{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_64488/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_64488","id":"gutenberg_64488","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/64488","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Stoics"],"text":"ROMAN STOICISM\n\n\n\n\n                       CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS\n\n                        London: FETTER LANE, E.C.\n\n                           C. F. CLAY, MANAGER\n\n                             [Illustration]\n\n                     Edinburgh: 100, PRINCES STREET\n                        Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.\n                        Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS\n                      New York: G. P. PUTNAM\u2019S SONS\n               Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd\n\n                          _All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\n                             ROMAN STOICISM\n\n                  BEING LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE\n                      STOIC PHILOSOPHY WITH SPECIAL\n                      REFERENCE TO ITS DEVELOPMENT\n                         WITHIN THE ROMAN EMPIRE\n\n                                   BY\n                        E. VERNON ARNOLD, LITT.D.\n\n       PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES\n            AND FORMERLY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE\n\n                               Cambridge:\n                         at the University Press\n                                  1911\n\n                               Cambridge:\n\n                       PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.\n                        AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.\n\n\n\n\nHENRICO JACKSON, LITT.D.\n\nDILECTISSIMO PRAECEPTORI\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis book is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by me in\nsuccessive years to Latin Honours students in accordance with the\nregulations of the University of Wales. It is therefore primarily\nintended for the assistance of classical students; but it may perhaps\nappeal in its present form to a somewhat wider circle.\n\nAt the time that the book was begun the best systematic exposition of\nthe Stoic philosophy available for English readers was to be found in\nProf. E. ZELLER\u2019S _Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics_, translated by O. J.\nREICHEL (Longmans, 1892). This work, admirable in detail, is nevertheless\nsomewhat inadequate to the subject, which appeared to its learned author\nas a mere sequel to the much more important philosophical systems of\nPlato and Aristotle. Since its first appearance many qualified writers\nhave been inclined to assign a higher rank to Stoicism, amongst whom L.\nSTEIN, A. SCHMEKEL, and HANS von ARNIM in the German-speaking countries,\nand A. C. PEARSON, G. H. RENDALL, and R. D. HICKS in our own, are perhaps\nmost conspicuous.\n\nThe view taken in this book corresponds generally to that taken by the\nwriters named. Shortly expressed, it regards Stoicism as the bridge\nbetween ancient and modern philosophical thought; a position which\nappears to be accepted by W. L. DAVIDSON writing on behalf of students\nof modern philosophy. Mr Hicks and Mr Davidson have recently published\nworks dealing with the Stoic philosophy as a whole; but as neither of\nthese quite covers the ground marked out for this book, I believe that\nroom will be found for a further presentation of the subject.\n\nTo the writers named and to many others, my obligations are great, and\ntheir extent is generally indicated in the Index. I owe a more intimate\ndebt to Mr A. C. PEARSON and Prof. ALFRED CALDECOTT, who have given me\nungrudgingly of their knowledge and counsel during the whole period of\nthe preparation of this book.\n\nThe appearance of H. von Arnim\u2019s \u2018Stoicorum veterum fragmenta\u2019 made\navailable to me a mass of material from Greek sources, and has (I\nhope) made this book less imperfect on the side of Greek than it would\notherwise have been. For the quotations in the notes from the Greek and\nthe less-known Latin authors I have generally given references to von\nArnim\u2019s collections, which will doubtless be more accessible to most of\nmy readers than the original writers. These references include those to\nthe fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, for which von Arnim is in the main\nindebted to the earlier work of Pearson.\n\nSo general a treatment of the subject as is here presented must\nnecessarily leave room for correction and amplification in its various\nbranches, and I trust that I am pointing out to younger students a\nfield in which a rich harvest may yet be gleaned. To such students the\nappended Bibliography, though necessarily incomplete, may be of use as an\nintroduction to the considerable literature which is available to them.\n\nThe concluding chapter makes its appeal not so much to classical\nstudents, as such, as to those who are interested in the problem of\nChristian origins; the further problems of the influence of Stoicism\non modern literature and philosophy, though at first included in my\nprogramme, I have not ventured to enter upon. But I hope that at least I\nhave been able to show that the interest of classical studies, even as\nregards Hellenistic philosophy, does not lie wholly in the past.\n\nMy sincere thanks are due to the Council of the University College of\nNorth Wales for granting me special assistance in my College duties\nduring the Spring term of 1910, in order that I might give more time\nto this book; to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for\nundertaking its publication; and to Mr Clay and his expert staff for the\nadmirable execution of the printing.\n\n                                                         E. VERNON ARNOLD\n\n_25 January 1911_\n\n\n\n\nCORRIGENDA ET NOTANDA\n\n\nIn the text the accentuation of Greek words should be corrected as\nfollows:\n\n  P. 117, l. 10, \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9. P. 239, l. 6, \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd. P. 423, l. 16, \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7.\n\n(Transcriber\u2019s Note: These have been corrected.)\n\nFor the quotations in the notes from Greek writers, more precise\nreferences will usually be found in the sections named of von Arnim\u2019s\n_Stoicorum veterum fragmenta_. In addition the following amplifications\nor corrections are needed:\n\n  P. 105, n. 44; Clem. _Strom._ ii 21, 129. P. 133, n. 38; Nem.\n  _nat. hom._ vi 13. P. 142, n. 86; Sext. _math._ vii 184. P. 158,\n  n. 17; Simp. _Arist. cat._ p. 269, 14 K; Cens. fr. 1, 1. P. 159,\n  n. 20; Simp. _Arist. cat._ p. 350, 16 K. P. 160, n. 30; for \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n  the word \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is now read, making the quotation inapplicable. P.\n  161, n. 133; add the words \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2. The reference\n  is to Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 306, 23 K. P. 164, n. 45; Simp.\n  _Arist. cat._ p. 66, 32 K; n. 47, _ib._ p. 165, 32 K. P. 166, n.\n  60; _ib._ p. 269, 14 K. P. 168, n. 75; _ib._ p. 165, 32 K. P.\n  173, n. 110; Galen _const. art. med._ p. 253 K; n. 111, _meth.\n  med._ i 2 p. 16 K. P. 185, n. 79; for \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 read \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78. P. 187, n.\n  86; Sext. _math._ viii 271. P. 193, n. 130; Nemes. _nat. hom._\n  xxxviii 95. P. 196, n. 145; Galen _de temp._ p. 617 K. P. 222,\n  n. 33; Corn. _N. D._ ii. P. 224, n. 47; Sext. _math._ vii 93. P.\n  251, n. 76; Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ p. 242 K. P. 255, n. 86;\n  for \u03bc\u1fd6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 read \u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1. P. 264, n. 139; to the quotation from Comm.\n  _in Luc._ ix 6 add \u2018et esse sic immortales ut non moriantur sed\n  resolvantur.\u2019 P. 298, n. 184; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 28, p. 199, 18\n  B.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAP.                                                 PAGE\n\n     I. The World-Religions                                1\n\n    II. Heraclitus and Socrates                           29\n\n   III. The Academy and the Porch                         53\n\n    IV. The Preaching of Stoicism                         78\n\n     V. The Stoic Sect in Rome                            99\n\n    VI. Of Reason and Speech                             128\n\n   VII. The Foundations of Physics                       155\n\n  VIII. The Universe                                     175\n\n    IX. The Supreme Problems                             198\n\n     X. Religion                                         216\n\n    XI. The Kingdom of the Soul                          238\n\n   XII. The Law for Humanity                             273\n\n  XIII. Daily Duties                                     301\n\n   XIV. Sin and Weakness                                 330\n\n    XV. Counsels of Perfection                           357\n\n   XVI. Stoicism in Roman History and Literature         380\n\n  XVII. The Stoic Strain in Christianity                 408\n\n        BIBLIOGRAPHY:\n\n             I. Ancient Writers and Philosophers         437\n\n            II. Modern Writers                           445\n\n        GENERAL INDEX                                    451\n\n        GREEK INDEX                                      466\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE WORLD-RELIGIONS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Roman literature.]\n\n=1.= The present work treats of a subject of outstanding interest in\nthe literature which is associated with the history of the Roman State,\nand which is expressed partly in Hellenistic Greek, partly in Latin.\nIn the generations preceding our own, classical study has, to a large\nextent, attended to form rather than to matter, to expression rather\nthan to content. To-day it is beginning to take a wider outlook. We are\nlearning to look on literature as an unveiling of the human mind in\nits various stages of development, and as a key to the true meaning of\nhistory. The literature of Greece proper does not cease to attract us by\nits originality, charm, and variety; but the new interest may yet find\nits fullest satisfaction in Roman literature; for of all ancient peoples\nthe Romans achieved most, and their achievements have been the most\nenduring. It was the Roman who joined the ends of the world by his roads\nand his bridges, poured into crowded towns unfailing supplies of corn and\nperennial streams of pure water, cleared the countryside of highwaymen,\nconverted enemies into neighbours, created ideals of brotherhood under\nwhich the nations were united by common laws and unfettered marriage\nrelations, and so shaped a new religion that if it shattered an empire\nit yet became the mother of many nations. We are the inheritors of Roman\ncivilization; and if we have far surpassed it in scientific knowledge\nand material plenty, we are not equally confident that we possess better\nmental balance, or more complete social harmony. In this direction the\nproblems of Roman life are the problems of Western life to-day; and\nthe methods by which they were approached in the Roman world deserve\nmore than ever to be studied by us. Such a study, if it is to be in\nany true sense historical, must break through the convention by which\nancient Greece and Rome have come to be treated as a world apart; it must\nseek its starting point in the distant past, and count that of chief\nimportance which will bear fruit in the ages that follow.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Beliefs of the Romans.]\n\n=2.= Great achievements are born of strong convictions; and Roman\nstatesmen, jurists, soldiers, and engineers did not learn to \u2018scorn\ndelights and live laborious days\u2019 without some strong impulse from\nwithin. These inner convictions do not come to the surface everywhere in\nthe Latin literature with which we are most familiar. The Roman orator\nor poet is generally content to express a conventional view of religion\nand morals, whilst he conceals his real thoughts in a spirit of reticence\nand almost of shame. Yet here and there every attentive reader will catch\nthe accent of sincerity, sometimes in the less restrained conversation\nof the lower classes, sometimes in flights of poetic imagination, or\nagain in instruction designed for the young. In this way we learn that\nthe Romans of the last century of the republic and of the first century\nof the principate were profoundly concerned, not so much with questions\nconnected with the safety of their empire or the justice of their form\nof government, as with problems in which all mankind has a common\ninterest. What is truth, and how can it be ascertained? What is this\nuniverse in which we dwell, and by whom and how was it made? What are the\nbeings called gods, and do they concern themselves with the affairs of\nmen? What is man\u2019s nature, his duty, and his destiny? These the Romans\ncalled the problems of philosophy, and they eagerly sought for definite\nand practical solutions to them[1]. Such solutions when embodied in\ntheoretical systems we still call \u2018philosophies\u2019; but when such systems\nare developed in a practical form and claim the obedience of large\nbodies of men they become religions. Stoicism is in the first instance\na philosophy, and amongst its many competitors that one which appealed\nmost successfully to the judgment of men who played a leading part in the\nRoman world; but as its acceptance becomes more general, it begins to\nassume all the features of a religion. All Latin literature is thickly\nstrewn with allusions to Stoicism and the systems which were its rivals,\nand thus bears witness to the widespread interest which they excited.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Origin of Philosophy.]\n\n=3.= The Romans learnt philosophy from Greek teachers; and they were not\nfree from a sense of shame in thus sitting at the feet of the children of\na conquered race. But they acknowledged their obligations in a generous\nspirit; and from Roman literature an impression has arisen, which is\nstill widespread, that Greece was the birthplace of philosophy, and\nthat its triumphs must be placed to the credit of Hellenic culture. But\nto the Hellenes themselves philosophy equally appeared as a foreign\nfashion, assailing their national beliefs and dangerous to their\nestablished morality; and of its teachers many of the most distinguished\nwere immigrants from Asia Minor. Thus Greece itself appears only as a\nhalting-place in the movement of philosophy; and we are carried more\nand more to the East as we seek to discover its origin. Yet at the time\nwith which we are concerned it had also spread to the extreme West. \u2018The\nMagi,\u2019 says Aristotle, \u2018taught the Persians philosophy; the Chaldaeans\ntaught it to the Babylonians and Assyrians; the Gymnosophists to the\nIndians; the Druids and Semnothei to the Gauls and Celts[2].\u2019 It was\na world-wide stirring of the human intellect, and we must attempt to\noutline its meaning more completely.\n\n\n[Sidenote: National and World-Religions.]\n\n=4.= Philosophy, in the sense in which Aristotle uses the term, appears\nto be a general name for a great change in man\u2019s intellectual attitude\ntowards his environment, corresponding to a definite era in the history\nof civilization. Before philosophy came nationalism, the habit of\nthinking according to clan and race; and nationalism remains on record\nfor us in the numerous national religions in which each people does\nreverence to the deity which lives within its borders and goes forth to\nfight with its armies. Philosophy is at once broader in its outlook\nand more intimate in its appeal. It breaks down the barriers of race,\nand includes the whole world in its survey; but on the other hand it\njustifies the individual in asserting his own thoughts and choosing\nhis own way of life. Thus philosophy on its arrival appears in each\nparticular country as a disintegrating force; it strikes at the roots of\npatriotism and piety, and challenges equally the authority of king and of\npriest. But everywhere in turn philosophy, as it gains ground, begins to\nconstruct a new patriotism and a new piety, and gradually takes concrete\nshape as a new religion. To us, as we look backwards to the past, the\ntrack of philosophy is recorded by a series of religions, all alike\nmarked with the note of world-wide outlook, reverence for reason, and\nthe sentiment of human sympathy. The era of philosophy is the era of the\nworld-religions. It belongs to that millennium when from China to Ireland\nmen of good will and bold spirit realized that they all looked up toward\none sky, breathed one air, and travelled on one all-encircling sea; when\nthey dreamed that before long all men should be united in one kingdom,\nconverse in one language, and obey the one unchanging law of reason.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Spread of the World-Religions.]\n\n=5.= The general importance and direction of this movement will\nbest be seen if we select for consideration a certain number of the\nworld-religions in which it was from time to time embodied. Aristotle has\nalready called our attention to the \u2018philosophies\u2019 of the Chaldaeans,\nthe Persians, and the Indians; amongst these last Buddhism at least was\na movement which had shaken off limitations of race and class. To these\nhe has added the Druids, whom we may well keep in mind if only because\nthey are representatives of Western Europe. Stoicism best represents the\npart played by the Greco-Roman world, and Judaism and Christianity come\nunder consideration as forces with which Stoicism in the course of its\nhistory came into close contact. The Greeks little realized that they\nwere being carried along in so mighty a stream. Regarding themselves as\nisolated and elevated, the sole pioneers of civilization in a \u2018barbarian\u2019\nworld, the beliefs of neighbouring peoples seemed to them beneath their\nnotice. To this prejudice they clung in spite of the protests of their\nown men of learning[3]; the Romans inherited it from them; and though\nthe Europe of the Middle Ages and of to-day professes an Oriental faith,\nits religious survey is still limited and its critical power impaired by\nthe same assumption of superior wisdom. Our information is however wider\nthan that of the ancient world, and our sympathies are beginning to be\nquickened; and we are thus in a position to trace generally the history\nof these seven religions. In this work we shall use, as far as possible,\nthe classical authorities, supplementing them (where deficient) from\nother sources.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Chaldaism.]\n\n=6.= The oldest of these philosophical or religious systems is that of\nthe Chaldaeans, as the Romans termed a pastoral, star-gazing folk[4]\npresumably identical with the people which, in or about the year 2800\nB.C.[5], mapped out the constellations as we now know them, traced the\norbits of the planets[6], and predicted their future movements. This\nwork was not carried out entirely in the spirit of modern science;\nit was further stimulated by the belief that the skies displayed a\nwritten message to mankind. But the nature of that message, of which\nfragments are possibly embodied in the names of the constellations,\nwas not preserved to the Romans by any tradition. Two principles seem\nto have survived, those of the inexorable tie between cause and effect\ncalled \u2018fate[7],\u2019 and of the interdependence of events in heaven and on\nearth[8]. Hence arose the hope of prophetic insight into the future;\nand the people of Babylon, under Chaldaean influence, are said to have\nspent four hundred and seventy years in collecting observations of\nthe history of boys born under particular combinations of the heavenly\nbodies[9]. We are not acquainted with the results of these observations;\nbut undoubtedly they established a profession of astrologers, whose\ncraft it was to observe the position of sun, moon and stars at a man\u2019s\nbirth or at some other critical hour, and thence to deduce his future\ncharacter or career. These wanderers, called by the Romans \u2018Chaldaei\u2019 or\n\u2018Mathematici,\u2019 spread over all Europe, and founded a lucrative trade on\nmen\u2019s fears and ambitions. Philosophers studied their methods, and did\nnot always entirely deny their validity[10]. In society the astrologer\nis a common figure[11]; he found his way to the chambers of princes[12],\nand was regularly consulted by conspirators. The dramatic scene in Walter\nScott\u2019s _Betrothed_ is as true in character to Roman times as to the\nMiddle Ages. Roman literature is full of allusions to the horoscope[13].\nBut whether we attribute these practices to fraud or to self-deception,\nthere is every reason to believe that they only form a diseased outgrowth\nfrom a system which at an earlier time was of much wider import.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persism.]\n\n=7.= The popular expression \u2018magic\u2019 still recalls to us the system of\nwhich the Magi of Persia were the professed exponents, and of which the\nRomans had a knowledge which is to a large extent confirmed from other\nsources. This system we shall here call \u2018Persism,\u2019 in order to free\nourselves of the popular associations still connected with such terms as\nMagism, Parsee-ism, and so forth; meaning by \u2018Persism\u2019 the teaching of\nZarathustra (the Latin Zoroastres) as it affected the Greek and Latin\nworld. Persism has its roots in the older nationalism, inasmuch as its\ndeity is one who takes sides with his believer and brings him victory\nin war; but on the other hand it grows into a world-religion because\nthat which begins as a conflict between races gradually changes into\na struggle between right and wrong. It is based also on the Chaldaean\nsystem, in so far as it looks up to the heaven as the object of human\nreverence and to the sun, moon and planets as at least the symbols of\nhuman destiny; but here again the outlook is transformed, for in the\nplace of impersonal and inexorable forces we find a company of celestial\nbeings, intimately concerned in the affairs of men, and engaged in an\nardent struggle for the victory of the better side. The meaning of\nPersism and its immense influence on the Greco-Roman world are still so\nlittle realized that it is necessary here to deal with the subject with\nsome fulness.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zarathustra.]\n\n=8.= The Greeks and Romans refer to the teachings of Zarathustra as of\nimmemorial antiquity[14]; whilst on the other hand the direct Persian\ntradition (existing in a written form from about the year 800 A.D.)\nascribes them to a date 258 years before the era of Alexander\u2019s invasion\nof Persia[15]. The best modern authorities incline to the Persian view,\nthus giving the date of about 600 B.C. to Zarathustra, and making\nhim roughly a contemporary of the Buddha and Confucius[16]. On the\nother hand considerations, partly of the general history of religion,\npartly of the linguistic and metrical character of such fragments of\nZarathustra\u2019s writings as still remain, indicate a date earlier than\nthis by many hundred years[17]. Zarathustra belonged to the tribe of the\nMagi, who maintained religious practices of which the nature can only\nbe inferred from such of them as survived the prophet\u2019s reforms[18];\nin their general character they cannot have differed widely from those\nrecorded in the Rigveda. In the midst of this system Zarathustra came\nforward as a reformer. He was deeply learned in the doctrines of the\nChaldaeans[19], and was an ardent student of astronomy[20]. In a period\nof solitary contemplation in the desert[21], it was revealed to him that\na great and wise being, named Ahura Mazd\u0101, was the creator and ruler of\nheaven and earth[22]. Upon him attend Angels who do him service; whilst\nthe spirit of Mischief and his attendants ceaselessly work to oppose his\npurposes. Ahura is the light, his enemy is the darkness[23]. The struggle\nbetween them is that between right and wrong, and in it every man must\ntake one or the other side. His soul will survive what men call death,\nand receive an everlasting reward according to his deeds. After quitting\nthe mortal body, the soul will pass over the Bridge of Judgment, and\nwill there be turned aside to the right or to the left; if it has been\nvirtuous, to enter Paradise, but if vicious, the House of Falsehood. Full\nof this doctrine, Zarathustra enters the court of King Visht\u0101spa, and\nconverts him and his court. The monarch in turn sets out to convert the\nunbelieving world by the sword, and the War of Religion begins.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Spread of Persism.]\n\n=9.= We cannot trace the long history of the War of Religion through\nits whole course, but in the end we find that the Religion has welded\ntogether the great kingdom of Persia, and its warlike zeal is directed\ntowards establishing throughout the world the worship of the \u2018God of\nheaven,\u2019 and the destruction of all images, whether in the shape of\nmen or of beasts, as dishonouring to the divine nature. In the sixth\ncentury B.C. Babylon opposed the Religion in the east, and Lydia in\nthe west; both fell before Cyrus the Great. The fall of Babylon set\nfree the Jews, who accepted the king\u2019s commission to establish the\nReligion in Jerusalem[24], and (at a rather later date) in Egypt[25];\non the other hand that of Lydia exposed the Hellenes, a people devoted\nto idol-worship, to the fury of the image-breakers[26]. The battles of\nMarathon and Salamis checked the warlike advance of Persism, and the\nvictories of Alexander suppressed its outward observance and destroyed\nits literature and its priesthood. But in this period of apparent\ndepression some at least of its doctrines were winning still wider\nacceptance than before.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persism invades Greece.]\n\n=10.= The departure of the Persians from Europe was the signal for an\noutburst of enthusiasm in Greece for the old gods and their worship\nwith the aid of images. Yet, unfavourable as the time might seem, a\nmonotheistic sentiment developed apace in Hellas, which we shall follow\nmore closely in the next chapter[27]. Even Herodotus, writing as a\nfair-minded historian, no longer regards the Persians as impious, but\nrealizes that they are actuated by conviction[28]. Socrates was an\noutspoken defender of all the main articles of the Religion, to the\nhorror of nationalists like Aristophanes, who not unjustly accused him\nof corrupting the loyalty of the youth of Athens to the institutions\nof their mother city. Xenophon, the most intimate of his disciples,\ntranslated this bias into action, and joined with the 10,000 Greeks in\na vain effort to re-establish the strength of Persia: he did not even\nhesitate to engage in war against his native land. To him Cyrus the\nPersian was a greater hero than any Homeric warrior or Greek sage; and\nfrom Cyrus he drew the belief in the immortality of the soul which from\nthis time on is one of the chief subjects of philosophic speculation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persism welcomed in Rome.]\n\n=11.= The Romans had not the same national motives as the Greeks to feel\nan antipathy to Persism. For the doctrine of monotheism they had probably\nbeen prepared by their Etruscan sovereigns, and the temple of Capitoline\nJove kept before their eyes a symbol of this sentiment. But in the Roman\nperiod Persian sovereignty had receded to the far distance, and the\ndoctrines of Persism only reached Rome through the Greek language and in\nGreek form. Thus of the doctrines of the Evil Spirit, the war between\nGood and Evil, and the future punishment of the wicked, only faint echoes\never reached the Roman ear. On the other hand the doctrines of the divine\ngovernment of the world and of the immortality of the soul made a deep\nimpression; and Cicero in a well-known passage repeats and amplifies the\naccount Xenophon gives in his _Cyropaedia_ of the dying words of Cyrus,\nwhich is doubtless to some extent coloured by recollections of the death\nof Socrates:\n\n  \u2018We read in Xenophon that Cyrus the elder on his death-bed spoke\n  as follows\u2014\u201cDo not think, my very dear children, that when I quit\n  you I shall no longer be in existence. So long as I was with you,\n  you never saw my soul, but you realized from my actions that it\n  dwelt in this my body. Believe then that it will still exist,\n  even if you see nothing of it. Honours would not continue to be\n  paid to great men after death, did not their souls assist us\n  to maintain their memory in freshness. I have never been able\n  to persuade myself that souls live whilst they are enclosed in\n  mortal bodies, and die when they issue from them; nor that the\n  soul becomes dull at the moment it leaves this dull body; I\n  believe that when it has freed itself from all contact with the\n  body and has begun to exist in purity and perfection, then it\n  becomes wise. Further, when the framework of humanity is broken\n  up in death, we see clearly whither each of its parts speeds\n  away, for all go to the elements from which they have sprung; the\n  soul alone is not seen by us either whilst it is with us or when\n  it departs. Lastly nothing resembles death so closely as sleep.\n  But men\u2019s souls, whilst they themselves sleep, most clearly\n  reveal their divine nature; for then, being set free from their\n  prison house, they often foresee things to come. From this we\n  may gather what their properties will be, when they have utterly\n  freed themselves from the fetters of the body. If then this is\n  so, do reverence to me as a god; but if the soul is destined to\n  perish with the body, still do reverence to the gods, who guard\n  and rule all this beauteous world, and while so doing keep up the\n  memory of me in loyal and unalterable affection.\u201d So spoke Cyrus\n  on his death-bed[29].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The manifold deity.]\n\n=12.= The Persian doctrine of the \u2018Angels\u2019 seems to have been very\nlittle understood either in Greece or at Rome, but, as we shall see\nin the course of this book, it profoundly influenced the course of\nreligious history. The \u2018Angels\u2019 or good Spirits of Persism are, from one\npoint of view, identical with the Creator himself, forms under which he\nmanifests himself to men. Their names are all those of abstractions:\nthe Good Mind, the Best Reason, the Desired Kingdom, Holy Humility,\nSalvation, and Immortality[30]. On the other hand, they gradually assume\nto the worshipper who contemplates them the appearance of separate\npersonalities, dwelling, like the Creator himself, in an atmosphere of\nheavenly Glory. Thus a system which is in principle strictly monotheistic\ngradually developes into one in which the deity is sevenfold, as in the\nfollowing hymn from the later part of the Avesta:\n\n  \u2018We praise the heavenly Glory.\n  The mighty, the god-given,\n  The praiseworthy, the life-giving,\n  Healing, strengthening, watching\n  High above the other creatures.\n\n      The Glory that belongs to the Immortal Spirits,\n      The rulers, that act by a look alone,\n      The lofty, all-powerful ones,\n      The strong servants of the All-wise,\n  That live for ever, and work justice.\n\n      All seven have the same Thought,\n      All seven have the same Word,\n      All seven have the same Deed.\n  One Thought, one Word, one Deed, one Father and Master\n      The All-wise, the Creator[31].\u2019\n\nOf these \u2018Angels\u2019 one was destined to play a considerable part in several\nof the world-religions; namely that which the Persians called the \u2018Best\nReason,\u2019 and which the Greeks knew as Wisdom (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1) or the Word (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2).\nSometimes an aspect of the Deity, sometimes an emanation from him, and\nthen again a distinguishable personality, this figure is again and again\npresented to our consideration. The personification of abstractions\nappealed with special force to the Romans, for from the earliest periods\nof their history they had raised temples to Faith (_fides_), Concord\n(_concordia_), and other deified virtues; and its character can perhaps\nbest be appreciated by reference to the personification of Light in\nChristian hymnology, both ancient and modern:\n\n  \u2018Hail, gladdening Light, of his pure glory poured\n  Who is the immortal Father, heavenly, blest[32]!\u2019\n\n  \u2018Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom\n      Lead thou me on[33].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sanctity of the elements.]\n\n=13.= Amongst the subsidiary, but still important, doctrines of Persism,\nis that of the sanctity of the four elements. Earth, air, fire and water\nare alike holy. Hence the dead must not be buried, for that would be to\ndefile the earth; nor burned, for that would be to defile fire[34]; nor\nmay any impurity be thrown into the water. This respect for the elements\noften appeared to strangers as worship of them[35]. Between the elements\nthey sometimes discriminated, considering earth and water as more akin\nto darkness and the evil spirit, but fire and air to light and the good\nspirit[36]. The element of fire they held in special reverence, so that\nat all times they have been called fire-worshippers[37]. More careful\nobservers have always recognised them as monotheists, distinguished by a\ncertain rapturous language in their description of the deity which they\nrefused to picture in any concrete shape[38]. They were also zealous\nthat their teaching should find its expression in a healthy social and\npolitical life[39]. In the education of the young they laid a special\nstress on speaking the truth[40].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Alexander in the East.]\n\n=14.= \u2018The Gymnosophists taught philosophy to the people of India[41].\u2019\nWho are the teachers thus indicated? An answer may be found, though of\na later date, in Plutarch\u2019s \u2018Life of Alexander,\u2019 where he describes the\nmeeting of Alexander with some eminent gymnosophists, who had stirred up\nopposition to his rule:\u2014\n\n  \u2018[Alexander] captured ten of the Indian philosophers called\n  Gymnosophistae[42]; who had been instrumental in causing Sabbas\n  to revolt, and had done much mischief to the Macedonians. These\n  men are renowned for their short, pithy answers, and Alexander\n  put difficult questions to all of them, telling them that he\n  would first put to death the man who answered him worst, and so\n  the rest in order.\n\n  The first was asked whether he thought the living or the dead to\n  be the more numerous. He answered \u201cThe living, for the dead are\n  not.\u201d\n\n  The second was asked, \u201cWhich breeds the largest animals, the sea\n  or the land?\u201d He answered \u201cThe land, for the sea is only a part\n  of it.\u201d\n\n  The third was asked, \u201cWhich is the cleverest of beasts?\u201d He\n  answered \u201cThat which man has not yet discovered.\u201d\n\n  The fourth was asked why he made Sabbas rebel. He answered\n  \u201cBecause I wished him either to live or to die with honour.\u201d\n\n  The fifth was asked, which he thought was first, the day or the\n  night. He answered \u201cThe day was first, by one day.\u201d As he saw\n  that the king was surprised by this answer, he added \u201cImpossible\n  questions require impossible answers.\u201d\n\n  Alexander now asked the sixth how a man could make himself most\n  beloved. He answered \u201cBy being very powerful, and yet not feared\n  by his subjects.\u201d\n\n  Of the remaining three, the first was asked how a man could\n  become a god. He answered \u201cBy doing that which it is impossible\n  for a man to do.\u201d\n\n  The next was asked which was the stronger, life or death. He\n  answered \u201cLife, because it endures such terrible suffering.\u201d\n\n  The last, being asked how long it was honourable for a man to\n  live, answered \u201cAs long as he thinks it better for him to live\n  than to die.\u201d\n\n  The king loaded them with presents, and dismissed them[43].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Were the Gymnosophists Buddhists?]\n\n=15.= In these \u2018gymnosophists\u2019 it is easy to recognise a type familiar\nto Indian antiquity. These men, who have almost dispensed with clothing\nand know nothing of the luxuries or even the conveniences of life, are\nnevertheless influential leaders of the people. They, like the Persians,\nhave broken away from the old religions; they talk lightly of the gods,\nand do not guide their actions by any decrees supposed divine. The sight\nof human sorrow fills them with sympathy for the ills of life, and makes\nthem doubt whether death is not the better choice. Their ethical standard\nis high, and includes both courage and gentleness. That they are Buddhist\nmonks is probable enough, but not certain, because India contained at\nthis time many sects professing similar principles. But the teaching\nof Gautama, the Buddha or \u2018enlightened,\u2019 represents to us in the most\ndefinite form the nature of this propaganda. It implies a revolt against\nnational rivalries, ritualist observances, and polytheistic beliefs; it\nis severely practical, and inculcates obedience to reason and universal\nbenevolence; and it is spread from East to West by devoted bands of\nascetic missionaries.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Buddhist teaching.]\n\n=16.= The fundamental teachings of Buddhism appear clearly in the\ntraditional account of the _Sermon of Benares_:\n\n  This is the holy truth of Sorrow; birth is Sorrow, age is Sorrow,\n  disease is Sorrow, death is Sorrow; to be joined with the unloved\n  is Sorrow, to be parted from the loved is Sorrow; to lose one\u2019s\n  desire is Sorrow; shortly, the five-fold clinging to existence is\n  Sorrow.\n\n  \u2018This is the holy truth of the Origin of Sorrow; it is the thirst\n  to be, leading from birth to birth, finding its pleasure here and\n  there; the thirst for pleasure, the thirst to be, the thirst to\n  be prosperous.\n\n  This is the holy truth of the Removing of Sorrow; the removal of\n  the thirst by destroying desire, by letting it go, by cutting\n  oneself off from it, separating from it, giving it no place.\n\n  This is the holy truth of the Path to the Removing of Sorrow; it\n  is the holy Path of eight branches, which is called Right Belief,\n  Right Aspiration, Right Word, Right Act, Right Life, Right\n  Effort, Right Meditation, Right Annihilation of Self[44].\u2019\n\nSpecially characteristic of Buddhism is that gentleness of temper,\ninstinctively opposed to all anger and cruelty, which no provocation can\nturn aside. We read in the Dhammapada:\n\n  \u2018Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by\n  love; this is an old rule. Let a man overcome anger by love,\n  let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by\n  liberality, the liar by truth[45].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Buddhists and Cynics.]\n\n=17.= The doctrines of Buddhism were not inculcated in India alone. From\nthe first it was a missionary religion; and its emissaries must often\nhave appeared in the Hellenistic world, promising \u2018to seekers after God\neternal communion with his very essence, to the weary pessimist eternal\nforgetfulness[46].\u2019 From contemporary Indian inscriptions we learn of\nmissionaries sent out by A\u00e7oka, the first great Buddhist king of India,\n\u2018with healing herbs and yet more healing doctrine\u2019[47] to Ptolemy II\nking of Egypt, Antiochus of Syria, and others, before the year 250 B.C.;\nand this mission can have been but one out of many. It thus appears very\nremarkable that we have no record of Buddhist communities established in\nthe Greco-Roman world. But if the name of Gautama remained unknown to the\nWest, and his community had no formal adherents, the manner of life of\nhis apostles did not lack imitators. In the Cynic preacher the Buddhist\nmonk reappears. In Greek literature he is usually an object of ridicule;\nhis uncouth appearance, his pitiable poverty, and his unconventional\nspeech give constant opportunity for the wit of his critics. But the\nCynics carried with them not only the outward garb of the Buddhist monks,\nbut also their lofty ethical standard, their keen sympathy with human\ntroubles, and their indifference to purely speculative problems[48]. In\nspite of the contempt heaped upon them (or perhaps in consequence of it)\nthey gradually won respect and admiration as the sincere friends and\nhelpers of the poor. Thus Buddhism at its best is pictured for us in the\nsketches drawn by Epictetus of Diogenes and the Cynic preachers of his\nown day, of which the following are examples:\n\n  \u2018Did Diogenes love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover\n  of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so\n  much labour and bodily suffering? He did love mankind, but how?\n  As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men,\n  and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was\n  his country, and not one particular place; and when he was taken\n  prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends\n  there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to\n  improve them; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as\n  before at Athens. Thus is freedom acquired[49].\u2019\n\n  \u2018And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked,\n  houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a\n  city, can pass a life that flows easily? See, God has sent you\n  a man to shew you it is possible. Look at me, who am without a\n  city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I\n  sleep on the ground; I have no wife, no children, no praetorium,\n  but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do\n  I want? Am I not without sorrow? Am I not without fear? Am I not\n  free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of my\n  desire, or ever falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever\n  blame God or man? did I ever accuse any man? did any of you ever\n  see me with sorrowful countenance?\n\n  This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this\n  their purpose[50].\u2019\n\nExcept that a simple form of theism has replaced the Buddhist atheism,\nthere is hardly a word here that we might not expect from a Buddhist monk.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoicism.]\n\n=18.= The Stoic philosophy was founded by Zeno of Citium (350-260 B.C.).\nAlthough he lived and taught at Athens, his youth was spent in a city\nthat was half Phoenician, and many of his most distinguished followers\nhad a like association with the Eastern world. The system deals with\nall the great themes touched upon by Chaldaism, Persism, and Buddhism.\nLike the first, it insists that there exists an unchanging Destiny,\naccording to which events throughout the universe are predetermined from\nall eternity. Like the second, it sets up as claiming the worship and\nallegiance of men a Supreme Deity, who governs the world with boundless\npower and benevolent will, and is manifested to men as the Logos or\n\u2018divine Word.\u2019 In its interpretation of the physical universe it accepts\nas a first principle a living and creative fire, ultimately identical\nwith the deity, and containing the germs of the whole creation. It\nsees in the will of man an independent and divine power, subject to no\ncompulsion from without, but attaining its highest and best by willing\nsubmission to the Supreme Being. In its practical ethics, though it\ndoes not advocate the suppression of all desires, it so far agrees with\nBuddhism as to hold that happiness is only found in the subordination of\nindividual claims to the voice of universal reason. Finally, its teachers\nare actively engaged in propagating its doctrines and guiding its\ndisciples. Stoicism has, in short, the inward and outward characteristics\nof the other great movements we have described, and may claim without\npresumption to be reckoned amongst the world-religions[51].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comprehensiveness of the Stoic view.]\n\n=19.= If however we reckon Stoicism amongst the world-religions, we must\nnot forget that of all of them it is the most philosophical, and this in\na double sense. In the first place the founders of Stoicism are conscious\nof the problems to which preceding schools of thought have endeavoured\nto find answers, and attempt to reconcile or at any rate to bring into\nrelation the answers which their predecessors have found. Secondly\nthey are greatly occupied with intellectual problems, and clearness of\nthought is to them almost equally important with rightness of thought.\nThe theory of Fate which we have attributed to the Chaldaeans is to the\nplain man irreconcileable with the doctrine of the government of the\nworld by a Supreme Deity; yet the Stoics hold both dogmas. The theory of\nthe freedom of the human will is a limitation equally of the dominion\nof Fate and of that of the Deity: the Stoics maintain the freedom of\nthe human will and refuse to admit the limitation of either power. The\nPersians maintained that the power of the principle of Good was balanced\nby that of the principle of Evil; and from this they drew what seemed\nto be the legitimate conclusion that man may choose to obey the one or\nthe other, to do good or to do evil. The Stoics omitted the principle\nof Evil altogether from their scheme, and yet maintained the theory of\nthe moral choice. To understand the Stoic system it is necessary to know\nexactly in what balance its different elements were maintained, and to\navoid identifying it with other systems, ancient or modern, which are\nmore sharply cut. Thus when it is commonly asserted that Stoicism on its\nreligious side is Pantheism, the very brevity of this summary must create\nsuspicion. Certainly the Stoics frequently speak of the universe as\ndivine; but they hold with equal firmness the doctrines that the universe\nis governed by Providence, and that human perversity may thwart the\ndivine purpose, both being doctrines which in ancient as in modern times\nare associated with Theism, and held to be inconsistent with pantheistic\nviews.\n\n\n[Sidenote: God and the \u2018Word.\u2019]\n\n=20.= A similar difficulty confronts us when we ask whether the deity\nof the Stoics is to be considered as personal. All the terms commonly\nused in association with a personal deity are adopted by the Stoics:\ntheir god is Lord and Father. But then they use with equal freedom terms\ncommonly associated with materialism: for the Supreme Being is to them\nbody or stuff, a primitive fire which converts itself by natural laws\ninto every form of being. For this reason the Stoics are commonly called\nmaterialists, and yet the main body of their teaching is contrary to that\nusually associated with materialism[52]. Further, beside the personal\nand the material conceptions of the Deity, they adopted and developed\na conception which exercised an extraordinary influence over other\nsystems, when they attributed the exercise of all the powers of deity\nto the divine Word, which from one point of view is the deity himself,\nand from another is something which emanates from him and is in some way\ndistinct. Thus the term \u2018God,\u2019 which to children and child-like religions\nappears so simple, is in the Stoic system extraordinarily complex; and\nits full content cannot be grasped without a willingness to revise the\nmeaning of many conceptions which seem firmly established, such as those\nof personality, material, and quality. If we are to suppose that the\nStoic conception of the Word arose ultimately from similar conceptions in\nHebraism or Persism, by which the voice of a personal God attained to a\nquasi-independent personality, we must allow that the Stoics made use of\nthis term with a boldness and consistency which from the time of their\nappearance brought it into the forefront of religious and metaphysical\ncontroversy. Through the Stoics the doctrine of the Word passed into the\nsystems of Judaism and Christianity, to perform in each the like service\nby reconciling doctrines apparently contradictory. Of all the systems\nwe may perhaps say that Stoicism makes the fewest new assertions or\nnegations, but introduces the most numerous interpretations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Influence of Stoicism.]\n\n=21.= We have comparatively little means of judging of the influence of\nStoicism in the world of Asia Minor, but incidentally we may infer that\nit was very considerable. In Athens the moral earnestness of its teachers\nfound little response in public feeling, whilst it laid the exponents\nof its tenets open to many a sharp thrust from keen critics whose\nconstructive powers were after all inferior. In Rome itself Stoicism took\nroot rapidly. The brilliant circle that gathered round Scipio Africanus\nthe younger was imbued with its ideals; Cato, the leading republican of\nthe first century B.C., was a living representative of its principles;\nand Cicero and Brutus, with many others less known to fame, were greatly\ninfluenced by it. In the first century of the principate Stoicism\nimparted a halo of heroism to a political and social opposition which\notherwise would evoke little sympathy[53]; in the second century A.D. its\ninfluence was thrown on the side of the government; the civilized world\nwas ruled under its flag, and its principles were embodied in successive\ncodes of law which are not yet extinct. Its direct supremacy was not\nlong-lived; for at the very time when a Stoic philosopher sits in the\nseat of the Caesars its followers seem to be losing their hold on its\nmost important doctrines. It came into sharp conflict with Christianity\non matters of outward observance; but in the cores of the two systems\nthere was much likeness[54], and from Stoic homes were drawn the most\nintelligent advocates of the newer faith.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Judaism.]\n\n=22.= By Judaism we mean here the way of thinking which was prevalent in\nthe Jewish world from the date of the return from Babylon to that of the\ndestruction of Jerusalem. Judaism was of course by no means restricted\nto the soil of Palestine; it was carried by the diffusion of the Jewish\nrace to all the coasts of the Mediterranean; besides its national centre\nat Jerusalem, it included a great centre of learning at Alexandria, and\nits branches, as we have seen[55], extended to the south of Egypt. The\nchief external impulse which affected it was the spread of Persism. The\ntwo systems agreed in their belief in a God of heaven, and in their\ndislike to idol-worship; and it can be no matter of wonder if one party\nat least among the Jews readily accepted the more strictly Persian\ndoctrines of the ministry of angels, the struggle between good and evil,\nthe immortality of the soul, and the reward after death, as well as\nsuch observances as the washing of hands[56]. Strong Persian influence\nhas been traced in the book of Daniel[57], and as Jewish speculation\ndeveloped at Alexandria, it took up the use of the Greek language,\nand so came into touch with the influences that were moulding thought\nthroughout Asia Minor[58]. The most interesting and elevated production\nof Alexandrine Judaism is the book known as the _Wisdom of Solomon_,\nprobably composed in the first century B.C.[59]\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u2018The Wisdom of Solomon.\u2019]\n\n=23.= The author of this book, whilst himself a firm adherent of\nmonotheism, shews a not altogether intolerant appreciation of those\nsystems in which either the heavenly bodies or the elements seem to\noccupy the most important place:\u2014\n\n  1.\n\n  For verily all men by nature were but vain who had no perception of God,\n      And from the good things that are seen they gained not power to know\n        him that is,\n      Neither by giving heed to the works did they recognise the artificer;\n\n  2.\n\n  But either fire, or wind, or swift air,\n      Or circling stars, or raging water, or the luminaries of heaven,\n      They thought to be gods that rule the world.\n\n  3.\n\n  And if it was through delight in their beauty that they took them to be\n        the gods,\n      Let them know how much better than these is their sovereign Lord:\n      For the first author of beauty created them:\n\n  4.\n\n  But if it was through astonishment at their power and influence,\n      Let them understand from them how much more powerful is he that\n        formed them:\n\n  5.\n\n  For from the greatness of the beauty even of created things\n      In like proportion does man form the image of their first maker.\n\n  6.\n\n  But yet for these men there is but small blame,\n      For they too peradventure do but go astray\n      While they are seeking God and desiring to find him.\n\n                                           _Wisdom of Solomon_, xiii 1-6.\n\nThe same author rises to still greater heights when he personifies Wisdom\nor Philosophy as a Spirit attendant upon, and almost identified with the\ndeity. Here his language resembles that of the Avestic hymns, describing\nthe angels attendant upon Ahura Mazd\u0101[60]:\u2014\n\n  22.\n\n  For there is in Wisdom a spirit quick of understanding, holy,\n      Alone in kind, manifold,\n      Subtil, freely moving,\n      Clear in utterance, unpolluted,\n      Distinct, unharmed,\n      Loving what is good, keen, unhindered,\n\n  23.\n\n  Beneficent, loving toward man,\n      Stedfast, sure, free from care.\n      All-powerful, all-surveying,\n      And penetrating through all spirits\n      That are quick of understanding, pure, most subtil:\n\n  24.\n\n  For wisdom is more mobile than any motion:\n      Yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her\n        pureness.\n\n  25.\n\n  For she is a breath of the power of God,\n      And a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty:\n      Therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her.\n\n  26.\n\n  For she is an effulgence from everlasting light,\n      And an unspotted mirror of the working of God,\n      And an image of his goodness.\n\n  27.\n\n  And she, being one, hath power to do all things:\n      And remaining in herself, reneweth all things,\n      And from generation to generation passing into holy souls\n      She maketh men friends of God, and prophets;\n\n  29.\n\n  For she is fairer than the sun,\n      And above all the constellations of the stars.\n\n                                          _Wisdom of Solomon_, vii 22-29.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Philo the Jew.]\n\n=24.= The fusion of Greek and Judaic modes of thought is most complete\nin the works of Philo the Jew (c. 20 B.C.-54 A.D.). This writer in\ncommenting upon the books of the Old Testament, finds himself able by\nway of interpretation to introduce large parts of Greek philosophies.\nThe place of Wisdom in the writer last named is taken in his works\nby the Logos or \u2018Word[61]\u2019; and the \u2018Word\u2019 is many times described\nas an emanation of the deity, after the Persian fashion[62]. Without\nanticipating the further discussion of this philosophical conception,\nwe may well notice here how characteristic it is of an age which paid\nboundless homage to reason, and how it supplies a counterpoise to\nconceptions of the deity which are rigidly personal. But Philo is of\nstill more direct service to the study of Stoicism, because he had so\ncompletely absorbed the system that, where other authorities fail us,\nwe may often trust to his expositions for a knowledge of details of the\nStoic system.\n\nAnother work of about the same period is the _Fourth book of the\nMaccabees_, in which Stoic ethics, only slightly disguised, are\nillustrated from Jewish history. In this fusion of Hebraic and\nHellenistic thought, unfortunately interrupted by political convulsions,\neminent modern Jews have recognised the natural development of the\nteaching of the Hebrew prophets[63].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Christianity.]\n\n=25.= The foregoing discussions will already have suggested that\nChristianity is bound by intimate ties to the other world-religions;\nthough it is beyond our present purpose to examine the precise nature\nof those ties. It is pre-eminently concerned with the breaking down\nof Jewish nationalism, and its constant appeal to \u2018the truth\u2019 is\nessentially the same as the appeal of kindred systems to \u2018wisdom\u2019 or\n\u2018philosophy.\u2019 The Lord\u2019s Prayer, addressed to the \u2018Father in heaven,\u2019 and\nwith its further references to \u2018The Name,\u2019 \u2018The Kingdom,\u2019 \u2018The Will,\u2019\n\u2018temptation,\u2019 and \u2018the Evil One,\u2019 reflects the principal conceptions\nof Persism, of which we are again reminded in the Apocalypse by the\nreference to the \u2018seven spirits of God[64].\u2019 The Sermon on the Mount has\nbeen, not without reason, compared to the Buddhist sermon of Benares.\nWith Stoicism Christianity has special ties, both direct and indirect.\nIts chief apostle was Paul of Tarsus, who was brought up in a city from\nwhich more than one eminent Stoic teacher had proceeded[65], and whose\nways of thinking are penetrated by Stoic conceptions. The most profound\nexponent of its theology (the author of the _Gospel according to John_)\nplaced in the forefront of his system the doctrine of the \u2018Word\u2019 which\ndirectly or (more probably) indirectly he derived from Stoic sources.\nThe early church writers felt the kinship of thought without perceiving\nthe historical relation. To them Cicero in his Stoic works was \u2018anima\nnaturaliter Christiana\u2019; and they could only explain the lofty teachings\nof Seneca by the belief that he was a secret convert of the apostle\nPaul[66]. Parallelism between Stoic and Christian phraseology is indeed\nso frequently traced that it may be well to emphasize the need of\ncaution. It is not by single phrases, often reflecting only the general\ntemper of the times, that we can judge the relation of the two systems;\nit is necessary also to take into account the general framework and the\nfundamental principles of each.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Druidism.]\n\n=26.= Of the systems named by Aristotle far the least known to us is\nDruidism. It appeared to Caesar and other Romans to be the national\nreligion of the Gauls and Britons, exactly as Magism appeared to the\nGreeks to be the national religion of the Persians. But other evidence\nindicates that Druidism was a reformed religion or philosophy, not unlike\nPersism in its principles. The training of Druidical students was long\nand arduous; it claimed to introduce them to a knowledge of heavenly\ndeities denied to the rest of the world, and to reveal to them the\nimmortality of the soul. Our best authority is the Latin poet Lucan:\u2014\n\n  \u2018To you alone it has been granted to know the gods and the powers\n  of heaven; or (it may be) to you alone to know them wrongly. You\n  dwell in deep forests and far-away groves: according to your\n  teaching the shades do not make their way to the still regions\n  of Erebus or the grey realm of Dis below; the same spirit guides\n  a new body in another world; if you know well what you say,\n  then death is but an interlude in life. If not, at least the\n  peoples, on whom the northern star gazes directly, are happy in\n  their illusion; for the greatest of terrors, the fear of death,\n  is nothing to them. Hence it comes that their warriors\u2019 hearts\n  are ready to meet the sword, and their souls have a welcome for\n  death, and they scorn to be thrifty with life, in which they can\n  claim a second share[67].\u2019\n\nDruidism, like Stoicism, seems to have prepared its adherents for a\nspecially ready acceptance of Christianity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The goal not reached yet.]\n\n=27.= The story of the world-religions, with their countless prophets,\nteachers, confessors and martyrs, has its tragic side. We ask what was\nattained by so much study and self-denial, such courageous defiance\nof custom and prejudice, such bold strivings after the unattainable,\nso many hardly spent lives and premature deaths, and feel puzzled to\nfind a reply. To the problems proposed the world-religions gave in turn\nevery possible answer. Some found life sweet, others bitter; some bowed\nbefore the inexorable rule of destiny, others believed in a personal and\nbenevolent government of the universe; some looked forward to a life\nafter death, others hoped for annihilation. Their theories crystallized\ninto dogmas, and as such became the banners under which national hatreds\nonce more sought outlet in bloodshed. Their adherents sacrificed\neverything in the hope of reaching certain and scientific truth, and,\nat the end of all, religion still appears the whole world over to be\nin conflict with science, and the thousand years during which Wisdom\nwas counted more precious than riches are often looked back upon as a\ntime of human aberration and childishness. It is not to be denied that\nthousands of noble spirits set out during this period for a goal that\nthey never reached; and those who are inclined to destructive criticism\nmay plausibly characterise their enterprise as vanity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The path still onward.]\n\n=28.= It is the task of literary research to pierce through this limited\nview, and to trace the real effect of philosophical effort on the life\nof individuals and nations. All over the civilized world it raised a\nrace of heroes, struggling not for power or splendour as in the epoch\nof barbarism, but for the good of their fellow-men. It gave a new value\nto life, and trampled under foot the fear of death. It united the\nnations, and spread the reign of law and justice. Where its influence\nhas weakened, the world has not changed for the better; so that the\nvery failures of the world-religions most attest their value. India has\nrelapsed from Buddhism, its own noblest work, to its earlier creeds, and\nthey still bar its path against social progress. Europe, no longer united\nby the sentiment of a catholic religion, and increasingly indifferent\nto literary sympathies, is falling back into the slough of frontier\nimpediments and racial hatreds. From all this there is no way out except\nin the old-fashioned quest of truth and good will.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Estimates of Stoicism.]\n\n=29.= Both in ancient and in modern times the importance of Stoicism\nhas been very variously estimated, according as the critic has set\nup a purely literary standard, or has taken into account historical\ninfluence. To those who look upon philosophy as it is embodied in books,\nand forms a subject for mental contemplation and aesthetic enjoyment,\nthe philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have always seemed of far\nhigher rank. As contributions to the progress of humanity, in politics\nand law, in social order and in the inventive adaptation of material\nsurroundings, they can hardly claim to approach any one of the systems\ndiscussed in this chapter. But it is with no wish to depreciate the great\nmasterpieces of Hellenic culture that we now set against the criticisms\nof some of its ardent advocates the maturer judgment of writers who have\napproached with greater sympathy the study of the Hellenistic and Roman\nworlds. \u2018In Plato and Aristotle,\u2019 says Zeller, \u2018Greek philosophy reached\nits greatest perfection[68].\u2019 \u2018Its bloom was short-lived[69].\u2019 \u2018Greece\nwas brought into contact with the Eastern nations, whereby it became\nsubject to a back-current of Oriental thought[70].\u2019 \u2018With the decline of\npolitical independence the mental powers of the nation were broken past\nremedy[71].\u2019 \u2018What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy\nwould become practical, if indeed it were studied at all[72]?\u2019 To minds\nof another temper it does not seem so fatal that \u2018philosophy should\nbecome practical.\u2019 \u2018It should be insisted,\u2019 says Prof. Mahaffy, \u2018that the\ngreatest practical inheritance the Greeks left in philosophy was not the\nsplendour of Plato, or the vast erudition of Aristotle, but the practical\nsystems of Zeno and Epicurus, and the scepticism of Pyrrho. In our own\nday every man is either a Stoic, an Epicurean, or a Sceptic[73].\u2019 The\ngreatness of Stoicism in particular was eloquently recognised by a French\nwriter of the eighteenth century: \u2018elle seule savait faire les citoyens,\nelle seule faisait les grands hommes, elle seule faisait les grands\nempereurs[74]!\u2019 With these tributes may be compared that paid by a writer\nwho approaches the subject from the standpoint of modern philosophy\nand theology. \u2018[Stoicism] has perennial fascination; and there are not\nwanting signs that it appeals with special attractiveness to cultured\nminds at the present day. It has both speculative and practical value;\nits analysis of human nature and its theory of knowledge, no less than\nits ethical teaching, giving insight into the problems of the universe\nand the right mode of guiding life. As an important stage in the march\nof philosophical thought, and as a luminous chapter in the history of\nnatural theology, it solicits our attention and will repay our study[75].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Interpretative Stoicism.]\n\n=30.= Judgments so contradictory reveal the fact that ancient\ndivergencies of philosophic sympathies have their counterparts to-day;\nand perhaps in studying and judging the systems of antiquity a little\nmore is needed of the sympathy and interpretative elasticity which every\nman unconsciously uses in maintaining the political, philosophic and\nreligious views to which he is attracted by inheritance or personal\nconviction. Thus to understand Stoicism fully a man must himself become\nfor the time being a Stoic. As such he will no longer bind himself by\nthe letter of the school authorities. In many a phrase they use he will\nrecognise an obsolete habit of thought, an exaggerated opposition, a\nweak compliance in the face of dominant opinions, or a mistaken reliance\nupon what once seemed logical conclusions. At other points he will see\ndifficulties felt to which an answer can now easily be supplied. At each\nstep he will ask, not so much what the Stoics thought, but what a Stoic\nmust necessarily think. Whilst constantly referring to the original\nauthorities, he will allow much to be forgotten, and in other cases he\nwill draw out more meaning than the writers themselves set in their\nwords. If he can walk, boldly but not without caution, on this path, he\nwill assuredly find that Stoicism throws light on all the great questions\nto which men still seek answers, and that to some at least it still holds\nout a beckoning hand.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] See below, \u00a7 441.\n\n[2] Diog. L. Prooem. 1.\n\n[3] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 161; and below, \u00a7 94.\n\n[4] \u2018principes Chaldaei, qui in patentibus campis colebant, stellarum\nmotus et vias et coetus intuentes, quid ex his efficeretur observaverunt\u2019\nGellius, _N. A._ xiv 1, 8.\n\n[5] Sir E. Walter Maunder, in the _Nineteenth Century_ for September 1900.\n\n[6] \u2018quinque stellarum potestates Chaldaeorum observatio excepit\u2019 Seneca,\n_N. Q._ ii 32, 6.\n\n[7] This is well described by Cicero, translating from a Stoic source:\n\u2018cum fato omnia fiant, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui colligationem\ncausarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. qui enim\nteneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat quae\nfutura sint\u2019 _Div._ i 56, 127. It seems reasonable to suppose that this\ngeneral conception of \u2018fate\u2019 or \u2018destiny\u2019 is deduced from the unchanging\nmovements of the heavenly bodies.\n\n[8] \u2018videbis quinque sidera diversas agentia vias; ex horum levissimis\nmotibus fortunae populorum dependent\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 18, 3.\n\n[9] \u2018aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis\nexperiundisque pueris, quicunque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse\u2019 Cic.\n_Div._ ii 46, 97. I assume that the original tradition named the smaller\nnumber suggested above.\n\n[10] \u2018duo apud Chaldaeos studuisse se dicunt, Epigenes et Apollonius\nMyndius\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ vii 4, 1; \u2018Diogenes Stoicus [Chaldaeis] concedit,\naliquid ut praedicere possint\u2019 Cic. _Div._ ii 43, 90. Seneca concludes\nagainst their authority, observing (i) that a proper horoscope should\ninclude all the stars in the heaven at the moment of birth, and (ii) that\ntwins should always have the same fortune, which is obviously untrue; see\n_N. Q._ ii 32, 6 to 8, _Ben._ vii 1, 5.\n\n[11] \u2018tu ne quaesieris (scire nefas), quem mihi, quem tibi | finem di\ndederint, Leuconoe, nec Babylonios | temptaris numeros\u2019 Hor. _C._ i 11,\n1-3.\n\n[12] See the interesting tale of Thrasyllus and Tiberius in Tac. _Ann._\nvi 21, to which the author affects to give some credit.\n\n[13] e.g., \u2018seu Libra seu me Scorpios adspicit | formidulosus, pars\nviolentior | natalis horae, seu tyrannus | Hesperiae Capricornus undae,\n| utrumque nostrum incredibili modo | consentit astrum\u2019 Hor. _C._ ii 17,\n17-22.\n\n[14] \u2018Eudoxus, qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque\n[artem magicam] intellegi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex millibus annorum\nante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit: sic et Aristoteles\u2019 Pliny, _N. H._\nxxx 2, 1; cf. Diog. L. Prooem. 2 and 8.\n\n[15] Williams-Jackson, _Zoroaster_, p. 161.\n\n[16] _ib._ p. 174.\n\n[17] K. Geldner, _Encycl. Brit._ ed. x, article \u2018Zoroaster.\u2019\n\n[18] Williams-Jackson, p. 7.\n\n[19] \u2018Magiam ... cuius scientiae saeculis priscis multa ex Chaldaeorum\narcanis Bactrianus addidit Zoroastres\u2019 Amm. Marc. xxiii 6, 32.\n\n[20] [Zoroastres] \u2018primus dicitur mundi principia siderumque\nmotus diligentissime spectasse\u2019 Justinus, _Hist. Phil._ i 1, 9\n(Williams-Jackson, p. 237): \u2018astris multum et frequenter intentus\u2019 Clem.\nRom. _Recogn._ iv 27.\n\n[21] \u2018tradunt Zoroastrem in desertis caseo vixisse\u2019 Pliny, _N. H._ xi 97.\n\n[22] \u2018[Ahura Mazd\u0101] created the paths of the sun and the stars; he made\nthe moon to wax and wane\u2019 (_Yasna_ 43, 3); \u2018he made the light and the\ndarkness\u2019 (_ib._ 5); \u2018he is the father of the good\u2019 (_ib._ 46, 2).\n\n[23] \u2018\u0396\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03bc\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f11\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3\u2019 Plut. _Isid. et\nOsir._ 46.\n\n[24] \u2018Thus saith Cyrus, king of Persia:\u2014all the kingdoms of the earth\nhath the Lord, the God of heaven, given me; and he hath charged me to\nbuild him an house in Jerusalem\u2019 Ezra i 2.\n\n[25] See the interesting papyri records recently discovered in\nElephantine, and published by Dr Sachau of Berlin. A general account of\nthem is given by Prof. Driver in the London _Guardian_ for Nov. 6, 1907.\n\n[26] Cicero rightly appreciated the religious character of the Persian\ninvasions: \u2018delubra humanis consecrata simulacris Persae nefaria\nputaverunt; eamque unam ob causam Xerxes inflammari Atheniensium fana\niussisse dicitur, quod deos, quorum domus esset omnis hic mundus,\ninclusos parietibus contineri nefas esse duceret\u2019 _Rep._ iii 9, 14. So\nThemistocles as represented by Herodotus: \u2018the gods and heroes grudged\nthat one man should become king both of Asia and of Europe, and he a man\nunholy and presumptuous, one who made no difference between things sacred\nand things profane, burning and casting down the images of the gods\u2019\n_History_ viii 109 (Macaulay\u2019s translation).\n\n[27] See below, \u00a7 41.\n\n[28] \u2018Images and temples and altars they do not account it lawful to\nerect, nay, they even charge with folly those who do these things; and\nthis, as it seems to me, because they do not account the gods to be in\nthe likeness of men, as do the Hellenes. But it is their wont to perform\nsacrifices to Zeus, going up to the most lofty of the mountains, and the\nwhole circle of the heavens they call Zeus: and they sacrifice to the\nSun and the Moon and the Earth, to Fire and to Water and to the Winds;\nthese are the only gods to whom they have sacrificed ever from the first\u2019\n_History_ i 131 (Macaulay\u2019s translation).\n\n[29] Cic. _Sen._ 22, 79 to 81, after Xen. _Cyr._ viii 7.\n\n[30] In the hymns of Zarathustra we can only trace the beginnings of this\nsystem, as in the following: \u2018All-wise Lord, all-powerful one, and thou\nPiety, and Righteousness, Good Mind and the Kingdom, listen ye to me and\nprosper my every beginning\u2019 _Yasna_ 33, 11.\n\n[31] _Yasht_ xix 15, 16. The translation follows Geldner, _Drei Yasht aus\ndem Zendavesta_, p. 15.\n\n[32] Ancient Greek hymn, \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f31\u03bb\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f01\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b7\u03c2, translated by J. Keble.\n\n[33] J. H. Newman.\n\n[34] \u2018Zoroaster taught the Persians neither to burn their dead, nor\notherwise to defile fire.\u2019 Xanthos (B.C. 465-425), as quoted by Nicolaus\nof Damascus (1st century B.C.).\n\n[35] See \u00a7 10, note 28; Strabo xv 3, 16.\n\n[36] \u2018Zarathustra said:\u2014the earthly demon is water derived from earth;\nthe heavenly demon is fire mixed with air\u2019 Origen, _contra haereses_, i\ncol. 3025.\n\n[37] \u2018The Persians first worshipped fire as a god in heaven\u2019 Clemens\nRomanus, _Hom._ ix 4 f.\n\n[38] \u2018Zoroaster the Magian says:\u2014God is the primal, the incorruptible,\nthe eternal, the unbegotten, the indivisible, the incomparable, the\ncharioteer of all good, he that cannot be bribed, the best of the good,\nthe wisest of the wise; he is also the father of good laws and justice,\nthe self-taught, the natural, perfect, and wise, the only discoverer of\nthe sacred and natural\u2019 Euseb. _Praep. ev._ i 10.\n\n[39] \u2018From the writings of Zoroaster it is inferred that he divided\nphilosophy into three parts, physics, economics, and politics\u2019 Schol. on\n_First Alcibiades_, p. 122 A (Williams-Jackson, p. 231).\n\n[40] \u2018They educate their children, beginning at five years old and going\non till twenty, in three things only; in riding, in shooting, and in\nspeaking the truth\u2019 Herod. i 136.\n\n[41] See above, \u00a7 3.\n\n[42] Alexander had reached the river Hyphasis, the modern Bias.\n\n[43] Plutarch\u2019s _Life of Alexander_, ch. lxiv (translation by Aubrey\nStewart and George Long, London, 1892).\n\n[44] Mah\u0101vagga i 6, 19 to 22, after H. Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 139, and\nthe translation in _S. B. E._ xiii pp. 95, 96.\n\n[45] Dhammapada i 5 and xvii 123 (_S. B. E._ x pp. 5, 58).\n\n[46] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 164. These alternative\ninterpretations of the doctrine of _Nirvana_ must not be accepted as\nuncontroversial.\n\n[47] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 163; V. A. Smith, _A\u00e7oka_, p.\n174.\n\n[48] See Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii pp. 155-162, and below, \u00a7 52.\n\n[49] Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 64 to 66 (Long\u2019s translation).\n\n[50] _ib._ iii 22, 45 to 50.\n\n[51] \u2018The system that stood to Pagan Rome more nearly than anything else\nin the place of a religion\u2019 Crossley, _M. Aurelius_, iv Pref. p. xii.\n\u2018Its history resembles that of a religion rather than a speculative\nsystem\u2019 Rendall, _M. Aurelius_, Pref. p. xv.\n\n[52] See below, \u00a7 173.\n\n[53] \u2018Patricians, as we call them, only too often fail in natural\naffection\u2019 M. Aurel. _To himself_, i 12 (Rendall\u2019s translation). See also\nbelow, \u00a7\u00a7 442, 443.\n\n[54] \u2018Dying, [Stoicism] bequeathed no small part of its disciplines,\nits dogmas, and its phraseology to the Christianity by which it\nwas ingathered\u2019 Rendall, _M. Aurelius_, Pref. p. xv. \u2018The basis of\nChristian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical\u2019 Hatch,\n_Hibbert Lectures_, p. 170. \u2018[The post-Aristotelian period] supplied the\nscientific mould into which Christianity in the early years of its growth\nwas cast, and bearing the shape of which it has come down to us\u2019 O. J.\nReichel in his Preface to the translation of Zeller\u2019s _Stoics_, etc.\n\n[55] See above, \u00a7 9.\n\n[56] It is not admitted by the best authorities that the term \u2018Pharisee\u2019\nis in any way connected with the name of \u2018Persian\u2019 or its modern\nequivalent \u2018Parsee.\u2019 But the resemblance in beliefs and habits is very\nstriking, especially if we contrast the Pharisees with their Sadducee\nopponents. \u2018The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither\nangel, nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both\u2019 Acts xxiii 8.\n\n[57] D. A. Bertholet, \u2018The value of the history of religions,\u2019 _Homiletic\nReview_, Nov. 1908.\n\n[58] See Fairweather, _Background of the Gospels_, ch. vii (on \u2018the\napocalyptic movement and literature\u2019).\n\n[59] _ib._ p. 337.\n\n[60] See above, \u00a7 12.\n\n[61] Heinze, _Lehre vom Logos_, pp. 251, 252.\n\n[62] \u2018The Logos is related to God as Wisdom, and is the full expression\nof the Divine mind. He is the sheckinah or glory of God, the first-born\nSon of God, the second God\u2019 Fairweather, _Background of the Gospels_, p.\n358.\n\n[63] Friedl\u00e4nder, _Die religi\u00f6sen Bewegungen innerhalb des Juda\u00efsmus_,\n1905.\n\n[64] \u2018There were seven lamps of fire burning before the throne, which are\nthe seven Spirits of God\u2019 Revelation iv 5.\n\n[65] Of these Antipater of Tarsus is the best known, for whom see \u00a7 110;\nothers are Heraclides, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Nestor, Athenodorus,\netc., for whom see Index of Proper Names.\n\n[66] Winckler, _Der Stoicismus_, p. 2; Lightfoot, _Philippians_, pp. 270,\n271.\n\n[67] Lucan, _Phars._ i 452-462.\n\n[68] _Stoics_, etc., p. 1.\n\n[69] _ib._ p. 10.\n\n[70] _ib._ pp. 13, 14.\n\n[71] _ib._ p. 15.\n\n[72] _ib._ p. 16.\n\n[73] _Greek Life and Thought_, Introd., pp. xxxvii, xxxviii.\n\n[74] Montesquieu, _Esprit des lois_, ii 24.\n\n[75] W. L. Davidson, _The Stoic Creed_, p. v.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nHERACLITUS AND SOCRATES.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Greek thought.]\n\n=31.= We have seen already that the great problems of which Stoicism\npropounds one solution were agitated during the millennium which\npreceded the Christian era alike in India, Persia and Asia Minor on the\none hand, and in Greece, Italy and the Celtic countries on the other.\nTo the beginnings of this movement we are unable to assign a date;\nbut the current of thought appears on the whole to have moved from\nEast to West. But just at the same time the influence of Greek art and\nliterature spreads from West to East; and it is to the crossing and\ninterweaving of these two movements that we owe almost all the light\nthrown on this part of the history of human thought. The early history\nof Stoicism has reached us entirely through the Greek language, and is\nbound up with the history of Greek literature and philosophy[1]. But\nlong before Stoicism came into existence other movements similar in\nkind had reached Greece; and the whole of early Greek literature, and\nespecially its poetry, is rich in contributions to the discussion of the\nphysical and ethical problems to which Stoicism addressed itself. From\nthe storehouse of this earlier literature the Stoics drew many of their\narguments and illustrations; the speculations of Heraclitus and the life\nof Socrates were especially rich in suggestions to them. The study of\nGreek literature and philosophy as a whole is therefore indispensable for\na full appreciation of Stoicism; and the way has been made easier of\nlate by excellent treatises, happily available in the English language,\ndealing with the general development of philosophic and religious thought\nin Greece[2]. Here it is only possible to refer quite shortly to those\nwriters and teachers to whom Stoicism is most directly indebted.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Homer.]\n\n=32.= Although the HOMERIC POEMS include representations of gods and men\ncorresponding to the epoch of national gods and to other still earlier\nstages of human thought, nevertheless they are pervaded by at least\nthe dawning light of the period of the world-religions. Tales of the\ngods that are bloodthirsty or coarse are kept in the background; and\nthough heroes like Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax move in an atmosphere\nof greed, bloodshed, and revenge, yet all of them are restrained both\nin word and in act by a strong feeling of self-respect, the \u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u03ce\u03c2 or\nshamefastness which entirely differentiates them from the heroes of\nfolk-lore; in particular, the typical vices of gluttony, drunkenness,\nand sexual unrestraint are amongst the things of which it is a shame to\nspeak without reserve. The gods are many, and in human shape; yet they\nare somewhat fairer than men, and something of the heavenly brilliance\nin which the Persian archangels are wrapped seems to encircle also the\nheights where the gods dwell on mount Olympus[3]. Gradually too there\ncomes to light amidst the picture of the many gods something resembling\na supreme power, sometimes impersonally conceived as Fate (\u03b1\u1f36\u03c3\u03b1,\n\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1), sometimes more personally as the Fate of Zeus, most commonly\nof all as Zeus himself, elevated in rank above all other gods[4]. Thus\nZeus is not only king, but also father of gods and men[5]; he is the\ndispenser of happiness to men, \u2018to the good and the evil, to each one\nas he will[6],\u2019 and the distributor of gracious gifts[7], unbounded\nin power[8] and in knowledge[9]. The gods again, in spite of the many\ntales of violence attached to their names, exercise a moral governance\nover the world. \u2018They love not froward deeds, but they reverence justice\nand the righteous acts of men[10]\u2019; \u2018in the likeness of strangers from\nfar countries, they put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the\ncities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men[11].\u2019\n\nWhilst therefore the philosophers of later times could rightly object to\nHomer that he told of the gods tales neither true nor worthy of their\nnature, there was on the other hand much in the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_,\nand particularly in the latter, which was in harmony with philosophical\nconceptions. It was not without reason that the Stoics themselves made\nof Ulysses, who in Homer plays but little part in fighting, an example\nof the man of wisdom and patience, who knows men and cities, and who\nthrough self-restraint and singleness of purpose at last wins his way\nto the goal[12]. From this starting-point the whole of the _Odyssey_ is\nconverted into a \u2018Pilgrim\u2019s Progress\u2019; the enchantress Circe represents\nthe temptations of gluttony, which turns men into swine[13]; the chant of\nthe Sirens is an allegory of the enticements of sensual pleasure.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Hesiod.]\n\n=33.= In HESIOD (8th century B.C.) we find the first attempt to construct\na history of the universe; his _Theogony_ is the forerunner of the\nCosmology which later on is a recognised part of philosophy. Here in the\ncompany of the personal gods we find not only the personified lights of\nheaven, Sun and Moon, but also such figures as those of Earth and Ocean,\nNight and Day, Heaven and Hell, Fate, Sleep, and Death, all bearing\nwitness to the emergence of the spirit of speculation. In Hesiod again we\nfirst find the description of the \u2018watchmen of Jove,\u2019 who are no longer\nthe gods themselves as in Homer, but an intermediate class of beings,\ncorresponding to the Persian angels and the \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 of later Greek.\n\n  \u2018Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus, immortal, watchmen\n  over mortal men; these watch deeds of justice and of wickedness,\n  walking all ways up and down the earth, clothed in the mist[14].\u2019\n\nBut it is in his ethical standards that Hesiod is more directly a\nforerunner of the Stoic school: for neither the warlike valour nor the\ngraceful self-control of the hero appeals to him, but the stern sense of\njustice and the downright hard work of the plain man.\n\n  \u2018Full across the way of Virtue the immortal gods have set the\n  sweat of the brow; long and steep is the path that reaches to\n  her, and rough at the beginning; but when you reach the highest\n  point, hard though it is, in the end it becomes easy[15].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Orphic poems.]\n\n=34.= Between Epic and Attic literature stands the poetry of the \u2018Orphic\u2019\nmovement, belonging to the sixth century B.C., and exercising a wide\ninfluence over various schools of philosophy in the succeeding centuries.\nFor an account of this movement the reader must look elsewhere[16]; here\nwe can only notice that it continued the cosmological speculations of\nHesiod\u2019s _Theogony_, and in particular developed a strain of pantheism\nwhich is echoed in the Stoic poets. According to an Orphic poet\n\n  \u2018Zeus is the first and the last, the head and the foot, the\n  male and the female, Earth and Heaven, Night and Day; he is the\n  one force, the one great deity, the creator, the alluring power\n  of love; for all these things are immanent in the person of\n  Zeus[17].\u2019\n\nHere amidst the fusion of poetry and theology we first see the budding\nprinciple of philosophic monism, the reaching after a unity which will\ncomprehend all things. To the same school is attributed the doctrine that\n\u2018the human soul is originally and essentially divine[18].\u2019\n\n[Sidenote: The Hylozoists.]\n\n=35.= To the sixth century B.C. belong also the earliest Greek\nphilosophers who are known to us by name. In all of these the early\npolytheism is either abandoned or becomes so dim in its outlines that\nthe origin and governing force of the universe is sought in quite other\ndirections. The philosophers of Ionia busied themselves with the problem\nof the elements. THALES of Miletus was a man of many attainments; he\nhad travelled both in Egypt and in Babylon, and was an active political\nreformer. To him water was the primary substance, from which all others\nproceeded and to which they returned[19]. ANAXIMANDER of the same town\nwas the first who undertook to give the Greeks a map of the whole known\nworld. To him it seemed that the primary matter could not be the same as\nany visible substance, but must be a protoplasm of undefined character\n(\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd), capable of assuming in turn all shapes[20]. ANAXIMENES (once\nmore of Miletus) assumed air as the first principle, and derived the\nother elements from it by processes of condensation (\u03c0\u03cd\u03ba\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) and\nrarefaction[21]. But on one point all the Ionian philosophers were\nagreed: the primary substance was the cause of its own motion; they were\n\u2018hylozoists,\u2019 since they hold that matter (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7) is a living thing (\u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd).\nThey are from the standpoint of physics \u2018monists,\u2019 as opposed to those\nwho hold matter and life, or matter and force, to be two things eternally\ndistinct, and are therefore \u2018dualists\u2019 in their theory[22].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Pythagoras.]\n\n=36.= To the same sixth century belong two other notable philosophers.\nPYTHAGORAS, born in Samos about 575 B.C., and like Thales, one who had\ntravelled widely, left his native land rather than submit to the rule of\na tyrant, and founded in Croton in Lower Italy a community half religious\nand half political, which in its original form was not long-lived. But a\nwidespread tradition remained as to his doctrines, in which the theory\nof Numbers held a leading position. Pythagoras appears to have been a\ngood mathematician and astronomer, and followers of his school were at an\nearly date led to the doctrines of the rotation of the earth on its axis\nand the central position of the sun in the planetary system[23]. His name\nis also connected with the theory of the transmigration of souls, which\nwe may suppose him to have derived ultimately from some Indian source;\nand to the same country we must look as having suggested to him and his\nfollowers the practice of abstaining from animal food[24].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Xenophanes.]\n\n=37.= If we looked merely to the theories of the philosophers, it might\nseem as if the old mythologies and theogonies were already dead. But in\nfact the battle was yet to come. XENOPHANES of Colophon (born circ. 580\nB.C.) witnessed in his youth the fall of Ionia before the conquering\nprogress of Cyrus king of Persia. Rather than submit to the power of the\ninvader he adopted the life of a wandering minstrel, and finally settled\nin Elea, in Lower Italy, where he became the founder of the Eleatic\nschool. But in his religious convictions he was whole-heartedly on the\nPersian side. \u2018There is one God, greatest amongst gods[25] and men,\nnot like mortal men in bodily shape or in mind[26].\u2019 Thus the worship\nof many gods and that of images of the deity are alike condemned; and\nit is probable that in this false worship he found the cause of his\ncountry\u2019s fall. With the lack of historic sense which is characteristic\nof the zealous reformer, he condemned Homer and Hesiod as teachers of\nimmorality, since they \u2018ascribed to the gods theft, adultery, and deceit,\nand all acts that are counted shame and blame amongst men[27].\u2019 With\nkeen criticism he pointed out that myths as to the birth of the gods\ndishonoured them just as much as if they related their deaths; for on\neither supposition there is a time when the gods do not exist[28]. The\nconception of the deity formed by Xenophanes seems to approach Pantheism\nor Nature-worship, and so far to foreshadow the Stoic deity; but the\nfragments that survive of his works are insufficient to make this point\nclear[29]. The successors of Xenophanes did not inherit his religious\nzeal, but they emphasized all the more the philosophic principle of an\nultimate Unity in all things.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Heraclitus.]\n\n=38.= With the opening of the fifth century B.C. we reach HERACLITUS\nof Ephesus, a philosopher of the highest importance to us, since the\nStoics afterwards accepted his teaching as the foundation of their own\nsystem of physics. The varied speculations of the sixth century were all\nexamined by Heraclitus, and all found wanting by him; his own solutions\nof the problems of the world are set forth in a prophetic strain,\nimpressive by its dignity, obscure in its form, and lending itself to\nmuch variety of interpretation. For the opinions of the crowd, who are\nmisled by their senses, he had no respect[30]; but even learning does\nnot ensure intelligence[31], unless men are willing to be guided by the\n\u2018Word,\u2019 the universal reason[32]. The senses shew us in the universe\na perpetual flowing: fire changes to water (sky to cloud), water to\nearth (in rainfall), which is the downward path; earth changes to water\n(rising mist), and water to fire, which is the upward path[33]. Behind\nthese changes the Word points to that which is one and unchanging[34].\nAnaximander did well when he pointed to the unlimited as the primary\nstuff, but it is better to describe it as an \u2018ever-living fire[35].\u2019 Out\nof this fire all things come, and into it they shall all be resolved[36].\nOf this ever-living fire a spark is buried in each man\u2019s body; whilst\nthe body lives, this spark, the soul, may be said to be dead[37]; but\nwhen the body dies it escapes from its prison, and enters again on its\nproper life. The \u2018Word\u2019 is from everlasting[38]; through the Word all\nthings happen[39]; it is the universal Law which holds good equally in\nthe physical world and in the soul of man. For man\u2019s soul there is a\nmoral law, which can be reached only by studying the plan of the world in\nwhich we live[40]. But of this law men are continually forgetful; they\nlive as in a dream, unconscious of it; it calls to them once and again,\nbut they do not hear it[41]. Most of all it is needed in the government\nof the state; for \u2018he who speaks with understanding must take his\nfoothold on what is common to all; for all human laws are nourished by\nthe one divine law[42].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Word.]\n\n=39.= The general import of the physical teaching of Heraclitus, and the\nindebtedness of the Stoics to it, have long been recognised: the bearing\nof this teaching upon religion, ethics and politics is a more disputable\nmatter. Does Heraclitus by the \u2018Logos\u2019 which he so often names mean\nmerely his own reasoning and message? is he speaking of the common reason\nof mankind? or does the term suggest to him a metaphysical abstraction,\na divine power through which the world is created and governed? For\nthe fuller meaning we have analogies in the beliefs of Persism before\nHeraclitus, and of Stoics, Judaists, and Christians afterwards. The\nlatest commentator, adopting this explanation, sums it up in three\npropositions: first, the \u2018Logos\u2019 is eternal, being both pre-existent and\neverlasting, like the world-god of Xenophanes; secondly, all things both\nin the material and in the spiritual world happen through the \u2018Logos\u2019; it\nis a cosmic principle, \u2018common\u2019 or \u2018universal\u2019; and in the third place,\nit is the duty of man to obey this \u2018Logos,\u2019 and so to place himself in\nharmony with the rest of nature. And accordingly, in agreement with many\nrecent writers, he adopts the translation \u2018the Word\u2019 as on the whole\nthe most adequate[43]. Even the Romans found it impossible to translate\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 by any single word, and they therefore adopted the phrase _ratio\net oratio_ (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to\ninclude also the broad notion of \u2018Universal Law\u2019 or the \u2018Laws of Nature.\u2019\nIf we can rightly attribute to Heraclitus all that is thus included in\nthe interpretation of this one word, he certainly stands out as a great\ncreative power in Greek philosophy, harmonizing by bold generalizations\nsuch diverse provinces as those of physics, religion, and ethics; \u2018he\nwas the first [in Greece, we must understand] to build bridges, which\nhave never since been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual\nlife[44].\u2019 It is to the Stoics almost alone that we owe it that teaching\nso suggestive and so practical was converted into a powerful social and\nintellectual force.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zarathustra and Heraclitus.]\n\n=40.= The prominence given to fire in the system of Heraclitus has\nvery naturally suggested that his doctrine is borrowed from that of\nZarathustra[45]. The historical circumstances are not unfavourable to\nthis suggestion. Ionia was conquered in turn by Cyrus and Darius, and\ndefinitely annexed by Persia about 496 B.C., that is, at the very time\nat which Heraclitus taught. Moreover the Persian invasion was akin to a\nreligious crusade, and had for a principal aim the stamping out of the\nidle and superstitious habit of worshipping images, by which (according\nto the Persians) the true God was dishonoured. The elevated character of\nthe Persian religion could hardly fail to attract learned Greeks, already\ndissatisfied with the crude mythology of their own people. Further, the\nresemblance between the teaching of Zarathustra and that of Heraclitus\nis not restricted to the language used of the divine fire; the doctrines\nof an all-creating, all-pervading Wisdom, the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 or Word, and of\nthe distinction between the immortal soul and the corruptible body, are\ncommon to both. But the differences between the two systems are almost\nequally striking. Heraclitus is a monist; according to him all existences\nare ultimately one. Zarathustra taught a principle of Evil, everywhere\nopposed to the Good Spirit, and almost equally powerful; his system is\ndualist[45a]. Zarathustra is not free from nationalism, Heraclitus is\ncosmopolitan. In the Ephesian system we find no trace of the belief in\nJudgment after death, in Heaven, or in Hell. We may in fact well believe\nthat Heraclitus was acquainted with Zoroastrianism and influenced by it,\nbut we have not the means to determine what the extent of that influence\nwas. It is related of him that he received (but declined) an invitation\nto the court of Darius; and that his dead body was given up to be torn to\npieces by dogs in the Persian fashion[45b].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The tragedians.]\n\n=41.= The development of philosophic thought at Athens was, as we have\nnoticed, much complicated by the political relations of Greece to\nPersia. Although the Persian empire had absorbed Asia Minor, it was\ndecisively repulsed in its attacks on Greece proper. Athens was the\ncentre of the resistance to it, and the chief glory of the victories of\nMarathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (480 B.C.) fell to Athenian statesmen\nand warriors. By these successes the Hellenes not only maintained\ntheir political independence, but saved the images of their gods from\nimminent destruction. A revival of polytheistic zeal took place, as might\nhave been expected. The wealth and skill of Greece were ungrudgingly\nexpended in the achievement of masterpieces of the sculptor\u2019s art, and\ntheir housing in magnificent temples. But even so religious doctrines\nstrikingly similar to those of the Persians gained ground. The same\nAeschylus who (in his _Persae_) celebrates the defeat of the national\nenemy, a few years later (in his _Agamemnon_) questions whether the\nSupreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus, and the\nGreek method of worshipping him[46]. His more conservative successor\nSophocles was contented, in the spirit of the Homeric bards, to eliminate\nfrom the old myths all that seemed unworthy of the divine nature.\nEuripides adopts a bolder tone. Reproducing the old mythology with exact\nfidelity, he \u2018assails the resulting picture of the gods with scathing\ncensure and flat contradiction[47].\u2019 With equal vigour he attacks the\nprivileges of noble birth, and defends the rights of the slave; he has\na keen sympathy for all the misfortunes that dog man\u2019s life; but his\nethical teaching in no way derives its sanction from any theology. The\nHellenes have lost confidence in their inherited outlook on the world.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Sophists.]\n\n=42.= The same problems which the poets discussed in the city theatre\nwere during the fifth century B.C. the themes of a class of men now\nbecoming so numerous as to form the nucleus of a new profession. These\nwere the \u2018sophists,\u2019 who combined the functions now performed partly by\nthe university professor, partly by the public journalist[48]. Dependent\nfor their livelihood upon the fees of such pupils as they could attract,\nand therefore sensitive enough to the applause of the moment, they were\ndistinguished from the philosophers by a closer touch with the public\nopinion of the day, and a keener desire for immediate results. Their\ncontribution to philosophic progress was considerable. Cultivating\nwith particular care the art of words, they created a medium by which\nphilosophic thought could reach the crowd of men of average education;\neager advocates of virtue and political progress, they gave new hopes\nto a people which, in spite of its material successes, was beginning to\ndespair because of the decay of its old moral and civic principles. In\nPRODICUS of Ceos we find a forerunner of the popular Stoic teachers of\nthe period of the principate[49]:\n\n  \u2018A profound emotion shook the ranks of his audience when they\n  heard his deep voice, that came with so strange a sound from the\n  frail body that contained it. Now he would describe the hardships\n  of human existence; now he would recount all the ages of man,\n  beginning with the new-born child, who greets his new home with\n  wailing, and tracing his course to the second childhood and\n  the gray hairs of old age. Again he would rail at death as a\n  stony-hearted creditor, wringing his pledges one by one from his\n  tardy debtor, first his hearing, then his sight, next the free\n  movement of his limbs. At another time, anticipating Epicurus,\n  he sought to arm his disciples against the horrors of death by\n  explaining that death concerned neither the living nor the dead.\n  As long as we live, death does not exist; as soon as we die, we\n  ourselves exist no longer[50].\u2019\n\nTo Prodicus we owe the well-known tale of Hercules at the parting of\nthe ways, when Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure on the other, each\ninvite him to join company with her[51]. This tale we shall find to be\na favourite with the Roman philosophers. The same Prodicus introduced a\ndoctrine afterwards taken up by the Cynics and the Stoics in succession,\nthat of the \u2018indifference\u2019 of external advantages as distinct from\nthe use to which they are applied. He also propounded theories as\nto the origin of the gods of mythology, explaining some of them as\npersonifications of the powers of nature, others as deified benefactors\nof the human race[52]; theories which later on were adopted with zeal\nby the Stoic Persaeus[53]. To another sophist, HIPPIAS of Elis, we owe\nthe doctrine of the \u2018self-sufficiency\u2019 of virtue, again adopted both\nby Cynics and Stoics[54]. ANTIPHON was not only the writer of an \u2018Art\nof Consolation,\u2019 but also of a treatise of extraordinary eloquence\non political concord and the importance of education. \u2018If a noble\ndisposition be planted in a young mind, it will engender a flower that\nwill endure to the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will it be\nwithered by drought[55].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Materialists.]\n\n=43.= Amongst the sophists of Athens was counted ANAXAGORAS, born\nat Clazomenae about 500 B.C., and a diligent student of the Ionic\nphilosophers. But in his explanation of nature he broke away from\n\u2018hylozoism\u2019 and introduced a dualism of mind and matter. \u2018From eternity\nall things were together, but Mind stirred and ordered them[56].\u2019 More\nfamous was his contemporary EMPEDOCLES of Agrigentum, whose name is still\nheld in honour by the citizens of that town. In him we first find the\nlist of elements reaching to four, earth, air, fire, and water; and the\ndoctrine that visible objects consist of combinations of the elements in\nvarying proportions, first brought together by Love, then separated by\nHatred. Just in so far as Empedocles abandoned the quest after a single\norigin for all things, his conceptions became fruitful as the basis of\nthe more limited study now known as Chemistry. His work was carried\nfurther by LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS, both of Abdera, who for the four\nelements substituted invisible atoms, of countless variety, moving by\nreason of their own weight in an empty space. This simple and powerful\nanalysis is capable of dealing effectively with many natural phenomena,\nand with comparatively slight alterations is still held to be valid in\nchemical analysis, and exercises a wide influence over the neighbouring\nsciences of physics and botany. When however (as has frequently been the\ncase both in ancient and modern times) the attempt is made to build upon\nit a general philosophical system, its failure to explain the cohesion\nof matter in masses, the growth of plants and animals, and the phenomena\nof mind, become painfully apparent. Such attempts roughly correspond\nto the attitude of mind now called _materialism_, because in them the\natoms, endowed with the material properties of solidity, shape, and\nweight alone, are conceived to be the only true existences, all others\nbeing secondary and derivative. This materialism (with some significant\nqualifications) was a century later the central doctrine of Epicurus, and\nis of importance to us by reason of its sharp contrast with the Stoic\nsystem of physics.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates.]\n\n=44.= The value of these scientific speculations was not for the time\nbeing fully recognised at Athens. It was in the atmosphere of sophistic\ndiscussion, not free from intellectual mists, but bracing to the exercise\nof civic and even of martial virtue that SOCRATES of Athens (circ.\n469-399 B.C.) grew to maturity. He set to his fellow-citizens an example\nof the vigorous performance of duty. As a soldier he was brave almost to\nrashness, and took an active part in three campaigns. As a magistrate\nhe discharged his duty unflinchingly. After the battle of Arginusae the\nten Athenian generals were said to have neglected the duty of succouring\ncertain disabled ships and the people loudly demanded that all should be\ncondemned to death by a single vote. Socrates was one of the presiding\nsenators, and he absolutely refused to concur in any such illegal\nprocedure[56a]. Again, when Athens was under the rule of the Thirty,\nSocrates firmly refused to obey their unjust orders[57]. But when himself\ncondemned to death, he refused to seize an opportunity for flight which\nwas given him; for this, he said, would be to disobey the laws of his\ncountry[58].\n\nHis private life was marked by a firm self-control. Athens was now\nwealthy, and its leading citizens frequently gathered together for\nfestive purposes. Socrates joined them, but showed the greatest\nmoderation in eating and drinking: such a course, he said, was the\nbetter for health and also produced more real pleasure. Over the grosser\ntemptations of the senses he had won a complete victory[59]. His temper\nwas calm and even; he was not put out by the violences of his wife, nor\ndid he allow himself to break out into rage with his slaves. His personal\nhabits, though simple, were careful: he did not approve any neglect\neither of bodily cleanliness or of neatness in dress.\n\nThus Socrates gave an example of a life of activity and self-control\n(\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2); and by his character, even more than by his\nspeculation, exercised an influence which extended widely over many\ncenturies.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His teaching.]\n\n=45.= The teaching of Socrates is not easily reduced to the set formulae\nof a philosophic school. But clearly it was focussed upon the life of men\nin the city and in the home, and was no longer chiefly concerned with the\nphenomena of the sky or the history of the creation of the universe. So\nCicero well says of him that \u2018Socrates called philosophy down from the\nheavens to earth, and introduced it into the houses and cities of men,\ncompelling men to enquire concerning life and morals and things good\nand evil[60]\u2019; and Seneca that he \u2018recalled the whole of philosophy to\nmoral questions, and said that the supreme wisdom was to distinguish\nbetween good and evil[61].\u2019 He had no higher object than to send out\nyoung men, of whose good disposition he was assured, to take an active\npart in the affairs of the community, and to this course he urged them\nindividually and insistently[62]. But it must not be supposed that he put\non one side problems concerned with the acquirement of truth, or with the\nconstitution and government of the universe. His views on these points\ncarried perhaps all the more weight because they were stated by him not\nas personal opinions, but as points upon which he desired to share the\nconvictions of his neighbours, if only they could assure him that reason\nwas on their side.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Reason the guide.]\n\n=46.= Socrates more than any other man possessed the art of persuasive\nreasoning, thereby making his companions wiser and better men. First he\nasked that terms should be carefully defined, so that each man should\nknow what the nature is of each thing that exists[63], and should examine\nhimself and know well of what he speaks. Next he introduced the practice\nof induction (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9), by which men make larger the outlook of\ntheir minds, understand one thing by comparison with another, and arrange\nthe matter of their thought by classes[64]. By induction we arrive at\ngeneral truths: not however by any mechanical or mathematical process,\nbut (at least in the higher matters) by the use of Divination, that is,\nby a kind of divine enlightenment[65]. He who has accustomed himself to\nthink with deliberation, to look on the little in its relation to the\ngreat, and to attune himself to the divine will, goes out into the world\nstrengthened in self-restraint, in argumentative power, and in active\ngoodwill to his fellow-men.\n\nMost directly this method appeals to the future statesman. Of those\nwho seek the society of Socrates many intend to become generals or\nmagistrates. Let them consider well what these words mean. Is not a pilot\none who knows how to steer a ship? a cook one who knows how to prepare\nfood? must we not then say that a statesman is one who knows how to guide\nthe state? And how can he know this but by study and training? Must we\nnot then say generally that all arts depend on knowledge, and knowledge\non study? Do we not reach the general truths that \u2018virtue is knowledge\u2019\nand that \u2018virtue can be taught\u2019? We may hesitate as to how to apply these\nprinciples to our individual actions, and Socrates will accuse none on\nthis point; but for himself he has a divine monitor which never fails\nto warn him when his mind is turned towards a course which the gods\ndisapprove.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His dualism in physics.]\n\n=47.= In the speculations of the Ionian philosophers Socrates could\nfind no satisfaction. But one day he discovered with pleasure the words\nof Anaxagoras: \u2018it is mind that orders the world and is cause of all\nthings[66].\u2019 Thus he was attracted to a dualistic view of the universe,\nin which matter and mind are in fundamental contrast. In the beginning\nthere existed a chaos of unordered dead meaningless matter, and also\nmind, the principle of life, meaning, and order. Mind touched matter,\nand the universe sprang into being. Mind controls matter, and thus the\nuniverse continues to exist. The proof is found in the providential\nadaptation of the world for the life and comfort of mankind: for it is\nonly consistent to suppose that things that exist for use are the work\nof mind[67]. He that made man gave him eyes to see with, ears to hear\nwith, and a mouth conveniently placed near to the organs of sight and\nsmell; he implanted in him a love of his offspring, and in the offspring\na love of its parents; and lastly endowed him with a soul capable of\nunderstanding and worshipping his maker. For the divine power Socrates\nuses quite indifferently the words \u2018god\u2019 and \u2018gods\u2019: but his belief is\nessentially monotheistic. In the gods of the city of Athens he has\nceased to believe, although he still makes sacrifices upon their altars\nin good-humoured conformity with the law, and even adopts the popular\nterm \u2018divination[68],\u2019 though in a sense very different to that in which\nthe official priesthood used it.\n\nIn the analysis of human nature Socrates adopts a similar dualism. Man\nconsists of body and soul: the soul is lord and king over the body, and\nindeed may rightly be called divine, if anything that has touch with\nhumanity is such[69].\n\n\n[Sidenote: His pietism.]\n\n=48.= The practical teaching of Socrates was entirely dominated by his\nreligious principles. The gods, he held, know all things, our words, our\ndeeds, and the secrets of our hearts: they are everywhere present and\ngive counsel to men concerning the whole of life[70]. The first duty of\nman is therefore to enter into communion with the gods by prayer, asking\nthem to give us the good and deliver us from the evil, but not qualifying\nthe prayer by any instruction to the gods as to what is good or evil; for\nthis the gods themselves know best[71]. In these words then we may pray:\n\u2018Zeus our king, give us what is good for us whether we ask for it or not;\nwhat is evil, even though we ask for it in prayer, keep far from us[72].\u2019\n\nIn this spirit of what we should to-day call \u2018pietism\u2019 we must interpret\nhis principle that \u2018virtue is knowledge[73].\u2019 This not only asserts that\nno one can rightly practise any art unless he has studied and understands\nit, but also that no one can rightly understand an art without practising\nit. We say that there are men who know what is good and right, but do not\nperform it; but this is not so; for such men in truth think that some\nother course is good for them. Only the wise and pious man has a right\nunderstanding; others cannot do good even if they try[74]; and when they\ndo evil, even that they do without willing it[75].\n\nIn its application to politics the teaching of Socrates came into\ncollision with the democratic sentiments prevalent at Athens. To say\nthe least, Socrates had no prejudice against the rule of kings. He\ndistinguished sharply between kingship and tyranny, saying that the rule\nof one man with the assent of his subjects and in accordance with the\nlaws was kingship, but without such assent and according to the man\u2019s\narbitrary will was tyranny. But under whatever constitutional form\ngovernment was carried on, Socrates asserted that those who knew the\nbusiness of government were alone the true rulers, and that the will of\nthe crowd, if conflicting with that of the wise, was both foolish and\nimpious[76].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Why Socrates was condemned.]\n\n=49.= So teaching and influencing men Socrates lived in Athens till\nhis seventieth year was past, and then died by the hands of the public\nexecutioner. This fate he might so easily have avoided that it seemed\nalmost to be self-chosen. His disciple Xenophon expresses amazement that\nthe jurors should have condemned a man so modest and so wise, and so\npractical a benefactor of the Athenian people[77]. Modern historians,\nwith a wider knowledge of human nature, wonder rather that Socrates\nwas allowed to live so long[78]. The accusers complained that Socrates\noffended by disbelieving in the gods of the city, introducing new\ndeities, and corrupting the youth of Athens. From the point of view\nof conservatively-minded Athenians, the charges were amply justified.\nClearly Socrates disbelieved, not merely in the official gods of the\ncity, but also in the deities it worshipped most earnestly, democracy\nand empire. Not only did he introduce new deities, but it might fairly\nbe argued that he was introducing the most essential parts of the\nreligion of the national enemy, Persia. Daily inculcating these heretical\ndoctrines upon young men of the highest families in Athens, he might well\nbe the cause that the Athenian state was less unquestioningly served\nthan before. That the heresies of Socrates were soundly founded on wide\nobservation and general truths could not be considered to make them less\ndangerous. Athens had already passed the time when its political power\ncould be of service to its neighbours; it had not reached that when it\ncould be content with intellectual influence; Socrates, just because he\nwas in harmony with the future of Athens, was a discordant element in its\npresent.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The companions of Socrates.]\n\n=50.= It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, that\nwe trace even in outline the positive teaching of Socrates. The severe\nself-repression with which he controlled his senses was exercised by\nhim no less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape\nof irony (\u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1), that is, the continual withholding of his personal\nconvictions, and obstetrics (\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae), the readiness to assist others\nin bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus he was a great educator\nrather than a great teacher. For whilst he held that virtue alone was\nworthy of investigation, and that virtue was essentially wisdom, he\nprofessed to be entirely at a loss where to find this wisdom for himself;\nhe left it to his pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus\nwhilst men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened\nto his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. Of the\nvarious suggestions which Socrates threw out, without committing himself\nto any one, his pupils took up each in turn and endeavoured to construct\nout of it a system[79]. These systems were in the sharpest possible\ncontrast one with another, but they have certain points in common. All\nthe teachers retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards\ntheir common master; each was convinced that he alone possessed the\nsecret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from the physical\nspeculations of which the ripe fruit was already being gathered in by\nthe Atomists. The portal of knowledge was to all of them the right use\nof the reasoning power; the shrine itself was the discipline of virtue,\nthe attainment of happiness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such\nwere the Socratic schools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply\ndivided into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century\nhad yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again\nestablished its importance.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Cynics.]\n\n=51.= Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to the Stoic\nsystem. Of these the Cynic school, founded by ANTISTHENES of Athens\n(circ. 440-365 B.C.) and developed by DIOGENES of Sinope, is its\nimmediate precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the\nmoral earnestness[80] and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates; and\nfor this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the master\u2019s favourite\npupil. The lives both of these men and of their successors were marked\nby simplicity and self-abnegation, and they devoted themselves with true\nmissionary zeal to the reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of\nthe figure of Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still\nlives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the\npicture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not without an\nelement of idealization and hero-worship) shews us the man as he appeared\nto his own disciples.\n\nThe breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was\ndisplayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the\ntrack of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many,\nbut the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82];\nand he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83].\nEqually offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which\ntreated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the\nglorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider\nthe civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it\nas the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return\nto a \u2018natural\u2019 life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage\nunspoilt by education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially\nappealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has\nbeen well described as \u2018the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek\nworld[85].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cynic intuitionism.]\n\n=52.= The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its\nattack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself.\nSocrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was\nequally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the\nexercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists;\nhorses they could see, but not \u2018horsiness.\u2019 In their ethics they held\nto the chief doctrines of Socrates, that \u2018virtue is knowledge,\u2019 \u2018virtue\ncan be taught\u2019 and \u2018no one willingly sins\u2019; and they laid special\nstress on the \u2018sufficiency\u2019 (\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1) of virtue, which to produce\nhappiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except\na Socratic strength of character (\u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03c2)[87]. But in reality\nthey identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with\nknowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific\ninvestigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical\nschool which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at\nthe present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all.\nIn practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that\nof \u2018liberty,\u2019 the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that\nwhich seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the\nconventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made\nat all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just\nor unjust, reckless or farseeing.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Limits of Cynism.]\n\n=53.= Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics; a doctrine which\nexercises a widespread influence because of its extreme simplicity,\nwhich is extraordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which\nit is appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothing\nis more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism; the Cynics\nwere virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. In their willing\nself-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the example set by Buddhist\nmonks, but they were probably much inferior to them in the appreciation\nof natural beauty and the simple pleasures of life. As compared with\ntheir master Socrates, they lacked his genial presence, literary taste,\nand kindly tolerance; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the\ntype of Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride in\ntheir country, their birth, and their literary studies[88].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Xenophon.]\n\n=54.= The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective use of\nliterature to disseminate their views; but in the works of XENOPHON of\nAthens (440-circ. 350 B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost\nexactly from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal friend\nof Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for intellectual\nsubtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military adventure, and his\ninterpretation of Socratic teaching entirely relieved him of any scruples\nwhich patriotism might have imposed upon him in this direction, leaving\nhim free at one time to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another\nto join with the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen.\nFrom adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of the\nexpedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took part in person)\nand of the life of Cyrus the Great have an interest which in no way\ndepends upon their accuracy. The account which he gives of Socrates in\nhis _Memorabilia_ (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) is not always to be depended upon; it\nis at the best a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher;\nbut it is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other\nsources, and is of special interest to us because of the great influence\nit exercised over Latin literature.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Cyrenaics.]\n\n=55.= In the opposite direction ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene shared the\nsympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt his moral earnestness\nor his zeal for the good of others. He refused altogether the earnest\nappeal of Socrates that he should take part in politics. \u2018It seems to\nme,\u2019 he says, \u2018to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do\nto find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with\nthis, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens with\nall that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts if he is\nnot successful.\u2019 Aristippus revolted altogether from the ascetic form in\nwhich the Cynics represented his master\u2019s teaching, and held that the\nwise man, by self-restraint and liberal training, attained to the truest\npleasure, and that such pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as\nhis followers were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of\nEpicurus; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage between\nStoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict between the Cynics\nand the Cyrenaics.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Megarians.]\n\n=56.= The school of EUCLIDES of Megara swerved suddenly from these\nethical interests and devoted itself mainly to the problems of dialectic.\nFrom the Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine\nof the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and which it\nidentified with the One God proclaimed by Xenophanes and his followers\nof the Eleatic school. To the Megaric school we are therefore chiefly\nindebted for the assertion of the philosophical principle of monism; the\nsame school drew the necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in\nany real sense existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived\nan interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly\noccupied with the solution of fallacies: amongst the followers of this\nschool we first meet with the puzzles of \u2018the heap\u2019 (_Sorites_), \u2018the\nliar\u2019 (_Pseudomenos_), and others upon which in later times Chrysippus\nand other Stoics sharpened their wits[89]. DIODORUS the Megarian set out\ncertain propositions with regard to the relation of the possible and the\nnecessary which are of critical importance in connexion with the problem\nof free-will[90]. Finally STILPO, who taught in Athens about 320 B.C.,\nand who made a violent attack upon Plato\u2019s theory of ideas, adopted\nan ethical standpoint not unlike that of the Cynics[91], and counted\namongst his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed amongst\nhis contemporaries a boundless reputation; princes and peoples vied in\ndoing him honour[92]; but we have scarcely any record of his teaching,\nand know him almost exclusively as one who contributed to form the mind\nof Zeno.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Advance of Philosophy.]\n\n=57.= With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not concerned;\nthe consideration of Plato and Aristotle and their respective followers\nwe must leave to another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow\nfrom being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is\ngathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of city and\nclass. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as regards its\nsubject-matter and its principles. But its range is now becoming better\ndefined, and in the period that is approaching we shall find determined\nattempts to reach a comprehensive solution of the problems presented to\nenquiring minds.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] \u2018Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the\nreligious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the\nWest\u2019 Lightfoot, _Philippians_, p. 274.\n\n[2] Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz\u2019 _Greek Thinkers_\n(transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam\u2019s\n_Religious teachers of Greece_ (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).\n\n[3] \u2018Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light\nfloats over it\u2019 Hom. _Od._ 6, 46 (Butcher and Lang\u2019s transl.). See also\nAdam, _Religious Teachers_, p. 31.\n\n[4] \u2018It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the\npurpose of Zeus\u2019 _Od._ 5, 103.\n\n[5] _Il._ 24, 308; _Od._ 14, 404.\n\n[6] _ib._ 6, 188.\n\n[7] _Od._ 8, 170.\n\n[8] _ib._ 4, 237.\n\n[9] _ib._ 20, 75.\n\n[10] _ib._ 14, 84.\n\n[11] _ib._ 17, 485.\n\n[12] See below, \u00a7 325.\n\n[13] So already Socrates understood it; Xen. _Mem._ i 3, 7.\n\n[14] Hesiod, _Works and Days_, 252-255; and see below, \u00a7 254.\n\n[15] _ib._ 289-292, quoted Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 20.\n\n[16] For instance, to Adam, _Religious Teachers_, Lect. V; Gomperz,\n_Greek Thinkers_, bk. i, ch. ii.\n\n[17] Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).\n\n[18] Adam, p. 114.\n\n[19] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, i pp. 46-48.\n\n[20] _ib._ 48-56.\n\n[21] _ib._ 56-59.\n\n[22] The terms \u2018monism\u2019 and \u2018dualism\u2019 have recently become the watchwords\nof opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In\nthis book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are\nnot necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and\nmatter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible;\nso far we are all \u2018dualists.\u2019 Yet as soon as we fix our attention on\nthese contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some\nkind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers\ntend to become \u2018monists.\u2019 Similarly the broad monistic principle \u2018all\nthings are one\u2019 is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in\ndualistic language.\n\n[23] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 71, 195.\n\n[24] Gomperz, i 127.\n\n[25] This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p.\n204.\n\n[26] Xen. apud Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiii 13.\n\n[27] Xenophanes apud Sext. _math._ ix 193.\n\n[28] Id. apud Arist. _Rhet._ ii 23.\n\n[29] On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.\n\n[30] \u2018Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have\nwit\u2019 Heracl. _Fr._ 4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).\n\n[31] \u2018Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and\nPythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus\u2019 _Fr._ 16 B, 40 D.\n\n[32] \u2018The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private\nunderstanding\u2019 _Fr._ 92 B, 2 D.\n\n[33] \u2018All things move and nothing remains\u2019 Plato _Crat._ 402 A.\n\n[34] \u2018Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess\nthat all things are one\u2019 _Fr._ 1 B, 50 D.\n\n[35] \u2018All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with\ngoods and goods with gold\u2019 _Fr._ 22 B, 90 D; \u2018neither God nor man created\nthis World-order (\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), which is the same for all beings: but it has\nbeen and shall be an ever-living fire\u2019 _Fr._ 20 B, 30 D.\n\n[36] \u2018The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them\u2019\n_Fr._ 26 B, 66 D.\n\n[37] \u2018Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we\ndie, our souls revive and live\u2019 Sext. _Pyrrh. inst._, iii 230 (_Fr._ 78\nB, 88 D).\n\n[38] \u2018This Word is always existent\u2019 _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D.\n\n[39] _ib._\n\n[40] \u2018There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all\nthings are steered through all\u2019 _Fr._ 19 B, 41 D.\n\n[41] \u2018Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at\nfirst even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what\nthey do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when\nasleep\u2019 _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D.\n\n[42] _Fr._ 91 B, 114 D.\n\n[43] Adam, pp. 217-222.\n\n[44] Gomperz, i p. 63.\n\n[45] See Gladisch, _Herakleitos und Zoroaster_; Ueberweg, _Grundriss_, p.\n39; above, \u00a7 13.\n\n[45a] Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus\nand Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).\n\n[45b] Clem. _Strom._ i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65,\n75).\n\n[46] _Agam._ 155-161, 167-171.\n\n[47] Gomperz, ii p. 13.\n\n[48] \u2018Half professor and half journalist\u2014this is the best formula that we\ncan devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th century B.C.\u2019 Gomperz,\ni p. 414.\n\n[49] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 124, 130, and 131.\n\n[50] Gomperz, i p. 428.\n\n[51] Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 21 to 34.\n\n[52] Gomperz, i p. 430.\n\n[53] See below, \u00a7 89.\n\n[54] Gomperz, i p. 433.\n\n[55] _ib._ p. 437.\n\n[56] Arist. _Phys._ viii 1; and see below, \u00a7 173.\n\n[56a] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 18.\n\n[57] Plato, _Apol._ p. 32.\n\n[58] Plato, _Crito_, p. 44 sqq.\n\n[59] Gomperz, ii p. 48.\n\n[60] Cic. _Ac._ i 4, 15; _Tusc. disp._ v 4, 10.\n\n[61] Sen. _Ep._ 71, 7.\n\n[62] Xen. _Mem._ iii 7.\n\n[63] Xen. _Mem._ iv 6, 1; Epict. _Disc._ i 7, 11.\n\n[64] Xen. _Mem._ iv 5, 12; Arist. _Met._ xiii 4.\n\n[65] Xen. _Mem._ iv 7, 10. The Socratic \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae must not be taken too\nseriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining\nthe process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term \u2018genius\u2019 in\nconnexion with achievements in poetry and art.\n\n[66] Plato, _Phaedo_, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a\nreal reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that\nSocrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.\n\n[67] Xen. _Mem._ i 4, 4.\n\n[68] _ib._ i 4, 2.\n\n[69] _ib._ i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 18.\n\n[70] _ib._ i 1, 19.\n\n[71] _ib._\n\n[72] Plato, _Alc._ ii 143 A.\n\n[73] Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 4 and 5.\n\n[74] _ib._\n\n[75] \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9; see Plato _Prot._ p. 345 D, _Apol._ p. 25,\nXen. _Mem._ iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil\nfor any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.\n\n[76] In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the\nreligious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself\nin agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical.\nIt should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his\npositive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or\n\u2018divinations.\u2019\n\n[77] _Mem._ i 1, 1.\n\n[78] Grote, _History of Greece_, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very\ndramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school;\n_Greek Thinkers_, ii pp. 94-97.\n\n[79] \u2018ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis\ndisputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat\u2019 Cic. _de Orat._ iii 16, 61.\n\n[80] \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 [\u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1f7c\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1f72\u03c2 \u03b6\u03b7\u03bb\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 Diog. L.\nvi 2.\n\n[81] \u2018Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens\u2019\nCic. _N. D._ i 13, 32.\n\n[82] \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 [\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd] \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03be \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Clem. Alex. _Protrept._ p.\n46 C.\n\n[83] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22, 91.\n\n[84] See below, \u00a7 303.\n\n[85] Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to G\u00f6ttling\u2019s book, _Diogenes der\nCyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats_ (Halle 1851).\n\n[86] \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Diog. L.\nvi 103.\n\n[87] _ib._ vi 11.\n\n[88] See Plato, _Theaet._ 155 E, _Soph._ 251 B; Aristotle, _Met._ vii 3,\n7.\n\n[89] See below, \u00a7 163.\n\n[90] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 220 and 221.\n\n[91] \u2018hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens\nvincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 9, 3.\n\n[92] Gomperz, ii p. 196.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Political changes of the 4th century.]\n\n=58.= Before a hundred years had passed since the death of Socrates,\nthe face of the Greek world had been completely changed. Athens,\nLacedaemon, Corinth, Thebes, which had been great powers, had sunk into\ncomparative insignificance; their preeminence was gone, and even of\ntheir independence but little remained. Throughout Greece proper the\nMacedonian was master. But if the old-fashioned politician suffered a\nbitter disappointment, and the adherents of the old polytheism despaired\nof the future, there was rich compensation for the young and the hopeful.\nPetty wars between neighbouring cities, with their wearisome refrain\n\u2018and the men they killed, and the women and children they enslaved[1],\u2019\nbegan to be less common; internal and still more murderous strife between\nbigoted oligarchs or democrats began to be checked from without. For\nthe enlightened Greek a new world of enterprise had been opened up in\nthe East. Alexander the Great had not only conquered Asia Minor, and\nestablished everywhere the Greek language and a Greek bureaucracy; he\nhad opened the way to the far East, and pointed out India and even China\nas fields for the merchant and the colonizer. His work had been partly\nfrustrated by the disorders that followed his death; but if achievement\nwas thus hindered, hopes were not so quickly extinguished. These new\nhopes were not likely to be accompanied by any lasting regrets for the\ndisappearance of ancient systems of government now regarded as effete\nor ridiculous, or of inherited mythologies which were at every point in\nconflict with the moral sense[2].\n\n\n[Sidenote: East and West.]\n\n=59.= The same historic events which opened the East to Hellenic\nadventurers also made the way into Europe easy for the Oriental. As\nthe soldier and the administrator travelled eastward, so the merchant\nand the philosopher pushed his way to the West. Not merely in Persia\nhad ancient superstitions been swept away by reforming zeal; the Jews\nwere now spreading from town to town the enthusiasm of a universalized\nreligion which was ridding itself of bloody sacrifices; and, for the time\nat least, the humane philosophy of the Buddha was dominant in India, was\nbeing preached far and wide by self-sacrificing monks, and was inspiring\nthe policy of great monarchies. We find it hard to picture the clashing\nof ideals, enthusiasms, and ambitions which was at this time taking place\nin all the great cities of the old world; but it is certain that in the\nuniversal excitement the old distinctions of Greek and barbarian, Jew and\nGentile, rich and poor, free and slave, man and woman were everywhere\nbecoming weakened, and community of thought and temperament were\nbeginning to reunite on a new basis individuals who had broken loose from\nthe ties of ancient society.\n\n\n[Sidenote: New schools of philosophy.]\n\n=60.= During this fourth century B.C. the foundations were laid of the\nfour philosophical schools which were destined to vie one with another\nfor the allegiance of the Roman world. The Socratic schools which we have\nalready mentioned, those of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, did not perhaps\naltogether die out; in particular the Cynic missionaries appear to have\nbeen a social force until the second century B.C. But their intellectual\nbasis was too narrow to admit of their effective transplantation to\nnew soil. At the end of the century each gave place to a new school,\nwhich preserved the central doctrines of its predecessor. The Socratic\nparadoxes were handed on from the Cynics to the Stoics; the doctrine that\npleasure is the good was accepted by Epicurus. Stoics and Epicureans\ndisputed with a bitterness as yet unequalled, finding themselves just\nas much opposed upon the subjects of logic and physics, which they\nintroduced anew into popular philosophy, as upon the questions of ethics\non which their antipathies were inherited. Between them stood two schools\nwhich had meanwhile established themselves. Plato, himself a companion of\nSocrates, founded the Academy at Athens about 380 B.C.; and if he did not\nimpress his own teaching upon it with absolute fixity, still the school\nflourished under a succession of leaders, always proud of the fame of\nits founder, and rendering him at least a nominal allegiance. From the\nAcademy branched off the school of the Peripatetics, founded by Plato\u2019s\npupil Aristotle about 350 B.C. After Aristotle\u2019s death this school\ngravitated towards the Academics, and in later centuries there seemed\nlittle difference, if any, between the two. If Stoicism may be called\nthe child of Cynism, it largely drew nourishment from these two schools\nand their founders. Some account of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle\nis therefore needed here, partly because of the great importance of both\nin the general history of philosophy, partly because of their direct\ninfluence upon the subject of this book. On account of the much greater\nprominence of the Academy in the later history we shall often use this\nterm to refer to the general teaching of the two allied schools.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Plato.]\n\n=61.= Of all the companions of Socrates far the most famous is PLATO of\nAthens (427-347 B.C.), the founder of the philosophical association known\nas the \u2018Academy.\u2019 In the general judgment of lovers of Greek letters he\nstands out not merely as a great master of Attic prose style, but also\nas the ablest exponent of the true mind of Socrates[3], and the most\nbrilliant light of Greek philosophy[4]. On the first point this judgment\nstands unchallenged; for delicate and good-natured wit, felicity of\nillustration and suggestiveness of thought the Platonic dialogues are\nunrivalled. But it is only in his earlier writings that we can accept\nPlato as a representative of Socrates; after the death of his master he\ntravelled for many years in Egypt, Lower Italy, and Sicily, and absorbed\nin particular much of the teaching of the Pythagoreans. The theory\nof \u2018ideas,\u2019 the special characteristic of Plato\u2019s later work, is not\nstrictly Socratic. Neither, we must add, is it of first-rate importance\nin the history of human thought; from our point of view it lies apart\nfrom the main current both of speculation and of practice. It was a\nstill-born theory, not accepted even by Plato\u2019s successors in the control\nof the Academy[5]. We are therefore very little concerned with the direct\nteaching of Plato; but all the more readily it should be acknowledged\nthat the Stoics were often indebted to him for help in the treatment of\nimportant details, and that the Platonic attitude remained for them a\nfactor of which they needed continuously to take account.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Plato\u2019s realism.]\n\n=62.= A striking feature of the Platonic dialogues is that their results\nare usually negative. First the opinions of the crowd, then those of\nSocrates\u2019 contemporaries the \u2018sophists\u2019 and of the other Socratic schools\nare subjected to a cross-examination, under which they are one and\nall shewn to be unreasonable. This cross-examination is quite in the\nSocratic spirit, and is before all things a mental gymnastic, training\nthe dialectician to observe with keener eye and to discuss with apter\ntongue than his fellows. Gradually there emerges from a mass of doubts\nsomething like a positive theory that Plato is prepared to adopt. The\ntrue reasoning is that of induction from the particular to the general,\nfrom the individual to the class. In the class name we come upon the true\nbeing of the individual, and by a right definition of it we discern what\neach thing really is. The \u2018idea,\u2019 which corresponds to the class name,\nis alone really existent; the individual is a more or less imperfect\nimitation of it (\u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this way Plato found what seemed to him a\nsolution of a difficulty which Socrates hardly felt, that of explaining\nthe participation (\u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) of the particular in the general (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nor \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1). Thus where ordinary men see \u2018horses,\u2019 and Antisthenes holds\nthat they are right, Plato sees \u2018horsiness,\u2019 or the idea of \u2018horse.\u2019 In\nthe language of medieval philosophy Plato is a _realist_, that is, one\nwho holds that our Ideas are more than what men mean when they say \u2018mere\nideas\u2019; that they are Realities, and have their being in a truly existing\nworld; and that in knowing them we know what _is_. But just as Plato\nholds that general conceptions are alone true and real, so he necessarily\nmaintains that objects perceivable by the senses are only half-real, and\nthat the ordinary man lives in a world of illusions. Thus the thoughts\nof the philosopher are separated by an abyss from the world in which men\nlive and die.\n\n\n[Sidenote: God and the soul.]\n\n=63.= Upon the basis of the individual \u2018ideas\u2019 Plato builds up by a\nprocess of classification and induction higher and smaller classes of\nideas, until we begin to see the vision of a single idea, a class which\nincludes all classes, a supreme \u2018being\u2019 from which all being is derived.\nThis highest idea is variously suggested by the names \u2018the Good,\u2019 \u2018the\nBeautiful,\u2019 \u2018the One.\u2019 By a sudden transformation it becomes the Creator\n(\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2) of the universe. Containing in itself all being, it needs\nfor its operation some kind of formless and inert matter; for this the\nname \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u2018the unlimited,\u2019 is taken from Anaximander. The whole\ncreated universe may be considered as the joint production of the \u2018idea\u2019\nand the \u2018unlimited\u2019; and the cosmology of Anaxagoras, \u2018all things were\ntogether, and mind came and ordered them,\u2019 is substantially justified.\nThe world thus created is both good and beautiful, for it is made by a\ngood Creator on the best of patterns.\n\nThe human soul is of triple nature. The highest part, the rational soul\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd), is seated in the head; the emotional soul (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03c2)\nin the heart; the appetitive soul (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd) in the belly. Over\nthese two lower souls the reasoning part should hold control, as a driver\nover two unruly steeds[6]. The rational soul has existed before birth,\nand may hope for immortality, for it is knit up with the idea of \u2018being.\u2019\nUltimately it may even attain to perfection, if it is purified as by\nfire from baser elements that have attached themselves to it.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]\n\n=64.= Plato himself does not formulate an ethical ideal of the same\nprecision that his successors used, but we infer from his works a goal\ntowards which he points. Thus the ethical end for each man is the\ngreatest possible participation in the idea of the good, the closest\nattainable imitation of the deity. The virtue of each part of the\nhuman soul lies in the fit performance of its proper work; that of\nthe reasoning soul is Wisdom (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1); of the emotional soul Courage\n(\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1); of the appetitive soul Soberness (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7). Over all (it\nis hinted rather than stated) rules the supreme virtue of Justice\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7), assigning to each part its proper function. Thus the\nfour cardinal virtues are deduced as a practical application from the\nPlatonic psychology. The high position assigned to Justice leads up to\nthe practical doctrine of Moderation (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2); even the virtues are\nrestricted both in their intensity and in their spheres of work, and if\nany virtue passes its proper limit it becomes changed into the vice that\nborders on it. Thus the ideal of practical life is the \u2018moderate man,\u2019\ncalm, considerate, and self-respecting, touched with a warm flow of\nfeeling, but never carried away into excitement; and even this ideal is\nstrictly subordinate to that of the life of philosophic contemplation.\n\nThe ideal State is modelled on the individual man. To the three parts of\nthe soul correspond three classes of citizens; the rulers, whose virtue\nis Wisdom; the guardians, on whom Courage is incumbent; the labourers and\ntradesmen, who owe the State Soberness and obedience. Thus the political\nsystem to which Plato leans is that of an Aristocracy; for the middle\nclass in his state has only an executive part in the government, and the\nlower orders are entirely excluded from it.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Aristotle.]\n\n=65.= By far the greatest of Plato\u2019s pupils was ARISTOTLE of Stagira\n(384-322 B.C.), who introduced into philosophy, now convulsed by the\ndisputes of the disciples of Socrates, a spirit of reconciliation. From\nhis point of view the various contentions are not so much erroneous as\ndefective. To attain the truth we need first to collect the various\nopinions that are commonly held, and then to seek the reconciling formula\nof which each one is a partial statement.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ten categories.]\n\n=66.= In his investigation Aristotle did not altogether break with\nPlato\u2019s theory of ideas, but brought them from a transcendental world\ninto touch with common life. He held fast to the method of induction\n(\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae) from the particular to the general, and agreed that we\nreach the true nature of each thing when we have determined the\nclass-conception. But the class-conception or idea (\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1), though the\nmost real existence, does not exist independently, but only in and\nthrough the particulars, which compose the class. Having thus come to\nsee that there are gradations of existence, we need to inquire what\nthese are; and to classify the various kinds of judgment with regard to\nwhich we inquire whether they are true or false. Now by observation we\nfind that judgments or predications have ten different shapes, to which\ntherefore there must correspond ten kinds of existence. These are the\nwell-known \u2018categories\u2019 of Aristotle, and are as follows:\n\n     (i) \u2018substance,\u2019 as when we say \u2018this is a man,\u2019 \u2018a horse\u2019;\n    (ii) \u2018quantity,\u2019 as that he is \u2018six feet high\u2019;\n   (iii) \u2018quality,\u2019 as \u2018a grammarian\u2019;\n    (iv) \u2018relation,\u2019 as \u2018twice as much\u2019;\n     (v) \u2018place,\u2019 as \u2018at Athens\u2019;\n    (vi) \u2018time,\u2019 as \u2018last year\u2019;\n   (vii) \u2018position,\u2019 as \u2018lying down\u2019;\n  (viii) \u2018possession,\u2019 as \u2018with a sword\u2019;\n    (ix) \u2018action,\u2019 as \u2018cuts\u2019; and\n     (x) \u2018passion,\u2019 as \u2018is cut\u2019 or \u2018is burned.\u2019\n\nAristotle thus reinstates the credit of the common man; he it is who\npossesses the substance of truth and gives it habitual expression by\nspeech, even roughly indicating the various kinds of existence by\ndifferent forms of words. It is now indicated that a study of grammar is\nrequired as the foundation of logic.\n\nAristotle also greatly advanced the study of that kind of reasoning which\nproceeds from the general to the particular, and which is best expressed\nin terms of the \u2018syllogism\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2), of which he defined the\nvarious forms.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The four causes.]\n\n=67.= In the study of physics Aristotle picks up the thread which\nSocrates had dropped deliberately, that is, the teaching of the Ionic\nphilosophers. Either directly from Empedocles, or from a _consensus_ of\nopinion now fairly established, he accepted the doctrine of the four\nelements (\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1), earth, water, air, and fire; but to these he added a\nfifth (\u03c0\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, _quinta essentia_), the aether, which fills the\ncelestial spaces. Behind this analysis lies the more important problem\nof cosmology, the question how this world comes to be. Collecting once\nmore the opinions commonly held, Aristotle concludes that four questions\nare usually asked, and that in them the search is being made for four\n\u2018causes,\u2019 which will solve the respective questions. The four causes are:\n\n    (i) the Creator, or \u2018efficient cause,\u2019 answering the question;\u2014Who\n          made the world?\n   (ii) the Substance, or \u2018material cause\u2019;\u2014of what did he make it?\n  (iii) the Plan, or \u2018modal cause\u2019;\u2014according to what design?\n   (iv) the End, or \u2018final cause\u2019;\u2014for what purpose?[7]\n\nReviewing these \u2018causes\u2019 Aristotle concludes that the first, third, and\nfourth are ultimately one, the Creator containing in his own nature\nboth the plan and the purpose of his work[8]. The solution is therefore\ndualistic, and agrees substantially with that of Plato; the ultimate\nexistences are (i) an informing power, and (ii) matter that has the\npotentiality of accepting form.\n\nIn consequence of this dualism of Aristotle the term \u2018matter\u2019 (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7,\n_materia_) has ever since possessed associations which did not belong to\nit in the time of the hylozoists. Matter now begins to suggest something\nlifeless, inert, and unintelligent; and to be sharply contrasted not\nonly with such conceptions as \u2018God\u2019 and \u2018mind,\u2019 but also with motion and\nforce. For this reason the Stoics in reintroducing monism preferred a new\nterm, as we shall see below[9].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The microcosm.]\n\n=68.= What God is to the universe, that the soul is to the body, which\nis a \u2018little universe[10].\u2019 But the reasoning part of the soul only is\nentirely distinct; this is of divine nature, and has entered the body\nfrom without; it is at once its formative principle, its plan, and its\nend. The lower parts of the soul are knit up with the body, and must\nperish with it. So far Aristotle\u2019s teaching differs little from that of\nPlato; but a new point of view is introduced when he speaks of the soul\nas subject to \u2018diseases\u2019 (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), and thus assigns to the practical\nphilosopher a social function as the comrade of the physician. Amongst\nthe diseases he specially names Pity and Fear, which assail the emotional\npart of the soul. Their cure is found in \u2018purging\u2019 (\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), that\nis to say in their complete expulsion from the soul, as reason and\ncircumstances may require; but Aristotle by no means considers that the\nanalogy between body and soul is complete, or that the emotions should\nalways be regarded as injurious[11].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]\n\n=69.= In setting forth an ideal for human activity Aristotle conceives\nthat other philosophers have differed more in words than in substance,\nand he hopes to reconcile them through the new term \u2018blessedness\u2019\n(\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1). This blessedness is attained when the soul is actively\nemployed in a virtuous way, and when it is so circumstanced that it\ncommands the instruments of such action, that is, in a life which is\nadequately furnished. On such activity pleasure must assuredly attend,\nand it is therefore needless to seek it of set purpose. Further, virtue\nappears personified in the \u2018true gentleman\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2), who ever\navoids vicious extremes, and finds his highest satisfaction in pure\ncontemplation, just as the Creator himself lives to contemplate the world\nhe has produced[12].\n\nIn politics Aristotle can find ground for approving in turn of monarchy,\noligarchy, and democracy, according to the circumstances of each state.\nWe cannot however but feel that his sympathies point most towards\nmonarchy, and that his personal association with Alexander the Great was\nin full harmony with his inmost convictions. As a means of government he\nadvocates before all things the education of the young.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Social prepossessions.]\n\n=70.= The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, comprehensive in their\nrange, brilliant and varied in their colouring, nevertheless appeal\neffectively only to a limited circle. Socrates had been the companion\nof rich and poor alike; Plato and Aristotle addressed themselves to\nmen of wealth, position, and taste. Their sympathies appear clearly in\ntheir political systems, in which the sovereign or the aristocracy is\nconsidered fit to play a part, whilst the many are practically excluded\nfrom the commonwealth, sometimes as a harmless flock which needs kindly\nshepherding, and at other times as a dangerous crowd which must be\ndeceived or enslaved for its own good. These prepossessions, which we\nshall find reappearing within the Stoic system, appear to weaken the\npractical forcefulness of both philosophies. In the ideal character\nthe Socratic \u2018force\u2019 has disappeared, and \u2018self-restraint\u2019 alone is\nthe standard of virtue; the just man moves quietly and conventionally\nthrough life, perhaps escaping blame, but hardly achieving distinction.\nIn resuming the study of ontology, which Socrates had treated as a \u2018mist\nfrom Ionia,\u2019 bright fancies had been elaborated rather than dominating\nconceptions; the deity of Aristotle seems but a faint reflex of the\ngod of Socrates and the Cynics, and neither the \u2018idea\u2019 of Plato or the\n\u2018matter\u2019 of Aristotle is so well fitted for the world\u2019s hard work as the\natoms of Leucippus and Democritus. The teachers who succeeded to the\ncontrol of the two schools inclined more and more to engross themselves\nin special studies, and to leave on one side the great controversial\nproblems.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Academics.]\n\n=71.= The followers of Plato were known as the \u2018Academics\u2019: amongst them\nwe must distinguish between the members of the \u2018old Academy,\u2019 as Cicero\nterms them[13], and those who followed the innovations of Arcesilaus.\nThe old Academy chiefly developed the ethical side of Plato\u2019s teaching,\nfinding that the path of virtue is indicated by the natural capacities\nof the individual. Thus XENOCRATES of Chalcedon (396-314 B.C.) taught\nthat each man\u2019s happiness resulted from the virtue proper to him (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae)[14]; whilst POLEMO of Athens (head of the school 314-270 B.C.)\nis said by Cicero to have defined it as consisting in \u2018virtuous living,\naided by those advantages to which nature first draws us,\u2019 thereby\npractically adopting the standard of Aristotle[15]. The teaching of\nPolemo had a direct influence upon that of Zeno the founder of Stoicism.\n\nBut with the first successes of Stoicism the Academy revived its\ndialectical position, in strong opposition to the dogmatism of the\nnew school. ARCESILAUS of Pitane in Aeolia (315-240 B.C.) revived the\nSocratic cross-examination, always opposing himself to any theory that\nmight be propounded to him, and drawing the conclusion that truth\ncould never be certainly known[16]. Life must therefore be guided by\nconsiderations of probability, and the ethical standard is that \u2018of\nwhich a reasonable defence may be made[17].\u2019 This sceptical attitude\nwas carried still further by CARNEADES of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), whose\nacute criticism told upon the Stoic leaders of his time, and forced them\nto abandon some of their most important positions. From this time a\nreconciliation between the two schools set in[18].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Peripatetics.]\n\n=72.= The members of the Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle are of\nless importance to us. The Romans found little difference between their\nteaching and that of the earlier Academy. Cicero mentions that the\nStoic Panaetius was a keen student of two of the pupils of Aristotle,\nTHEOPHRASTUS (his successor as head of the Peripatetic school) and\nDICAEARCHUS[19]; amongst later teachers in whose views he is interested\nhe names HIERONYMUS, who held that the supreme good was freedom from\npain[20]; CALLIPHO, who combined virtue with pleasure, and DIODORUS who\ncombined it with freedom from pain[21]; and amongst his contemporaries\nSTASEAS of Naples, who stated the same doctrines in a slightly different\nform[22], and CRATIPPUS, whom he selected as a teacher for his own\nson[23]. It was a common complaint of these teachers that the Stoics\nhad stolen their doctrines wholesale, and (as is the way with thieves)\nhad altered the names only[24]. All these writers however agree in\ndenying the doctrine which Zeno accepted from the Cynics that \u2018virtue is\nsufficient for happiness,\u2019 and lay stress upon the supply of external\ngoods (\u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03af\u03b1) as needed to admit of the active exercise of virtue. They\nwere diligent students of the written works of their founder, and thus\nopened the way for the work of erudition and interpretation which found\nits centre in Alexandria in a later period.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno.]\n\n=73.= Amidst the conflict of these schools ZENO grew up. Born in Citium\non the island of Cyprus in 336 B.C., in the same year in which Alexander\nbecame king of Macedon, he heard as a boy of the Greek conquest of\nthe East, and was only 13 years of age when its course was checked by\nthe death of Alexander. Of the town of Citium the inhabitants were\npartly Greek, partly Phoenician; and Zeno, whether or not he was of\nPhoenician blood, certainly derived from his environment something of\nthe character of the enterprising and much-travelled Phoenician nation,\nand imparted this trait to the school which he founded. He was nicknamed\nby his contemporaries \u2018the Phoenician,\u2019 and the title clung to his\nfollowers[25]. His father was a merchant of purple, and often travelled\nin the one direction to Tyre and Sidon, in the other as far as Athens,\nwhence he brought back a number of \u2018Socratic books,\u2019 which were eagerly\nread by the young Zeno, and in time attracted him to the famous Greek\ncity[26]. We may presume that when he first came to Athens he intended\nto carry further his studies without abandoning his calling; but when\nnews reached him of the wreck of the ship which carried all his goods,\nhe welcomed it as a call to devote himself entirely to philosophy[27].\nHis first step in Athens was to seek out the man who best represented the\ncharacter of Socrates, as represented in Xenophon\u2019s Memoirs; and it is\nsaid that a bookseller accordingly pointed him to CRATES of Thebes[28],\nthe pupil and (it would seem) the successor of Diogenes as acknowledged\nhead of the Cynic school.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno joins the Cynics.]\n\n=74.= Our authorities busy themselves chiefly with narrating the\neccentricities of Crates, who wore warm clothing in summer and rags in\nwinter, entered the theatre as the audience were coming out, and drank\nwater instead of wine. But doubtless, like his predecessors in the Cynic\nschool, he was a man of the true Socratic character, who had trained\nhimself to bear hunger and thirst, heat and cold, flattery and abuse.\nHis life and wisdom won him the love of the high-born Hipparchia, who\nturned from her wealthy and noble suitors, choosing instead the poverty\nof Crates, who had abandoned all his possessions. In his company she went\nfrom house to house, knocking at all doors in turn, sometimes admonishing\nthe inmates of their sins, sometimes sharing with them their meals[29].\nIn such a life Zeno recognised the forcefulness of Socrates, and in the\ndogmas of the Cynic school he reached the foundation on which that life\nwas built. From that foundation neither Zeno nor his true followers ever\ndeparted, and thus Stoicism embodied and spread the fundamental dogmas of\nCynism, that the individual alone is really existent, that virtue is the\nsupreme good, and that the wise man, though a beggar, is truly a king.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno\u2019s Republic.]\n\n=75.= Whilst still an adherent of the Cynic school[30], Zeno wrote his\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 or _Republic_, which is evidently an attack on Plato\u2019s work\nwith the same title[31]. If this work does not reveal to us the fully\ndeveloped philosopher, it at least shews us better than any other\nevidence what the man Zeno was. His ideal was the establishment of a\nperfect State, a completion of the work in which Alexander had failed;\nand he found a starting-point in a treatise by Antisthenes on the same\nsubject. The ideal State must embrace the whole world, so that a man no\nlonger says, \u2018I am of Athens,\u2019 or \u2018of Sidon,\u2019 but \u2018I am a citizen of the\nworld[32].\u2019 Its laws must be those which are prescribed by nature, not\nby convention. It will have no images or temples, for these are unworthy\nof the nature of the deity; no sacrifices, because he cannot be pleased\nby costly gifts; no law-courts, for its citizens will do one another\nno harm; no statues, for the virtues of its inhabitants will be its\nadornment[33]; no gymnasia, for its youth must not waste their time in\nidle exercises[34].\n\nThe people will not be divided into classes (and here Plato\u2019s _Republic_\nis contradicted), for all alike will be wise men[35]; nor will men and\nwomen be clothed differently, or shamefacedly hide any part of their\nbodies[36]. No man will speak of a woman as his property, for women will\nbelong to the community only[37]. As for the dead, men will not trouble\nwhether they bury them (as the Greeks), burn them (as the Indians), or\ngive them to the birds (as the Persians); for it matters not at all what\nhappens to men\u2019s dead bodies[38], but whether their souls shall reach\nthe abodes of the blest, or need hereafter to be purged by fire from\nthe foulness they have contracted through contact with the body[39]. To\nconclude, Love shall be master throughout the State, being as it were a\nGod cooperating for the good of the whole[40]; and the wise man shall be\na citizen in it, not a missionary, and shall be surrounded with wife and\nchildren[41].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno seeks knowledge.]\n\n=76.= Zeno, after writing his _Republic_, took up a position more\nindependent of the Cynics. He could not, perhaps, avoid noticing that\nthe coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the narrowmindedness of\nthe philosophers, their disagreement one with another, and their lack\nof clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of\ndialectics and physics was of more importance than his Cynic teachers\nwould allow; and he seems to have conceived the idea of uniting the\nSocratic schools. He became eager to learn from all sources, and turned\nfirst to Stilpo, who then represented the Megarian school[42]. Crates,\nwe are told, tried to drag him back from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno\nretorted that argument would be more to the point[43]. From this time he\nno longer restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also\nfor argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations\nof his state must be surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion,\nbut on the rock of knowledge. That a wise man should hesitate, change his\nviews, withdraw his advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach[44]. If\nindeed virtue, the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that\nknowledge is within the reach of man?\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno\u2019s theory of knowledge.]\n\n=77.= The chief cause of error, Zeno found, lay in hasty assertion; and\nthis he held was a fault not so much of the intellect as of the will. In\nthe simplest case the senses present to the mind a \u2018picture\u2019 (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,\n_visum_), carrying with it the suggestion of a statement (e.g. \u2018that is a\nhorse\u2019). But it is for the man to consider well whether this suggestion\nis true, and only to give his \u2018assent\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _adsensus_) when\nhe is so assured. Assent is an act of the will, and therefore in our\npower. Of a picture to which he has given his assent the wise man should\nretain a firm hold; it then becomes an item of \u2018comprehension\u2019 (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, _comprehensio_), and may be stored in the memory, thus\npreparing the way for further acquisitions of knowledge, which in the end\ncombine in \u2018scientific knowledge\u2019 (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, _scientia_).\n\nThis theory is little more than an exhortation against the prevailing\nerror of hasty thought (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1, _opinio_); but it made a very deep\nimpression, especially as enforced by Zeno\u2019s gestures. He stretched out\nhis fingers and shewed the open palm, saying \u2018Such is a picture.\u2019 He\npartially contracted his fingers, and said \u2018This is assent.\u2019 Making a\nclosed fist, he said \u2018This is comprehension.\u2019 Then closing in the left\nhand over the right he pressed his fist tight, and said \u2018This is science,\nand only the wise man can attain to it[45].\u2019\n\nWe have no reason to suppose that this theory was in any way suggested\nby Stilpo, from whom however Zeno probably learnt to attach importance\nto the formal part of reasoning, such as \u2018definition\u2019 and the use of the\nsyllogism. With Stilpo he shared an aversion to the Platonic theory of\nideas, maintaining that ideas are by no means realities but have only\na \u2018kind of existence\u2019 in our minds, or (as we should call it to-day) a\n\u2018subjective existence[46].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno studies under Polemo.]\n\n=78.= In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we may imagine,\nentered a new world. He left behind the rough manners, the stinging\nretorts, and the narrow culture of the Cynics and Eristics[47], to sit\nwith other intelligent students[48] at the feet of a man of cultured\nmanners[49] and wide reading, who to a love for Homer and Sophocles[50]\nhad, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge of the works of Plato\nand Aristotle, was himself a great writer[51], and yet consistently\ntaught that not learning, but a natural and healthy life was the end to\nbe attained. That Zeno profited much from his studies under Polemo we may\nconjecture from Polemo\u2019s good-natured complaint, \u2018I see well what you are\nafter: you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, which you\ndress in Phoenician clothes[52].\u2019 From this time it became a conventional\ncomplaint that Stoic doctrine was stolen from that of the Academics: yet\nthe sharp conflict between the two schools shews that this cannot apply\nto essentials. But in two important matters at least Zeno must have been\nindebted to Academic teaching. This school had elaborated the doctrine\nof Anaxagoras, which so attracted Socrates, that the world began with\nthe working of mind upon unordered matter. So too, according to all our\nauthorities, Zeno taught that there are two beginnings, the active which\nis identified with the deity or Logos, and the passive which is inert\nmatter, or substance without quality[53]. This doctrine appears to pledge\nZeno to a dualistic view of the universe.\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u2018Soul is body.\u2019]\n\n=79.= On the other hand the Platonic teaching on the soul was reversed\nby Zeno. He denied the opposition between soul and body. \u2018Soul is\nBreath[54],\u2019 he taught, and \u2018soul is body[55].\u2019 With Plato\u2019s threefold\ndivision of the soul he would have nothing to do; rather he maintained\nthat the soul has eight parts[56], each displaying itself in a distinct\npower or capacity, whilst all of them are qualities or operations of\none soul in various relations[57]. In this part of his philosophy Zeno\nappears as a strong monist, and his debt to the Platonists is necessarily\nrestricted to details.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno studies Heraclitus.]\n\n=80.= It would seem then that Zeno after seeking for philosophic safety\nfor some twenty years in one harbour after another had so far made\nshipwreck. But from this shipwreck of his intellectual hopes he could\nafterwards count the beginning of a fair voyage[58]. As he eagerly\ndiscussed with his younger fellow-student Arcesilaus the teaching of\ntheir master Polemon, he took courage to point out its weak points[59],\nand began to quote in his own defence not only his previous teachers\nCrates and Stilpo, but also the works of Heraclitus[60]. He thus\nbroke down the barrier which Socrates had set up against the Ionic\nphilosophers. From Heraclitus Zeno drew two doctrines of first-rate\nimportance; the first, that of the eternal fire[61] and its mutation into\nthe elements in turn[62]; the second (already referred to) that of the\n_Logos_[63]. It is evident that the Heraclitean doctrine of fire breaks\ndown the distinction between God and the world, active and passive, soul\nand body; and is therefore inconsistent with the dualism which Zeno had\npartly borrowed from Plato. It is not clear whether Zeno attained to\nclearness on this point; but in the general teaching of the Stoics the\nmonistic doctrine prevailed[64]. Hence God is not separate from body,\nbut is himself body in its purest form[65]. The _Logos_ or divine reason\nis the power which pervades and gives shape to the universe[66]; and\nthis Logos is identical with the deity, that is with the primitive and\ncreative Fire[67]. The Logos (\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, _vera ratio_) brings into\nharmony the parts of philosophy; for it is also on the one hand the guide\nto right reasoning[68]; on the other hand the law which prescribes what\nis right for the State and for the individual[69].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno opens his school.]\n\n=81.= When Zeno definitely accepted the teaching of Heraclitus, he felt\nbound to break finally with the school of Polemo, and he founded soon\nafter 300 B.C. a school of his own, which was rapidly crowded. His\nfollowers were at first called Zenonians, but afterwards Stoics, from the\n\u2018picture porch\u2019 (so called because it was decorated with paintings by\nPolygnotus) in which he delivered his lectures. He now applied himself\nafresh to the problem of ethics. Whilst still adhering to the Cynic views\nthat \u2018virtue is the only good,\u2019 and that \u2018example is more potent than\nprecept,\u2019 he entirely rejected the intuitional basis which the Cynics\nhad accepted, deciding in favour of the claims of reason. He found his\nideal in \u2018consistency\u2019 (\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, _convenientia_)[70]; as the Logos or\nWord rules in the universe, so should it also in the individual. Those\nwho live by a single and harmonious principle possess divine favour and\nan even flow of life[71]; those that follow conflicting practices are\nill-starred[72]. In this consistency there is found virtue, and (here\nagain he follows the Cynics) virtue is sufficient for happiness[73], and\nhas no need of any external support.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His theory of virtue.]\n\n=82.= But whilst the virtue of the Cynics is something detached and\nself-contained, and is \u2018natural\u2019 only in the sense that it is not\ndetermined by custom or authority, that of Zeno is bound up with the\nwhole scheme of the universe. For the universe puts before men certain\nthings, which though rightly named \u2018indifferent\u2019 by the Cynics, and\nwrongly named \u2018good\u2019 by the Academics, have yet a certain value (\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1,\n_aestimatio_), and are a natural goal for men\u2019s actions[74]. Such are\nhealth, prosperity, good name, and other things which the Academics named\n\u2018things according to nature\u2019 (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd). These Zeno took over, not\nas a part of his theory of virtue, but as the basis of it[75]; and for\nthings having value introduced the term \u2018of high degree\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1),\nand for their opposites the term \u2018of low degree\u2019 (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), these\nterms being borrowed from court life. Thus virtue alone is queen, and\nall things naturally desired are subject to her command[76]. The end of\nlife is therefore to live consistently, keeping in view the aims set\nbefore us by nature, or shortly, to live \u2018consistently with nature.\u2019 Our\nauthorities do not agree as to whether Zeno or Cleanthes was the first\nto use this phrase[77]; but there can be no doubt that the doctrine is\nthat of Zeno, that it is a fundamental part of the Stoic system, and that\nit was maintained unaltered by all orthodox Stoics. On the other hand\nthe Academics and Peripatetics ridiculed these new and barbarous terms\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 and \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, and their view has generally been supported\nboth in ancient and modern times[78]. We cannot however question the\nright of Zeno to reserve a special term for that which is morally good;\nhe was in fact feeling his way towards the position, still imperfectly\nrecognized, that the language of common life is inadequate to the exact\nexpression of philosophic principles[79].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno\u2019s syllogisms.]\n\n=83.= In expounding his system Zeno made much use of the syllogism,\nthereby laying the foundations of a new style of oratory, consisting\nof short and pointed clauses, which became a characteristic of his\nschool[80]. He no doubt regarded this form as a sure method of attaining\ntruth; but even at the present day the principle that truth can only\nbe reached from facts and not from words is not everywhere admitted.\nThe syllogisms of Zeno have all their weak points, and as a rule the\nterm which is common to the major and minor premisses suffers a shift\nof meaning. These syllogisms can no longer convince us, and even in\nantiquity they were severely criticized. But they are excellent aids\nto the memory, and so serve the same end as the catechisms of the\nReformation period. Amongst the syllogisms attributed to Zeno are\nthese: \u2018That which has reason is better than that which has not reason;\nbut nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe has\nreason[81].\u2019 \u2018No one trusts a secret to a drunken man; but one trusts\na secret to a good man; therefore a good man will not be drunken[82].\u2019\n\u2018No evil is accompanied by glory; but death is accompanied by glory;\ntherefore death is no evil[83].\u2019 Such syllogisms were embedded in the\nnumerous works of Zeno, of which many were certainly extant as late as\nthe time of Epictetus[84].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Epicurus and Arcesilaus.]\n\n=84.= At the very time when Zeno was elaborating the doctrines of the\nPorch, another school of equal eminence was established at Athens by\nEPICURUS (341-270 B.C.) in his Gardens. Epicurus combined the ethical\nprinciple of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is the end of life, with the\natomistic philosophy of Democritus; he had no respect for the study of\ndialectic, but placed the criterion of truth in the observations of the\nsenses, leaving little room for the participation of mind or will. Thus\nin every part of philosophy his teaching was opposed to that of Zeno,\nand the two schools during their whole existence were in the sharpest\nconflict. We may nevertheless notice some points of contact between them.\nBoth founded, or conceived that they founded their ethical doctrine upon\nphysical proofs; that is, both maintained that the end of life which they\nput forward was that prescribed by natural law. As a consequence, they\nagreed in removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the\npursuit of natural science. Both again were positive teachers, or (in the\nlanguage of the ancients) propounders of dogmas; and here they came into\nconflict with the Academic school, which maintained, and was soon about\nto emphasize, the critical spirit of Socrates and Plato. For in the last\nyears of Zeno\u2019s life his old fellow-pupil Arcesilaus became head of the\nAcademic school (270 B.C.), and at once directed his teaching against\nZeno\u2019s theory of knowledge[85]. Following the practice of Socrates and\nof Plato\u2019s dialogues, he argued against every point of view presented,\nand concluded that certain truth could not be known by man[86]. He\npressed Zeno closely as to his definition of \u2018comprehension,\u2019 and induced\nhim to add a clause which, in the opinion of his opponent, shewed the\nworthlessness of the whole doctrine[87]. Thus was raised the question\nof the \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd or test of truth, which for at least a century to come\nsharply divided the schools[88].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno at Athens.]\n\n=85.= The conflict between these three schools, which from this time\non greatly surpassed all others in importance, did not embitter the\npolitical life of Athens. The citizens watched with amusement the\ncompetition of the schools for numbers and influence, and drew their\nprofit from the crowds of foreigners who were drawn to Athens by its\ngrowing fame as a centre of adult education. To the heads of the schools\nthey were ready to pay every mark of respect. With Zeno they deposited\nthe keys of their gates, and they awarded him during his lifetime a gold\ncrown and a bronze statue. His fame spread abroad, and those of his\nfellow-citizens of Citium who were then resident at Sidon claimed a share\nin it. In his old age the high-minded Antigonus Gonatas (who occupied the\nthrone of Macedonia with varying fortune from 278 to 239 B.C.) looked to\nhim for advice and help. But no offers of public employment could draw\nZeno himself from his simple life and the young companions who surrounded\nhim: like Socrates, he thought that he could best serve the State by\nsending out others to take part in its duties[89]. He died in the year\n264 B.C.[90], having been engaged in teaching for more than 30 years from\nthe time when he \u2018discovered the truth[91].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Honours paid to him.]\n\n=86.= The vote which the Athenians passed in honour of Zeno, shortly\nbefore his death, deserves record by its contrast with that by which\ntheir predecessors had condemned Socrates. It ran somewhat as follows:\n\n  \u2018Whereas Zeno the son of Mnaseas from Citium has spent many\n  years in this city in the pursuit of philosophy; and has been\n  throughout a good man in all respects; and has encouraged the\n  young men who resorted to him in virtue and temperance, and has\n  sped them on the right path; and has made his own life an example\n  to all men, for it has been consistent with the teaching he has\n  set forth;\n\n  Now it seems good to the people of Athens to commend Zeno the\n  son of Mnaseas from Citium, and to crown him with a golden crown\n  (in accordance with the law) for his virtue and temperance, and\n  to build him a tomb on the Ceramicus at the public expense. And\n  the people shall elect five Athenian citizens to provide for the\n  making of the crown and the building of the tomb. And the town\n  clerk shall engrave this vote on two pillars, and shall set up\n  one in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And the treasurer\n  shall make due allotment of the expense, that all men may see\n  that the people of Athens honours good men both in their life\n  time and after their death[92].\u2019\n\nWe have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this tribute. It is true\nthat all the charges brought against Socrates hold even more forcibly\nas against Zeno. But the spirit of political and religious independence\nwas now dead, and the advantage of the philosophical schools to the fame\nand business interests of the city had become clearer; so that nothing\nprevented any longer the open recognition of Zeno\u2019s virtues and eminence.\nWho will may also read in the decree a belated mark of respect to the\nmemory of Socrates.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno\u2019s breadth of view.]\n\n=87.= In this sketch of the life of Zeno no attempt has been made to\ngive a complete view of his philosophy; but a few landmarks have been\nindicated, by which it may be possible to distinguish which parts of\nit were his own, which were taken over from others, and how all were\ngradually combined in one whole. Zeno had not the kind of originality\nwhich begins by assuming a general principle, and then explains all\nthings human and divine by deductions from it. Instead of this he\ngathered together (as Aristotle had done before, but with a very\ndifferent bias) what seemed most sound and illuminating in the teaching\nof all the schools which surrounded him. He did this in a positive\nspirit, feeling assured that truth exists and is discernible, and must be\nconsistent in all its parts. We seem unable to say that in his writings\nhe attained to this consistency, but at least he worked steadily towards\nit. The effort for consistency led him in the direction of monistic\nprinciple, though his points of departure both in physics and in ethics\nare dualistic. But the teaching of Zeno does not lend itself to that kind\nof study which assigns all new facts to compartments of thought ready\nlabelled in advance, nor can it be summarized by any of the technical\nterms which are in use in modern philosophical thought. Enough has\nperhaps been said to shew that, great as was the debt of Zeno to his\npredecessors, he was no mere imitator or plagiarist; the history of the\nfollowing centuries will shew that he had in some sense touched the\npulses of human life more truly than any of his contemporaries.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] Thucydides, _passim_.\n\n[2] Mahaffy, _Greek Life and Thought_, ch. 1.\n\n[3] \u2018Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically\nbroken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity\u2019\nUeberweg, Eng. transl. i p. 89.\n\n[4] \u2018The philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and\nAristotle\u2019 Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 11. \u2018The bloom of Greek philosophy\nwas short lived\u2019 _ib._ p. 10.\n\n[5] The phrases \u2018cum Platone errare,\u2019 \u2018amicus Plato, magis amica veritas\u2019\nagree in expressing the general incredulity with which Platonism was\nreceived in the ancient world. In our own days an ill-balanced sympathy\nfor Platonic dogma is often a serious hindrance to philosophic progress.\n\n[6] See further, \u00a7 284.\n\n[7] See below, \u00a7 179.\n\n[8] Aristotle, _Physics_, ii 7.\n\n[9] See below, \u00a7 173.\n\n[10] \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03af \u03ba\u03c9\u03bb\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd; \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u1ff3 Ar. _Phys._\nviii 2, 252 b.\n\n[11] See Ueberweg\u2019s note, i (Eng. trans., pp. 178-180; tenth German\nedition, pp. 238-240), and below, \u00a7 362.\n\n[12] \u2018vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis [Peripateticis]\nplacuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum; quae quia\ndeorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ v\n4, 11.\n\n[13] See note 15, below.\n\n[14] Clem. _Strom._ ii p. 419 a.\n\n[15] \u2018honeste autem vivere, fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura\nconciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (ut indicant scripta Polemonis), et\nAristoteles eiusque amici huc proxime videntur accedere\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii\n42, 131. Here Prof. J. S. Reid suggests that Polemo may merely have used\nthe phrase \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd, as opposed to \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (conventionally).\n\n[16] \u2018quem [_sc._ Arcesilan] ferunt ... primum instituisse, non quid ipse\nsentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset,\ndisputare\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 67. \u2018Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam\nquod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset\u2019\n_Ac._ i 12, 45.\n\n[17] \u2018[cuius] ratio probabilis possit reddi\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 58. See\nfurther below, \u00a7\u00a7 105, 332.\n\n[18] See especially \u00a7\u00a7 113 and 123.\n\n[19] Cic. _Fin._ iv 28, 79.\n\n[20] \u2018non dolere ... Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit\u2019 _ib._ v 25, 73.\n\n[21] \u2018at vero Callipho, et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem\nadamavisset, alter vacuitatem doloris: neuter honestate carere potuit,\nquae est a nostris laudata maxime\u2019 _ib._\n\n[22] _ib._ 25, 75.\n\n[23] _Off._ i 1, 1.\n\n[24] \u2018[Stoici] quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram a nobis, sed totam ad\nse nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. atque, ut reliqui fures, earum\nrerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris\npro suis uterentur, nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutaverunt\u2019 _Fin._ v 25,\n74.\n\n[25] \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a6\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1, Athen. _Deipnos._ xiii 2; \u2018tuus ille Poenulus,\u2019\n\u2018e Phoenicia profecti\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iv 20, 56.\n\n[26] Diog. L. vii 31 and 32.\n\n[27] \u2018nuntiato naufragio Zeno noster, cum omnia sua audiret submersa:\niubet, inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 14, 3.\n\n[28] Diog. L. vii 3.\n\n[29] Diog. L. vi 96 and 97.\n\n[30] _ib._ vii 4.\n\n[31] \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03ad\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Plut. _Sto. rep._ 8, 2 (Arnim\ni 260).\n\n[32] This doctrine can be traced back to Diogenes and even to Socrates:\nsee below, \u00a7 303.\n\n[33] \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\nStob. iv 1, 88.\n\n[34] See below, \u00a7 305.\n\n[35] \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd Diog. L. vii 33.\n\n[36] See below, \u00a7 318.\n\n[37] \u00a7 306.\n\n[38] \u00a7 307.\n\n[39] \u00a7\u00a7 296, 297.\n\n[40] \u00a7 304.\n\n[41] \u00a7 315.\n\n[42] See above, \u00a7 56.\n\n[43] He said \u2018O Crates, the best handle of philosophers is that by the\near; persuade me if you can, and lead me that way; if you use violence,\nmy body will stay with you, but my soul will be with Stilpo\u2019 Diog. L. vii\n24.\n\n[44] \u2018errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et\nsuspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis\nadsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque [Zeno] removebat\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 42.\n\n[45] \u2018hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. nam cum extensis digitis\nadversam manum ostenderat, \u2018visum,\u2019 inquiebat, \u2018huiusmodi est.\u2019 deinde\ncum paulum digitos contraxerat, \u2018adsensus huiusmodi.\u2019 tum cum plane\ncompresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat;\ncum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque\ncompresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat: cuius compotem nisi sapientem\nesse neminem\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 145.\n\n[46] See below, \u00a7 188.\n\n[47] So the Megarians were commonly called on account of their\ndisputatious methods.\n\n[48] As for instance Arcesilaus; \u1f08\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ad\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 Strabo xiii p. 614 (Arnim i 10).\n\n[49] Diog. L. iv 18.\n\n[50] _ib._ 20.\n\n[51] _ib._\n\n[52] Diog. L. vii 25.\n\n[53] See below, \u00a7 189.\n\n[54] See \u00a7 268, note 2.\n\n[55] \u03bf\u1f35 \u03b3\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 Iamb. _de an._ (Stob. i 49, 33).\n\n[56] \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1fc6 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd Nemes. _nat. hom._ p.\n96 (Arnim i 143).\n\n[57] \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1fc6 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 [\u1f23\u03bd] \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03ba\u1ff3 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 Iamb. _de an._ (Arnim i 143). See below, \u00a7 270.\n\n[58] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f24\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f15\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03bb\u03cc\u03b7\u03ba\u03b1, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c5\u03ac\u03b3\u03b7\u03ba\u03b1 Diog. L. vii 4. It must not however\nbe assumed that Zeno himself used the phrase in this sense: see the other\nreferences in Arnim i 277.\n\n[59] \u2018iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Sed Zeno cum\nArcesilam anteiret aetate, valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute\nmoveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 9, 34 and 35.\n\n[60] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ad\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a3\u03c4\u03af\u03bb\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1\n\u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039a\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiv 5, 11 (quoting Numenius) (Arnim i\n11).\n\n[61] Zeno often calls it _aether_: \u2018Zenon ... aethera ... interim\nvult omnium esse principium\u2019 Min. Felix xix p. 58: Cleanthes calls it\n_spirit_, see below, \u00a7 100. \u2018The fire of Heraclitus becomes aether or \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u2014for this distinction is unknown to the Ephesian\u2014and is thereby\nspiritualised and rarefied\u2019 Pearson, _Fragments_, Intr. pp. 22, 23.\n\n[62] See below, \u00a7 196.\n\n[63] See above, \u00a7 39.\n\n[64] Stein, _Psychologie_, i 62 sqq.\n\n[65] \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).\n\n[66] \u2018rationem quandam per naturam omnem rerum pertinentem vi divina esse\naffectam putat\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.\n\n[67] \u2018Zeno [deum nuncupat] naturalem divinamque legem\u2019 Lact. _Div. inst._\ni 5, 20.\n\n[68] \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03af Diog. L. vii 54\n(quoting Diocles Magnes). It is much disputed who the authorities are to\nwhich Posidonius here refers.\n\n[69] \u2018Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta\nimperantem prohibentemque contraria\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.\n\n[70] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd\u00b7\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u03ce\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd Stob. ii 7, 6 a. \u2018summum bonum, quod cum positum sit in\neo, quod \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii\n6, 21.\n\n[71] \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 Stob. ii 7, 6 e.\n\n[72] See note 70 above.\n\n[73] See below, \u00a7 322.\n\n[74] For a fuller treatment see below, \u00a7\u00a7 319-321.\n\n[75] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 (sc. Peripateticis) \u1f20\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd; Plut. _comm. not._\n23, 1; \u2018[a Polemone] quae essent principia naturae acceperat\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niv 16, 45.\n\n[76] \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd [\u03bf\u1f56\u03bd] \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 Stob. ii 7, 7 g; see also below, \u00a7 320.\n\n[77] Diogenes Laertius says distinctly that Zeno used the phrase, and\nnames the book in which he found it; Diog. L. vii 87. On the other hand\nStobaeus (ii 7, 6 a) attributes it to Cleanthes.\n\n[78] \u2018Zeno Citieus, advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex\u2019 Cic.\n_Tusc._ v 12, 34.\n\n[79] See below, \u00a7 165.\n\n[80] \u2018illa vetus Zenonis brevis, et ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio\u2019\nCic. _N. D._ iii 9, 22.\n\n[81] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 Sext. _math._ ix 104 (Arnim i 111);\nsee also below, \u00a7 202.\n\n[82] \u2018ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit; viro autem bono committit;\nergo vir bonus ebrius non erit\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 83, 9; for the original see\nArnim i 229.\n\n[83] \u2018nullum malum gloriosum est; mors autem gloriosa est; mors ergo non\nest malum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 82, 9.\n\n[84] \u2018If you would know, read Zeno\u2019s writings, and you will see\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ i 20, 14.\n\n[85] \u2018cum Zenone, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit\u2019\nCic. _Ac._ i 12, 44.\n\n[86] \u2018Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque\nSocraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut\nanimo percipi possit\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 67.\n\n[87] \u2018hic Zenonem vidisse acute, nullum esse visum quod percipi posset,\nsi id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non est,\nposset esse. recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum [sc.\nquale non possit esse a falso]. incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut\ndoceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso\nposset esse\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 24, 77.\n\n[88] See below, \u00a7 157.\n\n[89] \u2018compositus sequor Zenona Cleanthen Chrysippum, quorum tamen nemo ad\nrempublicam accessit, et nemo non misit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 1, 10; see also\nviii 6, 4.\n\n[90] Pearson, _Introd._ p. 1.\n\n[91] \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cd\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3[\u03b5\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f55\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 Sext. _math._ vii\n321. Pearson, _Introd._ p. 4.\n\n[92] Diog. L. vii 10 and 11.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE PREACHING OF STOICISM.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The companions of Zeno.]\n\n=88.= During the later years of his life Zeno gathered round him a number\nof men of practical and speculative capacity, not unworthy of comparison\nwith the companions of Socrates. His death dissolved the immediate\ntie between them. Some took an active part in the work of government;\nothers followed their teacher\u2019s example, and became the founders of\nindependent schools of thought; a few devoted themselves to strengthening\nand extending Zeno\u2019s system; and many were doubtless engaged in useful\nemployment of which no record has reached us. Zeno\u2019s work had not yet\nbeen exposed to the test of time, and another century was to pass before\nit could be seen that the Stoic school was to be of permanent importance.\nTowards the schools of the Cynics, the Megarians, and the Academics,\nfrom which its principles were so largely derived, the attitude of\nthe hearers of Zeno was that of a friendly interchange of opinions,\nin which sharp controversy stopped short of enmity; the followers of\nAristotle (the Peripatetics) continued to be but slightly distinguished\nfrom the Academics. But all these schools appear to have united in\nopposition to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; the champions of virtue\ncould hold no communings with the advocates of pleasure. Individual\nteachers who practically reverted to Cynic or Academic teaching still\ncalled themselves Stoics: but the only one of Zeno\u2019s hearers who adopted\nCyrenaic views was contemptuously branded as \u2018the deserter[1].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persaeus.]\n\n=89.= The most intimate companion[2] of Zeno was PERSAEUS of Citium\n(circ. 300-243 B.C.). He was the fellow-townsman of Zeno, and, as good\nauthorities assert, at first his personal servant (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2)[3] and\nafterwards his fellow-lodger. On the recommendation of Zeno he took\nservice, together with Aratus the poet, with Antigonus Gonatas, king of\nMacedonia[4]. Here he was often twitted as to the Stoic paradoxes. King\nAntigonus sent him messengers announcing the loss of his wife, child,\nand property, and found that he was not entirely indifferent to external\ncircumstances[5]. He adapted himself easily to court life, and is said to\nhave written a treatise on the theory of the banquet, in which he did not\nrise above the moral standard of his neighbours[6]. Nor did he disdain\nto hoax Aristo of Chius, who held strongly to the paradox that \u2018the wise\nman never opines\u2019; he first sent him money by one of two twins, and\nthen sent another to demand it back[7]. Another Socratic paradox, that\n\u2018the wise man is sure to be a good general,\u2019 he endeavoured to maintain\nby his personal example[8]. Antigonus placed him in command of the\nacropolis at Corinth, which was nevertheless taken by Aratus of Sicyon in\n243 B.C. According to one account, Persaeus was wounded in the attack,\nand afterwards put to death by the conqueror[9]; others relate that he\nescaped to Cenchreae[10]. As a philosopher he is of little importance;\nbut Cicero mentions that he not only maintained that amongst the gods\nwere men raised to the sky for their services to mankind (which was an\naccepted Stoic doctrine), but also that objects useful to man had been\ndeified[11].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Aratus.]\n\n=90.= Two other companions of Zeno also took service under Antigonus,\napparently at the same time. Of these PHILONIDES of Thebes[12] is\notherwise unknown to us. The other was ARATUS of Soli in Cilicia, author\nof the well-known poem _The Phaenomena_, an astronomical treatise\nafterwards translated into Latin by Cicero, and largely used by Virgil\nin his _Georgics_. The poems of Aratus had a wide influence, and were\nprobably the source from which so many Stoic conceptions reached Virgil.\nThe most interesting part for us is the Introduction, in which he\ninterprets Zeus in Stoic fashion as the deity who dwells in sea and land,\nin markets and streets: whose family is mankind; and whose providence has\nset the stars in the heaven to regulate the seasons of the year and to\nbe a guide to the farmer and the sailor[13]. The spirit of this poem is\nclosely akin to that of the hymn of Cleanthes.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sphaerus.]\n\n=91.= Still another hearer of Zeno took a prominent part in political\nlife. SPHAERUS from the Bosphorus (circ. 250 B.C.) was attracted to\nCleomenes III, king of Sparta, who under his influence reintroduced the\nlaws of Lycurgus in his city, and particularly those which referred to\nthe education of the youth and the taking of meals in common[14]. With\nthese he combined the plan of a monarchy after the Stoic model, in which\nthe sovereign was to side with the poor against the rich[15]. But in 221\nB.C. Cleomenes suffered a crushing defeat, and was compelled to take\nrefuge with Ptolemy III (Euergetes), king of Egypt. Sphaerus found his\nway to the same court. The death of Ptolemy III left Cleomenes in the\nposition of a disregarded suppliant[16]; but Sphaerus appears to have\nfound a congenial home in Alexandria, now the centre of Hellenistic\nlearning, and doubtless introduced the Stoic philosophy in the circle\nthat gathered round the Museum[17]. He gained a special reputation by the\nexcellence of his definitions[18]. From an anecdote related of him we\nmust infer that whilst adhering to Zeno\u2019s doctrine that the wise man will\nnot opine, he accepted reasonable assurance (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd) as a sufficient\nguide in daily life[19]. He appears to have laid special stress upon\nthe unity of virtue, maintaining that the separate virtues are but\nappearances of virtue or knowledge in different spheres of action[20].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Herillus.]\n\n=92.= HERILLUS of Carthage (circ. 250 B.C.) is frequently referred to\nby Cicero as teaching doctrines hardly distinguishable from those of\nthe Academy, in that he made knowledge the highest good[21], and taught\nthat separate from it, yet with claims of their own, there existed\ninferior ends of action (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2)[22]. It does not, however, appear\nclearly that he differed much from Zeno. Sphaerus, as we have seen, had\ndefined the virtues as being \u2018knowledge displayed in different spheres of\naction,\u2019 and the aim of Herillus, \u2018to live according to the standard of\nlife accompanied by knowledge[23],\u2019 points in the direction of practical\nrather than of speculative wisdom. His \u2018subordinate aims\u2019 appear also\nto correspond with Zeno\u2019s \u2018things of high degree\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), and are\ndefined as being the first states to which an animal is attracted upon\nbirth, as food, life, strength (\u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd)[24]; they serve only\nfor \u2018ends\u2019 (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7) for men who have not yet attained to wisdom[25]. This\ndoctrine corresponds closely to the Stoic doctrine as developed somewhat\nlater[26].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Aristo.]\n\n=93.= ARISTO of Chios (circ. 250 B.C.) departed more decidedly from\nZeno\u2019s teaching, falling back generally on Cynic views. He was no\nfavourite of Zeno, who called him a chatterbox[27]: and in later life\nhe was accused of becoming a flatterer of Persaeus when the latter was\nin power[28], and of luxury in his personal habits[29]. But his success\nas a teacher was great, and he formed a body of followers who called\nthemselves Aristonians.\n\nHe appears to have supported Zeno vigorously as to the doctrine of\n\u2018comprehension\u2019; and if on this subject he was worsted for the moment\nby Persaeus[30], he retaliated on some Academic by asking: \u2018do you see\nwho is sitting next you?\u2019 The Academic replied \u2018I do not.\u2019 \u2018Are you\nblind, then,\u2019 said Aristo; \u2018where are your eyes[31]?\u2019 Still he considered\nany systematic study of dialectics to be a mere waste of time; like\nspiders\u2019 webs, which seem to display much skill, but are of no use[32].\nWith regard to physics he was openly agnostic[33]; of the nature of the\ngods he thought we could know nothing, not even whether the deity were\nanimate or no[34]. Ethics alone remained; but this part of philosophy he\nreduced by omitting all practical precepts, as introducing the element\nof uncertainty[35]. In ethics proper he rejects the theory of \u2018things of\nhigh degree\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), observing that this term does not harmonize\nwith the treatment of advantages as \u2018indifferent,\u2019 but comes dangerously\nnear to calling them \u2018good[36].\u2019 Virtue, or rather knowledge, is, as he\nmaintains, the only good; and all that lies between good and evil is\nalike indifferent[37]. The highest good may therefore be defined as a\nstate of indifference (\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1) towards all such things[38].\n\nAristo was however once more in agreement with Stoic doctrine when he\nmaintained the unity of virtue. \u2018The soul,\u2019 he said, \u2018has one power only,\nthat of reasoning; one virtue only, the knowledge of good and evil. When\nwe need to choose the good and avoid the evil, we call this knowledge\nSoberness; when we need to do good and not evil, we call it Wisdom;\nCourage, when it is bold and cautious at the right moments; and when it\ngives every man his due, Justice[39].\u2019 But in deciding his action the\nwise man will be bound by no theories: he can do whatever comes into\nhis head, provided only he keep himself free from distress, fear and\ngreed[40].\n\nThe popularity of these views was repressed by the activity of\nChrysippus; in Cicero\u2019s time they were, in cultivated society,\nextinct[41]. But from the numerous references to Aristo in literature\nit is clear that his teaching was by no means forgotten; and when there\ntook place the revival of the Cynic tone which we see illustrated in the\nwritings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius, Aristo is again treated with high\nrespect[42].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Eratosthenes.]\n\n=94.= An eminent pupil of Aristo was ERATOSTHENES of Cyrene, the\ngrammarian, whom he won over from the Cyrenaic school. Eratosthenes\nundoubtedly represented the spirit of his teacher and of the Cynic\nschool towards which he inclined, when he vehemently repudiated the\nprejudice which then divided mankind into Hellenes and barbarians[43].\nHe was invited by Ptolemy III (Euergetes) to be chief librarian of the\nMuseum at Alexandria, and tutor to the crown-prince, and has left us an\nepigram in honour of this great patron of learning and philosophy[44].\nAmongst other followers of Aristo we hear specially of APOLLOPHANES of\nAntiochia[45].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dionysius.]\n\n=95.= Alone amongst the hearers of Zeno DIONYSIUS of Heraclea abandoned\nhis principles, and went over from the camp of virtue to that of\npleasure. A painful disease of the eyes had made him abandon the doctrine\nthat \u2018pain is no evil[46].\u2019 His secession was used by Antiochus as an\nargument against the doctrine of comprehension or certain knowledge[47].\nThat his life after he became a Cyrenaic was openly scandalous[48]\nwe need not too readily believe: such accusations may easily be mere\ndeductions from his supposed philosophic principles. Dionysius appears to\nhave been a particular friend and admirer of the poet Aratus[49].\n\nOf the less important hearers of Zeno we have the names of, amongst\nothers, ATHENODORUS of Soli[50], CALLIPPUS of Corinth[50], POSIDONIUS\nof Alexandria[50], and ZENO of Sidon[50]. The last, if he existed, must\nbe kept distinct from other Zenos, such as Zeno of Tarsus the pupil of\nChrysippus, and Zeno of Sidon the Epicurean philosopher.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cleanthes.]\n\n=96.= We come last amongst Zeno\u2019s hearers to CLEANTHES of Assos in Asia\nMinor (331-232 B.C.), who succeeded Zeno as head of the school when\nalready advanced in years, and presided over it for a whole generation.\nIn personal character he was a worthy successor of Socrates, Diogenes,\nand Zeno. He was trained in hardship and willing endurance[51]; and if he\ndid not quickly understand, yet all he learnt was deeply impressed upon\nhim[52]. He studied Zeno\u2019s life even more attentively than his doctrines;\nlived with him, watched his hours of retirement, inquired whether his\nactions corresponded to his teaching[53]. Himself a man of the people, he\nardently desired to spread his convictions amongst the many, and chose\nverse as the best means to express clearly his meaning and win access\nto men\u2019s ears[54]. He remained constant to Zeno\u2019s teaching[55], but he\ninspired it with a fresh enthusiasm and developed it in more consistent\ndetail. He is before all things the theologian of Stoicism. The belief\nin the deity, which in the fragments of Zeno\u2019s teaching appears merely\nformal and argumentative, becomes in the verse of Cleanthes ardent and\ndominating. God is the creator and the director of the world; his Logos\ngives it order and harmony. In God\u2019s designs it is the privilege and duty\nof man to cooperate; but since he is possessed of free will, it is also\nwithin his power to make a futile opposition. In this way the good and\nthe bad stand in definite contrast. Finally, right knowledge and right\naction are only possible by association with the deity through praise and\nprayer.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His poetry.]\n\n=97.= It is our good fortune to possess several complete poems of\nCleanthes, which are of more value to us towards appreciating his\nstandpoint than a hundred detached sentences would be. The _hymn to\nZeus_[56] is the most important, and its likeness to the opening of\nAratus\u2019 _Phaenomena_[57] will not escape notice.\n\n  _Hymn to Zeus._\n\n  Supreme of gods, by titles manifold\n  Invoked, o thou who over all dost hold\n    Eternal dominance, Nature\u2019s author, Zeus,\n  Guiding a universe by Law controlled;                         2\n\n  Hail! for \u2019tis meet that men should call on thee\n  Whose seed we are; and ours the destiny\n    Alone of all that lives and moves on earth,\n  A mirror of thy deity[58] to be.                              5\n\n  Therefore I hymn thee and thy power I praise;\n  For at thy word, on their appointed ways\n    The orbs of heaven in circuit round the earth\n  Move, and submissive each thy rule obeys,                     8\n\n  Who holdest in thy hands invincible\n  So dread a minister to work thy will\u2014\n    The eternal bolt of fire, two-edged, whose blast\n  Thro\u2019 all the powers of nature strikes a chill[59]\u2014          11\n\n  Whereby thou guid\u2019st the universal force,\n  Reason, through all things interfused, whose course\n    Commingles with the great and lesser[60] lights\u2014\n  Thyself of all the sovran and the source:                    14\n\n  For nought is done on earth apart from thee,\n  Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea;\n    Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men\n  Whose own hearts lead them to perversity.                    17\n\n  But skill to make the crook\u00e8d straight is thine,\n  To turn disorder to a fair design;\n    Ungracious things are gracious in thy sight,\n  For ill and good thy power doth so combine                   20\n\n  That out of all appears in unity\n  Eternal Reason, which the wicked flee\n    And disregard, who long for happiness,\n  Yet God\u2019s great Law can neither hear nor see;                24\n\n  Ill-fated folk! for would they but obey\n  With understanding heart, from day to day\n    Their life were full of blessing, but they turn\n  Each to his sin, by folly led astray.                        26\n\n  Glory would some thro\u2019 bitter strife attain\n  And some are eager after lawless gain;\n    Some lust for sensual delights, but each\n  Finds that too soon his pleasure turns to pain.              31\n\n  But, Zeus all-bountiful! the thunder-flame\n  And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim:\n    From ignorance deliver us, that leads\n  The sons of men to sorrow and to shame.                      33\n\n  Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul\n  And grant that Wisdom may our life control,\n    Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world\n  Upon the path of justice to its goal.                        35\n\n  So winning honour thee shall we requite\n  With honour, lauding still thy works of might;\n    Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this\u2014\n  The universal Law to praise aright.                          39\n\n                                            _Translated by W. H. Porter._\n\n\n=98.= Another short poem of Cleanthes identifies Zeus with fate, and\npoints the same moral as to human duty:\n\n  Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,\n  What way soe\u2019er ye have appointed me!\n  I follow unafraid: yea, though the will\n  Turn recreant, I needs must follow still[61].\n\nIn other poems characteristic Stoic doctrines are set forth with\nclearness and emphasis:\n\n  \u2018Look not at common opinion, and be not eager to be wise of a\n  sudden; fear not the chatter of the many, in which there is no\n  judgment and no modesty; for the crowd does not possess shrewd\n  just and fair judgment, but amongst the few you may perchance\n  find this[62].\u2019\n\n  \u2018Do you ask me of what kind the good is? Listen then. It is\n  orderly, just, innocent, pious, self-controlled, useful, fair,\n  necessary, severe, upright, always of advantage; fearless,\n  painless, profitable, without smart; helpful, pleasing, sure,\n  friendly, honourable, consistent; noble, not puffed up,\n  painstaking, comforting, full of energy, biding its time,\n  blameless, unchanging[63].\u2019\n\n  \u2018He who abstains from some disgraceful action yet all the\n  while has desire for it, will some day do it, when he gets\n  opportunity[64].\u2019\n\nIn the last of the passages we are introduced to an ethical paradox of\nthe highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the\nwill and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action[65].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Originality of Cleanthes.]\n\n=99.= To the ancients Cleanthes was the faithful disciple of Zeno.\nPersaeus, Aratus, and others had turned aside from the direct pursuit\nof philosophy, and their contact with science and politics might easily\nsully the purity of their philosophic creed. Herillus had adopted\nAcademic doctrine, Aristo had fallen back into Cynism, Dionysius\nhad actually seceded to the party of pleasure. It might seem that\nthe far-reaching sweep of Zeno\u2019s intellect had no real hold on his\ncompanions. But Cleanthes at least stood firm by the old landmarks. We\nmust not suppose from this that he was a man of no originality[66]; his\nlanguage and his style at least are his own. Nor on the other hand can we\ngo all the way with some recent writers, who attribute to him exclusively\nlarge parts of the Stoic system[67]. Our authorities commonly refer\neither to Zeno alone, or to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus jointly,\nas vouching for accepted Stoic doctrine; and we are hardly entitled\nto lay great stress on the comparatively few fragments of which the\nauthorship is assigned exclusively to Cleanthes, as evidence for the\nindependence of his teaching; especially as we can in many instances\nsee that our authorities delight in attributing a difference of meaning\nto the Stoic masters, when in reality there is nothing more to be found\nthan a difference of phrasing[68]. It is however clear that Stoicism did\nnot assume its complete form in the hands of its first propagator; and\nto a limited extent we can see the directions in which his teaching was\namplified by his successors.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Physics of Cleanthes.]\n\n=100.= Cleanthes took a special interest in the physical speculations\nof Heraclitus, on whose writings he composed four books[69], and in\nparticular in the bearing of his speculations upon the nature of the\ndeity. The belief in the dualism of God and matter, of the Word and the\nworld, is attributed to Cleanthes as distinctly as to Zeno[70]; but\non the other hand the conception of an overruling unity is much more\npronounced in the later writer[71]. Hence from the first Cleanthes\nendeavours to give a wider meaning to the primary fire of Heraclitus, the\ncreative fire of Zeno. For this fire he proposed the new term \u2018flame\u2019\n(\u03c6\u03bb\u03cc\u03be)[72]; at other times he identified it with the sky[73], with the\nsun[74], and with the principle of heat[75]; and finally adopted the\nterm \u2018spirit\u2019 (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, _spiritus_), which has ever since held its place\nin the discussion of natural theology. This term appears to have been at\nfirst intended to combine the conceptions of the creative fire and of\nthe Logos[76], but it gradually came to have distinctive associations\nof its own. Like fire, \u2018spirit\u2019 is to the Stoics a substance, stuff,\nor body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and\nelasticity; it is conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating\nit as the deity; immanent in the human body and penetrating it as the\nsoul[77]. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its \u2018tension\u2019 (\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n_intentio_), by means of which its creative power pushes forward from the\ncentre to the circumference: as for instance in the human body walking is\neffected by \u2018spirit exercising tension towards the feet[78].\u2019 The theory\nof \u2018tension\u2019 has an immediate application to ethics. When the soul has\nsufficient tension to perform its proper work, it operates according to\nthe virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness; but when the\ntension is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by the\nemotions[79].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Theology of Cleanthes.]\n\n=101.= To Cleanthes also it fell to explain more fully the government\nboth of the universe and of the individual. Zeno indeed is said to have\nused the term \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd (_principale_, _principatus_)[80], which we\nmay translate by \u2018ruling power,\u2019 or shortly (following the Latin) by\n\u2018principate[81],\u2019 for the highest power of the human soul; Cleanthes\nsought a similar principle in the universe also, and is said to have\nfound it in the sun[82]. By thus using the term in a double sense\nhe implies the analogy which is expressed by the correlative terms\n\u2018macrocosm\u2019 and \u2018microcosm,\u2019 and which leads up to the definition of\nGod as the \u2018soul of the universe[83].\u2019 Cleanthes further speaks of the\nuniverse itself as god[84]; but before describing him as a pantheist it\nis well to consider that this is only one form out of many in which he\nexpresses his creed. He was also the first to give the four proofs of the\nexistence of the deity upon which all discussions of the \u2018evidences of\nNatural Religion\u2019 have been based down to the present day, and which we\nshall further discuss in a later chapter[85].\n\nThe pious zeal of Cleanthes was not without a touch of bigotry, destined\nto have serious consequences in the final developments of Stoicism, and\nto reappear in the history of the middle ages with distressing intensity;\nhe was bitterly opposed to the novel heliocentric theory of the universe\nas an impiety[86].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Weakness of Stoicism.]\n\n=102.= Thus even though we can no longer discriminate sharply between the\nteaching of Zeno and that of Cleanthes, we have every reason to suppose\nthat the latter was possessed of originality of thought and vigour and\ncopiousness of expression. We cannot easily believe that a man of such\npowers failed to attract hearers or to retain a hold upon them. But in\nhis extreme old age it seems that the majority were drawn aside either\nto the ingenious arguments of Arcesilaus the Academic, or to the more\nindependent teaching of Aristo of Chios. The continued existence of\nStoicism seemed threatened; its critics were not to be contented with\nrhetoric or poetry, but insistently demanded proofs. In this crisis it\nwas saved and established by a younger man, CHRYSIPPUS of Soli (280-206\nB.C.), who was far inferior in original power, but equally zealous and\nmore in harmony with the tastes and demands of the younger generation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Chrysippus.]\n\n=103.= Chrysippus was a fellow-townsman of Aratus of Soli, and his\nappearance is doubtless a sign of the active interest in philosophy which\nfor some centuries marks the neighbourhood of the important town of\nTarsus. Born in 280 B.C. he found in his early manhood three prominent\nteachers at Athens, Arcesilaus, Aristo, and Cleanthes. Of these Aristo\nseems to have been the most popular, and surprise was expressed that\nChrysippus did not join his school. \u2018Had I followed the many,\u2019 he\nreplied, \u2018I should not have become a philosopher[87].\u2019 His convictions\ndrew him to Cleanthes, but he felt much impatience with his methods.\nThis state of mind he must have expressed freely, for in after life\nhe reproached himself that he had not behaved more kindly towards his\nteacher in his old age[88]. Confident in his own powers, he desired to\nrelieve Cleanthes of the burden of replying to the many attacks made\nupon his doctrines, especially as to dialectics[89]. It is well known\nthat he asked his master to supply him with his dogmas only, saying that\nhe himself would find the proofs[90]. Chrysippus probably outlived his\nopponents, and during the time when he was head of the school (232-206\nB.C.) only found himself opposed by men of mediocre talents. He devoted\nhis whole energies to strengthening and systematizing Stoic doctrine.\nHe not only gave its proofs, but used every art of the dialectician to\nrecommend it to his hearers[91]. From his facile pen there poured an\nendless stream of writings, not remarkable either for originality or for\nstyle, but of the highest importance as fixing definitely the standard\nof Stoic orthodoxy. He gathered numerous hearers round him, and before\nhis death it could truly be said that he had saved the Stoa[92].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dialectic of Chrysippus.]\n\n=104.= In his method of exposition Chrysippus made great use of the\nsyllogism, thus reverting to the practice of Zeno as opposed to the\nmore poetical style of Cleanthes. As to the value of this syllogistic\nreasoning very contrary opinions were expressed in antiquity. By\nhis contemporaries he was greatly admired, so that it was said that\n\u2018if the gods had needed a dialectic, they would have taken that of\nChrysippus[93].\u2019 On the other hand members of his own school complained\nthat he often stated his opponents\u2019 case more forcibly than his own[94].\nThe Romans mix their praise with censure, and find that he sometimes\nentangles himself in the threads of his own argument[95]; and we\nourselves cannot fail to notice that when his major and minor premisses\nare compared, the meaning of the common term has usually shifted[96].\nBut if Chrysippus did not provide a final solution to great problems,\nhe at least adapted the Stoic system to the taste of his age, alike by\nhis use of syllogisms and by the attention he paid to the solution of\nfallacies[97].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Opposition of the Academy.]\n\n=105.= Whilst the works of Chrysippus cover the whole range of the\nStoic philosophy, their special colour is largely due to the interests\nof his own time. The stress laid by Zeno on the certainty of knowledge\nhad produced a reaction in the Academic school. Arcesilaus, who had\nsucceeded Polemo as its leader, leaving on one side the positive teaching\nof Plato\u2019s later years, reverted to the sceptical attitude which had\nbeen one characteristic of Socrates, and which is so prominent in most\nof the Platonic dialogues[98]. He attacked with the utmost vigour Zeno\u2019s\ndoctrine of \u2018comprehension\u2019; and further argued that certain knowledge\nis unnecessary for practical life, of which probability, that is, such\naction as can find reasonable justification, is the sufficient guide[99].\nChrysippus defended with the utmost energy the dogma of the certainty of\nknowledge, based upon the perspicuity of true mind pictures[100]; but the\nteaching of Arcesilaus obtained a hold upon him, and (as we shall see)\nwas ultimately allowed by him a place within the Stoic system.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Spread of Epicureanism.]\n\n=106.= Chrysippus meanwhile had a more dangerous enemy to meet than\nthe Academy. During the weakness which befel the Stoic school in the\nmiddle of the third century B.C., the rival school of Epicurus had won\nan enormous popularity. Yet its ethical standard, which it had inherited\nfrom the Cyrenaics, offended not only the followers of Zeno but all\nsober-minded philosophers. For Epicurus had set up Pleasure as the queen\nof life, and had converted the virtues into her handmaidens[101]; and\nso far was he from taking interest in model states, that he advised his\nhearers to hold aloof altogether from public life. Worst of all, his\nfollowers only smiled at the reproofs that were showered upon them.\nThey formed among themselves a cheerful, affectionate, and united\nsociety; their simple pleasures created no public scandal, though their\nentertainments were often enlivened by tales of the moral lapses of their\nself-righteous rivals. The bracing morality of Cynism seemed to be quite\ngone out of fashion, and even the Aristonians had ceased to exist.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Alliance of the three schools.]\n\n=107.= Under these circumstances the remaining schools began to look one\nto another for support, and were even brought into a kind of alliance.\nThe adherents of the Academy and the Porch, in particular, began to meet\nin friendly discussion, and sometimes defined anew their doctrines so as\nto minimize points of difference, sometimes directly modified them by way\nof concession to opposed arguments. This process resulted in a toning\ndown of Stoicism in every part of its system. The Stoic teachers began\nto disregard or push into the background those characteristic doctrines\nwhich had been embodied in the Socratic paradoxes and enforced by the\nCynic propaganda. Thus their teaching gave less offence to the lax crowd,\nand at the same time (it must be admitted) less support to the striving\nfew; but its tone was now so modest that men of gentle and judicious\ntemperament were attracted to Stoicism for the first time. Stoicism\nbegan now to shew itself receptive of literary influences, especially\nas regards the works of Plato and Aristotle, and even appreciative of\nartistic ideals. Such was the tendency of the system during both the\nsecond and the first centuries B.C.; but it is more difficult to estimate\nthe extent of the deviation. Terms like \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u2018well proportioned\nmixture[102],\u2019 \u03b5\u1f54\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u2018even flow[103],\u2019 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u2018due tone[104],\u2019 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\n\u2018harmony[105],\u2019 are attributed even to the earliest masters: whilst it\nis abundantly clear that the Socratic and Cynic paradoxes formed at all\ntimes part of the generally accepted view of Stoic doctrine.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Chrysippus inclines to the Academy.]\n\n=108.= It is an interesting question, which perhaps needs further\ninvestigation, to what extent this approximation between the doctrines of\nthe Academy and the Porch can be traced in the writings of Chrysippus.\nOn the one hand we must remember that Chrysippus was a man of distinctly\northodox temperament; he firmly opposed the Cynizing heresies of\nAristo, and strongly defended the Stoic theory of knowledge against the\nAcademy. But our knowledge of the teaching of Chrysippus, abundant in\nvolume, is lacking in precision. Our authorities, as we have seen, very\nimperfectly distinguish, and very inadequately record, the teaching of\nthe two earlier masters; and the doctrines which are regarded as common\nto all Stoics must be assumed to be generally stated in the language of\nChrysippus, whose works remained for centuries the recognised standard\nof orthodoxy. Even so there are few distinctive doctrines of Chrysippus\nwhich do not seem to be foreshadowed in expressions attributed to some\nearlier teacher. Yet we may fairly assume that in his ethical teaching\nthere was a substantial sacrifice of the forcefulness of the Socratic\ncharacter, and a corresponding approach to Academic views. This appears\nwhen he defines the supreme good as \u2018a life according to nature, that is,\nboth general nature and our individual human nature[106],\u2019 and adds, \u2018for\nour individual natures are parts of the nature of the all[107].\u2019 This\napproaches the doctrine of \u2018virtue appropriate to the individual\u2019 (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae), as taught by the Academics[108]. A still more striking concession\nis his permission to men engaged in practical life to describe advantages\nas \u2018good things,\u2019 provided they are carefully distinguished from the\nsupreme good[109].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Successors of Chrysippus.]\n\n=109.= The weakening hold of the Stoics upon the principles of their\nfounder first becomes evident in the department of physics. Thus it is an\nessential part of the theory which the Stoics borrowed from Heraclitus,\nthat as the whole universe has proceeded from the all-creative fire, so\nit must in due course be re-absorbed in it, this periodical re-absorption\nbeing technically known as the \u2018conflagration\u2019 (\u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). On the other\nhand the followers of Aristotle, following dualistic principles, placed\nGod and the universe in eternal contrast, and held both to be immortal.\nIngenious controversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their\ndeity exercised his providence during the periodic intervals in which\nthe universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments had\nan immediate effect. BO\u00cbTHUS of Sidon, a contemporary of Chrysippus,\nabandoned altogether the Stoic theory on this subject[110]; ZENO of\nTarsus, who had been with his father DIOSCORIDES a pupil of Chrysippus,\nand who succeeded him as head of the school, discreetly \u2018suspended\nhis judgment\u2019 upon the point[111]. But whatever its theoretical\nembarrassments, the Stoic school continued to prosper. Zeno of Tarsus\nwrote but few books, but had more disciples than any other[112];\nhe was succeeded by SELEUCUS of the Tigris[113], and he in turn by\nDiogenes[114], Antipater, and Panaetius. The last of these maintained\nZeno\u2019s \u2018suspense of judgment[115]\u2019 on the question of the conflagration;\nbut after his death the Stoics quietly returned to the older opinion.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Diogenes and Antipater.]\n\n=110.= DIOGENES of Seleucia (circ. 238-150 B.C.; often called \u2018of\nBabylon,\u2019 or simply _Diogenes Stoicus_), and ANTIPATER of Tarsus (circ.\n200-129 B.C.), were both men of eminence in the history of Stoicism[116],\nbut they were unequally matched against Carneades (218-128 B.C.), who\nwas head of the Academic school about the same time, and who proclaimed\nthe doctrine of a universal suspension of judgment. The many volumes\nof Chrysippus gave Carneades ample opportunities for the exercise of\nhis critical powers; and Antipater, unable or unwilling to meet him in\nopen argument, fell himself into the evil habit of book-writing[117].\nBoth these teachers specially interested themselves in questions of\ncasuistry. Diogenes, who defined the good as \u2018reasonableness in the\nchoice of natural ends[118],\u2019 adopted practically that interpretation\nof \u2018reasonableness\u2019 in which divine reason has the least part, and\nhuman plausibility the freest play[119]. Thus he discusses the problems\nwhether the seller of a house ought to inform the purchaser of its\ndefects, and whether a man upon whom false coins have been passed may\ntransfer them to his neighbour[120]. Exactly as Carneades[121], he finds\n\u2018reasonable excuse\u2019 for the less scrupulous course. Antipater on the\nother hand holds that a man\u2019s duty to his neighbour requires perfect\nfrankness[122]; yet he is said to have abandoned the Socratic doctrine of\nthe self-sufficiency of virtue, and to have held that external goods are\na part (though only a small part) of the supreme good[123].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.]\n\n=111.= We may now shortly mention some less important Stoic teachers,\nchiefly of the early part of the second century B.C., since their number\nalone is an indication of the wide influence of the sect. ARISTOCREON,\nsaid to have been the nephew of Chrysippus, set up a statue in his\nhonour, as the man who could cut his way through the knots tied by the\nAcademics[124]. ZENODOTUS was a pupil of Diogenes, and wrote an epigram\non Zeno: he at least defended the \u2018manly doctrine\u2019 of the founder, and\nrecalled the principle of the sufficiency of virtue[125]. APOLLODORUS of\nSeleucia on the Tigris[126] (sometimes called Ephillus[127]), another\npupil of Diogenes, leant towards Cynic views; for he declared that \u2018the\nwise man will be a Cynic, for this is a short cut to virtue[128]\u2019; an\nopinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics generally[129]. He also wrote\non physics. A third pupil of Diogenes was APOLLODORUS of Athens[130].\nClosely associated with Antipater is ARCHEDEMUS of Tarsus; like his\nfellow-townsman, he was greatly devoted to dialectics[131]; in ethics\nhe appears to have inclined strongly to Academic views, holding that\nthe end of life was the regular performance of daily duties[132]. Just\nabout the time we have now reached (the middle of the second century\nB.C.) Eumenes II founded the great library at Pergamus, intended to\nrival that of Alexandria. As librarian he installed a Stoic philosopher,\nCRATES of Mallos, who devoted much of his time to grammatical inquiries,\nand endeavoured to bring Homer into accord with the Stoic views on\ngeography[133]; he is the first Stoic of whom we hear at Rome, which\nhe visited about 159 B.C. Being detained there by an accident, he\nemployed his time in giving lectures on literature[134]; and his pupil\nPanaetius was destined to introduce Stoicism to Roman society. Lastly\nwe may mention HERACLIDES of Tarsus, a pupil of Antipater, said to have\nbroken away from the teaching of the school by denying that all sins\nare equal[135]. Athenodorus of Tarsus, who held the same view, belongs\nto a later generation[136]. Of uncertain date are BASILIDES, who pushed\nhis monism so far as to declare that all things, even statements, are\nbodies[137]; EUDROMUS, who wrote on the elements of ethics[138]; and\nCRINIS, who interested himself in logic[139].\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] See below, \u00a7 95.\n\n[2] \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f20\u03b3\u03b1\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f41 \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 Ind.\nSto. Herc. col. xii 3 (Arnim i 437).\n\n[3] \u2018Zenonis Stoici servus, qui Persaeus vocatus est\u2019 A. Gellius _N. A._\nii 18, 8. \u1f26\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u1f7c\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u039d\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f41 \u039d\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd \u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a3\u03c9\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u1f08\u03bb\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c7\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452). On the other hand \u2018nullum [servum\nfuisse] Zenoni ... satis constat\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ xii 12, 4.\n\n[4] Arnim i 439, 440.\n\n[5] _ib._ 449.\n\n[6] Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452).\n\n[7] Diog. L. vii 162.\n\n[8] Athen. as above.\n\n[9] Paus. ii 8, 4; vii 8, 3 (Arnim i 442).\n\n[10] Plut. _Arat._ 23, 3. According to Plutarch he afterwards admitted\nthat he had been wrongly taught as to the \u2018good general.\u2019\n\n[11] \u2018Persaeus eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad\nvitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse\nvocabulis nuncupatas\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 38. Persaeus derived the theory\nfrom Prodicus; Philod. _de piet._ 9 (Arnim i 448), and above, \u00a7 42.\n\n[12] Diog. L. vii 9.\n\n[13] \u1f10\u03ba \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd | \u1f04\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03c5\u03b9\u03b1\u03af, | \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1\u03af, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1 |\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u0394\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. | \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u00b7\n\u1f41 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f24\u03c0\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd | \u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bb\u03b1\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 |\n\u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03bd\u1fc4\u03c3\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf: Aratus, _Phaen._ Pref.\n\n[14] Plut. _Cleo._ 11, 2.\n\n[15] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 222.\n\n[16] _ib._ p. 245.\n\n[17] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 44.\n\n[18] \u2018Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici\u2019 Cic.\n_Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53.\n\n[19] See below, \u00a7 332.\n\n[20] \u2018fortitudo est ... conservatio stabilis iudici in iis rebus, quae\nformidolosae videntur ... [haec definitio erat] Sphaeri\u2019 Cic. as above.\nThe principle was accepted by all Stoics, see below, \u00a7 323.\n\n[21] \u2018omitto ... Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum\nponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et\nquam non multum a Platone\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 129. See also _Fin._ iv 14,\n36.\n\n[22] \u2018sin ea [quae virtus leget quaeque reiciet] non neglegemus neque\ntamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate\naberrabimus; facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum\u2019 _Fin._ iv 15,\n40.\n\n[23] \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd Diog. L. vii 165.\n\n[24] \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b6\u1ff4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u03bf\u1f57 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03be\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c0\u03c9 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd [\u1f42\u03bd] \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\nStob. ii 7, 3 c.\n\n[25] \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd Diog. L. vii 165.\n\n[26] The best discussion is by Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii 46 sqq. He\nconsiders the teaching of Herillus to have inclined to Cynism rather\nthan to Platonism, and to have been substantially identical with that of\nAristo.\n\n[27] \u03bb\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 Diog. L. vii 18.\n\n[28] Athen. vi 58 (Arnim i 342).\n\n[29] _ib._ vii 14 (Arnim i 341).\n\n[30] See above, \u00a7 89.\n\n[31] Diog. L. vii 163.\n\n[32] _ib._ vii 161.\n\n[33] \u2018nihil istorum [physicorum] sciri putat posse\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123.\n\n[34] \u2018qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat, neque in dis sensum\nesse dicat; dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14,\n37.\n\n[35] \u2018Aristo moralem quoque ... quam solam reliquerat, circumcidit\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 89, 13. \u2018hanc partem [quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta]\nlevem existimat, et quae non descendat in pectus usque\u2019 _ib._ 94, 2: in\nthis letter the whole subject is very fully discussed.\n\n[36] \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd Sext. _math._ xi 64 (Arnim i 361).\n\n[37] \u2018Aristonis ... sententia, non esse res ullas praeter virtutes et\nvitia, inter quas quicquam omnino interesset\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iv 17, 47.\n\n[38] \u2018huic [sc. Aristoni] summum bonum est, in his rebus neutram in\npartem moveri, quae \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 ab ipso dicitur\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 130.\n\n[39] Galen, _Hipp. et Plat._ vii 2 (Arnim i 374). Chrysippus is said to\nhave complained that he made the various virtues \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 or variations of\na single virtue (Plut. _Sto. rep._ vii 3); nevertheless the same doctrine\nfrequently reappears in Stoic writers.\n\n[40] \u2018vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare, quod erit cunque\nvisum, ages: nunquam angere, nunquam cupies, nunquam timebis\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niv 25, 69.\n\n[41] \u2018Aristonis ... iampridem explosa sententia est\u2019 _Off._ i 2, 6; cf.\n_Fin._ iv 17, 47.\n\n[42] N. Saal, p. 37 sqq. For fuller discussions of Aristo see Hirzel,\n_Untersuchungen_, ii p. 44, and Dyroff, _Ethik_, pp. 43 sqq., 356 sqq.\n\n[43] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 161.\n\n[44] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 207.\n\n[45] Athen. vii 14 (Arnim i 408).\n\n[46] \u2018nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a\nStoicis propter oculorum dolorem; quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non\ndolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non\nesse, quia turpe non esset\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ v 31, 94; \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 166.\n\n[47] \u2018[quaerebat Antiochus], Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum\ncomprehendisset, ... honestum quod esset, id solum bonum esse, an ...\nhonesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 22,\n71.\n\n[48] Diog. L. vii 167; Athen. x 50 (Arnim i 428).\n\n[49] Diog. L. vii 167.\n\n[50] Diog. L. vii 38.\n\n[51] He drew water by night that he might study philosophy by day,\naccording to Diog. L. vii 168. \u2018Cleanthes aquam traxit et rigando horto\nlocavit manus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 44, 3.\n\n[52] Diog. L. vii 37.\n\n[53] \u2018Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset: vitae\nenim eius interfuit, secreta perspexit, observavit illum, an ex formula\nsua viveret\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 6, 6.\n\n[54] \u2018sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 108, 10.\n\n[55] \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f14\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5 \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd Diog. L. vii 168.\n\n[56] Stob. i 1, 12 (Arnim i 537).\n\n[57] See above, \u00a7 90.\n\n[58] I follow the reading \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1, \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6. The words \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd in the\ntext are surely a reminiscence of Aratus, _Phaen._ 5 (so Pearson, p.\n276), and \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 is confirmed by Musonius ap. Stob. _Flor._ 117, 8\n(see below, \u00a7 419). Mr Pearson now suggests to me that the MS reading\n\u1f24\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5 may represent the correction of a pious scribe, \u0399\u0305\u03f9\u0305 \u03a7\u0305\u03a5\u0305, i.e.\n\u1f38\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 for \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6. See below, \u00a7 244.\n\n[59] The translation follows Pearson\u2019s \u1f10\u03c1\u03c1\u03af\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Arnim reads \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Even the meaning is quite uncertain here.\n\n[60] \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 (Diels) seems the nearest reading to the MS, so\nthat the word \u2018great\u2019 above refers to the sun only.\n\n[61] \u1f04\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03ad \u03bc\u2019, \u1f66 \u0396\u03b5\u1fe6, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03cd \u03b3\u2019 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, | \u1f45\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u2019 \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03bc\u1f76\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. | \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c8\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u2019 \u1f04\u03bf\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f22\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9 | \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03c8\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 Epict. _Manual_ 53; \u2018duc, o parens celsique dominator\npoli, | quocunque placuit; nulla parendi mora est. | adsum impiger.\nfac nolle, comitabor gemens, | malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.\n| ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 107, 11. The\ntranslation given above is by G. H. Rendall (_M. Aurel._ Introd. p.\nlxvii).\n\n[62] Clem. _Strom._ v 3, 17 (Arnim i 559).\n\n[63] Clem. _Protrept._ vi 72 (Arnim i 557).\n\n[64] Stob. iii 6, 3 (Arnim i 573).\n\n[65] See below, \u00a7 317.\n\n[66] As, for instance, Zeller does when he writes \u2018Cleanthes was adapted\nto uphold his master\u2019s teaching, but he was incapable of expanding it\nmore completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis\u2019 _Stoics_, p. 41.\n\n[67] Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii pp. 134 sqq.; Stein, _Psychologie der\nStoa_, i 65-72, 162-171, ii 316-332.\n\n[68] Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23.\n\n[69] Diog. L. vii 174.\n\n[70] _ib._ 134.\n\n[71] \u2018Cleanthes ipsum mundum ... deum dicit esse\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37.\n\n[72] Arnim i 497, 511.\n\n[73] \u2018ultimum et altissimum et omnia complexum ardorem, qui aether\nnominetur\u2019 Cic. as in note 71.\n\n[74] Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 41.\n\n[75] \u2018sic res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant,\ncontineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere\u2019\n_ib._ 9, 23.\n\n[76] \u2018haec (quae Zeno dixit \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd esse) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit\nquem permeatorem universitatis affirmat\u2019 Tert. _Apol._ 21 (Arnim i 533).\n\n[77] The substance of this doctrine is attributed to Zeno also: \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd ...\n\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd Diog. L. vii 157.\n\n[78] See below, \u00a7 277.\n\n[79] Pearson, _Introd._ p. 45; below, \u00a7 362.\n\n[80] Arnim i 143.\n\n[81] There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using\nthis term both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the\nsoul, and historically for the system of government founded by Augustus.\nThere is a genuine analogy between the two, though it is not developed by\nthe Latin writers. Seneca uses _principale_ only.\n\n[82] \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f24\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f25\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Euseb.\n_pr. ev._ xv 15, 7 (Arnim i 499); and see below, \u00a7 201.\n\n[83] \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd A\u00ebt. i 7, 17 (Arnim i 532);\n\u2018totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen [dei]\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i\n14, 37.\n\n[84] \u2018Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse\u2019 _ib._\n\n[85] Cic. _N. D._ ii 5, 13-15; and see below, ch. x.\n\n[86] See below, \u00a7 195.\n\n[87] \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1 Diog. L. vii\n182.\n\n[88] \u1f10\u03b3\u1f7c \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u1f74\u03c1 | \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6 Diog. L. vii 179.\n\n[89] _ib._ 182.\n\n[90] _ib._ 179.\n\n[91] \u2018num contentus est [Chrysippus] docere, rem ostendere, definire,\nexplorare? non est contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat,\npraemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit,\npersonas fingit, orationem suam alii accommodat\u2019 Fronto, _ep. ad Ant._ p.\n146 (Arnim ii 27).\n\n[92] \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c7\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f26\u03bd \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f02\u03bd \u1f26\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03ac Diog. L. vii 183.\n\n[93] Diog. L. vii 180.\n\n[94] \u2018de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit contra\nsensus et perspicuitatem ... ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse;\nitaque ab eo armatum esse Carneaden\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 27, 87; cf. Plut.\n_Sto. rep._ x 3 and 4.\n\n[95] \u2018ab Chrysippo nihil magnum nec magnificum desideravi, qui suo quodam\nmore loquitur, ut omnia verborum momentis, non rerum ponderibus examinet\u2019\nCic. _Rep._ iii 8, 12; \u2018ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur\u2019 _de Fato_ 4, 7;\n\u2018Chrysippus, penes quem subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans\nveritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et verbis non ultra quam ad\nintellectum satis est utitur, totum librum his ineptiis replet\u2019 Sen.\n_Ben._ i 3, 8; \u2018magnum mehercule virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen\nnimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur\u2019 _ib._ 4, 1.\n\n[96] \u2018quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne\nest honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 8, 27.\n\n[97] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 162, 163.\n\n[98] \u2018Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque\nSocraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut\nanimo percipi possit\u2019 Cic. _de Orat._ iii 18, 67. See above, \u00a7 71.\n\n[99] \u1f41 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 Sext. _math._ vii\n158.\n\n[100] \u2018cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora et\ncertiora esse dicat, quae vigilantibus videantur, quam quae somniantibus\u2019\nCic. _Div._ ii 61, 126; see further, \u00a7 147.\n\n[101] See below, \u00a7 346.\n\n[102] See Pearson, _Cle._ fr. 42.\n\n[103] According to Stob. ii 7, 6 e this term was used by all the Stoic\nteachers.\n\n[104] Used by Chrysippus, see Arnim iii 473.\n\n[105] Diog. L. vii 88.\n\n[106] \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f97 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd, \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd _ib._ vii 89.\n\n[107] \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 _ib._ 87.\n\n[108] See above, \u00a7 71.\n\n[109] \u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac Plut. _Sto. rep._\n30, 4.\n\n[110] Philo, _inc. mund._ 15, p. 248 (Arnim iii Bo\u00ebth. 7).\n\n[111] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 [sc. Chrysippi] \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03ac \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels\n(Arnim iii Z. T. 5).\n\n[112] Diog. L. vii 35.\n\n[113] Ind. Sto. Herc. col. 48 (Arnim iii Z. T. 2).\n\n[114] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 50.\n\n[115] See below, \u00a7 115.\n\n[116] \u2018aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud\nAntipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 12, 51;\n\u2018Antipater inter magnos [Stoicae] sectae auctores\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5.\n\n[117] Plut. _de garr._ 23.\n\n[118] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1fc7 Diog. L. vii 88; for the\nAcademic view see \u00a7 71 above.\n\n[119] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 159, 332.\n\n[120] Cic. _Off._ iii 13, 54; 23, 91.\n\n[121] _Rep._ iii 20, 30.\n\n[122] \u2018tu cum hominibus consulere debeas, ... celabis homines\u2019 _Off._ iii\n13, 52.\n\n[123] \u2018Antipater ... aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum\nadmodum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5.\n\n[124] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 2, 5.\n\n[125] Diog. L. vii 30.\n\n[126] Arnim iii p. 259; see also Pauly-Wissowa _sub voce_.\n\n[127] So Diog. L. vii 39, where however others read \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a3\u03cd\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[128] Diog. L. vii 121.\n\n[129] _ib._ vi 104.\n\n[130] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 53: also a pupil of Antipater; to be\ndistinguished from an Apollodorus of Athens who was an Epicurean; Diog.\nL. vii 181.\n\n[131] \u2018duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archedemus,\nopiniosissimi homines\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 143.\n\n[132] \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd Diog. L. vii 88.\n\n[133] Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i pp. 155, 156.\n\n[134] _ib._ p. 157.\n\n[135] Diog. L. vii 121.\n\n[136] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 122, 123.\n\n[137] Arnim iii p. 268.\n\n[138] Diog. L. vii 39.\n\n[139] _ib._ 76.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE STOIC SECT IN ROME.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Growth of the Stoic \u2018sect.\u2019]\n\n=112.= In the third century B.C. Stoicism won adherents slowly and one\nby one, as individuals were convinced by reasoning and example. In the\nsecond century its progress became more rapid, for it was reinforced\nby inheritance and social influence. Fathers handed down its doctrine\nto their sons, and teachers to their pupils. Groups of men united by\na common respect for the school and its founders began to associate\ntogether, not only at Athens, but also (as we may well infer from the\nlist of names given at the end of the last chapter) at such centres as\nPergamus, Babylon, Seleucia, Tarsus, Sidon, and even Alexandria[1].\nThus out of the school there grew up the \u2018sect\u2019 (_secta_); that is, a\nsociety of men drawn from different nations and ranks, but sharing the\nsame convictions, united by a bond of brotherhood, and feeling their\nway towards mutual consolation and support; a company going through\nlife on the same path, and prepared to submit to a common authority[2].\nThe spread of the sect was rapid though quiet; and as we cannot expect\nto trace its history from place to place, we are unable to say when\nfirst it found adherents at Rome. But early in the second century B.C.\nRome entered into close political relations with two of the most highly\ncivilized states of Asia Minor, Pergamus and Rhodes; and through the men\nof learning and taste who were associated with these communities Stoicism\nwas introduced to the ruling class at the centre of the new empire,\nto win there an easy conquest which proved no slight compensation for\nthe political subordination of the states from which its emissaries had\nsprung.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Panaetius.]\n\n=113.= We have already noticed[3] that the Stoic Crates, the head of\nthe library established at Pergamus, visited Rome in 159 B.C. and there\ngave lectures on literature, in which he may perhaps have taken occasion\nto expound at least the chief doctrines of the Stoic school. Only a few\nyears later, in 155 B.C., the celebrated embassy from Athens, which\nincluded the heads of three of the chief philosophical schools at that\ntime, arrived in Rome. Diogenes of Seleucia represented the Stoics,\nCritolaus the Peripatetics, and Carneades the Academic school; and all\nthree expounded their respective theories before enormous audiences. We\nare told that Diogenes made a good impression by his sober and temperate\nstyle[4]. Thus the way was prepared for the more permanent influence\nof PANAETIUS of Rhodes (circ. 189-109 B.C.)[5]. He was a gentleman of\nposition in the wealthy and well-governed island state, and in early\nyouth pursued his studies at Pergamus, so that he was probably attracted\nto the school by Crates[6]. From Pergamus he passed to Athens, where he\nfound established the three teachers already named, and attached himself\nto Diogenes[7], and after his death to his successor Antipater[8].\nHis writings shew that he was also much influenced by the teaching\nof Carneades. But more than any of his predecessors he appreciated\nphilosophy in its literary form. Plato, the \u2018Homer of philosophers,\u2019\nhe held in veneration[9]; from Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus\nand Dicaearchus he constantly quoted[10]. His admiration for these\nphilosophers greatly influenced his style, and caused him to reject the\nstiff and paradoxical form used by his predecessors[11]; it also led to\nthe surrender of some characteristic Stoic doctrines in favour of the\nteaching of Plato and Aristotle[12]. His studies extended to every branch\nof philosophy, including astronomy[13] and politics[14]. The latter\ninterest brought him into association with Polybius the historian, with\nwhom he held frequent discussions as to the best form of government; the\ntwo learned and experienced Greeks agreed in their admiration for the\nconstitution of Rome[15]. Panaetius visited Rome, and there became the\nintimate friend of Scipio Africanus minor: this friendship must have\nbegun before the year 140 B.C., when Panaetius accompanied Scipio on a\nmission to settle the affairs of the East[16]; it lasted till the death\nof Scipio in 129 B.C. Round Scipio and his Greek friends Polybius and\nPanaetius there gathered a society of the noblest and most intelligent\nmen of Rome; and in this circle the Latin language as well as Greek\nphilosophy found a new birth. At the time of Scipio\u2019s death Panaetius\nbecame the head of the Stoic school at Athens, and held this position\ntill his own death twenty years later[17]. Amongst his friends and pupils\nwere men who took a leading part in the government of their native\ncities[18].\n\n\n[Sidenote: His ethical teaching.]\n\n=114.= Panaetius may well be regarded as the founder of Roman Stoicism,\nand is of special interest to us as the writer of the treatise (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2) which Cicero has freely translated in his _de Officiis_. He\nsets before us Stoicism as the school which will train the scholar,\nthe gentleman, and the statesman, whilst he shrinks from those bolder\ndoctrines, borrowed from the Cynic school, which conflict with that\nwhich is conventional, or, as their opponents say, with that which is\nbecoming. The central doctrine that virtue is knowledge, and is the sole\nand sufficient good, he accepts as the plain teaching of nature; and with\nit the paradox that the wise man never errs[19]. Yet even these maxims\nare somewhat toned down as he expresses them; and external advantages\nappear to him worthy of pursuit, not only as giving a meaning to virtue\nand providing a field for its exercise, but also for their own sake, so\nlong as they do not conflict with virtue[20]; and he perhaps hesitated\nto assert positively that \u2018pain is no evil[21].\u2019 In his treatises the\nfigure of the wise man is withdrawn to the background; he is practically\nconcerned only with the \u2018probationer\u2019 (\u1f41 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd), who is making some\nadvance in the direction of wisdom. This advance is not made by acts of\nperfect virtue, but by regular performance of \u2018services\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\n_officia_), the simple and daily duties which come in the way of the good\ncitizen[22]. Further, scientific investigation must not become the main\nend of life, as perhaps it seemed to Aristotle; it is permitted only as\na recreation in the well-earned intervals between the calls of active\nlife[23].\n\n\n[Sidenote: His views on physics.]\n\n=115.= It does not appear that Panaetius devoted much attention to\nlogic[24]; on the other hand he was much occupied with that part of\nphilosophy which deals with the history of the universe and its\ngovernment by divine providence[25]. The Heraclitean theory he appears\nto have left altogether on one side; for he rejected the theory of\nthe conflagration[26], as Boethus had done before him, accepting the\nobjection of Carneades that \u2018if everything turned into fire, the fire\nwould go out for lack of fuel[27].\u2019 He therefore joined the Peripatetics\nin holding that the universe is immortal[28]; but since again Carneades\nhas shown that \u2018no living thing is immortal,\u2019 it follows that the world\nis not an animal, nor is the deity its soul[29]. Upon all these subjects\nPanaetius ceased to maintain Stoic doctrines; and, alone amongst Stoic\nteachers, he \u2018suspended his judgment\u2019 as to the reality of divination[30].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Concession in ethics.]\n\n=116.= Similar concessions to his opponents mark his treatment in detail\nof ethics. Thus he takes from Aristotle the view that \u2018virtue is a\nmean between two vices\u2019; and this doctrine, so alien from true Stoic\nprinciple, forms the basis of the treatment which we find adopted in\nthe _de Officiis_. The theory of the four \u2018cardinal virtues,\u2019 Wisdom,\nJustice, Courage, and Soberness, was probably common property at\nthis time; but whereas in Cynism Courage and in the earlier Stoicism\nWisdom are the dominant virtues, in the theory of Panaetius Soberness,\nidentified with decorum, far exceeds the rest in practical importance.\nThus the triumph won by Panaetius for the name of Stoicism was purchased\nby the sacrifice not only of its physics, but very largely of its ethics\nalso; and the success of the new system might not unfairly be described\nas a victory of literature over logic, of reasonableness over reason,\nand of compromise over consistency. However this may be, Panaetius\nundoubtedly succeeded in presenting Greek philosophy to his Roman\nfriends in a form in which it recommended itself alike to their reasoning\npowers and to their moral sense.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Posidonius.]\n\n=117.= The virtual, though not the nominal, successor of Panaetius was\nPOSIDONIUS of Rhodes[31] (circ. 135-51 B.C.[32]), who after studying\nunder Panaetius at Athens travelled widely, finally settling at Rhodes,\nand there took an active part in political life. Like his master, he was\na devoted student of Plato, and he wrote a commentary on the _Timaeus_.\nIn this commentary he developes a new theory of the universe, which he\nasserts to be that which Plato had learnt from the Pythagoreans, and to\nbe at root the same as that taught by the Stoics. The starting-point is\nthe \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2 or unit; from this are evolved the numbers and the elements\nby a principle of flux, as in the system of Heraclitus[33]. The unity\nand the first of the numbers, the two, differ as force and matter; so\nthat the dualism of Aristotle is here definitely subordinated to a\nsupreme monism. This study of Posidonius is therefore incidentally of\nhigh importance as a side-light on Stoic metaphysics and cosmology. In\naddition he wrote on almost all the principal divisions of philosophy,\nthus acquiring a brilliant reputation, particularly in the eyes of the\nphilosophic nobles of Rome. Cicero made his acquaintance at Rhodes in\n78 B.C., and refers to him more often in his works than to any other of\nhis instructors[34]. Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put\nhimself to much trouble to visit him[35]. Amongst his Roman visitors and\nadmirers were also Velleius, Cotta, and Lucilius[36]. A century later,\nSeneca looked back to him as one of those who had made the largest\ncontribution to philosophy[37].\n\n\n[Sidenote: His teaching.]\n\n=118.= As compared with the more scientific Panaetius, Posidonius marks\na reaction in favour of the religious side of Stoicism[38]. Thus it\ncomes about that Cicero bases on his work \u2018on gods\u2019 (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd) his own\nstatement of the Stoic theology in the second book of his _de Natura\ndeorum_[39]. Posidonius restores the theory of Divination, as to which\nPanaetius had held the gravest doubts[40]. He strongly asserts the divine\norigin of the soul, and accepts the Persian view that in this life it is\nimprisoned in the body[41]. He affirmed the future conflagration[42], and\nfound this theory not inconsistent with a belief in the pre-existence and\nthe immortality of the individual soul.\n\nIn physics and logic alike Posidonius upholds the doctrine of the Logos,\nand it appears that it passed directly from him to Philo of Alexandria,\nand so into Judaeo-Christian speculation. In ethics he maintained the\nsufficiency of virtue[43], and re-defined it in the spirit of Cleanthes\nrather than of Chrysippus[44]. In the practical application of such\ndoctrines to cases of conscience he disliked the lax views of Diogenes,\nand sided rather with Antipater and Panaetius[45]. Finally he held that\nthe ideal Republic had already been achieved in the golden age, when the\nwise had ruled for the protection and happiness of their subjects[46].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Hecato.]\n\n=119.= HECATO of Rhodes was also a pupil of Panaetius: he wrote books on\nethics and casuistry which were largely used by Cicero and by Seneca,\nboth of whom frequently refer to him by name. In laying the foundations\nof his ethics he distinguishes between the \u2018theoretic virtues,\u2019 such\nas Wisdom, Justice, Courage and Soberness, which call for the assent\nof the individual, and are possessed only by the wise man, and the\ncorresponding \u2018non-theoretic virtues,\u2019 which are dispositions of body\nfound also amongst the unwise; as health which corresponds to temperance,\nand so forth[47]. By this extension of the conception of virtue the\ndoctrine of its sufficiency is rendered easy of acceptance[48]. In the\npractical application of his theory he laid great stress on the doctrine\nof \u2018relations\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), that is on duties towards parent, wife, child,\nslave, country, and so forth[49]. In order to be in a position to perform\nthese duties a man is entitled to care for his own life and property[50].\nHe need not be too careful to provide for his slaves if provisions are\ndear[51]; nor should he too hastily give up for another his chance of\nescape from a shipwreck[52]. Hecato therefore seems rather to side with\nDiogenes in questions of casuistry, taking a lax view where Antipater and\nPanaetius would be inclined to a more altruistic standpoint.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The unsectarian philosopher.]\n\n=120.= The three teachers of Rhodes appear to us as men of great learning\nand of wide interests, and not without original force; on the other hand\nwe cannot say that they made any very large contributions towards the\ndiscussion of the great problems of philosophy. Apart from them we find\nlittle trace of creative ability in the school during the first century\nB.C. There were however numerous teachers occupied in expounding and\ndefending the doctrines of the school, and their special interest lay in\nthe controversies between the Porch and the Academy. From these there\nresulted a temporary fusion of the two schools. Their respective names\nand dogmas remained unaltered; but attention was no longer given to the\ngreat differences of principle which divided them. Learning, politics,\nand social influences alike were at work, not to solve the great\ncontroversies, but to throw a mist over them. From these circumstances\nthere emerged the type which we now call the \u2018eclectic,\u2019 but which\nthe Romans called simply the \u2018philosopher\u2019; that is, the man who drew\npractical wisdom from all sources alike, binding himself to the dogmas of\nno school, but winning his way by aptness of discourse and sympathy of\nmanner to social importance[53]. We have but a limited interest at the\npresent day in these ephemeral reputations; the type is still with us,\nboth in the preacher whose sympathies are given with equal readiness to\nhalf-a-dozen warring denominations, and in the politician who emphasizes\nhis connexion by birth with three or four nationalities and as many\ngrades of society. Nor are we called upon to question the usefulness of\nthis blurring of differences. We must however remark that so far as our\nimmediate subject is concerned, the fusion was equivalent to a defeat\nof Stoicism by the Academy. That nothing can be definitely proved; that\na man may choose his principles at the bidding of his fancy; that an\nargument may be sufficiently sound for practical purposes even when there\nexists a counter-argument of almost equal strength; that the problems of\ndialectics, physics, and ethics may be discussed separately, instead of\nbeing treated as parts of one whole; all these are the points for which\nthe Academic contended with as much consistency as his system allowed,\nand which every philosopher, whether or not he called himself a Stoic,\nconceded when he began to combine the teachings of diverse systems.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.]\n\n=121.= After the death of Panaetius the school at Athens appears to have\nbeen conducted by DARDANUS and MNESARCHUS, both of Athens, jointly[54];\nlater we find at its head DIONYSIUS of Cyrene, who enjoyed a great\nreputation as a mathematician, and was a vigorous opponent of Demetrius\nthe Epicurean[55]. About the same time[56] ATHENODORUS the elder of\nTarsus (circ. 130-60 B.C.) became librarian at Pergamus; he made use of\nhis position to erase from Zeno\u2019s works those passages (probably from the\n_Republic_) which were repugnant to the Stoic teaching of his own time;\nhe was however detected and the passages in question were restored[57].\nIt appears also that he counselled withdrawal from the vexations of\npublic life, a policy by no means consistent with the teaching of Zeno,\nand for which he is rebuked by Seneca[58]. From him we first hear the\npractical precept which both Seneca and Juvenal echo, to ask nothing of\nthe gods that you cannot ask openly[59]. In his old age he left Pergamus\nand came to reside at Rome with M. Porcius Cato in B.C. 70. Amongst the\nyounger friends of Cato were ANTIPATER of Tyre, who wrote on practical\nethics, and died at Athens about 45 B.C.[60]; and APOLLONIDES, with whom\nhe conversed on the subject of suicide shortly before his death[61]. From\nDIODOTUS Cicero received instruction in Stoicism before 88 B.C.[62];\nhe conceived a great affection for him, and invited him to live in his\nhouse[63]: he remained there till his death in 59 B.C., when he left\nCicero a considerable property[64]. In his old age he was blind, but\nhe continued his studies, and in particular that of mathematics, as\nardently as ever[65]. APOLLONIUS of Tyre wrote a biography of Zeno,\nfrom which Diogenes Laertius often quotes[66]. To this period perhaps\nbelongs HIEROCLES, who was bitterly opposed to Epicurus on account of his\nchoosing pleasure as the end of life, and still more for his denial of\nprovidence[67].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cicero.]\n\n=122.= We have little reason to regret that only fragments at most remain\nto us of the works of these philosophers, since CICERO presents to us a\ncomprehensive view not only of the doctrines they professed, but also\nof the criticisms which their opponents passed upon them, and again of\nthe replies they made to these criticisms. In carrying out this work for\nStoicism and its rival systems Cicero not only created the philosophic\nterminology of the future by his translations of technical terms from\nGreek into Latin, but also established a new style of philosophic\ndiscussion. By the friendly tone of his dialogues, placed in the mouths\nof men whose common interest in Greek studies made the divergencies of\nthe schools to which they belonged a secondary matter; by the amplitude\nof his style, which gives itself time and space to approach a difficult\nconception from many points of view; and by the simplicity of his\nlanguage and illustrations, which assumes that every philosophical\ncontention can be plainly and forcibly put before the average man of\nletters, he has set an example of the art of exposition which has perhaps\nnot been surpassed since[68]. His most systematic expositions of Stoic\ndoctrine are as follows. In the _Academica_ a general view of Zeno\u2019s\nteaching is given by M. Varro (i 10, 35 to 11, 42), and the Stoic logic,\nas accepted by Antiochus[69], is defended by L. Licinius Lucullus (ii\n1, 1 to 19, 63). In the _de Natura deorum_ (bk ii) the Stoic physics\nis explained by Q. Lucilius Balbus; in the _de Finibus_ (bk iii) the\nStoic ethics by M. Porcius Cato, as the most distinguished Roman who has\nadopted them as a standard of life. In the _de Officiis_ Cicero adopts\nthe form of a letter addressed to his son when studying at Athens, and\navowedly adapts the substance of the work of Panaetius already mentioned,\nsupplementing it from a memorandum of the teaching of Posidonius which\nwas specially prepared for him by ATHENODORUS CALVUS[70]; this book\ndeals with ethics mainly in its practical applications. In many of\nhis other works, such as the _de Amicitia_, _de Senectute_, _Tusculan\ndisputations_, _de Fato_, _de Divinatione_, and _Paradoxa_, Cicero makes\nuse of Stoic material without giving professedly an exposition of the\nStoic system.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Areius Didymus.]\n\n=123.= The school to which Cicero finally attached himself was that\nfounded by ANTIOCHUS of Ascalon (circ. 125-50 B.C.)[71], who under\nthe name of the \u2018old Academy\u2019 taught doctrines which were practically\nindistinguishable from those of the diluted Stoicism which now\nprevailed, avoiding only the dogmatic temper and a few of the paradoxes\nof the Stoics[72]. This appears to have been the prevailing tone of\nphilosophical discussion from the fall of the Republic to the death\nof Augustus. Brutus (the \u2018tyrannicide\u2019), though family and political\nassociations have linked his name with that of Cato, was in his\nphilosophical opinions a follower of Antiochus[73]. Not very different\nwere probably the views of two teachers, nominally Stoics, who held\nhigh positions in the household of Augustus. ATHENODORUS the younger of\nTarsus (possibly the same as the Athenodorus Calvus mentioned in the last\nsection) was a pupil of Posidonius, and whilst teaching at Apollonia\ncounted amongst his pupils Julius Caesar\u2019s great-nephew Octavius, who\nwas afterwards to become the emperor Augustus. Octavius took his teacher\nwith him to Rome, and he had the credit of exercising a restraining\ninfluence on his patron. In B.C. 30 he was sent in his old age to reform\nthe government of his native city Tarsus. He appears to have written\nchiefly on popular moral subjects[74]. AREIUS DIDYMUS of Alexandria[75],\nwho was for a longer period installed in the household of Augustus[76],\nis of interest to us as the first of those who made excerpts from the\nworks of earlier writers, and to him we owe most of the Stoic fragments\nfound in the work of Stobaeus. He probably depended in the first instance\non the writings of Antiochus of Ascalon. He was instrumental in saving\nhis native town Alexandria when taken by Augustus in B.C. 30. It is\nprobable enough that his \u2018Epitome\u2019 was prepared for the use of Augustus,\nand provided the material for philosophical discussions at the banquet,\nsuch as those to which Horace so often refers[77]. Seneca tells us that\nhe was acquainted with the inmost thoughts of the family of Augustus, and\nreports the language in which he consoled Livia upon the death of her\nson Drusus[78] (B.C. 9). He was succeeded by THEON of Alexandria, also a\nStoic, who took a special interest in physiology.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Attalus.]\n\n=124.= We know from Horace that in the time of Augustus Stoic\nphilosophers were found not only at the court, but also in the public\nlecture-room, and at the street-corners. Such were Stertinius[79],\nof whom the commentators say that he was the author of 120 books on\nStoicism[80]; Crispinus[81], said to have been a bad poet[82]; and\nDamasippus[83]. In Horace\u2019s amusing sketches we find the Stoic as he\nappeared to the unconverted. He has sore eyes, or else a troublesome\ncough[84]; he presses his teaching upon his hearers unreasonably and\nunseasonably. But in the reign of Tiberius we find these popular\nlecturers held in very high esteem. One of the most eminent was ATTALUS,\nof whom Seneca the philosopher gives us a glowing account. Seneca was\nthe first each day to besiege the door of his school, and the last to\nleave through it. This philosopher must have exercised an extraordinary\ninfluence over the young men of his time. In his mouth the paradox \u2018the\nwise man is a king\u2019 seemed a modest statement; his pupils were half\ndisposed to regard him as a god[85]. When he declaimed on the misery of\nhuman life, a deep pity for their fellow-men fell upon them; when he\nextolled poverty, they felt disposed to renounce their wealth; when he\nrecommended the simple life, they readily abandoned the use of meat and\nwine, of unguents and of warm baths[86]. Seneca quotes from him in full\nan address on the vanity of wealth, which shews his teaching to be very\nsimilar to that of the more famous Musonius[87]. He attached a special\nvalue to the discipline which hardships bring with them[88]. He incurred\nthe dislike of Seianus, who defrauded him of his property and reduced him\nto the position of a peasant[89].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cornutus.]\n\n=125.= Our attention is next attracted by L. ANNAEUS CORNUTUS (circ.\n20-66 A.D.), who was born in Africa, and entered the house of the Annaei,\npresumably as a slave. There he received his freedom, and became the\nteacher of the two poets Persius and Lucan; of these the former has left\nus an attractive account of his personality[90]. He wrote in Greek, and\none of his works, \u2018On the Nature of the Gods,\u2019 is still extant. This book\nis a development of the system which we see followed by Cicero in the\n_de Natura deorum_ (based upon Posidonius), by which a reconciliation is\neffected between the Stoic physics and the popular mythology. By means of\netymology and allegory, all that is incredible or offensive in the old\nlegends of the gods is metamorphosed into a rationalistic explanation of\nthe phenomena of the universe. Thus Zeus is the soul of the universe,\nbecause he is the cause of life in all living things, Zeus being derived\nfrom \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd \u2018live.\u2019 Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon: Prometheus\nthe providence that rules in the universe. Pan is the universe. Cronos\nconsumes all his offspring except Zeus, for time consumes all except\nwhat is eternal. Hera, the air (\u1f2d\u03c1\u03b1 from \u1f00\u03ae\u03c1) is sister and wife of\nZeus, because the elements of fire and air are intimately associated.\nThe popularity of such a treatise goes far to explain to us the close\nconnexion now becoming established between the Stoic philosophy and the\npractices of Roman religion.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Seneca.]\n\n=126.= Roughly contemporary with Annaeus Cornutus, but perhaps rather\nolder, was the famous Latin writer L. ANNAEUS SENECA (circ. 4 B.C.-65\nA.D.). Born in Corduba in Spain, he may have inherited simple tastes\nfrom his provincial origin; but it was the eloquence of Attalus which\nmoved him to a deliberate choice of the philosophic life[91]. Under\nthis influence he was at one time tempted to throw away his wealth;\nwhilst the Pythagorean philosopher Sotion induced him to become for a\ntime a vegetarian[92]. To the end of his days he adhered to the \u2018simple\nlife\u2019; he felt an aversion to wine, oysters, and all luxurious food; he\ndiscarded hot baths and soft chairs as debilitating; and of perfumes he\nwould have only the best, that is, none at all[93]. He was an ardent\nlover of books, and appears to us as the last Roman who made a systematic\nstudy of Stoicism in the original authorities, and thus grasped the\nsystem in its full extent. He did not however claim, like his teacher\nAttalus, to be a wise man; far from that, he laments that he is still in\nthe deep waters of wickedness[94]. In an age when a governmental career\nwas freely open to talent, Seneca\u2019s powers and industry carried him to\nhigh political station, and greatly increased his inherited wealth. He\nplayed a part in the court of Claudius, and in time became the tutor,\nand ultimately the minister, of Nero. He did not possess the zeal of a\nreformer, and doubtless tolerated many an abuse, and often bowed his head\nbefore power even when linked with tyranny[95]. But if he did not imitate\nthe unbending stiffness of Cato, we have still no reason to credit the\npersonal calumnies that pursued him at court. Had his career as a whole\nbeen a discredit to his philosophical profession, we may feel sure that\nJuvenal would never have overlooked so sensational a contrast. For the\nlast few years of his life he resigned political power, that he might\ndevote himself to what he deemed a more important task, the exposition\nof the practical teaching of Stoicism[96]. Finally he was, or appeared\nto be, drawn into a plot against the emperor, and was called upon in\nconsequence to put an end to his life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His style.]\n\n=127.= The literary style of Seneca was severely criticized by critics\nalmost contemporary with him. Gellius tells us that in his time it was\nby many not thought worth while to read his writings, because the style\nwas found to be vulgar, the matter characteristic of half-educated men,\nthe argument petty and exaggerated[97]. Quintilian finds that much of\nhis work is admirable, but much also is tainted by a striving for cheap\neffect and a want of solid knowledge[98]; and he thinks him in no way\ncomparable to Cicero[99]. This judgment is generally maintained in the\nworld of modern scholarship, with the result that Seneca\u2019s works are\nnot read in our schools and universities, and are little known even to\nprofessional scholars. On the other side we may set the extraordinary\npopularity of Seneca both in his own times[100] and in those of the\nRenascence. It is possible to argue that his style represents the true\ntendency of the Latin language in his day, and that it is in the direct\nline towards the modern style of French prose, generally considered the\nbest in the world. As regards his matter it is not possible to deny\nthat he repeats the same moral teaching many times in slightly altered\nform[101], and that he seldom gives us a continuous or thorough treatment\nof any important subject[102]. His writings may well be compared with\narticles in our periodical literature and the hebdomadal productions\nof our pulpits; they aim at immediate effect rather than at the slow\nbuilding up of ordered knowledge. Just for that reason they admirably\nillustrate for us Stoicism in its practical application to daily life;\nand the extraordinary popularity which they enjoyed for many centuries\nseems to shew that they are in touch with deeply-rooted instincts of\nhumanity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His independence.]\n\n=128.= Seneca claims to be an independent thinker, only adopting the\nviews of Stoic masters because their arguments convince him[103]. Still\nhe does not use the liberty he claims to assert any new principles, but\nonly to deviate occasionally in the direction of popular views. Thus he\nfrequently adopts some dogma of Epicurus or some Cynic paradox to point a\nmoral, and appears unconscious of the deep-lying differences which keep\nthese schools apart from Stoicism; and only in reply to some challenge\ndoes he state with any care the Stoic position. This is particularly\nthe case with the problem of wealth, which both Epicurean and Cynic\ndisparage, but the true Stoic is called upon to defend as a \u2018thing of\nhigh degree.\u2019 Yet when Seneca is called upon to defend his own possession\nof wealth he states his case with admirable clearness.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Weakening of Stoicism.]\n\n=129.= It is perhaps partly due to his style that it appears at times\nas if Seneca\u2019s hold on Stoic doctrine was often weak. He has no real\nbelief in conviction and scientific knowledge: \u2018if we try to be exact\neverywhere, we shall need to keep silence; for there is something to be\nsaid against most statements[104].\u2019 For the detailed Stoic system of\nlogic he feels only contempt[105]. In physics however his interest is\nkeen, probably under the influence of his favourite Posidonius: he sets\nforth with great clearness the theory of tone (\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, _intentio_)[106]:\nhe eloquently maintains the existence of gods, abandoning the\ntraditional proofs, and basing his conviction upon the moral sense in\nman[107]: he holds firmly to the doctrine of the conflagration[108].\nStill we have constant reason to doubt whether these beliefs are linked\ntogether in his mind by any consistent principle. His ethics are marked\nby a similar weakness: the Socratic \u2018strength and force\u2019 is wanting,\nand is replaced by a spirit of quietism and resignation. The important\nposition which he has filled in Roman politics awakens no enthusiasm\nin himself, nor does the greatness of the Roman empire excite his\nadmiration. His heart is in his books; to them he gives up entirely\nhis closing years. His wise man will not go out of the way to mix in\npolitics; rather he will carefully consider how he may avoid the dangers\nof social strife[109]. This enfeebled moral teaching is found also in\nthe successors of Seneca, and in modern literature is constantly quoted\nas true Stoic doctrine. But though Seneca\u2019s philosophy finds him many an\nexcuse for his retirement, he would have been a more faithful disciple of\nZeno and Cleanthes if he had borne the burden of public life to the end.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Musonius.]\n\n=130.= To the same period as Seneca belongs C. MUSONIUS RUFUS, in whom\nhowever we observe distinctly, what we may conjecture had also been\nthe case with Attalus, that ethical teaching is becoming divorced from\nphilosophical theory, and so the Cynic standpoint approached. Musonius\nwas a preacher with a singular impressiveness of address. Speaking\nfrom the heart on matters of direct moral import, he won respect even\nfrom those who were least willing to be guided by him. He disdained\nthe applause of his hearers, desiring instead to see each one tremble,\nblush, exult, or stand bewildered according as the address affected\nhim[110]. \u2018If you have leisure to praise me,\u2019 he said to his pupils, \u2018I\nam speaking to no purpose.\u2019 \u2018Accordingly,\u2019 said one of them, \u2018he used to\nspeak in such a way that every one who was sitting there supposed that\nsome one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing,\nhe so placed before the eyes every man\u2019s faults[111].\u2019 Amongst his pupils\nwere Aulus Gellius the antiquarian, Epictetus, and a certain Pollio who\nmade a collection of his sayings (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u039c\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03bf\u03c5), of which\nextracts have been preserved for us by Stobaeus. They consist of moral\nmaxims (\u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9) such as \u2018Live each day as if your last[112],\u2019 \u2018Nothing\nis more pleasurable than temperance[113],\u2019 and discourses or \u2018diatribes\u2019\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03af) dealing with subjects such as discipline, endurance,\nmarriage, obedience to parents, and so forth[114]. In elevation of\nstandard these writings stand higher than those of the early Stoics; and\nthe influence of Musonius was so great that we may almost regard him as a\nthird founder of the philosophy.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His part in politics.]\n\n=131.= In public life Musonius played a conspicuous part; he was the Cato\nof his generation, trusted by all parties for his absolute rectitude\nof character, and respected for his fearlessness; but he was much less\nout of touch with the real conditions of the Roman world. When in A.D.\n62 Rubellius Plautus found himself unable to quiet Nero\u2019s suspicions of\nhis loyalty, it was believed that Musonius encouraged him to await his\nend calmly, rather than attempt rebellion[115]. After the conspiracy of\nPiso, Musonius was banished from Rome by Nero, together with most of the\neminent personalities of the capital[116]. On Nero\u2019s death he returned\nto Rome, and when the armies of Vespasian and Vitellius were fighting in\nthe suburbs of the city, the senate sent delegates to propose terms of\npeace. Musonius joined them, and ventured to address the common soldiers,\nexpatiating on the blessings of peace, and sternly reproving them for\ncarrying arms. He was roughly handled and forced to desist. Tacitus\nspeaks severely of this unseasonable display of philosophy[117]; and\ncertainly Rome would not have been the gainer if the issue had remained\nundecided[118]. But that such an attempt was possible in defiance of all\nmilitary discipline speaks much both for the courage of the speaker and\nfor the respect in which his profession was held. Musonius continued to\nplay an honourable part in public life during the reign of Vespasian, and\nretained the confidence of the emperor even at a time when his advisers\nsecured his assent to a measure for expelling other philosophers from the\ncapital[119].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Euphrates and Dio.]\n\n=132.= In the reigns of Titus and his successors pupils and converts\nof Musonius played not inconspicuous parts in public life. Amongst\nthem was one EUPHRATES, of Tyre or Epiphania (circ. 35-118 A.D.),\nwho in his day won all hearts and convinced all judgments. \u2018Some\npersons,\u2019 says Epictetus, one of his fellow-pupils, \u2018having seen a\nphilosopher, and having heard one speak like Euphrates\u2014and yet who can\nspeak like him?\u2014wish to be philosophers themselves[120].\u2019 Pliny made\nhis acquaintance in his native land, and was filled with affection for\nthe man. He found his style dignified and sublime; but especially he\nnoticed its sweetness, which attracted even his opponents. His personal\nappearance was even more charming; he was tall, handsome, and the\nproprietor of a long and venerable beard. His private life was beyond\nreproach, and he was devoted to the education of his family of two\nsons and one daughter[121]. He appears to have completely achieved the\nreconciliation of philosophy with worldly success.\n\nMore ascetic in temper was DIO of Prusa (circ. 40-117 A.D.), who was\nfirst an opponent but afterwards a follower of Musonius[122]. A Stoic in\ntheory, a Cynic in practice, he assumed the shabby cloak, and wandered\nas a physician of souls. His eloquence succeeded in calming a mutiny of\nsoldiers which followed on the death of Domitian, and won for him from\na following generation the title of the \u2018golden-mouthed.\u2019 He was held in\nhigh honour both by Nerva and by Trajan. A large number of his harangues\nare still extant.[123]\n\n\n[Sidenote: Epictetus.]\n\n=133.= The influence of such teachers was at any rate widespread, and if\nwe suspect that Stoicism was already losing its intensive force as it\nextended the sphere of its influence, in this it did but obey what we\nshall see to be its own law of creative activity[124]. We still have to\nconsider the two teachers who are of all the most famous and the most\nfamiliar; not however because they most truly express the substance of\nStoicism, but because they have most deeply touched the feelings of\nhumanity. These are EPICTETUS of Hierapolis (circ. 50-130 A.D.) and\nMarcus Aurelius, who later succeeded to the principate. The contrast\nbetween their positions has often excited comment, since Epictetus was\nborn a slave, and only obtained his freedom in mature years, that is,\nafter the death of Nero in 68 A.D. In reality it is characteristic of\nthe times that so many men of foreign and even servile origin rose to\npositions of eminence and became the associates and teachers of men\nof high official rank. In the great slave households, in particular,\nof imperial Rome unequalled opportunities lay open to talent; the\n\u2018educational ladder\u2019 was everywhere set up to encourage the youth to make\nthe best of his gifts. Further, just as young nobles were frequently\nenamoured of slave girls, so far superior to the ladies of their own\nclass in wit, gentleness of manners, and loyalty in the face of all\nterrors and temptations[125]; so their elders found a delight in the\ncompany of the thoughtful and intellectual men who came to the front\nthrough the competition of the slave schools. Thus the emperor Claudius\nchose his ministers amongst his freedmen, provoking thereby the sneers\nof the Roman aristocracy, but greatly advancing the good government of\nthe Roman empire; and it was Epaphroditus, himself a freedman of Nero,\nwho sent the young Epictetus to study at the feet of Musonius Rufus.\nEpictetus was a man of warm feelings and clear head; his addresses,\nrecorded for us by his hearer Arrian, serve admirably to stimulate\nthe domestic virtues and to keep alive the religious spirit; but his\nteaching lacks the force which befits the training of a statesman or a\nking. In logic he inclines too much to suspense of judgment, in ethics\nto resignation. But he did not altogether miss the Socratic force: in\nhis youth he had gone about inquiring of his neighbours if their souls\nwere in good health, and even when they replied \u2018What is this to you, my\ngood man? Who are you?\u2019 he had persisted in giving trouble. Only when\nthey raised their hands and gave him blows had he recognised that there\nwas something wanting in his method[126]. Other young philosophers, he\nfelt, lacked this energy, and were men of words, not deeds[127]. Like\nother philosophers, he was expelled from Rome by Domitian in A.D. 89,\nwhen he retired to Nicopolis; there he gave lectures till the time of his\ndeath[128].\n\n\n[Sidenote: His Cynism.]\n\n=134.= Epictetus was a vigorous opponent of the group of young\nphilosophers who delighted to display their talent upon the intricacies\nof the Stoic logic, and in his early youth he was taken to task by\nhis teacher Musonius for underrating this part of philosophy[129]. He\ncame however to see the great importance of a thorough training in the\nmethods of reasoning, so that in practical life a man should distinguish\nthe false from the true, as he distinguishes good coins from bad. In\nphysics he lays stress chiefly on theology, and the \u2018will of God\u2019 fills\na large place in his conception of the government of the world. In his\ntreatment of practical ethics he makes free use of illustrations from\nthe social life of his own day: he finds examples of Socratic strength\nin the athlete and the gladiator; and he makes it clear that the true\nphilosopher is not (as many believe the Stoics to hold) a man devoid\nof natural feeling, but on the contrary affectionate and considerate\nin all the relations of life. He has a special respect for the Cynic,\nwho appears in his lectures not as the representative of a differing\nphilosophical system, but as philanthropist, teacher, comforter, and\nmissionary. There is indeed in the addresses of Epictetus a complete\nfusion of Stoicism with Cynism; and we trace in them pictures not only\nof the Cynic system as a whole, but also of individual teachers like\nAntisthenes and Diogenes, profoundly different from and much more human\nthan the representations of them familiar through other literature; they\nare in fact pictures of Cynic teachers passed down or idealized by the\nmembers of their own sect. By their side stand the pictures of Ulysses\nthe sage and Heracles the purger of the world, as they must have been\ndescribed from generation to generation by Cynic orators to their hearers\namongst the poor and the unhappy.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Arrian.]\n\n=135.= In the second century A.D. the professed teachers of Stoicism\nmust have been very numerous; with the death of Domitian persecution had\npassed away. The philosophers were everywhere held in high esteem, and\nin turn their whole influence was used in support of the existing state\nof society and the official religion. In the early part of the century\nFLAVIUS ARRIANUS (circ. 90-175 A.D.) is the most eminent of Stoics; and\nit was noted that his relation to his teacher Epictetus much resembled\nthat of Xenophon to Socrates. To him we owe the publication of the\n\u2018discourses\u2019 (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03af) which he heard Epictetus deliver. In A.D. 124,\nwhen lecturing at Athens, he won the favour of the emperor Hadrian, and\nwas appointed by him to high public offices, in which he shewed himself\na wise administrator and a skilful general; in A.D. 130 he received the\nconsulship; and later he withdrew to his native town of Nicomedia in\nBithynia, where he filled a local priesthood and devoted himself to the\nproduction of works on history and military tactics. To Stoic doctrine he\nmade no direct contribution.\n\n[Sidenote: Rusticus.]\n\nAfter Arrian had given up the teaching of philosophy for public life\nQ. JUNIUS RUSTICUS succeeded to the position he left vacant. To him,\namongst other teachers belonging to various philosophical schools, was\nentrusted the education of the future emperor M. Aurelius, who gives us\nthe following picture of the teaching he received:\n\n  \u2018From Rusticus, I first conceived the need of moral correction\n  and amendment; renounced sophistic ambitions and essays\n  on philosophy, discourses provocative to virtue, or fancy\n  portraitures of the sage or the philanthropist; learned to\n  eschew rhetoric and poetry and fine language; not to wear full\n  dress about the house, or other affectations of the kind; in my\n  letters to keep to the simplicity of his own, from Sinuessa, to\n  my mother; to be encouraging and conciliatory towards any one who\n  was offended or out of temper, at the first offer of advances\n  upon their side. He taught me to read accurately, and not to\n  be satisfied with vague general apprehension; and not to give\n  hasty assent to chatterers. He introduced me to the memoirs of\n  Epictetus, presenting me with a copy from his own stores[130].\u2019\n\nIn Rusticus we may confidently trace a successor of the school of\nMusonius and Epictetus.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Marcus Aurelius.]\n\n=136.= M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS PIUS (121-180 A.D.) is commonly spoken\nof as \u2018the philosopher upon the throne,\u2019 but this description may\nbe misleading. Aurelius was in the first instance a Roman prince;\nto the institutions of Rome and to his own position as their chief\nrepresentative he owed his chief allegiance. He was undoubtedly an\napt pupil of the courtly philosophers by whom he was surrounded; he\ndeliberately chose philosophy in preference to rhetoric, and of the\nvarious schools of philosophy his judgment ranked Stoicism highest. He\nwas fairly well instructed, but by no means learned, in its doctrines; he\nadhered with sincerity, but without ardour, to its practical precepts. In\nthe leisure hours of a busy life it was his comfort and his relaxation\nto express his musings in the form of philosophic reflections. But his\nattitude towards Stoicism is always that of a judge rather than that of\nan advocate; and much that the school received as convincing reasoning he\nrejected as ingenious pleading. Hence a large part of Stoic doctrine, and\nalmost the whole of its detailed instruction, disappears from his view;\nbut we have the advantage that the last of the Stoic writers brings out\ninto clearer relief those features of this philosophy which could still\nrivet attention in his own time, and which therefore form part of the\nlast message of the ancient world to the coming generations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His belief in the cosmos.]\n\n=137.= It follows at once from the judicial attitude of Marcus Aurelius\nthat he cannot countenance the Stoic claim to certainty of knowledge. The\nobjection of opponents that the wise man, who alone (according to Stoic\ntheory) possesses such knowledge, is nowhere to be found, is sustained:\n\n  \u2018Things are so wrapped in veils, that to gifted philosophers\n  not a few all certitude seems unattainable. Nay to the Stoics\n  themselves such attainment seems precarious; and every act of\n  intellectual assent is fallible; for where is the infallible\n  man[131]?\u2019\n\nYet Aurelius does not relapse into scepticism. One doctrine at least\nis so convincing that he cannot for a moment doubt it; it does after\nall shine forth as true by its own light. It is that all things are\nultimately one, and that man lives not in a chaos, but in a cosmos:\n\n  \u2018All things intertwine one with another, in a holy bond; scarce\n  one thing is disconnected from another. In due coordination they\n  combine for one and the same order. For the world-order is one\n  made out of all things, and god is one pervading all, and being\n  is one, and law is one, even the common reason of all beings\n  possessed of mind, and truth is one: seeing that truth is the\n  one perfecting of beings one in kind and endowed with the same\n  reason[132].\u2019\n\nFrom the belief in a cosmos he is led on to a trust in Providence;\ntheoretically, because the doctrine of the chance clashing of atoms is\nout of harmony with the belief in ultimate unity; practically, because\nin such a conviction only man can find a starting-point for his own\nactivity. The choice is to him all-important; either Fortune or Reason is\nking, and claims allegiance from all.\n\n  \u2018Is it the portion assigned to you in the universe, at which\n  you chafe? Recall to mind the alternative\u2014either a foreseeing\n  providence, or blind atoms\u2014and all the abounding proofs that the\n  world is as it were a city[133].\u2019\n\n  \u2018The world is either a welter of alternate combination and\n  dispersion, or a unity of order and providence. If the former,\n  why crave to linger on in such a random medley and confusion? why\n  take thought for anything except the eventual \u201cdust to dust\u201d?\n  why vex myself? do what I will, dispersion will overtake me. But\n  on the other alternative I reverence, I stand steadfast, I find\n  heart in the power that disposes all[134].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: His piety.]\n\n=138.= Aurelius makes full use of the Stoic proofs of the existence\nof the gods, but it soon appears to us that his attachment to the\nestablished religion was not in any way founded upon philosophical\narguments. In discussing this point he displays a certain heat which we\nhave not yet had occasion to notice:\n\n  \u2018If indeed they [the gods] take no thought for anything at all\u2014an\n  impious creed\u2014then let us have done with sacrifice and prayer and\n  oaths, and all other observances by which we own the presence and\n  the nearness of the gods[135].\u2019\n\nFinally, he breaks away altogether from philosophy and rests his\nconvictions on personal experience:\n\n  \u2018To those who press the question, \u201cWhere have you seen the gods,\n  whence your conviction of their existence, that you worship them\n  as you do?\u201d I reply\u2014first, they are visible even to the bodily\n  eye; secondly, neither have I set eyes upon my soul, and yet\n  I do it reverence. So it is with the gods; from my continual\n  experience of their power, I have the conviction that they exist,\n  and yield respect[136].\u2019\n\nOne further argument he held in reserve; the sword, the cross, and the\nstake for the \u2018atheists\u2019 who refused to be convinced. He was, after all,\na king[137].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ethics.]\n\n=139.= In ethics, Aurelius states the main principles of Stoicism with\nclearness; but he altogether ignores the Stoic paradoxes, and does not\ntrouble himself with any detailed theory of the virtues and vices.\nFirmness of character is to him the supreme good.\n\n  \u2018Be like the headland, on which the billows dash themselves\n  continually; but it stands fast, till about its base the boiling\n  breakers are lulled to rest. Say you, \u201cHow unfortunate for me\n  that this should have happened\u201d? Nay rather, \u201cHow fortunate,\n  that in spite of this, I own no pang, uncrushed by the present,\n  unterrified at the future!\u201d The thing might have happened to any\n  one, but not every one could have endured it without a pang[138].\u2019\n\nBut in spite of these doctrines, we trace throughout his pages a tinge\nof melancholy. Too apt a pupil of Epictetus, he had learnt from him the\nprinciples of submission and resignation, but he had not acquired the\njoyous confidence of an older period, through which the wise man, even\nif a slave, felt himself a king. Rather, though a king, he felt himself\nin truth a slave and a subject to the universe that was his master. He\nwould not go against the universal order, but he hardly felt the delight\nof active cooperation. In this sense he represents to us the decadence\nof Stoicism, or (to put it more correctly) Stoicism coloured by the\ndecadence of Rome.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Absorption of the soul.]\n\n=140.= On the question of continued existence after death Aurelius takes\nup and emphasizes the teaching of Epictetus, ignoring the fact that other\nStoic teachers, from Zeno to Seneca, had taken larger views or at least\nallowed themselves an ampler language. There had been, indeed, a change\nin the point of view. The early Stoics, occupied with the question of\nphysics, had insisted upon the indestructibility of substance, and the\nreuniting of the \u2018spirit\u2019 (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1) with the all-pervading spirit from\nwhich it came at the beginning. The Roman school concerned itself more\nwith the question of individuality and personality. Accepting fully the\nprinciple that that which is born must die, it comes to the definite\nconclusion that that which we trace from the mother\u2019s womb through\ninfancy and youth, through success and failure in life, through marriage\nand the family ties onwards to weakness and dotage, must reach its end\nin death. The \u2018I\u2019 cannot survive the body. The future existence of the\nsoul, if such there be, is no longer (as with Seneca) a matter of joyful\nexpectation, but of complete indifference.\n\nEpictetus had expressed this with sufficient clearness:\n\n  \u2018Death is a change, not from the state which now is to that which\n  is not, but to that which is not now. Shall I then no longer\n  exist? You will not exist, but you will be something else, of\n  which the world now has need; for you also came into existence,\n  not when you chose, but when the world had need of you[139].\u2019\n\nAurelius constantly repeats the doctrine in varied forms:\n\n  \u2018You exist but as a part inherent in a greater whole. You will\n  vanish into that which gave you being; or rather, you will be\n  re-transmuted into the seminal and universal reason[140].\u2019\n\n  \u2018Death put Alexander of Macedon and his stable boy on a par.\n  Either they were received into the seminal principles of the\n  universe, or were alike dispersed into atoms[141].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Preparation for death.]\n\n=141.= The saddened outlook of Marcus Aurelius upon life harmonizes\nwell with the resignation with which he contemplates a death, which for\nhimself individually will be the end. Hence it is that his reflections so\noften make the thought of death a guiding principle of ethics; he who has\nlearnt to look forward calmly to his last act has learnt thereby to abide\npatiently all the troubles which postpone it. Thus the last message of\nthe princely philosopher, as of his predecessor, is that men should \u2018bear\nand forbear\u2019:\n\n  \u2018Contemn not death, but give it welcome; is not death too a part\n  of nature\u2019s will? As youth and age, as growth and prime, as\n  the coming of teeth and beard and grey hairs, as begetting and\n  pregnancy and the bearing of children, as all other operations\n  of nature, even such is dissolution. Therefore the rational man\n  should not treat death with impatience or repugnance or disdain,\n  but wait for it as one of nature\u2019s operations[142].\u2019\n\n  \u2018O for the soul ready, when the hour of dissolution comes, for\n  extinction or dispersion or survival! But such readiness must\n  proceed from inward conviction[143].\u2019\n\n  \u2018Serenely you await the end, be it extinction or transmutation.\n  While the hour yet tarries, what help is there? what, but to\n  reverence and bless the gods, to do good to men, \u201cto endure and\n  to refrain\u201d? and of all that lies outside the bounds of flesh and\n  breath, to remember that it is not yours, nor in your power[144].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: His yearnings.]\n\n=142.= Aurelius was no teacher of Stoicism in his time: his thoughts\nare addressed to himself alone[145]. But the happy accident that has\npreserved this work, which for nine centuries was lost to sight[146],\nenables us to obtain a view of this philosophy from which otherwise we\nshould have been shut out. We do not go to Aurelius to learn what Stoic\ndoctrine was; this is taken for granted throughout the book; but we can\nsee here how it affected a man in whom the intellectual outlook was\nafter all foreshortened by sympathies and yearnings which had grown up\nin his nature. The traditional criticism of the school as being harsh,\nunsympathetic, unfeeling, breaks to pieces as we read these \u2018thoughts\u2019;\nrather we find an excess of emotion, a surrender to human weakness. A\nstudy of Stoicism based on the works of Aurelius alone would indeed\ngive us but a one-sided picture; but a study in which they were omitted\nwould certainly lack completeness. He is also our last authority. In the\ncenturies which succeeded, other waves of philosophic thought washed\nover Stoicism, and contended in turn with more than one religion which\npressed in from the East. Yet for a long time to come Stoic principles\nwere faithfully inculcated in thousands of Roman homes, and young men\ntaught in childhood to model their behaviour upon the example of Zeno,\nCleanthes, and Epictetus formed the salt of the Roman world. If in riper\nyears they joined, in ever increasing numbers, the Christian church, they\nbrought with them something which the world could not afford to lose.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] Dill, _Roman Society_, p. 340.\n\n[2] \u2018omnis natura habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur\u2019\nCic. _N. D._ ii 22, 57. \u2018est tuae prudentiae sequi eius auctoritatem,\ncuius sectam atque imperium secutus es\u2019 _ad Fam._ xiii 4, 2. \u2018The sense\nof the word has been obscured by a false popular etymology which has\nconnected the word with the Latin _secare_ \u2018to cut,\u2019 Skeat, _Etymological\nDictionary_, p. 537.\n\n[3] See above, \u00a7 111.\n\n[4] \u2018dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria\u2019 A. Gellius _N. A._ vi (vii) 14,\n10.\n\n[5] For a full account of his life and teaching see Schmekel,\n_Philosophie der mittleren Stoa_, pp. 1-9.\n\n[6] Strabo xiv 5, 16.\n\n[7] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 51.\n\n[8] \u2018discipulus Antipatri Panaetius\u2019 Cic. _Div._ i 3, 6.\n\n[9] \u2018credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem omnibus\nlocis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum\nphilosophorum appellat\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.\n\n[10] _Fin._ iv 28, 79.\n\n[11] \u2018tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem\nsententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit\u2019 _ib._\n\n[12] \u1f26\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u1f00[\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba]\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1[\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03b4]\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u0396\u03b7\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd[\u03b5\u03af\u03c9]\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9[\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74]\u03bd \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0]\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.\nInd. Herc. col. 61, quoted by Schmekel, p. 379.\n\n[13] \u2018quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera,\ntum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere\u2019 Cic. _Rep._ i 10, 15.\n\n[14] \u2018ain\u2019 tandem? etiam a Stoicis ista [de optima republica] tractata\nsunt? non sane, nisi a [Diogene Stoico] et postea a Panaetio\u2019 _Leg._ iii\n6, 14.\n\n[15] See below, \u00a7 310, note 52.\n\n[16] \u2018[accepi] Publi Africani in legatione illa nobili Panaetium unum\nomnino comitem fuisse\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 2, 5.\n\n[17] This date is determined on circumstantial evidence by Schmekel, pp.\n2, 3.\n\n[18] \u2018Scylax Halicarnasseus, familiaris Panaeti, excellens in astrologia,\nidemque in regenda sua civitate princeps\u2019 Cic. _Div._ ii 42, 88.\n\n[19] \u2018omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae\ncupidinem; in qua excellere pulchrum putamus; labi autem, errare,\nnescire, decipi, et malum et turpe ducimus\u2019 _Off._ i 6, 18; \u2018cum sit is\n[Panaetius], qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem\nhuic repugnent specie quadam utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem\nvitam fieri, neque decessione peiorem\u2019 _ib._ iii 3, 12.\n\n[20] \u2018quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, id habet hanc, ut opinor,\nsententiam, cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum\nnaturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent\u2019 _Off._ iii 3,\n13.\n\n[21] \u2018Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet ...\nnusquam posuit non esse malum dolorem\u2019 _Fin._ iv 9, 23; see however\nbelow, \u00a7 322, note 132.\n\n[22] See below, ch. xiii.\n\n[23] \u2018cuius [veri investigationis] studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra\nofficium est. virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen\nfit intermissio saepe, multique dantur ad studia reditus\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i\n6, 19.\n\n[24] He was however a skilled grammarian; see Schmekel, p. 207.\n\n[25] He wrote a book \u2018on providence\u2019; how far he or Posidonius is\nCicero\u2019s authority for the treatment of the subject in _Nat. de._ ii has\nbeen much disputed; on this point see Schmekel, p. 8, n. 4.\n\n[26] \u2018id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis\nmundus ignesceret\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 46, 118.\n\n[27] Schmekel, p. 309, and below, \u00a7 211.\n\n[28] \u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd Ar. Did. fr. 36\n(Diels).\n\n[29] Schmekel, p. 309.\n\n[30] \u2018vim esse divinandi [Panaetius] dubitare se dixit\u2019 Cic. _Div._ i 3,\n6.\n\n[31] He came from Apamea in Syria, but is often described as \u2018of Rhodes,\u2019\nas the latter part of his life was spent there.\n\n[32] Schmekel, pp. 9, 10.\n\n[33] _ib._ p. 428.\n\n[34] Reid, _Cic. Acad._ Introd. p. 5.\n\n[35] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ ii 25, 61.\n\n[36] _N. D._ i 44, 123; ii 34, 88.\n\n[37] \u2018ecce Posidonius, ut mea fert opinio, ex his qui plurimum\nphilosophiae contulerunt\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 90, 20.\n\n[38] See below, \u00a7 195.\n\n[39] Also the _de Divinatione_ and the first half of _Tusc. disp._ i;\nSchmekel, p. 98, etc.\n\n[40] \u2018de divinatione libros edidit ... quinque noster Posidonius\u2019 Cic.\n_Div._ i 3, 6.\n\n[41] \u2018animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt, disiunguntque se a societate\ndivina, vinclis corporis impediti\u2019 _ib._ 49, 110.\n\n[42] \u2018deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum\u2019 _ib._ 49,\n111.\n\n[43] See \u00a7 322, note 132.\n\n[44] \u1f41 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 [\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03bd Clem. _Strom._ ii p. 416 B (Schmekel, p. 270); see\nalso below, \u00a7 321, note 125.\n\n[45] Schmekel, p. 62.\n\n[46] See below, \u00a7 214.\n\n[47] Diog. L. vii 90; Schmekel, pp. 291, 292.\n\n[48] Diog. L. vii 127.\n\n[49] Schmekel, p. 294.\n\n[50] See below, \u00a7 352.\n\n[51] \u2018plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum;\nsitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere? in\nutramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate officium\ndirigit magis quam humanitate\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 23, 89.\n\n[52] _ib._ 23, 90.\n\n[53] \u2018nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, | quo me cunque rapit\ntempestas, deferor hospes\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 1, 14 and 15.\n\n[54] \u2018qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 69;\ncf. _de Or._ i 11, 45.\n\n[55] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 52 (Schmekel, p. 16); but see Pauly-Wissowa\ns. v.\n\n[56] i.e. the earlier part of the first century B.C.\n\n[57] Diog. L. vii 34.\n\n[58] \u2018mihi nimis videtur submisisse temporibus se Athenodorus, nimis cito\nrefugisse\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 4, i.\n\n[59] \u2018apud Athenodorum inveni:\u2014tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus\nsolutum cum eo perveneris, ut nihil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis\npalam\u2019 _Ep._ 10, 5. But it is possible that the quotations are from the\nyounger Athenodorus.\n\n[60] Cic. _Off._ ii 24, 86; but some think that Cato\u2019s friend was an\nearlier Antipater.\n\n[61] Plutarch, _Cato minor_ 65-67 and 69.\n\n[62] Reid, _Academics_, p. 2.\n\n[63] \u2018Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi, qui mecum vivit\ntot annos, qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo?\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii\n36, 115.\n\n[64] _ad Att._ ii 20, 6.\n\n[65] _Tusc. disp._ v 39, 113.\n\n[66] vii 1, 2, 24 and 28.\n\n[67] \u2018verba haec Hieroclis Stoici, viri sancti et gravis: \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c1\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u2019 A. Gellius, _N. A._\nix 5, 8.\n\n[68] For a fair-minded estimate of Cicero\u2019s services to philosophy see\nReid, _Academics of Cicero_, pp. 10-28.\n\n[69] See next section.\n\n[70] \u2018de tertio [cum utile et honestum inter se pugnare videantur] nihil\nscripsit [Panaetius]. eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius\nlibrum arcessivi, et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi, ut ad me \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03b1\nmitteret\u2019 Cic. _ad Att._ xvi 11, 4. \u2018Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere;\nmisit enim satis bellum \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u2019 _ib._ 14, 4.\n\n[71] He was head of the Academy at Athens, where Cicero heard him in the\nyear 79-78 B.C., and was patronized by Lucullus.\n\n[72] \u2018eadem dicit quae Stoici\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 69. \u2018erat, si perpauca\nmutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus\u2019 _ib._ 42, 132. See further J. S. Reid,\n_Academics of Cicero_, Introd. pp. 15-19, and notes to _Ac._ ii 39, 123\nand 40, 126.\n\n[73] \u2018Brutus tuus, auctore Aristo et Antiocho, non sentit hoc [sc. nihil\nesse, nisi virtutem, bonum]\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ v 8, 21. \u2018si addubitas, ad\nBrutum transeamus, est enim is quoque Antiochius\u2019 _ad Att._ xiii 25, 3.\nSee also below, \u00a7 432.\n\n[74] \u2018tu nihil errabis, si paulo diligentius (ut quid sit \u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, quid\n\u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae intelligas), Athenodorus Sandonis filius quid de his rebus dicat,\nattenderis\u2019 _ad Fam._ iii 7, 5.\n\n[75] For the identification of the writer Didymus with Areius the\n\u2018philosophus\u2019 of Augustus, see Diels, _Proleg._ pp. 80-88.\n\n[76] \u2018[Augustus] eruditione etiam varia repletus per Arei philosophi\nfiliorumque eius Dionysi et Nicanoris contubernium\u2019 Suet. _Aug._ 89.\n\n[77] _Sat._ ii 6, 73-76.\n\n[78] Sen. _Dial._ vi 4 and 5; see below, \u00a7 377.\n\n[79] \u2018Empedocles, an Stertinium deliret acumen\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 12, 20;\n\u2018insanis et tu, stultique prope omnes, | si quid Stertinius veri crepat\u2019\n_Sat._ ii 3, 32 and 33.\n\n[80] Teuffel, _R\u00f6m. Lit._ 250, 4.\n\n[81] \u2018ne me Crispini scrinia lippi | compilasse putes\u2019 Hor. _Sat._ i 1,\n120 and 121.\n\n[82] Teuffel, as above, 3.\n\n[83] Hor. _Sat._ ii 3.\n\n[84] Hor. _Ep._ i 1, 108.\n\n[85] \u2018sublimem altioremque humano fastigio [Attalum] credidi\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n108, 13.\n\n[86] Sen. _Ep._ 108, 14-16.\n\n[87] _ib._ 110, 14-20.\n\n[88] \u2018Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat; malo me fortuna in castris suis\nquam in deliciis habeat\u2019 _ib._ 67, 15.\n\n[89] Sen. Rhet. _Suas._ 2, 12.\n\n[90] \u2018teneros tu suscipis annos | Socratico, Cornute, sinu ... tecum\netenim longos memini consumere soles, | et tecum primas epulis decerpere\nnoctes. | unum opus et requiem pariter disponimus ambo, | atque verecunda\nlaxamus seria mensa. | ... nescio quod certe est, quod me tibi temperat,\nastrum\u2019 Pers. _Sat._ v 36-51.\n\n[91] See above, \u00a7 124.\n\n[92] Sen. _Ep._ 108, 17.\n\n[93] _ib._ 13-23.\n\n[94] \u2018sapientem esse me dico? minime\u2019 _Dial._ xii 5, 2; \u2018multum ab homine\ntolerabili, nedum a perfecto, absum\u2019 _Ep._ 57, 3; \u2018ego in alto vitiorum\nomnium sum\u2019 _Dial._ vii 17, 4.\n\n[95] \u2018si respublica corruptior est quam ut adiuvari possit, ... non\nnitetur sapiens in supervacuum\u2019 _ib._ viii 3, 3.\n\n[96] \u2018in hoc me recondidi et fores clusi, ut prodesse pluribus possem.\nposterorum negotium ago. illis aliqua, quae possint prodesse, conscribo.\nsalutares admonitiones litteris mando, esse illas efficaces in meis\nulceribus expertus. rectum iter, quod sero cognovi et lassus errando,\naliis monstro\u2019 _Ep._ 8, 1 to 3.\n\n[97] \u2018cuius libros adtingere nullum pretium operae sit, quod oratio eius\nvulgaria videatur et protrita, res atque sententiae aut inepto inanique\nimpetu sint aut levi et causidicali argutia, eruditio autem vernacula et\nplebeia\u2019 A. Gellius, _N. A._ xii 2, 1.\n\n[98] Quint. _Inst. Orat._ x 1, 125-158.\n\n[99] \u2018potioribus praeferri non sinebam\u2019 _ib._ 126.\n\n[100] \u2018tum autem hic solus fere in manibus adulescentium fuit\u2019 _ib._ 125.\n\n[101] \u2018eandem sententiam miliens alio atque alio amictu indutam referunt\u2019\nFronto, p. 157.\n\n[102] How capable Seneca was of continuous exposition we may gather from\nhis excellent discussion of the \u2018causes\u2019 of Aristotle and Plato, in\n_Epistle_ 65: see below.\n\n[103] \u2018non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis\nChrysippive committere, sed quia res ipsa patitur me ire in illorum\nsententiam\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 1; \u2018nostram [opinionem] accipe. nostram\nautem cum dico, non adligo me ad unum aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus. est\net mihi censendi ius\u2019 _ib._ vii 3, 2.\n\n[104] \u2018si omnia argumenta ad obrussam coeperimus exigere, silentium\nindicetur; pauca enim admodum sunt sine adversario\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ iv 5, 1.\n\n[105] \u2018non tempero mihi, quominus omnes nostrorum ineptias proferam\u2019\n_ib._ iv 6, 1.\n\n[106] See the notes to \u00a7 177.\n\n[107] \u2018si hominem videris interritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus,\ninter adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superiore\nloco homines videntem, ex aequo deos, non subibit te eius veneratio? ...\nnon potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare\u2019 _Ep._ 41, 4 and 5.\n\n[108] See below, \u00a7 209, note 112.\n\n[109] \u2018idem facit sapiens; nocituram potentiam vitat, hoc primum cavens,\nne cavere videatur\u2019 _Ep._ 14, 8; \u2018circumspiciendum ergo nobis est,\nquomodo a vulgo tuti esse possimus\u2019 _ib._ 9.\n\n[110] A. Gellius, _N. A._ v 1, 3 and 4.\n\n[111] Epict. _Disc._ iii 23, 29.\n\n[112] Stob. iii 1, 48.\n\n[113] _ib._ 5, 21.\n\n[114] Specimens are given below, especially in ch. xv.\n\n[115] Tac. _Ann._ xiv 59; Henderson, _Nero_, p. 143.\n\n[116] Tac. _Ann._ xv 71.\n\n[117] _Hist._ iii 81.\n\n[118] \u2018reipublicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci\u2019 _ib._ 86.\n\n[119] See below, \u00a7 447.\n\n[120] _Disc._ iii 15, 8; _Manual_ 29.\n\n[121] Pliny, _Ep._ i 10.\n\n[122] \u2018quid nostra memoria Euphrates, Dio, Timocrates, Athenodotus? quid\nhorum magister Musonius? nonne summa facundia praediti, neque minus\nsapientiae quam eloquentiae gloria incluti extiterunt?\u2019 Fronto, _Ep. ad\nAur._ i 1 (Naber, p. 115).\n\n[123] See _Leben und Werke Dion\u2019s von Prusa_, by H. von Arnim. Berlin,\n1898.\n\n[124] See below, \u00a7 216.\n\n[125] See the story of Epicharis in connexion with the conspiracy of\nPiso, in Tac. _Ann._ xv 57.\n\n[126] Epict. _Disc._ ii 12, 17 to 25.\n\n[127] \u2018plerosque istos, qui philosophari viderentur, philosophos esse\neiuscemodi \u201c\u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u201d; id significat \u201cfactis\nprocul, verbis tenus\u201d A. Gellius, _N. A._ xvii 19, 1.\n\n[128] _ib._ xv 11, 4 and 5.\n\n[129] Epict. _Disc._ i 7, 32 and 33.\n\n[130] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, i 7 (Rendall\u2019s translation).\n\n[131] _To himself_, v 10.\n\n[132] _ib._ vii 9.\n\n[133] _ib._ iv 3.\n\n[134] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, vi 10.\n\n[135] _ib._ vi 44.\n\n[136] See further, \u00a7\u00a7 457 and 458.\n\n[137] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, xii 28.\n\n[138] _ib._ iv 49.\n\n[139] Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 93 and 94.\n\n[140] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, iv 14.\n\n[141] _ib._ vi 24.\n\n[142] _ib._ ix 3.\n\n[143] _ib._ xi 3.\n\n[144] _ib._ v 33.\n\n[145] Rendall, _M. Aurelius_, Introd. p. cxii.\n\n[146] _ib._ cxv.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nOF REASON AND SPEECH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Parts of philosophy.]\n\n=143.= The history of Greek philosophy, even before the time of Zeno,\nleads naturally to its division into the three parts of logic, physics,\nand ethics[1]. The Ionic philosophers had chiefly occupied themselves\nwith the nature and history of the universe, that is, with the problems\nof physics. The sophists were greatly concerned with questions as to the\nvalidity of human knowledge, that is, with logic. Socrates shared this\ninterest, but attached greater importance to the discussion of moral\nactivities, that is, to ethics. It is however not clear when a formal\ndivision into these three parts was first made. Cicero attributes it to\nthe immediate followers of Plato in the Academic school; others assign it\ndefinitely to Xenocrates[2]. The Peripatetics and Stoics both adopted the\ndivision, but whereas the former assigned to Logic an inferior position,\nmaking it an introduction to philosophy, the Stoics insist that it is\na part of philosophy itself[3]; and that of the three parts it comes\nfirst in the order of study, \u2018as in the measuring of corn we place first\nthe examination of the measure[4].\u2019 It must not however be thought that\nthe three parts of philosophy can be separately treated, for they are\nintertwined[5]; so that in treating of Logic we shall constantly have\nneed to assume a general knowledge of Stoic views both on physics and\nethics. Logic is subdivided into \u2018dialectic,\u2019 which deals with reasoning,\nand \u2018rhetoric,\u2019 the art of speech. The relation between reason and speech\nwas in ancient times, as now, a matter of perplexity; but it may be taken\nas a fundamental position of Stoicism that the two should always be in\nagreement.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Knowledge is attainable.]\n\n=144.= Stoicism, as one of the positive and dogmatic schools, assumes\nthat knowledge is attainable. Since this is the very point on which\nSocrates never reached assurance, except on the one particular that\nhe himself knew nothing, it was a matter of primary importance to the\nStoics to make good this position; more especially since they held (this\ntime in agreement with Socrates) that virtue is but another form of\nknowledge. Yet the Stoics could not agree with the Cynics, that true\nknowledge can be imparted without a study of its method[6]. Knowledge\nis, in their view, a high privilege derived by man from his divine\nancestry, and shared by him with the deity alone; and the whole duty of\nman may be summed up by saying that he should keep upright his reason[7].\nThey therefore devoted themselves with special zeal to this part of\nphilosophy[8], and were accordingly nicknamed \u2018the dialecticians[9].\u2019\nTheir aim in this was solely the ascertainment and imparting of truth;\nbut the common view that their style was in consequence harsh and\nrepellent will be found to need considerable qualification[10].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Are the senses true?]\n\n=145.= The chief argument for the certainty of knowledge is that we\nassume as much in the practical affairs of life[11]; and (as we have\nalready seen) Aristo found it ridiculous that his Academic neighbour\nshould not even know who he was[12]. Against it is the fact that men\nfrequently disagree even as to what they see, and commonly distinguish\nbetween what is known to them and what \u2018seems\u2019 to be this or that. Hence\nEpictetus well defines the function of dialectic as\n\n  \u2018a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an\n  inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; a condemnation and\n  distrust of that which only seems, and some kind of investigation\n  of that which seems, as to whether it rightly seems: and the\n  discovery of some rule (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03ce\u03bd)[13].\u2019\n\nOf all kinds of knowledge that which comes through the senses appears to\nthe ordinary man most worthy of confidence, and of the five senses that\nof sight seems to the philosopher the most divine[14]. In consequence,\nthe whole controversy hinges on the question whether the eyes can be\ntrusted. The positivist argues that the evidence of sight is so plain and\nunmistakeable that man, if he had the choice, could wish for no better\ninformant. The sceptic replies that nevertheless, if a straight oar be\nplaced partly in the water, it appears to the eyes to be bent; and that\nthe feathers on a dove\u2019s neck, though really alike, appear to the eyes as\nmany-coloured[15]. To deal with such questions we must examine closely\nthe nature of sensation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Process of sensation.]\n\n=146.= The Stoics fancifully derive the word \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (\u2018sensation\u2019) from\n\u03b5\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (\u2018storage\u2019); it is therefore, strictly speaking, the process\nby which the mind is stored[16]; but it is also, from an opposite point\nof view, the process by which the mind reaches out towards an external\nobject[17]. From the object (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) proceed waves which strike upon\nthe sense-organ (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd); this impact is called a \u2018sensation\u2019\nin a narrower sense. At the same time there proceeds from the mind\n(which is the ruling part or \u2018principate\u2019 of the soul), a \u2018spirit\u2019 or\nthrill which goes out to meet this impact; and this spirit and its\noperation are also called \u2018sensation[18].\u2019 As a result of the contact\nof these two waves, and simultaneously with it, there is produced in\nthe soul an effect like the imprint of a seal[19], and this imprint is\nthe \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 or \u2018mind-picture.\u2019 That the process may be sound, it is\nnecessary that the intellect be in a healthy state, and further that\nthe organ of sense be healthy, the object really there, and the place\nand the manner in accord[20]. But we must carefully distinguish between\nthe single sensation and the mind-picture. A flash of light, a cry, a\ntouch, a smell, a thrill of pleasure or pain, is always that which the\nsenses declare it to be[21]; here there is no possibility of error; so\nunderstood \u2018the sensations are always true[22].\u2019 But if we go in each\ncase a step further; if we say \u2018that is white,\u2019 \u2018this is sweet,\u2019 \u2018this is\nmusical,\u2019 \u2018this is fragrant,\u2019 \u2018that is rough,\u2019 we are now dealing with\nmind-pictures, not with \u2018sensations\u2019 in the strict sense[23]. And as to\nthe mind-pictures we agree with the Academics that things are not always\nwhat they seem; \u2018of the mind-pictures some are true, some are false[24].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The criterion of clearness.]\n\n=147.= In order then that we may distinguish the true mind-picture from\nthe false, we have need of a \u2018rule\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03ce\u03bd) or \u2018criterion\u2019 (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd).\nThe true mind-picture is a stirring of the soul, which reveals both\nwhat is taking place in the soul and the object which has caused this:\njust as light reveals both itself and the objects that lie within\nits range[25]. On the other hand the false mind-picture is an empty\ntwitching of a soul which is not in a healthy condition[26]; no real\nobject corresponds to it, but to that which appears to be an object\ncorresponding to it we give the name \u2018phantasm[27].\u2019 When Orestes\nthinks he sees the Furies leaping upon him, though his sister assures\nhim that in real truth he sees nothing, the vision of the Furies is a\nphantasm. The appearances of dreams are equally phantasms[28]. Now a\ntrue mind-picture differs from that of a phantasm by being clearer;\nor, in other words, the distinctive note of a true mind-picture is its\n\u2018clearness\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, _perspicuitas_)[29]. Clearness then is a quality\nwhich attaches itself to a true vision in a way in which it can never\nattach itself to a work of phantasy[30]. To this clearness the mind\ncannot but bow[31]; it is therefore (so far as our study has proceeded)\nthe criterion of truth[32].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Assent.]\n\n=148.= The mind-picture as such is not within a man\u2019s control; but\nit rests with him to decide whether he will give it his \u2018assent\u2019\n(\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _adsensio_ or _adsensus_)[33]. This assent is therefore\nan act of the soul, in its capacity as will; and can only be rightly\nexercised by a soul properly strung, that is, possessed of due tension.\nAssent wrongly given leads to \u2018opinion\u2019 (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1, _opinio_), and all wrong\nassent is error or \u2018sin\u2019 (\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, _peccatum_). This error may take place\nin two directions, either by a hasty movement of the will (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd),\ngiving assent to a picture which is not really clear; or by feebleness of\nwill, which leads to assent in a false direction (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9)[34]. Even\nhaste however is a form of weakness, so that we may say that all opining\nis a weak form of assent[35]. To ensure a right assent due attention\nshould be given to each of its parts; it includes (i) the intention of\nmastering the object (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); (ii) careful attention directed to the\nobject, or \u2018application\u2019 (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae); and (iii) assent in the narrower\nsense[36]. Apart from assent, three courses remain open: these are (i)\n\u2018quiescence\u2019 (\u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _quiescere_): (ii) \u2018suspense of judgment\u2019\n(\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _adsensum sustinere)_, which is a settled quiescence; and (iii)\nnegation[37].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comprehension.]\n\n=149.= Close upon assent follows \u2018comprehension\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2,\n_comprehensio_): this is the ratification of the assent given, the\nfixing irrevocably in the mind of the picture approved. This picture now\nbecomes a \u2018comprehension-picture\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1), and as such a\nunit of knowledge. We may understand thereby that the mind has grasped\nthe external object[38], and this is the plain meaning of Zeno\u2019s simile;\nor we may say that the object has gained a hold upon the mind, and has\nleft its stamp upon it. Both interpretations are consistent with Stoic\ndoctrine: but the former view, which represents the soul as active and\nmasterful, undoubtedly expresses the more adequately the meaning of the\nschool[39]. From this mutual grasp there follows an important physical\ndeduction. Since only like can grasp like, the soul must be like the\nobject, and the popular dualism of mind and matter is (to this extent)\nat an end[40]. Still this likeness is not complete; and the soul in\nsensation does not grasp the object from every point of view, but only\nso far as its own nature permits in each case[41]. For this reason the\ntrained observer and the artist grasp far more of the object than the\nordinary man[42].\n\n\n[Sidenote: From sensation to reason.]\n\n=150.= The soul, having grasped single mind-pictures, retains its\nhold upon them by memory[43]; the frequent exercise of which keeps\neach picture fresh and complete[44]. As the air, when an orchestra is\nperforming, receives the impression of many sounds at the same time, and\nyet retains the distinctive tone of each[45], so the soul by concurrent\nalterations of its texture preserves its hold on the separate pictures\nit has once grasped. Fresh operations of soul now supervene. First, from\nthe comparison of many like pictures, comes \u2018experience\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1,\n_experientia_)[46]; out of other comparisons, \u2018similitude\u2019 (\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2),\nas \u2018Socrates\u2019 from his portrait; and \u2018analogy\u2019 (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, _proportio_),\nas \u2018the centre of the earth\u2019 from that of other spheres; \u2018transference\u2019\n(\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _translatio_), as \u2018eyes in the heart\u2019; \u2018composition\u2019\n(\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _compositio_), as \u2018a Hippocentaur\u2019; \u2018opposition\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n_transitio_), as \u2018death\u2019 from life; \u2018deprivation\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd),\nas \u2018a cripple[47].\u2019 All these are based on the general principle of\nlikeness and unlikeness, and may be summed up under the general heading\nof \u2018reason\u2019s work of comparison\u2019 (_collatio rationis_)[48], or shortly,\nof reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2)[49]. Sensation shews us the present only; but reason\nbrings the past and the future within our view, and points out to us the\nworkings of cause and effect[50].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Perceptions and Conceptions.]\n\n=151.= With the mind-pictures (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9, _visa_) which are derived from\nsensation we may now contrast the \u2018notions\u2019 (\u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, _notiones_ or\n_intellegentiae_) which are derived from the combination of sensation and\nreasoning; the former correspond generally to \u2018perceptions,\u2019 the latter\nto \u2018conceptions\u2019 in the language of modern philosophy[51]. But each of\nthe Stoic terms is also used in a wider sense which includes the other.\nThe sensory pictures are inscribed upon the mind as upon a blank sheet\nfrom birth upwards; in this sense they may well be called \u2018entries on\nthe mind\u2019 (\u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 from \u1f10\u03bd \u03bd\u1ff7)[52]. On the other hand the conceptions may\nbe called \u2018rational mind-pictures\u2019[53]; quite as much as the sensory\nmind-pictures they need the prudent assent of the will before they become\n\u2018comprehensions,\u2019 when they are once more units capable of entering\ninto further combinations and becoming part of scientific knowledge.\nIf then for the sake of clearness we use the modern terms, we may say\nthat perceptions correspond generally to individual objects which have\na real existence, whilst conceptions correspond to classes of things,\nwhich (according to the Stoics) have no real existence in themselves, but\nonly a sort of existence in our minds. Thus the \u2018ideas\u2019 of Plato are all\nconceptions, subjectively but not objectively existent[54]. So far as our\nstudy has gone, all conceptions are based on perceptions: therefore all\nthe elements of knowledge either come from sense and experience solely,\nor from sense and experience combined with reasoning[55]; and the most\nimportant reasoning process is that comparison of like perceptions which\nin this philosophy takes the place of induction[56].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Preconceptions.]\n\n=152.= But even if all \u2018conceptions\u2019 are ultimately derived from\n\u2018perceptions,\u2019 it does not follow that in each particular case the mind\ncommences _de novo_ to collect and shape its material. On the contrary,\nit is clear that not only all practical life, but also all philosophy,\ntakes for granted a great many matters which are either allowed by\ngeneral consent, or at least assumed by the thinker; and these matters\nare mostly of the nature of class-conceptions. If it is stated that\n\u2018the consul entered Rome in a chariot drawn by four horses,\u2019 we assume\nthat the ideas expressed by \u2018consul,\u2019 \u2018chariot,\u2019 \u2018four,\u2019 \u2018horses,\u2019 are\nmatters of general consent, and we may go on to assume that the person\nof the consul and the locality called \u2018Rome\u2019 are also already known to\nthe speaker and his hearers. The general term in the post-Aristotelian\nwriters for such legitimate assumptions is \u2018preconception\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2,\n_anticipatio_ or _praesumptio_). The precise meaning of this term (of\nwhich the invention is ascribed to Epicurus[57]) appears not to be\nalways the same. Most commonly the \u2018preconception\u2019 is a general term\nor conception, and therefore to the Stoics it is one variety of the\n\u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1; it is \u2018a mental shaping, in accordance with man\u2019s nature, of\nthings general\u2019[58]. All such preconceptions are foreshadowings of\ntruth, especially in so far as they correspond to the common judgment of\nmankind[59]; and the art of life consists in correctly applying these\npresumptions to the particular circumstances with which each individual\nman has to deal[60]. If the preconceptions are rightly applied, they\nbecome clearer by use, and thus attain the rank of true knowledge by a\nprocess of development or \u2018unravelling\u2019 (_enodatio_)[61].\n\nAs to the nature of a preconception, there is a great difference\nbetween Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus identifies all the terms\n\u2018preconception,\u2019 \u2018comprehension,\u2019 \u2018right opinion,\u2019 \u2018conception,\u2019 and\n\u2018general notion,\u2019 and maintains that each of these is nothing but memory\nof a sensation frequently repeated[62]; the Stoics however hold that\npreconceptions are established by the mind[63], and (so far as they\nare common to all men) by the universal reason. This difference is\nfundamental. Epicurus, as a materialist in the modern sense, explains\nperception as a bodily function, and \u2018conceptions\u2019 of every kind as mere\nechoes of such bodily functions. The Stoics on the other hand recognise\nat each stage the activity of mind, and this in increasing degree as we\nproceed to the higher levels of thought.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Notions of inner growth.]\n\n=153.= We now approach the most critical point in the Stoic theory of\nknowledge. Is it possible for man to possess knowledge which is not\nderived, either directly or indirectly, through the organs of sense?\nSuch a question cannot be answered by any appeal to single Stoic texts;\nit needs an appreciation of the whole philosophic outlook, and upon\nit depend the most vital principles of the system. Let us then first\nconsider, on the supposition that such knowledge exists, what its nature\nis, what its content, and how it is attained by individual men. Knowledge\ncut off from the sense-organs is cut off from all human individuality;\nit is therefore the expression of the common reason (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), and\nits parts are \u2018common notions\u2019 (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 or \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), shared\nby gods and men, but by men only so far as they are partakers of the\ndivine nature. The principal content of such knowledge is also clear;\nit includes the conception of what is morally good, and the beliefs\nthat gods exist and that the world is governed by their providence[64].\nLastly, as of all general conceptions, the rudiments or rough outlines\nonly of these beliefs are inborn in men, by virtue of their divine\nancestry; whence they are called \u2018innate notions\u2019 (\u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9,\n_insitae notiones_)[65]. These notions in their full development are not\nattainable by children at all, nor by men till they attain to reason,\nthat is, till they become wise men[66].\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u2018Proofs\u2019 of inborn notions.]\n\n=154.= The Stoics are naturally reluctant to admit that doctrines which\nit is impious to deny are nevertheless unattainable except by perfect\nwisdom; but their whole system points inevitably to this conclusion. But\nthere are intermediate stages between the rough inborn outlines of these\ntruths and their ripe completeness. As man grows in reason, he becomes\nincreasingly able to appreciate contributory truths, derived from the\ncombination of perception and reasoning, that is, by processes such as\n\u2018analogy\u2019 and \u2018comparison,\u2019 which point in the direction of the supreme\nbeliefs. In this sense, and (it is here suggested) in this sense only,\ncan there be \u2018proofs\u2019 (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) of these[67]. Only in the crowning\nmoment of that probation which is described later on, at the moment\nof conversion, these truths finally flash forth, stirred up indeed by\nsecondary evidence, but really rooted in the man\u2019s deepest nature[68];\nthey then reveal themselves to the soul with an illuminating power which\nis all their own, but which carries with it the most complete conviction.\nOrdinary men must meanwhile somehow make shift with reflections or pale\ncopies of this knowledge, to which however the name of common or inborn\nnotions can also be applied.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The inward touch.]\n\n=155.= The list of \u2018common notions\u2019 is doubtless not limited to the\nhigh philosophical principles which we have mentioned; for instance it\nmust include such mathematical principles as \u2018two and two make four,\u2019\n\u2018a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,\u2019 \u2018a\nthree-sided figure has three angles,\u2019 and so forth. With these however\nwe have little direct concern. Of more interest to us is another kind of\nperception[69] recognised by the Stoics as well as by other schools of\nphilosophy, that called the \u2018inward touch\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c6\u03ae)[70]. By this the\nsoul becomes aware of its own workings, most obviously of its pleasure\nand pain. The doctrine of the \u2018inward touch\u2019 is of great philosophical\nimportance, for it breaks down the dualism of subject and object, the\nbarrier between the knowing and the known. Since these are the same\nin the specific cases named, the door is open to the conclusion that\neverywhere there is a kinship between the two, and that without this\nknowledge would be without firm foundation. By this kinship we may also\nexplain the fact that direct communications are made by the deity to man,\nas by dreams, oracles and augury[71].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Knowledge; the parts and the whole.]\n\n=156.= Thus it appears that the elements of knowledge, according to the\nStoics, are sensations, perceptions, conceptions or notions, and general\nor inborn notions. As in the other parts of the Stoic philosophy, we\nshall regard this fourfold division as indicating generally the ground\ncovered, and not as setting up definite lines of demarcation. The same\nmaterial may be analyzed from other points of view, as for instance in\nthe study of words, in which we shall find a division into objects,\nstatements, conditional statements, and syllogisms. The elements may\nalso be combined in various ways. A combination or \u2018system\u2019 (\u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1)\nwhich is directed towards a useful or pleasurable object, such as\nmusic or grammar, is called an \u2018art\u2019 (\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7, _ars_)[72]; and arts are\nattainable by ordinary men. The wise man, on the other hand, is not\nnecessarily acquainted with the several arts; his practice is to \u2018keep\nquiet\u2019 when matters are discussed which require such special knowledge.\nThe combination of all knowledge in one all-embracing system is\n\u2018science\u2019 (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, _scientia_); the only science in the full sense is\nphilosophy[73]; and in this system no part can be at variance with any\nother part[74]. The elements of knowledge also acquire the character of\nscience, when they are found to be parts of this compacted system, and\ntherefore incapable of coming into conflict with any other part[75]; and\nin particular we find the term \u2018science\u2019 predicated of comprehensions\nwhich are firmly established and cannot be refuted by any argument[76].\nIn the language of Zeno\u2019s simile, over the closed fist that grasps the\nobject is placed the other hand, keeping it with firmness and assurance\nin its place[77]; or, to use a comparison first suggested in ridicule of\nStoicism, but which by the progress of architectural skill has since then\nbeen made less damaging, science is like a firm and immoveable building\nconstructed upon a shifting foundation[78]. Finally ordinary men can\nreach comprehension, but only the wise man can attain to science[79].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The criterion reviewed.]\n\n=157.= We revert to the difficult problem of the criterion of truth, that\nis, the discovery of a rule by which the true can separated from the\nfalse. Our authorities differ greatly as to what the Stoic criterion is;\nand this vacillation must have placed the Stoics at a great disadvantage\nin their controversy with the Academics, who maintain that there is\nno criterion. The most usual statement is that the \u2018comprehensive\nmind-picture\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) is the criterion; this view is\nexpressly attributed to Chrysippus, Antipater, and Apollodorus[80]. As\nwe have seen, the meaning of this is that a true mind-picture can be\ndistinguished from one that is false by the note of clearness, and this\ngeneral doctrine can be traced back to Zeno[81]. It appears at first\nsight to provide a criterion which can be applied by the percipient at\nthe moment when it is needed, and it was doubtless intended to be a\npractical tool in this sense; but under the pressure of criticism the\nStoics were frequently compelled to modify it. They could not but admit\nthat in the case of dreams and drunken visions it is only at a later\nmoment that the lack of clearness can be appreciated[82]; whereas on the\nother hand a picture may be perfectly clear, and yet the percipient,\nbecause of some prepossession, may not realize this. Such was the case\nwhen Hercules brought Alcestis from the world below; her husband Admetus\nreceived a true mind-picture of her, but put no confidence in it, because\nhe knew her to be dead. It follows that no mind-picture can be implicitly\ntrusted for itself; for our sense organs may be clouded, or our previous\nexperience in conflict with it. If the Academics urged that the sure note\nof clearness is not to be found in the senses[83], the Stoics admitted\nas much when they now said that a true comprehensive picture must come\nfrom a real object[84], when they added the words that \u2018no objection must\narise[85]\u2019; thus really admitting that it must be not only persuasive,\nbut also such as no reasoning process can shake, and such as has been\nexamined from all sides[86]. Thus they shifted the centre of certainty\nfrom the single comprehension to the general field of science; they still\nheld to it in theory, but no longer maintained its practical application.\nFor this too they had the authority of the older masters. For we learn on\nthe authority of Posidonius that \u2018some of the older Stoics\u2019 held the true\ncriterion to be \u2018right reason\u2019 (\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2)[87], and this is equivalent\nto saying that only the deity and the wise man possess the secret[88]. In\na loose sense any important part of the Stoic theory of reason may be\nsaid to be a criterion; thus Chrysippus again said that \u2018the criteria are\nsensation and preconception,\u2019 and Boethus set up many criteria, as mind,\nsense, science, and (in practical matters) appetite[89].\n\n\n[Sidenote: General consent.]\n\n=158.= Seeing that the full assurance of truth is not at every moment\nattainable, it is necessary to be contented from time to time with\nsomething less complete. Amongst such tests the \u2018general consent of\nmankind\u2019 plays an important part, especially in connexion with the dogma\n\u2018that gods exist.\u2019 We may indeed well believe that this criterion was\nnot originally suggested by revolutionary philosophers, but rather by\nconservative advocates of an established religion; and therefore we are\nnot surprised to see it emphasized first by Posidonius and afterwards by\nSeneca[90]. General consent is however by itself no proof of truth, but\nat most an indication of the presence of a \u2018common notion\u2019 in its rough\nshape. If however we see that the \u2018common notion\u2019 grows stronger and more\nclear every day, and if it is the more firmly held as men approach the\nstandard of wisdom, it becomes a strong support[91].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Probability the guide of life.]\n\n=159.= From a very early period, as we have already indicated, Stoic\nteachers accepted probability as the guide of life in its details, being\nperhaps aided by the happy ambiguity of the expression \u2018reasonableness\u2019\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd), which suggests formally the pursuit of reason, but in\npractice is a justification of every course of which a plausible defence\ncan be brought forward. Ptolemy Philopator, we are told, jestingly put\nwax fruit before Sphaerus at his table, and when Sphaerus tried to eat\nit cried out that he was giving his assent to a false mind-picture.\nSphaerus replied that he had not assented to the picture \u2018this is\nfruit,\u2019 but only to the picture \u2018this is probably fruit[92].\u2019 Antipater\nof Tarsus, when he explained that the very essence of virtue lay in\nthe choice of natural ends upon probable grounds[93], was felt to be\ngiving way to Carneades[94]. Panaetius justified the maintaining of that\nwhich is plausible by the advocate, and Cicero, whose own conscience was\nnot at ease in the matter, was glad enough to quote so respectable an\nauthority on his own behalf[95]. In the Roman imperial period a growing\nspirit of humility and pessimism led to a general disparagement of human\nknowledge, centring in attacks on the trustworthiness of the senses.\nSo Seneca speaks of the \u2018usual weakness\u2019 of the sense of sight[96],\nand Marcus Aurelius feels that \u2018the organs of sense are dim and easily\nimposed upon[97].\u2019 The older Stoics had admitted the frequent errors of\nthe senses[98], but they had been confident they could surmount this\ndifficulty. Their latest disciples had lost the courage to do this, and\nin consequence the practice of \u2018suspension of judgment,\u2019 which before\nhad been the exception[99], became with them the rule. Nevertheless\nEpictetus, who alone amongst these later Stoics was an ardent student of\ndialectics, held fast to the main principle that certainty is attainable.\n\u2018How indeed\u2019 he said \u2018perception is effected, whether through the whole\nbody or any part, perhaps I cannot explain, for both opinions perplex me.\nBut that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty[100].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Grammar.]\n\n=160.= Having now dealt with the theory of knowledge, we may consider\nbriefly the subordinate sciences (or rather \u2018arts\u2019) of Grammar, Logic (in\nthe narrower sense), and Style. Here we may leave the technical divisions\nand subdivisions of the Stoics; for these matters are substantially\nindependent of the main lines upon which the ancient philosophies\nparted company, and have for us only a secondary and historical\ninterest. The Stoics distinguish five parts of speech: \u2018name\u2019 (\u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1,\n_nomen_), as \u2018Diogenes\u2019; \u2018class-name\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, _appellatio_), as\n\u2018man, horse\u2019[101]; \u2018verb\u2019 (\u1fe5\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1, _verbum_); \u2018conjunction\u2019 (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2,\n_coniunctio_); and \u2018article\u2019 (\u1f04\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, _articulus_). The last they define\nna\u00efvely as a little word which is all ending, and serves to distinguish\nthe cases and numbers[102]. To the list of the parts of speech Antipater\nadded the \u2018mixed part\u2019 or participle (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2). The noun has four\ncases (\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), the \u2018upright case\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, _casus rectus_;\nthis is of course a contradiction in terms); and the \u2018oblique\u2019 cases\n(\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9), that is the \u2018class\u2019 case (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae), the \u2018dative\u2019 (\u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae), and\nthe \u2018effect\u2019 case (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae). The \u1fe5\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1 or verb is identical with the\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 or \u2018predicate,\u2019 and may take the \u2018active\u2019 form (\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u03ac), the\n\u2018passive\u2019 (\u1f55\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1), or the \u2018neuter\u2019 (\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1); some verbs also express\naction and reaction, and are called \u2018reflexive\u2019 (\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1). The\nStoics also distinguished the tenses. Time (\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) being of three\nkinds, past (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1ff3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2), present (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c2), and future (\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd),\nwe have the following tenses which are \u2018definite\u2019 (\u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9): the\n\u2018present imperfect\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03c2), the \u2018past imperfect\u2019 (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1ff3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03c2), the \u2018present perfect\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f7c\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2), and the \u2018past perfect\u2019\n(\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1ff3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2); in addition to these we have the \u2018indefinite\u2019\ntenses, the future (\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd), and the past indefinite, called simply\nindefinite (\u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)[103].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Theories of speech.]\n\n=161.= So far we find in the Stoic system the general framework of\nthe grammar of the period, much of it adapted with modifications\nfrom Aristotle. In some other details points of real grammatical or\nphilosophical interest are raised. Such is the controversy between\n\u2018anomaly,\u2019 the recognition of the individuality of each word in its\nflexion, and \u2018analogy,\u2019 in which the validity of the rules of declension\nand conjugation is insisted upon. Two Stoic masters, Chrysippus and\nCrates of Mallos, took up the cause of \u2018anomaly[104].\u2019 Further the Stoics\nheld that all correct language exists by nature (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9), and not by\nconvention (\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9), as Aristotle had maintained; the elements of language\nbeing imitations of natural sounds[105]. Further, they held that the\nnatural relation between \u2018things\u2019 (\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, _significata_) and the\nwords that express them (\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, _significantia_) can frequently be\ndetermined by etymology; for instance \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae \u2018voice\u2019 is \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u2018the mind\u2019s\nlamp,\u2019 \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd \u2018age\u2019 is \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u1f44\u03bd \u2018enduring for ever[106].\u2019 Like Heraclitus and\nAristotle, the Stoics distinguished between \u2018thought\u2019 (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2,\n_ratio_) and \u2018speech\u2019 (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2, _oratio_), which the Greek\nword \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 tends to confuse[107]; thought is immaterial, but speech, as\nconsisting of air in motion, is body[108]. Young children and animals do\nnot possess real speech, but only \u2018a sort of speech[109].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Propositions and Syllogisms.]\n\n=162.= Words in combination form statements, questions, wishes,\nsyllogisms, and so forth[110]; there is therefore no clear line drawn\nbetween what we call syntax and logic respectively. Whenever we have\na complete combination of words expressing that which must either be\nfalse or true, as \u2018Hannibal was a Carthaginian,\u2019 \u2018Scipio destroyed\nNumantia,\u2019 we call it a \u2018statement\u2019 or \u2018proposition\u2019 (\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1)[111]; for\nphrases of all kinds we have the more general term \u2018phrase\u2019 (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, _id\nquod dicitur_)[112]. Of special interest is the conditional sentence\n(\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), which has two parts, the conditional clause (\u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) and\nthe contingent clause (\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd). The conditional or leading clause always\ncontains a sign (\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd), by means of which we reach proof: thus in\nsaying \u2018if it is day, it is light\u2019 we mean that \u2018day\u2019 is a sign of light.\nProof is \u2018speech on every subject gathering what is less clear from that\nwhich is more clear[113].\u2019 Its most important form is the syllogism, of\nwhich Chrysippus recognises five forms:\n\n    (i) if A, then B; but A, therefore B.\n   (ii) if A, then B; but not B, therefore not A.\n  (iii) not A and B together; but A, therefore not B.\n   (iv) either A or B; but A, therefore not B.\n    (v) either A or B; but not A, therefore B[114].\n\nAll these matters admit of endless qualifications, subdivisions, and\ndevelopments, and were therefore serviceable to those Stoics who were\nbefore all things makers of books[115]. Examples of Stoic syllogisms have\nbeen given above[116].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fallacies.]\n\n=163.= Closely connected with the theory of the syllogism is the enticing\nsubject of the \u2018resolution of fallacies\u2019 (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), which the\nMegarians had brought within the range of philosophy. To this subject\nthe Stoics gave much attention[117]. The most famous fallacy is that\nof the \u2018heap\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, _acervus_); \u2018if two are few, so are three; if\nthree, then four; and so forth.\u2019 In this Chrysippus took a special\ninterest[118]; his reply was to keep still[119]. Another is the \u2018liar\u2019\n(\u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, _mentiens_); \u2018when a man says \u201cI lie,\u201d does he lie or not?\nif he lies, he speaks the truth; if he speaks the truth, he lies[120].\u2019\nOn this subject Chrysippus wrote a treatise, which Epictetus thought not\nworth reading[121]. Seneca gives us examples of other fallacies, which\nalso are verbal quibbles[122]. Of an altogether different kind are those\nproblems in which the question of determinism as opposed to moral choice\nis involved. Such is the \u2018reaper,\u2019 which maintains \u2018either you will reap\nor you will not reap; it is not correct to say \u201cperhaps you will reap.\u201d\u2019\nSuch again is the \u2018master-argument\u2019 of Diodorus the Megarian, directly\naimed against every moral philosophy[123]. These difficulties we shall\ndiscuss later as touching the supreme problems which are presented to the\nhuman reason[124].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Definition.]\n\n=164.= The scientific study of syllogisms and fallacies promises at\nfirst sight to be a guide to truth and a way of escape from error,\nbut experience shews it nevertheless to be barren. It has however an\nadvantage in securing a careful statement of teaching, and for this\npurpose was much used by Zeno and Chrysippus. The later members of the\nschool realized that this advantage could be more simply gained by the\npractice of careful definition (\u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, _definitio_). Antipater thus\ndefined definition itself: \u2018definition is an expression which elaborates\nin detail without falling short or going too far[125].\u2019 He and all other\nStoics of his time gave numerous definitions of the most important terms\nused in the system, such as God, fate, providence, the supreme good,\nvirtue, and so forth; and these are of great value in giving precision to\ntheir doctrine.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Style.]\n\n=165.= In considering Style we first notice the distinction between\ndialectic in the narrower sense, in which statements are made in the\nshortest and most precise form, and rhetoric, in which they are expanded\nat length[126]. Zeno compared one to the closed fist, the other to the\nopen palm[127]. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote upon rhetoric,\nand it appears to have become a tradition to ridicule their teaching,\nchiefly on the ground of the novel terms which the Stoics introduced,\nas \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2[128]. But it is exactly in these new-fangled\nwords that we observe one of the chief aims of the Stoic theory of style,\nnamely the use of words which precisely and exclusively correspond\nto the objects described (\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, _proprietas verborum_), and\nwhich therefore lead up to transparent clearness of speech (\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1,\n_pellucida oratio_)[129]. To this clearness the study of grammar is\ncontributory; \u2018barbarisms\u2019 (faults in spelling and pronunciation) must be\navoided, with proper help from the doctrines of \u2018anomaly\u2019 and \u2018analogy\u2019;\nfor the Stoics learnt in time that neither of these is exclusively true.\nEqually important is the avoidance of \u2018solecisms,\u2019 or faults in syntax.\nIn this way a pure use of language (\u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, _Latinitas_) is attained;\nthis is largely based upon the example of older writers, such as Homer in\nGreek, and Cato the elder in Latin[130], but not to such an extent as to\nemploy words not commonly intelligible. But little more is needed; the\nStoic will say what he has to say with \u2018brevity\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, _brevitas_);\nthe graces of style will be represented by \u2018becomingness\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd,\n_decorum_) and \u2018neatness\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ae), the latter including euphony.\nThese virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well, which is\nneither more nor less than speaking truthfully[131]; for the Stoic needs\nonly to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to amuse\nhim or to excite his emotions[132]. Style has three varieties, according\nas it is employed in the council, in the law-courts, or in praise of\ngoodness and good men[133]; in the last there was no doubt greater room\nallowed for that expansiveness of speech which the Stoics specially\ndesignated as \u2018rhetoric.\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoic orator.]\n\n=166.= The \u2018Stoic style\u2019 was a severe intellectual and moral discipline.\nThe speaker was called upon under all circumstances to speak the truth,\nthe whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing\nfrom his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their\nreligious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of decency;\nhe could add no word which would touch their sympathies or kindle their\nindignation in the direction he himself might wish. He had always before\nhis eyes the example of Socrates\u2019 defence before the Athenian jury and\nits result. The Stoic appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and\nrather rugged speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the\ncircumstances demanded[134]. Even the Stoics of the transition period,\nin spite of their Academic leanings and their literary acquirements,\nmade this impression at Rome. Diogenes, who had himself done much to\nelaborate the theory of style, was noted as a quiet and self-restrained\nspeaker[135]. The influence of Panaetius may be traced in his friend\nLucilius, who in his book on style is never tired of ridiculing the\nartifices of rhetoricians. Then followed a succession of these reserved\nspeakers, which we shall trace in another chapter, leading up to Cato of\nUtica, by far the best-known and the most ridiculed of them all[136].\n\nIt is not easy to form a fair judgment of the merits of the Stoic style.\nIt must be admitted that the works of Chrysippus are not readable; but\non the other hand Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, Musonius Rufus, and\nEpictetus were all writers or speakers of great attractiveness[137].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Paradox.]\n\n=167.= In connexion with style we may call attention to the important\nfunction of paradoxes (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1, _inopinata_), that is, propositions\ncontrary to common opinion. Since all philosophies conflict with common\nopinion, they must necessarily include many paradoxes[138]. The chief\nStoic paradoxes are those which were borrowed directly from the Cynic\nschool, and indirectly from the teaching of Socrates[139]: and Cicero\ndevotes a special work to their defence. He includes the following: (i)\nthat only what is honourable is good; (ii) that virtue is sufficient\nfor happiness; (iii) that right actions and offences are equal; (iv)\nthat all foolish men are mad; (v) that the wise man alone is free and\nevery foolish man a slave; (vi) that the wise man alone is rich. These\nof course include the very pith and marrow of Stoic ethics; and the form\nis calculated to arrest the attention of the crowd and to challenge\ndefiantly its cherished opinions. The Stoics of literary taste and social\nposition usually shew some distaste for paradoxes, and prefer to state\ntheir teaching in ways more obviously reasonable. But it should hardly\nbe necessary to explain that no paradox is complete in itself, but each\nneeds to be interpreted according to the principles of the school which\npropounds it. In proportion as the doctrines of any school win general\nrecognition, its paradoxes tend to find ready acceptance, and may\nultimately become truisms[140].\n\nThe treatment of myths as allegories[141] may also be considered as\nthe use of a kind of paradox; this we shall find it most convenient to\ndiscuss in connexion with Stoic views upon the nature of the gods.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dangers of logic.]\n\n=168.= The study of logic is at first sight dismal and repulsive; when\nprogress has been made in it, it seems illuminating; in the end it\nbecomes so alluring, that the would-be philosopher may easily be lost\nfor ever in its mazes[142]. The early Stoics had pressed this discipline\nupon their pupils; those of the Roman period, themselves (with the\nexception of Epictetus) weak dialecticians, never cease to warn their\nhearers against its fascinations. So Seneca tells us that many logical\ninquiries have nothing to do with real life[143]; and that the older\nStoics had wasted much time over them[144]; Epictetus complains that\nhis hearers never get beyond the resolving of syllogisms[145], and M.\nAurelius thanks the gods that he never wasted his time in this way[146].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoic and Academic logic.]\n\n=169.= It was a favourite contention of Cicero, adopted from his teacher\nAntiochus, that the Stoic dialectic was no original system, but only a\nmodification of the views of the old Academy[147]. Such a conclusion\nseems partly due to the fact that the Stoics of his own time had\nlargely borrowed from the Academic system in detail; and partly to the\noverlooking by Antiochus of an essential difference of spirit between\nthe two schools. Plato is speculative, Zeno positive; Plato plays\nwith a dozen theories, Zeno consistently adheres to one. Plato ranks\nthe mind high, Zeno the will; Plato bases his system on the general\nconcept, Zeno on the individual person or object. It would seem that\nno contrast could be more complete. Nor does Zeno\u2019s theory agree with\nthat of Epicurus. Both indeed are positive teachers, and hold that the\nsenses are messengers of truth. But here Epicurus stops, whilst Zeno\ngoes on. We have to understand rightly the functions and limitations of\nthe senses, or we shall quickly glide into error; we have also to learn\nthat the senses are but servants, and that the mind rules them as a\nmonarch by divine right, coordinating the messages they bring, shaping\nthem according to its own creative capacity, even adding to them from\nthe material it has derived from its source. The Stoic theory is in\nfact a bold survey of the results of the reflection of the human mind\nupon its own operations; it has, as we might expect, many gaps, a good\ndeal of overlapping description, and some inconsistencies. To sceptical\nobjections it is of course unable to give answers which are logically\nsatisfactory; but its general position proved acceptable to men who\nsought in philosophy a guide to practical life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Questions of temperament.]\n\n=170.= In the approximation between Stoicism and the Academy which\ncharacterizes the first century B.C., the Stoic logic obtained in the\nend the upper hand; and the logic of the so-called \u2018old Academy\u2019 founded\nby Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless the\nobjections urged against it by Cicero represent not only his reason\nbut also his sentiments. The positive system appears at its best in\nthe education of children; and even at the present day the theory of\nknowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools is substantially that\nof the Stoics. It leads to careful observation, earnest inquiry, and\nresolute choice; and thus lays the foundation of solidity of character.\nBut it must be admitted that it also works in the direction of a certain\nroughness and harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded\nman lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, which he\nis bound to regard as both foolish and wicked; but he is also blind to\nthat whole side of the universe which cannot be reduced to syllogistic\nshape. Thus we may account for the indifference or hostility with which\nmost Stoics regarded both literature and art[148]. The Academic, on the\nother hand, even if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both\nsides of every question, was saved by his critical powers from extreme\nassertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate appreciation\nof the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the formal differences of\nthe two schools there lies a difference of character. We have long\nsince learnt that the fundamental questions between the two schools are\nincapable of solution by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate\nthe one without condemning the other. In practical life each theory has\nits appropriate sphere; but the Romans were hardly in the wrong when in\nmatters of doubt they leaned towards the Stoic side.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] \u2018[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes\ndiviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niv 2, 4.\n\n[2] Sext. _math._ vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).\n\n[3] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf Philopon. _ad Anal._ pr.\nf. 4a; Stein, _Psychologie_ ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.\n\n[4] Epict. _Disc._ i 17, 6.\n\n[5] Diog. L. vii 40.\n\n[6] \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd [\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u039a\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.\n\n[7] \u03c4\u03af\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5; \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b2\u03c9\u03bd; \u03bf\u1f54, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u03af \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2; \u03bc\u03ae\n\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b2\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1; \u03bf\u1f54, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd Epict. _Disc._ iv 8,\n12.\n\n[8] \u2018Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi\u2019 Aug. _Civ. De._\nviii 7.\n\n[9] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 66.\n\n[10] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 164, 165.\n\n[11] \u2018hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt\nfunditus\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 31.\n\n[12] See above, \u00a7 93.\n\n[13] Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 13.\n\n[14] \u2018Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant\u2019 Chalc. _in Tim._\n266 (Arnim ii 863).\n\n[15] Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.\n\n[16] Arnim ii 458.\n\n[17] \u2018mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est,\nnaturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii\n10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and\nsensation as automatic.\n\n[18] \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Diog. L. vii 52.\n\n[19] Cleanthes called it \u2018imprint\u2019 (\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); Chrysippus, lest the word\nimprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it \u2018alteration\u2019\n(\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) Sext. _math._ vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); \u2018visum objectum\nimprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem\u2019 Cic. _de\nFato_ 19, 43.\n\n[20] Sext. _math._ vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); \u2018ita est maxima in sensibus\nveritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et\nimpediunt\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.\n\n[21] \u2018idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui\nin sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius\u2019 _ib._\n\n[22] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 9, 4;\n\u2018[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.\n\n[23] \u2018sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam\nmodo sensibus, ut haec: \u201cillud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,\nhoc bene olens, hoc asperum.\u201d animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non\nsensibus\u2019 _ib._ 7, 21.\n\n[24] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); \u2018Zeno\nnonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 25, 70.\n\n[25] \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2\u00b7 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 is technically called the \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, but also \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd Sext.\n_math._ vii 426.\n\n[26] \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f11\u03bb\u03ba\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 A\u00ebtius _plac._ iv 12, 4.\n\n[27] _ib._ 12, 5.\n\n[28] \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cc\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f35\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f55\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\nDiog. L. vii 50.\n\n[29] \u2018visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae\npropriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur\u2019 Cic.\n_Ac._ i 11, 41; cf. \u00a7 105.\n\n[30] On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged;\nsee above, \u00a7 84.\n\n[31] \u2018necesse est animum perspicuis cedere\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 12, 38.\n\n[32] \u2018perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per\nsese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet\u2019 _ib._ 14, 45.\n\n[33] \u2018adsensio nostra erit in potestate\u2019 Cic. _Fat._ 19, 43; \u2018adsensio\nnon [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam\n[habet], non principalem\u2019 _ib._ 18, 42; \u2018[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit\nanimorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i\n11, 40.\n\n[34] \u03b4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6 Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut. _Sto.\nrep._ 47, 10.\n\n[35] \u2018opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem\u2019 Cic. _Tusc.\ndisp._ iv 7, 15; \u2018opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque\ncommunis\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 41; so Sext. _math._ vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).\n\n[36] Epict. _Disc._ i 21, 2.\n\n[37] _ib._ i 18, 1; Sext. _math._ vii 416.\n\n[38] \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd Nem. _nat. hom._ vii p. 175\nM (Stein, _Psych._ ii 135).\n\n[39] Cicero\u2019s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps\nthe object: \u2018[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno]\ncomprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur\u2019\nCic. _Ac._ i 11, 41. See further Stein, _Psych._ ii 174, and R. D. Hicks,\n_Stoic and Epicurean_, p. 71.\n\n[40] This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato\u2019s\n_Timaeus_: \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\n\u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 Sext. Emp. _math._ vii 93. See also\nbelow, \u00a7 266.\n\n[41] \u2018comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis\nvidebatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia\nnihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 42.\n\n[42] Diog. L. vii 51; \u2018quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in\neminentia, quae nos non videmus!\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 20.\n\n[43] \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd Sext. _math._ vii 373 (Arnim i 64);\n\u2018[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit,\ne quibus memoria oritur\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 30.\n\n[44] \u2018quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam\nsubducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit\u2019 Sen.\n_Ben._ iii 2, 3.\n\n[45] So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext. _math._ vii 231.\n\n[46] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bd\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\nA\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 11, 2.\n\n[47] Diog. L. vii 52.\n\n[48] The details of this list are variously given: e.g. \u2018cum rerum\nnotiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut\nconiunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii\n10, 33.\n\n[49] Diog. L. vii 52.\n\n[50] \u2018homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia\ncernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones\nnon ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque\nadnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 4, 11.\n\n[51] So Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 79.\n\n[52] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc7 \u1f41 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv\n11, 1. The metaphor of the _tabula rasa_ can be traced back to Plato and\nAristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke\npresumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this\nmetaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use\nit, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining\nimpressions. See Stein, _Psych._ ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.\n\n[53] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd ... \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f31\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd Diog. L. vii 51.\n\n[54] \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd A\u00ebt.\n_plac._ i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.\n\n[55] \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f22\n\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 Sext. _math._ viii 56 (Arnim ii\n88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.\n\n[56] \u2018cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 10,\n30.\n\n[57] Cic. _N. D._ i 17, 44.\n\n[58] \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 Diog. L. vii 54;\n\u2018notionem appello quam Graeci tum \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd tum \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd; ea est insita et\npraecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens\u2019 Cic. _Top._ 7,\n31; \u2018nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam\nnec quaeri disputarive potest\u2019 _Ac._ ii 7, 21. See also A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv\n11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must\nnot be called \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[59] \u2018There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted\nsee by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the\nmind is named common sense (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2)\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 8. See\nalso below, \u00a7 158.\n\n[60] \u2018We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the\npreconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things\nconformably with nature\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 2, 6.\n\n[61] See Cic. _Top._ above, note 58.\n\n[62] Diog. L. x 33.\n\n[63] \u2018cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus\nefficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 tum \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 vocant\u2019\nCic. _Ac._ ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two\nterms see Prof. Reid\u2019s note.\n\n[64] See notes to the next section.\n\n[65] \u2018rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit\n[qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae\u2019 Cic. _Leg._ i\n9, 26; \u2018quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae\nintelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur\u2019 _ib._ i 10, 30; \u2018As to\ngood and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we\nought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate\nidea of them?\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 3.\n\n[66] \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 ... \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f11\u03b2\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b4\u03b1 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 11, 4; \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u1f11\u03b2\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b4\u03b1\n\u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 _ib._ v 23, 1.\n\n[67] \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 52; \u2018collatione\nrationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum\nnaturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni\npervenit\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 33; \u2018nobis videtur observatio collegisse et\nrerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum\net honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac\ncogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his\ncollegimus esse et animi robur\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 120, 4; \u2018de bonis ac malis\nsensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest\nferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo\narbitra est bonorum ac malorum\u2019 _ib._ 66, 35.\n\n[68] \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd Diog. L. vii 53.\n\n[69] For the classification as a sensation see above, \u00a7 146.\n\n[70] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5 (sc. Aristotelis) \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u2018\u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd\u2019\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f23\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv\n8, 7; \u2018quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut\ndoloris aut voluptatis?\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken\nfor the perception of an external object, is an \u2018empty twitching\u2019:\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f43 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f11\u03bb\u03ba\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Sext. _math._ vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks, _Stoic\nand Epicurean_, p. 110.\n\n[71] \u2018visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur,\nquaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 15, 47.\n\n[72] Arnim ii 93 and 95; \u2018ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una\naut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 7,\n22; \u2018ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque\nefficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis\u2019 _N.\nD._ ii 59, 148.\n\n[73] Arnim ii 95.\n\n[74] \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Epict. _Disc._ i 22, 1.\n\n[75] \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7\n\u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f10\u03be \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see\nalso Wachsmuth\u2019s crit. note).\n\n[76] \u2018scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam\nstabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 8,\n23; \u2018quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut\nconvelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat\u2019 _ib._ i 11,\n41; \u2018quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo\ncomprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus\u2019 _ib._ ii 37, 119.\n\n[77] See above, \u00a7 77.\n\n[78] Plut. _comm. not._ 47, 4.\n\n[79] Sext. _math._ vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); \u2018scientiam, cuius compotem nisi\nsapientem esse neminem\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 145.\n\n[80] Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.\n\n[81] See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, \u00a7 84.\n\n[82] \u2018omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa\ncogitatione informantur, ... sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per\ninsaniam. nam ab omnibus eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus\ntenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... itaque, _simul ut experrecti_ sumus\n[ex somno], visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea quae in foro\ngessimus\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 17, 51.\n\n[83] \u2018[ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam,\nquae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam\u2019 _ib._ ii 32, 103; \u2018dicunt\n[Academici] hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non\neodem modo falsum etiam possit videri\u2019 _ib._ 11, 33.\n\n[84] \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\nDiog. L. vii 54. This view is attributed to Zeno himself: \u2018visum [Zeno\nita definiit] ex eo, _quod esset_, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et\neffictum\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 24, 77.\n\n[85] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03bd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 Sext.\n_math._ vii 253.\n\n[86] \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 Sext. _math._ vii\n181. Such was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344).\n\n[87] Diog. L. vii 54 (see \u00a7 80, note 68).\n\n[88] \u2018posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 21,\n67.\n\n[89] Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, p.\n70.\n\n[90] \u2018multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos\nveritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esse _inter\nalia_ hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est ... neminem\ninvenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere bonum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n117, 6.\n\n[91] \u2018opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat\u2019 Cic. _N.\nD._ ii 2, 5.\n\n[92] Diog. L. vii 177.\n\n[93] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd Plut.\n_comm. not._ 27, 9.\n\n[94] \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd] \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03bd\u03b5\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b9\u03b5\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b4\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 _ib._ 27, 15.\n\n[95] \u2018iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam\nverisimile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere ... non\nauderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio\u2019 Cic. _Off._ ii\n14, 51.\n\n[96] \u2018visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ i 2, 3.\n\n[97] _To himself_, v 33.\n\n[98] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 146, 147.\n\n[99] \u2018sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 17, 53.\n\n[100] Epict. _Disc._ i 27, 17.\n\n[101] The distinction between \u2018name\u2019 and \u2018class-name\u2019 was due to\nChrysippus: see Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i p. 144.\n\n[102] Diog. L. vii 58.\n\n[103] For these and further particulars see Sandys, _Classical\nScholarship_, i ch. ix; R. Schmidt, _Stoicorum Grammatica_, pp. 18 sqq.\n\n[104] \u2018Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo,\nqui reliquit \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 III libros, contra analogiam atque\nAristarchum est nixus\u2019 Varro _L. L._ ix 1 (Arnim ii 151).\n\n[105] Orig. _cont. Celsum_ i 24 (Arnim ii 146).\n\n[106] Varr. _L. L._ vi 11 (Arnim ii 163).\n\n[107] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 73, n. 2; Aristotle\u2019s distinction is\nbetween \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd and \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03c9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[108] \u2018vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera\u2019\nA. Gellius, _N. A._ v 15, 6.\n\n[109] \u2018hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut\nloqui; ... sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari,\nverba non esse verba\u2019 Varro _L. L._ vi 56 (Arnim ii 143).\n\n[110] Diog. L. vii 63 to 78.\n\n[111] Varro translates this by \u2018proloquium\u2019 (Gell. _N. A._ xvi 8, 8),\nCicero provisionally by \u2018pronuntiatum\u2019 (_Tusc. disp._ i 7, 14).\n\n[112] A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase \u2018complete in\nitself\u2019 (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c2) A. Gellius _N. A._ xvi 8, 4.\n\n[113] Diog. L. vii 45.\n\n[114] _ib._ 80 and 81.\n\n[115] \u2018ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur\u2019 Cic. _Top._ 14,\n57.\n\n[116] \u00a7 83.\n\n[117] \u1f14\u03bb\u03c5\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd] \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f10\u03ba\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 Plut. _Sto. rep._ 8, 2.\n\n[118] \u2018inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi\u2019 Pers. _Sat._ vi 80.\n\n[119] \u2018placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint\nanne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere\u2019 Cic.\n_Ac._ ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext. _math._ vii 416.\n\n[120] \u2018si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?\u2019\nCic. _Ac._ ii 29, 95.\n\n[121] Epict. _Disc._ ii 17, 34.\n\n[122] \u2018mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit\n... o pueriles ineptias!\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 48, 6 and 7; \u2018quod non perdidisti,\nhabes; cornua autem non perdidisti; cornua ergo habes\u2019 _ib._ 49, 8.\n\n[123] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq.\n\n[124] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 220, 221.\n\n[125] Diog. L. vii 60.\n\n[126] \u2018omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et\ninterrogantem discissa; hanc \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd, illam \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd placuit vocari\u2019\nSen. _Ep._ 89, 17.\n\n[127] Cic. _Orator_ 32, 113.\n\n[128] \u2018scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam; sed sic, ut\nsi quis obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo\nmodo loquantur; nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iv 3, 7.\n\n[129] Diog. L. vii 59.\n\n[130] \u2018uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi\u2019 Front. et\nAur. _Ep._ ii 13.\n\n[131] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f56 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Anon. _ad Herm.\nRhet. Gr._ vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue; \u2018[Stoicis] hanc habeo\ngratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse\ndixerunt\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 65.\n\n[132] \u2018fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris\nofficium docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant,\nprimum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem\na veritate pelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret, et\nvoluptatem audientium petere ... vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur\u2019\nQuint. _Inst. or._ v Prooem.\n\n[133] Diog. L. vii 42.\n\n[134] \u2018orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum;\nsed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi,\nobscurum, inane, ieiunum, attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo\npossit\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 66.\n\n[135] \u2018dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria\u2019 A. Gellius, _N. A._ vi 14, 10.\n\n[136] See below, chap. xvi.\n\n[137] See Smiley, _Latinitas_ and \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2.\n\n[138] \u2018Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as\nCleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv\n1, 173; \u2018where is the wonder if in philosophy many things which are true\nappear paradoxical to the inexperienced?\u2019 _ib._ i 25, 33.\n\n[139] \u2018ista \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1 quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica\u2019 Cic.\n_Parad._ Prooem. 4.\n\n[140] \u2018nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile\u2019 Cic.\n_Parad._ Prooem. 3; \u2018Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam\nmirabile quam prima facie videtur, adprobabo\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 87, 1.\n\n[141] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., pp. 354-370.\n\n[142] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xvi 8, 16 and 17.\n\n[143] \u2018quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra\nvitam iacent\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ vi 1, 1.\n\n[144] \u2018multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae\ndisputationes, quae acumen inritum exercent\u2019 _Ep._ 45, 5.\n\n[145] \u2018We terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able\nto expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the\nhypothetical syllogism\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv 4, 14.\n\n[146] \u2018Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for\nphilosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring\nover essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculation\u2019\nM. Aurelius _To himself_ i 17.\n\n[147] \u2018verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat,\ncorrectionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam\nputandam [Stoicorum rationem]\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 12, 43.\n\n[148] \u2018tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur,\nsimillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter\nnos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et\nstatuas insanimus, carius inepti? illos reperti in litore calculi leves\ndelectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 115, 8. This tone\nis clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates.\nA modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation: \u2018all the\nnastiness and stupidity which you call science and art\u2019 (Count Leo\nTolstoy in the _Westminster Gazette_, Sept. 3, 1910).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Physics.]\n\n=171.= Under the general heading of Physics the ancients included a\nnumber of subjects which in modern times form independent branches\nof philosophy. Cleanthes subdivided the subject into Physics proper\nand Theology[1]. Here it will be convenient to make a larger number\nof subdivisions, so as to treat separately of (i) the Foundations of\nPhysics, generally called (after Aristotle\u2019s treatise) \u2018Metaphysics\u2019;\n(ii) Physics proper, that is, the account of the Universe and its\nhistory; (iii) the final problems involved in the history of the\nUniverse, such as its government by Divine Providence, the Existence\nof Evil, Free-will, and Chance; (iv) the problems of Religion, such as\nthe existence of gods, their number, character, and claims on mankind;\nand (v) the nature of Man, including the modern subjects of Psychology\nand Physiology, and to some extent of Anthropology also, treated by the\nStoics as a Kingdom governed by the Soul. According to Stoic principles\nthese subjects cannot be separated one from the other, or from the other\nparts of philosophy; and therefore in treating each one we shall, as\nbefore, assume a general knowledge of all the others. The Stoics laid\ngreat stress upon the study of Physics, as the only sound basis for\na scientific rule of human conduct; and some of them (beginning with\nChrysippus), having especial regard to the elevated dignity of the study\nof Theology, were disposed to rank this branch of philosophy as the\nhighest and last of its three principal divisions[2]. We shall however,\nin accordance with a view more generally held, reserve the last place for\nEthics[3].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fundamental Conceptions.]\n\n=172.= To the earlier Greek philosophers, as we have already seen, it\nappeared that a single bold intuition was enough, or almost enough, to\ndiscover a sufficient foundation upon which to construct a reasoned\naccount of all things. Thus the Ionic philosophers took up as such a\nfoundation one or more of the elements of air, fire, and water. But as\nsoon as these three, together with earth, were recognized as \u2018elements\u2019\nexisting side by side, it became necessary to dig deeper, so as to\nsecure a foundation for these as well. Thus Democritus resolved all\nfour into \u2018atoms\u2019 and \u2018void\u2019; his theory was taken over by Epicurus,\nand remains to this day not only the most popular solution of the\nproblem, but also that which (till quite recently) was tacitly assumed\nas the basis of all scientific investigation. Anaxagoras, working on\ndifferent lines, began his account of the universe with \u2018mind\u2019 on the\none hand and a primal conglomerate \u2018matter\u2019 on the other; a doctrine\nevidently based upon the popular dualism of soul and body, and still\nthe basis of all transcendental philosophy and established religious\nconceptions. This Aristotle varied by assuming rather an \u2018active\u2019 and a\n\u2018passive\u2019 principle, force which works and matter upon which it works.\nBesides these conceptions many others need to be considered, which if\nnot absolutely fundamental, are nevertheless matters of discussion in\nall philosophical schools, as those of motion, space, time, soul, body,\nGod, the universe, cause, effect, will and necessity. In this way the\noriginal inquiry into the foundation of the universe developes into a\ngeneral study of fundamental conceptions; and it is at this stage that it\nis taken over and dealt with by Stoicism, which adds to the list certain\nconceptions on which it lays a special stress and to which it gives a\ncharacteristic colour; such are those of \u2018body,\u2019 \u2018spirit,\u2019 and \u2018tone.\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoic monism.]\n\n=173.= The fact that the Stoics use from time to time the language of\nother schools or of popular speculation does not necessarily imply\nthat this language is an adequate statement of their doctrine; and we\nfrequently[4] find that the discussion of particular problems seems\nto be based on dualisms, though these are in the end subordinated\nto monistic statements. Thus in logic we have already noticed the\nsharp contrast between the perceiving mind and the external object\nof perception (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd); nevertheless mind and object are\nultimately declared to be akin[5]. So in particular the popular dualism\nof \u2018soul\u2019 and \u2018body\u2019 is often accepted by the Stoics, and yet as steadily\nsuperseded by the paradox that \u2018soul is body.\u2019 The reason given for\nthis is that \u2018body is that which acts and is acted upon[6]\u2019; and this\nstatement in the end overrides the Aristotelian distinction of force and\nmatter, active principle and passive principle. \u2018Body,\u2019 as conceived by\nthe Stoics, is the one ultimate element, the foundation and beginning\nof the universe; it contains within itself the capacity of action, and\nnothing but \u2018body\u2019 has this capacity. Body, and nothing but body, exists\nin the true sense; that certain other things have a quasi-existence (as\nwe shall see later in this chapter) is an embarrassment which only brings\ninto clearer relief this distinctive feature of the system. The Stoic\n\u2018body,\u2019 though it is also called \u2018matter\u2019 (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, _materia_), must not\nbe confused with the \u2018matter\u2019 of modern philosophy, which has derived\nfrom Aristotle the implication of passivity[7]; much more closely it\ncorresponds with the \u2018stuff\u2019 by which modern monistic philosophers denote\nthe substratum of mind and body alike. To call the Stoics \u2018materialists\u2019\nwill generally prove misleading; it is the Epicurean system, to which the\nStoics were sharply opposed, which (as we have seen)[8] corresponds to\nmodern materialism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The nature of \u2018body.\u2019]\n\n=174.= The conception of \u2018body\u2019 therefore replaces in the Stoic system\nthe various elements which the Ionic philosophers assumed as the basis\nof the universe, and combines both parts of such dualistic elements\nas were assumed by Democritus, Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Since it is\nthe foundation of all things it must be capable of taking very various\nshapes. In logic we have met with it under the name of the \u2018substratum\u2019\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, _id quod est_)[9], but it none the less includes the\n\u2018subject\u2019 or feeling and reasoning mind. In the universe as a whole it\nis \u2018essence\u2019 (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _essentia_); in its parts it is \u2018matter\u2019 (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7,\n_silva_)[10]; but it also appears, possessed of intelligence, as the\ndeity[11], and again is identified with \u2018breath\u2019 or \u2018spirit[12],\u2019 and\nthrough this with the human soul[13]. Even in ethics it has its place;\nfor all causes are bodily, and not least \u2018the good\u2019 and the respective\nvirtues, all of which are bodies, for they act upon body[14]; similarly\nthe emotions such as anger and melancholy, are of the nature of body[15].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Motion, space and time.]\n\n=175.= The Stoic \u2018body\u2019 in all its transformations is active and alert.\nIt contains in itself the principle or power of movement; for though we\nobserve that one body is set in motion by another, yet this could not be\nthe case unless in the beginning there had been a body which had movement\nof itself[16]. As to the nature of the primal movement, the Stoics\nagree with Anaximenes that it may be described as alternate rarefaction\nand condensation. Rarefaction is a wave or \u2018spirit\u2019 spreading from the\ncentre to the extremities; condensation is a contrary movement from the\nextremities to the centre[17]. The extension of body is \u2018space,\u2019 which\ntherefore does not exist of itself, but only as a function of body[18].\nWhere there is no body (and body is limited), there is no space, but only\nthe \u2018boundless void\u2019 beyond the universe[19]; of this we cannot say that\nit \u2018exists\u2019; rather it \u2018not exists.\u2019 Time also does not exist of itself,\nbut only in the movement of body[20]. Neither space nor time existed\nbefore the universe, but have been all along bound up with it[21].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Body comprises life and thought.]\n\n=176.= In almost every particular we find a sharp contrast between\nthe Stoic conception of \u2018body\u2019 and the Epicurean \u2018atom.\u2019 The atom is\nextremely small and entirely unchangeable; \u2018body\u2019 is immensely large\nand in a high degree plastic. Atoms alternate with void; but \u2018body\u2019\nspreads continuously throughout the entire universe; it can never be\ntorn apart or show a gap[22]. Atoms move downwards in parallel straight\nlines; \u2018body\u2019 moves from the centre to the circumference, and thence\nreturns to the centre. Two atoms can never occupy the same space; but\n\u2018body\u2019 everywhere moves through body, penetrating it and combining with\nit throughout its whole extent[23]. The atom is a convenient hypothesis\nwithin the range of modern physical and chemical science; the conception\nof \u2018body\u2019 gains force as we enter the region of biology. For life also\nis a movement which proceeds from a warm centre (and warmth is body\nrarefied), and extends towards a circumference which is in comparison\ngross and cold[24]. Going further, we find that \u2018body\u2019 and its functions\nare so interpreted as to provide a key to the activities of the human\nreason and will.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Tone or tension.]\n\n=177.= To the central conception of body are attached in the Stoic\nsystem various supplementary conceptions, which serve to bring into\nclearer view its nature and powers. Of these the most characteristic\nis that of \u2018tone\u2019 or \u2018strain\u2019 (\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, _intentio_). This term appears\noriginally to have expressed muscular activity[25], and was next used\nby the Cynics to denote that active condition of the soul which is the\ntrue end of life; \u2018no labour,\u2019 said Diogenes, \u2018is noble, unless its end\nis tone of soul[26].\u2019 Although we cannot trace the term \u2018tone\u2019 directly\nto Zeno, we find that he explains sleep as a relaxation of the soul,\nsubstantially agreeing with later writers who call it a \u2018relaxation of\nthe sensory tone around the soul[27].\u2019 With Cleanthes the word becomes\nfairly common, first in the ethical application, in which \u2018tone\u2019 is \u2018a\nshock of fire, which if it be strong enough to stir the soul to fulfil\nits duties is called strength and force[28],\u2019 and then in physics to\nexplain the unceasing activity of the universe[29], personified by\nHercules in Stoic allegorical theology[30]. In later writers tone becomes\nconstantly associated with the \u2018spirit\u2019 or \u2018thrill\u2019 which explains both\nthe unity and the movement of all things[31], so that \u2018tone of spirit\u2019 or\n\u2018thrill-tone\u2019 (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, _intentio spiritus_) explains to us\nthe operations of body and mind alike[32].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The seed power.]\n\n=178.= Body however is not only active but creative; there is inherent\nin it a power, which is that of the \u2018seed\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1, _semen_), and which\nis most conspicuously illustrated in the seed of animals and plants. It\nis the characteristic of seed that from a small beginning it developes a\ngreat plan, and that this plan never changes[33]. This plan or purpose\nis named by the Stoics its \u2018reason\u2019 or \u2018word\u2019 (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), and at this point\nStoicism incorporates the doctrine of the \u2018Word\u2019 or universal reason with\nwhich it became acquainted through Heraclitus. The \u2018Word\u2019 or \u2018seed-power\u2019\n(\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2) of the universe is one; it is the primal fire in\nits work of creation; it is Zeus the Creator who moulds gross matter\ninto the things that are to be[34]; it is wisdom which plies matter\nas it will[35]. But there are also in individual objects, animate and\ninanimate, indestructible seed-powers, countless in number, displayed\nalike in growth, procreation, and purpose[36]; these seed-powers are, as\nit were, spirits or deities, spread throughout the universe, everywhere\nshaping, peopling, designing, multiplying; they are activities of fiery\nspirit working through tension[37] in its highest development. But the\nseed-power of the universe comprehends in itself all the individual\nseed-powers; they are begotten of it, and shall in the end return to it.\nThus in the whole work of creation and re-absorption[38] we see the work\nof one Zeus, one divine Word, one all-pervading spirit[39].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cause.]\n\n=179.= Closely akin to the theory of \u2018seed-powers\u2019 and the Word is that\nof \u2018cause\u2019 (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, _causa_). Aristotle had already explained this term\nin connexion with cosmogony, laying down that, in order that a universe\nmay come into being, three \u2018causes\u2019 are required; matter, without which\nnothing can be made; a workman, to make things; and the form or shape,\nwhich is imposed on every work as on a statue. To these may be added a\nfourth cause, the purpose of the work. Thus to produce a statue we need\nthe bronze, the artist, the design, and the fee. Grammatically these\ncauses may be expressed by the help of prepositions, as the _ex quo_, _a\nquo_, _in quo_ and _propter quod_[40]. To this theory of multiple causes\nthe Stoics oppose the doctrine of a single \u2018first cause,\u2019 the maker of\nthe universe. This first cause can be none other than the primal creative\nfire in a new aspect; equally it is the creative Word.\n\nIt seems well to translate here in full the argument of Seneca on\nthis point, for it stands almost alone as an example of his powers in\ncontinuous exposition:\n\n  The Stoic dogma is that there is one cause only, the maker.\n  Aristotle holds that cause is threefold. \u2018The first cause,\u2019 he\n  says, \u2018is the material itself, for without it nothing can be\n  made. The second cause is the maker. The third is the design,\n  which is impressed on every single work as on a statue;\u2019 this\n  Aristotle calls the \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2. I will now explain what he means.\n\n  The bronze is the first cause of a statue; for it could never\n  have been made, had there not been stuff to be cast or wrought\n  into shape. The second cause is the sculptor; for the bronze\n  could never have been brought into the shape of a statue without\n  the artist\u2019s touch. The third cause is the design; for the\n  statue would not be called the \u2018javelin-man\u2019 or the \u2018crowned\n  king\u2019 had not such a design been impressed upon it.\n\n  There is besides a fourth cause, the purpose. What is purpose?\n  It is that which induced the sculptor to undertake the work, the\n  aim that he had in view. It may have been money, if he intended\n  to sell it; or glory, if he wished to make himself a name; or\n  religious feeling, if he proposed to present it to a temple. That\n  for the sake of which a thing is done is therefore also a cause;\n  for you cannot think it right in making up a list of causes to\n  omit something, apart from which the thing would never have been\n  made.\n\n  Thus Aristotle postulates a multiplicity of causes; but we\n  maintain that the list is either too long or too short.\n\n  If we hold that everything, apart from which the thing would\n  never have been made, is a cause of its making, then the list is\n  too short. We ought to reckon time as a cause, for nothing can be\n  made without time. We ought to reckon space as a cause; for if\n  there is no room for a thing to be made, it will certainly not\n  be made. Movement too should be placed in the list; for without\n  movement nothing can be produced or destroyed; without movement\n  there can be neither art nor change.\n\n  We Stoics look for a first and general cause. Such a cause must\n  be single, for the stuff of the universe is single. We ask what\n  that cause is, and reply that it is the creative reason, the\n  deity. The various causes in the list that has been made are\n  not a series of independent causes, but are all variations of a\n  single cause, namely \u2018the maker[41].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Causation and free-will.]\n\n=180.= Although the \u2018first cause\u2019 and the \u2018Word\u2019 are thus formally\nidentified, their associations in connexion with cosmogony are very\ndifferent. For whereas the \u2018Word\u2019 suggests reason and purpose, and leads\nup to the dogma that the universe is governed by divine providence, the\nterm \u2018cause\u2019 suggests the linking of cause and effect by an unending\nchain, the inevitable sequence of events which leaves no room for effort\nor hope. These terms therefore point to the supreme problems of Fate and\ndivine Purpose, Determinism and Free-will, and as such will be discussed\nin a later chapter[42]. Here it is sufficient to note that the Stoics\nnot only accept, but insist upon the use of terms suggesting both points\nof view, and look therefore beyond their immediate opposition to an\nultimate reconciliation; and that the importance attached to the doctrine\nof a \u2018single and general cause\u2019 by no means excludes a multiplicity of\nindividual causes depending upon it, and capable of classification\naccording to their relative importance[43].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The categories.]\n\n=181.= Thus the conception of \u2018body,\u2019 so simple to the plain man,\nbecomes to the philosopher manifold and intricate. Its interpretation\nis to some extent brought into harmony with common speech through the\ndoctrine of the \u2018categories\u2019 based upon Aristotle\u2019s teaching[44].\nBut whereas Aristotle endeavoured in his categories to classify the\nvarious but independent classes of existences, the Stoics considered\nthe different aspects in which the one primary body might be studied.\nThe first two categories, those of \u2018substance\u2019 (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) and of\n\u2018quality\u2019 (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd), agree with those of Aristotle[45], and clearly\ncorrespond to the grammatical categories of noun and adjective. The\nthird category is that of \u2018disposition\u2019 (\u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd), as \u2018lying down\u2019\nor \u2018standing[46].\u2019 The fourth is that of \u2018relative position\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\n\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd), as \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018left,\u2019 \u2018son\u2019 and \u2018father[47].\u2019 Some of the\ncategories are further subdivided[48]; but enough is here stated to shew\nthe object of the analysis, which in practice may have been useful in\nsecuring some completeness in the discussion of particular conceptions.\nOf \u2018substances\u2019 the Stoics, like others, say that they \u2018exist,\u2019 and are\n\u2018bodies\u2019; of qualities they boldly say the same[49]. But they do not\nconsistently apply the same terms to disposition and relative position;\nin this direction they are at last led, like other philosophers, to speak\nof things which \u2018do not exist.\u2019 They could not take the modern view that\nall such discussions are verbal entanglements, of which no solution is\npossible, because they believed that there was a natural harmony between\nwords and things. We on the other hand shall be little inclined to follow\ntheir analysis into its manifold details[50].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Substance.]\n\n=182.= The analysis of the first two categories, those of Substance and\nQuality, leads us at once to the profoundest problems of Metaphysics;\nand even if we allow that the difficulty is primarily grammatical, and\nresolves itself into a discussion of the functions of Substantive and\nAdjective, it is none the less inextricably interwoven with all our\nhabits of thought. It would be unreasonable to expect from the Stoics\nperfectly clear and consistent language on this point; they absorb into\ntheir system much from popular philosophy, and much from the teaching\nof Aristotle in particular. The view which is distinctively Stoic is\nthat Substance and Quality are both body[51], but in two different\naspects. The terms \u2018body\u2019 and \u2018substance\u2019 refer to the same reality,\nbut do not describe it with the same fulness. Yet because the very word\n\u2018substance\u2019 (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) suggests existence, the Stoics are drawn also to\nspeak of \u2018substance without quality\u2019 (\u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1), and seem to identify\nit with a dead \u2018matter\u2019 (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7), or \u2018substratum\u2019 (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), as though\nlife must be introduced into it from without[52]. This is practically\nthe view of Aristotle, embodied in the phrase \u2018matter without quality\nis potentially body\u2019[53]; but just so far as terms of this kind imply a\ndualistic explanation of the universe, they are not really reconcileable\nwith the fundamental principles of Stoicism, and they must therefore be\nunderstood with reservations. It may often seem that the three terms\n\u2018body,\u2019 \u2018substance,\u2019 \u2018matter,\u2019 are practically interchangeable, but they\nare of different rank. For body exists eternally of itself; whereas\nsubstance and matter, except when loosely used as equivalents of body,\ndo not exist of themselves, but substance always in association with\nquality[54], and matter always in association with force. Further we may\ndistinguish between \u2018substance\u2019 in general, or \u2018first matter,\u2019 which\nis a \u2018substratum\u2019 (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) to the universe, and the \u2018matter\u2019 of\nparticular things[55]. The former never grows greater or less, the latter\nmay alter in either direction[56].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Quality.]\n\n=183.= Quality (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd, _qualitas_) constitutes the second\ncategory. It is defined by the Stoics as a difference in a substance\nwhich cannot be detached from that substance, but makes it \u2018such and\nsuch,\u2019 as for instance \u2018sweet,\u2019 \u2018round,\u2019 \u2018red,\u2019 \u2018hot[57].\u2019 Qualities, say\nthe Stoics, are bodies[58]. This paradoxical statement may be understood\nin two ways; first, in that qualities do not exist independently,\nbut are aspects of \u2018body\u2019 which possesses quality; secondly, in that\nqualities are bodies in a secondary sense. We may consider it evidence\nof the second point of view that language describes the qualities by\nnouns, as \u2018sweetness,\u2019 \u2018rotundity,\u2019 \u2018redness,\u2019 \u2018heat\u2019; and indeed it\nis not so long since our own chemists described heat as a \u2018substance\u2019\nunder the name of \u2018caloric.\u2019 This point of view is carried to an extreme\nwhen the Stoics say \u2018qualities are substances,\u2019 thus throwing the first\ntwo categories into one[59]. Much stronger is the tendency towards\nAristotle\u2019s views, so that as substance becomes identified with dead\nmatter, quality is explained as the movement, tension, or current which\nendows it with life. Hence the Stoics say \u2018the movement of rarefaction is\nthe cause of quality[60]\u2019; \u2018matter is a dull substratum, qualities are\nspirits and air-like tensions[61]\u2019; \u2018quality is a spirit in a certain\ndisposition[62]\u2019; \u2018the air-current which keeps each thing together is\nthe cause of its quality[63].\u2019 All these expressions must however be\ninterpreted in the light of the Stoic theory as a whole. Finally we\nnotice that, corresponding to the two kinds of substance, general and\nparticular, there are two kinds of quality, as shewn in the \u2018generically\nqualified\u2019 (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd) and the \u2018individually qualified\u2019 (\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd);\nfor instance, heat in the universe and heat in particular objects[64].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Disposition.]\n\n=184.= The third category is that of \u2018disposition\u2019 (\u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, _res\nquodammodo se habens_). It differs from quality in its variableness;\nfor a brave man is always brave, and fire is always hot; but a man\nis sometimes standing, sometimes lying; fire is sometimes lambent,\nsometimes still. Qualities therefore appear to correspond generally to\nthe \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 (_coniuncta_) of Epicurus, in that they can never be\nseparated from a body[65]; and dispositions rather with the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n(_eventa_), which come and go[66]. The third category appears to be used\nby the Stoics in a very wide sense, and to correspond to several of\nthe categories of Aristotle[67]. Disposition is attached to quality as\nquality is attached to substance[68]; and though dispositions are not\nexpressly termed bodies, yet we must consider them to be, as the terms in\nthe Greek and Latin sufficiently indicate, bodies in particular aspects.\n\nIn the further applications of Stoic theory disposition as defined above\nappears to be replaced in Greek by the term \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2. But this term is\nused in two different senses. In the first place it is the movement of\nrarefaction and condensation, by which a spirit or thrill passes from the\ncentre of an object to the extremities, and returns from the extremities\nto the centre[69]; in this sense it is translated in Latin by _unitas_,\nand takes bodily form as an air-current[70]. This force, when it requires\na further motive power in the direction of development, becomes the\nprinciple of growth (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _natura_), and is displayed not only in the\nvegetable world, but also in animals, as in particular in the hair and\nnails[71]. Growth when it takes to itself the further powers of sensation\nand impulse becomes soul (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae, _anima_), and is the distinctive mark of\nthe animal world[72].\n\nIn a rather different sense \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 or temporary condition is contrasted\nwith \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u2018permanent disposition.\u2019 In this sense the virtues are\npermanent dispositions of the soul, because virtue is unchanging; the\narts are temporary conditions. The virtues belong to the wise man only,\nthe arts to the ordinary man. This distinction however does not hold its\nground in the Roman period, the word _habitus_ (representing \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2), our\n\u2018habit,\u2019 being used in both senses[73]. The virtues are bodies, being\ndispositions of the soul which is bodily[74].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Relative position.]\n\n=185.= The fourth category, that of \u2018relative position\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af\n\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd) appears to be of less importance than the others[75]. Its\ncharacteristic is that it may disappear without altering that to which\nit belongs. Thus that which is on the right hand may cease to be so by\nthe disappearance of that which was on its left; a father may cease to\nbe such on the death of his son[76]. It seems difficult to describe\nthe fourth category as one consisting of \u2018body,\u2019 but at least it is a\nfunction of body. Also it does not appear that \u2018relative position\u2019 can\nbe predicated of the universe as a whole; it is peculiar to individual\nobjects, but works towards their combination in a larger whole. The\nfourth category has an important application in practical ethics in\nthe doctrine of daily duties, for these are largely determined by the\nrelative positions (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) of the parties concerned: such are the\nduties of a king to his people, a father to his son, a slave to his\nmaster[77].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Combination.]\n\n=186.= Having fully considered bodies and their relationships, we\nproceed to consider their combination. In ordinary experience we meet\nwith three kinds of combination; juxtaposition (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), as in a\nmixture of various kinds of grain; mixture (\u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2), when solid bodies\nare interfused, as fire and heat, or fusion (\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), when fluids are\ninterfused, as wine poured into the sea; chemical mixture (\u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2),\nwhen each of the two bodies fused disappears[78]. Of these the second\nin its most completed form (\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, _universa fusio_) is\nof high importance. For in this way we find that soul is fused with\nbody[79], quality with substance[80], light with air[81], God with\nthe universe[82]. Aristotle admits that there is this mixture between\nsubstance and qualities; but as both of these are to the Stoics bodies,\nand so too are the members of the other pairs quoted, the Stoic doctrine\nmust be summed up in the paradox \u2018body moves through body[83].\u2019 This\nalso follows from the Stoic doctrine that there is no void in the\nuniverse. Correspondingly the sum total of body in its various aspects\nand mixtures completes the whole (\u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd), which is identical with\nthe \u2018world-order\u2019 or \u2018universe\u2019 (\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2)[84]. It seems likely that\nthis important conception had been reached in very early times by the\nChaldaean astronomers; it was definitely propounded by Pythagoras[85],\nhad been taken up by Socrates[86] and the Sophists[87], and was in Stoic\ntimes generally accepted both in popular philosophy and in scientific\ninvestigation.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Quiddities.]\n\n=187.= Up to this point the Stoic system has been guided by a determined\nmonism. Body is; that which is not body is not. Yet in the end the Stoics\nfeel compelled to speak of certain things which are not body (\u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1,\n_incorporalia_). In the first instance there is the void beyond the\nuniverse[88]. It is possible to dispute as to whether void may more\ncorrectly be said to exist or not to exist; but at least it is a part\nof nature[89], and we need some term like \u2018the all\u2019 (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd) to include\nboth the universe and the void beyond[90]. Next we have to deal with\nstatements (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac), and mental conceptions of every kind, which stand\nas a class in contrast with the real objects to which they may or may\nnot respectively correspond[91]. Lastly, the Stoics included space and\ntime, which they had previously explained as functions of body, in the\nlist of things not bodily[92]. Having thus reached the two main classes\nof \u2018bodies,\u2019 and \u2018things not bodily,\u2019 the monistic principle can only\nbe saved by creating a supreme class to include both. Let this then be\ncalled the existent (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd, _quod est_)[93], or, if it be objected that\nthings incorporeal do not exist[94], we may use the name \u2018quiddities\u2019\n(\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac, _quid_)[95]. In this way the monistic theory, though a little\ndamaged in vitality, is again set on its feet so far as the ingenious use\nof words can help.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Statements.]\n\n=188.= The language of the Stoics with regard to the phenomena of speech\nand thought is not always easy to follow, and perhaps not altogether\nconsistent. On the one hand, attaching high importance to the reasoning\npower, they desire to include its operations in that which is real and\nbodily. Thus the \u2018mind-pictures\u2019 and indeed all mental conceptions are\nbodily and even \u2018animal,\u2019 in the sense that they are operations of\nbody[96]; and truthfulness, ignorance, science and art are all bodies in\nthe sense that they are dispositions of the soul, which is bodily[97].\nBut \u2018phrases\u2019 (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac) are definitely incorporeal, and with them appear to\nbe ranked all mental conceptions and general ideas; about these there is\na question, not merely whether they exist or not, but whether they may\neven be classed in the most general class of all as \u2018quiddities[98].\u2019\nNor can we call general conceptions true or false[99]; though of some\nof them, as of Centaurs, giants, and the like, we may say that they are\nformed by false mental processes[100]. Finally statements are either\ntrue or false, but are not to be called existent. The whole discussion\ntherefore ends with the broad distinction between the object, which may\nbe real or \u2018existent,\u2019 and the predication which may be \u2018true\u2019; and the\nattempt to unite these two conceptions is not persisted in[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Force and matter.]\n\n=189.= Although the Stoics aim consistently at the monistic standard,\nthey make frequent use of dualistic statements, some of which we have\nalready noticed. The Latin writers often contrast soul and body from\nthe standpoint of ethics[102]; and we meet in all the Stoic writers,\nand often in unguarded language, the favourite Aristotelian dualism\nof force and matter, or (what comes to the same thing) the active and\npassive principles. \u2018Zeno\u2019 (we are told) \u2018laid down that there are two\nprinciples in the universe, the active and the passive. The passive is\nmatter, or essence without quality; the active is the Logos or deity\nwithin it[103].\u2019 So also Cleanthes and Chrysippus taught[104]; and in the\nRoman period Seneca regarded this as a well-understood dogma of the whole\nschool[105]. But even if direct evidence were lacking, the whole bearing\nof the philosophy would shew that this dualism is also surmounted by an\nultimate monism. God and matter are alike body; they cannot exist the one\napart from the other[106]. Of this Cicero, speaking for the Stoics, gives\na proof; matter could never have held together, without some force to\nbind it; nor force without matter[107]. We must not therefore be led by\nthe term \u2018principles\u2019 (\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af, _principia_) to think of force and matter\nin any other way than as two aspects of primary body, separable as mental\nconceptions, inseparable as physical realities. The interpretation is\nessentially the same, whether the Stoics speak of God and the universe,\nmatter and cause, body and tension, or substance and quality, and has\nbeen already discussed with some fulness under these separate headings.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The elements.]\n\n=190.= The position of the four \u2018elements\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, _elementa_) is\nsimilar; these are in the Stoic philosophy subdivisions of the two\nprinciples just discussed. For fire and air are of the nature of cause\nand movement; water and earth of receptivity and passivity[108]. Body\nis therefore made up of the four elements mixed[109], or perhaps rather\nof the elementary qualities of heat and cold, dry and wet, which they\nrepresent[110]. The doctrine of primary or elemental qualities had been\ntaught before, first by Anaximenes, then by Hippocrates the physician,\nand by Aristotle[111]; the list of the four elements is traced back to\nEmpedocles. For Aristotle\u2019s \u2018fifth element\u2019 Zeno found no use[112].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conclusion.]\n\n=191.= Such are the fundamental conceptions or postulates with which\nthe Stoics approach the problems of physics. It is not necessary for\nour purpose to compare their merit with those of Aristotle, or to set a\nvalue on the debt that Zeno and his successors owed to the founder of\nthe Peripatetic school. Still less do we suggest that the Stoics have\nperfectly analyzed the contents of the universe, or have even produced an\norderly and rounded scheme. But at least it seems clear that their work\nshews intellectual power, and that speculation is not necessarily less\nprofound because it is pursued with a practical aim[113]. The founders\nof the Stoic philosophy had a wide reach; they took all knowledge to be\ntheir province; and they worked persistently towards the harmonization of\nall its parts.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] Diog. L. vii 41.\n\n[2] Arnim ii 42 and 44.\n\n[3] Diog. L. vii 40.\n\n[4] Perhaps necessarily: on the definition of monism, see above, \u00a7 35,\nnote 22.\n\n[5] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 149, 153.\n\n[6] \u2018[Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natura],\nquae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut\nquod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 39; \u2018cui tanta\nvis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat et iubeat, corpus est\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 106, 9.\n\n[7] See above, \u00a7 67.\n\n[8] \u00a7 43.\n\n[9] See above, \u00a7 157, note 84.\n\n[10] \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 Clem. Alex. _Strom._ ii p. 436\n(Arnim ii 359); \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 [\u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f55\u03bb\u1fc3] Plot. _Enn._ ii 4, 1\n(Arnim ii 320). \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 in this sense is also called \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, see \u00a7 182,\nnote 52.\n\n[11] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 Plut. _comm. not._ 48, 2.\n\n[12] \u2018vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia,\nquanto tenuior est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 50, 6.\n\n[13] \u2018et hoc [animus] corpus est\u2019 _ib._ 106, 4.\n\n[14] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac\u00b7 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 A\u00ebt. _plac._ i\n11, 5; \u2018placet nostris quod bonum est, corpus esse\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 117, 2;\n\u2018quaeris, bonum an corpus sit. bonum facit, prodest enim. quod facit,\ncorpus est\u2019 _ib._ 106, 4.\n\n[15] \u2018non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint, tanquam ira,\namor, tristitia. si dubitas, vide an voltum nobis mutent, an frontem\nadstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent\nsanguinem. quid ergo? tam manifestas notas corpori credis imprimi nisi a\ncorpore?\u2019 _ib._ 106, 5.\n\n[16] \u2018dicimus non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit\nmobile ex semet\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8; \u2018is ardor, qui est mundi, non\nagitatus ab alio, neque externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte\n[movetur]\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 11, 31.\n\n[17] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 ... \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03ba\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd (sc. \u03c0\u03c5\u03ba\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd) \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f14\u03be\u03c9 Simpl. _Arist. cat._\np. 74; \u2018tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem\nconcrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium\u2019 Censorinus _de die nat._\np. 75 (Zeller, p. 128).\n\n[18] \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 Ar. Did. fr. 25 Diels (Arnim ii 503).\n\n[19] \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f37\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4\u1f72 Sext. _math._ x. 3 (Arnim ii 505); \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Ar. Did. (as note 18).\n\n[20] \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5] \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 Simpl.\n_Arist. cat._ p. 88 l (Arnim ii 510); \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd [\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd] \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 22, 7.\n\n[21] \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f26\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f22 \u03c3\u1f7a\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\nPhilo _de mundi op._ \u00a7 26 (Arnim ii 511).\n\n[22] The question is thus stated by Seneca: \u2018[quaeramus] continua sit\nomnis et plena materia ... an diducta, et solidis inane permixtum sit\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ viii 4, 2; and answered as follows \u2018nihil usquam inane est\u2019\n_N. Q._ iii 16, 5. Cf. Arnim i 95 and ii 425.\n\n[23] \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Hipp. _Phil._\n21 (Arnim ii 469).\n\n[24] \u2018animus ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video\nPanaetio\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42. The principle is however not\ncarried out in the Stoic universe, in which the heat resides in the\nperiphery, and the central earth is cold.\n\n[25] \u03bd\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c1\u1fb6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 Eur. fr. 291 quoted by Corn. 31\n(Arnim i 514); \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.\n\n[26] Epict. _Fr._ 57.\n\n[27] See below, \u00a7 290.\n\n[28] \u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 ... \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af, \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 Plut. _Sto. rep._ 7, 4.\n\n[29] \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c0\u03ce\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 ... \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 Stob. i 17, 3.\n\n[30] \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 Cornutus 31.\n\n[31] \u2018quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem\nquam spiritus?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8.\n\n[32] \u2018quid est illi [animo] motus nisi intentio?\u2019 _ib._ ii 6, 6; \u2018quid\ncursus et motus omnis, nonne intenti spiritus operae sunt? hic facit vim\nnervis, velocitatem currentibus\u2019 _ib._ ii 6, 4.\n\n[33] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fd6 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u1fd6 Simpl. _Ar. cat._ \u039f \u03b3 \u03b2.\n\n[34] \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1] \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 ...\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03be\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd Diog. L. vii\n136; \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd _ib._ 134.\n\n[35] \u2018ratio materiam format et quocunque vult versat\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 65, 2.\nCf. Tert. _Apol._ 21.\n\n[36] \u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 [\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2\nProclus _in Parm._ iv 135. See further Stein, _Psychologie der Stoa_, i\np. 49; Heinze, _Lehre vom Logos_, pp. 107-127.\n\n[37] \u2018The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first\nmomentum to the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs\nof future existences, and assigning to them productive capacities of\nrealisation, change, and phenomenal succession.\u2019 M. Aurelius, _To\nhimself_ ix 1.\n\n[38] \u2018ad initia deinde rerum redit [sapientia] aeternamque rationem [sc.\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd] toti inditam, et vim omnium seminum [sc. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd] singula proprie figurantem\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 90, 29. See also the\ninterpretation of the picture of Samos, \u00a7 254, note 83.\n\n[39] \u1f41 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03ac\u03b4\u03b9\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 Athen. _Supp._ 6, 7 B (Pearson Z. 45).\n\n[40] See above, \u00a7 67.\n\n[41] Sen. _Ep._ 65, 4 to 6, 11 and 12.\n\n[42] See below, ch. ix.\n\n[43] \u2018causarum enim,\u2019 inquit [Chrysippus], \u2018aliae sunt perfectae et\nprincipales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae\u2019 Cic. _de Fato_ 18, 41.\n\n[44] See above, \u00a7 66.\n\n[45] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 ... \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u00b7 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 Simpl. _Arist. cat._ f 16\n\u0394 (Arnim ii 369).\n\n[46] Plotinus _Ennead._ vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).\n\n[47] Simpl. _Arist. cat._ f 42 \u0395 (Arnim ii 403).\n\n[48] For a fuller statement see Zeller, pp. 97-100.\n\n[49] See \u00a7 183.\n\n[50] For the position of \u2018things not existent\u2019 in the Stoic system see\nfurther below, \u00a7 187.\n\n[51] \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 Diog. L. vii 150; \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Stob. i\n11, 5 c.\n\n[52] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\n\u1f27\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Diog. L. vii 150; \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd Plot.\n_Enn._ ii p. 114 (Arnim ii 375).\n\n[53] \u1f21 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, \u1f23\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03af Dexipp. _Arist. cat._\np. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).\n\n[54] See Plutarch, _comm. not._ 50, 6.\n\n[55] \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, \u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c7\u03b1\u03bb\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\nDexippus _Arist. cat._ p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).\n\n[56] Diog. L. vii 150.\n\n[57] Simplic. _Arist. cat._ p. 57 \u0395 (Arnim ii 378).\n\n[58] \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ae\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f05 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 Galen _qual. incorp._ 1 xix, p. 463 K (Arnim\nii 377).\n\n[59] \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f56 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 Plut. _comm.\nnot._ 50, 1.\n\n[60] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd see above, note 17] \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 68 \u0395 (Arnim ii 452).\n\n[61] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b5\u03c1\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 Plut. _Sto. rep._ 43, 4.\n\n[62] \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03ac \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd Alex. Aph.\n_Arist. Top._ iv p. 181 (Arnim ii 379).\n\n[63] \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ae\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 Plut. _Sto. rep._\n43, 2.\n\n[64] Zeller, pp. 103-107.\n\n[65] \u2018pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aqua\u00ef, | tactus corporibus\ncunctis\u2019 Lucr. _R. N._ i 454, 455.\n\n[66] \u2018servitium contra, paupertas, divitiaeque, | ... cetera quorum |\nadventu manet incolumis natura abituque, | haec soliti sumus, ut par est,\neventa vocare\u2019 _ib._ 456-9.\n\n[67] \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03af Dexipp. _Arist. cat._ p. 34, 19 (Arnim ii 399).\n\n[68] \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 Plot. _Enn._ vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).\n\n[69] \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc Philo _quod deus_, \u00a7 35\n(Arnim ii 458).\n\n[70] \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2] \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 Plut. _Sto. rep._ 43, 2; \u2018esse autem unitatem in\naere vel ex hoc intellegi potest, quod corpora nostra inter se cohaerent.\nquid est enim aliud quod teneret illa, quam spiritus?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6,\n6.\n\n[71] \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03ac. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u1f44\u03bd\u03c5\u03c7\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c7\u03b5\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f24\u03b4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 Philo\n_Leg. Alleg._ ii \u00a7 22 (Arnim ii 458).\n\n[72] \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03c5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae\u03bd. \u03b1\u1f54\u03c4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd _ib._\n\n[73] \u2018voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; habitus\nporro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 95, 57.\n\n[74] \u2018virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens\u2019\n_ib._ 113, 2.\n\n[75] \u2018Relative position\u2019 must be distinguished from \u2018correlation\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b9). Such terms as \u2018sweet\u2019 and \u2018bitter,\u2019 \u2018living\u2019 and \u2018dead\u2019 are said to\nbe correlated. Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 42 \u0395 (Arnim ii 403).\n\n[76] Simpl. as in last note.\n\n[77] See below, \u00a7 337.\n\n[78] So Ar. Did. fr. 28, and, more exactly, Alex. Aph. _de mixt._ p. 216,\n14 Br. (Arnim ii 473). Another division is as follows: \u2018quaedam continua\nesse corpora, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem; quaedam ex\ndistantibus, tanquam exercitus, populus, senatus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 102, 6.\n\n[79] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 ... \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Simpl. _Arist. phys._ p. 530, 9 (Arnim ii 467).\n\n[80] Arnim ii 411 and 467.\n\n[81] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03c1\u03bd\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 Alex. Aph. _de mixt._\np. 216, 14 (Arnim ii 473).\n\n[82] \u2018Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel\nper favos\u2019 Tertull. _adv. Hermog._ 44; and see below, \u00a7 207.\n\n[83] Note 2 above.\n\n[84] \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd Achill. _Is._ 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii\n523).\n\n[85] See Rendall, _M. Aurelius_ Introd. p. xxix.\n\n[86] \u1f41 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd Xen. _Mem._ iv 3, 13.\n\n[87] _ib._ i 1, 11.\n\n[88] See below, \u00a7 193.\n\n[89] \u2018in rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt; et haec\nautem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 58, 15.\n\n[90] \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 Achill.\n_Isag._ 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).\n\n[91] Sen. as above.\n\n[92] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd Sext. _math._ x 218 (Arnim ii 331).\n\n[93] \u2018etiam nunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. dicimus enim quaedam\ncorporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia, quid ergo erit ex quo haec\ndeducantur? illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, \u201cquod est\u201d\u2019\nSen. _Ep._ 58, 11.\n\n[94] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03af, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0392\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f14\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd Sext. _math._ viii 258.\n\n[95] \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 [\u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76] \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd Alex. Aphr. _Arist. Top._ iv p.\n155 (Arnim ii 329); \u2018primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur \u201cquid\u201d\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 58, 15.\n\n[96] \u2018animalia sunt omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente complectimur;\nsequitur ut multa milia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris,\net singuli multa simus animalia. non sunt, inquit, multa, quia ex uno\nreligata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 113, 3 and 9\n(Seneca himself does not agree with this way of speaking).\n\n[97] \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f45\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd ... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1fc6\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5 Sext. _math._ vii 38 (Zeller, p. 129).\n\n[98] \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac, \u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f61\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 Ar. Did. fr. 40 (Diels).\n\n[99] \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 [\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9] Sext. _math._\nvii 246.\n\n[100] \u2018haec ... quae animo succurrunt, tanquam Centauri, gigantes, et\nquicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit,\nquamvis non habeat substantiam\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 58, 15.\n\n[101] \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd,\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Plut. _comm. not._ 30, 12.\n\n[102] See below, \u00a7 287.\n\n[103] \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Diog. L. vii 134.\n\n[104] _ib._; \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ac\u03c2, \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\nSext. _math._ ix 11 (Arnim ii 301).\n\n[105] \u2018dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex\nquibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. materia iacet iners, res ad\nomnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio,\nmateriam format et quocunque vult versat\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 65, 2; \u2018universa ex\nmateria et ex deo constant. deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem\nsequuntur. potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus,\nquam materia patiens dei\u2019 _ib._ 23.\n\n[106] \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03af Syrianus _Arist. met._ (Arnim ii 308).\n\u2018Stoici naturam in duas partes dividunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae\nse ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat. in illa prima esse vim sentiendi,\nin hac materiam; nec alterum sine altero [esse] posse\u2019 Lact. _Div. inst._\nvii 3.\n\n[107] \u2018neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi\ncontineretur, neque vim sine ulla materia\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 6, 24.\n\n[108] Arnim ii 418; \u2018e quibus [elementis] aer et ignis movendi vim habent\net efficiendi; reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico\net terram\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 7, 26.\n\n[109] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2, \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c3\u03ac\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 Justin _de res._ 6 (Arnim ii 414).\n\n[110] \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u1f74\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 Galen _const. art. med._ i p. 251 K (Arnim ii 405).\n\n[111] Galen _meth. med._ i 2, X p. 15 K (Arnim ii 411).\n\n[112] See below, \u00a7 196.\n\n[113] Cf. Mahaffy\u2019s _Greek Life and Thought_; \u2018it is quite wrong to\nsuppose that these thinkers [Zeno and Epicurus], busy as they were with\npractical life, despised or avoided speculation. Their philosophical\ntheories demand hard reading and hard thinking\u2019 p. 137.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE UNIVERSE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Study of the heavens.]\n\n=192.= In including in their system the study of the physical universe\nthe Stoics broke daringly with Socrates and his faithful followers the\nCynics. These had joined with the ignorant and the prejudiced[1] in\nridiculing those whose eyes were always turned up towards the sky, whilst\nthey saw nothing of things that were nearer at hand and concerned them\nmore closely. But it was not for nothing that the most highly civilised\nnations of antiquity, Egyptians, Chaldaeans, and Babylonians, had studied\nthe starry heavens, mapped out the constellations, measured the paths of\nthe wandering stars, predicted eclipses, reckoned with the tides, the\nseasons, and the winds; with the result that their successors defied\nthe common opinion by declaring the earth to be a sphere, and to hold\ninhabitants whom they called Antipodes, because they walk with their feet\nturned up towards ours[2]. All this body of knowledge, called generically\nthe knowledge of the sky (though it included the whole physical geography\nof the earth), had impressed and fascinated the Eastern world. It seemed\nthat as the eyes were raised to the sky, so the mind of man was elevated\nand made ampler and nobler[3], leaving behind it the petty contentions\nand rivalries of common life; and further that true knowledge had surely\nbeen reached, when the positions of the heavenly bodies and the eclipses\nof sun and moon could be predicted so long before with unfailing\naccuracy. These feelings are now commonplaces of literature, and were\nfully shared by the Stoics. \u2018Is not the sun,\u2019 says Seneca, \u2018worthy of our\ngaze, the moon of our regard? When the sky displays its fires at night,\nand countless stars flash forth, who is not absorbed in contemplation of\nthem? They glide past in their company, concealing swift motion under the\noutward appearance of immobility. We comprehend the movements of a few of\nthem, but the greater number are beyond our ken. Their dignity fills all\nour thoughts[4].\u2019 In the golden age which preceded our iron civilisation\n\u2018men lay at nights in the open fields, and watched the glorious spectacle\nof the heavens. It was their delight to note the stars that sank in one\nquarter and rose in another. The universe swept round them, performing\nits magnificent task in silence[5].\u2019 \u2018Their order never changes, spring\nand autumn, winter and summer succeed according to fixed laws[6].\u2019 And in\nthe same tone writes the Stoic poet: \u2018unshaken the lights of heaven ever\nmove onwards in their proper orbit[7].\u2019 The emotion roused in the Stoic\nby the contemplation of the sky was thus identical with that expressed in\nJudaic poetry by the \u2018Song of the Three Holy Children[8],\u2019 and in more\nmodern times by Addison\u2019s famous hymn[9].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The world-order.]\n\n=193.= The phenomena of earth and heaven combined, in the general\nopinion of intelligent men, to show the existence of a \u2018world-order\u2019 or\n\u2018universe[10].\u2019 The Stoics accepted this conception in their physics\nfrom Heraclitus, who had declared that \u2018neither god nor man created\nthis world-order,\u2019 as in their ethics from Diogenes, the \u2018citizen of\nthe universe[11].\u2019 They therefore needed only to adjust an established\nnotion to their own physical postulates. We observe at once that the\nvery conception of an ordered whole differentiates that whole from the\nabsolute totality of all things. The universe is indeed on the one hand\nidentified with the substance of all things (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd), but only as\na thing made individual by the possession of quality (\u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd)[12],\nand necessarily one[13]. It is self-created; and it may therefore be\nidentified with its creator, the deity[14]; it also includes all that\nis bodily[15]; but outside there remains the boundless void[16]. It is\ntherefore defined by Chrysippus as \u2018the combination of heaven and earth\nand all natures that are in them,\u2019 or alternatively as \u2018the combination\nof gods and men and all that is created for their sake[17].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Its position.]\n\n=194.= The Stoic conception of the universe is therefore that of a\ncontinuous body, having a definite outline, and stationed in the\nboundless void. That the universe has shape the Stoics deduce from its\nhaving \u2018nature\u2019 (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), that is, the principle of growth, displayed in\nthe symmetry of its parts[18]; and its shape is the perfect shape of a\nsphere[19]. Within this sphere all things tend towards the middle[20];\nand we use the terms \u2018down\u2019 meaning \u2018towards the middle,\u2019 and \u2018up\u2019\nmeaning thereby from the middle[21]. The Peripatetics are therefore\nneedlessly alarmed, when they tell us that our universe will fall down,\nif it stands in the void; for, first, there is no \u2018up\u2019 or \u2018down\u2019 outside\nthe universe; and, secondly, the universe possesses \u2018unity\u2019 (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2)[22]\nwhich keeps it together[23]. And here we see the folly of Epicurus, who\nsays that the atoms move downwards from eternity in the boundless void;\nfor there is no such thing as \u2018downwards\u2019 in that which is unlimited[24].\nFurther, the universe is divided into two parts, the earth (with the\nwater and the air surrounding it) which is stable in the middle, and the\nsky or aether which revolves around it[25].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The heliocentric theory.]\n\n=195.= Thus early in their theory the Stoics were led to make two\nassertions on questions of scientific fact, in which they opposed the\nbest scientific opinion of their own time. For many authorities held\nthat the earth revolved on its axis, and that the revolution of the sky\nwas only apparent. Such were HICETAS of Syracuse[26], a Pythagorean\nphilosopher, whose views were quoted with approval by Theophrastus, and\nlater ECPHANTUS the Pythagorean, and HERACLIDES of Pontus[27]. From the\npoint of view of astronomical science this view seemed well worthy of\nconsideration, as Seneca in particular emphasizes[28]. Other astronomers\nhad gone further, declaring that the sun lay in the centre, and that\nthe earth and other planets revolved round it. Theophrastus stated that\nPlato himself in his old age had felt regret that he had wrongly placed\nthe earth in the centre of the universe; and the heliocentric view was\nput forward tentatively by ARISTARCHUS of Samos, and positively by\nthe astronomer SELEUCUS, in connexion with the theory of the earth\u2019s\nrotation[29]. For this Cleanthes had said that the Greeks should have\nput Aristarchus on trial for impiety, as one who proposed to disturb\n\u2018the hearth of the universe[30].\u2019 This outburst of persecuting zeal,\nanticipating so remarkably the persecution of Galileo, was effective\nin preventing the spread of the novel doctrine. Posidonius was a great\nastronomer, and recognised the heliocentric doctrine as theoretically\npossible[31]; indeed, as one who had himself constructed an orrery,\nshewing the motion of all the planets[32], he must have been aware of its\nsuperior simplicity. Nevertheless he opposed it vigorously on theological\ngrounds, and perhaps more than any other man was responsible for its\nbeing pushed aside for some 1500 years[33]. The precise ground of the\nobjection is not made very clear to us, and probably it was instinctive\nrather than reasoned. It could hardly be deemed impious to place the sun,\nwhom the Stoics acknowledged as a deity, in the centre of the universe;\nbut that the earth should be reckoned merely as one of his attendant\nplanets was humiliating to human self-esteem, and jeopardised the\ndoctrine of Providence, in accordance with which the universe was created\nfor the happiness of gods and men only.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The elements.]\n\n=196.= Having determined that the earth is the centre of the universe,\nand the sun above it, the way is clear to incorporate in the system the\ndoctrine of the four elements (\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, _naturae_)[34], which probably\nhad its origin in a cruder form of physical speculation than the\ndoctrine of the heavenly bodies. As we have seen above[35], the elements\nare not first principles of the Stoic physics, but hold an intermediate\nposition between the two principles of the active and the passive on the\none hand, and the organic and inorganic world on the other. Earth is\nthe lowest of the elements, and also the grossest; above it is placed\nwater, then air, then fire; and these are in constant interchange, earth\nturning to water, this into air, and this into aether, and so again in\nreturn. By this interchange the unity of the universe is maintained[36].\nThe transition from one element to the next is not abrupt, but gradual;\nthe lowest part of the aether is akin to air[37]; it is therefore of no\ngreat importance whether we speak with Heraclitus of three elements, or\nwith Empedocles of four. The two grosser elements, earth and water, tend\nby nature downwards and are passive; air and fire tend upwards and are\nactive[38]. Zeno did not think it necessary to postulate a fifth element\nas the substance of soul, for he held that fire was its substance[39].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fire and breath.]\n\n=197.= Fire, heat, and motion are ultimately identical, and are the\nsource of all life[40]. Thus the elemental and primary fire stands\nin contrast with the fire of domestic use; the one creates and\nnourishes, the other destroys[41]. It follows that fire, though it\nis one of the four elements, has from its divine nature a primacy\namongst the elements[42], which corresponds to its lofty position in\nthe universe[43]; and the other elements in turn all contain some\nproportion of fire. Thus although air has cold and darkness as primary\nand essential qualities[44], nevertheless it cannot exist without some\nshare of warmth[45]. Hence air also may be associated with life, and it\nis possible to retain the popular term \u2018spirit\u2019 (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, _spiritus_)\nfor the principle of life. In the development of the Stoic philosophy\nwe seldom hear again of air in connexion with coldness; and between the\n\u2018warm breath\u2019 (_anima inflammata_) and the primary fire there is hardly\na distinction; we may even say that \u2018spirit\u2019 has the highest possible\ntension[46].\n\n\n[Sidenote: God in the stone.]\n\n=198.= Air on its downward path changes to water. This change is\ndescribed as due to loss of heat[47], and yet water too has some heat\nand vitality[48]. Even earth, the lowest and grossest of the elements,\ncontains a share of the divine heat; otherwise it could not feed living\nplants and animals, much less send up exhalations with which to feed\nthe sun and stars[49]. Thus we may say even of a stone that it has a\npart of the divinity in it[50]. Here then we see the reverse side of the\nso-called Stoic materialism. If it is true that God is body, and that\nthe soul is body, it is equally true that even water, the damp and cold\nelement, and earth, the dry and cold element, are both penetrated by the\ndivinity, by the creative fire without the operation of which both would\nfall in an instant into nothingness[51].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.]\n\n=199.= We return to the consideration of the heavenly bodies. These are\nset in spheres of various diameter, all alike revolving around the earth.\nThe succession we find described in Plato\u2019s _Timaeus_[52]; the moon is\nnearest to the earth, then comes the sun, then in order Venus, Mercury,\nMars, Jupiter and Saturn. This theory was taken up by Aristotle and\nafter him by Eudoxus, from whom it passed to Aratus and Chrysippus[53].\nA tradition derived from Chaldaean sources gave a different order,\nsetting Venus and Mercury nearer to the earth than the sun; and this\norder was accepted by the middle Stoics, that is to say by Panaetius and\nPosidonius, the latter placing Venus nearer to the earth, and therefore\nfurther from the sun, than Mercury[54]. The moon, like the earth, obtains\nher light from the sun, being crescent-shaped when nearest to him,\nfull-orbed when furthest away. Her distance from the earth is two million\nstadia (250,000 miles); when she lies between the earth and the sun she\neclipses his light, but when she is on the side of the earth directly\naway from the sun she is herself eclipsed[55]. Her phases are explained\nby her position relative to the sun[56]. The sun is 60 millions of miles\nfrom the earth[57]; his diameter is 37\u00bd times as large as that of the\nearth[58]; he appears larger when on the horizon because his rays are\nrefracted through the thick atmosphere[59]. The planets, whether they\nrevolve round the earth or the sun, are falsely called \u2018wandering stars,\u2019\nsince their orbits have been fixed from all eternity[60]. The fixed stars\nrevolve round the earth at such a distance that the earth, when compared\nwith it, is merely the central point[61]. All the heavenly bodies are,\nlike the earth, of spherical form[62]. Finally Seneca, in advance of\nthe school, declared the comets to be a regular part of the celestial\nworld[62a].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cruder theories.]\n\n=200.= Whilst the Stoics generally were in sympathy with the best\nastronomical teaching of their time, they combined with it many views\nbased on much cruder forms of observation. Even Seneca thinks it bold to\nsuggest that the sun is not a little larger than the whole earth[63];\nand it is commonly held that not only the sun and moon, but also\nthe heavenly bodies generally, feed upon moist exhalations from the\nOcean[64]. Cleanthes in particular seems to have viewed the astronomers\nwith suspicion. He alone regarded the moon not as a sphere, but as\na hemisphere with the flat side turned towards us[65]; the stars he\nconsidered to be conical[66]. These views, very probably derived from\nHeraclitus, seem to point to the conception of the sky or aether as a\nsingle fixed fiery sphere, in which the heavenly bodies only differ from\nthe surrounding element by containing more closely packed masses of fiery\nmatter[67]; a conception which harmonizes far more closely with the Stoic\ntheory of the elements than the doctrines which are astronomically more\ncorrect. Cleanthes also explained that the sun could not venture to\ntravel beyond his solstitial positions, lest he should be out of reach of\nhis terrestrial food[68]. And Cleanthes and Posidonius agree that the sun\nkeeps within the \u2018torrid zone\u2019 of the sky, because beneath it flows the\nOcean, from which the sun sucks up his nutriment[69].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Deity of the stars.]\n\n=201.= From the relation of the heavenly bodies to the element of fire\nthe Stoics draw the conclusion that they are animated, reasoning,\nself-determined, and divine; in short, that they are gods[70]. This\ngodhead pertains particularly to the sun[71]. Of this doctrine Cleanthes\nis especially the upholder[72], deeming that the sun is the ruling power\nin the universe, as reason in man[73]. It is not clear whether the Stoics\nderived their theory of the divinity of the heavenly bodies from logical\ndeduction, or whether they were here incorporating some Eastern worship.\nIn favour of the latter point of view is the consideration that at this\ntime the association of Mithra with the sun was probably making some\nprogress in the Persian religion, and that the popular names of the seven\ndays of the week, following the names of the sun, moon, and five planets,\nmust have been already current.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Deity of the universe.]\n\n=202.= But in the Stoic system this doctrine is overshadowed by the\nparadox that the universe itself is a rational animal, possessed of\nfree-will and divine. This is the teaching of all the masters of the\nschool, beginning with Zeno himself. It appeared to him to follow\nlogically from two principles, the first that the universe possesses\na unity, the second that the whole is greater than its parts. \u2018There\ncannot be a sentient part of a non-sentient whole. But the parts of the\nuniverse are sentient; therefore the universe is sentient[74].\u2019 \u2018The\nrational is better than the non-rational. But nothing is better than\nthe universe; therefore the universe is rational[75].\u2019 \u2018The universe is\none[76]\u2019; we must not therefore think of it as of an army or a family,\nwhich comes into a kind of existence merely through the juxtaposition of\nits members. By the same reasoning the universe possesses divinity[77].\nUpon this favourite Stoic text is based the frequent assertion of modern\ncommentators that the philosophy is pantheistic[78]; but the more central\nposition of Stoicism is that the deity bears the same relation to the\nuniverse as a man\u2019s soul to his body[79], and the universe is therefore\nno more all divine than a man is all soul. This view is expressed with\ngreat clearness by Varro, who says: \u2018As a man is called wise, being wise\nin mind, though he consists of mind and body; so the world is called God\nfrom its soul, though it consists of soul and body[80].\u2019 The Stoics are\nhowever in strong conflict with the Epicureans and all philosophers who\nhold that the world is fundamentally all matter, and that soul and mind\nare developments from matter. \u2018Nothing that is without mind can generate\nthat which possesses mind,\u2019 says Cicero\u2019s Stoic[81], in full opposition\nto modern popular theories of evolution. Further, just as it may be\nquestioned in the case of man whether the soul is situated in the head\nor in the heart, so in the case of the universe we may doubt whether its\nsoul, or rather its \u2018principate,\u2019 is in the sun, as Cleanthes held[82],\nor in the sky generally, as Chrysippus and Posidonius maintain[83], or in\nthe aether, as Antipater of Tyre taught[84].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The earth\u2019s inhabitants.]\n\n=203.= In the study of the universe we are not called upon merely to\nconsider the earth as a member of the celestial company; we have to\ncontemplate it as the home of beings of various ranks, which also display\nto us the principle of orderly arrangement. Pre\u00ebminent amongst the\ninhabitants of the earth stands man, who is distinguished by being the\nsole possessor of the faculty of reason, and in addition owns all those\ncapacities which are shewn in beings of lower rank. The nature of man\nconstitutes so large a part of philosophy that we must reserve its full\nconsideration for a special chapter[85]; and must restrict ourselves\nhere to treating of lower beings, which fall into the three orders of\nanimals, plants, and inanimate beings. But since each of the higher\norders possesses all the properties of every order that stands lower, the\nstudy of the orders inferior to man is also the study of a large part of\nhuman nature. The number and classification of these orders are not to\nbe treated mechanically. From one point of view gods and men form one\nclass, the rational, as opposed to every kind of non-rational being. On\nthe other hand, from the standpoint with which we are rather concerned\nat this moment, gods, men, and animals are subdivisions of the order of\nanimate beings, below which stand the plants, and lower still things\nwithout life. Animals, as the name indicates, possess life or soul; the\ntwo lower orders possess something corresponding to soul, but lower in\ndegree. The general term which includes soul in the animal and that\nwhich corresponds to it in the plants and in lifeless bodies is \u2018spirit\u2019\n(\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1); soul therefore is the highest type of \u2018spirit.\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The animals have not reason]\n\n=204.= To the dumb animals the Stoics consistently deny the faculty of\nreason; and this position must have seemed to them self-evident, since\nthe same word Logos expresses in the Greek both reason and speech. In\nthe Latin the point was no longer so clear; still the words \u2018ratio\u2019\nand \u2018oratio,\u2019 if not identical, appeared to be connected by a natural\nassociation. Since the animals then are necessarily unreasoning, those\nacts of animals which appear to show reason must be explained in some\nother way. A dog pursues a wild animal by its scent; it must therefore be\nadmitted that in a way the dog recognises that \u2018this scent is the sign\nof the wild animal[86]\u2019; still he is incapable of expressing this belief\nin the form of a correct syllogism. The industry of the ant is disposed\nof in a more summary way; this animal shows a \u2018restless helplessness,\u2019\nclimbing up and down straws in meaningless industry; many men however are\nno wiser[87]. For their young the animals have a certain feeling, yet\ntheir grief at losing them is comparatively short-lived[88]. In spite,\nhowever, of these limitations the animal world is one part of the wonders\nof nature, and is deserving of our admiration; all animals have strong\naffection for their young so long as these need their protection[89], and\nthe dog deserves special recognition both for his keen intelligence and\nfor his loyalty towards his master[90].\n\n\n[Sidenote: but a sort of reason.]\n\n=205.= To define more accurately the nature of animals we must to some\nextent anticipate the discussion of human nature in a later chapter,\nwhich follows the same general lines: for in every point the animals\nare like men, but inferior. They possess soul, but without reason[91];\nby soul we here mean the twin powers of observation and of independent\nmovement[92]. In a rough way the animals also possess a ruling part[93].\nTheir power of observation enables them to distinguish what is healthful\nto them from that which is injurious; their power of movement shapes\nitself into pursuit of the healthful and avoidance of the injurious[94].\nThey possess also properties which resemble the human feelings, such as\nanger, confidence, hope, fear; but they do not in a strict sense possess\nthe same feelings as men[95]. As they cannot attain to virtue, neither\ncan they fall into vice[96].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Plant life.]\n\n=206.= From the animals we pass to the plants. These seem to have soul,\nbecause they live and die[97]; yet they have not soul in any strict sense\nof the word. It will therefore be better not to use this word, but to\nspeak of the \u2018growth-power\u2019 (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)[98]. The governing part is situated\nin the root[99]. The growth of plants both in size and in strength is\nvery remarkable, inasmuch as little seeds, which at first find themselves\nplace in crevices, attain such power that they split huge rocks and\ndestroy noble monuments, thus illustrating what is meant by tone or\ntension; for it is a spirit which starts from the governing part (the\nroot) and spreads to the trunk and branches, conveying a force equally\nstrong to construct and to destroy[100]. From another point of view we\nmay say that the seed contains the Logos or law of the fully developed\nplant, for under no possible circumstances can any other plant grow from\nthat seed except the plant of its kind[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cohesion.]\n\n=207.= Lowest in the scale come inanimate objects, such as stones[102].\nYet even these have a property which corresponds to soul, and which keeps\nthem together in a particular outward form or shape; this property we\ncall \u2018cohesion\u2019 (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, _unitas_)[103]; like soul itself, it is a spirit\npervading the whole[104], and again it is the Logos of the whole. An\nexternal force cannot impart this unity: so that the water contained in\na glass is not an \u2018inanimate object\u2019 in this sense[105]. In this lowest\ngrade of \u2018spirit\u2019 we read in Stoicism the antithesis of the materialism\nof Epicurus, who postulates for his \u2018atoms\u2019 the fundamental property of\nindivisibility, and can only account for the coherence of the bodies\nformed from them by supplying them with an elaborate system of \u2018hooks and\neyes,\u2019 which was a frequent subject of derision to his critics. Epicurus\nmakes the indivisibility of the smallest thing his starting-point, and\nfrom it constructs by degrees a compacted universe by arithmetical\ncombination; the Stoics start from the indivisibility of the great\nwhole, and working downwards explain its parts by a gradual shedding of\nprimitive force. God is in fact in the stone by virtue of his power of\nuniversal penetration (\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd)[106].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Gradations of spirit.]\n\n=208.= No existing thing can possess one of the higher grades of spirit\nwithout also possessing all the lower. Stones therefore have cohesion,\nplants growth and cohesion, animals soul growth and cohesion; for these\nare not different qualities which can be combined by addition, but\nappearances of the same fundamental quality in varying intensity. Man\nclearly possesses cohesion, for he has an outward shape; there does not\nhowever seem to be any part of him which has merely cohesion. But in\nthe bones, the nails, and the hair are found growth and cohesion only,\nand these parts grow as the plants do. In the eyes, ears and nose, are\nsensation, as well as growth and cohesion; that is, there is soul in the\nsense in which the animals possess soul. It is the intelligence only\nwhich in man possesses soul in the highest grade[107].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The conflagration.]\n\n=209.= This universe, in spite of its majesty, beauty and adaptation,\nin spite of its apparent equipoise and its essential divinity, is\ndestined to perish. \u2018Where the parts are perishable, so is the whole;\nbut the parts of the universe are perishable, for they change one into\nanother; therefore the universe is perishable[108].\u2019 Possibly this\nsyllogism would not have appeared so cogent to the Stoics, had they not\nlong before adopted from Heraclitus the impressive belief in the final\nconflagration, familiar to us from its description in the \u2018second epistle\nof Peter[109].\u2019 According to this theory, the interchange of the elements\nalready described[110] is not evenly balanced, but the upward movement is\nslightly in excess. In the course of long ages, therefore, all the water\nwill have been converted into air and fire, and the universe will become\nhot with flame[111]. Then the earth and all upon it will become exhausted\nfor want of moisture, and the heavenly bodies themselves will lose their\nvitality for want of the exhalations on which they feed. Rivers will\ncease to flow, the earth will quake, great cities will be swallowed up,\nstar will collide with star. All living things will die, and even the\nsouls of the blest and the gods themselves will once more be absorbed in\nthe fire, which will thus regain its primitive and essential unity[112].\nYet we may not say that the universe dies, for it does not suffer the\nseparation of soul from body[113].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Is the universe perishable?]\n\n=210.= In connexion with the doctrine of the conflagration the Stoics\nwere called upon to take sides upon the favourite philosophic problem\nwhether the universe is perishable, as Democritus and Epicurus hold,\nor imperishable, as the Peripatetics say[114]. In replying to this\nquestion, as in the theory as a whole, they relied on the authority\nof Heraclitus[115]. The word universe is used in two senses: there is\nan eternal universe (namely that already described as the universal\nsubstance made individual by the possession of quality[116]),\nwhich persists throughout an unending series of creations and\nconflagrations[117]. In another sense the universe, considered in\nrelation to its present ordering, is perishable[118]. Just in the same\nway the word \u2018city\u2019 is used in two senses; and that which is a community\nof citizens may endure, even though the collection of temples and houses\nalso called the \u2018city\u2019 is destroyed by fire[119].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dissentient Stoics.]\n\n=211.= The doctrine of the conflagration was not maintained by all Stoic\nteachers with equal conviction. Zeno treated it with fulness in his book\n\u2018on the universe[120]\u2019; and Cleanthes and Chrysippus both assert that\nthe whole universe is destined to change into fire, returning to that\nfrom which, as from a seed, it has sprung[121]. In the transition period,\nowing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle, and the critical\nacumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned the theory[122].\nPosidonius however, though a pupil of Panaetius (the most conspicuous of\nthe doubters[123]), was quite orthodox on this subject; though he pays\nto his master the tribute of asserting that the universe is the most\npermanent being imaginable[124], and that its existence will continue\nthrough an immense and _almost_ unlimited period of time[125]. In the\nRoman period the conflagration is not only an accepted dogma, but one\nthat makes a strong appeal to the feelings. For with the conflagration\nthere comes to an end the struggle of the evil against the good; and\nthe Deity may at last claim for himself a period of rest, during which\nhe will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has\npassed away[126], and plan for himself a better one to follow[127].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The reconstruction.]\n\n=212.= Upon the conflagration will follow the reconstruction of the world\n(\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _renovatio_), which will lead again to a conflagration;\nthe period between one conflagration and the next being termed a \u2018great\nyear\u2019 (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, _magnus annus_). The conception of the \u2018great year\u2019 was\nborrowed by the Stoics from the Pythagoreans[128], and leads us back\nultimately to astronomical calculations; for a great year is the period\nat the end of which sun, moon and planets all return to their original\nstations[129]. The phenomena of the sky recur in each new period in the\nsame way as before; and hence we readily infer that all the phenomena\nof the universe, including the lives of individuals, will recur and\ntake their course again. Although this doctrine appears only slightly\nconnected with the general Stoic system, it was an accepted part of it:\nand Seneca expresses an instinctive and probably universal feeling when\nhe says that few would willingly repeat their past histories, if they\nknew they were so doing[130].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Creation.]\n\n=213.= We have put off till the end of this chapter the discussion of\nthe Stoic theory of Creation, because it is in fact one of the least\ndefined parts of the system. According to the theory of the great year\ncreation is not a single work, but a recurring event; and therefore in\none sense the history of the universe has neither beginning nor end.\nIt would however be a mistake to suppose that this point of view was\nalways present to the minds of Stoic teachers. The question of the\nbeginning of things is of primary importance to every philosophy, and\nthe Stoics approached it from many points of view, popular, scientific,\nmythological and theological, and gave a number of answers accordingly.\nTo the orthodox Stoic all these answers are ultimately one, though the\nlanguage in which they are expressed differs greatly; whilst the critic\nof Stoicism would assert that they are derived from different sources and\nare fundamentally irreconcileable. Seneca suggests four answers to the\nquestion \u2018Who made the universe?\u2019 It may be an omnipotent deity; or the\nimpersonal Logos; or the divine Spirit working in all things by tension;\nor (lastly) destiny, that is, the unalterable succession of cause and\nresult[131]. These answers we may examine in order.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The golden age.]\n\n=214.= The view that \u2018God made the world\u2019 is that of the theology which\nwas now everywhere becoming popular; and it is usually associated,\neven when expounded by Stoic teachers, with dualistic views. Before\nthe creation there existed a chaos, matter without shape, dark and\ndamp[132]; the Deity formed a plan, and brought life order and light into\nthe mass: from \u2018chaos\u2019 it became \u2018cosmos\u2019[133]. This deity is the same\nthat is commonly named \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2[134] or Jove, and is called the \u2018father of\ngods and men.\u2019 The universe so created was at first happy and innocent,\nas is expressed in the tradition of the Golden Age. Men lived together\nin societies, willingly obeying the wisest and strongest of their\nnumber[135]; none were tempted to wrong their neighbours. They dwelt\nin natural grottos or in the stems of trees, and obtained nourishment\nfrom tame animals and wild fruits. Little by little they made progress\nin the arts, and learnt to build, to bake, and to make use of metals.\nThese views were especially developed by Posidonius, who believed that in\nthe Mysians of his day, who lived on milk and honey, and abstained from\nflesh-meat, he could still trace the manners of this happy epoch[136].\nIt seems probable that it was from Posidonius, rather than from the\nPythagoreans, that Varro derived his picture of the Golden Age, which has\nbecome familiar to us in turn through the version given by Ovid in his\n_Metamorphoses_[137].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Older stoic theory.]\n\n=215.= These conceptions however are only familiar in the later forms\nof Stoicism. The teaching of the founders of Stoicism is on this matter\nmonistic, and is based upon the teaching of Heraclitus that the world\nwas in the beginning a creative fire, which was alike the creator and\nthe material of creation. The process of creation (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) may be\nregarded as identical with that of the mutation of the elements on the\ndownward path[138]; with the special note that when the stage of water is\nreached[139] the deity assumes the shape of the seed Logos (\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2)[140], and begets in the first instance the four elements[141];\nthen, from a combination of these, trees and animals and all other\nthings after their kind[142]. Yet even this statement is simplified if\nwe regard the original fire as itself containing the seed Logoi of all\nthings that are to be created[143]. To this is to be added that all this\nis well ordered, as in a duly constituted state[144]. From this point\nof view the Cosmos is a Cosmopolis, and we reach the border of the\ninvestigations which deal with the moral government of the universe, and\nthe political organization of mankind.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Summary.]\n\n=216.= We may sum up the history of the universe according to the Stoics\nsomewhat in the following way. Body is neither burden on the soul nor its\ninstrument, but all body is of itself instinct with motion, warmth, and\nlife, which are essentially the same. This motion is not entirely that of\ncontraction, or immobility would result; nor entirely that of expansion,\nelse the universe would be scattered into the far distance[145]. One of\nthese motions constantly succeeds the other, as Heraclitus says \u2018becoming\nextinguished by measure, and catching light by measure[146]\u2019; as when a\nswimmer with all his strength can just hold his own against the force of\nthe stream, or a bird straining its pinions appears to rest suspended\nin the air[147]. At the beginning of each world-period expansion or\ntension is supreme, and only the world-soul exists. Next the fiery breath\nbegins to cool, the opposing principle of contraction asserts itself,\nthe universe settles down and shrinks; the aether passes into air, and\nair in its turn to water. All this while tension is slackening, first\nin the centre, lastly even in the circumference; yet the vital force\nis not entirely quenched; beneath the covering of the waters lurks the\npromise of a new world. The fire still unextinguished within works upon\nthe watery mass or chaos until it evolves from it the four elements as\nwe know them. On its outer edge where it meets the expansive aether, the\nwater rarefies until the belt of air is formed. All the while the outward\nand inward movements persist; particles of fire still pass into air, and\nthence into water and earth. Earth still in turn yields to water, water\nto air, and air to fire (\u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9). Thus by the interaction of\nconflicting tendencies an equilibrium (\u1f30\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1) is established, and the\nresult is the apparent permanence of the phenomenal world[148]. Finally\nthe upward movement becomes slightly preponderant, water becomes absorbed\nin air and air transformed into fire, once more the conflagration results\nand all the world passes into the fiery breath from which it came[149].\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] As, for instance, Aristophanes in the _Clouds_.\n\n[2] \u2018vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae,\nqui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos Antipodas\nvocatis\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123.\n\n[3] \u2018cum tu, inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri, | nil parvum sapias\net adhuc sublimia cures; | quae mare compescant causae; quid temperet\nannum; | stellae sponte sua iussaene vagentur et errent\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 12,\n14-17.\n\n[4] Sen. _Ben._ iv 23, 2 to 4.\n\n[5] \u2018in aperto iacentes sidera superlabebantur et insigne spectaculum\nnoctium. mundus in praeceps agebatur silentio tantum opus ducens\n... libebat intueri signa ex media caeli parte vergentia, rursus ex\nocculto alia surgentia\u2019 _Ep._ 90, 42.\n\n[6] \u2018[vides] ordinem rerum et naturam per constituta procedere. hiems\nnunquam aberravit. aestas suo tempore incaluit. autumni verisque, ut\nsolet, facta mutatio est. tam solstitium quam aequinoctium suos dies\nrettulit\u2019 _N. Q._ iii 16, 3.\n\n[7] \u2018caelestia semper | inconcussa suo volvuntur sidera lapsu\u2019 Lucan\n_Phars._ ii 267, 8.\n\n[8] \u2018O all ye Works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord; praise and exalt him\nabove all for ever\u2019 Daniel iii 57 to 82.\n\n[9] \u2018The spacious firmament on high, | with all the blue ethereal sky, |\nand spangled heavens, a shining frame, | their great Original proclaim,\u2019\netc. J. Addison (1728).\n\n[10] See above, \u00a7 186.\n\n[11] See below, \u00a7 303.\n\n[12] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 138.\n\n[13] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u2019 \u03b5\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd [\u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2] \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 _ib._ 143.\n\n[14] \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2 Stob. i 21, 5.\n\n[15] \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf, \u1f43\u03bd \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 5, 1.\n\n[16] See \u00a7 187, note 90; Seneca however thinks there may be more outside\nthe universe than void; \u2018illud scrutor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne\nprofunda vastitas sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit\nhabitus exclusis\u2019 _Dial._ viii 5, 6.\n\n[17] Ar. Did. fr. 31.\n\n[18] Arnim ii 534.\n\n[19] Arnim ii 547.\n\n[20] \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u1fc6, \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1, \u1f00\u03ae\u03c1, \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1, \u1f03 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\nAchilles _Isag._ 9 (Arnim ii 554). But according to another view only\nearth and water, being naturally heavy, tend towards the middle; whereas\nair and fire, being naturally light, tend from it; _ib._ 4 (Arnim ii\n555). See \u00a7 196.\n\n[21] Arnim ii 557.\n\n[22] See above, \u00a7 184.\n\n[23] Arnim ii 540. The universe, being \u2018body,\u2019 possesses \u2018up\u2019 and \u2018down,\u2019\n\u2018front\u2019 and \u2018back,\u2019 and all the other relations, according to the fourth\ncategory.\n\n[24] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 44, 1.\n\n[25] Ar. Did. fr. 31, quoting from Chrysippus. So Cornutus 1; \u1f41 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u1fc6\u03bd.\n\n[26] \u2018Hicetas Syracosius caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia\nstare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum\ncircum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici\nomnia, quae si stante terra caelum moveretur\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123, on\nwhich see Prof. Reid\u2019s note.\n\n[27] Plut. _plac. phil._ iii 13, 3. The question of priority in the\nstatement of this theory has been much discussed in recent years; and\nit is contended that Hicetas and Ecphantus never existed except as\ncharacters in dialogues composed by Heraclides of Pontus, the true\ndiscoverer. See H. Steigm\u00fcller, _Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie_,\nBerlin 1892; Otto Voss, _de Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis_,\nRostock, 1896; Tannery, _Pseudonymes antiques_ (Revue des \u00e9tudes\ngrecques, 1897).\n\n[28] \u2018pertinebit hoc excussisse, ut sciamus utrum mundus terra stante\ncircumeat an mundo stante terra vertatur. fuerunt enim qui dicerent nos\nesse, quos rerum natura nescientes ferat\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ vii 2, 3. Seneca\nhowever appears for himself to reject the doctrine: \u2018scimus praeter\nterram nihil stare, cetera continua velocitate decurrere\u2019 _Ep._ 93, 9.\n\n[29] Plut. _qu. Plat._ viii 1, 2 and 3; A\u00ebt. _plac._ ii 24, 8 and iii 17,\n9.\n\n[30] Plut. _fac. lun._ 6, 3.\n\n[31] Simplic. _Arist. phys._ p. 64.\n\n[32] \u2018si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc,\nquam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae\nconversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis\nerrantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus\u2019 Cic. _N.\nD._ ii 34, 88.\n\n[33] Schmekel, p. 465.\n\n[34] \u2018in rerum natura elementa sunt quattuor\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ iii 12, 3.\n\n[35] See above, \u00a7 190.\n\n[36] \u2018ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex aere aether; deinde retrorsum\nvicissim ex aethere aer, ex aere aqua, ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis\nhis, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum ultro citro commeantibus,\nmundi partium coniunctio continetur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 32, 84.\n\n[37] \u2018necesse est ut et imus aether habeat aliquid aeri simile, et summus\naer non sit dissimilis imo aetheri, quia non fit statim in diversum\nex diverso transitus; paulatim ista in confinio vim suam miscent, ut\ndubitare possis an aer an hic iam aether sit\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 14, 2; cf.\niv 10.\n\n[38] Arnim ii 555. But see above, \u00a7 194, note 20.\n\n[39] \u2018de naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut in quattuor initiis rerum\nillis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensum et mentem effici\nrebantur, non adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae\nquidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus.\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 39; cf.\n_Fin._ iv 5, 12.\n\n[40] \u2018sic enim se res habet, ut omnia quae alantur et crescant,\ncontineant in se vim caloris: sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere.\u2019\n_N. D._ ii 9, 23 and 24; \u2018caloris [natura] vim [habet] in se vitalem, per\nomnem mundum pertinentem\u2019 _ib._\n\n[41] \u2018hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et\nconsumptor omnium; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia\nconservat alit auget sustinet sensuque afficit\u2019 _ib._ ii 15, 41. Cicero\nis quoting from Cleanthes (fr. 30 P); the teaching of Zeno was the same\n(fr. 71 B).\n\n[42] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd Ar. Did. fr. 21; \u2018Stoici\nignem, ... unum ex his quattuor elementis, et viventem et sapientem et\nipsius mundi fabricatorem ..., eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt\u2019\nAug. _Civ. De._ viii 5.\n\n[43] \u2018[ignem] natura sursum vocat; in illo igne purissimo nihil est quod\ndeprimatur\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 13, 1 and 2.\n\n[44] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 Plut. _prim.\nfrig._ 9, 1; \u2018aer frigidus per se et obscurus\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 10.\n\n[45] \u2018ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers\ncaloris\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 10, 26; \u2018aer nunquam sine igne est. detrahe illi\ncalorem; rigescet, stabit, durabitur\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ iii 10, 4.\n\n[46] \u2018quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem\nquam spiritus?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8. Aristotle held that air was warm\n(Arnim ii 431).\n\n[47] \u2018detrahe [aeri] calorem; transiet in humorem\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ iii 10, 4.\n\n[48] \u2018est aliquid in aqua vitale\u2019 _ib._ v 5, 2.\n\n[49] \u2018non esse terram sine spiritu palam est ... illo dico vitali et\nvegeto et alente omnia. hunc nisi haberet, quomodo tot arbustis spiritum\ninfunderet non aliunde viventibus, et tot satis?... totum hoc caelum,\n... omnes hae stellae ..., hic tam prope a nobis agens cursum sol ...\nalimentum ex terra trahunt\u2019 _ib._ vi 16, 1 and 2.\n\n[50] Philod. _de ira_ p. 77 Gomp.\n\n[51] \u2018ex quo concluditur, calidum illud atque igneum in omni fusum esse\nnatura\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 10, 28.\n\n[52] cap. xi, p. 38 D.\n\n[53] Schmekel, pp. 463, 4.\n\n[54] _ib._ p. 464.\n\n[55] Diog. L. vii 145 and 146; Posidonius is his general authority, but\nthe theory of the solar eclipse he refers to Zeno.\n\n[56] \u2018[lunae] tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem,\ndigressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 19, 50.\n\n[57] Pliny, _Nat. hist._ ii 21.\n\n[58] Such was the calculation of Posidonius; see Mayor\u2019s note on Cic.\n_N. D._ ii 36, 92. The sun\u2019s diameter is in fact three times as large as\nPosidonius thought.\n\n[59] This explanation has so plausible a sound that it may not be\nsuperfluous to remark that it is scientifically valueless.\n\n[60] Cic. _N. D._ ii 20, 51.\n\n[61] \u2018persuadent enim mathematici terram in medio mundo sitam ad universi\ncaeli complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod \u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd illi vocant.\u2019\n_Tusc. disp._ i 17, 40.\n\n[62] Diog. L. vii 144 and 145.\n\n[62a] \u2018ego nostris non adsentior; non enim existimo cometen subitaneum\nignem sed inter aeterna opera naturae\u2019 _N. Q._ vii 21, 1.\n\n[63] \u2018omni terrarum ambitu non semel maior\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ vi 16, 2.\n\n[64] \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 A\u00ebt. _plac._ ii 17, 4; \u2018[sidera] marinis terrenisque\numoribus longo intervallo extenuatis [aluntur]\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 16, 43;\n\u2018totum hoc caelum ... halitu terrarum [sustinetur]\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ vi 16, 2.\n\n[65] Ar. Did. fr. 34; for the text and interpretation see Hirzel, pp.\n121, 122.\n\n[66] A\u00ebt. _plac._ ii 14, 1 and 2.\n\n[67] \u2018solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae\noriantur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur\u2019 Cic. _N.\nD._ ii 15, 41.\n\n[68] Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 37.\n\n[69] \u2018ideo enim, sicut et Posidonius et Cleanthes adfirmant, solis meatus\na plaga, quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus\u2019\nMacrob. _Sat._ i 23, 2.\n\n[70] \u2018hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem\ndivinitas, quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur; ...\ntotaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime animantia\nesse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 39.\n\n[71] Sen. _Ben._ vii 31, 3.\n\n[72] \u2018Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii\n41, 126.\n\n[73] Diog. L. vii 139.\n\n[74] \u2018idemque [Zeno] hoc modo: \u201cnullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest\nesse sentiens. mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret sensu\nmundus\u201d\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 8, 22.\n\n[75] \u2018quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non\nutitur. nihil autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mundus utitur\u2019 _ib._ 8,\n21; see also \u00a7 83.\n\n[76] Diog. L. vii 143; \u2018haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus\nmundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato\nspiritu continerentur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. This unity of the universe\nis technically termed \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, \u2018consentiens conspirans\ncontinuata cognatio rerum\u2019 (Cic. as above). It was denied by Panaetius\n(Schmekel, pp. 191, 192).\n\n[77] \u2018est ergo in eo virtus: sapiens est igitur et propterea deus\u2019 Cic.\n_N. D._ ii 14, 39; \u2018quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini\naliquid existere, qui dei pars est? totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum\nest et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 92, 30.\n\n[78] \u2018From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted\nno essential difference between God and the world. Their system was\ntherefore strictly pantheistic\u2019 Zeller, p. 156.\n\n[79] \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f54\u03c4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2 Cornutus 2.\n\n[80] Varro Fr. i 27 b (Aug. _Civ. De._ vii 6).\n\n[81] \u2018nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se\npotest animantem compotemque rationis\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 8, 22.\n\n[82] See above, \u00a7 101.\n\n[83] Diog. L. vii 139.\n\n[84] _ib._\n\n[85] See below, chap. xi.\n\n[86] Sext. _math._ viii 270 (Arnim ii 727).\n\n[87] \u2018inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qualis formicis per arbusta\nrepentibus, quae in summum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur.\nhis plerique similem vitam agunt, quorum non immerito quis \u201cinquietam\ninertiam\u201d dixerit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 12, 3.\n\n[88] _ib._ vi 7, 2.\n\n[89] \u2018quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque\neis, quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem, dum possint se ipsa\ndefendere?\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 51, 129.\n\n[90] \u2018canum vero tam fida custodia, ... quid significat?\u2019 _ib._ 63, 158.\n\n[91] \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc7 Plut.\n_virt. mor._ 12.\n\n[92] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03ce\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 [\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd]\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd Galen _adv. Iul._ v (Arnim ii 718).\n\n[93] \u2018omnem naturam necesse est ... habere aliquem in se principatum, ut\nin homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 11,\n29; \u2018ipsum principale parum subtile, parum exactum. capit ergo visus\nspeciesque rerum quibus ad impetus evocetur, sed turbidas et confusas\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ iii 3, 7 and 8.\n\n[94] \u2018bestiis [natura] et sensum et motum dedit, et cum quodam appetitu\naccessum ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 12, 34;\nand so again, _ib._ 47, 122.\n\n[95] \u2018irasci quidem non magis sciunt quam ignoscere; muta animalia\nhumanis adfectibus carent, habent autem similes illis quosdam impetus\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ iii 3, 5 and 6.\n\n[96] \u2018[ira], cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam nascitur, nisi ubi rationi\nlocus est\u2019 _ib._ 3, 4.\n\n[97] \u2018sunt quaedam quae animam habent nec sunt animalia. placet enim\nsatis et arbustis animam inesse; itaque et vivere illa et mori dicimus\u2019\nSen. _Ep._ 58, 10; cf. _N. Q._ vi 16, 1.\n\n[98] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd Galen _de Hipp. et Plut._ vi. 561 K (Arnim ii 710). Aristotle\nhad used the term \u03b8\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae in the same sense. So too Cicero: \u2018iis\nquae [gignuntur] e terra natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo\natque augendo tueretur\u2019 _N. D._ ii 12, 33.\n\n[99] _ib._ ii 11, 29.\n\n[100] \u2018parvula admodum semina ... in tantum convalescunt ut ingentia saxa\ndisturbent et monumenta dissolvant. hoc quid est aliud quam intentio\nspiritus?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 5; and again \u2018quid aliud producit fruges et\nsegetem imbecillam ac virentes exigit umbras ac distendit in ramos quam\nspiritus intentio et unitas?\u2019 _ib._ ii 6, 6. See also Cic. _N. D._ ii 32,\n81.\n\n[101] Arnim ii 713.\n\n[102] \u2018quaedam anima carent, ut saxa; itaque erit aliquid animantibus\nantiquius, corpus scilicet\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 58, 10.\n\n[103] This use of \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 must be kept distinct from that which is\ncontrasted with \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, as _habitus_ from _dispositio_: see above, \u00a7\n184.\n\n[104] \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03af\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Galen _introd.\ns. med._ xiv p. 726 K (Arnim ii 716).\n\n[105] \u2018[unitas corporum] ad naturam corporis [refert], nulla ope externa,\nsed unitate sua cohaerentis\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 2, 4.\n\n[106] Alex. _de mixt._ p. 226, 24-30 Bruns (Arnim ii 1048); Lucian\n_Hermot._ 81. See above, \u00a7 186.\n\n[107] This gradation of soul-power is most clearly explained by Varro;\n\u2018idem Varro tres esse adfirmat animae gradus in omni universaque natura;\nunum qui omnes partes corporis, quae vivunt, transit et non habet sensum\nsed tantum ad vivendum valetudinem; hanc vim in nostro corpore permanare\ndicit in ossa ungues capillos, sicut in mundo arbores sine sensu ...\ncrescunt et modo quodam suo vivunt; secundum gradum animae, in quo sensus\nest; hanc vim pervenire in oculos aures nares os tactum; tertium gradum\nesse animae summum, quod vocatur animus, in quo intellegentia praeminet;\nhoc praeter hominem omnes carere mortales\u2019 Aug. _Civ. De._ vii 23.\n\n[108] Diog. L. vii 141.\n\n[109] \u2018The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements\nshall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that\nare therein shall be burned up.\u2019 2 Peter iii 10.\n\n[110] See above, \u00a7 196.\n\n[111] The theory of the conflagration appears to have been attached to\nthe Stoic system from without, and the logical contention is obviously\nweak. For if the upward movement is in excess, the earth should disappear\nbefore the water. It should also always be remembered that the fire that\nfinally remains is not the destructive, but a constructive element.\n\n[112] \u2018ex quo eventurum nostri putant id, ... ut ad extremum omnis mundus\nignesceret, cum humore consumpto neque terra ali posset neque remearet\naer; cuius ortus, aqua omni exhausta, esse non posset: ita relinqui nihil\npraeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret, atque\nidem ornatus oriretur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 46, 118. \u2018cum tempus advenerit,\nquo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus ista se suis caedent et\nsidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrante materia uno igne quicquid\nnunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. nos quoque felices animae atque aeterna\nsortitae, parva ruinae ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ vi 26, 6.\n\n[113] \u03bf\u1f50 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03bd\u1fc4\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd Plut. _Sto. rep._ 39, 2.\n\n[114] \u2018[quaeramus] immortalis sit mundus, an inter caduca et ad tempus\nnata numerandus\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 31.\n\n[115] \u2018Heraclitus after all his speculations on the conflagration of the\nuniverse\u2019 _To himself_ (Rendall\u2019s transl.), iii 3. Aristotle interpreted\nHeraclitus in the same way; thus he paraphrases fr. 26 (B), 66 (D); \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03ad\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 as follows: \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 _Met._ xi 10.\n\n[116] See above, \u00a7 193.\n\n[117] Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 14 (Arnim ii 590) relying on fr. 20 (B), 30\n(D). Philo _inc. mund._ p. 222, 2 (Arnim ii 620).\n\n[118] Clem. Al. as before, relying on fr. 21 (B), 31a (D); \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd [\u1f41\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2] \u1f40 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, Philo as above.\n\n[119] Ar. Did. fr. 29.\n\n[120] Diog. L. vii 142.\n\n[121] \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 Ar. Did. fr. 36.\n\n[122] See above, \u00a7 109.\n\n[123] See above, \u00a7 115. For a full discussion of the motives of this\nchange see Schmekel, pp. 304-318.\n\n[124] \u2018ita stabilis mundus est atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut\nnihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 45, 115.\n\n[125] \u2018[mundi partium coniunctio] certe perdiuturna [est,] permanens ad\nlonginquum et immensum paene tempus\u2019 _ib._ 33, 85.\n\n[126] \u2018[Iuppiter,] resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis paulisper\ncessante natura adquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n9, 16. On the relation of \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2 to the \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 see Alex. _de mixt._ p.\n226, 16 B; Philo _inc. mund._ c. 14, 15.\n\n[127] \u2018[conflagratio] fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri\u2019\n_N. Q._ iii 28, 7.\n\n[128] Zeller, p. 166.\n\n[129] Cic. _N. D._ ii 20, 51: see also Schmekel, p. 241.\n\n[130] \u2018veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponat dies; quem multi\nrecusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 36, 10. Socrates and Plato\nwill live again, their friends and fellow citizens will be the same, and\nthey will be again treated as before; Nemes. _nat. hom._ p. 277 (Arnim\nii 625). This theory is plainly not reconcileable with Seneca\u2019s hope of\nbetter things (see note 127). See also Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp.\n33 sqq.\n\n[131] \u2018quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens omnium,\nsive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus\nper omnia maxima et minima aequali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et\nimmutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ xii 8, 3.\n\n[132] This chaos the Stoics identified with the watery stage which\npreceded the creation of earth in the history of the elements: see\nPearson on Zeno fr. 112, 113.\n\n[133] Seneca\u2019s writings are penetrated with this conception: \u2018hoc\nuniversum ... dies aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem\ntenebrasque demerget\u2019 _Dial._ xi 1, 2; cf. _Ep._ 65, 19.\n\n[134] \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ce\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\nCornutus 2.\n\n[135] \u2018illo ergo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse\nregnum Posidonius iudicat\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 90, 5.\n\n[136] Strabo vii 296. See generally Schmekel, pp. 288-290.\n\n[137] Ov. _Met._ xv 96-142; Schmekel p. 288.\n\n[138] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd] \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 Diog. L. vii 136.\n\n[139] This stage, at which the whole universe is water, even though the\nfour elements have not yet been created, reflects the popular tradition\nas to Chaos as in the last section: see Pearson p. 102. For the process\nof creation as described by Cleanthes see Pearson p. 252.\n\n[140] See above, \u00a7 178.\n\n[141] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 ... \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 Diog. L. vii 136.\n\n[142] \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 _ib._ 142.\n\n[143] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Arist. apud Euseb. _praep. ev._ xv (Arnim i 98).\n\n[144] \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 _ib._\n\n[145] Galen _de trem._ 6 VII, p. 616 K (Arnim ii 446).\n\n[146] \u1f01\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 Heracl. Fr. 20 (B), 30 (D).\n\n[147] Galen _de musc._ i 7 and 8 (Arnim ii 450).\n\n[148] \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f30\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f23\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 Philo _an. sac._ II 242 M (Arnim ii 616).\n\n[149] This concluding section is based upon a note, which was prepared by\nMr A. C. Pearson for an edition of Chrysippus now abandoned, and which\nhas been kindly placed by him at my disposal.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE SUPREME PROBLEMS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The \u2018mauvais pas.\u2019]\n\n=217.= In the preceding chapter we have discussed the universe from the\nscientific standpoint. \u2018Such,\u2019 say the Stoics, \u2018we find that the universe\nis; such and such it was in the beginning, and such it will be to the\nend.\u2019 Their conclusions are reached by observation, classification,\nand analysis; and yet not entirely by these, for we must admit that\nthere is also employed that power of scientific imagination which\nthe ancients call \u2018divination.\u2019 Still on the whole the investigation\nhas been that of the student, and the method that of speculation or\ncontemplation dissociated from any consideration of the usefulness of\nthe results attained. In the study we now undertake all this is changed.\nOur philosophy proceeds to assert that the universe is good, that it is\ndirected by wise purpose, and that it claims the reverence and obedience\nof mankind. It calls upon its adherents to view the world with moral\napproval, and to find in it an ethical standard. Such conclusions\ncannot be reached by purely discursive reason; but they are such as are\neverywhere sought by practical men. They appeal to a side of human nature\ndifferent from that which passes judgment on the conclusions previously\nreached. From the first position \u2018the universe is\u2019 to the second \u2018the\nuniverse is good\u2019 the step is slippery. We are on the dizzy heights of\nphilosophical speculation, where the most experienced climbers find their\nway they know not how, and can hardly hold out a hand to help those who\nare in distress. The Stoic teachers did not perhaps always follow the\nsame track, and now and again they stumbled on the way. Reasoning often\nproved a weak support, but resolution carried them through somehow to the\nrefuges on which their eyes were all along set.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fate, providence, and fortune.]\n\n=218.= To the problem of the meaning and government of the universe three\nanswers were current in the epoch with which we are dealing. Either all\nthings take place by fate; or the world is ruled by a divine providence;\nor else fortune is supreme[1]. These three terms are not always mutually\nexclusive: Virgil speaks commonly of the \u2018fates of the gods[2]\u2019; and\n\u2018fortune\u2019 is frequently personified, not only in common speech, as\nwhen the Romans spoke of the \u2018fortune of the city,\u2019 but even by a\nphilosopher like Lucretius, who speaks of \u2018Fortune the pilot[3],\u2019 with a\nhalf-humorous abandonment of exactitude. The Stoics have the merit of not\nonly recognising fully these three powers, but also of using the terms\nwith relative consistency. By fate then we mean an abstract necessity,\nan impersonal tendency, according to which events flow; by providence\na personal will; by fortune the absence of both tendency and purpose,\nwhich results in a constant shifting to and fro, as when a man stands\nupon a ball, and is carried this way and that[4]. All explanations, both\nof general tendencies and of particular events, must ultimately resolve\nthemselves into one or other of these three; every constructive system\nmust necessarily aim at shewing that the three ultimately coincide, and\nthat philosophy is the guardian and guide of mankind in the understanding\nof their relations one to another[5].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fate.]\n\n=219.= The Stoics hold that \u2018all things happen by fate[6].\u2019 To this\nconclusion they are brought by the same reasoning that moved the\nChaldaeans. The visible universe is, and has motion. The heavenly bodies\nmove incessantly in their orbits; there is no force either within or\nwithout them that can turn them aside a hair\u2019s breadth, or make their\npace quicker or slower. No prayers of men, no prerogatives of gods can\nmake them change[7]. Without cause there is no effect; and each effect\nis in its turn a new cause. Thus is constructed an endless chain, in\nwhich all things living and inanimate are alike bound. If a man knew\nall the causes that exist, he could trace out all the consequences.\nWhat will be, will be; what will not be, cannot be. This first Stoic\ninterpretation of the universe is that of Determinism; it reiterates and\ndrives home the principle that is here our starting-point, \u2018the universe\nis.\u2019 \u2018Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno say that all things take place\naccording to fate; and fate is the linked cause of things that are, or\nthe system by which the universe is conducted[8].\u2019 This \u2018fate\u2019 is only\nanother name for \u2018necessity[9]\u2019; fates cannot be changed[10].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The \u2018fallacies\u2019 of determinism.]\n\n=220.= The doctrine of fate appears to contradict directly the belief in\nhuman free will, and to lead up to the practical doctrine of laziness\n(\u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, _ignava ratio_). Once we allow it to be true that \u2018what\nwill be, will be,\u2019 it becomes useless to make any effort. As at the\npresent time, this argument was familiar in cases of sickness. One says\nto the sick person, \u2018if it is your fate to recover, then you will recover\nwhether you call in the physician or not; and if it is your fate not to\nrecover, then you will not recover in either case. But it is your fate\neither to recover or not to recover; therefore it will be useless to\ncall in the physician.\u2019 To which another will reply: \u2018you may as well\nargue that if it is your fate to beget a son, you will beget one equally\nwhether you consort with your wife or not; therefore it will be useless\nto consort with your wife[11].\u2019 With such verbal disputes Chrysippus\ndelighted to deal; his reply to the \u2018lazy argument\u2019 was that certain\nthings go together by fate (_iuncta fato, confatalia_)[12]. Thus in the\nabove cases it may be determined by fate that you should both call in a\nphysician and recover, both consort with your wife and beget a son.\n\nSo once more when Nestor says to the watchmen by his ships:\n\n  Keep watch, my lads: let sleep seize no man\u2019s eyes,\n  Lest foes, loud laughing, take us by surprize[13].\n\nSome one then replies, \u2018No, they will not, even if we sleep, if it is\npredestined that the dock be not seized.\u2019 To such an objection any one\ncan give the right answer: \u2018all these things are equally predestined, and\ngo together by fate. There is no such thing as a watch kept by sleepers,\na victory won by runaways, or a harvest reaped except after sowing good\nclean soil[14].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Logic of possibility.]\n\n=221.= The doctrine of fate also seems to conflict with some of the\ncommonest forms of speech. For if it is correct to say \u2018Either this\nwill happen, or it will not happen,\u2019 it seems incorrect to say \u2018it may\nhappen\u2019; and still more of the past, since we must admit of any event\nthat \u2018it has happened\u2019 or \u2018it has not happened,\u2019 there seems no room for\nthe statement \u2018it might have happened.\u2019 Chrysippus however maintains\nthat the words \u2018may\u2019 and \u2018might\u2019 are correctly used, or (in other words)\nthat we may assert that it is or was \u2018possible\u2019 for things to happen,\nwhether or not they will happen or have happened. For example, the pearl\nhere is breakable, and may be broken, though fate has ordained that it\nnever will be broken. Cypselus might not have been tyrant of Corinth,\nthough the oracle at Delphi declared a thousand years before the time\nthat he would be[15]. This view had been sharply contested by Diodorus\nthe Megarian; and the controversy was summed up in the \u2018master argument.\u2019\nThis is stated as follows: there are three propositions in conflict\nwith one another in the sense that if any two of them are true, the\nthird is false. They are these: (i) every past event is necessary; (ii)\nthe impossible cannot follow on the possible; (iii) there are things\npossible that neither are nor will be true. Diodorus accepted the first\ntwo; he therefore drew the conclusion that there is nothing possible\nexcept that which is or will be true; or in other words he denied the\nexistence of any category of \u2018things possible\u2019 distinct from that of\nfacts past or future. Cleanthes and Antipater accepted the second and\nthird propositions: Chrysippus accepted the first and third, but denied\nthe second[16]; that is he admitted that the possible thing (e.g. the\nbreaking of the pearl) might become the impossible because fate had\ndecided to the contrary. The choice intimates much; it shows that the\nStoics, however strongly they assert the rule of fate or necessity,\nintend so to interpret these terms as to reconcile them with the common\nuse of words, that is, with the inherited belief in divine and human\nwill, breaking through the chain of unending cause and effect[17].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Definitions of fate.]\n\n=222.= The next step is professedly taken by way of definition of the\nword \u2018fate\u2019 (\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, _fatum_). Exactly as the stuff of the universe,\nfire, has been explained to be no mere passive or destructive element,\nbut one possessed of creative force and reason, so is fate declared to\nbe no blind or helpless sequence of events, but an active and wise power\nwhich regulates the universe. Fate is in fact but another name for the\nLogos or World-reason. On this point all Stoic teachers are in the main\nagreed. \u2018Fate,\u2019 said Zeno, \u2018is a power which stirs matter by the same\nlaws and in the same way; it may equally well be called providence or\nnature[18].\u2019 Chrysippus gives us several alternative definitions: \u2018the\nessence of fate is a spiritual force, duly ordering the universe[19]\u2019; it\nis \u2018the Logos of the universe[20],\u2019 or \u2018the law of events providentially\nordered in the universe[21]\u2019; or, \u2018the law by which things that have\nbeen have been, that are are, that will be will be[22].\u2019 But an important\ndifference appears between the views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. They\nare agreed that all that happens by providence also happens by fate.\nBut Cleanthes will not allow, as Chrysippus is prepared to do, that all\nthings that happen by fate happen providentially[23]. With Cleanthes the\nconception of fate is wider than that of providence, just as in Virgil\nthe fates are more powerful than Jove. Cleanthes, being deeply conscious\nof the evil existing in the universe, refused to hold providence\nresponsible for it. Chrysippus on the other hand identifies fate with the\ndeity[24].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Providence.]\n\n=223.= Providence (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, _providentia_) differs from fate, if at\nall, by including an element of personality. It is a principal dogma\nof the Stoics that \u2018the universe is ruled by providence.\u2019 Cicero\nindeed assures us that the word \u2018providence\u2019 is merely an abbreviation\nfor \u2018the providence of the gods,\u2019 and that the dogma really asserts\nthat \u2018the universe is ruled by the gods with foresight\u2019; and Balbus,\nthe Stoic advocate, in his treatise, rebukes his opponent Cotta for\nhaving travestied the Stoic doctrine by speaking of providence as \u2018a\nfortune-telling hag,\u2019 as though she were some kind of goddess governing\nthe world[25]. But the travesty is at least as instructive as the\nexposition. If \u2018providence\u2019 is on the one hand interpreted as God\u2019s\nprovidence[26], it is on the other hand equivalent to Nature[27], and\nagain to the Mind of the universe; it is the Logos, the universal Law,\nthe creative force[28]; not merely an attribute, but a manifestation and\nbodily presentment of deity. After the final conflagration three joining\nin one will be left, Zeus, providence, and the creative fire[29]. Lastly,\nif we consider the process of logical demonstration, it is from the\nreality of providence that the Stoics deduce the existence of the gods;\nonly from the standpoint of dogmatic instruction is the order reversed.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Beauty of the universe.]\n\n=224.= The work and functions of Providence are open to our view, for\nit has an aim and pathway of its own[30]. Its first aim is to create a\nuniverse capable of enduring; next, it makes that universe complete;\nthirdly, it endows it with every beauty and excellence[31]. The beauty\nof the world is a favourite theme upon which Stoic orators discourse at\nlength; this is, in their view, the best world that could possibly have\nbeen created[32]. This sense of beauty appears to be derived from two\nsources, the admiration and awe felt in contemplating the sky, the sun\nmoon and stars moving in it, lofty mountains, rushing rivers, and deep\ncaves[33]; and the gentler delight stirred by the sight of the fertile\nfield, the vine-clad hill, the river-pathway, the flocks and herds,\nwhich all subserve the convenience of man. Thus from beauty we pass to\nusefulness, and the Stoics now maintain that the world has been created\nand is maintained for the use of man[34]. In strict language, however,\nwe must say that the universe is made for the use of rational beings,\nthat is, for gods and men[35], that it is a home or city in which\ngods and men alike have a share[36]. From the protection of providence\nthe animals, according to the Stoic view, are in principle entirely\nexcluded. Yet it did not escape notice that nature has often provided\nfor their comfort in particulars, giving them instincts that enable them\nto maintain life, and an outward shape conformable to the conditions\nof their existence[37]. And Seneca especially found that man was apt\nto swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of\nwhich only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and where day\nand night, summer and winter would continue of themselves, even if no\nman observed them[38]. On the other hand zealots like Chrysippus worked\nout the detailed application of this theory in a way that provoked the\namusement of their critics[39].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Particular providence.]\n\n=225.= Providence cares for mankind in general, and therefore for the\nparts of mankind, the various continents, nations, and cities. The\nStoics are also inclined to hold that it cares for the individual[40].\nThe difficulty of this belief is great. Busy cities are overthrown by\nthe earthquake; the crops of the careful farmer are blasted by the\nhailstorm; Socrates is condemned to death by the Athenians; Pythagoras,\nZeno and Antiphon meet with violent ends. Yet we may not think that in\nany of these cases the sufferers were hated or neglected by the gods; it\nis rather an inevitable necessity that has worked their ruin. The gods\nwho have great things in their charge, must sometimes overlook small\nmatters; they must save the community by sacrificing the individual[41].\nThe storm may rage in the valley, yet there is peace on the mountain\nheights[42]. The philosopher who is absorbed in contemplating the great\nwhole cannot even see the flaws in its details. \u2018If the gods care for\nall men,\u2019 says Cicero\u2019s authority, \u2018it follows logically that they care\nfor each single man[43].\u2019 \u2018Nothing occurs on earth, nor in the heaven\nabove, nor in the sea, apart from thee, O God,\u2019 sings Cleanthes[44]. \u2018It\nis impossible,\u2019 says Chrysippus, \u2018that even the least of particulars can\nfall out otherwise than in accordance with the will of God, with his\nWord, with law, with justice, and with providence[45].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Existence of evil.]\n\n=226.= The doctrine of providence, carried to a logical extreme, leads\nto the denial of the existence of evil. But the Stoics did not draw this\nconclusion; had they done so, their whole treatment of ethics would have\nbecome futile. We have therefore to scrutinize carefully the language\nthat they employ. If we meet with the paradox that \u2018this is the best\nof all possible worlds,\u2019 we must remember that all paradoxes need for\ntheir interpretation some sense of humour, and that the \u2018best possible\u2019\nis not the same as the \u2018best imaginable.\u2019 Somewhere or other there\nis, in a sense, a limitation to the sphere of providence. If again in\npoetical passages we learn that \u2018nothing occurs without God,\u2019 we must\nnot forget the doctrine that good and evil are alike brought in the end\ninto harmony with the divine nature. The most exact statement of Stoic\ndoctrine would seem to be that evil exists indeed, but is not the equal\nof the good either in intensity or in duration; it is an incident, not a\nfirst principle of the universe[46]. From this point of view it becomes\npossible to \u2018plead the cause of the gods,\u2019 to defend providence from the\nheavy accusations men bring forward against it[47]. Thus the Stoics set\nabout to prove that, in spite of the existence of evil, the universe is\nruled by the foresight of a beneficent deity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Logical solutions.]\n\n=227.= The first argument for the defence is logical, and is pressed\nby Chrysippus. Good implies its opposite, evil. \u2018There could be no\njustice, unless there were also injustice; no courage, unless there were\ncowardice; no truth, unless there were falsehood[48].\u2019 Just in the same\nway we find coarse wit in a comedy, which is objectionable in itself,\nand yet somehow contributes to the charm of the poem as a whole[49]. The\nsecond argument is based upon the doctrine of \u2018necessary consequence\u2019\n(\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). The general design of the human head required that\nit should be compacted of small and delicate bones, accompanying which\nis the inevitable disadvantage that the head may easily be injured by\nblows[50]. War is an evil, but it turns to good by ridding the world of\nsuperfluous population[51].\n\nIn many other cases there may be explanations that are beyond our present\nknowledge, just as there are many kinds of animals of which we do not yet\nknow the use[52].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Moral solutions.]\n\n=228.= More important are those arguments which introduce moral\nconsiderations. In the first place the generous intentions of providence\nare often thwarted by the perverseness of wicked men[53], just as many\na son uses his inheritance ill, and yet his father in bequeathing it\nto him did him a service[54]. The Deity treats good men as a Roman\nfather his children, giving them a stern training, that they may grow\nin virtue[55]; those that he loves, he hardens[56]. Earthquakes and\nconflagrations may occur on earth, and perhaps similar catastrophes in\nthe sky, because the world needs to be purified from the wickedness that\nabounds[57]. The punishment of the wicked, for instance by pestilence\nand famine, stands for an example to other men, that they may learn to\navoid a like disaster[58]. Often, if the wicked have gone unpunished,\nthe penalty descends on their children, their grandchildren, and their\ndescendants[59].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Divine power limited.]\n\n=229.= The very multiplicity of these explanations or excuses betrays the\nweakness of the case, and the Stoics are in the last resort driven to\nadmit that the Deity is neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, and that\nthe sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity. Thus\nChrysippus explains blunders in divination by saying that \u2018the Deity\ncannot know everything[60],\u2019 and though he ascribes to the Deity all\npower, yet when hard pressed he admits that he cannot do everything, and\nthat \u2018there is a good deal of necessity in the matter[61].\u2019 In this way\nhe is forced back to the position which the shrewder Cleanthes had taken\nfrom the first[62]. After we have taken away from fate all that has life\nor meaning, there remains a residuum, which we can but vaguely assign to\nsome \u2018natural necessity[63].\u2019 This point once granted, we realize that it\nincludes many of the detailed explanations previously given. Thus it is\nby \u2018natural necessity\u2019 that good cannot exist without evil; that the past\ncannot be altered; that the one must suffer for the many[64]; that the\ngood cannot always be separated from the bad[65]; that character grows\nby the defiance of pain; that the individual is everywhere exposed to\ndisaster from tyranny, war, pestilence, famine, and earthquake.\n\n\n[Sidenote: God and men allied.]\n\n=230.= The recognition of the limitations of divine power creates a new\ntie between gods and men. Men are no longer the mere instruments of\nprovidence, they are its fellow-workers; we may even go further, and\nboldly call them its fellow-sufferers[66]. God has given man what he\ncould, not what he would[67]; he could not change the stuff on which\nhe had to work[68]; if anything has not been granted to us, it could\nnot have been granted[69]. Under such circumstances a sensible man will\nnot find fault with the gods, who have done their best[70]; nor will he\nmake appeals to them to which they cannot respond[71]. Even less will he\nquarrel with a destiny that is both blind and deaf[72].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fortune.]\n\n=231.= In the Stoic explanation of the universe fortune plays no part; it\nhas no existence in the absolute sense of the term[73]. But in practical\nlife, and from the limited point of view of the individuals concerned,\nfortune is everywhere met with. Her actions are the same as we have just\nseen to be ascribed to \u2018natural necessity\u2019; storms, shipwrecks, plagues,\nwars, and tyranny[74]. Fortune therefore by no means excludes causality,\nbut includes all events which are without meaning from the point of view\nof the individual[75]; all advantages or disadvantages which he has\nnot personally merited, and which are not designed for his individual\ndiscipline. So great is the sphere of Fortune, that it appears at first\nthat she is mistress of human life; and we may picture her as a tyrant,\nmocking and merciless, without principle and without policy[76]. The\nfurther consideration of Fortune belongs to the department of Ethics.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Has God or man free will?]\n\n=232.= The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation to gods and\nmen, the fellow-citizens of this universe, centre in the question of free\nwill. If we grant that the divine power is to some extent less in range\nthan the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute\nto it within that range some real choice between alternatives, something\nof that individual power which common opinion attributes to kings? or\nmust we on the other hand regard the divinity as a mere symbol of an\nunchanging law, girt with the trappings of a royalty from which all real\nshare in government has been withdrawn? Is man again a mere puppet under\nthe control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in\ncreating the destiny to which he must submit? Supposing him to have this\npower of will, is it bound up with his privilege of reason, or do the\nanimals also possess it?\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoics incline towards free will.]\n\n=233.= To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct answer \u2018Yes\u2019\nor \u2018No.\u2019 The critics who wish to tie them down to one or other of the\nopposing views complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and excited\nabout their answer[77]. They accept apparently both views as dogmas,\nasserting that \u2018all things take place by destiny\u2019 and that \u2018something\nrests with us[78].\u2019 To the first dogma the whole of their treatment of\nphysics points; but the second is required as a postulate for any science\nof ethics[78a]. The Stoics were in no way disposed to cut the knot by\nsacrificing one or the other of the principal parts of their philosophy.\nThey go back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, and\nendeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition to do away\nwith the obvious contradiction. In this work they were observed to have\na bias in favour of free will[79]. The first sign of this bias we have\nalready noticed in the vindication of the word \u2018possible[80].\u2019 If our\neyes are fixed merely on the movement of the heavenly bodies, we shall\nhardly need a term which prints on future events a character which it\ndenies to those that are past. The astronomer can describe to us with\nequal precision an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the\nbattle of Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word \u2018possible\u2019\nopens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense of right\nand wrong, with regard to the whole range of future events. However\ndelicately the doctrine may be shaded, the main issue is determined when\nwe say of gods and men that they \u2018can[81].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Proximate and principal causes.]\n\n=234.= In order to reconcile the doctrines of causality and possibility,\nwe must first distinguish between outer and inner compulsion, between\n\u2018proximate\u2019 and \u2018principal\u2019 causes. If a boy starts a cylinder rolling\ndown hill, he gives it an opportunity without which it could not have\nrolled; this is the proximate cause (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, _proxima_). But\nthe cylinder would not continue rolling except by an inner compulsion,\na law within itself, by which it is the nature of cylinders to roll\ndownwards[82]. This is the leading or principal cause (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7,\n_antecedens_ or _principalis_). So neither in thought nor in action can\na man form a judgment, unless there be a picture (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _visum_)\npresented to his mind. The picture is a proximate cause[83]. But assent\nto the picture rests with the man himself; the man himself, his reason,\nhis will, is the principal cause. Here we touch on the dogma which is\nthe foundation of ethics: \u2018assent is in our power.\u2019 Upon this rests the\nright of the philosopher to praise or blame, the right of the lawgiver to\nreward and punish.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The divine nature immutable.]\n\n=235.= We have to investigate further the inner compulsion, the principal\ncause. With regard to the gods their own disposition is a law to them,\ntheir character holds them to their purpose, their majesty makes their\ndecrees immutable[84]. This is the final answer of philosophy, even\nthough men cannot content themselves with it. Even amongst those most\ndisposed to accept Stoic principles, there is a wish that the gods\nshould be allowed a little _play_, a choice at any rate in small matters\nnot hampered by considerations of destiny and morality[85]; and upon\nthis issue the poet may deviate a little from the sterner creed of the\nphilosopher[86]. Nor must we so interpret the wisdom and benevolence of\nthe gods as to deny the efficacy of prayer[87].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Man\u2019s wickedness.]\n\n=236.= In the case of men free will comes accompanied by a heavy burden\nof responsibility; for by its exercise men have defied the gods and\nbrought evil into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny,\nwhen their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer bears\nwitness:\n\n  \u2018Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us\n  they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the\n  blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is\n  ordained[88].\u2019\n\n  \u2018Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished,\n  fools[89].\u2019\n\nEqually in vain it is that they protest against the penalties prescribed\nby the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has drawn them[90].\nOf their wrongdoing the \u2018principal cause\u2019 lies in their own natures; if\nthese are from the first wholesome, the blows of fate are deadened; if\nthey are boorish and undisciplined, they rush of themselves into sin and\nerror[91]. Into the further question, whether a man is responsible for\nhis own nature, our authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in\nethics a way will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent\nto undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into harmony\nwith the will of the universe. As to the animals, they act upon impulse,\nbut cannot be said in a strict sense to possess will, nor are they proper\nsubjects for praise and blame.\n\n\n[Sidenote: No result without cause.]\n\n=237.= Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent to the\nnegation of cause, is by the Stoics identified with the highest type of\ncause. Action without cause (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd), effect which is self-caused\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd), are totally denied[92]. Even if a man be given the\nchoice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, as when he\nmust begin walking either with the right or with the left foot, there is\nalways a cause which determines between them, though (as in all cases\nof \u2018chance\u2019) it is not discernible by human reasoning[93]. In this way\ndestiny, cause, will are all brought into harmony; the dualism (which\nafter all cannot be entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. \u2018All\nthings take place according to destiny, but not all things according to\nnecessity[94]\u2019; thus is saved the principle of free choice (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd).\nIn other words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living,\nwilling powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind\nnon-moral unbending \u2018necessity\u2019 of things, even whilst he admits that\nsuch necessity is there.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Pons Stoicus.]\n\n=238.= Now that the various steps have been decided upon, by which our\nphilosophy progresses from physics to ethics, it remains to connect them\nby a pathway in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that\nthe steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show of\nreasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical form is a\nconvenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction on the memory, and\nif it cannot remove difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, it at\nleast so distributes them that they may be overlooked by the zealous and\ndefied by the adventurous. Thus then the argument runs:\u2014\n\n  \u2018If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the\n  universe must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there\n  must be an ordered universe; and if so, there must be gods. Now\n  if there are gods, the gods are good; and if they are good,\n  goodness exists; and if goodness exists, so also does wisdom.\n  And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and for men[95].\n  If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and\n  to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right\n  actions are praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy\n  deserve reward, and things blameable deserve punishment.\n\n  Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be\n  rewards and punishments[96].\u2019\n\nAll this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is already a\nStoic; to his opponent it seems to display its weakness at every joint.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca; \u2018dicet\naliquis\u2014quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si\ndeus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat?... quicquid est ex\nhis, Lucili, _vel si omnia haec sunt_, philosophandum est; sive nos\ninexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta\ndisponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat,\nphilosophia nos tueri debet\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 16, 4 and 5.\n\n[2] e.g. _Aen._ vi 376.\n\n[3] \u2018quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans\u2019 _R. N._ v 108.\n\n[4] \u2018vaga volubilisque Fortuna\u2019 Cic. _Milo_ 26, 69; \u2018fortuna ... amica\nvarietati constantiam respuit\u2019 _N. D._ ii 16, 43.\n\n[5] Seneca as in note 1.\n\n[6] Diog. L. vii 149; \u2018[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt\u2019 Cic. _de Fato_\n15, 33.\n\n[7] \u2018et hoc secundum Stoicos, qui omnia dicunt fato regi et semel\nconstituta nec a numinibus posse mutari\u2019 Comment. in Lucan. ii 306 (Arnim\nii 924).\n\n[8] So Diog. L. vii 149. Cicero and Seneca describe with admirable\nclearness the conception of fate: \u2018fieri omnia fato ratio cogit fateri.\nfatum autem id appello, quod Graeci \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, id est ordinem seriemque\ncausarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat\u2019 Cic. _Div._ i 55,\n125; \u2018quid enim intellegis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium\nactionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 36; cf. _Ep._ 19, 6\nand _N. Q._ ii 35, 2.\n\n[9] \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd [\u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5] \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd A\u00ebt.\n_plac._ i 27, 2.\n\n[10] \u2018Stoicorum dogma [Vergilius] ostendit, nulla ratione posse fata\nmutari\u2019 Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 257 (Arnim ii 923).\n\n[11] Orig. _cont. Cels._ ii 20 (Arnim ii 957).\n\n[12] Cic. _de Fato_ 12, 28 to 13, 30.\n\n[13] Hom. _Il._ xi 192 and 193.\n\n[14] Plut. fr. 15, 3 (Stob. ii 8, 25).\n\n[15] Cic. _de Fato_ 7, 13.\n\n[16] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq.\n\n[17] Cicero gives a humorous comment on this contention: \u2018\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\nme scito \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u0394\u03b9\u03cc\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd; quapropter si venturus es, scito necesse\nesse te venire: sin autem non es, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd est te venire. nunc\nvide, utra te \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 magis delectet, \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b1ne, an haec, quam noster\nDiodotus non concoquebat. sed de his etiam rebus, otiosi cum erimus,\nloquemur; hoc etiam \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd est\u2019 _ad Fam._ ix 4.\n\n[18] A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 27, 5.\n\n[19] _ib._ i 28, 3.\n\n[20] \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 _ib._\n\n[21] \u1f24, \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 28, 3.\n\n[22] \u1f22 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f43\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 _ib._\n\n[23] \u2018ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia\nsint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat\nChrysippus. alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter\nquoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes\u2019\nChalc. _in Timaeum_ 144 (Arnim ii 933).\n\n[24] \u2018Chrysippus ... deum dicit esse ... fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum\nfuturarum\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39.\n\n[25] \u2018a te dictum est anum fatidicam \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd a Stoicis induci, id est\nprovidentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quod existimas ab his providentiam\nfingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat.\nplene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato, providentia deorum mundum\nadministrari\u2019 _ib._ ii 29, 73 and 74.\n\n[26] \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf ... \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).\n\n[27] \u1f25\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd] \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd A\u00ebt.\n_plac._ i 27, 5.\n\n[28] \u2018talis igitur mens mundi cum sit, ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel\nprovidentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 dicitur) ...\u2019\nCic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58. The term \u2018nature\u2019 is used in the same sense by\nEpicurus also, though it does not harmonize very well with his theory;\n\u2018natura gubernans\u2019 _R. N._ v 78.\n\n[29] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f36\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Plut. _comm. not._ 36, 5.\n\n[30] \u2018habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii\n22, 57.\n\n[31] _ib._ 22, 58.\n\n[32] \u2018[mundi] quidem administratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi\npossit; ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit,\neffectum est\u2019 _ib._ 34, 86.\n\n[33] _ib._ 39, 98.\n\n[34] \u2018omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata\u2019 _ib._ ii 61, 154.\n\n[35] \u2018deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum\u2019 _ib._ 53, 133.\n\n[36] \u2018est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut\nurbs utrorumque\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 62, 154; \u2018intraturus es urbem dis\nhominibusque communem\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 18, 1.\n\n[37] Cic. _N. D._ ii 47, 122.\n\n[38] \u2018neque enim omnia deus homini fecit. quota pars operis tanti nobis\ncommittitur?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ vii 30, 3; \u2018nimis nos suspicimus, si digni\nnobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur\u2019 _Dial._ iv 27, 2.\n\n[39] Thus \u2018horses assist men in fighting, dogs in hunting: lions and\nleopards provide a discipline in courage: the sow is convenient for\nsacrifices to the gods, who have given her a soul to serve as salt, and\nkeep the flesh from rotting. The peacock is created for his tail, and the\npeahen accompanies him for symmetry\u2019s sake. The flea is useful to wake us\nout of sleep, and the mouse to prevent us from being careless in leaving\nthe cheese about.\u2019 All these particulars are attributed to Chrysippus\n(Arnim ii 1152, 1163).\n\n[40] \u2018etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet\u2019 Cic.\n_N. D._ ii 65, 164.\n\n[41] \u2018nec vero si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit,\n... eum, cui quid horum acciderit, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo\n[iudicabimus]. magna di curant, parva neglegunt\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 66, 167;\n\u2018[universorum] maior dis cura quam singulorum est\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 1.\nSee also note 64.\n\n[42] \u2018lege deum minimas rerum discordia turbat, | pacem magna tenent\u2019\nLucan _Phars._ ii 273.\n\n[43] \u2018licet contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad\npauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 65, 164.\n\n[44] _Hymn_, vv. 15, 16.\n\n[45] Plut. _comm. not._ 34, 5; _Sto. rep._ 34, 10.\n\n[46] This appears to be the correct interpretation of the saying of\nEpictetus\u2014\u2018as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so\nneither does the nature of evil exist in the world\u2019 _Manual_ 27 (Long\u2019s\ntransl. ii p. 269, where see his note).\n\n[47] \u2018faciam rem non difficilem, causam deorum agam\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 1, 1.\n\n[48] Gell. _N. A._ vii 1, 4 and 5; \u2018nulli vitium est, nisi cui virtus\npotest esse\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 124, 19.\n\n[49] Plut. _comm. not._ 14, 1; M. Ant. vi 42.\n\n[50] A. Gellius, _N. A._ vii 1, 9 to 11.\n\n[51] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 32, 2.\n\n[52] Lactantius _de ira_ 13 (Arnim ii 1172).\n\n[53] \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03ad\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1fc3\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 Cleanthes _Hymn_ 18.\n\n[54] Cic. _N. D._ iii 28, 70.\n\n[55] \u2018patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum et illos fortiter\namat; operibus, inquit, doloribus, damnis exagitentur, ut verum colligant\nrobur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 2, 6.\n\n[56] \u2018deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet\u2019\n_ib._ 4, 7; \u2018when a difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like\na trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with rough young men\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ i 24, 1.\n\n[57] This view of Origen is conjecturally assigned to a Stoic source\n(Arnim ii 1174). See also Philo ap. Euseb. _praep. ev._ viii 13.\n\n[58] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 15, 2.\n\n[59] Cic. _N. D._ iii 38, 90; Sen. _Ben._ iv 32, 1.\n\n[60] Arnim ii 1183.\n\n[61] \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u1fd6\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 Plut. _Sto. rep._ 37, 2.\n\n[62] See above, \u00a7 222.\n\n[63] Seneca uses the term \u2018law of mortality\u2019: \u2018minime dis [irascamur]:\nnon enim illorum, sed lege mortalitatis patimur quicquid incommodi\naccidit\u2019 _Dial._ iv 28, 4.\n\n[64] \u2018sciat illa ipsa, quibus laedi videtur, ad conservationem universi\npertinere, et ex iis esse, quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant\u2019\n_Ep._ 74, 20.\n\n[65] \u2018di multa ingratis tribuunt. sed illa bonis paraverunt: contingunt\netiam malis, quia separari non possunt. excerpere singulos non potuerunt\u2019\n_Ben._ iv 28, 1.\n\n[66] \u2018quicquid est quod nos sic vivere sic mori iussit, eadem necessitate\net deos adligat\u2019 _Dial._ i 5, 8.\n\n[67] \u2018[God] has given me the things which are in the power of the will.\nHow was he able to make the earthly body free from hindrance? [He could\nnot], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole\npossessions, household things, house, children, wife\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv\n1, 100. \u2018What says Zeus? since I was not able to do for you what I have\nmentioned, I have given you a small portion of us\u2019 _ib._ i 1, 10-12.\n\n[68] \u2018non potest artifex mutare materiam\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 5, 9; see also\nPlut. _comm. not._ 34, and Mayor on Cic. _N. D._ ii 34, 86. In technical\nlanguage, the gods cannot control the \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 and \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1.\n\n[69] \u2018quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ ii 29, 3.\n\n[70] \u2018dementes itaque et ignari veritatis illis imputant saevitiam maris,\nimmodicos imbres, pertinaciam hiemis\u2019 _Dial._ iv 27, 2.\n\n[71] \u2018frustra vota ac studia sunt; habebit quisque quantum illi dies\nprimus adscripsit\u2019 _ib._ vi 21, 6.\n\n[72] \u2018accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus: stant dura et\ninexorabilia\u2019 _ib._ xi 4, 1.\n\n[73] See above, \u00a7 226, note 46. Fortune only has ultimate existence\nif identified with fate or providence; \u2018sic nunc naturam voca, fatum,\nfortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate\u2019\n_Ben._ iv 8, 3.\n\n[74] \u2018fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas,\ntempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia; deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus,\nimpetus, etc.\u2019 Cic. _Off._ ii 6, 19; \u2018saepe ... optimorum virorum segetem\ngrando percussit. fert sortem suam quisque\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ ii 28, 3.\n\n[75] So Fortune is technically defined as \u2018a cause not discerned by\nhuman reason\u2019; \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd] \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7 A\u00ebt.\n_plac._ i 29, 7.\n\n[76] \u2018in regnum Fortunae et quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus,\nillius arbitrio digna atque indigna passuri\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 10, 6; \u2018hanc\nimaginem animo tuo propone, ludos facere fortunam\u2019 _Ep._ 74, 7.\n\n[77] \u2018Chrysippus aestuans laboransque quonam pacto explicet et fato omnia\nfieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo\u2019 Gellius _N. A._ vii\n2, 15.\n\n[78] \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f31\u03c1\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd (seriem causarum) \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd\n\u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Oenom. apud Euseb. _pr. ev._ vi p. 258 (Arnim ii 978);\n\u2018manente fato aliquid est in hominis arbitrio\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 38, 3.\n\n[78a] \u2018ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in nobis ipsis?\u2019 Cic. _Ac._\nii 12, 39.\n\n[79] \u2018mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum\nphilosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum\nvim necessitatis adferret ... altera eorum quibus viderentur sine\nullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tanquam arbiter\nhonorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui\nnecessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt\u2019 Cic. _de Fato_ 17, 39.\n\n[80] See above, \u00a7 221.\n\n[81] It seems clear that so far as human thought goes \u2018possibility\u2019\nis only an abstraction from that which \u2018a man can do,\u2019 reached by\nwidening the subject \u2018man\u2019 so as to include both superhuman powers and\nhalf-personified unseen forces. In other words \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd is derived from\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, _possibilitas_ from _potest_. Such a combination as _fortuna\npotest_, though quite common, is really a contradiction in terms.\n\n[82] \u2018qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis,\nvolubilitatem autem non dedit\u2019 Cic. _de Fato_ 19, 43.\n\n[83] \u2018quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen id\nvisum proximam causam [habet], non principalem\u2019 _ib._ 18, 42.\n\n[84] \u2018non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in legem aeterna voluntas\nest. statuerunt quae non mutarent, ... nec unquam primi consilii deos\npaenitet. vis sua illos in proposito tenet\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ vi 23, 1 and 2;\n\u2018[deus] scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. semper paret, semel iussit\u2019\n_Dial._ i 5, 8. So Lucan: \u2018qua cuncta coercet se quoque lege tenens\u2019\n_Phars._ ii 9, 10.\n\n[85] \u2018disco ... liceat illi [sc. deo] hodieque decernere et ex lege\nfatorum aliquid derogare, an maiestatis diminutio sit et confessio\nerroris mutanda fecisse?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 3.\n\n[86] \u2018illud te, nulla fati quod lege tenetur, | pro Latio obtestor\u2019 Verg.\n_Aen._ xii 819, 820.\n\n[87] \u2018nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi ac potestate\nfatorum\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 37, 2; \u2018deos quorum notitiam nulla res effugit,\nrogamus; et illos vota non exorant, sed admonent\u2019 _Ben._ v 25, 4.\n\n[88] Hom. _Od._ i 32-34 (Butcher and Lang\u2019s translation).\n\n[89] _ib._ 7.\n\n[90] \u2018propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines\nad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur\u2019 A. Gellius _N. A._\nvii 2, 5.\n\n[91] \u2018contra ea Chrysippus argute disserit: ingenia, inquit, ipsa proinde\nsunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. nam si sunt\nper naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim quae\nde fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt.\nsin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia ... sua scaevitate et voluntario\nimpetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt\u2019 A. Gellius _N. A._ vii\n2, 6 to 8.\n\n[92] \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd ... [\u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5] \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03cd\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd Plut. _Sto. rep._ 23, 2 and 3.\n\n[93] \u03c4\u03af \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 8 (Arnim ii 970).\n\n[94] _ib._ 10 (Arnim ii 960).\n\n[95] \u1f41 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c6\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 Them. _Or._ ii p. 27 c (Arnim iii 251).\n\n[96] Alex. Aphrod. _de fato_ 37 (Arnim ii 1005).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nRELIGION.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Philosophy crystallized.]\n\n=239.= We now turn from the supreme problems of philosophy to the\nformulation of religious belief and practice. A complete change comes\nover the spirit of our study. Until now we have been reaching out to\nobserve, to define in words, to coordinate in a monistic system every\nobject, every statement, every generalisation of which the human mind\ncan rightly take account. We have kept eyes and ears open to learn from\nthe East and from the West, from the idealist and the materialist, from\nthe poet and from the critic. At last we have reached our highest point\nin the dogmas of the providential ordering of the universe and the moral\nobligation of the individual man; dogmas which, as we have seen, are\nexpounded in logical form, but are essentially such as logic can neither\nestablish nor refute. Stoicism, having once breathed in the mountain air\nof supreme principles, now begins to descend to the plains of common\nlife, and to find the due application of its theories in the ordering\nof practical affairs. The theory of religion is treated as the first\nstage in this downward path; it is the adaptation of philosophy to the\nlanguage of social life and individual aspiration. By \u2018religion\u2019 we mean\nhere the theory of the existence and character of the gods; the practice\nof ceremonies in their honour and of prayers for their favour; and\nfurther, the theory and practice of divination. Upon all these questions\nphilosophy sits as the supreme judge: external authority, embodied in the\ntraditions of Greece and Rome respectively, may claim consideration, but\nnot submission, from the intellect.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Historical changes of view.]\n\n=240.= In this attitude of the Stoics towards religion we can easily\ndistinguish certain historical changes. Zeno represents in the main the\ncritical temper; his tone is revolutionary and atheistic; he contemplates\nthe entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room for\na purer system. The principles of Cleanthes are the same, but finer\nexpression in a more cheerful spirit; he has no bitterness as to the\npresent, and much confidence in the future. With Chrysippus there sets in\na tide of reconciliation; the ingenuities of etymology and allegorical\ninterpretation are set to work to prove that the old religion contains,\nat least in germ, the substance of the new. The practical dangers of\nthis method are obvious, and have not escaped the notice of the critics\nof Stoicism. It may be well to smoothe the path of the convert by\nallowing him to use old formulas and practices with a new meaning; it\nis not so easy to excuse the acceptance of a purely formal conversion,\nby which philosophy enrols as its nominal adherents men who give it no\nreal submission, and increases its numbers at the cost of its sincerity.\nPosidonius stands out as the type of this weakness; with him begins\nthe subordination of philosophic principle to religious sentiment. In\nthe first period of Roman Stoicism the struggle was acute; many of\nthe Stoics had the courage to defy the inherited prejudices of their\nfellow-countrymen, others bowed before the storm. Those who condemn the\nStoics in a body as having sacrificed their convictions, in order that\nthey might hold the honoured and lucrative positions of defenders of\nthe national religion[1], show a lack both of sympathy and of critical\ndiscernment. All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory\na definite and consistent position, which will be expounded in this\nchapter; in the application of their principles to practical problems\nthey showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has\nalways to record even of societies of honourable and intelligent men.\nBut it must be admitted that as the Stoics increase in numbers, their\ndevotion to vital principles grows weaker, till at last we recognise in\nMarcus Aurelius both the most critical of Stoic thinkers, and the man in\nwhom the powers of thought are most definitely subjected to the play of\nold associations and prejudices.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dogmas of natural religion.]\n\n=241.= The theoretic teaching of the Stoics upon theology follows a very\ndefinite programme. Four dogmas need to be established: (i) that gods\nexist; (ii) that they are living, benevolent, and immortal; (iii) that\nthey govern the universe; and (iv) that they seek the good of men. To\neach of these dogmas is attached a series of \u2018proofs,\u2019 such as are still\nin vogue as \u2018evidences of natural religion[2].\u2019 The whole of this body\nof teaching may be treated by us as an exposition in popular language\nof the central dogma that \u2018the universe is ordered by providence.\u2019 We\nhave therefore first to consider whether the language used is really\nappropriate to the philosophic position, or whether it concedes too much\nto accepted beliefs. Secondly we have to consider whether the \u2018proofs\u2019\nemployed really correspond to the monistic point of view as understood\nby the Stoics, or whether dualisms abandoned in principle are regaining\ntheir old position in connexion with practical problems. Now the third\nand fourth dogmas, so far as they add to the first two, import nothing\nmore than the general doctrine of providence. The first two dogmas,\ntaken together, substitute for the abstract term \u2018providence\u2019 the more\nconcrete, and (as we should phrase it) the more personal conception of a\n\u2018god\u2019 or \u2018gods.\u2019 The supreme question of the Stoic religion is therefore\nwhether these terms are rightly used; and it falls into two parts, the\nuse of the singular \u2018god,\u2019 carrying with it associations derived from\nPersism and Judaism; and the use of the plural \u2018gods,\u2019 which carries\nwith it a qualified approval of the polytheism of the Greek and Roman\npantheons. In accordance with the general principles of our philosophy,\nthe wider question must be first determined.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The \u2018nature\u2019 of gods.]\n\n=242.= The \u2018gods,\u2019 according to the Stoics, form a \u2018natura,\u2019 a department\nof the universe, a category including one or more individuals. Hence\nthe title of Cicero\u2019s work, \u2018de natura deorum\u2019; that is, \u2018of the class\nof beings called gods.\u2019 Each department of philosophy, according to the\nStoic interpretation, brings us in the end into touch with this world of\ndeities. In dialectics we are led up to the supreme Reason, the Logos\nor Word, whose divine being permeates the universe[3]. Metaphysics point\nus to Body in the purest form[4]; to Spirit which reaches from end to\nend of the universe[5]; to a first Cause, a Cause of causes, the initial\nlink in the unending chain of events[6]. If we look to the elements in\ntheir unceasing interchange, we find deity in all things that shift\nand suffer metamorphosis, in water, in earth, and in air[7]; how much\nmore then in fire, which in one aspect is the purest of the elements,\nand in another is the creative rational substance from which the whole\nuniverse issues[8]? God is indeed the universe, and all that is in it,\nthough not in the pantheistic sense that he is evenly diffused throughout\nall things[9]. Look towards this earth, which lies at the centre of\nthe world-order; even in its most repulsive contents, in its grossest\nmatter, there is deity[10]. Lift up your eyes to the heavens; God is\nthe all-encircling sea of fire called Aether[11]; he is sun[12] and\nstars[13]. Consider the universe in its history; God is its creator[14],\nits ruler, its upholder[15]. Analyze it; he is its soul[16], its\nmind[17]. Strain your sight to perceive the meaning of all things: he is\nfate[18]; he is nature[19]; he is providence; he is necessity[20]. And if\nwe look forward to the problems of politics and ethics, we must say that\nGod is the Universal Law that calls for the reverence of gods and men\nas a community[21], and equally demands, under the name of conscience,\nthe unhesitating obedience of the individual[22]. Lastly, in the history\nof mankind, in its great men and useful discoveries, the Stoic masters\nrecognised the element of divinity[23]. In the language of to-day, God is\nthe pole in which all the parallels of human inquiry merge, the _x_ of\nthe problem of the universe, the unknown that is known in his works.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Unity of God.]\n\n=243.= That God is one is a doctrine which the Stoics take over from\nthe Cynics[24] (who therein follow Socrates), and from the general\nopinion; without making this a formal dogma, they constantly assume it\ntacitly by using the term \u2018God\u2019 (\u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2, _deus_). With equal readiness\nthey accept in use plural and abstract nouns for the same conception,\nas _di immortales_, _vis divina_. The interpretation of this apparent\nconflict of language must be found in the general principles of the Stoic\nmonism. Just as the elements are four, and yet are all the creative fire\nin its changing shapes: just as the virtues are many, and yet there is\nbut one Virtue appearing under different circumstances: so there is but\none Deity, appearing under many names[25]. This view the assailants of\nStoicism reduce to the absurdity that some Stoic gods are created and\nmortal, whilst others are uncreated[26]; and again that Zeus is worse\nthan a Proteus, for the latter changed into a few shapes only and those\nseemly, whilst Zeus has a thousand metamorphoses, and there is nothing so\nfoul that he does not in turn become[27]. No one however who is familiar\nwith the many points of view from which Greek philosophers approach the\nproblem of \u2018the one and the many\u2019 will be readily disturbed by this\nrather superficial criticism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeus.]\n\n=244.= In its practical application the belief in the one-ness of God\nassimilated itself to the worship of the Greek \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2 and the Latin Jove or\nJuppiter. It would be impossible within the limits of this work to trace\nthe growth of monotheistic feeling in the Greco-Roman world in connexion\nwith the names of these two deities, which in the mythologies are members\nof societies. We have already suggested that the most direct impulse came\nfrom Persism: but in connexion with Roman history it is important to\nnotice that a similar impulse arrived through the Tuscan religion[28].\nThe nature of the Stoic worship of Zeus is abundantly illustrated by the\n_Hymn_ of Cleanthes[29]; the intimate sense of companionship between\nZeus and his worshipper comes to light, perhaps with a tinge of Cynic\nsentiment, in all the discourses of Epictetus. A special emphasis is laid\non the fatherhood of Zeus. This attribute could be traced back to the\npoems of Homer, and is prominent throughout Virgil\u2019s _Aeneid_[30]. It can\nbe explained in connexion with the growth of all living substances[31],\nbut has a more lofty meaning in that man alone shares with the gods the\ninheritance of reason[32]. But the Homeric association of Zeus with\nmount Olympus entirely disappears in Stoicism in favour of the Persian\nconception of a god dwelling in heaven[33]. Further the Stoics agree with\nthe Persians that this god must not be thought of as having the form of\nany animal or man[34]; he is without form[35], but capable of assuming\nall forms[36].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Definition of \u2018god.\u2019]\n\n=245.= In the Stoic system the conception of godhead as one and supreme\nmuch exceeds in importance the conception of a multiplicity of gods.\nWe may therefore reasonably consider at this point the four dogmas of\nthe Stoic theology. The first point to be examined is the definition of\nthe word \u2018god.\u2019 As adopted by the Stoic school generally it runs thus:\n\u2018a rational and fiery spirit, having no shape, but changing to what it\nwills and made like to all things[37].\u2019 This definition corresponds\nsatisfactorily to the Stoic system of physics; but even so we must notice\nthat the statement \u2018God is necessity[38]\u2019 is an exaggeration, since\n\u2018necessity\u2019 is entirely devoid of the qualities of reasonableness and\nplasticity. We find a different definition in Antipater of Tarsus, which\nis emphasized by the Stoics of the transition period generally:\u2014\u2018God is\na living being, blessed, imperishable, the benefactor of mankind[39].\u2019\nThis definition points clearly the way to the Stoic system of religion.\nThe difference between the two definitions marks then the step that\nhas here to be taken. There is an accentuation of the property of\npersonality; we pass from a \u2018rational spirit\u2019 to a \u2018living being.\u2019 There\nis the addition of a moral quality; we pass from a plastic substance to\na beneficent will. The existence of deity in the first sense has been\ndisplayed to us by our whole analysis of the universe; it is with regard\nto the existence of deity in the second sense that we need the constant\nsupport of the dogma of providence, expounded in the technical proofs\nwhich we now proceed to examine.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Gods exist: the proof from consent.]\n\n=246.= The first Stoic dogma is \u2018that gods exist\u2019; and of this the first\nand most familiar \u2018proof\u2019 is that which depends upon common consent.\nAmongst all men and in all nations there is a fixed conviction that gods\nexist; the conception is inborn, indeed we may say graven on the minds\nof all men[40]. To this proof the Stoics attach the highest possible\nimportance; but its justification, as we have seen, presents great\ndifficulties[41]. Cleanthes, the most religiously minded of the early\nStoics, had not troubled to conceal his contempt for the opinions of the\ncrowd[42]; and the ridiculous belief in Tartarus[43] is as widespread as\nthat in the gods. Here then we must distinguish; it is not sufficient\nthat a conception should be universal, if it appeals most to foolish\nfolk, and even so is decaying[44]. We must not however at this moment\ninquire into the causes of this belief[45]; for this is to pass from\nthe question at issue to other proofs of the dogma. It seems clear that\nthe value of this particular proof depends upon the Stoic doctrine of\n\u2018inborn conceptions,\u2019 which we have already discussed[46]. Without\ngoing over the whole ground again, the substance of the argument as\napplied to the present question may be thus stated. The mind of each\nindividual man is by descent akin to the universal reason (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2,\n_universa ratio_)[47]. Therefore all men carry with them from their\nbirth predispositions in favour of certain preconceptions; and the\nfact that these preconceptions are common to all is evidence of their\ndivine origin. These predispositions by the growth and training of the\nindividual on the one hand, by his contact with the outer world on the\nother hand through the organs of sense, ripen into reason. Now all men\nare born with a predisposition to explain what is beyond their own\nreasoning powers by the hypothesis of a living and reasoning agent. The\nbelief in gods is therefore a \u2018preconception\u2019; and if it is confirmed\nby growth and experience, it must be of divine origin and therefore\nself-proving. In the language of our own times, the belief in deity\ncannot be dispensed with as a working hypothesis; its omission lames\nhuman reason.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The proof of the \u2018higher Being.\u2019]\n\n=247.= The second proof \u2018that gods exist\u2019 is particularly associated\nwith the name of Chrysippus; it may be summed up by saying \u2018there must\nbe a Being higher than man.\u2019 We begin by assuming that reason is the\nhighest power in the universe[48]; an axiom which is always subject to\nlimitation on account of the existence of \u2018natural necessity.\u2019 According\nto the Stoics, reason is common to gods and men; if, for the sake of\nargument, this is denied, then reason is possessed by men alone, for\nwe can certainly find no better name than \u2018god\u2019 for higher reasoning\nbeings[49]. If then there exists something greater than human reason can\nproduce, it must be the work of some reasoning being greater than man,\nthat is, it must be the work of the gods. But the heavenly constellations\nare such a work; therefore they are the work of the gods, and therefore\ngods exist[50]. To this argument two others are supplementary. First,\nhuman reason itself must be derived from some source, and what other can\nwe name but the deity[51]? Secondly, if there are no gods, man must be\nthe supreme being; but such a claim is an arrogant infatuation[52]. The\nsame arguments are attributed in substance to Zeno[53]; nay, so cogent\nare they that they are in part accepted even by Epicurus[54].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The proofs from the elements and the universe.]\n\n=248.= There follow two proofs connected with gradations in the scale\nof being. Earth and water are the two lower and grosser elements; and\nsince temperament depends greatly upon climate, we find that men and the\nanimals are all of somewhat heavy character. Air and fire are the higher\nand more refined elements; how then can we think otherwise than that they\nare the home of more lofty beings[55]? Then again the universe is either\na simple or a composite body. That it is not composite is shown by the\nharmony (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, _concentus_) of its parts; it is therefore simple. A\nsimple body must be held together by spirit in some one of its grades,\neither as unity, growth, or soul. Bodies held together merely by unity,\nlike stones or logs, admit of very simple changes only; but the universe\nadmits of every kind of change and development, and yet keeps together;\nit must therefore be held together by spirit in its highest grade, that\nis by soul and by reason. Being a whole, it must be greater than its\nparts, and include all that its parts possess. But a nature greater than\nman, and possessing soul and reason, is god[56].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The proof from providence.]\n\n=249.= The proof from the good gifts of providence has been already\ngiven in substance; we may however notice the sharp reply given to\nEpicurus, who maintains that the wondrous contrivances of the Creator\nfor the benefit of man result from the chance clashings of particles.\n\u2018As well contend,\u2019 replies the Stoic, \u2018that words and verses come from\nthe chance shifting of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, and that\nthe poems of Ennius could be produced by shaking together a sufficient\nquantity of these in a box, and then pouring them out on the ground!\nChance would hardly produce a single verse[57].\u2019 The terrors of the\nuniverse, its storms, earthquakes, deluges, pestilences and wars, which\nseem to militate against this proof, are themselves turned into a fourth\nproof[58]. A further proof, which depends on the contemplation of the\nmovements of the heavenly bodies[59], we have sufficiently considered in\nconnexion with the influence of Chaldaean and Persian thought.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The proof from worship.]\n\n=250.= There remain two proofs, which at first sight may appear\nsingular, but are nevertheless very strongly urged, the proofs from\nworship and divination; which according to the Stoics are practices\nthat must be justified, but cannot be justified without the postulate\nof the existence of gods. The proof from worship is best known in the\nparadoxical form, \u2018if there are altars, there are gods,\u2019 which is\nattributed to Chrysippus[60]. This proof is fused by Seneca with the\nproof from general consent[61]; but its true character seems to be\ndifferent. \u2018Without gods there can be no piety, for piety is the right\nworship of the gods. Without gods there can be no holiness, for holiness\nis a right attitude towards the gods. Without gods there can be no\nwisdom, for wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine[62]. But\nwithout piety, holiness, and wisdom a reasonable philosophy cannot be\nconstructed. Therefore gods exist.\u2019 The argument in its simplest form is\nattributed to Zeno himself. \u2018It is reasonable to honour the gods. But it\nis not reasonable to honour the non-existent. Therefore gods exist[63].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The proof from divination.]\n\n=251.= The final argument is that from divination; which is remarkable\nin view of the close association between divination and astrology,\nand the derivation of the latter from a scientific system which finds\nno place for divine interpositions. But both in Greece and Rome the\nforecasting of the future had long been reconciled with theology, upon\nthe hypothesis that the gods warn men for their good of coming events. In\naccepting the truth of divination the Stoics were following the Socratic\ntradition[64]. This belief was accepted by all the great Stoic masters,\nand was a \u2018citadel\u2019 of their philosophy[65]. It is true that on this\npoint Panaetius exercised the privilege of a suspense of judgment[66];\nbut all the more did his pupil, the pious Posidonius, lay stress upon\nthe subject, on which he composed five books[66], of which the spirit\nis preserved to us in Cicero\u2019s books _de Divinatione_[67]. To Roman\nwriters their inherited State practice of augury, with its elaborate\nthough half-forgotten science, was long a motive for maintaining\nthis belief[68]; but the ancient reputation of the oracle at Delphi\nmaintained its hold still more persistently, and was abandoned with\neven greater reluctance[69]. Nevertheless the whole group of beliefs\nwas quietly pushed aside by the Romans of the times of the empire, if\nwe may judge from the words of Epictetus\u2014\u2018what need have I to consult\nthe viscera of victims and the flight of birds, and why do I submit when\nhe (the diviner) says \u201cit is for your interest?\u201d Have I not within me a\ndiviner[70]?\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Divine qualities.]\n\n=252.= Our next enquiry is \u2018of what kind are the gods?\u2019 \u2018what are\ntheir qualities?\u2019 Here the Stoics break more decidedly with tradition.\nAntipater of Tarsus, as we have seen, defined the deity as \u2018a living\nbeing, happy, immortal and benevolent towards men[71].\u2019 It is clear\nthat this description can only be applied in its fulness to the supreme\ndeity, for all other gods are destined to pass away in the general\nconflagration[72]. That the supreme deity is possessed of life and of\nreason has already been assumed in the proofs of his existence; but\nwe have here a reaffirmation of Stoic doctrine as against those that\nhold that the world is governed by blind destiny and chance. In stating\nthat the gods are happy the Stoics agree with Epicurus; but according\nto them this happiness consists not in rest, but in activity. In this\ndistinction the whole difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ideals\nof happiness, that is, between their ethical ends, comes into sight.\nThe Stoics affirm that the gods are occupied, and that with matters\nof the greatest concern: and that any other conception is unworthy of\nthem[73]. That the activity of the gods has for its aim the happiness\nof men is plainly the doctrine of providence; and in making benevolence\nan attribute of deity[74] the Stoics turn their backs for ever upon the\nbelief in gods that are greedy, jealous, mischievous, and haughty; that\nis, not merely on such deities as were still a part of the creed of the\nrustic[75], but also such as had provided the problems of the whole of\nGreek tragedy, and given the opportunity for the stinging attacks of\nEpicurus on religion[76]. In examining these attributes of the gods we\nhave anticipated the enquiries which belong to the third and fourth\ncategories; namely as to the disposition and the relativity of the gods.\nIncidentally we have obtained an excellent illustration of the logical\nimportance of definition and the four categories. Definition implies in\nadvance what is contained in each of the categories, and each category\ncontains implicitly what is contained in the other three; but the logical\nmechanism enables us so to express the doctrine that it is for ever fixed\non the memory. Nor can we easily imagine that the world will ever forget\nthis conception of a Supreme God, in his essence a living all-wise Being;\nin his attributes immortal, immutable[77], active and benevolent; in his\ndisposition occupied in contemplating and controlling his great work the\nuniverse, and in his relation to his creatures constantly concerned for\ntheir comfort and happiness.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoicism and the old mythology.]\n\n=253.= It must by this time be plain that the whole atmosphere of Stoic\nreligion was alien to that in which the gods of the Greek and Roman\nmythology had taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods in the\nStoic system has therefore no theoretical importance; it was a work of\npolitical adaptation. The Stoics themselves doubtless believed that\nthey were restoring the original meaning of the pantheon, and freeing\nit from corruptions for which the poets were responsible. The original\nmeaning was also, in their judgment, the true meaning. Public opinion\nwas already in revolt against the old theology, both on scientific and\non moral grounds. The current tales of the gods were both incredible and\nrevolting[78]; the worship of them too often an attempt to silence the\nvoice of conscience[79]. The Stoics proposed to make the myths symbols of\nscientific truths, and the ritual an incentive to honest living. Their\ninterpretation was in the main physical; the gods represent respectively\nthe heavenly bodies, the elements, the plants; the amours of the gods\nrepresent the continuous work of the great creative forces of nature. To\na lesser extent explanations are found in society and in history. These\ninterpretations are greatly assisted by etymologies, according to the\ndoctrine of dialectics that wisdom lies hid in words. The whole process\nmay seem to the modern critic puerile, because the practical occasion for\nit has passed away; but there are still to be found thinkers who hold\nthat by such processes alone it is possible for human thought to progress\nwithout civil society being disrupted.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoic metamorphoses.]\n\n=254.= According to this system Juppiter becomes the fiery heaven, the\nchief of the elements, the source of all life[80]; Juno is the softer\nair, into which the fire enters to become the germinating seed[81].\nThus she is called sister as a fellow-element[82], and wife as an\ninstrument in the creative process. From a slightly different point of\nview Chrysippus interpreted Zeus as God, and Hera as matter; and their\nunion as the commencement of the Creation, when God spread throughout\nmatter the seed Logoi[83]. So again Hephaestus (Vulcan) represents fire;\nPoseidon (Neptune) is the sea; Dis (Pluto) and Rhea alike stand for the\nearth[84]. Demeter (Ceres) again is the corn-land[85], and Persephone\n(Proserpine) the growing crop; as such she is lost to her mother and\nlamented by her for six months in every year[86]. Apollo is the sun,\nLuna or Diana the moon[87]; Cronus, son of Earth and Heaven, is Chronos\n(\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) or Time, and he is said to devour his children, because all that\nis begotten of time is in turn consumed by time[88]. Athene or Minerva\nis the daughter of Zeus, to whom he has given birth without a partner,\nbecause she is the divine Reason by which he made the universe[89].\nChrysippus wrote at length on the allegorical interpretation of the three\nGraces[90]; and the work of Cornutus entirely consists of expositions of\nthis system.\n\nOther gods are recognised by the Stoics as personifications of actions\nor feelings; Eros (Cupid), Aphrodite (Venus) and Pothos (regret) of\nfeelings; Hope (\u1f18\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03c2, _Spes_), Justice (\u0394\u03af\u03ba\u03b7, _Iustitia_) and Wise Law\n(\u0395\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1) of actions[91]. So in particular Ares (Mars) stands for war, or\nthe setting of array against array.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Minor deities.]\n\n=255.= We have already noticed that the gods that are borrowed from the\npopular mythology do not possess the divine attribute of immortality;\nand in some of them the attribute of benevolence is not prominent.\nThere was thus a constant tendency to assign them to an order of nature\nof lower rank than the deity. Such an order was already constituted by\nthe popular belief, adopted by the Stoics, that the whole universe is\nfull of spirits or daemons, some kindly, others mischievous. Highest in\nthe former class stand the divine messengers, who everywhere throughout\nthe universe keep watch over the affairs of men and bring report thereof\nto God[92]. This was a widespread belief, most in harmony with the\nprinciples of Persism, but also met with in the Rigveda[93] and in the\npoems of Hesiod[94]. These watchmen are however not the spies of a cruel\ntyrant, but the officers of a benevolent sovereign; we find them early in\nRoman literature identified with the stars[95], and this may account for\nthe special recognition of the twins Castor and Pollux, as kindly daemons\nthat protect sailors from shipwreck[96]. There are also spirits which\nare careless, idle, or mischievous[97]; these the deity may employ as\nhis executioners[98]. A daemon which is solely the embodiment of an evil\nor mischievous principle, such as the Druh of Persism or the Satan of\nJudaism, is however not to be found in the Stoic system. Amongst daemons\nare also to be recognised the souls of men parted from their bodies,\nsome good and some evil[99]. All beliefs of this kind are specially\ncharacteristic of the type of Stoicism introduced by Posidonius[100].\nWe may specially note the belief in the Genius which accompanies each\nman from his birth to his death, (and which closely corresponds to the\nguardian angel of Persism,) because of the special vogue it obtained in\nthe Roman world[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Deified men.]\n\n=256.= The Stoics never failed to close their list of deities with\nthe recognition of men raised to the sky for their services to their\nfellow-men. Such were Hercules, who rid the earth of monsters; Castor and\nPollux; Aesculapius the inventor of medicine; Liber the first cultivator\nof the vine, and (amongst the Romans) Romulus the founder of the city.\nThese are deities established by the laws of each city[102]. The Stoics\ndo not raise their own leaders to this position, but (as we shall see in\ndealing with the question of the \u2018wise man\u2019) they assign to them almost\nequal honours. This part of their theory appears to open the door to\ngreat practical abuses, since it might be used to justify the claims of\nthe sovereigns of Egypt to be honoured as gods during their lifetime, and\nthose of the Roman emperors that their predecessors should be worshipped\nas such after their death. But it does not seem that such an abuse\nactually occurred; and this part of the theory of gods always seems to\nhave been regarded by the Stoics rather as an explanation of historical\nfacts than as a principle of civic submission.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Worship.]\n\n=257.= Questions as to the worship of the gods belong strictly to the\ndepartment of politics, so far as public worship is concerned, and of\nethics, so far as individuals are concerned. It may however be convenient\nto anticipate the discussion of them, since we cannot properly appreciate\nthe Stoic views of religion apart from their practical application. We\nmust therefore notice that Stoicism in its beginnings, in accordance with\nits Cynic origin, was revolutionary, unorthodox, in the popular language\natheistic. Not only did it follow the principles of Persism in condemning\naltogether the worship of images, but it also poured scorn upon the\nbuilding of temples and the offering of sacrifices. Thus Zeno in his book\non \u2018the State\u2019 forbids the making of temples and images, because they are\nunworthy of the deity[103]; an idea which the Romans recognised as not\naltogether strange to their own history, seeing that for a hundred and\nseventy years (presumably during the Etruscan supremacy) no images had\nbeen known at Rome[104]. The Stoic condemnation of sacrifice is mostly\nexpressed by silence, but it finds words in Seneca[105]. Although they\nthus denounced in principle the whole existing system of public worship,\nthe Stoics did not feel themselves prevented from taking part in it as a\nseemly and ancient custom[106]; and the Roman Stoics took a special pride\nin the reputation of the city for attention to \u2018religion,\u2019 that is to\nsay, to the ritual observances due to the gods[107].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoic hymnology.]\n\n=258.= Meanwhile the Stoics actively developed their own ideal of\nworship, namely the rendering of praise and honour to the gods by means\nof hymns. \u2018It is reasonable,\u2019 said Zeno, \u2018to honour the gods[108].\u2019\nThe hymn of Cleanthes shows the form in which this honour could find\nexpression, and though in the main it is an outburst of individual\nconviction, yet it contains the germ of public hymnology[109]. The value\nof music in public worship was recognised by Diogenes of Babylon[110].\nPosidonius laid it down that the best and most pious worship of the\ngods is to honour them with pure mind and voice[111]. Epictetus speaks\ncontinually in this spirit, and gives us examples of prose hymnology:\n\u2018great is God, who has given us implements with which we shall cultivate\nthe earth[112]\u2019; \u2018I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me\nto join in this thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to\ncomprehend this thy administration[113].\u2019 Thus ought we \u2018to sing hymns to\nthe deity, and bless him, and tell of his benefits[114].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Prayer.]\n\n=259.= Prayer to the gods may be taken as more characteristic of private\nand individual worship, though the paradox is worthy of attention that\nmen should ask nothing of the gods that they cannot ask publicly[115].\nThe whole problem of prayer is so fully and admirably treated upon Stoic\nlines by Juvenal in his Tenth Satire, that nothing can be added to his\nexposition but the evidence that his teaching is in fact Stoic. Let\nus then enter the temples and listen to men\u2019s prayers. First they beg\nthe doorkeeper for admission, though the deity is equally near to them\noutside; then they raise their hands to the sky, or press their mouths\nclose to the ear of an image[116]. To the unlistening deity they pour\nout wishes so shameful that they could not let a fellow-man share their\nsecret[117]. Decrepit old men babble prayers for long life, and make\nthemselves out younger than they are[118]. Another prays for riches[119],\nor for some other thing that will do him harm[120]. Undertakers pray\nfor a busy season[121]. Parents and nurses (and these are the nearest\nto innocence) pray for the success of their children in life[122]. They\nmay be excused, but the thoughtful man should know that the advantages\nfor which friends have prayed have often in the end proved a man\u2019s\ndestruction[123]. He should examine his own heart, and recognise that\nhis prayers till now have been unworthy and foolish[124]. Since the gods\nwish us well, let us leave it to them to choose what is best for us[125].\n\u2018Look up to God, and say:\u2014deal with me for the future as thou wilt: I am\nof the same mind as thou art. I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases\nthee[126].\u2019 \u2018Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you\nwish; but wish the things that happen to be as they are: and you will\nhave a tranquil flow of life[127].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Self-examination.]\n\n=260.= Prayer so regarded becomes not merely an act of resignation, in\nwhich a man ceases to battle against a destiny that is too strong for\nhim; it is a daily examination of his soul, to know whether it is in\ntune with the purposes of the universe. This examination is a religious\nexercise, never to be omitted before sleep. It is inculcated both by\nSeneca and Epictetus. \u2018How beautiful\u2019 says Seneca, \u2018is this custom of\nreviewing the whole day! how quiet a sleep follows on self-examination!\nThe mind takes its place on the judgment-seat, investigates its own\nactions, and awards praise or blame according as they are deserved[128].\u2019\nAnd Epictetus adopts the verses ascribed to Pythagoras:\n\n  \u2018Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes\n  Before each daily action thou hast scanned;\n  What\u2019s done amiss, what done, what left undone;\n  From first to last examine all, and then\n  Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice[129].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Religious duty.]\n\n=261.= We are now in a position to sum up in technical language[130] the\nobligations of religion freed from superstition[131]. Our duty towards\nthe gods is rightly to believe in them, to acknowledge their greatness\nand benevolence, to submit to them as the creators and rulers of the\nuniverse[132]. We may not light lamps in their honour on sabbath-days,\nnor crowd round their temples in the early hours of the morning; we may\nnot offer Jove a towel nor Juno a mirror[133]. Our service to them is to\nmake ourselves like to them; he who would win their favour, must be a\ngood man[134]. Wheresoever they call us, we must follow with gladness,\nfor they are wiser than we[135]. Without God we must attempt nothing,\nbut we must always reflect, examine ourselves, and seek to learn the\ndivine will[136]. We came here when it pleased God, and we must depart\nwhen he shall please[137]. \u2018So live,\u2019 says the Stoic teacher, \u2018with your\nfellow-men, as believing that God sees you: so hold converse with God, as\nto be willing that all men should hear you[138].\u2019\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] e.g. Theodor Mommsen, _Roman History_ iii 432 (Dickson\u2019s translation).\n\n[2] \u2018omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem\nin partes quattuor. primum docent esse deos; deinde quales sint; tum,\nmundum ab iis administrari; postremo, consulere eos rebus humanis\u2019 Cic.\n_N. D._ ii 1, 3.\n\n[3] \u2018\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, quem deum [Zeno] nuncupat\u2019 Lact. _ver. sap._ 9 (Arnim i 160);\n\u2018rationem deum vocat Zeno\u2019 Min. Felix 19, 10 (_ib._); \u2018[Zeno] rationem\nquandam, per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem, vi divina esse adfectam\nputat\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.\n\n[4] \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u1f45 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd Hippol. _Phil._ 21 (Arnim ii 1029).\n\n[5] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd Theoph. _Autol._ i 4\n(Arnim ii 1033).\n\n[6] \u2018ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iv\n7, 2; \u2018hic est causa causarum\u2019 _N. Q._ ii 45, 2.\n\n[7] \u2018[Chrysippus ait] ea quae natura fluerent et manarent [divina esse],\nut aquam et terram et aera\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39.\n\n[8] \u2018[Chrysippus] deum ait ignem praeterea esse\u2019 _ib._; \u2018et deum ipsum\nignem putavit [Zeno]\u2019 August. _adv. Ac._ iii 17, 38 (Arnim i 157); \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 Euseb. _pr. ev._ 15 (Arnim ii 1050).\n\n[9] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd Diog.\nL. vii 148; \u2018Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14,\n37; \u2018vis illum vocare mundum? non falleris\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 3; \u2018quid\nest deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum; solus est omnia\u2019\n_ib._ i Prol. 13; \u2018Iuppiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris\u2019 Lucan\n_Phars._ ix 580.\n\n[10] Arnim ii 1037 and 1039.\n\n[11] \u2018Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus\u2019 Cic.\n_Ac._ ii 41, 126.\n\n[12] \u2018Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat\u2019 _ib._\n\n[13] \u2018[Zeno] astris idem [sc. vim divinam] tribuit\u2019 _N. D._ i 14, 36;\n\u2018[Cleanthes] divinitatem omnem tribuit astris\u2019 _ib._ 14, 37.\n\n[14] \u2018tibi licet hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iv\n7, 1.\n\n[15] \u2018rectorem custodemque universi\u2019 _N. Q._ ii 45, 1; \u2018stant beneficio\neius omnia\u2019 _Ben._ iv 7, 1.\n\n[16] Arnim i 532.\n\n[17] \u2018[Chrysippus] ait vim divinam esse positam in universae naturae\nanimo atque mente\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39; \u2018quid est deus? mens universi\u2019\nSen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 13; cf. Arnim i 157.\n\n[18] Arnim iii Ant. 35; \u2018hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris\u2019\nSen. _Ben._ iv 7, 2.\n\n[19] \u2018quid aliud est natura quam deus?\u2019 _ib._ 1.\n\n[20] \u2018[Chrysippus] deum dicit esse necessitatem rerum futurarum\u2019 Cic. _N.\nD._ i 15, 39; cf. Arnim ii 1076.\n\n[21] \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd | \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u1f22 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u1fc3 \u1f51\u03bc\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Cleanthes _Hymn_ 38, 39; \u2018naturalem legem [Zeno] divinam\nesse censet\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.\n\n[22] \u2018[Chrysippus] legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae\natque magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse\u2019 _ib._ 15, 40.\n\n[23] \u2018[Chrysippus] homines etiam eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti\n[deos dicit esse]\u2019 _ib._ 15, 39; \u2018Persaeus ... inventa ipsa divina dicit\u2019\n_ib._ 15, 38.\n\n[24] \u2018Antisthenes populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse [dicit]\u2019\n_ib._ i 13, 32.\n\n[25] \u03ba\u03cd\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03ce\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5 ... \u0396\u03b5\u1fe6 Cleanthes _Hymn_ 1 and 2;\n\u2018Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae\npro ratione officiorum variis nominibus appellatur\u2019 Servius _ad Verg.\nGeorg._ i 5 (Arnim ii 1070).\n\n[26] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 [\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9], \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 Plut.\n_Sto. rep._ 38, 5 (quoting from Chrysippus).\n\n[27] Galen _qual. inc._ 6 (Arnim ii 1056).\n\n[28] \u2018ne hoc quidem [illi altissimi viri] crediderunt, Iovem, qualem\nin Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu fulmina, sed\neundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum\nac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne\nconvenit ... idem Etruscis visum est\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 1 and 3.\n\n[29] See above, \u00a7 97.\n\n[30] \u2018hominum sator atque deorum\u2019 _Aen._ i 254, and so _passim_.\n\n[31] \u2018tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus Aether | coniugis in gremium\nlaetae descendit, et omnes | magnus alit, magno commixtus corpore, fetus\u2019\nVirgil _Georg._ ii 335-327.\n\n[32] This seems undoubtedly to be the meaning underlying the corrupt text\nof Cleanthes _Hymn_ 4; Pearson well compares \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 (scil. \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd) \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Euseb. _praep.\nev._ xv 15. See above, \u00a7 97.\n\n[33] \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f10\u03bd \u1f97 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u1f35\u03b4\u03c1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd\nDiog. L. vii 138; ..., \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 Corn. _N. D._ 8.\n\n[34] [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9] \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, \u1f43\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 Philod. _de piet._\n11 (Arnim ii 1076); \u2018est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video; nec cor\nnec caput habet\u2019 Sen. _Apoc._ 8, 1.\n\n[35] \u2018Stoici negant habere ullam formam deum\u2019 Lact. _de ira_ 18 (Arnim ii\n1057).\n\n[36] In connexion with the association of God with the universe we may\nsay (but only in a secondary sense) that God has spherical form; \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03c2 Frag. Herc. p. 250 (Arnim ii 1060); \u2018quae vero\nvita tribuitur isti rotundo deo?\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 10, 24.\n\n[37] \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f43\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 6, 1.\n\n[38] See above, \u00a7 242, note 20.\n\n[39] \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\nPlut. _Sto. rep._ 38, 3. A similar definition is given in Diog. L. vii\n147 as indicating the view of the Stoics generally.\n\n[40] \u2018inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat; omnibus enim innatum\nest et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 4, 12; \u2018nec\nulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos\ndeos credat\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 117, 6.\n\n[41] See above, \u00a7 158.\n\n[42] \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd | \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\nCleanthes apud Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 3 (Arnim i 559).\n\n[43] See below, \u00a7 294.\n\n[44] \u2018videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate\nextabuisse ... quae [enim] anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa\nquae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? opinionum\nenim commenta delet dies\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 2, 5.\n\n[45] As for instance Cicero does (following Posidonius) _N. D._ ii 5, 13.\n\n[46] See above, \u00a7 158.\n\n[47] \u1f21 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\nSext. _math._ ix 93, see \u00a7 149.\n\n[48] See the next note.\n\n[49] \u2018si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in\neo enim solo ratio est, qua nihil potest esse praestantius\u2019 Cic. _N. D._\nii 6, 16.\n\n[50] \u2018si enim\u2019 inquit [Chrysippus] \u2018est aliquid in rerum natura, quod\npotestas humana efficere non possit; est certe id, quod illud efficit,\nhomine melius. atqui res caelestes ab homine confici non possunt. est\nigitur id, quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. id autem quid potius\ndixeris quam deum?\u2019 _ib._\n\n[51] \u2018et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam [mundi] mentem, et\neam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. unde enim haec homo\narripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates\u2019 _ib._ 18.\n\n[52] \u2018esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se\nputet, insipientis arrogantiae est\u2019 _ib._ 16.\n\n[53] See above, \u00a7 83.\n\n[54] \u2018placet enim illi [sc. Epicuro] esse deos, quia necesse sit\npraestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii\n17, 46. See however Mayor\u2019s note.\n\n[55] \u2018tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque\nrerum caelestium ... si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne\nplane desipere videare? an ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse\nmeliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer?\u2019\netc. Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 17. For the original argument of Chrysippus see\nSext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014).\n\n[56] \u2018haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus\nprofecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu\ncontinerentur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. Here cf. Sext. _math._ ix 78 to 85\n(Arnim ii 1013).\n\n[57] Cic. _N. D._ ii 37, 93.\n\n[58] The third in the exposition of Cleanthes: \u2018tertiam [causam\ndixit Cleanthes esse], quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus\n... pestilentia terrae motibus\u2019 _ib._ 5, 14.\n\n[59] \u2018quartam causam esse, eamque vel maximam, conversionem caeli\u2019 _ib._\n5, 15.\n\n[60] Arnim ii 1019.\n\n[61] \u2018[non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda\nnumina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia\u2019 Sen. _Ben._\niv 4, 2.\n\n[62] Sext. _math._ ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017).\n\n[63] _ib._ 133 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as\na \u2018transparent sophistry\u2019; but at the present time there is a widespread\ntendency towards its revival; see H\u00f6ffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, ch.\niii.\n\n[64] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 2.\n\n[65] Cic. _Div._ i 5, 9 and 6, 10.\n\n[66] _ib._ 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149.\n\n[67] Divination is based upon the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd (_continuatio\nconiunctioque naturae_), Cic. _Div._ ii 69, 142. See also Epict. _Disc._\ni 14, and above, \u00a7 248.\n\n[68] \u2018[Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._\nii 32, 2.\n\n[69] \u2018non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica\nsedes | quod siluit\u2019 Lucan _Phars._ v 111-113; cf. 86-96.\n\n[70] Epict. _Disc._ ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very\nseverely criticized by Zeller: \u2018these vagaries show in Stoicism practical\ninterests preponderating over science\u2019 _Stoics_, etc. p. 280. But the\nbelief in \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae is traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly\n\u2018practical\u2019 men in the sense in which Zeller seems to use the word.\n\n[71] See above, \u00a7 245.\n\n[72] See above, \u00a7 209.\n\n[73] Cic. _N. D._ ii 30, 77.\n\n[74] \u2018[di immortales] nec volunt obesse nec possunt. natura enim illis\nmitis et placida est\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv 27, 1; \u2018di aequali tenore bona sua\nper gentes populosque distribuunt, unam potentiam sortiti, prodesse\u2019\n_Ben._ vii 31, 4.\n\n[75] \u2018Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator, | per meos fines et aprica rura\n| lenis incedas, abeasque parvis | aequus alumnis\u2019 Hor. _C._ iii 18, 1-4.\n\n[76] \u2018tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum\u2019 Lucr. _R. N._ i 102.\n\n[77] \u2018Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed\nas becomes him who is ready to say\u2014Irrevocable is my word and shall not\nfail\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 26 (quoting from Hom. _Il._ i 526).\n\n[78] \u2018sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum Iuppiter ineptias\npoetarum, quorum alius illi alas imposuit, alius cornua; alius adulterum\nillum induxit et abnoctantem, alius saevum in deos, alius iniquum in\nhomines, alius parricidam et regni alieni paternique expugnatorem\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ vii 26, 6.\n\n[79] This feeling finds expression at Rome as far back as the times of\nHannibal; \u2018hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum, | Iovem se placare\nposse donis, hostiis; | et operam et sumptum perdunt\u2019 Plaut. _Rud._ 22 to\n24.\n\n[80] \u2018[Chrysippus] disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem\nappellarent\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 40.\n\n[81] \u2018aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, Iunonis nomine consecratur ...\neffeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius\u2019\n_ib._ ii 26, 66.\n\n[82] \u2018quoniam tenuitate haec elementa paria sunt, dixerunt esse germana\u2019\nServ. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 47 (Arnim ii 1066).\n\n[83] Rival philosophers in the earlier times, and the church fathers\nlater, concurred in reviling Chrysippus because he extended this\nprinciple of interpretation to a \u2018disgraceful\u2019 representation found in\nArgos or Samos, in which Hera receives the divine seed in her mouth;\nyet Christian antiquity was about to absorb the similar notion of\nthe conception of the Virgin Mary through the ear (\u2018quae per aurem\nconcepisti\u2019 in an old Latin hymn). Chrysippus of course rightly estimated\nthe absurdity of criticising cosmic processes as if they were breaches of\nsocial decency, and by so doing relieved the pious souls of his own day\nfrom a real source of distress. See Arnim ii 1071-1074.\n\n[84] Cic. _N. D._ ii 26, 66.\n\n[85] _ib._ i 15, 40 and ii 26, 66.\n\n[86] \u2018Proserpinam, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a\nmatre fingunt\u2019 _ib._\n\n[87] _ib._ 27, 68.\n\n[88] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u1fb6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 Cornutus _N. D._ 6. The castration of Uranus by Cronus\nis thus explained by the Stoics: \u2018caelestem naturam, id est igneam,\nquae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae\nconiunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 64.\n\n[89] Justin _Apol._ i 64 (Arnim ii 1096).\n\n[90] Sen. _Ben._ i 3, 9.\n\n[91] A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 6, 13.\n\n[92] \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd Diog. L. vii 151.\n\n[93] \u2018\u00e1sya [v\u00e1ru\u1e47asya] sp\u00e1\u015bo n\u00e1 n\u00ed mi\u1e63anti bh\u016br\u1e47aya\u1e25\u2019 Rigv. ix 73, 4.\n\n[94] \u03c4\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03c5\u03b2\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u1fc3 | \u1f00\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u0396\u03b7\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03cd\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b8\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd Hes. _Op. et Di._ 252, 253; see also \u00a7 33.\n\n[95] \u2018et alia signa de caelo ad terram accidunt; | qui\u2019st imperator divum\natque hominum Iuppiter, | is nos per gentis hic alium alia disparat, |\nhominum qui facta mores pietatem et fidem | noscamus\u2019 Plaut. _Rud._ 8-12.\n\n[96] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\n\u201c\u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd\u201d Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014); \u2018clarum\nTyndaridae sidus ab infimis | quassas eripiunt aequoribus rates\u2019 Hor.\n_C._ iv 8, 31 and 32.\n\n[97] \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 Plut. _def. orac._ 17.\n\n[98] \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u1fe6\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 _qu. Rom._ 51.\n\n[99] Arnim ii 1101.\n\n[100] \u2018Posidonius censet homines somniare, quod plenus aer sit\nimmortalium animorum\u2019 Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64.\n\n[101] \u2018Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum | naturae deus humanae,\nmortalis in unum | quodque caput\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ ii 2, 187-189; \u2018sepone in\npraesentia, quae quibusdam placent, uni cuique nostrum paedagogum dari\ndeum, ex eorum numero quos Ovidius ait \u201cde plebe deos\u201d\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 110,\n1; \u2018Zeus has placed by every man a guardian, every man\u2019s daemon, to whom\nhe has committed the care of the man; a guardian who never sleeps, is\nnever deceived\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 14, 12. M. Aurelius identifies this\ndaemon with the principate (_To himself_ v 27).\n\n[102] A\u00ebt. _plac._ i 6, 9 and 15; Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 62.\n\n[103] Arnim i 264. The feeling is reflected by Lucan: \u2018estne dei sedes,\nnisi terra et pontus et a\u00ebr, | et caelum et virtus? superos quid\nquaerimus ultra?\u2019 _Phars._ ix 578-9.\n\n[104] \u2018Varro dicit antiquos Romanos plus annos centum et septuaginta\ndeos sine simulacro coluisse: \u201cquod si adhuc mansisset, castius di\nobservarentur\u201d\u2019 August. _Civ. De._ iv 31.\n\n[105] \u2018ne in victimis quidem deorum est honor\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ i 6, 3.\n\n[106] \u2018To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits\naccording to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor\nscantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do\u2019\nEpict. _Manual_ 31, 5.\n\n[107] \u2018si conferre volumus nostra cum externis; ceteris rebus aut pares\naut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multum\nsuperiores\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 3, 8.\n\n[108] See above, \u00a7 250.\n\n[109] \u1f44\u03c6\u03c1\u2019 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03b2\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac \u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1fc7, | \u1f51\u03bc\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u1f70 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03ad\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5 _Hymn_ 36, 37.\n\n[110] \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4(\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c5)\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd (\u03c4)\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b5\u03b9(\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03b7)\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd Philod. _mus._ iv 66 (Arnim iii Diog. 64).\n\n[111] \u2018cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque\nsanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra\nincorrupta et mente et voce veneremur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71.\n\n[112] Epict. _Disc._ i 16, 17.\n\n[113] _ib._ iii 5, 10.\n\n[114] _ib._ i 16, 15.\n\n[115] See above, \u00a7 121.\n\n[116] \u2018non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus, nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos\nad aurem simulacri admittat; prope est a te deus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 41, 1.\n\n[117] \u2018turpissima vota dis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem,\nconticescent\u2019 _ib._ 10, 5.\n\n[118] Sen. _Dial._ x 11, 1.\n\n[119] _ib._ xi 4, 2.\n\n[120] _Ben._ ii 14, 5.\n\n[121] _ib._ vi 38, 1.\n\n[122] _Ep._ 32, 4.\n\n[123] \u2018etiamnunc optas, quod tibi optavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut\nmater? o quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum!\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 60, 1.\n\n[124] \u2018se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et\ninspiciat, quid tacitus optaverit. quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi\nfateri pudet! quam pauca, quae facere coram teste possimus!\u2019 _Ben._ vi\n38, 5.\n\n[125] This sentiment we can trace back to the time of Plautus: \u2018stulti\nhau scimus frustra ut simus, quom quid cupienter dari | petimus nobis:\nquasi quid in rem sit possimus noscere\u2019 Plautus _Pseud._ 683-5.\n\n[126] Epict. _Disc._ ii 16, 42.\n\n[127] _Manual_ 8.\n\n[128] Sen. _Dial._ v 36, 2. He describes his practice with na\u00efve detail:\n\u2018cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et _conticuit uxor_ moris mei iam\nconscia, totum diem meum scrutor\u2019 _ib._ 3.\n\n[129] Epict. _Disc._ iii 10, 2 and 3 (Long\u2019s transl.).\n\n[130] \u2018quomodo sint di colendi, solet praecipi\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 95, 47.\n\n[131] \u2018non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri\nsuperstitionem a religione separaverunt\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71.\n\n[132] \u2018primus est deorum cultus deos credere, deinde reddere illis\nmaiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla maiestas est; scire\nillos esse, qui praesident mundo\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 95, 50.\n\n[133] _ib._ 95, 47.\n\n[134] \u2018vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis\nimitatus est\u2019 _ib._ 95, 50.\n\n[135] \u2018You must believe that you have been placed in the world to obey\nthem, and to yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily\nto follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence\u2019 Epict.\n_Manual_ 31, 1.\n\n[136] _Disc._ iii 22, 53 (compare Long\u2019s transl. ii p. 83).\n\n[137] _ib._ iii 26, 30.\n\n[138] \u2018sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam deus videat; sic loquere cum deo,\ntanquam homines audiant\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 10, 5.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Man a part of the universe.]\n\n=262.= From the contemplation of the universe as a whole, both from the\npurely scientific standpoint in the study of physics, and from the more\nimaginative point of view in the dogmas of religion, we now pass on to\nthe more intimate study of the individual man, consisting of body and\nsoul. In its main outlines the Stoic theory has already been sketched.\nThus it follows from the monistic standpoint that man is not ultimately\nan \u2018individual\u2019 or unit of the universe; for the universe itself is\nthe only true unit, and a man is a part of it which cannot even for a\nmoment break itself off completely from the whole. It is therefore only\nin a secondary and subordinate sense, and with special reference to the\ninculcation of ethics, that we can treat Zeno or Lucilius as separate\nand independent beings. Again, when we say that man \u2018consists of body\nand soul,\u2019 we are merely adopting popular language; for body and soul\nare ultimately one, and differ only in the gradation of spirit or tone\nwhich informs them. Then we have already learnt in dialectics that\nthe highest power of man is that of \u2018assent\u2019 or free choice, which is\ndisplayed in every exercise of reason; and the same power, though in a\ndifferent aspect, is at work in every moral act. The doctrine of the\nuniverse is based upon the postulate that it is a living rational being\non the largest scale; and it follows, that each man is a \u2018microcosm,\u2019\nand contains in himself a complete representation of the universe in\nminiature. Lastly, we see that man takes his place in the universe, a\nlittle lower than gods and daemons, and as greatly higher than animals\nas these in their turn surpass plants and inanimate objects; and that his\nnature, considered as composite, includes all the varying gradations of\nspirit to which these orders correspond within the universe. In all his\nparts alike the divine element is immanent and it binds them together in\na coherent unity (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd). It remains for us to put together\nfrom these and like points of departure a complete picture of human\nnature.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The soul\u2019s kingdom.]\n\n=263.= To indicate the general trend of Stoic thought on this subject\nwe propose the title \u2018the kingdom of soul.\u2019 Starting with the popular\ndistinction between body and soul, we find that the biologist and the\nphysician alike are preoccupied with the study of the body, that is,\nof physiology. Only as an afterthought and supplement to their work\nare the functions of soul considered; and they are treated as far as\npossible by the methods suggested by the study of the body. All this is\nreversed in the Stoic philosophy. The study of the soul stands in the\nfront, and is treated by methods directly suggested by observation of the\nsoul\u2019s functions. The body is not entirely ignored, but is considered of\ncomparatively small importance. Further, the soul itself is manifold,\nand is likened to a State, in which all is well if the governing part\nhave wisdom and benevolence proportionate to its power, and if the lower\nparts are content to fulfil their respective duties; but if the balance\nof the State is upset, all becomes disorder and misery[1]. Lastly, this\nkingdom is itself a part of a greater whole, namely of the Cosmopolis or\nuniversal State. By the comparison with a kingdom we are also directed\ntowards right moral principle. For as the citizen of Corinth or Sparta\nought not to repine because his city is of less grandeur than Athens, so\nno man should be anxious because his external opportunities are limited.\nHe has a kingdom in his own mind and soul and heart. Let him be content\nto find his happiness in rightly administering it.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Man a picture of the universe.]\n\n=264.= The doctrine that man is a representation or reflection of the\nuniverse is of unknown antiquity. It seems to be clearly implied by\nthe teaching of Heraclitus, in so far as he lays it down that both\nthe universe and man are vivified and controlled by the Logos[2]. The\ntechnical terms \u2018macrocosm\u2019 (\u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2) and \u2018microcosm\u2019 (\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), are, as we have seen, employed by Aristotle[3]. But even if we\nsuppose that this conception is a commonplace of Greek philosophy, it\nis in Stoicism alone that it is of fundamental importance, and knit up\nwith the whole framework of the system. And accordingly we find that all\nthe Stoic masters laid stress upon this principle. The words of Zeno\nsuggest to Cicero that \u2018the universe displays all impulses of will and\nall corresponding actions just like ourselves when we are stirred through\nthe mind and the senses[4].\u2019 Cleanthes used the dogma of the soul of the\nuniverse to explain the existence of the human soul as a part of it[5].\nChrysippus found a foundation for ethics in the doctrine that man should\nstudy and imitate the universe[6]. Diogenes of Babylon says boldly that\nGod penetrates the universe, as soul the man[7]; and Seneca that the\nrelation of God to matter is the same as that of the soul to the body[8].\nIt is little wonder therefore if by Philo\u2019s time the analogy had become a\ncommonplace, and philosophers of more than one school were accustomed to\nsay that \u2018man is a little universe, and the universe a big man[9].\u2019 God\nis therefore the soul of the universe[10]; on the other hand the soul is\nGod within the human body[11], a self-moving force encased in relatively\ninert matter, providence at work within the limitations of natural\nnecessity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Soul and body.]\n\n=265.= The dualism of body and soul appears in a sharply defined shape\nin Persism, and upon it depends the popular dogma of the immortality of\nthe soul, which (as we have already noticed) reached the Greco-Roman\nworld from a Persian source[12]. It appears to be rooted in the more\nprimitive ways of thinking termed \u2018Animism\u2019 and \u2018Spiritism,\u2019 in which\nmen felt the presence both in natural objects and within themselves of\nforces which they conceived as distinct beings. According to this system\na man\u2019s soul often assumes bodily shape, and quits his body even during\nlife, either in sleep or during a swoon; sometimes indeed it may be seen\nto run away and return in the shape of a mouse or a hare. At death it is\nseen to leave the man as a breath of air, and to enter the atmosphere.\nBut besides his soul a man possesses a shadow, a likeness, a double,\na ghost, a name; and all these in varying degrees contribute to form\nwhat we should call his personality. In the animistic system the soul\nsurvives the man, and why not? But this survival is vaguely conceived,\nand only credited so far as the evidence of the senses supports it. Its\nformulation in the doctrine of immortality belongs to a more advanced\nstage of human thought[13].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Soul and body are one.]\n\n=266.= This dualistic conception could be and was incorporated in the\nStoic system to the same extent as the dualism of God and matter, but no\nfurther. Ultimately, as we have already learnt, soul and body are one;\nor, in the language of paradox, \u2018soul is body[14].\u2019 This follows not only\nfrom the general principles of our philosophy, but also specifically\nfrom observation of the facts of human life. \u2018The incorporeal,\u2019 argued\nCleanthes, \u2018cannot be affected by the corporeal, nor the corporeal by\nthe incorporeal, but only the corporeal by the corporeal. But the soul\nis affected by the body in disease and in mutilation, and the body by\nthe soul, for it reddens in shame and becomes pale in fear: therefore\nthe soul is body[15].\u2019 And similarly Chrysippus argues: \u2018death is the\nseparation of soul from body. Now the incorporeal neither joins with\nnor is separated from body, but the soul does both. The soul therefore\nis body[16].\u2019 This doctrine is commonly adduced as evidence of the\n\u2018materialism\u2019 of the Stoics: yet the Stoics do not say that \u2018soul is\nmatter,\u2019 and (as we shall see) they explain its workings upon principles\nquite different to the laws of physics or chemistry. The essential unity\nof body and soul follows also from the way in which we acquire knowledge\nof them. For we perceive body by the touch; and we learn the workings of\nthe soul by a kind of touch, called the inward touch (\u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c6\u03ae)[17].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Mind, soul and body.]\n\n=267.= Having realised that the division of man into soul and body is not\nultimate, we may more easily prepare ourselves to make other divisions. A\ndivision into three parts, (i) body, (ii) soul or life (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae, _anima_),\nand (iii) mind (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, _animus_), was widely accepted in Stoic times, and\nin particular by the school of Epicurus; the mind being that which man\nhas, and the animals have not[18]. The Stoics develope this division by\nthe principle of the microcosm. Mind is that which man has in common with\nthe deity; life that which he has in common with the animals; growth\n(\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _natura_), that which he has in common with the plants, as for\ninstance is shown in the hair and nails[19]. Man also possesses cohesion\n(\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, _unitas_) but never apart from higher powers. Further these four,\nmind, soul, growth, and cohesion, are not different in kind, but all are\nspirits (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) which by their varying degrees of tension (\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n_intentio_) are, to a less or greater extent, removed from the divine\nbeing, the primal stuff. In this sense man is not one, nor two, but\nmultiple, as the deity is multiple[20].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The soul is fire and air.]\n\n=268.= The soul in its substance or stuff is fire, identical with the\ncreative fire which is the primal stuff of the universe[21]. But the\npopular conception, according to which the soul is air or breath, and is\nseen to leave the body at death, is also not without truth[22]. There is\na very general opinion that the soul is a mixture of fire and air, or is\nhot air[23]. By this a Stoic would not mean that the soul was a compound\nof two different elements, but that it was a variety of fire in the first\nstage of the downward path, beginning to form air by relaxation of its\ntension: but even so this form of the doctrine was steadily subordinated\nto the older doctrine of Heraclitus, that the soul is identical with\nthe divine fire. Formally the soul is defined, like the deity himself,\nas a \u2018fiery intelligent spirit[24]\u2019; and in this definition it would\nseem that we have no right to emphasize the connexion between the word\n\u2018spirit\u2019 (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1) and its original meaning \u2018breath,\u2019 since the word has\nin our philosophy many other associations. It is further a Stoic paradox\nthat \u2018the soul is an animal,\u2019 just as God is an animal. But the soul and\nthe man are not on that account two animals; all that is meant is that\nmen and the brutes, by reason of their being endowed with soul, become\nanimals[25].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The temperaments.]\n\n=269.= According to another theory, which is probably not specifically\nStoic, but derived from the Greek physicians, the soul is compounded of\nall four elements in varying proportion, and the character of each soul\n(subject, in the Stoic theory, to the supreme control of reason[26]) is\ndetermined by the proportion or \u2018temperament\u2019 (\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _temperatura_) of\nthe four elements. There are accordingly four temperaments, the fervid,\nthe frigid, the dry, and the moist, according to the preponderance of\nfire, air, earth, and water respectively[27]. Dull and sleepy natures\nare those in which there is an excess of the gross elements of earth and\nwater[28]; whilst an excess of cold air makes a man timorous, and an\nexcess of fire makes him passionate[29]. These characters are impressed\nupon a man from birth and by his bodily conditions, and within the limits\nindicated above are unalterable[30]. The \u2018temperaments\u2019 have always been\na favourite subject of discussion in popular philosophy[31].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The soul\u2019s parts.]\n\n=270.= The characteristic attribute of the soul is that it is self-moved\n(\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd)[32]. Although in this point the Stoics agree with Plato,\nthey do not go on to name life as another attribute, for they do not\nagree with the argument of the _Phaedo_ that the soul, having life\nas an inseparable attribute, is incapable of mortality. We pass on\nto the dispositions of the soul, which correspond to its \u2018parts\u2019 in\nother philosophies, and are indeed often called its parts. But the\nsoul has not in the strict sense parts[33]; what are so called are its\nactivities[34], which are usually reckoned as eight in number, though\nthe precise reckoning is of no importance[35]. The eight parts of the\nsoul are the ruling part or \u2018principate[36],\u2019 the five senses, and the\npowers of speech and generation. The seven parts or powers other than the\nprincipate are subject to it and do its bidding, so that the soul is, as\nwe have called it, a kingdom in itself. These seven parts are associated\neach with a separate bodily organ, but at the same time each is connected\nwith the principate. They may therefore be identified with \u2018spirits\nwhich extend from the principate to the organs, like the arms of an\noctopus[37],\u2019 where by a \u2018spirit\u2019 we mean a pulsation or thrill, implying\nincessant motion and tension. The principate itself, that is the mind,\nis also a spirit possessed of a still higher tension; and the general\nagreement of the Stoics places its throne conveniently at the heart and\nin the centre of the body[38]. Accordingly Posidonius defined the soul\u2019s\nparts as \u2018powers of one substance seated at the heart[39].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Aspects of the principate.]\n\n=271.= If we now fix our attention on the principate itself, we find it\nno more simple than the universe, the deity, the man, or the soul. In\nparticular it resembles the deity in that, although essentially one, it\nis called by many names. It is the soul in its reasoning aspect, the\nreason, the intellect (\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1)[40]; it is also the\n\u2018ego,\u2019 that is, the will, the energy, the capacity for action[41]. It is\nin one aspect the divinity in us, world-wide, universal; in another the\nindividual man with his special bent and character; so that we may even\nbe said to have two souls in us, the world-soul and each man\u2019s particular\nsoul[42]. The principate becomes also in turn each of the other functions\nor parts of the soul, for each of them is an aspect of the principate\n(\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd)[43]. In addition the principate has many titles\nof honour, as when Marcus Aurelius terms it the Pilot[44], the King and\nLawgiver[45], the Controller and Governor[46], the God within[47].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The principate as reason.]\n\n=272.= Although for the purpose of discussion we may distinguish between\nreason and will, they are in fact everywhere intermingled. Thus the\nprincipate as the reasoning part of the soul includes the powers of\nperception, assent, comprehension, and of reason in the narrower sense,\nthat is, the power of combining the various conceptions of the mind, so\nas ultimately to form a consistent system[48]. But amongst these powers\nassent is equally an act of the will; and on the other hand the judgments\nformed by the reasoning mind are not purely speculative, but lead up to\naction; so that it is the reasoning power which must be kept pure, in\norder that it may duly control the soul\u2019s inclinations and aversions,\nits aims and shrinkings, its plans, interests and assents[49]. If in\nthe Stoic theory the greater emphasis always appears to be laid on the\nreason, it is the more necessary in interpreting it to bear in mind that\nwe are speaking of the reason of an active and social being.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The principate as will.]\n\n=273.= The maintenance of the principate as will in a right condition\nis the problem of ethics; and it is important to understand what this\nright condition is. The answer is to be found in a series of analogies,\ndrawn from all departments of philosophy. Thus from the standpoint of\nphysics the right condition is a proper strain or tension, as opposed to\nslackness or unsteadiness[50]. In theology it is the agreement of the\nparticular will with the divine or universal will[51]. From the point of\nview of the will itself it is the strength and force (\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\nof the will, the attitude that makes a man say \u2018I can[52].\u2019 Again it\nis that state of the soul which corresponds to health in the body[53];\nand in a quiet mood the Stoic may describe it as a restful and calm\ncondition[54]. Finally, if the soul as a whole is compared to a State,\nthe principate in its function as the will may at its best be compared to\na just and kind sovereign; but if this aim is missed, it may turn into a\ngreedy and ungovernable tyrant[55].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The principate, divine and human.]\n\n=274.= The principate, as it is of divine origin[56], and destined, as\nwe shall see, to be re-absorbed in the deity, may rightly be called god:\nit is a god making its settlement and home in a human body[57]: it keeps\nwatch within over the moral principle[58]. In the language of paradox we\nmay say to each man, \u2018You are a god[59].\u2019 Of this principle we see the\nproof in that man interests himself in things divine[60], and in it we\nfind the first incentive to a lofty morality[61]. As however the deity\nis not conceived in human form, and is not subject to human weaknesses,\nthere comes a point at which, in the study of the human principate,\nwe part company with the divine; and this point we reach both when\nwe consider the principate with regard to its seven distinctly human\nmanifestations, and when we consider its possible degradation from the\nstandard of health and virtue. We now turn to the seven parts or powers\nof the human soul which are subordinate to the reasoning faculty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Powers of the principate.]\n\n=275.= The first five powers of the principate are those which are\nrecognised in popular philosophy as the \u2018five senses.\u2019 To materialistic\nphilosophers nothing is plainer than that these are functions of the\nbody; is it not the eye which sees, and the ear which hears[62]? This\nthe Stoic denies. The eye does not see, but the soul sees through the\neye as through an open door. The ear does not hear, but the soul hears\nthrough the ear. Sensation therefore is an activity of the principate,\nacting in the manner already described in the chapter on \u2018Reason and\nSpeech[63].\u2019 The soul is actively engaged, and sends forth its powers\nas water from a fountain; the sense-organs are passively affected by\nthe objects perceived[64]. Subject to this general principle, sensation\n(\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _sensus_) may be variously defined. It is \u2018a spirit which\npenetrates from the principate to the sensory processes\u2019; it includes\nalike the mind-picture (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _visum_), that is, the first rough\nsketch which the mind shapes when stimulated by the sense-organ; the\nassent (\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _adsensus_), which the mind gives or refuses\nto this sketch; and the final act of comprehension (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2,\n_comprehensio_) by which this assent is sealed or ratified[65]. Of these\nthe middle stage is the most important, so that we may say paradoxically\n\u2018sense is assent[66].\u2019 Only in a secondary and popular way can we use the\nword sensation to denote the physical apparatus of the sensory organs\n(\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1), as when we say of a blind man \u2018he has lost the sense of\nsight[67].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The five senses.]\n\n=276.= The nature of sensation is more particularly described in the\ncase of sight and hearing. In the first case there proceed from the\neyes rays, which cause tension in the air, reaching towards the object\nseen[68]; this tension is cone-shaped, and as the distance from the\npupil of the eye increases, the base of the cone is increased in size,\nwhilst the vigour of the sight diminishes. This human activity effects\nvision of itself in one case; for we say \u2018darkness is visible,\u2019 when\nthe eye shoots forth light at it, and correctly recognises that it is\ndarkness[69]. But in complete vision there is an opposing wave-motion\ncoming from the object, and the two waves become mutually absorbed:\nhence Posidonius called sight \u2018absorption\u2019 (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)[70]. Similarly,\nin the case of hearing, the pulsation (which, as we have seen, comes\nin the first instance from the principate) spreads from the ear to the\nspeaker, and (as is now more distinctly specified) from the speaker to\nthe hearer; this reverse pulsation being circular in shape, like the\nwaves excited on the surface of a lake by throwing a stone into the\nwater[71]. Of the sensations of smell, taste and touch we only hear that\nthey are respectively (i) a spirit extending from the principate to the\nnostrils, (ii) a spirit extending from the principate to the tongue, and\n(iii) a spirit extending to the surface of the body and resulting in the\neasily-appreciated touch of an object[72].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Other activities.]\n\n=277.= The Stoic account of the functions of the soul displayed in the\nordinary activities of life is either defective or mutilated; for even a\nslight outline of the subject should surely include at least breathing,\neating (with drinking), speech, walking, and lifting. We need not\nhowever doubt that these, equally with the five senses, are all \u2018spirits\nstretching from the principate\u2019 to the bodily organs. This is expressly\nstated of walking[73]. Of all such activities we must consider voice to\nbe typical, when it is described as the sixth function of the soul. Voice\nis described as \u2018pulsating air[74],\u2019 set in motion by the tongue[75];\nbut we can trace it back through the throat to some source below, which\nwe can without difficulty identify with the heart, the seat of the\nprincipate[76]. The voice is indeed in a special relationship to the\nprincipate, since the spoken word is but another aspect of the thought\nwhich is expressed by it[77].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Procreation.]\n\n=278.= The seventh and last of the subordinate powers of the soul,\naccording to the Stoics, is that of procreation. This part of their\nsystem is of great importance, not only for the study of human nature,\nbut even in a higher degree for its indirect bearing upon the question\nof the development of the universe through \u2018procreative principles\u2019\n(\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9), or, as we have termed them above, \u2018seed powers[78].\u2019\nThat all things grow after their kind is of course matter of common\nknowledge; no combination of circumstances, no scientific arrangement\nof sustenance can make of an acorn anything but an oak, or of a hen\u2019s\negg anything but a chicken. But in the common view this is, at least\nprimarily, a corporeal or material process; whereas the Stoics assert\nthat it is not only a property of the soul, but one so primary and\nfundamental that it must be also assumed as a first principle of physical\nscience. Before approaching the subject from the Stoic standpoint, it may\nbe well to see how far materialistic theories, ancient and modern, can\ncarry us.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Heredity.]\n\n=279.= Lucretius finds this a very simple matter:\n\n  \u2018Children often resemble not only their parents, but also their\n  grandparents and more remote ancestors. The explanation is that\n  the parents contain in their bodies a large number of atoms,\n  which they have received from their ancestors and pass on to\n  their descendants. In the chance clashing of atoms in procreation\n  Venus produces all kinds of effects, bringing about resemblances\n  between children and their forebears, not only in the face and\n  person, but also in the look, the voice, and the hair[79].\u2019\n\nThis account has a generally plausible sound until we bear in mind that\nit is the fundamental property of atoms that, though their own variety\nis limited, they can form things in infinite variety by changes in their\ncombination and arrangement. They are like the letters out of which\nwords, sentences, and poems are made up; and we can hardly expect to\nreproduce the voice or the spirit of an Aeschylus by a fresh shuffling of\nthe letters contained in the _Agamemnon_. On the contrary, seeing that\nthe atoms contained in the bodies of parents have largely been drawn\nfrom plants and animals, we could confidently reckon upon finding the\ncomplete fauna and flora of the neighbourhood amongst their offspring.\nLucretius in effect postulates in his theory that particular atoms have\na representative and creative character, passing from father to child in\ninseparable association with the marks of the human race, and endowed\nwith a special capacity of combining with other like atoms to form the\nsubstratum of specifically human features. In giving his atoms these\nproperties he is insensibly approximating to the Stoic standpoint.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Modern theories.]\n\n=280.= Modern biologists deal with this subject with the minuteness of\ndetail of which the microscope is the instrument, and with the wealth of\nillustration which results from the incessant accumulation of ascertained\nfacts. But they are perhaps open to the criticism that where they reach\nthe borders of their own science, they are apt to introduce references\nto the sciences of chemistry and physics as explaining all difficulties,\neven in regions to which these sciences do not apply. The following\naccount is taken from one of the most eminent of them:\n\n  \u2018Hertwig discovered that the one essential occurrence in\n  impregnation is the coalescence of the two sexual cells and\n  their nuclei. Of the millions of male spermatozoa which swarm\n  round a female egg-cell, only one forces its way into its\n  plasmic substance. The nuclei of the two cells are drawn\n  together by a mysterious force which we conceive as a _chemical\n  sense-activity akin to smell_, approach each other and melt\n  into one. So there arises through the sensitiveness of the two\n  sexual nuclei, _as a result of erotic chemotropism_, a new cell\n  which unites the inherited capacities of both parents; the\n  spermatozoon contributes the paternal, the egg-cell the maternal\n  characteristics to the primary-cell, from which the child is\n  developed[80].\u2019\n\nIn another passage the same author sums up his results in bold language\nfrom which all qualifications and admissions of imperfect knowledge have\ndisappeared:\n\n  \u2018Physiology has proved that all _the phenomena of life may be\n  reduced to chemical and physical processes_. The cell-theory\n  has shown us that all the complicated phenomena of the life of\n  the higher plants and animals may be deduced from the simple\n  physico-chemical processes in the elementary organism of the\n  microscopic cells, and the material basis of them is the plasma\n  of the cell-body[81].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Their inadequacy.]\n\n=281.= These utterances may be considered typical of modern materialistic\nphilosophy in its extreme form. We may nevertheless infer from the\nreferences to a \u2018mysterious force,\u2019 \u2018chemical sense-activity akin to\nsmell,\u2019 and \u2018erotic chemotropism,\u2019 that the analogies to biological\nfacts which the writer finds in chemical science stand in need of\nfurther elucidation. We may notice further that the \u2018atom\u2019 has entirely\ndisappeared from the discussion, and that the \u2018material basis\u2019 of the\nfacts is a \u2018plasma\u2019 or \u2018plasmic substance,\u2019 something in fact which\nstands related to a \u2018protoplasm\u2019 of which the chemical and physical\nsciences know nothing, but which distinctly resembles the \u2018fiery creative\nbody\u2019 which is the foundation of the Stoic physics. Further we must\nnotice that the old problem of \u2018the one and the many\u2019 reappears in this\nmodern description; for the cell and its nucleus are neither exactly one\nnor exactly two, but something which passes from two to one and from\none to two; further the nuclei of the two cells, being drawn together,\ncoalesce, and from their union is developed a \u2018new cell\u2019 which unites\nthe capacities of its \u2018parents.\u2019 Modern science, therefore, although it\nhas apparently simplified the history of generation by reducing it to\nthe combination of two units out of many millions that are incessantly\nbeing produced by parent organisms, has left the philosophical problem of\nthe manner of their combination entirely unchanged. In these microscopic\ncells is latent the whole physical and spiritual inheritance of the\nparents, whether men, animals or plants, from which they are derived;\njust as the atoms of Epicurus possess the germ of free will[82], so the\ncells of Haeckel smell and love, struggle for marriage union, melt away\nin each other\u2019s embrace, and lose their own individuality at the moment\nthat a new being enters the universe.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Creation and procreation.]\n\n=282.= If then the phenomena of reproduction are essentially the same,\nwhether we consider the relations of two human beings or those of\ninfinitesimal elements which seem to belong to another order of being,\nwe are already prepared for the Stoic principle that the creation of\nthe universe is repeated in miniature in the bringing into life of each\nindividual amongst the millions of millions of organic beings which\npeople it. From this standpoint we gain fresh light upon the Stoic theory\nof creation, and particularly of the relation of the eternal Logos to\nthe infinite multitude of procreative principles or \u2018seed-powers.\u2019\nAgain, it is with the general theory of creation in our minds that we\nmust revert to the Stoic explanation of ordinary generation. This is to\nhim no humble or unclean function of the members of the body; it is the\nwhole man, in his divine and human nature, that is concerned[83]. The\n\u2018procreative principle\u2019 in each man is a part of his soul[84]; \u2018the seed\nis a spirit\u2019 (or pulsation) \u2018extending from the principate to the parts\nof generation[85].\u2019 It is an emanation from the individual in which one\nbecomes two, and two become one. Just as the human soul is a \u2018fragment\u2019\nof the divine, so is the seed a fragment torn away, as it were, from the\nsouls of parents and ancestors[86].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Motherhood.]\n\n=283.= In the seed is contained the whole build of the man that is\nto be[87]. It is therefore important to know whether the procreative\nprinciple in the embryo is derived from one or both parents, and if the\nlatter, whether in equal proportion. The Stoics do not appear to have\nkept entirely free from the common prepossession, embodied in the law of\npaternal descent, according to which the male element is alone active\nin the development of the organism; and so they allege that the female\nseed is lacking in tone and generative power[88]. On the other hand\nobservation appeared to them to show that children inherit the psychical\nand bodily qualities of both parents, and the general tendency of their\nphilosophy was towards the equalization of the sexes. On the whole the\nlatter considerations prevailed, so that the doctrine of Stoicism, as of\nmodern times, was that qualities, both of body and soul, are inherited\nfrom the seed of both parents[89]; wherein the possibility remains open,\nthat in particular cases the debt to one parent may be greater than to\nthe other[90].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Impulses.]\n\n=284.= The Stoic psychology is in its fundamental principles wholly\ndistinct from that of Plato; which does not at all prevent its exponents,\nand least of all those like Panaetius and Posidonius who were admirers of\nPlato, from making use of his system as an auxiliary to their own. Plato\ndivided the soul into three parts; the rational part, the emotional (and\nvolitional) part, and the appetitive[91]. Both the two latter parts need\nthe control of the reason, but the emotional part inclines to virtue,\nthe appetitive to vice[92]. The rational part, as with the Stoics, is\npeculiar to man; the other two are also possessed by the animals, and\nthe appetitive soul even by plants. The Stoics do not however seriously\nallow any kinship between virtue and the emotions, and they deal with\nthis part of the subject as follows. Nature has implanted in all living\nthings certain impulses which are directed towards some object. An\nimpulse towards an object is called \u2018appetite\u2019 (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, _appetitus_ or\n_impetus_); an impulse to avoid an object is called \u2018aversion\u2019 (\u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae,\n_alienatio_)[93]. In man appetite should be governed by reason; if\nthis is so, it becomes \u2018reasonable desire\u2019 (\u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, _recta\nappetitio_)[94]; if otherwise, it becomes \u2018unreasonable desire\u2019 (\u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3) or \u2018concupiscence\u2019 (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, _libido_). To living things\nlower in the scale than man terms that are related to reason can of\ncourse not apply.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Will and responsibility.]\n\n=285.= Practical choice is, according to the Stoics, exactly analogous\nto intellectual decision. Just as the powers of sensation never deceive\nus[95], so also the impulses are never in themselves irrational[96].\nAn impulse is an adumbration of a course of action as proper to be\npursued[97]; to this the will gives or refuses its assent[98]. It is the\nwill, and the will only, which is liable to error, and this through want\nof proper tone and self-control. If there is this want, it appears in a\nfalse judgment, a weak assent, an exaggerated impulse; and this is what\nwe call in ethics a perturbation[99]. A healthy assent leads up to a\nright action: a false assent to a blunder or sin. Hence we hold to the\nSocratic paradox that \u2018no one sins willingly\u2019 (\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9);\nfor the true and natural will cannot sin; it must first be warped to a\nfalse judgment and weakened by slackness of tone. We can equally use the\nparadox that \u2018every voluntary action is a judgment of the intellect,\u2019\nor (in few words) that \u2018virtue is wisdom\u2019 (\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae). In such\nviews we find a starting-point for dealing with the problems of ethics,\nincluding those of the ethical ideal or supreme good, its application to\ndaily duties, and its failure through ignorance or weakness of soul.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The body.]\n\n=286.= We pass on to consider the body, but at no great length; partly\nbecause many functions often considered as bodily are by the Stoics\ntreated as belonging to the soul (as sensations and impulses), partly\nbecause the study of the body is rather the task of the physician than\nof the philosopher. In the body we may notice separately (i) the bones,\nsinews, and joints, constituting the framework on which the whole is\nbuilt up; (ii) the surface, including beauty of outline and features, and\n(iii) the complexion, which suffuses a glow over the surface and most\nattracts the attention[100]. No absolute distinction can be made between\nbody and soul. Generally speaking, we may say that body is composed of\nthe two grosser elements, earth and water, whilst soul (as we have seen)\nrests on the two higher elements of air and fire[101]; of the gradations\nof spirit body possesses distinctively (but not exclusively) that of\ncoherence (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2), whilst it shares with the soul the principle of growth\n(\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)[102]. Yet these contrasts are after all only secondary. As surely\nas soul is body so body is soul, and divinity penetrates into its\nhumblest parts. In its practical applications Stoicism dwells so little\non the body that the wise man seems hardly conscious of its existence.\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u2018The flesh.\u2019]\n\n=287.= Side by side with the strictly Stoic view of the body we find\nin all the Roman literature another conception which is strongly\ndualistic, and which we cannot but think to be drawn from some non-Stoic\nsource[103]. According to this view the body, often called the \u2018flesh,\u2019\nis essentially evil[104]; it is the prison-house of the soul[105],\nthe source of corruption of the will[106], the hindrance to a clear\ninsight of the intelligence. In the language picturesquely adopted in\nthe _Pilgrim\u2019s Progress_ (after St Paul), it is a burden which the\nenlightened man longs to shake off[107]. For the body so understood we\nfind abusive names; it is the husk in which the grain is concealed[108],\nthe ass from which the owner should be ready to part at any moment[109].\nThis language tends to be exaggerated and morbid, and leads in practice\nto asceticism[110]. It appealed in ancient as in modern times to a\nwidespread sentiment, but is not reconcileable with the main teaching of\nthe Stoic philosophy.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dignity of the body.]\n\n=288.= According to the true Stoic view, the body is a dwelling-place\nor temple inhabited for a time by the principate, its divinity[111].\nTherefore the body as such is deserving of respect, even of\nveneration[112]. In particular the erect form of the human body is a\nmark of divine favour, by which it is hinted that man is fitted to\ncontemplate the operations of the heavens[113]. The whole framework of\nthe body, from the organs of sensation to those by which we breathe,\nswallow, and digest, is a masterpiece of divine skill, and an evidence of\nthe care of providence for man[114]. And even as an architect provides\nthat those parts of the house which are offensive to sight and smell\nshould be out of sight, so has nature hidden away those parts of the\nbody which are necessarily offensive, at a distance from the organs of\nsense[115]. The Stoic conception of the dignity of the body is symbolized\nin practical ethics by the culture of the beard, in which is latent the\nbroad principle of attention to the cleanliness and healthy development\nof every part of the body.\n\nIt is a mark of the Oriental associations of Stoicism that this respect\nfor the body is never associated with the Hellenic cult of the body as\ndisplayed in art and gymnastics.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Junction of soul and body.]\n\n=289.= Having now studied man in all his parts, it is time to consider\nhow those parts are compacted together, how man grows and decays, and\nwhat varieties of mankind exist. First then the principate is combined\nwith the lower functions of the soul, and every part of the soul, by the\nprocess of interpenetration (\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6)[116]; or (from a\nslightly different point of view) upon body which has cohesion (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2)\nis overlaid growth, on growth soul, and on soul reason; so that the\nhigher tension presupposes the lower, but not _vice versa_. In the act\nof generation the soul loses its higher tensions; and consequently the\nembryo possesses neither human nor animal soul, but only the principles\nof cohesion and growth. It is in fact a vegetable[117], but necessarily\ndiffers from other vegetables in having the potentiality of rising to\na higher grade of spirit[118]. At the moment of birth its growth-power\n(\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) is brought into contact with the cold air, and through this\nchill it rises to the grade of animal life, and becomes soul (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae from\n\u03c8\u1fe6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2)[119]. This etymological theory provokes the ridicule of opponents,\nwho do not fail to point out that soul, standing nearer to the divine\nfire than growth, ought to be produced by warmth rather than by coolness;\nbut the Stoics probably had in mind that contact with either of the two\nhigher elements must raise the gradation of spirit. The infant, according\nto this theory, is an animal, but not yet a man; it has not the gift of\nreason[120]. To attain this higher stage there is need both of growth\nfrom within, and of association with reasonable beings without; in\nthese ways reason may be developed in or about the seventh year[121].\nIn the whole of its growth the soul needs continually to be refreshed\nby the inbreathing of air, and to be sustained by exhalations from the\nblood[122]. Here we touch upon one of those fundamental doctrines of the\nsystem, derived by Zeno from Heraclitus[123], which bind together the\ngreat and the little world. Just as the heavenly bodies are maintained by\nexhalations from the Ocean[124], so the soul is dependent upon the body\nfor its daily food. Hence follows the important consequence that weakness\nand disease of the body react upon the soul; the philosopher must keep\nhis body in health for the soul\u2019s good, if for no other reason[125]. If\nthe Stoics in discussing problems of ethics constantly maintain that the\nhealth of the soul is independent of that of the body, such statements\nare paradoxical and need qualification[126].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sleep and death.]\n\n=290.= The mutual action of body and soul is most readily illustrated by\nsleep. The Stoics do not hold, as the Animists do, that the soul quits\nthe body in sleep; nor do they agree with another popular view, that the\nsoul then quits the extremities of the body and concentrates itself at\nthe heart[127]. Sleep is due to a relaxation, contraction, or weakening\nof the spirit[128]; a lowering of its grade, which nevertheless is\nclearly no sign of ill health. In old age there is often an imperfection\nof the reason, and this is also seen in the sick, the tired, and the\nanaemic[129]. In death there is a complete relaxation of tone in the\nbreath that we can feel, that is, in such spirit as belongs to the\nbody[130]; there follows the separation of soul from body.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The beyond.]\n\n=291.= We are thus brought to the critically important question of the\nexistence of the soul after death. On this point we shall not expect to\nfind that all Stoic teachers agree in their language. In Zeno himself we\nshall be sure to find that variety of suggestion which is accounted for\nby his eagerness to learn from all sources; and later writers will also\ndiffer according to their respective inclinations either to draw strictly\nlogical conclusions from the Stoic physics, or to respect the common\nopinion of mankind and to draw from it conclusions which may be a support\nto morality[131]. These variations need not discourage us from the\nattempt to trace in general outline the common teaching of the school.\nWe have already seen that the various parts of the Stoic system are not\nbound together by strictly logical processes; where two conclusions\nappear contradictory, and yet both recommend themselves to the judgment,\nthe Stoics are not prepared to sacrifice either the one or the other, but\nalways seek to lessen, if they cannot altogether remove, the difficulties\nwhich stand in the way of accepting both. On the other hand, we need\nnot too readily admit the charge of insincerity, whether it is found in\nthe candid admission of its temptations by Stoic teachers[132], or in\nthe less sympathetic criticisms of ancient or modern exponents of the\nsystem[133].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoic standpoint.]\n\n=292.= On certain points all Stoic teachers seem to be agreed; first\nthat the soul is, as regards its substance, imperishable; secondly,\nthat the individual soul cannot survive the general conflagration[134];\nlastly, that it does not of necessity perish with the body[135]. The\nfirst two dogmas follow immediately from the fundamental principles of\nthe Stoic physics, and point out that every soul will find its last home\nby being absorbed in the divine being. The third dogma leaves play for\nethical principles; subject to the monistic principle of an ultimate\nreconciliation, there is room for some sharp distinction between the\ndestiny of good and bad souls, such as stands out in the Persian doctrine\nof rewards and punishments after death. And so we find it generally held\nthat the souls of the good survive till the conflagration, whilst those\nof the wicked have but a short separate existence, and those of the\nlower and non-rational animals perish with their bodies[136]. If this\ndifference in duration will satisfy the moral sense, the nature of the\nfurther existence of the soul may be determined on physical principles.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The released soul.]\n\n=293.= In the living man the soul, as we have already seen reason to\nsuppose, derives its cohesion (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) and shape from its association with\nthe body. Separated from the body, it must assume a new shape, and what\nshould that be but the perfect shape of a sphere[137]? Again, the soul\nbeing compounded of the elements of air and fire must by its own nature,\nwhen freed from the body, pierce through this murky atmosphere, and rise\nto a brighter region above, let us say to that sphere which is just below\nthe moon[138]. Here then souls dwell like the stars, finding like them\ntheir food in exhalations from the earth[139]. Here they take rank as\ndaemons or heroes (of such the air is full), and as such are joined in\nthe fulfilment of the purposes of divine providence[140]. Yet it must\nbe admitted that this bright destiny, if substantiated by the laws of\nphysics, is also subject to physical difficulties. Suppose for instance\nthat a man is crushed by the fall of a heavy rock; his soul will not be\nable to escape in any direction, but will be at once squeezed out of\nexistence[141]. To fancies of this kind, whether attractive or grotesque,\nwe shall not be inclined to pay serious attention.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Tartarus.]\n\n=294.= In this general theory hope is perhaps held out before the eyes\nof good souls, but there is little to terrify the wicked, even if it be\nsupposed that their souls neither survive so long, nor soar so high, as\nthose of the good[142]. As against it we are told by a Church Father that\nZeno accepted the Persian doctrine of future rewards and punishments, and\nwith it the primitive belief in an Inferno in its crudest form[143]. We\nmust agree with the first English editor of the fragments of Zeno that\n\u2018it is hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philosophical\nimportance to a theory stated in these terms[144]\u2019; they can at the\nbest only have occurred in some narration in the style of the Platonic\nmyths, intended to illustrate a principle but not to convey a literal\ntruth[145]. For just as the whole Hellenistic world, including the\nStoics, stood aloof from the Persian doctrine of a spirit of evil, so\nit firmly rejected the dogma of a hell. Lucretius makes it a principal\nargument in favour of the philosophy of Epicurus that it drives out of\nmen\u2019s hearts the fear of Tartarus[146]; but writers partly or wholly\nStoic are not less emphatic. \u2018Ignorance of philosophy,\u2019 says Cicero, \u2018has\nproduced the belief in hell and its terrors[147].\u2019 In the mouth of the\nrepresentative of Stoicism he places the words \u2018Where can we find any\nold woman so silly as to believe the old stories of the horrors of the\nworld below?[148]\u2019 \u2018Those tales\u2019 says Seneca \u2018which make the world below\nterrible to us, are poetic fictions. There is no black darkness awaiting\nthe dead, no prison-house, no lake of fire or river of forgetfulness, no\njudgment-seat, no renewal of the rule of tyrants[149].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Purgatory of Virgil.]\n\n=295.= Of far more importance to us is the theory of purgatory familiar\nthrough the description in Virgil\u2019s _Aeneid_:\n\n  \u2018In the beginning the earth and the sky, and the spaces of night,\n  Also the shining moon, and the sun Titanic and bright\n  Feed on an inward life, and, with all things mingled, a mind\n  Moves universal matter, with Nature\u2019s frame is combined.\n  Thence man\u2019s race, and the beast, and the feathered creature that\n    flies,                                                               5\n  All wild shapes that are hidden the gleaming waters beneath.\n  Each elemental seed has a fiery force from the skies,\n  Each its heavenly being, that no dull clay can disguise,\n  Bodies of earth ne\u2019er deaden, nor limbs long destined to death.\n  Hence their fears and desires, their sorrows and joys; for their\n    sight,                                                              10\n  Blind with the gloom of a prison, discerns not the heavenly light.\n  Nor, when life at last leaves them, do all sad ills, that belong\n  Unto the sinful body, depart; still many survive\n  Lingering within them, alas! for it needs must be that the long\n  Growth should in wondrous fashion at full completion arrive.          15\n  So due vengeance racks them, for deeds of an earlier day\n  Suffering penance; and some to the winds hang viewless and thin,\n  Searched by the breezes; from others the deep infection of sin\n  Swirling water washes, or bright fire purges, away.\n  Each in his own sad ghost we endure; then, chastened aright,          20\n  Into Elysium pass. Few reach to the fields of delight\n  Till great time, when the cycles have run their courses on high,\n  Takes the inbred pollution, and leaves to us only the bright\n  Sense of the heaven\u2019s own ether, and fire from the springs of the\n    sky[150].\u2019\n\nAlthough we cannot accept Virgil as a scientific exponent of Stoic\nteaching, yet there is much reason to suppose that he is here setting\nforth a belief which met with very general acceptance in our school,\nand of which the principle is that the sufferings of the disembodied\nare not a punishment for past offences, but the necessary means for the\npurification of the soul from a taint due to its long contact with the\nbody.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Probable Stoic origin.]\n\n=296.= The language in which Virgil first describes the creation and\nlife of the universe closely resembles that of Stoicism; the phrases\n\u2018elemental seed,\u2019 \u2018fiery force,\u2019 \u2018heavenly being\u2019 might be used by any\nStoic teacher. The conception of the body as a \u2018prison-house,\u2019 even\nthough it does not express the most scientific aspect of Stoic physics,\nwas nevertheless, as we have seen, familiar to Stoics of the later\ncenturies. The ethical conception, again, of the doctrine of purgatory is\nexactly that of which the Stoics felt a need in order to reconcile the\ndualism of good and evil souls with the ultimate prevalence of the divine\nwill. Again, we can have no difficulty in supposing that Virgil drew his\nmaterial from Stoic sources, seeing that he was characteristically a\nlearned poet, and reflects Stoic sentiment in many other passages of his\nworks[151]. We have also more direct evidence. The Church Father whom we\nhave already quoted not only ascribes to the Stoics in another passage\nthe doctrine of purgatory, but expressly quotes this passage from Virgil\nas an exposition of Stoic teaching. And here he is supported to some\nextent by Tertullian, who says that the Stoics held that the souls of the\nfoolish after death receive instruction from the souls of the good[152].\nFinally, we have the doctrine definitely accepted by Seneca[153].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Views of Greek Stoics.]\n\n=297.= We may now consider more particularly the views and feelings of\nindividual Stoic teachers. It appears to us accordingly that Zeno left\nhis followers room for considerable diversity of opinion, and quoted\nthe Persian doctrine because of its suggestiveness rather than for its\nliteral truth. Of Cleanthes we are told that he held that all souls\nsurvived till the conflagration, whilst Chrysippus believed this only\nof the souls of the wise[154]. Panaetius, although a great admirer of\nPlato, is nevertheless so strongly impressed by the scientific principle\nthat \u2018all which is born must die,\u2019 that he is here again inclined to\nbreak away from Stoicism, and to suspend his judgment altogether as to\nthe future existence of the soul[155]; the belief in a limited future\nexistence was meaningless to a philosopher who disbelieved in the\nconflagration. Of the views of Posidonius we have the definite hint,\nthat he taught that the \u2018air is full of immortal souls[156]\u2019; and\nthis is in such harmony with the devout temper of this teacher that we\nmay readily believe that he enriched the somewhat bare speculations of\nhis predecessors by the help of an Oriental imagination, and that he\nintroduced into Stoicism not only the doctrine of daemons but also that\nof purgatory, holding that souls were both pre-existent and post-existent.\n\n\n[Sidenote: View of Seneca.]\n\n=298.= In the period of the Roman principate the question of the\nfuture existence of the soul acquires special prominence. Seneca is\ncriticized on the ground that he affects at times a belief which he\ndoes not sincerely entertain, partly in order to make his teaching\nmore popular, partly to console his friends in times of mourning. The\nfacts stand otherwise. At no time does Seneca exceed the limits of the\naccepted Stoic creed; he bids his friends look forward to the period of\npurgation[157], the life of pure souls in the regions of the aether, and\nthe final union with the divine being. It is after purgation that the\nsoul by the refinement of the elements of which it is built forces its\nway to higher regions[158]; it finds a quiet and peaceful home in the\nclear bright aether[159]; it has cast off the burden of the flesh[160];\nit is parted by no mountains or seas from other happy souls[161]; it\ndaily enjoys free converse with the great ones of the past[162]; it\ngazes on the human world below, and on the sublime company of the stars\nin its own neighbourhood[163]. At a later epoch all blessed souls will\nbe re-absorbed in the primal elements[164], suffering change but not\nforfeiting their immortal nature[165]. The somewhat exuberant language\nof Seneca has frequently been adopted by Christian writers, to express a\nbelief which is not necessarily identical[166]; but for the associations\nthus created Seneca must not be held responsible.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Personality cannot survive.]\n\n=299.= With the decay of interest in the Stoic physics there begins a\ntendency to overlook the intermediate stage of the soul\u2019s life, and to\ndwell solely on its final absorption; whilst at the same time it is urged\nfrom the ethical standpoint that no possible opinion as to the soul\u2019s\nfuture should disturb the calm of the virtuous mind. On one further, but\nimportant, point the Stoic teaching becomes clearer. In no case is the\nsoul that survives death to be identified with the man that once lived.\nCut off from all human relations, from the body and its organs, and from\nits own subordinate powers[167], it is no longer \u2018you,\u2019 but is something\nelse that takes your place in the due order of the universe. In all\nthis the Stoic doctrine remains formally unchanged; but its expression\nis now so chastened that it seems only to give a negative reply to the\ninherited hope, and the chief comfort it offers is that \u2018death is the\nend of all troubles.\u2019 This change of tone begins in Seneca himself; it\nis he who says to the mourner \u2018your loved one has entered upon a great\nand never-ending rest[168]\u2019; \u2018death is release from all pain and its\nend[169]\u2019; \u2018death is not to be. I know all its meaning. As things were\nbefore I was born, so they will be after I am gone[170].\u2019 \u2018If we perish\nin death, nothing remains[171].\u2019 In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this\nnew tone rings out much more clearly; if we like so to speak, more\nunrelentingly. To the characteristic passages from these writers which\nare quoted above[172] may be added the following, perhaps the most\nprecise of all:\n\n  \u2018If souls survive death, how can the air hold them from all\n  eternity? How, we reply, does earth hold the bodies of generation\n  after generation committed to the grave? Just as on earth, after\n  a certain term of survival, change and dissolution of substance\n  makes room for other dead bodies, so too the souls transmuted\n  into air, after a period of survival, change by processes of\n  diffusion and of ignition, and are resumed into the seminal\n  principle of the universe, and in this way make room for others\n  to take up their habitation in their stead. Such is the natural\n  answer, assuming the survival of souls[173].\u2019\n\nSuch are the last words of Stoicism, not wholly satisfying either to\nknowledge or to aspiration, but assuredly based on a wide outlook and a\nkeen discrimination.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Men and women.]\n\n=300.= The whole nature of man, as discussed up to this point, is\ncommon to every individual born into the world, with some exceptions\ndependent on age or temperament which have been explained incidentally.\nIt remains to discuss shortly the important differences which result\nfrom sex, nationality, and location. There seems every reason to believe\nthat the equality of men and women, though at the time seemingly\nparadoxical, was generally accepted by the earlier Stoics, and adopted\nas a practical principle in Stoic homes. The whole treatment of human\nnature by the Stoics applies equally to man and woman, and points to\nthe conclusion that as moral agents they have the same capacities and\nthe same responsibilities[174]. Seneca in writing to a great lady of\nphilosophical sympathies states this as his firm conviction[175], and\nthe lives of many Stoic wives and daughters (to whom we shall refer\nin a later chapter)[176] showed it to have a firm basis in fact. We\nneed attach no great importance to those more distinctively masculine\nviews which Seneca occasionally expresses, to the effect that woman is\nhot-tempered, thoughtless, and lacking in self-control[177], or to the\nPeripatetic doctrine that man is born to rule, women to obey[178]; for\nthese sentiments, however welcome to his individual correspondents, were\nnot rooted in Stoic theory nor exemplified in the Roman society of his\nown days.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Class and race.]\n\n=301.= It follows with equal certainty from the early history of\nStoicism, and in particular from the doctrine of the Cosmopolis, that\ndifferences of class and race were hardly perceived by its founders. For\nthis there was further historical cause in the spread of Hellenistic\ncivilisation, which was of an entirely catholic spirit and welcomed\ndisciples from all nationalities[179]. The doctrine of Aristotle, that\nsome nations are by nature fitted only for slavery, finds no echo in\nthe Stoic world[180]. There we look in vain for any trace of that\ninstinctive feeling of national difference, that sensitiveness to race\nand colour, which can easily be recognised in the early history of\nGreece and Rome, and which has become so acute in the development of\nmodern world-politics. The Roman Stoics, as we shall see later, might\nindividually be proud of advantages of birth, but they never associated\nthis feeling with their philosophy. Here and there, however, we find\nsigns of a scientific interest in the question of differences of national\ncharacter, which are generally ascribed to the influences of climate.\nSeneca, for instance, remarks that the inhabitants of northern climates\nhave characters as rude as their sky; hence they make good fighters, but\npoor rulers[181]. Yet when he contemplates the northern barbarians, his\nmind is mainly occupied by admiration; and, like other pro-Germans of the\nperiod, he foresees with prophetic clearness a danger threatening the\nRoman empire. \u2018Should the Germans once lay aside their fierce domestic\nquarrels, and add to their courage reason and discipline, Rome will\nindeed have cause to resume the virtues of its early history[182].\u2019\nThe roots of true greatness of soul, then, lie deeper than in literary\nculture or philosophic insight. It is a part of the irony of history\nthat Stoicism, which aimed above all things at being practical, should\ndiagnose so correctly the growing weakness of the Roman world, and yet\nfail to suggest any remedy other than a reversion to an epoch in which\nphilosophy was unknown.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] \u2018rex noster est animus: hoc incolumi cetera manent in officio,\nparent, obtemperant; cum ille paullum vacillavit, simul dubitant. ubi\nvero impotens, cupidus, delicatus est, fit tyrannus; tunc eum excipiunt\nadfectus impotentes\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 114, 24.\n\n[2] See L. Stein _Psych._ i p. 206.\n\n[3] See above, \u00a7 68.\n\n[4] \u2018natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et\nappetitiones, quas \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c2 Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic\nadhibet ut nosmetipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii\n22, 58.\n\n[5] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ae\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f27\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 Hermias _irris. gent. phil._ 7 (Arnim i 495).\n\n[6] \u2018ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum\u2019 Cic.\n_N. D._ ii 14, 37.\n\n[7] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0394\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd Philod. _piet._\n15 (Arnim iii _Diog._ 33).\n\n[8] \u2018quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod\nest illic materia, id in nobis corpus est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 65, 24.\n\n[9] Philo _rer. div._ i 494 M (Stein _Psych._ i 207).\n\n[10] See above, \u00a7 242.\n\n[11] See below, \u00a7 274.\n\n[12] See above, \u00a7 11.\n\n[13] On the whole subject see Tylor, _Anthropology_, ch. xvi; _Primitive\nCulture_, chs. xi-xvii; Jevons, _Introd. to the history of Religion_, ch.\nv.\n\n[14] See above, \u00a7 174.\n\n[15] Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518).\n\n[16] _ib._ 99 (Arnim ii 790).\n\n[17] Here we come into close touch with modern ways of thinking. The soul\nis the self as known subjectively and from within, as appealed to in the\nargument of Descartes \u2018cogito, ergo sum.\u2019 The body is the self as known\nobjectively and from without, first in our neighbours who obstruct our\nefforts (\u2018officium quod corporis exstat, | officere atque obstare\u2019 Lucr.\n_R. N._ i 337, 8), and then by analogy in ourselves. The Stoic theory\nthen asserts that subjective and objective knowledge are ultimately the\nsame, both being activities of the same Logos. See above, \u00a7 149.\n\n[18] The distinction is most clearly made by Juvenal: \u2018sensum a caelesti\ndemissum traximus arce, | cuius egent prona et terram spectantia. mundi |\nprincipio indulsit communis conditor illis | tantum animas, nobis animum\nquoque, mutuus ut nos | adfectus petere auxilium et praestare iuberet\u2019\n_Sat._ xv 146-150.\n\n[19] See above, \u00a7 206.\n\n[20] See above, \u00a7 203.\n\n[21] \u2018Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 10, 19.\n\n[22] \u2018spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quaerit hactenus; quo recedente\na corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu\nrecedente moritur animal; naturalis igitur spiritus anima est\u2019 Chalc. _in\nTim._ 220 (Arnim i 138).\n\n[23] \u2018probabilius enim videtur, tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex\nigni atque anima temperatum\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 36; cf. Arnim ii 786.\nThis view was accepted by Panaetius: \u2018is animus ... ex inflammata anima\nconstat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42.\nThe \u2018fire\u2019 and \u2018air\u2019 here referred to are not the ordinary elements:\n\u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd. \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd\n\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\nAlex. Aphr. _de anima_ p. 115, 6 (Arnim ii 785). See further Stein\n_Psychologie_ i pp. 101 to 103.\n\n[24] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd] A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 3, 3.\n\n[25] \u2018animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia;\net cum ab illo animalia hoc nomen traxerint\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 113, 2; \u2018et\nanimus meus animal est et ego animal sum; duo tamen non sumus. quare?\nquia animus mei pars est\u2019 _ib._ 5.\n\n[26] Tertullian deals with this point as against Valentinian heretics;\n_de an._ 21.\n\n[27] \u2018cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aeris terrae, potestates\npares his sunt, fervida frigida arida atque umida; eadem animalium\nhominumque discrimina sunt\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv 19, 1 and 2; \u2018cuius [in\nhomine] elementi portio praevalebit, inde mores erunt\u2019 _ib._ 2.\n\n[28] \u2018languida ingenia et in somnum itura inertibus nectuntur elementis\u2019\n_ib._ i 5, 9.\n\n[29] \u2018iracundos fervida animi natura faciet; frigidi mixtura timidos\nfacit\u2019 _ib._ iv 19, 2.\n\n[30] \u2018quaecunque adtribuit condicio nascendi et corporis temperatura,\nhaerebunt\u2019 _Ep._ 11, 6.\n\n[31] For a treatment of the subject on modern lines see Ribot, _The\nemotions_, chs. xii and xiii; and the works of Fouill\u00e9e, Paulhan, and\nother French writers. For the earlier history see Summers on Sen. _Ep._\n11, 3, and Stein _Psych._ i p. 175.\n\n[32] \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1f72\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Galen _def. med._ 29 (Arnim ii 780); \u2018nosmetipsi\nqui animis movemur\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58; \u2018humanus animus agilis est et\npronus ad motus\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 11.\n\n[33] \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u1f21 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [qu. \u1f40\u03c1\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9?] \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1f72 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\n\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 Alex. Aph. _de anima_ p. 118 (Arnim ii 823).\n\n[34] \u2018huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebuntur quam vires et\nefficaciae et operae\u2019 Tert. _de an._ 14. They may also be called the\nsoul\u2019s qualities: \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03cb\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ad\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 Stob. i 49, 33.\n\n[35] See above, \u00a7 79; for other divisions Tert. _de an._ 14 (Arnim i\n144), Cic. _Off._ i 28, 101, and generally Stein, _Psych._ i p. 123.\n\n[36] On this translation see \u00a7 101, note 81.\n\n[37] [\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6] \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 4, 4.\n\n[38] Arnim ii 838. Since many philosophers think the mind seated in the\nhead, Chrysippus collects many arguments to the contrary; for instance\nthat women say, when they don\u2019t agree with a statement, \u2018it won\u2019t go\ndown,\u2019 pointing all the while to the heart, Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._\niii 5, p. 323 K (Arnim ii 892). Further that \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1 is derived from\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, the heart being the seat of government _ib._ (Arnim ii 896).\nHe could support his view by thousands of quotations from the poets. On\nthe other hand we find the suggestion that the principate resides in our\nspherical heads, as in a universe (A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 21, 4). This latter\nview may be due to Academic influence (Schmekel, p. 259).\n\n[39] \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 Galen _plac. Hipp. et\nPlat._ p. 51 K.\n\n[40] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2, \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\nAlex. Aphr. _de an._ p. 98, 24 (Arnim ii 839). In this direction\nEpictetus defines the rational faculty as \u2018that which contemplates both\nitself and all other things\u2019 _Disc._ i 1, 4.\n\n[41] \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03b3\u1f7c \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf [\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd] \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 Galen _plac.\nHipp. et Plat._ ii 2 p. 215 K.\n\n[42] \u2018intellegendum est etiam, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse\npersonis, quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus\nrationis; altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i\n30, 107.\n\n[43] Arnim ii 823.\n\n[44] _To himself_ vii 64.\n\n[45] _ib._ iv 12.\n\n[46] _ib._ v 27.\n\n[47] _ib._ iii 5, v 10, xii 1; so too Epictetus \u2018God is within, and your\ndaemon is within\u2019 _Disc._ i 14, 14.\n\n[48] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 146-156.\n\n[49] \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bd, \u1f40\u03c1\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1fe5\u03c5\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd; \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u1f22 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u1f70 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 Epict. _Disc._ iv 11, 6 and 7.\n\n[50] \u1f21 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03bc\u03ae\nStob. ii 7 5b 4; \u2018quaerimus quomodo animus semper secundo cursu eat\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ ix 2, 4; \u2018quidam se domi contrahunt, dilatant foris ac extendunt;\nvitium est haec diversitas et signum vacillantis animi ac nondum habentis\ntenorem suum\u2019 _Ep._ 20, 3.\n\n[51] See above, \u00a7 96.\n\n[52] \u2018satis natura homini dedit roboris, si illo utamur; nolle in causa\nest, non posse praetenditur\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 116, 8.\n\n[53] \u2018animi motus eos putemus sanissimos validissimosque, qui nostro\narbitrio ibunt, non suo ferentur\u2019 _Dial._ iv 35, 2.\n\n[54] \u2018hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd vocant, ego\ntranquillitatem voco\u2019 _ib._ ix 2, 3.\n\n[55] _Ep._ 114, 24 (see above, \u00a7 263, note 1).\n\n[56] \u2018non est [mens] ex terreno et gravi concreta corpore, ex illo\ncaelesti spiritu descendit\u2019 _Dial._ xii 7, 7; \u2018ratio nihil aliud est quam\nin corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa\u2019 _Ep._ 66, 12.\n\n[57] \u2018animus, sed hic rectus bonus magnus ... quid aliud voces hunc quam\ndeum in corpore humano hospitantem?\u2019 _ib._ 31, 11.\n\n[58] \u2018sacer inter nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum\nobservator [et] custos\u2019 _ib._ 41, 2.\n\n[59] \u2018deum te igitur scito esse: si quidem deus est qui viget, qui\nsentit, qui meminit\u2019 Cic. _Rep._ vi (_Somn. Scip._) 24, 26.\n\n[60] Physics, and in particular astronomy, is meant: \u2018[animus] hoc habet\nargumentum divinitatis suae, quod illum divina delectant; nec ut alienis\nsed ut suis interest\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 12; cf. Horace _Ep._ i 12,\n14-19.\n\n[61] \u2018When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising\nyourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are\nnourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying\nabout a god with you, and you know it not.\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12.\n\n[62] \u2018dicere porro, oculos nullam rem cernere posse, | sed per eos animum\nut foribus spectare reclusis, | difficile est\u2019 Lucr. _N. D._ iii 360-362;\ncf. Arnim ii 862. See also Cic. _N. D._ iii 4, 9, and Mayor\u2019s valuable\nnote. Modern psychologists side with the Stoics.\n\n[63] See above, \u00a7 146, note 18.\n\n[64] \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b8\u03cc\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7 A\u00ebt. _plac._ iv 23, 1.\n\n[65] See above, \u00a7 146, note 18.\n\n[66] \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 Porph. _de\nanima_ (Arnim ii 74); \u2018dicunt Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse\u2019 Cic.\n_Ac._ ii 33, 108.\n\n[67] \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ae, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f25\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Diog. L. vii 52.\n\n[68] \u2018Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae\nvideri queunt, emissionem aerisque simul intentionem\u2019 Gell. _N. A._ v\n16, 2; \u2018Stoici videndi causam in nativi spiritus intentione constituunt,\ncuius effigiem coni similem volunt\u2019 Chalc. _Tim._ 237 (Arnim ii 863).\n\n[69] Arnim ii 869.\n\n[70] \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd (sc. \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f44\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd) \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 A\u00ebt. _plac._\niv 13, 3.\n\n[71] Diog. L. vii 158.\n\n[72] Arnim ii 836.\n\n[73] \u2018Cleanthes [ambulationem] ait spiritum esse a principali usque in\npedes permissum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23.\n\n[74] \u2018vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt, eamque esse dicunt ictum aera\u2019\nGellius _N. A._ v 15, 6.\n\n[75] \u2018quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, ut audiatur, linguae formata\npercussu?\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 3.\n\n[76] \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae. \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd Galen.\n_plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 5 p. 205 M\u00fcller.\n\n[77] See above, \u00a7 161.\n\n[78] See above, \u00a7 178.\n\n[79] Lucr. _R. N._ iv 1214-1220.\n\n[80] E. Haeckel, _Weltr\u00e4thsel_ (Volksausg.) p. 30. The italics are those\nof the author of this book.\n\n[81] _ib._ _Anmerkungen_, p. 158.\n\n[82] Though Lucretius laughs at the idea of attributing laughter and\ntears to the elements (\u2018hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum: | fiet,\nuti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent, | et lacrumis salsis umectent ora\ngenasque\u2019 _R. N._ i 917-919), yet he attributes to them the essential\npower of free-will: \u2018si ... nec declinando faciunt primordia motus |\nprincipium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, | unde est haec, inquam,\nfatis avolsa voluntas?\u2019 _R. N._ ii 253-257.\n\n[83] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\nA\u00ebt. _plac._ v. 11, 3; \u2018When you consort with your wife ... you are\ncarrying about a god with you\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12.\n\n[84] \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd ... \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Diog. L.\nvii 157.\n\n[85] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd [\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1, \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd A\u00ebt.\n_plac._ iv 21, 4; cf. Diog. L. vii 159.\n\n[86] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 _\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1_ \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1fd6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2 Euseb. _pr. ev._ xv 20, 1 (Arnim i 128). That the separation\nor \u2018tearing away\u2019 (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1) is not complete or absolute seems to follow\nfrom the general principles of Stoic physics: see above \u00a7 262.\n\n[87] \u2018in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._\niii 29, 3.\n\n[88] \u2018utrum ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, ut ... Stoici\nscripserunt\u2019 Censor. _di. nat._ 5; cf. Diog. L. vii 159, A\u00ebt. _plac._ v\n5, 2.\n\n[89] The evidence for this is mainly indirect. [\u1f41 \u03b4\u1f72 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2] \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03bd, \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518); \u2018quod declaret\neorum similitudo, qui procreentur; quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in\ncorporibus appareat\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.\n\n[90] \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u0390\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u00b7 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2, \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03af, \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03af A\u00ebt. _plac._ v 11, 4.\n\n[91] See above, \u00a7 63.\n\n[92] \u2018inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam\nambitiosam impotentem positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem languidam\nvoluptatibus deditam\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 92, 8.\n\n[93] \u2018appetitio (eam enim esse volumus \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae\u03bd), qua ad agendum impellimur,\net id appetimus quod est visum\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 8, 24.\n\n[94] This is termed by Panaetius \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 simply; the term \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae is also\nused: see \u00a7 272, note 49.\n\n[95] See above, \u00a7 146.\n\n[96] Zeller (_Stoics_, p. 243) states that man has irrational as well as\nrational impulses. This seems to be incorrectly expressed.\n\n[97] \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 Stob. ii 7, 9.\n\n[98] \u2018omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei\ninritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc\nimpetum. quid sit adsensio dicam. oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo,\ncum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 113, 18.\n\n[99] \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 Diog.\nL. vii III; \u2018omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione\u2019\nCic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14; \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03ad\u03c0\u03c9\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f66\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 Galen _de peccatis_ ii 1 p. 59 K (Arnim iii\n172); \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 ... \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 Diog. L. vii\n110.\n\n[100] \u2018in corpore nostro ossa nervique et articuli, firmamenta totius et\nvitalia, minime speciosa visu, prius ordinantur; deinde haec, ex quibus\nomnis in faciem adspectumque decor est. post haec omnia qui maxime oculos\nrapit, color, ultimus perfecto iam corpore adfunditur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv 1,\n2.\n\n[101] See above, \u00a7 268.\n\n[102] \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03ac \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iii 1\np. 251 M, quoting Chrysippus (Arnim ii 885).\n\n[103] Schmekel traces the introduction of this doctrine to Posidonius,\nand finds in it the starting-point of the later mysticism, _Philos. d.\nmittl. Stoa_, pp. 400 sqq. See also L. Stein, _Psych._ i 194.\n\n[104] \u2018nos corpus tam putre sortiti\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 120, 17; \u2018inutilis caro\net fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius\u2019 _ib._ 92,\n10.\n\n[105] \u2018haec quae vides ossa circumiecta nobis, nervos et obductam cutem,\nvoltumque et ministras manus, et cetera quibus involuti sumus, vincula\nanimorum tenebraeque sunt. obruitur his animus, effocatur, inficitur,\narcetur a veris et suis in falsa coniectus. omne illi cum hac carne\ngrave certamen est\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 24, 5; \u2018corpusculum hoc, custodia et\nvinculum animi\u2019 _ib._ xii 11, 7.\n\n[106] \u2018What am I? a poor miserable man with my wretched bit of flesh.\nThrough this kinship with the flesh, some of us become like wolves\u2019\nEpict. _Disc._ i 3, 5 and 7.\n\n[107] \u2018corpus hoc animi pondus et poena est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 65, 16; \u2018quantum\nper moras membrorum et hanc circumfusam gravem sarcinam licet\u2019 _Dial._\nxii 11, 6; \u2018corporis velut oneris necessarii non amator sed procurator\nest\u2019 _Ep._ 92, 33.\n\n[108] \u2018Epicurus placed the good in the husk\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 23, 1.\n\n[109] \u2018You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded. When\nthe body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass,\npack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder\u2019 _ib._ iv 1, 79 and 80.\n\n[110] In particular to the practice of self-mutilation, with which Seneca\nis disgusted: \u2018cottidie comminiscimur, per quae virilitati fiat iniuria\n... alius genitalia excidit\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ vii 31, 3.\n\n[111] \u2018nec domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium et quidem breve\nhospitium\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 120, 14; \u2018hoc [corpus] natura ut quandam vestem\nanimo circumdedit\u2019 _ib._ 92, 13.\n\n[112] \u2018inter me teque conveniet corpus in honorem animi coli\u2019 _ib._ 92,\n1. In the same spirit Seneca writes in condemnation of the gladiatorial\nconflicts \u2018homo sacra res homini\u2019 _ib._ 95, 33.\n\n[113] \u2018[natura] voltus nostros erexit ad caelum\u2019 _ib._ 94, 56; \u2018[natura]\n... ut ab ortu sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset, sublime fecit\n[homini] caput et collo flexili imposuit\u2019 _Dial._ viii 5, 4. See also\nMayor on Juv. _Sat._ xv 147.\n\n[114] Cic. _N. D._ ii 54 to 58.\n\n[115] \u2018quae partes corporis, ad naturae necessitatem datae, adspectum\nessent deformem habiturae atque turpem, eas [natura] contexit atque\nabdidit\u2019 _Off._ i 35, 127.\n\n[116] In the Epicurean system atoms of soul are dispersed amongst atoms\nof body, there being a mixture of the two, which however does not go\nbeyond juxtaposition; in the Stoic system soul permeates body. The Stoic\nexplanation is frequently referred to by opponents as a _reductio ad\nabsurdum_: \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f15\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\nAlex. Aphr. _Arist. Top._ ii 93 (Arnim ii 798). The relation of the\nprincipate to the man as a whole is also called \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (_constitutio_);\n\u2018constitutio est principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 121, 10.\n\n[117] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 [\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03c5\u03bf\u03bd] \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd A\u00ebt.\n_plac._ v 14, 2; \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2]\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd Plut. _Sto. rep._ 41, 1.\n\n[118] Stein, _Psych._ i p. 115.\n\n[119] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03b8\u1fc7, \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd Plut. as above.\n\n[120] \u2018infans nondum rationalis [est]\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 121, 14; \u2018tu me\nexpertem rationis genuisti, onus alienum\u2019 _Ben._ iii 31, 2.\n\n[121] See above, \u00a7 153, note 66.\n\n[122] \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u1ff4\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd [sc. \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd] \u1f14\u03ba \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f35\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u1f74\u03bd \u1f11\u03bb\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 [\u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2] Galen _comm.\nHipp._ 6 (Arnim ii 782); \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f35\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 8 (Arnim i 140); \u2018poor soul\nitself mere exhalation of the blood\u2019 M. Aurel. _To himself_ v 33.\n\n[123] \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7\n... \u2018\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03b3\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\u2019 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd Ar. Did. fr. 39, 2 and 3 (Diels); the\nreference to Heraclitus is not necessarily an exact quotation by Zeno,\nsee Bywater\u2019s critical note on fr. 42; on the other side Diels\u2019 note on\nfr. 12. L. Stein is of opinion that the Stoics missed the meaning of\nHeraclitus whilst accepting his terminology; see _Psych._ i, note 182.\n\n[124] See above, \u00a7 200.\n\n[125] See \u00a7 316, note 100.\n\n[126] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd [\u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76] \u1f14\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f22\n\u1f60\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 Theod. _Gr. aff. cur._ 11; see generally the\ndiscussion by Stein, _Psych._ i pp. 139, 140.\n\n[127] Plut. fr. (_de an._) 6, 3.\n\n[128] \u03bf\u1f31 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f55\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\nA\u00ebt. _plac._ v 23, 4, cf. Plut. _Qu. conv._ IV ii 4, 6; \u2018contrahi autem\nanimum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere, et id ipsum esse\ndormire\u2019 Cic. _Div._ ii 58, 119. See also above, \u00a7 177.\n\n[129] \u2018senes difficiles et queruli sunt, ut aegri et convalescentes, et\nquorum aut lassitudine aut detractione sanguinis exhaustus est calor\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ iv 19, 4.\n\n[130] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1f74\u03c2 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd A\u00ebt. _plac._ v 23, 4.\n\n[131] \u2018cum animarum aeternitatem disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos\nhabet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n117, 6.\n\n[132] \u2018iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere.\ncredebam enim me facile opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam\npromittentium magis quam probantium\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 102, 2; cf. Cic. _Tusc.\ndisp._ i 11, 24.\n\n[133] So especially L. Stein: \u2018um nun ihre Philosophie popul\u00e4r und\nmundgerecht zu machen, liessen sich die Stoiker zuweilen zu \u00c4usserungen\nherbei, die dazu angethan waren, ihr ganzes philosophisches System\numzustossen\u2019 _Psych._ i 149. Further their Scottish critic: \u2018thus did\nthe later Stoicism try to meet the claims of the human heart, which the\nearlier Stoicism had to a large extent ignored\u2019 W. L. Davidson, _The\nStoic creed_, p. 98; again \u2018die Lehre von der Fortdauer der Seele ... war\nnur f\u00fcr die grosse Menge berechnet\u2019 H. A. Winckler, _Stoicismus_, p. 50.\nZeller is much more judicial, _Stoics_, pp. 217-222.\n\n[134] \u1f14\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 [\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd] \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f70\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd Ar. Did. fr. 39, 5.\n\n[135] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\nib. 6; \u2018Stoici ... diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant\u2019 Cic. _Tusc.\ndisp._ i 31, 77.\n\n[136] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd [\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd] \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\u00b7 ... \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03c9\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 Ar. Did. fr. 39,\n6 and 7.\n\n[137] Arnim ii 815.\n\n[138] [\u03b1\u1f31 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76] \u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f27\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03ce\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c6\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 ... \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd Sext. _math._ ix 71 to 73 (Arnim ii 812); Ar. Did. fr. 39, 4; \u2018si\n[animae] permanent et conservant habitum suum, ... necesse est ferantur\nad caelum et ab his perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hic et concretus\naer; calidior enim est vel potius ardentior animus, quam est hic aer\u2019\nCic. _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42; \u2018itaque sublimantur animae sapientes ...\napud Stoicos sub lunam\u2019 Tert. _de an._ 54 (Arnim ii 814).\n\n[139] \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f70\n\u1f04\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 Sext. _math._ ix 73; \u2018fortium animas existimant in modum siderum\nvagari in aere\u2019 Comm. _in Lucan._ ix 6 (Arnim ii 817).\n\n[140] \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03af, \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 Sext.\nas in note 138; \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f24\u03c1\u03c9\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 151; \u2018plenus [est] aer\nimmortalium animorum\u2019 Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64, quoting from Posidonius.\n\n[141] \u2018[Stoici] existimant animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere\nnon posse et statim spargi\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 57, 7; Seneca himself rejects this\nopinion.\n\n[142] \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 [\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd Diog. L. vii 157.\n\n[143] \u2018esse inferos Zenon docuit et sedes piorum ab impiis esse\ndiscretas; et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones,\nhos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni voraginibus\nhorrendis\u2019 Lactant. _Div. inst._ vii 7, 13 (Arnim i 147); \u2018reliquas\nanimas ad inferos deiciunt\u2019 Tert. _de an._ 54. Cf. Cic. fr. 240, 6.\n\n[144] Pearson, _Fragments_, p. 146.\n\n[145] So Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_ ii p. 29 note.\n\n[146] \u2018et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, | funditus\nhumanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, | omnia suffuscans mortis nigrore, neque\nullam | esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit\u2019 _R. N._ iii 37-40.\n\n[147] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 16, 36.\n\n[148] _N. D._ ii 2, 5.\n\n[149] \u2018cogita illa, quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulam esse;\nnullas imminere mortuis tenebras nec carcerem nec flumina igne flagrantia\nnec oblivionis amnem nec tribunalia ... [nec] ullos iterum tyrannos.\nluserunt ista poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi\n19, 4. Here we have the opposite extreme to the statement in note 131.\n\n[150] Virgil _Aen._ vi 724-747 (transl. by Lord Bowen). For the\ncorresponding description of Paradise, see _ib._ 638-644. The\nsubstance of this discussion is drawn from Hirzel\u2019s full note in his\n_Untersuchungen_ ii pp. 25-31.\n\n[151] For instance _Georg._ iv 221 sqq. See also below, \u00a7\u00a7 434, 435.\n\n[152] \u2018impias vero [animas Stoici dicunt] ... habere aliquid\nimbecillitatis ex contagione carnis, cuius desideriis ac libidinibus\naddictae ineluibilem quendam fucum trahant labemque terrenam, quae cum\ntemporis diuturnitate penitus inhaeserit, eius naturae reddi animas, ut\n... cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quae peccatis inusta sensum\ndoloris attribuit. quam sententiam poeta sic explicavit\u2014\u201cquin et supremo\netc.\u201d\u2019 Lact. _Div. inst._ vii 20, 9 and 10 (Arnim ii 813); \u2018[Stoicos]\nmiror, quod \u2020 imprudentes animas circa terram prosternant, cum illas\na sapientibus multo superioribus erudiri adfirment\u2019 Tert. _de an._ 54\n(Arnim i 147, reading \u2018prudentes\u2019 on his own conjecture). On the other\nhand Augustine (_Civ. De._ xxi 13) ascribes the doctrine to \u2018Platonici\nquidam\u2019 and Comm. Luc. ix 9 (p. 291 Us.) to Pythagoras. See Schmekel, p.\n105.\n\n[153] \u2018facillimum ad superos iter est animis cito ab humana conversatione\ndimissis. facilius quicquid est illud obsoleti inlitique eluunt\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ vi 23, 1; \u2018[filius tuus] paulum supra nos commoratus, dum\nexpurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnem mortalis aevi excutit\u2019\n_ib._ 25, 1.\n\n[154] Diog. L. vii 157.\n\n[155] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.\n\n[156] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 254, 293; for the teaching of Posidonius as to the\npre-existence of the soul, see Schmekel, p. 250.\n\n[157] See above, \u00a7 296.\n\n[158] \u2018animus beneficio subtilitatis suae erumpit\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 57, 8.\n\n[159] \u2018ibi illum aeterna requies manet e confusis crassisque pura et\nliquida visentem\u2019 _Dial._ vi 24, 5.\n\n[160] \u2018emissis [animis] meliora restant onere detracto\u2019 _Ep._ 24, 18.\nSo in the Burial Service \u2018the souls of the faithful, after they are\ndelivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity.\u2019\n\n[161] \u2018non illos interfusa maria discludunt nec altitudo montium;\ntramites omnium plani\u2019 _Dial._ vi 25, 3.\n\n[162] \u2018ad excelsa sublatus inter felices currit animas, Scipiones\nCatonesque, interque contemptores vitae et mortis beneficio liberos\u2019\n_ib._ 1.\n\n[163] \u2018rerum naturae spectaculo fruitur et humana omnia ex superiore loco\ndespicit, divina vero propius intuetur\u2019 _ib._ xi 9, 3.\n\n[164] \u2018nos quoque, felices animae atque aeterna sortitae, parva ruinae\ningentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur\u2019 _ib._ vi 26, 7.\n\n[165] \u2018[animus], si superstes est corpori, nullo genere [perire potest],\nquoniam nulla immortalitas cum exceptione est\u2019 _Ep._ 57, 9.\n\n[166] See Winckler, _Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums_, p. 52.\n\n[167] \u2018haec sunt ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de\nmente dici, non de partibus iis, in quibus aegritudines irae libidinesque\nversentur\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 33, 80.\n\n[168] \u2018excepit illum magna et aeterna pax\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 19, 6.\n\n[169] \u2018mors dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis\u2019 _ib._ 19, 5.\n\n[170] \u2018mors est non esse. id quale sit, iam scio. hoc erit post me, quod\nante me fuit\u2019 _Ep._ 54, 4.\n\n[171] \u2018mors nos aut consumit aut exuit; ... consumptis nihil restat\u2019 _ib._\n24, 18.\n\n[172] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 140 and 141.\n\n[173] M. Aurel. _To himself_ iv 21.\n\n[174] See below, \u00a7 306. Cleanthes wrote a book to show that \u2018virtue is\nthe same in men and women\u2019; see Diog. L. vii 103.\n\n[175] \u2018quis dixit naturam maligne cum muliebribus ingeniis egisse, et\nvirtutem illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor,\npar ad honesta, libeat, facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si\nconsuevere, patiuntur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 16, 1.\n\n[176] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 431, 439, 444, 446.\n\n[177] \u2018muliebre est furere in ira\u2019 Sen. _Clem._ i 5, 5; \u2018[mulier]\naeque imprudens [atque] animal est, et nisi scientia accessit et multa\neruditio, ferum, cupiditatum incontinens\u2019 _Dial._ ii 14, 1.\n\n[178] \u2018utraque turba [_i.e._ sexus] ad vitae societatem tantundem\n[confert], sed altera pars ad obsequendum, altera imperio nata [est]\u2019\n_ib._ 1, 1.\n\n[179] See below, \u00a7 303.\n\n[180] See below, \u00a7 309.\n\n[181] \u2018fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos, qui mitiore caelo\nutuntur. in frigora septentrionemque vergentibus immansueta ingenia sunt\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ iv 15, 5. So too Lucan: \u2018omnis in Arctois populus quicunque\npruinis | nascitur, indomitus bellis et mortis amator\u2019 _Phars._ viii\n363-6.\n\n[182] \u2018agedum illis corporibus illis animis luxum opes ignorantibus da\nrationem, da disciplinam: ut nihil amplius dicam, necesse erit certe\nnobis mores Romanos repetere\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iii II, 4.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nTHE LAW FOR HUMANITY.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Right Law.]\n\n=302.= The department of Ethics contains two divisions: ethics (in the\nstricter sense) which is concerned with the action of the individual;\nand politics, which has to do with the order of the State. It has been\nmaintained that in Stoicism the latter is altogether subordinated, and\nthat the central aim of this philosophy is to erect a shelter for the\nindividual[1]. The truth of this view is more than doubtful. Stoic ethics\nare not based on the needs of the individual, but on the demands of the\nsupreme Law. \u2018If there is a universe, then there is a universal law,\nbidding us do this and refrain from that.\u2019 \u2018If there are gods, there\nis virtue[2].\u2019 We have already noticed that Zeno\u2019s earliest work was\n\u2018on the State[3],\u2019 and that it is an attempt to show how a state can\nbe ordered by wise laws. The whole theory of the Logos leads up to the\nsame point. The same eternal Wisdom through which the primal stuff took\nshape is, in another function, the Right Rule (\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, _vera ratio_)\nwhich commands and forbids[4]. Right Rule and Common Law (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2,\n_lex communis_) are terms of identical meaning, by which a standard of\nsupreme authority is set up[5]; State law and conventional morality,\nthough always of narrower range, and often of inferior purity, are yet\na reflection of universal Law. The moral law must therefore first be\nstudied in its bearings on man as a political and social animal.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Cosmopolis.]\n\n=303.= The root-principle of the Stoic State is that it is world-wide, a\ncosmopolis. This title arose from the practice, attributed to Socrates\nand Diogenes (as well as others), of replying to the current question \u2018Of\nwhat city are you?\u2019 by the answer \u2018Of the universe[6].\u2019 We must therefore\nregard ourselves as members not of a clan or city, but of a world-wide\nsociety[7]. In this society all distinctions of race, caste and class\nare to be subordinated to the sense of kinship and brotherhood[8]. This\nprinciple is equally opposed to the nationalist prejudices which rank\nHellene above barbarian, to philosophical theories (such as that of\nAristotle) which distinguish intelligent peoples fitted by nature to\nrule and others only fitted to obey[9], and to ideal states (such as\nthat of Plato) in which a ruling class is to be developed by artifice\nand schooling. Only the brute animals are excluded from this community,\nfor they are not possessed of reason; they have therefore no rights,\nbut exist for the service of men[10]. All human beings are capable\nof attaining to virtue, and as such are natural-born citizens of the\nCosmopolis[11]. Loyalty to this state, however, in no wise hinders a due\nloyalty to existing states which may be regarded as partial realizations\nof it. Socrates submitted to the laws of Athens even when they bade him\ndie; Zeno and Cleanthes declined the citizenship of that famous city,\nlest they should be thought to hold cheap the places of their birth[12];\nand amongst the Romans Seneca frequently insists that every man is born\ninto two communities, the Cosmopolis and his native city[13].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The law of nature.]\n\n=304.= The world-state is not held together either by force or by\nstate-craft, but by goodwill. We must be able say \u2018Love is god there,\nand is a helpmate to make the city secure[14].\u2019 This feeling of love and\nfriendship grows up naturally between wise men, because they partake\nin the reason of the universe; so that we may equally well say that\nthe bond of the state is the Logos (_ratio atque oratio_)[15]. Since\nreason and the universal law exist in the community from the beginning,\nlaw does not need to be created; it exists of itself, and by natural\ngrowth (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9)[16]. The writing down of laws is only a stage in their\ndevelopment[17].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Zeno\u2019s revolutionary views.]\n\n=305.= The theory of the world-state, as first sketched by Zeno, found no\nplace for any of the cherished institutions of the Athens in which it was\npreached. In the heavenly city must be neither temples nor images[18];\nso far the aims of the Persian invader are to be carried out. The reason\ngiven is far from flattering to the artistic pride of the Athenians, for\nthey are told that their magnificent buildings and statues of world-wide\nrenown are only the work of common builders and workmen[19]. Nor must\nthere be law-courts[20] or gymnasia. The practice of hearing both sides\nin a law-court is unreasonable, because if the plaintiff has proved his\ncase it is useless to hear the defendant, and if he has not proved it,\nit is superfluous[21]. The training of the youth in grammar, music, and\ngymnastic is worthless[22], for the true education is in virtue. Coined\nmoney, as in modern communistic Utopias, should not be required either\nfor commerce or for travel[23].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Women to be in common.]\n\n=306.= With regard to the position of women Zeno, agreeing to some extent\nwith Plato, asserted the startling doctrine that \u2018women should be in\ncommon, and men should mate with them as they pleased[24].\u2019 That Zeno\nwas suggesting, even for an imaginary state, any sort of loose living,\nneed not for a moment be supposed; his continence was notable[25]; he\nexpressly approves of marriage[26]; and the members of his school were\nhonourably known by their aversion to adultery[27]. But Zeno could not\nbase his theory of the relation of the sexes merely upon established\npractice. We may assume that he observed that in the world of animals and\nof birds mating was free[28], whereas in human society it was encumbered\nby national prejudices, class privilege, and personal jealousy; and\nin particular that woman was regarded as a chattel, contrary to the\nfundamental principle of his state[29]. By his doctrine of \u2018free mating\u2019\nhe aimed at the root of these evils. The gradual abolition at Rome of the\nrestrictions on \u2018connubium\u2019 illustrates the application of his principle,\njust as the prohibition of \u2018miscegenation\u2019 in modern America illustrates\nits denial. Zeno may well have perceived how deeply the potentiality\nof marriage affects all social relations, and it is probable that the\nprogress of Stoicism did much to break down the racial barriers that\nexisted in Zeno\u2019s time, but which had almost completely disappeared five\ncenturies later throughout the civilized world. Another application of\nhis doctrine is found in the life of Cato of Utica[30]. But its general\nmeaning is clear: marriage exists not by nature, but by institution\n(\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9); its law is human and mutable, but nevertheless within proper\nlimits is one that may not be transgressed. By the side of the text of\nZeno we still have the authorized comment of Epictetus[31].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Incest no abomination.]\n\n=307.= The Stoics did not shrink from insisting upon the abstract\nprinciple of the community of women even in an extreme case in which\ntheir doctrine encountered a violent prejudice. No natural law, they\nmaintained, prohibits marriage relationship between near relatives[32].\nThe tale of Oedipus and Jocasta, which is so prominent a theme in the\ngreat Athenian tragedies, appears to Zeno to be a matter about which too\nmuch ado has been made[33]. For suppose the case that all the world\nwere destroyed by flood except one man and his daughter; would it not be\nbetter that he should beget children by her, and that the whole human\nrace should not perish[34]? In this reference to the traditional flood we\nmay readily trace one reason why the Stoics insisted on their principle.\nFor at the beginning of human history we are compelled to postulate\nan Adam and an Eve, a human pair related in their birth and at the\nsame time united as parents of the race[35]. Go back to the beginnings\nof the universe; there too we must postulate the same combination of\nrelationships, and so only can we understand the poets when they speak of\nHera as \u2018wife and sister of Zeus[36].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Burial a convention.]\n\n=308.= Perhaps even more shocking to Hellenic feeling was Zeno\u2019s\nindifference to the treatment of the dead, Burial was to him no sacred\nduty to the departed one; it was equally right to throw the body to\nthe fire, as the Indians, or to the vultures, as the Persians[37]. Nor\nis there any need to condemn those nations amongst which the dead are\neaten by their own relatives[38], for all these things are matters not\nof principle but of convenience, and to eat human flesh may still be\ndesirable if circumstances require it[39], as for instance in shipwreck,\nor if a limb is amputated[40]. The problem of the disposal of the dead\nbecame a favourite subject of discussion in Stoic circles. Chrysippus\nwrote at length on the subject, comparing the customs of various nations\nas well as the habits of animals, in order to ascertain the law of\nnature. He reaches the conclusion that dead bodies should be disposed of\nin the simplest possible way, not being regarded as of more importance\nthan the hair or nail-parings from which we part in life[41]. Cicero\nshortly sums up this discussion in the _Tusculan disputations_, and draws\nthe conclusion that whilst the living must consider what it is fitting\nfor them to do, to the dead man it is a matter totally indifferent[42].\nIn the imperial period this consideration is of importance as showing\nthat the tyrant has no power after death[43].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Slavery.]\n\n=309.= The Stoic view of slavery can readily be inferred. Without\nproposing the immediate abolition of this social institution, the Stoics\ntreated it as essentially contrary to nature[44]. The earliest teachers\nseem to have passed over the subject in silence; Panaetius (as might be\nexpected from his social position), justified slavery by the arguments\nof Plato and Aristotle in exceptional cases: \u2018all those who through the\ninfirmity of their nature are unfit to govern themselves, are rightly\nmade slaves\u2019[45]. According to this theory we may speak of a \u2018natural\nslave\u2019 (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2), who as such can no more have rights in the\ncommunity than the lower animals. The true Stoic theory appears however\nto be formulated by a definition of Chrysippus, who says that a slave\nis a \u2018labourer hired for life[46].\u2019 This definition makes of slavery a\ncontract, to which there are two parties; and Seneca rightly uses this\ndefinition to argue that the relations of master to slave are those of\nman to man, and that as the master may wrong his slave, so the slave may\ndo a service to his master[47]. All this is really implied in the dogma\nthat \u2018women and slaves may become philosophers,\u2019 as is realized by the\nChurch Father Lactantius[48].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Constitutions.]\n\n=310.= The Stoic principles of politics may be realized under any form\nof government, and the theory of Constitutions, like that of grammar,\nbelongs to a neutral ground on which philosophers of different schools\nmay work in harmony. The Peripatetics appear first to have taken up this\nstudy; of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon[49], who himself acted as a\npolitical representative of Athens, is stated to have shown interest in\nthis subject; and after him Panaetius developed a complete theory, of\nwhich the substance is preserved for us in Cicero\u2019s _de Re publica_[50].\nAccording to this theory, which Cicero puts in the mouth of Scipio\nAfricanus, surrounded by Roman Stoics of distinction such as Laelius,\nTubero, and Furius Philo, the best constitution is one in which the\nelements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are combined, though\na bias remains in favour of monarchy[51]. This mixed constitution,\naccording to the teaching of Panaetius and his pupil Polybius, is best\nillustrated in the Roman state[52]; whereas tyranny, the perversion\nof monarchy, is the worst of all governments. By such reasoning the\nRoman nobles of the first century B.C. and the first century A.D. alike\npersuaded themselves easily that Stoic teaching supported the position\nof the republican party. But in fact they were maintaining Peripatetic\ntheories of government, and the real Stoic theory was far more in accord\nwith that practice of the principate, according to which all citizens\nare treated with respect, and the government of them is placed in the\nhands of men selected for their personal merit. We shall discuss the\nwhole question of the relation of Stoicism to Roman politics in a later\nchapter[53]; but we may notice here that those Stoics practically\nabandoned the theory of providence who looked into the history of their\nown times with the intention of seeing nowhere the \u2018king,\u2019 and everywhere\nthe \u2018tyrant.\u2019 On the other hand the practical statesmen who set about\nto re-create Roman law on the principle of substituting everywhere human\nrights for class privileges were men thoroughly imbued with the Stoic\nspirit, whether or not they were avowed disciples of this philosophy.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The citizen.]\n\n=311.= We must therefore maintain that the true Stoic state, whether it\nbe called monarchy or democracy, calls for a revolt against nationalism,\nantiquity, custom, pride, and prejudice; and a new construction based\nupon universal reason and individual liberty. For the realization of this\nstate it is first necessary to build up the individual, to fill his mind\nwith the conception of reason and love, to strengthen his will to a true\nindependence: for it is not buying or selling that makes the slave, but\nthe will within[54]. All are in truth slaves except the wise man; for\nfreedom is the power of directing one\u2019s own actions[55]. Here then we\npass from the community to the individual, from politics to ethics in the\nnarrower sense.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The supreme good.]\n\n=312.= For the individual man the ethical problem is to bring himself, a\npart of nature, into harmony with the whole. Whether we think of destiny,\nof providence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual\nis to agree and to cooperate; to struggle and to rebel is to fail.\nThis success is the end (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2) for which man exists, the supreme good\n(_summum bonum_), the ultimate good (_ultimum bonorum_), that towards\nwhich all other right action works, whilst it works itself for no other\nend[56]. Its name in the individual is virtue (\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae, _virtus_), and\nit is an active and firmly-established disposition of the soul[57]. It\nfollows from the monistic principle that the end for man is one, and that\nvirtue is one; but nevertheless each is capable of being regarded in many\naspects. The harmony of the ethical end with other parts of the Stoic\nphilosophy is marked by such phrases as \u2018life according to nature[58],\u2019\nthe rule \u2018keep company with God[59],\u2019 and the identification of virtue\nand reason[60].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Consistency with nature.]\n\n=313.= Because virtue is one thing and not many, it makes a man\u2019s life\none consistent whole, and stands in sharp contrast to the changing and\nundecided ways of the crowd. Virtue is therefore frequently defined\nas consistency in life[61], an even steady course of action[62],\nself-consistency[63], a principle in agreement with its applications[64].\nThe opposite of virtue is the unending restlessness and indecision of\nthe man in the crowd[65]. Accordingly we are told that the earliest\nStoics thought it a sufficient definition of wisdom or virtue that it\nwas something simple[66]; and similarly Zeno said that the end of life\nwas \u2018to live consistently[67].\u2019 To this short definition the words \u2018with\nnature\u2019 were soon added[68], whereby the distinctiveness of the original\ndefinition was diminished: for all the philosophical schools are agreed\nthat the right life must be guided by nature (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9), not by convention\n(\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9). From the time of Chrysippus the relation of right living to\nnature was further analyzed. Chrysippus defined the \u2018nature\u2019 referred\nto as \u2018universal and human nature[69],\u2019 thereby further approximating\nto the teaching of rival schools; but on the other hand he gave this\nnew and more characteristic explanation \u2018to live virtuously is to live\naccording to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing\nnothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which\npervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering\nof this world[70].\u2019 Diogenes of Babylon introduced the words \u2018to take\na reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with\nnature[71].\u2019 Antipater\u2019s definition is \u2018to live with preference for what\nis natural, and aversion to what is against nature[72],\u2019 thus throwing\nthe stress on the doctrine of the \u2018things of high degree[73].\u2019 Panaetius\nmade a distinct step forward when he admitted the claims of universal\nnature to be supreme, but (subject to them) held that each man should\nfollow the pointings of his individual nature[74]; this teaching however\ncomes rather near to naming a twofold end. Cicero follows Panaetius in\nhis _de Officiis_[75], but in the _de Finibus_ adheres more closely to\nChrysippus[76], and Seneca agrees with him in laying stress on the need\nof scientific knowledge of natural events[77]. In the main therefore\n\u2018life according to nature\u2019 means to the Stoics life in accordance with\nthe general movement of the universe, to which the particular strivings\nof the individual must be subordinated.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Obedience to God.]\n\n=314.= From the religious standpoint virtue is willing cooperation with\nthe deity, in preference to that unwilling cooperation to which even\nevil-doers are forced. This conception, first set forth by Cleanthes in a\npoem that we have quoted above[78], is enforced by Seneca and Epictetus\nalso in varying phrases. \u2018I do not obey God,\u2019 says Seneca, \u2018I agree with\nhim. I go with him heart and soul, and not because I must[79].\u2019 With a\nslight change of language this leads us to the paradox that \u2018obedience\nto God is liberty[80].\u2019 \u2018I have placed my impulses,\u2019 says Epictetus,\n\u2018in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is\nmy will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is my\nwish also. Does he not wish it? I do not wish it[81].\u2019 The personal\nbent of Epictetus leads him to develope this idea in the direction of\nsuffering rather than of acting. \u2018If the good man had foreknowledge of\nwhat would happen, he would cooperate towards his own sickness and death\nand mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him\nin accordance with the universal arrangement[82].\u2019 The proof that this\nmust be so rests on the unity of the Divine and individual purposes:\n\u2018Good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted\nanother thing[83].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Social duty.]\n\n=315.= It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue of the\nindividual is that disposition which will make him the best possible\nmember of society, that is, the best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis.\nYet this is everywhere implied. In the first place the wise man will\ntake part in the life of the community[84], he will marry and bring up\nchildren[85]. In the second place the virtue of man differs first from\nthe corresponding quality in the animals in that man is formed by nature\nfor social union; hence his reason only comes into play simultaneously\nwith the recognition that he is a member of a community, and as such\nbound to prefer the good of the whole to that of a part. \u2018Nature,\u2019 says\nPanaetius, \u2018through reason unites man to man, so that they have a common\nbond in conversation and life; it induces men to approve and take part\nin public gatherings and festivals, and to collect the materials for a\nsocial and cultivated life for themselves, their children, and all whom\nthey hold dear[86].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Health of soul.]\n\n=316.= Virtue, as a disposition of the soul[87], reflects all the aspects\nin which the soul itself is regarded. Since the principate is both wisdom\nand will, so virtue is wisdom, according to the paradox of Socrates\nand the Cynics[88]. Because virtue is wisdom, it can be taught[89]; in\nfact, it can only be acquired by teaching; and equally evil-doing can be\ncured by teaching[90]. But no less virtue is will. Cleanthes emphasized\nthis aspect, and identified virtue both with the Socratic \u2018strength\nof character\u2019 and with the Stoic \u2018tone[91].\u2019 In so far as virtue is\nwill, it is to be acquired by constant practice[92]. A true judgment is\nendangered by hasty assent; a healthy will by slackness of the soul\u2019s\nsinews. In the Stoic system vigour and strength of mind is everywhere\nidentified with the \u2018true tone\u2019 (\u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1)[93]; the possibility of\noverstrain is not considered. But in the development of the ideal we have\ntwo varying aspects of virtue presented to us. At one moment we see the\nman of action, engaged in the thick of the battle, sun-browned, dusty,\nhorny-handed[94]; with this model before him we find Musonius objecting\naltogether to relaxation of moral tone as being equivalent to its\nloss[95]. At another moment we see the man of quiet conviction, who goes\nhis way unmoved in the face of the howls of the mob or the threats of\nthe tyrant[96]; he is distinguished by a mental calm[97] which no storms\ncan shake. Any discrepancy between these views is finally reconciled by\nintroducing a comparison between the soul and the body. The philosophers\nhad at all times been greatly influenced by the theories and practice\nof the physicians; and they were proud to call themselves physicians of\nthe soul.\u2019 Chrysippus spent much time in comparing diseases of the soul\nto those of the body[98]. Equally there must be a healthy state of the\nsoul corresponding to that of the body, in which all its parts are in\nharmony[99]. Hence in the Stoic prayer health of soul is asked for, side\nby side with health of body[100]; and Seneca bases a singularly complete\nstatement of the Stoic conception of happiness upon a permanently healthy\ncondition of the mind[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virtue lies in intention.]\n\n=317.= Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the soul; it\nis not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (_inclinatio_), its aim\n(_intentio_), its desire (\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _voluntas_) is everything; the\nperformance through the organs of the body is nothing[102]. This Stoic\ndogma is to-day so familiar in divinity, law, and society that it is\nnot easy to realize how paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its\nproclamation the Stoics defied the whole system of _tabu_ by which the\nancient world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and\ndetestable; a system still in force in many departments of life and\ntheoretically defended by the \u2018intuitive system of morals.\u2019 The defenders\nof _tabu_ were bitterly affronted, and indignantly asked questions which\nmostly concerned the sexual relations, with regard to which _tabu_\nappears to have been at the time most vigorous. \u2018Is there nothing wrong\nin cannibalism? in foul language? in incest? in the accursed relations\nwith boy favourites (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac)?\u2019 To these questions firm-minded Stoics\nwere bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying themselves open\nto the charge of being defenders of immorality. This charge however is\nnever to be taken seriously; the high practical morality of the Stoics\nplaced them beyond reproach. But it was also easy to raise a laugh by\nquotations from these austere moralists which sounded like a defence\nof licentiousness. The solution of the difficulty in each individual\ncase follows exactly the same lines as in politics; and there is the\nsame divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their\nprinciples at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are\nintent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. Here we\nneed only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal with questions\naffecting practical life in another chapter[103].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Tabus.]\n\n=318.= The principal _tabus_ affecting the individual have to do with\ncannibalism, the sexual relations, nudity, and obscenity. Of the first we\nhave already spoken; the other three appeared to the Stoics partly due\nto inherited prejudices, partly to the theory that the body is in itself\nvile and corrupt. Of neither point of view could the Stoics approve.\nHence their repeated assertions that no sexual act, whether commonly\ndescribed as natural or as unnatural, is _in itself_ to be condemned,\nbut only according as it is seemly or unseemly for the individual[104].\nIt was perhaps unnecessary to explain to Greeks that the naked body is\nin itself no offensive sight, but doubtless the Stoics had to make this\nclear to their Oriental pupils; Zeno at any rate laid down the principle\nwhen he said that men and women should wear the same clothes (meaning\nsuch as nature requires for warmth and not such as fashion prescribes),\nand hide no part of the body[105]. As to decency of language, it did\nnot occur to the Stoics to discuss this question in connexion with the\nhistory of literature. Since truth is always good, and the very purpose\nof language is to express truth, a wise man will always say straight out\nwhat he needs to say[106].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virtue in its applications.]\n\n=319.= Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between the ethical\nprinciples of the Stoics and the Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy\nof virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external\ncircumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics\nvirtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the\nuniverse. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that universal\nreason which is equally at work in the universe and in the human mind.\nThe Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into\ntouch with circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this\narises their doctrine that virtue is bound up with the study both of\nuniversal and of individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent\nthere are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must\navoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this\ndoctrine as an afterthought[107], suggested by practical difficulties,\nand alien from the original teaching of Zeno. This seems to be a\nmisapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said: \u2018some things are good,\nsome are evil, some indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice,\nfortitude, everything that is virtue or an aspect of virtue; evil are\nfolly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an\naspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain\nand pleasure, riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth[108].\u2019 But\nthere is a difference between a principle and its application; and this\nvery list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying\ndifference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno\nwas therefore quite consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of\nthis difference.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Worth and Unworth.]\n\n=320.= This secondary difference is termed by the Stoics a difference\nof worth (\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1, _aestimatio_)[109]. Health, life, riches, have positive\nworth in greater or less degree; disease, death, poverty, have negative\nworth (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1, _inaestimabile_)[110]. Between these lie things that are\nabsolutely indifferent, as, for example, whether the number of hairs on\none\u2019s head is odd or even[111], or whether we take up one or the other of\ntwo coins that have the same general appearance and the same stamp[112].\nEven here a slight distinction has to be made; as to whether the hairs\non the head are odd or even in number we have not the slightest concern;\nbut in the matter of the coins we must make a choice, and that quickly.\nLet us then settle the matter anyhow, by chance as common folk say; \u2018for\na reason that is not clear to us,\u2019 as the Stoics say, not willing to\nadmit an effect without a cause, and yet leaving the matter much where it\nwas[113]. And now as to the things that have \u2018worth\u2019; it is clear that\nin some sense they are \u2018according to nature,\u2019 and in the same sense\nthose things that have \u2018negative worth\u2019 are opposed to nature[114]; and\nthe former in some way approximate to the character of the good[115]. It\nis then necessary to describe them by some term other than \u2018good.\u2019 Zeno\nselected the term \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u2018of high degree,\u2019 which Cicero translates\nvariously by _producta_, _promota_, _praecipua_, _praelata_, and\n_praeposita_. This term, we are told, Zeno borrowed from court life: \u2018for\nno one would think of calling a king \u201cof high degree,\u201d but only those\nwho are of a rank next to his, though far below[116].\u2019 The opposites\nwere described as \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 (_remota_, _reiecta_) \u2018things of low\ndegree[117].\u2019 Seneca, who states the theory with great clearness[118],\ncommonly uses the handier terms _commoda_ (\u2018advantages\u2019) and _incommoda_\n(\u2018disadvantages\u2019)[119]. In their treatment of the separate matters which\nfall under these divisions the Stoics were in close agreement with the\nPeripatetic theory of natural ends (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd)[120]: but their\nloyalty to their own school came into question, if they actually termed\nthem \u2018good\u2019 or \u2018evil,\u2019 as Chrysippus thought permissible if sufficient\nprecautions were taken[121], and as Seneca often describes them in his\nless careful moods[122].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The aim of virtue.]\n\n=321.= The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory of\n\u2018advantages\u2019 is essential to their system, because without it virtue\nhas no meaning, and practical life no guide[123]; whereas as soon as\nthis theory is established, we can assign to virtue the permanent\nand distinctive character, that it aims at securing \u2018advantages\u2019 and\navoiding \u2018disadvantages[124].\u2019 Now we are able to enlarge, though we do\nnot alter, our definition of the supreme good; the \u2018consistent life,\u2019\nthe \u2018life consistent with nature,\u2019 is the \u2018life which is accompanied by\na true knowledge of the things that happen by nature\u2019; to which words\nwe now add \u2018choosing those things which are in accordance with nature,\nand avoiding those things which are against nature[125].\u2019 Nevertheless,\nvirtue consists wholly in the aiming at the mark, and not at all in the\nhitting it. As the true sportsman finds all his pleasure in throwing\nhis quoit according to the rules of the game, and in aiming his arrow\nat the centre of the target, but cares not in the least (so it would\nseem) whether he succeeds[126]; so the wise man, even though (by those\ncircumstances which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we\ncall \u2018the play of fortune\u2019) he gain no \u2018advantage\u2019 at all, but suffer\ndishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme\ngood, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things. This\nis the Stoic doctrine of the \u2018sufficiency of virtue,\u2019 expressed in the\nlanguage of paradox, but nevertheless the central point of their whole\nethical system; and its force is really intensified by the doctrine of\n\u2018advantages,\u2019 which to a superficial critic appears to relax it.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sufficiency of virtue.]\n\n=322.= The doctrine of the sufficiency (\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, _sufficientia_) of\nvirtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of all periods, though\nin ever-varying phraseology. Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase \u2018virtue is\nsufficient for happiness,\u2019 or in other words \u2018virtue needs but herself\nfor a happy life[127].\u2019 Chrysippus maintains that there are only three\nlogical views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or\nboth[128], and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness therefore is\nnot made greater if advantages are added to virtue; or rather, virtue\ndoes not permit addition (_accessio_)[129]. In the transition period\nAntipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to have attributed a\nlittle importance, though very little, to external advantages[130]; but,\nas we have seen above[131], his definition of the supreme good is in full\naccord with the general teaching of the school. Panaetius and Posidonius\nheld to the orthodox doctrine both in word and deed, if we may trust\nthe direct statements of Cicero[132]; nevertheless they were so anxious\nto assimilate their expressions to those of ordinary life, that the\nconclusion could easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached\nimportance to external goods[133]. One authority indeed states that\nthey held health, strength, and estate to be \u2018needful\u2019 for happiness,\nthus abandoning the sufficiency of virtue[134]; but in the absence of\ndirect quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this statement as\nimplying anything different from the distinction of Chrysippus, viz. that\n\u2018the wise man _needs_ nothing, but _has use_ for everything[135].\u2019 But\nany faltering shown by the transition writers was more than made good\nby the zeal of the teachers under the principate. Seneca enforces the\nparadox in a score of phrases; in the form of a proverb \u2018virtue is its\nown reward[136]\u2019; in rhetorical exuberance \u2018virtue can defy death, ill\nfortune, and tyranny[137]\u2019; it is \u2018independent even of the deity[138]\u2019;\nand \u2018no circumstances can increase or impair its perfection[139].\u2019\nEpictetus often dwells on the same theme[140], and the whole work of\nMarcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it[141]. Nor is the dogma merely\nscholastic; the teachers of the Roman period lay special emphasis on the\npractical importance of upholding the ideal of virtue, as alike single\nand complete in itself[142].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virtue and the virtues.]\n\n=323.= But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in its\napplications; though it can only be possessed as a whole, it is attained\nby stages. By this amplification of the Stoic doctrine the way is\nprepared for that adaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of\ncircumstance which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By\nthe side of virtue stand \u2018the virtues,\u2019 sometimes conceived as virtue\nherself endowed with various qualities[143], more often as virtue at\nwork in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes in turn\nthe shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly understood, namely\nWisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness[144]; we may, if we please,\nreckon with a smaller or greater number[145]; yet we must always remember\nthat the virtues are so knit together, that he who truly possesses one,\npossesses all[146]. Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of\nwhich (whatever its sphere) is a \u2018right action\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, _recte\nfactum_)[147]. In proportion as virtue is displayed in its various\nqualities and spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself\na larger field; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread\nout and broadened[148].\n\n\n[Sidenote: How virtue is won.]\n\n=324.= Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also a history.\nThis follows clearly from Stoic principles, since virtue is an aspect of\nreason, and children are not possessed of reason[149]. Virtue therefore\ncomes by training, not by birth[150]; by art, not by nature[151]. In\nthe period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states\nof the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of virtue; and\nhe who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom we call \u2018the probationer\u2019\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, _proficiens_[152]), by learning and practice comes daily\nnearer to his goal, till in the crowning moment he wins it as a whole;\nfor virtue is no sum of lesser dispositions reached by a gradual\naddition of item to item, but a thing complete in itself[153]. Can\nvirtue thus won be lost at a later time? Virtue, it may seem, is not\nreally such, unless it is indestructible; and the Cynics and the earlier\nStoics taught accordingly that virtue cannot be lost[154], that it is a\n\u2018possession for ever.\u2019 In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus\nyielded to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through\nintoxication or indigestion[155], to which causes might well be added the\nfailure of the reason through insanity or old age[156]. But in spite of\nthese difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic school held firmly to\nthe doctrine that virtue once acquired is acquired for ever[157].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wise men.]\n\n=325.= Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philosopher; they\nexist and can be studied in human shape, in the wise and foolish men of\nmyth, history, and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best\nbe learnt by considering virtuous men[158]. Here the Stoics followed\nclosely the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics[159]. As the best\nof models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed a god[160],\nwho travelled over all the world, purging it of every lawlessness, and\nbringing with him justice, holiness, and peace[161]. Next comes Ulysses,\nwho like Hercules was untiring in his labours, triumphant over pain,\nand a conqueror throughout all the world[162]; an example to all men\nof endurance and vigour[163]. To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was\na like example to prove that suffering is a good[164]. Many such are\ncounted amongst the philosophers; first Heraclitus, not for his insight\ninto nature, but for his control over his passions[165]; then Socrates,\nwho in life and death was equally a model as a man and as a citizen[166].\nDiogenes the Cynic is worthy of special honour, for he was so filled\nwith love for mankind and obedience to God, that he willingly undertook\na life of labour and bodily suffering, and thus won himself the true\nfreedom[167], and became truly happy, truly divine[168]. Zeno the most\ntemperate of philosophers[169], and Cleanthes[170] the most enduring,\nwere men of like type within the Stoic school itself.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wise Romans.]\n\n=326.= To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the Romans were\nproud to add other names from their own history, thereby associating\ntheir philosophic principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology\nAeneas was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally\ncooperate with the destiny of his people; from the times of the republic\nScipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion Laelius[171]; whilst\nin Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be found who, like Socrates,\nwould not when on his trial consent to any other defence than a plain\nstatement of the facts, in which he neither exaggerated his own merits\nnor made any plea for mercy[172]. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica\nwas pre-eminent[173]. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in\npolitical life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and\nsuccess, his testimony to Cato\u2019s sincerity is all the more valuable[174];\nnor can we believe that Cato\u2019s voluntary death would so soon and so\ngreatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come as the climax of a\nlife worthily spent[175]. The period of the principate brought to the\nfront both men and women whose fearless lives and quiet self-approved\ndeaths proved them to be worthy successors to the heroes of the past; and\nat the same time we notice a disposition to find some at least of the\nelements of the heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the\nsoldier, the athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their\ndegree as models for those that seek wisdom[176].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wise men are few.]\n\n=327.= The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men had existed\nand did exist; they looked forward to a time not far distant when\nthere should be a Cosmopolis in which every citizen should be wise.\nThis robust belief was not maintained by their successors. According\nto Chrysippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed[177]; and he\nexpressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are amongst\nthe number[178]. The Stoics of the transition period avoided the topic\nas troublesome[179]; and their opponents naturally pressed it on them\nall the more. Zeno had said \u2018It is reasonable to honour the gods: it is\nnot reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.\u2019\nThis was now parodied: \u2018It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not\nreasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore wise men exist.\u2019 If\nthis argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told[180], to the Stoics,\nbecause they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, we are not\nsurprised to find that sometimes they refer him to the golden age[181],\nat other times convert him into an ideal[182]. The Stoics under the Roman\nprincipate re-affirmed vigorously the existence of the wise man[183].\nSeneca however admits that his appearance is as rare as that of the\nphoenix[184], and altogether disclaims any such character for himself\nindividually[185]. Epictetus is far more true to the spirit of the old\ndoctrine, when he not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his\nown character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope of\nreaching perfection[186].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The glory of virtue.]\n\n=328.= Thus the Stoics founded their moral ideal on the triple basis of\nthe good citizen, the healthily-disposed soul, and the examples of wise\nmen. In impressing this part of their system on their pupils, they made\nlittle use of definitions or syllogisms, but all the more they resorted\nto rhetorical description. As in their physics the Logos became almost\na person, so here the picture of Virtue is drawn, as by Prodicus in the\nold allegory of the choice of Hercules, drawing men to her not by the\npleasures she offers but by her majesty and beauty[187]. Cleanthes in\nparticular heaps epithets of praise on virtue[188]; more usually it is\nsufficient to insist that virtue is good, praiseworthy, and expedient.\nThat \u2018the wise man is a king[189]\u2019 almost ceases to be a paradox, since\nthe soul is rightly compared to a kingdom; that he is rich, handsome,\nfree, and invincible can equally be argued on Stoic principles[190]. To\ncarry such statements further seems to savour of pedantry, to ridicule\nthem at any stage is easy. Yet the statement that seems the boldest of\nall, that \u2018the wise man is happy even on the rack[191],\u2019 was many a time\nverified by the experience of individual Stoics[192]. That the wise man\nis a god, though subject to the limitations of mortality, is maintained\nwithout hesitation[193].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoic ethics.]\n\n=329.= The Stoic morality differs not only in form and in its reasoned\nbasis, but in substance, both from the popular morality of the time and\nthe ideals of rival philosophical schools. The Stoic heroes differ from\nthose of Homer by a world-age; they possess what the Romans called\n_humanitas_, powers of reasoning and of sympathizing unknown to an age of\nwarriors. The Epicurean sage was not, as popular criticism and that of\nmany Stoics unjustly described him, a man of gross tastes and reckless\nselfishness; but he was essentially easy-going and a quietist, little\ninclined to risk his peace of mind by meddling with the troubles of\nothers. To the Cynics the Stoics owed much in their principles, to the\nAcademics (as we shall see) much in their application of them; they stood\nbetween the two, more reasonable and judicious than the former, firmer\nin principle than the latter, possessed of a breadth of outlook which\nneither of these schools could claim.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] e.g. Zeller, _Stoics_ etc. pp. 16, 17; Stein _Psych._ ii p. 141.\n\n[2] See Alex. Aph. _de fato_, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 and 1005).\n\n[3] See above, \u00a7 75.\n\n[4] \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f67\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd Alex. Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88.\n\n[5] \u2018Chrysippus sic incipit: \u1f41 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd\u2019\nMarcianus i p. 11, 25 (Arnim iii 314); \u2018lex est ratio summa, insita in\nnatura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria\u2019 Cic.\n_Leg._ i 6, 18.\n\n[6] \u2018Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit.\ntotius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ v\n37, 108; [\u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2] \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u201c\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\u201d \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7 Diog. L. vi\n63; so Epict. _Disc._ i 9, 1.\n\n[7] Arnim i 262; \u2018patriam meam esse mundum sciam\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii 20, 5.\n\n[8] \u2018membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit\u2019 _Ep._ 95,\n52.\n\n[9] \u2018quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. quod argumenti\nsatis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere\u2019 Cic. _Leg._ i 10, 29\nand 30.\n\n[10] \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 Diog. L. vii 129; \u2018quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse\nvincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niii 20, 67. The honour of being the first to recognise the principle of\nconsideration for our dumb partners belongs to the Hindus.\n\n[11] \u2018nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad\nvirtutem pervenire non possit\u2019 Cic. _Leg._ i 10, 31; \u2018if the mind-element\nis common to us all, so likewise is that reason which makes us rational;\nand therefore too that reason which bids us do or leave undone; and\ntherefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and share a\ncommon citizenship\u2019 M. Aurel. _To himself_ iv 4.\n\n[12] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 4, i.\n\n[13] \u2018duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere\npublicam, qua di atque homines continentur; ... alteram, cui nos\nadscripsit condicio nascendi\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 1. So too Epictetus:\n\u2018What is a man? a part of a state, of that first which consists of gods\nand men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image\nof the universal state\u2019 _Disc._ ii 5, 26.\n\n[14] \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7 [\u1f41 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd] \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f1c\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263);\n\u2018salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ iv 31, 7.\n\n[15] \u2018eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae\nconciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate\u2019 Cic.\n_Off._ i 16, 50.\n\n[16] \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 128; \u2018ius esse natura\n[Stoici censent]\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 21, 71.\n\n[17] \u2018non tum denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta\nest\u2019 Cic. _Leg._ ii 5, 10.\n\n[18] \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f31\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Plut. _Sto. rep._ 6, 1; \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Theod. _Aff._ iii 74 (Arnim i 264).\n\n[19] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 6, 1.\n\n[20] Diog. L. vii 33.\n\n[21] Plutarch, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that\nupon the same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato\u2019s\nRepublic; _Sto. rep._ 8, 1.\n\n[22] Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial\nto the Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay\nof literature in imperial Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied\nthe needed qualification that these studies are useful as a training\npreliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and cf. \u00a7 336.\n\n[23] Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it\nwas by Seneca: \u2018quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae\ncentesimae?\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ vii 10, 4.\n\n[24] Diog. L. vii 131.\n\n[25] \u2018More continent than Zeno\u2019 became a proverb at Athens; _ib._ 27.\n\n[26] _ib._ 121.\n\n[27] \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 Origen\n_cont. Celsum_, vii 63 (Arnim iii 729).\n\n[28] This principle is stated by Chrysippus: \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Plut. _Sto. rep._ 22, 1.\n\n[29] The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated\nin the development of Roman law: \u2018led by their theory of natural law, the\n[Roman] jurisconsults had evidently ... assumed the equality of the sexes\nas a principle of their code of equity\u2019 Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 154. Cf.\non the whole subject Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, bk v ch. 13: e.g. \u2018to the\ncommon Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation [of women] and\nthe resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming so\nmuch of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as\n... in modern times\u2019 (vol. iii p. 119).\n\n[30] See \u00a7 431.\n\n[31] \u2018What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not\nthe theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their\nseats, come (if you think proper) and eject one of them!\u2019 Epict. _Disc._\nii 4, 8.\n\n[32] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2] \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03c5\u03b3\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c5\u1f31\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\nDiog. L. vii 188. A Church Father has caught the point better; \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u1ff3 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03b8\u03c5\u03b3\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd Origen _cont. Cels._ iv 45\n(Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8.\n\n[33] Arnim i 256.\n\n[34] Origen, as above.\n\n[35] See below, \u00a7 478.\n\n[36] See above, \u00a7 254.\n\n[37] Arnim i 253.\n\n[38] _ib._ i 254.\n\n[39] Diog. L. vii 121.\n\n[40] Arnim iii 748.\n\n[41] Arnim iii 752. For the same view in earlier times see Gomperz,\n_Greek Thinkers_, i p. 403.\n\n[42] i 45, 108.\n\n[43] \u2018ille divinus animus egressurus hominem, quo receptaculum suum\nconferatur, ignis illud exurat an terra contegat, an ferae distrahant,\nnon magis ad se iudicat pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 92, 34; \u2018But you will be cast out unburied ... If the corpse is I,\nI shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more\nproperly\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv 7, 31.\n\n[44] For a plain statement to this effect we have to look to Philo:\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03c2 _Sept. et fest. di._ p. 283 M (Arnim\niii 352).\n\n[45] \u2018est genus iniustae servitutis, cum hi sunt alterius, qui sui\npossunt esse\u2019 Cic. _Rep._ iii 25, 37.\n\n[46] \u2018servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est\u2019 Sen.\n_Ben._ iii 22, 1; \u2018non male praecipiunt, qui [servis] ita iubent uti, ut\nmercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 13, 41.\n\n[47] \u2018potest [servus] dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam\naccipere\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iii 22, 3.\n\n[48] \u2018quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices\net rusticos et mulieres doceri, ut sapiant: populumque [sapientium] ex\nomni lingua et condicione et sexu et aetate conflari. senserunt hoc adeo\nStoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt\u2019 Lact.\n_Div. inst._ iii 25 (Arnim iii 253).\n\n[49] See above, \u00a7 110.\n\n[50] Schmekel, _Phil. d. mittleren Stoa_, pp. 63, 69.\n\n[51] \u2018eorum nullum ipsum per se separatum probo; anteponoque singulis\nillud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. sed si unum ac simplex probandum\nsit, regium probem atque inprimis laudem\u2019 Cic. _Rep._ i 35, 54; \u2018optimus\ncivitatis status sub rege iusto est\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ ii 20, 2.\n\n[52] \u2018memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio\n... optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis\nreliquissent\u2019 Cic. _Rep._ i 21, 34.\n\n[53] See below, ch. xvi.\n\n[54] Arnim iii 354.\n\n[55] Diog. L. vii 121.\n\n[56] \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 Stob. ii 7, 3 b.\n\n[57] \u2018virtus nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n113, 2; \u2018virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque\u2019 Cic. _Tusc.\ndisp._ iv 15, 34.\n\n[58] In numerous variations: for the present it is sufficient to quote\nCicero\u2019s phrase \u2018convenienter naturae vivere\u2019 _Fin._ iii 9, 31, etc., and\nfrom Seneca \u2018virtus secundum naturam est; vitia inimica et infesta sunt\u2019\n_Ep._ 50, 8. Cf. also \u2018we ought to go to be instructed, in order that we\nmay maintain our minds in harmony with the things that happen\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ i 12, 17.\n\n[59] \u2018[virtus] habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ vii 15, 5.\n\n[60] \u2018ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._\niv 15, 34.\n\n[61] \u2018virtutis definitio est\u2014habitus consentiens vitae\u2019 Comm. _in Lucan._\nii 380 (Arnim iii 199).\n\n[62] \u2018perfecta virtus aequalitas [est] ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans\nsibi\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 31, 8.\n\n[63] \u2018ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi\u2019 _ib._ 35, 4.\n\n[64] \u2018virtus convenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant\net congruunt\u2019 _ib._ 74, 30.\n\n[65] \u2018[stultitia] semper incipit vivere: quam foeda [est] hominum\nlevitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, novas spes in exitu\nincohantium! quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens?\u2019 _ib._ 13, 16\nand 17.\n\n[66] \u2018Zeno is erat qui ... id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex\nquoddam et solum et unum bonum\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 36. So Seneca: \u2018quid est\nsapientia? semper idem velle atque idem nolle\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 20, 5.\n\n[67] See above, \u00a7 81.\n\n[68] Whether by Zeno (Diog. L. vii 87), or by Cleanthes (Stob. ii 7, 6 a:\nArnim i 552) is a matter of no importance.\n\n[69] See above, \u00a7 108. The emphasis on individual nature is sometimes\nstill greater; \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 Galen _plac.\nHipp. et Plat._ v 5, p. 468 K (from Chrysippus).\n\n[70] Diog. L. vii 87 and 88.\n\n[71] Stob. ii 7, 6 a. See also above, \u00a7 258.\n\n[72] Stob. ii 7, 6 a.\n\n[73] See below, \u00a7 320.\n\n[74] \u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf Clem. Al. _Strom._ ii 21, 129.\n\n[75] \u2018sic est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus;\nea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur\u2019 _Off._ i 31, 110.\n\n[76] \u2018vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent\u2019\n_Fin._ iv 6, 14.\n\n[77] \u2018huc et illud accedit, ut perfecta virtus sit aequalitas ac tenor\nvitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest esse nisi rerum scientia\ncontingit et ars, per quam humana ac divina noscantur; hoc est summum\nbonum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 31, 8.\n\n[78] See above, \u00a7 98.\n\n[79] \u2018non pareo deo, sed adsentior. ex animo illum, non quia necesse est,\nsequor\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 96, 2.\n\n[80] \u2018deo parere libertas est\u2019 _Dial._ vii 15, 7.\n\n[81] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 89 and 90.\n\n[82] _ib._ ii 10, 5.\n\n[83] _ib._ iii 7, 7.\n\n[84] \u2018Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid impedierit\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ viii 3, 2; \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\nDiog. L. vii 121.\n\n[85] See \u00a7 306, note 26.\n\n[86] Cic. _Off._ i 4, 12.\n\n[87] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.\n\n[88] [\u1f41 \u03a3\u03c9\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7] \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 5; see\nalso above, \u00a7\u00a7 48, 52.\n\n[89] \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 91.\n\n[90] \u2018They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by\nthieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Show them\ntheir errors, and you will see how they desist from their errors\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ i 18, 3 and 4.\n\n[91] See above, \u00a7 177, note 28.\n\n[92] \u2018If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. Generally,\nif you would make anything a habit, do it; if you would not make it a\nhabit, do not do it\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 2 and 4; \u2018nihil est quod non\nhumana mens vincat, et in familiaritatem adducat adsidua meditatio\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ iv 12, 3.\n\n[93] \u1f67\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd [\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9], \u1f21 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f74 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 Chrys. ap. Galen _plac. H. et Plat._ iv 6, p. 403 K (Arnim\niii 473).\n\n[94] \u2018virtutem convenies ... pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam,\ncallosas habentem manus\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii 7, 3.\n\n[95] \u2018Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum et modeste, non (ut\ndicitur) \u201cremittentes animum,\u201d nam \u201cremittere\u201d inquit Musonius \u201canimum\nquasi amittere est\u201d\u2019 Gellius, _N. A._ xviii 2, 1.\n\n[96] \u2018iustum ac tenacem propositi virum | non civium ardor prava\niubentium, | non vultus instantis tyranni | mente quatit solida\u2019 Hor.\n_C._ iii 3, 1-4.\n\n[97] \u2018hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd vocant; ego\ntranquillitatem voco\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 3.\n\n[98] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 10, 23.\n\n[99] \u2018ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se ex quibus\nconstamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque\nconcordant, eaque animi est virtus\u2019 _ib._ 13, 30.\n\n[100] \u2018roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi, deinde tunc corporis\u2019\nSen. _Ep._ 10, 4; \u2018orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano\u2019 Juv.\n_Sat._ x 356.\n\n[101] \u2018beata est vita conveniens naturae suae, quae non aliter contingere\npotest, quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua possessione sanitatis\nsuae, deinde fortis et vehemens, tum pulcherrima ac patiens, apta\ntemporibus, corporis sui pertinentiumque ad id curiosa non anxie\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ vii 3, 3.\n\n[102] \u2018actio recta non erit, nisi fuerit recta voluntas\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 95,\n57; \u2018gratus potest esse homo voluntate\u2019 _Ben._ ii 31, 1; \u2018sic timere,\nsic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est, etiam sine effectu\u2019\nCic. _Fin._ iii 9, 32; \u2018The being of the good is a certain kind of will\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What then\nare externals? Material for the will\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 29, 1 and 2.\n\n[103] See below, \u00a7 383.\n\n[104] Arnim i 250.\n\n[105] Diog. L. vii 33.\n\n[106] \u2018placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim\ndisserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu\u2019 Cic. _Fam._ ix 22, 1.\nSee further below, \u00a7 344.\n\n[107] \u2018postea tuus ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura,\nverba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus,\nconcessit ut haberentur \u2020 aestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae\u2019\n_Fin._ iv 20, 56; \u2018the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by\nthe admission of \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u2019 Zeller, _Stoics_, p. 290. The true note is\nstruck by Rendall, _Introd._ p. xlv: \u2018the course of Stoic ethics is, in\nfact, the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal\nof conduct, under the stress of that larger conception of \u201cnature\u201d which\nwas inherent in Stoic monism. The full content and interpretation of the\nformula was only gradually realised. Its deeper implications unfolded\nthemselves through life even more than through thought, and find their\nfullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.\u2019\n\n[108] Stob. ii 7, 5 a.\n\n[109] \u2018aestimatio, quae \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1 dicitur\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 34. Posidonius\nseems to have practically substituted \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 for \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, but in\nstrict usage the latter term is narrower, and includes only such things\nas have measurable worth.\n\n[110] \u2018inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum,\naliquid tamen quo differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia\naestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum\u2019 _ib._ 15, 50; \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd. \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f03 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03bd Stob. ii 7, 7\ng; \u2018quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris\u2019\nCic. _Ac._ i 10, 37.\n\n[111] Stob. ii 7, 7.\n\n[112] Arnim iii 122.\n\n[113] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 23, 6.\n\n[114] \u2018cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum\nnaturam dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia\ninteriecta et media numerabat\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 36.\n\n[115] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b3\u03b3\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 Stob. ii 7, 7 g.\n\n[116] \u2018[hoc] Zeno \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa\nfactis tamen nominibus ac novis. \u201cut enim,\u201d inquit, \u201cnemo dicit in regia\nregem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id enim est \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd),\nsed eos qui in aliquo honore sint, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut\nsecundus sit, ad regium principatum\u201d\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 51.\n\n[117] \u2018quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat; reiecta autem, quae\nminoris\u2019 _Ac._ i 10, 37; \u2018quae appellemus vel promota et remota, vel, ut\ndudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta\u2019 _Fin._ iii 16,\n52.\n\n[118] \u2018quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum\nvirtus, negat etiam haec, quae indifferentia vocamus, habere in se\naliquid pretii et alia aliis esse potiora? quibusdam ex iis tribuitur\naliquid honoris, quibusdam multum\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii 22, 4.\n\n[119] \u2018itaque commoda vocentur, et ut nostra lingua loquar, producta\u2019\n_Ep._ 74, 17.\n\n[120] See above, \u00a7 82.\n\n[121] \u2018bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est; quod contra, malum;\nnec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis\u2019\nCic. _Fin._ v 29, 89; cf. Arnim iii 137.\n\n[122] \u2018sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae; illa animi bona a\nstulto ac malo submoventur\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ v 13, 1.\n\n[123] \u2018deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quam si non ullam esse\ndiceremus, et confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; neque ullum\nsapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur; cum inter res eas quae ad vitam\ndegendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum delectum\nhaberi oporteret\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 50.\n\n[124] \u2018virtutis hoc proprium [est], earum rerum quae secundum naturam\nsint, habere delectum\u2019 _ib._ 4, 12.\n\n[125] \u2018relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum\nrerum quae natura eveniant, selegentem quae secundum naturam, et si quae\ncontra naturam sunt, reicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque\nnaturae vivere\u2019 _ib._ 9, 31 (after Posidonius).\n\n[126] \u2018ut si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere\ntalum, ut rectus assistat; qui ita talis erit iactus, ut cadat rectus,\npraepositum quiddam habebit ad finem; qui aliter, contra. neque tamen\nilla praepositio ad eum quem dixi finem pertinebit: sic ea, quae sunt\npraeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque\nnihil pertinent\u2019 _ib._ 16, 54; compare also 6, 22; \u2018non est turpe non\nconsequi, dummodo sequaris\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ v 5, 3.\n\n[127] \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd] \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Diog. L.\nvii 127; \u2018a Zenone hoc magnifice tanquam ex oraculo editur: virtus ad\nbene vivendum se ipsa contenta est\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ v 27, 79; cf. Pearson,\n_Fragments_, p. 19.\n\n[128] \u2018testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae\ndefendi possint, de finibus bonorum; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut\nvoluptatem aut utrumque\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ ii 45, 138.\n\n[129] \u2018crescere bonorum finem non putamus\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 48;\n\u2018honestum nullam accessionem recipit\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 66, 9; \u2018summum bonum\nnec infringitur nec augetur; in suo modo permanet, utcunque se fortuna\ngessit. utrum maiorem an minorem circulum scribas, ad spatium eius\npertinet, non ad formam\u2019 _ib._ 74, 26 and 27.\n\n[130] See above, \u00a7 110.\n\n[131] See above, \u00a7 313.\n\n[132] \u2018cum [Panaetius] sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod\nhonestum sit\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 3, 12; \u2018solebat narrare Pompeius se, cum\nRhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed\ncum audivisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus\nlaborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere ... itaque eum\ngraviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum\nesset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur,\nsaepe dixisse: \u201cnihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse\nconfitebor malum\u201d\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ ii 25, 61; cf. Sen. _Ep._ 87, 35.\n\n[133] See above, \u00a7 114.\n\n[134] Diog. L. vii 128.\n\n[135] \u2018sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis ei rebus opus esse\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 9, 14.\n\n[136] \u2018[virtus] ipsa pretium sui\u2019 _Dial._ vii 9, 4; \u2018recte factorum verus\nfructus [est] fecisse\u2019 _Clem._ i 1, 1; \u2018virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis\nest\u2019 _Ep._ 81, 20.\n\n[137] \u2018sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis\ntempestatibus vitae; ipse semper in actu est; in effectu tunc maximus,\ncum illi fortuna se obposuit\u2019 _ib._ 85, 37.\n\n[138] \u2018virtutem nemo unquam deo acceptam rettulit ... iudicium hoc\nomnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse\nsapientiam\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ iii 36, 86 and 88; \u2018aequum mi animum ipse\nparabo\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 18, 112; \u2018monstro, quod ipse tibi possis dare\u2019 Juv.\n_Sat._ x 363.\n\n[139] See note 129.\n\n[140] \u2018Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is\ngood and just? Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be\ngood and happy?\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 51 and 52.\n\n[141] \u2018What does not make the man himself worse, does not make his life\nworse either, nor injure him, without or within\u2019 _To himself_ iv 8.\n\n[142] \u2018nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se\nviderit dissimile meliori\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii 15, 1; \u2018No man is able to\nmake progress when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you\nhave preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to\nthis only, to work out this only, give up everything else\u2019 Epict. _Disc._\niv 2, 4.\n\n[143] Chrysippus wrote a book \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2; see Arnim\niii 256.\n\n[144] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 335-350.\n\n[145] Diog. L. vii 92.\n\n[146] \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Diog. L. vii 125; \u2018quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit,\nsed ex consilii sententia\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 67, 10; \u2018virtutibus inter se\nconcordia [est]\u2019 _Clem._ i 5, 3.\n\n[147] \u2018videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus; id autem est\nperfectum officium\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 59; \u2018rectum, quod \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\ndicebas\u2019 _ib._ iv 6, 15.\n\n[148] \u2018quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere; attamen utrumque\neorum fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari putant\u2019 _ib._ iii 15, 48.\n\n[149] See above, \u00a7 153, note 66.\n\n[150] \u2018scit [sapiens] neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv\n10, 6.\n\n[151] \u2018non dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri\u2019 _Ep._ 90, 44.\n\n[152] Zeno probably took over the term \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae from the Peripatetics, see\nDiog. L. vii 127; its implications he adapted to Stoic principles. See\nPlut. _prof. virt._ 12.\n\n[153] \u2018hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum\nceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum\u2019\nCic. _Fin._ iii 10, 34.\n\n[154] Stob. ii 7, 11 g; Diog. L. vii 127.\n\n[155] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd ... \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03bd _ib._\n\n[156] See above, \u00a7 289.\n\n[157] \u2018semel traditi nobis boni perpetua possessio est; non dediscitur\nvirtus. contraria enim mala in alieno haerent, ideo depelli et exturbari\npossunt\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 50, 8. Just in the same spirit we say that a new\nlanguage or (say) the art of swimming, if once learnt, is learnt \u2018for\ngood.\u2019\n\n[158] \u2018aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos\nhabendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus, et omnia tanquam illo\nvidente faciamus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 11, 8, quoting however from Epicurus.\n\n[159] \u2018Heracles was the model whom [Antisthenes] and the other Cynics\nheld up for imitation, the patron saint, so to speak, of the school.\nAntisthenes wrote a dialogue entitled \u201cHeracles\u201d and, with this for\nguidance, his followers delighted to tell again the story of the hero\u2019s\nlaborious and militant life, identifying, by ingenious allegories, the\nfoul monsters which he vanquished with the vices and lusts that beset the\nsouls of men\u2019 Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 151; \u2018the more generous\nCynics aver that the great Heracles also, as he became the author of\nother blessings, so also left to mankind the chief pattern of this\n(Cynic) life\u2019 Julian, _Or._ vi p. 187, 3 (Mayor on Juv. _Sat._ x 361). So\nalso in Buddhism: \u2018besides the ideal King, the personification of Power\nand Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation\nof early Buddhist ideas regarding their master. It was the ideal of a\nperfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha\u2019 Rhys\nDavids, _Hibbert Lectures_, p. 141.\n\n[160] \u2018Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio\ncaelestium collocavit\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 5, 25.\n\n[161] \u2018Hercules nihil sibi vicit: orbem terrarum transiit non\nconcupiscendo sed vindicando, quid vinceret; malorum hostis, bonorum\nvindex, terrarum marisque pacator\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ i 13, 3. See also the\nbrilliant descriptions in Epict. _Disc._ iii 24.\n\n[162] \u2018Ulixen et Herculem ... Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt,\ninvictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ ii 2, 1. Yet there is something to be said on the other\nside: \u2018Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and wept as he sat on a\nrock.... If Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ iii 24, 18.\n\n[163] So Horace, quite in the Stoic spirit: \u2018rursus quid virtus et quid\npatientia possit, | utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i\n2, 17 and 18.\n\n[164] Diog. L. vi 1, 2.\n\n[165] \u2018By acting thus Heraclitus and those like him were deservedly\ndivine, and were so called\u2019 Epict. _Manual_ 15.\n\n[166] \u2018praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita, et idem semper vultus\neademque frons, ut de Socrate accepimus\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 26, 90; \u2018Socrates\n... violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making\nhis defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself; nor even in the former\npart of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ iii 24, 61.\n\n[167] See above, \u00a7 17.\n\n[168] \u2018si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de\ndeorum immortalium statu\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 8, 5; \u2018By acting thus Diogenes\n... was deservedly divine, and was so called\u2019 Epict. _Manual_ 15.\n\n[169] See above, \u00a7 306, note 25.\n\n[170] \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f41 \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03bf Diog. L. vii 170; \u2018Learn how\nthose live who are genuine philosophers: how Socrates lived, who had a\nwife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, who attended to\nthe school and drew water\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 26, 23.\n\n[171] \u2018aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 25, 6; \u2018elige\nremissioris animi virum Laelium\u2019 _ib._ 11, 10.\n\n[172] \u2018nam cum esset ille vir [P. Rutilius Rufus] exemplum, ut scitis,\ninnocentiae, cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque\nsanctior, non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem\naut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat\u2019 Cic.\n_de Or._ i 53, 229; cf. Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 4 and 7; and see further, \u00a7 430.\n\n[173] \u2018Catonem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales\ndedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ii 2, 1.\n\n[174] \u2018ego te [Cato] verissime dixerim peccare nihil\u2019 Cic. _Mur._ 29, 60.\n\n[175] \u2018Catonis nobile letum\u2019 Hor. _C._ i 12, 35 and 36; and see below, \u00a7\n430.\n\n[176] \u2018nobis quoque militandum est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 51, 6; \u2018This is the true\nathlete. Great is the combat, divine is the work\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 18,\n28. See also below, \u00a7 402.\n\n[177] Euseb. _pr. ev._ vi 8, 13; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 28, p. 199, 16 B.\n\n[178] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 31, 5.\n\n[179] \u2018qui sapiens sit aut fuerit, ne ipsi quidem solent dicere\u2019 Cic.\n_Ac._ ii 47, 145. Thus Panaetius made no reference to the wise man;\nwhilst Posidonius only defended his possible existence in the future\n(Schmekel, pp. 213, 278).\n\n[180] Sext. _math._ ix 133.\n\n[181] See above, \u00a7 214.\n\n[182] Even if Cicero is not the creator of the conception of an \u2018ideal\ncharacter,\u2019 nowhere else can we find its meaning so clearly expressed.\nSo of the wise man; \u2018iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere\nfortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus,\nquem quaerimus certe, et confidere sibi debet, et suae vitae et actae et\nconsequenti, et bene de se iudicare\u2019 _Fin._ iii 8, 29.\n\n[183] \u2018non est quod dicas hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ ii 7, 1.\n\n[184] \u2018ille alter [sapiens primae notae] fortasse tanquam phoenix semel\nanno quingentesimo nascitur\u2019 _Ep._ 42, 1, cf. Alex. Aphr. p. 34, n. 2;\n\u2018scit [sapiens] paucissimos omni aevo sapientes evadere\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv\n10, 6.\n\n[185] See above, \u00a7 126.\n\n[186] \u2018Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving\nhimself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are\nnot yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates\u2019\nEpict. _Manual_ 50. Epictetus did not however ignore failures: \u2018we\n[Stoics] say one thing, but we do another; we talk of the things which\nare beautiful, but we do what is base\u2019 _Disc._ iii 7, 18.\n\n[187] See above, \u00a7 42.\n\n[188] See above, \u00a7 98.\n\n[189] This is again a Socratic paradox: \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c0\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Xen. _Mem._\niii 9, 10.\n\n[190] Cic. _Fin._ iii 22, 75 and 76.\n\n[191] \u2018eorum, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti\nin omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti\u2019 _ib._ iii 13, 42;\nArnim iii 585, 586; \u2018shew me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and\nhappy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Shew him; I desire, by\nthe gods, to see a Stoic\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 24.\n\n[192] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 431, 439.\n\n[193] \u2018bonus tempore tantum a deo differt\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 1, 5; \u2018sapiens\nexcepta mortalitate similis deo\u2019 _ib._ ii 8, 2; and see above, \u00a7 274.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nDAILY DUTIES.\n\n\n[Sidenote: From principles to practice.]\n\n=330.= As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside from the\nsupreme problems of the universe, such as gather round the questions\nof the divine purpose, the existence of evil, and unfettered choice,\nour way becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution\nof the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and in\nthe individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they are of\nnarrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough ground we\nlearn to tread with some assurance, so that we now feel ourselves, as it\nwere, on a downward path. For all that, the problems of the universal\nlaw and the perfect man must still be compared to mountain tops, if not\nto the highest peaks of all. But from this point on we steadily descend\ntowards the plains, to that common and practical life by which the worth\nof philosophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight or\nbreathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region of mists\nand shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to new neighbours. But\nher meaning is the same as before, and the pathway to the heights is not\nclosed behind her.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The daily round.]\n\n=331.= The region we have now reached is that of \u2018daily duties,\u2019 by\nwhich phrase we propose to translate here the Greek \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 and the\nLatin _officia_[1]. This word is defined by Zeno as meaning \u2018that which\nit comes in one\u2019s way to do[2],\u2019 and its quiet sound at once brings\nit into contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in\nfact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only possible\nfor reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men; and within our view\nit is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. But daily duty is\ncommon to the wise and the unwise[3]; it not only extends to children,\nbut also to the unreasoning animals[4] and to plants[5]. Virtue always\ncontemplates the Universal law; for daily duty it is sufficient to follow\nthe individual nature[6]. Virtue cannot even be understood except by the\ntrained philosopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained\nto the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty is the\nprojection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Between the two\nthere always remains an assured correspondence. Each Right Action which\nVirtue achieves is at the same time the performance of a daily duty, and\nthat in the most complete manner[7]; each daily duty performed by the\nunwise is a step by which he may in the end climb to Wisdom[8].\n\n\n[Sidenote: First laws of nature.]\n\n=332.= The subject of \u2018daily duties\u2019 was treated both by Zeno[9] and\nby Cleanthes[10], and is implied in the theory of Stoic ethics as a\nwhole; it has also a special relation to the doctrine of advantages\nand disadvantages. Nevertheless the Stoics do not directly say that\ndaily duty consists in the seeking of advantages, but that it is based\nupon primary ends which nature sets up (\u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, _principia\nnaturae_)[11]. This phrase indicates the source of this part of the\nStoic philosophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school\nand the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo[12]. We\nare not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated this subject; and\nwhen we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of the Academy is firmly\nestablished. Thus the Stoic demand for certain knowledge is here set\naside; and we are told that the standard of daily duty is \u2018that which\nwhen done can reasonably be defended[13]\u2019; which definition closely\ncorresponds with the definition of the supreme good by Diogenes of\nBabylon \u2018to take a reasonable course in the choice of things according\nto nature[14].\u2019 Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer\nrequired; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and\nrespectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the\nfounders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced\nby shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom: in short, by the doctrine of\n\u2018making the best of both worlds.\u2019 The subject was therefore congenial\nto Panaetius, who was both a practical statesman and an admirer of\nPlato and Aristotle; and it was from this standpoint that Stoicism so\nrapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the\nrepublic. Panaetius\u2019 book \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd was the basis of Cicero\u2019s work\n_de Officiis_, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess\non Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient source of\ninformation. As however this work leans very strongly towards Peripatetic\nviews, it will frequently be necessary to refer to other authorities,\namongst which Cicero\u2019s _de Finibus_ best represents the older Stoics, and\nSeneca and Epictetus the Stoics of the Roman principate.\n\n\n[Sidenote: From the animals to man.]\n\n=333.= It is no departure from the fundamental principles of Stoicism\nwhen we learn that the \u2018first lessons of nature\u2019 are those which are\nimprinted upon every animal at its birth[15]; Zeno himself had sought\nfor the natural law of marriage by a like method[16]. The first natural\nlesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the Epicureans\nhold, but its own preservation and the maintenance of its life in its\ncompleteness[17]. At a later stage is imparted the desire of sexual union\nfor procreation\u2019s sake, and with it some kind of affection for each\none\u2019s offspring[18]. But nature\u2019s best lessons are reserved for man; as\nto look into the future, and regard life as a whole[19]; to interest\nhimself in his fellows, to attend public festivities, and to procure\nthe amenities of a civilized life for himself and those dependent upon\nhim[20]; in spare hours, to acquire information on points of historical\nor philosophical interest[21]; in riper life to claim freedom, and to\nrefuse to submit to any arbitrary commands[22]; and finally, to perceive\nin all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance of it by\nwilful action[23]. \u2018Such,\u2019 says Cicero, \u2018is the picture of a beautiful\nlife; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), great would be\nour desire to possess Wisdom for a bride[24].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wavering as to the standard.]\n\n=334.= In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. The\nfirst lessons of nature may easily be perverted, so far as they are\ncommon to men and animals, for they point towards the acts of eating,\ndrinking, and sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary\nman with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from which\nmany Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the terrible error\nof the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is a first law of\nnature[25]. It is therefore necessary to lay it down that man should aim\nspecially at those results which are characteristic of human nature, that\nis at the development of powers which he does not share with the lower\nanimals. So far the Academy and the Porch might travel together. But\nthe only, higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the\npolitical sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason; such matters\nas antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty could only be\nintroduced under Academic influence. The last, however, as we shall see,\nis to become with Panaetius the predominant consideration[26].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The four virtues.]\n\n=335.= From the enunciation of general principles we pass on to the\nseparate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense can only be possessed by\nthe wise man; he therefore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless\nwe may use this and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those\nadumbrations or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach\nof the ordinary man[27]. The classification of the virtues varies.\nPanaetius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and\nSeneca follows him on this point[28]. It was perhaps Chrysippus who\ndistinguished between virtues that are \u2018arts\u2019 (\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) and which are\nbased on theoretical principles, and those which are \u2018acquirements\u2019\n(\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), being attained by practice[29]. But generally speaking the\ndivision of Virtue into the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice,\nCourage, and Soberness is accepted as sufficient; by subdivision the\nnumber of virtues may be increased to any extent; and in scholastic\nclassifications of virtue we find lists which have multiplicity for their\ndirect aim[30].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wisdom.]\n\n=336.= Wisdom (\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _prudentia_) is considered by Zeno not only\nas the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all; so that\nCourage is wisdom in suffering, Justice is wisdom in distribution, and\nSoberness is wisdom in enjoyment[31]. His successors treated Science\n(\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, _scientia_) as the parent virtue[32], thus placing Wisdom\nside by side with the other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point\nof Zeno\u2019s genealogy. The writers of the later periods desired to\nrecognise separately contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced\nas a subdivision of the first cardinal virtue \u2018Speculation\u2019 (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1,\n_sapientia_)[33]. But the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must\njustify itself by practical results. The study of the so-called\n\u2018liberal arts\u2019 has a value for children, for it prepares the way for\nvirtuous training[34]. Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious\nreasoning[35], and physics that we may rightly understand the universe\nand its providential government, upon which the conception of duty\ndepends[36]; in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues,\nthat is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom[37]. The study of\nphysics is also admirable because it elevates the soul[38]. Geometry,\nlaw, and astrology are useful in the several professions[39]. But study\nwhen carried to excess, as by antiquarians, bookworms, and other learned\ntime-wasters, is nothing but folly[40].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Justice.]\n\n=337.= The second cardinal virtue is Justice (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, _iustitia_), of\nwhich Chrysippus drew a striking allegorical picture. \u2018She is of virgin\nform, to show that she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad\nmen; ... of firm and fierce aspect, ... inspiring fear in the wicked,\nconfidence in the good; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at\nonce sad and awe-inspiring[41].\u2019 Cicero distinguishes Justice in the\nnarrower sense from \u2018Beneficence.\u2019 Justice proper is a political virtue,\nand consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals.\nBy nature indeed all things are common; but since they have become\nprivate property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, and so forth,\nindividuals may keep their own, provided they do not forget that they\nhave always the duty of contributing to the common good[42], and that\neven slaves have reasonable claims upon them[43]. Beneficence needs\nthe guidance of principle, and must be determined by considerations of\nperson and occasion. The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity;\ncountry, parents, wife and children must be first considered, then\nother relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general[44]. The\nconsideration of the degrees of propinquity (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) was a favourite\nsubject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who maintained\nthat the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection[45]. The virtue of\nJustice appealed specially to the statesman in both its applications, and\nis dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by Cicero after him.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Courage.]\n\n=338.= The third cardinal virtue is Courage (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, _fortitudo_),\nwhich retains the tradition of the \u2018strength and force\u2019 of Socrates.\nThis again, according to Cicero, has two parts, one passive, which\nconsists in despising fortune and its buffets, and is in harmony with\nthe picture of the wise man as usually drawn; the other part, which we\nmay call Greatness of Soul (\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, _magnitudo animi_) is shown\nin the undertaking of great enterprises. The virtue of Courage is\ncharacteristically Stoic, and may be considered, like its counterpart\nWisdom, as the foundation and source of all the virtues; the knowledge\nof good and evil can only be attained by the soul that is duly strung\nto vigorous resolution[46]. The Stoics of the principate perhaps insist\nmost of all on this virtue, which alone makes men independent of all that\nit lies with Fortune to give and to take away. The man of courage will\ntherefore detach himself from fortune\u2019s gifts; he will treat them as\nhousehold furniture lent to him which may be at any moment recalled[47].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Death not to be feared.]\n\n=339.= Courage appears in its highest development in the face of tyranny\nand death. It is the tyrant\u2019s boast that he has men in his power: but\nthe brave man is an exception. His rank and his property may be taken\naway; he may be subjected to the torture; his life may be forfeited; but\nthe soul, that is the man himself, is beyond the tyrant\u2019s reach[48]. To\npain he answers \u2018if I can bear it, it will be light; if I cannot bear\nit, it cannot be long[49].\u2019 Amidst all the extremities of fire and rack\nmen have been found who never groaned, never begged for mercy, never\nanswered a question, and indeed laughed heartily[50]. Of death the Stoic\nhas no fear; not only is it no evil, but it is to be welcomed as part\nof the course of nature[51]; it is the best of friends, for it offers a\nrelease from all troubles, and in particular from the oppression of the\ntyrant[52]. We do not indeed deny that normally life is an advantage,\nthat nature\u2019s first lesson is self-preservation, and that death in\nitself is a thing terrible to contemplate[53]; but life is not the more\ndesirable for its length[54]; and when old age begins to shatter the\npowers of the mind, and to degrade the man to the life of a vegetable,\nnature is calling him to quit his mortal body[55]. At no period is life\nworth purchasing at the cost of the loss of honour, without which it\nloses its savour[56]. The philosopher therefore will not merely see with\ncalm confidence the approach of death; he will go forward to meet it of\nhis own free will, if only he is assured that reasonable choice points\nthat way.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Reasonable departure.]\n\n=340.= The doctrine of \u2018reasonable departure\u2019 (\u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae,\n_rationalis e vita excessus_) plays a prominent part in the Stoic ethics.\nIt cannot rightly be described as the recommendation of suicide; for\nthe Stoics do not permit a man to pass sentence of death upon himself,\nbut only to cooperate in carrying out the decree of a higher power. The\ndoctrine is intended in the first instance to justify death gloriously\nmet in fighting for one\u2019s country or one\u2019s friends; next when intolerable\npain or incurable disease plainly indicates the will of the deity[57];\nin the development of Roman history a third reason was found in the\nloss of political freedom[58]. These reasons are not added to, but only\nsystematized, when we are told that it is an \u2018ordinary duty\u2019 to quit\nlife when a man\u2019s natural advantages (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd) are outweighed by\nthe corresponding disadvantages[59]; for amongst \u2018natural advantages\u2019\nare included in this connexion all those considerations of which an\nhonourable man will rightly take account; and the calculation may equally\nlead him to the conclusion that, in spite of old age and suffering, and\nthough he has never attained to true wisdom, his simple duty is to wait\nquietly in life[60].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Its dangers.]\n\n=341.= The practice of \u2018reasonable departure\u2019 was largely recommended\nto the Stoics by the examples of Socrates (whose death they regarded as\nvoluntary[61]) and of Cato[62]; and it was at first no small matter of\npride to them to find that these examples found imitators, and that their\nsystem thus showed its power over the greatest of the terrors that beset\nhumanity. But under the Roman principate \u2018free departure\u2019 soon became\nso common that it was a reproach rather than a glory to its advocates,\na social disease pointing to morbidity of soul rather than to healthy\nresolution[63]. Hence the philosophers turned from recommendation\nto reproof. \u2018A brave and wise man must not flee from life, but quit\nit,\u2019 says Seneca[64]; \u2018nothing is more disgraceful than to long for\ndeath\u2019[65]. \u2018Friends,\u2019 says Epictetus, \u2018wait for God; when he shall give\nyou the signal, then go to him[66].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Courage is active.]\n\n=342.= The \u2018free departure\u2019 is the most striking illustration of passive\ncourage, but even before it was abused Cicero at least had perceived the\nattraction which this attitude of soul possesses, and its opposition to\nthe spirit of active enterprise which he calls Greatness of Soul, and\nwhich he advocates perhaps more on Academic than on Stoic lines. Still\nthe Stoics had already defined Courage as \u2018virtue fighting in the front\nrank in defence of justice[67].\u2019 A good man must indeed regard power and\nwealth as things indifferent; but he is to be blamed if he makes this an\nexcuse for avoiding public life, and leaving to others magistracies at\nhome or commands in the wars[68]. In the old world the love of glory and\npraise on the one hand, angry feeling against enemies on the other, has\nled men to seek these positions; but now they should seek them at home\nthat they may have a wide field for the exercise of their virtues[69],\nand in the wars in order that all war may be brought to an end[70]. By\nthe older Stoics this Greatheartedness was advocated by precept and\nexample: Zeno had said that the wise man should take part in public\nlife[71], and his hearers Persaeus and Philonides had taken service\nunder Antigonus Gonatas[72], and Sphaerus with Cleomenes III, king of\nSparta[73]. We shall see later how large was the part played in Roman\npolitical life by men who were Stoics or inclined to Stoicism, in an age\nin which there was a strong current of fashion in favour of a quiet life.\nWe must therefore recognise in Courage, fully as much as in Wisdom or\nJustice, a political as well as a private virtue.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Soberness.]\n\n=343.= The fourth cardinal virtue is Soberness (\u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7,\n_temperantia_). Of this there are various definitions, and amongst them\nthat it is the principle which regulates our natural appetites so that\nthey are neither in excess nor in defect[74]. From Cicero\u2019s point of\nview Soberness embraces all the virtues, for it is in the due regulation\nof the impulses that virtue consists. The standard to be attained is a\nhealthy state of the soul; and this is to be judged, upon the analogy\nof the body, by the canon of that which is beautiful, symmetrical, and\nbecoming (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, _decorum_)[75]. \u2018Just as bodily beauty is symmetry\nestablished between the limbs mutually, and also between each and the\nwhole body, so beauty of the soul is symmetry between the reasoning power\nand its parts, and mutually between each of those parts[76].\u2019 Although\nthis is in principle a doctrine accepted by the whole Stoic school,\nyet in its application we may easily find an entirely new departure,\nthat is, if the appeal is made to an artistic standard which depends\nupon the taste of the individual. The door is then thrown open to an\nabandonment of the Cynico-Stoic theory of life according to reason, and\nto the acceptance of the standard of good feeling, which may easily be\nso stretched as to include existing prejudices and conventions. This\ndanger is realized in Cicero\u2019s treatment of the virtue of \u2018decorum,\u2019\nwhich in its distinctive sense is defined as having the element of\n\u2018gentlemanliness\u2019 in itself[77]. It begins with respect for the feelings\nand opinions of others[78]; it avoids all rough games and obscene\njests[79]; it makes choice of a profession adapted to the natural\ncharacter of the individual[80]; it observes, as the actor does, the\nproprieties of youth and age, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner[81];\nit prescribes dignity as fitting for men, gracefulness for women[82]. In\nparticular decorum is displayed in modesty (_verecundia_). This is shown\nby keeping out of sight those parts of the body which nature, though she\ncould not dispense with them, has concealed and covered; in attending\nto their functions with the utmost secrecy; and in referring both to\nthese parts of the body and to their uses by words that do not properly\ndescribe them[83].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cynism or \u2018decorum\u2019?]\n\n=344.= Cicero\u2019s treatment of \u2018decorum\u2019 is so full of good sense that his\n_de Officiis_ was the most widely-known textbook of Greco-Roman ethics\nin medieval schools, and has retained its importance in the classical\npublic schools of the present day. But its logical justification on Stoic\nprinciples is far from easy. We are therefore not surprised to find that,\njust as Zeno and the main body of his followers had proclaimed in advance\nthat such doctrine was false in principle and ridiculous in detail, so\nconversely the followers of Panaetius found it necessary expressly to\nrepudiate the teaching of a large number of Stoics[84]. We have in fact\nhere a sharp conflict between the cultured and Platonizing Stoics on the\none side, and the general feeling of the school on the other. Cicero\nelsewhere treats it as an accepted Stoic doctrine that \u2018the wise man\nwill blurt things straight out[85]\u2019; and the theory of \u2018gentlemanly\nprofessions\u2019 can never have appealed to any large social circle. In the\nperiod of the principate we find the theory of \u2018decorum,\u2019 as a whole,\nabandoned. Seneca, personally as sensitive as Cicero himself, recognises\nthe absurdity of wasting time in hinting at a plain meaning[86], nor does\nhe limit his choice of illustration even when addressing a lady of high\nsocial position[87]. We must look then in some other direction than the\n_de Officiis_ for a duly proportioned exposition of the Stoic virtue of\nSoberness.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The appetites.]\n\n=345.= Reverting to the definitions of this virtue, we find, amongst\nthose that are generally accepted, first, that it is \u2018the science of\nthings that are to be sought or avoided or neither[88]\u2019; secondly, that\nit is \u2018concerned with the human appetites[89].\u2019 Now the term \u2018appetite\u2019\nor \u2018impulse\u2019 (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, _appetitus_) includes in the Stoic philosophy all\nthose first movements of the soul which draw us on towards some object,\nand which are adumbrations of right conduct requiring revision and\ncontrol by reason. But it seems clear that Soberness has little to do\nwith those higher impulses that are characteristic of man, such as the\nlove of knowledge or of society, since other virtues are concerned with\nthese. It remains that Soberness is the virtue which is concerned with\nthe appetites common to men and the lower animals, which we may shortly\ncall the \u2018lower appetites\u2019; they are, as we have already stated, the\ndesires of eating, drinking, and sexual union. It is just in this sphere\nthat Pleasure arises, in the sense in which it is condemned by the Cynics\nand popular moralists[90]. We may therefore shortly define Soberness\nas a right disposition of soul in relation to Pleasure. Its peculiar\ncharacteristic is that it is in the main a negative virtue, displaying\nitself in abstinence from indulgence[91].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Two views of Pleasure.]\n\n=346.= In order then rightly to understand the virtue of Soberness, we\nneed a clear idea of the attitude of the Stoics towards Pleasure. Zeno,\nas we have seen, whilst definitely placing Pleasure in the category of\nthings indifferent, had nevertheless allowed it to be understood that\nit might be an advantage (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd), and the seeking after it natural\n(\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd)[92]; and this is stated to have been the express teaching of\nHecato, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus[93]. To other Stoics this appeared\nto be a disastrous concession to Epicurean views. Cleanthes, who had\nscornfully described the ideal of Epicurus by the picture of Pleasure\nenthroned as queen, with the Virtues submissively attending as her\nhandmaidens[94], interpreted the word \u2018indifferent\u2019 more strictly; he\nrefused to admit that pleasure was \u2018natural\u2019 or possessed any worth[95].\nIn this view he was supported by a great many Stoics, and practically by\nArchedemus, when he said that pleasure was natural but valueless, like\nthe hairs under the armpit[96]. Hence followed the acceptable conclusion\nthat no sensible man would pay much attention to so trivial a matter[97].\nThus the one word \u2018indifferent\u2019 came to include two views which were\nsubstantially opposed, the one inclining to the Academic standpoint, and\nthe other to Cynism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Pleasure an aftergrowth, or an evil.]\n\n=347.= From this contradiction an escape was sought by making a\ndistinction. In one sense pleasure is an affection of the body, namely\na tickling (_titillatio_) of organs of sense, most readily illustrated\nin the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is not an\nadvantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to one; though it is\nnot directly to be aimed at, yet it may be welcomed when nature grants\nit to us as an extra[98]. This new view practically coincides with\nthat of Aristotle, who calls pleasure an \u2018aftergrowth\u2019 (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1,\n_accessio_), which of itself follows on virtuous action, and is attached\nto it as the scent to a flower[99]. But much more commonly, in ethical\ndiscussions, \u2018pleasure\u2019 denotes the excitement which is more strictly\ntermed \u2018hilarity\u2019 (\u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _sublatio animi_), and is the unhealthy\ncondition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of\nchoice[100]. For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin term _laetitia_,\nwhich is perhaps not altogether adequate[101]. This \u2018pleasure\u2019 may be\nunreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but actually contrary\nto nature[102]; whilst the virtuous and natural disposition is that of\nthe man who not only contemplates toil and pain with calm mind, but\nactually welcomes them as possible stepping-stones towards his own true\nadvantage[103].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Active soberness.]\n\n=348.= Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching is to consider\nSoberness as a negative virtue, and as opposed to the perturbation of\nHilarity, there is not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For\nSoberness also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul\nin matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex; abstinence\nis not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season is both a folly\nand a fault. But this point of view is not adequately treated by any\nStoic writer. Panaetius in discussing daily duties omitted to consider\nthe proper care of the body, as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of\nTyre; and Cicero gets little further than a general recommendation of\ncommon sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life[104].\nThe Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter to the\nphysician, suggesting only that food should suffice to allay hunger,\ndrink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep away cold[105]; but\nit is probable that popular moral discourses stopped short of this, and\nfavoured some amount of endurance as a discipline for the soul[106].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sober love.]\n\n=349.= With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic tradition was\nfavourable to a more positive treatment. Accordingly the Stoics (not\nwithout some feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position)\nassert that love (\u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2, _amor_) is an essential, both for the maintenance\nof the State[107] and for the character of the good man. Zeno had laid\nit down that \u2018the wise man will love[108].\u2019 We must, however, make a\nsharp distinction between love as the desire of sexual union, and the\nhigher Love (\u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae) which is defined anew as \u2018an effort to make\nfriends suggested by a beautiful object[109].\u2019 Upon this impulse, which\nis natural in the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the\nmore lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self-restraint\non the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons of philosophy,\nthe Stoics introduced a new relation between husband and wife based upon\nequality and comradeship[110]. A notable precedent was furnished by the\nCynic community, when the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates\nin the life of the beggar-preacher[111]; and Roman Stoicism supplies\nus with numerous instances of the same companionship[112]. Under such\nconditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice; it is a civic\nduty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the Roman principate\nwell perceived the danger that threatened the society in which they lived\nthrough the growing practice of celibacy[113].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Of marriage.]\n\n=350.= The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated by the\nfollowing extract from a discourse by Antipater of Tarsus:\n\n  \u2018A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social\n  duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without\n  wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the\n  State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers\n  decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons\n  marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh\n  shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection\n  against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty\n  towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform\n  the accustomed sacrifices?\n\n  Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not\n  tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are\n  like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition,\n  but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and\n  water, or any other case of penetration (\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd); for\n  they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and\n  the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances\n  are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of\n  life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife\n  should be first in her husband\u2019s affection, and the husband in\n  his wife\u2019s.\n\n  But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change\n  for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men\n  call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for\n  licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door\n  against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy\n  taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is\n  piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they\n  trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man\n  would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a\n  lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would\n  have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to\n  supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or\n  take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of\n  housekeeping to his partner[114].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Advantages sought.]\n\n=351.= The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are interpreted, do\nnot exhaust the field of daily duties. All objects that are \u2018advantages\u2019\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1) are _prima facie_ such that the good man aims at securing\nthem; although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego\nthem. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, \u2018art,\u2019\nand \u2018progress\u2019 are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; as advantages\nof the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good digestion,\ngood proportions, and beauty; whilst external advantages are wealth,\nreputation, noble birth, and the like[115]. In all the details there is\na lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst the teachers. According to\nSeneca, men may reasonably wish for tallness[116], and there is a kind\nof beauty (not dependent on youth) of which women may be proud without\nblame[117]. Fine clothes make no one the better man, but a certain\ndegree of neatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage[118]. For\nnobility the Stoics have little regard; all men are derived through an\nequal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue is the true\nnobility[119]. Good name (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1, _gloria_) is commonly reckoned amongst\n\u2018advantages\u2019[120]; but Chrysippus and Diogenes are said to have taught\nthat a good man need not move a finger for the sake of reputation, unless\nsome advantage can be obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we\nare told) by the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that\nthey reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as an\nadvantage, and they even considered it natural that a man should think\nof posthumous reputation[121]. The general feeling of the school seems\nto be that the approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim;\nits place is taken by the approval of \u2018conscience.\u2019 This term, which\noriginally expressed the burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman\nperiod modified in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded\nto a man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the world\ndisapproves his acts: this self-approval is closely akin to peace of\nmind[122].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wealth.]\n\n=352.= On no subject would it be easier to find apparently contradictory\nviews amongst Stoic writers than on that of wealth. To decry wealth\nand praise poverty is to some extent a commonplace with all the\nphilosophical schools; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent\na practice[123] that his hearers found some inconsistency between his\nwords and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich man. But the\nposition of the school is clear. \u2018Riches are not a good\u2019 is a Stoic\nparadox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and by every teacher[124]; but\nnevertheless they are an \u2018advantage,\u2019 and thus are rightly aimed at by\nthe good man[125]. To the wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of\nthe republican period especially, the maintenance of the family property\n(_res familiaris_) was a duty of high importance; and the wasting of\nit in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed[126]. The Stoic view was\nsufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epicurus or one of his\nfollowers: \u2018he who feels the need of wealth least, can make the best\nuse of it[127].\u2019 Although Panaetius did not write a special chapter on\nthe acquisition and use of wealth[128], yet his views on the latter\npoint are made sufficiently plain in his treatment of the virtue of\nJustice[129]. The justification of wealth lies in the intention to use\nit well, and this was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes[130].\nAs to its acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us\nto the high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the\ncapital[131].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty.]\n\n=353.= Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous place in the\nStoic philosophy we must reckon \u2018liberty\u2019 (\u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, _libertas_). In one\nsense liberty is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born\ncitizen in contrast to the slave; this liberty differs but little from\nthe virtue of Greatness of Soul already described[132], and in its full\nmeaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess[133]. But in\nanother sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes defined as\n\u2018the power of living as you wish[134],\u2019 and as such eagerly desired by\nthe slave; more often perhaps it is conceived as \u2018the right of saying\nwhat you please[135].\u2019 In this sense liberty is equivalent to the\n\u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 which was the watchword of the democracy of Athens, and was the\nequally cherished privilege of the nobility of Rome[136]; in a slightly\ndifferent sense it was the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take\na middle position; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a\nprecious privilege[137], and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice life\nor position for its sake[138], there are not wanting voices to remind us\nthat it is unreasonable to speak out one\u2019s mind without regard to persons\nor circumstances[139], that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be\nprovoked[140], and that the most terrible of all oppressors is the soul\nthat has lost its self-control[141].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Disadvantages.]\n\n=354.= Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with natural\nlaws, so it refuses disadvantages in accordance with a disinclination\n(\u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _alienatio_), which is equally natural and right so long\nas it is controlled by reason[142]. Since to every advantage there is\nopposed a corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily\nto refuse the other; and the doctrine of \u2018reasonable refusal\u2019 is that of\nreasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore be sufficient\nto give a formal statement of the theory. Disadvantages, or things that\nhave negative value (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1), may be subdivided according as they are\ndisadvantages in themselves, as an ungainly figure; or as they bring\nabout other disadvantages, as shortness of ready money; or for both\nreasons, as bad memory or ill-health[143]. They may also be subdivided\ninto three classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or\nthings external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn\nvulgarity or dulness of wit; of the body, ill-health, and dulness of the\norgans of sensation; of external things, poverty, loss of children, and\nthe contempt of our neighbours[144].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Healthy affections.]\n\n=355.= Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) of the\nsoul, rooted in firm principles in which the wise man never wavers,\nbut to which none else can attain, some other name is required to\ndescribe those more passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in\ncontrast with the evil \u2018affections\u2019 or perturbations of the soul which\nwill be discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this\ndirection with the three \u2018good affections\u2019 (\u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, _constantiae_,\n_sapientis affectiones_). Here a new use of terms is introduced.\nStrictly speaking an \u2018affection\u2019 is an evil state of soul; but as we\nhave no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, the use of\nthe word \u2018affection\u2019 is extended in this direction[145]. Each of these\n\u2018good affections\u2019 is introduced to us in contrast with a perturbation\nto which it bears a superficial resemblance. Thus contrasted with Fear\nis \u2018Caution\u2019 (\u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, _cautio_), which is right avoidance, and is\nentirely consistent with Courage rightly understood. Subdivisions of\nCaution are (i) \u2018Shame\u2019 (\u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u03ce\u03c2, _verecundia_), the avoidance of deserved\nblame, and (ii) \u2018Sanctity\u2019 (\u1f01\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1) the avoidance of offences against the\ngods[146]. Contrasted with Greed is \u2018Readiness\u2019 (\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _voluntas_),\nthe reasonable stretching out after future advantages[147]; contrasted\nwith Hilarity is Joy (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac, _gaudium_), the reasonable appreciation of\npresent advantages[148]. Both Readiness and Joy are entirely consistent\nwith Soberness rightly understood. To the perturbation of Grief no good\naffection is named as bearing any resemblance; but we need not for that\nreason question but that the wise man may entertain some quiet form\nof sympathy for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows\nwhich fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal\nbereavement[149].\n\nThe \u2018good affections\u2019 are possessed by the wise man only[150]; but not\nall wise men possess them, nor any at all times[151]. On the other\nhand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so that on this ground\nthe good citizen enters into competition with the wise man on not\naltogether uneven terms[152]. The whole doctrine of \u2018good affections\u2019\nmay be conceived as an answer to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of\nfeeling[153]; for the much derided \u2018apathy\u2019 of the school is substituted\nthe doctrine of \u2018eupathy.\u2019 Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of\na frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of Musonius\nand Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning of \u2018eupathy\u2019 in its\nvarious applications.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The ethical motive.]\n\n=356.= We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties in its main\nfeatures, and this sketch will be made more complete in many particulars\nin the course of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question\nhere suggests itself\u2014what compelling force has this system? what motive\nis supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning out his life? To this\nquestion the ancient philosophers did not directly address themselves;\nnevertheless their answers are implied in their teaching as a whole.\nThus the Stoics would doubtless reply, first, that daily duties are\nprescribed to us by reason[154]; not perhaps always by reason in its\nhighest sense, to which we must not appeal in every individual action,\nbut at least by the spirit of reasonableness (\u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1). Secondly, that\nthe common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, recommends them;\nthey are, as we have seen from the beginning, things that it comes in\nour way to do, that every good citizen and good man will be sure to do.\nAs to future rewards and punishments, though these are not excluded by\nStoicism, they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living.\nBut the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental picture of\nthe wise man, the vision of that which is \u2018absolutely good.\u2019 Critics may\nurge: \u2018it is a picture that never has been or will be realized in men\u2019s\nlives, a vision of that which is very far off and which you will never\nsee or touch.\u2019 This the Stoics hardly care to deny, but the difficulty\ndoes not disturb them. The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope\nof attainment is cherished by all but the worst[155]. We have spoken of\nthe \u2018ordinary man,\u2019 or, as the Stoics put it, of \u2018us who are not wise\nmen.\u2019 But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary man in\nthe system, but only for the \u2018probationer\u2019 (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, _proficiens_). It\nremains for us to trace the upward path from daily duty to virtue, along\nwhich every good man is endeavouring to advance.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Progress.]\n\n=357.= The doctrine of progress (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae, _progressio_) is not peculiar\nto Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an essential feature of it[156].\nCritics may indeed dispute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice\nattained; but the Stoic must hold fast to the ethical principles that\n\u2018virtue can be taught[157]\u2019 and that \u2018virtue is an art[158].\u2019 Every\nman has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue[159], which varies\nin degree according to his natural disposition of soul[160]; on this\nfoundation every man builds by concurrent learning and practice[161].\nThe child is greatly helped if he possesses the trait of \u2018modesty\u2019\n(\u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u03ce\u03c2, _verecundia_), which is essentially a readiness to defer to\nothers and to learn from those who are older and wiser[162]; though\nlater it may turn to \u2018false shame,\u2019 which is a hindrance[163]. He will\nthen learn to understand and perform his daily duties; and as his\ncharacter ripens, this performance will daily become easier and more\npleasurable to him[164], more certain and more steady in itself. And now\ndaily duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties\nperfected (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, _perfectum officium_), and complete in every\npoint[165]. In order to rise to this higher standard the good man must\nfirst perform his duty in all particulars[166]; he must do so with\nregularity and in harmony with the order of nature[167]; he will then\nneed only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability to pass into the\nranks of the wise[168].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conversion.]\n\n=358.= The stages of progress are variously expounded by Stoic\nwriters[169]; but on one principle all are agreed. Progress is not a\nhalf-way stage between vice and virtue, as the Peripatetics teach[170];\nit is a long preparation, to be followed by a change sudden and complete\n(\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae, _conversio_)[171]. The final step, by which a foolish man\nbecomes in an instant wise, is different in kind to all that have gone\nbefore. This position is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that\n\u2018the good is not constituted by addition[172],\u2019 and is enforced by\nvarious illustrations. The probationer is like a man who has long been\nunder water; little by little he rises to the surface, but all in a\nmoment he finds himself able to breathe. He is like a puppy in whom\nthe organ of sight has been for days past developing; all at once he\ngains the power of vision[173]. Just so when progress reaches the end\nthere dawns upon the eyes of the soul the complete and dazzling vision\nof the good, of which till now only shadows and reflections have been\nperceived. For a moment he is wise, but does not even yet realize his\nown wisdom; then again in a moment he passes on to the complete fruition\nof happiness[174].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Duty.]\n\n=359.= Thus from the lowlier conception of \u2018daily duties\u2019 we have again\nclimbed upwards to the supreme ethical end, to absolute goodness, which\nis Virtue in her full royalty and the Universal Law (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2) as it\nappeals to the individual man. In this connexion the ideal is familiar\nin modern times under the name of Duty. The ancient Stoics perhaps never\nquite reached to any such complete formulation of their ethical theory\nin a single word; but their general meaning is perfectly expressed by\nit. Just as the Socratic paradoxes mark the quarrel of philosophy with\noutworn ideas expressed in conventional language, so its reconciliation\nwith the general opinion is marked by those newly-coined terms such as\n\u2018conscience\u2019 and \u2018affection\u2019 which are now familiar household words. We\ncannot indeed demonstrate that \u2018Duty exists,\u2019 any more than we can that\ndeity or providence exists; but we may well say that without it ethical\ndiscussion would in our own day be hardly possible. The following stanzas\nfrom Wordsworth\u2019s \u2018Ode to Duty,\u2019 based upon a Stoic text[175], may be a\nuseful reminder, not only of the dominant position of this conception in\nmodern thought, but also of the continued tendency of the human mind to\nexpress its supreme convictions in anthropomorphic language.\n\n          \u2018Stern daughter of the Voice of God!\n          O Duty! if that name thou love\n          Who art a light to guide, a rod\n          To check the erring, and reprove:\n          Thou who art victory and law\n          When empty terrors overawe:\n          From vain temptations dost set free;\n  And calm\u2019st the weary strife of frail humanity!\n\n          Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear\n          The Godhead\u2019s most benignant grace;\n          Nor know we anything so fair\n          As is the smile upon thy face:\n          Flowers laugh before thee on thy beds\n          And fragrance in thy footing treads:\n          Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;\n  And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.\n\n          To humbler functions, awful Power!\n          I call thee: I myself commend\n          Unto thy guidance from this hour;\n          O let my weakness have an end!\n          Give unto me, made lowly wise,\n          The spirit of self-sacrifice;\n          The confidence of Reason give;\n  And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!\u2019[176]\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect\ntranslation; in discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak\ninstead of \u2018ordinary\u2019 or \u2018simple\u2019 duties.\n\n[2] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u2018\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f25\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u2019 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 Diog. L. vii 108.\n\n[3] \u2018est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niii 18, 59.\n\n[4] Stob. ii 7, 8.\n\n[5] Diog. L. vii 107.\n\n[6] Stob. ii 7, 8.\n\n[7] \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f03 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 Stob. as above; \u2018[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud\nesse\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 59.\n\n[8] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 357, 358.\n\n[9] Diog. L. vii 4.\n\n[10] _ib._ 175.\n\n[11] \u2018omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae\u2019\nCic. _Fin._ iii 6, 22.\n\n[12] \u2018Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia\nnaturae acceperat\u2019 _ib._ iv 16, 45.\n\n[13] \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f43 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u2019 \u1f34\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd Diog.\nL. vii 107; \u2018est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti\nprobabilis ratio reddi possit\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 58; \u2018ratio [non] debet\nagere quidquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere\u2019 _Off._ i\n29, 101; \u2018huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos certissimam rerum\ncomprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea ire, qua\nducit verisimilitudo, omne hac via procedit officium\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iv 33,\n2; and see above, \u00a7 159.\n\n[14] See above, \u00a7 110.\n\n[15] \u2018quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico\nbonum sed initium boni\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 124, 7.\n\n[16] See above, \u00a7 306.\n\n[17] \u2018placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et\ncommendari ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia\nsunt eius status, diligenda\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a\ncomplete life is illustrated by the desire to avoid the loss of a limb\nor deformity, _ib._ 17. \u2018Universally (be not deceived) every animal is\nattached to nothing so much as to its own interest\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 22,\n15.\n\n[18] \u2018commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus\nprocreandi causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt\u2019 Cic. _Off._\ni 4, 11.\n\n[19] _ib._\n\n[20] _ib._ 12.\n\n[21] Cic. _Off._ i 4, 13.\n\n[22] _ib._\n\n[23] _ib._ 14.\n\n[24] \u2018formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides;\nquae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret\nsapientiae\u2019 _ib._ 5, 14.\n\n[25] \u2018in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant\nvoluptatem esse ponendam: quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si\nvoluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur,\nmulta turpia sequantur\u2019 _Fin._ iii 5, 17. Yet Cicero, still writing as\na Stoic, can say: \u2018[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque\nferuntur omni impetu\u2019 _Off._ i 30, 105. See below, \u00a7\u00a7 346, 347.\n\n[26] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 343, 344.\n\n[27] \u2018in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem\nperfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt\u2019 Cic.\n_Off._ iii 3, 13; \u2018vivitur cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt\nsimulacra virtutis\u2019 _ib._ i 15, 46; \u2018est autem quaedam animi sanitas,\nquae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum turbatio mentis\naufertur\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 30.\n\n[28] Diog. L. vii 92; \u2018in duas partes virtus dividitur, in\ncontemplationem veri et actionem\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 94, 45.\n\n[29] \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 (leg. \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 Hirz. ii\n482) \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2, \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.\n\n[30] For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii\n262-293; we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca: fortitudo, fides,\ntemperantia, humanitas, simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et\nparsimonia, clementia, _Ep._ 88, 29 and 30.\n\n[31] Plut. _virt. mor._ 2; _de fort._ 2; _Sto. rep._ vii 1.\n\n[32] Thus \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 became \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f67\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd Stob. ii 7 5 b 1, cf. Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 37 (Arnim iii 283).\n\n[33] \u2018omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus\nhonestis aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur\u2019 Cic. _Off._\ni 6, 19; \u2018natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et\nactioni\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 5, 1.\n\n[34] \u2018quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum,\nad virtutem nihil. quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia\nanimum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant\u2019 _Ep._ 88, 20.\n\n[35] \u2018sine hac arte (sc. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci\nfallique posse\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 21, 72.\n\n[36] \u2018qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab\nomni mundo atque ab eius procuratione\u2019 _ib._ 22, 73.\n\n[37] \u2018ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque\nambas virtutum nomine appellant\u2019 _ib._ 21, 72.\n\n[38] \u2018ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a\nsordidis; deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus\na corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta\ndeterior\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ iii Praef. 18.\n\n[39] \u2018quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri\ninvestigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra\nofficium est\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 6, 19.\n\n[40] \u2018est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium ... in res conferunt\nnon necessarias\u2019 _ib._ 6, 18.\n\n[41] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xiv 4, 4.\n\n[42] Cic. _Off._ i 7, 21 and 22.\n\n[43] _ib._ 13, 41.\n\n[44] \u2018principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus,\nquae spectat in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui\u2019 Cic.\n_Off._ i 17, 58.\n\n[45] \u2018I ought not to be free from affections (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c2) like a statue, but\nI ought to maintain the relations (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) natural and acquired, as a\npious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 2,\n4; \u2018Duties are usually measured by relations (\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9). Is a man\na father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all\nthings. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards\nhim\u2019 _Manual_ 30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply\ncorresponding duties on the other side; \u2018invicem ista, quantum exigunt,\npraestant, et parem desiderant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difficilis\nest\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ ii 18, 2.\n\n[46] \u2018[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid\nnon sit\u2019 _Ep._ 85, 28; \u2018quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est,\ninquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac\nperferendo, summae legi parens sine timore\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53.\n\n[47] \u2018quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget,\nliberi honores opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta\nvestibula, clara nobilis aut formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et\nmobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique adparatus sunt; nihil horum\ndono datur; collaticiis et ad dominos redituris instrumentis scena\nadornatur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 10, 1; \u2018victrix fortunae sapientia\u2019 Juv.\n_Sat._ xiii 20.\n\n[48] \u2018cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam\nomnes eorum impetus deficient\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ii 4, 1.\n\n[49] \u2018levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum\u2019 _Ep._\n24, 14.\n\n[50] \u2018inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum\nest, non respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo\u2019 _ib._ 78, 19.\n\n[51] \u2018mors optimum inventum naturae\u2019 _Dial._ vi 20, 1; \u2018fortem posce\nanimum, mortis terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter\nmunera ponat | naturae\u2019 Juv. _Sat._ x 357-9.\n\n[52] \u2018caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 20, 3;\n\u2018nullo nos invida tanto | armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod\npatet\u2019 Silius _Pun._ xi 186-8; \u2018adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio\neius nihil timendum sit\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 24, 11.\n\n[53] \u2018[mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros,\nquos in amorem sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat\u2019 _ib._ 36, 8.\n\n[54] So Heraclitus had said \u2018unus dies par omni est\u2019 _ib._ 12, 7; \u2018ut\nprorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem: quoniam\nmora non fit beatior vita, sed longior\u2019 _Ben._ v 17, 6.\n\n[55] \u2018si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere,\nsi mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac\nruenti\u2019 _Ep._ 58, 35.\n\n[56] \u2018melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nec enim omnia, quaedam |\npro vita facienda putant\u2019 Juv. _Sat._ xv 106 to 108.\n\n[57] Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good\nreasons for voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking\nup a banquet. As the guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as\nthe arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers breaking in and using violent\nlanguage, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being eaten up, or\n(v) the company being drunk; so the wise man will depart, because of\n(i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him\nviolence, (iii) disease hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v)\nmadness, which is the drunkenness of the soul. See Arnim iii 768.\n\n[58] Notably in the case of Cato.\n\n[59] \u2018in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est\nin vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur,\nhuius officium est e vita excedere\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 60.\n\n[60] \u2018perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium\nesse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum\nnaturam esse dicimus\u2019 _ib._ iii 18, 61.\n\n[61] He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen.\n_Mem._ iv 4, 4.\n\n[62] \u2018Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem\ndetraxeris gloriae\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 13, 14.\n\n[63] \u2018ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi\u2019 _ib._ 24, 25;\n\u2018quid ergo? non multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed\nplus momenti apud me habent qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et\nadmittunt illam, non adtrahunt\u2019 _ib._ 30, 15.\n\n[64] _ib._ 24, 25.\n\n[65] _ib._ 117, 22.\n\n[66] Epict. _Disc._ i 9, 16.\n\n[67] \u2018probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt\npropugnantem pro aequitate\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 19, 62.\n\n[68] _ib._ 21, 71.\n\n[69] _ib._ 26, 92.\n\n[70] _ib._ 23, 80.\n\n[71] \u2018Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid\nimpedierit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 2.\n\n[72] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 89, 90.\n\n[73] See above, \u00a7 91.\n\n[74] \u2018efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque\nneque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque\ntranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 29, 102.\n\n[75] \u2018hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine _decorum_ potest; Graece\nenim \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari\u2019\n_ib._ i 27, 93.\n\n[76] Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; \u2018ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum\ncum coloris quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritudo; sic in animo\nopinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam\net stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 31.\n\n[77] \u2018id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in\neo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali\u2019 _Off._ i\n27, 96.\n\n[78] \u2018adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et\noptimi cuiusque et reliquorum\u2019 _ib._ 28, 99; \u2018to order myself lowly and\nreverently to all my betters\u2019 English Church Catechism.\n\n[79] Cic. _Off._ i 29, 104.\n\n[80] \u2018id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum\nquisque igitur noscat ingenium\u2019 _ib._ 31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all\nthe arts that subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most\ntruly liberal: _ib._ 42, 150 and 151.\n\n[81] _ib._ 34, 122-124.\n\n[82] \u2018venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem\u2019 _ib._ 36,\n130. In the same spirit Epictetus says \u2018we ought not to confound the\ndistinctions of the sexes\u2019 _Disc._ i 16, 14.\n\n[83] Cic. _Off._ i 35, 127.\n\n[84] \u2018nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene\nCynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint,\nverbis flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus\nappellemus suis\u2019 _ib._ i 35, 128; \u2018Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam\nalii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte casus inciderit,\nut id faciendum sit: alii nullo modo\u2019 _Fin._ iii 20, 68.\n\n[85] \u2018habes scholam Stoicam, \u1f41 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. ego servo et servabo\n(sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te\nscripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici\u2019 _Fam._ ix 22, 5. See also above,\n\u00a7 318.\n\n[86] \u2018rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam\nillum matelam sumpsisse\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iii 26, 2.\n\n[87] _Dial._ vi 20, 3.\n\n[88] \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\nStob. ii 7, 5 b 1.\n\n[89] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 _ib._ 7, 5 b 2.\n\n[90] \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f21\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03bd was the expression of Antisthenes, see\nDiog. L. vi 3; \u2018voluptas est ... res humilis, membrorum turpium aut\nvilium ministerio veniens\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ vii 2, 2.\n\n[91] \u2018intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse\u2019 Cic.\n_Off._ i 29, 103.\n\n[92] See above, \u00a7 319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson\u2019s view\n(on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 to be the \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, and \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\nthe \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised\nthe value of \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks\ncommunicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really\ndifficult question. \u2018Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all\n\u201cpleasure\u201d is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller\u2019s _Socratics_,\np. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that\nwhich is the result and after-effect of \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. In other words, it may\nbe argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat. _Phileb._\n44 B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but\npleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected.\nZeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae was\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, his remark can only have applied to the \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1-\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae; and\nsuch certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 2).\u2019\nIn the passage here referred to from Plutarch \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 takes the place of\n\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae as a \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic. _Fin._ iii 15,\n51. See further \u00a7\u00a7 347, 371.\n\n[93] \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae as an advantage is contrasted with \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 (suffering) as a\ndisadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.\n\n[94] Cic. _Fin._ ii 21, 69.\n\n[95] \u039a\u03bb\u03b5\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd [\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd] \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b2\u03af\u1ff3 Sext. _math._ xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).\n\n[96] Arnim iii 136, 155.\n\n[97] \u2018sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem\ncorporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem\nanimi\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 1, 1; \u2018quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari\nvelit?\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii 5, 4; \u2018quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et\nfrivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?\u2019 _ib._ 4, 4.\n\n[98] \u2018voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono\u2019 Cic. _Leg._ i 11, 31;\n\u2018[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit\u2019\n_Off._ iii 33, 120; \u2018voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non\nut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora\nnobis illius faceret accessio\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 116, 3; \u2018[virtus voluptatem]\nnon praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis\naliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur\u2019 _Dial._ vii 9, 1. That this view was\nheld by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a);\nsee also above, notes 92 and 93.\n\n[99] _Eth. N._ x 7.\n\n[100] \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd Diog. L.\nvii 114 (of Chrysippus); \u2018hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in\nanimo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt; sublationem\nanimi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ ii 4, 13;\n\u2018vitium esse voluptatem credimus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 59, 1.\n\n[101] \u2018quam [perturbationem] Stoici \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd appellant, ego malo laetitiam\nappellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero translates with more fulness by _laetitia\ngestiens_ or _nimia_; _Tusc. disp._ iv 6, 13.\n\n[102] \u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 [\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03af] \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd Sext. _math._ xi 73 (Arnim iii 155).\n\n[103] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 371, 402, 403. On the whole subject see further\nHicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp. 110 to 112.\n\n[104] \u2018Antipater Tyrius, Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus,\npraeterit[am] censet a Panaetio valetudinis curationem. valetudo\nsustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut prodesse\nsoleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis\ntuendi causa, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent\u2019\nCic. _Off._ ii 24, 86.\n\n[105] \u2018hanc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum\nindulgeatis, quantum bonae valetudini satis est ... cibus famem sedet,\npotio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit\nadversus infesta corporis\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 8, 5; and so Musonius, below, \u00a7 381.\n\n[106] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22 and 26.\n\n[107] See above, \u00a7 304.\n\n[108] Diog. L. vii 129; \u2018Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt\u2019 Cic.\n_Tusc. disp._ iv 34, 72.\n\n[109] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u0390\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd Diog. L. vii 130;\n\u2018[Stoici] amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis\nspecie definiunt\u2019 Cic. as above. The \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae or _conatus_ is a variety of\nthe \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae or _appetitio_, Hirzel p. 390.\n\n[110] Not of course new in any absolute sense; in the country at least\nsuch relations must always have been common.\n\n[111] Diog. L. vi 96-98.\n\n[112] See above, \u00a7 300, and \u00a7 306, note 29; and below, \u00a7\u00a7 431, 439, 444,\nand 446.\n\n[113] \u2018in consensu vidui caelibatus nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit\u2019\nSen. _Ben._ i 9, 4.\n\n[114] Stob. iv 22, 25; and see further, \u00a7\u00a7 406, 407.\n\n[115] Diog. L. vii 106.\n\n[116] \u2018non contemnet se sapiens, etiamsi fuerit minimae staturae; esse\ntamen se procerum volet\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii 22, 2.\n\n[117] \u2018unicum tibi ornamentum pulcherrima et nulli obnoxia aetati forma\u2019\n_ib._ xii 16, 4.\n\n[118] \u2018contra naturam est, faciles odisse munditias\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 5, 4;\n\u2018non splendeat toga, ne sordeat quidem\u2019 _ib._ 5, 3.\n\n[119] \u2018unus omnium parens mundus est: ad hunc prima cuiusque origo\nperducitur\u2019 _Ben._ iii 28, 2; \u2018[philosophia] stemma non inspicit\n... animus facit nobilem\u2019 _Ep._ 44, 1 and 5.\n\n[120] Diog. L. vii 106; Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 51.\n\n[121] \u2018de bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta\nutilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. qui\nautem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc quam\ndixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt\u2019 _ib._\n17, 57. Cicero and Seneca were both keenly sensitive to the judgment of\nposterity: \u2018paucis natus est, qui populum aetatis suae cogitat: multa\nannorum milia, multa populorum supervenient: ad illa respice. etiamsi\nomnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit, venient qui sine\noffensa sine gratia iudicent\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 79, 17.\n\n[122] \u2018pacem demus animo, quam dabit ... intenta mens ad unius honesti\ncupiditatem. conscientiae satis fiat; nil in famam laboremus\u2019 _Dial._ v\n41, 2.\n\n[123] \u2018multis ad philosophandum obstitere divitiae; paupertas expedita\nest, secura est\u2019 _Ep._ 17, 3; \u2018transeamus ad patrimonia, maximam\nhumanarum aerumnarum materiam\u2019 _Dial._ ix 8, 1.\n\n[124] \u2018Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animo\ndant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona. divitiae autem ... nihil\nhorum faciunt; ergo non sunt [bonum]\u2019 _Ep._ 87, 35.\n\n[125] \u2018divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum\net habendas esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor\u2019\n_Dial._ vii 24, 5; \u2018[sapiens] non amat divitias, sed mavult. maiorem\nvirtuti suae materiem subministrari vult\u2019 _ib._ 21, 4.\n\n[126] \u2018largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis\nexhaurit\u2019 Cic. _Off._ ii 15, 52; \u2018mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum\nplurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat an servare nesciat\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n120, 8.\n\n[127] \u2018is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget\u2019 _ib._ 14,\n17.\n\n[128] Cic. _Off._ ii 24, 86.\n\n[129] See above, \u00a7 337.\n\n[130] \u2018Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris,\nquos de Officiis scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere \u201csapientis esse, nihil\ncontra mores leges instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris.\nneque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis propinquis\namicis, maximeque reipublicae. singulorum enim facultates et copiae\ndivitiae sunt civitatis\u201d\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 15, 63.\n\n[131] \u2018toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, commodius\na quibusdam optimis viris, ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quam ab ullis\nphilosophis ulla in schola disputatur\u2019 _ib._ ii 25, 90; and see further,\n\u00a7 408.\n\n[132] See above, \u00a7 342.\n\n[133] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd, ... \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f43 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd Stob. ii 7, 11 i.\n\n[134] \u2018quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis\u2019 Cic. _Par._ 5,\n34.\n\n[135] \u2018asperitas agrestis | vult libertas dici mera\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 18, 6\nand 8.\n\n[136] Juv. _Sat._ i 151-153.\n\n[137] \u2018non potest gratis constare libertas; hanc si magno aestimas, omnia\nparvo aestimanda sunt\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 104, 34, where the reference is to\n\u2018libertas\u2019 in both senses.\n\n[138] \u2018nec civis erat, qui libera posset | verba animi proferre, et vitam\nimpendere vero\u2019 Juv. _Sat._ iv 90 and 91.\n\n[139] \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u1f03 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\nMuson. apud Stob. iii 40, 9 (Hense, p. 754, 6).\n\n[140] \u2018sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit; immo declinabit, non\naliter quam in navigando procellam\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 14, 7.\n\n[141] \u2018Can we abolish the acropolis that is in us, and cast out the\ntyrant within us, whom we have daily over us?\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 86.\n\n[142] \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 ... \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\nPlut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 2; \u2018in aliis satis esse causae [Stoici voluerunt]\nquamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut ... in doloris vacuitate\u2019 Cic.\n_Fin._ iii 15, 51.\n\n[143] Stob. ii 7, 7 b; Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 56.\n\n[144] Stob. as above.\n\n[145] For a similar change in the meaning of the word \u2018conscience\u2019 see\nabove, \u00a7 351; the new use of this word as of the word \u2018affection\u2019 is that\nnow commonly understood in ethical discussion.\n\n[146] Diog. L. vii 116; \u2018declinatio [malorum] si cum ratione fiet, cautio\nappelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._\niv 6, 13.\n\n[147] \u2018eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd appellant, nos appellamus\nvoluntatem: quam sic definiunt\u2014voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione\ndesiderat\u2019 _ib._ 6, 12.\n\n[148] \u2018cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud\ngaudium dicitur\u2019 _ib._ 6, 13.\n\n[149] See below, \u00a7\u00a7 374, 379.\n\n[150] \u2018scio gaudium nisi sapienti non contingere. est enim animi elatio\nsuis bonis verisque fidentis\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 59, 1 and 2; \u2018sola virtus\npraestat gaudium perpetuum\u2019 _ib._ 27, 3.\n\n[151] \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd [\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd] \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u03af Stob. ii 7, 5 c.\n\n[152] \u2018in huius gaudii possessione esse te volo\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 23, 4.\n\n[153] \u2018\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 enim atque \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu\nprudentiorum hominum, sicut iudicio Panaetii, inprobata abiectaque est\u2019\nA. Gellius _N. A._ xii 5, 10.\n\n[154] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iv 2, p. 368 K.\n\n[155] \u2018negat [Zenon] Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa,\nqua tyrannum Dionysium. huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem\nsapientiae; illi propter spem vivere\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iv 20, 56.\n\n[156] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 289, 324.\n\n[157] For the Socratic paradox \u2018virtue can be taught,\u2019 see above, \u00a7 46,\nalso Diog. L. vii 91; \u2018nemo est casu bonus. discenda virtus est\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 123, 16.\n\n[158] Arnim iii 214.\n\n[159] \u2018omnibus natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 108,\n8.\n\n[160] The emphasis occasionally laid on \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c5\u0390\u03b1 (_bona indoles_) reflects\naristocratic and Platonic influences, see Pearson, pp. 205, 206; \u2018those\nwho have a good natural disposition (\u03bf\u1f31 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c5\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2), even if you try to turn\nthem aside, cling still more to reason\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 9.\n\n[161] \u2018Modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions\ndestroy him; actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the\ncontrary actions destroy him\u2019 _ib._ ii 9, 11; \u2018What then is progress? if\nany of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) to exercise it and to improve it by labour\u2019 _ib._ i 4, 18.\n\n[162] Cic. _de Off._ i 28, 99 (\u00a7 343 above); \u2018verecundiam, bonum in\nadulescente signum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 11, 1.\n\n[163] \u2018[obstitit] verecundia, quae multorum profectus silentio pressit\u2019\n_Dial._ vi 24, 2; cf. _Ep._ 40, 14.\n\n[164] \u2018paulatim voluptati sunt quae necessitate coeperunt\u2019 _Dial._ i 4,\n15.\n\n[165] Stob. ii 7, 8, 8 a, and 11 a; Cic. _Off._ i 3, 8 and iii 3, 14.\n\n[166] \u1f41 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u2019 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76 [\u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2], \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 Stob. iv (Flor.) 103, 22 M (Arnim iii\n510).\n\n[167] \u2018primum est officium, ut se conservet in naturae statu; deinceps ut\nea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint; ... deinde ea [selectio] perpetua;\ntum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae; in qua primum inesse\nincipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici\u2019 Cic. _Fin._\niii 6, 20.\n\n[168] \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f57\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03ad\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f11\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u1fc6\u03be\u03af\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 Stob.\nas above; \u2018illud, quod ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas et recta ire\nte via credas\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 2. Epictetus uses the technical term\n\u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u2018unchangeable firmness of mind\u2019 _Disc._ iii 2, 8.\n\n[169] See especially Seneca, _Epp._ 75 and 95.\n\n[170] Diog. L. vii 127.\n\n[171] \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\n\u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Clem. Al. _Strom._ iv 6, 28\n(Arnim iii 221).\n\n[172] Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 45; and see above, \u00a7 322.\n\n[173] \u2018ut qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si\nnon longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam\ntum essent in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat ut videat,\nplus cernit quam is qui modo est natus; item, qui processit aliquantum\nad virtutis aditum, nihilominus in miseria est, quam ille qui nihil\nprocessit\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 48.\n\n[174] As to the man who is \u2018wise without knowing it\u2019 (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1f7c\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2)\nsee Arnim iii 539 to 542, and Plut. _Sto. rep._ 19, 3 and 4.\n\n[175] \u2018iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus, ut non tantum recte\nfacere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 120, 10.\n\n[176] Written in 1805.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nSIN AND WEAKNESS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sin.]\n\n=360.= The Stoic view of the universe is coloured by optimism. All comes\nfrom God, all works towards good. None the less the Stoic morals are\nstern. Men in the mass are both foolish and wicked; they defy God\u2019s\nwill and thwart his purpose. The world is full of sin, and all sins (to\nuse the Socratic paradox) are equal. What then is sin? It is a missing\nof the mark at which virtue aims (\u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1); it is a stumbling on the\nroad (_peccatum_); it is a transgressing of the boundary line[1]. It\nis the child of ignorance, the outward expression of ill health of the\nsoul. Everywhere and in every man it weakens, hampers, and delays the\nwork of virtue. It cannot however finally triumph, for it is at war\nwith itself. The Persians were wrong when they conceived an Evil Power,\na concentration of all the powers of mischief in one personality. This\ncannot be, for sin lacks essential unity. It destroys but does not\nbuild; it scatters but it does not sow. It is an earth-born giant, whose\nunwieldy limbs will in the end be prostrated by a combatant, small to the\noutward view, but inspired with divine forcefulness. If we understand\nwhat sin is, we shall see its repulsiveness; if we learn how it spreads,\nwe shall seek protection against its infecting poison; if we attack it in\ndetail, in individual men and in their daily acts, we shall in the end\nlay it low. Philosophy then proceeds to arm itself for its task.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The four sinful conditions are errors.]\n\n=361.= Sin is ignorance; more accurately, it is that which appears to be\nknowledge, but is not knowledge; it is false judgment. If we follow the\nprocess by which knowledge is attained, we find that there is no error\nin the mind-picture (_visum_), whether it is sensory or partly sensory\nand partly rational; this is an adumbration automatically presented to\nthe mind. But \u2018assent is in our power\u2019; it is both an intellectual and\na moral act. A too hasty assent to that which appears to be but is not\nis both an error and an offence; and most particularly so when it lies\nin the application of the general conceptions (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) of \u2018good\u2019 and\n\u2018evil\u2019 to particular cases[2]. In this way we quickly reach four sinful\nconditions, which come about by mistaking things indifferent, that is,\nadvantages and disadvantages, for things good or evil. These are:\n\n(i) Fear (\u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2, _metus_), in which a future disadvantage is mistaken for\na future evil;\n\n(ii) Greed (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, _libido_), in which a future advantage is mistaken\nfor a future good;\n\n(iii) Grief (\u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7, _aegritudo_), in which a present disadvantage is\nmistaken for a present evil;\n\n(iv) Hilarity (\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, _laetitia_), in which a present advantage is\nmistaken for a present good[3].\n\nIn the case of the last two evils the title presents difficulty in\nall languages; thus for Grief we might substitute any term such as\nDiscontent, Vexation, Worry or Fretfulness; it is a lack of Courage in\nbearing pain or disappointment. Again for Hilarity we might substitute\nElation, Exaltation, Excitement: it is a lack of Soberness in the moment\nof pleasure.\n\n\n[Sidenote: They are also maladies.]\n\n=362.= From another point of view all sin is due to a lack of moral\nforce, a want of tone in the moral sinews, an unhealthy condition\nof the soul[4]. Ultimately this point of view agrees with that just\ndescribed: for it is the lack of health and strength which leads to hasty\nand ill-judged assent[5]. But for practical purposes we may use this\ndistinction to lead up to a difference of grade. Thus we may associate\nignorance with that rooted perversity of mind which is the exact opposite\nof virtue, and which is therefore in the strictest sense \u2018vice\u2019 (\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1,\n_vitium_)[5]; and want of tone with a passing condition which we cannot\ndeny to be an evil, but may nevertheless describe by the gentler terms\n\u2018perturbation\u2019 and \u2018affection[6].\u2019 Such an evil is a disturbance of the\nsoul\u2019s calm, an \u2018infection\u2019 of its health. It may exist in three grades\nto be hereafter described, as a \u2018ruffling,\u2019 a \u2018disturbance,\u2019 a \u2018disease\u2019;\nand in both the latter forms it must be rooted out, for in both grades it\nis an evil, and in the last it is a vice which threatens to poison the\nman\u2019s whole nature. Hence we reach the Stoic paradox that \u2018the affections\nmust be extirpated[7].\u2019 But although this is our only ethical standard,\nwe are not debarred from suggesting remedies which may alleviate the\nmalady in particular persons and under special circumstances.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fear.]\n\n=363.= The evil of Fear (\u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2, _formido_, _metus_) is practically\nopposed to the virtue of Courage. Here philosophy builds upon the\nfoundations of common opinion, and its task is the easier. The youth who\nis brought up not to regard suffering, poverty, exile, or death as evils,\nwill never be afraid. Since it is death that most alarms mankind by its\ngrim aspect, he who can face this giant without trembling will not know\nfear, or at the most will only feel a slight ruffling of the soul. In\nasserting that \u2018fear should be rooted out\u2019 the Stoics cross no general\nsentiment; the tradition of the heroic age is the same.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Greed.]\n\n=364.= The treatment of Greed (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, _libido_) is similar. This fault\nis opposed to the Soberness with which men should aim at advantages; and\nwhen we have determined the standard of Soberness every transgression of\nit reveals Greed. But under this heading the Stoics include the vices of\nAnger[8] and Cruelty, for which the heroic age had no condemnation. In\nregard to the former they come into conflict with the Peripatetics also,\nwho maintain that Anger serves useful ends, and should be controlled, not\nextirpated[9]. The consideration of this condition of mind will therefore\nbring out the divergence between the two schools.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Anger.]\n\n=365.= The Peripatetics assign Anger to the passionate part of the soul\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd); they admit that it needs to be restrained by reason,\nbut hold that within proper limits it is both natural and necessary. In\nwar it is essential to heroic action; he who is filled with it despises\ndanger, and rushes on to great achievements[10]. It is no less necessary\nin peace, in order that the wicked may not go unpunished[11]. Aristotle\nsays compendiously that \u2018anger is the spur of virtue[12],\u2019 the armour of\nthe man of high soul. To this point of view the Stoics are opposed alike\non the ground of principle and of experience. We do not need disease as a\nmeans to health[13], or armour which sways instead of being swayed[14].\nA good man will face danger unmoved, from the sense of duty; and will\nface it more firmly and more perseveringly than he whose passions are\nexcited[15]. He will punish wrong-doers either for their amendment or for\nthe protection of others, without being angry with them[16]. Fabius the\nDelayer conquered his own spirit before he overcame Hannibal[17]; and the\nvery gladiators strike, not when their feelings move them, but when the\nopportunity has come[18].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Degrees of anger; remedies for it.]\n\n=366.= Anger is technically defined as \u2018the greedy desire of avenging\nan injury,\u2019 or (more precisely) as \u2018the greedy desire to punish one\nwhom you deem to have injured you unjustly[19].\u2019 That it is a temporary\nmadness has always been held by the wise[20]; and this is indicated by\nthe appearance of the angry, the threatening look, the heightened colour,\nthe gnashing teeth, the stamp of the foot[21]; also by the fact that\nchildren are specially prone to anger, even for frivolous causes[22], and\nthat anger is often directed against harmless persons or objects[23].\nNevertheless anger does not consist of a merely instinctive feeling,\nbut implies the assent of the will[24]; so that we can always trace the\nthree stages, first the appearance of an injury done (_species oblata\niniuriae_), secondly the assent (_animus adsentit atque adprobat_),\nthirdly the outbreak of anger (_sequitur ira_)[25]. To check anger the\nfirst necessity is time[26]: reflection will often show us that we have\nnot been injured at all, or not so much as we supposed[27]. Then it is\nwell to put ourselves in the place of the offender, and try to look at\nthe offence from his point of view[28]. Where anger has become a disease\n(_iracundia_), more violent remedies must be used; some have been cured\nby looking at themselves in a mirror[29]; others must apply the \u2018contrary\ntwist[30],\u2019 and learn when struck to turn quietly away[31].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Variations of anger.]\n\n=367.= Anger is an evil that has many varieties, and the precisians\nexercise their ingenuity in distinguishing the bitter-humoured\n(_amarus_), the fiery (_stomachosus_), the fierce (_rabiosus_), the man\nwho is hard to get on with (_difficilis_), and many other shades of\ncharacter. But one variety deserves special notice, because the evil\ndisposition exists though its expression is checked. The angry man of\nthis type does not allow himself to go beyond complaint and criticism,\nbut he nurses his feeling in the depths of his heart[32]. He would on no\naccount express himself in loud outcries, but his displeasure is easily\nexcited and persistent. This evil we call moroseness; it is a feeling\ncharacteristic of a decadent society[33], and (like all other kinds of\nanger) it calls for unsparing repression.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cruelty.]\n\n=368.= Cruelty, a tendency to excess in punishment[34], is an evil\nconstantly attendant upon the possession of power, and directly opposed\nto the virtue of clemency. Roman history has exhibited many examples of\nit, beginning with Sulla who ordered seven thousand Roman citizens to be\nslain on one day[35], continuing with the many masters who are hated for\ncruelty to their slaves[36]. It cuts at the root of the ties of humanity\nand degrades man to the level of the beast[37]; in its extreme form it\nbecomes a madness, when the slaying of a man is in itself a pleasure[38].\nAs a remedy for cruelty in its milder forms it is well to consider the\ntrue objects of punishment; first, to reform the offender; secondly, to\nmake others better by a warning; thirdly, to give a sense of safety to\nthe community by removing offenders[39]. All these objects are better\neffected if punishment is moderate and rare, and appears to be awarded\nwith reluctance. When cruelty has become a disease it is necessary to\nremind the tyrant that his manner of life is a pitiable one[40], and that\na complete cure can be worked by putting him to death[41].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Grief.]\n\n=369.= In reckoning Grief in its countless varieties as an evil the\nStoics did not altogether run counter to public opinion. In the heroic\nage grief was indeed not forbidden, but it was sharply limited; women\nmight grieve, men should remember. But in prescribing the total\nextinction of this state of mind the Stoics appeared to pass the bounds\nof human nature; public feeling revolted against what seemed impossible\nof attainment. Our position to-day is not greatly altered; but we may\nnotice that whereas in ordinary social life Grief is not only tolerated\nbut approved, yet in battle, earthquake, flood, and pestilence our ideal\nof the hero is one which almost entirely excludes the indulgence of this\nemotion.\n\nGrief takes many forms, as Fretfulness, Disappointment, Restlessness,\nPity, and Mourning; we proceed to examine them in order.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Fretfulness.]\n\n=370.= The simplest form of Grief is fretfulness under bodily pain, the\neffect of depression of the soul and contraction of its sinews[42]. In\nall ages and under all philosophies the capacity of bearing pain without\nflinching is the primary test of virtue; and in the Cynic and Stoic\nschools alike the dogma \u2018pain is no evil\u2019 is of critical importance.\nIn this matter correct doctrine needs to be strengthened by life-long\ndiscipline; but it is not required by Stoic principles that general\nprinciples should be forced upon the acceptance of individual sufferers.\nPanaetius therefore acted quite correctly when, in writing to Quintus\nTubero on the subject of the endurance of pain, he abstained from\npressing the usual paradox[43]. But all who see this trial awaiting them\nwill do well to consider how much hardship men willingly endure for evil\npurposes, such as those of lust, money-making, or glory. Cocks and quails\nwill fight to the death for victory: jugglers will risk their lives\nswallowing swords, walking on tight ropes, or flying like birds, when in\neach case a slip means death[44]. If we compose our minds long before to\nmeet suffering, we shall have more courage when the time comes[45].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Discipline of pain.]\n\n=371.= Still more effective is active training[46]. Happy was the Spartan\nyouth who came to Cleanthes to ask him whether pain was not a good;\nhis education had taught him that this was a more practical question\nthan that other, whether pain is an evil[47]. Recruits cry out at the\nslightest wound, and are more afraid of the surgeon\u2019s touch than of the\nsword; on the other hand veterans watch the life-blood draining away\nwithout a sigh[48]. Some men groan at a box on the ear, whilst others\nsmile under the scourge[49]. Inexperience therefore is the chief cause\nfor weakness under pain; familiarity with it brings strength[50].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Disappointed ambition.]\n\n=372.= The Grief that gives way to pain of mind has very various forms;\nbut that which is due to disappointed ambition is perhaps the most\ntypical. Even men who had overcome the fear of death were known to\nshudder at the bitterness of soul (_aegritudo animi_) which accompanies\ndefeat in a contested election (_repulsa_) in a republic, or displacement\nfrom the favour of the powerful under a monarchy[51]. For this malady\nthe complete remedy is found in the paradox that \u2018the wise man is king,\u2019\nthat virtue can never be unseated from the curule chair[52]; temporary\nalleviations may be found, even by philosophers, in biting sarcasms\naimed at the incapacity of one\u2019s fellow-citizens[53]. It may be in the\nabstract the duty of a good man to take part in politics; but experience\nshows that the State has yet to be discovered which can tolerate a sage,\nor which a sage can tolerate[54]. Hence we find even Stoic teachers\nrelapsing into practical Epicureanism, and bidding their followers to\nlet the community go hang, and to reserve their energies for some nobler\noccupation[55]. To these lapses from sound principle we need not attach\nany serious importance; the individual Stoic did not always live up to\nhis creed.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Restlessness.]\n\n=373.= Restlessness is grief of mind without known cause; the unquiet\nsoul rushes hither and thither, vainly seeking to be free from its own\ncompany[56]. The lesson that Horace had pressed a century earlier, that\ndisquiet can only be cured by quiet, has not been learnt[57]. In Homer\nAchilles tosses on his bed in fever, lying first on his face, then on his\nback, never long at rest in any position; and so to-day our wealthy man\nfirst travels to luxurious Campania, then to the primitive district of\nthe Bruttii; north and south are tried in turn, and alike disapproved,\nwhilst after all the fault is not in the place, but in the man[58]. In\nthis temper men come to hate leisure and complain that they have nothing\nto do[59]. This folly reaches an extreme when men trust themselves to\nthe sea, take the chance of death without burial, and place themselves\nin positions in which human skill may avail nothing[60]. It even leads\nto great political disasters, as when Xerxes attacks Greece because he\nis weary of Asia, and Alexander invades India because the known world is\ntoo small for him[61]. The times will come, when men will seek novelty\nby travelling through the air or under the sea; they will force their way\nthrough the cold of the poles and the damp heat of the forests of Africa.\nThe remedy lies either in humbler submission to the will of the deity, or\nin a sense of humour which sees the absurdity of taking so much trouble\nfor so little advantage[62].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Pity.]\n\n=374.= Pity is that weakness of a feeble mind, which causes it to\ncollapse at the sight of another man\u2019s troubles[63], wrongly believing\nthem to be evils. Pity looks at the result, not at the cause, and it is\nmost keenly felt by women of all ages, who are distressed by the tears\neven of the most abandoned criminals, and would gladly burst open the\ndoors of the gaols to release them[64]. The cause of pity lies in a too\nrapid assent; we are caught napping by every sight that strikes on our\nsenses. If we see a man weeping, we say \u2018he is undone\u2019: if we see a poor\nman, we say \u2018he is wretched; he has nothing to eat[65].\u2019 Now we Stoics\nhave a bad name, as though we recommended to governors a system of harsh\npunishments[66]; but, on the contrary, none value more highly than we the\nroyal virtue of clemency[67]. Only let it be considered that a wise man\nmust keep a calm and untroubled mind, if only that he may be ready to\ngive prompt help to those who need it; a saving hand to the shipwrecked,\nshelter to the exile, the dead body of her son to a mother\u2019s tears. The\nwise man will not pity, but help[68].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sensibility.]\n\n=375.= Nearly akin to the evil of pity is that sensitiveness to the\nsufferings of others which leads men, contrary reason, to turn the other\nway and avoid the sight of them. Of this weakness Epictetus gives us a\nlively picture:\n\n  \u2018When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus\n  inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he\n  had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and\n  Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances.\n  \u2018Miserable,\u2019 the man said. Then Epictetus asked \u2018In what\n  respect? For men do not marry and beget children in order to be\n  wretched, but rather to be happy.\u2019 \u2018But I,\u2019 the man replied,\n  \u2018am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little\n  daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not\n  endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me\n  news that she had recovered.\u2019 \u2018Well then,\u2019 said Epictetus, \u2018do\n  you think that you acted right?\u2019 \u2018I acted naturally,\u2019 the man\n  replied; \u2018this is the case with all or at least most fathers.\u2019\n  \u2018Let us be careful,\u2019 said Epictetus, \u2018to learn rightly the\n  criterion of things according to nature. Does affection to\n  those of your family appear to you to be according to nature\n  and to be good?\u2019 Certainly.\u2019 \u2018Is then that which is consistent\n  with reason in contradiction with affection?\u2019 \u2018I think not.\u2019\n  \u2018Well then, to leave your sick child and to go away is not\n  reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but\n  it remains to inquire if it is consistent with affection.\u2019 \u2018Yes,\n  let us consider.\u2019 \u2018Has the mother no affection for her child?\u2019\n  \u2018Certainly she has.\u2019 \u2018Ought then the mother to have left her, or\n  ought she not?\u2019 \u2018She ought not.\u2019 \u2018And the nurse, does she love\n  her?\u2019 \u2018She does.\u2019 \u2018Ought then she also to have left her?\u2019 \u2018By no\n  means.\u2019 \u2018But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was\n  not at all an affectionate act[69].\u2019\n\nSeneca draws for us the same picture of sentimental neglect of duty.\n\u2018Of our luxurious rich,\u2019 he says, \u2018no one sits by the side of his dying\nfriend, no one watches the death of his own father, or joins in the last\nact of respect to the remains of any member of his family[70].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sensitiveness.]\n\n=376.= Another form of the evil of Grief is that of undue sensitiveness\nto criticism and abuse. This mental weakness is illustrated by the case\nof Fidus Cornelius, who burst into tears because some one in the senate\ncalled him a \u2018plucked ostrich\u2019; and in an earlier period Chrysippus\nhad been acquainted with a man who lost his temper merely because\nhe was called a \u2018sea-calf[71].\u2019 Others are annoyed by seeing their\neccentricities imitated, or by reference to their poverty or old age.\nThe remedy for all these things is humour; no one can be laughed at who\nturns the laugh against himself[72]. Another is to cease thinking about\noneself[73].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Mourning.]\n\n=377.= The hardest to bear of all distresses is the loss of friends by\ndeath, and most particularly, the loss by parents of their children. To\nmeet this trouble a special class of literature, called _consolationes_,\ngrew up, not confined to any one school of philosophers. The treatise of\nCrantor the Academic was famous in Cicero\u2019s time[74]; and in the letter\nof Servius Sulpicius to Cicero upon his daughter\u2019s death we have an\nadmirable example of the \u2018consolation\u2019 in private correspondence[75].\nSulpicius bids Cicero think of all the grief and trouble in the world,\nthe loss of political liberty at Rome, the destruction of so many famous\ncities of antiquity, until he feels that man is born to sorrow, and that\nhis own loss is but a drop in the ocean of the world\u2019s suffering. He also\ncalls on the mourner to think of his own character, and to set an example\nof firmness to his household[76]. Cicero found his real comfort in none\nof these things, but in industrious authorship. We have unfortunately no\nexample of a \u2018Consolation\u2019 by Musonius. Seneca has left us two treatises\nin this style, one a formal document addressed to the minister Polybius\non the death of his brother, the other a more personal appeal to Marcia,\na lady of an \u2018old Roman\u2019 family, on the death of a son. Besides the\narguments already used by Sulpicius[77], he recommends to Polybius\nattention to the public service and the reading of Homer and Virgil[78].\nBoth to him and to Marcia he pictures the happiness of the soul now\nadmitted to the company of the blest[79], or at any rate at peace and\nfreed from all the pains of life[80]. In writing to Marcia he recalls\nwith effect the examples of Octavia the sister, and Livia the wife of\nAugustus, each of whom lost a promising son in early manhood. Octavia\ngave herself up to her grief, never allowed her dead son to be mentioned\nin her presence, and wore mourning to the day of her death, though she\nwas surrounded by her children and grandchildren. Livia, after paying the\nlast tokens of respect, laid aside her grief, recalled with pleasure her\nson\u2019s achievements, and (advised so to act by her philosopher Areius)\ndevoted herself to her social duties, refusing to make all Rome sad\nbecause one mother had lost a son[81].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Resignation.]\n\n=378.= The consolations of Epictetus include less philosophical\nspeculation, and more religious resignation. To begin with, preparation\nshould be made for the loss of children. Parental affection should\nnot pass the bounds of reason; every time that a father embraces his\nchild, he should reflect \u2018this child is only lent to me,\u2019 \u2018this child\nis mortal[82].\u2019 If the child dies, his first thought should be \u2018he who\nhas given takes away[83].\u2019 To others he will say \u2018I have restored the\nchild[84].\u2019 His abiding mood will be that of resignation to the divine\nwill. He will realize that in the course of a long life many and various\nthings must happen; and that it is impossible to live to old age, without\nseeing the death of many whom we love[85].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comfort.]\n\n=379.= All \u2018consolations\u2019 aim at diminishing the grief of mourners,\nnature being inclined rather to excess than to defect in this matter.\nBut the Stoics could not altogether avoid the direct issue whether or\nnot grief is a sin, and weeping a weakness. The plain teaching of the\nschool was that \u2018death is no evil,\u2019 and therefore that grief for the\ndead is against reason. And to this view the teachers give from time to\ntime formal adhesion, as being the better cause[86]. But in individual\ncases they find that to a certain extent there is not only excuse,\nbut justification, for grief and tears; and thus they come into touch\nwith the common feelings of humanity[87], whilst the plea of \u2018natural\nnecessity\u2019 serves to ward off the criticism of sterner philosophers[88].\nFrom this concession emerges in the Roman period the definite precept\nof a time-limit for grief[89]; and its undue continuance is sternly\ndenounced as due to love of ostentation[90], and the morbid enjoyment of\nsorrow by an ill-balanced mind[91]. Grief in this shape is a dangerous\ndisease; there must be no trifling with it, but it must be totally\ndestroyed[92].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Misanthropy.]\n\n=380.= Lastly, we include under the heading of Grief a weakness which\noften developes into serious disease; that general discontent, which\nis voiced in complaints as to the wickedness of the age[93] and the\ndegeneracy of young Rome. Such discontent has always been characteristic\nof the old[94]; but under the principate it has developed into a special\nevil, the \u2018hatred of the human race\u2019 (_odium generis humani_). Of this\nfault even philosophers may be suspected; for it must be admitted that\nmen are bad, have been bad, and always will be bad[95]; in short, that\nthe whole human race is made up of madmen[96]. But wise men will bear\nwith this fact quietly and with a smile[97]. It is futile to bring\naccusations against the whole race[98], and a delusion to think our own\ntimes worse than those of our predecessors. The old Romans, to whom we\nlook up as models of virtue, made just the same complaints of their own\ntimes; and as a matter of fact the standard of general morality never\nvaries greatly from its average, either in an upward or a downward\ndirection[99].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Eating.]\n\n=381.= The fault of Hilarity (\u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _elatio animi_) is a\ndeparture from Soberness and cheerful Joy with regard to the things that\nappeal to our appetites, and this in the direction of excess. With regard\nto food, it corresponds to \u2018greediness\u2019 in modern speech. The matter is\nbut little discussed, but we have two interesting lectures by Musonius,\nwhich are chiefly concerned with this vice, from which we take the\nfollowing extracts:\n\n  \u2018Greediness\u2019 is an unpleasant fault, making men to resemble\n  pigs and dogs: but on the other hand healthy eating requires\n  much supervision and practice (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). Of all\n  pleasures that tempt men, greediness is the hardest to contend\n  against; for it assails us twice every day. To eat too much is\n  wrong; to eat too fast is wrong; so it is also to take too much\n  pleasure in food, to prefer the sweet to the wholesome, or not\n  to give your companions a fair share. Another fault is to let\n  meals interfere with business. In all these points we should look\n  chiefly to health. Now we observe that those who use the simplest\n  foods are generally the strongest; servants are stronger than\n  their masters, countryfolk than townsmen, the poor than the rich.\n  There is therefore good reason to prefer cheap food to that\n  which is costly, and that which is ready to hand to that which\n  is only obtained with great trouble. Further, some foods are\n  more congenial than others to men\u2019s nature; as those which grow\n  from the earth, or can be obtained from animals without killing\n  them. Food that requires no cooking has an advantage, as ripe\n  fruit, some vegetables, milk, cheese, and honey. Flesh food is\n  for many reasons objectionable. It is heavy and impedes thought;\n  the exhalations from it are turbid and overshadow the soul.\n  Men should imitate the gods, who feed on the light exhalations\n  of earth and water. But to-day we have even worse corruptions.\n  Many men are dainty and cannot eat food without vinegar or\n  some other seasoning. Also we call in art and machinery to aid\n  our pleasures, and actually have books written on cookery. All\n  this may serve to titillate the palate, but is mischievous to\n  health[100].\u2019\n\nThe sarcasms of Seneca are aimed not so much against excess in quantity\nor fastidiousness in quality, as against the collection of dainties from\nall parts of the world[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Drinking.]\n\n=382.= As to drinking, the Stoic period marks a great change in feeling.\nIn the times of Zeno, hard drinking had almost the honour of a religious\nceremony; and the banquet (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd) was the occasion of many a\nphilosophical discussion. Zeno began by laying it down as a principle\nthat \u2018the wise man will not be drunken[102],\u2019 and Chrysippus went so\nfar as to name drunkenness as causing the loss of virtue[103]. But\nthe prohibition was carefully guarded. The earlier teachers permitted\n\u2018wininess[104]\u2019; and Seneca justifies this means of banishing care,\npointing out many instances of public men of drinking habits who\ndischarged their duties admirably[105]. Yet on the whole he inclines\nto a stricter view, finding that \u2018drunkenness is a voluntary madness,\u2019\nand that it removes that sense of shame which most hinders men from\nwrongdoing[106]. Meanwhile a change in public taste, and perhaps the\ncontinual example of Cynic missionaries, had produced a tide of feeling\nin favour of simple living. The philosophical discussions sketched by\nCicero take place at all times of the day, but most usually in the\nmorning hours; they are never associated with riotous banqueting, but\nif necessary the meal is cut short to make room for the talk. Under the\nprincipate the fare is of the simplest; Seneca himself was a vegetarian\nin his youth[107]; his teacher Attalus was well content with porridge and\nwater, and found an audience ready to approve his taste[108].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sexual indulgence.]\n\n=383.= A similar but more profound change had taken place at the same\ntime in regard to sexual relations. In the time of Socrates courtesans\nand boy-favourites played a large part in social life; associated\nwith the banquet, they formed part of the accepted ideal of cultured\nenjoyment; even moralists approved of them as providing a satisfaction to\nnatural desires and indirectly protecting the sanctity of the home[109].\nThe same attitude of mind is shown by Seneca under similar circumstances,\nwhen he recommends that princes be indulged with mistresses in order to\nmake their character more gentle[110]. But little by little a more severe\nstandard prevailed[111]. From the first the Stoics set themselves against\nthe pursuit of other men\u2019s wives[112]. With regard to other relations,\nthey did not feel called upon to condemn them in other men[113]; they\nwere indeed, in themselves, matters of indifference[114]; but they\nfound it contrary to reason that a man\u2019s thoughts should be occupied\nwith matters so low, or that he should bring himself into subjection to\nirregular habits and become a slave to a woman[115]. As the courtesan\nwas gradually excluded by this rule[116], the general opinion fell\nback on the slave as the most accessible and least dangerous object of\nindulgence[117]. But the philosophers of the principate, following Zeno,\nwho in these matters took the \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd (_decorum_) as his rule[118], find\nit in a high degree unfitting that the master, who should in all things\nbe a model of self-control in his own household, should display so grave\na weakness to his slaves.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Chastity.]\n\n=384.= Thus little by little there emerged the ideal of a strict\nchastity, to the principle of which not even the marriage relation\nshould form an exception[119]. Every falling off from this ideal is sin\nor transgression[120]; and it is especially true in this matter that\neach act of weakness leaves its trace on the character, and that he who\nyields becomes a feebler man[121]. The Socratic paradox, that the wise\nman will be a lover[122], is consistently maintained by the Stoics; but\nthe practical limitations of this doctrine are well illustrated by the\nfollowing striking passage from the lectures of the Stoic Musonius:\u2014\n\n  \u2018Men who do not wish to be licentious and bad should consider\n  that sexual relations are only lawful in marriage, and for\n  the begetting of children; such as aim at mere pleasure are\n  lawless, even in marriage. Even apart from adultery and unnatural\n  relations, all sexual connexions are disgraceful; for what\n  sober-minded man would think of consorting with a courtesan, or\n  with a free woman outside marriage? and least of all would he\n  do so with his own slave. The lawlessness and foulness of such\n  connexions is a disgrace to all who form them; as we may see that\n  any man who is capable of a blush does his utmost to conceal\n  them. Yet one argues: \u201cin this case a man does no injustice; he\n  does not wrong his neighbour or deprive him of the hope of lawful\n  issue.\u201d I might reply that every one who sins injures himself,\n  for he makes himself a worse and less honourable man. But at any\n  rate he who gives way to foul pleasure and enjoys himself like\n  a hog is an intemperate man; and not least he who consorts with\n  his own slave-girl, a thing for which some people find excuse. To\n  all this there is a simple answer; how would such a man approve\n  of a mistress consorting with her own man-servant? Yet I presume\n  he does not think men inferior to women, or less able to restrain\n  their desires. If then men claim the supremacy over women, they\n  must show themselves superior in self-control. To conclude;\n  sexual connexion between a master and his female slave is nothing\n  but licentiousness[123].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u2018Bear and forbear.\u2019]\n\n=385.= Thus our detailed study of the four perturbations has led us to\nlay little stress on Fear and Greed, the weaknesses of the heroic period\nwhen men\u2019s minds were actively turned to the future, and to concentrate\nour attention on Grief and Hilarity, the two moods in which life\u2019s\ntroubles and temptations are wrongly met with as they arrive. As we\nfollow the history of Stoic philosophy through the times of the Roman\nprincipate, we find that this tendency to lay stress on the training of\nthe passive character increases: till Epictetus tells us that of all the\nvices far the worst are \u2018lack of endurance\u2019 (_intolerantia_), which is\nthe developed form of Grief, and \u2018lack of restraint\u2019 (_incontinentia_),\nwhich is the persistent inclination towards Hilarity[124]. Hence\nthe cure for vice is summed up by him in the golden word, \u2018bear and\nforbear[125]\u2019; that is, practise Courage and cast off Grief, practise\nSoberness and keep Hilarity far from you. \u2018A good rule,\u2019 a Peripatetic\nwould reply, \u2018for women and slaves.\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Avoidance of temptation.]\n\n=386.= This negative attitude is most strongly marked in Epictetus in\nconnexion with the dangers of sexual passion. Thus his short advice\nto all young men with regard to the attractions of women is \u2018Flee at\nonce[126]\u2019; and even in this his advice was countenanced in advance by\nthe more tolerant Seneca[127]. It would appear from both writers that the\nbattle between the sexes had become unequal at this period, so often is\nthe picture drawn of the promising and well-educated youth literally and\nhopelessly enslaved by a mistress presumably without birth, education,\nor honour[128]. It causes us some surprise to find that the distinction\nbetween heavenly and earthly love[129] is not brought in as a corrective\nof the latter. Only in a general way the suggestion is made that\nseductive attractions should be driven out by virtuous ideals:\n\n  \u2018Do not be hurried away by the appearance, but say: \u201cAppearances,\n  wait for me a little; let me see who you are and what you\n  are about; let me put you to the test.\u201d And do not allow the\n  appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things\n  which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever\n  it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful\n  and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if\n  you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see\n  what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have.... This is\n  the true athlete.... Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great\n  is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for\n  freedom, for happiness. Remember God; call on him as a helper and\n  protector[130].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Gradations of vice.]\n\n=387.= From the study of the separate evils we revert to the general\ntheory of Vice. And here we must recall the point that so far as vice\nis weakness or ill-health of the soul, it admits of gradations, which\nmay conveniently be stated as three, namely (i) rufflings of the soul;\n(ii) commotions, infections, or illnesses; (iii) diseases or vices\nproper[131]. It is not quite easy to classify the rufflings or first\nslight disturbances of the soul (_prima agitatio animi_) under the\nfour perturbations; but the bodily indications of them seem to be more\nmarked in the weaknesses of the active or heroic character, namely Fear\nand Greed. Thus in the direction of Fear we meet with hair standing on\nend\u2014pallor of complexion\u2014trembling limbs\u2014palpitation, and dizziness,\nall of which are bodily indications that fear is not far off; in the\ndirection of Anger (a form of Greed) we meet with heightened colour,\nflashing eyes, and gnashing teeth[132]. In the direction of Grief we\nmeet with tears and sighs, and in that of Hilarity the automatic sexual\nmovements, amongst which we must perhaps include blushing.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Rufflings.]\n\n=388.= It does not appear that the early Stoic masters occupied\nthemselves much with the gradations of vice; although a text can be taken\nfrom Zeno for a discourse on this subject. Neither does the earnest and\ncynically-minded Epictetus care to dwell on such details. On the other\nhand Seneca lays the greatest possible stress on the doctrine that\n\u2018rufflings\u2019 are not inconsistent with virtue. For this two arguments are\navailable, which are perhaps not quite consistent. First, the bodily\nindications are beyond the control of the mind; they are necessary\nconsequences of the union of body and soul, that is, of our mortal\ncondition[133]. Secondly, the \u2018rufflings\u2019 correspond to the mind-pictures\npresented to the soul in thought, and therefore are neither moral nor\nimmoral until the soul has given its assent to them[134]. From either\npoint of view we arrive at a result congenial to this philosopher. The\nwise man is, in fact, subject to slight touches of such feelings as grief\nand fear[135]; he is a man, not a stone. Secondly, the sovereignty of the\nwill remains unimpaired; give the mind but time to collect its forces,\nand it will restrain these feelings within their proper limits[136].\nThe doctrine is in reality, though not in form, a concession to the\nPeripatetic standpoint; it provides also a convenient means of defence\nagainst the mockers who observe that professors of philosophy often\nexhibit the outward signs of moral weakness.\n\n\n[Sidenote: \u2018Commotions.\u2019]\n\n=389.= If the soul gives way to any unreasoning impulse, it makes a\nfalse judgment and suffers relaxation of its tone: there takes place a\n\u2018commotion\u2019 or \u2018perturbation\u2019 (\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, _affectus_, _perturbatio_), which\nis a moral evil[137]. The Greek word \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 admits of two interpretations;\nit may mean a passive state or a disease; we here use it in the milder\nsense. By an \u2018emotion\u2019 we mean that the soul is uprooted from its\nfoundation, and begins as it were to toss on the sea; by \u2018affection\u2019\nthat it is seized or infected by some unwholesome condition[138]; by\n\u2018perturbation\u2019 that it has ceased to be an orderly whole, and is falling\ninto confusion. When we regard these words in their true sense, and\nshake off the associations they carry with them in English, it is clear\nthat all of them denote moral evils; nevertheless they cannot rightly be\ncalled \u2018diseases\u2019 of the soul[139]. The evils and weaknesses which have\nbeen discussed are commonly displayed in \u2018commotions\u2019 or \u2018perturbations,\u2019\nand are normally equivalent to them.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Diseases of the soul.]\n\n=390.= The soul by giving way to perturbations becomes worse; it\nacquires habits of weakness in particular directions. This weakness\nfrom a passing disposition (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) changes into a permanent disposition\nor habit (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), and this is in the full sense a \u2018disease\u2019 of the\nsoul[140]. These diseases or vices are, strictly speaking, four in\nnumber[141]: but the Stoics run into great detail as regards their\ntitles and subdivisions. Diseases in the ordinary sense (\u1f00\u03c1\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1)\ndisplay restlessness and want of self-control; such are ambition,\navarice, greediness, drunkenness, running after women[142], passionate\ntemper, obstinacy, and anxiety. An opposite class of maladies consists\nof unreasonable dislikes (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, _offensiones_);\nsuch are inhospitality, misogynism, and quarrelling with the world in\ngeneral[143].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Men are good or bad.]\n\n=391.= The study of vice in its various forms and gradations leaves\nuntouched the main positions of Stoic ethics, including the Socratic\nparadoxes. Men are of two classes only, the wise and the foolish, the\ngood and the bad[144]. This bold dualism the Stoics hold in common with\nthe Persians[145]; and though it is on the one hand tempered so as to\nmeet the common opinion that most men are of middling character, and on\nthe other hand subordinated to the monistic principle that good shall\nin the end prevail, it remains the key-stone of this department of\nphilosophy. Virtue is a right state of mind; everything that falls short\nof it is therefore a wrong state of mind. Virtue and vice lie in the\ninward disposition, not in the outward act[146]; and one who has crossed\nthe line is equally out of bounds whatever the distance to which he has\ntravelled on the far side[147]. Each man has therefore an all-important\nchoice to make. The great Stoic teachers were filled with a yearning\nafter righteousness and reconciliation with the divine purpose and a\ndisgust and horror of the condition of the man who is at variance with\nhis Creator, his neighbour, and himself[148]. These convictions they\nencased as usual in paradoxes and syllogisms.\n\n\n[Sidenote: All sins are equal.]\n\n=392.= That \u2018the affections must be extirpated[149]\u2019 ceases to be a\nparadox, as soon as we have defined affections as states of mind contrary\nto reason, and have made room for the \u2018reasonable affections\u2019 of caution,\ngood will, and joy[150]. That \u2018all sins are equal[151]\u2019 remains still,\nas of old, a stumbling block[152]. Yet this Socratic paradox has a\nsimple interpretation; it is a protest against the light-heartedness\nwhich tolerates \u2018petty\u2019 acts of wrongdoing, and is indifferent to the\nevil habits of mind thus acquired[153]. Two of the Stoic teachers of the\ntransition period, Heraclides of Tarsus and Athenodorus, are said to have\nabandoned the paradox[154], and all Stoics were ready to admit that sins\nare \u2018unlike\u2019[155]. But, as usual, the main body held firmly to a doctrine\nin which they had discovered a real practical value. Just the same\nprinciple is expressed by other paradoxes, as that \u2018he who has one vice\nhas all, though he may not be equally inclined to all[156]\u2019; and again\nthat \u2018he who is not wise is a fool and a madman[157].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sin is curable.]\n\n=393.= In spite of the parallelism of virtue and vice the latter is\ndestined to subordination, not only in the history of the universe, but\nalso in the individual man. Even if sins are equal, vice as ill health\nof the soul has degrees. The first \u2018rufflings\u2019 of the soul are, as we\nhave seen, not to be reckoned as real evils; its \u2018perturbations\u2019 give the\nhope of a coming calm; and grievous though its \u2018diseases\u2019 are, we have no\nsuggestion of incurable sin, or of the hopeless offender. Even he who has\nmost fallen retains the germs of virtue, and these may again ripen under\na proper discipline[158].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoic austerity.]\n\n=394.= The attitude of the Stoic school towards sin and weakness exposed\nit, as we have seen, to constant criticism and ridicule. To some extent\nthis was due to the profession of philosophy in itself: for every such\nprofession implied some claim to clearer knowledge and more consistent\naction than that of the crowd[159]. But the Stoics also sought to be\n\u2018austere\u2019 with regard to social pleasures, and thus it seemed that they\nneither offered others a share in their own happiness nor sympathetically\npartook in that of others[160]; whilst at the same time they claimed\nexemption from the weaknesses and failings of their neighbours. We have\nseen both Seneca and Epictetus anxious to meet criticism on these points\nby laying stress on those touches of natural feeling in which wise and\nfoolish alike share. But in addressing the members of the sect their\ntone is very different; they hold out, as a prize worth the winning, the\nprospect of attaining to that calm and unchanging disposition of mind\nwhich has for ever left behind the flutterings of fear and greed, of\ngrief and hilarity, and which is attuned to reason alone[161]. Epictetus\nindeed often expresses elation and pride upon this theme:\n\n  \u2018I will show the sinews of a philosopher. What are these? A\n  desire (\u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) never disappointed, an aversion (\u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) which\n  never meets with that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit\n  (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae), a diligent purpose (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), an assent which is not\n  rash. These you shall see[162].\u2019\n\n  \u2018Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you\n  are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion,\n  nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations\n  and free from everything. When a man has this peace (not\n  proclaimed by Caesar, for how should he be able to proclaim it?)\n  but by God through reason, is he not content when he reflects\u2014Now\n  no evil can happen to me[163]?\u2019\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] \u2018est peccare tanquam transilire lineas\u2019 Cic. _Par._ iii 20.\n\n[2] \u2018Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not\nuseful?... Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things\u2019\nEpict. _Disc._ ii 17, 10 and 11.\n\n[3] \u2018omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures;\naegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et\nanimi \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis\nanimi elationem voluptariam\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 35; \u2018est igitur\naegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ... laetitia opinio recens\nboni praesentis; ... metus opinio impendentis mali, ... libido opinio\nventuri boni\u2019 _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14; \u2018hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent\ngaudentque\u2019 Verg. _Aen._ vi 733. See also Diog. L. vii 110 and Stob. ii\n7, 10 b.\n\n[4] \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7, \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ae\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 Galen _Hipp. et Plat._ v i, p. 429 K; cf. _ib._ iv p. 387 K (Arnim i\n461).\n\n[5] In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one\nof the virtues; they are \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 (_insipientia_), \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 (_iniustitia_),\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1 (_ignavia_) and \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 (_intemperantia_); and each of these is\nrooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that he who has one vice has all\n(Stob. ii 7, 11 k, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth).\n\n[6] This view is summed up in the phrase that \u2018the perturbations\nare \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac, but not \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u2019 (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the\nprinciple that only vice and what is akin to vice is evil. The Roman\nwriters realized the difficulty in the use of words: \u2018morbi autem et\naegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem\npartes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes\nautem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse\u2019 Cic.\n_Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 29 and 30.\n\n[7] \u2018utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum\nest; nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 116,\n1; \u2018vacandum omni est animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum\netiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 20, 69;\n\u2018contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ x\n10, 1.\n\n[8] \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f20\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\nStob. ii 7, 10 c; \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae _ib._ 10 b.\n\n[9] Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: \u2018ira procul absit, cum\nqua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 38, 136.\n\n[10] \u2018[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nec quicquam sine illa magnificum\nin bello fortitudo gerit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iii 7, 1.\n\n[11] \u2018\u201cnon potest\u201d inquit \u201cfieri\u201d Theophrastus, \u201cut non vir bonus\nirascatur malis\u201d\u2019 _ib._ 14, 1; \u2018\u201cquid ergo?\u201d inquit \u201cvir bonus non\nirascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?\u201d\u2019 _ib._ 12, 1.\n\n[12] \u2018stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis\nexsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ v 3, 1.\n\n[13] \u2018abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo\u2019 _ib._ iii 12,\n6.\n\n[14] \u2018haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non\nexpectant manum, et habent non habentur\u2019 _ib._ 17, 1.\n\n[15] \u2018adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio\u2019 _ib._ 17, 5.\n\n[16] \u2018corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine\ncastigatione, sed sine ira\u2019 _ib._ 15, 1.\n\n[17] \u2018[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem\u2019 _ib._ 11, 5.\n\n[18] \u2018nec [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio ... ira enim\nperturbat artem\u2019 _ib._ iv 14, 2 and 3.\n\n[19] \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 [\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6] \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u1f20\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd Stob. ii 7, 10 c; \u2018ira est cupiditas\nulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius, a\nquo te inique putes laesum\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iii 2, 4.\n\n[20] \u2018ira furor brevis est\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 2, 62; \u2018quidam ex sapientibus\nviris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iii 1, 2.\n\n[21] _ib._ 4.\n\n[22] \u2018non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam\nparentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus\u2019 _ib._ 12, 4.\n\n[23] \u2018nec in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in occurrentia obiter furit\u2019\n_ib._ v 1, 3.\n\n[24] \u2018nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante\u2019\n_ib._ iv 1, 4; \u2018nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est\u2019 _ib._ 3, 4.\n\n[25] _ib._ 3-5.\n\n[26] \u2018maximum remedium irae mora est\u2019 _ib._ 29, 1; \u2018Keep quiet, and count\nthe days on which you have not been angry\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 12.\n\n[27] \u2018pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam\nlaedunt\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ v 28, 4; \u2018contempt is that which putteth an edge\nupon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself\u2019 Bacon, _Essay_ 57.\n\n[28] \u2018eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._\n12, 3.\n\n[29] \u2018quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum\u2019\n_ib._ iv 36, 1.\n\n[30] See below, \u00a7 403.\n\n[31] \u2018percussit te: recede. referiendo enim et occasionem saepius\nferiendi dabis et excusationem\u2019 _ib._ 34, 5.\n\n[32] \u2018quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt. quaedam\naltae gravesque sunt et introrsus versae\u2019 _ib._ iii 4, 3.\n\n[33] \u2018inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam\nenim sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus\npertinaces quam frequentes\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ 2 and 3.\n\n[34] Defined as \u2018atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis\u2019 or \u2018inclinatio\nanimi ad asperiora\u2019 Sen. _Clem._ ii 4, 1 and 3.\n\n[35] _ib._ i 12, 1.\n\n[36] \u2018domini crudeles tota civitate commonstrantur invisique et\ndetestabiles sunt\u2019 _ib._ 18, 3.\n\n[37] \u2018ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus\u2019 _ib._ 24, 3.\n\n[38] \u2018tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum\ncrudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat\u2019 _ib._\n25, 3.\n\n[39] _ib._ 22, 1.\n\n[40] \u2018puta tutam esse crudelitatem; quale eius regnum est?\u2019 _ib._ 26, 2.\n\n[41] \u2018optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est\u2019 _Ben._ vii\n20, 3.\n\n[42] \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u1fc6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 Stob. ii 7, 10 b; \u2018est\naegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo\nrectum esse videatur\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14.\n\n[43] See above, \u00a7 114.\n\n[44] Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75.\n\n[45] \u2018nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris\nquoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 107, 4; and see\nfurther, \u00a7 339.\n\n[46] \u2018id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam\nmalorum potentiam animus patientia pervenit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 4, 13.\n\n[47] Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however\ncomplicated by the ambiguity of the Greek word \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, which corresponds\nequally to _dolor_ and _labor_ in Latin; see Cic. _Tusc. disp._ ii 15, 35.\n\n[48] \u2018tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis\nquam ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine\ngemitu velut aliena corpora exsaniari patiuntur\u2019 _ib._ xii 3, 1.\n\n[49] \u2018scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho\u2019 _Ep._\n13, 5.\n\n[50] \u2018magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae\nputaverant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur\u2019 _ib._ 76, 34.\n\n[51] \u2018quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam\u2019\nHor. _Ep._ i 1, 43.\n\n[52] \u2018virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus; |\nnec sumit aut ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae\u2019 Hor. _C._ iii 2,\n17-20.\n\n[53] \u2018Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied:\n\u2018because, if a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods; if a\ngood politician, to his fellow-citizens\u2019 Stob. iv 4, 29.\n\n[54] \u2018si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam,\nquae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 8, 3.\n\n[55] \u2018si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe\u2019 _Ep._\n19, 1.\n\n[56] \u2018mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et\nquietis impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima\u2019 _ib._ xii 6, 6.\n\n[57] \u2018ratio et prudentia curas | ... aufert; | caelum non animum mutant,\nqui trans mare currunt\u2019 Hor. _Ep._ i 11, 25-27.\n\n[58] Sen. _Dial._ ix 12-15.\n\n[59] \u2018inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil\nipsos habere quod agant\u2019 _ib._ 2, 10.\n\n[60] \u2018incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope\nsuperabilem, mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti\u2019 _N. Q._ v 18, 6\nand 7; \u2018non eadem est his et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli\u2019 _ib._\n16; \u2018quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui persuasum est ut navigarem?\u2019 _Ep._\n53, 1.\n\n[61] _N. Q._ v 18, 10.\n\n[62] \u2018magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita\nconsumitur\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ 16.\n\n[63] \u2018misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi,\nad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis\u2019 _Clem._ ii 5, 1.\n\n[64] \u2018anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur,\nquae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent\u2019 _ib._\n\n[65] Epict. _Disc._ iii 3, 17.\n\n[66] \u2018cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva\nmineris | falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant\nhomines\u2019 Hor. _Sat._ i 3, 121-124; \u2018scio male audire apud imperitos\nsectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime principibus regibusque\nbonum daturam consilium ... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est\u2019 Sen.\n_Clem._ ii 5, 2 and 3.\n\n[67] See below, \u00a7 409.\n\n[68] \u2018non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret\u2019 Sen. _Clem._ ii 6, 3.\n\n[69] Epict. _Disc._ i 11.\n\n[70] \u2018ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui\nsustinet, quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum\npropinquorumque extrema hora deseritur\u2019 Sen. _N. Q._ iii 18, 6.\n\n[71] _Dial._ ii 17, 1.\n\n[72] \u2018[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces\nconcisas. sic inimicorum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ ii 17, 3; \u2018nemo risum praebuit qui ex se cepit\u2019 _ib._ 2.\n\n[73] \u2018cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet\u2019\n_Ep._ 63, 3.\n\n[74] Cicero wrote a treatise \u2018de Consolatione\u2019 based on this work, but\nonly a few fragments remain. Plutarch\u2019s \u2018Consolation\u2019 for Apollonius was\ndrawn from the same source (Schmekel, p. 150).\n\n[75] Cic. _Fam._ iv 5.\n\n[76] \u2018denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis\nconsueris praecipere et dare consilium\u2019 _ib._ 5, 5.\n\n[77] \u2018maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se\npassi sunt omnes omnesque passuri\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ xi 1, 4. On the other\nside \u2018malevoli solatii est turba miserorum\u2019 _ib._ vi 12, 5; \u2018[cogita]\nfratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere\u2019 _ib._ xi 5, 4.\n\n[78] _ib._ 8, 2.\n\n[79] _ib._ 9, 3; \u2018inter felices currit animas\u2019 _ib._ vi 5, 1.\n\n[80] _ib._ xi 9, 4; \u2018excepit illum magna et aeterna pax\u2019 _ib._ vi 19, 6.\nSee also above, \u00a7\u00a7 298, 299.\n\n[81] Sen. _Dial._ vi 3 to 5; above, \u00a7 123.\n\n[82] \u2018If you are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being\nwhom you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be\ndisturbed\u2019 Epict. _Manual_ 3 (after Anaxagoras).\n\n[83] _Disc._ iv 1, 101.\n\n[84] \u2018Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored\nit. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has\nbeen restored\u2019 _Manual_ 11.\n\n[85] _Disc._ iii 24, 27.\n\n[86] \u2018illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed\ncui ista firmitas animi continget?\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 63, 1.\n\n[87] \u2018inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suorum iisdem oculis,\nquibus ipsos, videre\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 99, 15; cf. _Dial._ xii 1, 2.\n\n[88] \u2018cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis\nnecessitas exprimit\u2019 _Ep._ 99, 18.\n\n[89] \u2018nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus\neffuderit, non esse tradendum animum dolori\u2019 _ib._ 27.\n\n[90] \u2018at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est\nquod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit\u2019 _Dial._ vi 7, 1.\n\n[91] \u2018fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor\u2019 _ib._ 1, 7.\n\n[92] \u2018non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est\u2019 _ib._\n\n[93] \u2018obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 2,\n11.\n\n[94] \u2018difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor\ncastigatorque minorum\u2019 Hor. _A. P._ 173, 174.\n\n[95] \u2018idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; malos esse nos, malos\nfuisse, invitus adiciam et futuros esse\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ i 10, 3; \u2018cupidi\nomnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes\u2019 _ib._ v 17, 3.\n\n[96] \u2018non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt\u2019 _ib._\n\n[97] \u2018satius est humana vitia placide accipere\u2019 _ib._ ix 15, 5; \u2018omnia\nvulgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur\u2019 _ib._ 2.\n\n[98] \u2018generi humano venia tribuenda est\u2019 _ib._ iv 10, 2.\n\n[99] \u2018hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri\nnostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res\nhumanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum\ndumtaxat ultra aut citra mota\u2019 _Ben._ i 10, 1.\n\n[100] Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37.\n\n[101] \u2018ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc\nmaria scrutatur, hinc terras. alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium\nvariis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi\nex fastidio pax est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 89, 22. Another form of luxury is in\nthe eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold: \u2018quemadmodum nihil\nillis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes boletos\ndemittunt\u2019 _N. Q._ iv 13, 10.\n\n[102] See above, \u00a7 83, note 82.\n\n[103] See above, \u00a7 324, note 155.\n\n[104] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f30\u03bd\u03c9\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd [\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd], \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad Diog. L. vii\n118. This was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson in _Journ. Phil._\nxxx pp. 221 sqq.\n\n[105] \u2018nonnunquam et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat\nnos, sed ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ ix 17, 8; see further _Ep._ 83, 14 and 15.\n\n[106] \u2018nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam\u2019 _Ep._\n83, 18; \u2018omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis\nconatibus verecundiam removet. plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona\nvoluntate prohibitis abstinent\u2019 _ib._ 83, 19.\n\n[107] See above, \u00a7 126.\n\n[108] Sen. _Ep._ 110, 14 and 18.\n\n[109] Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 5.\n\n[110] \u2018si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae\nferitatem eius emolliant, libens offeram\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ vii 20, 3. The\nfurthering of the amour of Nero with Acte was a practical application\nof this theory: \u2018tradit Cluvius ... Senecam contra muliebres illecebras\nsubsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam\u2019 Tac. _Ann._ xiv\n2, 2.\n\n[111] \u2018non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe\nenim frugalior haec iuventus quam illa est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 97, 9.\n\n[112] See above, \u00a7 306, note 27.\n\n[113] \u2018As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before\nmarriage; but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is\nconformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who\nindulge in these pleasures\u2019 Epict. _Manual_ 33, 8.\n\n[114] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03c1\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. \u00a7 317.\n\n[115] \u2018eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam\nquaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset: \u201cde sapiente\u201d inquit \u201cvidebimus;\nmihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut\nincidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi\u201d\u2019\nSen. _Ep._ 116, 5; \u2018Did you never love any person, a young girl, slave\nor free?... have you never flattered your little slave? have you never\nkissed her feet? What then is slavery?\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 15 and 17.\n\n[116] \u2018magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ii 6, 7.\n\n[117] Hor. _Sat._ i 2, 116-119.\n\n[118] See above, \u00a7 318, note 104.\n\n[119] \u2018Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry\nwith the adulterer\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were\nalready practised in Seneca\u2019s time; \u2018vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam\nomni umore interdixere corporibus\u2019 _Dial._ iv 12, 4.\n\n[120] \u2018lapsa est libido in muliere ignota ... peccavit vero nihilominus,\nsi quidem est peccare tanquam transilire lineas\u2019 Cic. _Par._ iii 1, 20.\n\n[121] \u2018When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person,\ndo not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also\nincreased your incontinence\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 6.\n\n[122] \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bd\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd Diog. L. vii 129.\n\n[123] Stob. iii 6, 23.\n\n[124] \u2018idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium\ngravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut\niniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus\nrebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus\u2019 A. Gellius, _N.\nA._ xvii 19, 5.\n\n[125] \u2018verba haec duo dicebat: \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5 et \u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5 _ib._ 6.\n\n[126] \u2018At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the\ncontest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in\nphilosophy\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 12, 12.\n\n[127] \u2018id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime\nprofugiamus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 51, 5; \u2018ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda\nest omnis admonitio dilecti corporis\u2019 _ib._ 69, 3.\n\n[128] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 15-21.\n\n[129] See above, \u00a7 349.\n\n[130] Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 24-29.\n\n[131] The terms \u2018ruffling\u2019 (_levis motus_), and \u2018commotions\u2019\n(_emotiones_) or \u2018perturbations\u2019 (_perturbationes_) are metaphors taken\nfrom the disturbance of a calm sea; the remaining terms properly describe\nbodily ill-health. The English words \u2018emotions,\u2019 \u2018affections\u2019 have almost\nentirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer suitable\nas translations. The substitution of \u2018commotion\u2019 for \u2018emotion\u2019 has\nalready been adopted by Maudsley, _Pathology of the Human Mind_.\n\n[132] \u2018ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba\nsubfunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv 2,\n1; \u2018erubescunt pudici etiam loqui de pudicitia\u2019 Cic. _Leg._ i 19, 50. See\nalso the following notes.\n\n[133] \u2018si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem humoris\nobsceni altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile\nindicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis\nhos esse pulsus\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv 3, 2; \u2018est primus motus non voluntarius\nquasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio\u2019 _ib._ 4, 1.\n\n[134] \u2018prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non\nmagis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species\u2019 _ib._ 3, 5.\n\n[135] \u2018[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit\nZenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix\nmanet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis\ncarebit\u2019 _ib._ iii 16, 7; \u2018scio inveniri quosdam, qui negent doliturum\nesse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in eiusmodi casum incidisse\u2019\n_ib._ xi 18, 5; \u2018nullo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est\u2019 _ib._ xii\n16, 1.\n\n[136] \u2018nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit\u2019 _ib._ i 2, 2; \u2018invicti\nesse possumus, inconcussi non possumus\u2019 _N. Q._ ii 59, 3.\n\n[137] \u2018adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere\nse illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi\u2019 _Dial._ iv 3, 1; \u2018[Zeno]\nperturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi,\net omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam\nintemperantiam\u2019 Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 39; perturbationes autem nulla naturae\nvi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia levitatis\u2019 _Fin._\niii 10, 35.\n\n[138] \u2018neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur\nadfectus, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iii 8, 2.\n\n[139] \u2018perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 appellant, poteram\nego verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad\nomnia. quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere?\nsed illi dicunt \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa\ndeclarari videtur\u2019 Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 35.\n\n[140] \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\nGal. _loc. aff._ i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429); on the other hand a\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 is called \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 Stob. vii 7, 10 e; \u2018adfectus sunt motus animi\nimprobabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere\nmorbum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 75, 12; \u2018morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius\nhaec animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt\u2019 _ib._ 11.\n\n[141] For the technical terms see above, \u00a7 362, note 6.\n\n[142] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 11, 25.\n\n[143] \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 [\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1] \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd,\n\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Stob. vii 7, 10 e; \u2018offensionum autem\ndefinitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde\nfugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita, et mulierum\nodium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani\u2019 Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv\n11, 27.\n\n[144] \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03b5 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a3\u03c4\u03c9\u03ca\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd Stob. ii\n7, 11 g.\n\n[145] See above, \u00a7 8.\n\n[146] See above, \u00a7 317.\n\n[147] \u2018cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe\nprogrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet\u2019\nCic. _Parad._ iii 20.\n\n[148] Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who\nwrites \u2018the Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school,\ncould have no real consciousness of sin\u2019 _Philippians_, p. 290. It may\nhowever be admitted that the feelings we ascribe to the Stoics are more\nforcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius and Epictetus than\nby Seneca.\n\n[149] See above, \u00a7 362, note 7.\n\n[150] See above, \u00a7 355.\n\n[151] \u1f00\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f34\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a7\u03c1\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c0\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd Diog. L. vii 120.\n\n[152] \u2018omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum\nqui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem\nsuffocaverit\u2019 Cic. _Mur._ 29, 61.\n\n[153] \u2018parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nec enim peccata rerum\neventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt\u2019 Cic. _Par._ iii 20; \u2018facilius\nest excludere perniciosa quam regere\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iii 7, 2; \u2018optimum est\nipsis repugnare seminibus\u2019 _ib._ 8, 1; \u2018si das aliquid iuris tristitiae\ntimori cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra\npotestate\u2019 _Ep._ 85, 11.\n\n[154] Diog. L. vii 121.\n\n[155] \u1f36\u03c3\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\u03ad\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 Stob. ii\n7, 11 l.\n\n[156] \u2018stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est;\nalius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur\n...\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iv 27, 1; \u2018omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet\nvitium unum, omnia habet\u2019 _ib._ v 15, 1.\n\n[157] \u2018intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum\ndiligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos\u2019 Cic.\n_Tusc. disp._ iii 5, 10.\n\n[158] \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 Cleanthes\nap. Stob. ii 7, 5 b 8; \u2018in pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam\nin malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non\ncertiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio\u2019 Sen.\n_Ben._ vii 19, 5; \u2018inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, modo\ndeliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia\u2019 _ib._ v 25, 6.\n\n[159] \u2018satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur,\ninvidiosum est\u2019 _Ep._ 5, 2.\n\n[160] \u03b1\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 Diog. L.\nvii 117.\n\n[161] \u2018[sapiens] nec cupit nec timet beneficio rationis\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vii\n5, 1; \u2018erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus\u2019 _ib._ ii 9, 3.\n\n[162] Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 29.\n\n[163] _ib._ iii 13, 11 to 13.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nCOUNSELS OF PERFECTION.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Precepts.]\n\n=395.= We have now set forth the Stoic theory of ethics, both in its\nhigh philosophic framework and in its more detailed treatment, in which\nit prescribes what is to be done and what to be left undone, and how the\nsoul is to be disciplined in health and medicined in sickness. It remains\nfor us to study the application of the system to individual cases, a\nmatter which perhaps lies outside the scope of philosophy as understood\nat the present day, but is an essential part of the work of churches and\nsocial organizations. This department of philosophy was termed by the\nancients \u2018precepts,\u2019 or (more fully) \u2018advice, dissuasion, admonition,\nexhortation, consolation, warnings, praise, reproof\u2019 and so forth[1]; by\nsome philosophers, as for instance by Aristo of Chios, it was held in\ncontempt, by others (less inclined to Cynism) it was considered alone\nworthy of pursuit[2]. But the steady conviction of the main body of\nStoic teachers was that theory and precept must go hand in hand[3]; that\nmoral principles have no strength apart from their daily application[4],\nand that practical suggestions apart from a sound and reasoned system\nare like leaves cut from the bough, without lasting greenness[5].\nSince precepts apply directly to individual persons and particular\ncircumstances, they presuppose some relationship between teacher and\nhearer[6]; the latter must be either a convert to the school or one who\nhas grown up under its influence. In the Roman period the department\nof precepts is of increasing importance; we have something to learn\nfrom Antipater, Panaetius and Cicero, but we find much more material in\nthe lectures (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03af, \u2018diatribes\u2019) and letters of Musonius, Seneca,\nEpictetus and other teachers of the period of the principate.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Training of the young.]\n\n=396.= The \u2018precepts\u2019 which we find illustrated by our various\nauthorities are not easily systematized, but they have all the more the\ncharm of personal intimacy; through them we are admitted to the home\nlife of the Stoics. As Seneca wrote to Lucilius, so every day did Stoic\nfathers, Stoic teachers, Stoic jurists, address those who came within\ntheir influence. Believing every man to have the seed of virtue in\nhim, they had confidence that by their words it would often be stirred\nto life[7]; and that in other cases, in which the promising shoot had\nbecome overshadowed by ignorance or evil habits, it would by the same\nmeans begin to grow again[8]. But the full benefits of precepts could\nonly be seen where they fell on well-prepared ground, and formed part\nof a training extending from infancy to the grave; where the instructor\ncould daily ensure their enforcement and observe their effect. This\nopportunity was necessarily found most often in the teaching of the\nyoung; and the Stoic system of precepts, though not restricted to one\nperiod of life, was to a large extent a foreshadowing of a \u2018Theory of\nEducation.\u2019 It was under all circumstances guided by the rule of \u2018little\nby little.\u2019 Precepts must be few[9], and must be in themselves easy for\nthe individual to carry out[10]; but by steady practice great things will\nbe accomplished.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The teacher\u2019s example.]\n\n=397.= Since the value of precepts depends on the personal influence of\nthe instructor, it is clear that his example will be of the greatest\nimportance, and we may first ask what the discipline is to which he\nhimself submits. Here the Cynic teacher seems to have the advantage, for\nhe lives in the sight of all men; and the Indian, who allows himself\nto be scorched or burnt to show his contempt for pain, makes a still\nmore forcible appeal[11]. The Stoic does not parade himself in this\nfashion, but neither does he lock the door of his private life against\nany who wish to examine it[12]. In the early morning he shakes off\nsleep, rousing himself to do the day\u2019s work of a man[13]. Having clothed\nhimself, he turns his mind towards his Maker, and sings his praises;\nhe resolves during the coming day to cooperate in his purposes, and to\nbear cheerfully any burden that may be placed upon him[14]. He will then\ngive a short time to gymnastic exercises for the good of his health[15];\nafter which, if his strength allows it, he will take, winter or summer,\na plunge into the cold bath[16]; next comes the slightest of meals[17];\nthen a short nap or reverie[18]. From this he is aroused by the stir\naround him, and he then applies himself to the day\u2019s studies, being\ncareful to alternate reading and writing, so that his mind may be neither\nexhausted by the latter nor relaxed by the former[19]. Later on he will\nconsider his practical duties towards his relatives, his friends, and\nsociety in general. He will order his household and settle the disputes\nof his dependents. He will visit his friends, saying a word here and\nthere in season[20], but not (like the Cynics) to all and sundry[21]. He\nwill encourage those who are making progress in virtue, and sharply warn\nthose who are in danger of a fall[22]. He advises a young mother to nurse\nher child at her own breast; and when he meets with objections, points\nout the wisdom and propriety of obeying the prescriptions of nature[23].\nReturning home, he will again enjoy some slight bodily exercise, joining\nperhaps in a game of ball; his thoughts however will not always turn\non success in the game, but he will consider how many principles in\nphysics and ethics may be illustrated by it[24]. Now that evening comes\non, he sits down to a meal (not over-elaborate) in the company of one\nor two favourite pupils[25]. Afterwards comes the temptation to burn\nthe midnight oil in gathering seeds of wisdom for the morrow from the\nwell-thumbed manuscript of Cleanthes or, it may be, of Epicurus[26].\nRetiring to his chamber, he will examine his conscience, review the\nevents of the past day, and be at peace with himself before he sleeps[27].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The child\u2019s life.]\n\n=398.= With the training of children the Stoic teacher is perhaps not\naltogether familiar, but he knows its importance[28]; it must be based\non simplicity and austerity, for just at this time indulgence and luxury\nare most dangerous stimulants to the passions[29]. The child must learn\nto eat and drink in a mannerly way[30], to refrain from loud talking and\nlaughing[31], to express himself in respectful and graceful words[32]. He\nmust be taught to do right before he can understand the reason why[33],\nor else by doing wrong he will make it difficult for himself afterwards\nto do right; he must be ruled until he can rule himself[34]. For this\nreason we give children proverbs (_sententiae_) or anecdotes (\u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9) to\nwrite out and learn, such as \u2018honesty is the best policy\u2019 or \u2018Socrates\nbeing asked of what city he was ...\u2019; and these short pithy sayings sink\ndeep[35]. But in the school life of children no attempt must be made\nto grapple with the real problems of life, because these are too hard\nfor them, though parents often forget this objection[36]. Games and\namusements may be permitted; for though in discussions on high principle\nthe Stoics may be entirely opposed to \u2018relaxation of soul[37],\u2019 yet in\npractical life they freely admit its importance[38]. All dealings with\nchildren should be gentle; the discipline of the rod has long ago been\nabandoned by all sensible parents and teachers[39].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Harm of soft living.]\n\n=399.= Soft living is at all ages to be avoided[40]. It is in these\ndays a danger to the bodily health; for when a man is accustomed to be\nprotected from a draught by glass windows, to have his feet kept warm\nby foot-warmers constantly renewed, and his dining-room kept at an even\ntemperature by hot air, the slightest breeze may put him in danger of\nhis life[41]. Those who envy men who \u2018live softly\u2019 forget that their\ncharacter becomes soft thereby[42]. In particular clothing should not\nbe such as altogether to protect the body from heat in summer, and from\ncold in winter. It is better to wear one shirt than two, best still to\nhave only a coat. Then again, if you can bear it, it is better to go\nwithout shoes; for after all to be shod is not very different from being\nfettered, and runners do not use shoes[43]. So also avoid luxurious\nfurniture; of what use is it that couches, tables and beds should be\nmade of costly woods, and adorned with silver and gold? We eat, drink,\nand sleep better without these things. In all these matters the Spartans\nset us a good example; for while disease injures the body only, luxury\ncorrupts both body and soul[44].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Training of girls.]\n\n=400.= Boys and girls must be educated alike. This nature teaches us, for\nwe train colts and puppies without any regard for the difference of sex.\nThe true education of children is in the practice of the virtues, and\nthese are the same for men and for women. Women need Wisdom to understand\nthe ordering of a household, Justice to control the servants, Soberness\nthat they may be modest and unselfish. But they also need Courage; in\nspite of the name \u2018manliness\u2019 (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1), this is not a virtue reserved\nfor men. Without it women may be led by threats into immodest acts.\nFemales of all kinds fight to defend their young; the Amazons too were\ngood fighters, and it is only for want of practice that women cannot\ndo the same to-day. That men, being the stronger, should do the heavier\nwork, and women the lighter, is an arrangement which is often convenient,\nbut circumstances may require the contrary. Girls at any rate must learn\nequally with boys to bear suffering, not to fear death, not to be in low\nspirits about anything that happens; to avoid grasping habits, to love\nequality and benevolence, and to do no harm to man or woman[45].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Obedience to parents.]\n\n=401.= Children should obey their parents, but in the spirit of reason.\nWe do not obey a father who gives orders for the treatment of a sick\nperson contrary to those of the physician; nor one, who being himself\nill, demands things that are not good for him; nor one who bids his son\nsteal, or appropriate trust funds, or sacrifice his youthful bloom. We\ndo not even obey him when he tells us to spell a word wrongly or strike\na false note on the lyre. If your father forbids you to philosophize,\nshow him by your manner of life, by prompt obedience, by good temper,\nby unselfishness, how good a thing philosophy is. But after all, the\ncommand of the universal Father is more urgent upon you; which is, to\nbe just, kind, benevolent, sober, high-souled; above labours and above\npleasures; pure from all envy and plotting. You need not assume the\noutward appearance of a philosopher; for the power of philosophy is in\nthe innermost part of the soul, which the father can no more reach than\nthe tyrant[46].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Example of gladiators and soldiers.]\n\n=402.= The fancy of young men is easily attracted by the vision of\nvirtue, but it is hard for them to persevere; they are like soft\ncheese which slips away from the hook by which it is taken up[47]. We\nmust therefore put before them an ideal which appeals to them, and in\nwhich the advantages of fixed purpose and severe training are apparent\nto the eye. Such is the training of the athlete, the gladiator, and\nthe soldier[48]. The teachers of wrestling bid the pupil try again\nafter each fall[49]; the trained boxer is eager to challenge the most\nformidable opponent[50]. The gladiator has learnt the lesson that pain is\nno evil, when he stands up wounded before a sympathetic crowd and makes\na sign that it matters nothing[51]. But most of all the soldier\u2019s oath\nserves as an example, when he pledges himself to serve Caesar faithfully\nall his life: let the young philosopher pledge himself to serve his God\nas faithfully, to submit to the changes and chances of human life, and to\nobey willingly the command to act or to suffer[52]. Without effort, as\nHesiod has taught us, no greatness can be attained[53].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The \u2018contrary twist.\u2019]\n\n=403.= In youth bad habits are apt to acquire some strength before\nthey can be rooted out, and it will be well to anticipate this evil by\nexercising body and soul in advance in a direction contrary to that of\nthe most common temptations. The teacher will therefore give to his\nprecepts an exaggerated character, reckoning upon human frailty to bring\nabout a proper standard in practice[54]. Thus since luxury is a chief\nenemy of virtue, the body should at least occasionally be brought low.\nA practice approved by the example of eminent men is to mark out from\ntime to time a few days for the exercise of the simple life; during this\ntime life is to be maintained on coarse bread and water, in rough dress\nand all the surroundings of poverty[55]. Since Cynism is a \u2018short cut\nto virtue[56],\u2019 philosophers may well employ the methods of Diogenes for\nshort periods, as a corrective to any tendency to excess; rich people do\nas much for love of change[57].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Personal appearance.]\n\n=404.= On the question of personal appearance there is much to be said on\nboth sides. Foppishness is a disagreeable vice, and it is contemptible\nthat a young man should smell of perfumes. On the other hand a total\ndisregard of appearances is not approved by the Stoics; \u2018it is against\nnature\u2019 says Seneca \u2018to be averse to neatness in appearance[58].\u2019 In\nthese outward matters a sensible man will conform to fashion, nor will he\nwish to make the name of philosopher still more unpopular than it is[59].\nThe founders of Stoicism laid it down that men and women should wear the\nsame dress; but the later teachers laid stress on the natural distinction\nof the sexes; and to men the beard should be an object of just pride, for\nit is more becoming than the cock\u2019s comb, or the lion\u2019s mane[60]. This is\nto the Stoic a point of honour; he should part with his head more readily\nthan with his beard[61]. But the beard may be trimmed; for, as Zeno has\nobserved, nature provides rather against the \u2018too little\u2019 than against\nthe \u2018too much,\u2019 and reason must come to her help. Women do right to\narrange their hair so as to make themselves more beautiful; but for men\nany kind of artistic hair-dressing is contemptible[62].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Solitude and society.]\n\n=405.= The young should train themselves alternately to bear solitude and\nto profit by society[63]: since the wise man is never dependent on his\nfriends, though none can take better advantage of them[64]. In living\nalone a man follows the example of the deity, and comes to know his own\nheart[65]. But solitude must not be a screen for secret vices; a man\nonly uses it rightly when he can without shame picture the whole world\nwatching his hours of privacy[66]. The right choice of friends calls for\ntrue wisdom; for the soul cannot but be soiled by bad company[67]. The\nonly true friendship is based on the mutual attraction of good folk[68];\ntherefore the wise are friends one to another even whilst they are\nunacquainted[69]. It is well to consider much before choosing a friend,\nbut afterwards to give him implicit trust[70]; for a true friend is\na second self[71]. Such friendship can only arise from the desire to\nlove and be loved[72]; those who seek friends for their own advantage,\nwill be abandoned by them in the day of trial[73]. In the companionship\nof well-chosen friends there grows up the \u2018common sense,\u2019 which is an\ninstinctive contact with humanity as a whole, making each man a partner\nin the thoughts and needs of all around him. This feeling is a principal\naim of philosophy[74]. But the young philosopher should make no enemies;\nhe should be free from that dislike of others which so often causes a man\nto be disliked, and should remember that he who is an enemy to-day may be\na friend to-morrow[75].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comradeship in marriage.]\n\n=406.= As the young Stoic passes from youth to manhood, he will turn\nhis mind towards marriage as a political and social duty[76]; but if\nhe is really touched by the divine flame, he will also find in it that\nenlargement of his own sympathies and opportunities of which the wise\nman is always glad[77]. Under the Roman principate we observe a rapid\ndevelopment of personal sympathy between husband and wife; and though in\nsociety girls who attended philosophers\u2019 classes had an ill name as being\nself-willed and disputatious[78], yet it is from this very circle that\nthe ideal of a perfect harmony of mind and purpose was developed most\nfully. Musonius often speaks on this subject:\n\n  \u2018Husband and wife enter upon a treaty to live and to earn\n  together, and to have all things in common, soul, body and\n  property. Unlike the lower animals, which mate at random, man\n  cannot be content without perfect community of thought and mutual\n  affection. Marriage is for health and for sickness alike, and\n  each party will seek to outrun the other in love, not seeking his\n  own advantage, but that of his partner[79].\u2019\n\n  \u2018A man should look for a healthy body, of middle stature, capable\n  of hard work, and offering no attraction to the licentious. But\n  the soul is far more important; for as a crooked stick cannot\n  be fitted with one that is straight, so there can be no true\n  agreement except between the good[80].\u2019\n\nSeneca is reticent as to marriage, but we have no reason to doubt that\nhis life with Paulina was typical of the best Stoic marriages. Thus\nhe excuses himself for taking more thought for his health than a\nphilosopher should, by saying that the happiness of Paulina depends upon\nit. \u2018Her life is wrapped up in mine, for its sake I must take care of my\nown. What can be more delightful than to be so dear to one\u2019s wife, that\nfor her sake one becomes dearer to himself[81]!\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Celibacy.]\n\n=407.= On the question of marriage Epictetus strikes a contrary note,\ncharacteristic of his time, and of his bias towards Cynic practice:\n\n  \u2018In the present state of things, which is like that of an army\n  placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should\n  without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of\n  God? To say nothing of other things, a father must have a heating\n  apparatus for bathing the baby; wool for his wife when she is\n  delivered, oil, a bed, a cup; and so the furniture of the house\n  is increased. Where then now is that king, who devotes himself to\n  the public interests,\n\n    \u201cThe people\u2019s guardian and so full of cares[82]\u201d\n\n  whose duty it is to look after others; to see who uses his wife\n  well, who uses her badly, who quarrels, who administers his\n  family well, and who does not? Consider what we are bringing the\n  Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him[83]!\u2019\n\nTo this very definite conception of a celibate order of philosophers,\ndevoting themselves to the good of humanity and entitled thereby to\nbecome the rulers of society, Musonius makes the following reply in\nadvance from the true Stoic standpoint:\n\n  \u2018Marriage was no hindrance to Pythagoras, Socrates or Crates;\n  and who were better philosophers than they? Since marriage is\n  natural, philosophers should set the example of it. Why else\n  did the Creator separate the human race into two divisions,\n  making the honourable parts of the body distinct for each, and\n  implanting in each a yearning for the other, but that he wished\n  them to live together and to propagate the race? He who would\n  destroy marriage, destroys the family and the commonwealth. No\n  relationship is so essential or so intimate; friend does not\n  agree so well with friend, nor does a father feel so keenly\n  separation from his son. And why should a philosopher be\n  different from other men? Only that which is unbecoming is a\n  hindrance to a philosopher; but by doing his daily duty as a man\n  he will become kindlier in disposition and more social in his\n  thoughts[84].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Means of livelihood.]\n\n=408.= The head of a household must have a means of living; and therefore\nthe making of money (\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, _cura rei familiaris_) comes within\nthe range of precepts. The Greek writers recognised three proper means\nof livelihood; (i) from kingship, that is, to be either a king or a\nking\u2019s minister or general; (ii) from politics, that is, by acting as\na magistrate or a judge; (iii) from sophistry, that is, by teaching\nphilosophy to those who are wishing to learn[85]. To each profession\nthere are obvious objections; indeed the sharp critic of Stoicism can\nsee no reason why a wise man, who lacks nothing, should trouble himself\nabout money-making. Each of the three professions named assumes the\nexistence of men willing to be guided by philosophy, and these are not\neasily found. If pupils are taken, the question arises whether fees\nshould be paid in advance or not. Now it is certainly more reasonable\nthat a student should only pay if he profits by his teaching; but on the\nother hand no one can absolutely promise to make a man good in a year,\nand deferred payments are often found unsatisfactory[86]. Under the Roman\nprincipate we hear little of the professions connected with public life;\nbut it is clear that the teacher and the physician are held in special\nregard[87]. Seneca has not the breadth of mind to respect the painter or\nthe sculptor, any more than the wrestler or the stage-engineer[88]. Yet\nChrysippus had suggested a bolder standpoint when he said that \u2018the wise\nman will turn three somersaults for a sufficient fee[89]\u2019; and no rule\ncan be laid down except that a man should earn his own living without\ninjuring his neighbour[90]. Agriculture, as a calling favourable both to\nhealth of body and to innocence of soul, continued to be praised, but was\nseldom practised except as an amusement[91].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Kingly duties.]\n\n=409.= For every profession philosophy has appropriate precepts,\nbeginning with the king. There came one day to Musonius a king of Syria,\nfor in those times there were kings subject to the Roman empire. Musonius\naddressed him thus:\n\n  \u2018You ought to be a philosopher as much as I. Your wish is to\n  protect and benefit your fellow-men; to do that, you must know\n  what is good and what is evil. A king too must understand\n  Justice; for wars and revolts come about because men quarrel\n  about their rights. Also he must show Soberness and Courage, that\n  he may be an example to his subjects[92]. The ancients thought\n  that a king should be a living law (\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2), and an\n  imitator of Zeus. Only a good man can be a good king.\u2019\n\nThe king was highly pleased, and asked him to name any boon he would.\n\u2018Abide by my words,\u2019 said Musonius, \u2018that will be the best boon both for\nme and for you[93].\u2019\n\nTwo precepts in particular are addressed to kings. The first, that they\nshould encourage friends who will speak the truth to them. Even Augustus\nCaesar needed this lesson; bitterly as he lamented the deaths of Agrippa\nand Maecenas, he would not have allowed them to speak frankly had they\nlived[94]. The second, that they should practise clemency, following the\nexample of Julius Caesar, who destroyed the evidence upon which he might\nhave punished his enemies[95]. None does this virtue better become than\nkings and rulers[96].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Court life.]\n\n=410.= To the man of high rank it is natural to desire to move in the\nsociety of the great and the powerful. Epictetus gives us a striking\ndescription of the man who desires to be on the list of the \u2018Caesaris\namici,\u2019 which he thinks to be a good, though experience shows that it is\nnot such.\n\n  \u2018Of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we\n  than this very man who is become Caesar\u2019s friend? \u201cCome forward\n  and tell us, when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you\n  became Caesar\u2019s friend?\u201d Immediately you hear the answer, \u201cStop,\n  I entreat you, and do not mock me; you know not what miseries\n  I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and\n  says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth; then come\n  troubles and cares.\u201d \u201cWell, and did you sup with more pleasure,\n  now or before?\u201d Hear what he says about this also. He says that\n  if he is not invited, he is pained; and if he is invited, he\n  sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious\n  that he does not say or do anything foolish. As befits so great\n  a man, Caesar\u2019s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head.\n  I can swear that no man is so stupid as not to bewail his own\n  misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar[97].\u2019\n\nIt is exactly under these circumstances that a thorough training in\nphilosophy is of really practical value.\n\n  \u2018When you are going in to any great personage, remember that\n  another also from above sees what is going on, and that you\n  ought to please him rather than that other. He then who sees\n  from above asks you: \u201cIn the schools what used you to say about\n  exile and bonds and death and disgrace?\u201d \u201cThat they are things\n  indifferent.\u201d \u201cAnd the end of life, what is it?\u201d \u201cTo follow\n  thee.\u201d \u201cDo you say this now also?\u201d \u201cI do.\u201d Then go in to the\n  great personage boldly and remember these things: and you will\n  see what a youth is who has studied these things, when he is\n  among men who have not studied them. I imagine that you will have\n  such thoughts as these; \u201cWhy do we make such great and so many\n  preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which is named power?\n  All this is nothing[98].\u201d\u2019\n\nYet a wise man will never challenge the anger of the powerful; he will\nturn aside from it, as a sailor from a storm[99]. The virtuous affection\nof caution must be called in to help him, so many are his dangers.\nAn independence of look, a slight raising of the voice, an outspoken\nexpression, an appeal to public opinion, even unsought popularity are\nenough to excite suspicion[100]. Perhaps after all the poet may be the\nwisest, who advises good men to stay away from court altogether, for it\nis a place where there is no room for them[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Life in the city.]\n\n=411.= A common cause of moral corruption is the routine of city life.\nHere fashion dictates a round of occupations which are unnatural, but\nin which men and women are alike absorbed[102]. Half of the morning\nis absorbed in sleep[103]; then follows the visit to the public shows,\nwhich are centres of demoralisation[104], and conversation with numerous\nfriends, each one of whom suggests some abandonment of principle[105]. In\nthe clubs all the most worthless members of society foregather[106]. The\nbaths, which were at one time simply constructed, and for the purpose of\ncleanliness, are now instruments of luxury; and the water is now so hot\nas to be better fitted for torture than pleasure[107]. For the evening\nmeal there must always be some novelty discovered, even if it is only to\nbegin with the dessert and end with the eggs[108]; even the order of the\nseasons must be inverted, that roses may adorn the table in winter[109].\nUpon the ill-spent day follows a disorderly night, and a heavy headache\nthe next morning[110]. From the temptations of such a life the adherent\nof Stoicism will gladly escape.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Life in the country.]\n\n=412.= A more real happiness is reserved for the man who gives up town\nlife for that of the country. For it is most natural to win sustenance\nfrom the earth, which is our common mother, and liberally gives back\nmany times over what is entrusted to her; and it is more healthy to\nlive in the open than to be always sheltering in the shade. It matters\nlittle whether one works on one\u2019s own land or on that of another; for\nmany industrious men have prospered on hired land. There is nothing\ndisgraceful or unbecoming in any of the work of the farm; to plant trees,\nto reap, to tend the vine, to thrash out the corn, are all liberal\noccupations. Hesiod the poet tended sheep, and this did not hinder him\nfrom telling the story of the gods. And pasturage is (says Musonius)\nperhaps the best of all occupations; for even farm work, if it is\nexhausting, demands all the energies of the soul as well as of the body,\nwhereas whilst tending sheep a man has some time for philosophizing also.\n\nIt is true that our young men to-day are too sensitive and too refined to\nlive a country life; but philosophy would be well rid of these weaklings.\nA true lover of philosophy could find no better discipline than to live\nwith some wise and kindly man in the country, associating with him in\nwork and in relaxation, at meals and in sleeping, and so \u2018learning\ngoodness,\u2019 as Theognis tells us to do, \u2018from the good[111].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The householder.]\n\n=413.= Within the household the head of it is a little king, and needs\nto display the kingly virtues of Justice and Soberness. In his dealings\nwith the perverse he must consider how far each man is capable of bearing\nthe truth[112]. Indeed, willingness to listen to reproof is no small\nvirtue; few words are best, so that the wrongdoer may be left as far as\npossible to correct his own ways[113]. Punishment must be reserved for\nextreme cases, and is always to be administered with calmness; it is\nfelt more keenly when it comes from a merciful master[114]. Persistent\nkindness wins over even bad men[115]. It is further the privilege of the\nhead of a household to distribute kindnesses to those below him. His\nwealth he must regard as given him in trust; he is only the steward of\nit, and must neither hoard nor waste; for he must give both a debit and\na credit account of all[116]. But if the right use of money causes the\npossessor anxious thought, no trace of this should appear to others;\ngiving should be without hesitation, and as a delight[117]. The good\ncitizen will pay his taxes with special pleasure, because in his eyes\nthe welfare of the community stands higher than his own or that of his\nfamily[118]; but he will not refuse a kindness even to an enemy who is\nin need[119]; and in giving a farthing to a beggar, he will imply by\nhis manner that he is only paying what the other is entitled to as his\nfellow-man[120]. In short, he will give as he would like to receive[121],\nand with the feeling that the chief pleasure of ownership is to share\nwith another[122].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Treatment of slaves.]\n\n=414.= The good householder will associate on easy terms with his\nslaves, remembering that they too are men, made of flesh and blood as\nhe is himself[123]. It is however a difficult matter to decide whether\na master should dine with his slave. Men of the old Roman type find\nthis a disgraceful practice, but the philosopher should decide in its\nfavour[124]. We do not need to inquire into a man\u2019s social position, if\nhis character is attractive[125]. Plato has well said that we cannot find\na king who is not descended from a slave, or a slave who is not descended\nfrom a king[126]; and in fact many a Roman slave was far better educated\nthan his master[127]. Even if we do not suppose that Seneca\u2019s rule was\ncommonly practised in great Roman houses, the suggestion itself throws\na pleasing light on the position of a Roman slave. But if the master\nwas thus called upon to ignore differences of social position, as much\nmight be expected of the slave. With him it was doubtless an instinct\nto prize liberty, \u2018the power of living as you like,\u2019 as the dearest of\npossessions. Yet many a slave who won this reward by years of faithful\nservice found that liberty delusive, and would have been wiser to stay in\nthe home where he was valued[128].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Large families.]\n\n=415.= A question of pressing practical importance is that of large\nfamilies (\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03af\u03b1). Statesmen have always considered it best that the\nhomes of citizens should be crowded with children; and for this reason\nthe laws forbid abortion and the hindrance of conception; they demand\nfines for childlessness, and pay honours to those who bring up large\nfamilies. Public opinion takes the same view; the father of many children\nis honoured as he goes about the city, and how charming is the sight of\na mother surrounded by a swarm of children[129]! No religious procession\nis so imposing. For such parents every one feels sympathy, and every one\nis prepared to cooperate with them[130]. But nowadays even rich parents\nrefuse to rear all their children, so that the first-born may be the\nricher. But it is better to have many brothers than few; and a brother is\na richer legacy than a fortune. A fortune attracts enemies, but a brother\nhelps to repel them[131].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comfort in poverty.]\n\n=416.= We have now accompanied the man of mature years in his duties\nand his temptations: philosophy has also a word to speak with regard\nto his trials. It is well indeed if he is convinced that the buffets\nof fortune are no real evils; but this doctrine can be supplemented by\nother consolations. Of the most bitter of all sufferings, bereavement by\nthe death of friends and children, we have already spoken; we may now\nconsider two other conditions usually held to be evil, namely poverty and\nexile. In poverty the first comfort is in the observation that poor men\nare usually stronger in body than the rich[132], and quite as cheerful\nin mind[133]. Further the poor are free from many dangers which beset\nthe rich; they can travel safely even when highwaymen are watching the\nroad[134]. Poverty is an aid to philosophy, for a rich man, if he wishes\nto philosophize, must freely choose the life of the poor[135]. A poor man\nis not troubled by insincere friends[136]. In short, poverty is only hard\nfor him who kicks against the pricks[137].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Comfort in exile.]\n\n=417.= The subject of exile has the special interest that in fact so\nmany philosophers endured this evil. To the Stoic there is in principle\nno such thing as exile, since the whole world is his country; but he\ndoes not for this reason disregard other sources of consolation. Cicero\nwas plainly miserable, not only when he was formally exiled, but also\nwhen he was away from Rome in an honourable position; Seneca at least\nmade the attempt to bear exile more bravely. Is it then so hard to be\naway from one\u2019s native place? Rome is crowded with strangers, who have\ncome thither for pleasure or profit, study or novelty[138]. True, it is\na beautiful town; but there is no place on earth so bare and unsightly,\nnot even this Corsica to which Seneca is banished, but that some men\nchoose it to reside in as a matter of taste[139]. Whole peoples have\nchanged their abode, and we find Greek cities in the midst of barbarism,\nand the Macedonian language in India[140]; wherever he conquers the\nRoman dwells[141]. The exile has everywhere the company of the same\nstars above[142], of the same conscience within him[143]; even if he is\nseparated from those near and dear to him, it is not for the first time,\nand he can still live with them in his thoughts and affections.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Old age.]\n\n=418.= Free or slave, rich or poor, powerful or insignificant, wherever\na man stands in the order of society, old age comes at last and\nimperiously stops all ambitions. It is, in the general opinion, a time\nof sadness[144]; to associate it with pleasure is not scandalous, only\nbecause it is paradoxical[145]. Cicero\u2019s work _de Senectute_ shows how\nold age became attractive according to Roman tradition; Seneca is hardly\nso successful. With the fading of hope the stimulus to effort dies away\nin old age[146]; but though philosophy forbids idleness, nature cries out\nfor rest. We cannot then approve when old men follow their professional\noccupations with undiminished zeal[147], and we must highly blame those\nwho cannot quit their pleasures[148]. The great boon which old age brings\nis leisure; for this many great men, amongst them Augustus, have longed\nin vain[149]. This leisure gives the opportunity of making acquaintance\nwith great men through their books, but better still, that of making\nacquaintance with our own selves.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Musonius\u2019 \u2018viaticum.\u2019]\n\n=419.= \u2018Give me,\u2019 said one to Musonius, \u2018_a viaticum_ for old age.\u2019 He\nreplied as follows:\n\n  \u2018The rule is the same as for youth, to live methodically and\n  according to nature[150]. Do not grieve because you are cut\n  off from the pleasures of youth; for man is no more born for\n  pleasure than any other animal: indeed man alone is an image of\n  the deity[151], and has like excellences. And do not consider\n  the divine excellences as beyond your reach; for we have no\n  other notion of the gods than such as we derive from observing\n  good men, whom therefore we call divine and godlike. He who has\n  acquired in youth sound principles and systematic training will\n  not be found to complain in old age of the loss of pleasures,\n  of weakness of body, or because he is neglected by friends and\n  acquaintance; he will carry about with him a charm against\n  all these evils, namely his own education. But if he has not\n  been rightly educated, he will do well to go to a friend wiser\n  than himself, and listen to his teaching and profit by it. And\n  specially he will ponder over death, how it comes in nature\u2019s\n  course to all, and therefore is no evil. With such thoughts he\n  will be cheerful and contented, and so he will live a happy life.\n  But let no one say that wealth brings happiness in old age; that\n  it does not bring a contented spirit is witnessed every day by a\n  crowd of rich old men, who are in bad temper and low spirits, and\n  feel deeply aggrieved[152].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Will-making.]\n\n=420.= When we see death before us there remains a last act to be\nperformed. We look at the wealth which no longer belongs to us, and\nconsider to whom it can most worthily be entrusted. We stand in the\nposition of a judge who can no longer be bribed, and, with all the wisdom\nand good will that we have, we give this last verdict on those around\nus[153].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Death.]\n\n=421.= For death the whole of philosophy is a preparation; yet when it\nis no longer a matter of uncertain fear, but close at hand and sure,\nsome last words are to be said. All this is in the course of nature, is\naccording to the will of the Creator.\n\n  \u2018God opens the door and says to you, \u201cGo.\u201d \u201cGo whither?\u201d To\n  nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your\n  friends and kinsmen, to the elements[154]. What there was in you\n  of fire goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of\n  water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus,\n  but all is full of gods and demons[155]. God has invited you; be\n  content when he calls others to the feast in your place.\u2019\n\nThe philosopher does not look forward to renewing his personal life, or\nto meeting again with parent, wife, or child. But death is a release from\nall his pains and troubles; and he who has striven to live his life well\nwill know how to meet death also at its due time[156]. If it come to him\nin the shipwreck, he will not scream nor blame God; if in the arena,\nhe will not shrink from his enemy, whether man or beast. In this last\nshort crisis he will bear witness that he accepts contentedly his mortal\nlot[157].\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] \u2018omnia ista [monitiones, consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes,\nobiurgationes, laudationes] monitionum genera sunt\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 94, 39.\n\n[2] \u2018eam partem philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta\n... quidam solam receperunt, sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem\nlevem existimat\u2019 _ib._ 94, 1 and 2. The Cynics gave exhortations, but\nwithout having a system for the purpose. See above, \u00a7 52.\n\n[3] \u2018Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et\nconsolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat\u2019 _ib._ 95, 65. Cf.\nCic. _Off._ i 3, 7; Sen. _Ep._ 94, 34.\n\n[4] \u2018ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur officiorum exsecutione,\nad quam praecepta perducunt\u2019 _ib._\n\n[5] \u2018quemadmodum folia virere per se non possunt, ramum desiderant; sic\nista praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent; infigi volunt sectae\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n95, 59.\n\n[6] See below, \u00a7 397, note 21.\n\n[7] Sen. _Ep._ 94, 29 and 108, 8.\n\n[8] \u2018inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet; modo deliciis et\nsitu, modo officii inscitia\u2019 _Ben._ v 25, 6.\n\n[9] \u2018plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed illa in\npromptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa\nnon habeas ad manum\u2019 _Ben._ vii 1, 3; \u2018We ought to exercise ourselves in\nsmall things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ i 18, 18.\n\n[10] \u2018debet semper plus esse virium in actore quam in onere. necesse est\nopprimant onera, quae ferente maiora sunt\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 6, 4.\n\n[11] Arnim i 241.\n\n[12] \u2018sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n83, 1.\n\n[13] \u2018In the morning, when you feel loth to rise, fall back upon the\nthought \u201cI am rising for man\u2019s work. Why make a grievance of setting\nabout that for which I was born, and for sake of which I have been\nbrought into the world? Is the end of my existence to lie snug in the\nblankets and keep warm?\u201d\u2019 M. Aurel. _To himself_ v 1.\n\n[14] \u2018I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander, praising\nhis acts; for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when\nit pleases him; and while I lived it was my duty to praise God\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ iii 26, 29 and 30. See also above, \u00a7 258.\n\n[15] \u2018minimum exercitationi corporis datum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 83, 3.\n\n[16] \u2018ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi\u2019\n_ib._ 5.\n\n[17] \u2018panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium\u2019 _ib._ 6.\n\n[18] \u2018brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo. satis est mihi vigilare\ndesiisse. aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor\u2019 _ib._\n\n[19] \u2018nec scribere tantum nec tantum legere debemus; altera res\ncontristabit, vires exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet\u2019\nSen. _Ep._ 84, 2.\n\n[20] \u2018nulli enim nisi audituro dicendum est\u2019 _ib._ 29, 1.\n\n[21] \u2018[Diogenes et alii Cynici] libertate promiscua usi sunt et obvios\nmonuerunt. hoc, mi Lucili, non existimo magno viro faciendum\u2019 _ib._ 29, 1\nand 3.\n\n[22] \u2018audebo illi mala sua ostendere\u2019 _ib._ 4.\n\n[23] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xii 1. Favorinus, of whom this is related, was\nnot himself a Stoic.\n\n[24] Sen. _Ben._ ii 17, 3 to 5 and 32, 1 to 4.\n\n[25] See above, \u00a7 125, note 90.\n\n[26] \u2018at te nocturnis iuvat impallescere chartis; | cultor enim iuvenum\npurgatas inseris aures | fruge Cleanthea\u2019 Pers. _Sat._ v 62-64; \u2018quid est\ntamen, quare tu istas Epicuri voces putes esse, non publicas?\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n8, 8.\n\n[27] \u2018qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur? quam\ntranquillus, quam altus ac liber!\u2019 _Dial._ v 36, 2.\n\n[28] \u2018plurimum proderit pueros statim salubriter institui\u2019 _ib._ iv 21, 1.\n\n[29] \u2018tenuis ante omnia victus [sit] et non pretiosa vestis\u2019 _ib._ 11;\n\u2018nihil magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda\u2019 _ib._ 6.\n\n[30] \u2018if he ... eats as a modest man, this is the man who truly\nprogresses\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 4, 20 and 21.\n\n[31] \u2018veritatis simplex oratio est\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 49, 12; \u2018Let silence be\nthe general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in a few\nwords. Let not your laughter be much\u2019 Epict. _Manual_ 33, 2 and 4.\n\n[32] \u2018loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et illa\nadicienda\u2014pluris quam putas obligasti\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ ii 24, 4.\n\n[33] \u2018inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necesse est aliquem praeire\u2014hoc\nvitabis, hoc facies\u2019 _Ep._ 94, 50.\n\n[34] \u2018regi ergo debet, dum incipit posse se regere\u2019 _ib._ 51.\n\n[35] \u2018facilius singula insidunt circumscripta et carminis modo inclusa.\nideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias\nvocant\u2019 _ib._ 33, 6 and 7.\n\n[36] \u2018He is ridiculous who says that he wishes to begin with the matters\nof real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things;\nand we ought to use this fact as an argument to parents\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i\n26, 4 and 5.\n\n[37] See above, \u00a7 316.\n\n[38] \u2018lusus quoque proderunt. modica enim voluptas laxat animos et\ntemperat\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ iv 20, 3; \u2018danda est animis remissio\u2019 _ib._ ix 17,\n5; \u2018mens ad iocos devocanda est\u2019 _ib._ 4.\n\n[39] Chrysippus had approved of the rod: \u2018caedi discentis, quamlibet\nreceptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim\u2019 Quint. _Inst. Or._\ni 3, 14. But Seneca writes quite otherwise: \u2018uter praeceptor dignior, qui\nexcarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit ... an qui\nmonitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere malit?\u2019 _Clem._ i 16, 2 and\n3.\n\n[40] \u2018fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 4, 9.\n\n[41] \u2018quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter\nfomenta subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus\ncircumfusus calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet\u2019\n_ib._\n\n[42] \u2018audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus\ninvidetur\u2014molliter vivit hoc dicunt\u2014mollis est\u2019 _Ep._ 82, 2.\n\n[43] Stob. iii 29, 78 (from Musonius).\n\n[44] _ib._ 29, 75.\n\n[45] Muson. apud Stob. ii 31, 123.\n\n[46] Muson. _ib._ iv 79, 25.\n\n[47] \u2018It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to\nhold soft cheese with a hook\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 9.\n\n[48] See above, \u00a7 326.\n\n[49] \u2018See what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen? Rise, they\nsay, wrestle again till you are made strong\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iv 9, 15.\n\n[50] \u2018[athletis] cura est, cum fortissimis quibusque confligere\u2019 Sen.\n_Dial._ i 2, 3.\n\n[51] \u2018[gladiator fortissimus] respiciens ad clamantem populum significat\nnihil esse et intercedi non patitur\u2019 _ib._ ii 16, 2.\n\n[52] \u2018ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia\u2019 _ib._ vii 15, 7;\nEpict. _Disc._ i 14, 15 and 16.\n\n[53] See above, \u00a7 33; and compare Horace in his Stoic mood: \u2018nil sine\nmagno | vita labore dedit mortalibus\u2019 _Sat._ i 9, 59 and 60.\n\n[54] \u2018quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant\u2019 Sen.\n_Ben._ vii 22, 1; \u2018We ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and\nwhere there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the\nhabit of exercise. I am rather inclined to pleasure; I will incline to\nthe contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise\u2019 Epict. _Disc._\niii 12, 6 and 7.\n\n[55] \u2018interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo\ncibo, dura atque horrida veste, dicas tibi \u201choc est quod timebatur?\u201d ...\ngrabatus ille verus sit et sagum et panis durus ac sordidus\u2014hoc triduo ac\nquatriduo fer\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 18, 5 and 7; \u2018quod tibi scripsi magnos viros\nsaepe fecisse\u2019 _ib._ 20, 13.\n\n[56] Diog. L. vii 121.\n\n[57] \u2018divites sumunt quosdam dies, quibus humi cenent, et remoto auro\nargentoque fictilibus utantur\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ xii 12, 3.\n\n[58] \u2018contra naturam est faciles odisse munditias\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 5, 4; \u2018I\nwould rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towards\nphilosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ iv 11, 25.\n\n[59] \u2018asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorem barbam evita.\nintus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo conveniat\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 5, 2.\n\n[60] \u2018We ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes.... How much\nmore becoming is the beard than the cock\u2019s comb and the lion\u2019s mane! For\nthis reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ i 16, 13 and 14.\n\n[61] \u2018Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself.\u2019 If I am a philosopher, I\nanswer, \u2018I will not shave myself.\u2019 \u2018But I will take off your head.\u2019 \u2018If\nthat will do you any good, take it off\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ i 2, 29.\n\n[62] Stob. iii 6, 24 (from Musonius).\n\n[63] \u2018miscenda tamen ista et alternanda [sunt], solitudo ac frequentia\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ ix 17, 3.\n\n[64] \u2018ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut\npossit\u2019 _Ep._ 9, 5.\n\n[65] \u2018proderit per se ipsum secedere; meliores erimus singuli\u2019 _Dial._\nviii 1, 1; \u2018A man ought to be prepared in a manner to be able to be\nsufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For Zeus dwells by\nhimself and is tranquil by himself\u2019 Epict. _Disc._ iii 13, 6 and 7.\n\n[66] \u2018tunc felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico;\nparietes plerumque circumdatos nobis iudicamus, non ut tutius vivamus sed\nut peccemus occultius\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 43, 3.\n\n[67] \u2018It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is\ncovered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself\u2019 Epict.\n_Disc._ iii 16, 3.\n\n[68] Diog. L. vii 124.\n\n[69] \u2018Stoici censent sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos;\nnihil est enim virtute amabilius\u2019 Cic. _N. D._ i 44, 121; so Stob. ii 7\n11 i.\n\n[70] \u2018post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum\u2019 Sen. _Ep._\n3, 2.\n\n[71] \u0396\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u201c\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b3\u03ce\u201d \u1f14\u03c6\u03b7 Diog. L. vii 23.\n\n[72] \u2018Hecaton ait; ego tibi monstrabo amatorium: si vis amari, ama\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 9, 6; \u2018multos tibi dabo, qui non amico sed amicitia caruerunt\u2019\n_ib._ 6, 3.\n\n[73] _ib._ 9, 8.\n\n[74] \u2018hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et\ncongregationem\u2019 _ib._ 5, 4; \u2018nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio\nest\u2019 _ib._ 6, 4.\n\n[75] \u2018monemus, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum\u2019 _ib._ 95, 63.\n\n[76] See above, \u00a7 349.\n\n[77] \u2018[sapiens] ducit uxorem se contentus, et liberos tollit se\ncontentus\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 9, 17; \u2018If indeed you had [this purpose], you would\nbe content in sickness, in hunger, and in death. If any among you has\nbeen in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true\u2019\nEpict. _Disc._ iii 5, 18 and 19.\n\n[78] \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bd\u1f74 \u0394\u03af\u03b1, \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03b8\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 Mus. apud Stob. ii 31, 126.\n\n[79] Stob. iv 22, 90.\n\n[80] Stob. iv 22, 104.\n\n[81] \u2018nam cum sciam spiritum illius [sc. Paulinae] in meo verti, incipio,\nut illi consulam, mihi consulere. quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam\ncarum esse, ut propter hoc tibi carior fias?\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 104, 2 and 5.\n\n[82] Hom. _Il._ ii 25.\n\n[83] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22, 69 to 75.\n\n[84] Stob. iv 22, 20.\n\n[85] Stob. ii 7, 11 m.\n\n[86] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 20, 10.\n\n[87] \u2018omnium horum [medicorum et praeceptorum] apud nos magna caritas,\nmagna reverentia est\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ vi 15, 1; \u2018ex medico ac praeceptore in\namicum transeunt\u2019 _ib._ 16, 1.\n\n[88] _Ep._ 88, 18 and 22.\n\n[89] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 3.\n\n[90] \u2018sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum\nest; alteri deripere ius non est\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 10, 42.\n\n[91] See below, \u00a7 412.\n\n[92] So too Epictetus: \u2018To whose example should [the many] look except\nyours [the governors\u2019]?\u2019 _Disc._ iii 4, 3.\n\n[93] Stob. iv 7, 67.\n\n[94] Sen. _Ben._ vi 32, 4.\n\n[95] _Dial._ iv 23, 4.\n\n[96] \u2018nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem\ndecet\u2019 _Clem._ i 3, 3.\n\n[97] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 46 to 50.\n\n[98] _ib._ i 30, 1 to 7.\n\n[99] \u2018sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit, non\naliter quam in navigando procellam\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 14, 7.\n\n[100] _Dial._ iii 18, 2.\n\n[101] \u2018exeat aula | qui volet esse pius. virtus et summa potestas | non\nco\u00ebunt: semper metuet, quem saeva pudebunt\u2019 Lucan _Phars._ viii 493 to\n495.\n\n[102] Sen. _Ep._ 77, 6, and 95, 20 and 21.\n\n[103] \u2018turpis, qui alto sole semisomnus iacet, cuius vigilia medio die\nincipit\u2019 _ib._ 122, 1.\n\n[104] \u2018nihil tam damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo\ndesidere\u2019 _ib._ 7, 2.\n\n[105] \u2018inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium\naut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit\u2019 _ib._\n\n[106] \u2018vilissimus quisque tempus in aliquo circulo [terit]\u2019 _Dial._ i 5,\n4.\n\n[107] _Ep._ 86, 9 and 10.\n\n[108] _ib._ 114, 9.\n\n[109] _ib._ 122, 8.\n\n[110] \u2018oculos hesterna graves crapula\u2019 _ib._ 122, 2.\n\n[111] Stob. iv 15, 18. Seneca gives a more qualified approval to country\nlife: \u2018non est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo, nec frugalitatem\ndocent rura; sed ubi testis et spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt,\nquorum monstrari et conspici fructus est\u2019 _Ep._ 94, 69.\n\n[112] \u2018de cetero vide, non tantum an verum sit quod dicis, sed an ille\ncui dicitur veri patiens sit\u2019 _Dial._ v 36, 4.\n\n[113] \u2018moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est; flectendus est paucis\nanimus, sui rector optimus\u2019 _Ben._ v 25, 4.\n\n[114] \u2018gravior multo poena videtur, quae a miti viro constituitur\u2019\n_Clem._ i 22, 3.\n\n[115] \u2018vincit malos pertinax bonitas\u2019 _Ben._ vii 31, 1.\n\n[116] \u2018quid tanquam tuo parcis? procurator es, in depositi causa\n[divitiae] sunt\u2019 _Ben._ vi 3, 2; \u2018donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos\neligens, ut qui meminerit tam expensorum quam acceptorum rationem esse\nreddendam\u2019 _ib._ 23, 5.\n\n[117] \u2018demus ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione\u2019 _Ben._ ii\n1, 1.\n\n[118] Cic. _Off._ i 17, 57.\n\n[119] \u2018non desinemus opem ferre etiam inimicis\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ viii 1, 4.\n\n[120] \u2018[sapiens] dabit egenti stipem (non hanc contumeliosam, qua pars\nmaior horum qui se misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos\nadiuvat contingique ab his timet) sed ut homo homini ex communi dabit\u2019\n_Clem._ ii 6, 2.\n\n[121] \u2018sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere\u2019 _Ben._ ii 1, 1.\n\n[122] \u2018nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est\u2019 _Ep._ 6, 4.\n\n[123] \u2018servi sunt? immo homines. servi sunt? immo humiles amici\u2019 _ib._\n47, 1; \u2018animas servorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putat\nparibusque elementis\u2019 Juv. _Sat._ xiv 16 and 17.\n\n[124] \u2018cognovi familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere. hoc eruditionem\ndecet. rideo istos, qui turpe putant cum servo suo cenare\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 47,\n1 and 2.\n\n[125] \u2018refert cuius animi sit, non cuius status\u2019 _Ben._ iii 18, 2.\n\n[126] _Ep._ 44, 4.\n\n[127] \u2018[Calvisius Sabinus] magna summa emit servos, unum qui Homerum\nteneret, unum qui Hesiodum. novem praeterea lyricis singulos adsignavit.\nmagno emisse illum non est quod mireris: non invenerat, faciendos\nlocavit\u2019 _Ep._ 27, 6.\n\n[128] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 33 to 40.\n\n[129] But hear Epictetus on the other side: \u2018Are those men greater\nbenefactors to mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own\nplaces two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far\nas they can all mankind? Did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons\ncontribute more to the community than Homer?\u2019 _Disc._ iii 22, 77 and 78.\n\n[130] Stob. iv 24, 15 (from Musonius).\n\n[131] _ib._ 27, 21.\n\n[132] See above, \u00a7 399.\n\n[133] \u2018compara inter se pauperum et divitum voltus; saepius pauper et\nfidelius ridet\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 80, 6.\n\n[134] \u2018etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est\u2019 _ib._ 14, 9.\n\n[135] \u2018si vis vacare animo, aut pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis\u2019\n_ib._ 17, 5.\n\n[136] \u2018[paupertas] veros certosque amicos retinebit; discedet quisquis\nnon te, sed aliud sequebatur. vel ob hoc unum amanda paupertas quod, a\nquibus ameris, ostendet\u2019 _ib._ 20, 7.\n\n[137] \u2018paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti\u2019 _ib._ 123, 16.\n\n[138] _Dial._ xii 6, 2.\n\n[139] \u2018usque eo commutatio ipsa locorum gravis non est, ut hic quoque\nlocus a patria quosdam abduxerit\u2019 _ib._ 5.\n\n[140] _ib._ 7, 1.\n\n[141] \u2018ubicunque vicit Romanus habitat\u2019 _ib._ 7, 7.\n\n[142] _ib._ 8, 6.\n\n[143] \u2018licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre\u2019 _ib._ 8, 1.\n\n[144] \u2018subeunt morbi tristisque senectus\u2019 Verg. _G._ iii 67 quoted by\nSen. _Ep._ 108, 29.\n\n[145] \u2018plena est voluptatis [senectus], si illa scias uti\u2019 Sen. _Ep._ 12,\n4.\n\n[146] \u2018nihil magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se\ndesidiaeque dedat\u2019 Cic. _Off._ i 34, 123; \u2018iuvenes possumus discere,\npossumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad meliora convertere\u2019 Sen.\n_Ep._ 108, 27.\n\n[147] \u2018adeone iuvat occupatum mori?\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ x 20, 3. He instances\nan old gentleman of 90, who had consented to resign his official post\nat that age; but when the time came, he threw his whole household into\nmourning until he got his work back again.\n\n[148] \u2018luxuria cum omni aetate turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est\u2019 Cic.\n_Off._ i 34, 123.\n\n[149] Sen. _Dial._ x 4, 1 and 2.\n\n[150] \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[151] \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03bd (see on hymn of Cleanthes,\nl. 5, in \u00a7 97).\n\n[152] Stob. _Flor._ 117, 8 (M).\n\n[153] \u2018ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum\niudicem misit, quaerimus dignissimos quibus nostra tradamus; nec quicquam\ncura sanctiore componimus quam quod ad nos non pertinet\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iv\n11, 5.\n\n[154] \u2018reverti unde veneris quid grave est?\u2019 _Dial._ ix 11, 4.\n\n[155] Epict. _Disc._ iii 13, 14 and 15; _ib._ iv 1, 106.\n\n[156] \u2018male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ ix 11, 4; and\nsee above, \u00a7\u00a7 298, 299.\n\n[157] \u2018quod tam cito fit, timetis diu?\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ i 6, 9; \u2018puto\nfortiorem eum esse, qui in ipsa morte est quam qui circa mortem. mors\nenim admota etiam imperitis animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia; sic\ngladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum adversario praestat et errantem\ngladium sibi adtemperat\u2019 _Ep._ 30, 8; \u2018the ship is sinking! what then\nhave I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full\nof fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been\nproduced must also perish; for I am not an immortal being\u2019 Epict. _Disc._\nii 5, 11 to 13.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nSTOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Spread of Stoicism.]\n\n=422.= Although up to this point it has been our main purpose to set\nforth the doctrines of Stoicism, we have seen incidentally that these\ncame to exercise a wide influence in Roman society, and that the later\nteachers are far less occupied in the attainment of truth than in the\nright guidance of disciples who lean upon them. In the present chapter\nwe propose to describe more particularly the practical influence of\nStoicism. Our information, whether drawn from history or from poetry,\nrefers generally to the upper classes of Roman society; as to the\ninfluence of the sect amongst the poor we have no sufficient record.\nBut although it is very generally held that the Stoics made no effort\nto reach the working classes of Rome, or met with no success in that\ndirection[1], the evidence points rather to an opposite conclusion,\nat any rate as regards all that development of the system which was\ncoloured by Cynism, the philosophy of the poor[2]. Our actual records are\ntherefore rather of the nature of side-lights upon the system; the main\nstream of Stoic influence may well have flowed in courses with which we\nare imperfectly acquainted, and its workings may perhaps come to light\nfirst in a period of history which lies beyond our immediate scope.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Conversion direct and indirect.]\n\n=423.= Individual Romans who professed themselves disciples of the Porch\nowed their allegiance to the sect to two causes, in varying proportion.\nOn the one hand they had attended lectures or private instruction\ngiven by eminent Stoic teachers, or had immersed themselves in Stoic\nliterature. This influence was in almost all cases the influence of Greek\nupon Roman, and the friendship between the Stoic Panaetius and Scipio\nAemilianus was the type of all subsequent discipleship. Scipio himself\ndid not perhaps formally become a Stoic, but he introduced into Roman\nsociety the atmosphere of Stoicism, known to the Romans as _humanitas_;\nthis included an aversion to war and civil strife, an eagerness to\nappreciate the art and literature of Greece, and an admiration for the\nideals depicted by Xenophon, of the ruler in Cyrus, and of the citizen\nin Socrates[3]. All the Stoic nobles of the time of the republic\nare dominated by these feelings. On the other hand individuals were\noften attracted by the existence of a society which proclaimed itself\nindependent of the will of rulers, and offered its members mutual\nsupport and consolation. Such men were often drawn into Stoicism by\nthe persuasion of friends, without being necessarily well-grounded in\nphilosophical principle; and in this way small groups or cliques might\neasily be formed in which social prejudice or political bias outweighed\nthe formal doctrine of the school. Such a group was that of the \u2018old\nRomans\u2019 of the first century of the principate; and with the spread of\nStoicism this indirect and imperfect method of attachment constantly\ngrows in importance as compared with direct discipleship.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Scipionic circle.]\n\n=424.= Of the first group of Roman Stoics the most notable was C.\nLAELIUS, the intimate friend of Scipio, who became consul in 140 B.C.\nIn his youth he had listened to the teaching of Diogenes of Babylon,\nin later life he was the friend of Panaetius[4]. He was in his time\na notable orator with a quiet flowing style[5]; his manners were\ncheerful[6], his temper was calm[7]; and, as we have seen[8], he seemed\nto many the nearest of all the Romans to the ideal of the Stoic sage. He\nis brought on as the chief speaker in Cicero\u2019s _de Amicitia_. Another\nclose friend of Africanus was SP. MUMMIUS, the brother of the conqueror\nof Achaia; his oratory was marked by the ruggedness characteristic of the\nStoic school[9]. Passing mention may be made of L. FURIUS PHILUS, consul\nin 136 B.C., and a member of the same group, though his philosophical\nviews are not known to us[10].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Gracchan period.]\n\n=425.= From the \u2018humane\u2019 movement sprang the Gracchan reforms, which all\nalike aimed at deposing from power the class to which the reformers by\nbirth belonged. To the temper of mind which made such a desire possible\nStoic doctrine had largely contributed. The Greeks had taught their\nRoman pupils to see in the nascent Roman empire, bearing the watchword\nof the \u2018majesty of the Roman name\u2019 (_maiestas nominis Romani_), at\nleast an approximation to the ideal Cosmopolis: and many Romans so far\nresponded to this suggestion as to be not unfriendly towards plans for\nextending their citizenship and equalizing the privileges of those who\nenjoyed it. C. BLOSSIUS of Cumae, a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus, went\nso far as to instigate Tiberius Gracchus to the schemes which proved his\ndestruction[11]; whilst other Stoics, equally sincere in their aims,\ndisagreed with the violence shown by Tiberius in his choice of method.\nAmongst the latter was Q. AELIUS TUBERO, a nephew of Africanus[12],\nwho became consul in 118 B.C. He devoted himself day and night to the\nstudy of philosophy[13], and though of no mark as an orator, won himself\nrespect by the strictness and consistency of his life[14]. Panaetius,\nPosidonius, and Hecato all addressed treatises to him[15]; and he is a\nleading speaker in Cicero\u2019s _Republic_.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Laelius to Lucilius.]\n\n=426.= After the fall of the Gracchi the Stoic nobles continued to\nplay distinguished and honourable parts in public life. A family\nsuccession was maintained through two daughters of Laelius, so that\nhere we may perhaps recognise the beginning of the deservedly famous\n\u2018Stoic marriages.\u2019 Of the two ladies the elder was married to Q. MUCIUS\nSCAEVOLA, known as \u2018the augur,\u2019 who was consul in 117 B.C. He was a\ndevoted friend of Panaetius, and famous for his knowledge of civil\nlaw[16]. The younger daughter was married to C. FANNIUS, who obtained\nsome distinction as a historian[17]. In C. LUCILIUS we find the Latin\npoet of Stoicism; the views which he expresses in his satires on\nreligion and ethics are in the closest agreement with the teaching of\nPanaetius[18], and the large circulation of his poems must have diffused\nthem through wide circles[19]. At the same time his attacks on the\nreligious institutions of Numa and his ridicule of his own childish\nbeliefs may well have brought philosophy into ill odour as atheistic and\nunpatriotic: and we find the statesmen of the next generation specially\nanxious to avoid any such imputations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Scaevola \u2018the pontifex.\u2019]\n\n=427.= A dominating figure is that of Q. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA, commonly called\n\u2018the pontifex,\u2019 who was a nephew of his namesake mentioned above, and\nderived from him his interest in civil law; he was consul in 95 B.C. He\novercame the difficulty about the popular religion by distinguishing on\nStoic lines three classes of deities, (i) mythical deities, celebrated by\nthe poets with incredible and unworthy narrations[20]; (ii) philosophical\ndeities, better suited for the schools than for the market-place; (iii)\ncivic deities, whose ceremonies it is the duty of state officials to\nmaintain[21], interpreting them so as to agree with the philosophers\nrather than with the poets[22]. In this spirit he filled the position\nof chief officer of the state religion. He was however no time-server;\nfor being appointed after his consulship to be governor of Asia, he\njoined with his former quaestor P. RUTILIUS RUFUS in the design of\nrepressing the extortion of the _publicani_. A decisive step taken by him\nwas to declare all dishonourable contracts invalid[23]; and more than\na generation later his just and sparing administration was gratefully\nremembered both at Rome and in the provinces[24]. The _equites_ took\ntheir revenge not on Scaevola but on Rutilius[25], whom they brought\nto trial in 92 B.C., when Scaevola pleaded his cause in a simple and\ndignified way that became a Stoic, but did not exclude some traces of\nelegance[26]. He is regarded as the father of Roman law, for he was the\nfirst to codify it, which he did in eighteen volumes[27]. He also wrote a\nspecial work on definitions, which no doubt reflected the interest which\nthe Stoics took in this part of logic.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Stoic lawyers.]\n\n=428.= It seems beyond dispute that the systematic study of law, which\ndeveloped in later centuries into the science of Roman jurisprudence,\nand as such has exercised a weighty influence on the development\nof Western civilisation, had its beginnings amongst a group of men\nprofoundly influenced by Stoic teaching. It does not therefore follow\nthat the fundamental ideas expressed by such terms as _ius gentium_, _lex\nnaturae_, are exclusively Stoic in origin. The former phrase appears\nto have been in common use at this time to indicate the laws generally\nin force amongst the peoples that surrounded Rome; the latter is a\nphilosophical term derived from the Greek, denoting an ideal law which\nought to exist amongst men everywhere[28]. The principle of obedience\nto nature is not peculiar to the Stoic philosophy, but belongs to the\ncommon substratum of all philosophical thought. It does however seem to\nbe the case that the Stoic theory of the \u2018common law\u2019 (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2)\nwas in fact the stimulus which enabled the Romans to transform their\nsystem of \u2018rights,\u2019 gradually throwing over all that was of the nature\nof mechanical routine or caste privilege, and harmonizing contradictions\nby the principle of fairness. The successor of Scaevola was C. AQUILIUS\nGALLUS, praetor in 66 B.C. with Cicero, of whom it is specially noted\nthat he guided his exposition of law by the principle of equity[29];\nand after him S. SULPICIUS RUFUS, the contemporary and intimate friend\nof Cicero. We do not know that he was a Stoic, but he was a student of\ndialectic under L. LUCILIUS BALBUS, who as well as his brother belonged\nto this school[30]; and he followed Stoic principles in studying oratory\njust enough to make his exposition clear[31]. He was the acknowledged\nhead of his profession, and compiled 180 books on law[32]. In the civil\nwar he took sides with Caesar[33].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoics of the Sullan period.]\n\n=429.= Amongst men of high rank definitely pledged to Stoicism in the\ngeneration preceding Cicero are further L. AELIUS STILO (circ. 145-75\nB.C.)[34], who devoted himself to Roman grammar and antiquities, and\nwas the teacher of both Cicero and Varro; Q. LUCILIUS BALBUS, whose\nknowledge of this philosophy rivalled that of his Greek teachers[35], and\nwho is the exponent of the Stoic view in Cicero\u2019s _de Natura Deorum_, the\nscene of which takes us back to about 76 B.C.; SEXTUS POMPEIUS, uncle\nof Pompey the Great, and distinguished both as a philosopher and as a\njurist[36]; and more particularly P. RUTILIUS RUFUS, to whom we have\nalready referred[37]. A pupil and devoted admirer of Panaetius[38], a\ntrained philosopher[39], and a sound lawyer[40], he brought his career\nat Rome to an abrupt end by his firm resistance to the _publicani_, as\nalready recounted[41]. With true cosmopolitanism he retired to Smyrna,\nand accepted the citizenship of that town. His stern principles did not\nprevent him from saving his life in the massacre ordered by Mithradates,\nby assuming Greek dress[42]; the massacre itself was the ripe fruit\nof the abuses which he had endeavoured to repress. He is one of the\ncharacters in Cicero\u2019s _de Republica_.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cato.]\n\n=430.= Of the Stoics of Cicero\u2019s time the most eminent was M. PORCIUS\nCATO (95-48 B.C.). In him Stoicism received a special colouring by\nassociation with the traditions of ancient Roman manners. In his early\nyears he became a pupil of Antipater of Tyre[43], and so far adopted the\nCynic ideal as to train himself for public life by freely submitting to\nhunger, cold, and hardship[44]. After a period of service in the army he\nmade a journey to Asia to secure the companionship of Athenodorus the\nelder[45]. He became a practised speaker; and though he adhered firmly to\nthe Stoic tradition of plain language and short sentences[46], yet could\nbecome eloquent on the great themes of his philosophy[47], and could win\nthe approval of the people even for its paradoxes[48]. He was resolutely\nopposed to bribery and extortion. As quaestor in B.C. 66 he introduced\nreform into the public finances, and put an end to embezzlements by\nofficials. His popularity became very great, and he was elected tribune\nof the plebs towards the end of the year 63 B.C., when his voice decided\nthe senators to decree the death of the associates of Catiline. With his\nsubsequent policy Cicero finds fault, because Cato refused to connive\nat the extortions of the _publicani_: and from Cicero\u2019s criticisms has\narisen the accepted view that Cato was an unpractical statesman. On\nthe other hand it may well be held that if the Roman aristocracy had\nincluded more men like Cato, the republic might have been saved: and\ntowards the end of his life Cicero bitterly lamented that he had not\nsufficiently valued the sincere friendship which Cato offered him[49].\nIn the year 54 B.C. the candidates for the office of tribune paid him a\nsingular compliment; each deposited with him a large sum of money, which\nhe was to forfeit if in Cato\u2019s opinion he was guilty of bribery[50]. His\nwhole political life was guided by the strictest moral principle[51];\neven in so unimportant a matter as Cicero\u2019s request for a triumph he\nwould do nothing to oblige a friend[52]. In private life he attempted\nto put into practice the principle of the community of women taught in\nZeno\u2019s _Republic_. He had married Marcia, daughter of Philippus, and\nhad three children by her: in 56 B.C. he gave her up to his friend C.\nHortensius, whose family was in danger of becoming extinct: finally on\nthe threatening of the civil war in B.C. 50 he took her back to his own\nhome. At a time when the marriage bond was lightly treated by many of\nhis contemporaries he at least rose above petty motives. In the civil\nwar he took sides strongly against Caesar, his old political opponent.\nHis self-sought death after Pharsalia won him a distinction which he had\nearned better by his life: and the unmeasured praise bestowed upon him a\ncentury later is perhaps due more to political bias than to philosophical\nrespect[53]. The few words with which Virgil honours his memory are more\neffective, when he pictures Cato as chosen to be a judge in the world of\nthe blest[54]. Cato represents the Stoic view as to the _summum bonum_ in\nCicero\u2019s _de Finibus_.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Varro, Brutus and Porcia.]\n\n=431.= Contemporary with Cicero and Cato was M. TERENTIUS VARRO (B.C.\n116-28). In his public career and political principles he was not unlike\nCato; in his literary activity he more resembled Cicero. Both Varro\nand Cicero were deeply influenced by Stoic teaching, but as they were\nby no means professed adherents of this philosophy[55], they may be\nhere passed by. In the next generation M. JUNIUS BRUTUS (85-42 B.C.)\nconcerns us more: for by his marriage with PORCIA, Cato\u2019s daughter\nand an ardent Stoic, he came into a family connexion with the sect,\nwith which his personal views, as we have seen, were not entirely in\nagreement[56]. Still Brutus was not altogether unfitted to play the part\nof Cato\u2019s successor; he was no mean orator[57], and wrote more than\none philosophical treatise[58]; whilst Cicero dedicated several of his\nphilosophical works to him[59]. But the practical Stoicism of Porcia, who\nstabbed herself in the thigh to show that she was fit to be trusted with\na political secret, shines out more brightly than the speculations of\nher husband. In her honour Martial has written one of the few epigrams\nin which he allows himself to be caught in a mood of admiration: yet his\nstory of Porcia\u2019s death must be rejected as unhistorical[60].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Horace.]\n\n=432.= After the death of Brutus Stoicism ceases for a while to play\na prominent part in Roman history; but its indirect influence is very\nmarked in the two great poets of the Augustan epoch, Horace and Virgil.\nOf these HORACE is in the main an Epicurean, and as such is quite\nentitled to use the Stoic paradoxes as matter for ridicule, and even to\nanticipate dangerous consequences from their practical application[61].\nBut in fact his works show a constantly increasing appreciation of the\nethics of Stoicism. He recognises the high ideals and civic activity\nof its professors[62], and he draws a noble picture of the Stoic sage,\nconfident in his convictions, and bidding defiance to the crowd and the\ntyrant alike[63]. Of that practical wisdom and genial criticism which has\nmade Horace the favourite poet of so many men eminent in public life, no\nsmall part consists of Stoic principles deftly freed from the paradoxical\nform in which they were conveyed to professed adherents.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virgil.]\n\n=433.= With this picture of Stoicism seen from without we must contrast\nthat given us by VIRGIL, who inherited the Stoic tradition from\nAratus[64], his model for the _Georgics_. Virgil\u2019s mind is penetrated by\nStoic feeling, and his works are an interpretation of the universe in\nthe Stoic sense; but like so many of his contemporaries he holds aloof\nfrom formal adherence to the sect, and carefully avoids its technical\nlanguage. Quite possibly too he incorporated in his system elements\ndrawn from other philosophies. In physics he accepts the principle\nthat the fiery aether is the source of all life[65]; it is identical\nwith the divine spirit[66] and the all-informing mind[67]. From this\nstandpoint he is led on to the doctrine of purgatory[68], and from that\nhe looks forward to the time of the conflagration, when all creation\nwill be reconciled by returning to its primitive unity in the primal\nfire-spirit[69]. Still Virgil\u2019s picture must be regarded rather as an\nadaptation than as an exposition of Stoicism; it lacks the sharp outlines\nand the didactic tone of the poetry of Cleanthes or Lucretius, and other\ninterpretations are by no means excluded.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virgil\u2019s theology.]\n\n=434.= With the problem of the government of the universe Virgil\u2019s mind\nis occupied throughout the _Aeneid_. He is constantly weighing the\nrelative importance of the three forces, fate, the gods, and fortune,\nprecisely as the philosophers do. To each of the three he assigns a\npart in the affairs of men; but that taken by fate is unmistakably\npredominant. The individual gods have very little importance in the\npoem; they are to a large extent allegorical figures, representing human\ninstincts and passions; they cannot divert destiny from its path, though\nwith their utmost effort they may slightly delay its work or change\nits incidence. Above all these little gods Jove towers aloft, a power\nmagnificent and munificent; at his voice the gods shudder and the worlds\nobey. But the power of Jove rests upon his complete acceptance of the\nirrevocable decrees of fate[70]. The critic may even describe him as a\npuppet-king, who wears an outward semblance of royalty, but is really\nobedient to an incessant interference from a higher authority. Virgil\nhowever appears truly to hold the Stoic principle that Fate and Jove\nare one; he thus takes us at once to the final problem of philosophy,\nthe reconciliation of the conceptions of Law formed on the one hand by\nobserving facts (the modern \u2018Laws of Nature\u2019) and on the other hand by\nrecognising the moral instinct (the modern \u2018Moral Law\u2019). As we have seen,\na reconciliation of these two by logic is intrinsically impossible.\nVirgil however shows us how they may be in practice reconciled by a\ncertain attitude of mind; and because that attitude is one of resignation\nto and cooperation with the supreme power, it would seem right to place\nVirgil by the side of Cleanthes as one of the religious poets of Stoicism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virgil\u2019s ethics.]\n\n=435.= Virgil\u2019s conception of ethics is displayed in the character of\nAeneas. Much modern criticism revolts against the character of Aeneas\nexactly as it does against that of Cato, and for the same reason, that it\nis without sympathy for Stoic ethics. To understand Aeneas we must first\npicture a man whose whole soul is filled by a reverent regard for destiny\nand submission to Jove, who represents destiny on its personal side. He\ncan therefore never play the part of the hero in revolt; but at the same\ntime he is human, and liable to those petty weaknesses and aberrations\nfrom which even the sage is not exempt. He can hesitate or be hasty, can\nlove or weep; but the sovereignty of his mind is never upset. In a happy\nphrase Virgil sums up the whole ethics of Stoicism:\n\n  \u2018Calm in his soul he abides, and the tears roll down, but in vain[71].\u2019\n\nIn contrast to Aeneas stands Dido, intensely human and passionate, and\nin full rebellion against her destiny. She is to him Eve the temptress,\nCleopatra the seducer; but she is not destined to win a final triumph. A\nmodern romance would doubtless have a different ending.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Ovid.]\n\n=436.= Amongst writers who adopted much of the formal teaching of\nStoicism without imbibing its spirit we may reckon OVID (43 B.C.-18\nA.D.). Not only does he accept the central idea of Stoicism, that it is\nthe divine fire by virtue of which every man lives and moves[72], but\nhe opens his greatest work by a description of the creation[73] which\nappears to follow Stoic lines, and in which the erect figure of man is\nspecially recognised as the proof of the preeminence which Providence\nhas assigned to him over all the other works of the Creator[74]. But\nthe tales related in the _Metamorphoses_ show no trace of the serious\nreligious purpose of Virgil; and the society pictured in Ovid\u2019s love\npoems gives only a caricature of the Stoic doctrines of the community of\nwomen, the absence of jealousy, and outspokenness of speech. Finally the\nplaintive tone of the _Tristia_ shows how little Ovid was in touch with\nStoic self-control amidst the buffetings of fortune.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Cremutius Cordus.]\n\n=437.= In the time of the next _princeps_ we first find Stoicism\nassociated with an unsympathetic attitude towards the imperial\ngovernment. There was nothing in Stoic principles to suggest this\nopposition. Tiberius himself had listened to the teaching of the Stoic\nNestor, and the simplicity of his personal life and the gravity of his\nmanners might well have won him the support of sincere philosophers.\nBut if Stoicism did not create the spirit of opposition, it confirmed\nit where it already existed. The memory of Cato associated Stoic\ndoctrines with republican views: vague idealisations of Brutus and\nCassius suggested the glorification of tyrannicide. CREMUTIUS CORDUS (ob.\nA.D. 25) had offended Seianus by a sarcastic remark: for when Tiberius\nrepaired the theatre of Pompey, and the senate voted that a statue of\nSeianus should be erected there, Cordus said that this meant really\nspoiling the theatre[75]. Seianus then dropped a hint to his client\nSatrius, who accused Cordus before the senate of writing a history in\nwhich he highly praised Brutus, and declared Cassius to have been \u2018the\nlast of the Romans.\u2019 A word of apology would have saved the life of\nCordus; he resolved to die by his own act[76], to the great annoyance\nof his prosecutors[77]. From this time on suicide became an object of\npolitical ambition. The Stoic tradition continued in the family of\nCordus, and to his daughter Marcia, as a fellow-member of the sect,\nSeneca addressed the well-known _Consolatio_[78]; but the title of \u2018old\nRomans\u2019 describes far better the true leanings of the men of whom Cordus\nwas the forerunner.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Kanus Iulius.]\n\n=438.= In the reign of Gaius (Caligula) we first find philosophers as\nsuch exposed to persecution; and we may infer that, like the Jews, they\nresisted tacitly or openly the claim of the emperor to be worshipped as\na god. IULIUS GRAECINUS, according to Seneca, was put to death for no\nother reason than that he was a better man than a tyrant liked to see\nalive[79]. KANUS IULIUS reproved the emperor to his face, and heard with\ncalmness his own doom pronounced. During the ten days still left to him\nhe went quietly on with his daily occupations; he was engaged in a game\nof chess when the centurion summoned him. \u2018After my death,\u2019 he said to\nhis opponent, \u2018do not boast that you won the game.\u2019 His philosopher\naccompanied him, and inquired how his thoughts were occupied. \u2018I\npropose,\u2019 said Kanus, \u2018to observe whether at the last moment the soul is\nconscious of its departure. Afterwards, if I discover what the condition\nof departed souls is, I will come back and inform my friends[80].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Arria the elder.]\n\n=439.= In the reign of Claudius we find Stoics engaged in actual\nconspiracy against the emperor. The name of PAETUS CAECINA introduces us\nto a famous Stoic family, for his wife was ARRIA the elder. Pliny tells\nus, on the authority of her granddaughter Fannia, how when her husband\nand son both fell sick together, and the latter died, she carried out the\nwhole funeral without her husband\u2019s knowledge; and each time that she\nentered his sick chamber, assumed a cheerful smile and assured him that\nthe boy was much better. Whenever her grief became too strong, she would\nleave the room for a few minutes to weep, and return once more calm. When\nScribonianus in Illyria rebelled against Claudius, Paetus took his side;\nupon his fall he was brought a prisoner to Rome. Arria was not allowed to\naccompany him, but she followed him in a fishing boat. She encouraged him\nto face death by piercing her own breast with a dagger, declaring \u2018it\ndoesn\u2019t hurt[81],\u2019 and upon his death she determined not to survive him.\nThrasea, her son-in-law, tried to dissuade her. \u2018If I were condemned,\nwould you,\u2019 said he, \u2018wish your daughter to die with me?\u2019 \u2018Yes,\u2019 said\nArria, \u2018if she had lived with you as long and as happily as I with\nPaetus.\u2019 Here we have a deliberate justification of the Hindu practice of\nthe Sat\u012b.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Seneca.]\n\n=440.= In the reign of Nero the Stoics are still more prominent, and\nalmost always in opposition. SENECA, of course, the emperor\u2019s tutor and\nminister, is on the government side; and from his life we can draw the\ntruest picture of the imperial civil servant in high office. We shall\ncertainly not expect to find that Seneca illustrated in his own life all\nthe virtues that he preached; on the other hand we shall not readily\nbelieve that the ardent disciple of Attalus[82] and affectionate husband\nof Paulina was a man of dissolute life or of avaricious passions. Simple\ntastes, an endless capacity for hard work, and scrupulous honesty were\nthe ordinary marks of the Roman official in those days, as they are of\nmembers of the Civil Service of India to-day[83]. Seneca is often accused\nof having been too supple as a minister; but he was carrying out the\nprinciples of his sect better by taking an active part in politics than\nif he had, like many others, held sullenly aloof[84]. He did not indeed\nimitate Cato or Rutilius Rufus, who had carried firmness of principle\nto an extent that laid them open to the charge of obstinacy; but in\nsubmitting frankly to power greater than his own he still saw to it that\nhis own influence should count towards the better side. For the story of\nhis political career we cannot do better than to refer to the latest\nhistorian of his times[85]; of his work as a philosopher, to which he\nhimself attributed the greater importance, a general account has been\ngiven above[86] and more particular discussions form the central theme of\nthis book.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persius and Lucan.]\n\n=441.= From Seneca we pass naturally to some mention of the poets Persius\nand Lucan. A. PERSIUS FLACCUS (34-62 A.D.) became at 16 years of age\nthe pupil and companion of the Stoic philosopher Cornutus: he was also\na relative of the Arriae already mentioned. He gives us a charming\npicture of his teacher\u2019s ways of life, which were doubtless typical[87]:\nand his summary view of the scope of philosophy well indicates how its\nproportions had shrunk at this period. Dialectic is not mentioned, and\nphysics has interest only in its bearing upon the position and duty of\nthe individual.\n\n  \u2018Go, study, hapless folk, and learn to know\n  The end and object of our life\u2014what are we;\n  The purpose of our being here; the rank\n  Assigned us at the start, and where and when\n  The turn is smoothest round the perilous post;\n  The bounds of wealth; life\u2019s lawful aims; the use\n  Of hoards of coin new-minted; what the claims\n  Of fatherland and kinsfolk near and dear;\n  The will of God concerning thee, and where\n  Thou standest in the commonwealth of man[88].\u2019\n\nHis contemporary M. ANNAEUS LUCANUS (39-65 A.D.), a nephew of Seneca,\nplunged more deeply both into philosophy and into politics. In both he\ndisplayed ardour insufficiently tempered with discretion; he had a far\nkeener sense of his personal grievances than became a Stoic, and was much\nmore of a critic than of a reformer. Yet hardly any writer expresses more\nforcibly the characteristic doctrines of Stoicism, as they seized the\nimagination of young Romans of the upper classes. Amongst such doctrines\nthat of the conflagration was clearly prominent.\n\n  \u2018So when this frame of things has been dissolved,\n  And the world\u2019s many ages have received\n  Their consummation in one final hour,\n  Chaos recalled shall gain his utmost seat,\n  The constellations in confusion dire\n  Hurled each on each together clash; the stars\n  Flaming shall fall into the deep; the earth\n  No longer shall extend her barrier shores,\n  And fling the waters from her; and the Moon\n  Shall meet the Sun in fratricidal war[89].\u2019\n\n  \u2018One pyre awaits the Universe; in ruin\n  \u2019Twill mix with bones of men the heavenly spheres[90].\u2019\n\nLucan emphasizes the pantheistic interpretation of the divine nature;\n\n  \u2018God is all eye can see or heart can feel[91].\u2019\n\n  \u2018The powers of heaven are round about us all;\n  And though from out the temple come no voice,\n  Nought can we do without the will of God[92].\u2019\n\nTo the idealized Cato he addresses the noblest praises;\n\n  \u2018For sure a consecrated life is thine,\n  The laws of heaven thy pattern, God thy guide[93].\u2019\n\n  \u2018See the true Father of his country, worth\n  The homage of thine altars, Rome; for they\n  Who swear by him shall never be ashamed.\n  If e\u2019er the yoke is lifted from thy neck,\n  Now or hereafter he shall be thy God[94].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Civil service and \u2018old Romans.\u2019]\n\n=442.= The careers of Seneca and Musonius, and the early years of Lucan\nhimself, indicate sufficiently that there was no essential opposition\nbetween Stoic principles and the Roman principate; in other words, that\nStoics as such were not \u2018republicans.\u2019 Rather the contrary; for nearly\nall the Greek philosophers had been inclined to favour monarchy, and the\nStoics had been conspicuous in the desire to abolish the distinctions of\nbirth and class upon which the Roman aristocracy laid so much stress,\nand which the principate was disposed to ignore. But in fact Stoicism\nwas the common mould in which the educated youth of Rome were shaped at\nthis period; it produced honest, diligent, and simple-minded men, exactly\nsuited to be instruments of the great imperial bureaucracy. Large numbers\nentered the service of the state, and were heard of no more; such an\none (except for Seneca\u2019s incidental account of him) was C. LUCILIUS,\nSeneca\u2019s correspondent. The great work of Roman government was carried on\nin silence, just as that of India in the present day. This silence was\nprobably on the whole beneficial to society, though it was often felt as\na constraint by the individual. For this reason and many others there\nwere at Rome (as everywhere and at all times) many able but disappointed\nmen; they became the critics of the government, and from being critics\nthey might at any time become conspirators; but at no period did they\nseriously aim at restoring the republican system. Their political\ncreed was limited, and did not look beyond the interests of the class\nfrom which they sprang. They claimed for members of the senate at Rome\ntheir ancient personal privileges, and especially that of _libertas_,\nthat is, freedom to criticize and even to insult the members of the\ngovernment; they sang the praises of Cato, celebrated the birthdays of\nBrutus and Cassius[95], and practised a kind of \u2018passive resistance\u2019\nbased on Oriental methods, by quitting life without hesitation when\nthey were baulked in their immediate wishes by the government. When the\nadministration was carried on decently these men were ridiculous; when\nfrom time to time it became a scandal they were heroes.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Republican prejudices.]\n\n=443.= The early years of Nero\u2019s reign show us plainly that true spirit\nof Stoicism was far more developed on the side of the government than on\nthat of the aristocracy. Nothing distinguishes Seneca more honourably\nthan his humane attitude towards the slave population; and he was chief\nminister of the princeps when in the year A.D. 61 a \u2018notable case[96]\u2019\narose, in which the human rights of slaves were involved. The city\nprefect, Pedanius Secundus, was killed by one of his slaves. It was\ncontended in the senate that by ancient custom the whole household, old\nand young, guilty and innocent, must be put to death alike; and this\nview prevailed and was carried into effect. Public opinion, according\nto Tacitus[97], was unanimous against such severity; it looked, not\nunreasonably, to the emperor and his minister to prevent it[97a]. They on\nthe contrary left the decision to the free judgment of the senate. Where\nnow were the men of philosophic principle, of world-wide sympathies, of\noutspoken utterance? The historian tells us that not one was found in the\nsenate. The honourable men who could defy an emperor\u2019s death-sentence\nstill lacked the courage to speak out against the prejudices of their own\nclass; many indeed uttered exclamations, expressing pity for the women,\nthe young, and the indubitably innocent, and even voted against the\nexecutions; but even in so simple a matter there was not a man to follow\nthe lead of Catiline in Cicero\u2019s days, and take up as his own the cause\nof the oppressed. The leader of the merciless majority was C. Cassius\nLonginus, a celebrated jurist, and one who regularly celebrated the\nhonours of Cassius the conspirator.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Nero and the Stoics.]\n\n=444.= But although the administration of which Nero was the head was\nlargely manned by professed Stoics, and stood as a whole for the better\nsympathies of the Roman people, the course of court intrigue brought\nabout a fierce conflict between the government and a growing force of\npublic opinion of which the \u2018old Roman\u2019 group of Stoics were sometimes\nthe spokesmen, and at other times the silent representatives. To Nero the\nconsideration of his own safety was predominant over every consideration\nof justice to individuals, and herein he stood condemned (and knew that\nit was so) by the judgment of all men of philosophic temper. The first\nof his victims, and perhaps the most deserving of our admiration, was\nRUBELLIUS PLAUTUS, accused by Tigellinus because he maintained the\nirritating cult of the \u2018tyrannicides,\u2019 and had joined the disloyal sect\nof the Stoics[98]. The charge of disloyalty against himself and his\ncompanions he disproved; for, advised by his Stoic teachers Coeranus and\nMusonius, he declined to take part in a rising which might have been\nsuccessful, and calmly awaited his fate (60 A.D.). In the conspiracy of\nPiso, which broke out a few years later, PLAUTUS LATERANUS is named by\nthe historian as one of the few whose motives were honourable and whose\nconduct was consistently courageous[99]. The later years of Nero\u2019s reign\nare illuminated in the pages of Tacitus by the firmness of men like\nTHRASEA PAETUS, PACONIUS AGRIPPINUS, and BAREA SORANUS, and the heroic\ndevotion of women like the younger ARRIA, Thrasea\u2019s wife, and SERVILIA,\nthe daughter of Soranus[100]. In the persecution of this group the modern\nhistorian finds extenuating circumstances, but at Rome itself it appeared\nas though the emperor were engaged in the attempt to extirpate virtue\nitself[101].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Helvidius Priscus.]\n\n=445.= Upon the fall of Nero the \u2018old Romans\u2019 came for a short time\ninto power under the principate of Galba, and amongst others HELVIDIUS\nPRISCUS, Thrasea\u2019s son-in-law, returned from exile. From the account of\nTacitus he appears to have been a very sincere adherent of the Stoic\nschool.\n\n  \u2018He was not like others who adopt the name of philosopher in\n  order to cloak an idle disposition. He followed those teachers\n  who maintain that only the honourable is good, and only the base\n  is evil; power, nobility, and other things external to the soul\n  being neither good nor evil. He designed so to fortify himself\n  thereby against the blows of fortune that he could play his part\n  in public affairs without flinching[102].\u2019\n\nHis first act on returning to Rome was to commence a prosecution of the\naccuser of Thrasea. The senate was divided in opinion as to the wisdom\nof this step, and when Helvidius abandoned the suit some praised his\ncharity, whilst others lamented his indecision[103]. He resumed his\nattempt, as we shall see, at a later time.\n\n\n[Sidenote: His fall.]\n\n=446.= Vespasian was undoubtedly tolerant in his views: his reign\nbegan with the restitution of honours to the deceased Galba, and the\nmuch-respected Musonius[104] seized the opportunity to attack in the\nsenate P. Egnatius Celer, whose treachery had brought about the fall of\nSoranus[105], for false evidence. The trial was postponed, but resulted a\nlittle later in the condemnation of Celer[106]. Public opinion took the\nside of Musonius: but the accused found a champion in Demetrius the Cynic\nphilosopher, and at least defended himself with the ability and courage\nof his sect. Thereupon Helvidius resumed his prosecution of the accuser\nof Thrasea; but the emperor, now anxious to let bygones be bygones,\nrefused to approve[107]. This second failure appears to have embittered\nHelvidius: his opposition to Vespasian became open and insulting, and\nbrought about his death[108]. The life of his wife FANNIA was worthy\nof the two Arriae, her grandmother and her mother. Twice she followed\nher husband into exile; a third time she brought this punishment upon\nherself, by encouraging his friend Senecio to publish his biography,\nsupplying him with the materials, and openly justifying her action. In\nher private life she had singular charm and affability; and her death\nappeared to Pliny to close an era of noble women[109].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Renewal of the Stoic opposition.]\n\n=447.= It seems probable that the Stoic nobles found the low birth\nof Vespasian as intolerable as the tyranny of Nero; at any rate they\nsoon resumed their attitude of opposition to the government, and the\npunishment of Helvidius, if intended as a warning, proved rather a\nprovocation. It appears that he and the \u2018old Romans\u2019 began a systematic\npropaganda in favour of what they called \u2018democracy[110],\u2019 that is,\nthe government of the Roman empire by the senatorial class; and they\nprobably involved many professed philosophers in this impracticable\nand reactionary movement. Vespasian resolved on expelling all the\nphilosophers from Rome. From this general sentence the best known of all,\nMusonius, was excepted[111], and we must infer that he had shown the\ngood sense to keep himself free from political entanglements. In spite\nof this act of Vespasian, Stoicism continued to gain ground, and during\nthe greater part of the period of the Flavian dynasty met with little\ninterference.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Persecution by Domitian.]\n\n=448.= But towards the end of the reign of Domitian a more violent\npersecution broke out. ARULENUS RUSTICUS had been tribune of the plebs\nin 66 A.D., and had then proposed to use his veto in an attempt to save\nthe life of Thrasea Paetus[112]. In 69 A.D. he was praetor, and as such\nheaded an embassy sent by the senate to the soldiers under Petilius\nCerealis. On this occasion he was roughly handled and wounded, and barely\nescaped with his life[113]. After many years of quiet, he was accused\nin 93 A.D., when Pliny was praetor, of having written and spoken in\nhonour of Thrasea Paetus, Herennius Senecio, and Helvidius Priscus; he\nwas condemned to death and his books were destroyed[114]. SENECIO was\ncondemned at the same time for having written the biography of Helvidius\nPriscus, and for the further offence that since holding the quaestorship\nhe had not become a candidate for any higher office[115]. About the same\ntime were banished Artemidorus, the most single-minded and laborious of\nphilosophers, whom Musonius had selected out of a crowd of competitors\nas the fittest to claim his daughter in marriage[116]; Junius Mauricus,\nbrother of Arulenus Rusticus, who had joined Musonius in the attempt to\nsecure the punishment of the _delatores_ of Nero\u2019s time[117]; Demetrius,\nand Epictetus[118]; and further many distinguished ladies, including\nArria and her daughter Fannia[119]. But from the time of the death of\nDomitian in A.D. 96 the imperial government became finally reconciled\nwith Stoicism, which was now the recognised creed of the great majority\nof the educated classes at Rome, of all ages and ranks. As such it\nappears in the writings of JUVENAL, who not only introduces into serious\nliterature the Stoic principle of \u2018straight speaking,\u2019 but actually\nexpounds much of the ethical teaching of Stoicism with more directness\nand force than any professed adherent of the system.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoic reform of law.]\n\n=449.= Stoicism, received into favour in the second century A.D., won new\nopportunities and was exposed to new dangers. Its greatest achievement\nlay in the development of Roman law. As we have just seen[120], the\n\u2018old Romans\u2019 of Nero\u2019s day, in spite of their profession of Stoicism,\nwere unbending upholders of the old law, with all its harshness and\nnarrowness; and we have to go back a hundred years to the great lawyers\nof the times of Sulla and Cicero[121] to meet with men prepared to\nthrow aside old traditions and build anew on the foundations of natural\njustice. But the larger view had not been lost sight of. It remained\nas the ideal of the more generous-minded members of the imperial civil\nservice; and in the times of the emperors Antoninus Pius (138-161 A.D.)\nand Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) it became the starting-point for a\nnew development of Roman law, which is one of the great achievements of\nRoman history. The most eloquent of the historians of the origins of\nChristianity thus describes this movement.\n\n  \u2018Le sto\u00efcisme avait [d\u00e9j\u00e0] p\u00e9n\u00e9tr\u00e9 le droit romain de ses\n  larges maximes, et en avait fait le droit naturel, le droit\n  philosophique, tel que la raison peut le concevoir pour tous les\n  hommes. Le droit strict c\u00e8de \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9quit\u00e9; la douceur l\u2019emporte sur\n  la s\u00e9v\u00e9rit\u00e9; la justice para\u00eet ins\u00e9parable de la bienfaisance.\n  Les grands jurisconsultes d\u2019Antonin continu\u00e8rent la m\u00eame \u0153uvre.\n  Le dernier [Volusius Moecianus] fut le ma\u00eetre de Marc-Aur\u00e8le en\n  fait de jurisprudence, et, \u00e0 vrai dire, l\u2019\u0153uvre des deux saints\n  empereurs ne saurait \u00eatre s\u00e9par\u00e9e. C\u2019est d\u2019eux que datent la\n  plupart de ces lois humaines et sens\u00e9es qui fl\u00e9chirent la rigueur\n  du droit antique et firent, d\u2019une l\u00e9gislation primitivement\n  \u00e9troite et implacable, un code susceptible d\u2019\u00eatre adopt\u00e9 par tous\n  les peuples civilis\u00e9s[122].\u2019\n\nIn the legislation of Antoninus and Aurelius the humane and cosmopolitan\nprinciples of Stoic politics at last triumph over Roman conservatism.\nThe poor, the sick, the infant, and the famine-stricken are protected.\nThe slave is treated as a human being; to kill him becomes a crime, to\ninjure him a misdemeanour; his family and his property are protected by\nthe tribunals. Slavery in fact is treated as a violation of the rights of\nnature; manumission is in every way encouraged. The time is within sight\nwhen Ulpian will declare that \u2018all men, according to natural right, are\nborn free and equal[123].\u2019 This legislation is not entirely the work of\nprofessed Stoics; it is nevertheless the offspring of Stoicism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Repression of zeal.]\n\n=450.= There was in the second century, as there is still, a sharp\nantagonism between the manners of cultivated society and the ardent\nprofession of intellectual convictions. An anecdote related by Gellius\nwell illustrates the social forces which were now constantly at work to\ncheck superfluous enthusiasm.\n\n  \u2018There was with us at table a young student of philosophy who\n  called himself a Stoic, but chiefly distinguished himself by an\n  unwelcome loquacity. He was always bringing up in season and\n  out of season recondite philosophical doctrines, and he looked\n  upon all his neighbours as boors because they were unacquainted\n  with them. His whole talk was strown with mention of syllogisms,\n  fallacies, and the like, such as the \u201cmaster-argument,\u201d the\n  \u201cquiescent,\u201d and the \u201cheap\u201d; and he thought that he was the only\n  man in the world who could solve them. Further he maintained that\n  he had thoroughly studied the nature of the soul, the growth\n  of virtue, the science of daily duties, and the cure of the\n  weaknesses and diseases of the mind. Finally he considered he\n  had attained to that state of perfect happiness which could be\n  clouded by no disappointment, shaken by no pains of death[124].\u2019\n\nSuch a man, we may think, might soon have become an apostle of sincere\nStoicism, and might have left us a clear and systematic exposition of\nStoic doctrine as refined by five centuries of experience. It was not\nto be. The polished Herodes Atticus crushed him with a quotation from\nthe discourses of Epictetus. Not many offended in the same way. Even\nSeneca had been severe on useless study in the regions of history\nand antiquity[125]; the new philosophers despised the study even of\nphilosophy.\n\n\n[Sidenote: State establishment of philosophy.]\n\n=451.= The Stoicism of the second century is therefore much less sharply\ndefined than that of earlier times. Its doctrines, acquired in childhood,\nare accepted with ready acquiescence; but they are not accompanied by\nany firm repudiation of the opposing views of other schools. Once more,\nas in the time of Augustus, the \u2018philosopher\u2019 comes to the front; the\nparticular colour of his philosophy seems of less importance[126]. It\nis philosophy in general which wins the patronage of the emperors.\nNerva allowed the schools of the philosophers to be re-opened; Trajan\ninterested himself in them as providing a useful training for the young.\nHadrian went further, and endowed the teachers of philosophy at Rome;\nAntoninus Pius did the same throughout the provinces. Marcus Aurelius\nestablished representatives of each of the philosophic schools at Athens;\nand amongst later emperors Septimius Severus, aided by his wife Julia\nDomna, was conspicuous in the same direction. The philosophers, who had\nfirmly resisted persecution, gradually sacrificed their independence\nunder the influence of imperial favour. They still recited the dogmas of\ntheir respective founders, but unconsciously they became the partisans\nof the established forms of government and religion. Yet so gentle was\nthe decay of philosophy that it might be regarded as progress if its true\nposition were not illuminated by the attitude of Marcus Aurelius towards\nthe Christians. For Marcus Aurelius was universally accepted as the most\nadmirable practical representative of philosophy in its full ripeness,\nand no word of criticism of his policy was uttered by any teacher of\nStoicism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The pagan revival.]\n\n=452.= The decay of precise philosophic thought was accompanied by\na strong revival of pagan religious sentiment. The atmosphere in\nwhich Marcus Aurelius grew up, and by which his political actions\nwere determined far more than by his philosophic profession, is thus\nsympathetically described by the latest editor of his Reflections.\n\n  \u2018In house and town, the ancestral Penates of the hearth and the\n  Lares of the streets guarded the intercourse of life; in the\n  individual breast, a ministering Genius shaped his destinies and\n  responded to each mood of melancholy or of mirth. Thus all life\n  lay under the regimen of spiritual powers, to be propitiated or\n  appeased by appointed observances and ritual and forms of prayer.\n  To this punctilious and devout form of Paganism Marcus was inured\n  from childhood; at the vintage festival he took his part in\n  chant and sacrifice; at eight years old he was admitted to the\n  Salian priesthood; \u201che was observed to perform all his sacerdotal\n  functions with a constancy and exactness unusual at that age;\n  was soon a master of the sacred music; and had all the forms and\n  liturgies by heart.\u201d Our earliest statue depicts him as a youth\n  offering incense; and in his triumphal bas-reliefs he stands\n  before the altar, a robed and sacrificing priest. To him \u201cprayer\n  and sacrifice, and all observances by which we own the presence\n  and nearness of the gods,\u201d are \u201ccovenants and sacred ministries\u201d\n  admitting to \u201cintimate communion with the divine[127].\u201d\u2019\n\nThe cult thus summarized is not that of the Greek mythology, much less\nthat of the rationalized Stoic theology. It is the primitive ritualism of\nItaly, still dear to the hearts of the common people, and regaining its\nhold on the educated in proportion as they spared themselves the effort\nof individual criticism.\n\n\n[Sidenote: State persecution.]\n\n=453.= It was by no mere accident that Marcus Aurelius became the\npersecutor of the Christians. He was at heart no successor of the Zeno\nwho held as essential the doctrine of a supreme deity, and absolutely\nrejected the use of temples and images. In the interval, official\nStoicism had learnt first to tolerate superstition with a smile, next\nto become its advocate; now it was to become a persecutor in its name.\nPontius Pilatus is said to have recognised the innocence of the founder\nof Christianity, and might have protected him had his instructions\nfrom Rome allowed him to stretch his authority so far; Gallio[128] was\nuninterested in the preaching of Paul; but Aurelius was acquainted with\nthe Christian profession and its adherents[129], and opposed it as an\nobstinate resistance to authority[130]. The popular antipathy to the new\nreligion, and the official distaste for all disturbing novelties, found\nin him a willing supporter[131]. Thus began a new struggle between the\npower of the sword and that of inward conviction. Because reason could\nnot support the worship of the pagan deities, violence must do so[132].\nIt became a triumph of the civil authority and the popular will to extort\na word of weakness by two years of persistent torture[133]. No endowed\nprofessor or enlightened magistrate raised his voice in protest; and in\nthis feeble acquiescence Stoicism perished.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Revolt of the young Stoics.]\n\n=454.= For the consciences of the young revolted. Trained at home and in\nschool to believe in providence, in duty, and in patient endurance of\nevil, they instinctively recognised the Socratic force and example not\nin the magistrate seated in his curule chair, nor in the rustic priest\noccupied in his obsolete ritual, but in the teacher on the cross and the\nmartyr on the rack[134]. In ever increasing numbers men, who had from\ntheir Stoic education imbibed the principles of the unity of the Deity\nand the freedom of the will, came over to the new society which professed\nthe one without reservation, and displayed the other without flinching.\nWith them they brought in large measure their philosophic habits of\nthought, and (in far more particulars than is generally recognised) the\ndefinite tenets which the Porch had always inculcated. Stoicism began a\nnew history, which is not yet ended, within the Christian church; and\nwe must now attempt to give some account of this aftergrowth of the\nphilosophy.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] Lightfoot, _Philippians_, p. 319; Dill, _Roman Society_, p. 334;\nWarde Fowler, _Social Life at Rome_, p. 27.\n\n[2] The practice of street-preaching, as described by Horace and\nEpictetus, points this way; and the world-wide diffusion of Stoicism, in\nmore or less diluted forms, is hardly reconcileable with its restriction\nto a single class of society.\n\n[3] \u2018semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophontem in manibus habebat\u2019 Cic.\n_Tusc. disp._ ii 26, 62; \u2018Cyrus ille a Xenophonte ad effigiem iusti\nimperi scriptus ... quos quidem libros Africanus de manibus ponere non\nsolebat\u2019 _ad Quint._ I i 8, 23.\n\n[4] \u2018ille [Laelius] qui Diogenem Stoicum adulescens, post autem Panaetium\naudierat\u2019 _Fin._ ii 8, 24.\n\n[5] \u2018lenitatem Laelius habuit\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ iii 7, 28; \u2018C. Laelius et P.\nAfricanus imprimis eloquentes\u2019 _Brut._ 21, 82.\n\n[6] \u2018in C. Laelio multa hilaritas\u2019 _Off._ i 30, 108.\n\n[7] \u2018praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus\neademque frons, ut de Socrate itemque de C. Laelio accepimus\u2019 _ib._ 26,\n90.\n\n[8] See above, \u00a7 326.\n\n[9] \u2018Sp. [Mummius] nihilo ornatior, sed tamen astrictior; fuit enim\ndoctus ex disciplina Stoicorum\u2019 Cic. _Brut._ 25, 94.\n\n[10] \u2018non tulit ullos haec civitas humanitate politiores P. Africano, C.\nLaelio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Graecia palam semper\nhabuerunt\u2019 _de Or._ ii 37, 154.\n\n[11] Cic. _Amic._ 11, 37.\n\n[12] \u2018Ti. Gracchum a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum\nvidebamus\u2019 _ib._\n\n[13] _de Or._ iii 23, 87.\n\n[14] \u2018quoniam Stoicorum est facta mentio, Q. Aelius Tubero fuit illo\ntempore, nullo in oratorum numero, sed vita severus et congruens cum ea\ndisciplina quam colebat\u2019 _Brut._ 31, 117.\n\n[15] _Fin._ iv 9, 23; _Off._ iii 15, 63.\n\n[16] \u2018Panaetii illius tui\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ i 11, 45; \u2018[Mucius augur]\noratorum in numero non fuit: iuris civilis intellegentia atque omni\nprudentiae genere praestitit\u2019 _Brut._ 26, 102.\n\n[17] \u2018C. Fannius, C. Laeli gener, ... instituto Laelii Panaetium\naudiverat. eius omnis in dicendo facultas ex historia ipsius non\nineleganter scripta perspici potest\u2019 _ib._ 101.\n\n[18] Schmekel, _Mittlere Stoa_, pp. 444, 445.\n\n[19] See especially his praise of virtue, beginning \u2018virtus, Albine,\nest pretium persolvere verum | queis in versamur, queis vivimu\u2019 rebu\u2019\npotesse\u2019 fr. 1.\n\n[20] \u2018primum genus [po\u00ebticum] nugatorium dicit [Scaevola] esse, quod\nmulta de dis fingantur indigna\u2019 Aug. _Civ. De._ iv 27, on the authority\nof Varro.\n\n[21] \u2018tertium genus\u2019 inquit Varro \u2018quod in urbibus cives, maxime\nsacerdotes, nosse atque administrare debent\u2019 Aug. _Civ. De._ vi 5.\n\n[22] \u2018maior societas nobis debet esse cum philosophis quam cum poetis\u2019\n_ib._ 6.\n\n[23] \u2018ego habeo [exceptionem] tectiorem ex Q. Mucii P. F. edicto\nAsiatico; _extra quam si ita negotium gestum est, ut eo stari non\noporteat ex fide bona_; multaque sum secutus Scaevolae\u2019 Cic. _Att._ vi 1,\n15.\n\n[24] \u2018hanc gloriam iustitiae et abstinentiae fore inlustriorem spero.\nquod Scaevolae contigit\u2019 _ib._ v 17, 5.\n\n[25] See above, \u00a7 326.\n\n[26] \u2018dixit causam illam quadam ex parte Q. Mucius, more suo, nullo\nadparatu, pure et dilucide\u2019 Cic. _de Or._ i 53, 229; \u2018Scaevola parcorum\nelegantissimus\u2019 _Brut._ 40, 148.\n\n[27] \u2018Q. Mucius pontifex maximus ius civile primus constituit, generatim\nin libros xviii redigendo\u2019 Pompon. _Dig._ i 2, 2, 41.\n\n[28] H. Nettleship, _Ius Gentium_ (_Journal of Philology_ xiii 26, pp.\n169 sqq.).\n\n[29] \u2018qui iuris civilis rationem nunquam ab aequitate seiunxerit\u2019 Cic.\n_Caec._ 27, 78.\n\n[30] \u2018cum discendi causa duobus peritissimis operam dedisset, L. Lucilio\nBalbo et C. Aquilio Gallo\u2019 _Brut._ 42, 154; cf. _de Orat._ iii 21, 78.\n\n[31] \u2018Servius [mihi videtur] eloquentiae tantum assumpsisse, ut ius\ncivile facile possit tueri\u2019 _Brut._ 40, 150.\n\n[32] \u2018[Servius] longe omnium in iure civili princeps\u2019 _ib._ 41, 151:\nPomp. _Dig._ i 2, 2, 43.\n\n[33] For an interesting account of his career and death see Warde Fowler,\n_Social Life at Rome_, pp. 118-121.\n\n[34] \u2018idem Aelius Stoicus esse voluit\u2019 Cic. _Brutus_ 56, 206.\n\n[35] \u2018Q. Lucilius Balbus tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum\nexcellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur\u2019 _N. D._ i 6, 15.\n\n[36] \u2018Sextus frater praestantissimum ingenium contulerat ad summam iuris\ncivilis et rerum Stoicarum scientiam\u2019 _Brutus_ 47, 175.\n\n[37] See \u00a7 427.\n\n[38] \u2018Posidonius scribit P. Rutilium dicere solere, quae Panaetius\npraetermisisset, propter eorum quae fecisset praestantiam neminem esse\npersecutum\u2019 Cic. _Off._ iii 2, 10.\n\n[39] \u2018[P. Rutilius], doctus vir et Graecis litteris eruditus, prope\nperfectus in Stoicis\u2019 _Brutus_ 30, 114.\n\n[40] \u2018multa praeclara de iure\u2019 _ib._\n\n[41] See above, \u00a7 326.\n\n[42] Cic. _pro Rabir._ 10, 27.\n\n[43] Plut. _Cato minor_ 4, 1.\n\n[44] _ib._ 5, 3.\n\n[45] _ib._ 10, 1.\n\n[46] \u2018Cato perfectus, mea sententia, Stoicus, ... in ea est haeresi, quae\nnullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum; sed minutis\ninterrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit\u2019 Cic. _Par._\nPro. 2.\n\n[47] \u2018Cato dumtaxat de magnitudine animi, de morte, de omni laude\nvirtutis, Stoice solet, oratoriis ornamentis adhibitis, dicere\u2019 Cic.\n_Par._ Pro. 3.\n\n[48] \u2018animadverti Catonem ... dicendo consequi ut illa [= loci graves ex\nphilosophia] populo probabilia viderentur\u2019 _ib._ 1.\n\n[49] \u2018[doleo] plus apud me simulationem aliorum quam [Catonis] fidem\nvaluisse\u2019 _ad Att._ iii 15, 2 (in B.C. 48).\n\n[50] _ib._ iv 15, 7.\n\n[51] \u2018Catoni vitam ad certam rationis normam dirigenti et diligentissime\nperpendenti momenta officiorum omnium\u2019 _Mur._ 2, 3.\n\n[52] Cato apud Cic. _ad Fam._ xv 5, 2.\n\n[53] See for instance below, \u00a7 441, note 94.\n\n[54] \u2018his [sc. piis] dantem iura Catonem\u2019 Verg. _Aen._ viii 670.\n\n[55] \u2018illam \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd ... ad Varronem transferamus: etenim sunt\n\u1f08\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, quae iste valde probat\u2019 Cic. _Att._ xiii 12, 3; \u2018in iis quae\nerant contra \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1\u03bd praeclare collecta ab Antiocho, Varroni dedi;\n... aptius esse nihil potuit ad id philosophiae genus, quo ille maxime\nmihi delectari videtur\u2019 _ib._ 19, 3 and 5.\n\n[56] See above, \u00a7 123.\n\n[57] \u2018tu, [Brute,] qui non linguam modo acuisses exercitatione dicendi,\nsed et ipsam eloquentiam locupletavisses graviorum artium instrumento\u2019\nCic. _Brutus_ 97, 331.\n\n[58] \u2018Brutus in eo libro quem de virtute composuit\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ xii\n9, 4; \u2018Brutus in eo libro quem \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 inscripsit, dat multa\npraecepta\u2019 _Ep._ 95, 45. There was also a treatise _de patientia_.\n\n[59] The _de Finibus_, _de Natura Deorum_, and _Tusculanae disputationes_.\n\n[60] Mart. _Ep._ i 42.\n\n[61] See above, \u00a7 374, note 66.\n\n[62] \u2018nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis, | virtutis verae custos\nrigidusque satelles\u2019 _Ep._ i 1, 16 and 17.\n\n[63] See above, \u00a7 316, note 96.\n\n[64] See above, \u00a7 90.\n\n[65] \u2018igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo | seminibus\u2019 _Aen._ vi\n730, 731.\n\n[66] \u2018caelum et terras | spiritus intus alit\u2019 _ib._ 724, 726.\n\n[67] \u2018totamque infusa per artus | mens agitat molem\u2019 _ib._ 726, 727.\n\n[68] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 295 to 297.\n\n[69] \u2018donec longa dies, perfecto temporis orbe, | concretam exemit labem,\npurumque reliquit | aetherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem\u2019 _Aen._\nvi 745 to 747.\n\n[70] \u2018desine fata deum flecti sperare precando\u2019 _ib._ 376.\n\n[71] \u2018mens immota manet; lacrimae volvuntur inanes\u2019 _Aen._ iv 449;\nthe \u2018lacrimae inanes\u2019 indicate the ruffling of the soul, in which the\nintelligence and will take no part.\n\n[72] \u2018est deus in nobis: agitante calescimus illo\u2019 Ov. _F._ vi 5.\n\n[73] \u2018ante mare et terras, et quod tegit omnia caelum, | unus erat toto\nNaturae vultus in orbe, | quem dixere Chaos, etc.\u2019 _Met._ i 5 to 88.\n\n[74] \u2018os homini sublime dedit, caelumque tueri | iussit, et erectos ad\nsidera tollere vultus\u2019 _ib._ 85 and 86.\n\n[75] \u2018exclamavit Cordus tunc vere theatrum perire\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 22, 4.\n\n[76] Tac. _Ann._ iv 34. Tacitus entirely ignores the personal motives\nunderlying the story, and quite unnecessarily suggests that Tiberius was\nadopting the policy of repressing freedom of historical narration.\n\n[77] \u2018accusatores queruntur mori Cordum\u2019 Sen. _Dial._ vi 22, 7.\n\n[78] That Cremutius Cordus was a professed Stoic seems a fair inference\nfrom the story as a whole, and yet, as in several similar cases, is not\nexpressly stated.\n\n[79] \u2018quem [Graecinum Iulium] C. Caesar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior\nvir erat quam esse quemquam tyranno expedit\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ ii 21, 5.\n\n[80] _Dial._ ix 14, 4-10.\n\n[81] \u2018casta suo gladium cum traderet Arria Paeto, | quem de visceribus\ntraxerat ipsa suis, | \u201csi qua fides, vulnus quod feci non dolet,\u201d inquit,\n| \u201csed quod tu facies, hoc mihi, Paete, dolet\u201d\u2019 Martial _Ep._ i 14;\n\u2018praeclarum illud eiusdem, ferrum stringere, perfodere pectus, extrahere\npugionem, porrigere marito, addere vocem immortalem et paene divinam\n\u201cPaete, non dolet\u201d\u2019 Pliny _Ep._ iii 16, 6.\n\n[82] See above, \u00a7 126.\n\n[83] \u2018non derunt et frugalitatis exactae homines et laboriosae operae\u2019\nSen. _Dial._ x 18, 4. For the British official the authority of the\nauthor of _Tales from the Hills_ will suffice.\n\n[84] See below, \u00a7 448, note 115.\n\n[85] Henderson\u2019s _Nero_, pp. 31-38, 50-142, 257-288.\n\n[86] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 127-129.\n\n[87] See above, \u00a7 125.\n\n[88] Persius _Sat._ iii 66-72. The translations in this section are by Mr\nW. H. Porter.\n\n[89] _Phars._ i 72 to 80.\n\n[90] _ib._ vii 814 and 815.\n\n[91] See above, \u00a7 242, note 9.\n\n[92] _Phars._ ix 573 and 574.\n\n[93] _ib._ 556 and 557.\n\n[94] _ib._ 601 to 604. The force of this tribute is impaired by the\nsimilar praise given to Pompey (_Phars._ vii 682-689) and to Brutus\n(_ib._ 588 and 589).\n\n[95] \u2018quale coronati Thrasea Helvidiusque bibebant | Brutorum et Cassi\nnatalibus\u2019 Juv. _Sat._ v 36 and 37. See also G. Boissier, _L\u2019Opposition\nsous les C\u00e9sars_.\n\n[96] Henderson\u2019s _Nero_, pp. 90 sqq.\n\n[97] _Annals_ xiv 42, 2.\n\n[97a] The government had in fact appointed an officer for the prevention\nof cruelty to slaves: \u2018de iniuriis dominorum in servos qui audiat positus\nest, qui et saevitiam et libidinem et in praebendis ad victum necessariis\navaritiam compescat\u2019 Sen. _Ben._ iii 22, 3.\n\n[98] Tac. _Ann._ xiv 57.\n\n[99] See Henderson\u2019s _Nero_, pp. 257-283.\n\n[100] Tac. _Ann._ xvi 21-35.\n\n[101] \u2018Nero virtutem ipsam exscindere concupivit\u2019 _ib._ 21.\n\n[102] _Hist._ iv 5.\n\n[103] Tac. _Hist._ iv 6.\n\n[104] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 130, 131.\n\n[105] See above, \u00a7 444.\n\n[106] Tac. _Hist._ iv 40.\n\n[107] _ib._ 43 and 44.\n\n[108] Dill, _Roman Society_, p. 152.\n\n[109] Pliny _Ep._ vii 19, 7.\n\n[110] \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f44\u03c7\u03bb\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf, \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n\u1f10\u03c0\u1fc4\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 Dion Cassius lxvi 12.\n\n[111] Dion Cassius lxvi 13.\n\n[112] See above, \u00a7 444.\n\n[113] Tac. _Hist._ iii 80.\n\n[114] _Agr._ 2; Suetonius, _Dom._ 10.\n\n[115] Dion C. lxvii 13, Tac. _Agr._ 45.\n\n[116] Pliny _Ep._ iii 11, 7.\n\n[117] Tac. _Hist._ iv 40.\n\n[118] A. Gellius _N. A._ xv 11, 5 (for Epictetus).\n\n[119] Pliny _Ep._ iii 11, 3; \u2018tot nobilissimarum feminarum exilia et\nfugas\u2019 Tac. _Agr._ 45.\n\n[120] See above, \u00a7 443.\n\n[121] See above, \u00a7\u00a7 428, 429.\n\n[122] Renan, _Marc-Aur\u00e8le_, pp. 22, 23; cf. Maine, _Ancient Law_, pp. 55,\n56.\n\n[123] Renan, _Marc-Aur\u00e8le_, p. 30.\n\n[124] Aulus Gellius _N. A._ i 2, 3 to 5.\n\n[125] \u2018nam de illis nemo dubitabit, quin operose nihil agant, qui\nlitterarum inutilium studiis detinentur, quae iam apud Romanos quoque\nmagna manus est ... ecce Romanos quoque invasit inane studium supervacua\ndiscendi,\u2019 etc. Sen. _Dial._ x 13, 1 and 3. The condemnation extends to\nthe whole study of history, _N. Q._ iii Pr.\n\n[126] \u2018In the purely moral sphere to which philosophy was now confined,\nthe natural tendency of the different schools, not even excluding the\nEpicurean, was to assimilation and eclecticism\u2019 Dill, _Roman Society_, p.\n343.\n\n[127] Rendall, _M. Aurelius to himself_, Introd. pp. cxxvii, cxxviii.\n\n[128] The connexion (if any) of Gallio the proconsul of Achaia (Acts\nxviii 12) with the Junius Gallio who adopted Seneca\u2019s elder brother is\nuncertain.\n\n[129] Renan, _Marc-Aur\u00e8le_, p. 55, note 2.\n\n[130] M. Aurel. _To himself_ xi 3.\n\n[131] Renan, _M.-A._ p. 329.\n\n[132] \u2018quia ratione congredi non queunt, violentia premunt; incognita\ncausa tanquam nocentissimos damnant\u2019 Lact. _Inst. Epit._ 47 (52), 4.\n\n[133] \u2018vidi ego in Bithynia praesidem gaudio mirabiliter elatum tanquam\nbarbarorum gentem aliquam subegisset, quod unus qui per biennium magna\nvirtute restiterat, postremo cedere visus esset\u2019 _Div. inst._ v 11, 15.\n\n[134] \u2018nam cum videat vulgus dilacerari homines et invictam tenere\npatientiam, existimant nec perseverantiam morientium vanam esse nec ipsam\npatientiam sine deo cruciatus tantos posse superare ... dicit Horatius:\n\u201ciustum ac tenacem ...\u201d quo nihil verius dici potest, si ad eos referatur\nqui nullos cruciatus nullam mortem recusant\u2019 _ib._ 13, 11 to 17.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nTHE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Neighbours, but strangers.]\n\n=455.= During the first century and a half of the Christian era Stoicism\nmaintained an active and successful propaganda, without becoming\nconscious that meanwhile a new force was spreading in the Hellenic world\nwhich was soon to challenge its own supremacy. There is no evidence to\nshow that any of the Stoic teachers with whom we have been concerned knew\nanything of Christianity beyond the bare name, until the two systems came\ninto conflict in the time of Marcus Aurelius; and it is in the highest\ndegree improbable that any of them were influenced in their opinions,\ndirectly or indirectly, by the preaching of Christianity[1]. On the other\nhand the apostles of the newer faith, as often as they entered any of the\nchief cities of the Roman empire, met at once not only with the professed\nadherents of Stoicism, but also with a still wider world of educated men\nand women which was penetrated by Stoic conceptions. From the first it\nwas incumbent on Christian teachers to define their attitude towards this\nphilosophy; and it is our purpose in this chapter to sketch shortly the\nmanner in which they did so. This task belongs primarily to the historian\nof Christianity, but the present work would be incomplete without some\nadumbration of this important field of study. From the middle of the\nsecond century the relations between the two systems alter in character:\nthere then sets in a steady stream of conversion by which the younger\nStoics are drawn away from the older creed, and carry over to its rival\nnot only their personal allegiance but also their intellectual equipment.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Common influences.]\n\n=456.= It is necessarily a difficult task to estimate the influence\nof Stoicism upon the historical development of Christianity, and it\nis impossible to do so without trenching upon ground which is highly\ndebateable. Upon parallels between phrases used by Stoic and Christian\nwriters respectively not too much stress should be laid[2]. Many of these\ncan be traced back to common sources from which each religion drew in\nturn. From Persism the Stoic creed inherited much through Heraclitus,\nand Christianity through Judaism. The kindred doctrines of Buddhism and\nCynism present themselves to our view in Christianity in the Sermon\non the mount, and in Stoicism through the discourses of Epictetus.\nIndividuals in either camp were also influenced in varying degrees by a\nwave of feeling in favour of asceticism and resignation which spread over\nthe whole Greco-Roman world about this time, resulting from exaggerated\nattention being paid to the individual consciousness at the cost of\nsocial and political life. We should therefore endeavour to keep our eyes\nsteadily fixed on the essential features of Stoicism rather than on its\ndetails, and inquire how these were regarded by Christian teachers in\nsuccessive generations.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Progressive influence of Stoicism.]\n\n=457.= A starting-point is obviously afforded us by the speech of St\nPaul upon Mars\u2019 hill, in which he accepts a verse from the Stoic poet\nAratus[3] as a text upon which to proclaim the fatherhood of God. This\nStoic doctrine (like many others to which he refers in his writings) is\ntreated by Paul as embodying an elementary truth, and as a starting-point\nfor fuller knowledge; from any other point of view philosophy is regarded\nas a snare and an imposture[4]. A generation later we find that the\neditor of the fourth gospel boldly places the Stoic version of the\nhistory of creation in the forefront of his work[5]. Later on in the\nsecond century we find the doctrines of the double nature of the Christ\nand of the variety inherent in the Deity becoming incorporated in\ntechnical Stoic forms as part of a defined Christian creed. From whatever\npoint we regard the Stoic influence, it appears during this period as\nan increasing force. We shall speak of it here as the \u2018Stoic strain\u2019 in\nChristianity; meaning by this that a certain attitude of the intellect\nand sympathies, first developed in Stoicism, found for itself a home in\nearly Christianity; that men, Stoics by inheritance or training, joined\nthe church not simply as disciples, but to a large extent as teachers\nalso. This point of view can perhaps best be explained by a sketch of the\ndevelopment of Christian doctrine as it might be regarded by fair-minded\nStoics, attached to the principles of their philosophy but suspicious of\nits close relations with the religion of the State, and ready to welcome\nany new system which might appeal to their reason as well as to their\nmoral sense.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Jesus from the Stoic standpoint.]\n\n=458.= A Stoic of the time of Vespasian (A.D. 69 to 79) might well be\nsupposed to be made acquainted with the beginnings of Christianity by\nsome Christian friend. The story he would hear would take the form of\none of those \u2018oral gospels\u2019 which are now generally supposed to have\npreceded the shaping of the \u2018gospels\u2019 of our New Testament, and to\nhave corresponded generally to the common parts of the first three\ngospels and some of the narratives of the fourth[6]. He would thus learn\nthat the founder was a Jew named JESUS, the son of Joseph a carpenter\nof Nazareth[7]. This Jesus had in his childhood sat at the feet of\nthe philosophic Rabbis of Jerusalem[8], and had learnt from them to\ninterpret the documents of Hebraism, \u2018the law and the prophets,\u2019 in\nthe sense of the world-religions, and by the principle of allegorism to\ngive a new and truer meaning to such parts of them as seemed obsolete or\nincredible[9]. Upon reaching manhood he had been shocked to find that\nthe general body of the Pharisees, to which his teachers belonged, was\nfar more interested in maintaining prejudices of race and class than\nin boldly proclaiming principles of world-wide application; and that\nwhilst freely avowing their own opinions amongst friends, they held it\nindiscreet to reveal them to the crowd[10]. After a period of prolonged\nreflection and inward struggle[11] he resolved on coming forward as a\nteacher in his own name.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The wise man.]\n\n=459.= At this point our Stoic would assuredly be impressed by the\n\u2018strength and force\u2019 of character displayed in the preaching of the young\nJesus, and would so far be disposed to rank him with Socrates and with\nZeno. In the content of Jesus\u2019 teaching he would at once recognise some\nof the prominent characteristics of Zeno\u2019s _Republic_. For Jesus too\nspoke of a model state, calling it the \u2018kingdom of heaven\u2019; and in this\nstate men of all nations were to find a place. Not only the ceremonies\nof the old Hebrew religion, its sacrifices and its sabbaths, were to be\nsuperseded[12]; the temple itself at Jerusalem was to cease to be a place\nof worship[13]; the social and economic system of the Jewish people was\nto be remodelled; the rich were to be swept away, and the poor to enter\ninto their inheritance[14]. Men\u2019s prayers were no longer to be offered to\nthe God of Abraham, but to the Father in heaven, surrounded by spirits\nlike those of Persism, the Name, the Will, the Kingdom, the Glory and the\nMajesty[15]. That Jesus also spoke, after the Persian fashion, of rewards\nfor the good and the wicked in a future existence might interest our\nStoic less, but would not be inconsistent with the traditions of his own\nsect.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The emotions in Jesus.]\n\n=460.= Whilst recognising this strength of character and sympathizing\ngenerally with the gospel message, our Stoic could not fail to observe\nthat the Christian tradition did not claim for the Founder the\nimperturbable calm which the wise man should under all circumstances\npossess. From time to time his spirit was troubled[16]; sometimes by\nAnger, as when he denounced in turn the Pharisees, the scribes, and the\ntraders in the temple; sometimes by Pity, as when he wept over Jerusalem;\nby Fear, as in the garden of Gethsemane[17]; then again by Shame, as in\nthe meeting with the woman taken in adultery[18]; and even by Hilarity,\nas when he participated in the marriage revels at Cana. Yet perhaps,\ntaking the character as a whole, a Stoic would not be surprised that\nthe disciples should remember only the sweetness, the patience, and the\nperseverance of their master; that they should account him a perfect\nman[19], attributing his faults to the weakness of the body[20], and not\nto any taint of soul; and finally that they should accept him as their\nLord and their God[21]. For all these points of view, without being\nspecifically Stoic, find some kind of recognition within Stoicism itself.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Mythologic Christianity.]\n\n=461.= But as our inquirer proceeded to trace the history of Christianity\nafter its Founder\u2019s death, he would soon find the beginnings of division\nwithin the Christian body. He would learn, for instance, that the\nChristians of Jerusalem, who even during their Master\u2019s lifetime had been\npuzzled by his condemnation of Hebrew traditions, had quickly relapsed\nupon his death into the ways of thinking to which in their childhood\nthey had been accustomed. They had become once more Hebrews, and even\nardent advocates of an obsolete ceremonialism; and in this respect they\nseemed entirely to have forgotten the teaching of their Founder. But\ntheir allegiance to his person was unshakeable; and they cherished the\nconviction that during the lifetime of most of them he would rejoin\nthem, and establish that earthly kingdom which in their hearts they had\nnever ceased to covet. In view of this imminent revolution, quite as\nmuch as out of respect for the teaching of the Sermon on the mount, they\nencouraged their members to spend their savings on immediate necessities,\nand soon fell into dire poverty. To Christianity as an intellectual\nsystem they contributed nothing; \u2018little children\u2019 at heart[22], they\nwere content to live in a perfect affection one towards another, and\ntheir miserable circumstances were cheered by visions of angels and a\nsense of their master\u2019s continual presence[23]. From this company our\nStoic might easily turn aside as from a band of ignorant fanatics,\ndisplaying the same simplicity and conservatism as the idol-worshippers\nof Rome, with the added mischief of being disloyal towards the majesty of\nthe empire, and a possible danger to its security[24].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Philosophic Christians.]\n\n=462.= In startling contrast to this band of simple-minded brethren\nwould appear the Christian propagandists whose temper is revealed to us\nin the latter part of the book of Acts, in the epistles of Paul, the\nfirst epistle of Peter, and the epistle to the Hebrews. These fiery\npreachers, equally attached to the name of their Lord, might appear\nto have been singularly indifferent to his person and his history,\nand even to have paid little heed to the details of his teaching as\nrecorded in the oral gospels[25]. But they were entirely possessed by\nhis secret\u2014the transmutation of Hebraism into a world-religion; and they\nhad an ardent desire to present it to the Roman world in a form that\nwould win intellectual assent. Into this effort they threw their whole\npersonality; all the conceptions which filled their minds, some of them\nchildish and common to them with uncivilised peoples, others derived from\nJewish tradition or Hellenistic philosophy, were crudely but forcibly\nfused in the determination to present \u2018the Christ\u2019 to the world, as the\nsolution of its difficulties and the centre of its hopes. The outpourings\nof these men were as unintelligible and unsympathetic to the fraternity\nat Jerusalem as they are to the average church-goer to-day; only breaking\nout here and there into the flame of clear expression when at last some\nlong-sought conception had been grasped[26]. Of such preachers St Paul\nis for us the type, and we may describe them as the \u2018Paulists.\u2019 Paul\nhimself is self-assertive in tone, as a man may be who feels himself\nmisunderstood and misjudged in his own circle[27]. But an ardent Stoic\nmight well have recognised in him a kindred spirit, an intellect\ngrappling boldly with the supreme problems, and laying the foundations of\na new philosophy of life.\n\n\n[Sidenote: St Paul and Stoicism.]\n\n=463.= PAUL was a man of Jewish descent, intensely proud of his\nnationality; but nevertheless brought up in the city of Tarsus, which had\nfor centuries been a centre of Hellenistic philosophy of every type[28],\nand more especially of Stoicism[29]. This philosophy is to Paul\u2019s mind\nentirely inadequate and even dangerous; nevertheless he is steeped in\nStoic ways of thinking, which are continually asserting themselves in\nhis teaching without being formally recognised by him as such. Thus the\n\u2018universe\u2019 (\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), which to the Stoic includes everything with which he\nis concerned, and in particular the subject-matter of religion, becomes\nwith Paul the \u2018world,\u2019 that out of which and above which the Christian\nrises to the \u2018eternal\u2019 or spiritual life.\u2019 Yet this contrast is not\nfinal[30]; and whether or not the Pauline \u2018spirit\u2019 is derived from\nthe Stoic \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, the Pauline system, as it is elaborated in detail,\nincreasingly accommodates itself to that of the Stoics. Our supposed\ninquirer would examine the points both of likeness and of contrast.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Paulist logic.]\n\n=464.= The teaching of Paul was, like that of the Stoics, positive and\ndogmatic[31]. He accepted unquestioningly the evidence of the senses\nas trustworthy, without troubling himself as to the possibility of\nhallucinations, from which nevertheless his circle was not free[32].\nHe also accepted the theory of \u2018inborn ideas,\u2019 that is, of moral\nprinciples engraved upon the heart[33]; and for the faculty of the soul\nwhich realizes such principles he uses the special term \u2018conscience\u2019\n(\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)[34]; conscience being described, with a correct sense of\netymology and possibly a touch of humour, as that within a man which\nbecomes a second witness to what the man says[35]. From another point of\nview the conscience is the divine spirit at work in the human spirit[36].\nClosely associated with conscience in the Pauline system is \u2018faith\u2019\n(\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2), a faculty of the soul which properly has to do with things not\nas they are, but as we mean them to be[37]. The Stoic logic had failed\nto indicate clearly how from the knowledge of the universe as it is\nmen could find a basis for their hopes and efforts for its future; the\nmissing criterion is supplied by the Paulist doctrine of \u2018faith,\u2019 which\nmay also be paradoxically described as the power always to say \u2018Yes[38].\u2019\nThe fraternity at Jerusalem appear to have been alarmed not so much at\nthe principle of faith, as at the manner in which St Paul used it to\nenforce his own doctrines; we find them by way of contrast asserting\nthe Academic position that \u2018none of us are infallible[39].\u2019 We may here\nnotice that the next generation of Christians again brought the theory of\nfaith into harmony with Stoic principles, by explaining that the power of\nknowing the right is strictly dependent upon right action[40].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Paulist metaphysics.]\n\n=465.= In their metaphysical postulates the Paulists started, like all\nancient philosophers, with the contrast between soul and body, but this\nthey transformed into that between \u2018spirit\u2019 and \u2018flesh.\u2019 To them the\n\u2018spirit\u2019 included the whole message of Christianity, the \u2018flesh\u2019 the\ndoctrine and practice of the Gentile world[41]. The terms themselves were\nin use in the oral gospel[42], but the Paulists developed the content of\n\u2018spirit,\u2019 until it included a whole world of conceptions, encircling and\ninterfused with the world of sense-experience. But Paul did not desire\nthat this spiritual world should be regarded as wanting in reality, or\nas a mere product of the imagination: and to express this objectivity\nof spirit he adopted the Stoic term \u2018body.\u2019 Body then expresses the\nunderlying monistic principle of all nature; and we may say \u2018spirit-body\u2019\nexists[43], with the same confidence with which we speak of animal body\nor \u2018flesh-body.\u2019 There has been a flesh-body of Jesus; with that we have\nno more concern[44]. There exists eternally a spirit-body of Christ; from\nthat his church draws its life. The Christian feeds upon the spirit of\nhis Master; but in paradoxical phrase we may say that he eats his body\nand drinks his blood[45]. What is not \u2018body\u2019 has no real existence at\nall[46].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Christian universe.]\n\n=466.= St Paul in his letters appears entirely lacking in that reverent\nfeeling towards the physical universe, that admiration for sun, moon and\nstars, which marked the earlier world-religions, and which he perhaps\nassociated with Babylonian idolatry. As we have seen, he only used the\nStoic term for universe in disapproval. And yet the conception of the\nhistory of the universe was deeply impressed upon the Paulists, and\nalmost precisely in Stoic form. God, the Father, is the beginning of all\nthings; from him they come, and to him they shall all return[47]. From\nthe Father went forth an image of him[48], his first-born Son[49], his\nword, the Christ; by this he created the world, and for this the world\nexists[50]. By a further outpouring of the divine spirit, men are created\nwith the capacity of becoming the \u2018images\u2019 or bodily representations of\nGod and his Son[51]. To this general doctrine individual Paulists add\nspecial features; St Paul himself introduces \u2018woman\u2019 as a fourth order of\ncreation, an image or \u2018vessel\u2019 bearing the same relation to man as man\nto Christ[52]; and a writer (of distinctly later date) seems to refer\nnot only to the creation of the elements[53], but also to their coming\ndestruction by the conflagration[54]. Of the creation of the animals no\nnotice is taken[55].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The divine immanence.]\n\n=467.= From this theory of creation it would seem to follow as a\nconsequence that the world is inhabited by the Deity, and is essentially\ngood. This is the Stoic doctrine, and it is accepted boldly by Paul. God\ndwells in the universe, and the universe in him; man is not in the strict\nsense an individual, for apart from God he does not exist at all[56].\nBut there nevertheless remains the fact of the existence of evil, both\nphysical and moral, in apparent defiance of the divine will. Here too\nthe Paulists agree with Stoic teaching; they hold that evil serves a\nmoral purpose as a training in virtue[57]; that God turns evil to his own\npurpose, so that in the final issue all things are working together for\ngood[58]; that God is active through his Word in restoring a unity that\nhas been for a time broken[59]. Neither can man shift on to his Maker the\nresponsibility for his own wrongdoing; that is (as Cleanthes had taught\nbefore) the work of men following out their own ways in accordance with\nsome bias which is in conflict with their divine origin[60]. In spite\nof all this common ground Paul maintains with at least equal emphasis\ndoctrines of a gloomier type. The universe, as it is, is evil; its rulers\nare the powers of darkness[61]. St Paul by no means put out of sight,\nas the Stoics did, the doctrine of an Evil Spirit; on the contrary,\nthis conception dominates his mind and multiplies itself in it. Sin in\nparticular is in his eyes more widespread, more hideous, more dangerous\nthan it is to the Stoic philosopher. To this point we must revert later.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Religion.]\n\n=468.= With regard to religious belief and practice (we are here using\nthe word \u2018religion\u2019 in the narrower sense, as in the previous chapter on\nthis subject) Paul was in the first place a monotheist, and addresses his\nprayers and praises alike to the Father in heaven, and to him alone. At\nthe same time he does not regard the Deity as dwelling in a world apart;\nhe is to be worshipped in and through the Christ, who is the point of\ncontact between him and humanity[62]. From the ceremonial practices of\nHebraism all the Paulists break away completely. Its bloody sacrifices\ntake away no sin[63]; the solemn rite of circumcision is nothing in\nitself[64], and in practice it is an impediment to the acceptance of\nChrist[65]. The disposition to observe days and seasons, sabbaths and\nnew moons, is a matter for serious alarm[66]. In place of this ritualism\nis to be substituted \u2018a worship according to reason[67],\u2019 which is in\nclose agreement with Stoic practice. To think rightly of the Deity[68],\nto give thanks to him[69], to honour him by an innocent life[70], is\nwell pleasing to God; and the writings of Paul, like those of Epictetus,\ninclude many a hymn of praise, and show us the existence at this time of\nthe beginnings of a great body of religious poetry[71].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Human nature.]\n\n=469.= In the analysis of human nature Paul again started from the Stoic\nbasis. In the first place he recognised the fundamental unity of the man\nas a compacted whole[72]; subject to this monism, he recognised three\nparts, the spirit, the animal life, and the flesh[73]. Of these only the\ntwo extremes, the spirit and the flesh, are usually mentioned; but these\ndo not strictly correspond to the traditional distinction of soul and\nbody. The soul (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae, _anima_) is that which man has in common with the\nanimals; the spirit (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, _spiritus_) is that which he has in common\nwith God. Where therefore only two parts are mentioned, the soul and the\nflesh must be considered both to be included under the name \u2018flesh.\u2019\nSoul and flesh are peculiar to the individual man; spirit is the common\npossession of the Deity and of all men[74]. Thus God and man share in\nthe spiritual nature, and become partners in an aspect of the universe\nfrom which animals, plants, and stones are definitely excluded[75]. The\n\u2018spirit\u2019 of St Paul therefore corresponds closely to the \u2018principate\u2019\nof the Stoics, and though the Christian apostle does not lay the same\nemphasis on its intellectual aspect, he fully recognises that the\nspiritual life is true wisdom, and its perversion folly and darkness[76].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Resurrection and immortality.]\n\n=470.= From this analysis of human nature Paul approaches the central\ndoctrine of the Christian community, that of the resurrection of its\nFounder. To the simple-minded fraternity at Jerusalem the resurrection\nof Jesus was a marvel, an interference with the orderly course of divine\nprovidence, a proof of the truth of the gospel message. Jesus has\nreturned to his disciples in the body as he lived; he has again departed,\nbut before this generation has passed away he will return to stay with\nthem and establish his kingdom. To St Paul all this is different. He\naccepts implicitly the fact of the resurrection, but as typical, not as\nabnormal. As Christ has risen, so will his followers rise. But Christ\nlives in the spirit; by their intrinsic nature neither the flesh-body\nnor the soul-body can become immortal[77]. And in the spirit Christ\u2019s\nfollowers are joined with him, and will be more fully joined when they\nare rid of the burden of the flesh[78]. This continued existence is\nno mere fancy; it is real, objective, and (in philosophical language)\nbodily. Though by the creation all men have some share in the divine\nspirit, yet immortality (at any rate in the full sense) is the privilege\nof the faithful only; it is won, not inherited. Paul does not venture to\nsuggest that human individuality and personality are retained in the life\nbeyond. He draws no picture of the reunion of preacher and disciple, of\nhusband and wife, or of mother and child. It is enough for him to believe\nthat he will be reunited with the glorified Christ, and be in some sense\na member of the heavenly community[79].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The seed theory.]\n\n=471.= On its philosophical side the Paulist view of immortality is\nclosely akin to the Stoic, and is exposed to the same charge of logical\ninconsistency. If the whole man is one, how can we cut off the flesh-body\nand the soul-body from this unity, and yet maintain that the spirit-body\nis not also destroyed? To meet this difficulty St Paul, in one of his\ngrandest outbursts of conviction, propounds the doctrine of \u2018seeds,\u2019\nclosely connected with the Stoic doctrine of seed-powers\u2019 (\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9)[80], and with the general principles of biological science as\nnow understood. This seed is the true reality in man; it may throw off\nboth soul and flesh, and assume to itself a new body, as a tree from\nwhich the branches are lopped off will throw out new branches. Thus, and\nnot otherwise, was Christ raised; and as Christ was raised, so will his\nfollowers be raised[81]. Man is not in any final sense a unit; as the\nrace is continued by the breaking off of the seed from the individual, so\nis the spirit-life won by the abandonment of soul and flesh.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Life and death.]\n\n=472.= At this point we are brought face to face with a very old paradox,\nthat life is death, and death is life. What is commonly called life is\nthat of the soul and the flesh, which the animals share and which may\nmean the atrophy of man\u2019s higher part; on the other hand death has no\npower over the life of the spirit, which is therefore called \u2018eternal\nlife\u2019 or \u2018life of the ages.\u2019 To enter upon this \u2018eternal life\u2019 is the\nvery kernel of the gospel message[82]; in the language of philosophy it\nis the bridge between physics and ethics. Although the steps by which it\nis reached can be most clearly traced in the Pauline epistles, yet the\ngeneral conclusion was accepted by the whole Christian church. From this\npoint of view Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, by virtue of their communion\nwith God, are still alive[83]; he who holds his life dear, loses it; and\nhe who makes it of no account keeps it to the life of the ages[84]; he\nwho listens to the teaching of Jesus and believes in the Father who sent\nhim, has passed over out of death into life[85].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Moral principles.]\n\n=473.= From the doctrine of \u2018eternal life\u2019 follow the first principles\nof morals: eternal life is the moral end (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2) or _summum bonum_[86].\nThe spirit is everything, the act nothing; good lies in the intention,\nnot in the performance[87]; we are saved by faith, not by works[88].\nTherefore all _tabus_ fall away; \u2018to the pure everything is pure[89]\u2019;\n\u2018in its own nature no food is impure; but if people regard any food as\nimpure, to them it is[90]\u2019; \u2018our ungraceful parts come to have a more\nabundant grace[91]\u2019; \u2018everything that God has created is good[92].\u2019 And\nbecause God and all men share in one spirit, all men are fellow-citizens\nin the cosmopolis[93]. To this St Paul sacrifices all personal advantages\nof which otherwise he might be justly proud, his Hebrew descent, his\nfree citizenship in the Roman empire, and even his standing in sex\nabove an inferior part of the creation[94]. The spiritual condition is\nexpressed in terms of certain emotional attitudes which correspond to the\nthree Stoic \u2018constancies[95]\u2019; the details vary, but love, joy, peace,\ngentleness and sweet reasonableness[96] are frequently recurring terms,\nwhilst faith, hope and love are recommended in one passage of the highest\neloquence, love (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7, _caritas_) being given the highest place of\nall[97].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Virtues and vices.]\n\n=474.= In the treatment of the virtues and vices we miss the familiar\nseries of the four virtues, though three of them find a place here or\nthere in some more elaborate list[98]. The vices are treated with much\nmore fulness. Those connected with the sexual relations and functions\nare invariably the first to be condemned; incest, adultery, harlotry,\nfoul conversation, are named in almost every list[99]. Next in importance\nare ill-feeling and quarrelsomeness; heavy drinking comes after these.\nMore upon Stoic lines is the reproof of \u2018excessive grief[100].\u2019 The\nnecessity of steady progress is strongly pressed, and the term used\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae) is that with which we are familiar in Greek philosophy[101].\nIn all the Paulist writers there is also incessant insistence upon the\nimportance of the regular performance of daily duties[102]. Experience\nnot only of the disasters which befel the church at Jerusalem, but also\nof similar tendencies nearer at hand, had impressed deeply on Paul the\ninsufficiency of moral teaching which relied on general principles and\nemotional feeling only, especially if such teaching (as in the Sermon\non the mount) was mainly negative. The Paulists at any rate set forth,\nalmost in a fixed form, a body of instructions to serve the community as\na whole, and social[103] rather than ethical in nature. This teaching\nfollows closely the Stoic teaching of the same period, and is based upon\nthe relationships (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), such as those of king and subject, master\nand slave, husband and wife, parent and child[104]. It is conservative in\ncharacter, advocating kindness, contentment, and zeal in social relations\nas they exist. Thus whilst we recognise the spirit of Zeno in the Sermon\non the mount, we find that of Panaetius in the Pauiist discourses.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sage and saint.]\n\n=475.= As against the Stoic sage the Paulists set up as their ideal the\nsaint, and used all the resources of eloquence in his commendation. He is\nthe true king and priest[105]; even if he is a beggar, he is surpassingly\nrich[106]; he alone, though a slave, is free[107]. On the other hand\nthe sinner is always a slave[108]; even his good acts are without real\nvalue[109]. All such phrases would be familiar to our Stoic inquirer; but\nperhaps he might be specially impressed by finding once more the doctrine\nof the \u2018sufficiency of virtue\u2019 amongst the Christians. The term is indeed\naltered[110], but it bears the same meaning as regards independence of\nwealth, health and liberty, though with more emphasis upon support from a\ndivine source.\n\n\n[Sidenote: St Paul and sin.]\n\n=476.= It is generally agreed that in the writings of St Paul there is\ndisplayed a special sense of shame and horror in speaking of sin[111],\nwhich entirely differentiates his teaching from that of the Stoics.\nThis difference, however, cannot be due to St Paul treating sin as\n\u2018defiance towards a loving Father[112],\u2019 for this view was also that of\nCleanthes and the Stoics generally; and Paul\u2019s horror of sin depends on\nno reasoning, but is felt by him as instinctive. It remains to add that\nour Stoic inquirer would find an apparent conflict between this instinct\nand Paul\u2019s reasoning. The sin of which St Paul finds it \u2018a shame even\nto speak[113]\u2019 is sexual; and so far as it consists in abnormal social\nhabits, such as those relations between persons of the same sex which had\nfound excuse in the classical world, the Stoic would at once agree that\nthese practices were \u2018against nature[114]\u2019 and were unseemly. Again, the\nmarriage of near relations, though not against nature in the sense in\nwhich nature is illustrated by the animal world, is still opposed to so\ndeep-seated a social tradition as to merit instinctive condemnation[115].\nBut the instincts of St Paul go far deeper; the marriage relation is to\nhim at the best a concession to human frailty, and falls short of the\nideal[116]. Nor is this merely a personal view of Paul; it is deeply\nimpressed upon the consciousness of the whole Christian church. How, it\nwould be asked, can this be reconciled with the abolition of the _tabu_,\nwith the principle that \u2018all things are pure,\u2019 or even with the obvious\npurpose of the Creator when he created mankind male and female?\n\n\n[Sidenote: The sex tabus.]\n\n=477.= It would seem that here we have touched a fundamental point in\nthe historical development of the moral sentiments. The sexual _tabus_\nare the most primitive and deeply-seated in human history. From this\npoint of view woman is by nature impure, the sex-functions which play\nso large a part in her mature life being to the savage both dangerous\nand abhorrent. Hence the view, so strongly held by St Paul, that woman\nas a part of the creation is inferior to man. But man too becomes by\nhis sex-functions impure, though for shorter periods; and by union with\nwoman lowers himself to her level. Hence the unconquerable repugnance\nof St Paul to the sexual relation under any conditions whatever[117]; a\nrepugnance which reason and religion keep within limits[118], but which\nyet always breaks out afresh in his writings. Hence also he assumes\nas unquestionable the natural unseemliness of the sexual parts of the\nbody; in all these points not going beyond feelings which are to-day as\nkeen as ever, though no philosopher has found it easy to justify them.\nBut in certain points St Paul outpaces the general feeling, and shows\nhimself an extreme reactionary against the philosophic doctrines which he\nshared with the Stoic. He extends his dislike, in accordance with a most\nprimitive _tabu_, to woman\u2019s hair[119]; he desires the subordination of\nwoman to man to be marked in her outward appearance[120]; and he forbids\nwomen to speak in the general meetings of church members[121].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Hebrew feeling.]\n\n=478.= This intense feeling on the part of St Paul required, as his\nwritings assume, no justification; it was therefore an inherited\nfeeling, as familiar to many an Oriental as it is usually strange and\nunsympathetic to the ancient and modern European. It appears also to\nbe rooted in Hebrew tradition; for if we are at liberty to interpret\nthe myth of Adam and Eve by the parallel of Yama and Yam\u012b in the\nRigveda[122], the fall of man was nothing else than the first marriage,\nin which Eve was the suitor and Adam the accomplice. In the dramatic\npoem of the Rigveda Yama corresponds to the Hebrew Adam, his sister Yam\u012b\nto Eve[123]. Yam\u012b yearns to become the mother of the human race; Yama\nshudders at the impiety of a sister\u2019s embrace. Zeno had already conceived\nthe world-problem in much the same shape[124]; but to the Oriental it is\nmore than a problem of cosmology; it is the fundamental opposition of\nsex attitude, the woman who longs for the family affections against the\nman who seeks an ideal purity. In Genesis the prohibition of the apple\nappears at first sight colourless, yet the meaning is hardly obscure.\nAfter touching the forbidden fruit man and woman first feel the shame\nof nakedness; and Eve is punished by the coming pains of child-bearing,\nand a rank below her husband\u2019s. None the less she has her wish, for she\nbecomes the mother of all living. It is hard to think that Paul, who\nalways traces human sin back to the offence of Adam, and finds it most\nshamelessly displayed in the sex-relationships of his own time, could\nhave conceived of the Fall in any very different way.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The taint in procreation.]\n\n=479.= According then to a point of view which we believe to be latent\nin all the teaching of Paul on the subject of sin, the original taint\nlay in procreation, and through the begetting of children has passed on\nfrom one generation of mankind to another; \u2018through the succession from\nAdam all men become dead[125].\u2019 As an ethical standpoint this position\nis very alien from Stoicism; with the Stoic it is a first law of nature\nwhich bids all men seek for the continuance of the race; with the Apostle\nthe same yearning leads them to enter the pathway of death. It would\nlead us too far to attempt here to discuss this profound moral problem,\nwhich has deeply influenced the whole history of the Christian church.\nWe are however greatly concerned with the influence of this sentiment\non Pauline doctrine. For it follows that in order to attain to a true\nmoral or spiritual life man needs a new begetting and a new birth[126];\nhe must become a son of God through the outpouring of his spirit[127].\nThis is one of the most familiar of Pauline conceptions, and for us it\nis easy to link it on to the Stoico-Pauline account of the creation,\naccording to which man was in the first instance created through the Word\nof God, and endowed with his spirit. But to the community at Jerusalem\nall conceptions of this kind appear to have been hardly intelligible, and\ntended to aggravate the deep distrust of the teachings and methods of St\nPaul and his companions, which was rooted in his disregard of national\ntradition.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The quarrel.]\n\n=480.= This difference of mental attitude soon broke out into an open\nquarrel. So much was inevitable; and the fact that the quarrel is\nrecorded at length in the texts from which we are quoting is one of\nthe strongest evidences of their general accuracy. The Christians at\nJerusalem formed themselves into a nationalist party; they claimed\nthat all the brothers should be in the first instance conformists to\nHebrew institutions. Paul went up to Jerusalem[128], eager to argue the\nmatter with men of famous name. He was disillusioned, as is so often the\ntraveller who returns after trying experiences and much mental growth to\nthe home to which his heart still clings. Peter and the others had no\narguments to meet Paul\u2019s; he could learn nothing from them[129]; they\nhad not even a consistent practice[130]. At first Paul\u2019s moral sense\nwas outraged; he publicly rebuked Peter as double-faced. After a little\ntime he realized that he had met with children; he remembered that he\nhad once thought and acted in the same way[131]. Jews in heart, the home\napostles still talked of marvels[132], still yearned for the return of\nJesus in the flesh[133]. A philosophic religion was as much beyond their\ngrasp as a consistent morality. Through a simple-minded application of\nthe doctrines of the Sermon on the mount they had slipped into deep\npoverty[134]; they were ready to give Paul full recognition in return for\ncharitable help. This was not refused them; but to his other teaching\nPaul now added a chapter on pecuniary independence[135]; and in his old\nage he left to his successors warnings against \u2018old wives\u2019 fables[136]\u2019\nand \u2018Jewish legends[137].\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: The development of Christian mythology.]\n\n=481.= Thus for the first time the forces of mythology within the\nChristian church clashed with those of philosophy. For the moment Paul\nappeared to be the victor; he won the formal recognition of the church,\nwith full authority to continue his preaching on the understanding that\nit was primarily directed to the Gentile world[138]. External events\nwere also unfavourable to the Hebraists: the destruction of Jerusalem\ndeprived them of their local centre; the failure of Jesus to reappear\nin the flesh within the lifetime of his companions disappointed them of\ntheir most cherished hope. But their sentiments and thoughts remained to\na great extent unchanged. To Paul they gave their respect, to Peter their\nlove; and the steady tradition of the Christian church has confirmed\nthis judgment. No saint has been so loved as Peter; to none have so many\nchurches been dedicated by the affectionate instinct of the many; whilst\neven the dominant position of Paul in the sacred canon has hardly secured\nhim much more than formal recognition except by the learned. So again it\nwas with Paul\u2019s teaching; formally recognised as orthodox, it remained\nmisunderstood and unappreciated: it was even rapidly converted into that\nmythological form to which Paul himself was so fiercely opposed.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The Virgin birth and the resurrection.]\n\n=482.= This divergence of view is illustrated most strikingly in the two\ndoctrines which for both parties were the cardinal points of Christian\nbelief, the divine nature of the Founder and his resurrection. On the\nlatter point the standpoint of the Hebraists is sufficiently indicated\nby the tradition of the gospels, all of which emphatically record as a\ndecisive fact that the body of Jesus was not found in his grave on the\nthird day; to the Paulists this point is entirely irrelevant, and they\npass it by unmentioned[139]. To Paul again the man Jesus was of human\nand natural birth, born of the posterity of David, born of a woman,\nborn subject to the law[140]; in his aspect as the Christ he was, as\nhis followers were to be, begotten of the spirit and born anew[141].\nHis statement as to descent from David (which hardly means more than\nthat he was of Jewish race) was crystallized by the mythologists in two\nformal genealogies, which disagree so entirely in detail that they have\nalways been the despair of verbal apologists, but agree in tracing the\npedigree through Joseph to Jesus. The phrase \u2018begotten of the spirit\u2019\nwas interpreted with equal literalness; but the marvel-lovers were for\na time puzzled to place the \u2018spirit\u2019 in the family relationship. In the\nfirst instance the spirit seems to have been identified with the mother\nof Jesus[142]; but the misunderstanding of a Hebrew word which does not\nnecessarily connote physical virginity[143] assisted to fix the function\nof fatherhood upon the divine parent. The antipathy to the natural\nprocess of procreation which we have traced in St Paul himself, and which\nwas surely not less active amongst many of the Hebraists, has contributed\nto raise this materialisation of a philosophic tenet to a high place\namongst the formal dogmas of historic Christianity.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of the Word.]\n\n=483.= But if the tendency to myth-making was still alive in the\nChristian church, that in the direction of philosophy had become\nself-confident and active. The Paulists had taken the measure of their\nformer opponents; they felt themselves superior in intellectual and moral\nvigour, and they knew that they had won this superiority by contact with\nthe Gentile world. More than before they applied themselves to plead the\ncause of the Christ before the Gentiles; but the storm and stress of the\nPauline epistles gave way in time to a serener atmosphere, in which the\ntruths of Stoicism were more generously acknowledged. A Stoic visitor\nof the reign of Trajan would meet in Christian circles the attitude\nrepresented to us by the fourth gospel, in which the problem of the\nChrist-nature stands to the front, and is treated on consistently Stoic\nlines. St Paul had spoken of Jesus as \u2018for us a wisdom which is from\nGod[144]\u2019 and had asserted that \u2018from the beginning he had the nature of\nGod[145]\u2019; his successors declared frankly that Christ was the Logos, the\nWord[146]; and in place of the myth of the Virgin Birth they deliberately\nset in the beginning of their account of Christ the foundation-principles\nof Stoic physics and the Paulist account of the spiritual procreation of\nall Christians.\n\n  \u2018In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and\n  the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things\n  came into being through him, and apart from him nothing that\n  exists came into being[147].\u2019\n\n  \u2018To all who have received him, to them\u2014that is, to those who\n  trust in his name\u2014he has given the privilege of becoming children\n  of God; who were begotten as such not by human descent, nor\n  through an impulse of their own nature, nor through the will of a\n  human father, but from God.\n\n  \u2018And the Word came in the flesh, and lived for a time in our\n  midst, so that we saw his glory, the glory as of the Father\u2019s\n  only Son, sent from his presence. He was full of grace and\n  truth[148].\u2019\n\nThe Stoic character of this teaching is no longer latent, but proclaimed;\nand the Church Fathers recognise this in no doubtful terms[149].\n\n\n[Sidenote: The doctrine of the Trinity.]\n\n=484.= During the whole of the second century A.D. men trained in Stoic\nprinciples crowded into the Christian community. Within it they felt they\nhad a special work to do in building up Christian doctrine so that it\nmight face all storms of criticism. This effort gradually took the shape\nof schools modelled upon those of the philosophic sects. Such a school\nwas founded by an ex-Stoic named PANTAENUS at Alexandria in 181 A.D.;\nand his successors CLEMENS of Alexandria (ob. c. 215 A.D.) and ORIGENES\n(c. 186-253 A.D.) specially devoted themselves to developing the theory\nof the divine nature upon Stoic lines. Not all the particulars they\nsuggested were accepted by the general feeling of the Christian body, but\nfrom the discussion was developed gradually the ecclesiastical doctrine\nof the Trinity[150]. The elements of this doctrine have been already\ntraced in St Paul\u2019s epistles, in which the dominating conceptions are\nthose of God the Father, the Christ, and the divine spirit. For these in\nthe next generation we find the Father, the Word, and the Spirit; and the\nlast term of the triad becomes increasingly identified with the \u2018holy\nspirit\u2019 of Stoicism. But these three conceptions (with others) are in\nStoic doctrine varying names or aspects of the divine unity. Seneca, for\ninstance, had written in the following tone:\n\n  \u2018To whatever country we are banished, two things go with us,\n  our part in the starry heavens above and the world around, our\n  sole right in the moral instincts of our own hearts. Such is\n  the gift to us of the supreme power which shaped the universe.\n  That power we sometimes call \u201cthe all-ruling God,\u201d sometimes\n  \u201cthe incorporeal Wisdom\u201d which is the creator of mighty works,\n  sometimes the \u201cdivine spirit\u201d which spreads through things great\n  and small with duly strung tone, sometimes \u201cdestiny\u201d or the\n  changeless succession of causes linked one to another[151].\u2019\n\nHere the larger variety of terms used by the early Stoic teachers[152]\nis reduced to four aspects of the first cause, namely God, the Word, the\ndivine spirit, and destiny. The Christian writers struck out from the\nseries the fourth member, and the doctrine of the Trinity was there. Its\nstiff formulation for school purposes in the shape \u2018these three are one\u2019\nhas given it the appearance of a paradox; but to persons conversant with\nphilosophic terminology such a phrase was almost commonplace, and is\nindeed found in various associations[153]. The subsequent conversion of\nthe members of the triad into three \u2018persons\u2019 introduced a simplification\nwhich is only apparent, for the doctrine must always remain meaningless\nexcept as a typical solution of the old problem of \u2018the One and the\nmany,\u2019 carried up to the level of ultimate Being[154].\n\n\n[Sidenote: Subsequent history.]\n\n=485.= In the ages that have since followed mythology and philosophy have\nbeen at work side by side within the Christian church. At no time had\nChristians of philosophic temperament entirely thrown off the belief in\nmarvels, and this in increasing degree infected the whole Hellenistic\nworld from the second century onwards. But this spirit of concession\nproved no sure protection to men who, after all, were guilty of thinking.\nIt was substantially on this ground that the first persecutions began\nwithin the church. Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria (circ. 230 A.D.),\nexcommunicated Origen, and obtained the support of the great majority of\nthe Christian churches for his action; still Origen steadily held his\nground, and has found advocates in all ages of Christian history[155].\nThroughout the \u2018dark ages\u2019 philosophical thought lay almost extinguished,\nand a childish credulity attained such monstrous dimensions as to\nthreaten the very existence of social life. In the ecclesiastical\nchronicles of the middle ages miracles are so frequent that the orderly\ncourse of nature seems the exception; angels and devils are so many\nthat men are almost forgotten. To these hallucinations and fictions of\nthe monastery, so deservedly ridiculed in the _Ingoldsby Legends_[156],\nthe practical experience of daily life must always have supplied some\ncorrective; the swollen claim of \u2018faith\u2019 to say yes to every absurdity\nhad to be met by the reassertion of criticism, the right to say \u2018no.\u2019 The\nReformation, at the cost of infinite effort and sacrifice, swept away the\nmiracles of the saints; modern criticism has spared none of the marvels\nof the Old Testament, and is beginning to lay its axe to the root of\nthose of the New. Every day the conviction that \u2018miracles do not happen\u2019\ngains ground amongst intelligent communities; that is (in philosophic\nlanguage) the dualism of God and Nature is being absorbed in the wider\nmonism according to which God and Nature are one.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Christian philosophy.]\n\n=486.= As the credit of Christian mythology diminishes, the philosophic\ncontent of the new religion is regaining its authority. The doctrine of\nthe \u2018spiritual life\u2019 has not yet lost its freshness or its power; but the\nmore closely it is examined, the more clearly will it be seen that it is\nrooted in the fundamental Stoic conceptions of providence and duty, and\nthat, in the history of the Christian church, it is specially bound up\nwith the life and writings of the apostle Paul. It is not suggested that\nthe sketch of Christian teaching contained in this chapter is in any way\na complete or even a well-proportioned view of the Christian faith; for\nwe have necessarily thrown into the background those elements of the new\nreligion which are drawn from Judaism[157] or from the personality of the\nFounder. Nor have we found in Paul a Stoic philosopher: it remains for\na more direct and profound study to determine which of the forces which\nstirred his complex intellect most exactly represents his true and final\nconvictions. No man at any rate ever admitted more frankly the conflict\nboth of moral and of intellectual cravings within himself; no man ever\ncautioned his followers more carefully against accepting all his words\nas final. With these reservations we may perhaps venture to join in the\nhopes of a recent writer who was endowed with no small prophetic insight:\n\n  \u2018The doctrine of Paul will arise out of the tomb where for\n  centuries it has lain buried. It will edify the church of the\n  future; it will have the consent of happier generations, the\n  applause of less superstitious ages. All will be too little to\n  pay the debt which the church of God owes to this \u201cleast of the\n  apostles, who was not fit to be called an apostle, because he\n  persecuted the church of God[158].\u201d\u2019\n\n\n[Sidenote: Stoicism in the present.]\n\n=487.= When that day comes, it will be recognised that Stoicism is\nsomething more than what the Church Fathers meant when they described\nit as part of the \u2018preparation of the gospel\u2019; that it may rather be\nregarded as forming an integral part of the Christian message, or (as it\nhas been recently called) a \u2018root of Christianity[159].\u2019 If this view\nis correct, Stoicism is not dead nor will it die; whether it is correct\nor not, the study of Stoicism is essential to the full understanding\nof the Christian religion, as also to that of many other fundamental\nconceptions of our modern life. Still the Christian churches celebrate\nyearly in quick succession the twin festivals of Pentecost and Trinity,\nin which the groundwork of the Stoic physics is set forth for acceptance\nby the faithful in its Christian garb; whilst the scientific world has\nlately in hot haste abandoned the atomic theory as a final explanation\nof the universe, and is busy in re-establishing in all its essentials\nthe Stoic doctrine of an all-pervading aether. In the practical problems\nof statesmanship and private life we are at present too often drifting\nlike a ship without a rudder, guided only by the mirages of convention,\nchildishly alarmed at the least investigation of first principles; till\nthe most numerous classes are in open revolt against a civilisation which\nmakes no appeal to their reason, and a whole sex is fretting against a\nsubordination which seems to subserve no clearly defined purpose. In\nthis part of philosophy we may at least say that Stoicism has stated\nclearly the chief problems, and has begun to pave a road towards their\nsolution. But that solution will not be found in the refinements of\nlogical discussion: of supreme importance is the force of character which\ncan at the right moment say \u2018yes\u2019 or say \u2018no.\u2019 In this sense also (and\nnot by any more mechanical interpretation) we understand the words of the\nFounder of Christianity: \u2018let your language be \u201cYes, yes\u201d or \u201cNo, no\u201d;\nanything in excess of this comes from the Evil one[160].\u2019 To the simple\nand the straightforward, who trust themselves because they trust a power\nhigher than themselves, the future belongs.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] As to supposed instances to the contrary see Winckler, _Stoicismus_,\npp. 5 to 14.\n\n[2] For material of this kind see Winckler\u2019s dissertation just quoted,\nand Lightfoot\u2019s _Philippians_, pp. 278-290.\n\n[3] \u2018For we are also his offspring\u2019 Acts xvii 28.\n\n[4] 1 Cor. i 20-25.\n\n[5] John i 1.\n\n[6] In the references to the New Testament books in this chapter no\nattempt is made to apply any precise critical theory of their origin or\ndate. Since we suppose that all Christian doctrine was enunciated orally\nlong before it was committed to writing, the date and circumstances\nof the written record become for the present purpose of secondary\nimportance. Translations from the New Testament are, as a rule, taken\nfrom Dr R. F. Weymouth\u2019s _New Testament in Modern Speech_ (London 1903).\nThis admirable translation has for the present purpose the great negative\nadvantage of keeping in the background the mass of associations which\nhinder the modern reader from taking the words of the writers in their\nsimple and natural sense; but on the other hand, Dr Weymouth sometimes\ndisguises the technical terms of ancient philosophy so far as to make\nthem unrecognisable. In such cases the Revised Version is quoted, and\noccasionally the Greek text.\n\n[7] Matt. xiii 55, Luke ii 48; and see below, \u00a7 482.\n\n[8] Luke ii 46, 47. Such men would of course be typical of the spirit of\n\u2018Judaism,\u2019 see \u00a7 22 above.\n\n[9] See the treatment of the Jonah myth (Matt. xii 40 and 41), and of the\nprophecy of the return of Elijah (Matt. xvii 10 to 13).\n\n[10] Matt. xxiii 13.\n\n[11] Matt. iv 1 to 11; Mark i 13; Luke iv 1 to 14.\n\n[12] Matt. xii 1 to 13; Mark ii 23 to 28; Luke vi 1 to 10.\n\n[13] John iv 21.\n\n[14] Matt. v 5.\n\n[15] Matt. vi 9 to 13; a doxology is first found in the MS of the\n_Teaching of the Apostles_, and it was probably not specifically\nconnected with the prayer originally.\n\n[16] John xiii 21.\n\n[17] Luke xxii 44.\n\n[18] John viii 6 and 8.\n\n[19] Matt. v 48; Luke vi 40.\n\n[20] Matt. xxvi 41; Mark xiv 38. The author of the _Epistle to the\nHebrews_ adopts the technical terms of Stoicism more completely.\nAccording to him Christ was touched with all the passions of weak men,\nbut to a degree falling short of sin; \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd ... \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 Heb. iv 15. Thus the\nagony in the garden, though accompanied by loud cries and tears, did not\npass the limits of the healthy affection of caution (\u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), or (as we\nmight say) \u2018anxiety\u2019; _ib._ v 7.\n\n[21] John xx 28.\n\n[22] Mark x 15.\n\n[23] Acts xii 15.\n\n[24] This antipathy to the Roman government finds biting expression in\nthe _Apocalypse of John_.\n\n[25] There seems to be no definite reference even to the Lord\u2019s prayer,\nor to any of the parables, in the books named above.\n\n[26] For instance, that of \u2018love\u2019 in 1 Cor. xiii, and of \u2018faith\u2019 in\nHebrews xi.\n\n[27] For the conflict between St Paul and the church at Jerusalem, see\nbelow, \u00a7 480; for his tone towards those who differed from him, see\nGalatians i 8 and 9; Col. ii 4; 1 Tim. i 20, vi 3 to 5; Titus i 10. A\ngentle expostulation as to this style of controversy is found in the\nepistle of James, see note 39.\n\n[28] \u2018With such zeal do the inhabitants [of Tarsus] study philosophy and\nliterature, that they surpass Athens, Alexandria, and all other schools\nof learning.... Rome knows well how many men of letters issue from this\ncity, for her streets swarm with them\u2019 Strabo xiv p. 673.\n\n[29] Juv. _Sat._ iii 117 and 118; and see above, \u00a7 25, note 65.\n\n[30] Romans viii 20 and 21.\n\n[31] Romans vi 17, 1 Cor. i 10.\n\n[32] 2 Cor. xii 2 to 5.\n\n[33] \u2018a knowledge of the conduct which the Law requires is engraven on\nthe hearts [of the Gentiles]\u2019 Rom. ii 15.\n\n[34] _ib._\n\n[35] \u2018my conscience adds its testimony to mine\u2019 Rom. ix 1.\n\n[36] _ib._\n\n[37] \u2018Faith is a well-grounded assurance of that for which we hope\u2019\nHeb. xi 1. Thus whilst sense-knowledge, and especially sight, calls for\nacceptance because it is \u2018objective,\u2019 and detached from personal bias,\nfaith is essentially subjective, and suggests a power by which (in\nharmony with a divine source) personality dominates fact.\n\n[38] 2 Cor. i 19.\n\n[39] \u2018Do not be eager to become teachers; for we often stumble and fall,\nall of us\u2019 James iii i and 2.\n\n[40] \u2018He who does what is honest and right comes to the light\u2019 John\niii 21; \u2018if any one is willing to do His will, he shall know about the\nteaching\u2019 _ib._ vii 17.\n\n[41] \u2018The cravings of the [flesh] are opposed to those of the spirit, and\nthe cravings of the spirit are opposed to those of the [flesh]\u2019 Gal. v\n17; cf. Romans viii 12 and 13.\n\n[42] See above, \u00a7 460, note 20.\n\n[43] \u2018There are bodies which are celestial and there are bodies which are\nearthly\u2019 1 Cor. xv 40; \u2018as surely as there is an animal body, so there is\nalso a spiritual body\u2019 _ib._ 44.\n\n[44] 2 Cor. v 16.\n\n[45] 1 Cor. xi 24, 25.\n\n[46] \u2018which are a shadow of the things to come, but the body is Christ\u2019s\u2019\nCol. ii 17 (Revised Version).\n\n[47] \u2018The universe (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1) owes its origin to Him, was created by Him,\nand has its aim and purpose in Him\u2019 Rom. xi 36 (Weymouth\u2019s translation);\n\u2018of him and through him and unto him are all things\u2019 _ib._ (Revised\nVersion); \u2018God, the Father, who is the source of all things\u2019 1 Cor. viii\n6. See further _ib._ xv 24 and 28.\n\n[48] \u2018Christ, who is the image of God\u2019 2 Cor. iv 4; \u2018he brightly reflects\nGod\u2019s glory and is the exact representation of His being\u2019 Hebr. i 3.\n\n[49] \u2018Christ is the visible representation of the invisible God, the\nFirst-born and Lord of all creation\u2019 Col. i 15; \u2018it is in Christ that the\nfulness of God\u2019s nature dwells embodied\u2019 _ib._ ii 9.\n\n[50] \u2018in him were all things created ...; all things have been created\nthrough him and unto him\u2019 _ib._ i 16 (Revised Version); \u2018through whom\n[God] made the ages\u2019 Hebrews i 2. Compare the discussion on the four\ncauses above, \u00a7 179, and the phrase of Marcus Aurelius: \u1f10\u03ba \u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03c3\u1f72 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 _To himself_, iv 23.\n\n[51] \u2018Those he has also predestined to bear the likeness of his Son\u2019 Rom.\nviii 29; \u2018a man is the image and glory of God\u2019 1 Cor. xi 7.\n\n[52] \u2018woman is the glory of man; woman takes her origin from man\u2019 1 Cor.\nxi 7 and 8 (with special reference to Eve); cf. 1 Thess. iv 4 (R. V.), 1\nPet. iii 7.\n\n[53] \u2018there were heavens which existed of old, and an earth, the latter\narising out of water by the [word] of God\u2019 2 Pet. iii 5.\n\n[54] \u2018the heavens will pass away with a rushing noise, the elements be\ndestroyed in the fierce heat, and the earth and all the works of man be\nutterly burnt up\u2019 _ib._ 10. But compare 1 Cor. iii 13 to 15.\n\n[55] The omission is due to contempt of dumb creatures, see 1 Cor. ix 9.\n\n[56] \u2018It is in closest union with Him that we live and move and have our\nbeing\u2019 Acts xvii 28; \u2018one God and Father of all ... rules over all, acts\nthrough all, and dwells in all\u2019 Eph. iv 6.\n\n[57] \u2018God is dealing with you as sons; for what son is there whom his\nfather does not discipline?\u2019 Heb. xii 7.\n\n[58] \u2018for those who love God all things are working together for good\u2019\nRom. viii 28.\n\n[59] \u2018God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself\u2019 2 Cor. v 19;\ncf. Col. i 20.\n\n[60] \u2018these men are without excuse, for ... their senseless minds were\ndarkened ... in accordance with their own depraved cravings\u2019 Romans i 20\nto 24. The point is brought out still more plainly by a writer of the\nopposite party, James i 13 to 15.\n\n[61] \u2018ours is not a conflict with mere flesh and blood, but with the\ndespotisms, the empires, the forces that control and govern this dark\nworld, the spiritual hosts of evil arrayed against us in the heavenly\nwarfare\u2019 Eph. vi 12.\n\n[62] \u2018let your thanks to God the Father be presented in the name of our\nLord Jesus Christ\u2019 _ib._ v 20.\n\n[63] \u2018it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away\nsins\u2019 Hebr. x 4.\n\n[64] \u2018in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any\nimportance\u2019 Gal. v 6.\n\n[65] \u2018if you receive circumcision Christ will avail you nothing\u2019 _ib._ v\n2.\n\n[66] \u2018you scrupulously observe days and months, special seasons, and\nyears. I am alarmed about you\u2019 _ib._ iv 10 and 11; cf. Col. ii 16 to 19.\n\n[67] \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f51\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b6\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u1f01\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd Rom. xii 1.\n\n[68] 2 Cor. xiii 5.\n\n[69] 1 Cor. xiv 15.\n\n[70] 1 Tim. ii 8.\n\n[71] Rom. xvi 25 to 27; 1 Cor. i 4; 2 Cor. i 3; Eph. i 3 to 14, iii 20\nand 21; 1 Tim. i 17. Compare 1 Peter i 3 to 5.\n\n[72] \u2018The whole body\u2014its various parts closely fitting and firmly\nadhering to one another\u2014grows by the aid of every contributory link, with\npower proportioned to the need of each individual part\u2019 Eph. iv 16; cf.\nRom. xii 4 and 5.\n\n[73] 1 Cor. xv 44.\n\n[74] The point is continually emphasized that there is only one spirit.\nIn English translations the double printed form, Spirit and spirit,\ndisguises the real meaning, \u2018if there is any common sharing of the\nspirit\u2019 Philipp. ii 1.\n\n[75] \u2018You may, one and all, become sharers in the very nature of God\u2019 2\nPeter i 4.\n\n[76] \u1f10\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1 Rom. i 21.\n\n[77] \u2018our mortal bodies cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor will\nwhat is perishable inherit what is imperishable\u2019 1 Cor. xv 50; \u2018if we\nhave known Christ as a man (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b1), yet now we do so no longer\u2019 2\nCor. v 16. The Pauline doctrine of the spiritual resurrection, in spite\nof its place in the sacred canon, has never been recognised by popular\nChristianity, but it has found notable defenders in Origen in ancient\ntimes, and in Bishop Westcott recently. \u2018No one of [Origen\u2019s] opinions\nwas more vehemently assailed than his teaching on the Resurrection. Even\nhis early and later apologists were perplexed in their defence of him.\nYet there is no point on which his insight was more conspicuous. By\nkeeping strictly to the Apostolic language he anticipated results which\nwe have hardly yet secured. He saw that it is the \u201cspirit\u201d which moulds\nthe frame through which it is manifested; that the body is the same, not\nby any material continuity, but by the permanence of that which gives the\nlaw, the _ratio_ as he calls it, of its constitution (Frag. _de res._ ii\n1, p. 34). Our opponents say now that this idea is a late refinement of\ndoctrine, forced upon us by the exigencies of controversy. The answer is\nthat no exigencies of controversy brought Origen to his conclusion. It\nwas, in his judgment, the clear teaching of St Paul\u2019 Westcott, _Religious\nThought in the West_, p. 244.\n\n[78] \u2018my earnest desire being to depart and to be with Christ\u2019 Philipp. i\n23.\n\n[79] \u2018We shall be with the Lord for ever\u2019 1 Thess. iv 17. So another\nPaulist writer: \u2018we see them eager for a better land, that is to say, a\nheavenly one. For this reason God has now prepared a city for them\u2019 Heb.\nxi 16.\n\n[80] The term used is \u03ba\u03cc\u03ba\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u2018grain\u2019 in 1 Cor. xv 37, but \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u2018seed\u2019\n_ib._ 38. The Stoic term \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is found in Justin Martyr\n_Apol._ ii 8 and 13.\n\n[81] 1 Cor. xv 16, 17.\n\n[82] \u2018while we are at home in the body we are banished from the Lord; for\nwe are living a life of faith, and not one of sight\u2019 2 Cor. v 6; \u2018we by\nour baptism were buried with him in death, in order that we should also\nlive an entirely new life\u2019 Rom. vi 4; \u2018surrender your very selves to God\nas living men who have risen from the dead\u2019 _ib._ 13.\n\n[83] \u2018He is not the God of dead, but of living men\u2019 Matt. xxii 32.\n\n[84] Matt. x 39, xvi 25, John xii 25.\n\n[85] John v 24.\n\n[86] \u2018the end eternal life\u2019 Rom. vi 22 (Revised version); \u2018you have the\nLife of the ages as the final result\u2019 _ib._ (Weymouth).\n\n[87] \u2018the end sought is the love which springs from a pure heart, a clear\nconscience, and a sincere faith\u2019 1 Tim. i 5.\n\n[88] \u2018it is as the result of faith that a man is held to be righteous,\napart from actions done in obedience to Law\u2019 Rom. iii 28.\n\n[89] Titus i 15.\n\n[90] Romans xiv 14.\n\n[91] 1 Cor. xii 23.\n\n[92] 1 Tim. iv 4.\n\n[93] Eph. ii 19.\n\n[94] \u2018in Him the distinctions between Jew and Gentile, slave and free\nman, male and female, disappear\u2019 Gal. iii 28.\n\n[95] See above, \u00a7 355.\n\n[96] \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 2 Cor. x 1.\n\n[97] 1 Cor. xiii. For the constancy of Caution see \u00a7 460, note 20.\n\n[98] Justice (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7) 1 Tim. vi 11; Courage (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae) 1 Tim. vi 11,\n(\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2) 2 Tim. i 7; Soberness (\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1) Gal. v 23.\n\n[99] Rom. i 26 to 30; Gal. v 19 and 20; Col. iii 5.\n\n[100] 2 Cor. ii 7, vii 10.\n\n[101] \u2018I shall go on working to promote your progress\u2019 Philipp. i 25;\n\u2018with my eyes fixed on the goal I push on\u2019 _ib._ iii 14. There is also\n(paradoxically) progress in wrongdoing; \u2018they will proceed from bad to\nworse in impiety\u2019 2 Tim. ii 16.\n\n[102] The technical term used is \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (Eph. v 4, Philem. 8), once\nonly (in negative form) \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (Rom. i 28).\n\n[103] In the sense in which the word \u2018political\u2019 is used above, \u00a7\u00a7\n302-311.\n\n[104] Rom. xiii 1 to 9; Ephes. v and vi; Col. iii 18 to 25; Titus ii 1 to\n10; 1 Peter ii and iii.\n\n[105] \u2018You are a priesthood of kingly lineage\u2019 1 Peter ii 9.\n\n[106] \u2018as poor, but we bestow wealth on many; as having nothing, and yet\nwe securely possess all things\u2019 2 Cor. vi 10.\n\n[107] \u2018where the spirit of the Lord is, freedom is enjoyed\u2019 2 Cor. iii 17.\n\n[108] \u2018every one who commits sin is the slave of sin\u2019 John viii 34.\n\n[109] \u2018if I am destitute of love, I am nothing\u2019 1 Cor. xiii 2.\n\n[110] It is \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 not \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 (2 Cor. iii 5 and 6), the latter word\nbeing used in a different sense, for which see \u00a7 480, note 135.\n\n[111] The term (\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, _peccatum_) is Stoic.\n\n[112] Lightfoot, _Philippians_, p. 296. This view has become familiar\nthrough Milton\u2019s treatment of the Fall of man in _Paradise Lost_. There\nthe prohibition of the forbidden fruit is nothing but a test of readiness\nto obey. This point of view seems quite foreign to St Paul, who always\nspeaks of sin as sinful in itself, not in consequence of the Creator\u2019s\nwill.\n\n[113] Eph. v 12 (R. V.).\n\n[114] Rom. i 26.\n\n[115] 1 Cor. v 1.\n\n[116] 1 Cor. vii 1 to 8.\n\n[117] \u2018It is well for a man to abstain altogether from marriage. But\nbecause there is so much fornication every man should have a wife of his\nown\u2019 1 Cor. vii i and 2.\n\n[118] \u2018If you marry, you have not sinned\u2019 _ib._ 28.\n\n[119] \u2018if a woman will not wear a veil, let her also cut off her hair\u2019 1\nCor. xi 6. For the savage tabu of women\u2019s hair see Jevons, _Introduction\nto the History of Religion_, p. 78.\n\n[120] 1 Cor. xi 10.\n\n[121] _ib._ xiv 34 and 35.\n\n[122] Rigveda x 10.\n\n[123] See the author\u2019s translation in his _Rigveda_ (London, 1900).\n\n[124] See above, \u00a7 307.\n\n[125] \u2018just as through Adam all die, so also through Christ all will be\nmade alive again\u2019 1 Cor. xv 22.\n\n[126] \u2018God in his great mercy has begotten us anew\u2019 1 Peter i 3;\n\u2018you have been begotten again from a germ not of perishable, but of\nimperishable life\u2019 _ib._ 23.\n\n[127] \u2018you are all sons of God through faith\u2019 Gal. iii 26.\n\n[128] Gal. ii 1.\n\n[129] _ib._ 6.\n\n[130] _ib._ 12.\n\n[131] 1 Cor. xiii 11.\n\n[132] _ib._ i 22.\n\n[133] James v 8.\n\n[134] James i 27, ii 15 to 17, v 1 to 3.\n\n[135] 2 Cor. ix 8 (the technical term is \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1); \u2018if a man does not\nchoose to work, neither shall he eat\u2019 2 Thess. iii 10.\n\n[136] \u2018worldly (i.e. materialistic) stories, fit only for credulous old\nwomen, have nothing to do with\u2019 1 Tim. iv 7.\n\n[137] Titus i 14.\n\n[138] Galatians ii 9.\n\n[139] \u2018[Christ] was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the\nspirit\u2019 1 Peter iii 18.\n\n[140] \u2018[Jesus Christ] who, as regards His human descent, belonged to\nthe posterity of David, but as regards the holiness of His Spirit was\ndecisively proved by the Resurrection to be the Son of God\u2019 Romans i 4;\n\u2018God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born subject to Law\u2019 Gal. iv 4.\n\n[141] 1 Peter i 3.\n\n[142] In the account of the transfiguration in the _Gospel to the\nHebrews_ (p. 15, 36 Hilgenfeld; Preuschen _Antileg._ 4) Jesus says\n\u2018Lately my mother, the holy spirit, seized me by one of my hairs and\ncarried me away to the great mountain of Thabor.\u2019 Here Origen restores a\nphilosophical interpretation by referring to Matt. xii 50; \u2018whoever shall\ndo the will of my Father ... is my mother\u2019 _Comm. in Joh._ ii 12, p. 64\nD. Modern writers find an identification of Mary with the Wisdom (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1)\nof God. See Gruppe, _Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte_,\nvol. ii p. 1614.\n\n[143] Matt. i 23.\n\n[144] 1 Cor. i 30.\n\n[145] Philipp. ii 6.\n\n[146] \u2018That which was from the beginning ... concerning the Word of life\u2019\n1 John i 1; \u2018his name is the Word of God\u2019 Rev. xix 13.\n\n[147] John i 1 to 3.\n\n[148] John i 12 to 14.\n\n[149] \u2018apud vestros quoque sapientes \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd (id est sermonem atque\nrationem) constat artificem videri universitatis\u2019 Tert. _Apol._ 21; \u2018Zeno\nopificem universitatis \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd praedicat, quem et fatum et necessitatem et\nanimum Iovis nuncupat\u2019 Lact. _Div. inst._ iv 9. Naturally the Christian\nwriters regard the Stoic doctrine of the Logos as an \u2018anticipation\u2019 of\ntheir own, exactly as in modern times the Darwinists, having borrowed\nfrom Epicurus the doctrine of atoms, regard the original doctrine as a\n\u2018marvellous anticipation\u2019 of modern science. Justin Martyr goes further,\nand concludes that all believers in the Logos were (by anticipation)\nChristians: \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03b9\u03ce\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03a7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u1f02\u03bd \u1f04\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\n_Apol._ i 46.\n\n[150] The term is first used by Theophilus (c. 180 A.D.), of God, his\nWord, and his Wisdom.\n\n[151] In this passage an \u2018anticipation\u2019 of the doctrine of the Trinity\nhas many times been discovered; for instance in the 18th century by the\nJesuit Huet (Winckler, _der Stoicismus_, p. 9); in our own country by Dr\nHeberden (see Caesar Morgan, _An investigation of the Trinity of Plato_,\nHolden\u2019s edition, 1853, p. 155); and again recently by Am\u00e9d\u00e9e Fleury and\nothers (Winckler, p. 8).\n\n[152] See above, \u00a7 242.\n\n[153] For instance in 1 John v 8, and (in substance) in 1 Cor. xiii 13.\n\n[154] Whatever may be the ecclesiastical or legal sense of the word\n\u2018person,\u2019 in its original philosophical meaning it expresses an aspect of\nindividuality, and not an individual: see Cicero\u2019s use of the term quoted\nabove, \u00a7 271, note 42.\n\n[155] See above, \u00a7 470, note 77.\n\n[156] This book claims rank as a classic; amongst others of similar\npurpose may be mentioned R. Garnett\u2019s _Twilight of the gods_ (New\nedition, London 1903).\n\n[157] Amongst these elements we include all that Christianity has drawn\nfrom Persism through Judaism. We have indeed referred to the Persian\nbeliefs embodied in the \u2018Lord\u2019s prayer\u2019; but it has lain outside our\nscope to discuss the Eschatology which figures so largely in popular\nconceptions of Christianity, but is now thought to be but slightly\nconnected with its characteristic message. On this point see especially\nCarl Clemen, _Religionsgeschichtliche Erkl\u00e4rung des Neuen Testaments_\n(Giessen, 1909), pp. 90-135.\n\n[158] Matthew Arnold, _St Paul and Protestantism_ (Popular edition, p.\n80).\n\n[159] The full title of Winckler\u2019s book from which we have often already\nquoted is _Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums_.\n\n[160] Matt. v 37.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY.\n\nThe numbers in brackets are those of the British Museum catalogue.\n\nThe dates given are usually those of the latest available edition.\n\n\nI. ANCIENT WRITERS AND PHILOSOPHERS.\n\n=Achilles= (the astronomer). Isagoge ad Arati phaenomena. In Migne\u2019s\nPatrology. (2001 c.) A better text in E. Maass\u2019 Aratea; see \u2018Aratus.\u2019\n\n=A\u00ebtius= (1st cent. A.D.). Placita philosophiae. In \u2018Doxographi Graeci\u2019\ned. H. Diels, 1879. (2044 f.)\n\n=Alexander= of Aphrodisias (circ. 200 A.D.). In Aristotelis metaphysica,\ned. M. Hayduck (Ac. 855/9); in Arist. Top. ed. M. Wallies (Ac. 855/9); de\nanima, de fato, de mixtione, etc. ed. I. Bruns (2044 f).\n\n=Ammonius= (the grammarian) of Alexandria. In Aristotelis analytica, ed.\nM. Wallies. (Ac. 855/9.)\n\n=Antigonus= (of Carystus, circ. 250 B.C.). Mirae auscultationes, ed.\nA. Westermann, in \u2018Paradoxographi Graeci.\u2019 [His life of Zeno is the\nbasis of that given by Diogenes Laertius.] Antigonus von Carystos, by\nWilamowitz-Moellendorf, 1881. (12902 ee 25.)\n\n=Antipater= (of Tarsus). Fragments in H. von Arnim \u2018Stoicorum veterum\nfragmenta.\u2019 (8460 k.)\n\n=Antoninus, M. Aur.= See Aurelius.\n\n=Apollonius= (of Tyana; Neo-Pythagorean philosopher, ob. 97 A.D.). Ap. of\nT., a study of his life and times, by F. W. Groves Campbell, 1908. (10606\nl 4.) See also Mead, G. R. S., and Whittaker, T.\n\n=Aratus.= Phaenomena, ed. E. Maass, 1893. (11312 f 58.) Comm. in Aratum\nreliquiae, coll. E. Maass, 1898. (11313 gg 1.)\n\n  _Maass, E._ Aratea. 1892.\n\n=Areius Didymus= (time of Augustus). The presumed fragments collected by\nH. Diels in \u2018Doxographi Graeci.\u2019 1879. (2044 f.)\n\n=Aristo.= De Aristone Chio et Herillo Carthaginiensi Stoicis commentatio.\nN. Saal, 1852. (10605 e 33.) See also the article by H. von Arnim, in\nPauly-Wissowa ii 957 sqq.\n\n=Aristotle.= The commentaries on Aristotle are valuable authorities for\nStoic teaching; new editions are in course of publication by the Royal\nPrussian Society of Science. The most important for our purpose are those\nof Alexander, Dexippus, Philoponus, Simplicius, and Themistius. (Ac.\n855/9.)\n\n  _Butcher, S. H._ Aristotle\u2019s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art. 1902.\n  (2236 cc 9.) [Contains a discussion of the phrase \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.]\n\n  _Hicks, R. D._ Arist. de anima, 1907.\n\n  _Wallace, Edwin._ Aristotle\u2019s Psychology in Greek and English,\n  with introd. and notes. 1882. (2236 cc.)\n\n=Arrianus, Flavius= (2nd cent. A.D.). Ed. A. G. Roos, in Bibl. Teub.\n(2047 c.)\n\n=Athenaeus.= Ed. G. Kaibel, 3 vols., in Bibl. Teub. (2047 e.)\n\n=Augustinus= (353-430 A.D.). In the Corpus Script. Eccles., vols. 25-28.\n(2003 d.)\n\n=Aurelius, M. Antoninus.= Ed. with commentary by Gataker, 1652, with\npreface \u2018de Stoica disciplina cum sectis aliis collata.\u2019 Of this book\nG. Long says, \u2018it is a wonderful monument of learning, and certainly no\nEnglishman has yet done anything like it.\u2019 (12205 ff 3.) Also ed. by J.\nStich, in Bibl. Teub. (2047 e.) Also by J. H. Leopold, in Script. Cl.\nBibl. Oxon. (2046 b.)\n\nThere are numerous translations. By M. Casaubon, 5th ed. 1692 (231 c\n14), and edited with introd. by W. H. D. Rouse, 1899; by G. Long, 1862,\nand with an essay by Matthew Arnold attached, 1904 (12204 p 3/15); by J.\nCollier, revised by Alice Zimmern, 1891 (012207 l 3); by John Jackson,\n1906 (8410 ee 23); and by G. H. Rendall, with introductory study on\n\u2018Stoicism and the last of the Stoics,\u2019 1898 (08461 g 1).\n\n  Treatises by the following:\n\n  _Alston, L._ Stoic and Christian in the second century. 1906.\n  (4532 de 6.)\n\n  _Bach, N._ De M. Aurelio Ant. Imperatore philosophante.\n\n  _Bodek, Arn._ M. Aur. Ant. als Freund und Zeitgenosse des Rabbi\n  Jehuda ha-Nasi, 1868. (10605 ee 29.)\n\n  _Braune, A._ M. Aurel\u2019s Meditationen, 1878.\n\n  _Crossley, Hastings._ The fourth book, with translation,\n  commentary, and appendix on C. Fronto, 1882. (8462 d 12.)\n\n  _Dartigne-Peyrou, J._ Marc-Aur\u00e8le dans ses rapports avec le\n  christianisme, 1897. (4530 ee 30.)\n\n  _Davis, C. H. S._ Greek and Roman Stoicism and some of its\n  disciples, 1903. (08461 g 11.)\n\n  _Ellis, Robinson._ The correspondence of Fronto and M. Aurelius.\n  (11312 g 11/4.)\n\n  _K\u00f6nigsbeck, Max._ De Stoicismo M. Antonini, 1861. (8461 bbb 33.)\n\n  _Pollock_, Sir _Fred._ See _Mind_, 1st series, vol. iv, pp. 47-68.\n\n  _Renan, J. E._ Marc-Aur\u00e8le et la fin du monde antique. 1882. (A,\n  B 35090.) Translated by W. Hutchinson, 1904. (012208 ee 120.)\n\n  _Russell, E. W._ Marcus Aurelius and the later Stoics. 1910.\n\n  _Schuster, J._ Ethices Stoicae apud M. Aur. Ant. fundamenta. 1869.\n\n  _Smith, B. E._ Selections from the original Greek, with introd.\n  New York, 1899. (8411 de 4.)\n\n  _Steinhauser, K._ Filosofie stoicka a Cisar Mark Aurel. Caslau,\n  1892.\n\n  _Suckau, M. E._ \u00c9tude sur Marc-Aur\u00e8le, sa vie et sa doctrine,\n  1858. (8461 c. 10.)\n\n  _des Vergers, M. Noel._ Essai sur Marc-Aur\u00e8le, 1860. (10605 ee\n  19.)\n\n  _Watson, P. B._ M. Aurelius Ant. 1884.\n\n  _Zeller, Ed._ See his Vortr\u00e4ge und Abhandlungen, pp. 82-107.\n\n=Censorinus.= De die natali liber, ed. F. Hultsch. (2047 g.)\n\n=Chalcidius.= In Timaeum, ed. Wrobel. (8462 dd 2.)\n\n=Chrysippus.= See Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. Hans von Arnim. 3\nvols., 1903-5. (8460 k.)\n\n  _Baguet, F. N. G._ De Chrysippi vita, etc. Louvain, 1822.\n\n  _Bergk, Theodor._ De Chrys. libris \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd. Cassel, 1841.\n\n  _Gercke, A._ Chrysippea. 1885. (R. PP. 4986.)\n\n  _Nicolai, R._ De logicis Chrysippi libris. Quedlinburg, 1859.\n\n  _Petersen, C._ Philosophiae Chrysippeae fundamenta. 1827. (714 d\n  38.)\n\n=Cicero, M. Tullius.= Philosophica omnia, ed. R. Klotz. 2 vols. 1840, 1.\nLibros qui ad rempublicam et ad philosophiam spectant ed. Th. Schiche. 9\nvols. Prag, 1881-1890. (11305 bb.)\n\n  _Bernhardt, C. M._ De Cicerone graecae philosophiae interprete.\n  1865.\n\n  _Brandis, C. A._ See Rheinisches Museum iii 541 sqq. (R. PP.\n  4980, 1.)\n\n  _Gedike, Fr._ Zusammenstellung der auf die Geschichte der\n  Philosophie bez\u00fcglichen Stellen des Cicero. Berlin, 1814.\n\n  _Hirzel, Rudolf._ Untersuchungen zu Cicero\u2019s philosophischen\n  Schriften. 3 vols., 1877-83. (8462 cc 12.)\n\n  _Levin, T. W._ Six lectures introductory to the philosophical\n  writings of Cicero. 1871. (8461 ee 19.)\n\n  _Merguet, P. A. H._ Lexicon zu den philosophischen Schriften\n  Cicero\u2019s. 3 vols. 1889-94. (12933 l 13.)\n\n  _Thiaucourt, C._ Essai sur les trait\u00e9s philosophiques de Ciceron\n  et leurs sources grecques. 1885. (8460 f 8.)\n\nACADEMICA. Edited with full commentary by J. S. Reid. Also translation. 2\nvols. 1885. (2282 d 2.)\n\nDE DIVINATIONE.\n\nDE FATO.\n\nDE FINIBUS. Ed. J. N. Madvig. 3rd ed., 1876. (8408 g 6.) Ed. with introd.\nand commentary by W. M. L. Hutchinson, 1909. (08407 f 26.)\n\nDE LEGIBUS.\n\nDE NATURA DEORUM. Ed. with introd. and comm. by J. B. Mayor. 3 vols.\n1880-5. (2236 e 8.)\n\nDE OFFICIIS. Ed. H. Holden, 7th ed. 1891. (2282 a 1.) Erkl\u00e4rende Ausgabe\nvon C. F. W. M\u00fcller, 1882. Translated by G. B. Gardiner, 1899.\n\nPARADOXA. Erkl\u00e4rt von Max Schneider, 1891.\n\nDE REPUBLICA. La R\u00e9publique de Ciceron traduite ... avec un discours\npr\u00e9liminaire, par A. F. Villemain. 1858. (12238 ee 2.)\n\nTUSCULANAE DISPUTATIONES. Erk. von Otto Heine, 1896.\n\n  _Corssen, P._ De Posidonio Rhodio M. Tulli Ciceronis in libro i\n  Tusc. disp. et in Somnio Scipionis auctore. Rhein. Mus. xxxvi p.\n  505 sqq. (R. PP. 4980, 1.)\n\n  _Zietschmann, G._ De Tusc. disp. fontibus. 1868.\n\n=Cleanthes.= The fragments collected by A. C. Pearson, 1891 (2280 aa 3);\nand by H. von Arnim in \u2018Stoic. veterum fragm.\u2019 1903-5. (8460 k.)\n\n  _Mohnike, G. C. F._ Cleanthes der Stoiker. (832 b 14.)\n\n  _Wachsmuth, C._ (i) Cleanthis physica; (ii) commentatio de\n  Cleanthe Assio, 1874.\n\n=Clemens= (of Alexandria, 150-211 A.D., and head of the Catecheten-school\nthere), ed. G. Dindorf, 4 vols. 1869. (3805 bbb 22.) Protreptikos and\nPaidagogos ed. Otto St\u00e4hlin, 1905.\n\n  _de Faye, E. Cl\u00e9m._ d\u2019Alexandrie. \u00c9tudes sur les rapports du\n  Christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au IIe si\u00e8cle, 1906.\n  (R. Ac. 8929/7.)\n\n=Cornutus, Lucius Annaeus.= De natura deorum 1 ed. Fr. Osann; adj. est J.\nde Volloison, de theologia physica Stoicorum commentatio. 1844. (1385 g\n4.) Ed. G. Lang. 1881. (2048 a.)\n\n  _de Martini, G. J._ Disp. de L. A. Cornuto, 1825. (8461 cc 12.)\n\n  _Reppe, R._ De L. A. Cornuto. 1906.\n\n=Crates= (of Mallos). De Cr. Mall. adiectis eius reliquiis. C. Wachsmuth,\nLeipzig, 1860.\n\n=Demetrius= (of Magnesia, 1st cent. B.C.). D. Magnetis fragm. 1858.\n(11335 f 43.) He wrote a life of Zeno which is quoted by Themistius.\n\n=Dexippus= (Platonist of 4th century A.D.) Ed. A. Busse. (Ac. 855/9.)\n\n=Diocles= (of Magnesia). He wrote lives of the philosophers, from which\nDiogenes Laertius quotes freely.\n\n=Diogenes= (of Seleucia or Babylon). See H. von Arnim \u2018Sto. vet.\nfragmenta.\u2019 (8460 k.)\n\n=Diogenes Laertius= (\u2018Laertius\u2019 is a nickname based on a verse of Homer;\nabout 230 A.D.). Lives of the philosophers, in ten volumes, based upon\nearlier works. Our principal authority for Stoic doctrine. In Bibl.\nTeub., 2 vols. (10606 a 23.) English trans, by C. D. Yonge, 1848.\n\n=Dion Cassius.= Historia Romana. Ed. J. Melber in Bibl. Teub. (2048 a.)\n\n=Dion= of Prusa (popular philosopher, circ. 50 A.D.). Ed. J. de Arnim.\n(11391 ee 5.)\n\n  _von Arnim, H._ Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, mit einer\n  Einleitung \u2018Sophistik, Rhetorik, und Philosophie in ihrem Kampfe\n  um die Jugendbildung.\u2019 1898. (8460 g 20.)\n\n=Dionysius= (of Halicarnassus). Ed. H. Usener and L. Radermacher. In\nBibl. Teub. (2048 a.) Contains an account of Chrysippus.\n\n=Epictetus.= Ep. diss. libri IV. Gr. et Lat. Ann. ill. J. Schweigh\u00e4user,\n1799, 1800. (8459 g 4.) Ep. dissertationes, ed. H. Schenkl. In Bibl.\nTeub. (2278 k 5.) The references to the life of Epictetus are also\ncollected here. A commentary exists dating from the 6th century A.D. See\nSimplicius. Translation with notes, a life of Epictetus, and a view of\nhis philosophy, by G. Long, 1848. (8460 ccc 30.) Popular edition in 2\nvols., 1891.\n\n  _Asmus, R._ Quaestiones Epicteteae. Freiburg, 1888. (8463 i 6/2.)\n\n  _Bernard, Edw. R._ Great Moral Teachers; Epictetus. (8410 p 29.)\n\n  _Bonh\u00f6ffer, A._ Epictet und die Stoa. 1890. (8460 g 11.) Die\n  Ethik des Sto\u00efker\u2019s Epictet. 1894.\n\n  _Brandis, C. A._ Epictetus (Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography).\n\n  _Braune, A._ Epictet und das Christenthum. Zeits. f. kirchl.\n  Wiss., 1884-9.\n\n  _Bruns, Ivo._ De schola Epicteti. Kiel, 1897.\n\n  _Crossley, H._ Golden sayings of Epictetus, etc. 1903. (8462 de\n  8.)\n\n  _Farrar, F. W._ Seekers after God: Epictetus. 1876. (3605 bb 3.)\n\n  _Grosch, G._ Die Sittenlehre des Epictetus. Wernigerode, 1867.\n\n  _Rouse, W. H. D._ Words of the ancient wise, from Epictetus.\n  1906. (8462 de 14.)\n\n  _Schenkl, H._ Die epiktetischen Fragmente. Wien, 1888.\n\n  _Schranka, E. M._ Der Sto\u00efker Epictetus und seine Philosophie.\n  Frankfurt, 1885.\n\n  _Stuhrmann, J._ De vocabulis notionum philosophicarum ab Epicteto\n  adhibitis. Neustadt, 1885.\n\n  _Thurot, Charles._ Epict\u00e8te, Manuel. 1892. (8460 aaa 37.)\n\n  _Zahn, Theodor._ Der Sto\u00efker Epiktet und sein Verh\u00e4ltniss zum\n  Christenthum. Erlangen, 1895.\n\n=Epiphanius= (Bishop of Constantia). Adversus haereses prooemium. (3627 c\n19.)\n\n=Eusebius.= Evangelica praeparatio, etc. Berlin, 1897. (2004 f.)\n\n=Fragmenta Herculaniensia.= Ed. by Walter Scott. 1885. (7706 ee 13.)\n\n=Fronto.= M. Cornelii Frontonis et M. Aurelii imperatoris epistulae. Ed.\nS. A. Naber. 1867. (10905 ccc 19.)\n\n=Galenus, Claudius= (of Pergamus; circ. 131-200 A.D. He was a physician\nwho attended the family of Marcus Aurelius, and he gives large extracts\nfrom Chrysippus\u2019 books _de anima_ and _de affectibus_). Ed. C. G. Kuhn,\n20 vols., 1821-3. (541 d 1 to 20.) This edition has a good index; its\npages are referred to by the letter K. Also edited by Marquardt, M\u00fcller,\nand others in Bibl. Teub. 1884-93. (2048 b.) Also an edition by Iw.\nM\u00fcller of the book _de placitis Hipp. et Plat._, the pages of which are\nreferred to by the letter M.\n\n=Gellius, Aulus= (2nd cent. A.D.). Post M. Hertz ed. C. Hosius in Bibl.\nTeub. (2048 b.)\n\n=Hecataeus= (a geographer of Miletus, circ. 500 B.C.). Fragm. Gr. et Lat.\ned. C. et Th. M\u00fcller in \u2018Hist. Graec. fragmenta,\u2019 vol. i. Paris, 1878-85.\n(2053 b.)\n\n=Hecato= (of Rhodes). Panaetii et Hecatonis fr. coll. H. N. Fowler. 1885.\n\n=Heracleides= (of the Pontus; a pupil of Plato, and propounder of the\nheliocentric system). See Steigm\u00fcller, H. in the _Archiv f. d. Geschichte\nd. Philosophie_ xv, pp. 141 sqq. (PP. 1253 ba.)\n\n=Heracleitus= (of Ephesus). H. Ephesii reliquiae; rec. I. Bywater, 1877.\n(8460 ee 18.) H. Diels in \u2018die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,\u2019 1903. (2044\ne.) H. von Ephesos, gr. und deutsch, von H. Diels, 1909.\n\n  _Bernays, J._ Neue Bruchst\u00fccke des H. (4980, 1 and 204 g h); die\n  Heraklitischen Briefe, 1869. (8461 dd 18.)\n\n  _Campbell, Lewis._ Heraclitus and Parmenides, in his edition of\n  Plato\u2019s _Theaetetus_. 1883. (12204 f 19.)\n\n  _Diels, H._ Heraklit: eine Studie. 1904. (8461 ee 41.)\n\n  _Drummond, James._ See his _Philo-Judaeus_, 1888. (8485 d f 18.)\n\n  _Gladisch, A._ Herakleitos und Zoroaster. 1859. (4504 d 15.)\n\n  _Gomperz, Th._ Zu Heraklit\u2019s Lehre. 1887.\n\n  _Lassalle, F. J. G._ Die Philosophie H. 2 vols., 1858. (8461 e\n  22.) Also a new edition by L\u00f6wenthal in 4 vols.\n\n  _Pfleiderer, Edmund._ Die Philosophie des H. im Lichte der\n  Mysterienidee. 1886. (8485 e 28.)\n\n  _Sch\u00e4fer, G._ Die Philosophie d. Heraklit von Ephesus u. d.\n  moderne Heraklitforschung. 1902.\n\n  _Schultz, W._ Pythagoras und Heraklit. 1905.\n\n  _Wendland, P._ Ein Wort des H. im neuen Testament. 1899.\n\n=Herillus.= _Krug, W. T._ H. de summo bono sententia, 1822.\n\n=Hermias= (perhaps 5th or 6th cent. A.D.). Irrisio gentilium\nphilosophorum. Ed. J. C. Th. von Otto, Jena, 1872. Quoted in Diels\u2019\n\u2018Doxographi Graeci.\u2019\n\n=Herodotus.= The history transl. into English by G. C. Macaulay. 2 vols.\n1890. (2280 aa 2.)\n\n=Hierocles= (Stoic). Ethische Elementarlehre, her. von H. von Arnim und\nSchubart. 1906.\n\n  _Pr\u00e4chter, K._ Hierokles der Stoiker. 1901.\n\n=Hippolytus= (Bishop in 2nd cent. A.D.). Ed. G. N. Bonwetsch and H.\nAchelis. 1897. (2004 f.)\n\n=Iamblichus= (Neo-platonist philosopher, early in 4th cent. A.D.). Rec.\nG. Parthey, 1857.\n\n=Iulianus= (the emperor). Ed. F. C. Hertlein, in Bibl. Teub. (2048 d);\ntransl. by C. W. King (2500 f 13.)\n\n  _Gardner, Alice._ Julian the Philosopher. 1890. (10601 f 30.)\n\n  _Rendall, G. H._ The Emperor Julian, Paganism and Christianity.\n  1879. (4534 cc 8.)\n\n=Iustinus= (historian, circ. 4th cent. A.D.). Historiarum Philippicarum\nlibri xliv. Ed. C. H. Frotscher. 3 vols., 1827. (9040 cc 12.)\n\n=Iustinus= (the martyr: circ. 105-165 A.D.). Op. Gr. et Lat. ed. J. C.\nTh. von Otto. 3 vols. 1876-81. (3622 cc 3.)\n\n=Lactantius= (3rd cent. A.D.). Ed. S. Brandt and G. Laubmann in Corpus\nScript. Eccl. Lat. (2003 d.)\n\n=Lucanus, M. Annaeus.= Pharsalia, ed. C. E. Haskins. 1887. (2045 e.)\nScholia in Lucanum. 1869. (11312 g 30.)\n\n  _Diels, H._ Seneca und Lucan. Abh. d. Ak. d. Wiss. z. Berlin,\n  1885. (Ac. 855/6.)\n\n=Lucianus= (of Samosata, 130-200 A.D.). Ed. J. Sommerbrodt. 3 vols.\n1886-99. Ed. Nils Nil\u00e9n in Bibl. Teub. (2048 d.)\n\n  _Bernays, J._ Lucian und die Kyniker. 1879. (8462 cc 10.)\n\n=Lucilius, C.= Rec. F. Marx. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1904-6.\n\n=Lucretius, T. Carus.= Ed. H. A. J. Munro. 3 vols. 1893. (2045 h.)\n\n  _Masson, J._ Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet; with notes and\n  comments by J. S. Reid. 2 vols. 1907-9. (2282 c 22.)\n\n=Macrobius.= Ed. F. Eyssenhardt in Bibl. Teub. (2278 c 9.) On the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af see _Saturnalia_ vii 16.\n\n=Marcellinus, Ammianus= (historian, of 5th cent. A.D.). Ed. V.\nGardthausen in Bibl. Teub. (2048 d.) Ed. C. U. Clark, Berlin, 1910.\n\n  _Michael, H._ De Amm. Marc. studiis Ciceronianis. Breslau, 1874.\n\n=Maximus= (of Tyre: 2nd cent. A.D.). Ed. F. D\u00fcbner, Paris, 1840. (2046\ne.) Ed. H. Hobein, 1910. Transl. by T. Taylor. 2 vols. 1804. (1385 g 3.)\n\n=Minucius, M. Felix= (3rd cent. A.D.). Ed. H. B\u00f6nig in Bibl. Teub. 1903.\n(2047 a.)\n\n=Musonius, C. Rufus.= Ed. O. Hense in Bibl. Teub. (2048 e.)\n\n  _Baltzer, E._ Musonius\u2019 Charakterbild aus der r\u00f6mischen\n  Kaiserzeit. 1871.\n\n  _Bernhardt, Otto._ Zu Musonius Rufus. Sorau, 1866.\n\n  _Pflieger, T._ Musonius bei Stobaeus. Tauberbischofsheim, 1897.\n\n  _Wendland, P._ Quaestiones Musonianae. Berlin, 1886. (11312 dd\n  12/4.)\n\n=Nemesius= (5th cent. A.D..). De natura hominis (in Greek). In Migne\u2019s\nPatrology. (2001 d.) Nemesius drew largely from A\u00ebtius.\n\n=Origenes= (185-254 A.D.). In Migne\u2019s Patrology. (2004 f.) Commentary\non St John, ed. A. E. Brooke. 1896. Philosophumena: revised text with\nintrod. etc., by J. A. Robinson, 1893.\n\n  _Fairweather, W._ Origen and Greek Patristic Theology. (10600 eee\n  7/13.)\n\n  _Falconer, J. W._ Origen and the return to Greek theology. Biblia\n  Sacra liii, pp. 466 sqq.\n\n  _Westcott, B. F._ Origen and the beginnings of Christian\n  philosophy. In his Essays in the history of religious thought in\n  the West. 1891. (8486 aaa 1.)\n\n=Orphica.= Ed. E. Abel. Prag, 1885.\n\n  _Maass, E._ Orpheus; Untersuchungen z. gr. r\u00f6m. altchristl.\n  Jenseitsdichtung und Religion. 1895.\n\n=Panaetius= (180-110 A.D.). P. et Hecatonis librorum fragm. coll. H. N.\nFowler, 1855. Disputatio hist. de P. Rhodio. F. van Lynden. Leyden, 1802.\n(8460 cc 16.)\n\n=Papiri Ercolanesi=, ed. D. Comparetti. Turin, 1875. Contains an index to\nthe Stoic philosophers.\n\n=Pausanias.= Ed. H. Hitzig and H. Bl\u00fcmer, 1896-1910. (2044 f.) Transl.\nwith comm. by J. G. Frazer, 1898. (2044 e.)\n\n=Persius, A. Flaccus.= Ed. with transl. and comm. by J. Conington. Third\nedition by H. Nettleship, 1893.\n\n  _Houck, M. E._ De ratione stoica in Persii satiris conspicua.\n  Daventriae, 1894.\n\n=Philo= (of Alexandria, circ. 20 B.C. to 50 A.D.). Ed. T. Mangey, 1742.\n(691 k 78.) Ed. L. Cohn et P. Wendland, 1896-1906. (8459 h and 3623 de.)\n\n  _Arnim, H. von._ Quellenstudien z. P. von Al. 1888.\n\n  _Drummond, James._ Philo Judaeus. 1888.\n\n  _Freudenthal. J._ Die Erkenntnisslehre P.\u2019s von Al. 1891.\n\n  _Harnack, A._ De Phil. Jud. \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3 inquisitio. 1879.\n\n  _Heinze, Max._ Die Lehre vom Logos in d. griech. Philosophie.\n  1872.\n\n  _Lake, J. W._ Plato, Philo and Paul; or the pagan conception of a\n  divine \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 the basis of the Christian dogma. 1874. (4027 e 7/5.)\n\n  _Mills, L. H._ Zarathustra, Philo, the Achaemenids, and Israel.\n  1905. (4506 ee 26.)\n\n  _Wendland, P._ Die philos. Quellen des P. in s. Schrift \u00fcber die\n  Vorsehung. 1891. P.\u2019s Schrift \u00fcber die Vorsehung. 1892. (8460 f\n  4.)\n\n=Philodemus= (of Gadara, 1st cent. B.C.). In Bibl. Teub. (2048 e.)\n\n  _Gomperz, Th._ Zu Philodem\u2019s B\u00fcch. v. d. Musik. 1885.\n\n=Philoponus= (Aristotelian commentator, 7th cent. A.D.). Ed. M. Hayduck\nand others for Royal Prussian Academy. 1887-. (Ac. 855/9.) The _comm. in\nAristotelis physica_ is of special value for its account of the Stoic\nlogic.\n\n=Plotinus= (Neo-platonist, 205-270 A.D.). Ed. R. Volkmann in Bibl. Teub.\n(2048 f.) He criticized specially the Stoic doctrine of categories.\n\n=Plutarchus= (circ. 46-120 A.D.). Moralia, ed. G. N. Bernardakis in Bibl.\nTeub. (2047 a, etc.)\n\n=Posidonius.= Pos. Rhodii rell. coll. J. Bake. 1810. (91 i 1.)\n\n  _Corssen, P._ De Pos. R. Ciceronis in lib. i. Tusc. disp. et in\n  somn. Scip. auctore. 1878. Rhein. Mus. xxxvi p. 505. (R. PP.\n  4980, 1 and 2049 h i.)\n\n  _Hultsch, F._ Pos. \u00fcber d. Gr\u00f6sse und Entfernung d. Sonne. 1897.\n  (Ac. 6770.)\n\n  _Scheppig, R._ De Pos. Apamensi. Berlin, 1870. (8367 f 7/12.)\n\n  _Sch\u00fchlein, F._ Zu Posidonius Rhodius. Freising, 1891. \u00dcber P.\u2019s\n  Schrift \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f60\u03ba\u03b5\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6. 1900.\n\n  _T\u00f6pelmann, V. E. P._ De Pos. Rhodio rerum scriptore. Bonn, 1867.\n  (8363 b 7/13.)\n\n=Proclus Diadochus= (Platonic commentator, 5th cent. A.D.). In Bibl. Teub.\n\n=Seneca, L. Annaeus.= Opera, ed. by O. Hense and others, in Bibl. Teub.\n(2048 g 15, 16.) Quaestiones Naturales. Transl, by J. Clarke, with notes\nby Sir Archibald Geikie. 1910. (08709 c 2.)\n\n  _Aubertin, C._ S\u00e9n\u00e8que et S. Paul. 1869. (4807 dd 3.)\n\n  _Badst\u00fcbner, E._ Beitr. z. Erkl. der philos. Schriften Sen.\u2019s.\n  Hamburg, 1901. (8460 l 5.)\n\n  _Baumgarten, M. L. A._ Seneca u. d. Christenthum. 1895.\n\n  _Baur, F. C._ Seneca und Paulus. 1858. In Zeitsch. f. wiss.\n  Theologie, 1, 2 and 3. (PP. 88 c.)\n\n  _Bernhardt, W._ Die Anschauung des Seneca vom Universum 1861.\n  (8705 ee 15/5.)\n\n  _Betzinger._ Weltfrohes u. Weltfreies aus S.\u2019s Schriften. S. u.\n  d. Christenthum. 1899.\n\n  _Bock, F._ Aristoteles Theophrastus Seneca de matrimonio.\n  Leipzig, 1898.\n\n  _Burgmann, Rud._ S.\u2019s Th\u00e9ologie in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss zum\n  Stoicismus und zum Christenthum. 1872.\n\n  _Diels, H._ Seneca und Lucan. Abh. d. Ak. d. Wiss. z. Berlin,\n  1885. (Ac. 855/6.)\n\n  _Fleury, Am\u00e9d\u00e9e._ Saint Paul et S\u00e9n\u00e8que. 2 vols. 1853.\n\n  _Gercke, Alf._ Seneca-studien. 1895. (R. PP. 4986 Bd. 22, Heft 1.)\n\n  _Heikel, J. A._ Seneca\u2019s Charakter und politische Th\u00e4tigkeit.\n  Helsingfors, 1888.\n\n  _Hense, O. F._ Seneca und Athenodorus. Freiburg, 1893.\n\n  _Lightfoot, J. B._ St Paul and Seneca. In his _Philippians_,\n  1879. (3266 ff 6.)\n\n  _Martens, A._ De L. A. Sen. vita, etc. Altona 1871. (10605 ee 6.)\n\n  _Martha, C._ S\u00e9n\u00e8que. C. R. Acad. d. Sci. mor. et pol., cxxxv,\n  1891.\n\n  _Ribbeck, W._ L. A. Sen. der Philosoph, und sein Verh\u00e4ltniss zu\n  Epikur, Plato, und dem Christenthum. Hannover, 1887. (8464 dd\n  34/9.)\n\n  _Rubin, Sol._ Die Ethik S.\u2019s in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss zur \u00e4lteren und\n  mittleren Stoa. M\u00fcnchen, 1901. (8409 m 15.)\n\n  _Summers, W. C._ Select letters. 1910. (010910 e 35.)\n\n  _Thomas, P._ Morceaux choisis. Extrait des lettres \u00e0 Lucilius et\n  des trait\u00e9s de morale. 1896.\n\n=Servius.= Comm. ad Verg. Aen. (11312 i 35.)\n\n=Sextus Empiricus= (3rd cent. A.D.). Ed. I. Bekker, 1842. (1385 i 3.)\n\n=Simplicius= (Aristotelian commentator, 6th cent. A.D.). Ed. Heiberg and\nothers for Royal Prussian Academy. (Ac. 855/9.)\n\n=Stobaeus, Johannes= (4th or 5th cent. A.D.). A collector of extracts.\nHis works were formerly divided into _Eclogae_ and _Florilegium_. In the\ncurrent edition by C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, 4 vols., Berlin, 1884-\n(8462 ee), this distinction is dropped. This edition is not yet complete,\nand occasionally reference has to be made to A. Meineke\u2019s edition of the\nFlorilegium, 6 vols., Leipzig, 1855-7. (2047 a.)\n\n=Strabo= (geographer, circ. 54 B.C. to 24 A.D.). Ed. A. Meineke. 3 vols.\nLeipzig, 1877. Also in Didot\u2019s Script. Gr. Bibl. (2046 c.)\n\n=Suidas= (lexicographer). Lexicon, ed. I. Bekker. 1854. (12923 ee 14.)\n\n=Tertullianus= (160-220 A.D.). Ed. A. Reifferscheid et G. Wissowa, in the\nCorpus Script. Eccl. 1890-. (2003 d.)\n\n=Themistius= (Aristotelian commentator, circ. 350 A.D.). Ed. R. Heinze\nand others for Royal Prussian Academy. (Ac. 855/9.)\n\n=Theodoretus= (bishop of Cyrus, circ. 425 A.D.). Graecorum affectionum\ncuratio, ed. J. Raeder in Bibl. Teub. (2049 a.) He has preserved long\nextracts from A\u00ebtius.\n\n=Theophilus= (bishop). Ed. J. G. Wolf, 1724. (3622 cc 3.)\n\n=Varro, M. Terentius.= De lingua Latina quae supersunt ed. G. Goetz et\nFr. Sch\u00f6ll. (12933 v 2.) Antiquitates divinae, ed. R. Agahd. In Bibl.\nTeub.\n\n=Xenocrates.= Darstellung d. Lehre und Sammlung d. Fragmente, von R.\nHeinze. 1892.\n\n=Zeno.= The fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, by A. C. Pearson. 1891.\n(2280 aa 3.) Also in von Arnim\u2019s Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 1903 to\n1905. (8460 k.)\n\n  _Meuleman._ Commentatio literaria de Zenone Stoico. Groningen,\n  1858.\n\n  _Troost, K._ Z. Citiensis de rebus physicis doctrina. 1891. (PP.\n  4991 e.)\n\n  _Wachsmuth, C._ Commentatio de Zenone Citiensi. 1874.\n\n  _Wellmann, E._ Die Philosophie des Sto\u00efker\u2019s Z. 1873.\n\n=Zoroaster.= See article by Karl F. Geldner in the Encyclopaedia\nBritannica. Zoroaster the prophet of ancient Iran, by A. V.\nWilliams-Jackson. New York, 1899. (4505 eee 9.) See also Philo (Mills).\n\n\nII. MODERN WRITERS.\n\n=Aall, Anathon.= Der Logos. Geschichte seiner Entwicklung in d. griech.\nPhilosophie und in d. christlichen Literatur. 2 vols. 1896, 9. (08461 h\n8.)\n\n=Adam, James.= The religious teachers of Greece. 1908. (4506 i 7.)\n\n=Allard, P.= Le Christianisme et l\u2019Empire romain de N\u00e9ron \u00e0 Th\u00e9odose. 2nd\ned., 1897. (2208 a.)\n\n=Alston, L.= Stoic and Christian in the second century. 1906. (4532 de 6.)\n\n=Apelt, O.= Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte d. gr. Philosophie. 1891. (8486 e 3.)\n\n=Archiv= f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie. Herausg. von Ludwig Stein.\nBerlin, 1888-. (PP. 1253 ba.)\n\n=Arnim, Hans von.= Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. 3 vols., 1903-5. (8460\nk.) See also Aristo and Philo.\n\n=Arnold, Matthew.= Essay attached to an edition of Long\u2019s Marcus\nAurelius, 1904. (12204 p 3/15.) St Paul and Protestantism. Popular\nedition, 1887. (3266 bb 1.)\n\n=Aubertin, C.= De sapientiae doctoribus, qui a Ciceronis morte ad Neronis\nprincipatum Romae viguerunt. Paris, 1857. (8461 bb 8.) See also Seneca.\n\n=Aust, E.= Die Religion der R\u00f6mer. M\u00fcnster i. W., 1899. (4506 f 29.)\n\n=Avenel, J. d\u2019.= Le Sto\u00efcisme et les Sto\u00efciens. 1886.\n\n=Baldensperger, W.= Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu\u2019s im Lichte der\nmessianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit. 2nd ed., 1892. (4226 h 2.)\n\n=Barth, Paul.= Die Stoa. Stuttgart, 1908. (08464 f.)\n\n=Baumhauer, J. C. M. von.= Veterum philosophorum, praecipue Stoicorum,\ndoctrina de morte voluntaria. Bonn, 1842. (8460 e 13.)\n\n=B\u00e4umker, Cl.= Das Problem d. Materie in d. griech. Philosophie. M\u00fcnster,\n1890.\n\n=Baur, F. Ch.= Zur Geschichte d. alten Philosophie und ihres\nVerh\u00e4ltnisses zum Christenthum. 1876.\n\n=Benn, A. W.= The Greek Philosophers. 2 vols. 1882. (8461 dd 14.)\n\n=Bergson, Henri L.= L\u2019\u00e9volution cr\u00e9atrice. 1907. (7006 g 29.)\n\n=Bernays, J.= Lucian und die Kyniker. 1879. (8462 cc 10.)\n\n=Bois, Henri.= Essai sur les origines de la philosophie\njud\u00e9o-alexandrine. 1890. (8486 bbb 28.)\n\n=Boissier, Gaston.= La fin du paganisme. 1891. (4530 Le 1.) L\u2019opposition\nsous les C\u00e9sars. 5th ed., 1905. (09039 bb 9.) La religion romaine\nd\u2019Auguste jusqu\u2019aux Antonins. 2 vols. 2nd ed., 1878. (2212 g.)\n\n=Bonh\u00f6ffer, Adolf.= Zur stoischen Psychologie. Philologus liv, 1895, pp.\n4023-4429. (R. PP. 5043.) See also Epictetus.\n\n=Borchert, L.= Num Antistius Labeo ... Stoicae philosophiae fuerit\naddictus? Breslau, 1869. (6006 e 11/2.)\n\n=Brandis, Christian August.= Handbuch d. Gesch. d. gr-r\u00f6m. Philosophie.\n3 vols. 1835-66. (1386 d 20.) Gesch. d. Entwicklungen d. gr. Philosophie\nund ihrer Nachwirkungen im r\u00f6mischen Reiche. 2 vols. 1862-4. (2236 e 2.)\n\n=Br\u00e9heir, \u00c9mile.= La th\u00e9orie des incorporels dans l\u2019ancien sto\u00efcisme.\nArchiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philosophie xxi, pp. 115-125. (PP. 1253 ba.)\n\n=Brochard, Victor.= Sur la logique des sto\u00efciens. Archiv f. d. Gesch. d.\nPhilosophie v, p. 449. (PP. 1253 ba.)\n\n=Bryant, J. H.= The mutual influence of Christianity and the Stoic\nschool. 1866. (8461 bbb 27.)\n\n=Burnet, J.= Early Greek Philosophy. 1908. (2023 c.)\n\n=Caird, Edward.= The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers. 2\nvols., 1904. [On Stoicism see vol. ii, chs. xvi to xx.]\n\n=Caldecott, Alfred.= The philosophy of religion. 1901. (4372 cc 29.)\n\n=Campbell, Lewis.= Religion in Greek literature. See also Heracleitus.\n1898. (4503 g 15.)\n\n=Capes, William Wolfe.= Stoicism. 1882. (4421 f 64.)\n\n=Caspari, E.= De Cynicis, qui fuerunt aetate imperatorum Romanorum.\nChemnitz, 1896.\n\n=Cheyne, T. K.= Zoroastrianism and Primitive Christianity. Hibbert\nJournal, 1903, 4. (R. PP. 324 ga.)\n\n=Clemen, Carl.= Die religionsgeschichtliche Bedeutung des\nstoisch-christlichen Eud\u00e4monismus in Justin\u2019s Apologie. 1891.\nReligionsgeschichtliche Erkl\u00e4rung des neuen Testaments. 1909.\n\n=Collins, J. Churton.= Studies in Shakespeare. 1904. [Gives parallels\nbetween Seneca\u2019s tragedies and Shakespeare.] (2300 b 9.)\n\n=Cruttwell, C. H.= A literary history of early Christianity. 2 vols.,\n1893. (2208 b 3.)\n\n=Cumont, Fr.= Textes et monum. fig. relatifs aux myst\u00e8res de Mithra.\n2 vols., 1899. La th\u00e9ologie solaire du paganisme romain. 1909. Les\nReligions Orientales dans le paganisme romain. 2nd ed., 1909.\n\n=D\u00e4hne, A. F.= Geschichtliche Darstellung der j\u00fcdisch-alexandrinischen\nReligionsphilosophie. 2 vols. 1834. (1363 d 8.)\n\n=Davids, T. W. Rhys.= Buddhism. 1901. (4505 cc 26.) Hibbert Lectures on\nsome points in the history of Buddhism. 1881. (2217 aa 11.)\n\n=Davidson, William Leslie.= The Stoic creed. 1907. (3605 i.)\n\n=Deussen, Paul.= Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, mit besonderer\nR\u00fccksicht der Religionen. 1894. (8486 d.)\n\n=Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology=, ed. by J. M. Baldwin. 3 vols.,\n1905. (2023 h.)\n\n=Diderot, Denis.= Essai sur les r\u00e8gnes de Claude et de N\u00e9ron, et sur les\nm\u0153urs et les \u00e9crits de S\u00e9n\u00e8que. 2 vols., 1782.\n\n=Diels, H.= \u00dcber die Philosophenschulen der Griechen (Zeller-Aufs\u00e4tze,\n1887). Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, gr. und deutsch von H. D. 2nd\ned., 1906-10. (2044 e.) Doxographi Graeci, 1879.\n\n=Dill, S.= Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius. 1904. (09039 cc 3.)\n\n=D\u00f6ring, A.= Geschichte d. griech. Philosophie. 2 vols., 1903.\n\n=Dourif, J.= Du Stoicisme et du Christianisme consider\u00e9s dans leurs\nrapports. 1863. (8470 e 16.)\n\n=Drummond, James.= Philo-Judaeus, or the Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy in\nits development and completion. 1888. (8485 df 18.)\n\n=Dyroff, A.= Die Ethik der alten Stoa. 1897, 8. (PP. 4991 e.)\n\n=Eisler, Rudolf.= Geschichte der Philosophie im Grundriss. 1895.\nW\u00f6rterbuch der phil. Begriffe und Ausdr\u00fccke. 3rd ed., 1910. (2236 c 18.)\n\n=Eucken, Rudolph.= Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker. 1909. (8486\nee 6.) Geschichte der philos. Terminologie in Umriss. 1879. (8486 de 5.)\n\n=Ewald, P.= Der Einfluss d. sto\u00efsch-ciceronianischen Moral a. d.\nDarstellung d. Ethik bei Ambrosius. 1881. (8463 df 25/6.)\n\n=Fairweather, W.= The Background of the Gospels; or Judaism in the period\nbetween the Old and New Testaments. 1908. (03225 h 15.)\n\n=Favre, Mme Jules.= La morale sto\u00efcienne. 1888. (8460 bb 27.)\n\n=Feine=, \u2014\u2014. Sto\u00efcismus und Christenthum. Theol. Lit.-Blatt 1905, pp. 73\nsqq.\n\n=Ferraz=, \u2014\u2014. De Stoica disciplina apud poetas Romanos. Paris, 1863.\n\n=Fischer, Kuno.= Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie. Jubil\u00e4ums-ausgabe,\n1897-1901. (8486 ee.)\n\n=Fowler, W. Warde.= Social life at Rome in the age of Cicero. 1908. (2382\ne 10.)\n\n=Franke, Carl.= Sto\u00efcismus und Christenthum. Breslau, 1876. (4378 l 1.)\n\n=Freudenthal, Jakob.= Ueber den Begriff des Wortes \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 bei\nAristoteles. 1863. (11312 d 9.) Zur Geschichte d. Anschauungen \u00fcber\ndie j\u00fcdischhellenische Religionsphilosophie. 1869. (4034 dd 36/6.) Die\nErkenntnisslehre Philo\u2019s von Alexandria. 1891.\n\n=Friedl\u00e4nder, L.= Darstellungen aus d. Sittengeschichte Roms. 8th ed.\n1910. (2258 b 2.) Authorized translation of 7th ed. by L. A. Magnus.\n1908. (09039 dd.)\n\n=Friedl\u00e4nder, Moritz.= Die religi\u00f6sen Bewegungen innerhalb des Juda\u00efsmus.\n1905. (4516 eee 26.)\n\n=Geldner, K.= See article \u2018Zoroaster\u2019 in Encyclopaedia Britannica.\n\n=Giesecke, Alfred.= De philosophorum veterum quae ad exsilium spectant\nsententiis. 1891. (8460 dd 25.)\n\n=Giles, J. A.= The writings of the early Christians of the second\ncentury. 1857. (3627 c 44.)\n\n=Girard, J.= Le sentiment religieux en Gr\u00e8ce d\u2019Hom\u00e8re \u00e0 Eschyle. 1869-79.\n\n=Gladisch, A.= Herakleitos und Zoroaster. 1859. (4504 d 15.) Die Religion\nund die Philosophie in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung. 1852. (4531\nc 11.)\n\n=Glover, T. R.= The conflict of religions in the Early Roman Empire. 3rd\ned., 1909.\n\n=Gomperz, Theodor.= Griechische Denker. 3 vols. 1903-8. (8486 dd.)\nEnglish translation by Laurie Magnus and G. G. Berrie. 1905.\n\n=G\u00f6ttling, C. W.= Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des\ngriechischen Proletariats. Halle, 1851.\n\n=Grant=, Sir =Alexander=. The Ancient Stoics. 1858. (PP. 6119 c.)\n\n=Gruppe, O.= Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte. 2 vols.,\n1906. (2044 g.)\n\n=Haake, A.= Die Gesellschaftslehre der Sto\u00efker. 1887.\n\n=H\u00e4bler, A.= Zur Kosmogonie der Sto\u00efker. Jahrb. f. Phil, und P\u00e4d. cxlvii,\n1893, pp. 298-300.\n\n=Haeckel, E.= Die Weltr\u00e4thsel. 1899. English transl., \u2018The Riddle of the\nUniverse,\u2019 by J. McCabe. 1908.\n\n=Hamelin=, \u2014\u2014. Sur la logique des sto\u00efciens. Ann. philosophiques, 1902,\np. 23.\n\n=Hardy, E. G.= Christianity and the Roman Government. 1894. (4532 df 2.)\n\n=Harnack, A.= Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. 3 vols., 3rd ed., 1894-7.\n(3544 i.) History of Dogma, transl. by N. Buchanan, J. Millar, and W.\nMcGilchrist. 7 vols. 1894-9. (2206 cc 3.)\n\n=Harrison, J. E.= Prolegomena to the study of Greek Religion. 2nd ed.,\n1908.\n\n=Hatch, E.= The influence of Greek ideas and usages upon the Christian\nchurch. 1890. (2217 aa 4.)\n\n=Heinze, Max.= Die Lehre vom Logos in d. griechischen Philosophie. 1872.\nZur Erkenntnisslehre der Sto\u00efker. Leipziger Prog., 1879, 80. Stoicorum\nde fato doctrina. Stoicorum de affectibus doctrina. Stoicorum ethica ad\norigines suas relata. 1862.\n\n=Henderson, Bernard W.= The life and principate of the Emperor Nero.\n1903. (10606 e 12.)\n\n=Hepke=, \u2014\u2014. De philosophis qui Romae docuerunt usque ad Antoninos.\nBerlin, 1842.\n\n=Herford, C. H.= The Stoics as teachers. 1889.\n\n=Hicks, E.= Traces of Greek Philosophy and Roman Law in the New\nTestament. 1896. (4430 aaa 22.)\n\n=Hicks, R. D.= Stoic and Epicurean. 1910.\n\n=Hirzel, Rudolf.= De logica Stoicorum. 1879. (7006 c 17.) See also Cicero.\n\n=H\u00f6ffding, H.= Philosophy of Religion. Transl. by B. E. Meyer, 1906.\n\n=H\u00fcber, N.= Die Philosophie der Kirchenv\u00e4ter. 1859.\n\n=Jevons, Frank Byron.= An Introduction to the History of Religion. 2nd\ned., 1902. (2217 bb 9.)\n\n=Kaerst, J.= Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters. 1909.\n\n=Knauer, Vincenz.= Die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie. 1892. (8462 g 2.)\n\n=Krische, A. B.= Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie. 1840.\n(1134 c 19.)\n\n=Laberthonni\u00e8re, P. L.= Essai de philosophie religieuse.\n\n=Laferri\u00e8re, L. F. J.= M\u00e9moire concernant l\u2019influence du Stoicisme sur la\ndoctrine des Jurisconsultes romains. M\u00e9m. de l\u2019acad. d. sciences morales,\nx, 1860, pp. 579-685. (5254 aaa 11.)\n\n=Le Blant, Edmond.= Les persecutions et les martyrs aux premiers si\u00e8cles\nde n\u00f4tre \u00e8re. 1893. (4530 ee 24.)\n\n=Lehmann, Edv.= Die Perser. In de la Saussaye\u2019s Lehrbuch der\nReligionsgeschichte. 2nd ed., 1897. (3554 i.)\n\n=Lewes, G. H.= History of Philosophy. New ed., 1897. (2023 a.)\n\n=Lightfoot, J. B.= See Seneca.\n\n=Lindsay, James.= Studies in European Philosophy. 1909. [Chap. iv deals\nwith \u2018the ethical philosophy of Marcus Aurelius.\u2019]\n\n=Lodge=, Sir =Oliver J.= Life and Matter. 2nd ed., 1909. (08461 f 40/1.)\n\n=Long, George.= See Aurelius, Epictetus.\n\n=Luthe, Werner.= Die Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker. 1890. (08464 f 9/1.)\n\n=Mahaffy, J. P.= Greek Life and Thought. 1896. (9026 bbb 3.) The progress\nof Hellenism in Alexander\u2019s Empire. 1905. (9025 bbb 28.) The empire of\nthe Ptolemies. 1895. (2382 b 5.) A survey of Greek civilisation. 1897.\n(2258 b 19.)\n\n=Martha, C.= Les moralistes sous l\u2019empire romain. Philosophes et po\u00e8tes.\n1865. (8407 ff 17.) See also Seneca.\n\n=Masson, J.= See Lucretius.\n\n=Mayor, J. B.= A sketch of ancient philosophy from Thales to Cicero.\n1881. (2322 b 57.)\n\n=Mead, G. R. S.= Apollonius of Tyana. 1901. (10606 cc 8.)\n\n=Mont\u00e9e, P.= Le Sto\u00efcisme \u00e0 Rome. 1865. (8461 aaa 6.)\n\n=Montefiore, Claude G.= The Wisdom of Solomon. 1887. (Ac. 2076.)\n\n=Natorp, Paul.= Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntniss-problems im\nAlterthum. 1884. (8460 h 7.)\n\n=Naville, H. Adrien.= Julian l\u2019Apostat et la philosophie du polytheisme.\n1877. (4504 bb 5.)\n\n=Neander, A.= Vorlesungen \u00fcber Geschichte d. christlichen Ethik. 1864.\n[On Stoicism see pp. 29-57.]\n\n=Nettleship, Henry.= Jus Gentium. Journal of Philology xiii (1885), p. 26.\n\n=Neumann, C. J.= Der r\u00f6mische Staat und die allg. Kirche bis auf\nDiocletian. 1890. (4534 d 16.)\n\n=Ogereau, F.= Essai sur le syst\u00e8me philosophique des sto\u00efciens. 1885.\n(8460 ee 20.)\n\n=Oldenberg, H.= Buddha; his life, his doctrine, his order. Transl. by W.\nHoey. 1882. (759 d 4.)\n\n=Orttoff, Jo. Andr.= \u00dcber den Einfluss d. sto\u00efschen Philosophie auf die\nr\u00f6mische Jurisprudenz. 1797.\n\n=Pater, Walter H.= Marius the Epicurean. 2 vols., 1892. (12620 dd 18.)\n\n=Pauly, A. F. von.= Realencyclop\u00e4die d. klassischen\nAltertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung, herausg. von G. Wissowa. 1893-.\n(2046 f.)\n\n=Poussin, L. de la Vall\u00e9e.= Bouddhisme: opinions sur l\u2019histoire de la\nDogmatique. 1909.\n\n=Pr\u00e4chter, Karl.= Hierocles der Sto\u00efker. 1901. (8460 h 23.)\n\n=Prosopographia Imperii Romani Saec. I, II, III.= Ed. E. Klebs and\nothers. 1897-. [Gives the authorities for biographies of this period.]\n\n=Ramsay=, Sir =W. M.= The Church in the Roman empire before A.D. 170. 7th\ned. 1903. (2208 b 2.)\n\n=Rauch, G.= Der Einfluss d. sto\u00efschen Philosophie an d. Lehrbildung\nTertullianus.\n\n=Ravaisson, F.= Essai sur le Sto\u00efcisme. 1856.\n\n=Renan, J. E.= See Aurelius.\n\n=Rendall, G. H.= The Emperor Julian, Paganism and Christianity. 1879.\n(4534 cc 8.) See also Aurelius.\n\n=Renouvier, C. B.= Uchronie. [Deals with the secular importance of\nStoicism.] (8008 g 1.)\n\n=R\u00e9ville, Jean.= La religion \u00e0 Rome sous les S\u00e9v\u00e8res. 1886. (4505 ee 19.)\n\n=Richter, D.= Die \u00dcberlieferung der sto\u00efschen Definitionen \u00fcber die\nAffekte. 1873.\n\n=Sachau, C. E.= Drei arama\u00efsche Papyrus-Urkunden aus Elephantine. 1907.\nRoyal Prussian Society. (Ac. 855/6.)\n\n=Saussaye, P. D. C. de la.= Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte. 3rd ed., 2\nvols., 1905. (3554 i.)\n\n=Schiller, Hermann.= Die sto\u00efsche Opposition unter Nero. 1867, 8. (8485\nbbb 28.)\n\n=Schmekel, August.= Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem\ngeschichtlichen Zusammenhange dargestellt. 1892. (8485 df 19.)\n\n=Schmidt, C. G. A.= Essai historique sur la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile dans le monde\nromain et sur sa transformation par le christianisme. 1853. (4531 c 25.)\nTrans. by Mrs Thorpe, 1907. (4532 de 10.)\n\n=Schmidt, R. T.= Stoicorum Grammatica. 1839. (8462 b 1.)\n\n=Schulze, Vict.= Geschichte des Untergangs der gr.-r\u00f6m. Heidenthums. 2\nvols. 1887-96. (4530 ee 8.)\n\n=Seeck, O.= Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt. 3rd ed., 1910-.\n(09039 dd.)\n\n=Sidgwick, Henry.= Outlines of the History of Ethics. 1886. [Ch. 11 deals\nwith \u2018Greco-Roman Ethics.\u2019]\n\n=Smiley, C. N.= Latinitas und \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2. Wisconsin, 1906.\n\n=Sonnenschein, E. A.= The new Stoicism. Hibbert Journal, April 1907. (R.\nPP. 324 ga.) Shakespeare and Stoicism. University Review, i 1. (PP. 1187\nief.)\n\n=Spiess, E.= Logos Spermatikos. Parallelstellen z. neuen Test. aus d.\nSchriften d. alten Griechen. 1871. (3225 ee 29.)\n\n=Stein, Ludwig.= Psychologie der Stoa. 2 vols., 1886-8. (PP. 4991 e.) Die\nWillensfreiheit etc. bei den j\u00fcdischen Philosophen. 1882. (8469 bbb 26.)\nDualismus oder Monismus. 1909.\n\n=Steinthal, H.= Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und\nR\u00f6mern. 2nd ed., 1890, 1. (12924 h 18.) [On the Stoic grammar see i pp.\n265 sqq.]\n\n=Stern, J.= Homerstudien der Sto\u00efker. L\u00f6rrach, 1893.\n\n=Stock, St George W. J.= Stoicism. (Phil. Ancient and Modern.) 1908.\n(8467 de.)\n\n=Striller, F.= De Stoicorum studiis rhetoricis. Breslau, 1886. (12902 f\n25.)\n\n=Susemihl, Fr.= Geschichte der gr. Litteratur in d. Alexandrinerzeit. 2\nvols., 1891, 2. (2045 g.)\n\n=Teuffel, W. S.= History of Roman Literature. Translated by G. C. W.\nWarr. 2 vols., 1890. (2045 g.)\n\n=Thiersch, W. J.= Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss zur\nReligion unter Traianus, Hadrianus, und den beiden Antoninen. Marburg,\n1853. (4573 e 37.)\n\n=Thomas, A.= Rome et l\u2019Empire aux deux premiers si\u00e8cles de n\u00f4tre \u00e8re.\n1897. (9039 d 9.) Transl.: Roman Life under the Caesars. 1899. (7701 aa\n11.)\n\n=Thomson=, Sir =J. J.= The corpuscular theory of matter. 1907. (08709 dd\n16.)\n\n=Tiedemann, D.= System der stoischen Philosophie. 1776.\n\n=Tucker, T. G.= Life in the Roman World of Nero and St Paul. 1910.\n\n=Tylor, Edward B.= Primitive culture. 4th ed., 2 vols., 1903. (2034 a.)\nAnthropology. 1881. (2024 b.)\n\n=\u00dcberweg, Fr.= Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Tenth ed. by K.\nPr\u00e4chter, 1909-. (8485 ff.) Translated from the 4th German edition by G.\nS. Morris. 2 vols. New York. 1872-4.\n\n=Usener, H.= Epicurea. 1887. (8460 ee 36.) Religionsgeschichtliche\nUntersuchungen. 3 vols. 1889-99. (4532 dd 2.)\n\n=Vachereau, \u00c9tienne.= Histoire critique de l\u2019\u00e9cole d\u2019Alexandrie. 3 vols.,\n1846-51. (2236 d 7-9.)\n\n=de Villoison, J. d\u2019Ansse.= De theologia physica Stoicorum commentatio.\nG\u00f6ttingen, 1844. (1385 g 4.)\n\n=Voigt, M.= Die Lehre vom _ius naturale_, _aequum et bonum_, und\n_ius gentium_ der R\u00f6mer. 4 vols., 1856-76. (5207 d 5.) R\u00f6mische\nRechtsgeschichte. 3 vols., 1892-1902. (5255 dd 1.)\n\n=Vollers, Charles.= Die Weltreligionen in ihrem geschichtlichen\nZusammenhange.\n\n=Vollman, F.= \u00dcber das Verh\u00e4ltniss der sp\u00e4teren Stoa zur Sklaverei im\nr\u00f6mischen Reiche. Regensburg, 1890.\n\n=Wachsmuth, Curtius.= Die Ansichten der Sto\u00efker \u00fcber Mantik und D\u00e4monen,\n1860. (8461 bb 44 (9).) De Cratete Mallota, 1860. (11312 g 40.)\n\n=Wadskin, S. E.= Einfluss des Sto\u00efcismus auf die christliche Lehrbildung.\nTheol. Stud. und Krit., 1880. (PP. 150.)\n\n=Wallace, William.= Epicureanism. 1880. (4421 f 64.)\n\n=Walter, Julius.= Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der\ngriechischen Philosophie. 1874. (8462 cc 22.)\n\n=Weissenfels, C. O.= De Platonicae et Stoicae doctrinae affinitate.\nBerlin, 1890.\n\n=Wellmann, Eduard.= Die pneumatische Schule bis auf Archigenes in ihrer\nEntwicklung dargestellt. 1895. See also Fleckeisen\u2019s Jahrb. 1873, pp. 477\nsqq.\n\n=Wendland, Paul.= Die hellenisch-r\u00f6mische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu\nJudenthum und Christenthum. 1907.\n\n=Westcott, B. F.= See Origenes.\n\n=Westermarck, Edward.= The history of human marriage. 3rd ed. 1901. (2236\nf 7.) The origin and development of the moral ideas. 2 vols., 1906-9.\n(08407 f 21.)\n\n=Wetzstein, O.= Die Wandlung der sto\u00efschen Lehre unter ihren sp\u00e4teren\nVertretern. Neu-Strelitz, 1892-4.\n\n=Weygoldt, G. P.= Die Philosophie der Stoa nach ihrem Wesen und ihren\nSchicksalen dargestellt. 1883. (8462 b 8.)\n\n=Whittaker, Thomas.= Apollonius of Tyana and other essays. 1906. (012356\nl 62.)\n\n=Winckler, H. A.= Der Sto\u00efcismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums. 1878.\n\n=Windelband, W.= Geschichte der alten Philosophie. In the Handbuch d.\nklass. Alterthumswissenschaft. 1894. Translated by H. E. Cushmann, New\nYork, 1899. (2236 cc 8.)\n\n=Winter, F. J.= Stoicorum pantheismus et principia doctrinae ethicae.\nLeipzig, 1878.\n\n=Zeller, Eduard.= Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen\nEntwicklung. 5th ed. 1892-. (8486 h.) The Stoics, Epicureans and\nSceptics. Translated from the German by O. J. Reichel. 1892. (2234 b 22.)\nVortr\u00e4ge und Abhandlungen, 1875. (12250 i 13.) Philosophische Aufs\u00e4tze,\n1887. (8468 f 34.) \u00dcber eine Ber\u00fchrung des j\u00fcngeren Cynismus mit dem\nChristenthum. Sitzungsb. d. Akad. Wiss. z. Berlin, ix pp. 129-132. Kleine\nSchriften, unter Mitwirkung von H. Diels und K. Holl. Edited by Dr Otto\nLeuze. Berlin, 1910-. (12252 g.)\n\n=Zimmermann, D.= Quae ratio philosophiae Stoicae sit cum religione\nRomana. Erlangen, 1858.\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX.\n\n_The numbers refer to the pages and notes._\n\n\n  Abstract ideas, 136 sqq.\n\n  Academy, 55 sqq.;\n    influence on Stoicism, 69, 93, 94, 100, 103, 106, 192, 302.\n    Essential difference between the two schools, 153.\n\n  _accessio_, 292, 316.\n\n  _acervus_, 147.\n\n  Achilles, 339.\n\n  A\u00c7OKA, 15.\n\n  Acquirements, 305.\n\n  ACTE, 347 n. 110.\n\n  Action, 59.\n\n  Active and passive, 69, 156, 172.\n\n  Adam (and Eve), 278, 427.\n\n  ADAM, J., 30 n. 2, 30 n. 3, 32 n. 16, 34 n. 25, 37 n. 43, 46 n. 76.\n\n  ADDISON, J., 176 n. 9.\n\n  _adfectus_, see \u2018Affections.\u2019\n\n  _adsensio_, _adsensus_, see \u2018Assent\u2019;\n    _adsensum sustinere_, see \u2018Suspense of judgment.\u2019\n\n  Adultery condemned, 276, 347.\n\n  Advantages, 72, 290, 319 sqq.;\n    rejected by Aristo, 82.\n\n  _aegritudo_, 331;\n    _aeg. animi_, 338.\n\n  Aeneas, 297, 391.\n\n  AESCHYLUS, 38.\n\n  Aesculapius, 233.\n\n  _aestimatio_, 72, 289.\n\n  Aether, 180, 183, 186, 436;\n    as first principle, 70 n. 61;\n    as god, 219.\n\n  Affection for children, 341.\n\n  Affections, 332 sqq., 352;\n    good affections, 323;\n    in Jesus, 412.\n\n  _agitatio prima_, 351.\n\n  Agriculture, 369, 372.\n\n  AGRIPPINUS, PACONIUS, 399.\n\n  Ahura Mazd\u0101, 8.\n\n  Air, 180 sqq.\n\n  Alcestis, 142.\n\n  ALEXANDER, 13, 62, 339.\n\n  Alexandria, 20, 64, 80, 83, 110.\n\n  _alienatio_, 256, 322.\n\n  Allegorism, 112, 151, 411.\n\n  _amarus_, 335.\n\n  _amor_, 317.\n\n  Analogy, in logic, 134;\n    in grammar, 145.\n\n  ANAXAGORAS, 40, 44, 156.\n\n  ANAXIMANDER, 33.\n\n  ANAXIMENES, 33, 158;\n    on elemental qualities, 173.\n\n  Angels, 8, 11, 21, 31;\n    guardian angels, 233, 264.\n\n  Anger, 333 sqq.\n\n  _anima_, 168, 242;\n    in St Paul, 420.\n    _an. inflammata_, 181, 243 n. 23.\n\n  Animals, 186 sqq.;\n    their place in the universe, 205;\n    have no rights, 274;\n    St Paul\u2019s view, 417 n. 55.\n\n  Animism, 241.\n\n  _animus_, 242.\n\n  _annus, magnus_, 193.\n\n  Anomaly, 145.\n\n  Ant, 187.\n\n  _anticipatio_, 136.\n\n  ANTIGONUS GONATAS, 75, 79, 311.\n\n  ANTIOCHUS (of Ascalon), 109 sqq., 152.\n\n  ANTIPATER (of Tarsus), 96;\n    on the criterion, 141;\n    gives way to Carneades, 144;\n    on definition, 148;\n    definition of God, 222;\n    of virtue, 283;\n    on advantages, 292;\n    on marriage, 318.\n\n  ANTIPATER (of Tyre), 108, 186, 317;\n    teacher of Cato, 386.\n\n  ANTIPHON (sophist), 40.\n\n  Antipodes, 175.\n\n  Antiquarianism, 306.\n\n  ANTISTHENES, 48 sqq.\n\n  ANTONINUS, M. PIUS, 402 sqq.\n\n  Apathy, 324.\n\n  Apocalypse, 24 n. 64, 413 n. 24.\n\n  Aphrodite, 231.\n\n  Apollo, 231.\n\n  APOLLODORUS (of Athens), 97.\n\n  APOLLODORUS (of Seleucia, called Ephillus), 97;\n    on the criterion, 141;\n    on pleasure, 315.\n\n  APOLLONIDES, 108.\n\n  APOLLONIUS (of Tyre), 108.\n\n  APOLLOPHANES, 84.\n\n  _appellatio_, 145.\n\n  _appetitio_, _appetitus_, 256, 314;\n    _app. recta_, 256.\n\n  AQUILIUS, C. GALLUS, 385.\n\n  ARATUS, 80;\n    view of the universe, 182;\n    influence on Virgil, 389;\n    on St. Paul, 409.\n\n  _arbitrium liberum_, 210.\n\n  ARCESILAUS, 63;\n    converses with Zeno, 69 n. 48;\n    opposes Zeno, 74;\n    opposes Cleanthes, 90;\n    influence on Chrysippus, 93.\n\n  ARCHEDEMUS, 97;\n    on pleasure, 315.\n\n  AREIUS, 110, 343.\n\n  ARISTARCHUS, 146 n. 104, 179.\n\n  ARISTIPPUS, 50.\n\n  ARISTO, 79, 82 sqq., 129;\n    inclines to Cynism, 82;\n    opposes art, 153 n. 148;\n    rejects precepts, 357.\n\n  ARISTOCREON, 97.\n\n  ARISTOPHANES, 10, 175 n. 1.\n\n  ARISTOTLE, 58 sqq.;\n    on active and passive principles, 156;\n    on substance and quality, 165;\n    on the categories, 59, 164, 169;\n    on the solar system, 182;\n    on the microcosm, 61, 240;\n    on slavery, 271, 279;\n    on pleasure, 316;\n    on anger, 333.\n\n  ARIUS, see \u2018Areius.\u2019\n\n  ARNIM, H. von, 86 n. 59, 119 n. 123.\n\n  ARNOLD, MATTHEW, 435 n. 158.\n\n  ARRIA (the elder), 393.\n\n  ARRIA (the younger), 399.\n\n  ARRIANUS, 121.\n\n  Art disparaged, 153.\n\n  ARTEMIDORUS, 401.\n\n  Artemis, 112.\n\n  Arts (_artes_), 140, 144, 305, 306;\n    are passing conditions of soul, 168.\n\n  _articulus_, 145.\n\n  ARULENUS RUSTICUS, 401.\n\n  Asceticism, 258, 362, 409.\n\n  Assent (_adsensio_, _adsensus_), in logic, 68, 132, 249;\n    in morals, 256.\n\n  Astrology or Astronomy, 6, 101, 306.\n\n  Atheism, of Socrates, 46;\n    of the Cynics, 48 sqq.;\n    of Zeno, 217, 234.\n\n  Athene, 231.\n\n  ATHENODORUS CALVUS, 109.\n\n  ATHENODORUS (of Soli), 84.\n\n  ATHENODORUS (of Tarsus), (1) the elder, 98, 107;\n      denies that sins are equal, 355;\n      teacher of Cato, 386;\n    (2) the younger, 110.\n\n  Atoms, 41, 159, 189, 436.\n\n  ATTALUS, 111, 347.\n\n  AUGUSTUS, 110;\n    encourages flattery, 370;\n    longs for leisure, 377.\n\n  AURELIUS, M., 122 sqq.;\n    belief in providence, 123;\n    view of the future life, 125, 270;\n    on sufficiency of virtue, 293;\n    devotion to paganism, 124, 405;\n    persecutes the Christians, 405.\n\n  Austerity, 356.\n\n  Avesta, 11.\n\n\n  Babylonians, 3, 5.\n\n  BACON, FRANCIS, 335 n. 27.\n\n  BALBUS, L. LUCILIUS, 385.\n\n  BALBUS, Q. LUCILIUS, 109, 386.\n\n  BAREA SORANUS, 399.\n\n  BASILIDES, 98.\n\n  Baths, 372.\n\n  \u2018Bear and forbear,\u2019 126, 350.\n\n  Beard, 259, 365.\n\n  Beauty of the universe, 204, 226;\n    of body and soul, 312;\n    of women, 319;\n    of virtue, 325.\n    St Paul not appreciative, 417.\n\n  Beneficence, 307.\n\n  BERTHOLET, D. A., 21 n. 57.\n\n  Bigotry of Cleanthes, 90;\n    of M. Aurelius, 405.\n\n  Blessedness, 61.\n\n  BLOSSIUS, C., 382.\n\n  Body, the ultimate existence, 157;\n    definition, 157;\n    not the same as matter, 157;\n    moves and has life, 159;\n    moves through body, 159, 169;\n    how known, 242 n. 17;\n    is soul, 257;\n    in St Paul, 416.\n    Human body, 257;\n      is a temple, 259;\n      its humble parts, 254, 259, 313, 426.\n    See also \u2018Flesh.\u2019\n\n  BO\u00cbTHUS (of Sidon), 95;\n    on the criterion, 143.\n\n  BOISSIER, G., 397 n. 95.\n\n  _bonum_, 281;\n    _summum bonum_ or _ultimum bonorum_, 281, 422.\n\n  BOWEN, Lord (translation by), 265, 266.\n\n  Boy-favourites, 287, 425.\n\n  Brevity (_brevitas_), 149.\n\n  BRUTUS, M. JUNIUS, 110, 388.\n\n  Buddhism, 14 sqq., 54, 295 n. 159.\n\n  Burial, 66, 278.\n\n\n  CAESAR, C. JULIUS, his clemency, 370.\n\n  CALLIPHO, 64.\n\n  CALLIPPUS, 84.\n\n  Cannibalism, 278.\n\n  _caritas_, 423.\n\n  CARNEADES, 63, 96;\n    his visit to Rome, 100;\n    on the criterion, 142 n. 86;\n    influence on Antipater, 96, 144;\n    criticizes the conflagration, 192.\n\n  CASSIUS LONGINUS, 398.\n\n  Castor, 232, 233.\n\n  Categories of Aristotle, 59;\n    of the Stoics, 164 sqq.\n\n  CATO, M. PORCIUS, 108, 109, 386 sqq.;\n    his marriage relations, 277, 387;\n    his death, 310, 388;\n    as \u2018wise man,\u2019 297;\n    honoured by the \u2018old Romans,\u2019 397.\n\n  Cause (_causa_), in Aristotle, 60, 162;\n    in Stoicism, 162;\n    _causa antecedens_, _c. principalis_, _c. proxima_, 212;\n    first cause, 219.\n\n  Caution (_cautio_), 323;\n    in court life, 371;\n    in Jesus, 412.\n\n  Celibacy, advocated by Epictetus, 368;\n    by St Paul, 425.\n\n  Ceres, 231.\n\n  Chaldaism, 5, 6, 170, 182, 199.\n\n  Chance, 199 sqq.;\n    Epicurean theory ridiculed, 226.\n\n  Chaos, 44, 194.\n\n  Chastity, 348.\n\n  Children, without speech, 146;\n    without reason, 138, 260;\n    their training, 360 sqq.\n\n  Christianity, 23 sqq.;\n    its Stoic strain, 408 sqq.\n\n  CHRYSIPPUS, 91 sqq.;\n    on the criterion, 141, 143;\n    on anomaly, 145;\n    on fallacies, 147;\n    on definition and rhetoric, 148;\n    defines the \u2018universe,\u2019 177;\n    on the conflagration, 192;\n    on possibility, 201;\n    on fate, 202;\n    on particular providence, 205;\n    on evil, 207;\n    on limitations of divine power, 208;\n    no action without cause, 214 n. 92;\n    on the \u2018higher Being,\u2019 224;\n    on the universe as a moral standard, 240;\n    that soul is body, 242;\n    wise souls only survive, 267;\n    law the moral standard, 273, 275;\n    on burial, 278;\n    on slavery, 279;\n    defines \u2018virtue\u2019 and \u2018nature,\u2019 282;\n    on diseases of the soul, 286;\n    calls advantages \u2018good,\u2019 290;\n    on wise men, 298;\n    distinguishes arts and acquirements, 305;\n    on justice, 307;\n    on pleasure, 315, 316;\n    on reputation, 320;\n    on political life, 338 n. 53;\n    on drunkenness, 346;\n    approves of the rod, 361 n. 39;\n    on the professions, 369.\n\n  CICERO, M. T., recounts death of Cyrus, 10;\n    meets Posidonius, 104;\n    life, 108;\n    criticism of Stoic dialectic, 152;\n    in exile, 376.\n    _Academica_, 109;\n    _de Amicitia_, 382;\n    _de Divinatione_, 227;\n    _de Finibus_, 109, 283, 303, 388;\n    _de Natura Deorum_, 105, 109, 386;\n    _de Officiis_, 109, 283, 303, 313;\n    _Paradoxa_, 151;\n    _de Republica_, 280, 383, 386;\n    _de Senectute_, 377;\n    _Tusculanae disputationes_, 278.\n\n  Circe, 31.\n\n  City life, 371 sqq.\n\n  CLAUDIUS (princeps), 113, 119.\n\n  CLEANTHES, 84 sqq.;\n    hymn to Zeus, 85;\n    on tone or tension, 89, 160;\n    on the _tabula rasa_, 135 n. 52;\n    on rhetoric, 148 sqq.;\n    on solar system, 179;\n    on moon and stars, 183;\n    on fate, 202;\n    on the soul\u2019s future, 267;\n    on woman, 270 n. 174;\n    declines Athenian citizenship, 275;\n    on obedience to God, 283;\n    as wise man, 296;\n    praise of virtue, 299;\n    on daily duties, 302;\n    on pleasure, 315;\n    that pain is a good, 338.\n\n  Clearness, 132.\n\n  CLEMEN, C., 435 n. 157.\n\n  Clemency, 340.\n\n  CLEMENS, 432.\n\n  CLEOMENES III, guided by Sphaerus, 80, 311.\n\n  Clothing, 66, 362, 365.\n\n  COERANUS, 399.\n\n  Cohesion, 189, 243;\n    in the body, 257.\n\n  Cold, 181.\n\n  _collatio rationis_, 135.\n\n  Comets, 183.\n\n  _commoda_, 290.\n\n  Common sense (_sensus communis_), 366.\n\n  Commotions (_emotiones_), 351, 352;\n    in Jesus, 412.\n\n  _compositio_, 134.\n\n  Comprehension (_comprehensio_), 68, 82, 249;\n    how qualified, 74;\n    defended by Chrysippus, 93;\n    as the criterion, 141.\n\n  _conatus_, 318 n. 109.\n\n  _concentus_, 225.\n\n  Conceptions, 135 sqq., 170.\n\n  _conclusio_, 73 n. 80.\n\n  Condensation, 158, 167 sqq.\n\n  Conditional sentence, 147.\n\n  _confatalia_, 201.\n\n  Conflagration (_conflagratio_), 95 sqq., 105, 190 sqq.;\n    denied by Panaetius, 103;\n    in Christianity, 417.\n\n  Conformity, 45, 217, 404.\n\n  _coniuncta_, 167.\n\n  _coniunctio naturae_, 227 n. 67.\n\n  Conjunction (_coniunctio_), 145.\n\n  Conscience, 220, 320;\n    in St Paul, 415.\n\n  Consent, common, 143;\n    illustrated, 223, 325.\n\n  Consistency, 71, 282, 291.\n\n  Consolations, 40, 342 sqq.\n\n  Constancies (_constantiae_), 323;\n    in Pauline writers, 412 n. 20, 423.\n\n  Constellations, 5.\n\n  _constitutio_, 260 n. 116.\n\n  Constitutional theory, 46;\n    in Aristotle, 62;\n    in Panaetius, 101;\n    in the Roman Stoics, 280.\n\n  _continuatio naturae_, 227 n. 67.\n\n  Contrary twist, 335, 364.\n\n  _convenientia_, 71.\n\n  Conversion (_conversio_), 139, 327.\n\n  CORDUS, CREMUTIUS, 392.\n\n  CORNELIUS, FIDUS, 341.\n\n  CORNUTUS, 112, 231, 395.\n\n  Cosmology, 193 sqq.;\n    Christian, 417.\n\n  Cosmopolis, 66, 196, 274, 284;\n    levels race and sex, 271;\n    in the Roman empire, 382;\n    in Christianity, 423.\n\n  COTTA, 104.\n\n  Country life, 372.\n\n  Courage, in Plato, 58;\n    in Stoicism, 294, 308;\n    defined, 311;\n    in women, 362;\n    at death, 378.\n\n  Court life, 370.\n\n  CRANTOR, 342.\n\n  CRATES, 65, 318.\n\n  CRATES (of Mallos), 98;\n    teacher of Panaetius, 100;\n    advocates \u2018anomaly,\u2019 146.\n\n  CRATIPPUS, 64.\n\n  Creation, 60, 193;\n    Pauline view, 428;\n    compared with procreation, 254.\n\n  Creator, in Plato, 57;\n    in Aristotle, 60;\n    as the Logos, 161;\n    in popular theology, 194.\n\n  CRINIS, 98.\n\n  CRISPINUS, 111.\n\n  Criterion, 75, 130, 131, 141.\n\n  CRITOLAUS, 100.\n\n  Cronos, 112, 231.\n\n  CROSSLEY, H., 17 n. 51.\n\n  Cruelty, 336.\n\n  Cupid, 231.\n\n  Cynics, 16, 48 sqq.;\n    their theory of morals, 288;\n    freedom of speech, 322.\n\n  Cynism, a short cut to virtue, 97, 365.\n\n  Cyrenaics, 50.\n\n  CYRUS, 9 sqq.;\n    conquest of Ionia, 34, 37;\n    described by Xenophon, 50;\n    a \u2018wise man,\u2019 296.\n\n\n  Daemons, 232, 264.\n\n  Daily duties, 301 sqq.\n\n  DAMASIPPUS, 111.\n\n  DARDANUS, 107.\n\n  DARIUS conquers Ionia, 37.\n\n  DAVIDSON, W. L., 27 n. 75, 262 n. 133.\n\n  Death, 261;\n    of children, 343;\n    how to be met, 333, 378 sqq.\n\n  Decency, 312.\n\n  _decorum_ 312, 348;\n    in speech, 149.\n\n  Definition (_definitio_), 148;\n    in Sphaerus, 80.\n\n  Deification, 79.\n\n  Demeter, 231.\n\n  DEMETRIUS (Cynic philosopher), 400.\n\n  DEMETRIUS (bishop), 434.\n\n  DEMOCRITUS, 41;\n    theory of atoms and void, 156.\n\n  Departure, reasonable, 309 sqq.\n\n  DESCARTES, 242 n. 17.\n\n  Determinism, 200.\n\n  Dialectic, 129 sqq., 148;\n    rejected by the Cynics, 49.\n\n  _di immortales_, 220.\n\n  Diana, 231.\n\n  DICAEARCHUS, 64.\n\n  Dido, 391.\n\n  DIELS, H., 110 n. 75.\n\n  _difficilis_, 335, 344 n. 94.\n\n  _dilatatio_, 294 n. 148.\n\n  DILL, S., 99 n. 1, 380 n. 1, 400 n. 108, 404 n. 126.\n\n  DIO (of Prusa), 118.\n\n  DIODORUS (Megarian), 51;\n    against free will, 148;\n    the \u2018master-argument,\u2019 201.\n\n  DIODORUS (Peripatetic), 64.\n\n  DIODOTUS, 108.\n\n  DIOGENES (the Cynic), 16, 48 sqq., 274;\n    on labour, 160;\n    as \u2018wise man,\u2019 296.\n\n  DIOGENES (of Seleucia), 96;\n    visit to Rome, 100;\n    his style in speaking, 150;\n    on music, 234;\n    on the divine immanence, 240;\n    on constitutions, 280;\n    definition of virtue, 283, 303;\n    on reputation, 320.\n\n  DIONYSIUS (of Cyrene), 107.\n\n  DIONYSIUS (of Heraclea), 84.\n\n  Dionysus, 110 n. 76.\n\n  DIOSCORIDES, 96.\n\n  Dis, 231.\n\n  Disadvantages, 322.\n\n  Disappointment, 338.\n\n  Discipline, 112;\n    of pain, 338.\n\n  Discontent, 331.\n\n  Diseases of the soul, 332, 353.\n\n  Disposition, 167.\n\n  Divination, suggested by Socrates, 43, 198;\n    denied by Panaetius, 103;\n    accepted by Posidonius, 105;\n    an argument for the existence of gods, 227.\n\n  Dog, 187.\n\n  Dogmatism, 74;\n    of St Paul, 415.\n\n  DOMITIAN expels the philosophers, 120.\n\n  Drinking, 304, 314, 317, 346.\n\n  DRIVER, S. R., 9.\n\n  Druidism, 24.\n\n  DRUSUS, 111.\n\n  Dualism, 33 n. 22.\n    Of Zarathustra, 38;\n    of Anaxagoras, 40;\n    of Socrates, 44;\n    of Aristotle, 60;\n    of Zeno, 69, 172;\n    of Cleanthes, 88;\n    of the Stoics, 157;\n    of soul and body, 157;\n    of force and matter, 172;\n    of active and passive, 172;\n    of good and bad men, 354.\n\n  Duty, 301 sqq., 328;\n    towards the gods, 237;\n    daily duties, 101, 301 sqq.\n\n  DYROFF, A., 83 n. 42.\n\n\n  Earth revolves on its axis, 178;\n    round the sun, 179;\n    a gross element, 225.\n\n  Eating, 304, 314, 317, 345.\n\n  Eclecticism, 106, 404.\n\n  ECPHANTUS, 178.\n\n  Education, 358;\n    of children, 360;\n    of slaves, 374.\n\n  EGNATIUS CELER, 400.\n\n  Ego, 125, 246.\n\n  Eleatics, 34.\n\n  Elements (_elementa_), 12, 156, 173, 179, 196, 225;\n    are divine, 219;\n    in Empedocles, 41;\n    their qualities, 173.\n\n  Elephantine, 9 n. 25.\n\n  Emotions, see \u2018Commotions.\u2019\n\n  EMPEDOCLES, 41, 173.\n\n  _enodatio_, 137.\n\n  EPICTETUS, 119 sqq.;\n    on the soul\u2019s absorption, 125;\n    defines dialectic, 130;\n    on certainty, 144;\n    rejects divination, 228;\n    on hymns, 235;\n    on self-examination, 236;\n    on obedience to God, 284;\n    on the sufficiency of virtue, 293;\n    on the \u2018wise man,\u2019 298;\n    on the relationships, 307;\n    on \u2018free departure,\u2019 311;\n    on family affection, 341;\n    consolations, 343;\n    women to be avoided, 350;\n    on celibacy, 368;\n    on court life, 370;\n    in exile, 401.\n\n  Epicureans, 54, 93.\n\n  EPICURUS, 74;\n    his logic, 137;\n    theory of atoms, 159;\n    on the gods, 225.\n\n  ERATOSTHENES, 83.\n\n  Eristics, 69.\n\n  Eros, 231.\n\n  _essentia_, 158, 165.\n\n  Ethics, 273 sqq.\n\n  Etruscans, their monotheism, 10, 221;\n    reject images, 234.\n\n  EUCLIDES (of Megara), 51.\n\n  EUDOXUS, 182.\n\n  EUDROMUS, 98.\n\n  EUMENES II, 98.\n\n  Eupathy, 324.\n\n  EUPHRATES, 118.\n\n  EURIPIDES, 39.\n\n  _eventa_, 167.\n\n  Evil, 206 sqq., 213 sqq., 330;\n    in St Paul, 418.\n\n  _excessus rationalis_, 309.\n\n  Exercise, 359.\n\n  Exhalations, 183, 260, 264.\n\n  Exile, 376.\n\n  _exitus_, 309.\n\n  _experientia_, 134.\n\n\n  FABIUS (Cunctator), 334.\n\n  FAIRWEATHER, W., 21 n. 58, 23 n. 62.\n\n  Faith, 415.\n\n  Fallacies, 51, 147.\n\n  Fame, 320.\n\n  FANNIA, 393, 400.\n\n  FANNIUS, C., 383.\n\n  Fasting, 364.\n\n  Fate (_fatum_), in Chaldaism, 5;\n    in Homer, 30;\n    in Stoicism, 199 sqq.\n\n  FAVORINUS, 360 n. 23.\n\n  Fear, 331, 333 sqq.\n\n  Fire, sacred to the Persians, 13;\n    in Heraclitus, 35;\n    with Zeno, 70;\n    with Cleanthes, 89;\n    tends upwards, 180;\n    elemental and primary, 180;\n    is divine, 219;\n    is a refined element, 225.\n\n  Flesh, 258;\n    in St Paul, 416 sqq.\n\n  FLEURY, AM\u00c9D\u00c9E, 433 n. 151.\n\n  Flood, 278.\n\n  Forcefulness, in Socrates, 42;\n    in the Cynics, 49;\n    in Crates, 65;\n    in Epictetus, 120;\n    in Stoic ethics, 247;\n    identified with virtue, 285;\n    of Ulysses, 296;\n    of Jesus, 411.\n\n  _formido_, see \u2018Fear.\u2019\n\n  _fortitudo_, see \u2018Courage.\u2019\n\n  Fortune, 199, 209.\n\n  FOWLER, W. WARDE, 380 n. 1, 385 n. 33.\n\n  Freedom, 281, 304;\n    of the will, 17, 210.\n\n  Fretfulness, 337.\n\n  FRIEDL\u00c4NDER, M., 23 n. 63.\n\n  Friendship, 366.\n\n  FURIUS, L. PHILUS, 280, 382.\n\n  _fusio universa_, 169.\n\n\n  GALILEO, 179.\n\n  GALLIO, 406.\n\n  GALLUS, C. AQUILIUS, 385.\n\n  Games, 360, 361.\n\n  GARNETT, R., 434 n. 156.\n\n  _gaudium_, 324.\n\n  GAUTAMA, 14 sqq.\n\n  GELDNER, K., 7 n. 17, 12 n. 31.\n\n  GELLIUS, A., 117;\n    on Seneca, 114.\n\n  Generation, see \u2018Procreation.\u2019\n\n  _genius_, 232.\n\n  Gentlemanliness, 61, 312.\n\n  Geometry to be studied, 306.\n\n  Germans, 272.\n\n  Girls, education of, 362;\n    girl students are disputatious, 367.\n\n  Gladiator as ideal, 120, 363.\n\n  GLADISCH, A., 37 n. 45, 38 nn. 45 a and 45 b.\n\n  _gloria_, 320.\n\n  God, 218 sqq.;\n    in Persism, 8;\n    in Stoicism, 17, 218 sqq.;\n    in Judaism, 21;\n    in Homer, 30;\n    in Xenophanes, 34;\n    in Cynism, 48;\n    with the Megarians, 51;\n    in world-literature, 229;\n    in Jesus, 411;\n    in St Paul, 419.\n    His fatherhood, 30, 80, 221, 409.\n    His immanence, 181, 240, 418;\n      he dwells in heaven, 411.\n    His limitations, 208, 212.\n    Four proofs, 90, 223 sqq.\n    Definitions, 222.\n\n  Gods, in Homer, 30;\n    in Posidonius, 104;\n    in Cornutus, 112;\n    Stoic interpretation, 40, 229 sqq.;\n    classified, 384;\n    in Virgil, 390.\n    Rustic gods, 229, 405.\n\n  Golden age, 194.\n\n  GOMPERZ, TH., 5 n. 3, 16 n. 48, 30 n. 2, 32 n. 16, 33 nn. 19 to 21,\n      34 n. 24, 35 n. 29, 37 n. 44, 39 nn. 47 and 48, 42 n. 59, 46 nn.\n      76 and 78, 49 n. 85, 52 n. 92, 83 n. 43, 277 n. 29, 278 n. 41,\n      295 n. 159.\n\n  Good, in Plato, 57;\n    defined by Diogenes, 96;\n    is bodily, 158;\n    in Stoicism, 281.\n    See also \u2018Virtue.\u2019\n\n  Gospel to the Hebrews, 430 n. 142.\n\n  G\u00d6TTLING, C. W., 49 n. 85.\n\n  GRACCHI, 382.\n\n  GRAECINUS, IULIUS, 393.\n\n  Graces (_Gratiae_), 231.\n\n  Grammar, 144 sqq.\n\n  Great year, 193.\n\n  Greatheartedness, 308, 311.\n\n  Greed, 331, 333 sqq.\n\n  Greediness, 345.\n\n  Grief, 331, 336.\n\n  GROTE, G., 46 n. 78.\n\n  GRUPPE, O., 430 n. 142.\n\n  Gymnasia forbidden, 276.\n\n  Gymnastics, 259, 359.\n\n  Gymnosophists, 13 sqq.\n\n\n  Habit (_habitus_), 168, 353.\n\n  HADRIAN, 121, 404.\n\n  HAECKEL, E., 252 sqq.\n\n  HATCH, E., 20 n. 54.\n\n  Health of soul, 247, 285, 286;\n    of body, 261, 286.\n\n  Hearing, 250.\n\n  Heat, 181;\n    is rarefied body, 159.\n\n  Heaven, home of the gods, 7, 21, 222, 411, 419.\n\n  HEBERDEN, Dr, 433 n. 151.\n\n  Hebraists, 428.\n\n  HECATO, 105;\n    on pleasure, 315;\n    on wealth, 321 n. 130;\n    his love-charm, 366 n. 72.\n\n  HEINZE, O., 23 n. 61, 161 n. 36.\n\n  Heliocentric theory, 34, 90, 178 sqq.\n\n  Hell disbelieved, 223, 265.\n\n  Hellenes, 9, 48, 83;\n    not a superior race, 271, 274.\n\n  HELVIDIUS PRISCUS, 399.\n\n  HENDERSON, B. W., 117, 395 n. 85, 398 n. 96, 399 n. 99.\n\n  Hera, see \u2018Juno.\u2019\n\n  HERACLIDES (of Pontus), 178.\n\n  HERACLIDES (of Tarsus), 98;\n    denied that sins are equal, 355.\n\n  HERACLITUS, 35 sqq.;\n    followed by Zeno, 70;\n    by Cleanthes, 88;\n    on the universe, 177;\n    on the aether, 183;\n    on the conflagration, 190, 191;\n    on the microcosm, 240;\n    on exhalations, 261;\n    as \u2018wise man,\u2019 296;\n    on length of life, 309 n. 54.\n\n  Hercules, personifies activity, 160;\n    deified, 233, 296;\n    as \u2018wise man,\u2019 295.\n\n  Heredity, 251.\n\n  HERILLUS, 81.\n\n  HERODES ATTICUS, 403.\n\n  HERODOTUS, 9.\n\n  HESIOD, 31, 232, 364, 372.\n\n  HICETAS, 178.\n\n  HICKS, R. D., 133 n. 39, 139 n. 70, 143 n. 89, 193 n. 130.\n\n  HIEROCLES, 108.\n\n  HIERONYMUS, 64.\n\n  Hilarity, 331, 345 sqq.\n\n  HIPPARCHIA, 65, 318.\n\n  HIPPIAS (of Elis), 40.\n\n  HIPPOCRATES, on primary qualities, 173.\n\n  HIRZEL, R., 81 n. 26, 83 n. 42, 88 n. 67, 265 n. 145, 266 n. 150,\n      318 n. 109.\n\n  H\u00d6FFDING, H., 227 n. 63.\n\n  HOMER, 30 sqq.\n\n  HORACE, 111, 389.\n\n  HUET, P. D., 433 n. 151.\n\n  _humanitas_, 300, 381.\n\n  Humour, 340, 342.\n\n  Hylozoists, 32, 156.\n\n  Hymns, of Cleanthes, 85 sqq.;\n    of the Stoics, 234, 359;\n    Christian, 419.\n\n\n  _id quod dicitur_, 146.\n\n  _id quod est_, 158, 170.\n\n  Idea, in Plato, 56 sqq.;\n    in Aristotle, 59;\n    not really existent, 136.\n\n  _ignava ratio_, 200.\n\n  _ignavia_, 332 n. 5.\n\n  Images disallowed by the Persians, 8, 9;\n    by the Jews, 21;\n    by Xenophanes, 34;\n    by Antisthenes, 48;\n    by the Tuscans, 234;\n    by Zeno, 66, 234, 275.\n\n  Immanence of the deity, 181, 240, 418;\n    in St Paul, 420.\n\n  Immortality, 8, 262 sqq.\n\n  _impetus_, 256.\n\n  _inaestimabile_, 289.\n\n  Incest, 277.\n\n  _inclinatio_, 286.\n\n  _incommoda_, 290.\n\n  Incontinence (_incontinentia_), 348 sqq.\n\n  _incorporalia_, 170.\n\n  Indians, 3;\n    sympathy for animals, 274 n. 10;\n    disposal of the dead, 278;\n    asceticism, 359.\n\n  _indifferentia_, 40, 289, 315.\n\n  _indoles bona_, 326 n. 160.\n\n  Induction, 56, 136.\n\n  Inference, 135.\n\n  Ingoldsby Legends, 434.\n\n  _iniustitia_, 332 n. 5.\n\n  _inopinata_, 150.\n\n  _insipientia_, 332 n. 5.\n\n  _intellegentiae incohatae_, 138 n. 65.\n\n  _intemperantia_, 332 n. 5.\n\n  _intentio_, see \u2018Tone.\u2019\n\n  Intention (_intentio_), 87, 286.\n\n  _intolerantia_, 349.\n\n  Intuitionism, 49.\n\n  _ira_, 333 sqq.\n\n  _iracundia_, 335.\n\n  _iuncta fato_, 201.\n\n  _ius gentium_, 385.\n\n  _iustitia_, 231.\n\n\n  Jerusalem, 9.\n\n  JESUS, 410 sqq.\n\n  JEVONS, F. B., 241 n. 13, 426 n. 119.\n\n  JOHN (saint), 24, 431.\n\n  Joy, 324.\n\n  Judaism, 20 sqq.\n\n  JULIA DOMNA, 404.\n\n  JULIUS GRAECINUS, 393.\n\n  JUNIUS MAURICUS, 401.\n\n  Juno, 112, 230, 278.\n\n  Juppiter, 10, 221, 230;\n    in Virgil, 390.\n    See also \u2018Zeus.\u2019\n\n  Jurists, 384 sqq., 402 sqq.\n\n  Justice (_iustitia_), 58, 294, 307.\n\n  JUSTIN (Martyr), 421 n. 80, 432 n. 149.\n\n  JUVENAL, 235, 402.\n\n\n  KANUS IULIUS, 393.\n\n  KEBLE, J., 12 n. 32.\n\n  Kingdom of heaven, 411;\n    of the soul, 238 sqq.\n\n  Kingship, 369 sqq.\n\n  Knowledge, 129, 140.\n\n\n  LAELIUS, C., 381;\n    as \u2018wise man,\u2019 297.\n\n  _laetitia_, 316, 331;\n    _laet. gestiens_ or _nimia_, 316 n. 101.\n\n  Language, its origin, 146.\n\n  LATERANUS PLAUTUS, 399.\n\n  _Latinitas_, 149.\n\n  Law, 71, 273, 276;\n    in Virgil, 390;\n    universal Law is divine, 36, 220, 328;\n    first laws of nature, 302 sqq.\n    Law as a profession, 306.\n    Roman law codified by Scaevola, 384;\n      developed by the Antonini, 402.\n\n  Lawcourts condemned, 276.\n\n  Leisure, 377.\n\n  LEUCIPPUS, 41.\n\n  _lex communis_, 273;\n    _lex naturae_, 385.\n\n  \u2018Liar\u2019 fallacy, 147.\n\n  Liber, 233.\n\n  Liberal arts, 306.\n\n  Liberality, 373.\n\n  Liberty (_libertas_) of the Cynics, 49;\n    an advantage, 322;\n    sought by slaves, 375;\n    of the \u2018old Romans,\u2019 397.\n\n  _libido_, 256, 331, 333.\n\n  Life an advantage, 309;\n    \u2018eternal\u2019 or \u2018spiritual,\u2019 414, 415, 422, 434.\n\n  LIGHTFOOT, J. B., 24 n. 66, 29 n. 1, 354 n. 148, 380 n. 1, 409 n. 2,\n      425 n. 112.\n\n  LIVIA, 111, 343.\n\n  LOCKE, on the _tabula rasa_, 135 n. 52.\n\n  Logic, 128 sqq.;\n    its use, 306;\n    its danger, 115, 120, 151 sqq., 403.\n\n  Logos, in Persism, 12, 19;\n    in Philo, 23;\n    in Heraclitus, 35 sqq.;\n    in Zeno, 17, 70;\n    in Cleanthes, 88 sqq.;\n    in Posidonius, 105.\n    As creator, 161;\n    as the active principle, 172;\n    as fate, 202;\n    as Providence, 203;\n    is God, 219;\n    as bond of the state, 273, 275;\n    in Christianity, 417 sqq., 431 sqq.\n\n  LONG, G., 206 n. 46.\n\n  Love, 317 sqq.;\n    in the State, 67, 275;\n    in St Paul, 423.\n\n  LUCAN, 112, 395 sqq.;\n    account of Druidism, 25;\n    pupil of Cornutus, 112.\n\n  Lucidity, 149.\n\n  LUCILIUS, C. (poet), visited Posidonius, 104;\n    on style, 150;\n    his poems, 383.\n\n  LUCILIUS, C. (official), 397.\n\n  LUCULLUS, L. LICINIUS, 109.\n\n  LUCRETIUS on fortune, 199 n. 3;\n    on procreation, 251.\n\n  _luctus_, 344.\n\n  Luna, 231.\n\n  Luxury, 362, 364.\n\n\n  Maccabees iv, 23.\n\n  Macrocosm, 61, 90, 238, 240.\n\n  Magi, 3, 6, 7.\n\n  _magnitudo animi_, 308.\n\n  MAHAFFY, J. P., 15 n. 46, 16 n. 47, 27, 54 n. 2, 80 n. 15, 84 n. 44,\n      174 n. 113.\n\n  MAINE, Sir H., 277 n. 29, 402 n. 122.\n\n  Man, his position in the universe, 186;\n    his erect figure, 391;\n    \u2018all men are equal,\u2019 403.\n\n  MARCIA (wife of Cato), 387.\n\n  MARCIA (daughter of Cremutius), 342, 392.\n\n  Marriage, approved, 276;\n    a social duty, 284, 318;\n    discourse by Antipater, 318;\n    by Musonius, 367.\n    Stoic marriages, 383.\n\n  Mars, 231.\n\n  MARY (Virgin), 231 n. 83;\n    as Wisdom, 430 n. 142.\n\n  \u2018Master-argument,\u2019 148, 201 sqq.\n\n  _materia_, 44, 60, 157, 172.\n\n  Materialism, 41, 157, 253;\n    limited by the Stoics, 242.\n\n  _mathematici_, 6.\n\n  Matter (_materia_), with Socrates, 44;\n    in Aristotle, 60;\n    Stoic views, 157, 173.\n\n  MAUDSLEY, H., 351 n. 131.\n\n  MAUNDER, Sir E. W., 5 n. 5.\n\n  MAYOR, J. E. B., 295 n. 159.\n\n  MAYOR, J. B., 182 n. 58, 209 n. 68, 225 n. 54, 249 n. 62.\n\n  Megarians, 51.\n\n  Memory, 134.\n\n  _mentiens_, 147.\n\n  _metus_, 331, 333 sqq.\n\n  Microcosm in Aristotle, 61;\n    in Cleanthes, 90;\n    Stoic view, 238, 240.\n\n  MILTON, J., 425 n. 112.\n\n  Mind-picture, 68, 131.\n\n  Minerva, 231.\n\n  Miracles do not happen, 434.\n\n  Misanthropy, 344.\n\n  Mithra-worship, 184.\n\n  MNESARCHUS, 107.\n\n  Modesty, 313, 326.\n\n  MOMMSEN, TH., 217 n. 1.\n\n  Monarchy, favoured by Socrates, 46;\n    by Sphaerus, 80;\n    by the Stoics, 396.\n\n  Monism, 33 n. 22;\n    in Xenophanes, 35;\n    in the Megarians, 51;\n    in Zeno, 70;\n    in Cleanthes, 88;\n    in the Pythagoreans, 104;\n    of the Cynics, 220 n. 24;\n    of mind and matter, 134;\n    of soul and body, 157;\n    of the existent, 170.\n\n  Monotheism, see \u2018God.\u2019\n\n  MONTESQUIEU, 27 n. 74.\n\n  Moon, 182.\n\n  Motherhood, 255, 375.\n\n  Motion, 159, 180.\n\n  _motus levis_, 351.\n\n  Mourning, 344, 424 n. 100.\n\n  _mundus_, see \u2018Universe.\u2019\n\n  MUSONIUS, 116 sqq.;\n    against relaxation, 285;\n    on greediness, 345;\n    on marriage, 367, 368;\n    on kingship, 370;\n    on pastoral life, 372;\n    on old age, 377;\n    discourages sedition, 399;\n    attacks Egnatius, 400;\n    exempted from exile, 401.\n\n  Mythology, Christian, 428.\n\n\n  _natura_, (1) growth, 168, 242;\n    (2) category of existence, 179, 218.\n    See also \u2018Nature.\u2019\n\n  Nature, as standard of morals, 95, 240, 282;\n    common to all philosophies, 385.\n\n  Neatness, 320, 365.\n\n  Necessity (_necessitas naturalis_), 200, 208, 224, 344.\n\n  Neptunus, 231.\n\n  NERO, 113, 117, 394 sqq.\n\n  NERVA, 404.\n\n  NESTOR (philosopher), 392.\n\n  NETTLESHIP, H., 385 n. 28.\n\n  NEWMAN, J. H., 12 n. 33.\n\n  NICANOR, 110 n. 76.\n\n  Nobility, 320;\n    in Euripides, 39.\n\n  _nomen_ (noun), 145.\n\n  Nominalism of the Cynics, 49;\n    of Zeno, 68;\n    of the Stoics, 136.\n\n  Notions (_notiones_), 135;\n    _not. communes_ and _insitae_, 138.\n\n\n  Obedience to God, 283, 363;\n    to parents, 363;\n    to natural law, 385.\n\n  Object (_obiectum_), 157;\n    is existent, 172.\n\n  Ocean, its exhalations, 183.\n\n  OCTAVIA, 343.\n\n  _odium generis humani_, 345.\n\n  Odyssey moralized, 31.\n\n  _offensio_, 353.\n\n  _officium_, 101, 301 sqq.;\n    _off. perfectum_, 326.\n\n  Old age, 261, 309, 377 sqq.\n\n  Old Romans, 381 sqq.\n\n  Opinion (_opinio_), 68, 133.\n\n  _oratio pellucida_, 149.\n\n  ORIGEN, 420 n. 77, 430 n. 132, 432;\n    excommunicated, 434.\n\n  Orphic fragments, 32.\n\n  OVID, 391;\n    on the golden age, 195.\n\n\n  PACONIUS AGRIPPINUS, 399.\n\n  PAETUS, CAECINA, 393.\n\n  PAETUS, THRASEA, 394, 399.\n\n  Pagan revival, 405.\n\n  Pain, to be met with Courage, 308;\n    is no evil, 337, 364.\n\n  Pan, 112.\n\n  PANAETIUS, 100 sqq.;\n    abandons the \u2018conflagration,\u2019 103;\n    on advocacy, 144;\n    on the planets, 182;\n    questions divination, 227;\n    and immortality, 267;\n    on slavery, 279;\n    on government, 280;\n    definition of virtue, 283;\n    on social duty, 284;\n    on the \u2018sufficiency,\u2019 292;\n    on daily duties, 303;\n    on anger, 333 n. 9;\n    letter to Q. Tubero, 337.\n\n  PANTAENUS, 432.\n\n  Pantheism, in Hesiod, 32;\n    of Aratus, 80;\n    of Cleanthes, 90;\n    limited by the Stoics, 18, 185, 219;\n    by St Paul, 418.\n\n  Paradox, 150.\n\n  Paradoxes, 151;\n    \u2018body moves through body,\u2019 159, 169;\n    \u2018soul is body,\u2019 69, 157, 241;\n    is an animal, 243;\n    \u2018virtues are bodies,\u2019 158;\n    \u2018if there are altars, there are gods,\u2019 227;\n    \u2018man is god,\u2019 248;\n    \u2018no man sins willingly,\u2019 45, 49, 257;\n    \u2018virtue can be taught,\u2019 285;\n    \u2018sin is ignorance,\u2019 331;\n    \u2018virtue is sufficient,\u2019 291;\n    \u2018is knowledge,\u2019 44, 45, 49, 257, 285;\n    \u2018is the true nobility,\u2019 320;\n    \u2018cannot be lost,\u2019 295;\n    \u2018wise man is a king,\u2019 66, 111, 299, 338;\n    \u2018is a good general,\u2019 79;\n    \u2018never errs,\u2019 102;\n    \u2018is a lover,\u2019 318, 348;\n    \u2018needs nothing,\u2019 293;\n    \u2018is happy on the rack,\u2019 299;\n    \u2018is a god,\u2019 299;\n    \u2018he who is not wise is a fool,\u2019 355;\n    \u2018is a slave,\u2019 424;\n    \u2018he who has one vice has all,\u2019 332 n. 5, 355;\n    \u2018all sins are equal,\u2019 354;\n    \u2018affections must be extirpated,\u2019 332, 354;\n    \u2018riches are not a good,\u2019 321;\n    \u2018pain is no evil,\u2019 102, 337;\n    \u2018is a good,\u2019 338;\n    \u2018death is no evil,\u2019 309, 344;\n    \u2018is a boon,\u2019 309;\n    \u2018these three are one,\u2019 433.\n\n  Parts of philosophy, 128;\n    of speech, 145.\n\n  Passion, 59.\n\n  Pastoral life, 372.\n\n  PAUL (saint), 24, 409 sqq.;\n    education, 414;\n    theory of \u2018body,\u2019 416;\n    of sin, 418;\n    of human nature, 419;\n    of immortality, 421;\n    of tabus, 423;\n    breach with Hebraists, 428;\n    on birth of Jesus, 430.\n\n  PAULINA, 367.\n\n  Peace, see \u2018Tranquillity.\u2019\n\n  PEARSON, A. C., 70 n. 61, 75 n. 90, 85 n. 58, 86 n. 59, 94 n. 102,\n      133 n. 34, 141 n. 81, 162 n. 39, 194 n. 132, 195 n. 139, 196 and\n      197, 222 n. 32, 227 n. 63, 264 n. 144, 292 n. 127, 315 n. 92,\n      326 n. 160, 346 n. 104.\n\n  _peccatum_, 330, 425 n. 111.\n\n  PEDANIUS SECUNDUS, 398.\n\n  Penetration, 159, 169;\n    by the deity, 181, 189;\n    by the soul, 259;\n    in marriage, 319.\n\n  Perceptions, 135 sqq.\n\n  Pergamus, 99.\n\n  Peripatetics, 63 sqq.;\n    on Anger, 333.\n\n  PERSAEUS, 79, 311.\n\n  Persecution of Christians, 405.\n\n  Persephone, 231.\n\n  Persism, 6 sqq.;\n    influence on Heraclitus, 37;\n    on the evil spirit, 232;\n    on body and soul, 241;\n    on future rewards, 264;\n    disposal of the dead, 278;\n    men good and bad, 354;\n    influence on Christianity, 435 n. 157.\n    See also \u2018Angels,\u2019 \u2018Zarathustra.\u2019\n\n  PERSIUS, 112, 395.\n\n  Person (_persona_), 246 n. 42, 433 n. 154.\n\n  _perspicuitas_, 132.\n\n  Perturbation (_perturbatio_), 332, 351 n. 131, 352.\n\n  PETER (saint), 428;\n    his popularity, 429.\n\n  Phantasm, 132.\n\n  Pharisees, 21 n. 56, 411.\n\n  PHILO, 23;\n    follows Posidonius, 105.\n\n  PHILONIDES, 80, 311.\n\n  Philosophy, its subject-matter, 2;\n    derived from the East, 3;\n    its parts, 128;\n    becomes ill-defined, 106;\n    is unpopular, 356 n. 159;\n    persecuted, 393;\n    established, 404;\n    absorbed in Christianity, 413 sqq.\n\n  PHILUS, see \u2018Furius.\u2019\n\n  Phrase, 146.\n\n  Physicians respected, 286, 369.\n\n  Physics, 155 sqq.;\n    value of the study, 306.\n\n  Picture (of Samos), 231 n. 83.\n\n  PISO, conspires against Nero, 117.\n\n  Pity, 340.\n\n  Place, 59.\n\n  Planets, 182.\n\n  Plants, 186, 188.\n\n  PLATO, 26, 55 sqq.;\n    theory of ideas still-born, 56;\n    view of the solar system, 179, 182;\n    on the soul, 255;\n    on slavery, 279;\n    commentary on the _Timaeus_ by Posidonius, 104, 134 n. 40;\n    the _Phaedo_, 245;\n    the _Republic_, 66, 274.\n\n  PLAUTUS, 230 n. 79, 232 n. 95, 236 n. 125.\n\n  PLAUTUS LATERANUS, 399.\n\n  Pleasure, 314 sqq., 331.\n\n  Pluto, 231.\n\n  POLEMO, 63;\n    teacher of Zeno, 69;\n    taught \u2018first lessons of nature,\u2019 302.\n\n  Politics, of Socrates, 45;\n    of Plato, 58;\n    of Aristotle, 61;\n    of the Stoics, 280;\n    participation a duty, 43, 284;\n    sometimes avoided, 116, 338 sqq.;\n    as a profession, 369.\n\n  POLLIO, 117.\n\n  Pollux, 232, 233.\n\n  POLYBIUS, 101, 280.\n\n  POLYGNOTUS, 71.\n\n  Polytheism, 218.\n\n  POMPEIUS, S. (uncle of Magnus), 386.\n\n  POMPEIUS (Magnus), meets Posidonius, 104.\n\n  PONTIUS PILATUS, 405.\n\n  PORCIA, 388.\n\n  PORTER, W. H., translation of _Hymn of Cleanthes_, 85 to 87;\n    other translations, 395, 396.\n\n  POSIDONIUS, 104 sqq.;\n    on general consent, 143;\n    opposes heliocentric doctrine, 179;\n    view of the solar system, 182;\n    adheres to the \u2018conflagration,\u2019 192;\n    on the \u2018golden age,\u2019 194, 195;\n    on fate, 200;\n    religious sentiment, 217;\n    defends divination, 227;\n    belief in daemons, 232;\n    on hymns, 235;\n    on sight, 250;\n    on immortality, 267;\n    lays stress on precepts, 357 n. 3.\n\n  POSIDONIUS (of Alexandria), 84.\n\n  Possibility, 201.\n\n  Poverty, 375.\n\n  _praecipua_, _praelata_, _praeposita_, 290.\n\n  _praesumptio_, 136.\n\n  Prayer, of Socrates, 45;\n    with the Stoics, 213, 235 sqq.;\n    Lord\u2019s prayer, 23, 411.\n\n  Precepts, 357;\n    must be few and easy, 358.\n\n  Preconception, 136;\n    of deity, 224.\n\n  Predication, 146;\n    is true or untrue, 172.\n\n  Presumption, 136.\n\n  Principate (_principale_, _principatus_), 89, 90 n. 81, 130;\n    of the universe, 186;\n    of animals and plants, 188;\n    in man, 245 sqq.;\n    as \u2018spirit\u2019 in St Paul, 420.\n\n  _principia_ (1) in physics, 173;\n    (2) _pr. naturae_, in ethics, 302.\n\n  Probability, 143;\n    the guide of daily life, 303 n. 13.\n    See also \u2018Reasonableness.\u2019\n\n  Probationer, 102, 294.\n    See also \u2018Progress.\u2019\n\n  Procreation, 251 sqq.;\n    in Lucretius, 251;\n    in Haeckel, 252;\n    these theories inadequate, 253;\n    its taint, 427;\n    spiritual procreation, 428.\n\n  PRODICUS, 39;\n    \u2018choice of Hercules,\u2019 299.\n\n  _producta_, 290.\n\n  Professions, 313, 369.\n\n  _proficiens_, see \u2018Probationer,\u2019 \u2018Progress.\u2019\n\n  Progress (_progressio_), 102, 294, 325 sqq.;\n    in St Paul, 424.\n\n  _proloquium_, _pronuntiatum_, 146 n. 111.\n\n  Prometheus, 112.\n\n  _promota_, 290.\n\n  Property justified, 307.\n\n  _proportio_, 134.\n\n  Proposition, 146.\n\n  _proprietas_, 149.\n\n  Proserpina, 231.\n\n  Proverbs, 361.\n\n  Providence, taught by Socrates, 44;\n    by Panaetius, 103;\n    by the Stoics, 203 sqq.;\n    particular providence, 205;\n    the human body its masterpiece, 44, 259;\n    belief of M. Aurelius, 123.\n\n  _prudentia_, 306 sqq.\n\n  PTOLEMY II (Philadelphus), 16.\n\n  PTOLEMY III (Euergetes), 80, 83.\n\n  PTOLEMY IV (Philopator), 143.\n\n  Punishment, 336.\n\n  Purgatory, 67, 265 sqq.\n\n  PYTHAGORAS, 33;\n    belief in the \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, 170;\n    on self-examination, 236.\n\n  Pythagoreans, on the monad, 104;\n    heliocentric theory, 178;\n    the \u2018great year,\u2019 193.\n\n\n  Quality (_qualitas_), 59, 164 to 166;\n    in Aristotle, 59;\n    of the elements, 173;\n    is body, 166.\n\n  Quantity, 59.\n\n  Quiddity (_quid_), 171.\n\n  _quinta essentia_, 60.\n\n  QUINTILIAN, on Seneca, 114;\n    on Stoic oratory, 149 n. 132.\n\n  _quod est_, 170.\n\n\n  Rabbis, 410.\n\n  _rabiosus_, 335.\n\n  Race-suicide, 375.\n\n  Rarefaction, 33, 158, 167 sqq.\n\n  _ratio_, 135;\n    _r. probabilis_, 63 n. 17;\n    _r. vera_, 71, 273;\n    _ratio atque oratio_, 37, 187, 275;\n    _collatio rationis_, 135;\n    _r. ignava_, 200;\n    _r. universa_, 224.\n    See also \u2018Logos\u2019 and \u2018Wisdom.\u2019\n\n  Readiness, 324.\n\n  Realism of Plato, 57.\n\n  \u2018Reaper,\u2019 148.\n\n  Reason, see \u2018Logos,\u2019 \u2018ratio,\u2019 \u2018Wisdom\u2019.\n\n  Reasonable departure, 309.\n\n  Reasonableness, 63, 81, 143;\n    admitted by Chrysippus, 93, 303;\n    advocated by Diogenes, 96, 303;\n    by Panaetius, 103;\n    in ethics, 283, 325.\n\n  _recte factum_, 294.\n\n  REICHEL, O. J., 20 n. 54.\n\n  REID, J. S., 63 n. 15, 104 n. 34, 108 n. 62, 109 n. 68, 110 n. 72,\n      137 n. 63, 178 n. 26.\n\n  _reiecta_, 290.\n\n  Relation, 59.\n\n  Relationship, duties of, 106, 169, 307;\n    in the Paulists, 424.\n\n  Relative position, 168.\n\n  Relaxation, 285, 361.\n\n  Religion, 216 sqq.;\n    in St Paul, 419.\n    See also \u2018God,\u2019 \u2018Prayer,\u2019 \u2018Hymns.\u2019\n\n  _remota_, 290.\n\n  RENAN, E., 402, 403 n. 123, 406 nn. 129 and 131.\n\n  RENDALL, G. H., 17 n. 51, 20 n. 54, 87 n. 61, 123 to 127, 170 n. 85,\n      288 n. 107, 405.\n\n  _renovatio_, 193.\n\n  Republic of Plato, 58, 66, 274;\n    of Zeno, 66, 274 sqq.;\n    of Jesus, 411.\n\n  _repulsa_, 338.\n\n  Reputation, 320.\n\n  _res familiaris_, 321, 369.\n\n  _res quodammodo se habens_, 167.\n\n  Resignation, 120, 126, 343.\n\n  Restlessness, 339, 353.\n\n  Resurrection, Pauline view, 416, 420 sqq., 430.\n\n  Rewards, future, 263.\n\n  Rhea, 231.\n\n  Rhetoric, 129, 148, 150.\n\n  Rhodes, 99.\n\n  RHYS DAVIDS, T. W., 295 n. 159.\n\n  Rigveda, 232, 427.\n\n  Roman law, 281, 384, 402.\n\n  Romulus, 233.\n\n  RUBELLIUS PLAUTUS, 117, 399.\n\n  Ruffling, 332, 351;\n    shown by tears, 391 n. 71.\n\n  RUSTICUS, Q. IUNIUS, 121 sqq.\n\n  RUTILIUS, P. RUFUS, 297, 384, 386.\n\n\n  SAAL, N., 83 n. 42.\n\n  SACHAU, Dr, 9 n. 25.\n\n  _sacramentum_, 364.\n\n  Sacrifices, condemned by Zeno, 66;\n    by Seneca, 234;\n    by Jesus, 411;\n    by the Paulists, 419.\n\n  Sanctity, 324.\n\n  SANDYS, J. E., 98 n. 133, 145 nn. 101 and 103.\n\n  _sapientia_, 306.\n\n  SCAEVOLA the augur, 383.\n\n  SCAEVOLA the pontifex, 383 sqq.\n\n  SCHMEKEL, A., 100 n. 5, 101 n. 17, 102 n. 24, 103 nn. 25, 27 and 29,\n      104 nn. 32 and 33, 105 n. 39, 107 n. 55, 142 n. 86, 179 n. 33,\n      182 nn. 53 and 54, 185 n. 76, 192 n. 123, 193 n. 129, 195 nn. 136\n      and 137, 245 n. 38, 258 n. 103, 267 nn. 152 and 156, 280 n. 50,\n      298 n. 179, 342 n. 74, 383 n. 18.\n\n  SCHMIDT, R., 145 n. 103.\n\n  Science (_scientia_), 68, 140, 306.\n\n  SCIPIO, 20, 101, 280, 297, 381.\n\n  SCOTT, Sir W., 6.\n\n  SCYLAX, 101 n. 18.\n\n  _secta_, 99 n. 2.\n\n  Seed-powers, 161, 195, 251, 254;\n    in St Paul, 421.\n\n  SELEUCUS (of the Tigris), 96.\n\n  SELEUCUS (the astronomer), 179.\n\n  Self-examination, 236, 360.\n\n  _semen_, 161.\n\n  SENECA, 113 sqq.;\n    on wealth, 115, 322 sqq.;\n    on \u2018tone,\u2019 115;\n    on general assent, 143;\n    on the causes, 162 sqq.;\n    admiration of the heavens, 176;\n    on the heliocentric theory, 178 n. 28;\n    condemns sacrifice, 234;\n    on self-examination, 236;\n    on Tartarus, 265;\n    on immortality, 268;\n    on woman, 270;\n    on climate, 271;\n    on usury, 276 n. 23;\n    on obedience to God, 284;\n    calls \u2018advantages\u2019 good, 290;\n    on \u2018sufficiency of virtue,\u2019 293;\n    on the \u2018wise man,\u2019 298;\n    on suicide, 311;\n    on anger, 334;\n    on cruelty, 336;\n    consolations, 342;\n    on drunkenness, 346;\n    to Lucilius, 358;\n    on neatness, 365;\n    married life, 367;\n    exile, 376;\n    part in political life, 113, 394.\n\n  SENECIO, 401.\n\n  Sensation (_sensus_), 130, 249.\n    Sensations are always true, 131.\n\n  Sense, common, 137 n. 59.\n\n  Senses (_sensus_), 130;\n    their weakness, 144.\n\n  Sensibility, 340.\n\n  Sensitiveness, 341.\n\n  _sententiae_, 361.\n\n  SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS, 404.\n\n  Sermon of Benares, 15;\n    on the mount, 24, 429.\n\n  SERVILIA, 399.\n\n  Sexual appetite, 304, 314, 317, 347;\n    revolting to St Paul, 425 sqq.\n\n  Shame, 324.\n\n  Shipwreck, 379.\n\n  Sight, 130, 249.\n\n  Sign (_signum_), 147.\n\n  _silva_, 158.\n\n  Similitude, 134.\n\n  Simple life, 111, 364.\n\n  Sin, 330 sqq.;\n    is ignorance, 331;\n    is sickness, 332;\n    hateful to the Stoics, 354;\n    to St Paul, 418, 423.\n    \u2018Sins are equal,\u2019 354;\n    are curable, 355.\n\n  Sirens, 31.\n\n  SKEAT, W. W., 99 n. 2.\n\n  Slavery, 279, 374, 397 sqq., 403 sqq.;\n    in Euripides, 39.\n\n  Sleep, 132 n. 28, 261.\n\n  Smell, 250.\n\n  SMILEY, C. N., 150 n. 137.\n\n  SMITH, V. A., 16 n. 47.\n\n  Soberness, 58, 294, 312 sqq.;\n    made dominant by Panaetius, 103.\n\n  Social duty, 284.\n\n  Society, 366.\n\n  SOCRATES, 10, 41 sqq., 274, 275, 310.\n\n  Softness, 362.\n\n  Soldier as ideal, 363.\n\n  Solecism, 149.\n\n  Solitude, 366.\n\n  Sophistry as a profession, 369.\n\n  Sophists, 39.\n\n  SOPHOCLES, 39.\n\n  SORANUS, 399.\n\n  SOTION, 113.\n\n  Soul, 168;\n    is divine, 32;\n    in Plato, 57;\n    in Aristotle, 61;\n    is body, 69, 157;\n    in man, 238 sqq.;\n    its parts, 242, 245;\n    consists of hot air, 243;\n    is fed by the body, 260;\n    future absorption, 269;\n    its health, 285;\n    in St Paul, 420.\n\n  Space, 158.\n\n  Speech, 146.\n\n  Spes, 231.\n\n  SPHAERUS, 80, 143, 311.\n\n  Spirit, favourite conception of Cleanthes, 89;\n    its destiny, 125;\n    in sensation, 130;\n    in rarefaction, 158;\n    equivalent to tone, 160;\n    the principle of life, 181;\n    its gradations, 186, 243;\n    in the sense-activities, 245, 250;\n    in St Paul, 415 sqq.;\n    as mother of Jesus, 430.\n\n  Spiritism, 241.\n\n  Spirits, see \u2018Angels.\u2019\n\n  Stars, are divine, 184;\n    as divine spies, 232.\n\n  STASEAS, 64.\n\n  Statements, are true or false, 146, 171;\n    are not bodily, 170.\n\n  STEIGM\u00dcLLER, H., 178 n. 27.\n\n  STEIN, L., 71 n. 64, 88 n. 67, 133 n. 39, 135 n. 52, 161 n. 36,\n      240 n. 2, 243 n. 23, 244 n. 31, 245 n. 35, 258 n. 103,\n      260 n. 118, 261 n. 123, 262 n. 133, 273 n. 1.\n\n  STERTINIUS, 111.\n\n  STILO, L. AELIUS, 385.\n\n  STILPO, 51, 67.\n\n  STOBAEUS, 110, 117.\n\n  Stoicism, 17 sqq.;\n    estimates of its value, 26 sqq.;\n    inclines to the Academy, 94, 106, 152;\n    to Cynism, 121;\n    amongst the poor, 380;\n    its kindly temper, 340 n. 66;\n    established, 404;\n    its collapse, 406.\n\n  _stomachosus_, 335.\n\n  Strain, 160.\n    See also \u2018Tone.\u2019\n\n  Stuff, 157.\n\n  Style, 148;\n    of Laelius, 382;\n    of Rutilius, 384;\n    of Cato, 386;\n    of Brutus, 388.\n\n  Subject (_subiectum_), 157.\n\n  _sublatio animi_, 316.\n\n  Substance, in Aristotle, 59;\n    in Stoicism, 164 sqq.\n\n  _Substratum_, 158, 166.\n\n  Sufficiency of virtue, 49, 105, 291 sqq.;\n    taught by the Cynics, 49;\n    by Hecato, 106;\n    by Posidonius, 105;\n    questioned by Antipater, 97;\n    in St Paul, 425.\n\n  Suicide, 309;\n    its dangers, 310.\n\n  SULPICIUS, S. RUFUS, 342, 385.\n\n  SUMMERS, W. C., 244 n. 31.\n\n  _summum bonum_, 281.\n\n  Sun, 182;\n    his divinity, 90, 184;\n    fed by Ocean, 184;\n    is principate, 184.\n\n  Suspense of judgment, 120, 133, 144.\n\n  Syllogism, in Aristotle, 60;\n    in Zeno, 73;\n    in Chrysippus, 92.\n    Its varieties, 147.\n\n\n  _tabula rasa_, 135 n. 52.\n\n  Tabus, 287, 423, 426.\n\n  TANNERY, P., 178 n. 27.\n\n  Tarsus, 24 n. 65, 91, 110, 414 n. 28.\n\n  Tartarus discredited, 223, 265, 378.\n\n  Taste, 250.\n\n  Teaching profession, 369.\n\n  Temperament, 244.\n\n  Temperance, see \u2018Soberness.\u2019\n\n  _temperatura_, 244.\n\n  Temples, condemned by Zeno, 66, 234, 275;\n    by Jesus, 411.\n\n  Tension, see \u2018Tone.\u2019\n\n  TEUFFEL, W. S., 111 nn. 80 and 82.\n\n  THALES, 33.\n\n  THEOGNIS, 373.\n\n  Theology, its four dogmas, 218.\n\n  THEON, 111.\n\n  THEOPHILUS, 432 n. 150.\n\n  THEOPHRASTUS, 64, 179;\n    on anger, 333 n. 11.\n\n  THRASEA PAETUS, 394, 399.\n\n  TIBERIUS, 6 n. 12, 392.\n\n  Time, 59, 159.\n\n  _titillatio_, 316.\n\n  TOLSTOY, LEO, 153 n. 148.\n\n  Tone (_intentio_), 89, 115, 160, 243, 260, 285;\n    of seeds, 188;\n    in morals, 247.\n\n  Touch, 250;\n    \u2018inward touch,\u2019 139, 242.\n\n  TRAJAN, 404.\n\n  Tranquillity, 247 n. 54, 356.\n\n  _transitio_, 134.\n\n  _translatio_, 134.\n\n  Transmigration, 34.\n\n  Trinity, 432;\n    alleged suggestion by Seneca, 433.\n\n  TUBERO, Q., 337, 382.\n\n  TYLOR, E. B., 241 n. 13.\n\n  Tyrant, 46, 280, 308;\n    may be slain, 336.\n\n\n  \u00dcBERWEG, FR., 37 n. 45, 55 n. 3, 61 n. 11.\n\n  _ultimum bonorum_, 281.\n\n  Ulysses, 31, 296.\n\n  _unitas_, 168, 189, 243;\n    of the universe, 226.\n\n  Universe, 170, 175 sqq.;\n    is rational and divine, 184;\n    destined to perish, 190;\n    two meanings, 191;\n    its equilibrium, 196;\n    its beauty, 204;\n    is possessed of will, 240;\n    in St Paul, 414.\n\n  Uranus, 231 n. 88.\n\n  Usury condemned, 276 n. 23.\n\n\n  VARRO, M. T., 109, 185, 190 n. 107, 195, 388.\n\n  Vegetarianism, 34.\n\n  Venus, 231.\n\n  _verbum_, 145.\n\n  _verecundia_, 313, 324, 326.\n\n  VESPASIAN, 117, 118, 400.\n\n  Vexation, 331.\n\n  Vice, 213, 332, 351, 353 sqq.;\n    in St Paul, 423.\n\n  VIRGIL, debt to Aratus, 80;\n    on fate, 199;\n    on fatherhood of God, 221;\n    on purgatory, 265 sqq.;\n    on Cato, 388;\n    on government of the universe, 390.\n\n  Virgin birth, 231, 430.\n\n  Virtue (_virtus_), is knowledge, 44, 45, 67, 257, 285;\n    can be taught, 44, 285;\n    in Plato, 58;\n    defined by Sphaerus and Herillus, 81;\n    is one, 281;\n    is a body, 158, 168;\n    is the end, 281;\n    is in the aim, 286, 291;\n    is health of soul, 285;\n    is sufficient, 291;\n    permits no addition, 292;\n    is one and many, 293, 305;\n    cannot be lost, 295;\n    its praise, 299;\n    its attraction, 325;\n    how attained, 326 sqq.\n\n  Virtues, the four, in Aristo, 83;\n    in Panaetius, 103;\n    in Stoicism, 294;\n    longer lists, 305 n. 30;\n    in St Paul, 423;\n    are permanent dispositions, 168, 323.\n\n  _vis divina_, 220.\n\n  _visum_, 68, 249.\n\n  _vitium_, see \u2018Vice.\u2019\n\n  Voice, 250.\n\n  Void, 159, 170.\n\n  _voluntas_, (1) \u2018will,\u2019 286;\n    (2) \u2018readiness,\u2019 324.\n\n  VOSS, OTTO, 178 n. 27.\n\n  Vulcan, 231.\n\n\n  Walking, 89, 250.\n\n  War is useful, 207.\n\n  Wealth, 115, 320 sqq.\n\n  WESTCOTT, B. F., 420 n. 77.\n\n  WEYMOUTH, R. F., 410 sqq.\n\n  Will, 68, 246, 256;\n    its freedom, 210 sqq.\n\n  WILLIAMS-JACKSON, A. V., 7 n. 15, 8 n. 18.\n\n  Will-making, 378.\n\n  WINCKLER, H. A., 24 n. 66, 262 n. 133, 269 n. 166, 408 n. 1,\n      409 n. 2, 435 n. 159.\n\n  Wine-drinking, 346.\n\n  Wisdom in Persism, 12;\n    in _Wisdom of Solomon_, 22;\n    in Plato, 58;\n    as cardinal virtue, 58, 294;\n    as daily duty, 306;\n    identified with the Virgin Mary, 430;\n    included in the Trinity, 432.\n\n  Wisdom of Solomon, 21 sqq.\n\n  Wise men, 105, 295 sqq., 325;\n    in Horace, 389;\n    men wise without knowing it, 327.\n\n  Women equal to men, 270;\n    to wear the same clothes, 288, 365;\n    to be in common, 66, 276;\n    to be fled from, 350;\n    need the four virtues, 362;\n    to dress their hair, 365;\n    in life of Cato, 387;\n    in Ovid, 392;\n    in St Paul, 417;\n    the hair _tabu_, 426.\n    See also \u2018Chastity,\u2019 \u2018Love,\u2019 and \u2018Marriage.\u2019\n\n  Word, see \u2018Logos.\u2019\n\n  WORDSWORTH, W., 328 sqq.\n\n  World-order, see \u2018Universe.\u2019\n\n  World-religions, 4 sqq.\n\n  Worship, 233;\n    a proof of deity, 226.\n\n  Worth, 72, 289.\n\n\n  XENOCRATES, 63, 128.\n\n  XENOPHANES, 34.\n\n  XENOPHON, 10, 46, 50.\n\n  XERXES, 339.\n\n\n  Yama and Yam\u012b, 427.\n\n  Youth, 363 sqq.\n\n\n  ZARATHUSTRA, 7 sqq.;\n    followed by Heraclitus, 37.\n\n  ZELLER, E., 26, 55 n. 4, 80 n. 17, 88 n. 66, 96 n. 114, 129 n. 9,\n      135 n. 51, 146 n. 107, 151 n. 141, 164 n. 48, 167 n. 64, 185 n. 78,\n      193 n. 128, 228 n. 70, 256 n. 96, 262 n. 133, 273 n. 1, 288 n. 107.\n\n  ZENO, 17, 64 sqq.;\n    his _Republic_, 66;\n    turns to Stilpo, 67;\n    to Polemo, 69;\n    to Heraclitus, 70;\n    theory of virtue, 72;\n    use of syllogisms, 73;\n    on tone, 160;\n    on the active and the passive, 172;\n    on fate, 200, 202;\n    on the Logos, 219 n. 3;\n    on piety, 227, 234;\n    on the macrocosm, 240;\n    on future punishments, 264 n. 143;\n    on the Cosmopolis, 274 sqq.;\n    declines Athenian citizenship, 275;\n    on marriage, 276;\n    on advantages, 289;\n    on sufficiency of virtue, 292;\n    on progress, 294 n. 152;\n    as wise man, 296;\n    on \u2018wise men,\u2019 298;\n    on daily duties, 302;\n    on wisdom, 306;\n    on pleasure, 315;\n    on drinking, 346;\n    on dressing the hair, 365.\n\n  ZENO (of Sidon: Epicurean), 84.\n\n  ZENO (of Sidon: Stoic), 84.\n\n  ZENO (of Tarsus), 84;\n    questions the conflagration, 96.\n\n  ZENODOTUS, 97.\n\n  Zeus, in Homer, 30;\n    in the Orphic poems, 32;\n    in Aeschylus, 38;\n    in Socrates, 45;\n    in Aratus, 80;\n    in Cleanthes, 85;\n    as Creator, 194;\n    as the one God, 221.\n    See also \u2018Juppiter.\u2019\n\n  ZOROASTER, see \u2018Zarathustra.\u2019\n\n\n\n\nGREEK INDEX.\n\n\n  \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7, 423.\n\n  \u1f01\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, 324.\n\n  \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, 83.\n\n  \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1, 332 n. 5.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f30\u03b4\u03ce\u03c2, 30, 324, 326.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f36\u03c3\u03b1, 30.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 130, 249.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1, 130, 249.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, 130, 157.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, see \u2018Cause.\u2019\n\n  \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd (derivation), 146.\n\n  \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1, 388 n. 55.\n\n  \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 332 n. 5.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 131 n. 19.\n\n  \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 330.\n\n  \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, 133, 425 n. 11.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 327 n. 168.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 183, 260, 264.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, 214.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 324 n. 153.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, 134.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, 308, and see \u2018Courage.\u2019\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, 424 n. 102.\n\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, 133 n. 38.\n\n  \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1, 72, 289;\n    \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, 289 n. 109.\n\n  \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, 146.\n\n  \u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, 145.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, 324 n. 153; cf. 48 n. 80.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1, 289, 323.\n\n  \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, 33, 57.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, 139.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, 315 n. 92.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, 72, 290.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1, 254 n. 86.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 200.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae, see \u2018Virtue\u2019;\n    \u1f00\u03c1. \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, 63, 95.\n\n  \u1f04\u03c1\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, 145.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c1\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, 353.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af, 173.\n\n  \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 345.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, 170.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, see \u2018Sufficiency.\u2019\n\n  \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, 244.\n\n  \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, 214.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae (_alienatio_), 256.\n\n  \u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, 332 n. 5.\n\n\n  \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 286, 324.\n\n\n  \u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, 31.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1, 332 n. 5.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2, 57.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 168, 323, 353.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 195.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 148 n. 126.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, 246.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b1\u03af, 117, 121, 358.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, 133.\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, see \u2018Justice.\u2019\n\n  \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b7, 231.\n\n  \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1, 68, 133, 320.\n\n  \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2, 245 n. 34, 305, 423 n. 98.\n\n  \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac, 202 n. 17, 211 n. 81.\n\n\n  \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, 423 n. 98.\n\n  \u1f10\u03b3\u03ce, 125, 246 n. 41.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, 162.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, 200 sqq.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, 47.\n\n  \u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 322, 356.\n\n  \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 95.\n\n  \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, 322.\n\n  \u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, 149.\n\n  \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03c2, 231.\n\n  \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, 134.\n\n  \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 134.\n\n  \u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, 132.\n\n  \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, 135;\n    \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd., 138;\n    \u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd., 138.\n\n  \u1f14\u03bd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 142 n. 85.\n\n  \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f01\u03c6\u03ae, 139, 242.\n\n  \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 309.\n\n  \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, (i) = _unitas_, 167, 178, 189, 243, 257;\n    (ii) = _habitus_, 167, 353.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae, 59.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, 209 n. 68.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9, 43.\n\n  \u1f14\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 316, 345.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae, (i) = \u2018attention,\u2019 133;\n    (ii) = \u2018reasonable effort,\u2019 256 n. 94, 318 n. 109.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 316.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, 57, 333.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, 256, 331, 333.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, 345.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, 68, 140, 306.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae, 133.\n\n  \u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2, 317.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, 61, 327 n. 168.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, 247 n. 54, 286 n. 97.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, 313 n. 85.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 94.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03ac\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, 323, 412.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, 96 n. 118, 325.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, 81, 93 n. 99.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, 231.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, 323.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f54\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, 72 n. 71, 94.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, 94, 285.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, 324 n. 151.\n\n  \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c5\u0390\u03b1, 326 n. 160.\n\n  \u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd, 214.\n\n\n  \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2, see \u2018Juppiter,\u2019 \u2018Zeus.\u2019\n\n\n  \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, 89, 246;\n    \u1f21\u03b3. \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, 246.\n\n  \u1f21\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, 147.\n\n  \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, see \u2018Pleasure.\u2019\n\n  \u1f2d\u03c1\u03b1, see \u2018Juno.\u2019\n\n  \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, 133.\n\n\n  \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2, 220.\n\n  \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 63 n. 15, 146, 277, 282.\n\n  \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03ad\u03c2, 57.\n\n\n  \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1, 57, 59.\n\n  \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac, 167, 177.\n\n  \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, 425 n. 110.\n\n  \u1f30\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, 196.\n\n  \u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03cd\u03c2, see \u2018Forcefulness.\u2019\n\n\n  \u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 61.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, 101, 301 sqq., 424 n. 102;\n    \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8. \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, 326.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac, 332 n. 6.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1, 332;\n    see also \u2018Vice.\u2019\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2, 61.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03ce\u03bd, 130, 131, 273 n. 5.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1, 245 n. 38.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, 133, 249;\n    \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4. \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 133.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ae, 149.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 145.\n\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, 294.\n\n  \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ac, 167.\n\n  \u03ba\u03cc\u03ba\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2, 421 n. 80.\n\n  \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2, 196, 274.\n\n  \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, 170;\n    \u03ba. \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba. \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2, 61, 240.\n\n  \u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, (i) = _mixtura_, 169;\n    \u03ba\u03c1. \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, 169, 189;\n    see also \u2018Penetration,\u2019\n   (ii) = _temperatura_, 244.\n\n  \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, 75, 130, 131, 141.\n\n  \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd, 148, 201.\n\n  \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, 149.\n\n\n  \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, 146, 170;\n    \u03bb. \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c2, 146 n. 112.\n\n  \u03bb\u1fc6\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, 147.\n\n  \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, 57.\n\n  \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, see \u2018Logos\u2019;\n    \u1f00\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 200;\n    \u03bb. \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, 146;\n    \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 138, 224;\n    \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 71, 142, 273;\n    \u03bb. \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2, 146;\n    \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af, see \u2018Seed-powers.\u2019\n\n  \u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7, 331.\n\n\n  \u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 47.\n\n  \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 43, 228 n. 70.\n\n  \u03bc\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 33, 158.\n\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, 308.\n\n  \u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, 56.\n\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, 145.\n\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae, 327.\n\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 134.\n\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, 58.\n\n  \u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 85 n. 58.\n\n  \u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 56.\n\n  \u03bc\u1fd6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, 169.\n\n  \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, 134 nn. 43 and 46.\n\n  \u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c1\u03b1, 30.\n\n  \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2, 104.\n\n\n  \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2, 273, 328, 385.\n\n  \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 353 n. 140.\n\n  \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, 242, 246.\n\n\n  \u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9, 35, 196.\n\n  \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, 170.\n\n  \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, 134.\n\n  \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, 71.\n\n  \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd, 71 n. 70.\n\n  \u1f44\u03bd, 170.\n\n  \u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1, 145.\n\n  \u1f40\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae, see \u2018Anger.\u2019\n\n  \u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, 256, 356.\n\n  \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, 256, 314, 356.\n\n  \u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, 148.\n\n  \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 158, 165;\n    \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3., 165;\n    \u03bf\u1f50. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, 177.\n\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, 61.\n\n  \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, 352, 412;\n    \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7, 332 n. 4.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac, 287.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 193.\n\n  \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd, 170.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1, 150.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 169.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03cd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 207.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 322.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, 193.\n\n  \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 136 n. 55.\n\n  \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2, 415.\n\n  \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, see \u2018Spirit.\u2019\n\n  \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, 164, 166;\n    \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c0., \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0., 167, 177.\n\n  \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, 66.\n\n  \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03af\u03b1, 375.\n\n  \u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, (i) = pain, (ii) = toil, 338 n. 47.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, 149, 312, 348.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 286 n. 102, 326 n. 161.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1, see \u2018Advantages.\u2019\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, 212.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 133, 356.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 212.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae, see \u2018Progress.\u2019\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, 136, 331.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, 203.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, 133.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, 145.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, 164, 168.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae, 353.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, 302.\n\n  \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, 145.\n\n  \u03c0\u03cd\u03ba\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 33, 158.\n\n  \u03c0\u1f7c\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, 164, 167.\n\n\n  \u1fe5\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1, 145.\n\n  \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 148 n. 126.\n\n\n  \u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, 149.\n\n  \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, 146.\n\n  \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, 146.\n\n  \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, 147.\n\n  \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2, 291.\n\n  \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1, 58, 306, 430.\n\n  \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, 147.\n\n  \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2, see \u2018Wise men\u2019;\n    \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ce\u03c2, 328 n. 174.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1, 161, 421 n. 80.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 134.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03bb\u03b7, 71.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, 60, 173, 179;\n    \u03c0\u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4., 60.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 68, 132, 249.\n\n  \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 169.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, see \u2018Syllogism.\u2019\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1, 167.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, 225, 227 n. 67;\n    \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, 239.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, 346.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, 167.\n\n  \u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 250.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, 94.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, 209 n. 68.\n\n  \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, 145.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 415.\n\n  \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 134.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, 147.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, 149.\n\n  \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 260 n. 116.\n\n  \u03c3\u03cd\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, 140.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, (i) = \u2018variation,\u2019 83 n. 39;\n    (ii) see \u2018Relationship.\u2019\n\n  \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1, see \u2018Body\u2019;\n    \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6, 169.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, 51, 147.\n\n  \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, 58, 312 sqq.\n\n\n  \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, 58, 281, 422.\n\n  \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, 140, 305.\n\n  \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac, 171.\n\n  \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, see \u2018Tone\u2019;\n    \u03c4. \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2, 161.\n\n  \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 131 n. 19.\n\n\n  \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, 33, 60, 157, 158, 165, 166;\n    \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7, 158 n. 10;\n    \u1f04\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, 165.\n\n  \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, 132 n. 25, 142 n. 84, 157, 158.\n\n  \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 57.\n\n  \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, 164 to 166.\n\n  \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, 133 n. 34.\n\n  \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, 423 n. 98.\n\n  \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03c2, 81.\n\n\n  \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, 68, 131, 135, 212, 249;\n    \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4. \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 68, 133;\n    \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4. \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, 256 n. 97.\n\n  \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1, 132.\n\n  \u03c6\u03bb\u03cc\u03be, 89.\n\n  \u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2, see \u2018Fear.\u2019\n\n  \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 306.\n\n  \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (i) = _natura_, \u2018growth,\u2019 168, 177, 188, 242, 257;\n    (ii) as a moral standard, 63 n. 15, 275, 315;\n    \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, 72, 290, 310;\n    \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, 81, 302.\n\n  \u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03ae (derivation), 146.\n\n\n  \u03c7\u03ac\u03bf\u03c2, 44, 194.\n\n  \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac, 324.\n\n  \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03af\u03b1, 64.\n\n  \u03c7\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9, 117, 361.\n\n  \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, 369.\n\n\n  \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, 51, 147.\n\n  \u03c8\u1fe6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, 260.\n\n  \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae, see \u2018Soul\u2019;\n    \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 187 n. 91, 242;\n    \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, 246;\n    derived from \u03c8\u1fe6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, 260.\n\nCAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.","title":"Roman Stoicism: being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":193000}