in this is the proof that he had a relation to the idea (of truth),\nand only objects to be reminded of his unfaithfulness to his better\nself. No male criminal has ever believed that his punishment was unjust.\nA woman, on the contrary, is convinced of the animosity of her accuser,\nand if she does not wish to be convinced of it, no one can persuade her\nthat she has done wrong.\n\n  [13] A male criminal even feels guilty when he has not actually done\n  wrong. He can always accept the reproaches of others as to deception,\n  thieving, and so on, even if he has never committed such acts, because\n  he knows he is capable of them. So also he always feels himself\n  \u201ccaught\u201d when any other offender is arrested.\n\nIf any one talks to her it usually happens that she bursts into tears,\nbegs for pardon, and \u201cconfesses her fault,\u201d and may really believe that\nshe feels her guilt; but only when she desires to do so, and the\noutbreak of tears has given her a certain sort of satisfaction. The male\ncriminal is callous; he does not spin round in a trice, as a woman would\ndo in a similar instance if her accuser knew how to handle her\nskilfully.\n\nThe personal torture which arises from guilt, which cries aloud in its\nanguish at having brought such a stain upon herself, no woman knows, and\nan apparent exception (the penitent, who becomes a self-mortifying\ndevotee,) will certainly prove that a woman only feels a vicarious\nguilt.\n\nI am not arguing that woman is evil and anti-moral; I state that she\ncannot be really evil; _she is merely non-moral_.\n\nWomanly compassion and female modesty are the two other phenomena which\nare generally urged by the defenders of female virtue. It is especially\nfrom womanly kindness, womanly sympathy, that the beautiful descriptions\nof the soul of woman have gained most support, and the final argument of\nall belief in the superior morality of woman is the conception of her as\nthe hospital nurse, the tender sister. I am sorry to have to mention\nthis point, and should not have done so, but I have been forced to do so\nby a verbal objection made to me, which can be easily foreseen.\n\nIt is very shortsighted of any one to consider the nurse as a proof of\nthe sympathy of women, because it really implies the opposite. For a man\ncould never stand the sight of the sufferings of the sick; he would\nsuffer so intensely that he would be completely upset and incapable of\nlengthy attendance on them. Any one who has watched nursing sisters is\nastounded at their equanimity and \u201csweetness\u201d even in the presence of\nmost terrible death throes; and it is well that it is so, for man, who\ncannot stand suffering and death, would make a very bad nurse. A man\nwould want to assuage the pain and ward off death; in a word, he would\nwant to _help_; where there is nothing to be done he is better away; it\nis only then that nursing is justified and that woman offers herself for\nit. But it would be quite wrong to regard this capacity of women in an\nethical aspect.\n\nHere it may be said that for woman the problem of solitude and society\ndoes not exist. She is well adapted for social relations (as, for\ninstance, those of a companion or sick-nurse), simply because for her\nthere is no transition from solitude to society. In the case of a man,\nthe choice between solitude and society is serious when it has to be\nmade. The woman gives up no solitude when she nurses the sick, as she\nwould have to do were she to deserve moral credit for her action; a\nwoman is never in a condition of solitude, and knows neither the love of\nit nor the fear of it. The woman is always living in a condition of\nfusion with all the human beings she knows, even when she is alone; she\nis not a \u201cmonad,\u201d for all monads are sharply marked off from other\nexistences. Women have no definite individual limits; they are not\nunlimited in the sense that geniuses have no limits, being one with the\nwhole world; they are unlimited only in the sense that they are not\nmarked off from the common stock of mankind.\n\nThis sense of continuity with the rest of mankind is a sexual character\nof the female, and displays itself in the desire to touch, to be in\ncontact with, the object of her pity; the mode in which her tenderness\nexpresses itself is a kind of animal sense of contact. It shows the\nabsence of the sharp line that separates one real personality from\nanother. The woman does not respect the sorrow of her neighbour by\nsilence; she tries to raise him from his grief by speech, feeling that\nshe must be in physical, rather than spiritual contact with him.\n\nThis diffused life, one of the most fundamental qualities of the female\nnature, is the cause of the impressibility of all women, their\nunreserved and shameless readiness to shed tears on the most ordinary\noccasion. It is not without reason that we associate wailing with women,\nand think little of a man who sheds tears in public. A woman weeps with\nthose that weep and laughs with those that laugh--unless she herself is\nthe cause of the laughter--so that the greater part of female sympathy\nis ready-made.\n\nIt is only women who demand pity from other people, who weep before them\nand claim their sympathy. This is one of the strongest pieces of\nevidence for the psychical shamelessness of women. A woman provokes the\ncompassion of strangers in order to weep with them and be able to pity\nherself more than she already does. It is not too much to say that even\nwhen a woman weeps alone she is weeping with those that she knows would\npity her and so intensifying her self-pity by the thought of the pity of\nothers. Self-pity is eminently a female characteristic; a woman will\nassociate herself with others, make herself the object of pity for these\nothers, and then at once, deeply stirred, begin to weep with them about\nherself, the poor thing. Perhaps nothing so stirs the feeling of shame\nin a man as to detect in himself the impulse towards this self-pity,\nthis state of mind in which the subject becomes the object.\n\nAs Schopenhauer put it, female sympathy is a matter of sobbing and\nwailing on the slightest provocation, without the smallest attempt to\ncontrol the emotion; on the other hand, all true sorrow, like true\nsympathy, just because it is real sorrow, must be reserved; no sorrow\ncan really be so reserved as sympathy and love, for these make us most\nfully conscious of the limits of each personality. Love and its\nbashfulness will be considered later on; in the meantime let us be\nassured that in sympathy, in genuine masculine sympathy, there is always\na strong feeling of reserve, a sense almost of guilt, because one\u2019s\nfriend is worse off than oneself, because I am not he, but a being\nseparated from his being by extraneous circumstances. A man\u2019s sympathy\nis the principle of individuality blushing for itself; and hence man\u2019s\nsympathy is reserved whilst that of woman is aggressive.\n\nThe existence of modesty in women has been discussed already to a\ncertain extent; I shall have more to say about it in relation with\nhysteria. But it is difficult to see how it can be maintained that this\nis a female virtue, if one reflect on the readiness with which women\naccept the habit of wearing low-necked dresses wherever custom\nprescribes it. A person is either modest or immodest, and modesty is not\na quality which can be assumed or discarded from hour to hour.\n\nStrong evidence of the want of modesty in woman is to be derived from\nthe fact that women dress and undress in the presence of one another\nwith the greatest freedom, whilst men try to avoid similar\ncircumstances. Moreover, when women are alone together, they are very\nready to discuss their physical qualities, especially with regard to\ntheir attractiveness for men; whilst men, practically without exception,\navoid all notice of one another\u2019s sexual characters.\n\nI shall return to this subject again. In the meantime I wish to refer to\nthe argument of the second chapter in this connection. One must be fully\nconscious of a thing before one can have a feeling of shame about it,\nand so differentiation is as necessary for the sense of shame as for\nconsciousness. The female, who is only sexual, can appear to be asexual\nbecause she is sexuality itself, and so her sexuality does not stand out\nseparately from the rest of her being, either in space or in time, as in\nthe case of the male. Woman can give an impression of being modest\nbecause there is nothing in her to contrast with her sexuality. And so\nthe woman is always naked or never naked--we may express it either\nway--never naked, because the true feeling of nakedness is impossible to\nher; always naked, because there is not in her the material for the\nsense of relativity by which she could become aware of her nakedness and\nso make possible the desire to cover it.\n\nWhat I have been discussing depends on the actual meaning of the word\n\u201cego\u201d to a woman. If a woman were asked what she meant by her \u201cego\u201d she\nwould certainly think of her body. Her superficies, that is the woman\u2019s\nego. The ego of the female is quite correctly described by Mach in his\n\u201cAnti-metaphysical Remarks.\u201d\n\nThe ego of a woman is the cause of the vanity which is specific of\nwomen. The analogue of this in the male is an emanation of the set of\nhis will towards his conception of the good, and its objective\nexpression is a sensitiveness, a desire that no one shall call in\nquestion the possibility of attaining this supreme good. It is his\npersonality that gives to man his value and his freedom from the\nconditions of time. This supreme good, which is beyond price, because,\nin the words of Kant, there can be found no equivalent for it, is the\ndignity of man. Women, in spite of what Schiller has said, have no\ndignity, and the word \u201clady\u201d was invented to supply this defect, and her\npride will find its expression in what she regards as the supreme good,\nthat is to say, in the preservation, improvement, and display of her\npersonal beauty. The pride of the female is something quite peculiar to\nherself, something foreign even to the most handsome man, an obsession\nby her own body; a pleasure which displays itself, even in the least\nhandsome girl, by admiring herself in the mirror, by stroking herself\nand playing with her own hair, but which comes to its full measure only\nin the effect that her body has on man. A woman has no true solitude,\nbecause she is always conscious of herself only in relation to others.\nThe other side of the vanity of women is the desire to feel that her\nbody is admired, or, rather, sexually coveted, by a man.\n\nThis desire is so strong that there are many women to whom it is\nsufficient merely to know that they are coveted.\n\nThe vanity of women is, then, always in relation to others; a woman\nlives only in the thoughts of others about her. The sensibility of women\nis directed to this. A woman never forgets that some one thought her\nugly; a woman never considers herself ugly; the successes of others at\nthe most only make her think of herself as perhaps less attractive. But\nno woman ever believes herself to be anything but beautiful and\ndesirable when she looks at herself in the glass; she never accepts her\nown ugliness as a painful reality as a man would, and never ceases to\ntry to persuade others of the contrary.\n\nWhat is the source of this form of vanity, peculiar to the female? It\ncomes from the absence of an intelligible ego, the only begetter of a\nconstant and positive sense of value; it is, in fact, that she is devoid\nof a sense of personal value. As she sets no store by herself or on\nherself, she endeavours to attain to a value in the eyes of others by\nexciting their desire and admiration. The only thing which has any\nabsolute and ultimate value in the world is the soul. \u201cYe are better\nthan many sparrows\u201d were Christ\u2019s words to mankind. A woman does not\nvalue herself by the constancy and freedom of her personality; but this\nis the only possible method for every creature possessing an ego. But if\na real woman, and this is certainly the case, can only value herself at\nthe rate of the man who has fixed his choice on her; if it is only\nthrough her husband or lover that she can attain to a value not only in\nsocial and material things, but also in her innermost nature, it follows\nthat she possesses no personal value, she is devoid of man\u2019s sense of\nthe value of his own personality for itself. And so women always get\ntheir sense of value from something outside themselves, from their money\nor estates, the number and richness of their garments, the position of\ntheir box at the opera, their children, and, above all, their husbands\nor lovers. When a woman is quarrelling with another woman, her final\nweapon, and the weapon she finds most effective and discomfiting, is to\nproclaim her superior social position, her wealth or title, and, above\nall, her youthfulness and the devotion of her husband or lover; whereas\na man in similar case would lay himself open to contempt if he relied on\nanything except his own personal individuality.\n\nThe absence of the soul in woman may also be inferred from the\nfollowing: Whilst a woman is stimulated to try to impress a man from the\nmere fact that he has paid no attention to her (Goethe gave this as a\npractical receipt), the whole life of a woman, in fact, being an\nexpression of this side of her nature, a man, if a woman treats him\nrudely or indifferently, feels repelled by her. Nothing makes a man so\nhappy as the love of a girl; even if he did not at first return her\nlove, there is a great probability of love being aroused in him. The\nlove of a man for whom she does not care is only a gratification of the\nvanity of a woman, or an awakening and rousing of slumbering desires. A\nwoman extends her claims equally to all men on earth.\n\nThe shamelessness and heartlessness of women are shown in the way in\nwhich they talk of being loved. A man feels ashamed of being loved,\nbecause he is always in the position of being the active, free agent,\nand because he knows that he can never give himself entirely to love,\nand there is nothing about which he is so silent, even when there is no\nspecial reason for him to fear that he might compromise the lady by\ntalking. A woman boasts about her love affairs, and parades them before\nother women in order to make them envious of her. Woman does not look\nupon a man\u2019s inclination for her so much as a tribute to her actual\nworth, or a deep insight into her nature, as the bestowing a value on\nher which she otherwise would not have, as the gift to her of an\nexistence and essence with which she justifies herself before others.\n\nThe remark in an earlier chapter about the unfailing memory of woman for\nall the compliments she has ever received since childhood is explained\nby the foregoing facts. It is from compliments, first of all, that woman\ngets a sense of her \u201cvalue,\u201d and that is why women expect men to be\n\u201cpolite.\u201d Politeness is the easiest form of pleasing a woman, and\nhowever little it costs a man it is dear to a woman, who never forgets\nan attention, and lives upon the most insipid flattery, even in her old\nage. One only remembers what possesses a value in one\u2019s eyes; it may\nsafely be said that it is for compliments women have the most developed\nmemory. The woman can attain a sense of value by these external aids,\nbecause she does not possess within her an inner standard of value\nwhich diminishes everything outside her. The phenomena of courtesy and\nchivalry are simply additional proofs that women have no souls, and that\nwhen a man is being \u201cpolite\u201d to a woman he is simply ascribing to her\nthe minimum sense of personal value, a form of deference to which\nimportance is attached precisely in the measure that it is\nmisunderstood.\n\nThe non-moral nature of woman reveals itself in the mode in which she\ncan so easily forget an immoral action she has committed. It is almost\ncharacteristic of a woman that she cannot believe that she has done\nwrong, and so is able to deceive both herself and her husband. Men, on\nthe other hand, remember nothing so well as the guilty episodes of their\nlives. Here memory reveals itself as eminently a moral phenomenon.\nForgiving and forgetting, not forgiving and understanding, go together.\nWhen one remembers a lie, one reproaches oneself afresh about it. A\nwoman forgets, because she does not blame herself for an act of\nmeanness, because she does not understand it, having no relation to the\nmoral idea. It is not surprising that she is ready to lie. Women have\nbeen regarded as virtuous, simply because the problem of morality has\nnot presented itself to them; they have been held to be even more moral\nthan man; this is simply because they do not understand immorality. The\ninnocence of a child is not meritorious; if a patriarch could be\ninnocent he might be praised for it.\n\nIntrospection is an attribute confined to males, if we leave out of\naccount the hysterical self-reproaches of certain women--and\nconsciousness of guilt and repentance are equally male. The penances\nthat women lay on themselves, remarkable imitations of the sense of\nguilt, will be discussed when I come to deal with what passes for\nintrospection in the female sex. The \u201csubject\u201d of introspection is the\nmoral agent; it has a relation to psychical phenomena only in so far as\nit sits in judgment on them.\n\nIt is quite in the nature of positivism that Comte denies the\npossibility of introspection, and throws ridicule on it. For certainly\nit is absurd that a psychical event and a judgment of it could coincide\nif the interpretations of the positivists be accepted. It is only on the\nassumption that there exists an ego unconditioned by time and\nintrinsically capable of moral judgments, endowed with memory and with\nthe power of making comparisons, that we can justify the belief in the\npossibility of introspection.\n\nIf woman had a sense of her personal value and the will to defend it\nagainst all external attacks she could not be jealous. Apparently all\nwomen are jealous, and jealousy depends on the failure to recognise the\nrights of others. Even the jealousy of a mother when she sees another\nwoman\u2019s daughters married before her own depends simply on her want of\nthe sense of justice.\n\nWithout justice there can be no society, so that jealousy is an\nabsolutely unsocial quality. The formation of societies in reality\npresupposes the existence of true individuality. Woman has no faculty\nfor the affairs of State or politics, as she has no social inclinations;\nand women\u2019s societies, from which men are excluded, are certain to break\nup after a short time. The family itself is not really a social\nstructure; it is essentially unsocial, and men who give up their clubs\nand societies after marriage soon rejoin them. I had written this before\nthe appearance of Heinrich Schurtz\u2019 valuable ethnological work, in which\nhe shows that associations of men, and not the family, form the\nbeginnings of society.\n\nPascal made the wonderful remark that human beings seek society only\nbecause they cannot bear solitude and wish to forget themselves. It is\nthe fact expressed in these words which puts in harmony my earlier\nstatement that women had not the faculty of solitude and my present\nstatement that she is essentially unsociable.\n\nIf a woman possessed an \u201cego\u201d she would have the sense of property both\nin her own case and that of others. The thieving instinct, however, is\nmuch more developed in men than in women. So-called \u201ckleptomaniacs\u201d\n(those who steal without necessity) are almost exclusively women. Women\nunderstand power and riches but not personal property. When the thefts\nof female kleptomaniacs are discovered, the women defend themselves by\nsaying that it appeared to them as if everything belonged to them. It is\nchiefly women who use circulating libraries, especially those who could\nquite well afford to buy quantities of books; but, as matter of fact,\nthey are not more strongly attracted by what they have bought than by\nwhat they have borrowed. In all these matters the relation between\nindividuality and society comes into view; just as a man must have\npersonality himself to appreciate the personalities of others, so also\nhe must acquire a sense of personal right in his own property to respect\nthe rights of others.\n\nOne\u2019s name and a strong devotion to it are even more dependent on\npersonality than is the sense of property. The facts that confront us\nwith reference to this are so salient that it is extraordinary to find\nso little notice taken of them. Women are not bound to their names with\nany strong bond. When they marry they give up their own name and assume\nthat of their husband without any sense of loss. They allow their\nhusbands and lovers to call them by new names, delighting in them; and\neven when a woman marries a man that she does not love, she has never\nbeen known to suffer any psychical shock at the change of name. The name\nis a symbol of individuality; it is only amongst the lowest races on the\nface of the earth, such as the bushmen of South Africa, that there are\nno personal names, because amongst such as these the desire for\ndistinguishing individuals from the general stock is not felt. The\nfundamental namelessness of the woman is simply a sign of her\nundifferentiated personality.\n\nAn important observation may be mentioned here and may be confirmed by\nevery one. Whenever a man enters a place where a woman is, and she\nobserves him, or hears his step, or even only guesses he is near, she\nbecomes another person. Her expression and her pose change with\nincredible swiftness; she \u201carranges her fringe\u201d and her bodice, and\nrises, or pretends to be engrossed in her work. She is full of a\nhalf-shameless, half-nervous expectation. In many cases one is only in\ndoubt as to whether she is blushing for her shameless laugh, or laughing\nover her shameless blushing.\n\nThe soul, personality, character--as Schopenhauer with marvellous sight\nrecognised--are identical with free-will. And as the female has no ego,\nshe has no free-will. Only a creature with no will of its own, no\ncharacter in the highest sense, could be so easily influenced by the\nmere proximity to a man as woman is, who remains in functional\ndependence on him instead of in free relationship to him. Woman is the\nbest medium, the male her best hypnotiser. For this reason alone it is\ninconceivable why women can be considered good as doctors; for many\ndoctors admit that their principal work up to the present--and it will\nalways be the same--lies in the suggestive influence on their patients.\n\nThe female is uniformly more easily hypnotised than the male throughout\nthe animal world, and it may be seen from the following how closely\nhypnotic phenomena are related to the most ordinary events. I have\nalready described, in discussing female sympathy, how easy it is for\nlaughter or tears to be induced in females. How impressed she is by\neverything in the newspapers! What a martyr she is to the silliest\nsuperstitions! How eagerly she tries every remedy recommended by her\nfriends!\n\nWhoever is lacking in character is lacking in convictions. The female,\ntherefore, is credulous, uncritical, and quite unable to understand\nProtestantism. Christians are Catholics or Protestants before they are\nbaptized, but, none the less, it would be unfair to describe Catholicism\nas feminine simply because it suits women better. The distinction\nbetween the Catholic and Protestant dispositions is a side of\ncharacterology that would require separate treatment.\n\nIt has been exhaustively proved that the female is soulless and\npossesses neither ego nor individuality, personality nor freedom,\ncharacter nor will. This conclusion is of the highest significance in\npsychology. It implies that the psychology of the male and of the female\nmust be treated separately. A purely empirical representation of the\npsychic life of the female is possible; in the case of the male, all the\npsychic life must be considered with reference to the ego, as Kant\nforesaw.\n\nThe view of Hume (and Mach), which only admits that there are\n\u201cimpressions\u201d and \u201cthoughts\u201d (ABC and \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ...), and which has almost\ndriven the psyche out of present day psychology, declares that the whole\nworld is to be considered exclusively as a picture in a reflector, a\nsort of kaleidoscope; it merely reduces everything to a dance of the\n\u201celements,\u201d without thought or order; it denies the possibility of\nobtaining a secure standpoint for thought; it not only destroys the idea\nof truth, and accordingly of reality, the only claims on which\nphilosophy rests, but it also is to blame for the wretched plight of\nmodern psychology.\n\nThis modern psychology proudly styles itself the \u201cpsychology without the\nsoul,\u201d in imitation of its much over-rated founder, Friedrich Albert\nLange. I think I have proved in this work that without the\nacknowledgment of a soul there would be no way of dealing with psychic\nphenomena; just as much in the case of the male who has a soul as in the\ncase of the female who is soulless.\n\nModern psychology is eminently womanish, and that is why this\ncomparative investigation of the sexes is so specially instructive, and\nit is not without reason that I have delayed pointing out this radical\ndifference; it is only now that it can be seen what the acceptation of\nthe ego implies, and how the confusing of masculine and feminine\nspiritual life (in the broadest and deepest sense) has been at the root\nof all the difficulties and errors into which those who have sought to\nestablish a universal psychology have fallen.\n\nI must now raise the question--is a psychology of the male possible as a\nscience? The answer must be that it is not possible. I must be\nunderstood to reject all the investigations of the experimenters, and\nthose who are still sick with the experimental fever may ask in wonder\nif all these have no value? Experimental psychology has not given a\nsingle explanation as to the deeper laws of masculine life; it can be\nregarded only as a series of sporadic empirical efforts, and its method\nis wrong inasmuch as it seeks to reach the kernel of things by surface\nexamination, and as it cannot possibly give an explanation of the\ndeep-seated source of all psychical phenomena. When it has attempted to\ndiscover the real nature of psychical phenomena by measurements of the\nphysical phenomena that accompany them, it has succeeded in showing that\neven in the most favourable cases there is an inconstancy and variation.\nThe fundamental possibility of reaching the mathematical idea of\nknowledge is that the data should be constant. As the mind itself is the\ncreator of time and space, it is impossible to expect that geometry and\narithmetic should explain the mind, that the creature should explain the\ncreator.\n\nThere can be no scientific psychology of man, for the aim of psychology\nis to derive what is not derivative, to prove to every man what his real\nnature and essence are, to deduce these. But the possibility of deducing\nthem would imply that they were not free. As soon as it has been\nadmitted that the conduct, action, nature, of an individual man can be\ndetermined scientifically, it will be proved that man has no free-will.\nKant and Schopenhauer understood this fully, and, on the other hand,\nHume and Herbart, the founders of modern psychology, did not believe in\nfree-will. It is this dilemma that is the cause of the pitiful relation\nof modern psychology to all fundamental questions. The wild and repeated\nefforts to derive the will from psychological factors, from perception\nand feeling, are in themselves evidence that it cannot be taken as an\nempirical factor. The will, like the power of judgment, is associated\ninevitably with the existence of an ego, or soul. It is not a matter of\nexperience, it transcends experience, and until psychology recognises\nthis extraneous factor, it will remain no more than a methodical annex\nof physiology and biology. If the soul is only a complex of experiences\nit cannot be the factor that makes experiences possible. Modern\npsychology in reality denies the existence of the soul, but the soul\nrejects modern psychology.\n\nThis work has decided in favour of the soul against the absurd and\npitiable psychology without a soul. In fact, it may be doubted if, on\nthe assumption that the soul exists and has free thought and free-will,\nthere can be a science of causal laws and self-imposed rules of willing\nand thinking. I have no intention of trying to inaugurate a new era of\nrational psychology. I wish to follow Kant in positing the existence of\na soul as the unifying and central conception, without which any\nexplanation or description of psychic life, however faithful in its\ndetails, however sympathetically undertaken, must be wholly\nunsatisfying. It is extraordinary how inquirers who have made no attempt\nto analyse such phenomena as shame and the sense of guilt, faith and\nhope, fear and repentance, love and hate, yearning and solitude, vanity\nand sensitiveness, ambition and the desire for immortality, have yet the\ncourage simply to deny the ego because it does not flaunt itself like\nthe colour of an orange or the taste of a peach. How can Mach and Hume\naccount for such a thing as style, if individuality does not exist? Or\nagain, consider this: no animal is made afraid by seeing its reflection\nin a glass, whilst there is no man who could spend his life in\na room surrounded with mirrors. Can this fear, the fear of the\ndoppelganger,[14] be explained on Darwinian principles? The word\ndoppelganger has only to be mentioned to raise a deep dread in the mind\nof any man. Empirical psychology cannot explain this; it reaches the\ndepths. It cannot be explained, as Mach would explain the fear of little\nchildren, as an inheritance from some primitive, less secure stage of\nsociety. I have taken this example only to remind the empirical\npsychologists that there are many things inexplicable on their\nhypotheses.\n\n  [14] It is notable that women are devoid of this fear; female\n  doppelgangers are not heard of.\n\nWhy is any man annoyed when he is described as a Wagnerite, a\nNietzchite, a Herbartian, or so forth? He objects to be thought a mere\necho. Even Ernst Mach is angry in anticipation at the thought that some\nfriend will describe him as a Positivist, Idealist, or any other\nnon-individual term. This feeling must not be confused with the results\nof the fact that a man may describe himself as a Wagnerite, and so\nforth. The latter is simply a deep approval of Wagnerism, because the\napprover is himself a Wagnerite. The man is conscious that his agreement\nis in reality a raising of the value of Wagnerism. And so also a man\nwill say much about himself that he would not permit another to say of\nhim. As Cyrano de Bergerac put it:\n\n  \u201cJe me les sers moi-m\u00eame, avec assez de verve,\n  Mais je ne permets pas qu\u2019un autre me les serve.\u201d\n\nIt cannot be right to consider such men as Pascal and Newton, on the one\nhand, as men of the highest genius, on the other, as limited by a mass\nof prejudices which we of the present generation have long overcome. Is\nthe present generation with its electrical railways and empirical\npsychology so much higher than these earlier times? Is culture, if\nculture has any real value, to be compared with science, which is always\nsocial and never individual, and to be measured by the number of public\nlibraries and laboratories? Is culture outside human beings and not\nalways in human beings?\n\nIt is in striking harmony with the ascription to men alone of an\nineffable, inexplicable personality, that in all the authenticated cases\nof double or multiple personality the subjects have been women. The\nabsolute female is capable of sub-division; the male, even to the most\ncomplete characterology and the most acute experiment, is always an\nindivisible unit. The male has a central nucleus of his being which has\nno parts, and cannot be divided; the female is composite, and so can be\ndissociated and cleft.\n\nAnd so it is most amusing to hear writers talking of the soul of the\nwoman, of her heart and its mysteries, of the psyche of the modern\nwoman. It seems almost as if even an accoucheur would have to prove his\ncapacity by the strength of his belief in the soul of women. Most women,\nat least, delight to hear discussions on their souls, although they\nknow, so far as they can be said to _know_ anything, that the whole\nthing is a swindle. The woman as the Sphinx! Never was a more\nridiculous, a more audacious fraud perpetrated. Man is infinitely more\nmysterious, incomparably more complicated.\n\nIt is only necessary to look at the faces of women one passes in the\nstreets. There is scarcely one whose expression could not at once be\nsummed up. The register of woman\u2019s feelings and disposition is so\nterribly poor, whereas men\u2019s countenances can scarcely be read after\nlong and earnest scrutiny.\n\nFinally, I come to the question as to whether there exists a complete\nparallelism or a condition of reciprocal interaction between mind and\nbody. In the case of the female, psycho-physical parallelism exists in\nthe form of a complete co-ordination between the mental and the\nphysical; in women the capacity for mental exertion ceases with senile\ninvolution, just as it developed in connection with and in subservience\nto the sexual instincts. The intelligence of man never grows as old as\nthat of the woman, and it is only in isolated cases that degeneration of\nthe mind is linked with degeneration of the body. Least of all does\nmental degeneration accompany the bodily weakness of old age in those\nwho have genius, the highest development of mental masculinity.\n\nIt is only to be expected that the philosophers who most strongly argued\nin favour of parallelism, such as Spinoza and Fechner, were also\ndeterminists. In the case of the male, the free intelligible agent who\nby his own will can distinguish between good and evil, the existence of\nparallelism between mind and body must be rejected.\n\nThe question, then, as to the proper view of the psychology of the sexes\nmay be taken as settled. There has to be faced, however, an\nextraordinarily difficult problem that, so far as I know, has not even\nbeen stated yet, but the answer to which, none the less, strongly\nsupports my view of the soullessness of women.\n\nIn the earlier pages of my volume I contrasted the clarity of male\nthinking processes with their vagueness in woman, and later on showed\nthat the power of orderly speech, in which logical judgments are\nexpressed, acts on women as a male sexual character. Whatever is\nsexually attractive to the female must be characteristic of the male.\nFirmness in a man\u2019s character makes a sexual impression on a woman,\nwhilst she is repelled by the pliant man. People often speak of the\nmoral influence exerted on men by women, when no more is meant than that\nwomen are striving to attain their sexual complements. Women demand\nmanliness from men, and feel deeply disappointed and full of contempt if\nmen fail them in this respect. However untruthful or great a flirt a\nwoman may be, she is bitterly indignant if she discover traces of\ncoquetry or untruthfulness in a man. She may be as cowardly as she\nlikes, but the man must be brave. It has been almost completely\noverlooked that this is only a sexual egotism seeking to secure the most\nsatisfactory sexual complement. From the side of empirical observation,\nno stronger proof of the soullessness of woman could be drawn than that\nshe demands a soul in man, that she who is not good in herself demands\ngoodness from him. The soul is a masculine character, pleasing to women\nin the same way and for the same purpose as a masculine body or a\nwell-trimmed moustache. I may be accused of stating the case coarsely,\nbut it is none the less true. It is the man\u2019s will that in the last\nresort influences a woman most powerfully, and she has a strong faculty\nfor perceiving whether a man\u2019s \u201cI will\u201d means mere bombast or actual\ndecision. In the latter case the effect on her is prodigious.\n\nHow is it that woman, who is soulless herself, can discern the soul in\nman? How can she judge about his morality who is herself non-moral? How\ncan she grasp his character when she has no character herself? How\nappreciate his will when she is herself without will?\n\nThese difficult problems lie before us, and their solutions must be\nplaced on strong foundations, for there will be many attempts to destroy\nthem.\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nMOTHERHOOD AND PROSTITUTION\n\nThe chief objection that will be urged against my views is that they\ncannot possibly be valid for all women. For some, or even for the\nmajority, they will be accepted as true, but for the rest----\n\nIt was not my original intention to deal with the different kinds of\nwomen. Women may be regarded from many different points of view, and, of\ncourse, care must be taken not to press too hardly what is true for one\nextreme type. If the word character be accepted in its common, empirical\nsignification, then there are differences in women\u2019s characters. All the\nproperties of the male character find remarkable analogies in the female\nsex (an interesting case will be dealt with later on in this chapter);\nbut in the male the character is always deeply rooted in the sphere of\nthe intelligible, from which there has come about the lamentable\nconfusion between the doctrine of the soul and characterology. The\ncharacterological differences amongst women are not rooted so deeply\nthat they can develop into individuality; and probably there is no\nfemale quality that in the course of the life of a woman cannot be\nmodified, repressed, or annihilated by the will of a man.\n\nHow far such differences in character may exist in cases that have the\nsame degree of masculinity or of femininity I have not yet been at the\npains to inquire. I have refrained deliberately from this task, because\nin my desire to prepare the way for a true orientation of all the\ndifficult problems connected with my subject I have been anxious not to\nraise side issues or to burden the argument with collateral details.\n\nThe detailed characterology of women must wait for a detailed treatment,\nbut even this work has not totally neglected the differences that exist\namongst women; I shall hope to be acquitted of false generalisations if\nit be remembered that what I have been saying relates to the female\nelement, and is true in the same proportion that women possess that\nelement. However, as it is quite certain that a particular type of woman\nwill be brought forward in opposition to my conclusions, it is necessary\nto consider carefully that type and its contrasting type.\n\nTo all the bad and defamatory things that I have said about women, the\nconception of woman as a mother will certainly be opposed. But those who\nadduce this argument will admit the justice of a simultaneous\nconsideration of the type that is at the opposite pole from motherhood,\nas only in this way is it possible to define clearly in what motherhood\nconsists and to delimit it from other types.\n\nThe type standing at the pole opposite to motherhood is the prostitute.\nThe contrast is not any more inevitable than the contrast between man\nand woman, and certain limits and restrictions will have to be made. But\nallowing for these, women will now be treated as falling into two types,\nsometimes having in them more of the one type, sometimes more of the\nother.\n\nThis dichotomy may be misunderstood if I do not distinguish it from a\ncontrast that is popularly made. It is often said that a woman should be\nboth mother and mistress. I do not see the sense or the utility of the\ndistinction involved in the phrase. Is no more meant by \u201cmistress\u201d than\nthe condition which of necessity must precede motherhood? If that is so,\nthen no lasting characterological property is involved. For the word\n\u201cmistress\u201d tells us nothing about a woman except that she is in a\ncertain relation to a man. It has nothing to do with her real being; it\nis something imposed on her from without. The conception of being loved\ntells us nothing about the nature of the person who is loved. The\ncondition of being loved, whether as mother or mistress, is a merely\naccidental, external designation of the individual, whereas the quality\nof motherhood is something born in a woman, something deep-seated in her\nnature. It is this something that we must investigate.\n\nThat motherhood and prostitution are at extreme poles appears probable\nsimply from the fact that motherly women bear far more children, whilst\nthe frivolous have few children, and prostitutes are practically\nsterile. It must be remembered, of course, that it is not only\nprostitutes who belong to the prostitute type; very many so-called\nrespectable girls and married women belong to it. Accurate analysis of\nthe type will show that it reaches far beyond the mere women of the\nstreets. The street-walker differs from the respectable coquette and the\ncelebrated hetaira only through her incapacity for differentiation, her\ncomplete want of memory, and her habit of living from moment to moment.\nIf there were but one man and one woman on the earth, the prostitute\ntype would reveal itself in the relations of the woman to the man.\n\nThis fact of limited fertility ought by itself to relieve me from the\nnecessity of comparing my view of prostitution with the popular view\nthat would derive what is really deep-seated in the nature of women from\nmere social conditions, from the poverty of women and the economic\nstress of a society arranged by males, from the difficulty of women\nsucceeding in a respectable career, or from the existence of a large\nbachelor class with the consequent demand for a system of prostitution.\nTo these suggestions it may well be replied that prostitution is by no\nmeans confined to the poorer classes; that women without any economic\nnecessity have frequently given way to its appeal; that there are many\nsituations in shops, offices, post-offices, the telegraph and telephone\nservices, wherever mere mechanical ability is required, where women are\npreferred because, from their lower degree of differentiation, their\ndemands are smaller; and business men having discovered this in\nanticipation of science, readily employ them at a lower rate of wages.\nYoung prostitutes have often quite as hard an economic battle to fight,\nas they must wear expensive clothes, and as they are always charged\nexcessively high rates for food and lodging. Prostitution is not a\nresult of social conditions, but of some cause deep in the nature of\nwomen; prostitutes who have been \u201creclaimed\u201d frequently, even if\nprovided for, return to their old way of life. It is a curious\ncircumstance that prostitutes appear to be relatively immune to certain\ndiseases which readily affect other types of women. I may note finally,\nthat prostitution is not a modern growth; it has been known from the\nearliest times, and even was a part of some ancient religions, as, for\ninstance, among the Ph\u0153nicians.\n\nProstitution cannot be considered as a state into which men have seduced\nwomen. The man may occasionally be to blame, as, for instance, when a\nservant is discharged and finds herself deserted. But where there is no\ninclination for a certain course, the course will not be adopted.\nProstitution is foreign to the male element, although the lives of men\nare often more laborious and unpleasant than those of women, and male\nprostitutes (such as are found amongst waiters, barbers, and so on) are\nalways advanced sexually intermediate forms. The disposition for and\ninclination to prostitution is as organic in a woman as is the capacity\nfor motherhood.\n\nOf course, I do not mean to suggest that, when any woman becomes a\nprostitute, it is because of an irresistible, inborn craving. Probably\nmost women have both possibilities in them, the mother and the\nprostitute. What is to happen in cases of doubt depends on the man who\nis able to make the woman a mother, not merely by the physical act but\nby a single look at her. Schopenhauer said that a man\u2019s existence dates\nfrom the moment when his father and mother fell in love. That is not\ntrue. The birth of a human being, ideally considered, dates from the\nmoment when the mother first saw or heard the voice of the father of her\nchild. Biological and medical science, under the influence of Johannes\nM\u00fcller, Th. Bischoff, and Darwin have been completely opposed, for the\nlast sixty years, to the theory of \u201cimpression.\u201d I may later attempt to\ndevelop such a theory. For the present I shall remark only that it is\nnot fatal to the theory of impression that it does not agree with the\nview which regards the union of an ovum and spermatazoon as the only\nbeginning of a new individual; and science will have to deal with it\ninstead of regarding it as being opposed to all experience and so\nrejecting it. In an _a priori_ science such as mathematics, I may take\nit for granted that even on the planet Jupiter 2 and 2 could not make 5,\nbut biology deals only with propositions of relative universality.\nAlthough I support the theory of the existence of such a power of\nimpression, it must not be supposed that I think that all malformations\nand abnormalities, or even any large number of them, are due to it. I go\nno further than to say that it is possible for the progeny to be\ninfluenced by a man, although physical relations between him and the\nmother have not taken place. And just as Schopenhauer and Goethe were\ncorrect in their theory of colour, although they were in opposition to\nall the physicists of the past, present, and future, so Ibsen (in \u201cThe\nLady from the Sea\u201d) and Goethe (in \u201cElective Affinities\u201d) may be right\nagainst all the scientific men who deal with the problems of inheritance\non a purely physical basis.\n\nIf a man has an influence on a woman so great that her children of whom\nhe is not the father resemble him, he must be the absolute sexual\ncomplement of the woman in question. If such cases are very rare, it is\nonly because there is not much chance of the absolute sexual complements\nmeeting, and this is no argument against the truth of the views of\nGoethe and Ibsen to which I have just referred.\n\nIt is a rare chance if a woman meets a man so completely her sexual\ncomplement that his mere presence makes him the father of her children.\nAnd so it is conceivable in the case of many mothers and prostitutes\nthat their fates have been reversed by accident. On the other hand,\nthere must be many cases in which the woman remains true to the maternal\ntype without meeting the necessary man, and also cases where a woman,\neven although she meets the man, may be driven none the less into the\nprostitute type by her natural instincts.\n\nWe have not to face the general occurrence of women as one or other of\ntwo distinct inborn types, the maternal type and the prostitute. The\nreality is found between the two. There are certainly no women\nabsolutely devoid of the prostitute instinct to covet being sexually\nexcited by any stranger. And there are equally certainly no women\nabsolutely devoid of all maternal instincts, although I confess that I\nhave found more cases approaching the absolute prostitute than the\nabsolute mother.\n\nThe essence of motherhood consists, as the most superficial\ninvestigation will reveal, in that the getting of the child is the chief\nobject of life, whereas in the prostitute sexual relations in themselves\nare the end. The investigation of the subject must be pursued by\nconsidering the relation of each type to the child and to sexual\ncongress.\n\nConsider the relation to the child first. The absolute prostitute thinks\nonly of the man; the absolute mother thinks only of the child. The best\ntest case is the relation to the daughter. It is only when there is no\njealousy about her youth or greater beauty, no grudging about the\nadmiration she wins, but an identification of herself with her daughter\nso complete that she is as pleased about her child\u2019s admirers as if they\nwere her own, that a woman has a claim to the title of perfect mother.\n\nThe absolute mother (if such existed), who thinks only about the child,\nwould become a mother by any man. It will be found that women who were\ndevoted to dolls when they were children, and were kind and attentive to\nchildren in their own childhood, are least particular about their\nhusbands, and are most ready to accept the first good match who takes\nany notice of them and who satisfies their parents and relatives. When\nsuch a maiden has become a mother, it matters not by whom, she ceases to\npay any attention to any other men. The absolute prostitute, on the\nother hand, even when she is still a child, dislikes children; later on,\nshe may pretend to care for them as a means of attracting men through\nthe idea of mother and child. She is the woman whose desire is to please\nall men; and since there is no such thing as an ideally perfect type of\nmother, there are traces of this desire to please in every woman, as\nevery man of the world will admit.\n\nHere we can trace at least a formal resemblance between the two types.\nBoth are careless as to the individuality of their sexual complement.\nThe one accepts any possible man who can make her a mother, and once\nthat has been achieved asks nothing more; on this ground only is she to\nbe described as monogamous. The other is ready to yield herself to any\nman who stimulates her erotic desires; that is her only object. From\nthis description of the two extreme types we may hope to gain some\nknowledge of the nature of actual women.\n\nI have to admit that the popular opinion as to the monogamous nature of\nwomen as opposed to the essential polygamy of the male, an opinion I\nlong held, is erroneous. The contrary is the case. One must not be\nmisled by the fact that a woman will wait very long for a particular\nman, and where possible will choose him who can bestow most value on\nher, the most noble, the most famous, the ideal prince. Woman is\ndistinguished by this desire for value from the animals, who have no\nregard for value either for themselves and through themselves, as in the\ncase of a man, or for another and through another, as in the case of a\nwoman. But this could be brought forward only by fools as in any way to\nthe credit of woman, since, indeed, it shows most strongly that she is\ndevoid of a feeling of personal value. The desire for this demands to be\nsatisfied, but does not find satisfaction in the moral idea of monogamy.\nThe man is able to pour forth value, to confer it on the woman; he can\ngive it, he wishes to give it, but he cannot receive it. The woman seeks\nto create as much personal value as possible for herself, and so adheres\nto the man who can give her most of it; faithfulness of the man,\nhowever, rests on other grounds. He regards it as the completion of\nideal love, as a fulfilment, even although it is questionable if that\ncould be attained. His faithfulness springs from the purely masculine\nconception of truth, the continuity demanded by the intelligible ego.\nOne often hears it said that women are more faithful than men; but man\u2019s\nfaithfulness is a coercion which he exercises on himself, of his own\nfree will, and with full consciousness. He may not adhere to this\nself-imposed contract, but his falling away from it will seem as a wrong\nto himself. When he breaks his faith he has suppressed the promptings of\nhis real nature. For the woman unfaithfulness is an exciting game, in\nwhich the thought of morality plays no part, but which is controlled\nonly by the desire for safety and reputation. There is no wife who has\nnot been untrue to her husband in thought, and yet no woman reproaches\nherself with this. For a woman pledges her faith lightly and without any\nfull consciousness of what she does, and breaks it just as lightly and\nthoughtlessly as she pledged it. The motive for honouring a pledge can\nbe found only in man; for a woman does not understand the binding force\nof a given word. The examples of female faithfulness that can be adduced\nagainst this are of little value. They are either the slow result of the\nhabit of sexual acquiescence, or a condition of actual slavery,\ndog-like, attentive, full of instinctive tenacious attachment,\ncomparable with that necessity for actual contact which marks female\nsympathy.\n\nThe conception of faithfulness to one has been created by man. It arises\nfrom the masculine idea of individuality which remains unchanged by\ntime, and, therefore, needs as its complement always one and the same\nperson. The conception of faithfulness to one person is a lofty one, and\nfinds a worthy expression in the sacramental marriage of the Catholic\nChurch. I am not going to discuss the question of marriage or free-love.\nMarriage in its existing form is as incompatible as free-love with the\nhighest interpretations of the moral law. And so divorce came into the\nworld with marriage.\n\nNone the less marriage could have been invented only by man. No\nproprietary institution originated with women. The introduction of order\ninto chaotic sexual relations could have come only through man\u2019s desire\nfor it, and his power to establish it. There have been periods in the\nhistory of many primitive races in which women had great influence; but\nthe period of matriarchy was a period of polyandry.\n\nThe dissimilarity in the relations of mother and prostitute to their\nchild is rich in important conclusions. A woman in whom the prostitute\nelement is strong will perceive her son\u2019s manhood and always stand in a\nsexual relation to him. But as no woman is the perfect type of mother,\nthere is something sexual in the relation of every mother and son. For\nthis reason, I chose the relation of the mother to her daughter and not\nto her son, as the best measure of her type. There are many well-known\nphysiological parallels between the relations of a mother to her\nchildren and of a wife to her husband.\n\nMotherliness, like sexuality, is not an individual relation. When a\nwoman is motherly the quality will be exercised not only on the child of\nher own body, but towards all men, although later on her interest in her\nown child may become all-absorbing and make her narrow, blind, and\nunjust in the event of a quarrel.\n\nThe relation of a motherly girl to her lover is interesting. Such a girl\nis inclined to be motherly towards the man she loves, especially towards\nthat man who will afterwards become the father of her child; in fact, in\na certain sense the man is her child. The deepest nature of the\nmother-type reveals itself in this identity of the mother and loving\nwife; the mothers form the enduring root-stock of our race from which\nthe individual man arises, and in the face of which he recognises his\nown impermanence. It is this idea which enables the man to see in the\nmother, even while she is still a girl, something eternal, and which\ngives the pregnant woman a tremendous significance. The enduring\nsecurity of the race lies in the mystery of this figure, in the presence\nof which man feels his own fleeting impermanence. In such minutes there\nmay come to him a sense of freedom and peace, and in the mysterious\nsilence of the idea, he may think that it is through the woman that he\nis in true relation with the universe. He becomes the child of his\nbeloved one, a child whose mother smiles on him, understands him, and\ntakes care of him (Siegfried and Br\u00fcnnhilde, Act III.). But this does\nnot last long. (Siegfried tears himself from Br\u00fcnnhilde). For a man only\ncomes to his fulness when he frees himself from the race, when he raises\nhimself above it. For paternity cannot satisfy the deepest longings of a\nman, and the idea that he is to be lost in the race is repellent to him.\nThe most terrible chapter in the most comfortless of all the great books\nthat have been written, the chapter on \u201cDeath and its Relation to the\nIndestructibility of our Nature,\u201d in Schopenhauer\u2019s \u201cThe World as Will\nand Idea,\u201d is where the permanence of the will to maintain the species\nis set down as the only real permanence.\n\nIt is the permanence of the race that gives the mother her courage and\nfearlessness in contrast with the cowardliness and fear of the\nprostitute. It is not the courage of individuality, the moral courage\narising from an inner sense of freedom and personal value, but rather\nthe desire that the race should be maintained which, acting through the\nmother, protects the husband and child. As courage and cowardice belong\nrespectively to the mother and the prostitute, so is it with that other\npair of contrasting ideas, hope and fear. The absolute mother stands in\na persisting relation to hope; as she lives on through the race, she\ndoes not quail before death, whilst the prostitute has a lasting fear of\nit.\n\nThe mother feels herself in a sense superior to the man; she knows\nherself to be his anchor; as she is in a secure place, linked in the\nchain of the generations, she may be likened to a harbour from which\neach new individual sails forth to wander on the high seas. From the\nmoment of conception onwards the mother is psychically and physically\nready to feed and protect her child. And this protective superiority\nextends itself to her lover; she understands all that is simple and\nna\u00efve and childlike in him, whilst the prostitute understands best his\ncaprices and refinements. The mother has the craving to teach her child,\nto give him everything, even when the child is represented by the lover;\nthe prostitute strives to impose herself on the man, to receive\neverything from him. The mother as the upholder of the race is friendly\nto all its members; it is only when there is an exclusive choice to be\nmade between her child and others that she becomes hard and relentless;\nand so she can be both more full of love and more bitter than the\nprostitute.\n\nThe mother is in complete relation with the continuity of the race; the\nprostitute is completely outside it. The mother is the sole advocate and\npriestess of the race. The will of the race to live is embodied in her,\nwhilst the existence of the prostitute shows that Schopenhauer was\npushing a generalisation too far when he declared that all sexuality had\nrelation only to the future generation. That the mother cares only for\nthe life of her own race is plain from the absence of consideration for\nanimals shown by the best of mothers. A good mother, with the greatest\npeace of mind and content, will slaughter fowl after fowl for her\nfamily. The mother of children is a cruel step-mother to all other\nliving things.\n\nAnother striking aspect of the mother\u2019s relation to the preservation of\nthe race reveals itself in the matter of food. She cannot bear to see\nfood wasted, however little may be left over; whilst the prostitute\nwilfully squanders the quantities of food and drink she demands. The\nmother is stingy and mean; the prostitute open-handed and lavish. The\nmother\u2019s object in life is to preserve the race, and her delight is to\nsee her children eat and to encourage their appetites. And so she\nbecomes the good housekeeper. Ceres was a good mother, a fact expressed\nin her Greek name, Demeter. The mother takes care of the body, but does\nnot trouble about the mind.[15] The relation between mother and child\nremains material from the kissing and hugging of childhood to the\nprotective care of maturity. All her devotion is for the success and\nprosperity of her child in material things.\n\n  [15] Compare the conversation in Ibsen\u2019s \u201cPeer Gynt,\u201d Act ii., between\n  the father of Solveig and Aase (perhaps the best-drawn mother in all\n  literature) when they were discussing the search for their son:\n\n  Aase. \u201cWe shall find him.\u201d\n\n  Her Husband. \u201cAnd save his soul.\u201d\n\n  Aase. \u201cAnd his body.\u201d\n\nMaternal love, then, cannot be truly represented as resting on moral\ngrounds. Let any one ask himself if he does not believe that his\nmother\u2019s love would not be just as great for him if he were a totally\ndifferent person. The individuality of the child has no part in the\nmaternal love; the mere fact of its being her own child is sufficient,\nand so the love cannot be regarded as moral. In the love of a man for a\nwoman, or between persons of the same sex, there is always some\nreference to the personal qualities of the individual; a mother\u2019s love\nextends itself indifferently to anything that she has borne. It destroys\nthe moral conception if we realise that the love of a mother for her\nchild remains the same whether the child becomes a saint or a sinner, a\nking or a beggar, an angel or a fiend. Precisely the same conclusion\nwill be reached from reflecting how children think that they have a\nclaim on their mother\u2019s love simply because she is their mother.\nMaternal love is non-moral because it has no relation to the\nindividuality of the being on which it is bestowed, and there can be an\nethical relation only between two individualities. The relation of\nmother and child is always a kind of physical reflex. If the little one\nsuddenly screams or cries when the mother is in the next room, she will\nat once rush to it as if she herself had been hurt; and, as the children\ngrow up, every wish or trouble of theirs is directly assumed and shared\nby the mother as if they were her own. There is an unbreakable link\nbetween the mother and child, physical, like the cord that united the\ntwo before childbirth. This is the real nature of the maternal relation;\nand, for my part, I protest against the fashion in which it is praised,\nits very indiscriminate character being made a merit. I believe myself\nthat many great artists have recognised this, but have chosen to be\nsilent about it. The extraordinary over-praising of Raphael is losing\nground, and the singers of maternal love are no higher than Fischart or\nRichepin.\n\nMaternal love is an instinctive and natural impulse, and animals possess\nit in a degree as high as that of human beings. This alone is enough to\nshow that it is not true love, that it is not of moral origin; for all\nmorality proceeds from the intelligible character which animals, having\nno free will, do not possess. The ethical imperative can be heard only\nby a rational creature; there is no such thing as natural morality, for\nall morality must be self-conscious.\n\nHer position outside the mere preservation of the race, the fact that\nshe is not merely the channel and the indifferent protector of the chain\nof beings that passes through her, place the prostitute in a sense above\nthe mother, so far at least as it is possible to speak of higher or\nlower from the ethical point of view when women are being discussed.\n\nThe matron whose whole time is taken up in looking after her husband and\nchildren, who is working in, or superintending the work of, the house,\ngarden, or other forms of labour, ranks intellectually very low. The\nmost highly-developed women mentally, those who have been lauded in\npoetry, belong to the prostitute category; to these, the Aspasia-type,\nmust be added the women of the romantic school, foremost among whom must\nbe placed Karoline Michaelis-B\u00f6hmer-Forster-Schlegel-Schelling.\n\nIt coincides with what has been said that only those men are sexually\nattracted by the mother-type who have no desire for mental productivity.\nThe man whose fatherhood is confined to the children of his loins is he\nwhom we should expect to choose the motherly productive woman. Great men\nhave always preferred women of the prostitute type.[16] Their choice\nfalls on the sterile woman, and, if there is issue, it is unfit and\nsoon dies out. Ordinary fatherhood has as little to do with morality as\nmotherhood. It is non-moral, as I shall show in chap. xiv.; and it is\nillogical, because it deals with illusions. No man ever knows to what\nextent he is the father of his own child. And its duration is short and\nfleeting; every generation and every race of human beings soon\ndisappears.\n\n  [16] Wherever I am using this term I refer, of course, not merely to\n  mercenary women of the streets.\n\nThe wide-spread and exclusive honouring of the motherly woman, the type\nmost upheld as the one and only possible one for women, is accordingly\nquite unjustified. Although most men are certain that every woman can\nhave her consummation only in motherhood, I must confess that the\nprostitute--not as a person, but as a phenomenon--is much more estimable\nin my opinion.\n\nThere are various causes of this universal reverence for the mother.\n\nOne of the chief reasons appears to be that the mother seems to the man\nnearer his ideal of chastity; but the woman who desires children is no\nmore chaste than the man-coveting prostitute.\n\nThe man rewards the appearance of higher morality in the maternal type\nby raising her morally (although with no reason) and socially over the\nprostitute type. The latter does not submit to any valuations of the man\nnor to the ideal of chastity which he seeks for in the woman; secretly,\nas the woman of the world, lightly as the demi-mondaine, or flagrantly\nas the woman of the streets, she sets herself in opposition to them.\nThis is the explanation of the social ostracisms, the practical outlawry\nwhich is the present almost universal fate of the prostitute. The mother\nreadily submits to the moral impositions of man, simply because she is\ninterested only in the child and the preservation of the race.\n\nIt is quite different with the prostitute. She lives her own life\nexactly as she pleases, even although it may bring with it the\npunishment of exclusion from society. She is not so brave as the mother,\nit is true, being thoroughly cowardly; but she has the correlative of\ncowardice, impudence, and she is not ashamed of her shamelessness. She\nis naturally inclined to polygamy, and always ready to attract more men\nthan the one who would suffice as the founder of a family. She gives\nfree play to the fulfilment of her desire, and feels a queen, and her\nmost ardent wish is for more power. It is easy to grieve or shock the\nmotherly woman; no one can injure or offend the prostitute; for the\nmother has her honour to defend as the guardian of the species, whilst\nthe prostitute has forsworn all social respect, and prides herself in\nher freedom. The only thought that disturbs her is the possibility of\nlosing her power. She expects, and cannot think otherwise than that\nevery man wishes to possess her, that they think of nothing but her, and\nlive for her. And certainly she possesses the greatest power over men,\nthe only influence that has a strong effect on the life of humanity that\nis not ordered by the regulations of men.\n\nIn this lies the analogy between the prostitute and men who have been\nfamous in politics. As it is only once in many centuries that a great\nconqueror arises, like Napoleon or Alexander, so it is with the great\ncourtesan; but when she does appear she marches triumphantly across the\nworld.\n\nThere is a relationship between such men and courtesans (every\npolitician is to a certain extent a tribune of the people, and that in\nitself implies a kind of prostitution). They have the same feeling for\npower, the same demand to be in relations with all men, even the\nhumblest. Just as the great conqueror believes that he confers a favour\non any one to whom he talks, so also with the prostitute. Observe her as\nshe talks to a policeman, or buys something in a shop, you see the sense\nof conferring a favour explicit in her. And men most readily accept this\nview that they are receiving favours from the politician or prostitute\n(one may recall how a great genius like Goethe regarded his meeting with\nNapoleon at Erfurt; and on the other side we have the myth of Pandora,\nand the story of the birth of Venus).\n\nI may now return to the subject of great men of action which I opened\nin chap. v. Even so far-seeing a man as Carlyle has exalted the man of\naction, as, for instance, in his chapter on \u201cThe Hero as King.\u201d I have\nalready shown that I cannot accept such a view. I may add here that all\ngreat men of action, even the greatest of them, such as C\u00e6sar, Cromwell,\nNapoleon, have not hesitated to employ falsehood; that Alexander the\nGreat did not hesitate to defend one of his murders by sophistry. But\nuntruthfulness is incompatible with genius. The \u201cMemoirs of Napoleon,\u201d\nwritten at St. Helena, are full of misstatements and watery sophistry,\nand his last words, that \u201che had loved only France,\u201d were an altruistic\npose. Napoleon, the greatest of the conquerors, is a sufficient proof\nthat great men of action are criminals, and, therefore, not geniuses.\nOne can understand him by thinking of the tremendous intensity with\nwhich he tried to escape from himself. There is this element in all the\nconquerors, great or small. Just because he had great gifts, greater\nthan those of any emperor before him, he had greater difficulty in\nstifling the disapproving voice within him. The motive of his ambition\nwas the craving to stifle his better self. A truly great man may\nhonestly share in the desire for admiration or fame but personal\nambition will not be his aim. He will not try to knit the whole world to\nhimself by superficial, transitory bonds, to heap up all the things of\nthe world in a pyramid over his name. The man of action shares with the\nepileptic the desire to be in criminal relation to everything around\nhim, to make them appanages of his petty self. The great man feels\nhimself defined and separate from the world, a monad amongst monads,\nand, as a true microcosm, he feels the world already within him; he\nrealises in the fullest sense of personal experience that he has a\ndefinite, assured, intelligible relation to the world whole. The great\ntribune and the great courtesan do not feel that they are marked off\nfrom the world; they merge with it, and demand it all as decoration or\nadornment of their empirical persons, and they are incapable of love,\naffection, or friendship.\n\nThe king of the fairy tale who wished to conquer the stars is the\nperfect image of the conqueror. The great genius honours himself, and\nhas not to live in a condition of give and take with the populace, as is\nnecessary for the politician. The great politician makes his voice\nresound in the world, but he has also to sing in the streets; he may\nmake the world his chessboard, but he has also to strut in a booth; he\nis no more a despot than he is a beggar for alms. He has to court the\npopulace, and here he joins with the prostitute. The politician is a man\nof the streets. He must be completed by the public. It is the masses\nthat he requires, not real individualities. If he is not clever he tries\nto be rid of the great men, or if, like Napoleon, he is cunning, he\npretends to honour them in order that he may make them harmless. His\ndependence on the public makes some such course necessary. A politician\ncannot do all that he wishes, even if he is a Napoleon, and if, unlike\nNapoleon, he actually wished to realise ideals, he would soon be taught\nbetter by the public, his real master. The will of him who covets power\nis bound.\n\nEvery emperor is conscious of this relation between himself and the\nmasses, and has an almost instinctive love of great assemblages of his\npeople, or his army, or of his electors. Not Marcus Aurelius or\nDiocletian, but Kleo, Mark Antony, Themistocles, and Mirabeau are the\nembodiments of the real politician. Ambition means going amongst the\npeople. The tribune has to follow the prostitute in this respect.\nAccording to Emerson, Napoleon used to go _incognito_ amongst the people\nto excite their hurrahs and praise. Schiller imagined the same course\nfor his Wallenstein.\n\nHitherto the phenomena of the great man of action have been regarded\neven by artists and philosophers as unique. I think that my analysis has\nshown that there is the strongest resemblance between them and\nprostitutes. To see an analogy between Antonius (C\u00e6sar) and Cleopatra\nmay appear at first far-fetched, but none the less it exists. The great\nman of action has to despise his inner life, in order that he may live\naltogether \u201cin the world,\u201d and he must perish, like the things of the\nworld. The prostitute abandons the lasting purpose of her sex, to live\nin the instincts of the moment. The great prostitute and the great\ntribune are firebrands causing destruction all around them, leaving\ndeath and devastation in their paths, and pass like meteors unconnected\nwith the course of human life, indifferent to its objects, and soon\ndisappearing, whilst the genius and the mother work for the future in\nsilence. The prostitute and the tribune may be called the enemies of\nGod; they are both anti-moral phenomena.\n\nGreat men of action, then, must be excluded from the category of genius.\nThe true genius, whether he be an artist or a philosopher, is always\nstrongly marked by his relation to the constructive side of the world.\n\nThe motive that actuates the prostitute requires further investigation.\nThe purpose of the motherly woman was easy to understand; she is the\nupholder of the race. But the fundamental idea of prostitution is much\nmore mysterious, and no one can have meditated long on the subject\nwithout often doubting if it were possible to get an explanation.\nPerhaps the relation of the two types to the sexual act may assist the\ninquiry. I hope that no one will consider such a subject below the\ndignity of a philosopher. The spirit in which the inquiry is made is the\nchief matter. It is at least clear that the painters of Leda and Dan\u00e4e\nhave pondered over the problem, and many great writers--I have in mind\nZola\u2019s \u201cConfession of Claude,\u201d his \u201cHortense,\u201d \u201cRen\u00e9e,\u201d and \u201cNana,\u201d\nTolstoi\u2019s \u201cResurrection,\u201d Ibsen\u2019s \u201cHedda Gabler,\u201d and \u201cRita,\u201d and above\nall the \u201cSonja\u201d of that great soul Dostoyevski--must have been thinking\nof the general problem rather than merely wishing to describe particular\ncases.\n\nThe maternal woman regards the sexual relations as means to an end; the\nprostitute considers them as the end itself. That sexual congress may\nhave another purpose than mere reproduction is plain, as many animals\nand plants are devoid of it. On the other hand, in the animal kingdom\nsexual congress is always in connection with reproduction and is never\nsimply lust; and, moreover, takes place only at times suitable for\nbreeding. Desire is simply the means employed by nature to secure the\ncontinuity of the species.\n\nAlthough sexual congress is an end in itself for the prostitute, it must\nnot be assumed that it is meaningless in the mother-type. Women who are\nsexually an\u00e6sthetic no doubt exist in both classes, but they are very\nrare, and many apparent cases may really be phenomena of hysteria.\n\nThe final importance attached by the prostitute to the sexual act is\nmade plain by the fact that it is only that type in which coquetry\noccurs. Coquetry has invariably a sexual significance. Its purpose is to\npicture to the man the conquest of the woman before it has occurred, in\norder to induce him to make the conquest an actual fact. The readiness\nof the type to coquet with every man is an expression of her nature;\nwhether it proceeds further depends on merely accidental circumstances.\n\nThe maternal type regards the sexual act as the beginning of a series of\nimportant events, and so attaches value to it equally with the\nprostitute, although in a different fashion. The one is contented,\ncompleted, satisfied; her life is made richer and of fuller meaning to\nher by it. The other, for whom the act is everything, the compression\nand end of all life, is never satisfied, never to be satisfied, were she\nvisited by all the men in the world.\n\nThe body of a woman, as I have already shown, is sexual throughout, and\nthe special sexual acts are only intensifications of a distributed\nsensation. Here, also, the difference between the two types displays\nitself. The prostitute type in coquetting is merely using the general\nsexuality of her body as an end in itself; for her there is a difference\nonly in degree between flirtation and sexual congress. The maternal type\nis equally sexual, but with a different purpose; all her life, through\nall her body, she is being impregnated. In this fact lies the\nexplanation of the \u201cimpression\u201d which I referred to as being\nindubitable, although it is denied by men of science and physicians.\n\nPaternity is a diffused relation. Many instances, disputed by men of\nscience, point to an influence not brought about directly by the\nreproductive cells. White women who have borne a child to a black man,\nare said if they bear children afterwards to white men, to have retained\nenough impression from the first mate to show an effect on the\nsubsequent children. All such facts, grouped under the names of\n\u201ctelegony,\u201d \u201cgerminal infection,\u201d and so on, although disputed by\nscientists, speak for my view. And so also the motherly woman,\nthroughout her whole life, is impressed by lovers, by voices, by words,\nby inanimate things. All the influences that come to her she turns to\nthe purpose of her being, to the shaping of her child, and the \u201cactual\u201d\nfather has to share his paternity with perhaps other men and many other\nthings.\n\nThe woman is impregnated not only through the genital tract but through\nevery fibre of her being. All life makes an impression on her and throws\nits image on her child. This universality, in the purely physical\nsphere, is analogous to genius.\n\nIt is quite different with the prostitute. Whilst the maternal woman\nturns the whole world, the love of her lover, and all the impressions\nthat she receives to the purposes of the child, the prostitute absorbs\neverything for herself. But just as she has this absorbing need of the\nman, so the man can get something from her which he fails to find in the\nbadly dressed, tasteless, pre-occupied maternal type. Something within\nhim requires pleasure, and this he gets from the daughters of joy.\nUnlike the mother, these think of the pleasures of the world, of\ndancing, of dressing, of theatres and concerts, of pleasure-resorts.\nThey know the use of gold, turning it to luxury instead of to comfort,\nthey flame through the world, making all its ways a triumphant march for\ntheir beautiful bodies.\n\nThe prostitute is the great seductress of the world, the female Don\nJuan, the being in the woman that knows the art of love, that cultivates\nit, teaches it, and enjoys it.\n\nVery deep-seated differences are linked with what I have been\ndescribing. The mother-woman craves for respectability in the man, not\nbecause she grasps its value as an idea, but because it is the supporter\nof the life of the world. She herself works, and is not idle like the\nprostitute; she is filled with care for the future, and so requires from\nthe man a corresponding practical responsibility, and will not seduce\nhim to pleasure. The prostitute, on the other hand, is most attracted by\na careless, idle, dissipated man. A man that has lost self-restraint\nrepels the mother-woman, is attractive to the prostitute. There are\nwomen who are dissatisfied with a son that is idle at school; there are\nothers who encourage him. The diligent boy pleases the mother-woman, the\nidle and careless boy wins approval from the prostitute type. This\ndistinction reaches high up amongst the respectable classes of society,\nbut a salient example of it is seen in the fact that the \u201cbullies\u201d loved\nby women of the streets are usually criminals. The souteneur is always a\ncriminal, a thief, a fraudulent person, or sometimes even a murderer.\n\nI am almost on the point of saying that, however little woman is to be\nregarded as immoral (she is only non-moral), prostitution stands in some\ndeep relation with crime, whilst motherhood is equally bound with the\nopposite tendency. We must avoid regarding the prostitute as the female\nanalogue of the criminal; women, as I have already pointed out, are not\ncriminals; they are too low in the moral scale for that designation.\nNone the less, there is a constant connection between the prostitute\ntype and crime. The great courtesan is comparable with that great\ncriminal, the conqueror, and readily enters into actual relations with\nhim; the petty courtesan entertains the thief and the pickpocket. The\nmother type is in fact the guardian of the life of the world, the\nprostitute type is its enemy. But just as the mother is in harmony, not\nwith the soul but with the body, so the prostitute is no diabolic\ndestroyer of the idea, but only a corrupter of empirical phenomena.\nPhysical life and physical death, both of which are in intimate\nconnection with the sexual act, are displayed by the woman in her two\ncapacities of mother and prostitute.\n\nIt is still impossible to give a clearer solution than that which I have\nattempted, of the real significance of motherhood and prostitution. I am\non an unfamiliar path, almost untrodden by any earlier wayfarer.\nReligious myths and philosophy alike have been unable to propound\nsolutions. I have found some clues however. The anti-moral significance\nof prostitution is in harmony with the fact that it appears only amongst\nmankind. In all the animal kingdom the females are used only for\nreproduction; there are no true females that are sterile. There are\nanalogies to prostitution, however, amongst male animals; one has only\nto think of the display and decoration of the peacock, of the shining\nglow-worm, of singing birds, of the love dances of many male birds.\nThese secondary sexual manifestations, however, are mere advertisements\nof sexuality.\n\nProstitution is a human phenomenon; animals and plants are non-moral;\nthey are never disposed to immorality and possess only motherhood. Here\nis a deep secret, hidden in the nature and origin of mankind. I ought to\ncorrect my earlier exposition by insisting that I have come to regard\nthe prostitute element as a possibility in all women just as much as the\nmerely animal capacity for motherhood. It is something which penetrates\nthe nature of the human female, something with which the most\nanimal-like mother is tinged, something which corresponds in the human\nfemale, to the characters that separate the human male from the animal\nmale. Just as the immoral possibility of man is something that\ndistinguishes him from the male animal, so the quality of the prostitute\ndistinguishes the human female from the animal female. I shall have\nsomething to say as to the general relation of man to this element in\nwoman, towards the end of my investigation, but possibly the ultimate\norigin of prostitution is a deep mystery into which none can penetrate.\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nEROTICS AND \u00c6STHETICS\n\nThe arguments which are in common use to justify a high opinion of woman\nhave now been examined in all except a few points to which I shall\nrecur, from the point of view of critical philosophy, and have been\ncontroverted. I hope that I have justified my deliberate choice of\nground, although, indeed, Schopenhauer\u2019s fate should have been a warning\nto me. His depreciation of women in his philosophical work \u201cOn Women,\u201d\nhas been frequently attributed to the circumstance that a beautiful\nVenetian girl, in whose company he was, fell in love with the extremely\nhandsome personal appearance of Byron; as if a low opinion of women were\nnot more likely to come to him who had had the best not the worst\nfortune with them.\n\nThe practice of merely calling any one who assails woman a misogynist,\ninstead of refuting argument by argument, has much to commend it. Hatred\nis never impartial, and, therefore, to describe a man as having an\nanimus against the object of his criticism, is at once to lay him open\nto the charge of insincerity, immorality, and partiality, and one that\ncan be made with a hyperbole of accusation and evasion of the point,\nwhich only equal its lack of justification. This sort of answer never\nfails in its object, which is to exempt the vindicator from refuting the\nactual statements. It is the oldest and handiest weapon of the large\nmajority of men, who never wish to see woman as she is. No men who\nreally think deeply about women retain a high opinion of them; men\neither despise women or they have never thought seriously about them.\n\nThere is no doubt that it is a fallacious method in a theoretical\nargument to refer to one\u2019s opponent\u2019s psychological motives instead of\nbringing forward proofs to controvert his statements.\n\nIt is not necessary for me to say that in logical controversy the\nadversaries should place themselves under an impersonal conception of\ntruth, and their aim should be to reach a result, irrespective of their\nown concrete opinions. If, however, in an argument, one side has come to\na certain conclusion by a logical chain of reasoning, and the other side\nmerely opposes the conclusion without having followed the reasoning\nprocess, it is at once fair and appropriate to examine the psychological\nmotives which have induced the adversaries to abandon argument for\nabuse. I shall now put the champions of women to the test and see how\nmuch of their attitude is due to sentimentality, how much of it is\ndisinterested, and how much due to selfish motives.\n\nAll objections raised against those who despise women arise from the\nerotic relations in which man stands to woman. This relationship is\nabsolutely different from the purely sexual attraction which occurs in\nthe animal world, and plays a most important part in human affairs. It\nis quite erroneous to say that sexuality and eroticism, sexual impulse\nand love, are fundamentally one and the same thing, the second an\nembellishing, refining, spiritualising sublimation of the first;\nalthough practically all medical men hold this view, and even such men\nas Kant and Schopenhauer thought so. Before I go into the reasons for\nmaintaining the existence of this great distinction, I should like to\nsay something about the views of these two men.\n\nKant\u2019s opinion is not of much weight, because love as sexual impulse\nmust have been as little known to him as possible, probably less than in\nthe case of any other man. He was so little erotic that he never felt\nthe kindred desire to travel.[17] He represents too lofty and pure a\ntype to speak with authority on this matter: his one passion was\nmetaphysics.\n\n  [17] The association of these two desires may surprise readers. It\n  rests on a metaphysical ground, much of which will be more apparent\n  when I have developed my theory of eroticism further. Time, like\n  space, is conceived of as unlimited, and man, in his desire for\n  freedom, in his efforts stimulated by his power of free will to\n  transcend his limits, has the craving for unlimited time and unlimited\n  space. The desire for travel is simply an expression of this\n  restlessness, this fundamental chafing of the spirit against its\n  bonds. But just as eternity is not prolonged time, but the negation of\n  time, so however far a man wanders, he can extend his area but cannot\n  abolish space. And so his efforts to transcend space must always be\n  heroic failures: I shall show that his eroticism is a similar notable\n  failure.\n\nAs for Schopenhauer, he had just as little idea of the higher form of\neroticism; his sexuality was of the gross order. This can be seen from\nthe following: Schopenhauer\u2019s countenance shows very little kindliness\nand a good deal of fierceness (a circumstance which must have caused him\ngreat sorrow. There is no exhibition of ethical sympathy if one is very\nsorry for oneself. The most sympathetic persons are those who, like Kant\nand Nietzsche, have no particle of self-pity).\n\nBut it may be said with safety that only those who are most sympathetic\nare capable of a strong passion: those \u201cwho take no interest in things\u201d\nare incapable of love. This does not imply that they have diabolical\nnatures. They may, on the contrary, stand very high morally without\nknowing what their neighbours are thinking or doing, and without having\na sense for other than sexual relations with women, as was the case with\nSchopenhauer. He was a man who knew only too well what the sexual\nimpulse was, but he never was in love; if that were not so, the bias in\nhis famous work, \u201cThe Metaphysics of Sexual Love,\u201d would be\ninexplicable; in it the most important doctrine is that the unconscious\ngoal of all love is nothing more than \u201cthe formation of the next\ngeneration.\u201d\n\nThis view, as I hope to prove, is false. It is true that a love entirely\nwithout sexuality has never been known. However high a man may stand he\nis still a being with senses. What absolutely disposes of the opposite\nview is this: all love, as such--without going into \u00e6sthetic principles\nof love--is antagonistic to those elements (of the relationship) which\npress towards sexual union; in fact, such elements tend to negate love.\nLove and desire are two unlike, mutually exclusive, opposing conditions,\nand during the time a man really loves, the thought of physical union\nwith the object of his love is insupportable. Because there is no hope\nwhich is entirely free from fear does not alter the fact that hope and\nfear are utterly opposite principles. It is just the same in the case of\nsexual impulse and love. The more erotic a man is the less he will be\ntroubled with his sexuality, and _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nIf it be the case that there is no adoration utterly free from desire,\nthere is no reason why the two should be identified, since it might be\npossible for a superior being to attain the highest phases of both. That\nperson lies, or has never known what love is, who says he loves a woman\nwhom he desires; so much difference is there between sexual impulse and\nlove. This is what makes talk of love after marriage seem, in most\ncases, make-believe.\n\nThe following will show how obtuse the view of those is who persist,\nwith unconscious cynicism, in maintaining the identity of love and\nsexual impulse. Sexual attraction increases with physical proximity;\nlove is strongest in the absence of the loved one; it needs separation,\na certain distance, to preserve it. In fact, what all the travels in the\nworld could not achieve, what time could not accomplish, may be brought\nabout by accidental, unintentional, physical contact with the beloved\nobject, in which the sexual impulse is awakened, and which suffices to\nkill love on the spot. Then, again, in the case of more highly\ndifferentiated, great men, the type of girl desired, and the type of\ngirl loved but never desired, are always totally different in face,\nform, and disposition; they are two different beings.\n\nThen there is the \u201cplatonic love,\u201d which professors of psychiatry have\nsuch a poor opinion of. I should say rather, there is only \u201cplatonic\u201d\nlove, because any other so-called love belongs to the kingdom of the\nsenses: it is the love of Beatrice, the worship of Madonna; the\nBabylonian woman is the symbol of sexual desire.\n\nKant\u2019s enumeration of the transcendental ideas of love would have to be\nextended if it is to be held. For the purely spiritual love, the love of\nPlato and Bruno, which is absolutely free from desire, is none the less\na transcendental concept; nor is its significance as a concept impaired,\nbecause such a love has never been fully realised.\n\nIt is the problem put forward in \u201cTannh\u00e4user.\u201d We have Tannh\u00e4user,\nWolfram, Venus, and Maria. The fact that two lovers, who have found each\nother once for all--Tristan and Isolde--choose death instead of the\nbridal bed, is just as absolute a proof of a higher, maybe metaphysical,\nsomething in mankind, as the martyrdom of a Giordano Bruno.\n\n  \u201cDir, hohe Liebe, t\u00f6ne\n  Begeistert mein Gesang,\n  Die mir in Engelsch\u00f6ne\n  Tief in die Seele drang!\n  Du nahst als Gott gesandte:\n  Ich folg\u2019 aus holder Fern\u2019,--\n  So f\u00fchrst du in die Lande,\n  Wo ewig strahlt dein Stern.\u201d\n\nWho is the object of such love? Is it woman, as she has been represented\nin this work, who lacks all higher qualities, who gets her value from\nanother, who has no power to attain value on her own account?\nImpossible. It is the ideally beautiful, the immaculate woman, who is\nloved in such high fashion. The source of this beauty and chastity in\nwomen must now be found.\n\nThe question as to whether the female sex is the more beautiful, and as\nto whether it deserves the title of \u201cthe\u201d beautiful, has been much\ndisputed.\n\nIt may be well to consider by whom and how far woman is considered\nbeautiful.\n\nIt is well known that woman is not most beautiful in the nude. I admit\nthat in pictures or statues the nude female may look well. But the\nsexual impulse makes it impossible to look at a living woman in a nude\ncondition with the purely critical, unemotional eye, which is an\nessential feature in judging any object of beauty. But apart from this,\nan absolute nude female figure in the life leaves an impression of\nsomething wanting, an incompleteness, which is incompatible with beauty.\n\nA nude woman may be beautiful in details, but the general effect is not\nbeautiful; she inevitably creates the feeling that she is looking for\nsomething, and this induces disinclination rather than desire in the\nspectator. The sight of an upright female form, in the nude, makes most\npatent her purposelessness, the sense of her purpose in life being\nderived from something outside herself; in the recumbent position this\nfeeling is greatly diminished. It is evident that artists have perceived\nthis in reproducing the nude.\n\nBut even in the details of her body a woman is not wholly beautiful, not\neven if she is a flawless, perfect type of her sex. The genitalia are\nthe chief difficulty in the way of regarding her as theoretically\nbeautiful. If the idea were justified that man\u2019s love for woman is the\ndirect result of his sexual impulse; if we could agree with Schopenhauer\nthat \u201cthe under-sized, narrow-shouldered, broad-hipped, and short-limbed\nsex is called beautiful only because the male intellect is befogged by\nthe sexual impulse, that impulse being the creator of the conception of\nthe beauty of woman,\u201d it would follow that the genitalia could not be\nexcluded from the conception of beauty. It requires no lengthy\nexposition to prove that the genitalia are not regarded as beautiful,\nand that, therefore, the beauty of woman cannot be regarded as due to\nthe sexual impulse. In fact, the sexual impulse is in reality opposed to\nthe conception of beauty. The man who is most under its influence has\nleast sense of female beauty, and desires any woman merely because she\nis a woman.\n\nA woman\u2019s nude body is distasteful to man because it offends his sense\nof shame. The easy superficiality of our day has given colour to the\nstatement that the sense of shame has arisen from the wearing of\nclothes, and it has been urged that the objection to the nude arises\nfrom those who are unnatural and secretly immorally-minded. But a man\nwho has become immorally-minded no longer is interested in the nude as\nsuch, because it has lost its influence on him. He merely desires and no\nlonger loves. All true love is modest, like all true pity. There is only\none case of shamelessness--a declaration of love the sincerity of which\na man is convinced of in the moment he makes it. This would represent\nthe conceivable maximum of shamelessness; but there is no declaration of\nlove which is quite true, and the stupidity of women is shown by their\nreadiness to believe such protestations.\n\nThe love bestowed by the man is the standard of what is beautiful and\nwhat is hateful in woman. The conditions are quite different in\n\u00e6sthetics from those in logic or ethics. In logic there is an abstract\ntruth which is the standard of thought; in ethics there is an ideal good\nwhich furnishes the criterion of what ought to be done, and the value of\nthe good is established by the determination to link the will with the\ngood. In \u00e6sthetics beauty is created by love; there is no determining\nlaw to love what is beautiful, and the beautiful does not present itself\nto human beings with any imperative command to love it. (And so there is\nno abstract, no super-individual \u201cright\u201d taste).\n\nAll beauty is really more a projection, an emanation of the requirements\nof love; and so the beauty of woman is not apart from love, it is not an\nobjective to which love is directed, but woman\u2019s beauty is the love of\nman; they are not two things, but one and the same thing.\n\nJust as hatefulness comes from hating, so love creates beauty. This is\nonly another way of expressing the fact that beauty has as little to do\nwith the sexual impulse as the sexual impulse has to do with love.\nBeauty is something that can neither be felt, touched, nor mixed with\nother things; it is only at a distance that it can be plainly discerned,\nand when it is approached it withdraws itself. The sexual impulse which\nseeks for sexual union with woman is a denial of such beauty; the woman\nwho has been possessed and enjoyed, will never again be worshipped for\nher beauty.\n\nI now come to the second question: what are the innocence and morality\nof a woman?\n\nIt will be convenient to start with a few facts that concern the origin\nof all love. Bodily cleanliness, as has often been remarked, is in men a\ngeneral indication of morality and rectitude; or at least it may be said\nthat uncleanly men are seldom of high character. It may be noticed that\nwhen men, who formerly paid little attention to bodily cleanliness,\nbegin to strive for a higher perfection of character, they at the same\ntime take more trouble with the care of the body. In the same way, when\nmen suddenly become imbued with passion they experience a simultaneous\ndesire for bodily cleanliness, and it may almost be said of them that\nonly at such a time do they wash themselves thoroughly. If we now turn\nto gifted men, we shall see that in their case love frequently begins\nwith self-mortification, humiliation, and restraint. A moral change sets\nin, a process of purification seems to emanate from the object loved,\neven if her lover has never spoken to her, or only seen her a few times\nin the distance. It is, then, impossible that this process should have\nits origin in that person: very often it may be a bread-and-butter miss,\na stolid lump, more often a sensuous coquette, in whom no one can see\nthe marvellous characteristics with which his love endows her, save her\nlover. Can any one believe that it is a concrete person who is loved?\nDoes she not in reality serve as the starting point for incomparably\ngreater emotions than she could inspire?\n\nIn love, man is only loving himself. Not his empirical self, not the\nweaknesses and vulgarities, not the failings and smallnesses which he\noutwardly exhibits; but all that he wants to be, all that he ought to\nbe, his truest, deepest, intelligible nature, free from all fetters of\nnecessity, from all taint of earth.\n\nIn his actual physical existence, this being is limited by space and\ntime and by the shackles of the senses; however deep he may look into\nhimself, he finds himself damaged and spotted, and sees nowhere the\nimage of speckless purity for which he seeks. And yet there is nothing\nhe covets so much as to realise his own ideal, to find his real higher\nself. And as he cannot find this true self within himself, he has to\nseek it without himself. He projects his ideal of an absolutely worthy\nexistence, the ideal that he is unable to isolate within himself, upon\nanother human being, and this act, and this alone, is none other than\nlove and the significance of love. Only a person who has done wrong and\nis conscious of it can love, and so a child can never love. It is only\nbecause love represents the highest, most unattainable goal of all\nlonging, because it cannot be realised in experience but must remain an\nidea; only because it is localised on some other human being, and yet\nremains at a distance, so that the ideal never attains its realisation;\nonly because of such conditions can love be associated with the\nawakening of the desire for purification, with the reaching after a goal\nthat is purely spiritual, and so cannot be blemished by physical union\nwith the beloved person; only thus, is love the highest and strongest\neffort of the will towards the supreme good; only thus does it bring the\ntrue being of man to a state between body and spirit, between the senses\nand the moral nature, between God and the beasts. A human being only\nfinds himself when, in this fashion, he loves. And thus it comes about\nthat only when they love do many men realise the existence of their own\npersonality and of the personality of another, that \u201cI\u201d and \u201cthou\u201d\nbecome for them more than grammatical expressions. And so also comes\nabout the great part played in their love story by the names of the two\nlovers. There is no doubt but that it is through love that many men\nfirst come to know of their own real nature, and to be convinced that\nthey possess a soul.\n\nIt is this which makes a lover desire to keep his beloved at a\ndistance--on no account to injure her purity by contact with him--in\norder to assure himself of her and of his own existence. Many an\ninflexible empiricist, coming under the influence of love, becomes an\nenthusiastic mystic; the most striking example being Auguste Comte, the\nfounder of positivism, whose whole theories were revolutionised by his\nfeelings for Clotilde de Vaux.\n\nIt is not only for the artist, but for the whole of mankind that _Amo,\nergo sum_ holds good psychologically.\n\nLove is a phenomenon of projection just as hate is, not a phenomenon of\nequation as friendship is. The latter presupposes an equality of both\nindividuals: love always implies inequality, disproportion. To endow an\nindividual with all that one might be and yet never can be, to make her\nideal--that is love. Beauty is the symbol of this act of worship. It is\nthis that so often surprises and angers a lover when he is convinced\nthat beauty does not imply morality in a woman. He feels that the nature\nof the offence is increased by \u201csuch depravity\u201d being possible in\nconjunction with such \u201cbeauty.\u201d He is not aware that the woman in\nquestion seems beautiful to him because he still loves her; otherwise\nthe incongruity between the external and internal would no longer pain\nhim.\n\nThe reason an ordinary prostitute can never seem beautiful is because it\nis naturally impossible to endow her with the projection of value; she\ncan satisfy only the taste of vulgar minds. She is the mate of the worst\nsort of men. In this we have the explanation of a relation utterly\nopposed to morality: woman in general is simply indifferent to ethics,\nshe is non-moral, and, therefore, unlike the anti-moral criminal, who is\ninstinctively disliked, or the devil who is hideous in every one\u2019s\nimagination, serves as a receptacle for projected worthiness; as she\nneither does good nor evil, she neither resists nor resents this\nimposition of the ideal on her personality. It is patent that woman\u2019s\nmorality is acquired; but this morality is man\u2019s, which he in an access\nof supreme love and devotion has conveyed to her.\n\nSince all beauty is always only the constantly renewed endeavour to\nembody the highest form of value, there is a pre-eminently satisfying\nelement in it, in the face of which all desire, all self-seeking fade\naway.\n\nAll forms of beauty which appeal to man, by reason of the \u00e6sthetic\nfunction, are in reality also attempts on his part to realise the ideal.\nBeauty is the symbol of perfection in being. Therefore beauty is\ninviolable; it is static and not dynamic; so that any alteration with\nregard to it upsets and annuls the idea of it. The desire of personal\nworthiness, the love of perfection, materialise in the idea of beauty.\nAnd so the beauty of nature is born, a beauty that the criminal can\nnever know, as ethics first create nature. Thus it is that nature always\nand everywhere, in its greatest and smallest forms, gives the impression\nof perfection. The natural law is only the mortal symbol of the moral\nlaw, as natural beauty is the manifestation of nobility of the soul;\nlogic thus becomes the embodiment of ethics! Just as love creates a new\nwoman for man instead of the real woman, so art, the eroticism of the\nAll, creates out of chaos the plenitude of forms in the universe; and\njust as there is no natural beauty without form, without a law of\nnature, so also there is no art without form, no artistic beauty which\ndoes not conform to the laws of art. Natural beauty is no less a\nrealisation of artistic beauty than the natural law is the fulfilment of\nthe moral law, the natural reflection of that harmony whose image is\nenthroned in the soul of man. The nature which the artist regards as his\nteacher, is the law which he creates out of his own being.\n\nI return to my own theme from these analyses of art, which are no more\nthan elaborations of the thoughts of Kant and Schelling (and of Schiller\nwriting under their influence). The main proposition for which I have\nargued is that man\u2019s belief in the morality of woman, his projection of\nhis own soul upon her, and his conception of the woman as beautiful, are\none and the same thing, the second being the sensuous side of the first.\n\nIt is thus intelligible, although an inversion of the truth, when, in\nmorality, a beautiful soul is spoken of, or when, following Shaftesbury\nand Herbart, ethics are subordinated to \u00e6sthetics; following Socrates\nand Plato we may identify the good and the beautiful, but we must not\nforget that beauty is only a bodily image in which morality tries to\nrepresent itself, that all \u00e6sthetics are created by ethics. Every\nindividual and temporal presentation of this attempted incarnation must\nnecessarily be illusory, and can have no more than a fictitious reality.\nAnd so all individual cases of beauty are impermanent; the love that is\ndirected to a woman must perish with the age of the woman. The idea of\nbeauty is the idea of nature and is permanent, whilst every beautiful\nthing, every part of nature, is perishable. The eternal can realise\nitself in the limited and the concrete only by an illusion; it is\nself-deception to seek the fulness of love in a woman. As all love that\nattaches itself to a person must be impermanent, the love of woman is\ndoomed to unhappiness. All such love has this source of failure inherent\nin it. It is an heroic attempt to seek for permanent worth where there\nis no worth. The love that is attached to enduring worth is attached to\nthe absolute, to the idea of God, whether that idea be a pantheistic\nconception of enduring nature, or remain transcendental; the love that\nattaches itself to an individual thing, as to a woman, must fail.\n\nI have already partly explained why man takes this burden on himself.\nJust as hatred is a projection of our own evil qualities on other\npersons in order that we may stand apart from them and hate them; just\nas the devil was invented to serve as a vehicle of all the evil impulses\nin man; so love has the purpose of helping man in his battle for good,\nwhen he feels that he himself is not strong enough. Love and hate are\nalike forms of cowardice. In hate we picture to ourselves that our own\nhateful qualities exist in another, and by so doing we feel ourselves\npartly freed from them. In love we project what is good in us, and so\nhaving created a good and an evil image we are more able to compare and\nvalue them.\n\nLovers seek their own souls in the loved ones, and so love is free from\nthe limits I described in the first part of this book, not being bound\ndown by the conditions of merely sexual attraction. In spite of their\nreal opposition, there is an analogy between erotics and sexuality.\nSexuality uses the woman as the means to produce pleasure and children\nof the body; erotics use her as the means to create worth and children\nof the soul. A little understood conception of Plato is full of the\ndeepest meaning: that love is not directed towards beauty, but towards\nthe procreation of beauty; that it seeks to win immortality for the\nthings of the mind, just as the lower sexual impulse is directed towards\nthe perpetuation of the species.\n\nIt is more than a merely formal analogy, a superficial, verbal\nresemblance, to speak of the fruitfulness of the mind, of its conception\nand reproduction, or, in the words of Plato, to speak of the children of\nthe soul. As bodily sexuality is the effort of an organic being to\nperpetuate its own form, so love is the attempt to make permanent one\u2019s\nown soul or individuality. Sexuality and love are alike the effort to\nrealise oneself, the one by a bodily image, the other by an image of the\nsoul. But it is only the man of genius who can approach this entirely\nunsensuous love, and it is only he who seeks to produce eternal children\nin whom his deepest nature shall live for ever.\n\nThe parallel may be carried further. Since Novalis first called\nattention to it, many have insisted on the association between sexual\ndesire and cruelty. All that is born of woman must die. Reproduction,\nbirth, and death are indissolubly associated; the thought of untimely\ndeath awakens sexual desire in its fiercest form, as the determination\nto reproduce oneself. And so sexual union, considered ethically,\npsychologically, and biologically, is allied to murder; it is the\nnegation of the woman and the man; in its extreme case it robs them of\ntheir consciousness to give life to the child. The highest form of\neroticism, as much as the lowest form of sexuality, uses the woman not\nfor herself but as means to an end--to preserve the individuality of the\nartist. The artist has used the woman merely as the screen on which to\nproject his own idea.\n\nThe real psychology of the loved woman is always a matter of\nindifference. In the moment when a man loves a woman, he neither\nunderstands her nor wishes to understand her, although understanding is\nthe only moral basis of association in mankind. A human being cannot\nlove another that he fully understands, because he would then\nnecessarily see the imperfections which are an inevitable part of the\nhuman individual, and love can attach itself only to perfection. Love of\na woman is possible only when it does not consider her real qualities,\nand so is able to replace the actual psychical reality by a different\nand quite imaginary reality. The attempt to realise one\u2019s ideal in a\nwoman, instead of the woman herself, is a necessary destruction of the\nempirical personality of the woman. And so the attempt is cruel to the\nwoman; it is the egoism of love that disregards the woman, and cares\nnothing for her real inner life.\n\nThus the parallel between sexuality and love is complete. Love is\nmurder. The sexual impulse destroys the body and mind of the woman, and\nthe psychical eroticism destroys her psychical existence. Ordinary\nsexuality regards the woman only as a means of gratifying passion or of\nbegetting children. The higher eroticism is merciless to the woman,\nrequiring her to be merely the vehicle of a projected personality, or\nthe mother of psychical children. Love is not only anti-logical, as it\ndenies the objective truth of the woman and requires only an illusory\nimage of her, but it is anti-ethical with regard to her.\n\nI am far from despising the heights to which this eroticism may reach,\nas, for instance, in Madonna worship. Who could blind his eyes to the\namazing phenomenon presented by Dante? It was an extraordinary\ntransference of his own ideal to the person of a concrete woman whom the\nartist had seen only once and when she was a young girl, and who for all\nhe knew might have grown up into a Xantippe. The complete neglect of\nwhatever worth the woman herself might have had, in order that she might\nbetter serve as the vehicle of his projected conception of worthiness,\nwas never more clearly exhibited. And the three-fold immorality of this\nhigher eroticism becomes more plain than ever. It is an unlimited\nselfishness with regard to the actual woman, as she is wholly rejected\nfor the ideal woman. It is a felony towards the lover himself, inasmuch\nas he detaches virtue and worthiness from himself; and it is a\ndeliberate turning away from the truth, a preferring of sham to reality.\n\nThe last form in which the immorality reveals itself is that love\nprevents the worthlessness of woman from being realised, inasmuch as it\nalways replaced her by an imaginary projection. Madonna worship itself\nis fundamentally immoral, inasmuch as it is a shutting of the eyes to\ntruth. The Madonna worship of the great artists is a destruction of\nwoman, and is possible only by a complete neglect of the women as they\nexist in experience, a replacement of actuality by a symbol, a\nre-creation of woman to serve the purposes of man, and a murder of woman\nas she exists.\n\nWhen a particular man attracts a particular woman the influence is not\nhis beauty. Only man has an instinct for beauty, and the ideals of both\nmanly beauty and of womanly beauty have been created by man, not by\nwoman. The qualities that appeal to a woman are the signs of developed\nsexuality; those that repel her are the qualities of the higher mind.\nWoman is essentially a phallus worshipper, and her worship is permeated\nwith a fear like that of a bird for a snake, of a man for the fabled\nMedusa head, as she feels that the object of her adoration is the power\nthat will destroy her.\n\nThe course of my argument is now apparent. As logic and ethics have a\nrelation only to man, it was not to be expected that woman would stand\nin any better position with regard to \u00e6sthetics. \u00c6sthetics and logic are\nclosely interconnected, as is apparent in philosophy, in mathematics, in\nartistic work, and in music. I have now shown the intimate relation of\n\u00e6sthetics to ethics. As Kant showed, \u00e6sthetics, just as much as ethics\nand logic, depend on the free will of the subject. As the woman has not\nfree will, she cannot have the faculty of projecting beauty outside\nherself.\n\nThe foregoing involves the proposition that woman cannot love. Women\nhave made no ideal of man to correspond with the male conception of the\nMadonna. What woman requires from man is not purity, chastity, morality,\nbut something else. Woman is incapable of desiring virtue in a man.\n\nIt is almost an insoluble riddle that woman, herself incapable of love,\nshould attract the love of man. It has seemed to me a possible myth or\nparable, that in the beginning, when men became men by some miraculous\nact of God, a soul was bestowed only on them. Men, when they love, are\npartly conscious of this deep injustice to woman, and make the fruitless\nbut heroic effort to give her their own soul. But such a speculation is\noutside the limits of either science or philosophy.\n\nI have now shown what woman does not wish; there remains to show what\nshe does wish, and how this wish is diametrically opposed to the will of\nman.\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nTHE NATURE OF WOMAN AND HER SIGNIFICANCE IN THE UNIVERSE\n\n  \u201cErst Mann und Weib zusammen\n  Machen den Menschen aus.\u201d--KANT.\n\nThe further we go in the analysis of woman\u2019s claim to esteem the more we\nmust deny her of what is lofty and noble, great and beautiful. As this\nchapter is about to take the deciding and most extreme step in that\ndirection, I should like to make a few remarks as to my position. The\nlast thing I wish to advocate is the Asiatic standpoint with regard to\nthe treatment of women. Those who have carefully followed my remarks as\nto the injustice that all forms of sexuality and erotics visit on woman\nwill surely see that this work is not meant to plead for the harem. But\nit is quite possible to desire the legal equality of men and women\nwithout believing in their moral and intellectual equality, just as in\ncondemning to the utmost any harshness in the male treatment of the\nfemale sex, one does not overlook the tremendous, cosmic, contrast and\norganic differences between them. There are no men in whom there is no\ntrace of the transcendent, who are altogether bad; and there is no woman\nof whom that could truly be said. However degraded a man may be, he is\nimmeasurably above the most superior woman, so much so that comparison\nand classification of the two are impossible; but even so, no one has\nany right to denounce or defame woman, however inferior she must be\nconsidered. A true adjustment of the claims for legal equality can be\nundertaken on no other basis than the recognition of a complete,\ndeep-seated polar opposition of the sexes. I trust that I may escape\nconfusion of my views as to woman with the superficial doctrine of P. J.\nM\u00f6bius--a doctrine only interesting as a brave reaction against the\ngeneral tendency. Women are not \u201cphysiologically weak-minded,\u201d and I\ncannot share the view that women of conspicuous ability are to be\nregarded as morbid specimens.\n\nFrom a moral point of view one should only be glad to recognise in these\nwomen (who are always more masculine than the rest) the exact opposite\nof degeneration, that is to say, it must be acknowledged that they have\nmade a step forward and gained a victory over themselves; from the\nbiological standpoint they are just as little or as much phenomena of\ndegeneration as are womanish men (unethically considered). Intermediate\nsexual forms are normal, not pathological phenomena, in all classes of\norganisms, and their appearance is no proof of physical decadence.\n\nWoman is neither high-minded nor low-minded, strong-minded nor\nweak-minded. She is the opposite of all these. Mind cannot be predicated\nof her at all; she is mindless. That, however, does not imply\nweak-mindedness in the ordinary sense of the term, the absence of the\ncapacity to \u201cget her bearings\u201d in ordinary everyday life. Cunning,\ncalculation, \u201ccleverness,\u201d are much more usual and constant in the woman\nthan in the man, if there be a personal selfish end in view. A woman is\nnever so stupid as a man can be.\n\nBut has woman no meaning at all? Has she no general purpose in the\nscheme of the world? Has she not a destiny; and, in spite of all her\nsenselessness and emptiness, a significance in the universe?\n\nHas she a mission, or is her existence an accident and an absurdity?\n\nIn order to understand her meaning, it is necessary to start from a\nphenomenon which, although old and well recognised, has never received\nits proper meed of consideration. It is from nothing more nor less than\nthe phenomenon of _match-making_ from which we may be able to infer\nmost correctly the real nature of woman.\n\nIts analysis shows it to be the force which brings together and helps\nforward two people in their knowledge of one another, which helps them\nto a sexual union, whether in the form of marriage or not. This desire\nto bring about an understanding between two people is possessed by all\nwomen from their earliest childhood; the very youngest girls are always\nready to act as messengers for their sisters\u2019 lovers. And if the\ninstinct of match-making can be indulged in only after the particular\nwoman in question has brought about her own consummation in marriage, it\nis none the less present before that time, and the only things which are\nat work against it are her jealousy of her contemporaries, and her\nanxiety about their chances with regard to her lover, until she has\nfinally secured him by reason of her money, her social position, and so\nforth.\n\nAs soon as women have got rid of their own case by their own marriage,\nthey hasten to help the sons and daughters of their acquaintances to\nmarry. The fact that older women, in whom the desire for sexual\nsatisfaction has died out, are such match-makers is so fully recognised\nthat the idea has wrongly spread that they are the only real\nmatch-makers.\n\nThey urge not only women but men to marry, a man\u2019s own mother often\nbeing the most active and persistent advocate of his marriage. It is the\ndesire and purpose of every mother to see her son married, without any\nthought of his individual taste; a wish which some have been blind\nenough to regard as another charm in maternal love, of which such a poor\naccount was given in an earlier chapter. It is possible that many\nmothers may hope that their sons should obtain permanent happiness\nthrough marriage, however unfit they may be for it; but undoubtedly this\nhope is absent with the majority, and in any case it is the match-making\ninstinct, the sheer objection to bachelordom, which is the strongest\nmotive of all.\n\nIt is clear that women obey a purely instinctive, inherent impulse,\nwhen they try to get their daughters married.\n\nIt is certainly not for logical, and only in a small degree for material\nreasons, that they go to such lengths to attain their ends, and it is\ncertainly not because of any desire expressed by their daughters (very\noften it is in direct opposition to the girl\u2019s choice); and since the\nmatch-making instinct is not confined to the members of a woman\u2019s own\nfamily, it is impossible to speak of it as being part of the\n\u201caltruistic\u201d or \u201cmoral\u201d attitude of maternal love; although most women\nif they were charged with match-making projects would undoubtedly answer\n\u201cthat it is their duty to think of the future welfare of their dear\nchildren.\u201d\n\nA mother makes no difference in arranging a marriage for her own\ndaughter and for any other girl, and is just as glad to do it for the\nlatter if it does not interfere with the interests of her own family; it\nis the same thing, match-making throughout, and there is no\npsychological difference in making a match for her own daughter and\ndoing the same thing for a stranger. I would even go so far as to say\nthat a mother is not inconsolable if a stranger, however common and\nundesirable, desires and seduces her daughter.\n\nThe attitude of one sex to certain traits of the other can often be\napplied as a criterion as to how far certain peculiarities of character\nare exclusively the property of the one sex or are shared by the other.\nSo far, we have had to deny to women many characters which they would\ngladly claim, but which are exclusively masculine; in match-making,\nhowever, we have a characteristic which is really and exclusively\nfeminine, the exceptions being either in the case of very womanish men\nor else special instances which will be fully dealt with later on, in\nchap. xiii. Every real man will have nothing to do with this instinct in\nhis wife, even when his own daughters, whom he would gladly see settled\nin life, are concerned; he dislikes and despises the whole business, and\nleaves it entirely to his wife, as being altogether in her province.\nThis is a striking instance of a purely feminine psychical\ncharacteristic, being not only unattractive to a man, but even\nrepulsive to him when he is aware of it: while the male characteristics\nin themselves are sufficient to please the female, man has to denude\nwoman of hers before he can love her.\n\nBut the match-making instinct exerts a much deeper and more important\ninfluence on the nature of woman than can be gathered from the little I\nhave said on this subject. I wish now to draw attention to woman\u2019s\nattitude at a play: she is always waiting to see if the hero and\nheroine, the lovers in the piece, will quarrel. This is nothing but\nmatch-making, and psychologically does not differ a hair from it: it is\nthe ever present desire to see the man and woman united. But that is not\nall; the tremendous excitement with which women await the crucial point\nin a decent or indecent book is due to nothing less than the desire to\nsee the sexual union of the principal characters, and is coupled with an\nactual excitation at the thought, and positive appreciation of the force\nwhich is behind sexual union. It is not possible to state this formally\nand logically, the only thing is to try and understand how it is that\nthe two things are psychologically one with women. The mother\u2019s\nexcitement on her daughter\u2019s wedding-day is of the same quality as that\nengendered by reading a story by Pr\u00e9vost, or Sudermann\u2019s \u201cKatzensteg.\u201d\nIt is quite true that men are very interested by novels which end in\nsexual union, but in quite a different way from women; they thoroughly\nappreciate the sexual act in imagination, but they do not follow the\ngradual approach of the two people concerned from the very beginning;\nand their interest does not grow, as woman\u2019s does, in constant\nproportion to the reciprocal value which the two people have for one\nanother.\n\nThe breathless pleasure with which the various obstacles are overcome,\nthe feeling of disappointment at each thwarting of the sexual purpose,\nis altogether womanish and unmanly; but it is always present with woman.\nShe is continually on the watch for sexual developments, whether in real\nlife or in literature. Has no one ever wondered why women are so keen\nand \u201cdisinterested\u201d about bringing other men and women together? The\nsatisfaction they derive from it arises from a personal stimulus at the\nthought of the sexual union of others.\n\nBut the full extent to which match-making influences the point of view\nof all women is not yet fully grasped. On a summer evening when lovers\nmay be seen in dark corners of public places, or on the seats and banks\nround about, it is always the women who wilfully and curiously try to\nsee what is happening, whilst men who have to pass that way do so\nunwillingly, looking the other way, because of a sense of intrusion.\nJust in the same way it is women who turn in the streets to look at\nnearly every couple they meet, and gaze after them. This espionage and\nturning round are none the less \u201cmatch-making,\u201d because they are\nsub-conscious acts. If a man does not want to see a thing he turns his\nback on it, and does not look round; but women are glad to see two\npeople in love with one another, and take pleasure in surprising them in\ntheir love-making, because of their innate and super-personal desire\nthat sexual union should occur.\n\nBut man, as was seen much further back, only cares for that which has a\npositive value. A woman when she sees two lovers together is always\nawaiting developments, that is to say, she expects, anticipates, hopes,\nand desires an outcome. I know an elderly married woman who listened\nexpectantly at the door for some time, when a servant of hers had\nallowed her sweetheart to come into her room, before she walked in and\ngave her notice.\n\nThe idea of union is always eagerly grasped and never repelled whatever\nform it may take (even where animals are concerned).[18] She experiences\nno disgust at the nauseating details of the subject, and makes no\nattempt to think of anything pleasanter. This accounts for a great deal\nof what is so apparently mysterious in the psychic life of woman. Her\nwish for the activity of her own sexual life is her strongest impulse,\nbut it is only a special case of her deep, her only vital interest, the\ninterest that sexual unions shall take place; the wish that as much of\nit as possible shall occur, in all cases, places, and times.\n\n  [18] The one apparent exception to this rule is fully discussed in\n  this chapter.\n\nThis universal desire may either be concentrated on the act itself or on\nthe (possible) child; in the first case, the woman is of the prostitute\ntype and participates merely for the sake of the act; in the second, she\nis of the mother type, but not merely with the idea of bearing children\nherself; she desires that every marriage she knows of or has helped to\nbring about should be fruitful, and the nearer she is to the absolute\nmother the more conspicuous is this idea; the real mother is also the\nreal grandmother (even if she remains a virgin; Johann Tesman\u2019s\nmarvellous portrayal of \u201cTante Jule\u201d in Ibsen\u2019s \u201cHedda Gabler\u201d is an\nexample of what I mean). Every real mother has the same purpose, that of\nhelping on matrimony; she is the mother of all mankind; she welcomes\nevery pregnancy.\n\nThe prostitute does not want other women to be with child, but to be\nprostitutes like herself.\n\nA woman\u2019s relations with married men show how she subordinates her own\nsexuality to her match-making instinct, the latter being the dominant\npower.\n\nWoman objects more strongly to bachelordom than anything else, because\nshe is altogether a match-maker, and this makes her try to get men to\nmarry; but if a man is already married she at once loses most of her\ninterest in him, however much she liked him before. If the woman herself\nis already married, that is to say, when each man she meets is not a\npossible solution to her own fate, one would not imagine that a married\nman would find less favour with her because he was married than when he\nwas a bachelor if the woman herself is unfaithful; but women seldom\ncarry on an intrigue with another woman\u2019s husband, except when they wish\nto triumph over her by making him neglect her. This shows that the\ndisposition of woman is towards the fact of pairing; when men are\nalready paired she seldom attempts to make them unfaithful, for the fact\nof their being paired has satisfied her instinct.\n\nThis match-making is the most common characteristic of the human female;\nthe wish to become a mother-in-law is much more general than even the\ndesire to become a mother, the intensity and extent of which is usually\nover-rated.\n\nMy readers may possibly not understand the emphasis I have laid on a\nphenomenon which is usually looked upon as amusing as it is disgusting;\nand it may be thought that I have given undue importance to it.\n\nBut let us see why I have done so. Match-making is essentially the\nphenomenon of all others which gives us the key to the nature of woman,\nand we must not, as has always been the case, merely acknowledge the\nfact and pass on, but we should try to analyse and explain it. One of\nour commonest phrases runs: \u201cEvery woman is a bit of a match-maker.\u201d\n\nBut we must remember that in this, and nothing else, lies the actual\nessence of woman. After mature consideration of the most varied types of\nwomen and with due regard to the special classes besides those which I\nhave discussed, I am of opinion that the only positively general female\ncharacteristic is that of match-making, that is, her uniform willingness\nto further the idea of sexual union.\n\nAny definition of the nature of woman which goes no further than to\ndeclare that she has the strong instinct for her own union would be too\nnarrow; any definition that would link her instincts to the child or to\nthe husband, or to both, would be too wide. The most general and\ncomprehensive statement of the nature of woman is that it is completely\nadapted and disposed for the special mission of aiding and abetting the\nbodily union of the sexes. All women are match-makers, and this property\nof the woman to be the advocate of the idea of pairing is the only one\nwhich is found in women of all ages, in young girls, in adults, and in\nthe aged. The old woman is no longer interested in her own union, but\nshe devotes herself to the pairing of others. This habit of the old\nwoman is nothing new, it is only the continuance of her enduring\ninstinct surviving the complications that were caused when her personal\ninterests came into conflict with her general desire; it is the now\nunselfish pursuit of the impersonal idea.\n\nIt is convenient to recapitulate at this point what my investigation has\nshown as to the sexuality of women. I have shown that woman is engrossed\nexclusively by sexuality, not intermittently, but throughout her life;\nthat her whole being, bodily and mental, is nothing but sexuality\nitself. I added, moreover, that she was so constituted that her whole\nbody and being continually were in sexual relations with her\nenvironment, and that just as the sexual organs were the centre of woman\nphysically, so the sexual idea was the centre of her mental nature. The\nidea of pairing is the only conception which has positive worth for\nwomen. The woman is the bearer of the thought of the continuity of the\nspecies. The high value which she attaches to the idea of pairing is not\nselfish and individual, it is super-individual, and, if I may be\nforgiven the desecration of the phrase, it is the transcendental\nfunction of woman. And just as femaleness is no more than the embodiment\nof the idea of pairing, so is it sexuality in the abstract. Pairing is\nthe supreme good for the woman; she seeks to effect it always and\neverywhere. Her personal sexuality is only a special case of this\nuniversal, generalised, impersonal instinct.\n\nThe effort of woman to realise this idea of pairing is so fundamentally\nopposed to that conception of innocence and purity, the higher virginity\nwhich man\u2019s erotic nature has demanded from women, that not all his\nerotic incense would have obscured her real nature but for one factor. I\nhave now to explain this factor which has veiled from man the true\nnature of woman, and which in itself is one of the deepest problems of\nwoman, I mean her absolute duplicity. Her pairing instinct and her\nduplicity, the latter so great as to conceal even from woman herself\nwhat is the real essence of her nature, must be explained together.\n\nAll that may have seemed like clear gain is now again called into\nquestion. Self-observation was found lacking in women, and yet there\ncertainly are women who observe very closely all that happens to them.\nThey were denied the love of truth, and yet one knows many women who\nwould not tell a lie for anything. It has been said that they are\nlacking in consciousness of guilt; but there are many women who reproach\nthemselves bitterly for most trifling matters, besides \u201cpenitents\u201d who\nmortify their flesh. Modesty was left to man, but what is to be said of\nthe womanly modesty, that bashfulness, which, according to Hamerling,\nonly women have? Is there no foundation for the way in which the idea\nhas grown and found such acceptance? And then again: Can religion be\nabsent, in spite of so many \u201cprofessing\u201d women? Are we to exclude all\nwomen from the moral purity, all the womanly virtues, which poets and\nhistorians have ascribed to her? Are we to say that woman is merely\nsexual, that sexuality only receives its proper due from her when it is\nso well known that women are shocked at the slightest allusion to sexual\nmatters, that instead of giving way to it they are often irritated and\ndisgusted at the idea of impurity, and quite often detest sexual union\nfor themselves and regard it just as many men do?\n\nIt is, of course, manifest that one and the same point is bound up in\nall these antitheses, and on the answer given to them depends the final\nand decisive judgment on woman. And it is clear that if only one single\nfemale creature were really asexual, or could be shown to have a real\nrelationship to the idea of personal moral worth, everything that I have\nsaid about woman, its general value as psychically characteristic of the\nsex, would be irretrievably demolished, and the whole position which\nthis book has taken up would be shattered at one blow.\n\nThese apparently contradictory phenomena must be satisfactorily\nexplained, and it must be shown that what is at the bottom of it all and\nmakes it seem so equivocal arises from the very nature of woman which I\nhave been trying to explain all along.\n\nIn order to understand these fallacious contradictions one must first of\nall remember the tremendous \u201caccessibility,\u201d to use another word, the\n\u201cimpressionability,\u201d of women. Their extraordinary aptitude for anything\nnew, and their easy acceptance of other people\u2019s views have not yet been\nsufficiently emphasised in this book.\n\nAs a rule, the woman adapts herself to the man, his views become hers,\nhis likes and dislikes are shared by her, every word he says is an\nincentive to her, and the stronger his sexual influence on her the more\nthis is so. Woman does not perceive that this influence which man has on\nher causes her to deviate from the line of her own development; she does\nnot look upon it as a sort of unwarrantable intrusion; she does not try\nto shake off what is really an invasion of her private life; she is not\nashamed of being receptive; on the contrary, she is really pleased when\nshe can be so, and prefers man to mould her mentally. She rejoices in\nbeing dependent, and her expectations from man resolve themselves into\nthe moment when she may be perfectly passive.\n\nBut it is not only from her lover (although she would like that best),\nbut also from her father and mother, uncles and aunts, brothers and\nsisters, near relations and distant acquaintances, that a woman takes\nwhat she thinks and believes, being only too glad to get her opinions\n\u201cready made.\u201d\n\nIt is not only inexperienced girls but even elderly and married women\nwho copy each other in everything, from the nice new dress or pretty\ncoiffure down to the places where they get their things, and the very\nrecipes by which they cook.\n\nAnd it never seems to occur to them that they are doing something\nderogatory on their part, as it ought to do if they possessed an\nindividuality of their own and strove to work out their own salvation. A\nwoman\u2019s thoughts and actions have no definite, independent relations to\nthings in themselves; they are not the result of the reaction of her\nindividuality to the world. They accept what is imposed on them gladly,\nand adhere to it with the greatest firmness. That is why woman is so\nintolerant when there has been a breach of conventional laws. I must\nquote an amusing instance, bearing on this side of woman\u2019s character,\nfrom Herbert Spencer. It is the custom in various tribes of Indians in\nNorth and South America for the men to hunt and fight and leave all the\nlaborious and menial tasks to their wives. The Dakotan women are so\nimbued with the idea of the reasonableness and fitness of this\narrangement that, instead of feeling injured by it, the greatest insult\nthat one of these women can offer to another would be implied in some\nsuch words as follows: \u201cYou disgraceful creature.... I saw your husband\ncarrying home wood for the fires. What was his wife doing that he had to\ndemean himself by doing woman\u2019s work?\u201d\n\nThe extraordinary way in which woman can be influenced by external\nagencies is similar in its nature to her suggestibility, which is far\ngreater and more general than man\u2019s; they are both in accordance with\nwoman\u2019s desire to play the passive and never the active part in the\nsexual act and all that leads to it.[19]\n\n  [19] The quiescent, inactive, large egg-cells are sought out by the\n  mobile, active, and slender spermatozoa.\n\nIt is the universal passivity of woman\u2019s nature which makes her accept\nand assume man\u2019s valuations of things, although these are utterly at\nvariance with her nature. The way in which woman can be impregnated with\nthe masculine point of view, the saturation of her innermost thoughts\nwith a foreign element, her false recognition of morality, which cannot\nbe called hypocrisy because it does not conceal anything anti-moral, her\nassumption and practise of things which in themselves are not in her\nrealm, are all very well if the woman does not try to use her own\njudgment, and they succeed in keeping up the fiction of her superior\nmorality. Complications first arise when these acquired valuations come\ninto collision with the only inborn, genuine, and universally feminine\nvaluation, the supreme value she sets on pairing.\n\nWoman\u2019s acceptance of pairing as the supreme good is quite unconscious\non her part. As she has no sense of individuality she has nothing to\ncontrast with pairing; and so, unlike man, she cannot realise its\nsignificance, or even notice the presence in herself of this instinct.\n\nNo woman knows, or ever has known, or ever will know, what she does when\nshe enters into association with man. Femaleness is identical with\npairing, and a woman would have to get outside herself in order to see\nand understand that she pairs. Thus it is that the deepest desire of\nwoman, all that she means, and all that she is, remain unrecognised by\nher. There is nothing, then, to prevent the male negative valuation of\npairing overshadowing the female positive valuation of it in the\nconsciousness of the woman. The susceptibility of woman is so great that\nshe can even act in opposition to what she is, to the one thing on which\nshe really sets a positive value!\n\nBut the imposture which she enacts when she allows herself to be\nincorporated with man\u2019s opinions of sexuality and shamelessness, even of\nthe imposture itself, and when she uses the masculine standard for her\nactions, is such a colossal fraud that she is never conscious of it; she\nhas acquired a second nature, without even guessing that it is not her\nreal one; she takes herself seriously, believes she is something and\nthat she believes in something; she is convinced of the sincerity and\noriginality of her moralisings and opinions; the lie is as deeply rooted\nas that; it is organic. I cannot do better than speak of the ontological\nuntruthfulness of woman.\n\nWolfram von Eschenbach says of his hero:\n\n        \u201c... So keusch und rein\n  Ruht\u2019 er bei seiner K\u00f6nigin,\n  Dass kein Gen\u00fcgen f\u00e4nd\u2019 darin\n  So manches Weib beim lieben Mann.\n  Dass doch so manche in Gedanken\n  Zur \u00dcppigkeit will \u00fcberschwanken,\n  Die sonst sich spr\u00f6de zeigen kann!\n  Vor Fremden z\u00fcchtig sie erscheinen,\n  Doch ist des Herzens tiefstes Meinen\n  Das Widerspiel vom \u00e4ussern Schein.\u201d\n\nWolfram indicates clearly enough what is at the bottom of woman\u2019s\nheart, but he does not say all that is to be said. Women deceive\nthemselves as well as others on this point. One cannot artificially\nsuppress and supplant one\u2019s real nature, the physical as well as the\nother side, without something happening. The hygienic penalty that must\nbe paid for woman\u2019s denial of her real nature is hysteria.\n\nOf all the neurotic and psychic phenomena, those of hysteria are the\nmost fascinating for psychologists; they represent a far more difficult\nand, therefore, a more interesting study than those observed in\nmelancholia or in simple paranoia.\n\nThe majority of psychiatrists have a distrust of psychological analyses\nwhich it is not easy for them to shake off; every statement of\npathological alteration of tissues or intoxication by certain means is\nfor them _a limine_ credible; it is only in psychical matters that they\nrefuse to recognise a primary cause. But since no reason has so far been\ngiven why psychical phenomena should be of importance secondary to\nphysical phenomena, it is quite justifiable to disregard such\nprejudices.\n\nIt is quite possible--there is nothing to prevent it being so--that a\nvery great deal, perhaps everything, may depend on the proper\ninterpretation of the \u201cpsychical mechanism\u201d of hysteria. That this is so\nis proved by the fact that the few conclusions of any value with\nreference to hysteria so far discovered have been arrived at in this\nway; the investigations carried out by Pierre Janet, Oskar Vogt, and\nparticularly by J. Breuer and S. Freud, show what I mean. All good work\non hysteria will undoubtedly follow the lines these men have worked on;\nthat is to say, by investigation of the psychological processes which\nled up to the disease.\n\nI believe myself that what may be called a psychological sexual\ntraumatism is at the root of hysteria. The typical picture of a\nhysterical case is not very different from the following: A woman has\nalways accepted the male views on sexual matters; they are in reality\ntotally foreign to her nature, and sometime, by some chance, out of the\nconflict between what her nature asserts to be true and what she has\nalways accepted as true and believed to be true, there comes what may be\ncalled a \u201cwounding of the mind.\u201d It is thus possible for the person\naffected to declare a sexual desire to be an \u201cextraneous body in her\nconsciousness,\u201d a sensation which she _thinks_ she detests, but which in\nreality has its origin in her own nature. The tremendous intensity with\nwhich she endeavours to suppress the desire (and which only serves to\nincrease it) so that she may the more vehemently and indignantly reject\nthe thought--these are the alternations which are seen in hysteria. And\nthe chronic untruthfulness of woman becomes acute if the woman has ever\nallowed herself to be imbued with man\u2019s ethically negative valuation of\nsexuality. It is well known that hysterical women manifest the strongest\nsuggestibility with men. Hysteria is the organic crisis of the organic\nuntruthfulness of woman.\n\nI do not deny that there are hysterical men, but these are comparatively\nfew; and since man\u2019s psychic possibilities are endless, that of becoming\n\u201cfemale\u201d is amongst them, and, therefore, he can be hysterical. There\nare undoubtedly many untruthful men, but in them the crisis takes a\ndifferent form, man\u2019s untruthfulness being of a different kind and never\nso hopeless in character as woman\u2019s.\n\nThis examination into the organic untruthfulness of woman, into her\ninability to be honest about herself which alone makes it possible for\nher to think that she thinks what is really totally opposed to her\nnature, appears to me to offer a satisfactory explanation of those\ndifficulties which the \u00e6tiology of hysteria present.\n\nHysteria shows that untruthfulness, however far it may reach, cannot\nsuppress everything. By education or environment woman adopts a whole\nsystem of ideas and valuations which are foreign to her, or, rather, has\npatiently submitted to have them impressed on her; and it would need a\ntremendous shock to get rid of this strongly-rooted psychical\ncomplexity, and to transplant woman to that condition of intellectual\nhelplessness which is so characteristic of hysteria.\n\nAn extraordinary shock suffices to destroy the artificial structure, and\nto place woman in the arena to undertake a fight between her\nunconscious, oppressed nature, and her certainly conscious but unnatural\nmind. The see-sawing which now begins between the two explains the\nunusual psychic discontinuity during the hysterical phase, the continual\nchanges of mood, none of which are subject to the control of a dominant,\ncentral, controlling nucleus of individuality. It is extraordinary how\nmany contradictions can co-exist in the hysterical. Sometimes they are\nhighly intelligent and able to judge correctly and keenly oppose\nhypnotism and so forth. Then, again, they are excited by most trivial\ncauses, and are most subject to hypnotic trances. Sometimes they are\nabnormally chaste, at other times extremely sensual.\n\nAll this is no longer difficult to explain. The absolute sincerity, the\npainful love of truth, the avoidance of everything sexual, the careful\njudgment, and the strength of will--all these form part of that spurious\npersonality which woman in her passivity has taken upon herself to\nexhibit to herself and to the world at large. Everything that belongs to\nher original temperament and her real sense form that \u201cother self,\u201d that\n\u201cunconscious mind\u201d which can delight in obscurities and which is so open\nto suggestion.\n\nIt has been endeavoured to show that in what is known as the \u201cduplex\u201d\nand \u201cmultiplex personality,\u201d the \u201cdouble conscience,\u201d the \u201cdual ego,\u201d\nlies one of the strongest arguments against the belief in the soul. As a\nmatter of fact, these phenomena are the very reasons why we ought to\nbelieve in a soul. The \u201cdividing up of the personality\u201d is only possible\nwhen there never has been a personality, as with woman. All the\ncelebrated cases which Janet has described in his book, \u201cL\u2019Automatisme\nPsychologique,\u201d concern women, not in a single instance man. It is only\nwoman who, minus soul or an intelligible ego, has not the power to\nbecome conscious of what is in her; who cannot throw the light of truth\non her inmost self; who can by her completely passive inundation by a\nconsciousness belonging to another, allow what is in her own nature to\nbe suppressed by an extraneous element; who can display the hysterical\nphenomena described by Janet. Hysteria is the bankruptcy of this\nsuperficial sham self which has been put on, and the woman becomes for\nthe time being a _tabula rasa_, whilst the working in her of her own\ngenuine nature appears to her as something coming from without. This\napparent \u201csecondary personality,\u201d this \u201cforeign body in the\nconsciousness,\u201d this false self, is, in reality, the true female nature,\nsexuality itself appearing, and a proper understanding of this fact, and\nof the complications that must ensue from the ebbings and flowings of\nthe false, supposed to be true, and the true supposed to be false, lie\nat the root of the most difficult phenomena of hysteria.\n\nWoman\u2019s incapacity for truth--which I hold to be consequent on her lack\nof free will with regard to the truth, in accordance with Kant\u2019s\n\u201cIndeterminism\u201d--conditions her falsity. Any one who has had anything to\ndo with women knows how often they give offhand quite patently untrue\nreasons for what they have said or done, under the momentary necessity\nof answering a question. It is, however, hysterical subjects who are\nmost careful to avoid unveracity (in a most marked and premeditated way\nbefore strangers); but however paradoxical it may sound it is exactly in\nthis that their untruthfulness lies! They do not know that this desire\nfor truth has come to them from outside and is no part of their real\nnature.\n\nThey have slavishly accepted the postulate of morality, and, therefore,\nwish to show at every opportunity, like a good servant, how faithfully\nthey follow instructions.\n\nIt is always suspicious when a man is frequently spoken of as\nexceptionally trustworthy: he must have gone out of his way to let\npeople know it, and it would be safe to wager that in reality he is a\nrogue. No confidence must be placed in the genuineness of hysterical\nmorality, which doctors (no doubt in good faith) often emphasise by\nremarks as to the high moral position of their patients.\n\nI repeat: hysterical patients do not consciously simulate. It can only\nbe made clear to them by suggestion that they actually have been\nsimulating, and all the \u201cconfessions\u201d of the dissimulation can only be\nexplained in the same way. Otherwise they believe in their own natural\nhonesty and morality. Neither are the various things which torture them\nimaginary; it is much more likely that in the fact that they feel them,\nand that the symptoms first disappear with what Breuer calls \u201ccatharsis\u201d\n(the successive bringing to their consciousness of the true causes of\ntheir illness by hypnotism), lies the proof of their organic\nuntruthfulness.\n\nThe self-accusations which hysterical people are so full of are nothing\nbut unconscious dissimulation. The sense of guilt, which is equally\npoignant in great and most trifling things, cannot be genuine; if the\nhysterical self-torturers possessed a standard of morality for\nthemselves and others they would not be so indiscriminate in their\nself-accusations, and not cast as much blame on themselves for a slight\nerror as for real wrong-doing.\n\nThe most distinguishing character of the unconscious untruthfulness of\ntheir self-reproaches is their habit of telling others how wicked they\nare, what terrible things they have done, and then they ask if they (the\nhysterical) are not hopelessly abandoned sort of people. No one who\nreally feels remorse could talk in such a way. The fallacy of\nrepresenting the hysterical as being eminently moral is one which even\nBreuer and Freud have shared. The hysterical simply become imbued with\nmoral ideas which are foreign to them in their normal state. They\nsubordinate themselves to this code, they cease to prove things for\nthemselves, they no longer exercise their own judgment.\n\nProbably these hysterical subjects approach more closely than any other\nnatures to the moral ideal of the social and utilitarian ethics which\nregard a lie as moral if it is for the good of society or of the race.\nHysterical women realise that ideal ontogenetically inasmuch as their\nstandard of morality comes from without, not from within, and\npractically as they appear to act most readily from altruistic motives.\nFor them duty towards others is not merely a special application of duty\ntowards oneself.\n\nThe untruthfulness of the hysterical is proportional to their belief in\ntheir own accuracy. From their complete inability to attain personal\ntruth, to be honest about themselves--the hysterical never think for\nthemselves, they want other people to think about them, they want to\narouse the interest of others--it follows that the hysterical are the\nbest mediums for hypnotic purposes. But any one who allows him or\nherself to be hypnotised is doing the most immoral thing possible. It is\nyielding to complete slavery; it is a renunciation of the will and\nconsciousness; it means allowing another person to do what he likes with\nthe subject. Hypnosis shows how all possibility of truth depends upon\nthe wish to be truthful, but it must be the real wish of the person\nconcerned: when a hypnotised person is told to do something, he does it\nwhen he comes out of the trance, and if asked his reasons will give a\nplausible motive on the spot, not only before others, but he will\njustify his action to himself by quite fanciful reasons. In this we\nhave, so to speak, an experimental proof of Kant\u2019s \u201cEthical Code.\u201d\n\nAll women can be hypnotised and like being hypnotised, but this\nproclivity is exaggerated in hysterical women. Even the memory of\ndefinite events in their life can be destroyed by the mere suggestion of\nthe hypnotiser. Breuer\u2019s experiments on hypnotised patients show clearly\nthat the consciousness of guilt in them is not deeply seated, as\notherwise it could not be got rid of at the mere suggestion of the\nhypnotiser. But the sham conviction of responsibility, so readily\nexhibited by women of hysterical constitution, rapidly disappears at the\nmoment when nature, the sexual impulse, appears to drive through the\nsuperficial restraints. In the hysterical paroxysm what happens is that\nthe woman, while no longer believing it altogether herself, asseverates\nmore and more loudly: \u201cI do not want that at all, some one not really me\nis forcing it on me, but I do not want it at all.\u201d Every stimulation\nfrom outside will now be brought into relation with that demand, which\nas she partly believes, is being forced on her, but which, in reality,\ncorresponds with the deepest wish of her nature. That is why women in a\nhysterical attack are so easily seduced. The \u201cattitudes passionelles\u201d of\nthe hysterical are merely passionate repudiations of sexual desire,\nwhich are loud merely because they are not real, and are more plaintive\nthan at other times because the danger is greater. It is easy to\nunderstand why the sexual experiences of the time preceding puberty play\nso large a part in acute hysteria. The influence of extraneous moral\nviews can be imposed comparatively easily on the child, as they have\nlittle to overcome in the almost unawakened state of the sexual\ninclinations. But, later on, the suppressed, although not wholly\nvanquished, nature lays hold of these old experiences, reinterprets them\nin the light of the new contents of consciousness, and the crisis takes\nplace. The different forms that the paroxysms assume and their shifting\nnature are due very largely to the fact that the subject does not admit\nthe true cause, the presence of a sexual desire, any consciousness of it\nbeing attributed by her to some extraneous influence, some self that is\nnot her \u201creal self.\u201d\n\nMedical observation or interpretation of hysteria is wrong; it allows\nitself to be deceived by the patients, who in turn deceive themselves.\nIt is not the rejecting ego but the rejected which is the true and\noriginal nature of the hysterical patients, however much they pretend to\nthemselves and others that it is foreign to them.\n\nIf the rejecting ego were really their natural ego they could act in\nopposition to the disturbing element which they say is foreign to them,\nand be fully conscious of it, and differentiate and recognise it in\ntheir memory. But the fraud is evident, because the rejecting ego is\nonly borrowed, and they lack the courage to look their own desire in the\nface, although something seems to say that it is the real, inborn, and\nonly powerful one they have. Even the desire itself has no real\nidentity, for it is not seated in a real individual, and, as it is\nsuppressed, leaps, so to speak, from one part of the body to the other.\nIt may be that my attempt at an explanation will be thought fanciful,\nbut at least it appears to be true that the various forms of hysteria\nare one and the same thing. This one thing is what the hysterical\npatient will not admit is part of her, although it is what is pressing\non her. If she were able to ascribe it to herself and criticise it in\nthe way in which she admits trivial matters of another kind, she would\nbe in a measure outside and above her own experiences. The frantic rage\nof hysterical women at what they say is imposed on them by some strange\nwill, whilst it in reality is their own will, shows that they are just\nas much under the domination of sexuality as are non-hysterical women,\nare just as subject to their destiny and incapable of averting it, since\nthey, too, are without any intelligible, free ego.\n\nBut it may be asked, with reason, why all women are not hysterical,\nsince all women are liars? This brings us to a necessary inquiry as to\nthe hysterical constitution. If my theory has been on the right lines,\nit ought to be able to give an answer in accordance with facts.\nAccording to it, the hysterical woman is one who has passively accepted\nin entirety the masculine and conventional valuations instead of\nallowing her own mental character its proper play. The woman who is not\nto be led is the antithesis of the hysterical woman. I must not delay\nover this point; it really belongs to special female characterology. The\nhysterical woman is hysterical because she is servile; mentally she is\nidentical with the maid-servant. Her opposite (who does not really\nexist) is the shrewish dame. So that women may be subdivided into the\nmaid who serves, and the woman who commands.[20]\n\n  [20] We may find the analogy to this in men: there are masculine\n  \u201cservants\u201d who are so by nature, and there is the masculine form of\n  the shrew--_e.g._, the policeman. It is a noticeable fact that a\n  policeman usually finds his sexual complement in the housemaid.\n\nThe servant is born and not made, and there are many women in good\ncircumstances who are \u201cborn servants,\u201d although they never need to put\ntheir rightful position to the test! The servant and the mistress are a\nsort of \u201ccomplete woman\u201d when considered as a \u201cwhole.\u201d[21]\n\n  [21] A real dame would never dream of asking her husband what she was\n  to do, what she is to give him for dinner, &c.; the hysterical woman,\n  on the contrary, is always lacking in ideas, and wants suggestions\n  from others. This is a rough way of indicating the two types.\n\nThe consequences of this theory are fully borne out by experience. The\nXanthippe is the woman who has the least resemblance to the hysterical\ntype. She vents her spleen (which is really the outcome of unsatisfied\nsexual desires) on others, whereas the hysterical woman visits hers on\nherself. The \u201cshrew\u201d detests other women, the \u201cservant\u201d detests herself.\nThe drudge weeps out her woes alone, without really feeling\nlonely--loneliness is identical with morality, and a condition which\nimplies true duality or manifoldness; the shrew hates to be alone\nbecause she must have some one to scold, whilst hysterical women vent\ntheir passion on themselves. The shrew lies openly and boldly but\nwithout knowing it, because it is her nature to think herself always in\nthe right, and she insults those who contradict her. The servant submits\nwonderingly to the demands made of her which are so foreign to her\nnature: the hypocrisy of this pliant acquiescence is apparent in her\nhysterical attacks when the conflict with her own sexual emotions\nbegins. It is because of this receptivity and susceptibility that\nhysteria and the hysterical type of woman are so leniently dealt with:\nit is this type, and not the shrewish type, that will be cited in\nopposition to my views.[22]\n\n  [22] It is the \u201cyielding type\u201d and not the virago type of woman that\n  men think capable of love. Such a woman\u2019s love is only the mental\n  sense of satisfaction aroused by the maleness of some particular man,\n  and, therefore, it is only possible with the hysterical; it has\n  nothing to do with her individual power of loving, and can have\n  nothing to do with it. The bashfulness of woman is also due to her\n  \u201cobsession\u201d by one man; this also causes her neglect of all other men.\n\nUntruthfulness, organic untruthfulness, characterises both types, and\naccordingly all women. It is quite wrong to say that women lie. That\nwould imply that they sometimes speak the truth. Sincerity, _pro foro\ninterno et externo_, is the virtue of all others of which women are\nabsolutely incapable, which is impossible for them!\n\nThe point I am urging is that woman is never genuine at any period of\nher life, not even when she, in hysteria, slavishly accepts the aspect\nof truth laid on her by another, and apparently speaks in accordance\nwith those demands.\n\nA woman can laugh, cry, blush, or even look wicked at will: the shrew,\nwhen she has some object in view; the \u201cmaid,\u201d when she has to make a\ndecision for herself. Men have not the organic and physiological\nqualifications for such dissimulation.\n\nIf we are able to show that the supposed love of truth in these types of\nwoman is no more than their natural hypocrisy in a mask, it is only to\nbe expected that all the other qualities for which woman has been\npraised will suffer under analysis. Her modesty, her self-respect, and\nher religious fervour are loudly acclaimed. Womanly modesty, none the\nless, is nothing but prudery, _i.e._, an extravagant denial and\nrejection of her natural immodesty. Whenever a woman evinces any trace\nof what could really be called modesty, hysteria is certainly answerable\nfor it. The woman who is absolutely unhysterical and not to be\ninfluenced, _i.e._, the absolute shrew, will not be ashamed of any\nreproaches her husband may shower on her, however just; incipient\nhysteria is present when a woman blushes under her husband\u2019s direct\ncensure; but hysteria in its most marked form is present when a woman\nblushes when she is quite alone: it is only then that she may be said to\nbe fully impregnated with the masculine standard of values.\n\nThe women who most nearly approximate to what has been called sexual\nan\u00e6sthesia or frigidity are always hysterical, as Paul Solliers, with\nwhom I entirely agree, discovered. Sexual an\u00e6sthesia is merely one of\nthe many hysterical, that is to say, unreal, simulated forms of\nan\u00e6sthesia. Oskar Vogt, in particular (and general observation has\nconfirmed him), proved that such an\u00e6sthesia does not involve a real\nlack of sensation, but is simply due to an inhibition which keeps\ncertain sensations in check, and excludes them from the consciousness.\n\nIf the an\u00e6sthetised arm of a hypnotised subject is pricked a certain\nnumber of times, and the medium is told to say how many times he has\nbeen pricked, he is able to do so, although otherwise he would not have\nperceived them. So also with sexual frigidity; it is an order given by\nthe controlling force of the super-imposed asexual ideas; but this, like\nall other forms of an\u00e6sthesia, can be counteracted by a sufficiently\nstrong \u201corder.\u201d\n\nThe repulsion to sexuality in general shown by the hysterical woman\ncorresponds in its nature with her insensibility to sexual matters in\nher own case. Such a repulsion, an intense disinclination for everything\nsexual, is really present in many women, and this may be urged as an\nexception to my generalisation as to the universality in woman of the\nmatch-making tendency. But women who are made ill by discovering two\npeople in sexual intercourse are always hysterical. In this we have a\nspecial justification of the theory which holds match-making to be the\ntrue nature of woman, and which looks upon her own sexuality as merely a\nspecial case of it. A woman may be made hysterical not only by a sexual\nsuggestion to herself which she outwardly resists whilst inwardly\nassenting to it, but may be just as much so by the sight of two people\nin sexual intercourse, for, though she thinks the matter has no value\nfor her, her inborn assent to it forces itself through all outward and\nartificial barriers, and overcomes the super-imposed and incorporated\nmethod of thought in which she usually lives. That is to say, she feels\nherself involved in the sexual union of others.\n\nSomething similar takes place in the hysterical \u201cconsciousness of\nguilt,\u201d which has already been spoken about. The absolute shrew never\nfeels herself really in the wrong; the woman who is slightly hysterical\nonly feels so in the presence of men; the woman who is thoroughly\nhysterical feels it in the presence of the particular man who dominates\nher. One cannot prove the existence of a sense of guilt in woman by the\nmortifications to which \u201cdevotees\u201d and \u201cpenitents\u201d subject themselves.\nIt is these extreme cases of self-discipline which make one suspicious.\nDoing penance proves, in most cases, that the doer has not overcome his\nfault, that the sense of guilt has not really entered consciousness; it\nappears really to be much rather an attempt to force repentance from the\noutside, to make up for not really feeling it.\n\nThe difference between the conviction of guilt in hysterical women and\nin men, and the origin of the self-reproaches of the former, are of some\nimportance. When the hysterical woman realises that she has done or\nthought something immoral, she tries to rectify it by some code which\nshe seeks to obey and to substitute in her mind in place of the immoral\nthought. She does not really get rid of the thought which is too deeply\nrooted in her nature; she does not really face it, try to understand it,\nand so purge herself of it. She simply, from point to point, case by\ncase, tries to adhere to the moral code without ever transforming\nherself, reforming her idea. The moral character in the woman is\nelaborated bit by bit; in the male right conduct comes from moral\ncharacter. The vow remodels the whole man; the change takes place in the\nonly possible way, from within outwards, and leads to a real morality\nwhich is not only a justification by works. The morality of the woman is\nmerely superficial and is not real morality.\n\nThe current opinion that woman is religious is equally erroneous. Female\nmysticism, when it is anything more than mere superstition, is either\nthinly veiled sexuality (the identification of the Deity and the lover\nhas been frequently discussed, as, for instance, in Maupassant\u2019s\n\u201cBel-Ami,\u201d or in Hauptmann\u2019s \u201cHannele\u2019s Himmelfahrt\u201d) as in numberless\nspiritualists and theosophists, or it is a mere passive and unconscious\nacceptance of man\u2019s religious views which are clung to the more firmly\nbecause of woman\u2019s natural disinclination for them. The lover is readily\ntransformed into a Saviour; very readily (as is well known to be the\ncase with many nuns) the Saviour becomes the lover. All the great women\nvisionaries known to history were hysterical; the most famous, Santa\nTeresa, was not misnamed \u201cthe patron saint of hysteria.\u201d At any rate, if\nwoman\u2019s religiousness were genuine, and if it proceeded from her own\nnature, she would have done something great in the religious world; but\nshe never has done anything of any importance. I should like to put\nshortly what I take to be the difference between the masculine and\nfeminine creeds; man\u2019s religion consists in a supreme belief in himself,\nwoman\u2019s in a supreme belief in other people.\n\nThere is left to consider the self-respect which is often described as\nbeing so highly developed in the hysterical. That it is only man\u2019s\nself-respect which has been so thoroughly forced into woman, is clear\nfrom its nature and the way it shows itself, as Vogt, who extended and\nverified experiments first made by Freud, discovered from self-respect\nunder hypnotism. The extraneous masculine will creates by its influence\na \u201cself-respecting\u201d subject in the hypnotised woman by inducing a\nlimitation of the field of the unhypnotised state. Apart from\nsuggestion, in the ordinary life of the hysterical it is only the man\nwith whom they are \u201cimpregnated\u201d who is respected in them. Any knowledge\nof human nature which women have comes from their absorption of the\nright sort of man. In the paroxysms of hysteria this artificial\nself-respect disappears with the revolt of oppressed nature.\n\nThis is quite parallel to the clairvoyance of hysterical mediums, which\nis undoubted, but has as little to do with \u201coccult\u201d spiritism as the\nordinary hypnotic phenomena. Just as Vogt\u2019s patients made strenuous\nefforts to observe themselves carefully under the powerful will of the\nsuggestor, the clairvoyante, under the influence of the dominating voice\nof the man who is imposing his will on her, is capable of telepathic\nperformances, and at his command can, blindfolded, read communications\nheld by people unknown to her at a great distance away; this I saw\nhappen at M\u00fcnchen under circumstances which precluded any chance of\nfraud.\n\nIn woman there are not strong passions opposed to the desire for the\ngood and true as is the case with man. The masculine will has more power\nover woman than over the man himself; it can realise something in women\nwhich, in his own case, has to encounter too many obstacles. He himself\nhas to battle with an anti-moral and anti-logical opposition in himself.\nThe masculine will can obtain such power over woman\u2019s mind that he makes\nher, in a sense, clairvoyant, and breaks down her limitations of\nmentality.\n\nThus it comes about that woman is more telepathic than man, can appear\nmore innocent, and can accomplish more as a \u201cseer,\u201d and it is only when\nshe becomes a medium, _i.e._, the object, that she realises in herself\nmost easily and surely the masculine will for the good and true. Wala\ncan be made to understand, but not until Dotan subdues her. She meets\nhim half-way, for her one desire is to be conquered.\n\nThe subject of hysteria, so far as the purposes of this book are\nconcerned, is now exhausted.\n\nThe women who are uniformly quoted as proofs of female morality are\nalways of the hysterical type, and it is the very observance of\nmorality, in doing things according to the moral law as if this moral\nlaw were a law of their personality instead of being only an acquired\nhabit, that the unreality, the immorality of this morality is shown.\n\nThe hysterical diathesis is an absurd imitation of the masculine mind, a\nparody of free will which woman parades at the very moment when she is\nmost under a masculine influence.\n\nWoman is not a free agent; she is altogether subject to her desire to be\nunder man\u2019s influence, herself and all others: she is under the sway of\nthe phallus, and irretrievably succumbs to her destiny, even if it leads\nto actively developed sexuality. At the most a woman can reach an\nindistinct feeling of her un-freedom, a cloudy idea of the possibility\nof controlling her destiny--manifestly only a flickering spark of the\nfree, intelligible subject, the scanty remains of inherited maleness in\nher, which, by contrast, gives her even this slight comprehension. It is\nalso impossible for a woman to have a clear idea of her destiny, or of\nthe forces within her: it is only he who is free who can discern fate,\nbecause he is not chained by necessity; part of his personality, at\nleast, places him in the position of spectator and a combatant outside\nhis own fate and makes him so far superior to it. One of the most\nconclusive proofs of human freedom is contained in the fact that man has\nbeen able to create the idea of causality. Women consider themselves\nmost free when they are most bound; and they are not troubled by the\npassions, because they are simply the embodiment of them. It is only a\nman who can talk of the \u201cdira necessitas\u201d within him; it is only he\ncould have created the idea of destiny, because it is only he who, in\naddition to the empirical, conditioned existence, possesses a free,\nintelligible ego.\n\nAs I have shown, woman can reach no more than a vague half-consciousness\nof the fact that she is a conditioned being, and so she is unable to\novercome the sexuality that binds her. Hysteria is the only attempt on\nher part to overcome it, and, as I have shown, it is not a genuine\nattempt. The hysteria itself is what the hysterical woman tries to\nresist, and the falsity of this effort against slavery is the measure of\nits hopelessness. The most notable examples of the sex (I have in mind\nHebbel\u2019s Judith and Wagner\u2019s Kundry) may feel that is because they wish\nit that servitude is a necessity for them, but this realisation does not\ngive them power to resist it; at the last moment they will kiss the man\nwho ravishes them, and succumb with pleasure to those whom they have\nbeen resisting violently. It is as if woman were under a curse. At times\nshe feels the weight of it, but she never flees from it. Her shrieks and\nravings are not really genuine, and she succumbs to her fate at the\nmoment when it has seemed most repulsive to her.\n\nAfter a long analysis, then, it has been found that there is no\nexception to the complete absence in women of any true, inalienable\nrelation to worth. Even what is covered by such current terms as\n\u201cwomanly love,\u201d \u201cwomanly virtue,\u201d \u201cwomanly devoutness,\u201d \u201cwomanly\nmodesty,\u201d has failed to invalidate my conclusions. I have maintained my\nground in face of the strongest opposition, even including that which\ncomes from woman\u2019s hysterical imitations of the male morality.\n\nWoman, the normal receptive woman of whom I am speaking, is impregnated\nby the man not only physically (and I set down the astonishing mental\nalteration in women after marriage to a physical phenomenon akin to\ntelegony), but at every age of her life, by man\u2019s consciousness and by\nman\u2019s social arrangements. Thus it comes about that although woman lacks\nall the characters of the male sex, she can assume them so cleverly and\nso slavishly that it is possible to make mistakes such as the idea of\nthe higher morality of women.\n\nBut this astounding receptivity of woman is not isolated, and must be\nbrought into practical and theoretical connection with the other\npositive and negative characteristics of woman.\n\nWhat has the match-making instinct in woman to do with her plasticity?\nWhat connection is there between her untruthfulness and her sexuality?\nHow does it come about that there is such a strange mixture of all these\nthings in woman?\n\nThis brings us to ask the reason why women can assimilate everything.\nWhence does she derive the falsity which makes it possible for her to\nprefer to believe only what others have told her, to have only what they\n(choose to) give her, to be merely what they make her?\n\nIn order to give the right answer to these questions we must turn once\nmore, for the last time, from the actual point. It was found that the\npower of recognition which animals possess, and which is the psychical\nequivalent of universal organic response to repeated stimuli, was\ncuriously like and unlike human memory; both signify an equally lasting\ninfluence of an impression which was limited to a definite period; but\nmemory is differentiated from mere passive recognition by its power of\nactively reproducing the past.\n\nLater on, it was seen that mere individuation, the characteristic of all\norganic differentiation, and individuality, man\u2019s possession, are\ndifferent. And finally it was found that it was necessary to distinguish\ncarefully between love, peculiar to man, and the sexual instinct, shared\nby the animals. The two are allied inasmuch as they are both efforts at\nimmortality.\n\nThe desire for worth was referred to as a human character, absent in the\nanimals where there is only a desire for satisfaction. The two are\nanalogous, and yet fundamentally different. Pleasure is craved; worth is\nwhat we feel we ought to crave. The two have been confused, with the\nworst results for psychology and ethics. There has been a similar\nconfusion between personality and persons, between recognition and\nmemory, sexuality and love.\n\nAll these antitheses have been continually confused, and, what is even\nmore striking, almost always by men with the same views and theories,\nand with the same object--that of trying to obliterate the difference\nbetween man and the lower animals.\n\nThere are other less known distinctions which have been equally\nneglected. Limited consciousness is an animal trait; the active power of\nnoticing is a purely human one. It is evident that there is something in\ncommon in the two facts, but still they are very different. Desire, or\nimpulse, and will are nearly always spoken of as if they were identical.\nThe former is common to all living creatures, but man has, in addition,\na will, which is free, and no factor of psychology, because it is the\nfoundation of all psychological experiences. The identification of\nimpulse and will is not solely due to Darwin; it occurred also in\nSchopenhauer\u2019s conception of the will, which was sometimes biological,\nsometimes purely philosophical.\n\nI may group the two sets of factors as follows:\n\n  Common to men and animals,  Limited to mankind, and in\n  fundamentally organic.      particular to the males of\n                              mankind.\n\n  Individuation.              Individuality.\n\n  Recognition.                Memory.\n\n  Pleasure.                   Sense of worth or value.\n\n  Sexual desire.              Love.\n\n  Limitation of the field of  Faculty of \u201ctaking\n  consciousness.              notice.\u201d\n\n  Impulse.                    Will.\n\nThe series shows that man possesses not only each character which is\nfound in all living things, but also an analogous and higher character\npeculiar to himself. The old tendency at once to identify the two series\nand to contrast them seems to show the existence of something binding\ntogether the two series, and at the same time separating them. One may\nrecall in this connection the Buddhistic conception of there being in\nman a superstructure added to the characters of lower existences. It is\nas if man possessed all the properties of the beasts, with, in each\ncase, some special quality added. What is this that has been added? How\nfar does it resemble, and in what respects does it differ from, the more\nprimitive set?\n\nThe terms in the left-hand row are fundamental characteristics of all\nanimal and vegetable life. All such life is individual life, not the\nlife of undivided masses; it manifests itself as the impulse to satisfy\nneeds, as sexual impulse for the purpose of reproduction. Individuality,\nmemory, will, love, are those qualities of a second life, which,\nalthough related to organic life to a certain extent, are _toto c\u0153lo_\ndifferent from it.\n\nThis brings us face to face with the religious idea of the eternal,\nhigher, _new_ life, and especially with the Christian form of it.\n\nAs well as a share in organic life, man shares another life, the \u03b6\u03c9\u03b7\n\u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 of the New Dispensation. Just as all earthly life is sustained\nby earthly food, this other life requires spiritual sustenance\n(symbolised in the communion service). The birth and death of the former\nhave their counterparts in the latter--the moral re-birth of man, the\n\u201cregeneration\u201d--and the end: the final loss of the soul through error or\ncrime. The one is determined from without by the bonds of natural\ncausation; the other is ruled by the moral imperative from within. The\none is limited and confined to a definite purpose; the other is\nunlimited, eternal and moral. The characters which are in the left row\nare common to all forms of lower life; those in the right-hand column\nare the corresponding presages of eternal life, manifestations of a\nhigher existence in which man, and only man, has a share. The perpetual\nintermingling and the fresh complications which arise between the higher\nand lower natures are the making of all history of the human mind; this\nis the plot of the history of the universe.\n\nIt is possible that some may perceive in this second life something\nwhich in man might have been derived from the other lower characters;\nsuch a possibility dismiss at once.\n\nA clearer grasp of this sensuous, impressionable lower life will make it\nclear that, as I have explained in earlier chapters, the case is\nreversed; the lower life is merely a projection of the higher on the\nworld of the senses, a reflection of it in the sphere of necessity, as a\ndegradation of it, or its Fall. And the great problem is how the\neternal, lofty idea came to be bound with earth. This problem is the\nguilt of the world. My investigation is now on the threshold of what\ncannot be investigated; of a problem that so far no one has dared to\nanswer, and that never will be answered by any human being. It is the\nriddle of the universe and of life; the binding of the unlimited in the\nbonds of space, of the eternal in time, of the spirit in matter. It is\nthe relation of freedom to necessity, of something to nothing, of God to\nthe devil. The dualism of the world is beyond comprehension; it is the\nplot of the story of man\u2019s Fall, the primitive riddle. It is the binding\nof eternal life in a perishable being, of the innocent in the guilty.\n\nBut it is evident that neither I nor any other man can understand this.\nI can understand sin only when I cease to commit it, and the moment I\nunderstand it I cease to commit it. So also I can never comprehend life\nwhile I am still alive. There is no moment of my life when I am not\nbound down by this sham existence, and it must be impossible for me to\nunderstand the bond until I am free from it. When I understand a thing I\nam already outside it; I cannot comprehend my sinfulness while I am\nstill sinful.\n\nAs the absolute female has no trace of individuality and will, no sense\nof worth or of love, she can have no part in the higher, transcendental\nlife. The intelligible, hyperempirical existence of the male transcends\nmatter, space, and time. He is certainly mortal, but he is immortal as\nwell. And so he has the power to choose between the two, between the\nlife which is lost with death and the life to which death is only a\nstepping-stone. The deepest will of man is towards this perfect,\ntimeless existence; he is compact of the desire for immortality. That\nthe woman has no craving for perpetual life is too apparent; there is\nnothing in her of that eternal which man tries to interpose and must\ninterpose between his real self and his projected, empirical self. Some\nsort of relation to the idea of supreme value, to the idea of the\nabsolute, that perfect freedom which he has not yet attained, because he\nis bound by necessity, but which he can attain because mind is superior\nto matter; such a relation to the purpose of things generally, or to the\ndivine, every man has. And although his life on earth is accompanied by\nseparation and detachment from the absolute, his mind is always longing\nto be free from the taint of original sin.\n\nJust as the love of his parents was not pure in purpose, but sought more\nor less a physical embodiment, the son, who is the outcome of that love,\nwill possess his share of mortal life as well as of eternal: we are\nhorrified at the thought of death, we fight against it, cling to this\nmortal life, and prove from that that we were anxious to be born as we\nwere born, and that we still desire to be born of this world.\n\nBut since every male has a relation to the idea of the highest value,\nand would be incomplete without it, no male is really ever happy. It is\nonly women who are happy. No man is happy, because he has a relation to\nfreedom, and yet during his earthly life he is always bound in some way.\nNone but a perfectly passive being, such as the absolute female, or a\nuniversally active being, like the divine, can be happy. Happiness is\nthe sense of perfect consummation, and this feeling a man can never\nhave; but there are women who fancy themselves perfect. The male always\nhas problems behind him and efforts before him: all problems originate\nin the past; the future is the sphere for efforts. Time has no\nobjective, no meaning, for woman; no woman questions herself as to the\nreason of her existence; and yet the sole purpose of time is to give\nexpression to the fact that this life can and must mean something.\n\nHappiness for the male! That would imply wholly independent activity,\ncomplete freedom; he is always bound, although not with the heaviest\nbonds, and his sense of guilt increases the further he is removed from\nthe idea of freedom.\n\nMortal life is a calamity, and must remain so whilst mankind is a\npassive victim of sensation; so long as he remains not form, but merely\nthe matter on which form is impressed. Every man, however, has some\nglimmer of higher things; the genius most certainly and most directly.\nThis trace of light, however, does not come from his perceptions; so far\nas he is ruled by these, man is merely a passive victim of surrounding\nthings. His spontaneity, his freedom, come from his power of judging as\nto values, and his highest approach to absolute spontaneity and freedom\ncomes from love and from artistic or philosophical creation. Through\nthese he obtains some faint sense of what happiness might be.\n\nWoman can really never be quite unhappy, for happiness is an empty word\nfor her, a word created by unhappy men. Women never mind letting others\nsee their unhappiness, as it is not real; behind it there lies no\nconsciousness of guilt, no sense of the sin of the world.\n\nThe last and absolute proof of the thoroughly negative character of\nwoman\u2019s life, of her complete want of a higher existence, is derived\nfrom the way in which women commit suicide.\n\nSuch suicides are accompanied practically always by thoughts of other\npeople, what they will think, how they will mourn over them, how\ngrieved--or angry--they will be. Every woman is convinced that her\nunhappiness is undeserved at the time she kills herself; she pities\nherself exceedingly with the sort of self-compassion which is only a\n\u201cweeping with others when they weep.\u201d\n\nHow is it possible for a woman to look upon her unhappiness as personal\nwhen she possesses no idea of a destiny? The most appallingly decisive\nproof of the emptiness and nullity of women is that they never once\nsucceed in knowing the problem of their own lives, and death leaves them\nignorant of it, because they are unable to realise the higher life of\npersonality.\n\nI am now ready to answer the question which I put forward as the chief\nobject of this portion of my book, the question as to the significance\nof the male and female in the universe. Women have no existence and no\nessence; they are not, they are nothing. Mankind occurs as male or\nfemale, as something or nothing. Woman has no share in ontological\nreality, no relation to the thing-in-itself, which, in the deepest\ninterpretation, is the absolute, is God. Man in his highest form, the\ngenius, has such a relation, and for him the absolute is either the\nconception of the highest worth of existence, in which case he is a\nphilosopher; or it is the wonderful fairyland of dreams, the kingdom of\nabsolute beauty, and then he is an artist. But both views mean the same.\nWoman has no relation to the idea, she neither affirms nor denies it;\nshe is neither moral nor anti-moral; mathematically speaking, she has no\nsign; she is purposeless, neither good nor bad, neither angel nor devil,\nnever egoistical (and therefore has often been said to be altruistic);\nshe is as non-moral as she is non-logical. But all existence is moral\nand logical existence. So woman has no existence.\n\nWoman is untruthful. An animal has just as little metaphysical reality\nas the actual woman, but it cannot speak, and consequently it does not\nlie. In order to speak the truth one must _be_ something; truth is\ndependent on an existence, and only that can have a relation to an\nexistence which is in itself something. Man desires truth all the time;\nthat is to say, he all along desires only to be something. The\ncognition-impulse is in the end identical with the desire for\nimmortality. Any one who objects to a statement without ever having\nrealised it; any one who gives outward acquiescence without the inner\naffirmation, such persons, like woman, have no real existence and must\nof necessity lie. So that woman always lies, even if, objectively, she\nspeaks the truth.\n\nWoman is the great emissary of pairing. The living units of the lower\nforms of life are individuals, organisms; the living units of the higher\nforms of life are individualities, souls, monads, \u201cmeta-organisms,\u201d a\nterm which Hellenbach uses and which is not without point.\n\nEach monad, however, is differentiated from every other monad, and is as\ndistinct from it as only two things can be. Monads have no windows, but,\ninstead, have the universe in themselves. Man as monad, as a potential\nor actual individuality, that is, as having genius, has in addition\ndifferentiation and distinction, individuation and discrimination; the\nsimple undifferentiated unit is exclusively female. Each monad creates\nfor itself a detached entity, a whole; but it looks upon every other ego\nas a perfect totality also, and never intrudes upon it. Man has limits,\nand accepts them and desires them; woman, who does not recognise her own\nentity, is not in a position to regard or perceive the privacy of those\naround her, and neither respects, nor honours, nor leaves it alone: as\nthere is no such thing as one-ness for her there can be no plurality,\nonly an indistinct state of fusion with others. Because there is no \u201cI\u201d\nin woman she cannot grasp the \u201cthou\u201d; according to her perception the I\nand thou are just a pair, an undifferentiated one; this makes it\npossible for woman to bring people together, to match-make. The object\nof her love is that of her sympathy--the community, the blending of\neverything.[23]\n\n  [23] All individuality is an enemy of the community. This is seen most\n  markedly in men of genius, but it is just the same with regard to the\n  sexes.\n\nWoman has no limits to her ego which could be broken through, and which\nshe would have to guard.\n\nThe chief difference between man\u2019s and woman\u2019s friendship is referable\nto this fact. Man\u2019s friendship is an attempt to see eye to eye with\nthose who individually and collectively are striving after the same\nidea; woman\u2019s friendship is a combination for the purpose of\nmatch-making. It is the only kind of intimate and unreserved intercourse\npossible between women, when they are not merely anxious to meet each\nother for the purpose of gossiping or discussing every day affairs.[24]\n\n  [24] Men\u2019s friendships avoid breaking down their friends\u2019 personal\n  reserve. Women expect intimacy from their friends.\n\nIf, for instance, one of two girls or women is much prettier than the\nother, the plainer of the two experiences a certain sexual satisfaction\nat the admiration which the other receives. The principal condition of\nall friendship between women is the exclusion of rivalry; every woman\ncompares herself physically with every woman she gets to know. In cases\nwhere one is more beautiful than the other, the plainer of the two will\nidolise the other, because, though neither of them is in the least\nconscious of it, the next best thing to her own sexual satisfaction for\nthe one is the success of the other; it is always the same; woman\nparticipates in every sexual union. The completely impersonal existence\nof women, as well as the super-individual nature of their sexuality,\nclearly shows match-making to be the fundamental trait of their beings.\n\nThe least that even the ugliest woman demands, and from which she\nderives a certain amount of pleasure, is that any one of her sex should\nbe admired and desired.\n\nIt follows from the absorbing and absorbable nature of woman\u2019s life\nthat women can never feel really jealous. However ignoble jealousy and\nthe spirit of revenge may be, they both contain an element of greatness,\nof which women, whether for good or evil, are incapable. In jealousy\nthere lies a despairing claim to an assumed right, and the idea of\njustice is out of woman\u2019s reach. But that is not the chief reason why a\nwoman can never be really jealous of any man. If a man, even if he were\nthe man she was madly in love with, were sitting in the next room making\nlove to another woman, the thoughts that would be aroused in her breast\nwould be so sexually exciting that they would leave no room for\njealousy. To a man, such a scene, if he knew of it, would be absolutely\nrepulsive, and it would be nauseous to him to be near it; woman would\nfeverishly follow each detail, or she would become hysterical if it\ndawned on her what she was doing.\n\nA man is never really affected by the idea of the pairing of others: he\nis outside and above any such circumstance which has no meaning for him;\na woman, however, would be scarcely responsible for her interest in the\nprocess, she would be in a state of feverish excitement and as if\nspellbound by the thought of her proximity to it.\n\nA man\u2019s interest in his fellow men, who are problems for him, may extend\nto their sexual affairs; but the curiosity which is specially for these\nthings is peculiar to woman, whether with regard to men or women. It is\nthe love affairs of a man which, from first to last, interest women; and\na man is only intellectually mysterious and charming to a woman so long\nas she is not clear as to these.\n\nFrom all this it is again manifest that femaleness and match-making are\nidentical; even a superficial study of the case would have resulted in\nthe same conclusions. But I had a much wider purpose, and I hope I have\nclearly shown the connection between woman positive as match-maker, and\nwoman negative as utterly lacking in the higher life. Woman has but one\nidea, an idea she cannot be conscious of, as it is her sole idea, and\nthat is absolutely opposed to the spiritual idea. Whether as a mother\nseeking reputable matrimony, or the Bacchante of the Venusberg, whether\nshe wishes to be the foundress of a family, or is content to be lost in\nthe maze of pleasure-seekers, she always is in relation to the general\nidea of the race as a whole of which she is an inseparable part, and she\nfollows the instinct which most of all makes for community.\n\nShe, as the missionary of union, must be a creature without limits or\nindividuality. I have prolonged this side of my investigation because\nits important result has been omitted from all earlier characterology.\n\nAt this stage it well may be asked if women are really to be considered\nhuman beings at all, or if my theory does not unite them with plants and\nanimals? For, according to the theory, women, just as little as plants\nand animals, have any real existence, any relation to the intelligible\nwhole. Man alone is a microcosm, a mirror of the universe.\n\nIn Ibsen\u2019s \u201cLittle Eyolf\u201d there is a beautiful and apposite passage.\n\n\u201cRita. \u2018After all, we are only human beings.\u2019\n\n\u201cAllmers. \u2018But we have some kinship with the sky and the sea, Rita.\u2019\n\n\u201cRita. \u2018You, perhaps; not me.\u2019\u201d\n\nWoman, according to the poet, according to Buddha, and in my\ninterpretation, has no relation to the all, to the world whole, to God.\nIs she then human, or an animal, or a plant?\n\nAnatomists will find the question ridiculous, and will at once dismiss\nthe philosophy which could lead up to such a possibility. For them woman\nis the female of _Homo sapiens_, differentiated from all other living\nbeings, and occupying the same position with regard to the human male\nthat the females of other species occupy with regard to their males. And\nhe will not allow the philosopher to say, \u201cWhat has the anatomist to do\nwith me? Let him mind his own business.\u201d\n\nAs a matter of fact, women are sisters of the flowers, and are in close\nrelationship with the animals. Many of their sexual perversities and\naffections for animals (Pasiph\u00e4e myth and Leda myth) indicate this. But\nthey are human beings. Even the absolute woman, whom we think of as\nwithout any trace of intelligible ego, is still the complement of man.\nAnd there is no doubt that the fact of the special sexual and erotic\ncompletion of the human male by the human female, even if it is not the\nmoral phenomenon which advocates of marriage would have us believe, is\nstill of tremendous importance to the woman problem. Animals are mere\nindividuals; women are persons, although they are not personalities.\n\nAn appearance of discriminative power, though not the reality, language,\nthough not conversation, memory, though it has no continuity or unity of\nconsciousness--must all be granted to them.\n\nThey possess counterfeits of everything masculine, and thus are subject\nto those transformations which the defenders of womanliness are so fond\nof quoting. The result of this is a sort of amphi-sexuality of many\nideas (honour, shame, love, imagination, fear, sensibility, and so on),\nwhich have both a masculine and feminine significance.\n\nThere now remains to discuss the real meaning of the contrast between\nthe sexes.\n\nThe parts played by the male and female principles in the animal and\nvegetable kingdoms are not now under consideration; we are dealing\nsolely with humanity.\n\nThat such principles of maleness and femaleness must be accepted as\ntheoretical conceptions, and not as metaphysical ideas, was the point of\nthis investigation from the beginning. The whole object of the book has\nbeen to settle the question, in man at least, of the really important\ndifferences between man and woman, quite apart from the mere\nphysiological-sexual differentiation. Furthermore, the view which sees\nnothing more in the fact of the dualism of the sexes than an arrangement\nfor physiological division of labour--an idea for which, I believe, the\nzoologist, Milne-Edwards, is responsible--appears, according to this\nwork, quite untenable; and it is useless to waste time discussing such a\nsuperficial and intellectually complacent view.\n\nDarwinism, indeed, is responsible for making popular the view that\nsexually differentiated organisms have been derived from earlier stages\nin which there was no sexual dimorphism; but long before Darwin, Gustav\nTheodor Fechner had already shown that the sexes could not be supposed\nto have arisen from an undifferentiated stage by any principle such as\ndivision of labour, adaptation to the struggle for existence, and so\nforth.\n\nThe ideas \u201cman\u201d and \u201cwoman\u201d cannot be investigated separately; their\nsignificance can be found out only by placing them side by side and\ncontrasting them. The key to their natures must be found in their\nrelations to each other. In attempting to discover the nature of erotics\nI went a little way into this subject. The relation of man to woman is\nsimply that of subject to object. Woman seeks her consummation as the\nobject. She is the plaything of husband or child, and, however we may\ntry to hide it, she is anxious to be nothing but such a chattel.\n\nNo one misunderstands so thoroughly what a woman wants as he who tries\nto find out what is passing within her, endeavouring to share her\nfeelings and hopes, her experiences and her real nature.\n\nWoman does not wish to be treated as an active agent; she wants to\nremain always and throughout--this is just her womanhood--purely\npassive, to feel herself under another\u2019s will. She demands only to be\ndesired physically, to be taken possession of, like a new property.\n\nJust as mere sensation only attains reality when it is apprehended,\n_i.e._, when it becomes objective, so a woman is brought to a sense of\nher existence only by her husband or children--by these as subjects to\nwhom she is the object--so obtaining the gift of an existence.\n\nThe contrast between the subject and the object in the theory of\nknowledge corresponds ontologically to the contrast between form and\nmatter. It is no more than a translation of this distinction from the\ntheory of experience to metaphysics. Matter, which in itself is\nabsolutely unindividualised and so can assume any form, of itself has\nno definite and lasting qualities, and has as little essence as mere\nperception, the matter of experience, has in itself any existence. If\nthe Platonic conception is followed out, it will be apparent that that\ngreat thinker asserted to be nothing what the ordinary Philistine\nregards as the highest form of reality. According to Plato, the negation\nof existence is no other than matter. Form is the only real existence.\nAristotle carried the Platonic conception into the regions of biology.\nFor Plato form is the parent and creator of all reality. For Aristotle,\nin the sexual process the male principle is the active, formative agent,\nthe female principle the passive matter on which the form is impressed.\nIn my view, the significance of woman in humanity is explained by the\nPlatonic and Aristotelian conception. Woman is the material on which man\nacts. Man as the microcosm is compounded of the lower and higher life.\nWoman is matter, is nothing. This knowledge gives us the keystone to our\nstructure, and it makes everything clear that was indistinct, it gives\nthings a coherent form. Woman\u2019s sexual part depends on contact; it is\nthe absorbing and not the liberating impulse. It coincides with this,\nthat the keenest sense woman has, and the only one she has more highly\ndeveloped than man, is the sense of touch. The eye and the ear lead to\nthe unlimited and give glimpses of infinity; the sense of touch\nnecessitates physical limitations to our own actions: one is affected by\nwhat one feels; it is the eminently sordid sense, and suited to the\nphysical requirements of an earth-bound being.\n\nMan is form, woman is matter: if that is so it must find expression in\nthe relations between their respective psychic experiences.\n\nThe summing up of the connected nature of man\u2019s mental life, as opposed\nto the inarticulate and chaotic condition of woman\u2019s, illustrates the\nabove antithesis of form and matter.\n\nMatter needs to be formed: and thus woman demands that man should clear\nher confusion of thought, give meaning to her henid ideas. Women are\nmatter, which can assume any shape. Those experiments which ascribe to\ngirls a better memory for learning by rote than boys are explained in\nthis way: they are due to the nullity and inanity of women, who can be\nsaturated with anything and everything, whilst man only retains what has\nan interest for him, forgetting all else.\n\nThis accounts for what has been called woman\u2019s submissiveness, the way\nshe is influenced by the opinions of others, her suggestibility, the way\nin which man moulds her formless nature. Woman is nothing; therefore,\nand only therefore, she can become everything, whilst man can only\nremain what he is. A man can make what he likes of a woman: the most a\nwoman can do is to help a man to achieve what he wants.\n\nA man\u2019s real nature is never altered by education: woman, on the other\nhand, by external influences, can be taught to suppress her most\ncharacteristic self, the real value she sets on sexuality.\n\nWoman can appear everything and deny everything, but in reality she is\nnever anything.\n\nWomen have neither this nor that characteristic; their peculiarity\nconsists in having no characteristics at all; the complexity and\nterrible mystery about women come to this; it is this which makes them\nabove and beyond man\u2019s understanding--man, who always wants to get to\nthe heart of things.\n\nIt may be said, even by those who may wish to agree with the foregoing\narguments, that they have not indicated what man really is. Has he any\nspecial male characteristics, like match-making and want of character in\nwomen? Is there a definite idea of what man is, as there is of woman,\nand can this idea be similarly formulated?\n\nHere is the answer: The idea of maleness consists in the fact of an\nindividuality, of an essential monad, and is covered by it. Each monad,\nhowever, is as different as possible from every other monad, and\ntherefore cannot be classified in one comprehensive idea common to many\nother monads. Man is the microcosm; he contains all kinds of\npossibilities. This must not be confused with the universal\nsusceptibility of woman who becomes all without _being_ anything, whilst\nman is all, as much or as little, according to his gifts, as he will.\nMan contains woman, for he contains matter, and he can allow this part\nof his nature to develop itself, _i.e._, to thrive and enervate him; or\nhe can recognise and fight against it--so that he, and he alone, can get\nat the truth about woman. But woman cannot develop except through man.\n\nThe meaning of man and woman is first arrived at when we examine their\nmutual sexual and erotic relations. Woman\u2019s deepest desire is to be\nformed by man, and so to receive her being. Woman desires that man\nshould impart opinions to her quite different to those she held before,\nshe is content to let herself be turned by him from what she had till\nthen thought right. She wishes to be taken to pieces as a whole, so that\nhe may build her up again.\n\nWoman is first created by man\u2019s will--he dominates her and changes her\nwhole being (hypnotism). Here is the explanation of the relation of the\npsychical to the physical in man and woman. Man assumes a reciprocal\naction of body and mind, in the sense rather that the dominant mind\ncreates the body, than that the mind merely projects itself on\nphenomena, whilst the woman accepts both mental and psychical phenomena\nempirically. None the less, even in the woman there is some reciprocal\naction. However, whilst in the man, as Schopenhauer truly taught, the\nhuman being is his own creation, his own will makes and re-makes the\nbody, the woman is bodily influenced and changed by an alien will\n(suggestion).\n\nMan not only forms himself, but woman also--a far easier matter. The\nmyths of the book of Genesis and other cosmogonies, which teach that\nwoman was created out of man, are nearer the truth than the biological\ntheories of descent, according to which males have been evolved from\nfemales.\n\nWe have now to come to the question left open in chap. ix., as to how\nwoman, who is herself without soul or will, is yet able to realise to\nwhat extent a man may be endowed with them; and we may now endeavour to\nanswer it. Of this one must be certain, that what woman notices, that\nfor which she has a sense, is not the special nature of man, but only\nthe general fact and possibly the grade of his maleness. It is quite\nerroneous to suppose that woman has an innate capacity to understand the\nindividuality of a man. The lover, who is so easily fooled by the\nunconscious simulation of a deeper comprehension on the part of his\nsweetheart, may believe that he understands himself through a girl; but\nthose who are less easily satisfied cannot help seeing that women only\npossess a sense of the fact not of the individuality of the soul, only\nfor the formal general fact, not for the differentiation of the\npersonality. In order to perceive and apperceive the special form,\nmatter must not itself be formless; woman\u2019s relation to man, however, is\nnothing but that of matter to form, and her comprehension of him nothing\nbut willingness to be as much formed as possible by him; the instinct of\nthose without existence for existence. Furthermore, this \u201ccomprehension\u201d\nis not theoretical, it is not sympathetic, it is only a desire to be\nsympathetic; it is importunate and egoistical. Woman has no relation to\nman and no sense of man, but only for maleness; and if she is to be\nconsidered as more sexual than man, this greater claim is nothing but\nthe intense desire for the fullest and most definite formation, it is\nthe demand for the greatest possible quantity of existence.\n\nAnd, finally, match-making is nothing else than this. The sexuality of\nwomen is super-individual, because they are not limited, formed,\nindividualised entities, in the higher sense of the word.\n\nThe supremest moment in a woman\u2019s life, when her original nature, her\nnatural desire manifests itself, is that in which her own sexual union\ntakes place. She embraces the man passionately and presses him to her;\nit is the greatest joy of passivity, stronger even than the contented\nfeeling of a hypnotised person, the desire of matter which has just been\nformed, and wishes to keep that form for ever. That is why a woman is so\ngrateful to her possessor, even if the gratitude is limited to the\nmoment, as in the case of prostitutes with no memory, or, if it lasts\nlonger, as in the case of more highly differentiated women.\n\nThis endless striving of the poor to attach themselves to riches, the\naltogether formless and therefore super-individual striving of the\ninarticulate to obtain form by contact, to keep it indefinitely and so\ngain an existence, is the deepest motive in pairing.\n\nPairing is only possible because woman is not a monad, and has no sense\nof individuality; it is the endless striving of nothing to be something.\n\nIt is thus that the duality of man and woman has gradually developed\ninto complete dualism, to the dualism of the higher and lower lives, of\nsubject and object, of form and matter, something and nothing. All\nmetaphysical, all transcendental existence is logical and moral\nexistence; woman is non-logical and non-moral. She has no dislike for\nwhat is logical and moral, she is not anti-logical, she is not\nanti-moral. She is not the negation, she is, rather, nothing. She is\nneither the affirmation nor the denial. A man has in himself the\npossibility of being the absolute something or the absolute nothing, and\ntherefore his actions are directed towards the one or the other; woman\ndoes not sin, for she herself is the sin which is a possibility in man.\n\nThe abstract male is the image of God, the absolute something; the\nfemale, and the female element in the male, is the symbol of nothing;\nthat is the significance of the woman in the universe, and in this way\nmale and female complete and condition one another. Woman has a meaning\nand a function in the universe as the opposite of man; and as the human\nmale surpasses the animal male, so the human female surpasses the female\nof zoology. It is not that limited existence and limited negation (as in\nthe animal kingdom) are at war in humanity; what there stand in\nopposition are unlimited existence and unlimited negation. And so male\nand female make up humanity.\n\nThe meaning of woman is to be meaningless. She represents negation, the\nopposite pole from the Godhead, the other possibility of humanity. And\nso nothing is so despicable as a man become female, and such a person\nwill be regarded as the supreme criminal even by himself. And so also is\nto be explained the deepest fear of man; the fear of the woman, which is\nthe fear of unconsciousness, the alluring abyss of annihilation.\n\nAn old woman manifests once for all what woman really is. The beauty of\nwoman, as may be experimentally proved, is only created by love of a\nman; a woman becomes more beautiful when a man loves her because she is\npassively responding to the will which is in her lover; however deep\nthis may sound, it is only a matter of everyday experience.\n\nAll the qualities of woman depend on her non-existence, on her want of\ncharacter; because she has no true, permanent, but only a mortal life,\nin her character as the advocate of pairing she furthers the sexual part\nof life, and is fundamentally transformed by and susceptible to the man\nwho has a physical influence over her.\n\nThus the three fundamental characters of woman with which this chapter\nhas dealt come together in the conception of her as the non-existent.\nHer instability and untruthfulness are only negative deductions from the\npremiss of her non-existence. Her only positive character, the\nconception of her as the pairing agent, comes from it by a simple\nprocess of analysis. The nature of woman is no more than pairing, no\nmore than super-individual sexuality.\n\nIf we turn to the table of the two kinds of life given earlier in this\nchapter, it will be apparent that every inclination from the higher to\nthe lower is a crime against oneself. Immorality is the will towards\nnegation, the craving to change the formed into the formless, the wish\nfor destruction. And from this comes the intimate relation between\nfemaleness and crime. There is a close relation between the immoral and\nthe non-moral. It is only when man accepts his own sexuality, denies the\nabsolute in him, turns to the lower, that he gives woman existence. The\nacceptance of the Phallus is immoral. It has always been thought of as\nhateful; it has been the image of Satan, and Dante made it the central\npillar of hell.\n\nThus comes about the domination of the male sexuality over the female.\nIt is only when man is sexual that woman has existence and meaning.\n\nHer existence is bound up with the Phallus, and so that is her supreme\nlord and welcome master.\n\nSex, in the form of man, is woman\u2019s fate; the Don Juan is the only type\nof man who has complete power over her.\n\nThe curse, which was said to be heavy on woman, is the evil will of man:\nnothing is only a tool in the hand of the will for nothing. The early\nFathers expressed it pathetically when they called woman the handmaid of\nthe devil. For matter in itself is nothing, it can only obtain existence\nthrough form. The fall of \u201cform\u201d is the corruption that takes place when\nform endeavours to relapse into the formless. When man became sexual he\nformed woman. That woman is at all has happened simply because man has\naccepted his sexuality. Woman is merely the result of this affirmation;\nshe is sexuality itself. Woman\u2019s existence is dependent on man; when\nman, as man, in contradistinction to woman, is sexual, he is giving\nwoman form, calling her into existence. Therefore woman\u2019s one object\nmust be to keep man sexual. She desires man as Phallus, and for this she\nis the advocate of pairing. She is incapable of making use of any\ncreature except as a means to an end, the end being pairing; and she has\nbut one purpose, that of continuing the guilt of man, for she would\ndisappear the moment man had overcome his sexuality.\n\nMan created woman, and will always create her afresh, as long as he is\nsexual. Just as he gives woman consciousness, so he gives her existence.\nWoman is the sin of man.\n\nHe tries to pay the debt by love. Here we have the explanation of what\nseemed like an obscure myth at the end of the previous chapter. Now we\nsee what was hidden in it: that woman is nothing before man\u2019s fall, nor\nwithout it; that he does not rob her of anything she had before. The\ncrime man has committed in creating woman, and still commits in\nassenting to her purpose, he excuses to woman by his eroticism.\n\nWhence otherwise would come the generosity of love, which can never be\nsatisfied by giving? How is it that love is so anxious to endow woman\nwith a soul, and not any other creature? Whence comes it that a child\ncannot love until love coincides with sexuality, the stage of puberty,\nwith the repeated forming of woman, with the renewing of sin? Woman is\nnothing but man\u2019s expression and projection of his own sexuality. Every\nman creates himself a woman, in which he embodies himself and his own\nguilt.\n\nBut woman is not herself guilty; she is made so by the guilt of others,\nand everything for which woman is blamed should be laid at man\u2019s door.\n\nLove strives to cover guilt, instead of conquering it; it elevates woman\ninstead of nullifying her. The \u201csomething\u201d folds the \u201cnothing\u201d in its\narms, and thinks thus to free the universe of negation and drown all\nobjections; whereas the nothing would only disappear if the something\nput it away.\n\nSince man\u2019s hatred for woman is not conscious hatred of his own\nsexuality, his love is his most intense effort to save woman as woman,\ninstead of desiring to nullify her in himself. And the consciousness of\nguilt comes from the fact that the object of guilt is coveted instead of\nbeing annihilated.\n\nWoman alone, then, is guilt; and is so through man\u2019s fault. And if\nfemaleness signifies pairing, it is only because all guilt endeavours to\nincrease its circle. What woman, always unconsciously, accomplishes, she\ndoes because she cannot help it; it is her reason for being, her whole\nnature. She is only a part of man, his other, ineradicable, his lower\npart. So matter appears to be as inexplicable a riddle as form; woman as\nunending as man, negation as eternal as existence; but this eternity is\nonly the eternity of guilt.\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nJUDAISM\n\nIt would not be surprising if to many it should seem from the foregoing\narguments that \u201cmen\u201d have come out of them too well, and, as a\ncollective body, have been placed on an exaggeratedly lofty pedestal.\nThe conclusions drawn from these arguments, however surprised every\nPhilistine and young simpleton would be to learn that in himself he\ncomprises the whole world, cannot be opposed and confuted by cheap\nreasoning; yet the treatment of the male sex must not simply be\nconsidered too indulgent, or due to a direct tendency to omit all the\nrepulsive and small side of manhood in order to favourably represent its\nbest points.\n\nThe accusation would be unjustified. It does not enter the author\u2019s mind\nto idealise man in order more easily to lower the estimation of woman.\nSo much narrowness and so much coarseness often thrive beneath the\nempirical representation of manhood that it is a question of the better\npossibilities lying in every man, neglected by him or perceived either\nwith painful clearness or dull animosity; possibilities which as such in\nwoman neither actually nor meditatively ever come to any account. And\nhere the author cannot in any wise really rely on the dissimilarities\nbetween men, however little he may impugn their importance. It is,\ntherefore, a question of establishing what woman is not, and truly in\nher there is infinitely much wanting which is never quite missing even\nin the most mediocre and plebeian of men. That which is the positive\nattribute of the woman, in so far as a positive can be spoken of in\nregard to such a being, will constantly be found also in many men.\nThere are, as has already often been demonstrated, men who have become\nwomen or have remained women; but there is no woman who has surpassed\ncertain circumscribed, not particularly elevated moral and intellectual\nlimits. And, therefore, I must again assert that the woman of the\nhighest standard is immeasurably beneath the man of lowest standard.\n\nThese objections may go even further and touch a point where the\nignoring of theory must assuredly become reprehensible. There are, to\nwit, nations and races whose men, though they can in no wise be regarded\nas intermediate forms of the sexes, are found to approach so slightly\nand so rarely to the ideal of manhood as set forth in my argument, that\nthe principles, indeed the entire foundation on which this work rests,\nwould seem to be severely shaken by their existence. What shall we make,\nfor example, out of the Chinese, with their feminine freedom from\ninternal cravings and their incapacity for every effort? One might feel\ntempted to believe in the complete effeminacy of the whole race. It can\nat least be no mere whim of the entire nation that the Chinaman\nhabitually wears a pigtail, and that the growth of his beard is of the\nvery thinnest. But how does the matter stand with the negroes? A genius\nhas perhaps scarcely ever appeared amongst the negroes, and the standard\nof their morality is almost universally so low that it is beginning to\nbe acknowledged in America that their emancipation was an act of\nimprudence.\n\nIf, consequently, the principle of the intermediate forms of the sexes\nmay perhaps enjoy a prospect of becoming of importance to racial\nanthropology (since in some peoples a greater share of womanishness\nwould seem to be generally disseminated), it must yet be conceded that\nthe foregoing deductions refer above all to Aryan men and Aryan women.\nIn how far, in the other great races of mankind, uniformity with the\nstandard of the Aryan race may reign, or what has prevented and hindered\nthis; to arrive more nearly at such knowledge would require in the first\ninstance the most intense research into racial characteristics.\n\nThe Jewish race, which has been chosen by me as a subject of discussion,\nbecause, as will be shown, it presents the gravest and most formidable\ndifficulties for my views, appears to possess a certain anthropological\nrelationship with both negroes and Mongolians. The readily curling hair\npoints to the negro; admixture of Mongolian blood is suggested by the\nperfectly Chinese or Malay formation of face and skull which is so often\nto be met with amongst the Jews and which is associated with a yellowish\ncomplexion. This is nothing more than the result of everyday experience,\nand these remarks must not be otherwise understood; the anthropological\nquestion of the origin of the Jewish race is apparently insoluble, and\neven such an interesting answer to it as that given by H. S. Chamberlain\nhas recently met with much opposition. The author does not possess the\nknowledge necessary to treat of this; what will be here briefly, but as\nfar as possible profoundly analysed, is the psychical peculiarity of the\nJewish race.\n\nThis is an obligatory task imposed by psychological observation and\nanalysis. It is undertaken independently of past history, the details of\nwhich must be uncertain. The Jewish race offers a problem of the deepest\nsignificance for the study of all races, and in itself it is intimately\nbound up with many of the most troublesome problems of the day.\n\nI must, however, make clear what I mean by Judaism; I mean neither a\nrace nor a people nor a recognised creed. I think of it as a tendency of\nthe mind, as a psychological constitution which is a possibility for all\nmankind, but which has become actual in the most conspicuous fashion\nonly amongst the Jews. Antisemitism itself will confirm my point of\nview.\n\nThe purest Aryans by descent and disposition are seldom Antisemites,\nalthough they are often unpleasantly moved by some of the peculiar\nJewish traits; they cannot in the least understand the Antisemite\nmovement, and are, in consequence of their defence of the Jews, often\ncalled Philosemites; and yet these persons writing on the subject of\nthe hatred of Jews, have been guilty of the most profound\nmisunderstanding of the Jewish character. The aggressive Antisemites, on\nthe other hand, nearly always display certain Jewish characters,\nsometimes apparent in their faces, although they may have no real\nadmixture of Jewish blood.[25]\n\n  [25] Zola was a typical case of a person absolutely without trace of\n  the Jewish qualities, and, therefore, a philosemite. The greatest\n  geniuses, on the other hand, have nearly always been antisemites\n  (Tacitus, Pascal, Voltaire, Herder, Goethe, Kant, Jean Paul,\n  Schopenhauer, Grillparzer, Wagner); this comes about from the fact as\n  geniuses they have something of everything in their natures, and so\n  can understand Judaism.\n\nThe explanation is simple. People love in others the qualities they\nwould like to have but do not actually have in any great degree; so also\nwe hate in others only what we do not wish to be, and what\nnotwithstanding we are partly. We hate only qualities to which we\napproximate, but which we realise first in other persons.\n\nThus the fact is explained that the bitterest Antisemites are to be\nfound amongst the Jews themselves. For only the quite Jewish Jews, like\nthe completely Aryan Aryans, are not at all Antisemitically disposed;\namong the remainder only the commoner natures are actively Antisemitic\nand pass sentence on others without having once sat in judgment on\nthemselves in these matters; and very few exercise their Antisemitism\nfirst on themselves. This one thing, however, remains none the less\ncertain: whoever detests the Jewish disposition detests it first of all\nin himself; that he should persecute it in others is merely his\nendeavour to separate himself in this way from Jewishness; he strives to\nshake it off and to localise it in his fellow-creatures, and so for a\nmoment to dream himself free of it. Hatred, like love, is a projected\nphenomenon; that person alone is hated who reminds one unpleasantly of\noneself.\n\nThe Antisemitism of the Jews bears testimony to the fact that no one who\nhas had experience of them considers them loveable--not even the Jew\nhimself; the Antisemitism of the Aryans grants us an insight no less\nfull of significance: it is that the Jew and the Jewish race must not\nbe confounded. There are Aryans who are more Jewish than Jews, and real\nJews who are more Aryan than certain Aryans. I need not enumerate those\nnon-semites who had much Jewishness in them, the lesser (like the\nwell-known Frederick Nicolai of the eighteenth century) nor those of\nmoderate greatness (here Frederick Schiller can scarcely be omitted),\nnor will I analyse their Jewishness. Above all Richard Wagner--the\nbitterest Antisemite--cannot be held free from an accretion of\nJewishness even in his art, however little one be misled by the feeling\nwhich sees in him the greatest artist enshrined in historical humanity;\nand this, though indubitably his Siegfried is the most un-Jewish type\nimaginable. As Wagner\u2019s aversion to grand opera and the stage really led\nto the strongest attraction, an attraction of which he was himself\nconscious, so his music, which, in the unique simplicity of its motifs,\nis the most powerful in the world, cannot be declared free from\nobtrusiveness, loudness, and lack of distinction; from some\nconsciousness of this Wagner tried to gain coherence by the extreme\ninstrumentation of his works. It cannot be denied (there can be no\nmistake about it) that Wagner\u2019s music produces the deepest impression\nnot only on Jewish Antisemites, who have never completely shaken off\nJewishness, but also on Indo-Germanic Antisemites. From the music of\n\u201cParsifal,\u201d which to genuine Jews will ever remain as unapproachable as\nits poetry, from the Pilgrim\u2019s march and the procession to Rome in\n\u201cTannh\u00e4user,\u201d and assuredly from many another part, they turn away.\nDoubtless, also, none but a German could make so clearly manifest the\nvery essence of the German race as Wagner has succeeded in doing in the\n\u201cMeistersingers of Nurnberg.\u201d In Wagner one thinks constantly of that\nside of his character which leans towards Feuerbach, instead of towards\nSchopenhauer. Here no narrow psychological depreciation of this great\nman is intended. Judaism was to him the greatest help in reaching a\nclearer understanding and assertion of the extremes within him in his\nstruggle to reach \u201cSiegfried\u201d and \u201cParsifal,\u201d and in giving to German\nnature the highest means of expression which has probably ever been\nfound in the pages of history. Yet a greater than Wagner was obliged to\novercome the Jewishness within him before he found his special vocation;\nand it is, as previously stated, perhaps its great significance in the\nworld\u2019s history and the immense merit of Judaism that it and nothing\nelse, leads the Aryan to a knowledge of himself and warns him against\nhimself. For this the Aryan has to thank the Jew that, through him, he\nknows to guard against Judaism as a possibility within himself. This\nexample will sufficiently illustrate what, in my estimation, is to be\nunderstood by Judaism.\n\nI do not refer to a nation or to a race, to a creed or to a scripture.\nWhen I speak of the Jew I mean neither an individual nor the whole body,\nbut mankind in general, in so far as it has a share in the platonic idea\nof Judaism. My purpose is to analyse this idea.\n\nThat these researches should be included in a work devoted to the\ncharacterology of the sexes may seem an undue extension of my subject.\nBut some reflection will lead to the surprising result that Judaism is\nsaturated with femininity, with precisely those qualities the essence of\nwhich I have shown to be in the strongest opposition to the male nature.\nIt would not be difficult to make a case for the view that the Jew is\nmore saturated with femininity than the Aryan, to such an extent that\nthe most manly Jew is more feminine than the least manly Aryan.\n\nThis interpretation would be erroneous. It is most important to lay\nstress on the agreements and differences simply because so many points\nthat become obvious in dissecting woman reappear in the Jew.\n\nLet me begin with the analogies. It is notable that the Jews, even now\nwhen at least a relative security of tenure is possible, prefer moveable\nproperty, and, in spite of their acquisitiveness, have little real sense\nof personal property, especially in its most characteristic form, landed\nproperty. Property is indissolubly connected with the self, with\nindividuality. It is in harmony with the foregoing that the Jew is so\nreadily disposed to communism. Communism must be distinguished clearly\nfrom socialism, the former being based on a community of goods, an\nabsence of individual property, the latter meaning, in the first place a\nco-operation of individual with individual, of worker with worker, and a\nrecognition of human individuality in every one. Socialism is Aryan\n(Owen, Carlyle, Ruskin, Fichte). Communism is Jewish (Marx). Modern\nsocial democracy has moved far apart from the earlier socialism,\nprecisely because Jews have taken so large a share in developing it. In\nspite of the associative element in it, the Marxian doctrine does not\nlead in any way towards the State as a union of all the separate\nindividual aims, as the higher unit combining the purposes of the lower\nunits. Such a conception is as foreign to the Jew as it is to the woman.\n\nFor these reasons Zionism must remain an impracticable ideal,\nnotwithstanding the fashion in which it has brought together some of the\nnoblest qualities of the Jews. Zionism is the negation of Judaism, for\nthe conception of Judaism involves a world-wide distribution of the\nJews. Citizenship is an un-Jewish thing, and there has never been and\nnever will be a true Jewish State. The State involves the aggregation of\nindividual aims, the formation of and obedience to self-imposed laws;\nand the symbol of the State, if nothing more, is its head chosen by free\nelection. The opposite conception is that of anarchy, with which\npresent-day communism is closely allied. The ideal State has never been\nhistorically realised, but in every case there is at least a minimum of\nthis higher unit, this conception of an ideal power which distinguishes\nthe State from the mere collection of human beings in barracks.\nRousseau\u2019s much-despised theory of the conscious co-operation of\nindividuals to form a State deserves more attention than it now\nreceives. Some ethical notion of free combination must always be\nincluded.\n\nThe true conception of the State is foreign to the Jew, because he, like\nthe woman, is wanting in personality; his failure to grasp the idea of\ntrue society is due to his lack of a free intelligible ego. Like women,\nJews tend to adhere together, but they do not associate as free\nindependent individuals mutually respecting each other\u2019s individuality.\n\nAs there is no real dignity in women, so what is meant by the word\n\u201cgentleman\u201d does not exist amongst the Jews. The genuine Jew fails in\nthis innate good breeding by which alone individuals honour their own\nindividuality and respect that of others. There is no Jewish nobility,\nand this is the more surprising as Jewish pedigrees can be traced back\nfor thousands of years.\n\nThe familiar Jewish arrogance has a similar explanation; it springs from\nwant of true knowledge of himself and the consequent overpowering need\nhe feels to enhance his own personality by depreciating that of his\nfellow-creatures. And so, although his descent is incomparably longer\nthan that of the members of Aryan aristocracies, he has an inordinate\nlove for titles. The Aryan respect for his ancestors is rooted in the\nconception that they were _his_ ancestors; it depends on his valuation\nof his own personality, and, in spite of the communistic strength and\nantiquity of the Jewish traditions, this individual sense of ancestry is\nlacking.\n\nThe faults of the Jewish race have often been attributed to the\nrepression of that race by Aryans, and many Christians are still\ndisposed to blame themselves in this respect. But the self-reproach is\nnot justified. Outward circumstances do not mould a race in one\ndirection, unless there is in the race the innate tendency to respond to\nthe moulding forces; the total result comes at least as much from the\nnatural disposition as from the modifying circumstances. We know now\nthat the proof of the inheritance of acquired characters has broken\ndown, and, in the human race still more than the lower forms of life, it\nis certain that individual and racial characters persist in spite of all\nadaptive moulding. When men change, it is from within, outwards, unless\nthe change, as in the case of women, is a mere superficial imitation of\nreal change, and is not rooted in their natures. And how can we\nreconcile the idea that the Jewish character is a modern modification\nwith the history of the foundation of the race, given in the Old\nTestament without any disapprobation of how the patriarch Jacob deceived\nhis dying father, cheated his brother Esau and over-reached his\nfather-in-law, Laban?\n\nThe defenders of the Jew have rightly acquitted him of any tendency to\nheinous crimes, and the legal statistics of different countries confirm\nthis. The Jew is not really anti-moral. But, none the less, he does not\nrepresent the highest ethical type. He is rather non-moral, neither very\ngood nor very bad, with nothing in him of either the angel or the devil.\nNotwithstanding the Book of Job and the story of Eden, it is plain that\nthe conceptions of a Supreme Good and a Supreme Evil are not truly\nJewish; I have no wish to enter upon the lengthy and controversial\ntopics of Biblical criticism, but at the least I shall be on sure ground\nwhen I say that these conceptions play the least significant part in\nmodern Jewish life. Orthodox or unorthodox, the modern Jew does not\nconcern himself with God and the Devil, with Heaven and Hell. If he does\nnot reach the heights of the Aryan, he is also less inclined to commit\nmurder or other crimes of violence.\n\nSo also in the case of the woman; it is easier for her defenders to\npoint to the infrequency of her commission of serious crimes than to\nprove her intrinsic morality. The homology of Jew and woman becomes\ncloser the further examination goes. There is no female devil, and no\nfemale angel; only love, with its blind aversion from actuality, sees in\nwoman a heavenly nature, and only hate sees in her a prodigy of\nwickedness. Greatness is absent from the nature of the woman and the\nJew, the greatness of morality, or the greatness of evil. In the Aryan\nman, the good and bad principles of Kant\u2019s religious philosophy are ever\npresent, ever in strife. In the Jew and the woman, good and evil are not\ndistinct from one another.\n\nJews, then, do not live as free, self-governing individuals, choosing\nbetween virtue and vice in the Aryan fashion. They are a mere collection\nof similar individuals each cast in the same mould, the whole forming\nas it were a continuous plasmodium. The Antisemite has often thought of\nthis as a defensive and aggressive union, and has formulated the\nconception of a Jewish \u201csolidarity.\u201d There is a deep confusion here.\nWhen some accusation is made against some unknown member of the Jewish\nrace, all Jews secretly take the part of the accused, and wish, hope\nfor, and seek to establish his innocence. But it must not be thought\nthat they are interesting themselves more in the fate of the individual\nJew than they would do in the case of an individual Christian. It is the\nmenace to Judaism in general, the fear that the shameful shadow may do\nharm to Judaism as a whole, which is the origin of the apparent feeling\nof sympathy. In the same way, women are delighted when a member of their\nsex is depreciated, and will themselves assist, until the proceeding\nseems to throw a disadvantageous light over the sex in general, so\nfrightening men from marriage. The race or sex alone is defended, not\nthe individual.\n\nIt would be easy to understand why the family (in its biological not its\nlegal sense) plays a larger _r\u00f4le_ amongst the Jews than amongst any\nother people; the English, who in certain ways are akin to the Jews,\ncoming next. The family, in this biological sense, is feminine and\nmaternal in its origin, and has no relation to the State or to society.\nThe fusion, the continuity of the members of the family, reaches its\nhighest point amongst the Jews. In the Indo-Germanic races, especially\nin the case of the more gifted, but also in quite ordinary individuals,\nthere is never complete harmony between father and son; consciously, or\nunconsciously, there is always in the mind of the son a certain feeling\nof impatience against the man who, unasked, brought him into the world,\ngave him a name, and determined his limitations in this earthly life. It\nis only amongst the Jews that the son feels deeply rooted in the family\nand is fully at one with his father. It scarcely ever happens amongst\nChristians that father and son are really friends. Amongst Christians\neven the daughters stand a little further apart from the family circle\nthan happens with Jewesses, and more frequently take up some calling\nwhich isolates them and gives them independent interests.\n\nWe reach at this point a fact in relation to the argument of the last\nchapter. I showed there that the essential element in the pairing\ninstinct was an indistinct sense of individuality and of the limits\nbetween individuals. Men who are match-makers have always a Jewish\nelement in them. The Jew is always more absorbed by sexual matters than\nthe Aryan, although he is notably less potent sexually and less liable\nto be enmeshed in a great passion. The Jews are habitual match-makers,\nand in no race does it so often happen that marriages are arranged by\nmen. This kind of activity is certainly peculiarly necessary in their\ncase, for, as I have already stated, there is no people amongst which\nmarriages for love are so rare. The organic disposition of the Jews\ntowards match-making is associated with their racial failure to\ncomprehend asceticism. It is interesting to note that the Jewish Rabbis\nhave always been addicted to speculations as to the begetting of\nchildren and have a rich tradition on the subject, a natural result in\nthe case of the people who invented the phrase as to the duty of\n\u201cmultiplying and replenishing the earth.\u201d\n\nThe pairing instinct is the great remover of the limits between\nindividuals; and the Jew, _par excellence_, is the breaker down of such\nlimits. He is at the opposite pole from aristocrats, with whom the\npreservation of the limits between individuals is the leading idea. The\nJew is an inborn communist. The Jew\u2019s careless manners in society and\nhis want of social tact turn on this quality, for the reserves of social\nintercourse are simply barriers to protect individuality.\n\nI desire at this point again to lay stress on the fact, although it\nshould be self-evident, that, in spite of my low estimate of the Jew,\nnothing could be further from my intention than to lend the faintest\nsupport to any practical or theoretical persecution of Jews. I am\ndealing with Judaism, in the platonic sense, as an idea. There is no\nmore an absolute Jew than an absolute Christian. I am not speaking\nagainst the individual, whom, indeed, if that had been so, I should have\nwounded grossly and unnecessarily. Watchwords, such as \u201cBuy only from\nChristians,\u201d have in reality a Jewish taint; they have a meaning only\nfor those who regard the race and not the individual, and what is to be\ncompared with them is the Jewish use of the word \u201cGoy,\u201d which is now\nalmost obsolete. I have no wish to boycott the Jew, or by any such\nimmoral means to attempt to solve the Jewish question. Nor will Zionism\nsolve that question; as H. S. Chamberlain has pointed out, since the\ndestruction of the Temple at Jerusalem, Judaism has ceased to be\nnational, and has become a spreading parasite, straggling all over the\nearth and finding true root nowhere. Before Zionism is possible, the Jew\nmust first conquer Judaism.\n\nTo defeat Judaism, the Jew must first understand himself, and war\nagainst himself. So far, the Jew has reached no further than to make and\nenjoy jokes against his own peculiarities. Unconsciously he respects the\nAryan more than himself. Only steady resolution, united to the highest\nself-respect, can free the Jew from Jewishness. This resolution, be it\never so strong, ever so honourable, can only be understood and carried\nout by the individual, not by the group. Therefore the Jewish question\ncan only be solved individually; every single Jew must try to solve it\nin his proper person.\n\nThere is no other solution to the question and can be no other; Zionism\nwill never succeed in answering it.\n\nThe Jew, indeed, who has overcome, the Jew who has become a Christian,\nhas the fullest right to be regarded by the Aryan in his individual\ncapacity, and no longer be condemned as belonging to a race above which\nhis moral efforts have raised him. He may rest assured that no one will\ndispute his well-founded claim. The Aryan of good social standing always\nfeels the need to respect the Jew; his Antisemitism being no joy, no\namusement to him. Therefore he is displeased when Jews make revelations\nabout Jews, and he who does so may expect as few thanks from that\nquarter as from over-sensitive Judaism itself. Above all, the Aryan\ndesires that the Jew should justify Antisemitism by being baptized. But\nthe danger of this outward acknowledgment of his inward struggles need\nnot trouble the Jew who wishes for liberty within him. He will long to\nreach the holy baptism of the Spirit, of which that of the body is but\nthe outward symbol.\n\nTo reach so important and useful a result as what Jewishness and Judaism\nreally are, would be to solve one of the most difficult problems;\nJudaism is a much deeper riddle than the many Antisemites believe, and\nin very truth a certain darkness will always enshroud it. Even the\nparallel with woman will soon fail us, though now and then it may help\nus further.\n\nIn Christians pride and humility, in Jews haughtiness and cringing, are\never at strife; in the former self-consciousness and contrition, in the\nlatter arrogance and bigotry. In the total lack of humility of the Jew\nlies his failure to grasp the idea of grace. From his slavish\ndisposition springs his heteronomous code of ethics, the \u201cDecalogue,\u201d\nthe most immoral book of laws in the universe, which enjoins on obedient\nfollowers, submission to the powerful will of an exterior influence,\nwith the reward of earthly well-being and the conquest of the world. His\nrelations with Jehovah, the abstract Deity, whom he slavishly fears,\nwhose name he never dares to pronounce, characterise the Jew; he, like\nthe woman, requires the rule of an exterior authority. According to the\ndefinition of Schopenhauer, the word \u2018God\u2019 indicates a man who made the\nworld. This certainly is a true likeness of the God of the Jew. Of the\ndivine in man, of \u201cthe God who in my bosom dwells,\u201d the true Jew knows\nnothing; for what Christ and Plato, Eckhard and Paul, Goethe and Kant,\nthe priests of the Vedas, Fechner, and every Aryan have meant by divine,\nfor what the saying, \u201cI am with you always even to the end of the\nworld\u201d--for the meaning of all these the Jew remains without\nunderstanding. For the God in man is the human soul, and the absolute\nJew is devoid of a soul.\n\nIt is inevitable, then, that we should find no trace of belief in\nimmortality in the Old Testament. Those who have no soul can have no\ncraving for immortality, and so it is with the woman and the Jew; \u201cAnima\nnaturaliter Christiana,\u201d said Tertullian.\n\nThe absence from the Jew of true mysticism--Chamberlain has remarked on\nthis--has a similar origin. They have nothing but the grossest\nsuperstition and the system of divinatory magic known as the \u201cKabbala.\u201d\nJewish monotheism has no relation to a true belief in God; it is not a\nreligion of reason, but a belief of old women founded on fear.\n\nWhy is it that the Jewish slave of Jehovah should become so readily a\nmaterialist or a freethinker? It is merely the alternative phase to\nslavery; arrogance about what is not understood is the other side of the\nslavish intelligence. When it is fully recognised that Judaism is to be\nregarded rather as an idea in which other races have a share, than as\nthe absolute property of a particular race, then the Judaic element in\nmodern materialistic science will be better understood. Wagner has given\nexpression to Judaism in music; there remains to say something about\nJudaism in modern science.\n\nJudaism in science, in the widest interpretation of it, is the endeavour\nto remove all transcendentalism. The Aryan feels that the effort to\ngrasp everything, and to refer everything to some system of deductions,\nreally robs things of their true meaning; for him, what cannot be\ndiscovered is what gives the world its significance. The Jew has no fear\nof these hidden and secret elements, for he has no consciousness of\ntheir presence. He tries to take a view of the world as flat and\ncommonplace as possible, and to refuse to see all the secret and\nspiritual meanings of things. His view is non-philosophical rather than\nanti-philosophical.\n\nBecause fear of God in the Jew has no relation with real religion, the\nJew is of all persons the least perturbed by mechanical, materialistic\ntheories of the world; he is readily beguiled by Darwinism and the\nridiculous notion that men are derived from monkeys; and now he is\ndisposed to accept the view that the soul of man is an evolution that\nhas taken place within the human race; formerly, he was a mad devotee of\nBuchner, now he is ready to follow Ostwald.\n\nIt is due to a real disposition that the Jews should be so prominent in\nthe study of chemistry; they cling naturally to matter, and expect to\nfind the solution of everything in its properties. And yet one who was\nthe greatest German investigator of all times, Kepler himself, wrote the\nfollowing hexameter on chemistry:\n\n  \u201cO curas Chymicorum! O quantum in pulvere inane!\u201d\n\nThe present turn of medical science is largely due to the influence of\nthe Jews, who in such numbers have embraced the medical profession. From\nthe earliest times, until the dominance of the Jews, medicine was\nclosely allied with religion. But now they would make it a matter of\ndrugs, a mere administration of chemicals. But it can never be that the\norganic will be explained by the inorganic. Fechner and Preyer were\nright when they said that death came from life, not life from death. We\nsee this taking place daily in individuals (in human beings, for\ninstance, old age prepares for death by a calcification of the tissues).\nAnd as yet no one has seen the organic arise from the inorganic. From\nthe time of Schwammerdam to that of Pasteur it has become more and more\ncertain that living things never arise from what is not alive. Surely\nthis ontogenetic observation should be applied to phylogeny, and we\nshould be equally certain that, in the past, the dead arose from the\nliving. The chemical interpretation of organisms sets these on a level\nwith their own dead ashes. We should return from this Judaistic science\nto the nobler conceptions of Copernicus and Galileo, Kepler and Euler,\nNewton and Linn\u00e6us, Lamarck and Faraday, Sprengel and Cuvier. The\nfreethinkers of to-day, soulless and not believing in the soul, are\nincapable of filling the places of these great men and of reverently\nrealising the presence of intrinsic secrets in nature.\n\nIt is this want of depth which explains the absence of truly great Jews;\nlike women, they are without any trace of genius. The philosopher\nSpinoza, about whose purely Jewish descent there can be no doubt, is\nincomparably the greatest Jew of the last nine hundred years, much\ngreater than the poet Heine (who, indeed, was almost destitute of any\nquality of true greatness) or than that original, if shallow painter,\nIsraels. The extraordinary fashion in which Spinoza has been\nover-estimated is less due to his intrinsic merit than to the fortuitous\ncircumstance that he was the only thinker to whom Goethe gave his\nattention.\n\nFor Spinoza himself there was no deep problem in nature (and in this he\nshowed his Jewish character), as, otherwise, he would not have\nelaborated his mathematical method, a method according to which the\nexplanation of things was to be found in themselves. This system formed\na refuge into which Spinoza could escape from himself, and it is not\nunnatural that it should have been attractive to Goethe, who was the\nmost introspective of men, as it might have seemed to offer to him\ntranquillity and rest.\n\nSpinoza showed his Jewishness and the limits that always confine the\nJewish spirit in a still plainer fashion; I am not thinking of his\nfailure to comprehend the State or of his adhesion to the Hobbesian\ndoctrine of universal warfare as the primitive condition of mankind. The\nmatter goes deeper. I have in mind his complete rejection of\nfree-will--the Jew is always a slave and a determinist--and his view\nthat individuals were mere accidents into which the universal substance\nhad fallen. The Jew is never a believer in monads. And so there is no\nwider philosophical gulf than that between Spinoza and his much more\neminent contemporary, Leibnitz, the protagonist of the monad theory, or\nits still greater creator, Bruno, whose superficial likeness with\nSpinoza has been exaggerated in the most grotesque fashion.\n\nJust as Jews and women are without extreme good and extreme evil, so\nthey never show either genius or the depth of stupidity of which mankind\nis capable. The specific kind of intelligence for which Jews and women\nalike are notorious is due simply to the alertness of an exaggerated\negotism; it is due, moreover, to the boundless capacity shown by both\nfor pursuing any object with equal zeal, because they have no intrinsic\nstandard of value--nothing in their own souls by which to judge of the\nworthiness of any particular object. And so they have unhampered natural\ninstincts, such as are not present to help the Aryan man when his\ntranscendental standard fails him.\n\nI may now touch upon the likeness of the English to the Jews, a topic\ndiscussed at length by Wagner. It cannot be doubted that of the Germanic\nraces the English are in closest relationship with the Jews. Their\northodoxy and their devotion to the Sabbath afford a direct indication.\nThe religion of the Englishman is always tinged with hypocrisy, and his\nasceticism is largely prudery. The English, like women, have been most\nunproductive in religion and in music; there may be irreligious poets,\nalthough not great artists, but there is no irreligious musician. So,\nalso, the English have produced no great architects or philosophers.\nBerkeley, like Swift and Sterne, were Irish; Carlyle, Hamilton, and\nBurns were Scotch. Shakespeare and Shelley, the two greatest Englishmen,\nstand far from the pinnacle of humanity; they do not reach so far as\nAngelo and Beethoven. If we consider English philosophers we shall see\nthat there has been a great degeneration since the Middle Ages. It began\nwith William of Ockham and Duns Scotus; it proceeded through Roger Bacon\nand his namesake, the Chancellor; through Hobbes, who, mentally, was so\nnear akin to Spinoza; through the superficial Locke to Hartley,\nPriestley, Bentham, the two Mills, Lewes, Huxley, and Spencer. These are\nthe greatest names in the history of English philosophy, for Adam Smith\nand David Hume were Scotchmen. It must always be remembered against\nEngland, that from her there came the soulless psychology. The\nEnglishman has impressed himself on the German as a rigorous empiricist\nand as a practical politician, but these two sides exhaust his\nimportance in philosophy. There has never yet been a true philosopher\nwho made empiricism his basis, and no Englishman has got beyond\nempiricism without external help.\n\nNone the less, the Englishman must not be confused with the Jew. There\nis more of the transcendental element in him, and his mind is directed\nrather from the transcendental to the practical, than from the practical\ntowards the transcendental. Otherwise he would not be so readily\ndisposed to humour, unlike the Jew, who is ready to be witty only at his\nown expense or on sexual things.\n\nI am well aware how difficult are the problems of laughter and\nhumour--just as difficult as any problems that are peculiar to man and\nnot shared by him with the beasts; so difficult that neither\nSchopenhauer nor Jean Paul himself were able to elucidate them. Humour\nhas many aspects; in some men it seems to be an expression of pity for\nthemselves or for others, but this element is not sufficient to\ndistinguish it.\n\nThe essence of humour appears to me to consist in a laying of stress on\nempirical things, in order that their unreality may become more obvious.\nEverything that is realised is laughable, and in this way humour seems\nto be the antithesis of eroticism. The latter welds men and the world\ntogether, and unites them in a great purpose; the former loses the bonds\nof synthesis and shows the world as a silly affair. The two stand\nsomewhat in the relation of polarised and unpolarised light.\n\nWhen the great erotic wishes to pass from the limited to the illimited,\nhumour pounces down on him, pushes him in front of the stage, and laughs\nat him from the wings. The humourist has not the craving to transcend\nspace; he is content with small things; his dominion is neither the sea\nnor the mountains, but the flat level plain. He shuns the idyllic, and\nplunges deeply into the commonplace, only, however, to show its\nunreality. He turns from the immanence of things and will not hear the\ntranscendental even spoken of. Wit seeks out contradictions in the\nsphere of experience; humour goes deeper and shows that experience is a\nblind and closed system; both compromise the phenomenal world by showing\nthat everything is possible in it. Tragedy, on the other hand, shows\nwhat must for all eternity be impossible in the phenomenal world; and\nthus tragedy and comedy alike, each in their own way, are negations of\nthe empiric.\n\nThe Jew who does not set out, like the humourist, from the\ntranscendental, and does not move towards it, like the erotic, has no\ninterest in depreciating what is called the actual world, and that never\nbecomes for him the paraphernalia of a juggler or the nightmare of a\nmad-house. Humour, because it recognises the transcendental, if only by\nthe mode of resolutely concealing it, is essentially tolerant; satire,\non the other hand, is essentially intolerant, and is congruous with the\ndisposition of the Jew and the woman. Jews and women are devoid of\nhumour, but addicted to mockery. In Rome there was even a woman\n(Sulpicia) who wrote satires. Satire, because of its intolerance, is\nimpossible to men in society. The humourist, who knows how to keep the\ntrifles and littlenesses of phenomena from troubling himself or others,\nis a welcome guest. Humour, like love, moves away obstacles from our\npath; it makes possible a way of regarding the world. The Jew,\ntherefore, is least addicted to society, and the Englishman most adapted\nfor it.\n\nThe comparison of the Jew with the Englishman fades out much more\nquickly than that with the woman. Both comparisons first arose in the\nheat of the conflict as to the worth and the nature of Jews. I may again\nrefer to Wagner, who not only interested himself deeply in the problem\nof Judaism, but rediscovered the Jew in the Englishman, and threw the\nshadow of Ahasuerus over his Kundry, probably the most perfect\nrepresentation of woman in art.\n\nThe fact that no woman in the world represents the idea of the wife so\ncompletely as the Jewess (and not only in the eyes of Jews) still\nfurther supports the comparison between Jews and women. In the case of\nthe Aryans, the metaphysical qualities of the male are part of his\nsexual attraction for the woman, and so, in a fashion, she puts on an\nappearance of these. The Jew, on the other hand, has no transcendental\nquality, and in the shaping and moulding of the wife leaves the natural\ntendencies of the female nature a more unhampered sphere; and the Jewish\nwoman, accordingly, plays the part required of her, as house-mother or\nodalisque, as Cybele or Cyprian, in the fullest way.\n\nThe congruity between Jews and women further reveals itself in the\nextreme adaptability of the Jews, in their great talent for journalism,\nthe \u201cmobility\u201d of their minds, their lack of deeply-rooted and original\nideas, in fact the mode in which, like women, because they are nothing\nin themselves, they can become everything. The Jew is an individual, not\nan individuality; he is in constant close relation with the lower life,\nand has no share in the higher metaphysical life.\n\nAt this point the comparison between the Jew and the woman breaks down;\nthe being-nothing and becoming-all-things differs in the two. The woman\nis material which passively assumes any form impressed upon it. In the\nJew there is a definite aggressiveness; it is not because of the great\nimpression that others make on him that he is receptive; he is no more\nsubject to suggestion than the Aryan man, but he adapts himself to every\ncircumstance and every race, becoming, like the parasite, a new creature\nin every different host, although remaining essentially the same. He\nassimilates himself to everything, and assimilates everything; he is not\ndominated by others, but submits himself to them. The Jew is gifted, the\nwoman is not gifted, and the giftedness of the Jew reveals itself in\nmany forms of activity, as, for instance, in jurisprudence; but these\nactivities are always relative and never seated in the creative freedom\nof the will.\n\nThe Jew is as persistent as the woman, but his persistence is not that\nof the individual but of the race. He is not unconditioned like the\nAryan, but his limitations differ from those of the woman.\n\nThe true peculiarity of the Jew reveals itself best in his essentially\nirreligious nature. I cannot here enter on a discussion as to the idea\nof religion; but it is enough to say that it is associated essentially\nwith an acceptance of the higher and eternal in man as different in\nkind, and in no sense to be derived from the phenomenal life. The Jew is\neminently the unbeliever. Faith is that act of man by which he enters\ninto relation with being, and religious faith is directed towards\nabsolute, eternal being, the \u201clife everlasting\u201d of the religious phrase.\nThe Jew is really nothing because he believes in nothing.\n\nBelief is everything. It does not matter if a man does not believe in\nGod; let him believe in atheism. But the Jew believes nothing; he does\nnot believe his own belief; he doubts as to his own doubt. He is never\nabsorbed by his own joy, or engrossed by his own sorrow. He never takes\nhimself in earnest, and so never takes any one else in earnest. He is\ncontent to be a Jew, and accepts any disadvantages that come from the\nfact.\n\nWe have now reached the fundamental difference between the Jew and the\nwoman. Neither believe in themselves; but the woman believes in others,\nin her husband, her lover, or her children, or in love itself; she has a\ncentre of gravity, although it is outside her own being. The Jew\nbelieves in nothing, within him or without him. His want of desire for\npermanent landed property and his attachment to movable goods are more\nthan symbolical.\n\nThe woman believes in the man, in the man outside her, or in the man\nfrom whom she takes her inspiration, and in this fashion can take\nherself in earnest. The Jew takes nothing seriously; he is frivolous,\nand jests about anything, about the Christian\u2019s Christianity, the Jew\u2019s\nbaptism. He is neither a true realist nor a true empiricist. Here I must\nstate certain limitations to my agreement with Chamberlain\u2019s\nconclusions. The Jew is not really a convinced empiricist in the fashion\nof the English philosophers. The empiricist believes in the possibility\nof reaching a complete system of knowledge on an empirical basis; he\nhopes for the perfection of science. The Jew does not really believe in\nknowledge, nor is he a sceptic, for he doubts his own scepticism. On the\nother hand, a brooding care hovers over the non-metaphysical system of\nAvenarius, and even in Ernst Mach\u2019s adherence to relativity there are\nsigns of a deeply reverent attitude. The empiricists must not be accused\nof Judaism because they are shallow.\n\nThe Jew is the impious man in the widest sense. Piety is not something\nnear things nor outside things; it is the groundwork of everything. The\nJew has been incorrectly called vulgar, simply because he does not\nconcern himself with metaphysics. All true culture that comes from\nwithin, all that a man believes to be true and that so is true for him,\ndepend on reverence. Reverence is not limited to the mystic or the\nreligious man; all science and all scepticism, everything that a man\ntruly believes, have reverence as the fundamental quality. Naturally it\ndisplays itself in different ways, in high seriousness and sanctity, in\nearnestness and enthusiasm. The Jew is never either enthusiastic or\nindifferent, he is neither ecstatic nor cold. He reaches neither the\nheights nor the depths. His restraint becomes meagreness, his\ncopiousness becomes bombast. Should he venture into the boundless realms\nof inspired thought, he seldom reaches beyond pathos. And although he\ncannot embrace the whole world, he is for ever covetous of it.\n\nDiscrimination and generalisation, strength and love, science and\npoetry, every real and deep emotion of the human heart, have reverence\nas their essential basis. It is not necessary that faith, as in men of\ngenius, should be in relation only to metaphysical entity; it can extend\nalso to the empirical world and appear fully there, and yet none the\nless be faith in oneself, in worth, in truth, in the absolute, in God.\n\nAs the comprehensive view of religion and piety that I have given may\nlead to misconstruction, I propose to elucidate it further. True piety\nis not merely the possession of piety, but also the struggle to possess\nit; it is found equally in the convinced believer in God (Handel or\nFechner), and also in the doubting seeker (Lenau and D\u00fcrer); it need\nnot be made obvious to the world (as in the case of Bach), it may\ndisplay itself only in a reverent attitude (Mozart). Nor is piety\nnecessarily connected with the appearance of a Founder; the ancient\nGreeks were the most reverent people that have lived, and hence their\nculture was highest; but their religion had no personal Founder.\n\nReligion is the creation of the all; and all that humanity can be is\nonly through religion. So far from the Jew being religious, as has been\nassumed, he is profoundly irreligious.\n\nWere there need to elaborate my verdict on the Jews I might point out\nthat the Jews, alone of peoples, do not try to make converts to their\nfaith, and that when converts are made they serve as objects of puzzled\nridicule to them. Need I refer to the meaningless formality and the\nrepetitions of Jewish prayer? Need I remind readers that the Jewish\nreligion is a mere historical tradition, a memorial of such incidents as\nthe miraculous crossing of the Red Sea, with the consequent thanks of\ncowards to their Saviour; and that it is no guide to the meaning and\nconduct of life? The Jew is truly irreligious and furthest of mankind\nfrom faith. There is no relation between the Jew himself and the\nuniverse; he has none of the heroism of faith, just as he has none of\nthe disaster of absolute unbelief.\n\nIt is not, then, mysticism that the Jew is without, as Chamberlain\nmaintains, but reverence. If he were only an honest-minded materialist\nor a frank evolutionist! He is not a critic, but only critical; he is\nnot a sceptic in the Cartesian sense, not a doubter who sets out from\ndoubt towards truth, but an ironist; as, for instance, to take a\nconspicuous example, Heine.\n\nWhat, then, is the Jew if he is nothing that a man can be? What goes on\nwithin him if he is utterly without finality, if there is no ground in\nhim which the plumb line of psychology may reach?\n\nThe psychological contents of the Jewish mind are always double or\nmultiple. There are always before him two or many possibilities, where\nthe Aryan, although he sees as widely, feels himself limited in his\nchoice. I think that the idea of Judaism consists in this want of\nreality, this absence of any fundamental relation to the\nthing-in-and-for-itself. He stands, so to speak, outside reality,\nwithout ever entering it. He can never make himself one with\nanything--never enter into real relationships. He is a zealot without\nzeal; he has no share in the unlimited, the unconditioned. He is without\nsimplicity of faith, and so is always turning to each new\ninterpretation, so seeming more alert than the Aryan. Internal\nmultiplicity is the essence of Judaism, internal simplicity that of the\nAryan.\n\nIt might be urged that the Jewish double-mindedness is modern, and is\nthe result of new knowledge struggling with the old orthodoxy. The\neducation of the Jew, however, only accentuates his natural qualities,\nand the doubting Jew turns with a renewed zeal to money-making, in which\nonly he can find his standard of value. A curious proof of the absence\nof simplicity in the mind of the Jew is that he seldom sings, not from\nbashfulness, but because he does not believe in his own singing. Just as\nthe acuteness of Jews has nothing to do with true power of\ndifferentiating, so his shyness about singing or even about speaking in\nclear positive tones has nothing to do with real reserve. It is a kind\nof inverted pride; having no true sense of his own worth, he fears being\nmade ridiculous by his singing or speech. The embarrassment of the Jew\nextends to things which have nothing to do with the real ego.\n\nIt has been seen how difficult it is to define the Jew. He has neither\nseverity nor tenderness. He is both tenacious and weak. He is neither\nking nor leader, slave nor vassal. He has no share in enthusiasm, and\nyet he has little equanimity. Nothing is self-evident to him, and yet he\nis astonished at nothing. He has no trace of Lohengrin in him, and none\nof Telramund. He is ridiculous as a member of a students\u2019 corps and he\nis equally ridiculous as a \u201cphilister.\u201d Because he believes in nothing,\nhe takes refuge in materialism; from this arises his avarice, which is\nsimply an attempt to convince himself that something has a permanent\nvalue. And yet he is no real tradesman; what is unreal, insecure in\nGerman commerce, is the result of the Jewish speculative interest.\n\nThe erotics of the Jew are sentimentalism, and their humour is satire.\nPerhaps examples may help to explain my interpretation of the Jewish\ncharacter, and I point readily to Ibsen\u2019s King Hakon in the\n\u201cPretenders,\u201d and to his Dr. Stockmann in \u201cThe Enemy of the People.\u201d\nThese may make clear what is for ever absent in the Jew. Judaism and\nChristianity form the greatest possible contrasts; the former is bereft\nof all true faith and of inner identity, the latter is the highest\nexpression of the highest faith. Christianity is heroism at its highest\npoint; Judaism is the extreme of cowardliness.\n\nChamberlain has said much that is true and striking as to the fearful\nawe-struck want of understanding that the Jew displays with regard to\nthe person and teaching of Christ, for the combination of warrior and\nsufferer in Him, for His life and death. None the less, it would be\nwrong to state that the Jew is an enemy of Christ, that he represents\nthe anti-Christ; it is only that he feels no relation with Him. It is\nstrong-minded Aryans, malefactors, who hate Jesus. The Jew does not get\nbeyond being bewildered and disturbed by Him, as something that passes\nhis wit to understand.\n\nAnd yet it has stood the Jew in good stead that the New Testament seemed\nthe outcome and fine flower of the Old, the fulfilment of its Messianic\nprophecies. The polar opposition between Judaism and Christianity makes\nthe origin of the latter from the former a deep riddle; it is the riddle\nof the psychology of the founder of religions.\n\nWhat is the difference between the genius who founds a religion and\nother kinds of genius? What is it that has led him to found the\nreligion?\n\nThe main difference is no other than that he did not always believe in\nthe God he worships. Tradition relates of Buddha, as of Christ, that\nthey were subject to greater temptations than other men. Two others,\nMahomet and Luther, were epileptic. Epilepsy is the disease of the\ncriminal; C\u00e6sar, Narses, Napoleon, the greatest of the criminals, were\nepileptics.\n\nThe founder of a religion is the man who has lived without God and yet\nhas struggled towards the greatest faith. How is it possible for a bad\nman to transform himself? As Kant, although he was compelled to admit\nthe fact, asked in his \u201cPhilosophy of Religion,\u201d how can an evil tree\nbring forth good fruit? The inconceivable mystery of the transformation\ninto a good man of one who has lived evilly all the days and years of\nhis life has actually realised itself in the case of some six or seven\nhistorical personages. These have been the founders of religions.\n\nOther men of genius are good from their birth; the religious founder\nacquires goodness. The old existence ceases utterly and is replaced by\nthe new. The greater the man, the more must perish in him at the\nregeneration. I am inclined to think that Socrates, alone amongst the\nGreeks, approached closely to the founders of religion; perhaps he made\nthe decisive struggle with evil in the four-and-twenty hours during\nwhich he stood alone at Potid\u00e6a.\n\nThe founder of a religion is the man for whom no problem has been solved\nfrom his birth. He is the man with the least possible sureness of\nconviction, for whom everything is doubtful and uncertain, and who has\nto conquer everything for himself in this life. One has to struggle\nagainst illness and physical weakness, another trembles on the brink of\nthe crimes which are possible for him, yet another has been in the bonds\nof sin from his birth. It is only a formal statement to say that\noriginal sin is the same in all persons; it differs materially for each\nperson. Here one, there another, each as he was born, has chosen what is\nsenseless and worthless, has preferred instinct to his will, or pleasure\nto love; only the founder of a religion has had original sin in its\nabsolute form; in him everything is doubtful, everything is in question.\nHe has to meet every problem and free himself from all guilt. He has to\nreach firm ground from the deepest abyss; he has to surmount the\nnothingness in him and bind himself to the utmost reality. And so it\nmay be said of him that he frees himself of original sin, that in him\nGod becomes man, but also that the man becomes God; in him was all error\nand all guilt; in him there comes to be all expiation and redemption.\n\nThus the founder of a religion is the greatest of the geniuses, for he\nhas vanquished the most. He is the man who has accomplished victoriously\nwhat the deepest thinkers of mankind have thought of only timorously as\na possibility, the complete regeneration of a man, the reversal of his\nwill. Other great men of genius have, indeed, to fight against evil, but\nthe bent of their souls is towards the good. The founder of a religion\nhas so much in him of evil, of the perverse, of earthly passion, that he\nmust fight with the enemy within him for forty days in the wilderness,\nwithout food or sleep. It was only thus that he can conquer and overcome\nthe death within him and free himself for the highest life. Were it\notherwise there would be no impulse to found a faith. The founder of a\nreligion is thus the very antipodes of the emperor; emperor and Galilean\nare at the two poles of thought. In Napoleon\u2019s life, also, there was a\nmoment when a conversion took place; but this was not a turning away\nfrom earthly life, but the deliberate decision for the treasure and\npower and splendour of the earthly life. Napoleon was great in the\ncolossal intensity with which he flung from him all the ideal, all\nrelation to the absolute, in the magnitude of his guilt. The founder of\nreligion, on the other hand, cannot and will not bring to man anything\nexcept that which was most difficult for himself to attain, the\nreconciliation with God. He knows that he himself was the man most laden\nwith guilt, and he atones for the guilt by his death on the cross.\n\nThere were two possibilities in Judaism. Before the birth of Christ,\nthese two, negation and affirmation, were together awaiting choice.\nChrist was the man who conquered in Himself Judaism, the greatest\nnegation, and created Christianity, the strongest affirmation and the\nmost direct opposite of Judaism. Now the choice has been made; the old\nIsrael has divided into Jews and Christians, and Judaism has lost the\npossibility of producing greatness. The new Judaism has been unable to\nproduce men like Samson and Joshua, the least Jewish of the old Jews. In\nthe history of the world, Christendom and Jewry represent negation and\naffirmation. In old Israel there was the highest possibility of mankind,\nthe possibility of Christ. The other possibility is the Jew.\n\nI must guard against misconception; I do not mean that there was any\napproach to Christianity in Judaism; the one is the absolute negation of\nthe other; the relation between the two is only that which exists\nbetween all pairs of direct opposites. Even more than in the case of\npiety and Judaism, Judaism and Christianity can best be contrasted by\nwhat each respectively excludes. Nothing is easier than to be Jewish,\nnothing so difficult as to be Christian. Judaism is the abyss over which\nChristianity is erected, and for that reason the Aryan dreads nothing so\ndeeply as the Jew.\n\nI am not disposed to believe, with Chamberlain, that the birth of the\nSaviour in Palestine was an accident. Christ was a Jew, precisely that\nHe might overcome the Judaism within Him, for he who triumphs over the\ndeepest doubt reaches the highest faith; he who has raised himself above\nthe most desolate negation is most sure in his position of affirmation.\nJudaism was the peculiar, original sin of Christ; it was His victory\nover Judaism that made Him greater than Buddha or Confucius. Christ was\nthe greatest man because He conquered the greatest enemy. Perhaps He\nwas, and will remain, the only Jew to conquer Judaism. The first of the\nJews to become wholly the Christ was also the last who made the\ntransition. It may be, however, that there still lies in Judaism the\npossibility of producing a Christ, and that the founder of the next\nreligion will pass through Jewry.\n\nOn no other supposition can we account for the long persistence of the\nJewish race which has outlived so many other peoples. Without at least\nsome vague hope, the Jews could not have survived, and the hope is that\nthere must be something in Judaism for Judaism; it is the idea of a\nMessiah, of one who shall save them from Judaism. Every other race has\nhad some special watchword, and, on realising their watchword, they have\nperished. The Jews have failed to realise their watchword, and so their\nvitality persists. The Jewish nature has no other metaphysical meaning\nthan to be the spring from which the founders of religion will come.\nTheir tradition to increase and multiply is connected with this vague\nhope, that out of them shall come the Messiah. The possibility of\nbegetting Christs is the meaning of Judaism.\n\nAs in the Jew there are the greatest possibilities, so also in him are\nthe meanest actualities; he is adapted to most things and realises\nfewest.\n\nJudaism, at the present day, has reached its highest point since the\ntime of Herod. Judaism is the spirit of modern life. Sexuality is\naccepted, and contemporary ethics sing the praises of pairing. Unhappy\nNietzsche must not be made responsible for the shameful doctrines of\nWilhelm B\u00f6lsche. Nietzsche himself understood asceticism, and perhaps it\nwas only as a revulsion from the evils of his own asceticism that he\nattached value to the opposite conception. It is the Jew and the woman\nwho are the apostles of pairing to bring guilt on humanity.\n\nOur age is not only the most Jewish but the most feminine. It is a time\nwhen art is content with daubs and seeks its inspiration in the sports\nof animals; the time of a superficial anarchy, with no feeling for\nJustice and the State; a time of communistic ethics, of the most foolish\nof historical views, the materialistic interpretation of history; a time\nof capitalism and of Marxism; a time when history, life, and science are\nno more than political economy and technical instruction; a time when\ngenius is supposed to be a form of madness; a time with no great artists\nand no great philosophers; a time without originality and yet with the\nmost foolish craving for originality; a time when the cult of the Virgin\nhas been replaced by that of the Demi-vierge. It is the time when\npairing has not only been approved but has been enjoined as a duty.\n\nBut from the new Judaism the new Christianity may be pressing forth;\nmankind waits for the new founder of religion, and, as in the year one,\nthe age presses for a decision. The decision must be made between\nJudaism and Christianity, between business and culture, between male and\nfemale, between the race and the individual, between unworthiness and\nworth, between the earthly and the higher life, between negation and the\nGod-like. Mankind has the choice to make. There are only two poles, and\nthere is no middle way.\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nWOMAN AND MANKIND\n\nAt last we are ready, clear-eyed and well armed, to deal with the\nquestion of the emancipation of women. Our eyes are clear, for we have\nfreed them from the thronging specks of dubiety that had hitherto\nobscured the question, and we are armed with a well-founded grasp of\ntheory, and a secure ethical basis. We are far from the maze in which\nthis controversy usually lies, and our investigation has got beyond the\nmere statement of different natural capacity for men and women, to a\npoint whence the part of women in the world-whole and the meaning of her\nrelation to humanity can be estimated. I am not going to deal with any\npractical applications of my results; the latter are not nearly\noptimistic enough for me to hope that they could have any effect on the\nprogress of political movements. I refrain from working out laws of\nsocial hygiene, and content myself with facing the problem from the\nstandpoint of that conception of humanity which pervades the philosophy\nof Immanuel Kant.\n\nThis conception is in great danger from woman. Woman is able, in a quite\nextraordinary way, to produce the impression that she herself is really\nnon-sexual, and that her sexuality is only a concession to man. But be\nthat as it may, at the present time men have almost allowed themselves\nto be persuaded by woman that their strongest and most markedly\ncharacteristic desire lies in sexuality, that it is only through woman\nthat they can hope to satisfy their truest and best ambitions, and that\nchastity is an unnatural and impossible state for them. How often it\nhappens that young men who are wrapped up in their work are told by\nwomen to whom they appeal and who would prefer to have them paying them\nattention, or even as sons-in-law, that \u201cthey ought not to work too\nhard,\u201d that they ought to \u201cenjoy life.\u201d At the bottom of this sort of\nadvice there lies a feeling on the woman\u2019s part, which is none the less\nreal because it is unconscious, that her whole significance and\nexistence depend on her mission as a procreating agent, and that she\ngoes to the wall if man is allowed to occupy himself altogether with\nother than sexual matters.\n\nThat women will ever change in this respect is doubtful. There is\nnothing to show that she ever was different. It may be that to-day the\nphysical side of the question is more to the fore than formerly, since a\ngreat deal of the \u201cwoman movement\u201d of the times is merely a desire to be\n\u201cfree,\u201d to shake off the trammels of motherhood; as a whole the\npractical results show that it is revolt from motherhood towards\nprostitution, a prostitute emancipation rather than the emancipation of\nwoman that is aimed at: a bold bid for the success of the courtesan. The\nonly real change is man\u2019s behaviour towards the movement. Under the\ninfluence of modern Judaism, men seem inclined to accept woman\u2019s\nestimate of them and to bow before it.\n\nMasculine chastity is laughed at, and the feeling that woman is the evil\ninfluence in man\u2019s life is no longer understood, and men are not ashamed\nof their own lust.\n\nIt is now apparent from where this demand for \u201cseeing life,\u201d the\nDionysian view of the music-hall, the cult of Goethe in so far as he\nfollows Ovid, and this quite modern \u201ccoitus-cult\u201d comes. There is no\ndoubt that the movement is so widespread that very few men have the\ncourage to acknowledge their chastity, preferring to pretend that they\nare regular Don Juans. Sexual excess is held to be the most desirable\ncharacteristic of a man of the world, and sexuality has attained such\npre-eminence that a man is doubted unless he can, as it were, show\nproofs of his prowess. Chastity, on the other hand, is so despised that\nmany a really pure lad attempts to appear a _blas\u00e9 rou\u00e9_. It is even\ntrue that those who are modest are ashamed of the feeling; but there is\nanother, the modern form of shame--not the eroticist\u2019s shame, but the\nshame of the woman who has no lover, who has not received appraisement\nfrom the opposite sex. Hence it comes that men make it their business to\ntell each other what a right and proper pleasure they take in \u201cdoing\ntheir duty\u201d by the opposite sex. And women are careful to let it be\nknown that only what is \u201cmanly\u201d in man can appeal to them: and man takes\ntheir measure of his manliness and makes it his own. Man\u2019s\nqualifications as a male have, in fact, become identical with his value\nwith women, in women\u2019s eyes.\n\nBut God forbid that it should be so; that would mean that there are no\nlonger any _men_.\n\nContrast with this the fact that the high value set on women\u2019s virtue\noriginated with man, and will always come from men worthy of the name;\nit is the projection of man\u2019s own ideal of spotless purity on the object\nof his love.\n\nBut there should be no mistaking this true chastity for the shivering\nand shaking before contact, which is soon changed for delighted\nacquiescence, nor for the hysterical suppression of sexual desires. The\noutward endeavour to correspond to man\u2019s demand for physical purity must\nnot be taken for anything but a fear lest the buyer will fight shy of\nthe bargain; least of all the care which women so often take to choose\nonly the man who can give them most value must not deceive any one (it\nhas been called the \u201chigh value\u201d or \u201cself-respect\u201d a girl has for\nherself)! If one remembers the view women take of virginity, there can\nbe very little doubt that woman\u2019s one end is the bringing about of\nuniversal pairing as the only means by which they acquire a real\nexistence; that women desire pairing, and nothing else, even if they\npersonally appear to be as uninterested as possible in sensual matters.\nAll this can be fully proved from the generality of the match-making\ninstinct.\n\nIn order to be fully persuaded of this, woman\u2019s attitude towards the\nvirginity of those of her own sex must be considered.\n\nIt is certain that women have a very low opinion of the unmarried. It\nis, in fact, the one female condition which has a negative value for\nwoman. Women only respect a woman when she is married; even if she is\nunhappily married to a hideous, weak, poor, common, tyrannical,\n\u201cimpossible\u201d man, she is, nevertheless, married, has received value,\nexistence. Even if a woman has had a short experience of the freedom of\na courtesan\u2019s life, even if she has been on the streets, she still\nstands higher in a woman\u2019s estimation than the old maid, who works and\ntoils alone in her room, without ever having known lawful or unlawful\nunion with a man, the enduring or fleeting ecstasy of love.\n\nEven a young and beautiful girl is never valued by a woman for her\nattractions as such (the sense of the beautiful is wanting in woman\nsince they have no standard in themselves to measure it by), but merely\nbecause she has more prospect of enslaving a man. The more beautiful a\nyoung girl is, the more promising she appears to other women, the\ngreater her value to woman as the match-maker in her mission as guardian\nof the race; it is only this unconscious feeling which makes it possible\nfor a woman to take pleasure in the beauty of a young girl. It goes\nwithout saying that this can only happen when the woman in question has\nalready achieved her own end (because, otherwise, envy of a\ncontemporary, and the fear of having her own chances jeopardised by\nothers, would overcome other considerations). She must first of all\nattain her own union, and then she is ready to help others.\n\nWomen are altogether to blame for the unpleasant associations which are\nso unfortunately connected with \u201cold maids.\u201d One often hears men talking\nrespectfully of an elderly woman; but every woman and girl, whether\nmarried or single, has nothing but contempt for such a one, even when,\nas is often the case, they are unconscious that it is so with them. I\nonce heard a married woman, whose talents and beauty put jealousy quite\nout of the question, making fun of her plain and elderly Italian\ngoverness for repeatedly saying that: \u201cIo sono ancora una virgine\u201d (that\nshe was still a virgin). The interpretation put on the words was that\nthe speaker wished to admit she had made a virtue of necessity, and\nwould have been very glad to get rid of her virginity if she could have\ndone so without detriment to her position in life.\n\nThis is the most important point of all: women not only disparage and\ndespise the virginity of other women, but they set no value on their own\nstate of virginity (except that men prize it so highly). This is why\nthey look upon every married woman as a sort of superior being. The deep\nimpression made on women by the sexual act can be most plainly seen by\nthe respect which girls pay to a married woman, of however short a\nstanding; which points to their idea of their existence being the\nattainment of the same zenith themselves. They look upon other young\ngirls, on the contrary, as being, like themselves, still imperfect\nbeings awaiting consummation.\n\nI think I have said enough to show that experience confirms the\ndeduction I made from the importance of the pairing instinct in women,\nthe deduction that virgin worship is of male, not female origin.\n\nA man demands chastity in himself and others, most of all from the being\nhe loves; a woman wants the man with most experience and sensuality, not\nvirtue. Woman has no comprehension of paragons. On the contrary, it is\nwell known that a woman is most ready to fly to the arms of the man with\nthe widest reputation for being a Don Juan.\n\nWoman requires man to be sexual, because she only gains existence\nthrough his sexuality. Women have no sense of a man\u2019s love, as a\nsuperior phenomenon, they only perceive that side of him which\nunceasingly desires and appropriates the object of his affections, and\nmen who have none or very little of the instinct of brutality developed\nin them have no influence on them.\n\nAs for the higher, platonic love of man, they do not want it; it\nflatters and pleases them, but it has no significance for them, and if\nthe homage on bended knees lasts too long, Beatrice becomes just as\nimpatient as Messalina.\n\nIn coitus lies woman\u2019s greatest humiliation, in love her supremest\nexaltation. Since woman desires coitus and not love, she proves that she\nwishes to be humiliated and not worshipped. The ultimate opponent of the\nemancipation of women is woman.\n\nIt is not because sexual union is voluptuous, not because it is the\ntypical example of all the pleasures of the lower life, that it is\nimmoral. Asceticism, which would regard pleasure in itself as immoral,\nis itself immoral, inasmuch it attributes immorality to an action\nbecause of the external consequences of it, not because of immorality in\nthe thing itself; it is the imposition of an alien, not an inherent law.\nA man may seek pleasure, he may strive to make his life easier and more\npleasant; but he must not sacrifice a moral law. Asceticism attempts to\nmake man moral by self-repression and will give him credit and praise\nfor morality simply because he has denied himself certain things.\nAsceticism must be rejected from the point of view of ethics and of\npsychology inasmuch as it makes virtue the effect of a cause, and not\nthe thing itself. Asceticism is a dangerous although attractive guide;\nsince pleasure is one of the chief things that beguile men from the\nhigher path, it is easy to suppose that its mere abandonment is\nmeritorious.\n\nIn itself, however, pleasure is neither moral nor immoral. It is only\nwhen the desire for pleasure conquers the desire for worthiness that a\nhuman being has fallen.\n\nCoitus is immoral because there is no man who does not use woman at such\ntimes as a means to an end; for whom pleasure does not, in his own as\nwell as her being, during that time represent the value of mankind.\n\nDuring coitus a man forgets all about everything, he forgets the woman;\nshe has no longer a psychic but only a physical existence for him. He\neither desires a child by her or the satisfaction of his own passion; in\nneither case does he use her as an end in herself, but for an outside\ncause. This and this alone makes coitus immoral.\n\nThere is no doubt that woman is the missionary of sexual union, and that\nshe looks upon herself, as on everything else, merely as a means to its\nends. She wants a man to satisfy her passion or to obtain children; she\nis willing to be used by man as a tool, as a thing, as an object, to be\ntreated as his property, to be changed and modelled according to his\ngood pleasure. But we should not allow ourselves to be used by others as\nmeans to an end.\n\nKundry appealed often to Parsifal\u2019s compassion for her yearnings: but\nhere we see the weakness of sympathetic morality, which attempts to\ngrant every desire of those around, however wrong such wishes may be.\nEthics and morality based on sympathy are equally absurd, since they\nmake the \u201cought\u201d dependent on the \u201cwill,\u201d (whether it be the will of\noneself, or of others, or of society, it is all the same,) instead of\nmaking the \u201cwill\u201d dependent on the \u201cought\u201d; they take as a standard of\nmorality concrete cases of human history, concrete cases of human\nhappiness, concrete moments in life instead of the idea.\n\nBut the question is: how ought man to treat woman? As she herself\ndesires to be treated or as the moral idea would dictate?\n\nIf he is going to treat her as she wishes, he must have intercourse with\nher, for she desires it; he must beat her, for she likes to be hurt; he\nmust hypnotise her, since she wishes to be hypnotised; he must prove to\nher by his attentions how little he thinks of himself, for she likes\ncompliments, and has no desire to be respected for herself.\n\nIf he is going to treat her as the moral idea demands, he must try to\nsee in her the concept of mankind and endeavour to respect her. Even\nalthough woman is only a function of man, a function he can degrade or\nraise at will, and women do not wish to be more or anything else than\nwhat man makes them, it is no more a moral arrangement than the suttee\nof Indian widows, which, even though it be voluntary and insisted upon\nby them, is none the less terrible barbarity.\n\nThe emancipation of woman is analogous to the emancipation of Jews and\nnegroes. Undoubtedly the principal reason why these people have been\ntreated as slaves and inferiors is to be found in their servile\ndispositions; their desire for freedom is not nearly so strong as that\nof the Indo-Germans. And even although the whites in America at the\npresent day find it necessary to keep themselves quite aloof from the\nnegro population because they make such a bad use of their freedom, yet\nin the war of the Northern States against the Federals, which resulted\nin the freedom of the slaves, right was entirely on the side of the\nemancipators.\n\nAlthough the humanity of Jews, negroes, and still more of women, is\nweighed down by many immoral impulses; although in these cases there is\nso much more to fight against than in the case of Aryan men, still we\nmust try to respect mankind, and to venerate the idea of humanity (by\nwhich I do not mean the human community, but the being, man, the soul as\npart of the spiritual world). No matter how degraded a criminal may be,\nno one ought to arrogate to himself the functions of the law; no man has\nthe right to lynch such an offender.\n\nThe problem of woman and the problem of the Jews are absolutely\nidentical with the problem of slavery, and they must be solved in the\nsame way. No one should be oppressed, even if the oppression is of such\na kind as to be unfelt as such. The animals about a house are not\n\u201cslaves,\u201d because they have no freedom in the proper sense of the word\nwhich could be taken away.\n\nBut woman has a faint idea of her incapacity, a last remnant, however\nweak, of the free intelligible ego, simply because there is no such\nthing as an absolute woman. Women are human beings, and must be treated\nas such, even if they themselves do not wish it. Woman and man have the\nsame rights. That is not to say that women ought to have an equal share\nin political affairs. From the utilitarian standpoint such a concession,\ncertainly at present and probably always, would be most undesirable; in\nNew Zealand, where, on ethical principles, women have been enfranchised,\nthe worst results have followed. As children, imbeciles and criminals\nwould be justly prevented from taking any part in public affairs even if\nthey were numerically equal or in the majority; woman must in the same\nway be kept from having a share in anything which concerns the public\nwelfare, as it is much to be feared that the mere effect of female\ninfluence would be harmful. Just as the results of science do not depend\non whether all men accept them or not, so justice and injustice can be\ndealt out to the woman, although she is unable to distinguish between\nthem, and she need not be afraid that injury will be done her, as\njustice and not might will be the deciding factor in her treatment. But\njustice is always the same whether for man or woman. No one has a right\nto forbid things to a woman because they are \u201cunwomanly\u201d; neither should\nany man be so mean as to talk of his unfaithful wife\u2019s doings as if they\nwere his affair. Woman must be looked upon as an individual and as if\nshe were a free individual, not as one of a species, not as a sort of\ncreation from the various wants of man\u2019s nature; even though woman\nherself may never prove worthy of such a lofty view.\n\nThus this book may be considered as the greatest honour ever paid to\nwomen. Nothing but the most moral relation towards women should be\npossible for men; there should be neither sexuality nor love, for both\nmake woman the means to an end, but only the attempt to understand her.\nMost men theoretically respect women, but practically they thoroughly\ndespise them; according to my ideas this method should be reversed. It\nis impossible to think highly of women, but it does not follow that we\nare to despise them for ever. It is unfortunate that so many great and\nfamous men have had mean views on this point. The views of Schopenhauer\nand Demosthenes as to the emancipation of women are good instances. So\nalso Goethe\u2019s\n\n  Immer is so das M\u00e4dchen besch\u00e4ftigt und reifet im stillen\n  H\u00e4uslicher Tugend entgegen, den klugen Mann zu begl\u00fccken.\n  W\u00fcnscht sie dann endlich zu lesen, so w\u00e4hlt sie gewisslich ein\n    Kochbuch,\n\nis scarcely better than Moli\u00e8re\u2019s\n\n            ... Une femme en sait toujours assez,\n  Quand la capacit\u00e9 de son esprit se hausse\n  A conna\u00eetre un pourpoint d\u2019avec un haut de chausse.\n\nMen will have to overcome their dislike for masculine women, for that is\nno more than a mean egoism. If women ever become masculine by becoming\nlogical and ethical, they would no longer be such good material for\nman\u2019s projection; but that is not a sufficient reason for the present\nmethod of tying woman down to the needs of her husband and children and\nforbidding her certain things because they are masculine.\n\nFor even if the possibility of morality is incompatible with the idea of\nthe absolute woman, it does not follow that man is to make no effort to\nsave the average woman from further deterioration; much less is he to\nhelp to keep woman as she is. In every living woman the presence of what\nKant calls \u201cthe germ of good\u201d must be assumed; it is the remnant of a\nfree state which makes it possible for woman to have a dim notion of her\ndestiny. The theoretical possibility of grafting much more on this \u201cgerm\nof good\u201d should never be lost sight of, even although nothing has ever\nbeen done, or even if nothing could ever be done in that respect.\n\nThe basis and the purpose of the universe is the good, and the whole\nworld exists under a moral law; even to the animals, which are mere\nphenomena, we assign moral values, holding the elephant, for instance,\nto be higher than the snake, notwithstanding the fact that we do not\nmake an animal accountable when it kills another. In the case of woman,\nhowever, we regard her as responsible if she commits murder, and in this\nalone is a proof that women are above the animals. If it be the case\nthat womanliness is simply immorality, then woman must cease to be\nwomanly and try to be manly.\n\nI must give warning against the danger of woman trying merely to liken\nherself outwardly to man, for such a course would simply plunge her more\ndeeply into womanliness. It is only too likely that the efforts to\nemancipate women will result not in giving her real freedom, in letting\nher reach free-will, but merely in enlarging the range of her caprices.\n\nIt seems to me that if we look the facts of the case in the face there\nare only two possible courses open for women: either to pretend to\naccept man\u2019s ideas, and to think that they believe what is really\nopposed to their whole, unchanged nature, to assume a horror of\nimmorality (as if they were moral themselves), of sexuality (as if they\ndesired platonic love); or to openly admit that they are wrapped up in\nhusband and children, without being conscious of all that such an\nadmission implies, of the shamelessness and self-immolation of it.\n\nUnconscious hypocrisy, or cynical identification with their natural\ninstincts; nothing else seems possible for woman.\n\nBut it is neither agreement nor disagreement with, but rather the denial\nand overcoming of her womanishness that a woman should aim at. If a\nwoman really were to wish, for instance, for man\u2019s chastity, it would\nmean that she had conquered the woman in her, it would mean that pairing\nwas no longer of supreme importance to her and that her aim was no\nlonger to further it. But here is the trouble: such pretensions must not\nbe accepted as genuine, even although here and there they are actually\nput forward. For a woman who longed for man\u2019s purity is, apart from her\nhysteria, so stupid and so incapable of truthfulness that she is unable\nto perceive that she is in this way negating herself, making herself\nabsolutely worthless, without existence!\n\nIt is difficult to decide which is preferable: the unlimited hypocrisy\nwhich can appropriate the thing that is most foreign to it, _i.e._, the\nascetic ideal, or the ingenuous admiration for the reformed rake, the\ncomplacent devotion to him. The principal problem of the woman question\nlies in the fact that in each case woman\u2019s one desire is to put all\nresponsibility on man, and in this it is identical with the problem of\nmankind.\n\nFriedrich Nietzsche says in one of his books: \u201cTo underestimate the real\ndifficulties of the man and woman problem, to fail to admit the abysmal\nantagonism and the inevitable nature of the constant strain between the\ntwo, to dream of equal rights, education, responsibilities and duties,\nis the mark of the superficial observer, and any thinker who has been\nfound shallow in these difficult places--shallow by nature--should be\nlooked upon as untrustworthy, as a useless and treacherous guide; he\nwill, no doubt, be one of those who \u2018briefly deal with\u2019 all the real\nproblems of life, death and eternity--who never gets to the bottom of\nthings. But the man who is not superficial, who has depth of thought as\nwell as of purpose, the depth which not only makes him desire right but\nendows him with determination and strength to do right, must always look\non woman from the oriental standpoint:--as a possession, as private\nproperty, as something born to serve and be dependent on him--he must\nsee the marvellous reasonableness of the Asiatic instinct of superiority\nover women, as the Greeks of old saw it, those worthy successors and\ndisciples of the Eastern school. It was an attitude towards woman which,\nas is well known, from Homer\u2019s time till that of Pericles, grew with the\ngrowth of culture, and increased in strength step by step, and gradually\nbecame quite oriental. What a necessary, logical, desirable growth for\nmankind! if we could only attain to it ourselves!\u201d\n\nThe great individualist is here thinking in the terms of social ethics,\nand the autonomy of his moral doctrine is overshadowed by the ideas of\ncaste, groups, and divisions. And so, for the benefit of society, to\npreserve the place of men, he would place woman in subjection, so that\nthe voice of the wish for emancipation could no longer be heard, and so\nthat we might be freed from the false and foolish cry of the existing\nadvocates of women\u2019s rights, advocates who have no suspicion of the real\nsource of woman bondage. But I quoted Nietzsche, not to convict him of\nwant of logic, but to lead to the point that the solution of the problem\nof humanity is bound up with the solution of the woman problem. If any\none should think it a high-flown idea that man should respect woman as\nan entity, a real existence, and not use her merely as a means to an\nend, that he should recognise in her the same rights and the same duties\n(those of building up one\u2019s own moral personality) as his own, then he\nmust reflect that man cannot solve the ethical problem in his own case,\nif he continues to lower the idea of humanity in the women by using her\nsimply for his own purposes.\n\nCoitus is the price man has to pay to women, under the Asiatic system,\nfor their oppression. And although it is true that women may be more\nthan content with such recompence for the worst form of slavery, man has\nno right to take part in such conduct, simply because he also is morally\ndamaged by it.\n\nEven technically the problem of humanity is not soluble for man alone;\nhe has to consider woman even if he only wishes to redeem himself; he\nmust endeavour to get her to abandon her immoral designs on him. Women\nmust really and truly and spontaneously relinquish coitus. That\nundoubtedly means that woman, as woman, must disappear, and until that\nhas come to pass there is no possibility of establishing the kingdom of\nGod on earth. Pythagoras, Plato, Christianity (as opposed to Judaism),\nTertullian, Swift, Wagner, Ibsen, all these have urged the freedom of\nwoman, not the emancipation of woman from man, but rather the\nemancipation of woman from herself.\n\nIt is easy to bear Nietzsche\u2019s anathema in such company! But it is very\nhard for woman to reach such a goal by her own strength. The spark in\nher is so flickering that it always needs the fire of man to relight it;\nshe must have an example to go by. Christ is an example; He freed the\nfallen Magdalen, He swept away her past and expiated it for her. Wagner,\nthe greatest man since Christ\u2019s time, understood to the full the real\nsignificance of that act: until woman ceases to exist as woman for man\nshe cannot cease being woman. Kundry could only be released from\nKlingsor\u2019s curse by the help of a sinless, immaculate man--Parsifal.\nThis shows the complete harmony between the psychological and\nphilosophical deduction which is dealt with in Wagner\u2019s \u201cParsifal,\u201d the\ngreatest work in the world\u2019s literature. It is man\u2019s sexuality which\nfirst gives woman existence as woman. Woman will exist as long as man\u2019s\nguilt is inexpiated, until he has really vanquished his own sexuality.\n\nIt is only in this way that the eternal opposition to all\nanti-feministic tendencies can be avoided; the view that says, since\nwoman is there, being what she is, and not to be altered, man must\nendeavour to make terms with her; it is useless to fight, because there\nis nothing which can be exterminated. But it has been shown that woman\nis negative and ceases to exist the moment man determines to be nothing\nbut true existence.\n\nThat which must be fought against is not an affair of ever unchangeable\nexistence and essence: it is something which can be put an end to, and\nwhich ought to be put an end to.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis is the way, and no other, to solve the woman question, and this\ncomes from comprehending it. The solution may appear impossible, its\ntone exaggerated, its claims overstated, its requirements too exacting.\nUndoubtedly there has been little said about the woman question, as\nwomen talk of it; we have been dealing with a subject on which women\nare silent, and must always remain silent--the bondage which sexuality\nimplies.\n\nThis woman question is as old as sex itself, and as young as mankind.\nAnd the answer to it? Man must free himself of sex, for in that way, and\nthat way alone, can he free woman. In his purity, not, as she believes,\nin his impurity, lies her salvation. She must certainly be destroyed, as\nwoman; but only to be raised again from the ashes--new, restored to\nyouth--as a real human being.\n\nSo long as there are two sexes there will always be a woman question,\njust as there will be the problem of mankind. Christ was mindful of this\nwhen, according to the account of one of the Fathers of the\nChurch--Clemens--He talked with Salome, without the optimistic\npalliation of the sex which St. Paul and Luther invented later: death\nwill last so long as women bring forth, and truth will not prevail until\nthe two become one, until from man and woman a third self, neither man\nnor woman, is evolved.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNow for the first time, looking at the woman question as the most\nimportant problem of mankind, the demand for the sexual abstinence on\nthe part of both sexes is put forward with good reason. To seek to\nground this claim on the prejudicial effects on the health following\nsexual intercourse would be absurd, for any one with knowledge of the\nphysical frame could upset such a theory at all points; to found it on\nthe immorality of passion would also be wrong, because that would\nintroduce a heteronomous motive into ethics. St. Augustine, however,\nmust certainly have been aware, when he advocated chastity for all\nmankind, that the objection raised to it would be that in such a case\nthe whole human race would quickly disappear from the face of the earth.\n\nThis extraordinary apprehension, the worst part of which appears to be\nthe thought that the race would be exterminated, shows not only the\ngreatest unbelief in individual immortality and eternal life for moral\nwell-doers; it is not only most irreligious, but it proves at the same\ntime the cowardice of man and his incapacity to live an individual life.\nTo any one who thinks thus, the earth can only mean the turmoil and\npress of those on it; death must seem less terrible to such a man than\nisolation. If the immortal, moral part of his personality were really\nvigorous, he would have courage to look this result in the face; he\nwould not fear the death of the body, nor attempt to substitute the\nmiserable certainty of the continuation of the race for his lack of\nfaith in the eternal life of the soul. The rejection of sexuality is\nmerely the death of the physical life, to put in its place the full\ndevelopment of the spiritual life.\n\nHence it follows that it cannot be a moral duty to provide for the\ncontinuance of the race. This common argument appears to me to be so\nextraordinarily false that I am almost ashamed to meet it. Yet at the\nrisk of making myself ridiculous I must ask if any one ever consummated\ncoitus to avoid the great danger of letting the human race die out, if\nhe failed in his duty? And would it not follow that any man who prefers\nchastity would be open to the charge of immoral conduct? Every form of\nfecundity is loathsome, and no one who is honest with himself feels\nbound to provide for the continuity of the human race. And what we do\nnot realise to be a duty, is not a duty.\n\nOn the contrary, it is immoral to procreate a human being for any\nsecondary reason, to bring a being into the limitations of humanity, the\nconditions made for him by his parentage; the fundamental reason why the\npossible freedom and spontaneity of a human being is limited is that he\nwas begotten in such an immoral fashion. That the human race should\npersist is of no interest whatever to reason; he who would perpetuate\nhumanity would perpetuate the problem and the guilt, the only problem\nand the only guilt. The only true goal is divinity and the union of\nhumanity with the Godhead; that is the real choice between good and\nevil, between existence and negation. The moral sanction that has been\ninvented for coitus, in supposing that there is an ideal attitude to\nthe act in which only the propagation of the race is thought of, is no\nsufficient defence. There is no such imperative in the mind of man; it\nis merely an ingenious defence of a desire, and there is the fundamental\nimmorality in it, that the being to be created has no power of choice\nwith regard to his parents. As for the sexual union in which the\nproduction of children is prevented, there is no possible justification.\n\nSexual union has no place in the idea of mankind, not because ascetism\nis a duty, but because in it woman becomes the object, the cause, and\nman does what he will with her, looks upon her merely as a \u201cthing,\u201d not\nas a living human being with an inner, psychic, existence. And so man\ndespises woman the moment coitus is over, and the woman knows that she\nis despised, even although a few minutes before she thought herself\nadored.\n\nThe only thing to be respected in man is the idea of mankind; this\ndisparagement of woman (and himself), induced by coitus, is the surest\nproof that it is opposed to that idea of mankind. Any one who is\nignorant of what this Kantian \u201cidea of mankind\u201d means, may perhaps\nunderstand it when he thinks of his sisters, his mother, his female\nrelatives; it concerns them all: for our own sakes, then, woman ought to\ntreated as human, respected and not degraded, all sexuality implying\ndegradation.\n\nBut man can only respect woman when she herself ceases to wish to be\nobject and material for man; if there is any question of emancipation it\nshould be the emancipation from the prostitute element. It has never\nuntil now been made clear where the bondage of woman lies; it is in the\nsovereign, all too welcome power wielded on them by the Phallus. There\ncan be no doubt that the men who have really desired the emancipation of\nwomen are the men who are not very sexual, who have no great craving for\nlove, who are not very profound, but who are men of noble and spiritual\nminds. I am not going to try to palliate the erotic motives of man, nor\nto represent his antipathy to the \u201cemancipated woman\u201d as being in any\nsense less than it is; it is much easier to go with the majority, than,\nas Kant did, to climb, painfully and slowly, to the heights of\nisolation.\n\nBut a great deal of what is taken for enmity to emancipation is due to\nthe want of confidence in its possibility. Man does not really want\nwoman as a slave: he is usually only too anxious for a companion. The\neducation which the woman of the present day receives is not calculated\nto fit her for the battle against her real bondage. The last resource of\nher \u201cwomanly\u201d teacher, if she declines to do this or that, is to say\nthat no man will have her unless she does it. Women\u2019s education is\ndirected solely to preparing them for their marriage, the happy state in\nwhich they are to find their crown. Such training would have little\neffect on man, but it serves to accentuate woman\u2019s womanishness, her\ndependence, and her servile condition. The education of woman must be\ntaken out of the hands of woman; the education of mankind must be taken\nout of the hands of the mother. This is the first step towards placing\nwoman in a relation to the idea of mankind, which since the beginning\nshe has done more than anything else to hinder.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA woman who had really given up her sexual self, who wished to be at\npeace would be no longer \u201cwoman.\u201d She would have ceased to be \u201cwoman,\u201d\nshe would have received the inward and spiritual sign as well as the\noutward form of regeneration.\n\nCan such a thing be?\n\nThere is no absolute woman, but even so to say \u201cyes\u201d to the above\nquestion is like giving one\u2019s assent to a miracle. Emancipation will not\nmake woman happier; it will not ensure her salvation, and it is a long\nroad which leads to God. No being in the transition stage between\nfreedom and slavery can be happy. But will woman choose to abandon\nslavery in order to become unhappy? The question is not merely if it be\npossible for woman to become moral. It is this: is it possible for\nwoman really to wish to realise the problem of existence, the conception\nof guilt? Can she really desire freedom? This can happen only by her\nbeing penetrated by an ideal, brought to the guiding star. It can happen\nonly if the categorical imperative were to become active in woman; only\nif woman can place herself in relation to the moral idea, the idea of\nhumanity.\n\nIn that way only can there be an emancipation of woman.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  \u00c6sthetics and Erotics, Chap. XI., 236-251\n\n  Affinity, sexual, compared with chemical, 41\n\n  Ahriman, 183\n\n  Alcm\u00e6on, of Kroton, 81\n\n  Alexander the Great, 229\n\n  Amphibia, hermaphroditism, 22\n\n  An\u00e6sthesia, sexual, 274\n\n  Anatomical distinctions of the sexes, 3\n\n  Anatomy, as guide to sexuality, 3, 4\n\n  Animals, women and the sexual union of, 257\n\n  Angelo, M., 105\n\n  Anti-Christ, 183\n\n  Antisemitism, 303, 304, 312\n\n  Apprehension, 116\n\n  Architecture, 119\n\n  Aristotle, 18, 140, 187, 293\n\n  Arrhenoplasm, Chap. II., 11-25\n\n  Aryans, 302\n\n  Asceticism, 329, 336, 347\n\n  Attraction, between the sexes, 26, 27\n\n  Autobiography, 122\n\n  Avenarius, 31, 82, 94, 100, 128, 144, 322\n\n\n  Bach, 103, 323\n\n  Bachelors, and women, 258\n\n  Bacon, 182\n\n  Bashkirtseff, Marie, 69\n\n  Bateson, on dimorphic earwigs, 34\n\n  Beatrice, 240, 336\n\n  Beauty, analysis of, 240, 242\n\n  Beethoven, 96, 112, 317\n\n  Bentham, 176, 317\n\n  Berkeley, 141, 317\n\n  Bisexuality, oscillations in, 55\n\n  Bischoff, 12, 217\n\n  Bj\u00f6rnson, 108\n\n  Blavatsky, Mdme., 68\n\n  Blindness, colour, 110\n\n  Blood, transfusion of, 20\n\n  B\u00f6lsche, 329\n\n  Bonheur, Rosa, 68\n\n  Bonnet, 143\n\n  Boys and girls, education of, 58\n\n  Breeding, application of laws of sexual attraction to, 43\n\n  Breuer, on hysteria, 265, 269, 270\n\n  Bridgman, Laura, 66\n\n  Br\u00fcnnhilde, 223\n\n  Bruno, 141, 240, 316\n\n  Buchner, 315\n\n  Buddha, 325, 328\n\n  Burckhardt, 72\n\n  Burns, Robert, 317\n\n  Byron, Lord, 236\n\n\n  C\u00e6sar, 134, 229, 230, 326\n\n  Carlyle, 113, 136, 140, 175, 229, 307, 317\n\n  Castration, effect of, 18\n\n  Catharsis, 269\n\n  Catherine II. of Russia, 66\n\n  Catholic view of marriage, 221\n\n  Catholicism and women, 207\n\n  Cattle, homosexuality in, 49\n\n  Causality, invented by man, 279\n\n  Cells, sexuality of, 15, 17, 22, 23\n\n  Ceres, 224\n\n  Chamberlain on Jews, 312, 321, 323, 328\n    on origin of Christianity, 328\n\n  \u201cCharacter\u201d of Avenarius, 94, 95, 96\n\n  Characterology, Chap. V., 52-63\n\n  Characters, classification of, 14\n    secondary sexual, 43\n\n  Chastity, 331, 332, 334, 335, 341, 346\n\n  Chemistry, Kepler\u2019s estimate of, 315\n\n  Chemotropism, 39, 41\n\n  Child, relation of mother and prostitute to, 219\n\n  Chinese, 187, 302\n\n  Chivalry, 204\n\n  Chopin, 67\n\n  Christ, 313, 325, 329\n\n  Christianity and Judaism, 325, 327, 328\n\n  Clairvoyance, 277\n\n  Classification, 97\n\n  Clemens, 345\n\n  Cleopatra, 230\n\n  Coitus, 332, 337, 343\n\n  Colour blindness, 110\n\n  Commerce, and Jews, 325\n\n  Communism, 307\n\n  Comparisons, in poetry, 118\n\n  Compassion, womanly, 197\n\n  Compliments, and women, 203\n\n  Comprehension, power of by genius, 105\n\n  Comte, A., 141, 204, 244\n\n  Confucius, 328\n\n  Consciousness, male and female, Chap. III., 93-102\n\n  Conventions, women and, 262, 263\n\n  Conversion, Jews and, 323\n\n  Copernicus, 140, 315\n\n  Coquetry, and sexuality, 232\n\n  Correlations, importance of, 61\n\n  Cromwell, 229\n\n  Crustacea, hermaphroditism in, 19\n\n  Cuvier, 61, 62, 315\n\n  Cyrano de Bergerac, 211\n\n\n  Dan\u00e4e, 231\n\n  Dante, 249, 299\n\n  Darwin, 97, 130, 140, 217\n    on correlation, 61\n    on female talent, 71\n    on heterostylism, 33, 34\n    on sexual tastes of animals, 27\n    on union of those akin, 44\n\n  Da Vinci, 97\n\n  Death, 346\n\n  Death, consciousness at, 128, 129\n\n  De Bergerac, 211\n\n  Decalogue, 313\n\n  Demeter, 224\n\n  Demosthenes, 340\n\n  Descartes, 149\n\n  Determinants, in psychology, 81\n\n  Determination of sex, 23\n\n  De Vries, on cell characters, 16\n\n  Dilthey, 82\n\n  Dimorphism, sexual, 6\n\n  Divorce, 221\n\n  Don Juan, 90, 233, 299, 332, 335\n\n  Doppelganger, 210\n\n  Drawing, and women, 120\n\n  Dualism of the world, 166\n\n  D\u00fcrer, 322\n\n\n  Eckhard, 313\n\n  Education, 57\n    of the race, 348\n    of women, 348\n\n  Ego, awakening of, 164\n\n  Ego, conception of, Chap. VII., 153-162\n\n  \u201cElective Affinities,\u201d 69, 218\n\n  \u201cElement\u201d of Avenarius, 94\n\n  Eliot, George, 67\n\n  Emancipation of Women, Chap. VI., 64-75, 338\n\n  Embryoes, sexual differentiation of, 5\n\n  Emerson, 141, 230\n\n  Empedocles, 172\n\n  Emperors and genius, 139\n\n  Empiricism, and English philosophy, 317\n\n  English philosophy, 153\n\n  English and Jew compared, 317, 319\n\n  Erotics, and \u00e6sthetics, Chap. XI., 236-251\n\n  Eroticism and humour, 318\n\n  Ethics and Logic, Chap. VI., 142-152, Chap. VII., 153-162\n\n  Euler, 315\n\n  Euripides, 105, 187\n\n  Exner, 98\n\n\n  Faithfulness, sexual, 220\n\n  Falkenberg, on fertilisation in seaweeds, 40\n\n  Fall, meaning of, 283\n\n  Familiarity, quality of, 144\n\n  Family, origin of, 205\n    amongst the Jews, 310\n\n  Faraday, 315\n\n  Fechner, 82, 292, 313, 322\n\n  Female, contrasted with male, Chap. I., 79-84\n\n  F\u00e9r\u00e9, on sexual inversion, 45\n\n  Ferns, sexual attraction caused by malic acid, 39\n\n  Fertility, limited in prostitutes, 216\n\n  Feuerbach, 141, 305\n\n  Fichte, 140, 150, 307\n\n  Fischart, 226\n\n  Flowers, heterostylous, 33, 34\n\n  Forgetting, analysis of process, 97\n\n  Form, matter and form, 293\n\n  Formula, of sexual attraction, 29, 37, 38\n    of sexual constitution, 8\n\n  Fouqu\u00e9, 188\n\n  Free love, 221\n\n  Free will, 209\n\n  Freud, on hysteria, 265-277\n\n  Friendship, 49, 288\n\n\n  Galileo, 140, 315\n\n  Gall, on physiognomy, 59\n\n  Gauss, 140\n\n  Gaule, 12\n\n  Genesis, Book of, 295\n\n  Genital, glands, effect of transplantation, 21\n\n  Genius, compared with talent, Chap. IV., 103-113\n    and the Ego, Chap. VIII., 163-185\n    in evolution of race, 137\n    and language, 137\n    and maleness, 113\n    and memory, Chap. V., 114-141\n    and morality, 183\n    and time, 136\n    summary of, 169, 182, 183\n\n  Germain, Sophie, 194\n\n  Girls and boys, education of, 58\n\n  God, Schopenhauer\u2019s definition, 313\n\n  Goethe, 40, 41, 43, 69, 97, 106, 107, 120, 126, 174, 203, 218, 228,\n  313, 316, 332, 340\n\n  Gonochorism, 6, 73\n\n  Grafting, of sexual organs, 20\n\n  Greeks and religion, 323\n\n  Guilt, hysterical consciousness of, 275\n\n\n  H\u00e6ckel\u2019s \u201cgonochorism,\u201d 6\n\n  \u201cHakon,\u201d King, 328\n\n  Hamilton, 317\n\n  Handel, 322\n\n  Happiness, impossibility of, 285\n\n  Hartley, 143, 317\n\n  Hatred, 236\n\n  Hauptmann, 276\n\n  Havelock Ellis, 11, 12\n\n  Hebbel, 279\n\n  Hegel, 155\n\n  Heine, 316, 323\n\n  Hellenbach, 287\n\n  Helmholtz, 82, 97\n\n  Henids, 99\n\n  Herbart, 93, 94, 141, 246\n\n  Hering, 143\n\n  Hermaphroditism, 6, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 45\n\n  \u201cHero-worship,\u201d 113\n\n  Hertwig, 16\n\n  Heterostylism, 33, 34\n\n  Hildebrand, on heterostylism, 33\n\n  Hobbes, 316, 317\n\n  Homosexuality, Chap. IV., 45-52\n    of famous women, 66\n\n  Horwicz, 93, 94\n\n  Hume, 81, 141, 153, 164, 175, 193, 208, 218, 317\n\n  Humour, analysis of, 318\n\n  Hunter, John, 14\n\n  Hutcheson, 175\n\n  Huxley, 193, 317\n\n  Hydrocele, 25\n\n  Hypnotism, 50\n\n  Hypnotism and hysteria, 277\n\n  Hysteria, analysis of, 265\n\n\n  Ibsen, 160, 187, 218, 224, 231, 258, 290, 325, 343\n\n  Idealism, 176\n\n  Idioplasm, 16, 21, 155\n\n  Imagination, of women, 119\n\n  Immortality, 127, 135, 314, 346\n\n  \u201cImpressions,\u201d maternal, 217\n\n  Impulse, sexual, 87, 88, 282\n\n  Individualism, 176\n\n  Individuality, 282\n\n  Individuation, 282\n\n  Infants, sex of, 23, 24\n\n  Innocence, 243\n\n  Intermediate sexual forms, 7\n\n  Inversion, sexual, 45\n\n  Irony, 323\n\n  Israels, 316\n\n\n  James, W., 82, 144\n\n  Janet, on hysteria, 265, 267, 268\n\n  Jealousy, and women, 205, 289\n\n  Jewish race, 303\n\n  Jews and English compared, 319\n    and women compared, 320\n\n  Joshua, 328\n\n  Judaism, Chap. XIII., 301-330\n    and Christianity, 325\n    and the Messiah, 329\n\n\n  Kant, 42, 85, 105, 138, 150, 153, 158, 159, 161, 164, 192, 208, 237,\n  246, 270, 313, 320, 331, 340\n\n  Karneades, 141\n\n  Karsch, 49\n\n  Kaufmann, 119\n\n  Kepler, 315\n\n  Kleptomania, 205\n\n  Kowalevsky, Sonia, 67\n\n  Kraepelin, 45\n\n  Kundry, 270, 319, 337, 344\n\n\n  \u201cLady from the Sea,\u201d 218\n\n  Lamarck, 97, 143, 315\n\n  Lange, 129, 208\n\n  Language, origin of, 137\n\n  Latin, women and, 89\n\n  Lavater, 174\n\n  Laws against homosexuality, 51\n    of sexual attraction, 29\n\n  Leda, 231, 291\n\n  Leibnitz, 140, 171, 172, 316\n\n  Lepage, Bastien, 69\n\n  Lewes, 317\n\n  Liars, and memory, 145\n\n  Libraries, and women, 206\n\n  Lichtenberg, 153\n\n  Linn\u00e6us, 140, 315\n\n  Locke, 141, 317\n\n  Logic and the Ego, Chap. VII., 153, 162\n\n  Logic and ethic, Chap. VII., 153-162\n    and memory, Chap. VI., 142-152\n\n  Lohengrin, 324\n\n  Lombroso, 138\n\n  Lotze, 125\n\n  Love, analysis of, 236, 251\n    maternal, 225\n    and sexuality, 239\n\n  Luther, 325\n\n  Luxemburg, 69\n\n\n  Mach, 143, 154, 201, 208, 210, 322\n\n  Madness, and genius, 183\n\n  Madonna worship, 249\n\n  Maeterlinck, 108\n\n  Mahomet, 187, 325\n\n  Male and Female, Chap. I., 79-84\n    minds, 284\n    plasmas, 11\n\n  Malic acid in ferns, 39\n\n  Marriage, effect on progeny of loveless, 44\n    ideas of boys and girls on, 90\n    religious, 221\n\n  Marx, 307\n\n  Marxism, 329\n\n  Masculine women, 2, 8, 17\n\n  Match-making, and women, 252-300\n    amongst Jews, 311\n\n  Materialism, and Jews, 314\n\n  Matriarchy, 222\n\n  Matter, and form, 293\n    and woman, 292\n\n  Maupas, on rotifers, 24\n\n  Maupassant, 276\n\n  Mayer, 97\n\n  Medicine, Jewish influence on, 315\n\n  Medical view of hysteria, 271\n\n  \u201cMeistersingers,\u201d 305\n\n  Memory, 282\n    and genius, Chap. V., 114-141\n    in boys and girls, 294\n    in relation to logic, Chap. VI., 142-152\n\n  Messalina, 336\n\n  Messiah, 325, 329\n\n  Meta-organisms, 287\n\n  Metaphysics, Jews and, 322\n\n  Microcosm, 171\n\n  Mill, J. S., 176, 317\n\n  Milne-Edwards, 291\n\n  Mirandola, 188\n\n  Modesty, 261, 274\n    womanly, 200\n\n  Moli\u00e8re, 340\n\n  Moll, 52, 88\n\n  Monads, 198, 287, 294, 297\n\n  Monogamy, 43, 220\n\n  Morality, 176\n\n  Morality of women, 196, 278, 340\n\n  More, 73\n\n  Morphology, in relation to character, Chap. V., 52-63\n\n  Motherhood, analysis of, Chap. X., 214-235\n\n  Mozart, 323\n\n  M\u00fcller, Joh., 217\n\n  Murder, 109\n\n  Music, and women, 118\n\n  Myxodema, 25\n\n\n  Naegeli, 16\n\n  Names, and women, 206\n\n  \u201cNana,\u201d 231\n\n  Napoleon, 182, 228, 326, 327\n\n  Newton, 140, 315\n\n  New Testament, 325\n\n  New Zealand, 339\n\n  Nietzsche, 104, 108, 140, 167, 329, 342, 344\n\n  Nirwana, 174\n\n  Nobility, Jews and, 308\n\n  N\u00f6rgler, 174\n\n  Novalis, 103, 165, 258\n\n  Nudity, 240, 241\n\n\n  Organotherapy, 21\n\n  Oriental view of women, 342\n\n  Origen, 187\n\n  Oscillations, in sexuality, 54\n\n  Ostwald, 31, 315\n\n  Ovid, 332\n\n  Owen, 307\n\n\n  Painting, and women, 120\n\n  Pairing, woman\u2019s chief instinct, 252-300\n    and Jews, 311\n\n  \u201cParsifal,\u201d 305, 337, 344\n\n  Pascal, 179, 205\n\n  Pasiph\u00e4e, 291\n\n  Pasteur, 315\n\n  Paternity, 232, 346\n\n  Pathology, 25\n\n  Paul, Jean, 103, 164, 318\n\n  Pederasty, Chap. IV., 45-52\n\n  \u201cPeer Gynt,\u201d 224, _foot note_\n\n  Periodicity, of genius, 107\n\n  Personality, multiple, 211, 267\n\n  Persoon, 33\n\n  Petzoldt, 96, 100\n\n  Pfeffer, 39\n\n  Phallus, relation of, to women, 298, 347\n\n  Philosophy, English, 153\n\n  Philosophers, and genius, 141\n\n  Physiognomy, 59, 60\n\n  Piety, 322\n\n  Pity, 199\n\n  Plasmas, male and female, 11\n\n  Plato, 149, 150, 240, 246, 293, 313, 343\n\n  Platonic love, 239\n\n  Pleasure, 282\n\n  Politeness, and women, 203\n\n  Politician, character of, 230\n\n  Politicians and genius, 139\n    and value, 134\n\n  Pollen, in heterostylous flowers, 35\n\n  Polyandry, 222\n\n  Polygamy, 220\n\n  Pregnancy, 86, 222\n\n  Pre-Raphaelites, 73\n\n  Pr\u00e9vost, 256\n\n  Preyer, 315\n\n  Pride, of women, 201\n\n  Property, Jewish relation to, 306\n\n  Prostitution, analysis of, Chap. X., 214-235\n\n  Protestantism, and women, 207\n\n  Psychology, 142\n    male and female, Chap. IX., 186-213\n\n  Puberty, effect of, 90\n\n  Pythagoras, 343\n\n\n  Rabbis, Jewish, 311\n\n  Race, persistence of human, 224, 346\n\n  Raphael, 226\n\n  Recognition, 282\n\n  Red Sea, crossing of, 323\n\n  Regeneration, of lost parts, 16\n    moral, 283\n\n  Religion, founders of, 326, 327\n    importance of, 323\n    Jews and, 321\n    women and, 261\n\n  Revenge, 289\n\n  Reverence, 322\n\n  Richepin, 226\n\n  Rousseau, 307\n\n  Rudiments, of embryonic sexual organs, 3\n\n  Ruskin, 307\n\n\n  St. Augustine, 345\n\n  Salome, 345\n\n  Samson, 328\n\n  Sand, George, 66\n\n  Sappho, 65, 66\n\n  Schelling, 81, 105, 138, 165, 246\n\n  Schiller, 230, 246\n\n  Schleiermacher, 140\n\n  Schoolmasters, and types, 57\n\n  Schopenhauer, 95, 167, 174, 199, 218, 223, 236, 237, 238, 281, 295,\n  305, 313, 318, 340\n\n  Schrenk-Notzing, 45\n\n  Schurtz, 205\n\n  Schwammerdam, 315\n\n  Science, and genius, 140\n    Judaism, in, 314\n\n  Secretion, internal, and sexual characters, 15\n\n  Sellheim and Foges, experiments on castration, 18\n\n  Servant, type of woman, 272\n\n  Sex, appearance of, in embryos, 5\n    assignment of, to infants, 22, 23, 24\n\n  Sexual attraction, laws of, Chap. III., 26-44\n    characters, secondary, 14, 43\n    impulses, 88\n\n  Sexuality, of male and female compared, 85, 92\n    opposed to love, 239\n    of women, 260, 331, 332, 334, 335\n\n  Shaftesbury, 246\n\n  Shakespeare, 105, 109, 110, 317\n\n  Shelley, 168, 317\n\n  Shrew, type of woman, 272\n\n  \u201cSiegfried,\u201d 223, 305\n\n  Sigwart, 156\n\n  Simmel, George, 148\n\n  Slavery, compared with Jewish problem, 338\n\n  Smith, Adam, 175, 317\n\n  Socialism, 307\n\n  Society, origin of, 205\n\n  Socrates, 150, 246, 326\n\n  Solidarity, of the Jews, 310\n\n  Solitude, and women, 205\n\n  Solliers, on sexual an\u00e6sthesia, 274\n\n  Somerville, Mary, 194\n\n  Sophocles, 184\n\n  Soul, 313\n    denied by modern science, 315\n    and great men, 168\n    and modern psychology, 209\n    and women, 187\n\n  Spencer, Herbert, 128, 130, 263, 317\n\n  Spinoza, 316, 317\n\n  Sprengel, 315\n\n  State, 307\n\n  Steenstrup, 12, 13\n\n  Sterility, 216\n\n  Stern, L. W., 82\n\n  Sterne, 317\n\n  \u201cStockman, Dr.,\u201d 325\n\n  Strauss, 112\n\n  Strindberg, 187\n\n  Sudermann, 256\n\n  Suggestibility, of women, 294\n\n  Suicide, of women, 286\n\n  Sulpicia, 319\n\n  Superstition, of women, 127\n\n  Swift, 317, 343\n\n  Sympathy, 177, 197\n\n\n  \u201cTannh\u00e4user,\u201d 240, 305\n\n  Telegony, 233\n\n  Teresa, St., 277\n\n  Tertullian, 187, 314, 343\n\n  \u201cTesman,\u201d in Hedda Gabler, 258\n\n  Thelyplasm, Chap. II., 11-25\n\n  Time, relation to value, 133\n\n  Tolstoy, 231\n\n  Touch, sense of, in women, 191\n\n  Tragedy, 319\n\n  Transcendentalism, 314\n\n  Transfusion, of blood, 20\n\n  Travel, desire of, 237, _note_\n\n  Truth, 150\n\n  T\u00fcrck, 138\n\n  Tylor, 128\n\n  Types, male and female, mental, 53\n\n\n  Undine, 188\n\n  Universality, of genius, 112\n\n  Untruthfulness, of women, 266\n\n\n  Value, theory of, 133\n\n  Vanity, of women, 202\n\n  Variation in sexual characters, 18\n\n  Virginity, a male idea, 333\n    woman\u2019s attitude to, 334\n\n  Virtue of women, 333\n\n  Vogt, on hysteria, 265, 274, 277\n\n  Von Eschenbach, 264\n\n  Von H\u00f6ffding, 144\n\n  Von Humboldt, 140\n\n  Von Kleist, 105\n\n  Von M\u00f6bius, 59\n\n\n  Wagner, 67, 109, 211, 240, 279, 305, 319, 343\n\n  Weill, 36\n\n  Weismann, 81\n\n  Wier, 81\n\n  Will, 282\n\n  Wit and humour, 318\n\n  Woman and animals, 290, 291\n    character of, 280\n    emancipated, 64\n    famous, 69\n    future of, Chap. XIV., 331-340\n    compared with Jews, 320\n    and matter, 292\n    sexuality of, 260\n    summary of her nature, Chap. XII., 252-300\n\n  Wundt, 94, 131, 140\n\n\n  \u201cZarathustra,\u201d 108, 167\n\n  Zionism, 307, 312\n\n  Zola, 105, 231, 304\n\n\n  Printed by BALLANTYNE & CO. LIMITED\n  Tavistock Street, London\n\n\n\n\n  Transcriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\n  The language of the source document (including inconsistencies in\n  spelling, hyphenation, etc.) has been retained, unless listed below.\n  Many of the proper names mentioned in the book are spelled differently\n  from what is usual. These have been left as printed as well, unless\n  listed below.\n\n  Page xviii, Continuous and discontinuance memory: as printed in the\n  source document.\n\n  Page 36, so many other actors: possibly an error for so many other\n  factors.\n\n  Page 141, Prospera: possibly an error for Prospero.\n\n  Page 205, much more developed in men than in women: probably an error\n  for much more developed in women than in men (cf. remainder of\n  paragraph).\n\n  Page 282, The terms in the left-hand row: as printed in the source\n  document.\n\n  Page 307, in the left row: as printed in the source document.\n\n\n  Changes made\n\n  Some minor obvious typographical and punctuation errors and misprints\n  have been corrected silently.\n\n  Footnotes have been moved to directly underneath the paragraph where\n  they are referenced.\n\n  Page 7: Boyle-Guy-Lussac changed to Boyle-Gay-Lussac\n\n  Page 25: thelyplastic changed to thelyplasmic\n\n  Page 29: closing quote mark added after ... in different proportions.\n\n  Page 38: Postwangen changed to Postwagen\n\n  Page 69: Jeanna de la Mothe Guyon changed to Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon;\n  Footnote 6: Hysterias if ... changed to Hysteria is ...\n\n  Page 97: Helmholz changed to Helmholtz as elsewhere\n\n  Page 118: Kloppstock changed to Klopstock\n\n  Page 160: Nebbel\u2019s epigram changed to Hebbel\u2019s epigram\n\n  Page 181: Ernest Mack changed to Ernest Mach\n\n  Page 185: closing quote mark added after Latin text\n\n  Page 217: Th. Bischof changed to Th. Bischoff\n\n  Page 305: Tannha\u00fcser changed to Tannh\u00e4user\n\n  Index: some minor spelling changes made to conform to the text.","title":"Sex & Character: Authorised Translation from the Sixth German Edition","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":128597}