{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_64834/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_64834","id":"gutenberg_64834","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/64834","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Language & Communication","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Language and languages","Thought and thinking"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Notes:\n\nText enclosed by underscores is in italics.\n\nAdditional Transcriber\u2019s Notes are at the end.\n\n * * * * *\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH\n\n\n BY\n M. MONCALM\n\n TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH\n BY\n G. S. WHITMARSH\n\n \u201cLanguage is the autobiography of the human mind.\u201d\n _The Science of Thought_ (MAX M\u00dcLLER).\n\n \u201cLanguage is our Rubicon which no brute will dare to cross.\u201d\n _The Science of Language_ (MAX M\u00dcLLER).\n\n\n LONDON\n KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TR\u00dcBNER & CO., LTD.\n DRYDEN HOUSE, 43 GERRARD STREET, W.\n 1905\n\n * * * * *\n\nWith the approval of the Author\u2019s representative, the translator has at\ntimes followed the exact words of Max M\u00fcller rather than the literal\ntranslation, where the latter has differed slightly from the former.\n\nThe thanks of the translator are due to friends who have kindly revised\nthe MS. and a portion of the proof sheets.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe books used by the Author in this work are:--\n\nMAX M\u00dcLLER.\n\n _Introduction to the Science of Religion._\n _Origin and Growth of Religion._\n _Chips from a German Workshop._\n _The Science of Language._\n _The Science of Thought._\n _Natural Religion._\n _Physical Religion._\n _Anthropological Religion._\n _Theosophy, or Psychological Religion._\n\nCH. DARWIN.\n\n _Origin of Species._\n _The Descent of Man._\n _Expression of the Emotions._\n\nL. NOIR\u00c9.\n\n _Der Ursprung der Sprache._\n _Die Lehre Kants, und der Ursprung der Vernunft._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PAGE\n\n INTRODUCTION 1\n\n CHAPTER I HYPOTHESES 14\n\n CHAPTER II OUR ARYAN ANCESTORS 41\n\n CHAPTER III THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 51\n\n CHAPTER IV ANIMALS 57\n\n CHAPTER V PRIMITIVE HUMANITY 63\n\n The 121 Original Concepts 89\n\n CHAPTER VI ANCIENT LANGUAGE 93\n\n CHAPTER VII MYTHS 99\n\n CHAPTER VIII BETWEEN SLEEPING AND WAKING 118\n\n CHAPTER IX A DECISIVE STEP 140\n\n Kant\u2019s Teaching 149\n Sensation 149\n Space and Time 152\n Phenomena 152\n The Categories of the Understanding 153\n Cause and Effect 154\n Axioms 154\n Metaphysics 156\n\n CHAPTER X THE VEDIC HYMNS 173\n\n CHAPTER XI MAN\u2019S CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION 214\n\n The Sacred Writings of the Hebrews 228\n The Various Names of God 231\n The Genius of Languages 234\n Metaphor 235\n The Later Name for God amongst the Hebrews 236\n On the Prophets (N\u0101bh\u012b) 238\n The Views of Spinoza 242\n Obedience 246\n The Law 249\n The Law in the Gospel 251\n Biographical Note 252\n The Ideas of Plato 255\n Episodial 257\n An Excursion into a Country little known 258\n Anthropomorphism 261\n The Sacred Codes and the Codes of Laws 262\n\n CHAPTER XII OF WORDS 276\n\n CHAPTER XIII OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS 286\n\n Physics 287\n Comparative Sciences 288\n Concerning some Authors 291\n Religion and Religions 293\n Opposition 298\n Abstraction, Inattention 298\n Speech 300\n R\u00e9sum\u00e9 303\n\n * * * * *\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nWhen opening my eyes in the morning, and whilst still struggling with\nan inclination to sleep, I review the day and what it will have in\nstore for me; but the pictures drawn are confused, and my will takes no\npart in it.\n\nFor some time I have been haunted by the impression that the mental\nfaculties of the generality of men have not succeeded in throwing\noff a species of torpor resembling that of a person hardly awake;\nthe supposition that this torpid condition prevents our minds from\nattaining that degree of lucidity to which they have a right to aspire,\nis perhaps a hallucination, yet possibly I may be right in thinking it.\n\nHow many confused ideas traverse my brain in one day, and how seldom\nthose come of which I follow the thread. We know well that injunction\nso often given by parents to children, and by schoolmasters to their\npupils: \u201cTry to concentrate your attention.\u201d It almost seems as if that\nwhich we require of children is beyond my powers, for I have hardly\nresolved to disentangle a problem of whatever kind, when, under the\nform of useless, futile, inept thoughts, obstacles heap themselves\nacross my path. I conclude from this that a fatal somnolence paralyses\nmy faculties.\n\nWhen a person has to be awakened who is disinclined to be disturbed,\nhe is violently shaken. What movement would suffice to energise a\nman whose mental powers were drowsy? I do not see anything from the\noutside; and a personal effort could not be looked for, from an\nenervated will.\n\nAnd yet I am possessed by the desire to penetrate the mystery of my\nexistence; I ask myself what I am, and why I am on this earth; from the\nmoment that I put this question to myself I feel that the awakening may\nbe possible for me. I know two classes of men who never ask it; first\nthose who do not see that there is any problem to solve; and secondly\nthose who are content with infantine and superficial teaching; or more\nor less elaborate and learned, but coming from one who appears to\nhimself to be the depository of a collection of supernaturally inspired\ntruths. I own that I do not belong to the first of these divisions,\nsince I shall have no rest as long as I am ignorant of what passes in\nme and around me; neither do I belong to the second of these classes,\nsince those who compose it are content to believe; but faith is not\nknowledge, and I am anxious to comprehend what has been discovered,\nknown, and established by evidence. But how shall I submit to this\nlabour of research, when the habitual condition of my thoughts is to\nwander at will amongst my impressions, and when I am so incurably\nabsent-minded?\n\nWe live in an atmosphere of many and varied ideas; ideas true and\nfalse, good and bad; they pulsate in the air we breathe; they are like\nthe winged antheral seeds which are lifted up by the slightest breeze\nof autumn and carried afar; they are little heeded; but should it\nhappen that these seeds attached themselves to our garments we should\nnotice how strikingly the one form varied from the other.\n\nAmongst those ideas which wander at large is this aphorism--that we\nare ignorant of that of which we know not the commencement, or in\nother words of that which we do not examine from the practical point\nof view; he who wishes to learn how something is made, whatever it may\nbe, must know how to begin it. This truth has so ancient a date that\nwe cannot conceive of a time when it was absent from the mind of man;\nonly it had the common lot of all truths with which we are so familiar\nthat apparently there is nothing to learn from them, and this aphorism\nappears at first sight to be the ramblings which we hear but to which\nwe do not listen.\n\nTo me it is of value, as it strengthens my conviction that the mist\nwhich obscures my vision will not be dissipated until I have traced\ncertain problems to their source; I know by experience that few\nphenomena are easy of explanation when their appearances only are\nexamined at any given moment; and close questioning fails to elicit\nlight, whilst ignorance prevails concerning their beginning.\n\nHow does it happen that in spite of such unfavourable circumstances,\noften with no clear purpose, and with eyes half shut, humanity can\nadvance? For the progress is indubitable. The public conscience has\ndeveloped; and its actions make themselves felt; civilised nations\nhave become more humane; they understand better than they did formerly\nthat peace is more profitable than war; certain social problems are\nbeing seriously discussed, and some are on the point of solution. In\nthe physical sciences, as well as in mechanical arts, progress is most\nmarked. But I see that though imagination, observation, and a talent\nfor invention have had much to do with this progress, the capacity of\nimitation has also been a powerful factor. When William Herschel gave\nup music for astronomy, he perfected the optical instruments which\nwere in use at that time, and manufactured some excellent telescopes\nat comparatively moderate prices, with the result that his fellow\nastronomers and their successors were able to devote themselves to the\nstudy of the heavens with greater ease and readiness; and the discovery\nof Uranus was soon followed by that of a large number of celestial\nbodies. Again, at one of the National Exhibitions of our time, there\nwas shown to all comers the model of a recently invented apparatus\nfor the conveyance of the wounded on battlefields; since which, each\ncountry now produces its own design with various improvements, and the\nvictims of the barbarism, still lingering in war, were benefited by\nthese modern appliances, due entirely to the art of imitation.\n\nIn short, progress exists, but not all along the line. As thought\ntravels slowly in its own domain, so mental science is behindhand.\nA true idea is not mechanically reproduced, it must be tended for\nit to bear fruit, but what tendance would avail, if it is only with\ndifficulty that we discriminate between what we know already, and what\nwe do not yet know, for this distinction must accompany conscious\nprogress.\n\nEverything around us tends to keep us in this penumbra, which is\nso favourable to inertia, ignorance, sleep. Certain groups of\nphilosophical ideas become condensed and systematised; in some systems\nthere are one or two great thoughts only. This suffices--these systems\nremain, germinate and direct contemporaneous generations as well as\nthose of the future. It may also happen that these same ideas invade\nbrains little prepared to receive them, and thus deviate from their\ncourse, err as they advance, and end by becoming so travestied that\nit is no longer possible to know what they were at their origin--a\nswerving movement has taken place, which causes suffering to\ncontemporaries, and, still more, to those who come after. Thus the bulk\nincreases, the bulk of truth and the bulk of error; and this fatal\nexpansion of the true and the false, intertwined the one with the\nother, pursues its encroaching and troublous way.\n\nThis confusion is something impersonal; it is an opaque body which\ninterposes itself between the truth and ourselves, and prevents us\nfrom contemplating it; but the confusion may also arise directly from\nthose whose mission it is to guide us. I open a book written by some\ngrave thinker who, I imagine, knows his subject thoroughly, and I\nbegin to read in all confidence; at first I think I understand him;\nthen I am stopped by a word, and I wonder what meaning the author has\nattached to it; a little further I come upon the same word, which now\nseems invested with another signification; this disconcerts me, and\nI close the book. I take another, but the same disagreeable surprise\nawaits me, and I find everywhere terms whose meaning varies to suit the\nconvenience of the author; and what we are to understand by these words\nis nowhere explained. These defects arise probably from the fact that\ncertain philosophers, taking their confused opinions for new ideas,\nseek for words in which to express them, and not finding them in their\nvocabulary, they coin them, using terms to which no precise meaning is\nattached; which terms remain more or less enigmatical to the authors\nthemselves, and, consequently, unintelligible to the readers; in this\nway does the confusion of ideas arise and is propagated. A philosopher,\nI think it was Haman, made the following very true and very alarming\nstatement: \u201cLanguage is not only the basis of our power of thought, but\nalso the point from which our misunderstandings and errors spring\u201d; and\nHobbes also says: \u201cIt is obvious that truth and falsehood dwell only\nwith those living creatures who have the use of speech.\u201d\n\nBut all that I have just said indicates merely a superficial portion\nof my passing impressions; in going below the surface I find in the\npast other causes for our present perturbation of mind. For centuries\nwe have frequented schools in order to learn to distinguish truth\nfrom error, yet it is always a mixture of truth and error that we\nare taught. What result had we attained on the eve of the twentieth\ncentury? We are still asking ourselves whether science does or does not\nharmonise with religion. After that we cannot but give ourselves up to\nthe deepest despondency, we cannot but fold our arms in despair and\nquestion whether we shall ever see things clearly.\n\nAmongst our ancestors there were sometimes found men of great\nresolution who, in order to punish themselves for cowardice and luxury,\nadministered discipline to themselves; the idea is not so extravagant\nas it appears to some people. A few good strokes of the whip might\nresult in reviving or strengthening the will, and in forcing it to\nresist the moral supineness which is so apt to increase; but physical\ndiscipline is no longer in use amongst us, and in my own case I have\nsubstituted an illustration of which I try never to lose sight. I\npicture to myself an ideal potter, whose whole ambition would be to\nmake good vessels, and, having succeeded in making some of great\nsolidity, he would choose out those of the finest shape for the market.\nHe attains success, and his thoughts being occupied with his pottery\nonly, at last he makes vases of absolute perfection. With what feelings\nof envy I contemplate this creature of my imagination, who is to serve\nas my model, and yet whom the want of concentration of thought prevents\nme from imitating.\n\nIt would have been perhaps prudent on my part to follow the example\nof this workman, and to accustom myself to reflect on subjects less\nimmeasurably above me than those which have such a powerful attraction\nfor me; but I yield to the impulse--once given. I often lose myself\nwhen pondering on the world where destiny has placed me; and I ask\nmyself--How did life first appear on the earth? Was there nothing but\na cellule from whence all that fills space came? Was there one cellule\nfor the vegetables and another for the animals? If man did not spring\nfrom the cradle of all things that live and grow on the surface of\nthe globe, was he an individual of his own species at the beginning,\nor two individuals, or many? After what fashion did man speak at his\nfirst appearance? What were his thoughts? \u201cHow can it be explained,\u201d I\nasked myself again, \u201cthat of all the members of the animal kingdom, one\nonly should have marvelled at and pondered on his position with regard\nto the universe and himself? That one only should have manifested\nthe desire to understand his role in life, whilst all the creatures\nthat surrounded him, lived contentedly in blissful ignorance? It\nwould be impossible to conceive of a horse, an elephant, or a mammoth\ndisquieting itself concerning its origin and the end of its being; why\nhas man only sought a solution of these problems?\u201d The learned scholars\nwho occupy themselves with these questions are far from agreeing\nunanimously concerning them; thus I--I, who am only one link in the\ninterminable chain of units which composes humanity, past, present and\nfuture; I, in my own individuality must live and die in my ignorance.\nI revolt against this prospect, which I yet recognise as inevitable;\nI refuse to acknowledge myself beaten, and I feel myself irresistibly\ndriven to seek for more knowledge; then feeling unable to supply the\nlack, I cease to be anxious, and fall asleep again.\n\nSometimes when led to investigate the inner tribunal, conscience, I\ncontemplate a phenomenon purely intellectual and moral, which the\nuproar raised by the conflict of so many heterogeneous ideas cannot\nmake me forget, although it does not intrude itself upon me with\nviolence; on the contrary, it waits with an unparalleled patience and\ndiscretion at my door. It is the phenomenon named religion.\n\nWe read in the Bible that Moses, having noticed a burning bush that\nyet was not consumed, went up to it, the more closely to investigate\nthis marvel. For many people religion has borne the same aspect that\nthe burning bush did for Moses, and those, like Moses, have approached\nit in the endeavour to discover what it could be. Religion has always\ncompelled attention, its metaphysical side has been described in\nvoluminous theological and philosophical treatises; historians on their\nside have made many researches concerning the forms in which it has\nclothed itself on earth during a long succession of centuries, and\namongst many peoples; it is even said there are learned men who have\nstudied all the Bibles and catechisms; and it is added that few amongst\nthem know what religion really is. It does not on that account play\na less important part in our existence; it is from religion that all\nthose acts of devotion and charity spring, to which millions of human\ncreatures give themselves. There are few who ask themselves whence\ncomes this breath which inspires them so fully, and since when has its\ninfluence extended itself amongst us; to be nourished with its fruits\nsufficed. Such is the disposition of soul of the majority of those\nfor whom religion is more than a name--whatsoever it be--pronounced\nin an unknown tongue. Would it not be natural to desire to make its\nacquaintance more closely? Apparently not; we accept it as something\nknown by intuition, without concerning ourselves with its aspect.\n\nThis strange fact I have also noticed. When studying history very\nattentively, and with an attitude of mind free from all prejudice,\nit is possible to fix the exact period at which errors, more or less\ngenerally acknowledged as such, have first crept into the world; but I\nhave vainly sought in history for the corresponding moment when truths\nfirst made their appearance; truths, which have been accepted, if only\nby a few isolated individuals, or by certain groups of individuals, of\nwhatever race, or of whatever period of the life of humanity they might\nbe. But as it is acknowledged that amongst the errors which trouble\nus, we possess some truths, it is evident that they have manifested\nthemselves; but when and how? At this I do not arrive.\n\nThis silence of history indicates, I think, that the truths of which\nwe seek the commencement have been revealed to man in prehistoric\ndays. I do not feel that I know positively concerning the first human\nbeings who appeared on the earth; I picture them like soft wax ready to\nreceive a definite form from the hand which created them. These first\ncomers who knew nothing, never having had any training, and possessing\nonly their five senses to aid them in arriving at knowledge, were\ninfinitely better placed than I am to embrace truth, since I should\nhave to disentangle myself from a vast mass of ideas which disfigure\nthe natural simplicity of my soul; I should have to forget, even the\ntruths which I believed myself to possess, and to transform myself\ninto white plastic blank wax, with no impress whatsoever, and to wait\nuntil my Creator traced the image He wished; this is now not possible.\nI should not be now here if I could have been contemporaneous with my\nancestors, and I had been permitted to follow in the steps of their\npilgrimage, this would have pleased me well.\n\nI perceive my friends are uneasy--\u201cTake care,\u201d they say, \u201can _Id\u00e9e\nfixe_ is dangerous.\u201d\n\nBut is it quite certain that an _Id\u00e9e fixe_ is always harmful?\nHave they never seen a man wandering in a forest without any fixed\ndetermination to quit it? Is it credible that our first parents had no\nfixed idea of discovering the import towards themselves, of the vast\nworld in which they had been placed, knowing nothing of the reason\nof their position? Equally ignorant of the reason why the sun, the\nmoon, fire, hurricanes, storms, thunder, rivers, mountains existed,\nalways above and around them. The whole of nature itself required to\nbe interrogated. In what way could this settled determination have\nharmed them? It is true that they are all dead, but determination did\nnot kill them. And their _Id\u00e9e fixe_ must have been very tenacious and\npowerful for this thirst for knowledge to have descended with their\nblood into our own veins; their wish to gain information is reproduced\nin us; this is the legacy that our fathers have left us, and the\nsingular feature of the legacy is that unlike others, of which the\nparts are subdivided and diminished, this in its entirety has passed\ndown to each of the milliards and milliards of inheritors.\n\nMust we then feel that we are destined to ask perpetually, and to\nreceive no answer? That need not be. Many things that our ancestors\ncould not fathom are clear to us; what was unknown to them is known\nto us. That which prevents us from following up this line of progress\nthrough these phases is that each reply brings forth anew fresh\nquestions, and thus it will be to the end--if the end should ever\narrive. This last question we do not put to ourselves, which is an\nindication that we are not careful to arrive at the answer. When I\ncompare the present state of our knowledge, and of our condition of\nmind, to which I have given the epithets of torpor and inertia--and\nthey are rightly given--to that which held sway in the dark ages when\nthe earth rested on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, and the\ntortoise swam in the void, I must acknowledge that we now see things\nmore truly.\n\nBut to start from the point of the sum of our acquired knowledge\nin this march of progress would be fatal to us; the ground we have\nwon will only retain its solidity in proportion as we keep in sight\nthe path we have trodden, with all its encountered and vanquished\nobstacles, and that will only be by pursuing the same path again in\ncompany with our ancestors.\n\nHere my friends interpose--\u201cThat would be a vain task, you cannot\npicture humanity in its infancy, that is an impossibility.\u201d\n\nDoubtless, and since I am too practical to attempt the impossible,\nabstaining from every superhuman effort, and submitting my imagination\nto a strict discipline, I will again consult history, but not history\nas I know it, nor that history which is written in our days, polished,\ncautious, honestly critical, that which notes the old traces of\nhumanity when they occur on the route mixed with events, and which\ntreats the eternal truths as though they had no existence, and,\ntruly, they do not belong to its dominion. I would study the other\nhistory, which at first was related, not written, because speech came\nbefore writing. I should try to collect information from the ancient\nliteratures of the people concerning the manner in which our ancestors\ndepicted divinity to themselves, especially with regard to dealings\nwith mortals at the time when visits between the celestial inhabitants\nand those on earth were common.... We possess the Old Testament of the\nHebrews, the sacred books of the Hindoos, and the mythology of the\nAryan family; the mine is rich, so rich that I should have time to die\na thousand times before I should have finished the task of searching in\nthis mixed medley of historical remains, fantastic recitals, sublime\nthoughts, and flagrant falsehoods. Happily this work of digging in the\npast in quest of an idea is not the work of one man nor of one epoch,\nbut that of many men and many epochs, and it never ceases.\n\nMoreover, a short time ago no one imagined that documents very much\nmore ancient than those I have just named, would have been discovered\nin hitherto unexplored regions of the physical and mental world. Two\nenterprising men, Darwin and Max M\u00fcller, visited and studied them.\nDarwin sought to explain what the origin of organic beings might have\nbeen, and in what way they passed through a series of evolutions, from\none form to another of great dissimilarity. He who speaks of evolution\nimplies researches into the beginnings of things; this was exactly what\nI needed. All the world knows Darwin\u2019s name, even those who abstain\nfrom dealing with scientific problems; he has some ardent admirers who\nare not careful to define very accurately what it is they admire in\nhim, and some furious adversaries, who, judging mainly by hearsay, have\nformed a conception of him which is either very superficial or very\nfalse.\n\nThe development of human reason has been one of the objects of Max\nM\u00fcller\u2019s researches. This great thinker, who is at the same time the\nfirst philologist of our time, has sought in the science of Language\nfor the origin of thinking man. Very few amongst the men of the world,\nwho are nothing more than men of the world, know what the name of Max\nM\u00fcller represents, even the existence of a science of Language is\nunknown to them.\n\nEven if Darwin and Max M\u00fcller have not been absolutely the first to\nstrive to go back, the one to the origin of the organic world, the\nother to the dawn of human speech, no others have yet walked in this\ndarkness so courageously and so perseveringly as these two men.\n\nNot only have the journeys of exploration been much multiplied of\nlate, but a principle of action has been extracted from beneath the\nscaffolding used in the building up of new theories; which is, \u201cIf you\nhave an idea, and you wish to see whither it may lead, take it from its\nfirst commencement, and advance confidently.\u201d This is what I am about\nto do.\n\nI am undertaking a long journey; I carry with me but few plans; turning\nmy eyes away from whatever might attract my curiosity either on the\nright hand or the left, I shall still more carefully guard myself\nfrom being dazzled by the mirages which I am told are frequent in\nthose countries; or frightened by the phantoms which it is possible\nI may meet on the road. I shall always remind myself that one hour\nof feebleness, indecision, hesitation might cause me to lose my\nequilibrium, and that it would only require one moment of dizziness to\ncause my retrogression to the elephant and the tortoise. God forbid! It\nis to the opposite pole to which I shall direct myself; if truth exist,\nreason is here to find it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I HYPOTHESES\n\n\nThinkers of all times have asked themselves the question whence does\nthis world come on which we live. Curious to know whether the universe\nwas self-made, or was the work of a great primal ancestor, or personal\nCreator; philosophers who considered the matter in its entirety have\nleft us two hypotheses.\n\n\u201cAccording to one, chaos reigned at the beginning, or in other words,\nthe possibility of everything; and from the midst of this chaos certain\nrealities were evolved,\u201d[1] from an inherent aptitude for development;\nthis aptitude has been named in many ways, such as \u201cnatural selection,\u201d\n\u201csurvival of the fittest.\u201d The Greek sages were already acquainted\nwith the thought implied in these terms. Empedocles said that the\nfittest would always preponderate, since conservation is an integral\npart of their nature; whilst what is unfit, or not in accord with\nthe surroundings, must disappear. But the partisans of this theory\nfind themselves confronted by a serious difficulty: if a blind force\nhas produced the universe, whence comes the order which reigns in\nnature? It is freely acknowledged, even by those with small powers of\nobservation, that the inhabitants of the terrestrial globe are divided\ninto animal and vegetable, which are again subdivided into distinct\nclasses, separated by distinct lines of demarcation. If we admitted\nthat the vegetable and animal kingdoms were not at first so entirely\nseparated as they are at present, there would always remain a question\nawaiting reply: How is it to be accounted for, that two families\nissuing from the same source, become so separated, and have remained\ndistinct ever since?\n\nAmongst the propagators of the second hypothesis, some admit the\nexistence of a primordial germ possessing the power of infinite\nproduction; others believe in a Personal Creator who formed all things,\nwhether by the means of pre-existent material or from nothing. In\naccepting this theory of a reasonable Being we must at once lay aside\nthat of pure chance, since to Him is attributed the permanence of the\nseparation described above, this separation or division is of such a\nnature as to induce the impression that thus it is by premeditation\nand co-ordination. Certain philosophers putting aside the question\nof the origin of the organic world in its entirety, have restricted\ntheir field of investigation, and taken it in detail. Thus: What is\nthe origin of man? How is it that man thinks and speaks? What is\nhuman thought and human speech? Is it man\u2019s nature that compels him\nto speak, or has language been from the first a matter of convention?\nThe Greeks whilst pursuing their researches amongst the lofty regions\nof metaphysics expressed some very subtle theories on this subject,\ncoupled with vast systems which comprehended the whole of humanity.\nBy these they weighed the words spoken, their derivation, the ideas\nwhich these words represented, and the primitive source of the\nvarious phenomena exhibited by man, for the ancients recognised man\u2019s\nindivisibility.\n\nHeraclitus considered that each object combines in itself a thought\nand its expression, emanating from the object, and that man is the\nrecipient only; that he breathes a spiritual atmosphere; thus it is\nthat every name necessarily designates the object it denotes.\n\nPlato said that all the objects of the external world have in them\nsomething which constitutes their essence, and that this essence is\ncapable of being transmitted from objects themselves into the human\nmind; that ideas constitute the essence of objects, and that words are\ntherefore necessarily related to the constituent parts of the objects,\nand their impression on the human understanding.\n\nEpicurus said that human language is the result of the pressure\nexercised by the external world on the sensitive essential matter in\nman, and that as soon as man sustains this pressure he emits words\nspontaneously; the most ancient words used seem to have been expressive\nsounds, and with the human race it was as natural for them to talk as\nto groan, to cough, or to sneeze.\n\nThus the Ancients did not distinguish speech from conception.\n\nThe problem of the origin of speech, treated in antiquity with as\nmuch depth as calmness, profoundly agitated the minds in the Middle\nAges, and the theologians naturally introduced this variant in their\nexposition of the subject: Has language a divine or human origin?\nThe Christian philosopher replies: \u201cThe intellect of God created the\nworld, and the human soul, made in the likeness of the mind of God,\nhas in itself the source of all knowledge: thought and language are\nof divine origin; left to himself, with only the help of his own\npowers, man would never have found a means of expressing his thoughts.\u201d\nSuch was the belief of the greatest thinkers of the Middle Ages; and\nthey accepted the fact of a primordial language which men must have\nreceived directly from the Creator; this opinion was perpetuated until\nthe most recent times. But from the earliest Christian centuries\nthere were certain philosophers such as Gregory of Nyssa, who, whilst\nacknowledging the existence of a primitive universal language,\nconsidered that it redounded more to the glory of the Almighty Creator\nto endow man simply with the power of speech, and they deny that this\nlanguage with its grammar and orthography was divinely revealed.\n\nThe materials for the study of these questions are lacking. The\nonly document in our possession on the origin of mankind--the Old\nTestament--was carefully consulted; there we read that God created\nman after His image, that He made him of the dust of the earth, that\nHe breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, so that man became\na living creature. The Bible narrative is one of simple facts, and it\nwas necessary to look upon them as so many facts, for any effort to\npierce beneath the surface of these mysterious words was like groping\nin the dark. Another recital was also given in Genesis. God brought\nall the animals of the earth, and the birds of the air to Adam that he\nmight name them, and whatsoever Adam called every living thing that\nwas the name of it. This seemed difficult to interpret, and renewed\nthe questions under other forms. Did man at the beginning resemble a\nnewly born babe who cries but cannot speak? In this case how did he\nbegin to express his thoughts? If man was created an adult, but did not\nreceive a complete language from heaven, how did he acquire the faculty\nof speech, this faculty which we know to be the distinguishing mark of\nhumanity, and which is missing in other creatures?\n\nThe eighteenth century decided that this way of treating a scientific\nquestion left much to be desired; it resulted in a _cul de sac_, and a\nfresh beginning had to be made. Some philosophers, thinking to simplify\nmatters, affirmed that primitive man, tired of wandering through woods\nlike other animals, decided to group themselves into companies; the\nmembers of this society, feeling the necessity of making themselves\nmutually understood, expressed themselves at first by the aid of\nsigns and gestures, then by sounds peculiar to the things denoted,\nafterwards, in one way or another, actual words were pronounced.\nThis reasoning was used in the eighteenth century, and not knowing\nwhere to find better, those who employed it felt satisfied with their\nperspicacity; language which was formerly considered as a gift direct\nfrom God, became a physiological endowment, a conventional art; this\ncentury had an intense horror of the supernatural, so that it readily\naccepted any system in which God did not appear.\n\nThe lack of reflection shown in the building up of these hypotheses\nconcerning the commencement of humanity has been severely criticised,\nand that they were very superficial must be conceded. It is equally\nclear that all these tentative efforts had this in common, that they\nwere the results of the influence on immature minds of the period, of\nthe necessity of explaining the awakening of human reason in a rational\nmanner.\n\nThe search was continued. At last the nineteenth century considered\nthat a solution had been found. Certain ideas which had received\nattention during divers periods were now collected, sorted, re-examined\nmore closely, and classified, and from these labours there arose the\ntwo theories of interjection and imitation. According to the first,\nlanguage consists of sounds drawn involuntarily from man by his\nemotions and feelings; by degrees man became accustomed to reproduce\nsimilar exclamations when wishing to express the same feelings, and\nthese exclamations would serve as the roots of words; this is the\ninterjectional theory. The imitative or onomatop\u0153ic proceeds from\nanother source; when man was confronted by all the objects of the\nexterior world he began to imitate the sounds emitted, such as the\ncries of various animals, the whistling of the wind, the fall of a\nstone; the many sounds which fill the air were reproduced by the human\nvoice and formed the basis for future words. Objections to both of\nthese theories are not lacking. If emotions such as joy, pain, anger,\nlove, disgust--or if physical sensations such as result from the\nsting of a bee or from a blow of the fist, could furnish the roots\nof a language, and if it were the same with the imitation of noises\nproduced by nature, the sounds of the words should retain a definite\nimpress of these emotions and feelings, and should reproduce, if only\napproximately, these various noises. Even if we admit that a small\nnumber of primitive men set themselves to imitate the murmur of the\nstream, the rolling of the thunder, the barking of a dog, the groans\nof the wounded, the only result would have been infinite variations\nof clamour quite impossible to distinguish or to understand. Strictly\nspeaking, the prolonged sound of \u201c_b\u00e9e_\u201d and \u201c_mou_\u201d might awaken the\nconception of a goat and cow in the mind; but in order to convey the\nidea of a herd of oxen it would be necessary to avoid equally the sound\nof \u201c_b\u00e9e_\u201d and \u201c_mou_,\u201d as belonging exclusively to the two special\nanimals. The warbling notes of birds have always attracted attention,\nand essays have been made to reproduce them by imitative harmony,\nbut the various peoples have given various interpretations,[2] and\nin the generality of cases there is no resemblance between the names\nof animals and their cries.[3] After examining the testimony of the\nname \u201ccuckoo\u201d (no doubt convincing taken by itself), which is the\nprominent argument brought forward by the advocates of the imitative\ntheory called by Max M\u00fcller the bow-wow theory, we are not able to\nadvance further in that direction. Darwin in his book, _The Descent\nof Man_, promulgates the idea that language may have originated from\ninterjections and imitations, but elsewhere in the _Expressions of\nthe Emotions_ he hastens to add with his accustomed frankness: \u201cBut\nthe whole subject of the differences of the sounds produced under\ndifferent states of the mind is so obscure that I have succeeded in\nthrowing hardly any light on it; and the remarks which I have made have\nbut little significance.\u201d[4]\n\nScholars and literary men have taxed the resources of all the treasures\nof their imagination in endeavouring to picture the beginnings of\nlanguage; in the present day many efforts are made by learned men to\ndiscover, from nurses surrounded by their charges, how the first words\nwere reproduced by primitive man. It would be as useful to study the\nnature of primitive rocks amongst a mass of bricks and mortar, since\nthe chasm is wide between the thoughts which our little ones have when\nthey first begin to speak and those which primitive man had in trying\nto name his surroundings. We who speak because we know point out father\nor mother to a little child, naming them at the same time--\u201cthis is\nmother,\u201d \u201cthis is father;\u201d by degrees attributes become connected in\nthe child\u2019s mind with these names; such as mother\u2019s hair, or her dress;\nor father\u2019s beard, his pin; and whilst naming them we again point them\nout; and when the child pronounces these words in its own fashion, that\nis incorrectly, is this defect in pronunciation to be a sign-post to\nus--pointing out the direction to be followed in judging of primitive\nlanguage? At a later period the child distinguishes between the\nmother\u2019s smile and the father\u2019s voice; later still its mind comprehends\nall the moral and physical attributes covered by these two terms; and\nthus with all other objects--\u201chere is the cow,\u201d and \u201chere is the piece\nof sugar,\u201d which so soon become familiar to the child, with their\ncognate words, milk and sweetness. Our children thus learn to speak\nunder very different conditions from those in which our first ancestors\nfound themselves, when with no previous experience they tried to put\nforth their first words.\n\nConjectures increased and developed into systems, which, however,\ncontained nothing beyond germs of fresh conjectures and fresh systems,\nof which none rested on a reasonable basis.\n\nAt the beginning of the eighteenth century it was quite natural that\nthere should be uncertainty as to the path to be followed in seeking\nthe beginning of human speech. Was it necessary to trace all the known\nlanguages to their source? Would not the same feeling of confusion\narise when attacking all the dialects spoken on the surface of the\nearth as oppressed those who were at the base of the Tower of Babel? An\nidea which was universally adopted rather tended to check the progress\nof this study: it sprang from the theory that humanity had received the\ngift of speech from the Creator; and as the Jewish people alone were\nthought to be the recipients of a supernatural revelation, it followed\nthat Hebrew must be the earliest language, and consequently that all\nexisting languages were derived from the Hebrew. It is hardly possible\nto conceive the number of works put forth by the learned to remove\nany doubt with regard to this strange affiliation; the difficulty was\nto support or prove the supposition that Hebrew had given birth to\nGreek, Latin, and the rest; this Biblical language was tortured and\ntwisted about in the endeavour to prove the descent of the others from\nit, but no satisfactory result was obtained. It was by the advice of\nLeibniz that as many facts as possible were collected concerning the\nmodern languages then in use. He asked for the assistance of monarchs,\nEuropean princes, ambassadors, missionaries, and travellers. It was\nduring these investigations that the attention of certain philologists\nwas directed to Sanscrit, a language which had been dead 300 years\nbefore the Christian era, and about which the learned in Europe had\ntroubled themselves very little.\n\nAt the time of Plato and Aristotle a vague notion was current in\nGreece that India, as well as Egypt, was the birthplace of matchless\nlearning, only it was not known in what this learning consisted, and\neven the name of the Vedas (the most ancient collection of sacred\nwritings of the Hindoos) was unknown to the philosophers. The first\nChristian writers who mentioned the religions of India, and who knew\nup to a certain point how to distinguish Brahminism from Buddhism,\nnever quoted the Vedas; this name is first used by some Chinese\nconverts to Buddhism, at the beginning of the Christian era, who had\nundertaken a pilgrimage to India, considered by them as a holy land.\nIn the sixteenth century Francis Xavier went there as a missionary,\nbut without knowing Sanscrit; in the seventeenth century Roberto\nde Nobili, another missionary, acquired the language, and caused a\ncompilation to be made of Hindoo and Christian doctrines. It was not\nwell done; the French translation was sent to Voltaire, who praised it\nand spoke of it as the most precious gift for which the West had ever\nbeen indebted to the East. The P\u00e8re Calmette, who had heard of the\nimportance of the Vedas, was the first European to obtain authentic\nfragments, but these attracted little attention in Europe. In the early\npart of the nineteenth century some members of the Asiatic Society\nresiding in Calcutta discovered a collection of Sanscrit MSS., amongst\nthem some portions of the laws of Manu, two epic poems, the R\u00e2mayana\nand the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata, some philosophical treatises, works on astronomy\nand medicine, plays and fables. These works possessed great interest\nfor those scholars who were occupied with the study of humanity,\nsuch as Herder, Schlegel, Goethe, and Humboldt. For the most part\nthe preconceived ideas with which these literary men received them\ntended to diminish the benefit to be derived from them to a great\nextent, as they endeavoured--consistently with the spirit of the\ntime--to establish the identity of thought running through the sacred\nliterature of the Hindoos and the Bible. They also sought to point out\nthe supposed connection between the historical recitals of the Old\nTestament, the Indian legends, and the Greek and Latin mythologies.\nCertain MSS. containing passages from the sacred code of the Hindoos\nhaving been translated by Anquetil Duperron, Schopenhauer drew from it\nthe foundations of his own philosophical belief; nothing less than the\ngenius of this German scholar would have sufficed for the presentation\nof the sublime truths which the original contained, by means of this\nvery defective translation. One of the first historiographers of\nBuddhism was the Abb\u00e9 Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, but yet his labours\nhave not served to raise the veil hiding the true meaning of the\nBrahman writings, for without the knowledge of the early Sanscrit, it\nwas not possible to seize the inner meaning of a literature which the\nsages of India had required fifteen centuries to complete. Thus it was\nthat Europe only knew the more accessible portions, and those better\ncalculated to strike the imagination, but not necessarily the most\nimportant. \u201cMuch had been said and written about Buddhism, enough to\nshow the Roman Catholic clergy that the Lamas of Thibet had anticipated\nthem in the use of auricular confession, the rosary, and the tonsure;\nand to disconcert philosophers by showing them that they were outdone\nin positivism and nihilism by the inmates of Chinese monasteries.\u201d[5]\n\nThe strangeness of this religion attracted public attention, which\nwas especially directed towards certain blemishes, which had crept\ninto it during a decadent period, and tarnished its original purity,\nand although learned men continued to devote themselves to a study\nmore and more deeply penetrated with the Sanscrit language, they\nwere yet so unprepared for the results which must inevitably follow\nthis study, that certain German universities became the scenes of\nveritable scandals, when some of the learned declared that they had\nfound a community of origin between the people of Athens, of Rome,\nand of India, and the stupefaction of the philologists knew no bounds\nwhen, in 1833, Bopp\u2019s work appeared, _The Comparative Grammar of\nthe Greek, Latin, Gothic, Sanscrit, Zend, Lithuanian, Slavonic, and\nGerman Languages_, whilst the effect on the younger students was quite\nbewildering.\n\nBut that which created the greatest furore in all Europe was the\npromulgation of the scientific discoveries of Eug\u00e8ne Burnouf, Professor\nof Oriental Languages in the Coll\u00e8ge de France. Long centuries had\npassed during which no original Sanscrit document had come to light,\nand now in the short space of ten years three complete collections\nof Oriental literature were known, the sacred books of the Brahmans,\nof the Buddhists, and of the Magians. \u201cThe critical examination and\nrestitution of the Zend texts, the outlines of a Zend grammar, the\ntranslation and philological anatomy of considerable portions of\nthe Zoroastrian writings were the work of the learned young French\nscholar.\u201d[6]\n\nA few proper names and certain titles were up to this time all that\ncould be deciphered of the cuneiform inscriptions on the walls of\nPersian palaces. Classical or oriental scholars had hitherto only\nseen in them a quaint conglomeration of nails, wedges, or arrows; but\nwhen at last the meaning was disentangled, it suddenly flashed upon\nthe discoverers that there was a close relationship between languages\nhitherto held to be quite distinct. Facts, at first only suspected, now\nreceived full confirmation; those previously unknown were discovered\nand claimed, if only provisionally, in the name of Science. Historians\nand philologists pressed eagerly into this new path. In looking back\nthey could see that the human family was divided into three distinct\ngroups, the Semetic family, the Aryan family--sometimes called the\nIndo-Germanic--and the Turanian class, the northern division of which\nhas the name Ural-Altaic given to it occasionally. I use the word\n_class_ advisedly, as the characteristic traits hardly merit the rank\nof family. They also discovered that human speech had equally marked\ndivisions, making three groups or families, corresponding to the three\ngreat human races. The Semetic family produced the Hebrew of the Old\nTestament, the Arabic of the Koran, and the ancient language graven on\nthe monuments of Ph\u0153nicia and Carthage, of Babylon and Assyria; the\nGreek and Latin, Persian and Sanscrit, the Germanic languages, Celtic\nand Slavonic, all belong to the Aryan family; from the Ural-Altaic\ngroup come the Tungusic, Mongolic, Turkic, Samoyedic and Finnic; there\nstill remains the Chinese language, which is monosyllabic and stands by\nitself, the only remnant of the earliest formation of human speech.\n\nThese discoveries caused a complete change in the methods adopted\nby philologists; at the present time the ancient systems of the\nclassification of tongues are entirely abandoned. The comparative\nphilologist ignores altogether geographical locality, the varying\nages of languages, and their classical or illiterate character.\nLanguages are now classified genealogically, according to their real\nrelationship; and Hebrew, coming down from its pedestal, took its\nnatural place amongst the languages of the Semetic family.[7]\n\n * * * * *\n\nI revert here for a moment to the past in order to quote a page from\nPlato, which shows us the small esteem in which the purely speculative\nmethod, in the treatment of philosophy, was held by one of the\nprofoundest minds of antiquity:--\n\n\u201cDost thou see that very tall plane-tree?\u201d said Ph\u00e6dros to Socrates.\n\n\u201cCertainly, I do.\u201d\n\n\u201cTell me, Socrates, is it not from the foot of this plane-tree that\nthey say Boreas carried away Oreithyia from the Ilissos?\u201d\n\n\u201cSo they say.\u201d\n\n\u201cBut tell me, O Socrates, dost thou believe this mythe to be true?\u201d\n\n\u201cWell, if I did not believe it, like the wise people, I should not\nbe so very far wrong; and I might set up an ingenious theory and say\nthat a gust of Boreas, the north wind, carried her down from the rocks\nin the neighbourhood, and that having died in this manner, she was\nreported to have been carried off by Boreas from thence. As for myself,\nPh\u00e6dros, I think these explanations, on the whole, very pleasant; a man\nis, after all, not much to be envied, if it were only for this, that\nwhen he has set right this one fable, he is bound to do the same for\na second, then a third, and thus much time is lost. I, at least, have\nno leisure to spare for these things, and the reason, my friend, is\nthis, that I cannot yet, according to the Delphic line, know myself;\nand it seems to me ridiculous that a man who does not yet know this,\nshould trouble himself about what does not concern him. Therefore I\nleave these things alone, and, believing what other people believe\nabout them, I meditate, as I said just now, not on them, but on\nmyself--whether I be a monster more complicated and more savage than\nTyphon, or a tamer and simpler creature, enjoying by nature a blessed\nand modest lot.\u201d[8]\n\n\u201cThus, to the mind of Socrates, man was pre-eminently the individual\n... he is ever seeking to solve the mystery of human nature by brooding\nover his own mind, by watching the secret workings of the soul, by\nanalysing the organs of knowledge, and by trying to determine its\nproper limits; and thus the last result of his philosophy was that he\nknew but one thing, and this was, that he knew nothing.\u201d[9]\n\nMore than 2300 years have elapsed since the intercourse between\nSocrates and his disciple took place. But the problems which we of the\ntwentieth century have not yet succeeded in solving, have so entirely\nabsorbed our attention, that it seldom occurs to us to measure the\ndistance which separates us from the commencement of philosophical\nstudies. Although the scientific equipment of our forefathers occupies\na small portion of our thoughts in our leisure moments, we yet\ndiscover--in comparison with ourselves--how very indigent they were.\n\nThis earth was unintelligible to the Greeks, they looked upon it as a\nsolitary being, without a peer in the whole universe; to us it is a\nplanet; one of many, all governed by the same laws, all moving round\nthe same centre. It is the same with man who also remained a riddle to\nthe ancients. An intelligent study of the world\u2019s history, which they\nknew but imperfectly, has enriched our language with a word which never\npassed the lips of Socrates, Plato or Aristotle--humanity. Where the\nGreeks saw barbarians, that is, human beings other than themselves--we\nsee brethren; those whom they called heroes and demi-gods are our\nancestors; those who appeared to them strangers, united by no ties,\nare to us one family in work and suffering, divided by language and\nsevered by national enmity, but pressing forward step by step almost\nunconsciously towards the fulfilment of that inscrutable purpose for\nwhich the world was created. As we have ceased to see in nature the\nworking of demons or the manifestation of an evil principle, so we\ndeny in history an atomistic conglomerate of chances, or the despotic\nrule of a mute fate; we turn over the leaves of the past seeking for a\nhidden train of thought in the actions of the human race; we understand\nthat every effect has its cause; that connecting links run through\nthe moral world, as well as the physical world; that there is nothing\nirrational in either history or nature, and we believe that the human\nmind is called upon to discover in both the manifestations of a Divine\nPower, the source of our existence.[10]\n\nThis result, however, we could not have attained without first\nrecognising the fact that man is no isolated being, complete in\nhimself; that if he is to be effectively studied he cannot be\ndisassociated from his family, all the members of which are governed by\nthe same laws, all move round the same centre, and all receive their\nlight from the same focal point. He is one of a class, of one genus\nor kind, whom it would be impossible to estimate correctly, if we set\naside his relations to his fellows.\n\n\u201cTo understand man,\u201d an illustrious naturalist has said recently, \u201cit\nis not sufficient _not_ to separate him from those whom he resembles in\nevery point; it is quite as necessary to study him in connection with\nthose closely related to him, the inferior animals.\u201d\n\nHitherto I have not mentioned a hypothesis which has been promulgated\nin our days on the origin of man, which would have been considered\nthe most remarkable this century had seen, had it not appeared\nsimultaneously with another treatment of a like subject equally\nnoticeable for its profundity in another direction.\n\nDuring a voyage which he made in South America, Darwin had been struck\nby the very close affinity which existed between the living and the\nfossil species of this continent; this link between the past and\npresent appeared to him to throw considerable light on the obscurity\nwhich enveloped the question of the origin of species. The degree in\nwhich organs were capable of modification was especially to be taken\ninto account; the study of the variation of animals and plants under\ndomestication led Darwin to the path he followed; the uninterrupted\nreproduction of characteristics in the structure of organic beings,\nintensified rather than attenuated by a succession of modifications,\ncaused him to see in all living creatures, not independent entities,\nthe one apart from the other, but descendants from common ancestors now\nextinct.\n\nEvolution, like many another theory, may be dangerous if not thoroughly\ngrasped, and if it lead to a denial of the permanence of the well\nmarked lines of demarcation in nature. Evolution, according to Darwin,\nstarts from beginnings which are quite distinct; and leads on to\nwell defined ends; thus Darwin does not acknowledge only one common\nprogenitor for all the great natural races, but many, and nothing more\nclearly demonstrates his transparent sincerity in scientific matters\nthan what his critics are pleased to call his inconsistencies.\n\nAt the end of many years of persistent labour, Darwin published his\nbook on the _Origin of Species_.\n\nI do not propose to give a summary of it. The author does not adopt\nthe method of a learned writer expounding his system; his attitude is\nthat of a naturalist who, during his excursions, examines nature in\nits innumerable and most minute details; when two facts, both of which\nhe considers true, appear to contradict each other, he notes both\nequally, since he is too sincere to conceal that one from the public\nwhich apparently invalidates his theory. Moreover at each step he avows\nthat this theory is not yet entirely free from the fog which invariably\nenvelops each new idea at its birth. An explorer such as he is, who\nhas succeeded in explaining so many mysteries, might very naturally\nbecome elated, but it is not so with him; his thoughts never seem\ndirected towards himself; with all his genius, self does not appear to\nexist with him; the only things that are prominent--with a distinct\nexistence--are the phenomena which he studies.\n\nThe notion that all organic beings have been such as we now see them\nfrom the beginning, was almost inevitable, as long as the theory was\nheld that the formation of the world was of comparatively recent date;\nand those who, without further investigation, held the traditional\nbelief of the independent and individual creation of each species,\ncould only offer one explanation, if all animals--all plants--are\nas they are it is because it has pleased the Creator to make them\nso. Because the Darwinian theory has cast a doubt on the successive\ncreation of living things, it has been said that Darwin\u2019s views were\ninimical to religion. These impressions are transitory--as were those\nexpressed by Leibniz when he reproached Newton with introducing \u201coccult\nqualities and miracles into philosophy;\u201d[11] and when he attacked his\nlaw of gravitation \u201cas subversive of natural, and inferentially of\nrevealed religion.\u201d[11]\n\nAfter explaining in what manner nature had produced all the variations\nof plants and inferior animals from a small number of germs, Darwin\ndid not feel himself under the necessity of adding one more to the\ngerms in order that what was afterwards termed humanity might appear\non the scene; the principle of evolution as already applied to the\norganic world, would suffice to explain all difficulties; the natural\nforces all engaged in the same movement, would spread and branch out\nin various directions, until they reached the culminating point of\nincorporation with the human creature.\n\nDarwin\u2019s book, the _Descent of Man_, contains the genealogical table\nof this higher animal which the author so often compares with the\nlower animals. If both have so much in common, such as the chemical\ncomposition of their bodies--their germinal vesicles--their laws of\ngrowth and reproduction; it is--so he conceives--that both have come\nfrom the same ancestor; moreover, all helps to prove that man has\nreceived from his prototype amongst the mammifers, all the special\ncharacteristics of its own organs. Thus it is easy to understand that\nin the eyes of many naturalists the embryonic structure is of more\nimportance for an accurate classification than that of an adult, since\nthe embryo is that condition in which the animal has undergone the\nleast modification, thus it better represents the original form of the\nprimitive progenitor.\n\nFor a species of one of the inferior animals to have attained the\nlevel of man, it was necessary that, following an universal law, it\nmust have undergone variations both corporally and mentally, during a\nlong succession of generations; the primary causes of these variations\nis not clearly understood, but it has been proved that the conditions\nof life or environment to which the living beings submitted were\npotent agents in the renewal of phenomena. Like all other creatures\nman increased out of all proportion to his means of subsistence,\nand thus began the struggle for existence, when those who were best\nequipped for the fight survived in the greatest numbers, and left the\ngreatest number of robust descendants. Man acquired the capability of\nexpressing his wants by means of language, at first, perhaps, little\ndifferent from that of the inferior animals, but the continued use\nof language reacting on the brain furnished a means for the further\ndevelopment of those mental faculties which of themselves constitute a\nreal distinction between man and beast. This difference, however, does\nnot become pronounced until a certain period of man\u2019s existence, as\nduring the earliest stages the intelligence of the newly created human\nbeings does not differ from that of other mammifers. It begins to dawn\na little later, then gradually increases, and at last becomes most\nstrongly marked, even if a comparison be made between the intelligence\nof a highly developed monkey and that of the lowest savage, who\nhas failed perhaps to find words with which to express the most\nelementary emotions. But men are not all on the same level; without\nspeaking of the vast difference that exists between the faculties of\na Papuan and those which we know to have been possessed by a Newton\nor a Kant, we notice a very sensible difference between the mental\npowers of two individuals of the same race; but we always find these\nextremes are connected by shades of difference which gradually melt\nimperceptibly the one into the other. Darwin arrives at the conclusion\nthat the distinctions to be drawn between the intellect of man and the\nintelligence of animals is one of degree rather than of kind.\n\nDarwin shares the opinion of those who consider the moral consciousness\nin man as that which distinguishes him specially from the inferior\nanimals, and he conceives its origin to be found in the social\ninstincts whose most important constituent parts are family ties and\nthe emotions to which they give rise. This consciousness makes man\ncapable of approving of certain acts and disapproving of others. After\nhaving been overcome by a temporary passion, he reflects and compares\nthe already weakened motives causing him to act as he did, with the\nappeal made to him by his family and social instincts, and he resolves\nto act differently in the future; the opinion of his neighbours\ninfluences him, but it is not so much the opinion of the community in\ngeneral as that of his own small circle to which he belongs.\n\nSocial instincts are found also amongst a large number of inferior\nanimals, but with them, this mutual sympathy does not extend to all the\nspecies of their class, as with man it reaches only to the members of\ntheir own small community.\n\nWith the progress of civilisation and in proportion as the smaller\ncommunities become larger, so man\u2019s reason leads him to extend his\nsympathy to all the men of his nationality; arrived at this point,\nthere remains a very impalpable barrier between that and the inclusion\nof men of all races in feelings of universal benevolence; but if these\nraces are separated from his by strong dissimilarities in external\nappearance and in habits of life, it would take much time for him to\nlearn and recognise in them the constituent parts of humanity similar\nto himself.\n\nThe moral consciousness which raises man to a level not attained by\nbeasts, leads him to conceive and apprehend the precept, \u201cDo unto\nothers as you would they should do unto you.\u201d The sympathy which\nextends beyond the limits of humanity, such as compassion for animals,\nseems the last quality to be developed. The moral sense in man has its\ncounterpart in animals of the inferior order; under the influence of\nman the animal becomes more capable of improvement by the increased\nexercise of his intelligence, by habits, by instincts of heredity, so\nas to have transformed the prototype of the wolf and jackal to that of\na dog.\n\nThere is nothing to lead us to suppose that primitive man had felt the\nexistence of a principle higher than nature. There is much to indicate\nthat what we mean by religious feeling was not known to him; but the\naspect of the question undergoes a change if by religious sentiment we\nunderstand belief in invisible spirits, for this belief was universal.\nThis is natural; as soon as certain faculties of the imagination awoke\nin man, such as astonishment, curiosity, he would seek to understand\nall that passed around him; his first idea would be that all the\nphenomena in nature would proceed from the presence inherent in them\nof a power compelling to action in the same way as man feels himself\nobliged to act. This belief in the course of age would easily tend\ntowards fetishism, then to polytheism and finally to monotheism; it\nwould simultaneously inculcate many strange superstitions, of which\nsome produced terrible effects, such as the sacrifice of human lives to\na powerful being eager for human blood, since savages readily attribute\nto these superior powers the desire for vengeance as well as all the\nother evil passions they themselves possess.\n\nAmongst civilised peoples the conception of an all-knowing, an\nall-seeing God, exercises a powerful influence on morality; man learns\nlittle by little, no longer to regard the praise or blame of society\nas his sole guide; this external guidance is replaced by personal\ninward convictions which come from his reason and which is conscience.\nReligious devotion is a very complex human sentiment; it is composed of\nlove, submission, gratitude, hope, and perhaps of other elements; no\ncreature is in a position to experience so complicated an emotion whose\nintellectual faculties have not attained a level of medium development.\nYet something approaching this may be seen in the depth of affection\nmanifested by a dog for his master, which is a combination of complete\nsubmission, of fear, dependence, and perhaps also of other qualities.\n\nLearned writers have for some time agreed in looking upon language\nas the barrier separating man from animals; all books on logic state\nthe fact. But this special characteristic of the human race attracted\nDarwin\u2019s attention in a very small degree. \u201cMan, however, at first,\nuses, in common with the lower animals, inarticulate cries to express\nhis meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of\nthe face.\u201d[12] \u201cCertain animals,\u201d he says, \u201cdo not lack the physical\nconditions necessary for articulate language, since there is not a\nletter in the alphabet that a parrot cannot pronounce.\u201d Darwin goes\neven beyond this. \u201cIt is not the mere power of articulation that\ndistinguishes man from other animals, but it is his large power of\nconnecting definite sounds with definite ideas.\u201d[12]\n\nIt would be difficult to be more explicit, and it must be owned that\nthis was a great concession on Darwin\u2019s part; but afterwards, and\nperhaps with the object of weakening the force of this statement,\nhe adds: \u201cThe fact of the higher apes not using their vocal organs\nfor speech, no doubt depends on their intelligence not having been\nsufficiently advanced.\u201d[13] However, no effort of thought, in the\npresent state of our knowledge, would cause us to understand how\nany number of thousands of centuries passed in roaring and barking\ncould enable wolves and dogs to join a single definite idea to a\nsingle definite sound; and if we said that, by the help of specially\nfavourable environments some unknown species of primitive animal had\nacquired the power of speech, and had succeeded in imparting the\nknowledge to its descendants, and in thus elevating them to the level\nof human beings, we should only be relating fantastic tales, which\nwould have no connection with scientific research.\n\nDarwin does not allow himself to be affected by this consideration. \u201cIn\na series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to\nman as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite\npoint where the term \u2018man\u2019 ought to be used.\u201d[14] It is evident that\nif the gradations were imperceptible, there would be no possibility of\nmarking the precise point where the animal ended and man began; \u201cthe\nadmission of this insensible gradation would eliminate, not only the\ndifference between ape and man, but likewise between black and white,\nhot and cold, a high and a low note in music; in fact, it would do away\nwith the possibility of all exact and definite knowledge, by removing\nthose wonderful lines and laws of nature which ... enable us to count,\nto tell, and to know.\u201d[15]\n\nI will now bring together some passages which are scattered in various\nparts of the _Origin of Species_ and the _Descent of Man_ which have\nespecially attracted criticism.\n\n\u201cIt is interesting to note that all that we are, all that we see,\nhas been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the\nlargest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance, which is\nalmost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and\ndirect action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a\nRatio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a\nconsequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and\nthe Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature,\nfrom famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable\nof conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly\nfollows.\u201d[16]\n\nAnd again: \u201cThere is grandeur in this view of life, with its several\npowers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms\nor into one.\u201d[16] \u201cMan may be excused for feeling some pride at having\nrisen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the\norganic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead of having\nbeen aboriginally placed there, may give him hopes for a still higher\ndestiny in the distant future.\u201d[17] \u201cIn the future I see open fields\nfor far more important researches. Psychology will be securely based on\nnewly laid down foundations; that of the necessary acquirement of each\nmental power and capacity by gradation. Much light will be thrown on\nthe origin of man and his history.\u201d[18]\n\nAgain elsewhere: \u201cThe moral sense or conscience, as Mackintosh remarks,\nhas a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action.\nIt is summed up in that short but imperious word _ought_,\u201d and Darwin\nproceeds to quote Kant\u2019s apostrophe as follows: \u201cDuty! wondrous\nthought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by\nany threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law in the soul, and so\nextorting for thyself always reverence, if not always obedience; before\nwhom all appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel. Duty! whence\nthy original?\u201d[19]\n\nDarwin continues: \u201cThis great question, \u2018Whence thy origin?\u2019 has been\ndiscussed by many writers of consummate ability; and my sole excuse for\ntouching on it is ... that, as far as I know, no one has approached it\nexclusively from the side of natural history.\u201d[20]\n\n\u201cBut as the feelings of love and sympathy and the power of self-command\nbecome strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes\nclearer, so that man can appreciate the justice of the judgments\nof his fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, independently of\nany pleasure or pain felt at the moment, to risk his life for his\nfellow-creature, or to sacrifice himself for any great cause. He\nmay then say, I am the supreme judge of my own conduct, and, in the\nwords of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of\nhumanity.\u201d[21]\n\nThe warmest admirers of Darwin wish that he had expressed himself\nmore definitely. Some amongst them are astonished to find the word\n\u201c_Creator_\u201d in certain editions of the _Origin of Species_, and not\nin all; others have drawn attention to the fact that Darwin could\nsay in all good faith, \u201cI see no good reason why the views given in\nthis volume should shock the religious feelings of any one.\u201d[22]\nDarwin\u2019s line of thought has perhaps not been perfectly grasped, and\nhis commentators have been numerous. This, however, is certain. From\nthe moment when the author of the _Descent of Man_ considered that\nhe had discovered in social instincts the first germ of the idea of\nduty, it becomes a matter for surprise that he yielded to the desire\nof referring to Kant and of quoting his apostrophe to Duty. But it\nis quite evident that Darwin did not see in the universe only the\nfortuitous result of a combination of matter; he admitted the existence\nof a law acting from the beginning and continuing to act. In order\nthe better to grasp his thought, it is necessary to be in a position\nto define his terms. He speaks of natural selection, but in ordinary\nparlance selection presupposes the existence of distinction and\njudgment; and to distinguish and choose, intelligence is necessary; and\nif the essential nature is intelligent, what is this nature?\n\nThe endeavour to prove that man has descended from a creature not\noriginally man has deeply stirred our generation, and the greater\nnumber amongst us only yielded to a natural repugnance in repulsing\nthe idea with indignation. However, because this inward feeling\ntells us that a proposition is false, it does not necessarily follow\nthat it is so; in looking at it more closely, we have to admit that\nmany humiliating facts are accepted by us without demur. We are not\nscandalised at the notion of being composed of the same chemical\nelements as the inferior animals, nor do we revolt against the\ninjustice of the circumstances and restraints imposed upon all by\nthe facts of birth and death; but this unreasoning submission has no\nmore rational basis than the revolt of our feelings, in presence of\nthe assumption, that an animal only was our ancestor. The notion that\nanimals so dissimilar as the monkey, the elephant, the bird, fish, and\nman could have proceeded from the same parentage seems too monstrous to\nbe true; from the scientific point of view this feeling is of no value;\nin the face of all the assertions of our moral convictions science,\nas such, remains immovable; the only weapon admitted in a scientific\nencounter is fact opposed to fact, argument to argument. Moreover,\nany appeals which can be made to our pride, our dignity, our piety,\nwould be equally wide of the mark, so long as proof is lacking that\nman possesses something which has no existence in lower animals either\nactually or potentially.\n\nIt is a matter for regret to have to acknowledge the fact that the\nunion of a profound knowledge, combined with true sincerity in\nresearch, is insufficient to endow the world with a well established\ntruth. The world is too hasty in accepting or rejecting a new system\nbefore giving itself the trouble to divide the system into two parts,\none of which can be placed at once amongst evident truths, whilst the\nother must be subjected to minute investigation and close testing.\nPrecisely after this manner does Darwin\u2019s work lend itself to a\ndivision into two parts, the former is the history of the formation and\ngradual development of the organic world, represented by plants and\nanimals, including man (_The Origin of Species_), but it is also the\nhistory of the formation and gradual development of man considered as a\nbeing composed of body and spirit (_Descent of Man_). In the author\u2019s\nmind this portion of the subject is closely connected with the former.\n\nAt first sight it would appear that a tribunal, which was quick to\ndistinguish truth from error in this teaching, had not been found.\nCertainly scientific materialism has no voice in the matter, since its\nmission is only to deal with material and actual facts; and when from\nthe facts accumulated conclusions are deduced as applied to origins,\nthis would be out of its sphere, and the conclusions reached can only\nbe arbitrary; thus Darwin\u2019s theory not being found free from the taint\nof idealism, it was condemned without trial. Religious dogmatism did\nnot show itself any more capable of deciding the question, for this\ndogmatism, whose domain is faith, considered that due reference was\nnot made to Divine intervention, and concluded that the theory was\nonly judged by the light of science, and thus condemned it unheard.\nBut all condemnation, which cannot prove itself to be just, has no\nscientific value, only one tribunal is competent of judging and solving\nthe question, and that is the science of language, it alone possesses\ndocumentary evidence. The exact point at which the animal ceases and\nman begins can be determined with precision since it coincides with the\nbeginning of the \u201cRadical Period\u201d of language, and language is reason.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Thought_, p. 98.\n\n[2] Thus Max M\u00fcller says: \u201cIn Chinese the number of imitative sounds is\nvery considerable.... We give a few, together with the corresponding\nsounds in Mandshu. The difference between the two will show how\ndifferently the same sounds strike different ears, and how differently\nthey are rendered into articulate language:\n\n The cock crows = _kiao kiao_ in Chinese\n = _dchor dchor_ in Mandshu.\u201d\n\n--Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Language_, vol. i. note p. 419.\n\n[3] Max M\u00fcller says again: \u201cWe listen in vain for any similarity\nbetween goose and cackling, hen and clucking, duck and quacking.\u201d--Max\nM\u00fcller, _Science of Language_, vol. i., p. 410.\n\n[4] Darwin\u2019s _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 93.\n\n[5] Max M\u00fcller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 190.\n\n[6] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 82.\n\n[7] Max M\u00fcller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 21.\n\n[8] Max M\u00fcller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 1.\n\n[9] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 5.\n\n[10] Max M\u00fcller, partly from _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii.\np. 6.\n\n[11] Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, 6th Edition, p. 396.\n\n[12] Darwin\u2019s _Descent of Man_, 1871, vol. i. p. 54.\n\n[13] Darwin\u2019s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. 59.\n\n[14] _Ibid._, vol. i. p. 235.\n\n[15] Max M\u00fcller\u2019s _Science of Thought_, pp. 166, 167.\n\n[16] Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, p. 403.\n\n[17] Darwin\u2019s _Descent of Man_, vol. ii. p. 405.\n\n[18] Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, p. 402.\n\n[19] Quoted by Darwin in _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. 70.\n\n[20] Darwin\u2019s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p. 71.\n\n[21] _Ibid._, vol. i. p. 86.\n\n[22] Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, p. 396.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II OUR ARYAN ANCESTORS\n\n\nSome of the studies undertaken and carried on in a tentative groping\nfashion, with the purpose of ascertaining the nature of that complex\nbeing man, have been placed before you. I have mentioned the more\nor less fantastic suppositions set forth on the subject, and I have\ndwelt rather more fully on a recent system, of which the fundamental\nportion (a magnificent scientific monument, to which experimental tests\nhave given a solid basis) is followed by a second part which treats\nespecially of the descent of man. The time has now come to examine\nthe studies of a school of philosophy, which, guided by a new theory,\nsearches in the past, and passes under review all previous conceptions,\nsuppositions, or even misconceptions of the previous schools.\n\nThe science of language, based on the close connection between thought\nand speech, only dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.\nThe first problem presented to it is that of origin--the origin of\nthought and speech in man--which two united in their essential parts,\nmake man what he is. The means by which this science works is called\ncomparative philology; it is by the analysis of languages--living as\nwell as dead--that it seeks to discover the infancy of human thought.\nIt is evident that in order to penetrate thus deeply, this analysis\nmust follow the whole progress of speech since it first sounded; to no\nother school of philosophy had this idea occurred; all others ignored\nthe fact that previous to the commencement of human language, no\nvestige of humanity could exist; therefore, probably, another fact had\nbeen ignored; that the only archives in which it is possible to study\nthe history of humanity and the development of reason are those of\nlanguage.\n\nWherever sacred writings exist, we find in them the most ancient\nlanguages of the people who possess them; this is the case in Persia,\nChina, Palestine, Arabia, and India; thus it is in these writings which\nare looked upon as being divinely inspired, that search must be made\nfor the genesis of the successive thought of these peoples.\n\nBut these ancient writings differ widely the one from the other; for\nthe most part they contain ideas which are the product of various\nages; often also, as in Greece, and Rome and Persia, we find ourselves\nconfronted by thoughts or theories which had already arrived at a high\ndegree of development, or are beginning to lose their first clearness.\nOnly amongst the Hindoos is it possible to follow step by step the\ngrowth of the conception, and the transformation of the names which\nclothe them. The Vedas show us more clearly than any other literary\nmonument in the world, the uninterrupted course of the evolution of\nlanguage and thought from the first word pronounced by our ancestors to\nour own most recent reflection.\n\nIndia does not possess remains of ancient temples nor of ancient\npalaces. Edifices of this kind were probably unknown before the\ninvasion of Alexander. The Hindoos have always felt themselves\nstrangers in the land, and the constant efforts of the kings of Egypt\nand of Babylon to perpetuate their names during thousands of years,\nby means of bricks and blocks of stone, did not occur to them until\nsuggested by foreigners. But on the other hand, from the most remote\ntimes, they have possessed sacred writings, and they still preserve\nthem in their ancient form. The number of separate works in Sanscrit of\nwhich the manuscripts are still in existence is now estimated at more\nthan ten thousand. What would Plato and Aristotle have said, had they\nbeen told that there existed in that India which Alexander had just\ndiscovered--if not conquered--an ancient literature, far richer than\nanything they possessed at that time in Greece, and dating back so far\nthat the old Sanscrit which clothed the religious and philosophical\nthought of these early inhabitants was a dead language. This literature\nhas not ceased to increase, and contains the canonical books of the\nthree principal religions of the ancient world; the Zend-Avesta, the\nsacred books of the Magians, written in Zend, the ancient Persian;\nthe Tripitaka, the sacred books of the Buddhists, which contain moral\ntreatises, dogmatic philosophy, and metaphysics; and the sacred\nwritings of the Brahmans called the Vedas.\n\nIt would be difficult to say whether the Old Testament, or certain\nportions of the Vedas, have existed for the greater number of\ncenturies; it is certain that the Aryan race had no existence previous\nto the Vedas. The name _Veda_ signifies \u201cknowing, or knowledge\u201d; veda,\nGreek _\u03bf\u1f30\u03b4\u03b1_, is a verb with the same meaning in Sanscrit as in Greek,\n\u201cI know.\u201d The book of the Vedas contains an epitome of the most ancient\nBrahmanic science, and is composed of four collections of hymns; that\nwhich is called Rig-Veda (hymns of praise) is the true Veda, and the\nother Vedas are to the Rig-Veda what the Talmud is to the Bible.\nThe Rig-Veda, which for more than three thousand years had laid the\nfoundations of the moral and religious life of innumerable millions of\nhuman creatures had never been published until Max M\u00fcller put forth\na complete edition, accompanied by authorised commentaries on Indian\ntheology.\n\nThe composition of these hymns occupied many centuries, and in 600\nB.C. the collection seems to have been complete. Some early treatises\non these hymns tell us that at this date the theological schools had\naccomplished a great undertaking, that of counting every verse, every\nword, every syllable of the hymns; the number of syllables is 432,000,\nthe number of words 153,826, and the number of verses as computed in\nthese treatises varies from 10,402 to 10,622. Until the introduction of\nwriting, the Vedic hymns were entirely preserved by memory, with such\naccuracy and fidelity that the rules contained in the treatise for the\nrepetitions correspond with great exactness with the actual text, its\naccents, metre, and the divinity it praises. The Rig-Veda now forms the\nfoundation of all philological and mythological studies, as well as\nthose connected with the science and growth of religion; without it we\nshould never have obtained any insight into the belief of our ancestors.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe will now transport ourselves to the cradle of the Aryas \u201cNoble,\u201d\naccording to some writers situated on the Asiatic continent, according\nto others more to the north, between the Baltic and the Caspian seas.\nThis will suffice for the first stage; I shall make few demands on\nhistory, or on grammar.\n\nThere was a time when the great mass of the Aryan people was\nhesitating on the eve of abandoning their early habitations, previous\nto a dispersion in two directions. This people was composed of two\nbranches, the tribes of the north, and those of the south; the former\nwent towards the north-west of Asia and Europe; here they established\nthemselves, and the great historical nations--historical, since most of\nthem have played noted parts amongst the nations--the Celts, Grecians,\nRomans, Germans and Slavs were their descendants. Endowed with every\naptitude for an active life, they fostered these capabilities to the\nhighest degree; society was founded by them, morals brought to a\ngreater perfection, the foundation of science and art established, and\nthe principles of philosophy laid down. Although constantly in conflict\nwith the Semitic and Turanian races, these Aryans became in their\ndescendants the masters of the world. Whilst the northern division\nfollowed a north-westerly direction, the southern went to the mountains\nlying to the north of India; crossing the passes of the Himalayas, and\nfollowing the long watercourses, they descended into the vast fertile\nvalleys, and from that time India became as their own land. These\npleasant dwelling-places of the Aryan colonists, protected on the one\nside by high mountains, and on the other by the ocean from all foreign\ninvasions, were not disturbed by any of the ancient conquerors of the\nworld; around them kingdoms rose and fell, dynasties were created and\nbecame extinct, but the inner life of the tribes remained undisturbed\nby these events. The ancient Hindoos were calm, contemplative dreamers,\na nation of philosophers, who could only conceive of disputes in\nthemselves, in their own thoughts; the transcendental nature of the\natmosphere in which his ideas worked, and in which the Hindoo lived,\ncould not fail to retard the development of practical, social, and\npolitical virtues, and the appreciation of the beautiful and useful.\nThe Hindoo saw nothing in the past but the mystery of the Creation,\nin the future but the mystery of his destiny; the present offered\nnothing to him that could awaken physical activity, and apparently had\nno reality for him; no people ever existed who believed more firmly\nin a future life, or who occupied themselves less with this one; such\nas they were in the beginning, such they remained. The only sphere in\nwhich the Indian mind moves freely is the sphere of religion and that\nof philosophy. In no other part of the world have metaphysical ideas\ntaken such deep root as in India; the forms in which these ideas were\nclothed, in epochs of varying culture, and in the midst of divers\nclasses of society, were alternately those of the grossest superstition\nand of the most exalted spiritualism.\n\nIt has been asserted that in these two Aryan branches must we look for\nour ancestors. How shall we verify the truth of this assertion? What\nfamily likeness must we seek in order to recognise the relationship?\nHow feel certain that the languages we speak have been derived from\nthem? \u201cIf we knew nothing of the existence of Latin--if no historical\ndocuments existed to tell us of the Roman empire--a mere comparison of\nthe six Romance dialects would enable us to say that at some time there\nmust have been a language from which all these modern dialects derived\ntheir origin in common.\u201d[23]\n\nLet us conjugate the verb _to be_ in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese,\nFrench, Walachian, and in Rh\u00e6tian, and we shall see that it is clear:\nfirst, that all are but varieties of one common type: secondly, that\nit is impossible to consider any one of these six dialects as the\noriginal from which the others had been borrowed, since no single one\ncontains the elements composing them. \u201cIf we find such forms as _j\u2019ai\naim\u00e9_, we can explain them by a mere reference to the grammatical\nmaterials which French has still at its command, and the same may be\nsaid of _j\u2019aimerai_, i.e. _je-aimer-ai_, I have to love, I shall love.\nBut a change from _je suis_ to _tu es_ is inexplicable by the light of\nFrench grammar; it must have been a part of some language antecedent\nto any of the Romance dialects; it is, in fact, the verb _to be_ in\nLatin, which solves this difficulty; each of the six paradigms is but a\nmetamorphosis of the Latin.\u201d[24]\n\nIt was known that the roots were the same in all the Aryan languages,\nthat the same grammatical changes were common in many of the words\nin everyday use, such as father, mother, heaven, sun, moon, horse,\nand cow, as well as in the principal numbers; but it was the study\nof Sanscrit in its primitive form which first led the learned to the\ndiscovery of the reason of the vowel changes in certain words in use\nin our day, and which changes the English word _to wit_, to know, into\n_I wot_, I know, and the German _ich weise_ into _wir wissen_; these\nchanges are the result of a general law, the application of which can\nnowhere be more clearly appreciated than in the Vedic Sanscrit, and\nwhich was unknown until this language was studied in the Veda. (I\nwill here note that Sanscrit not being the original from which the\nother Aryan dialects have their being, but an elder brother, when Max\nM\u00fcller makes use of a Sanscrit phrase he does it to give an idea of\nthe process through which the language has passed which he considers\npreceded Sanscrit.)\n\nThere is another list of paradigms which, under a less familiar aspect\nthan the first, presents the same phenomenon. Conjugate the verb _to\nbe_ in Doric, Latin, old Slav, Sanscrit, Celtic, Lithuanian, Zend,\nGothic, and Armenian, and you will see that the nine are varieties of\none common type, and that it is impossible to consider any one of them\nas the original of the others, since, here again, none of the languages\npossess the grammatical material out of which these forms could have\nbeen framed. Sanscrit cannot have been the source from which the rest\nwere derived, since Greek, in several instances, has retained a more\norganic form than the Sanscrit. Nor can Greek be considered as the\nearliest language from which the others were derived, for not even\nLatin could be called the daughter of Greek, since Latin has preserved\ncertain forms more primitive than the Greek. Hence all these nine\ndialects point to some more ancient language, which was to them what\nLatin was to the Romance dialects; only at that early period there was\nno literature to preserve to us any remnant of that mother-tongue that\ndied in giving birth to all the modern Aryan dialects.[25]\n\nThere is one fact to be noted. If a comparison be made of the verb\n_to be_ in these dialects, it will be seen that Sanscrit is no more\ndistinct from the Greek of Homer, or from the Gothic of Ulfilas,\nor from the Anglo-Saxon of Alfred, than the Romance dialects from\neach other; that, in fact, the resemblance is more striking between\nSanscrit and Lithuanian, and between Sanscrit and Russian, than between\nFrench and Italian. This circumstance proves that all the essential\ngrammatical forms of these languages had been fully framed and\nestablished before the first separation of the Aryan family took place,\nthat is to say, at a time before there were any Grecians to speak\nGreek, or any Brahmans to invoke God\u2019s name in Sanscrit.\n\nThe science of comparative philology enables us to have glimpses of the\nsocial condition of our Aryan ancestors before they left their first\nabode. All historical documents of this period are lacking, for the\nsimple reason that the time of which we are speaking is anterior to any\nhistorical records; \u201cbut comparative philology has placed in our hands\na telescope of such power that where formerly we could see but nebulous\nclouds we now discover distinct forms and outlines.\u201d[26]\n\nWe see that our ancestors were no savages, but agricultural nomads,\nthat they laboured, made roads, possessed the art of weaving and\nsewing; they built towns, kept domestic animals, lived under a kingly\ngovernment, and counted at least up to one hundred. We learn this not\nonly from the words father, mother, son, daughter, heaven, earth, but\nalso from house, town, king, dog, cow, hatchet, and many others, which\nare found to be the same in the German, Celtic, Slavonic, Greek, Latin,\nand Sanscrit. They are the same because they all point to some more\nancient language, the mother-tongue in use before the separation of\nthe various Aryan tribes. From this period the other words also date,\nexpressing all the degrees of relationship, even those by alliance,\nthus giving clear proof of the early organisation of family life.\n\nAt the same time a decimal system of numeration also existed, the\nnumbers from one to a hundred, \u201cin itself one of the most marvellous\nachievements of the human mind, produced from an abstract conception\nof quantity, regulated by a spirit of philosophical classification,\nand yet conceived, matured and finished before the soil of Europe was\ntrodden by Greek, Roman, Slav, or Teuton. Such a system could only have\nbeen formed by a very small community, in which by the help of a tacit\nagreement, each number could only bear one signification. If we were\nsuddenly obliged to invent new names for one, two and three we should\nquickly feel the great difficulty of the task; to supply new names for\nmaterial objects would be comparatively easy, as these have different\nattributes which could be used in their designation; we could call the\nsea, the salt water; and the rain, the water of heaven; numbers are,\nhowever, such abstract conceptions that it would be foolish to attempt\nto find in them palpable attributes, and thus give expression to a\nmerely quantitative idea.\u201d[27]\n\nSince the names of the Aryan numbers up to one hundred are the same,\nit proves that they date from a time when our ancestors lived under\ncircumscribed conditions united by common ties. This is not so with\nthe word _thousand_; the names for _thousand_ differ in German and\nSlavonic, because they have their rise after the dispersion of the\nrace. Sanscrit and Zend share the name for thousand, which proves the\nunion of the ancestors of the Brahmans and Zoroastrians--after their\nexodus--by the ties of a common language.\n\nIn this way the facts of language--which are so simple that a child\ncould seize them--enable us to travel from the known to the unknown,\nand prove our descent from the once small family of the Aryas.\n\nMan in the abstract has been studied for long years. Max M\u00fcller\ncontemplates this abstraction in the Aryan man; this has not previously\nbeen attempted. Certainly we Aryans of to-day differ greatly from our\nfirst parents, but not _in toto_; the ties which connect us have not\nbeen severed, and he it is--our Aryan ancestor--who will help us to\nunderstand how we are verily the children of our fathers.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[23] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 18.\n\n[24] _Ibid._, vol. ii. p. 19.\n\n[25] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. pp. 18-20.\n\n[26] _Chips from, a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 17.\n\n[27] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 52.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE\n\n\nIt is possible to distinguish in ourselves four things: sensation,\nperception, conception, and the signs by means of which we designate\nobjects, that is their names; these enable us to separate the one\nfrom the other. We must not imagine that these four exist as separate\nentities, \u201cno words are possible without concepts, no concepts without\npercepts, no percepts without sensations.\u201d[28]--_Science of Thought_,\np. 2.\n\nThese four constituent elements of thought are merely four different\nphases in the growth of what we call our mind.\n\nI employ these terms because they are in use in philosophical language;\nthere are also many others constantly on the lips of philosophers, some\nof them newly coined. This is greatly to be regretted, as much of our\nconfusion of thought arises from this superabundance of philosophical\nterms. If such words as impression, sensation, perception, intuition,\npresentation, conception, soul, reason, and many others could for a\ntime be banished from our philosophical dictionaries, and some only\nreadmitted after they had undergone a thorough purification and were\nmade to return to their primitive signification, an immense service\nwould have been rendered to mental science; as every writer defines\nthem as he will, or uses them without definition; and he seems to\nimagine that because there are so many words, there must also be so\nmany variations, \u201cBecause in the German language there are two words:\n_verstand_ and _vernunft_, both originally expressing the same thing,\nthe greatest efforts have been made to show that there is something to\nbe called _verstand_, totally different from what is called _vernunft_;\nand as there is a _vernunft_ by the side of a _verstand_ in German,\nEnglish philosophers have been most anxious to introduce the same\ndistinction between understanding and reason into English\u201d;[29] and\n\u201cbecause we have a name for impression, and another for sensations,\nwe are led to imagine that impressions do actually exist by the side\nof sensations. But what was originally meant by impression was not\nsomething beside sensation, but rather one side of sensation, namely,\nthe passive side, which may be spoken of by itself, but which in every\nreal sensation is inseparable from its active side.\u201d[30]\n\nAll the various shades and developments of sensation were doubtless\ndistinguished and named for some very useful purpose; but the\ninconvenience was great when the terms became too numerous. \u201cWe may\nsafely enjoy the wealth of language accumulated by a long line of\nthinkers, if only we take care not to accept a coin for more or less\nthan it is really worth. We must weigh our words as the ancients often\nweighed their coins, and not be deceived by their current value.\u201d[31]\nWhen we have bravely resolved to throw away superfluous words, we need\nnot imagine that we are the poorer, since we have only lost what we, in\nreality, never possessed. So powerful, however, is the action of words\non thoughts, that as soon as we throw away a word, we feel ourselves\nto have been robbed of the thing itself; the sun rises just the same,\nthough we say now that it does not rise. Those things which we call\nmind, intellect, reason, memory, in fact the soul, have no existence\nas such--that is apart from ourselves. This assertion may sound very\nterrible to those philosophers who imagine that the dignity of man\nconsists in the possession of these and other powers; at last there\narises a complete mythology, a philosophic polytheism, when these are\nspoken of as distinct possessions, independent powers, with limits not\nvery sharply defined; and however orthodox that polytheism has become,\nit is never too late to protest against it. In making use of these\nterms it should be understood that they represent certain modes of\naction and phases of the Ego.\n\nIt is to be regretted that our modern languages have nothing to replace\nthe word \u201cmind,\u201d such as there is in the Sanscrit language, meaning\n\u201cworking within.\u201d As soon as we speak of _mind_ we cannot help thinking\nof an independent something dwelling in our body, whereas by mind I\nmean nothing but that working which is going on within, embracing\nsensation, perception, conception, and naming, and the worker who\naccomplishes this is the Ego.\n\nThus the Ego means nothing but consciousness of itself.\n\nThere is one word which it would be desirable to reintroduce into our\nphilosophical phraseology and that is Logos; it means the word and\nthe thought combined. Logos is a single intellectual act under two\naspects; it is an untranslatable word. We were told at school that it\nwas strange that the Greeks should not have distinguished between Logos\nSpeech and Logos Reason, and it was represented as a progress toward\nclearer thought that later writers should have distinguished between\nLogos the spoken word and Logos the inner thought.\n\nBut the Greeks were right: no doubt it may be an advantage to be able\nto distinguish between two sides of the same thing, but that advantage\nis more than neutralised if such distinction leads us to suppose that\nthese two sides are two different things. Let us avoid the very common\nerror that things which can be distinguished can therefore claim an\nindependent existence; we can distinguish between an orange and its\npeel, but no orange can grow without peel, nor peel without the fruit.\n\nLet it not be supposed that I am such a bigoted upholder of the\nunity of the Ego as to wish to see all these names banished from our\nphilosophical dictionaries. Let us use the word Sense when speaking\nof the Ego as perceiving. Let us use Intellect when the Ego is simply\nconceiving; and the word language when it is speaking; let us even use\nthe word _memory_ when we wish to speak of the partial permanence of\nthe work done by sensation, perception, and conception; and let us use\nReason or Reasoning for the process which produces what the logicians\ncall propositions and syllogisms; but let us never forget that neither\nto remember nor to reason implies the possession of a thing called\nreason or memory. All our mental life will remain just the same though\nwe deny the existence of the terms which obscure our vision; let us\nhold fast to the existence of the Ego, it exists in its entity, it only\nis the worker, and it receives its highest expression in the Logos.\n\nThis truth, that thought and language are inseparable, that thought\nwithout language is as impossible as language without thought has\nonly recently been affirmed by comparative philologists. Many learned\nwriters are still unwilling to admit that ideas without words are\nimpossible though at the same time they are quite willing to concede\nthat words are impossible without concepts.[32]\n\nWe possess an immense number of books on logic, yet we are met\neverywhere by the same vagueness on this subject. John Stuart Mill\nspeaks of language as one of the principal elements or helps of\nthought, but he never mentions any other instruments. This lack is\nprobably owing to the unfortunate influence of modern languages\nwhich have two words, the one for language, the other for thought;\nthis gives the impression that there is a substantial instead of an\napparent difference between the two; it is also owing to the dislike\nof philosophers to allow that all which is most lofty, most spiritual\nin us should be dependent on such miserable crutches as words are\nsupposed to be. Yet it is evident that we cannot advance one step\ntowards philosophy without acknowledging the fact that we think in\nwords and words only. This thought would be less difficult to grasp\nif we defined clearly what are thoughts. Sensation, pain, pleasure,\ndreaming, or willing cannot be called true thought, but variations of\ninward activity; in the same way as shrieks, howls, or even the sounds\nof real words, taken from a foreign language, are no more language\nthan our emotions are thoughts. The word Logos expresses this, since\nit had originally the two meanings of gathering and combining, and so\nbecame the proper name of all that we call reason; but as it also means\nlanguage, it tells us that the process of gathering and combining,\nwhich begins with sensation and passes on to perception and conception,\nreaches its full perfection only when the inward activity takes form in\nthe Logos or speech.\n\nLanguage therefore is not as has been often imagined, thought plus\nsound; but thought is really language minus sound; words are the\nexternal symbols of thought, sounding symbols when we articulate in\na loud voice, but mute when we confine ourselves to merely thinking\nthem, since it is a fact that we think in words, and it is not possible\nto think otherwise. The possession of a language is shown even in the\ntracing of whole sentences by ideographic signs, which need not be\npronounced at all, or as in the astronomical signs in our almanacks\nwhich may be pronounced differently in different languages: or we\nmay substitute algebraic signs for words; we could as well calculate\nwithout numbers as apply our reason without words I have freely and\nfully admitted that thoughts may exist without words, because other\nsigns may take the place of words between persons speaking different\nlanguages possibly between deaf and dumb people. Five fingers held\nup are quite sufficient to convey the concept of five, thus the hand\nmay become the sign for five, both hands for ten, hands and feet for\ntwenty. In America and Australia where many dialects are spoken this\nmethod has attained a great degree of perfection, but we notice that\nin all cases under review each one thinks in his own language and then\ntranslates his thought into pantomime.\n\nA final fact adduced against the theory that it is impossible to think\nwithout language, which was very popular, is that deaf and dumb people\ncannot speak, and yet can think; this argument has no great value, as\nit is now averred that \u201ca man born dumb who had always lived among\ndeaf and dumb people, and had not been taught to express thoughts by\nsigns would be capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than a\nmonkey or an elephant; and this in spite of the fact that no naturalist\ncould distinguish any difference between the size of their brains and\nthose belonging to men who could speak.\u201d For deaf mutes to be able to\nthink and reason, they must have learned from those who use words, then\nonly can they substitute other signs for their words and concepts.\nStill Professor Huxley accords to these unfortunate men certain\nintellectual heritages derived from their parents.\n\nThese are some of the chief points in the science of language. The\nfundamental law which this science lays down of the unity of thought\nand speech is a torch which may throw light on the origin of man.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[28] Max M\u00fcller says: \u201cI use percept instead of presentation, because\nit is better understood in English.\u201d--_Science of Thought_, p. 2.\n\n[29] Max M\u00fcller\u2019s _Science of Thought_, p. 72.\n\n[30] _Ibid._, p. 17.\n\n[31] _Ibid._, p. 75.\n\n[32] _Science of Thought_, p. 30.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV ANIMALS\n\n\nWhilst philosophers and moralists have studied men, and naturalists\nanimals, Darwin considered it necessary to collect information\nconcerning both men and beasts simultaneously before making a biography\nof the human being. With the modesty so often characteristic of a great\ngenius, the English naturalist acknowledges that \u201cmany of the views\nwhich have been advanced are highly speculative, and some no doubt will\nprove erroneous. False facts are highly injurious to the progress of\nscience, for they often long endure; but false views, if supported by\nsome evidence, do little harm, as everyone takes a salutary pleasure in\nproving their falseness; and when this is done, one path towards error\nis closed and the road to truth is often at the same time opened.\u201d[33]\n\nAlthough there is no doubt that the facts observed by Darwin and\nrecorded in the _Origin of Species_, are perfectly correct, I hope to\nbe able to dispose of the opinion that \u201cman and animals follow parallel\nlines in their lives, but that man advances more quickly, and has taken\nhis place in the front rank.\u201d\n\nWhilst making a short _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of remarks which Noir\u00e9 and other learned\nwriters have made on animals, I also propose to draw a comparison\nbetween the two who are so closely connected--the superior and inferior\nanimal.\n\nDarwin was not alone in his endeavour to prove that there exists no\nessential difference between man and beast; some have even asserted\nthat the intelligence of certain animals is not only equal to, but\nat times, superior to that of man. We must be on our guard, however,\nagainst those numerous anecdotes which have led even philosophers\nastray; we will also divest our minds of prejudice and preconceived\nnotions, that we may introduce some order into ideas which have been\ndisturbed by superficial observers and the makers of false systems,\nthose enemies of true science; let us candidly own the smallness of\nour knowledge concerning the mind of an animal; we do not in the least\nknow how they philosophise, nor how an ox recognises his stable door.\nInstead of having recourse to animals and seeking to draw parallels\nbetween their mental faculties and ours, let us examine ourselves to\nfind out what passes in our own minds. We shall then discover that\nwe never in reality perceive anything unless we can distinguish it\nfrom other things by means, if not of a word, yet of a sign; that is\ntill we have passed through the four stages of sensation, perception,\nconception, and more important than all, for our present purpose, of\nnaming. When it is once acknowledged that concepts are impossible\nwithout words, and that man alone amongst organised beings possesses\nthe power of language, and that the mental faculties of animals are\ndifferent from ours in kind, and not only in degree, it naturally\nfollows that a genealogical descent of man from animals is an\nimpossible assumption.\n\nFormerly, in comparing the characteristics of man and animals it was\ncontended that the latter were ruled by instinct in place of the reason\nwhich was the attribute of the former; and although an affirmation\nis not an explanation it appeared sufficiently plausible and was\naccepted. But the fact is that both man and beast possess instinct.\nIf the spider weaves his net by instinct, a child takes his mother\u2019s\nbreast also by instinct; both are with regard to instinct at one level.\nMan involuntarily extends his arm to protect himself if he suddenly\nperceives an object near him on the point of striking him. \u201cIf we tear\na spider\u2019s web, and watch the spider first run from it in despair, then\nreturn and examine the mischief and endeavour to mend it. Surely we\nhave the instinct of weaving controlled by observation, by comparison,\nby reflection, and by judgment.\u201d[34]\n\nNo one has hitherto succeeded in explaining and analysing the instinct\nsaid to be in animals. Cuvier[35] and other naturalists have compared\nit with habit.[36] This comparison gives an accurate notion of the\nframe of mind under which an instinctive action is performed, but does\nnot necessarily explain its origin.\n\nAs reason develops in man, instinct plays a less important part;\nwhereas a cat chases a mouse, a bird flies, and fish swim by instinct\nfrom their birth to their last day; and the actions of ants, bees, and\nmoles, do not cease to amaze us, because they are inseparable from\ntheir structure and their vital functions. The natural impulses which\nguide birds and insects in making their nests, hives, and storehouses,\ncocoons of silk with which they have so enriched our world and theirs,\nare the results of constant and repeated acts, during the course of\ninnumerable generations. The fact of not distinguishing the instinct\nwhich is in man from that found in animals and thus attributing\nman\u2019s conscious acts to the natural leanings which guide unconscious\ncreatures, has perhaps caused Renan to assert that the monotheistic\ntendency of the Semitic race belongs to it by a religious instinct.\n\nIt is certain that impressions are received both by man and by animals;\nwith both the knowledge of objects proceeds from the impressions made\non the senses, thus transmitting the image to the intelligence; but\nthere the likeness ends; the capacities differ. The animal remains the\nslave--in every sense of the word--of his organs; the sight of a bone\nto gnaw, the corner in which he lies, the signs of friendship that he\nreceives from human beings, call forth in a dog a chain of feelings\ntaking the place of the chain of ideas called out in man.\n\nMan\u2019s capabilities of introducing intermediaries between the intention\nand the fulfilment of his object witness to his wideness of mind, his\nexperience of the past and prevision of the future; all those things\nthat he owes to his power of imagination and conception even in the\ncase of things having no real existence, or which do not exist as yet;\nhe reproduces at will the outward likeness of what is not at the moment\nbefore him. Thus man who names an object, _thinks_ it; but the animal\nfrom not possessing language cannot _think_ it and cannot reproduce it\nwhen out of its sight.\n\nThe use or non-use of tools creates a great gulf between man and the\nbrutes. The most intelligent animal, a monkey of a high order, never\nuses a tool--even the most primitive--to accomplish his will; no one\ncan ascribe to the animal creative actions, that is, it does not\nfashion an implement that it may attain another end; it has never been\nknown to carry an object from one spot to another that it might act as\na ladder to bring the animal nearer to the fruit it desired to reach.\n\nBut this concession, I think, we may make to Darwin; that even in the\nsphere of mental activities we can never entirely separate ourselves\nfrom the brute creation. We experience in ourselves a certain condition\nof mind, where fancies alternate with passing agitation; these proceed\nfrom intense, but confused emotions. This condition does not allow of\nclear explanation even to ourselves, since it has nothing in common\nwith true thought, which is inseparable from the consciousness of\nobjects, and therefore is lacking in words with which to express\nitself. To Mendelssohn this mental condition was perfectly known, and\nhe says, \u201cIt is exactly at that moment when language is impotent to\nexpress the experiences of the soul, that the sphere of music opens to\nus; if all that passes in us were capable of being expressed in words,\nI should write no more music.\u201d\n\nA flock of birds about to migrate, all follow an unanimous impulse in\nuttering at starting a few high clear notes, perhaps impelled by an\nunknown motive, their inclinations and wills find collective expression\ntherein, by a mutual impulse which comes from soundless depths of the\nlife of the senses, carrying all before it. This universal sympathy,\nhowever difficult to explain, is one of the noblest possessions of the\ninferior animals; even the aptitude they display for certain mechanical\nacts of labour does not stand on the same level; but in the vocal\nmanifestations of birds there is no indication of true thought, the\nbasis of real language.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNow come, my dog, for a _t\u00eate-\u00e0-t\u00eate_. It would be impossible to hold\nconverse with ants, bees, monkeys, moles, or birds, as I should not\nacknowledge them as my compeers, I should not admit them as intimates;\nbut you I know well; and, let me tell you, your judges have shown their\nimpartiality towards you; none of the vices which degrade us--your\nsuperiors--have been laid to your account. You are called neither\ngourmand, thief, idler, nor hypocrite; but you lack the qualities that\nmight have been yours had you possessed the faculty of combination.\nThey say that you create nothing because you fail to see what purpose\ntools may serve; and you are ignorant of the fact that _A._ being\ngiven, _B._ must follow--such is combination. Still, on looking\nclosely, it is possible to discover amongst us--your superiors--those\nwho are stupid--or awkward--who take small advantage of all the means\nput within their reach to recede from a false position, to recover\nfrom the effects of a wrong step, or, what is still more important,\nremedy their ignorance. Yes, there are many such, and these also lack\nthe faculty of combination.\n\nYour judges also assert that from the want on your part of being able\nto attach one idea to another, you do not think of your master when\nhe is absent from you. What ingratitude! But I wonder whether those\nfriends, who profess so much pleasure in my company, think of me when I\nam absent; perhaps no more than you do.\n\nLet me continue my enquiries for a few minutes. We will suppose that\nwe two are in my study. I am occupied with a book, and am not thinking\nof you at all. You are stretched at my feet with your nose between\nyour paws, watching a fly near you. I make a sudden movement, you look\nat me, and at the same moment wag your tail.... Am I to suppose that\nyou wag it to hide your dislike to me? The noble quality which I and\nall your superiors possess is lacking in you; you have no speech for\nthought in which to tell me your love for me; but if you could speak,\nthat is, were like one of ourselves, would you be as truthful as you\nare now, being only a dog that has nothing but his tail with which\nto make his master understand his feelings towards him? Schopenhauer\n... but you know nothing of Schopenhauer, if you could speak I should\nteach you to read, and then you would know him. Schopenhauer is a great\nand learned philosopher, who says, \u201cHow much this movement of the\ntail surpasses in sincerity many other assurances of friendship and\ndevotion.\u201d[37]\n\nThis is a long digression on Darwin\u2019s idea that man and animals lead\nparallel lives, but that the one progresses quickly, the other slowly.\nI think I have shown that it is not a question of rapidity or tardiness\nof progress, but rather whether both travellers are equally well\nequipped with the means of passing the Rubicon.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[33] Darwin\u2019s _Descent of Man_, vol. ii. p. 385.\n\n[34] Max M\u00fcller\u2019s _Science of Language_, vol. i. p. 402.\n\n[35] \u201cCuvier maintained that instinct and intelligence stand in an\ninverse ratio to each other.\u201d--Darwin\u2019s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p.\n37. Translator\u2019s note.\n\n[36] Frederick Cuvier and several of the older metaphysicians have\ncompared instinct with habit.--Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_, p. 191.\n\n[37] Max M\u00fcller\u2019s _Science of Thought_, p. 178.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V PRIMITIVE HUMANITY\n\n\nSome courage is required to attack the subject of comparative philology\nas treated by certain learned authors; they are bold enough to seek to\ntransport themselves to an age of such remote antiquity that history is\nsilent on the subject, but in which a nascent humanity endeavoured to\nfind expression for its sensations in a language which probably had no\nname.\n\nWhen my attention was first attracted to the work of this school, so\nlong as my mind was content to skim over the surface of an unknown\nworld, so immeasurably distant from us, and whilst flitting too rapidly\nover it to be able to distinguish any of its features, it presented\nitself to me as a creation of my heated imagination. Since then I have\nlived in that world of wonders, and I then grasped the fact that it was\nquite possible for this world to have been a reality. But to journey\nthither, even to live in this strange country, the only path to which\nis by induction, in company with Max M\u00fcller and Noir\u00e9, who, apparently,\nare its inhabitants, from the ease with which they move in it, is a\ntotally different matter from explaining the methods of getting there,\nor describing the sojourn. I should have to draw information from\nvarious sources, and the scientific and hypothetical data connected\ntherewith would require sorting and rearranging to make them assimilate\nmore easily; these would present difficulties not readily surmounted.\n\nHow could a reasonable and speaking being come forth from that which\nhad no reason and no language?\n\nThe earliest traditions are silent on the manner of man\u2019s acquisition\nof his first ideas and his first words. But because a problem has not\nbeen solved, that is no reason for the assertion that it is insoluble,\nunless a refutation is at once demonstrable, as in the squaring of the\ncircle. \u201cIf every one had abstained from striving to penetrate hidden\nthings, no sciences would exist,\u201d Noir\u00e9 remarked. Newton might have\nsaid: \u201cThe facts that a stone falls and the planets move are known\nby actual experience, why search out the laws which produce these\nphenomena?\u201d And the theory of gravitation would have been lacking.\nLyell might have said: \u201cWe see that the crust of the earth is composed\nof several strata, why reckon the time required for their formation?\u201d\nAnd there would have been no science of geology. Liebig might have\nsaid: \u201cWe see that clover grows and cattle prosper, why should the\nrelation of cause and effect concern us?\u201d And there would have been no\norganic chemistry. Adam Smith might have said: \u201cWe know by experience\nthat valuable objects can be exchanged, and that their prices\nfluctuate, why should we study the cause of rise and fall?\u201d And this\nchapter would have been missing from political economy.\n\nNo road presents itself to me by which to arrive in the midst of\nprimitive humanity; of necessity, therefore, I have recourse to\nanalogy, which, under the circumstances, is not the worst expedient.\n\nWhen the Romans first encountered Germans, they were chiefly struck\nby the great stature, the blue eyes, and the light hair of this\ninimical race. Tacitus, in alluding to this fact, says that each\nGerman exactly resembled his fellow. Although we are familiar with\nthe external appearance of various nations, yet if we found ourselves\nin the presence of a large number of negroes we should experience an\nanalogous sensation, only by degrees should we distinguish one from the\nother. In an intensified degree primitive man must have had similar\nexperiences when, first finding himself in a world of which he knew\nnothing, and of which he understood nothing, the consciousness of\nwhat he saw around him was making itself apparent. These early races\nlearnt the meaning of the details of surrounding nature but slowly;\ntheir eyes followed the brilliant circle as it moved from one quarter\nof the heavens to the other; they noticed the fire which came whence\nthey knew not; they heard the crash of thunder, reproduced by the\nechoes in the mountains synchronising with the devastations caused by\nthe storm. If one man alone had witnessed these terrifying effects\nin nature, his reason would have tottered from fear; the stones and\nthe herbs of the field could not share his agitation; the death of a\nman from terror would leave them unmoved. Happily man was not alone,\nall those around him shared his agitation, and the terror manifested\nitself on each by signs which each would understand instinctively.\nThis period of semi-consciousness before the full awakening might\nhave been a prolonged one, but physical sensations and necessities\nmultiplied themselves, and were very various and imperative; action was\nindispensable if privations were to be avoided; and instinct came to\ntheir aid. The need of guarding themselves from the burning rays of the\nsun caused them to provide shelters by interlacing branches of trees;\nto protect themselves from cold they took the skins of wild beasts to\nthrow over their shoulders; where natural caverns were insufficient for\ntheir wants they made themselves refuges in the sides of the mountains;\nthey were forced to light and maintain fires; sharpen stones either\nfor tools or for weapons of defence; the wants of one were the wants\nof all, and all gave themselves to the task of satisfying them. It is\nso evident that primitive activity must have been co-operative, that\nit outrages common sense to picture each man labouring by himself for\nhimself alone. The mental phenomenon known as _intention_, was the\ncommon property of all; the mutual sympathy played the part of the\nelectric current of our laboratories, and the inarticulate sounds\nescaping involuntarily from the lips of each worker, served as a means\nof communication.\n\nIn order the better to understand the function of the voice in the\neducation of primitive man, let us look around us and listen. Whenever\nour senses are excited, and our muscles hard at work, we feel a kind of\nrelief in uttering sounds which in themselves have no meaning. \u201cThey\nare a relief rather than an effort, a moderation or modulation of the\nquickened breath in its escape through the mouth.\u201d[38]\n\nWhen men work together, on account of the nature of the task\nrequiring united effort, they are naturally inclined to accompany\ntheir occupations with certain more or less rhythmical utterances,\nwhich react beneficially on the inward disturbance caused by muscular\neffort. When a body of men march, row, or wield hammers, they do not\nkeep silence; formerly soldiers sang as they marched to battle; our\nmodern civilisation only caused the substitution of fife and drums\nfor the songs; and our soldiers do not readily abandon these measured\naccompaniments, which make them less susceptible of fatigue. When\nsavage races dance they make the air resound with measured cadences;\nour peasants sing while joining in the country dances; the custom of\nsinging during work is more marked amongst those who belong to the\nraces which are less under the influence of civilisation, and are more\nentirely absorbed by their manual occupation, and with whom personal\npreoccupation has small hold.\n\nThese inarticulate sounds which Noir\u00e9 has named _clamor concomitans_\nand Max M\u00fcller _clamor significans_, uttered by primitive men when\nworking in concert, and always inseparable from acts, could be\ndifferentiated in accordance with the acts performed; and at a period\nwhen actual speech did not yet exist, they would always have this\npractical value, they would awaken the remembrance of acts performed in\nthe past, and be repeated in the present, they would thus be instantly\nunderstood by all, and readily retained by the memory. But what was\nthere to determine the application of certain sounds to certain\noccupations? This has not been made clear. Plato, Socrates, and others,\nhave considered that the origin of language might be traced to the\nimitation of the sounds of nature, and have sought for a resemblance\nbetween these sounds and certain letters of the alphabet, but even were\nit possible here and there to discover a faint analogy, our efforts\nwould only end in contradictions. There seems to be neither necessity\nnor absolute freedom in the choice of the sounds expressive of these\nacts, but rather the result of some accident, or of causes of which we\nare ignorant. In any case these sounds were merely the materials of\nwhich language was built.\n\nIt will be easily understood that nothing would penetrate more deeply\ninto man\u2019s consciousness, or produce mutual understanding more\nreadily, than acts undertaken and accomplished with the same end in\nview by a number of men united in a common impulse. During the digging\nof the caves, the weaving of the nets, the thrashing of the grain,\nthe workers would follow with their eyes the gradual transformation\nperceptible in these activities, and the sounds which they emitted,\nor the half-formed words issuing from their lips would be modified or\nsoftened at each development in the work; these developments becoming\nmore and more distinct, more and more impressed with their own special\ncharacteristic. The idea of individuality must have been very clouded,\nvery confused amongst primitive man; that which one saw the other saw\nafter the same manner; they designed each object in creating it; in\nthis way the world became as a book to them, this book, the result of\ntheir combined labour, they learnt to read fluently by means of these\nsounds and words which increased as they varied. Thus work--man\u2019s good\ngenius--is proved to be the source of what is truly human, viz., reason\nand language.\n\nHere I will note a curious fact and one which is historical. At a\nperiod when writing was unknown in India, the Brahmans had already\nestablished the rules of poetical metre, which were originally\nconnected with dancing and music. These rules had been preserved in the\nVeda. The various Sanscrit names for metre are a witness of the union\nof corporal and phonetic movements. The root of _Khandas_, metre, is\nthe same as the Latin _scandere_ in the sense of stepping; _vritta_,\nmetre, from _vrit_, verto--to turn, meant originally the last three\nor four steps of a dancing movement, the turn, the _versus_, which\ndetermined the whole character of dance or of the metre. _Trishtubh_,\nthe name of a common metre in the Veda, meant three-step, because\nits turn--its _vritta_ or _versus_--consisted of three steps, \u222a - -.\nThus the innate necessity that man feels of linking the play of the\nvocal chords to the movement of hands or feet, had been controlled by\nfixed laws, twenty-four centuries ago, by the Hindoo grammarians; and\nthe most recent theories of modern writers on the subject attest the\nexcellence of these laws. The assertion that it is natural to peasants\nnot to keep silence when working is of very ancient date, but Noir\u00e9 was\nthe first to deduce scientific data from the fact.\n\nThe study of Sanscrit has shown us that two thousand years ago it\noccurred to Hindoo grammarians to investigate the origin of the words\nof their language, when they discovered that all words could be reduced\nto roots, and that these roots all expressed various forms of activity;\nthat they were therefore verbs, and that the number of these roots was\nvery restricted. Our present philologists have continued this work\nand are not only able to acknowledge the accuracy of the Brahmanic\ndiscovery, but also to certify that the grammatical analysis of the\nHindoos, put forth 500 years before our era, has never been surpassed.\nIt is important to remember that roots are the fundamental elements\nwhich permeate the whole organism of the language. Hebrew has been\nreduced by Renan and other Hebraists to about 500 roots; the work\nhas still to be done for the whole Semitic family. The same process\nhas been carried out with regard to the Aryan languages; we find the\nnumber of roots in Sanscrit reduced to about 800; of Gothic about 600;\nrather more than 400 in the Teutonic family, and 600 in the Slavic. The\nUral-Altaic languages have also undergone a partial analysis of the\nsame kind, and the result at present corresponds to that obtained by\nthe examination of the other families. After eliminating the tertiary\nand secondary roots from the Sanscrit the residuum is 600 or 500,\nand we arrive at the fact that this entire language, and, in a great\nmeasure, all the Aryan languages, can be traced back to an extremely\nsmall number of roots.\n\nAs the Hindoo grammarians asserted that all roots contain the\nrepresentation of various forms of activity, it behoved our\nphilologists to investigate this and discover their meaning. Professor\nNoir\u00e9 thought that the consciousness that men had of their own acts\nmust have formed the origin of the primitive concepts of the human\nmind, and found expression in signs or words. Max M\u00fcller shows us[39]\nthat all the Sanscrit roots express a concept or consciousness of\nthe repeated acts, the acts with which man in his infancy would be\nmost familiar. But it must be noted that the concepts or signs are\nnot of single acts, but the realisation of repeated acts; to dig was\nnot to put a spade into the ground once, it is the action of digging\ncontinuously; to sharpen was not to pass one flint over another\nonce, it was the continual action of sharpening. The consciousness of\naccomplishing these repeated acts as if one act, became the first germ\nof conceptual thought. During this initial phase of thought, when the\nfirst consciousness of his own repeated acts awoke in man and assumed\na conceptual character, will, act and knowledge were as yet one and\nundivided, and the whole of his conscious knowledge was subjective,\nexclusively concerned with his own voluntary act. We possess the\ngenealogy of a large number of Aryan roots, and we find on examination\nthat the activity which formed their basis was at the beginning always\na creative activity, since it called into life conceptions which up to\nthat time had not existed.\n\nNothing is more interesting than researches into the origin of the\ngrowth of human thought, when carried out not according to the systems\nof certain philologists of our day, but historically, after the fashion\nof the Indian trapper, who notes on the sand every imprint of the\nfootsteps of him whom he pursues.\n\nFor the present I will content myself by bringing forward in\nillustration three primary roots. _V\u00ea_ (_V\u00e2_), which is, to weave;\n_Mar_, to crush; and _Khan_, to dig. _V\u00ea_ (_V\u00e2_), _Mar_, and _Khan_ are\nthus verbs.\n\nWhen we now picture the four acts of weaving, spinning, sewing, and\nknitting, they appear so to differ the one from the other, that it\nseems impossible to consider them other than four distinct acts, and\ndifficult to believe that there is one common origin to all. These four\nprocesses, however, all had their germ in the one primitive act of\ninterlacing the boughs of trees to form a hedge or roof. This root _V\u00ea_\n(_V\u00e2_) had an immense number of offshoots; from the acts of interlacing\nand platting came the conception of binding, in Latin _vieo_, to twist,\nto divide; in German, _winden_, _wickeln_; the Latin words _vitis_, a\nvine; _vimen_, osier, a twig; _viburnum_, a climbing plant; the Slavic\nword _vetla_, willow; the Sanscrit _vetra_, reed, rush; the German\nword for rush, _binse_, is connected with _binden_, to join, and the\nsecondary meaning of ties of relationship and alliance: again, in the\nOld High-German, _nothbendig_, or _nothwendigkeit_, bound, straitened,\nand the Gothic _naudibandi_, tie, chain. All these words, whether in\nthe Roman, German, or Slavonic dialects, have retained the root _V\u00ea_\n(_V\u00e2_), so that it is impossible not to recognise the trunk of which\nthese are the branches. Thus a large number of apparently dissimilar\nimages became entangled the one with the other, and in proportion as\nwe approach their starting-point do we find them discarding their own\nspecial signification, and becoming absorbed in the single conception\nof weaving and platting.\n\nThe root _mar_, to grind, has also the meaning of to crush, to powder,\nto rub down, etc., and whether we look at the Latin, Greek, Celtic,\nGerman, or Slav, the words representing the verb _to mill_, and the\nname _mill_ come thence; the transition from _milling_ to _fighting_ is\nnatural; thus Homer used the word _mar-na-mai_, I fight, I pound. _Mar_\nproduced in Latin the words _mordeo_, I bite; _morior_ (originally,\nto decay), I die; _mortuus_, dead; _mors_, death; _morbus_, illness;\nin Greek, _marasmos_, decay; rendered in German by _sich aufreiben_,\nto become exhausted. In Sanscrit we must remember that the consonants\n_r_ and _l_ are cognate and interchangeable; thus, _mar_ = _mal_;\nand that _ar_ in Sanscrit is shortened, and the vowel modified and\npronounced _ri_, _mar_ = _mri_; that _ar_ may be pronounced _ra_,\nand _al_, _la_; _mar_ = _mra_ and _mal_ = _mla_: thus in Sanscrit\nwe find _mrita_, dead; _mritya_, death, and _mriye_, I die. One of\nthe earliest names for man was _marta_, the dying; the equivalent in\nGreek for the Sanscrit _mra_ and _mla_ is _mbro_, _mblo_; and after\ndropping the _m_ becomes _bro_ and _blo_; _brotos_, mortal. Having\nchosen this name for himself, man gave the opposite name to the gods;\nhe called them _Ambrotoi_, without decay, immortal; and their food\n_ambrosia_, immortality. An offshoot of _mar_ is _mard_ and _mrg_;\nthence _mradati_, rubbing down, pulverising, grind to powder; _mrid_\nis in Sanscrit the word for dust, and afterwards was used for soil\nin general or earth; _mrid_, to weaken, to soften, to melt; thus,\nfluid mass. This idea in English takes the form _malt_, grain soaked\nand softened; then the Greek _meldo_, and the Gothic _mulda_, soft\nground or morass, and that which is softened by use or the action of\ntime. The Latin _sordes_ and _sordidus_ are connected herewith, as the\nsame root may be found in _smarna_, Gothic, and the Greek _m\u00e9las_ and\n_moros_, black, and in _murus_, brown-black; in the Russian _smola_,\nwax and resin. \u201cColour was conceived originally as the result of the\nact of covering or extending a fluid over a surface; it was not till\nthe art of painting, in its most primitive form, was discovered and\nnamed, that there could have been a name for colour.\u201d[40] The name of\ncolour in Sanscrit is _varna_, from _var_, to cover. The idea conveyed\nby the words, to smooth, to flatter, to soften, to mollify, to melt a\nhard substance, to polish a rough surface by constant rubbing, led to\nthe same terms being used for expressing the softening influence which\nman exercised on man, by looks, gestures, words or prayers, and these\nexpressions were especially used by men in their relations to the gods,\nwhen they strove to propitiate them by supplications and sacrifices:\nthus the prayer which we now translate by \u201cBe gracious unto us, O God,\u201d\nmeant originally, \u201cMelt to us; be softened, ye gods.\u201d\n\nLanguage grew and made offshoots, but without confusion; disorder had\nno place in the progress of thought (still less chance), which was\nsimple and rational. This was not the development of the conscious\neffort towards some goal. At this period there was no such thing as\nreflection properly so called; for instance, man did not ponder how\nbest to express a feeling of fear, since fear, like so many other\nimpressions, received vague expression before the concept of fear\nacquired shape; but our ancestors had a root to express shaking (in\nSanscrit _kap_, _kamp_, to shake): they used it to describe fear,\nwhich manifested itself in the trembling of voice or limbs. Thus, \u201cI\nshake\u201d might mean, \u201cI shake a tree,\u201d or \u201cI am shaken,\u201d \u201cI am shaken\nby him\u201d (by my horse), but also \u201cI am trembling\u201d; from it we have\nin Greek _karnos_, smoke, not what shakes, or is shaken, but what\nis in a shaking state, that which moves; _kup_, which is probably a\nmodification of _kamp_, means to shake inwardly, to be angry.\n\nSome learned writers have felt disconcerted when after tracing words to\ntheir source, they have found nothing but roots with general meanings,\nsuch as to go, to move, to run, to do; however, it is by means of these\nvague, pale conceptions that language has obtained the material for\nan entire language. The Aryan root _ar_ signified originally to go,\nto send, to advance, to proceed, going regularly, to stir. Applied to\nthe stirring of the soil, it took the meaning of ploughing; in Latin\n_ar-are_, in Greek _ar-oun_, in Irish _ar_, in Lithuanian _ar-ti_, in\nRussian _ora-ti_; this root, from its meaning of advancing regularly,\nwas the name of the plough; one derivative was applied to the cattle\nfit for ploughing, and also to the labourer. _Ar_ was also used for\nthe ploughing of the sea, or rowing, and was found in the words rower\nand rudder. The Latin word _\u00e6vum_, originally from _i_, to go, became\nthe name of time, age; and its derivative _\u00e6viternus_, _\u00e6turnus_ was\nmade to express eternity. It was by a poetical fiat that the Greek\n_probata_, which originally meant no more than things walking forward,\nbecame in time the name of cattle. In French, the word _meuble_ means\nliterally anything that is movable, but it became the name of chairs,\ntables, wardrobes, etc. In this way we see the power of language,\nwhich, out of a few simple elements, has created names sufficient to\nexpress the infinite aspects of nature.\n\nThe ramifications of the Aryan root _D\u00e2_ give a good idea of the\nprocess. Thus _D\u00e2_ = to give, is in the Sanscrit _d\u0103d\u0101mi_, I give;\nin Latin, _do_; in Old Slavonic, _da-mi_; in Lithuanian, _du-mi_; in\nFrench, _donner_ and _pardonner_; in Latin, _trado_, to give over; in\nItalian, _tradire_; in French, _trahir_, _trahison_; in Latin again,\n_reddo_, to give back; in French, _rendre_ and _rente_. Side by side\nwith the root _D\u00e2_, there is another root also _D\u00e2_, exactly the same\nin all outward appearance; it consists of _D_ + _\u00c2_, but is totally\ndistinct from the former. While from the former we have in Sanscrit,\n_d\u00e2-tram_, a gift, we have from the latter _d\u00e2\u00b4-tram_, a sickle. The\nmeaning of the second root is to cut, to carve; the difference is\nshown by the accent remaining on the radical syllable in _d\u00e2\u00b4-tram_,\n_i.e._, the cutting (active); whilst it leaves the radical syllable in\n_d\u00e2-tr\u00e1m_, _i.e._, what is given (passive).\n\nThe history of these roots _d\u00e2_ affords an opportunity of noticing\na curious resemblance between natural history and philology, two\nsciences which otherwise are totally different, but alike in one idea\nwhich enters into the inwardness of both. Darwin admitted four or five\nprogenitors in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, so that the primary\nelements of all living organisms are the simple cells. In the same\nway philologists have discovered that there remain in the end certain\nsimple elements of human speech--the primordial roots--which have\nsufficed to provide the innumerable multitude of words used by the\nhuman race. A principle neglected by a great number of evolutionists\nis that if two origins, whether the roots of language or living\ncells, have at their starting-point an absolutely similar appearance,\nand afterwards diverge, it is because at their origin they bore in\nthemselves the germs destined to produce this divergence. Darwin says\nthat two organic cells, which in the embryonic stage may perfectly\nresemble each other, in growing, gradually develop, the one into an\ninferior animal, the other into a superior animal, never varying the\nprocess; the reason of which fact is that the cells, although not\ndistinguishable the one from the other, differ in the rudiments or\nprinciple of life: in the same way philologists say that when two roots\nhave the same sound, but produce families of perfectly distinct words,\nit is because the germs in each differ. We learn from this that the\nsound of the words is a matter of indifference at the commencement of\na language; no one has succeeded, or will succeed, in making the sound\nalone the vehicle of a conception.\n\nTo Locke belongs the merit of having first clearly asserted that\nroots, the true irreducible elements of language, which furnish\nwords for the most abstract and sublime conceptions, had at the\nbeginning only a material or sensuous meaning, and this fact, on which\nidealists and materialists are agreed, is confirmed by comparative\nphilologists. All primitive roots express directly only those acts\nand those conditions which come under the domain of the senses; all\nexpress the consciousness of repeated acts familiar to the members of\na society in its infancy, such as pounding, striking, weaving, tying,\nburning, rubbing, moving, cutting, sharpening, softening. By means of\ngeneralisation and specialisation, the roots have acquired the most\nabstract terms of our advanced society; thus the root to burn developed\ninto the thought of to love, and also to be ashamed; to dig, came\nto mean to search for, to enquire; the root which means to gather,\nexpressed in primitive logic what we now call observation of facts;\nthe connection of major and minor, or even syllogism. This is without\ndoubt, and it is as certain that the words rake and pinchers came from\nthe verbs to rake and to pinch.\n\nTo make the assertion of Locke the more striking, Noir\u00e9 adds: \u201cWhen\nthe representative words springing from one root are found side by\nside, it is always the more ancient of the two which expresses the\nmore material act. The verbs to tear and to cut are the offshoots of\na single root; but the passage from the concept of tearing to that of\ncutting would be slowly effected; the act of tearing was immediate with\nman, cutting was a mediate act, and of later date, since it could not\nbe done whilst the instrument was lacking.\u201d\n\nI shall now bridge over the distance between the primordial roots,\nand the organised language as we possess it, in order to show how\nour ancestors succeeded in forming real phrases, that is to say,\nintelligible propositions; this will show us the continuous thread\nwhich connects our present language with primitive speech.\n\nWe can show that both dictionary and grammar are made up of predicative\nroots and demonstrative elements. By the help of the first we make\naffirmations concerning things, derived from our knowledge of another\nobject or of many, either in combination under one name, or taking each\nseparately. With the demonstrative element we point to any object in\nspace or time, by using such words as this, that, then, here, there;\nnear, far, above, below, and others of the same kind, whose existence\nmay be explained as a survival of the gesticulating phase in which\nobjects were neither conceived nor described but pointed out; from this\nwe are not to infer that gestures--even accompanied by sounds--gave\nbirth to speech, since they rather excluded it. In their primitive\nform and intention, these demonstrative elements are addressed to\nthe senses rather than to the intellect. They have in themselves no\nmeaning, and to be of service they must be attached to words that\nhave. The history of the root _Khan_, to dig, will explain my thought.\nWhen our Aryan ancestors had learnt to say _Khan_, and they wanted\nto distinguish between those who were digging and the instruments\nused in digging, between the object of the digging and the time and\nplace of the work, it is possible that these demonstrative suffixes,\ncombined with predicative roots, formed bases, such as _Khan-ana_,\n_Khan-i_, _Khan-a_, _Khan-itra_, and still others, which were intended\nprobably for digging-here, digging-now, dig-we, dig-you. By means of\nthese combinations, which varied in their application according to\nthe customs of different villages and families, the speaker sought\nto distinguish between the subject acting and the object acted upon;\nand when this difficulty was surmounted, a great step had been taken,\nthe passage from perception to conception was accomplished, and this\npassage no philosopher prior to Noir\u00e9 had made clear. \u201cWe must always\nbear in mind that we are speaking here of times, so far beyond the\nreach of history, and of intellectual processes so widely removed from\nour own, that none would venture to speak dogmatically on what was\nactually passing in the minds of the early framers of language when\nthey first uttered these words.\u201d[41] All we can do is to hazard an\nexplanation, and accept it in as far as it seems reasonable; and in the\ninterest of science, we must carefully guard ourselves from asserting\nthat our theory is the only true one. It is easy to conceive that\nafter centuries of constant use certain derivatives should have become\nunalterably attached to certain meanings, and others should have also\nretained their special meanings. But what we do not know, is how the\nsounds destined to become demonstrative elements or personal pronouns\nwere restricted to the terms required for such words, as--here, there,\nthose, he, I, that, etc. There were cases in which a verb in the\ninfinitive would develop into a phrase without any additions being\nmade to it; it would suffice, for instance, if a man uttered the\nword _Khan_ in a commanding voice--as we should say \u201cwork\u201d--for his\nfellow-labourers to understand that they were to begin to dig. Thus the\nimperative could be considered a complete sentence with as much justice\nas Veni-Vedi-Vici would be termed independent and complete sentences.\n\u201cThe shortest sentence of all is, no doubt, the imperative, and it is\nin the imperative that almost to the present day roots retain their\nsimplest form.\u201d[42]\n\nOur intellects in the present day are developed by the discourses we\nhear, the books we read, the reflections suggested by our experiences\nof life; our vocabularies become enriched as our knowledge increases\nand embraces a greater number of subjects; and if we retrace the path\ntaking us to our ancestors who could not count beyond four sometimes,\nwe should find words and ideas becoming fewer and conspicuous by their\nabsence. It does not therefore follow that because we use language\nthat we made it. It is not our invention; to us every language is\ntraditional. \u201cThe words in which we think are channels of thought\nwhich we have not dug ourselves, but which we found ready made for\nus. The work of making language belongs to a period in the history of\nmankind beyond the reach of the ordinary historian, and of which we\nin our advanced state of mental development can hardly form a clear\nconception.\u201d Yet that time must have been a fact not less possible of\nverification than that geological period when \u201cthe earth was absorbed\nin producing the carboniferous vegetation which still supplies us with\nthe means of warmth, light, and life, accumulating during enormous\nperiods of time small deposits of organic matter forming the strata of\nthe globe on which we live. In the same manner the human mind formed\nthat linguistic vegetation, the produce of which still supplies the\nstores of our grammars and dictionaries\u201d; and after a close examination\nof these primordial roots whence our language has sprung, we find that\nit does not consist in a conglomeration of words, the result of an\nagreement amongst a certain number of men, or the result of chance, but\nexpresses human activity by means of verbs, the living and vivifying\nportion of speech by the side of which the remainder may almost be\nconsidered as dead matter.\n\nThe question of the birth of the substantive, without being\ndeliberately posed as a problem, occupied the minds of the Grecian\nphilosophers, and was involved in their researches concerning the\nrelation of an object to the name it bears, of the unknown cause by\nwhich a certain name designates a certain object and no other. Whilst\nthe Greeks speculated on the subject after a tentative manner, building\nup theories which later observations were not long in upsetting, the\nHindoos were also engaged in efforts to solve the problem by the help\nof a more reliable process--the historical.\n\nThe early grammarians, having found that words came from roots\nexpressing general concepts, and that these concepts represented some\nsort of activity, made this fact the basis of their studies; profound\nthinkers as they were they discovered that man at first could not give\na name to a tree, an animal, a star, a river, nor to any other object\nwithout discovering first some special quality that seemed at the time\nmost characteristic of the object to be named. Sanscrit has a root\n_As_, having amongst other meanings sharpness, quickness; from the\nsame root came words for needle, point, sharpness of sight, quickness\nof thought; this root is found in the Sanscrit name for a horse, which\nis _asva_, runner or racer, one who leaves space quickly behind him.\nMany other names might have been given to the horse besides the one\nhere mentioned, but all must recall some characteristic trait of this\nanimal; that name, _the quick_, could also have been given to other\nanimals, but having been repeatedly applied to one, it became unfit\nfor other purposes, and the horse retains undisputed possession. The\nSanscrit _aksha_, eye, comes from the same root as, which also meant to\npoint, to pierce. Another name for eye in Sanscrit is _netram_, leader,\nfrom _n\u00ee_, to lead.\n\nNoir\u00e9 has just put forth an ingenious theory, that the first\nsubstantives would not be miller, digger, weaver, carpenter; but flour,\ncave, pit, mat, hedge, club, arrow, boat, because these were what had\nbeen thought and willed, whilst the agents, of no account from that\npoint of view, remained in the shade, forgotten, and it is possible\nthat for some time no names were given to them.\n\n\u201cWhen we have once seen that thought in its true sense is always\nconceptual, taking a verbal form, and that every word is derived from a\nconceptual root, we shall be ready for the assertion that words being\nconceptual can never stand for a single percept.\u201d--MAX M\u00dcLLER.\n\nLocke first insisted that names are not the signs of things themselves,\nbut always the signs of our concepts of them. This remark received\nsmall attention at first, and remained little appreciated until such\ntime as the discoveries of our contemporaries, with no preconcerted\nunanimity, confirmed its value. Max M\u00fcller explains Locke\u2019s words\nin the following manner: \u201cEach time that we use a general name, if\nwe say dog, tree, chair, we have not these objects before our eyes,\nonly our concepts of them; there can be nothing in the world of sense\ncorresponding even to such simple words as dog, tree, chair. We can\nnever expect to see a dog, a tree, a chair. Dog means every kind of dog\nfrom the greyhound to the spaniel; tree, every kind of tree from the\noak to the cherry; chair, every kind of chair from the royal throne to\nthe artisan\u2019s stool. We may see a spaniel or a Newfoundland dog; we may\nsee a fir or an apple tree; we may see such and such a chair. People\noften imagine that they can form a general image of a dog by leaving\nout what is peculiar to every individual dog.\u201d[43]\n\nThis general idea we have in our mind of which we can talk, but our\neyes cannot see it as they could a real object. Nothing that we name,\nnothing that we find in our dictionary can ever be heard, or seen, or\nfelt. \u201cWe can even have names for things which never existed, such as\ngnomes; also for things which exist no more, or which exist not yet,\nsuch as the grapes of the last harvest, and those of the next. The mere\nfact that I call a thing past or future ought to be sufficient to show\nthat it is my concept of which I am speaking, and not the thing as\nindependent of me.\u201d[44]\n\nBerkeley showed that it is simply impossible for any human being to\nmake to himself a general image of a triangle, for such an image would\nhave to be at the same time right-angled, obtuse-angled, acute-angled,\nand other kinds also; such an object does not exist; whereas it is\nperfectly possible to have an image of any single triangle; to name\nsome characteristic features common to all triangles, and thus to\nform a name and at the same time a concept of a triangle.[45] This\nmental process which Berkeley described so well as applied to modern\nconcepts we can adopt with regard to all, even the most primitive.\nMan, in entering a forest, discovered in the trees something that was\ninteresting to him. For practical purposes trees were particularly\ninteresting to the primitive framers of language, because they could be\nsplit in two, three, or four pieces, cut, shaped according to the size\nof the piece into blocks, planks, boats, and shafts; any object for\nwhich the necessity had made itself felt. Hence, from a root _dar_, to\ntear, our Aryan ancestors called trees _dru_, or _d\u00e2ru_, literally what\ncan be torn, or split, or cut; from the same root the Greeks called the\nskin of an animal _d\u00e9rma_, because it was torn off, and a sack _d\u00f3ros_\n(in Sanscrit _driti_), because it was made of leather, and a spear\n_d\u00f3ry_, because it came from a tree, and was cut and shaped and planed.\n\nSuch words being once given would produce many offshoots; the Celts\nof Gaul and of Ireland called their priests _Druids_, literally the\nmen of oak-groves. The Greeks called the spirits of the forest trees\n_Dryades_; and the Hindoos called a man of wood, or a man with a\nwooden, or, as we say, flinty heart, _d\u00e2runa_, cruel.\n\nThe immense number of intelligible roots gave birth to many new images,\nthese roots crossed and recrossed, for the concepts of to go, to give,\nto move, to make, would be the foundations of others, in some ways\ndiffering; one idea or thought in its flight would meet others perhaps\nof a conflicting nature, thoughts and words would equally undergo\nincessant modifications, which fact explains why in these earlier\nstages of language the members of a community soon ceased to understand\neach other if separated but for a short period of time.\n\nOvid, in speaking of the chaos at the beginning of the world, makes\na picture which would equally well describe the birth of language.\n\u201cMatter was in an unformed mass ... the sky, the earth, the sea had all\none aspect; there where was the earth, was also the sea, and the sky\nwas there also.\u201d\n\nThe extraordinary destinies of the roots I have named constitutes a\nshort chapter only, in the birth and development of tongues; but short\nas it is, it suffices to give us an idea of the elastic nature of\nthese roots, their faculty of extension, and the part they play in the\neconomy of language, and in the administration of the affairs of the\nhuman mind.\n\nEvery mental phenomenon has its history, which can only be discovered\nby tracing it to its source; and as speech has undergone many phases,\nof which the earlier must have been very different from those now in\nexistence, it is pardonable in the greatest philosophers of antiquity\nnot to have known the intricacies of the human mind, which this\nchangeable speech could alone interpret. The ancients knew their\nown times, but were ignorant of the preceding ones, in the same way\nthey knew their own language only, and of this language only its\ncontemporary form; and in the case of a word whose meaning was lost or\nof a foreign word, they sought its origin in an idiom with which they\nwere familiar; in other words, not where it could be found.\n\nFor a long time man only knew one kind of being, his own; and possessed\none language only, that which expressed his own acts and his own\nstates; the primitive men were sufficiently advanced to say: \u201clet us\ndig,\u201d \u201cgrind,\u201d \u201cthey weave\u201d; but if, at the beginning, concepts and\nspeech arose from the consciousness of their own activity, how was the\nadvance made when men desired to speak of the external objects of the\nworld which they saw around them, and were conscious of not having\nmade, and which consequently remained outside the sphere of their wills\nand of their experience? It is clear that these outward objects to be\ngrasped and named, must have their part in the human activities for\nwhich names had already been found. When he saw the lightning tearing\na hole in the field, or splitting the trunk of a tree, man could no\nlonger say, \u201c_We_ have dug this hole, _you_ have split the tree.\u201d It\nwas no longer _someone_, but _something_ that had dug and struck.\nNothing seems more simple to us than after saying \u201c_I dig_\u201d to say\nalso \u201c_it digs_,\u201d and yet it was a passing to a new world of thought,\nfrom the conscious feeling of our own activity to the intuition of the\nactivity of an outward object; this mental act, though inevitable,\nwas by no means an easy one; men realised that the world around was a\nreflex of themselves, the only light was the light from within. If men\ncould measure, so could the moon; hence he was called the measurer of\nthe sky, from the root _M\u00e2_, to measure; the moon was called _M\u00e2s_,\nthat which measures, its actual name in Sanscrit; in Latin, _mensis_;\nin Greek, _m\u00ean\u00e9_; English, _moon_; German, _Monat_; in Russian,\n_mi\u00e9sets_. Men who ran called themselves runners; also the rivers\nthey named _sar_, running; and to designate the position of the river\nthey added the suffix _it_, _sar-it_; literally, running here. Thus\n_sarit_ is river in Sanscrit; _M\u00e2s_ and _sarit_ thus become complete,\nintelligible sentences. What we call lightning was originally, tearing,\ndigging, bursting, sparkling; what we call storm and tempest were,\ngrinding, smashing, bursting, blowing; if man could smash, so could the\nthunderbolt, hence it was called the smasher; and tempest and storm and\nthunderbolt may have been, smashing, grinding, hurling; and with the\naddition of the suffix, smashing here, now, there, then.\n\nWe have seen that the attribute which was the peculiar characteristic\nof an object supplied its name, but as most objects possessed more\nthan one attribute, more than one designation were given to it; thus\nseveral names were used for river besides _sarit_, each representing\none of its aspects; when flowing in a straight line it was called\n_s\u00eer\u00e2_, arrow, plough, plougher; if it seemed to nourish the fields\nit was _m\u00e2tar_, mother; if it separated or protected one country from\nanother, it became _sindhu_, the defender, from _sidh_ or _sedhati_,\nto keep off; if it became a torrent it received the name of _nadi_,\nnoisy. In all these forms the river is considered as acting, and is\nnamed by roots expressing action; it nourishes, it traces a furrow, it\nguards, it roars as a wild beast roars. The sun has many attributes;\nhe is brilliant, the warmer, the generator, the scorcher, he is\nvivifying, overpowering, his many qualities giving him fifty different\nnames, all synonyms of the sun. The earth also had many, it was known\nby twenty-one names, amongst others it was _urv\u00ee_, wide; _jurithv\u00ee_,\nbroad; _mah\u00ee_, great; but each characteristic trait of the earth could\nalso be found in other objects, thus _uriv\u00ee_ also meant a river; sky\nand dawn were called _prithv\u00ee_; and _mah\u00ee_ (great, strong) is used for\ncow and speech. Hence earth, river, sky, dawn, cow, and speech would\nbecome homonyms.\n\nThese names are of clearly defined objects, all recognisable by the\nsenses; this fact entitles us to apply the following definition to this\nprimitive stage of language; the conscious expression of impressions\nperceived by the senses.\n\nBut there is another class of words differing somewhat from those\nwe have named, such words, as day, night, spring, winter, dawn and\ntwilight; these lack the individuality and tangibleness of the others;\nand when we say \u201cday approaches, night comes,\u201d we attribute acts to\nthings which are not agents, we affirm propositions, which, logically\nanalysed, have no properly defined subjects. Semi-tangible names, such\nas sky, earth, belong to the same category. When we say \u201cthe earth\nnourishes man,\u201d we do not allude to any well defined portion of the\nsoil, we take the earth as a whole; and the sky is not only the small\nportion of the horizon grasped by our eyes, our imagination conceives\nobjects not within the ken of our senses, but inasmuch as we look upon\nthe earth or sky as a whole, see in it a power or an ideal, we make\nof it, involuntarily, an individuality. Now these words had certain\nterminations affixed to them indicating what we call gender, and\nbecame masculine or feminine, the neuter gender at that time did not\nenter into the language, until thought becoming more lucid perceived\nit in nature. What was the result? That it was impossible to speak of\nmorning or night, of spring or winter, of dawn or twilight, of sky\nand earth, without clothing them not only with active and individual\ncharacteristics, but with personal and sexual attributes; hence all\nthe objects of discourse as used by the founders of language became\nnecessarily so many actors, as men and women act; and thought, when\nonce launched in this direction, being irresistibly attracted by the\ntendency towards analogy and metaphor, overspread the whole world\nof human experience with this method of representation. What is\ncalled animism, anthropomorphism, and personification, have therefore\ntheir source in this inevitable dynamic stage, as Max M\u00fcller calls\nit, of thought and language, in which the psychological necessity of\nrepresenting the external objects as resembling themselves operated on\nour ancestors. This necessity might have been named subjectivism had\nit not received more specific terms such as _animism_, which consists\nin conceiving of inanimate objects as animate; _anthropomorphism_,\nconceiving objects as men, and _personification_, conceiving objects\nas persons. As soon as this new mental act was performed, a new world\nwas called into existence, a world of names, or as we now call it, the\nworld of myths.\n\n\u201cSo long as the real identity of thought and language had not been\ngrasped, so long as people imagined that language is one thing and\nthought another, it was but natural that they should fail to see the\nreal meaning of treating mythology, if not as a disease, at all events\nas an inevitable affection of language. If the active verb was merely\na grammatical, and not at the same time a psychological, nay, an\nhistorical fact, it might seem absurd to identify the active meaning of\nour roots with the active meaning ascribed to the phenomena of nature.\nBut let it be once perceived that language and thought are one and\nindivisible, and nothing will seem more natural than that what, as the\ngrammarian tells us, happened in language, should, as the psychologist\ntells us, have likewise happened in thought.\u201d[46]\n\nThe men who spoke in this manner of the external phenomena understood\nperfectly that they themselves, who struck, who measured, who ran, who\nrose up, who lay down, were not to be confounded with the thunder,\nthe moon, the river, and the sun; those scholars who studied thought\nas apart from language, rather allowed themselves selves to be misled\nby the phraseology of the time, and considered it a proof that our\nAryan ancestors looked upon their physical surroundings as human\nbeings, endowed with the appropriate organs and acts. Not only had the\nearly Aryans perfectly understood that they were not identical with\nthemselves, but they were far more struck by the differences between\nthem than by any imaginary similarities. The confirmation of this\ntheory is preserved for us in the Veda. \u201cThe torrent is roaring--not\na bull,\u201d _i.e._ like a bull; instead of saying as we do, \u201cfirm as\na rock,\u201d the poets of the Veda would say \u201cfirm--not a rock.\u201d \u201cThe\nmountains were _not_ to be thrown down, but they were _not_ warriors,\u201d\n\u201cThe fire was eating up the forest, yet it was _not_ a lion.\u201d\n\nThe men of that time used few words; all thoughts that went beyond the\nnarrow horizon of their daily and practical lives had to be expressed\nby the transference of a name from the object to which it properly\nbelongs to other well known objects. It was the birth of metaphor; it\nwas metaphor that enabled the inner consciousness to project itself\ninto the outer chaos of the world of objects; which it recreated with\npersonal images; and the fact that each natural phenomenon bore many\nnames, and that these same names were used for many other different\nobjects furnished germs of metaphor. Metaphor was to language what rain\nand sunshine are to the harvest, it multiplies each grain a hundred and\na thousand fold; and metaphor in multiplying language disperses it in\nevery direction; without it no language would have progressed beyond\nthe simplest rudiments.\n\nWe must be careful not to confuse the radical metaphor with the\npoetical which we use daily, and which is very different from the\nformer. If we open any book of poetry at whatever page, we shall find\ninanimate and mute objects described as speaking, rejoicing, praising\ntheir Creator; there is no portion of nature however insentient,\nhowever incapable of thought, in which we do not infuse our own\nsentiments, our own ideas. This mode of expression is especially a\npoet\u2019s prerogative, and that it does not strike us as incongruous is\nowing to the fact that poetry appeals to the generality of men, and\nis more natural to them than prose, and that this outpouring of our\nheart towards nature costs us less effort than to speak of it in the\nabstract. It requires cold reflection to describe lightning as an\nelectrical discharge, and rain as condensed vapour; in this case it is\nno longer the transference of the characteristic of a known object to\none still unknown, but that of a known object to another equally well\nknown; the poet who transfers the word tear to the dew has already\nclear names and concepts both for tear and dew; the poetical metaphor\nis thus a voluntary creative act of our mind, and as such takes no part\nin the formation of the human mind.\n\nThe world was astonished some few years ago by a declaration made by\nstudents of the science of language that the 250,000 words comprehended\nin the English Dictionary now being published at Oxford all proceeded\nfrom about 800 roots; and it has now been found possible to reduce\nthis number. In any case 500 to 800 Sanscrit roots, on account of\ntheir great fertility, sufficed our Aryan ancestors for all the many\nwords occurring in Sanscrit literature, and suffice also for us who\nhave 245,000 living animals and 95,000 fossil specimens to name; also\n100,000 living and 2500 fossil plants, without speaking of crystals,\nmetals and minerals. Another surprising discovery is that every thought\nthat has ever passed through a human brain can be expressed in 121\nradical concepts, of which I give a list. It is taken from Max M\u00fcller\u2019s\n_Science of Thought_, p. 404. Each single word of every phrase that\nwe use has its origin in one of the 800 roots, and not a thought but\nproceeds from the 121 fundamental concepts. This is as accepted a fact\nas that all that is visible on the earth and in the vault of heaven is\ncomposed of about 60 elementary substances.\n\n\nTHE 121 ORIGINAL CONCEPTS.\n\n 1. Dig.\n 2. Plait, weave, sew, bind.\n 3. Crush, pound, destroy, waste, rub, smoothe.\n 4. Sharpen.\n 5. Smear, colour, knead, harden.\n 6. Scratch.\n 7. Bite, eat.\n 8. Divide, share, eat.\n 9. Cut.\n 10. Gather, observe.\n 11. Stretch, spread.\n 12. Mix.\n 13. Scatter, strew.\n 14. Sprinkle, drip, wet.\n 15_a_. Shake, tremble, quiver, flicker.\n 15_b_. Shake mentally, be angry, abashed, fearful, etc.\n 16. Throw down, fall.\n 17. Fall to pieces.\n 18. Shoot, throw at.\n 19. Pierce, split.\n 20. Join, fight, check.\n 21. Tear.\n 22. Break, smash.\n 23. Measure.\n 24. Blow.\n 25. Kindle.\n 26. Milk, yield.\n 27. Pour, flow, rush.\n 28. Separate, free, leave, lack.\n 29. Glean.\n 30. Choose.\n 31. Cook, roast, boil.\n 32. Clean.\n 33. Wash.\n 34. Bend, bow.\n 35. Turn, roll.\n 36. Press, fix.\n 37. Squeeze.\n 38. Drive, thrust.\n 39. Push, stir, live.\n 40. Burst, gush, laugh, beam.\n 41. Dress.\n 42. Adorn.\n 43. Strip, remove.\n 44. Steal.\n 45. Check.\n 46. Fill, thrive, swell, grow strong.\n 47. Cross.\n 48. Sweeten.\n 49. Shorten.\n 50. Thin, suffer.\n 51. Fat, stick, love.\n 52. Lick.\n 53. Suck, nourish.\n 54. Drink, swell.\n 55. Swallow, sip.\n 56. Vomit.\n 57. Chew, eat.\n 58. Open, extend.\n 59. Reach, strive, rule, have.\n 60. Conquer, take by violence, struggle.\n 61. Perform, succeed.\n 62. Attack, hurt.\n 63. Hide, dive.\n 64. Cover, embrace.\n 65. Bear, carry.\n 66. Can, be strong.\n 67. Show.\n 68. Touch.\n 69. Strike.\n 70. Ask.\n 71. Watch, observe.\n 72. Lead.\n 73. Set.\n 74. Hold, wield.\n 75. Give, yield.\n 76. Couch.\n 77. Thirst, dry.\n 78. Hunger.\n 79. Yawn.\n 80. Spue.\n 81. Fly.\n 82. Sleep.\n 83. Bristle, dare.\n 84. Be angry, harsh.\n 85. Breathe.\n 86. Speak.\n 87. See.\n 88. Hear.\n 89. Smell, sniff.\n 90. Sweat.\n 91. Seethe, boil.\n 92. Dance.\n 93. Leap.\n 94. Creep.\n 95. Stumble.\n 96. Stick.\n 97. Burn.\n 98. Dwell.\n 99. Stand.\n 100. Sink, lie, fail.\n 101. Swing.\n 102. Hang down, lean.\n 103. Rise up, grow.\n 104. Sit.\n 105. Toil.\n 106. Weary, waste, slacken.\n 107. Rejoice, please.\n 108. Desire, love.\n 109. Wake.\n 110. Fear.\n 111. Cool, refresh.\n 112. Stink.\n 113. Hate.\n 114. Know.\n 115. Think.\n 116. Shine.\n 117. Run.\n 118. Move, go.\n 119_a_. Noise, inarticulate.\n 119_b_. Noise, musical.\n 120. Do.\n 121. Be.\n\nThis classification of the roots is purely tentative. It has been\ndifficult to ascertain what is most likely to have been the original\nmeaning of some; there are certain words of which it is almost\nimpossible to find the etymology. The order in which the concepts\nsucceed each other is not very systematic. Max M\u00fcller tried to classify\nthem more correctly by keeping the special acts, such as to dig,\nthe general acts, such as to find, the special states, such as to\ncough, and the general states, such as to stand--together. But it was\nimpossible to adhere strictly to such a plan, because there are roots\nwhich express both acts and states; while in many cases it is difficult\nto determine whether the special or general meaning predominates; thus\nthere are the words to boil, to make boil, or to be boiling. Some of\nthe roots have closely allied meanings, so that there are as many as\nfifteen connected with the concepts to burn, and to speak; and many\nmore which can be traced to shine.\n\nWe experience feelings at once humbling and elevating when we consider\nthat all we admire, all on which we pride ourselves, our thoughts,\nwhether poetical, philosophical, religious, our whole literature, all\nour dictionaries, whether scientific or industrial; in fact, our whole\nintellectual life is built upon this small number of mother-ideas,\nof 121 concepts. We should feel neither humbled nor elevated; we are\nmaking use of the wisdom of our ancestors. It is our duty to transmit\nthe legacy to our descendants which they gave us, but purged from alloy.\n\nThree chief points are to be noted, when we are concerned with the\nprogress of the intellect:--\n\n1. The creative activity of humanity is the basis of all the roots of\nwords.\n\n2. The source of all abstract ideas lies in acts which are entirely\nmaterial.\n\n3. It has been satisfactorily proved that we speak the language derived\nfrom that spoken by our primitive ancestors. It was the custom of\nNebuchadnezzar to have his name stamped on every brick that was used\nduring his reign in erecting his colossal palaces. Those palaces fell\nto ruins, but from the ruins the ancient materials were carried away\nfor building new cities; and on examining the bricks in the walls of\nthe modern city of Bagdad, travellers have discovered on every one the\nclear traces of that royal signature. Our modern languages were built\nup with the materials taken from the ruins of the ancient languages,\nand every word that we pronounce displays the royal stamp impressed\nupon it by the founders. The formation of those derived languages,\nby means of the roots with their successive change of meaning, the\nconstruction of their grammatical forms, the continued changes amongst\nthe different dialects, all indicate the presence of a germ in man\ntending from the first to make him a reasoning being.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[38] Max M\u00fcller\u2019s _Science of Thought_, p. 300.\n\n[39] _Science of Thought_, p. 219.\n\n[40] Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Thought_, p. 303.\n\n[41] Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Thought_, p. 223.\n\n[42] Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Thought_, p. 421.\n\n[43] _Science of Thought_, pp. 77, 78. _Natural Religion_, p. 381.\n\n[44] _Science of Thought_, p. 79.\n\n[45] _Natural Religion_, p. 382.\n\n[46] Max M\u00fcller, _Natural Religion_, p. 406.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI ANCIENT LANGUAGE\n\n\nLanguage may be divided into three distinct periods, when taken as a\nwhole.\n\nThe first is, when language, finding itself released from those\nrestraints which enveloped it in its cradle, supplies those words which\nare most indispensable to man in connecting the one word with others,\nsuch as pronouns, prepositions, names of numbers, and of objects of\ndaily use. This must have been the first stage of a language hardly\nyet agglutinate, free from trammels, with no sign of nationality, or\nindividuality, but containing in itself all the chief features of the\nmany forms belonging to the Turanian, Aryan and Semitic families; the\nexplorer of philosophic antiquity does not penetrate beyond this first\nperiod.\n\nThe second phase is that in which two linguistic families passing out\nof the agglutinate stage, unattached as yet to grammatical forms,\nreceived once for all the stamp of the formation which we find amongst\nthe popular and modern dialects belonging both to the Semitic and\nAryan divisions, and to which they owe this family resemblance,\nwhich justifies their inclusion in one or other of these branches\nof language; on the one side the Teutonic, Celtic, Slav, Italic,\nHellenic, Iranian and Indian; on the other Arabic, Armenian and Hebrew;\nthe yet unformed elements of grammar were eventually introduced\ninto these languages at the substitution of the amalgamate for the\nagglutinate. The Turanian or Ural-Altaic languages have an entirely\ndifferent character; they preserved for some time--and one or two\nstill retain--the agglutinate form which retards the development of\nthe grammar, and hides the evidence of relationship to the languages\nbetween China and the Pyrenees, and between Cape Comorin and Lapland.\n\nThese two periods are followed by a third, generally known as the\nmythological; it is obscure, and is calculated to shake one\u2019s faith\nin the regular and orderly progress of human reason. We find it to be\na phase through which all peoples have passed; yet in using the word\nmythology our thoughts naturally turn to the mythology of Greece, the\nonly one with which we were made acquainted in our school days, and\nalso the only one with which those were familiar who had not given\nthemselves over specially to the study of the beliefs of antiquity. In\nthe schools this study ran side by side with history; from our earliest\ndays we had been taught the complete polytheism of heathen divinities;\nour work as pupils was to know our lessons, the work of the masters\nwas to see that we learnt them. Mythology, therefore, was to us only\none chapter in that great work, entitled the compulsory course of\nstudies--a chapter which apparently required no more elucidation than\nthe gymnastic lesson.\n\nOur masters represented the Greeks as a people endowed with a vivid\nimagination, who recounted in exalted pure language most fantastic\nstories; we read in these authors: \u201cEos has fled--Eos will return--Eos\nhas returned--Eos wakens the sleepers--Eos lengthens the life of\nmortals--Eos rises from the sea--Eos is the daughter of the sky--Eos\nis followed by the sun--Eos is loved by the sun--Eos is killed by the\nsun,\u201d and so on _ad infinitum_; and we were told, \u201cThese are myths.\u201d As\nno explanation was given of the word myth, we were none the wiser.\n\nIf the movements of Eos are inexplicable, they are not without a\ncertain picturesqueness. But what shall we say of the myth concerning\nSaturn, who, on account of a prediction that he would be killed by his\nchildren, swallowed them as soon as they were born, with the exception\nof Jupiter, who was saved by the substitution of a stone, which Saturn\nafterwards brought up with the children he had swallowed. Or again,\nwhat can be said of the feast offered to the gods by Tantalus to test\ntheir omniscience; he caused the members of the body of his son Pelops\nto be mixed with other meats; a shoulder was eaten before Jupiter\ndiscovered the deception; he ordered the remainder to be thrown into\na copper from which Pelops emerged alive with one shoulder lacking,\nand one made of ivory was given to him. Can anything more grotesque be\nimagined? And our children are subjected to this regimen, and their\nmemories charged with these fables, under the pretext that they will\nthe better appreciate the _chefs-d\u2019\u0153uvre_ of classical literature.\n\nThe enigmatical part of this period of language will be more evident\nif we examine the early traditional history which began at its close,\nand at which time a light appeared in Greece destined to flood the\nworld with a splendour hitherto unknown; it was the epoch which\nproduced Thales, Pythagoras and Heraclitus, who, in the midst of much\nignorance, had thoughts of wonderful lucidity. A national literature\nwas beginning, where we find indications of the germs of political\nsocieties; the creation of laws, and the development of morals. And we\nask ourselves: Whence come these sages? Who were their masters? How\ncould these glorious days of Greek civilisation have been preceded\nby several generations whose principal occupation seemed to consist\nin inventing and repeating to satiety absurd fables concerning gods,\nheroes, and other beings whom no human being had ever seen; which\nfables contravene the simplest principles of logic, morality and\nreligion? The ancient sages themselves were harsh in their judgment of\nthese revolting stories contained in Grecian mythology; Xenophanes, a\ncontemporary of Pythagoras, considered Hesiod and Homer responsible\nfor these superstitions, and blamed them for attributing to the gods\nall that was most reprehensible in man. Heraclitus was of opinion\nthat Homer deserved to be banished from the public assemblies, and\nPlato wrote, \u201cMothers and nurses tell their children stories full of\nmisstatements and immoralities which are gathered from the poets.\u201d\n\nThus spoke philosophers 500 years before our era, because they knew\nthat if the \u201cgods commit anything that is evil they are no gods.\u201d\n\n\u201cTaken by themselves and in their literal meaning, most of these\nancient myths are absurd and irrational, and frequently opposed to\nthe principles of thought, religion, and morality which guided the\nGreeks as soon as they appear to us in the twilight of traditional\nhistory.\u201d[47]\n\nMany explanations have been sought to account in a rational manner for\nthese strange tales; writers have striven to discover what can have\ngiven rise to such ridiculous inventions; some have asserted that it\nwas the intention of the authors of mythology to convey to the people a\nknowledge of certain facts of nature, and certain moral truths whilst\nclothing them in allegorical form, and by endowing the divinities with\ncertain virtues which it would become men to imitate and acquire; and\nthat the worship of these divinities was instituted that man might be\nmore fully impressed, that the likeness of the virtues upheld might\nbe more deeply engraved in the heart of the pious worshipper. Zeus,\nwas mind; Athene, art; Hercules, energy and perseverance in labours of\ngreat difficulty; whilst the Homeric heroes, Agamemnon, Achilles, and\nHector represented physical activities. According to another theory the\nobject with which the myths were composed was political, the laws of\ngovernment were supposed to emanate from the gods; and whoso refused\nto recognise the excellence of the institutions of the country was\nheld to be in revolt against the gods themselves. The philosopher\nEuhemerus was the author of a third theory, called the historical; he\nrepresented the mythological personages not as gods, but as kings,\nheroes, and philosophers, who, after their death, had received divine\nhonours among their fellow men; in this system Eolus, the god of the\nwinds, became a skilful mariner who could foretell atmospheric changes;\nAtlas, supporting the sky and earth on his wide shoulders, had been\nformerly a great astronomer; Jupiter, a ruler of Crete; Hercules, a\nknight-errant. Although these ancient writers interpreted the fables\nin so many different ways, they all agreed in denying that an atom of\ntruth is found in these stories concerning the gods, and they insisted\nthat no myth must be taken _au pied de la lettre_. At a later period\nit was thought that reminiscences of a barbaric age could be found in\nwhich the ancestors of the Greeks apparently occupied themselves by\nstealing, killing, deceiving, and eating their offspring. \u201cLactantius,\nSt Augustine, and the first missionaries, in their attacks on the\nreligious belief of the Greeks, and Romans availed themselves of\nthese arguments of Euhemerus, and taunted them with worshipping gods\nthat were no gods, but known and admitted to have been merely deified\nmortals.\u201d[48] In later times the same theory was revived; certain\ntheologians, rather lacking in penetration, looked to Greek mythology\nfor traces of sacred personages, they imagined that they could\nrecognise in Saturn and his three sons, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto,\nthe features of Noah and his sons, Ham, Japhet, and Shem; and in a\nrecently published book the author suggests that when Hesiod describes\nthe garden of the Hesperides, we have a tradition of the garden of Eden.\n\nThus from the moment when, for the first time, the ancient philosophers\nquestioned \u201cwhy?\u201d from the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, to\nour own practical and matter-of-fact century, mythology has not ceased\nto compel attention, and to furnish endless matter of conjecture.\nLearned writers have sought in physical sciences, history, and\nmetaphysics, an explanation of this phenomenon; but in spite of this\nvast labour inspired by a love of science, and carried on for more\nthan two thousand years, the secret of the sphinx of mythology remains\nundisclosed, and we still ask, \u201cwhat is mythology?\u201d Is it an invention\nof Homer and Hesiod? Or is it a phase in the development of the human\nmind, a deviation in the growth of reason?\n\nThe school of philology has a solution of its own to offer; will it be\nas futile as the others? After hearing it shall we still say the Sphinx\nis mute? This school takes upon itself to assert that the explanation\nof the mystery can only be found in the Science of Language. It is a\nfact that the history of language--which is the history of the human\nmind--enables us to answer the preceding questions categorically.\nYes. Mythology was inevitable, an inherent part of language itself,\nto be considered, not as a simple external symbol, but as the only\nincorporation of thought possible. Mythology, in the widest acceptation\nof the term, is the shadow which language casts on thought; and\nthe whole history of philosophy from Thales to Hegel has been one\nuninterrupted struggle with mythology, a constant protest between\nthought and language.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[47] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 11. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n[48] Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Language_, vol. ii. p. 436.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII MYTHS\n\n\nIn order to appreciate truly our neighbour\u2019s impressions and points of\nview, we must constantly detach ourselves from our own special way of\nseeing and feeling; this habit of abstraction--which is most difficult\nto every one--is indispensable when we are endeavouring to understand\nthe natures of persons who lived many thousands of years ago, and who\nthought and spoke in a totally different manner from ourselves.\n\nIn seeking to grasp the phraseology of myths we perceive that its\nchief elements consist in a repetition of phrases in which the acts of\nnature are used as embodiments of the idea, under the figures of day\nand night, dawn and twilight, the sun and the moon, the heavens and the\nearth, as they stand in relation to man.\n\nWhen we in the present century speak of the last hours of the\nday, we use precise and exact terms; we say, \u201cIt is late; the sun\nis setting; the moon rises; it is night.\u201d Our ancestors also had\noccasion to mention these same hours, but as they did not speak of\nthe facts of nature without investing them with some of their own\npersonality, they preferred to say, \u201cDawn flies before the sun.\u201d \u201cThe\nsun loves--pursues--embraces the dawn.\u201d \u201cShe dies in the arms of the\nsun.\u201d They spoke of the sun growing old--decaying--dying. Besides\nthese general terms our ancestors used special designations, which the\nnature of their language suggested; the hymns of the Rig-Veda supply\ninstances. One of these modes of speech it would be difficult for me\nto render in French, but the English language has the impersonal verb\nwhich will illustrate my meaning, for all such atmospheric phenomena\nsuch as rain, thunder, the light of day; instead of _it_ rains, _it_\nthunders, _it_ shines, our ancestors said, _he_ rains, _he_ thunders,\n_he_ shines, without knowing who was this _he_, who for us is the third\nperson masculine; but, naturally for them, _he_ meant the rainer, the\nthunderer, the lightener, or, in other words--the agent.\n\nMythology, taken in its entirety, is the outcome of myths which\npreceded it. If the original meaning of the Greek word Logos--as both\nword and thought--has revealed to us a forgotten truth; the original\nmeaning of _mythos_ is also indispensable for the study of mythology.\nThis Greek term means simply _word_ as opposed to _deed_, and hardly\ndiffered at first from Logos. Afterwards, however, a distinction was\nmade between myth,--a fable, a story, and logos, a historical account.\nThus a myth was at first a word. Almost all terms used in the first\nspontaneous stage of language had for their basis striking metaphors,\nwhose signification may have been forgotten, and these terms having\nlost their original as well as poetical meaning, remained words only,\ncurrent in familiar conversation.\n\nI give the following myths as they have come down to us.\n\nEndymion is the son of Zeus and Kalyke, but he is also the son of\n\u00c6thlios, a king of Elis, who is himself called a son of Zeus; for,\naccording to Greek customs, the reigning race of Elis derived its\norigin from the king of the gods. Endymion is one of the many names\nof the sun, but with special reference to the setting or dying sun;\nit is derived from a verb which originally meant _to dive into_; an\nexpression such as \u201cthe sun dived\u201d presupposes an earlier conception,\nthat it dived into the sea. But the verb _enduo_ is never used in\nclassical Greek for setting, because the simple verb _duo_ had become\nthe technical term for sunset. Thus this myth of Endymion owes its\norigin to the use probably of _enduo_ in some Greek dialect, though not\nthe commonly received term for sunset. The original meaning of Endymion\nbeing once forgotten, what was told originally of the setting sun was\nnow told of a name, which in order to have any meaning, had to be\nchanged into a god or hero.\n\nThis handsome prince or shepherd, according to the different versions\nof the tale, went to Karia, where on Mount Latmos he had strange\nadventures; he slept in a cave to which the rays of the moon, Selene,\npenetrated, and in the ancient poetical and proverbial language of\nElis it was said, \u201cSelene loves and watches Endymion; Selene embraces\nEndymion and kisses him into sleep.\u201d The name Selene is so transparent\nthat the word moon pierces through it; we should have guessed that\nthe moon was intended, even if tradition had only preserved her other\nname, Asterodia--\u201cwanderer amongst the stars\u201d; the names Hecate or\nLucina do not force us to acknowledge their fitness, they present to\nour imagination a totally different figure (as they suggest opaqueness)\nfrom Selene. Learned writers at times still put forward the explanation\nwith regard to mythology that it \u201cwas a past which was never a\npresent,\u201d but this myth of Endymion was \u201cpresent\u201d with the people of\nElis at the period of its narration.\n\nThese and similar expressions were repeated long after their meaning\nhad ceased to be understood; and as the human mind is generally as\nanxious for a reason as ready to invent one, the poets added to this\nstory several details, and reasons why Endymion sank into eternal sleep\nafter a life of but one day; and if allusions were made to these by a\npopular poet, it became a mythological fact, repeated and embellished\nby later poets.\n\nThe construction of such a name as Eos does not differ materially from\nthat of any other name, but as all roots expressed at the first denote\naction, it follows that for all an agent must be found; the name of\nEos in Sanscrit is Ushas, dawn, or \u201cthe bright one\u201d from the root Vas,\nto shine; thus Eos meant originally \u201che or she shines.\u201d But who was\n\u201che\u201d or \u201cshe\u201d? Thus the inevitable myth is evolved. For us the dawn\nis only the natural illumination of the sky, the brightness of the\nmorning; our ancestors received a different impression by the break of\nday. After having coined a word meaning \u201che or she shines,\u201d that is\nthe light, or Eos, the Greeks continued to portray each step of Eos as\nshe preceded the appearance of the sun on the celestial vault; \u201cEos\nis followed by the sun--is loved by the sun\u201d; she is conceived as a\nbright and beautiful woman; if she appeared veiled in clouds, she would\nbe considered as a veiled bride; thus the epithets and relationships\nshowered on Eos become intelligible, she is the daughter of Hyperion,\nthus her father would be the high heaven, since _hyper_ corresponds to\nthe Latin _super_; she is the sister of Helios and Selene, the sun and\nthe moon. As soon as a name such as Eos was first enunciated and used\nin daily conversation, it grew and gathered new materials round itself;\nall the names surrounding Eos in Greek and Aurora in Latin show us how\ninevitably what we call mythology springs up from the soil of language.\nEven such simple sentences as \u201cEos appears, disappears, or dies\u201d are\nchanged at once into myth, fable, and legend, and it soon becomes\nimpossible to draw a line between what is simple language and what is\nmyth.\n\nWe do not unfortunately always possess the original form of each legend\nas it first passed from mouth to mouth in the towns and country; thus\nour chief sources are the ancient chroniclers, who took mythology for\nhistory, and used only so much of it as answered their purpose, and\nthese accounts do not reach us at first hand.\n\nWe find a legend in Greek mythology which has much exercised the\nlearned; the nymph Daphne flies before Ph\u0153bus Apollo, her mother, the\nearth, moved by compassion, takes her to her bosom, and immediately a\nlaurel appears and fills the abyss into which Daphne had vanished. The\nmythologists asked themselves what could be the meaning of this; the\nmore phlegmatic amongst them considered that it had no special meaning\nat all, but was simply to be looked upon as a fable; why seek further\nfor a hidden import? Why? Because people do not relate such stories\nconcerning their gods and heroes without some good motive.\n\nIn the legend of Endymion the Greek language supplies all that is\nneeded to make it intelligible, but there are many instances of the\ndifficulty, or even the impossibility of explaining certain Greek names\nby the help of Greek only; since a name is not converted into a myth\nuntil its original meaning has become obscured in the language which\ngave it birth, though still perfectly comprehensible in another of the\nsame family, it behoves the classical philologist to surrender all\netymological researches of this nature to the comparative philologist,\nwhose privilege it is to seek to discover the signification of a Greek\nword by confronting it with contemporary witnesses from the German,\nCeltic, or Sanscrit. In the Teutonic languages, for instance, day\nhas several names which are derived from the root _dah_, to burn, to\nbe hot; and this same root has also given rise to the Greek name for\ndawn. In Sanscrit it is called Ahana, from _ahan_ or _dahan_, the root\nof which is _ah_; _dah_ and _dahan_ may have lost their initial _d_,\nor this letter may have been added to the root _ah_; these gains and\nlosses are met with frequently.\n\nThe Sanscrit name Ahana, known before Greek and Sanscrit became\nseparated, occurs but once in a hymn of the Rig-Veda; in India this\nmythological germ withered away, and even the name Ahana would not have\nsurvived, but for this single verse which saved it from oblivion; but\nit developed into a splendid growth in Greece, in the legend of Eos,\nwhich I have quoted.\n\nIn this hymn addressed to Ushas we read: \u201cWe have crossed the frontier\nof this darkness; Ahana shining forth gives light, lighting up all the\nworld, awakening mortals to walk about--she received praise from every\nthinker.\u201d Ahana rises from the head of Dyu, the forehead of the sky;\nshe shows herself in the east, she advances and awakens the sleepers.\nIn Sanscrit _budh_ means to wake and to know, but light in Sanscrit has\nagain a double meaning, and means knowledge, much more frequently and\ndistinctly than light; this explains how Ahana, in awakening mortals,\ncauses persons to know.\n\nThe stories of Daphne and of Ahana are closely allied, and the one\nexplains the other. As long as we remain ignorant of the fact that at\nfirst Daphne and Aurora were one, this myth is inexplicable; but turn\nthe name Ahana into Greek, and you have the Dawn in the features of a\nnymph loved by Apollo, and dying when the bright sun touched her with\nhis rays.\n\nBut why, it may be asked, was Daphne supposed to have been changed\ninto a laurel-tree? The dawn was called daphne, the burning; so was\nthe laurel--as wood that burns easily, and whose flame throws a bright\nlight--two different objects, but alike under one aspect, though two\ndistinct acts. The root _dah_ is found in daphne for laurel equally\nwith Daphne, dawn, the synonymy of the two names producing the myth of\nDaphne. Although this legend first came to life on Greek soil, it would\nhave been unintelligible without the help of the Veda, as the later\nSanscrit supplied no key to it.\n\nThe Sanscrit root _Ah_ is also the germ of the name of Athena, the\ntermination of the name corresponding to Ahana; Athene is said to\nspring from the head of Zeus. This extraordinary birth, though\npost-Homeric, is no doubt of ancient date, since it repeats exactly\nthe birth of Ahana. The Hellenists maintain that the Greeks were\nunconscious that the word Athene meant the dawn; doubtless few amongst\nthem knew that Zeus originally meant the surface or forehead of the\nsky. It is also true that when the people of Athens worshipped Athene\nas their tutelary deity, she became something very different from the\nIndian Ushas; but if we notice carefully all the many and various ideas\nconcerning this Greek goddess, we shall be led to the supposition that\nher cradle was no other than that of the dawn, namely, the east, the\nforehead of the sky, or Zeus. Neither in the Veda, nor in Homer, is\nthere any mention of the mother of the dawn, although both mention _her\nparents_.\n\nIt is a curious fact that in the mythology of Italy, Minerva, who was\nidentical with Athene, should from the beginning have assumed a name\napparently expressive of the intellectual rather than the physical\ncharacter of the Dawn-goddess. Minerva or Menerva is clearly connected\nwith _mens_, the Greek _menos_, the Sanscrit _manas_, mind; _mane_\nin Latin is morning; _manare_ is specially used of the rising sun;\nand _matuta_, another name of the same category, is the Dawn. The\nroot _man_, which in all Aryan languages means thought, was at a very\nearly time, like the Sanscrit _budh_, destined to express the revived\nconsciousness of the whole of nature at the approach of the light of\nthe morning. The equation Ahane = Athene is both phonetically and\nmythologically irreproachable, the correlative Minerva can also be\nexplained mythologically.\n\nTo reject the explanations of these myths which Comparative Philology\nfurnishes, it would be necessary to prove that Ahana and Eos do not\nmean the dawn, that Athene does not correspond with Ahana, and that\nHelios is not the sun.\n\nMythologists have sometimes failed to discover the primitive character\nof certain myths, because they have not looked beyond the Greek\netymology. The word Erinnys, \u201chovering in the gloom,\u201d corresponds\nexactly to the Sanscrit Sarany\u00fb = \u201cbreak of day.\u201d Poets sometimes speak\nof the Dawn as avenging the crimes committed in the dark; the myth of\nErinnys denotes this same idea. Instead of our lifeless and abstract\nexpression, \u201cA crime is sure to be discovered,\u201d the old proverbial and\npoetical saying amongst the Greeks and Hindoos was, Erinnys--Sarany\u00fb,\n\u201cwill bring misdeeds to light.\u201d At first this phrase was free from all\nmythological taint, but it was afterwards transformed into a myth by\nthe Greeks, as they were ignorant of the true signification of the name\nof Erinnys.\n\nWhen the mythology of Greece fails to furnish an explanation of many\nof the Greek phrases, because it belongs to a later date than the\nclassical period, the Veda may then be questioned, and will supply us\nwith the information, by disclosing an ancient substratum of human\nthought, such as existed amongst the inhabitants of one of the most\nimportant regions of the world, India. It is with as much pleasure as\nassurance that we repeat to those learned scholars, who decline to open\ntheir eyes in order to see, or see only what they consider should be\nthere, the Brahmanic saying, \u201cIt is not the fault of the post that the\nblind man passes it without noticing it.\u201d\n\nIt seems astonishing that a people so richly endowed as the Greeks\nshould have found pleasure in romancing so constantly concerning the\nsun and the moon, the day and the night, the dawn and the twilight;\nbut the custom of repeating these mythological phrases, which much\nresembled each other, dated from an epoch before the Greeks, when\nnothing more powerfully attracted and fascinated the imagination of\nman than the aspect of nature\u2019s forces, especially the return of the\nsun, bringing with it each morning light and heat and life. Repeated\nthus incessantly these phrases became idiomatic, and were retold long\nafter the thread connecting them with the simple facts of nature was\nbroken and lost to memory. At first some old grandmother would repeat\nthem, partly understanding them in their true natural sense, and partly\nmetaphorically; the sons of the old people would repeat them with a\npartial understanding; but the grandsons would relate them only for\ntheir peculiarities, or for the charm of their style and setting;\nand the great-grandchildren would hand them on at random, with no\ncomprehension of their meaning. At a much later period when all these\nsayings, with no connection between them, had become traditional, the\npoets would embody them in verse, giving them their first form and\npermanence in a cycle of legends. They congratulated themselves on the\ntreasure-trove, but marvelled that the Greeks should enclose these\nbald phrases of perpetual iteration in the casket of their literature.\nThey might as well ask why the Greeks apparently sanctioned all the\nirregular verbs their language holds by retaining them in their\ngrammar. Is it not a historical fact that cannot be denied that the\nwhole Aryan peoples, without exception, have conserved as the heritage\nof their common origin not only the names of their divinities, their\nlegends, and their folk-lore, but also remains of their primitive\nlanguage. Here is a noteworthy statement. Comparative Philology has\nproved that there is nothing really irregular in a language, and\nthat what was formerly considered so in declensions and conjugations\nis the stratum on which the edifice of each language raised itself\nprogressively. This same apparent irregularity is found also in\nmythology, because it is itself only a sort of dialect or offshoot of\nlanguage.\n\nSince the _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of myths, as such, is a forgetfulness of\nthe original sense of the words, we cannot hope to be able to explain\nall the mythological recitals; no one has more clearly stated the\ndifficulty, nor expressed it with greater modesty, than he who has laid\nthe most lasting foundation of comparative mythology. Grimm says: \u201cI\nshall indeed interpret all that I can, but I cannot interpret all that\nI should like.\u201d[49]\n\nIn examining these archives, which, if only on account of their\nantiquity, are very superior to any other evidence for our purpose, we\nlearn that identification differs from comparison. It is only possible\nto identify two or more divinities by seeing if one name applies\nequally to all, and by showing that this name denotes the essence of\neach; this result is obtained when, for instance, we note a general\nresemblance between a god or a hero of the Veda, and a god or hero\nof Hesiod, and discover that though their names may be phonetically\ndissimilar, yet that they have one source. Uranus, in the language of\nHesiod, is used as a name for the sky--\u201ca firm place for the blessed\ngods\u201d; and the poet says that Uranus covers everything, and that when\nhe brings the night he is stretched out, everywhere embracing the\nearth. This sounds like a reproduction of the name of Varuna, which\nis derived from a root _Var_, to cover (the Sanscrit term _varutra_,\novercoat, would prove this if need be). The name Uranus in the Greek\napparently retains something of its primitive meaning, which is not\nthe case with the name of Zeus and Apollo. Varuna and Uranus evidently\nboth express the same mythological concept, that of the covering,\nenclosing sky; this may even be one of the most ancient discoveries\nof comparative mythology. In the same way we prove that Ushas, Eos,\nDaphne, Ahana, and Athene were five names of the dawn, and that they\ncan be traced back to a time before Greek and Sanscrit were separated.\nThus, whilst one legend becomes differentiated from another by its\nown peculiar form and attributes, the name of its original prototype\nremains etymologically the same, though taking varying forms amongst\nthe various peoples who use the legend; it is in this immutable\nname that the continuity of ideas lies, which nothing obliterates,\nand which traverses the centuries, and connects the mythologies of\ncountries as totally distinct as India, Greece, and Ireland. But we\nmust remember that all that is taken for etymology is not always so;\nthe explanations which Homer gives of the names of the divinities only\nproves that at his time the original meaning had been forgotten. To\nus who now know the true principles of mythology, it is clear that it\nrepresents a prehistoric period of language, and the light it throws\non the times that followed, has the same importance with regard to the\nstudy of the human mind, that geology and paleontology have for the\nknowledge of the earth.\n\nSometimes we come upon difficulties of another kind when we seek to\ntranslate the language of the poets into our modern forms of thought\nand speech. In consequence of the absence of merely auxiliary words\nin mythological language, each word, whether noun or verb, had its\nfull original power, it was heavy and unwieldy, it said more than it\nought to say. Here is an example: _Nyx_ (night), the mother of _Moros_\n(fate), of _Ker_ (destruction), of _Thanatos_ (death), of _Hypnos_\n(sleep), and of the _One\u00efroi_ (dreams), and these,--her progeny,\n_Night_ is said, by the poet, to have borne without a father. She has\nalso other children: _Momos_ (blame), _Oizys_ (woe), the _Hesperides_,\nwhich are the evening stars, _Nemesis_ (vengeance), _Apate_ (fraud),\n_Philotes_ (lust), _Geras_ (old age), and _Eris_ (strife). Now let\nus use our modern expressions. \u201cThe stars are seen as the night\napproaches,\u201d \u201cwe sleep, we dream, we die,\u201d \u201cwe run into danger during\nnight,\u201d \u201cnightly revels lead to strife, angry discussions, and\nwoe,\u201d \u201cmany nights bring old age, and at last death,\u201d \u201can evil deed\nconcealed at first by the darkness of night will at last be revealed\nby the day,\u201d \u201cnight herself will be revenged on the criminal\u201d; and we\nhave translated the language of Hesiod, a language to a great extent\nunderstood by the people to whom it was addressed many hundreds of\nyears ago, and it is made comprehensible to us by the addition of some\nauxiliary words. This is hardly mythological language, but rather a\npoetical and proverbial kind of expression known to all poets whether\nmodern or ancient, and frequently to be found in the language of common\npeople when it becomes proverbial.\n\n\u201cIn Greece the mortal element, inherent in all gods, was eliminated\nto a great extent by the conception of heroes. Whatever was too human\nin the ancient legends told of Zeus and Apollo was transferred to\nso-called half gods or heroes, who were represented as the sons or\nfavourites of the gods. The two-fold character of Herakles as a god and\nas a hero is acknowledged even by Herodotus, and some of his epithets\nwould have been sufficient to indicate his solar and originally divine\ncharacter. But in order to make some of the legends told of the solar\ndeity possible or conceivable, it was necessary to represent Herakles\nas a more human being, and to make him rise to the seat of the\nimmortals only after he had endured toils and sufferings incompatible\nwith the dignity of an Olympian god.\u201d[50] The divinities of a second\nand third order, who were sometimes solicited for special favours, were\nperhaps placed in the same category as some provincial or local saints,\nwho were considered more accessible and more pitiful in certain places,\njust as some physicians make a practice of curing those ills only of\nwhich they had made a speciality.\n\nThere were also abstract divinities, representing certain virtues\nin the eyes of the people, which were highly esteemed and useful to\npossess; each of these qualities which were conceived separately, and\nconsidered in the superlative degree, were from that time raised to\nthe rank of a divine person, thus altars and temples were dedicated to\nCourage, Strength, and Piety; Fame was likewise thus honoured. \u201cGreat\nFame is never lost though scattered abroad,\u201d said Hesiod, \u201cit is in\nitself a divinity.\u201d\n\nThe language of mythology was in use at a late period. History tells\nus that the Greek town of Cyrene in Libya was founded about the\nthirty-seventh Olympiad, the ruling race came from Thessaly; the\nfoundation of the colony was due to the oracle of Apollo at Pytho. This\nsimple historical fact has been thus rendered, from the habit of not\nrecounting events as they happened. \u201cThe heroic maid Cyrene, who lived\nin Thessaly, was loved by Apollo, and carried off to Libya.\u201d\n\nThe question has been often asked, what can be the origin of the fables\nwhich are identical in character and form, whether we find them on\nIndian, Greek, Italian, Persian, Slavonic, Celtic, or Teutonic soil.\nWas there a period of temporary insanity, through which the human\nmind had to pass, and was it a madness identically the same in the\nsouth of India and in the north of Ireland? The necessity of solving\nthis problem became more imperative when collections of these ancient\ntraditions were brought from countries which formerly were almost\nunknown to us; incredible tales came from all parts, from amongst the\nHottentots, the Patagonians, Zulus, Esquimaux, and Mongols; in all\ncases we were able to recognise the fables with which we were already\nso well acquainted, from having seen them in Aryan literature. When Max\nM\u00fcller first published his essays on the Greek myths, the mythologists\nacknowledged generally that it was very natural he should devote so\nmuch time to the explanation of the Greek legends, since these same\nstories had been universally found in all parts of the globe, from the\none pole to the other; stories of men and women turned into trees,\ntrees transformed into men, men behaving as animals, animals talking\nas if they were men, men swallowed by gods and brought up again whole,\nas were the children of Kronos; in all places the same adventures were\ntold of the sun and moon, also swallowed, but the swallower not known.\nThe Greek myths--so it was asserted by the learned who did not care\nto abandon the old paths--form only one page of that vast mythology\ncreated by the disordered imagination of nations in their infancy;\nthe epidemic was general, and it is useless to seek for a definite or\npeculiar meaning in such and such a local myth.\n\nNevertheless, in presence of these striking likenesses, impartial and\nclear-sighted science recognised that there must be something in the\nhuman mind that of necessity tended to mythology, nay, that there\nmust be some reason in all the unreason that goes by the name of\nmyth. That \u201csomething\u201d Max M\u00fcller discovered to be language, in its\nnatural progress from roots to words, up to definite and special names.\nMythology has now been acknowledged to be an inevitable phase in the\ngrowth of language and thought; a form of expression which changes\nnon-personal beings into personal, and all relationships into actions;\nit is a mental phenomenon so peculiar that it would be difficult to\navoid the admission that it emanated from a distinct stratum, it is\nmetaphoric language and thought; and it is the duty of the geologist of\nlanguage to establish the authenticity of this epoch of organic life\nin humanity, which is contemporaneous with the most ancient forms of\nlanguage.\n\nIf Hegel compares the discovery of the common origin of Greek and\nSanscrit to that of a new world, the same may be said with regard to\nthe common origin of all the mythologies, for already the science of\nComparative Mythology has risen to the same importance as Comparative\nPhilology.\n\nThe supposition that grammatical gender of nouns must necessarily be\nthe cause of personification, and produce myths which had no previous\nexistence at the time when this denotation of sex did not yet exist,\nhas been proved incorrect. But the following fact, which concerns\nlanguage more than mythology, is not so evident at first sight,\nviz., that however the various languages may differ externally, and\nhowever they may lack gender, yet they have without exception what is\nanalogous to it, and takes its place; this is a system of fundamental\nclassification to which all equally submit, and which each language\nsupplies; the result is that at the foundation of thought common to all\nhumanity, certain forms are found answering the purpose of gender. Each\nmyth and each legend was at first the intelligible expression of an\nintelligible thought, and as the thought contained in each recital must\nevidently be the same wherever there were men to repeat it, the science\nof Comparative Mythology seeks to place its hand on the expression\nwhich best renders this one and the selfsame thought, under different\naspects.\n\nWhat is commonly called Hindoo mythology is of little or no avail for\ncomparative purposes, because nothing is systematically arranged.\nNames are used in one hymn of the Rig-Veda as appellatives, in another\nas names of gods. There are as yet no genealogies, and no recorded\nmarriages between gods and goddesses. As the conception of the poet\nvaried, so varied the nature of these gods; the myths are arranged\nwith little order. Nowhere is the wide distance which separates the\nancient poems of India from the most ancient literature of Greece\nmore clearly felt than when we compare the growing myths of the Veda\nwith the full-grown, or already decaying myths on which the poetry of\nHomer is founded. The Veda is the real theogony of the Aryan races,\nwhile that of Hesiod is a copy only of the original image. The Hindoo\nRishis differed much amongst themselves in their representation of\nthings; some of them attributed the dispersion of clouds by a solar\nhero, to the will of some supreme or divine being; others considered\nthe combatants to be the supreme beings themselves, who dispersed the\nclouds full of lightning and thunder, making the sky serene after the\nfight. These are the two distinct interpretations of the solar and\natmospheric schools; the dualism in nature, which at a later period\ntook the character of light and darkness, even of good and evil, was at\nthe beginning the dualism of day and night, spring and winter, life and\ndeath, represented by the two great luminaries of the physical world.\n\nThe characteristic traits of the moon which made the deepest impression\non our ancestors were its increase, and afterwards its gradual\ndiminution, until its total disappearance. The eclipses, though filling\nthe minds of the people with sudden fear at first, did not continue\nlong to awaken dread or curiosity, as they were of rare occurrence and\ntransitory; the moon, it was thought, was swallowed and afterwards\ndisgorged by some hostile power; but the monthly increase and\ndiminution required some other explanation. The Hindoos, in seeking to\ndiscover the abode of the gods and of their own ancestors, assigned the\nbrilliant sky to the former, and where, therefore, should the Fathers\nlive if not in the vast vault and in the moon? This was, in fact, the\nbelief of the whole Aryan race. But the subject is complicated, since\nin an earlier period of lunar mythology, we find in the Vedic Pantheon\na divinity of the name of Soma, which certain poets identify with the\nplant of that name, whose intoxicating juice played an important part\nin the sacrifices; there is no doubt a great obscurity with regard to\nthese two rival powers, to which the same name had been given, and on\nwhich mythologists have found it difficult to enlighten us; but quite\nrecently exponents of the Rig-Veda have discovered that Soma originally\nmeant the moon itself, thus the Rishis allow it to be apparent in\ntheir hymns that there were at one time two Somas--the plant and its\njuice, and at an earlier period the other Soma, known only to the old\nBrahmans, which was the moon. A belief held by the Hindoos was that\nthe moon supplied nourishment to the gods, which was the cause of the\ndiminution; its increase was explained by the entrance into it of\nthe souls of their ancestors; the gods swallowing these also as an\nintegral portion of the moon.\n\nAll these ideas were of slow development, and of successive growth; no\nportion of mythology had a systematic elaboration.\n\nI will add as a curious scientific fact, that lately botanists have\nsought in vain in Northern India and in Persia for a plant whose\nqualities correspond to those of the Soma as described in the Vedic\nhymns; they are more or less agreed that it must be akin to the\n_Ephedra_, but as this plant abounded in the whole country between\nSiberia and the Iberian Peninsula, there was no hope of discovering the\nlocality of the Aryans by means of the habitat of the plant.\n\nIt has been often asserted that these stories of men and things that\nhave been swallowed must have come from countries formerly inhabited\nby cannibals; learned writers, even Herbert Spencer--to quote one\ninstance--consider, not without some appearance of reason, that\nHindoos, Greeks, Romans and Germans could hardly have put forth similar\nstories of this kind had there been no foundation in fact. But the\nverbs to eat, to swallow, will admit of divers interpretations; we say\nof a man that it was impossible for him to swallow such an insult, or\nthat he has consumed his fortune; and this mode of speech surprises no\none; where we speak of an eclipse, the inhabitants of the shores of\nthe Baltic say that the moon or sun is in the act of being eaten; in\nIndia instead of saying such an one has been flogged, it would be said,\nhe has tasted the whip. A little reflection will convince us that if\nnations who had nothing in common but human nature, spoke of the night\nas covering, hiding, swallowing various beings, especially the sun\nand the day, it was not more unreasonable on their part than to say,\nas we do, that day and night follow each other, instead of expressing\nourselves after a more scientific manner, and not less correctly, in\nsaying that day and night are the successive effects of the rotation of\nthe earth on its axis.\n\nHaving discovered that mythological phraseology was sometimes due to\nmisconceptions of names, and that poetical fantasies had their share,\nphilologists quoted an instance of the imagination being misled by a\nsimple mistake; that of the name \u201cGreat Bear\u201d being given to a certain\ngroup of stars. The Sanscrit root _Ark_ signified to brighten, to\npraise, to glorify, to celebrate; man praised, glorified, celebrated\nthe sun, moon and stars; for these purposes the word _Ark_ was used.\nFor all we know the substantive _rik_ may really have conveyed all\nthese meanings during the earliest period of the Aryan language; but if\nwe look at the fully developed branches of that family of speech, we\nfind that in this, its simplest form, _rik_ has been divested of all\nmeaning in the Rig-Veda except one; it only means a song of praise, a\nhymn, that gladdens the heart of man, and brightens the countenance\nof the gods. The other words, however, which rik might have expressed\nwere not entirely given up, but the root was rendered more definite;\nthus _arki_ and _arkis_ were formed, these no longer meant hymns of\npraise, but light, ray. It is difficult to understand how _Riksha_, in\nthe sense of bright, has become the name of \u201cthe bear\u201d; might it not\nbe on account of his brilliant tawny fur, or from his bright eyes? No\none knows. Certain it is that in Sanscrit bears were called _Riksha_.\nBut the word _Riksha_ had also another meaning, as shown by a passage\nin the Rig-Veda 1, 24, 10. \u201cThese stars (riksha) fixed high above,\nwhich are seen by night; whither did they go by day?\u201d The Commentator\nobserved that the word _riksha_ is not used in the sense of stars in\ngeneral, but that according to tradition the name is only given to\nthat particular constellation, which in later Sanscrit is called \u201cthe\nSeven Rishis,\u201d or \u201cthe Seven Sages.\u201d And thus it happened that when\nthe dispersion took place, and the Aryans left their primitive home\nand settled in Europe, they ceased to use the plural form \u201c_Arktoi_,\u201d\nor many bears, and spoke of the group of seven stars as the Bear, the\nGreat Bear, without knowing why these stars had originally received\nthat name.\n\nIt did not escape the notice even of the less erudite that the gods\nof Greece and Rome and of other Aryan nations had a close connection\nwith the most striking phenomena of nature; they also recognised the\nsame origin amongst the divinities of the Semitic nations, as well as\nthose of Egypt, Africa and America; this could, of course, be accounted\nfor by the presence of the same primitive stratum of human thought,\nresembling those deeper geological layers, which only show themselves\nin a partial and fragmentary manner.\n\nBut none of these mythologists attached the least importance to the\n_names_ of the divinities, and if they were told that they were nothing\nbut names, it sounded almost like heresy to them, and they ignored the\nfact that one of the latest scientific discoveries was being submitted\nto them. Yet it is indubitable that the sun and the moon were in the\nplaces occupied by them at present before they were named; but not till\nthey were named was there a Savitar, a Helios, a Selene or a Mene. If\nthen it is the name which makes the gods in mythology, in enabling\nus to distinguish one from another, it follows that we must call\nthe Science of Language to our aid in order to solve the problem of\nmythology, since that alone discloses the causes which have despoiled\nthe names of their primitive meaning, and that alone shows how the\ngerms of decrepitude, inherent in language, affect both the phonetic\nportion and also the signification of words, since words naturally\nreact on thought and mould it.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[49] Max M\u00fcller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. ii. p. 70.\n\n[50] Max M\u00fcller, _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 243.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII BETWEEN SLEEPING AND WAKING\n\n\nThe habit which I have contracted of living in the society of our\nancestors of prehistoric times, would, it might be thought, naturally\ncause me to notice the dissimilarities between us and them rather than\nthe likenesses; this often happens, but not always. Our fathers, for\ninstance, did not know the thousandth part of our vocabulary, which\nis very copious; this would seem to indicate that our knowledge has\nconsiderably increased in the course of thirty or forty centuries.\nWords of deep import are familiar to us; who amongst us does not\nknow and use such as these--Law, Necessity, Liberty, Spirit, Matter,\nConscience, Belief, Nature, Providence, Revelation, Inspiration, the\nSoul, Religion, Infinite, Immortality, and many others, which are\neither of recent origin, or have become new because their meaning has\nchanged? Here the difference between our fathers and ourselves springs\ninto sight.\n\nBut the points of resemblance are still more striking.\n\nLong before our present era, certain philosophers asserted that their\nworld was full of gods, we may say with equal truth that God fills our\nworld; His name is in every mouth, and our little children know it\nwell. Moreover the complete identity between certain mental acts of our\nfathers and our own is easily recognised. Our fathers were satisfied\nnot to enquire concerning the nature of their gods, they knew their\nnames, and that sufficed. We too have become accustomed to hear God\u2019s\nname repeated frequently, without always questioning ourselves as to\nits meaning, and in what way He has made the earth His habitation.\n\nTo talk of what we do not grasp must be essentially human, since we\nfind the practice in two social conditions, separated from each other\nby thousands of years.\n\nIt is incredible to what a point we of the nineteenth century carry\nour lack of enquiry. If one day we were to count on our fingers the\nnumber of interesting subjects we had allowed to pass by us without\nany interrogations concerning them, fifty hands would not suffice us\nfor the tale; our ignorance would then become apparent. Should we\nfeel humiliated? In all probability no, for before arriving at this\nmuch to be desired consummation, we should have been carried away by\nmany thoughts in no way bearing on the subject, and the one thought\nwhich would come prominently to the front and hinder us from passing\nour conduct in review would be, \u201cI see no necessity to apply myself\nto them.\u201d In fact, nothing is easier and nothing so reposeful to our\nmind as acquiescence in the popular opinion, which we allow to guide\nus in our estimation of words and phrases; as so frequently happens\nwith ourselves (by \u201courselves\u201d I mean that very considerable portion\nof society which separates the working classes from the savants and\nphilosophers).\n\n\u201cAll things are full of the gods,\u201d was said by the heathen in former\ndays; and in fact divinities abounded; this was not surprising. \u201cGod\nhas chosen to Himself a people and spread His name over the whole\nearth, and to make His will to be known,\u201d as we say now. Thus we know\nthat God is, and that His commandments must be kept.\n\nTo consider words as ideas is not wise. Why do we not imitate the\nsavages who when they hear an organ for the first time have a great\ndesire to open it in order to see what is inside; and we who are\ncivilised play with much light-hearted readiness on the gigantic\ninstrument of language without seeking to know the value of the sounds\nwe draw from it; and the names of beings and objects which should\nexercise the most powerful influence to which moral things can be\nsubjected, are treated as mere sounds.\n\nHave we asked ourselves the meaning of the word God? Many must answer\nno to this question. This is not well, in spite of the fact that those\nwho have asked it in this form have not always succeeded in obtaining\nan answer; no one has formed a complete conception of God, since\nneither sense nor reason is equal to the task. Plato, although named\n\u201cDivine\u201d by the ancient philosophers and by Christian theologians,\ndid not like to speak of _The Gods_, but replacing the plural by\nthe singular used the word \u201cDivine,\u201d but he did not explain what he\nunderstood by this word. Plato certainly mentions the Creator of the\nUniverse, the Father of humanity, but--\u201che does not tell His name, for\nhe knew it not; he does not tell His colour, for he said it not; he\ndoes not tell His size, for he touched it not.\u201d[51] Xenophanes, who\nlived 300 years before Plato, said, \u201cThere is one God, the greatest\namongst gods and men; neither in form nor in thought like unto\nmortals.\u201d[52]\n\nThe Greek philosophers protested against all attempts to apply a name\nwhich should be adequate to the Supreme Being; since all the words\nchosen failed to grasp His essence, and only designated certain sides\nand points of view, predicting of Him whatever was most beautiful in\nnature. For this reason early Christian writers who were Greeks rather\nthan Jews, who had studied in the schools of Plato and Aristotle, spoke\nof God in the same abstract language, the same negative terms; they\nsaid, \u201cWe cannot call Him Light, since Light is His creation; we cannot\ncall Him Spirit, since the Spirit is His breath; nor Wisdom, since\nWisdom emanates from Him; nor Force, since Force is the manifestation\nof His Power.\u201d\n\nThus instead of saying what God is, the philosophers, heathen as well\nas Christian, prefer to say what He is not. But in that case what\nidea could man form of a Being whom the wisest amongst them could not\nrepresent or describe? Do we understand the nature of this Supreme\nBeing better by using the name so well known of Providence? Again no;\nsince we have introduced several meanings into this word which are\ninconsistent the one with the other. Amongst them there might well be\nsome that are erroneous, which would thus lead us to rest our hopes on\nfalse foundations.\n\nThis mist, hiding from us the meaning of words and obscuring our ideas,\nis partly owing to a fault committed by the ancients themselves.\n\nWhen our ancestors communed with their divinities, they did not ask\nthemselves what the names they pronounced really meant; in invoking\nVaruna, Helios, Athene, Prithvi, and the others, they were satisfied,\nat least for the time being, since names possess a strange calming\nproperty; this unquestioning acquiescence has been bequeathed to us.\nWe are neither more enquiring, more exact, nor more pedantic than\nthe greater part of our ancestors; we speak of angels, for instance,\nwithout seeking to fathom their nature, much in the same way as we\nmight mention lords and dukes without troubling ourselves to reflect\nthat the one means \u201cbread-giver\u201d and the other \u201cdux,\u201d or one capable of\nbeing a leader of men.\n\nIn speaking of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and of religion,\nwe use words which have become common property, and it is not necessary\nto analyse them in order to feel sure that they represent things which\nare very real; still we do not strive to understand what these things\nreally are. Thus it happens that words whose meaning is unknown to us\nor escapes us, are generally those of which we make daily use; we keep\nto the impression received of them in our childhood, or accepted by\ncurrent opinion, or with which sentiment invests them, but this is\nunsatisfactory; we should feel ashamed of not possessing more accurate\nknowledge than this of geography or arithmetic. On the other hand,\nthere are scientific terms which seem to us so technical that we\nwillingly abandon their use to experts, and yet their meaning can be\nreadily and definitely grasped.\n\nWhat meaning, for instance, has the word _infinite_ for us, even if\ntaken in its most simple acceptation; this _infinite_ towards which our\nthoughts travel when we raise our eyes to the skies? Astronomers say to\nus, \u201cLook at something greater than the greatest possible greatness,\nthat is the infinitely great.\u201d They then quote figures, but these\nfigures of infinite greatness elude our imagination, we repeat them\nmechanically and only out of respect to the high scientific authority\nwho guarantees the accuracy of the calculations or the value of the\nappreciation.\n\nA small object, apparently of the size of a homeopathic globule, moves\nin space, it contains our continents and our oceans, this globule moves\nin company with other globules of the same nature.\n\nAstronomers speak to us of the millions of miles separating us from the\nsun, yet this distance dwindles down to nothing as compared with the\nnearest star, which, we are told, lies twenty millions of millions of\nmiles from our earth. Another stupendous thought is that a ray of light\ntraverses space at the rate of 187,000 miles in a second, and yet it\nrequires three years to reach us.\n\nBut this is only a small matter.\n\nMore than one thousand millions of such stars have been discovered by\nour telescopes, and there may be millions of millions of suns within\nour siderial system which are as yet beyond the reach of our best\ntelescopes; even that siderial system need not be regarded as single\nwithin the universe, thousands of millions of similar systems may be\nrecognised in the galaxy or milky way.[53]\n\nNow let us turn our eyes to the infinitely little. One drop of water\ntaken from the ocean contains atoms so small that a grain of the finest\ndust would seem colossal by the side of them; chemists are now able to\nascertain the relative positions of atoms so minute that millions of\nthem can stand upon a needle\u2019s point.\n\nAll this we gather from science when--working together with the\ntelescope--it investigates space; and this may still be little compared\nto what we might see through glasses, which should magnify objects some\nmillions of times more than our best instruments.\n\nThe infinite in space has engaged the attention of many thinkers; I\nwill quote from two only, as this infinite, which they studied from\ndifferent points of view, yet suggests thoughts somewhat alike. Kepler,\nthe discoverer of the laws on which our planetary system is based,\nsaid, \u201cMy highest wish is to find _within_ the God whom I have found\neverywhere _without_.\u201d Kant, the philosopher, to whom the Divine in\nnature and the Divine in man appeared as transcendent and beyond our\ncognisance, and who refused to listen to any theological argument\ntending to prove the existence of God, yet says, \u201cTwo things fill me\nwith new and ever growing admiration and awe: the starry firmament\nabove me, and the moral law within me; neither of them is hidden in\ndarkness, I see them both before me, and I connect them directly with\nthe consciousness of my own existence.\u201d[54]\n\nThese are very abstract thoughts; and it is pertinent to notice that\nthe most solemn religious terms, and the most striking expressions of\nadmiration, and poetical phrases of love, have their source in verbal\nroots, indicative of acts and conditions palpable to the senses.\n\nBut I am approaching too closely to matters of high import. I am drawn\nby the word _Infinite_. Aristotle said truly, \u201cthe Infinite attracts.\u201d\nHe was thinking of that other infinite, which is not the one intended\nby astronomers; but for myself the infinite in nature captivates me so\npowerfully that I find it difficult to touch earth again. Let us walk\nin beaten paths; let us endeavour to grasp the meaning of the more\nsimple words learnt mechanically at school, such as those denoting\nabstraction as well as nouns, and terms both general and particular;\nand let us see to what phase of thought and speech these grammatical\nexercises will carry us.\n\n * * * * *\n\nEach palpable object is known to us according as it affects our senses,\nthat is to say, by its properties; all impalpable objects cannot be\nknown otherwise than by their qualities; but nothing exists in nature,\nwhether palpable or impalpable, that has only one property or one\nquality, each object has several; an object as it exists in reality\nis concrete, and has a concrete name. If we wished to consider only\none of its attributes, we should have to take that apart and isolate\nit, in order to fix our thoughts exclusively on that; \u201cwe must drop\nthat of which the attributes are attributes.\u201d[55] We see white snow,\nwhite chalk, white milk, we have the sensation of the white colour;\nbut to take whiteness apart from the snow, the chalk, and the milk, is\nan operation which requires an instrument, a means, this we possess\nin a word, viz., the word _white_. Without that word we should have\nthe sensation of whiteness, but not the idea; it is the word _white_,\nwhilst separating the white colour from the snow, the chalk, and the\nmilk, that gives us the abstract idea as well as the abstract term\nwhiteness. This mental act is called _abstraction_: and it is by this\nprocess of abstraction that we really arrive at the true knowledge of\nanything, apart from the sensation of it only.\n\nHere is another example of abstraction. Let us suppose that two persons\nare in one room, and that there are in the room two windows, two doors,\ntwo tables and two chairs. Let us try to obliterate in our mind the\npersons, the windows, the doors, the tables and the chairs; nothing\nnow remains but the abstraction _two_. Now _two_, as such, apart from\nobjects, does not exist in nature; still it is a conception we can\nretain in our mind, and this abstract idea can be incorporated in the\nabstract word _two_.\n\nThese two examples of abstraction tell us but little of what is meant\nby it; and although they teach us little of the part abstraction plays\nin our mental life, they are correct from a logical point of view, and\nclearly demonstrate the impossibility of retaining a thought apart from\nthe word expressing it, since evidently the representation of _two_ and\nof _whiteness_ could not have been made if the words had been lacking.\n\nThe faculty of abstraction has no doubt taken time to develop in man,\nand the absence of abstract words and consequently of abstract ideas\nwas complete in primitive man as it now is in our very young children.\nThe faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. One\nreason, amongst others, why we have no ground to think brutes have\nabstract general ideas is that they do not speak, that they have no use\nof the words without which it is impossible to carry out the operation\nwhich I have just described, and to cause a conception to arise from a\nsensation.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhen, in our early days, our parents gave us instruction on the\nthree divisions of natural history, and explained to us of what\nthey consisted, we did not suspect that a period of immense length\nhad elapsed before man succeeded in thus skilfully classifying the\nvast mass of names in the manner which struck us as so natural and\ninevitable. Many thousands of objects were before us, each one entitled\nto bear an expressive name; and in proportion as our knowledge of\nthings increased was science called upon to furnish new terms; their\nname became legion and memory failed to retain them. It therefore\nbecame a necessity to classify the objects of a common nature under one\nname; hence the evolution of the terms animal, vegetable and mineral,\nwhich relieved us from the burden of enumerating all the objects\ncomposing genus and species; then in speaking of them to others we use\nthe generic term, which at the same time presents the image to our own\nminds. Thus when we wish to denote men having the same nationality as\nourselves we employ the collective term compatriot; in the same way the\nword furniture includes all that serves to furnish our rooms. By the\nhelp of this ingenious combination we relieve our memories of a mass of\nencumbering words, we economise our time and our powers, and simplify\nthe machinery of our thoughts.\n\nThis is evidently an advantage. But now a difficulty presents itself.\nWhen employing these general terms, such as vegetable, animal, the\nhuman race, we are speaking of things of which we are ignorant, and are\ntherefore for us as if they had no existence. We cannot have a complete\nknowledge of vegetables since that word comprehends all plants and\ntrees on the earth; neither of animals, since \u201canimal\u201d includes not\nonly all beasts lacking reason but also man who is endowed with it. We\nare equally ignorant of the human race, since it is composed of all\nhuman creatures, past, present and to come. It is evident that we only\nknow individual persons and things, such as this fir tree or that oak,\nthis horse, this cow, Paul or James, and we know them because we are in\na position to distinguish them by naming them, or indicating them.\n\nHow is it that philosophers of the mental calibre possessed by Locke,\nHume and Berkeley--whose minds follow so closely the progress of the\nperception of general ideas--did not question how it was that terms\nwhich were applicable to these ideas could equally well be applied to\nparticular things? What was the origin of the word _man_ that it could\nbe as suitable for Paul or James as for many men, in fact the whole\nhuman race? This is a fact about which philosophers do not appear to\nhave troubled themselves, and which the science of language alone can\nexplain.\n\nIn the time of our primitive ancestors human knowledge was evolved\ngradually from what was confused and vague, before arriving at what was\ndeemed settled and distinct. Man\u2019s vocabulary was small, substantives\nwere rare; that which we now understand by garden, courtyard, field,\nhabitation, was merged into one and the same conception, and would be\nexpressed by one vocable, of which the modern equivalent is enclosure;\nthe word _serpent_ designated all creatures that crawled, the word\n_fruit_ implied all that could be eaten, the word _man_ all who could\nthink; each name was a general term expressive of a general idea.\n\nWe may remember that the Sanscrit word _sar_, to run, which was\nat first used for rivers in general, became a particular name; a\ndemonstrative element joined to the verb, changing it into _sarit_,\nrun here, sufficed at once to turn it into an intelligible phrase,\nand the name of a particular river. In order to form the word\n_man-u-s_, man, the constructors of language combined the root _man_,\nmeasurer, thinker, in its secondary form _man-u_, with the suffix\n_s_, which gives the meaning think-here. This was at first not of\ngeneral application, but as it could be repeated any number of times\nand referred each time to different persons, who could each be named\nthinker-here, it became a general term. We thus see that the name\n_manus_ was from the beginning something more than a mere conventional\nsign applied to a particular person as are all proper names. It was\na predicative name, that is applicable to all possessing the same\nattributes, viz., of being able to think, and capable of the same act,\nthat of thinking.\n\nThis discovery was followed by another not less unexpected. When\nexamining the oldest word for name, which in Sanscrit is _n\u00e2man_, in\nGreek _onoma_, in Latin _nomen_, we find that it dates from a time when\nthe Sanscrit, Greek and Latin languages were all one; consequently the\nEnglish _name_ and the German _Name_ are not as we supposed, words\ninvented by the ancient Saxons, but they already existed before the\nseparation of Teutonic idioms from their elder brothers.\n\nAfter some further steps our contemporary philologists discovered\nthe sources whence proceeded this Sanscrit _n\u00e2man_; it is formed\nof the root _n\u00e2_, originally _gn\u00e2_, to know, joined to a suffix\nwhich generally expresses an instrument, a means; _n\u00e2man_ is the\nrepresentative of _gn\u00e2man_, which we recognise in the Latin _cognomen_,\nthe consonant _g_ being dropped as in _natus_, son, which was formerly\n_gnatus_. This word _name_ had at first a much more extended meaning\nthan that of a simple arbitrary sign applied \u201cto what we call a\nthing.\u201d The constructors of the word were aware of a fact of which\nconsciousness was afterwards lost, and which the learned ignored during\nall the supervening centuries--viz., that all names, far from being\nmere conventional signs used to distinguish one thing from another,\nwere meant to express what it was possible to know of a thing; and\nthat a name thus places us in a position really to be cognisant of a\nthing. A natural insight taught the early framers of our language a\ntruth only acquired by us after interminable researches, such as Hegel\nexpresses when saying, \u201cWe think in words,\u201d and which we find again in\nthis somewhat tautological expression \u201cnominibus noscimus\u201d = \u201ctel nom,\ntelle notion.\u201d\n\nThe fact that names, which are signs not of things, but of particular\nconcepts, are all derived from general ideas, is one of the most\nfruitful discoveries of the science of language; since it not only\nexpresses the truth which has been stated below, that language and the\ncapability of forming general ideas separate man from the animals, but\nalso a second truth that these two phenomena are two sides of the same\ntruth. This explains the reason why the science of language rejects\nequally the interjectional theory and the mimetic, but accepts the\nfinal elements of language, those roots which all contain concepts.\n\nThe name man, which we all apply to ourselves, is a title of nobility\nto which none other can compare. It is the direct issue of _man_, which\nin its turn came from _m\u00e2_, to measure, this gave _m\u00e2s_, moon, to the\nSanscrit language. The word man contains in itself the kernel of subtle\nthought; if we connect the word with the celestial body that helps us\nto measure our time, we do not therefore necessarily invest the moon\nwith a living and thinking personality; it is sufficient to consider\nthat if our ancestors conceived of it as measuring the nights and days,\nthey had in themselves the capabilities with which they invested the\nwords they created.\n\nWe must also notice that the creators of this name having connected\nit with the loftiest thing of which they could conceive--thought--did\nnot stop there; the sight of what was lowest--the dust--inspired them\nwith another name, _homo_ = earth-born; this Latin word having the\nsame source as _humus_ = the soil. Our fathers also gave themselves\na third name, which was _brotos_ in Greek, _mortalis_ in Latin, and\n_marta_--the dying--in Sanscrit; they could hardly have applied the\nword mortal to themselves if they had not at the same time believed in\nother beings who did not die.\n\nAnd this strange fact has come to pass, that on our planet there\nexisted in former days men--simple mortals as they were--who\nmanipulated thought, incorporating it with language, the only domain\nin which it can exist; then these marvellous men so entirely eclipsed\nthemselves, and passed out of our ken, that their posterity do not\nrecognise them under their modest garb of anonymity; for their work\nthough still living through thousands of centuries, is so unrecognised\nthat men ask themselves, \u201cWhy is it not possible to think apart from\nwords?\u201d\n\nThus we acknowledge the profound wisdom of the conceptions of our\nancestors; but their understanding worked unequally, on certain points\nit was very advanced, but on others behindhand.\n\nIn following the march of human intellect in the past, we are struck\nby the slowness with which thought and speech co-operated. As long as\nour ancestors had no occasion to speak of the action of covering a\nsurface with a liquid or soft substance, they did not possess the word\n_var_ = to cover; \u201cthe name of colour in Sanscrit is _varna_, clearly\nderived from this word; and not till the art of painting, in its most\nprimitive form, was discovered and named, could there have been a name\nfor colour.\u201d For some time they continued to view various objects\ndifferently coloured without distinguishing the tints; it is well known\nthat the distinction of colours is of late date; our ancestors gazed on\nthe blue sky, or the green trees, as in a dream, without recognising\nblue or green, as long as they lacked words to define the two colours,\nand some time elapsed before they particularised the colours by giving\neach its proper title.\n\nWe speak of the seven colours of the rainbow, because the intermediate\ntints elude us; the ancients acted much in the same way, Xenophanes\nspeaks of the rainbow as a cloud of purple, red, and yellow; Aristotle\nalso speaks of the tri-coloured rainbow, red, yellow, and green; and\nDemocritus seems only to have mentioned black, white and yellow.\n\nDoes this indicate that our senses have gradually become more acute and\naccurate? No, no one has asserted that the sensitiveness of the organs\nof sense was less thousands of years ago than it is now; the sensation\nhas not changed, but \u201cwe see in this evolution of consciousness of\ncolour how perception goes hand in hand with the evolution of language,\nand how, by a very slow process, every definite concept is developed\nout of an infinitude of indistinct perceptions.\u201d[56]\n\nThe names of colours have not been applied arbitrarily, any more than\nthe names given to divinities. Blue, for instance, owes its origin to\nthe visible results of violence, or of an accident; the science of\netymology shows us that the Old Norse words, bl\u00e1r, bl\u00e1, blatt, which\nnow mean blue, meant originally the livid colour of a bruise. Grimm\ntraces these words back to the Gothic _bliggvan_, to strike; and he\nquotes as an analogous case the Latin _c\u00e6sius_--a bluish grey, from\n_c\u00e6dere_, to cut. If the assertion that blue and green are rarely\nmentioned until a late date be correct, it would follow that they had\nbeen worked out of an infinity of colours before they took their place\ndefinitely as the colour of the sky and the colour of the trees and\ngrass.\n\nAs we trace etymology to its source, we see how man\u2019s perception was\nconfused at first. From the Sanscrit root _ghar_, which has many\ndifferent meanings, such as to heat, to melt, to drip, to burn, to\nshine, come not only many words--heat, oven, warmth, and brightness,\nbut also the names of many bright colours, all varying between yellow,\ngreen, red, and white. But the most striking example is afforded by\nthe Sanscrit word _ak-tu_. Here we have the first instance of the\nuncertainty in the meaning of the names of colours which pervades\nall languages, and which can be terminated at last by scientific\ndefinition only. This word has two opposite meanings--a light tinge\nor ray of light, and also a dark tinge, and night; this same word in\nGreek, _ak-tis_, means a ray of light. Thus, whilst ideas are not\ndefinitely named, even the most simple, such as those of white and\nblack, are not realised; philosophers have long known this, but the\nlearned in physical science seem only recently to have drawn attention\nto the fact. Virchow was the first to make the following assertion:\n\u201cOnly after their perceptions have become fixed by language, are the\nsenses brought to a conscious possession and a real understanding of\nthem.\u201d[57]\n\nSurgeons have explained that the faculty of sight proceeds from the\nmovement of an unknown medium, which in the case of light has been\ncalled ether, this strikes the retina, and is conveyed to the brain\nby the optic nerve; \u201cbut what relation there is between the effect,\nnamely, our sensation of red, and the cause, namely, the 500 millions\nof millions of vibrations of ether in one second, neither philosophy\nnor physical science has yet been able to explain.\u201d[58]\n\nWe are able to picture to ourselves the difficulties which assailed man\nin his efforts to express his impressions in primitive times, since\nwe find ourselves at times struggling with the same difficulties, and\nthere are occasions when we struggle in vain, we do not conquer the\ndifficulty.\n\nSensations which are subjective and personal are of all others the\nmost difficult to define, since we lack words to express what is from\nits nature purely personal; and yet we have frequently occasion to\nmention them, how can we best express ourselves? As the required word\ndoes not seem forthcoming we have recourse to metaphor, and almost\nunconsciously we use terms borrowed from external phenomena connected\nwith the sense of hearing, of smelling, and of tasting, and which\nfor the most part are acts or conditions in the domain of the sense\nof sight. Our old acquaintances the roots, whose meanings are to\ncut, to pinch, to bite, to burn, to hit, to sting, to soften, having\nformed the base of the adjectives sharp, sweet, keen, burning, we use\nthese to describe certain sensations. We do not know how better to\nparticularise a physical pain than by comparing it to something that\ntears, cuts or stings. But if certain physical ills, certain colour\nperceptions, certain impressions of sharpness, sweetness and heat\nexperienced when tasting various foods find metaphorical expression in\nexternal acts, there still remains a whole category of simple ideas\nfor which no words can be found. There are certain sensations of taste\nwhich cannot be expressed in words. Yesterday I ate a pear, to-day I\nhave eaten a peach; I am quite capable of distinguishing the special\nflavour of each, but finding nothing in the world of facts with which\nto compare them, I am without words to apply to them, and it would be\nas impossible for me to convey an idea of the flavour to any one who\nhad never eaten a pear or a peach as to make any person understand if I\nspoke in a language which was unknown to him.\n\nSince all words that succeed in expressing our sensations are drawn\nfrom external phenomena, we are in a position to know the origin and\nhistoric past of these words. But I cannot thus easily foresee even\nthe near future of some of these words. The sound of the clarionet and\nthat of the hautbois, the whistling of the wind, the whisper of the\nwaves, the yellow of the straw and that of the lemon, the green of the\nemerald and the blue of the sky, all characterise objects belonging\nto the material world; but if these words: clarionet and hautbois,\nwind and waves, straw and lemon, emerald and sky, which alone enable\nus to define clearly to our minds certain sounds and certain colours\nwere lacking in our vocabulary, I do not know how a musician could\nhave composed a symphony, or an artist painted his picture, although\nthe creation of both works of art proceeds equally from personal\ninspiration invisible to the eye.\n\nThe tie that binds thought to speech has been alternately acknowledged\nand forgotten; if Plato believed that the origin of language was the\nimitation of the voices of nature (an error which weighed heavily\non humanity during the space of two thousand years), he also knew\nthat words are indispensable to man for the very formation of\nthought. Abelard was more explicit on this point, he said: \u201cLanguage\nis generated by the intellect, and generates intellect.\u201d Hobbes\nunderstood so well that language was meant first of all for ourselves,\nand afterwards only for others, that he calls words, as meant for\nourselves, _not\u00e6_, and distinguishes them from _signa_, the same\nwords as used for the sake of communication, and he added: \u201cIf there\nwere only one man in the world he would require _not\u00e6_.\u201d[59] The\nclose connection between thought and speech cannot be more clearly or\nconcisely expressed.\n\nThis discovery makes its way slowly in the world, because certain\nphilosophers who have been rendered immobile by tradition, darken\ncounsel by their speculations. Some of the Polynesians would seem to\nhave a far truer insight into the nature of thought and language than\nthese philosophers to whom I have made allusion; they call thinking\n\u201cspeaking in the stomach,\u201d which means of course to speak inaudibly,\nand it is this absolutely inarticulate speech which is so often\nmistaken for thought without words; because the fact is ignored that\n_notion_ and _name_ are two words for one thing. \u201cIt is certain,\u201d they\nsay, \u201cthat a thought may be conceived in the mind, but is formulated\nat a later period; for instance, if you have to write a letter of no\ngreat importance, and which affects you little, take your pen, and\nbefore the idea appears to you completely clothed, your hand has passed\nover the paper, and you proceed to read your ideas in the words you\nsee before you.\u201d This is an illusion. We can no doubt distinguish the\nwritten word from the word-concept, but the former could not exist\nwithout the latter. I defy our opponents to think of the most ordinary\nand familiar object, such as a dog for instance, without saying to\nthemselves the word dog. They would explain that the remembrance only\nof a special dog, or of its bark would suffice to call up the image of\nthe dog in their minds; they do not see that the likeness of a dog, or\nthe remembrance of its bark is equivalent to the word dog, and that\nthey cannot possibly become conscious to themselves of what they appear\nto be thinking, without having the word in reserve in some part of\nthemselves, either \u201cin the stomach,\u201d as some savages say, or, as is\nmore gracefully expressed by the Italians, _in petto_.\n\nDescartes was a learned Christian, who pondered for some time over the\nquestions whether the human mind could be certain of anything without\nbeing supernaturally enlightened; he resolved to prove it; and to this\nend he imagined that he, Descartes, was certain of nothing--doubted of\nall--even mathematical conclusions; he then reflected on this position,\nand after a time the idea occurred to him that as he was capable of\nreflection it proved without a doubt that he, Descartes, existed, and\nthat consequently it was no longer possible to have doubts of his own\nidentity.\n\nThe portrait of this philosopher as depicted on the cover of his works,\nrepresents him reclining in a chair thinking--thinking--thinking--and\nexclaiming, \u201cCogito ergo sum.\u201d\n\nThose persons amongst us who are not specially interested in any\nsystem of philosophy are certainly in the majority; all know that\nsuch systems exist, and that they are noted, but from the want of\nreflection, however little, some persons look upon them as having\nsprung fully equipped, and in their present form, from the brains of\ntheir founders. But it would be incorrect, simply on the evidence of\na frontispiece, to consider these philosophical processes as thus\ninstantaneous. The systems of philosophy, even those of small value,\nrequire much time for their elaboration, and ripen slowly, and are\nnever free from opposition. They establish close links between the\nliving thinkers of to-day, and those who are no longer on earth. The\nphilosophers of the Middle Ages consulted those of antiquity, the\nthinkers of to-day strove to be in agreement with those alike of the\nMiddle Ages and of antiquity, and there arise from this intercommunion\nof knowledge, groups of ideas of which some are borrowed and some\noriginal, some true and some false; these are dependent on the\nintellectual lucidity and vigour of the latest arrivals in the arena.\nMany problems are thus threshed out before our eyes. Not long ago three\nphilosophers were in dispute and Noir\u00e9 records the arguments; the\ndiscussion turned on the question of priority of thought or speech.\n\nThey agreed on the fundamental point, all three said there could be\nno reason without language, nor language without reason. But as they\npenetrated more deeply into the question, they perceived divergencies;\nalthough the conception and the word be inseparable, yet there may be\na moment of time--infinitely little, doubtless--between the arrival of\nthe one and of the other, as with twins.\n\nAccording to Schopenhauer conceptions were the first in the field, and\ntheir immediate duty consisted in creating words; since the mind could\nnot deal with ideas at will, could neither evoke them, grasp them, nor\nreject them, whilst no signs were attached to them.\n\nTo this Geiger objected. How could ideas be produced whilst no signs\nexisted with which to represent them? Words came first, and thought,\nrendered possible by the development of language, followed; \u201clanguage\nhas created reason; before language, man was without reason.\u201d[60]\n\nMax M\u00fcller replied to both. How could there be a sign when there was\nnothing to represent? Conceptions and words, inseparable from the\nbeginning, were produced on the same day; the day when man\u2019s history\nbegins; before that what was a fugitive impression and a vocal sound\nvoid of sense, became a conception. Max M\u00fcller adds: \u201cIf Geiger had\nsaid that with every new word there is more reason, or that every\nprogress of reason is marked by a new word, he would have been right,\nfor the growth of reason and language may be said to be coral-like,\neach shell is the product of life, and becomes in turn the support of\nnew life.\u201d[61]\n\nThe most important results obtained during the Middle Ages on these\nsubjects find their representations in this discussion carried on by\nthe three learned contemporaries. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s point of view is one\nwhich reconciles the two diverse opinions.\n\nMen still find themselves under the magic influence of the past after\nsome thousands of years; the first words which our ancestors used in\nthe midst of their ordinary occupations have not ceased to appear\nin our daily conversations, in our philosophical writings, and in\nthe reports of scientific proceedings; it is impossible to speak\nof our family or social relations, of our affections, our ordinary\nobligations, our most sacred duties, our observance of laws, without\nhaving recourse to words and expressions, which represent the acts\nof linking or _tying_, those early activities of our ancestors. The\nchemist speaks of the _affinity_ of the substances with which he is\nworking; the poet and the devout believer when giving free scope to\ntheir highest aspirations do not find truer or loftier terms than\n_links_, _chains_, _ties_, for that which connects them with the Giver\nof all pure, sublime thoughts.\n\nAs it is possible in the present day to speak of _delving_ into a\nquestion (_creuser_) and of _racking_ our brains (creuser) when\nwe puzzle over a conundrum; of _linking_ one idea to another; of\n_polishing_ our manners by the help of art and letters; of seeking\nto _soften_ the heart of God by offerings (as if He were a mercenary\nJudge), of linking ourselves with others the better to accomplish\na good work, of uniting in freeing ourselves from an undesirable\nopponent; it follows that our ancestors as they emerged from their\ncondition of muteness found it necessary to _dig_ (creuser) cabins for\nthemselves, to _polish_ stones, to weave and plait branches together,\nand to soften tough roots for their nourishment. The same words repeat\nthemselves from time immemorial.\n\nBut how comes it that these words, which have remained the same\noutwardly, have so completely changed their meaning as exactly to adapt\nthemselves to modern usage? We have been deceived by appearances. These\nwords have not changed their meaning, but at first they were applied to\ntangible objects and visible acts, those which were the most necessary\nand the most usual in daily life at that time; and now these words are\napplied to intangible things, and invisible acts, the most necessary\nand usual in our present mental life.\n\nNor is this which follows less curious. This adaptation of the old\nwords to modern usages could only have been accomplished on one\ncondition, that we should forget many things, and be utterly oblivious\nto the original destination of these words; that we should put from\nbefore our eyes all images of caves, branches, stones and tough roots;\nand this condition we have fulfilled absolutely; the forgetfulness has\nbeen complete; no one suspects the source of these expressions; only a\nsmall number of men knows it, but these men are thoroughly aware that\nthey are making use of the true primitive forms of the human language.\n\nA difficulty to be avoided still remains. It might be said that, as\nit is the result of concerted action undertaken from a community of\ninterest, that these images have become fixed in the memory, and that\nif the ideas and representations exercised so potent a spell on us,\nthat we were compelled to use the words which can be traced back to\nthe first period of language, does it not follow that we absolutely\nresemble each other, and that consequently we must renounce the idea\nof attributing the least individuality to ourselves? This is a great\nmistake. Each one of us gives to these representations of ideas that\nform towards which he is impelled by his own nature, his education, his\nenvironment. A man who has some knowledge of astronomy will look at\nthe star-lit sky with quite another eye to that of the poet, who knows\nnothing of the subject but is struck with its inexpressible splendour.\nA landscape painter would see in a tree details of beauty which would\nquite escape one who admired it, but had never sought to draw it; a\nclever architect with one glance at a newly-built house could assign\nit a place either with the failures or with those houses which were a\nsuccess, and this glance would sufficiently account for the murmured\nexclamation, \u201cHow gladly would I live in it!\u201d\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[51] Max M\u00fcller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 100.\n\n[52] _Ibid._, p. 181.\n\n[53] Max M\u00fcller, _Natural Religion_, p. 138.\n\n[54] Max M\u00fcller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 393.\n\n[55] Max M\u00fcller, _Science of Thought_, p. 80.\n\n[56] Max M\u00fcller.\n\n[57] _Science of Thought_, p. 151. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n[58] _Natural Religion_, p. 118. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n[59] _Science of Thought_, p. 40. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n[60] _On the Origin of Human Language and Reason._ Geiger.\n\n[61] _Science of Thought_, p. 299. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX A DECISIVE STEP\n\n\nHow is it that primitive man, provided with five senses which bring him\ninto contact with the material world only, has found it possible to\nconceive the existence of an invisible world peopled with beings whom\nhis eyes cannot see, nor his hands touch, nor his ears hear?\n\nBetween the birth of human reason and the invention of writing a long\nperiod of time elapsed; when the art of writing was followed by that of\nprinting, man then printed all that he had thought and written, and at\npresent we possess thousands of volumes which will inform us on all the\ntruths and errors which have alternately illuminated and obscured the\nhuman mind.\n\nWhoever would take the trouble to examine this mass of documents, and\nread those which furnish an approximate estimate of the mental activity\nof our primitive ancestors, will see that the human _ego_ pursued\nscience unconsciously long before scholars appeared, and applied the\nname of philosophers to themselves, because they had sought patiently\nand with many discussions, through thousands of centuries, to find the\nbest way of arriving at the truth.\n\nThese ancestors of ours were of an enquiring turn of mind.\n\nThe appearance of religion amongst men is at the same time the most\nnatural and the most supernatural fact in the history of humanity.\n\nThe greater number of philosophers have recognised that the tendency of\nthe human mind to turn towards that which is outside the domain of the\nsenses is as powerful in man as the desire of eating and drinking is in\nall living beings. The ancients acknowledged this to be a true sense,\nas irresistible as the rest of the operations of our external senses,\nand they have well named it _sensus numinis_--the consciousness of the\ndivine. The desire of understanding the secrets with which the Unknown\nwas invested naturally led to the investigation of the influence which\nthese secrets might exercise on the destinies of mankind. Amongst\ncertain peoples this gave birth to the art of divination. To this they\nabandoned themselves in all sincerity, not doubting that omnipotent\nbeings would always be ready to make their will known to mortals.\n\nThe men of modern times have shown that they have the critical faculty\nmore highly developed, and their investigations have dealt more with\npractical matters. In the eighteenth century, writers, historians and\nphilosophers--Voltaire amongst the number--wishing to know how the\nphenomenon of mental religion appeared in the world, collected all the\ndata to be obtained from travellers concerning savages; they found\nthat without exception all believed in occult powers, as distinct from\nmaterial or human forces, and doubted not the efficacy of certain magic\narts in use amongst them to attract these powers to themselves, and\nto constrain them to act on their behalf. Judging by analogy these\nwriters contend that primitive man, doubtless impressed by the alarming\nphenomena of nature, would make search for the unknown beings around\nhim, whom the storms, the thunders and the lightnings obey, but these\nbeings were invisible, consequently there must be an invisible world in\ncommunication with the visible or human world.\n\nIn this way were the beliefs of the present-day savages supposed to be\nthose current at the dawn of religious conceptions of humanity.\n\nThe ignorance of a subject, of whatever nature, has never prevented\nthe laying down of axioms concerning that subject. Towards the end of\nthe eighteenth century some Portuguese navigators, who never embarked\nwithout providing themselves with talisman and amulet,--to protect\nthem during their voyages,--which they called _feiti\u00e7os_, seeing\nsome negroes of the Gold Coast prostrating themselves with every\nappearance of reverence, before bones, stones, or the tails of some\nanimals, concluded at once without further investigation that these\nwere considered as divinities by the negroes; and on their return to\ntheir native land, they spread the report that savage races worshipped\n_feiti\u00e7os_. This word _feiti\u00e7os_ corresponds to the Latin _factitius_,\nmeaning that which is made by hand, as the amulets were which belonged\nto the Portuguese sailors. The well-known President de Brosses used the\nname and promulgated the idea, and without having set foot on countries\ninhabited by negroes, composed and published a book on their fetishes.\nIn this manner the French language was enriched in 1760 by the new\nword fetish. All this seemed so natural and plausible that the word,\nand the idea of the adoration of fetishes became quite general; the\ntheory of the worship of fetishes penetrated rapidly, and took deep\nroot in the public mind, it found its way very readily into school\nbooks and manuals, and we were taught that the religion of savages\nconsists solely in the worship of fetishes, and learned writers draw\nthe conclusion that fetishism must necessarily have been the primitive\nreligion of humanity.\n\nWith what readiness do well-instructed persons, no less than the\nignorant, allow themselves to speak without sufficiently reflecting\non what they say. In order to elevate material objects, of whatever\nkind, to the rank of divinities, it would be necessary previously to\npossess the concept of a divinity. Writers on religion speak of that as\nexisting in primitive times which they seek to describe; they might\nas well say that primitive men mummified their dead before they had\n_m\u00fbm_ or wax to embalm them with. Fetishism cannot be considered as\nabsolutely primitive, seeing that from its nature it must presuppose\nthe previous growth of the predicate God. This idea of De Brosses and\nhis successors will remain for ever a striking anachronism in the\nhistory of religion.\n\nThe history of all primitive races opens with this note. \u201cMan is\nconscious of a divine descent, though made from the dust of the earth;\nthe Hindoo doubted it not, though he called Dyn his father, and Prithvi\nhis mother; Plato knew it when he said the earth produced men, but that\nGod formed them.\u201d\n\nOn the banks of the Rhine, Tacitus listened to the war-songs of the\nGermans; they were to him in an unknown tongue. \u201cIt resembles the\nwhisperings of birds,\u201d he said, but added, \u201cThey are cries of valour,\u201d\nand his ear caught the sound of two words which recurred frequently,\n\u201cTuisto Mannus!\u201d\n\nWe now know what formed the basis of these songs; the Germans were\ncelebrating their lineal ancestors under the names of Tuisto, and\nMannus, his son. Tuisto appears to have been one form of Tiu, the\nAryan god of light. Tacitus tells us that the Germans \u201ccalled by the\nnames of gods that hidden thing which they did not perceive except by\nreverence.\u201d[62] Mannus, so the Germans considered, sprang from the\nearth, which they venerated as their mother-earth who before nourishing\nher children on its fruits first gave them life. This Mannus, grandson\nof the god of light, meant originally man.\n\nCertain races living beyond the pale of organised religious systems\nhaving been interrogated have furnished the following information\nconcerning their belief.\n\nA very low race in India is supposed to worship the sun under the name\nof Chando or Cando; they declared to the missionaries who had settled\namongst them that Chando had created the world. \u201cHow is that possible!\nWho then has created the sun itself?\u201d They replied with \u201cWe do not mean\nthe visible Chando, but an invisible one.\u201d[63]\n\n\u201cOur god,\u201d said the original natives of California to those who asked\nin what god they believed, \u201cour god has neither father nor mother, and\nhis origin is quite unknown. But he is present everywhere, he sees\neverything even at midnight, though himself invisible to human eyes. He\nis the friend of all good people, and he punishes the evil-doers.\u201d\n\nA Blackfoot Indian, when arguing with a Christian missionary, said:\n\u201cThere were two religions given by the Great Spirit, one in a book for\nthe guidance of the white men, who, by following its teaching, will\nreach the white man\u2019s heaven; the other is in the heads of the Indians,\nin the sky, rocks, rivers and mountains. And the red men who listen to\nGod in nature, will hear his voice, and find at last the heaven beyond.\u201d\n\nThese Indians consider that that external nature which to us is at the\nsame time the veil and the revelation of the Divine, is sufficient to\nteach them so much concerning the Supreme Being that missionaries are\nsuperfluous.\n\nAmongst those whose thoughts are occupied by the origin of religious\nperception in man, there exist several theories; the first, that\nthe idea of infinity is a necessity to the mind of man, and that by\nenlarging the boundaries of space and of time, it arrives at that\nwhich is without space and without time. Thus may a true philosopher\nreason; but primitive man was no philosopher, and the infinite of\nphilosophy had no existence for him. Another theory is that man is\nnaturally endowed with religious instincts, which render him--alone\nof all living creatures--capable of perceiving the infinite in the\ninvisible; but the nature of this innate instinct not being clearly\ndefined, it is in vain that we try to explain one mystery by another.\nOthers again affirm that religious impressions were the result of a\nsupernatural revelation, but they seem vague with regard to the time in\nthe life of humanity, to which people, and in what manner this came to\npass. At the same time they draw attention to the fact that men have\nalways arrived at conclusions rapidly, and, as they consider, without\ndue reflection; one of these conclusions is that _God is_. Let us, for\nthe sake of argument, replace the word _man_ by the word _intuitive\nsense_ or apprehension, and we shall understand why this intuitive\nsense renders it a superfluous task to make great researches as to the\nreasons of man\u2019s decision that _God is_. This intuitive sense is wise,\nand utters at times great truths; but the philosophers who consider it\ntheir metier to seek for the reason of things are not content with what\nsatisfies intuitive sense, and they act on their right.\n\nIn our days the religious problem is viewed from two sides. What\nis understood by these words--the conception of God? This is the\nquestion of questions; and the names of the writers on the subject,\nboth philosophical and theological, are too numerous to give. It is a\npsychological and thought impelling study.\n\nHow did the idea of God first arise in the minds of primitive man? This\nis another question which few try and answer. It is a historical study.\n\nThis presentation of the problem is perhaps not calculated to inspire\nexcitement or let loose agitating passions; and apparently the\nend of the nineteenth century will not witness the renewal of the\nphilosophical debates on the subject which characterised the last half\nof the eighteenth.\n\nNever either, before or since, has there been so much agitation, nor\nhave men\u2019s minds been so tossed by diverse currents. Many various\ntheories were promulgated at the time, but opinions grouped themselves\nchiefly round two diametrically opposite schools of thought, towards\none or the other of which they leaned.\n\nAccording to Hume, Condillac and their adherents, matter alone exists;\nour understanding, our feelings, our will are only transformed\nsensations. This was pure materialism. Pure idealism was represented by\nBerkeley, who went so far as to deny the reality of matter; according\nto him the bodies making up the universe have no real existence; the\ntrue realities were God and the ideas He produced in us.\n\nThose who preserved their ancient beliefs were the most troubled, they\nbegan to ask themselves whether the foundations of their faith were\nsolid, and they much desired to see certain problems solved. These\nthoughts had exercised the minds of the sages of India, the thinkers of\nGreece, the dreamers of Alexandria, and the divines and scholars of the\nMiddle Ages. They were the old problems of the world, what we know of\nthe Infinite, the questions of the beginning and end of our existence;\nthe questions of the possibility of absolute certainty in the evidence\nof the senses, of reason or of faith.\n\nHow much was comprehended in these enquiries.\n\nOne hundred years previously, the cautious reasoner, Descartes, instead\nof asking \u201cWhat do we know?\u201d posed in its place the question, \u201cHow do\nwe know?\u201d\n\nThis was in fact a fundamental question which appealed to philosophers\nwho followed Descartes, as of the utmost importance, and they also\nasked themselves, \u201cAfter what manner does the human mind acquire what\nit knows?\u201d\n\nWhat is called Locke\u2019s tenet, \u201cNihil est in intellectu quod non ante\nfuerit in sensu,\u201d Leibnitz answered by \u201cNihil--nisi intellectus.\u201d Noir\u00e9\ngives this sentiment a fresh turn by saying: \u201cThere is nothing in this\nplant that was not already in the soil, the water and the atmosphere,\nbut that which causes this plant to be a plant.\u201d\n\nCondillac, who agreed with Locke, thus formulated his opinion: \u201cPenser\nc\u2019est sentir\u201d; or, \u201cIn order to feel it is necessary to possess\nsenses,\u201d which is self-evident.\n\nNevertheless, this sentence scandalised some of the philosophers, they\nconsidered it degraded thought. It degraded thought only in Condillac\u2019s\nmouth, since he and his school had previously taken out of _sentir_ or\nsensation all that possessed the right to be called thought; but for\nthose who admit that sensation is really impregnated with thought it is\nno degradation; it is then true to say that thought is sensation, in\nthe same way as an oak-tree may be said to be the acorn; and a little\nreflection will show us that \u201cthe acorn is far more wonderful than\nthe oak, and perceiving far more wonderful than thinking.\u201d This was\nnot acknowledged by some who disagreed as to the nature of reason and\nsensation; they considered the former a mysterious power that could\nonly be a direct gift of the Creator, and the senses, to which we owe\nour perceptions, appeared so natural and simple, as not to require a\nscientific explanation.\n\nIf philosophers, such as Descartes and Leibnitz, succeeded in\ninfluencing certain enlightened spirits, their language was not\nunderstood by the general public; and Berkeley\u2019s idealism when pushed\nto the extreme point, proved too abstract to counterbalance the\nsensualist doctrines; its language hardly penetrated beyond the inner\ncircle of the experts dealing with the subject, whereas the writings of\nLocke, Condillac and Hume permeated all classes of society; everywhere\nthe same questions were asked, and often unanswered amidst the maze of\nmetaphysics, in which it would have been difficult to obtain a precise\nexplanation of a science not yet clearly defined.\n\nIt is natural that reason after its high flight in pursuit of\ntruth, frightened by the obstacles met in its ascent, and by the\ncontradictions found in itself, should fall heavily to earth,\nexclaiming with Voltaire, \u201cO metaphysics, we are as advanced as in the\ntimes of the Druids.\u201d This same feeling of distrust towards proceedings\nwhich resulted only in hypothesis, was also expressed by Newton, who,\nrecognising that philosophy moved nowhere so freely nor with such\ncertainty as in the domain of facts, recently cried, \u201cO physics,\npreserve me from metaphysics.\u201d\n\n\u201cTowards the end of the eighteenth century the current public opinion\nhad been decidedly in favour of materialism, but a reaction was slowly\nsetting in in the minds of independent thinkers when Kant appeared\u201d; he\ncame so exactly in the nick of time that one almost doubts whether the\ntide was turning, or whether he turned the tide.\n\nTo sketch briefly the chief points in Kant\u2019s system such as he has\ngiven us in his book called _Critique of Pure Reason_, is a rash\nproceeding; my object, which is to satisfy the imperious and more\nimmediate wants of our moral being, could only be attained by ignoring\nthe irradicable difficulties; this is excusable if we, unlearned\nmembers of society, are to form any idea of this same philosophy.\n\nThe technical terms which abound in philosophical works are useful in\nthe exposition of a system, but rather the reverse for those who are\nstriving to grasp its salient features; for understanding these terms\npartially only, or not understanding them at all, they are tempted to\nimagine that they take in the meaning; this leads to vague notions\nbeing entertained on a subject which is nevertheless earnestly studied.\nGenerally I abstain from the use of esoteric terms, but Kant having\ncoined fresh ones to express his ideas it behoves us to use his own\nformula. To paraphrase them so as to render them intelligible without\nmultiplying them might only further obscure the sense, and yet, on the\nother hand, to enter freely into further developments would require a\nvolume, and the end would be better served by going direct to Kant\u2019s\nwork. Hence the embarrassment I feel on approaching the subject.\n\n\nKANT\u2019S TEACHING.\n\nKant undertook a work which no one before him had attempted.\nInstead of criticising, as was then the fashion, the result of our\nknowledge, whether in religion or in history, or science, he shut\nhis eyes resolutely to all that philosophy, whether sensualistic or\nspiritualistic asserted as true, and making Descartes his starting\npoint he boldly went to the root of the matter; he questioned whether\nhuman reason had the power of perceiving the truth, and in cases where\nthis power existed--but with limits--he sought to discover why these\nlimits existed. He therefore resolved to subject reason itself to his\nsearching analysis, and thus to assist, as it were, at the birth of\nthought. He accomplished this extraordinary task with an ease of which\nno one previously would have been capable.\n\nThe world is governed by immutable laws, and the human race is subject\nto them. Kant gives an account of those which it must necessarily obey\nin order to pass from a passive \u201cmirror\u201d into a conscious mind.\n\n\nSENSATION.\n\nIn any material object I may seek to obtain, such as a table, my\ninterests are concentrated in the table itself, not on the tools which\nthe workman has used in its manufacture; but if it were a question of\nthought, then the means by which it was produced by the human mind\nengage us; and these means, of course, consist in the proper use of the\ninstruments at man\u2019s disposal.\n\nThat which was at the origin of mankind is repeated at the birth of\nevery human being; he comes into the world in a lethargic condition,\nbut endowed with latent instincts which we name in one word, sense;\ncommon to man and to animals, it places them in relationship with the\nthings exterior to themselves; this sense, or capability of sensation,\nis merely the general faculty of feeling. No newly-born child would\nemerge from its torpor if it were not surrounded by material objects\nwhich affirm their presence by reacting on him; his first act, at the\nmoment when he perceives his surroundings is the transference of his\nown mind, until now isolated in itself alone, towards the objects which\nsolicit his attention.\n\nThe sense which operates in each child is inward, we name it\nbriefly--sensation--to distinguish it from the five external senses,\nwhich are more familiar to us, since even at school their functions and\nmodes of action have been explained to us.\n\nFor instance, we know that it is only necessary to touch the strings of\nan instrument to cause them to vibrate, the vibrations are communicated\nto the air, and are then called waves of sound; they diffuse themselves\nwith an incredible swiftness in space, advancing and retreating in the\nmanner of the waves of the sea, they reach our ears, touch the auditory\nnerve, cause the tympanum to vibrate, penetrate to the brain, and give\nus instantaneously the sensation of sound. And it is to the waves of\nlight passing through the ether, and communicating with the optic\nnerve of the organ of sight, that we owe the sensation of sight of the\nobjects before us.\n\nThe vacant look of a newly-born infant, implies that it has undergone\nan experience, it has felt something of the nature of a shock; a shock\nalways implies resistance and yielding. In the child it is the human\neye becoming conscious of itself amidst the impressions produced on\nit by the confused sight of external objects, and hearing the noises\nwhich occur around him. This instance is analogous to the vibratory\nmovement of the waves described and even drawn in all manuals on\nphysics.\n\nIt is strange that a natural phenomenon which learned men have taken\nsome trouble to analyse, should find expression in the following\ncommonplace phrase. \u201cFrom the clash of opinions light is generated.\u201d If\nthis phrase were not only on our lips, but also implanted in our mind,\nwe should more readily have grasped the physiological fact of sensation.\n\nSensation plays such an important part in the world of humanity, that\nall the sciences, both physical and moral, deal with it; but we, who\ngrumble so readily and continuously at feeling either too hot or too\ncold, probably never enquire what philosophy has to do with purely\nbodily impressions.\n\nSensations come to us from without, but they would leave us in a\ncondition of perturbation only, if whilst receiving them we were\npassive as a mirror on which external objects are reflected; we might\nhave continued to sleep--perchance to dream--if a mental act on our\npart did not mark the awakening of our intelligence when in contact\nwith the material world, and thus have proved the existence of a power\nwithin us hitherto latent, but quite capable of accepting, knowing, and\nrealising sensations which come to us without having been summoned.\n\nWe are nearing the solution of the problem. Descartes had asked: How\nwe know. Kant had clearly explained that all our knowledge has its\ncommencement in our senses, which give us pure intuitions, that is to\nsay, a clear direct view of external objects, and he also proved that\nintelligence would not have been aroused without the aid of material\nobjects. But still greater discoveries awaited Kant.\n\nWe feel that nothing in ourselves is so free as thought. It comprehends\nthe whole world, it mounts to the stars, it descends to the bowels of\nthe earth, arrested perhaps in its path by special objects on which it\ndwells at will; but although free to encircle the universe, it may not\nchoose its path, thought is obliged--like the sun--to follow one which\nhas been previously traced out for it; of this we can readily convince\nourselves.\n\n\nSPACE AND TIME.\n\nAll objects of which we become conscious must be placed by us in the\nimagination side by side in space, and at a distance from ourselves,\nhere or there; as being now present, or as having been, or about to\nbe; but always in succession, _i.e._, in time, time past, present and\nfuture.\n\nAccording to Kant, Space and Time are two fundamental or inevitable\nconditions of all sensuous manifestations, and he was the first to\nobserve that they are imposed by so absolute a power that no effort, on\nour part, would enable us to escape from them, any more than we could\navoid seeing the light of day at noon, unless we are either blind or\nhave our eyes shut.\n\nWe must make it clear that what we call Space and Time, being forms of\nour sensuous intuition, do not exist apart from ourselves, or, as Max\nM\u00fcller says, \u201cdepend on us as recipients, as perceivers.\u201d It is we who\nsay there can be no _Here_ without a _There_, and no _Now_ without a\n_Then_; and this is necessary, since we are dependent on the mould of\nour minds, which work in accordance with their constitutions.\n\n\nPHENOMENA.\n\nWhen opening a dictionary at the letters P. H. E. we should soon arrive\nat the word Phenomenon and its meaning: whatever is presented to the\nsenses, or affects us physically or morally.\n\nAs long as knowledge comes to us only by the way of our senses, it\nfollows that in speaking of affinity, electricity and magnetism as\nnatural phenomena, which are known to us only by their effect on Space\nand Time, we speak in accordance with our method of representation, and\nnot as they are _in themselves_, since we have not the least idea what\nthese natural forces are _in themselves_. We recognise musical sounds\nbecause our ears hear them, and we appreciate colours because our eyes\nsee them; we take cognisance of them as they appear to us, but we are\nignorant of both the one and the other as they are in actuality, that\nis independently of our organs which correspond to them. Thus all the\nobjects that we know--from the manner of our knowledge--become for us\nphenomena, and the world in which we live is a world of phenomena.\n\n\nTHE CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING.\n\nBesides these fundamental forms of sensuous intuition Space and Time,\nKant by his analysis of Pure Reason discovered other conditions of our\nknowledge which could not have come from without. He divides them into\ntwelve distinct classes, and in the phraseology of philosophy they\nare called Categories of the Understanding. Aristotle had previously\narranged a table of Categories, but in his Logic Aristotle concerns\nhimself with the laws of thought in general, the abstraction derived\nfrom the practical use made of them; whilst Kant studies the facts\nfirst themselves, or first principles, in their relation with certain\nfixed objects.\n\nThe different categories have certain traits in common, not a single\none of our thoughts but will find a place in the one or the other.\nAnother feature which characterises all is, that without them no\nexperience would be possible, they rule our understanding. This is\nvery marked in the category called Plurality. Let us try to think\nof anything without thinking of it at the same time as one or many,\nand we shall find it an impossibility. We cannot think of an apple or\nspeak of an apple without picturing more than one; and Max M\u00fcller has\ndemonstrated that rational speech is impossible, if we cannot when\nspeaking decide whether the subject of a sentence consists of one or\nmany.\n\n\nCAUSE AND EFFECT.\n\nThe ideas of _Cause_ and _Effect_ belong to those first principles\nthat reason draws from itself, and the category of causality is one\nof the most important. We never experience a sensation, of whatever\nkind, without attaching it, involuntarily and necessarily, to some\nexternal object which we know possesses the qualities corresponding to\nour sensations. Thus the impressions of heat or cold, sweet or bitter,\nblue or yellow, evoke immediately the picture of certain objects which\nare hot or cold, such as fire or ice; or which are sweet or bitter,\nsuch as sugar or absinth; or blue, as the sky; or yellow, as the lemon;\nand these external objects we consider as the causes, and our bodily\nsensations as the effects.\n\n\nAXIOMS.\n\nThere are certain universal truths which are self-evident, and were\nevolved not by experience only or argument, nor science, as they are\nthe natural appanage of common-sense, _e.g._, such axioms as the\nfollowing: the whole is greater than the part; a straight line is the\nshortest distance between two points; each body occupies space; every\nevent occupies time; every effect has a cause. All these are more\ncertain than that the sun will rise to-morrow; common-sense has always\nknown them, and the entire human race has not waited for the coming of\nKant to recognise these facts.\n\nIt is strange that the majority of men who know so many things that are\ntrue by intuition, often make mistakes when they begin to reflect. They\nimagine that all things falling under their observation have the power\nof making themselves known directly, as if they entered an empty space\nin the imagination which was ready to receive them. Are they ignorant\nof the fact that in order to think of an external object, it is not\nnecessary to have it in actuality--as it exists in nature--before one\u2019s\neyes, but that it suffices to imprint its image on the mind? This is\nvery simple, and no doubt common-sense itself would see a truism which\nmight be passed in silence. \u201cWhat is there extraordinary,\u201d common-sense\nmight say, \u201cif in thinking of a lemon, for instance, there should be at\nonce presented to the mind a yellow fruit, of acid flavour, and of a\ncertain shape--a lemon in fact?\u201d\n\nThis remark is useful only in showing our natural incapacity for\nexperiencing a sensation, of whatever kind, without connecting it\nwith an external object possessing corresponding attributes to the\nsensation, and which was its cause.\n\nIn any case the truism is not to be ignored, since Aristotle, great\nphilosopher as he was, did not consider it beneath his dignity to\nemploy it. He said: \u201cI think of a stone; the stone is not in my mind,\nbut its form is.\u201d\n\nTo prove to common-sense that its remark has no connection with\nthe thesis recently laid down, would serve no good purpose. A\npersonal mental act, if it be lawful to personate a quality, would\nalone convince common-sense of its error; but when once convinced\ncommon-sense would then have changed to something higher than it had\npreviously been. It will have mounted up one stage towards reason, and\nin following this route under the guidance of increasing reason, it\nwill end by understanding this truth as demonstrated by Kant: he who\ncannot distinguish a real object from its representation will never\nunderstand the working of the human mind.\n\nThe importance of this truth must excuse my digression.\n\n\nMETAPHYSICS.\n\nThe name of Kant will always be intimately connected with the word\nmetaphysics, not because he buried himself in it, as some have supposed\nwho only know his system of philosophy by hearsay; but because his\nlabours consisted in forbidding reason to approach this science which\nis constantly threatening to invade it, and to get the upper hand by\nputting itself in its place.\n\nKant was the first to trace with decision the line of demarcation\nbetween the knowledge of which our reason is capable, and that of\nwhich it is incapable. No one has drawn so sharp a line between the\nknowable and the unknowable; this was to explain metaphysics. Alfred\nFouill\u00e9e has defined them as \u201cthe critical study of problems which the\nmind seeks to unravel from a necessity of its nature, although another\nnecessity of its nature renders it incapable of solving them\u201d--such is\nmetaphysics.\n\nThis definition is excellent, but for those who make no preparatory\nstudies in philosophy it would present itself rather in this form. If\ncertain questions are of necessity presented to the mind which it finds\nit impossible to solve, it follows that the mind would necessarily\ncontradict itself. Thus this succinct definition of Fouill\u00e9e requires\nto be itself defined.\n\nNoir\u00e9, whilst giving more details, is also more exact. \u201cMetaphysics\nis only explained on the condition that we understand the nature\nof our power of understanding, in so far as, on the one part, this\npower is actively manifested in experience, and secondly, in so\nfar as it possesses anteriorly to any experience, and to anything\nobserved, certain ideas without which there could not possibly or even\nconceivably, be any impression made in the human mind.\u201d I am afraid\nthat this explanation of Noir\u00e9 will also be lost upon those who are not\nexperienced in the subject.\n\nThe explanation of Schopenhauer is not less definite, and is more\nconcise than the two preceding. The foundation upon which all our\nknowledge and all our science rests, is the incomprehensible--I fancy\nthat the uninitiated will be equally unable to understand this.\n\nIt is not surprising. Philosophers speak a language of their own, which\nmust be learnt before it can be understood, which is the case with all\nlanguages.\n\nKant develops this thesis with greater simplicity and clearness. \u201cAs\nlong as the human intellect moves in the sphere of the senses and of\nexperience it is safe; this sphere is very vast; it is there that all\nphenomena may be known which appears in space and time, that is to say,\nall belonging to the phenomenal world in which we live. But if the\nintellect rebels against the gaoler which holds it captive in the magic\ncircle, breaks its chains and enters into the region of ideals, it will\nerr.\u201d\n\nKant relates the following anecdote: \u201cA dove, which found great\npleasure in spreading its wings, was troubled because this pleasure\nwas of short duration; the simple bird was ignorant of the fact that\nits structure did not admit of its taking flights such as the swallow\nenjoys; not divining the real cause of its inability, it blamed the\nfluid ether whose resisting power it had felt, and thought how much\nbetter it would fly \u2018in vacuo.\u2019\u201d The dove was mistaken.\n\nKant\u2019s crowning merit is having discovered the object of metaphysics\nnot only in the categories of the understanding, without which, as\nNoir\u00e9 says, no impression on the human mind would be possible, or even\nconceivable, but chiefly in the power, inherent in our nature, of\nresisting or yielding to impressions. It is this power, according to\nKant, which constitutes the transcendental side of our knowledge.\n\nThe empirical school of philosophers is tried by Kant\u2019s recognition\nof the transcendental principle in man. Its members accuse the\nspiritualists of seeking to raise human nature beyond its proper level,\nand of wishing at the same time to open an inlet for other truths which\nclaim a mysterious character and a superhuman authority. But Kant is\nthe very last person to encourage the thought; on the contrary, through\nthe whole of his philosophy he insists that these _\u00e0 priori_ forms, or\nantecedent conditions of knowledge, have no authority whatever \u201cexcept\nin and for experience,\u201d and to use the category of causality, for\ninstance, in order to establish the existence of God is, according to\nKant, a philosophical blunder.\n\n\u201cIf only we could always remember the first intentions of our words,\nmany philosophical difficulties would vanish.\u201d In Greek \u03bf\u1f30\u03b4\u03b1 meant\noriginally, I have seen, and therefore I know. In a court of justice\nthe witness who says, \u201cI saw\u201d can hardly say anything more convincing.\nTo apply such a word to our knowledge of causes, forces, and faculties\nwould be a solecism--to apply it to God would be self-contradictory.\n\nEach of the abstract definitions of metaphysics given by Alfred\nFouill\u00e9e, Noir\u00e9, and Schopenhauer contains the leading conception of\nthe subject; if presented in more simple language it would be within\nthe comprehension of all; our understanding is blind to all with which\nit is not made acquainted by intuition derived from experience. Those\nthings for which we have a strong desire, of which we have a certain\nconviction, but which are outside the sphere of our actual life,\n\u201cfor these,\u201d as Max M\u00fcller says in this connection, \u201cwe want another\nword which should mean--I have not seen and yet I know, and that\nis--faith.\u201d[64] Our senses may not always authorise us to affirm their\nreality. God and the future life are not made the subjects of phenomena.\n\nAll that I have said as to what distinguishes knowledge acquired by\nthe senses from that which is anterior to all experience (Kant was the\nfirst to make this distinction), might seem simple to those heedless\nminds which are surprised at nothing, but complicated and confused\nto minds however little attentive, and quite useless to the rest of\nus. There may be something of truth in each of these primitive and\nsuperficial estimations, but the whole truth is that all this is very\nscientific, so scientific as to require a Kant to enable those who\nreflect to give a lucid account of it.\n\nIt was by the help of this learned science that Kant broke the serried\nranks of his antagonists. Confronted by two philosophical opinions,\nboth of which he considered erroneous, he proved to the materialists\nCondillac, Hume, and Locke, that there is something within us which\ncould never have been supplied from without, which therefore belongs to\nour ego, that is to say to the subject thinking and not to the object\nthought of, or matter; then turning against the Idealists of the time\nof Berkeley, he shows that there is something without us which could\nnever have been supplied from within; and when he proved that intellect\nand matter are correlative, that they exist for each other, depend on\neach other, form together a whole that should never have been torn\nasunder, two streams of philosophic thought, which had been running in\nseparate beds, met for the first time.\n\nThe existence of the phenomenal world being proved by the irrefragable\ntestimony of the senses, is admitted also by reason, and, as a\nnecessary consequence, another, not only in appearance, but which _will\nbe_, assuredly; as sound is independent of our hearing, as material\nobjects are independent of our sight; for though Kant declares our\ninability to know objects as they are in themselves, he does not\ndeny their existence, since he says, \u201cWe should be capable, if not\nof knowing things as they are in themselves, at least of knowing\nthem as they are to us, otherwise we should arrive at the irrational\nconclusion, that there may be appearances without something that\nappears.\u201d\n\nKant undertook to make an exact science of the necessary and universal\nideas of the human mind, such as logic and mathematics, which are parts\nof human knowledge; to this end he wrote _Critique of Pure Reason_,\nafterwards he composed another work, the _Critique of Practical\nReason_. Practical reason may also be called pure, in as much as it\ndoes not allow itself to be influenced by anything but what proceeds\nfrom itself, and reason becomes practical when it seeks an independent\nprinciple which determines the will. This principle is formulated by\nKant in the following terms: \u201cLet each individual follow commands which\nmay be considered as a universal law imposed alike on all human beings.\u201d\n\nThis law, which man possesses in his conscience, does not stop half way\nin its exactions from man since it aims at perfection, it commands man\nto love his neighbour, and to do good even to his enemy. To love and to\ndo acts of kindness when pleasant to oneself is natural, and requires\nno command, but, otherwise, a law is required to coerce the will, the\nman who submits is free, since he can choose to infringe or to obey it;\nobedience to the moral law constitutes duty, which must be accomplished\nbecause it is our duty, and embodies the satisfaction felt in its\nperformance.\n\nMan is under an obligation to be moral and to do his duty, but not\nnecessarily to be happy, yet he demands happiness. The union of virtue\nand happiness being the _summum bonum_, we must acknowledge the\nexistence of a power external to ourselves, endowed with intellect\nand will, which makes this union possible; this power is known to us\nby the name of God. The perfect good is holiness; this life is too\nshort to enable us to attain to it in its perfection, it is therefore\na necessity that our life should be prolonged beyond the term of years\nspent on this earth, thus we are assured of the survival of the soul\nafter what we term death.\n\nThus Kant speaks in his _Critique of Practical Reason_.\n\nI may now be permitted to speak and give my own opinion. I hear the\nPositivist perhaps say: \u201cThis result might be considered conceivable\nif all that has been previously said were true; but to infer from the\ndesire for happiness that a supernatural power must infallibly satisfy\nit might be a hallucination, or at least a hypothesis.\u201d If this were\nso we need not deride hypotheses; in the domain of human knowledge\nreason would not be itself if it never made ventures in scientific\ndiscoveries; its path starts from the possible in making excursions\nfrom the known to the unknown, in going from darkness to light--hence\nthen hypothesis.\n\nThere is also this fact to notice, some of the most important of our\nacts are not guided by reason, it acts as a spectator; for instance,\nreason is not active when we have perception of an object, and\nintuitions occur in us without the intervention of reason.\n\nThis was well understood by certain men who have come forward from time\nto time from the multitude, the bearers of inspired messages to the\nworld; they have spoken of those things which \u201ceye hath not seen nor\near heard,\u201d and they were hard to be understood of the people; but each\none alike said: \u201cI give no proof of the truth of what I assert; do as I\nsay, and you will know the truth of my words.\u201d\n\nThere remains little more to be said on the subject of Kant. There is\na serious omission in the system of this profound thinker.\n\nNothing has so stopped the progress of Darwin\u2019s great conception as\nthe injudicious efforts of his so-called disciples to bring it to\nperfection. Instead of correcting their chief, they should have weighed\nthoughtfully all Kant\u2019s arguments against the materialism of his\nadversaries, and have sought to refute them; if they had succeeded in\nproving that Kant makes a mistake when he admits that there is in man a\nprinciple quite distinct from his body, they would have been authorised\nin replacing Darwin\u2019s theory by their own; if they had not succeeded,\nDarwin and his theory would have remained unshaken, but they would be\nannihilated.\n\nMax M\u00fcller examines the question from another point of view. \u201cWe admit\nthat as we know nothing, except by analogy, of the mind of animals,\nwe could not with the weapons that Kant has placed in our hands, make\nhead against the assertion that they might possess, for all we know,\nthe same forms of sensuous intuition and the same categories of the\nunderstanding which we possess. Nothing, therefore, could have been\nsaid from a purely philosophical point of view, against treating man\nas a mere variety of some other genus of animals.\u201d[65] But as the\norigin of language was to Kant less than a secondary question--it\nmight almost be said to have no existence for him--it belongs to the\nscience of language to show, what Kant had never shown, that for all\nhuman knowledge not only were percepts and concepts necessary, but also\nnames. How was it that it did not occur to Kant since he perceived that\nthere were mathematics of the forms or manifestations of sensation,\nnamely, time or duration and space? He said well: Each object of which\nwe think is attached in time or space to another; this can only be done\nby the use of such indications as _now_, _then_, _here_, _there_; and\nhe saw in this gradation of perception, the first step towards the act\nof counting, that is to say of reasoning, and consequently of speaking;\nall of which was comprehended by the Greeks in their word Logos. As\nan instance the word _cent_ exists in every language, but _cent_ in\nFrench consists only of four letters placed side by side one after the\nother, and would never be anything else to us if we could not count;\nbut to count is to add and to take away, that is to say, addition and\nsubtraction, thus to conceive and name; in order to possess a hundred\nobjects, it does not suffice to see them only, it is necessary to count\nthem up to the hundred.\n\nThese two works of Kant\u2019s, the _Critique of Pure Reason_ and the\n_Critique of Practical Reason_ appear to emanate from two different\npens; in the first, whatever is asserted is proved. The second work is\ndictated by a personal experience; Kant affirms that thus it is and\nthat it cannot be otherwise. But here again I perceive a lack, a want,\nif not from the believer\u2019s point of view, yet from that of those people\nwho ask what could be the religion of our primitive ancestors; personal\nexperience is not expressed as Kant expresses it, unless it is the\nresult of a long series of meditations and examinations of conscience;\nin a word, experiences which have been transmitted from generation to\ngeneration. This is a religion that has achieved much, it is not that\nform of it which would be found amongst the generality of men, and\nstill less would it spring to life in the heart of primitive man.\n\nBut here are two positivist philosophers who undertake to solve this\ngreat problem: they consider reason as ready with a reply to those who\nseek to know the meaning of God and of religion, two concepts which\nare inseparable, the one from the other; and even ready to explain how\nthese two concepts have penetrated into the consciousness of all human\nbeings. These philosophers speak no doubt from experience, for having\nquestioned their reason it has replied to them: God and religion form\none conception.\n\nThe first explanation is--man is conscious of his condition; he is\npossessed with the desire of happiness, and is unable to realise it;\nbut his imagination represents to him another state in which the desire\nof happiness will exist and in which there will be no obstacle to its\nrealisation; the first of these states is real, the other visible to\nthe mind\u2019s eye; they are therefore not identical; to will and not to\nhave the power is to be man; to will and to be omnipotent is to be God.\nLittle by little man understands that these two states of conditions\nhaving been conceived by the same mind, have the same origin; the\nnotion fixes itself firmly in his mind that the two states seem\ngradually to approach each other, and are not always distinguishable;\nthe union of desire and power is the Divine essence; the growing\nconsciousness of this union is religion, which dawns and increases in\nman.\n\nMan does not desire immortality because he believes in it, nor because\nit is demonstrable; but he believes in it and demonstrates its\nexistence because he desires it. The sentence, \u201cGod sees all,\u201d does not\nmean, so we are told, what it appears to mean; it expresses the feeling\nGod knows all of which man is ignorant, but which he fain would know;\nand the sentence, \u201cGod is beneficence,\u201d is the cry of man who desires\nhappiness. All the predicates applied by man to the Deity in the course\nof history and humanity have never, in the opinion of philosophers, had\nany other origin than the representation of our wishes.\n\nBut the inner combat, which has been long and unhappy, with no truce,\nhas exhausted man\u2019s powers, and when the despondency checks, and at\ntimes almost paralyses his flight after happiness, the instinct of\nself-preservation leads him towards religion; as this instinct with the\nincapacity of satisfying it is inseparable in man, motives of religion\nare renewed continually in each individual and consequently in the\nmultitude.\n\nGod and religion, _i.e._ the outward sign of our union with God,\nyet emanates from ourselves. This system, of which Feuerbach is the\nexponent, has many followers amongst the Positivists.\n\nThe second explanation comes from a learned member of the extreme\nPositivist school in Germany; but, as Max M\u00fcller says, it would\nbe impossible to represent religion in a worse light ... \u201cand it\nwould be difficult to take a lower view of it.\u201d[66] According to Dr\nGruppe, religion exists simply because it satisfies certain selfish\ninstincts of man. He notices two. The first instinct is common to all\norganic beings; it tends towards the preservation of the individual,\nand consequently to that of the race; it is elementary, and acts\nfrom within outwards. The second instinct belongs only to man taken\ncollectively, and has vitality only in numbers; it belongs to a more\nadvanced stage, and acts from without inwardly. Man instinctively\ngrasps the greatest amount of happiness possible; he therefore seeks\nthat which he considers his greatest good, not after the fashion of the\nbeasts, but in his own way.\n\n\u201cWe call religious belief,\u201d says Dr Gruppe, \u201ca belief in an indefinable\nstate or being which we strive to bring into our sphere, and to render\npermanent by means of sacrificial ceremonies, prayers, penances, and\nself-denial.\u201d[67]\n\nThis indefinable something, the professor considers, would never\nhave appeared in the world without an impulsion, however light; an\naccidental movement, a casual combination of a disordered brain, and\na personality endowed with a certain amount of energy, would have\nsufficed to make a single individual the author of an idea totally\nopposed to man\u2019s good possession common sense, and the originator of\na movement which must find in the surroundings in which it came to\nlife, all facilities for its indefinite perpetuation. It is of no\nconsequence whether this mental phenomenon has been produced in one\nindividual or in more; figures are of little account in the matter.\nIf this disease called hallucination[68] had remained confined in the\ncircumscribed sphere of one individual or a few, a personal intelligent\neffort might have overcome it, but being contagious and spreading\namongst the people it became impossible to conquer it. The natural laws\nof reason once violated, the perturbed mind created a succession of\nsophistical arguments which appeared to satisfy the ineradicable desire\nfor happiness in man; and an incredibly tenacious opposition on the\nside of error assumed menacing proportions. If the belief that the sun,\ninstead of disappearing each night below the horizon, would continue to\nshine during the night could in any way contribute to the happiness of\nmankind, men would slowly but surely have accepted it.\n\nThe man who isolates himself from his fellow men and becomes\nself-absorbed is peculiarly apt to create for himself mental pictures\nwhich give him pleasure; if, then, joy is indispensable to man\u2019s\nexistence, the religion which gives it, or the illusion of it, enables\nhim to forget the tangible world, and substitute an imaginary one\npeopled with phantoms. But the solitary man is a rare phenomenon, and\nwe judge favourably those men who live in the midst of their social\nsurroundings, and whose community of ideas and sentiments has made a\nhomogeneous whole, during many centuries. Each one will find means\nto develop his personal faculties, and to strengthen his power of\nresistance in the struggle of all against all, and the good which is\nillusive in the solitary man becomes a benefit to the members of the\nsociety.\n\nReligion might possibly cease to exist, in Gruppe\u2019s opinion, were it\nnot for the inequalities of man\u2019s condition, and for the troubles which\nfollow him; but the action of religion is helpful to society.[69] It\ntells the poor not to hanker after riches which are not lasting. It\nmirrors for them images of future compensations, thus the rich and the\nnoble here are enabled to enjoy their pleasures on earth in safety. In\nits name bright hopes are built up for the wretched, and it takes its\nstand in front of the palaces of the rich; sedatives are prescribed\nfor incurables, and rich foods for those who can pay for them. Charity\nis preached to the compassionate, and persecutions to the fanatics: at\ntimes it encourages the use of arts and sciences; at times it warns\nits followers not to love overmuch the beautiful in art, nor to seek\ntoo earnestly the truth in science. But the outcome of this religion,\nwhether good or the reverse, is of small importance compared with the\nbenefits it renders to society. It is the support of the civil and\nmoral law, and in lighting the hymeneal torch it adds to the sanctity\nof families.\n\nWithout attributing selfish motives, in the lowest sense, to the\nfounders of the various religions and sects which flourish in our\nmidst, Gruppe considers all of them unconscious egoists; he thinks that\nhad they been calm psychologists, which sincere prophets are not, they\nwould have recognised in themselves the attraction that glory had for\nthem; but in that case they would not have remained faithful unto the\ndeath, and the power of communicating their own spirit and force to\ntheir adherents would have failed them. Gruppe distinguishes with great\nkeenness the reflex action of our desire for happiness, which is no\nother than the instinct of self-preservation, from the motives which\nare sufficient to inspire certain enthusiasts to found new religions;\nthese two things are in reality quite distinct, although they may act\nin concert; the desire for universal and permanent happiness paves the\nway for the manifestation of individual enthusiasm; he asserts that\nreligions, while professing to found a new kingdom of heaven, only\nsucceed in inheriting the kingdom of this world.\n\nThe struggle between an extreme positivism and a true idealism is a\nsight that energises earnest men. Evidently impressed by the exposition\nof the spiritualist doctrine, the learned doctor remarks: \u201cThe first\nperception of the infinite, of law and order in nature, communicated an\nimpulse to the mind of man; but this force, when once in movement, did\nnot slacken before having called forth in our ancestors the conviction\nthat all is right and good, and the hope--even more than hope--that\nall would be right and good. Such is the celebrated system of Max\nM\u00fcller. It is not only the great personal worth of the author that\nobliges us to give it close consideration, but also the fact that this\nsystem is the most eloquent exposition of an idea which has also been\nexpressed by other writers in some remarkable works on the history of\nreligions. The position in which Max M\u00fcller has placed himself for a\nstarting-point is, from a positivist point of view, impregnable.\u201d\n\nThis commendation, which is particularly striking, coming as it does\nfrom one of Max M\u00fcller\u2019s fiercest adversaries, I have quoted word for\nword.\n\nGruppe is not only a positivist philosopher, but also learned in\nEastern languages and literature, and a clever mythologist; it would\nhave been better had he confined himself to fields of labour with which\nhe was acquainted. But as he admits that there is psychological and\nspontaneous thought in man, side by side with the rational, he cannot\nbut acknowledge the right of humanity to say what it thinks. There\nare certain literary documents which show us what the human mind has\nthought in all ages and in all places, and we are of opinion that these\nsentiments have not varied.\n\nIt is said that an universal belief in any fact is not a proof of\nthe existence of this fact, and that consequently the conception of\nsuper-sensible things need have no real basis; the observation is\njust; I shall reply to it by a question. Is it possible to demonstrate\nthat this belief in things that cannot be proved is not only universal\nbut even inevitable? If it were possible much would be gained. In\ngeometrical calculations it is sufficient to know that three dimensions\nonly exist,--at least in this world--that the straight line is the\nshortest, that two parallel lines never meet; it should suffice to know\nthat in this world belief, whether rational or illusory, in one or more\ndivinities, is inevitable for men constituted as we are.\n\nOur first fathers no doubt pictured a large space situated on the\nfurther side of all that they could see, and we know how their\nimagination peopled it with confused images, either hidden, or seen in\nthe visible phenomena.\n\nThese flights of fancy, which may have lasted thousands of centuries,\nbecame crystallised at last in the mythologies of all peoples, and it\nis these mythologies by which we gain access to this initial stage\nin the life of humanity, and which preserves for us the traces of\nthis eternal truth amidst many extravagances of the fancy misled\nby language, which guided their first steps. There is a petrified\nphilosophy in mythology.\n\nSince history and legend, in one form or another, have voiced the\nfeelings called religion, these feelings, variously interpreted, have\nchanged their aspect from age to age, and from country to country; as\nlong as we have not traced the stream to its source, the question, as\nto the manner in which the conception of God had birth in the human\nmind, will always be before us.\n\nWe take man at the time when he had recently appeared on the earth,\nhis sole possession being his five senses, which place him in contact\nwith the external world. We must distinguish between two classes of\nsenses; those of touch, scent, and taste being more evident; from the\nevolutionist\u2019s point of view the sense of touch has the largest share\nin the building up of the human edifice which arose later; its use\nis chiefly connected with the hands, and has thus given us the word\n_manifest_; that which we call certainty hardly exists for us apart\nfrom what is manifest. The two other senses, sight and hearing, are\nless sure, and have frequently to be verified by those first named.\n\nThe objects of which we obtain knowledge by means of our senses can be\ndivided into tangible, semi-tangible and intangible. The first are,\nfor instance, a stone, a bone, a fruit, the skin of an animal, these\ncan be touched as it were all round, and we are able to assert their\nreality. The second, the semi-tangible, might be a river, a mountain,\nthe earth, a tree. We stand by the banks of a river and dip our hand\nin the small volume of water passing away before our eyes; we can also\ntouch the ground on which we are standing, also the trunk of the tree\nbeneath which we are sitting; but it is only an insignificant part of\nwhich we assert the reality by touching it, all the other parts remain\nunknown to us; for the river itself consists of a large mass of waters\nspringing from a source which is not seen and flowing towards a spot\nwhich we may never see; we are told that the earth is in the shape of\na globe, and that this globe is suspended in air, which fact it would\nbe difficult to verify; the tree is small in comparison with the river\nand the earth, and yet how little we know of it, whence come its buds,\nand its leaves, and the sap which rises each spring in the branches?\nWe say of a beam that it is dead wood, but of the tree we say that it\ngrows and lives; what is this life of the tree? We are in the presence\nof the unknown. These are samples of semi-tangible objects. The sense\nof touch has no place with regard to the sky, the stars, the clouds,\nthe winds; those are intangible objects, which we see and feel without\nknowing them by personal grasp; the proof of their existence is also\nin the fact that years of work are required to know astronomy and\nmeteorology.\n\nWe now have primitive man provided with fine senses, in presence of\nthese natural phenomena, and the problem to be solved is this: How is\nit that this man is able to think and to speak of things which are not\nfinite, finite things being the only ones of which his senses make him\ncognisant?\n\n\u201cI have before me,\u201d says Max M\u00fcller, \u201ca school of philosophy adverse\nto my views; I am warned that nothing I say will be accepted, unless\nI submit to the conditions imposed on me. I am told: \u2018You pretend\nto prove that man can know that God exists; whereas we affirm that\nthe great triumph of our age is that we have proved that religion is\nan illusion. All knowledge must pass through two gates, the gate of\nthe senses and the gate of reason, consequently religious knowledge\neven can enter by no other gate.\u2019 In this way does positivism bar\nthe entrance which Kant left open, who in his definition of religion\nconsidered morality the basis of it, which with him presupposed the\nexistence of God. Positivism refuses to hear a psychological and\nhistorical explanation of one of the greatest psychological and\nreligious facts--namely, religion; it stops its ears when we say _Nihil\nest in fide quod non ante fuerit in sensu_; but we are not discouraged\nby the absurdity of imagining that by shutting our eyes, we can\nannihilate facts; we accept the struggle on the common ground on which\nthe positivist and we have decided to fight; we also agree to use the\nweapons chosen for us. Let us inspect the battlefield and measure the\nground. Both sides seem in accord that all consciousness begins with\nsensuous perception, with what we feel, and hear, and see; what is\nlikewise granted is that out of this we construct what may be called\nconceptual knowledge, consisting of collective and abstract concepts.\nThe conditions of the combat are fixed; at the two gates of the senses\nand reason we take our stand; whatever claims to have entered in by\nany other gate, whether that gate be called primeval revelation, or\nreligious instinct,[70] must be rejected as contraband of thought; and\nwhatever claims to have entered in by the gate of reason without having\nfirst passed through the gate of the senses, will equally be rejected,\nas without sufficient warrant.\u201d[71]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[62] Tac. Germ. 9. \u201cDeorumque nominibus appellant secretum illud quod\nsola reverentia vident,\u201d from Max M\u00fcller\u2019s _Origin and Growth of\nReligion_, p. 94.\n\n[63] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 214.\n\n[64] _Science of Thought_, p. 609.\n\n[65] _Science of Thought_, p. 125.\n\n[66] _Natural Religion_, pp. 74, 77.\n\n[67] _Ibid._, p. 76.\n\n[68] It is not surprising that Max M\u00fcller says, \u201cWe are not likely\nto allow ourselves to be persuaded by Dr Gruppe that the only source\nof religion all over the world was hallucination.\u201d--_Anthropological\nReligion_, p. 126.--TRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE.\n\n[69] Max M\u00fcller remarks: \u201cHis (Dr Gruppe\u2019s) definition of religion\nis at all events too narrow; it might possibly be found to apply\nto religion, not in its original, but in its most depraved\nstate.\u201d--_Natural Religion_, p. 77.--TRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE.\n\n[70] _Natural Religion_, p. 194.\n\n[71] Max M\u00fcller does not exclude faith in making this statement, which\nalso occurs in his work _The Origin and Growth of Religion_, as on the\nnext page he says, \u201cWhat we call sense, reason, and faith are three\nfunctions of one and the same perceptive self.\u201d--_Origin and Growth of\nReligion_, p. 227.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X THE VEDIC HYMNS\n\n\nIt has been possible to ascertain that the first words pronounced by\nthe most ancient members of the Aryan family are connected by a thread\nof continuity to those which we use to-day in all languages, whether\nliving or dead; our family would not be a portion of the entire human\nrace, if this continuity of thought did not form a constituent part\nof the mental equipment of all the other families; but as no others\npossess in an equal degree with ourselves the archives sufficiently\nextensive to contain indication of the gradual development of human\nspeech, such as the Veda furnishes, that is the authority to which\nMax M\u00fcller appeals in all his works. And it is precisely because\nthere has been no cessation in the continuity of human thought, that\nthe historical method is the only one capable of linking us with the\nprimitive Aryans; our work will consist in collecting tokens of the\nlong pilgrimage undertaken by our ancestors, and with which we desire\nto be associated, and which those who come after us must also undertake.\n\n\u201cNo doubt, between the first daybreak of human thought and the first\nhymns of praise of the Rig-Veda, composed in the most perfect metre and\nthe most polished language, there may be, nay, there must be a gap that\ncan only be measured by generations, by hundreds, aye, by thousands of\nyears.\u201d[72] The exodus and separation of the Aryan family, belonging\nas it does to a prehistoric epoch and therefore unchronicled, and the\nVedic Hymns--the work of many centuries--having been completed and\ncollected together some hundreds of years before our present era, thus\nat a time relatively recent, that which constitutes their chief claim\nto great antiquity in our eyes is that the Hindoo poets or rishis\nincorporated certain thoughts and words in them whose roots threw out\nshoots in the primitive Aryan soil before the dispersion of its members.\n\nThe period of the life of humanity into which the hymns enable us to\npenetrate, is the most ancient of which mention is made. The rishis\nsing in Sanscrit of thoughts conceived in the hidden recesses of souls\nbefore they awoke to the consciousness of that concept to which the\nname of God alone can be applied, before these same people pictured in\ntheir imagination those whom they named gods, before the appearance of\nmyths and mythological fables, and before the Sanscrit language existed.\n\nOur Aryan ancestors had not left the cradle of their race when their\nlanguage, whatever it may have been, possessed the root _dyu_ and\n_div_, two cognate words meaning to shine. The Veda shows that many\nthings were bright to the Vedic poets, the heaven, dawn, the stars\nand several other things, such as the rivers, spring, the fields, the\neyes of man, all that would have the effect on us of being smiling,\nflourishing, and rejoicing in life; and from this root the word _deva_\nwas formed. Neither in Greek nor in Latin, nor in any living language\ncan a word be found which exactly expresses _deva_; Greek dictionaries\ntranslate it by Theos, in the same way as we translate Theos by God;\nbut if--dictionary in hand--we put the word God in certain passages in\nthe hymns where this word is found, we should sometimes commit a mental\nanachronism of a thousand years. At the time of the first Aryans, gods,\nin one sense of the word, did not exist; they were slowly struggling\ninto being; it was therefore impossible for man to form any conception\nof them even in dreams. As this word _deva_ changes its signification\nso frequently, not only in the most ancient Brahmanic poems, but also\nin works of a later date, we can only obtain even an approximate idea\nof its meaning by writing its history, beginning from its etymology and\nending with its latest definition; but it is not necessary to undertake\nthis philological labour, and I shall content myself by showing that\noriginally _deva_ denoted a quality common to many natural phenomena,\nthat of light, and therefore _deva_ was a general term.\n\nMan at first received this impression passively, as animals would, but\nby his nature he could not rest there; all the phenomena surrounding\nhim were animated, the most marvellous and those of peculiar intensity\nmoved in the upper regions of the firmament; in the midst of these\ngeneral movements the mind of man could not alone be inactive, and\nthought and speech--that is reason--inevitably vindicated their right\nto activity; names were given to all things. The Aryan root _svar_ or\n_sval_, which signified to shine, to sparkle, and to heat, produced a\nSanscrit substantive meaning sometimes sun and sometimes the sky.\n\nThe Hindoo poets, the authors of these hymns, gave various names to the\nsun, according to the task it accomplished; and each name reproduced\nthe salient feature of the task. The sun when rising was Mitra =\nfriend; as it advances on its journey, giving new life, it is Savitar\n= bringing forth, or leading day; the vivifying sun; when it collects\nthe clouds and sends rain on the earth, it is Indra, from _ind-u_ =\ndrops; and it continues to be Indra when its rays attain their zenith\nand reach their greatest splendour; for no plant flourishes without\nthe combined action of light and humidity; the sun is Vishnu when\nit makes \u201cits three strides\u201d in the vault of heaven, its position\nin the morning, at noon, and in the evening; it is Varuna--the all\nembracing--when it envelops itself in clouds as in a shroud, and\nthe sky darkens. Some phenomena descended on man from above, such\nas thunder-bolts, winds, storms; the storms that came unexpectedly,\ndealing destruction as they passed received the name of Maruts--from\nthe root _Mar_--and with the meaning of those who strike or beat to\ndeath; the thunder was called Rudra = he who roars; the wind was Vayu =\nhe who blows.\n\nAll these names indicated that which could be seen and that which could\nbe heard; the invisible things remained unnamed; how was it possible\nfor man to name that of which he was ignorant (except that they had a\nreal existence), he who could only conceive a name after having seen a\ncertain feature or quality in the object? They made use therefore of\nthe names they already knew, and they rang the changes on the storm,\nthe fire, and the firmament, which names they borrowed. Jacob\u2019s prayer,\nwhich arose in the darkness when he was wrestling with a great Unknown,\n\u201cTell me, I pray thee, thy name,\u201d must have been, in the early ages,\nthe question of all humanity; but uttered under a thousand varying\nforms, and as, at the beginning, each name was imperfect, since it\nexpressed only one side of the object, every additional name denoted\na step forward, and every fresh check experienced by the mind in its\nsearch after accurate names only stimulated it to look elsewhere.\n\nThe first germ of the concept of law and order appears in the minds of\nthe poets, and to this they give the name of _Rita_. This word has no\nequivalent in our languages, and translators are uncertain as to the\nmeaning attached to it by the rishis. Pliant and full of capability,\nthere seems no word more fitted to reflect new shades of thought;\nand in our efforts to understand it conjecture is much called into\nplay, from the fact that we have to transfuse ancient thought into\nmodern forms; in that process some violence is inevitable. Max M\u00fcller\nsupposes, from etymological reasons, that Rita originally was used\nto express the regular movement of the heavenly bodies, and the path\nwhich they followed daily, from the one point of the heavens to the\nother, and he translates _Rita_ by the \u201cright path.\u201d \u201cIf we remember\nhow many of the ancient sacrifices in India depended on the course of\nthe sun, how there were daily sacrifices, at the rising of the sun, at\nnoon, and at the setting of the sun; how there were offerings for the\nfull moon and the new moon, we may well understand how the sacrifice\nitself came in time to be called the path of Rita.\u201d[73] Rita expresses\nall that is right, good, and true, and Anrita was used for whatever\nis false, evil, and untrue; thus the Hindoos laid it down as an axiom\nthat there was an universal law in the world equally binding on the\nphysical phenomena and on conscious beings, such as themselves; and\nit was this law which ruled the times of the sacrifices to be offered\nto the divine powers; and this intuitive perception of law and order,\nwhich is the foundation of the ancient faith of the Asiatic Aryans, is\nfar more important than all the histories of Savitar, Mitra, Rudra, and\nIndra, which are recounted at a later period of the gods of India. This\nbelief in Rita, in law and order, as revealed in the unvarying movement\nof the stars, or manifested in the unvarying number of the petals, and\nstamens, and pistils of the smallest plant, was a grand thing; it was\nall the difference between a chaos and a cosmos, between the blind\nplay of chance and a well defined plan. We have become so familiarised\nwith the idea of a fundamental law, that it now often occupies us less\nthan many of the secondary laws or causes; and yet our philosophers\noften find themselves at fault when they endeavour to give an exact\nidea of this primary law; but to the ancient prophets it must have been\ninfinitely more perplexing, though also infinitely more important in\ntheir gropings after _terra firma_ on which to plant their feet. The\nrishis are indefatigable in pointing to the straight path, or Rita,\nfollowed by the day and night; and because the gods have themselves\nfollowed this path, they have the strength to triumph over the powers\nof darkness, and to those who ask for it they grant the grace to walk\nin the same road.\n\n\u201cO Indra, lead us on the path of Rita, on the right path over all\nevils.\u201d[74]\n\nTo walk with regularity in the path of duty, imitating the example\nof the astral bodies, or following step by step the sun which never\ndeviates from its orbit, cannot be an idea foreign to humanity since\nit is equally familiar to the primitive races and the most elevated\nminds. Cicero said of himself that he was born not only to contemplate\nthe order of the heavenly bodies, but to imitate this order in his own\nconduct; this great orator, although he was ignorant of the existence\nof the Vedic hymns, spoke after the same manner as the rishis; and the\nMaoris are inspired neither by Cicero nor the Hindoo poets, when they\nsend forth their energetic cry, \u201cWait, wait, O sun, we will go with\nthee.\u201d\n\nTo our first ancestors nothing in nature could have been indifferent;\nall that they perceived must have come upon them as a continual\nsurprise; the Vedic hymns show that our surmise is correct. An\nirresistible force led them continually to investigate and interrogate\nthose apparitions which, by their strangeness and grandeur, were\nso striking, and to which they gave the names of the thunderers,\nthe rainers, the pounders or storm gods; no voice replied to their\nquestions; absolute silence reigned around them; the limits of the\nknown confronted them. Gradually a different perception forced itself\nupon them, whether consciously or unconsciously; all limits have two\nsides, the one towards ourselves, the other towards the beyond; they\nwere ignorant of what existed beyond, but they believed it to be there,\nsince the further boundaries came in contact with it. They wished to\ndraw near to it in order to examine it close at hand, but in what\ndirection should they advance?\n\nThe sentiments which the sun and its forerunners awoke in our ancestors\nmust remain for ever beyond our powers of imagination; the rising\nof this luminary is to us the result of a physical law, and is not\nconsidered more extraordinary than the birth of a child in a large\nfamily; we know that the dawn is the reflection of the sun\u2019s rays in\nthe matutinal vapours; we have even learnt to calculate the time of its\nduration in different climates; but the assurance with which we say,\n\u201cThe sun will rise to-morrow, the day after to-morrow, every day,\u201d our\nancestors never possessed, and it was this vast unknown domain, behind\nthe known, that from the very first supplied the human mind with the\nimpetus required to cause it to seek, to discover, what there could be\nbeyond the visible world.\n\nAs nothing seems to be so far apart as the two points of the horizon\nwhere the light of day appears and where he sets, it is there that the\nrishis look for a solution of the problem of the beyond.[75]\n\n\u201cThat whence the sun rises, and that where he sets, that I believe is\nthe oldest, and no one goes beyond.\u201d[76]\n\nThe poets gave the name Aditi to the dawn. Aditi is derived from\n_diti_, binding and bond, with the negative particle _a_; thus at first\n_Aditi_ meant that which is without bonds, not chained, not enclosed,\ninfinite. But their imagination soon carried the poets beyond the dawn\nitself, that came and went, but there remained always behind the dawn\nthat heaving sea of light or fire from which she springs; thus Aditi\nherself could not be grasped by the senses. Was not this the visible\ninfinite?\n\nAt this point the mind of the rishis conceived an original and\nstriking idea, at the sight of the sun following his path and touching\ntwo opposite points of the horizon; they said that arrived at the\ncentre of its course at the zenith, Indra from thence could see at\nthe same time Diti and Aditi--\u201cThat is what is yonder and what is\nhere, what is infinite and what is finite, what is mortal and what is\nimmortal.\u201d[77]\n\nWhilst searching increasingly for what he had not yet found, man had\nmastered two ideas, those of law, and the beyond or the infinite,\nthough not understanding the accurate meaning of these words; on these\ntwo points his mind was at rest. These two possessions once acquired\ncould not be taken from him; in Aditi--which is limitless--could be\nfound a home for things which had no bounds, and it could furnish an\nanswer to all questions; and Rita, the order which rules the movements\nof the celestial bodies, is at the same time an incentive and a\npromise. A violent convulsion of nature may have alarmed the hearts of\nmen, but the thought occurs to them, \u201cThis cannot last always.\u201d[78]\n\n\u201cSun and moon move in regular succession--that we may see, Indra, and\nbelieve.\u201d[79]\n\nWithout fear there could have been no hope, without hope there could\nhave been no faith.\n\n\u015araddh\u00e2, an ancient Aryan word used before the dispersion of the\nvarious members of the family, is the same as the Latin Credo. Where\nthe Romans said _credidi_ the Brahmans said _\u015braddadhau_; where the\nRomans said _creditum_, the Brahmans said _\u015braddhitam_. The germ of\nthe faculty of faith, therefore, must have existed in the earliest\nstrata of thought and language, since without the first glimpses of\nfaith in the soul, there could have been no word for \u201cto believe.\u201d\n\nAs auxiliary verbs were lacking at first, the early Aryans found\nit very difficult to say of a thing that it is or is not; but they\npossessed the root _as_, which originally meant _to breathe_, and its\nsimplest derivation was _as-u_--breath. Man having discovered in all\nthe natural phenomena an activity resembling his own, said of the\nmoon that it measures, of the river that it runs, of the sun that it\nrises and sets; thus each of these had certain activities peculiar to\nitself. Was there nothing common to all? Doubtless, since an action can\nbe found which is shared equally by man and all animals, the act of\nbreathing is common to all, so that our fathers when wishing to affirm\nthat something existed said that it breathed.\n\nMan turns his gaze from the things that surround him to himself;\nhe feels superior to the physical phenomena, to the rivers, to the\nmountains. He possesses another nature to that of the sun, of the\nstars. He has discovered something in himself that is more than his\nbody. What is it? how is he to name it? He saw his father or his\nmother, who had formerly been in every respect like himself, prostrate,\nwithout motion, without speech. What had happened? What was it that\nhad left them? Knowing the root _as_, and its derivative _as-u_, he\ncalled it from the first breath, then spirit, which originally meant\nnothing more than the air absorbed by the lungs, from which it is\nexhaled as breath. Nothing constrained our ancestors to believe that\nbecause they had seen their parents die and their bodies decay, it\nmust follow that what had hitherto animated them was now annihilated.\nThis notion may have entered the brain of a philosopher, but man in\nhis primitive simplicity, though doubtless terrified at the sight of\ndeath, would naturally incline to the belief that what he had known\nand loved, and had called by the names of father and mother, must\nstill exist somewhere, although not in the body. The breath had not\nbeen seen to decay. What had become of it? Various answers were given\nto this question, at divers times and in divers countries. They were\nall equally probable; no objections could be made to them, but neither\nwas there proof; they are beyond the reach of proof. \u201cThe best answer\nwas perhaps that contained in the most ancient Greek language and\nmythology, that the souls had gone to the house of the Invisible, of\n_Aides_. No one has ever said anything truer.\u201d\n\nFrom the depths of the eastern sky Aditi arises each morning. To the\neyes of the ancient seers the dawn seemed to open the gates of another\nworld into which they begged to enter--into the abode of the gods. We\ncan understand that as the sun and all the solar deities rise from the\neast, Aditi was said to be the mother of Mitra, Vishnu, Savitar, and\nVaruna. Another conception also arose, that the east being the abode\nof the bright gods, would also become the home of those parents and\nfriends who died, \u201cthe blessed departed who would join the company of\nthe gods that they might be transferred to the east.\u201d[80] Aditi thus\nembodied the mystery of life and death; and was the \u201cMot de l\u2019\u00c9nigme\u201d\nof our existence. All the theogony and primitive philosophy of the\nAryan were concentrated in the dawn. Those souls who participate with\nAditi in the \u201cbirthplace of the Immortals\u201d sometimes share the worship\noffered by their children who are still on the earth. One off-shoot of\nthis ancient worship still survives, and the popularity of the festival\nof the 1st of November in certain countries testifies that the homage\nrendered to the memory of the dead is a necessity of the human heart.\nAnd certainly those whom we are accustomed to speak of as dead are most\nsurely living. The rishis desired to contemplate their faces, and one\nof them, speaking for all, cried: \u201cWho will give us back to the great\nAditi, that I may see father and mother?\u201d[81]\n\nAll peoples have desired to know which part of the human body is the\nseat of the soul and of life; the dictionaries of all languages,\nwhether spoken by civilised or uncivilised people, show that the words\nblood, heart, chest, reins and breath have all been used to indicate\nthe seat of life, soul, thought, and the affections. Amongst the\nMaoris, the words used for the internal organs mean at the same time\nthe heart, and the centre of joy and sorrow; the seat of conscience and\nof desires and the will; it is strange that the brain, which we often\nlook upon as the cradle of thought, is not found in the psychological\nnomenclature of the ancient world. The expression which we find in the\nBible, \u201cThe blood is the life,\u201d and in other languages besides Hebrew,\ninspired many religious and superstitious acts. It is singular that\nin one of the dialects spoken in the south of India, Tamil, the word\nused for soul has the sense of leaper or dancer; these are efforts to\nexpress that which moves within us. We are here not amongst learned\nmetaphysicians, but concerned with simple children of nature; but the\ngreatest philosophers have at no time more clearly defined the soul\nthan by describing it as that which moves of itself, but is not moved.\n\nOur language is so rich in abstract terms, derived from a small number\nof concrete words, that we are not aware how often we use the old\nmaterial words to express purely mental states or conditions; for\ninstance we speak of taking things to heart, or learning verses by\nheart, without thinking of the heart that beats within our breasts.\n\nFire has always occupied a prominent position in the imagination of\nall people, of all nations; but with the exception of the Hindoos none\nhave left traditions which enable us to transport ourselves to the\nsimplest beginnings of the fire upon the hearth, and nothing more.\nHeracleitus already mentions fire as everlasting or immortal, and the\n\u201corigin of all things, a higher conception than that of the gods of\nthe populace whom Heracleitus tolerated, though he did not believe in\nthem. \u2018Neither one of the gods,\u2019 he declares, \u2018nor of men has made this\nworld, ... it always was and will be, ever-living fire, catching forms\nand consuming them.\u2019\u201d[82] Heracleitus imagined that he knew what was\nfire; but the rishis speak with less assurance; at first they express\ntheir astonishment at the appearance of fire, it is one of the physical\napparitions which impressed them the most, although of all the devas\nfire seemed the one most readily known, since it had its dwelling with\nmen, it was within reach of the hand, could be touched, but as it burnt\nthe fingers the experiment was only made once. Although seen so near at\nhand fire remained a great enigma; our ancestors could not understand\nhow it could unite in itself at the same time such good and such\ndestructive qualities. It warmed the members numbed by cold, at night\nit lighted the hut as if the sun were in it, yet at times it destroyed\nsuddenly whole forests; it seemed everywhere; when the thunder rolled,\nfire escaped from a dark cloud like a flash; it appeared as a spark\nwhen two flints were struck or two branches of wood rubbed together;\nbut its chief characteristic was its excessive mobility, nothing in\nnature could compare with the velocity of its movements.\n\nThe Aryans at that time possessed a root _ag_, which meant going,\nmarching, leading, running, forcing, pushing, chasing, and jumping,\nand gives generally an idea of quick movement, and as fire moved\nperpetually, our ancestors made use of this root _ag_, and called\nfire _agni_; this Sanscrit word--which amongst many others was the\nmost popular--still survives in the Latin, as _ignis_, in Lithuania\nas _ugni_, in old Slavonic, as _ogni_; another Sanscrit name for fire\nis _vah-ni_, coming from the same root which we have in _veho_ and\n_vehemens_, and it meant originally what moves about quickly.\n\nI have collected a few of the characteristic traits attributed by the\nrishis to the deva Agni.\n\n\u201cHow did he come--living--from pieces of dead wood? How is he produced\nfrom two stones? His mother does not nourish him, how does he grow\nso rapidly, and proceed at once to do his work? He whom nothing\nresists--like the heavenly thunderbolt--like a hurled weapon. Agni,\nin a moment, does violence to the trees of the forest; he prostrates\nthem--all that moves--that which stands, trembles before him--making\nthe herbs his food--he licks the garment of the earth--he nourishes\nhimself. Turning about with his tongues of fire, Agni flares up in the\nforests. Roused by the wind, he moves about among the tall trees, and\neats them with his sharpened teeth; he never tires; coming again and\nagain; turning about on all sides; resounding with his sickle; laughing\nwith his light.\u201d\n\n\u201cProfessor Tyndal asks quite rightly: \u2018Is it in the human mind to\nimagine motion, without at the same time imagining something moved?\nCertainly not. The very conception of motion includes that of a\nmoving body. What then is the thing moved in the case of sunlight?\nThe undulatory theory replies that it is a substance of determinate\nmechanical properties, a body which may or may not be a form of\nordinary matter, but to which, whether it is or not, we give the name\nof Ether.\u2019 May not the ancient Aryas say with the same right (had he\nbeen wise enough to put the question), \u2018Is it in the human mind to\nimagine motion without at the same time imagining some one that moves?\u2019\nCertainly not. The very conception of motion includes that of a mover,\nand, in the end, of a prime mover.\u201d[83] And if, in the presence of\nfire, the early Aryas had asked who then is the mover, he would have\nbeen told (if any had been there wise enough to answer the question)\nthat it is a subject of determinate properties, a person who may or may\nnot be like ordinary persons, but to whom, whether he be or not, the\nname Agni has been given.\n\nThus the rishis spoke of Agni as of an agent, as well as of Indra,\nVayu, Rudra, and the Maruts; but we must always remember that they knew\nnothing definite of these agents any more than we do when we speak\nof physical phenomena as elements, or forces of nature, or certain\nmovements.\n\nThis striking deva, Agni, manifested at first in the lightning and in\nthe spark, became as time went on, the most popular, and most desired\nof all the powers; the fire on the hearth rendered winter bearable,\ncooked herbs and roots, and transformed the devourer of raw flesh into\nthe eater of roast meat; caused the smoke of sacrifices offered to the\nhigher Powers to ascend up to heaven. What precautions were necessary\nto prevent the capricious and uncertain fire from becoming extinct at\nan inopportune moment, or in its rage from destroying men and things.\nFire was for the rishis a being more and more inexplicable. Becoming\nincreasingly impressed by his beneficence, they seek to call him by\nsome new name which shall express more perfectly this later impression;\nthe name deva--bright, shining--no longer satisfies them; they use\nwords such as invincible, almighty; even these do not suffice them; at\nlast they find the word Amartya--immortal.\n\n \u201cImmortal amongst Mortals.\u201d\n\nThis expression may be understood in more ways than one; it is enough\nfor me that the Hindoos made use of it. It is possible to recognise\nin it the first attempt to bridge over the gulf which human language\nand human thought had themselves created between the visible and the\ninvisible, between the mortal and the immortal, between the finite\nand the infinite. For the right appreciation of our intellectual\norganisation, it is important to discover and distinguish the coarse\nthreads that form the woof of our most abstract thoughts.\n\nIt must be noticed that the use of the word _immortal_ in this passage\ndoes not imply that Agni is considered otherwise than as natural fire.\nThe Rig-Veda does not seem to acknowledge the presence of supernatural\nbeings; all the names given to the striking aspects of nature, even\nthose used to designate the unknown powers in general, such as Asura--a\nliving thing; Deva-asura--the living gods; Amartya--the immortal, still\nretain physical elements in the most ancient hymns.\n\nBeings without definite attributes did not occur to the imagination of\nthose who supplied these names, and believed in the existence of those\nwhich these names represented.\n\nThat which has often been called the adoration of fire was at first its\napplication to the necessities of domestic life, and afterwards its use\nin all mechanical and artistic pursuits. If we transfer ourselves to\nthat early stage of life, and picture the difficulties there were in\nprimitive times of procuring fire at a moment\u2019s notice, and the dangers\nwhich would menace a whole community deprived of fire in the midst of\nwinter, and plunged suddenly in darkness, we require no far-fetched\nexplanation for a number of time-hallowed customs throughout the world\nconnected with the lighting, and still more with the guarding of the\nfire. The natural desire for possessing so useful an object, and the no\nless natural terror of being deprived of it, would lead men to adopt\nthe practices for maintaining it, afterwards called superstitions, but\nwhich during the infancy of humanity, were perfectly natural, and which\ndeveloped into a sacred rite; at a later period vestal virgins were\nappointed to guard it in the temples; and the fires of St John, which\nare still lighted annually on the tops of certain mountains, are the\nlast remains of these ancient customs.\n\nThe Vedic hymns give us the many different channels whence the\nphenomenon of fire proceeds, at one time coming in one way and then in\nanother, to attract man\u2019s attention and to awaken his drowsy faculties.\nFire comes from the skies where it shines as the sun, from the waters,\nsince it comes as lightning, from the moist and rain-laden clouds, from\nthe stones, and from wood, in the shape of sparks, from dried leaves\nand herbs placed on the altar to receive and nourish the sacrificial\nflame. Ceaselessly fire applied at the door of each habitation.\nApparently it said to man, whose slowness of comprehension it seemed to\nunderstand, \u201cTo you men, I come, that I may awake you from sleep, and\ncause you to know what I am.\u201d\n\nAt last man understood, and the rishis reply to the fire.\n\n\u201cThou, O Agni, art born from the skies--thou from the waters--thou from\nthe stone--thou from the wood--thou from the herbs--thou, king of men,\nthe bright one.\u201d[84]\n\nAt the same time the mind of the poet seems illuminated with a new\nthought.\n\n\u201cIf we have committed any sin against thee through human weakness,\nthrough thoughtlessness, make us sinless before Aditi, O Agni, loosen\nour misdeeds from us on every side.\u201d[85]\n\nOf Agni, the fire, there would seem to be nothing left in that supreme\ngod whose laws must be obeyed, and who can forgive those who have\nbroken his laws. Between this transformed Being of whom the Aryans\nimplore mercy, and Him whom we call God, we can perceive no difference,\nand yet, so mysterious are human speech and thought, the Hindoos, who\nthought in ancient Sanscrit, declare that Agni has not yet thrown off\nhis physical characteristics, that he is not yet, and cannot be God;\nthey add that it is impossible to give the true Vedic impression in\nits fulness, since no modern language possesses phrases in which to\nexpress it.\n\nI read in another hymn addressed to Agni a curious verse.\n\n\u201cO Heaven and Earth, I proclaim this truthful fact, that the child, as\nsoon as born, eats his parents. I, a mortal, do not understand this\nfact of a god; Agni indeed understands, for he is wise.\u201d[86]\n\nAre the rishis who utter this exclamation ignorant of the fact that the\nparents of fire are two dry sticks? Or is it that the act of a god in\neating its father and mother is abhorrent to them?\n\n\u201cIf we, O gods--ignorant among the wise--transgress your commandments,\nwhatever of the sacrifice weak mortals with their feeble intellect do\nnot comprehend, Agni, the priest, who knows all rights, comprehends it,\nmakes it all good.\u201d[87]\n\nThe whole question of sacrifices is still hotly discussed; whether\nthey preceded or followed prayer. Did the Vedic poets wait till the\nceremonial was fully developed before they invoked the Powers, or did\ntheir prayers suggest the performance of sacrificial acts?\n\n\u201cAgni, accept this branch that I offer. Accept this my service--listen\nwell to these my songs. Whosoever sacrifices to Agni with a stick of\nwood, with a libation, with a bundle of herbs, or with an inclination\nof his head, he will be blessed.\u201d[88]\n\nWe nowhere hear of a mute sacrifice. That which we call a sacrifice the\nancients called simply _karma_, an act; a simple prayer, preceded by a\nwashing of the hands, or accompanied by an inclination of the head, may\nconstitute a _karma_, an act; to light the fire on the hearth, to bow\nthe head and utter the name of Agni with some kind epithet, might also\nbe termed an act. At first the sacrifice may only have been a prayer\naccompanied by a gift. They may originally have been inseparable, but\nin all this there is nothing opposed to the idea that it would be in\naccordance with human nature that prayer should come first. In time the\nact of sacrifice assumed a sacred and solemn character. In the earlier\nvocabularies of the Aryan tongues the word sacrifice does not occur;\nthe Sanscrit and Zend root of the word are almost identical, and these\nlanguages furnish many words indicative of minute detail of ancient\nceremonial. From this may be inferred that a hymn full of allusions to\nthe celebrations of sacrifices must date from a period posterior to the\nseparation of the families.\n\n\u201cAgni, drive away from us the enemies--tribes who keep no fire came to\nattack us.\u201d[89]\n\nWhen the Aryans of Asia abandoned their first habitation, and advanced\nsouthwards plundering as they went, they encountered some of the\naborigines of the country, whose territory they coveted. They were\nwild tribes; the descriptions given by the rishis evidently refer to\nthe aborigines of India, whose descendants survive to the present day,\nspeaking non-Aryan dialects. The epithets of devil and demon are freely\nused concerning them in the hymns. But apparently in their encounters\nAgni, who opposes these hostile foes, by appearing under the form of\nflaming torches, is not successful in overcoming them, since the Aryans\nimplore the aid of other allies. They invoke the help of the two chief\nwarlike powers, Indra and Soma, to destroy those \u201cwho worship other\ngods, who do not speak the truth, and who eat raw meat.\u201d[90]\n\n\u201cO Indra and Soma, burn the devils, throw them down--they who grow in\ndarkness--tear them off, the madmen, kill them, slay the gluttons.\nO Indra and Soma, up against the cursing demon--may he burn like\nan oblation in the fire. Pour your everlasting hatred upon the\nvillain who hates the Brahman, who eats raw flesh, and who looks\nabominable.\u201d[91]\n\nOf Soma, who lends such capable aid to Agni when repulsing the enemies\nof the Aryans, the Hindoos have four different conceptions. Soma is\nsometimes the moon, the abode of the fathers. Soma is also the lord of\nthe moon. Soma is the bowl containing the drink of the gods, ambrosia.\nSoma is sometimes ambrosia itself. The etymology of the word indicates\nhomonymy; originally it meant rain and the moon. Ambrosia was a type\nof the rain fertilising the earth, yet being at the same time a\nstrengthening draught. It is sometimes quite impossible to decide of\nwhich Soma the rishis are speaking, especially as they seem to find\npleasure in confounding the terms. This play upon words fills almost\nthe whole of one book of the _Rig-Veda_.\n\n\u201cMeditate on the wisdom of Soma (moon) in all its greatness--yesterday\nit was dead, to-day it is living.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe poet has swallowed Soma (the juice), he has felt an overpowering\ninspiration--he has found his hymn.\u201d\n\nThe exalted virtues of Soma have raised it to the rank of those\ndivinities who dispense immortality.\n\n\u201cWhere there is eternal light, in the world where the sun is placed, in\nthat immortal, imperishable world place me, O Soma, where life is free,\nin the third heaven of heavens, there make me immortal.\u201d[92]\n\nWhat is the third heaven? It is an expression with which we are\nfamiliar, but what does it mean? The Aryans also call the children of\nRudra to their help; they are allied to Indra and are called Maruts.\nThey fill the air with alarming sounds; these noise-producing beings\nare the representatives of storms and tempests, they never appear alone\nin the Veda, they traverse space in groups of from twenty-five to\neighty in number, and they make the earth tremble.\n\n\u201cWhere are you going? towards whom do you go when you descend from\non high like a blast of fire? May power be with thee and thy race, O\nRudra. Come to us, Maruts, come and help us as quickly as lightning\nbefore the rain! Let loose, O devourer, your anger like an arrow\nagainst the proud enemy of the poets.\u201d[93]\n\n * * * * *\n\nA deep problem now presents itself. What was there before anything\nexisted? Two contradictory ideas appear in the hymns, and the conflict\nmust have been trying.\n\n\u201cSages have said: In the beginning the world was--a single world--there\nwas not a second. Others have said: In the beginning this world had no\nexistence, and out of nothing, what now is, came.\u201d\n\nMuch confusion of thought reigned in the human mind. The world must\nsurely have been made from something, and by certain agents; but then,\nhow were the agents themselves formed? and what material served them\nfor the making of the world?\n\nOther questions followed. \u201cWho has seen the firstborn? Where was the\nlife, the blood, the soul of the world? Who went to ask this from any\nthat knew it? What was the forest? what was the tree out of which they\nshaped heaven and earth? Ye wise, seek in your mind on what he stood\nwhen he held the world.\u201d[94]\n\nOur ancestors would not have been human if they had not yielded to\nthe temptation of representing the invisible makers of the world by\nsome personality. They therefore speak of carpenters and workmen\n\u201cwho have cunning hands; clever artificers who forge the lightning.\u201d\nIs it those who have made all that is visible? They know not. It is\ncertain that in speaking of carpenters, workmen, thunderers, tearers,\nrainers, men approached, perhaps unconsciously, the domain of causes,\nwhich from the beginning has been the ancient foundation of all that\nis transcendental in our knowledge. It could not be otherwise, since\nour reason is so constituted that it admits nothing but what is either\ncause or effect.\n\nThere are thoughts to be found in the Veda which are excessively\ninfantine, but again there are others of astonishing subtlety; perhaps\nthey date from different epochs; but individualities are apparent in\nthese hymns, and they anticipated by many centuries the greater number\nof contemporary writers who followed at a slower pace. The rishis\nwho said, \u201cThere is one Being only, although the poets call him by a\nthousand names,\u201d perfectly expressed this truth; and the Hindoos for\ncenturies have invoked Indra, Mitra, Agni, and Savitar, though the more\nprofound thinkers have protested against the traditional use of these\nnames, just as Heracleitus 500 years before our era objected to the\nthousand names, the thousand temples, and the thousand legends of the\nGreek mythology.\n\nThe rishis in asking themselves how all things began were not content\nwith representing the world as coming from the hands of clever workmen,\nwere they even invisible; it was no great labour to discover that; but\nat times they had profounder thoughts. The sacred literatures of many\nancient peoples have reached us, in fragments more or less complete;\nbut the meditations which can equal those in the hymn 129 are rare.\n\n\u201cThe One in the form of the Un-born was not--the luminous firmament\nexisted not--nor the great vault of heaven--where was he hidden? Was\nit in the bottomless abyss? Death existed not--nor immortality. There\nwas no distinction between day and night. The One breathed breathless\nby itself. Other than it there nothing since has been. There was\ndarkness then; everything in the beginning was hidden in gloom--all\nwas like the ocean, without a light. Then that germ which was covered\nby the husk--the One--was brought forth by the power of heat. On this\ngerm was love--the springtime of the spirit--yes. And the poets\nwhilst meditating upon it, discovered in their soul the link between\ncreated things and things not created. This spark, comes it from the\nearth--piercing all--penetrating through all--or comes it from the sky?\nThere seeds were scattered, and powerful forces came into being; nature\nbeneath, will and power above. Who knows the secret--who proclaimed\nwhence this manifold creation sprang? The gods themselves came later\ninto being; who knows whence this great creation sprang? He from whom\nall this great creation came--whether his will created or was mute.\nHe, the most high seer, that is in highest heaven, he knows it--or\nperchance even he knows not.\u201d\n\n\u201cWho knows whence this great creation sprang?\u201d the Hindoos asked\nthemselves, thousands of years before our era; and again, \u201cWhat was the\nforest, what was the tree, from which they cut out heaven and earth?\nWhat was there before anything existed?\u201d These questions, differently\nexpressed, are found in many places in the Veda; every kind of problem\nis presented to us under the form of enigmas. The Hindoos seem to have\nhad an idea that the visible world was preceded by something invisible,\nyet much more real than the world of phenomena in which we live;\nand that before apparitions existed, there was that which appeared\nafterwards in time and space.\n\nThese same questions will constantly be repeated in changing terms,\nthrough the coming centuries, whilst a heaven and earth remain.\n\nThe problem which occupied the powerful intellects of Hume and Kant,\nand which these philosophers named the principle of causality, was\nalready exercising the brains of our fathers when they gave names for\nthe first time to the sky, the sun, the dawn, and the other physical\nphenomena, by means of roots indicating activity; for the principle of\ncausality manifested itself in the beginning, not in the direct search\nfor a cause, but in the assertion of the existence of an agent. This\nmental labour, commenced and accomplished thousands of centuries ago by\nmillions of human beings, deserves at least as much attention from us\nas the learned speculations of two modern philosophers, be they Hume or\nKant.\n\nSo striking an object as the sun, even before possessing a definite\nname, must have been designated in some special way; perhaps as a\nsimple circle, such as we find in the Egyptian hieroglyphics, in the\nChinese writing, and in our astronomical almanacs; this symbol would\ngive little opportunities to the mythologists; but when the idea arose\nthat the sun was a ball, and that an analogy was found between a ball\nand an eye, man began to speak of the sun as the eye of the sky. We say\nreadily in all languages, \u201cGod is omniscient,\u201d but Hesiod, to express\nthe same truth said, \u201cThe sun is the eye of Zeus who sees and knows\nall.\u201d If the language appears childish to us, we must remember that it\nwas the expression of a poet who lived long before the philosophers of\nGreece, we shall then be less struck by its harshness than by the happy\nand pure thought which has been expressed.\n\nThe sun has been an object of adoration with many of the primitive\nnations; it seems uncertain whether as the divinity himself or as\nhis representative; most of the mythologists assure us that the\nancient Egyptians worshipped the sun\u2019s disc itself. The first step is\ninvariably followed by a second, and a good example of development in\nreligious belief is afforded by a Mexican legend. The story is told of\nthe Inca Tupac Yupanqui, who, though reputed a son of the sun, began\nto doubt the divine omnipotence of his divine ancestor. At a great\nreligious council, held at the consecration of the newly built temple\nof the sun at Cuzco, he rose before the assembled multitude to deny\nthe divinity of the sun. \u201cMany say,\u201d he began, \u201cthat the sun is the\nmaker of all things. But he who makes should abide by what he has made.\nNow many things happen when the sun is absent; therefore he cannot be\nthe universal Creator. And that he is alive at all, is doubtful, for\nhis journeys do not tire him. He is like a tethered beast who makes\na daily round; he is like an arrow which must go whither it is sent,\nnot whither it wishes. I tell you that he, our father and maker--the\nsun--must have a lord and master more powerful than himself, who\nconstrains him to his daily circuit without pause or rest.\u201d[95]\n\nWe can follow in the Vedic hymns the gradual development which changes\nthe sun from a simple luminary, and the giver of daily light and life,\nto the preserver and ruler of the world. He who brings life and light\nto-day, is the same who brought life and light on the first of days; as\nhe drives away the darkness of night, and as \u201cthe stars flee before the\nall-seeing sun, like thieves,\u201d the eye fixed on men--the sun--sees the\nright and wrong and knows their thoughts.\n\nAlmost all peoples have raised their eyes to the sky, the abode of the\ninvisible Powers; and our ancestors, who addressed such fervent prayers\nto all the phenomena of nature could not fail to invoke it. But the\nsky shows itself under very varying aspects, it is sometimes the sky\ndazzling with light, then there is the lowering sky, or the sky that\nthunders, that rains; each time that it varies it changes its name; and\nthese names must be known to man since it is always invoked under the\nspecial denomination of the power he is about to address. Varuna is one\nof the names of the sky, his physical characteristic reflects it, it\nis the vast vault or covering which protects the whole earth and its\ninhabitants; it is also the sky which is itself obscured when the sun\ndisappears. In the Veda, Varuna is associated with Mitra, the light,\nthus giving rise to a concept of correlative gods representing night\nand day, morning and evening, heaven and earth.\n\n\u201cHe who should flee far beyond the sky--even he would not be rid of\nVaruna, the king. King Varuna sees all this, what is between heaven\nand earth, and what is beyond. This earth, too, belongs to Varuna,\nthe king, and this wide sky with its ends far apart. The two seas are\nVaruna\u2019s loins; he is also contained in this small drop of water.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe great lord of these worlds sees as if he were near: if a man\nstands or walks, if he goes to lie down or to get up, if he thinks he\nis walking by stealth, the god Varuna knows it all. What two people\nsitting together whisper, King Varuna knows it, he is there as the\nthird.\u201d[96]\n\nThe prayers of the rishis overflow with the acknowledgment of their\nsins, and their belief that the gods have the power to deliver them\nfrom the burden of their faults.\n\n\u201cLet me not yet, O Varuna, enter into the house of clay (earth). Have\nmercy, Almighty, have mercy. If I move along trembling, like a cloud\ndriven by the wind, have mercy. Through want of strength, have I gone\nastray, thou strong and bright god, have mercy. Thirst came upon the\nworshipper, though he stood in the midst of the waters--have mercy,\nAlmighty, have mercy.\u201d[97]\n\nIt is noticeable that in the Hindoo mind the sun, in its many\nmanifestations, is sometimes synonymous with the firmament: Indra, as\nthe illuminator of the zenith; Savitar, as the bestower of life; Mitra,\nas the friend of humanity; the indefatigable Agni, so modest but so\nactive, in cooking the food and smelting iron, so powerful when it\nbears the smoke of the sacrifices heavenwards, and so exalted when it\ntakes its place in the sun and descends in the form of lightning; and\nthe spacious firmament which holds them all in its bosom; they are all\none to the adorer of the divine powers; all are equally marvellous, it\nis a galaxy of brilliance. What innumerable gods, and not one to whom\nit could be said, \u201cDeliver us from evil.\u201d\n\nUrged on by an irresistible curiosity the rishis ceaselessly probe into\nthe unknown and the distant.\n\n\u201cBeyond the sky, beyond the earth, beyond the Devas and the Asuras,\nwhat was the first germ which the waters bore, wherein all gods were\nseen? The waters bore that first germ in which all the gods came\ntogether. That _one_ thing in which all creatures rested was placed\nin the lap of the unborn. You will never know him who created these\nthings, something else stands between you and Him. Enveloped in mist\nand with faltering voices, the poets walk along rejoicing in life.\u201d[98]\n\nHow was it that in the midst of the magnificence of their immense\nPantheon, the poets succeeded in obtaining glimpses of the _One_. Who\nwas He? The mists surround Him and prevent Him being clearly discerned.\n\nIf there was one thing in nature more adapted than another to satisfy\nthe desire of bridging over the limits of the visible world, it was\ncertainly the vault of heaven; above the storms and clouds which are\ntemporary, beyond all that is changeable; amongst all the changing\nobjects which meet the eyes, surely the firmament was the most exalted,\nthe most extended, and immovable. We know the genealogy of the name\nof the sky, Dyaus, which enables us to trace the transformations\nand subsequent applications; and as we advance we shall glean some\nparticulars of that science which at a later date was called grammar.\n\nIt is known that in the Aryan languages some of the oldest words are\nwithout gender; speaking grammatically, pater is not a masculine,\nnor mater a feminine; nor do the oldest words for river, mountain,\ntree, or sky, disclose any outward sign of grammatical gender. But\nthough without any signs of gender, all ancient nouns expressed\nactivity. The distinction of gender began, not with the introduction\nof masculine nouns, but with the setting apart of certain derivative\nsuffixes for feminine words; thus when _bona_ was introduced, _bonus_\nbecame masculine; when _puella_ could be applied to a girl, _puer_,\nwhich formerly meant both boy and girl, became restricted to the\nmeaning of boy. Therefore, whenever it happens that we have a female\nrepresentative of a natural phenomenon by the side of a male, the\nfemale may almost always be taken as the later form. This rule, which\nhas been strictly applied to the name of Dyaus, dates from so remote a\ntime that its origin is lost in the mists of ages.\n\nDyaus, like _deva_, shining, comes from the root _div_ or _dyu_, but\nthis root bifurcates at once. In the Rig-Veda forms derived from the\nbase _div_ are masculine or feminine as the case may be, whilst those\nwhich are derived from _dyu_ are always masculine; thus _dyaus_ from\n_div_, is the firmament, the expanse above our heads, and is the later\nfeminine form; whereas _dyaus_ from _dyu_, is the sky considered as\na power, an active force, and is masculine, and consequently is the\nearlier conception. These two words, _dyaus_, nominative singular, and\nits base, _dyu_, being almost synonymous may be used indifferently.\n\nAll vegetable cells are destined to become plants, though sometimes\ndifferent plants, this, observation of nature teaches us. All verbal\ncells are destined to become words, though differing, that is, with\ndifferent meanings; the small amount of philological study to which we\nhave already devoted ourselves in these pages shows us this. All cells,\nwhatever their nature, possess a transitive movement; the French word\n_\u00e9clater_ has the meaning of to disperse in brilliancy; if we imagine\nscintillations of light escaping from a central luminary we obtain the\nidea of a transitive luminous movement. Whilst a cell preserves its\nprimary condition it is not possible to predict its future; no human\nintelligence could have foretold that the root _div_ and _dyu_ would\nproduce the Sanscrit word deva, which means to shine, and deva would\nin time develop into deus, which now no longer means to shine, but God.\nIt is a curious characteristic of Vedic Sanscrit that this uncertainty\nof meaning of such words as deva, which expresses equally the half\nphysical and half spiritual intention, is an evidence of its rays\nhaving proceeded from the same source of light and heat.\n\nHuman reason, in finding its way amongst crooked paths, often wanders;\nthe representations it makes of things are coloured by rays projected\nby mythological or dogmatic mirages. We may recognise in the manner in\nwhich our ancestors have viewed the supernatural powers the prototype\nof our own errors of judgment. From the time that Dyaus became the\nwarming, life-giving sky and thus active, the rishis were authorised to\ncall him pitar, father, and to place by his side Prithvi, the earth,\nwho is the mother, and they then spoke of Dyaus as the father of the\ndawn, and of day and night. These were thus considered as the first\nattributes of the sky in Aryan mythology.\n\nWe are inclined to ascribe these excursions of thought to the flights\nof poetic fancy, but they are rather the results of the poverty of\nlanguage, which make it impossible not only to express abstract ideas,\nbut even to describe accurately the phenomena of the physical world.\nReligion and language in those days were so closely allied that it\nis possible to say of a religious idea in its infancy that it was a\nfragment of ancient language; for in order to describe his impressions\nthe Aryan depended entirely on the words with which it furnished him.\nFor this reason many of the hymns, incoherent though they may appear,\nare of inestimable value. Every one of their words weighs and tells,\nbut for the translator who endeavours to present the Vedic thought in\nmodern idioms, the results are so discouraging that he is tempted to\ngive up in despair.\n\nWhen at a later date the name of Dyaus became the centre of fabulous\ntales, it still remained in the Sanscrit language of that time one\nof the many traditional and unmeaning words for sky; but we must\nunderstand clearly that in the most ancient hymns of the _Rig-Veda_\nthis name is the incarnation of the Power which is beyond and above\nconception, whose existence had been obscurely indicated from the\nbeginning, and who remained unnamed long after the beasts of the\nforests and the birds of the air had received their appellations.\n\nFrom the time of their exodus the Aryan family, going in different\ndirections, were naturally divided into branches; vast distances\nseparated them, and they forgot that the same cradle, the same hearth,\nhad sheltered them at birth. But the ties which connected them\noriginally were not snapped at all points, since they brought away with\nthem words belonging to their mother-tongue, and certain intuitions\nwere the common property of all. Before the Greek, Latin, Sanscrit, and\nGerman languages became separated, the name of a sovereign Power was\nimplied in those of the divinity which at a much later time occupied so\nlarge a space in the history of Greece, Rome, India, and of Germany.\n\nCoupled with the word _pitar_ the name Dyaus appears in the most\nancient Aryan prayers as Dyaush-pitar, Zeus-pater, and Ju-piter.\nThese composite names are no invention of the poets; they are the\nresults of certain laws of language to which our minds--if they would\nnot turn from the right path--must submit. The initial _dy_ in Dyaus\nis represented in Latin by _j_; Ju in Jupiter corresponds exactly\nwith Dyaus. The name of the Teutonic god Tyr, genitive Tys, also\ncorresponds, and as exactly, with Dyaus; in Gothic it would be Tius,\nand in Anglo-Saxon Tiw, preserved in Tiwsd\u00e6g, the day of the god Tyr,\nand Zio in Old High-German, where we find Ziestac for the modern\nDienstag, the day of the god Mars. Tius, Tiw, Tyr, and Zio are forms\nthat exist side by side, all of which of course proceed from that\nwonderful root _div_, and represent the bright sky, day, and god. No\netymological interpretation would be satisfying which did not embrace\nall these forms, since they are all dialectic variations of Dyaus, the\nsame name in different languages. All names truly related have but one\nroot, in the same way as living beings who are brothers have but one\nmother.\n\nIf another proof were needed of the uninterrupted continuity of speech\nand thought amongst the chief of the Aryan people, the following fact\nwill afford it:--\n\nAt the time when the schools flourished in Athens, and when the Greeks\nwere hardly conscious of the existence of India, it would have been\npossible, I suppose, to see young pupils seated before tables on which\nthe master had written the declensions which composed the task for the\nday. There might be read:--\n\n _Nom._ Ze\u00fas\n _Gen._ Dios\n _Dat._ Dii\n _Acc._ Dia\n _Voc._ Ze\u00fb\n\nThus the young Athenians wrote the name of Zeus with an acute accent in\nthe nominative, and a circumflex in the vocative.\n\nAt the same time the pupils of the Brahmans at Benares, when declining\nthe name of their supreme deity, accented the syllables exactly in the\nsame way as the Greeks, and they wrote:--\n\n _Nom._ Dya\u00fas\n _Gen._ Dyvas\n _Dat._ Divi\n _Acc._ Divam\n _Voc._ Dya\u00fbs\n\nBut there was this difference between the Grecian pupils and the\nHindoos, that the former were ignorant of the reason of these changes\nof accent, since the explanation was lacking in the Greek grammar,\nwhereas the Sanscrit grammar explained to the latter the general\nprinciples of accentuation on which the changes rested.\n\nThe name of Dyaus was the source from which sprang an unique name,\ncoined once and for ever, adopted by our entire family; the Greeks\nhave no more borrowed it from the Hindoos, than the Romans and the\nTeutons from the Greeks; for it was pronounced before the separation\nof our ancestors with regard to language or religion; its meaning was\nHeaven-Father.\n\nOur missionaries who go from one end of the earth to the other,\nreciting the Lord\u2019s Prayer in all the dialects of the world, do\nnot doubt the historical fact that this prayer was said one day at\nJerusalem for the first time; we also may feel as profoundly convinced\nthat under the name of Heaven-Father, the Supreme Being has been\nworshipped on the Himalayan mountains, under the oaks of Dodona, on the\nCapitol, and in the forests of Germany. It has required millions of men\nto fashion this name alone, which is the most ancient prayer of the\nAryan race.\n\n\u201cFive thousand years have passed, perhaps more, since the Asiatic\nAryans, speaking as yet neither Sanscrit, Greek, nor Latin, called upon\nthe All-Father as Dyu-patar, Heaven-Father. Four thousand years ago,\nor it may be earlier, the Aryans who had travelled southwards to the\nrivers of the Punjaub called him Dyaush-pita, the Heaven-Father. Three\nthousand years ago, or it may be earlier, the Aryans on the shores\nof the Hellespont called him Zeus-pater, Heaven-Father. Two thousand\nyears ago the Aryans of Italy looked up to that bright Heaven above and\ncalled it Ju-piter, the Heaven-Father. And a thousand years ago the\nsame Heaven-Father was invoked in the dark forests of Germany, since\nthe Teutonic Aryans sacrificed to the same Heaven-Father; and his old\nname of Tyr, Tiu, or Zio resounded then perhaps for the last time.\n\n\u201cBut no thought, no name, has ever been entirely lost.\u201d[99]\n\nSome thousands of years have elapsed since these families have spread\nabroad on all sides; each branch has formed its own language, its own\nnationality, its mode of viewing life, and its philosophies; temples\nhave been built and razed to the ground; since then all have aged,\nall are wiser, perhaps better, but the name which they gave to the\nInvisible Power who enfolds them is still the same, \u201cOur Father which\nart in Heaven.\u201d\n\nThis name, whose unity has always been perfect, is a magical formula,\nwhich brings our ancestors, even the most remote, within touch, and\nenables us to see them as they were, as they spoke and felt, thousands\nof years before Homer and the Hindoo poets. Guided by the science\nof language and following the path in the Vedic hymns taken by the\nhumanity preceding us, we see how the concept of God, in its germ in\nthe name Deva, grew from the idea of light, to active light, the one\nwho wakens, the giver of daily light, of warmth and new life.\n\nIt is easy to understand the difference between these two\nassertions--first of this one--that the early Aryans called the\nphenomena of nature themselves by the name of God; and the other--that\nthe Aryan mind distilled from the concept of these phenomena the\ngeneral idea of God.\n\n\u201cIf I were asked,\u201d said Max M\u00fcller, \u201cwhich is the most wonderful\ndiscovery of the nineteenth century in the history of humanity, I\nshould reply it is that of the etymological equation of the Sanscrit\nDyaush-pitar, the Greek Zeus-pater, the Latin Ju-piter, and Tyr, Tiw,\nand Zio of the Germans.\u201d\n\nThat the generality of people should be inconsequent is not a matter\nof surprise. He may well be pardoned who does not at once, on the\nword of another, credit a number of facts of which no proofs are\nforthcoming, and who at the same time shows himself unwilling to\naccept the deductions of a science of which he knows nothing, that of\netymology; but what does seem strange is that learned scholars who are\nperfectly capable of following the progress made by philology, refuse\nto recognise the identity of the different names given to the supreme\ndeity of the Aryan race. Certain positivists are in this case; nothing\nirritates them more than to offer them grammatical proof that all the\nAryan families had, before their separation, the same belief; and they\ntry to demonstrate that the name of Dyaus at the first meant nothing\nmore than the sky; and that only at a later period people had changed\nthe name of sky and of firmament--physical phenomena only--into proper\nnames which transformed _nomina_ into _numina_.\n\nIt is worthy of note that this assertion is founded on a fact, but a\nfact not well understood. In the later literature of India which was\nknown before the Veda became so much studied, the name of Dyaus was\nonly known as a feminine; it was the recognised name for sky and day,\nand implied nothing divine. The ancient Aryan Dyaus after a time paled\nbefore Indra--a god of Indian soil; Indra, formerly the rain-giver--the\nally of Rudra--ceased to reside exclusively in the more menacing\nphenomena of the atmosphere, and it is the pure light in which he is\nworshipped. He is now supreme.\n\n\u201cBefore Indra the divine Dyu bowed, before Indra bowed the great\nPrithivi.\u201d[100]\n\nIn order duly to celebrate Indra, the rishis did not content themselves\nwith the praises they considered fitting for the other gods. They\nlaboured hard to find the right expression and every hymn is a heroic\nfeat.\n\n\u201cThe other gods were sent away like shrivelled up old men; thou, O\nIndra, becamest the king. No one is beyond thee, no one is better than\nthou art, no one is like unto thee. Keep silence well! we offer our\npraises to the great Indra in the house of the sacrificer. Does he find\ntreasure for those who are like sleepers? Mean praise is not valued\namong the munificent.\u201d[101]\n\nIt is strange that it is in connection with the great Indra, the most\npopular of all the gods of India, that indications of a struggle\nbetween faith and doubt are apparent in the praises addressed to him.\nThe existence of the other divinities was as firmly established as\nthe splendour of the sun and stars, as the appearances of fire, the\nmovements of the winds, the impressions made by heat and cold; and\nthe confidence they inspired was too firmly established to require\nstimulating; and then suddenly we find the rishis discoursing on and\nenumerating the reasons that exist for man\u2019s belief in Indra.\n\n\u201cWhen the fiery Indra hurls down the thunder-bolt, then people put\nfaith in him. Look at this his great and mighty work, and believe in\nhis great power.\u201d\n\nWhence came this insistence to recall the great power of Indra? It\nalmost suggests the thought that the rishis felt the approach of a\nchange in their conception of the omnipotence of some of the gods of\nnature.\n\n\u201cOffer praise to Indra, if you desire booty; true praise, if he truly\nexists. One and the other says, There is no Indra, who has seen him?\nWhom shall we praise? The terrible one of whom they ask where he\nis.\u201d[102]\n\nBut the poet at once introduces Indra on the scene, and makes him say:--\n\n \u201cHere I am, O worshipper! behold me here.\n In might I overcome all creatures.\u201d--Id.\n\nIn reading the Rig-Veda attentively, in spite of these efforts to\nrevive the ancient faith, here and there can be discovered slight\ntraces of scepticism, so slight as to be scarcely perceptible, and\nthese apart from the incredulity exhibited concerning the powerful\nIndra. The Hindoo was by nature profoundly believing, but his intellect\nwas subtle and scrutinising, and he considered it due to himself to\ngive exact explanations of all; the rishis make the following true\nremarks.\n\n\u201cFire is quenched by water, a cloud hides the sun, the sun also\ndisappears behind the sea;\u201d and from these observations they draw the\nfollowing conclusions.\n\n\u201cWater must not be worshipped, since a cloud can carry it away; nor the\ncloud, since the wind can disperse it.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe positivists have made too much of the fact that Dyaus, at one time\nin India, meant simply the sky and day; a rock is not more immovable\nthan grammar, and it is moreover quite indifferent to all blows aimed\nat truths other than it holds.\n\nCertain scholars in their researches after the origin of Aryan\ndivinities, were surprised and somewhat disconcerted at a gap which\nconfronted them and prevented further progress; nowhere in the later\nliterature of India could any trace be found of Dyaus as a god who\ncould correspond to the supreme divinity of the other branches of the\nfamily. However, the very rational conviction that this deity must have\nexisted gradually strengthened in the minds of the learned. They were\nthus at a standstill, when the Veda appeared under the strong light\nof modern investigation and brought to view the name of Dyaus totally\ndifferent from the feminine dyaus, a Dyaus presenting in itself, not\nmerely the masculine substantive, but joined with pita--father. Amongst\nthe Hindoos it had paled before Indra, who was a god of later date,\nbut the other Aryan races had been uninfluenced by this. Dyaus, the\nchief god, had accompanied them in their migrations, and Zeus-pater,\nJu-piter, Tyr, Tiw, and Zio, became the exact representative of him,\neach in a different country; this discovery of Dyaush-pita, was like\nfinding at last a star in the very place of the heavens which had been\nfixed before by calculation, but where previously there had been a void.\n\nThis was not the only discovery due to the study of the Veda. No one\ncould ignore the fact, that amongst the Hindoos dyaus was the name of\nthe sky, since it bears in itself the root which attests this; but\nit would have been impossible to discover the radical or predicative\nmeaning of Zeus by the help of Greek alone; it possesses no certificate\nof birth, and the Greeks had no traditions connected with it that could\nhave taught us. With the help of comparative philology all is made\nplain; Zeus was born when Dyaus was recognised as masculine and called\nfather, Dyaush-pitar, Ju-piter, Zeus-pater, and from the moment that\nwe are made acquainted with the origin of Zeus, the rest of his career\nunrolls before us.\n\nOur ancestors, however, had still a long time to wander in the\nwilderness of error, and lost themselves many times.\n\nThe Hindoos thought for a time that they had found in Dyaus the object\nof their search; but the supernatural light and the light of day became\nconfounded; when the word Dyaus was pronounced, the many natural bright\nobjects it might signify all vibrated in response and melted into one;\nthey became--as a double star does--one object, and Dyu, the god of\nlight, was eclipsed behind dyu the sky.\n\nWhen the question was asked for the first time whence came the rain,\nthe lightning, and the thunder, those who inhabited Italy replied that\nrain came from Jupiter Pluvius, the lightning from Jupiter fulminator\nand fulgurator, the thunder from Jupiter tonans. In Greece all that\nconcerned the higher regions of the atmosphere was attributed to Zeus;\nit was Zeus who rained, who snowed, thundered, gathered the clouds,\nlet loose the tempests, held the rainbow in his hand; many legends were\ngrouped around these divine names; the more incomprehensible they were,\nthe more eagerly were they heard, until it is very doubtful whether any\ntrace remains of that Being who at the first gave to the name of the\nsky its highest signification.\n\nA characteristic trait of the Hindoos, which is noticeable in the\nhymns, is a tendency to praise all by which they are surrounded. Not\nsatisfied with celebrating the virtues of the invisible beings, which\nthey imagine to be behind the semi-tangible and intangible objects such\nas mountains, rivers, trees, fire, the sun, storms, etc., the rishis,\ncarried away by the ardour of their feelings, glorify objects which are\nperfectly tangible, even those which they may have made with their own\nhands, or those which at least have nothing mysterious in them; these\nare termed _devatas_, and the commentator explains that by this word is\nmeant the person or thing addressed; thus the victims to be offered, or\na sacrificial vessel, or a battle-axe or shield, all these are called\ndevatas; in some dialogues found in the hymns whoever speaks is called\nthe rishi, whoever is spoken to is the devata.\n\n\u201cThe late Herbert Spencer relates that even in our days the Hindoo\noffers prayers to the objects which he uses; a woman adores the basket\nwhich she takes to the market and offers sacrifices to it, as well as\nto the other implements which assist her in her household labours. A\ncarpenter pays the like homage to his hatchet, the mason to his trowel,\nand the Brahman to the style with which he is going to write. The\nquestion is, in what sense did the author of _Principles of Sociology_\nuse the word adore?\u201d[103]\n\nThe desire to have an exact account of what is happening alternates\nwith the prayers and adoration; the questions and praises interlace\nlike the threads of a web.\n\n\u201cUnsupported, not fastened, how does he (the sun) rising up, not fall\ndown?\u201d\n\nThe poet is also anxious to know how the dawn and the sun appear each\nmorning; how there is so much rain, also such an abundance of rivers\nand streams.\n\n\u201cHow many fires are there, how many dawns, how many suns, and how many\nwaters? I do not say this, O fathers, to worry you; I ask you, O seers,\nthat I may know.\u201d\n\nThe explanation also is desired by these enquirers how it is that a\nred or brown cow can give white milk.[104] The rishis are rigorous\nlogicians, and consider that the powerful divinities who made the\nworld such as it is might have done better; and they do not scruple to\ncommunicate their opinion to whom it concerns. \u201cIf we were as rich as\nyou we should not allow our worshippers to beg their bread.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt has been asked whether humanity commenced by having a monotheistic\nor a polytheistic religion. This is not the first time that this\nquestion has been propounded; it has as an antecedent a very ancient\nopinion, developed in the schools of theology in the Middle Ages; the\nFathers of the Church gave it as their opinion that a faith in one God,\nfrom the days of the greatest antiquity, had been the glorious heritage\nof the Semitic family, coming in a direct line from the first man. But\nthese same theologians considered Hebrew to be the primitive language\nof the human race, an assertion now known to be erroneous.[105] We may\ntherefore subject the first assertion to an examination.\n\nThe learned writers who dispute on the original form of religious\nthought forget that the ancient Aryans could not have been either\nmonotheistic or polytheistic. The Vedic hymns show us that though there\nwere many gods, and that they were equal, yet whilst the worshipper\nwas addressing one, the rest were excluded from his mind, and were as\nthough they did not exist; each god became in turn the Supreme Power,\nand received the highest praise; the rishis, who had represented the\nsun under the names of Vishnu, Varuna, Mitra, Savitar as the creator\nof the world, spoke of it immediately afterwards as the child of the\nwaters, born of the dawn, a god among other gods, neither better nor\nworse; it is this characteristic of the Aryan religion, this worship\noffered alternately to different divinities to which Max M\u00fcller has\ngiven the name of Henotheism.\n\n\u201cAmong you, O gods, there is none that is great, and none that is\nlittle--none old or young--you are all great indeed.\u201d\n\nThe religion of humanity in its entirety at the beginning was this\nintuition of the divine, whose formula is that article of faith,\nat once the simplest and the most important--God is God--the want\nof definiteness in it making it the more applicable to the dawn of\nthought. This primitive intuition of God was in itself neither\nmonotheistic nor polytheistic, though it might become either according\nto the expression which it took in the language of man; in no language\ndoes the plural exist before the singular; no human mind could have\nconceived the idea of gods without having previously conceived the idea\nof one God. \u201cIt would be, however, quite as great a mistake to imagine,\nbecause the idea of a god must exist previously to that of gods, that\ntherefore a belief in one God preceded everywhere the belief in many\ngods. A belief in God, as exclusively One, involves a distinct negation\nof more than one God, and that negation is possible only after the\nconception, whether real or imaginary, of many gods.\u201d[106] If therefore\nan expression had been given to this primitive intuition of the Deity,\nwhich is the mainspring of all later religion, it would have been,\n\u201cThere is a God,\u201d but certainly not yet, \u201cThere is but one God.\u201d\n\nThese fine distinctions require close attention to grasp them; the fact\nthat in our modern tongues we have derived the singular _Theos_ from\nthe Greek plural _Theoi_ has caused confusion; from a historical point\nof view, no doubt Theos has come from Theoi; but putting this aside,\nthe meaning of the word has gone through as complete a transformation\nas that of the acorn to the oak; the evidence of this change has been\nso deeply impressed even on our outward senses that as soon as our\nintellect has attained some measure of development the sound of the\nword God used in the plural jars on our ears as if we heard of two\nuniverses or one twin.\n\nThe Hindoo mind, however, oscillated between the representation of many\ngods and of one only God; and the rishis appear to have attempted to\nestablish a sort of priority amongst their numerous deities.\n\n\u201cThat which is one, the seers call in many ways; they speak of Indra,\nMitra, Agni, and Varuna--they call it by various names--that which is,\nand is one.\u201d\n\n\u201cIn the evening Agni becomes Varuna--he becomes Mitra when rising in\nthe mornings; having become Savitri, he passes through the sky--having\nbecome Indra he warms the heaven in the centre.\u201d[107]\n\nThis attempt, which might have led to monotheism, came to nothing; on\nthis point the Hindoos were behind the Greeks and Romans, who with\ntheir polytheism had a presiding deity, viz., Zeus and Jupiter.\n\n\u201cWhen we thus see the god Dyaus antiquated by Indra, and Indra himself\nalmost denied, we might expect in India the same catastrophe which in\nIceland the poets of the Edda always predicted--the twilight of the\ngods preceding the destruction of the world. We seem to have reached\nthe stage when henotheism, after trying in vain to grow into an\norganised polytheism on the one side, or into an exclusive monotheism\non the other, would by necessity end in atheism; yet atheism is not the\nlast word of the Indian religion.\u201d[108]\n\nWhat is atheism?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[72] Max M\u00fcller, _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 231.\n\n[73] Max M\u00fcller, _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 250.\n\n[74] _Rig-Veda_, X. 133. 6.\n\n[75] \u201cTo the ancient seers the dawn seemed to open the golden gates of\nanother world, and while these gates were open for the sun to pass in\ntriumph, their eyes and their minds strove in their childish way to\npierce beyond the limits of this finite world.\u201d--_Origin and Growth of\nReligion_, p. 235.\n\n[76] _Atharva-Veda_, X. 8. 16.\n\n[77] _Rig-Veda_, I. 35. 2.\n\n[78] Max M\u00fcller\u2019s words on the subject are as follows: \u201cThese two\nconcepts (the infinite, and order and law), which sooner or later\nmust be taken in and minded by every human being, were at first no\nmore than an impulse, but their impulsive force would not rest till\nit had beaten into the minds of the fathers of our race the deep and\nindelible impression that \u2018all is right,\u2019 and filled them with a hope,\nand more than a hope, that \u2018all will be right.\u2019\u201d--_Origin and Growth of\nReligion_, p. 259.\n\n[79] _Rig-Veda_, I. 102. 2.\n\n[80] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 238.\n\n[81] _Rig-Veda_, I. 24. 1.\n\n[82] _Physical Religion_, p. 245.\n\n[83] _Physical Religion_, p. 127.\n\n[84] _Rig-Veda_, II. 1. 1.\n\n[85] _Ibid._, IV. 12. 4.\n\n[86] _Rig-Veda_, X. 79. 4.\n\n[87] _Ibid._, X. 2. 4, 5.\n\n[88] _Ibid._, II. 6. 1; VIII. 19. 5.\n\n[89] _Rig-Veda_, I. 189. 3.\n\n[90] _Ibid._, VII. 104.\n\n[91] _Rig-Veda_, VII. 104.\n\n[92] _Ibid._, IX. 113. 7.\n\n[93] _Rig-Veda_, I. 39.\n\n[94] _Ibid._, I. 164; X. 81. 4.\n\n[95] _Physical Religion_, pp. 183-4.\n\n[96] _Atharva_, IV. 16.\n\n[97] _Rig-Veda_, VII. 89.\n\n[98] _Rig-Veda_, X. 82.\n\n[99] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 223.\n\n[100] _Rig-Veda_, I. 131. 1.\n\n[101] _Rig-Veda_, I. 153; IV. 19. 2.\n\n[102] _Ibid._, VIII. 100. 3.\n\n[103] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 205 note.\n\n[104] Max M\u00fcller says: \u201cThere is also a common saying or riddle in\nGerman which you may hear repeated to the present day:--\n\n \u2018O sagt mir doch wie geht es zu\n Dass weis die milch der rothen Kuh?\u2019\u201d\n\n --_Physical Religion_, p. 101.\n\n[105] Dante at one time was of this opinion. \u201cIn his _Il Volgare\nEloquio_, lib. 1, cvi. p. 155, he says: \u2018It was the Hebrew idiom which\nwas uttered by the lips of the first man who ever spoke in this world!\u2019\nThis idea was afterwards relinquished by him, as in the _Paradiso_ he\nputs these words into the mouth of Adam:--\n\n \u2018The language I did use\n Was worn away or ever Nimrod\u2019s race\n Their unaccomplishable work began.\u2019\n\n\u201cThe oldest form of human speech still remains lost in the darkness of\nantiquity.\u201d--Quoted from _Dante in Ravenna_ by Miss Phillimore.\n\n[106] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i. p. 354.\n\n[107] _Atharva_, XIII. 3. 13.\n\n[108] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 310.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI MAN\u2019S CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION\n\n\n \u201cNo one sufficiently recognises the power of reason.\u201d\n --ST THOMAS AQUINAS.\n\n \u201cDe nos jours, nous mouquons encore plus de raison que de religion.\u201d\n --FENELON.\n\nThis question: \u201cWhat is atheism?\u201d has aroused me with a start. Led\naside as I had been by many beautiful, true, and striking thoughts,\nwhich I noted as they presented themselves to me; being also very\npreoccupied by depressing observations that I had made on my chronic\ninability to turn them to account, I lost sight of the fact that it\nis not sufficient to write and think at will merely, without definite\nplan, not keeping the goal in sight. This is my eleventh chapter, and I\nsee with dismay that it is likely to exceed the two which precede it in\nlength, and that it follows one concerned more with the repetition of\nwords often spoken and seldom understood. I fear that I lack method.\n\nDuring our own time we have seen a school arise, the Historical School;\nit was heralded in Germany by such men as Niebuhr, the two Humboldts,\nBopp--the author of the first Comparative Grammar--Grimm, and many\nothers. This School shows that an uninterrupted continuity connects\nwhat has been thought of old with what is being thought at present;\nthat there is no break between the present and the past; and that the\ndifficulties which are presented to us by the study of the present\nphilosophical problems, would in a great measure disappear, if we knew\nunder what form these same problems presented themselves to man for the\nfirst time.\n\nThe Historical School advances step by step with the study of\ncomparative philology; this latter has shown that at the beginning the\nnumber of words was very small; they lay, as it were, side by side,\nbefore man\u2019s eyes, as evenly and as regularly as the threads on a\nweaver\u2019s loom. But gradually, on account of our neglect, and our many\nmisunderstandings, the idea contained in these words became entangled,\nand we have ceased to follow the course of the thread; the words have\nremained in our memory, but the meaning has changed; they may even have\nseveral meanings which contradict each other; the result is that we are\nignorant of many things it would be well for us to know with certainty.\n\nAll problems whether of philosophy or of philology, are best solved\nby the historical method; let us bravely face each obscure question\nto which we have no key; each doubtful term the meaning of which is\nlost, and bid all retrace their steps in the path by which they arrived\nat us; avoiding the peril of the idle worker who has a theory, and a\nremedy ready for everything; and the walks in the country of dreams\nwhich have no chart to direct travellers.\n\nFor us who are not learned linguists there is more than one method of\ngaining information concerning words; the easiest is to note the use\nmade of them at various times in the past; another way which is more\nimportant and more certain is to study their biographies, we should\nfind them in ancient documents; a third method that exacts neither a\nknowledge of their history, nor their genealogy, consists simply in\nreflection; this process, which should be within the reach of all, is\nseldom used.\n\nAs I am constrained to follow the development of the Vedic religion\nat the commencement of what was neither polytheism nor monotheism; I\nrecur to the last word of the preceding chapter in order to find its\nhistorical antecedents.\n\nHistory tells us that much in the same way as a wild beast pursues its\nprey, this epithet of atheist is hurled at men who in truth have little\nin common. \u201cIn the eyes of his Athenian judges Socrates was an atheist;\nyet he did not even deny the gods of Greece, but he reserved to himself\nthe right to believe in something higher and more truly divine than\nHephaistos and Aphrodite.\u201d[109] Spinoza was called an atheist by the\nJews, his co-religionists, because his conception of Jahveh or Jehovah\nwas wider than theirs. The early Christians were called _\u00e1theoi_ by the\nJews and Greeks because they believed not as the Jews and Christians\nbelieved. Were the Hindoos atheists when they said, \u201cWhat is Indra?\nit is the sun, the rain only.\u201d Were they atheists when they ceased to\nbelieve in their Devas, the brilliant objects, the stars, the fields,\nthe rivers, the eyes of man? If the history of the word atheist had\nonly taught us one thing, _e.g._ that those who think differently\nfrom ourselves do not deserve the reproach of atheism, it would have\nextinguished the fires of many an _auto da f\u00e9_.\n\nBut are there real atheists? Do those persons exist who are convinced\nthat the word God represents nothing? There may be; if you have\nsucceeded in convincing human reason that there can be an act without\na cause, a boundary without a beyond, a finite without an infinite;\nthen you will have proved without doubt that there is no God. \u201cGod is a\n_great_ word,\u201d said a German theologian, lately deceased, whose honesty\nand piety have never been questioned, \u201che who feels and understands\nthat, will judge more mildly and more justly of those who confess that\nthey dare not say that they believe in God.\u201d[110]\n\nWe ought never to call a man an atheist till we know what kind of God\nit is that he has been brought up to believe in, and what kind of God\nit is that he rejects, it may be, from the best and highest motives. If\nwe can respect the childlike faith of a charcoal-burner, let us also\nrespect philosophical doubt; it may well indicate a turning-point in\nthe life of a man, in which he is perhaps abandoning a belief of which\nhe has seen the error, or is perhaps seeking to replace the less worthy\nfaith, however dear it may be to him, by one more perfect, however its\nnovelty may distress him; without such \u201catheism\u201d as this our religion\nwould long ago have only been a congealed hypocrisy.\n\nIn the life of an individual, as in the life of a nation, there comes\na moment when opinion becomes modified; the old theory of the world\nbeing fashioned by a workman as a potter moulds his vessels of clay,\nhas gradually disappeared. These ideas were so repugnant to the\nenlightened mind of Sakya-muni, the Hindoo Prince--universally known as\nBuddha--that he considered it irreverent to enquire how the world was\nmade, and still more audacious to attempt to answer the enquiry.\n\nThat which took the place of henotheism amongst the Hindoos might aptly\nbe termed adivism, a denial of the old Devas. Such a denial, however,\nof what was once believed, but could be honestly believed no longer, so\nfar from being the end of religion, is in reality its vital principle.\n\nWhilst about to deal with ideas which I know are true, it is gratifying\nto expose at the same time certain false opinions which have been\nput forth on the subject; it is curious to note how to start with a\nfalse opinion brings one to a wrong conclusion. Herodotus, C\u00e6sar, and\nQuintus Curtius, who have all written on popular religious beliefs,\nrelate that men adored the sun, the earth, the sky, fire, and water;\nthat they worshipped certain rivers, and certain trees, and considered\nas gods all things that were useful to them. This was the opinion of\nthe ancient writers who knew no better, and modern theorists repeated\nalso: \u201cPrimitive men deified the grand natural phenomena of nature,\nespecially the stars, taking them for gods.\u201d\n\nIt is not a matter for surprise that primitive man should have formed\nthe opinion that either in the world or out of it there should be a\nsovereign power which they considered as their gods.\n\nIn the eighteenth century the theory of fetishism was held to explain\nall the intuitions of primitive man; although not pertinent to the\nsubject, this was not perceived until afterwards, and the theory was\nconsidered reasonable.\n\nWhilst the _Theorists_ take the predicate of God, when applied even to\na fetish, as requiring no explanation, the _Historical School_ sees in\nit the result of a long continued evolution of thought. It was evident\nthat the human soul was so constituted that it must tend naturally and\ninevitably towards the Unknown; it was also necessary that man should\nlearn that he possessed a soul.\n\nWe recognise that we have one; but are we equally clear as to what it\nis?\n\nWe answer perhaps: \u201cYes, it is that part of us which is not the body\nwhich perishes--the soul is immortal.\u201d It is well to be able to make\nsuch a reply, since it is true; our catechisms have sown the seed of\nwhich this is the result.\n\nBut since all human knowledge, whether abstract or practical, has the\nsame beginning, through the senses, and that neither eye, ear, nor hand\nhas to do with the soul, what can we know of it? Above all, what can\nwe learn of its existence after death, the time when immortality has\npassed beyond the sphere of the experience of the senses? As man we\nrecognise the spirit inhabiting the body, but with no form, such as it\nmight receive after death; we can hardly clothe these ideas in words.\n\nThis belief in a soul, exactly like the belief in gods, and at last in\nOne God, can only be understood as the outcome of constantly renewed\nobservations and long meditations; the annals of language furnish\nmaterial for this study, those ancient words, which, meaning originally\nsomething quite tangible and visible, came in time to mean that which\nis invisible and infinite.\n\nThe last breath of a dying person gave the first conception of the\npresence in man of a non-corporeal principle; it was recognised that\nthis perceptible breath, at the moment of death, was an accident and\ntransient. Language marks clearly the difference between the act of\nbreathing or breath, and that which breathed, the invisible agent of\nthis act--the living soul, the spirit. This agent received different\nnames, in the different languages; the Greeks named it Psyche, saying\nthat it was the breath which, at the hour of death, passed out through\nthe bars of the teeth; amongst the Hindoos it was called _Atman_, and\n_Anima_ amongst the Latins, two words which originally were understood\nby those using them as meaning something breathing. Cicero spoke of\n_Anima_, but he refrained from defining it, and frankly avowed that he\ndid not know whether to call it breath or fire.\n\nThe word breath has been used figuratively to express the Power\ngoverning the world.[111] A poet in the Veda when speaking of the\nSupreme Being says, \u201cIt breathed without air.\u201d\n\nAlthough the word breath was most frequently used to denote the\nprinciple of life, another expression was employed at a much earlier\nperiod; in countries the most remote from each other, the words,\n_the shadow of the dead_, were used, in order to express the idea of\nsomething intangible yet closely related to the body. The influence\nof language on thought is so real and so much more powerful than the\ntestimony of our senses, that those who named the soul a shadow, came\nat last to believe that corpses threw no shadow because it had left\nthem.\n\nIt was then considered that the soul was not a homogeneous whole, but\ncomposed of parts of which some are ephemeral, destined to disappear\nwith the body; these parts form what the Greek and Latin writers call\nthe Ego, and the Hindoos _Aham_, what in French would be termed the\n_moi_--three words for one thing--an object of contingency, since it\ndepends on circumstances--on the body, on age, and on sex.\n\nAll men have endeavoured to solve the riddle of human life; but the\nHindoos, who especially excelled in researches dealing with the\nformation of words, that is to say, with the birth or development of\nideas, whilst penetrating deeply into the mysteries of their soul,\ntheir Atman, arrived at an abstraction of this Atman, entirely freed\nfrom all earthly or physical particles, and this \u201cvehicle of an\nabstraction\u201d they considered to be incapable of perishing, since it\nhad no connection with breath, it was the pure self, \u201cfreed from the\nfetters and conditions of the human Ego,\u201d hidden in the _Aham_; not\ncontingent on circumstances--the self-existent One.\n\nThis new conception demanded a new name; the word Atman, which at first\nsignified all the concomitant elements of the soul--those which pass,\nequally with those that remain--the Hindoos retained in their language,\nand it was used to define the essence itself, the being with no\nattributes, identical with the Being who vivified nature, the Infinite\nthat supported man\u2019s own being, the Highest Self. Socrates knew this\nsame Self, but he called it _Daimonion_, the indwelling God, whom the\nearly Christians called the Holy Ghost.\n\nFrom the Hindoo point of view this idea holds in itself the solution of\nthe world\u2019s great enigma. The commandment indicating the kernel of all\nphilosophy, \u201cKnow thyself,\u201d was the Hindoo doctrine. Know thyself as\nthe self, or if we translate it into religious language, \u201cKnow that we\nlive and move and have our being in God\u201d (Acts xvii. 28).[112]\n\nIn recognising the soul as that which is the _self_, we see that this\nfact of existing is more wonderful than the acts of breathing, feeling,\nthinking, living, since none of these manifestations are possible but\non the sole condition of having proceeded from the Being--who _is_.\n\nAfter having analysed the human soul, the Hindoos followed it from\nphase to phase from the moment when the breath which makes man a living\nbeing received its first names. They thus traced its history through\ntime, and believed that they could follow it through eternity.\n\nYears were employed in the elaboration of this history, and we only\nfind its completion in a work which is posterior to the Vedic hymns,\nthe Upanishads. The study of the human soul is the central point in\nHindoo philosophy, and the Upanishads are the first psychological work\nwhich has ever been made.\n\nThere are persons who doubt the existence of things, of which others\nfeel certain; but no one ever doubted the existence of his own\nsoul. Why did the theologians who arranged the creeds not include\nthe article, \u201cI believe in my soul.\u201d It would not have found men\nincredulous.\n\nReflection enables us to admit that the soul without God could possess\nno history, since neither the soul without God, nor God without the\nsoul, could constitute religion. For this which is called religion,\nif under the form only of a soaring towards an unknown but longed-for\nBeing, has always existed since there have been men on the earth.\n\nWe often meet the recurring questions \u201cWhence?\u201d \u201cWhy?\u201d and the frequent\n\u201cBecause\u201d; and now we are told by a small number of thinkers that all\nthe explanations of speculative philosophy on the first impulses of\nthe human soul towards religion, are only worthless suppositions,\nunless philosophers--as historians have done--have recognised that\nthere was a revelation at the beginning of time in the true sense of\nthe word; but opinions differ as to \u201cthe true sense of the word.\u201d\n\nWe are so accustomed to apply the expression \u201cthe Word of God\u201d to the\nsacred canon of Scripture, that we are inapt at seeking for God\u2019s Word\nelsewhere. But our first fathers read and studied it before the Bible\nexisted.\n\nTo reflective minds, primitive man presents a moving spectacle,\ndrawn towards the Unknown--the Unseen--they abandoned themselves\nunresistingly to the current leading them in certain directions.\n\nI imagine that our Aryan ancestors would not have fixed their attention\nwith such tenacity on the objects in nature which environed them, had\nthe stars and heavenly bodies been immovable. But the sun appearing on\nthe one side, traversing the sky and then disappearing on the opposite\nside, made the remark of the Incas prince very natural: \u201cThere is some\npower behind the sun causing it to ascend and descend.\u201d It did not\noccur to him that the sun travelled in accordance with natural laws.\nOther princes and poets, with their eyes fixed on the moving objects\nof the firmament, would have made the same reflection and sought the\ninvisible cause.\n\nIf the world had been propelled by a moving power within itself,\ncreatures possessing reason would have been vaguely conscious of\nit from the first. They would have been like the plants which turn\nregularly and infallibly in one direction, since they are not free to\ndo otherwise.\n\n\u201cYou premise a revelation,\u201d may be said to me, \u201cand yet you direct us\ntowards Evolution; choose one of the two since the one contradicts the\nother.\u201d\n\nThat remains to be proved. Apply the theory of the evolutionist to\nthe mollusc; we see it directing itself, and extending its tentacles,\ntowards a crumb of bread that floats on the water. If they touch\nit the contact calls forth in the mollusc the act of seizing its\nprey. This is only a movement of semi-consciousness, or perhaps\nrather it is not entirely involuntary. Under the aspect of immediate\ncause and effect, we see a principle anterior to the phenomenon;\ncertain perceptions which appear in the sight of many psychologists\nto be innate, that is to say, impressions received on our mind\nbefore we became conscious of ourself, may well be the result of the\nreceptability of our Ego, which enables us, when it is affected in\na certain fashion, to represent these affections to ourselves under\ncertain forms.\n\nThe presentiment that unknown powers were to be found behind the\nvisible world only showed itself when the Aryans first named them sky,\nsun, moon, storm, day, night, all terms previously used for various\nparts of nature.\n\nWith the perception of a Beyond, with the desire to know what it\ncontained, a gap made itself felt which separated it from the known\nworld. It must be crossed--a bridge was necessary. This thought spread\nfrom one end of the globe to the other, but our ancestors were the\nfirst bridge-makers. Scandinavian mythology mentions a bridge built by\nthe gods which was of three colours; it was clearly intended originally\nfor the rainbow. The Milky Way provided the Hindoos with a bridge; and\nin the Upanishads mention is made of a path having five colours. Here\nwe have the rainbow again probably. The source of these legends is the\nineradicable belief in the heart of man, that the here and hereafter,\nthe immortal and the mortal, the divine and the human, cannot remain\napart for ever.\n\nHere I will comment on a striking feature of the _Rig-Veda_. The rishis\ngive accounts of the manner in which the hymns are composed. They say\nthat they worked at them as other workmen do, such as carpenters,\nweavers, and potters. Sometimes they speak of the verses as coming\ndirect from the heart; another says his hymn moves as a skiff on the\nriver. Sometimes they speak of their hymns as god-given, and that the\ngods themselves are seers and poets. In no part of the _Rig-Veda_ are\nthere traces of the theories of the verbal inspiration with the meaning\nwhich the Greeks attached to the word as a theophany or manifestation\nof divinity, nor as it was understood afterwards in all religions,\nbeginning with Brahmanism.\n\nIt would be useless to seek for a complete exposition of Vedic thought\nin the _Rig-Veda_; all the hymns found in it are not ancient; the\ncollection was made by the priests, and if they retained much that\nwas useless for our purpose in their worship, yet we should be very\ngrateful to them, as in this manner much has been preserved to us of\nthe ancient poetry of India, and it is they who recount the pilgrimage\nundertaken by the Aryans in search of the invisible lodestone which\nattracted them beyond what they could see and hear. As they advanced\nthey rejoiced, seeming to attain their desire; but cast down under the\nweight of their sadness, as at times they found themselves misled.\n\nIt is said in the Bible, that for God a thousand years is as one day,\nand as I read the sacred books of India, not as a learned critic, but\nas a man who is rejoiced to discover his own thoughts in the writings\nof the Hindoo poets, the three or four thousand years appear to me as\none day during which these poets have not ceased to pour themselves out\nin their hymns, and it would be possible to condense in one page the\nsentiments expressed in the first hymns and the last Upanishads.\n\n\u201cSimple minded, not comprehending in my mind, I ask for the hidden\nplaces of the gods.\u201d[113] \u201cMy ears vanish, my eyes vanish, and the\nlight also which dwells in my heart; my mind with its far-off longings\nleaves me; what shall I say, and what shall I think?\u201d[114]\n\n\u201cThere is no likeness of Him whose name is Great Glory. He is not\napprehended of the eye, nor by the other senses, nor by speech; not\nby penance, or good works. We do not know, we do not understand, how\nanyone can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above\nthe unknown, thus we have heard from those of old who taught us this.\u201d\n\n\u201cYou will not find Him who has created these things; something else\nstands between you and Him.\u201d[115]\n\nThese detached sentences acquire a very special value, when it is\nremembered that they are not quotations drawn from some modern works,\nwhich imitate the writings of another epoch; these exist nowhere but\nin the _Veda_, a literary work composed in the silence and shade, by\nwriters who themselves were ignorant of the object of their desire.\n\nOne point at last becomes clear in the mist; a thousand years probably\nbefore the coming of Christ in Palestine, this verse was pronounced in\nthe north of India, \u201cHe who is above the gods alone is God.\u201d[116]\n\nThe Grecian, Roman, and German divinities disappeared before other\nbeliefs; but the Hindoos who knew that their gods were nothing more\nthan mere names, had no dawning religion within their reach that they\ncould adopt; therefore they did not abandon their traditions, and they\ncontinued to grope, as one of their own poets says, \u201cEnveloped in mist\nand with faltering voices.\u201d\n\nAll the religious thought of the Vedic period can be found in the\nUpanishads (the literal meaning of this name is, sessions or assemblies\nof pupils round their master). There is not what could be called a\nphilosophical system in these Upanishads; they are fragments, and are\nin the true sense of the word, guesses at truth; the spirit of the\nwork is liberal, all shades of opinion are represented in it, the most\ndivers, and sometimes contradictory. Conjectures abound with regard\nto the creation, all start from the theory that the world we see is\nnot the true world, and that before it appeared there was the true\nSelf--the Self-existent--the One which underlies the whole world, from\nwhich has come all that seems to exist and does actually exist. This\nwas the final solution of the search after the Unknown, the Invisible,\nwhich had been foretold through a long chain of centuries; an intuition\nmore convincing than all the arguments which were used at a later\nperiod to prove the existence of the Causa Caus\u00e6.\n\nThe difficulties of the Brahmans in making a complete collection of\nthese vague presentiments, confused thoughts, and true intuitions,\nwere increased a hundredfold by the fact that they had to accept every\nword and every sentence of the Upanishads as supernaturally revealed.\nHowever contradictory at first sight, all that was said in the\nUpanishads had to be accepted and explained. It would seem difficult to\nconstruct a well-arranged literary monument out of such heterogeneous\nmaterials; but it was harmonised and welded into a system of philosophy\nthat for solidity and unity will bear comparison with any other system\nof philosophy in the world.[117]\n\nThis gigantic work, which commenced with the Vedic hymns and ended in\nthe book called the Vedanta, or End, and was the end or supreme object\nof the Veda, is also known under the name of M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2-sutras. M\u00eem\u00e2ms\u00e2 is\na desiderative form of the root _man_, to think, and a very appropriate\nname for a philosophical work of this kind; and s\u00fbtra means literally\na string; but it is here used as the name of short and abstract\naphorisms, rendered still more enigmatical by the conciseness of the\nlanguage. There are several hundreds of these sayings or headings,\nforming tables of contents, a magic chaplet of immeasurable length,\neach word containing condensed thought. This work must have required a\nconcentration of mind which it is difficult for us to realise.\n\nThe meaning and form of these aphorisms are characteristic--here is one.\n\n\u201cI will declare in a line, that which has required millions of volumes.\n\n\u201cBrahma is true, the world is false; the soul is Brahma and nothing\nelse.\u201d\n\nThose who consider the Supreme Being as the Infinite in nature, and\nthe individual soul as the Infinite in man, must consider God and the\nsoul as one, not two, seeing there cannot be two Infinites; such is\nthe belief of the Hindoos; but this belief does not belong to them\nexclusively, it existed amongst the Greeks, and it is encountered in\nother places in our day besides India.\n\nAs works of art these s\u00fbtras are of course nothing, but for giving a\ncomplete and accurate outline of a whole system of philosophy they are\nadmirable. Under these fragmentary forms can be found treatises of\ngrammar, etymology, exegesis, phonetics, ceremonial, and jurisprudence.\n\nThe aphorism which I have quoted is the pure quintessence of the\nVedanta.\n\nAnd of Pantheism also, it may be said. This word Pantheism is one of\nthe most difficult to define, and I shall not attempt to explain it.\nI have a horror of epithets, and I am sorry that it is not always\npossible to avoid them. I do not examine philosophical systems too\nminutely, lest I should be drawn into hurling at them such words as\npantheism, mysticism, positivism, materialism, naturalism, without\nbeing quite clear when it is no longer lawful to express myself in\nthese terms; epithets and labels are very apt to return home to roost.\nI will therefore confine myself to this remark, with regard to the\nbelief of the Hindoos; if each definite colour can be broken up into\na number of tints too numerous to name, may it not be the same with\ncertain shades and meanings in words and thoughts?\n\nThe Greeks hardly suspected the existence of the Veda; in more modern\ntimes Europe caught glimpses of it; and now, although completely\ndiscovered and studied, it is thoroughly known only to a few erudite\nscholars, which explains the fact that this ancient creation of the\nHindoo mind has exercised so small an influence on our philosophy.\n\n\nTHE SACRED WRITINGS OF THE HEBREWS\n\nWhilst the hymns of the Rig-Veda, with their simple meditations,\ninvocations and interrogations--sent out by chance, as it were, into\nspace--accurately trace the march of thought which accompanies the\nsearch for indications of the Unknown--the Infinite; we look in vain in\nthe Old Testament for the first dawnings, the first impressions made on\nthe human soul by the existence of things divine. From the time when,\nin the garden of Eden, Adam and Eve entered into communion with the\nEternal, the sacred narrative of facts, evidently historical, continues\nin such a manner as to have led some to regard it as merely allegorical.\n\nTo verify in the light of scientific knowledge the titles which the\nBible can truly present to the veneration of the Christian world\nappears to some more and more advisable.[118] Few persons amongst the\ncritical students of the Old Testament doubt that the books said to be\nby Moses are a collection of ancient documents, a compilation made by\ndifferent individuals living at different periods, with long intervals\nbetween them, each with his own point of view. The conscientious\nexamination to which these portions of the sacred writings have been\nsubjected was directed at first to isolated points, and in order to\nexercise freely the critical faculties so much in evidence now, it was\nnecessary to modify the generally accepted view that the religion\nof the Jews was cast in one piece, and perfect at the first. It was\nnecessary to separate the ancient documents from those of a more\nrecent date, but the attempt to make an exact chronological table of\nthe earlier history of the Hebrews was abandoned. Until the death\nof Solomon only round numbers could be used, even the date of the\noldest fact in history, the exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt,\ncannot definitely be fixed. Amongst the Egyptologists, whose testimony\nis of the greatest value, there is great hesitation in assigning a\ndate, though the greater number hold to the fifteenth century B.C.\nTheir representations with regard to Moses are so devoid of definite\nhistorical data as to envelop his personality in great mystery.\n\nThe idea of a revelation expressly delivered to the Jewish people\nacquired a more definite form in the Middle Ages; and from the\nReformation the theory was promulgated, amongst those to whom the\nidea was not repugnant, that to a small portion of humanity only--the\nelect--had been consigned the task of disseminating the knowledge of\nreligious truth in the world. The study of the Scriptures spread to all\nclasses where it was not forbidden to the laity, and from that time\nmillions of human beings knew no other literature.\n\nAssured that the Old Testament contained the inspired words, Jews\nand Christians alike read it with feelings of reverence which\nnaturally excluded all idea of captious criticism. But the spirit of\nbiblical criticism which animated the reformers was never afterwards\nextinguished, and attentive readers discovered variations in the\nconstruction of the Pentateuch which at that time were inexplicable.\nThe fact that the Bible contained many narratives which could not\nalways be reconciled the one with the other was known long before the\nperiod of which we are speaking. St Jerome, when feeling the want of\nmore accurate Greek and Latin translations than those in use in his\ntime, undertook to make one, and wrote thus to a friend of his, a\npriest: \u201cRe-read the books of the Old and New Testaments, and you will\nfind so many contradictions in the numbers referring to the years,\nand to the kings of Judah and Israel, that it would require a man of\nleisure rather than a student to enter thoroughly into the matter.\u201d[119]\n\nSide by side with this historical reconstruction which is now carried\non, there is a work of examination being pursued. It is asked by what\nmeans did the Jewish people become so strong, so compact, whilst in\nthe midst of strange nations, and in spite of all vicissitudes. It is\nalso asked what was the earliest history of the Hebrews, and whether\nit is due to the supernatural element that the tribes assembled at\nthe base of Mount Sinai were enabled to become an united people; and,\nfinally, these keen questioners desire to know the stages by which the\nconception of the Deity entered the Semitic mind.\n\nThe scholars who give themselves to these enquiries, generally\neliminate the question of popular orthodoxy from the subject, since\nthey consider that when theoretical theology finds its way amongst\nsuch workers it does not assist research; it confuses their point\nof view; they look upon the whole race as becoming prophets, and\nthe prophets become apostles, and thus, out of proportion. The work\nadvances slowly; each critic puts forth his own special lucubrations\nconcerning the biblical settings which all are naturally anxious to\nretain; contentions are rife on the subject of the Hebrew writers;\ntheir lack of Christianity, and their philosophy are both made matters\nfor discussion, and disputes between the commentators did not cease.\n\nAmongst those who are passive witnesses of the scientific\ninvestigations, there are many who, without closely following this\nmodern exegesis, are sufficiently enlightened to recognise its aim and\nits use, and they exclaim with a satisfaction mixed with astonishment,\n\u201cWhatever may be said one fact remains certain, our holy Scriptures\nspeak of God as God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth, as He most truly\nis, therefore the Old Testament, the product of the Semitic mind, is\nfree from the taint which is perceptible in ancient Aryan literature,\nthat of mythology.\u201d\n\nLet us seek the reason of this immunity accorded to the sacred books of\nthe Hebrews, let us seek it _in_ the language, not _apart_ from it, as\nsome do when looking for the origin of thought.\n\n\nTHE VARIOUS NAMES OF GOD\n\nAccording to the historians who have made a study of the ancient\nreligions, each name given to or descriptive of a deity corresponded to\na special conception formed by the people. This has been a generally\nreceived principle, and it serves as a clue to guide us in our study of\nprimitive creeds.\n\nThe Semitic languages, like the Aryan, possessed a number of names of\nthe Deity in common, all expressive of certain general qualities of\nthe Deity, but all raised by one or other of the Semitic tribes to be\nthe names of God, or of that idea which the first breath, the first\nsight of the world, the feeling of absolute dependence on a power\nbeyond ourselves, had for ever impressed and implanted in the human\nmind. These names were all either honorific titles, or represented\nsome moral qualities. El and El-Schadai--Strong, Powerful; Bel or\nBaal--Lord; Adon or Adonai--my Lord, Master; Melk or Moloch--King;\nEliun--the Highest God. Such names as these, so clear and easily\nunderstood, did not readily lend themselves to mythological contagion,\nand they were adopted by Christian phraseology because they contained\nnothing but what might be rightly ascribed to God.\n\nI could have wished to pass over the name Eloha, which eventually\nbecame Elohim, in silence, as its history is a long one, but I shall\nsay a few words about it, as it is one of the most primitive names,\nand indicates to us what the Semites understood by divine. The name\nElohim, applied to an unknown, invisible power, one not grasped by the\nsenses, was the expression of all that was superior and beyond what was\nseen and known on the earth. At the same time the name was used not\nexclusively for the Deity, but for others whose attributes, whether\nphysical or moral, demanded a superlative appellative ... there were\nthus several Elohims of varying natures, the Semitic termination in\n_im_ turning Eloha into a plural, still always took a singular verb\nafter it, and Elohim or the Elohim (pl.) were both used.\n\nIf a comparison be made between the Semitic and Aryan methods of\ntreating the same subjects, the assertion seems amply justified that\nmythology has not ventured to effect an entrance into the thoughts of\nthe Hebrew writers. If the subject Dawn be taken, it would remain with\nthe Semitic authors a natural daily occurrence, but the Aryan writers\nwould transform it into a personal agent taking the form of gracious,\nkindly mythical personages. An example presents itself in the book of\nJob.\n\nJehovah, the Creator of the universe, \u201canswered Job out of the\nwhirlwind,\u201d who had sought to learn the secrets of nature. Jehovah said\nto him:--\n\n \u201cHast thou commanded the morning since thy days began, and caused the\n dayspring to know its place?\n\n \u201cDeclare if thou knowest it all.\n\n \u201cWhere is the way to the dwelling of light; and as for darkness,\n where is the place thereof?\n\n \u201cDoubtless thou knowest, for thou wast then born. And the number of\n thy days is great.\u201d (Job xxxviii. 12, 18, 19, 21).\n\nThis is dawn in biblical language and in nature; but who would\nrecognise it under the figure of Daphne, Eos, or Ahana? All of whom\nhave so exercised the brains of our mythologists.\n\nBut Jehovah drives still more deeply the point of His discourse into\nthe conscience of Job.\n\n \u201cWho hath cleft a channel for the water flood, to cause it to rain on\n a land where no man is?\n\n \u201cHath the rain a father?\n\n \u201cOr who hath begotten the drops of dew?\n\n \u201cCanst thou lift up thy voice to the clouds, that abundance of waters\n may cover thee?\u201d (Job xxxviii. 25, 26, 28, 34).\n\nThe Aryans had also described the rain, and their thoughts on the\nsubject coincided with those of the Semitic race, but they were clothed\nin the grotesque language generally associated with myths.\n\n\u201cThe rain is represented in all the primitive mythologies of the Aryan\nrace as the fruit of the embraces of Heaven and Earth.\u201d[120] This is\nan advance towards the poetical metaphor which \u00c6schylus at a later\ndate thus expressed: \u201cThe bright sky loves to fructify the earth; the\nearth on her part aspires to the heavenly marriage. Rain falling from\nthe loving sky impregnates the earth, and she produces for mortals her\nfruit.\u201d\n\nIt is necessary to possess a somewhat profound knowledge of the\nmorphological characteristics of the Semitic and Aryan languages\nin order to note accurately the particulars to which I have drawn\nattention, and to understand the amount of influence they exercise on\nreligious phraseology.\n\n\nTHE GENIUS OF LANGUAGES\n\nEach linguistic family has special features, just as each race has\nits own physiognomy; the distinctive feature of the Semitic languages\nis that the significative elements destined to form appellatives,\nwhen once incorporated as roots in the body of a word, suffered no\nmodification, and the original meaning could never be ignored. Thus all\nSemitic names for the dawn, the sun, the vault of heaven, the rain,\nand other natural phenomena, preserving their appellative character,\ncould not be used for any other object; thus they could never express\nan abstract idea, such as that of the Deity. The method followed with\nregard to the arrangement of words in the greater number of Semitic\ndictionaries, which are generally arranged according to their roots,\nattest the truth of this fact. When we wish to find the meaning of a\nword in Hebrew or Arabic, we first seek for its root, and then look in\nthe dictionary for that root and its derivatives. In similar languages\nno ambiguity is possible; nothing lends itself to myths.\n\nIn the Aryan languages, on the contrary, such an arrangement would\nhave been extremely inconvenient; here the roots were apt to become\nso completely absorbed by the derivative elements, whether prefixes\nor suffixes, that often substantives ceased almost immediately to be\nappellative, and were changed into mere names or proper names; this\npeculiarity of the language enabled the Hindoos to form such words\nas Dyaus, Aditi, Varuna, Indra, which at first designate various\naspects of nature, and afterwards were applied to different aspects of\ndivinities. The preceding pages have afforded us many examples, and I\nhope that the comparison I have drawn between the two representations\nof the same object will suffice to explain why it is that we possess a\nGrecian and Hindoo mythology, but that there was no Hebrew mythology.\n\n\nMETAPHOR\n\nBut, on the other hand, the Old Testament is full of metaphor--these\npearls of discourse; these expressions so light and effective in\nthe mouths of poets as they skim over the surface of the subject in\nhand, but which we make so ponderous and ungraceful with our literal\ninterpretations. When David speaks of God as a rock, a fortress, a\nbuckler, we have no difficulty in understanding his meaning, although\nwe might express ourselves differently, and probably speak of the\never-present help of God. Where we allude to a temptation from within\nor from without, it was more natural for the ancients to speak of a\ntempter, whether in a human or animal form. What with us is a heavenly\nmessage or a godsend was to them a winged messenger.\n\nWhat is really meant is perhaps the same, and the fault is ours, not\ntheirs, if we persist in understanding their words in their outward and\nmaterial aspect only; and forget that before language had sanctioned\na distinction between the concrete and the abstract, the intention of\nthe speakers comprehended both the concrete and the abstract, both\nthe material and the spiritual, in a manner which has become quite\nstrange to us.[121] I believe it can be proved that more than half\nthe difficulties in the history of religion owe their origin to this\nconstant misinterpretation of ancient language by modern language, of\nancient thought by modern thought, particularly whenever the word has\nbecome more sacred than the spirit.\n\n\nTHE LATER NAME FOR GOD AMONGST THE HEBREWS\n\nEach divine name mentioned hitherto represented a quality or an\nattribute; we now come to one of comparatively more recent date, which\ncontains neither attribute nor similitude; it is mentioned for the\nfirst time in a conversation between God and Moses. God speaks from the\nburning bush, and tells Moses to bring the children of Israel out of\nEgypt. \u201cAnd Moses said unto God: Behold, when I come unto the children\nof Israel and shall say unto them: \u2018The God of your fathers hath sent\nme unto you\u2019; and they shall say to me: \u2018What is His name?\u2019 what shall\nI say unto them? And God said unto Moses: \u2018I Am that I Am.\u2019 And he\nsaid: \u2018Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent\nme unto you\u2019\u201d (Exod. iii. 14, 15).\n\nGod in speaking of Himself said: \u201cI Am that I Am,\u201d or, \u201cI Am\u201d; but\nman in designating God used the word Jehovah. The etymology of this\nword was sought, and it was regarded by many, rightly or wrongly, as a\nderivative of the verb to be. Jehovah was thus--absolute existence, or\nthe Being.\n\n\u201cAnd God spake unto Moses and said unto him: \u2018I am Jehovah; and I\nappeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob as El Shaddai, but by\nmy name Jehovah I was not known to them\u2019\u201d (Exodus vi. 2, 3).\n\nWriters are now generally agreed that Jehovah should be pronounced\nJahveh. Renan notices this striking fact. \u201cThe name of God which\nhas conquered the world,\u201d he says, \u201cis unknown to all who are not\nHebraists, and even they do not know how to pronounce it.\u201d\n\nBy a superstition which some writers trace back to a very remote\nperiod, the Israelites considered the name which God had used of\nHimself to be too sacred to be uttered by human lips; gradually its use\nwas discontinued; and the name Lord was used in its place.\n\nAlthough the names of God all indicated the one true God, they did not\npreserve the children of Israel from polytheism, since there was hardly\na tribe that did not forget the original meaning of the titles used. If\nthe Jews had remembered the meaning of the word El, they could not have\nworshipped Baal as distinct from El; but in the same way as the Greeks\nconnected the worship of Apollos and Uranus with that of Zeus, so the\nJews were ready at times to invoke the gods of their neighbours.\n\nIt is not that the earlier names of the Deity contained no second\nmeaning as qualificative adjective; Force, for instance, could be\nsymbolised, but the idea of absolute existence expressed by the words,\n\u201cI Am,\u201d excluded all symbol and all likenesses.\n\nThe Jews did not profit by this preservative from error; on the\ncontrary, with the advent in Israel of this new conception of the\nDeity, the partial eclipse which so often obscured their reason seems\nat times to have given place to one more complete. As soon as Moses had\nconstituted them a nation, they appear to have looked upon God as a\nnational God, ignoring His relationship with other peoples.\n\nThe salient point in the Old Testament is the relation of God with His\npeople, an alliance or covenant between Jehovah and Israel of which\nthe rainbow became the first type. Threatenings and promises enforced\nthe keeping of the moral law, the good and evil things of this life;\nif Israel obeyed the Lord and kept His commandments, the fields would\nyield their crops, the trees their fruits, and peace would reign in the\nland; if they were disobedient, the heaven would become brass, and\nfamine and pestilence would decimate the people, and the rest would be\nled captive by foreign kings.\n\nAlthough no definite assertion concerning the immortality of the soul\nmay be found in the Old Testament, a belief in personal immortality is\ntaken for granted in several passages, and mention is frequently made\nof an abode in which the spirits remain after their separation from the\nbody, that is Sheol, in which joy and suffering are equally unknown.\nThe picture drawn by David in some of the Psalms, of the abode of the\ndeparted is sad and desolate. Though the word is not meant for an\nindividual grave, this idea may have been borrowed from it; the meaning\nis that of a vast space in the interior of the earth; the dead lie down\nand are together and at rest, but separated not only from man but also\nfrom God.\n\nThe Hebrews naturally mourned and compassionated their dead most\nsincerely. \u201cAlas my father, alas my mother, my poor children.\u201d But why\nshould we Aryans, whose language is not allied philologically with\nthe Semitic, copy their phrases? Why should we Christians, who are\nnot linked to them by dogma, allow ourselves to use the same hopeless\nexpressions, instead of words instinct with life and hope?\n\n\nON THE PROPHETS (N\u0100BH\u012a)\n\nThe phenomenon of prophecy, one of the earlier developments of the\nhuman mind, has been found amongst all peoples, at one time or other\nof their history. Certain spontaneous psychical movements dominated\nmen. The important r\u00f4le played by the oracles in the history of Greece,\nis well known; the Greeks classed both the priests who interpreted\nthe auguries, and those persons who considered themselves inspired by\nthe gods and claimed a knowledge of hidden things, under the name\nof prophets, indifferently. In the third century B.C. the Jews of\nAlexandria, when writing the Septuagint, translated the Hebrew word\n_N\u0101bh\u012b_ by prophet. As amongst Hebraists the word N\u0101bh\u012b does not\nnecessarily imply the power of foretelling the future, whilst the word\nprophet conveys that meaning, it might have been well to employ both\nterms.\n\nThe original meaning of the word N\u0101bh\u012b seems to have been \u201cagitated\noutbursts.\u201d These men seem to have passed through a phase of nervous\nexaltation before beginning their exhortations; when once they had\nstarted their outpourings they no longer had control over their\nspirit\u2019s impulse; and were often physically prostrated, showing signs\nof an overpowering compelling physical force, divinely irresistible.\n\nThese N\u0101bh\u012bs, who appeared on the occasion of any crisis, when the\nwelfare of the public was at stake, were at the head of popular\nmovements, giving them a right direction; they were the first to rise\nagainst the oppression of the ruling powers, and thousands of them\nperished in misery. Isaiah likens them to sentinels, or watchmen always\non the alert, watching with eyes fixed on the horizon, charged with\nthe duty of sounding the alarm on the approach of danger. \u201cOne calleth\nunto me out of Seir; Watchman, what of the night? Watchman, what of the\nnight?\u201d This same Isaiah compares the negligent prophets to \u201cdumb dogs,\nthat cannot bark, lying down, loving to slumber.\u201d\n\nTheir preaching must have been very powerful; Luther, in speaking of\nthe prophecies of Isaiah, says, \u201cEvery word is a furnace.\u201d\n\nUntil now Jehovah had by the mouth of the N\u0101bh\u012bs addressed the people\nas a nation; the individual was not singled out. But imperceptibly a\nchange took place; new indications presented themselves. Instead of the\norder, \u201cSlay, slay,\u201d milder accents were heard; it was as though heart\nspoke to heart: \u201cWherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself\nbefore the high God? Shall I come before Him with burnt offerings; with\ncalves of a year old? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression,\nthe fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath showed thee, O\nman, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do\njustly, and to love mercy\u201d (Micah vi.).\n\nThe individual becomes more evident; like the rishis, Elijah sought the\nLord; and he came to Mount Horeb: \u201cAnd a great and strong wind rent the\nmountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord\nwas not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was\nnot in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord\nwas not in the fire; and after the fire a still small voice,\u201d I imagine\nthat Elijah said to himself: \u201cThat still small voice is for _me_.\u201d\n\nThere were in certain places assemblies of N\u0101bh\u012bs, and schools in\nwhich the young prophets were trained in rhetoric and in composing\ndiscourses; for though some improvised, others--amongst them probably\nIsaiah--previously wrote their messages. All used a rhythmical language\nakin to poetry; the teaching of music no doubt formed a part of their\neducation, since we know that the sound of music helped to produce the\necstasy which resulted in prophesy.[122] The gift seems to have been to\nsome extent contagious. Prophets were found in bands, prophesying, and\nfollowed by musicians.\n\nDuring the eight centuries preceding our era, a succession of terrible\ncalamities took place. The N\u0101bh\u012bs upheld the courage of the people\nby their immovable conviction that the Lord would send a leader, and\ndeliverer of the people from their enemies. Through the whole of this\ntime Israel, though often despairing and sometimes in revolt, resisted\ndoubt; an unknown phenomenon amongst the heathens of antiquity. That\nwhich strikes us as so inexplicable is that Judaism showed itself\ncapable of such prodigies of devotion and self-sacrifice, though so\nlittle sustained by the bright glimpses of the future life.\n\nThe Elohim with whom the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were\npermitted to hold intercourse, appeared more accessible to the\nIsraelites than the mighty Jehovah of whom they were forbidden to make\nan image. The more we contemplate the infinite grandeur of the majesty\nof God, of whom there is no similitude, whose name is \u201cI Am,\u201d to whom,\naccording to Fenelon, even the word spirit is inapplicable, and of\nwhom, according to Descartes and Bossuet, nothing may be said but this,\n\u201cThe Being,\u201d the more it seems possible to fear, to reverence Him; but\nto love in those days seemed difficult--love was rarely seen.\n\nI desired to know what the best and most profound thinkers could say on\nthe ties uniting them with their Creator, those who had experienced the\naction of the Divine love in themselves. At the same time I determined\nto emphasise as little as possible the various forms these thoughts\nmight wear, whether in philosophical systems or in religions which had\nbeen founded or organised in the visible Church.\n\nAmongst the thinkers who have occupied themselves with these matters,\nI will mention one who, about two hundred years ago, was looked upon\nas a dangerous heretic. Since that time Baruch Spinoza has been\nanathematised as an atheist, and venerated as a saint; afterwards he\nwas declared by certain philosophers to be no atheist, but was counted\nas a Pantheist. In our day he is known to be less of a Pantheist than\nwas thought.\n\nShrinking from such epithets, which disturb my judgment, I will not\nenter into the question as to which approaches more nearly to the\ntruth.\n\nI spoke once after this manner to some friends of mine, in the presence\nof one whom I had not seen before.\n\n\u201cYou are too diffident,\u201d he said to me, \u201cI will give you a safeguard\nagainst obscurity of judgment. Read any system of philosophy you like,\nyou will doubtless discover that error predominates in it; put it aside\nfor the time being and read another, make the round of several systems.\nWith each your first impression will probably be renewed. After that go\nover each in your mind, not in detail, but taking each in its entirety.\nYou will find that you can point out a certain truth, _one_ truth which\nwill have occurred in all. Let this gradually expand in your mind\nwithout unduly forcing it; you will have forgotten the epithets used,\nand will find one dominant note which will enlighten your judgment.\u201d\n\nThe manner in which Spinoza interpreted the sacred writings of his race\nhas perhaps not attracted sufficient attention. His most important work\nfrom this point of view has the somewhat repellant title of _Tractatus\ntheologico-politicus_. It is diffuse and heavy, and its translators\nhave not succeeded in rendering it more agreeable. It is very difficult\nto grasp in detail, as omissions and reservations abound.\n\n\nTHE VIEWS OF SPINOZA\n\nWhen reading Spinoza it is necessary to bear in mind--which is not\neasy--that he is neither a heathen philosopher nor a Father of the\nChurch nor a modern critic, but a learned Jew, living in the middle\nof the seventeenth century. I will try to reproduce his opinions in\nhis own words, and endeavour to keep them uncontaminated, as far as\npossible, with the views of the end of the nineteenth century.\n\nSpinoza asserts plainly that he receives the Bible as an inspired book;\nin this he perhaps differs from some of our more recent exegetes who\nexamine the Bible as any other literary work of history and morality.\n\nChristians grow up in the truth that the Bible contains the Word of\nGod, and they claim that their teaching has its basis in the Old\nTestament. But others have argued thus: What do these know of the\nhistory of the Hebrews? They do not understand the language of their\nwritings, and they cannot say what caused those sublime teachers of the\npeople, the prophets, to speak on such and such an occasion, in such\nand such a manner. Being ignorant on all these points it is possible\nthat interpretations of the Old Testament may have led us into error.\n\nThe existence of what are now called the laws of nature being\nunknown in those far-off days, the Hebrews were unable to recognise\nsecondary or mediate causes; the book of Job is an example of this.\nGod intervenes personally on each occasion. Our attention is directed\nsolely to two points: man who suffers, that is, who consents or is in\nrevolt, and God who wills or wills not.\n\nAs everything without exception is placed in direct relationship with\nGod in the Old Testament, all is said to emanate from God; the cedars\nof Lebanon are the cedars of God;[123] men of great stature, the\ngiants, are called in Genesis sons of God; the knowledge of nature and\nof natural things which Solomon possessed is called the wisdom of God;\nthe discretion of a judge and the gains of a merchant are the gifts\nof God; Assyria is the scourge of God, and the lightning His arrows.\nAnd Spinoza asks: why are the children of Israel called God\u2019s chosen\npeople? Because the Lord, having delivered them out of Pharaoh\u2019s hands,\nled them into the land of Canaan, where they lived under the laws\nrevealed to Moses, to which the surrounding nations were not subject.\n\u201cI will be your God, and ye shall be My people,\u201d Jehovah had said by\nthe mouth of Moses. This was the covenant concluded on Mount Sinai\nbetween the Lord God and the Jewish nation. These laws, which were at\nthe same time civil and religious, were included under the general\nterm, the Law of the Lord, and the Book containing these precepts was\ncalled the Word of God.\n\nAccording to an ancient tradition, God revealed to Noah seven precepts\nwhich corresponded to commandments given generally to all mankind\nwithout distinction of race; there was thus perhaps a revelation given\nat the beginning of time, even before the first and greatest of the\nprophets, Moses; and this revelation the patriarchs knew. The light\nwhich lightens every man born into the world impressed these first\nprecepts on the human heart; to the Jewish race it seemed perhaps\nimprobable that a divine law not promulgated by a human mouth nor\ndelivered in the name of the God of Israel, could be imposed on man;\nas Moses was permitted to hear God\u2019s voice amongst the lightnings and\nthunders, the Israelites considered themselves on a higher level than\nthe rest of humanity, and held in less esteem eternal verities which\nwere the possession of all mankind. Moses told them that after his\ndeath God would raise up a prophet amongst them on condition that they\nshould keep His Covenant and His Commandments to do them, and he warned\nthem of the consequences of breaking these: \u201cI testify against you this\nday that ye shall surely perish.\u201d\n\nWe find the second revelation in the books ascribed to Moses; written\nin our memory as distinctly as in the Bible; it has so entirely\neclipsed the first that the greater number of us do not remember ever\nto have heard of the seven precepts of Noah.\n\nAfter the death of Moses, prophets succeeded each other in Israel;\nall from the first to the last acknowledged that they received the\nrevelation either by symbols or illustrations, or by the word; their\neyes saw certain objects and their ears heard the explanation of what\nthey saw. Ezekiel, like Moses, saw God under the appearance of a\nflaming fire; Daniel saw Him as the \u201cAncient of Days, whose garment was\nwhite as snow\u201d; the disciples of Christ saw the Spirit of God under\nthe form of a dove; the Apostles as tongues of fire; and Saul, at the\nmoment of his conversion, recognised it in a bright light, and these\nvisions were always accompanied by words.\n\nThe prophets rise above the level of other men by the intensity of\ntheir faith, and by their vivid imagination; but imagination is mobile,\nand their ecstatic conditions were not permanent; how could they feel\nassured of being in direct communication with the Lord Himself? They\nwere so lacking in assurance that they often required some palpable\nsign, thus did Abraham, Moses, Gideon and many others. Each time the\nsign was granted to them; a fire descending from heaven to consume\nthe offering; a rod changed into a serpent; a healthy hand instantly\ncovered with leprosy; a fleece of wool remaining dry on ground that was\nwet with dew, and other miraculous signs.\n\nAccording to Spinoza the gift of prophecy is on a lower level than that\nof ordinary intellectual knowledge which requires no outward sign of\nconfirmation.\n\nThe nature of the revelation depended also upon the temperament of each\nprophet, on his education and his own personal opinions; the Magi who\nstudied astronomy and astrology, seeing a star in the east, at once\nwent in search of the expected child. But on one point all were agreed,\nthey all said with Moses: \u201cThou shalt love the Lord thy God with all\nthine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might, and thou\nshalt love thy neighbour as thyself.\u201d And they said with Isaiah: \u201cWash\nyou, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings, cease to do\nevil, learn to do well, relieve the oppressed.\u201d\n\n\nOBEDIENCE\n\nA striking feature of Spinoza\u2019s philosophical system was the basis of\nobedience upon which the whole edifice of a religious life rested; now\nobedience presupposes the existence of a law.\n\nAs the Israelites seemed incapable of appreciating the intrinsic\nexcellence of the precepts delivered to them, Moses enforced their\nfulfilment, and spoke of God to them as a just and righteous law-giver\nwho would reward those who kept the commandments and punish those\nwho transgressed them. And when this law was given out, amongst\nthunders and lightnings, the children of Israel acknowledged it with\nacclaim--though not always fulfilling it--because they were the only\npeople possessing it.\n\nAt last the time came when it was possible to say: \u201cThe appointed hour\nhas come.\u201d The Jewish nation, for whose sake the Mosaic law had been\nrevealed, was on the point of crumbling to pieces, when Christ appeared\nproclaiming the universal and divine law. Christ was no prophet in\nthe ordinary acceptation of the word, since neither word nor vision\nrevealed God\u2019s Will to Him, the truth was in Him in all its plenitude,\nHis mind was identical with that of the Father, and Eternal Wisdom took\nthe form of humanity.\n\nJewish as well as Christian theologians have equally contributed at\ntimes to obscure the sense of the Holy Scriptures; they have taught\nthat man\u2019s reason is unsound and can with difficulty penetrate the\nmysteries of religion; and that the only way, therefore, was to accept\nthe Bible as infallible in all its details. The faithful extended this\ndoctrine of infallibility to every verbal peculiarity and failed to\ndistinguish the eternal principles, always clearly and simply expressed\nby the prophets, from those vivid illustrations which enabled them\nto speak, without hindrance, in terms most adapted for arousing\nthe wonder and belief of the ordinary hearer, of matters _per se_\ninexpressible, as for instance of the Divine Nature. Spinoza especially\nblames the theologians for having introduced in their commentaries\nnotions borrowed from Grecian philosophers, which they adapted to the\nOld and New Testament, clothing them in biblical language; this mixture\nof divine inspiration and subtle argument more and more disturbed pious\nsouls who went to their Bibles for edification only.\n\nTo those capable of understanding them Christ revealed the secrets\nof the Kingdom of God; they were the higher truths of eternal life,\nthe counsels of perfection; to the multitude He spoke in parables and\ngave them commandments which were to be obeyed that they might enter\nthe kingdom of heaven. The Apostles spread abroad the teachings of\nChrist; they preached the love of God with that of our neighbour,\nnot as sufficing in itself, but as a commandment spoken in the name\nof the Life and Passion of our Saviour. And then each one added to\nthese great truths minor teachings, varying the subjects according as\nthey addressed Jews or Gentiles; many different teachings were thus\npromulgated, giving rise in the early Church to misunderstandings,\ngradually leading to disputes and schisms; and after nineteen centuries\nof study of the subject we still have not arrived at perfect mutual\nunderstanding. Spinoza quotes in this connection a Dutch proverb: \u201cGeen\nketter; sonder letter.\u201d Without a text, no heresy.\n\nWhen shall we learn that the revelation of God is not confined to a\ncertain number of books, to a certain number of words? It must of\nnecessity be inscribed elsewhere also, since words are patient of\nmore than one interpretation, books go astray and are lost, paper\nbecomes mildewed and is torn, stones are smashed even in the hands of a\nprophet.\n\nSpinoza tells us that he read and re-read the Holy Scriptures with\nthe greatest care before commenting on them, and he undertakes to\ndemonstrate to the Christian governments the necessity of reforming the\nconstitutions of the established churches by replacing a phantom Bible\nby the Bible understood in spirit and in truth.\n\nThe scientific portion of the task would not be complicated, since the\ncommandments of God are few in number, in fact they may be reduced\nto one. \u201cHe that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He\nis a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him\u201d; and as a proof that\nthey seek Him they must practise justice and charity; these are the\nfoundations of the faith, and they are so clear and so simple, that\nno commentary thereon is needed, nor are they affected by any of the\nverbal differences or inaccuracies.\n\nThe ecclesiastical authorities thus act sometimes contrary to the\ndivine will when they declare those who are leading a good and virtuous\nlife to be the enemies of God, simply because their opinions are not\nin exact conformity with the theological definitions put forth by the\nchurches. The civil power ought to be able to judge of the belief of\nits citizens by the fruits they produce, if their works are good, it\nmay be thought that in the eyes of God their belief is also correct,\nbut personal theological opinions, though in conformity with the\ndecrees permitted by the Church, would not prevail in God\u2019s sight over\nwrong doing. When governments act in accordance with these views, all\nis well--individuals, the nation, and the governments.\n\nIn order to believe that God\u2019s Word may be found elsewhere, it\nis necessary to believe that He exists. His existence cannot be\nknown;[124] we can, however, obtain some knowledge of it by certain\nmeans of which we can know the reality; they are so real that we\ncannot imagine any force that can invalidate them; these means or\nnotions are the fundamental axioms inherent in the human mind, and\nare the bases of all knowledge; it is to these that we owe the power\nof being able to distinguish good from evil, and this faculty we may\nregard as the forerunner of the divine revelation. If we once admit\nthe possibility of these first principles--these axioms--becoming\nobliterated, we should then admit a doubt of their intrinsic truth,\nwhich would attack and weaken their immediate conclusion, which is\nthe existence of God; from that time we should possess no element of\ncertainty. This is why it has been said that attacks against reason are\nmore dangerous than attacks against the faith, because they destroy\nwith one blow the sacred edifice and the foundation which bears it.\n\n\nTHE LAW\n\nIn a system where law is everything, how does Spinoza understand the\naction of Providence?\n\nMen are accustomed to call that knowledge divine which surpasses the\nhuman understanding, and that event miraculous when the cause is\nunknown to them; and nothing better demonstrates to them the existence\nof God, His power and His providence, than those things which appear to\nthem to change the order of nature. We sometimes show our ignorance by\nattributing things of which we are ignorant to a special interposition\nof providence. Those who think thus are not in a position to explain\nwhat they mean by the order of nature.\n\nThis manner of viewing things might well date from the time of the\nearly Hebrews, who wished to prove to those nations who were not\nSemitic, and who worshipped visible objects, such as the heavenly\nbodies, that these were subordinate deities, subject to the will of the\ninvisible God, whose miracles on their behalf they related, since they\nwere convinced that the whole of nature contributed to the well-being\nof the Hebrew people exclusively.\n\nWith God the understanding and the will are the same; to know and\nto will is a single act; to know an object as it is in itself, and\nto realise it effectively, is a necessity inherent in the Divine\nperfection; since all truths come inevitably from the Divine intellect,\nthe universal laws of nature are the eternal decrees of God.\n\nIf any event takes place in nature not in accordance with these\nuniversal laws, then the mind of God has not conceived it; in other\nwords, he who affirms that in a certain case God has acted contrarily\nto the laws of nature, affirms also that God has acted contrarily to\nHis own Divine nature, which would prove the speaker\u2019s perversity. No\nevent happens that is not by the will and eternal decrees of God, each\nevent conforms to laws eternally necessary and absolutely true. To\nbelieve that this could be otherwise would be to admit that God made an\nimperfect nature, and established laws so incomplete that they required\nto be retouched each time that they failed to realise the divine plan,\na strange conception, and for which there is no necessity. Those who\nseek and find their supreme happiness in the love of God, and in doing\nthe greatest good, have no wish that nature should obey them; they\ndesire to submit to nature, knowing indubitably, that God governs all\nthings in accordance with general laws which are in agreement with\nuniversal life.\n\nFrom this statement it will be seen that it is no longer a question of\nresignation--of passive submission; man responds in every part of his\nbeing to the supreme law which, as is the case with all men, leads them\nblindly, and, for the most part, unconsciously towards happiness; and\ncauses, in a great nature, such as Spinoza\u2019s, an unceasing effort to\nmaintain and to raise itself; the passage from excellence to perfection\nis always accompanied by a feeling of joy, and sadness marks each\nbackward step towards imperfection. The being--Spinoza\u2019s monad--thus\ntypifies perfection, and good, and evil consists in the increase or\ndiminution of the being. The natural love of man for life has been\ntransformed by Spinoza into law; his maxim is well known: Every being\ntends to preserve its existence.\n\n\nTHE LAW IN THE GOSPEL\n\nThe Old and New Testaments are an exposition of a long discipline of\nobedience, this makes their power, and those who study them without\npreconceived ideas discover this.\n\nSpinoza distinguishes between the spiritual needs of the majority of\nmen and the minority, and between the religions which suit the one and\nthe other. But all men, without exception, must acquire the religion\ndemanded by all, that is practical religion, which consists in keeping\nthose commandments given us in the sacred books. This obedience serves\nto weaken passions; in the same proportion as man attains this end, so\na light, ever increasing in purity, illumines his intellect, and so\nmuch the more does he comprehend that true happiness is the result of\nvirtue. Few men go beyond this, or--without any other guide than their\nreason--experience that intellectual love of God, inseparable from the\ntrue knowledge of God and man; this love, when entirely disinterested,\nyields a joy which is not the reward of virtue, since it is one with\nvirtue itself.\n\nThe divine law was in the world, as St John said, before the coming\nof Moses or of Christ, but the world as a whole was ignorant of it;\nreason leads us to it, and reason tells us that it leads to the highest\nbeatitude, and that those who follow it will not need to seek any other.\n\nBut there is one thing of which reason cannot tell us; this--that the\nmoral effect of this universal law, which is obeyed, not because it is\ntrue, necessary and perfect, but simply because Moses commanded the\nobservance of it, by reason of the covenant made by God, and because\nChrist commands it in His own name, is the power of leading to this\nbeatitude, which those obtain who strive after the spirit of Christ,\nperceiving in this law of God, absolute truth. This reason alone could\nnot have taught us, it is not written in the human heart, this we learn\nin the Bible.\n\nThat obedience only to a truth should inevitably produce certain\nresults can hardly be asserted with mathematical certainty, since\nmathematical results are the effects only of those things which can be\ndeduced from the elements contained in them; but a moral certainty we\ncan feel, and this was the privilege and portion of the prophets; and\nit was possible, as it was not contrary to reason.\n\n\nBIOGRAPHICAL NOTE\n\nSpinoza belonged to a family of Portuguese Jews settled in Amsterdam.\nHe led an exemplary life; he was poor and apparently content to be so,\nsince he refused help from his friends, which he might have accepted\nwith a clear conscience; what he obtained by polishing spectacle lenses\nseems to have satisfied him. He was advised to dedicate one of his\nbooks to Louis XIV., a munificent patron of literary men, but he did\nnot do so.\n\n_Ethics_--the work to which he owes his fame--in accordance with his\nexpress wish, only appeared after his death, and without the name of\nthe author, because, he said, the truth should go forth under no man\u2019s\nname; he feared also to attach his to a new school of philosophy.\n\nThe Rabbis of Amsterdam had long sought to bring Spinoza into a more\northodox path than the one he trod; his idea that the institution of\nprophets had been a source of weakness rather than of strength to the\nHebrew people, threatened to develop into a formal heresy.\n\nThe appearance in 1656 of Spinoza\u2019s _Tractatus theologico-politicus_,\nraised a storm of indignation; it was the only work of importance which\nhe published during his lifetime; it was followed by a sentence of\nexcommunication, read at the gate of the synagogue, and was in these\nterms:--\n\n\u201cIn the name of the Angels and by a decree of the Saints, we\nanathematise and exorcise Baruch Spinoza, in the presence of the Sacred\nBooks and the six hundred and thirty precepts they contain. Cursed be\nhe by day and night; may the fury of the Lord consume this man, and\nmay all the maledictions written in the Book of the Law light on him;\nmay the Lord destroy him from amongst the tribes of Israel; let no\nman go near him, nor speak to him, nor write to him, nor show him any\ncompassion.\u201d\n\nHow eloquent men can be when they are angry! Spinoza left his native\ntown on that day; he took refuge at the Hague, where he died in 1677,\nat forty-four years of age.\n\nIn reading the pages in which eminent critics have examined Spinoza\u2019s\nsystem, one seems to see not the man whose writings are known, but two\ndifferent men, or rather perhaps several different men; I do not think\neven the philosopher would have recognised himself in these r\u00e9sum\u00e9s.\n\nAs has been noticed, Spinoza is neither a true Jew nor, apparently,\na Christian, since the negation of final causes is as foreign to the\nspirit of the Old Testament, as his joyous stoicism is to that of the\nNew; some have remembered the words of Novalis: \u201cSpinoza is inebriated\nwith God.\u201d They added that with him the crown of the intellectual love\nof God was the transport of a soul carried out of itself, but that\nthis transport must have differed from the ecstasies in which so many\nof the saints of the Christian Church found the supreme delight of\nthe religious life. But amongst Christians what is their conception\nof the highest beatitude? I see God in His heaven, but my neighbour,\nwhere is he? On the one side are the happy, on the other the faulty;\nwe recognise ourselves in each, we see ourselves, we have fellowship\nwith all; painters have so often represented this scene on theological\nlines, that it is familiar to us; is this really the beatitude we\npicture to ourselves?\n\nThe mental and moral condition of this philosopher lends itself little\nto analysis; he who has the most carefully studied his views, would be\nthe most diffident in expounding them, having found so many obscure\npoints in them. In any case it is well to remember this circumstance,\nSpinoza has now been dead more than two hundred years, and the\ndiscovery that before speaking it is advisable to know something of the\nmeaning of the words used, dates from yesterday only. Spinoza in his\n_Tractatus theologico-politicus_, uses constantly the words prophecy,\ninspiration, revelation, faith, and theology, and the reader who has\nsacrificed his rest for several nights that he may know what he means\nby these five words, ends by acknowledging that his devotion has been\nin vain. Happily, no one knows better than our philosopher the meaning\nof the word obedience; this helps the reader; he only regrets that the\ncritics have laid little stress on this crucial point.\n\nSince no man\u2019s writings are capable of being clearly understood if he\nis isolated from those who have written on similar lines--beginning\nfrom Novalis (that poetic and charming writer whose true name was\nHardenberg), points of comparison have been established between the\nDutch philosopher (Spinoza), the ecstatic Saint Theresa and the\nenthusiastic Saint Francis d\u2019Assisi. Let us now turn to the more sober\ngenius of Aristotle and see if he will succeed in throwing daylight on\nthe obscure thought of Spinoza.\n\n\u201cInfinity attracts,\u201d this word of Aristotle would have sufficed, but\nthe prince of critics gives a further explanation. \u201cMan is face to face\nwith a truth, and the light lighteth every one that cometh into the\nworld; all who see see the same things, and all that man has seen is\ntrue.... God works in us not as a workman who tires himself, but as an\nall-powerful virtue which acts; He moves as an object of love.\u201d[125]\n\nThis opinion of Aristotle is shared by Plato, St Thomas Aquinas and St\nAugustine. A complete unanimity.\n\nWhen I am sometimes struck by certain truths, dressed in all the\nbrilliance which pure virtues possess, but feeling unable to form\na rational whole of these virtues when they are not arranged in an\norderly manner, I should often have yielded to discouragement, if I\nhad not read in Bossuet\u2019s _Trait\u00e9 du libre arbitre_ these words: \u201cWhen\nwe begin to reason, we must first consider this as indubitable, that\nwe may know _with complete certainty_ many things of which we do not\nunderstand their corollaries, nor all their results. The first rule of\nour logic is that we must not abandon truths which we have once known,\nwhatever difficulties may present themselves when we are trying to\ndeal with them; but that we must hold both ends of the chain firmly,\nalthough we may not be able to see the middle by which the two ends are\nlinked.\u201d\n\n\nTHE IDEAS OF PLATO\n\nA philosopher said to me: \u201cSince we can know nothing of the beyond,\nlet us make a virtue of necessity, and learn exactly what there is on\nour side of the veil.\u201d The advice is excellent. Astronomy teaches us\nthat perfect order reigns in the sphere studied by that science. The\nworld may be the result of certain chemical combinations which have\nmet by chance; but if chance has introduced order in these chemical\ncombinations, it might as easily derange them and replace them by\ndisorder; yet the astronomers have not succeeded in discovering the\nleast indication of disorder in their domain; that we know positively.\n\nIt is generally admitted that the world has had a beginning; is it\nreason or the absence of reason that we should expect to find at the\norigin of the world? Does it proceed so regularly in obedience to laws?\nSages have said, \u201cLaws govern matter, forces, movements, all things\nthat _are_, but might not have been, just as the world is or exists,\nbut might not have been.\u201d\n\nSince Darwin wrote, much discussion has taken place with regard to\nthe origin of species, no one has thought of asking whether the Greek\nphilosophers had anything to say on the subject. If, for instance,\nit had been discovered that the law of certain sidereal phenomena\ncompelled a circular or elliptical movement, or any other geometrical\nform, then this law, in itself, would be a geometrical idea; that\ncould exist, although the phenomenon in which it was realised, might\ndisappear with the world itself.\n\nAccording to Kepler, geometry has given forms for all creation, and\nKepler has also said that God governs all things in conformity with\nHimself; in that case geometry would be anterior to the world and\nco-eternal with God, and if these geometrical forms which are perfect\nhave been thought out by a perfect intelligence, is it not the same\nwith all the component parts of the vegetable and animal kingdoms?\nWould a horse, or whatever the ancestor of a horse may be, have been\nproduced spontaneously by nature? Must there not have been a type of\nsome kind, which was realised in all horses, multiplying and varying\nfor every new species? And in the same manner also for all trees and\nplants. The first types of these things existed before man, that other\npart of nature, and before all that man calls the good, the beautiful.\nWere not all these things thought and willed by a mind capable of\nthinking and willing?\n\nThus Plato reasons.\n\nIt is received in theology as in philosophy that all things have their\nideal in God; matter itself has its conception and _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ in\nGod; St Thomas Aquinas was able to say with no trace of pantheism, \u201cGod\nis eminently all things.\u201d\n\n\nEPISODIAL\n\nTwo English travellers, Gatchet and Hall, finding themselves once\namongst the Klamaths, a tribe of Red Indians, asked them concerning\ntheir beliefs; these Indians worshipped a supreme being who made the\nworld with its plants, animals and men, whom they called \u201cThe most\nAncient,\u201d \u201cThe Ancient One on high.\u201d The travellers then asked how He\nhad created the world, whether by means of tools or instruments; they\nreplied, \u201cBy thinking and willing.\u201d This wonderful answer contains the\ngerm of the thought which, on Greek soil, became the _Logos_, the act\nof thinking and speaking, the unique act which in the Creator means\nwilling and producing. This answer is an echo, and by no means a feeble\none, of the celebrated saying: \u201cGod is the Living One who is, in whom\nis the Idea of Good\u201d (Timaeus). Plato affirms that the world and all\nthat it contains has been made in the eternal pattern of the Idea of\nGood, and this Idea of Good is not separable from the Creator.\n\nAgain perfect unanimity, extending this time to the Red Indians.\n\nIt might be thought that an electric current ran round the world;\ncertain psychical phenomena cannot otherwise be explained.\n\n\nAN EXCURSION INTO A COUNTRY LITTLE KNOWN\n\nIf there are proofs of the existence of God, they should be within\nreach of all the world, both the learned and the ignorant, since God is\nno more the God of a certain class of person than He is of a certain\nnation.\n\nIn some modern books on philosophy we see this phrase, \u201cThe influence\nof the Infinite on souls,\u201d though we may not pay much attention to it,\nwe perhaps have the feeling that the infinite does not exercise much\ninfluence on us; but it does not allude to ourselves, it refers to our\nprimitive ancestors, who sought to discover what there could be behind\nall they saw and heard; common sense, with its uncertain but powerful\ninstincts directed primitive man towards an invisible magnet. This is\nnot our common sense, that is, not as we should define it, self-evident\nprinciples, spontaneous judgments, which direct our acts; but common\nsense as Aristotle would understand the word; the faculty of feeling\nand perceiving, where all our sensations are united, because all our\nexternal senses converge thither; this common sense is so truly a\nsense, that it has its own central organ, which is what we call heart.\nBut this influence of the invisible--another name for the infinite--had\nat first no connection with religion; it merely deposited a germ in\nthe soul, without which no religious tendency could make itself felt;\nand under the impulse of this power--this divine sense which Aristotle\ncalls the attraction of the desirable and the intelligible--the\npassing from the finite to the infinite--the most natural and the most\nnecessary act of the moral life--is accomplished by a simple flight or\nupward movement of the human spirit.\n\nPlato explains this mental phenomenon: \u201cThere is in the depth of our\nsoul a point which is the root of the soul and which forms a connecting\nlink between God and the soul; the soul apprehends because God has\ntouched it.\u201d\n\nPerceiving in itself and all around it traces of goodness, beauty,\njustice, love, and joy; feeling in itself and around it, life and its\nforces; it is only necessary for the soul to send its ideas beyond the\nlimits of its own confined being, with its imperfect capabilities and\njoys, and it will approach God.\n\nKepler, when discovering the laws governing the planetary system, found\ngeometry in the sky; since then, the learned have found mathematics in\nall the branches of physics. They have seen numbers and geometrical\nfigures in light and colour, in sound and in music under its sensible\nform. Leibnitz, one of the world\u2019s greatest mathematicians, who\ndiscovered the infinitesimal calculus, saw that in this way one could\npass from finite grandeur to mathematical laws and forms such as belong\neternally to God--independent of all dimensions.\n\nBetween the spontaneous flight of the soul with spreading wings, going\nfrom finite facts to infinite, and the highest mathematics, which have\nexisted for about two hundred years only, the analogy is complete;\nthe learned demonstrations of the existence of God given by all true\nphilosophers are results which correspond with those obtained by the\nordinary methods used by all men. Thus the identity of the fundamental\nprocess of a reasonable life with that of the geometrical process,\nwhich both demonstrate the existence of God, is established. The\nmetaphysical certainty of the first process equals the geometrical\ncertainty of the second. For this reason Leibnitz could say, \u201cThere are\ngeometry, metaphysics, harmony, and morality everywhere.\u201d\n\nI have well said that the human Ego used science and philosophy, before\nthe appearance of philosophers, to attest that the true path leading\nto God is that natural movement of the soul described by the Hindoo\npoets--during a time of great ignorance--in the Vedic hymns. This\nmovement is the universal act of prayer.\n\nFor the philosopher, the proof of the existence of God may appear\nto rest on a syllogism; for the historian it rests on the complete\nevolution of the human mind.\n\nIs it necessary still to ask how the idea of a super-sensible principle\npenetrated into the human mind, and how it is diffused over the world?\nThe reply to this question is in the Veda, where the hymns show\nmethodically, under an apparent confusion, what we have been able\nto glean here and there from the mouth of sages of all times. This\nidea revealed itself to man at first in external nature; then man\ndiscovered it in his own personal and phenomenal self, the abridgment\nof humanity in its entirety with its living and its dead. \u201cAt last\nthe consciousness of self arose from out the clouds of psychological\nmythology, and became the consciousness of the Infinite or the Divine\nwithin us. The individual self found itself again in the Divine Self.\nSocrates knew it, but he called it _Daimonion_, the indwelling God.\nThe early Christian philosophers called it the _Holy Ghost_, a name\nwhich received many interpretations and misinterpretations in different\nschools of theology, but which ought to become again what it was meant\nfor in the beginning, the spirit which unites all that is holy within\nman, with the Holy of Holies, or the Infinite.\u201d[126] This may be called\nnatural religion, since it was revealed by nature, and the truth of\nthis revelation is demonstrated mathematically.\n\nAll that I have just said has been epitomised in a few lines by a\nthinker of our century, Bordas-Desmoulins: \u201cWithout mathematics it\nwould be impossible to penetrate to the depths of philosophy; without\nphilosophy it would be impossible to arrive at the foundations of\nmathematics; without the two we could penetrate nothing.\u201d\n\nAristotle quotes these words of Anaxagoras, who lived one hundred\nand fifty years before him: \u201cThe man who recognised in nature an\nintelligence which is the cause of the arrangement and order of the\nuniverse has alone kept his reason in the midst of the follies of his\npredecessors.\u201d\n\nThere has been no break in the continuity of the first impression\nexperienced by man at the sight of lightning, and God whom each nation\nnamed after its own way, and Him whom the Athenians worshipped without\nknowing, whom the Apostle declared to them.\n\nI will here repeat the words of Aristotle, which must never be effaced\nfrom our memories: \u201cMan is face to face with the light that lighteth\nevery one that cometh into the world.\u201d It was this that caused the same\nphilosopher to use those other surprising words, so difficult to grasp\nwhen reading them for the first time in a book: \u201cAll who see see the\nsame things, and all that a man has seen is true.\u201d\n\n\nANTHROPOMORPHISM\n\nMan at the beginning, knowing of two kinds of agents only, both\ntangible, themselves and the beasts, conceived the idea that the\nphenomena of nature were set in motion by invisible agents of some\nkind, their imagination followed its natural bent in picturing these\nagents under one or the other of the two aspects familiar to them,\nand sometimes under the two united; since these unknown powers--for\ninstance amongst the Egyptians--often assumed the shape of creatures\nhalf man and half fish, or bird, or quadruped. But with the progress\nof civilisation these representations of divinities were modified.\nMan having obtained glimpses of the difference between the phenomenal\nand the non-phenomenal, was led to suspect the existence of an author\nfor the one and the other; and this author or agent was perceived\nby him anthropomorphically, that is to say, arrayed with a human\npersonality, but endowed with all the qualities of goodness and\nbeauty which distinguish the highest and noblest of men. We know that\nanthropomorphism in the abstract is wrong, yet without it man could\nnever have found the way of approach to this unknown author of all\ncreated things, and the desire to know him nearer was irresistible.\n\nIn one sense we are less advanced than our primitive ancestors.\nAttracted on the one hand by the occult properties of the magnet, and\nimpelled by sensation, they advanced in all simplicity. At a later date\nthey desired to have those things explained to them which they did not\nunderstand; men undertook this duty, greater distances grew up between\nthem, and the sacred code was the result.\n\n\nTHE SACRED CODES AND THE CODES OF LAWS\n\nHistory teaches us that each sacred Code grew gradually, and in the\nsame way as the Codes of Laws. A religion peculiar to each people\nexisted, though vague and indefinite, before the written Code. If there\nhad not been a growth of the law by means of decrees, pronounced at\nvarious times by the heads of the people, accumulating slowly, and\naccepted in the same degree by the people in general, there would have\nbeen no definite Codes of Laws, such as those of Solon and Draco and\nothers. If there had not been a religious growth formulated in oracles\nand prayers, and in commandments promulgated at different times by the\nprophets, accumulating slowly, and accepted in the same degree by the\npeople in general, there would have been no sacred writings, such as\nthose of Moses, Confucius, Buddha, and others.\n\nIt sometimes happens that Codes of Laws become transformed into\npetrified fetishes, to which submission is blindly yielded, whilst\ntheir origin is forgotten, and the sense of what is just or unjust\nis lost in the question of what is written and thus legal; and some\nsacred books are treated as fetishes, to which an implicit submission\nis exacted, whilst their origin is forgotten and the sense of what is\ntrue and divine is absorbed in the sole thought of what is written and\ntherefore orthodox.\n\nThe sense of responsibility of the citizen with regard to the law of\nhis country is in danger of becoming paralysed when that law is applied\nwith such mechanical exactitude as to confuse the ideas of _law_ and\n_equity_;[127] and the responsibility of the believer with regard to\nthe religion of his country may run risks of becoming paralysed when\nthat religion is framed in accordance with a ceremonial exactitude\nrather than with a human feeling for what is true or false. The mere\npossession of the sacred Scriptures may have become a substitute\nfor the love of God; the effective influence of the Infinite became\nchanged into a mere habit which drove away the spontaneous action of\nthe soul. We distinguish with difficulty organised religions from\nreligions as practised by each one, which was our primitive religion.\nThere are rites that we love; rites which at first reflected God have\nimperceptibly taken the place of God who vivified our religious life.\nWe possess dogmas, but lose perhaps our hold of the personal assurance\nof the existence of a Being whom Plato named \u201cthe Being apart,\u201d or \u201cthe\nself-existent Being.\u201d The results of this are serious, since dogmata,\nof themselves, do not always furnish sufficing arguments against\natheism.\n\nIt may be asked for how many people is this Supreme Being anything more\nthan a name encountered in a book? To a small number of individuals\nHe was an intense reality at intervals during the course of ages, to\nsaints of the Christian Church and some of the heathen philosophers.\nHe may still be a reality for certain individualities which modern\nphilosophies have not classified, as amongst pantheists or atheists,\nor minds full of inconsequent enthusiasm. This Being is also a reality\nfor the erudite mind, or the contemplative who make Him an object of\nstudy. But the greater number of men, even the civilised, the baptised,\nare content to pass by; they are satisfied with the reflection only.\n\nSome might say that it is by means of our reason rather than of\nour heart that we are enabled to trace in God \u201cthe Being apart\u201d or\n\u201cself-existent Being,\u201d but Seneca says: \u201cReason is not only composed of\nevidence; its best part is obscure and hidden.\u201d\n\nIn our days this remark of Seneca\u2019s has been paraphrased and rendered\nmore in detail, it has been said: \u201cThere are certain minds which are\nillumined, and there are others full of warmth; the warmth and the\nclarity at times separate, but never the warmth and the nobility; in\nthe more noble minds there is more warmth.\u201d\n\nIf, as Spinoza thought, reason becomes less apt at raising itself to\nthe knowledge of God, in proportion as imagination and enthusiasm--to\nwhich it gives rise--gain in strength, yet, on the other hand, the\nworld in general would no doubt have benefited by the work of prophets\nwhich characterised the history of the Hebrew people; the greater\nnumber of intellectual men amongst the ancient philosophers would not\nhave sought after the knowledge of God, when it was presented in a\nform too pure and too abstract to impress the multitude. The divine\nconception therefore descended and captivated them by a union of the\ndivine and human; and it is because the Bible contains this universal\nelement that the idea of a supernatural revelation has become deeply\nengraved in the human conscience, and has caused some to consider the\nBible as the unique source of all revelation. For this reason the\npeople of Israel, though less prone to action than many of whom history\nspeaks, are, to those who think, the most important amongst the nations\nof antiquity, since they have proved, as none others have done, the\npower of the spiritual element in humanity.\n\nIt is displeasing to many persons to hear the term \u201cScience of\nReligion\u201d used. \u201cHow can a science be made,\u201d they say, \u201cof what is a\nnatural sentiment? We can believe without study.\u201d Why do they not add,\n\u201cand without reflection?\u201d\n\nCertainly religion did not commence in this world by study; men first\napplied themselves to the natural sciences; they have hardly arrived,\nat the present time, at the social sciences; and in the opinion\nof certain theologians--P\u00e8re Gratry, for instance--it was several\ncenturies before the science of religion became known, but it may be a\nscience without the religious sentiment suffering in any way. With this\nview before us, let us begin not to build but to bring together the\nmaterials; following the advice of the excommunicated philosopher of\nAmsterdam, let us look at the sacred writings of the people in order to\nform some idea of the different religions, which is much easier than to\nknow what religion is.\n\nIndifference and ignorance are so common that sometimes young men are\nfound--even those about to take orders--who would be incapable of\nanswering these questions: \u201cWhat are the chief historical religions\nof our day? How many are there? Who are their founders? What are the\ntitles of the sacred writings considered by these communities as\nauthorities in matters of Faith?\u201d We know that it is not of Faith to\nconsider that the world was created in six days of ordinary length, but\nwe do not know the constitution and names of the religions whence for\nthousands of years millions of human creatures have drawn their hope,\ntheir consolation, and their rules of conduct.\n\nEight supreme or \u201cbook\u201d religions, as Max M\u00fcller calls them, are in\npossession of Sacred Writings; Brahmanism, which is the religion of\nthe Veda, and the most ancient of the Aryan family, with Buddhism form\nthe two religions of India; Zoroastrianism, or Magism, the Persian\nreligion; two religions in China, one the result of the philosophical\nteachings of Lao-tse; the other--which is more practical--of Confucius;\nJudaism and Christianity; and Mohammedanism, the religion of\nArabia.[128]\n\nWith regard to the non-Christian religions, there is one with which we\nare little familiar; it seems to have an attraction for some people,\nprobably because we imagine it to contain much occult knowledge, which\nstimulates us to search for its mysteries; this religion is Buddhism.\nWith what complacency we discuss it in our drawing-rooms, without\nsuspecting that we have erred from the first; we generalise on the\nreligious opinions of millions of souls separated from us by half\nthe globe, and by thousands of years, without remembering that these\nopinions have varied and continue to vary amongst numerous sects, just\nas the dialects of a language vary; and all the time the fundamental\nprinciples of the religion have escaped us.\n\nI shall say a few words only as to Buddhism, and these will relate\nfirst to orthography; it is necessary to distinguish between the words\nBuddha and Budha, which are often confounded; they have nothing in\ncommon but their roots. Buddha with two _ds_ is a participle of _budh_\nwhich means awakened, or enlightened with a special light; this name is\ngiven to those who have attained the highest degree of human wisdom;\nBudha with one _d_ is simply a wise man; and when the Hindoos taught\nthe Greeks a knowledge of the planets, they gave this name to the\nplanet Mercury.\n\nThe custom of immolating the widow on the funeral pile of her dead\nhusband is naturally spoken of with astonishment and horror; for many\ncenturies neither the Hindoos nor Europeans knew that it arose from a\nmistaken interpretation of some lines in the Veda.\n\nAt last a time arrived when the Brahmans, who were the religious\nnobility of the country and had the control of the Vedic religion,\npretended that each word of the Veda had been supernaturally revealed;\nvoices were now raised in protest against this affirmation; the Hindoo\npeople, who submitted patiently to the yoke of political despotism,\nwould not permit a monopoly of the teaching of eternal truths; and\nto shake the authority of the clergy it was quite sufficient for one\nman to step forth from amongst the multitude and assert that it was\npossible to obtain eternal happiness without the intervention of the\nBrahmanic priesthood, and without a blindfold faith in the books on\nwhich they had placed the seal of infallibility. Five hundred years\nbefore our present era this man appeared, the son of a king, of the\nwarrior caste, not belonging to the Brahman class; he was Gautama\nS\u00e2kya-Muni, known to the entire world afterwards as the Buddha. He\nclaimed the right of giving instruction, and handed it on to others who\nwere also enlightened. Two hundred years after his death, the famous\nking Asoka convened a great council in order to determine the various\npoints of doctrine; and his edicts were engraved in the Sanscrit\ndialect then in use, on rocks in various parts of his kingdom.\n\nIf the teaching of Buddha awakened such an ardent sympathy amongst men,\nand was propagated with so much rapidity, it was owing to the fact\nthat the Hindoo mind had been prepared to receive it by centuries of\nmeditation.\n\nIn all probability it was not Buddha who coined the term Nirv\u00e2na;\nhe may have found it ready made in the Upanishads, where it meant\noriginally not annihilation of the soul, or absorption, but a \u201cblowing\nout, an extinction,\u201d then an extinction of passions, a final moral\nemancipation, and the union of the individual soul with eternal truth.\n\nIn ending this short appreciation of Buddhism, I will add that, even\nin our day, there are begging Brahmans, some living in communities,\nothers dispersed in villages, who know the entire Rig-Veda by heart,\nas their ancestors did three thousand years ago; and although they had\nmanuscripts and even printed texts they made no use of them.\n\nOur knowledge of established religions has rendered one indubitable\nfact clear to us, that is the deterioration to which all are subject;\nnone has remained what it was in its initial period; the most perfect\nsuffers from contact with the world, in the same way as pure air\nundergoes a change when breathed by thousands of lungs.\n\nChrist\u2019s teaching conquered alike the ignorant multitude and the most\ncivilised portions of the world, because from the first He used words\nwith which to express the most exalted truths, which could equally\nbe understood by the young Jew, the Roman publican, and the Greek\nphilosopher. Christianity broke down the barrier which divided nations;\nuntil that time everyone who did not speak Greek, was, to the Greek, a\nbarbarian; to the Jew all the uncircumcised were strangers; the nascent\nChristianity drew white and black together; the idea of the whole human\nrace forming one family had its birth at the word of Christ.\n\nThe narrowness of outlook disappeared for a time; it returned when\nefforts were made to confine the words of Christ within the narrow\ncompass of a rigid formula; and thus it came to pass that the recently\nestablished doctrine soon ceased to fulfil its chief object, that\nof being a link of universal charity. Zealous disciples, whilst\ndepreciating dissident religions, endeavoured to detach Christianity\nfrom the uninterrupted chain of the government of the world or divine\nProvidence, thus forming an isolated branch in the history of the human\nfamily.\n\nEach religion, like each language, has a past history, only we neglect\nto study the beginnings, because we lose sight of the fact that the\nfounders of the great religions claim no exclusive right to the name of\nsole author.[129]\n\nJustin Martyr, in his _Apology_ (A.D. 139), has this memorable passage\n(_Apol._ i. 46): \u201cOne article of our faith, then, is that Christ is the\ntrue Logos (or universal Reason) of which mankind are all partakers;\nand therefore those who live according to the Logos are Christians,\nnotwithstanding they may pass with you for atheists; such among the\nGreeks were Socrates and Heracleitus, and the like; and such among the\nbarbarians were Abraham, and Ananias, and Azarias, and Misael, and\nElias, and many others; ... and those who have lived in former times\nin defiance of the Logos or Reason were evil, and enemies of Christ,\nand murderers of such as lived according to the Logos; but they who\nhave made or make the Logos or Reason the rule of their actions are\nChristians, and men without fear and trembling.\u201d[130]\n\nSt Augustine, speaking in the same strain, says: \u201cWhat is now called\nthe Christian religion, has existed among the ancients, and was not\nabsent from the beginning of the human race, until Christ came in the\nflesh, from which time the true religion, which existed already, began\nto be called Christian\u201d (_Retr._ i. 13).\n\nWe know by heart certain passages of the New Testament, but it is\nrather the sound than the meaning which is impressed on our memory;\nwhen we come upon similar remarks made some centuries before the Gospel\nwas preached, they strike us forcibly; and it is as though we heard\nthem for the first time. Jesus Christ declared before the assembled\nmultitude: \u201cVerily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born anew,\nhe cannot see the kingdom of God.\u201d These words were said to a ruler of\nthe Jews named Nicodemus, who had come to Jesus by night, and he asked\nHim to explain how these things could be. Jesus answered: \u201cArt thou the\nteacher of Israel, and understandest not these things?\u201d\n\nNo, the teacher of Israel understood not these things, but the heathen\nAristotle knew them; he had said in speaking of the contemplation of\nGod: \u201cSuch a life is superior to the ordinary life of man; it is not as\nman that man lives this life, but by merit of a divine principle living\nin him.\u201d\n\nJesus said unto the woman of Samaria who was sitting at the foot of\nMount Gerizim, a place sacred to those of her belief: \u201cWoman, believe\nMe, the hour cometh, when neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem,\nshall ye worship the Father; ... but the true worshippers shall worship\nthe Father in spirit and truth.\u201d Although nearly two thousand years\nhave passed men do not yet believe it.\n\nOrigen, one of the early Fathers of the Church, wrote: \u201cIf we wish\nat last to emerge from infancy, we must translate the temporal and\nvisible Gospel into that which is eternal and intelligible.\u201d This\nsame Father was condemned by a council for certain opinions deemed\nerroneous, amongst others those on the plurality of worlds, which he\nsaid he found in the Gospel, this opinion might well be true. St Jerome\nmentions the anathema used: \u201cLike Satan, of whom he is the son, Origen\nfell as lightning from heaven.\u201d As a piece of eloquence it rivals the\ncondemnation of the philosopher of Amsterdam.\n\n * * * * *\n\nMany legends were disseminated amongst the people, they were the\nnatural productions of the moral atmosphere of Europe at the time when\nthe first germs of Christianity sank into a soil strewn with the debris\nof ancient mythology. What happened then will always happen when the\nmultitudes learn the language of their rulers without at the same time\nassimilating their ideas.\n\nIt is related that in the thirteenth century, in a little town of\nItaly, a Brother Thomas asked Brother Bonaventure whence came the power\nand unction of which all his sermons were so full. Bonaventure pointed\nto a crucifix hanging on the wall of his cell: \u201cHe it is who dictates\nto me all that I say.\u201d This reply was reported to the people, who\nbelieved it literally, and the inhabitants of the town were convinced\nthat Brother Bonaventure possessed a crucifix that spoke. The painters\nadopted the subject, amongst the first were those of Spain. Thus a\nsymbol took the place of a sacred truth.\n\nThe Church has often been accused of tolerating like superstitions;\nyet she endeavours to stop their propagation; but the task of trying\nto restore each stone to its place is one of great delicacy, lest the\nfoundations should be shaken upon which the spiritual life of long\ncenturies has been built. Miracles are a prominent feature in all\nreligions; nevertheless, when the disciples of Buddha asked their\nmaster to enable them to perform them, he replied: \u201cI will teach you to\nperform the greatest moral miracle. Hide your good deeds, and confess\nbefore the world the sins you have committed\u201d (_Phy. Religion_, p. 339).\n\nMohammed, in the Koran, expresses the strongest contempt for miracles,\nin the usual sense of that word, and he appeals to the true miracles,\nthe great works of Allah in nature: \u201cI cannot show you,\u201d he said to his\ndisciples, \u201csigns more wonderful than what you see every day and every\nnight.\u201d But the orthodox Mohammedans delight in relating the miracles\nwrought by Mohammed, and which have made him the marvel of Arabia.\n\nMiracles seem to serve the purpose of impressing upon us that the\nreligion is true in which name they are performed; it has also been\nobserved that the same miracle is not generally performed twice, as\nthe second time it appears natural; it is extraordinary the faculty\nman possesses of feeling no astonishment at those things which should\nawaken his most profound astonishment.\n\nAs critics we are now in a position to take note of the mental\naberrations of the mythological period; we can understand that when\nthe ancient peoples attributed a divine descent to their kings and\nheroes, it was the highest praise that one man could give to another;\nwe know that the mythology as taught in the schools, was no more the\nreligion of the Greeks and Romans than rust is iron. Yet it is this\nhomage which has perhaps obscured our minds as we imagine absolutely\nhuman intercourse taking place between mortals and immortals. The\naction of metaphor overstepped the boundary of the fabulous ages; it\ninvaded, unknown to us, the domain of the modern thinker, and even\nour religion was not sheltered from its attacks; we now use in our\nreligious phraseology the words of _father_ and _son_, without having\nfirst despoiled them of their material meaning; and we hardly realise\nthat in this different sphere these words are a daring metaphor, upon\nwhich, of our own initiative, we could not have ventured. A vague\nidea that God is separated from us by space dominates us, so that the\nbelief that there can be no barrier between the divine and human is\noften confounded with pantheism; yet without pantheism of this kind,\nwhich differs _in toto_ from the dogmatic pantheism, Christianity would\nnot have made its appearance in the world. We invoke neither Jupiter\nnor Jehovah; God is for us the God whose name is found in all modern\nlanguages; but it is God around us, beyond us; in speaking of Him our\nthoughts follow Him to Heaven. When a man takes God to witness of\nhis innocence, he involuntarily lifts his hand to Heaven; in a time\nof disastrous drought, when the earth refuses its nourishment to man\nand beast, pious souls are invited to pray to God for the blessing of\nrain. Whilst the work of science has been specially directed to causes,\nreligion is content, as in the past, to attribute each act to an agent;\nthe influence of ancient ideas on our present thought is still in\nforce, and our mind has to live as the oyster, under a cover which it\nhas made for itself. But we must submit to evidence, and acknowledge\nthat if we do not yet escape from the power of mythology, it is that we\nmeet its language everywhere, even in our sacred writings.\n\nLanguage has moulded our thoughts; when they tend towards God, we make\na representation of Him as a person, we are not able to avoid such\nrepresentations; we know that the sun does not rise each morning, but\nwe cannot do otherwise than see it rise; we know that the sky is not\nblue, but to us it wears no other appearance.\n\nWe hear it repeated that an impersonal God is no God; but it is\nforgotten that personification implies limitations, since it cannot be\nconceived but from a human point of view, and thus with limits. When\nSpinoza denied a Divine personality, his opposers believed him to be\ndenying God; the philosophers of the seventeenth century, including\nCatholic theologians, did not define the personality of God.[131]\nDescartes and Fenelon\u2019s definition is \u201cThe Infinitely perfect Being,\nwithout restrictions, the Being, to which nothing can be added.\u201d In\nregarding God\u2019s personality as we do that of a human being, we might\nlogically say with Massillon: \u201cGod, in His anger, hears unwise prayers,\nin order to punish those who use them\u201d; you would also be logical if\nyou thought with that mother that God had taken away her child because\nshe had loved it too well.\n\nIn tracing the progress of ideas concerning God throughout the\ncourse of ages, it would be a sorry task to gather together the\ncharacteristics chosen by Christian writers as those which mark\nthe supreme Being; these traits would furnish a whole Pantheon of\nmythological divinities.\n\nAll philosophers and all truly philosophical theologians have held that\nGod is impersonal Reason; Bossuet called Him \u201cLa Raison-Dieu.\u201d This\nLight that lighteth every one that cometh into the world is the source\nof a principle of certitude; Aristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas\nthus understood it when they said that mind cannot be mistaken.\n\nIf we would make an approximate conception of God we must scrupulously\nfollow the advice of St Thomas Aquinas, \u201cEliminate, eliminate,\u201d then\nonly shall we understand the meaning of the sages who said that\nnegation is fuller than affirmation.\n\nThousands of years before St Thomas Aquinas, the Hindoos practised\nhis method; for it was the inadequacy of the names used to express\nthe indefinable attributes of divinity that led them always to search\nfor new ones, until at last, all the phenomena of nature having been\nexamined and rejected, the Hindoos in despair cried, \u201cIt is impossible\nto seize that which we seek; it is not this, nor that, nor anything for\nwhich we have a name.\u201d At last they came to the conclusion that there\nwas no name worthy of God in the language of humanity, and that all\nthat could be said was, \u201cNo, no.\u201d\n\nIt is necessary, however, to use names as soon as we possess the ideas.\nAll those which have contributed to the education of humanity have been\nthe production of an impersonal work, the result of a long meditation\nby the human mind. It has been said that the idea and name of \u201cthe\nBeing\u201d for God, originated in the mind of Moses; perhaps this prophet\nput the last touch. \u201cI Am that I Am\u201d was the name used by him for the\nEternal. The Hebrews employed another method when speaking of God,\nthey used the word Il or El. In Hebrew it occurs both in its general\nsense of strong or hero, and as a name of God. Something equivalent is\nfound in the Zend-Avesta; \u201cLooking around him, Il (Ahuramazda, the Zend\nname for Ormazd) sees nothing but himself; and Il said, \u2018I Am,\u2019 and his\nname became \u2018I Am.\u2019\u201d\n\nBut man at times yearns for a closer union with God than is expressed\nby the name \u201cBeing.\u201d When troubled and in pain he says, \u201cMy Father!\u201d\nand he remembers the names which he lisped as a child, and all come\ncrowding to his lips; and He who is above all hears and understands.\n\nWe must not separate religion from philosophy; the subjects touching on\nreligion have always been those which have given birth to philosophy;\neven if religion existed only on sentiment, as some people maintain,\nit would be for philosophy to determine if this sentiment were an\nillusion, or if it had a rational base; to separate them is to lessen\nboth.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[109] _Origin and Growth of Religion_, p. 312.\n\n[110] Rothe in his \u201cStille Stunden,\u201d _Anthropological Religion_, p. 16.\n\n[111] Psalm xxxiii. 6; Isaiah xi. 4.\n\n[112] _Natural Religion_, p. 164.\n\n[113] _Rig-Veda_, I. 164. 6.\n\n[114] _Ibid_., VI. 9. 6.\n\n[115] _Rig-Veda_, X. 82. 7.\n\n[116] _Ibid._, 121. 8.\n\n[117] _Theosophy or Psychological Religion_, p. 97.\n\n[118] Higher Critics.\n\n[119] We find from a letter of St Jerome\u2019s to Paula that he was in the\nhabit of advising his disciples to read the Scriptures, which he so\nreverenced, in the following order. He began by the Psalms, then took\nthe books of Solomon, then he would come to Job. After going through\nthis course of Old Testament history he would come to the Gospels and\nthen to the Acts and the Epistles. After this preparation he would turn\nto the Prophets, who had foretold all that the Gospels related, and\nended by allowing his disciples to read the historical Books of the Old\nTestament, which might, he thought, without such previous training,\ntrouble and perplex them.--TRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE.\n\n[120] From M. Renan\u2019s work on Semitic languages.\n\n[121] _Introduction to the Science of Religion_, pp. 31, 32.\n\n[122] 2 Kings iii. 15.\n\n[123] Ezekiel xxxi. 8.\n\n[124] \u201cA God understood would be no God at all.\u201d--Dean Mansel,\nseventeenth century.\n\n[125] _Metaphysics_, xii.\n\n[126] _Physical Religion_, p. 4.\n\n[127] Cf. _Summum jus est summa injuria_.\n\n[128] This study of religions hardly gives sufficient prominence\nto Christianity; Max M\u00fcller says: \u201cI make no secret that true\nChristianity, I mean the religion of Christ, seems to me to become\nmore and more exalted the more we know and the more we appreciate\nthe treasures of truth hidden in the despised religions of the\nworld.\u201d--_Introduction to the Science of Religion_, p. 28.\n\n\u201cIt may be said that my chief object has been to magnify Christianity,\nby showing that it is the fulfilment of all that the world has been\nhoping and striving for. In one sense that is true. But if I hold that\nChristianity has given the best and truest expression to what the old\nworld had tried to express in various and less perfect ways, I have at\nleast given the facts on which I rely.\u201d--_Anthropological Religion_, p.\n388.\n\n[129] On this subject Max M\u00fcller says: \u201cThe ancient Fathers of the\nChurch spoke on these subjects with greater freedom than we venture to\nuse in these days.\u201d--_Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i., Pref.\nxxix.\n\n[130] _Chips from a German Workshop_, vol. i., Pref. xxix.\n\n[131] In the seventh century the Personality was clearly set forth in\nthe Athanasian Creed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII OF WORDS\n\n\n \u201cNomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum.\u201d--LINN\u00c9.\n\nIf language is the true autobiography of the human mind, our present\nlanguage may also be called a perfect photograph of our mind in its\npresent state of fog. Whether ignorant or learned we still talk and\ndiscuss, and we seldom arrive at an understanding of the subject,\nowing to our want of knowledge of the precise meaning of the terms.\nThe most advanced sciences are those about whose terms we no longer\ndispute, mathematics, for instance. When we are quite convinced of\nthe identity of thought and speech, we shall introduce into our\nideas, and consequently into all our discourses, whether familiar or\nphilosophical, a clearness impossible to obtain in any other manner.\n\nIt would be a great help to know the etymology of words, but that would\nnot suffice. \u201cL\u2019\u00e9tymologie,\u201d said Voltaire, \u201cest une science o\u00f9 les\nvoyelles ne font rien, et les consonnes fort peu de choses.\u201d This sally\nbears on its face the date of the century of which this could be said\nin all truth. At the time of Voltaire the science of etymology was\nconfined to ascribing the derivation of a word to another word to which\nit bore a close resemblance in sound; and the clever writer was not the\nonly one to rally the few learned men who considered it possible to\ntrace words to a source which one can hardly suspect of being related\nto them. If Voltaire had known that his sarcasm was nothing more than\na simple scientific truth, he would perhaps have found less pleasure\nin expressing it. The science of etymology--a growth of our day--has\ndiscovered that words, which in appearance have nothing in common,\nneither sound nor meaning, yet have a common origin.\n\nThat would be a curious chapter of the history of thought, in which\nwere demonstrated the errors that had been introduced and embedded in\nour minds by the use of certain words, which in the course of time\ngradually developed a meaning the exact opposite of that which they had\nat the first.\n\nFor instance, matter is generally represented as something tangible,\nthat is to say, all are agreed in finding it devoid of mind, and it\nis a sign of condemnation to say of a century it is materialistic.\nYet we who daily touch tangible objects, such as stone, metal, wood,\nnever succeed in putting our hands on matter as such; we should not\nknow where to find it. Does this arise from the fact that matter is not\ntangible? The Latin word _materia_ had originally the meaning of the\nwood of a tree, then of wood or timber for building. This meaning was\ngeneralised so as to include solid bodies capable of taking various\nshapes. When idols were fashioned a distinction was made between the\nwood and the shape which emerged; and afterwards, when sculptors carved\nstatues of marble or of metal, the marble and metal again received the\nname of matter or material; and when it was asked of what all tangible\nobjects were made, even the world on which we live, the answer was that\nall were made of matter whilst they differ in form. In this way have we\nbecome possessed of our word matter, to which nothing tangible quite\ncorresponds; and no doubt, owing to its complexity of meaning, it has\nnot ceased to exercise the minds of learned men.\n\nIf philosophers have not been able to explain accurately the meaning of\nmatter, physicists have not been more successful, since what we call\nmatter does not come under our senses. The word might have escaped\nthis ill fate had it always been used only by philosophers \u201cwho try\nonly to use words that have been clearly defined, but names are used by\nthe wise and the foolish, and the foolish, as we know, are in such an\nimmense majority that the wonder is that words have any definite sense\nleft at all.\u201d[132]\n\nMax M\u00fcller says: \u201cI am quite willing to admit that matter may be called\nthe objective cause of all that we perceive. For the very reason,\nhowever, that it is a cause, matter can never fall under the cognisance\nof our senses. All that we can predicate of matter is that it causes\nour sensations, that it exists in space and time, that it is one, but\nappears under an endless variety of phenomenal forms, that it remains\nunchanged in the change of outward appearances.\u201d[133]\n\nThe history of the word matter teaches us then that speech, whose\nsole duty it is to introduce light into our minds, admits error also\nas long as we are ignorant of the original meaning of words: matter,\nwhilst it was the solid wood of a tree and wood for building, became\nfor those who had coined the word a fit object for perception and\nconception; later, others, differently constituted, saw in it a word\n\u201cwhich contains to every man exactly what he has found in it or added\nto it.\u201d[134]\n\nThere are many words whose transformations we are able to follow from\none language to another, but, on the other hand, there are others\nwhose history it is not possible to know with exactness, owing to the\nmany revolutions, the many breaks and pauses which here and there\nhave destroyed and scattered the links; but the science of language\nprogresses, and those who study it look forward to the day when its\nfoundations will be placed on philosophical bases.\n\nMany of the false ideas we have conceived of words are no doubt\nowing to the translations we read of books. When we first begin the\nstudy of a new language the task appears a simple one, the dictionary\nsupplies us with the equivalent words and the grammar with the correct\nforms; but the further we advance the less we are satisfied; the\ndifficulties of finding expressions which content us increase; words\nare too abundant, or too scarce; our conceptions are invaded by ideas\nof complete disparity; and we seem to be entering an unknown land,\nbecause new effects of light and shade have lent a novel character to\nthe country. A translation is therefore at best but an effort to bring\ntogether thoughts which were designed to remain always apart.\n\nIf in our modern languages certain words necessarily change their\nmeaning during the course of three or four centuries, ancient languages\nare under the same necessity in an infinitely greater degree.\n\nMany scholars have devoted their entire lives to the task of\ndeciphering old documents, as it is impossible for literature of an age\nanterior to our present era by many centuries to preserve its original\nphysiognomy two thousand years later. A translation of the hymns of\nthe Veda, or of the Zend-Avesta, requires exactly the same process as\nthe deciphering of the inscriptions in the time of Cyrus, Darius, and\nXerxes. The only certain way is to compare every passage in which the\nsame word occurs, and look for a meaning that is equally applicable\nto all. From the lack of this method Sanscrit and Zend texts have\nbeen rendered most incorrectly. It is precisely the Sacred Writings\nthat have suffered the most from the efforts of interpreters. Those\npassages of the hymns which have no close connection with religious or\nphilosophical doctrines are generally correctly rendered, but as each\ngeneration expects to find the ideas reflecting its own time in the\nwords of the ancient seers, the most simple discourse--if it can in any\nway be construed to represent modern thought--is tortured and twisted\nso as to coincide with preconceived ideas, however foreign to the mind\nof the writer.\n\nIt is the same with the Hebrew version of the Old Testament. At the\ntime when the seventy Jews at Alexandria were occupied in translating\nthe Scriptures into Greek, 250 B.C., although Hebrew could not be\nlooked upon as a dead language, yet even the most learned amongst these\nelders did not understand the original of many of the expressions, and\nprobably few of the translators undertook the task of explaining how\nfar those to whom Moses\u2019 discourses were addressed, understood them.\n\nIf the Old Testament has lost amongst the Higher Critics some of its\nancient glories, it has, on the other hand, acquired a historical\nvalue which theologians of former times had never contemplated. The\nknowledge of comparative philology having been used in deciphering the\ncuneiform inscriptions or hieroglyphics engraved on the ruined walls of\nthe temples and palaces of Nineveh and Babylon, we possess information\nconcerning the worship of the Ph\u0153nicians, the Carthaginians, and the\nNomads of the Arabian peninsula. We no longer seek the help of the\ninscriptions in proving the truth of the biblical records; it is rather\nthese which confirm the correctness of all that we learn from the\ninscriptions.\n\nOne more remark on the subject of our venerable and venerated Bible. I\ndo not understand how it is that some people with literary tastes never\nopen the Old Testament to satisfy them. Lack of habit perhaps. Some\nof the wits of the Renaissance looked down on the Old Testament; now\nthe admirers of classic literature know better how to appreciate its\nliterary beauties of many kinds of which it is full; some of our modern\nwriters have been much commended for their perorations; the perorations\nof the chapters contained in the Bible are superb.\n\n\u201cI will give an instance how the peculiar character of a language may\ninfluence even religious expressions. A Mohawk (coming originally from\nNorth America) was questioned concerning his mother-tongue. It seems\nthat in Mohawk it is impossible to say father, mother, child, nor the\nfather, the mother, the child. We must always say, my father, thy\nmother, or his child. Once when I asked him to translate the Apostles\u2019\nCreed for me, he translated \u2018I believe in our God, our Father, and\nhis Son\u2019 all right. But when he came to the Holy Ghost, he asked is\nit _their_ or _his_ Holy Ghost? I told him there was a difference of\nopinion on that point between two great divisions of the Christian\nChurch, and he then shook his head and declared that he could not\ntranslate the Creed till that point had been settled.\u201d[135] This fact\nhas an interest for linguists; what I am about to relate concerns all.\n\nA lady wishing to practise a little philosophy with the means within\nher reach, wrote to me once: \u201cI am perplexed; my heart tells me one\nthing, and my soul another.\u201d It required some moments of reflection to\nunderstand what my correspondent meant; the heart was, in her eyes,\nobviously, the seat of earthly affections; and the soul that of purely\nspiritual aspirations. This hazy manner of explanation might, at first\nsight, appear harmless, but on looking at it more closely, it is seen\nto be unfortunate, for this confusion between thoughts and words,\nmeets one in many a book of so-called edification, where the reader\nseldom takes note of it, especially if he be hurried or careless; but\none regrets to see good women waste daily half an hour in reading such\nindefinite nothings, thinking to accomplish thereby a religious duty;\nthese persons, with intellectual culture would draw greater benefit to\nthemselves in devoting their half hour to the perusal of books of a\nmore sturdy tone.\n\nWe believe ourselves to be in the possession of very clear notions\nconcerning conscience; earnest men speak of it as an inward monitor;\nsimple folk like ourselves call it the Voice of God; for the one and\nfor the other conscience seems to be a guide on which they can rely,\nand the Greek poet Menander was not mistaken when he wrote the line\n\u201cConscience is a god to all mortals.\u201d But if we possessed within us a\nfaculty to tell us what is our duty, how could Pascal have said that\ngood and evil differ with a few degrees of latitude? It is a well-known\nfact that the conscience of a Mormon speaks another language to that of\na non-Mormon. We say with truth that we are conscious of having done\nwell or ill, but it does not follow that it is to our conscience that\nwe owe the fact of knowing right from wrong; this consciousness is\nthe result of instruction from without, which we accept when our own\njudgment and our own experience demonstrate its truth.\n\nIn subjects of general interest, the task of defining terms should\nconsist in choosing amongst the various interpretations which have\ngradually become attached to certain words, not always that one which\nis most intimately or etymologically connected with the primary root,\nbut that which would indicate an important practical difference. Yet by\nan unforeseen misfortune, the daily necessity comes before us of using\nwords whose meaning has never been clearly defined, so that at no time\nhas one meaning prevailed more than another; this is especially the\ncase with words connected with religion, faith, and objects of belief,\nwhich each one understands after his own manner.\n\nIn our days the possibility of an agreement between religion and\nscience is often debated; how can we enter on the discussion without\nbeing quite clear as to what religion is? According to some it is\nsimply the feeling of love for God; according to others it is the\nexpression of our faith under the form of acts of worship, acts of\ncharity, or perhaps the holding of certain dogmas.\n\nThe same holds good with that which we call faith, and which is often a\nfeeling of confidence--not always the result of thought--in the faith\nof those surrounding us. Some give the name of faith to that enthusiasm\nwhich has sufficed to cause men joyfully to meet martyrdom; others\napply it to the confidence with which the wise men followed the guiding\nof the star, when it indicated the road they should follow. Faith is\nonly worthy of the name when it can be said to be a reasonable faith,\nand thus accounting for its existence. If we are not amongst the number\nof those who can give a reason for the faith that is in them, we must\ntake care that credulity does not glide in before we are aware of its\napproach; it arises from a weakness of the mind and is compatible with\na tranquillity that differs very widely from peace; and when once\nmistress of the situation, it increases, and occupies it. A wise Arab\nwell said, \u201cHe who builds his house on human credulity builds on a\nrock.\u201d\n\n\u201cAbstract,\u201d this word which we can trace back to Aristotle, has an\ninteresting history. Aristotle used it at first to characterise the\ncreation of a work of art; the sculptor carves out of a block of marble\nthe statue of a man or of a woman, rejecting the chips and dust which\nserve no purpose. Afterwards Aristotle applied this same word to an\nidea which an accurate thinker forms, giving it a suitable shape, and\nseparating it from all accidental thoughts that may have surrounded\nit; that done, what remains is an abstract idea. Aristotle has so well\nexplained the meaning of abstract, that if our logicians had simply\nspoken of _concrete_ as that which is non-abstract, all the world would\nmore readily have understood the meaning of the word--concrete.\n\nWe possess and employ a vast number of words, and we apparently\nincrease them by endowing the same word--from a want of clearness\nin our perceptions--with various meanings. The ancient Hindoos must\nhave felt that an over-abundance of words is pernicious, and for this\nreason, no doubt, the Brahmans at a certain period of their literature,\nimposed on themselves the rule of expressing their thoughts in the\nfewest words possible. They succeeded in presenting each point of\ndoctrine denuded of all but the barest outline of words; they are the\nauthors of the aphorism, \u201cA writer of the Sutras is happier in having\neconomised a portion of a diphthong than from the birth of a son.\u201d The\nfull force of this sentence becomes apparent when it is remembered that\nthe Brahman who has no son to perform his funeral rites cannot hope to\nenter heaven. It would be difficult to express more forcibly a respect\nfor words, and the great necessity there is for cultivating clearness\nof thought.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhat I am about to say concerns a word to which I owe the direction\nof my views of life, and my resolution to undertake the study of the\nsubjects forming my present work; this word is the name of a man.\n\nWhen I was young I made the acquaintance of a very learned Jesuit\nFather who employed his time in researches on the ecclesiastical\nantiquities of the East. We once found ourselves in the company of\ncertain persons who were surveying the most remarkable of all the\nscientific and philosophical works published in our day; Darwin,\nPasteur, Helmholtz and Max M\u00fcller were named. When the reverend Father\nheard this last name, he exclaimed, with his accustomed impetuosity,\n\u201cOh! Max M\u00fcller, his works are absolutely magnificent.\u201d\n\nTwenty years later the announcement of a new work of Max M\u00fcller\nreminded me of the Jesuit Father\u2019s exclamation; hitherto I had read\nnothing of this author\u2019s; I procured the book which had appeared\nrecently; afterwards I read those that had preceded it. At the end\nof some years I wrote to the reverend Father; the state of his health\nhad obliged him to settle in a town in the south, and I had not seen\nhim for some time. I thanked him for having drawn my attention to\nMax M\u00fcller\u2019s name. I received an immediate reply, the first lines of\nwhich I will quote. \u201cYour thanks are unexpected. Max M\u00fcller seems to\nme an incomparable philosopher, but my admiration does not surpass his\nmerit.\u201d A few weeks later the worthy Father died of consumption.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[132] _Science of Thought_, p. 568.\n\n[133] _Ibid._, p. 569.\n\n[134] _Ibid._, p. 570.\n\n[135] Max M\u00fcller, _Anthropological Religion_, p. 171.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS\n\n\nI had not decided beforehand on the number of my chapters; it seems\nthat there will be thirteen. If these pages have readers to whom the\nnumber thirteen is distressing, I beg of them at once to dismiss\nthis feeling by saying: \u201cHe who objects to sit down thirteen at\ntable, acknowledges by this that he does not believe in a supreme\nintelligence, superior to his own, which governs the world.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nScience, religion, reason, and faith, these four words form the circle\nin which all intellects move, now more than ever; on this all the world\nis agreed, but all the world does not know what the greatest thinkers\nhave understood by these four words.\n\nIf we do not wish to deserve the title given to that collective\nbeing, \u201cthe man in the street,\u201d the best means of avoiding it is to\nacknowledge openly that there are many unexplained problems facing us,\nand that man exists in order to do his part in solving them. Humanity\nis not composed of individuals who have been poured forth from a horn\nof plenty, its destiny cannot therefore be to diffuse itself over the\nsurface of the earth without the means of knowing why it is there.\n\nAn ancient Greek said once that the gods were ready to sell all kinds\nof good things to mortals but at a high price, at the cost of hard\nwork. If then we can only acquire the promised good things by the aid\nof hard work, our thoughts carry us at once to science, and we ask\nwhat can this science do, upon which we so pride ourselves in this\ncentury, to explain the motive of our existence?\n\n\nPHYSICS\n\nIn proportion as physical science studies this universe, so it\nrecognises more and more clearly that its most general phenomenon is\nvibration, a periodical movement, which propagates itself in waves\nsucceeding each other at regular intervals.\n\nWe have all noticed the effect produced by drops of rain falling on\nwater which the absence of wind leaves perfectly tranquil. Each drop\nforms a circle, but the causes of perturbation of an aqueous surface\nare infinite; the dip of an insect, the leap of a fish, all ceaselessly\ncause new circles, which follow each other, become wider, and finally\nlose themselves in each other under our eyes; the water is apparently\na prey to shivering fits; this is a type of the vibrations whose\npercussions are felt by the whole world. We are all, body and soul,\nsubject to the law of vibrations, each sense recognises its power by\nmeans of sensations whose various kinds are apprehended by physical\nscience, by the calculation of the number of vibrations which, in\na given time, affect differently each of our organs of sensation.\nScience records the number of vibrations which denote to our skin the\nexact degree of the external temperature, she counts the millions of\nvibrations which enable our eyes to see definite colours in the space\nof a second, and the thousands of vibrations which enable our ears to\nhear, in the same space of time, well defined sounds.\n\nThus physical science explains a general phenomenon which exerts its\ninfluence, indubitably, on all men since there have been men on earth.\n\n\nCOMPARATIVE SCIENCES\n\nWhen Bordas-Desmoulins, one of the first of our learned thinkers to\nstudy comparative science, said: \u201cWithout mathematics we cannot plumb\nthe depths of philosophy; without philosophy we cannot penetrate\nmathematics; without the two we can reach the foundation of nothing,\u201d\ndid he see that this truth is so great as to be all embracing?\n\nWe see theologians walking steadily in the footsteps of those who\nstudy comparative science with conviction. Father Gratry contends that\nwithout it it is impossible to know God, man, and nature. Matter cannot\nbe conceived without spirit, nor spirit apart from matter. Whilst a\nhuman being is in the embryonic stage, the soul, the principle of\nlife, is occupied in forming the body, destined to cover it during its\nearthly existence. The moment arrives when this body is sufficiently\nprepared to appear in the light of day; it contains two nervous\ncentres, the one supplying the vegetative life, the other the animal;\nthey are distinct though not separated, and the soul still continues\nits work on the body, whether it sleeps or whether it wakes; but during\nsleep, whilst man\u2019s will is torpid, the soul supplies by rhythmic\nmovements of the nerves, the requisite matter for the reparation of the\nlosses sustained during the waking periods.\n\nThis intimate union of mind and matter has been rejected by certain\ngreat philosophers. Descartes, for instance, completely separated the\nimmaterial substance possessed of the property of thinking from the\nmaterial body. Apparently we are of his way of thinking since we always\nspeak of our soul as of one thing and our body as of another; this is\nto make two truths out of one and the same truth. But it is better to\nlook upon it as one truth as Aristotle did formerly. At a later date\ncertain doctors of the Church became of the same opinion, and at\npresent Christian theologians, who are also thinkers, hold the same\nview.\n\n * * * * *\n\nA fresh science is now in process of development. It connects psychical\nphenomena, such as sensation, thought, and action, with that which\ncan be weighed and measured. This science bears several more or less\ncharacteristic names; in order to keep to generalities I will call\nit the new psychology; it is taught in Germany, England, Paris, and\nRussia, and perhaps elsewhere. There is only one way of dealing rightly\nwith so vast a science, it should be treated in its entirety; but as I\nam anxious only to make known some of its more recent discoveries, I\nwill content myself by doing this briefly and with many omissions.\n\n * * * * *\n\nKant had as his disciple the physiologist J. M\u00fcller, who applied the\nmethod of his master to the study of sensations; and Helmholtz was\ntrained by J. M\u00fcller.\n\nAt one time, rather more than fifty years ago, the germs of life were\nconsidered to be an exception on the terrestrial globe; but Helmholtz\ndiscovered them even in rocky masses; and he proved to Liebig that\nputrefaction was not a simple chemical reaction, but was due to the\naction of a living organism. M. Pasteur was one of the first to profit\nby this lesson.\n\nEach definite science has its own special sphere in which it is\noccupied only with itself; Helmholtz, a physician and musician, worked\nentirely in connection with his own science only; without reference to\nthe conclusion that comparative science might draw from his labours,\nhe gave himself up to the study of the rapidity of the transmission\nof nervous impressions, and dogmatically laid down his thesis in his\nbook _The Physiological Theory of Music_, which is perhaps the most\nimportant of his works; at least it is the one of which I have made the\nmost use.\n\nIn nature we never hear simple sounds; nothing but a fusion of\nnoises reaches us. Helmholtz, however, succeeded in distinguishing a\nfundamental sound in a mass of others; but it is quickly amalgamated\nwith two or three other sounds which are higher and feebler than\nitself, as distant echoes. Helmholtz became convinced that music\nis composed of single sounds accompanied by others of a decreasing\nintensity, and he demonstrated by calculation that the number of\nvibrations of these secondary sounds called harmonics are greater than\nthose of the fundamental sounds; and the differences of the grouping\nof harmonic sounds determines the difference of timbre. In this way\nHelmholtz discovered the cause of musical timbre, and was able to\nexplain the reason, hitherto unknown, of the sound of a flute differing\nfrom that of a hautbois, or of a woman\u2019s voice from that of a man\u2019s.\n\nThere are two marvellous things in music; timbre and rhythm.\n\nBy rhythm is understood the number of a group of corresponding\nvibrations recurring in a second. Rhythm may be defined as a recurring\nmovement, composed of unequal parts; the beat of a pulse, in which each\npulsation can be separately distinguished, will serve as an example.\n\nRhythm may be found everywhere, in poetry equally with music; and it is\nthis which imparts its chief charm. The beauty of the rhythmic prose\nof the Hebrew N\u0101bh\u012b naturally attracted the multitude independently\nof the subject matter of their words; and the rhythmic language of\nRenan\u2019s translation of the book of Job enables us perfectly to grasp\nand appreciate the special charm incidental to rhythm.\n\nMusic is provocative of nervous effects, at times of great intensity;\nbeneficent to the greater number of persons, but to others quite the\nreverse; in his infancy Mozart almost fainted on hearing the sound of\nthe trumpet.\n\nProfessor Wundt--who in his works deals with the human soul and that of\nbeasts--founded at Leipzig, in 1879, a laboratory with this inscription\nover the entrance, \u201cInstitute for Experimental Psychology.\u201d Wundt\nsaid: \u201cThe result of my researches does not accord with the dualism\nof Plato and Descartes; from experimental psychology the animism of\nAristotle (who connects psychology and biology) alone is evolved, as\nthe plausible metaphysical conclusion.\u201d\n\nA wonderful man this Aristotle! Whether we wish to analyse those\nsensations which stir every fibre of our moral being, or to trace the\netymology of a word, or study the most modern of all our sciences, the\nfirst to present himself to our mental vision is the sage of Stageira.\n\nThe first notes of an air by Mozart or of a sonata of Beethoven could\nnever have been produced by them by chance, they were willed by a power\nwhich their composers considered outside themselves.\n\nInspiration--revelation--the same thing with all, in all time, and in\nevery place, they differ but in degree. It is possible that a musical\nphysician such as Helmholtz, added to a psychological physiologist as\nWundt was, and the two grafted on to a philosopher such as Aristotle,\nmight have been able to define, in a measure, the meaning of the words\nInspiration and Revelation.\n\nIt is with a knowledge of causes that we are able to say: \u201cThe\nuniversal phenomenon of vibration is a fight for life, a fight between\n_being_ and _not being_.\u201d\n\n\nCONCERNING SOME AUTHORS\n\nWe do not always occupy ourselves with science, and writers of a\npoetical temperament like to write on the more serious subjects, at\nthe dictation of their heart and conscience only, especially when they\nspeak to themselves alone, with no thought of others.\n\nRenan, in his _History of the People of Israel_, writes: \u201cIn presence\nof the social problems of our days, and of the question: Has life\na premeditated end and object? What is it? Is it for the good of\nhumanity? Is it for the good of the individual?\u201d The author replies:\n\u201cThe universe, whose last word we never learn, attains its end by\nan infinite variety of germs; if we are amongst those who deceive\nthemselves and rebel against authority, that may not be attended by\nserious consequences ... let us be quiet; if we miss the mark others\nwill hit it; that which Jahvah wills, will come to pass.\u201d\n\nUnderstand if you can.\n\nThose who wish to adore, always find an object of adoration; Renan\nseeks his religion in the love of science and art; Comte thought to\nfind it in a life devoted to the happiness of humanity. Is it not of\nthese, and of men similar to them, that the most intellectual and\nclearest sighted of judges, the mythological god Krishna, spoke when he\nsaid, \u201cAll those who adore idols, adore me.\u201d\n\nEverywhere we encounter God and His power; either He triumphs over man,\nor man vainly seeks to triumph over Him.\n\nI have noticed that Renan\u2019s work, _La Vie de J\u00e9sus_, to which\nearnest-minded persons have a great objection, has been the means of\nconsoling more than one sincere soul. Is it to be reckoned a good or\nan evil? Who shall take upon himself to say? Renan has certainly an\nattraction for certain readers, they do not succeed in finding out\nwhat he believes, but that is not to the point; generally he confines\nhimself to troubling the water, it becomes muddy; in muddy waters fish\nare sometimes taken--we throw our lines--and--marvellous--each one\ndraws out his favourite fish.\n\nP\u00e8re Gratry has nothing in common with Renan, except that both are\npoets. Plato having said that all but the wicked have their eternal\ntypes in God, Gratry was authorised in the conclusion he drew in his\n_Logic_ that \u201cnothing in us, neither sentiment, nor imagination, nor\nprayer, can go too far; all is more beautiful than that of which we\ndream; all is higher than we can believe possible.\u201d\n\nThis language has displeased certain moralists, and they have not\nspared their censures on the theologian who used it. They have accused\nhim of dreaming whilst dealing with religion, and they would have\npreferred that Gratry should occupy himself simply with literature.\n\u201cAbove all,\u201d they say, \u201chow is it that Gratry has ventured to write\nfive long chapters on the probable site of immortality, and to inquire\nwhere men will live when there is no longer death.\u201d\n\nWhy should we not be permitted to ask ourselves these questions, and\nto reply to them as we please? Are not theologians men like ourselves?\nEspecially that theologian who said: \u201cThe time when religion will have\nacquired the characteristics of a science is yet far distant.\u201d\n\n\nRELIGION AND RELIGIONS\n\nAt an early period of our present era, various groups of men formed\nthemselves into assemblies, \u201cChurches,\u201d as they were called, all\nteaching religion, and each from his own point of view. The study of\nthese instructions is full of important lessons. First is to be noticed\nthis fact that the truths on which all were agreed weighed more heavily\nin the balance than those on which they disagreed. It is necessary to\ndisentangle true religion in itself from its surroundings. There is\none true religion, as there is one God, and one logic. The expressions\nwhich are current with us of natural religion and revealed religion\nshould be lacking in our conversation, since they cause us to believe\nthat they denote two different religions.[136]\n\nOpinions are sometimes attributed to the founders of organised\nreligions which really belong only to their disciples, or even to\ntheologians who live in an age much more recent than the historical\nbirth of the religion; if free discussion followed, suppositions and\ndoubts might often be dissipated, but in certain cases laws are imposed\nand rules laid down which are considered infallible and not open to\ndiscussion.\n\nAccording to the early Christian Doctors, the Church is external and\nvisible, together with that which is within and invisible; the title,\n\u201cSoul of the Church,\u201d was given to the invisible union of men amongst\nthemselves and with God; its dogma is, \u201cAll the righteous, none but the\nrighteous can have their share in the soul of the Church; many are in\nthe visible Church who do not belong to its soul; many are out of the\nvisible Church who form a portion of the soul of the Church.\u201d[137]\n\nIn speaking thus the Fathers rested on an ancient tradition; it came\nto them from Plato, whose words I have already quoted: \u201cThere is in\nthe soul a point, which is the root by which the Divinity suspends\nhis creatures to Himself; and this central point is the truth which\nconnects all men from one end of the world to the other.\u201d This explains\nthe previous assertion of the Fathers.\n\nBut they did not content themselves with an assertion only; they\nimposed on reason the burden of explanation and the duty of knowing\nall. The first effort of our reason in natural sciences consists in\nexamining facts and endeavouring to find the laws. If one eternal law\ndid not rule over the whole of nature our labour would be in vain;\nif this same law did not govern our reason we should be incapable of\nfinding those laws which govern the phenomena around us; and it is\nclear that there could consequently be no physical science. But it is\nnot so apparent at first sight that if our reason were not governed by\nan eternal law, there could be no moral sciences either.\n\nMany observations have been made by men of attentive and profound\nminds, but they have remained isolated for the most part. I will quote\none or two that I have collected here and there; it is well to pass\nthem in review, if only to assure one\u2019s self that they are true.\n\n\u201cIt is a great mistake to suppose that those who have read many books\nknow many things. Reading supplies the material for knowledge, but\nreflection alone causes it to take root and grow.\u201d Locke made this\nobservation. I add to it that for reflection to bear fruit it must be\njoined to a good method. P\u00e8re Gratry, who is a practical man, also\nenforces this in a chapter in his _Logic_, in which he lays great\nstress on the importance of reserving the morning hours for study and\nreflection. It is a fine paragraph, and worthy of being reproduced.\n\n\u201cIn the book of the Apocalypse we read, \u2018And there was silence in\nheaven for the space of half an hour.\u2019 In the heaven of souls this is\nrare. According to St Augustine the Eternal Wisdom does not cease to\nspeak to human creatures, and reason does not cease its activities\nin us. We have only to listen, and to listen we must keep silence.\nBut amongst men, and especially amongst thinkers, who can keep still\nsilence? The generality of men, especially those who study, have not a\nsingle half hour of silence in the day, men of learning either listen\nto those who speak, or are speaking themselves; and when they find\nthemselves alone and silent, then they permit books to speak to them,\nand they devour long discourses, with rapid glances, in a few minutes.\u201d\n\nUnder these conditions all study requiring much reflection is\nimpossible.\n\nAttention, Abstraction, Contradiction, Speech--only a few persons\nappreciate the importance of these four words, and hardly any one\ndoubts that they know the part played in their lives by the things\nwhich these words represent.\n\nIf we wish to know ourselves many subjects of all kinds must be studied\nsimultaneously; religion and religions; the opinions of the ancients\nand of our contemporaries; men as they now are and as they were. Renan\nhas well characterised primitive men in attributing to them \u201ca special\nfeeling for nature which enabled them, with wonderful delicacy and\naccuracy, of which we have no conception, to perceive the qualities\nwhich furnished names; and they saw innumerable things at once.\u201d\n\nThe Hindoos, who were writers many centuries before our present era,\nmust have inherited from their primitive ancestors this special feeling\nfor nature, or they would not have composed those verses in the 129th\nhymn: \u201cEverything in the beginning was hidden in gloom--the germ which\nwas covered by the husk was brought forth by the power of heat. On\nthis germ rested love, the spring of the mind, yes, and the poets,\nin meditating thereon, discovered in their souls the tie between the\nthings created and the things uncreated.--This spark, comes it from the\nearth, piercing all, penetrating into all, or comes it from heaven?\u201d\n\nThese passages have something modern in them; they might have been\nwritten now when science seeks to fuse heaven and earth, which was not\ndone formerly.\n\nThe cord does not cease to vibrate. The persistence of this phenomenon\nhas different comments made on it. \u201cIt is the effect of heredity,\u201d says\nmodern science; \u201cit is a contemporaneous effect of the fall,\u201d says\ntheology. Perhaps the one and the other make of the human race one\nunique being which continues through the ages.\n\nIt is as though time had no existence for humanity. Space also\napparently does not count for much with the race. If the singular\nfacts are true which we hear, two persons separated by a great\ndistance have the same thoughts at the same instant; not the universal\nthought naturally inherent in the human mind, but entirely personal.\nHas sympathy--which is as essentially human as it is mysterious--a\nrelationship with electricity, which is a distinctly physical\nphenomenon? On those who reject such a supposition should fail the\nburden of finding another.\n\nEach of us sees a landscape according to our sight; to the\nshort-sighted (and this is a normal condition) the landscape appears\nsimple; trees here, there houses and streets, men walking; but with\nstrong glasses, as is well known, it is possible to see many more\nthings. Again, the short-sighted can distinguish only the colour, veins\nand serrated edge of a leaf, but if this were placed under a microscope\nthey would see a surface of green glittering with light, and strewn\nwith gold and diamonds.\n\nIf there are two ways of looking at a leaf, there are at least three of\nlooking at life; it can be seen from its pleasant or painful side, this\nis to feel that we live only; then we can grasp it with regard to the\nduties it imposes on us. This is a right point of view, but it shows\none side only; or we may consider it as science represents it, that is\nits moral, rational, and religious aspect combined.\n\nThe more we observe and the more we reflect on what we observe, so\nmuch the more do we exercise our faculty of understanding things; and\naccording as this faculty approaches or withdraws from the normal type,\nso it will correspond either with the leaf seen by the naked eye or\nwith it as seen under the microscope.\n\n\nOPPOSITION\n\nThere are two kinds of opposition. Very often we come upon a true\nthought in a book which shocks us because for the moment we do not\nrecognise its truth. We also forget that all truths can be viewed at\nvarious angles; or we do not understand a truth because it is expressed\nin a novel way.\n\nA manual treating of physics will best explain the reason of our\nfalse impression. When a ray of light is transmitted from one medium\nto another of different density, as from air to water, a change of\ndirection is impressed on the ray, making the straight line appear\nbroken; this change of direction is called _refraction_. Cardinal\nNewman made a very true observation on this subject. \u201cIf an idea is\npresented unexpectedly to us,\u201d he said, \u201cclothed in words to which\nwe are unaccustomed, it is sufficient to cause us to speak of it as\nerroneous; this illusion is only a simple effect of the _refraction of\nwords_; that is to say, that in the mind of the writer of this truth\nwhich startles us, the idea followed a straight line, but in our mind\nit became broken.\u201d\n\nThe second kind of opposition is of a different nature. It is amusing\nto watch two individuals who are taking opposite sides in a heated\ndiscussion concerning some philosopher. \u201cWhat I tell you is correct;\nA, who is a great scholar, says so.\u201d \u201cYes, but I also know a great\nscholar, B, and he says just the contrary.\u201d\n\nThere seems to be a charm in controversy which few persons can resist;\nthey ignore what you say, and bluntly tell you that you are in the\nwrong.\n\n\nABSTRACTION, INATTENTION\n\nNot only is abstraction fatal to study, but it often plays us sorry\ntricks apart from our occupations. Sometimes a bright idea comes into\nour mind, but touching only the surface; if by inattention or idleness\nwe do not fix it firmly in our memory by clothing it in suitable words,\nit is a hundred to one that it is not irrevocably lost to us. It is not\nmore possible to arrest its flight than to fasten a placard to the wall\nwithout nails or gum.\n\nIt is difficult to note with exactness the amount of inattention which\nso frequently accompanies the act of opening a serious book even with\nthe fixed intention of reading it.\n\nI once surprised myself in a flagrant act of inattention. I was staying\nwith a friend, and took up Pascal\u2019s _Pens\u00e9es_, which I had not read\nfor some time. The edition was not the same as the one I had at home.\nWhilst turning over the leaves I said to myself occasionally, \u201cHow\nthe style has changed--this is not clear--this observation is very\nshallow\u201d; and so I went on, astonished at not being able to admire\nthis celebrated work as I had formerly done. Suddenly I came upon this\nphrase, \u201cMonsieur Pascal confond tout cela.\u201d What was my humiliation\nto discover that in this edition \u201cles Pens\u00e9es de Pascal\u201d were followed\nby \u201cles Pens\u00e9es de Nicole.\u201d I had passed from the one to the other\nwithout noticing it. But what could have given rise to this impression\nof Nicole\u2019s? I turned back a few pages, and read: \u201cA book has just\nappeared which is perhaps the most useful that could be placed in the\nhands of princes; it is a selection of the \u2018Pens\u00e9es de Pascal.\u2019 I do\nnot say that all are equally good ... I find amongst them many well\npolished stones and fit to adorn a great building; but the remainder\nappeared to be mixed material, for which I can hardly suppose that M.\nPascal could find a use.... There are even certain sentiments which\nhardly appear to be exact, and are like scattered thoughts thrown\nout at random, which are written only that they may afterwards be\nexamined with more care and attention. Monsieur Pascal supposes that\nennui comes from that which we see in ourselves--from what we think of\nourselves. That assertion is perhaps more subtle than solid. Thousands\nof persons experience ennui without thinking of themselves at all; they\nfeel weariness not from what they think, but because they do not think\nenough.... M. Pascal confond tout cela.\u201d Upon my word, I felt consoled\nfor my lapse into inattention; to this fault I owe my acquaintance with\nM. Nicole\u2019s acute remark: \u201cMen do not feel weariness from what they\nthink, but because they do not think enough.\u201d\n\n\nSPEECH\n\nWhen the members of the human family began to use the _clamor\nconcomitans_ which accompanied their occupations, as _clamor\nsignificans_, these simple materials formed the roots which indicated\nsuch and such acts, and produced verbal and nominatival bases composed\nof predicative and demonstrative elements. During the course of ages\nthe first became conjugated and the second were declined. By means of\nadding the successive acts together, and retaining them united in the\nmind, or subtracting in several directions, our ancestors diversified\nthe meaning of all the primitive roots; they formed collective and\nabstract nouns in their simplest form by combination. The process never\nvaried; thus the thought progressed from the first root to the last\nconcept. But the first word ever pronounced by a human creature was\na true proposition, and our last literary chef-d\u2019\u0153uvre consists of a\nseries of propositions.\n\nDescartes\u2019 brief phrase \u201cCogito, ergo sum\u201d may be better rendered and\nstill more briefly by one word. The Greek word Logos, meaning word and\nthought combined, had originally, as I have already remarked, the two\nmeanings of assembling and combining. \u201cCogito\u201d = I think, which is the\nshort for co-agito = I assemble. The act of assembling presupposes\nthat of separating, seeing that it is impossible to combine two or more\nthings without at the same time separating them from other things. The\nchild who is taught the first rules of arithmetic adds and subtracts,\nwhich can only be done by combining and separating. However little\nintelligence he may have, his task does not present great difficulties\nto him; and yet the most abstruse mathematical problem consists in\nadding and subtracting, and the most astounding calculations of Newton,\nand the most profound mathematical speculations of Kant, are but the\nresults of addition and subtraction, of combining and separating.\n\nIn the course of time all that fills our dictionaries and our\ngrammars was developed and achieved, and nothing remained for poets\nand philosophers to do but to add to and deduce from the materials\nwhich they had inherited or had themselves acquired as the result of\ntheir own efforts; and however powerful the imagination of poets may\nbe, and however subtle the reasoning of philosophers, the materials\nwhich both use to form their monuments are exactly the same, and\nthese are nothing but the words derived from roots and collected in\ndictionaries. Most decidedly Michael Angelo was something more than a\nmason or bricklayer, but yet the basilica of St Peter\u2019s is made only\nof stones and bricks and a little cement, which, when brought down to\nits final constituents, is nothing but pulverised stone. Most decidedly\none of Shakespeare\u2019s plays is possessed of other qualities than a\nmere assemblage of the letters of the alphabet arranged in a certain\norder, but the materials of which the plays are formed were drawn from\nthe inexhaustible supply of words accumulated during thousands of\nyears, and which contain no single particle of gold or silver that is\nnot found in the thousand roots of our language and the 121 concepts\nconceived in our minds.\n\nAmongst the men who know how to think, many are astonished that the\nso-called civilised portion of humanity should have advanced so little,\nthere is nothing astonishing in this; let us consider the point, and\nremember that we are only now on the morrow of the day when we were\nstill immature humanity, and in which the human character, with its\ngerms of language and of thought, only began to be visible in us. The\nuniverse obeys the unchangeable law which we name Divine Providence;\nan irresistible law which compels matter to make certain predetermined\nmovements, and the mind to tend towards perfection; man knows that he\nis morally free, and not necessarily subject to animal impulses.\n\nMan\u2019s moral liberty being conceded, he uses it as he will; at times he\nseeks and finds opportunities for resisting the moral law; man, even\nthe nominal Christian, stifles the spirit\u2019s higher voice and compels\nhimself to listen to the lower voice of the flesh. Pascal said plainly:\n\u201cAccording to the carnal Christian the Messiah has come to dispense us\nfrom the necessity of loving God by providing sacraments which act as\ncharms apart from our co-operation,\u201d and our hatred and our injustice\ncontinue--under cover of a scrupulous observance of rites--to infect\nthe world as well as ourselves. He spoke truly, and saw clearly, who\nfirst said: \u201cEvery being tends to preserve its existence.\u201d With regard\nto the man of whom Pascal speaks, this means to follow incessantly his\nevil practices. But, happily, there exist other men who feel that,\nbesides oxygen and pleasure, they must also absorb science and true\nprosperity for their well-being.\n\nWe read in the book of Ecclesiasticus: \u201cIn every good work trust thine\nown soul\u201d (Ecclesiasticus xxxii. 23). Yes, let us believe in our own\nsoul, which is the true Ego, and it will bid us live. I am far from\nsharing Pascal\u2019s opinion, which is, that the Ego always merits contempt.\n\nScience, after having noted and counted the exact number of vibrations\nof all kinds which from all parts affect us, at a certain point\nceases to have the power to calculate further, and recognises that\nbeyond and above all vibrations there exists that which can neither\nbe named nor counted. In my opinion that which is the best part of\nscience is that it knows its limitations; with some people it is a well\nknown experience that when they have once grasped the fact that their\ninability rightly to comprehend something they desire to know arises\nfrom an immutable decree, they become at once imbued with a profound\nquiescence, closely allied to certainty.\n\nAfter which there is but one step left to human reason, to forsake that\nreason which is but temporary, and to lose oneself in that which has\nneither beginning nor end. This last step is an act of faith. Someone,\nwho does not think sufficiently, calls this a leap in the dark, but for\nhim who accomplishes it this darkness becomes transparent as crystal.\n\n\u201cYes,\u201d these persons exclaim, \u201cand such was Kant\u2019s last act.\u201d It would\nbe more correct to say Kant ended as he began, by an act of reason,\nsince he drew the logical conclusion of what he had learnt.\n\n\nR\u00c9SUM\u00c9\n\nThe evolution of the human race will not become clear to us unless we\nremember that a time existed when man was without language and without\nreason.\n\nDuring this obscure period which we name the dawn of humanity, the\nmaterial wants and their satisfaction, comprised the whole being of\nman, as it does that of the animal. With man commenced the line of\nindividuals leading to the higher order of social life. It is possible\nthat the feeling of being one of many was one of the first to awake\nin man, since it was owing to the support afforded him by his fellows\nthat he obtained what he needed; he was also conscious of family ties,\nthis emotion and sentiment was the cradle of all his best qualities;\nafterwards would come the attractions of race; this feeling might\nso dominate the individual as to cause him to forget that he was a\nseparate entity; then by a concurrence of circumstances difficult to\ndefine, national feelings were developed from the salient features of\nthe race, and national languages separated themselves from the central\nsource. The knowledge of being a portion of humanity arrived at a much\nlater period; he is still at this present time a part of a feeble few,\nand he can be summed up in the well-known sentence, of which the first\nwords are, \u201cHomo sum.\u201d If we consider the meaning of this classical\nquotation it is very striking.\n\nWe often mention the pre-historic times, but we seldom ask ourselves at\nwhat date history can have begun. With the first heap of stones piled\nup by the men of a certain tribe at the burial of a venerated chief,\nhistory commenced; this heap became the point at which the past touched\nthe future, a visible link in the interminable chain of human thought.\n\nAt the origin of all this mental activity we find an inspiration--a\npoetical fiat. It was a historical moment--no other similar to it has\never been, before or since--when the first group of human creatures\nacclaimed with inarticulate cries their first cavern, or the first den\ndug by themselves. At a much later date when man, looking up at the\nvault of heaven--his curiosity aroused--wished to know what were the\nbrilliant things he saw moving high above him, was he not impelled by\nthe feeling of the presence of a Being hitherto unknown, and to whom\nhe paid unconscious homage by giving Him a name? If the feeling had\nnot made itself felt simultaneously with the awakened attention caused\nby the appearance of the sky, the electric spark would not have burst\nforth.\n\nAt a later date still to what can we attribute the union of pure\nthought and beating hearts but to the first definite perception of the\nDivine breath, and the conception of an invisible yet longed for God,\nwhose name descended from generation to generation down to ourselves?\nAristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Kant, and Max M\u00fcller, have\nall described this ascension of the reason from the first thought which\ncontained the germ of the idea, up to God Himself.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe thus arrive at a high level though starting from low ground; we\nshould be higher still, but that we are retarded equally by lack of\nspeech and of thought. As long as we fondly imagine that in possessing\na word we are also masters of the thought attached to it, and that\nto penetrate to the heart of a thought is nothing but a linguistic\nexercise, or an intellectual gymnastic feat, we shall not use the sole\nmethod with which we are supplied, of growing morally, rationally, and\nreligiously.\n\nWe form ideas of many things, but we know them only partially and\ndisjointedly; sciences which we have learnt possess unity, since with\ngrammar is connected synthesis, and with mathematics, algebra; (this\nword algebra is of Arab origin, \u201cal djabroun,\u201d and means the reduction\nof dislocated members), is it possible that we--the creators of these\nsciences--should be destined to wander around and away from unity, and\nnever attain it?\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is time to end this study; I suspect that I am not the only one\nof this opinion. It is possible that amongst my readers--if I have\nany--some may already have found means of shortening it for themselves;\nthey will perhaps turn over the pages, read a few, and say, \u201cHow\ntedious the old pedant is,\u201d then shut the book and not open it again.\n\nThis would be a pity in my opinion; they should read a little more.\n\nNo philosophical work can be written without the words _perceive_\nand _conceive_ appearing very frequently in it. The Latin language\npossesses the word \u201ccapio,\u201d which means to seize something with the\nhand; only convincing facts can lead us to believe that these terms\nto _perceive_ and to _conceive_ are derived from _capio_; thus the\nword expressing the well-known physical movement of taking something\nwith the hand was the origin of the two words _percept_ and _concept_,\nwithout which no philosophical idea could take shape or be developed in\nus.\n\nThe space which separates the word _capio_ from _percept_ and _concept_\nincludes neither more nor less than the entire evolution of man; that\nis, our own history.\n\nThat of which we think so little is in reality the indelible sign\nimpressed once for all on man, that which alone distinguishes him\nfrom the animals, and which may yet help to form in man an excellence\nhitherto unknown to us; this distinguishing mark is thought and speech.\n\nWe are men--but has the type of the \u201cgenus homo\u201d been realised? Is it\nimpossible?\n\nIt has been undoubtedly proved that man is free in certain directions,\nand not in others; happily he is not free not to be a man.\n\nTHE END\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[136] There is _one_ in the way in which St Paul speaks: \u201cThere is one\nbody, and one spirit, even as also ye were called in one hope of your\ncalling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all,\nwho is over all, and through all, and in all.\u201d\n\n[137] As Savonarola said: \u201cYes, from the Church militant, but not from\nthe Church in Heaven,\u201d in answer to his excommunication.\n\n * * * * *\n\n PRINTED BY\n TURNBULL AND SPEARS,\n EDINBURGH\n\n * * * * *\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes:\n\nFootnotes have been moved to the end of each chapter and relabeled\nconsecutively through the document.\n\nPunctuation has been made consistent.\n\nVariations in spelling and hyphenation were retained as they appear in\nthe original publication, except that obvious typographical errors have\nbeen corrected.\n\nThe following changes were made:\n\np. 23: Llamas changed to Lamas (the Lamas of)\n\np. 180: Lines below S and s have been standardized to acute accents\n(\u015araddh\u00e2, \u015braddadhau, \u015braddhitam)","title":"The Origin of Thought and Speech","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":97786}