{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_62663/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_62663","id":"gutenberg_62663","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/62663","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Teaching & Education","Philosophy -- History"],"text":"A BEGINNER\u2019S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Transcriber\u2019s Notes \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Punctuation has been standardized. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Characters in small caps have been replaced by all caps. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Non-printable characteristics have been given the following \u2502\n \u2502 Italic text: --> _text_ \u2502\n \u2502 emphasized text within \u2502\n \u2502 bold text: --> =text=. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 This book was written in a period when many words had \u2502\n \u2502 not become standardized in their spelling. Words may have \u2502\n \u2502 multiple spelling variations or inconsistent hyphenation in \u2502\n \u2502 the text. These have been left unchanged unless indicated \u2502\n \u2502 with a Transcriber\u2019s Note. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 The symbol \u2018\u2021\u2019 indicates the description in parenthesis has \u2502\n \u2502 been added to an illustration. This may be needed if there \u2502\n \u2502 is no caption or if the caption does not describe the image \u2502\n \u2502 adequately. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Index references have not been checked for accuracy. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Footnotes are identified in the text with a number in \u2502\n \u2502 brackets [2] and have been accumulated in a single section \u2502\n \u2502 at the end of the text. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Transcriber\u2019s Notes are used when making corrections to the \u2502\n \u2502 text or to provide additional information for the modern \u2502\n \u2502 reader. These notes are identified in the text by a \u2666 symbol, \u2502\n \u2502 and are accumulated in a single section at the end of the \u2502\n \u2502 book. \u2502\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n\n\n Illustration: IMMANUEL KANT\n\n (The Puttrich\u2019sche Portrait of Kant was printed in the\n _Kant-Studien_ in 1906 and is said by Professor Vaihinger to\n be one of the best likenesses of the K\u00f6nigsberg philosopher.\n The name of the artist was Puttrich, and the original painting\n goes back before 1798. It is interesting to note that this\n portrait of Kant was used by the sculptor, Rauch, as his model\n for the statue of Kant upon the memorial monument of Frederick\n the Great.)\n\n\n\n\n A BEGINNER\u2019S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n BY\n\n HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN, LL.D., PH.D.\n\n _Sometime Professor of Philosophy in Tufts College\n Lecturer of Philosophy in Harvard College\n Lecturer of Philosophy in Dartmouth College_\n\n\n VOL. II\n\n MODERN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n Illustration: (\u2021 Colophon)\n\n\n BOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO\n HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY\n The Riverside Press Cambridge\n\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1911, BY HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN\n ALL RIGHTS RESERVED\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n\nThe pedagogical purpose of this history of philosophy is stated in\nthe Preface to the first volume. It may be desirable in this place to\nrestate what that purpose is.\n\nThis book is intended as a text-book for sketch-courses in the history\nof philosophy. It is written for the student rather than for the\nteacher. It is a history of philosophy upon the background of geography\nand of literary and political history. Since the book is intended for\nthe student, it makes the teacher all the more necessary; for it puts\ninto the hands of the student an outline of the history of philosophy\nand into the hands of the teacher the class-room time for inspiring\nthe student with his own interpretations. In making use of geographical\nmaps, contemporary literature, and political history, this book is\nmerely employing for pedagogical reasons the stock of information\nwith which the student is furnished, when he begins the history of\nphilosophy. The summaries, tables, and other generalizations are\nemployed, as in text-books in other subjects, as helps to the memory.\nTherefore the book has the single purpose of arranging and organizing\nthe material of the history of philosophy for the beginner.\n\nThe student will be impressed with the short time-length of the modern\nperiod compared with the tremendously long stretches of the periods\nof antiquity. The modern period is only four hundred and fifty years\nin length, if we take the date 1453 as its beginning. Compared to the\ntwenty-two hundred years of ancient and medi\u00e6val life, the period of\nmodern life seems very short. Furthermore the student who has followed\nthe philosophy of antiquity must have observed how often philosophy\narose out of ethnic situations in which whole civilizations were\ninvolved. He will find that modern philosophy in this respect stands in\ncontrast with the philosophy of ancient times. With the decentralizing\nof modern Europe, philosophy has also become decentralized. This\ndoes not mean that philosophical movements have included fewer people\nin their sweep, but that the movements have had shorter life, the\ntransitions have been quicker, and the epochs have been briefer.\nModern civilization is subjective; and its philosophy is thereby more\ntechnical, and more difficult to understand and to interpret than the\nphilosophy of antiquity.\n\nThere are many helpful books in English on the history of modern\nphilosophy, and the student should have them at hand. I call attention\nespecially to Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, for its judicious\nselection from the original sources; to Royce, _Spirit of Modern\nPhilosophy_, chapters iii to x; to Eucken, _The Problem of Human\nLife_, pp. 303 to 518; and to the Summaries in Windelband, _History\nof Philosophy_, Parts IV to VII. Besides these there are valuable\nhistories of modern philosophy by Falckenberg, H\u00f6ffding (2 vols.),\nWeber, Ueberweg (vol. ii), Calkins, Dewing, and Rogers.\n\nTo friends who have read parts of the manuscript, I desire to\nacknowledge my indebtedness for many wise criticisms and suggestions;\nespecially to Professor W. A. Neilson, Professor R. B. Perry, Dr. B.\nA. G. Fuller, and Dr. J. H. Woods of Harvard University; to Professor\nMary W. Calkins of Wellesley College; to Professor W. P. Montague of\nColumbia University; and to Professor S. P. Capen of Clark College.\n\nTUFTS COLLEGE, December, 1910.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS\n\n VOLUME II. MODERN PHILOSOPHY\n (1453 TO THE PRESENT TIME)\n\n\n CHAPTER I. THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DIVISIONS OF THE MODERN\n PERIOD 1\n THE DIFFICULTY IN THE STUDY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 1\n THE PERIODS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 2\n THE CAUSES OF THE DECAY OF THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE\n AGES 4\n (a) _The Internal Causes_ 4\n (1) The Intellectual Methods were Self-Destructive 4\n (2) The Standard of Truth became a Double Standard 5\n (3) The Development of Mysticism 5\n (4) The Doctrine of Nominalism 5\n (b) _The External Causes_ 6\n\n CHAPTER II. THE RENAISSANCE (1453\u20131690) 8\n THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE RENAISSANCE 8\n (a) _The New Man of the Renaissance_ 8\n (b) _The New Universe of the Renaissance_ 9\n (1) The Transformation of the Physical Universe 9\n (2) The Restoration of the World of Antiquity 10\n THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RENAISSANCE IN HISTORY 11\n MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE 13\n THE TWO PERIODS OF THE RENAISSANCE: THE HUMANISTIC\n (1453\u20131600); THE NATURAL SCIENCE (1600\u20131690) 15\n (a) _The Similarities of the Two Periods_ 16\n (b) _The Differences of the Two Periods_ 16\n (1) The Countries which participate in the\n Renaissance differ in the Two Periods 16\n (2) The Intellectual Standards differ in the Two\n Periods 17\n (3) The Scientific Methods in the Two Periods were\n Different 18\n (4) The Attitude of the Church toward Science differs\n in the Two Periods 19\n A BRIEF CONTRAST OF THE TWO PERIODS\u2015\u2015A SUMMARY OF THE\n DISCUSSION ABOVE 21\n\n CHAPTER III. THE HUMANISTIC PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE\n (1453\u20131600) 22\n THE LONG LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HUMANISTIC PERIOD 22\n NICOLAS OF CUSA (1401\u20131464) 24\n PARACELSUS (1493\u20131541) 25\n GIORDANO BRUNO (1548\u20131600) 27\n MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHERS OF\n THE RENAISSANCE 30\n\n CHAPTER IV. THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE\n (1600\u20131690) 31\n THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD 31\n THE MATHEMATICAL ASTRONOMERS 32\n GALILEO GALILEI (1564\u20131641) 36\n THE LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON, BARON VERULAM (1561\u20131626) 39\n THE POSITION OF BACON IN PHILOSOPHY 39\n THE AIM OF BACON 42\n THE METHOD OF BACON 43\n (a) _Bacon\u2019s Criticism of the Past_ 44\n (b) _Bacon\u2019s Positive Construction_ 45\n THE ENGLISH NATURAL SCIENCE MOVEMENT 46\n THOMAS HOBBES AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES 47\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HOBBES (1588\u20131679) 49\n 1. As a Classical Scholar (1588\u20131628) 49\n 2. As Mathematician (1628\u20131638) 49\n 3. As Philosopher (1638\u20131651) 50\n 4. As Controversialist (1651\u20131668) 50\n 5. As Classical Scholar (1668\u20131679) 50\n THE INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF HOBBES 50\n 1. His Premature Birth 50\n 2. His Father 51\n 3. The New Mathematical Science 52\n THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE TEACHING OF HOBBES 52\n THE METHOD OF HOBBES 54\n THE KINDS OF BODIES 55\n HOBBES\u2019S APPLICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY TO\n PSYCHOLOGY 56\n HOBBES\u2019S APPLICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY TO\n POLITICS 58\n THE RENAISSANCE IN ENGLAND AFTER HOBBES 61\n\n CHAPTER V. THE RATIONALISM OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD\n OF THE RENAISSANCE 62\n THE NATURE OF RATIONALISM 62\n THE MENTAL CONFLICT IN DESCARTES 65\n THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES\n (1596\u20131650) 66\n 1. As Child and Student (1596\u20131613) 66\n 2. As Traveler (1613\u20131628) 66\n 3. As Writer (1629\u20131650) 67\n 4. In Stockholm (1649\u20131650) 67\n THE TWO CONFLICTING INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF\n DESCARTES 67\n THE METHOD OF DESCARTES 69\n INDUCTION\u2015\u2015PROVISIONAL DOUBT\u2015\u2015THE ULTIMATE CERTAINTY OF\n CONSCIOUSNESS 70\n DEDUCTION\u2015\u2015THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 72\n THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 73\n THE REALITY OF MATTER 75\n GOD AND THE WORLD 77\n THE RELATION OF GOD TO MATTER 77\n THE RELATION OF GOD TO MINDS 78\n THE RELATION OF MIND AND BODY 78\n THE INFLUENCE OF DESCARTES 80\n THE RELATION OF THE OCCASIONALISTS AND SPINOZA TO\n DESCARTES 81\n PORTRAIT OF SPINOZA 84\n THE HISTORICAL PLACE OF SPINOZA 84\n THE INFLUENCES UPON SPINOZA 86\n 1. His Jewish Training 86\n 2. His Impulse from the New Science\u2015\u2015Descartes\u2019\n Influence 86\n 3. His Acquaintance with the Collegiants 87\n THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF SPINOZA\n (1632\u20131677) 88\n 1. In Israel (1632\u20131656) 89\n 2. In Retirement (1656\u20131663) 89\n 3. In the Public Eye (1663\u20131677) 90\n THE METHOD OF SPINOZA 90\n THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SPINOZA\u2019S PHILOSOPHY 91\n THREE CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SPINOZA\u2019S TEACHING 93\n THE PANTHEISM OF SPINOZA\u2015\u2015THE ALL-INCLUSIVENESS OF GOD 94\n THE MYSTICISM OF SPINOZA 98\n SPINOZA\u2019S DOCTRINE OF SALVATION 102\n SUMMARY OF SPINOZA\u2019S TEACHING 106\n LEIBNITZ AS THE FINISHER OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE\n FORERUNNER OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 107\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF LEIBNITZ (1646\u20131716) 108\n 1. Leipsic and University Life (1646\u20131666) 111\n 2. Mainz and Diplomacy (1666\u20131672) 111\n 3. Paris and Science (1672\u20131676) 111\n 4. Hanover and Philosophy (1676\u20131716) 112\n THE THREE INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF LEIBNITZ 112\n (1) His Early Classical Studies 112\n (2) The New Science and his own Discoveries 113\n (3) Political Pressure for Religious Reconciliation 114\n THE METHOD OF LEIBNITZ 115\n THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR LEIBNITZ 118\n THE RESULT OF LEIBNITZ\u2019S EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES\n OF SCIENCE\u2015\u2015A PLURALITY OF METAPHYSICAL SUBSTANCES 119\n 1. Leibnitz first scrutinized the Scientific\n Conception of Motion 119\n 2. Leibnitz next examined the Scientific Conception of\n the Atom 120\n 3. Leibnitz then identified Force with the Metaphysical\n Atom 121\n THE DOUBLE NATURE OF THE MONADS 122\n THE TWO FORMS OF LEIBNITZ\u2019S CONCEPTION OF THE UNITY OF\n SUBSTANCES 125\n THE INTRINSIC UNITY OF THE MONADS\u2015\u2015THE PHILOSOPHICAL\n UNITY 125\n THE SUPERIMPOSED UNITY OF THE MONADS\u2015\u2015THE THEOLOGICAL\n UNITY 129\n\n CHAPTER VI. THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1690\u20131781) 132\n THE EMERGENCE OF THE \u201cNEW MAN\u201d\u2015\u2015INDIVIDUALISM 132\n THE PRACTICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT\u2015\u2015THE\n INDEPENDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 134\n THE METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 135\n THE PROBLEMS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 135\n (a) _Utilitarian Problems_ 136\n (b) _Questions of Criticism_ 138\n A COMPARISON OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN ENGLAND, FRANCE,\n AND GERMANY 140\n THE MANY GROUPS OF PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 140\n MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF SOME OF THE INFLUENTIAL\n THINKERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 144\n\n CHAPTER VII. JOHN LOCKE 145\n THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 145\n JOHN LOCKE, LIFE AND WRITINGS (1632\u20131704) 147\n 1. Student Life (1632\u20131666) 147\n 2. As Politician (1666\u20131683) 148\n 3. As Philosophical Author (1683\u20131691) 149\n 4. As Controversialist (1691\u20131704) 149\n THE SOURCES OF LOCKE\u2019S THOUGHT 150\n 1. His Puritan Ancestry 150\n 2. His Training in Tolerance 150\n 3. The Scientific Influence 151\n 4. The Political Influence 152\n SUMMARY 153\n THE PURPOSE OF LOCKE 153\n TWO SIDES OF LOCKE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY 155\n (a) _The Negative Side\u2015\u2015Locke and Scholasticism_ 156\n (b) _The Positive Side\u2015\u2015The New Psychology and\n Epistemology_ 157\n LOCKE\u2019S PSYCHOLOGY 158\n LOCKE\u2019S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 160\n LOCKE\u2019S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 162\n THE INFLUENCE OF LOCKE 163\n THE ENGLISH DEISTS 164\n THE ENGLISH MORALISTS 166\n CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE ENGLISH MORALISTS 168\n\n CHAPTER VIII. BERKELEY AND HUME 169\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF GEORGE BERKELEY (1685\u20131753) 169\n 1. His Early Training (1685\u20131707) 169\n 2. As Author (1707\u20131721) 170\n 3. As Priest and Missionary (1721\u20131753) 171\n THE INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF BERKELEY 172\n THE PURPOSE OF BERKELEY 173\n BERKELEY\u2019S GENERAL RELATION TO LOCKE AND HUME 174\n BERKELEY\u2019S POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH LOCKE 175\n THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF BERKELEY\u2019S PHILOSOPHY 176\n 1. As shown in General in his Analysis of Abstract\n Ideas 177\n 2. As shown in Particular in his Analysis of Matter 177\n THE POSITIVE SIDE OF BERKELEY\u2019S PHILOSOPHY 179\n 1. Esse est Percipi 179\n 2. The Existence of Mind is assumed by Berkeley 180\n 3. Spiritual Substances are Sufficient to explain all\n Ideas 181\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF DAVID HUME (1711\u20131776) 183\n 1. Period of Training (1711\u20131734) 184\n 2. Period of Philosopher (1734\u20131752) 185\n 3. Period of Politician (1752\u20131776) 185\n INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF HUME 186\n DOGMATISM, PHENOMENALISM, AND SKEPTICISM 187\n THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS 189\n THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 191\n THE ASSOCIATION OF CONTIGUITY 193\n THE ASSOCIATION OF RESEMBLANCE 194\n 1. Mathematics 194\n 2. The Conception of Substance: Hume\u2019s Attack on\n Theology 195\n THE ASSOCIATION OF CAUSATION: HUME\u2019S ATTACK ON SCIENCE 196\n THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 199\n HUME\u2019S THEORY OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 200\n THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL 201\n\n CHAPTER IX. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 203\n THE SITUATION IN FRANCE IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 203\n THE ENGLISH INFLUENCE IN FRANCE 206\n THE TWO PERIODS OF THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT 207\n THE INTELLECTUAL ENLIGHTENMENT (1729\u20131762)\u2015\u2015VOLTAIRE,\n MONTESQUIEU, AND THE ENCYCLOP\u00c6DISTS 208\n VOLTAIRE (1694\u20131778) 209\n THE ENCYCLOP\u00c6DISTS 211\n THE SOCIAL ENLIGHTENMENT (1762\u20131789) 213\n ROUSSEAU (1712\u20131778) 213\n THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1740\u20131781) 216\n THE INTRODUCTORY PERIOD (1648\u20131740). ABSOLUTISM 217\n 1. The Rise of Prussia 218\n 2. The Early German Literature 219\n 3. The Pietistic Movement 219\n 4. The Transformation of Leibnitz\u2019s Rationalism 220\n SUMMARY OF THE LITERARY ENLIGHTENMENT OF GERMANY\n (1740\u20131781) 223\n THE POLITICAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF GERMANY\u2015\u2015FREDERICK THE\n GREAT 224\n THE COURSE OF THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT 226\n LESSING 228\n\n CHAPTER X. KANT 230\n THE CONVERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES IN GERMANY 230\n THE THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 231\n THE TWO PERIODS OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 232\n THE INFLUENCES UPON KANT 233\n 1. Pietism 233\n 2. The Leibnitz-Wolffian Philosophy 233\n 3. The Physics of Newton 234\n 4. The Humanitarianism of Rousseau 234\n 5. The Skepticism of Hume 235\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF KANT (1724\u20131804) 235\n THE PROBLEM OF KANT 238\n THE METHOD OF KANT 239\n THE THREEFOLD WORLD OF KANT\u2015\u2015SUBJECTIVE STATES,\n THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES, AND PHENOMENA 240\n THE WORLD OF KNOWLEDGE 243\n THE PLACE OF SYNTHESIS IN KNOWLEDGE 245\n THE JUDGMENTS INDISPENSABLE TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 248\n THE PROOF OF THE VALIDITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 252\n 1. In what does the Validity of Sense-\u2666Perception\n consist? 253\n 2. In what does the Validity of the Understanding\n consist? 255\n HAS THE REASON BY ITSELF ANY VALIDITY? 260\n THE IDEA OF THE SOUL 262\n THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSE 264\n THE IDEA OF GOD 265\n CONCLUSION 268\n THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON: THE\n ETHICS OF KANT 269\n THE MORAL LAW AND THE TWO QUESTIONS CONCERNING IT 271\n 1. The First Question concerning the Moral Law 272\n 2. The Second Question concerning the Moral Law 273\n THE MORAL POSTULATES 275\n 1. The Postulate of Freedom 276\n 2. The Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul 276\n 3. The Postulate of the Existence of God 276\n\n CHAPTER XI. THE GERMAN IDEALISTS 278\n IDEALISM AFTER KANT 278\n FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND HEGEL 279\n MAP SHOWING THE UNIVERSITY TOWNS AND OTHER IMPORTANT\n PLACES CONNECTED WITH THE GERMAN IDEALISTS 280\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FICHTE (1762\u20131814) 282\n 1. His Education (1762\u20131790) 283\n 2. Discipleship of Kant (1790\u20131794) 283\n 3. His Life at Jena (1794\u20131799) 284\n 4. His Life at Berlin (1799\u20131814) 284\n THE INFLUENCES UPON FICHTE\u2019S TEACHING 285\n WHY WE PHILOSOPHIZE 286\n THE MORAL AWAKENING 287\n THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE IN FICHTE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY 288\n THE MORAL WORLD 290\n GOD AND MAN 292\n WHAT A MORAL REALITY INVOLVES 293\n 1. It involves the Consciousness of Something Else 293\n 2. It involves a Contradiction 294\n ROMANTICISM 295\n GOETHE AS A ROMANTICIST 297\n ROMANTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 299\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF SCHELLING (1775\u20131854) 300\n 1. Earlier Period (1775\u20131797) 302\n 2. The Philosophy of Nature (1797\u20131800) 302\n 3. The Transcendental Philosophy (1800\u20131801) 302\n 4. The Philosophy of Identity (1801\u20131804) 303\n 5. The Philosophy of Freedom and God (1804\u20131809) 303\n 6. The Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation\n (1809\u20131854) 303\n A BRIEF COMPARISON OF FICHTE AND SCHELLING AS\n PHILOSOPHERS 303\n SCHELLING\u2019S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 305\n SCHELLING\u2019S TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 307\n THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY 310\n SCHELLING\u2019S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY 311\n HEGEL AND THE CULMINATION OF IDEALISM 312\n WHY HEGEL REMAINS TO-DAY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF KANT 314\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HEGEL (1770\u20131831) 315\n 1. Formative Period (1770\u20131796) 317\n 2. Formulation of his Philosophy (1796\u20131806) 317\n 3. Development of his Philosophy (1806\u20131831) 317\n REALISM, MYSTICISM, AND IDEALISM 318\n THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HEGEL\u2019S IDEALISM 321\n THE COSMIC UNITY 322\n THE COSMIC LAW 326\n HEGEL\u2019S APPLICATION OF HIS THEORY 328\n\n CHAPTER XII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF 330\n HERBART AND SCHOPENHAUER 330\n JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART 332\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HERBART (1776\u20131841) 333\n THE CONTRADICTIONS OF EXPERIENCE 334\n THE ARGUMENT FOR REALISM 334\n THE MANY REALS AND NATURE PHENOMENA 337\n THE SOUL AND MENTAL PHENOMENA 338\n ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER AND HIS PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS 340\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF SCHOPENHAUER (1788\u20131860) 342\n 1. Period of Education (1788\u20131813) 343\n 2. Period of Literary Production (1813\u20131831) 343\n 3. Period of Retirement (1831\u20131860) 343\n THE INFLUENCES UPON SCHOPENHAUER\u2019S THOUGHT 343\n THE WORLD AS WILL AND THE WORLD AS IDEA 345\n THE WILL AS IRRATIONAL REALITY 347\n THE MISERY OF THE WORLD AS IDEA\u2015\u2015PESSIMISM 348\n THE WAY OF DELIVERANCE 349\n\n CHAPTER XIII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 352\n THE RETURN TO REALISM 352\n THE CHARACTER OF THE REALISM OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 353\n MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND GERMAN IDEALISM 355\n THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 356\n 1. The Problem of the Functioning of the Soul 357\n 2. The Problem of the Conception of History 360\n\n INDEX 365\n\n\n\n\n ILLUSTRATIONS\n\n\n IMMANUEL KANT _Frontispiece_\n\n MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE 13\n\n MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHERS OF\n THE RENAISSANCE 30\n\n BARUCH DE SPINOZA 84\n\n MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF SOME OF THE INFLUENTIAL\n THINKERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 144\n\n MAP SHOWING THE UNIVERSITY TOWNS AND OTHER IMPORTANT\n PLACES CONNECTED WITH THE GERMAN IDEALISTS 280\n\n\n\n\n A BEGINNER\u2019S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n VOLUME II\n\n MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1453 TO THE PRESENT TIME)\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DIVISIONS OF THE MODERN PERIOD\n\n\n=The Difficulty in the Study of Modern Philosophy.= Beside the great\nspans of ancient and medi\u00e6val civilizations, the 450 years of the\nmodern period seem brief. The road is indeed relatively short from\nmedi\u00e6val times to the century in which we live, and yet it proves\ndifficult to the student who travels it for the first time. Even for\nthe modern mind the study of modern philosophy is inherently more\ndifficult than that of the ancient and medi\u00e6val. The preceding periods\npresent new points of view, but these, once attained, lead along\ncomparatively easy ways. The chief difficulty of the preceding periods\nis overcome when their peculiar view of things is gained; but the\nstudent of modern philosophy is confronted with difficulties all along\nthe way. In the first place, modern philosophy is very complex because\nit is a conflict of various aspirations. It has neither the objectivity\nof ancient thought nor the logical consistency of medi\u00e6val thought.\nIt arises from subjective motives, whose shadings are difficult to\ntrace. The task is rendered harder by the fact that intimations of the\nproblems in the history of modern philosophy are on the whole present\nin the beginner\u2019s mind; and yet at the same time his mind possesses,\nbesides these, many medi\u00e6val notions as well. For the student to pass\nsuccessfully through the entire length of modern thought from Cusanus\nto Spencer means, therefore, two things for him: (1) he must gain an\ninsight into the depth and significance of his own half-formed ideas;\n(2) he must transcend or give up entirely his medi\u00e6val notions. If\ntherefore philosophy represents the epoch that produces it,\u2015\u2015either as\nthe central principle or as the marginal and ulterior development of\nthat epoch,\u2015\u2015the modern can come to an understanding of the history of\nmodern philosophy only by coming to an understanding of himself and his\nown inner reflections.\n\nThis will explain why the short period of modern thought is\ntraditionally divided into comparatively many periods. These\nsubordinate periods ring out the changes through which the modern man\nfeels that he himself has blindly passed in his inner life. Modern\nphilosophy is no more local and temporary than the ancient; it is no\nless a part of a social movement; but the modern man is more alive to\nthe differentiations of modern thought than he is to those of antiquity.\n\n=The Periods of Modern Philosophy.= The divisions of the history of\nmodern philosophy are as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n 1. The Renaissance (1453\u20131690)\u2015\u2015from the end of the Middle\n Ages to the publication of Locke\u2019s _Essay on the Human\n Understanding_.\n\n 2. The Enlightenment (1690\u20131781)\u2015\u2015to the publication of Kant\u2019s\n _Critique of Pure Reason_.\n\n 3. German Philosophy (1781\u20131831)\u2015\u2015to the death of Hegel.\n\n 4. The Nineteenth Century Philosophy (1820\u2013the present time).\n\nThe Renaissance, the first period, covers more than half of the length\nof modern times. It is sometimes called the springtime of modern\nhistory, although it is longer than all the other seasons together.\nIt is to be noted that two epoch-making books form the dividing lines\nbetween the first three periods. The transition from the Renaissance\nto the Enlightenment is signalized by Locke\u2019s great _Essay on the Human\nUnderstanding_, which expressed for one hundred years the political\nand philosophical opinions of western Europe. The transition from the\nEnlightenment to German Philosophy was in its turn signalized by the\nappearance of Kant\u2019s _Critique of Pure Reason_, and this book may be\nsaid to have been fundamental to human thinking ever since. There is\none point further to be noticed in these divisions, and that is the\noverlapping of the last two periods. German philosophy ends practically\nwith the death of Hegel in 1831, and the modern Evolution movement\nbegan at least ten years before, about 1820. No great philosophical\ntreatise marks the division here, for the Evolution movement had its\nbeginnings in German philosophy and in the discoveries and practical\ninventions of natural science. Evolution, however, became a reaction\nupon the last phases of German philosophy, and then formed a distinct\nmovement. The book that formulated the Evolution movement most fully\nappeared several years after the theory was under way. This was\nDarwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, published in 1859. Locke\u2019s _Essay_ and\nKant\u2019s _Critique_ are therefore the most influential philosophical\ninterpretations of the history of modern times since its early\nbeginnings in the Renaissance.\n\n=The Causes of the Decay of the Civilization of the Middle Ages.= The\nsocial structure of the medi\u00e6val time weakened and broke apart, in the\nfirst place because of certain inherent defects in its organism; in\nthe second place because of some remarkable discoveries, inventions,\nand historical changes. We may call these (1) _the internal causes_ and\n(2) _the external causes_ of the fall of the civilization of the Middle\nAges.\n\n(a) _The Internal Causes_ were inherent weaknesses in medi\u00e6val\nintellectual life, and alone would have been sufficient to bring\nmedi\u00e6val society to an end.\n\n(1) _The intellectual methods_ of the Middle Ages were self-destructive\nmethods. We may take scholasticism as the best expression of the\nintellectual life of the Middle Ages, and scholasticism even in its\nripest period used the _method of deductive logic_. Scholasticism did\nnot employ induction from observation and experiment, but proceeded on\nthe principle that the more universal logically a conception is, the\nmore real it is. (See vol. i, p. 355.) On this principle scholasticism\nset as its only task to penetrate and clarify dogma. Its theism was\na _logical_ theism. Even Thomas Aquinas, the great classic schoolman,\nused formal logic (dialectics) as the method of obtaining the truth.\nAfter him in the latter part of the Middle Ages, logic instead of being\na method became an end. It was studied for its own sake. This naturally\ndegenerated into word-splitting and quibbling, into the commenting\nupon the texts of this master and that, into arid verbal discussions.\nThe religious orders frittered away their time on verbal questions of\ntrifling importance. The lifetime of such intellectual employment is\nalways a limited one.\n\n(2) _The standard of the truth_ of things in the Middle Ages became\na double standard, and was therefore self-destructive. Ostensibly\nthere was only one standard,\u2015\u2015infallible dogma. Really there were two\nstandards,\u2015\u2015reason and dogma. The employment of logical methods implied\nthe human reason as a valid standard. Logic is the method of human\nreasoning. To use logic to clarify dogma, to employ the philosophy\nof Aristotle to supplement the Bible, to defend faith by argument,\namounted in effect to supporting revelation by reason. It was the same\nas defending the infallible and revealed by the fallible and secular.\nIt was the erecting of a double standard. It called the infallible into\nquestion. It was the offering of excuses for what is supposedly beyond\nsuspicion. The scholastic made faith the object of thought, and thereby\nencouraged the spirit of free inquiry.\n\n(3) _The development of Mysticism_ in the Middle Ages was a powerful\nfactor that led to its dissolution. There is, of course, an element\nof mysticism in the doctrine of the church from St. Augustine\nonwards, and in the Early Period of the Middle Ages mysticism had\nno independence. But mysticism is essentially the direct communion\nwith God on the part of the individual. The intermediary offices of\nthe church are contradictory to the spirit of mysticism. It is not\nsurprising, therefore, to find in the last period of scholasticism\nnumerous independent mystics as representatives of the tendency of\nindividualistic religion, which was to result in the Protestantism of\nthe Renaissance.\n\n(4) _The doctrine of Nominalism_ was the fourth important element to be\nmentioned that led to the dissolution of the civilization of the Middle\nAges. This was easily suppressed by the church authorities in the early\nmedi\u00e6val centuries, when it was a purely logical doctrine and had no\nempirical scientific basis. In the later years, however, nominalism\ngained great strength with the acquisition of knowledge of the nature\nworld. Nominalism turned man\u2019s attention away from the affairs of\nthe spirit. It incited him to modify the realism of dogma. It pointed\nout the importance of practical experience. It emphasized individual\nopinion, neglected tradition, and placed its hope in the possibilities\nof science rather than in the spiritual actualities of religion.\n\n(b) _The External Causes_ consisted of certain important events that\nbrought the Middle Ages to a close and introduced the Renaissance.\nThese events caused great social changes by demolishing the\ngeographical and astronomical conceptions of medi\u00e6val time which had\nbecome a part of church tradition.\n\nFirst to be mentioned are the inventions which belong to the Middle\nAges, but which came into common use not before the beginning of the\nRenaissance. These played an important part in the total change of\nthe society which followed. They were the magnetic needle, gunpowder,\nwhich was influential in destroying the feudal system, and printing,\nwhich would have failed in its effect had not at the same time\nthe manufacture of paper been improved. Moreover at the end of the\nfifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century occurred the\nfollowing events:\u2015\u2015\n\n1453. Constantinople fell and its Greek scholars migrated to Italy.\n\n1492. Columbus discovered America, an achievement which was made\npossible by the use of the magnetic needle.\n\n1498. Vasco da Gama discovered the all-sea route to India and thereby\nchanged the course of the world\u2019s commerce.\n\n1518. The Protestant Reformation was begun by Luther.\n\n1530. Copernicus wrote his _De revolutionibus orbium_, in which he\nmaintained that the earth moved around the sun.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE RENAISSANCE[1] (1453\u20131690)\n\n\n=The General Character of the Renaissance.= The causes that led to the\ndecline of the society of the Middle Ages were of course the same that\nushered in the period of the Renaissance,\u2015\u2015the first, the longest, and\nthe most hopeful period of modern times. The general characterization\nof this period may be expressed in a single phrase,\u2015\u2015_a New Man in a\nNew Universe_. This, however, needs explanation.\n\n(a) The _New Man_ of the Renaissance was distinctly a man with a\ncountry. The fusion of the German and Roman peoples in the Dark Ages\nbefore Charlemagne (800) was now completed. The fusion did not result\nin a \u2666homogeneous whole, but in groups which formed the nations of\nEurope. The time when this grouping was practically finished is a\ndifficult problem, into which we will not inquire. In a real sense it\nnever was nor will be ended. We know that the nations began to form\nabout the year 1000, and when we examine the history of the Renaissance\nwe find Italians, Germans, French, Dutch, and English with distinctive\nnational characteristics. We find the Renaissance first centralized\namong the Italians and Germans, and then later among the English, the\npeople of the Low Countries, and the French. The Italian is a new Roman\nand the German a new Teuton. The undefined nationalities of the Middle\nAges now become clear-cut. Philosophy also becomes now more or less of\na national concern.\n\n(b) A _New Universe_ is now opened to the \u201cNew Man\u201d of the Renaissance.\nNot only in mental equipment, but in scope for his activity, does\nthe European of the Renaissance differ from the medi\u00e6val man. The\nworld is actually a new world\u2015\u2015new in its geographical outlines and\nits astronomical relations; new in its intellectual stores from the\npast. The physical world that supported his body and the intellectual\nworld that refreshed his mind were newly discovered by the man of the\nRenaissance. We must examine these two new worlds more in detail.\n\n1. The physical universe had undergone a wonderful transformation\nfor man. Our nineteenth century has often been looked upon as a\nperiod of extraordinary discoveries; but no discoveries have ever\nso revolutionized the human mind as those enumerated above as \u201cthe\nexternal causes of the fall of the society of the Middle Ages.\u201d Think\nhow new that old world must have seemed to the common people who\nhad supposed it to be flat, as well as to the scientists who had\nhypothetically supposed it to be solid\u2015\u2015how new it must have seemed\nwhen they found that it had been actually circumnavigated! How the\nhorizon of men\u2019s minds must have widened when new continents were\ndiscovered by sailors and new celestial worlds were found by the\ntelescope of the astronomers! Discovery led to experiment, and the\nwhole new physical world was transformed by the new physical science of\nGalileo into a mechanical order. It was a wonderful new material world\nthat was discovered and scientifically reorganized at the beginning\nof the Renaissance. Whereas the common man in medi\u00e6val time had found\nlittle joy in living, the common man now looked upon the world as a\nmagnificent opportunity. Whereas the medi\u00e6val man had turned from the\ndisorders of this wicked world to contemplation of the blessedness of\nheaven, the man of the Renaissance came forth from the cloister and\nengaged in trade and adventure. The earth and the things therein had\nsuddenly become objects of emotional interest.\n\n2. Not only was a new geographical and physical world discovered at\nthis time, but also the intellectual world of antiquity was restored.\nFor more than a thousand years in western Europe the literature of\nthe Greeks and Romans had been a thing of shreds and patches, and even\nthen read only in Latin translations. Now the European had come into\npossession of a large part of it and was reading it in the original. He\nwas aroused to the wonderful intellectual life of the Age of Pericles.\nThe interest in ancient literature, which had been started by Dante,\nPetrarch, and Boccaccio in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,\nbecame an absorbing and controlling force at this time. The real\ninterest began with the stimulus received by the coming of the Greek\nscholars to Italy from the East: first the ecclesiastical embassy\nin 1438, and afterward in 1453 the large number of refugees from\nConstantinople at the time of its capture by the Turks. Upon these\nrefugees the patronage of the great Italian nobles\u2015\u2015chiefly perhaps\nin Florence\u2015\u2015was lavishly bestowed. The Platonic Academy was founded.\nLearned expounders of the new learning arose,\u2015\u2015Pletho, the two Picos,\nFincinus, Reuchlin. Of all the philosophies of antiquity Platonism\nwas favored, and it was interpreted in a mystical manner. Aristotle\nand Christianity were looked upon as mere interpretations of Plato.\nNevertheless the Renaissance scholars were interested in all the new\nliterary material from the East. They studied the Jewish Cabala and\nits mystic numbers. They revived Skepticism, Eclecticism, Stoicism, and\nEpicureanism. Aristotle was represented by two antagonistic schools;\nand Taurellus opposed both and appealed to the scholarly world to\nreturn to Christianity.\n\n=The Significance of the Renaissance in History.= We have above\ncharacterized the Renaissance as a time in which a \u201cnew man\u201d found\nhimself living in a \u201cnew universe.\u201d But the old world of medi\u00e6val\nscience, culture, and conventional manners had by no means been\nentirely outgrown and discarded. Periods of history do not \u201cleave their\nlow-vaulted past\u201d as easily as a man may throw away his coat. Medi\u00e6val\nscience and theology still remained, not only as a background but\nalso as an aggressive social factor everywhere. Medi\u00e6val scholasticism\nwas something with which the Renaissance had always to reckon.\nScholasticism modified, frequently restricted, and even directed\nthe thought of the Renaissance. Consequently when we form our final\nestimate of the place of the Renaissance in the modern movement, we\nmust not overlook the conservative force of the medi\u00e6val institutions\nexisting during the period. The \u201cnew man\u201d lived in a \u201cnew universe\u201d;\nand _his problem was how to explain the relation of that \u201cnew\nuniverse\u201d to himself so that his explanation would not antagonize\nthe time-honored traditions of the church_. This was the constructive\nproblem that gave the Renaissance its place in history.\n\nThe first impression, however, of the Renaissance upon the reader is\nthat it stands for no constructive problem whatever. The changes that\nusher in the Renaissance seem to speak of an epoch that is entirely\nnegative, destructive, and revolutionary. The period seems from one\nside to be a declaration against time-honored traditions. The \u201cnew man\u201d\nhad risen superior to dogma and to Aristotle. Intellectual fermentation\nhad set in, and never had so many attempts at innovation been so\nstrenuously sought. The love for novelty filled the human mind, and the\nimagination ran riot. The movement toward modern individualism appeared\nin the decentralization that at this time was everywhere taking place.\nLatin, for example, ceased to be the one language for educated men,\nand the modern languages came into use. Rome ceased to be the only\nreligious centre, and Wittenberg, London, and Geneva became centres.\nThere was no longer one church, but many sects. Scientific centres\nbecame numerous. Many of the universities had arisen independently,\nand now Oxford, Vienna, Heidelberg, Prague, and numerous universities\nin Italy and Germany afforded opportunities for study equal to those\nof Paris. To the man who looks upon the Classic Period of Scholasticism\nin the Middle Ages as the golden age of united faith,\u2015\u2015to that man the\nRenaissance will appear only as the beginning of the disintegration and\nrevolution that he sees in modern times.\n\n Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE\n IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY\n\n (Note that Rome, Wittenberg, London, and Geneva are the\n religious centres; that Paris, Oxford, Heidelberg, and Prague\n are the educational centres; and that Europe is divided into\n many nations)\n\nBut a deeper insight into the Renaissance shows that its revolutionary,\nnegative, and spectacular aspect is not its whole significance. No\ndoubt a strong, universal, and well-centralized government and a unity\nof faith are social ideals. The reverence in which the name of Rome\nwas held long after the empire had been destroyed, and the reluctance\nwith which the first Protestants separated themselves from the Catholic\nchurch, show that the loss of such a unity is a real loss. But the\nchurch of the Middle Ages was not the carrier of all the treasure\nof the past, nor could the church with its own inherent limitations\nstand as representative of modern times. The new problem which the\nRenaissance faced might be destructive of much of the traditional\npast, but it contained many new elements. The \u201cnew man\u201d found himself\nin a \u201cnew universe.\u201d He was obliged to undertake the solution of a\nfar deeper problem than antiquity had ever attempted. He must orient\nhimself in a larger world than the past had ever imagined. He must do\nthis in the very presence of medi\u00e6val institutions, which had not lost\ntheir spiritual nor their temporal power. The constructive problem\nbefore the man of the Renaissance was therefore an exceedingly complex\none. How should he explain his relation to the \u201cnew universe\u201d in a\nway that would not antagonize tradition? It was a new problem, a real\nproblem in which the traditional factor was always persistently present.\n\nThere were two _motifs_ which give to the problem of the Renaissance\nits constructive character. These were _naturalism_ and _subjectivism_.\n_In the first place, the Renaissance is the period when the naturalism\nof the Greeks was recovered._ By naturalism is meant the love for\nearthly life. Of this the medi\u00e6val church and the medi\u00e6val time had\nlittle or nothing. The church had been born out of the revulsion from\nthe earthly, and it rose on the aspiration for the supernatural. The\nRenaissance was, on the contrary, born out of a passionate joy in\nnature, which joy was intensified by the unexpected possession of the\nliterature of the past and by the discovery of new lands beyond the\nseas. Man felt now the happiness and dignity of earthly living and\nthe worth of the body as well as the soul. _In the next place, the\nRenaissance is marked by the rise of subjectivism._ At the beginning of\nour book we have already given the meaning of subjectivism (see vol. i,\np. 2), and we have characterized modern civilization as subjective\nin distinction from the ancient as objective and the Middle Ages as\ntraditional. We have also found, as we have gone on, the beginnings\nof subjectivism in the Sophists, Stoics, and Christians. But in the\nRenaissance for the first time does the individual as a rational self\ngain the central position. This is subjectivism: the individual is\nnot only the interpreter of the universe, but also its mental creator.\nOf the subjective _motif_ in modern times the Renaissance marks the\ninauguration, and German Idealism the culmination. While the world of\nthe ancients was cosmo-centric and the medi\u00e6val world was theo-centric,\nthe world of the modern man is ego-centric. The love of life, and\nthe love of life because the individual feels his own capacity for\nlife\u2015\u2015this is the situation presented to the man of the Renaissance.\nThus in the restoration of naturalism and in the construction of\nsubjectivism did the Renaissance stand for positive upbuilding, in\nspite of the fact that in all this the period was constrained by the\npowerful tradition of the church.\n\n=The Two Periods of the Renaissance: The Humanistic= (1453\u20131600);\n=The Natural Science= (1600\u20131690). The Renaissance is divided into two\nperiods at the year 1600. The reason for taking this date as a division\nline will soon appear. The period before 1600 we call the Humanistic,\nor the period of the Humanities; the period after this date the Natural\nScience Period.\n\n(a) The Similarities of the Two Periods. These two periods are alike\nin having the same motives. Both feel the same urgent need (1) for\nnew knowledge, (2) for a new standard by which to measure their\nnew knowledge, (3) for a new method of gaining knowledge. From the\nbeginning to the end of the Renaissance the \u201cnew man\u201d was feeling\nhis way about, was trying to orient and readjust himself in his \u201cnew\nuniverse.\u201d He was seeking new acquisitions to his rich stores of\nknowledge, to systematize his knowledge by some correct method, and\nto set up some standard by which his knowledge might be tested.\n\n(b) The Differences of the Two Periods. There are, however, some marked\ndifferences in the carrying out of these motives by each period, and to\nthese we must give our attention.\n\n(1) _The Countries which participate in the Renaissance differ in the\nTwo Periods_. In the Humanistic Period Italy and Germany were chiefly\nconcerned. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, these\ncountries had been engaged in commerce with the Orient, had become\nprosperous and more or less acquainted with the culture of the Orient.\nIn the second place, Italy had been the refuge of the Greek scholars;\nwhen the colony of Greek refugees in Florence had died out in 1520,\nnortherners like Erasmus, Agricola, Reuchlin, the Stephani, and Bud\u00e6us\nhad luckily already made themselves masters of the Greek language and\nliterature, and had carried their learning into Germany.\n\nIn the Natural Science Period the Renaissance had practically become\ndead both in Germany and in Italy. The reason for this is not far to\nseek. In Italy, in 1563, the Council of Trent had fixed the dogma of\nthe church and had made it impossible for the church to assimilate\nanything more from antiquity. The so-called Counter-Reformation set\nin, and Italy became dumb under the persecutions of the Inquisition.\nFurthermore, the discovery of the sea-route to the East had turned\ncommerce away from Italy. When we look to Germany, we find a similar\nsituation. The Thirty Years\u2019 War (1618\u20131648) had devastated the land\nand had made intellectual life wholly impossible.\n\nOn the other hand, England, France, and the Low Countries represent\nthe Natural Science Period in the Renaissance. By the War of Liberation\n(1568\u20131648) Holland became the European country where the greatest\nfreedom of thought was granted, and it proved itself an asylum for\nthinkers and scholars. France, through the influence of the University\nof Paris, was the centre of mathematical research. In England the\nbrilliant Elizabethan era had already begun.\n\n(2) _The Intellectual Standards differ in the Two Periods._ The\nHumanistic Period has been well characterized as the time of \u201cthe\nstruggle of traditions.\u201d Naturally enough, with the revival of Greek\nlearning the thinkers of the first period of the Renaissance would\ntry to solve the new problems by the standards which they found in\nantiquity. What did Aristotle, Plato, the Epicureans say in matters of\nscience? What standards did they yield for solving the new problems of\nthe \u201cnew universe\u201d? The traditions of antiquity were therefore revived;\nand the contention was, Which should be taken as a standard? Among\nall the ancient systems neo-Platonism became the most prominent. It\ndominated the Humanistic Period because its \u00e6sthetic character and its\nmystical explanations appealed to the susceptible mind of that time.\nNevertheless, the sway of neo-Platonism was not absolute. The \u201cstruggle\nof traditions\u201d continued throughout the period, as appears in the\nschisms of the church and in the literary and philosophical contentions.\n\nThe Natural Science Period, in its hope of finding a standard to\nexplain the problems of the \u201cnew universe,\u201d discovered a new standard\nwithin the \u201cnew universe\u201d itself. No tradition of antiquity had proved\nitself adequate to the situation. Nothing could be found in Plato\nand Aristotle to give a theoretic standard for the new discoveries\nand inventions. Nature disclosed its own standard within itself. The\nNatural Science Period said _nature facts must be explained by nature\nfacts_. But the question will naturally be asked, Why did the thinkers\nof this period, when the theories of antiquity were found to be\ninadequate, turn to nature rather than elsewhere for an explanation\nof nature? The answer to this is found in the great successes of the\nphysical astronomers, who had started their investigations at the\nbeginning of the Humanistic Period, and had reached the zenith of their\nglory at the beginning of the Natural Science Period. The discoveries\nof Galileo were especially important.\n\n(3) _The Scientific Methods in the Two Periods were Different._ The\nmethod usually employed in the Humanistic Period was magic. This first\nperiod tried to explain nature facts of the \u201cnew universe\u201d by referring\nthem to agencies in the spiritual world. In their neo-Platonic\nnature-worship the scholars of this period imagined that the control\nof nature was to be obtained by a fanciful linking of the parts of\nnature to the spirits supposed to be in nature. The Bible is the\nproduct of the spiritual world, so why is not the \u201cnew nature-world\u201d\ninspired from the same source? God is the first cause of all things;\nHe is in all things and each finite thing mirrors Him. All things have\nsouls. To gain control over nature, some all-controlling formula must\nbe found which will reveal the secret of the control of spirits over\nnature; and to master the spirits that control nature is to control\nnature herself. Hence arose, as the methods of this first period, magic,\ntrance-mediumship, necromancy, alchemy, conjurations, and astrology.\nAntiquity could offer (and especially is this true of Platonism) only\nspiritual causes for nature facts,\u2015\u2015hence the search in this time for\nthe philosopher\u2019s stone. There was never a blinder groping after a\nmethod.\n\nThe scientific method used in the Natural Science Period was the\nmathematical. The world of experience was found to coincide with the\nnumber system, and therefore mathematics was used as the symbol to\ndetermine the form of nature events. Induction and deduction were used\nin different combinations. The period has been characterized as the\ntime of \u201cthe strife of methods.\u201d Induction and deduction became in fact\nthe new methods of finding the truth about the \u201cnew world.\u201d Whatever is\nclear and distinct, like the axioms, must be taken as true. All other\nknowledge must be deduced from these axiomatic certainties. In contrast\nwith the magical methods of the Humanistic Period, which point beyond\nnature for an explanation of nature, here in the Natural Science Period\nmathematics need not lead the explanation farther than nature herself.\n\n(4) _The Attitude of the Church toward Science differs in the Two\nPeriods._ In the Humanistic Period the attitude of the church toward\nthe new learning was not yet defined. This was because the bearing\nof the new learning upon dogma was not yet understood. On the one\nhand, on matters upon which the church had clearly declared itself,\nit was easily seen what could and what could not be believed. But,\non the other hand, the significance of much of the wealth of the\nnewly acquired learning could not at first be fully determined. The\nenthusiasm for science was so widespread, and the new discoveries were\nso many, that the church was unable to know what was consistent with\ndogma and what was not. At the outset the church was inclined to treat\nthe new science with contemptuous toleration. Nevertheless, in spite of\nthe new intellectual intoxication there was no real freedom of thought.\nThe position of science was merely precarious, uncertain, and undefined.\n\nIn the Natural Science Period this uncertainty was dispelled because\ndogma came into violent conflict with science. It was soon found\nthat questions in physics involved metaphysics, and that the new\nscience touched the church doctrines at every point. In 1563 the\nchurch authorities at the Council of Trent settled dogma for all time.\nGreat conflicts arose between the church and the secularizing spirit.\nThe scientist became wary. He tried to avoid any intrusion upon the\nfield of theology, and he insisted that his own field existed quite\nindependent of theological dogma. But practically it was impossible\nfor science not to take heretical positions, and this was especially\ntrue of the Rationalistic School, which tried to construct a new\nscholasticism. Safe independence of thought was not gained until the\nnext period (the Enlightenment), and this was brought to pass by\npolitical changes.\n\n=A Brief Contrast of the Two Periods\u2015\u2015A Summary of the Discussion\nabove.=\n\n _The Humanistic Period._\n (1) The Time\u2015\u20151453\u20131600.\n (2) The Countries Concerned\u2015\u2015Italy and Germany.\n (3) The Intellectual Standards\u2015\u2015Neo-Platonism and other theories\n of antiquity.\n (4) The Method\u2015\u2015magic.\n (5) The Relation of Science to the Church\u2015\u2015precarious and\n uncertain.\n\n _The Natural Science Period._\n (1) The Time\u2015\u20151600\u20131690.\n (2) The Countries Concerned\u2015\u2015England, France, and the Low\n Countries.\n (3) The Intellectual Standard\u2015\u2015the mechanism of nature facts.\n (4) The Method\u2015\u2015induction and mathematical deduction in various\n combinations.\n (5) The Relation of Science to the Church\u2015\u2015so definitely stated\n as to be placed in conflict with dogma.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE HUMANISTIC PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE (1453\u20131600)\n\n\n=The Long List of Representatives of the Humanistic Period.= There was\na revival of _scholasticism_,\u2015\u2015Paulus Barbus Socinas (d. 1494), Cajetan\n(d. 1534), Ferrariensis (d. 1528), Melchior Cano (d. 1560), Dominicus\nde Soto (d. 1560), Dominicus Banez (d. 1604), John of St. Thomas\n(d. 1644), Vasquez (d. 1604), Toletus (d. 1596), Fonseca (d. 1599),\nSuarez (d. 1617), John the Englishman (d. 1483), Johannes Magistri\n(d. 1482), Antonius Trombetta (d. 1518), Maurice the Irishman (d. 1513).\nAmong the _Humanists_ were Pletho, Bessarion (d. 1472), Lorenzo Valla\n(d. 1457), Marsilio Ficino (d. 1499), Giovanni Pico della Mirandola\n(d. 1494), Francesco Pico della Mirandola (d. 1533), Theodore of Gaza\n(d. 1478), Agricola (d. 1485), George of Trebizond (d. 1484), Justus\nLipsius (d. 1606), Schoppe (b. 1562), Paracelsus (d. 1541), Reuchlin\n(d. 1522), Fludd (d. 1637), Montaigne (d. 1592), Charron (d. 1603),\nSanchez (d. 1632), Pomponatius (d. 1530), Achillini (d. 1518), Nifo\n(d. 1546), Petrus Ramus (d. 1572), Scaliger (d. 1558). The _Italian\nnature philosophers_ were Cardano (d. 1576), Telesio (d. 1588),\nPatrizzi (d. 1597), Bruno (d. 1600), Campanella (d. 1639). The notable\n_scientists_ were Cusanus (d. 1464), Copernicus (d. 1543), Tycho Brahe\n(d. 1601), Kepler (d. 1631). _The Protestant Mystics_ were Luther\n(d. 1546), Zwingli (d. 1531), Franck (d. 1545), Weigel (d. 1588),\nBoehme (d. 1624). The _political philosophers_ were Macchiavelli\n(d. 1527), Thomas More (d. 1535), Jean Bodin (d. 1597), Gentilis\n(d. 1611), Althusius (d. 1638), Hugo Grotius (d. 1645).\n\nAs examples of the first epoch of the Renaissance[2] we have selected\nCusanus (1401\u20131464), Paracelsus (1493\u20131541), and Bruno (1548\u20131600).\nThese three men will represent fairly well the wide interests of this\nepoch, and more especially its neo-Platonic spirit and its methods.\nThe reader will see from their dates that the lives of these three\nphilosophers nearly cover the Humanistic Period. Cusanus lived during\nthe last half century of the Middle Ages and the first decade of\nthe Humanistic Period; Paracelsus\u2019s life covers the middle of the\nHumanistic Period; Bruno lived during the last part of the period,\nand his death (1600) coincides with the last year of the period.\nAll three were neo-Platonists. They had been so impressed with\nthe nature-world that had opened before them that they were mystic\nnature-worshipers\u2015\u2015pantheists, to whom neo-Platonism became the truest\nphilosophical standard. All three were scientists in different degrees.\nYet Cusanus, the cardinal of the church, and Bruno, the speculative\nphilosopher, contributed more to science than Paracelsus, who aspired\nto medical science. This seeming inconsistency in their lives is\nnot difficult to explain. Paracelsus merely reflects the science\nof the time; while Cusanus and Bruno anticipate the Natural Science\nPeriod\u2015\u2015the one by his empirical discoveries, the other by his mystic\nspeculations which were almost prophecies.\n\n=Nicolas of Cusa= (1401\u20131464). Modern German scholars place Nicolas of\nCusa (Nicolas Cusanus) with Bacon and Descartes, as the leaders of the\nmodern philosophical movement. Nicolas lived two hundred years before\nDescartes and one hundred years before Bacon. The German estimate\nof him shows at least that he was modern in his thought, although he\nbelongs in time to the Middle Ages for the most part. He lived when\nthe Middle Ages were passing over into the Renaissance. His principal\nwork, the _Idiota_, was published in 1450, when the Renaissance was on\nthe threshold. He was certainly a forerunner of modern times. He was a\nGerman, a cardinal, and is now reverenced by liberal Catholics as one\nof their deepest thinkers.\n\nCusanus was a scientist of no small merit. He died before the great\ndiscoveries were made; but he anticipated Copernicus in his belief that\nthe earth rotated on its axis; he anticipated Bruno in conceiving space\nto be boundless and time unending; he proposed a reform in the calendar;\nhe was the first to have a map of Germany engraved. He condemned\nthe prevalent superstitions of the church and the use of magic in\nexplaining nature events. Thus he anticipated the science of the time\nof Bacon, Hobbes, and Descartes, and transcended his own period.\n\nIn other respects Cusanus belongs in this period with Bruno and\nParacelsus. He did not seek to discover a new method; but he turned\nback to the revived traditional Greek systems for an explanation\nof the \u201cnew world.\u201d He found in the mystic numbers of Plato and the\nPythagoreans the principle of all scientific investigation. The world\nof nature phenomena must be accounted for by the spiritual world.\nCusanus uses almost the identical language of Bruno, when he says\nthat the world is the mirror of God and that man is an epitome of the\nuniverse. In the neo-Platonic spirit of the Humanists, he regarded the\nworld as a soul-possessing and articulate Oneness. Although a scientist,\nhe conceived science to be only a conjecture, which in its unreality\nreveals the inner interconnections of the real world\u2015\u2015the world of the\nspirit.\n\n=Paracelsus= (1493\u20131541). Paracelsus did not transcend his time as did\nCusanus. He merely expressed it. He was the exponent of its science as\nBruno was the representative of its poetic speculation. Paracelsus was\na much-traveled Swiss, who tried to reform the practice of medicine\nby a kind of magical chemistry. The poet Browning makes his adventures\nthe basis of a poem. As a physician Paracelsus could employ the magic\narts without much danger of the charge of heresy, for the practice\nof the magic art was theoretically justified by the neo-Platonism of\nthe time. The Faust of Goethe is at first a Paracelsus. The universal\nspirit behind nature presents itself in an infinite number of spiritual\nindividuals. Nature facts are to be understood and mastered by\nunderstanding the activities of these spiritual forces. In this way\nmedicine became a brewing of tinctures, magical drinks, and secret\nremedies. It was an alchemy which grew to the proportions of a science.\nThe alchemists of the time expected to discover a panacea against\ndisease, which would give them the highest power. This is the meaning\nof the \u201cphilosopher\u2019s stone,\u201d which was to heal all diseases, transmute\neverything into gold, and bring all spirits into the power of its\npossessor. Paracelsus thus turned back to Greek hylozoism for the truth\nabout physiology and the cure of disease; and he met with some degree\nof personal success, for his physics had many adherents both in theory\nand in practice.[3]\n\nIn the neo-Platonic manner Paracelsus conceived the world as\nfundamentally a developing vital principle (Vulcanus). Man is this\ncosmic force individualized (Arch\u00e6us). The laws that operate in the\nworld are the same as in man, except that in man they are hidden.\nThe study of nature\u2019s laws, as they lie open, will reveal how those\nsame laws operate in a human being. Now the vital principle in nature\nmanifests itself in three realms: the terrestrial, the astral or\ncelestial, and the spiritual or divine. The Arch\u00e6us or vital principle\nin man must have the same realms of activity. There is man\u2019s body,\nwhich gets its strength from the terrestrial realm of nature; man\u2019s\nmind, which is nourished by the stars; man\u2019s soul, that feeds on faith\nin Christ. Perfect health, therefore, consists in the sympathetic\ninteraction of these three realms in man. A complete medicine consists\nof physics, astronomy, and theology.\n\nBut Paracelsus was a chemist, and the terrestrial nature of man was his\npeculiar interest. The theologian may prescribe for the human soul, and\nit is the duty of the astronomer to care for the human intellect; but\nthe practical physician must understand the human body. Here is the\nArch\u00e6us imprisoned in the gross terrestrial body! It is in continual\nwarfare with that body. What is the nature of that body which is so\nhostile to the human vital principle? Here Paracelsus introduces his\nstrange chemical analysis which characterizes him as a Renaissance\nphysician. Nature has three essences of which all bodies are composed:\n(1) mercury, that makes bodies liquid; (2) sulphur, that makes them\ncombustible; (3) salt, that makes them rigid. These essences are\ncompounded in such a way that from them the four elements\u2015\u2015earth, air,\nwater, and fire\u2015\u2015are derived. Each one of these elements is controlled\nby elemental spirits. The earth is controlled by gnomes, the water\nby undines, the air by sylphs, and the fire by salamanders. Thus the\nchemical analysis of Paracelsus discovers four sets of spirits with\nwhich the physician is obliged to deal. Gnomes, sylphs, undines, and\nsalamanders are in warfare with the human vital principle for control.\nWhen the Arch\u00e6us is in any way checked by these, there is disease; when\nthe Arch\u00e6us has them under control, the man has health. The medicines\nthat the physician administers are determined by their effectiveness\nin helping the Arch\u00e6us in its battle against the hostile spirits. This\nmakes medicine a field for the magician in the control of spirits.\n\n=Giordano Bruno= (1548\u20131600). The neo-Platonic spirit of the Humanistic\nPeriod reached its most complete development in the \u00e6sthetic philosophy\nof Giordano Bruno. He sang the world-joy of the \u00e6sthetic Renaissance.\nItaly ordained him priest, exiled him as heretic, and then burned\nhim at the stake as recalcitrant. Italy has produced very few great\nspeculators since his day. The Council of Trent met when he was fifteen\nyears old; already the counter-Reformation had begun in Italy, and\nItaly was soon to become an intellectually arid waste. The influence of\nBruno appears in Spinoza and perhaps in Leibnitz. His one contribution\nto modern science was in his inspired conception that because God is\ninfinite, the world is infinite in space and time. The philosophers who\ninfluenced his thought were Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and Lucretius.\n\nThe fundamental thought of the Humanistic Period was expressed by\nBruno in his imaginative conception of the divine beauty of the living\nAll. Poet as well as philosopher, he was consumed by a love for nature\nas a beautiful religious object. He revolted from all asceticism and\nscholasticism. The \u201cnew world\u201d in which he found himself was to him the\nemblem of God. The thought of that chief of neo-Platonists, Plotinus,\nof the beauty of the universe had never been so sympathetically\nregarded as by the Renaissance; in the hands of Bruno this beauty\nbecame the manifestation of the divine Idea. Philosophy, \u00e6sthetics, and\nreligion were identical to him. To express his thought he employed the\nusual neo-Platonic symbol of the all-forming and all-animating light.\nBruno was no patient student of natural phenomena as such, but a lover\nof the great illumination of nature facts by the great soul behind\nthem. He was not interested in any single group of phenomena, as was\nParacelsus; but he loved them all as a religion. Not only externally\nbut internally is the universe an eternal harmony. When one gazes upon\nit with the enthusiasm of a poet, its apparent defects will vanish in\nthe harmony of the whole. Man needs no special theology, for the world\nis perfect because it is the life of God. Bruno is a universalistic\noptimist and a mystic poet. Before this cosmic harmony man should never\nutter complaint, but should bow in reverence. True science is religion\nand morality.\n\nSince Bruno conceived no theodicy (proof of the goodness and justice of\nGod) to be necessary, he did not define in exact terms his conception\nof God. Nevertheless, to escape the charge of atheism, he distinguished\nbetween the universe and the world. For him God = the universe =\nnature = matter = the principle immanent in the world. The \u201cworld,\u201d\non the other hand, = the sum-total of nature phenomena. The \u201cworld\u201d\nis the body of God, and God is the soul of the \u201cworld.\u201d God is _natura\nnaturans_; the world is _natura naturata_[4]. Just as the sum of the\nparts of man\u2019s body does not equal the man himself, so to identify God\nwith the totality of objects of nature is atheism in the true sense. It\nis to make God a finite being, although very big. In opposition to this,\nBruno conceives God as the one substance manifesting himself through\nall things. This is to magnify God and to make him really omnipresent.\n\nNevertheless, Bruno is involved in all the inconsistencies of the\nMystic. In a neo-Platonic fashion he frequently speaks of God as if\nhe were a plural number of atoms. God is not only the world unity,\nbut in every particle of the world is He writ small. The elements of\nthe world are monads, and each is the mirror of the All. The Absolute\nis the primal unity; and yet in the paradoxical fashion in which\nthe neo-Platonist is so successful, Bruno says that all creation is\nunfolded out of God and is included in him. The speculative poet is\nso in love with the world that he does not stop to make consistent the\ndistinctions which he has drawn. The _natura naturans_ and the _natura\nnaturata_, the unity and plurality of the world, are the two aspects of\nthe reality in his own life\u2015\u2015and that reality is God.\n\n Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF THE CHIEF\n PHILOSOPHERS OF THE RENAISSANCE\n\n (The names of the philosophers are given in brackets beneath\n the towns in which they were born)\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE (1600\u20131690)[5]\n\n\n=The Philosophers of the Natural Science Period.=\n\n 1. Galileo, 1564\u20131641, and the group of scientists.\n 2. Bacon, 1561\u20131626.\n 3. Hobbes, 1588\u20131679.\n 4. The Rationalists.\n Descartes, 1596\u20131650.\n Spinoza, 1632\u20131677.\n Leibnitz, 1646\u20131716.\n\nCountries other than Italy and Germany come upon the philosophic stage\nduring the eighty-nine years of the period of teeming natural science.\nEngland is represented by Bacon and Hobbes, France by Descartes,\nHolland by the Jew, Spinoza, and, at the end of the period, Germany\nby Leibnitz. Still Italy yields the most influential thinker of\nthem all,\u2015\u2015Galileo, who is the most prominent of a long series\nof astronomers coming from many countries. The most completely\nrepresentative is Descartes, who was the founder of the Rationalistic\nschool; for he was not only interested in mathematics itself, but\nin the application of mathematics to metaphysical questions. Neither\nas influential as Galileo, nor as comprehensive as Descartes, the\nEnglishmen, Bacon and Hobbes, were nevertheless important as the\nforerunners of the English empirical school. Spinoza is more of a\n\u201cworld\u2019s philosopher\u201d than any of the others, and he joins in his\ndoctrine the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and the mathematics\nof the Renaissance; while Leibnitz occupies the position between the\nEnlightenment and the Renaissance.\n\n=The Mathematical Astronomers.= After enthusiastically canvassing\nthe traditional theories of antiquity, the Humanists had been unable\nto find one which would explain and organize the newly accumulated\nmaterials of their \u201cnew world.\u201d But working in more or less narrow\ncircles, natural science had already made a beginning in the midst\nof the Humanists. Beginning with Copernicus, an interest in physics\nand astronomy had been aroused, but in these early days it was more\nspeculative than empirical. The speculations of the astronomers had\nbut little influence upon their own time. However, when the ancient\ntheories proved inadequate to explain the facts of the \u201cnew world,\u201d\nand especially when the empirical researches of Galileo confirmed the\nspeculations of his predecessors, the Renaissance turned away from\nantiquity to nature herself for an explanation. This was about the year\n1600, the year of the beginning of the Natural Science period.\n\nThe most prominent of these astronomers were\u2015\u2015\n\n Copernicus, 1473\u20131543, a Pole.\n Bruno, 1548\u20131600, an Italian.\n Tycho Brahe, 1546\u20131601, a Dane.\n Kepler, 1571\u20131630, a German.\n Galileo, 1564\u20131641, an Italian.\n Huyghens, 1629\u20131695, a Hollander.\n Newton, 1642\u20131722, an Englishman.\n\nWhile the greatest of these scientists is Newton, who belongs to\nthe next period, the most influential is Galileo. Modern _methods\nin science_ began with Galileo. Of the four predecessors of Galileo\nthree\u2015\u2015Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Bruno\u2015\u2015are in spirit Humanists;\nfor their final explanation of nature is the world of spirits. Kepler\nbelongs to both the Humanistic and Natural Science periods; for at\nfirst he constructed his natural science by an amalgamation of the\ndoctrine of spirits and the Copernican theory; but in the latter\npart of his life he adopted completely the mechanical view of nature.\nThe above scientists may be divided for convenience into two groups:\n(1) the speculative scientists before Galileo; (2) Galileo and the\nfollowing empirical investigators.\n\nFor fourteen centuries the ancient Ptolemaic astronomy had been\nregarded by the learned as beyond question. Although complex and\nunwieldy, it explained all phenomena satisfactorily enough as they\nappeared to the senses; and it brought phenomena into a system. (The\nPtolemaic system has been fully described in vol. i, pp. 322 ff.) To\nrecapitulate it: the world-all was conceived as a hollow sphere with\nthe earth as the centre and the fixed stars in the periphery, while the\nplanets were supposed to move in epicycles. The universe was divided\ninto the heavenly and terrestrial realms, which were occupied by\nvarious spirits. God resided outside this hollow sphere and held it,\nas it were, in his lap.\n\nThe history of the changes leading up to our modern astronomical\nconception makes a vivid chapter. How Copernicus contributed the idea\nof placing the sun at the centre of things, Kepler the idea of the\norbits of the planets as ellipses, Bruno the idea of the boundlessness\nof space and time, and how Galileo, corroborating these theories by\nempirical investigations, was put under the ban of the church\u2015\u2015all this\nshows what heroism must have been required to tear down a time-honored\nand firmly intrenched traditional conception. Probably the speculative\nastronomers were not conscious that they were undermining the whole\nastronomical structure, and probably their sole motive was to simplify\nthe Ptolemaic conception, not to destroy it. For Copernicus accepted\nthe Ptolemaic system, except that he put the sun instead of the\nearth at the centre, and thereby simplified it by making many of the\nepicycles unnecessary; and Kepler simplified it further by supplanting\nthe epicycles with ellipses. However, the result was inevitably an\nentirely new conception of the universe, and with it a new conception\nof the relation among particular material things. It was in this way\nthat new scientific methods arose.\n\nThe universe now comes to be regarded as a mechanism, and what was\nformerly looked upon as the influence of spirits or as Providential\nguidance becomes an impersonal law of causal necessity. In the heavens\nabove and the earth beneath there are no longer vital forces and\nsupernatural influences. _The universe becomes a homogeneous whole\nthroughout_, in which there is no difference between the fall of\nan apple and the revolution of the planets, no distinction between\nterrestrial and celestial spheres. The Christian heaven is nowhere\nin it; the Medi\u00e6val spirits are banished from it. The Greek gods have\nbeen pushed out, and the Christian God has been made to stand aside.\n\nThe demand that the new conception of the universe be verified in\nconcrete experiments, if it were to replace the old Ptolemaic system,\nthe revival of the study of Archimedes, the rivalry in trade and\ninventions among the Italian towns, were three causes for the demand\nfor greater exactness. Investigation, experiment, and invention\ncame into vogue. Magic, alchemy, astrology, and conjurations were no\nlonger accepted as serious methods. In the Middle Ages deduction had\nbeen purely the logical employment of the syllogism in theological\ndiscussions, while induction, so far as it was used at all, had been\nthe reference of nature phenomena to spiritual forces. Now deduction\nand induction[6] come to be used for other purposes, and mathematics\nis necessarily conjoined with both. The new Natural Science period\nis essentially a \u201cstrife of methods\u201d; it is the period when the true\nplan of scientific procedure is being determined. It is here that the\nimportance and influence of Galileo is seen upon modern science and\nphilosophy.\n\nThe influence of mathematics in modern times grew up from these\nastronomical beginnings among the Humanists; and the Natural Science\nperiod with its contention as to methods was the immediate result.\nBacon, for example, regarded final causes as one of the \u201cidols.\u201d Hobbes\nmaintained that physics has only to do with efficient causes; Descartes\nheld that it is audacious in man to think of reading the purposes of\nGod in nature; while Spinoza thought it absurd to attribute divine\npurpose to nature. By degrees everything in nature came to be regarded\nas a mechanism, and there was no distinction between the animate and\nthe inanimate. The discovery of the mechanical circulation of the blood\nby Harvey, in 1626, became a vigorous impulse toward the mechanical\nstudy of animal life. Descartes regarded animals as complex automata\nand on this line he published essays on dioptrics, musical law, and\nthe f\u0153tus. Hobbes applied mechanical law to psychological phenomena.\nThe study of reflex action was carried on with great vigor in the Low\nCountries and France. The mechanical theory was rendered complete in\nthis early time by the exclusion of the soul from the explanation of\nthe body of man, just as God had been pushed into the background of the\nuniverse.\n\n=Galileo Galilei= (1564\u20131641).[7] The dates of the life of Galileo\nshow him to have been a younger contemporary of Bruno, and, like Bruno,\nto have been a victim of the ecclesiastical reaction that was sweeping\naway all scientific freedom in Italy. But while Bruno belonged both\nchronologically and in spirit to the first period of the Renaissance,\nGalileo is the true beginner of the second period. Bruno was a\nphilosopher of nature, while Galileo was a true scientist. _Galileo\ngave to all future thought a wisely formulated method of dealing with\nthe new materials of the nature world._ His laws of projectiles,\nfalling bodies, and the pendulum created a new theory of motion. He set\nthe hypothesis of Copernicus upon an experimental basis and made the\nfuture work of Newton possible. He was professor at the Universities of\nPadua and Pisa, and he was mathematician and philosopher at the court\nof Tuscany. That he perjured himself and thereby saved his life from\nthe Inquisition, there is no doubt; but instead of death he had an\nold age of great bitterness. He gave open adherence to the Copernican\nsystem in 1610, when he constructed a telescope and discovered the\nsatellites of Jupiter; and after this there followed discovery after\ndiscovery, like the spots on the sun and the phases of Venus, which\nlatter discovery confirmed the Copernican hypothesis. He invented\nthe hydrostatic balance, the proportional compass, the thermoscope,\nmicroscope, and telescope. His two most noteworthy writings are\n_The Dialogue concerning the Two Most Important World-Systems_, and\n_Investigations into Two New Sciences_.\n\n_As to method_, Galileo objected to formal logic, that it is not a\nmeans of discovering new truth, although valuable as a corrective\nof thought. New truth is discovered when we frame an hypothesis from\ncertain experiences, and then infer the truth of other cases from\nthat hypothesis. The hypothesis is first formed by induction from\na few characteristic cases; the inference to other cases is made\nby deduction. He therefore linked induction and deduction closely\ntogether, and conceived them as necessarily complementary in scientific\ninvestigation. Either induction or deduction alone is absurd and\nimpossible. By induction alone we should be obliged to examine all\ncases, an impossible undertaking. By deduction alone we should be\nin the same straits as the Scholastics, and never discover new laws.\nWe must begin with our perceptual experiences and make an induction\nfrom them; then we must bring mathematics into use in constructing\nthe hypothesis from which to deduce (calculate) new cases. This is the\ntrue, modern method and reveals the great genius of Galileo.\n\nA mathematical law never exactly coincides with any particular concrete\nrelations. A mathematical law is an hypothesis or ideal construction.\nWhat value, then, has a mathematical law for science? The orbits of\nplanets[8] are described as ellipses, but no actual planet moves in\na perfect ellipse. The ellipse is an hypothetical, mathematical orbit\nfor a planet which has no disturbing influences upon it. We get at such\na law by the method of concomitant variations;[9] and the value of it\nconsists in the simplification and system that it gives the facts. For\nexample, knowing that a planet would move in an ellipse if it suffered\nno perturbations, and then knowing the influences upon any particular\nplanet, we can calculate its orbit. Mathematical law, although ideal,\nis the common rule under which all nature phenomena can be brought.\nHowever, only by measurements founded on the tests of observation\nand experiment can we know how far the claims of such deduction are\nsupported. Measure everything measurable, and calculate the measurement\nof those things not directly measurable.\n\nNature, therefore, must be called upon to explain her own phenomena.\nSince the laws of nature are found by investigating nature phenomena\nas we experience them, the laws must be a part of nature and can be\nfound nowhere else. To explain nature phenomena by referring them to\nspiritual influence is no real explanation. To say that God moves the\nplanets is to involve the subject in mystery. Here is where Galileo\nshows that he does not belong to the Scholastics or the Mystics or the\nHumanists. He searched for some constant element, and not for a \u201cvital\nforce\u201d behind nature phenomena. He declared this constant element\nto be motion\u2015\u2015measurable motion. He is the author of the theory that\nmechanics is the mathematical theory of motion. Science was therefore\ntaken by him out of the paralyzing grip of the theologian.\n\n=The Life of Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam= (1561\u20131626). Francis\nBacon was a native of London and received his university education at\nCambridge. He was in the English diplomatic service at an early age,\nbut he later returned to London and took up the legal profession. At\nthe age of thirty-two he entered Parliament and became immediately\ndistinguished as a debater. At forty-three he became legal adviser of\nthe crown, and when he was fifty-six he was made Lord Chancellor. After\na brilliant career in public office he was accused and convicted of\nbribery and corruption, deposed from office, and heavily fined. His\nmost notable writings are his _Essays_, two parts of his uncompleted\n_Instauratio Magna_, viz., _De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum_ and\n_Novum Organum_, and his _New Atlantis_, a Utopian fragment.\n\n=The Position of Bacon in Philosophy.= Tradition has frequently placed\nBacon as the founder of modern philosophy. This estimate is due to a\nremark by Diderot, which was repeated by many French writers. The\nestimate, however, rests on a misapprehension of Bacon\u2019s influence.\nBacon was more of a Humanist than a technical philosopher, and in his\nconstructive philosophy he seems not only to have had no influence upon\nhis contemporaries, but also to have been uninfluenced by them. He was\nunconscious of the influence of Kepler and Galileo and their mighty\nscientific constructions. Bacon\u2019s _Novum Organum_, which embodies his\nscientific methods, had no influence upon his own time, nor was it\nread in the seventeenth century. Its influence was first felt in the\neighteenth century. However, all this must be qualified in one respect.\nBacon\u2019s _New Atlantis_ did have an immediate influence. The ideal of\na college of science, which Bacon presented in his _New Atlantis_, was\nnot only the cause of the work of Diderot in his _Encyclopedia_ in the\neighteenth century, but what is more important, it had effect in his\nown time. It led to the founding of the Royal Society, thirty-six years\nafter Bacon\u2019s death, and later to the founding of similar academies\nabroad. While the reader may be confused by the conflicting estimates\nof Bacon, the words of his own countryman, Sir David Brewster, may be\naccepted as embodying the truth: \u201cHad Bacon never lived, the student\nof nature would have found in the works and writings of Galileo not\nonly the principles of inductive philosophy, but also its practical\napplication to the noblest efforts of invention and discovery.\u201d So\nfar from being the founder of modern science, Bacon developed only one\nside of it, the inductive side, and that without success. He identified\ndeduction with the Aristotelian syllogism, and he was therefore unaware\nof the importance of the use of mathematics in the method of deduction.\nHe did not seem to have the slightest idea that mathematics was going\nto be the scientific method; consequently science has gone much further\nthan Bacon dreamed it would go. Bacon\u2019s importance in the Renaissance\ndoes not consist in his contribution to the content of philosophy or to\nhis successful formulation of the scientific method.\n\nWherein then lies the value of Bacon\u2019s work as a philosopher?[10]\nBacon was the first in England to collect the fruits of the Renaissance\nand give them a secular character. Taking them out of the hands of\nthe theologian, he, a lawyer, \u201cgave them a legal existence by the most\neloquent plea that has ever been made for them.\u201d It was a time when\nphilosophy and science were passing out of the hands of the theologian;\nand Bacon, feeling that science, including philosophy, should be\nsecularized, drew a sharp line between the work of science and that\nof theology. Out of his great contempt for antiquity, Bacon voiced for\nEngland the contemporary reaction against the old scholastic methods.\n_He set up the ideal_ and gave directions for following it. He issued\nthe call to go from abstractions back to things. A man of worldly\nwisdom and pungency, his nature was buoyant in its belief in the coming\nage. He had confidence amounting to an optimism that final principles\nwould be found to explain all the particulars of the \u201cnew world.\u201d\nHe was a prophet who outlined his prophecy. He felt that not only\nnature but all the activities of man would be reduced to some simple\nprinciples. He shared and expressed the confidence of his time that\nwonderful things were to be revealed; that nothing is impossible to\nman, provided man hits upon the right key to nature\u2019s secrets. Just as\nevery age, that feels itself upon the threshold of a new epoch, writes\nUtopias,[11] so Bacon wrote the _New Atlantis_, the Utopian fragment,\nfor his age. This is the literary expression of his optimism about\nthe future of a distinctively secular science. The world of the\n_New Atlantis_ is the world of new machines. Bacon\u2019s most ambitious\nscientific contribution to the same end is his _Instauratio Magna_.\nOf this only two parts were completed: _De Dignitate et Augmentis\nScientiarum_ and _Novum Organum_. Bacon is best known in philosophy by\nthe second part, which was thus named to contrast it with the \u201cold\u201d\n_Organum_ of Aristotle.\n\nThe high influence that Bacon gained later among philosophers may\ntherefore be accounted for by the association of his eminent position\nand wonderful personality with his bold expression of this congenial\nutilitarianism. Even in that rich Elizabethan age of English literature,\nhe was prominent as a writer and politician. He had occupied high\npolitical positions under James I; but his peculiar personality would\nin itself have attracted attention, for his genius was such that any\nof the products of that age\u2015\u2015even the plays of Shakespeare\u2015\u2015have seemed\npossible to him. Pope describes him as \u201cthe wisest, brightest, meanest\nof mankind.\u201d Macaulay says in his essay, _Bacon_, that there were many\nthings that he loved more than virtue and many that he feared more than\nguilt. His career shows that he loved himself, wealth, and learning.\nHis unusual love for learning may be safely taken as his excuse for\nhis unscrupulous lust for wealth. His great versatility prevented his\nsuccess in any one direction, but he had the power of expressing the\nfeeling of his impressive age and of becoming its personal\nrepresentative.\n\n=The Aim of Bacon.= Bacon sought to secularize philosophy by making\nit the same as science. It was the age when Nature was conceived to\nbe identical with the world of the natural sciences. Bacon stood in\nthis age as the formulator of the scientific usefulness of philosophy.\nPhilosophy is to ameliorate social conditions and enrich human life\nby bringing nature under control. Ancient and medi\u00e6val times had not\nbeen occupied with the improvement of human society, but Bacon was\ninspired with the feeling of the modern statesman for such improvement.\nThe true test of philosophy, according to Bacon, is what it will do.\nThat philosophy is worth while which will effectively remove the\nweighing conditions upon human society, so that there are no longer two\nclasses,\u2015\u2015those that sacrifice and those that satisfy their ambitions.\nThis dominant utilitarian motive in Bacon sets him in opposition to\npure theoretical and contemplative knowledge, and makes him the father\nof utilitarianism and positivism[12] in England.[13] Knowledge is\nthe only kind of permanent power, and man can master the world when\nhe gives up verbal discussions and belief in magic. Man must gain a\npositive insight into nature. Science and philosophy must be separated\nfrom theology, and philosophy must be reduced to science. Thus while\naiming to give a tangible form to the scholastic doctrine of the\n\u201ctwofold truth,\u201d Bacon through his utilitarianism missed the goal\nreached by Galileo and Descartes.\n\n=The Method of Bacon.= Bacon says that the method of the scientist\nshould not be like that of the spider that spins a web out of himself,\nnor like that of the ant which merely collects material, but like\nthat of the bee which collects, assimilates, and transforms. Bacon\u2019s\noriginal inspiration had been his respect for method, and this grew\nmore pronounced. Philosophy, _i. e._ science, is method. With Bacon\nwe see the beginning of philosophy cut loose from personality and\nover-valued because it had mechanical accuracy. Nevertheless, the\nmethod of Bacon was very comprehensive. It included on the one hand a\ncritical survey of the past, and on the other an anticipatory programme\nfor the science of the future. Let us now turn to these two aspects of\nhis method.\n\n(a) _Bacon\u2019s criticism of the past_ was a trenchant criticism of\nprevailing philosophy, and amounted to a break with the past. Bacon\nfelt that what passed for science in his day was but a pretence. In\nthe presence of the facts of life traditional science was but empty\nwords. The early thinkers are not the ancients. We are the ancients,\nfor we embody in ourselves all the preceding centuries. Thus does Bacon\nswing from the medi\u00e6val blind acceptance of the past to an equally\nblind rejection of the past. But why did the ancient thinkers err?\nNot because they were not men of talent, nor because they lacked in\nintellectual opportunity; but because their method of procedure led\nthem astray. The early thinkers followed wrong paths, and their results,\nwhich we now possess, are vain.\n\nWhat must be our attitude in the presence of this traditional\nphilosophy? We must dispossess ourselves of the prejudices that have\nmisled the past, for they form the obstacles to our true knowledge of\nthe world. The roots of the errors that have infected philosophy are\n\u201cfantastic, contentious, and delicate learning.\u201d We must not, indeed,\ntrust to our every-day perceptions; for although science is based\non our perceptions, our every-day perceptions are corrupted by our\nuncritical habits of thought. Thus there have arisen perversions and\nfalsifications, of which we must first of all be rid. Bacon calls these\nIdols.[14] Idols are false images, that intervene between us and the\ntruth and are mistaken for reality. Bacon makes four general classes\nof Idols:\u2015\u2015\n\n(1) The Idols of the Tribe, or the presuppositions common to the human\nrace.\n\n(2) The Idols of the Cave,[15] or individual prejudices due to natural\nindividual disposition, situation in life, etc.\n\n(3) The Idols of the Forum, or the traditional meanings of words,\nby which we substitute the word for the idea. These are the worst\nillusions.\n\n(4) The Idols of the Theatre,[16] the theories or philosophic dogma,\nwhich command discipleship from groups of men and have not been\nsubjected to our own criticism.\n\nBacon\u2019s classification of our prejudices as Idols is a critical attempt\nto separate, in what passes for knowledge, the subjective, which has\nbecome traditional, from the real. Logic, religion, and poetry have\nhad a bad effect on science, as is especially shown in the theatrical\ncharacter of philosophy.\n\n(b) Having dispossessed ourselves of our prejudices or Idols, we are\nready to proceed to a positive construction of a scientific method of\nwork. By what, in general, ought science to be guided? By induction and\nexperience. Bacon suggests the following steps for the science of the\nfuture:\u2015\u2015\n\n(1) There must be an exhaustive collection of particular instances.\n\n(2) There must then be an analysis and comparison of these instances,\nfor to Bacon induction was not a mere enumeration of single instances.\nNegative instances, and instances of difference of degree, must be\ntaken into account. Hasty generalizations must be avoided, and we must\nascend gradually from the particular to the general.\n\n(3) The simple \u201cform\u201d of the phenomenon must be discovered. Of the four\ncauses of Aristotle, Bacon emphasizes the \u201cformal.\u201d By \u201cform\u201d Bacon\nmeans the nature that is always present when the phenomenon is present,\nabsent when the phenomenon is absent, and increases or decreases with\nthe phenomenon. The \u201cform\u201d is the abiding essence of the phenomenon.\n\n=The English Natural Science Movement.= The natural science movement\nin England thus received at the start the impression of the sober\nAnglo-Saxon mind. Through its entire history English philosophy\ndiffered from that of the Continent. Here at the outset the Englishman\nis skeptical, not only of scholastic deductions from dogma, but\nalso of deductions of all kinds.[17] He prefers the slow road of\npatient empirical discovery. Even pure contemplative knowledge and\nthe deductions of mathematics have little charm for him. To be sure,\ninduction even in the hands of an Englishman demands by its nature the\nestablishment of a general principle, but Bacon would have refused to\nuse such a deduction to establish a new truth in the way that Galileo\nused his mathematical hypotheses. According to Bacon, an hypothesis is\ntrue only so far as it has already received the indispensable sanction\nof experience.\n\n=Thomas Hobbes[18] and his Contemporaries.= During a certain period\nBacon had under him a secretary by the name of Thomas Hobbes. Here\nwas an obscure man turning to philosophy because of his interest in\npolitics; whose point of attachment to philosophy was the mechanical\ntheory of nature, so universally accepted by the scientists of\nthat time. No contemporary of Hobbes\u2015\u2015neither Bacon, Descartes, nor\nGalileo\u2015\u2015had so systematic a philosophy. No other man succeeded better\nin expressing all that was in his mind. Hobbes was one of a large group\nof political theorists of the Renaissance. When the medi\u00e6val idea of\nthe universal Christian state, such as was embodied in Augustine\u2019s\n_City of God_, was no longer held, many of the Humanists tried to\nconstruct theoretical systems of political government that would meet\nthe demands of the time. Macchiavelli, Thomas More, Bodin, Althusius,\nand Grotius[19] belong to this group. Hobbes is best known in modern\ntimes as a writer on this aspect of morals and politics; but politics\nis only a part of his general mechanical system of the universe. He\nis the forerunner of modern materialism, and his peculiar theory of\nsociety is only an exemplification of this theory.\n\nIn passing from Bacon to Hobbes we come to a very different type of man.\nBacon had risen to fame by his own genius, in spite of the hostility\nof his powerful relatives; Hobbes was a hard-headed man, with a narrow\noutlook, but with undoubted talents, which were fostered all his life\nunder the patronage of the Devonshire family. Bacon was a practical\npolitician; Hobbes was a doctrinaire and theoretical political writer.\nOf the voluminous literary remains of Bacon his philosophy forms but a\nsmall part; Hobbes had a general philosophical system, with which his\nclassical and theological studies have connection.\n\nIn the succeeding chapter we shall review the philosophy of the\nrationalist, Descartes, who was a contemporary of Hobbes. We shall\nfind that Descartes and Hobbes are alike in this: that both employed\nGalileo\u2019s mathematical theory as authoritative. They differed, however,\nin the way in which they used Galileo\u2019s theory. Descartes reduced\nmathematics to the rational, and conceived it to be the instrument\nof the reason; Hobbes reduced the rational to the mathematical, and\nconceived the reason as a form of mechanics. The starting-point of\nDescartes was the subjective, and he was held at a standstill until\nthe relation of thought and mechanics was solved by him. The point\nof view of Hobbes was objective, and since all was mechanical, he\ndiscussed only incidentally the relation between thought and mechanical\nexistence. Hobbes conceived the world in the terms of only one series,\nthe mechanical. Descartes\u2019 main motive was to preserve the rational;\nand, consequently, the world to him consisted of a double or dualistic\nseries of terms. We therefore place Descartes, with Spinoza and\nLeibnitz, in a group called Rationalists. Hobbes was a materialist,\nand his greatness consisted in going the full length of materialism: he\nwent beyond all the scientists of his time by extending the mechanical\ntheory to the mental life.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Hobbes= (1588\u20131679). The life of Hobbes falls\ninto five natural periods. In his first and last periods he was the\nclassical scholar. During his middle period of about thirteen years\nhe was the philosopher. Furthermore, at one time he was absorbed in\nmathematics and at another in controversy. His period as mathematician\nwas begun not until he was forty years old, and was preparatory to his\ncreative philosophical period, which was begun when he was about fifty.\n\n1. _As a Classical Scholar_ (including his early years)\n(1588\u20131628)\u2015\u2015the first forty years of his life. At Oxford (1603\u20131608);\nfirst journey abroad (1608\u20131612); beginning of his relations with the\nDevonshire family and also of his acquaintance with the \u201cnew science\u201d;\ntime of leisurely study (1612\u20131628) and acquaintance with Bacon,\nHerbert of Cherbury, and Ben Jonson; translation of _Thucydides_ (1628).\n\n2. _As Mathematician_ (1628\u20131638). Second journey abroad (1629\u20131631)\nfor eighteen months as tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clifton; reads\n_Euclid_ while abroad; third journey abroad (1634\u20131637), when he meets\nGalileo; begins to develop the conception of motion and sensation;\nby 1638 he is counted among the notable philosophers and he meets the\nParisian scientists, Mersenne and Gassendi.\n\n3. _As Philosopher_ (1638\u20131651). Plans his philosophy under title of\n_Elements of Philosophy_: _De Corpore_, _De Homine_, and _De Cive_,\nwhich is interrupted by the English Revolution; _Elements of Law_\n(\u201clittle treatise\u201d) written in 1640, read by a few in manuscript,\npublished without his consent in 1650 in two parts: _Human Nature_\nand _De Corpore Politico_; flees to Paris (1640) and enters again the\nscientific circle at Paris; criticises Descartes\u2019 _Meditations_; _De\nCive_ published (1642), which is _De Corpore Politico_ enlarged; acts\nfor a time as tutor to Charles II in Paris; engages upon his general\nphilosophical theory (1642\u20131645); _Liberty and Necessity_, written\n(1646), published (1654); _Leviathan_ published (1651).\n\n4. As Controversialist (1651\u20131668). Flees back to London (1651); _De\nCorpore_, published (1655); _Behemoth_, written (1668), proscribed and\nnot published until after his death; controversies with Bramhall, Ward,\nWallis, and Boyle; _De Homine_, published (1658).\n\n5. As Classical Scholar (1668\u20131679). Translation of _Iliad_ and\n_Odyssey_ (1675).\n\nIn Molesworth\u2019s edition (1839\u20131845), Hobbes\u2019 Latin works occupy\nfive volumes, the English eleven. The _Elements of Philosophy_\u2015\u2015the\n_De Corpore_, _De Homine_, and _De Cive_\u2015\u2015were not published in the\nsequence in which they were planned, but, on account of political\nexigencies, in the above order.\n\n=The Influences upon the Thought of Hobbes.= 1. The premature birth of\nHobbes had no inconsiderable influence upon his life. When his mother\nwas carrying him, she had suffered a great fright, at the announcement\nof the approach of the Spanish Armada. Was it in consequence of this\nthat Hobbes\u2019s life was a series of panics and controversies? He was\nextremely conservative in politics. He saw the new changes without\nsympathy with either party, and he had no political ideals\u2015\u2015only\nfear. The time in which he lived reinforced this natural conservatism.\nWhen he was translating _Thucydides_, Buckingham was assassinated\nand the Petition of Rights was presented. Henry IV of France had been\nassassinated not many years before, and the Puritan element had become\na disturbing factor in England. His study and his alliance with the\nDevonshire family confirmed him in his conservative position. All signs\nof the time pointed toward decentralization of government, toward war\nand rebellion. In fear he was \u201cthe first that fled\u201d to France at the\nbeginning of the troubles of Charles I; in fear he fled back to London\neleven years later, lest the Roman Catholics, whom his _Leviathan_ had\noffended, should murder him. Hobbes was again in great panic over the\nLondon fire and looked upon it as a divine penalty, on account of the\nimpurity of the English court. Hobbes was always in fright lest he\nmight not have peace.\n\n2. The father of Hobbes was one of the unworthy clergymen of the\nEnglish Established Church in the reign of Elizabeth. He was a\ndissolute man, and after many escapades he abandoned his family.\nIn consequence of this Hobbes always had an antipathy toward the\noffices of the church and toward theology. Although he claimed to be a\ncommunicant, his allegiance was only nominal, as his theory will show.\n\n3. Hobbes was very much influenced by the new mathematical science. His\nyears at Oxford left little impression upon him, and he was but little\ninterested in the scholasticism which was taught there. Yet his twenty\nyears on the Continent brought him into the midst of the scientific\ncircles of Italy and France. He was well along into maturity when\nhe felt this influence. On his second journey, he read _Euclid_ for\nthe first time. He was then forty-three. On his third journey, he met\nGalileo and the French scientists, Mersenne and Gassendi, and it was\nthen that he began his reflections concerning motion and sensation.\nThe writings of Kepler, Descartes, and Galileo influenced him mightily.\nAlthough he acted as Bacon\u2019s secretary after the latter\u2019s fall, Bacon\u2019s\ninfluence upon him was little and has been overestimated. The mental\npowers of Bacon and his secretary were different, and Bacon knew\nnothing of the mathematical method. Hobbes shows to some degree the\nempirical tendency of his nationality, and he believed that knowledge\nmust spring from experience. Further than this, the method that Bacon\npursued does not appear in him. _The mission of Hobbes was to construct\na mechanical view of the world._\n\nOf the three influences upon Hobbes, his inherited timidity is seen in\nhis conservative political theory; the influence of his father is seen\nin his theory of religion; the influence of the \u201cnew\u201d mathematical\nscience is seen in his whole philosophy, especially in his psychology.\n\n=The Fundamental Principle in the Teaching of Hobbes.= The assumption\nfrom which Hobbes deduced his entire philosophy was the mechanical\nconception of the physical world,\u2015\u2015the characteristic philosophical\nassumption of his age. Hobbes\u2019s contemporaries, both the natural\nscientists and the philosophers, had, however, on the whole, restricted\nthe conception of mechanism to the physical world. Hobbes differed from\nthem all in universalizing the conception. He extended its application\nfrom the physical over upon the mental realm, and thereby reduced\nthe mental world to physics. He stated this mechanical principle in\ntwo parts: _all that exists is body_; _all that occurs is motion_.\nHobbes applies this assumption to the physical world and it gives\nhim materialism;[20] he applies it to knowledge and it gives him\nsensationalism;[21] he applies it to the will and it gives him\ndeterminism;[22] he applies it to morals and politics and it gives him\nnaturalism.[23] Body is nature; body is everything. Body is the first\nterm leading through man up to the State. With Hobbes, as with others\nof his time, the political field was the whole ground to be penetrated.\nThe fundamental principle, by which Hobbes thought the whole field was\nto be explained, is body in motion. The mental world became drawn into\nthe physical, and thereby his mechanical conception became the more\nnatural.\n\nThere was one realm which Hobbes left untouched by his principle:\nthe realm of the spirit, _i. e._ God, souls, angels. The science of\nbodies cannot deal with the supernatural, for the supernatural does not\nconsist of bodies in motion. Matter and mind are homogeneous; matter\nand spirit are not. The contrast in Hobbes is not between matter and\nmind, the material and the psychical, but between matter and spirit,\nthe material and the supra-material.\n\n=The Method of Hobbes.= Hobbes made the method of Galileo his own.\nHe believed that all knowledge is rooted in mathematics. There is one\ntrue method of treating all subjects: the mathematical calculation of\nthem as motions of bodies. Knowledge consists in using words as the\nsigns of experience and in reckoning with them. Scientific thought is\nthe combination of signs. It is the rationalizing of our experiences.\nScience has a truth in itself and stands as a rationally organized\nworld, quite different from the world of experience which it has\norganized. The world of bodies in causally related motions is such\nan organized world, the most systematized and most simply constructed\nworld that science can devise. But how does the scientist proceed? He\nbegins with a phenomenon, which is a body in motion, and finds out the\ncauses of the phenomenon, which causes are nothing more nor less than\nthe elements of the phenomenon in question. Then the scientist proceeds\nfrom the causes to other phenomenal effects. These new effects are\nlike the original phenomenon and its causes,\u2015\u2015bodies in motion. Thus\nthe world of the scientist is a world of causes and effects, for \u201cthe\nnatural reason of man is busily flying up and down among the creatures,\nand bringing back a true report of their order, causes, and effects.\u201d\nThus we find Hobbes to be a nominalist (see vol. i, p. 358) who,\nnevertheless, used the deductive method\u2015\u2015rather a strange combination.\nLike all his English successors, he employed induction and deduction,\nbut the two processes never became fused.[24] Moreover for induction\nhe has no method.\n\nThe order in which the writings of Hobbes appeared seems to have been\nthe sport of outward events, for they were not written according to his\noriginal plan. On his return from his third journey to the Continent\n(1638), Hobbes, then fifty years old, had adopted the mechanical theory\nand had planned his philosophy. His comprehensive work was to be called\nthe _Elements of Philosophy_, and was to be divided into three parts:\n_De Corpore_, treating physical bodies; _De Homine_, treating man as a\npsychological individual; _De Cive_, treating man as the citizen of a\nState. Hobbes\u2019s philosophy was therefore to be a universal philosophy,\nand he intended to bring his works out in logical order\u2015\u2015first, the\nscience of physics, then of human nature, and last of society. However,\nthe growing disturbances in the political world at that time moved him\nto publish several treatises on politics first, and his physics and\npsychology more than fifteen years later.\n\n=The Kinds of Bodies.= There are two kinds of bodies, natural and\nartificial. Natural bodies are those belonging to the physical world.\nThe artificial bodies are the institutions of society, of which the\nmost important is the State. Man belongs to both classes of bodies\u2015\u2015he\nhas a physical nature and he is a member of the State. Man is the\nconnecting link between natural and artificial bodies. Philosophy\nis therefore divided into three parts: _physics_, which treats of\npurely natural bodies; _psychology_, which treats of man in his r\u00f4le\nas a natural individual; _politics_, which treats of man in social\ncongregations with his fellows. Looking at the situation from the\nother end, political bodies are decomposable into men, men are in\nturn decomposable into physical bodies. Political bodies are dependent\non the psychical nature of men, and the psychical nature of men is\ndependent on the nature of physical bodies, _i. e._ on bodies and their\nmotions. Thus all bodies, natural and artificial, must be explained in\nterms of motion, if they are explained scientifically. Physical bodies\nare the first term leading up through man to the last term in the\nseries, which is the State.\n\n=Hobbes\u2019s Application of the Mathematical Theory to Psychology.=\nAlthough the prime interest of Hobbes lay in the political life of\nman, he nevertheless made an original contribution to psychology.\nHe snatched the science of mental phenomena from the hands of the\nscholastic theologian and made it for the first time an independent\nscience. Psychology had been based upon the assumptions of the\ntheologian; for these Hobbes substituted the assumptions of the\nmathematician. Consciousness became in his hands not a soul, but the\nmotion of bodies. It is described by him as \u201cthe movement of certain\nparts of the organic body.\u201d The states of consciousness, such as\nsensations, perceptions, etc., are brain movements or the refined\nmovements of atoms in the nervous system. Memory and imagination\nare \u201cdecaying sensations\u201d; thought is the sum of several sensations;\nexperience is the totality of sensations bound together by the rigid\nlaws of association. Hobbes was the father of what is known as the\nAssociational Psychology, or the theory that consciousness is composed\nof mental atoms under fixed laws of association.\n\nBut although Hobbes took psychology out of the hands of the theologian\nand made it a mechanical science, he did not identify it with physics.\nIt is still psychology. The mental states are the physical motion of\nbodies, but they are not external motions, nor are they the copies of\nthe external motions of bodies. Mental states are brain movements; they\nare the _result_ of external motions. They come about in this way. A\nmoving body in the outer world makes an impression on the sense organ,\nand this motion is transmitted by the nerves to the heart and brain.\nA reaction is effected in the brain, and this is a mental state. The\nbrain transformations, and not the movement of the external object,\nis that of which we are conscious. The mental state is an \u201capparition\u201d\nof the actual fact in the external world; it is an effect in a causal\nseries. Our perception of light is, for example, a modification of the\ncerebral substance, and not of the external body itself. We deceive\nourselves when we think that the sensations of light, sound, heat are\noutside us. These qualities of things are modifications of ourselves.\nThere is nothing external to us, except the motions of bodies which\nare the causes of these modifications. The external world is no doubt\nreal, but we have no knowledge of it\u2015\u2015no knowledge of aught save the\nmotions of bodies within ourselves. _This is the point of view of\nall subsequent English philosophy: the substance of things is quite\ndifferent from our knowledge of them. The substance of things is real;\nbut is not the object of our knowledge. The object of our knowledge is\na modification of ourselves._\n\nThe independence of knowledge with reference to theology on the one\nside, and to physical reality on the other, is well illustrated in\nHobbes\u2019s discussion of language. Speech consists of words, which are\nonly the counters of things. Words are markers by which men may know a\nthing as \u201cseamen mark a rock.\u201d Science consists in their manipulation.\nScience combines them by addition and subtraction into judgments and\nsyllogisms, and thereby constructs a body of demonstrated principles.\nWords are only counters, and he is a fool who mistakes the counter for\nthe coin of reality. Words only represent reality, and the law of their\nuse is mathematics. Truth and falsity are terms that are concerned with\nthe correct or incorrect manipulation of these verbal counters and not\nwith real things.\n\n=Hobbes\u2019s Application of the Mathematical Theory to Politics.= In the\nsame way that material bodies in motion give rise to mental states, and\nmental states as bodies in motion give rise to the human consciousness,\nso men as individuals are the source of the artificial body,\u2015\u2015the State.\nIn every individual man the impulse to self-preservation is innate,\nand is, in fact, his absolute and universal characteristic. Just as\nthe law of the mechanical association of ideas is the fundamental\nprinciple of the human mind, so the mechanical law of self-preservation\nis the principle of man\u2019s ethical and political life. All our\npolitical institutions are the result of the striving of men for\nself-preservation. In his natural state\u2015\u2015when, as Hobbes conceived,\nman lived without social organization\u2015\u2015man had no other standard\nfor conduct than his own self-interest; in the artificial political\nstate, which man has constructed, self-interest is still his motive.\nEgoism is the sole working principle of human beings both before and\nafter they live in societies; but the political state is the most\ningenious contrivance which egoism has hit upon for its own profit.\nHobbes conceived that the original state of man, which under the name\nof \u201cstate of nature\u201d was a common problem in the Renaissance, was\na condition in which every man was making war against every other\nman. (Compare Locke and Rousseau.) But such a condition of things\nwas obviously self-destructive. Consequently man arbitrarily and\nartificially formed the political State to avoid this self-destructive,\ninternecine warfare. Under the circumstances it was the most effective\nway in which man could gain his personal ends, for the political State\nwas the only possible means to peace. In the \u201cstate of nature\u201d the\nright of every man to everything was the equivalent of the right of\nevery man to nothing. So men made a compact with one another under\nwhich each relinquished a portion of his rights in order that each\nmight have a portion of them secure. But what gives security to this\ncompact? The sovereign to which the powers of the many have thus been\ndelegated. What is the sovereign? It is the soul of the State, the\ngeneral will,\u2015\u2015represented by a single person in a monarchy, by\nan assembly in a republic. This sovereign, in whom the contract is\nvested, is absolute; for the sovereign was not a party to the original\ncontract, since he did not then exist. The contract was made among the\nindividuals, at that time in a \u201cstate of nature.\u201d So long as the State\npreserves its power among the people, the people must render their\nobedience to the State,\u2015\u2015to the sovereign in whom the contract was\nvested. The might of the political State makes right. Whatever the\nState commands is right; whatever is forbidden is wrong. There was no\nright and wrong in the \u201cstate of nature,\u201d only the possible and the\nimpossible. An act is a crime when it breaks the contract, and thus\nthe ground of morality is political legislation. Even the religion of\nthe people is determined by the State. Any political State is better\nthan a revolution. Here was philosophical justification of Charles I.\nA reversion to war is a reversion to the \u201cstate of nature.\u201d\n\nWhen Hobbes was in France as a refugee he wrote the _Leviathan_,\nwhich contained this doctrine of political society. He presented a\nvellum-bound copy to Charles II, hoping to gain favor with that prince.\nHowever, the _Leviathan_, unfortunately for Hobbes\u2019s purpose, contained\ntwo paragraphs that antagonized the royalists and the Catholics. One\nwas, that when a commonwealth is unable to protect its citizens in\npeace, that commonwealth is dissolved and a new sovereign commonwealth\nis formed. The second was, that while the sovereign state shall\ndecide what the religion of its people shall be, no religion is\ninfallible\u2015\u2015neither Anglican, Catholic, nor Puritan. The religion that\nthe sovereign makes legal is only a temporary one; the true religion\nwill come not until the Last Judgment. The church is subordinate to\nthe State, like everything else, and it does not matter much what the\nState religion shall be, provided there be peace. Religion is only a\nsuperstition resting on a defective knowledge of nature, and it is of\nlittle consequence what particular religion the State makes binding.\n\nIt hardly need be said that the _Leviathan_ pleased neither Charles II\nnor the Catholics. The sequel of its publication was that Hobbes fled\nback to England from fear of assassination.\n\n=The Renaissance in England after Hobbes.= The philosophies of Bacon\nand Hobbes do not exhaust, but merely represent the philosophy of\nEngland during the Renaissance. Empiricism[25] had to wait for Locke in\nthe next period before it became dominant. After Hobbes Scholasticism\nwas narrowly confined to limited circles and appeared under the form of\nSkepticism or of Platonism, neo-Platonism, or Mysticism. The reaction\ntoward Platonism was centred in a group of ethical scholars, called\nthe Cambridge School. It included Culverwell, Cudworth, Henry More,\nand Cumberland. This Platonic movement was short-lived. The scientific\nspirit, represented in the Renaissance by Bacon and Hobbes, dominated\nthe next period,\u2015\u2015the Enlightenment,\u2015\u2015and we shall find it spreading\nits influence over France and Germany in the form that Locke gave to it.\n\nBut the history of the philosophy of the Renaissance is not yet\ncompleted. Contemporary with Bacon and Hobbes, there was a movement\non the Continent which was more characteristic of the Renaissance, and\nindeed more important to it than the movement in England. This was the\nschool of Rationalists, to which we now turn.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n THE RATIONALISM OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE\n\n\n=The Nature of Rationalism.= Although the new science grew apace,\nit was not altogether a safe vocation. Natural science involves\nmetaphysical questions at every point. The scientist at this time,\ntherefore, found himself often in delicate relations with the jealous\nchurch guardians. A scientific explanation of the universe might\nantagonize the church dogma concerning God, creation, and the final\noutcome of the world. The church doctrine concerning the soul, too,\nits nature and its immortality, its relation to the body, might\nbe antagonized by physiological and psychological discussions. In\nsuch dilemmas as these the natural scientist was not successful in\npretending to isolate himself entirely from theology and in assuming\nan attitude of aloofness to it. Galileo might declare that, whatever\nthe results of his investigations in physics might be, they had nothing\nto do with the Bible; but he sorrowfully found that the Inquisition\nthought otherwise. Copernicus found that his astronomical theories\ncame into conflict with church dogma, and he was tormented by his\nbishop. Kepler spent his later years in a deadly struggle with both\nProtestantism and Catholicism. Bacon and Hobbes lived in a country\nwhere their personal safety was fairly secure, nevertheless Bacon\ndisguised his position by using large words and Hobbes was untroubled\nbecause he accepted the religion of his sovereign.\n\nIf the position of those was difficult who tried to keep themselves\nstrictly within the limits of science, how much more fraught with\npersonal danger was the position of those who openly constructed a\nnew metaphysics? It would mean that a challenge was issued to the old\nScholasticism by the same human reason that had already challenged\nand overthrown the old science. The group of men who did this were\nthe Rationalists. The Rationalists were interested in science, but\nthey were more interested in the metaphysical problems that science\naroused. The human reason had been successful in the reconstruction\nof physics by the use of mathematics. Why should it not also be able\nto reconstruct metaphysics and set it, too, upon a mathematical basis?\nThe leaders of this school were Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and the\nOccasionalists,\u2015\u2015Malebranche and Geulincx. The Rationalists advanced\na new conception not only of nature, but of God; new theories not only\nof the human body, but of the soul. Their task was the dangerous one of\nbravely invading the hitherto impregnable realms of the spirit.\n\nThe task of the Rationalists was rendered the more difficult because,\nfor the first time in the history of European thought, the inner and\nouter worlds had been completely sundered. For the first time do we\nmeet with a clear-cut and positive dualism. The history of the growth\nof this dualism had been a long one, and to it the Greek Sophist,\nthe Stoic, and the Christian had each contributed his share. However,\nGalileo and his fellow scientists in this period of the Renaissance\nhad so reconstructed the old \u201cworld of nature\u201d that it had become\nirreconcilable to the \u201cworld of grace.\u201d These scientists believed that\nnature must be made to explain itself; its events must be conceived as\nnecessitated; its processes as having the inevitableness of a machine.\nFrom the revolutions of the planets to the circulation of the blood,\nthe movements of nature can be measured. The law of nature, that\nis conceived to underlie all this science, is mechanical causation.\nThe researches of the scientists of the Renaissance had yielded a\nrich world of brute, inevitable, and scientific facts, and these\nstood in absolute fundamental contrast to the world of spiritual\nfacts which were embodied in the church dogma. Apparently the problem\nof reconciling the \u201cworld of nature\u201d and the \u201cworld of grace\u201d had\nbeen solved by St. Thomas Aquinas in medi\u00e6val times. Now, however,\nthe \u201cworld of nature\u201d had been so reconstructed that the question\nwas re-opened. How is the new \u201cworld of nature\u201d to be brought into\nharmonious relation with that old, persistent, and settled dogma of the\nchurch? How can the newly conceived mechanism of nature be harmonized\nwith the realm of free conscious spirits, without giving up the\nconception of God as a rational being, and also without depriving the\nsoul of its power of initiation? The new science had therefore made it\nespecially difficult on the one hand to reconcile a mechanical universe\nwith an omnipotent God, and on the other to reconcile the mechanical\nhuman body with the free soul.\n\nThe struggle of the Renaissance with the Middle Ages is therefore\nconcentrated in the development of the doctrine of this Rationalist\nSchool. It is studied here even better than by reading the two periods\nside by side. In Rationalism the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages and\nthe Science of the Renaissance meet. Rationalism was a new science, but\nit was a new theology as well. It was a new scholastic philosophy; for,\nwhile the Rationalists thought that they were giving the death blow to\nmedi\u00e6val philosophy, they were instead only replacing it with another\nscholasticism. In their attempt, by means of the mechanical theory,\nto get an absolute system of knowledge upon which thought can rest,\nthe Rationalists were acting in the spirit of the schoolmen. In fact,\nno schoolman ever showed more vigor or more dogmatic confidence in\nhis philosophy. To the mathematical eye of the Rationalist there\nwas absolutely nothing mysterious in the physical universe or in the\nspiritual realm. All things in heaven and earth could be made clear.\nThe declaration of the Rationalists was the call of freedom, but it\nwas as hazardous as it was ambitious; and the church with its assured\nrevelations always stood opposed to the realization of freedom. So we\nshall find Descartes spending his whole life trying to trim his sails\nthat he may not offend the Inquisition; Spinoza saving himself from\nboth the Jews and the Christians by living in obscurity and publishing\nnothing; Leibnitz constructing philosophy with the avowed purpose of\nreconciling science and religion.\n\n=The Mental Conflict in Descartes.= The strife between the spirit\nof the Middle Ages and that of the Renaissance appears in Descartes\nmore strikingly than in any other thinker of this time. He shows,\non the one hand, all the conservatism of a churchman of medi\u00e6val time\nin his respect for institutional authority; on the other hand, his\nintellectual activity places him among the leading scientists of the\nRenaissance. In no other thinker does the conflict between the Old\nand the New appear so unsettling; in none does the antagonism between\nthe scholastic world of spiritual things and the mechanical world of\nscience appear so irreconcilable. He suffered a life-long mental strife,\nfor within himself medi\u00e6valism and science were engaged in an unending\ndramatic struggle. The philosophy of Descartes was a compromise between\nhis traditions and his scientific genius; and his philosophy never\novercame his conflicting motives. The admirers of Descartes have\ncalled him the father of modern thought, and this is partly true. The\nfather of the modern scientific method was Galileo. Descartes, on the\nother hand, pointed out the incontestable principle from which modern\nthought has proceeded; he won his place in the history of philosophy\nby attempting to harmonize the old scholasticism with the new science\nunder this single principle.\n\n=The Life and Philosophical Writings of Descartes= (1596\u20131650).[26]\n\n(1) _As Child and Student_ (1596\u20131613).\n\nAt home until he was eight years old (1596\u2013 1604).\n\nAt the Jesuit school at La Fl\u00e8che until he was seventeen (1604\u20131613).\n\n(2) _As Traveler_ (1613\u20131628). Descartes studies \u201cthe book of the\nworld.\u201d\n\nAt Paris (1613\u20131617), in retirement and study.\n\nIn Holland (1617\u20131619), nominally attached to the army of Maurice.\n\nFirst Journey (1619\u20131621), going through Bavaria, Austria, north to\nthe shores of the Baltic and back to Holland. The greater part of these\ntwo years were spent in Bohemia, enrolled in the army of the Emperor.\nHe was on this journey when his mental crisis occurred,\u2015\u2015at Neuberg,\nin Austria, in 1619. It was then that he discovered either analytical\ngeometry or the fundamental principle of his philosophy.\n\nIn Paris again, 1623.\n\nSecond Journey (1623\u20131625), to Switzerland and Italy, making a\npilgrimage to the shrine of Loretto.\n\n(3) _As Writer_ (1629\u20131650).\n\nIn Holland (1629\u20131649). For the sake of absolute seclusion from\ninquisitive visitors, Descartes changed his residence in Holland\ntwenty-four times and lived in thirteen places. All his correspondence\npassed through Mersenne. During these twenty years he made three\njourneys to France. Thus this period of absolute retirement became his\nperiod of literary production, chiefly between the years 1635 and 1644.\nHe wrote his\n\n_Method_ (1635\u20131637).\n\n_Meditations_ (1629\u20131641).\n\n_Le Monde_ (1630\u20131632), published posthumously.\n\n_Principles_ (1641\u20131644).\n\n_Passions_ (1646\u20131649).\n\n(4) _In Stockholm, Sweden_ (1649\u20131650). The romantic side of the life\nof Descartes appears in his book on the _Passions_, which he wrote for\nthe Princess Elizabeth, and also in his acceptance of the invitation\nof the Queen of Sweden to reside at her court and become her tutor. He\ndied there from the rigors of the climate after a residence of one year.\n\n=The Two Conflicting Influences upon the Thought of Descartes.= On\nthe one hand, all the ties of inheritance, family influence, and\nearly education allied Descartes with the spirit of the Middle Ages.\nA delicate constitution made him shrink from public controversy and\nthe public eye. He even made a half apology for his pursuit of science\nby saying that he was seeking to reform his own life, and that it was\nabsurd for an individual to attempt to reform a state. His family on\nboth sides belonged to the landed gentry, and he was therefore bound\nby caste to the support of institutional authority. He was educated\nin the Jesuit school of La Fl\u00e8che, and this most conservative of\necclesiastical influences restrained him from following the logical\nconclusions of his own thought. He was therefore both physically timid\nand intellectually aloof. In 1632 he was about to publish _Le Monde_,\nwhich was a scientific description of the origin and nature of the\nuniverse, and agrees in part with the Copernican theory. It was a\ntreatise which would naturally conflict with the teaching of the\nchurch. He learned of the trial of Galileo at Rome, and he never dared\nto publish the book.\n\nThe rival spirit speaking in Descartes was the new scientific spirit\nof the Renaissance. He had a genius for mathematics even when he was at\nschool at La Fl\u00e8che. On his going to Paris he became the centre of the\nmost notable scientific circle in France\u2015\u2015a circle composed of such men\nas the Abb\u00e9 Claude Picot, the physician Villebressieux, the optician\nFerrier, the mathematician Mersenne, and many other scientists and\ntheologians. But he became dissatisfied and made some long journeys in\norder to study \u201cthe book of the world.\u201d His discovery of his method and\nhis philosophical principle was the result. In mathematics he was the\ndiscoverer of analytical geometry and was the first to represent powers\nby exponents; in physics he stated the principle of the refraction of\nlight in trigonometrical form; he explained the rainbow; he weighed\nthe air. The same industrious application of the new scientific methods\nthat yielded great results in science, also resulted in his development\nof his philosophy. Love for original discovery made Descartes\ndisdainful of all scientific authorities and even contemptuous of his\nnotable contemporaries, Galileo and Harvey. He mentions by name Plato,\nAristotle, Epicurus, Campanella, Telesio, and Bruno, but he claimed\nthat he learned nothing from any one except Kepler. He felt himself to\nbe above criticism, and in his self-arrogating dogmatism he is the type\nof the modern practical individualist. He defined truth as candor to\none\u2019s self, and both in his practical life and in his theoretical ideal\nthere is an entire absence of utilitarianism.\n\n=The Method of Descartes.= Both science and scholasticism show\nthemselves in the method of Descartes. He attempted to construct\na philosophical method entirely in the scientific spirit of the\nRenaissance, but in the application of it he showed his scholastic\ntraining. Surfeited with inadequate and traditional methods he felt\nthe need of some single principle by which all knowledge might be\nsystematized, and he was sure that mathematics would furnish the\nkey. Rational science was to Descartes only mathematics. Truth is\nto be found not in metaphysics, nor in empirical science. Descartes\u2019\nphilosophical aim was to establish a universal mathematics. Descartes\nwas not entirely faithful to Galileo\u2019s mathematical principle in his\nemployment of it, and his influence in metaphysics was thereby all the\ngreater; for in the development of his method he found assistance in\nthe traditional scholastic methods. Descartes was original in insisting\nupon finding the existence of an absolute and undeniable principle\nbefore any progress could be made. Such an absolute principle can be\nobtained only by an _inductive sifting of all ideas_. From this all\nfurther truths must be obtained by _deduction_. Every true philosophy\nmust therefore be an induction or analysis of ideas, and secondly,\na deduction or synthesis. _The great contribution of Descartes was\ntherefore this: to the inductive method of Bacon and the deductive\nmethod of Galileo, he added an absolute principle which must be taken\nas the basis of both induction and deduction._[27]\n\n=Induction\u2015\u2015Provisional Doubt\u2015\u2015The Ultimate Certainty of Consciousness.=\nThe philosophical proclamation of Descartes was characteristically\nFrench, for he demanded the same return to an uncorrupted nature for\nthe understanding that Rousseau many years later demanded for the heart.\nThe first step of Descartes was also French in its demand for absolute\nclearness, which from his youth had shown him to be so passionately\nfond of mathematics. The way to such clearness is through provisional\ndoubt. Let us purify the understanding by delivering it of the rubbish\nof traditional opinions, taken upon the say-so of others. By this\nnegative induction of received knowledge, let us see if there is\nanything positive and certain. In Descartes\u2019s _Meditations_, in \u201ca\ndramatic dialogue with himself,\u201d he portrays his own intellectual\nstruggle to gain uncontaminated truth. He makes an induction of all\nkinds of knowledge and challenges each as it appears. Nothing is to\nbe accepted as true until it has proved itself true. All facts are\nsubjected to rigid scrutiny. Descartes doubts the testimony of the\nsenses, the existence of the material world, the existence of God. But\nthis induction is provisional, even if it is radical. While none of the\nusually accepted truths are found by him to be undeniable and absolute,\nyet Descartes has an ulterior purpose in challenging them. Greek\nskepticism had no further end than doubt, while at the other extreme\nAnselm and the orthodox scholastics had refused to doubt at all. The\nmethod of Descartes is contrasted both with that of Anselm and with\nthat of the Skeptics, for he doubts in order that he may know. _Dubito\nut intelligam._ Doubt is necessary, but only as a means to an end; and\nthat end is knowledge. Descartes proclaimed for the modern individual\nthe privilege and the duty of rationalizing his own beliefs.\n\nIn such an inductive sifting of traditional beliefs, are there any\nthat can be called knowledge? Is there one whose reliability cannot\nbe successfully doubted? Not a single one, except the thinking process\nitself. I am certain that I am conscious. Even when in my universal\ndoubt I say that nothing is certain, I am at least certain that I\ndoubt. I am, therefore, contradicting my universal skepticism. To doubt\nis to think; in doubting, consciousness is asserting its existence.\nSkepticism is self-contradictory. An induction of our ideas reveals\nat least this one absolutely certain principle: I, as thinking,\nam. _Cogito ergo sum._ My own existence is an intuitive truth that\naccompanies every state of mind. This is the best known portion of\nDescartes\u2019s philosophy, and perhaps it is in part to the Latin formula\nof it that it owes its widespread acceptance. It is criticised as\ntrifling, even if it be true; and as reasoning in a circle. Yet\nit must be remembered that Descartes does not intend the _ergo sum_\n(\u201ctherefore I am\u201d) to be a conclusion of a syllogism of which _Cogito_\n(\u201cI think\u201d) is the minor premise. This formula is not an inference, but\nan intuition, which is revealed by induction as the certain background\nof all knowledge.\n\nThree things are to be learned from this fundamental principle, said\nDescartes: (1) The first is that man has gained a criterion of truth.\nThe characteristic of this principle that makes it reliable and certain\nis its clearness and distinctness. _Clearness and distinctness of ideas\nis the proof of their truth._ All true ideas will therefore have the\nmathematical and intuitive certainty that the idea of the existence\nof the self has. (2) The second lesson from this fundamental principle\nis that the existence of the soul is more certain than that of the\nbody. The soul is more important and independent than the body. This\nis the subjective point of view of modern times. The modern man views\nthe world as the representation or the creation of his thinking soul.\n(3) The third lesson from this principle concerns the nature of the\nsoul. How long do you exist? As long as you think. (_Sum cogitans._)\nTrue existence is rational thinking, and God alone has it. Feelings and\npassions are obscure ideas.\n\n=Deduction\u2015\u2015The Implications of Consciousness.= For Descartes reality\nlies within the Self; and the next question before him is how to get\nout of the Self. Knowledge that is confined to the Self and its states\nis called, technically, solipsism. Such knowledge amounts to little;\nindeed, it is not knowledge at all. Certainty of self-existence is the\nminimum amount of knowledge\u2015\u2015merely the starting point of knowledge.\nDescartes proposes to escape from this solipsism by the use of logic.\nHis method from this point on is ostensibly deductive, although he\nintroduces by the side door other ideas than the idea of Self to make\nhis proof complete. Descartes maintains that any idea will be as true\nas the consciousness that accompanies it, just as a proposition in\ngeometry partakes of the truth of the axioms from which it is derived.\nNow my consciousness contains many ideas; some of them seem to be\nthe product of my imagination; some seem to be adventitious; some are\ninnate. It is upon the innate ideas that Descartes depends to get him\nout of his solipsism, for they are not created by the Self and they\nhave the qualities of truth\u2015\u2015a conscious clearness and distinctness.\nAmong these innate ideas is the idea of God as a perfect being.\n\n=The Existence of God.[28]= As a deduction from consciousness, the idea\nof God would prove to be a very useful one to Descartes, provided it\nhad reality. For it is evident that consciousness can testify only to\nthe existence of itself and its own states. How do I know the reality\nof anything else? Am I confined within the circle of my own thinking?\nIs all that I can say of this or that, \u201cIt is real to me\u201d? Are all\nthings only the phantasmagoria of my own brain, testifying only to the\nexistence of myself? Descartes thought that the idea of God relieved\nhim of this solipsism. If he could demonstrate God\u2019s existence,\nhe would then be able to demonstrate the existence of the material\nuniverse. The problem was so highly important to Descartes that he\nthrew it into several different arguments. The complications with which\nthese arguments are filled must be passed over here, and the arguments\nstated in their simplest forms.\n\n(a) Two are ontological arguments, that is, arguments from the\ncharacter of the conception of God\u2019s nature.\n\n(1) _A Simple Deduction._ If I have in my consciousness any idea as\nclear and distinct as my idea of Myself, it must have existence like\nMyself. My idea of God has just that clearness and distinctness; and\ntherefore God exists.\n\n(2) _The Geometrical Argument_, so called by Descartes. Some ideas have\nproperties so immutable that, when we think the ideas, we necessarily\nthink their properties. Such is the idea of a triangle; when I think\nof a triangle, I must think of it as having its three angles equal to\ntwo right angles. Such is also my idea of God; I must think of him as\nperfect and existing. He would not be God, _i. e._ a perfect Being, if\nHe did not exist.\n\nThe reader will recognize this as a re-statement of the argument by\nSt. Anselm. As such it raised a tempest of controversy in Descartes\u2019\ntime, and was attacked from all sides.\n\n(b) Two are causal arguments, that is, based on the assumption of the\nequality of cause and effect. Only one of these arguments will be cited\nhere. This is known as\n\n_The Cartesian Argument._ I have an idea of a perfect Being. This idea\nmust have an adequate cause. Therefore God must exist, for only He, and\nno imperfect being, can be the adequate cause of my idea of perfection.\n\nThe ontological arguments given by Descartes are evidently deductions\nfrom the certainty of self-consciousness. The question which we\nimmediately raise concerning them is, Are they true? As to the causal\narguments, Descartes is breaking away from his original assumption,\nviz., that self-consciousness is the only certainty, and is introducing\nanother assumption, viz., the certainty of the law of cause. The\nquestion, then, that the thoughtful student asks, is, Does Descartes\nreally escape from his solipsism?\n\n=The Reality of Matter.= It will be seen that Descartes is trying\nto deduce from the certainty of the idea of self-consciousness the\ncertainty of other ideas, as propositions are deduced in geometry from\naxioms. The existence of God is an implication of human consciousness.\nNow Descartes points out that the existence of matter is implied in the\nexistence of God. Descartes is interested in material science, and it\nis important for him to prove the reality of matter. Here again his\nscholastic training comes into play. Since God has all the attributes\nof a perfect being, He must be veracious. If there were no God, but\nonly a deceiving Devil, the external world might be only a fiction,\ncreated to deceive us. But God exists, and we can trust that He would\nnot continually deceive men about the existence of nature. An atheist\ncould have no science, but to Descartes,\n\n \u201cGod\u2019s in His heaven\u2015\u2015\n All\u2019s right with the world.\u201d\n\nOf course, man is constantly in error about the character of physical\nthings, but these errors arise from his misinterpretation of them.\nNature in some form lies before man, or else God in His truthfulness\ndoes not exist. The essence of matter is extension (see below), and\nwhatever my interpretation of it, something extended lies before me\nto be interpreted.\n\nThis is the skeleton upon which Descartes constructs his theory. Even\nthis cursory examination of it shows the obvious attempt to explain\n\u201cthe world of grace\u201d by the method of mathematics, and it is quite\nconsistent with the spirit of the Renaissance. The existence of God\nand the existence of matter are deduced in turn from the axiom of all\nthought, the Self; while matter is further described as the extended or\nthe measurable. Thus Descartes has tried to construct a bridge between\nthe scholastic concepts and the science of the Renaissance. The three\nrealities, the Self, God, and matter, which Descartes often speaks of\nas intuitively certain, have obviously a differing cogency. The reality\nof consciousness is the ground from which the other two are derived.\nIn asserting its primacy, he is voicing the spirit of the Renaissance\neven more clearly than did Galileo and Bacon. For Descartes in this\nhas gone back of the objective facts to a single subjective principle;\nwhereas the deductive principles of Galileo were objective. In this\nrespect Descartes is the founder of the subjective method of modern\nthought, and in identifying the Self as the reason he became the\nfounder of rationalism. In any case he established a background for\nepistemology, or the theory of knowledge. But in his derivation of\nthe other two realities\u2015\u2015God and matter\u2015\u2015he shows how persistent was\nthe scholastic current in his thought. Although he declared them to\nbe intuitively known, they evidently are not so in the same sense\nthat self-consciousness is; and he felt obliged to support them by\ntraditional scholastic arguments.\n\n=God and the World.= Leaving these fundamental principles of\nDescartes, we now come to a consideration of a few of the details of\nhis philosophy. Descartes\u2019 world is a dualism in which conscious being\nstands in contrast with space objects. God is related to the world of\nmind on the one hand and to the world of matter on the other. The order\nin which Descartes came upon the three substances\u2015\u2015the Self, God, and\nmatter\u2015\u2015is, however, not the order of their reality. In reality God is\nthe _primary substance_, for He depends only upon Himself. Matter and\nthe Self are _relative or created substances_, for they depend upon\nGod. Matter and mind have different modes of appearing: the modes of\nmatter are form, size, position, and motion. The modes of mind are\nideas, judgments, and will. Thus mind is so essentially different from\nmatter, as can be seen in their respective modes, that God stands in a\ndifferent relation to each.\n\n=The Relation of God to Matter.= Descartes here investigates the realm\nin which he has the deepest interest; but he makes a concession at\nthe very beginning. He divests things of their qualities and finds the\nessence of matter to be extension. Qualities are not resident in things,\nbut are the result of our sensations. Sense-perception is knowledge of\nqualities, and therefore obscure knowledge; while clear or intellectual\nknowledge is of quantities. But there is one quality common to\nmatter,\u2015\u2015extension. Space, extension, and matter are the same. There\nis no space that is empty, no matter that is not extended. An extended\nor material body has, however, in itself no principle of motion. It\ncannot move itself. It must be moved by an external cause, and the\nwhole universe must be a mechanism whose movements have their first\ncause in God. Matter in its modes of motion and rest has God as its\nfirst cause or unmoved mover; and under matter is included everything\nextended,\u2015\u2015inanimate objects, the lower animals, and the bodies of men.\nTo this world of matter God stands in the relation of an inventor to\nhis machine.\n\n=The Relation of God to Minds.= The essential nature of minds\nis thought. Mind is therefore different from matter because it is\nunextended and free. The two relative substances have nothing in common\nexcept that they are related to God. The relation of God to minds\nis, however, very different from His relation to matter. God is not\nthe unmoved mover of minds, but He is the perfect and infinite mind\nto which our finite minds turn as their ideal. God thinks and wills\nperfectly what we think and will imperfectly. He is not the mechanical\nbut the teleological cause of minds, their _ens perfectissimum_, the\ngoal of all mental aspiration.\n\n=The Relation of Mind and Body.= In proportion as Descartes clearly\ndefined mind and body, and referred each back to its own principle,\nthe impossibility of connecting the two became apparent. Descartes\nintended that his theory should, above everything else, clear\nphilosophy of all obscurities. So he divided the world into two\nrelative substances,\u2015\u2015mind and matter,\u2015\u2015each operating in its own\nrealm, each exclusive of the other. The intention of Descartes is to\nbe a consistent dualist. But there was one point where, with one eye on\nthe church, he had to qualify for ethical considerations his scientific\nprinciple of matter. That is the point where the human body acts upon\nthe soul and the soul acts upon the body.\n\nThere was little trouble for Descartes in conceiving the movements\nof inanimate bodies, plants, and all the lower animals as purely\nmechanical and automatic, with their first cause in God. From his own\ninvestigations he felt obliged to regard many of the human functions\nas automatic also. But his ethical and theological interests compelled\nhim to think of man as exalted above the rest of creation. Theology has\nalways been in a sense aristocratic, and has drawn a line between man\nand other things. Man alone has a soul in his body. The soul of man\nis immortal and free, and must therefore have control over the body;\nnevertheless the soul of man must be conscious of the impressions\nthat come through the body. Here the science of the Renaissance and\nthe scholasticism of the Middle Ages refuse to be reconciled in the\nphilosophy of Descartes. When it became a question between Descartes\u2019\nscientific theory of matter operating itself mechanically and the\nchurch doctrine of a spiritual will operating the matter of the human\nbody, the scientific theory had to yield. How does Descartes yield\ngracefully to the theological requirements and bring together the two\nunlike worlds of matter and mind in the human personality?\n\nDescartes\u2019 explanation of the relation of human mind and body reminds\nus of the mythical explanations of Paracelsus. The soul is united to\nall parts of the body, but its point of contact with the body is the\npineal gland, and this contact is made possible through the animal\nspirits (_spiritus animales_) or the fire atoms in the blood, a revived\nGreek conception. The pineal gland is a ganglion in the centre of the\nbrain, which biologists tell us is a defunct eye, but which Descartes\nconceived to be the seat of the soul. Descartes maintained that\nthe animal spirits, having been distilled by the heart, ascend by\nmechanical laws from the heart to the brain, and then descend to the\nnerves and muscles. When they pass through the pineal gland, they come\nin contact with the soul. The soul exercises influence on the body by\nslightly moving the gland and diverting the animal spirits. In this way\nthe emotions and sensations are to be explained. The movement of the\npineal gland by the animal spirits causes sensations in the soul; the\nmovement of the gland by the soul changes the movement of the animal\nspirits, and is an exhibition of free action. But this does not add to\nor subtract from the energy. It merely changes the direction of energy.\n\n=The Influence of Descartes.= Although the philosophy of Descartes\nwas forbidden in the University of Oxford, was proscribed by the\nCalvinists in Holland, and his works were placed upon the Index by the\nCatholics, it created a profound impression on the theology, science,\nand literature of the seventeenth century. It spread over Europe in a\nsomewhat similar way to the Darwinian evolution theory in modern times.\nIts success was immense, many standard men rallied to its support,\nand everything before Descartes was considered to be antiquated. Among\nphilosophers his doctrine had an internal development in a natural\nway along the lines of the problems which he had left unsolved. A\nphilosophical development, the source of which can be traced directly\nback to Descartes, went on until Kant published his _Critique_ in\n1781. This has later been called the School of Rationalism in Germany,\nFrance, and Holland. The most important members of this school\u2015\u2015the\nOccasionalists, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Wolff\u2015\u2015we shall consider in\ntheir place. Descartes had an important immediate following in the\ngroup, who go by the name of Occasionalists; but his most important\nsuccessor, who can hardly be called his disciple, was Spinoza.\n\nDescartes\u2019 method had a peculiar fate. His followers misunderstood\nit, exactly reversed it, and obtained very fruitful results. Descartes\nhimself had hoped to see induction employed in most metaphysical\nproblems. He regarded deduction as of use only in proceeding from\none self-evident fact to another. But the following Rationalists used\nthe deductive method entirely and tried to systematize ethics after\nthe manner of Euclid. They deduced their systems from some assumed\nprinciple. This tendency was first seen in the Port Royal logic, and\nwas completed by Spinoza.\n\n=The Relation of the Occasionalists and Spinoza to Descartes.= The\ndevelopment of the doctrines of the Occasionalists and Spinoza from\nDescartes was an attempt to make clear the conception of _substance_.\nSince substance was the most important scholastic category, it is easy\nto see why Spinoza\u2019s teaching became thoroughly scholastic. Descartes\nhad used the term \u201csubstance\u201d in a very loose way to apply to God\nas infinite, and to minds and bodies as finite. He speaks of God as\nthe only substance, and yet of consciousness and bodies as created\nsubstances. Such ambiguity must be overcome, if a philosophy which\nprided itself on making everything \u201cclear and distinct\u201d was to stand.\nDescartes had fallen short of justifying his attempt to put metaphysics\ncompletely upon a mathematical basis, although this had been his\noriginal problem. The obscurity of the spiritual world still remained,\nbecause Descartes had left the concept of the spiritual substance\nundefined. The world of the spirit was still an unknown country. The\nspiritual substance had not been made clear and distinct, and there\nstill remained the ontological problem of the relation between mind\nand matter, and the psychological problem of the relation between the\nindividual soul and its body.\n\nDescartes had, however, defined clearly the concept of the substance\nof matter\u2015\u2015the substance with which the natural scientist works. He had\naccomplished this, to be sure, by destroying the essential distinctions\nbetween material things. A \u201cthing\u201d is essentially a substance in\nwhich many qualities inhere, _e. g._ a piece of sugar having whiteness,\nsweetness, etc. Material substances were alike in that all were\nessentially extension. All else besides extension in any particular\nfinite thing was a modification of extension. A lump of sugar was\nessentially the same as a lump of salt in that both were extension; the\nsaltness, sweetness, etc., were secondary. Now this makes the nature\nof bodies very clear; and Descartes proposed to reduce the substance\nof the states of mind to the same clearness, but he did not do it.\nHe was interested in natural science and he developed his rationalism\nonly with reference to matter. Bodies are parts of space or corpuscles,\nwhich are mathematically infinitely divisible, but perceptually are not\nfurther divisible. As far as he went, Descartes was clear enough.\n\nThe Occasionalists and Spinoza represent the second stage in the\ndevelopment of Rationalism. Both tried by making clear the meaning of\nspiritual substance to define the relationship of God to the material\nworld. Both tried to state the problem in other words, to overcome the\ndualism between mind and matter, and to reconstruct the old \u201cworld of\ngrace\u201d so that it would be consistent with the new world of science.\nThe Occasionalists, whose chief exponents were Malebranche and Geulincx,\nwe shall dismiss with only a few words, while considerable attention\nmust be given to the teaching of Spinoza. Malebranche tried to do\nfor the mental world what Descartes had done for the world of matter.\nSince no knowledge is possible except in God, he claimed that the\nmodes of finite minds\u2015\u2015our ideas, judgments, imaginations\u2015\u2015are alike\nin essence in being modifications of the universal reason of God.\nGod is so far the \u201cplace of minds\u201d as space is the place of bodies.\nAll our ideas participate in God\u2019s reason, and all our volitions\nare the modifications of the will of the Divine, just as bodies are\nmodifications of extension. What then is the relation, asked Geulincx,\nbetween bodily movement and the states of consciousness? Why does my\narm move when I wish to move it? By the mediatory power of God. The\nthought in my mind is the \u201coccasional cause\u201d of the movement of my\narm, while God is the true cause of the movement. The movement of the\nhuman body is therefore, like the movement of all matter, a continuous\nmiracle caused by an ever watchful Deity, who keeps body and mind\nin harmony. Spinoza completed his pantheism before Malebranche had\nprepared the way. He formulated a complete doctrine of substance,\nconceiving material bodies to be essentially the same in being modes of\nextension, and mental phenomena to be essentially alike in being modes\nof thought. But more important was his further teaching that on that\naccount the two series have no relation to each other. That is to say,\nSpinoza reduced the whole difficulty to clearness and distinctness\nby reducing the three substances of Descartes to one. For this reason\nSpinoza was a more complete Rationalist than Descartes; and he was\nassisted in this construction of a mathematical Rationalism by two\nfacts: he held himself strictly to the deductive method, and he\nwas free from social and ecclesiastical ties. Spinoza is the truest\nutterance of his time in its effort to make all things clear; and this\nis not contradicted by the fact that he had little influence in shaping\ncontemporary thought.\n\n Illustration: BARUCH DE SPINOZA\n\n (Pollock (_Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy_, p. xxvi) says\n that only three of the portraits of Spinoza may reasonably be\n considered authentic. One is a miniature of the philosopher\n in the Summer Palace at the Hague; the second is a painting in\n the Town Museum at the Hague; the third is the one given here,\n which is an engraving found in copies of the original edition\n of Spinoza\u2019s Posthumous Works (1677). This portrait seems to be\n somewhat idealized, but of the three it is the most artistic and\n lifelike.)\n\n=The Historical Place of Spinoza.=[29] Spinoza did not get full\nstanding nor was he widely read, until Lessing, one hundred years\nlater, resurrected his teaching and Goethe adopted it. He produced\nwhat the Renaissance was striving for, but what the Renaissance\ncould not yet grasp,\u2015\u2015the complete logical formulation of its deepest\nthought. Spinoza produced the only great conception of the world during\nthis period, and it excited the hostility of contemporary Catholics,\nProtestants, and free-thinkers alike. The product of his thinking\nwas a new systematic scholasticism, which, if the time had been ready\nfor it, would have entirely superseded the medi\u00e6val. He succeeded in\nplacing metaphysics upon a scientific and mathematical basis, for his\nphilosophy was not only logical in its content but mathematical in its\nform. Spinoza\u2019s philosophy is the Renaissance expression of medi\u00e6val\nscholasticism,\u2015\u2015the expression of that rationalism that underlies\nboth the thought of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It is as if\nThomas Aquinas had been transported into the Renaissance, and finding\nthat science would not support and explain dogma, had conformed dogma\nsystematically to the new science. Mathematically science was the new\ndogma. Spinoza is the last word of medi\u00e6valism, although his language\nis the science of the Renaissance. The utterance of Spinoza sounds\nstrange because, while his thought is medi\u00e6val, his expression and form\nare scientific.\n\nSpinozism had a revival in the eighteenth century.[30] It formed the\nbackground of the philosophy of Herder and that of the author of the\n_\u2666Wolfenb\u00fcttel Fragments_. The connection of Lessing and Spinoza was\na matter of active controversy at that time. Spinoza was the great\ninfluence upon Goethe. In the nineteenth century in England Coleridge\nreproduced from Spinoza\u2019s _Ethics_ the doctrine of an all-pervading\nlove and reason.\n\nSpinoza strove before everything else for a unitary system, and yet\nit is interesting to see how much he has been honored from different\nquarters. Artists, religious devotees, poets, idealists, materialists,\nand scientists have found in him their truest expression. This is\nnot only because each has found something different, but because his\nphilosophy had actually a many-sided character. His teaching had the\nadvantage of being thoroughly radical. Bad systems of philosophy are\nimpossible, because they are contradictory. While no one knows that any\nsystem corresponds to fact, still it is possible that a radical system\nmay have such correspondence. Spinoza\u2019s system is comprehensive, and\ntherefore has struck sympathetic chords in differing thinkers.\n\n=The Influences upon Spinoza.= =1. His Jewish Training.= Spinoza\nwas born a Jew and remained a member of the Synagogue until he was\nexcommunicated at the age of twenty-four. Although he was the original\ngenius who transcends his limitations, his young mind was moulded after\nthe Jewish type. He received the strictly religious training of the\nJewish boy in the Jewish academy at Amsterdam, where he learned a trade\nin connection with his studies. He studied the Talmud, medi\u00e6val Jewish\nphilosophy, especially the writings of Maimonides (twelfth century),\nand the Cabalistic literature. In a Jewish curriculum the classical\nlanguages had no place; and mathematics, except arithmetic, was\ngenerally overlooked. His early instruction emphasized above everything\nelse the unity and the supremely transcendent, theistic character of\nGod.\n\nHowever, his separation from the Synagogue at this early age could\nnot but modify his theology. It made him a free Jew. He was no\nlonger under the restraints of Jewish traditions. While he never\nabandoned his belief in God as a unity, he gave up his belief in the\ntranscendent theistic God of the Hebrew prophets; and he differed from\nthe contemporary Jewish Cabalistic teaching of emanations from God. He\nseems to have so modified the orthodox Hebrew conception of God that\nit rather resembles that of the medi\u00e6val mystic Christian. Perhaps the\ninfluence of Bruno upon his thought may account for its final shape.\n\n=2. His Impulse from the New Science\u2015\u2015Descartes\u2019 Influence.= The \u201cfree\nthinking\u201d for which Spinoza was excommunicated by the Synagogue was\nobtained first from his instruction in the school of Van der Ende,\na physician of daring naturalistic tendencies. This was when he was\neighteen. Spinoza had already learned Italian and French; Spanish,\nPortuguese, Dutch, and Hebrew were his native tongues; Van der Ende\ntaught him German and Latin, and introduced him to the science of the\ntime. It was then that he read Descartes, whose philosophy he made the\nbasis of his own. Spinoza was not an inventive genius like Descartes\nand Leibnitz, but he was more rigidly systematic than either. He was\nby nature a thinker who was obliged to carry his thought through to\nits logical conclusions. He had already, at this early age of eighteen,\nbegun to make independent theological excursions. Consequently the\nmathematical methods of Descartes furnished him a method, and Van\nder Ende gave him the encouragement for carrying out his independent\nthinking unrelentingly to its logical end. To state his modified Jewish\nconception of God in mathematical terms became his task, and his\nsuccess in thus stating it, with Descartes as a starting point, made\nhim the most complete representative of Rationalism.\n\n=3. His Acquaintance with the Collegiants.= After his expulsion from\nhis kindred, he lived for seven years with a sect of Baptist Quakers\ncalled Collegiants. This was a dissenting religious body without\npriests or set forms of worship. The members were simple, pious\npeople, who regarded moral living as superior to creed; and Spinoza\u2019s\nlife in their midst must have determined to some degree the lines\nof his thought. To a man of Spinoza\u2019s simplicity of mind and kindly\ndisposition, the Collegiants would prove to be not only congenial\ncompanions in his hours of distress, but they would confirm his own\nlove for the ethical as an ideal. Spinoza says that the motive of his\nphilosophy is a practical one; that he is seeking that which would\n\u201cenable me to enjoy continuous and supreme and unending happiness.\u201d He\nis seeking a theory of life that would aid in allaying the unrest of\nhis time; and he is the only philosopher who has called his metaphysics\n_Ethics_. The humaneness of his doctrine, the practical purpose of his\nwritings, and the ethical ideal that informed his whole life had at\nleast their reinforcement, and perhaps their origin, in his contact\nwith the Collegiants during this critical period. His life with this\nsect influenced him in his refusal to accept the chair of philosophy at\nthe University of Heidelberg, and to remain content to be the obscure\ngrinder of optical lenses.\n\n=The Life and Philosophical Writings of Spinoza=[31] (1632\u20131677).\nThe history of philosophy presents in the person of Spinoza a lovable,\ninteresting, and striking character, as well as the author of one of\nthe profoundest of philosophical systems. His life was one of social\nisolation and retirement rather than of solitude. The Jews to whom\nhe belonged lived a kind of double exile\u2015\u2015they were exiled from their\nhome in Spain, and they lived by themselves apart from the people\nof Amsterdam. When Spinoza was excommunicated by his brethren, he\nsuffered, therefore, a threefold exile. Moreover, Spinoza was not only\nexcommunicated by his people, but he was hated by the contemporary\nCatholics, Protestants, and the prevailing Cartesian school. Even the\nfree-thinker, Hume, spoke of him as \u201cthe infamous Spinoza,\u201d and another\nphilosopher described his philosophy as \u201cthe hideous hypothesis of\nSpinoza.\u201d But his isolation was far from solitude, and he had many\neminent and faithful friends and a notable correspondence. Of his short\nlife of forty-five years, he spent twenty-four, or more than half, as\na member of the Jewish synagogue. During the next seven years he found\nrefuge among the Collegiants. In the last fourteen years of his life he\nbecame widely known, mainly through the _Theological-Political Tract_,\npublished in 1670, the only one of his writings which he himself\npublished. This brought him the call to the University of Heidelberg,\nwhich he declined. His life may be conveniently divided into three\nperiods, as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n1. _In Israel_ (1632\u20131656). Spinoza was educated at the Jewish academy\nat Amsterdam, where he studied theology and learned a trade, according\nto the Jewish custom. This trade was the grinding of optical lenses;\nthat is, he became an optician, and this required some knowledge of\nmathematics and physics. During these years he got instruction from\nVan der Ende in science and Latin. He also read Descartes and learned\nmany languages. He wrote a compendium of a Hebrew Grammar, of which\nthe date is doubtful. In 1656 he was excommunicated by the synagogue.\nThe charges brought against him were that: (1) he denied that the Old\nTestament taught the doctrine of immortality; (2) he affirmed that\nangels may be only phantoms or ideas in men\u2019s minds; (3) he affirmed\nthat God may have a body.\n\n2. _In Retirement_ (1656\u20131663). Spinoza spent this time with the\nCollegiants, and this was his most fruitful intellectual period.\nHe brought his ontology, ethics, politics, and physics into a\nunified system; and he formulated his theory of determinism and his\nmathematical method. In 1658\u20131661 he was writing his so-called _Short\nTreatise_, \u201cconcerning God, man and his well-being.\u201d This was the first\ndraft of his _Ethics_. In 1656\u20131662 he was writing his _Improvement of\nthe Understanding_. In 1662\u20131663 he wrote a summary of the principles\nof Descartes.\n\n3. _In the Public Eye_ (1663\u20131677). During this period Spinoza\nlived at or near the Hague, where he had many visitors and a large\ncorrespondence.[32] He was an intimate friend of the brothers DeWitte,\nwho made so large a part of the political history of the country.\nIn 1662\u20131665 he was writing his _Ethics_, his monumental work. In\n1663\u20131670 he wrote and published the _Theological-Political Treatise_,\nthe only work published during his life. Although received with horror,\nit was widely read. It aimed to show that the _Bible_ is history. In\n1673 he declined the call to the University of Heidelberg. Just before\nhis death, in 1677, he wrote the fragment of the _Political Treatise_.\n\n=The Method of Spinoza.= The method which Spinoza employed in writing\nhis _Ethics_ must not be regarded by the reader as a fantastic dress\nthat he capriciously chose. It had for Spinoza a real and not merely\nan external significance. On taking up the book, one finds philosophy\ntreated exactly as Euclid treated his geometry. Beginning with a\nnumber of definitions and axioms, there are deduced, step by step,\npropositions with appended scholia and corollaries. To Spinoza this was\nnot pressing philosophy into an artificial and rigid form, but was only\nthe natural mode of philosophical expression. For, in the first place,\nif the new method of science had proved itself successful in treating\nphysical phenomena, why should not the same method have the same\nsuccess with problems of the world of the spirit\u2015\u2015and in this way\nbring the two worlds into harmony? By deduction one could then arrive\nat absolute certainty and unassailable proof of the solutions of\nmetaphysical problems that had long vexed the Middle Ages. With the\nperfect geometrical method all problems in heaven and earth could be\nsolved. In the second place, the religious conviction of Spinoza that\nall things come from God required the deductive method to explain them.\nThe order in which we should study phenomena should correspond to the\nreal order in which they stand to God. God is the ground or reason of\nthings, and all are derived from Him as consequents. The deduction of\nthe relation of finite things to God will correspond to the real\nrelation in which God stands to them.\n\n=The Fundamental Principle in Spinoza\u2019s Philosophy.= The philosophy\nof Spinoza seems to be Cartesian in every respect except one; and\nthat one difference was like the leaven in the lump\u2015\u2015it transformed\nhis philosophy into a radically different one from that of Descartes.\nSpinoza\u2019s point of departure was the philosophy of Descartes, all\nhis presuppositions are the fundamental principles of Descartes, and\nthe structure of his system seems to be that of Descartes. He has the\nsame respect for the power of the reason to know all truth, the same\nfaith in the omnipotence of the mathematical method, the same general\nconception of substance, the same idea of the qualitative difference\nbetween the worlds of thought and extension, the same belief in the\nmechanical structure of the world of nature. He made these his own\nand accentuated them. But he added to these a new and transforming\nprinciple: he conceived that the substance, God, is not merely one\nobject of knowledge, but _He is the only object of knowledge_. He is\nthe only substance, and finite things are only modifications of Him.\nFinite things are alike at bottom, and to know them truly is to know\nGod.\n\nThis new principle transforms all the Cartesian elements in Spinoza\u2019s\nteaching. It changes the Cartesian theism into a pantheism; it\nsupplants Descartes\u2019 theological orthodoxy with a naturalism and\nDescartes\u2019 doctrine of freedom with a determinism; and it turns the\ncultured aloofness of Descartes into a benevolent mysticism. This\nnew principle becomes \u201cthe head of the corner.\u201d The oneness and\nuniversality of God is the single proposition from which Spinoza\ndeduced his whole philosophy. God is the ultimate ground whose\nexistence must be real, because it is conceived. The intrinsic\nscholasticism of the philosophy of Spinoza appears in his definition\nof substance, for it is only a condensed statement of St. Anselm\u2019s\nargument for the existence of God. Spinoza says, \u201cBy substance I mean\nthat which is in itself and conceived through itself alone.\u201d There\nare, therefore, two kinds of things: the thing that has existence in\nitself and the things that have existence in something else. God stands\nalone in the first class; all other things make up the second class.\nSpinoza\u2019s world is divided into two parts: God and the modes of God.\nGod is self-explanatory and self-existent, while everything else is\nexplained through Him. The only object of knowledge and the single\npresupposition of existence is God. In a phrase that has become classic,\nNovalis described Spinoza as a \u201cGod-intoxicated man.\u201d\n\n=Three Central Problems in Spinoza\u2019s Teaching.= We have already noted\nthat Spinoza was the chief exponent of \u201cclearness and distinctness\u201d\nin this epoch when all mysteries were to be revealed. He sought to\narticulate a metaphysics that would spread out the plan of the world\nlike a demonstration in geometry. His definition of substance is\nperfectly intelligible; he accepted the mathematical analysis of\nthe material world into a world of extension, and that of the world\nof conscious states into one of thought\u2015\u2015all this for the sake of\nsimplification and clearness. How simple such a philosophy at the first\nblush appears\u2015\u2015the world is God and his modifications. As a matter of\nfact it is one of the many examples of the irony of history that the\nphilosophy of Spinoza is one of the most difficult to interpret. Its\ndifficulties do not arise from its having a novel point of view, for on\nthe contrary it is one that appeals strongly to the popular imagination.\nIts difficulties arise from its very simplicity, for, after all, human\nlife is so rich and varied that a simple formula will hardly express\nit. From beginning to end Spinoza\u2019s thought has a vagueness for which\nthe beginner in vain strives to find the cause. The cause lies in the\nseemingly simple principle that God is all that really exists, and yet\nthe world consists of God and other things.\n\nFrom Spinoza\u2019s effort to simplify matters emerged three central\nproblems: (1) The problem of the all-inclusiveness of God\u2015\u2015the problem\nof pantheism; (2) The problem of the unity of God\u2015\u2015the problem of\nmysticism; (3) The problem of the salvation of man\u2015\u2015an ethical problem.\nWe shall now consider these problems in order.\n\n=The Pantheism of Spinoza\u2015\u2015The All-Inclusiveness of God.= That\nSpinoza\u2019s philosophy is a pantheism appears at the outset in his\nconception of substance; for the substance is all that really is.\nDescartes had conceived of three substances,\u2015\u2015God as the absolute\nsubstance, and mind and matter as the two relative substances. But to\nSpinoza there can be only one substance; for if there were two or more,\nno one would be substance, since each would be conceived through the\nothers. If we think at all, we must think of substance as all-inclusive.\nOne might suppose that this preliminary statement would be all that\nSpinoza could say about life: all that really is, is substance; other\nthings do not exist. But that would be a misinterpretation of Spinoza.\nHe does not mean that finite things are mere nothings. They exist as\nunrealities; they exist as negations of the substance. If you prick\ninto the finite world, it does not collapse, like a balloon. It still\nexists as an unreality.\n\nNo person ever had the idea of infinity so profoundly as did Spinoza.\nHis idea of infinity is not merely that of the infinity of time\nand space, which indeed affords a tremendous variety of possible\nconstructions, since space and time are each infinite. To Spinoza the\ninfinity of the substance is much more than these possible combinations\nof time and space, for corresponding to the time and space series\nis a series of mental states. Every event has a reason. Every one\nof the infinity of events in the world of extension is paralleled\nby some state of thought. But this is by no means the whole story\nabout Spinoza\u2019s conception of infinity. Besides the infinite world of\ntime and space and the infinite world of corresponding thought, the\nsubstance to Spinoza possesses an infinity of other attributes, each\nof which is infinite. Spinoza piles up infinities upon infinities, and\nthus conceives the substance as an infinity in an overwhelming sense.\nOnly two of the infinite modes appear to our limited human discernment:\nthe infinity of the mode of extension, and the infinity of the mode of\nthought.\n\nSpinoza begins at once to tell us about the forms in which the\nall-inclusive God appears to us. First, the substance has two\nattributes, thought and extension. An attribute is \u201cthat which the\nintellect perceives as constituting the essence of the substance.\u201d Each\nattribute in its turn manifests itself in modes: thought appears in the\nmodes of intellect and will, extension in the modes of rest and motion.\n\n Substance = God.\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n Attributes = Thought Extension.\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510 \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n Modes = Intellect Will Motion Rest.\n\nThis bare skeleton of our rich and varied world appears very much\nthe same as that which one might find beneath Descartes\u2019 philosophy.\nHowever, Spinoza\u2019s conception of substance transforms it into a\nframework of a very different kind of philosophy. Since God is the\ninclusive reality of it all, we have here a pantheism instead of a\ndualism. The antithesis which in Descartes\u2019 philosophy was between\nextension and thought, now in Spinoza\u2019s teaching is between God and\nother things.\n\nWhat is the place of the attributes and modes in the all-embracing\nand real substance? As to the attributes, Spinoza maintained that we,\nas finite beings, do not know God in His character as substance, but\nthat He always appears to us through His attributes of thought and\nextension. There are only these two attributes that the human mind\ncan know, although God as an infinite being must possess an infinite\nnumber of such attributes. In our human world all things are either\nthought-things or extension-things. Each of these two attributes is\ninfinite after its kind. Each fully expresses an aspect of God without\ndepreciating the value of the other. Each is fully adequate, just as a\ntable may be both white and hard without either quality infringing upon\nthe other. The attributes are the substance made more concrete. The\nmodes are in turn modifications of the attributes and more concrete\nexpressions of them and of the substance. Each mode is infinite after\nits kind. Since God exists only in reality, He would not supposably\nsee from His point of view the world laid out in attributes and modes;\nfor these are only human ways of interpreting Him. While the critics\nagree that the modes are human interpretations of the attributes and\ntherefore unreal, they disagree about the relation of the attributes\nto God. Some maintain that the attributes are merely human ways of\nseeing the substance, analogously to the modes\u2015\u2015as if we saw God now as\nthought and now as extension; others maintain that God is nothing other\nthan the sum of the attributes; of extension, thought, and the unknown,\ninfinite, other attributes. The difficulty lays bare the nerve of the\nproblem of pantheism, and probably Spinoza was not clear in his own\nmind about the relation of the attributes to the substance.\n\nSpinoza speaks more definitely upon this same problem of the relation\nof the modes to God. Is God the sum-total of all existent things, or is\nHe the principle behind them? Spinoza says that God is both. God is the\ncause of the world, not cause in the way that the term is commonly used\nnor in the sense that Descartes used it. God is not to existent things\nthe first cause or the unmoved mover of matter, or the teleological\ncause of thought, as in Descartes. He is cause in the sense that a\ntriangle is the cause of its own three sides. He is the rational ground\n(_ratio essendi_) or the logical reason for the being of things. In\nthis sense God may be regarded as the cause _both_ in the sense that\nHe is the sum-total of existent things or modes (_natura naturata_),\nand in the sense that He is the immanent and energizing principle of\nexistent things (_natura naturans_). These conceptions as well as their\nphrases Spinoza probably got from Bruno.\n\nThe world is, therefore, related to God in that it follows directly\nfrom the nature of God; God is related to the world in that He is\nthe logical ground of the world. Is God the creator of the world? No,\nHe is the world. Is God a person? Is He a self-conscious being like\nourselves,\u2015\u2015an individual? No. The thought-aspect of God includes\nour thought, but it is the very different infinite thought; the\nextension-aspect of God includes our body, but it is the very different\ninfinite body. God has soul and body and an infinite number of\nother aspects. _God is_\u2015\u2015an unchanging, self-dependent being, whose\nmodifications are necessarily determined in their relation to Him and\nto one another. Spinoza conceived the character of God exactly from\nthe nature of geometry. Just as all geometrical conclusions follow from\nthe nature of space and exist in determined and fixed relations to one\nanother, so everything finite follows from the nature of the Infinite,\nand each finite thing is in a rigid chain of finite things of its own\nkind\u2015\u2015a chain without beginning or end. The necessity of the divine\nnature appears in all, not as a series of emanations from God, but in\na series, each member of which is determined equally by Him.\n\n=The Mysticism of Spinoza.= _From the point of view of man_, mysticism\nin speculative or religious thought has reference to the immediate\napprehension of God. Mysticism frequently accompanies pantheism,\nand _from the point of view of God_ refers to the oneness of His\nall-inclusive nature. Spinoza\u2019s pantheism is also a mysticism which\ninvolves the immediate apprehension of the divine by the human;\nit involves the oneness of God and man. More often than otherwise\nmysticism is animated by a religious motive, and Spinoza\u2019s philosophy\nis profoundly religious. We have already seen similar mysticism in the\nOrphic-Pythagorean sect which formed so great a peril to Greek culture\nin the sixth century B. C., in the neo-Pythagoreans and neo-Platonists\nat the beginning of this era, in many of the churchmen of the Middle\nAges, especially Scotus Erigena and Meister Eckhart. Bruno and many\nof the Humanists were mystics, and if we should wish to go outside our\nfield, we should find mysticism to be the prevailing attitude of mind\nof the great Oriental peoples. Mysticism frequently is accompanied by\nbelief in occult spiritual appearances, but that is not necessarily the\ncase; nor was it the case with Spinoza. Spinoza\u2019s mysticism was purely\nintellectual. Although a religious philosophy with an immediate ethical\nbearing upon conduct, it was a scientific relationalism that could not\ntolerate the miraculous and the abnormal psychological phenomena (such\nas clairvoyance, hallucinations, etc.). Spinoza is, on the contrary,\ndistinguished as a mystic because he interpreted the universe in\nentirely non-human terms. His great service to mysticism lies in\ndivesting the reality of life of every human attribution and laying\nbare a mathematical skeleton. The desire of the period to find a\ngreater unity in life was responded to by him in a mathematical\nmysticism. To him the universe is not only divided into parts, not\nonly is there no opposition between God and the world, but life is so\ncompletely a rational thing that no exceptional phenomena can occur.\nHe believed that any description of God or of nature in anthropomorphic\nterms disunites life. Spinoza dehumanized the universe, conceiving\nmatter to consist of elements, and conceiving spirit to consist of\nsimple ideas. He resolved the personality of man into parts for the\nsake of the unity of the universe, and he obtained scientific clearness\nat the expense of humanity. Thus, instead of being able to say with\nDescartes, \u201cI think and therefore I am,\u201d Spinoza could say, and wished\nonly to say, \u201cGod thinks\u201d (_Deus cogitat_).\n\nLike the usual speculative mystic, Spinoza described his God in the\nterms of formal deductive logic. God is the most real being, _ens\nrealissimum_. What is the most real being to a mystic? Would reality\ncontain any finite quality such as the world around us contains? Can\nyou say that God has this particular faculty, or is endowed with that\nconcrete attribute? Does God enjoy, love, hate; does He create and\ndestroy? But how can God be the real unity of the world unless He\ncontains in Himself everything in the finite world? We approach here\nthe threshold of _the problem of the concrete universal_, which has\nengaged the attention of so much of modern philosophy. A concrete\nuniversal is all-inclusive of finite existence, but at the same time is\na self-consistent unity. In contrast with the concrete universal is the\nabstract universal, which is a unity, but outside of which all finite\nexistence falls. While it was undoubtedly the concrete universal that\nSpinoza sought, his method could lead to nothing more concrete than\nthe abstract universals of Plato and the Schoolmen. The world of finite\nthings is included by Spinoza\u2019s God in the same way that blocks are\nincluded by a string which has been tied around them.\n\nSpinoza\u2019s God is the most abstract entity which it is possible to\nconceive. All finite things fall outside Him. No quality can be\npredicated of Him, for to define Him is to limit Him. After the manner\nof the \u201cnegative theology\u201d (see vol. i, p. 283), Spinoza refused to\nascribe any quality to God. He does not feel, think, or will as we do,\nnor can extension be ascribed to Him in the sense of finite spaces.\nWe can say only that He is not this and not this. Spinoza\u2019s conception\nof God is reached by dropping off all determinate qualities, until the\nmost general and most abstract term is gained. The barrenness of this\nlogical conception, its absolute emptiness and abstractness, makes all\ndescription of it impossible. God is a bloodless entity, an absolute\nlogical necessity and the most abstract universal. Outside of Him falls\nall that we call life. If this is God\u2019s character, is He everything\nor nothing? If the process of abstraction rises so far above every\nlimitation to an _ens realissimum et generalissimum_,\u2015\u2015to the most\nreal and most general entity,\u2015\u2015if all content falls away from God,\nwhat does such an empty form amount to? The paradox in Spinoza\u2019s\nphilosophy appears here as in the case of all mysticism\u2015\u2015for the mystic\nrevels in paradoxes. This empty generality is all that really is.\nGod is everything, and Spinoza points out empirical proof of this by\ninsisting that the transitory life of man has its only meaning in such\na substance. God is not this particular thing nor again that finite\ndetermination, but He is all these. He is the timeless reality of\nthe temporal world, the infinity of finite things, the necessity of\ncontingent nature. When therefore Spinoza speaks of God as having an\nintellectual love for Himself, and when he says that the attributes\nof thought and extension constitute the essence of the substance, he\nis not giving finite characteristics to God. He is struggling with\nlanguage to express the inherent paradox of his philosophy.\n\nMoreover, the delineation of the finite world with God as a background,\nas it appears from the point of view of a human being, is an inadequate\npresentation of Spinoza\u2019s profound conception of God. For the substance\nis not merely a neutral point nor the central point of the universe.\nThe substance is all. All things have neither their explanation nor\ntheir existence in themselves. God alone has an existence that explains\nitself, and He is the reality and essence of all finite things. God\nis immanent in the world. Just as the sides of a triangle get their\nmeaning from the triangle itself, so the significance of the attributes\nand modes of the substance lies in the substance.\n\nThe unity of Spinoza\u2019s God is further suggested by the relation of the\nattributes of thought and extension, however separate they must appear\nin their quality and causal dependence. Both are aspects of the same\nsubstance, in the one case in the form of extension, and in the other\nin the form of thought. In the all-inclusive nature of God, presumably\neach moment has an infinite number of correlative moments corresponding\nto the infinite number of the attributes of God. Since to human beings\nonly two of these worlds lie in sight, only two corresponding modes\nappear, but always two. This correspondence of the physical and\npsychical throughout nature is called in later times _panpsychism_;\nin the relation of the body and mind of a human being it is called\n_psycho-physical parallelism_. This correspondence helped Spinoza\nto solve the apparent dualism of the two worlds. While ideas are\ndetermined only by ideas, and motions by motions, both series point\nbelow to the divine substance which is the significance of both. They\nare like the top and bottom sides of a piece of paper, neither side\nconstituting the piece of paper, but both being necessary to it. The\nsubstance is immanent in thought as well as in extension. Both thought\nand extension are aspects of God. The relation of thought and extension\nthrough the Deity discloses the monistic character of Spinoza\u2019s\nphilosophy and seems to prove that he cannot be a materialist, although\nsome critics have said that he is. The same reality is seen, now as\nconsciousness and now as extension.\n\n=Spinoza\u2019s Doctrine of Salvation.= Spinoza divided his _Ethics_ into\nfive parts. The first is a treatment of the nature of God; the second,\nof the nature and origin of the mind; the third, of the emotions;\nthe fourth, of human bondage; the fifth, of human freedom. This\nmost important writing of Spinoza, the only treatise on metaphysics\nwhich has been called Ethics, is a practical philosophy of life and\nredemption. The divisions of it, as they appear above, show that the\nphilosophy of life is looked at from two points of view: with reference\nto the nature of God, and with reference to the nature of man. We\nhave above discussed the first point,\u2015\u2015Spinoza\u2019s conception of God,\nwhom he regards as pantheistic and mystic. But Spinoza\u2019s conception of\nthe nature of the human being in relation to such a God is the other\npole of this subject. The problem of life from the human point of\nview involves primarily the question of human freedom. Human freedom\nand human bondage are conditions that depend upon the human as well\nas the divine nature. By Spinoza\u2019s eliminating the human element\nfrom the nature of God, man himself has been reduced by Spinoza to an\ninsignificant detail in a machine-like universe. Yet for man in his\nlittleness Spinoza hews out a way to God in His greatness by his mystic\nreconstruction of the universe. Existence in Spinoza\u2019s pantheistic\nmysticism is, after all, a sphere of wonderful grandeur for man,\u2015\u2015more\nwonderful and of wider utility than the existence which man is\nordinarily supposed to possess. Since God is the reality of everything,\nman is deified; even the loss of man\u2019s essential humanity is the\napotheosis of man.\n\nHuman salvation and freedom consist in being like God; bondage consists\nin being unlike Him, in mistaking the unreality of life for His reality.\nWe are endowed with the ability of forming an adequate idea of God\nby means of our reason, but we are also endowed with the faculties of\nsensation, emotion, and imagination. The latter faculties make man a\npassive creature, for they bring him into dependence upon the things\nthat act upon him and into bondage to them. We are passive when our\nactivities are limited by such limited objects. While a passion seems\nto be the most active and turbulent of our faculties, if we look at\nit more closely, we find that instead of being active ourselves during\na passion, we are being acted upon by an external object. Only as we\nare purely rational,\u2015\u2015only through the reason,\u2015\u2015are we purely active.\nIt is then that we are like God, free like Him, and then do we rise\nfrom insignificance to greatness. Then we transcend our false ideas of\nfreedom and become necessary beings, for in God freedom is necessity.\n\nTo be free from the passions and the finite things of the world we must\nunderstand their nature; for to understand a thing is to be delivered\nfrom it. An illusion is not an illusion when we know it to be such. To\nsee that all the passions, sensations, imaginations, and all the other\nmodes of thought are human limitations, is to dwell within the reason.\nSpinoza\u2019s freedom is not, as will be seen, freedom in the ordinary\npsychological meaning of the term, but is the metaphysical freedom\nof being identical with the deity and determined by no finite thing.\nFreedom is rational knowledge. Nevertheless, freedom is ethical\nalso, for it consists in overcoming the passions by reason. Freedom,\ntherefore, has two sides: an escape from the emotions and an escape\nfrom obscure ideas\u2015\u2015the goal in both cases being the life of reason.\nTo attain freedom is to see the world as God sees it, which is the same\nas the reason sees it. This is to see each finite thing as eternal.\nAny concrete thing may be regarded by the human being as a finite and\nisolated thing out of all relation to other objects; or the same thing\nmay be regarded as a detail of infinity. Looked at by itself, a thing\nis seen partially and falsely, for no finite thing has its explanation\nin itself. It is, however, seen truly when it is regarded, to use\nSpinoza\u2019s own celebrated phrase, \u201cunder a certain form of eternity\u201d\n(_sub specie aeternitatis_). This conception of eternity is one of the\nmost admirable in Spinoza\u2019s teaching. When man rises through the reason\nto the consciousness of the eternity of the truth of a thing, the thing\nitself is transformed, and the man himself has gained salvation. Any\ncircle that I may draw is imperfect, every leaf upon the forest trees\nis defective, all moral activities are wanting, if regarded in their\ntime-limitations. But below all the imperfections of the universe is\nits absolute mathematical perfectness. There is nothing so abortive\nand evil that it does not have its aspect of eternity. Side by side\nwith Spinoza\u2019s conception of infinity is his conception of eternity.\nInfinity is everlastingness, eternity is quality of being. Eternity\nhas no reference to time. One minute may be eternal. The infinity of\nthe substance is one aspect; the eternity of the substance is another.\nThat eternity gained through the reason is salvation and immortality.\nGod is reason, and by the act of the reason do we become one with Him.\nOur knowledge is, therefore, the measure of our morality. Knowledge\nand morality are the same; and whatever increases our understanding is\nmorally good; whatever diminishes our understanding is morally wrong.\n\nNevertheless, from the point of view of the philosopher, there is\nnothing in the world that is morally good or bad,\u2015\u2015nothing which merits\nhis hatred, love, fear, contempt, or pity,\u2015\u2015since all that occurs\nis necessary. The philosopher\u2019s knowledge of the determinism of the\nworld lifts him above the usually conceived world of finite things to\nthis mystic world, reconstructed by his intellectual love of nature\nor God. Love for God will give to everything its proper value. It\nis the highest form of human activity. Love for God is an absolutely\ndisinterested feeling, and is not therefore like human love, which\nis the passing from a less state to a greater. Love for God is peace,\nresignation, and contentment, for it is oneness with God. In fact,\nthe love of man for God is the love of God for man; it is the love\nof God for Himself, since man cannot love God without becoming God.\nThus man intellectually recognizes his oneness with God, and rejoices.\nImmortality is absorption in the eternal and necessary substance of the\nworld. It is a common misconception that immortality is duration after\ndeath; immortality consists in looking at things under the aspect of\neternity. The finite man perishes, but man\u2019s real self, which is God,\nsurvives.\n\n=Summary of Spinoza\u2019s Teaching.= The rationalism of Spinoza is the\nfinal word of scholastic realism. It is a mathematical scholasticism\nin which the attempt is to make clear by the method of deduction all\nmetaphysical problems. That the philosophical teaching of Spinoza is\ninspiring and ennobling, no one will gainsay. That his philosophy is\nnot clear, is also true. In the beginning of his discussion, spirit is\nsubordinated to nature; at the end, nature is subordinated to spirit.\nThe result is that under the hands of Spinoza God has become a pure\nabstraction and without content, the world is an illusion, dualism is\nsuperseded by a monistic parallelism, individual activity gives way and\nbecomes a pantheistic determinism. Yet amid all this a reconstructed\nworld arises in which man is recompensed for all his losses by his\nparticipation in _infinity_ and _eternity_.\n\n=Leibnitz[33] as the Finisher of the Renaissance and the Forerunner\nof the Enlightenment.= Leibnitz is the last of the remarkable group\nof Rationalists of the Renaissance, who so fully represent the spirit\nof its Natural Science epoch. But Leibnitz also carries us into\nthe next period of modern philosophy\u2015\u2015the Enlightenment. He is the\ntransition philosopher. If the reader will examine the dates of his\nlife, he will observe that Leibnitz lived until twenty-five years\nafter the Enlightenment was ushered in by Locke\u2019s _Essay on the Human\nUnderstanding_ (1690). But as Leibnitz had already formed his own\nphilosophy by the year 1686, even so versatile a mind as his could\nnot then renounce the Rationalistic point of view for a new one. Some\nof his writings, such as his _Correspondence with Clark and Bayle_,\nhis _Theodicy_, and his _New Essays_, show that he participated in the\nnew movement of the next period. Yet the majority of his philosophical\nwritings show him to be a Rationalist. Although he may be called\nthe \u201cfather of the Enlightenment,\u201d the body of his thought belongs\nto the Renaissance. His main motive was that which animated all\nRationalists\u2015\u2015of stating theology in scientific terms. The immediate\noccasion for his doing this was the political necessity of peace among\nthe religious bodies of Germany.\n\nThe effort of Leibnitz to restore the individual to his central place\nin the universe was a _secondary motive_. It nevertheless makes him\nthe forerunner of the Enlightenment. Of the Rationalists, Leibnitz\nspeaks for the future, just as Spinoza for the past. Leibnitz unites\nthe Renaissance and the Enlightenment, just as Spinoza joins the\nRenaissance and the Middle Ages. Spinoza is the Rationalist who\nutters the final word of scholastic realism, while Leibnitz presages\nthe coming individualism. Spinoza\u2019s philosophy is science buried in\ntraditionalism; Leibnitz\u2019s is science breaking through traditionalism.\nSpinoza harks back to universals and particulars, substance and forms;\nLeibnitz points forward to vortex rings, energy, and dynamics. From\nLeibnitz\u2019s original purpose to rationalize theology, and to succeed\nwhere Descartes and Spinoza had failed, there emerges a new motive. He\nno longer lays the emphasis entirely upon the universal, but he shifts\nit in part to the particular. The pantheism of Spinoza had systematized\nthe individual out of its reality. Leibnitz\u2019s conception of the\nindividual as dynamic and his conception of the importance of the\ninfinitesimal redeem the individual and bring Leibnitz into more modern\ntimes. To classify Leibnitz as a Rationalist is, therefore, not to\ndescribe him fully.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Leibnitz= (1646\u20131716). Compared with\nDescartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz had a life that was long in time and\nrich in experience. Descartes died at 54 and Spinoza at 45, while\nLeibnitz lived to be 70. In striking contrast with Spinoza\u2019s career,\nthere was no time in the life of Leibnitz after his graduation from the\nuniversity that he was not in public service. He held the offices that\nwould naturally go to the hanger-on of princes\u2015\u2015some of them grandiose\nones. While theoretically the interests of the three Rationalists were\nthe same, Leibnitz differed from his predecessors in that his study\nof philosophical problems always grew out of some practical problem\nor political occasion. Leibnitz was not an academic thinker, and his\n\u201cwritings were called forth to estimate some recent book, to outline\nthe system for the use of a friend, to meet some special difficulty,\nor to answer some definite criticism.\u201d Philosophy was only one\nof the interests of Leibnitz. He was jurist, historian, diplomat,\nmathematician, physical scientist, theologian, and philologist.\nLeibnitz was as much at home with the theories of Plato and Aristotle\nof ancient time, with those of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus of medi\u00e6val\ntime, as with the science of Descartes and Galileo. He was precocious,\nhad a prodigious memory and a reactive mind. In the wealth of his\ninformation and the productiveness of his genius, he stands with\nAristotle as unequaled. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz belonged to\nthe inner circle of scholars of the time, but Leibnitz was also in\npersonal touch with political affairs and in intimate acquaintance with\nmany of the important rulers. He was in the service of the Elector of\nMainz and later of George I of England when George was only Elector of\nHanover. He was distinguished by Peter the Great of Russia and Ernst\nAugust, Emperor of Germany. He corresponded with Eugene of Savoy and he\nwas ambassador to Louis XIV of France. Sophie Charlotte of Hanover, who\nmarried the King of Prussia, was especially interested in him, and he\nwrote for her his _Theodicy_. The three great Rationalists came from\ndifferent strata of society. Descartes was a nobleman\u2019s son, and he\nvoluntarily relinquished the life that Leibnitz was ambitious to enjoy.\nSpinoza came from the lower class. Leibnitz was the son of a college\nprofessor and belonged to the upper middle class. The ambitions of\nLeibnitz reached for large ends, as often happens among educated people\nin the middle walks of life. Among other things, he tried to reconcile\nthe Catholics and Protestants, and he tried to universalize language by\ngetting universal characters for all languages.\n\nThe literary production of Leibnitz was enormous, consisting of\nsome lengthy works, but mainly of correspondence (at one time with\na thousand persons) and of dissertations to learned journals and\nsocieties. No one book contains his philosophy\u2015\u2015the _Monadology_ coming\nthe nearest to doing so. His most considerable work is his _Theodicy_.\nHe himself published in book form only two works: his university\ndissertation on _Individuation_ and the _Theodicy_.[34]\n\nIn spite of his many successes, the life of Leibnitz was not happy.\nFrom death or other causes his noble patrons changed, until he was\nleft without a patron. His life went from bad to worse, and his death\noccurred almost unnoticed.\n\nThe seventy years of Leibnitz\u2019s life fall into four periods. That\nhe passed through three of these periods by the time he was thirty\nshows the voracity and versatility of his mental powers during their\nformative and acquisitive state. It also reveals the unusual length\nof his productive period,\u2015\u2015from his thirtieth to his seventieth year.\nTen years after his productive period began, when he was forty, he had\ncompleted his philosophical theory, so that the last thirty years of\nhis life were free for its elaboration and elucidation, and in part for\nhis departure from it. The details of Leibnitz\u2019s life are as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n1. _Leipsic and University Life_ (1646\u20131666).\n\nLeibnitz was the son of a professor of the University of Leipsic. He\nentered the University at the age of fifteen; received his bachelor\u2019s\ndegree at seventeen, and his doctor\u2019s degree at Altdorf at the age of\ntwenty. He was offered a professorship on account of his thesis, but\nhe declined. He published as his bachelor\u2019s thesis, _The Principle of\nIndividuation_ (1663).\n\n2. _Mainz and Diplomacy_ (1666\u20131672).\n\nMeeting Baron John of Boineburg, who became his patron, Leibnitz went\nwith him to Mainz, and entered the service of the Elector of Mainz.\nAt this time Leibnitz wrote many pamphlets at the Elector\u2019s request,\non the religious and political questions of the day. He wrote _A New\nPhysical Hypothesis_ in 1671.\n\n3. _Paris and Science_ (1672\u20131676).\n\nLeibnitz began this period with a diplomatic mission to the court of\nLouis XIV in 1672; but during the year both Boineburg and the Elector\ndied, and Mainz was no longer his home nor diplomacy his interest.\n\nHe remained in Paris (and London) three years longer, and spent the\ntime in acquiring the \u201cnew science.\u201d In Paris he met Arnauld the\nCartesian, Tschirnhausen the German mathematician, logician, and most\ndiscriminating critic of Spinoza, and he studied with Huyghens the\nDutch mathematician. In London he met Boyle, the chemist, Oldenburg,\nsecretary of the Academy of Science, Collins, the mathematician, and he\ncorresponded with Newton. On his return to Hanover he called on Spinoza,\nwho showed him the manuscript of the _Ethics_.\n\n4. _Hanover and Philosophy_ (1676\u20131716).\n\nLeibnitz became court councilor and librarian to the Duke of Hanover\n(Brunswick-L\u00fcneburg). He was involved in a multitude of administrative,\nhistorical, and political tasks, and he carried on an enormous\ncorrespondence. Among other things he wrote the history of the reigning\nfamily, which necessitated his going to Rome and Vienna. In 1684\nhe published his discovery of the differential calculus, over which\narose the celebrated controversy as to whether he or Newton made the\nprior discovery. In 1686, in his fortieth year, he constructed his\nphilosophical system. However, he showed his affiliation to the coming\nage by introducing into his system in 1697 the term \u201cmonad.\u201d _Nearly\nall his important works were produced in this period._ In 1700 he\nfounded the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. He was instrumental in the\nfounding of an academy at St. Petersburg, and he planned academies at\nDresden and Vienna.\n\n=The Three Influences upon the Thought of Leibnitz.=\n\n(1) _His Early Classical Studies._ The father of Leibnitz, who was a\nprofessor of moral philosophy at Leipsic, died when his son was young.\nLeft much to himself, the boy spent his time in his father\u2019s library.\nAt eight years he had acquired Latin; at twelve he had read Seneca,\nPliny, Quintilian, Herodotus, Xenophon, Cicero, Plato, the Roman\nhistorians, the Greek and Latin fathers. He became so absorbed in\nscholastic studies that his friends feared that he would not leave\nthem, \u201cnot knowing that my mind could not be satisfied with only one\nkind of thing.\u201d There can be no question that this scholastic training\ngave him a first hand and sympathetic appreciation of scholastic\nphilosophy. The Aristotelian conception of cosmic purpose, which he got\nat this time, never left him. Among the writers of the Natural Science\nPeriod he alone returned to Aristotle. He made Aristotle\u2019s teleological\ncause an integral part of his doctrine. His motto finally became, in\nhis _Theodicy_, \u201cEverything is best in this best of possible worlds.\u201d\nWhile for a time he turned from Aristotle to Descartes, in his final\nconstruction of his theory he borrowed more from Aristotle.\n\n(2) _The New Science and His Own Discoveries._ Leibnitz was more\nfortunate than many of his contemporaries in that his university had\nalready included in its curriculum the study of mathematics. At the\nage of fifteen he was devoting himself to mathematics at Jena, and he\nsaid that the study of Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes made him feel\nas though \u201ctransported into a different world.\u201d Later in life he said\nof himself, that at fifteen he had decided to give up the scholastic\ntheory of Forms for the mathematical explanation of the world. He\nbecame acquainted with the theories of Hobbes and Gassendi in 1670,\nwhen he was at Mainz. In 1672, at the age of twenty-six, when he was\nin Paris, he made himself possessor of all that the celebrated circle\nof Parisian scientists had to teach. He had gone to Paris a dualist;\nhe returned to his native land with the Aristotelian teleology side\nby side in his mind with the Spinozistic conception of identity and\nnecessity, the Spinozistic method, and the mathematical theory of\nthe significance of infinitely small particles. The next ten years\n(1676\u20131686) were spent in overcoming his own dualism by systematizing\nthese new theories acquired from so many sources. In 1680 he had\nuniversalized the concept of force so as to apply it to both souls\nand bodies. In 1684 he published his discovery of the differential\ncalculus, in which he has had to share honors with Newton. In 1685 he\nasserted that the centres of force have individuality. He was led to\nthis conclusion on account of the discovery of small organisms by the\nmicroscopes of Swammerdam and \u2666Leeuwenhoek. In 1686 he successfully\norganized his collected material into his final system, although it\nwas not until eleven years later (1697) that he called these centres\n\u201cmonads.\u201d Probably he got the term \u201cmonad\u201d not from Bruno, but from the\nmystic chemist, Van Helmont.\n\nNot only the content, but the form of his philosophy was determined by\nhis mathematical studies. His philosophical diction is remarkably lucid.\nMathematics reinforced his early resolve \u201cin words to attain clearness\nand in matter usefulness.\u201d His later discussions contain many terms\nthat he had borrowed directly from mathematics.\n\n(3) _Political Pressure for Religious Reconciliation._ When Frederick\nthe Wise of Saxony in 1519 refused the crown of Emperor, Germany\nwas thrown into internal strife that in one hundred and thirty years\ndestroyed all its material wealth and depopulated the country. This\nterminated in the Thirty Years\u2019 War (1618\u20131648) and the Peace of\nWestphalia. Leibnitz was born two years before peace was declared. He\nwas the first German scientist in two hundred years. Both Catholics\nand Protestants were weary of strife, and there was a general movement\ntoward religious reconciliation. Thus religious amity was the most\nurgent public question.\n\nPietism had been one of the movements in Germany during the recovery\nof the country from the Thirty Years\u2019 War, and it represented the best\nside of German civilization at that time. It was a reaction on the one\nside against the mechanical theory of the scientists, and on the other\nagainst the destructive strife of the old and new confessions. The\nmother of Leibnitz was not only a Protestant, but also a Pietist, so\nthat the subject of religion early formed an important part of her\nson\u2019s training. When he entered the diplomatic service of the Elector\nof Mainz the question of religious reconciliation took practical form\nfor him. No doubt his philosophy as a theory of reconciliation grew\nout of such practical issues, as they were presented to him at Mainz.\nLeibnitz had, therefore, a part in the religious reaction in Germany\nin the last of the seventeenth century, which aimed to reconcile the\ndivergent interests of religion and science. He tried to effect this in\nno external way, by patching together irreconcilable elements, but in\nan internal way, by an examination of fundamental principles. With his\nearly training, his theological reading, and his wide public experience,\nLeibnitz was fitted to take a prominent part in the movement for\nreconciliation.\n\n=The Method of Leibnitz.= Although the philosophers who immediately\nfollowed Spinoza did not dare to accept his philosophical conclusions,\nthey adopted his method. They united it with the syllogistic processes\nof formal logic for the deduction of all knowledge. This method became\nvery prevalent, as is seen in the practices of the German Cartesians\nand in the preparation of academic text-books. Examples of this are\nJung, Weigel, who was Leibnitz\u2019s teacher, and Puffendorf, who tried\nto deduce by the geometrical method the entire system of natural right\nfrom a single principle of human need. In the next century Wolff used\nthis method in writing his Latin text-books.\n\nWhen this aspect of Spinoza\u2019s teaching was gaining a foothold in\nGermany, Leibnitz came into sympathy with it through his teacher,\nWeigel, and at first was one of its most ardent supporters. In jest he\nshowed by this geometrical, syllogistic method in sixty propositions\nthat the Count Palatine of Neuberg _must_ be elected King of the Poles.\nIn seriousness he believed that all philosophical controversies would\ncease when philosophy should be stated like a mathematical calculation.\n\nHobbes\u2019s theory of words as counters to be used in conceptual reckoning,\nthe universal formulas of the Art of Lull and the pains which Bruno had\ntaken for its improvement, the Cartesian belief that the geometrical\nmethod would prove to be an art of invention\u2015\u2015all these were influences\nupon Leibnitz, that committed him to the method of Spinoza and made him\npursue that method energetically. Leibnitz was part of the widespread\nmovement of the time to form a _Lingua Adamica_\u2015\u2015a universal language,\nwhich should discover fundamental philosophical conceptions and the\nlogical operations of their combinations. In brief, Leibnitz hoped to\nform a philosophical calculus.\n\nWhat, asked Leibnitz, are the highest truths which in their\ncombination yield all knowledge? What are the truths, so immediately\nand intuitively certain, that they force themselves upon the mind\nas self-evident and thereby form the ground for the deduction of all\nknowledge? They are of two classes: (1) The universal truths of the\nreason, and (2) The facts of experience. The truths of the reason are\nforever true; the facts of experience have a truth for that single\ninstance. But both are true in themselves and not from deduction from\nanything else. They are \u201cfirst truths,\u201d for a thing is true if it\ncan be deduced from the reason or tested as an experienced fact. The\ntwo kinds of truth are the rational or _a priori_, and the empirical\nor _a posteriori_. The difference between the starting point of the\nRationalism of Leibnitz and the Enlightenment of Locke appears here.\nLocke said, \u201cThere is nothing in the mind that does not come from the\nsenses.\u201d \u201cExcept the mind itself and its operations,\u201d added Leibnitz in\ncomment.\n\nBut there is a difference between these two kinds of truth. The\ntruths of the reason are clear and distinct; the truths of experience\nare clear but not distinct. Leibnitz is, be it observed, making\na distinction between the two terms of the pet phrase of the\nRationalists\u2015\u2015\u201cclear and distinct ideas.\u201d He means that rational truth\nis so transparent that it is impossible to conceive its opposite; that\nempirical truth is only clear, and its opposite is thinkable. It is\nimpossible to think that the three angles of a triangle equal anything\nbut two right angles, but it is possible to think that its side, which\nis now two inches, may be four inches. Thus emerge the two logical\nprinciples upon which Leibnitz founded his philosophy: rational truths\ndepend upon the _Principle of Contradiction_; empirical truths depend\nupon the _Principle of Sufficient Reason_. At first Leibnitz conceived\nthat this distinction between truths did not apply to God, but only to\nman. Man must rejoice in the few rational truths in his possession and\nbe content with merely establishing the actuality of his experiences.\nThe divine reason can, however, see the impossibility of the opposite\nboth in rational and in empirical truth. Later on Leibnitz conceived\nthe distinction between the two kinds of truth to be absolute. That is,\nin the nature of things the two truths differ. The rational truth has\nno opposite, but is a _necessary_ truth; the empirical truth has an\nopposite, and is a _contingent_ truth.\n\nLeibnitz thus shows the fundamental principles upon which knowledge\nis based, but what does he say about the logical method of their\ncombination? Nothing. No one would ever suspect from Leibnitz\u2019s\nphilosophical remains that he had planned a system of philosophy\naccording to the method of Spinoza. The many pamphlets of Leibnitz on\nmany scattered subjects show how far short he fell of his ideal of a\nuniversal philosophical calculus. He was too versatile, his interests\nwere too diversified, to carry through so slow and plodding a task.\nHe merely stated the principles upon which a systematic symbolic\nphilosophy might rest, without developing these principles in a logical\nway. Like Bacon, Leibnitz conceived a method that was more of a hope\nthan an accomplishment.\n\n=The Immediate Problem for Leibnitz.= Perhaps Leibnitz was called\naway from this purely theoretical problem of method by the practical\nproblem of reconciling science and religion, which problem in his\nday had become particularly acute. For science had made rapid strides\nsince the days of Descartes, had drawn very far away from religion,\nand Leibnitz\u2019s attempt to reconcile science and religion was much\nmore difficult than that of the preceding Rationalists. Leibnitz had\naccepted the most radical results of science, but he saw that science\nhad yielded only a mechanical view of the world. Politics demanded in\nthe exigencies of that hour some principle of unity. He sought to find\nsome philosophical principle for the _living, religious character_\nof the universe, and a principle that at the same time would preserve\nthe results of science. He therefore sought to leave the conception of\nmechanical nature intact and go behind it for a teleological principle.\nHe examined the mechanical principles of the science of his day and\nfound them embedded in a deeper metaphysical principle.\n\n=The Result of Leibnitz\u2019s Examination of the Principles of\nScience[35]\u2015\u2015A Plurality of Metaphysical Substances.= What was the\ndeveloped scientific principle of Leibnitz\u2019s time? And what was the\nresult of his analysis of it? The principle was the mathematical\nprinciple of Galileo in more complex form, for there had been added\nto it since Galileo\u2019s day the concept of the atom. That is to say,\nthe fundamental scientific principle was that nature consists of the\nmeasurable movements of atoms. From his analysis of this, Leibnitz\nobtained as follows his conception of a plural number of substances,\nwhich he called monads.\n\n1. Leibnitz first scrutinized the scientific conception of motion.\nHis analysis of motion into infinitely small impulses by the method\nemployed by Galileo, Huyghens, and Newton had already led him to one\nimportant discovery\u2015\u2015the differential calculus. Now he scrutinizes it\nfurther and discovers that the fundamental ground of motion is _force_.\nWhile Leibnitz was in entire agreement with other scientists in their\neffort to reduce all phenomena to motion, he insisted that motion\nwas not by any means the fundamental thing. He calls the Cartesian\nconception of motion the antechamber of true philosophy. There is no\nabsolute motion nor absolute rest. Motion and rest are relative to\neach other. Descartes\u2019 theory that there is conservation of motion\nis incorrect. Motion and rest are the phenomenal changes of force.\nForce alone is constant and conserved. Physics points beneath itself\nto metaphysics; motion points to force. Force is what is fundamental\nin nature. Force is \u201cthat which in the present state of things brings\nabout a change in the future.\u201d Therefore force as the substance of\nnature is super-spatial and immaterial, and therefore the basis of\nthe new physics ought to be dynamic metaphysical substance.\n\n2. Leibnitz next examined the scientific conception of the atom.\nGassendi, one of that celebrated group of Parisian scientists, had\nbeen the author of the introduction of Greek atomism into modern\nthought. It had been generally accepted by scientists and combined with\nthe mathematical hypothesis of Galileo. Leibnitz had known Gassendi\nin Paris, and he took the hard, inelastic atoms of Gassendi under\nexamination. He agreed that the atomist was perfectly correct in saying\nthat material bodies consist of simple parts or atoms. But Leibnitz\ninsisted that the atomist erred in thinking such simple parts to be\nphysical. However simple the parts might physically appear to be,\nthey were not really simple. However small a bit of matter may be, it\nmay be divided again, and the dividing process may go on to infinity.\nThe atom is the extended, and the extended cannot be simple or real.\nSubstance must be unextended, and the materialists were wrong in\nattributing substance to the extended. Is there anything simple that\nhas a qualitative character? Is there anything real below the physical\natoms? Yes, the metaphysical atoms. The indivisible, immaterial unit\nlies beneath the physical atom, and in order to reach it we must\npass beneath the physical into the metaphysical. This immaterial\nor metaphysical atom is called by Leibnitz the _monad_; and thus is\nLeibnitz\u2019s theory called _monadology_.\n\nThere are three kinds of points, or units, or \u201csimples.\u201d There is the\nmathematical point, which is simple enough, but it is only imaginary.\nThere is the physical point, or atom, which is real but not simple.\nThere is, lastly, the metaphysical point, or monad, which is both real\nand simple. The metaphysical point is the only true point. To call the\nmaterial atoms real, only shows \u201cthe feebleness of the imagination,\nwhich is glad to rest, and is, therefore, in haste to make an end of\ndivision and analysis.\u201d\n\n3. Leibnitz then identified force, as the substance of motion, with the\nmetaphysical atom, as the substance of the material atom. The result\nwas the monad, as he conceived it. The monads are the principles of\nactive working. They are the super-spatial and immaterial principles\nin which the mechanical principles of the universe have their roots and\nmeaning. Nature is not dead; it is not merely extended. It is alive,\nresistant, and reproductive. If, as Spinoza taught, there were only one\nsubstance, nature would be non-resistant and passive. But as a matter\nof fact there are many substances acting for themselves, many bodies\nresisting other bodies. They are the centres of separate activity, and\nthere are as many forces as there are things. There is no body without\nmovement, no movement without force. Thus does Leibnitz reintroduce\nvitalism in a maturer form than is seen in neo-Platonism. Life becomes\nthe principle of nature. Purpose is placed at the centre of things.\n\n=The Double Nature of the Monads.= The student will find that the\nphilosophy of Leibnitz is spoken of as a pluralism, but the student\nwill also find that Leibnitz devoted nearly all his strength to prove\nthat the world is after all a unity. Leibnitz analyzed the world into\na plural number of parts, and the question then with him was, how to\nput these parts together again in an organic unity. This accomplishment\nwould depend a good deal upon his conception of the nature of the parts.\n\nThe monads have a double character. Leibnitz conceived the monad (1) as\na force centre and (2) as an immaterial soul. This makes an equivalence\nof psychical and physical attributes which reminds us of the Stoics\u2019\n\u201cfiery reason\u201d of God. The word \u201cforce,\u201d as Leibnitz uses it, squints\nboth toward physics and toward psychology. But such ambiguity about the\nmonads, the cornerstones in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, assists Leibnitz\u2019s\nreconciliation at the start. Here, in a miniature, the physical and\nspiritual lie in unity. The monad is conceived as a _soul-atom_.\n\nLeibnitz came to philosophy with a mind saturated with the mathematical\nideas of the continuous, the infinitesimal, and the possible. He\nthought of the monads as potentialities or possibilities. He looked\nupon the world as essentially a developing world. Behind the facts\nthat seem to us inflexible, lies the great world of generating force.\nExplanation of the actual can be made only in view of what the actual\nmay be and has been. Let us enlarge the scope of man by so widening his\nconception of the actual that it will include the possible. Leibnitz\nalso spoke of the monads as infinitesimal. He thereby lifted the\nconception of the infinitesimal from the realm of mathematics into\nthat of metaphysics, just as Hobbes universalized the conception of\nmechanics by lifting it to metaphysics. Leibnitz, therefore, did not\nregard the limits of perception as the limits of nature: the reality\nof a nature object must be too small to be the object of perception. In\nthe same way he made use of his mathematical conception of continuity.\nLeibnitz\u2019s conception of nature-continuity is one of his contributions\nto philosophy. Within itself the world of nature consists of a\ncontinuous gradation from the lower to the higher forms; and also the\nworld of nature is continuous with the world of the spirit. There are\nno leaps in the series from matter to God. Seeming differences in kind\nare only differences in degree; for example, evil is only the absence\nof good; matter is only an obscure idea of spirit.\n\nBut this Leibnitzian atomism consists of soul-atoms. These monads,\nthese force-centres are souls, and the mathematical qualities have a\nplace in Leibnitz\u2019s description of the psychical powers of the monad.\nThe monad is a soul, for soul is the only substance in the universe\nthat may pass through many changes and it, itself, not change. The self\nis the only subject of which many predicates may be asserted, while\nit, itself, may not be the predicate of any other subject. The idea\nof myself underlies all my mental states. The monad is an entelechy,\nor an entity having its purpose within itself. All its attributes are\ncontained within itself, and it is, therefore, by nature, sufficient\nunto itself. It is an individual which passes from one state to another,\nmoved by its \u201cconstitutional appetition.\u201d\n\nAmong the psychical powers none is more important in Leibnitz\u2019s\ndescription of the monad than its power of representation.\nRepresentation is the general function of the monad\u2015\u2015from the lowest\nto the highest monad. This means that each monad is the world force,\nyet in a particular form,\u2015\u2015a world substance, but in some peculiar\naspect. Every monad is a microcosm. Each represents the world so\nfar as it is conscious of its own activity. But it is evident that\nall things in the universe are not conscious, and therefore all\nsoul-monads are not conscious. In souls there are, therefore, more\nthan conscious thoughts\u2015\u2015there are thoughts that are unconscious.\nAmong the Rationalists Leibnitz is the first to give significance to\nthe so-called unconscious states that form so important a place in\nmodern psychology. (But see Plotinus.) As a wave is composed of small\nparticles of water, so the mind is made up of a myriad of unconscious\nstates. The conscious state is the general effect of the whole. A\nsoul-monad contains in itself at all times representations of the whole\nworld, some obscure, some clear. This power of universal representation\nmakes the monad a microcosm. What we call knowledge of the external\nworld is our representation of it within ourselves. This representation\nis possible to us because we reproduce it in miniature. Since the monad\ndirectly perceives only itself and its own states, it follows that\nthe more clearly and distinctly it is conscious of its own activities,\nthe more adequately does it represent the cosmos. The converse is also\ntrue\u2015\u2015that the more a monad represents the cosmos, the more truly does\nit represent itself.\n\nIn his development of his description of the monad, Leibnitz hits upon\ntwo catch-phrases, one of which presents his doctrine of the physical\nisolation of the monad, the other presents the doctrine of its ideal\npsychical unity. These phrases are: \u201cthe monads are windowless\u201d and\n\u201cthe monads mirror the universe.\u201d By \u201cwindowless\u201d Leibnitz means that\neach monad is \u201clike a separate world, self-sufficient, independent\nof every other creature.\u201d \u201cHaving no windows by which anything can\nenter or depart,\u201d the monad can perceive only its own states. Whatever\nhappens to it comes from itself alone as a purely internal principle.\nThe monad\u2019s development is self-development and not the result of\nexternal changes. Nevertheless the monad is a \u201cmirror of the universe.\u201d\nIn this psychical qualification of the nature of the monad, its\nphysical isolation vanishes and the way is open for a unity of monads,\nwhich would have otherwise seemed to be physically hopelessly sundered.\nHow is it possible for each of the numberless monads, all so different,\nto \u201cmirror the universe\u201d? The answer is found in their psychical power\nof representation.\n\n=The Two Forms of Leibnitz\u2019s Conception of the Unity of the\nSubstances.= The principle of unity among the monads is called by\nLeibnitz a _pre\u00ebstablished harmony_. He presented this principle\nof harmony in two ways. In part the harmony comes out of their\nconstitution, as he conceived it to be. In part Leibnitz artificially\nsuperimposed it upon the monads for theological reasons. In either case\nit is pre\u00ebstablished.\n\n=The Intrinsic Unity of the Monads\u2015\u2015The Philosophical Unity.= There\nis a family resemblance among the monads. The lowest reproduces the\nuniverse in obscure and elementary representations. Minerals and\nplants are sleeping monads with entirely unconscious ideas. Animals\nare dreaming monads. Man is a waking monad. The highest monad is God,\nwho reproduces the universe in clear and distinct ideas. Between God\nand matter there is a series of monads, graded as to the clearness\nof their ideas. All contain the universe by representation. All are\nbound together according to the principle of continuity; plants are\nlower animals and animals are less perfect men. Man is a monad whose\nconscious activity has risen to the height of self-consciousness, with\nthe cognate power of reason. There is no inert matter; no soul-less\nbodies nor body-less souls. The smallest portion of dust is the\nhabiliment of animalcul\u00e6. Nothing is dead, and nature is a gradation\nof monads in differing degrees of activity.\n\nMetaphysically the monads are isolated, yet in nature as we see them,\nthey live in groups, and compose the things which we call plants,\nanimals, and men. An organic thing is a combination of monads with a\ncentral ruling monad. This central monad is the soul of the group; the\nsubordinate ones form the body of the organism. The influence of the\nsoul or ruling monad upon the body-monads is purely ideal. They all\nstrive for the same end, which the soul represents more clearly. The\ngroup acts spontaneously and together, not from any outside influence.\nAn inanimate object differs from such a living organism, inasmuch as\nit is a group of monads without a soul or a ruling, central monad;\nand therefore such a monad is both soul and body. There is therefore\nno dualism between soul and body in any creatures, for body is only\nobscure or unconscious activity. The body consists of monads having a\nconfused sense of their activity.\n\nThis continuity and unity within the world, as Leibnitz sees it, is\nonly the logical development of the unity with which he originally\nendowed his monads. Although he starts the monads as \u201cwindowless,\u201d he\nalso says that \u201cthey mirror the universe.\u201d They are so conceived as\nto be originally physically separated, but psychologically and ideally\nunited. \u201cTheir natural harmony resides in an ideal of perfect activity,\nwhile in actual existence they are independent.\u201d The ideal which unites\nthem is God, the last term in the graded series of the monads. He is\nthe monad of monads, because He is perfect, conscious activity. Just\nas the various groups of monads are ruled by a central soul-monad, so\nthe world of these groups is an hierarchy, which derives its unitary\nand harmonious character from this dominating monad. The world may\nbe likened to a pyramid with God at the apex. The world is like a\nmachine which differs from other machines, in that its parts are little\nmachines. Although the parts seem to operate separately, they are under\nthe dominating control of God. God is their intrinsic unity and the\nuniverse is a pre\u00ebstablished harmony.\n\nA comparison with Spinoza\u2019s conception of the world of nature brings\nout Leibnitz\u2019s meaning effectively. Both philosophers conceive nature\nphenomena to be under the law of mechanical causation. To Spinoza,\nhowever, all phenomena are qualitatively alike; there are no grades or\ndistinctions of value between them. All are modes of substance and all\nillusions in the sight of God. To Spinoza phenomena are homogeneous.\nLeibnitz\u2019s estimate of the world of nature is quite different, and for\nhim nature has a far richer endowment. The phenomena of nature are not\nhomogeneous. Their difference does not consist in their content, but\nin the degree in which they represent the universe. The law of nature\nis a unifying principle that gives unitary individuality to the members\nunder the law. The individuality of the terms of the nature-series\nis implied in the very nature of the law of necessity, and on the\nother hand, the individual terms, for their part, transform the law of\nnecessity into a principle of unity that is higher than bare necessity.\nIn a necessitated series, Leibnitz points out, each term is determined\nby the preceding, and in turn each term determines the events that\nfollow. Thus, while nature phenomena are a series and a necessitated\nseries, it is a series whose existence depends upon each event having\nnot only its place, but its unique place. No other event can fill that\nplace, and the conditions that give the event its place constitute its\nindividuality. Every finite event has, so to speak, its formula, and\nthis gives individuality to each term of the series, which appeared\nto Spinoza only as a homogeneous, mathematical, and characterless\nmode. Life is meaningful to Leibnitz, because each member of the\nnecessitated series of events has its unique part to play. The changes\nof life are to Spinoza void of meaning, because he conceives them\nto be undifferentiated. The law of mechanical necessity became under\nLeibnitz\u2019s hands a principle of harmony, a teleological principle. Even\nin the necessitated mathematical series, such as Spinoza conceived the\nworld to be, Leibnitz believed that necessity implies individuality and\nindividuality implies purpose.\n\nHow vital, therefore, does life now appear, with its mechanical members\ntransformed into living units! Universal striving or force fills nature,\nand the surging of individual forces gives a new meaning to the unity\nof the whole. The mechanical series\u2015\u2015the physiological changes of our\nbodies and the efficient causes in nature\u2015\u2015are only the expression\nof the inner teleological development. Leibnitz points out several\npregnant principles that are aspects of this pre\u00ebstablished but\nintrinsic harmony. In the first place, nature has no breaks and abhors\na vacuum; and the series is a continuous one,\u2015\u2015_the law of continuity_.\nMember follows member in continuous and graded order. Their qualitative\ndifferences are differences of quality of activity. Rest and motion,\ngood and evil, are differences of degree. In the second place, there\nis nothing superfluous; no two things in nature are alike. If they\nwere alike, they would be identical\u2015\u2015_the law of the identity of\nindiscernibles_. Although there is no absolute antithesis or contrast\nbetween things, there is no absolute likeness. Every monad must be\ndifferentiated from every other intrinsically, _i. e._ according to\nits perfected activity. Therefore, in the third place, every member\nhas an excuse for being\u2015\u2015_the law of sufficient reason_. Every member\nhas its part to perform and no other can act as an understudy for it.\nHowever insignificant any member may appear to be, it is as unique as\nits bigger neighbor.\n\n=The Superimposed Unity of the Monads\u2015\u2015The Theological Unity.= The\nintrinsic unity of the monads is derived naturally from the monads\nthemselves, but it is an unattained ideal for which they strive. When\nLeibnitz turns his philosophy into a theodicy, or justification of the\nnature of God, this unity of the world takes on a different form and\nassumes a theological importance. The unity is no longer an intrinsic\nunity, with no actual but only ideal existence depending upon the\nhighest monad in the series, but is an actual personality who exists\napart from the world. The world is his eternal purpose. Probably this\nconception was always in the background of Leibnitz\u2019s thought, but it\ncannot be deduced from his philosophy. It is a conception afterwards\nsuperimposed upon his philosophy. Leibnitz now conceives God not as an\nideal goal, but as a perfect and actual person, whose reason impelled\nHim to construct the best possible world. The world in which we live\nis the world He chose. It is perfectly conceivable that the world could\nbe different. Why, among all the possible worlds, did God choose to\nconstruct this world? There is no reason in logic, but in fact. There\nwas no necessity for its construction. The fact is the excellence of\nthe world. Spinoza said that all possible worlds exist. Leibnitz said\nthis best possible world exists. Look about you; is it not so?\n\nThe best possible world is a world of free agents, whose acts are\nrewarded or punished according to their deserts. If we discover what\nseems to be inexplicable evil, we must regard it as an incident in the\nharmony of the whole. The world would be less good without evil. There\nis no more evil than there ought to be. The world which God conceived\nto be the best possible\u2015\u2015this world\u2015\u2015is a world of lights and shades.\nEvil comes from the free agency of man, and God is not responsible\nfor it. It is better to have evil and free agency than no evil and no\nfree agency. Evil after all is not positive, and is only due to the\nindistinct ideas of man. It is the absence of good, as cold is the\nabsence of heat.\n\nThus a pre\u00ebstablished harmony was constructed by Leibnitz that does\nnot come out of his original philosophical premises. Leibnitz used his\ncelebrated figure of the two clocks to illustrate the harmony of the\nmonads. Two clocks keep the same time, not because they influence one\nanother (interaction), nor because the maker moves the hands of one\n(Occasionalism), but because they have been thus constructed by an\nintelligent Creator. Thus the harmony of the world implies a personal\nGod. Leibnitz\u2019s philosophical Rationalism here passed into theology,\nand his metaphysics became an ethics. Leibnitz began with a monadology,\nand by means of the conception of harmony passed to an optimism.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1690\u20131781)[36]\n\n\n=The Emergence of the \u201cNew Man,\u201d\u2015\u2015Individualism.= In passing to this\nperiod we should recall the two objects of interest that distinguish\nmodern from medi\u00e6val thought: the \u201cnew man\u201d of modern Europe; and\nthe \u201cnew universe\u201d\u2015\u2015new in its geographical outlines and in its\nintellectual materials. We have already found that the two hundred and\nmore years of the Renaissance, the first period of modern thought, was\nabsorbed in exploiting the second of these objects\u2015\u2015the \u201cnew universe.\u201d\nIn fact the \u201cnew man\u201d had been so interested in the \u201cnew universe\u201d that\nhe had not thought of studying himself. He had systematized the great\nwealth of his acquisitions and had constructed great systems of science\nand metaphysics.\n\nThis second period of modern thought\u2015\u2015the Enlightenment\u2015\u2015begins\nwhen the \u201cnew man\u201d turns away from his intellectual struggles with\nhis environment and attempts to understand his own nature. Thus the\nmore important of the two objects emerges last; and this turn to\nself-reflection constitutes the century of the Enlightenment. The\nRenaissance had been subjective and spectacular; the Enlightenment was\nsubjective and tragic. The mental activity of the Renaissance had been\nvital, spontaneous, and unconscious, like the awakening from sleep;\nthat of the Enlightenment was self-conscious and attitudinizing.\nThe man of the Renaissance had been in love with nature; the man\nof the Enlightenment was in love with himself. Like the Greek\nSophistic Illumination, which is its parallel in ancient history, the\nEnlightenment turned away from cosmological and metaphysical problems.\nOn the other hand, the philosophy of the Enlightenment penetrated\nall departments of life and found expression in practical questions.\nErdmann has well expressed the meaning of these nine decades of the\nEnlightenment as \u201can effort to raise man, so far as he is a rational\nindividual, into a position of supremacy over everything.\u201d It was\nduring this period, which we are now about to enter, that Herder\nbrought into currency in Germany the word \u201chumanity.\u201d In England the\nsame sentiment was uttered by Pope in 1732 in his _Essay on Man_:\u2015\u2015\n\n \u201cKnow then thyself, presume not God to scan;\n The proper study of mankind is man.\u201d\n\nThe Enlightenment marks, therefore, the rise of modern individualism;\nand the concerns of the individual become the important object of\nconsideration. The novelty of the great discoveries and inventions of\nthe Renaissance had lost its lustre. The \u201cnew universe\u201d had become old\nand familiar, but through his accomplishments the \u201cnew man\u201d had begun\nto feel the strength of his liberated powers. For had not the wonderful\nworld of the Renaissance been his own accomplishment? Had not all its\nnotable constructions been the creations of his powers? The \u201cstruggle\nof traditions\u201d to revive antiquity and to incorporate the \u201cnew\nuniverse\u201d upon an old basis; the \u201cstrife of methods\u201d to reorganize the\n\u201cnew world\u201d upon a new basis\u2015\u2015revealed this great fact: that man has\n\u201cworld wisdom.\u201d Man in his supremacy occupies the entire foreground,\nand interest in the \u201cnew universe\u201d fades away. The \u201cnew universe\u201d is\nnow seen in the light of one\u2019s personal interests. Man is supreme,\nand to his word there can be no exception. There is constant reference\nduring this time to the \u201clight of reason\u201d\u2015\u2015to a bright inner,\nrational illumination in contrast to the vagaries of mysticism and the\nobscurities of dogmatism. The worship of genius arises and with it a\ncontempt for the unenlightened. \u201cThus would I speak, were I Christ,\u201d\nsaid Bahrdt. No wonder that Goethe described the Enlightenment as an\nage of self-conceit!\n\n=The Practical Presupposition of the Enlightenment\u2015\u2015The Independence of\nthe Individual.= The \u201cnew man\u201d emerged from the Renaissance as the most\nimportant object of consideration, and during the Enlightenment there\nwas never the slightest question about his independence. The individual\nbecame the original datum of this period into which we are now entering;\nhe was considered to be the only thing that is self-intelligible;\nhe was the starting-point from which all social relationships were\nto be explained. Among the many problems that arose, the independent\nexistence of the individual remained unquestioned. It was the period\nof \u201cliberty, equality, and fraternity.\u201d The problems were about the\nrelations of the individual; never about the individual himself,\nfor concerning the individual no problem could arise. The individual\nrejoicing in the exuberance of his own powers, the \u201cmonad enjoying\nhimself,\u201d dominated everything. The monadology of the Renaissance\nbecame an atomism in the Enlightenment. The individual was the\npractical assumption of the period.\n\n=The Metaphysical Presupposition of the Enlightenment.= There was a\nmetaphysical background to this practical assumption of the individual.\nThis was the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter. Although the\neighteenth century despaired of a successful metaphysical construction\nof the \u201cnew universe,\u201d and although its attention was riveted on an\nanalysis of human relationships, it must not be supposed that the\nperiod was without its metaphysical bias. Such is not the nature\nof human history; and if an epoch refuses to discuss metaphysical\nquestions, it is because it assumes some metaphysics as true. The\nassumption of the independent individual implies the independent\nexistence of matter. The Enlightenment assumed the Cartesian theory as\ncorrect. While many were the polemics against metaphysical speculation,\nthe Cartesian dualism was nevertheless in control. Here within is the\nindependent existence of mind; and it would naturally follow that there\nwithout is the equally independent existence of matter. The conception\nmight fade into a ghost-like dualism, as in Berkeley and Hume, but\nthe dualism never entirely vanished. This has since been known as\nthe philosophy of \u201ccommon sense,\u201d and is to-day the easy attitude of\nthose not interested in metaphysical discussions. \u201cCommon sense\u201d means\nthe opinion of the majority as to truth. Most people to-day, as then,\naccept without question some sort of dualism, usually the dualism of\nmind and body.\n\n=The Problems of the Enlightenment.= The area of inquiry was thus very\nmuch restricted during this period. Nature lies beyond our ken. God is\nstill more incomprehensible. From the study of nature and God, let us\nturn to a study of the problems of the inner life. Yet while the field\nof study was restricted, the problems within it were multitudinous,\nand there was an astonishing breadth and universality, a tenacity\nof everything, a disdainfulness of nothing. Within its own field the\nEnlightenment sought to systematize and to stand by any idea in spite\nof all opposition. The imagination took bold flights and, from the\nstandpoint of the inner individual life, tried to transform its world.\nOverloaded with ballast, it tried to reconcile the irreconcilable and\nto overlook the brute facts of existence. The problems arise from an\nage that is self-opinionated, self-tormenting, and subjective.\n\nThe problems of this age may be divided into two classes,\u2015\u2015utilitarian\nand critical,\u2015\u2015both having reference to the individual man in his\nrelations. These include the problems of psychology, epistemology,\nsociology, economics, politics, etc. There was, for example, the\nproblem of our knowledge of the external world, of the validity of\ninnate ideas as the basis of knowledge, of the rational basis of\nreligion. Thought was very alert at this time, as is always the case\nin times of great individualism, and thought could move with great\nrapidity over the wide range of such subjects.\n\n(a) =Utilitarian Problems.= The Enlightenment was curious about\nthe interests, the happiness, and the many powers of the individual.\nEmpirical psychologists and brilliant ethical scholars appeared. How\nmuch can man know, and what are the limits and extent of his knowledge?\nThe Rationalists of the Renaissance had accepted without question the\nmedi\u00e6val teaching that a group of our ideas is innate and therefore\nGod-given. The Middle Ages had been built up on revealed knowledge.\nBut to the thinkers of the Enlightenment the most important ideas\u2015\u2015yea,\nthe only ideas of service to us\u2015\u2015are those derived from experience. We\nshould be happier if we confined ourselves to the facts of every-day\nlife, and did not try to deal with things beyond experience. Let us\ngive metaphysical theories to the Churchman. Empirical psychology\nthus took the place of metaphysics, and became known as philosophy.\nIt was the favorite science of the time, and the basis of ethics\nand epistemology. Philosophy thus came out of the school, and\nbecame a public utility. It was based, to be sure, upon theological\npreconceptions, but it was to be put to the service of man. It was to\nbe an instrument of discovery as well as a means of grace. With this\npsychological incentive great schools of moralists arose, especially in\nEngland: studying morality as based on the intellect, on the feelings,\non authority, on the association of ideas.\n\nEmpirical psychology led to self-inspection, and this is the age\nwhen self-inspection was universal. It is the age of the founding of\n\u201csocieties for the observation of man.\u201d It is the age of sentimental\ndiary writing. Rousseau wrote his autobiography in France, and it\nwas followed by a flood of autobiographies in Germany. Even memoirs\nof such scoundrels as Laukhardt were written and read as matters of\npublic interest. Religion, too, took the form of personal experiences\nand individual conversions; and the church was more interested in the\nexperiences of the saved than in the dogma of salvation. The Methodist\nmovement arose in England and spread over the continent and to America.\nIndividual opinions were more important than conventions; friendships\nthan marriage; societies than corporations. The historical was lost\nto view because the personal and particular occupied the foreground.\nGibbon said, \u201cAll ideas were equally true in the eyes of the people,\nequally false in the eyes of the philosophers, equally useful in the\neyes of the magistrates.\u201d\n\n(b) =Questions of Criticism.= In the second place, the Enlightenment\nis a period of criticism and stands in contrast with the constructive\nRationalism of the Renaissance. From Locke\u2019s invective against innate\nideas to Hume\u2019s skepticism of the law of cause, from Voltaire\u2019s\nexamination of the foundations of religion to Rousseau\u2019s polemic\nagainst society, the age was one of the criticism of authority.\nThe psychologists, moralists, deists, and sociologists were\nrevolutionists\u2015\u2015all striking directly or indirectly at absolute\npolitical sovereignty, against the theoretical dogmatism and the\nceremonious morality in which the Renaissance was complacent. The\nrevolution began in the realm of the intellect and spread to political\nsociety. It was natural that the beginnings should be made in the\napparently harmless theoretical examination of the grounds of knowledge\nand the principles of morality; but the outcome was a general sweep\nof historical criticism, in which authority and science, the church,\nthe state, and education came under censure. The spirit of man was\nimpatient. Man became indifferent to \u201clearning.\u201d In contrast with\nthe Renaissance, this was a time when books were little read, proper\nnames infrequently appeared in writings, authorities were little cited.\nLet man study himself if he would learn about history and understand\nthe world. Man stands above the scholar, the Christian, the German.\nHe is independent of tradition, and should substitute the useful for\nthe historical. Cosmopolitanism takes the place of patriotism. The\nEnlightenment is practical and yet imaginative. Its criticism aims to\nstrip man of all his artificialities and to find his natural state. Its\nemphasis is negative and destructive.\n\nThe revolt of the Enlightenment against the past appeared in remarkable\nchanges in the political map of Europe. Medi\u00e6val Europe was breaking\nto pieces. The Renaissance had been a period of social absolutism in\nwhich the despotic powers of Macchiavelli and Richelieu were typical\nof its political life. In this period new-comers forced their way\ninto politics and the Enlightenment was marked by the rise of Russia,\nPrussia, and the American colonies. France and Austria, representing\nthe past, were arrayed against England and Prussia, representing the\nfuture of Europe. The conflict between them was that of the old idea\nof military despotism, non-commerce, and non-toleration against the new\nspirit of individual freedom. From the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to\nthe Seven Years\u2019 War (1756\u20131763) occurred many conflicts which presaged\nthe breaking down of the old boundaries. The old r\u00e9gime received its\ndeath-blow at the hands of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years\u2019 War;\nand a half-century later (1806) the Holy Roman Empire came to an end.\n\nIn all countries there were vigorous political movements in support of\nthe rights of the individual. In England the House of Commons began to\nrise to power and the colonies in America to assert their independence.\nIn France the Bourbon family was fast losing its grip, to be completely\noverthrown in the French Revolution (1789). The current was entirely\nin the same direction in Germany. This was the time of Adam Smith and\nthe rise of economic theories. It is a matter of no little significance\nthat this period from the point of view of philosophy begins with\nLocke\u2019s psychological _Essay_ and ends with Kant\u2019s _Critique_; and from\nthe point of view of politics it begins with the Revolution of 1688\nin England, and ends with a revolution in France and another in the\nAmerican colonies.\n\n=A Comparison of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany.=\nThe individualism of the Enlightenment expressed itself as a\nrationalism in Germany, as a sensationalism and deism in France, and as\na deism and an empiricism in England. Nevertheless all its phases may\nbe found in each one of these countries. The outcome of the movement\nin the three countries is, however, very different. In England the\nEnlightenment passed into a philosophical reaction in the so-called\nScottish School; in France, it resulted in a political revolution; in\nGermany, it merged with a great literary movement and resulted in a\ncreative idealism.\n\n=The Many Groups of Philosophers of the Enlightenment.= A comparison of\nthe lists of philosophers of this with those of other periods reveals\nan extraordinary number of names. The Renaissance, for example, shows\nabout half as many names of consequence, although it is about twice\nas long. The Enlightenment teems with philosophers, for its secular\nlife was permeated with the reflective spirit. The philosophers are\nalso often notable men, whose names are familiar to the modern reader.\nNevertheless the number of constructive philosophers was exceedingly\nfew. Only Locke, Berkeley, and Hume can be found whose importance\nequals that of Bacon, Hobbes, Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.\nIn personal talents and importance to their age the others seem to go\nin groups or to be part of the secular spirit. On the whole the history\nof the Enlightenment is that of social movements, and the philosophers\nseem to be the exponents of such movements.\n\nSome of these important groups are as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\nIn England.\n\n1. _Associationalist Psychologists_: Peter Brown (d. 1735), Hartley\n(1704\u20131757), Search (1705\u20131774), Priestley (1733\u20131804), Tooke\n(1736\u20131812), Erasmus Darwin (1731\u20131802), Thomas Brown (1778\u20131820).\n\n2. _Moral Philosophers_: Shaftesbury (1671\u20131713); morality based on\nintellect, Samuel Clarke (1675\u20131729); Wollaston (1659\u20131724); morality\nbased on feeling, Hutcheson (1694\u20131747); Home (1696\u20131782); Burke\n(1730\u20131797); Ferguson (1724\u20131816); Adam Smith (1723\u20131790); morality\nbased on authority, Butler (1692\u20131752); Paley (1743\u20131805); ethics\nbased on associational psychology, Bentham (1748\u20131832); in an isolated\nethical position, Mandeville (1670\u20131733); the Platonist, Price\n(1723\u20131791).\n\n3. _The Deists_: Toland (1670\u20131722), Collins (1676\u20131729), Tindal\n(1656\u20131733), Chubb (1679\u20131747), Morgan (d. 1743), Bolingbroke\n(1678\u20131751).\n\n4. _The Scottish School of Philosophy_: Thomas Reid (1710\u20131796), Oswald\n(d. 1793), Beattie (d. 1805), Dugald Stewart (1753\u20131828).\n\nIn France.\n\n1. _Skeptics_: Bayle (1647\u20131706), Voltaire (1694\u20131778), Maupertuis\n(1698\u20131759), d\u2019Alembert (1717\u20131783), Buffon (1707\u20131788), Robinet\n(1735\u20131820).\n\n2. _The Sensualists_: La Mettrie (1709\u20131751), Bonnet (1720\u20131793),\nCondillac (1715\u20131780), Cabanis (1757\u20131808).\n\n3. _The Encyclop\u00e6dists_: Diderot (1713\u20131784), Voltaire, d\u2019Alembert,\nRousseau (1712\u20131778), Turgot, Jaucourt, Duclos, Grimm (1723\u20131807),\nHolbach (1723\u20131789), Helvetius (1715\u20131771).\n\n4. _The Political Economists and Constitutionalists_: Montesquieu\n(1689\u20131755), Quesnay, Turgot, Morelly, Mably.\n\n5. _The Sentimentalist_: Rousseau (1712\u20131778), the most notable figure\nof France during the Enlightenment.\n\n6. _Philosophical Revolutionists_: St. Lambert (1716\u20131803), Volney\n(1757\u20131820), Condorcet (1743\u20131794), Garat (1749\u20131833).\n\nIn Germany.\n\n1. _Thomasius_ (1655\u20131728), the first of the Enlightenment.\n\n2. _The Wolffians_: Wolff (1679\u20131754), Bilfinger, Knutzen (d. 1751),\nGottsched (1700\u20131766), Baumgarten (1714\u20131762).\n\n3. _The Geometrical Method and its Opponents_: Hansch, Ploucquet,\nCrousaz, R\u00fcdiger (1671\u20131731), Crusius (1712\u20131775), Budde, Brucker,\nTiedemann, Lossius, Platner.\n\n4. _The Psychologists and Related Philosophers_: Kruger, Hentsch, Weiss,\nIrwing, Moritz (1757\u20131793), Basedow (1723\u20131790), Pestalozzi, and Sulzer.\n\n5. _The Independent Philosophers_: Lambert (1728\u20131777), Tetens\n(1736\u20131805).\n\n6. _The Deists_: Schmidt, Semler (1725\u20131791), Reimarus (1699\u20131768),\nEdelmann.\n\n7. _The Pietists_: Spener (1635\u20131705), Francke (1663\u20131727), Arnold,\nDippel.\n\n8. _The Popular Philosophers_: Mendelssohn (1729\u20131786), Nicolai\n(1733\u20131811), Basedow, Abbt, Engel, Feder, Meiners, Garve.\n\n9. _The Writer on Philosophical Religion_: Lessing (1729\u20131781).\n\n10. _The Writer on Faith Philosophy_: Herder (1744\u20131803).\n\nThe philosophers of greatest importance in this period are given below.\nTo help the reader keep in mind contemporary philosophical influences\nother names are given with them in a parallel table.\n\n Bacon\n 1561\n \u2502 Hobbes\n \u2502 1588\n \u2502 \u2502 Descartes\n \u2502 \u2502 1596\n 1626 \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502 Spinoza Locke\n \u2502 \u253c 1632 1632\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Newton \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 1642 \u253c\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Leibnitz \u2502\n \u2502 1650 \u2502 \u2502 1646 \u2502\n \u2502 1677 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n 1679 \u253c \u2502 \u2502 Wolff\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 1679 Berkeley\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Voltaire 1685\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 1694 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502 1704 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Hume\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 1711 Rousseau\n \u2502 1716 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 1712\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Lessing\n 1727 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 1729\n \u2502 \u2502 1753 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n 1754 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 1776 \u2502 \u2502\n 1778 1778 \u2502\n 1781\n\n Illustration:\n MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF SOME OF THE INFLUENTIAL\n THINKERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1690\u20131781)\n\n (Note that the names of the philosophers are given in\n brackets beneath the names of the towns and cities)\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n\n JOHN LOCKE\n\n\n=The Enlightenment in Great Britain.= The history of the philosophy of\nGreat Britain includes the teachings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the\nScottish School. With the exception of the teachings of the reactionary\nScottish School, all the important philosophical teachings appear\nin the first half of the eighteenth century. We need to understand,\nfirst, the philosophical position of Locke, who was the father of the\nEnlightenment. We shall then see how his doctrine developed in three\ndifferent directions: (1) as Deism,\u2015\u2015a rational Christianity, (2) as\nan associational psychology in ethics, (3) as a theory of knowledge in\nthe philosophies of Berkeley and Hume.\n\nOur discussion of the philosophy of Bacon and Hobbes has been followed\nby that of Rationalism. It would, however, be a mistake for the reader\nto infer, as we are about to take up the study of Locke, that a long\nperiod of time intervened between Hobbes and Locke. A chronological\ncomparison of their lives shows that they were contemporaries for\nforty-seven years. Both lived through the reign of Charles I, during\nthe Commonwealth and the Restoration. Hobbes died eleven years before\nLocke published his only philosophical essay. We must remember, too,\nthat the English empirical philosophers of the Enlightenment were not\ninsulated from the Rationalists of the Continent. On the contrary,\nthere was a lively interchange of ideas. Descartes influenced Hobbes\nand Hobbes influenced Spinoza. The influence of Descartes upon\nLocke was not inconsiderable, and Leibnitz felt the influence of\nLocke. Berkeley and Leibnitz arrived at idealistic conclusions from\nindependent points of view. Bacon alone seems to stand apart both from\nhis contemporaries and from his immediate followers.\n\nThe English Enlightenment was the natural development of the English\nRenaissance. Locke was the successor of Bacon and Hobbes. On the other\nhand, the English Enlightenment is similar to what went on in France\nand Germany. The first half of the English Enlightenment\u2015\u2015from 1690 to\n1750\u2015\u2015was absorbed in philosophical discussions; during the second half,\nthe period abandoned philosophy, and was engaged entirely in politics.\nThe classes that won in the Revolution of 1688 had little trouble in\nmaintaining their place of power. The peaceful coming of William and\nMary gave well-ordered conditions for intellectual development and for\na powerful literary movement. The Jacobites were crushed, and there\nensued a period of political peace. In the latter half of the century,\nhowever, another set of topics came to the front. After 1750 politics\nsuperseded philosophy; and whereas the keenest English minds had been\nemployed upon the theoretical \u201cstudy of mankind\u201d in literature and\nphilosophy, they now became engaged in practical political questions.\nPolitical parties developed. The Court was arrayed against the families\nof the Revolution, the American trouble, and the Wilkite agitations\nwere looming large. England was sucked into the political maelstrom\nthat was involving all Europe. Instead of deistic controversies with\nthe theological orthodoxy, dangerous political questions were appearing.\nInstead of Hume\u2019s _Essay_ and Butler\u2019s _Analogy_ we have Burke\u2019s\nspeeches, Adam Smith\u2019s _Wealth of Nations_, Junius\u2019s _Letters_, and\npolitical pamphlets. In the first half of the period Bolingbroke had\nleft politics for philosophy; in the second half Priestley left his\nlaboratory for politics. The great change in English intellectual\ninterests is shown in Hume himself. In 1752 he turned from philosophy,\nbecause there was so little interest in the subject, to the writing\nof his history of England. Theology was paralyzed; deism was no longer\nridiculed; orthodoxy slumbered in its victory. The only philosophic\ntones came from France, where Voltaire, the Encyclop\u00e6dists, and\nRousseau were carrying out a movement that had its origin in England;\nand, on the other hand, from Scotland and its reactionary school. But\nthe political movement always remained political in England, because\nits institutions were not inflexible and because the English people are\nby nature constitutional. In England there has never been a revolution,\nin the true sense, but England\u2019s progress has always been controlled by\ntradition. Even the revolution in the English colonies in America was\ncaused by an abridgment of constitutional rights, and not by political\ntheory, although the formal Declaration of Independence was framed\nunder the influence of French philosophers.\n\n=John Locke, Life and Writings= (1632\u20131704).[37] The life of Locke\nfalls into four periods.\n\n1. _Student Life_ (1632\u20131666). Locke passed his first fourteen years\nat home, which were the troublesome years of the Civil War. The next\nsix years were spent at the Westminster School in London. The last\nfourteen years of this period were spent, first as student and then\nas lecturer in Oxford. He took his Oxford degrees in 1660, the year\nof the Restoration and the year in which the British Royal Society was\nfounded at Oxford. His dislike for the classics, which was begun at the\nWestminster School, was confirmed by his Oxford studies. Consequently,\nduring the years of his perfunctory lecturing at Oxford (1660\u20131666),\nhis main interest was in physics. He was engaged in chemical,\nmeteorological, and especially medical observations. He was also\nengaged in an amateur medical practice, in partnership with an old\nphysician.\n\nThe first turning point in his life came in 1666, when he was called\nto attend the first Lord Shaftesbury, who had fallen ill at Oxford.\nThis accidental meeting was the beginning of a lasting friendship with\nthe Shaftesbury family, sustained by their common love for political,\nreligious, and intellectual liberty. The first Lord Shaftesbury was\nthe most notable statesman in the reign of Charles II; the third Lord\nShaftesbury was the greatest of English ethical scholars. Locke was the\ntrusted friend and beneficiary of the first Lord Shaftesbury, the tutor\nof the second, and influenced, more than any one else, the ethical\nproductions of the third. Locke wrote some notes in this period on\nthe Roman Commonwealth, an essay on toleration, and made records of\nphysical observations.\n\n2. _As Politician_ (1666\u20131683). During these seventeen years Locke\u2019s\noutward fortunes were intimately connected with the political career\nof Shaftesbury. He held public office. He was made a member of the\nRoyal Society in 1668. The winter of 1670\u20131671 was important for\nhis intellectual fortunes and marks another turning point in his\nlife. It was then that he started the inquiry that led to his famous\n_Essay_.[38] The _Essay_ was in the process of development during the\nnext nineteen years. He passed four years in retirement and in study in\nFrance (1675\u20131679). He also at this time first conceived his _Essays on\nGovernment_. Shaftesbury fled to Holland in November, 1682, and Locke a\nfew months later followed him.\n\n3. _As Philosophical Author_ (1683\u20131691). The year 1689 divides this\nperiod into two important parts. The first part (1683\u20131689) is not\nonly the period of his exile in Holland, but it is the time in which\nhe is composing and completing his three most important literary\nworks,\u2015\u2015_Essay on the Human Understanding_, the two _Treatises on\nGovernment_, the three _Epistles on Tolerance_. During the second\npart (1689\u20131691) he published these, which was the time immediately\nfollowing his return to England. Newton\u2019s _Principia_ was published\nin 1687, and Locke\u2019s _Essay_ in 1690\u2015\u2015the one the foundation of modern\nphysical science, the other the beginning of modern psychology. The\nappearance of these two works together with the Revolution in 1688\nmakes this point of time an important one in the history of the world.\n\n4. _As Controversialist_ (1691\u20131704). Locke then began to write upon\nalmost every conceivable subject,\u2015\u2015the coining of silver money, the\nraising of the value of money, the culture of olives, etc. He was also\nvery busy in defending his philosophy against attacks. For him, until\n1700 the period was one of controversy. At that time he retired from\nall activity, and after four years of failing health died in 1704. His\nperiod of production was confined to the eleven years between 1689 and\n1700.\n\n=The Sources of Locke\u2019s Thought.= 1. _His Puritan Ancestry._ The\nancestry of Locke is little known, and not much that appears in his\npersonality can be explained by it. Both his father and mother were\nPuritans, and he seems to have inherited the severe piety, prudent,\nself-reliant industry, and love of liberty, that were common in English\nPuritan families of the middle class in the seventeenth century. During\nthe first fourteen years he was schooled by his parents.\n\n2. _His Training in Tolerance._ If Locke inherited in the least\ndegree any temper of intolerance from his Puritan ancestry it entirely\ndisappeared with his experiences before and during his life at the\nUniversity of Oxford. In 1646, at the Westminster School, his mind\nrevolted at the cruel intolerance on both sides in the events just\nsucceeding the Civil War. He also rebelled at the stern scholastic\ntraining which he received. These negative influences were supplemented\nby positive incentives to freedom and toleration during his university\nlife. John Owen was the liberal Vice-Chancellor of Oxford at that time,\nand the university granted freedom of thought to all Protestants. Locke\nfelt Owen\u2019s influence throughout his whole life. The fact that Locke\u2019s\nintimate friend at Oxford was Professor Pococke, the most outspoken\nRoyalist in the university, shows that whatever Puritanism there\nwas in Locke\u2019s nature had been ameliorated. Tolerance and liberty of\nopinion became now the key-note in the life of John Locke. \u201cA gentle\ndisposition, great love for his friends, an honest seeking after truth,\nand a firm faith in the importance of personal and political freedom\nare the traits most remarkable in Locke as we know him from his books\nand letters.\u201d His toleration was not of the same sort as that of\nhis contemporary Leibnitz. Leibnitz sought to reconcile discordant\nelements by combining them into a new dogmatic theory; Locke neglected\ndisagreements, sought no perfect harmony, but pointed out a _via media_\nthat any individual might take. Leibnitz set forth a metaphysical\nsystem; Locke gave a practical method. He had great directness, and was\na man of honesty of thought. Not being a partisan he had no side to\ndefend; and he was not a partisan because philosophy was not his trade.\nPhilosophy was to Locke the accomplishment of a gentleman who was\ninterested in the puzzles of life. His diction is for ordinary people;\nit is simple and expressed in short Anglo-Saxon words. He shows no\nlogic of thought; and while any sentence is admirable, the paragraph\nand the page are dull. His _Essay_ is a chaos of plain truths, only\nhere and there illuminated by imagination. He shows no poetic power,\nand the world in which he lived never fired his imagination. He studied\nthe human mind as he would read the thermometer. To our fathers his\n_Essay_ was a philosophical Bible. To us the _Essay_ stands, not like\na completely planned building, but like an enlarged cottage, very\nhabitable, but making no single impression.\n\n3. _The Scientific Influence._ As a fellow-countryman of Ockam and\nthe two Bacons, Locke shows the same anti-mystical and positivist\ntendencies. He was a thorough Englishman in taste and temperament. When\nthe \u201cnew philosophy\u201d was finding its way into the Oxford circle, he\nwas one of the first to welcome it. It came to the University through\nbooks; the lecturers were still true to Aristotle. Descartes, Hobbes,\nand Bacon were widely read, as was also Gassendi\u2019s exposition of\nEpicurus. Locke himself writes concerning the influence of Descartes\nupon him. He gave up all thought of becoming a clergyman; and his\npersonal friendship for Bayle, a famous chemist, and for Sydenham, a no\nless famous physician, interested him in the empirical method as they\napplied it to chemistry and therapeutics. He owed his philosophical\nawakening to Descartes and the Port Royal logic. The lucidity of\nDescartes came to him as an inspiration of intellectual liberty;\nalthough he afterwards used the principles that Descartes had taught\nhim to controvert his teacher\u2019s doctrine.\n\nDuring the first period of Locke\u2019s life (1632\u20131666) he was nothing more\nthan a student of medicine and a meteorological observer. He was the\nretired scholar who led so placid a life that it portended nothing\nnoteworthy. He was a creditable scholar and teacher, but his life was\nnegative in character. He had passed through stirring times, and they\ndid not stir him.\n\n4. _The Political Influence._ Locke\u2019s interest in politics began when\nhe was thirty-four years old\u2015\u2015when he met Lord Ashley at Oxford. For\nfifteen years he shared the home and fortune of this most remarkable\nman of affairs in the reign of Charles II. This Lord Ashley (Earl of\nShaftesbury) fled to Holland in 1682, and died there the next year.\nAfter the death of his patron Locke left England for exile in Holland\nuntil 1689, when he returned to England with William and Mary. In\nHolland he found a brilliant company, exiled from all countries; and\nhe formed an intimate friendship with Limborch, the leader of liberal\ntheology in Holland. Some of the time he lived with a Quaker. Locke\u2019s\nfriendship with Shaftesbury and his residence in Holland confirmed him\nin his belief in political liberty. So when William entered England and\nneeded literary justification for the Revolution, he got it in Locke\u2019s\ntwo _Treatises on Government_. Locke thus became the philosophical\ndefender and intellectual representative of the Revolution that now\nafter fifty years had reached its culmination.\n\n=Summary.= On the whole, the inherited Puritanism of Locke was\neasily modified not only by his own moderate disposition, but also\nby his scientific interests and by his large political experiences.\nHe naturally grew to be the apostle of the _via media_ between\ntraditionalism and empiricism. He published practically nothing before\nhe was sixty years old. After his return from exile his principal\nworks appeared in swift succession. Two accidents formed turning-points\nin his life. His accidental meeting with Shaftesbury in 1666 turned\nhim to politics; and secondly, at an informal meeting of friends in\nthe winter of 1670\u20131671 the question about the nature of sensations was\naccidentally raised, out of which grew his great _Essay_. His life was\nprimarily one of affairs and of large acquaintance with men and things.\nTo him life was the first thing, his interest in politics came second,\nand his philosophy third. That his ideas should have been the basis of\nextreme philosophical and political beliefs on the Continent is natural\nenough when one remembers the perils of misinterpretation to the man\nwho preaches the doctrine of the _via media_.\n\n=The Purpose of Locke.= In the historical perspective of two\ncenturies we to-day see Locke in his _Essay on the Human Understanding_\ndelivering the inaugural address of the eighteenth century. He is\nmaking the first formal declaration of the intellectual rights of the\nindividual in a lengthy, dry, and erudite psychological dissertation.\nOf course he never knew the historical importance of his own work.\nIt grew out of the need of the hour. He would have been astonished to\nfind himself the spokesman of the century of French Encyclop\u00e6dists,\nmaterialists, and revolutionists, of English deists, of German\nIlluminati, of Hume, and of Voltaire. He had in mind to answer the\nrestrictions of the high churchman on the one hand, and the arrogant\nclaims of the atheists on the other, as to the power of the human\nintellect. He states that his design is to \u201cinquire into the original\ncertainty and extent of human knowledge.\u201d In this declaration Locke\nforeshadows Kant, but he falls short of the insight of Kant. For Locke\nspeaks for the spirit of the eighteenth and not the nineteenth century,\nand (1) he must keep within the range of concrete facts; (2) he must\nstate only what can be stated clearly; and (3) he must be practical.\nIt was, however, in its larger meaning a declaration of human freedom.\nLocke shows what limitations the human intellect has, what it can and\nwhat it cannot know. When the Enlightenment got momentum, it forgot the\nlimitations to knowledge that the sober Locke had set down, and read in\nhis words only a declaration of license. The _Essay_ differs from any\nprevious modern philosophical writing. Man and not the universe is the\nsubject. For the first time we find an examination of the laws of mind,\nand not of the laws of the universe.\n\nBut it is the _via media_ for which Locke stands, and not the\nlawless excesses of the eighteenth century. The human reason is not\nall-knowing\u2015\u2015cannot solve all problems, is not endowed with divine\nideas; on the other hand, the human reason is not merely a string of\nsensations. The human reason is just this: it is _human_. It stands\nmidway between divine intuition and animal sensation. Man is free, but\nfree under his own limitations. \u201cIf by this inquiry it may be of use to\nprevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with\nthings beyond its comprehension\u2015\u2015we should then not be so forward, out\nof affection for universal knowledge, to perplex ourselves and others\nwith disputes about things, to which our understandings are not suited\nand of which we have not any notions at all.\u201d Human freedom stands\nbetween the absolute freedom of God and the absolute necessity of\nthe animal. Human freedom lies within the limits and bounds of human\nideas\u2015\u2015the _via media_; and analysis of those ideas will show what\nthose limits and bounds are. There can be no knowledge without ideas.\nSome ideas may be erroneous and out of all relation to reality.\nOn the other hand, there may be ideas to which no experiences fit.\nIntellectual freedom consists in having not isolated ideas, but ideas\nin their relations, that is, in the form of judgments. Locke was\nmoved in making his analysis of ideas by a general moral purpose to\ncorrect the faults and fallacies in mankind and in himself. \u201cMan\u2019s\nfaculties were given him to procure the happiness which this world\nis capable of,\u201d says Locke, and it might have been Bacon who had said\nit. The search for the _via media_ is justified by its practical and\nutilitarian ends. The _via media_ is the way of freedom.\n\n=Two Sides of Locke\u2019s Philosophy.= The search for the _via media_ is\nan attempt to find \u201cthe limits and extent of human knowledge.\u201d This\ninvolved Locke in a discrimination as to what should be accepted and\nwhat rejected of the past. It gives his philosophy a positive and a\nnegative aspect. In brief, on its negative side he makes a show of\nrejecting the entire past by rejecting all innate ideas, but really he\ninconsistently accepted from the past its conception of substance and\nof individuality. On its positive side he builds up from experience a\ntheory of knowledge which he divides into intuitive, demonstrative, and\nprobable. That is to say, while Locke affirms that all our knowledge\nmust be derived from experience, it never occurs to him to doubt the\ntraditional Cartesian theory of the existence of God, man, and matter.\n\n(a) =The Negative Side\u2015\u2015Locke and Scholasticism.= Locke issued an\navowed defiance to scholasticism in the introduction of his _Essay_.\nOf the four books into which the _Essay_ is divided, the first was\ncomposed last and added as an introductory declaration of independence.\nIf it had been the only part ever written, the anarchism of the\neighteenth century would have been right in finding its justification\nin the _Essay_. To a modern mind this first book looks harmless enough,\nbut in Locke\u2019s time it had a deep sociological and political meaning.\nIt expresses his practical moral defiance of traditional medi\u00e6valism.\n\u201cThere exist no innate ideas,\u201d says Locke. Innate ideas mean to him\nthe tyranny of tradition\u2015\u2015unexamined and unsubstantiated beliefs,\nconceptions unverified by fact. They stand for church dogma imposed\nupon the unthinking masses, the absolutism of monarchy and the divine\nright of kings, the inherited superstitions about nature. Spinoza\nhad deduced his entire philosophy from the innate idea of substance;\nDescartes had found at least three innate ideas; Leibnitz believed\nall ideas innate. Locke pleads for the personal right to examine all\nideas. Locke\u2019s critics have claimed that no philosopher ever maintained\nthe existence of innate ideas in the sense in which Locke attacked\nthem. Locke was aiming at something more vulnerable than innate ideas\nthemselves\u2015\u2015he was attacking the medi\u00e6val habit of the individual who\ntakes a thing as true because the thing has the weight of traditional\nauthority.\n\n(b) =The Positive Side\u2015\u2015The New Psychology and Epistemology.= If\ninherited ideas have no weight for Locke, he was bound to show the\nkind of ideas upon which we can rely. The mind enters upon life with\nno stock of ideas in trade; how do they arise? The logical outcome of\nLocke\u2019s disclaimer of scholastic psychology obliged him to construct\na new psychology and theory of knowledge. He must offer a psychology\nas a constructive programme for the individualism of the Enlightenment.\nIn his second book Locke states the positive side of his doctrine\nby saying that the mind is like a white paper without any original\nmarkings; that it gets its markings from the impressions made upon it.\nThus to deny innate ideas and to affirm that all ideas are empirically\naroused, are the negative and positive sides of the same doctrine\nof individualism. They are two ways of saying that the mind of the\nindividual is free to judge for itself of the truth or falseness of\nits experiences.\n\nIn his denial of the existence of innate ideas, in his use of the\nformula that \u201cnothing is in the intellect that has not been first in\nthe sense,\u201d or in his employment of the figure of the \u201cwhite piece\nof paper,\u201d Locke does not intend to state anything further than that\nthe mind is free. He merely means that the individual starts without\ntrammels and prejudices. He does not mean that the mind is completely\npassive and at the mercy of its environment, as his French followers\ninterpreted him. Locke is a sensationalist, but he does not belong to\nthat class who believe that our mental states are merely translated\nsensations, and that the mind itself is merely passive. He believes\nthat the mind does not create its ideas, but that they are presented\nto it. The mind has original powers upon which it can reflect. The mind\ncan operate with its ideas and make them into compounds. Thus one must\nread Locke\u2019s _Essay_ to the end to get his double point of view. In the\nsecond and third books he frequently discusses the contents of the mind\nas if the mind were passive, in the manner of modern psychologists. In\nthe fourth book he develops an epistemology on the assumption that the\nmind is active and free.\n\n=Locke\u2019s Psychology.= The second and third books of the _Essay_ are\na discussion of the empirical sources of our ideas. One notes the\nCartesian dualism of mind and matter in the background. All ideas\nhave their source either externally in the impressions upon the bodily\nsenses, or internally in the operations of the mind itself. The sources\nof ideas are either sensations or reflections, or, as Locke calls\nthem, \u201couter and inner perceptions.\u201d Locke also calls them \u201csimple\nideas,\u201d being the units out of which the complex ideas are constructed.\nWe understand easily enough what Locke means by sensations, but\n\u201creflections\u201d is a word peculiar to him, which has not been taken up by\nphilosophy. He means by \u201creflections\u201d a consciousness of the machinery\nof the mind. We are, that is to say, conscious of our willing, loving,\nremembering, etc. As to the order of their appearance in the mind,\nthe sensations are prior to the reflections and are the occasion\nfor the appearance of the reflections. The reflections are not the\nprocess of transmitting the sensations, but they are the later and\nmechanical transmutation of the sensations. It is important to note\nthat throughout Locke\u2019s psychological analysis, he regards the mind as\npassive, even with respect to the ideas of reflection. The reflections,\nas faculties of the mind, are dependent on the sensations, and both\nsensations and reflections make impressions upon a passive mind.\n\nThese \u201csimple\u201d ideas come into the crucible of the mind and form\n\u201ccomplex\u201d ideas of various sorts. There are three general classes of\nthese complex ideas: substances, modes, and relations. The construction\nof \u201ccomplex ideas\u201d out of \u201csimple ideas\u201d and the objects to which the\ncomplex ideas refer receive a great variety of illustration at Locke\u2019s\nhands, but the details of his lengthy discussion need not detain us.\nHe is very painstaking; he shows hard common sense; but he is deficient\nin logical classification and he often betrays much indecision. His\n_Essay_ is of encyclop\u00e6dic character in its derivation of all common\nnotions from \u201csimple ideas.\u201d The laws of association form the chemistry\nby which he welds the \u201csimple ideas\u201d together.\n\nThus far Locke is empirical and consistent. However, the dualistic\nbackground of the thought of his age makes him deviate from his\navowed empiricism. Besides the clear and simple ideas of sensation and\nreflection Locke introduces the idea of the Self. What is the idea of\nSelf? It is not a sensation nor a reflection. It is not a complex idea,\nderived from sensations and reflections. \u201cIt is an internal, infallible\nperception that we are.\u201d It is an accompaniment of the processes of\nthought. It stands beside the ideas, which are empirically derived,\nas an unexplained remainder. The result of Locke\u2019s psychological\nanalysis is therefore that the inner world of the mind consists of the\ncombination of the simple ideas of sensation and reflection plus the\nunexplained idea of the Self.\n\n=Locke\u2019s Theory of Knowledge.= Although Locke says that the purpose\nof his _Essay_ is to show the limits and extent of human knowledge, he\ndoes not reach this until the last book. The first three books form a\nlong introduction to the fourth book and his real theme. Here for the\nfirst time he treats the mind as active; and here for the first time in\nthe history of thought the attempt is made to show what questions man\ncan answer with certainty, what with probability, and what are beyond\nman\u2019s knowledge.\n\nAll the difficulties in the assumptions of the Enlightenment come out\nin Locke\u2019s treatment of his main theme. Locke defines knowledge as the\n\u201cperception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas,\u201d and yet he\nsays that knowledge is real only as ideas agree with things. That is\nto say, Locke had assumed (in Book II of the _Essay_) the existence of\nthe material substance of things of the outer world, just as he assumed\nthe existence of the spiritual Self-substance of the inner world. What\nis the nature of the outer material substance? Locke hesitates, and\nthe best he can answer is, \u201cIt is the unknown support and cause of\nthe union of several distinct, simple ideas.\u201d Substance, to Locke,\nis a word for something unknown. But does the mind know nothing about\nsubstance? What information do our ideas convey to us of substance? We\nhave this knowledge: we know the _primary_ or constant, unchangeable\nqualities of substances, and the _secondary_ or variable qualities\nof substances. The _primary_ qualities of bodies are the same as\ntheir effects in us, such as the extension of bodies, their solidity,\nmovement and rest, duration and position in time. The _secondary_\n\u201care nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various\nsensations in us by their primary qualities.\u201d Secondary qualities\nare sounds, colors, etc. In this confused statement it would seem\nthat substance stands as merely the nominal support of the _primary_\nqualities, and the _primary_ qualities are the cause of the _secondary_\nqualities.\n\nThus the individual stands forth free in the development of his\nideas, but he is an individual circumscribed by his dualistic\nworld. He belongs to the world of an unexplained spiritual substance\non the one hand, and he is surrounded by a world of an unknown\nmaterial substance on the other. There are three kinds of knowledge:\nintuitive, demonstrative, and probable. Locke says that the individual\nis intuitively certain of his own ideas. The individual has also\ndemonstrative knowledge\u2015\u2015he can reason logically and mathematically.\nBut Locke\u2019s real problem does not lie with intuitive and demonstrative\nknowledge. The question that concerned him was rather, What is the\ncharacter of our knowledge of the external world? The individual in\nthe Enlightenment lived in a spiritual independence of matter, yet\nhe had a feeling of uncertainty about his hold upon a world of matter\nso different from himself. It was a world foreign to his spiritual\nessence. With the deepening of the mind within itself and with its\ngrowing independence, the equally independent material world grew more\ndifficult and distant. Locke feels this difficulty. How can man know\nthis external world? How can the individual, with all his freedom,\nbring the external world under his control?\n\nBesides the certainty of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, there\nis a third kind according to Locke. This is the probable knowledge\nof the nature world. We are certain of our sensations, but we are\nnot certain of what our sensations report. The highest degree which\nour knowledge of the external world can attain is probability, or an\ninference from many sources. Such knowledge is mere opinion, which\nsupplements certain knowledge and operates in the large field of our\ndaily existence. The spiritual individual stands in a kind of twilight\nregion with the dull wall of the material world of probable existence\nlooming up before him, the outlines of which he can barely discern.\nOn either side of this twilight existence lies the broad daylight of\nintuitive and demonstrative knowledge, and around it all the absolute\ndarkness of ignorance. Our knowledge is much less than our ignorance\nbecause our knowledge is limited to our ideas and their combinations.\n\n=Locke\u2019s Practical Philosophy.= Locke pursued the _via media_ in his\ndiscussion of the practical problems that were at that time of burning\nimportance in English society. He always kept in mind the spiritual\nman who is circumscribed by his own limitations. Morally, religiously,\nand politically the individual has to conform to the conditions in\nwhich he lives. But morality, religion, and government cannot get their\nauthority from ideas inborn in the mind. All are the outgrowths of\nexperience. The moral law, for example, is a law of nature, although at\nthe same time it is a law of God. It arises from experience, and at the\nsame time it has its root in God. To obey it is to be happy, to disobey\nit is to be unhappy. The revelation of religion, too, may transcend\nexperience, but it must not contradict experience. In both religion and\nmorality the individual must be the final judge, for he is the arbiter\nof his own happiness. Individual happiness is of more value than all\nelse. Religious toleration is therefore one of the first principles\nof government, and between the church and the state there should be\nno conflict.\n\nLocke\u2019s political philosophy is along the same _via media_. In his\n_Treatises on Government_ he seeks to make good the title of King\nWilliam to the British throne. He justifies the right of the individual\nto revolt under certain conditions. Political government is not a\nsacred innate idea, but has arisen out of experience as conducive\nto the happiness of man. The individuals and the government make a\ncontract to serve each other. When either violates the contract, the\nState is at an end. To the advocates of the divine rights of kings,\nlike Filmer, political law antedated \u201cnature\u201d; to Hobbes, law came\nafter \u201cnature\u201d; to Locke, law is \u201cnature.\u201d To Filmer \u201cnature\u201d was a\ngolden age; to Hobbes it was a shocking state to be got rid of; to\nLocke \u201cnature\u201d is harmony. Thus according to Locke the individual has\nthrough his experiences constructed his morality, his religion, and his\ngovernment because they are conducive to his happiness, and at the same\ntime they have their ground in the \u201cnature\u201d of things. The individual\nstands free among them, the central figure in the world.\n\n=The Influence of Locke.= The philosophy of Locke became the\nfountain-head of the many divergent schools of thought of the\nEnlightenment. His _Essay_ did not contain anything fundamentally new,\nand its presentation has little originality; but it voiced the thought\nof the eighteenth century so easily, and with such skillful avoidance\nof pitfalls, that it made Locke the most widely read and the most\ninfluential philosopher of his time. Four separate movements had\ntheir source in him: (1) From his theory of knowledge, in which the\nemphasis is laid upon the mind as active, came the empirical idealism\nof Berkeley and Hume; (2) from his psychological analysis in the\nsecond and third books of the _Essay_, in which the mind is regarded\nas passive, came the sensationalism of the French; (3) from his theory\nof religion came Deism; (4) from his associationalistic ethics came\nthe utilitarian ethical theories of the English moralists. The most\nconstructive followers of Locke were Berkeley and Hume. The others\nmay be called the lesser Lockian schools; for although they may\nhave exercised a much greater influence upon their own time, they\nwere nevertheless only partial interpreters of Locke. We shall deal\nbriefly with Deism and Ethics in England, next consider at length the\nphilosophies of Berkeley and Hume, and then present in a summary but\narticulate way the development of the Enlightenment in France and\nGermany.\n\n=The English Deists.= We have seen how Rationalism, especially\nin the case of Descartes, tried at the beginning to reconstruct\ntheology without breaking with established dogma. Gradually, however,\nrationalism and revealed religion showed signs of divorce. Some of\nthe rationalists came to take the stand that if reason can understand\nthe nature of God, revelation is either incredible or superfluous.\nThe revealed religions differ. The god of the medi\u00e6val people is not\nthe same as the god of the heathen nor as the Jehovah of the Jews.\nThere are many religions and many sects in each religion. There must\nbe to them all a common basis, which is the true religion. This was\nthe creed of Deism or Natural Religion. Positive religions are only\nthe corruptions of natural religion, or the religion of reason. Deism\nsought to separate religion from special revelations, which were looked\nupon as the irrational elements of religion. Bacon and Descartes had\nfreed natural science from church dogma; Hobbes had freed psychology\nfrom the same dogma; Grotius had freed the conception of law from dogma.\nThe Deists would free religion from dogma.\n\nDeism was founded on three principles; (1) the origin and truth of\nreligion may be scientifically investigated; (2) the origin of religion\nis the conscience; (3) positive religions are degenerate forms of\nnatural religion. The tendency of the Enlightenment was deistical,\nand the movement was powerful in England, France, and Germany. Deism\nwas quite consistent with the central principle of this period\u2015\u2015the\nself-sufficiency of the individual.\n\nIn England the first deist was Herbert of Cherbury (1581\u20131648), with\nhis \u201cfive fundamental propositions of religion.\u201d The body of English\ndeists, however, got their cue from Locke\u2019s identification of the moral\nlaw with the law of nature; but Locke himself was not a deist. The\nliterature of deism coincides for the most part with the English moral\nphilosophy of the period, but usually the group of English deists is\nsupposed to include only Toland, Chubb, Tindal, Collins, Morgan, and\nBolingbroke. These men lived in the first half of the Enlightenment.\nThey were much despised by the scholars of the time as being mere\ndabblers in letters. \u201cThey were but a ragged regiment whose whole\nammunition of learning was a trifle when compared with the abundant\nstores of a single light of orthodoxy; whilst in speculative ability\nthey were children by the side of their antagonists.\u201d[39]\n\nThe English deists passed from view at the end of the first half\nof the eighteenth century, crushed by the weight of the attack upon\nthem. The more powerful orthodoxy, with its greater talent, was itself\nrationalistic, and could beat them on their own ground. The churchmen\nshowed that the objections against the God of revelation would be\nequally effective against the deistic God of nature. The classic\nargument along this line against the deists is Bishop Butler\u2019s _Analogy\nof Religion_. The battle was unequal, and the character of the books\npublished during the controversy reveals the inequality of the contest.\nThe deistic publications were small and shabby octavos, and were\npublished anonymously. The orthodox publications were solid octavos\nand quartos in handsome bindings, with the credentials of powerful\nsignatures. Even if the orthodoxy had not employed the arm of the\nlaw against the deists, the deists would have been broken by the\nintellectual force against them.\n\n=The English Moralists.= Just as the motive of the deists was to\nfree religion from the authority of theology, so the motive of the\ncelebrated group of English moralists of the Enlightenment was to\nfind a basis for morality outside of church dogma. Many of the English\nmoralists were also deists in belief. Their number is legion, as the\nlist given below will show. The greatest among them was Shaftesbury.\n\nThe school began with Hobbes and received momentum from the\nassociational psychology of Locke. All the members of this group sought\nto find an ultimate basis for morality\u2015\u2015some seeking it with Locke in\nexperience, others in innate ideas. Yet the starting-point with each of\nthese moralists seems to be Hobbes and his selfish ethics, for nearly\nall ethical scholars have his ethics in mind, either to attack or to\ndefend. For many years Hobbes was regarded by ethical scholars either\nas an evil spirit or as an inspired genius. In any case, his influence\nwas felt in ethical discussion for a long time.\n\n Chronological Table of the English Moralists.\n\n 1500 1600 1700 1800\n Hobbes 88 .. 79 .. .. .. .. .. ..\n Cudworth .. 17 88 .. .. .. .. .. ..\n Locke .. 32 .. 04 .. .. .. .. ..\n Cumberland .. .. 32 .. 18 .. .. .. ..\n Wollaston .. .. 59 24 .. .. .. .. ..\n Mandeville .. .. 70 .. 33 .. .. .. ..\n Shaftesbury .. .. 71 13 .. .. .. .. ..\n Clarke .. .. 75 .. 29 .. .. .. ..\n Berkeley .. .. 85 .. .. 53 .. .. ..\n Pope .. .. 88 .. 44 .. .. .. ..\n Butler .. .. 92 .. .. 52 .. .. ..\n Hutcheson .. .. 94 .. 47 .. .. .. ..\n Edwards .. .. .. 03 .. 58 .. .. ..\n Hartley .. .. .. 05 .. 57 .. .. ..\n Tucker .. .. .. 05 .. .. 74 .. ..\n Reid .. .. .. 10 .. .. 96 .. ..\n Hume .. .. .. 11 .. .. 76 .. ..\n Smith .. .. .. 23 .. .. 90 .. ..\n Price .. .. .. 23 .. .. 91 .. ..\n Paley .. .. .. .. 43 .. .. 05 ..\n Bentham .. .. .. .. 47 .. .. 32 ..\n Stewart .. .. .. .. .. 53 .. 28 ..\n Whewell .. .. .. .. .. .. 95 .. 66\n Mill .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 06 73\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII\n\n BERKELEY AND HUME\n\n\n=The Life and Writings of George Berkeley= (1685\u20131753). In Bishop\nBerkeley we have the finest type of Irish mind. In his brilliant\nmental powers and idealistic theory he reminds us of that wonderful\nIrish scholar of the Middle Ages, John Scotus Erigena. Berkeley was\nacutely critical, and yet he possessed a childlike religious faith. He\ncombined an insatiable longing for knowledge with an ardent missionary\nzeal. \u201cBerkeley was a born child of Plato, a lineal descendant of\na race whose origin is afar off and is divine.\u201d[40] He was one of\nthose exceptional minds that begin to bring forth their intellectual\noffspring when they are young. Berkeley began to publish at the age\nof twenty-four, Hume at twenty-eight, Descartes at forty-one, Locke\nat fifty-eight.\n\nWe shall divide the life of Berkeley into three periods.\n\n1. _His Early Training_ (1685\u20131707). Nothing is known of Berkeley\u2019s\nearly years, except that he was born in Kilkenny, Ireland. He was\neducated at the Eton of Ireland, the Kilkenny school, where Swift had\nbeen a pupil; and it is known that one of Berkeley\u2019s schoolmates was\nThomas Prior. Berkeley entered Trinity College, Dublin, at fifteen, and\ngraduated at nineteen. Scholasticism was still influential at Trinity,\nbut new sciences, such as botany, chemistry, and anatomy, had been\nadded to the curriculum. There, too, the young Berkeley found that\nLocke\u2019s _Essay_ was much discussed, and that Newton, Boyle, Malebranche,\nDescartes, and Leibnitz were widely read. From this early date Berkeley\nbegan to keep a book of his own philosophical reflections, calling\nit his _Commonplace Book_. From it and from his philosophy it would\nappear that Locke and Malebranche were the most powerful philosophical\ninfluences upon him.\n\n2. _As Author_ (1707\u20131721).\n\nBerkeley remained at Dublin as tutor and fellow five years after\nhis graduation. In 1709 he was ordained deacon in the English church.\nHe published two mathematical tracts in 1707, his _Theory of Vision_\nin 1709, his _Principles of Human Knowledge_ in 1710. The _Theory\nof Vision_ and the _Principles of Human Knowledge_ were practically\na statement of his philosophy. They have been compared thus: the\n_Theory of Vision_ teaches that \u201call that we see is our sensation\u201d; the\n_Principles of Human Knowledge_ teaches that \u201call that exists is our\nknowledge.\u201d Berkeley then went to London, where he was admitted to the\ncourt of Queen Anne and also to the circle that included Steele, Swift,\nAddison, and Pope. Berkeley showed himself humble, wise, considerate,\nand unselfish, and although he was shocked at the court life, he on\nhis side charmed every one whom he met. He wanted to make his idealism\nbetter understood, and so he published it in the form of a dialogue\nbetween a realist and an idealist. This publication was called _Three\nDialogues between Hylas and Philonous_ (1713). He then made two\njourneys to the Continent\u2015\u20151713\u20131714 and 1716\u20131720\u2015\u2015and spent much\nof the time in Italy, where he absorbed its literature. The South Sea\nswindle turned him to economics, and in 1721 he published an _Essay\ntoward Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain_.\n\n3. _As Priest and Missionary_ (1721\u20131753).\n\nBerkeley was appointed Dean of Derry in 1721 at a salary of \u00a31100.\nAlthough he threw himself into his work with his accustomed zeal, there\nhad already appeared in his mind the conception of an ideal society,\nwhere church and state would be united. He was disgusted with the\nworn-out European society, and wanted to remove the youth to a colony\nwhere there would be no temptations. He raised a large sum of money for\nthis purpose, and obtained the promise of a grant from the government\nof \u00a320,000, gave up his deanery, and sailed for America. He intended to\nsettle in Bermuda and there to found an ideal State, which should also\nbe a centre for the conversion of the American Indians to Christianity.\nThe promised grant from the English government did not come, and\nBerkeley got no farther than Newport, R. I., where he lived three\nyears. While at Newport he wrote _Alciphron, the Minute Philosopher_,\nand published it in England in 1732. The records of Trinity Church\nin Newport show that he preached there many Sundays. He gave several\nbooks to Harvard and Yale Colleges. At Newport he was visited by Samuel\nJohnson, an Episcopal missionary, who afterwards became president\nof King\u2019s College in New York. Johnson was converted to Berkeley\u2019s\nidealism, and through Johnson the doctrine was received by Jonathan\nEdwards, his pupil.\n\nFrom 1734 to 1752 Berkeley was Bishop of Cloyne. He was devoted\nto missionary work among the poor, and many of his people being\nafflicted with an epidemic of influenza, he treated them effectively\nwith tar-water\u2015\u2015a remedy he had learned from the Indians. He published\n_Siris_, an essay on the philosophical virtues of tar-water, in 1744.\nIn 1752 he went to Oxford to live, and in 1753 he died.\n\n=The Influences upon the Thought of Berkeley.= Berkeley\u2019s philosophy\nshows little development after his first publications. With the\nexception of _Siris_, which contains much Platonic idealism, the later\nworks of Berkeley are scarcely more than an elaboration of his early\nthought in the _Theory of Vision_ and the _Principles of Human Nature_.\nWe should infer, therefore, that the only philosophical influences\nupon Berkeley were the original springs at which he drank as a youth.\nMoreover, he always speaks with the dogmatic certainty of one who has\ndrawn his material from but few sources. Never does he exhibit the\nindecision of a man who is embarrassed by many points of view. The two\nchief influences upon him were Locke and Malebranche. The influence of\nLocke was partly of the nature of a reaction: Berkeley accepted Locke\u2019s\npsychological analysis, but reacted from Locke\u2019s \u201ccommon sense\u201d dualism\nas early as the time of his student life at Trinity. Malebranche, with\nhis theory of \u201coccasional causes,\u201d reinforced his opinion along the\nline that his reaction took. But Berkeley\u2019s own incisive genius had a\nrelatively greater influence in dictating the course of his philosophy\nthan is usually the case. His mind was precocious, fertile, and\ncontinuously versatile. Furthermore, Berkeley\u2019s simple religious nature\nseems to have been an important factor in determining his intellectual\nbelief. His peculiar idealism could take root only in a mind inspired\nby faith.\n\n=The Purpose of Berkeley.= The life and teaching of Berkeley were\ndedicated to the true interests of religion. He may be called the\nreligious Enlightener. He would not, like the deists, strip religion\nbare of dogma, but he would unlimber dogma and rational philosophy so\nthat they would be of service to religion. _His purpose was to free\nscholasticism on the one hand, and rationalism on the other, from\nabstractions and obscure terms, and thereby bring about a union of\nfaith and knowledge._ Berkeley looked upon himself as a crusader who\nwould retake the Holy Land for the spiritual individual.\n\nWe have remarked that one of the presuppositions of this period of the\nEnlightenment is the independence of the individual. The individual\naround which Berkeley\u2019s philosophy centres is the spiritual individual,\nand is therefore unique even for this period. Such an individual is\nsuperior to his environment because he belongs not to a material world,\nbut to a community of religious beings who can talk and walk with God.\nThe English Enlightenment passed from Locke to Berkeley. The inner life\ncame into complete ascendency and the spiritual individual emerged.\nFrom the Lockian philosophy, with its many contradictory motives,\nthere appeared the audacious one-sided philosophy of Berkeley, with its\nproclamation of the reign of spirituality. It stood in marked contrast\nwith the development of the Enlightenment in France\u2015\u2015a development\nof materialism and material atoms. The spectral although stubborn\nboundaries of the unknowable material world, which Locke supposed to\nshut around the powers of the human intellect, crumbled before the hand\nof Berkeley.\n\nThe casual reader of the history of thought is, however, often\ndisconcerted at the appearance of such a philosophy as Berkeley\u2019s in\nthis period of empiricism, and especially as the immediate follower\nof Locke. The English school is called the empirical school, and\nyet Berkeley is also called an idealist. But we must remember that\nempiricism and idealism are not antithetical. Empiricism refers to the\nsource of our knowledge; it means that all our knowledge is primarily\nderived from sense-perceptions. These sense-perceptions may be of two\nkinds: they may be (1) psychological facts, or (2) material facts.\nBerkeley was, like Locke and Hume, an empiricist of the first class;\nand yet because he denied the independent existence of material facts,\nhe was also an idealist. He was an empirical idealist, just as the\nFrench philosophers of the Enlightenment were empirical materialists.\nThe critic may find that Berkeley is not a consistent empiricist,\nto be sure, but neither was Locke. Berkeley started out by affirming\nthe testimony of experience against scholastic \u2666speculation and\nabstraction; yet all along he assumed the scholastic conception of\nmind. Nevertheless, this assumption of the individual makes Berkeley\na true child of the Enlightenment.[41]\n\n=Berkeley\u2019s General Relation to Locke and Hume.= The growth of this\nEnglish school from Locke to Hume is not difficult to understand or\nto remember. It is not so much a page in the history of metaphysics\n(the nature of reality) as in epistemology (the theory of knowledge).\nLocke asks, What can we know? And he replies to his own question, that\nwe can know our \u201cideas.\u201d At the same time he assumes the existence\nof a spiritual substance on the one side, and a material substance\non the other. Neither of these is an idea, in the sense that it is an\nobject of knowledge. The advance of Berkeley from Locke and of Hume\nfrom Berkeley was one of cancellation. Berkeley cancelled the material\nsubstance, because the material substance is not an idea. Hume then\nconsistently enough asked, Why not for the same reason cancel the\nspiritual substance? The spiritual substance is not an idea or object\nof knowledge. We have no more right to assume it than the material\nsubstance. The only things we know to exist are our ideas. The\ndevelopment of the English school may be briefly put as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n Locke, Spiritual substance\u2015\u2015ideas\u2015\u2015material substance.\n\n Berkeley, Spiritual substance\u2015\u2015ideas.\n\n Hume, ideas.\n\nHume is Locke made logically consistent. Berkeley went only halfway.\nHume among these three was the only self-consistent empiricist. On\nthe assumption that all knowledge is derived from sense-perception\nthe history of the English empirical school was a history of the\nrestriction of knowledge.\n\n=Berkeley\u2019s Points of Agreement with Locke.= Berkeley starts from\nLocke\u2019s psychological analysis as the basis of his own theory. The\npurely scientific aspect of the contents of mind as classified by Locke\ndoes not call for particular criticism from him. Logical classification\ndoes not seem to concern him very much, and while he accepts Locke\u2019s\nanalysis, he often calls Locke\u2019s classes by other names. He commits\nhimself to Locke\u2019s psychological empiricism in the first sentence in\nhis _Principles_: \u201cIt is evident to any one who takes a survey of the\nobjects of knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on\nthe senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions\nand operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by the help\nof memory and imagination\u2015\u2015either compounding, dividing, or barely\nrepresenting those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.\u201d Our\nknowledge, therefore, deals only with ideas. There are the simple ideas\nof sensation and reflection, and ideas compounded from these.\n\nBesides accepting the psychological analysis of Locke, Berkeley also\nadopts without question the assumption common to Locke and all the\nphilosophers of the Enlightenment,\u2015\u2015the assumption of the independence\nof the individual soul. \u201cBut besides all the endless variety of ideas\nor objects of knowledge, there is likewise something that knows or\nperceives them\u2015\u2015what I call mind, spirit, soul, or self. By which I\ndo not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from\nthem, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are\nperceived.\u201d\n\nBerkeley, therefore, (1) agrees with Locke that all knowledge is\nderived from sense-perception, _i. e._ he agrees with Locke\u2019s empirical\npsychology, and (2) he also agrees with one of Locke\u2019s assumptions,\nviz., that the spiritual substances exist.\n\n=The Negative Side of Berkeley\u2019s Philosophy.= We have now pointed out\nBerkeley\u2019s general relation to Locke and Hume, and more in particular\nhis agreements with Locke. We are now prepared to examine the teaching\nof Berkeley by itself.\n\nBerkeley was obliged to devote a good deal of time to the negative\nside of his philosophy. Just as Locke could not construct an empirical\npsychology until he had disclaimed all allegiance to innate ideas, so\nBerkeley could not construct an idealism until he had brought to bear\nin a polemical fashion all his forces against abstract ideas. Of his\ntwo masterpieces he devotes the entire essay on the _Theory of Vision_\nand a good part of his _Principles of Human Nature_ to this end.\n\n1. In proof of this he advances his analysis of abstract ideas. He not\nonly denies that abstract ideas have a corresponding external reality,\nbut he even denies that abstract ideas exist in the mind itself. The\ndeception in abstract ideas arises from the use of words as general\nterms. Words are always general; ideas are always particular. There\nis never an idea that exactly corresponds to a word. Words are useful\nnot as a conveyance of ideas, but for inciting men to action and\narousing the passions. Whenever a word is used, what we think of is\nthe particular sense, idea, or group of sense objects that give rise to\nit. For example, the word \u201cyellow\u201d cannot be employed by us except in\nconnection with the thought of some particular yellow thing. Berkeley\nis a nominalist of the extremest type.\n\n2. Again Berkeley seeks to show, by demolishing the distinction between\nprimary and secondary qualities, that matter as an abstract idea has\nno existence. This distinction was as old as the Greek, Democritus, and\nwas accepted by Locke. We have already described it: of a thing like a\nlump of sugar, the sense qualities of whiteness, roughness, sweetness,\netc., are secondary because they depend upon our sensations for their\nexistence; they are the ways in which our organisms are affected, and\nnot true copies of things; the mathematical qualities, form, size,\ndensity, impenetrability, are primary because they exist independent\nof our senses and are true copies of things. Hobbes had already\nshown that such a distinction is erroneous, and Berkeley followed\nhim by maintaining that all qualities are secondary. The size and\nimpenetrability of a body depends as much on sense-perception as\nits sweetness and color. At some length in his _Theory of Vision_\nBerkeley takes up the question of the solidity, or third dimension,\nof a material body, and shows that it is an inference depending on\nsensations arising from the convergence of the two eyes and complicated\nby the sensations of touch.\n\nBerkeley professed to be pleading the cause of the man in the street\nwho wants a philosophy that is real \u201ccommon sense.\u201d He maintained that\nthe conception of matter is only a philosophical subtlety for those\nphilosophers who seek for something beyond perception. The man in\nthe street wishes to explain things as he finds them, and not to seek\nmysterious abstractions which philosophers say in one breath that we\nknow, and in another that we cannot know.\n\nTherefore, while Berkeley agreed with Locke\u2019s assumption of the\nexistence of the spiritual substance, he departed from Locke in denying\nthe existence of a material substance. Berkeley accepted, therefore,\none of the two assumptions common to the Enlightenment, but he denied\nthe other. Now Berkeley was trying to prove a thesis. He was controlled\nby the ideal of his ardent religious nature to free religion from\nfalse philosophy. He felt that the foes of religion\u2015\u2015atheism and\nmaterialism\u2015\u2015had employed effectively abstract ideas, which had been\none of the weapons of religion, against religion itself. Berkeley\nconcentrated his attack against the traditional scholastic conception\nof abstract ideas in general and the abstract idea of matter in\nparticular. Abstract ideas have no existence; the idea of a material\nsubstance is an abstract idea and therefore has no existence. Berkeley\nwas bound from the beginning of his religious crusade to explain away\nthe existence of material substance.\n\n=The Positive Side of Berkeley\u2019s Philosophy.=[42] In the construction\nof his theory in a positive way Berkeley abridged the dualism of\n\u201ccommon sense,\u201d and asserted that the abridged form was better. He\nconverted the dualism into a religious hypothesis, but it was a dualism\nstill,\u2015\u2015a dualism of minds and their ideas. Berkeley then set to\nwork to show how much better his theory would explain the problems of\nknowledge. \u201cBerkeley sought to humanize science.\u201d He set the spirit\nfree by relieving it of the falsities of the old dualistic assumption,\nbut the usefulness of his abridgment lay in its solution not of\nmetaphysical, but of epistemological problems.\n\n1. Berkeley\u2019s theory may be summed up in his own abbreviated\nstatement of it,\u2015\u2015_Esse est percipi_ (to be is to be perceived). Or it\nmay be stated in that figurative and oft-quoted paragraph, \u201cSome truths\nthere are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open\nhis eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that\nall the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth, in a word all\nthose bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not\nany subsistence without a mind\u2015\u2015that their being is to be perceived or\nknown.\u201d Or we may state Berkeley\u2019s position in the terms of a modern\ninterpreter[43] of him: \u201cAll objects are mentally discerned; all\nobjects are mentally constituted.\u201d Berkeley means that the existence\nand character of all objects are within the confines of consciousness,\nand there are no objects outside of consciousness. As sense-perceptions\nthey have reality; as memories they lose their warmth and distinctness;\nbut they are not objects at all when neither perceived nor remembered.\nThese objects are always colored by the sense-perception. They\nare received through the consciousness, and constituted by the\nconsciousness. Minds and their ideas are all that exist.\n\n2. Berkeley does not try to prove the existence of the mind or soul,\nnor does he attempt to show that we perceive the soul. But in the\nspirit of the Enlightenment he hardly questions its reality. He takes\nits existence for granted, and like the philosophers of the period he\nmakes a direct appeal to consciousness. \u201cI know I am conscious of my\nown being.\u201d Like Locke and Descartes he alleges the direct intuition of\nthe self. In the _Principles_ he speaks of \u201ca notion of our own minds\nor spirits.\u201d Since the ideas are copies of other ideas, there can be\nno idea of the soul; but the \u201cnotion is like the spirit that knows\nit.\u201d We have therefore direct knowledge or _notion_ of ourselves in\nknowing our ideas; we have direct knowledge of something superior to\nthe ideas, an activity whose reality consists not in being perceived,\nbut in perceiving. Indeed, he made the assertion in his _Commonplace\nBook_, which he began in college, that nothing properly does exist but\nconscious persons. All other things are not so much existences as signs\nof the existences of persons. One is absolutely certain of what one\nmeans by \u201cI.\u201d\n\n3. Spiritual substances are sufficient and adequate to explain all\nideas. There is no difficulty in explaining the images of our own minds,\nfor our minds control them. But what explains the existence of our\npercepts over which we have no control? What substantial support have\nthey if we remove the \u201cmaterial hypothesis\u201d? Suppose I grant that I\nexist and have control of my imaginative ideas, and that other minds\nexist and have control of their imaginative ideas, how then, I ask\nBerkeley, am I to explain the great world of perceptions over which\nneither I nor other men have control?\n\nBerkeley\u2019s general psychological position must be summarized\nhere in order to answer this important question. It is as follows:\n(1) All things are nothing more than perceptions. (2) All ideas,\nboth perceptions and images, are passive, and must be caused by\nsomething in itself active. (3) Souls are active and the cause of\nideas. The question then is, What soul is the cause of our perceptions?\nPerceptions are ideas, are passive, but they are the ideas of whom?\nRepudiate the material substance, and what is the cause of perceptions?\n\nPerceptions are not originated by me; they cannot be self-originated,\nbecause they are passive and not active; they cannot be originated by\na material substance, because it does not exist. Their origin must be\nsought in the infinite spirit, or God. If you will examine the ideas\nwhich constitute what we call nature objects, you will observe these\nsignificant characteristics about them, to which attention has already\nbeen called. They have, as we have said, a strength, liveliness,\ndistinctness, and orderliness that distinguish them from imaginations.\nThey are God speaking to us in His orderly way. Nature objects are\nthe language of God. The regularity and dependability of the world of\nnature reveal the character of the Being whose language the world of\nnature is. They reveal a Being who is intelligent, infinite, omnipotent,\nand benevolent. The regularity of the changing seasons, the constancy\nof the heavenly bodies to their orbits, the provision of the earth for\nman\u2015\u2015all the laws of nature are the language of an orderly Being.\n\nNow we see the importance of Berkeley\u2019s deviation from Locke in his\n(Berkeley\u2019s) conception of all ideas as passive. All ideas being\npassive, there must be a cause of them. The only active causes are\nspirits. I am the cause or perceiver of my own imaginations. I perceive\nanother\u2019s movements and know that another person or spirit must be the\ncause. When nature speaks in its invariable and purposive harmony, I\nknow that an infinite spirit is the cause. We are indeed living in a\nsociety of spirits, who speak to one another in their own language.\n\nThe doctrine of Berkeley strikes beginners and people who\ntemperamentally cannot understand it, as absurd. The reduction of the\ntrees, sky, etc., to ideas is a theory that has brought down all kinds\nof ridicule upon it. When Dr. Johnson heard of it, he is said to have\nstamped his foot upon the ground, and thereby refuted it. Byron is\nquoted as saying, \u201cIf there is no matter, and Berkeley has proved\nit, it is no matter what he said.\u201d Others have asked if we eat and\ndrink ideas and are clothed with ideas. But Berkeley never doubted the\nexistence of material objects, and the point of his theory is missed\nif we think that he did. What he denied is the existence of an unknown\nsubstance, matter, behind external objects. \u201cThe table I write on\nexists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study\nI should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I were in my study\nI might perceive it or that some other person does perceive it.\u201d\n\nAnother question has been asked of Berkeley which goes deeper. If to be\nis to be perceived, what existence has a tree in the forest that no one\nhas ever perceived. What existence have past events that are forgotten?\nBerkeley has considered this objection and has answered it. When he\nsays that existence depends upon perception, he does not mean merely\nmy own perception. Berkeley is not what in philosophy is called a\nsolipsist (_solus_ and _ipse_), _i. e._ one who believes that nothing\nexists but himself and his modifications. A thing may have existence\nin the mind of some one else. If the thing has never been perceived\nby any human being, it is perceived, if the thing exists, by the mind\nof God. The modern scientist assumes the existence of matter in the\nwhole universe. Berkeley assumes the existence of a perceiving God.\nOne is the materialistic and the other the religious explanation of\nthe universe.\n\n=The Life and Writings of David Hume[44]= (1711\u20131776). Hume\u2019s life\nbears some marks of external resemblance to Berkeley\u2019s. After periods\nof training that differed very greatly in point of discipline, but were\nalmost the same in point of time, both produced, at about the age of\ntwenty-five, their most important philosophical works. Both turned from\nphilosophy to other pursuits\u2015\u2015Berkeley to missionary work at the age\nof thirty-six, and Hume to politics at the age of forty-one. There\nthe resemblance between the two men ceases; for they were antipodal\nby nature, and animated by different purposes. The enthusiastic nature\nof Berkeley is in marked contrast with the unimpassioned nature of\nthe Scot. Hume was unimaginative to the last. He was unimpressed by\nthe legends of the border where he lived; he had no love for nature\nand no appreciation of art. \u201cWhile Hume\u2019s intellect was imperial,\nhis sympathies were provincial.\u201d Berkeley\u2019s sympathies were imperial\nand his intellect was in their service. Hume was a man of kindly\ndisposition and of moderate temper, yet he was vain, and interested\nabove everything else in his own reputation. No object seemed worth\nwhile to him, unless it made for the improvement of his talents in\nliterature. The failure of the _Treatise_ was a blow from which he\nnever recovered. Always afterward he had an eye to popularity, and this\nis important in making up our judgment about him. All his works after\nthe _Treatise_ were written to please his readers and for personal\nsuccess. Locke the Englishman, Berkeley the Irishman, and Hume the\nScotchman came from the same middle class of society, had university\ntraining, were engaged in public service, and are to be classed in\nthe same empirical school of philosophy. But they were personally\nvery different kinds of men, and were types, although perhaps not\nrepresentatives, of their nationalities.\n\n1. _Period of Training_ (1711\u20131734). Hume was born in Edinburgh\nand lived there and at Ninewells on the border. He was a student at\nEdinburgh University (1723\u20131726) and studied law the next year. He was\nin business in Bristol in 1734. In all the occupations of this period\nhe was unhappy.\n\n2. _Period of Philosopher_ (1734\u20131752). From 1734 to 1737 Hume was\nin retirement in France, especially at La Fl\u00e8che, where he wrote\nhis _Treatise on Human Nature_. He returned to Edinburgh in 1737 and\npublished his _Treatise_ (1739\u20131740). It was read by nobody and was\nan absolute failure. So he rewrote Book I in 1748 and called it the\n_Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_. Hume\u2019s full statement of\nhis theory of knowledge is contained in the _Treatise_ and not in\nthe _Enquiry_. He rewrote Book III in 1751 and called it the _Enquiry\nconcerning Principles of Morals_, \u201cof all my writings, incomparably the\nbest,\u201d and in 1757 he published Book II as an _Essay on the Passions in\nFour Dissertations_. He became acquainted with Adam Smith in 1740; he\npublished _Essays, Moral and Political_, in 1741\u20131742, and was a tutor\nin 1745, because he needed money. In 1746\u20131748 he became secretary in\nthe English military embassy to Vienna. In 1751, the same year that he\nwas recasting the third book of the _Treatise_, he wrote his _Dialogues\nconcerning Natural Religion_, which was not published until 1779. His\nautobiography was also published posthumously.\n\n3. _Period of Politician_ (1752\u20131776). In 1752 Hume published his\n_Political Discourses_, \u201cthe only work of mine that was successful on\nits first publication.\u201d In 1754\u20131761, while Librarian at Edinburgh, he\nwrote and published his _History of England_. This work was the first\nserious attempt since the Revolution to give an impartial account\nof the earlier struggles against the Stuarts. Through it he at last\ngot great fame, and fortune followed in its wake. In 1757 came his\nrestatement of Book II of the _Treatise_. In 1763\u20131765 Hume was\nsecretary of the English Embassy at Paris, and he was made much of by\nFrench society. The thought of the French Enlightenment had advanced\nfar enough to entertain him and his doctrines. Hume met Rousseau at\nthis time. Later Hume was visited by Rousseau in England and was badly\ntreated by the eccentric Frenchman. He says that Rousseau sins at the\nfoundation. Hume was appointed Under Secretary of State in 1766; he\nreturned to Edinburgh in 1769, and died in 1776.\n\n=Influences upon the Thought of Hume.= The writings of Hume show\nno erudition, and for that reason it is uncertain what were all the\nsources from which he drew. He does not mention Descartes, for example,\nalthough he wrote his _Treatise_ at La Fl\u00e8che in the shadow of the\nschool where Descartes was educated. It is probable, however, that Hume\nwas influenced at least by the Greek philosophers of the Hellenic-Roman\nPeriod, and by Locke. During the years after Hume\u2019s student life at\nthe university, he pored over the writings of the Roman Stoics in the\nlibrary at Ninewells, and he felt the influence of Cicero, Seneca,\nand Plutarch. Hume read extensively, and he reacted from his reading.\nHe became so dissatisfied with the past that he put it aside, in the\nbelief that the true philosophy had not yet been written. In this\nreaction from the past he was influenced along the lines of Locke and\nBerkeley. He admired the advance that Berkeley had made over Locke,\nand naturally took a further step in the same direction. Hume was also\nacquainted with the writings of Hobbes and with the history of the\nEnglish theories of morals.\n\nIn 1740 he became acquainted with Adam Smith, the political economist,\nand Hume\u2019s _Political Discourses_ (1752) anticipated Smith\u2019s classic\n_Wealth of Nations_. At this time (1752) he turned with all other\nEnglishmen from the discussion of philosophical to political topics.\nThere are many points of resemblance between Smith and Hume, especially\nin their ethical doctrine.\n\n=Dogmatism, Phenomenalism, and Skepticism.= Hume liked to speak of\nhimself as a skeptic, but philosophically speaking he was skeptical\nonly of the dogmatic Rationalism of the Renaissance, which had made\nunlimited claims for the human reason. Hume maintained in the spirit\nof the Enlightenment that the human mind deals with ideas and not with\nreality. Human knowledge has therefore its limits. More consistently\nthan Locke or any one else in the Enlightenment, he tried to show the\nlimits and extent of human knowledge.\n\nPure skepticism is the denial that there is any such thing as truth;\npure dogmatism would be the deductive explanation of all problems from\na set of infallible principles. It would be hard to find an absolutely\ntrue example of skepticism or dogmatism, for generally philosophical\ntheories are a mixture of dogmatism and skepticism. Pyrrho is often\ngiven as an example of the pure skeptic, but Pyrrho, like all other\nGreeks, never for a moment doubted the existence of an external,\nmaterial object (vol. i, chapter xii). Spinoza is a fairly good\nexample of a pure dogmatist, but he developed his _Ethics_ by\nmeans of interpolated principles not in his original assumptions. A\nthorough-going skeptic would have to be a modern\u2015\u2015not a Greek\u2015\u2015who\nwould deny that truth can be known and that things exist. This was\nnot Hume\u2019s contention. He affirmed the validity (1) of mathematical\nreasoning (2) and of matters of fact, and (3) the probability of\nthe natural sciences. Hume may correctly be called a phenomenalist,\na positivist, or an agnostic. So far as he maintained that there are\nsome things which the reason cannot know, he is an agnostic. In his\naffirmation that we can know ideas and only ideas, he is a positivist.\nIn his affirmation that ideas are the only existences, he is a\nphenomenalist. Are external objects the cause of sensations? Experience\nis dumb. Have external objects an existence? Experience is dumb.\nAre souls the substance of our thoughts? Experience is dumb. But\nmathematics has truth, experience is beyond question, and the workings\nof nature are probable.\n\nWe shall find Hume to be the keenest critical mind of this\ncritical period of the Enlightenment. He is profoundly serious\nin his examination of the roots of the intellectual life. He is\npast-master in the art of raising questions. He not only shows that\nthe fundamental theoretical problems are still unsolved, but he also\ncalls to account the hitherto untested assumptions of practical life.\nBut this is criticism, positivism, phenomenalism, or agnosticism, and\nnot skepticism. He speaks of his doctrine as like that of the Middle\nAcademy, in contrast with that of Pyrrho. He says that excessive\nskepticism upsets activity, employment, and common occupations. The\nconclusions of the intellect never agree with our natural instincts.\nEvery time positive skepticism appears, nature destroys it.\n\nHume\u2019s conclusion as to the practical attitude of the positivist\ntoward life can best be stated in his own words (_Treatise_, Book I,\nConclusion): \u201cShall we then establish it for a general maxim, that no\nrefined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? If we embrace\nthis principle, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we\nreject it in favor of those reasonings, we subvert entirely the human\nunderstanding. We have, therefore, no choice left, but between a\nfalse reason and none at all. Most fortunately it happens that since\nreason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature suffices to that\npurpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy. I dine, I play\na game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends.\u2015\u2015No:\nIf I must be a fool, as all who reason or believe anything certainly\nare, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. In all the\nincidents of life we ought still to preserve our skepticism. Where\nreason is lively and mixes itself with some propensity it ought to be\nassented to.\u201d\n\n=The Origin of Ideas.= Locke did not proceed to the construction of\nhis theory of knowledge until he had disclaimed at length his belief\nin the existence of innate ideas. Berkeley went further and made his\npolemic against the existence of all abstract ideas. Hume went still\nfurther and denied that any ideas existed except those derived from\nimpressions. Locke\u2019s attack upon innate ideas was an attack upon\nunverified tradition; Berkeley\u2019s attack upon abstract ideas was an\nattack upon materialism; Hume made a general attack upon rationalism.\nThe psychology of Hume is thus made simple. It is a cancellation of the\nfactors incompatible with strict empiricism\u2015\u2015the factors which he found\nin Locke and Berkeley. Hume\u2019s empirical psychology is simply this:\n_every idea is the image or copy of an impression_.\n\nWhat is an impression? Impressions are of two classes: (1) sensations\nor outer impressions; (2) feelings or emotions or inner impressions.\nImpressions are never mistaken, because they always have a very lively\nand vivid character. What is an idea? It is the copy of an impression.\nAn idea should never be mistaken for an impression, because it is\nfainter and more feeble than the impression of which it is the copy.\nFor example, the sensation of yellow is more vigorous than the thought\nof yellow; the feeling of anger more vivid than the thought of anger.\nImpressions are simple and elemental. Can we go back of them and find\ntheir origin? We cannot. We receive impressions; echoes of impressions\nlinger as ideas; ideas may be compounded with other ideas. Hume deals\nin his criticism mostly with the compounding or combining of ideas,\nbut this is the sum and substance of his psychological analysis of our\nmental life. The following table will help us.\n\n { Sensations or outer\n { Impressions { impressions\n { (= original) { Feelings or inner\n { { impressions\n Perceptions {\n (= mental { { Memories or an exact\n states) { { reproduction of an\n { { impression or of a\n { Ideas { combination of impressions\n { (= derived) { Imagination or a combination,\n { separation, and transposition\n { of impressions according to\n { the imagination\u2019s own laws.\n\nIt should be noted, however, that the above classes are not co\u00f6rdinate\naccording to Hume. Impressions are prior to ideas, and of the\nimpressions the feelings or inner impressions are \u201cposterior to the\nsensations and derived from them.\u201d Hume is a sensationalist, for the\nmost original of the impressions are sensations.\n\n=The Association of Ideas.= Since nothing can enter the mind except\nthrough the two portals of outer and inner impressions, every idea\nin the mind is the copy of one or several impressions. How then can\nthere be any such thing as error? Error arises from the understanding\nand imagination in their manipulation of the impressions\u2015\u2015from\nthe faculties of the mind combining, separating, and transposing\nthe impressions and their memories. An idea resulting from such\ntransposition may and often is referred to an impression different\nfrom the one of which it is the copy.\n\nWhat does Hume mean by the faculties and powers of the mind? He does\nnot mean that the mind with its functions exists as a reality, since\nall that exist are impressions and the copies of impressions or ideas.\nHume means by mental faculties and powers the various modes by which\nideas combine. Hume makes no distinction between memory, imagination,\njudgment, conception, etc., except (1) as different groupings of ideas\nand (2) as accompanied by different feelings. _The whole mental life\nand the faculties of the mental life are nothing but an association of\nideas._ Isolated ideas are explained as copies of isolated impressions;\nand from these ideas are derived groups of ideas which we call trains\nof thought. Why do ideas group themselves together? The only answer\nis that it is the nature of ideas. Hume frequently speaks of these\nassociative relations as \u201cthe manner of conceiving ideas.\u201d He also\nsays that there is a \u201cgentle force\u201d or \u201cdetermination\u201d of the ideas\nto relate themselves with other ideas. Given the impressions and their\nrelations, and Hume will explain the whole knowing process. Associative\nrelations take an important place in Hume\u2019s theory, but some critics\nsay that they are interlopers; that he has introduced them by a back\ndoor; that they are not mentioned in his psychological inventory.\n\nBut to Hume there is nothing mysterious about the association of ideas.\nThey are combined, transposed, augmented, and diminished according\nto fixed rules under mechanical laws. Their relationship takes place\nwithout freedom. Impressions occur in the way they happen to occur.\nIdeas combine in the way they happen to combine. Relations between\nideas are accidental and external. There is only one quality of ideas\nthat does not depend on its accidental relation to other ideas. This is\nthe quality of non-contradiction. This is the necessary property of an\nimpression. An impression must be what it is, and cannot be conceived\nas having properties contrary to its own nature. The quality of\nidentity in an impression is intrinsic and necessary.\n\nAccording to Hume, there are three fundamental ways in which ideas\nassociate, called the three laws of association. (1) There is the _law\nof resemblance_ or contrast, by which the occurrence of a thing calls\nup a similar thing or its opposite. Mathematics is based upon this law\nof the resemblance, the contrariety, and the quantitative relations of\nideas. (2) There is _the law of contiguity in time and space_, by which\nthings happening together in time and space are recalled together. Upon\nthis law are based the descriptive and experimental sciences. (3) There\nis the _law of causation_, upon which religion and the metaphysics of\nthe world of nature are based. The question with Hume is, How is he\nto explain all these laws of association as derived from impressions?\nIf they cannot be derived from impressions, then his theory that\nall knowledge is derived from impressions goes to the wall. The\nRationalists and even his predecessors, Locke and Berkeley, had\nconceived mathematical propositions and causation as underived and in\nthe nature of things. If Hume is to establish his doctrine of complete\nsensational empiricism, here is his test.\n\nThese associations, and not isolated impressions, are the objects\nof human interest, inquiry, and investigation. Hume makes a further\nreduction of associations by his well-known classification of them\nas either \u201crelations of ideas\u201d or \u201cmatters of fact.\u201d Associations of\ncontiguity and associations of causation are \u201cmatters of fact,\u201d while\nassociations of resemblance are \u201crelations of ideas.\u201d Furthermore, Hume\nlooks upon associations of contiguity as those of outer impressions,\nassociations of resemblance as those of inner impressions, while\nassociations of causation are not what they are alleged to be, but\nare derived from some inner impressions.\n\n { { 1. Contiguity Outer Descriptive\n { Matters { association impressions Sciences\n Objects of { of Fact {\n Knowledge { { 2. Causation Inner Metaphysics\n { { association[45] impressions\n {\n { Relations { 3. Resemblance Inner Mathematics\n { of Ideas { association impressions\n\n=The Association of Contiguity.= This is the most elementary of the\nthree classes of association, and concerns the spatial and temporal\norder in which impressions come to us. Two impressions come at the same\ntime or in succession, and when one of them is remembered, the other is\nlikely to be remembered also. We see a man and hear his name; when we\nremember the man\u2019s face, we may remember his name also. Hume maintains\nthat this association of succession or coexistence is given with the\nimpressions themselves. It is the order of the _outer impressions_.\nWe perceive the order of the outer impressions with the same certainty\nthat we perceive the contents of the impressions. _This is the only\ncertainty we have about \u201cmatters of fact,\u201d_\u2015\u2015a certainty of the exact\norder of our immediate outer impressions. We know the order in which\nour impressions do occur, but, as we shall see, when we argue from this\nthat our impressions must recur in the same order we are involved in a\nfallacy. Any order may recur. The fact that the sun rises in the east\nto-day does not make certain that it will rise in the east to-morrow.\nIt is only a matter of probability, however many times repeated. There\nis no certain science of \u201cmatters of fact.\u201d\n\n=The Association of Resemblance.= This is a clear and distinct\nassociation which is given with the impressions. When we have an\nimpression, we see intuitively its similarity or difference to other\nimpressions, and the degrees of likeness and unlikeness. The face of\none man reminds us of another man, or we contrast it with a brute\u2019s\nface. _This association concerns only inner impressions_, while the\nassociation of contiguity concerns outer impressions. This has to do\nwith the \u201crelation of ideas,\u201d while the association of contiguity has\nto do with \u201cmatters of fact.\u201d\n\n=1. Mathematics.= But there is this difference between the association\nof resemblance and that of contiguity\u2015\u2015upon resemblance is founded\na demonstrative science. This is mathematics\u2015\u2015the sole demonstrative\nscience. The subject-matter of mathematics consists of the possible\nrelations between the contents of our ideas\u2015\u2015the possible relations\nbetween our inner impressions. These relations are intuitively known\nby us, and out of them we get a science of complete certainty. We make\na comparison between the magnitudes in the contents of ideas, and we\nanalyze their regularity. This is mathematics, and it is a perfectly\nlegitimate science. Because it confines itself to the relations between\nideas, and has nothing to do with \u201cmatters of fact,\u201d it can be a\ndemonstrative science. All mathematical knowledge is restricted to the\nstudy and verification of ideas, and has therefore nothing to do with\nthe external world.\n\n=2. The Conception of Substance: Hume\u2019s Attack on Theology.= But the\nassociation of resemblance has been made the basis of a common illusion.\nIt has been made to transcend its proper sphere of a relationship among\ninner impressions; and resemblance between ideas has been taken by\npeople generally to mean metaphysical identity or substance. It has\nbeen transformed from a relationship between ideas to a relationship\nbetween \u201cmatters of fact.\u201d Now substance is evidently not an\nassociation given with the impressions, like their temporal and spatial\norder in the association of contiguity, nor is it mere impression of\nresemblance. Substance is the conception of an unknown, indescribable\nsomething back of impressions. There is the conception of the material\nsubstance or matter, and the spiritual substance or the soul. How did\nsuch illusory conceptions arise? If Hume rejects them as matters of\nreal knowledge, he must nevertheless explain their psychological origin.\nThe illusory idea of substance originates from the similarity of the\nfrequent conjoining of certain impressions. The impressions\u2015\u2015sweet,\nrough, white, etc.\u2015\u2015occur together so often that the imagination\ncreates the conception of the substance of sugar behind them. This\narises not from the first experience, but after the association\nof impressions has been observed a large number of times. From the\nfrequent association of ideas arises the _feeling_ of their necessary\ncoexistence. Thus do we come to have the idea of a material substance.\n\nHume evidently follows Berkeley in his criticism of material substance.\nBut Berkeley went only halfway. Berkeley had found that bodies were\nonly conjunctions of sensations, and he had rejected as meaningless\nthe unknown substance behind them. He did not see that the same attack\ncould be made upon spiritual substances. Berkeley\u2019s argument against\nthe substance of the cherry could be used against the Ego or the Soul.\nHave I the impression of my Ego? Can I touch it or see it? The simple\ntest shows that I know nothing about it, and I cannot affirm whether\nor not it exists. But if the conception of the Soul has no reality as\nan object of knowledge, how can it be psychologically explained? How\ndoes it arise in the mind? The idea of the Soul is due to the frequent\nreappearance of the same trains of thought in my mind. Their similarity\ngives rise to the feeling that a metaphysical identity, or Soul, exists\nbehind them.\n\n=The Association of Causation: Hume\u2019s Attack on Science.= Among\nthe many traditional conceptions upon which Hume turned his critical\nexamination, that of causation occupies the most of his attention.\nHe discusses it both in the _Treatise_ and in the _Enquiry_. He\nis the first philosopher since Aristotle to give it comprehensive\ntreatment. He saw that all philosophical, theological, and indeed\nscientific knowledge rests upon this conception of causation. It was\naccepted without question by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, the\nRationalists of the Renaissance, and the scientists of his own time.\nIf the conception is valid, Hume\u2019s criticism goes for naught; for \u201cby\nmeans of that relation we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and\nsenses.\u201d In that case what becomes of Hume\u2019s psychological analysis\nthat all knowledge consists of impressions and ideas? And if Hume\u2019s\npsychology falls, all his criticism of the spiritual and the material\nsubstance falls also. Upon the validity of the concept of cause depend\nmany of the scholastic arguments for the existence of God, whose\nexistence we can demonstrate although He is not an object of sense\nimpression. Imagination can then go on unrestricted; for God is\naccepted not only as cause, but as first or uncaused cause. Descartes,\nLeibnitz, and even Berkeley and Locke had accepted the causal argument\nfor the existence of God, although the latter two had pretended to\nrestrict knowledge to sense-perceptions and ideas. Again, the causal\nconcept has been the foundation for the belief in a functioning soul\nbehind the mental and physical activities of a human being; and on the\nsame causal concept man has argued from sensations to their material\nsubstrate. All this is unwarranted and unrestricted knowledge because\nit \u201cgoes beyond the memory and senses.\u201d Not only theology, but science\nitself has gone \u201cbeyond the memory and senses.\u201d Hume dares to doubt\nthe certainty of the causal principle even in scientific knowledge. Is\nthere any necessary connection among events so that with certainty we\ncan predict the occurrence of one event if another is given? Is there\nin nature and history any causal law so binding that every event is a\nnecessary result of what has gone before and a necessary cause of what\nwill come? The question of cause is, therefore, paramount with Hume.\nIf he is successful in impeaching cause as he has been in the case of\nsubstance, scientific theory must fall with theological dogma.\n\nIn his review of the conceptions of time and space (association by\ncontiguity), Hume had found succession to be a quality of impressions\nand to be given with them. But that is all that can be said\u2015\u2015the\nrelation is one of time order, but not a relation that is necessary.\nThe outer impressions happen to occur thus and thus; they need not have\noccurred thus, and may never occur in this order again. This temporal\norder is not by any means a causal order. The idea of cause is that\nof power transferred, but we have no impression of power. Impressions\ncome as sequences, not as consequences or as powers. Sequences of\nimpressions are the only \u201cmatters of fact\u201d; consequences are not\n\u201cmatters of fact.\u201d They must, therefore, be only \u201crelations between\nideas\u201d and have no objective reality. From Hume\u2019s point of view this\nis sufficient to show that cause is not valid and real.\n\nTo deny that we have the concept of cause would, however, be nonsense.\nWe do have the concept, and how is its psychological origin to be\nexplained? How does the idea arise? It does not originate (1) as an _a\npriori_ concept, _i. e._ by an analysis of ideas, nor (2) as an outer\nimpression, _i. e._ a sensation, nor (3) as memory, since memories\nare images of impressions. The idea of cause originates from an inner\nimpression\u2015\u2015a strong and lively feeling connected with the imagination.\nBut how does it happen that the feeling is so strong that it makes us\nbelieve the idea, with which it is connected, is a reality? The feeling\ndoes not arise from a single instance of conjunction of two impressions,\nbut from the conjunction of two ideas repeated many times. _The belief\nin cause is a feeling originating in the constant conjunction of\nimpressions._ This explains why the ideas that fire will burn, that\npoison will kill, that water will wet\u2015\u2015are so lively. The conjunction\noccurs many times, and an inner necessity or compulsion arises to\nimagine the second impression after the first. Given the first idea, we\nlearn to expect the second. Repetition produces nothing new in objects,\nbut it produces in the mind a new feeling to pass from one idea to the\nidea usually attending it. Necessity exists in the mind and not in the\nobjects.\n\n=The Extent and Limits of Human Knowledge.= What remnants of\nknowledge remain after Hume has applied his destructive criticism? His\ncritics would answer that, if Hume had been consistent, no knowledge\nwhatever would remain. Upon the basis of pure positivism, that all\nknowledge is composed of impressions and their copies, knowledge is an\nimpossibility. But he introduced an additional element, \u201crelations,\u201d\nthat made knowledge possible because it afforded synthesis and allowed\ndistinctions.\n\nTaking Hume\u2019s doctrine as it stands, his results are these. There\nare two classes of sciences, the formal and the empirical. The formal\nincludes logic and mathematics, and consists of knowledge of relations\nbetween ideas. Such knowledge has certainty and validity. Empirical\nsciences consist in knowledge of matters of fact. Such knowledge\nnever amounts to more than probability. There is no certainty or\ndemonstration in natural science. Its results call forth not conviction,\nbut belief. Beyond these subjects we have no knowledge whatever.\nMetaphysics and theology are only fictions. Beyond impressions and\nthe copies of impressions we can make no assertions. The tendency of\nthought to trench beyond its own territory is the cause of all our\nmetaphysical difficulties. It tries to do what it was not intended\nto do, and the result is abstract ideas. Reason and the relation\nof resemblance give us the erroneous idea of spiritual and material\nsubstance; imagination and the relation of cause give the erroneous\nidea of the fundamental principle of nature.\n\n=Hume\u2019s Theory of Religion and Ethics.= Hume is so true an empiricist\nto the end that he is a remarkable exception among the philosophers\nof the Enlightenment. He alone among philosophers shows the historical\nsense in the application of his positivism to religion and morals. In\ngeneral the Enlightenment took no account of the past; in this Hume\ndiffers from his contemporaries.\n\nHume was the destroyer of deism because he advanced historical evidence\nagainst deism. Deism had three principles: that religion is the object\nof scientific investigation; that religion had its origin in the reason;\nand that \u201cnatural religion\u201d is the oldest form. Hume agreed to the\nfirst proposition, but he revealed his historical instinct by showing\nthat religion did not originate in the reason, but in the feelings; and\nthat not \u201cnatural religion,\u201d but idolatry, etc., is the oldest form.\nFurthermore, he stood almost alone among philosophers of the period in\nbuilding ethics upon the feelings rather than upon the intellect. The\nethical motives of man are pleasure and pain, and not an idea of the\nreason. Hume\u2019s historic sense led him to this conclusion.\n\nBoth morals and religion should be empirically investigated. As in\nscience, so in them the most cogent conclusions are only probable and\nnot intuitive. Our moral activities are under the same kind of law\nof cause that exists in the world of nature-phenomena. The will is\ndetermined by the feelings, and the reason is the slave of the passions.\nOur moral judgment is based on the feeling of sympathy (Adam Smith).\nIt is practically probable that there is a purpose in the world and\ntherefore a God. But this cannot be established. On the same principle\nof probability the world may have grown up mechanically or by chance.\nReligion is naturally reasonable enough, but its doctrines cannot be\nproved.\n\n=The Scottish School.= This school represents in Great Britain the\nreaction from the sensualism of the Enlightenment. The Scottish School\nwas the British reply to Hume, just as Kant was the German reply. They\nwere the late eighteenth century reactions in two countries to the\nEnlightenment. The teaching of Kant was, however, also the beginning\nof a new movement and a new period. The Scottish School has no such\nimportance.\n\nThomas Reid (1710\u20131796) was the founder. Reid admitted that Berkeley\nand Hume drew legitimate conclusions from Locke\u2019s general assumption\nthat the objects of thought are not things, but ideas. Therefore Reid\nmaintained that Locke\u2019s position must be given up. Still empiricism\nremains tenable and must be applied to the phenomena of mind. What are\nthe data of consciousness? Not individual ideas, as Locke said, but\ncomplex ideas or judgments. The elements will be discovered later by\nanalysis of these complex states which are first given. The mind is not\na blank piece of paper upon which simple characters are first inscribed,\nand then later the understanding introduced to form judgments and the\nreflection to add belief in the existence of objects. Our knowledge\nstarts rather from judgments, which involve certain original truths or\n\u201cnatural judgments.\u201d Mankind possesses the faculty of \u201ccommon sense,\u201d\nand this faculty makes these truths a common possession. Among the\nprinciples that \u201ccommon sense\u201d includes are self-consciousness, the\nreality of objects perceived, and the principle of cause.\n\nThe Scottish School called attention to the importance of\nself-observation. The members of the school made their attack\nupon sensualism from the point of empirical psychology. Philosophy\nbecame in their hands the perfecting of psychology as a science of\ninner observation. Thus they were in accord with the school of the\nEnlightenment, although opposed to its sensualistic outcome. The\nprominent members of the school were Reid, Dugald Stewart, Brown, and\nSir William Hamilton.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IX\n\n THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY[46]\n\n\n=The Situation in France in the Enlightenment.= The historian of the\nFrench Enlightenment has to take account of the reign of two kings;\nthat of Louis XIV (1643\u20131715); and that of Louis XV (1715\u20131774).\nTogether they cover the long period of one hundred and thirty-one years.\nThe reign of Louis XV marks the actual development of the Enlightenment,\nwhile that of Louis XIV contains the causes. The long reign of\nseventy-two years of Louis XIV had been an absolute, arbitrary, and\npersonal government. It had been an age unsurpassed in literature\nand eloquence, but also an age in which all those subjects that did\nnot redound to the glory of the church were suppressed. It had been\nthe age of Moli\u00e8re, Corneille, Racine, La Fontaine, and F\u00e9nelon;\nan age when art was encouraged, but also an age in which political\nand philosophical originality would not presume to breathe. Between\nDescartes\u2019 death in 1650 and the death of Louis XIV in 1715, one finds\na single philosopher, Pierre Bayle, and he had to leave France. The\nNewtonian physics was not accepted in France until 1732\u2015\u2015forty-five\nyears after its publication in England. Upon the death of Louis XIV the\nartistic glories of his reign lost all their value for the nation. In\ntheir place was set the problem of the material misery of the nation,\nwhich had been caused by the long wars and the extravagance of paternal\ngovernment.\n\nThe reign of Louis XV seethes with the struggle of social forces. It is\na period in which the individual is striving to gain his rights under\nthe institutions that have so long repressed him. The development of\nthe French Enlightenment is identical with the struggle for political\nliberty. In no other period of history\u2015\u2015except perhaps the Age of\nPericles\u2015\u2015is the history of philosophic thought so intimately connected\nwith political history. The fifty-nine years of the reign of Louis XV\nare filled with exciting events which interest both the philosopher\nand the historian. The French Enlightenment is the \u201creaction against\nthat protective and interfering spirit which reached its zenith\nunder Louis XIV.\u201d With Louis XV the magnificence and the utility of\necclesiastical and political absolutism could not be maintained. For\nthe hierarchy of the church was unable longer to keep up its claim of\nindependence and morality; and the State was rapidly exhausting its\npower by exhausting its financial resources. Each event in the history\nof France in the eighteenth century had therefore two aspects\u2015\u2015each\nled to the Revolution, and each was a step in the development of the\nEnlightenment of the individual. The pioneers in the movement could\nnot have been conscious of the end to which their criticism would lead;\nbut to us looking back upon the century the result seems inevitable.\nA comparison with the situation in England is interesting. While in\nEngland the political and ecclesiastical institutions were so elastic\nthat they could without disintegrating absorb the movement of the\nEnlightenment, and while they were so little bound to traditional\ninstitutions that the growth in individualism would be constitutional,\nthe situation in France was exactly opposite. (1) In France the church\nand the political institutions had become inelastic bodies under\nLouis XIV. They had reached the limit of their development. So deeply\nrooted in absolutism and special privileges were they that they were\nnot open to innovation or reform. During the reign of Louis XV the\nonly question was, which would be crushed\u2015\u2015the new individualism or the\nold institutions. No compromise was possible. The institutions, having\nsurvived their usefulness, gave way. (2) In the next place the French\nchurch and state had for many years been identified with oppression\nand tyranny, while the English people had within a century gained\nmany needed reforms by beheading one king and forcing out another.\nConsequently the English government of the eighteenth century was\nidentified with the liberty of the individual. In England political and\nreligious speculation followed and did not precede political reforms.\nIn France the opposite was true. To the mind of the French people the\nchurch represented only superstition, and the state only profligacy\nand tyranny. The more they seemed to support each other in one social\nstructure, the more rapid, virulent, and excessive would naturally be\nthe reaction against both when once individualism got a footing.\n\nThe result was that while in England the Enlightenment always remained\ncritical and negative, in France it became an obstinate and positive\ndogmatism. Behind French criticism was developing a philosophical creed.\nThe French Enlightenment was a social cause and a self-sustaining idea.\nThe French philosophers of the eighteenth century, on the whole, were\nnot superior men intellectually, for they were inclined to make the\nsmall look large and the large great. But although their perspective\nwas inaccurate, they had an enthusiastic faith in progress and humanity.\n\n=The English Influence in France.= Louis XIV and his two predecessors\nhad made Paris the intellectual centre of Europe, and up to 1690 it had\nno rival. The French language had taken its place beside the Latin as\nthe language of science. The circle of scientists existing just before\nand at the beginning of Louis XIV\u2019s reign had its equal nowhere in\nEurope. We remember how Hobbes found Euclid in Paris, Locke spent four\nyears at or near Paris, Leibnitz gained there all his mathematical\nerudition and training. During the seventeenth century Paris was the\ncentre of scholastic influence, and this is seen directly or indirectly\nin the writings of all seventeenth century philosophers. The English\nhad taken their cue from the French; but on the other hand, it is\ndoubtful if as late as the death of Louis there were a half dozen\nFrenchmen that knew the English language.\n\nAbout the time of the publication of Locke\u2019s _Essay_ the intellectual\ncentre of gravity began to move from Paris to London. The founding\nof the Royal Society in Oxford in 1660 was the beginning of the\norganization of British scientific influence. Newton\u2019s physics (1687)\nthen began to supplant the Cartesian physics, and Locke\u2019s psychological\ndoctrines the dogmatism of the Rationalists, among the thinkers of\nwestern Europe. Newtonian physics and English empiricism became the\nscientific watchwords of the eighteenth century; and although the\nFrench were late in accepting them, it is said that at the end of\nthe Enlightenment there was no cultured Frenchman who could not read\nEnglish. We find that such notable Frenchmen as Voltaire, Montesquieu,\nBuffon, Brissot, Helvetius, Gournay, Jussieu, Lafayette, Maupertuis,\nMirabeau, Roland, and Rousseau visited England during the period\nfrom the death of Louis XIV to the Revolution. Poets, mathematicians,\nhistorians, naturalists, philologists, philosophers, and essayists all\nagreed to the necessity of studying the language and people on whom\ntheir fathers had not deigned to waste thought except in contempt.\n\nBut perhaps the political motive was quite as strong as the scientific\nin turning the French of the eighteenth century toward England. The\nEnglish government was the example of political liberty of that time.\nThe rising inquisitive thinkers of France had no alternative but to\nturn to free England for spiritual support against their own decrepit\ntyranny. The first French visitors were amazed at English prosperity,\neven though the crown had decreased in power\u2015\u2015amazed at the liberty\nof the press and Parliament, amazed at the control of the revenues by\nthe representative body. England thus became the school for all the\nthinkers of Europe, and through her literature taught the lesson of\npolitical liberty first to France, and then to all Europe.\n\n=The Two Periods of the French Enlightenment.= The eighteenth century\ndivides itself in France much the same as it does in England. There\nare two periods: the first extending to the middle of the century, when\nthe Enlightenment of the individual is thought to lie in intellectual\ncultivation; the second, when his salvation becomes social and\npractical. The first period is dominated by Voltaire, and advanced by\nMontesquieu and the Encyclop\u00e6dists; the second is dominated by Rousseau,\nand results in the Revolution.\n\nThe two periods have a common fundamental motive, although the means\nused are radically different. Both represent a gradual progression\ntoward the elevation of the individual in his reaction against\nthe institutions of the seventeenth century. But the first was an\nintellectual Enlightenment and all that this means, while the second\nwas emotional and social. The first was aristocratic, while the second\nwas democratic. Yet the whole movement was a gradual filtering of\nthe doctrine of individualism from the upper to the lower classes. It\nnaturally took the form, first, of intellectual culture, and then of\nan appeal to spontaneity. The intellectual theories of the first period\nwere bound to find practical expression in the second. In the first\nperiod the champions of the ancient monarchy were forced to defend\nit on their opponents\u2019 own ground\u2015\u2015that of rationality. In the second\nperiod, the monarchists had to change their battleground and make some\npractical reforms. In the first, the attack was made principally on the\nchurch, in the second on society. While the attack on the state began\nearly, it attained significance not until the middle of the century.\n\n=The Intellectual Enlightenment (1729\u20131762). Voltaire, Montesquieu,\nand the Encyclop\u00e6dists.= The first representatives of the French\nEnlightenment were Voltaire and Montesquieu. Voltaire went to England\nin 1726, and Montesquieu in 1728, and they both returned to France\nin 1729. Voltaire published his _Letters on the English_ in 1734 and\nhis _Elements of the Philosophy of Newton_ in 1738.[47] Montesquieu\nhad published a fierce invective against the political institutions\nof France in 1721, a discussion of the decadence of the Romans in\n1734, and his famous _Spirit of the Laws_ in 1748, selling twenty-two\neditions in eighteen months. Voltaire introduced and espoused the\nreligious theory of Locke in deistic form, and Montesquieu expounded\nLocke\u2019s theory of government. Their writings were widely read by the\nupper classes, and this theoretical revolutionary movement against all\nexisting institutions got momentum about 1735.\n\nThe aim of this movement was entirely aristocratic. The solution of the\nexisting predicament in France lay for them in the greater care of the\nmasses by an enlightened tyranny. The dualism of the classes was always\nassumed. The few are to be cultured; for them reason is to take the\nplace of dogma. The masses are not amenable to reason, have no capacity\nfor education, and for them religion suffices. To free the individual\nfrom terror of the supernatural, to release his morality from\nJesuitical dominance, to give him intellectual independence of state\nand church\u2015\u2015this was the working idea of the intellectual Enlightenment.\nThought should be free, and the conscience of the individual should\nbe untrammeled, because the reason is a sufficient guide. Being thus\nrationalistic, the movement was aristocratic. A new aristocracy should\nbe substituted for the old\u2015\u2015an aristocracy of the cultured instead of\nthe corrupt and ignorant, who were then the dominant French classes\nin church and state. The illuminati should participate in the existing\npolitical privileges.\n\n=Voltaire= (1694\u20131778).[48] Voltaire was a deist when he went to\nEngland, and he was therefore very much impressed by the prevalent\nEnglish deism. Among the English deists, Bolingbroke had the greatest\ninfluence over him, and he was the \u201cdirect progenitor of Voltaire\u2019s\nreligious opinions.\u201d Bolingbroke\u2019s light and supercilious infidelity\nof the man of the world was suited to Voltaire. A universal genius,\nVoltaire wrote on every subject; but \u201cnot one of his books but bears\nmarks of his sojourn in England.\u201d He read with familiarity all the\nEnglish philosophers,\u2015\u2015Hobbes, Berkeley, Cudworth, Locke; but always\nreturning to Locke. \u201cHarassed, wearied, ashamed of having sought so\nmany truths and found so many chimeras, I returned like a prodigal\nson to his father and threw myself into the arms of that modest man\nwho never pretends to know what he does not know; who in truth has no\nenormous possessions, but whose substance is well assured.\u201d\n\nIn his _Philosophical Letters_ Voltaire makes invidious comparisons\nbetween Locke\u2019s Empiricism and Descartes\u2019 Rationalism, between English\nDeism and French Catholicism, and between the English government\nand the French government. Toward Christianity, as he saw it in his\nown country, his hatred amounted to fanaticism. His strictures were\nso scathing that Christians have looked upon him as an atheist. He\nwas, however, a deist, who believed that, while we can know God\u2019s\nexistence, we cannot know his nature. He was fond of bringing all\ndogma under criticism, and \u201cwhile he denied nothing, he cast suspicion\nupon everything.\u201d He called himself the \u201cignorant philosopher.\u201d To\nhim atheism was preferable to dogma and superstition. His passion for\ninvective against the French clergy was so great that his constructive\nstatements about God and immortality were cold and impersonal.\n\n=The Encyclop\u00e6dists.=[49] In modern times the French have been\nunequaled in their encyclop\u00e6dias and dictionaries. The famous\n_Encyclop\u00e9die_ or _Dictionnaire Raisonn\u00e9_ was what its name implies.\nIt was published in seventeen volumes during the years from 1751 to\n1766, and had an addition of eleven volumes of plates (1766\u20131772).\nThirty thousand copies were printed in the first instance, and\nin 1774 it was translated into four foreign languages. The moving\nspirit and editor-in-chief was Diderot (1713\u20131784) and his chief\nassistant d\u2019Alembert. They were assisted by many notable French\nwriters like Voltaire, Rousseau, Grimm, von Holbach, etc., who wrote\nseparate articles. There was a host of unsolicited contributors.\nTwo years before the _Encyclop\u00e6dia_, Buffon had begun to publish his\n_Natural History_ in forty-three volumes, the last volume appearing\nin 1789. The _Encyclop\u00e6dia_ had two predecessors,\u2015\u2015Bacon\u2019s chapter\non _Experimental History_ and Chambers\u2019s _Encyclop\u00e6dia_. The articles\nin the _Encyclop\u00e6dia_ were presumably scientific explanations\nalphabetically arranged, such as would appear in any work of the\nsort. Frequently they were disguised attacks upon existing French\ninstitutions. Often a detailed description, as on the subject \u201cTaxes\u201d\nor \u201cGod,\u201d would reveal existing French conditions. As Comte says,\n\u201cThe _Encyclop\u00e6dia_ furnished a rallying ground for the most divergent\nefforts without any sacrifice of essential independence, and made a\nmass of incoherent speculation appear like a coherent system.\u201d The two\nsuccessive periods of the movement of the Enlightenment unite in the\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia_ against the common enemy of authority.\n\nThere are two things to be noticed in connection with the\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia_: the men who wrote it went much further toward\nindividualism and skepticism than did Voltaire; and the _Encyclop\u00e6dia_\nreached a wider circle and different classes than did the works of\nVoltaire. Instead of the deism of Voltaire we find contributions\nfrom skeptics, atheists, and materialists,\u2015\u2015men who are becoming more\nnegative in their opinions as the century advances. The thorough-going\nagnosticism of the Encyclop\u00e6dist group reached a point where it ceased\nto be a philosophy. Diderot had said that the first step in philosophy\nis unbelief, and his associates went so far as to think that unbelief\nis all of philosophy. Their extreme sensationalism, naturalism, and\nmaterialism sometimes appeared in disguised form in the _Encyclop\u00e6dia_,\nbut more often in independent writings. The _Encyclop\u00e6dia_ became the\nsource of information for everybody. It spread information among all\nclasses and undermined their reverence for French institutions. The\nresult was that what had been sacred to the court and the laborer\nbecause it was traditional, now became the object of scorn to all.\n\nThe most profound of the sensationalists of this time was Condillac\n(1715\u20131780),[50] who does not, however, appear to be connected with\nthe _Encyclop\u00e6dia_. He published his _Treatise on Sensations_ in 1754,\nwhich reduced Locke\u2019s psychological analysis to a pure sensationalism.\nThe well-known figurative statue endowed only with the sense of smell\nwas conceived by him. He introduced Locke\u2019s psychology into France,\nwhence it was carried into Germany.\n\n=The Social Enlightenment= (1762\u20131789). The second period of the\nFrench Enlightenment begins with the publication of Rousseau\u2019s _Contrat\nSocial_ in 1762 and culminates in the Revolution. The influence of\nRousseau dominates the second period as that of Voltaire dominated the\nfirst. Voltaire had never aimed at a social revolution. His objective\npoint was to reinstate the understanding, to emancipate the individual\nby self-culture and by freedom of thought. He was not historian enough\nto see that he could not revolutionize intellectual France without\npulling down the social structure. He did not realize that in striking\nat the tyranny of the church he was dealing a fatal blow at the\nstructure of French society. The literary fencing between Voltaire and\nthe adroit churchmen might have been amusing, had the issue not been\nso serious. But although superficial and vain, Voltaire was downright\nin earnest. At one time it seemed as if the intellectual Enlightenment\nwould work itself out in the church. But the causes of the revolt were\ntoo deeply social, the malady against which Voltaire was aiming was too\nvital; and besides, at that moment attention was being directed to the\ncharacter of the State itself.\n\n=Rousseau= (1712\u20131778).[51] Rousseau began at the point where Voltaire\nleft off. He was under the influence of Voltaire at the first and\nreceived from Voltaire his original productive impulse. But the\nconcrete right of individuals, and not their abstract intellectual\nfreedom, was what appealed to Rousseau. Strict moderation and literary\nfreedom were too negative, half-hearted, for a reformer of Rousseau\u2019s\ntype. Public opinion was not to be found in Versailles, as Voltaire\nthought, but in the streets of Paris. The Revolution then came to a\nhead, and we find the schools of Voltaire and Rousseau locking horns.\nVoltaire\u2019s theory of moderation was represented in the Constituent\nAssembly and the upper and middle classes, while Rousseau\u2019s radicalism\nwas introduced in the Convention and fully expounded in the sections of\nthe Commune of Paris which attacked the Convention. History shows how\nimpossible the aim of each school was, and how the contest had to be\nfought over again in the nineteenth century.\n\nRousseau lived a wandering and adventurous life, full of hallucinations\nand self-created trouble. He made many friends, only to quarrel with\nthem. He was half insane, and his career inspires both disgust and\nadmiration. His numerous works fill twenty-two volumes, the most\nimportant ones being two prize essays published in 1750 and 1773, which\nrepresent the negative side of his doctrine; _H\u00e9lo\u00efse_, 1761; _Emile_,\n1762; _Le Contrat Social_, 1762; and his _Confessions_, which contain\nhis constructive thought.\n\nRousseau was at first a contributor to the _Encyclop\u00e6dia_, but at\nheart he cared nothing for the diffusion of knowledge and art. He did\nnot understand the comprehensive intellectual ambition of Diderot; he\nresented the utilitarianism of Helvetius and the materialism of Holbach.\nWhen he wrote his prize essay in 1750, he suddenly perceived how absurd\nthe intellectual Enlightenment was amid the distressing social state\nof France. He turned against both the existing order and the would-be\nintellectual reformers. The temporal order of things was to him awry.\nStudy, knowledge, and cultivation were to him only a gloss over the\ndeep-lying degradation. Society, as it is constructed, is artificial,\nand all organization is a tyranny. God exists, and He is good. Man\nwas good until civilization and art invaded his simplicity, corrupted\nhis virtues, and transformed him into a suffering and a sinful being.\nRousseau\u2019s call was that of anarchism. It was a condemnation of the\nentire past. Sweep all the so-called civilization away, and level\ninequalities. Go back to nature; and in the simplicity of that idyllic\nstate let children grow up undirected except by their own uncorrupted\ninstinct,\u2015\u2015that \u201cimmortal and celestial voice.\u201d\n\nIn an age tired of oppression and corruption Rousseau struck a\nsympathetic chord which made the intellectual Enlightenment sound\nfalse. His contemporaries did not inquire into the motives of the mean\nlunatic. They did not then see that he was a doctrinaire holding up an\nunpractical ideal in contrast with their present state. He alone in all\nFrance was the one to appeal to man\u2019s self-respect. He alone appealed\nto the only motives that will result in action,\u2015\u2015the human emotions.\nHis plea was for every Frenchman, and his words for the unfortunate\nwere given with such eloquence that the fortunate were compelled to\nlisten. They were a majestic language of wide compassion and sympathy.\nHe saw in the French monarchy the greatest misery for the greatest\nnumber, and no one of its supporters appeared to the people so generous\nand true as he. His influence not only upon his own time but upon\nthe nineteenth century was extraordinary, and some have said that he\nis the greatest modern. At all events he sounded the keynote of our\nown civilization, especially in art, literature, and education; for\nhe showed the fundamental correlation between Nature and the passions.\nRousseau taught a sentimental deism, in which sentiment is the\nessential part.\n\nThe Revolution was the natural consummation of the Enlightenment in\nFrance. The immediate issues out of which it grew were the practical\nones of finance, legislation, economics, and policy. The growth in the\nphysical sciences (beginning 1760), in the study of political science,\nin the theory of government, as well as the financial distress of\nthe French government, the success of the American Revolution, the\nadvance of the French middle class to a position of power, the foolish\nand half-hearted measures of the French statesmen\u2015\u2015all these were\nfactors that at the end brought on the crisis. Yet the words of\nRousseau, falling on fruitful soil, were the real cause. In the years\nimmediately preceding the Revolution there was a world-wide agitation,\nan enthusiasm for nature, an exaltation of man, and a contempt for the\nage and for the society then existing. There was a vague presentiment\nof impending change, which most people were prepared to welcome.\nThinkers were full of illusions. Even such despots as Frederick the\nGreat, Catherine of Russia, and Joseph of Austria affected a radicalism,\nand Spain, Portugal, and Tuscany, as well as England, France, and\nGermany, were moved with great humanitarian sentiments. The debate\nwas universal as to the condition of the human race. Rousseau was the\neloquent expression of this world-wide movement.\n\n=The German Enlightenment= (1740\u20131781). As the Enlightenment in France,\nso the Enlightenment in Germany had its introductory period. The\nhistory of Germany from the end of the Thirty Years\u2019 War (1648) to the\npublication of Kant\u2019s _Critique_ (1781), or 133 years, is divided into\ntwo periods at the year 1740, when Frederick the Great was crowned.\nThe period from 1740 to 1781, or forty-one years, is the German\nEnlightenment. The period from 1648 to 1740, or ninety-two years,\nis introductory to the Enlightenment, and, as in France, a period\nof absolutism.\n\n=The Introductory Period= (1648\u20131740). =Absolutism.= The spirit of\nabsolutism, both politically and intellectually, dominated Germany from\nthe end of the Thirty Years\u2019 War (1648) to the crowning of Frederick\nthe Great (1740). Absolutism dominated Germany and France a full one\nhundred years. There are some differences between the two countries,\nhowever. It began and ended in Germany about thirty-five years later\nthan in France. Again, in France it grew in splendor from the efforts\nof Richelieu and Louis XIII (1610) to the great protective idea of\nLouis XIV, who for seventy-two years ruled as absolute political and\nintellectual dictator. In Germany, on the other hand, it was a spectre\nhovering over a disintegrating and decaying nation once known as the\nHoly Roman Empire, but since the Thirty Years\u2019 War only a collection of\nstates under a nominal central government. The idea of absolutism\nprevailed none the less, for within the several states each monarch was\ndictator as to the religious, intellectual, and political opinions of\nhis subjects.\n\nPolitically and socially the Holy Roman Empire was in striking contrast\nto the power and splendor of contemporaneous France. The Thirty Years\u2019\nWar had left the empire absolutely desolate. The land was impoverished,\nthe nation disrupted, and the population reduced from seventeen\nmillions before the war to five millions after the war. The war had\nbeen a generation long and it had degraded the nation. It had settled\nnothing. It left the people poor and the princes absolute within their\nrespective states. The upper classes everywhere, except at Weimar, had\nbecome profligate. The universities were reduced to a position below\nwhat they were in the Renaissance. The prince of each state established\nthe religion for his state, so that practically no religious liberty\nhad been gained. Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics were exhausted,\nbut were still antagonistic. There was no moral activity among\nthe Orthodox; often they set their own immorality up to prove the\nabsolutism of their respective dogma. The war left Germany politically\nprostrate and intellectually stagnant.\n\nIn the years that follow the Thirty Years\u2019 War it is possible to\ndetect movements that are the beginnings of the Enlightenment. It is\nan important point that Germany was resuscitated from sources that\nlay within her own civilization. The French Enlightenment and the\nintellectual freedom of modern France were due largely to the influence\nof foreign ideas from England. The seeds of the German intellectual\nrevival were developed on her own soil. Those beginnings are (1) the\nrise of Prussia; (2) the early German literature; (3) the Pietistic\nmovement; (4) the transformation of Leibnitz\u2019s rationalism.\n\n1. The rise of the little electorate of Brandenburg to the powerful\nkingdom of Prussia in 1740 was the political basis of the Enlightenment\nthat followed. No state had suffered more during the Thirty Years\u2019 War.\nThe entire population was reduced to less than a million, and Berlin,\nthe capital, had only three hundred citizens. The government was as\nharshly absolute as elsewhere. The rights of the citizens were entirely\ntaken away by the three princes who ruled over Prussia between 1648 and\n1740. But a powerful kingdom was built up, with a strong and patriotic\narmy. It extended its dominions and was a refuge for Protestants, who\nfled to it in large numbers. It came to be feared by all the German\nstates, and in the latter part of this period it had to be reckoned\nwith in the councils of Europe. Itself an absolutism, it was the\nvigorous political body that alone could destroy the traditional\nabsolutism of the Hapsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire. Puffendorf\ndeclared that the old Empire with its feeble sovereignties was a\nmonster. It was a monster spectre\u2015\u2015a stubborn political idea that\nhovered over Europe. Frederick the Great\u2019s mission in the next period\nwas to destroy it.\n\n2. The meagre German literature of this early period was also an\nimportant factor in the development of the Enlightenment. Poor, indeed,\nit was. Never was German literary production so low. Before the war the\nGermans had taken Greek as their model; after the war they copied the\nlanguage, manners, and methods of the French of Louis XIV. The early\nliterature was ruled in the same spirit of absolutism by Opitz until\n1700, and after him by Gottsched, especially in the years from 1730\nto 1740. It was for only a small fraction of the people, and was in\nthe interests of the depraved aristocrats of the courts. Such pedantic\nabsolutism was the basis of the reaction in the next period of the\nliterary Enlightenment, which proved the redemption of Germany.\n\n3. The Pietistic movement was the third factor that went to make up\nthe German Enlightenment. It was a positive expression of religious\nindividualism, similar in its position to the Prussian state in its\nindependent growth in politics. It was a religious movement outside the\nchurch. Its two leaders were Spener (1635\u20131705) and Francke (1663\u20131727).\nThe movement entered Germany from the Netherlands; and the members\nwere devout and holy men consecrated to good deeds. The Pietists were\nnot heroic figures like the early Lutherans, but they stood for what\nLuther had in his early period taught. They opposed ecclesiastical\nformalism, and they proclaimed the need of personal regeneration and\nof the universal priesthood. They stood for religious freedom. They\nmade no onslaught upon the church, but they were content with saving\nindividuals. Pietism united at first with Rationalism\u2015\u2015of which we\nshall next speak\u2015\u2015against orthodoxy, but when the two had won their\nvictory they quarreled. Although the Pietistic movement later became\nitself conventional, it furnished the ground for the religious freedom\nof the Enlightenment. During these hundred years of German religious\nabsolutism, the Pietists represent the moral activity among religious\nbodies.\n\n4. The chief source of the Enlightenment was the philosophy of\nLeibnitz. In turning back to the life of this distinguished German the\nreader will remember that he was the \u201cfirst scientist in two hundred\nyears,\u201d and that he was the Rationalist who presaged the Enlightenment.\nLeibnitz was born in 1646, just two years before the war closed, and\nhe died in 1716, one year after the death of Louis XIV. He lived during\nthose unfruitful years after the war and before the Enlightenment;\nand his philosophy stands out prominently from the low plane of\nthe intellectual activity of that time. In 1686 he completed the\nconstruction of his philosophy by introducing the conception of the\nindividual as a dynamic centre.\n\nMany German philosophers, about the time of Leibnitz, had later tried\nto free philosophy from its technical difficulties and make it readable\nfor the people as the French Encyclop\u00e6dia was for the French people.\nAmong these were Tschirnhausen (1651\u20131708), Mendelssohn (1729\u20131786),\nand Tetens (1736\u20131805), but the German Enlightenment for many reasons\ndid not come about like the French in the popularizing of philosophy.\nThe philosophy of Leibnitz did reach the people directly, but the\npeople were stirred through the medium of literature rather than of\nphilosophy. Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy became the dominant thought only\nin the universities and academic circles, and remained so until the\npublication of Kant\u2019s _Critique_ in 1781. The Halle professor, Wolff\n(1679\u20131754), developed and transformed it, not to its advantage, into\nan absolutism, and under the name of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy\nit was the canon for the German schools. Once established in the\nuniversities it remained unchanged there even by the invasion of\nFrench thought that penetrated other German circles. Even Voltaire\u2019s\nresidence at the court at Berlin (1750) had no influence upon the\nLeibnitz-Wolffian philosophy of the Berlin Academy. The dogmatic\nabsolutism of this philosophy remained impregnable in academic circles\nand was the last to be dislodged\u2015\u2015and then only by a German. There was\nlittle progress among these Rationalists, once their doctrine had been\ncast, except in incorporating in an eclectic fashion the doctrine of\nothers.\n\nWolff systematized the unordered and desultory doctrines of Leibnitz\nfor the purpose of teaching them logically. This was in 1706, when by\nthe aid of Leibnitz he obtained the professorship of mathematics at\nHalle. He met with instant success. The rationalism of his doctrine\nis seen from the title of many of his works, which are _Reasonable\nThoughts on God_, _Reasonable Thoughts on the Powers of the Human\nUnderstanding_, etc. He lectured at Halle until 1723, when he was\nexpelled by the theological influence. His return to Halle in 1740 was\ncoincident with the crowning of Frederick the Great and the beginning\nof the German Enlightenment. We can note a few general aspects of his\nteaching. He employed the German language in his lectures, following\nThomasius, who was the first to do it. Leibnitz had written in letters\nand treatises for the few, and had used either Latin or French. Wolff\nexpanded Leibnitz\u2019s doctrine, broadly and superficially, for a larger\npublic, in the German tongue. He systematized Leibnitz\u2019s teaching,\nand thereby could disseminate it. But in doing this he so toned down\nLeibnitz\u2019s leading ideas that they lost all their peculiar force.\nFor instance, he taught that only the human mind has the power of\nrepresentation; and again, that pre\u00ebstablished harmony applies only\nto the relation of the soul and body of the human monad. In general, he\nso extended the Leibnitz principle of sufficient reason that it applied\nto all departments, and was reduced to the principle of identity.\nThe world is a huge mechanism designed for divine ends. Rationality\nis assumed to be everywhere, and knowledge of its existence is to be\nobtained only by deduction from evident principles. The result was\nthat the philosophy of Leibnitz was reduced to a commonplace and empty\nrationalism\u2015\u2015a purely deductive affair. Wolff undertook to demonstrate\neverything, and to make intelligible what is above reason. The\nWolffian philosophy was a reversion to medi\u00e6val scholasticism, since\nit solved all problems by proof through the cogency of mathematical and\nlogical processes. Truth is a matter of definition and classification.\nThus Wolff produced a philosophy that was pedantic and formal,\nclear but shallow. It was Leibnitzian with Leibnitz omitted; it was\na thorough-going dogmatism, because no problem was difficult to it; it\nwas a rationalism, because to it all truth is the deliverance of the\nreason and none is derived from experience.\n\nThe Wolffian Rationalism became a factor in the German Enlightenment\non the one hand by combining with Pietism, and on the other through\nits translation into the new German literature. In itself the Wolffian\nRationalism was a dogmatism that merely supplanted the dogmatic\nscholasticism of Melanchthon and Luther. It lost its absolutism in its\ncombination with Pietism, and became a personal and individualistic\nreligion. It also lost its absolutism and became more like the\nphilosophy of Leibnitz through its translation into the literary\nwritings of Lessing and Herder; and thus was subordinated to an\nincident in individual culture.\n\n=Summary of the Literary Enlightenment of Germany= (1740\u20131781). The\nGerman Enlightenment was thus made possible by the political growth\nof Prussia, by the development of a meagre literature, by the rise of\nPietism, and by the Wolffian interpretation of Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy.\nAll these were important features of the century following the Thirty\nYears\u2019 War. The year 1740 is the beginning of the German Enlightenment.\nIt marks the crowning of Frederick the Great, the decline of the\ninfluence of Gottsched in literature, and Wolff\u2019s return to Halle.\nThe arrival of Voltaire in Berlin (1750) is an important factor in\nthe rise of the German Enlightenment. The spirit of the Enlightenment\nwas at its height twenty years later (1760), contemporaneous with the\nSeven Years\u2019 War (1756\u20131763) and with the publication by Lessing in\n1759 of his _Letters concerning the most Modern Literature_. In these\n_Letters_ Lessing gave the death-blow to Gottschedism, and established\nthe Enlightenment on a firm basis. This was followed by the Storm and\nStress movement (1773\u20131787), which brought the Enlightenment proper to\nan end.\n\n1730\u20131750 Period of Experimentation\u2015\u2015Gottsched, the Swiss, the\nAnacreonticists, etc.\n\n1740 The Enlightenment inaugurated\u2015\u2015the crowning of Frederick the Great,\nthe decline of Gottschedism, the return of Wolff to Halle.\n\n1750 The coming of Voltaire to Berlin.\n\n1751\u20131780 Lessing and the Enlightenment.\n\n1773\u20131787 Storm and Stress Period.\u2015\u2015The Enlightenment proper at an\nend.[52]\n\n1787\u20131805 Classicism. (Schiller d. 1805).\n\n1795\u20131850 (approximately) The Romantic Movement.\n\n1850\u2013 The Realistic Movement.\n\n=The Political Enlightenment of Germany\u2015\u2015Frederick the Great.=\nPolitical changes preceded and did not follow philosophical theories\nin the German Enlightenment. Germany was therefore like England\nand unlike France in this respect. The coming of Frederick to the\nthrone of the now powerful Prussia, the reforms that he inaugurated,\nthe religious toleration that he granted, his recall of Wolff to\nHalle, his avowed support of intellectual things, and especially the\nSeven Years\u2019 War (1756\u20131763) were the political groundwork that made\npossible the Enlightenment in Germany. Frederick himself is the great\nfigure in the German Enlightenment, just as Voltaire is in the French.\nFrederick accomplished in concrete acts for political Europe what\nVoltaire accomplished for ecclesiastical Europe. Voltaire destroyed\nthe ecclesiastical absolutism of the spiritual power, while Frederick\ndestroyed the absolutism so long connected with the name of the Holy\nRoman Empire and the House of Hapsburg. Before he died, he had freed\nthe German states from the dominance of Austria, and had given to\nthe Empire its death-blow. In the Seven Years\u2019 War he had given to\nmodern Europe an example of a new political ideal in an autocrat who\nprofessed to be the servant of the State. His whole thought was upon\nthe advancement of his State. He set up the principle of the equality\nof his subjects before the law, and the principle of religious and\nphilosophical liberty. In his external struggles with Austria and in\nthe internal construction of his kingdom Frederick is the protest of\nthe Enlightenment against the arbitrary despotism of political Europe.\nThe example of Frederick was an inspiration to all Germany. Kant calls\nthe eighteenth century the Age of Frederick the Great. Frederick had\nmade his subjects feel that they were Prussians, or, as Goethe puts it,\n\u201cFritzche\u201d (Fritz\u2019s men); that the great foe of the German people was\nthe German Empire as personified by the Austrians and Saxons. When he\nhad conducted to a successful issue a deadly war of seven years single\nhanded against the combined force of more than half of Europe,\u2015\u2015Austria,\nRussia, and France, all representing political absolutism,\u2015\u2015he inspired\npatriotism not only in his own subjects, but in the people of many\nother German states. Reforms were undertaken in Bavaria, Baden, Saxony,\nBrunswick, etc., and by Catherine of Russia and Joseph of Austria.\n\nFurthermore, Frederick himself was personally enlightened; he looked\nupon himself as the greatest among those of enlightened intellects. He\nhad become denationalized by his early training. His father was fond\nof what was German, his mother of what was English, and he himself\nof what was French. He had studied Bayle, read French philosophy, and\nbecome acquainted with the rationalism of Wolff and the empiricism of\nLocke. He was at one time an atheist and materialist; but deism was his\nnatural attitude of mind, for he emphasized morality above speculation.\nConceiving himself, as the most enlightened, to be the great servant\nof the State, he undertook the enlightenment of his people. All Prussia\nmust be enlightened by him, and therefore no restrictive institutions,\nsuch as guilds and corporations, could be permitted. The best man\nshould rule, and he was the best man. Since the people are incapable of\nlooking after themselves, they must be compelled under his benevolent\nautocracy to be enlightened, rational, and happy.\n\n=The Course of the German Enlightenment.= Why did not the movement\nbecome as in France a political revolution? There are three reasons\nwhy it did not: (1) the reforms that the German princes adopted were\nwise; (2) Germany was composed of segregated states in which concerted\naction was difficult; (3) a new intellectual and \u00e6sthetic current was\nbegun by Lessing, of whom we shall speak. There is no doubt that the\nEnlightenment in Germany pointed to the same result as in France. From\n1760 to 1780 it looked as if Germany as well as France would witness\na tremendous social upheaval. From 1773 to 1787, Germany was stirred\nby the Storm and Stress movement. Frederick himself had pointed to the\nEnglish parliamentary government as the \u201cmodel for our days.\u201d The most\nof the German thinkers were at heart republicans,\u2015\u2015Klopstock, Schiller,\nKant. Every man in Germany became a little Frederick, and tried to\nenlighten those who were inferior to him. The movement extended to the\nschoolroom. Secret societies were formed of kindred enlightened souls\nto enlighten the world. The most important of these societies was the\nIlluminati. The aim of these was to free men from national and civil\nties, from pedantry, intolerance, political and theological slavery.\nThe human heart is the basis of society, and the only worthy object of\nstudy. The Illuminati included even princes among its members. It was\nestablished in 1776 and prohibited in 1786. There was a distinctive\nStorm and Stress literature. This was set in motion by Rousseau\u2019s\n_H\u00e9lo\u00efse_ and _Emile_, which were widely read in Germany. Writers\nglorified the individual, called men back to primitive and uncorrupted\nnature, denounced civilization, and for twenty years it almost seemed\nas if the German Enlightenment had turned from the intellectual\nachievements of Lessing, and would follow the sentimental appeal of\nRousseau. Herder was particularly prominent in this movement, also\nGoethe and Schiller in their early writings.\n\nOf the three factors that saved Germany from a political revolution,\nperhaps the most potent was the new, fresh, literary ideas of Lessing.\nIf Frederick is the originator of the German Enlightenment, Lessing\nis the savior of it. The Enlightenment in England stopped with the\nphenomenalism of Hume, in France with the Revolution, but in Germany it\nhas in a sense continued even to the present day. The classic period of\nGoethe and Schiller, the modern scientific achievements of the Germans,\nhave their perpetual source in Lessing. He not only gave the death-blow\nto the pedantic absolutism of the intellectual past, but he set the\nmovement upon a permanent intellectual basis, upon which it has stood\nagainst the assaults of sentimentalism for a hundred and fifty years.\n\n=Lessing.= G. E. Lessing (1729\u20131781) was not only a sound scholar,\nbut a polished man of the social world. He was a writer of epigrams,\nfables, and comedies, a dramatic and literary critic, a translator\nand essayist, a student of philosophy and ecclesiastical history, and\na writer upon art. His _Nathan the Wise_ is, after Goethe\u2019s _Faust_,\nthe greatest literary production of German thought. With him German\nliterature begins. He rejected the French models accepted by Gottsched;\nhe introduced Shakespeare to the Germans; and he surpassed all his\ncontemporaries in literary and artistic reform, social enlightenment,\nand religious emancipation. Lessing and Winckelmann were the first to\nspread a love for the past by a critical study of it. Lessing was not\na violent iconoclast like Voltaire, but a discriminating critic. He\nsaid that if Leibnitz had wished for an interpreter, he would not\nhave chosen Wolff. The new literary writers, Lessing and Herder, in\ntheir insistence upon subjectivity and intuition, rather than Wolff,\nwere the true interpreters of Leibnitz. Lessing differed from the\nEnlightenment in his conception of the present in its continuity with\nthe past. Herder, too, was interested in development. Lessing pointed\nto the perfect models in the past; Herder to the origins of things.\nBoth believed in an immanent God and the harmony of the universe.\nAt this time the problems in \u00e6sthetics came to light, and with them\nthe creation of \u201cworld literature,\u201d which drew from all historical\nthought\u2015\u2015from antiquity, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. The\nPietists, the Wolffians, and the literary writers agreed in taking the\nsubjective point for their view of life. Thus Leibnitz appears through\nLessing as a motive power in the German Enlightenment. Lessing\u2019s\ndoctrine of individuality so transcended that of the Storm and Stress\nPeriod that he was not understood by it. His enlightened individual\nsuppresses his individuality. But his principles were so fundamental\nthat the Storm and Stress Period proved to be only an interruption,\nand the German Enlightenment was perpetuated. He thus projected himself\nbeyond the eighteenth century by the instruments of that century.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER X\n\n KANT[53]\n\n\n=The Convergence of Philosophical Influences in Germany.= The\nintellectual thoroughfare from the past into our modern times does\nnot pass in the eighteenth century through England, nor yet through\nFrance, but by way of Germany. Traditional France ended with the French\npolitical revolution, while the English empirical movement proved its\nown inconsistency in the phenomenalism of Hume. In Germany alone, at\nthe close of the eighteenth century, there was a renewed and brilliant\nintellectual life. In its creative productions it has been compared by\nthe Germans to the Systematic Period of Greek thought (from the death\nof Socrates to that of Aristotle). Both periods appeared when the\npolitical fortunes of the respective countries were at their lowest ebb.\n\nThere were six large influences that converged upon this epoch, some of\nwhich we have already noted as beginning even as far back as the period\nintroductory to the Enlightenment (1648\u20131740) (see pp. 217 ff.). Some\nare later in their origin or come from a foreign source. Let us merely\nenumerate them here.\n\n(1) Pietism, the religious influence that began with Spener (1635)\nand swept Germany in the eighteenth century; (2) The sentimentalism\nof Rousseau; (3) The empirical psychology of Locke among the younger\nGermans; (4) The Rationalism of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, which\nwas most powerful in academic circles; (5) The mathematical rigorism of\nthe nature-philosophy of Newton; (6) The new literary writers in their\ninsistence upon subjectivity and intuition.\n\n=The Three Characteristics of German Philosophy.= German philosophy\nwill be seen to have three characteristics. (1) It is scholastic or\nacademic. It is the philosophy of the professors of universities.\nAt the same time it must be said to be the expression of the social\ngenius of the German people. Napoleon testified to this when he said,\n\u201cThe English inhabit the sea, the French the land, the Germans the\nair.\u201d (2) This German philosophy is mystical. It is profound rather\nthan external. It is not founded upon external experience, but upon a\nquestioning of the inner and spiritual life. It is inward, religious,\nand spiritual, like the philosophy of Plato. One of the most accurate\ninterpreters of Kant has pointed out the many similarities between\nKant and Plato (see Paulsen, _Immanuel Kant_). (3) German philosophy\nwas nevertheless cosmic, or a description of the world. These men\nwhom we are now to study were not ignorant of the world or of science.\nPolitical life offered them no attractions. The soul of man was\nregarded by them as too noble to be engrossed in external things.\nAs Madame De Sta\u00ebl said of the time, \u201cThere was nothing to do save\nfor him whose concern was with the universe.\u201d Men, however, took the\ninner point of view, and regarded all things with reference to it.\nThe Germans tried to humanize the universe. They looked upon nature as\nworking out unconsciously those processes which consciously took place\nin man. The contemplation of beauty is not that of an external world,\nbut of the inmost nature of reality. Thus individuality and cosmic\nreality are one and the same. Life has a joyful outlook, not because\nour tasks are easy, but because our strength is equal to them; for is\nnot God in us?\n\n=The Two Periods of German Philosophy.= German philosophy is divided\ninto two epochs: (1) the period of the formation of the critical theory\nof knowledge by Kant; (2) the period of the metaphysical development\nof Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, and Schopenhauer. Kant belongs\nboth to the Enlightenment and to German idealism. He is the point\nof convergence of the intellectual forces that preceded him and the\npoint of departure of the idealists who followed him. For this reason\nhistorians differ as to the period in which he is to be placed. In one\nsense he is the transition from the Enlightenment, in another sense\nhe is the introduction of German idealism. But in reality he forms\nan epoch between the two. Although the dualism, which was always the\nbackground of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, formed too the\nbackground of his thought, although he on the other hand looked upon\nhis _Critique of Pure Reason_ as only an introduction to a metaphysics,\nwhich he never wrote, nevertheless he occupies a unique place in\ndrawing up for his time and for the future a new conceptual standard by\nwhich the new problems might be criticised. The problem that Kant set\nbefore himself was epistemological and not one of metaphysics.\n\nAfter Kant there appeared a growth of metaphysics. The great\nGerman idealistic systems appeared. At first the Kantian theory\nwas misunderstood, but at Jena, then the chief intellectual centre\nin Germany, there was formed a little group of Kantians under the\nleadership of Rheinhold. Jena is near Weimar (see map p. 280), which\nwas the main literary city of Germany, and the residence of Goethe.\nThe poetry of Weimar and the philosophy of Jena stimulated each\nother. Schiller is a notable example of the influence of Kant upon the\nliterature of the time. In philosophy Kant was followed by the various\nsystems of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, and Schopenhauer, which\nbuilt a metaphysical superstructure upon the Kantian foundation.\n\n=The Influences upon Kant.= The development of Kant\u2019s thought was\nmodified by influences from at least five different sources.\n\n1. _Pietism._ This was the earliest influence upon his life, and\nwas due to his parents and to F. A. Schultze, the teacher of the\nhigh school of K\u00f6nigsberg. It will be remembered that this ethical\nPuritanism was a moral reaction against the formalism of the churches\nin the period after the Thirty Years\u2019 War. Kant never lost his\nattachment for the Pietists; and his later rigoristic ethical theory,\nas well as his own personal life, sprang from his early Pietistic\ntraining. Schiller wrote to Goethe, \u201cThere is always something about\nKant, as about Luther, which reminds one of the monk, who has indeed\nquitted his cloister, but who can never quite rid himself of its\ntraces.\u201d\n\n2. _The Leibnitz-Wolffian Philosophy._ This influence came during his\nacademic training in the University of K\u00f6nigsberg, which he entered\nupon at the age of sixteen years. This was in 1740, the same year in\nwhich Frederick was crowned and Wolff was recalled to Halle,\u2015\u2015the time\nwhen the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy was at the fullness of control\nof Germany. It must not be forgotten that this philosophy remained\ndominant in German academic circles until Kant\u2019s own theory supplanted\nit in the nineties. Kant was an avowed disciple of the Wolffian school\nfor the next twenty years (until 1760), and he never shook off the\nWolffian metaphysical dualism.\n\n3. _The Physics of Newton._ To his university training Kant was\nindebted also for his acquaintance with Newton. The antagonism between\nthe metaphysics of Wolff and the physics of Newton was, at least at the\nbeginning of Kant\u2019s career, of decisive importance in his development.\nOne of Kant\u2019s teachers at the university was Martin Knutzen, whose\nlectures included philosophy, mathematics, and natural science. Through\npersonal intercourse with Knutzen, the young Kant was introduced to the\nWolffian philosophy, and also to the Newtonian mathematics and physics.\nDuring his activity as a teacher Kant showed, even into his later\nperiod, a predilection for natural science, especially for physical\ngeography and anthropology. The same year in which he entered upon his\ncareer as teacher in the University of K\u00f6nigsberg (1755), he published\nhis celebrated _Theory of the Heavens_, in which he anticipated Laplace\nby forty years in the formulation of the nebular hypothesis.\n\n4. _The Humanitarianism of Rousseau._ Kant got from Rousseau a new\nevaluation of man. Kant had the advantage of a prolonged youthful\ndevelopment. He was well into his thirties when the movement,\nbegun by Lessing, became a social force in Germany. A new political\nconsciousness appeared among the German people, due to the influence\nof Frederick the Great and to that of the Frenchmen, Voltaire and\nRousseau. Kant was thirty-eight (in 1762) when he read Rousseau\u2019s\n_Emile_. Kant had been brought up in the common teaching of the early\npart of the Enlightenment to despise the ignorant masses of people.\nThrough Rousseau he received in words of authority the conception of\nthe inherent dignity of the individual man. Through this conception\nscience and speculation came to have a new value to Kant. They were\nno longer ends in themselves, but the means for moral development.\nThe moral in its primacy over the intellectual came to be a permanent\nfeature in Kant\u2019s doctrine. His early Pietism was confirmed, and\nRousseau replaced Newton in his regard.\n\n5. _The Skepticism of Hume._ The influence of Hume\u2019s skepticism\nwas felt by Kant just before his eleven years of silence, when he\nbecame engaged in his construction of his critical problem. But\nHume influenced Kant in a negative way. The classic and oft-quoted\nexpression of Kant, that Hume awoke him from his \u201cdogmatic slumber,\u201d\nrefers to the dogmatism of the empirical school to which Hume belonged,\nand not to that of the rationalistic school of Wolff. To Kant both\nempiricism and rationalism were dogmatic; the one because it assumed\nthe validity of sensations, the other because it assumed the existence\nof innate ideas. Thus Hume effected a reaction in Kant against Hume\u2019s\nown doctrine. But in thus reacting from Hume, Kant saw that the answer\nwas to be found not in the rationalism of Wolff, but in an ideal\nconception of space and time. Hume\u2019s influence was the last before Kant\nfirmly established his theory of knowledge in his _Critique of Pure\nReason_.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Kant= (1724\u20131804). The external changes in\nthe life of Immanuel Kant were the fewest possible. He was born at\nK\u00f6nigsberg in 1724; he went to the school of that city and then to its\nuniversity, and then acted in the capacity of tutor in families in the\nprovince of K\u00f6nigsberg. He became privat-docent in the university at\nthe age of thirty-one, and professor of logic and metaphysics at the\nage of forty-four. He was called to the University of Halle in 1778,\nbut he refused to leave K\u00f6nigsberg. In fact, Kant never went outside\nthe province, and but little outside the city. Nevertheless, in the\neighties he saw himself become the most important figure in K\u00f6nigsberg,\nand in the nineties the most important power in German academic circles.\nIn 1794 he came under the censure of the reactionary government of\nFrederick William II and \u201cwas obliged to refrain in the future from\nall public addresses on religion.\u201d This was the only outer conflict in\nhis life. In 1804, at the age of eighty, he died. The externals of his\nlife were from the beginning to the end an undeviating routine,\u2015\u2015his\nlectures, his daily walk, his dinner with friends, his hours of\nreflection upon his great problem. These have been made the subject\nof many descriptions.[54]\n\nThe life of Kant is notable because it is the history of an unusual\nsingleness of devotion to the solution of a speculative problem. His\nyouthful point of departure was the rationalism of Wolff; his point of\nattainment was the _Critique of Pure Reason_. Between these two points\nhis history was a series of mental reversals. Kant spoke of his life\nas divided into two parts at the year 1770; his pre-critical and his\ncritical periods. At that time there was a change in the form as well\nas the content of his writings. His pre-critical writings possess a\ngraceful, flowing style; his critical works are heavy and artificial in\ntheir structure, and reveal the labor with which his thought tried to\nreconcile contending _motifs_. So far as the content of Kant\u2019s thought\nis concerned the pre-critical period will be seen to fall into two\nsubdivisions at the year 1760. Kant\u2019s life may therefore be divided\ninto three epochs: (1) 1724\u20131760, the period when he was a Wolffian\nrationalist; (2) 1760\u20131770, the period when he was an empirical skeptic;\n(3) 1770\u20131804, the period when he was a critical epistemologist.\n\nIn the first period he accepted the rationalism of Wolff, but his main\ninterest, as shown by his writings, was in natural science. He was\ninspired by the natural philosophy of Newton, which, in the latter part\nof this period, led him to mistrust the metaphysics of Wolff. That is\nto say, he began to suspect that the mere logical operation of concepts\nby the \u201cpure reason\u201d could not be a statement about things in the real\nworld. In the next ten years\u2015\u2015his second period\u2015\u2015he became convinced\nthat the metaphysics of the rationalists was impossible, and yet that\nthe metaphysics of the empirical school of the English was equally\nabsurd. His writings during this time are more strictly devoted to\nquestions of metaphysics and epistemology. Then came his critical\nperiod. This was inaugurated by his celebrated Dissertation of 1770,\nfollowed by a period of eleven years of literary silence, a silence\nbroken by the publication of his _Critique of Pure Reason_ in 1781.\nBetween 1781 and 1790 appeared the more mature works from Kant\u2019s pen.\nAmong them were the _Critique of Practical Reason_ (1788) and the\n_Critique of Judgment_ (1790), formed on the model of the _Critique\nof Pure Reason_. Besides these, his minor writings were very numerous,\nand one notes an essay by him in the last year of his life. But the\nwritings of Kant after 1790 treat in the main of the philosophy of law\nand conduct, and show themselves to be the writings of his declining\nyears.\n\n=The Problem of Kant.= The problem which Kant placed before himself\nwas that of epistemology. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge,\nand Kant set to work to investigate the knowing process. The peculiar\nsignificance of Kant rests upon the fact that out of the various\ninfluences converging upon him and his time he matured a new conception\nof the problem and of the method of procedure of philosophy. He was\nconvinced that the problem of his time was not one of metaphysical\nspeculation, although he felt the value of such speculation in the\nregions of religion and morals. Yet he saw that the metaphysical\nrationalism of Wolff had proved itself inadequate because it was\nmerely the logical operation of concepts, and had not dealt with\nreal relations. He was equally sure that the empirical metaphysics\nof the Englishmen was inadequate because it was never certain of any\ntruth. Rational metaphysics was logically true, but not real; empirical\nmetaphysics was real enough, but never true. So Kant determined to find\nout the relation between the logical process of thought and the reality\nof things. He felt that the first problem in his time to be faced and\nsettled was the problem of knowledge,\u2015\u2015the epistemological problem.\nHe planned to face later the metaphysical problem, but he delayed this\nuntil too late in his old age. The problem of Kant can be put in the\nsimple question, What can we know? The metaphysical problem that he\ndeferred was, What is real? Yet his problem was not nearly so simple as\nthis statement would seem to make it; for the epistemological problem\nwhich he set himself was complicated by the Wolffian metaphysical\ndualism which he always presupposed. Since Kant agreed with the\nWolffian dualism\u2015\u2015the theory that a great gulf separates mind and\nmatter\u2015\u2015his query about knowledge was not the simple question, What can\nwe know? but the longer question, What can we know about the external\nworld?\n\n=The Method of Kant.= There is bound up with the epistemological\nproblem a new method of procedure in solving it. How shall we find\nout what we can know? Kant calls his method the critical method. It is\nnot only a criticism in a general sense, in that it weighs carefully\nthe conditions of knowledge. It is also criticism in the special\nsense of confining itself to a restricted field. Kant pointed out that\ntwo methods may be employed, the dogmatic and the transcendental. He\nasserted that the dogmatic method had been employed in the past and had\nproved itself fallacious. What is the dogmatic method? All philosophy\nwas dogmatic to Kant which sought to find out what knowledge is true\nby showing how it originated and developed. Dogmatism is no solution;\nit is merely a psychological tracing of ideas to their sources.\nThese sources will be either innate ideas, if we are rationalists,\nor sensations, if we are empiricists. _The true method is the\ntranscendental or critical method._ What is this method? It is a study\nof the nature of the reason itself. It is an examination of the \u201cpure\nreason\u201d to see if its judgments have in any instance a universality\nbeyond human experience, and yet are necessary to human experience.\nThe logic of such judgments must be absolutely reliable; and yet at\nthe same time the judgments must be applicable to the world of things.\nThe method being transcendental, such judgments are transcendental; not\nbecause they transcend our experience, but because they are necessary\nto experience. The transcendental is not what is chronologically but\nwhat is rationally _prior_. The transcendental is the indispensable\nto knowledge. The critical method is the finding of this indispensable\ncondition. Kant would search the whole field of the reason for this.\nSince to Kant thinking, feeling, and willing are the fundamental forms\nof the reason, he sought the realm of thought for the transcendental\nprinciples of knowledge, that of the will for the transcendental\nprinciples of morality, that of feeling for the transcendental\nprinciples of beauty.\n\n=The Threefold World[55] of Kant\u2015\u2015Subjective States,\nThings-in-Themselves, and Phenomena.= In his search for those\nindispensable conditions of knowledge of the external world, Kant\nunfolds the threefold character of the realm of human life. To Wolff\nthe world had been twofold. In other words, Wolff had conceived the\nworld as dual, in which there was a correspondence, part by part, of\nindependent reality to the states of consciousness. To Wolff reality is\nindependent of consciousness, and yet we are conscious of that reality.\nNow Kant never gave up entirely the Wolffian dualism, but he came to\nsee that in such a situation there could be no knowledge. For how can\nwe be conscious of what is absolutely independent of us? Consequently\nKant plundered the Wolffian worlds of independent realities to build\nup an intermediate world,\u2015\u2015a world of phenomena. He dissolved the\nsharpness of Wolff\u2019s dualism into a world with three divisions; and he\ngave to each division a new epistemological value. These were the realm\nof the subjective states or the inner consciousness of the individual,\nthe world of phenomena or the realm of knowledge, and the world of\nabsolute reality or that of things-in-themselves. The value of the\nworld of phenomena consists in its being the realm of knowledge. The\nother two realms have values of their own, which we shall describe\nbelow.\n\nWolff\u2019s twofold world may be thus compared with Kant\u2019s threefold\nworld:\u2015\u2015\n\n Wolff. Kant.\n\n 1. Mind. 1. Subjective states.\n 2. Phenomena\u2015\u2015the realm of knowledge.\n 2. Matter. 3. Things-in-themselves.\n\n1. The realm of subjective states evidently is not a realm of knowledge.\nFor it is the realm of intuition and immediate apprehension of the\nindividual\u2019s own ideas and sensations; and this is not what we mean by\nknowledge. This subjective world is that in which I live alone. It is\na realm of which nobody else is conscious, a realm which gives to me\nmy individuality. The only connecting linkage between my various purely\nsubjective states is the accidental order of time in which, empirically\nor by association, they occur. Animal intelligence possesses only\nsuch sense-perceptions and sensations, and these are modifications of\nits subjective consciousness. Such a mental constitution has not the\ncapacity for knowledge, but only the haphazard association of ideas.\nKant looked upon the content of subjective consciousness as the object\nonly of psychological investigation.\n\n2. The realm of things-in-themselves is not to Kant the realm of\nknowledge. By things-in-themselves Kant distinctly does not mean\nthings-for-us, not material bodies, not nature objects. It must be\nremembered that Kant has plundered the material realm of the dualist.\nThe things-in-themselves which are left behind as a residuum lie\noutside all sense-perception and so beyond all knowledge. A divine\nintelligence might have the things-in-themselves as objects of\nknowledge, but not we human beings. The thing-in-itself is the unknown\nand unknowable. But if this realm of things-in-themselves is so\nabsolutely independent of us that we cannot in any way know it, how\ncan we say that it exists? Kant replies to this: while we cannot say\n_what_ a thing-in-itself is, we are obliged to say _that_ it is. For\nalthough beyond even our sense-perception, it stands as a necessary\npostulate to perception, as a mere \u201cproblem.\u201d Kant also calls\nthings-in-themselves Noumena, and regards them as \u201climiting concepts\u201d\nto the divine non-sensuous intelligence. Their reality is as little to\nbe denied as affirmed.\n\n3. Kant pointed out that between or beside the realm of subjectivity\nand that of the things-in-themselves lies the realm of human knowledge,\nwhich we in our every-day speech call physical nature, and to which he\ngave the name \u201cthe world of phenomena\u201d or \u201cthe world of experience.\u201d\nThe subjective world is apprehended by the individual alone, the world\nof things-in-themselves is known by no human being, but the world of\nphenomena is the common object of knowledge of humanity. Phenomena are\nnot things-in-themselves, but things-for-us; they are physical nature,\nan interrelated totality for us. They constitute not absolute reality,\nbut a reality relative to us. Phenomena are experiences in their\nrelations; such related experiences are objects of knowledge, and in\ntheir thoroughly organized and systematic form they constitute nature.\n\nThus the dualism which we ordinarily meet, like the \u201ctwo world\u201d theory\nof Wolff, has many differences from this critical theory of Kant with\nits threefold divisions of one world. One of the most important is that\nin Kant\u2019s theory the correspondence between states of consciousness\nand reality has disappeared. Reality touches consciousness only at\none point,\u2015\u2015at that point where sensations arise. Sensations mark\nthe boundary between unknown reality and conscious life. On the side\nof reality all is darkness; on the side of conscious life all is the\ncreation of our complex synthetic activity. With the boundary line of\nsensation as a base, the two realms extend in opposite directions. In\nvalue the realm of our conscious life is only relative; that of reality\nor things-in-themselves is absolute.\n\n=The World of Knowledge.= There is this to be observed about the\nthreefold realm of Kant: the realm of subjectivity and that of\nknowledge together make up our conscious life. One is the realm of\nthe conscious individual, and the other the realm of the consciousness\nof humanity. Kant conceived this further distinction between the two\nrealms: in a purely subjective state the mind is entirely passive\nand its content is without control; in a state of knowing the mind is\nactively engaged in collecting and relating its ideas. This is called\nby Kant synthesis.\n\nWhen Kant was formulating his problem, there gradually came to him\nin clearer outline the synthetic nature of the activity of the human\nreason. He felt more and more that the secret of the knowing process\nwas to be explained by its function of combining many experiences into\na unity. This conception of synthesis is what separates the _Critique\nof Pure Reason_ from all the previous writings of Kant. Furthermore,\nthe three books of the _Critique_ are expositions of the different\nstages in which mental synthesis completes itself: in (1) perception,\n(2) understanding, and (3) reason. The knowing activity of man develops\nin these three different forms of synthesis, in which each lower stage\nis the content of the higher.\n\nWhat, then, is the central factor in knowledge? It is the synthetic\npower of the mind. The mind is not merely passively aware of its\nsensations as they come _seriatim_, but it actively relates them\nand holds them together. The mind is a dynamic agent whose activity\nconsists in synthesizing in the present moment its experiences of the\npast. The human mind is not like a curtain upon which stereopticon\npictures appear and then disappear in turn. It retains its pictures,\nalthough they are no longer being thrown upon the screen. Suppose we\nhear the ticking of a clock. Now if we had no synthetic power, all we\nshould apprehend would be one, one, one,\u2015\u2015and so on. But we do have\nsynthetic power, and we say one, two, three, and so on. We count in\na series in which each term includes the preceding term. Two includes\none, and three includes two, etc. This is knowledge. It is cumulative\nexperience. The experience of twenty animals, each having one\nexperience, is not the same as the experience of one man having twenty\nexperiences. In vain would nature act on man if the mind of man through\nmemory and imagination did not carry over experiences. So the important\nthing is not what happens, but what power the human mind has. Knowledge,\nthen, to Kant is the unifying of the manifold.\n\nThere are, therefore, two aspects to knowledge; the passive sensations\nand the active power of synthesis. Sensations, on the one hand, are the\nraw material out of which reason through its various forms creates the\nfinished fabric of knowledge. Sensations are the content of knowledge.\nOn the other hand, there is the active unifying power of the reason.\n_Knowledge consists of sensations and synthesis in conjunction._ Reason\nalone deals with \u201cthought relations\u201d or imaginations, whenever it\ntries to treat objects of which sensations are not the raw material.\nSensations alone, however, are only subjective states. The oft-quoted\nsayings of Kant, that \u201cOnly in experience is the truth,\u201d and that\n\u201cConception without perception is empty, perception without conception\nis blind,\u201d refer to the restriction of knowledge to the sense-materials\nand to the synthetic function of the reason.\n\n=The Place of Synthesis in Knowledge.= What position does synthesis\noccupy in the total process of knowledge? Is synthesis one of the\nfactors or elements of knowledge? Is synthesis on the same level\nwith the sensations, the feelings, the imaginations? No, it is very\ndifferent. The synthesis that Kant is describing is not the product\nor conclusion from an inference. Kant does not mean by synthesis the\ncombination of facts as a result, such as a biologist might make in\nframing the law of the habits of animals from his observation of them.\nThe synthesis that Kant is talking about is not so much the result of\ncombining experiences _as the act of combining them_. The frame of the\nunified manifold, the law of its unification, the act of binding the\nisolated experiences together is synthesis. Synthesis occupies a higher\nlevel than the elements of knowledge or knowledge itself. Synthesis is\nthe knowing process rather than the known product. It is constitutive;\nit is creative; it conditions experience and puts the material of\nexperience together. It must not be thought to be a voluntary act of\nthe mind, which the mind will or will not do, as it pleases. When the\nmind acts, it synthesizes.\n\nFurthermore, the synthetic functioning of all human minds everywhere\nis the same. However much their sensations differ, they combine\nand orderly arrange their sense-materials in the same ways. The\nsynthesis of the human mind is the source of the universality belonging\nto knowledge; the sensations, the \u201cgiven,\u201d are the source of the\ndifference in knowledge. Knowledge is the result of minds that function\nin absolutely the same ways; and we should never have knowledge if the\norder and linkage of the world depended on the accident of experience.\nTake, for example, such laws as those of mathematics or the physical\nlaw of cause. These are the same for everybody. They are universal\nlaws. The ordinary conception of them as independent principles of\nan independent nature world will not account for their necessity for\neverybody and their universality. As independent principles they would\ndiffer for different peoples just as sensations differ. In that case we\nshould have no knowledge. Human beings could not then think about the\nsame things, nor reason under the same guiding principles. However, we\ndo think alike, we have the same geometry, the same physical laws, the\nsame time-estimates; and simply because we function alike synthetically.\nKnowledge is thus the common possession of humanity because the\nsynthetic functioning of the different individual men is identically\nthe same.\n\nA very good way to get at Kant\u2019s central principle of synthesis is to\ndraw this picture. Suppose that besides the race of human beings with\nits own peculiar way of ordering its world, there were a race of angels\nendowed with its own powers, another of hobgoblins likewise endowed\nwith its own powers, and so on to x, y, and z races\u2015\u2015any number you\nplease. What would be the situation? In the first place, each one of\nthe groups would be absolutely isolated from each of the others. No\none would have the power to know even the existence of the others. No\none race would even have anything in common with the others. The world\nof each would be different. In the next place each would be trying\nto interpret reality, and in doing so, each would construct and order\na world of reality of its own. The members of each race would have a\nworld in common and the members would know one another. But that is\nall. The members of each race would not be able to get outside their\nown powers of synthesis. In Holy Writ the home of the angels has been\nsometimes described as having no time and space, but this means only\nthat space and time are aspects of our mental synthesis and not of\ntheirs. We live in our world of our interpretative construction of\nreality, and they in theirs. The same would have to be said of x,\ny, and z. None would live in a world of absolute reality. But each\nwould live in a world made different from all the other worlds by the\ndiffering mental powers of each race. Yet the members of each race\nwould inhabit a world in common because the individuals of each had\ncommon mental powers. The particular world that human beings inhabit\nis called physical nature, whose laws are known as the laws of science.\nHow can it be _one_ world in which so many millions of different human\nbeings live? Because these millions of human beings are under the same\nfundamental rational laws, and they construct the world in a common\nfashion. The laws of nature are, after all, the laws of our own minds.\nThey are the laws of reason. The laws of nature are not the laws of\nabsolute reality, but the laws of the human interpretation of reality.\nAll the linkage of facts, all the law and order of our universe, all\nthe combination of the variety of objects of knowledge\u2015\u2015in a word,\nthe entire body of science or the world of physical nature is a human\nmental synthesis. Does independent absolute reality exist? Yes; but\nit exists behind the scenes for us as for the angels. Mental synthesis\nis constitutive of the world in which we are actually engaged\u2015\u2015mental\nsynthesis is shot through and through all our experiences. Mental\nsynthesis is the framework of the universe, and therefore Kant says,\n\u201cThe world is my representation.\u201d\n\n=The Judgments Indispensable to Human Knowledge.= It will be seen\nfrom the above discussion that Kant does not believe that an idea or a\nsensation taken by itself constitutes knowledge. Knowledge consists of\nsensations framed together in a synthesis. That is, ideas must be taken\ntogether with other ideas. This is called in grammar a proposition,\nhaving a subject and a predicate. In logic it is called a judgment.\nThe only way a human being can express knowledge is in the form of\njudgments, but all judgments of human beings are not necessarily\nknowledge.\n\nJudgments are divided by Kant into two large classes,\u2015\u2015analytic and\nsynthetic. The large class of analytic judgments are not expressions\nof knowledge. What is an analytic judgment? An analytic judgment merely\nexpresses in the predicate something that is contained in the usual\nmeaning of the subject. Such a judgment articulates the meaning of\nan idea by emphasizing some of its well-known attributes. Thus we\nsay, \u201cGold is yellow.\u201d Such a statement about \u201cgold\u201d does not show\nany knowledge. It is called sometimes an explicative statement. It\nis tautologous, but not on that account trivial. Let us look then to\nsynthetic judgments to see if they express knowledge. But first, what\nis a synthetic judgment? A synthetic judgment is one in which the\npredicate is not contained in the usual meaning of the subject. It is\na statement of something new about the subject in hand. For example,\nthe judgment, \u201cThe watch is yellow\u201d is a synthetic judgment because the\npredicate \u201cyellow\u201d is not a necessary part of the meaning of \u201cwatch.\u201d\nA synthetic judgment therefore brings two ideas together in a new\nrelation. It thereby enriches knowledge and is the expression of\ndiscovery. The synthetic judgment is often called ampliative. (The\ndouble meaning which Kant gives the term \u201csynthetic\u201d need not confuse\nus. Synthesis is used by Kant to mean the framing constitution of\nthe mind, and also as one of the results of the activity of the mind,\n_i. e._ a class of judgments. In the first sense all judgments, both\nanalytic and synthetic, are expressions of synthesis.)\n\nAre all synthetic judgments expressions of knowledge? Kant replies\nthat they certainly are not. He points out that there are two classes\nof synthetic judgments: one class he calls _a posteriori_ and the\nother _a priori_. By _a posteriori_ he means judgments founded in some\nsense-perception, which are particular judgments or judgments that\nare inferences from a greater or less induction of sense-perceptions.\nFor example, if I say, \u201cTo-day is warm,\u201d or that \u201cSwans, so far\nas I have observed, are white,\u201d I am making a synthetic judgment,\nbecause I am joining two ideas in a new relation, and I am also\nmaking an _a posteriori_ judgment, because it is a statement founded\nupon sense-perception. Now Kant rules such judgments out from those\nthat constitute true knowledge. This would rule out even empirical\ngeneralizations of high probability, such as \u201cThe sun rises in the\neast.\u201d _A posteriori_ judgments, or those founded on experience,\nhowever large, do not give us knowledge, but merely probability. The\ncases upon which such judgments are founded are always limited, and\nthere may be exceptions beyond our observation.\n\nThe only kind of judgments that are the expression of true knowledge\nmust, therefore, be synthetic judgments that are _a priori_. That\nis to say, they must express some new relation between ideas that\nis also universally and necessarily true. By _a priori_ Kant means\nthe universal and necessary; and, furthermore, he maintains that the\nuniversal and necessary, and nothing else, constitutes knowledge. He\npoints out that we make such judgments. When we say that the three\nangles of a triangle equal two right angles, or that every event has\na cause, we are saying something universal and necessary, something not\nfounded on experience. No one would admit that there were exceptions\nto these propositions. The question, then, that Kant tries to answer\nin his _Critique of Pure Reason_ is, How are synthetic judgments _a\npriori_ possible? Or since to Kant knowledge consists of synthetic\njudgments _a priori_, under what conditions is knowledge possible?[56]\n\nFor the sake of clearness, let us state this problem of Kant in another\nway. It is the nature of man to try by mere thinking to discover the\nnature of reality. The dogmatic school of Rationalists had attempted,\nwithout calling in experience to its aid, to weave out of pure thought\nanswers to the questions about God, immortality, and nature. It had\nmaintained that clear and distinct notions have a reality corresponding\nto them, and are therefore real. Judgments formed in this way are\nanalytic _a priori_; but it is evident that while such analyses of\nthought have a cogency for thought, they do not necessarily have\na corresponding reality. On the other hand, conclusions based on\nexperience have a kind of validity for the real world, but they yield\nno certain truth about it. These are synthetic judgments _a posteriori_.\nIf Hume is right in saying that these are the only judgments dealing\nwith nature, then we have no certain truth about nature. They give\ngeneralizations that are useful on the whole, but their conclusions\nrange only from possibility to high probability, and never reach\ncertainty. Besides (1) conceptual knowledge and (2) \u201cknowledge of\nmatters of fact,\u201d Kant pointed out that there is a third kind. This\nis the only valid kind. This knowledge is based on synthetic judgments\n_a priori_. Such knowledge arises independently of experience, _i. e._\nis _a priori_, and yet is valid for experience, _i. e._ is synthetic.\nHume\u2019s statement that such knowledge is synthetic _a posteriori_ is\nnot accepted by Kant. Kant is, therefore, bound to show how this third\nclass of synthetic judgments _a priori_ is possible, and how pure\nthought can be binding on experience.\n\n=The Proof of the Validity of Human Knowledge.= If we turn now to\nreview what we have said about Kant, we find that he undertakes to\nsolve the problem, _How can we know?_ by a critical study of the\nforms of the reason. We have found that the reason is essentially a\nsynthetic power, and is the framework of the world of phenomena to\nwhich knowledge is limited. Knowledge is the complex thing, consisting\nof sensations as its woof and synthesis as its warp. To answer the\nquestion, Under what conditions is knowledge possible? we must study\nnot sensations, but synthesis in its several forms. If Kant can show\nthat the mind furnishes the _a priori_, that is, the universal and\nnecessary forms to knowledge, he thinks he has proved his case. He\nhas then explained why human knowledge is valid and thus proved that\nhuman knowledge _is_ valid. Now Kant tries to show what the special\n_a priori_ forms of knowledge are and in what the validity of such\nforms consists. In the first book of the _Critique of Pure Reason_,\nthe _\u00c6sthetic_, he undertakes to show what the _a priori_ forms of\nmathematics are and how they make knowledge valid by being forms of\nmental synthesis. In the next part of the _Critique_, the _Analytic_,\nhe tries to show what the _a priori_ forms of the knowledge of physical\nscience are and how they make physical science valid and objective.\nIn the last part, the _Dialectic_, he discusses the _a priori_ forms\nof the reason and shows why they have no validity in knowledge. These\nare three stages in which the knowing activity develops as three\ndifferent forms of synthesis. The stages are perception, understanding,\nand reason. Each higher stage has the lower as its content. Finished\nknowledge involves perceptions, reproductions in the understanding,\nand a recognition of the whole by a thinking subject. Perception,\nunderstanding, and reason are not separate acts, but different levels\nof one consciousness. These will be taken up in succession.\n\n=1. In What does the Validity of Sense-Perception Consist?= Kant points\nout:\n\n(1) Sense-perception has (a) a content of sense qualities, like sound,\ncolor, etc., and (b) the relations of space and time.\n\n(2) Space and time originally belong to the subject as its forms of\nsense-perception, and are not introduced from without by experience.\n\n(3) By means of space and time _a priori_ knowledge is possible.\n\nIf there is any validity in perceptual knowledge, it depends upon\nthe constitution of space and time; not upon the character of the\nempirical content, or the sensations. The question about the validity\nof sense-perception, then, is a question about the reliability of\nmathematics.\n\nThere are two elements in sense-perception: a necessary and constant,\nand a changing and accidental. Space and time are the constant element.\nThey are homogeneous, and always one and the same in quality. They are\nunities, for there is only one space and one time, and the many spaces\nand times are only divisions of this oneness. All the differences in\nspace and time are due to the relation and movements of bodies, and\nare not inherent in space and time themselves. How is this unity and\nhomogeneity of space and time to be explained? By assuming that space\nand time are original and uniform functions of perception, the forms\nof perception, the ways of apprehension, the \u201cprehensile organs of our\nsensibility.\u201d They are the ways in which we synthesize on the lower\nlevel of consciousness. If they were given in experience, there is no\nreason why the several spaces and times should not be intrinsically\ndifferent, like different bodies with different qualities. However,\nby conceiving them to be mental syntheses in the level of perception,\nthey explain the universality of the laws of mathematics. They are\nthe colored spectacles that all human beings wear; or, to use another\nfigure, they are the mould into which all sensations are run. Being the\nunchangeable forms of our sensuous receptivity, they have a validity\nfor the entire compass of perception. They are universal because one\nexperience of space and time is valid for all spaces and times; they\nare necessary because we cannot think of objects apart from them; they\nare perceptual syntheses because they increase knowledge. Of course we\nare unconscious of this perceptual synthesis of the sensory elements\nin space and time. The process takes place automatically. We can\nnevertheless analyze the process after it has taken place, and speak\nof the sensations as the materials of knowledge, and the forms of\nspace and time as the _a priori_ elements. But in actual conscious\nexperience, sensations never come to us in their rawness. They are\nnever turned over to the understanding unless they bear the stamp\nof space and time. The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with\ncomplex material\u2015\u2015complex because it has been synthesized below\nconsciousness. In other words, perceptions come into the process of\nknowledge with two aspects: (1) their permanent and necessary form;\nand (2) their accidental and changing content.\n\n=2. In What does the Validity of the Understanding Consist?= Kant\u2019s\ndiscussion of the synthesis of the understanding is given in the\n_Analytic_, the second part of his _Critique_. His treatment of the\nunderstanding is similar to that of perception. The understanding, be\nit remembered, is regarded by Kant as the second stage in the process\nof a complete synthesis of knowledge. It is synthesis on a higher\nlevel than perception. Indeed, perception is the material which the\nunderstanding synthesizes. As in the _\u00c6sthetic_ Kant seeks to show:\n(1) the _a priori_ factors of the understanding and (2) that these _a\npriori_ factors give to knowledge its validity. The unifying principle\nof perception is the mathematical; but physical nature, which is\nthe subject-matter of the study of the understanding, is more than\nmathematical, more than an aggregate of space and time forms, more than\nshapes and motions. Nature exists as a connected system of substances,\ncauses, etc. Natural science possesses besides its mathematical basis\na number of general _a priori_ principles for the validity of its\nconclusions.\n\nKant\u2019s task was therefore only begun by showing that perception\npossesses the universal and synthetic principles of space and time.\nPerception is only the beginning of knowledge. It is not knowledge, but\nonly subjective consciousness. On the other hand, the understanding is\nthe faculty of knowledge, and therefore Kant seeks to point out its _a\npriori_ or universal elements, and by their presence prove its validity.\n\nSince the days of Aristotle the general terms used in reasoning\nhave been called categories. Any class-term or genus may be called a\ncategory. There are certain _summa genera_, the most extensive classes\nor classes with the lowest connotation, that have been traditionally\nknown as categories, because everything that can be affirmed in\na judgment must come under some one or other of them. Aristotle\nnames ten,\u2015\u2015substance, quality, quantity, etc. But these Aristotelian\ncategories are classes of analytical relations, such as formal logic\ntreats. They are the classes of the attributes and relations into\nwhich objects may be analyzed. These evidently are not what Kant\nis seeking. He is in search of synthetic categories. He is looking\nfor the synthetic forms of the understanding itself, which transform\nperceptions into objects of knowledge. He is not looking merely for\nabstract conceptions. For ideas become nature objects only when they\nare thought as things with qualities universal to every human mind.\nThe understanding creates out of the perceptions the objects of thought\nwhich form the nature-world; and the categories of the understanding\nare the constitutive principles of such objects. The categories are\nthe relating forms of synthesis through which objects arise. The\nmost difficult part of the _Critique_ is called the \u201cDeduction of\nthe Categories,\u201d in which Kant attempts to derive the synthetic forms\nof the understanding from the various kinds of judgment. Kant\u2019s list\nis curious but unimportant, and only two of these categories are\nuseful,\u2015\u2015substance and cause. He divides the categories into four\ngeneral kinds and enumerates three categories of each of these kinds,\nas follows:\u2015\u2015\n\nCategories of Quantity,\u2015\u2015Unity, Plurality, Totality.\n\nCategories of Quality,\u2015\u2015Reality, Negation, Limitation.\n\nCategories of Relation,\u2015\u2015Substance, Cause, Reciprocity.\n\nCategories of Modality,\u2015\u2015Possibility, Existence, Necessity.\n\nThese categories occupy the same position in the understanding\nthat space and time do in the perception,\u2015\u2015they are the _a priori_\nprinciples. In respect to them the perceptions are the _a posteriori_\nmaterial. The categories are pure, innate, and transcendental. They\nare the inner nature of the understanding. Thus the objects of the\nunderstanding contain both _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ factors, and\nare syntheses of manifolds. Perception synthesizes sensations, while\nthe understanding synthesizes perceptions, and states the synthesis in\nthe form of a judgment.\n\nHaving named the _a priori_ forms of the understanding, how does\nKant show that by their means our knowledge of nature has validity?\nBecause when the understanding functions, it prescribes these forms\nto perception. Impressions would remain vague and formless, if we did\nnot think them; by means of thought we weld impressions into objects\nand give them a coherent reality. This is exactly what is meant by\nunderstanding. If nature were an independent thing and prescribed\nlaws to the understanding, the laws would never be universal and\nnecessary. The universality of the laws of nature can be explained\nonly by supposing that the understanding prescribes its laws to nature,\nnot to nature as a Thing-in-Itself, but only so far as it appears\nin sense-perception. Universal and necessary knowledge of nature\nis possible only if the connections and relations of nature are\nabsolutely identical with the modes of thought. The categories of the\nunderstanding have objective validity, therefore, because the laws of\nthe understanding are the fundamental laws of nature. The understanding\nhas given such laws to nature. _A priori_ and therefore universal and\nnecessary, synthetic and therefore creative, the world consists of\nobjects under laws of the understanding. There are as many kinds of\nnatural objects as there are categories of the understanding.\n\nIf we will examine what we call the world of nature, we shall find\nthat many of its objects have never been perceived. Man has only\npartly explored the earth, and there are vast regions in space that\nhe has never seen. He has never seen the South Pole, and the North\nPole only recently; he has never seen the other side of the moon, and\nthere are myriads of stars beyond even the reach of his telescope.\nThese are not perceptible things, and yet they are the objects of\nthe understanding\u2015\u2015objects of knowledge. How is it possible? It would\nnot be possible if the laws of nature were limited to the empirically\nperceived facts. It is possible because the laws of the understanding\nare the laws of nature and apply everywhere, whether the thing is\nactually perceived or not. The moon must have another side because the\nhuman understanding conceives all substances in this way; the law of\ncause and effect obtains beyond the stars, and at the South Pole, even\nthough they have never been perceived. The world of physical objects,\nor in other words the world of objects of the understanding, consists\nof both possible and actually perceived objects. If the laws of nature\nwere prescribed by nature to the mind, then the world of objects would\nconsist only of actually perceived objects.\n\nBut look at the world of nature a little more closely. It is one whole\nworld with very many things in it. Why is this the case? Would it\never be so if our knowledge of the world was simply a reproduction of\nwhat the world presented to us? Of course not. There would be as many\ndifferent worlds as there are human beings. The wholeness, the oneness\nof our world of many things to many individuals indicates not only that\nthe understanding is the source of the laws of the world, but also that\nthe faculties of understanding in all the millions of human beings have\na transcendental unity. Knowledge has therefore a stronger proof of its\nvalidity, since what is knowledge for one human being is knowledge for\nall. Every individual man is conscious of the contrast between his own\nsubjective world and the world of knowledge which he shares with other\nmen. His own ideas have a movement of their own and have no validity\nbeyond themselves; the ideas which he shares with others, however, are\nvalid for all others because these ideas are beyond the control of any\none man. Each individual man has to acknowledge this control of his\nknowledge as residing in something beyond himself. The categories of\neach man\u2019s understanding co\u00f6perate exactly with those of every other\nman. The individual man is not actually conscious of this process of\nco\u00f6peration in experience, but he accepts the objective necessity of it.\n\nThe individual consciousness is not therefore the creator of\nthe objects of knowledge; rather consciousness in general\u2015\u2015the\nconsciousness of humanity\u2015\u2015is the creator. Kant is not a solipsist,\nbut an idealist. A higher consciousness, a super-conscious Self, must\nbe assumed to explain the compactness of human knowledge. Kant does\nnot call this super-conscious Self the \u201csoul\u201d or \u201cspirit,\u201d but the\n\u201cI think\u201d or the \u201ctranscendental ego,\u201d or by the more clumsy phrase\n\u201cthe transcendental unity of apperception.\u201d He contrasts it with what\nhe calls the \u201cempirical ego\u201d on the ground that it is the ego always\nidentical with itself, rather than the Self at this or that particular\nmoment. It is the Self as thinker rather than the Self as thought about.\nThe super-conscious Self is always self-active and never dependent\nupon empirical conditions. It must be accepted as the postulate of all\nknowledge. It is the universal Self, and through it the categories of\nthe human understanding become universalized. Just as space and time\nare the unifying forms of synthetic consciousness on its lower level;\njust as the categories of the understanding are the unifying forms of\nthe synthetic consciousness on a higher level; so the universal Self\nmust be postulated to explain the universality of the categories. It is\na postulate only because it, not known in experience, is necessary to\nexplain the unity of knowledge. This theoretical conception of the Self\nby Kant is thus very different from the traditional notion of the soul.\n\n=Has the Reason by Itself any Validity?= When Kant calls his criticism\nthe _Critique of Pure Reason_, he uses the term \u201cReason\u201d in a wide\nsense as the whole knowing process. In the _Dialectic_ he treats the\nReason in a narrow sense, as if it were a special faculty like the\nperception or understanding. This is, of course, a confusing use of\nterms, like his use of the term \u201cSynthesis\u201d; but it should cause no\ndifficulty provided the two uses are known beforehand. The term \u201cIdeas\u201d\nis also used in two senses. In this place it has a special use. While\nusually an idea means any thought, here it means the synthetic form of\nthe special faculty of the reason, just as the categories are the form\nof the understanding, and space and time the form of sense-perception.\nThe synthetic forms of the Reason are the three Ideas, viz., God, the\nsoul, and the totality of the universe.\n\nWhat is the office of this special faculty of the Reason and its\nIdea-forms? They represent Kant\u2019s way of stating the natural tendency\nof the human mind to get from its knowledge the greatest possible unity\nwith the greatest possible extension. Consciousness is a synthesis\nwhich is never satisfied in being partial and incomplete. The partial\nsyntheses of its faculties of perception and understanding do not\nsatisfy it. Perception and understanding tell us nothing about God,\nabout the soul, and about the totality of the universe, for these\nfaculties are fettered to experience. Yet God, the soul, and the\ntotality of the universe are very important matters. So the Reason\nleaps over the boundaries of experience, and thinks it is justified\nin poaching in the territory forbidden to knowledge. The Reason is\nnot content with the partial and relational knowledge of mathematics\nand of physical science, but it would deal with the unrelated and the\nunconditioned. Indeed, we need only search our own minds to see how\ntrue Kant is to fact. We find that we ourselves are not satisfied with\nconditioned things, which must be explained by other conditioned things.\nOn the contrary, we long to know the absolutely unconditioned, which\nalone will explain all conditions. We are forever seeking to make our\nsynthesis complete, and to render a rational and complete account of\nwhat is nevertheless impossible to our knowledge.\n\nNow it is evident that the Ideas of the Reason are not indispensable\nto knowledge in the sense that the categories of the understanding and\nthe forms of sense perception are indispensable. Cause, time, and space\nenter into all knowledge. Physical and mathematical laws exist as facts,\nand need no proof for their existence. Kant asked about them, \u201cHow are\nsynthetic _a priori_ judgments possible?\u201d But concerning the judgments\nof the Reason, he asks a different question: not _How_ are they\npossible, but _Are_ they possible?\n\nThe Reason and its three Ideas give what Kant calls transcendent\nknowledge in distinction from the transcendental knowledge of the\nunderstanding and its categories. By transcendent knowledge he\nmeans that which is beyond the limits of possible experience; while\ntranscendental knowledge refers to knowledge about the necessary\nprinciples of experience. Kant, however, is willing to acknowledge that\nthe Ideas of the Reason have a legitimate use. They are \u201cregulative\nprinciples\u201d in that, by showing what our limitations are, they also\nshow that human knowledge is not the final goal. Their illegitimate\nuse appears when they make a show of being true knowledge. Both science\nand theology will be the gainers when the Ideas are no longer used\nillegitimately. Kant says that he has destroyed knowledge of God and\nthe soul \u201cin order to make room for faith.\u201d\n\n=The Idea of the Soul.= Rational psychology had taught that the soul\nhad direct and intuitive knowledge of itself. From the time when\nDescartes formulated his famous \u201c_Cogito ergo sum_,\u201d this conception\nof self-consciousness has been popular. I can have myself as the direct\nobject of my own thought. Upon the basis of such assumed intuitive\nknowledge that each soul has of itself, the Rationalists had ascribed\nthe qualities of simplicity, substantiality, spirituality, and\nimmortality to the soul.\n\nKant denies that we have any such self-knowledge. If we turn back to\nhis definition of knowledge we find it to be a synthesis of a manifold.\nKnowledge, to be knowledge, must (1) be based upon sensations, and on\nthat account (2) consist only of phenomena. The soul is not phenomenal,\nbut the deepest kind of reality. How can I have knowledge of my\nsoul? The soul is spiritual and not phenomenal, even according to the\nRationalistic philosophy. Therefore the soul is precluded from being\nan object of knowledge. Furthermore the Rationalists\u2019 conception of\nthe soul as simple and immortal would make it an impossible object of\nknowledge. An object of knowledge is not simple, but is the unity of\na manifold. The unifying or synthesizing function is not an object to\nitself. Sensations are synthesized by space and time into perceptions;\nbut space and time are not objects for the sensations. In understanding,\ntherefore, the \u201cI think,\u201d which synthesizes the perceptions into\njudgment, cannot be an object for the understanding.\n\nKant points out that we must be careful to distinguish between\nthe transcendental and the empirical ego. We have referred to this\ndistinction already. In Kant\u2019s criticism of knowledge he maintained\nthat there must be postulated a \u201csynthetic unity of apperception,\u201d\nif knowledge is possible. But such an ego is only a postulate; we\ncan have no knowledge of it nor can we say what it is. We know that\nthe immediacy of experience or the sameness of knowledge from moment\nto moment demands this. This is the transcendental ego, a kind of\nuniversal synthetic background.\n\nBut this is different from the empirical ego, which I can know as an\nobject of experience. The empirical ego is what I can know of myself at\nany time\u2015\u2015a group of sensations, feelings, or thoughts. Now such groups\nchange from moment to moment. My knowledge of myself consists only of\nmy momentary, changing self. This changing self is not the immortal,\nsimple, and identical soul of which the Rationalists have been speaking.\nThe empirical self is complex and transitory; it is an object of\nknowledge, and it is not therefore the same as the immortal soul. \u201cI\nthink I\u201d is impossible. \u201cI think me\u201d is possible. To make the \u201cI\u201d an\nobject is to commit a fallacy.\n\n=The Idea of the Universe.= The contradiction in reasoning about\nmatters beyond the test of experience appears sharply with reference to\nproblems about the world as a totality. The inherent self-contradiction\nof the reason attracted Kant\u2019s attention very early with reference\nto the problems of infinity. Such self-contradictions were put into\nfinal shape by Kant in the _Critique_ in the four following so-called\nantinomies:\u2015\u2015\n\n(1) The antinomy of creation. Thesis: The world must have a beginning\nin time and be inclosed in finite space. Antithesis: The world is\neternal and infinite.\n\n(2) The antinomy of immortality (or the simple). Thesis: The world is\nultimately divisible into simple parts which cannot be further divided.\nAntithesis: The world is composed of parts subject to further division,\nand no simple thing exists in the world.\n\n(3) The antinomy of freedom. Thesis: There is freedom; there are\nphenomena that cannot be accounted for by necessity. Antithesis: There\nis no freedom, but everything takes place entirely according to the\nnecessary laws of nature.\n\n(4) The antinomy of theology. Thesis: There is a necessary being either\nas part or as cause of the world. Antithesis: There exists neither\nwithin nor without the world an absolutely necessary being.\n\nCritics have pointed out that these problems as thus stated by Kant are\nnot altogether cosmological problems, but include the contradictions of\npsychology and theology; that is, all the contradictions of the Reason\nwhen it is used dialectically. They show how both Rationalism and\nEmpiricism, as metaphysical theories, are in their nature contradictory.\nWhen the universe is treated as an object of knowledge, contradictory\npropositions can be maintained. The contradictories are both proved\nand refuted. In respect to the first two antinomies, both theses and\nantitheses are false; in respect to the last two, both theses and\nantitheses may be true, if they refer to different worlds. If the Ideas\nare applied only to the world of phenomena, they involve inexplicable\ncontradiction. The Idea of free will and unconditioned being may apply\nto the world of Noumena; while the Idea of necessity and conditioned\nbeing may apply to the world of phenomena.\n\n=The Idea of God.= The Idea of the soul involves us in a\nparalogism, the Idea of the universe as a whole involves us in\ninextricable difficulties and contradictions; the Idea of God cannot be\ndemonstrated. Kant does not deny that God exists. He merely maintains\nthat we cannot make God an object of knowledge. The Idea of God is to\nKant the expression of the need of the Reason for a perfect unity.\n\nIn one of his earlier writings Kant had constructed a conception of\nGod, which is the same as appears in the _Critique_. God, purely as\na conception, is constructed by Kant as the sum total of reality, the\n_ens realissimum_, who so includes all finite qualities in Himself that\nthey do not limit Him. He is the primal cause of the possibility of\nall being. Now, can such an Idea have objective validity? No; the Idea\nof a sum total of all that is conceivable is not an object of possible\nexperience. Only particular things or phenomena are realities for\nus. God as the transcending total of particular things can have only\na conceptual reality and a validity for thought. The total has the\nreality that any idea has. This is Kant\u2019s general criticism of the\ndialectic Idea of God.\n\nBut the general conception of God had played so important a part in\ntraditional philosophy that Kant felt it necessary to examine the three\nimportant intellectual proofs for His existence in order to show their\nfalsity.\n\nHe takes up first _the ontological proof_ of God\u2019s existence, which\noriginated with St. Anselm and had been accepted by the Rationalists.\nThe Idea of God is the idea of a perfect being. A being would not be\nperfect who did not exist. Therefore the Idea of a perfect being must\ninclude the quality \u201cexistence\u201d among its predicates. The essence\nof God must involve His existence, because the unreality of the _ens\nrealissimum_ cannot be thought. Kant replies thus: \u201cBeing is no real\npredicate.\u201d It is not a quality like love, power, or goodness, for it\nadds nothing to the content of the subject. \u201cA hundred dollars contains\nno more content than a hundred possible or conceptual dollars.\u201d We\ncannot reason from the concept of the actual to its existence. The only\ntest of actuality is perception.\n\n_The cosmological proof_, which Kant examines next, is an argument\nfrom the existence of contingent phenomena to the existence of an\nunconditioned reality. There must be some uncaused cause of existing\ncaused phenomena. Kant\u2019s reply is this: Cause has no meaning if it\nis applied beyond the bounds of experience. Within experience all\ncauses are the results of causes, and therefore an uncaused cause is a\ncontradiction in terms. Every existing thing is contingent. A necessary\nbeing can be only a thought, and would not be powerful. It would not be\nas powerful as a very great finite being which had existence.\n\n_The physico-teleological argument_ comes next under Kant\u2019s criticism.\nThis argument is based upon the inference that intelligent design found\nin nature implies an intelligent designer of nature. Kant replies as\nfollows: Even granting that the world exhibits the design of beauty,\ngoodness, and purpose in its construction, such a beautiful, good, and\npurposeful world would only prove the existence of an architect and\nnot the existence of a creator. Kant points out, however, that this\nproof is the oldest, clearest, and the most popular; and he thinks it\ndeserves to be treated with respect on that account. The wonder and\nmagnificence of nature must free man from the oppression of any subtle\nargument against the significance of nature. Nevertheless Kant feels\nthat this proof lacks intellectual cogency; for it is possible that\nnature is freely acting and has power within itself.\n\nThe conclusion of the _Dialectic_, in which the Reason attempts through\nits Ideas to soar beyond experience, is that such speculation has never\nadded to our knowledge. Mere conceptual thought cannot be knowledge of\nthe reality of the soul, God, and the world. Still, the Ideas of the\nreason are an integral part of the human mind, and they must have their\npurpose. They cannot be verified by experience, in which alone is truth,\nbut they can regulate experience. They are \u201cregulative Ideas\u201d in that\nour experience is better governed if we act as if there were a soul,\nas if God existed, and as if the world were a totality of related\nthings. Moreover, while speculation cannot prove the existence of God,\nthe immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, atheistic\nspeculation is unable to prove the contrary of all these propositions.\nThe Ideas of the Reason clear the way for faith based on morality.\n\n=Conclusion.= The _Critique of Pure Reason_ is what its name\nimplies,\u2015\u2015a criticism of our conscious powers. It points out the limits\nand extent of human knowledge. In one sense, it is constructive; for\nit establishes against skepticism the conclusion that knowledge has a\nvalidity within its own limits. In another sense, it is destructive;\nfor it shows against dogmatism how futile our intellectual striving is\nto explore many regions that have been considered the proper realm of\nknowledge. No knowledge is possible that is transcendent\u2015\u2015no knowledge\nbeyond the limits of experience. Experience ties our mental powers to\nitself. Experience is the boundary of the understanding. Reality, the\nThings-in-Themselves, are unknown and unknowable. But transcendental\nknowledge is possible. Within experience there are the transcendental\nfactors that on the one hand transform sensations into phenomena, and\non the other give to these phenomena a validity for all mankind. These\ntranscendental factors make knowledge reliable, but they add not one\nwhit to its content. On account of these transcendental factors we\ncan be rational with one another and members of one world of humanity.\nThe value of knowledge is not lessened, but is defined. Our world of\nphenomenal existence is now accurately assessed as a world of relative\nreality. It is placed in its proper perspective. It is seen as our own\n_interpretation_ of what is really real. This is very important; for\nalthough the restricted form of our mental powers withholds us from\nknowing reality, we may nevertheless think it. The pure intellection\nof reality will be of value, if in some other way its contents can be\nassured. Kant now points out that this assurance is found in the moral\nwill.\n\n=The Problem of the Critique of Practical Reason: The Ethics of Kant.=\n\u201cTwo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration\nand awe, the oftener and the longer we reflect upon them: the starry\nheavens above and the moral law within.\u201d In this classic sentence\nKant showed that he had no desire to humiliate the theoretical\nreason, which is the understanding. He was merely assigning it to its\nplace among the powers of man, in order that it might do its proper\nwork more efficiently. The world of morality and the starry heaven\nimpressed Kant equally. Kant would not have the understanding chasing\nwill-o\u2019-the-wisps. After his criticism of the understanding he turned\nto the will, or as he calls it the practical reason, and criticized\nits functions and scope. This ethical teaching of Kant appears in his\n_Metaphysic of Morality_ and in the _Critique of Practical Reason_.\nHis early Pietistic education, his reading of Rousseau, his study\nof the English moralists, influenced his theory of morals; while\nhis investigations into the history of civilization, his theoretical\nphilosophy, and his independent analysis of the ethical feeling marked\nthe route which his ethical development took. The world of morality\nto Kant has primacy. In his theory it is the real world, for compared\nto it the world of scientific phenomena, the world of the theoretical\nreason, is relative.\n\nThe central idea in Kant\u2019s theory of morals is that rational\nspontaneity is exactly the same as freedom. This contrasts his\ntheory with Hedonism. The value of man\u2019s life depends on what he does\nspontaneously, not on what happens to him. This idea of freedom is the\ncentral thought in all Kant\u2019s discussions of society. In his theory\nof government the republic is to be preferred to the monarchy, because\nof the opportunity to its citizens of spontaneous freedom; in religion\nthe true church is composed of free beings worshiping God freely; in\neducation self-activity is the sole principle of growth. Ethics is\na system of the pure rational laws of freedom, just as science is a\nsystem of the pure rational laws of nature. If ethics has real validity\nits laws must be, as in science, _a priori_ or derived from the reason\nitself, and synthetic or applicable to experience everywhere. If the\nmoral law be valid it must be indifferent as to its content, and yet\nvalid for all content irrespectively. The source of the principle\nof morals is thus the same as that of science: it is _a priori_. The\nprinciple of morals is universal in its application to experience,\njust as the _a priori_ synthesis of knowledge is. However, just at that\npoint the difference is to be seen between the foundation of science\nand that of morals\u2015\u2015between the reason as pure and the reason as\npractical. Reason in the form of knowledge is restricted to experience;\nbut reason in the form of the will, while applicable to experience,\nis not restricted to experience. If the understanding is without the\ncontent of experience, it is empty and useless. The understanding must\nalways be a synthesis of a manifold. On the other hand, the practical\nreason needs no content. It is sufficient in itself. It need not be\nobeyed anywhere nor have any concrete content in the phenomenal world.\nIt has no reference to what is but to what _ought to be_. The world\nof morality and the world of phenomena are different worlds. The world\nof morality is absolute reality, while the world of knowledge is only\nrelative. The world of morality is the unconditioned, while that of\nknowledge is conditioned by experience. Morality applies not only\nto human beings, but to all rational beings, if any other rational\nbeings exist. Knowledge, however, belongs to human beings alone. The\nmoral law has not its home in the empirical, but in the transcendent,\nintelligible world, which to knowledge would be the world of\nThings-in-Themselves.\n\n=The Moral Law and the Two Questions concerning It.= The questions\nof the _Critique of Practical Reason_ are the same as those of the\n_Dialectic_: (1) Is there any _a priori_ synthesis? This is not the\nquestion of the _Analytic_, which is, How is an _a priori_ synthesis\npossible? (2) Can the human being be moral and still be a part of the\nworld of phenomena and necessity? We shall now comment on the first of\nthese problems. If the will has validity, it must be the expression of\nsome universal and necessary principle. Can we find any such _a priori_\nprinciple in our consciousness?\n\n1. _The First Question concerning the Moral Law._ If we search our\nconsciousness, we shall find that there are two classes of incentives\nto action. The first are called the inclinations, or perhaps better\nthe impulses. We may will because we desire to gain something, of use,\npleasure, perfection, etc. Such an act of will is dependent upon the\nobject that arouses it. Such an act of will would not be an example\nfor any one else; for the circumstances that called it forth would be\nlikely to be different in each case. For example, there is no consensus\nas to pleasure among individual men; and what is pleasant to one\nis unpleasant to another. The same is true about objects of use and\nambition. In all these matters judgment does not help us in making our\nselection, for people who are the most discriminating often are the\nmost unhappy and useless. All these things are indeed goods, but they\nare goods for the moment\u2015\u2015goods that are dependent on something else,\nand not goods in themselves. They are legitimate ends enough, but they\nare so transitory that they cannot be valid. It is evident that when\nthe will is governed by inclination, it is governed by an empirical\n(_a posteriori_), and not by a universal and necessary (_a priori_)\nprinciple. Such empirical principles are called by Kant hypothetical\nimperatives.\n\nLet us look to the reason itself to see if the principle of its\npractice lies there; for it is certain that we shall not find the\nprinciple of universal validity for our will among our impulses.\nThe reason is a spontaneous synthesis. It is a fact that any one\nmay verify who will search his consciousness\u2015\u2015that man may will from\nreason. The will may be impelled from within, and need not be compelled\nfrom without. The will may be an imperative in itself, proclaiming\nits right because it is reasonable, justifying itself because it is\nreasonable, functioning because it is the function of reason. Then\nis the will the expression of reason. It is the reason in practice.\nThe will is unconditioned and free because it is the unconditioned\nreason acting. It is then autonomous. It has then validity because the\nreason is universal and necessary. This kind of willing Kant calls the\ncategorical imperative. It is the moral law. It is a law unto itself,\nand it is the only basis for morality because it is the universally\nvalid reason.\n\nThe categorical imperative is unique\u2015\u2015there is nothing like it in\nhuman nature. It is the one kind of willing that has absolute validity;\nand that is because it is unique in having itself for its own end. The\nconscience may be said to be its expression in the individual. Kant\nformulates the valid command of the moral law as, \u201cAct as if the maxim\nfrom which you act were to become through your will a universal law\nof nature.\u201d The various maxims of morality, like \u201cThou shalt not lie,\u201d\noccupy the same position to the will that the categories do to the\nunderstanding. They are the forms of the moral will. Actions should\nproceed from maxims rather than from impulses, and the moral maxims are\nadapted for all beings who act rationally. A specific act may become\ngood because the moral law, that inspires it, is good. Nevertheless\n\u201cnothing can possibly be conceived in the world or even out of it,\nwhich can be called good without qualification, except a good will.\u201d\nThe virtues or the gifts of fortune may be good and desirable; they\nmay also be evil and mischievous, if they are not the expression of the\nmoral will.\n\n2. _The Second Question concerning the Moral Law._ This leads us to\nthe answer to the second question, How can such a purely necessary and\nuniversal principle be effective in human life? Of what service to man\nis a principle so formal that if the inclinations co\u00f6perate with it,\nthe act is no longer moral? The moral law is not only transcendental,\nbut it is transcendent, for it does not have experience as its content.\nIt is its own content. It is independent of all experience in three\nways: (1) In origin, it contains only a formal principle; (2) In\ncontent, it contains only a formal principle; (3) In validity, it is\nnot concerned as to whether it is obeyed or not; it declares what ought\nto be, even if what ought to be is never done. The question always\narises about Kant\u2019s ethics, Of what service can such a remote and\nformal principle be? Morality takes place in the world of experience;\nand here is Kant\u2019s principle of morality existing in the world of\nunconditioned reality. Of the usefulness of such a principle Kant\u2019s\nexplanation is not fully satisfactory. His ethics is fundamentally a\nrigorism, from which he is unable to escape. Duty and inclination are\nin antagonism. Only those acts of will are moral which are performed\nsolely from the sense of duty. In themselves the natural inclinations\nare indifferent; when they oppose the moral will, they become bad; only\nwhen they are inspired by the moral will are they of ethical service.\nMoral action is therefore narrowed to that in which the imperative of\nduty is consciously paramount.\n\n \u201cThe friends whom I love, I gladly would serve, but to this\n inclination incites me;\n And so I am forced from virtue to swerve, since my act through\n affection delights me.\n The friends, whom thou lovest, thou must first seek to scorn,\n for to no other way can I guide thee;\n \u2019Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform the acts to\n which duty would lead thee.\u201d[57]\n\n=The Moral Postulates.= Kant\u2019s ethical theory points away from the\nphenomenal world rather than toward it. To be sure, the natural\ninclinations take the color of the moral law when they are inspired\nby it; but the moral law tells us of the world of reality rather than\nof the world of phenomena. The moral law shows to man that he is more\na resident of the world of reality than of that of phenomena. Man\u2019s\nnature is dual. Of its two sides\u2015\u2015the theoretical and the moral\u2015\u2015the\nmoral is primary. Fundamentally man is a willing agent rather than\na thinking being. He is a phenomenal being, bound to the laws of\nnatural necessity; but he is also a real unconditioned being, because\nthe unconditioned reason is his real self. What was implicated in\nthe _Critique of Pure Reason_ becomes explicit in the _Critique of\nPractical Reason_. The understanding hints at what the will makes\nplain. Human knowledge is a mixture of transcendental understanding and\nempirical sensations. God\u2019s knowledge would be pure understanding; the\nknowledge of the brutes is pure sensations. Human morality, however,\ncontains a dualism; for the practical morality of man consists of\nthe formal moral law inspiring the sensibilities although not heeding\nthem. The will as pure reason is the activity of God; the will as pure\nimpulses is the activity of brutes. But the true realm of man is this\nworld of reason in which he is one with God, although he is at the same\ntime hampered by being part of the world of phenomena.\n\n=1. The Postulate of Freedom.= The unconditioned moral law is the\nbasis of freedom for which all scientific knowledge seeks in vain. An\nunconditioned will is a free will. The will based upon the reason is\nbased upon itself and is therefore free. The consciousness of the moral\nlaw within us implies freedom in its exercise. The \u201cI ought\u201d implies\n\u201cI can.\u201d We can have no knowledge of freedom, for in the eye of the\nunderstanding only causal necessity rules. But the reason commands\nas well as knows. It states what ought to be as well as what is. Its\nmandate implies freedom, as its knowledge states existence. When we\nwill, we act as if we were free, and our freedom is a postulate which\ncannot be proved to the understanding. Freedom is not an object of\nknowledge, but an act of faith. Freedom as a postulate is the condition\nof morality, and the primacy of the will over the pure reason is shown\nin the fact that it can guarantee what the understanding cannot prove.\n\n=2. The Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul.= The goal of the\ninclinations is happiness. The goal of the will is virtue. There is\nno relation or correspondence between the two in this world. A man\nmay be happy and still not virtuous; he may be virtuous and not happy.\nSince a man belongs to both the world of free spirits and the world of\nnecessity, he is thwarted in reaching for his highest good in this life.\nHis highest good is the union of virtue and happiness. If this is to be\nattained, another life must be guaranteed. Yet this is only a postulate\nand not a proof. When man wills, he wills as if he were an immortal\nbeing.\n\n=3. The Postulate of the Existence of God.= Faith in reaching forward\nmust postulate God, as alone able to vouchsafe future harmony between\ngoodness and happiness and alone able to distribute justly the rewards\nand punishments that are so disproportionate in this world. When I\nwill, I will _as if_ God existed. When I will, I create by my willing\nmy freedom, my immortality, and God\u2019s existence. But because my will is\nan unconditioned law of my real being, my faith in these things is well\nfounded.[58]\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XI\n\n THE GERMAN IDEALISTS\n\n\n=Idealism after Kant.=[59] Kant\u2019s criticism had been a fine dissection\nof the processes of knowledge. He had laid scientific knowledge open\nand separated it into its parts. In doing this he had acted in the\nspirit of his time, which had been inaugurated by Lessing. His doctrine\nbecame the point of departure of many differing systems. A modern\nGerman professor in the University of Berlin has been wont to say,\n\u201cThere are ten interpretations of Kant\u2019s _Critique_, which are the ten\nkinds of philosophy at the present time.\u201d The incoherence of Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy made it famous. He represented the first stage of a social\nmovement; and like all social movements the world over, the first\nstage was critical, self-inconsistent, and destructive of tradition.\nThe second stage is the one upon which we now enter, and we shall\nfind it to be reconstructive along several lines. Criticism is always\nan inducement to new systematization. In Germany, after Kant, there\nwas naturally, therefore, a great systematic movement which its\nintellectually virile and many-sided life was ready to express. Culture\nand philosophy went hand in hand. Jena was the centre of Kantianism and\nwas in close proximity to Weimar, the centre of German culture.\n\nAt the time that the philosophy of Kant became popular, the teaching\nof Spinoza was resurrected from its long sleep and introduced into\nGermany. Kant was the \u201call-crushing\u201d critic; Spinoza was the dogmatic\nmystic. Their opposition did not amount to a contradiction, but was of\nthe correlative sort. Kant and Spinoza became the two intellectual foci\nabout which revolved the thought of the generation after Kant. All the\nsucceeding philosophers show Kant\u2019s influence upon them, for they all\naccept his epistemology. They show the influence of Spinoza in varying\ndegrees.\n\nThe philosophers whom we shall now meet may be divided into groups.\nThe first group consists of Rheinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.\nThese took the lead in destroying the Kantian conception of the\nthing-in-itself and in constructing a pure idealism. The second\ngroup consists of Herbart and Schopenhauer. These tried in different\nways to develop a metaphysics of the thing-in-itself. A third group\nconsisted of the old Wolffian rationalistic school, which was, however,\nunsuccessful in its opposition to the spread of the doctrines of\nKant and Spinoza. A summary of the leaders of the German thought\nof this time would not be complete without mention, lastly, of\nthe miscellaneous group of literary Romanticists, whose writings\npartook of the philosophical spirit. The influence of Spinoza is\nespecially prominent in this group. Jean Paul Richter (1763\u20131825)\nwas the forerunner of this movement, and it included the names of\nTieck, Wackenroder, the two Schlegels, Novalis, the two Romantic\nwomen,\u2015\u2015Dorothea and Caroline,\u2015\u2015Schiller, and Goethe. The poet Schiller\ndid much to popularize Kant\u2019s \u00e6sthetic and moral doctrines.\n\n Illustration:\n MAP SHOWING THE UNIVERSITY TOWNS\n AND OTHER IMPORTANT PLACES CONNECTED WITH THE GERMAN IDEALISTS\n\n=Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.= This group of disciples of Kant can\nbe understood sympathetically only in the light of their age. They\nwere not philosophical adventurers, otherwise the great representative\nof the age, Goethe, would not have associated with Schelling and Hegel\non equal terms. They stood for the revulsion of the period against\nall external systems, and for the realization of a spiritual realm of\nfree spirits. They sought not a factitious and imaginary condition,\nbut tried rather to discover the essentials of the spiritual life.\nThey would reclaim reality spiritually, and their only defect was in\ntheir haste in carrying out their principles. Fichte, Schelling, and\nHegel are sharers in one common movement. They tried systematically to\npresent the evolution of the world as an unbroken evolution of thought.\nThey went back to Kant, but they were bolder than he. They sought to\ntranscend the limitations of thought which he had laid down. They would\nset thought free, and, gazing in upon their own spirits, they would\nfind there the whole infinite universe. The spiritual realm seemed to\nthem to be wider than any one had supposed. It was a self-governing\nrealm, quite different from the world of matter. History to them is\ncosmic and develops under one law of progression. It is an upward\nmovement of assertions, negations, and syntheses. Life is cosmic\nspirituality. For Fichte the spirit is a cosmic battle for moral ends;\nfor Schelling the spirit is a cosmic artistic construction, which\ntransforms the external and internal worlds into a work of living art;\nfor Hegel the cosmic spirit unfolds in a strict and rigorous logic,\nwhose consummation is thought of thought. But while Fichte, Schelling,\nand Hegel look at the world each in his own way, they are members of\none common movement toward spiritual freedom, and toward the\nre\u00ebstablishment of metaphysics.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Fichte= (1762\u20131814).[60] Johann Gottlieb\nFichte was the most notable of the immediate disciples of Kant. In\ncontrast with the undisturbed and uneventful scholastic retirement of\nhis master, Fichte\u2019s life looms up as a series of conflicts, sometimes\nwith extreme poverty and sometimes with hostile forces created by\nhis own stubborn and irascible disposition. Fichte\u2019s external life\nwas throughout one of curious contrasts, both of tragedy and romance.\nHis love for the moral and theological appears in his early youth in\nhis voluntary self-denial and in his sermons to the geese which he\nwas herding. Again, he made preparation to become a preacher, but his\nintellectual training in the university drove him to abandon it. He\nbecame a necessitarian and tried to square his life with his philosophy,\nalthough it weighed his heart down. Then came the so-called \u201cAtheistic\nControversy\u201d when he was professor at Jena, and his defiance of the\nauthorities and his dismissal. In the tumultuous days at Berlin he\nturned his metaphysics into patriotic appeals, and would have joined\nthe army, but his death intervened. The inner development of Fichte,\ntoo, was different from that of Kant. Kant\u2019s inner development was\ncoincident with his long life. Fichte, on the other hand, at the age\nof twenty-eight had read and accepted Kant\u2019s philosophy, and four years\nlater had created his own. This was only slightly modified in his later\nyears in the direction of the pantheism of Spinoza. Kant\u2019s life was\napart from the political current of his time, while his doctrine became\nfundamental for all future philosophy. Fichte\u2019s life and philosophy\nwere more expressive of his time, but less lasting in their influence.\nFichte is the philosophic preacher to his time; Kant is the instructor\nof all time.\n\nFichte\u2019s life may be divided into four periods, which are marked by\ncertain external events.\n\n1. _His Education_ (1762\u20131790). He was the son of a poor ribbon-maker.\nAs a boy he worked for his father, and again at the equally humble\nemployment of herding geese. It was during this latter occupation\nthat his wonderful memory attracted the attention of a philanthropic\nnobleman, who gave him means for an education. Fichte studied theology,\nphilosophy, and philology at Leipsic and Jena; but he had to face\nextreme poverty again upon the death of his benefactor. In 1788 he got\na position as tutor in Zurich, and here he met Pestalozzi, Lavater,\nand his future wife, a niece of the poet, Klopstock. During this period\nhis philosophy was a necessitarianism, which he had evolved from the\ntheology in which he was trained and his reading of certain books on\nSpinoza.\n\n2. _Discipleship of Kant_ (1790\u20131794). Fichte returned from Zurich\nto Leipsic, and in the capacity of tutor in philosophy he assisted a\nyoung man in the reading of Kant\u2019s _Critique_. He was at once converted\nheart and soul to the Kantian doctrine. In 1791 he called on Kant at\nK\u00f6nigsberg and submitted to Kant his _Critique of Revelation_. The next\nyear he published this work, and by some fortunate accident his name as\nauthor was omitted from the title-page. The work was attributed to Kant,\nand was widely read as a masterpiece by Kant. Kant had to correct the\nmistake, which, however, made the real author, Fichte, famous. So he\nreturned to Zurich in 1793 to marry Fr\u00e4ulein Rahn, who was herself now\nin comfortable circumstances.\n\n3. _His Life at Jena_ (1794\u20131799). The year 1794 was another\nmilestone in the biography of Fichte. In this year he was called to\nJena, then the principal university of Germany, to succeed Rheinhold.\nIn this year he published his philosophy in his best known work, the\n_Wissenschaftslehre_. He remained at Jena only five years. At first his\npopularity exceeded that of the popular Rheinhold, but he soon filled\nhis life with controversies. He quarreled with the students and the\nclergy, and in 1799 the so-called \u201cAtheistic Controversy\u201d arose, in\nwhich charges were brought against his teaching as atheism. Brooking no\ncriticism either of his teaching or of his official position, he defied\nthe authorities of the university and was dismissed.\n\n4. _His Life at Berlin_ (1799\u20131814). In 1799 Fichte went to Berlin to\nlive. At first he had no academic affiliations, but he found a large\nand sympathetic public, to whom he lectured. He was warmly received by\nthe circle of Romanticists,\u2015\u2015the Schlegels, Tieck, and Schleiermacher.\nHis philosophical system got little development; but the influence\nof Spinoza appeared in his teaching. He lectured upon the ethical and\nreligious aspects of his philosophy, and upon political and social\nsubjects. In 1808 he delivered his famous _Addresses to the German\nPeople_. In 1810 the University of Berlin was founded and he was called\nto the chair of philosophy, but he was connected with the university\nonly two years. For in 1812 came the call to arms, and Fichte was with\ndifficulty dissuaded from enlisting. He remained in Berlin and preached\nto the soldiers in camp. His wife volunteered as hospital nurse and\ncontracted a fever, from which she recovered. Fichte, however, who\nnursed her through her sickness, died of the disease in 1814.\n\n=The Influences upon Fichte\u2019s Teaching.= Any estimate of the\ninfluences upon Fichte would be distorted that did not recognize the\ncalibre of the man himself. Fichte was essentially a puritan reformer.\nHe was impetuous and life-loving, but withal a simple-minded man. All\nthe philosophical influences which he was capable of feeling would\nnaturally be turned by him into ethical and religious sermons to reach\nthe life of men. He must be thought of as the crusader armed with\nabstract truths, which he wields with a giant\u2019s strength for the moral\nuplift of man.\n\nIt was natural then that the two principal influences upon Fichte\u2019s\ndoctrine should be Spinoza and Kant. To be sure, such writers as\nLessing, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi furnished him much material in his\nearly years, and the Romanticists in his later years. His wife, Johanna\nRahn, was also a source of power to him, and through her influence\nafter their marriage his aim became clearer and his character lost much\nof its harshness. But the two great influences upon Fichte were the\ntwo great philosophical forces of this time, Spinoza and Kant. Fichte\u2019s\nphilosophy has been described as \u201cSpinoza in terms of Kant,\u201d and also\nas \u201can inverted or idealistic Spinozism.\u201d The influence of Spinoza upon\nFichte\u2019s thought is seen at both ends of his life. At the beginning he\nwas an amateurish Spinozist. He found that the theological training of\nhis boyhood was a necessitarianism like Spinozism. He lost his faith\nin Christianity, and he was unhappy because he found Spinoza\u2019s doctrine\nof necessity was intolerable and yet unanswerable. Then he read Kant\nand found a solution of his difficulty without having to change the\ndoctrine of Spinoza. For Kant had placed behind the necessitated world\nthe free spirit. In the last period of Fichte\u2019s life the influence of\nthe mystical side of Spinozism appeared, through Fichte\u2019s intercourse\nwith the Romanticists in Berlin.\n\n=Why We Philosophize.= To Fichte philosophy was distinctly a personal\nproblem, and we feel in all his words that he is wrestling with his own\nnature. He found in his mind two very different classes of ideas, and\nhe was certain that philosophical problems arise from their antagonism.\nOn the one hand there are the ideas about the world of physical nature,\nwhich are only our experiences under the law of necessity. On the\nother hand there are the ideas of the individual consciousness, which\nare contingent and voluntary. Which of these two classes of ideas is\nprimal? Fichte felt that all philosophical curiosity arose from the\ncontrast of these two classes; the solution of philosophy and the\nsatisfaction of our philosophical curiosity would be reached only by\nthe reduction of one class to the other. Fichte calls the philosopher\na dogmatist who seeks to reduce voluntary ideas, which compose\nour individual consciousness, to the necessitated series. Spinoza\nsought to do this, and the philosophy of Spinoza depressed Fichte as\nintolerable. But there is the alternative to the philosopher to explain\nthe necessitated series by voluntary consciousness. This is idealism.\nThe moment a man begins to reflect, he must choose between dogmatism,\n_i. e._ necessitarianism, and idealism. He is always confronted by an\nEither-Or, a choice between freedom and necessity.\n\n=The Moral Awakening.= In his early life Fichte saw to his despair no\nescape from the philosophy of necessity. When he read the _Critique of\nPure Reason_ a great light came to him. He flung himself immediately\nupon the side of idealism. He saw that necessitated events were\nphenomena, and therefore the creations of consciousness. Consciousness\ncannot be the slave of necessitated events. Kant\u2019s philosophy was to\nFichte a work of art of the free spirit. The world cannot contain man\nand compel him. Man may be oppressed by the world, but he can see that\nsuch oppression is not real. In his _Vocation of Man_ (1800) he gave\nin autobiographical terms the story of the awakening and development\nof the individual mind. At first one is overwhelmed by the sight of\nthe necessitated events of the world. Next he comes to believe that\nall events are mere appearances, and he is weighed down by the still\ngreater despair that no reality whatever exists. Finally he finds the\nrock of hope amid the sea of appearances. He finds an ultimate and\nirreducible fact in the categorical imperative of duty. \u201cThou must\u201d\nis above necessity, above the phenomena that are always reducible to\nother phenomena. Duty means the freedom of my inner life. That there\nis always lodged in me a duty to perform, shows that I am superior to\nphenomena, that I am a citizen of the supersensuous world. This \u201cheaven\ndoes not lie beyond the grave, but already encompasses us, and its\nlight dawns in every human heart.\u201d \u201cThat I myself am a freely acting\nindividual must be the fundamental thought of every true philosopher.\u201d\n\nEvery one must therefore choose between dogmatism and idealism, if\nhe would not fall a victim to skeptical despair. Two motives will\ndetermine one\u2019s choice: one theoretical, the other practical. The\nprimary motive is the practical one, and since dogmatism and idealism\nare equally consistent systems, man\u2019s choice will depend mainly on\nthe manner of man he is. If the individual has a high sense of duty,\nhe will be disposed to believe in his moral control over all his\nexperiences, however much they may seem to be necessitated. Conscious\nfreedom will seem to him to be the only satisfactory explanation of\npractical life. But then there will be the additional theoretical\nmotive. The man that chooses either dogmatism or idealism must\ntheoretically make his world consistent. The dogmatist cannot explain\nthe conscious facts in terms of determinism; but, Fichte thinks, the\nidealist can explain the necessitated facts in terms of consciousness.\nAt any rate the idealist has the task of rethinking his scientific\nknowledge.\n\n=The Central Principle in Fichte\u2019s Philosophy.= How does Fichte attempt\nto draw up a consistent theory so that he can overcome the dualism\nbetween the necessitated facts of physical nature and the free states\nof consciousness? As an idealist he must rethink the knowledge of\nscience. But how is this to be done? What principle will he place\nat the central point of consciousness, so to illuminate the manifold\nproblems of life that life\u2019s dualism will prove to be only apparent\nafter all? Here as answer we find the outcome of Fichte\u2019s struggle with\nhis own nature. He believed that the principle of the true philosophy\nof life comes from the study of consciousness. The nature of the Ego\nis the subject for philosophical study. What is the essence of the\nEgo or the personality? It is activity, will, vitality; not intellect\nand changelessness. But can we not get beneath the activity of the\npersonality and ask, Why does it act? Yes, _because it ought_. When we\nhave said this we have said all. The essence of the vitality of the Ego\nis moral obligation. _Ought_ is the foundation of life; it is ultimate\nground of existence. If we ask why there is an ought, the only answer\nis, there ought to be. The duty exists that you and I shall have a\nduty. In order to be, the Ego must act; and it acts in response to duty.\nThis activity is free activity. The Ego is unconditioned because it\nis acting out its own nature. Thus when Fichte is talking about the\nEgo, the ought, the moral law or freedom, he is talking about the same\nthing in different guises. Fichte placed moral freedom as the central\nprinciple of metaphysics and tried to rethink the world of necessitated\nexperiences in terms of moral freedom. He attempted to construct a\nmonistic view of life, of which the free moral personality should be\nits inner vitality. Monism and liberty was Fichte\u2019s war-cry. Reality is\nin us; there can be no reality independent of us. The morally free Ego\nis the central principle of life.\n\nSuch a message to the German people would appeal to two sides of their\nnature. It would appeal as a metaphysics to the mysticism in their\nblood; it would find also a practical response in the humanitarian and\nrevolutionary spirit of that revolutionary time. Be up and be doing,\nfor reality is not what people commonly think it is. Your environment\nis only apparently an independent existence beyond your control.\nReality is not static. Rethink it and make it dynamic. Not being, but\nacting, and free acting, is reality. Such was Fichte\u2019s sermon to the\nGermans of his day. His theory can be stated in the terms of the Greek\nHeracleitus, \u201cAll things change,\u201d provided the change be thought of\nas moral activity. To philosophize was to Fichte to think the universe\nas free moral activity, to see inactivity nowhere, to free ourselves\nfrom dualism and to participate in the universal freedom. Freedom is\nhigher than truth. Existence is derived from thought in action, and\nthus our existence and our environment may be shaped by us. Thought is\nessentially action, and we shall educate the world only through our own\nactivity.\n\n=The Moral World.= Fichte had a philosophy, the principles of which he\nrepeated over and over again as a kind of habit. He was a man of few\nbut great ideas. He was inspired by some general conceptions which he\ndid not carefully elaborate. His philosophy can be expressed in few\nwords, and his point of view is not difficult to feel. Nevertheless,\nthere is great difficulty in restating his meaning. He maintained that\nKant\u2019s early philosophy was not truly Kantian, and that he, Fichte,\nrepresented the true Kant. In taking this stand he was obliged to do\ntwo things: to explain away the thing-in-itself, and to rethink the\nworld of necessitated nature in terms of the activity of the morally\nfree Ego.\n\nIf we start from the heart of existence\u2015\u2015the active Ego\u2015\u2015the world\nspreads out before us as a system of reason which has been created by\nthe activity of the Ego. On this account Fichte\u2019s philosophy has been\ncalled subjective idealism. In such a scheme of things there is no\nplace for the Kantian thing-in-itself. All Being is only an extended\nproduct of the active Ego and the object of its knowledge. The Ego acts\nbecause it must, and then reflects upon its activity. Its knowledge of\nits activity is in grades from sense-perception to complete knowledge.\nNow Kant had referred sensations to the thing-in-itself as their source.\nBut this is unnecessary, since sensations are only the activity of\nthe Ego. Sensations are the groundless, free act of the Ego. They\nappear to be \u201cgiven,\u201d because they appear to be foreign and coming\nfrom without. They are, however, only the lowest form of the activity\nof the personality\u2015\u2015they are unconscious self-limitation of the Ego.\nThe sensations have no ground that determines them, but as the lowest\nform of the activity of the Ego they are absolutely free. Thus the\nthing-in-itself becomes superfluous, since it is not necessary to\naccount for sensations.\n\nThe next task for Fichte is to rethink the series of necessitated\nevents of physical nature. If we will look at these events from the\npoint of view of the willing Ego, which is reality, they will be seen\nto be products of purposive action. Together they will make a world\nof connected rational activities rather than a mechanical system. The\nnecessity in nature is not causal, but teleological. It is not the\nnecessity linking the series of events together, but rather the linking\nof each event to the acting Ego, and thus the connecting of the whole\nseries. Take the idealist\u2019s position and this illuminating thought will\ncome to you: a thing is not because something else is, but in order\nthat something else may be. As moral beings we have tasks. As moral\nbeings we are the impersonation of duty, and duty is reality. These\nphenomena that so trouble us because we think them necessitated are\nonly contingent upon the performance of our duty. The existence of\none thing is not to be explained by the existence of another, but by\nthe existence of me, an Ego. Phenomena are little steps toward great\nends. When I rethink the world I see no causal relationship, but the\nteleological means for the achievement of purposes by striving souls.\nHistory and nature\u2015\u2015these are the material created by human beings for\ntheir own activity. We not only create our human drama, but we create\nalso the stage upon which it is performed. Being is not the cause of\nDoing, but Being is created for the sake of Doing. Whatever is, is to\nbe explained by what ought to be. \u201cThe world is the theatre of moral\naction.\u201d \u201cNature is the sensible material of duty.\u201d\n\n=God and Man.= If Fichte regarded the human personality from this moral\nheight, he would naturally give a new meaning to God, the absolute\nreality. God is not a substance, a something that \u201cis.\u201d God is the\nuniversal moral process, the moral world-order. God is the Universal\nEgo, a free, world-creating activity. God was conceived by Fichte as\nMatthew Arnold\u2019s \u201csomething not ourselves that makes for righteousness.\u201d\nWhen I find in myself that duty is reality and not this or that\nfixed and crystallized thing, when I find that my real self is moral\nfunctioning and not a tangible form of flesh and bones, then I take\nthe next step. I then find that God is universal duty, universal moral\nfunctioning, in which I am participating. We are not only part of\nGod\u2015\u2015yea, we are He. As the Holy Writ says, \u201cYe are Gods.\u201d The absolute\nEgo manifests Itself in our poor finite Egos. How dignified our humble\nlot is made by thinking that in our acting, God is acting! We are\nfighting God\u2019s battle, and His victory is not won except as we win.\nDuty in us is the clarion voice of God, and we are persons so far as\nwe express that voice. It matters little whether I speak of my own duty\nor the moral purpose of the world. They are the same thing.\n\nThis enjoined labor upon every rational soul to perform his duty of\nreaching high ideals, through his humble tasks, of \u201cfighting the good\nfight and keeping the faith,\u201d is to Fichte the meaning of coming to a\nconsciousness of one\u2019s self. What is myself, my real self? It is not\nthis phenomenal existence with its appearance of necessity. It is the\neternal and everlasting duty within me. What is it to think myself?\nIt is to think my duty; and to think duty is to think God. When I\ncome to consciousness of myself, the cosmic order is coming so far to\nself-consciousness. Reality is so far attained. History is the record\nof this process of the moral order coming to self-consciousness.\n\nIn his later teaching Fichte succumbed to the victorious Spinozism\nof the period. He conceived God as an Ego whose infinite impulse is\ndirected toward Himself; he conceived finite things as products of\nthis infinitely active consciousness. The finite products find their\nvocation in imitating the infinite producer, which imitation consists\nnot in the activity of producing other finite things through the\ncategorical imperative, but in the \u201cblessed life\u201d of sinking into the\ninfinite.\n\n=What a Moral Reality involves.= Since reality is this process of\nmoral development, its conditions will arise out of itself and be\nits own creation. Since the world is reason coming to itself, it must\ndevelop its own conditions out of its original task. All the acts of\nhistory must be explained as the original \u201cdeed-act,\u201d as Fichte calls\nit. Fichte thought that the whole business of philosophy consists in\nshowing what is involved in this original \u201cdeed-act\u201d of consciousness,\nthis attempt of consciousness to think itself. Since self-consciousness\nis reality, this will be the same as showing what reality involves.\n\n1. In the first place, consciousness always involves the consciousness\nof something else. To use Fichte\u2019s technical language, the Ego posits\nitself (since it is a moral process) and in the same act it posits a\nnon-Ego (which is the necessary object of consciousness). \u201cThe absolute\nEgo asserts a distinguishable Ego against a distinguishable non-Ego.\u201d\nIt is like a boy who feels the call to become a lawyer. He asserts\nhimself in that call, and at the same time in that assertion he creates\nhis life\u2019s career. His career in the law is his non-Ego. Both the\nEgo and the non-Ego are creations of that absolute Ego, which is the\never surging duty or God. While both the Ego and the non-Ego are the\ncreations of that absolute Ego, which is cosmic duty or God, yet each\nlimits the other. Ego and non-Ego are correlative terms; both originate\nin the free act of God. The world is, therefore, the creation of\nthe real self as the condition of its own activity. It even creates\nits sensations as the given materials of its knowledge. The world is\nthe material of duty put into sense forms. While we create matter in\norder that we may be active in it, the spatial and temporal forms, its\ncategories, limit our activities.\n\n2. In the second place, this awakening of the Ego to a consciousness\nof itself involves a curious contradiction. Duty is by nature\ncontradictory. Duty calls me to know myself and to perform my task,\nand yet in that call duty prevents the task from being performed. In\nattempting to know duty completely I am always under the condition of\nan opposing and limiting non-Ego. The non-Ego is essential to the Ego\nand at the same time thwarts the Ego\u2019s full knowledge of itself. So\nlong as the non-Ego exists, no complete knowledge of myself is possible.\nA limiting non-Ego makes the Ego limited, and therefore prevents\ncomplete knowledge and fulfillment of duty. Duty calls upon us to\nperform a task, but under conditions such that it cannot be performed.\nSo long as the boy strives in his legal profession, duty appears; but\nso long is duty rendered incomplete. Moral progress is endless, but\nthat only shows how contented we must be with the process of striving\nand not with some static condition. To strive morally is reality; the\ngoal is nowhere. The contradiction is seen in the eternal contrast\nbetween what is and what ought to be, between the moral task and the\nactual performance. We are under the requirement to perform, and in the\nrequirement is the restraint. The dialectic process is endless. First\nthere is the stage which Fichte calls the Thesis in the call of the\nabsolute Ego. The next stage is the Antithesis, seen in the mutually\nlimiting Ego and non-Ego. The next stage is the Synthesis, in which\nsome accomplishment is gained, but which becomes only the Thesis for\nanother Antithesis; and so on infinitely. The terms Thesis, Antithesis,\nand Synthesis are important, for they are employed by Fichte\u2019s\nsuccessors, Schelling and Hegel.\n\n=Romanticism.=[61] \u201cWe seek the plan of nature in the outside world.\nWe ourselves are this plan. Why need we traverse the difficult roads\nthrough physical nature? The better and purer road lies within our own\nmind.\u201d (Novalis.)\n\nRomanticism was a great European movement which lasted about a century\nfrom 1750 to 1850; and it would be perfectly justifiable to speak of\nthe intellectual period in Germany from Lessing to Heine as Romanticism.\nRousseau and the French Revolutionists, Ossian, Scott, Wordsworth,\nColeridge, Byron, Shelley, Keats, and Wagner were in the forefront of\nthis world-wide movement. The Storm and Stress Period was a phase of\nit; and so even was the Period of Classicism that followed. Goethe and\nSchiller were Romanticists, and Classicism was only an episode in their\nlives. The Period of German Classicism (1787\u20131805) was different from\nthe Classicism of the seventeenth century, because it was thoroughly\ninfected with Romantic germs. If one is to take account of the\ndifferent phases of German thought after Lessing, one mentions first\nthe Storm and Stress Period, then Classicism, and then the Romantic\nmovement proper from 1795 to 1850. Some of the literary names connected\nwith the Romantic movement have already been mentioned,\u2015\u2015Richter, Tieck,\n\u2666Wackenroder, Novalis, the Schlegels, Schiller, and Goethe. Fichte,\nSchelling, and Hegel are the philosophers of this Romantic movement and\nembody its spirit in different degrees. The true philosophical exponent\nof it is Schelling.\n\nRomanticism is an accidental and inadequate name for this world-wide\nliterary and philosophical movement. In general it means the exalting\nof the individual, \u201cwho admits no law above himself.\u201d The Romantic\nindividuality is dominated by unrestrained fancy, is animated by\nfeeling and passion, and prefers the vague and mystical to the clear\nand defined. In literature Romanticism is contrasted with Classicism.\nThe Classicist emphasizes the type, the Romanticist the individual. The\nClassicist defers to traditional form and law; the Romanticist has no\ncommon canon even with other Romanticists except the right to disagree.\nThe only common principle among Romanticists is subjective\u2015\u2015the truth\nof the individual intuitions, which in the case of the historical\nRomanticists found expression in the play of fiercely egoistic\nwills seeking self-realization. The historical Romantic movement\nwas a passionate and mighty reaction against the previous shallow\nintellectual life with its narrow conventions. Romanticism was a revolt\nagainst the period of the Enlightenment, which scorned what it could\nnot define. These Romanticists were discontented with typical ideas\nand with logical reasoning about them. They challenged the universe,\nbecause it was not obedient to their egoistic cravings.\n\nIt is very clear what the dangers as well as the greatness of this\nGerman Romanticism were. The dangers of the movement lay within itself,\nin its aristocratic exclusiveness, its reluctance to face the forces\nof evil, its lack of strength and of firmness of character. Yet the\nage itself may be largely responsible for these. Its strength lay also\nwithin, in its deepening of self-consciousness, in its rejuvenating and\nennobling the whole expanse of being, in its intellectual conception of\nman\u2019s most intimate relations to himself, to his companions, and to the\nworld around him. Sometimes, indeed, the spiritual force of this small\nband shows itself quite capable of strong action in the outer world.\nNapoleon himself ascribed his downfall not primarily to diplomacy or\nto the bayonet, but to the resistance of the German Ideologists.\n\n=Goethe as a Romanticist.= We have already spoken of the resurrection\nof Spinoza\u2019s doctrine and its acceptance as a model by this time. The\nRomanticists, following Spinoza, conceived of nature as a unity in\nwhich the divine manifests itself in its fullness. Nature is Reason\nin Becoming. So fitting, indeed, for the time was Spinoza\u2019s pantheism\nthat Goethe, the literary exponent of the period, made it the central\nprinciple of his poetic thought. Goethe can be understood only as the\nRomantic Spinoza. The philosophy that underlies Goethe\u2019s work is noted\nhere as an example of the Romantic movement.\n\nLike all the Romantic philosophy, Goethe\u2019s philosophy was a personal\nrevelation, and not a formulated doctrine for universal application.\nLike all the Romanticists, Goethe was a highly strung personality, and\nhis philosophy was conceived to be true by himself only for himself.\nHe did not look upon the trivialities and the conventions of life as\nmere limitations of his personality, but as a fall from truth. _Truth\nis realized by man when he is in vital interchange with the universe._\nTherefore Goethe was in full agreement with Spinoza in longing for\nemancipation from human littleness and in his desire for the infinite.\nGoethe differed from Spinoza\u2019s pantheism in his own way; for Goethe\nconceived man to have an independent function in the infinite. Man\nmakes his contribution to history and does not merely passively\nappropriate the products of the world around himself. Man reacts upon\nthe world, he resists it, and becomes alive to the joy of it.\n\nTo Goethe the world had a soul, because the world gives clearness\nto the human soul. Nature shows how closely she is related to us by\ndisclosing to us her inmost soul. Here in Goethe is a mysticism in\nmodern garb, an artistic view of life. Besides, the world expresses\nhuman experiences on a large scale, and the way to nature\u2019s heart\nis not to go behind nature-phenomena, but through them. The facts\nof nature are real, and our own life is like nature. Both move in\nprescribed orbits, but both are empty if the connection between them\nis severed. We find therefore the secret of our life by returning\nto nature, and this is a return to the spiritual whole of things.\nAt different times Goethe was pantheist, naturalist, and theist.\nHe believed that all finite life is divine, and is a synthesis of\nopposite forces, in which individuality has a place. Humanity is ruled\nby necessary types, yet within them the individual is free. Such free\nindividuals take their objects from the world, spiritually endow these\nobjects, and thus make art and ethics very close to nature.\n\n=Romanticism in Philosophy.=[62] The Romantic movement was\nintrinsically speculative and naturally had its representatives\nin philosophy, which is systematic speculation. Fichte and Hegel,\nbut especially Schelling, are the philosophical exponents of the\nrevolutionary spirit of the age. All three were demonstrators\nin philosophy of the truths and dreams held by ardent souls, but\nSchelling\u2019s system reflected the spiritual upheaval. Fichte belongs\nto the Romantic movement inasmuch as he strives for the infinite, but\nFichte separates himself from that movement by distinguishing between\nconsciousness and its content. The true Romantic spirit appears in\nSchelling\u2015\u2015the impulse to revel in intuitions, in symbolism, to run\nriot first in nature and art, and afterwards in religion. The Romantic\nphilosophers were friends and sympathizers of the Romanticists, living\nin the same city, sometimes in the same house, and were members of the\nsame spiritual family. But it must be remembered that there was not\none Romanticist leader with many imitators, but that each Romanticist\nfollowed out his own line. When we speak of Schelling as a Romantic\nphilosopher we mean that he gives the speculative tendency of the many\nRomanticists his own clearer definition and formulation. The background\nof Schelling\u2019s philosophy is the source of the Romanticists\u2019 motives.\nIt may be stated under three headings:\u2015\u2015\n\n(1) Man\u2019s ideal is to expand his soul until it becomes one with God.\n\n(2) There is no Thing-in-Itself. The finite world is only a limitation\nof the ego.\n\n(3) Man and the nature world are essentially one. Man has a knowledge\nof nature when he has a knowledge of himself. In reading his own\nhistory he reads the history of nature. The Romanticist drew a veil\nfrom the face of nature and found there his own spirit.\n\n=The Life and the Writings of Schelling= (1775\u20131854).[63] Of\nSchelling\u2019s long life of seventy-nine years, the fifteen years from\n1795 to 1810 were the most important productive period. Like Berkeley,\nhe was a many-sided genius, and began to write brilliantly in his early\nyears. He published his first treatise at sixteen years, and before he\nwas twenty he published several essays of distinct merit on Fichte\u2019s\nphilosophy, the success of which led to his call to the chair of\nphilosophy at Jena. All his technical works were written in an academic\natmosphere. After 1812 he, so fond of writing, became silent. He even\nceased to deliver lectures at the University of Berlin when he found\nthat notes of them were published without his consent. Hegel, in\ncommenting on Schelling, said that Schelling liked to carry on his\nthinking in public.\n\nSchelling and Fichte may be studied together because they are alike\nin developing one side of Kant\u2019s doctrine. But their careers were\nvery different. Contrasted with Fichte\u2019s life of poverty, struggle,\nself-created antagonisms, long-delayed victory, and devotion to\nrigorous morality, is Schelling\u2019s life of early academic success,\nprosperity, and romantic friendships. The life of Kant was one of inner\ndevelopment and outward routine; that of Fichte of early formulated\nthought and external warfare. Schelling\u2019s life, on the other hand, does\nnot strike us as one of development, either externally or subjectively.\nIt was rather a series of changes. He looked upon his own philosophy\nas a development, but its linkage is thread-like, due to his wonderful\nimagination and mobility of thought. With his great suggestive\npower, he depended more upon analogy than logic; his argument and\nhis philosophy lie before us as if ever in process of continuous\nreadaptation. Schelling possessed all the fervor and insight of\nthe Romanticists, and all their egoism and caprice. It is even more\ndifficult to characterize his philosophy than that of Spinoza. He was\nmonist, pantheist, and evolutionist; parallelist, theosophist, and\nbeliever in freedom; he accepted the doctrine of the Trinity; in all\nthis he was the true Romanticist. Schelling\u2019s philosophy of nature\nis intelligible only in the light of the great artistic ferment of\nhis time and as the expression of his strong artistic personality.\nHis ideal of artistic insight into nature became for him his idea\nof science. Reality is nature, and nature is a work of art, self\ncomposed and self renewing. The endeavor of Schelling was to fashion\nall human existence into artistic form. At first he looked upon nature\nas rational, but later he was impressed with its irrationality.\n\nSchelling\u2019s life may be divided into six periods on the basis of the\nchanges of his thought:\u2015\u2015\n\n1. _Earlier Period_ (1775\u20131797). Schelling was the son of the\nchaplain of a cloister school near T\u00fcbingen, and was educated in\nhistory and speculative science in the university of that town. After\nhis university education he held the position of tutor in a nobleman\u2019s\nfamily at Leipsic for two years. During this time he listened to\nlectures at the University of Leipsic on medicine and physics. Before\nhe was twenty he had published several notable essays on speculative\nmatters, among them _The Ego as a Principle in Philosophy_; and in 1797\n_Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature_. These led to his call to a chair\nin the University of Jena. Schelling was early acquainted with the\ndoctrine of Leibnitz, but the most powerful influences upon him at this\ntime were Kant and, especially, Fichte.\n\n2. _The Philosophy of Nature_ (1797\u20131800). Schelling was called to Jena\nthrough the influence of Goethe, Schiller, and Fichte; and it was here\nthat he completed what he had begun at Leipsic\u2015\u2015the supplementation\nof Fichte\u2019s philosophy with a _Philosophy of Nature_ (written 1798).\nHe was colleague of Fichte and afterwards a helpful friend of Hegel.\nJena was then the centre of the Romantic movement, the moving spirit\nof which was Caroline, the wife of August Schlegel. Schelling was very\nsuccessful at Jena as lecturer, and his publications at this time were\nvery many.\n\n3. _The Transcendental Philosophy_ (1800\u20131801). While still at Jena\nhe felt the influence of Schiller, who had united the ideas of Kant\nand Goethe into an \u00c6sthetic Idealism. Under this influence Schelling\nreconstructed the Fichtean philosophy of the Ego on a Romantic basis.\n\n4. _The Philosophy of Identity_ (1801\u20131804). Schelling now undertook to\nput his recast philosophy of Fichte upon the basis of Spinozism. This\ncaused a break between him and Fichte and Hegel. In 1803 he married\nCaroline, the divorced wife of August Schlegel and the idol of the\nRomantic circle, and the same year accepted a call to the University\nof Wurzburg, where he remained three years (1803\u20131806).\n\n5. _The Philosophy of Freedom and God_ (1804\u20131809). The doctrine of\nSchelling now became mystical and showed the influence of Boehme. In\n1806 Schelling was called to the Academy of Munich.\n\n6. _The Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation_ (1809\u20131854). This may\nbe well called Schelling\u2019s period of silence, so far as publication was\nconcerned. He who had poured forth his thoughts in print now became\naverse to publishing anything. He accepted the call to Munich in 1806\nand remained there, excepting his seven years at Erlangen, thirty-five\nyears (until 1841). During this time he was much under the influence\nof Aristotle, neo-Platonism, and the Gnostics. He had first an official\nposition at the Academy of Munich; then he spent seven years as teacher\nat the University of Erlangen (1820\u20131827); and in 1827 he entered the\nnewly founded University of Munich. In 1841 he was called to Berlin to\ncounteract the Hegelian movement, and he became a member of the Academy\nwith the privilege of lecturing at the University. He was now sixty-six,\nand he spent the remaining years in elaborating his system. He died in\n1854.\n\n=A Brief Comparison of Fichte and Schelling as Philosophers.= We have\nalready spoken of the relation of Fichte and Schelling to the Romantic\nmovement. What is their relation as philosophers? Fichte\u2019s idealism\nis commonly called subjective because of his emphasis upon the Ego\nat the expense of the non-Ego. In non-technical terms Fichte gave no\nadequate philosophy of nature; for his assumption was that nature is\nonly material for the reason. Nature to Fichte was only the stage upon\nwhich the reason could act. Fichte\u2019s keen insight into human affairs\nblinded him to the meaning of nature. The contribution of Schelling to\nthe philosophy of nature was not therefore unwelcomed by Fichte; for\nhe saw that such a philosophy could easily be developed from his point\nof view, provided nature be regarded as a unity in the service of the\nreason. _In brief, the development of Schelling over Fichte was this_:\n(1) Schelling added a science of nature to Fichte\u2019s science of mind;\n(2) Then he transformed Fichte\u2019s philosophy of mind into an \u00e6sthetic\nphilosophy of mind; (3) Then he tried in several successive attempts\nto find a common metaphysical ground for his own philosophy of nature\nand his recast philosophy of mind. While the method of Schelling was\nnot different from that of Fichte, his general motive was different;\nfor to Schelling the universe must not be regarded as the creation of\nan active moral Ego, but as having an existence of its own. While for\nFichte to think is to produce, for Schelling it is to reproduce. To\nthe investigating mind of Schelling experience and observation are\nthe sources of knowledge; yet it must not be inferred that Schelling\u2019s\nphilosophy was inductive or that he _derived_ the Ego from the non-Ego,\nas if the Ego had been evolved from the non-Ego. These were the days\nbefore the modern theory of evolution. Mind does not have its source\nin nature; on the contrary, mind and nature have a common source in\nthe Reason. They have a parallel existence and develop according to\nthe same law. Nature is existing Reason, mind is thinking Reason.\n\n=Schelling\u2019s Philosophy of Nature.= Schelling started with Kant\u2019s\nearly conception of nature as dynamic\u2015\u2015that matter exists through the\ninterplay of the forces of attraction and repulsion. The human organism\nis the highest expression of such dynamic activity. In the world there\nis nothing dead. Matter is the lowest expression of dynamic activity;\nthe vegetable is next, the animal next, and the human brain is the\nconsummation of this process of productivity. Thus matter on the one\nhand and mind on the other are the two poles of reason in nature.\nEverything is life movement; everything is the oscillation between two\nextremes, the interplay of contrary but correlative forces. In romantic\nterms, nature is the Self in Becoming. Nature is a living whole which\nmanifests itself in an ascending scale of rich and varied forces\nbetween matter and mind.\n\nSuch a conception met consistently the demands of this Romantic\nperiod.[64] The high expectations of the physicists of the previous\ncentury had been unfulfilled, for they had not succeeded in obtaining\na purely mechanical explanation of the derivation of life from matter.\nDarwin was still to come. Medicine, which was at that time showing\ngreat progress, offered no argument for the mechanical conception of\nthe world. There had, however, been many discoveries at this time in\nelectricity and magnetism; and these mysterious qualities seemed to\nrepudiate the mechanical theory. Vitalism thus usurped the place of\nmathematics. Spinoza rather than Galileo was the model of the time.\nNature must be conceived as a unity in which the Divine manifests\nitself in its fullness.\n\nAll these influences appear in Schelling\u2019s first philosophical\nundertaking. He states philosophically what Goethe states poetically.\nNature is not to be described in quantities nor measured by rule.\nIt transcends measurement. It is to be truly understood only as\nproductivity having organic life as its goal. Nature is rational life,\nnot mechanism. Everything has its logically determined place. Schelling\nused the natural science of his time to show how the connection of\nforces and their transformation into one another were the manifestation\nof divine cosmic purpose. The gaps he filled in with teleological\nconceptions. He used morphology with the same purpose as Goethe. He\nfelt the same need of a deeper meaning of nature than mathematics can\ngive\u2015\u2015the need of a rational purposeful meaning. Goethe shows this\nin his \u201cTheory of Colors\u201d when he looks upon colors not as atomic\nmovements, but as something essentially qualitative. Schelling, too,\nwas not an evolutionist in the modern sense, and he did not regard one\nspecies as derived from another. He thought of species in an ascending\nscale, to be sure; but he saw in each only the preliminary stage to the\nnext, and all as the divine expression. One accomplishment of nature\nmerely precedes another in time.\n\nThe nineteenth century looked back on this Romantic science as merely a\nfit of excessive sentiment that has impeded the modern work of serious\ninvestigation. Yet it may safely be said that the nineteenth century\nhas not settled the question, and that nature will always need a\nrational as well as a mechanical explanation.\n\n=Schelling\u2019s Transcendental Philosophy.= _The Philosophy of Nature_\nends with the explanation of sensitivity; and it is there for Schelling\nthat the philosophy of knowledge begins. When three years later\nSchelling was ready to reconstruct Fichte\u2019s philosophy of mind\u2015\u2015when he\nwas ready to break with Fichte\u2015\u2015he was influenced by the great change\nthat had come over the thought of the Jena idealists. This change was\ndue curiously enough to the philosophy of the intimate friend of Goethe,\nthe poet Schiller. Here again the proximity of Weimar and Jena was\nthe cause of the reciprocal influence of philosophy and literature.\nSchelling was the first to give this new thought its philosophical\nexpression. The theory of Schiller is an \u00e6sthetic idealism in which\nthe artistic function supplants the moral law of Fichte and Kant, and\nis the fundamental reality of life.\n\nWhen Schiller[65] reshaped Kant\u2019s moral philosophy he was not\nconcerned, as might be supposed, merely with \u00e6sthetic results, but\nwith conduct, history, and the whole system of metaphysics. The problem\nalways uppermost in Schiller\u2019s mind was the place of art and beauty\nin the whole system of things. So when he tried to reconcile Kant\u2019s\ntheoretical reason and Kant\u2019s practical reason, he naturally looked to\nart for such reconciliation. What is there that is both necessary and\nfree? Beauty! \u201cBeauty is freedom in phenomenal appearance.\u201d \u00c6sthetic\ncontemplation apprehends the beautiful object, and yet in so doing\nit transcends all the trammels and bonds of experience. The artistic\necstasy is freedom in necessity. It is independent of moral as well as\nintellectual rules. Beauty is as little an object of sense as of will.\nIt does not have the quality of need that belongs to sense phenomena,\nnor of earnestness that accompanies morality. Sense is obliterated;\nthe stirrings of the will become silent. That which appears was called\nby Schiller the \u201cplay impulse.\u201d Toward the education of man Schiller\nthus offered art, while Kant had presented religion. Art refines the\nfeelings, tempers the sensuous will, and makes room for the moral will.\nYet the moral will is not the end; for art is not only the means of\neducation, but the goal as well. Complete life comes when the conflict\nbetween morality and sense disappears in artistic feeling. \u201cOnly as\nman plays is he truly man.\u201d The ideal that Schiller formulated for\nthis Romantic age was the \u201csch\u00f6ne Seele.\u201d While in the soul of man the\nKantian rigoristic moral law exists when sense stands in opposition to\nduty, the \u201cbeautiful soul\u201d does not know conflict because its nature\nis ennobled by its own inclination. This \u00e6sthetic humanism Schiller\nexpresses for his time in antithesis to Kant\u2019s and Fichte\u2019s rigorism.\nGoethe impersonated this ideal in his life and represented it in his\nworks. The Romanticists carried this conception to its extreme both\nin their practice and in their literary productions. Thus they came to\nstand for an aristocracy of culture, and in them \u201cethical geniality\u201d\nculminated. The Romanticist contrasted himself with the \u201cPhilistine\u201d\nwho lives according to rules. The Romanticist would live out his own\nindividuality as valuable in itself. He substituted the endless play of\nthe imagination for Fichte\u2019s moral law, and was frequently very wayward\nand capricious. This is seen in Schlegel\u2019s _Lucinde_. Schleiermacher\nthe preacher tried to preserve the purity of Schiller\u2019s doctrine.\n\nIn his construction of his own philosophy of mind Schelling adopted\ncompletely Schiller\u2019s theory of the \u00e6sthetic reason in what he called\n_Transcendental Idealism_. He looked upon the Fichtean antithesis\nbetween theoretical and practical reason as the same as that between\nthe unconscious and the conscious activity of the Self. Theoretically,\nor from the point of view of the understanding, consciousness is\ndetermined by the unconscious; practically, or from the point of view\nof the will, the unconscious is the creation of consciousness. The\npractical or willing Self re-shapes the products of the nature world.\nFor a thinking being is not merely a reflector or re-presenter of\nevents as they occur in the nature world\u2015\u2015as nature produces them.\nThinking man is not merely passive. He re-shapes and transforms nature\nthrough the freedom of his morality.\n\nBut neither the series of passively apprehended events, nor the\nseries of events transformed by the active moral will, is ever\ncomplete. Neither as a passive product of nature nor as a moral will\nis man a perfected being. In either condition man perpetually feels the\ncontradiction, since he is neither wholly passive nor wholly active.\nThe antagonism between will and sense is ever present. Man realizes\nthe fullness of his Ego, when he transcends both will and sense,\nboth morality and science, in the conscious-unconscious activity of\nartistic genius. This is the highest synthesis. In Schelling\u2019s lectures\ndelivered at Jena on the philosophy of art, after he had written his\n_Transcendental Idealism_, he developed and applied this theory and\nit determined the subsequent development of \u00e6sthetics in the Jena\ncircle. Kant had previously defined genius as intellect that works like\nnature; Schiller had defined it as playing; Schelling looked upon it as\n\u00e6sthetic reason and the climax of the philosophy of mind. Art, and not\nlogic, is the instrument by which the reason develops. Artistic reason\nis the goal toward which the reason aims.\n\n=The System of Identity.= Schelling published his _Transcendental\nIdealism_ in 1800. In the next year he published his _System of\nIdentity_ in the hope of finding some common ground for his two\npreceding points of view. For Nature is not absolute, but is a limited\nobjective Ego; and Mind is also not absolute, but is also limited,\nalthough subjective. The Self perceives the object as other than itself,\nand in subsequent reflection it sees the object as a form of its own\ndeeper Self. Subject and object, mind and nature, are one in reality.\nThe question then is, Does the absolute Self exist? Yes, but outside\nthe conditions of existence and beyond all contradictions. It is itself\nthe highest condition, the unconditioned condition. But what is the\nbasis of these two antithetical aspects of life? The most suitable name\nthat Schelling could give it was Identity or Indifference; for other\nnames would imply conditions. In this attempt to construct an absolute\nIdealism, Schelling shows the influence of Spinoza. Identity reminds\nus of Spinoza\u2019s substance,\u2015\u2015a reality that is absolutely indifferent\nto both mental and nature phenomena, and yet is the reality of both. It\nis absolute reason undetermined in its content. It was this turning to\nSpinozism on the part of Schelling, that made Hegel break with him and\ncall his Identity \u201cthe night, in which all cows are black.\u201d Schelling\neven came so much under the influence of Spinoza as to imitate\nSpinoza\u2019s form of presentation in the Ethics. But Schelling regarded\nthe objective and subjective worlds not after the manner of Spinoza\nas independent of each other. On the contrary he looked upon every\nphenomenon as both ideal and real, and as having its logical place\naccording to the degree in which the two elements are combined.\nDifferences are what constitute phenomena; the Absolute is the\nIndifferent. Schelling illustrates this by the magnet, which is itself\nan indifference of opposite poles of varying intensity.\n\nIn the nature series the objective factor predominates, and in the\nmental series the subjective factor. The universe is the most perfect\nwork of art, the most perfect organism, and the best expression of God.\n\n=Schelling\u2019s Religious Philosophy.= Romanticism took a religious turn\nat the beginning of the eighteenth century under the influence of\nSchleiermacher.[66] The motive of this movement was the thought that\nreligious feeling lies below art. Reason can be completed only in\nreligion, by which is meant not dogma, nor morality, but an \u00e6sthetic\nrelation to the world-ground, a pious feeling of absolute dependence.\nIt is the feeling of being permeated by the Absolute. Schleiermacher\ntaught in the true Romantic spirit that religion is an individual\nmatter and is different from church organization. Thus in this time of\nquickly passing shades of imaginative thought Schiller idealized Greece\nand Schleiermacher the Middle Ages. Susceptible as he was to every\nidea of his time, Schelling embodied this teaching of Schleiermacher\nin his later teaching. With the other Romanticists he expected that the\nconcept of religion would furnish a final basis for the solution of all\nproblems, overcome all antitheses in an inner harmony, and bring about\nthe eternal welfare of all.\n\nSchelling now no longer called the Absolute Indifference, but God\nor Infinity, and he conceived Him as possessing modes and potencies.\nIn the development of this new line of thought he introduced the\nneo-Platonic doctrine of Ideas as God\u2019s intuitions of Himself, and as\nintermediaries with the world. Later Schelling passed through another\nchange, and this doctrine grew under his hands into a theosophy and a\ntheory of the irrational. The influence of Schelling was eclipsed by\nHegel after Schelling retired to Munich; and Schelling saw his rival\nin control of German academic thought for many years. But he had the\nsatisfaction in his old age of being called by the authorities to\nBerlin as the official spokesman against the Hegelian doctrine.\n\n=Hegel and the Culmination of Idealism.= We have divided the\nphilosophers after Kant into two groups; (1) Fichte, Schelling and\nthe Romanticists, and Hegel; (2) Herbart and Schopenhauer. In this\nfirst group, which we have at present under our eye, Fichte is the\nethical exhorter, Schelling the Romantic nature-lover, and Hegel the\nintellectual systematizer. Fichte\u2019s conception of Reality is always\nan ethical ideal unrealized, in whose cause men are called to fight\nfor conviction\u2019s sake. Schelling points to the beauty of nature\u2019s\nproductivity as a reality that lies hidden in mystery. Both these\ntheories show profound insight into life and both are expressive\nof the period in its attitude toward life. Fichte is the type of\nthe Puritan idealist; Schelling the type of the sentimentalist. Yet\nboth, even from the point of view of the Idealism of the period, were\npartial expressions. Idealism was a social movement; and like all\nsocial movements must run its course. It would not stop until it had\nculminated in a full and systematic formulation. This was found in the\nphilosophy of Hegel. The social forces of the eighteenth century had\nbeen gathering a momentum, which naturally came to a magnificent climax.\nOn its political side this movement culminated under the leadership of\nthe greatest of all political idealists, Napoleon Bonaparte, in 1815\nat Waterloo. On its intellectual side it reached its completion in the\nphilosophical system of Hegel. Hegel died in 1831, and his intellectual\nkingdom, like the political kingdom of Napoleon, was immediately\nshattered. But the observer of the currents of history will find much\nsignificance in the stubborn persistence of the intellectual phase of\nthe Idealistic movement long after its political dominance had gone.\nHegel ruled the intellectual world of Germany from Berlin for sixteen\nyears after the battle of Waterloo, and his philosophy was officially\nrecognized by the Berlin authorities. This stubbornness of the realm of\nideas can be exemplified throughout history, for it requires more than\none political earthquake to demolish a well-organized intellectual\ntheory.\n\nHegel may be said to have drawn the scattered threads of the preceding\nidealists into a system. Like them, he firmly grounded his philosophy\non the Kantian epistemology. Like them also, he sought to find absolute\nreality by means of the conscious Ego. This only means that all three\nwere idealists. But Fichte\u2019s conception of the Ego was only partially\nformed. It could not be an absolute reality, since it needed to be\nconfronted by a non-Ego in order to assert itself and live. Hegel was\ndiscerning enough to see that Reason was more fundamental than either\naction, purpose, or consciousness itself. To him both the Ego and\nthe non-Ego were in essence Reason. The Ego could not know that it\nhad created the non-Ego unless the Ego was in the beginning rational.\nTo distinguish the Ego from the non-Ego, there must be some ground of\nsimilarity upon which both are based. In his search for this ground\nHegel at first allied himself with Schelling. The brilliancy of\nSchelling\u2019s thought dazzled him. Then he saw that Schelling only\nled back to the abstract universal of Spinoza. A mystical \u201cblack\nnight\u201d Identity was not actual nor did it explain anything actual.\nIt merely said that the Absolutely Real is unknowable. This is too\neasy a solution of the complexity of life. Having neither meaning nor\nactuality, it cannot explain the actual concrete and meaningful things.\nThe Absolutely Real must be a universal, but it must also be concrete.\nHistory has been the Reason in its toil and travail. The Absolutely\nReal must include history and it must be Reason. With Fichte the \u201cdeed\nact\u201d had primacy, with Schelling the \u00e6sthetic feeling, with Hegel the\nReason as an articulated series of concepts.\n\n=Why Hegel remains to-day the Representative of Kant.= There were\nseveral reasons why Hegel remains the representative of Kant:\u2015\u2015\n\n1. He had more learning and ability than the other post-Kantians.\n\n2. His own interpretation was an interpretation of facts. By the other\npost-Kantians things are not represented as they are, but as they have\nbeen transformed. Hegel, however, was a respecter of things as they\nare. Hegel was possessed of no sentiment. He was a satirist; although\na romanticist, he was an encyclop\u00e6dic historian as well. He was a\nphilosopher in that old-time sense of wishing to know the nature of\nthings.\n\n3. He was fortunate in his application of Kant\u2019s doctrine to evolution.\nIt proved to be the beginning of the movement which appeared later in\nDarwin. People were going to be evolutionists in the nineteenth century,\nand Hegel played into their hands and helped evolution.\n\n4. Hegel gave to his philosophy the air of orthodoxy. In the nineteenth\ncentury there was a desire for Christianity that was orthodox. Hegel\noffered no objection to allowing that interpretation to be placed upon\nhis philosophy.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Hegel= (1770\u20131831).[67] The slow movement of\nHegel\u2019s diction is paralleled by his gradual development in thought. He\nwas the most painstaking metaphysician that ever completed a philosophy.\nWhile he was lacking in the painful hesitation that made Kant consume\nso much time in introductions as to have little for the body of his\ndiscourses and none for the completion of his philosophy, he was\nnevertheless a plodding, careful, and prosaic thinker. As a boy he\nshowed these traits without showing any predominant taste or capacity.\n\u201cHe was that uninteresting character\u2015\u2015the good boy who takes prizes\nin every class, including the prize for good conduct.\u201d As a man he\nwas shrewd and reserved, overbearing to his inferiors and opponents,\nand even patronizing to his superiors. He was the type of the pedantic\nteacher who brooks no opposition. Like Kant\u2019s, his life was entirely\nacademic, but unlike Kant\u2019s, his experience was in many university\ncircles\u2015\u2015T\u00fcbingen, Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin. His thirteen years at\nBerlin were remarkable, not only for his philosophical dominance, but\nfor his influence in society and court. The official recognition of\nhis philosophy by the Berlin authorities was a detriment in the end;\nfor immediately after his death, in 1831, it lost its influence. Hegel\nhad succeeded Fichte at Berlin, and by the irony of fate, Schelling,\nalready an old man in Vienna, was called by the Berlin authorities to\ncombat Hegel\u2019s influence. Hegel\u2019s followers, after his death, became\nengaged in angry disputes over their interpretations of their master\u2019s\nphilosophy. His philosophy was attacked by Herbart. The intellectual\nworld turned away from him to empirical discoveries and the doctrine\nof evolution. In twenty years Hegel\u2019s influence was insignificant, and\nto-day his name is scarcely mentioned in the lecture room of a German\nuniversity. His influence is, however, growing and powerful in England\nand the United States. Still it must be said that even in Germany\nno one has so dominated the direction of jurisprudence, sociology,\ntheology, \u00e6sthetics, and history (a science which Hegel himself\ncreated). Hegel\u2019s erudition, his ability to systematize, his power\nof discrimination, are sufficient to explain such influence. The\nillumination that his philosophy gives, lies less in his metaphysical\ntheory than in his application of it to history and tradition. He won\nadherents, not by his abstruse arguments that so few can understand,\nbut by illustration; not by his demonstration of the Absolute, but by\nshowing how that Absolute is what the religious devotee seeks, what\nthe moralist presupposes and the historian recognizes. In carrying out\nhis theory in detail he arbitrarily fitted his facts to his theory,\nespecially in the philosophy of nature, the history of philosophy, and\nhistory. In the realm of pure thought, where conceptual facts are dealt\nwith, this is not so apparent. He was successful, for example, in the\nscience of \u00e6sthetics.\n\nHegel\u2019s literary style is difficult, and his technicalities are almost\nbarbarous. He uses philosophical and common terms with meanings to\nsuit himself. He loves paradoxical phrases, and is pedantic in his\ninsistence on systematic arrangement.\n\n1. _Formative Period_ (1770\u20131796). Hegel was born at Stuttgart in 1770,\nand in the years between 1788 and 1793 he studied philosophy, theology,\nand the classics in the University of T\u00fcbingen. Among his companions\nthere were Schelling and H\u00f6lderlin. From 1793 to 1796 he was a tutor in\nSwitzerland, where he made a further study of Kant.\n\n2. _Formulation of his Philosophy_ (1796\u20131806). Hegel formulated his\nphilosophy for the first time in the four years (1796\u20131800) of his life\nat Frankfort, where he was acting in the capacity of tutor. In 1801\nhe became privat-docent at Jena through Schelling\u2019s recommendation. He\nedited a philosophical journal with Schelling, and the two were friends\nso long as Hegel found Schelling\u2019s assistance of value to himself.\nWhen, in 1803, Schelling left Jena, Hegel began to criticize his former\nfriend\u2019s philosophy. Hegel was appointed professor of philosophy at\nJena in 1805.\n\n3. _Development of his Philosophy_ (1806\u20131831).\n\n 1806. He wrote the _Ph\u00e4nomenologie_, which was published in 1807.\n\n 1807. The university was discontinued after the battle of Jena,\n and Hegel went to Bamberg to edit a newspaper.\n\n 1807\u20131815. Hegel was at Nuremberg as teacher in its gymnasium,\n and in 1811, at the age of forty-one, he married.\n\n 1812\u20131813. He published his _Logic_.\n\n 1816\u20131817. He was professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. He\n published his _Encyclop\u00e6dia_, which consists of three parts:\n Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Mind. This was\n enlarged in 1827.\n\n 1818. Hegel succeeded Fichte at Berlin, where he met with marked\n success, and where he exercised a very wide influence. When\n Hegel came to Berlin his philosophical theory was already\n formulated, and his thirteen years at Berlin were spent in\n illustrating and verifying it in history.\n\n 1831. At the height of his fame, he died of cholera.\n\n=Realism, Mysticism, and Idealism.= It will not be amiss at this\npoint to contrast three of the great types of human thought,\u2015\u2015Realism\nand Mysticism with the Idealism of which Hegel was the consummate\nexpression. The Idealistic Period of European thought is confined\nwithin the forty-one years between 1790 and 1831. Moreover it is\na world-wide movement, the philosophical expression of which is\nrestricted to the German people. Mysticism and Realism represent the\ncivilizations of longer periods and of many peoples. Mysticism is, for\nexample, the attitude of mind frequently found in the Middle Ages in\nEurope, and may be roughly said to be the philosophy of the Oriental\npeoples. Spinoza was a belated mystic and its best European exponent;\nand against the revival of Spinoza\u2019s Mysticism during this period Hegel\nas an idealist took his stand. Realism has been a popular philosophy\nin all civilizations at all times, and it was the irony of fate that\nRealism followed directly upon Hegel\u2019s long period of dominance as an\nidealist. Modern science is based on Realism, and so, on the whole,\nwas Greek civilization. In contrast to Realism, Idealism represents a\nfew years of history and has been confined to a limited civilization,\nyet for profundity of insight into the meaning of life Idealism is the\nconsummation of human reflection.\n\nSince \u201cphilosophy lends itself to extended discourse,\u201d it is quite\nimpossible to contrast these theories briefly in more than a crude\nway. From the mystic\u2019s point of view, absolute reality is that which\ncan be immediately apprehended. However, since immediate intuition is\nalways undetermined, the mystic\u2019s reality is a very vague and abstract\nthing, although for him it is none the less real. Such a reality is\nnot usually sought in the \u201cworld of nature\u201d; for nature objects are\nvery definite, besides being very transitory. The mystic\u2019s world of\nreality is within; therefore God to the mystic is to be found within\nthe soul and is to be contrasted with the unreality of the world of\nsense. There is only one reality, and that is within the soul; all\nelse is an illusion. Reality is gained by direct knowledge and never\nby the process of logical reflection. Mysticism is frequently allied\nwith \u00e6sthetics; the love of God is apparently the same as the love\nfor a work of art; the immediate intuition that the soul has of God\napparently is the same psychological process as the artistic ecstasy\nover a thing of beauty. Both result in the absorption of the soul in\nits object, and in the presence of either all else seems illusory.\nNow Realism is a theory that is more easily defined than Mysticism. It\nis simply the conception of many realities independent of one another\nand of the thinking mind. Reality is not one, it is a plurality of\nindependent things, all of which are independent of the thinking\nprocess. Such realities are not undefined. As in Idealism, our\nknowledge of them is a definite matter of reflection; but against\nMysticism, such definite knowledge is proof of their reality.\n\nThis can be illustrated by the series 1 + \u00bd + \u00bc + \u215b ... 2. Let the\nnumber \u201c2\u201d represent the reality or meaning of the infinite series,\nwhich, however far extended, never reaches \u201c2.\u201d Let the series itself\nrepresent the definite processes of phenomenal nature. The Realist\nwould say that only the increasing series is real, and the \u201c2\u201d is\nan unknowable. The Realist admits that the series is fragmentary and\nincomplete, but it is quite definite and certainly the best we can\ndo. It is at least exact and scientific; and the goal of scientific\nknowledge belongs to the realm of the attainable. On the other hand the\nMystic maintains that, since exact knowledge attains only the changing\nand phenomenal, exact knowledge is illusory. When we cannot attain the\nreal by effort and sense knowledge, why waste our time in seeking to do\nso? Reality is right at hand\u2015\u2015in one\u2019s self. To the Mystic the infinite\nseries of fractions is unreal, because it is and always will be\nincomplete. The ideal \u201c2\u201d can be got by direct and intuitive knowledge.\nThus to the Realist the infinite series is real and the goal \u201d2\u201d\nis unreal, while to the Mystic the \u201c2\u201d is real and the fractions of\nexperience are unreal.\n\nHegel felt profoundly convinced that neither Realism with its\ndefinite realities nor Mysticism with its undefined goal was an\nadequate explanation of the world and life. The truly real must not\nonly be definite, but it must also be all-inclusive. It must not on\nthe one hand be incomplete, nor on the other must it be vague. It\nmust be both the number \u201c2\u201d and the infinite series leading to \u201c2.\u201d\nA truly and absolutely real must be the explanation of everything that\nhappens,\u2015\u2015joy, evil, necessity in nature, every least event and change.\nIn the light of the idealism of Hegel the solutions of the Mystic and\nthe Realist seem to fade in importance, and the problem of life seems\nto grow in significance and meaning.\n\n=The Fundamental Principles of Hegel\u2019s Idealism.= In contrast with\nMysticism and Realism, as well as with the doctrine of Fichte and\nSchelling, Hegel tried to formulate a conception of the universe that\nwould include everything and yet be an organic whole. In what terms can\nthis world of richness and variety, of co\u00f6rdinations and contradictions,\nbe conceived as a single whole? How can it be one and still be many?\nHegel saw clearly that this was his problem. The truly absolute must be\na unity, and still be absolute.\n\nThere are two fundamental principles upon which his doctrine rests:\n(1) _The world must be conceived in terms of consciousness._ To any\none who has studied the principles of psychology, or who has followed\nKant\u2019s epistemological analysis, it is clear that the only real unities\nare conscious unities. The characteristic of consciousness is synthesis.\nThis is what we mean by consciousness, and consciousness is unique in\nthis. (2) _The world as a conscious whole must be essentially a world\nof contradictions._ We must accept contradiction and not consistency\nas the fundamental and explanatory principle of life. In science\nand our ordinary human problems we try to get results that are\nlogically consistent. This is useful, but in doing so we do not get\na full explanation. We omit in such calculations life\u2019s negations\nand incongruities. But do not inconsistencies and negations and\nincongruities exist? They certainly do; everything has its opposite;\nand if we will take the pains to observe the processes of thought,\nwe shall find that thought is fundamentally inconsistent. Why do\nwe usually regard thought as a self-consistent process? Because our\nmethods of formal logic are such. In formal logic we reason smoothly\nand consistently from the premises to the conclusion. If we look\nmore deeply into thought, we shall find that such consistency is made\npossible by ignoring the inconsistencies necessary to the very being\nof thought. The question therefore is not, Can the cosmic whole be\nconceived as consistent? but _What is the law of its inconsistencies?_\n\nLet us consider these two principles of the Hegelian philosophy more in\ndetail.\n\n=The Cosmic Unity.= Hegel insists on the old truth that thought\nis self-operating within us. Thought belongs to our nature, yet it\ncontrols our nature. Thought develops consequences without regard\nto the will and demands that contradictions shall be solved. It is\nnot correct to say that we think, but rather that thinking goes on\nwithin us. Thought is the life of the world. Thought is a process which\nembraces all things and projects them. Hegel emancipates thought from\nall the limitations of human minds. He would make thought objective and\ntransform reality into thought.\n\nThus Hegel conceives that this self-operating thought within us\nis essentially the reality of the universe. Thought is the great\ncosmic undercurrent that includes all things in its sweep. Indeed,\nthe universe cannot be conceived as a unity unless the universe is\nconceived as a cosmic consciousness or reason. The true study of the\nnature of the world is cosmic logic, and philosophy becomes in Hegel\u2019s\nhands panlogism,\u2015\u2015universal logic. Kant restricted the categories of\nthought to the human understanding; Hegel universalizes them and they\nbecome categories of the cosmos. For if the reality of the world is\nconscious reason, the categories are not only the forms of thought,\nbut also the modes of being. The categories are, therefore, more\ncomprehensive than Kant supposed. To use a term from the Middle Ages,\nthey are \u201csubstantial forms.\u201d They are at one and the same time the\nforms that mould thought and the stages of eternal creation. The\nknowing process and the cosmic process are one and the same\u2015\u2015one writ\nsmall and the other writ large. They are not separate from each other,\nbut are the transformations of one Being. If we would study the cosmic\nforms, let us study thought-forms. Logic is really ontology; the study\nof the genealogy of thought is the study of Being. The real is reason,\nand the reason is real. By reason Hegel does not mean intuition or\neven immediate perception, which Fichte and Schelling claimed to\nbe the fundamental principle of the mind. The reason which Hegel is\ntalking about is the concept or general notion. All actuality is the\ndevelopment of the general notion in a necessary and self-creative\nmovement. History, matter, and thought are exhibitions of the divine\nIdea. \u201cAll Being is thought realized and all Becoming is a development\nof thought.\u201d\n\nHegel\u2019s philosophy is a monism of reason,\u2015\u2015a universalized concept, in\nwhich everything has its divine place. It is an all-embracing system,\nmoulding every department. Mind and matter are not aspects of a reality\nwhich is behind them, but are the modes of that reality. The cosmic\nreason is successively mind and matter, and not the principle of\nmind and nature. In Schelling things proceed from the absolute. In\nHegel they are the absolute. The absolute does not exceed things,\nbut is wholly in them as their organic unity. Everything is under the\nconceptual labor of thought. The important thing is to refer all our\ncomplex states to the unifying cosmic concept and have one illuminating\nidea. Absolute reason is absolute movement\u2015\u2015the perpetual movement\nof life. Yet this absolute reason\u2015\u2015the reason that refuses to change\naccording to our likes and dislikes\u2015\u2015is its own law and goal. The\ncosmos is the law of reason and has as its end its own unfolding\nself-consciousness. It is not the purpose of philosophy, according to\nHegel, to tell what the world should be, but to recognize its nature\nas rational.\n\nWe must, therefore, be careful to distinguish Hegel\u2019s conception of\nthe unity of God from that other conception of Him as a quantitative,\nsingle, and isolated unity. An isolated and single Being would imply\nthe existence of other isolated Beings. Such an individual would be\nlimited by others and dependent upon them. In technical terms sameness\nwith one\u2019s self implies difference from others. A good example of the\nconception of an isolated God can be found in modern theology; such\na God is a unity, but He is only the greatest of the several powers\nin the universe. Such an One is not an absolute, for the One to be\nabsolute must be all that there is. Limitation implies something else.\n_Das Wahre ist das Ganze._\n\nBut Hegel does not mean by the Oneness of God an aggregation of parts,\nnor does he mean a system or arrangement of parts. An aggregation of\nparts, however big, is never complete and cannot include all that there\nis. An aggregation, even if it includes the past and the present, is\nnot Absolute. The temporal series points to something else to give\nit meaning; and yet Reality must not stand outside any part of the\ntemporal series. The Absolute Reality must include the temporal series,\nand yet the temporal series is not in itself Reality. Neither does\nHegel mean that Reality is a system or society of individuals, whose\nknowledge and will imply one another; for such an organization of\nindividuals also has its meaning in something below it.\n\nThe Absolute Reality is a spiritual individual. It is a unifying\nconsciousness, which is self-moving, subjective, and active. \u201cIt is\nthe Idea that thinks itself and is completely self-identical in its\notherness.\u201d It cannot be abstract thought like Spinoza\u2019s God, for\nthe Absolute must be actual. Nor does Hegel mean by Reality merely\nlife or vitality, as Haeckel has conceived it in modern times; for\nthese, too, are only abstract terms. \u201cIt is pure personality which\nalone through the absolute dialectic encloses all within itself.\u201d\nReality is an Absolute Cosmic Spirit engaged in its self-discovery and\nself-appropriation by means of its own movement; and this movement is\nrevealed in art, religion, and philosophy. The Absolute is, as Shelley\nmakes the Earth picture man in _Prometheus Unbound_,\n\n \u201cOne harmonious Soul of many a soul,\n Whose nature is its own divine control,\n Where all things flow to all, as rivers to the sea.\u201d\n\nThe panorama of _history_ is the progressive knowledge of the\nAbsolute appearing under successively more adequate forms. _Morality_\nis the Absolute in ever enlarging social relations. _Religion_ is the\nAbsolute in personal relations to man. _Philosophy_ is the Absolute in\nreasoned apprehension of himself. The Absolute is not to be conceived\nin anthropomorphic terms, but is the world-process realized as an\nindividual self-consciousness. It is cosmic consciousness become more\nsignificant. It is Being regarded as an individuality and including all\ndevelopment.\n\n=The Cosmic Law.= If the cosmic unity is a cosmic synthetic\nconsciousness, it must be subject to the law of reason which is\nfundamental in consciousness. The process of consciousness is an\nunfolding. It is an evolution, but an evolution that is an unfolding.\nOrdinarily biological evolution restricts itself to the particular\ntype under consideration. It does not take account of the fact that the\ngrowth of one type means the destruction of another. It does not view\nnature in a universal way and consider construction and destruction,\naction and reaction, equal. It looks upon development as a process\nalong a tangent or like the infinite series of numbers. But the\ndestructions, the defeats, the reciprocal retrogressions, must be\naccounted for in a truly Absolute consciousness. Evolution is not\ntherefore an upward advance, but a closed circle. The Absolute is not\ntherefore a consistency, but includes contradictions; and evolution\ncannot truly be interpreted in quantitative but in qualitative\nterms, as the unfolding of consciousness. The only way to include\neverything in the Absolute is to think of the Absolute as coming to\na consciousness of itself. The Absolute Reality is the same at any\ntemporal beginning or ending. Its meaning is becoming clearer to\nitself alone. Such clearness appears in the clearness with which the\ncategories which are the forms of any consciousness become related.\nThe task of philosophy is not to understand these forms together or\n_seriatim_, but as moments of a unitary development. They are the links\nin the development of Spirit, God, the Idea, or the Absolute.\n\nWhat is this law of spiritual circular development? What are the\ncategories of the cosmic Ego? How can the cosmic organism take account\nof the contradictions as well as the consistencies of life? The three\nnecessary categories or three fundamental conceptions of the cosmic\nconsciousness are \u201cto be,\u201d \u201cto be denied,\u201d \u201cto be transcended,\u201d\u2015\u2015Thesis,\nits Antithesis, and the Synthesis of the two. In other words they\nare Assertion, Contradiction, and Return-to-itself. The cosmic law\nis the Law of Negativity. It is a dialectic process in the union of\ncontradictories, of extremes meeting, of the equality of action and\nreaction. In Hegel\u2019s hands contradiction becomes the very principle\nof cosmic harmony. It is the struggle of thought to comprehend itself\nby using its own contradictory and created experiences for such\ncomprehension. \u201cThe phenomenon is the arising and passing away which\nitself does not pass away, but exists in itself. It constitutes\nthe movement and reality of the life of truth.\u201d The law of human\nconsciousness is this: Assume the truth of any doctrine. Examine\nit and you will find it in some detail asserting not only its own\ncontradiction or opposite, but also the relation between its assertion\nand its contradiction. The truth lies in the assertion that transcends\nthe two opposites. The law of the cosmic consciousness is the same. Any\nstage of history appears in the conscious assurance of the truth of the\nprinciples upon which history is founded. But any such assertion by any\nepoch arouses opposition; and the next stage in historical development\nis the assertion of principles that synthesize the assertion of the\nprevious epoch and the opposition to it. The law of consciousness\ndrives history to oppose its own self-assertions and then to a deeper\napprehension of itself in a higher assertion, until it finds rest in\nthe knowledge of the Absolute Idea\u2015\u2015_that Absolute Truth is continuous\ncontradiction_. Perhaps Hegel\u2019s most notable contribution to modern\nthought was his emphasis upon the tremendous power of negation and the\nstimulating force in contradiction. Spiritual advance is made through\nopposition.\n\n=Hegel\u2019s Application of his Theory.= Formulating his theory in 1800,\nHegel spent the most of his literary career in exemplifying it. The\n_Ph\u00e4nomenologie_ (1807) is an attempt to show the natural history of\nthought in experience. He shows there the series of stages through\nwhich the mind passes,\u2015\u2015stages corresponding to logic, to the growth\nof the individual, and to society. In the dialectic movement,\nconsciousness views the world in an external way until it becomes\nself-conscious; then reason is evolved as a synthesis of the two:\n_i. e._ of external consciousness and self-consciousness. Reason then\ndevelops by continually turning back upon itself into an ethical,\nreligious, and, lastly, an absolute reason. Hegel wrote his _Logic_\n(1812) as an application of his theory to thought\u2015\u2015regarding thought\nas consisting of general concepts. Then came his _Encyclop\u00e6dia_ (1816),\ncontaining his _Philosophy of Nature_ and _Philosophy of Mind_. In\nhis _Philosophy of Nature_, nature is regarded as revealing the same\ndialectic as logic, but in the external world. Nature, therefore,\nstands to logic as its antithesis. The _Philosophy of Mind_ places\nmind as the synthesis of logic and nature, and elaborates the subject\nas mind, objective mind, and the synthesis of the two, or Absolute\nmind. Thus the dialectic of the _Logic_ is repeated and applied to\nthe _Philosophy of Nature_ and the _Philosophy of Spirit_. Logic and\nhistory are therefore parallel. The content is always the same in both;\nand the development is always in logical forms. The Absolute Idea by\ndifferentiation with itself comes to itself: (1) in Logic through Being,\nEssence, and Idea; (2) in Nature through matter, individual forms,\nand organism; (3) in Spirit through consciousness, self-consciousness,\nreason, right, morality, social morality, art, religion, philosophy.\nLogic is the Spirit _an-sich_; nature is the spirit _f\u00fcr-sich_; mind\nis the Spirit _an-und-f\u00fcr-sich_.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XII\n\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF\n\n\n=Herbart and Schopenhauer.= The main line of development of the\ncritical Kantian movement was the idealism of Fichte, Schelling,\nand Hegel. It was the most perfect expression of the period of German\nphilosophy. There were, however, so many distinct elements in the\nKantian doctrine, and these were so loosely tied together by Kant, that\none is not surprised to find many divergent lines of its subsequent\nelaboration. It is difficult to classify all these later philosophers.\nBut most prominent in this group stood Herbart and Schopenhauer.\nHerbart was a Realist, and Schopenhauer a voluntarist and pessimist.\nThey had a common ground and motive for their respective philosophies,\nand may be placed together in the second group of the disciples of\nKant. They were allied (1) in their emphasis upon the importance of\nthe thing-in-itself and (2) in their strong opposition to the idealist\nmovement. While both published their principal writings before the\ndeath of Hegel in 1831, both lived to the middle of the nineteenth\ncentury and both represent the reaction against the period of idealism.\nThey speak more for the subsequent nineteenth century than for German\nideals and Romanticism. They represented a certain feeling of the\ntime that Kant\u2019s doctrine had not received its due at the hands of\nthe Idealists.\n\nSome philosophers had remained true to Kant, but they could not get\nthe public ear until they were reinforced by the positive science and\nhistorical criticism of the second quarter of the nineteenth century.\nBands of men had gathered to study Kant even while Idealism was\ndominant. These were not professional philosophers, but politicians\nand others engaged in active service. Kant himself in his later years\nprotested against his \u201cfalse disciples.\u201d Fries and Herbart, even\nthough pupils of Fichte, were true to Kant; and turned attention away\nfrom idealistic construction to an examination of the psychological\nfoundations upon which the Kantian criticism rested. Herbart was the\nmost prominent of the empirical psychologists and physicists who turned\naway from the speculative tendency back to Kant. Schopenhauer was the\nearly spokesman for that mysticism and pessimism which characterized\nthe nineteenth century and appeared in the music of Wagner, the\nliterature of Ibsen, and the philosophy of Von Hartmann and Nietzsche.\n\nWhat discredited Hegelianism in particular and philosophy in general in\nthe eyes of the nineteenth century was (1) the errors of Hegelianism as\nto facts; (2) the patronizing tone of the Hegelians toward scientists\nlike Copernicus, Newton, and Lavoisier; and (3) the refusal of the\nHegelians to test hypotheses by facts. The opposition against Hegel\nwas against his principles, his method, and his conclusions. At\nthe downfall of Napoleon the age gave up the hope of reconstructing\nthe world either politically or philosophically. The new spirit was\nscientific and positive. It tried to accept the world as it found it,\nand to explain it mechanically so far as it could be done. Things are\nnot the creation of thought, and thought cannot change the reality of\nthings. We must observe and experiment, since we cannot construct. We\nmust restore the boundaries of Kant. Yet both Herbart and Schopenhauer\nwere true to the spirit that inspired German idealism, for they could\nnot develop their philosophy of education, psychology, or art except\nupon a metaphysical background. Metaphysics was necessary. It was\nas necessary a foundation to the Germans as ethics to the Greeks and\npsychology to the English.\n\n=Johann Friedrich Herbart.=[68] As \u201ca Kantian of the year 1828\u201d\nHerbart claimed to have carried the Kantian doctrine a step further\nby disclosing its psychological grounds. He insisted that analysis\nwas the only true method; and he contended against Fichte that it is\nimpossible to deduce the theory of the world from a single principle.\nAn all-inclusive principle may be the conclusion, but not the premise,\nof a philosophy. Thus his thought moved in exactly the opposite\ndirection from the monism of the Idealists and Schleiermacher, with\nwhich he was in constant hostility. Experience proved to Herbart the\nexistence of independent realities; and he could not reconcile himself\nwith the _a priori_ doctrine of the idealists, which begins by denying\nthe existence of the Thing-in-Itself. On the contrary, philosophy\nto Herbart had the Thing-in-Itself as its chief concern. Herbart did\nnot see how paradoxical his position must be\u2015\u2015how futile must be the\nresults of attempting to know the unknowable. He was impressed with the\ndepth of the problem of existence, and he felt that, if it was to be\nexplained at all, it must be along scientific lines, especially in the\nfields of psychology and education. The scientific method of Herbart\nwas mechanics; his Realism was the result of his method.\n\nHerbart\u2019s programme at the beginning of his teaching at G\u00f6ttingen\nin 1802 was as follows: He defined philosophy in a general way by\nsimplifying the concepts that underlie the different sciences. Thus he\n(1) reconstructed Realism, (2) restored the principle of contradiction,\nand (3) established philosophy on the same basis as science. Of all the\nphilosophical schools in the nineteenth century the Herbartian school\nwas the most numerous and compact. Hegel\u2019s attitude had driven many\nthinkers into science, and the majority of them attached themselves\nto Herbart for want of something better.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Herbart= (1776\u20131841). Herbart was the\ntypical scholar. He was a man of quiet and conservative tastes, and\nhis life was never disturbed by dramatic situations arising out of\ncontradictions in his character or environment. His days were spent in\nstudy, lecturing, and efforts for social education. The philosophical\ninfluences upon his thought were Leibnitz, Kant, and negatively the\nIdealists. In his early life he had read Leibnitz and Kant, and before\nhe was eighteen he had read enough of Fichte to be repelled by his\ndoctrine. In 1796 he was a student at Jena. From Jena he went as tutor\nto Switzerland, where he met Pestalozzi and laid the foundation of his\nown philosophy. In 1802 he was called to G\u00f6ttingen, where he became\nfull professor in 1805. In 1806 he published _Principal Points in\nMetaphysics_. In 1809 he was called to K\u00f6nigsberg, where he published\nhis chief works:\u2015\u2015\n\n 1813 _Text-book of the Introduction to Philosophy_.\n\n 1816 _Text-book of Psychology_.\n\n 1822 _Possibility and Necessity of Applying Mathematics to\n Psychology_.\n\n 1824\u20131825 _Psychology as a Science_.\n\n 1828\u20131829 _General Metaphysics_.\n\nIn 1830 he was called back to G\u00f6ttingen, and he died in 1841.\n\n=The Contradictions of Experience.= All the conceptions of practical\nlife are self-contradictory and are therefore vicious. This applies\nnot only to the conceptions of unreflecting minds, but also to those of\nscientists and philosophers. To philosophize is nothing else than this:\nto free our conceptions of their self-contradictions by simplifying\nand revising them. We think of the world as consisting of things,\npersons, relations, and laws; but such a view of the world is founded\nupon the fallacy of thinking an object at the same time as one and\nas many. This general fallacy takes four specific forms: inherence,\nchange, continuity, and selfhood. For example, it is contradictory to\nthink of a plant as one thing in which many qualities inhere; it is\ncontradictory to think of a plant as the same when it passes through\nmany changes; it is contradictory to think of space as continuous and\nyet divided into parts; and it is contradictory to think of the self as\nalways the same and yet as a stream of conscious states.[69]\n\n=The Argument for Realism.= This inherent contradiction in human\nconceptions had been a matter of observation by philosophers for many\ncenturies, but it had led to many divergent conclusions. The Greek\nSkeptics had long ago observed it, and had concluded therefore that\nthere is no such thing as reality. To them thought is discredited\nbecause the contradictions of thought are insoluble. Truth does not\nexist. On the other hand Hegel developed his great dialectic system\nupon the basis of these contradictions. Is thought self-contradictory?\nYes. But is thought discredited because it is self-contradictory?\nBy no means. It is the nature of thought to be self-contradictory,\nand the highest truth is the knowledge of this. So Hegel, instead of\nrejecting the conception of reality because thought is contradictory,\nincorporated contradictions into his conception of the Being of the\nuniverse. Indeed, he made contradictions the \u201chead of the corner\u201d of\nhis system. Contradiction to Hegel is cosmic law. However, in such\na conception Hegel had to give up entirely the principle upon which\nformal logic was founded. This was the principle that a thing cannot\nbe different from itself. To Hegel the highest truth was exactly the\nopposite\u2015\u2015everything is self-contradictory.\n\nWhile Herbart agreed with the Skeptics and with Hegel that experience\nis self-contradictory, he differed from them in the inference which he\ndrew from such contradictions. In acknowledging the contradictions of\nexperience Herbart did not find himself driven to either one of these\nalternatives. Philosophy did not mean for him skepticism. On the other\nhand he was repelled by the turn that Hegel had given to logic, and\nhe refused to accept reasoning as a self-contradictory process. He\nreturned to the demands of formal logic and restored the principle\nof contradiction[70] to the place which it had occupied during the\nEnlightenment. Herbart took as his _fundamental philosophical principle\nthat experiences are not actual when they are self-contradictory_.\n\nThe self-contradictoriness of experiences shows that they are\nphenomena and not actualities. It also shows that they have reality\nas their ground. Seeming things imply realities as the ground of their\nqualities; seeming occurrences imply actual relations between the\nreals. Seeming is just so much an indication of Being. Consistency lies\nbehind phenomena. The existence of appearances must be admitted, but\nappearances are appearances of something. If nothing existed, nothing\nwould appear to exist; and yet things are not in reality what they\nappear to be.\n\nHerbart agreed with Kant that we can experience only phenomena. There\nis also a similarity in the two theories as to the relationship between\nphenomena and the thing-in-itself. The similarity is, however, only\nsuperficial. Kant reasoned from the relativity of phenomena to the\nsynthetic unity of apperception, _i. e._ to consciousness in general,\nwhile the \u2666thing-in-itself was to Kant an unknowable and irreducible\nremainder. To Kant phenomena pointed to consciousness rather than\nto things-in-themselves. On the other hand, Herbart reasoned from\nphenomena to the existence of things-in-themselves. Phenomena point\nto an independent, objective reality rather than to a thinking subject.\nWhile in Kant\u2019s doctrine phenomena depend for their existence upon\nthe creative power of consciousness, to Herbart consciousness has no\ncreative power, but itself depends on the existence and independence\nof a plurality of independent Reals. Even the categories and the forms\nof space and time are not innate synthetic forms. All are the result of\nthe relationships among independent Reals, which are the spring of all\nactivity and existence. Herbart thus gave to the things-in-themselves\nall the independent functions that Kant attributed to consciousness.\n\n=The Many Reals and Nature Phenomena.= We must remove the\ncontradictions of experience, if we would get at a true conception of\nReality and the meaning of phenomena. The true way is (1) to posit a\nplural number of Reals, and (2) to interpret the phenomena as derived\nfrom the relation among these Reals.\n\nIn the first place, a multiplicity of Reals, and not a single Real,\nis needed to explain the multiplicity of phenomena. Herbart\u2019s doctrine\nis therefore a pluralism. He conceives the many Reals to exist, not in\nphenomenal, but in \u201cintellectual space.\u201d They are not subject to any\nphenomenal limitations whatsoever; they may occupy one point of space\nat the same time. Their nature cannot be known, but we can say that\nthey have \u201cabsolute position.\u201d They cannot be limited nor negated, and\neven their plurality does not mean that they limit one another.\n\nIn the second place, Herbart assumes a multiplicity of relations. Why\ndo the Reals appear as phenomena? Why should the Reals appear to be\nthe qualities that inhere in things, the continuities of things, and\nthe changes of things? Herbart is not altogether satisfactory in his\nexplanation of this problem. It is the problem of the unity of the\nmanifold, which Kant could explain as due to the synthetic power of\nconsciousness; but such an explanation was precluded from Herbart\u2019s\nRealism. Herbart speaks of two kinds of relations. There are the actual\nrelations among the Reals. Although the Reals are conceived by Herbart\nas simple and unchangeable, he also thinks of them as \u201ccoming and going\nin intelligible space.\u201d We can never know what the nature of these\nactual relations is. The actual relations between two Reals are not\nessential to either Real, nor can such relations have their basis in\nthe Reals. All that we can know are the seeming relations among things.\nThese are the relations of phenomenal space\u2015\u2015of inherence, continuity,\nand change. Herbart calls these phenomenal relations \u201ccontingent views\u201d\n(_zufallige Ansichten_), and looks upon them as having a semi-existence.\nThat is to say, Herbart regards the world of experience as a world\nof relations which are not the actual relations among Realities, but\nmerely the phenomenal relations, or relations as they appear to us.\n\n=The Soul and Mental Phenomena.= Each Real has one single function,\nviz., self-preservation; and inasmuch as the Reals \u201cco-exist,\u201d they\nmutually disturb each other. The disturbances take the form of inner\nreactions on the part of the Real in its effort at self-preservation.\nProminent among the Reals is the Soul-real. Like all the other\nReals, it is unknowable. We have, however, immediate knowledge of\nits manifestations in its self-preservation among the other Reals.\nPsychology is the science of the relations which the Soul-real bears\nto other Reals. From the conflict of the Soul with other Reals,\nmental phenomena take their rise. Consciousness is, therefore, not\nthe same as the Soul; it is the sum-total of the acts of the Soul in\nself-preservation. Consciousness is the aggregate mental states, and is\nnot essential to the Soul. Nevertheless, isolated souls do not think;\nthey have no states of consciousness. Consciousness can arise only in\na community of Reals.\n\nOur knowledge consists therefore of ideas, which are the results of\nthe disturbance of the Soul-real by other Reals. These ideas live\nwithin the Soul, which is merely an indifference point where they are\nheld together. The ideas in turn disturb and inhibit one another, and\nthe description of our mental life is a description of the reciprocal\ntension of ideas. The tension among the ideas modifies the intensity\nof each, and consciousness of an idea is proportional to its intensity.\nAn idea is just on the threshold of consciousness when it has the\nlowest degree of intensity, and is still actual. When it drops below\nthat threshold it is changed into an impulse. The primary ideas are\nsensations. They are not the images of things, but the primary acts of\nthe Soul in its attempt at self-preservation. All other mental states,\nlike memory, imagination, feeling, and will, are to be described as\nkinds of tension of the ideas. Feeling and will are kinds of inhibitive\ntension. The coming of sensations and the interplay of sensations\ncan be reduced to a mechanical law. Therefore, according to Herbart,\npsychology is the \u201cstatics and mechanics of ideas,\u201d and must be treated\nmathematically.\n\nHerbart\u2019s contribution to modern thought lies in his psychology. Modern\nthought has not accepted his metaphysics, but it has been influenced\nto a not inconsiderable degree by his psychology. Herbart gave the\ndeath-blow to the old \u201cfaculty psychology,\u201d and he placed psychology\nupon the same basis as the natural sciences. The science of psychology\nwas not to Herbart a discussion of the nature of the soul, for that\nis unknowable. It is the study of the aggregate of the contents\nof consciousness. It is not a study of psychical faculties, but of\npsychical elements. This reduces psychology to an atomism, like other\nsciences, and thereby frees it from the influence of theology. Thus\nwas the so-called modern psychology made possible by Herbart. Herbart\u2019s\ntheory was also of incalculable value to modern educational theory. The\nconception of the influence of environment upon mental life, the theory\nof the development of mental life, the natural method of \u201cpreparation,\npresentation, association, systematization, and application\u201d of an\neducational subject, the theory of the correlation of subjects\u2015\u2015all\nare founded upon his psychology. Herbart\u2019s attempt to apply mathematics\nto the laws of psychological phenomena was not so fortunate. At one\ntime, during the nineteenth century, psychologists hoped much from\nmathematics in their science; but the hope has been practically\nabandoned. In recent years the demand for exactness has been met in\npsycho-physics, which operates with mathematics in a different way.\n\n=Arthur Schopenhauer[71] and his Philosophical Relations.= Schopenhauer\nis grouped with Herbart because (1) both had an especial dislike\nfor the idealistic development that the Kantian movement took; and\n(2) both built their theories upon interpretations of the Kantian\nthing-in-itself. While Herbart was a Realist, Schopenhauer was a\nMystic; which only shows how theories, seemingly very different, can\nhave the same source. Herbart\u2019s Realism was an interpretation of Kant\u2019s\nthing-in-itself as many realities; while Schopenhauer\u2019s Mysticism\nwas an interpretation of it as one reality. In both theories the\nconsciousness, and with it the reason, were conceived as derivations\nof the thing-in-itself.\n\nThe best approach to Schopenhauer\u2019s doctrine can perhaps be made\nby contrasting it with his pet aversion\u2015\u2015the doctrine of Hegel.\nSchopenhauer was to Idealism what Mephistopheles was to Faust\u2015\u2015he\nturned Romanticism into pessimism. The theory of empirical evolution,\nwhich was to be highly developed in the nineteenth century, lay in\ntheoretical germ in the teaching of the immediate followers of Kant.\nTo Hegel the historical development of the cosmos is the struggle\nof reason, which with all its essential contradictions is futilely\nstriving to come to itself. To Schopenhauer the history of the cosmos\nis also an endless struggle, although a struggle in which all reason is\nabsent. Hegel could conceive the history of the cosmos as a development\nworthy of investigation. Schopenhauer, on the contrary, took no\ninterest in history, because to him it could not be a development. To\nHegel, phenomena form an intimate part of the cosmic struggle, since\nthey are the content of the cosmic-reason; to Schopenhauer, phenomena\nare the surface illusions of an ebullient, unreasoning Will.\n\nAs the first theoretical pessimist of Europe, Schopenhauer expressed\nfor the nineteenth century one of its most essential characteristics.\nHe got scant recognition during his lifetime on account of the vogue\nof Hegel; but to-day it is Schopenhauer, rather than Hegel, who has\na popular influence, and is widely read. This is partly on account\nof his masterly literary style and partly by reason of the content of\nhis doctrine. The nineteenth century was carried along upon a strong\ncurrent of pessimism because of (1) industrial problems, which involved\nmany ethical considerations, and because of (2) its breaking away\nfrom traditional religious ties. So long as the unbounded optimism\nof Idealism prevailed, the world had little room for Schopenhauer\u2019s\nteaching; but when Realism with its limitations took hold of the\nnineteenth century, then did Schopenhauer\u2019s day of recognition come.\nThe popular mind has found in Schopenhauer its best philosophical\nexpression, and representatives of his teaching have been numerous.\nAmong them are Richard Wagner (1813\u20131883) with his music dramas;\nVon Hartmann (b. 1842) with his theory of the unconscious; Nietzsche\n(1844\u20131900) with his extreme statement of egoism\u2015\u2015that in view of\nuniversal evil, the only hope is in the survival of the strongest and\nin the virtue of selfishness.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Schopenhauer= (1788\u20131860). Schopenhauer was\nthe kind of genius who is always an alien to the world of men. He lived\na long, lonely, isolated life, in which his inherited emotional and\nbrooding nature became more and more cynical and pessimistic. Even in\nhis paternal home he found himself a stranger. His father pushed him\ninto mercantile business, which he hated; and after the death of his\nfather his brilliant mother told him that he was welcome to her Weimar\nhome only as a visitor. The doors of all academic circles were closed\nto him; and he, in commenting on it, said that he had failed to get an\nacademic hearing, because the German did not believe in a metaphysics\nwhich was so expressed as to be understood. But the cause of his\nisolation lay mainly in himself. He was neurasthenic and peculiar\u2015\u2015the\nsubject of ill-temper, night-terrors, causeless depressions and dreads.\nWith the genealogy of Schopenhauer\u2019s family on his father\u2019s side before\nus, who could wonder?\u2015\u2015the grandmother insane, one uncle insane, one\nuncle idiotic, one neurotic, and his father a suicide. Schopenhauer\u2019s\nown peculiarities were not pathological. He had a genius that blossomed\nas early in his years as Hegel\u2019s blossomed late. He wrote his two\nimportant works before he was thirty.\n\n1. _Period of Education_ (1788\u20131813). The parents of Schopenhauer were\nwealthy, and in 1803 he traveled with them in England, France, and\nHolland. In 1804 he entered business, which he gave up the next year\non the death of his father. In 1809 he was busy studying the classics,\nphilosophy, and Hindu learning in Weimar, G\u00f6ttingen, and Berlin.\n\n2. _Period of Literary Production_ (1813\u20131831). In 1813 he wrote\nthe _Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason_, in the\nThuringian forest, when other German young men were rallying to arms\nagainst Napoleon. This was accepted as a doctorate thesis at Jena.\nFrom 1814 to 1819 he lived in Dresden at work on _The World as Will\nand Idea_, which is the complete exposition of his doctrine. The work\nis divided into four parts: 1. Theory of Knowledge; 2. Description\nof the Forms of the Will; 3. Art as a Deliverance from the Will;\n4. Morality as a Deliverance from the Will. In 1820 he got a position\nas Privat-docent in the University of Berlin. This was the only year\nof his teaching and was an utter failure.\n\n3. _Period of Retirement_ (1831\u20131860). In 1831 he went to\nFrankfort-on-the-Main to live alone and in retirement. Slowly he became\nknown and gathered a little circle of disciples about him. He died in\n1860.\n\n=The Influences upon Schopenhauer\u2019s Thought.= The principal influences\nupon Schopenhauer\u2019s thought were three: (1) Kant, from whom he got his\ntranscendental theory of knowledge (he always considered himself to\nbe Kant\u2019s true heir); (2) Plato, from whom he got his formulation of\neternal Ideas as offering an escape from the Will; (3) the Hindus, from\nwhom he got his ethical-Mysticism and the confirmation of his pessimism.\n\nSchopenhauer is unique among the philosophers of Europe, because he\ndenied all for which the Enlightenment stood. Even such reactionaries\nagainst the Enlightenment as Rousseau were a part of its essential\nspirit; for the presupposition of traditional theology and philosophy\nhas been that existence is essentially a harmony. Schopenhauer, however,\nappealed to the discordances and the sorrow of existence, and drew the\ninference that fundamentally existence is irrational. For the source\nof Schopenhauer\u2019s unique teaching we have to look, therefore, farther\nthan modern Europe. The preceding modern European philosophers whom\nwe have studied, developed their philosophies from purely Occidental\nsources. Schopenhauer drew from the Orient as well as from the Occident.\nThe Romanticists had re-discovered Orientalism. The study of the\nHindus had been interesting European scholars since the beginning of\nthe nineteenth century. Schopenhauer, who was introduced to Indian\nphilosophy by Goethe\u2019s friend, Fr. Mayer, read the Upanishads in a\nLatin translation; and they contributed much to the development of the\ntheory which his own emotional and cynical nature had presaged. The\nHindus had long felt that the main problem of existence is moral and\nphysical evil. Schopenhauer found in this teaching the statement of his\nown attitude.\n\nHe esteemed the principles of Christianity and Buddhism because their\ncentral requirement was faith in a redeemer rather than a creator.\nChristianity had no original metaphysics, but Buddhism on account of\nits metaphysics had an especial importance in Schopenhauer\u2019s eyes. It\nwas not only a pessimism, but a philosophy of pessimism. Our existence\nis only a blind struggle for enlightenment and arises out of a flowing\nchain of perennial re-births. Man needs to be freed from the illusion\nof existence and released from re-birth.\n\n=The World as Will and the World as Idea.= In _The Four-fold Root of\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason_, Schopenhauer summarizes knowledge\nas, \u201cThe world is my presentation,\u201d which is Kant\u2019s theory of knowledge.\nA conscious subject vitalizes all things. But the presentations have\nno corresponding reality in the outer world. They are created by my\nown subjectivity from the \u201cprinciple of sufficient reason.\u201d This has\na fourfold root: logic, cause, mathematics, and will-activity. \u201cThe\nworld of phenomena is my idea,\u201d and in _The World as Will and Idea_\nSchopenhauer says, \u201cThis is a truth which holds good for everything\nthat lives and knows.\u201d Man alone can reflect upon this truth. When man\ncomes to the realizing sense that the world is an ideal construction,\nhe begins to philosophize as to the nature of the reality behind\nit. We remember that Herbart started from the same proposition.\nHowever, Schopenhauer departs from Kant\u2019s teaching in one important\nrespect: although he agrees with Kant that the thing-in-itself\ncannot be understood by ideas or a chain of reasoning, he holds that\nthe thing-in-itself is knowable. The World as Idea is a world of\nappearances, but we can know the thing-in-itself by intuition\u2015\u2015by\n\u201cthe look of genius.\u201d The certainty of this first-hand or immediate\nknowledge shows how poor our second-hand or mediate knowledge is. For\neven reasoned or mediate knowledge in its most perfect form, viz.,\nscience, is under the law of cause and can therefore reveal nothing\nabsolute. Science never gets below phenomena.\n\nIf reason reveals only the World as Idea, what revelation does\nintuition give of the thing-in-itself? Intuition reveals the\nthing-in-itself to be Will. Man finds, first, the Will to be in himself.\nHe finds it objectified in his own body and in its members. All the\nmembers of the body are structures of some function. Every part is the\nvisible expression of some desire. Hunger, speech, locomotion, have\ntheir different instruments. Will is immediately known to us as the\nreality in us. In spite of the exaltation of the reason by the modern\nEnlightenment, is it not secondary to Will?\n\nFor behold! Let me look beyond myself. The revelation of the reality\nwithin myself illuminates the reality of the outer world. My Will\nmeets resistance in other things. The everlasting striving of the\nWill appears in all nature. It appears in the fall of a stone, the\ncrystallizing of the diamond\u2015\u2015in all the mechanical movements of matter.\n\u201cThe impulse with which waters hurry to the ocean,\u201d the persistence\nof the magnet for the pole, the perennial push of vegetation, the\nmotivation of animals, show by an analogy stronger than any proof\nthat the reality of the world is fundamentally Will. All nature is in\nreality the \u201cWorld as Will.\u201d This Will is always one and the same. Only\nin the \u201cWorld as Idea\u201d do differences appear. Will is common to all and\nis the only reality. Differences are illusions, and the reason which\nexists only in man is one of those differences.\n\nThe World as Will and the World as Idea do not stand in the relation\nof cause and effect, but the World as Idea is the objectification of\nthe World as Will. Will is to phenomena what essence is to expression.\nWill is the freedom that is within all things; and yet all things are\ndetermined when they have the form of ideas. There is only one Will,\nand so the world is in reality a unity. In essence all things are the\nsame\u2015\u2015in appearance they are different. The Will has no content; it\nwills to will\u2015\u2015to live\u2015\u2015to be actual. In the pantheism of the Will the\nWorld as Idea is an illusion.\n\n=The Will as Irrational Reality.= Before Schopenhauer\u2019s time European\nmysticism had been of one general type. However universal the character\nof illusory appearances had been to the European mystics, there had\nalways been supposed behind the veil a rational reality. Indeed, the\nillusions themselves had been proof of the existence elsewhere of a\ngoverning reason. The medi\u00e6val churchman often preached a mysticism,\nand his exhortation to turn away from illusions of \u201cthe world, the\nflesh, and the Devil,\u201d was based upon the compensation to be found in\nHeaven and in God. The ineffable rest in the bosom of God was reason\nenough for averting the eyes from the passing show of sensuous things.\nSchopenhauer now presents to the Occident another type of mysticism,\nand in this there is no refuge from illusions. This conception had\nlong been common enough in the Orient. The _Rub\u00e1iy\u00e1t_ of Omar Khayy\u00e1m,\nwritten about 1100, represents fundamentally the attitude of the\nPersians of his time. \u201cHe is said to have been especially hated by the\nSufis, whose practice he ridiculed, but whose faith amounts to little\nmore than his own when stripped of the mysticism and formal recognition\nof Islamism.\u201d (FitzGerald.) But in Europe Schopenhauer\u2019s doctrine was\nunique, and he arrived at its construction by stripping mysticism of\nall its religious elements. Faith and belief are eliminated because\nthey have no reality as their object. Reason produces only a world\nof illusory ideas; the Will is a reality, but it is a reality which\nis only a blind urgency\u2015\u2015an instinctive blind force. The essence of\nthings is undirected striving. Life is the expression of the absolute\nunreason of the Will. It is a Will without an object. Nature is the\nobjectification of the Will that perpetually creates itself and is\nforever unsatisfied, unresting, and unhappy.\n\n \u201cA Moment\u2019s Halt\u2015\u2015a momentary taste\n Of Being from the Well amid the Waste\u2015\u2015\n And Lo! the phantom Caravan has reacht\n The Nothing it set out from\u2015\u2015Oh, make haste!\u201d[72]\n\n=The Misery of the World as Idea\u2015\u2015Pessimism.= The fundamental\nirrationality of the Will reveals the absolute misery of the World\nas Idea. The despair of pessimism follows from the very nature of the\nWill; for it must be remembered that Schopenhauer\u2019s pessimism does not\nmerely mean that the appearances of life are illusory, but that reality\nitself is irrational. The World as Idea is the objectification of such\nmisery. Willing has its source in want, and want arises from suffering.\nMoreover the proportion of our wants that are satisfied is very small.\nTo one that is supplied there are many that are not. Furthermore, while\nour desires last long, their satisfaction is short and scanty, \u201clike\nthe alms thrown to a beggar that keeps him alive to-day that his misery\nmay be prolonged to-morrow.\u201d Our ever-springing wants make lasting\npeace impossible. The finite world is not adequate to the infinite\ncraving which it contains, and there is no equation between the cares\nand the satisfactions of life. The greatest evil that can befall a\ncreature is to have been born; and this is a thousand-fold worse in\nman than in any other. To live is to go from willing to attaining and\nthen to willing again. Attainment means new striving, and the Will\nshows \u201cthe ache of the not-yet-satisfied.\u201d After all is said and done,\nsatisfaction destroys not only the desire, but the satisfaction itself.\nThere is no meaning in life. Pain is positive; pleasure is negative,\nand is merely the absence of or respite from pain.\n\n=The Way of Deliverance.= The relief from misery that Schopenhauer\noffers is tinged with the grim despair of life itself. It is an escape\nthat he finds, rather than a haven\u2015\u2015an escape that consists in giving\nup all that life means. Why not, then, give up life, since it is misery\nand torment? But escape is not in suicide, for the act of taking one\u2019s\nown life is the performance of the greatest act of affirmation of the\nWill; and in the Buddhistic doctrine the suicidal soul only passes by\nre-birth (metempsychosis) into another form of Will. Schopenhauer uses\ntwo phrases that have become classic in the description of the two\nattitudes possible to man: (1) if man is merely a part of the World\nas Idea he is \u201caffirming the Will to life\u201d; and (2) if he seeks a way\nof deliverance he \u201cis denying the Will to life.\u201d Suicide is an act of\naffirmation of the Will to life.\n\nHow may the Will be denied? and since we are in essence Will, the\nquestion takes this form, How may the Will deny the Will? This question\npresupposes a transcendental freedom which may be sought in two ways:\none in which the freedom is temporary and the other in which it is\npermanent.\n\n1. The temporary deliverance of the Will may be found in artistic\ncontemplation (Schiller\u2019s disinterested contemplation). Art deals\nnot with particular forms, but eternal types (Platonic Ideas). Art\nisolates an eternal object from out the stream of the world\u2019s changes,\nand places it beyond all relations of time, place, and cause. Art not\nonly removes its object from the World as Idea, but it removes the\ncontemplator as well. The contemplating subject and the contemplated\nobject thus become one, and the subject is temporarily saved, for he is\nelevated above all desire and pain. This, however, is possible not to\nthe majority of men, but only to those few possessing \u00e6sthetic fancy,\nand for them only at intervals. Music is ranked by Schopenhauer as\nthe highest form of art,\u2015\u2015even above poetry,\u2015\u2015and it is not surprising\ntherefore that among the Schopenhauerian worshipers have been many\nprominent musicians.\n\n2. But artistic ecstasy is too fleeting and restricted to offer lasting\ndeliverance from the affirmation of the Will to life and the World as\nIdea. Another act of transcendental freedom will bring man into more\ncomplete freedom; but _this act is a miracle and a mystery_, since\nit is the complete transformation of our nature. This act must be\nsupernatural, and the church is right in calling it a new birth and\na work of grace. _Complete freedom from the Will comes through moral\ndeliverance._\n\nThis lasting escape from the Will is open to the man who appreciates\ntwo facts: that all striving for happiness is vain; and that all men\nare alike manifestations of the Will. To take this double view of life\ninvolves the feeling of sympathy with others in their misery. Sympathy\nis thus the only true moral motive and the fundamental ethical feeling.\nThe Will in us is moral if we feel another\u2019s hurt as our own. But\nsympathy is only a palliative, and it does not remove the cause of\ndisease. The misery still exists, and our sympathy has only changed its\nform. Even though our sympathy goes out to the whole world, the endless\ntragedy would still pass on.\n\nIn the moral deliverance sympathy can be made complete by absolute\ndenial, and this will come by asceticism, mortification, and complete\neradication of want and desire. The Hindu _sannyasi_ shows the way.\nThis is the mystery of the Will. But Schopenhauer is not quite sure\nthat extreme asceticism can be made effective, since we are full of\nWill. At the close of his work he says that even if we could be\ncompletely ascetic the result would be Nothingness. \u201cIn thy Nothing I\nhope to find the ALL.\u201d Schopenhauer despairs of deliverance for himself,\nbut does not count it unachievable by others. Absolute deliverance even\nby asceticism seems impossible to him. The only hope is that through\nart and science the Will may be some time overcome.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII\n\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY[73]\n\n\n=The Return to Realism.= If the history of mankind had terminated with\nthe nineteenth century, the last tendency of thought to be recorded\nwould have been the return to Realism. The abbreviated account which\nfollows of the philosophy of the nineteenth century will explain and\nillustrate this tendency. Before we set this forth, however, it may be\nwell to define again the nature of Realism. What is Realism? In general\nit is the belief that reality or realities exist quite independent of\nanybody\u2019s knowing them. Moreover, Realism has the distinction of being\none of the four great types of metaphysical thought. These types are\nRealism, Mysticism, Critical-rationalism, and Idealism.[74] In other\nwords, Realism is an attitude of mind possible to a whole civilization.\nThis is what is meant by a great philosophical type. The Idealism\nof the period which we have just studied is such a type. Although\nGermany had been the leading representative of Idealism, the spread of\nphilosophical and literary Idealism had been world-wide. All nations\nhad shared in it. But when the great events and the romancing spirit of\nthat period had passed, the reaction to Realism was likewise felt the\nworld over. It is the period of this reaction that we are briefly to\nconsider.\n\n=The Character of the Realism of the Nineteenth Century.= We have\nalready discussed the nature of the Realism of ancient civilization as\nit appeared in Plato\u2019s theory of Ideas; and we also have reviewed the\nvariation of Plato\u2019s doctrine in medi\u00e6val times. Both ancient and\nmedi\u00e6val societies give expression through Plato to Realistic\nconceptions\u2015\u2015ancient society to an \u00e6sthetic Realism, medi\u00e6val to an\necclesiastical Realism. Now in the modern period we find a still\ndifferent kind. _The Realism of the nineteenth century has been that of\nnatural science._ The question of the nineteenth century has been, What\ndegree of importance has the scientific conception of phenomena in our\ntotal conception of life? German Idealism had taken up the natural\nscience of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and had made it a\npart of a world conceived as cosmic Reason. But in the nineteenth\ncentury the conception of the cosmic Reason and that of nature part\ncompany. The two conceptions begin to stand in antithesis. Nature is\nconceived as a reality existing in sublime independence. Democritus\nwins his victory over Spinoza. There are two reasons for this: (1) The\nideas of science are expressed with a clearness and distinctness\nthat is in marked contrast with the ideas of German romanticism.\nNatural science is formulated mathematically and demonstrated in\nexperience, and natural science moreover does not require the labor\nof interpretation. (2) Natural science proves its usefulness, thereby\nresponding to the imperative needs of the economic changes of the\nnineteenth century.\n\nIn this modern period the attention of man has been riveted upon his\nenvironment. If at any time the man of the nineteenth century has\nseemed to be interested in man, the interest has really been in man\u2019s\nrelation to his environment. The nineteenth century has championed\nthe necessary laws and mechanical structure of the outer world against\nman himself. The universe has been enthroned; man has become its\nserf. Human effort has become slave to its own progress. Work has been\napotheosized\u2015\u2015work in the outer world, work with the hands. Inventions\nin material things have multiplied. The nineteenth century has been\nthe period of steam, of electricity, of machinery, of factories,\nof the enormous increase in the number and size of cities, of the\nminute division of labor. Social and economic rather than metaphysical\nproblems have commanded attention. Not another and ideal world, but\n_this present world_, is the one in which the modern man has lived.\nThe sciences have been specialized and man has become practical. Hegel\nwould have said of our time that the cosmic Reason had been so engaged\nin concrete and external realities, that it had had no time to turn\nwithin and scrutinize itself. If one wishes to turn back the leaves\nof history for centuries similar to the nineteenth in their spirit,\none will find them in the third and second centuries B. C. and the\nfourteenth and fifteenth of the present era. Nevertheless, there is\nthis to be said about modern Realism in comparison with the Realism of\npreceding periods\u2015\u2015the preceding Realism had been critical, negative\nin its practical results, and usually an opposition to tradition or a\nreaction from it; modern Realism has been distinguished by its positive\npractical results, its ambition for supremacy, and its shaping of the\nwhole direction of the life of man. It has assumed control of religion,\nart, and social morality, to the end of the well-being of the whole.\n\n=Modern Philosophy and German Idealism.= The nineteenth century\nhas been remarkable in the extent of its historical, literary, and\nscientific productions. It has been poor in its philosophical ideas,\nwhen we compare it with the preceding romantic movement of the German\nIdealists. To be sure, there has been much philosophical literature\nwith a great variety of doctrine, but the many personally impressive\nstructures have on the whole been only the re-shaping of former thought.\nIt has sometimes seemed as if some of the philosophic doctrines of this\ntime were about to take original shape; but none have ever reached it,\nwith the possible exception of the doctrine of historical evolution.\n\nThe explanation of the uncreative character of modern thought is found\nin its relation to the Idealism which preceded it. The German Idealists\nhad conquered the world of the spirit, but in spite of all their\nefforts the realm of empirical facts remained stubborn to all their\nromancing. Even Hegel, the greatest among them, had not succeeded in\ncompletely penetrating history by his dialectic law. Already in the\neighteenth century a Realistic movement had been stirring in England\nand France, and had made notable achievements. So the Idealists turned\nto the study of the facts of life\u2015\u2015partly in order to subordinate them\nto their Idealism, partly because a great interest had appeared in the\nstudy of the records of the past. The origin and history of religions,\nof law, of languages, of art, of institutions formed topics of study\nwithin the Romantic circle. A remarkable list of books was published\nby the Romanticists on these subjects between the date of the battle\nof Waterloo (1815) and that of the death of Hegel (1831). After Hegel\ndied no adequate successors in speculative power came to take the place\nof the old Idealistic leaders, but the interest in empirical science\nwas borne on by many men of genius. The study of empirical phenomena\nwas extended to all branches; biology and geology, which were late in\nbeing studied historically, began to occupy the centre of the stage.\nIn spite of the fact that the nearness of modern philosophical theories\nblinds us to their true perspective, yet even now we can see that in\ncomparison with the German Idealism the philosophical doctrines of the\nnineteenth century are partial in their survey of the field. The whole\nproblem of life was before the eyes of the Idealists; the modern world\nabout 1831 shifted its attention to a critical scrutiny of only one\npart of that problem. The philosophical problem to the Idealists was\nthe problem of the cosmos; the philosophical problem to the nineteenth\ncentury was concerned only with a re\u00ebxamination of the environment of\nman.\n\n=The Philosophical Problems of the Nineteenth Century.= In summarizing\nwhat we have above said, we have before us a situation something as\nfollows. Idealism had run its course as a social attitude of mind, and\nabout 1831 the leaders of Idealism had died with no one to fill their\nplaces. But within Idealism between 1815 and 1831 there had arisen\na great empirical interest in the origins of history, law, philology,\netc. Side by side with this empirical interest there had come certain\neconomic conditions that had called forth and rewarded genius in\nnatural science.\n\nThus we find even before the fourth decade of the nineteenth century\ntwo strong tendencies: (1) a new conception of the meaning of history\nas an evolution from origins; and (2) a remarkable interest in\nthe natural sciences. The two tendencies modified each other. The\nhistorical view of the world exercised a powerful influence upon\nnatural science; natural science had to be reckoned with in the writing\nof history. History and natural science were drawn together, but\nwithout producing a new philosophical conception that would include\nthem both.\n\nFrom the interaction of these two powerful tendencies the great variety\nof philosophical interests were grouped around two general problems.\nThese were (1) _The problem of the functioning of the soul_; (2) _The\nproblem of the conception of history_.\n\n=1. The Problem of the Functioning of the Soul.= With the decline of\nmetaphysics and the reaction from speculation, psychology began to\nloosen from its anchorage in philosophy. Psychology, which had been a\nstudy of mind, now became the study of the relation of mind and body.\nThe tendency was strong to make psychology an empirical science, and\nby the use of the methods of science to become a part of physiology\nand biology. Philosophy has been a nest in which all the sciences have\nbeen brooded. Psychology has been the last to attempt to leave the nest,\nand to-day in some of our large universities it is co\u00f6rdinated in the\ncurriculum with the natural sciences. Deprived of a basis in philosophy,\npsychology turned to natural science for support. Concerning the\nrelation of the soul to the body many solutions have been offered.\n\nFollowing the Sensationalist, Cabanis, who died in 1808, some of the\nFrench Ideologists, so-called, concluded that the soul is everywhere\ndetermined by physical influences, such as age, sex, temperament,\nclimate, etc.; some said that the mind is a result of brain activity;\nsome developed the conception of phrenology, according to which the\nshape of the skull determines the faculties of the mind. The French\nIdeologists differed widely in their interpretations, but on the\nwhole the basis of the movement was materialism. The hypothesis of\nphrenology aroused great interest in England, but John Stuart Mill\nled the movement back to Hume\u2019s associational psychology. He conceived\nthe psychical and the physical states as two separate realms, and he\nconcluded that psychology as the study of the laws of mental states\ncannot reduce mental states to physical. So Sir William Hamilton, under\nthe influence of Kant, championed the life of inner experience.\n\nOf course the materialistic challenge of the soul aroused great heat\nin theological circles. The personality of God and the nature of\nthe soul became burning questions, and led to the dissolution of the\nHegelian school into \u201cthe right wing\u201d and \u201cthe left wing.\u201d Hegel had\nalways maintained his standing in orthodox circles as the Prussian\n\u201cState philosopher.\u201d Those followers who composed the \u201cright wing\u201d\ntried to interpret his doctrine in accordance with the traditional\ntheological conception of the soul; the \u201cleft wing\u201d interpreted Hegel\nas a pantheist, in whose doctrine the soul could not be considered\nas a substance with immortality. Feuerbach followed this by inverting\nHegelianism into a nominalistic materialism, and conceived the soul\nas nature \u201cin its otherness.\u201d In 1854, at a convention of naturalists\nin Germany, the materialistic conception of the soul was found to be\nwidely spread among the German physicians and naturalists. But the\ncontradiction between the inferences of science and \u201cthe needs of\nthe heart\u201d became a subject of controversy, and in 1860, under the\nleadership of Kuno Fischer, the \u201creturn to Kant\u201d was begun, which\nlasted throughout the nineteenth century.\n\nThere are two names that stand out most prominently in relation to\nthis controversy over the nature of the soul: they are those of Lotze\n(1817\u20131881) and Fechner (1801\u20131887). They are names that were conjured\nwith by the generation of American scholars before the present. Lotze\nregarded the mechanical necessity of nature as the form in which\nthe impulsive mental life of man realizes its purposes. Every soul\ntherefore has a life that consists essentially in purposeful relations\nwith other souls. And this is possible only if the lives of men are\nunder an all-embracing Providence. Fechner chose another way to escape\nfrom the materialistic tendency. He regarded the soul and body as\nseparate and qualitatively different, although exactly corresponding,\nmanifestations of one unknown reality. There is a parallelism between\nthe mental and the physical, in which the mental phenomena are known\nonly to the individual perceiving them. As sensations are the surface\nwaves of a total individual consciousness, so the consciousnesses of\nhuman beings are the surface waves of a universal consciousness. The\nmechanical activity of nature corresponds to the consciousness of God.\nWe can investigate this correspondence by studying the correspondence\nbetween our own mental states and physical states. This is the modern\nwell-known psychological method of psycho-physics. We can measure\npsychical quantities by formulating mathematical laws of their\noccurrence.\n\nOur present psychology has seen a development from all these earlier\nexplanations; but this is a matter of contemporary writing and not of\nhistory.\n\n=2. The Problem of the Conception of History.= The contrast in the\nKantian teaching between nature and mind became an antagonism in the\nnineteenth century. When psychology was no longer a purely mental\nscience, social life in its historical development at first withstood\nthe vigorous march of the natural science of the nineteenth century.\nBut the inroads of science in psychology were duplicated in the field\nof sociology, and thus the problem of society was only the problem of\nthe soul on a larger scale.\n\nThe first form that this problem took arose from the opposition in\nFrance between the traditional conception of society and that of the\nphilosophy of the Revolution. The nineteenth century French philosophy\nhas, however, a religious coloring that differentiates it from that\nof the Revolution. Auguste Comte[75] (1798\u20131857) stands as the chief\nrepresentative of this scientific reduction of society. He pushed the\ndoctrines of Hume and Condillac to their extreme in his positivist\nsystem of social science. He maintained that human knowledge had\nas its objects phenomena in their reciprocal relations, but that\nthere is nothing absolute at the basis of these phenomena. The only\nabsolute principle is, All is relative. There is a hierarchy of\nsciences in which sociology is highest. Sociology includes all the\npreceding sciences, and yet it is the original fact. The first social\nphenomenon is the family. The stages of the development of society are\n(1) theological, (2) metaphysical, and (3) positivistic or scientific.\nAll mental life in detail, and human history as a whole, are subject\nto these stages of growth. In the positivistic stage mankind will be\nthe object of religious veneration, and the lives of great men will\nbe justified because they have raised the lives of common men. The\ndemocracy to which Comte looks is one ruled by great minds, and is not\na socialism. In contrast to Comte\u2019s theory is that of Buckle, who would\nstudy history by discovering the mechanical laws governing society.\n\nWhile human history was thus being invaded by natural science and had\nto defend its autonomy against the naturalistic principle of science,\nnatural science on the other hand was in the nineteenth century invaded\nby the historical principle of evolution. Natural science becomes\na history. We have seen that in the Romantic circle there was great\ninterest in the origin and development of law, philology, art, etc. In\nthe beginning and middle of the nineteenth century this interest spread\nto an investigation of the origin of animal life. This investigation\nhas been the most notable in this century, because (1) it included\nin its scope the source and means of progress of the human race; and\nbecause (2) it advanced a new conception of development. Development\nnow becomes evolution. Up to the nineteenth century the world was\nlooked upon as a graded series of types, but no type was supposed to\nevolve into another. (See vol. i, pp. 180, 193; vol. ii, p. 306.) The\ntheory of historical evolution of the nineteenth century is notable\nbecause it advanced the conception, based upon empirical investigation,\nthat types are changed into others. This theory, among those of the\ncentury, comes the nearest to an original philosophical doctrine.\nThe book that became the centre of scientific interest for many years\nwas Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, published in 1859. The name most\nprominently linked with that of Darwin is that of Herbert Spencer,\nwho attempted to make universal the principle of development and to\nformulate its law.\n\nThe modern theory of the historical evolution of animal life has\nreinforced the mechanical principle of nature, which had its origin in\nthe minds of the philosophers of the Renaissance. It has antagonized\nthe theological doctrine of creation; it has related the animal and\nman by filling in the supposably impassable gulf between them; it has\nadvanced the doctrine of chemical synthesis against the hylozoistic\nnotion of a vital principle; it has pushed forward with great assurance\nits theories of transformation and equivalence of forces, and of the\naction of electricity as a substitute for thought-activity; it has\nshown a wonderful parsimony in giving a value to all the facts of\nhistory which had hitherto been conceived as trivial; and on the other\nhand it has reduced the conception of mighty cosmic cataclysms to\na geological series of gradual gradations. Darwin\u2019s place in this\nmovement of the nineteenth century was this: he tried to show that\nanimal life can be explained without the aid of final causes. In other\nwords, the adaptation of the structure of animals can be accounted for\nmechanically. The factors involved in the development of organic life\nupon the earth were, according to Darwin, infinite differentiation,\nadaptation, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest.\n\nNow at the beginning of the twentieth century there seems to be a\nreaction from the scientific positivism of the last century. This has\ntaken the form of an extravagant mysticism, although at heart it is an\noptimism and an idealism.\n\n\n\n\n INDEX\n\n\n Abbott, E. A.,\n _Francis Bacon_, 40 n.\n Absolute Reality,\n of Hegel, 314, 316, 321, 323\u2013326, 328, 329.\n _See_ Reality.\n Absolutism, spirit of,\n in Germany, from 1648 to 1740, 217\u2013223;\n in France, 217, 225;\n destroyed by Frederick the Great and Lessing, 225, 226, 228, 229.\n \u00c6sthetic Idealism,\n of Schelling, 302, 304, 307.\n Agnosticism,\n of Hume, 188.\n Alchemists, the,\n 25.\n Alembert, Jean le Rond d\u2019,\n 211.\n Althusius, Johannes,\n 47.\n America,\n discovery of, 6.\n Anacreonticists, the,\n 224.\n Analysis.\n _See_ Induction.\n Analytic judgments,\n of Kant, 249\u2013252.\n Antinomies,\n of Kant, 264, 265.\n Antithesis,\n of Fichte, 295;\n of Hegel, 327.\n _A posteriori_,\n judgments, of Kant, 250\u2013252;\n material, the perceptions, 257;\n principle, in ethics, 271, 272.\n _A priori_,\n judgments, of Kant, 250\u2013252;\n principles, categories, 257, 271, 272.\n Arch\u00e6us, the,\n of Paracelsus, 26, 27.\n Aristotle,\n represented by two antagonistic schools in the Renaissance, 11.\n Art,\n in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 308;\n and in Schopenhauer\u2019s philosophy, 359.\n Association of Ideas,\n according to Hume, 191\u2013193;\n by law of contiguity, 192\u2013194;\n by law of resemblance, 192\u2013196;\n by law of causation, 192, 193, 196\u2013199.\n Associational Psychology,\n Hobbes the father of, 56.\n Associationalist Psychologists,\n 141.\n Astronomers,\n mathematical, 32\u201336.\n Atheistic controversy,\n of Fichte, 282, 284.\n Atoms,\n scientific conception of, examined by Leibnitz, 119, 120, 121.\n Attributes,\n according to Spinoza, 95, 96.\n _See_ Qualities.\n Auerbach, Berthold,\n _Spinoza_, 88 n.\n Autobiographies,\n many of them written in the Enlightenment, 137.\n\n\n Bacon, Francis,\n 31, 35;\n life of, 39;\n position of, in philosophy, 39\u201342;\n his _New Atlantis_, 40\u201342;\n the aim of, 42, 43;\n his method, 43\u201346;\n compared with Hobbes, 48;\n seems to stand apart, 146.\n Baldwin, J. M.,\n _Fragments in Philosophy_, 84 n.\n Ball, W. W. R.,\n _History of Mathematics_, 36 n., 40 n.\n Bayle, Pierre,\n 203.\n Beauty,\n in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 307.\n Beers, H. A.,\n _History of Romanticism in Eighteenth Century_, 295 n.;\n _History of Romanticism in Nineteenth Century_, 295 n.\n Berkeley, George,\n life and writings of, 169\u2013172;\n the influences upon his thought, 172;\n the purpose of, 173, 174;\n general relation of, to Locke and Hume, 174, 175;\n his points of agreement with Locke, 175, 176;\n the negative side of his philosophy, 176\u2013179;\n denies existence of abstract ideas, 177\u2013179;\n the positive side of his philosophy, 179\u2013183;\n and Hume, compared, 183, 184.\n Blackwood Classics,\n _Descartes_, 70 n., 73 n.\n Bodin, Jean,\n 47.\n Body,\n relation of mind and, according to Descartes, 78\u201380;\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 126.\n Bohn\u2019s Libraries,\n _Spinoza_, 90 n.\n Brahe, Tycho,\n 32, 33.\n Brown, Thomas,\n 202.\n Browning, Robert,\n _Paracelsus_, 25, 26 n.\n Bruno, Giordano,\n 25, 27\u201330, 32, 33.\n Buckle, H. T.,\n 362.\n Buffon, G. L. L. de,\n 211.\n Butler, Joseph,\n his _Analogy of Religion_, 166.\n Byron, G. G., Lord,\n on Berkeley, 182.\n\n\n Caird, E.,\n _Philosophy of Kant_, 236 n.\n Calkins, M. W.,\n _Persistent Problems in Philosophy_, iv, 66 n., 73 n., 110 n.\n Cambridge School, the,\n 61.\n Campanella, \u2666Tommaso,\n his _State of the Sun_, 41 n.\n Cartesian argument, the,\n 74, 75.\n Categorical imperative, the,\n of Kant, 273.\n Categories,\n Aristotelian and Kantian, 256, 257;\n of Hegel, 323, 327.\n Causation,\n association of, 192, 193, 196\u2013199.\n Chubb, Thomas,\n 165.\n Church,\n medi\u00e6val, 14;\n attitude of, toward science, in the period of the Renaissance,\n 19\u201321, 62\u201365;\n according to Hobbes, 60.\n Civilization,\n of the Middle Ages, causes of the decay of, 4\u20137;\n modern, is subjective, 15.\n Classicism,\n German, 224, 296.\n Coleridge, S. T.,\n and Spinoza, 85.\n Collegiants, the,\n Spinoza\u2019s acquaintance with, 87\u201389.\n Collins, Anthony,\n 165.\n Columbus, Christopher,\n discovers America, 6.\n Comte, Auguste,\n quoted on the _Encyclop\u00e6dia_, 211;\n his philosophy, 360.\n Concomitant variations,\n the name, 38 n.\n Condillac, E. B. de,\n 212.\n Consciousness,\n ultimate certainty of, according to Descartes, 70\u201372;\n implications of, according to Descartes, 72, 73;\n in Fichte\u2019s philosophy, 286\u2013288, 293;\n in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 309;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 321, 322, 326, 327;\n in Herbart\u2019s philosophy, 336, 338;\n in Fechner\u2019s philosophy, 359.\n Constantinople,\n fall of, 6.\n Constitutionalists and Political Economists, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Contiguity,\n association of, 192\u2013194.\n Continuity,\n law of, 129.\n Contradictions,\n the world a world of, according to Hegel, 321, 327, 328, 335;\n of experience, according to Herbart, 334, 335.\n Copernicus, Nikolaus,\n 7, 32\u201334.\n Cosmic,\n unity, of Hegel, 322\u2013326;\n law, of Hegel, 326\u2013328.\n Counter-Revolution, the,\n 17.\n Criticism,\n the Enlightenment a period of, 138;\n Kant\u2019s method of, 239.\n Cusanus, Nicolas (Nicolas of Cusa),\n 23\u201325.\n\n\n Darwin, Charles Robert,\n his _Origin of Species_ formulated most fully the Evolution\n movement, 3, 362.\n Decentralization of Europe and of philosophy,\n iv, 12, 13.\n Deduction,\n in the Natural Science period, 19, 21, 35;\n defined, 35 n.;\n use of, according to Galileo, 37;\n according to Bacon, 40, 46;\n according to Descartes, 70, 72, 73;\n use made of, by the followers of Descartes, 81.\n Deed-act,\n of Fichte, 293.\n Deism,\n and Hume, 200;\n of Voltaire, 210.\n Deists,\n the English, 141, 164\u2013166;\n the German, 142.\n Descartes, Ren\u00e9,\n 31, 35;\n compared with Hobbes, 48, 49;\n the mental conflict in, 65, 66;\n life and philosophical writings of, 66, 67;\n the two conflicting influences upon the thought of, 67\u201369;\n the method of, 69, 70;\n the great contribution of, an absolute principle, 70;\n induction, provisional doubt, ultimate certainty of consciousness,\n according to, 70\u201372;\n deduction, implications of consciousness, according to, 70, 72, 73;\n his proofs of the existence of God, 73\u201375;\n the reality of matter, according to, 75\u201377;\n his view of the relation of God to the world, 77;\n of God to matter, 77, 78;\n of God to minds, 78;\n of mind and body, 78\u201380;\n influence of, 80, 81;\n relation of the Occasionalists and Spinoza to, 81\u201384;\n his influence on Spinoza, 87;\n his influence on Locke, 145, 146, 152.\n Determinism,\n 53.\n Dewing, A. S.,\n _Introduction to Modern Philosophy_, iv, 8 n., 332 n.\n Diderot, Denis,\n 211.\n Differential calculus,\n discovered by Leibnitz, 112, 114, 119.\n Discoveries.\n _See_ Inventions.\n Dogmatism,\n defined, 187.\n Doubt,\n provisional, of Descartes, 70\u201372.\n Dualism,\n Cartesian, of mind and matter, assumed in the Enlightenment, 135;\n of Berkeley, 179;\n formed the background of Kant\u2019s thought, 232.\n Dualists,\n 174 n.\n Duty,\n according to Fichte, 289\u2013295.\n\n\n Eclecticism,\n revived by Renaissance scholars, 11.\n Edwards, Jonathan,\n 171.\n Ego, the,\n of Kant, 260, 263, 264;\n of Fichte, 288\u2013295, 313;\n of Schelling, 304, 309;\n of Hegel, 313, 314.\n Empiricism,\n begun by Locke, 61;\n defined, 61 n.;\n in the Enlightenment, 137;\n of Berkeley, 174;\n of Hume, 189;\n of the nineteenth century, 355\u2013357, 361, 362.\n Encyclop\u00e6dists, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142, 211, 212.\n England,\n in the Natural Science period, 17, 21, 31;\n the Natural Science movement in, 46;\n the Renaissance in, after Hobbes, 61;\n the Enlightenment in, 140, 145\u2013147;\n comparison of the French Enlightenment with the Enlightenment\n in, 204, 205;\n influence of, in France, in the Enlightenment, 206, 207.\n Enlightenment, the,\n the second period of modern philosophy, 2, 3;\n general treatment of, 132\u2013143;\n begins when the \u201cnew man\u201d tries to understand his own nature, 132;\n the practical presupposition of, 134;\n the metaphysical presupposition of, 135;\n the problems of, 135\u2013140;\n the period of empirical psychology, autobiographies, and\n Methodism, 137;\n a period of criticism, 138;\n a period of remarkable changes in the political map of Europe, 139;\n a comparison of, in England, France, and Germany, 140, 204, 205;\n the many groups of philosophers in, 140\u2013143;\n birthplaces of influential thinkers of (map), 144;\n in Great Britain, 145\u2013147;\n in France, 203\u2013216;\n the situation in, in France, 203\u2013206;\n the English influence in, in France, 206, 207;\n the two periods of, in France, 207, 208;\n the intellectual (Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclop\u00e6dists),\n 208\u2013212;\n the social (Rousseau), 213\u2013216;\n in Germany, 216\u2013229;\n the introductory period (absolutism), 217\u2013223;\n sources of, 218\u2013223;\n the literary, in Germany, summary of, 223, 224;\n the political (Frederick the Great), 224\u2013226;\n the course of, in Germany, 226\u2013228;\n Lessing, 228, 229.\n Epicureanism,\n revived by Renaissance scholars, 11.\n Epistemology,\n of Locke, 155, 156, 158, 160\u2013162;\n of Kant, 238, 239.\n _See_ Knowledge.\n Erdmann, J. E.\n on the Enlightenment, 133.\n Eternity,\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 105, 106.\n Ethics\n of Spinoza, 102\u2013106;\n of Hume, 200, 201;\n of Kant, 269\u2013277.\n Eucken, Rudolf,\n _Problem of Human Life_, iv, 8 n., 23 n., 40 n., 47 n., 66 n.,\n 84 n., 107 n., 147 n., 183 n., 203 n., \u2666213 n., 236 n.,\n 282 n., 300 n., 315 n., 340 n., 352 n.\n Evil,\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 130.\n Evolution,\n principle of, 3, 361, 362.\n Experience,\n contradictions of, according to Herbart, 334, 335.\n Extension,\n the essence of matter, according to Descartes, 77, 82;\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 93, 95, 96, 102.\n\n\n Faith philosophy,\n Herder a writer on, 143.\n Falckenberg, Richard,\n _History of Modern Philosophy_, iv, 26 n., 36 n., 47 n., 55 n.,\n 70 n., 73 n.;\n quoted, 274, 275.\n Fechner, G. T.,\n 359.\n Feuerbach, L. A.,\n 358.\n Fichte, J. G.,\n and Schelling and Hegel, what they sought, 279, 281, 312;\n life and writings of, 282\u2013285;\n the influences upon his teaching, 285, 286;\n his two kinds of ideas, 286;\n the moral awakening, according to, 287, 288;\n the central principle in his philosophy, 288\u2013290;\n the moral world of, 290\u2013292;\n God and man, in the philosophy of, 292, 293;\n what a moral reality involves, according to, 293\u2013295;\n his relation to Romanticism, 299;\n and Schelling, a brief comparison of, as philosophers, 303\u2013305.\n Fischer, Kuno,\n _Descartes and his School_, 70 n.;\n leads the \u201creturn to Kant,\u201d 359.\n FitzGerald, Edward,\n his translation of the _Rub\u00e1iy\u00e1t_, 347, 348.\n Force,\n fundamental ground of motion, according to Leibnitz, 119, 120;\n identified with the metaphysical atom by Leibnitz, 121;\n the word, as used by Leibnitz, squints toward physics and\n psychology, 122.\n France,\n in the Natural Science period, 17, 21, 31;\n the Enlightenment in, 140, 203\u2013216;\n the situation in, in the Enlightenment, 203\u2013206;\n the English influence in, 206, 207;\n the two periods of the Enlightenment in, 207, 208;\n the intellectual Enlightenment (Voltaire, Montesquieu, the\n Encyclop\u00e6dists) in, 208\u2013212;\n the social Enlightenment (Rousseau) in, 213\u2013216;\n absolutism in, 217.\n Francke, A. H.,\n 220.\n Frederick the Great,\n 223\u2013226.\n Freedom,\n Spinoza\u2019s conception of, 104;\n according to Locke, 154, 155;\n Kant\u2019s idea of, 270;\n the postulate of, according to Kant, 276;\n according to Fichte, 289, 290;\n and God, Schelling\u2019s philosophy of, 303;\n transcendental, of Schopenhauer, 349\u2013351.\n\n\n Galilei, Galileo,\n 31\u201333, 35\u201339.\n Gama, Vasco da,\n discovers all-sea route to India, 7.\n Gassendi, Pierre,\n was author of the introduction of Greek atomism into modern\n thought, 120.\n Geneva,\n new religious centre in the Renaissance, 12.\n Geometrical Method and its Opponents,\n in the Enlightenment, 142.\n German Idealism,\n and modern philosophy, 355, 356.\n German Idealists,\n places connected with (map), 280;\n treated, 278\u2013329.\n German literature,\n a factor in the Enlightenment, 218, 219, 223.\n German Philosophy,\n the third period of modern philosophy, 3;\n treatment of, 230\u2013329;\n the three characteristics of, 231, 232;\n the two periods of, 232, 233.\n Germany,\n in the Renaissance, 12, 16, 17, 21, 31;\n the Enlightenment in, 140, 216\u2013229;\n the introductory period (absolutism), 217\u2013223;\n summary of the literary Enlightenment in, 223, 224;\n the political Enlightenment in (Frederick the Great), 224\u2013226;\n the course of the Enlightenment in, 226\u2013228;\n Lessing, 228, 229;\n the convergence of philosophical influences in, 230, 231.\n Geulincx, Arnold,\n 63, 83.\n Gibbon, Edward,\n quoted, 138.\n God,\n in the philosophy of Cusanus, 25;\n in Bruno\u2019s philosophy, 28\u201330;\n Descartes\u2019 proofs of the existence of, 73\u201375;\n relation of, to the world, to matter, and to minds, according\n to Descartes, 77, 78;\n in the philosophy of the Occasionalists, 83;\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 91\u2013106;\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 126, 127, 130, 131;\n in the Enlightenment, 135;\n in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 181\u2013183;\n in Hume\u2019s philosophy, 200;\n in Voltaire\u2019s philosophy, 210;\n the idea of, according to Kant, 261, 265\u2013268;\n the postulate of the existence of, according to Kant, 276, 277;\n in Fichte\u2019s philosophy, 292, 293;\n in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 300;\n and freedom, Schelling\u2019s philosophy of, 303, 312;\n of the Mystic, 319;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 324;\n according to Fechner, 359.\n Goethe, J. W. von,\n _Faust_, 25, 26 n., 85 n.;\n and Spinoza, 84, 85;\n describes the Enlightenment as an age of self-conceit, 134;\n prominent in the Storm and Stress movement, 227;\n as a Romanticist, 297\u2013299;\n and Schelling, their philosophy, 306.\n Gottsched, J. C.,\n 219, 223, 294.\n Grace,\n world of. _See_ World of grace.\n Great Britain,\n the Enlightenment in, 145\u2013147.\n _See_ England.\n Greek,\n language and literature, study of, before and in the Renaissance,\n 10\u201314, 16.\n Greeks, the,\n naturalism of, recovered in the Renaissance, 14.\n Grotius, Hugo,\n 47.\n Gunpowder,\n discovery of, 6.\n\n\n Hamilton, Sir William,\n 202, 358.\n Hardenberg, Friedrich von (Novalis),\n on Spinoza, 92;\n quoted, 295.\n Hartmann, K. R. E. von,\n 342.\n Harvey, William,\n 35.\n Hegel, G. W. F.,\n German philosophy ends with, 3;\n and Fichte and Schelling, what they sought, 279, 281, 312;\n comment of, on Schelling, 299;\n and the culmination of Idealism, 312\u2013314;\n why he remains to-day the representative of Kant, 314, 315;\n life and writings of, 315\u2013318;\n the fundamental principle of his idealism, 321, 322;\n the cosmic unity of, 322\u2013326;\n the cosmic law of, 326\u2013328;\n his application of his theory, 328, 329;\n basis of the opposition against, 331, 332;\n and Schopenhauer, compared, 340, 341;\n his philosophy, how interpreted by his followers, 358.\n Heidelberg,\n University of, 12.\n Herbart, J. F.,\n as a follower of Kant, 330\u2013332;\n turns to the thing-in-itself, 332;\n his programme at the beginning of his teaching, 332, 333;\n life and writings of, 333, 334;\n his contradictions of experience, 334;\n his argument for realism, 334\u2013336;\n the many reals and nature phenomena, according to, 337, 338;\n the soul and mental phenomena, according to, 338\u2013340.\n Herbert of Cherbury,\n 165.\n Herder, J. G. von,\n brought into currency the word \u201chumanity,\u201d 133;\n prominent in the Storm and Stress movement, 227;\n true interpreter of Leibnitz, 228.\n Hibben, J. G.,\n _Philosophy of Enlightenment_, 107 n., 119 n., 132 n., 179 n.;\n quoted on Berkeley, 180.\n History,\n conception of, in the nineteenth century, 357, 360\u2013363.\n Hobbes, Thomas,\n 31, 35, 36;\n a political theorist, 47;\n forerunner of modern materialism, 48, 49;\n compared with Bacon, 48;\n compared with Descartes, 48;\n life and writings of, 49, 50;\n the influences upon the thought of, 50\u201352;\n his mission, to construct a mechanical view of the world, 52;\n the fundamental principle in the teaching of, 52\u201354;\n the method of, 54, 55;\n kinds of bodies, according to, 55, 56;\n his application of the mathematical theory to psychology, 56\u201358;\n to politics, 58\u201360;\n his _Leviathan_, 60;\n and Descartes and Locke, 145, 146;\n began the school of English Moralists, 167, 168.\n H\u00f6ffding, Harold,\n _History of Modern Philosophy_, iv, 36 n., 40 n., 70 n.\n Holland,\n in the Natural Science period, 17, 21, 31.\n Holy Roman Empire,\n 217, 225.\n Humanistic period,\n general character of, 15\u201321;\n long list of representatives of, 22, 23;\n consideration of representatives of (Cusanus, Paracelsus, Bruno),\n 23\u201330.\n _Humanity_,\n the word, brought into currency by Herder, 133.\n Hume, David,\n on Spinoza, 88;\n the change in English intellectual interests shown in, 147;\n general relation of Berkeley to, 174, 175;\n a dualist, 174 n.;\n life and writings of, 183\u2013186;\n compared with Berkeley, 183, 184;\n influences upon the thought of, 186, 187;\n his Skepticism and Phenomenalism, 187\u2013189;\n the origin of ideas, according to, 189\u2013191;\n the association of ideas, according to, 191\u2013193;\n association, by law of contiguity, 192\u2013194;\n by law of resemblance, 192\u2013196;\n association of causation, 192, 193, 196\u2013199;\n mathematics in his philosophy, 194, 195;\n his conception of substance, 195, 196;\n his attack on theology, 195, 196;\n his attack on science, 196\u2013199;\n the extent and limits of human knowledge, according to, 199, 200;\n his theory of religion and ethics, 200, 201;\n the \u2666skepticism of, influenced Kant, 235.\n Huyghens, Christian,\n 32.\n\n\n Idea,\n the world as, and as Will, according to Schopenhauer, 345\u2013347;\n the misery of the world as, according to Schopenhauer, 348, 349.\n Idealism,\n of Berkeley, 174;\n after Kant, 278, 279;\n subjective, of Fichte, 290, 304;\n \u00e6sthetic, of Schelling, 302, 304, 307;\n Transcendental, of Schelling, 309, 310;\n Hegel and the culmination of, 312\u2013314;\n and Realism, and Mysticism, contrasted, 318\u2013321;\n Hegel\u2019s, the fundamental principle of, 321, 322;\n German, and modern philosophy, 355, 356.\n Idealists,\n German, treated, 279\u2013329.\n Ideas,\n the proof of their truth, according to Descartes, 72;\n innate, of Descartes, 73, 156;\n innate, of Spinoza, 156;\n innate, denied by Locke, 156, 157, 189;\n innate, of Leibnitz, 157;\n source of, according to Locke, 157\u2013159;\n in the philosophies of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 174, 175;\n abstract, in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 177, 179, 189;\n source of, according to Berkeley, 181\u2013183;\n origin of, according to Hume, 187, 189\u2013191;\n association of, according to Hume, 191\u2013193;\n association of, by law of contiguity, 192\u2013194;\n by law of resemblance, 192\u2013196;\n Kant\u2019s use of the term, 261;\n the three, according to Kant (God, soul, totality of the universe),\n 261\u2013268;\n of Fichte, 286;\n neo-Platonic, in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 312.\n Identity,\n of indiscernibles, 129;\n Schelling\u2019s philosophy of, 303, 310, 311.\n Ideologists,\n French, 358.\n Idols, the,\n of Bacon, 45.\n Illuminati, the,\n 227.\n Immortality of the soul,\n the postulate of, according to Kant, 276.\n Impressions,\n in Hume\u2019s philosophy, 190.\n Inconsistencies,\n of the world according to Hegel, 322.\n Independent Philosophers, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Individual, independence of the,\n in the Enlightenment, 134.\n Individualism,\n movement toward, in the Renaissance, 12, 15;\n modern, the rise of, 132\u2013134;\n in the Enlightenment, its expression in England, France, and\n Germany, 140;\n in France, in the Enlightenment, 207\u2013209;\n in Germany, 219, 220, 223, 225\u2013229;\n of the Romantic movement, 296.\n Induction,\n in the Natural Science period, 19, 21, 35;\n defined, 35 n.;\n use of, according to Galileo, 37;\n according to Bacon, 40, 46;\n according to Descartes, 70\u201372.\n Infinity,\n Spinoza\u2019s idea of, 94, 95, 105, 106.\n Innate Ideas,\n of Descartes, 73, 156;\n of Spinoza, 156;\n existence of, denied by Locke, 156, 157, 189;\n of Leibnitz, 157.\n Intellectual Enlightenment,\n in France, 207\u2013212.\n Inventions,\n of the Middle Ages, 6, 9;\n in the nineteenth century, 354.\n Italian nature philosophers,\n 22.\n Italy,\n in the Renaissance, 10, 12, 16, 17, 21, 31.\n\n\n James, William,\n _Hibbert Journal_, 315 n.;\n _Pragmatism_, 352 n.\n Jena,\n 233, 284, 302, 307.\n Jewish Cabala, the,\n 11.\n Johnson, Samuel,\n president of King\u2019s College in New York, 171.\n Judgments indispensable to knowledge,\n according to Kant (analytic, synthetic, _a posteriori_,\n _a priori_), 248\u2013252.\n\n\n Kant, Immanuel,\n his _Critique of Pure Reason_, marks the transition from the\n Enlightenment to German Philosophy, 2\u20134, 232;\n the influences upon, 233\u2013235;\n life and writings of, 235\u2013238;\n the problem of, 238, 239;\n the method of, 239, 240;\n the threefold world of (subjective states, things-in-themselves,\n and phenomena), 240\u2013243;\n his world of knowledge, 243\u2013245;\n place of synthesis in knowledge, according to, 245\u2013248;\n the judgments indispensable to knowledge, according to, 248\u2013252;\n proof of the validity of human knowledge, according to, 252\u2013260;\n validity of sense-perception consists in space and time, 253\u2013255;\n the validity of the understanding, 255\u2013260;\n the question of the validity of the reason, 260\u2013262;\n the idea of the soul, 261\u2013264;\n the idea of the universe, 261, 264, 265;\n the idea of God, 261, 265\u2013268;\n summary of the theory of knowledge contained in the _Critique of\n Pure Reason_, 268, 269;\n the ethics of (the problem of the _Critique of Practical Reason_),\n 269\u2013271;\n the moral law and the two questions concerning it, 271\u2013275;\n the moral postulates, 275\u2013277;\n idealism after, 278, 279;\n his influence upon Fichte, 285, 286;\n why Hegel remains to-day the representative of, 314, 315;\n followers of (Herbart and Schopenhauer), 330\u2013332.\n Kepler, Johann,\n 32\u201334.\n Khayy\u00e1m, Omar,\n 347, 348.\n Knowledge,\n in Hobbes\u2019s philosophy, 57;\n in Descartes\u2019s philosophy, 77;\n God the only object of, according to Spinoza, 92;\n Locke\u2019s theory of, 155, 156, 158, 160\u2013162;\n in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 176;\n in Hume\u2019s philosophy, 187, 199, 200;\n in Reid\u2019s philosophy, 202;\n Kant\u2019s theory of, 238, 239;\n Kant\u2019s world of, 243\u2013245;\n the place of synthesis in, according to Kant, 245\u2013248;\n the judgments indispensable to, according to Kant, 248\u2013252;\n human, proof of the validity of, according to Kant, 252\u2013262;\n transcendent and transcendental, of Kant, 262;\n of the soul, 262\u2013264;\n of the universe, 264, 265;\n of God, 265\u2013268;\n summary of Kant\u2019s theory of, contained in the _Critique of Pure\n Reason_, 268, 269;\n according to Schopenhauer, 345.\n Knutzen, Martin, teacher of Kant, 234.\n\n\n Latin,\n before and in the Renaissance, 10\u201312.\n Leibnitz, G. W. von,\n 31;\n as the finisher of the Renaissance and the forerunner of the\n Enlightenment, 107, 108;\n life and writings of, 108\u2013112;\n his early classical studies, 112, 113;\n the new science and his discoveries, 113, 114;\n influenced by political pressure for religious reconciliation,\n 114, 115;\n the method of, 115\u2013118;\n the immediate problem for (that of reconciling science and\n religion), 118, 119;\n the result of his examination of the principles of science, a\n plurality of metaphysical substances, 119\u2013122;\n his examination of the scientific conception of motion, 119, 120;\n his examination of the scientific conception of the atom, 120, 121;\n his theory of monadology, 121;\n the double nature of his monads, 122\u2013125;\n the two forms of his conception of the unity of the substances,\n 125;\n the intrinsic (philosophical) unity of his monads, 125\u2013129;\n the superimposed (theological) unity of his monads, 129\u2013131;\n his toleration compared with that of Locke, 151;\n his philosophy, a source of the German Enlightenment, 220\u2013223;\n his philosophy developed and transformed by Wolff and Thomasius,\n 221\u2013223;\n Lessing and Herder as interpreters of, 228;\n appears, through Lessing, as a motive power in German\n Enlightenment, 229.\n Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy,\n 221\u2013223, 231;\n influenced Kant, 233, 234.\n Lessing, G. E.,\n and Spinoza, connection of, 85;\n helped save Germany from a political revolution, 226\u2013228;\n gave the death-blow to pedantic absolutism, 228;\n German literature begins with, 228;\n as interpreter of Leibnitz, 228;\n his philosophy, 229.\n Life,\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 128.\n Locke, John,\n his _Essay on the Human Understanding_ marks the transition from\n the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, 2\u20134;\n his general position in the history of philosophy, 145\u2013147;\n his life and writings, 147\u2013150;\n the sources of his thought, 150\u2013153;\n his Puritan ancestry, 150;\n his training in tolerance, 150, 151;\n the scientific influence on, 151, 152;\n the political influence on, 152, 153;\n the purpose of, 153\u2013155;\n two sides of his philosophy, 155\u2013158;\n and scholasticism, 156, 157;\n his psychology, 157\u2013160;\n his epistemology, 155, 156, 158, 160\u2013162;\n his practical philosophy, 162, 163;\n the influence of, 163, 164;\n general relation of Berkeley to, 174, 175;\n Berkeley\u2019s points of agreement with, 175, 176.\n Logic,\n in the latter part of the Middle Ages, studied for its own sake, 4;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 323, 328.\n London,\n new religious centre in the Renaissance, 12;\n becomes an intellectual centre about the time of the publication\n of Locke\u2019s _Essay_, 206.\n Lotze, R. H.,\n 359.\n Louis XIV, French King,\n 203.\n Louis XV, French King,\n 204.\n\n\n Macaulay, T. B.,\n _Essay on Bacon_, 40 n.;\n on Bacon, 42.\n Macchiavelli, Niccol\u00f2,\n 47.\n Magic,\n in the Humanistic period, 18, 19, 21, 25.\n Magnetic needle,\n discovery of, 6, 7.\n Malebranche, Nicolas de,\n 63, 83.\n Man,\n his relation to the universe in the Renaissance, 8\u201318;\n in the philosophy of Paracelsus, 26;\n in Hobbes\u2019s philosophy, 55, 58;\n in Descartes\u2019s philosophy, 79;\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 103;\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 126;\n in Fichte\u2019s philosophy, 292, 293;\n in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 300, 309.\n _See_ New man.\n Materialism,\n of Hobbes, 48, 49, 53;\n defined, 53 n.;\n of the nineteenth century, 358.\n Mathematical Astronomers, the,\n 32\u201336.\n Mathematical law,\n according to Galileo, 37, 38.\n Mathematics,\n in the Natural Science period, 19, 21;\n modern influence of, grew from astronomical beginnings among the\n Humanists, 35;\n of Hobbes, 48, 54, 56\u201360;\n of Descartes, 48, 68, 69, 74, 76;\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 90, 91, 93, 99;\n differential calculus, discovered by Leibnitz, 112, 114, 119;\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 116, 122, 123;\n in Hume\u2019s philosophy, 194, 195.\n Matter,\n the reality of, according to Descartes, 75\u201377, 82;\n relation of God to, according to Descartes, 77, 78;\n in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 177, 178;\n in Schelling\u2019s philosophy, 305;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 324.\n Mechanism,\n of the world of Hobbes, 52\u201354.\n Medi\u00e6val,\n man, 9, 10;\n science, 11;\n institutions, 11;\n church, 14;\n world, 15.\n Mendelssohn, Moses,\n 221.\n Metaphysics,\n Cartesian, assumed in the Enlightenment, 135.\n Methodism,\n rise of, 137.\n Middle Ages, the,\n causes of the decay of the civilization of, 4\u20137.\n Mill, J. S.,\n 38 n., 358.\n Mind,\n relation of God to, according to Descartes, 78;\n relation of body and, according to Descartes, 78\u201380;\n in the philosophy of the Occasionalists, 83;\n in the philosophy of Locke, 156\u2013162;\n in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 176, 180;\n in Hume\u2019s philosophy, 191;\n in Reid\u2019s philosophy, 202;\n of Fichte and Schelling, 304;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 324;\n phenomena of, according to Herbart, 338\u2013340.\n _See_ Soul.\n Modern philosophy,\n comparative short time-length of, iii, iv;\n difficulty in the study of, 1, 2;\n periods of, 2\u20134;\n and German idealism, 355, 356.\n Modes,\n of mind and matter, according to Descartes, 77;\n of thought and extension, according to Spinoza, 95, 96.\n Monadology,\n Leibnitz\u2019s theory of, 121.\n Monads,\n of Leibnitz, metaphysical atoms, 112, 114, 119, 121;\n the double nature of, 122\u2013125;\n conceived as soul-atoms, 122, 123, 126;\n representation the general function of, 124;\n are windowless, and mirror the universe, 125, 127;\n the principle of unity among, called a pre-established harmony,\n 125;\n the intrinsic (philosophical) unity of, 125\u2013129;\n the superimposed (theological) unity of, 129\u2013131.\n Montesquieu, C. de S. de, Baron,\n 208.\n Moral,\n awakening, the, according to Fichte, 287, 288;\n freedom, of Fichte, 289, 290;\n world, of Fichte, 290\u2013292;\n reality, a, what it involves, according to Fichte, 293\u2013295.\n Moral Philosophers,\n of the Enlightenment, 141.\n Moralists,\n English, the, 166\u2013168.\n Morality,\n according to Hegel, 326.\n Morals,\n Kant\u2019s theory of, 269\u2013277.\n More, Thomas,\n his _Utopia_, 41 n., 47.\n Morley, John,\n _Diderot_, 211 n.\n Motion,\n in Galileo\u2019s philosophy, 38;\n in Hobbes\u2019s philosophy, 53;\n Leibnitz\u2019s examination of the scientific conception of, 119, 120.\n Music according to Schopenhauer,\n 350.\n Mysticism,\n self-destructive, 5;\n of Spinoza, 98\u2013102;\n and Realism, and Idealism, contrasted, 318\u2013321;\n of Schopenhauer, 347;\n of twentieth century, 363.\n Mystics,\n Protestant, the, 23.\n Mythology and Revelation,\n Schelling\u2019s philosophy of, 303, 311, 312.\n\n\n Napoleon,\n quoted, 231.\n _Natura naturans_ and _natura naturata_,\n 29, 30, 97.\n Natural Religion,\n the creed of, 165.\n Natural Science period, the,\n general facts about, 15\u201321;\n discussion of (Galileo, Bacon, Hobbes), 31\u201361;\n discussion of the Rationalism of, 62\u2013131.\n Naturalism,\n of the Greeks, recovered in the Renaissance, 14;\n in Hobbes, 53;\n defined, 53 n.\n Nature,\n in the Natural Science period, 18;\n in the philosophy of Paracelsus, 27;\n in Bruno\u2019s philosophy, 29, 30;\n its two aspects, _natura naturans_ and _natura naturata_, 29, 30;\n in the philosophy of the Rationalists, 63, 64;\n continuity of, according to Leibnitz, 123, 126, 128, 129;\n in the Enlightenment, 135;\n in the philosophy of Locke, 163;\n according to Kant, 248, 255, 258, 259;\n as conceived by the Romanticists, 297;\n Schelling\u2019s philosophy of, 300, 304\u2013306;\n phenomena of, and the many reals, according to Herbart, 337, 338;\n in Schopenhauer, 348;\n how conceived, in the nineteenth century, 353;\n according to Fechner, 359.\n Nature philosophers,\n Italian, 22.\n Neo-Platonism,\n dominated the Humanistic period, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, 27\u201329.\n New Man,\n in a New Universe, phrase characterizing first period of modern\n philosophy, 8\u201318;\n the emergence of the, in the Enlightenment, 132\u2013134.\n Newton, Sir Isaac,\n 32;\n his physics, Kant influenced by, 234.\n Nietzsche, Friedrich,\n 342, 352 n.\n Nineteenth century,\n pessimistic, 341, 342;\n the character of the realism of, 353\u2013355;\n the barrenness of the philosophy of, and German idealism, 355, 356;\n the philosophical problems of, 356\u2013362.\n Nineteenth Century Philosophy,\n the fourth period of modern philosophy, 3, 352\u2013363.\n Nominalism,\n doctrine of, led to the dissolution of the civilization of the\n Middle Ages, 6.\n Noumena of Kant,\n 242.\n Novalis.\n _See_ Hardenberg.\n\n\n Occasionalists, the,\n 63, 81;\n their relation to Descartes, 81\u201383.\n Owen, John,\n Locke influenced by, 150.\n Oxford University,\n 12.\n\n\n Panpsychism,\n 102.\n Pantheism,\n defined, 94;\n of Spinoza, 94\u201398.\n Paracelsus,\n 23, 25\u201327.\n Paris,\n the centre of scholastic influence in the seventeenth century, 206.\n Paulsen, Friedrich,\n cited, 231;\n on Kant\u2019s synthetic judgments _a priori_, 251 n.\n Perceptions,\n of Berkeley, 181;\n of Hume, 190.\n _See_ Sense-perception.\n Periods of modern philosophy,\n 2\u20134.\n Pessimism,\n 341, 342, 344, 348\u2013351.\n Phenomena,\n the world of, according to Kant, 242\u2013243;\n realities implied by, according to Herbart, 336;\n nature, and the many reals, according to Herbart, 337, 338.\n Phenomenalism,\n of Hume, 187\u2013189.\n \u201cPhilosopher\u2019s stone, the,\u201d\n 25.\n Philosophical Religion,\n Lessing a writer on, 143.\n Philosophical Revolutionists, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Philosophy,\n according to Hegel, 326;\n modern, barren of ideas, 355;\n and German Idealism, 355, 356.\n Phrenology,\n in the nineteenth century, 358.\n Physics,\n in Hobbes\u2019s philosophy, 56;\n of Descartes, 68.\n _See_ Science.\n Pietism,\n and Leibnitz, 115;\n a factor in the German Enlightenment, 219, 220, 223, 230;\n influenced Kant, 233.\n Pietists, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Plato,\n 45 n.\n Platonic Academy, the,\n of the Renaissance, 10.\n Platonism,\n reaction toward, after Hobbes, 61.\n Plotinus,\n 28.\n Pluralism,\n of Leibnitz, 119\u2013122.\n Political Economists and Constitutionalists, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Political philosophers,\n 23.\n Politics,\n according to Hobbes, 56, 58\u201360.\n Pope, Alexander,\n on Bacon, 42;\n _Essay on Man_, quoted, 133.\n Popular Philosophers, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Positivism,\n Bacon the father of, in England, 43;\n defined, 43 n.;\n of Hume, 188, 189.\n Prague,\n University of, 12.\n Printing,\n discovery of, 6.\n Protestant Mystics, the,\n 23.\n Prussia,\n rise of, 218, 219, 223;\n and Frederick the Great, 224\u2013226.\n Psychologists and related philosophers,\n of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Psychology,\n in Hobbes\u2019s philosophy, 56\u201358;\n empirical, took the place of metaphysics in the Enlightenment, 137;\n of Locke, 157\u2013160;\n of Hume, 189;\n of Herbart, 338\u2013340;\n in the nineteenth century, 357.\n _See_ Associational Psychology, Associational Psychologists.\n Psycho-physical parallelism,\n of Spinoza, 102.\n Ptolemaic system, the,\n 33.\n Pyrrho,\n Skeptic philosopher, 187.\n\n\n Qualities,\n primary and secondary, in Locke\u2019s philosophy, 161;\n in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 177, 178.\n _See_ Attributes.\n\n\n Rand,\n _Modern Classical Philosophers_, iv, 40 n., 47 n., 66 n., 84 n.,\n 107 n., 147 n., 169 n., 183 n., 212 n., 236 n., 282 n., 300 n.,\n 315 n., 340 n., 352 n., 360 n.\n Rationalism,\n defined, 61 n.;\n the nature of, 62\u201365;\n School of, in Germany, France, and Holland, 80;\n of Wolff and the Leibnitz-Wolffians, 221\u2013223, 231.\n Rationalists, the,\n 31, 63\u201365.\n _See_ Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz.\n Realism, Mysticism, and Idealism,\n contrasted, 318\u2013321;\n the argument for, according to Herbart, 334\u2013336;\n multiple, according to Herbart, 337, 338;\n the return to, in the nineteenth century, 352, 353;\n of the nineteenth century, the character of, 353\u2013355.\n Realistic Movement, the,\n 224.\n Reality,\n of Fichte, 287\u2013295;\n of Realism, Mysticism, and Idealism, 320, 321;\n implied by phenomena, according to Herbart, 336;\n irrational, the will as, according to Schopenhauer, 347, 348.\n _See_ Absolute Reality.\n Reason,\n the question of its validity, according to Kant, 260\u2013262;\n the will exerted from, 272, 273;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 314, 323.\n Reflections in Locke\u2019s philosophy,\n 158, 159.\n Reformation, Protestant, the,\n 7.\n Reid, Thomas,\n 201, 202.\n Religion,\n according to Hobbes, 60;\n and science, Leibnitz\u2019s attempt to reconcile, 118, 119;\n in the Enlightenment, 137;\n Philosophical, Lessing a writer on, 143;\n of the Deists, 164, 165;\n in Hume\u2019s philosophy, 200, 201;\n according to Hegel, 326.\n Religious philosophy,\n of Schelling, 311, 312.\n Renaissance, the,\n the first period of modern philosophy, 2\u20134;\n general character of, 8\u201311;\n significance of, in history, 11\u201315;\n the problem of, 14;\n two periods of, 15\u201321;\n discussion of the Humanistic period of, 22\u201330;\n birthplaces of the chief philosophers of (map), 30;\n discussion of the Natural Science period of (Galileo, Bacon,\n Hobbes), 31\u201361;\n in England after Hobbes, 61;\n discussion of the Rationalism of the Natural Science period of,\n 62\u2013131.\n Representation,\n the general function of Leibnitz\u2019s monads, 124, 126.\n Resemblance,\n association by, 192\u2013196.\n Revelation and Mythology,\n Schelling\u2019s Philosophy of, 303, 311, 312.\n Revolution,\n French, the, 213, 214, 216.\n Revolutionists,\n Philosophical, the, of the Enlightenment, 142.\n Ribot, Th\u00e9odule,\n _German Psychology of To-day_, 332 n.\n Richter, J. P.,\n forerunner of the literary Romanticists, 279.\n Robertson, G. C.,\n _Hobbes_, 47 n., 66 n.\n Romantic philosophers, the,\n 299.\n Romanticism,\n 224;\n the period of, 295, 296;\n its meaning, 296, 297;\n in philosophy, 299, 300;\n takes a religious turn at beginning of eighteenth century, 311.\n Romanticists, the,\n 284, 285;\n Goethe as one of, 297\u2013299;\n the \u00e6sthetic humanism of, 308.\n Rousseau, J. J.,\n the most notable figure of France during the Enlightenment, 142;\n his philosophy, 213\u2013216;\n his influence, 216, 230, 234, 235.\n Royal Society, the,\n 40.\n Royce, Josiah,\n _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, iv, 84 n., 169 n., 236 n., 282 n.,\n 299 n., 315 n., 352 n.;\n _The World and the Individual_, 352 n.\n\n\n Salvation,\n Spinoza\u2019s doctrine of, 102\u2013106.\n Schelling, F. W. J. von,\n and Fichte and Hegel, what they sought, 279, 281, 312;\n the true Romantic spirit appears in, 299;\n life and writings of, 300\u2013303;\n his philosophy of Nature, 300, 304\u2013306;\n his philosophy characterized, 301;\n his transcendental philosophy, 302, 307\u2013310;\n his system of identity, 303, 310, 311;\n and Fichte, a brief comparison of, as philosophers, 303\u2013305;\n his religious philosophy, 311, 312.\n Schiller, J. C. F. von,\n prominent in the Storm and Stress movement, 227;\n notable example of the influence of Kant upon literature, 233;\n quoted on Kant, 233;\n _Artists, Letters on \u00c6sthetic Education_, 307 n.\n Schleiermacher, F. E. D.,\n 308, 311.\n Scholasticism,\n a self-destructive method, 4;\n medi\u00e6val, Renaissance had to reckon with, 11;\n representatives of the revival of, 22;\n after Hobbes, 61;\n and Locke, 156, 157.\n Schopenhauer, Arthur,\n his relation to Kant, 330\u2013332;\n and his philosophical relations, 340\u2013342;\n and pessimism, 341, 342, 344, 348, 349\u2013351;\n life and writings of, 342, 343;\n the influences upon his thought, 343\u2013345;\n the world as will and the world as idea, 345\u2013347;\n the will as irrational reality, 347, 348;\n the misery of the world as idea, 348, 349;\n the way of deliverance, 349\u2013351.\n Schultze, F. A.,\n teacher of Kant, 233.\n Science,\n attitude of the Church toward, in the period of the Renaissance,\n 19\u201321;\n modern methods in, began with Galileo, 32, 37\u201339;\n in Bacon, 40\u201346;\n in Hobbes, 54, 58;\n and religion, Leibnitz\u2019s attempt to reconcile, 118, 119;\n Hume\u2019s attack on, 196\u2013199;\n Hume\u2019s two classes of, 199, 200;\n in the nineteenth century, 353\u2013357;\n invaded by evolution, 361.\n _See_ Natural Science period, Physics.\n Scientific methods,\n in the Renaissance, 18, 19.\n Scientists,\n of the Natural Science period, 31\u201339, 62\u201365.\n _See_ Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz.\n Scottish School of Philosophy, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 141, 201, 202.\n Self,\n idea of, in Locke\u2019s philosophy, 159, 160;\n of Kant, 260;\n of Fichte, 293;\n of Schelling, 309, 310.\n _See_ Ego.\n Sensationalism,\n 53.\n Sensationalists.\n _See_ Sensualists.\n Sensations,\n of Locke, 158, 159;\n of Kant, 245;\n of Fichte, 290, 291;\n of Herbart, 339;\n of Fechner, 359.\n Sense-perception,\n in what its validity consists, according to Kant, 253\u2013255.\n _See_ Perceptions.\n Sensualists, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 141, 212.\n Sentimentalist, the,\n of the Enlightenment (Rousseau), 142.\n Seven Years\u2019 War,\n 225.\n Shaftesbury, Lord,\n and Locke, 148, 152, 153.\n Shelley, P. B.,\n _Love\u2019s Philosophy_, 305 n.;\n _Prometheus Unbound_ quoted, 325.\n Skepticism,\n revived by Renaissance scholars, 11;\n of Hume, 187\u2013189;\n of Hume, influenced Kant, 235.\n Skeptics, the,\n of the Enlightenment, 141.\n Social Enlightenment,\n in France, 213\u2013216.\n Sociology,\n according to Comte, 360.\n Solipsism,\n of Descartes, 72;\n defined, 183.\n Soul,\n according to Descartes, 72, 79;\n the monad of Leibnitz conceived as, 122, 123, 126;\n according to Hume, 196;\n the idea of the, according to Kant, 261\u2013264;\n the postulate of the immortality of, according to Kant, 276;\n in Herbart\u2019s philosophy, 338\u2013340;\n the problem of the functioning of, 357\u2013360.\n _See_ Mind.\n Space and time,\n knowledge possible by means of, according to Kant, 253\u2013255.\n Spencer, Herbert,\n _Education_, 43 n.;\n and evolution, 362.\n Spener, P. J.,\n 220, 230.\n Spinoza, Baruch de,\n 31, 35;\n his relation to Descartes, 81\u201384;\n the historical place of, 84\u201386;\n influence of his Jewish training on, 86;\n his impulse from the new science, and Descartes\u2019s influence upon,\n 86, 87;\n his acquaintance with the Collegiants, 87, 88;\n life and philosophical writings of, 88\u201390;\n the method of, 90, 91;\n the \u2666fundamental principle in his philosophy, 91, 92;\n three central problems in his teaching, 93;\n his pantheism, 94\u201398;\n the mysticism of, 98\u2013102;\n his doctrine of salvation, 102\u2013106;\n summary of his teaching, 106;\n his conception of the world compared with Leibnitz\u2019s, 127;\n and Kant, foci of the philosophy of the generation after Kant,\n 278, 279;\n his influence upon Fichte, 285.\n Spirit.\n _See_ Mind, Soul.\n Spirituality of Fichte,\n Schelling, and Hegel, 281.\n Sta\u00ebl, Madame de,\n quoted, 231.\n State, the,\n according to Hobbes, 55, 58\u201360.\n States,\n ideal, 41, 47.\n Stephen, Leslie,\n _Hobbes_, 47 n.;\n _History of English Thought_, 166 n.\n Stewart, Dugald,\n 141, 202.\n Stirling, J. H.,\n _Textbook to Kant_, 236 n.\n Stoicism,\n revived by Renaissance scholars, 11.\n Storm and Stress movement,\n 224, 227, 229, 295, 296.\n \u201cStrife of methods, the,\u201d\n 19, 35.\n \u201cStruggle of traditions, the,\u201d\n 17, 18.\n Subjective idealism,\n of Fichte, 290, 304.\n Subjective states,\n the world of, according to Kant, 240\u2013242.\n Subjectivism,\n Renaissance marked by the rise of, 14, 15.\n Substance,\n in Descartes\u2019s philosophy, 77, 81, 82;\n in the philosophy of the Occasionalists and Spinoza, 81\u201384,\n 91\u201395, 101;\n in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy, 119\u2013122;\n in Locke\u2019s philosophy, 160\u2013162;\n according to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 174, 175;\n in Berkeley\u2019s philosophy, 176, 178;\n Hume\u2019s conception of, 195, 196,\n Sufficient reason,\n law of, 129.\n Suicide,\n according to Schopenhauer, 349.\n Sympathy,\n according to Schopenhauer, 350, 351.\n Synthesis,\n according, to Kant, 244, 245;\n the place of, in knowledge, according to Kant, 245\u2013248;\n of Fichte, 295;\n of Hegel, 327.\n _See_ Deduction.\n Synthetic,\n judgments of Kant, 249\u2013252.\n\n\n Taurellus,\n 11.\n Tetens, J. N.,\n 221.\n Theology,\n Hume\u2019s attack on, 195, 196.\n Thesis,\n of Fichte, 295;\n of Hegel, 327.\n Things-in-themselves,\n the world of, according to Kant, 240\u2013242, 336;\n how treated by Fichte, 290, 291;\n how treated by Schelling, 300;\n the philosophy of, 330\u2013351;\n the chief concern of philosophy, according to Herbart, 332;\n implied by phenomena, according to Herbart, 336;\n basis of Schopenhauer\u2019s philosophy, 340;\n according to Schopenhauer, 345, 346.\n Thirty Years\u2019 War,\n 217.\n Thomasius, Christian,\n 142, 221.\n Thought,\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 95, 101, 102;\n in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, 322, 335.\n Time and space,\n knowledge possible by means of, according to Kant, 253\u2013255.\n Tindal, Matthew,\n 165.\n Toland, John,\n 165.\n Transcendental,\n method, of Kant, 239, 240;\n philosophy, of Schelling, 302, 307\u2013310;\n freedom, of Schopenhauer, 349\u2013351.\n Trent,\n Council of, 16, 20.\n Truth,\n standard of, in the Middle Ages, self-destructive, 5;\n criterion of, according to Descartes, 72.\n Truths,\n of Leibnitz, 116, 117.\n Tschirnhausen, E. W. von,\n 221.\n Turner, William,\n _History of Philosophy_, 73 n.\n\n\n Ueberweg, Friedrich,\n _History of Philosophy_, iv, 209 n.\n Understanding,\n in what its validity consists, according to Kant, 255\u2013260.\n Unity,\n of Leibnitz, 122;\n a pre\u00ebstablished harmony, 125;\n the intrinsic (philosophical), 125\u2013129;\n the superimposed (theological), 129\u2013131;\n cosmic, of Hegel, 322\u2013326.\n Universal,\n concrete and abstract, 99, 100.\n Universe,\n Man\u2019s relation to, in the Renaissance, 8\u201318;\n according to the Ptolemaic system, 33;\n according to the Copernican system, 34;\n the idea of the, according to Kant, 261, 264, 265;\n according to Schelling, 304, 311.\n _See_ New Man.\n Universities,\n in the Renaissance, 12;\n towns containing (map), 280.\n Utilitarianism,\n 43.\n Utopias,\n 41, 47.\n Van der Ende,\n his influence on Spinoza, 87, 89.\n Vienna,\n University of, 12.\n Voltaire, F. M. A. de,\n 208\u2013210, 223.\n\n\n Wagner, Richard,\n 342.\n Watson, John,\n _Hedonistic Theories_, 47 n.\n Weber, E. A.,\n _History of Philosophy_, iv, 70 n., 73 n., 107 n., 332 n., 352 n.\n Weimar,\n 233, 307.\n Wernaer, R. M.,\n _Romanticism and the Romantic School in Germany_, 300 n.\n Will, the,\n Kant\u2019s theory of, 269\u2013277;\n the world as, and as idea, according to Schopenhauer, 345\u2013347;\n as irrational reality, according to Schopenhauer, 347, 348;\n suicide and, according to Schopenhauer, 349;\n the denial of, according to Schopenhauer, 349\u2013351.\n Windelband, Wilhelm,\n _History of Philosophy_, iv, 8 n., 23 n., 30 n., 47 n., 70 n.,\n 119 n., 132 n., 183 n., 230 n., 236 n., 278 n., 282 n.;\n on Kant\u2019s synthetic judgments _a priori_, 251 n.\n Wittenberg,\n new religious centre in the Renaissance, 12.\n _Wolfenb\u00fcttel Fragments_,\n 85.\n Wolff, Christian,\n 221, 222, 228.\n Wolffians, the,\n 142.\n World,\n of grace, 63, 64, 76, 83;\n relation of God to, according to Descartes, 77;\n in Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, 97;\n the, Leibnitz\u2019s conception of, as the best possible, 130;\n according to Goethe, 298;\n in terms of consciousness, 321;\n a world of contradictions, 321;\n as will and as idea, according to Schopenhauer, 345\u2013347;\n as idea, the misery of, according to Schopenhauer, 348, 349.\n _See_ Universe.\n\n\n\n\n Footnotes.\n\n\n 1 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 303\u2013321;\n Windelband, _History of Philosophy_, pp. 348\u2013351;\n Dewing, _Introduction to Modern Philosophy_, pp. 52\u201354.\n\n 2 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 321\u2013331;\n Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 352\u2013354.\n\n 3 \u2013 Read Falckenberg, _Hist. of Modern Phil._, pp. 27\u201328;\n Browning, _Paracelsus_; Goethe, _Faust_, lines 1\u2013165.\n\n 4 \u2013 These two phrases will be found again in the philosophy\n of Spinoza. Nature is conceived as having two aspects: one\n is _natura naturans_, or God as the animating principle\n of nature; the other is _natura naturata_, or the world as\n materialized forms or effects.\n\n 5 \u2013 Read Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 378\u2013379.\n\n 6 \u2013 Induction and deduction are methods of reasoning.\n Induction is the method of beginning with particular cases\n and inferring from them a general conclusion. Deduction is\n the opposite method of reasoning.\n\n 7 \u2013 Read H\u00f6ffding, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 175; Ball,\n _Hist. of Math._, pp. 249 ff.; Falckenberg, _Hist. of\n Mod. Phil._, pp. 59 ff.\n\n 8 \u2013 An example used by Galileo is the law of the velocity of\n falling bodies in empty space.\n\n 9 \u2013 The name, \u201cconcomitant variations,\u201d was later given by\n John Stuart Mill.\n\n 10 \u2013 Read Ball, _Hist. of Math._, pp. 253 ff.; H\u00f6ffding, _Hist.\n of Mod. Phil._, vol. i, pp. 184\u2013186; Macaulay, _Essay on\n Bacon_; Bacon, _Essays_,\u2015\u2015_Studies, Truth, Friendship,\n Simulation, and Dissimulation_; Abbott, _Francis Bacon_;\n Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 336\u2013344; Rand,\n _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 24\u201356.\n\n 11 \u2013 Bacon wrote his _New Atlantis_ in 1623. The same year\n Campanella wrote his _State of the Sun_, and the preceding\n year Thomas More wrote his _Utopia_.\n\n 12 \u2013 Utilitarianism regards adaptation to general happiness\n as the ideal of society. Positivism, broadly used, is\n that philosophy which limits the scope of thought to\n the observation of facts, although the observations are\n inferior to the facts. The data and methods of positivism\n are the same as those of natural science, and opposed to\n the _a priori_ methods of metaphysics.\n\n 13 \u2013 In this connection read Herbert Spencer, _Education_.\n\n 14 \u2013 Bacon chooses the word Idols, because it is the same as\n the Greek word for false forms (eidola, \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1).\n\n 15 \u2013 Bacon is here alluding to Plato\u2019s myth of the cave. Read\n Plato, _Republic_ (Jowett\u2019s trans.), Bk. VII, 514 A\u2013520 E.\n\n 16 \u2013 Bacon is satirical here and is likening philosophical\n systems to stage-plays.\n\n 17 \u2013 But see the contradiction in the theory of Hobbes.\n\n 18 \u2013 Read Robertson, _Hobbes_ (Blackwood\u2019s _Phil. Classics_),\n pp. 204\u2013206; Falckenberg, _Hist. Mod. Phil._, pp. 71\u201372;\n _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, article, \u201cHobbes\u201d; Leslie\n Stephen, _Hobbes_; Watson, _Hedonistic Theories_, pp.\n 73\u201394; Turner, _Hist. Phil._, pp. 443\u2013446; Windelband,\n _Hist. Phil._, p. 389; Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_,\n pp. 359\u2013360; Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp.\n 57\u201369, 80\u201384.\n\n 19 \u2013 See also the ideal States of Campanella and Bacon, p. 41.\n\n 20 \u2013 The theory that the assumption of extended, impenetrable,\n eternal, and moving bodies explains the universe.\n\n 21 \u2013 The theory that all knowledge originates in sensations;\n that all complex mental states (like memory, reason, etc.)\n are only combinations of elementary sensations.\n\n 22 \u2013 The theory that between alternative courses of conduct\n the choice decided upon is fully accounted for by\n psychological and other pre-conditions.\n\n 23 \u2013 The theory sometimes meaning materialism, sometimes\n positivism, but sometimes, as here, meaning that man in\n all his operations is a product of his environment.\n\n 24 \u2013 Read Falckenberg, _Hist. Mod. Phil._, p. 72, for his\n quotation from Grimm\u2019s criticism of the irreconcilable\n contradiction of the empirical and the rational in Hobbes.\n\n 25 \u2013 Empiricism and Rationalism have reference to the source\n of truth. Empiricism is the theory that truth is to be\n found in immediate sense experience. The opposite theory\n is Rationalism, which declares that the reason is an\n independent source of knowledge, distinct from sensation,\n and having a higher authority.\n\n 26 \u2013 Read Robertson, _Hobbes_ (Blackwood Phil. Classics), p. 40;\n Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 117\u2013147; Eucken,\n _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 351\u2013362; Calkins, _Persistent\n Problems_, pp. 459\u2013463.\n\n 27 \u2013 Read Descartes, _Method_, _Meditations_, for the dramatic\n struggle of his inner life; Falckenberg, _Hist. Modern\n Phil._, pp. 86\u201388; Fischer, _Descartes and his School_,\n p. 199; Blackwood Classics, _Descartes_, pp. 144\u2013149;\n Windelband, _Hist. Phil._, pp. 389 ff.; H\u00f6ffding, _Hist.\n Modern Phil._, pp. 219 ff.; Weber, _Hist. Phil._, pp. 306\n ff., for an opposing opinion about the place of Descartes.\n\n 28 \u2013 Read Falckenberg, _Hist. of Modern Phil._, pp. 92\u201394;\n Blackwood\u2019s Classics, _Descartes_, pp. 151\u2013153; Weber,\n _Hist. of Phil._, p. 310; Calkins, _Persistent Problems\n in Philosophy_, pp. 25\u201330; Turner, _Hist. of Phil._,\n pp. 451 f., which presents Descartes\u2019 arguments as reduced\n to two.\n\n 29 \u2013 Read Royce, _Spirit of Modern Phil._, chap. iii; Baldwin,\n _Fragments in Philosophy_, pp. 24\u201342; Rand, _Modern\n Classical Philosophers_, pp. 148\u2013166; Eucken, _Problem of\n Human Life_, pp. 362\u2013380.\n\n 30 \u2013 See page 279. Read Goethe, _Geheimnisse_, in this connection.\n\n 31 \u2013 Read Auerbach, _Spinoza_, an historical romance.\n\n 32 \u2013 Read _Bohn\u2019s Libraries, Spinoza_, vol. ii, pp. 275 ff.,\n for Spinoza\u2019s interesting correspondence with notable men.\n\n 33 \u2013 Read Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 199\u2013214;\n Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 388\u2013405; Weber,\n _History of Philosophy_, pp. 343\u2013369; Hibben, _Phil. of\n Enlightenment_, pp. 161\u2013193.\n\n 34 \u2013 A good selection of Leibnitz\u2019s works for the student\n to read is: _Discourse on Metaphysics_ (1690), _Letters\n to Arnauld_, _Monadology_ (1714), _New System of\n Nature_ (1695), _Principles of Nature and Grace_ (1714),\n _Introduction to New Essays_ (1704), and the _Theodicy_\n (1710). See Calkins, _Persistent Problems in Phil._,\n p. 74, note.\n\n 35 \u2013 Read Hibben, _Phil. of Enlightenment_, ch. vii; Windelband,\n _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 420\u2013425.\n\n 36 \u2013 Read Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 437\u2013440, 447\u2013449,\n 500\u2013502; Hibben, _Phil. of Enlightenment_, pp. 3\u201313, 18\u201320.\n\n 37 \u2013 Read Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 215\u2013217,\n 248\u2013262; Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 380\u2013388.\n\n 38 \u2013 See _Essay_, introductory epistle to the reader.\n\n 39 \u2013 Read Leslie Stephen, _History of English Thought_, vol. i,\n pp. 86\u201388.\n\n 40 \u2013 Read Royce, _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 86; Rand,\n _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 263\u2013277.\n\n 41 \u2013 Berkeley and Hume were really also dualists, like Locke\n and all other Enlighteners. The ideas were substituted by\n them for material substances. As objects of knowledge the\n ideas were antithetical to the knowing process. Hume tried\n to overcome this dualism, but he was not successful in his\n attempt.\n\n 42 \u2013 Read Hibben, _The Philosophy of the Enlightenment_,\n chap. iii.\n\n 43 \u2013 Hibben, _Phil. of Enlightenment_, p. 64.\n\n 44 \u2013 Read Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 326\u2013342;\n Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 420\u2013422; Windelband,\n _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 472\u2013476.\n\n 45 \u2013 Causal events are to Hume merely _alleged_ matters of fact.\n\n 46 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 415\u2013420.\n\n 47 \u2013 Voltaire\u2019s _Letters on the English_ were written in 1728,\n published first in London, and appeared in France in 1734.\n His _Elements of the Philosophy of Newton_ was published\n in Amsterdam in 1738, but was not allowed to be published\n in France until 1741.\n\n 48 \u2013 Read Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. ii, pp. 124\u2013125.\n\n 49 \u2013 Read Morley, _Diderot_, vol. i, ch. v, pp. 113\u2013171.\n\n 50 \u2013 Read Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 347\u2013375.\n\n 51 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 423\u2013433.\n\n 52 \u2013 In a real sense the German Enlightenment has never come\n to an end. Classicism and the Romantic movement were a\n continuation of it.\n\n 53 \u2013 Read Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 529\u2013531.\n\n 54 \u2013 Read the quotation from Heine in E. Caird, _Phil. of Kant_,\n vol. i, p. 63; Stirling, _Textbook to Kant_, Biographical\n Sketch; Royce, _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, chap. iv;\n Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 532\u2013534; Rand, _Modern\n Classical Philosophers_, pp. 376\u2013405, 420\u2013424; Eucken,\n _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 435\u2013452.\n\n 55 \u2013 The word \u201cworld\u201d is used for lack of a better. The reader\n is, however, again reminded that Kant\u2019s problem is one of\n epistemology and not of metaphysics.\n\n 56 \u2013 Paulsen says (_Immanuel Kant, His Life and Teaching_,\n p. 135) that this formula of synthetic judgments _a\n priori_ appears only in the introduction to the _Critique_\n and in Kant\u2019s later writings, and it would have been no\n misfortune if Kant had never discovered it. But Windelband\n (_Hist. of Phil._, p. 533, n. 2) says, \u201cNo one who\n does not make this clear to himself has any hope of\n understanding Kant.\u201d\n\n 57 \u2013 Quoted from Falckenberg, _Hist. of Modern Phil._, p. 387.\n This is a paraphrase of some of Schiller\u2019s verses in _The\n Philosophers_, a satirical poem of philosophical theories.\n\n 58 \u2013 Kant\u2019s theory of Beauty, discussed in his _Critique\n of Judgment_, through which he tries to reconcile the\n antagonism of knowledge and morality, is omitted here.\n\n 59 \u2013 Read Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 568\u2013569.\n\n 60 \u2013 Read Royce, _Spirit of Modern Phil._, chap. v; Eucken,\n _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 486\u2013490; Rand, _Modern\n Classical Philosophers_, pp. 486\u2013496, 516\u2013535; Windelband,\n _Hist. of Phil._, pp. 579\u2013581.\n\n 61 \u2013 Read Beers, _History of Romanticism in Eighteenth Century_,\n pp. 1\u201325; Beers, _History of Romanticism in Nineteenth\n Century_, pp. 132\u2013139.\n\n 62 \u2013 Read Royce, _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, ch. vi.\n\n 63 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 457\u2013464, 490\u2013494;\n Wernaer, _Romanticism and the Romantic School in Germany_,\n pp. 132\u2013143; Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_,\n pp. 535\u2013568.\n\n 64 \u2013 Read Shelley, _Love\u2019s Philosophy_.\n\n 65 \u2013 Read Schiller, _Artists; Letters on \u00c6sthetic Education_.\n\n 66 \u2013 F. E. D. Schleiermacher, b. 1768; educated in the\n Herrnhuten institutions and at the University of Halle;\n in 1796 preacher at the Berlin Charit\u00e9; in 1802 court\n preacher at Stolpe; in 1804 professor extraordinary at\n Halle; in 1809 preacher at a church in Berlin; in 1810\n professor in Berlin University.\n\n 67 \u2013 Read Royce, _Spirit of Modern Phil._, chap. vii; James,\n _Hibbert Journal_, 1908\u201309, pp. 63 ff.; Eucken, _Problem\n of Human Life_, pp. 494\u2013507; Rand, _Modern Classical\n Philosophers_, pp. 569\u2013574, 583\u2013592, 614\u2013628.\n\n 68 \u2013 Read Ribot, _German Psychology of To-day_, pp. 24\u201367;\n Weber, _History of Philosophy_, pp. 536\u2013543; Dewing,\n _Introduction to Modern Philosophy_, pp. 230\u2013235.\n\n 69 \u2013 A discussion of these contradictions can be found in any\n text-book in metaphysics.\n\n 70 \u2013 The \u201cprinciple of contradiction\u201d in logic is the\n prohibition to commit contradiction.\n\n 71 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 510\u2013518; Rand,\n _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 629\u2013671.\n\n 72 \u2013 Read _Rub\u00e1iy\u00e1t_ of Omar Khayy\u00e1m, FitzGerald\u2019s translation,\n 4th ed., quatrains xlvii\u2013lxxiii; Goethe, _Sorrows of\n Werther_, as an example of pessimism due mainly to\n environment.\n\n 73 \u2013 Read Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 703\u2013708;\n Weber, _Hist. of Phil._, \u00a7\u00a7 69, 70; Eucken, _Problem of\n Human Life_, pp. 518\u2013523, 524\u2013553, 559\u2013573; Nietzsche,\n _Also Sprach Zarathustra_; James, _Pragmatism_, Lectures\n I, IV, VII; Royce, _Spirit of Mod. Phil._, Lecture IX.\n\n 74 \u2013 Royce, _The World and the Individual_, vol. i, pp. 60 f.\n\n 75 \u2013 Read Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, pp. 672\u2013689.\n\n\n\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Notes.\n\n\nThe following corrections have been made in the text:\n\n Page xiv:\n Sentence starting: In what does the Validity....\n \u2013 \u2018Persception\u2019 replaced with \u2018Perception\u2019\n (Validity of Sense-Perception consist?)\n\n Page 8:\n Sentence starting: The fusion did not result....\n \u2013 \u2018homogenous\u2019 replaced with \u2018homogeneous\u2019\n (in a homogeneous whole,)\n\n Page 85:\n Sentence starting: It formed the background....\n \u2013 \u2018Wolffenb\u00fcttel\u2019 replaced with \u2018Wolfenb\u00fcttel\u2019\n (Wolfenb\u00fcttel Fragments)\n\n Page 114:\n Sentence starting: He was led to this conclusion....\n \u2013 \u2018Leeuwenhook\u2019 replaced with \u2018Leeuwenhoek\u2019\n (of Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek)\n\n Page 174:\n Sentence starting: Berkeley started out by....\n \u2013 \u2018speculalation\u2019 replaced with \u2018speculation\u2019\n (against scholastic speculation and abstraction;)\n\n Page 296:\n Sentence starting: Some of the literary names....\n \u2013 \u2018Wackenrode\u2019 replaced with \u2018Wackenroder\u2019\n (Tieck, Wackenroder, Novalis,)\n\n Page 336:\n Sentence starting: Kant reasoned from the relativity....\n \u2013 \u2018thing-it-itself\u2019 replaced with \u2018thing-in-itself\u2019\n (while the thing-in-itself was)\n\n Index Campanella:\n \u2013 \u2018Tommasso\u2019 replaced with \u2018Tommaso\u2019\n (Campanella, Tommaso)\n\n Index Eucken:\n \u2013 \u2018223\u2019 replaced with \u2018213\u2019\n (213 n.)\n\n Index Hume:\n \u2013 \u2018scepticism\u2019 replaced with \u2018skepticism\u2019\n (the skepticism of, influenced Kant)\n\n Index Spinoza:\n \u2013 \u2018fundanental\u2019 replaced with \u2018fundamental\u2019\n (the fundamental principle in)\n\n Index Unity:\n \u2013 \u2018pre\u00ebstabished\u2019 replaced with \u2018pre\u00ebstablished\u2019\n (a pre\u00ebstablished harmony)","title":"A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":109022}