{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_65041/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_65041","id":"gutenberg_65041","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65041","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Biology","Phrenology"],"text":"PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.\n\n\n\n\n                          PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.\n\n                             BY P. FLOURENS,\n     MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, PERPETUAL SECRETARY OF THE ROYAL\n        ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (INSTITUTE OF FRANCE), MEMBER OF THE\n      ROYAL SOCIETIES OF LONDON AND EDINBURG, OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY\n      OF SCIENCES OF STOCKHOLM, OF MUNICH, AND OF TURIN, ETC. ETC.\n       PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY AT THE NATURAL HISTORY\n                            MUSEUM AT PARIS.\n\n                \u201cJ\u2019ai un sentiment clair de ma libert\u00e9.\u201d\n\n                    BOSSUET, TRAIT\u00c9 DU LIBRE ARBITRE.\n\n             Translated from the Second Edition of 1845, by\n                      CHARLES DE LUCENA MEIGS, M.D.\n                    MEMB. AMER. PHIL. SOC. ETC. ETC.\n\n                              PHILADELPHIA:\n                            HOGAN & THOMPSON.\n                                  1846.\n\n         ENTERED ACCORDING TO ACT OF CONGRESS, IN THE YEAR 1845,\n                       BY CHARLES D. MEIGS, M. D.\n       IN THE CLERK\u2019S OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN\n                        DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.\n\n\n\n\nTO DR. JAMES JACKSON, OF BOSTON.\n\n\nMY DEAR SIR:\n\nPerhaps I have taken too great a liberty in sending to you in this public\nmanner, and in praying you to accept a copy of M. Flourens\u2019 ingenious\nwork. I have a very sincere desire that you should read the Inquiry;\nfor I feel sure, that if you approve of it, the studious portion of our\ncountrymen who may peruse it, will concur in the opinion of a gentleman\nso justly distinguished as yourself in every good word and work, and\nso capable of judging as to the salutary or evil tendency of the\nproductions of our teeming press.\n\nInasmuch as many of our countrymen have heretofore felt, and many do\nnow feel, desirous to know the truth as to the question of the multiple\nnature of the human mind, I have here translated the Examination, in\norder that they might have an opportunity to learn what is thought of\nGall\u2019s doctrines by one of the best and most precise thinkers in Europe.\n\nProfessor Flourens, by his writings on the brain and nervous system, by\nhis courses of lectures at the Jardin des Plantes, by numerous writings\non various scientific subjects, by his position in the Institute, has\nacquired a place among the literary and scientific celebrities of the\npresent age. The amiable and elegant manners, and the fine disposition of\nthis distinguished character, coincide with his acknowledged learning,\nand exactness, and zeal, to accumulate upon him the public respect and\nesteem. It is therefore with great confidence that I present to you this\ncopy of his criticism upon Phrenology, since I suppose that every writing\nof so good a man might prove acceptable to you, and to the studious\nportion of our countrymen generally.\n\nI invoke your approbation of what I cannot but deem a masterly criticism\nof the doctrines of Gall. So highly have I appreciated it, that I cannot\nreadily suppose it possible to rise from its perusal, without being\nconvinced that Gall was wholly mistaken in his views of the human mind;\nand of course, that all the cranioscopists, mesmerizers, and diviners,\nwho have followed his track, or risen up on the basis of his opinions,\nare equally in error.\n\nIn order to have a just view of human responsibility, it is indispensable\nto entertain the justest notions of the nature of the human mind. If\nPhrenology _be an unsubstantial hypothesis_, no phrenologist is fit\nto be a juror, a judge, or a legislator: for since all human law\u2014the\nwhole social compact\u2014and indeed all divine law, as relative to human\npropensities and actions\u2014is founded on some real nature of the soul\nand mind, there is risk that manifestly erroneous conceptions of the\nfreewill, of the conscience, of the judgment, and the perceptive powers,\n&c. may mislead the juror, the judge, and the legislator, in their vote,\ntheir opinion, and their notion of rights and wrongs.\n\nIf I am correct in entertaining these apprehensions as to the influence\nof false metaphysics on the public characters I have enumerated, there is\nabundant cause to rejoice when a blow is struck, like that pulverizing\nblow which is given in this work, to so considerable an error. There are\nthousands among the young and ardent and curious of our countrymen and\ncountrywomen, whose minds may be likewise led astray from the truth; but\nif it be mischievous for the judge and the juror and the legislator\nto entertain erroneous views upon the nature of the understanding, the\nmind, or the soul, it is equally to be deprecated where the error is sown\nbroadcast in the land.\n\nTares, if not in themselves poisonous, serve at best to choke up the\nuseful or beautiful plants that ought to be cultivated in the fields of\nscience or morals; but you will find that M. Flourens regards them as\npoisons.\n\nHas not M. Flourens clearly refuted the phrenologists? and has he not, in\ndoing so, performed a useful and an acceptable service?\n\nI pray you to believe that I am, with the most grateful respect and the\nsincerest esteem,\n\n                   Your obliged and faithful servant,\n\n                                                        CHARLES D. MEIGS.\n\nPHILADELPHIA, Dec. 10, 1845.\n\n\n\n\nTO THE MEMORY OF DESCARTES.\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR\u2019S PREFACE.\n\n\nHaving been a witness to the progress of phrenology, I was led to the\ncomposition of the following treatise.\n\nEach succeeding age has a philosophy of its own.\n\nThe seventeenth century recovered from the philosophy of Descartes; the\neighteenth recovered from that of Locke and Condillac: is the nineteenth\nto recover from that of Gall?\n\nThis is a really important question.\n\nI propose, in this work, to examine phrenology as it appears in the\nwritings of Gall, of Spurzheim, and of Broussais.\n\nMy wish is to be brief. There is, however, one great secret in the art of\nbeing brief: it is to be clear.\n\nI frequently quote Descartes: I even go further; for I dedicate my work\nto his memory. I am writing in opposition to a bad philosophy, while I am\nendeavouring to recall a sound one.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n         I. Of Gall.\u2014Of his doctrine in general                 17\n\n        II. Of Gall.\u2014Of the faculties                           47\n\n       III. Of Gall.\u2014The organs                                 59\n\n        IV. Of Spurzheim                                        96\n\n         V. Of Broussais                                       115\n\n        VI. Broussais\u2019s Psycology                              121\n\n       VII. Broussais\u2019s Physiology                             125\n\n      VIII. Of Gall                                            127\n\n    Note I. Anatomical relations supposed by Gall to exist\n              between the organs of the external senses and\n              the organs of the intellectual faculties         131\n\n        II. Difference between instinct and understanding      133\n\n       III. Gall as an observer                                137\n\n        IV. The animal spirits                                 139\n\n         V. Exaggeration of Broussais, even in phrenology      140\n\n        VI. Contractility of Broussais                         142\n\n       VII. Real labours of Gall as to the brain               143\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nOF GALL.\n\nOF HIS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL.\n\n\nThe great work in which Gall sets forth his doctrine is well known.[1]\nThat work shall serve as the groundwork of my examination. I shall\nexamine in succession each of the questions studied by the author; merely\nintroducing some slight changes in the order in which they are arranged.\n\nThe entire doctrine of Gall is contained in two fundamental propositions,\nof which the first is, that understanding resides exclusively in the\nbrain, and the second, that each particular faculty of the understanding\nis provided in the brain with an organ proper to itself.\n\nNow, of these two propositions, there is certainly nothing new in the\nfirst one, and perhaps nothing true in the second one.\n\nLet us commence our examination with the first proposition.\n\nI say that in the first proposition, namely, that the brain is the\nexclusive seat of the understanding, there is nothing new. Gall himself\nadmits this to be the case.\n\n\u201cFor a long time,\u201d says he, \u201cboth philosophers and physiologists, as\nwell as physicians, have contended that the brain is the organ of the\nsoul.\u201d[2] The opinion that the brain, (as a whole, or such and such\nparts of the brain considered separately,) is the seat of the soul,\nis, in fact, as old as learning itself. Descartes placed the soul in\nthe _pineal gland_, Willis in the _corpora striata_, Lapeyronie in the\n_corpus callosum_, &c. &c.\n\nAs to the more recent authorities, Gall quotes S\u0153mmerring, who says\nprecisely that, \u201cthe brain is the exclusive instrument of all sensation,\nall thought, and all will,\u201d[3] &c. He quotes Haller, who proves (proves\nis the very expression made use of by Gall himself,) that \u201csensation does\nnot take place at the point where the object touches the nerve, the point\nwhere the impression is made, but in the brain.\u201d[4] He might have quoted\nmany other authorities to the same effect.\n\nWere not Cabanis\u2019s writings anterior to the time of Gall? and did not\nhe say, \u201cIn order to obtain a just idea of those operations whose result\nis thought, the brain must be considered as a peculiar organ designed to\nproduce it, just as the stomach and the bowels are designed to produce\ndigestion, the liver to secrete the bile,\u201d &c.?[5] a proposition so\nextravagant as to become almost ridiculous, but which is in truth the\nvery proposition of Gall himself, except as to some exaggeration in the\nterms employed.\n\nAntecedently to the time of Gall, both S\u0153mmerring and Cuvier, in the\ncomparative anatomy of the various classes of animals, had investigated\nthe ratio existing between the development of the encephalon and that\nof the intellectual power. The following remarkable phrase is from the\npen of Cuvier: \u201cThe proportion of the brain to the medulla oblongata, a\nproportion which is greater in man than in all other animals, is a very\ngood index of the perfection of the creature\u2019s intelligence, because\nit is the best index of the preeminence of the organs of reflection\nabove the organs of the external senses.\u201d[6] And this other still more\nremarkable phrase: \u201cIn animals the intelligence appears to be greater in\nproportion as the volume of the hemispheres is greater.\u201d[7]\n\nGall, in an especial manner, contends against the assertion of Bichat,\nwho remarks that \u201cThe influence of the passions is exerted invariably\nupon the organic life, and not upon the animal life; all the signs that\ncharacterise them are referable to the former and not to the latter.\nGestures, which are the mute exponents of the sentiments and the\nunderstanding, afford a remarkable proof of this truth. When we wish\nto signify something relative to the memory, the imagination, to our\nperception, to the judgment, &c. the hand moves involuntarily towards\nthe head: if we wish to express love, joy, grief, hatred, it is directed\ntowards the region of the heart, the stomach, or the bowels.\u201d[8]\n\nDoubtless, there is much that might be criticised in the foregoing words\nof Bichat; nevertheless, to say that the passions expend their influences\nupon the organic life, is not the same thing as to say that they reside\nor exist there. Bichat had already remarked, that \u201cEvery species of\nsensation has its centre in the brain, for sensation always supposes both\nimpression and perception.\u201d[9] Furthermore, regarding this distinction,\n(which as yet has not been drawn with sufficient clearness,) between the\nparts that are the seats of the passions, and the parts that are affected\nby their action, Gall might have found in Descartes the following\nremark, which is not less judicious than acute.\n\n\u201cAlthough,\u201d says he, writing to Leroy, \u201cthe spirits that move the\nmuscles come from the brain, we must, nevertheless, assign as seats of\nthe passions, the places that are most considerably affected by them;\nhence, I say, the principal seat of the passions, as far as they relate\nto the body, is the heart, because it is the heart that is most sensibly\naffected by them; but their place is in the brain, in as far as they\naffect the soul, for the soul cannot suffer immediately, otherwise than\nthrough the brain.\u201d[10]\n\nAs I am quoting Descartes, who, I ask, more clearly than Descartes has\nperceived that the soul can have only a very circumscribed seat in the\neconomy, and that that circumscribed seat is the brain itself?\n\n\u201cWe know,\u201d says he, \u201cthat, properly speaking, it is not inasmuch as the\nsoul is in the members that serve as organs to the exterior senses, that\nthe soul feels, but inasmuch as she is in the brain, where she exercises\nthe faculty denominated common sense.\u201d[11]\n\nHe elsewhere observes: \u201cSurprise is expressed because I do not recognise\nany other point of sensation except that which exists in the brain; but\nall physicians and surgeons will, I hope, assist me in proving this\npoint, for they are aware of the common fact that a person who has been\nsubjected to amputation of a limb, continues to feel pain in a part that\nhe no longer possesses.\u201d[12]\n\nHere then, according to Descartes, we find that the soul is situated,\nthat is to say, _feels_ in the brain, and only in the brain. The\nfollowing passage shows with what precision he excluded even the\nexternal senses from any participation with the functions of the soul.\n\n\u201cI have shown,\u201d says he, \u201cthat size, distance, and form are perceived\nonly by the reason; and that, by deducing them the one from the\nother.\u201d[13]\n\n\u201cI cannot agree with the assertion that this error (the error caused\nby the bent appearance of a stick partly plunged into water,) is not\ncorrected by the understanding but by the touch; for, although the sense\nin question makes us judge that the stick is straight, yet that cannot\ncorrect the error of vision; but furthermore, it is requisite that reason\nshould teach us to confide, in this case, rather to our judgment after\ntouching, than to the judgment that we come to after using our eyes; but\nthis reason cannot be attributed to the sense, but to the understanding\nalone; and in this very example, it is the understanding that corrects\nthe error of the sense.\u201d[14]\n\nThe brain, then, is the exclusive seat of the soul; and all sensation,\neven those operations that appear to depend upon the simple external\nsense, is function of the soul.\n\nGall falls back upon Condillac, who, much less rigorous in this\nparticular than Descartes, says, that \u201call our faculties proceed from\nthe senses.\u201d[15] But when Condillac speaks thus, he evidently speaks\nby ellipsis, for he immediately adds these words: \u201cThe senses are only\noccasional causes. They do not feel; it is the soul that alone feels,\nthrough the medium of the organs.\u201d[16]\n\nNow, if it be the _soul_ only that feels, _\u00e0 fortiori_, it is the soul\nonly that _remembers_, that _judges_, that _imagines_, &c. _Memory_,\n_judgment_, _imagination_, &c., in a word, all our faculties, are\ntherefore of the soul, and therefore come from the soul, and not from the\nsenses.\n\nThere is no philosopher who has exaggerated more than Helvetius the\ninfluence of the senses upon the intelligence. But Helvetius says, \u201cIn\nwhatsoever manner we interrogate experience, she always answers that any\ngreater or lesser superiority of mind is independent of any greater or\nlesser perfection of the senses.\u201d[17]\n\nBut I leave Helvetius and Condillac, and I return to Descartes, to\nWillis, to Lapeyronie, to Haller, S\u0153mmerring, Cuvier, &c. They all\nperceived and all asserted that the brain is the seat of the soul,\nand that it is so to the exclusion of the senses. Therefore, the\nproposition that the brain is the exclusive seat of the soul is not a\nnew proposition, and hence does not originate with Gall. It belonged to\nscience before it appeared in his Doctrine. The merit of Gall, and it is\nby no means a slender merit, consists in his having understood better\nthan any of his predecessors the whole of its importance, and in having\ndevoted himself to its demonstration. It existed in science before Gall\nappeared\u2014it may be said to reign there ever since his appearance. Taking\neach particular sense, he excluded them all, one after another, from\nall immediate participation in the functions of the understanding.[18]\nFar from being developed in the direct ratio of the intellection, most\nof them are developed in an inverse ratio. Taste and smell are more\ndeveloped in the quadruped than in man. Sight and hearing are more so\nin the bird than in the quadruped. The brain alone is in all classes\ndeveloped in the ratio of the understanding. The loss of a sense does\nnot lead to the loss of the intelligence. The understanding survives the\nloss of sight and hearing. It might survive the loss of all the senses.\nTo interrupt the communication between the sense and the brain, is enough\nto insure the loss of the sense. The mere compression of the brain, which\nabolishes the intellection, abolishes all the senses. Far, therefore,\nfrom being organs of the intelligence, the organs of the senses are not\neven organs of the senses, they do not even exercise their functions as\norgans of the senses, except through the medium of the intelligence, and\nthis intelligence resides only in the brain.\n\nThe brain alone, therefore, is the organ of the soul;\u2014is it the whole\nbrain\u2014the brain taken _en masse_? Gall thought so, and Spurzheim followed\nGall\u2019s opinion; and all the phrenologists who have come after them have\nfollowed the examples of Gall and Spurzheim.\n\nYet, after all, it amounts to nothing. If we deprive an animal of its\ncerebellum, it loses only its locomotive action. If we deprive it of\nits tubercula quadrigemina, it loses its sight only; if we destroy its\nmedulla oblongata, it loses its respiratory movements, and in consequence\nthereof, its life.[19] Neither of these parts, therefore, that is to say,\nthe cerebellum, the tubercula quadrigemina, and the medulla oblongata, is\nthe organ of the understanding.\n\nThe brain, properly so called, is so, and it alone. If we remove from an\nanimal the brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres, it immediately\nloses its understanding, and loses nothing but its understanding.[20]\n\nThe brain, en masse, the _encephalon_, is then a multiple organ; and\nthis multiple organ consists of four particular organs: the cerebellum,\nthe seat of the principle that regulates the movements of locomotion; the\ntubercula quadrigemina, seats of the principle that regulates the sense\nof sight; the medulla oblongata, in which resides the principle that\ndetermines the respiratory motions; and the brain proper, the seat, and\nthe exclusive seat of the intelligence.[21]\n\nTherefore, when the phrenologists promiscuously place the intellectual\nand moral faculties in the brain, considered en masse, they deceive\nthemselves. Neither the cerebellum, the quadrigeminal tubercles, nor\nthe medulla oblongata can be regarded as seats of these faculties. All\nthese faculties dwell solely in the brain, properly so called, or the\nhemispheres.\n\nThe question as to the precise seat of the intelligence, has undergone a\ngreat change since the time of Gall. Gall believed that the intelligence\nwas seated indifferently in the whole encephalon, and it has been proved\nthat it resides only in the hemispheres.\n\nFurther, it is not the encephalon taken en masse that is developed in\nthe ratio of the intelligence of the creature, but the hemispheres.\nThe mammifera are the animals most highly endowed with intelligence;\nthey have, other things being equal, the most voluminous hemispheres.\nBirds are the animals most highly endowed with power of motion; their\ncerebellum is, other things being equal, the largest. Reptiles are the\nmost torpid and apathetic of animals; they have the smallest brain, &c.\n\nEvery thing concurs then to prove, that the encephalon, in mass, is a\nmultiple organ with multiple functions, consisting of different parts, of\nwhich some are destined to subserve the locomotive motions, others the\nmotions of the respiration, &c., while one single one, the brain proper,\nis designed for the purposes of the intellection.\n\nThis being conceded, it is evident that the entire brain cannot be\ndivided, as the phrenologists divide it, into a number of small organs,\neach of which is the seat of a distinct intellectual faculty; for\nthe entire brain does not serve the purposes of what is called the\nintelligence. The hemispheres alone are the seats of the intellectual\npower; and consequently, the question as to whether the organ, the seat\nof the intelligence may be divided into several distinct organs, is a\nquestion relative solely to the uses and powers of the hemispheres.\n\nGall avers, and this is the second fundamental proposition of his\ndoctrine, that the brain is divided into several organs, each one of\nwhich lodges a particular faculty of the soul. By the word _brain_, he\nunderstood the _whole brain_, and he thus deceived himself. Let us reduce\nthe application of his proposition to the hemispheres alone, and we\nshall see that he has deceived himself again.\n\nIt has been shown by my late experiments, that we may cut away, either\nin front, or behind, or above, or on one side, a very considerable slice\nof the hemisphere of the brain, without destroying the intelligence.\nHence it appears, that quite a restricted portion of the hemispheres may\nsuffice for the purposes of intellection in an animal.[22]\n\nOn the other hand, in proportion as these reductions by slicing away the\nhemispheres are continued, the intelligence becomes enfeebled, and grows\ngradually less; and certain limits being passed, is wholly extinguished.\nHence it appears, that the cerebral hemispheres concur, by their whole\nmass, in the full and entire exercise of the intelligence.[23]\n\nIn fine, as soon as one sensation is lost, all sensation is lost; when\none faculty disappears, all the faculties disappear. There are not,\ntherefore, different seats for the different faculties, nor for the\ndifferent sensations. The faculty of feeling, of judging, of willing any\nthing, resides in the same place as the faculty of feeling, judging, or\nwilling any other thing, and consequently this faculty, essentially a\nunit, resides essentially in a single organ.[24]\n\nThe understanding is, therefore, a unit.\n\nAccording to Gall, there are as many particular kinds of intellect as\nthere are distinct faculties of the mind. According to him, each faculty\nhas its perception, its memory, its judgment, will, &c., that is to say,\nall the attributes of the understanding, properly so called.[25]\n\n\u201cAll the intellectual faculties,\u201d says he, \u201care endowed with the\nperceptive faculty, with attention, recollection, memory, judgment, and\nimagination.\u201d[26]\n\nThus each faculty perceives, remembers, judges, imagines, compares,\ncreates; but these are trifles\u2014for each faculty _reasons_. \u201cWhenever,\u201d\nsays Gall, \u201ca faculty compares and judges of the relations of analogous\nor different ideas, there is an act of comparison, there is an act of\njudgment: a sequence of comparisons and judgments constitutes reasoning,\u201d\n&c.[27]\n\nTherefore, each and every faculty is an understanding by itself, and Gall\nsays so expressly. \u201cThere are,\u201d says he, \u201cas many different kinds of\nintellect or understanding as there are distinct faculties.\u201d[28] \u201cEach\ndistinct faculty,\u201d says he, further, \u201cis intellect or understanding\u2014each\n_individual intelligence_ (the words are precise) has its proper\norgan.\u201d[29]\n\nBut, admitting all these _kinds of intellects_, all these _individual\nunderstandings_, where are we to seek for the General Intelligence, the\nunderstanding, properly so called? It must, as you may please, be either\nan _attribute_ of each faculty,[30] or the _collective expression_ of\nall the faculties, or even the mere simple _result_ of their common and\nsimultaneous action;[31] in one word, it cannot be that positive and\nsingle faculty which we understand, conceive of, and feel in ourselves,\nwhen we pronounce the word _soul_ or _understanding_.\n\nNow here is the sum and the substance of Gall\u2019s psycology. For the\nunderstanding, essentially a unit faculty, he substitutes a multitude\nof little understandings or faculties, distinct and isolate. And, as\nthese faculties, which perform just as he wills them to do\u2014which he\nmultiplies according to his pleasure,[32] seem in his eyes to explain\ncertain phenomena which are not well explained by the lights of ordinary\nphilosophy, he triumphs!\n\nHe does not perceive that an explanation, which is words merely, adapts\nitself to any and to every thing. In the time of Malebranche, every thing\nwas explained by _animal spirits_; Barthez explained every thing by his\n_vital principle_, &c.\n\n\u201cThis,\u201d says Gall, \u201cexplains how the same man may possess a judgment\nthat is ready and sure as to certain objects, while it is imbecile\nas to certain others; how he may have the liveliest and most fruitful\nimagination upon some subjects, while it is cold and sterile upon\nothers.\u201d[33]\n\n\u201cGrant,\u201d says he, further, \u201cto the animals certain fundamental faculties,\nand you have the dog that follows the chase with _passion_; the weasel\nthat strangles the poultry with _rage_; the nightingale that sings with\n_fervour_ beside his mate,\u201d[34] &c.\n\nNo doubt of it. But what sort of philosophy is that, that thinks to\nexplain a fact by a word? You observe such or such a penchant in an\nanimal, such or such a taste or talent in a man; _presto_, a particular\nfaculty is produced for each one of these peculiarities, and you suppose\nthe whole matter to be settled. You deceive yourself; your _faculty_ is\nonly a _word_,\u2014it is the name of the fact,\u2014and all the difficulty remains\njust where it was before.\n\nBesides, you speak only of the facts that you suppose yourself able\nto explain; you say nothing of those that you render by your system\nwholly inexplicable. You say not one word as to the unity of the\nunderstanding, the unity of the _me_, or you deny it. But the unity of\nthe understanding, the unity of the _me_, is a fact of the conscious\nsense, and the conscious sense is more powerful than all the philosophies\ntogether.\n\nGall is always talking about observation, and he was indeed, as an\nobserver, full of ingenuity. But, in order to follow out an observation,\nit must be traced to the very end, and we must accept all that it yields\nto our research; and observation every where gives, and shows every\nwhere, and above all things else, the unity of the understanding, the\nunity of the _me_.\n\nGall\u2019s philosophy consists only in transmuting into a particular\nunderstanding each separate _mode_[35] of the understanding, properly so\ncalled.\n\nDescartes had already said, \u201cThere are in us as many faculties as there\nare truths to be known.... But I do not think that any useful application\ncan be made of this way of thinking; and it seems to me rather more\nlikely to be mischievous, by giving to the ignorant occasion for\nimagining an equal number of little entities in the soul.\u201d[36]\n\nIt may well be supposed that Gall, who in the word understanding sees\nnothing but an abstract word, expressive of the sum of our intellectual\nfaculties, would also, in the word _will_, perceive nothing more than an\nabstract word, expressing the sum of our moral faculties.\n\nHe had given a definition of _reason_: \u201cThe result of the simultaneous\naction of all the intellectual faculties.\u201d[37] In the same way he defined\n_will_ to be \u201cthe result of the simultaneous action of the superior\nintellectual faculties.\u201d[38] But Gall always deceives himself; for reason\nand will are not _results_\u2014they are _powers_, and primary powers of\nthought.\n\nGall, in a manner equally singular, defines _moral liberty_ or _free\nwill_.\n\n\u201cMoral liberty,\u201d says he, \u201cis nothing more than the faculty of _being\ndetermined_, and of determining under motive.\u201d[39] Not so: liberty is\nprecisely the power to determine against all motive. Locke well defined\nliberty as _power_: to be determined, is to allow one\u2019s self to be\ndetermined\u2014that is, to _obey_.\n\nGall says again, \u201cUnlimited liberty supposes not only that man governs\nhimself independently of all law, but that he is the creator of his own\nnature.\u201d[40] Not at all; it supposes that he may have choice\u2014and in fact\nhe does choose.\n\nLastly, Gall says, \u201cA phenomenon such as that of absolute liberty, would\nbe a phenomenon occurring without any cause whatever.\u201d[41] Why without\ncause? The cause is in the power of choosing\u2014and this power is a fact.\n\nGall\u2019s whole doctrine is one series of errors, which press upon each\nother cumulatively. He resolves that the part of the brain in which\nthe understanding resides shall be divided into many small organs,\ndistinct from each other; a physiological error. He decries the unity\nof the understanding, and looks upon the will and the reason as mere\nresults\u2014psycological errors. In the free will he perceives merely a\ncompulsory determination,[42] and consequently a mere result\u2014this is a\nmoral error.\n\nMan\u2019s liberty is a positive faculty, and not the simple passive result of\nthe preponderance of one _motive_ over another _motive_, of one _organ_\nover another _organ_.[43]\n\nReason, will, liberty, are therefore, not as in Gall\u2019s doctrine,\n_positive faculties_, _active powers_; or rather, they are\nthe understanding itself. Reason, will, liberty, are in fact\nthe understanding, as _conceiving_, _willing_, _choosing_, or\n_deliberating_.[44]\n\nThe consciousness which feels itself to be one, feels itself free. And\nyou will remark, that these two great facts given out by the inward\nsense, the consciousness, to wit, the unity of the understanding and the\npositive power of the free will, are precisely the two first facts denied\nby the philosophy of Gall.\n\nAnd take good care to observe further, that if there be in us any thing\nthat belongs to the _consciousness_, it is evidently and par excellence\nthe sense of our personal unity; or what is more, the consciousness of\nour moral liberty.\n\nMan is a moral force, only inasmuch as he is a free force. Any philosophy\nthat attempts the liberty of man, attempts, without knowing it, morals\nitself. Man then is free, and as he is a moral agent only in proportion\nas he is free, it would seem that his liberty is the only attribute of\nhis soul from which Providence has designed to remove all the boundaries.\n\n\u201cWhat is here very remarkable,\u201d says Descartes, \u201cis that, of all within\nme, there is not one thing so perfect or so great, but that I know it\nmight be greater and more perfect. Thus, for example, if I consider my\nfaculty of conceiving, I find it of very small extent, and very limited.\nIf, in the same manner, I examine the memory, the imagination, or any\nother one of my faculties, I find not one that is not very limited and\nvery small. Within me there is only my will or my liberty of free will,\nwhich I feel to be so great that I conceive not the idea of another more\nfull and of greater extent.\u201d[45]\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nOF GALL.\n\nOF THE FACULTIES.\n\n\nGall\u2019s philosophy consists wholly in the substitution of _multiplicity_\nfor _unity_. In place of one general and single brain,[46] he substitutes\na number of small brains: instead of one general sole understanding,\nhe substitutes several individual understandings.[47] These pretended\n_individual understandings_ are the _faculties_.\n\nNow, Gall admits the existence of twenty-seven of these faculties, each\none of them (since each one is a peculiar understanding) endowed with its\nperceptive faculty, its memory, its judgment, its imagination; &c.[48]\n\nHence, there are twenty-seven perceptive faculties, twenty-seven\nmemories, twenty-seven judgments, twenty-seven imaginations, &c.\n\nFor, if we are to follow Gall, each attribute is not less distinct than\neach faculty. The memory, the judgment, imagination, &c. of one faculty\nare not the memory, judgment, or imagination of another faculty.\n\n\u201cThe sense of numbers,\u201d says he, \u201cpossesses a judgment for the relations\nof numbers; the sense of the arts, a judgment for works of art; but where\nthe fundamental faculty is wanting, the judgment relative to objects of\nthat faculty must necessarily be wanting likewise.\u201d[49]\n\nHe says further: \u201cIt is impossible for an individual to possess\nimagination and judgment for any object with the fundamental faculty for\nwhich he has not been gifted by nature.\u201d[50]\n\nThus, beyond all doubt: there are twenty-seven faculties; and as there\nare twenty-seven faculties, there must be twenty-seven memories,\njudgments, imaginations, &c.\n\nIn one word, there is no such thing as a general understanding; but\nthere are twenty-seven special understandings, with three or four times\ntwenty-seven distinct attributes of each. Such is the entire psycology\nof Gall.\n\nTo proceed. Gall\u2019s twenty-seven faculties are: the instinct of\npropagation, love of offspring, self-defence, the carnivorous\ninstinct, the sense of property, friendship, cunning, pride, vanity,\ncircumspection, memory for things, memory for words, sense of locality,\nsense of persons, sense of language, of relations of colours, relations\nof sounds, relations of numbers, of mechanics, of comparative sagacity,\nthe metaphysical genius, sarcasm, poetic talent, benevolence, imitation,\nreligion, firmness.\n\nGall says that these faculties are innate,[51] and this assertion\ncertainly will not be contested.\n\nLocke, who so vigorously opposed the doctrine of innate ideas, never\ndecried the _innateness_ of our faculties. He always regarded them as\nnatural, that is to say, _innate_.[52]\n\nCondillac himself, who charges Locke with having considered the faculties\nof the soul as _innate_, in making these charges confounds the _faculties\nof the soul_ with the _operations of the soul_.[53]\n\nNow, that which is perfectly true as to the _operations of the soul_,\nis by no means so as regards her _faculties_. All the faculties of the\nsoul are innate and contemporary, for they are nothing more than _modes_\nof the soul; indeed, they are the soul itself, viewed under different\naspects. But the operations of the soul succeed each other, and beget\neach other. There can be no memory without previous perception; there can\nbe no judgment without recollection. In order that there may be a will,\nthere must have been a judgment, &c.\n\nAfter saying that the faculties are innate, Gall says also that they are\n_independent_.[54]\n\nAnd if, by the word _independent_, he means distinct, there is nothing\nless contestible. But if, by this word _independent_, he understood (as\nindeed he does understand) that each faculty is a real understanding, the\nquestion is altered and the difficulty begins.\n\nFor, if each individual faculty is a proper understanding, it follows\nthat there are as many understandings as there are faculties, and the\nunderstanding ceases to be _one_, and the _me_ is no longer _one_. I\nam well aware that this is exactly what Gall means; he says it, and\nreiterates it throughout his work. He says it, but does not prove it. And\nhow should he prove it? Can we prove any thing against our consciousness?\n\n\u201cI remark here, in the first place,\u201d says Descartes, \u201cthat there is a\ngreat difference between the mind and the body, in that the body is, by\nits nature, always divisible, and the mind wholly indivisible. For, in\nfact, when I contemplate it\u2014that is, when I contemplate my own self\u2014and\nconsider myself as a thing that thinks, I cannot discover in myself any\nparts, but I clearly know and conceive that I am a thing absolutely one\nand complete.\u201d[55]\n\nGall reverses the common philosophy, and it is worthy of remark, that\nthe whole of his philosophy, which he thinks so novel,[56] is, to the\nvery letter, nothing more nor less than this very inversion. According to\ncommon philosophy, there is one general understanding\u2014a unit; and there\nare faculties which are but modes of this understanding. Gall asserts\nthat there are as many kinds of peculiar intelligences as there are\nfaculties, and that the understanding in general is nothing more than a\nmode or attribute of each faculty. He says so expressly.\n\nHis words are: \u201cThe intellectual faculty and all its subdivisions, such\nas perception, recollection, memory, judgment, and imagination, are not\nfundamental faculties, but merely their general attributes.\u201d[57]\n\nGall first inverts the common philosophy, and then contends for the\nexistence of all the consequences of that common philosophy.\n\nHe suppresses the _me_, but insists that there is a soul. He abolishes\nthe freewill, and yet contends that there is such a thing as morals. He\nmakes of the idea of God an idea that is merely relative and conditional,\nbut yet asserts that there may be such a thing as religion.\n\nI say he abolishes the _me_; for the _me_ is the soul. The soul is the\nunderstanding, general and one; but if there be no understanding as\ngeneral, there can be no soul.\n\nAccording to Gall, there is nothing real and positive except the\n_faculties_.\n\nAnd these faculties alone are possessed of organs. \u201cNone of my\npredecessors,\u201d says he, \u201chad any knowledge of those forces which alone\nare the functions of special cerebral organs.\u201d[58]\n\nBy the contrary reasoning, neither the will, nor the reason, nor the\nunderstanding, are possessed of any organs, for they are nothing but\nforces; they are nothing but nouns collective\u2014words.\n\n\u201cThese observations may suffice,\u201d says Gall, \u201cto convince the reader that\nthere cannot exist any special organ of the will, or the freewill.\u201d[59]\nHe adds: \u201cIt is equally impossible that there should be any peculiar\norgan of the reason.\u201d[60]\n\nFinally he says: \u201cFrom all that I have now said it follows, that the idea\nof an organ of the intellect or understanding is quite as inadmissible as\nthe idea of an organ of the instinct.\u201d[61]\n\nHence there can be nought but the faculties; and, according to Gall,\nthese faculties are so distinct, that he attributes to each particular\none a separate organ.[62] He divides the understanding into little\nunderstandings.\n\nDescartes expressed himself in the following words: \u201cWe do not conceive\nof any body, except as divisible; whereas the human mind cannot conceive\nof itself except as indivisible; for in fact we are incapable of\nconceiving of half a soul.\u201d[63] Gall, however, settles that point. He\nmakes half souls. He retrenches or adds as many faculties as suits his\nplan. These faculties are separated by material limits. He goes so far\nas to say that such or such a faculty acts with greater or less facility\nupon such or such another faculty, according as one happens to be\nsituated nearer to or farther off from the other.\n\n\u201cAs the organ of the arts,\u201d says he, \u201cis located far from that of the\nsense of colour, the circumstance explains why historical painters have\nrarely been colourists.\u201d[64]\n\nThus, we find that the faculties alone are possessed of _forces_. These\nforces alone are endowed with organs; and these organs, by which they are\nkept separate from each other, separate them to distances sufficiently\ngreat to hinder, in certain cases, one given faculty from exercising any\ninfluence over another. Therefore, there is no such thing as unity; there\nis no unit faculty, no unit understanding; there is no _me_; and if there\nbe no _me_, there can be no soul.\n\nIn the same way he abolishes the _freewill_. Will, liberty, reason, in\nhis view,[65] are nothing but _results_, as I have already stated.\n\n\u201cTo the end,\u201d says he, \u201cthat man may not be confined merely to the\nability to wish\u2014in order that he may actually will\u2014the concurrence of\nseveral superior faculties is requisite. The motives must be weighed,\ncompared, and judged; the decision resulting from this operation is\ndenominated will.\u201d[66]\n\n\u201cReason,\u201d he further adds, \u201csupposes a concerted action of the superior\nfaculties. It is the judgment pronounced by the superior intellectual\nfaculties.\u201d[67]\n\nHence, the will is nothing but a _decision_; reason is nothing but a\n_judgment_. The faculties _concert together_. What a singular philosophy,\nwhich always substitutes the fictions of language for the facts of the\nconscious sense, and which is satisfied with those fictions!\n\nFreewill is either a power, a force, or it is nothing. He resolves that\nit is merely a _result_. Gall therefore abolishes the freewill.\n\nIndeed, he makes of the idea of God nothing but a relative and\nconditional idea, for he supposes that this idea comes from a particular\norgan; and he supposes that that organ may possibly, in some case, be\nwanting.\n\n\u201cIt cannot be doubted,\u201d says Gall, \u201cthat the human race are endowed with\nan organ by means of which it recognises and admires the Author of the\nuniverse.\u201d[68]\n\n\u201cGod exists,\u201d adds he, \u201cfor there is an organ to know and adore him.\u201d[69]\n\nBut he continues: \u201cClimate and other circumstances may obstruct the\ndevelopment of the cerebral part, by means of which the Creator designed\nto reveal himself to his creature man.\u201d[70]\n\nAgain: \u201cIf there were a people whose organization should be altogether\ndefective in this respect, they would be as little susceptible as any\nother kinds of animal, of the religious idea or sentiment.\u201d[71]\n\nFurther: \u201cThere is no God for beings whose organization does not bear the\noriginal stamp of determinate faculties.\u201d[72]\n\nWhat! If I happen not to possess a little peculiar organ, (for it\nmay be wanting,) can I not feel that God exists! And how can I be an\nintelligence, knowing myself, and yet not knowing that God is? I do not\nmore strongly feel that I am, than that God is. \u201cThis idea,\u201d (the idea of\nGod) says Descartes, \u201cis born and produced along with me, just as is the\nidea of myself.\u201d[73]\n\nMy understanding, which perceives itself and feels itself to be an\neffect, necessarily perceives the intelligent Cause which produced it.\n\u201cIt is a very evident thing,\u201d says Descartes again, \u201cthat there must\nbe at least as much reality in a cause as in the effect it produces;\nand since I am a thing that thinks, whatsoever be in fact the cause of\nmy being, I am compelled to confess, that _it also_ is something that\nthinks.\u201d[74]\n\nHitherto I have considered Gall\u2019s philosophy only under its speculative\npoints of view; what would it be, if considered in a practical relation?\n\nIn one of his happy moments, Diderot wrote the following very remarkable\nphrase: \u201cThe ruin of liberty overthrows all order and all government,\nconfounds vice and virtue together, sanctions every monstrous infamy,\nextinguishes all shame and all remorse, and degrades and deforms without\nrecovery the whole human race.\u201d[75]\n\nNothing astonishes a phrenologist.\n\n\u201cLet us imagine,\u201d says Gall, \u201ca woman in whom the love of offspring is\nbut little developed, ... if, unfortunately, the organ of murder be very\nmuch developed in her, need we be surprised if her hand....\u201d[76] &c.\n\nOrganization explains every thing.\n\n\u201cThese last named facts show us,\u201d says Gall, \u201cthat this detestable\ninclination (the inclination to commit murder) has its source in a vice\nof the organization.\u201d[77]\n\n\u201cLet those haughty men,\u201d says he again, \u201cwho cause nations to be\nslaughtered by thousands, know that they do not act of their own\naccord, but that Nature herself has filled their hearts with rage and\ndestructiveness.\u201d[78]\n\nNo, indeed! This is not what they must know; for, thanks be to God, it is\nnot true. What they ought to know, what they ought to be told, is, that\nalthough Providence has left to man the power to do evil, he has also\nendowed him with the power to do good. That which man ought to know, that\nwhich should be instilled into his mind and heart is, that he has a free\npower, and that this power ought not to be misdirected; and that he who\nin his own nature misdirects it, no matter under what form of philosophy\nhe takes refuge, is a being who degrades his nature.\n\nUnder the title of _fundamental faculties_, Gall confounds all things\ntogether\u2014the passions, the instinct, the intellectual faculties. These\nfaculties, which are at the basis of his whole philosophy, he knows not\neven how to denominate them. He calls them instincts,[79] inclinations,\nsenses, memories, &c. There is a memory or sense of things, a memory\nor sense of persons, &c. He confounds the instinct that leads certain\nanimals to live in elevated regions with pride, which is a moral\nsentiment in man;[80] the carnivorous instinct with courage;[81] he\nbelieves that conscience, (which is the soul judging itself,) is nothing\nbut a modification of a particular sense, the sense of benevolence,\n&c.[82]\n\nThe hesitation of his mind is visible every where.\n\n\u201cI leave it to the reader,\u201d says he, \u201cto decide whether the fundamental\nfaculty to which this penchant relates, should be denominated sense of\nelevation, self-esteem,\u201d &c.[83]\n\n\u201cTo speak correctly,\u201d continues he, \u201cfirmness is neither a penchant nor\na faculty; it is a mode-of-being, which gives to a man a distinctive\nquality, which is called character.\u201d[84]\n\nFinally, he writes the following paragraph, perhaps the most singular\none that he ever wrote, for it shows in the clearest manner how little\nconfidence he had in his own psycology.\n\n\u201cIf we are materialists because we do not admit the existence of a\nunit-faculty of the soul, but recognise several primitive faculties,\nwe ask whether the ordinary division of the faculties of the soul\ninto understanding, will, attention, memory, judgment, imagination,\nand affections and passions, expresses nothing more than a primitive\nunit-faculty? If it be asserted that all these faculties are merely\nmodifications of a sole and same faculty, what can hinder us from making\nthe same assertion as to the faculties whose existence we do admit.\u201d[85]\n\nTo be sure, nothing prevents you. Or rather every thing constrains you\nto do so. There is therefore one sole faculty, of which all the other\nfaculties are but moods. You return then to the common philosophy, and\nconsequently you no longer possess a peculiar philosophy.\n\nThe problem proposed by Gall is at the same time physiological,\npsycological, and anatomical.\n\nIn our first article an account has been given of Gall\u2019s _physiology_,\nand it has been shown to be generally disproved by direct experiment.\nIn the present one his _psycology_ has been examined, and it is confuted\nby the consciousness (_le sens intime_). It only remains for us now to\nexamine his _anatomy_.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nOF GALL.\n\nTHE ORGANS.\n\n\nOf all Gall\u2019s writings, his anatomy is that which has been most talked\nof, and yet it is the part least known.\n\nIn the year 1808, Gall read to the first class of the Institute a memoir\non the anatomy of the brain;[86] and M. Cuvier made a report upon that\nmemoir. But neither in that memoir nor in the report do we find one\nword of _special anatomy_, of _secret anatomy_, of what might be called\n_anatomy of the Doctrine_; or, in other terms, and as it would be\nexpressed at the present day, of _phrenological anatomy_.\n\nThe anatomy of Gall\u2019s memoir is nothing but a very ordinary anatomy.\nHe insists that the cerebral nerves, all of them without exception,\nrise upwards from the medulla oblongata towards the encephalon; that\nthe cineritious matter produces the white matter: he divides the fibres\nof the brain into _divergent_ and _convergent_; he supposes that each\nconvolution of this organ, instead of being a full and solid mass, as is\ngenerally thought, is merely a fold[87] of nervous or medullary fibres,\n&c. &c.\n\nSuch are the questions discussed by Gall; and it is sufficiently clear\nthat, whatever side we take upon these questions, his doctrine assuredly\nwould neither gain nor lose any thing.\n\nWhether such or such a nerve ascends or descends; whether the white\nmatter is produced by the gray; or whether, which is, to say the least,\nquite as probable, this be nonsense; whether this or that fibre goes out\nor comes in, diverges or converges, &c. &c. the doctrine of the plurality\nof brains, the doctrine of individual intelligences, will be neither more\nnor less true, more nor less doubtful.[88]\n\nM. Cuvier, in his report, observed: \u201cIt is essential to repeat, were it\nmerely for the information of the public, that the anatomical questions\nwe have been considering, have no immediate and necessary connexion with\nthe physiological doctrines taught by M. Gall, as to the functions and\nrelative volume of different parts of the brain; and that all that we\nhave inquired into as to the structure of the brain, might be either true\nor false, without affording the least conclusion in favour of or against\nthe doctrine.\u201d[89]\n\nIt is necessary not to make any mistake as to the real point of the\nquestion. Gall\u2019s doctrine goes to establish one and only one thing, to\nwit, _the plurality of intelligences_ and _the plurality of brains_.[90]\nThat is what constitutes the special and peculiar doctrine; that\nis to say, different from the common doctrine, which admits but one\nunderstanding and a single brain. Whatever goes to prove the plurality\nof understandings and brains belongs to Gall\u2019s doctrine; and whatever\ndoes not tend to prove the plurality of understandings and brains is in\nopposition to that doctrine.\n\nGall\u2019s works then really contain two very distinct anatomies: one is\na _general anatomy_, which has nothing in particular to do with his\ndoctrine; the other is a _special anatomy_, which, supposing it to be\ntrue, would constitute the basis of his doctrine.\n\nNow, a great deal has been said about Gall\u2019s general anatomy; but as to\nhis special anatomy, I know of no one who has spoken of it. Gall himself\nsays as little as possible about it. In other matters he tells his\nopinions both very clearly and very positively: in this particular we are\nobliged to guess at them.\n\nWhen Gall, in his _psycology_, substitutes the _faculties_ for the\nunderstanding, he defines those _faculties_. He defines them, as we have\nalready seen, to be _individual intelligences_. How happens it, then,\nthat in his anatomy, when he substitutes the organs of the brain for the\nbrain itself, he does not define these organs? How strange! Gall\u2019s whole\ndoctrine, all _phrenology_, rests upon the _organs of the brain_; for,\nwithout distinct cerebral organs, there can be no independent faculties;\nand without independent faculties there can be no phrenology: and Gall\ndoes not say, nor has any phrenologist said for him, what is the thing\ncalled a _cerebral organ_.\n\nThe truth is: Gall never had any settled opinion upon what he called the\norgans of the brain; he never saw those _organs_, and he imagined them\nfor the use of his _faculties_. He did what so many others have done. He\ncommenced with imagining a hypothesis, and then he imagined an anatomy\nto suit his hypothesis.\n\nWhen the doctrine of animal spirits was believed, the brain was composed\nof pipes and tubes to convey these spirits.\n\n\u201cThe cortical substance which is found in the hemispheres of the brain,\u201d\nsays Pourfour du Petit, \u201cfurnishes the whole of the medullary portion,\nwhich is a mere collection of an infinite number of pipes.\u201d[91]\n\n\u201cThe small arteries of the cortical part of the brain,\u201d says Haller,\n\u201ctransmit a spirituous liquor into the medullary and nervous tubes.\u201d[92]\n\nIt is evident that the _organs_ of Gall have no more real existence than\nthe _pipes_ of Pourfour du Petit, or the _tubes_ of Haller. They are two\nstructures that have been imagined, as suitable for two hypotheses.\n\nIn searching for the primary idea, the secret notion that led Gall to\nhis doctrine of the _plurality of the intelligences_, I detect it in the\nanalogy that he supposed to exist between the functions of the senses and\nthe faculties of the soul.\n\nHe sees the functions of the senses constituting distinct functions, and\ninsists that the faculties of the soul must constitute equally distinct\nfaculties; he sees each particular sense possessing an organ proper to\nitself, and thinks that each faculty of the soul must have its proper\norgan;[93] in one word, he looks upon the outer man, and constructs the\ninner man after the image of the outer man.\n\nAccording to Gall, every thing between an organ of a sense and an organ\nof a faculty, between a faculty and sense, is similar. A faculty is a\nsense. His words are: the _memory or the sense of things_, the _memory\nor the sense of persons_, the _memory or the sense of numbers_. He talks\nof the _sense of language_, the _sense of mechanics_, the _sense of the\nrelations of colours_, &c. &c.\n\n\u201cAs we must admit,\u201d says he, \u201cfive different external senses, since their\nfunctions are essentially different, ... so we must agree, after all, to\nacknowledge the different faculties and the different inclinations as\nbeing essentially different moral and intellectual forces, and likewise\nconnected with organic apparatuses, which are special to each and\nindependent of each other.\u201d[94]\n\n\u201cWho,\u201d says he, \u201ccan dare to say that sight, hearing, taste, smell, and\ntouch, are simple modifications of faculties? Who could dare to derive\nthem from a single and same source, from a single and same organ? In\nthe same way, the twenty-seven qualities and faculties which I recognise\nas fundamental or primary forces, ... cannot be regarded as the simple\nmodifications of any one faculty.\u201d[95]\n\nOn the one hand, Gall gives to the _faculties_ all the independence of\nthe _senses_; and on the other, he gives the _senses_ all the attributes\nof the _faculties_.\n\n\u201cHere,\u201d says he, \u201care new reasons why I have always maintained in my\npublic discourses, though these assertions are in opposition to the ideas\nthat prevail among philosophers, that each organ of a sense possesses\nabsolutely its own functions; that each of these organs has its peculiar\nfaculty of receiving and even of perceiving impressions, its own\nconscience, its own faculty of reminiscence,\u201d[96] &c.\n\nGall did not foresee that a physiological experiment (and a very sure one\nit is) would one day demonstrate that the sense receives the impression\nbut does not perceive it, and that, consequently, it is endowed neither\nwith _conscience_ nor _reminiscence_, &c.\n\nWhen the cerebral lobes or hemispheres[97] are removed from an animal,\nthe animal immediately loses its sight.\n\nAnd yet nothing, as regards the eyes themselves, has been changed;\nobjects continue to be depicted upon the retina, the iris retains its\ncontractility, and the optic nerve its excitability. The retina continues\nto be sensible of light, for the iris contracts or dilates according as\nthe light admitted to it is more or less intense.\n\nNo change has taken place as to the structure of the eye, and yet the\nanimal does not see! Therefore it is not the eye that perceives, nor is\nit the eye that sees.[98]\n\nThe eye does not see; it is the understanding that sees by means of the\neyes.[99]\n\nWhen Gall concludes from the independence of the external senses to\nthe independence of the faculties of the soul, he confounds, as to the\nsense itself, two things that are essentially distinct, impression and\nperception. Impression is multiple; perception is single.\n\nWhen the hemispheres are removed, the animal instantly loses its\nperception; it no longer sees nor hears,[100] &c. notwithstanding all the\norgans of the senses, the eye, the ear, &c. subsist, and the impressions\ntake place.\n\nTherefore the principle that perceives is _one_. Lost for one sense, it\nis lost for all the senses. And if it be _one_ for the external senses,\nhow can it be other than _one_ for the faculties of the soul?\n\nGall therefore cannot suppose the existence of several distinct\nprinciples for the faculties of the soul, otherwise than because he\nsupposes several distinct principles for the perceptions; and he only\nsupposes several principles for the perceptions because he confounds\nimpression with perception. The whole of his psycology arises from a\nmistake; and the whole of his anatomy is constructed for the sake of his\npsycology.\n\nIn psycology he endeavours to prove that the faculties of the soul are\nmerely _internal senses_; in anatomy, he endeavours to prove that the\norgans of the faculties of the soul only repeat and reproduce the organs\nof the _external senses_.\n\nNow an _organ_, that is to say, under the present point of view, the\n_nerve_ of an _external sense_, is nothing more than a _fascicle_ of\n_nervous fibres_. Therefore the brain, under the theory, can be nothing\nbut a collection of _fascicles_ of _fibres_.[101]\n\nAccording to Gall, the origin, the development, the structure and mode of\ntermination, as to the organs of the faculties of the soul and the organs\nof the external senses, every thing is similar, every thing is in common.\nAnd yet the primitive difficulty remains unsolved.\n\nWhen I say an _organ of the senses_, I speak of a very determinate\nnervous apparatus. But is the same thing true when I say an organ of the\nbrain? What is an organ of the brain? Is it a _fascicle_ of _fibres_?\nIs it each particular fibre? But if it be a _fascicle_ of _fibres_,\nthere are too few of them, for there are not twenty-seven of them; and\ntwenty-seven are necessary, for there are twenty-seven faculties. If it\nbe each particular fibre, then there are too many of them, and far too\nmany, because there are only twenty-seven faculties. What are we to do in\nthis difficulty? We must do as Gall does: sometimes say it is a fascicle\nof fibres; at other times, that it is each fibre in particular.\n\nIn one place he says: \u201cThe brain consisting of several divisions whose\nfunctions are totally different, there are several primary bundles, which\ncontribute by their development to produce it. Among these bundles we\nplace the anterior and posterior pyramids, the bundles that come off\ndirect from the corpora olivaria, and some others that are concealed in\nthe interior of the medulla oblongata.\u201d[102]\n\n_And there are yet some others_; be it so; but they never can amount to\ntwenty-seven.\n\nAgain he says: \u201cA more extensive development of the same conjecture,\nmight perhaps dispose the reader to consider each nervous fibrilla,\nwhether in the nerves or in the brain itself, as a little special\norgan.\u201d[103]\n\nEven this is not all. For the sake of Gall\u2019s doctrine, the anatomy of the\nbrain must have a connexion with cranioscopy. And Gall takes great care\nto place all his organs upon the surface of the brain.\n\n\u201cThe possibility of a solution of the problem under consideration,\u201d says\nhe, \u201csupposes the organs of the soul to be situated at the surface of the\nbrain.\u201d[104] Indeed, were they not situated at the surface of the brain,\nhow could the cranium bear the impression of them? and what would become\nof cranioscopy?\n\nCranioscopy has nothing to fear. Gall has made provision for it; all the\norgans of the brain are placed at the surface of the brain; and Gall most\njudiciously adds, \u201cThis explains the relation or the correspondence that\nexists between craniology and the doctrine of the cerebral functions\n(cerebral physiology), the sole aim and end of my researches.\u201d[105]\n\nBut as to the pretended _organs of the brain_, are they really situated\nat the surface of the brain, as Gall asserts? In plain terms, is the\nsurface of the brain the only active part of the organ? Here is a\nphysiological experiment that shows how very much mistaken Gall is.\n\nYou can slice off a considerable portion of an animal\u2019s brain, either in\nfront, behind, on one side, or on the top, without his losing anyone of\nhis faculties.[106]\n\nThe animal may, therefore, lose all that Gall calls surface of the brain,\nwithout losing any of his faculties. Therefore it cannot be that the\norgans of the faculties reside at the _surface of the brain_.\n\nAnd comparative anatomy is not less opposite to Gall\u2019s opinions than\nis direct experiment itself. I shall not follow him here in the detail\nof his localizations. How could these localizations have any meaning?\nHe does not even know whether an organ is a _fascicle of fibres_, or a\n_fibre_.[107]\n\nFor example; he places what he calls the instinct of propagation in the\ncerebellum, and what he calls the _instinct of the love of offspring_, in\nthe posterior cerebral lobes; and he looks upon these two localizations\nas the very surest in his book.\n\n\u201cI should wish,\u201d says he, \u201cthat all young naturalists might begin their\nresearches with the study of these two organs. They are both easily to be\nrecognised,\u201d[108] &c.\n\nWhat! The cerebellum, so different in its structure from the great brain,\nis the cerebellum, like the brain,[109] to be considered an organ of\ninstinct? And what is more, is it to be regarded as the organ of a single\ninstinct only, while the brain shall have twenty-six of them?\n\nI have already said that the cerebellum is the seat of the principle that\npresides over the locomotion[110] of the animal, and that it is not the\nseat of any instinct.\n\nGall places the love of offspring in the posterior lobes of the\nbrain.[111] Now, the love of offspring, and especially maternal love,\nis every where to be found among the superior animals; it is found in\nall the mammifera, in all the birds.[112] The posterior lobes of the\nbrain, therefore, ought to be found in all these beings. Not at all: the\nposterior lobes are wanting in most of the mammifera; they are wanting in\nall the birds.\n\nGall locates the faculties that are common to both man and animals,\nin the posterior part of the brain; in the anterior part he places\nthose[113] that are peculiar to man alone. According to this plan, the\nmost _persistent_ portion of the brain will be the posterior portion,\nand the least persistent the anterior portion. But the inverse of the\nproposition holds. The parts that are most frequently wanting are the\n_posterior parts_, and those that are most invariably present are the\n_anterior parts_.[114]\n\nIf, from the brain, I pass on to consider the cranium, all the foregoing\nis found to be of still greater force. How can the localizations that\nare destitute of meaning as to the brain\u2014how can they, I say, have any\nmeaning as relative to the cranium itself?\n\nThe cranium, especially the external surface of it, represents the\nsuperficial configuration of the brain but very imperfectly. Gall knows\nit. \u201cI was the first,\u201d says he, \u201cto maintain that it is impossible for us\nto determine with exactitude the development of certain circumvolutions,\nby the inspection of the external surface of the cranium. In certain\ncases, the exterior lamina of the cranium is not parallel with the\ninternal lamina.\u201d[115] \u201cThere are certain species in which there is no\nfrontal sinus; in others, the cells betwixt the two bony lamin\u00e6 are found\nthroughout the whole skull,\u201d[116] &c. &c.\n\nThe cranium represents the convolutions of the brain only upon its\ninner surface; it does not represent them upon its external superficies.\nAnd as to the _fibres_, as to the _bundles of fibres_, it does not even\nrepresent them on its inner surface; for the fibres are covered with\na layer of gray matter, and the bundles of fibres are situated in the\ninterior of the nervous mass.\n\nGall is aware of all this, and nevertheless he inscribes his twenty-seven\nfaculties upon the skulls.[117] Such confidence surprises one. Nothing\nis known of the intimate structure of the brain,[118] and yet people\nare bold enough to trace upon it their circumscriptions, their circles,\ntheir boundaries. The external surface of the skull does not represent\nthe brain\u2019s surface, it is admitted; and yet they inscribe upon this\nsurface twenty-seven names, each of which names is written within a small\ncircle, each little circle corresponding to one precise faculty! And what\nis stranger yet, people are to be found who, under each of these names\ninscribed by Gall, imagine that there is concealed something more than a\nname!\n\nThose who, seeing the success of Gall\u2019s doctrine, imagine that the\ndoctrine therefore rests upon some solid foundation, know very little of\nmankind. Gall knew mankind better. He studied them in his own way, but he\nstudied them very closely. Let us hear his own words:\n\n\u201cIn society, I employ many expedients to find out the talents and\ninclinations of people. I start the conversation upon a variety of\ntopics. In general, we let fall in conversation whatsoever has little or\nno concern with our faculties and penchants; but when the interlocutor\ntouches upon one of our favourite subjects, we at once become interested\nin it.... Do you wish to spy out the character of a person, without the\nfear of being misled as to your conclusions, even though he might be\non his guard? Set him to talking about his childhood and boyhood; make\nhim relate his schoolboy exploits; his conduct towards his parents, his\nbrothers and sisters, and his playfellows, and his emulators.... Ask\nhim about his games, &c. Few persons think it necessary to dissemble\nupon these points; they do not suspect they are dealing with one who\nknows perfectly well that the basis of character remains ever the same;\nand that the objects only that interest us change with the progress of\nyears.... Besides, when I discover what it is that a person admires or\ndespises; when I see him act; when he is an author, and I merely read his\nbook, &c. &c. the whole man stands unveiled before me.\u201d[119]\n\nDescartes _shut himself up in a stove_,[120] in order that he might\nmeditate. According to Gall, there is no necessity for one\u2019s shutting\nhimself up in a stove.\n\nDescartes says: \u201cNow I shall shut my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall\nturn my senses aside; I shall even efface from my memory every image\nof corporeal objects, or at least, as that can hardly be done, I will\nrepute them as vain and false; and thus, shut up within myself, and\ncontemplating what is within me, I shall endeavour gradually to become\nmore and more familiarly acquainted with my own real nature.\u201d[121]\n\nAccording to Gall, there is no occasion for this absolute gathering\none\u2019s self together within. All that is needful is to look at and touch\nthe skulls of people. Gall\u2019s doctrine succeeded just as Lavater\u2019s did.\nMen will always be looking out for external signs by which to discover\nsecret thoughts and concealed inclinations: it is vain to confound their\ncuriosity upon this point: after Lavater came Gall; after Gall some one\nelse will appear.\n\nWe soon become wearied of a true philosophy, because it is true; because\nthe search after truth, of whatsoever kind, requires strenuous and\ncontinual efforts. It is impossible, moreover, always to have the very\nsame philosophy: even the same philosopher cannot be always approved of.\nApprobation must change its object, especially in France.\n\nIt was for the French that Fontenelle wrote these words: \u201cThe approbation\nof mankind is a sort of forced state, which seeks nothing so much as to\ncome to an end.\u201d[122]\n\nDescartes goes off to die in Sweden, and Gall comes to reign in France.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\nOF SPURZHEIM.\n\n\nSpurzheim published two works; the first of which is entitled,\n\u201cObservations sur la Phr\u00e9nologie, ou la connaissance de l\u2019homme moral\net intellectuel, fond\u00e9e sur les fonctions du syst\u00e8me nerveux:\u201d[123]\nthe title of the second is, \u201cEssai philosophique sur la nature mor\u00e2le\net intellectuelle de l\u2019homme;\u201d[124] and these two works are merely a\nreproduction of the doctrine of Gall. Spurzheim makes Gall\u2019s book over\nagain\u2014the same book that they commenced together\u2014and abridges it.\n\nSpurzheim tells us how he heard Gall, and having heard him, felt himself\ndrawn to participate in his labours, and propagate his doctrine.\n\n\u201cIn 1800, I attended for the first time a course of lectures which\nM. Gall had from time to time repeated at Vienna for four years. He\nspoke then of the necessity there was for a brain to give out the\nmanifestations of the soul; and of the plurality of organs; ... but he\nhad not as yet begun to examine into the structure of the brain.[125]\nFrom the very first, I found myself much attracted by the doctrine of the\nbrain; and from the period of my first attention to that subject to the\npresent moment, I have never lost sight of it as an object of study.\nAfter finishing my studies in 1800, I joined M. Gall, in order to pursue\nin a special manner the anatomical part of the researches.[126] In 1805,\nwe left Vienna for the purpose of travelling together; from which time,\nup to the year 1813, we made our observations in common,\u201d &c.[127]\n\nIn fact, the two authors, uniting their labours, first published,\nin 1808, their fine memoir upon the anatomy of the brain,[128] and\nsubsequently, in 1810 and 1812, the two first volumes of Gall\u2019s great\nwork.[129]\n\nIn the year 1813 they separated, and that separation even proved useful.\nGall, when writing independently, has a freer movement. Had he continued\nunited with Spurzheim, he either would not have written the last chapter\nof his fourth volume, or he would have written it very differently, and\nwe should not have obtained the definite expression of his doctrine.\n\nThat chapter, entitled \u201cPhilosophy of Man,\u201d is Gall\u2019s philosophy entire.\nIt is in that chapter that he says what he does understand by faculties,\nby understanding, by will, &c. &c. and it is there that he defines\nthe faculties of the individual understandings;[130] understanding, a\nsimple _attribute of each faculty_;[131] will, a simple result of the\nsimultaneous action of superior faculties, &c.[132]\n\nSpurzheim never would have imagined the doctrine: he found it already\nconcocted; he follows it, and in doing so, always hesitates. He did not\nimagine it; and perhaps never could have had the facilities enjoyed\nby Gall for carrying it successfully into the world. Gall\u2019s mind was\nfull of address. We have seen his method of studying men.[133] In his\ngreat work there is a dominant tone of philosophy; for the doctrine was\nalready established at the period of the publication of that work. When\nthe doctrine was inchoate, Gall\u2019s tone was not quite so grave, for it\nis above all things necessary to awaken the public curiosity, and the\nphilosophic tone does not answer for that purpose.\n\nCharles Villers has preserved some of his souvenirs, touching the first\nimpressions produced by the doctrine.[134] \u201cIf,\u201d writes Gall at the\nperiod in question, \u201cthe exterminating angel was under my orders, wo to\nK\u00e6stner, to Kant, to Wieland, and others like them.... Why is it, that\nno one has ever preserved for our times, the skulls of Homer, Virgil,\nCicero, &c.?\u201d[135]\n\n\u201cAt one time,\u201d says Charles Villers, \u201cevery body in Vienna was trembling\nfor his head, and fearing that after his death it would be put in\nrequisition to enrich Dr. Gall\u2019s cabinet. He announced his impatience\nas to the skulls of extraordinary persons\u2014such as were distinguished\nby certain great qualities or by great talents\u2014which was still greater\ncause for the general terror. Too many people were led to suppose\nthemselves the objects of the doctor\u2019s regards, and imagined their\nheads to be especially longed for by him, as a specimen of the utmost\nimportance to the success of his experiments. Some very curious stories\nare told on this point. Old M. Denis, the Emperor\u2019s librarian, inserted a\nspecial clause in his will, intended to save his cranium from M. Gall\u2019s\nscalpel.\u201d[136]\n\nGall and Spurzheim differ from each other upon several points: upon the\noffices of the external senses; upon the names of the faculties of the\nsoul; upon their number; and upon the classification of the faculties,\n&c. Let us examine a few of the points more particularly.\n\n1. _Offices of the external senses._ \u201cM. Gall is disposed,\u201d says\nSpurzheim, \u201cto attribute to the external senses, as well as to each\nand every internal faculty, not only perception, but also memory,\nreminiscence, and judgment.... It seems to me that such facts (the facts\ncited by Gall) do not prove the conclusion. In the first place, memory,\nbeing nothing more than the repetition of knowledge, must have its seat\nin the point where perception takes place. The impressions of the nerves\nthat give rise to the sensation of hunger, &c. are indisputably perceived\nin the head, which likewise has the reminiscence of hunger.... I do\nnot believe we can conclude that the eyes or the ears are the seats of\nreminiscence.\u201d[137]\n\nSpurzheim is right, as we have sufficiently seen;[138] perception is not\nin the organ of the sense.\n\nBut the error that Spurzheim combats is not the whole of Gall\u2019s error; it\nis only a particular and secondary error:[139] the error that he does not\nperceive, the error that he follows, is a general and capital one. From\nthe independence of the external senses, Gall concludes the independence\nof the faculties of the soul: he reasons upon an apparent analogy, which\nconceals a profound dissimilitude; and Spurzheim reasons just as Gall\ndoes.\n\n\u201cIn the nervous system,\u201d says he, \u201cwe find the five external senses\nseparate and independent of each other.\u201d[140] \u201cThe faculties of the\nexternal senses are attached to different organs; they may exist\nseparately. The same holds true of the internal senses.\u201d[141] \u201cWe assert\nthat there is a particular organ for each species of sentiment or\nthought, as there is for each species of exterior sensation.\u201d[142]\n\nLike Gall, Spurzheim denominates the faculties of the soul _internal\nsenses_; in the same spirit he says: \u201cThe _sense of colour_, the _sense\nof number_, _sense of language_, _sense of comparison_, _sense of\ncausality_,\u201d[143] &c. &c.\n\nBoth authors begin by calling the faculties of the soul _internal\nsenses_; and then, misled by the word, they conclude from the\n_independence of the external senses_, to the _independence_ of their\n_internal senses_; that is to say, the independence of the faculties of\nthe soul.\n\n2. _Names of the faculties._ Spurzheim accuses Gall of having given\ndenominations only to actions, and not to the principles of those actions.\n\n\u201cFinding,\u201d says he, \u201ca relation betwixt the development of a cerebral\npart and a sort of action, M. Gall denominated the cerebral part from the\naction; thus, he spoke of the organs of music, poetry, &c.\u201d[144] \u201cThe\nnomenclature,\u201d says he further, \u201cought to be conformed to the faculties,\nwithout regard to any action whatever.... When we attribute to an organ\ncunning, management, hypocrisy, intrigue, &c. we do not make known the\nprimary faculty which contributes to all these modified actions.\u201d[145]\n\nGall replies: \u201cM. Spurzheim cannot have forgotten how often we reasoned\nwithout end, with a view to determine the primitive destination of an\norgan.... I confess, that there are several organs, with whose primary\nfaculties I am not yet acquainted; and I continue to denominate them from\nthe degree of activity that led me to the discovery of them. M. Spurzheim\nthinks himself more fortunate: his metaphysical temperament has led him\nto the discovery of the fundamental or primitive faculty of every one of\nthe organs. Let us put it to the proof.\u201d[146]\n\nIndeed, Spurzheim\u2019s expedient for rendering himself master of the primary\nfaculties is very simple. He creates a word: he calls the instinct of\npropagation _amativity_, the propensity to steal, _convoitivity_; courage\nis _combativity_, &c. &c.\n\nGall and Spurzheim talk a great deal about nomenclature; but they do not\nperceive, that as to nomenclature, the first difficulty, and indeed the\nonly one, is to get at simple facts. Whoever has come to simple facts, is\nvery nigh to a good nomenclature.\n\nDescartes says: \u201cHad some one clearly explained the simple ideas that\nexist in the imagination of men, and which constitute all that they\nthink, I should venture to hope for a language that it would be very easy\nto learn, ... and, which is the principal matter, that would assist the\njudgment, representing to it things so distinctly that it would be almost\nimpossible for it to be deceived; whereas, on the contrary, the words we\nnow have possess, so to speak, only confused significations, to which the\nhuman mind has been so long accustomed, that it therefore understands\nscarcely any thing perfectly well.\u201d[147]\n\n3. _Number of the faculties._ Spurzheim adds eight faculties to those\nestablished by Gall, and Gall is vexed by it. One does not see why.\n\nWhat! Shall Gall endow twenty-seven faculties, and Spurzheim not have the\nsame privilege for seven or eight?[148] Shall Gall have a faculty for\n_space_, one for _number_, &c. and Spurzheim be refused one for _time_,\none for _extent_, &c.? Is not Spurzheim half right, when he says:\n\n\u201cOne does not readily perceive why M. Gall should desire to suggest to\nhis readers that his method of treating the doctrine of the brain is the\nonly admissible one, and that there are no other organs than those he has\nrecognised; that the organs do nothing but what he attributes to them;\n... that all he says and all he does (and that only) bears the stamp of\nperfection; and that his decision constitutes the supreme law.\u201d[149]\n\n4. _Classification and attributes of the faculties._ Gall, by giving\nthe same attributes to all the faculties, and to each faculty all the\nattributes of the understanding, in fact forms out of the faculties only\ntwo groups: the group of faculties that he supposes common to man and the\nanimals, and the group of faculties that he supposes to be proper to man\nalone. Spurzheim divides and subdivides them.\n\nNone of the formulas required for the classification agreed upon are\nomitted.[150]\n\nIn the first place, there are two _orders_ of faculties: the _affective_\nand the _intellectual faculties_; then each of these _orders_ is divided\ninto _genera_. The first _order_ has two _genera_: the affective\nfaculties common to man and animals,[151] and the affective faculties\npeculiar to man alone.[152] The second has three genera: the faculties\nor _internal senses_ which make external objects known;[153] the\nfaculties or internal senses which make known the relations of objects in\ngeneral;[154] and the faculties or internal senses that _reflect_.[155]\n\nWhat an apparatus for saying very simple things; for saying that there\nare _propensities_,[156] _sentiments_,[157] and _intellectual faculties_!\nWhat singular personification of all these faculties: faculties that\nknow; faculties that reflect![158] Spurzheim elsewhere speaks of _happy\nfaculties_.[159] Indeed, what arbitrariness in the distribution of facts!\nAnd Gall, too, is he not half right?\n\n\u201cBy what right,\u201d says he, \u201cdoes M. Spurzheim exclude from the\nintellectual faculties imitation, wit, ideality or poetry,\ncircumspection, secretivity, constructivity? How are perseverance,\ncircumspection, imitation; how are they sentiments? What reason have we\nfor counting among the propensities constructivity rather than melody,\nbenevolence, or imitation?\u201d[160]\n\nGall, by endowing each faculty with all the attributes of an\nunderstanding, makes as many understandings as faculties. Spurzheim makes\nseveral kinds of understandings: understandings that know, understandings\nthat reflect, &c. He restores the _sensitive_ and _rational souls_.\n\nIn fine, Gall and Spurzheim rarely agree as to their faculties. In\n_hope_ Gall sees nothing more than an attribute; Spurzheim beholds it\nas a primary faculty. In _conscience_ Gall sees nothing but an effect\nof _benevolence_; Spurzheim looks upon it as a peculiar faculty. Gall\nresolves that there is only one organ of _religion_, and Spurzheim\ninsists upon three\u2014the organ of causality, that of supernaturality, and\nthat of veneration, &c. &c.\n\nWe should never end, were we to follow them throughout their debates. I\nhave said enough to show the case, and I now pass on to Broussais.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\nOF BROUSSAIS.\n\n\nBroussais appears to have been born solely for the purpose of imagining\nor propagating systems.\n\nGuided by facts which he seized upon with a rare sagacity, Broussais\nbegins by bringing back certain affections to their real seats;[161] but\nsoon, by an immoderate generalization of this fine result, he perceives\nall affections in the same affection, all diseases in the same malady;\nhe imagines one _abstract affection_, by means of which he explains all\nother affections: _fevers_ are nothing but irritations of the digestive\napparatus; _insanity_ is nothing but an _irritation_ of the brain;[162]\nand he who is so intolerant of the _personifications_ proposed by others,\nmakes one _personification_ more; in fine, his exclusive and headstrong\ngenius carries him beyond himself, and, as if merely to amuse him after\nthe fatigue of forming his systems, plunges him into the question of\n_phrenology_, where he enjoys himself so much the more, because he finds\nin it his own accustomed method, his own ideas, and his own language:\nthere are plenty of faculties to bring back to their organs, plenty of\nlocalizations to establish.\n\nBroussais ought not to be judged of by his \u201cCours de Phr\u00e9nologie.\u201d[163]\nThe five or six first _lessons_, or, as he calls them, _generalities_,[164]\nare merely a confused mixture of ideas: the notions of Condillac rejected\nby Cabanis, and the ideas of the phrenologists.\n\nHe says that sensibility is the _common origin_ of the faculties;[165] he\ncalls _perception_ a _primary faculty_,[166] &c. &c.; and Condillac would\nnot speak differently.\n\nBut, on the other hand, he says that there are as many _memories_ as\nthere are organs;[167] that the instincts and the sentiments possess a\nmemory, as the _external perceptions_[168] have theirs; that the mind\nis the _sum of the faculties_,[169] &c.; and Gall could not say it more\nclearly.\n\nBroussais is particularly opposed to the _moi_ of Descartes. \u201cSeduced,\u201d\nsays he, \u201cby the _moi_ of Descartes, philosophers have been led to reason\naccording to the testimony of their consciousness....\u201d[170] And according\nto what testimony does Broussais think they ought to reason?\n\nHe thinks it very funny to call the _moi_ an _intra-cranial entity_,[171]\n_intra-cranial central being_,[172] _person_ par excellence, &c.[173]\n\nHe laughs at the _moi_ of Descartes; he forgets that the _moi_ of Gall\nis either nothing else than the sum (_ensemble_) of the intellectual\nfaculties, or nothing else than a word; and he makes for himself a\n_peculiar moi_,[174] which he locates in the organ of _comparison_. \u201cWe\nowe,\u201d says he, \u201cto the organ of general comparison the distinction of one\nperson expressed by the sign _me_.\u201d[175]\n\nBroussais was never designed for compliance with the ideas of others; a\nyoke oppresses him; he is never truly Broussais, except in the midst of\nconflict. In 1816 he publishes a volume,[176] and the medical doctrines\nare shook for half a century: we ought to read that volume over again,\nand forget the \u201cCours de Phr\u00e9nologie.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\nBROUSSAIS\u2019S PSYCOLOGY.\n\n\nThe fact is, Broussais is busier with his own opinions than with what\nGall thought; and here is a specimen of his way of thinking: \u201cThe\nunderstanding and its different manifestations are,\u201d says he, \u201cthe\nphenomena of the nervous actions.\u201d[177] \u201cThe faculties,\u201d says he further,\n\u201care the actions of the material organs,\u201d[178] &c.\n\nBroussais\u2019s whole psycology is contained in these words. The organ, and\nthe phenomenon produced by the organ. To speak more clearly, the organ\nand the action of the organ. To speak like Cabanis, the organ and the\n_secretion_ of the organ, or _thought_.[179] That\u2019s all!\n\nThe understanding, therefore, is merely a _phenomenon_, a product, an\nact. But if this be the case, how can there be a _continuity of the\nmoi_? Now, the consciousness which gives me the _unity_ of the _moi_,\ngives me not less assuredly the _continuity_ of the _moi_. Descartes\u2019\nadmirable words are: \u201cI find that there is in us an _intellectual\nmemory_.\u201d[180]\n\nThe consciousness tells me that I am _one_, and Gall insists that I\nam _multiple_; the consciousness tells me I am _free_, and Gall avers\nthat there is no _moral liberty_; the consciousness endows me with the\ncontinuity of my understanding, but Cabanis and Broussais tell me that\nmy understanding is nothing but an _act_.\n\nPhilosophers will talk.\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\nBROUSSAIS\u2019S PHYSIOLOGY.\n\n\nThe whole of Broussais\u2019s physiology is founded upon _irritation_.\nHe says, \u201cIrritation constitutes the basis of the physiological\ndoctrine.\u201d[181] But what is irritation? Broussais replies: \u201cIt is the\nexaggeration of contractility.\u201d[182] But then, what is _contractility_?\n\nIn Haller, the term _irritability_ (for that is his term for\n_contractility_) possesses a precise meaning and import. _Irritability_\nis a property of muscular fibre, by which it shortens or contracts\nitself when touched.\n\nHaller demonstrated, and it is his glory, that the muscle alone _moves_\nwhen it is touched. What is that to Broussais? He goes back again to\nthe vague irritability of Glisson and de Gorter: like those authors, he\nassigns it to every tissue, and, like them, he explains every thing by\nmeans of it.\n\nBroussais\u2019s _irritation_ is merely Haller\u2019s _irritability_ exaggerated\nand deformed.\n\nThe genius of Broussais was too impatient to allow him to proceed step by\nstep up to the idea\u2014too impassioned to hinder him from being satisfied\nwith the name\u2014and for that very reason he appears to have been by nature\nfitted for success in a school where the name is every thing.\n\nBut here is the great difference. Gall and Broussais laboured for the\nSchool: Descartes toiled for the human mind.\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\n\nI return to Gall.\n\nThose who wish to learn Gall\u2019s doctrine, will always go up to Gall\nhimself. Spurzheim already alters the spirit of that doctrine, and Gall\ncomplains of it. \u201cM. Spurzheim,\u201d says he, \u201cknows my discoveries better\nthan any body else, but he tries to introduce among them a spirit quite\nforeign to that in which they were begun, continued and perfected.\u201d[183]\n\nGall, moreover, was a great anatomist. His idea of tracing the fibres\nof the brain is, as to the anatomy of that organ, the fundamental idea.\nThe idea is not his own: two French anatomists, Vieussens and Pourfour\ndu Petit, had admirably understood it long before his time; but at the\nperiod of his appearance it had been long forgotten. The brain was not\nthen dissected by any one: it was cut in slices.\n\nIt was a great merit in Gall to have recalled the true method of\ndissecting the brain; and there was still greater address on his part,\nin connecting with his labours in positive anatomy, his doctrine of\nindependent faculties and multiple brain.\n\nThis strange doctrine has had a fortune still more strange. Gall and\nSpurzheim forgot to place _curiosity_ among their primary faculties. They\nwere wrong. But for the credulous curiosity of mankind, how could they\nhave explained the success of their doctrine?\n\nFortunately, a system never lives otherwise than as a system lives. That\nof the moment is abandoned for the sake of another: and almost always\nfor a perfectly opposite one. Systems multiply and pass away; and we are\nindebted to the systems themselves for an escape from the mischiefs of\nsystems.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE I.\n\nANATOMICAL RELATIONS SUPPOSED BY GALL TO EXIST BETWEEN THE ORGANS OF THE\nEXTERNAL SENSES, AND THE ORGANS OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.\n\n    Page 82. _According to Gall, the origin, the development, the\n    structure and mode of termination, as to the organs of the\n    faculties of the soul and the organs of the external senses,\n    every thing is similar, every thing is in common._\n\n\nIt is known that two substances compose the nervous system\u2014the gray\nmatter, and the white or fibrous matter. Well, according to Gall, one\nof these substances produces the other. The _gray matter_ produces the\n_white matter_.\n\nWherever, therefore, there happens to be any _gray matter_, white matter\nmust appear; that is to say, _nervous fibres_,[184] _nervous filaments_,\nnerves. All the nerves in the body must arise in this way. The spinal\nnerves arise from the gray matter which is in the interior of the spinal\nmarrow; the cerebral nerves from the gray matter that is in the interior\nof the medulla oblongata.\n\nHence, the nerves of the body are _organs of the senses_.\n\nOn the other hand, the brain and the cerebellum,[185] which are _the\norgans of the faculties of the soul_, must arise like the nerves: the\nbrain from the gray matter of the _pyramidal eminences_; the cerebellum\nfrom the gray matter that surrounds the _restiform bodies_.\n\nIn the second place, whenever a nerve traverses a mass of gray matter, it\nreceives from it, according to Gall, certain new nervous filaments; and\nin this way it grows and developes itself. The cerebrum and cerebellum\nwill not fail therefore to grow and be developed likewise. The primitive\nbundles of the cerebellum, (_the restiform bodies_,) will grow by means\nof the filaments which will be imparted to them by the gray matter of the\n_ciliary body_: the primitive bundles of the cerebrum, (the _pyramidal\neminences_,) by the filaments imparted to them by, first, the gray matter\nof the _pons varolii_; secondly, by that of the _optic strata_; and then\nby that of the olivary bodies, _corpora striata_, &c. &c.\n\nFinally, in the same manner as a nerve of sense expands at its\ntermination, and by means of such expansion forms the organ of the\nsense, so the primitive bundles of fibres of the brain and of the\ncerebellum terminate in expansions, and constitute the _organs of the\ninternal senses_; that is to say, the lobes of the cerebellum and the\nhemispheres of the brain.[186]\n\n\n\n\nNOTE II.\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN INSTINCT AND UNDERSTANDING.\n\n    Page 64 (Note). _And he does not see that as to the instincts\n    and the understanding all is contrast._\n\n\nHere is what I have elsewhere said upon this question, so long debated,\nof the _instinct and understanding of animals_.\n\n\u201cThere is a most complete difference between _instinct_ and\n_understanding_.\n\n\u201cIn _instinct_ all is blind, necessary, and invariable. In\n_understanding_ every thing is elective, conditional, and modifiable.\n\n\u201cThe beaver which builds its house, and the bird that constructs its\nnest, act only by instinct.\n\n\u201cThe dog and the horse, that learn even the meaning of several of our\nwords, and who pay obedience to us, do so by understanding.\n\n\u201cIn _instinct_ all is innate. The beaver builds without having learned\nto build: all that he does is from fatality. The beaver builds under the\nimpulsion of a constant and irresistible force.\n\n\u201cIn _understanding_, every thing results from experience and\n_instruction_. The dog obeys only because he has learned to obey: he is\nperfectly free in this respect; for he obeys only because he will obey.\n\n\u201cFinally, in regard to _instinct_ every thing is particular. That\nadmirable industry that the beaver exhibits in the construction of his\nhut, can be employed in no other occupation than the building of his hut.\nNow, in _understanding_ every thing is general; for the dog could apply\nthe same flexibility of attention, and of conception, which he uses in\nobeying, to do any other thing.\n\n\u201cIn animals there are, therefore, two distinct and primary\nforces\u2014_instinct_ and _understanding_. As long as our conceptions of\nthese forces were confused, all our views and opinions in regard to\nthe actions of animals remained obscure and contradictory. Among these\nactions, some exhibited man every where superior to the brute; while\nothers appeared to accord to the brute creation the superiority over\nman\u2014a contradiction almost as deplorable as absurd! By the distinction\nthat separates blind and necessary actions from elective and conditional\nones\u2014or, in a word, instinct from intelligence\u2014all contradiction\ndisappears, and order succeeds to confusion. Whatever in animals is\n_understanding_, does not in any degree approach the excellence of\nthe human understanding; and whatsoever, under the appearance of\n_understanding_, seemed superior to the human understanding, is in fact a\nmere result of a mechanical and blind force.\u201d[187]\n\nHere is what I say as to the boundaries between the intelligence of man\nand of animals.\n\n\u201cAnimals receive, through their senses, impressions similar to those that\nwe receive through the medium of our senses; like ourselves, they retain\nthe traces of these impressions: these impressions, when preserved, form\nfor them, as well as for us, numerous and various associations: they\ncombine them, they draw from them inferences, and deduce judgments from\nthem: therefore they possess understanding.\n\n\u201cBut the whole of their understanding stops at that point. The\nunderstanding they possess is not one that can consider itself: it cannot\nsee itself, does not know itself. They do not possess _reflection_, that\nsupreme faculty with which the mind of man is endowed, and which enables\nhim to turn his intellectual power inwards, so as to study and know the\nnature of his own understanding.\n\n\u201cReflection, thus defined, is then the boundary that separates human\nintelligence from that of the brute creation: and in fact it cannot be\ndenied that this furnishes a strong line of demarcation between them.\nThought, which contemplates itself; understanding, which sees itself and\nstudies itself; knowledge, which knows itself; these evidently constitute\nan order of determinate phenomena of a decided character, and to which no\nbrute animal can ever attain. This is, if one might so speak, a purely\nintellectual domain; and it appertains to man alone. In one word, animals\nfeel, know, think; but man is the only one of all created beings to whom\nhas been given the power of feeling that he feels, of knowing that he\nknows, and of thinking that he thinks.\u201d[188]\n\nI will quote, also, the following passage from my work sur _l\u2019instinct et\nl\u2019intelligence des animaux_, p. 178, et seq.\n\n\u201c ... There are three facts: _instinct_, _understanding of brutes_, and\n_human understanding_; and each of these facts has its definite limits.\n\n\u201cInstinct acts without knowing; understanding knows in order to act; the\nhuman understanding alone knows, and knows itself.\n\n\u201cReflection, closely defined, is the _knowledge of thought by thought_.\nAnd this power of thought over thought gives us a whole order of new\nrelations. As soon as the mind perceives itself it judges itself; as\nsoon as it can act upon itself it is free; as soon as it becomes free it\nbecomes moral.\n\n\u201cMan is only moral because he is free.\n\n\u201cThe brute animal follows its body; in the midst of this body, which\nshrouds it completely in matter, the human mind is free, and so free that\nit can, whenever it prefers to do so, immolate its very body.\n\n\u201c\u2018The great power of the will over the body,\u2019 says Bossuet, \u2018consists in\nthis prodigious effect, that man is so completely master of his frame,\nthat he can even sacrifice it for the sake of some greater good in view.\nTo rush into the midst of blows, and plunge into a flight of arrows from\na blind impetuosity, as happens among brute creatures, shows nothing\nsuperior to the body itself; but to resolve to die with understanding,\nand for reasons, notwithstanding the whole disposition of the body to the\ncontrary, evinces a principle superior to the body; and among all the\ntribes of animals, man is the only one in whom this principle exists.\u2019\u201d\n\n\n\n\nNOTE III.\n\nGALL, AS AN OBSERVER.\n\n    Page 93. _He studied them (mankind) in his own way, but he\n    studied them very closely._\n\n\nGall was a practical observer. He observed and studied always, and with\nso much the greater success because \u201cpeople never suspected that they\nhad to do (these are his own words) with a man who knew perfectly well\nthat the basis of human character continues to be always the same, and\nthat merely the objects that interest us change with the progress of\nyears.\u201d[189]\n\nHe examined \u201cfamilies, schools, hospitals, &c.\u201d[190] And he never was\nsatisfied with appearances only. \u201cThe occupations that we pursue as our\nbusiness, generally prove nothing either as to our faculties or our\npropensities: but those which we engage in as recreation are almost\nalways in conformity with our tastes and our talents.\u201d[191]\n\nHis observations on men were more serviceable to him in judging of and\ndescribing their characters, than the _bumps on the skull_.\n\n\u201cI often said to my friends, show me the fundamental forces of the soul,\nand I will find the organ and the seat for each one of them.[192] ...\nWhen I had become convinced that a distinguished talent, and one fully so\nrecognised, was especially the work of nature, I examined the head of the\nindividual, ... &c.\u201d[193]\n\nGall\u2019s progression, then, was from _observation_ to the _cranium_; he\nfirst proceeded from _observation_ to the _cranium_, and next from the\n_cranium_ to the _brain_.\n\nFurthermore, Gall began by studying the _physiognomy_\u2014the _features_ of\nthe _countenance_\u2014like Lavater.\n\nHe at first thought that a good memory was connected with a certain\n_conformation of the eyes_: \u201cI remarked,\u201d says he, \u201cthat they all had\nlarge projecting eyes.... I suspected, therefore, that there ought\nto exist some connexion between memory and this conformation of the\neyes.\u201d[194] Again he says, \u201cIt may be perceived, from the progress of\nthese researches, that the first step consisted in the discovery of\ncertain organs; that it was by degrees only that we allowed facts to\nspeak in order to deduce from them general principles; and that it was\nsubsequently, and towards the close, that we had learned to know the\nbrain.\u201d[195]\n\nThus it appears that the study of the brain came later than the doctrine;\nand that is the reason why the anatomy of the brain is a mere series of\nmistakes and conjectures\u2014I mean here the _special anatomy_, the _secret\nanatomy_, the _phrenological anatomy_; I mean the anatomy made out to\nsuit the doctrine. I have already sufficiently discriminated between it\nand the _real anatomy_.[196]\n\n\n\n\nNOTE IV.\n\nOF THE ANIMAL SPIRITS.\n\n    Page 116. _He who is so intolerant of the personifications\n    proposed by others makes one personification more._\n\n\nBroussais explains every thing by the word _irritation_, just as Gall\nexplains every thing by the word _faculties_, and as Malebranche\nexplained them by _animal spirits_.\n\nAfter serving Descartes, the _animal spirits_ were in the service of\nMalebranche; they served all the authors of the seventeenth century.\n\nMalebranche commences one of his chapters with these words: \u201cEvery body\nagrees that the _animal spirits_....\u201d[197] He had no idea that every body\nwould agree some day, that the _animal spirits_ is mere nonsense.\n\nThere were animal spirits of all sorts; as Gall had _faculties_ of all\nsorts: there were _agitated_[198] animal spirits, _languid_ animal\nspirits.[199] There were even _libertine_ animal spirits.\n\n\u201cWine is so spirituous,\u201d says Malebranche, \u201cthat it is _animal spirits_\nalmost completely formed, but libertine spirits.\u201d[200]\n\nThe animal spirits seemed to have become the _ultima ratio_ of the\nphilosophers.\n\nThe author of a book, in other respects to be esteemed, thus defined\n_imagination_: \u201cImagination is a perception of the soul\u2019s caused by the\ninternal motion of the animal spirits.\u201d[201]\n\nThat author had no doubt that he was saying something.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE V.\n\nEXAGGERATION OF BROUSSAIS, EVEN IN PHRENOLOGY.\n\n    Page 120. _We ought to read that volume over again, and forget\n    the Cours de Phr\u00e9nologie._\n\n\nBroussais does not adopt merely the general ideas of the phrenologists\u2014he\nadopts even the smallest of them.\n\nGall had located the _instinct_ of _murder_ in a given part of the brain;\nand he supposed, be it understood, that this part existed only in the\nbrain of the carnivorous animals. But see, it is found in the brain of\nthe herbivora; and one would suppose that the phrenologists would be in\ntrouble about it. Don\u2019t deceive yourself, the _instinct of murder_ is\nthe _instinct of destruction_. Spurzheim denominates it _destructivity_;\nand the herbivorous animals must possess it, for they eat plants and\nconsequently _destroy_ them.\n\n\u201cThe herbivora\u201d says Broussais, \u201ceffect a real destruction among\nplants.[202] An attempt has been made to turn these ideas into ridicule,\neven in an Academy.... It was in a learned society of this kind\nconsidered ridiculous in the phrenologists to compare the destruction of\nvegetables to that of animals. For my own part I do not see why the idea\nshould be rejected, if the fundamental object of the organ be to procure\nthe means of alimentation, which seems to be quite certain.\u201d[203]\n\nGall imagines an organ for religion; he thinks it peculiar to man, and\ndenominates it the _Organ of Theosophy_. The same organ is found quite\ndown in the scale as low as the sheep;[204] and do not suppose that\nBroussais is at all shocked by the discovery. If necessary he will go\nfurther than all the phrenologists taken together.\n\n\u201cThe phrenologists\u201d says he, \u201chave denied that this sentiment (the\nsentiment of veneration) belongs to the animals. I am not of that\nopinion. A certain shade of _veneration_ exists in many species, among\nthe vertebrate, that choose their leaders, and march according to a\nsignal given by their chiefs and obey them. Thus even among the sheep you\nmay see a chief.\u201d[205]\n\nWho would have believed it? Broussais finds Gall too timorous.\n\n\u201cThere is,\u201d says he, \u201cno central organ. This is considered as one of the\nmost powerful objections to Gall. As far as I know he never answered it.\nAs for me, I shall be more frank, perhaps more bold: I shall say it is\nimpossible that there should be one, &c.\u201d[206]\n\n\n\n\nNOTE VI.\n\nCONTRACTILITY OF BROUSSAIS.\n\n    Page 126. _He assigns it to every tissue, and, like them, he\n    explains every thing by means of it._\n\n\nHe assigns it to every tissue. Haller attributed this property to the\nmuscles alone, \u201cbut it is a common property of the tissues.\u201d[207]\n\nHe explains every thing by means of it: every thing, even _innervation_\nitself. But he is constrained to add: \u201cDoubtless _something more occurs_\nin the interior of the nervous tissue; doubtless we are unacquainted and\nignorant as to how _that other thing_ is connected with the motions in\nquestion, and how it may employ them in the act of innervation,\u201d &c.[208]\n\nSo we perceive, in the first place, _contractility_ explains\n_innervation_; and then, that _something more_ is wanting. And as nervous\ncontractility is nothing but a mental fiction (a nerve never moves, never\n_contracts_, when it is touched) the whole matter tapers down to this\n_something more_, or to _that other thing_.\n\nSee how very far from being rigorous are those who construct systems.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE VII.\n\nREAL LABOURS OF GALL AS TO THE BRAIN.\n\n    Page 128. _Gall, moreover, was a great anatomist._\n\n\nHe found that the medullary substance of the brain was fibrous\nthroughout;[209] he saw the fibres of the medulla oblongata decussate\nbefore they form the pyramidal eminences,[210] those of the corpora\nolivaria, &c.; that is to say, all the ascending fibres of the medulla\noblongata across the pons varolii, thalami nervor opticorum, and the\ncorpora striata, as far as the vault of the hemispheres; he saw the\nbundles formed by these fibres increased in magnitude at each of these\npassages; he distinguished the fibres which go out in order to expand\nin the hemispheres, from those that go in in order to give birth to the\ncommissures: many nerves that were regarded as coming out immediately\nfrom the brain, were by him traced even into the medulla oblongata, &c.\n\nAnd I repeat that all these facts, with the discovery of which he has\nenriched the science of anatomy, all of them are the results of a happy\nthought of his\u2014the idea of _tracing_ the fibres of the brain, or to use\na common expression, of substituting in the dissection of the brain the\nmethod of _developments_ for that of _sections_.\n\nThose of Gall\u2019s opinions which it seems ought not to be adopted, are:\nthat in which he supposes the nerve fibres to be born (he understands\nthe word to the letter) of the gray matter; that in which he contends\nthat the convolutions of the brain are merely foldings of the medullary\nfibres, and can therefore be _unfolded_; that in which he compares the\nrete mucosum of the skin to the gray matter of the encephalon, &c., &c.\n\nGall had a mind which impelled him to the formation of hypotheses; and\neven in his real anatomy there is a decided smack of a system-author.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] Anatomie et Physiologie du syst\u00e8me nerveux en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, et du cerveau\nen particulier, avec des observations sur la possibilit\u00e9 de reconna\u00eetre\nplusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de l\u2019homme et des\nanimaux par la configuration de leurs t\u00eates; 4 vol. 4to, avec planches.\nParis, de 1810 \u00e0 1819.\n\n[2] T. ii. p. 217. \u201cIt is generally understood,\u201d says he further, \u201cthat\nthe brain is the peculiar organ of the soul.\u201d T. ii. p. 14.\n\n[3] Gall, t. ii. p. 221.\n\n[4] Gall, t. ii. p. 222. Haller, Elem. Physiolog. etc., t. iv. p. 304.\nSensus pr\u00e6terea sedem in cerebro esse, atque ad cerebrum per nervos\nmandari, alia sunt qu\u00e6 ostendunt.\n\n[5] Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l\u2019homme, IIe M\u00e9moire, \u00a7 vii.\n\n[6] Le\u00e7ons d\u2019Anat. Comp. t. ii. p. 153.\n\n[7] Ibid. p. 173.\n\n[8] Recherches Phys. sur la Vie et la Mort, art. vi. \u00a7 ii.\n\n[9] Ibid.\n\n[10] Descartes, Lettre \u00e0 Regius ou Leroy, t. viii. p. 515, edit, par M.\nCousin.\n\n[11] T. v. p. 34. \u201cI remark,\u201d says he again, \u201cthat the mind does not\nreceive the impression from all parts of the body, but from the brain\nonly.\u201d\u2014T. i. p. 344.\n\n[12] T. vi. p. 347.\n\n[13] T. ii. p. 357.\n\n[14] T. ii. p. 358.\n\n[15] \u201cThe principal object of this work,\u201d says he, \u201cis to show how all\nour knowledge, and all our faculties come from the senses.\u201d\u2014Trait\u00e9 des\nSensations, pr\u00e9ambule de l\u2019Extrait Raisonn\u00e9.\n\n[16] Trait\u00e9 des Sensations, pr\u00e9am. de l\u2019Extrait Raisonn\u00e9.\n\n[17] De l\u2019homme, de ses facult\u00e9s intellectuelles, etc. t. i. p. 186.\nLiege, 1774.\n\n[18] He very properly distinguishes the senses from the understanding;\nbut, as will be elsewhere seen, he endows each sense with all the\nattributes of the understanding. He escapes from one error only to fall\ninto another.\n\n[19] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les fonctions\ndu Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, 2d edit. Paris, 1842.\n\n[20] Ibid.\n\n[21] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les fonctions\ndu Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, 2d edit. Paris, 1842.\n\n[22] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les fonctions\ndu Syst\u00e8me Nerveux.\n\n[23] Ibid.\n\n[24] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les fonctions\ndu Syst\u00e8me Nerveux.\n\n[25] \u201cFrom what I have now said, it clearly follows that the aperceptive\nfaculty, the faculty of reminiscence, and that of memory, are nothing but\nattributes common to all the fundamental faculties.\u201d\u2014Gall, t. iv. p. 319.\n\u201cAll that I have just said, is also applicable to the judgment and the\nimagination,\u201d &c.\u2014Ibid. p. 325. \u201cThe sentiments and the propensities also\nhave their judgment, their imagination, their recollection, and their\nmemory.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 327.\n\n[26] Ibid. 328.\n\n[27] Ibid. 327.\n\n[28] Gall, t. iv. p. 339.\n\n[29] Ibid. p. 341.\n\n[30] \u201cThe _intellectual faculty_ and all its subdivisions, such as\nperception, recollection, memory, judgment, imagination, &c. are not\nfundamental faculties, but merely general attributes of them.\u201d\u2014Gall, t.\niv. p. 327.\n\n[31] \u201cReason,\u201d says Gall, \u201cis the result of the simultaneous action of\nall the intellectual faculties.\u201d\u2014Gall, t. iv. p. 341.\n\n[32] Gall enumerates twenty-seven of these faculties, Spurzheim\nenumerates twenty-five, &c.\n\n[33] Gall, t. iv. p. 325.\n\n[34] Ibid. p. 330.\n\n[35] \u201cI find in myself,\u201d says Descartes, \u201cdivers faculties of thought,\nthat have each their own way, ... whence I conclude, they are distinct\nfrom me, as modes are distinct from things.\u201d\u2014T. i. p. 332.\n\n[36] T. viii. p. 169.\n\n[37] Gall, iv. p. 341.\n\n[38] Ibid.\n\n[39] Ibid. t. ii. p. 100.\n\n[40] Gall, t. ii. p. 97.\n\n[41] Ibid.\n\n[42] \u201cIt is a law of moral liberty, that man shall be always determined,\nand that he shall himself determine from the most numerous and most\npowerful motives.\u201d\u2014T. ii. p. 137.\n\n[43] \u201cBut an organ may act with greater energy, and furnish a more\npowerful motive.\u201d\u2014T. ii. p. 104.\n\n[44] \u201cThere is no person who, upon contemplating himself, does not feel\nand experience that will and liberty are one and the same; or rather,\nthat there is no difference between that which is voluntary and that\nwhich is free.\u201d\u2014T. i. p. 496.\n\n[45] Descartes, t. i. p. 299. \u201cIt is always in our power to prevent\nourselves from pursuing a good which is clearly known to us, provided we\nshould think it a good to show in that way our free will.\u201d\u2014Descartes,\nt. vi. p. 133. \u201cThe fulness of liberty consists in the great use of\nour positive ability to follow the worse, while we truly know the\nbetter.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 138.\n\n[46] The question here relates solely to the brain, properly so called,\n(the lobes or cerebral hemispheres.) The rest of the encephalon does not\nserve in the operations of the understanding. See the preceding article,\np. 29, et seq.\n\n[47] _Individual intelligences_\u2014an expression of Gall\u2019s. \u201cEach individual\nintelligence has its own proper organ.\u201d\u2014iv. 341.\n\n[48] Even the instincts, according to Gall, have their memory,\nimagination, &c. \u201cThe instinct of propagation, that of the love of\noffspring, pride, vanity, possess, beyond contradiction, their perceptive\nfaculty, their recollection, their memory, judgment, imagination, and\ntheir own attention.\u201d\u2014T. iv. p. 331. \u201cThe propensities and the sentiments\nlikewise possess their judgment, their taste, their imagination, their\nrecollection, and their memory.\u201d\u2014iv. 344.\n\n[49] Gall, t. iv. p. 325.\n\n[50] Ibid.\n\n[51] See particularly t. ii. p. 5.\n\n[52] \u201cHad I to do with readers wholly free from prejudice, I should, in\norder to convince them of this, (the supposition of innate ideas,) have\nnothing to do but show them that mankind acquire all the knowledge they\npossess by the simple use of their natural faculties.\u201d\u2014Philos. Essay on\nthe Human Understanding.\n\n[53] \u201cLocke contents himself,\u201d says he, \u201cwith acknowledging that the soul\nperceives, doubts, believes, reasons, knows, wills, and reflects: that we\nare convinced of the existence of these _operations_; ... but he seems to\nhave regarded them as something innate.\u201d A short time before he had said,\n\u201cWe shall see that all the faculties of the soul appeared to him to be\ninnate qualities.\u201d\u2014Trait\u00e9 des Sensations. (Extrait raisonn\u00e9.)\n\n[54] See t. iii. p. 81.\n\n[55] T. i. p. 343.\n\n[56] \u201cI may now flatter myself,\u201d says he, \u201cthat the reader is\nsufficiently prepared for quite a new philosophy, deduced directly from\nthe fundamental forces.\u201d\u2014T. iii. p. 11.\n\n[57] T. iv. p. 327.\n\n[58] T. iv. p. 319.\n\n[59] T. iv. p. 341.\n\n[60] Ibid.\n\n[61] Ibid.\n\n[62] \u201cEach individual understanding possesses its own proper organ.\u201d\u2014T.\niv. p. 341.\n\n[63] T. i. p. 230.\n\n[64] T. iv. p. 105.\n\n[65] See the preceding articles.\n\n[66] T. iv. p. 340. \u201cFrom all these faculties comes at last decision. It\nis this decision ... which is really will and wishing.\u201d\u2014T. ii. p. 105.\n\n[67] T. iv. p. 341.\n\n[68] T. iv. p. 269.\n\n[69] T. iv. p. 271.\n\n[70] T. iv. p. 252.\n\n[71] T. iv. p. 252.\n\n[72] T. iv. p. 10.\n\n[73] T. i. p. 290.\n\n[74] T. i. p. 287.\n\n[75] Article \u201cLibert\u00e9,\u201d Diction. Encyclop.\n\n[76] T. iii. p. 155. Such phrases cannot be concluded.\n\n[77] T. iii. p. 213.\n\n[78] Ibid. 219.\n\n[79] \u201cThis term, instinct, is applicable,\u201d says he, \u201cto all the\nfundamental forces.\u201d\u2014T. iv. p. 334. And he does not see that as to the\ninstincts and the understanding all is contrast. Upon this difference\nof instinct and understanding, see my work De l\u2019Instinct et de\nl\u2019Intelligence des Animaux, etc. Paris, 1845, 2d edit.\n\n[80] It is true that this approximation astonishes him. \u201cThe predilection\nof animals for elevated places depends,\u201d says he, \u201cupon the same parts\nas pride, which is in man a moral sentiment! Let the reader imagine the\nastonishment excited in my mind by such a phenomenon.\u201d\u2014T. iii. 311.\n\n[81] \u201cCo-existing with the love of war, it (the carnivorous instinct)\nconstitutes the intrepid warrior.\u201d\u2014T. iii. p. 258. \u201cI know a head which,\nas to the organ of murder, approaches that of Madeline Albert, and the la\nBouhours, except only that nature has executed it upon a grander scale.\nTo witness suffering, is for this person to have the keenest enjoyment.\nWhoever does not love blood, is in his eyes contemptible.\u201d\u2014T. iii. p.\n259. The pen refuses to transcribe such things, which fortunately,\nhowever, are pure extravagances.\n\n[82] \u201cFrom my reflections it follows that conscience is nothing but a\nmodification, an affection of the moral sense,\u201d (organ.)\u2014T. iv. p. 210.\n\u201cFrom all that I have said as to conscience, it follows that it can by\nno means be regarded as a fundamental quality: that it is really only an\naffection of the moral sense\u2014or benevolence.\u201d\u2014T. iv. p. 217.\n\n[83] T. iii. p. 321.\n\n[84] T. iv. p. 272.\n\n[85] T. ii. p. 287.\n\n[86] Recherches sur le syst\u00e8me nerveux en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et sur celui du cerveau\nen particulier; m\u00e9moire pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019Institut de France, le 14 Mars,\n1808; suivi d\u2019Observations sur le rapport qui en a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait \u00e0 cette\ncompagnie par ses commissaires, par F. J. Gall et G. Spurzheim. Paris,\n1809.\n\n[87] \u201cThe nervous membrane of the brain forms these folds, which are\ndenominated its convolutions.\u201d\u2014Anat. et Physiol. du Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, t.\niii. p. 82.\n\n[88] Spurzheim justly remarks: \u201cAdmitting that the direction of the\nfibres is known, that we know their consistence to be greater or less,\nthat their colour is more or less white, that their magnitude is more\nor less considerable, &c. what conclusions can we, from all these\ncircumstances, draw as to their functions? None at all.\u201d\u2014Obser. sur la\nPhr\u00e9nologie, ou la connaissance de l\u2019homme moral et intellectuel fond\u00e9e\nsur les fonctions du Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, p. 83. Paris, 1818.\n\n[89] Rapport sur un M\u00e9moire de MM. Gall et Spurzheim, r\u00e9latif \u00e0 l\u2019anat.\ndu cerveau. S\u00e9ances des 25 Avril et 2 Mai, 1808.\n\n[90] \u201cThe determination of the fundamental forces and the seat of\ntheir organs constitutes the most striking portion of my discoveries.\nThe knowledge of the primary faculties and qualities, and the seat of\ntheir material conditions, constitutes precisely the phrenology of the\nbrain.\u201d\u2014Gall, Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., t. iii. p. 4.\n\n[91] Lettre d\u2019un M\u00e9decin des H\u00f4pitaux du Roi. Namur. 1710.\n\n[92] Elementa Physiologi\u00e6, t. iv. p. 384.\n\n[93] \u201cBut if it be supposed that each fundamental faculty, as well as\neach particular sense, is dependent on a particular part of the brain,\u201d\n&c. Gall, Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., t. iii. p. 392.\n\n[94] T. iv. p. 9.\n\n[95] T. iv. p. 9.\n\n[96] T. ii. p. 234.\n\n[97] The brain, properly so called.\n\n[98] _I_ see with _my_ eyes.\u2014M.\n\n[99] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les fonctions\ndu Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842.\n\n[100] Ibid.\n\n[101] See at the end of this work the first Note on Gall\u2019s Anatomy.\n\n[102] T. i. p. 271. Spurzheim explains himself in like manner. \u201cThe\norgans of the internal faculties are as separate as the bundles of the\nnerves of the five senses.\u201d\u2014Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9nol., &c. p. 74. \u201cIt is\nfound that the brain is composed of many bundles, which must have their\nfunctions.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 94. \u201cThe organs ... are composed of divergent\nbundles, of convolutions, and of the commissures.\u201d\u2014Ibid.\n\n[103] T. iv. p. 8. \u201cBonnet believes, and it is probable, that each nerve\nfibre has its own proper action.\u201d\u2014Ibid.\n\n[104] T. iii. p. 2.\n\n[105] T. iii. p. 4.\n\n[106] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les\nfonctions du Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842. See also the first article\nof this work.\n\n[107] It must, however, be one or the other; for it must be something.\nMight it be a convolution, as has been since said? But there are not\nseven and twenty convolutions, &c. &c.\n\n[108] T. ii. p. 163.\n\n[109] Gall, as we have seen, confounds understanding with instinct.\nLiterally, he divides understanding into many instincts, and then out of\neach instinct constructs an intellectual faculty. See the second article\nof this work. \u201cThe term instinct suits all the fundamental faculties.\u201d\u2014T.\niv. p. 334. For the characters peculiar to the instincts, see my work\nentitled \u201cDe l\u2019Instinct et de l\u2019Intelligence des Animaux,\u201d 2d edit. 1845.\n\n[110] See my Recherches Exp\u00e9rimentales sur les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et les\nfonctions du Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842.\n\n[111] \u201cThe organ of philogeniture, or the last convolution of the\ncerebral lobes.\u201d\u2014Spurzheim, Obser. sur la Phr\u00e9n., &c. p. 117.\n\n[112] With very few exceptions.\n\n[113] \u201cThe qualities and faculties common to man and animals, are\nsituated in the posterior portions,\u201d &c.\u2014T. iii. p. 79, and t. iv. p. 13.\n\u201cThe qualities and faculties that man exclusively enjoys, are situated\nin the cerebral portions, of which the brute creation is deprived; and\nwe must consequently seek for them in the antero superior portion of the\nfrontal bone.\u201d\u2014T. iii. page 79.\n\n[114] \u201cThe anterior parts of the brain are not wanting in the mammifera,\nbut the posterior parts,\u201d says Leuret, very justly, in his fine work\non the circumvolutions of the brain, entitled, Anat. Compar. du Syst.\nNerveux, consider\u00e9 dans ses rapports avec l\u2019Intelligence, t. i. p. 588.\nParis, 1839.\n\n[115] T. iii. p. 20.\n\n[116] T. iii. p. 26.\n\n[117] It is curious to see how M. Vimont, a very decided phrenologist\nas well as an able anatomist, expresses himself on the subject of the\n_localizations_ of Gall and Spurzheim. \u201cGall\u2019s work,\u201d says M. Vimont,\n\u201cis fitter to lead into error than to give a just idea of the seats of\nthe organs.\u201d\u2014Trait\u00e9 de Phr\u00e9n. t. ii. p. 12. \u201cGall says he has remarked,\nthat horses whose ears are widely separated at the roots, are sure-footed\nand courageous. Possibly the fact may be true; but I cannot comprehend\nthe connexion that may exist betwixt the outward mark and the quality of\ncourage, whose seat, in the horse, Gall indicates at a point where there\nis no brain.\u201d\u2014Ibid. 281. \u201cSpurzheim indicates the region of the frontal\nsinuses as the seat of gentleness, while courage is located upon the\nmuscles that go to be inserted on the os occipitis.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 117. Such\nare M. Vimont\u2019s remarks, yet this same M. Vimont inscribes the following\ntwenty-nine names on the skull of a goose!\n\n    1. Conservation.\n    2. Choice of aliment.\n    3. Destruction.\n    4. Cunning.\n    5. Courage.\n    6. Choice of locality.\n    7. Concentration.\n    8. Attachment to life, or marriage.\n    9. Attachment.\n    10. Reproduction.\n    11. Attachment to the product of conception.\n    12. Property.\n    13. Circumspection.\n    14. Perception of substance.\n    15. Configuration.\n    16. Extent.\n    17. Distance.\n    18. Geometrical sense.\n    19. Resistance.\n    20. Localities.\n    21. Order.\n    22. Time.\n    23. Language.\n    24. Eventuality.\n    25. Construction.\n    26. Musical talent.\n    27. Imitation.\n    28. Comparison.\n    29. Gentleness.\n\n\u201cAll this upon the cranium of a goose!\u201d says M. Leuret upon this\noccasion, (page 355.) \u201cAnd there is no place so small but it is\noccupied.... The faculties are so crowded,\u201d adds he, \u201cthat it would be a\nmarvellous thing to be able to write their names upon the brain.... It\nwould be a greater marvel to discover them.\u201d\n\n[118] Gall himself says: \u201cIn whatever region we examine the two\nsubstances that compose the brain, it is with difficulty that we can\ndiscern any difference between them as to their structure, &c.\u201d\u2014T. iii.\np. 70.\n\n[119] T. iii. p. 63.\n\n[120] \u201cI remained a whole day shut up in an oven.\u201d\u2014T. i. 133.\n\n[121] T. i. p. 263.\n\n[122] Eloge de Tournefort.\n\n[123] One volume, 8vo. Paris, 1818. Phrenology is the very name given by\nSpurzheim to the doctrine of Gall.\n\n[124] One volume, 8vo. Paris, 1820.\n\n[125] Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9nol. &c. p. 8.\n\n[126] Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9n. p. 20.\n\n[127] Ibid. p. 22.\n\n[128] Rech. sur le Syst. Nerv. en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, &c. par F. J. Gall et G.\nSpurzheim.\n\n[129] Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerveux, &c., the work which has been\nexamined in the three preceding articles.\n\n[130] T. iv. p. 341.\n\n[131] Ibid. p. 327.\n\n[132] Ibid. p. 341.\n\n[133] In the preceding article, p. 93.\n\n[134] Lettre de Charles Villers \u00e0 Georges Cuvier, sur une nouvelle\nth\u00e9orie du cerveau, par le Docteur Gall, &c. Metz, 1802.\n\n[135] Lettre de Charles Villers, &c. p. 34.\n\n[136] Ibid.\n\n[137] Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9n., &c. p. 10.\n\n[138] Especially in the last article.\n\n[139] And which was not taken up by Gall, except from the necessity he\nwas under of assimilating at all points the external senses with the\nfaculties of the soul.\n\n[140] Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9n., &c. p. 65.\n\n[141] Ibid. p. 67.\n\n[142] Ibid. p. 75.\n\n[143] See particularly the Essai philosophique sur la mor\u00e2le et\nintellectuelle de l\u2019homme, p. 54, et seq.\n\n[144] Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9n. p. 17.\n\n[145] Ibid. p. 127.\n\n[146] Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., &c. t. iii. p. 19. This volume came\nout the same year as Spurzheim\u2019s Observ., &c.\n\n[147] T. iv. p. 67.\n\n[148] The eight organs added by Spurzheim, are the organs of\nhabitativity, order, time, right, supernaturality, hope, extent,\nweight. Gall\u2019s remarks upon these eight organs proposed by Spurzheim\nare as follows: \u201cM. Spurzheim, it is true, recognises eight organs\nmore than I admit. As to the organs of habitativity, order, time, and\nsupernaturality, I have already spoken. I admit an organ of the moral\nsense, or sense of right (_juste_), but I have very strong reasons\nfor believing that benevolence is nothing more than a very strong\nmanifestation of the moral sense; therefore I treat these two organs\nunder the rubric of a single organ. What M. Spurzheim says on the organs\nof hope, of extent, and of weight, has not as yet convinced me: and, in\nfact, he has hitherto proved nothing in respect to them.\u201d\u2014T. iii. p. 25.\n\n[149] Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 216.\n\n[150] See the Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 47, et seq.\n\n[151] The sense of Amativity, the sense of Philogeniture, the sense of\nDestructivity, the sense of Affectivity, the sense of Thievishness,\nthe sense of Secretivity, the sense of Circumspection, the sense of\nApprobation, the sense of Self-love. (What a chaos, and what words!)\n\n[152] The sense of Benevolence, the sense of Veneration, the sense\nof Firmness, the sense of Duty, the sense of Hope, the sense of the\nMarvellous, the sense of Ideality, the sense of Gaiety, the sense of\nImitation.\n\n[153] The sense of Individuality, of Extent, of Configuration, of\nConsistence, of Weight, of Colour.\n\n[154] The sense of Localities, of Numeration, of Order, of Phenomena, of\nTime, of Method, of Artificial Language.\n\n[155] The sense of Comparison, the sense of Causality.\n\n[156] \u201cSome of the affective faculties produce only a desire, an\ninclination.... I shall call them propensities.\u201d\u2014Observ. sur la Phr\u00e9nol.,\n&c. p. 124.\n\n[157] \u201cOther affective faculties are not restricted to a simple\ninclination, but something beyond; which is what is called sentiment or\nfeeling.\u201d\u2014Ibid.\n\n[158] \u201cThe intellectual faculties are also double: some of them know;\nothers reflect.\u201d\u2014Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 225.\n\n[159] \u201cThe faculties peculiar to man are happy in themselves, per\nse.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 167.\n\n[160] Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv. &c. t. iii. p. 27.\n\n[161] See his Histoire des Phlegmas. Chron. 1808.\n\n[162] See his work entitled, \u201cDe l\u2019Irritation et de la Folie,\u201d 1828.\n\n[163] Cours de Phr\u00e9nologie, 1 vol. 8vo. 1836.\n\n[164] Cours de Phr\u00e9nologie, p. 82.\n\n[165] Ibid. p. 140.\n\n[166] Ibid. p. 37.\n\n[167] \u201cMemory is not an isolated faculty; and there are as many memories\nas organs.\u201d\u2014p. 131.\n\n[168] \u201cThe instincts and the sentiments have a memory as well as the\nexternal perceptions.\u201d\u2014p. 36.\n\n[169] \u201c ... The study of the human mind, not indeed that of a fictitious\none bearing this mysterious appellation, but of the _ensemble_ of the\nmental faculties of man.\u201d\u2014p. 82.\n\n[170] Page 48.\n\n[171] \u201cThe favorers of the intra-cranial entity.\u201d\u2014p. 153.\n\n[172] \u201cTheir central intra-cranial being, to which they attribute all\ntheir faculties.\u201d\n\n[173] \u201cSuppose they had called this being _person par excellence_....\u201d\u2014p.\n75.\n\n[174] Let us examine, as to this particular (_moi_) ME, all Broussais\u2019s\n_variorums_. In one place the _me_ comes from only one organ\u2014the organ\nof general comparison: \u201cWe owe to the organ of general comparison the\ndistinction of our person expressed by the sign _me_.\u201d\u2014Cours de Phr\u00e9n.,\np. 684. Further on it comes from two\u2014the organ of comparison and the\norgan of causality: \u201cThe organ of causality is as necessary to the\ndistinction of the _me_, and of the _person_, as the organ of general\ncomparison.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 685. Next there is no organ at all: \u201cTo assign to\nthe _me_ a special organ appears to me to be out of the question.\u201d\u2014Ibid.\np. 119. And then it comes from every where: \u201cThere is no special and\ncentral organ, and our perception of ourselves has for its basis the\nsensitive perceptions.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 119.\n\n[175] Cours de Phr\u00e9nologie, p. 684.\n\n[176] Examen de la Doctrine M\u00e9dicale, etc. 1816.\n\n[177] Cours de Phr\u00e9nologie, p. 717.\n\n[178] Cours de Phr\u00e9nologie, p. 77. He also says, \u201cTheir central\nintra-cranial being, to which they attribute all the faculties of a\nman, is not cognisable by any of our senses, ... it is therefore a pure\nhypothesis.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 153. Thus there is no _mind_ (pure hypothesis);\nno _faculties_ but those of the _organs_ (the faculties are the acts\nof _material organs_); no understanding, except as a simple phenomenon\nof the nervous action (understanding and all its manifestations are\n_phenomena of nervous action_); consequently, there is no psycology;\nthere is nothing but physiology; and even (for it should be clearly\nunderstood) nothing but Broussais\u2019s physiology.\n\n[179] \u201cIn order to form for one\u2019s self a just notion of the operations\nwhich result in the production of thought, it is necessary to conceive\nof the brain as a peculiar organ, specially designed for the production\nthereof, just as the stomach is designed to effect digestion, the liver\nto form the bile, &c.\u201d\u2014Cabanis, Rapports du Physique et du moral de\nl\u2019homme, IIe m\u00e9moire, \u00a7 vii.\n\n[180] Whence he concludes still more admirably, to the immortality of\nthe soul. \u201cI cannot,\u201d says he, \u201cconceive otherwise of those who die,\nthan that they pass into a more pleasing and tranquil life than ours,\neven carrying with them the remembrance of the past: for I find there\nis within us an intellectual memory.... And although religion teaches\nus many things upon this subject, I must, notwithstanding, confess my\ninfirmity on this point, which it appears to me that I possess in common\nwith most people, which is, that although we might wish to believe, and\neven might suppose ourselves to be firm believers in the doctrines of\nreligion, we are not so deeply touched with those things that are taught\nby faith alone, and which our mere reason cannot attain, as by those that\nare instilled into us by natural and very evident reasons.\u201d\u2014T. viii. p.\n684.\n\n[181] De l\u2019Imitation et de la Folie, p. 4.\n\n[182] \u201cThe exaggeration of the phenomena of contractility is what\nconstitutes irritation.\u201d\u2014Ibid. p. 77.\n\n[183] Anat. et Physiol. du Syst\u00e8me Nerveux, &c. iii. 15.\n\n[184] The white matter is every where fibrous. No person has contributed\nmore than Gall to the demonstration of this great fact. He justly\nremarks: \u201cThose authors who, with S\u0153mmerring and Cuvier, &c., recognise\nthe fibrous structure of the brain, in many of its parts, have\nnevertheless, not yet ventured to say that it is so in all its parts.\u201d\u2014T.\ni. 235.\n\n[185] The cerebellum serves only for the motions of locomotion. (See the\nfirst article of this work.) But, I am here setting forth Gall\u2019s opinions.\n\n[186] \u201cThe particular systems of the brain terminate in fibrous\nexpansions arranged in layers, just as the other nervous systems expand\nin fibres at their peripheral extremity.\u201d\u2014T. i. 318. \u201cAll the diverging\nbundles of the brain, after they come out from the last apparatus of\nreinforcement, expand in layers and form convolutions.\u201d\u2014T. i. 283. \u201cThe\nnerves of sensation and motion expand in the skin and the muscles; the\nnerves of the senses, each in the external instrument to which they\nbelong: for example, the pituitary membrane upon the bones of the nose:\nthe nerve of taste in the tongue, and the expansion of the optic nerve\nin the retina.... Nature obeys precisely the same law in the brain. The\ndifferent parts of the brain originate and are reinforced at different\npoints; they form fibrous bundles of various sizes, which terminate in\nexpansions. All these expansions of the various bundles constitute, when\nreunited, the hemispheres of the brain.\u201d\u2014T. iii. p. 3.\n\nI here speak only of the _diverging fibres_. Coming from the interior,\nthey proceed towards the exterior: the _converging fibres_ coming from\nthe exterior, that is, according to Gall, from the gray matter that\nenvelopes the brain and the cerebellum, are directed inwards. The\nformer constitute the _convolutions_, while the latter compose the\n_commissures_. But I shall, further on, return to this subject.\n\n[187] See my work, De l\u2019instinct et de l\u2019intelligence des animaux, &c. p.\n46, 2d edit.\n\n[188] Opus citat. p. 49.\n\n[189] T. iii. p. 64.\n\n[190] T. iii. p. 64.\n\n[191] T. iii. p. 64.\n\n[192] T. iii. p. 58.\n\n[193] T. iii. p. 59.\n\n[194] T. i. p. 3.\n\n[195] T. i. p. 18.\n\n[196] T. i. p. 64 & 67.\n\n[197] De la Rech. de la Verit\u00e9, liv. ii. chap. ii.\n\n[198] Ibid.\n\n[199] Ibid.\n\n[200] Du bel esprit, p. 80.\n\n[201] Ibid.\n\n[202] Cours de Phr\u00e9n. 218.\n\n[203] P. 221.\n\n[204] See M. Leuret: Anat. Comp. du Syst. Nerv. &c. 1839.\n\n[205] Cours de Phr\u00e9n. p. 350.\n\n[206] Ibid. p. 117.\n\n[207] De l\u2019Irritation et de la Folie, p. 2.\n\n[208] Ibid. p. 76.\n\n[209] Steno had already said, \u201cIf the medullary substance be every where\nfibrous, as in fact, in most parts it appears to be, you must confess\nthat the disposal of these fibres must be arranged with great skill,\nsince the whole diversity of our feelings and motions depend upon them.\nWe wonder at the artifice of the fibres in each muscle, but how much more\nare they worthy of admiration in the brain, where these fibres, enclosed\nwithin so small a space, perform each its own function without confusion\nand without disorder.\u201d\u2014_Discours sur l\u2019anat. du cerveau_, 1668.\n\n[210] Long before his time the same had been seen by Mistichelli,\nPourfour du Petit, Winslow, and several others, but it had been\nforgotten. \u201cEach pyramidal body,\u201d says Pourfour du Petit, \u201cis divided at\nits inferior part into two large bundles of fibres, most frequently into\nthree, and in some instances into four. Those of the right pass to the\nleft side, and those of the left pass to the right side, mingling with\neach other.\u201d\u2014_Lettre d\u2019un m\u00e9decin des h\u00f4pitaux du Roi._ Namur 1710.","title":"Phrenology Examined","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":21524}