{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_64671/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_64671","id":"gutenberg_64671","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/64671","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Diplomacy","Europe -- Politics and government"],"text":"PREVIOUS WRITINGS OF PAUL S. REINSCH\n\n\n  The Common Law in the Early American Colonies, 1899.\n\n  World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as\n    Influenced by the Oriental Situation, 1900.\n\n  Colonial Government, 1902.\n\n  Colonial Administration, 1905.\n\n  American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, 1907.\n\n  Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 1911.\n\n  International Unions, 1911.\n\n  An American Diplomat in China, 1913\u20131918, 1922.\n\n\n\n\n  SECRET DIPLOMACY\n\n  HOW FAR CAN IT BE ELIMINATED?\n\n  BY\n  PAUL S. REINSCH\n\n  [Illustration]\n\n  NEW YORK\n  HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY\n\n\n\n\n  COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY\n  HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY, INC.\n\n\n  PRINTED IN THE U.\u00a0S.\u00a0A. BY\n  THE QUINN & BODEN COMPANY\n  RAHWAY, N. J.\n\n\n\n\nThe principal conclusions based on the material contained in this\nbook were presented by the Author at a joint meeting of the American\nHistorical Association and the American Political Science Association,\nin his address as President of the latter, on December 28th, 1920.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                     PAGE\n        INTRODUCTION                                    3\n\n  CHAPTER\n     I. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY                   22\n\n    II. OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE                  36\n\n   III. AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA                   45\n\n    IV. NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK               58\n\n     V. TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND MOROCCO          70\n\n    VI. ENTENTE DIPLOMACY                              84\n\n   VII. THE CRISIS OF 1914                            102\n\n  VIII. THE SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR                116\n\n    IX. HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED                129\n\n     X. THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE          136\n\n    XI. PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS                149\n\n   XII. THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY                      166\n\n  XIII. A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM                      181\n\n   XIV. RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE                    194\n\n        CONCLUSION                                    211\n\n        INDEX                                         225\n\n\n\n\nSECRET DIPLOMACY\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIs secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern politics? Is it the\nforce that keeps nations in a state of potential hostility and does\nnot allow a feeling of confidence and of wholehearted co\u00f6peration to\ngrow up? Or is it only a trade device, a clever method of surrounding\nwith an aura of importance the doings of the diplomats, a race of men\nof average wisdom and intelligence who traditionally have valued the\nprestige of dealing with \u201csecret affairs of state\u201d? Or is it something\nless romantic than either of these--merely the survival from a more\nbarbarous age of instincts of secretiveness and chicane acquired at a\ntime when self-defense was the necessity of every hour?\n\nIt is quite patent that the practice of secret diplomacy is\nincompatible with the democratic theory of state. Even in the Liberal\ntheory of state it finds little favor, although that is disposed\nto grant a great deal of discretion to the representatives who are\ngiven the trusteeship of public affairs. Yet the essential idea of\nLiberalism, government by discussion, includes foreign affairs\nwithin its scope fully as much as those of purely domestic concern.\nIn applying to public affairs the experience of private business it\nis often argued that as the directorate of a corporation could not\nbe expected to transact its business in public, even so diplomatic\nconversations are not to be heralded from the house tops. How far\nthis particular analogy between private business and public affairs\nwill hold, is a point we shall have to examine later. At first sight\nthe planning of private enterprises and the consideration of benefits\nand losses, can hardly furnish completely satisfactory rules for the\nconduct of public affairs, particularly those involving the life and\ndeath of the persons concerned. Stockholders would be reluctant to\nallow such matters to be determined by a board of trustees in secret\nconclave.\n\nDivesting ourselves of all prejudices, even of righteous indignation\nagainst plainly unconscionable practices, we shall try to examine and\nanalyze the action of great diplomats and to see to what extent really\nimportant results achieved by them have depended upon the use of secret\nmethods. In the 18th Century, diplomacy was still looked upon as a\nsharp game in which wits were matched, with a complete license as to\nthe means pursued; provided, however, that embarrassing discovery\nmust be avoided, in other words, that the exact method of deception\nmust be so closely guarded that only the results will show. The great\ndiplomats of the beginning of the 19th century--Metternich, Talleyrand,\nPozzo di Borgo--while they talked much about humanitarian principles,\ncontinued to play a barren game of intrigue. Napoleon III, that master\nof devious statecraft, will always be cited by excoriators of secret\ndiplomacy as an abhorrent example--a man undone by the results of his\nown plotting. Bismarck indeed prided himself on looking down upon\npetty secret man\u0153uvering and cast a certain amount of contempt on the\nwhole diplomatic business; he often disconcerted his opponents by an\nunaccustomed frankness. Yet the orientation of his statesmanship was\nbased upon the idea of helping history to find a short-cut to her aims\nthrough masterful plotting. He took the reins out of the hands of\nProvidence.\n\nBut let us return to our first question: \u201cIs secret diplomacy the\nevil spirit of modern politics?\u201d It is indeed worth inquiring how far\nour secretive methods in foreign affairs are to blame for the pitiful\ncondition in which the world finds itself to-day. No doubt there is a\ngeneral belief that secret diplomacy and ever-increasing armaments\nled Europe into the terrible destruction of the Great War and that the\ncontinuance of such methods is chiefly to blame for the deplorable\ncondition since the Armistice. There may be deeper causes, but these\nevidences are so obtrusive that they naturally attract most attention\nand are given most blame for the evils we endure. It is plain that\nsecret diplomacy is a potent cause for continued distrust, fear and\nhate. There are few statesmen that would not shrink from deliberately\nplanning and staging a war. Yet they nearly all participate in methods\nof handling public business from which it is hardly possible that\nanything but suspicion, fear and hatred should arise. Distrust is\nplanted everywhere. There is no assurance of what is the truth; true\nreports are questioned; false reports, believed. All motives are under\nsuspicion. The public conscience and will are beclouded; nothing stands\nout as reliable but stark military force.\n\nIt would seem that we have learned very little from the war. The same\ndangerous and unhealthy methods continue to be used with inveterate\nzeal. The result is that suspicion has now grown up among those who\nfought side by side and who shed their blood together. Realizing the\nfundamental importance of basing international life on sound opinion\nand fair dealing, the framers of the League of Nations tried to secure\nthe publicity of all international agreements. Yet this moderate\nprovision of the covenant has not been obeyed by some of the strongest\ncontracting powers. Some outsiders, indeed, such as Russia, have quite\nwillingly published their treaties and furnished them to the bureau of\nthe league.\n\nThat the first act of peace-making was to shut the door of the\ncouncil chamber in the face of the multitudes who had offered their\nlives and shed their blood for the rights of humanity was a tragic\nmistake. In the defense of secret procedure, published on January 17,\n1919, it was said \u201cTo discuss differences in the press would inflame\npublic opinion and render impossible a compromise.\u201d So all connection\nbetween the great public that was paying the price of the game and the\nbenevolent elder statesmen who thought they would shoulder the burden\nof responsibility alone, was cut off. The men in the council chamber\nwere not strengthened in this great crisis by a feeling of intimate\ntouch with a strong and enlightened public opinion. The public itself\nwas disillusioned; suspicion and contempt were the natural result. The\nbald statements given to the press concerning the negotiations did not\nsatisfy any one. Most of what was going on became known to outsiders.\nBut its authenticity was so uncertain and it was so commingled with\nmere rumor that the public soon gave up in despair. It will be\nimportant to inquire as to what is the proper perspective between\nconfidential deliberation and publicity of results, in conferences,\nwhich are becoming the usual agency for discussing and settling\ninternational affairs.\n\nWhen secrecy is confined merely to the methods of carrying on\nnegotiations, its importance for good and evil is certainly not so\ngreat as when the secrecy of methods includes concealment of aims and\nof the agreements arrived at. We could imagine that even a statesman\nwho seeks the closest relationship with public opinion, even a\nLincoln, could not at all times eliminate all use of confidential\ncommunications. But the temper of the whole system of foreign affairs\nis a different matter; and any broad effort to conceal the tendency of\naction or its results is certainly productive of evil, no matter how\nsalutary or beneficial it may seem to the men employing it at the time.\n\nBut, it is said, we must trust to experts. International relations are\nso intricate and have so many delicate shadings that they elude the\ngrasp of the ordinary man, and can be held together and seen in their\nproper relations only by the comprehensive and experienced mind of the\nseasoned statesman. There is, however, a distinction which ought to be\nnoted. The public relies in most cases unreservedly upon expertship in\nmatters of engineering, science, accounting, business management, and\neven in medicine, though in the latter with a feeling of less complete\nsecurity. In all these cases we know that the processes applied and\nthe methods pursued are demonstrable, and mathematically certain to\nproduce the results anticipated. But in the affairs of international\npolitics into which the human equation and other inexactly calculable\nfactors enter, there is no such mathematical certainty which can be\ntested and ascertained by any group of experts. It is all a matter of\nwisdom in choosing alternatives, and we may well doubt whether any man\nor small group of men, under modern conditions of life and public state\naction, can be wiser in such matters by themselves than they would be\nif they constantly kept in direct touch with public opinion. Society,\nwhen properly organized, will have at its disposal on every question\nof importance, groups of men who have expert knowledge. Expertship\nin foreign affairs is not confined to the foreign offices or the\nchanceries; many thoughtful men observing and thinking intensely,\ntraveling widely, seeing foreign affairs from an independent angle,\nhave opinions and judgments to contribute that the officials cannot\nsafely ignore. In an inquiry of this kind we shall have to consider\nthe broader setting of diplomacy as a part of public life within the\nnation and throughout the world. The element of secrecy is appropriate\nonly when we consider diplomacy as a clever game played by a small\ninner privileged circle; it appears out of place in a society organized\non a broader basis. As a matter of fact the defense of secrecy, from\nthe point of view of the inner politics of the state, resolves itself\nalmost entirely into an opinion that the ignorance and inexperience of\nthe people does not fit them to judge of foreign relations. That, it\nmust be confessed, does not seem to be a very sound or convincing basis\nfor the choice of methods of public action in a modern state.\n\nBut the real strength of the argument for secrecy comes when the\nexternal aspects of state action are considered. Then there is, on the\nsurface at least, an apparent justification for secretiveness, in the\ninterest of a closely knit society engaged in competitive struggle with\nsimilar societies and obliged to defend itself and to safeguard its\ninterest by all available means.\n\nRegarded in its broader aspects there are two conceptions of diplomacy\nwhich are quite antagonistic and which have divided thinkers since\nthe time of Machiavelli and Grotius. These two great minds may indeed\nbe considered as typifying the two tendencies and expressing them in\nthemselves and through the sentiments which their thought and writings\nhave engendered in their successors.\n\nWe have the conception of diplomacy as working out a complex system\nof state action, balancing and counterbalancing forces and material\nresources and giving direction to the innermost purposes of the state.\nIt is probable that all professional diplomats are more or less\nenchanted by this ideal. Up to the great war, Bismarck was generally\nconsidered the ablest master of diplomacy, and his action seemed to\nsupply short-cuts for historical forces to work out their natural aims.\nNationalism was the word of the day and the creation of the German\nnational state, foreordained as it seemed by the laws of history, was\naccelerated by the masterful action of the great diplomat. But we are\nnow able to see wherein lay the limitations of this method as applied\nby Bismarck. Notwithstanding his grasp of historic principles of\ndevelopment, he did not, after all, work in unison with broad natural\nforces, but relied on his power to dominate other men through forceful\nmastery, with dynastic associations. He was a superman rather than a\ngreat representative of a people\u2019s aspirations. So while he proclaimed\nthe truthfulness of his diplomacy, it was nevertheless kept essentially\nas his own and his master\u2019s affair and business, rather than the\npeople\u2019s. The base of his policy was narrow. He understood nationalism\nfrom a Prussian point of view. He severed Austria from Germany, and\nthen antagonized France by taking Lorraine; far more important still,\nhe failed to strengthen German relations with Central Europe and thus\nmade it later seem necessary for Germany to go on to the sea and thus\nto arouse the apprehensions and enmity of England. Thus while he\nhimself would probably have in the end avoided confronting the entire\nworld as enemies, the foundations he had laid did not provide a safe\nfooting for the more ordinary men who followed him. His diplomacy, once\nconsidered so great, had contained no adequate and sound foundation\nfor permanent national life. Such have been the results of the most\ndistinguished and successful work of manipulative diplomacy during the\nNineteenth Century.\n\nWhat then shall we say of the justification of wars brought about\nas a part of such a system; under which statesmen consider it quite\nnatural to contemplate \u201cpreventive war\u201d and to assume responsibility\nfor wholesale slaughter because their plan of action seems to reveal\na necessity for it. The idea of conscious planning, or striving to\nsubject national and economic facts and all historic development\nto the conscious political will,--that conception of diplomacy is\nsynonymous with the essence of _politics_ and will stand and fall\nwith the continuance of the purely political state. Manipulative, and\nhence secret, diplomacy is in fact the most complete expression of\nthe purely political factor in human affairs. To many, it will seem\nonly a survival of a hyper-political era, as human society now tends\nto outgrow and transcend politics for more comprehensive, pervasive\nand essential principles of action. We need not here rehearse the\nfundamental character of _politics_ as a struggle for recognized\nauthority to determine the action of individuals, with the use of\nexternal compulsion. Politics is a part of the idea of the national\nstate seen from the point of view of a struggle for existence among\ndifferent political organizations, in which one class originally\nsuperimposed its authority upon a subject population and in which,\nafter authority is firmly established within, political power is\nthen used to gain advantages from, or over, outside societies. It is\nMachiavelli as opposed to Grotius who gives us the philosophy of this\nstruggle. The narrowness of this basis for human action and the direful\neffect of conscious and forceful interference with social and economic\nlaws, is now beginning to be recognized.\n\nBut there is also a broader conception of diplomacy which is\ninfluencing the minds of men although it is not yet fully embodied\nin our daily practice. This conception looks upon humanity, not as a\nmosaic of little mutually exclusive areas, but as a complex body of\ninterlocking interests and cultural groups. As this conception gains\nin strength, the center of effort in diplomacy will not be to conceal\nseparatist aims and special plots, but to bring out into the clear\nlight of day the common interests of men. The common work for them to\ndo in making the world habitable, in dignifying the life of men and\nprotecting them against mutual terror and massacre,--that ideal of\nco\u00f6peration and forbearance, is as yet only partially embodied in our\ninternational practices, although it arouses the fervid hopes of men\nthroughout the world. Whether a system of local autonomy combined with\nfull co\u00f6peration and free interchange of influences can be brought\nabout without the exercise of an overpowering influence on the part\nof a group of allied nations, is still doubtful. But if it should be\nachieved, then plainly the old special functions of diplomacy will fall\naway and administrative conferences will take the place of diplomatic\nconversations. When Portugal became a republic, the proposal was made\nto abolish all diplomatic posts and have the international business of\nPortugal administered by consuls. That would eliminate politics from\nforeign relations.\n\nDiplomacy in the spirit of Grotius has always had its votaries even\nin periods of the darkest intrigue, but there has only recently come\ninto general use a method of transacting international business which\nfavors open and full discussion of diplomatic affairs. Such business\nwill be dealt with less and less in separate negotiation between two\npowers; there will generally be more nations involved, and conferences\nand standing committees or commissions will be at work, rather than\nisolated diplomats. Indeed, international conferences are still largely\ninfluenced by the old spirit of secretive diplomacy. Yet the practice\nof meeting together in larger groups is itself inimical to the strict\nmaintenance of the older methods and we may expect a natural growth of\nmore simple and direct dealings. It will be interesting to watch the\nuse of the older methods of diplomacy under these new conditions and to\nsee how far and how fast they will have to be modified in order to bear\nout the underlying principle in human development to which action by\nconference responds.\n\nThe Washington Conference of 1921 afforded the first notable occasion\nfor bringing into use open methods in diplomatic discussion. Secretary\nHughes in his introductory speech struck a keynote hitherto not\nheard in negotiations on international matters. A new era seemed to\nhave dawned in which great issues and all-important interests could\nbe discussed openly and decided on their merits. A great wave of\nenthusiasm passed over the public. But it cannot be said that the\ntemper of this auspicious opening was sustained throughout. As the\nconference descended from general declarations to important questions\nof detail there was an unmistakable reversion to old methods, which\nobstructed the straightforward aims of Secretary Hughes. Even the\ngenerous initial proposal of the American government was made by\none of the powers a trading subject. The result was that some of the\nattendant evils of secret diplomacy invaded even this conference,\nand that the public soon became somewhat confused as to its object\nand purposes, through an abundance of guesses which put a premium\non the sensational imagination. It must be said that the temper of\nthe press, encouraged by the manner in which the Conference had been\ninaugurated, was one of restraint and responsibility. Viewing the\nquestions which were before this Conference, there can be no doubt that\nthe very problems about which there was hesitation and exaggerated\nsecretiveness, were exactly those which could have been best judged of\nby the well-informed public opinion. One could not avoid the conclusion\nthat the fear of publicity is in all cases inspired by motives which\ncannot stand the test of a world-wide public opinion.\n\nAt the present day, as yet, the fatal circle has not been broken:\nsecret diplomacy, suspicion, armaments, war. We had thought that we\nshould escape from it quite easily, after the terrible sacrifices laid\non mankind and the light which had been flashed on us in that darkness.\nBut the passions which had been stirred up and the fear and terror\nwhich had been aroused in that dire experience may for some time yet\nserve to strengthen the reactionary forces in human affairs, and retard\nthose which tend to liberate humanity from terror and suffering. But it\nis lack of leadership toward better things, that is most to blame.\n\nTo America, to the government and the people, the elimination of\nsecret dealings in international affairs is nothing short of a primary\ninterest. The entire character of our foreign policy is inspired with,\nand based upon, the belief in open dealings and fair play. We have a\nbroad continental position which makes secret plotting and devious\ntransactions unnatural, inappropriate and unnecessary. Our national\nexperience of one hundred and fifty years has expressed itself quite\nspontaneously in proposals for the peaceful settlement of international\ndisputes by discussion, for the improvement of international relations\nthrough conferences, and in the great policies of the Open Door, which\nmeans commercial fair play, and the Monroe Doctrine, which means\npolitical fair play to the American sister republics. A policy such as\nthis has nothing to seek with secret methods and concealed aims.\n\nTo tolerate secrecy in international affairs would mean to acquiesce\nin a great national danger. For good or ill we can no longer conceive\nourselves as isolated. Our every-day happiness and permanent welfare\nare directly affected by what other nations do and plan. Continued\nsecrecy would mean that we should feel ourselves surrounded by\nunknown dangers. We should have to live in an atmosphere of dread and\nsuspicion. We could find peace of mind only in the security of vast\narmaments. In international affairs we would be walking by the edge\nof precipices and over volcanoes; our best intentioned proposals for\nthe betterment of human affairs would be secretly burked, as in the\ncase of Secretary Knox\u2019 plan of railway neutralization in Manchuria.\nOur rights would be secretly invaded and our security threatened, as\nat the time when England and France agreed with Japan that she should\nhave the North Pacific islands, behind our backs, though our vital\ninterests were involved. In all such matters secrecy will work to the\ndisadvantage of that power which has the most straightforward aims\nand policies. America cannot willingly submit to such a condition. It\nis unthinkable that with our traditions of public life and with our\nConstitutional arrangements, we should ourselves play the old game of\nsecret intrigue; it is for us to see, and to the best of our power and\nability to assure, that it will not be played in the future by others.\n\nNations will respond to the call for absolutely open dealings in\ninternational affairs, with a varying degree of readiness and\nenthusiasm. We are perhaps justified in saying that wherever the people\ncan make their desires felt they will be unanimously for a policy of\nopenness. The English tradition of public life would also be favorable\nto such a principle of action, were it not that such special imperial\ninterests as the British raj in India frequently inspires British\ndiplomacy with narrower motives and with a readiness to depart from\nopen dealings from a conviction that imperial interests so require.\nThe Russian Soviet government in giving to the public a full knowledge\nof international affairs, was at first inspired primarily by a desire\nto discredit the old r\u00e9gime. But it is also undoubtedly true that the\nhold which this government has on the party which supports it, is in\na measure due to the fact that all foreign policies and relationships\nare freely reported to, and discussed in, the party meetings and the\nsoviets. No matter what the aims of this government may be, it cannot\nbe denied that it has strengthened itself by the openness of its\nforeign policy. The Chinese people have manifested a deep faith in\npublic opinion and their chief desire in international affairs is that\nthere shall be open, straightforward dealings so that all the world may\nknow and judge. Through all their difficulties of the last decade they\nhave been sustained by this faith in the strength of a good cause in\nthe forum of world-wide public opinion.\n\nThe peoples of the Continent of Europe undoubtedly would welcome a\nreign of openness and truth, for they have suffered most from secret\ndealings in diplomacy. But those who govern them find it difficult to\nextricate themselves from the tangle of intrigue. As President Wilson\nexpressed it:\n\n  \u201cEuropean diplomacy works always in the dense thicket of ancient\n  feuds, rooted, entangled and entwined. It is difficult to see the\n  path; it is not always possible to see the light of day. I did\n  not realize it all until the peace conference; I did not realize\n  how deep the roots are.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nEIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY\n\n\nDuring the eighteenth century, diplomatic action was dominated entirely\nby the tactics and stratagems of war. Diplomacy was a continuous\nstruggle for political advantage and power, seeking to accomplish the\npurposes of war through keen intriguing; it was war pursued in the\ncouncil chamber. The temper of diplomacy was not that of a commercial\ntransaction, or of co\u00f6peration in the works of peace and betterment;\nbut it was intent upon selfish advantage--power, prestige, preferment,\nand all the outward evidences of political success. It did not have\nthe conscience of peaceful enterprise and co\u00f6peration, but on the\ncontrary emulated the keen, restless, alert, and all-suspecting spirit\nof the military commander in action. All the ruses, deceptions,\nsubterfuges, briberies and strategies which the struggle for existence\nin war appears to render justifiable, diplomacy made use of. It was\nessentially a political secret service informed with the spirit of\nlife-and-death competition. As, among individuals in that society, all\naction was dominated by the constantly overhanging hazard of private\nduel, bringing into life something of the keenness and cruelty of the\ntempered blade; so among nations warlike rivalry inspired all political\naction. War was either going on or impending and being prepared for;\nhumanity was living true to the old adage: \u201cMan a wolf to man.\u201d\n\nDiplomacy was personal in that the ambassador was held to be an _alter\nego_ of the monarch. It was surrounded with the glamor of high state\nand important enterprise, and inspired with a great pride of office.\nThe fact that he represented absolute power in its contact with the\nabsolute power of others, gave the diplomat a sense of high importance.\nThe monarchs, themselves, were generally governed by personal motives\nand considerations. They looked upon politics as a keen game for\npersonal or family power in which populations of subjects, territory,\nand war indemnities were the stakes, and human lives the pawns; the\nhighest happiness and good fortune of the subject was supposed to be\nthe right to die for his king. The diplomatic representatives quite\nnaturally fell into the same way of regarding affairs of state from the\nviewpoint of political power to be gained, maintained and constantly\nincreased. It was a rather narrow game as seen by the rank and file of\nthe diplomatic world; only a few far-seeing and statesmanlike minds\ncould at that time appreciate the broad underlying human foundation of\nall political action.\n\nSuch broader insight would often have been a real obstacle to the\nsuccess of the keen and clever player of the game. The mastery of\nunderlying principles which made Grotius famous for all ages did not\ncontribute to his success as a diplomat. The wheel of fortune turned\nfast, and fleeting advantage had to be caught by quick, clever though\noften superficial, machinations. Even as late as 1830, John Quincy\nAdams observed that deep insight and unusual ability was something of a\nhindrance to a diplomat. Yet the keen edge of the successful diplomats\nof the powdered wig period is in itself one of the noteworthy qualities\nof that sociable though unsocial age.\n\nThroughout this period Machiavelli\u2019s _Prince_ may be taken as the\nfitting commentary on political action. The men of this age had not\nyet grown up to the realization which Machiavelli already had of the\nnature and importance of the national principle; but Machiavelli\u2019s\nthought concerning the means by which, in a period of unrest and sharp\nrivalry, political power may be established, built up and preserved,\nwith total disregard of every feeling and ideal and the single-minded\npursuit of political success,--that thoroughly explains the spring of\naction of this period.\n\nIn reading the memoirs and letters of this time, one will encounter\na great many protestations of conventional morality, as well as an\nunderstanding of human nature and a comprehensive grasp of the details\nof international rivalry. But far-seeing ideals of wisdom, moderation,\nand justice, and of human co\u00f6peration will not frequently be met with;\nthere is no searching vision of realities. Nor will one gain from these\nmemoirs very specific information about the actual methods of doing\ndiplomatic business. These methods, even the particularly unscrupulous\nones, were probably considered almost as natural processes, to be\npassed by without mention. But incidentally, one may receive hints,\neven in the correspondence of the most correct and guarded diplomat,\nsufficient to reconstitute their current manner of thought and action.\n\nWe encounter there all the artifices of a secret service versed\nin the stratagems and tricks through which information can be\nobtained,--the stealing of documents, bribery of public officials,\ngeneral misrepresentation and deceit. Matters are often so inextricably\ncomplicated that it must have required the greatest effort to remember\nwhat each participant in that particular intrigue knew or was supposed\nnot to know, what he could be told and what must be kept from him.\nThese are still the more venial methods; but when the welfare of the\nstate required, it might even be necessary, as in the case of war, to\ndispose of inconvenient and obstructive individuals by wrecking their\nreputation or even by putting them out of the way altogether.\n\nEven the learned and dignified authorities on international law\ncould not entirely ignore the methods employed in actual diplomatic\nintercourse. Grotius held that \u201camphibologies\u201d--a term apparently\ncoined by him to designate statements, which could be understood in\nseveral ways--were admissible, except in certain cases where there\nexisted a duty to unmask, as in matters involving the \u201chonor of God,\u201d\nor charity towards a neighbor, or the making of contracts, or others\nof like nature. His successor, Vattel, draws a distinction between\na downright lie, \u201cwords of him who speaks contrary to his thoughts\non an occasion when he is under obligation to speak the truth\u201d; and\na \u201cfalsiloquy,\u201d which he considers venial, and which is \u201can untrue\ndiscourse to persons who have no right to insist on knowing the truth\nin a particular case.\u201d This distinction gives a rather ample latitude\nto the discretion of a diplomat in the matter of truthfulness.\nAccording to the good and learned Vattel, the duty of any one to\ntell the truth was binding only towards another who had the right to\ndemand that the truth be spoken. In his day, very few people indeed\ncould claim the right of demanding an insight into diplomatic affairs,\nso that his rule did not put the diplomat under a very severe moral\nconstraint. Even to the present day there have been known individual\nenvoys whose utterances plainly are made in the spirit of Vattel\u2019s\ndistinction.\n\nCalli\u00e8res, who wrote on the Practice of Diplomacy, in the year 1716, is\nfull of admiration of all that a shrewd, clever diplomat may accomplish\nin stirring up trouble and confounding things generally in the state\nto which he is accredited. To the question, \u201cWhat can be achieved by a\nnegotiator?\u201d Calli\u00e8res answers, \u201cWe see daily around us its definite\neffects--sudden revolutions favorable to a great design of state, use\nof sedition and fermenting hatreds, causing jealous rivals to arm, so\nthat the third party may rejoice (_ut tertius gaudeat_), dissolution\nby crafty means of the closest unions. A single word or act may do more\nthan the invasion of whole armies, because the crafty negotiator will\nknow how to set in motion various forces native to the country in which\nhe is negotiating and thus may spare his master the vast expense of a\ncampaign.... It frequently happens that well chosen spies contribute\nmore than any other agency to the success of great plans. They are not\nto be neglected. An ambassador is an honorable spy because it is his\nfunction to discover great secrets. He should have a liberal hand.\u201d\nThat admiration of successful deceit and mental cleverness in obtaining\nresults that could only be gained by force through great sacrifice of\nlife, inspired also the Italian admiration for clever deceit, such\nas shown by Machiavelli in his eulogy of Pope Alexander VI for his\nunrivaled eminence in prevarication.\n\nIt is remarkable that the famous witticism of Sir Henry Wotton that \u201can\nambassador is a person sent abroad to lie for the good of his country,\u201d\ndid not occur to some one much earlier; but though the _bon mot_ had\nnot been coined, the idea itself was quite familiar. Louis XI quite\nbluntly instructed his embassies, \u201cIf they lie to you, lie still more\nto them.\u201d But through all this period the virtue of sincerity and\nof truthfulness also had their admirers: Calli\u00e8res, speaking of the\nsuccessful diplomat, says, \u201cDeceit is but the measure of smallness of\nmind and intelligence. A diplomat should have a reputation for plain\nand fair dealing and should observe the promises he has made.\u201d It\nmay, however, be suspected that the good writer here contemplates the\ndangers of unsuccessful deceit and of too transparent ruses, rather\nthan the positive value of truth itself.\n\nJames Harris, Lord Malmesbury, who was certainly conversant with all\nthe ins and outs of eighteenth century diplomacy, wrote in a letter\nof advice (April 11, 1813) addressed to Lord Camden: \u201cIt is scarce\nnecessary to say that no occasion, no provocation, no anxiety to rebut\nan unjust accusation, no idea, however tempting, of promoting the\nobject you have in view, can need, much less justify, a falsehood.\nSuccess obtained by one is a precarious and baseless success. Detection\nwould ruin, not only your own reputation for ever, but deeply wound\nthe honor of your Court.\u201d In this sage advice, too, the dominant idea\nseems to be that detection is ruinous. The homage which is thus paid to\nthe ideal of truth and sincerity is compatible with the use of quite\nopposite methods provided they are successful and so cleverly guarded\nthat they are not discovered.\n\nHowever, at all times there must have existed, among the people at\nlarge and even among those playing the game of politics, men who had\na natural inborn desire for truth and a simplicity of nature which\nbrought them closer to the true underlying forces than were the common\nrun of courtiers and politicians. The ever recurring admiration\nexpressed for the diplomacy of Cardinal d\u2019Orsat, the envoy of Henry IV\nto the Pope, indicates a real appreciation, even among the profession,\nof high standards of straightforwardness in diplomatic negotiations.\nCardinal d\u2019Orsat seems to have disdained all shallow devices of\ndeceptive cleverness. He relied upon simple reasonableness and honesty\nin proposing an arrangement mutually beneficial, to win after others\nhad exhausted all possible tricks and stratagems. In discussing\ndiplomacy, Mably says that such methods alone are calculated to secure\npositive and permanent results while the devices of clever deceit can\nonly serve to delay and confuse.\n\nSeveral statesmen have discovered that the telling of the actual\ntruth often exerts a somewhat befuddling effect on diplomats, so that\nthey may easily be misled by telling them real facts which they will\ninterpret in a contrary sense. This method has usually been associated\nwith the name of Bismarck who on one occasion said, \u201cIt makes me\nsmile to see how puzzled all these diplomats are when I tell them the\ntruth pure and simple. They always seem to suspect me of telling them\nfibs.\u201d The discovery had, however, been made by many statesmen before\nBismarck. As early as 1700, de Torcy had arrived at the conclusion that\nthe best way of deceiving foreign courts is to speak the truth. Lord\nStanhope said quite complacently that he could always impose upon the\nforeign diplomats by telling them the naked truth, and that he knew\nthat in such cases they had often reported to their courts the opposite\nto what he had truthfully told them to be the facts. At a later date,\nPalmerston also prided himself on being able to mislead by the open\nand apparently unguarded manner in which he told the truth. It would,\nhowever, manifestly be difficult to use this method successfully more\nthan in spots; it would have to be interspersed from time to time with\na judicious amount of prevarication, in order to throw the other party\noff the scent.\n\n_To appear_ simple and true has always been greatly desired of\ndiplomats. Count Du Luc, French Ambassador to Vienna, said in a\nletter, \u201cMy great desire, if I may be permitted to speak about myself,\nis to appear simple and true. I flatter myself that I possess the\nlatter qualification; but you know my method of man\u0153uvering.\u201d The\nappearance of frankness has indeed been most valuable to diplomats\nin all ages; though one naturally suspects the man who in and out\nof season explicitly declares and protests that virtue. Diplomatic\nfrankness is a part of that elaborate and complicated system of\nself-control and coolness together with a mastery of all the outward\nexpressions of different affections and passions, which notable\ndiplomats have sought to achieve. It would not take an expert to advise\nagainst pomposity. Calli\u00e8res counsels, \u201cBe genial. Avoid the sober,\ncold air. An air of mystery is not useful.\u201d\n\nIn that century in which keenness and cleverness were so intensively\ncultivated with the high pitch of the personal duel transferred to\naffairs of state, the complete self-control of diplomats, their\nquickness and their gift of taking advantage of any favorable turn in\nthe situation, are certainly worthy of admiration, as we reanimate\nin our minds the life portrayed in these old memoirs and letters.\nOccasionally a mishap occurs like that of the British Minister,\nMr. Drake, who boasted to Meh\u00e9e de la Touche of the very careful\nprecautions he had taken to guard his secret correspondence; which\nvainglory resulted quite disastrously to his collection of secrets.\nInstances of delightful cleverness and cool-headedness are frequent.\nCardinal Mazarin, who in his methods and principles was quite the\nopposite to Cardinal d\u2019Orsat and who was particularly free from any\nscruples whatsoever concerning the truth, won his first striking\ndiplomatic success through a ruse. What a quick mind and daring spirit\nhis, when on his first mission to the court of the Duke of Feria, as\na very young man, he attained his object so completely. How otherwise\ncould he have ascertained the true opinion of His Highness on the\nmatter of great importance to the Court of France which Mazarin was\nespecially sent to ascertain, as there were great doubts about it\nand the duke entirely unwilling to express himself? A keen observer,\nMazarin had soon learned that the duke was irascible and unguarded when\nin anger; but few would have followed him in suddenly, out of the clear\nsky, deliberately, so stirring the duke to anger that he, entirely\noff his guard, blurted out things which unmistakably gave a clue to\nhis real opinions on the important matter of state in question. What\na vivid satisfaction the young man must have had, which, however, he\nneeds must carefully conceal to feign grief and despair because he had\nbeen hapless enough to arouse the ill will of His Highness. Mazarin was\nthroughout his life noted for a perfect command of the expressions of\nall the moods, sentiments and passions, used by him at will so that it\nwas impossible for any one to penetrate his mask. The same achievement\nwas attained in a notable manner by the great diplomats of the old\nschool, Talleyrand and Metternich, who held the stage at the beginning\nof the nineteenth century; and it has been emulated in greater or less\nperfection by successive generations of Ministers, Counselors, and\nSecretaries.\n\nWhen Cromwell had allowed himself to be tangled up in double-faced\nnegotiations with the Spanish and the French courts of which the\nlatter had obtained complete knowledge, the French envoy, DeBass, very\ncleverly rebuked him for the inconstancy and disingenuousness of his\naction. The envoy related to Cromwell in complete detail, but as an\n\u201cunauthenticated report,\u201d all the facts of the dubious negotiation, and\nthen asked the Protector kindly to extricate him from this labyrinth.\nCromwell was entirely taken aback and took his departure abruptly\non urgent business, leaving his secretary to make excuses. The star\nperformance of Metternich was when Napoleon, returning from a hunt\nin a fit of heated excitement, in the presence of the other foreign\nrepresentatives, rushed up to him shouting, \u201cWhat the deuce does your\nEmperor expect of me?\u201d Metternich replied with the greatest composure,\n\u201cHe expects his ambassador to be treated with respect.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nOLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE\n\n\nThe correspondence of diplomats of the eighteenth century is full of\ninterest because of the particular intimacy which characterized social\nlife at that time. But we receive from it also direct and invaluable\ninformation on the spirit and methods of diplomacy. The correspondence\nfrom St. Petersburg at the time of Catherine the Great gives a complete\npicture of the less noble features of diplomatic life and action. At\nthat Court, presided over by a woman of great ambition whose every\nmovement and mood the diplomats felt necessary to take into account\nand carefully to calculate, at a time when England and France as well\nas other nations were involved in almost constant hostilities, the\nsharpest characteristics of eighteenth century diplomacy came to the\nsurface. Politics is seen as a game of forfeits and favors in which\nwars were made for personal and dynastic reasons and territories traded\noff in the spirit of the gamester without regard to natural or ethnic\nfacts, or the welfare of the population.\n\nA letter written near the beginning of Catherine\u2019s reign, addressed\nby Sir George Macartney to the Earl of Sandwich, most strikingly\nillustrates the character of the period. The British Minister first\nreports that M. Panin, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had\nsigned a treaty of alliance with Denmark, contemplating war with\nTurkey. By a most secret article, Denmark promises \u201cto disengage\nherself from all French connections, demanding only a limited time to\nendeavor to obtain the arrears due to her by the Court of France. At\nall events, she is immediately to enter into all the views of Russia\nin Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly, with her in that\nkingdom.\u201d The writer then reports that it is the ardent wish of the\nEmpress \u201cto make a common cause with England and Denmark, for the\ntotal annihilation of the French interest there (in Sweden). This\ncertainly cannot be done without a considerable expense; but Russia,\nat present, does not seem unreasonable enough to expect that we should\npay the whole.\u201d The amount necessary absolutely to prevent the French\nfrom ever getting at Stockholm again is suggested. As the Swedes are\nhighly sensitive because of their dependent situation in recent years,\nthe Russian Court desires \u201cthat we and they should act upon separate\nbottoms, still preserving between our respective Ministers a confidence\nwithout reserve. That our first care should be, not to establish a\nfaction under the name of a Russian or of an English faction; but,\nas even the wisest men are imposed upon by a mere name, to endeavor\nto have our friends distinguished as the friends of liberty and\nindependence.\u201d The Minister then reports that an alliance with Russia\nis not to be thought of unless by some secret article England would\nagree to pay a subsidy to Russia in case of a Turkish war (Turkey\nhappened at the time to be in alliance with England). The Minister\nrelates that a similar proposal which was put up to the King of Prussia\nby a Russian official who was his mortal enemy and who hoped greatly to\nembarrass him thereby, was unexpectedly and quite blandly accepted by\nFrederick II. The letter closes with the earnest entreaty on no account\nto mention to M. Gross, the Russian Minister in London, the secret\narticle of the treaty which his own Government had just concluded with\nDenmark.\n\nThe correspondence of James Harris, Lord Malmesbury, is a particularly\nfull and continuous account of court and diplomatic life in the\neighteenth century. In describing his diplomatic struggles in a\nCourt in which everything turned round the whims and ambitions of an\nunscrupulous woman who had come to the throne through putting out of\nthe way its rightful occupant, the vicious practices of the day are\npresented in all their corruption and deceitfulness. Before going\nto Russia, Sir James Harris was Minister at Berlin. He paints the\ncharacter of Frederick the Great in the following words: \u201cThus never\nlosing sight of his object, he lays aside all feelings the moment that\nis concerned; and, although as an individual he often appears, and\nreally is, humane, benevolent, and friendly, yet the instant he acts\nin his Royal capacity, these attributes forsake him, and he carries\nwith him desolation, misery, and persecution, wherever he goes.\u201d A\nGerman scholar of the period, an admirer of the great monarch, used\nthe following language: \u201cThe art, till then unknown in Europe, of\nconcluding alliances without committing one\u2019s self, of remaining\nunfettered while apparently bound, of seceding when the proper\nmoment is arrived, can be learnt from him and only from him.\u201d These\ndescriptions of the political character of Frederick II set forth the\nessential _political_ factor as it was understood at the time and\nas it has been understood by a continuous line of statesmen from\nMachiavelli to the present. As in physical science, every factor has to\nbe disregarded except those essential to the experiment which is being\nconducted, so in the intensive politics of the modern state, in the\nmind of such men, abstraction is made from all sentiment, virtue and\nquality, to the sole pursuit of a closely calculated political effect.\nThe same German scholar credits Frederick the Great with a superior\nstraightforwardness. That quality, however, is manifested by such a man\nmostly on occasions where he is so sure of himself and of his plans\nthat he can challenge the worst attempts of his enemies to upset them\nand can confound them utterly by flinging his plans in their faces, as\ndid Bismarck at a later time. A startling and fearless frankness is one\nof the characteristics of political genius.\n\nBut to return to the correspondence of Lord Malmesbury. All the devices\nand foibles of the profession at that period are there mirrored. When\nhe (still as Sir James Harris) reports the coming of a new French\nMinister to St. Petersburg, he expresses the hope that the new envoy\nwill not be so difficult to deal with as the present charg\u00e9 d\u2019affairs,\n\u201cwho, though he has a very moderate capacity, got access to all the\nvalets de chambre and inferior agents in the Russian houses, who very\noften conjured up evil spirits where I least of all expected them.\u201d A\nlittle later he reports to the British Foreign Minister, Lord Stormont,\nas follows: \u201cIf, on further inquiry, I should find, as I almost\nsuspect, that my friend\u2019s (Prince Potemkin) fidelity has been shaken,\nor his political faith corrupted, in the late conferences, by any\ndirect offers or indirect promises of reward, I shall think myself, in\nsuch a case, not only authorized but obliged to lure him with a similar\nbait.\u201d He reminds His Lordship of the fact that Prince Potemkin is\nimmensely rich and that, therefore, perhaps as much may be required as\nde Torcy offered to the Duke of Marlborough (two million francs).\n\nIn a letter of June 25, 1781, Sir James Harris, writing to the same\nMinister, speaks of having obtained information of the conclusion\nof a secret treaty between Russia and Austria from the confidential\nsecretary of a Russian minister. He adds: \u201cI trust I shall keep him to\nmyself, since I have lost almost all my other informers by being outbid\nfor them by the French and Prussians.\u201d He adds that it is painful to\nhim that the secret service expenses come so very high but he explains\nthat the avid corruption of the court is ever increasing and that\nhis enemies are favored by the fact that they can join in the expense\nagainst him, their courts moreover supplying them most lavishly. He\nadds: \u201cThey are also much more adroit at this dirty business than I am,\nwho cannot help despising the person I corrupt.\u201d\n\nThe Foreign Minister of Russia at this time, and for many years before\nand after, was Count Panin. It was then suspected and is now known\nthat he was firmly bought by Frederick II. But there has been some\ndoubt as to whether he entered upon this corrupt relation behind the\nback of Empress Catherine or at her bidding. It is known that she\noften encouraged her ministers at foreign courts to accept bribes and\napparently to sell themselves to foreign governments, because through\nthe relationship of confidence thus established they might gather\ninformation useful to their own government. This is one of the many\nways in which the game of corruption tended to defeat itself.\n\nAs far as the letters of this period deal with diplomatic policies\nthey are no more reassuring than when they relate the details of\ndiplomatic practice. On August 16, 1782, Sir James Harris made a long\nconfidential report to Lord Grantham. He observes that Count Panin\nis powerfully assisting the King of Prussia, the French Minister is\nartful and intriguing, working through Prince Potemkin and the whole\ntribe of satellites which surrounded the Empress, whom he calls \u201cbarber\napprentices of Paris.\u201d He then unfolds his own policy of winning the\nfavor of the Empress for England by giving her the island of Minorca\nas a present. His idea had been adopted by the British Foreign Office\nand he writes, \u201cNothing could be more perfectly calculated to the\nmeridian of this Court than the judicious instructions I received on\nthis occasion.\u201d He decided,--hand in hand with the proposed cession\nof Minorca,--to designate the Empress as a friendly mediatrix between\nEngland and Holland; he says: \u201cI knew, indeed, she was unequal to the\ntask but I knew too how greatly her vanity would be flattered by this\ndistinction.\u201d Farther on he reports how, gradually, after several\nBritish Ministers had incurred the ill humor of Catherine, Fox and\nthe present Minister of Foreign Affairs have finally found favor and\nsmoothed the road for Sir James. He hopes that all these great efforts\nand sacrifices may result in \u201clighting the strong glow of friendship\nin Her Imperial Majesty in favor of England.\u201d At this distance a slim\nresult of so much effort. The characterization of Catherine with which\nhe closes, few historians would now accept.[A]\n\n    [A] \u201cWith very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon\n        sagacity, she wants judgment, precision of ideas,\n        reflection, and l\u2019esprit de combinaison.\u201d\n\nAmerican diplomats had their first taste of European diplomatic methods\nin 1797, when Pinckney, Gerry and Marshall were sent to France on their\nspecial mission. Every attempt at delay and mystification was practised\non them. After various secret agents had tried the patience of the\nAmericans and had finally come out with the plain demand of Talleyrand\nfor a million francs as the price for peace and good relations, they\nresolutely turned their back on Paris. Meanwhile Pitt was seriously\nconsidering buying peace on similar terms.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nAFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA\n\n\nThe convulsions of the French revolution and the Napoleonic conquests\ndid not seem materially to affect the principles and practices of\ndiplomacy. When the Congress of Vienna met to rearrange the state\nof Europe, it was guided by men who still looked upon diplomacy\nentirely in the manner of the 18th century, when, in the words of\nHorace Walpole, \u201cit was the mode of the times to pay by one favor for\nreceiving another.\u201d The idea of restoring the balance of Europe or\npatching up the rents and cracks in the old system which had been so\nseverely shaken was the purpose which animated these men. They viewed\neverything from the dynastic interests of their respective rulers and\ntraded off lesser kingdoms and slices of territory with the same spirit\nof the gamester that has always characterized the absolutist diplomacy.\n\nOf the three master minds of the Congress of Vienna, Talleyrand,\nMetternich and Pozzo di Borgo, it may indeed be said that they\nillustrated both the qualities and the vices of the old diplomacy in a\nsuperlative degree. The last named has characterized Talleyrand as \u201ca\nman who is unlike any other. He wheedles, he arranges, he intrigues,\nhe governs in a hundred different manners every day. His interest in\nothers is proportioned to the need which he has of them at the moment.\nEven his civilities are luxurious loans which it is necessary to repay\nbefore the end of the day.\u201d Talleyrand, himself, has said: \u201cTwo things\nI forbid--too much zeal and too absolute devotion--they compromise\nboth persons and affairs.\u201d He did not, indeed, betray his great master\nNapoleon, he only quitted him in time.\n\nMetternich, who resembled Talleyrand in the complete self-control of\na passionless diplomat, had a long and brilliant, but essentially\nsterile, career. His correspondence shows a keen and luminous spirit\nwith a great mastery of detail, and capacity for manipulating the human\npawns; but there is no deep insight, no real constructive policy.\nIndeed, he supported Alexander I in his efforts for a Holy Alliance or\nsacred league among nations, but it was conceived in such a form that\nit would not have interfered with the traditional game of diplomacy.\nMetternich indeed often pays his compliments to the ideal, as when he\npraises the league as resting on the same basis as the great Christian\nsociety of man, namely, the precept of the Book of Books, \u201cDo unto\nothers as you would that they should do unto you.\u201d But the details of\nhis policy were governed entirely by the barren principles of balance\nof power and legitimacy, and showed an utter disregard for the natural\nand ethnic facts underlying government. Metternich indeed himself at\ntimes realized the vanity of political intrigue, as when he wrote to\nhis daughter from Paris in 1815, \u201cThis specific weight of the masses\nwill always be the same, while we, poor creatures, who think ourselves\nso important, live only to make a little show by our perpetual motion,\nby our dabbling in the mud or in the shifting sand.\u201d\n\nWhen Alexander himself left the realm of vague ideals and descended to\ndetails, his impulses often took a form somewhat like the proposal made\nto Castlereagh at Vienna, \u201cWe are going to do a beautiful and grand\nthing. We are going to raise up Poland by giving her as king one of my\nbrothers or the husband of my sister.\u201d The British statesman does not\nseem to have been immediately carried away with this generous design.\n\nIt was consistent with the character and temper of the Congress\nof Vienna that there flowed in it innumerable currents and\ncounter-currents of intrigue. In January, 1815, the representatives of\nEngland, France and Austria agreed upon a secret treaty of alliance,\ndirected against Russia and Prussia. When Napoleon returned from Elba\nhe found this document and showed it to the Russian Minister before\ntearing it up.\n\nThe first half of the nineteenth century was dominated by the\nprinciples that had prevailed at Vienna. In the details of diplomatic\nintercourse, indirection, bribery and deceit continue to prevail\nalthough in a less flamboyant fashion than in the eighteenth century.\nAs the principle of nationalism comes more clearly to emerge, the\nsecrecy of diplomatic _methods_ is distinguished from the secrecy of\ndiplomatic _policy_ with increasing condemnation of the latter; a\ngreater sense of responsibility to the nation as a whole begins to show\nitself, and the traditional resources of diplomacy are no longer quite\nadequate.\n\nNevertheless, the diplomatic literature of the age still looks upon\ndiplomacy as essentially a tactical pursuit, conditioned by the\ncontinuous enmity of states. The French writer, Garden, in his _Trait\u00e9\nde diplomatie_, gives the following elucidation: \u201cPut on this plane,\ndiplomacy becomes like a transcendent man\u0153uvering of which the entire\nglobe is the theater, where states are army corps, where the lines of\ncombat change unceasingly, and where one never knows who is a friend,\nand who is an enemy. It is a political labyrinth in the midst of\nwhich ability alone is capable of moving with ease and without being\nsmothered by detail.\u201d\n\nThe memoirs and anecdotal literature of the period afford numerous\ninstances of the persistence of that desire for cleverness in dealing\nwith secrets, which often brings about amusing incidents.\n\nAt the time when Frankfort was the capital of the North German\nConfederation, the Austrian government provided its representative\nthere (Count Rechberg) with duplicate instructions; one to the effect\nthat he must exhaust every energy to maintain the most friendly\nand mutually helpful relations with Prussia; the other of quite\nthe opposite tenor. The former was to be shown to the Prussians.\nUnfortunately, at the critical moment the Austrian Minister showed the\nwrong letter to Bismarck, who guessed the situation; suppressing his\namusement as best he could, Bismarck tried to console the embarrassed\nAustrian by promising not to take any advantage of the slip.\n\nA Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Manteuffel) had hired a\npolice agent to sneak into the French Embassy in order to secure some\ndocuments there. When he delightedly showed one of the letters secured\nto General Von Gerlach, the latter said: \u201cI could have written you ten\nsuch letters for what this cost you.\u201d\n\nDisraeli, in a letter to his sister, spoke of the Danish Minister at\nLondon as his secret agent in the diplomatic corps.\n\nThere were also more innocent means of gaining advantages such as are\npractised in many other branches of human enterprise. For instance,\nLabouchere relates his discovery, when attach\u00e9 at Washington, that\nSecretary Marcy was put in a terrible ill-humor whenever he lost at\nwhist. Upon a hint from Labouchere, the British Minister managed\nthereafter regularly to lose in his games with Marcy who was immensely\npleased at \u201cbeating the British at their own game.\u201d Labouchere adds:\n\u201cEvery morning when the terms of the treaty were being discussed we had\nour revenge and scored a few points for Canada.\u201d\n\nThere was all this time an increasing tendency to discount the\nimportance of the traditional arts of diplomacy and to believe that\na great deal of this carefully nurtured secrecy was merely a trick of\nthe trade. Bismarck expressed himself in the following language on\ndiplomatic literature: \u201cFor the most part it is nothing but paper and\nink. If you wanted to utilize it for historical purposes, you could not\nget anything worth having out of it. I believe it is the rule to allow\nhistorians to consult the Foreign Office archives at the expiration of\nthirty years (after the date of despatches). They might be permitted\nto examine them much sooner, for the despatches and letters, when they\ncontain any information at all, are quite unintelligible to those\nunacquainted with the persons and relations treated of in them.\u201d In\nreporting this statement, Labouchere observes: \u201cIf all foreign office\ntelegrams were published they would be curious reading.\u201d[B] He also\nrelates how his youthful efforts at secret diplomacy were received by\nthe Foreign Office. He had succeeded at St. Petersburg in being able\nquite regularly, through the assistance of a laundress, to get from\nthe government printing office loose sheets of confidential minutes of\nState Council meetings. When Lord John Russell discovered the method in\nwhich this interesting information was obtained, he put a stop to the\nsimple intrigue; Labouchere concludes his account of this experience\nthus: \u201cFor what reason, I wonder, did Russell imagine diplomacy was\ninvented?\u201d\n\n    [B] He writes that when \u201cI was an attach\u00e9 at Stockholm, the\n        present Queen, the Duchess of Ostrogotha, had a baby, and\n        a telegram came from the Foreign Office desiring that Her\n        Majesty\u2019s congratulations should be offered, and that she\n        should be informed how the mother and child were. The\n        Minister was away, so off I went to the Palace to convey\n        the message and to inquire about the health of the pair. A\n        solemn gentleman received me. I informed him of my orders,\n        and requested him to say what I was to reply. \u2018Her Royal\n        Highness,\u2019 he replied, \u2018is as well as can be expected, but\n        His Royal Highness is suffering a little internally, and\n        it is believed that this is due to the fact of the milk\n        of his nurse having been slightly sour last evening.\u2019 I\n        telegraphed this to the Foreign Office.\u201d\n\nThe term \u201csecret diplomacy\u201d is during this period used in a special\nsense, referring to a secret intrigue on the part of a monarch\nor minister without the knowledge of those who have the public\nresponsibility in the matter. Earlier monarchs often played their\nown game without informing their ministers and attempted to keep the\nthreads of foreign intrigue in their own hands. Louis XV did great\ninjury to his country by pursuing this method.\n\nNapoleon III was a great offender in this respect. Not only was his\ninternational policy prone to unscrupulous attempts and proposals,\nbut he acted in these matters frequently without informing those who\nwere responsible before the country. Most of his secret advances to\nBismarck were made entirely on his own responsibility; he did not\ninform the Foreign Minister, Ollivier, of the fateful instructions to\nBenedetti to the effect that he should demand of Prussia assurances\nthat no German prince should ever again be suggested for the Spanish\nthrone; his Mexican policy, too, was worked out by himself, in\nconjunction with the Duc de Morny and Jecker, the banker, rather than\nwith his ministers. The disastrous consequences of the secret diplomacy\nof Napoleon III will be reverted to later on.\n\nIt has also repeatedly happened that envoys have incurred a strong\nsuspicion of playing a political game of their own without the\nauthorization or even the knowledge of their Foreign Minister. While\na diplomatic representative in taking such action risks disavowal\nand dismissal, yet the temptation felt by a strong-willed man who\nis confident that he knows the local situation and the needs of his\ncountry there better than any one else, has often been too powerful\nto be resisted. When the unauthorized action has been successful in\ngaining some advantage, it has generally been condoned.[C] But though\nthe home government is at all times able theoretically to disavow\nunauthorized actions of its foreign representatives, yet the latter\nthrough their self-willed acts may have set in motion forces which can\nno longer be controlled. Very often also doubt and confusion is cast on\nthe real causes of important events and a general feeling of suspicion\nis thus generated.\n\n    [C] Frequently, indeed, ministers have been encouraged to make\n        certain d\u00e9marches \u201con their own account\u201d; if successful,\n        they could be sanctioned after the event. Such is the\n        procedure which Palmerston criticized in a letter to Lord\n        Clarendon (May 22, 1853):\n\n        \u201cThe Russian Government has always had two strings to its\n        bow--moderate language and disinterested professions at\n        Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents\n        on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed\n        locally, the Petersburg Government adopts them as a _fait\n        accompli_ which it did not intend, but cannot, in honor,\n        recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed\n        and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed\n        to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their\n        instructions.\u201d\n\nOne of the most self-willed of British Ministers was Stratford Canning\n(Lord Stratford de Redcliffe). It is generally accepted that his\npersonal diplomacy at Constantinople, where he began his diplomatic\ncareer in 1808 and where he ended it in 1858 after various intervening\nmissions, was one of the causes which brought on the Crimean war.\nAfter reciting that Lord Stratford constantly held private interviews\nwith the Sultan and did his utmost to alarm him, urging him to reject\naccommodation with Russia, and promising him the armed assistance of\nEngland, John Bright stated that all this was done without instructions\nfrom the home government. Lord Clarendon wrote: \u201cHe is bent on war and\non playing the first part in settling the great Eastern question.\u201d When\nthe war came on, Lord Granville wrote: \u201cWe have generals whom we do not\ntrust, and whom we do not know how to replace. We have an Ambassador at\nConstantinople, an able man, a cat whom no one cares to bell, whom some\nthink a principal cause of the war, others the cause of some of the\ncalamities which have attended the conduct of the war; and whom we know\nto have thwarted or neglected many of the objects of his Government.\u201d\n\nLabouchere, who served under Lord Stratford in 1862, wrote afterwards\nthat the despatches of Stratford during the Crimean war could not\nbe recognized as the originals from which Mr. Kinglake drew his\nmaterial for a narrative of the ambassador\u2019s career.[D] He thought\nthat Stratford\u2019s great power at Constantinople was due to his long\nstay there which made it necessary for the Turks to remain on good\nterms with him. Labouchere also claims that Lord Stratford misled\nhis own government by getting the Sultan to publish certain reform\ndecrees which he would send home as evidence of good government, never\nexplaining that such decrees were entirely dead letters.\n\n    [D] Labouchere wrote: \u201cLord Stratford was one of the most\n        detestable of the human race. He was arrogant, resentful\n        and spiteful. He hated the Emperor Nicholas because he had\n        declined to accept him as Ambassador to Russia and the\n        Crimean war was his revenge. In every way he endeavored to\n        envenom the quarrel and to make war certain.\u201d\n\nThe danger and disadvantage of having a diplomat or ruler inject his\npersonal ambitions and dislikes into his diplomacy have, unfortunately,\nbeen frequently exemplified. With respect to the causes of the Crimean\nwar, it will be remembered that Napoleon III had a personal grudge\nagainst Emperor Nicholas who had addressed him \u201cSire and Good Friend\u201d\ninstead of \u201cBrother\u201d as is customary among monarchs. Though Napoleon\nanswered him, acknowledging the compliment implied from the fact that\none may choose one\u2019s friends but not one\u2019s brothers, yet he never\nforgot the slight.\n\nLord Palmerston as Foreign Minister quite openly regarded himself as a\npower independent not only of Parliament but of the Cabinet itself, and\nnot bound to consult his colleagues provided he could justify himself\nlater before the House of Commons. But when in December, 1851, he had\nentirely on his own responsibility approved the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_ by\nwhich Napoleon III made himself emperor, Lord John Russell instantly\ndismissed him and thus vindicated the rule that the Foreign Minister\nmust always pay regard to the joint responsibility of the Cabinet.\n\nIn 1861 a select committee of Parliament on the diplomatic service\nwas appointed. It took evidence, among other things, on the existence\nof \u201csecret diplomacy\u201d in the British service. By this term was\nunderstood private correspondence or private action affecting the\nconduct of public affairs, which did not become part of the record\nin the ministry. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the Earl of Clarendon,\nLord Cowley, and Lord John Russell, all gave evidence with respect to\nthe conduct of business by private correspondence. They all seemed to\nagree that private correspondence between the Foreign Minister and the\nindividual representatives abroad was useful and even necessary for\nsupplementing the formal instructions and reports. But they stated\ntheir belief that whenever any such private correspondence should begin\nto affect the actual conduct of public affairs it would certainly get\ninto the record; if, however, it should come to nothing, then it might\nnot be referred to in public despatches.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nNAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK\n\n\nWe have so far been dealing primarily with the methods of diplomacy.\nDuring the old r\u00e9gime both the methods and the general policy of\ndiplomatic action were controlled by the secret councils of the monarch\nand of a few ministers. With the growth of representative government\npublic opinion began to concern itself more directly with foreign\naffairs. There grew up gradually, although with many relapses and\nwith many breaks of continuity, a consensus that while the methods\nof diplomatic action might be secret, the general trend of policy\nshould regularly be laid before the representatives of the people\nwho should also be informed of any individual action involving the\nresponsibilities of the nation. When, therefore, in contemplating the\nhistory of the last one hundred years, secret diplomacy is spoken\nof in condemnatory terms, the attempted secrecy of national foreign\n_policy_, rather than of methods, is usually thought of. When important\nengagements are undertaken which involve the nation in responsibility\nto others, particularly for the use of armed forces; when by a series\nof specific acts a tendency is given to foreign policy which is not\navowed to the representatives of the people; then there exists secret\ndiplomacy in a reprehensible sense. A further method of concealment\nworks through a false statement of motives. Often narrowly selfish\naction has been camouflaged with the avowal of noble aims and high\nideals; or there has been fencing for position in order that at the\nbeginning of a war the opprobrium of being the assailant could be\nthrown on the other party. Undoubtedly sometimes statesmen may persuade\nthemselves of the presence of high motives in matters in which their\nspecific action or that of their successors, working with the same\nmaterials, takes on a contrary direction.\n\nAt the conclusion of the Crimean war, Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord\nClarendon (March 1, 1867) as follows:\n\n  \u201c... the alliance of England and France has derived its strength\n  not merely from the military and naval power of the two states,\n  but from the force of the moral principle upon which that union\n  has been founded. Our union has for its foundation resistance to\n  unjust aggression, the defence of the weak against the strong,\n  and the maintenance of the existing balance of power. How, then,\n  could we combine to become unprovoked aggressors, to imitate\n  in Africa the partition of Poland by the conquest of Morocco\n  for France, of Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of\n  Egypt for England? And, more especially, how could England and\n  France, who have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire,\n  turn round and wrest Egypt from the Sultan? A coalition for such\n  a purpose would revolt the moral feelings of mankind, and would\n  certainly be fatal to any English Government that was a party to\n  it. Then, as to the balance of power to be maintained by giving\n  us Egypt, but we do not want the burden of governing Egypt, and\n  its possession would not, as a political, military, and naval\n  question, be considered, in this country, as a set-off against\n  the possession of Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all\n  these countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let\n  us all abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call upon\n  us the condemnation of all other civilized nations.\u201d\n\nThis program of liberal principles applied to foreign affairs, of\nhigh-toned and high-minded diplomacy, one reads with mixed feelings in\nview of the things which have come thereafter.\n\nIn the period between the Crimean and the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon\npursued a policy, or a series of policies, which fitly illustrate the\nworst features of secret diplomacy. In 1858 Napoleon III obtained\nfrom Cavour a promise that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France.\nThese arrangements, made without the knowledge or the desire of the\nFrench people, involved Napoleon in the war of 1859 and led to a\nfatal weakening of his position. In 1864 Napoleon secretly suggested\nto Prussia that she might take Schleswig-Holstein, thus greatly\nencouraging her to undertake the war of 1864. France at this time was\nunder treaty obligations to Denmark which made such action doubly\ndishonest. When the war between Austria and Prussia broke out in\n1866, Napoleon concluded a secret treaty with Austria which contained\na bargain that he would assist Austria to recover Silesia in return\nfor a cession of Venetia to Italy, to compensate the latter for Savoy\nand thus to eradicate the evil effects of the arrangement of 1858.\nAs this treaty became known, it absolutely alienated Prussia from\nFrance. At the same time Napoleon had secretly demanded from Prussia\nthe cession of the Rhenish Palatinate which belonged to Bavaria; this\nwould mean of course that Prussia and France together would first have\nto take it from Bavaria. Bismarck secretly informed Bavaria of this\ndemand and thus turned her decisively against Napoleon; so that he was\nenabled to make secret treaties of alliance not only with Bavaria but\nwith Wurtemberg and Baden for their military support in case of war.\nNapoleon had thus managed unwittingly to bring about the coalition of\nGerman states which proved disastrous to him in 1870. Had the French\ngovernment known of these three German treaties, it would probably have\navoided war; as it was, France did not know that she would have all\nGermany against her. In 1866 Napoleon, through Benedetti, submitted to\nBismarck a draft treaty according to which, in case the French Emperor\nshould decide to send his troops to enter Belgium, the King of Prussia\nwould grant armed aid to France and support her with all his forces,\nmilitary and naval, in the face of and against every other power which\nmight in this eventuality declare war. Though this draft treaty, which\nbecame known in Great Britain and caused high excitement there, was\nnot adopted in this form, a secret compact was made between France and\nPrussia in 1867, one article of which stated that Prussia would not\nobject to the annexation of Belgium by France. The fact that both of\nthese powers had signed the treaty of 1839, guaranteeing the neutrality\nof Belgium, aggravates the noxiousness of this conspiracy. Early in\n1870 Napoleon was secretly negotiating with Austria with a view to a\njoint war against North Germany. The negotiations were in progress when\nthe war of 1870 broke out. Probably Bismarck was informed of what\nwas going on and was therefore the more anxious to face at once what\nhe considered an inevitable war. As already stated, Napoleon did not\ncommunicate to his responsible minister his decision to require of the\nKing of Prussia the absolute assurance that no German prince should\never again be nominated for the throne of Spain. In doing so he put\nhimself in a position where Bismarck could man\u0153uver him into a dilemma\nfrom which there seemed no exit except war.\n\nThis was done by the famous editing of the Ems dispatch through which,\ntaking advantage of King William\u2019s permission to modify and eliminate,\nBismarck gave to the report sent by the king the appearance that\nnothing further could be said between the king and the French envoy\nand that therefore the only alternative to the French was retreat\nor war. This act illustrates one of the most terrible dangers of\nsecret diplomacy in that just at the time when inflammable material\nis at hand in abundance, one word or phrase may give a decisive turn\nto developments and force an issue, in a certain direction, without\nallowing a chance for calm consideration of all that is involved.\n\nBismarck considered that the unification of Germany required a war\nbecause only thus could the feeling of unity among the German people,\nuntil then divided into numerous small states, be molded into political\noneness. But in bringing on the Franco-Prussian war, no matter how\ninevitable he might consider such a struggle, he was too confident of\nhis ability to play the part of a Providence and to cut short the slow\nprocesses of historic development. Therefore, though he attempted to\nwork in the interest of outstanding national factors, his policy was\nnot of a nature to develop that public confidence in the aims of his\nnation on which alone a statesman can permanently build. His was the\ndiplomacy of authority, often announcing its aims with great frankness,\nindeed, but always retaining the old method so that the public mind\nremained often in the dark. His politics directed German development\ninto a dangerous course. He abhorred German disunion, but tried to\ncure it with means too forceful and artificial. The solutions brought\nabout further problems. The taking of Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of\nfuture war. In 1871, Bismarck offered Mulhouse to Switzerland secretly,\nbut the gift was declined. In the years after 1871, Bismarck always\nthreatened Parliament with the danger of war whenever he wanted to put\nanything through.\n\nThe Russo-Turkish war of 1878, being in its nature a conflict about the\nmerits of which only vague ideas could be current among the Western\nnations, produced a whole nest of secret treaties. The treaty of San\nStefano itself was kept secret by Russia and Turkey. The British\nForeign Secretary in a diplomatic note which was much admired at the\ntime, demanded that the treaty must be submitted to the European powers.\n\nMeanwhile a second secret treaty had been made between Russia and\nAustria wherein, as is customary in such transactions, \u201ccompensations\u201d\nwere distributed out of property belonging to neither of the\ncontracting parties, at the cost of somebody else; it was agreed that\nAustria should have Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile the British\nForeign Office, though it had just declaimed in indignant tones against\nthe secret terms of San Stefano, made an agreement, equally secret,\nwith Russia (May 30, 1878), concerning the points on which Great\nBritain would insist in the final adjustment. Through the wrongful\naction of an employee of the Foreign Office this agreement leaked out\nand a summary of it was published on May 31st. When questioned in\nthe House of Lords, the Marquis of Salisbury, who at all times had a\nwell-deserved reputation for sincerity, nevertheless qualified the\nstatement in the _Globe_ as \u201cwholly unauthenticated and not deserving\nof any confidence on the part of the House of Lords.\u201d The full text\nof the agreement was published by the _Globe_ on June 14th, and when\nchallenged by Lord Rosebery concerning his _dementi_, Lord Salisbury\ncalmly stated: \u201cI described it as unauthentic simply because it was so,\nand because no other adjective actually described it, and I shall be\nable to state why I so described it.\u201d The explanation which followed\nwas, however, quite lame, and consisted mainly in stating that the\ndocument as published did not give a complete view of the situation.\nThe impression produced by these tactics was far from favorable. Lord\nGranville, with a great deal of justice, wanted to know \u201cwhere the\nHouse of Lords would have been had it not been for the immoral action\nof the man who gave the secret treaty to the newspaper. They would\nhave had blue books and copies of instructions, protocols and other\ndocuments, but they would have been perfectly duped as to the way in\nwhich the government had actually proceeded.\u201d\n\nBut there followed another, a fourth secret treaty, growing out of\nthe Turkish situation, an agreement between Great Britain and Turkey\nconcluded on June 4th, at Constantinople. As a result of erroneous\ninformation having been telegraphed from Constantinople by Mr. Layard,\nthe British envoy, to the effect that in spite of the armistice\nthe Russians were moving on Constantinople, a large war credit was\nvoted in the British House, although against the opposition of the\nLiberals under Gladstone and Bright. Orders were also given to the\nIndian Government to send troops to Cyprus. A secret treaty was then\nconcluded in which Great Britain received a protectorate over Cyprus in\nreturn for the engagement on her part to protect the Asiatic domains\nof Turkey. Never was the blood of a nation without its own knowledge\nand consent risked in a more doubtful adventure than in this famous\ntransaction of Lord Beaconsfield. Gladstone, on July 20th, analyzed the\ntreaty as providing for three things: the occupation and annexation of\nCyprus, the defense of Turkey in Asia against any attempt Russia may\nmake (\u201cto go two thousand miles from your own country, alone and single\nhanded, in order to prevent Russia making war at any time upon Turkey\nin Asia\u201d), and responsibility for the government of Turkish territory\nin Asia; and all that was undertaken without the consent and knowledge\nof the British people, to be done at their expense by the blood of\ntheir children. Mr. Gladstone concluded: \u201cThere is but one epithet\nwhich I think fully describes a covenant of this kind. I think it is an\ninsane covenant.\u201d\n\nDisraeli had formerly said of Palmerston: \u201cWith no domestic policy, he\nis obliged to divert the attention of the people from the consideration\nof their own affairs to the distraction of foreign politics. His scheme\nof conduct is so devoid of all political principle that when forced\nto appeal to the people, his only claim to their confidence is his\nname.\u201d The same language could with equal justice have been applied to\nBeaconsfield himself. His speeches in defense of his foreign policy are\nusually a superficial appeal to imperialist passion, and deal in such\nphrases as \u201cWhat is our duty at this critical moment?\u201d \u201cTo maintain\nthe empire of England.\u201d (Loud cheers.) \u201cEmpire\u201d is taken for granted\nas covering everything desirable, but the actual relationship of these\nadventurous foreign policies to the welfare and true development of the\nEnglish people is never reasoned out.\n\nWhile Beaconsfield had opposed the first Afghan war, he readily changed\nhis views when he came into power and began the second war in 1878\non the avowed ground that the Ameer had refused to receive a British\nmission. But with a sudden change of tactics, at a dinner at the\nMansion House on November 9, Lord Beaconsfield solemnly announced that\nthe war had been made because the frontier of India was \u201ca haphazard\nand not a scientific one.\u201d Yet a little before, when condemning the\nfirst Afghan war, he had described the frontiers of India as \u201ca perfect\nbarrier.\u201d He did not give to any organization of public opinion a\nchance to influence him in this matter, or even to be heard. On\nDecember 9, Lord Derby said in the House of Lords: \u201cWe are discussing,\nand we know we are discussing, an issue upon which we have no real or\npractical influence.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nTRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND MOROCCO\n\n\nToward the end of the nineteenth century the dominating development\nin the diplomacy of Europe was the actual formation of the two\ngreat alliances--the Triple Alliance created by Bismarck, and\nthe Russo-French Alliance which had come into being in 1896 as a\ncounterpoise to the former. The treaties upon which these alliances\nrested were made secretly; they were part of an authoritative policy\nbased on the theory of balance of power. The texts of the Triple\nAlliance Treaty were not published until after the beginning of the\nGreat War. The so-called Counter-Insurance Treaty with Russia by which\nBismarck attempted to stabilize the situation and isolate France\nthrough a mutual neutrality agreement between Russia, Austria and\nGermany, was one of the most characteristic examples of complicated\nmethods followed by the old diplomacy; it was, of course, also kept\nsecret. When after Bismarck\u2019s retirement the German Government did\nnot renew this secret treaty, it made possible a fundamental change in\nthe grouping of powers with the result that Russia, after a very short\ninterval, identified herself with France in the Dual Alliance.\n\nWhile Bismarck had been in control of German diplomacy, the main lines\nof German foreign policy were kept quite clear and their general\ndirection was definite, no matter how complicated and indirect were\nthe means frequently applied to carry it out. Emperor William II\nsought to free himself from the tutelage of the powerful Chancellor,\nbut from then on the orientation of German diplomacy was far from\ndefinite. No one could be clear where its main objective lay; it seemed\nto seek expansion of influence in Asia Minor, the Far East, Morocco,\nSouth Africa, and almost everywhere, even with the inclusion of South\nAmerica. Germany appeared to have many irons in the fire, although\nmeanwhile she did not make much progress in any specific direction.\nThis uncertainty of her diplomatic aims in an increasing manner aroused\nthe apprehension of her neighbors; none of them felt any assurance\nabout what Germany actually wanted. That her actual wants may not have\nbeen unreasonable, that she herself apparently did not know exactly\nwhich of her interests should predominate, did not help matters; all\nthose who had more possessions than she felt themselves endangered, and\na general suspicion and lack of confidence resulted.\n\nIn the years after the Chino-Japanese war the German Government showed\na great desire to play a prominent part in Far Eastern affairs. Thus,\nit took the lead in bringing about the joint intervention of Russia,\nFrance and Germany, which obliged Japan to surrender Port Arthur, a\npart of the spoils of war just taken from China. The three powers who\nhad thus come to the rescue, however, forthwith proceeded to exact\nfrom China an enormous commission for their good offices, and forced\nher to make to them grants of lease-holds and other concessions, in\nwhich was included the very territory that they had rescued from Japan.\nIn this keen onset, which amounted to an attempt to divide up the\nChinese Empire, Great Britain in her turn also participated. The Far\nEastern situation was rendered decidedly unstable, and the frantic and\nunorganized resistance of the Boxer levies was the result.\n\nAfter the settlement of these troubles, in 1901, the German Government,\nas we now know, tentatively suggested the formation of an alliance\nincluding Great Britain and Japan. This proposal shows how far\nGerman diplomacy at the time had departed from the fundamentals of\npolicy under Bismarck. Japan proceeded most assiduously to work on\nthis suggestion, but Germany was left out when the highly important\nAnglo-Japanese Alliance was secured by the Japanese Minister in London.\nNegotiations between Great Britain and Japan were carried on with the\ngreatest secrecy. Lord Lansdowne himself seems at one time to have been\nvery anxious for prompt action; he said to Count Hayashi, as reported\nby the latter, that \u201cthere was great danger in delay, as the news of\nthe proposed treaty might leak out and objections might then be raised.\u201d\n\nIt is significant that while Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi were in\nthe depth of their negotiations, Marquis Ito, on his return journey\nfrom the United States, proceeded to Russia and, entirely in opposition\nto the express judgment of Count Hayashi, \u201cplunged into conversations\non the most delicate of matters\u201d at St. Petersburg. In fact, the\nJapanese Government allowed almost identical secret negotiations to\nbe carried on in London and St. Petersburg at the same time. Count\nHayashi considered this procedure as implying \u201ca lack of faith and a\nbreach of honor.\u201d When the Anglo-Japanese treaty had been actually\nsigned it was, through the indiscretion of some official, published in\nJapan three days too soon. The Japanese Foreign Office promptly denied\nits existence, and Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokyo, who no\ndoubt knew of the Ito negotiations at St. Petersburg, very emphatically\ndenied the very possibility of such a treaty. The effect on Russia of\nthe truth when it became known there, can be readily imagined. In the\nAnglo-Japanese treaty, England, which had recently joined in the solemn\nguarantee of the integrity of China and of the independence of Korea,\nmade engagements scarcely consistent with either.\n\nLord Rosebery, in a public address, October, 1905, expressed his\nsense of the great importance of this treaty. \u201cThe treaty,\u201d he\nsaid, \u201cis an engine of tremendous power and tremendous liability.\nWhatever else is certain, this at least is sure, that it will lead to\ncountless animosities, many counter intrigues, and possibly hostile\ncombinations. But I want to point out to you the enormous importance of\nthe engagements in which this treaty involves you, the reactions which\nit will cause elsewhere, and to bid you to be vigilant and prepared,\nand not negligent, as sometimes you are, of the vast bearings of your\nforeign policy.\u201d\n\nThe German Emperor, having failed to obtain a treaty with England, now\nturned to his Russian cousin with the design of inducing him to make\nan alliance. The Willy-Nicky correspondence which was published by the\nRussian Revolutionary Government in 1917, as well as the memoirs of\nIsvolsky, give us a complete insight into the action of William II in\nthis matter. The correspondence shows that Emperor William neglected no\nmeans of arousing resentment and suspicion of England in the mind of\nNicholas, particularly in attempting to show a complicity of England\nwith Japan in the war against Russia. In November, 1904, William\nproposed the immediate signature by Russia, without the knowledge of\nFrance, of a defensive treaty of alliance, evidently directed against\nGreat Britain. France was to be invited to join _after_ the signature\nby Germany and Russia. The Czar, however, insisted that he could not\nentertain this proposal without first submitting it to his ally.\nWilliam, in a long telegram, argued insistently upon the danger of\ninforming France before the signature. He said: \u201cOnly the absolute,\nundeniable knowledge that we are both bound by the treaty to give\nmutual aid to each other, can induce France to exercise pressure upon\nEngland to remain tranquil and in peace, for fear of placing France\nin a dangerous situation. Should France know that a German-Russian\nagreement is simply in preparation and not yet signed, she would\nimmediately inform England. England and Japan would then forthwith\nattack Germany.\u201d Therefore, William concluded that if the Czar should\npersist in refusing to sign the treaty without the previous consent\nof France, it would be better not to attempt making an agreement at\nall. He stated that he had spoken only to Prince Buelow about it, and\nthat as undoubtedly the Czar had spoken only to Count Lamsdorff, the\nforeign minister, it would be easy to keep it an absolute secret. He\nthen congratulated the Czar on having concluded a secret agreement of\nneutrality with Austria. As a matter of fact, Count Lamsdorff had not\nbeen informed by the Czar of the Emperor\u2019s proposal.\n\nIn the summer of 1905, Emperor William returned to the charge, taking\nadvantage of the discouragement of the Czar due to many external and\ninternal troubles resulting from the Japanese war. He visited the Czar\nat the Island Bjorkoe in July, and used every resource of his personal\ninfluence to prevail on Nicholas. This time he succeeded, and the two\nsovereigns signed a secret treaty of alliance, which contained four\narticles to the following effect:\n\n(1) If any European state shall attack either of the empires the allied\nparty engages itself to aid with all its forces on land and sea.\n\n(2) The contracting parties will not conclude a separate peace.\n\n(3) The present agreement comes in force at the moment of conclusion of\npeace between Russia and Japan, and may be denounced with one year\u2019s\nnotice.\n\n(4) When the treaty has come into force Russia will take the necessary\nsteps to inform France and to propose to her to adhere to it as an ally.\n\nOn this occasion the Emperor was accompanied by Von Tschirsky, who\nsoon after became German Foreign Minister and who countersigned the\nagreement. The Russian Foreign Minister was not present but Admiral\nBirileff, the Minister of the Navy, was called in to countersign the\nCzar\u2019s signature. After his return to St. Petersburg, the Czar allowed\nfifteen days to pass before informing Count Lamsdorff. When informed,\nthe Czar\u2019s advisers took a very strong position against the agreement,\nwith the result that notwithstanding the insistent arguments of\nEmperor William, who in his telegram signed himself \u201cYour friend and\nally,\u201d the treaty was never given full force. William strongly appealed\nto the gratefulness of the Czar for having stood by him during the\nJapanese war, at a time when, \u201cas afterwards the indiscretions of\nDelcass\u00e9 have shown, although allied to Russia, France had nevertheless\nmade an agreement with England to attack Germany without warning, in\ntime of peace.\u201d The latter phrase gives the effect upon William\u2019s mind\nof all he knew or believed to know about the arrangements concluded\nbetween France and Great Britain concerning Morocco.\n\nThe Moroccan intrigues and secret negotiations, during the first decade\nof the twentieth century, contributed in no small measure to rendering\ninternational relations strained and generating a general sense of\ninsecurity and suspicion. In July, 1901, a protocol was signed between\nthe Sultan of Morocco and the French Government in which the latter\ndeclared its respect for the integrity of Morocco. At the same time M.\nDelcass\u00e9 began secret negotiations with Spain for a delimitation of\nspheres of influence in that country. In September, 1902, the first\nFranco-Spanish secret treaty concerning Morocco was given its final\nform. It was, however, not ratified because of British opposition at\nthe time. In 1904, the formation of the Anglo-French Entente agreement,\nin which the French Government declared that it had no intention \u201cof\naltering the political status of Morocco,\u201d was accompanied by the\nconclusion of a secret understanding concerning Morocco which was not\nrevealed until 1911. According to the terms of that agreement the\nBritish Government was to be informed of any understanding on Morocco\nwhich might be concluded between France and Spain. These two countries,\nin fact, on October 3, 1904, consummated a convention for the partition\nof Morocco into spheres of influence. A copy of this secret agreement\nwas given to Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister, who wrote,\nin acknowledging it: \u201cI need not say that the confidential character of\nthe Convention entered into by the President of the French Republic and\nthe King of Spain in regard to French and Spanish interests in Morocco\nis fully recognized by us, and will be duly respected.\u201d\n\nThe German Government, which had been ignored, now suggested the\nholding of an international conference. After considerable opposition\nthe conference met at Algeciras, in February, 1906. The Powers\nrepresented there again solemnly recognized the independence and\nintegrity of Morocco. Meanwhile, various incidents were brought on\nby the actions of French and Spanish commissaries in Morocco. The\nFrench parliament repeatedly reiterated its intention to observe the\nact of Algeciras, particularly in the declaration of February, 1909,\nregarding Morocco, in which declaration Germany joined. In 1911, events\nhappened which induced a serious European crisis. The French Government\nundertook military operations against Fez, the capital of Morocco, on\nthe ground that the foreign colony there was in danger. In reply to\nquestions in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey confirmed that such\nmeasures were being undertaken by the French Government \u201cfor the succor\nof Europeans in Fez.\u201d He added: \u201cThe action taken by France is not\nintended to alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty\u2019s\nGovernment cannot see why any objection should be taken to it.\u201d\n\nThe facts of the Fez affair have been thus described by the French\npublicist, Francis de Pressens\u00e9:\n\n  \u201cAt this point the Comit\u00e9 du Maroc and its organs surpassed\n  themselves. They organized a campaign of systematic untruth.\n  Masters of almost the entire press, they swamped the public with\n  false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack.\n  A whole European French Colony was suddenly discovered there,\n  living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and children\n  was described in the most moving terms.... At all costs the\n  Europeans--the Sultan, Fez itself must be saved.... As ever from\n  the beginning of this enterprise, the Government knew nothing,\n  willed nothing of itself.\u201d\n\nWhile these events were happening, the Foreign Offices both in Paris\nand London failed to give any information concerning the aims which\nunderlay the action taken. On May 23d, Mr. Dillon in the House of\nCommons asked to what extent England was committed to this \u201cill-omened\nand cruel expedition.\u201d The Foreign Secretary replied, \u201cWe are not\ncommitted at all.\u201d The French Foreign Minister declared at the same\ntime that he had never heard of any treaty with Spain concerning\nMorocco.\n\nWhen the international crisis came to a head suddenly in July, 1911,\nthrough the disconcerting action of the German Government in sending a\nwar vessel to Agadir, the public was totally taken by surprise and was\nabsolutely in the dark as to the issues and interests involved as well\nas to the commitments which had been made by the British and French\nforeign offices. The text of the secret treaty between France and Spain\nhad, however, now been secured by the Paris papers _Le Temps_ and\n_Le Matin_. This revelation led to party attacks on secret diplomacy\nin the British House of Commons and in the French Parliament. Baron\nd\u2019Estournelles de Constant, in February, 1912, said:\n\n  ... \u201cWhy was the French Parliament told only half the truth\n  when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our arrangement with\n  England? Why was it allowed to suspect that this arrangement had\n  as its complement and corrective some secret clauses and other\n  secret treaties? It is this, it is this double game towards\n  Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse\n  of trust.... Now the whole effort of the arrangement of 1904\n  appears to-day in its truth and in its vanity. It was a treaty of\n  friendship with England recognizing the freedom of our political\n  action in Morocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the\n  integrity of that country; that was what the public knew and\n  approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by\n  other Treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the\n  partition of Morocco between Spain and France was prepared, of\n  that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity.\u201d\n\nIn the House of Commons, Mr. John Dillon charged that \u201cthe Foreign\nOffice policy has become during the last ten years progressively more\nsecret every year. For ten years the foreign policy of this country has\nbeen conducted behind an elaborate screen of secrecy.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nENTENTE DIPLOMACY\n\n\nAs the commitments of the British Government gradually became more and\nmore known the question arose as to how deeply and extensively Great\nBritain had been involved in continental affairs. Lord Rosebery, who\nwas uninformed, with the rest of Parliament and the public, as to the\nactual details, said in a speech at Glasgow in January, 1912:\n\n  \u201cThis we do know about our foreign policy, that, for good or for\n  evil, we are now embraced in the midst of the Continental system.\n  That I regard as perhaps the gravest fact in the later portion of\n  my life. We are, for good or for evil, involved in a Continental\n  system, the merits of which I do not pretend to judge, because\n  I do not know enough about it, but which, at any rate, may at\n  any time bring us into conflict with armies numbering millions,\n  and our own forces would hardly be counted in such a war as they\n  stand at present.\u201d\n\nLord Rosebery realized perhaps more fully than most of the leaders of\nEnglish public life the complications adherent to what had already\nbecome public knowledge at the time.\n\nMeanwhile the government, in Parliament, confined itself to plain\ndenials whenever the matter of international undertakings and\nobligations of a general nature was brought up. The denials could be\njustified from the point of view that the situation as stated by the\nuninformed questioner in Parliament, in each case did not exactly\ncorrespond to the facts. But the impression created by such denials\nthat no serious obligations had been incurred was, as the result\nshowed, entirely misleading.\n\nOn March 8, 1911, Mr. Jowett asked in the House of Commons whether any\nundertaking, promise or understanding had been given to France that\nin certain eventualities British troops would be sent to co\u00f6perate\nwith the French army. The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs\nreplied: \u201cThe answer is in the negative.\u201d On December 6, 1911, the\nPrime Minister said:\n\n  \u201cAs has been stated, there were no secret engagements with France\n  other than those that have now been published, and there are no\n  secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon\n  us any obligation to render military or naval assistance to any\n  other Power.\u201d\n\nUpon another occasion Mr. Yerburgh, M.P., inquired:\n\n  \u201cMay I ask whether or not we are to understand that the\n  Government arrived at no decision upon this particular question?\n  Is the right honorable gentleman not aware that this new\n  definition of the two-Power standard is a question of supreme\n  importance, and that in arriving at our standard of naval\n  strength previous Governments had regard to the power of the\n  fleets of other countries?\u201d\n\nThe Prime Minister replied only:\n\n  \u201cI think this question shows the inconvenience of dealing with\n  these matters by way of question and answer.\u201d\n\nIn December, 1912, Lord Hugh Cecil made the following inquiry:\n\n  \u201cThere is a very general belief that this country is under an\n  obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising\n  out of an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of\n  diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of\n  this country to operate in Europe. That is the general belief. It\n  would be very presumptuous of any one who has not access to all\n  the facts in possession of the Government--\u201d\n\nThe Prime Minister interrupted him with: \u201cI ought to say that it is\nnot true.\u201d Lord Cecil thereupon expressed his satisfaction for having\nelicited this explanation, \u201cbecause,\u201d he stated, \u201cit was certainly\nwidely believed that the Government has engaged in a military\npolicy of an adventurous kind and that if such a policy had actually\nbeen contemplated by the Government it would involve a very serious\nconsideration of the military resources of the country.\u201d As a matter of\nfact, the latter was a just conclusion from the actual situation as it\nreally existed, notwithstanding the denial by the Prime Minister.\n\nIn March, 1913, when during the discussion of the Navy estimates, the\nMediterranean situation came up, Lord Beresford suggested that Mr.\nChurchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) must be trusting to France\nthe duty of guarding the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill had said in the\ncourse of these discussions: \u201cIn conjunction with the Navy of France,\nour Mediterranean Fleet would make a combined force superior to all\npossible combinations.\u201d Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke referred to this as a\nremarkable statement, and one \u201csomewhat difficult to reconcile with the\nrecent pronouncement of the Prime Minister as to our understanding with\nFrance in the matter of armaments.\u201d He added: \u201cIn one case we have the\nPrime Minister repudiating an obligation on our side of any kind, and\nin the other we have the First Lord of the Admiralty relying for the\nsafety of our Eastern Empire, our trade and our food supply, upon the\nassistance which he presumes will be ready at any moment to be given to\nus by France.\u201d\n\nOn March 24, 1913, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister, made a comprehensive\nanswer to a question of Sir W. Byles in the following terms:\n\n  \u201cAs has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any\n  obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels\n  it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between\n  European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will\n  restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to\n  decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war.\u201d\n\nIn August, 1913, Lord Haldane made a statement to the effect that the\nvery friendly relationships with France rendered the situation in the\nMediterranean most satisfactory. On June 11, 1914, this same general\nmatter was up again for discussion. Sir Edward Grey, in answering a\nquestion, referred back to the statement made by Mr. Asquith on March\n24, 1913, and added: \u201cIt remains as true to-day as it was a year ago.\u201d\n\nThe nation was meanwhile left entirely in the dark with respect to the\nactual matter of the relationships which had developed between Great\nBritain and France, and it was only after the Great War had broken\nout that Sir Edward Grey, in his speech of August 3, 1914, gave to\nParliament some account of what had actually happened.\n\nThe first important step in the new international policy of Great\nBritain was taken immediately after the Liberal Government had been\nformed on December 12, 1905. It appears that Sir Edward Grey consulted\nin this matter particularly Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane, informing\nthe Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but not his other\nCabinet colleagues. The above three men were the leaders of the Liberal\nImperialist faction, and it is not at all certain that in an aggressive\nforeign policy they would have been at that moment readily followed by\ntheir whole party.\n\nWhen in consequence of the attempted division of Morocco, relations\nbetween France and Germany became somewhat strained, Sir Edward Grey,\nForeign Minister, made communications to the French Ambassador to the\neffect that, while no promises could be given to any Foreign Power,\nyet in Sir Edward Grey\u2019s opinion, if war was then forced upon France\non the question of Morocco, public opinion in England would rally to\nthe material support of France. Sir Edward Grey, as related in his own\nwords, said: \u201cI made no promises and I used no threats, but I expressed\nthat opinion.\u201d The accuracy of that opinion has been questioned, in\nview of the temper of the House of Commons elected at a time when\nresentment at the imperialist war in South Africa was powerful.\n\nOn the basis of the statement made by Sir Edward Grey, the French\nGovernment said to the British Foreign Minister, as reported by him:\n\n  \u201cIf you think it possible that the public opinion of Great\n  Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in\n  giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in\n  advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you\n  wish it when the time comes, unless some conversations have\n  already taken place between naval and military experts.\u201d\n\nSir Edward Grey saw merit in this proposal and agreed to it. He\nauthorized that conversations should take place, but with the distinct\nunderstanding that nothing which would bind either Government should\noccur. However, the holding of conversations between two Powers\nconcerning military co\u00f6peration is in itself a sufficiently serious\nmatter out of which expectations and relationships are apt to arise\nthat cannot be overlooked in future action. The Cabinet was not\ninformed of the authorization given by Sir Edward Grey until later. He\ndid not state how much later.\n\nWe know from official sources that Colonel Barnardiston proceeded to\nBelgium and had interviews with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff\nconcerning combined operations in the event of a German attack directed\nagainst Antwerp. Colonel Barnardiston confided to the Belgian Chief\nof Staff that his Government intended to move the British base of\nsupplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had\nbeen cleared of all German warships. When the Belgian documents were\npublished in Germany, it was attempted by the press to represent these\nconversations as an actual convention. These consultations occurred\nduring the first quarter of 1906.\n\nFrom an official source comes the statement that in July, 1911, the\nBritish Government informed the German, that on certain contingencies,\nGreat Britain would support France (if Germany should demand the whole\nof French-Congo and Agadir as a naval base). What actually happened at\nthis time has never been fully revealed.\n\nIn April, 1912, the British military attach\u00e9 at Brussels informed the\nBelgian General Jungbluth that Great Britain had 160,000 men available\nfor despatch to the continent, and added that the British Government\nin certain contingencies during recent events would have immediately\nlanded troops on Belgian territory.\n\nAbout this time the Cabinet had a discussion of the whole situation\nand of the special relationship with France; and it was decided that\nthere should be some definite expression in writing, of the latter.\nAccordingly, in November, 1912, an exchange of notes took place between\nSir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador. The British Foreign Minister\nwrote the following letter:\n\n                                        Nov. 22nd (1912).\n\n  \u201cMY DEAR AMBASSADOR:\n\n  \u201cFrom time to time in recent years the French and British Naval\n  and Military experts have consulted together. It has always\n  been understood that such consultation does not restrict the\n  freedom of either Government to decide at any future time\n  whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have\n  agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to\n  be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to\n  action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never\n  arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British\n  fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon\n  an engagement to co\u00f6perate in war. You have, however, pointed\n  out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an\n  unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential\n  to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed\n  assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had\n  grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power,\n  or something that threatened the general peace, it should\n  immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments\n  should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace,\n  and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in\n  common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the\n  General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the\n  Governments would then decide what effect should be given to\n  them.\u201d\n\nA reply from the French Ambassador accepted this understanding.\n\nSide by side with the Anglo-French military and naval collaboration,\nthere went the making of joint plans by France and Russia which\nculminated in the Franco-Russian military convention of August, 1912.\nAt the same time Russia had pressed upon France the need of increasing\nher army by raising the term of service to three years. Concerning the\nnew disposal of the French fleet, according to the desires of Russia,\nPresident Poincar\u00e9 stated to Ambassador Isvolsky in November, 1912:\n\n  \u201cThis decision has been made in agreement with England, and forms\n  the further development and completion of arrangements already\n  made previously between the French and English staffs.\u201d\n\nThus the chain of co\u00f6peration was completed, and England was\neffectively tied up with the situation in the Balkans, in which only\nRussia had a primary interest.\n\nMeanwhile, the repeated denials previously set forth kept the British\nParliament and public from all knowledge of the exceedingly important\nrelationships which were growing up between the Naval and Military\nestablishments of Great Britain and France.\n\nHow these relationships, though only partially known and suspected,\nwere looked upon by outsiders is shown from expressions in the reports\nof Belgian diplomats. Count de Lalaing wrote from London in 1907:\n\u201cEngland is quietly pursuing a policy opposed to Germany and aimed\nat her isolation.\u201d Baron Greindl wrote from Berlin in 1908: \u201cCall it\nalliance or what you will, the grouping constitutes, none the less, a\ndiminution of Germany\u2019s security.\u201d Baron Guillaume wrote, in 1911, from\nParis: \u201cI have less faith in the desire of Great Britain for peace.\nShe would not be sorry to see the others eat one another up.\u201d These\nexpressions are not, of course, evidences of British policy, but simply\nof the impression which whatever leaked out concerning that policy,\nmade upon outside diplomats.\n\nIn his clear and convincing analysis of the situation created by the\ngradual formation in secret, of these relationships, Lord Loreburn\nbrings out the following points: Through the communications with the\nFrench Ambassador and military and naval conversations concerning\nplans for joint action, France was encouraged more and more to expect\nthat Great Britain would stand by her in arms if she were attacked by\nGermany. Such a policy of a defensive understanding with France, no\nmatter how right in itself, was obviously a new departure of tremendous\nimportance. Its execution and effectiveness could be assured only if\nunderstood by Parliament as a national policy, with all the risks\ninvolved, so that proper preparations could be made. Parliament was,\nhowever, never warned of the danger England stood of being thrown\nsuddenly into a European war. Had Germany been told in July, 1914,\nthat Great Britain would support France and Russia, the war would\nundoubtedly have been prevented; but while the ministers had in fact\nincurred moral obligations over against France, they had not assured\nthemselves of the necessary Parliamentary support and could therefore\nnot make a statement involving such risk as the above declaration to\nGermany would have created.\n\nOf Sir Edward Grey\u2019s speech of the 3rd of August, 1914, Lord Loreburn\nsays:\n\n  \u201cThis remarkable speech began with an elaborate effort to prove\n  that the House of Commons was perfectly free to determine either\n  for peace or war. It ended with a passionate declaration that\n  this country would be disgraced if we did not declare war, and\n  the reasoning of the speech proved that Sir Edward Grey had\n  committed himself irretrievably. It left the House of Commons\n  convinced that it had in honor no choice but to join France in\n  arms. It is an epitome of the reasoning by which Sir Edward Grey\n  had been brought to believe that he could say and do what he said\n  and did without limiting his freedom of action. But if this is\n  legitimate we ought not to keep up the pretense that we are a\n  self-governing nation in foreign affairs.\u201d\n\nThus a minister, to whom national intrigue and duplicity were\nessentially foreign, who was trusted by his country and who wanted\npeace, was brought by the methods of secret diplomacy into a position\nwhere he had actually incurred the moral obligation to assist another\ncountry without having the power for peace which the ability to avow\nthat relationship openly, to take the responsibility, and to confront\nGermany therewith, would have given him.\n\nAs early as November, 1911, Lord Lansdowne, one of the founders of\nthe Entente, in speaking of the secret agreement of 1904 concerning\nMorocco, which had then just become known to the public, had admitted\nthat in such a case the promise of purely diplomatic support might\neasily bring on the obligation to assist in other ways; that an entente\ncordiale creates close relationships between two countries; and that,\nshould one of them get into difficulties without its guilt, it would\nexpect to receive support.\n\nThe moral responsibilities in which the Foreign Minister had involved\nthe British Government were not simple, nor did they exist against\nFrance alone. Because of the Franco-Russian alliance the relationship\nestablished between Great Britain and France virtually involved sharing\nin the defense of France against the consequences of her alliance with\nRussia, as the subsequent events showed; any serious situation arising\nin the Balkans and affecting Russian interests would thereafter involve\nFrance, and through her, Great Britain. Accordingly, the effect of\nthis policy was to make the peace of Great Britain depend upon, and to\ninvolve it with, the complex struggle for influence in the Balkans.\n\nAfter Sir Edward Grey\u2019s speech of August 3rd, Mr. T. Edmund Harvey,\nM.P., said: \u201cI am convinced that this war for the great masses of the\ncountries of Europe is no peoples\u2019 war. It is a war that has been\nmade by men in high places, by diplomatists working in secret, by\nbureaucrats out of touch with the people, by men who are a remnant of\nan older evil civilization.\u201d\n\nLord Loreburn sums up his indictment of secret diplomacy in the\nfollowing language: \u201cSecret diplomacy has undergone its \u2018acid test\u2019 in\nthis country. It had every chance. The voice of party was silent. The\nForeign Minister was an English gentleman whom the country trusted and\nadmired, who was wholly free from personal enmities of every kind, and\nwho wanted peace. And secret diplomacy utterly failed. It prevented us\nfrom finding some alternative for war, and it prevented us from being\nprepared for war, because secret diplomacy means diplomacy aloof from\nParliament.\u201d The issue is here quite clearly stated. Those who see in\nthe methods and spirit of the old diplomacy the chief cause of war,\ndo not hold, on the one hand, that secret diplomacy involves at all\ntimes and in all cases unscrupulous plotting. But they believe that the\nmethod of dealing with foreign affairs as a mysterious matter, fit to\nbe handled only by the select, and the reliance on a policy of bargains\nand compensations, with the aim thus artificially to maintain a balance\nof power, may be blamed for this great catastrophe; for they stood\nin the way of dealing with great public affairs in a sounder manner,\nthat is, with more regard of the actual public interest and of the\nunderlying racial and popular factors.\n\nThose British critics who have attacked this method as practised in\ntheir own country before and during the war, do not thereby mean to\nimpute to British statesmen a major share in the responsibility for\nthe war. The high-mindedness and public spirit of the responsible\nstatesmen is recognized by all fair critics, and most of them imply\nthat Great Britain has far less to fear from this system than have\nnations with less responsible governments and a less sound tradition\nof statesmanship. They attack the system as a whole as it exists\nthroughout European diplomacy, and as it has been used by the British\nGovernment.\n\nFrom the point of view of historic evidence, and of strict reasoning\nfrom cause to effect, a great deal of doubt still remains as to how\nfar secret diplomacy in itself,--that is, the failure to publish\nto parliament and the people, details of the situation as it\ndeveloped,--could properly be considered the specific cause of the\nwar; no matter how definite may be our judgment and belief that the\nsecrecy and tortuousness of foreign policy are bound to generate an air\nof uncertainty and suspicion which will so greatly favor militarist\nintrigues and influence as to render the making of wars far more easy\nthan they would otherwise be, were time and opportunity given to the\npublic to consider the details of a critical situation. Yet it might\nbe difficult to prove by historic evidence, the specific proposition\nthat the war of 1914 was directly due to the fact that the development\nof international affairs was quite generally kept from the knowledge\nof the public. Nevertheless, unquestionably the atmosphere of secret\ndiplomacy is a medium exactly suited to the most baneful influences.\n\nViscount Haldane has made a strong defense of the policy of Sir Edward\nGrey. He asserts that \u201cthe failure of those who had to make the effort\nto keep the peace, does not show that they would have done better had\nthey discussed delicate details in public.\u201d He continues: \u201cThere are\ntopics and conjunctures in the almost daily changing relations between\nGovernments as to which silence is golden. For however proper it may be\nin point of broad principle that the people should be fully informed\nof what concerns them vitally, the most important thing is that those\nto whom they have confided their concerns should be given the best\nchance of success in averting danger to their interests. To have said\nmore in Parliament and on the platform in the years in question, or\nto have said it otherwise, would have been to run grave risks of more\nthan one sort.\u201d This defense, however, also makes certain assumptions,\nparticularly the underlying one that the war was not to be avoided by\nany method. It is based on the traditional concept of foreign affairs\nwhich considers that it is best to leave them at the discretion of a\nfew initiated and responsible officials. There can be no question that\nfrom the highest plane conceivable under the older ideas and norms of\ndiplomacy, the conduct of foreign relations by Sir Edward Grey must be\nconsidered as a model of sagacity and caution. But when Lord Cromer\ndescribes the secret arrangements concerning Morocco as \u201ca wise measure\nof preventive diplomacy,\u201d it is not easy to follow him.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nTHE CRISIS OF 1914\n\n\nIf secret diplomacy exhibits its drawbacks even in a country where\nparliamentary government is so highly developed as in England and\nwhere political intelligence and independence of judgment exist, we\nshall not be surprised at the continuous prevalence of devious methods\nin diplomacy in countries where the conduct of foreign affairs is\nconsidered quite frankly a matter only for the initiated, and where\nlittle pretense is made of an appeal to public opinion except in the\nsense of holding it in subjection by vague general ideas of national\ndanger, necessity, and honor. The main faults of German diplomacy\nwere due to its bureaucratic point of view and its lack of contact\nwith public opinion, both at home and abroad. It was distinctly\nan expression of the authoritative will of the state, guided by a\nsupposed inner knowledge of its dangers and needs, but without any real\neffort to strengthen itself through contact with the public mind. The\nReichstag was indeed occasionally informed of foreign developments,\nperhaps as frequently as in England, but there was no real mutual\ninfluence between the nation and the officials conducting foreign\naffairs. As has already been pointed out, German diplomacy failed to\nreassure either the neighbors or the people of Germany; its lack of\nclear objectives was puzzling and disquieting. It was also hurt by\nits constant, evident dependence on what should have been only the\nvery last resort--military force. A further disquieting characteristic\nof German politics was that there seemed to be a cynical approval of\ncertain courses of action which might indeed resemble what some other\nnations were doing, but which were treated by the latter rather as\nregrettable necessities. Thus there is, for instance, the conception of\n_Realpolitik_, of which Frederick the Great\u2019s statement is an extreme\ninstance: \u201cBefore declaring my intentions I consider on the one side\nthe adverse incidents which I must risk; on the other, the good fortune\nwhich I might hope; and after thorough consideration of pro and con, I\ndecide for war.\u201d\n\nComing now to the fateful crisis of 1914, it would appear that at this\ntime a great danger was allowed to grow up without the men in control\nof the government giving themselves a full account as to the fatal\nprobabilities involved, whereas the parliament and the public remained\nentirely uninformed. Germany had always more or less backed her\nAustrian ally in the Balkan policy of the latter. Bismarck had indeed\nbeen very cautious in this respect, and had been fully aware of the\ndanger inherent in such a policy, of committing Germany through giving\nAustria too much head. When the Servian question became acute, the\nheads of the German Government were indeed so reckless in encouraging\nstrong Austrian action as to justify the impression that they desired\nto push Austria-Hungary into a conflict. It would, however, appear,\nfrom a full study of all the data which is now possible, that the\nKaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg were quite optimistic in believing that\nthe conflict could be localized and that the solution could be left\nto Austria and Servia. When it was beginning to become quite clear\nthat Russia would in this instance not stand aside and that therefore\nFrance, too, would be thrown into the conflict, the German Chancellor\nbegan to make belated efforts to induce Austria to accept the mediation\nof the Powers on the basis that Belgrade should be occupied to assure\ncompliance with the Servian promises. The Austrian premier, Count\nBerchtold, however, was not inclined to reverse his engines. He took\nadvantage of the encouragement given to Austria in the first place, to\npersist in an irreconcilable attitude toward Servia. The documentary\nmaterial which has so far been published, shows that Berchtold\ninsinuated to the Russian and British embassies that he was favorable\nto mediation; meanwhile, he did not answer the proposals to that effect\nmade from Berlin, but in fact stubbornly pursued his stern policy\nagainst Servia. In turning a deaf ear to all proposals of mediation at\nthis time, Berchtold gave the militarists at Berlin and Petrograd the\ncontrol of the situation.\n\nBerchtold had inherited the Balkan policy of Aehrenthal, who had in\n1909 carried out the ambition of laying the two Slavic Provinces,\nBosnia and Herzegovina, \u201cat the feet of Emperor Francis Joseph at his\nSixtieth Jubilee.\u201d Count Berchtold himself was not considered a man\nof strong initiative; he vacillated and was undecided upon questions\nof great moment; he, however, displayed great stubbornness on the\nfatal point that the \u201chonor\u201d of Austria-Hungary did not permit of\nany mediation with Servia. Count Forgach, who was his chief adviser,\nhated Russia and Servia intensely, and it is believed that he was very\ninfluential in spurring Count Berchtold to aggressive action. Countess\nLeutrum holds him responsible for the war, \u201cnext to Aehrenthal.\u201d The\nGerman Ambassador at Vienna, Von Tschirsky, also harbored a great deal\nof personal resentment against Russia. There would appear to be great\nreason to doubt whether such efforts as Bethmann-Hollweg made to urge\nmoderation upon Berchtold were strongly emphasized by the personal\ninfluence of the German ambassador. Count Czernin states that all of\nHerr von Tschirsky\u2019s private speeches at this time were attuned to\n\u201cNow or Never,\u201d and he asserts that the German ambassador declared\nhis opinion to be \u201cthat at the present moment Germany was prepared\nto support our point of view with all her moral and military power,\nbut whether this would prove to be the case in future if we accepted\nthe Serbian rebuff appears to me doubtful.\u201d Count Czernin believes\nthat Tschirsky in particular was firmly persuaded that in the very\nnear future Germany would have to go through a war against France and\nRussia, and that he considered the year 1914 would be more favorable\nthan a later date. Count Czernin adds: \u201cFor this reason, because first\nof all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of either Russia or\nFrance, and secondly, because--and this is a very important point--he\nwas convinced that he could bring the Monarchy into this war, while\nit appeared doubtful to him that the aged and peace-loving Emperor\nFrancis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on any other occasion\nwhere the action would center less round him, he wished to make use of\nthe Servian episode so as to be sure of Austria-Hungary in the decisive\nstruggle. That was his policy, and not Bethmann\u2019s.... I am persuaded,\nhowever, that Tschirsky, in behaving as he did, widely overstretched\nhis prescribed sphere of activity. Isvolsky was not the only one of his\nkind.\u201d\n\nIt is not the purpose of this essay to enter into the difficult\nquestion of the specific guilt for bringing on the war of 1914.\nHowever, in examining the quality and methods of contemporary diplomacy\nit is not possible to avoid considering some of the phases of this\ndifficult question. The documents and other evidence which have\nrecently been published, make it appear that Bethmann-Hollweg, when\nthe terrible crisis was actually at hand, honestly attempted to bring\nabout a moderation of the course pursued by Austria. The original\nbelief of the German statesman itself could, however, be accounted\nfor, only on one of two alternative reasons, either because of an\nunbelievable lack of foresight, or the conviction that a threatening\nattitude would again, as in 1909, be successful, and that Russia would\nnot dare to follow up her constantly declared interest in the Servian\nsituation. And if worst should come to worst, \u201cwell then,\u201d the German\nleaders seemed to think, \u201cnow will be better than later.\u201d No matter\nwhat reasonable occasion German statesmen had during the years leading\nup to the war to fear a hostile policy on the part of neighboring\ngovernments, yet their attitude and action at a critical time shows\nuppermost in the minds of these statesmen and diplomats, a narrowly\ntactical, primarily bureaucratic, view of the factors involved. There\nwas always present in the background the notion of the necessity of\na preventive war. Those who make the actual decision to begin a war\nwithout any immediate provocation making it plainly defensive, who\nbegin it because of contingent dangers in the future, no matter how\ngreat, take a very serious responsibility. As has been said, the\nindicative \u201cGermany made war,\u201d is far more apt to leave a powerful\nimpression in the record of history than the subjunctive, \u201cIf Germany\nhad not made war then the others would have done so later on.\u201d\n\nThe fact that military action against Servia would probably involve\nRussia and thus set in motion the complete chain of international\nforces involving Europe in a world war, that is, the futility of the\nattempt to localize the struggle in Servia, is practically admitted in\nthe statement of the German White Book, issued August 3, 1914, to the\nfollowing effect: \u201cWe were aware of the fact that warlike undertaking\nagainst Servia would bring Russia into the war and that therefore our\nduty as an ally might entangle us likewise. We could, however, not\nadvise our Ally to yield in a manner incompatible with its dignity, nor\ncould we deny our assistance at this difficult moment.\u201d\n\nAustria-Hungary had judged that it would be incompatible with its\ndignity and honor to submit the Servian matter to arbitration. This\nillustrates a very characteristic feature of contemporary diplomacy,\nstill adhering to the traditions and prejudices of the past. The\nterm \u201chonor\u201d is one that is not translatable into terms which can be\nreasoned about. It is in fact a direct descendant of the conception of\n\u201chonor\u201d during the eighteenth century, in the code of the duelist. Men\nconstantly translate the concepts of their private life into public\naffairs, and to these men who at Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin, had\nthe destiny of the world in their hands, honor was an indefinable term\nwhich could be felt but not discussed. In practice, when applied to\nhuman affairs of the utmost importance, it cannot be distinguished from\nthe character of the personal duel, in which the conception of justice\nwas entirely subordinate. When it was said that Austria-Hungary found\narbitration \u201cbeneath its dignity,\u201d there was speaking the mentality of\nthe Feudal junker who considers himself too noble to appeal to a court\nagainst a peasant neighbor, but prefers to send his servants to give\nhim a thrashing. The honor of Austria-Hungary is of such a special\nkind in the mind of these men that it does not suffer arbitration, but\nsees in war the only possible satisfaction. In this as in many other\npoints, secret diplomacy is a superstition of the past. As late as May,\n1916, the _Pester Lloyd_, a semi-official paper, declared: \u201cEven if the\nRussian Government had stopt its mobilization, which it had secretly\nbegun notwithstanding all its hypocritical assurances, nevertheless\nAustria-Hungary would not have gone to any conference but would have\ninsisted without interference from third parties to settle its affairs\nwith Servia in consonance with the future security of Austria-Hungary.\u201d\nIt would appear plain that the Austrian leaders wanted war, but with\nServia alone; trusting that the formidable power of their great ally\nwould again block outside intervention.\n\nThus when we look at the men in whose hands at this time such a fateful\npower of decision was placed, we find them, as the great crisis\napproaches, themselves stunned by the enormity of the forces about to\nbe unchained, seeking still and hoping for some fortunate escape; yet\nguided in their specific action, not by a general masterly grasp of\nthe entire situation, such as is ordinarily expected of the diplomatic\nsuperman, but just by details happening to be most prominent in their\nmind, such as the incompatibility of arbitration with the honor of\nAustria, or the personal judgments and inclinations of individual\ndiplomats. As to a correct estimate of how the forces would work out,\nas to foresight of determining factors, these men showed no unusual\nability; in fact, the guess of the intelligent man on the street would\nhave been as safe as their judgment. They stood on too narrow a base;\nthey believed that Italy would remain neutral, that England would not\nenter the contest, and later that the United States would never engage\nin hostilities. When we consider the mental attitude of the controllers\nof foreign affairs in all countries during this long period of secret\nmanipulations, we can find nothing sacrosanct about the deductions\nand judgments of secret diplomacy; in fact, the lack of contact with\npublic opinion and the deeper forces of life, is everywhere painfully\napparent. A Swiss writer has stated: \u201cThe World War is the work of a\nsmall minority of men in power. Their power rests on the principle of\nauthority, and on the erroneous supposition of wisdom and foresight\nexceeding the average. The means of maintaining this erroneous\nsupposition is secret diplomacy, which deprives the people of all\npossibility of insight and control in the most momentous questions. The\nresult of this system is the ruin of Europe.\u201d It is too great a risk\nto take, to leave in the hands of individual men, no matter how highly\ngifted personally, the control of such forces and the playing of such\nchances.\n\nIn Russia, the conduct of foreign affairs under the Empire was in the\nhands of a narrow group of men of special training and experience, but\nwithout an element of responsibility to the public at large, except\nthat involved in the general results of diplomatic policy. It is a\nnotable fact that during the nineteenth century only six men held the\nposition of foreign ministers in Russia. This is by far the longest\naverage tenure in any country. Sazonov, who became foreign minister\nin 1911, further emphasized the esoteric character of foreign policy\nby definitely divorcing it from home affairs. He did not consult\nwith the Council of Ministers, but only with men of his own chosen\nenvironment, a select group of a few collaborators. Russian foreign\npolicy was therefore controlled by a very small clique, representing\nthe traditions of secret diplomacy, and playing at a game of chance,\nthough never so shrewdly, with the lives, fortunes and interests of\nvast populations. In the Balkan states Russian diplomacy had for a\nlong time applied all its arts in order to establish the predominance\nof Russian influence. The secret alliance between Servia and Bulgaria\nwas nurtured by Russia evidently with the desire of raising a barrier\nto the eastward expansion of Austrian influence. In 1912, the fear was\nentertained that the alliance might spend its main efforts against\nTurkey instead of Austria. At this time a loan was arranged for King\nFerdinand of Bulgaria, the funds for which were advanced by the Czar.\nThe Russian Foreign Office was fully informed concerning the Balkan\nalliance, which commenced the war in 1912 with Russian assent and\nencouragement. What direction the thoughts of Russian diplomats were\ntaking, is apparent from a remark of Sazonov, Russian Minister of\nForeign Affairs, to the Servian Minister, on April 29, 1913, reported\nby the latter as follows:\n\n  \u201cAgain Sazonov told me that we must work for the future because\n  we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria. I\n  replied that we would gladly give Bulgaria Monastir (Bitollia) if\n  we could acquire Bosnia and other territory of Austria.\u201d\n\nA Belgian diplomat, in a report written from Berlin in 1913, says that\nnotwithstanding the great Russian influence in the Balkans, Russian\ndiplomacy had vacillated a great deal there since the beginning of\nthe Balkan war; he goes on to say: \u201cIn a moment of confidence the\nFrench ambassador spoke particularly concerning the influence which M.\nIsvolsky has maintained, who has a personal desire of revenge against\nAustria-Hungary, and takes great pains to spoil the game whenever there\nis any appearance of Austrian success.\u201d (Baron Beyens to the Belgian\nMinister for Foreign Affairs, March 18, 1913.)\n\nWhen the great crisis came on, the diplomacy of Russia worked in close\nconnection with the militarists. The irreconcilable stubbornness of\nCount Berchtold greatly strengthened the hands of the militarists,\nboth in Petersburg and Berlin, and virtually put the decision in their\nhands. The Russians did their part to bring on the war by first\nordering mobilization and making that mobilization general almost\nimmediately. The facts concerning this matter have become known. On\nJuly 29, 1914, General Janushkevich, the Russian Minister of War, under\ndirections from the Foreign Minister Sazonov, gave the German military\nattach\u00e9 his word of honor as a soldier, to the effect that \u201cno general\nmobilization had taken place, or was desired.\u201d At the very time, he\nhad with him the Czar\u2019s mobilization order. During the night of July\n29th, the Czar gave directions to suspend the execution of the order\nfor general mobilization. Generals Janushkevich and Sukhomlinoff, with\nthe approval of M. Sazonov, made the momentous decision to go on with\nthe execution of the order, in disregard of the Czar\u2019s command. It is\nquite evident that this action made the peaceful settlement of the\ncrisis far more difficult, and gave full control into the hands of\nthe military party in Berlin. As late as July 31, M. Viviani told the\nGerman Ambassador at Paris that he was in no way informed of a general\nmobilization in Russia. The Russian militarists had got away.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nTHE SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR\n\n\nWhile the war lasted, the demands of self-protection required the\ncareful concealment of negotiations and policies from enemy knowledge.\nBut though it is easy to understand the need of secrecy at such a\ntime, yet the spirit displayed in these negotiations had but little in\ncommon with the ideals professed in the same breath. Moreover, there\nwas a lack of complete sincerity among the Allies themselves, and\nparticularly was there a concealment from some of them of important\nfacts and agreements affecting their interests. However, the most\nbaneful effect of secret diplomacy during the war is found in the\nundermining of public confidence in a moral foundation of public\naction. As Lord Loreburn says: \u201cIt was not wholesome that while our\npeople were stimulated to unparalleled exertions by a parade of lofty\nmotives there should be at the same time in existence agreements of\nthis kind, of which no public mention could be made, and from which\nlittle has resulted except the right of foreign Powers to demand\ntheir fulfilment on our part.\u201d That at a time when the people in the\nvast armies were actually fighting for ideals of freedom and peace,\ncommon to humanity, the chief care of responsible statesmen should have\nbeen the division of prospective spoils, did certainly not lay solid\nfoundations for peace.\n\nJapan in her action with respect to Shantung and in secretly making the\ntwenty-one demands on China, was first in the attempt to utilize the\ngreat struggle for narrowly selfish gain, in this case not entirely\nat the expense of the enemy but of a neutral and of her allies. Nor\ndid other governments keep themselves free from the temptations of\nprospective conquest, with the risk of making war interminable and\nputting the world face to face with revolution, anarchy and famine.\nAs early as February, 1915, the Russian Foreign Minister informed\nthe French and British ambassadors of the territorial acquisitions\nwhich Russia desired to make through the war, including a great part\nof Turkey in Europe and in Asia. The French and British Governments\nexpressed their readiness to agree, provided a number of claims made by\nFrance and England were satisfied. Italy entered the war, as is well\nknown, on condition of her claims for territorial annexations being\nsatisfied. She agreed to the Russian demands on the same condition.\n\nOn March 9, 1916, the Russian Foreign Minister instructed the Russian\nAmbassador at Paris to the following effect: \u201cIt is above all necessary\nto demand that the Polish Question should be excluded from the\nsubjects of international negotiation, and that all attempts to place\nPoland\u2019s future under the guarantee and control of the Powers should\nbe prevented.\u201d Thus did the Russian Government attempt secretly to\nlock the door against any chance of Poland regaining her lost national\nrights. The entry of Roumania in 1916 led to additional arrangements.\nThese agreements were kept strictly secret and the millions who were\nlaying down their lives in the war had no conception of this intricate\nweb of bargains.\n\nAn effort to settle at a time when the Allies were united in their\nmain aim in the furnace heat of the war, questions which might divide\nthem when peace had come in sight, could be understood; and that such\nagreements should be kept secret during the war, might have been\nconsidered a necessity. However, the necessity of war in this case was\nstretched to cover arrangements which in themselves went diametrically\ncontrary to the publicly professed principles for which the war was\nbeing fought, and gave rise to the just suspicion that in several cases\nat least, very specific advantages had been the controlling incentive\nfor entering the war. But these agreements have aroused the greatest\nresentment because they were in several cases directed against the\ninterests of third parties, and particularly because when the United\nStates was making its enormous and unselfish sacrifices, these treaties\nwere kept from its knowledge. That the American Government should not\nhave been informed of the secret treaties made at the instance of Japan\nin which American interests were most seriously affected, and that just\nafter these agreements had been concluded the statesmen who had been\nclosely connected with acceding to these arrangements on the part of\nGreat Britain, at the price of the British control of the islands of\nthe South Pacific, came to the United States to stimulate the practical\ndevotion there to the cause of the Allies, is a fact that will\nunfortunately help to give munition to those who are unfavorable to\nany real friendly understanding between the two great English-speaking\npowers. The secret commercial policy pursued by Great Britain during\nthe war is also justly subject to severe criticism as giving food and\nsubsistence to the growth of deep suspicion on the part of even the\nmost faithful of friends.\n\nThe secret treaties relating to the division of territories in Europe\ndid not come to the knowledge of the public until 1918. At that\ntime they were republished by one or two British papers, but were\nsuppressed by the remainder. The treaties were, however, distributed\nin innumerable copies by their own governments among the troops of\nthe Central Powers in order to stimulate them to fight in a spirit of\nself-defense. It is reported from various reliable sources that the\nSlovenes were the most eager to fight, of any part of the Austrian\narmy, after the Pact of London had become known to them, with its\nvarious promises to Italy.\n\nThe secret assurances which had been given to Italy in the Compact\nof London were probably the cause of prolonging the war, with its\nenormous slaughter, for more than a year. In the Spring of 1917,\nsecret negotiations were pursued between the Emperor of Austria, the\nPresident and Premier of France, and the British Prime Minister. The\nintermediaries in these negotiations were the Bourbon Princes Sixtus\nand Xavier, brothers of the Empress of Austria. The negotiations were\ncarried on from Switzerland with a confidential envoy of the Emperor\nof Austria. Only the Emperor, the Empress and the Duchess of Parma\nwere in the secret. Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of\nForeign Affairs at this time, at first knew only of the general fact,\nnot of the details. A note of Count Czernin, with a secret personal\nnote written by the Emperor, were brought to Prince Xavier and taken\nby him to Paris. The proposals in Count Czernin\u2019s note related to the\nrestoration and indemnification of Belgium, and the German renunciation\nof Alsace-Lorraine, which \u201cAustria-Hungary naturally would not\noppose.\u201d Count Czernin stated that Austria-Hungary could not make a\nseparate peace; that it had no idea of crushing Servia, but needed\nguarantees against such affairs as led to the murder at Sarajevo; that\nAustria-Hungary had no desire of crushing Roumania, etc. The secret\naddenda made by the Emperor, without the knowledge of Count Czernin,\nstated: \u201cWe will support France and exercise pressure on Germany with\nall means [in connection with Alsace-Lorraine]. We are absolutely not\nin Germany\u2019s hands; it was against Germany\u2019s will that we did not break\nwith America.\u201d\n\nWhen President Poincar\u00e9 received the Prince\u2019s report he stated\nthat the secret note afforded a basis for discussion, that he would\ncommunicate the two notes, with arrangements of absolute secrecy, to\nthe Premier, and inform the Czar by personal letter, as well as the\nKing of England, and Mr. Lloyd George, \u201cwho is a discrete man.\u201d But\nthe President thought that Italy would be the stumbling block. After\nthis interview the Princes proceeded to Vienna for a personal interview\nwith the Emperor, which took place on the night of March 23rd. The\nEmperor discussed the whole situation, saying that Servia was naturally\nthe friend of Austria, and that all that Austria needed was the\nsuppression of revolutionary propaganda there. He stated that one of\nthe Entente Powers was secretly conversing with Bulgaria; Bulgaria does\nnot know that the secret has leaked out. \u201cIt has not much importance,\nbecause all these dreams of empire of the East will have to end in the\nstatus quo, or very nearly that.\u201d Count Czernin later joined in the\nconversation, which is described as \u201crather glacial.\u201d He expressed\nhis belief that peace must be made at any price, and that it might be\nnecessary for Austria to secure a divorce from Germany because the\nlatter would never abandon Alsace-Lorraine. After a second visit, the\nEmperor gave Prince Xavier an autographed letter, enjoining absolute\nsecrecy because \u201can indiscretion would force him to send troops to the\nFrench front.\u201d The autographed letter of Emperor Charles, dated March\n24th, contains the following proposals: That he will support the just\nFrench claims to Alsace-Lorraine by all means, using all his personal\ninfluence with his allies; Belgium and Servia are to be restored to\nfull sovereignty; Belgium is to secure indemnities for her losses; and\nServia is to have access to the Adriatic Sea. On the basis of this\nletter, discussions took place among the men concerned in France and in\nEngland. But Italy remained the obstacle.\n\nAnother trip was taken by Prince Xavier to Vienna, where he met the\nEmperor on May 8th. The question now was, What compensations should\nAustria receive for ceding its territory to Italy in accordance\nwith the Pact of London? Count Czernin joined the meeting and on\nthe following day prepared a memorandum, which was based upon the\nprinciple, \u201cAustria-Hungary can cede no territory without compensation;\nbut if the territorial question is arranged, then a separate peace with\nthe Entente might be concluded.\u201d When the matter was taken up again at\nParis, the Italian difficulty remained. M. Ribot strongly adhered to\nthe idea that without Italy, no result could be had. Meanwhile, the\nunsuccessful Italian offensive of July, 1917, had supervened, and the\nwar had to go on for another sixteen months, although the acceptance of\nthe proposals of the Emperor would undoubtedly have brought it to an\nearly end.\n\nCount Czernin has given in his book, _In the World War_, an\nunimpassioned and coldly-balanced view of the diplomacy of the time.\nHe does not relate the details of the secret negotiations of 1917, but\nhe evidently did not approve of the manner in which they were carried\nout because their effect was to suggest to the Entente a willingness of\nAustria-Hungary to separate from her allies, without strengthening her\nposition in any way. In a letter written to Count Tisza in the summer\nof 1917, Czernin said: \u201cIt is possible to turn and steer the Entente\ncourse if thought feasible; but then courage would be needed to make\nthe turn fully. Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery\nand not carrying it out; we should lose all ground in Berlin and gain\nnothing either in London or Paris.\u201d\n\nThe policy pursued by Japan throughout the war made use of all the\ndevices of secret diplomacy for the attainment of ends narrowly\nnational. After having possessed herself of Tsing-tau, with a marked\ncold-shouldering of her British allies, Japan set about an attempt\nto arrange things in China so that no effective resistance might be\noffered there to Japan\u2019s expansionist desires. In January, 1915, the\nJapanese minister in an interview with the President of China, after\nenjoining the strictest secrecy on the pain of most disagreeable\nconsequences, proposed the famous twenty-one demands. That it should\nhave been attempted to dispose of matters so fundamentally important,\ninvolving the national rights of a population of 350,000,000 people,\nthrough demands secretly forced upon a President, at a time when the\nnational representative body did not function,--that is one of the\nstartling facts of modern history. Strange as it may seem, the Japanese\nForeign Office had apparently persuaded itself that secrecy could\nbe maintained in a matter of such transcendent importance. For when\ncontrary to that expectation and in accordance with nature and with\nthe salutary fact that, after all, such tremendous issues can not be\nthus secretly disposed of, the facts of the case began to leak out,\ncategorical denials were made by the Japanese Foreign Office and by\nvarious embassies. In this case, those who had the right to object\nto the disposal of important interests in which they themselves had a\nshare, were not mere neutrals or outsiders but the allies of Japan,\nengaged in a life and death struggle at the time. As the twenty-one\ndemands aimed at the establishment of a predominant position in\nChina through control of finance and armament, every other nation\nthere interested would have been adversely affected by the proposed\narrangement. The Chinese, though isolated, would not immediately yield\nto the threatening attitude of their neighbor and the negotiations\nwere strung out over months. Though they were assiduously kept secret,\nthe nature of the transaction in general and in detail became quite\nwell known outside, so that the results could not be kept hidden; yet\nthe whole procedure constituted an affirmation that it was proper to\ndeal with the destinies of a people in a secret council chamber, where\nthe demandant backed by strong military forces, confronted the first\nofficial of a vast, peaceful but unmilitant nation, which would never\nin the world agree to such procedure and the resultant undertakings.\nJapan did indeed get certain concessions, but at the cost of making her\ndiplomacy and policy universally suspected on account of the methods\nwhich had been used.\n\nThe policy of Japan at the time did not look with favor upon China\nassociating herself with the Allies. D\u00e9marches which were made to\nbring about the entry of China into the alliance were negatived by\nJapan. This in itself might have been based on sound reasons, yet\nthe real inwardness of this policy was revealed at the time when the\nUnited States had broken off relations with Germany and when the\nChinese Government in the days immediately thereafter was considering\nwhether to follow the example of the United States. From a report\nof the Russian Ambassador at Tokio concerning an interview with the\nForeign Minister of Japan, which took place on February 10, 1917, we\nlearn that the Minister for Foreign Affairs alluded to a rumor that an\nattempt might be made to induce China to join the Allies to the extent\nof breaking off relations with Germany. The Foreign Minister said in\neffect: \u201cIt would be unwise and dangerous to attempt to bring China to\nthe side of the Allies unless we can be sure that it can be carried\nthrough. This is, however, doubtful. Yet the Japanese Government is\nwilling to undertake the task of inducing China to take the step. But\nbefore making any such proposal, the Japanese Government desires to be\ninformed as to the attitude of the Russian Government in the matter of\nShantung and the Pacific Islands. Will the Russian Government support\nJapan at the Peace Conference in these matters?\u201d The Russian ambassador\nwas requested to get the opinion of his government on this point. In\nother words, in return for a commission paid largely by China herself,\nthe Japanese Government was ready to permit that China should join the\nAllies in the Great War. It was assumed by the Foreign Minister that\nJapan\u2019s persuasion should be necessary to induce China to take this\nstep; but in fact, at the very time when this conversation between\nthe minister and ambassador was going on, the Cabinet of China was in\nthe all-day session from which resulted the decision to follow the\nUnited States in breaking off relations with Germany. This step was\ntaken without compulsion, urgency or the promise of advantages, upon\na careful consideration of the underlying conditions and equities,\nwithout assurances of gain, merely in the expectation of fair treatment\nas an ally and associate.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nHOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED\n\n\nThe world has not yet recovered from the surprise and disillusionment\nwhich overcame it when the secret treaties of the war became known and\nwhen it became evident that they would be made the basis of the Treaty\nof Peace. The secrecy of the procedure of the Peace Conference--which\nhad been heralded as an assembly of the peoples for carrying out and\nmaking permanent those great principles for which men had grimly and\nsilently suffered and died and which had been eloquently voiced by\nthe American President--seemed to be so complete a return to the old\nmethods of diplomacy that from the day when the muzzle was clamped on,\npublic faith in the conference and its results was shaken. The motives\nof the men who made this decision were probably good. It was their\ndesire that the work should be rapidly accomplished and should not\nbe confused by divided counsels. But again the results of the secret\nmethod are hardly apt to increase confidence in its usefulness as a\nprocedure for dealing with the affairs of the peoples of the world in\nsuch a manner as to place them upon a sound and lasting foundation.\n\nThe solemn document which was prepared for the information of the\nnewspaper men on the decision of the peace conference to enforce\nsecrecy, did not satisfy any one. To the public there seemed to be\nno larger principle at issue than that, on this occasion if ever,\nopen covenants should be openly arrived at, and it was feared that\nif the peace conference did not base its action upon an appeal to\npublic opinion, no adequate solution could be found at all. When the\ntreaty itself had been framed, it was sedulously kept secret until\ndistributed by the French paper _Bonsoir_. The deliberations of the\nCouncil of Five were secret beyond all precedents in public action.\nNo secretaries were admitted and no official minutes were kept, nor\nwere there communications to the public through the press. Doctor\nDillon\u2019s description of the Five as \u201ca gang of benevolent conspirators,\nignoring history and expertship, shutting themselves up in a room and\ntalking disconnectedly,\u201d unfortunately appears not entirely untrue;\nparticularly as to the ignoring of history and expertship, which was\nquite patent, although from the nature of things we cannot exactly\nknow how disconnectedly the Five talked.\n\nUnfortunately, after the war the use of secret diplomatic policy\nhas continued without noticeable diminution. The details of certain\nsituations make one feel as if we are after all only a generation\nremoved from the eighteenth century. These matters are so recent and\nstill so controversial that I do not desire to enter upon them in any\ndetail.\n\nIt is, however, surely to be regretted, that it should have been\nfound necessary to surround the mandates with peculiar secrecy. This\ninstitution was conceived in a desire to create a trusteeship in\nbehalf of the world in general and for the particular benefit of the\npopulations comprised in the mandates. Not only has the assignment of\ncertain mandates given rise to great popular resistance indicating that\nthe local populations were far from ready to trust their interests\nto a foreign mandatory, but the fact that these arrangements are so\ncarefully guarded with secrecy comes near to destroying all hope\nthat there is any intention to handle them otherwise than from the\nimperialist point of view and for the benefit of the mandatory.\n\nAmong the many things that have happened since the armistice, the\nFranco-Hungarian intrigues are specially to be noted as emphasizing the\ngreat danger of secret methods, in which a government runs the risk of\nbeing committed by persons, irresponsible or not properly controlled,\ninto embarrassing and harmful situations. We know of these particular\nfacts through confidential reports discovered and published, officially\nrecognized by certain governments, though formally denied by the\nMagyar Cabinet. These papers give working details of what was already\nknown in general terms concerning reactionary Hungarian intrigues\nin Czecho-Slovakia and Austria, including preparations for an armed\nuprising, and other assistance to monarchists. French interests were at\nthe same time active in Hungary. They made an agreement for a leasing\nof the Hungarian state railways for fifty years. According to this\ncontract, the Hungarian Government is bound to consult the diplomatic\nrepresentative of the French Government concerning every measure\nwhich may have a bearing on any clause of the agreement. A political\ncompact was simultaneously initialed in which the French Government\nwithdrew its opposition to universal military service in Hungary, and\nthat country was to be assisted in boundary rectifications at the\nexpense of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. A third agreement provided\nfor the sending of a Hungarian army against Soviet Russia under French\ncommand. These agreements were undoubtedly accepted by many people as\nfully concluded. The Magyar Premier in open session of the national\nassembly boasted of having achieved an alliance with France; the same\nunderstanding was also accepted by certain Paris newspapers. The French\nGovernment, however, did not sanction what secret negotiators had\nprepared in Hungary and disavowed the agreements, with the exception\nof the lease of the Hungarian railways. This illustrates how in times\nof unsettlement and sharp national rivalry, representatives on the\nspot or agents of powerful interests in close touch with the home\ngovernment may by secret means try to bring about arrangements which\nthe conscience of their nation does not approve and which serve merely\nto generate suspicion and distrust.\n\nThere is reason to believe that the draft of a secret treaty between\nFrance and Yugo-Slavia which was published in 1920 by the _Idea\nNazionale_ was at the time actually being considered by the two\ngovernments concerned. One of the points of the proposed treaty was\nthat upon the declaration of war between France and any Mediterranean\npower, Yugo-Slavic troops would be massed along the hostile boundary\naccording to previously determined plans. In connection with this\nprovision the representatives of France made the following suggestion:\n\u201cIn case of a conflict it would be better that the Yugo-Slavic\ntroops, instead of massing on the hostile frontier, should rather\nprovoke a \u2018Casus Belli\u2019 on the part of the nation at war with France.\nOtherwise their intervention might bring on the interference of other\npowers.\u201d The proposed arrangements, even though not adopted by the two\ngovernments, nevertheless illustrate the methods acceptable to secret\ndiplomacy, but which open public opinion would never sanction.\n\nWhatever we may think about the exact share of the blame for having\nbrought on the great catastrophe which should be attributed to\nsecret methods and policies, we cannot have any doubts about their\ninfluence since the armistice. Whether or not secret diplomacy brought\non the war, it certainly has not ended it. War still exists, not\nonly when actual hostilities are going on, but in the whole temper\nof international affairs--continuing enmity, continuing armaments,\nunending waste of human effort. Thus, for one thing, the entire Near\nEastern situation remains unsettled. As an expert on this troubled\nregion has said: \u201cThe principle of settlement as revealed by these\ntreaties is fundamentally wrong. The East must be resuscitated, not\nexploited.\u201d But be it East or West, there is the same return to the\nold game of balancing off gains and changing boundaries, without\nconsideration of the rights of the respective peoples. The costly\nmistakes of the Congresses of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin are being\nrepeated.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\nTHE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE\n\n\nOur historical survey of diplomatic policy and practice does not hold\nmuch assurance that the evils of secret diplomacy have very appreciably\nwaned since the eighteenth century. The cruder methods of deception\nand corruption which were at that time employed would indeed now be\nconsidered beneath the dignity of diplomats; although it is unhappily\ntrue that some of the most despicable tricks, such as stealing\ncorrespondence and placing informers in houses to be watched, are still\npractised occasionally. However, it may be said that while in general\nthe trade-secrets of diplomacy have lost greatly in prestige, the\nspirit of diplomatic action itself has not yet been brought into accord\nwith democratic ideals.\n\nA secret service attached to the diplomatic establishment is still\nconsidered useful by some governments. It is, however, certainly very\ndoubtful whether the results thus obtained in the nature of accurate\ninformation, are at all commensurate to the expense and to the constant\ndanger of being misinformed through secret agents who think that they\nmust earn their pay. My own observation leads me to believe that people\nwho use secret service information are frequently confused and worried\nby an abundance of unauthenticated reports brought to them; they would\nhave been far better off without backstairs information, relying on\nthe fundamental facts and on knowledge which can be obtained only by\nseeking the confidence of the men who control public action. Secret\nservice gossip may often give the key to the aims and desires of an\nindividual person, and if one is willing to appeal to motives through\ncorrupt and deceitful means, the information may be actually useful.\nHowever, he whose policy rests upon an essential reasonableness and\nmutual benefit, can afford to disregard such gossip.\n\nWe might distinguish between a secrecy which is vicious in itself,\nand one that pursues beneficent objects. The former seeks to conceal\nthe presence of harmful motives and projects, to confuse and mislead\npeople to their disadvantage, and in general, to play on weakness and\nignorance. The other keeps secret its plans and negotiations which in\nthemselves have honest motives, from a desire to prevent interference\nwith their prompt and complete realization. Opinions as to the\ncharacter of a policy may differ widely and those who secretly advance\na policy generally condemned by many, may perhaps claim credit for\nhonest purposes. This type of secrecy is common. Unfortunately, though\nit may advance a good object, it incidentally has an evil influence\nupon public confidence. It must be confessed that the distinction here\npointed out is difficult to apply in practice in a thoroughly objective\nmanner, because there are probably among diplomats very few indeed who\ndo not persuade themselves at least that the means applied by them are\ndesigned to achieve useful purposes.\n\nA good example of how stratagem may be used for a laudable purpose\nis found in the action of William J. Buchanan, American Minister\nto Argentina, in adjusting the Chili-Argentinian boundary dispute.\nBuchanan, one of the most original of American diplomats, had nothing\nwhatever of the suave manipulator of the old school of diplomacy. He\nwas direct to the verge of bruskness, yet his ability to go straight\nto the essential point, and his mastery and bigness, made him highly\nsuccessful as a negotiator. In this particular case, Buchanan had been\ndesignated, together with a Chilian and an Argentinian representative,\non a commission to settle boundary questions and requested to make a\npreliminary report. He agreed to act only on the following conditions:\nThat because of the complexity and difficulty of the questions\ninvolved, it would be necessary to report on the suggested boundary\nby sections, that each section should be voted upon as reported by\nhim, and that a majority vote on each section should be decisive. This\nproposal was accepted. After a careful investigation, Buchanan made his\nreport, and it was found that on each section the suggested boundary\nwas carried by two votes against one; the American always voted in the\naffirmative; the Chilian and Argentinian, as in the particular section\nthe allotments seemed favorable or unfavorable to their respective\ncountry. In accordance with the terms agreed upon, the entire report\nhad thus to be accepted, and all the thorny problems of long-standing\nboundary controversies were settled. Had Buchanan not used this\nstratagem it is very unlikely that the report as a whole would have\nbeen accepted, as each of his associates would have felt that he could\nnot vote for a report containing arrangements for giving up specific\ntracts of territory which his country had hitherto always insisted\nupon retaining. By this clever arrangement Buchanan made it possible\nfor them to vote against such relinquishment in each case without\ndefeating the project as a whole; but if he had revealed to them his\nplan at the beginning, the object could not have been achieved.\n\nThis incident illustrates that a complete solution will often be\naccepted as satisfactory although it may contain details which, by\nthemselves, would have been resisted to the last. It may be said that\nthe disadvantage of public discussion lies in the emphasizing of such\npoints of opposition, and the obscuring of the general reasonableness\nof a solution.\n\nMr. Balfour in his defense of the secrecy of diplomatic intercourse,\nsays that the work of diplomacy is exactly similar to the work which\nis done every day between two great business firms. He then argues\nthat, in all such relationships, it is unwise to air difficulties in\npublic. Bismarck used the more homely illustration of a horse trade,\nthe participants in which should not be expected to tell each other\nall they know about the prospective bargain. That view is putting\ndiplomacy on a rather lowly footing. One might expect a somewhat\ndifferent temper among men dealing with momentous public affairs than\nthe bluff-and-haggle of a petty private transaction. Yet such tactics\nhave actually been found useful in diplomacy. Mr. Balfour is on\nsounder ground when he says, \u201cIn private, in conversations which need\nnot go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, both parties may\nput their case as strongly as they like and no soreness remains,\u201d but\n\u201cdirectly a controversy becomes public, all that fair give-and-take\nbecomes difficult or impossible.\u201d This, of course, implies a somewhat\nlow estimate of public intelligence and self-control, of which more\nlater.\n\nThe greatest vice of a secret diplomatic policy, working in the dark\nand concealing international undertakings, lies in the inevitable\ngenerating of mutual suspicion and the total destruction of public\nconfidence among the different countries which compose the family of\nnations. No nation is so bad as imagination, confused and poisoned\nby secrecy and by the suggestion of dire plottings, would paint it.\nAgreements and understandings which do not exist at all are imagined,\nthe nature of those which actually have been made is misjudged, and\nanimosities are exaggerated; thus the public is quite naturally put in\nthat mood of suspicion and excitement which renders it incapable of\njudging calmly when apparently startling facts suddenly emerge.\n\nSecret diplomacy destroys public confidence, however, in a still more\ninsidious manner: by the practice of using a language of ideal aims\nand humanitarian professions in order to conceal and veil the most\nnarrowly selfish, unjust and unconscionable actions. The conventional\nlanguage of diplomacy still carries in it many of the phrases and\nconcepts instilled by the false idealism of the eighteenth century, to\nwhich at that time diplomacy gave lip worship. The most disconcerting\nperformances of this kind are the profuse and reiterated declarations\npromising the maintenance of the sovereignty, independence and\nintegrity of certain countries, when in fact the action really taken\nwas quite to the contrary effect.\n\nThe diplomacy of Japan has manifested peculiar expertship in the use\nof phrases that are associated with some wise public dispensation\nor arrangement and which have a calming effect--to cover action not\nremotely in fact contributing to such beneficent providences. The\nsovereignty, integrity and independence of a neighboring country are\nguaranteed in solemn terms at the very moment when force, intrigue and\nevery tricky artifice are secretly employed to destroy them. \u201cStrong\npopular demand\u201d is alleged as a reason for harsh action abroad, in a\ncountry where the expressions of public opinions as well as policy\nitself are controlled by a narrow group, with absolutist authority.\nThere is so much talk of \u201cfrank discussion\u201d that every one is put on\nhis guard as soon as the word \u201cfrank\u201d is uttered.\n\nThe \u201cpeace of Asia,\u201d a \u201cMonroe Doctrine for Asia,\u201d the \u201cOpen Door,\u201d\n\u201cgreatest frankness,\u201d \u201chearty co\u00f6peration with other powers,\u201d are\nheralded at times when the context of facts makes a strange commentary.\nBut while such a discrepancy is very strident in a country where\nmilitary absolutism wields control over diplomacy, with a grudging\nobeisance to representative forms, yet other countries are by no\nmeans free from this hypocrisy. What blasted promise of equity in\nall that succession of declarations concerning Korea, China, Persia,\nparts of Turkey, and Morocco. What confusion of political ideals in\nsupporting Denikin, Wrangel, and Horthy as defenders of \u201crepresentative\ngovernment.\u201d\n\nWhen Russia and Japan, in response to Secretary Knox\u2019 Manchurian\nproposal had made their secret arrangements to defeat his policy,\nGreat Britain, though it had made many reassuring protestations at\nWashington, nevertheless had secretly acquiesced (to cite a Russian\ndiplomatic paper) in the \u201crecognition of our (Russian) sphere of\ninfluence in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Western China, with\nthe exception of Kashgar, as well as the undertaking not to hinder us\nin the execution of our plans in these territories, and herself to\npursue no aims which we should have to regard as incompatible with our\ninterest.\u201d And it was also stated that Great Britain, in return, was\nto receive \u201crecognition of her freedom of action and her privileged\nposition in Tibet.\u201d This was in 1912.\n\nThus were the solemn declarations relating to the Open Door and the\nintegrity of China applied in action.\n\nSubsequent departure from the letter and spirit of such declarations\nmay indeed sometimes be excused on account of changed circumstances;\nbut frequently it is quite apparent to those who know what is going on,\nthat such well-sounding declarations are made for public consumption,\nat the very time when the contrary action is taken secretly.\n\nThis is indeed nothing less than a crime against the public opinion and\nconscience of the world, which cannot be condemned in terms too strong.\nIt shows a thorough contempt of the people, who are supposed to be\neither of so little intelligence or of so short a memory that such vain\nprofessions may succeed in veiling the true inwardness of political\nintrigue. This practice tends to engender thorough confusion in the\npublic mind as to standards of right and justice in international\naffairs; it shakes the basis on which alone sound international\nrelations can grow up; as, indeed, all social relations must rest upon\nconfidence in an underlying justice and equity.\n\nClosely allied to the practice of making public declarations in\ninternational affairs which do not correspond with the specific action\ntaken, is the control of the press and the censure of news. This is\nindeed a matter which transcends the subject of diplomacy, because\na system of press control and censure is often applied by other\ndepartments of the government than the diplomatic branch. As far as\nforeign affairs are concerned, it is used in an effort to support\nforeign policy, and it therefore shares the same defects which inhere\nin the old diplomacy. Like secret diplomatic control, it is accounted\nfor on the assumption that the people cannot be trusted with the entire\ntruth, and that carefully selected portions of the truth have to be\nput forth in order to make them ready to support the policy considered\nnecessary by the leaders. This involves the assumption of an enormous\nresponsibility by a few leaders in determining by themselves what\nthe public interest requires and instead of relying on the strength\nnaturally to be gained from a spontaneous public opinion, to attempt\nto fashion that opinion for specific purposes. Press control and\ncensure, with the incomplete and warped information which it implies,\nis one of the evil accompaniments considered necessary in the conduct\nof a war, for the safety of the combatant nation. The principle that\nstrategic information must be kept secret is extended, at such times,\nout of all reason. After hostilities have actually been concluded, this\npractice tends to subsist and to continue the evils of misinformation\nand confusion in the public judgment. The manner in which all news\nemanating from the Balkan and Near Eastern countries has been censured\nsince the war, has made it impossible for the public of the world to\nform a just conception as to what is there going on. Control of the\npress and censorship likewise resulted in such confusion in the public\nmind concerning the problems of Russia, that there remained no reliable\nbasis for a policy which would facilitate the restoration of more\nnormal conditions there, in a sympathetic spirit with the struggles and\ndifficulties of the Russian people.\n\nOn account of the natural fact that men are apt to be influenced in\ntheir action unconsciously through persons with whom they have constant\nassociations, it is a matter of no mean importance that the armament\ninterests should have been so strongly represented in many capitals by\nmen of high professional and social standing, always on the ground,\neager to advance the business in military supplies. In many capitals,\nvery close relationships have grown up between the diplomatic officers\nand the representatives of the great armament firms. As a mutual\napprehension of excessive preparation for war greatly stimulates these\nindustries, it is not surprising that their representatives do not\nexert themselves to prevent occasional war scares. In fact, highly\nmisleading information on war plans has often been given out, as in the\ncase of a representative of the Coventry Ordnance Works, who in 1909\ninformed the British Government of excessive shipbuilding by Germany.\nThe news was later found to be erroneous; but new orders had been\ngiven in Great Britain, and through action and reaction armaments were\nstimulated elsewhere. The close connection of the Krupp Iron Works with\nthe German Government and with associations favoring aggressive foreign\naction is well known.\n\nIt has often happened that what represents itself to be a national\ninterest and enlists diplomatic and political support in that way, is\nreally only the enterprise of individuals to make profits. The men\nwho support it with their best energies and talents are not villains,\nbut their method of assuming a great national interest where only\na tradition, a prejudice or a private plan of profit are involved,\nrenders their doings far from beneficial to the commonweal. Similarly,\nthose who operate on the principle that the public mind must be\nnourished with certain carefully selected facts and kept from the\nknowledge of others, may have honest motives, but their ideas of public\naction are obsolete or deserve to be so, as they are left over from the\nabsolutist r\u00e9gime in politics.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\nPARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS\n\n\nIn considering the relation of legislative bodies, and of the public\nopinion therein represented, to the conduct of foreign affairs, it will\nbe useful to glance briefly at the relevant historical facts. When the\nUnited Colonies of America formed a separate political organization\nfrom the mother country, the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted\nto a committee of Congress, a successor to the Committee of Secret\nCorrespondence. In 1781 a Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, with a\npermanent department, was created and in 1782 the conduct of foreign\naffairs was regulated in the following terms:\n\n  \u201cAll letters to sovereign powers, letters of credence, plans of\n  treaties, conventions, manifestoes, instructions, passports, safe\n  conducts, and other acts of Congress relative to the department\n  of foreign affairs, when the substance thereof shall have been\n  previously agreed to in Congress, shall be reduced to form in\n  the office of foreign affairs, and submitted to the opinion of\n  Congress, and when passed, signed and attested, sent to the\n  office of foreign affairs to be countersigned and forwarded.\u201d\n\nCongress therefore retained a very close control over this matter; a\ncontrol which under the Constitution passed to the Senate, though in\na restricted form. In no other country did a legislative committee\nparticipate in the conduct of foreign affairs with similar power and\ninfluence. The policy of the arrangements under the Constitution is\nexplained by John Jay in the _Federalist_ as follows:\n\n  \u201cIt seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever\n  nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are\n  sometime requisite. There are cases where the most useful\n  intelligency may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can\n  be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions\n  will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by\n  mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many\n  of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the\n  President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and\n  still less in that of a large popular assembly.\u201d\n\nJay\u2019s explanation is dominated by the conception which the eighteenth\ncentury had of the functions of diplomacy and the conditions of its\nwork. The constitutional system as conceived at that time implied\n(1) Full power of negotiation in the President, (2) Taking counsel\nwith the Senate, (3) Formal ratification of treaties by the Senate,\nand publication thereof as parts of the law of the land. The system\nhas been highly praised by European publicists as reconciling the\nmaintenance of confidential relations with publicity of the results, in\nthat treaties are given the character of laws.\n\nIn the course of the nineteenth century there occurred many instances\nresulting in a growing practice of making special agreements by the\nSecretary of State alone, without the advice and consent of the Senate.\nWhen President Roosevelt in 1905 attempted to deal with the Dominican\nsituation in this manner, the Senate objected and insisted that all\ninternational agreements of any kind must be submitted to its action.\nThe system of the United States, however, actually permits of the\ncurrent conduct of foreign affairs without information to the people or\neven without constant and complete information to the Senate which is,\nmoreover, usually preoccupied with matters of internal legislation.\n\nIn England, the mother of Parliaments, we might expect that there\nshould have been a constant effort at parliamentary control of\nforeign affairs, with strong remonstrance when effective control was\ndenied; yet on account of the specific nature of the system of Cabinet\ngovernment, such has not been the case. Under the two-party system as\nit exists in England the conduct of foreign affairs is always in the\nhands of a minister trusted and supported by the majority in the Lower\nHouse. Even if the minority should attempt to censor the conduct of\nforeign affairs as being carried on apart from the knowledge and active\nconsent of the House, the majority whose leaders form the Cabinet which\nis managing things, will always prevent such a vote from succeeding.\nOnly in case of a cabinet going absolutely and openly counter to the\npolicy of its own party in Parliament could a real conflict of this\nnature arise; and such a contingency is itself impossible, because of\nthe party control exercised by the cabinet.\n\nAccording to the theory of the Stuarts, the management of foreign\naffairs belonged entirely to the Crown which had not at that time been\nput in commission. In 1677 the House of Commons objected to granting\nmoney for alliances and for wars, unless the matter in question had\nbeen previously communicated to it. Charles II, however, declared the\nconduct of foreign affairs to be the Crown\u2019s fundamental prerogative\nin which it must remain free from direct control of Parliament.\nWilliam III was in fact to a very large extent his own Minister for\nForeign Affairs. With the introduction of responsible Government\nunder the Hanoverians, however, the situation changed. The dominant\nparty being represented by the ministers was quite ready to submit to\ntheir guidance in matters of foreign affairs. It was the opposition\nwho occasionally attacked the government on its foreign policy, and\nparticularly the opposition in the House of Lords. In a Lords\u2019 protest\nof March 26, 1734, it was urged that \u201cthe interposition of the British\nParliament would be more effectual than the occasional expedients of\nfluctuating and variable negotiations.\u201d In 1740 it was moved that a\nselect committee consisting of peers should be appointed to inquire\ninto the conduct of the Spanish War. The motion was rejected. Another\nLords\u2019 protest in the same year opposes the argument that absolute\nsecrecy is essential because this claim is often used in bar of all\ninquiries. Such secrecy is \u201cmuch oftener the refuge of guilt than the\nresort of innocence.\u201d\n\nWyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for certain letters of\ninstructions, argued for the necessity of giving such information to\nParliament. He asked how could members of the House of Commons judge\nof the estimates to be laid before them as a provision for national\nsafety if they did not know by what danger the nation was confronted.\nThe motion, however, was rejected.\n\nWhen Pelham was criticized in the House for not having informed\nParliament of the preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle he\nargued: \u201cIf Parliament should encroach upon the prerogative of the\nCrown, by assuming a right to make peace or war, and to inquire into\nforeign transactions under negotiation, our affairs will be reduced\nto a dangerous predicament; for no foreign State will negotiate with\nour ministers, or conclude any treaty with them, either political or\ncommercial.\u201d This is an argument often made in the eighteenth century\nto show the unwisdom of Parliamentary control. The change of ministers\nfollowing party changes in the House, and the fact that the Foreign\nMinister would not by his own word be able to give complete assurances\nto foreign governments, were considered to put the British Government\nunder a disadvantage in negotiations. It was therefore considered\nundesirable that negotiations should be submitted to the control and\nsanction of Parliament. Walpole had stated the matter in the following\nwords:\n\n  \u201cTherefore while our happy constitution remains entire, while the\n  Parliament meets but once a year, and does not continue assembled\n  above three or four months in the twelve, it is impossible for\n  either House of Parliament to intermeddle, much less to prescribe\n  to the Crown, in any affairs relating to peace or war, without\n  exposing the nation to imminent danger.\u201d\n\nThroughout the nineteenth century Parliament interfered very little\nwith the conduct of foreign affairs. The minister for foreign affairs\nor the premier would from time to time give information or make a\nsystematic discourse on foreign affairs and it was understood that\nthe House would be kept informed concerning the aims and tendencies\nof the Government\u2019s foreign policy. Specific questions were asked by\nmembers but not frequently. The nature of the British system would have\nrendered unmeaning any struggle for control between the House and the\nCabinet.\n\nThe manner of keeping Parliament and the public informed on foreign\naffairs was discussed. The Earl of Clarendon spoke of the practice of\nlaying before Parliament official information in the _Blue Books_. He\nstated:\n\n  \u201cI am perfectly certain there is always laid before Parliament\n  a very fair and complete view of the transactions between this\n  country and any other to which those papers may relate. I know\n  that foreign Governments rather complain of our Blue Books, and\n  to a certain extent they may curtail some of the communications\n  that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be extremely\n  sorry to see our system of publication of diplomatic papers in\n  any way curtailed, or different from what it is; of course,\n  there must always be care taken not to compromise individuals\n  for the information they have given, but I believe it is an\n  immense advantage to this country that our despatches and\n  diplomatic transactions should be known, because if they have the\n  approbation of Parliament and of the country, the Government then\n  has the whole weight of public opinion in its favor, and it is\n  that which gives such strength to our policy and to our opinions\n  in foreign countries.\u201d\n\nThat is a very statesmanlike presentation of the advantages of constant\npublic knowledge of foreign policy in giving the government a secure\nbase of intelligent support.\n\nWhen dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large numbers concerning the\nforeign policy of the government, as in 1857 and again in 1878 after\nthe concealment of the Schuvalof agreement, complaint was frequently\nmade in Parliament and in the press to the effect that Parliament on\nthe one hand was not given a chance to acquire a complete knowledge\nof foreign policy, and on the other it was not sufficiently alert and\nactive in using its opportunities for control. In 1886 the following\nresolution was moved:\n\n  \u201cThat in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient\n  to embark in war, contract engagements involving grave\n  responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the\n  Empire, without the knowledge and consent of Parliament.\u201d\n\nLike other similar resolutions, it did not pass. Mr. Gladstone opposed\nit on the ground that the House of Commons under existing arrangements\nactually possessed all necessary power of control and that the passage\nof this resolution would mean simply that the House of Lords would\nshare this power with it.\n\nIn 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to public criticism of\nnegotiations which were still in progress between Russia and Great\nBritain regarding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the following\ninteresting and important statement with respect to the relations of\nforeign policies to public opinion, which in temper resembles that of\nLord Clarendon cited above:\n\n  \u201cThe noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which\n  we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty of\n  an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the conduct of the\n  Government, if by so doing it should have the effect of\n  discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world.\n  That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it\n  is impossible to assent to.... If we are of opinion that the\n  course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government\n  has mismanaged, that faults are being committed and dangers are\n  being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom we can\n  appeal in order to correct the evil; our absolute Sovereign is\n  the people of this country, and it is they, and they alone, who\n  can bring a remedy to the mischief which is going on. You have\n  a form of Government which in many points is purely democratic,\n  and you must take it with the incidents which naturally adhere to\n  it, and one of these incidents is publicity of deliberation. The\n  Cabinet is the people, and their deliberations are conducted in\n  the open field. If they are to be rightly informed, you must deal\n  fully and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their\n  determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, but\n  it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign\n  Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged communications\n  between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot\n  suppress the argument because somebody else outside hears it and\n  you may be adversely affected by it....\u201d\n\nThe concealment of important obligations and the growing secrecy of\ndiplomatic affairs during the first decade of the Twentieth Century\nbrought on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the House of Commons.\nAfter the secret agreement concerning Morocco became known, Mr. John\nDillon expressed himself as follows, in a speech in the House of\nCommons in September, 1911:\n\n  \u201cI do not believe any representative assembly in the history\n  of the world has ever been called upon to discuss a matter so\n  vital and so far-reaching as that which the House of Commons has\n  before it to-day to consider, and with so absolute a lack of\n  information.... The House was summoned for this discussion to-day\n  without any papers whatsoever.... We ought at all events to have\n  had an account of diplomatic correspondence between the four\n  great Powers intimately interested in the question of Morocco,\n  as is customary to be given to the House of Commons on such an\n  occasion. This would have enabled members of the House before\n  the debate commenced, to form a really well-grounded judgment\n  upon the whole matter. We have heard a good deal to-night of\n  the secrecy of the Foreign policy of this country. It is no use\n  attempting to deny it. Those of us who have been a long time in\n  this House, and can remember the methods of the Foreign Office\n  twenty-five years ago, know as a matter of fact, which cannot be\n  successfully denied, that the Foreign Office policy has become\n  during the last ten years progressively more secret every year.\n  Until this present year this has gone on, when the intense\n  pressure of Foreign Affairs and the danger of war has forced\n  the hands of the Minister to give some time for the discussion\n  of Foreign Office affairs. For ten years the Foreign policy of\n  this country has been conducted behind an elaborate screen of\n  secrecy. Some of us pointed out years ago that the secrecy of\n  Foreign Affairs was the inevitable and logical result of that\n  new departure which was heralded about ten years ago, and which\n  we heard praised once more on the floor of this House to-night.\n  I refer to what is known as the policy of the continuity of the\n  Foreign policy of this country; of the withdrawal of the Foreign\n  policy of this country from the sphere of party politics.\u201d\n\nAt the same session Mr. Swift MacNeill expressed himself very strongly\non the subject of withholding information from Parliament, in the\nfollowing terms:\n\n  \u201cFrom generation to generation, you have allowed treaties\n  involving the highest international obligations--involving\n  questions of peace and war--to be taken absolutely out of the\n  hands of the House. It is no exaggeration to say, so far as\n  international policy is concerned, you have rendered the House as\n  little effectively powerful as any man walking over Westminster\n  Bridge. Over and over again treaties involving matters of life\n  and death, involving questions of first-class importance, have\n  been ratified behind the back of Parliament.... The people\n  themselves must be allowed to know all about this diplomacy and\n  what it is. And there should be no secrecy in regard to high\n  diplomatic statecraft about it. The House of Commons is sample\n  judge of what is discreet and what is indiscreet, and it is a\n  complete absurdity for others to treat us as children or for\n  us to allow ourselves to be so treated in matters of such high\n  international importance as those involving questions of peace\n  and war.\u201d\n\nSir Edward Grey in his reply stated that secrecy up to a certain point\nwas necessary and that particularly the ratification of treaties could\nnot be previously discussed. He then made the very significant remark\nthat not until the House of Commons \u201cwas really free to devote itself\nto discussions of imperial affairs would it get control.\u201d In other\nwords as long as the House of Commons remains a body occupied primarily\nwith domestic and local legislation it cannot spare the attention\nnecessary for an effective control of foreign policy.\n\nEarly in 1914, evidence was taken by a select committee on House\nof Commons procedure. Mr. Balfour during these discussions rather\nemphasized the need of secrecy in dealing with foreign affairs. He\nthinks that such matters should not be aired too frequently in the\nHouse of Commons, because indiscreet speeches, which can be perfectly\nappraised in the House, may make bad blood when reported. Diplomatic\nconversations must be kept confidential if you are to work the European\nsystem at all. But though the House of Commons does not and cannot\nknow the current details of international negotiations, it is not\nuninformed. This plainly is the language of a statesman to whom the\nidiosyncrasies of the European system are so familiar that they seem to\nbe the only natural state of affairs. The statement is made from the\npoint of view of the expert who rather resents any sort of interference\non the part of the less well informed.\n\nIn March, 1918, it was moved in the House of Commons:\n\n  \u201cThat, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Committee of\n  Foreign Affairs should be appointed, representative of all\n  parties and groups in the House, in order that a regular channel\n  of communication may be established between the Foreign Secretary\n  and the House of Commons, which will afford him frequent\n  opportunities of giving information on questions of Foreign\n  policy and which, by allowing Members to acquaint themselves\n  more fully with current international problems, will enable this\n  House to exercise closer supervision over the general conduct of\n  Foreign Affairs....\u201d\n\nMr. Balfour expressed himself quite in length on this motion and\nfurther elaborated the ideas which he had put forward in 1914. In a\nspeech delivered March 19th, he gave what is probably the most complete\nand persuasive exposition of the value of traditional methods in\ndiplomacy:\n\n  \u201c... A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are great\n  instruments for preventing, as far as can be prevented, and\n  diminishing, even when you cannot prevent, friction between\n  States which are, or which ought to be, friendly. How is the\n  task of peace-maker--because that is largely the task which\n  falls to diplomatists and to the Foreign Office, which controls\n  diplomatists--to be pursued if you are to shout your grievances\n  from the housetop whenever they occur? The only result is that\n  you embitter public feeling, that the differences between the\n  two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought never to be\n  allowed to approach, that the newspapers of the two countries\n  agitate themselves, that the Parliaments of the two countries\n  have their passions set on fire, and great crises arise, which\n  may end, have ended sometimes, in international catastrophes....\n  Office officials, or officials of any Department,--to expend some\n  of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination, you will\n  really be destroying the public service. There is nothing on\n  which I feel more strongly than that. They are not accustomed to\n  it, and they ought not to be accustomed to it.... I do not hold\n  the view that antique methods are pursued by diplomatists which\n  no man of common sense adopts in the ordinary work of every-day\n  life. On the contrary, the work of diplomacy is exactly the work\n  which is done every day between two great firms, for instance,\n  which have business relations, or between two great corporate\n  entities which have interests diverging or interests in common.\n  If you are a man of sense you do not create difficulties to\n  begin with. You try to get over all these things without the\n  embitterment which advertisement always brings with it. It is\n  when you begin to press your case in public that antagonism\n  arises. In private--in conversation which need not go beyond\n  the walls of the room in which you are,--you can put your case\n  as strongly as you like, and the gentleman with whom you are\n  carrying on the discussion may put his case as strongly as he\n  likes, and if good manners are observed and nothing but fair\n  discussion takes place no soreness remains and no one is driven\n  to ignore the strong points of his opponent\u2019s case. Directly a\n  controversy becomes public all that fair give-and-take becomes\n  either difficult or impossible.... But if all you mean ... is\n  that it is wrong for the nations of the world to find themselves\n  hampered in their mutual relations by treaties of which those\n  countries know nothing, that, I think, is an evil. I do not say\n  that there have not been secret treaties which were inevitable;\n  but I do say that, if they are necessary, they are a necessary\n  evil. Please remember that two nations make a treaty together\n  for their mutual advantage. Both are desirous of passing it. One\n  nation says, \u2018It is against our interest that this treaty should\n  be made public at present.\u2019 The other says, \u2018We do not like being\n  committed to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make public\n  at once.\u2019 Which is going to prevail?... It does not rest with\n  any single Foreign Office, British or other. It is always an\n  arrangement between two--possibly three or four, Foreign Offices.\n  You cannot lay down--and I do not think you would be wise to\n  lay down, an absolute rule that under no circumstances, and for\n  no object, could you so far concede the point as to say that a\n  treaty is to be made which is not to become public property. I\n  am perfectly ready to admit that that is not a process which, to\n  me, is a very agreeable one. To reduce secret treaties to the\n  narrowest possible limits should, I think, be the object of every\n  responsible statesman who has the control of foreign affairs.\n  Beyond that I do not feel inclined to go. I do not see any signs\n  of a grasp of the true realities of life in the Motion before\n  us. You should have your control over those who manage your\n  affairs, but it is not the kind of control which the honorable\n  Member wishes to set up with his Committee of forty or fifty. It\n  is quite a different control. You must know, broadly speaking,\n  what the general lines of policy are, and I maintain that that is\n  thoroughly known with regard to foreign affairs at this moment\n  by every man in this House who takes the trouble to think. The\n  general lines on which we are proceeding are thoroughly known.\u201d\n\nThis argument brings out all the strong points of the system of secret\ndiplomacy under the existing conditions of international politics,\nbut it contains no hint that these conditions need improvement. They\ncannot, as a matter of fact, be improved until some strong nations,\neven at the risk of disadvantage to themselves, take the lead in\nplacing diplomatic affairs on a broader basis.\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\nTHE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY\n\n\nIn consequence of the startling developments in diplomacy which\npreceded and accompanied the great war, the relation of democracy to\ndiplomacy has been earnestly discussed of late, particularly in Great\nBritain.\n\nWhen considering this important matter, the distinction between the\n_methods_ of diplomacy and diplomatic _policies_ should be borne in\nmind for the sake of clearness of thought. The development of public\nopinion, the disappearance of purely dynastic aims of state action, and\nthe constantly broadening outlook of political life, have led to the\nelimination of most of the cruder methods of deception and intrigue.\nBut two questions still remain: Should diplomatic negotiations\nbe carried on in the public view, that is with constant and full\ninformation given to the public or parliament, on all important\ndetails? and, Should the diplomatic policy of a democratic government\nat all times be kept fully before the representative bodies, and the\npublic?\n\nMost discussions which favor the use of secret diplomacy, refer to\nthe presumed necessity of confidential _methods_ of negotiation. But\nthere are some publicists and statesmen who believe that the policy of\nforeign affairs itself can best be handled by responsible statesmen\nkeeping their own counsel and giving to the public only a general\nadumbration of the trend of policy. These two questions are constantly\nmixed up in current discussion; and their absolute separation is\nindeed difficult. Thus, a strictly secret diplomatic policy will\nnaturally accentuate the secrecy of the methods employed. Abstractly\nconsidered, it would be quite possible to have the foreign policy of a\ncountry determined by public action, and still to surround diplomatic\nnegotiations with secrecy. But if the substance of the policy were\ndefinitely known in detail, the secrecy of methods would lose much of\nits effectiveness.\n\nThe use of such methods is defended from two points of view; from that\nof the trader who looks for a better bargain through not having given\naway his entire hand at the beginning; and from that of the builder who\ndesires to work quietly without interruptions from an excitable public,\nwho desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away contrasts which\npublicity would tend to exaggerate.\n\nThere is an _ex post facto_ publicity of diplomatic policy. If this is\nafforded as soon as a new situation has arisen or a new agreement has\nbeen created, some of the harm of secrecy is avoided. In such a case\nthe statesmen, cabinet, or conference, practically give assurance that,\nif allowed to work quietly on a certain problem, they will produce a\nsolution which will commend itself in general to the sense of equity\nof the nation or nations concerned; although the sum total of the\narrangement may contain details which, considered by themselves, would\nbe unacceptable and which might have interfered with the making of an\naccord, if unduly emphasized or given publicity during the negotiations.\n\nMr. Balfour in his speech of March 19, 1918, which has already been\nreferred to, indeed speaks quite convincingly of the advantage of\nconfidential relations and of secrecy in negotiations, but he goes so\nfar as strongly to deprecate a demand for information on the part of\nParliament. In that he certainly shows a measure of anti-democratic\nbias, as when he says, \u201cDo not suppose that we can do the work better\nby having to explain it _to a lot of people who are not responsible_.\nThat is not the way to get business properly done.\u201d He therefore\nrejects the idea of a parliamentary committee of control in the matter\nof foreign relations. He agrees, however, that the existence of secret\ntreaties is an evil, although he thinks that it may be at certain times\nnecessary, because the associated treaty power may desire it. He is\nmildly deprecatory, at best.\n\nCount Czernin, speaking to the Austrian delegations on June 24, 1918,\nconcerning President Wilson\u2019s fourteen points, stated that he has no\nobjection to the introduction of the principle of \u201copen covenants,\u201d\nalthough he confesses that he does not know by what means effective\nadherence thereto can be assured. Concerning diplomatic negotiations,\nwhich he treats simply as a matter of business, he points out the\nadvantages of secrecy from the point of view of trading. Moreover, if\nthere were full publicity, the general public might passionately oppose\nevery action involving any concession as a defeat. This would not be\nconducive to peaceable relations.\n\nThere are those who believe that the chief evils of secret diplomacy\nwould be avoided if ample opportunity were given for discussion in\nrepresentative assemblies, if there were a parliamentary committee\nkeeping constantly in touch with the conduct of foreign relations,\nand if treaties and declarations of war could not be made without the\nconsent of the national legislature. Some advocates of democratic\ncontrol go so far as to reason that a decision to make war and thereby\nto order the shedding of human blood, should not be made without a\nnational referendum vote.\n\nOn the other hand, those opposed to all publicity of diplomatic\naffairs argue that international policies cannot be determined in\nthe market place. They hark back to DeTocqueville, who holds that as\ndemocracy cannot be expected to regulate the _details_ of an important\nundertaking, it is particularly unqualified to deal with international\nmatters where secrecy, discretion, and patience are required. Followers\nof this opinion believe that the conduct of foreign affairs is best\nplaced quite unreservedly in the hands of responsible statesmen, who\nhave greater information, larger experience and more self-control than\nthe average of humanity. They generally have in view the preservation\nof national interests, under conditions of peace if possible; they\nwill not be inflamed by exciting incidents, but will keep these in\nproper subordination to the general plan. Such details, if made public,\nwould easily lead to occurrences that would upset the results of\nwise planning. As Lord Cromer has said, it is such untoward chance\nincidents which cannot be controlled that are to be feared, rather than\nany deliberate plotting on the part of diplomats. Such responsible\nstatesmen always remain accountable for the general results of their\npolicy; they are conscious of the importance of their trust, and\ntherefore are a safer repository of discretionary powers than a general\ncommittee.\n\nBack of these arguments, however, there usually lies the conviction\nthat the public is superficial, easily swayed, excitable and altogether\ndelighting more in the hurrah of war than in the humdrum of peace. It\nmight be remarked that if such had actually been the case, the most\nrecent experience of the people with war has probably given them a\ndifferent idea of the attractiveness of that kind of excitement; unless\nindeed the mass of humanity are irremediably and forever fools, when\ntaken in the aggregate.\n\nThe sensational character of the daily press must be considered in\nthis connection. The news value of normal, peaceable developments is\nvery small. It is therefore a godsend to the newspapers when something\nextraordinary happens, particularly in international affairs. For\nthis reason, the daily news frequently presents an untrue or warped\npicture of the actual situation. Gilbert Murray asks what people are\nreferred to by those who demand popular control of diplomacy; are\nthey the people of educational societies, or of the music halls? The\npublic is not homogeneous, or so organized as to give expression to\nconvictions on current affairs which have been maturely considered. It\nlacks the leisure and training for penetrating superficialities and\ngoing to the bottom of difficult questions. Lord Cromer believes in\ngeneral that democracies are not peaceful, and he refers particularly\nto the American democracy for proof; Lord Lytton said, \u201cGovernments are\ngenerally for diplomacy, the people for war.\u201d\n\nMen of all shades of opinion are agreed that the people are not greatly\ninterested in foreign affairs, and the opponents of proposals of\ndemocratic control argue that it would be useless to create machinery\nfor action where there exists no interest, nor purpose to act.\n\nIt is quite true that the public during the nineteenth century seemed\nless interested in foreign affairs than during the eighteenth. At the\nearlier time, diplomacy was a fascinating, personal game, about which\nthe wiseacres in the coffee houses were eager to make their criticisms\nand prognostications. When the middle class came to power in the\nnineteenth century, it was primarily interested in economic and other\ndomestic questions, and was satisfied to leave the conduct of foreign\naffairs to statesmen and diplomats. The constantly growing political\nconsciousness of the public at large was concentrated chiefly on\nquestions of internal politics and reform. Foreign affairs, as they\nreached the public, were thought of still from the point of view of\nthe onlooker, rather than of him who actually had to bear the brunt of\nthe burden. Those who had to bleed and die when hostilities had been\nbrought about, never had any chance, nor determination, to influence\nthe course of diplomacy leading up to wars.\n\nWith such a general apathy of the public, it was not surprising that\ndiplomacy should cling to its caste privileges, should try to preserve\nits discretionary powers, and should often attempt deliberately to keep\npeople in the dark. \u201cIn the public interest\u201d is the curtain beyond\nwhich no one may peer. Even in the American Government, particularly\nduring and since the war, foreign affairs have been handled with what\nwould ordinarily seem insufficient information to the public; in fact,\nwith occasional putting forth of misleading and entirely partial\ninformation, or the refusal to furnish information even when requested\nby those having official responsibilities. This is a notable change,\nas up to 1914 it was substantially true that the United States had no\ndiplomatic secrets.\n\nWhile from the point of view of traditional diplomacy, and of\ninternational relations as they were up to the Great War, it seems\nquite natural that democratic control should be thought by many to be\nunpractical; and while indeed no one can flatter himself that through a\nchange of method the conduct of international affairs could suddenly be\nrendered more wise and entirely effective towards the public welfare,\nyet I cannot avoid the conclusion that there is a wrong orientation\nin the emphasis of the need of secrecy and of the unfitness of the\npeople to deal with problems of foreign affairs. The belief in the\nunfitness of the people in this matter appears to be the result of\na preconceived notion as to the overpowering difficulty, complexity\nand almost sanctity of foreign affairs. Modern governments are based\non the principle that all legislation must meet the test of public\ncriticism and rest on public consent; certainly it cannot be argued\nthat matters of the incidence of taxation, the proper organization\nof credit, and the determination of commercial policies, are less\ncomplex and intricate than are foreign affairs. It is indeed true that\nit is difficult for one nation thoroughly to appreciate in detail the\nconditions of life in another. This truth should have its greatest\nvalue in dissuading a nation from meddling with the internal affairs of\nanother, even from good motives. Those international questions which\nare apt to produce war may indeed relate to intricate matters, but\nthe essential point is always the contention for power, influence or\ncommercial advantage, and it is not apparent why the public in general\nshould be unfit to judge as to whether national treasure and life\nare eventually to be spent in huge quantities to bring about, or to\nprevent, any such shifting of power or influence.\n\nIt is, however, because the motives involved are so largely connected\nwith class interests, or survivals of pride of race, that those\nconcerned in them are eager to deny the fitness of the general public,\nwhich if called on to decide would put into the foreground the\nquestion, \u201cHow does the control of this or that group of capitalists in\nMorocco, for instance, or the greater or smaller influence of Austria\nor Russia in Servia, affect the daily life and welfare of our people?\u201d\nIt is certainly true that questions of peace and war have never\ndefinitely been reasoned out on that basis. There has always been the\nassumption that certain things were essential to national prestige and\ncould not be questioned; it is only when the actually existing broader\nbase of national political life is organized also for active control of\nforeign affairs, that these considerations will have their full weight.\nOnly the most exceptional statesmen could lift themselves out of the\nnarrow groove of tradition and precedent; and more exceptional still,\nin fact all but impossible, is the capacity of one man to represent in\nhimself in just proportion, all the interests and feelings of a nation.\n\nInfallibility cannot be expected in the handling of foreign affairs,\nwhether under a broad discretion of statesmen or under strict\ndemocratic control. There will always be an alternative of wisdom\nand rashness, constructive planning and headlong action, carefulness\nand negligence. But past experience has certainly established beyond\nperadventure of doubt that secret diplomacy is not infallible, and\nparticularly that diplomacy acting under absolutist traditions,\nas in Germany before the war, may make the most fatal mistakes of\njudgment and of policy. Balfour said: \u201cI do not think the Government\nin June, 1914, had the slightest idea that there was any danger\nahead.\u201d A remarkable statement, when we consider the actions and\nreactions of secret diplomacy during the decade preceding the war.\nIt has been quite truly said that diplomacy is far more eminent in\nautopsy than in diagnosis. M. Cheradame somewhat severely observes,\n\u201cThe typical diplomat lives in a world of his own. His information is\nrarely obtained by direct observation of people and facts.\u201d And while\nordinarily men of exceptional talents are selected for the difficulty\nposition of Minister for Foreign Affairs, yet all considered, it\nis hard to believe that were decisions on the essential matters of\ninternational life made on a broader basis, and influenced more by a\ndirect action of public opinion, the result would be less wise.\n\nActive participation of the people in the making of momentous decisions\nregarding foreign affairs, is denied either under the assumption that\nthe people might not be ready to face the fateful test, or, by the\nmajority, with the thought that the people are too excitable and rash\nto be trusted with such far-reaching decisions. While it is indeed easy\nto generate warlike excitement among the masses, it must be remembered,\nwhen such a charge of rashness is made, that the people have never\nbeen currently informed of the development of international dangers,\nbut usually at a critical time shreds of information have been flashed\non them, designed or at least apt to stir up all their atavistic love\nof fight and fear of attack. Even thus, the greatest noise is made\nusually by those who do not in the event of hostilities actually have\nto risk their blood and bones.\n\nIt stands to reason that if honestly kept informed about international\nrelationships, the people would be far less prone to sudden excitement.\nVery few people indeed appear to doubt that had the decision of war\nor no war been laid before the peoples of Europe in 1914, with a full\nknowledge of the facts, the terrible catastrophe would never have come\nabout. As Mr. Lowes Dickinson has said, if the people had been allowed\nto share the apprehension and precautions of the diplomats before 1914,\nthere would have been quite a simple and clear question before the\nEnglish people, for one. It could have decided whether it would pursue\na policy that might lead at any moment to a general European war, or\nto take the alternative which Sir Edward Grey later spoke of, namely,\n\u201cto promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party by\nwhich she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would\nbe pursued against her by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or\nseparately.\u201d Without the support of the people, kept in line by fear of\nhidden dangers, not even the militarists of Germany could have forced\nmilitary action.\n\nOne of the first acts of the Russian Soviet Government was to announce\nits hostility to secret diplomacy. When it first published the secret\ntreaties and documents of the Czarist Government, its motive was,\nas shown by Trotsky\u2019s declaration made at the time, thoroughly to\ndiscredit the management of affairs under the old r\u00e9gime. In the same\nconnection, it announced its own purpose of conducting foreign affairs\nin the open. Such seems indeed to have been its general practice with\nrespect to the announcement of policies, though its agents continued\nto use underground methods. One thing, however, the Soviet Government\nis evidently trying to bring about, namely, a broad public interest\nin the conduct of foreign affairs. It desires the Russian people, and\nmore particularly the members of the ruling Communist Party, to be\ncurrently informed about the progress of international affairs and\nabout arrangements concluded. Observers report that at the meeting of\nthe provincial soviets the first business ordinarily taken up is the\nreading and discussion of a report on international relations sent by\nthe central government. We have no means to check up the truth of these\nreports; but this effort to interest the broad mass of the population\nin the outward relations of the state is certainly worth notice. The\nexpectation is encouraged that the reason for acts relating to foreign\naffairs will be explained, particularly when sacrifices are demanded.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\nA SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM\n\n\nThose who view the modern state as a purely predatory\norganization,--for exploitation within and without,--point to the\nmethods, practices and results of diplomacy as one of the plainest\nindications of the sinister nature of the political state. Such\ncriticism cannot be safely brushed aside as utterly unreasonable; it\nshould rather call forth a searching inquiry as to whether, as a matter\nof fact, the conduct of foreign affairs could not and should not be\nbrought into greater consonance with genuinely democratic principles,\nand be placed on the sound basis of well-informed public support.\n\nNo matter what opinion one may hold with respect to the necessity of\nsecret diplomacy, it must be recognized that this practice involves\na very narrow conception of the active scope of democracy. It is in\nfact a historical survival from the period of the absolutist state;\nor in other words, that aspect of the modern state which deals with\nforeign affairs has retained the character of absolutism. It is a\nsuperstition, in the picturesque sense of that word used by Lowell,\nwhen he defines it as \u201csomething left standing over from one of the\nworld\u2019s witenagemotes to the other.\u201d In this case, indeed the most\nrecent witenagemote approached the question and proposed a step in\nadvance towards its solution. But the difficulty still persists.\n\nIn its relations with other states, the state is considered to be\nabsolute, not bound by any laws, responsible only for its own security,\nwelfare and progressing influence. The struggle for political power\nstill exists among states, in essentially the same keenness and\nrigidity with which it appeared to the eyes of Machiavelli. The\nimportance of world-wide human relationships, and of international\nco\u00f6peration in scientific and economic life, has indeed been brought\nforth and given its place in the public mind; but because of the manner\nin which the conduct of international affairs is actually handled, the\nfeeling thus generated does not have much chance to influence action at\ncritical times, when the people are startled and excited by the sudden\nrevelation of dangers, which awaken in them all the bitter feelings\nengendered by the past struggles of mankind.\n\nThis survival is given strength by class interests, pride of race, and\nby the manipulations of plutocratic control. Where affairs are handled\nby a narrow circle of men, no matter how high-minded and how thoroughly\nconscious of their public responsibility, yet with the necessary\nlimitations of the human mind, they cannot but be influenced at every\nturn by the opinions of others with whom they are actually in contact;\nso that in decisions on these momentous matters, the thing which is\nconcretely present is very often an interest comparatively narrow in\nitself, and related to the public welfare only by a series of remote\ninferences which are accepted at their face value. The most successful\nstatesman of the nineteenth century said that the whole Balkan question\nwas not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier; yet his successors\nin power risked the very existence of the nations of Europe for one\nphase of that question.\n\nPowerful interests will always have means, formal or informal, to lay\ntheir needs and desires before the men in power. They may indeed be\nvery important and may deserve special attention, but unfortunately,\nmany cases have happened in which their point of view has been adopted\nwithout making sure that there existed a general public interest\nsufficiently important to warrant taking the risks involved.\n\nA diplomatic caste recruited from a certain class of society, trained\nin the traditions of authority, in contact all the time with men of\nsimilar views and principles, cannot in the nature of things free\nitself from the limitations of such environment and such training.\n\nFrom the personal point of view diplomacy has adhered to the belief\nin the superior intelligence, ability and foresight in the handling\nof foreign affairs, on the part of those who by inherited traditions\nand special experience may be said to belong to a caste distinguished\nfrom the mass of humanity. Some one has said, there is a great danger\nin that there exists a caste of people who have taken the making of\nhistory as their profession; who still cling to the erroneous idea\nthat the manipulation of large masses of people, the redistribution of\nterritories, and the modification of the natural processes of grouping\nand settlement, is history. But such people who believe they are making\nhistory are really obstructing it. Even so unusual a man as Bismarck,\nworking as he did on a great national problem, did not gain lasting\nsuccess in action whereby he endeavored to anticipate the developments\nof history. The artful contrivance and harsh, ruthless execution\nof many of his plans left a heritage of evil to the world; but the\ngreatest evil lay in the example given by so successful a man in making\nit seem that history could actually thus be made. The attitude which\nis taken in behalf of such men, in claiming for them a completely free\nand full discretion in controlling foreign affairs, recalls a statement\nmade by H. G. Wells concerning a British leader: \u201cHe believes that\nhe belongs to a particularly gifted and privileged class of beings\nto whom the lives and affairs of common men are given over--the raw\nmaterial for brilliant careers. It seems to him an act of insolence\nthat the common man should form judgments on matters of statecraft.\u201d\nThe diplomats of the old school indeed do require the people, but only\nas material with which to work out their grandiose projects. Their view\nnot too distantly resembles that of the German militarists to whom\nordinary humanity existed only for one purpose, \u201cto do their damn\u2019d\nduty.\u201d\n\nWe should naturally expect to find the greatest secrecy and the\nmost callous use of secretive methods, where absolutism remains\nmost completely established. In the last remaining absolutism,\nthat of Japan, these expectations are fulfilled, both as regards\ncarefully-guarded secrecy of all diplomatic action, and the habitual\nuse of well phrased declarations of a theoretical policy, announced for\npublic consumption, but bearing only a Platonic relation to the details\nof actual doings. But more liberally governed states have not by any\nmeans all freed themselves from this practice, even to the extent of\nfaithfully keeping the representative bodies, and the public, informed\nof the true character and aims of important national policies.\n\nDuring the discussions of the last few years, a great many remedies\nfor this state of affairs have been suggested. The Constitutional\npractice of the United States has been taken as a model in England\nin the suggestion that there should be a representative committee on\nforeign affairs in the House of Commons, which should keep in constant\ntouch with the diplomatic officials and supervise the conduct of\nforeign relations; that there should be at least two days given to\nthe discussion of the Foreign Office Vote; that there should be full\nreports made on the progress of all important negotiations; and that\ntreaties and alliances should not be concluded, nor war made, without\na previous authorization on the part of Parliament. The last formal\nproposal of this kind was the motion made in March, 1918, in the\nHouse of Commons, the opposition to which by Mr. Balfour has already\nbeen alluded to. That he should object particularly to the prying\ninto foreign affairs on the part of persons \u201cnot responsible,\u201d and by\n\u201cpoliticians,\u201d that the proposed committee of the House of Commons\nshould be thus characterized, throws light on the prejudices involved;\nbut it also reveals the absurdity of the present arrangement from the\npoint of view of free government. In France there has existed, since\n1902, a standing committee on foreign and colonial affairs in the\nChamber of Deputies.\n\nWhen he was premier, in 1920, Signor Giolliti introduced a bill\ncarrying the following provision: \u201cTreaties and International\nunderstandings, whatever be their subject and character, are valid only\nafter they have been approved by Parliament. The Government of the\nKing can declare war only with the approval of the two Chambers.\u201d The\nministry of Giolliti fell before this sound measure could be passed.\n\nIt may be questioned whether many of the arrangements suggested could\nbe more than palliatives, as long as an intelligent and constant public\ninterest in foreign affairs has not been aroused, and as long as the\nabsolutist aspect of foreign policy continues. The suggestion that war\nshould not be made without a previous national referendum, has indeed\nlogic on its side from the point of view of the democratic theory of\nstate, but it has thus far not entered into the state of practical\nconsideration.\n\nThe most important remedy as yet attempted is the provision in the\nCovenant of the League of Nations, that all treaties shall be made\npublic. No greater encouragement, indeed, could be given to the growth\nof confidence and the destruction of baneful suspicions and fears,\nthroughout international life, than if it were possible to assure\nthe nations of the world that all engagements imposing international\nobligations of any kind whatsoever would be made known immediately\nupon their conclusion. This provision of the Covenant has already\ngone into force, and numerous new treaties have been submitted, even\nby governments who are not as yet members of the League. But certain\ngovernments have delayed compliance in cases where treaties are known\nto have been made secretly. As there is no specific sanction for this\nprovision in the Covenant, and as actually binding agreements can be\nmade without taking the form of a treaty or convention, this remedy\nis not in itself powerful enough to remove the evil. If two or three\nstates are willing to keep an engagement secret at the risk of later\nincurring a certain amount of opprobrium when the fact is discovered,\nthere is no means as yet available for obliging them to abandon such\ncourse. Nevertheless, this provision of the Covenant constitutes\na great advance in the work of placing the public business of the\nworld on the only sound basis, and cultivating that confidence upon\nwhich depends the future immunity of mankind from constant danger of\nsuffering and destruction. It will, however, not be a real remedy\nuntil the nations agree actually to outlaw all secret agreements as a\nconspiracy against the general welfare and safety.\n\nThe other important advance made in the Covenant is found in the\nprovisions for the investigation of any cause of conflict before\nhostilities shall be resorted to. If after the first shock of\nexcitement, which accompanies the revelation of a serious international\ncrisis, public opinion can be given a certain space of time to inform\nitself, then it may indeed be hoped that a different temper will\ncontrol the giving of the fateful doom of war. As Count Czernin has\nstated, on the night of August 4, 1914, between the hours of nine and\nmidnight the decision as to whether England would come into the war,\nlay with the German Government. A system under which such tremendous\nissues have to be decided in such a manner, is absurd to the verge of\ninsanity.[E]\n\n    [E] A German writer puts the blame for the outbreak of the\n        war on the telegraph. He says that if there had been no\n        telegraphic communication between the capitals, the fatal\n        crisis would not have arisen; there would have been time\n        for reflection and a decision to make war would never have\n        been taken in blood.\n\nWhile the above arrangements, if they could be effectively carried out,\nwould undoubtedly serve to moderate the evils which now result from\nthe conduct of international affairs on so narrow a basis, yet it is\ndifficult to expect from them more than relatively superficial results.\nIt is only if a new spirit can be developed among the nations, and if\nthe absolutist conception of the state as far as it still remains, can\nbe transformed into something more consonant with the complexity and\ndelicacy of human relationships, that we may hope to hail the dawn of a\nnew era. It would be as great a transformation as that which separates\nthe Pagan from the Christian ideal. Mankind is still somewhat blinded\nby the glitter and pageantry of the absolutist state; the pride of\npower manifests itself now particularly in foreign intercourse. When\nPortugal became a republic, it desired at first to abolish the entire\ndiplomatic establishment, and to allow all international business\nto be done by the consuls. That proposal may have resulted from an\ninstinctive feeling that there was something incompatible between a\nreally free community, and the sense of absolute power embodied in\ndiplomacy.\n\nA change can be brought about only when the underlying unity of mankind\nis more intensely felt and when the common interests in science,\ncommerce, industry and the universal language of art are valued at\ntheir true importance to the welfare of the people of all nations.\nJoint effort in the constructive work of developing resources,\nparticularly in the tropics, will make it possible for vastly increased\npopulations to live in comfort on their present sites, without the need\nof crowding each other. A higher valuation of humanity, a more just\nproportion in the influence permitted different interests, a keener\nscrutiny of traditions and watch-words--all this is necessary. Men\nand women to-day feel an intense apprehension, when they think of the\nfate of their children in a world in which the unreasoning prejudices\nand unenlightened practices that have recently again come to the fore\nin international life should prevail, leaving mankind in a dazed\nconfusion, and pushing the people from time to time into wholesale\nslaughter with ever more horrible instruments of destruction. They feel\nalso that if secret policies, engendering fears and suspicion, are\nto continue to be the dominant factor, then all improvement in human\nwelfare, education and science, will have to be in a large measure\npostponed to the preparation of constantly more formidable engines of\ndeath. One cannot but remember the worst imprecations of the Greek\ntragic poets and philosophers, on the miserable destiny of man. In\nfact, if we should have to believe that no better way could be found\nto manage the vital interests of mankind, a great natural catastrophe,\nwhich would extinguish once and for all the miserable breed on this\nplanet, would almost appear in the light of a redemption.\n\nBut we cannot believe that the peoples of the world will be so foolish\nas to allow themselves to remain in this condition and not to find\ntheir way to a reorganization of public affairs which will make such a\nhaphazard and perilous situation impossible. It seems plain that the\nidea of the state and of state action will have to be transformed in\naccordance with the greater self-consciousness of humanity which has\ndeveloped in the last century, or the desire to scrap the political\nstate and to find some more adequate and natural form of organization\nwill rapidly gain in strength. Meanwhile, there is a need of the\nformation of a great freemasonry of all publicists, political men and\nteachers of the people, united in the resolve to know and make known\nthe essential elements in current international affairs, to arouse the\npublic to a sense of the importance of these matters to their every-day\nlife, and to support the men more directly responsible for the conduct\nof foreign policy, with an intelligent, searching, reasonable and broad\npublic opinion.\n\n\n\n\nXIV\n\nRECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE\n\n\nUp until a recent date Americans could contemplate the play of secret\ndiplomacy in Europe and Asia with a feeling of entire aloofness,\nas belonging to a political society which had neither need nor\ninclination to utilize such methods. Our unmenaced continental\nposition, the natural protection and separation implied in distance\nand ocean boundaries, and the conscious intention of keeping clear of\ninternational entanglements, all contributed to make the foreign policy\nof the United States entirely public and straightforward. The fathers\nof the Constitution had established the sound principle that treaties\nare the law of the land. This not only involves mature consideration of\na treaty before it is made, but publicity as well. The American people\nhave known at all times what obligations had been incurred, and the\nworld had the same information. There has been no room for guesswork\nand suspicion.\n\nThe instructions which were issued to John Jay when he was sent as\nspecial envoy to England in 1794 lay down the following rule of\nconduct: \u201cIt is the President\u2019s wish that the characteristics of an\nAmerican minister should be marked on the one hand by a firmness\nagainst improper compliances, and on the other by sincerity, candor,\ntruth and prudence, and by a horror of finesse and chicane.\u201d These\nstraightforward words began a tradition which has ever since animated\nthe American diplomatic service. When after the Spanish war, under\nSecretary Hay, American diplomacy entered more fully into world-wide\nproblems than in any previous era, the expression \u201cthe new diplomacy\u201d\nwas currently used in a laudatory sense to designate what Hay had\nimplied when in a public address he had declared the Golden Rule to\nbe the cardinal principle of American diplomacy--an ideal which makes\nsecrecy and intrigue unnecessary.\n\nIn order to give the public an opportunity of informing itself\nconcerning the conduct and development of foreign affairs, the United\nStates Government has from an early date published an annual collection\nof diplomatic correspondence. Since 1861, this publication is known\nas _Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States_.\nIt was formerly published within two or three years of the year to\nwhich it related, but during the war this interval was considerably\nextended. The precedents and principles elaborated in the diplomatic\ncorrespondence of the United States have been collected, codified\nand published in a very important and useful compendium by Francis\nWharton, under the title of _Digest of International Law_. This work\nwas expanded, amplified and brought down to date by Prof. John Bassett\nMoore, under the same title, in 1906. It is of the highest importance,\nnot only as a repository of diplomatic and legal precedent, but as\na definite and public record of the position taken by the American\nGovernment on all international questions that had arisen up to the\ndate of its publication. The preparation of such digest on the part\nof other governments is highly to be desired for the purpose of\nclarifying international law and policy, and for giving them a sound\nbasis of reason and experience upon which the people and governments\nmay rely. The fact that a precedent reported in this digest, might be\ncited against the American Government as an admission, does not imply\na disadvantage which would at all offset the benefits resulting in\ngeneral from public knowledge.\n\nWith respect to the details of negotiation, there are confidential\nrelationships which have always been observed by the American\nGovernment. Ordinary considerations of courtesy require that those\nwho may speak to us frankly in confidence shall not be made to suffer\nby being quoted and thus perhaps be exposed to misunderstanding and\ncriticism. On our part, in preparing a sound basis of action, favorable\nas well as unfavorable matters have to be considered; yet there\nis ordinarily no need of publicly advertising the shortcomings of\nindividuals and governments as set forth in reports on such unfavorable\nmatters. Such considerate action is not based on a desire to mislead or\nto take advantage, but to save unnecessary irritation. For the purpose\nof permitting complete freedom of discussion and of criticism without\nthe risk of giving offense, the United States Senate, as a matter of\nits ordinary procedure, goes into secret session when discussing a\ntreaty submitted to it. There have, however, been several exceptions.\nThus, for instance, the debates on the Bayard-Chamberlain Fisheries\nTreaty of 1888, on the Taft arbitration treaties of 1912, and on the\nNicaragua Treaty of 1916, were carried on, and concluded, in open\nsession. Many senators are in favor of making this the common practice.\n\nBefore the war, as Prof. John Bassett Moore, whose knowledge of\nthe records is unequaled, said to me, the State Department had no\nsecrets whatsoever, with the exception of personnel reports. We, too,\nhowever, can depart from a well-established tradition, as is shown by\nour diplomatic history during the war. I do not believe it will ever\nbe charged that in any matter big or little the American Government\nsought narrow, selfish advantages. Secrecy due to such motives,\nthere was none. There was no American policy or enterprise that\nneeded concealment, apart from military policies and strategy during\na war. When I glanced over at the end of my mission in Peking the\nextra-confidential cable correspondence, I was inwardly amazed by the\nentire lack of anything that really needed concealing, in that closely\nguarded dossier.\n\nYet American diplomacy did during the war fall somewhat under the spell\nof the traditional methods still in vogue in Europe. We were not a\nparty to any secret engagements for the division of spoils after the\nwar, although from the time of the peace conference on, the influence\nof the American Government was exercised mostly in secret, and the\nagreements subsidiary to the general settlement were secretly signed.\nThese did not contain any apportionment of advantage to the United\nStates, but on the contrary were supposed to contain the nearest\napproach to the equitable ideas of American policy which was, under\nexisting conditions, obtainable. But throughout this trying period\nthe conduct of American diplomacy did not rest on the foundation of a\ncontinuous, frank appeal to the public opinion of our own nation or of\nthe world.\n\nEven before the armistice some very important matters were dealt with\nin this fashion. Though the permanent importance of the Lansing-Ishii\nnote as affecting in a concrete and specific way the definition of\nrights and policies in the Far East is very doubtful, yet in its\nimmediate effect under all of the circumstances of the time, this was\ncertainly a noteworthy document to issue from the American foreign\noffice. Yet, its conception and execution was absolutely surrounded\nwith secrecy so that not even the high officials normally consulted in\nsuch matters, with the exception of the Secretary of State himself,\nwere informed as to what was coming. This secrecy worked entirely in\nthe interest of the Japanese government. By privately giving out the\nagreement in Japan and in China before the date when its publication\nhad been agreed upon, the Japanese government succeeded to a certain\nextent and for a time, in giving this matter the appearance of a great\nJapanese diplomatic victory and of a highly important concession on the\npart of the United States.\n\nIt is not necessary to recall the general disillusionment that came\nabout when President Wilson agreed to the policy of secrecy at the\npeace conference. Undoubtedly this decision was based on the motive\nto secure, with a promptness required by the stress of the times,\na settlement which would in general commend itself to the sense of\njustice of the world, although it might necessarily contain details\nwhich, if published by themselves, would cause lengthy public\ndiscussion and delay the final solution. If such an expectation was\nentertained, it was not as a matter of fact fulfilled in the results\nof these secret consultations. The method adopted did not favor the\nbroad and permanent view, but rather the more shortsighted bargaining\nin which the old diplomacy excels. In their solutions neither the\nconsultations of the peace conference, nor the subsequent diplomatic\nnegotiations among the Allies, got beyond the old methods of bartering\nthe destinies of small and weak peoples, which had been used by the\nCongresses of Vienna and of Berlin with disastrous results. The various\nconferences of 1919 to 1920 recorded a complete return to the system\nof secret diplomacy, to such an extent that it appeared constantly as\nif the plenipotentiaries feared to let their doings be known. Even when\nthere was no reason from any point of view for concealment, information\ncame out in a roundabout fashion which left the public mind confused;\nas for instance in the giving out of a decision regarding the fate of\nConstantinople, and in the reports concerning the text of President\nWilson\u2019s Adriatic memorandum which were current before its publication.\n\nFrom the entanglements of this procedure American diplomacy did not\nkeep itself free, nor did it, at this time, assist the world in finding\na more straightforward method more in accord with American political\nexperience.\n\nThe disadvantages of secret methods of transacting public business have\nbeen brought home to the American people through several incidental\nmatters of no small importance. It evidently was the intention of\nPresident Wilson to reserve American rights as to the Island of Yap\nwhich is a vital link in the chain of cable communication between\nAmerica and the Far East, and a reservation of this kind is indicated\nby references in the official minutes, though not by a written\nprotocol. Without the knowledge of the United States, the Council of\nthe League of Nations later disposed of the mandate for all of the\nNorth Pacific Islands. As this action was secret, it could not be\nknown whether the American interest bearing on Yap Island had been\nsafeguarded or not. It was stated as late as January 26, 1921, that the\nAmerican Government was not in possession of the greater part of the\nminutes of the Peace Conference. Notwithstanding the protests of the\nUnited States, Japan based her claim to the North Pacific Islands on\nthe secret treaties made during the war.\n\nThe secrecy of the peace conference, and the revelations before and\nduring its sessions, concerning the secret treaties for the division of\nthe spoils, produced a great disillusionment in the public mind. The\nfact that the United States though asked to make enormous sacrifices\nin the common cause had been kept in the dark concerning at least some\nof these treaties, and particularly of those which affected its own\ninterest, did not inspire the American public with any confidence in\nthe general conduct of affairs among the nations.\n\nAfter the adjournment of the conference the American President and\nGovernment still continued to take a part in the various attempts\nto settle outstanding questions, particularly with respect to\nthe Adriatic. When President Wilson towards the end of February,\n1920, addressed a note to the allied powers concerning the Adriatic\nsettlement, the documents and negotiations which had gone before were\nentirely unknown to the public. On December 9, 1919, an agreement\nhad been signed by Great Britain, France and the United States,\nUndersecretary Polk signing for the latter. On January 9th, the British\nand French premiers had agreed with the Italian premier on a modified\nplan of settlement. On February 10th, the American Secretary of State\nwrote a note containing President Wilson\u2019s objections to the plan of\nJanuary 9th. The allied premiers replied to this note on February 18th.\nAll these agreements and this correspondence were kept secret, nor was\nPresident Wilson\u2019s final answer given out for some time; only more or\nless accurate prognostications appeared in the press.\n\nThe American Government at this time was at a disadvantage in not\nparticipating in the negotiations directly; the American ambassador\nat Paris was invited from time to time to hear what the conference of\npremiers cared to tell him, but the proceedings of the conference were\napparently not transmitted to the American Government. The British\npress at the time quite generally expressed great dissatisfaction\nwith the methods followed by the diplomats. The _Westminster Gazette_\nwrote: \u201cThe whole of both peoples is acutely concerned in the result.\nWe must, therefore, register a protest against the manner in which the\nnegotiations are being conducted. They are being carried on in secrecy,\nonly broken by unreliable rumors, by the three principal governments.\nThe peoples have a right to know what is being done in their name, so\nthat they may be able to protest, if need be, against decisions which\nmay affect their future relations.\u201d The _Times_ protested: \u201cWe are not\ngoing to stand by and have our friendship and relations with America\njeopardized by the proceedings of a triumvirate sitting behind closed\ndoors. The American democracy, we imagine, will not be less resolved to\nassert their rights and stifle this effort at secret diplomacy.\u201d\n\nAt this time Mr. Bonar Law, the government spokesman in the House of\nCommons, denied absolutely that a harsh and uncompromising reply had\noriginally been drafted to President Wilson\u2019s despatch, and that it\nhad subsequently been changed through the influence of Viscount Grey\nand Lord Robert Cecil. The _Times_ characterized this denial as \u201can\nexample of verbal quibbling which inferior intelligences mistake for\ndiplomacy,\u201d and maintained that \u201cthough it may be verbally true, it\nconveys and is designed to convey what is untrue\u201d; and the _Daily\nMail_ stated that the country owed a debt of gratitude to Lord Grey\nfor his activities in the matter. This all illustrates on how insecure\na foundation, and with what chances of confusion, public opinion has\nto work in matters of foreign affairs where the practices of the old\ndiplomacy are followed.\n\nThe American people at this time very nearly lost patience with the\nentire business, and turned away from European affairs with complete\ndisgust. This is the most outstanding effect produced by the secret\ndiplomacy of Europe as far as the American people are concerned. The\ndanger now is that their feeling of disgust and confusion, and their\nimpatience with the selfish and shortsighted manipulations of European\ndiplomacy, will over-emphasize the desire of America to live by and\nfor herself alone. If such a mood and temper should prevail, it would\nbe a great loss to America and to the world. At no time has the world\nneeded America more than at present, not so much from the point of view\nof direct economic assistance, as on account of the fact that American\nexperience, principles and ideals constitute at the present time the\nhope of the peoples of the whole world; and America could, if she\ndesired, exercise an enormous influence in making the popular desire\nfor such action active, vital and fruitful.\n\nBut even aside from the general confidence which is felt by the\npeoples of Europe and Asia in the character and ideals of the United\nStates, there are a great many specific contributions which America\ncould make to the solution of European problems. No matter how much we\nshall desire during the next decade to hold aloof from Europe and to\nconcentrate on our own affairs, nevertheless, should European affairs\ngo radically wrong through a constant denial and deception of the\nhopes and aspirations of the people for honest and sensible solutions,\nAmerica in the end will again have to share the burden thus laid on the\nshoulders of mankind.\n\nThe fundamental American principle that treaties have the force and\nstatus of law contains in itself the promise of solving some of the\nworst troubles of the world, if it could be generally applied. America\nshould continue, for her own safety and that of the world, to use her\nwhole influence for making that principle a part of the universal\npublic law. No international engagement shall be binding unless\nratified by a representative body, and published to all the nations.\nOtherwise it shall be absolutely void, and shall not give rise to\nany rights or obligations; in fact, an attempt to make an agreement\ncontrary to these conditions shall be considered an act hostile to the\npeace of the world. That should be the recognized law.\n\nNothing shows so clearly how human development has halted at this\npoint, as the fact that it should still require an argument to\nshow the necessity of publicity and lawfulness with respect to the\nmost essential interests of the vast populations that make up the\ninternational family.\n\nThe record and constant practice of the United States, as well as her\ngreat actual and potential power, fit her above all others to be a\nleader in the establishment of this principle. The American nation\npossesses a great moral capital in the confidence and trust that\nthe peoples of the world repose in it. No matter if unsympathetic\nchanceries should plot to prevent America from making her influence\nfelt in the affairs of the world, no matter how European diplomacy\nmay occasionally sneer at American idealism, the peoples themselves,\ngreat and small, including particularly those areas so immensely\nimportant--Russia and China--would willingly look to America for\nleadership and guidance, with complete trust and confidence. When this\nis fully realized, we shall also be able to judge how vitally what\nAmerica stands for in the world will be strengthened by a constant\nadherence to open and straightforward methods in international\nintercourse.\n\nBut America herself, it will be said, cannot fundamentally change the\nspirit that animates foreign policies, and bring about the universal\nuse of honest and open practices. We are living under a system which is\nthe result of historic forces that have not yet fully spent themselves\nand which put the potential enmity among nations in the foreground.\n\nI do not believe that it is necessary to shut our eyes to reality and\nto seek recourse in a Utopian policy, in order to escape the menace\ninherent in current international practices. If America will only not\nfall in line with the absolutist tradition in diplomacy, but will\nemphasize at all times, with all her influence, those principles of\ninternational conduct which our natural freedom from entanglements\nhas permitted us to develop as of actual experience, America will\ncontribute in a most potent manner to the realization of that new\nspirit which must surely come to deliver humanity. That spirit is not a\nmere ideal,--it is fortunately already present in much of international\npractice; but it needs constantly to be followed up and supported\nin order that it may become the customary and instinctive guide,\nsuperseding such prejudices as are still current which favor tortuous\nmanipulation and perpetuate an uninformed and confused state of the\npublic mind.\n\nIn order to fulfil this promise and destiny the United States would\nhave to rely in the first place on the inherent merit of her ideals\nand principles of action, and on the support which they will receive\nfrom the approval of the peoples of the world. As far as organized\ngovernments go, as distinguished from the people, some will be more\ninclined than others to co\u00f6perate with the United States in a reform\nof international practice. There is no question but that the great\nmajority of governments will thus co\u00f6perate, though some of the most\nimportant may for a time be left on the other side.\n\nWith those peoples and governments who are in language, political\ntraditions and general impulses most closely related to us, there\nshould grow up a particularly strong feeling of confidence making\nall our intercourse absolutely open. There certainly need not be any\nsecrets between the United States and the great commonwealths of Canada\nand Australia. Our interests, our condition, our institutions, all make\nfor the closest understanding. Through them there may be also realized\nthat harmony which ought by every normal reason to exist between the\nUnited States and the English people, and which is disturbed only from\ntime to time when the policy of the British government is determined\nmore from the point of view of the supposed needs of the British Empire\nin India, than of that of the true tradition of the English-speaking\nworld. I do not think of treaties or of alliances, but of something\nmuch stronger--an intimate understanding among peoples, based on mutual\ntrust and confidence, and the consciousness of a common destiny, common\npurposes, and a common belief in the things which alone will prevent\ncivilization from extinguishing itself in senseless hatreds.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nIn modern diplomacy there still persists the image of the chess\nplayers intent on their complicated game, planning each move with long\nforesight of all the combinations that could possibly be organized\nby the opponent. In the popular image, too, the great diplomat is\nconceived as spinning a complicated web of actions and relationships in\nwhich every detail is subordinate and subservient to a general dominant\npurpose. Then comes the international publicist and with ingenuity\nstill more refined than that of the imagined diplomat, he reasons out\nthe innermost ambitions that dominate and inspire the makers of foreign\naffairs. So it has remained possible for the most extravagant imaginary\nconstructions to be put forth in volumes of sober aspect, which purport\nto give the key to diplomacy or to expose the pernicious ambitions of\nthis or that foreign office. It has become a game in which nothing is\nimpossible to the constructive imagination.\n\nTo any one familiar with the usual methods of foreign offices and\nof diplomatic representatives, the idea that foreign affairs are\nreally handled in this manner, like mental legerdemain, becomes quite\ngrotesque. Complicated manipulations with respect to movements far\nin the future, looking to still more distant results,--that kind of\ndiplomatic planning exists more in the imagination than in the actual\nconduct of foreign affairs. In the majority of cases foreign offices\nmeet each situation as it arises, relying indeed on precedents and\nhaving certain underlying aims and purposes, but giving most attention\nto the facts immediately present and often satisfied with anything that\nwill ease a troublesome or embarrassing situation. Foreign offices\nindeed differ greatly in the definiteness and constancy of their\nobjectives and the completeness with which they subordinate details to\ncentral aims. The Russian foreign office always had the reputation of\ngreat continuity of policy; it gave the central place to fundamental\nobjectives to which problems that arose from day to day could be\nreferred; and thus it solved them with a cumulative effect upon the\nadvancement of its political aims.\n\nFrom the point of view of the older traditions of diplomacy, there\nwould be a decided advantage in definiteness of plan and in the\nharmonious subordination of all details to the main idea. However, the\nadvantage of this method is frequently defeated through the narrowness\nof the objects aimed at, when diplomatic policy is conceived in this\nmanner. Immediate purposes may indeed be achieved more readily, but\nthe permanent results will usually be barren or lead ultimately to\nconflicts of forces. In such a system there is too much abstraction\nfrom the multiform forces of actual life; and while those who pursue it\nmay flatter themselves that they are making history, they are not often\nbuilding in accordance with natural and historic forces.\n\nThe concept of diplomacy which has been criticized in these pages does\nnot exclude the possibility of immediate brilliant success; but its\nineffectiveness appears when we view it over longer periods of history.\nIt is built on too narrow a foundation. We have seen that even with\nthe greatest statesmen, any plan of action conceived in this manner\nhas such positive limitations that the very success in executing such\npolicies through a shrewd play of diplomatic forces, conjures up new\ndangers and difficulties. The wisdom of no man nor small self-contained\ngroup of men is at present sufficient to measure the needs of society\nand to transform its impulses into effective action. A broader basis\nfor policy is needed. But the greatest weakness of the old method lies\nin the fact that just at the very times when men are most in need of\nconfidence and of a spirit of reason and sane judgment, this mode of\naction leaves the public mind in confusion, excitement and the darkest\nfears.\n\nIf democracy means anything, its significance for the welfare of\nhumanity must lie in the value of allowing constantly more and more\nminds to participate in the great things of the world. Not only would\nsuch participation seem to be a natural right of the human mind but\nalso the things most worth while can be achieved only when the ablest\nand best can freely lend their efforts. To all this a narrow system of\nsecret management by a limited hierarchy is hostile. The old diplomacy\nrests entirely on skepticism as to the wisdom and self-control of\nthe people. The people are merely material for statesmanship. This\nconception is blind to the fact that everything that is great in modern\nlife has arisen through the freedom with which talent may manifest\nitself wherever found and that in all pursuits of humanity that are\nworth while, innumerable minds co\u00f6perate, in a degree as warranted\nby their capacity to bring about sound action and improvement. The\nolder diplomacy assumed that the people furnished only passive\nmaterial for statesmanship to work upon, and it saw in the public only\npotentialities for vague and general influences which statesmanship in\nturn was to mold and utilize. The greatest distance it went, was to\nadmit that national policy must rest on popular instinct; a principle\nwhich is quite compatible with the practice of secret diplomacy. When\nwe come to talk of political instincts, however, we are dealing with\none of the vaguest and most indefinite concepts known to thought. These\ninstincts may be interpreted and given active expression as it suits\nany diplomatic policy. Unfortunately the \u201cinstincts\u201d most to the fore\nare not usually helpful to calm and sound action. In international\naffairs, an instinctive dislike or hatred of anything different has\nagain and again been made the basis of aggressive action, stirring\nup otherwise peaceful populations to warlike and murderous intent.\nGreat national policies may often truly be said to rest on instinct\nin the sense that undivided popular support is given to a policy from\na variety of motives which are not clearly reasoned out but which all\nexpress themselves in an overpowering impulse which may be called\ninstinctive. Thus the Monroe policy in which the most fundamental\nmotive is the desire for peace and for the safety of the continental\nposition of the American nation, may be said to rest on the instinct of\nself-preservation.\n\nBut it is quite plain that unless what is here called instinct can\nbe transformed into an intelligent, wise and discriminating public\nopinion, such instinct is but a shifting sand, affording material which\nmay be molded into any desired form by an ambitious policy working\nthrough suggestion and propaganda. Instinct can be transformed into\na true public policy only through publicity and through the training\nof large groups of men to see things with true eyes and to judge with\nreason and wisdom. Here is the crux of the matter. Secret diplomacy\ntreats all except the inner official ring as outsiders and \u201cpersons\nwithout responsibility.\u201d Among these outsiders there may be numerous\npersons actually better qualified than the officials themselves,\nthrough experience and thought, to judge of international affairs. No\none can here assume infallibility. Safe counsel can come only if the\nentire intelligence and moral sentiment of a nation can find expression\nand if its fittest individuals can concentrate their attention upon\nevery great problem as it arises. A sound, just, wise public policy\nwithout publicity cannot be imagined. To consider publicity an evil,\nto consider it as impeding the proper flow of international influences\nand obstructing the solution of international difficulties, appears as\nan unbelievable perversion when we consider the true implications of\nsuch a thought.\n\nIt is therefore inestimably important that the facts of international\nlife, the materials out of which policies are formed, should be known\nfreely and fully to the public of every nation. The manipulation\nof international communications for political purposes is the most\nsinister and dangerous part of the system with which secret diplomacy\nis entwined. According to this theory it is not only not good for the\npeople to know everything but they must also be made to know things\nabout the truth of which we need not bother our heads but which will\nstimulate the passions and arouse the instincts our policy desires\nto work upon. Thus the void left by secrecy, by a concealment of the\ntrue nature and character of internationally important matters, is\nfrequently supplied by an intelligence service carrying distorted\nand colored versions of facts; all this confuses and discourages the\npublic mind to such an extent that it becomes unable to sever fact from\nfiction and to form a consistent and firm judgment.\n\nThe abolition of secret diplomacy is not a matter of agreeing to\nhave no more secrets. It is a matter of arousing among the public so\npowerful a determination to know, so strong a sentiment of the value of\ntruth, such a penetrating spirit of inquiry, that the secrets will fade\naway as they always do when the importance of a situation is really\nunderstood by a large number of people.\n\nMeanwhile it need not appear futile to work for the positive\nelimination of secrecy. No one can doubt that the provision of the\nCovenant of the League of Nations, which requires that all treaties\nshall be made public, is salutary and that its enforcement would\ngreatly increase public confidence. But it is necessary to go beyond\nthis and to outlaw any agreement which is kept secret, by making it the\npublic law of the world that no rights or obligations can be founded on\nsuch attempts against the peace and common welfare of the nations.\n\nThe personal relationships of diplomacy also require attention. The\nspirit of the Diplomatic Service should be transformed in accordance\nwith the modern organization of society. The most essential weakness\nof caste diplomacy lies in the fact that it does not provide means\nfor a sufficient contact among the peoples of the world. Contact is\nmaintained only within a narrow class. The diplomatic fraternity lives\nin its own realm of precedences, rivalries and traditions. To confine\nthe intercourse and interchange of influences so narrowly, is a great\nweakness of our present political system.\n\nThe diplomatic office should be conceived as having the function to\nrepresent not only the special national interest of the respective\ncountry, but also, on an equal plane, its participation in all the\nactivities and interests which are common to the nations of the world.\nThe legations and embassies should be provided with a personnel\nof attach\u00e9s not only for political and military affairs, but for\ncommerce, education, science and social legislation. All these\nmatters are already dealt with to some extent by common action among\nthe nations. The sending of ministers as delegates to international\ntechnical conferences has often been criticized as importing into\nsuch conferences the narrow, separatist point of view of diplomatic\npolitics. It should be exactly the other way; participation in such\nconferences ought to impart to diplomats a broad spirit of co\u00f6peration\ninstead of a desire to maintain intact a theoretical isolation. That is\nthe essence of the matter. As long as it is supposed that by jealously\nscrutinizing every international relationship from the point of view\nof abstract political independence, and assuming that it is best to\nmake the very least possible contribution of energy and co\u00f6peration,\nthe national interest can be most promoted; so long will diplomatic\naction continue on a strained basis, always being painfully conscious\nof the potential enmity among nations. But when it is realized that in\nnearly every case the national interest, or the interest of the people\nof the nation which ought to be synonymous therewith, is best advanced\nby whole-souled co\u00f6peration in constructive work in commerce, industry,\nscience and the arts, then the political factor of diplomatic rivalry\nwill assume more just proportions as compared with the other interests\nof humanity.\n\nThis borders upon a very broad subject dealing rather with general\ninternational policy than with the specific problems we were\nconsidering; and yet we ought to be aware of this background. We need\nnot give up our conviction that the autonomy of the national state\nmust be preserved and that each political society shall dispose of\nits own affairs within its borders as its wisdom and judgment may\ndictate, free from intervention from without. But complete freedom of\nlocal self-determination can rest only upon a universal recognition\nof that right in all others, in a spirit of confidence and security\nengendered by the absence of intrigue and secret ambitions. In a still\ngreater measure does the happiness of the national state depend on\nfree and full co\u00f6peration with all others in all pursuits, activities\nand interests common to humanity and in making the earth a place for\ndignified and happy human life. Unless diplomacy looks forward to\nthis and helps to bring it about, it will remain ensnared in the old\npractices which ever lead only to barren results.\n\nLincoln\u2019s simple faith in the people has not yet been adequately\napplied in international affairs. International action has shown the\nimpersonal character of calculated manipulations coldly disposing of\nthe rights and lives of millions with cruel callousness. The last great\nwar has made us consider the relation of war sacrifices to the daily\nwelfare of the people. A great deal of the prevailing unrest in the\nworld is undoubtedly due to a lack of confidence that great affairs are\nbeing handled with wisdom and with regard to the true, lasting welfare\nof the people themselves. It is difficult to reduce to personal terms\nrelations so abstract and general as those obtaining in international\naffairs. We think of the armies in serried ranks and are impressed\nwith the impact of their force and the great feats it may accomplish.\nBut we are too apt to forget the individual destiny carried in every\nbreast, the human feeling in every heart, among all the millions that\nmake up this engine of power and destruction. Human welfare rather than\nhuman power has not yet been made the constant and overshadowing aim\nof diplomacy. That will be done only when the people themselves demand\nthat international affairs shall be dealt with in a different spirit\nand with other methods. Then we shall have policies that can be avowed\nand understood by the people who bear the burden and who pay the bill.\n\nThe questions which we have been considering are not distinct and\nisolated but are bound up with all that goes toward a more adequate\norganization of modern society. Even in the industries, men are no\nlonger satisfied with a narrowly centralized control. They call for\ninformation and accountability, they claim a share in management,\nat least of an advisory or consultative nature. All who contribute\nin bearing the risks of industry demand to be kept informed of the\npolicies and actions of the management. In ever extending circles\nmen share in the responsibility for action taken in their name.\nIt is a truism that risk is diminished and tends to disappear\nas it is distributed over greater and greater numbers. Under our\npresent political system nations are carrying a tremendous risk in\ninternational affairs--they are risking their wealth, the lives of\ntheir citizens, their own very existence. The responsibility for\nbearing these risks and for arranging the conditions of safety is now\ntoo narrowly centralized. It is an elementary demand of safety that it\nshould be more widely distributed, that a larger number of competent\nand representative minds should take part in carrying this burden.\nAnd they should at all points be supported by a well-informed public\nopinion throughout the nation.\n\nBut there is a condition that lies still deeper. The popular psychology\ncultivated under the narrow aims of nationalism has exhausted itself\nin international matters in dislike and hatred of everything alien and\nof all that lies beyond the national pale. Such a state of mind is\never ready to act the bull to any red rag of newspaper sensationalism.\nSo, the inside managers of diplomatic affairs may still say with some\njustification, \u201cOpen discussion would too much excite the public\nmind.\u201d This fundamental condition cannot be suddenly purged of all its\npotency for evil. Only by gradual degrees may an attitude be brought\nabout within the national communities which will be more just to the\noutside world and to everything that is strange and unaccustomed. What\nthe great imaginative writers of the first half of the nineteenth\ncentury accomplished in breaking down social prejudices and abuses\nwill have to be done for humanity by a new host of inspired molders\nof human sentiment. We may not get rid of artificial hostilities now\nstill nurtured by nationalism, until ideals of international goodwill\nand fellowship have been expressed in the form of human experience\nand portrayed as part of the struggles and triumphs of the individual\nhuman soul. Patient, sound, upbuilding influences shall have to work\npowerfully on the masses of men, and on their leaders, before we\nmay finally overcome the evils that express themselves in practices\ninherent in a system such as that we call \u201csecret diplomacy,\u201d before\nthe world may be made an abode of mutual confidence and helpfulness\ninstead of a house of imprisonment, suspicion and terror.\n\n\n\n\nSHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\n  ASHLEY. Life of Palmerston.\n\n  BAGGER, E. S. Central European Conspiracy. N. Y. _Nation_, November\n      17, 1920.\n\n  BARTH\u00c9LEMY, J. D\u00e9mocratic et politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re. 1917. Part I.\n\n  BASS, J. F. The Peace Tangle. 1920.\n\n  BROWN, PHILIP. Democracy and Diplomacy. _North American Review._\n      1916.\n\n  CALLI\u00c8RES, F. DE. On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes. 1716.\n      Translated by A. F. Whyte. 1919.\n\n  COOLIDGE, A. C. (ED.). Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary. 1920.\n\n  CZERNIN, COUNT. In the World War. 1919.\n\n  DICKINSON, G. L. Democratic Control of Foreign Policy. _Atlantic_,\n      August, 1916.\n\n  DILLON, E. J. The Inside Story of the Peace Conference. 1920.\n\n  FAY, S. B. Origins of the War. _Am. Hist. Rev._ 1920.\n\n  FITZMAURICE, LORD. Life of Lord Granville. 1905.\n\n  GORI\u010cAR and L. B. STOWE. Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue.\n      1920.\n\n  HARRIS, JOHN H. The Chartered Millions. Swarthmore Press, London.\n\n  HAYASHI, COUNT. Secret Memoirs. Ed. A. M. Pooley. 1915.\n\n  HEATLY, D. P. Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations.\n      1919.\n\n  ISVOLSKY, ALEXANDER. Memoirs. 1921.\n\n  LABOUCHERE, HENRY. Life of. 1916.\n\n  LANE-POOLE, STANLEY. The Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. 1890.\n\n  LANSING, ROBERT. The Peace Negotiations. 1921. Chapter 17.\n\n  LEUTRUM, COUNTESS. Court and Diplomacy in Austria. 1920.\n\n  LOFTUS, LORD AUGUSTUS. Diplomatic Reminiscences. 1837\u20131862.\n\n  LOREBURN, EARL. How the War Came. 1919.\n\n  MACKNIGHT, THOMAS. Thirty Years of Foreign Policy. 1855.\n\n  MALMESBURY, EARL OF. Diaries and Correspondence. 1844.\n\n  MAXWELL, SIR HERBERT. Life of Lord Clarendon. 1913.\n\n  METTERNICH. Memoirs.\n\n  MOREL, E. D. Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. 6th Edition. 1920.\n\n  MOREL, E. D. Pre-War Diplomacy. 1920.\n\n  MURRAY, SIR GILBERT. Faith, War and Policy. 1917. Part 6.\n\n  MYERS, D. P. Legislatures and Foreign Relations. _Am. Political\n      Science Review._ 1917.\n\n  NEILSON, FRANCIS. How Diplomats make War. 1916.\n\n  PONSONBY, A. Democracy and Diplomacy. 1919.\n\n  Report of the Select Committee on the Diplomatic Service. 1861.\n\n  S\u00c9GUR. Politique de tous les cabinets. 3rd Edition, 1802.\n\n  SMITH, MUNRO. Militarism and Statecraft. 1918.\n\n  THOMPSON, G. C. Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield. 1886.\n\n  Union for Democratic Control. London. Publications. 1920\u20131921.\n\n  WITTE, COUNT. Memoirs. 1921.\n\n  YOUNG, GEORGE. Diplomacy, Old and New. 1921.\n\n  ZURLINDEN, S. The World War. Chapter IV. Zurich, 1917.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  Absolutism, survival of, 181 ff., 208\n\n  Absolutist politics, 148\n\n  Absolutist tradition in diplomacy, 208\n\n  Adams, John Quincy, 24\n\n  Adriatic memorandum, 201, 203\n\n  Aehrenthal, 106\n\n  Afghanistan, 157\n\n  Afghan war, 69\n\n  Agadir, 81\n\n  Algeciras, Act of, 80\n\n  American government, 16, 18, 119, 173, 194 ff., 196\n\n  American idealism, 207\n\n  Alexander I, 46\n\n  Alliances, 70, 73\n\n  Alsace-Lorraine, 64, 121, 123\n\n  Anglo-French Entente, 79, 89, 93\n\n  Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 73, 74\n\n  Antwerp, 91\n\n  Apathy of the public, 172, 173\n\n  Appearances, 32\n\n  Archives, 51\n\n  Armament interests, 147\n\n  Asquith, Herbert H., 85, 87, 88\n\n  Australia, 210\n\n  Austria-Hungary, 48, 49, 61, 62, 65, 70, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 120,\n          121, 123, 124, 132\n\n\n  Balfour, Arthur J., 140, 141, 161, 162, 168, 176, 187\n\n  Balkans, 97, 104, 113, 146\n\n  Barnardiston, Colonel, 91\n\n  Bavaria, 61\n\n  Beaconsfield, Lord, 67, 68, 69\n\n  Belgian General Staff, 91\n\n  Belgian neutrality, 62, 91\n\n  Benedetti, 53, 62\n\n  Berchtold, Count, 104, 105, 106, 114\n\n  Beresford, Lord, 87\n\n  Bethmann-Hollweg, 104, 106, 107\n\n  Beyens, Baron, 114\n\n  Bismarck, 5, 11, 31, 49, 51, 53, 61, 63, 64, 70, 140, 184\n\n  Bjorkoe meeting, 1905, 76\n\n  Blue Books, 156\n\n  Borgo, Pozzo di, 46\n\n  Bosnia, 114\n\n  Bosnia and Herzegovina, 65, 105\n\n  Bribery, 41, 42, 48\n\n  Bright, John, 55, 67, 157\n\n  British diplomacy, 20\n\n  Buchanan, William J., 138\n\n  Buelow, Prince, 76\n\n  Bulgaria, 122\n\n  Byles, Sir W., 88\n\n\n  Cabinet, 158\n\n  Cabinet and Parliament, 56\n\n  Calli\u00e8res, practice of diplomacy, 27, 29, 32\n\n  Canada, 210\n\n  Canning, Stratford, 54, 57\n\n  Caste, diplomatic, 184\n\n  Castlereagh, 47\n\n  Catherine, Empress, 36, 42, 43, 44\n\n  Cavour, 60\n\n  Cecil, Lord Hugh, 86\n\n  Censure of news, 145\n\n  Central Powers, 120\n\n  Charles, Emperor of Austria, 121, 123\n\n  Charles II, 152\n\n  Cheradame, M., 177\n\n  Chili-Argentinian boundary dispute, 138\n\n  China, 117, 126, 127, 143, 199, 208\n\n  China, breaking off relations with Germany, 127, 128\n\n  Chinese people, 20\n\n  Chinese public opinion, 21\n\n  Chino-Japanese war, 72\n\n  Christian ideal, 190\n\n  Clarendon, Earl of, 55, 57, 155, 157\n\n  Comit\u00e9 du Maroc, 80\n\n  Common interests, 14, 219\n\n  Communist Party and international affairs, 179\n\n  \u201cCompensations,\u201d 65, 98, 123\n\n  Conference diplomacy, 15, 219\n\n  Conferences, international technical, 219\n\n  Congress, 150\n\n  Constantinople, 54, 201\n\n  Continental system, 84\n\n  Council of Five, 130\n\n  Counter-Insurance Treaty, 70\n\n  Crimean war, 54, 55, 56, 59\n\n  Cromer, Lord, 101, 171, 172\n\n  Cromwell, 34\n\n  Crown, prerogative of the, 153, 154\n\n  Cyprus protectorate, 67\n\n  Czecho-Slovakia, 132\n\n  Czernin, Count, 106, 121, 123, 124, 169, 189\n\n\n  _Daily Mail_, London, 205\n\n  De Bass, 34\n\n  De Tocqueville, 170\n\n  De Torcy, 31, 41\n\n  Deceit, 28, 29, 39\n\n  Deception, 136\n\n  Declarations, general, 142, 144, 186\n\n  Delcass\u00e9, M., 78\n\n  _Dementi_, 66, 125\n\n  Democracy, 10, 158, 159, 170, 172, 214, 221\n\n  Denmark, 37\n\n  Derby, Lord, 69\n\n  D\u2019Estournelles de Constant, Baron, 82\n\n  Dickinson, G. Lowes, 178\n\n  Digest of International Law, 196\n\n  Dillon, Dr. E.\u00a0J., 130\n\n  Dillon, John, 81, 82, 158\n\n  Diplomacy, personal, 23, 52, 55, 184\n\n  Diplomacy of authority, 64\n\n  Diplomacy resembling war, 49\n\n  Diplomatic fraternity, 219\n\n  Diplomatic literature, 51\n\n  Diplomatic Service, spirit of the, 218\n\n  Disillusionment, 200, 202\n\n  Disraeli, 50, 67, 68, 69\n\n  d\u2019Orsat, Cardinal, 30, 33\n\n  Double-dealing, 73\n\n  Drake, 33\n\n  Du Luc, Count, 31\n\n  Dual Alliance, 71\n\n\n  \u201cEmpire,\u201d 68\n\n  Ems dispatch, 63\n\n  English-speaking powers, 119, 204, 210\n\n  Experts, 8, 111\n\n\n  Falsiloquy, 26\n\n  Far Eastern situation, 72, 199, 201\n\n  _Federalist_, 150\n\n  Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 113\n\n  Feria, Duke of, 33\n\n  Fez, 80\n\n  Forgach, Count, 105\n\n  France, 48, 60, 61, 62, 70, 75, 78, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 97,\n          117, 132, 133\n\n  Francis Joseph, Emperor, 105, 107\n\n  Franco-Hungarian intrigues, 132\n\n  Franco-Prussian war, 64\n\n  Franco-Russian Alliance, 97\n\n  Franco-Russian military convention of August, 1912, 93\n\n  \u201cFrankness,\u201d 32, 40, 64, 143\n\n  Frederick II, 38, 39, 42, 103\n\n  French Parliament, 82\n\n  \u201cFriends of liberty,\u201d 38\n\n  Foreign Office Vote, 186\n\n  Foreign Relations of the United States, 195\n\n  Fox, Charles James, 43\n\n\n  German diplomacy, 103\n\n  German-Russian agreement, 76, 77\n\n  Germany, 62, 64, 70, 71, 78, 81, 89, 95, 102, 103, 106, 176\n\n  Giolliti, Signor, 187\n\n  Gladstone, 67\n\n  Golden Rule, 47, 195\n\n  Gossip, 137\n\n  Granville, Lord, 55, 66, 157\n\n  Great Britain, 48, 65, 67, 72, 84, 88, 97, 117, 119, 143, 210\n\n  Great War, 6, 99, 112, 174, 178\n\n  Greindl, Baron, 94\n\n  Grey, Sir Edward, 80, 88, 89, 90, 96, 97, 100, 160, 178\n\n  Gross, M., 38\n\n  Grotius, 11, 14, 15, 24, 26\n\n  Guillaume, Baron, 94\n\n\n  Haldane, Viscount, 88, 100\n\n  Harris, Sir James, 29, 38, 40, 42\n\n  Harvey, T. Edmund, 97\n\n  Hayashi, Count, 73\n\n  Holy Alliance, 46\n\n  Honor, 110\n\n  House of Lords and foreign affairs, 66, 153\n\n  Hughes, Secretary, 16\n\n  Human equation, 9\n\n  Human welfare, 222\n\n  Humanitarian professions, 142\n\n  Hungarian railways, 133\n\n\n  Ideals professed, 117, 142, 186\n\n  India, 20, 210\n\n  India, frontier of, 69\n\n  Indifference, public, 172, 173\n\n  Infallibility does not exist, 176\n\n  Instincts, 215\n\n  Isvolsky, 75, 93, 114\n\n  Italy, 117, 124\n\n  Ito, Marquis, 73\n\n\n  Japan, 19, 72, 73, 117, 119, 124, 126, 127, 142, 143, 199, 202\n\n  Japan, absolutism, 185\n\n  Janushkevich, General, 115\n\n  Jay, John, 150, 194, 195\n\n  Jowett, F.\u00a0W., 85\n\n  Jungbluth, General, 91\n\n\n  Kinloch-Cooke, Sir C., 87\n\n  Knox, Secretary, 19, 143\n\n  Korea, 143\n\n  Krupp Iron Works, 147\n\n\n  Labouchere, 50, 51, 55\n\n  Lalaing, Count de, 94\n\n  Lamsdorff, Count, 76, 77\n\n  Lansdowne, Lord, 73, 79, 96\n\n  Lansing-Ishii notes, 199\n\n  Law, Bonar, 204\n\n  League of Nations, 7, 188, 218\n\n  Leutrum, Countess, 105\n\n  Liberal theory of state, 3\n\n  Lincoln, 221\n\n  Lloyd-George, 122\n\n  London, Pact of, 120, 123\n\n  Loreburn, Lord, 95, 96, 98, 116\n\n  Lords, House of, 66, 153\n\n  Louis XI, 28\n\n  Louis XV, 52\n\n  Lowell, J.\u00a0R., 182\n\n  Lytton, Lord, 172\n\n\n  Macartney, Sir George, 37\n\n  Machiavelli, 11, 14, 24, 28, 40, 182\n\n  MacNeill, Swift, 160\n\n  Malmesbury, Lord, 29, 38, 40\n\n  Manchuria, 143\n\n  Manchurian railway neutralization, 19\n\n  Mandates, 131\n\n  Manipulations, 212, 221\n\n  Mankind, underlying unity of, 191\n\n  Manteuffel, 50\n\n  Marcy, Secretary, 50\n\n  Marlborough, Duke of, 41\n\n  \u201cMaterial for statesmanship,\u201d 215\n\n  _Matin_, 82\n\n  Mazarin, Cardinal, 33\n\n  Mediterranean situation, 87, 88\n\n  Meh\u00e9e de la Touche, 33\n\n  Memoirs, Eighteenth Century, 25\n\n  Methods of diplomacy and of private business, 4, 140, 163, 169\n\n  Metternich, 35, 46, 47\n\n  Militarists, German, 105, 185\n\n  Militarists, Russian, 105, 115\n\n  Military assistance, 85, 90, 92, 93\n\n  Minority interests, 183\n\n  Monarchist diplomacy, 23\n\n  Monroe Doctrine, 18, 215\n\n  Moore, John Bassett, 196, 197\n\n  Morny, Duc de, 53\n\n  Morocco, 60, 71, 78, 79, 82, 89, 101, 143\n\n  Murray, Gilbert, 172\n\n\n  Napoleon I, 35, 46, 48\n\n  Napoleon III, 5, 52, 53, 56, 60, 62, 63\n\n  Naval assistance, 87, 90, 92, 93\n\n  Nationalism, 11\n\n  Near East, 134\n\n  Necessity of war, 118\n\n  Newspapers, 171, 223\n\n  Nicholas II, 56\n\n  Nicholas III, 75, 77, 115\n\n  North Pacific islands, 19, 128, 202\n\n  Notes, exchange of, November, 1912, 92\n\n\n  Objectives, constancy of, 212\n\n  Open covenants, 130\n\n  Open Door, 18, 144\n\n\n  Pact of London, 120, 123\n\n  Palmerston, 31, 54, 56, 59, 68\n\n  Panin, 37, 42, 43\n\n  Parliament and foreign affairs, 149 ff.\n\n  Parliament and secret diplomacy, 82, 85, 94, 95, 98, 149 ff.\n\n  Peace Conference of Paris, 129, 130\n\n  \u201cPeace of Asia,\u201d 143\n\n  Pelham, 154\n\n  \u201cPeople who are not responsible,\u201d 168, 216\n\n  _Pester Lloyd_, 110\n\n  Pinckney, 44\n\n  Plutocratic control, 183\n\n  Poincar\u00e9, President, 93, 121\n\n  Poland, 47, 118\n\n  Policy, diplomatic, 48, 58, 166\n\n  Polish Question, 118\n\n  Politics, essence of, 13, 39\n\n  Polk, Undersecretary, 203\n\n  Port Arthur, surrender, 72\n\n  Portugal, 15, 190\n\n  Potemkin, Prince, 41, 43\n\n  Press, control of, 145, 171\n\n  Pressens\u00e9, Francis de, 80\n\n  Prestige, 176\n\n  Preventive war, 13, 64, 106, 108\n\n  Private business and diplomatic affairs, 4, 140, 163, 169\n\n  Propaganda, 216\n\n  Prussia, 49, 53, 61, 62\n\n  Public opinion, crime against, 144\n\n  Public opinion and diplomacy, 58, 102, 112, 144, 166 ff.\n\n  Publicity, 216, 217\n\n\n  Rashness, alleged, of the people, 177\n\n  \u201cRaw material for brilliant careers,\u201d 185\n\n  Realpolitik, 103\n\n  Reichstag, 102\n\n  Representative government, 58\n\n  Ribot, Alexander, 123\n\n  Roosevelt, President, 151\n\n  Rosebery, Lord, 66\n\n  Rosebery, Lord, on Anglo-Japanese treaty, 74\n\n  Rosebery, Lord, on Entente, 84\n\n  Rosen, Baron, 74\n\n  Roumania, 118\n\n  Russell, Lord John, 52, 57\n\n  Russia, 7, 37, 55, 65, 67, 70, 75, 78, 97, 104, 105, 108, 109, 114,\n          143, 146, 208, 212\n\n  Russian diplomatic policy, 112\n\n  Russian local agents, 54\n\n  Russo-French Alliance, 70\n\n  Russo-Turkish war, 65\n\n\n  Salisbury, Marquis of, 66, 157\n\n  San Domingo, 151\n\n  San Stefano, treaty of, 65\n\n  Sandwich, Earl of, 37\n\n  Savoy and Nice, 60\n\n  Sazonov, 112, 115, 133\n\n  Schleswig-Holstein, 61\n\n  Schuvalof agreement, 156\n\n  Secret diplomacy, abolition of, 127, 218\n\n  \u201cSecret diplomacy\u201d used in a special sense, 52, 57\n\n  Secret procedure, Paris Conference, 7\n\n  Secret service, 22, 28, 41, 50, 136, 137\n\n  Secret treaties, 48, 61, 65, 67, 71, 76, 78, 79, 113, 116 ff.,\n          119, 134, 164\n\n  Senate and foreign affairs, 151, 197\n\n  Servian question, 104, 108, 113\n\n  Shantung, 117, 125, 128\n\n  Sixtus, Prince, of Bourbon, 120\n\n  South Pacific Islands, 119\n\n  Soviet Russia, 133, 179\n\n  Speech of August 3, 1914, 89, 96\n\n  Spheres of influence, 79\n\n  St. Petersburg, 40, 52, 73\n\n  Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, proposed, 162, 164, 186\n\n  Standing committee on foreign and colonial affairs in France, 187\n\n  Stanhope, Lord, 31\n\n  Stratagem, 138\n\n  Stratford de Redcliffe, 54, 55, 57\n\n  Survival, 13\n\n  Suspicion, 6, 17, 54, 72, 100, 126, 136, 141\n\n  Sweden, 37\n\n\n  Talleyrand, 44, 46\n\n  _Temps_, 82\n\n  Tibet, 144\n\n  _Times_, London, 204, 205\n\n  Trait\u00e9 de diplomatie, Garden, 48\n\n  Treaties, publication of all, 188, 205, 206\n\n  Treaty of Versailles, 129\n\n  Triple Alliance, 70\n\n  Trotsky, 179\n\n  Truthfulness of diplomacy, 12, 30\n\n  Tschirsky, Von, 77, 106, 107\n\n  Turkey, 38, 67\n\n  Turkish Empire, 60\n\n  Twenty-one demands, 117, 125\n\n  Two-party system, 152\n\n\n  United Colonies of America, 149\n\n  United States, 119, 151, 174, 186, 194 ff., 201, 209\n\n\n  Vattel, 26\n\n  Vienna, Congress of, 45\n\n  Viviani, M., 115\n\n\n  Walpole, Sir Robert, 154\n\n  Walpole, Horace, 45\n\n  War, declaration of, 186, 187\n\n  Washington, Conference of, 1921, 16\n\n  Wells, H.\u00a0G., 185\n\n  _Westminster Gazette_, 204\n\n  Whist, 50\n\n  William I, 63\n\n  William II, 75, 76, 78\n\n  William III of England, 153\n\n  Willy-Nicky correspondence, 75\n\n  Wilson, President, 21, 129, 169, 200, 201, 203, 204\n\n  Wotton, Sir Henry, 28\n\n  Wyndham, 153\n\n\n  Xavier, Prince of Bourbon, 120, 123\n\n\n  Yap, 201, 202\n\n  Yerburgh, Mr., 85\n\n  Yugo-Slavia and France, 133\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\nPunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a\npredominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they\nwere not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation\nmarks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left\nunbalanced.\n\nThe index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page\nreferences.\n\nPage 225: The \u201c\u010d\u201d in \u201cGori\u010dar\u201d may have been printed with a breve (\u0306),\nnot with a caron (\u030c).","title":"Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":47125}