{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_65097/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_65097","id":"gutenberg_65097","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65097","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Journals","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy -- Periodicals"],"text":"The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I.\n\n\n\n\n THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n VOL. I.\n\n\n EDITED BY WM. T. HARRIS.\n\n\n ST. LOUIS, MO.:\n GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS.\n 1867.\n\n KRAUS REPRINT CO.\n\n New York\n\n 1968\n\n\n\n\n\n KRAUS REPRINT CO.\n A U.S. Division of Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited\n\n\n Printed in Germany\n Lessingdruckerei in Wiesbaden\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE.\n\n\nIn concluding the first volume of this Journal, the editor wishes to say\na few things regarding its contents, even at the risk of repeating, in\nsome cases, what has already been said. He hopes that his judgment in\nthe selection of articles will be, in the main, approved. In so novel an\nundertaking it is not to be expected that the proper elevation and range\nwill be found at once. But the editor thinks that he has acquired some\nvaluable experience that will aid him in preparing the second volume.\n\nThe reader will notice, upon looking over the table of contents, that\nabout one-third of the articles relate to Art, and hence recommend\nthemselves more especially to those who seek artistic culture, and wish\nat the same time to have clear conceptions regarding it.\n\nIt is, perhaps, a mistake to select so little that bears on physical\nscience, which is by far the most prominent topic of interest at the\npresent day. In order to provide for this, the editor hopes to print in\nthe next volume detailed criticisms of the \u201cPositive Philosophy,\u201d\nappreciating its advantages and defects of method and system. The\n\u201cDevelopment Theory,\u201d the \u201cCorrelation of Physical, Vital and Mental\nForces,\u201d the abstract theories in our text-books on Natural Philosophy,\nregarding the nature of attraction, centrifugal and centripetal forces,\nlight, heat, electricity, chemical elements, &c., demand the\ninvestigation of the speculative thinker. The exposition of Hegel\u2019s\nPhenomenology of Spirit will furnish pertinent thoughts relating to\nmethod.\n\nWhile the large selection of translations has met with approval from\nvery high sources, yet there has been some disappointment expressed at\nthe lack of original articles. Considerably more than half of the\narticles have been original entirely, while all the translations are\nnew. The complaint, however, relates more especially to what its authors\nare pleased to call the Un-American character of the contents of the\nJournal. Here the editor feels like pleading ignorance as an excuse.\u2014In\nwhat books is one to find the true \u201cAmerican\u201d type of Speculative\nPhilosophy? Certain very honorable exceptions occur to every one, but\nthey are not American in a popular sense. We, as a people, buy immense\neditions of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Comte, Hamilton, Cousin,\nand others; one can trace the appropriation and digestion of their\nthoughts in all the leading articles of our Reviews, Magazines and books\nof a thoughtful character. If this is American philosophy, the editor\nthinks that it may be very much elevated by absorbing and digesting more\nrefined aliment. It is said that of Herbert Spencer\u2019s works nearly\ntwenty thousand have been sold in this country, while in England\nscarcely the first edition has been bought. This is encouraging for the\nAmerican thinker: what lofty spiritual culture may not become broadly\nand firmly rooted here where thoughtful minds are so numerous? Let this\nspirit of inquiry once extend to thinkers like Plato and Aristotle,\nSchelling and Hegel\u2014let these be digested and organically reproduced\u2014and\nwhat a phalanx of American thinkers we may have to boast of! For after\nall it is not \u201cAmerican _thought_\u201d so much as American _thinkers_ that\nwe want. To _think_, in the highest sense, is to transcend all _natural\nlimits_\u2014such, for example, as national peculiarities, defects in\nculture, distinctions in Race, habits, and modes of living\u2014to be\n_universal_, so that one can dissolve away the external hull and seize\nthe substance itself. The peculiarities stand in the way;\u2014were it not\nfor these, we should find in Greek or German Philosophy just the forms\nwe ourselves need. Our province as _Americans_ is to rise to purer forms\nthan have hitherto been attained, and thus speak a \u201csolvent word\u201d of\nmore potency than those already uttered. If this be the goal we aim at,\nit is evident that we can find no other means so well adapted to rid us\nof our own idiosyncracies as the study of the greatest thinkers of all\nages and all times. May this Journal aid such a consummation!\n\nIn conclusion, the editor would heartily thank all who have assisted him\nin this enterprise, by money and cheering words; he hopes that they will\nnot withdraw in the future their indispensable aid. To others he owes\nmuch for kind assistance rendered in preparing articles for the printer.\nJustice demands that special acknowledgment should be made here of the\nservices of Miss Anna C. Brackett, whose skill in proof-reading, and\nsubtle appreciation of philosophic thought have rendered her editorial\nassistance invaluable.\n\nST. LOUIS, _December, 1867_.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS.\n\n\n Alchemists, The _Editor._ 126\n\n B\u00e9nard\u2019s Essay on Hegel\u2019s _Jas. A. 36,\n \u00c6sthetics (translation). Martling._ 91,\n 169,\n 221\n\n Dialogue on Music. _E. 224\n Sobolowski._\n\n Editorials. _Editor._ 127\n\n Fichte\u2019s Introduction to the _A. E. 23\n Science of Knowledge Kroeger._\n (translation).\n\n Criticism of Philosophical _A. E. 79,\n Systems (translation). Kroeger._ 137\n\n Genesis. _A. Bronson 165\n Alcott._\n\n Goethe\u2019s Theory of Colors. _Editor._ 63\n\n Essay on Da Vinci\u2019s \u201cLast _D. J. 242\n Supper\u201d (translation). Snider & T.\n Davidson._\n\n Herbert Spencer. _Editor._ 6\n\n Introduction to Philosophy. _Editor._ 57,\n 114,\n 187,\n 236\n\n In the Quarry. _Anna C. 192\n Brackett._\n\n Leibnitz\u2019s Monadology _F. H. 129\n (translation). Hedge._\n\n Letters on Faust. _H. C. 178\n Brockmeyer._\n\n Metaphysics of Materialism. _D. G. 176\n Brinton._\n\n Music as a Form of Art. _Editor._ 120\n\n Notes on Milton\u2019s Lycidas. _Anna C. 87\n Brackett._\n\n Paul Janet and Hegel. _Editor._ 250\n\n Philosophy of Baader _A. 190\n (translation from Dr. Strothotte._\n Hoffmann).\n\n Raphael\u2019s Transfiguration. _Editor._ 53\n\n Schelling\u2019s Introduction to _Tom 159\n Idealism (translation). Davidson._\n\n \u201c \u201d \u201c the _Tom 193\n Philosophy of Nature Davidson._\n (transl\u2019n).\n\n Schopenhauer\u2019s Dialogue on _C. L. 61\n Immortality (translation). Bernays._\n\n \u201d Doctrine of the _C. L. 232\n Will (translation). Bernays._\n\n Seed Life. _Anna C. 60\n Brackett._\n\n Second Part of Goethe\u2019s Faust _D. J. 65\n (translation). Snider._\n\n \u201cThe Speculative.\u201d _Editor._ 2\n\n Thought on Shakespeare, A _Anna C. 240\n Brackett._\n\n To the Reader. _Editor._ 1\n\n\n\n\n THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.\n Vol. I. 1867. No. 1.\n\n\n\n\n TO THE READER.\n\n\nFor the reason that a journal devoted exclusively to the interests of\nSpeculative Philosophy is a rare phenomenon in the English language,\nsome words may reasonably be expected from the Editors upon the scope\nand design of the present undertaking.\n\nThere is no need, it is presumed, to speak of the immense religious\nmovements now going on in this country and in England. The tendency to\nbreak with the traditional, and to accept only what bears for the soul\nits own justification, is widely active, and can end only in the demand\nthat Reason shall find and establish a philosophical basis for all those\ngreat ideas which are taught as religious dogmas. Thus it is that side\nby side with the naturalism of such men as Renan, a school of mystics is\nbeginning to spring up who prefer to ignore utterly all historical\nwrappages, and cleave only to the speculative kernel itself. The vortex\nbetween the traditional faith and the intellectual conviction cannot be\nclosed by renouncing the latter, but only by deepening it to speculative\ninsight.\n\nLikewise it will be acknowledged that the national consciousness has\nmoved forward on to a new platform during the last few years. The idea\nunderlying our form of government had hitherto developed only one of its\nessential phases\u2014that of brittle individualism\u2014in which national unity\nseemed an external mechanism, soon to be entirely dispensed with, and\nthe enterprise of the private man or of the corporation substituted for\nit. Now we have arrived at the consciousness of the other essential\nphase, and each individual recognizes his substantial side to be the\nState as such. The freedom of the citizen does not consist in the mere\nArbitrary, but in the realization of the rational conviction which finds\nexpression in established law. That this new phase of national life\ndemands to be digested and comprehended, is a further occasion for the\ncultivation of the Speculative.\n\nMore significant still is the scientific revolution, working out\nespecially in the domain of physics. The day of simple empiricism is\npast, and with the doctrine of \u201cCorrelation of forces\u201d there has arisen\na stage of reflection that deepens rapidly into the purely speculative.\nFor the further elucidation of this important point the two following\narticles have been prepared. It is hoped that the first one will answer\nmore definitely the question now arising in the mind of the reader,\n\u201cWhat is this Speculative Knowing of which you speak?\u201d and that the\nsecond one will show whither Natural Science is fast hastening.\n\nWith regard to the pretensions of this Journal, its editors know well\nhow much its literary conduct will deserve censure and need apology.\nThey hope that the substance will make up in some degree for\ndeficiencies in form; and, moreover, they expect to improve in this\nrespect through experience and the kind criticisms of friends.\n\n\n\n\n THE SPECULATIVE.\n\n\n \u201cWe need what Genius is unconsciously seeking, and, by some daring\n generalization of the universe, shall assuredly discover, a\n spiritual calculus, a _Novum Organon_, whereby nature shall be\n divined in the soul, the soul in God, matter in spirit, polarity\n resolved into unity; and that power which pulsates in all life,\n animates and builds all organizations, shall manifest itself as one\n universal deific energy, present alike at the outskirts and centre\n of the universe, whose centre and circumference are one; omniscient,\n omnipotent, self-subsisting, uncontained, yet containing all things\n in the unbroken synthesis of its being.\u201d\u2014(\u201cCALCULUS,\u201d _one of\n Alcott\u2019s \u201cOrphic Sayings.\u201d_)\n\nAt the end of the sixth book of Plato\u2019s Republic, after a\ncharacterization of the two grades of sensuous knowing and the grade of\nthe understanding, \u201cwhich is obliged to set out from hypotheses, for the\nreason that it does not deal with principles but only with results,\u201d we\nfind the speculative grade of knowing characterized as \u201cthat in which\nthe soul, setting out from an hypothesis, proceeds to an unhypothetical\nprinciple, and makes its way without the aid of [sensuous] images, but\nsolely through ideas themselves.\u201d The mathematical procedure which\nbegins by hypothecating definitions, axioms, postulates, and the like,\nwhich it never examines nor attempts to deduce or prove, is the example\ngiven by Plato of the method of the Understanding, while he makes the\nspeculative Reason \u201cto posit hypotheses by the Dialectic, _not as fixed\nprinciples_, but only as starting points, in order that, by removing\nthem, it may arrive at the unhypothetical\u2014the principle of the\nuniverse.\u201d\n\nThis most admirable description is fully endorsed by Aristotle, and\nfirmly established in a two-fold manner:\n\n1. In the Metaphysics (xi. 7) he shows ontologically, starting with\n_motion_ as an hypothesis, that the _self-moved_ is the first principle;\nand this he identifies with the speculative, and the being of God.\n\n2. In the _De Anima_ (iii. 5-8) he distinguishes psychologically the\n\u201cactive intellect\u201d as the highest form of knowing, as that which is its\nown object, (subject and object,) and hence as containing its own end\nand aim in itself\u2014as being infinite. He identifies this with the\nSpeculative result, which he found ontologically as the Absolute.\n\nSpinoza in his Ethics (Prop. xl. Schol. ii., and Prop, xliv., Cor. ii.\nof Part II.) has well described the Speculative, which he names\n\u201c_Scientia intuitiva_,\u201d as the thinking of things under the form of\neternity, (_De natura rationis est res sub quadam specie \u00e6ternitatis\npercipere._)\n\nThough great diversity is found in respect to form and systematic\nexposition among the great philosophers, yet there is the most complete\nunanimity, not only with respect to the transcendency of the\nSpeculative, but also with reference to the content of its knowing. If\nthe reader of different systems of Philosophy has in himself achieved\nsome degree of Speculative culture, he will at every step be delighted\nand confirmed at the agreement of what, to the ordinary reader, seem\nirreconcilable statements.\n\nNot only do speculative writers agree among themselves as to the nature\nof things, and the destiny of man and the world, but their results\nfurnish us in the form of pure thought what the artist has wrought out\nin the form of beauty. Whether one tests architecture, sculpture,\npainting, music or poetry, it is all the same. Goethe has said:\n\n \u201cAs all Nature\u2019s thousand changes\n But one changeless God proclaim;\n So in Art\u2019s wide kingdoms ranges\n One sole meaning, still the same:\n This is Truth, eternal Reason,\n Which from Beauty takes its dress,\n And serene, through time and season,\n Stands for aye in loveliness.\u201d\n\nWhile Art presents this content to the senses, Religion offers it to the\nconception in the form of a dogma to be held by faith; the deepest\nSpeculative truth is allegorically typified in a historical form, so\nthat it acts upon the mind partly through fantasy and partly through the\nunderstanding. Thus Religion presents the same content as Art and\nPhilosophy, but stands between them, and forms a kind of middle ground\nupon which the purification takes place. \u201cIt is the purgatory between\nthe Inferno of Sense and the Paradise of Reason.\u201d Its function is\nmediation; a continual degrading of the sensuous and external, and an\nelevation to the supersensual and internal. The transition of Religion\ninto Speculative Philosophy is found in the mystics. Filled with the\nprofound significance of religious symbolism, and seeing in it the\nexplanation of the universe, they essay to communicate their insights.\nBut the form of Science is not yet attained by them. They express\nthemselves, not in those universal categories that the Spirit of the\nRace has formed in language for its utterance, but they have recourse to\nsymbols more or less inadequate because ambiguous, and of insufficient\nuniversality to stand for the archetypes themselves. Thus \u201cBecoming\u201d is\nthe most pure germinal archetype, and belongs therefore to logic, or the\nsystem of pure thought, and it has correspondences on concrete planes,\nas e.g., _time_, _motion_, _life_, _&c._ Now if one of these concrete\nterms is used for the pure logical category, we have mysticism. The\nalchemists, as shown by a genial writer of our day, use the technique of\ntheir craft to express the profound mysteries of spirit and its\nregeneration. The Eleusinian and other mysteries do the like.\n\nWhile it is one of the most inspiring things connected with Speculative\nPhilosophy to discover that the \u201cOpen Secret of the Universe\u201d has been\nread by so many, and to see, under various expressions, the same\nmeaning; yet it is the highest problem of Speculative Philosophy to\nseize a method that is adequate to the expression of the \u201cSecret;\u201d for\nits (the content\u2019s) own method of genetic development must be the only\nadequate one. Hence it is that we can classify philosophic systems by\ntheir success in seizing the content which is common to Art and\nReligion, as well as to Philosophy, in such a manner as to allow its\nfree evolution; to have as little in the method that is merely formal,\nor extraneous to the idea itself. The rigid formalism of Spinoza\u2014though\nmanipulated by a dear speculative spirit\u2014is inadequate to the unfolding\nof its content; for how could the mathematical method, which is that of\nquantity or external determinations alone, ever suffice to unfold those\nfirst principles which attain to the quantitative only in their result?\n\nIn this, the profoundest of subjects, we always find in Plato light for\nthe way. Although he has not given us complete examples, yet he has\npointed out the road of the true Speculative method in a way not to be\nmistaken. Instead of setting out with first principles presupposed as\ntrue, by which all is to be established, (as mathematics and such\nsciences do), he asserts that the first starting points must be removed\nas inadequate. We begin with the immediate, which is utterly\ninsufficient, and exhibits itself as such. We ascend to a more adequate,\nby removing the first hypothesis; and this process repeats itself until\nwe come to the first principle, which of course bears its own evidence\nin this, that it is absolutely universal and absolutely determined at\nthe same time; in other words it is the self-determining, the\n\u201cself-moved,\u201d as Plato and Aristotle call it. It is its own other, and\nhence it is the true infinite, for it is not limited but continued by\nits other.\n\nFrom this peculiarity results the difficulty of Speculative Philosophy.\nThe unused mind, accepting with na\u00efvet\u00e9 the first proposition as\nsettled, finds itself brought into confusion when this is contradicted,\nand condemns the whole procedure. The irony of Socrates, that always\nbegins by positing the ground of his adversary, and reducing it through\nits own inadequateness to contradict itself, is of this character, and\nthe unsophisticated might say, and do say: \u201cSee how illogical is\nSocrates, for he sets out to establish something, and arrives rather at\nthe destruction of it.\u201d The _reductio ad absurdum_ is a faint imitation\nof the same method. It is not sufficient to prove your own system by\nitself, for each of the opposing systems can do that; but you must show\nthat any and all counter-hypotheses result in your own. God makes the\nwrath of men to praise Him, and all imperfect things must continually\ndemonstrate the perfect, for the reason that they do not exist by reason\nof their defects, but through what of truth there is in them, and the\nimperfection is continually manifesting the _want_ of the perfect.\n\u201cSpirit,\u201d says Hegel, \u201cis self-contained being. But matter, which is\nspirit outside of itself, [turned inside out,] continually manifests\nthis, its inadequacy, through gravity\u2014attraction to a central point\nbeyond each particle. (If it could get at this central point, it would\nhave no extension, and hence would be annihilated.)\u201d\n\nThe soul of this method lies in the comprehension of the negative. In\nthat wonderful expos\u00e9 of the importance of the negative, which Plato\ngives in the Parmenides and Sophist, we see how justly he appreciated\nits true place in Philosophic Method. Spinoza\u2019s \u201c_omnis determinatio est\nnegatio_\u201d is the most famous of modern statements respecting the\nnegative, and has been very fruitful in results.\n\nOne would greatly misunderstand the Speculative view of the negative\nshould he take it to mean, as some have done, \u201cthat the negative is as\nessential as the positive.\u201d For if they are two independent somewhats\nover against each other, having equal validity, then all unity of system\nis absolutely impossible\u2014we can have only the Persian Ahriman and\nOrmuzd; nay, not even these\u2014for unless there is a primal unity, a\n\u201c_Zeruane-Akerene_\u201d\u2014the uncreated one, these are impossible as\nopposites, for there can be no tension from which the strife should\nproceed.\n\nThe Speculative has insight into the constitution of the positive out of\nthe negative. \u201cThat which has the form of Being,\u201d says Hegel, \u201cis the\nself-related;\u201d but relation of all kinds is negation, and hence whatever\nhas the form of being and is a positive somewhat, is a self-related\nnegative. Those three stages of culture in knowing, talked of by Plato\nand Spinoza, may be characterized in a new way by their relation to this\nconcept.\n\nThe first stage of consciousness\u2014that of immediate or sensuous\nknowing\u2014seizes objects by themselves\u2014isolatedly\u2014without their relations;\neach seems to have validity in and for itself, and to be wholly positive\nand real. The negative is the mere absence of the real thing; and it\nutterly ignores it in its scientific activity.\n\nBut the second stage traces relations, and finds that things do not\nexist in immediate independence, but that each is related to others, and\nit comes to say that \u201cWere a grain of sand to be destroyed, the universe\nwould collapse.\u201d It is a necessary consequent to the previous stage, for\nthe reason that so soon as the first stage gets over its childish\nengrossment with the novelty of variety, and attempts to seize the\nindividual thing, it finds its characteristic marks or properties. But\nthese consist invariably of relations to other things, and it learns\nthat these properties, without which the thing could have no distinct\nexistence, are the very destruction of its independence, since they are\nits complications with other things.\n\nIn this stage the negative has entered and has full sway. For all that\nwas before firm and fixed, is now seen to be, not through itself, but\nthrough others, and hence the being of everything is its negation. For\nif this stone exists only through its relations to the sun, which is\n_not_ the stone but something else, then the being of this stone is its\nown negation. But the second stage only reduces all to dependence and\nfinitude, and does not show us how any real, true, or independent being\ncan be found to exist. It holds fast to the stage of mediation alone,\njust as the first stage held by the _immediate_. But the dialectic of\nthis position forces it over into the third.\n\nIf things exist only in their relations, and relations are the negatives\nof things, then all that appears positive\u2014all being\u2014must rest upon\nnegation. How is this? The negative is essentially a relative, but since\nit as the only substrate (for all is relative), it can relate only to\nitself. But self-relation is always identity, and here we have the\nsolution of the previous difficulty. All positive forms, all forms of\nimmediateness or being, all forms of identity, are self-relations,\nconsisting of a negative or relative, relating to itself. But the most\nwonderful side of this, is the fact that since this relation is that of\nthe _negative_, it _negates_ itself in its very relation, and hence its\n_identity_ is a producing of _non_-identity. Identity and distinction\nare produced by the self-same process, and thus _self-determination_ is\nthe origin of all identity and distinction likewise. This is the\nspeculative stand-point in its completeness. It not only possesses\nspeculative content, but is able to evolve a speculative system\nlikewise. It is not only conscious of the principles, but of their\nmethod, and thus all is transparent.\n\nTo suppose that this may be made so plain that one shall see it at first\nsight, would be the height of absurdity. Doubtless far clearer\nexpositions can be made of this than those found in Plato or Proclus, or\neven in Fichte and Hegel; but any and every exposition must incur the\nsame difficulty, viz: The one who masters it must undergo a thorough\nchange in his innermost. The \u201cPalingenesia\u201d of the intellect is as\nessential as the \u201cregeneration of the heart,\u201d and is at bottom the same\nthing, as the mystics teach us.\n\nBut this great difference is obvious superficially: In religious\nregeneration it seems the yielding up of the self to an alien, though\nbeneficent, power, while in philosophy it seems the complete\nidentification of one\u2019s self with it.\n\nHe, then, who would ascend into the thought of the best thinkers the\nworld has seen, must spare no pains to elevate his thinking to the plane\nof pure thought. The completest discipline for this may be found in\nHegel\u2019s Logic. Let one not despair, though he seem to be baffled seventy\nand seven times; his earnest and vigorous assault is repaid by\nsurprisingly increased strength of mental acumen which he will be\nassured of, if he tries his powers on lower planes after his attack has\nfailed on the highest thought.\n\nThese desultory remarks on the Speculative, may be closed with a few\nillustrations of what has been said of the negative.\n\nI. Everything must have limits that mark it off from other things, and\nthese limits are its negations, in which it ceases.\n\nII. It must likewise have qualities which distinguish it from others,\nbut these likewise are negatives in the sense that they exclude it from\nthem. Its determining by means of qualities is the making it _not_ this\nand _not_ that, but exactly what it is. Thus the affirmation of anything\nis at the same time the negation of others.\n\nIII. Not only is the negative manifest in the above general and abstract\nform, but its penetration is more specific. Everything has distinctions\nfrom others in general, but also from _its_ other. _Sweet_ is opposed\nnot only to other properties in general, as _white_, _round_, _soft_,\netc., but to _its_ other, or _sour_. So, too, white is opposed to black,\nsoft to hard, heat to cold, etc., and in general a _positive_ thing to a\n_negative_ thing. In this kind of relative, the negative is more\nessential, for it seems to constitute the intimate nature of the\nopposites, so that each is reflected in the other.\n\nIV. More remarkable are the appearances of the negative in nature. The\nelement _fire_ is a negative which destroys the form of the combustible.\nIt reduces organic substances to inorganic elements, and is that which\nnegates the organic. Air is another negative element. It acts upon all\nterrestrial elements; upon water, converting it into invisible vapor;\nupon metals, reducing them to earths through corrosion\u2014eating up iron to\nform rust, rotting wood into mould\u2014destructive or negative alike to the\nmineral and vegetable world, like fire, to which it has a speculative\naffinity. The grand type of all negatives in nature, such as air and\nfire, is _Time_, the great devourer, and archetype of all changes and\nmovements in nature. Attraction is another appearance of the negative.\nIt is a manifestation in some body of an essential connection with\nanother which is not it; or rather it is an embodied self-contradiction:\n\u201cthat other (the sun) which is not me (the earth) is my true being.\u201d Of\ncourse its own being is its own negation, then.\n\nThus, too, the plant is negative to the inorganic\u2014it assimilates it; the\nanimal is negative to the vegetable world.\n\nAs we approach these higher forms of negation, we see the negative\nacting against itself, and this constitutes a process. The food that\nlife requires, which it negates in the process of digestion, and\nassimilates, is, in the life process, again negated, eliminated from the\norganism, and replaced by new elements. A negation is made, and this is\nagain negated. But the higher form of negation appears in the generic;\n\u201cThe species lives and the individual dies.\u201d The generic continually\ntranscends the individual\u2014going forth to new individuals and deserting\nthe old\u2014a process of birth and decay, both negative processes. In\nconscious Spirit both are united in one-movement. The generic here\nenters the individual as pure _ego_\u2014the undetermined possibility of all\ndeterminations. Since it is undetermined, it is negative to all special\ndeterminations. But this _ego_ not only exists as subject, but also as\nobject\u2014a process of self-determination or self-negation. And this\nnegation or particularization continually proceeds from one object to\nanother, and remains conscious under the whole, not dying, as the mere\nanimal does, in the transition from individual to individual. This is\nthe _aper\u00e7u_ of Immortality.\n\n\n\n\n HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n THE CRISIS IN NATURAL SCIENCE.\n\n\nDuring the past twenty years a revolution has been working in physical\nscience. Within the last ten it has come to the surface, and is now\nrapidly spreading into all departments of mental activity.\n\nAlthough its centre is to be found in the doctrine of the \u201cCorrelation\nof Forces,\u201d it would be a narrow view that counted only the expounders\nof this doctrine, numerous as they are; the spirit of this movement\ninspires a heterogeneous multitude\u2014Carpenter, Grove, Mayer, Faraday,\nThompson, Tyndall and Helmholtz; Herbert Spencer, Stuart Mill, Buckle,\nDraper, Lewes, Lecky, Max M\u00fcller, Marsh, Liebig, Darwin and Agassiz;\nthese names, selected at random, are suggested on account of the\nextensive circulation of their books. Every day the press announces some\nnew name in this field of research.\n\nWhat is the character of the old which is displaced, and of the new\nwhich gets established?\n\nBy way of preliminary, it must be remarked that there are observable in\nmodern times three general phases of culture, more or less historic.\n\nThe first phase is thoroughly dogmatic: it accepts as of like validity\nmetaphysical abstractions, and empirical observations. It has not\narrived at such a degree of clearness as to perceive contradictions\nbetween form and content. For the most part, it is characterized by a\nreverence for external authority. With the revival of learning commences\nthe protest of spirit against this phase. Descartes and Lord Bacon begin\nthe contest, and are followed by the many\u2014Locke, Newton, Leibnitz,\nClark, and the rest. All are animated with the spirit of that time\u2014to\ncome to the matter in hand without so much mediation. Thought wishes to\nrid itself of its fetters; religious sentiment, to get rid of forms.\nThis reaction against the former stage, which has been called by Hegel\nthe metaphysical, finds a kind of climax in the intellectual movement\njust preceding the French revolution. Thought no longer is contented to\nsay \u201cCogito, ergo sum,\u201d abstractly, but applies the doctrine in all\ndirections, \u201cI think; in that deed, I am.\u201d \u201cI am a man only in so far as\nI think. In so far as I think, I am an essence. What I get from others\nis not mine. What I can comprehend, or dissolve in my reason, that is\nmine.\u201d It looks around and spies institutions\u2014\u201cclothes of spirit,\u201d as\nHerr Teufelsdroeck calls them. \u201cWhat are you doing here, you sniveling\npriest?\u201d says Voltaire: \u201cyou are imposing delusions upon society for\nyour own aggrandizement. _I_ had no part or lot in making the church;\n_cogito, ergo sum_; I will only have over me what I put there!\u201d\n\n\u201cI see that all these complications of society are artificial,\u201d adds\nRousseau; \u201cman has made them; they are not good, and let us tear them\ndown and make anew.\u201d These utterances echo all over France and Europe.\n\u201cThe state is merely a machine by which the few exploiter the many\u201d\u2014\u201coff\nwith crowns!\u201d Thereupon they snatch off the crown of poor Louis, and his\nhead follows with it. \u201cReason\u201d is enthroned and dethroned. Thirty years\nof war satiates at length this negative second period, and the third\nphase begins. Its characteristic is to be constructive, not to accept\nthe heritage of the past with passivity, nor wantonly to destroy, but to\nrealize itself in the world of objectivity\u2014the world of laws and\ninstitutions.\n\nThe first appearance of the second phase of consciousness is\ncharacterized by the grossest inconsistencies. It says in general, (see\nD\u2019Holbach\u2019s \u201cSyst\u00e8me de la Nature\u201d): \u201cThe immediate, only, is true; what\nwe know by our senses, alone has reality; all is matter and force.\u201d But\nin this utterance it is unconscious that matter and force are purely\ngeneral concepts, and not objects of immediate consciousness. What we\nsee and feel is not matter or force in general, but only some special\nform. The self-refutation of this phase may be exhibited as follows:\n\nI. \u201cWhat is known is known through the senses: it is matter and force.\u201d\n\nII. But by the senses, the particular only is perceived, and this can\nnever be _matter_, but merely a _form_. The general is a mediated\nresult, and not an object of the senses.\n\nIII. Hence, in positing matter and force as the content of sensuous\nknowing, they unwittingly assert mediation to be the content of\nimmediateness.\n\nThe decline of this period of science results from the perception of the\ncontradiction involved. Kant was the first to show this; his labors in\nthis field may be summed up thus:\n\nThe universal and necessary is not an empirical result. (General laws\ncannot be sensuously perceived.) The constitution of the mind itself,\nfurnishes the ground for it:\u2014first, we have an _a priori_ basis (time\nand space) necessarily presupposed as the condition of all sensuous\nperception; and then we have categories presupposed as the basis of\nevery generalization whatever. Utter any general proposition: for\nexample the one above quoted\u2014\u201call is matter and force\u201d\u2014and you merely\nposit two categories\u2014Inherence and Causality\u2014as objectively valid. In\nall universal and necessary propositions we announce only the subjective\nconditions of experience, and not anything in and for itself true (i. e.\napplicable to things in themselves).\n\nAt once the popular side of this doctrine began to take effect. \u201cWe know\nonly phenomena; the true object in itself we do not know.\u201d\n\nThis doctrine of phenomenal knowing was outgrown in Germany at the\ncommencement of the present century. In 1791\u2014ten years after the\npublication of the Critique of Pure Reason\u2014the deep spirit of Fichte\nbegan to generalize Kant\u2019s labors, and soon he announced the legitimate\nresults of the doctrine. Schelling and Hegel completed the work of\ntransforming what Kant had left in a negative state, into an affirmative\nsystem of truth. The following is an outline of the refutation of\nKantian scepticism:\n\nI. Kant reduces all objective knowledge to phenomenal: we furnish the\nform of knowing, and hence whatever we announce in general concerning\nit\u2014and all that we call science has, of course, the form of\ngenerality\u2014is merely our subjective forms, and does not belong to the\nthing in itself.\n\nII. This granted, say the later philosophers, it follows that the\nsubjective swallows up all and becomes itself the universal (subject and\nobject of itself), and hence Reason is the true substance of the\nuniverse. Spinoza\u2019s _substance_ is thus seen to become _subject_. We\npartake of God as intellectually seeing, and we see only God as object,\nwhich Malebranche and Berkeley held with other Platonists.\n\n1. The categories (e. g. Unity, Reality, Causality, Existence, etc.)\nbeing merely subjective, or given by the constitution of the mind\nitself\u2014for such universals are presupposed by all experience, and hence\nnot derived from it\u2014it follows:\n\n2. If we abstract what we know to be subjective, that we abstract all\npossibility of a thing in itself, too. For \u201cexistence\u201d is a category,\nand hence if subjective, we may reasonably conclude that nothing\nobjective can have existence.\n\n3. Hence, since one category has no preference over another, and we\ncannot give one of them objectivity without granting it to all others,\nit follows that there can be no talk of _noumena_, or of things in\nthemselves, _existing_ beyond the reach of the mind, for such talk\nmerely applies what it pronounces to be subjective categories,\n(existence) while at the same time it denies the validity of their\napplication.\n\nIII. But since we remove the supposed \u201c_noumena_,\u201d the so-called\nphenomena are not opposed any longer to a correlate beyond the\nintelligence, and the _noumenon_ proves to be _mind itself_.\n\nAn obvious corollary from this is, that by the self-determination of\nmind in pure thinking we shall find the fundamental laws of all\nphenomena.\n\nThough the Kantian doctrine soon gave place in Germany to deeper\ninsights, it found its way slowly to other countries. Comte and Sir Wm.\nHamilton have made the negative results very widely known\u2014the former, in\nnatural science; the latter, in literature and philosophy. Most of the\nwriters named at the beginning are more or less imbued with Comte\u2019s\ndoctrines, while a few follow Hamilton. For rhetorical purposes, the\nHamiltonian statement is far superior to all others; for practical\npurposes, the Comtian. The physicist wishing to give his undivided\nattention to empirical observation, desires an excuse for neglecting\npure thinking; he therefore refers to the well-known result of\nphilosophy, that we cannot know anything of ultimate causes\u2014we are\nlimited to phenomena and laws. Although it must be conceded that this\nconsolation is somewhat similar to that of the ostrich, who cunningly\nconceals his head in the sand when annoyed by the hunters, yet great\nbenefit has thereby accrued to science through the undivided zeal of the\ninvestigators thus consoled.\n\nWhen, however, a sufficiently large collection has been made, and the\nlaws are sought for in the chaotic mass of observations, then _thought_\nmust be had. Thought is the only crucible capable of dissolving \u201cthe\nmany into the one.\u201d Tycho Brahe served a good purpose in collecting\nobservations, but a Kepler was required to discern the celestial harmony\ninvolved therein.\n\nThis discovery of laws and relations, or of relative unities, proceeds\nto the final stage of science, which is that of the _absolute\ncomprehension_.\n\nThus modern science, commencing with the close of the metaphysical\nepoch, has three stages or phases:\n\nI. The first rests on mere isolated facts of experience; accepts the\nfirst phase of things, or that which comes directly before it, and hence\nmay be termed the stage of _immediateness_.\n\nII. The second relates its thoughts to one another and compares them; it\ndevelopes inequalities; tests one through another, and discovers\ndependencies everywhere; since it learns that the first phase of objects\nis phenomenal, and depends upon somewhat lying beyond it; since it\ndenies truth to the immediate, it may be termed the stage of\n_mediation_.\n\nIII. A final stage which considers a phenomenon in its totality, and\nthus seizes it in its _noumenon_, and is the stage of the\n_comprehension_.\n\nTo resume: the _first_ is that of sensuous knowing; the _second_, that\nof reflection (the understanding); the _third_, that of the reason (or\nthe speculative stage).\n\nIn the sensuous knowing, we have crude, undigested masses all\nco-ordinated; each is in and for itself, and perfectly valid without the\nothers. But as soon as reflection enters, dissolution is at work. Each\nis thought in sharp contrast with the rest; contradictions arise on\nevery hand. The third stage finds its way out of these quarrelsome\nabstractions, and arrives at a synthetic unity, at a system, wherein the\nantagonisms are seen to form an organism.\n\nThe first stage of the development closes with attempts on all hands to\nput the results in an encyclop\u00e6diacal form. Humboldt\u2019s Cosmos is a good\nexample of this tendency, manifested so widely. Matter, masses, and\n_functions_ are the subjects of investigation.\n\nReflection investigates _functions_ and seizes the abstract category of\nforce, and straightway we are in the second stage. Matter, as such,\nloses its interest, and \u201ccorrelation of forces\u201d absorbs all attention.\n\nForce is an arrogant category and will not be co-ordinated with matter;\nif admitted, we are led to a pure dynamism. This will become evident as\nfollows:\n\nI. Force implies confinement (to give it direction); it demands,\nlikewise, an \u201coccasion,\u201d or soliciting force to call it into activity.\n\nII. But it cannot be confined except by force; its occasion must be a\nforce likewise.\n\nIII. Thus, since its confinement and \u201coccasion\u201d are forces, force can\nonly act upon forces\u2014upon matter only in so far as that is a force. Its\nnature requires confinement in order to manifest it, and hence it cannot\nact or exist except in unity with other forces which likewise have the\nsame dependence upon it that it has upon them. _Hence a force has no\nindependent subsistence, but is only an element of a combination of\nopposed forces_, which combination is a unity existing in an opposed\nmanner (or composed of forces in a state of tension). This deeper unity\nwhich we come upon as the ground of force is properly named _law_.\n\nFrom this, two corollaries are to be drawn: (1.) That matter is merely a\nname for various forces, as resistance, attraction and repulsion, etc.\n(2.) That force is no ultimate category, but, upon reflection, is seen\nto rest upon law as a deeper category (not law as a mere similarity of\nphenomena, but as a true unity underlying phenomenal multiplicity).\n\nFrom the nature of the category of force we see that whoever adopts it\nas the ultimate, embarks on an ocean of dualism, and instead of \u201cseeing\neverywhere the one and all\u201d as did Xenophanes, he will see everywhere\nthe self opposed, the contradictory.\n\nThe crisis which science has now reached is of this nature. The second\nstage is at its commencement with the great bulk of scientific men.\n\nTo illustrate the self-nugatory character ascribed to this stage we\nshall adduce some of the most prominent positions of Herbert Spencer,\nwhom we regard as the ablest exponent of this movement. These\ncontradictions are not to be deprecated, as though they indicated a\ndecline of thought; on the contrary, they show an increased activity,\n(though in the stage of mere reflection,) and give us good omens for the\nfuture. The era of stupid mechanical thinkers is over, and we have\nentered upon the active, _chemical_ stage of thought, wherein the\nthinker is trained to consciousness concerning his abstract categories,\nwhich, as Hegel says, \u201cdrive him around in their whirling circle.\u201d\n\nNow that the body of scientific men are turned in this direction, we\nbehold a vast upheaval towards philosophic thought; and this is entirely\nunlike the isolated phenomenon (hitherto observed in history) of a\nsingle group of men lifted above the surrounding darkness of their age\ninto clearness. We do not have such a phenomenon in our time; it is the\nspirit of the nineteenth century to move by masses.\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n THE \u201cFIRST PRINCIPLES\u201d OF THE \u201cUNKNOWABLE.\u201d\n\n\nThe _British Quarterly_ speaking of Spencer, says: \u201cThese \u2018First\nPrinciples\u2019 are merely the foundation of a system of Philosophy, bolder,\nmore elaborate and comprehensive, perhaps, than any other which has been\nhitherto designed in England.\u201d\n\nThe persistence and sincerity, so generally prevailing among these\ncorrelationists, we have occasion to admire in Herbert Spencer. He seems\nto be always ready to sacrifice his individual interest for truth, and\nis bold and fearless in uttering, what he believes it to be.\n\nFor critical consideration no better division can be found than that\nadopted in the \u201cFirst Principles\u201d by Mr. Spencer himself, to wit: 1st,\nthe unknowable, 2nd, the knowable. Accordingly, let us examine first his\ntheory of\n\n\n THE UNKNOWABLE.\n\n\nWhen Mr. Spencer announces the content of the \u201cunknowable\u201d to be\n\u201cultimate religious and scientific ideas,\u201d we are reminded at once of\nthe old adage in jurisprudence\u2014\u201c_Omnis definitio in jure civili est\npericulosa_;\u201d the definition is liable to prove self-contradictory in\npractice. So when we have a content assigned to the unknowable we at\nonce inquire, whence come the distinctions in the unknowable? If unknown\nthey are not distinct to us. When we are told that Time, Space, Force,\nMatter, God, Creation, etc., are unknowables, we must regard these words\nas corresponding to no distinct objects, but rather as all of the same\nimport to us. It should be always borne in mind that _all universal\nnegatives are self-contradictory_. Moreover, since all judgments are\nmade by subjective intelligences, it follows that all general assertions\nconcerning the nature of the intellect affect the judgment itself. The\nna\u00efvet\u00e9 with which certain writers wield these double-edged weapons is a\nsource of solicitude to the spectator.\n\nWhen one says that he knows that he knows nothing, he asserts knowledge\nand denies it in the same sentence. If one says \u201call knowledge is\nrelative,\u201d as Spencer does, (p. 68, _et seq._, of First Principles,) he\nof course asserts that his knowledge of the fact is relative and not\nabsolute. If a distinct content is asserted of ignorance, the same\ncontradiction occurs.\n\nThe perception of this principle by the later German philosophers at\nonce led them out of the Kantian nightmare, into positive truth. The\nprinciple may be applied in general to any subjective scepticism. The\nfollowing is a general scheme that will apply to all particular\ninstances:\n\nI. \u201cWe cannot know things in themselves; all our knowledge is\nsubjective; it is confined to our own states and changes.\u201d\n\nII. If this is so, then still more is what we name the \u201cobjective\u201d only\na state or change of us as subjective; it is a mere fiction of the mind\nso far as it is regarded as a \u201cbeyond\u201d or thing in itself.\n\nIII. Hence we _do_ know the objective; for the scepticism can only\nlegitimately conclude that the objective which we do know is of a nature\nkindred with reason; and that by an _a priori_ necessity we can affirm\nthat not only all knowable must have this nature, but also _all possible\nexistence_ must.\n\nIn this we discover that the mistake on the part of the sceptic consists\nin taking self-conscious intelligence as something one-sided or\nsubjective, whereas it must be, according to its very definition,\nsubject and object in one, and thus universal.\n\nThe difficulty underlying this stage of consciousness is that the mind\nhas not been cultivated to a clear separation of the imagination from\nthe thinking. As Sir Wm. Hamilton remarks, (Metaphysics, p. 487,)\n\u201cVagueness and confusion are produced by the confounding of objects so\ndifferent as the images of sense and the unpicturable notions of\nintelligence.\u201d\n\nIndeed the great \u201claw of the conditioned\u201d so much boasted of by that\nphilosopher himself and his disciples, vanishes at once when the\nmentioned confusion is avoided. Applied to space it results as follows:\n\nI.\u2014_Thought of Space._\n\n1. Space, if finite, must be limited from without;\n\n2. But such external limitations would require space to exist in;\n\n3. And hence the supposed limits of space that were to make it finite do\nin fact _continue it_.\n\nIt appears, therefore, that space is of such a nature that it can only\nend in, or be limited by _itself_ and thus is universally _continuous_\nor _infinite_.\n\nII.\u2014_Imagination of Space._\n\nIf the result attained by pure thought is correct, space is infinite,\nand if so, it cannot be imagined. If, however, it should be found\npossible to compass it by imagination, it must be conceded that there\nreally is a contradiction in the intelligence. That the result of such\nan attempt coincides with our anticipations we have Hamilton\u2019s\ntestimony\u2014\u201cimagination sinks exhausted.\u201d\n\nTherefore, instead of this result contradicting the first, as Hamilton\nsupposes, it really confirms it.\n\nIn fact if the mind is disciplined to separate pure thinking from mere\nimagining, the infinite is not difficult to think. Spinoza saw and\nexpressed this by making a distinction between \u201cinfinitum actu (or\nrationis),\u201d and \u201cinfinitum imaginationis,\u201d and his first and second\naxioms are the immediate results of thought elevated to this clearness.\nThis distinction and his \u201c_omnis determinatio est negatio_,\u201d together\nwith the development of the third stage of thinking (according to\nreason), \u201c_sub quadam specie \u00e6ternitatis_,\u201d\u2014these distinctions are the\npriceless legacy of the clearest-minded thinker of modern times; and it\nbehooves the critic of \u201chuman knowing\u201d to consider well the results that\nthe \u201chuman mind\u201d has produced through those great masters\u2014Plato and\nAristotle, Spinoza and Hegel.\n\nHerbert Spencer, however, not only betrays unconsciousness of this\ndistinction, but employs it in far grosser and self-destructive\napplications. On page 25, (\u201cFirst Principles,\u201d) he says: \u201cWhen on the\nsea shore we note how the hulls of distant vessels are hidden below the\nhorizon, and how of still remoter vessels only the uppermost sails are\nvisible, we realize with tolerable clearness the slight curvature of\nthat portion of the sea\u2019s surface which lies before us. But when we seek\nin imagination to follow out this curved surface as it actually exists,\nslowly bending round until all its meridians meet in a point eight\nthousand miles below our feet, we find ourselves utterly baffled. We\ncannot conceive in its real form and magnitude even that small segment\nof our globe which extends a hundred miles on every side of us, much\nless the globe as a whole. The piece of rock on which we stand can be\nmentally represented with something like completeness; we find ourselves\nable to think of its top, its sides, and its under surface at the same\ntime, or so nearly at the same time that they seem all present in\nconsciousness together; and so we can form what we call a conception of\nthe rock, but to do the like with the earth we find impossible.\u201d \u201cWe\nform of the earth not a conception properly so-called, but only a\nsymbolic conception.\u201d\n\nConception here is held to be adequate when it is formed of an object of\na given size; when the object is above that size the conception thereof\nbecomes symbolical. Here we do not have the exact limit stated, though\nwe have an example given (a rock) which is conceivable, and another (the\nearth) which is not.\n\n\u201cWe must predicate nothing of objects too great or too multitudinous to\nbe mentally represented, or we must make our predications by means of\nextremely inadequate representations of such objects, mere symbols of\nthem.\u201d (27 page.)\n\nBut not only is the earth an indefinitely multiple object, but so is the\nrock; nay, even the smallest grain of sand. Suppose the rock to be a rod\nin diameter; microscope magnifying two and a half millions of diameters\nwould make its apparent magnitude as large as the earth. It is thus only\na question of relative distance from the person conceiving, and this\nreduces it to the mere sensuous image of the retina. Remove the earth to\nthe distance of the moon, and our conception of it would, upon these\nprinciples, become quite adequate. But if our conception of the moon be\nheld inadequate, then must that of the rock or the grain of sand be\nequally inadequate.\n\nWhatever occupies space is continuous and discrete; i. e., may be\ndivided into parts. It is hence a question of relativity whether the\nimage or picture of it correspond to it.\n\nThe legitimate conclusion is that all our conceptions are symbolic, and\nif that property invalidates their reliability, it follows that we have\nno reliable knowledge of things perceived, whether great or small.\n\nMathematical knowledge is conversant with pure lines, points, and\nsurfaces; hence it must rest on inconceivables.\n\nBut Mr. Spencer would by no means concede that we do not know the shape\nof the earth, its size, and many other inconceivable things about it.\nConception is thus no criterion of knowledge, and all built upon this\ndoctrine (i. e. depending upon the conceivability of a somewhat) falls\nto the ground.\n\nBut he applies it to the questions of the divisibility of matter (page\n50): \u201cIf we say that matter is infinitely divisible, we commit ourselves\nto a supposition not realizable in thought. We can bisect and rebisect a\nbody, and continually repeating the act until we reduce its parts to a\nsize no longer physically divisible, may then mentally continue the\nprocess without limit.\u201d\n\nSetting aside conceivability as indifferent to our knowledge or\nthinking, we have the following solution of this point:\n\nI. That which is extended may be bisected (i. e. has two halves).\n\nII. Thus two extensions arise, which, in turn, have the same property of\ndivisibility that the first one had.\n\nIII. Since, then, bisection is a process entirely indifferent to the\nnature of extension (i. e. does not change an extension into two\nnon-extendeds), it follows that body is infinitely divisible.\n\nWe do not have to test this in imagination to verify it; and this very\ntruth must be evident to him who says that the progress must be\n\u201ccontinued without limit.\u201d For if we examine the general conditions\nunder which any such \u201cinfinite progress\u201d is possible, we find them to\nrest upon the presupposition of a real infinite, thus:\n\n\n Infinite Progress.\n\n\nI. Certain attributes are found to belong to an object, and are not\naffected by a certain process. (For example, divisibility as a process\nin space does not affect the continuity of space, which makes that\nprocess possible. Or again, the process of limiting space does not\ninterfere with its continuity, for space will not permit any limit\nexcept space itself.)\n\nII. When the untutored reflection endeavors to apprehend a relation of\nthis nature, it seizes one side of the dualism and is hurled to the\nother. (It bisects space, and then finds itself before two objects\nidentical in nature with the first; it has effected nothing; it repeats\nthe process, and, by and by getting exhausted, wonders whether it could\nmeet a different result if its powers of endurance were greater. Or else\nsuspecting the true case, says; \u201cno other result would happen if I went\non forever.\u201d)\n\nIII. Pure thought, however, grasps this process as a totality, and sees\nthat it only arises through a self-relation. The \u201cprogress\u201d is nothing\nbut a return to itself, the same monotonous round. It would be a similar\nattempt to seek the end of a circle by travelling round it, and one\nmight make the profound remark: \u201cIf my powers were equal to the task, I\nshould doubtless come to the end.\u201d This difficulty vanishes as soon as\nthe experience is made that the line returns into itself. \u201cIt is the\nsame thing whether said once or repeated forever,\u201d says Simplicius,\ntreating of this paradox.\n\nThe \u201cInfinite Progress\u201d is the most stubborn fortress of Scepticism. By\nit our negative writers establish the impotency of Reason for various\nulterior purposes. Some wish to use it as a lubricating fluid upon\ncertain religious dogmas that cannot otherwise be swallowed. Others wish\nto save themselves the trouble of thinking out the solutions to the\nProblem of Life. But the Sphinx devours him who does not faithfully\ngrapple with, and solve her enigmas.\n\nMephistopheles (a good authority on this subject) says of Faust, whom he\nfinds grumbling at the littleness of man\u2019s mind:\n\n \u201cVerachte nur Vernunft und Wissenchaft,\n Des Menschen allerh\u00f6chste Kraft!\n Und h\u00e4tt\u2019er sich auch nicht dem Teufel \u00fcbergeben,\n Er m\u00fcsste doch zu Grunde gehen.\u201d\n\nOnly prove that there is a large field of the unknowable and one has at\nonce the _vade mecum_ for stupidity. Crude reflection can pour in its\ndistinctions into a subject, and save itself from the consequences by\npronouncing the basis incomprehensible. It also removes _all_\npossibility of Theology, or of the Piety of the Intellect, and leaves a\nvery narrow margin for religious sentiment, or the Piety of the Heart.\n\nThe stage of Science represented by the French Encyclop\u00e6dists was\nimmediately hostile to each and every form of religion. This second\nstage, however, has a choice. It can, like Hamilton or Mansel, let\nreligious belief alone, as pertaining to the unknown and\nunknowable\u2014which may be _believed_ in as much as one likes; or it may\n\u201cstrip off,\u201d as Spencer does, \u201cdeterminations from a religion,\u201d by which\nit is distinguished from other religions, and show their truth to\nconsist in a common doctrine held by all, to-wit: \u201cThe truth of things\nis unknowable.\u201d\n\nThus the scientific man can baffle all attacks from the religious\nstandpoint; nay, he can even elicit the most unbounded approval, while\nhe saps the entire structure of Christianity.\n\nSays Spencer (p. 46): \u201cScience and Religion agree in this, that the\npower which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.\u201d He\ngoes on to show that though this harmony exists, yet it is broken by the\ninconsistency of Religion: \u201cFor every religion, setting out with the\ntacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution\nof this mystery, and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human\ncomprehension.\u201d In this confession he admits that all religions agree in\nprofessing to _reveal_ the solution of the Mystery of the Universe to\nman; and they agree, moreover, that man, as simply a being of sense and\nreflection, cannot comprehend the revelation; but that he must first\npass through a profound mediation\u2014be _regenerated_, not merely in his\nheart, but in _intellect_ also. The misty limitations (\u201cvagueness and\nconfusion\u201d) of the imagination must give way to the purifying dialectic\nof pure thought before one can see the Eternal Verities.\n\nThese revelations profess to make known the nature of the Absolute.\nThey call the Absolute \u201cHim,\u201d \u201cInfinite,\u201d \u201cSelf-created,\u201d\n\u201cSelf-existent,\u201d \u201cPersonal,\u201d and ascribe to this \u201cHim\u201d attributes\nimplying profound mediation. All definite forms of religion, all\ndefinite theology, must at once be discarded according to Spencer\u2019s\nprinciple. Self-consciousness, even, is regarded as impossible by him\n(p. 65): \u201cClearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which\nthe knowing and known are one, in which subject and object are\nidentified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation\nof both.\u201d He considers it a degradation (p. 109) to apply personality\nto God: \u201cIs it not possible that there is a mode of being as much\ntranscending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical\nmotion?\u201d And again (p. 112) he holds that the mere \u201cnegation of\nabsolute knowing contains more religion than all dogmatic theology.\u201d\n(P. 121,) \u201cAll religions are envelopes of truth, which reveal to the\nlower and conceal to the higher.\u201d (P. 66,) \u201cObjective and subjective\nthings are alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis.\u201d\n\u201cUltimate religious and scientific ideas (p. 68) alike turn out to be\nmere symbols of the actual, and not cognitions of it.\u201d (P. 69,) \u201cWe\ncome to the negative result that the reality existing behind all\nappearances must ever be unknown.\u201d\n\nIn these passages we see a dualism posited in this form: \u201cEverything\nimmediate is _phenomenal_, a manifestation of the hidden and inscrutable\nessence.\u201d This essence is the unknown and unknowable; yet it _manifests_\nitself in the immediate or phenomenal.\n\nThe first stage of thought was unconscious that it dealt all the time\nwith a mediated result (a dualism) while it assumed an immediate; that\nit asserted all truth to lie in the sensuous object, while it named at\nthe same time \u201c_matter_ and _force_,\u201d categories of reflection.\n\nThe second stage has got over _that_ difficulty, but has fallen into\nanother. For if the phenomenon _manifested_ the essence, it could not be\nsaid to be \u201cunknowable, hidden, and inscrutable.\u201d But if the essence is\n_not_ manifested by the phenomenon, then we have the so-called\nphenomenon as a self-existent, and therefore independent of the\nso-called essence, which stands co\u00f6rdinated to it as another existent,\nwhich cannot be known because it does not manifest itself to us. Hence\nthe \u201cphenomenon\u201d is no _phenomenon_, or manifestation of aught but\nitself, and the \u201cessence\u201d is simply a fiction of the philosopher.\n\nHence his talk about essence is purely gratuitous, for there is not\nshown the need of one.\n\nA dialectical consideration of essence and phenomenon will result as\nfollows:\n\n\n Essence and Phenomenon.\n\n\nI. If essence is seized as independent or absolute being, it may be\ntaken in two senses:\n\n_a._ As entirely unaffected by \u201cotherness\u201d (or limitation) and entirely\nundetermined; and this would be pure nothing, for it cannot distinguish\nitself or be distinguished from pure nothing.\n\n_b._ As relating to itself, and hence making itself a duality\u2014becoming\nits own other; in this case the \u201cother\u201d is a vanishing one, for it is at\nthe same time identical and non-identical\u2014a process in which the essence\nmay be said to appear or become _phenomenal_. The entire process is the\nabsolute or self-related (and hence independent). It is determined, but\nby itself, and hence not in a finite manner.\n\nII. The Phenomenon is thus seen to arise through the self-determination\nof essence, and has obviously the following characteristics:\n\n_a._ It is the \u201cother\u201d of the essence, and yet the own self of the\nessence existing in this opposed manner, and thus self-nugatory; and\nthis non-abiding character gives it the name of phenomenon (or that\nwhich merely _appears_, but is no permanent essence).\n\n_b._ If this were simply another to the essence, and not the\nself-opposition of the same, then it would be through itself, and\n_itself_ the essence in its first (or immediate) phase. But this is the\nessence only as negated, or as returned from the otherness.\n\n_c._ This self-nugatoriness is seen to arise from the contradiction\ninvolved in its being other to itself, i. e. outside of its true being.\n_Without_ this self-nugatoriness it would be an abiding, an essence\nitself, and hence no phenomenon; _with_ this self-nugatoriness the\nphenomenon simply exhibits or \u201cmanifests\u201d the essence; in fact, with the\nappearance and its negation taken together, we have before us a totality\nof essence and phenomenon.\n\nIII. Therefore: _a._ The phenomenal is such because it is not an abiding\nsomewhat. It is dependent upon other or essence. _b._ Whatever it\nposesses belongs to that upon which it depends, i. e. belongs to\nessence. _c._ In the self-nugatoriness of the phenomenal we have the\nentire essence manifested.\n\nThis latter point is the important result, and may-be stated in a less\nstrict and more popular form thus: The real world (so-called) is said to\nbe in a state of change\u2014origination and decay. Things pass away and\nothers come in their places. Under this change, however, there is a\npermanent called Essence.\n\nThe imaginative thinking finds it impossible to realize such an abiding\nas exists through the decay of all external form, and hence pronounces\nit unknowable. But pure thought seizes it, and finds it a pure\nself-relation or process of return to itself, which accordingly has\nduality, thus: _a._ The positing or producing of a somewhat or an\nimmediate, and, _b._ The cancelling of the same. In this duality of\nbeginning and ceasing, this self-relation completes its circle, and is\nthus, _c._ the entire movement.\n\nAll categories of the understanding (cause and effect, matter and form,\npossibility, etc.) are found to contain this movement when dissolved.\nAnd hence they have self-determination for their presupposition and\nexplanation. It is unnecessary to add that unless one gives up trying to\n_imagine_ truth, that this is all very absurd reasoning. (At the end of\nthe sixth book of Plato\u2019s Republic, ch. xxi., and in the seventh book,\nch. xiii., one may see how clearly this matter was understood two\nthousand, and more, years ago.)\n\nTo manifest or reveal is to make known; and hence to speak of the\n\u201cmanifestation of a hidden and inscrutable essence\u201d is to speak of the\nmaking known of an unknowable.\n\nMr. Spencer goes on; no hypothesis of the universe is\npossible\u2014creation not conceivable, for that would be something out of\nnothing\u2014self-existence not conceivable, for that involves unlimited\npast time.\n\nHe holds that \u201call knowledge is _relative_,\u201d for all explanation is the\nreducing of a cognition to a more general. He says, (p. 69,) \u201cOf\nnecessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring us down to the\ninexplicable\u2014the deepest truth which we can get at must be\nunaccountable.\u201d This much valued insight has a positive side as well as\nthe negative one usually developed:\n\nI. (_a._) To explain something we subsume it under a more general.\n\n(_b._) The \u201c_summum genus_\u201d cannot be subsumed, and\n\n(_c._) Hence is inexplicable.\n\nII. But those who conclude from this that we base our knowledge\nultimately upon faith (from the supposed fact than we cannot prove our\npremises) forget that\u2014\n\n(_a._) If the subsuming process ends in an unknown, then all the\nsubsuming has resulted in nothing; for to subsume something under an\nunknown does not explain it. (Plato\u2019s Republic, Book VII, chap. xiii.)\n\n(_b._) The more general, however, is the more simple, and hence the\n\u201c_summum genus_\u201d is the purely simple\u2014it is Being. But the simpler the\nclearer, and the pure simple is the absolutely clear.\n\n(_c._) At the \u201c_summum genus_\u201d subsumption becomes the principle of\nidentity\u2014being is being; and thus stated we have simple self-relation as\nthe origin of all clearness and knowing whatsoever.\n\nIII. Hence it is seen that it is not the mere fact of subsumption that\nmakes something clear, but rather it is the reduction of it to identity.\n\nIn pure being as the _summum genus_, the mind contemplates the pure form\nof knowing\u2014\u201ca is a,\u201d or \u201ca subject is a predicate\u201d\u2014(a is b). The pure\n\u201cis\u201d is the empty form of mental affirmation, the pure copula; and thus\nin the _summum genus_ the mind recognizes the pure form of itself. All\nobjectivity is at this point dissolved into the thinking, and hence the\nsubsumption becomes identity\u2014(being = _ego_, or \u201c_cogito, ergo sum_\u201d;)\nthe process turns round and becomes synthetic, (\u201cdialectic\u201d or\n\u201cgenetic,\u201d as called by some). From this it is evident that\nself-consciousness is the basis of all knowledge.\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n THE \u201cFIRST PRINCIPLES\u201d OF THE \u201cKNOWABLE.\u201d\n\n\nAs might be expected from Spencer\u2019s treatment of the _unknowable_, the\n_knowable_ will prove a confused affair; especially since to the\nabove-mentioned \u201cinscrutability\u201d of the absolute, he adds the doctrine\nof an \u201cobscure consciousness of it,\u201d holding, in fact, that the knowable\nis only a relative, and that it cannot be known without at the same time\npossessing a knowledge of the unknowable.\n\n(P. 82) he says: \u201cA thought involves relation, difference and likeness;\nwhatever does not present each of them does not admit of cognition. And\nhence we may say that the unconditioned as presenting none of these, is\ntrebly unthinkable.\u201d And yet he says, (p. 96): \u201cThe relative is itself\ninconceivable except as related to a real non-relative.\u201d\n\nWe will leave this infinite self-contradiction thus developed, and turn\nto the positions established concerning the knowable. They concern the\nnature of Force, Matter and Motion, and the predicates set up are\n\u201cpersistence,\u201d \u201cindestructibility\u201d and similar.\n\n\n THE KNOWABLE.\n\n\nAlthough in the first part \u201cconceivability\u201d was shown to be utterly\ninadequate as a test of truth; that with it we could not even establish\nthat the earth is round, or that space is infinitely continuous, yet\nhere Mr. Spencer finds that inconceivability is the most convenient of\nall positive proofs.\n\nThe first example to be noticed is his proof of the compressibility of\nmatter (p. 51): \u201cIt is an established mechanical truth that if a body\nmoving at a given velocity, strikes an equal body at rest in such wise\nthat the two move on together, their joint velocity will be but half\nthat of the striking body. Now it is a law of which the negative is\ninconceivable, that in passing from any one degree of magnitude to\nanother all intermediate degrees must be passed through. Or in the case\nbefore us, a body moving at velocity 4, cannot, by collision, be reduced\nto velocity 2, without passing through all velocities between 4 and 2.\nBut were matter truly solid\u2014were its units absolutely incompressible and\nin unbroken contact\u2014this \u2018law of continuity, as it is called, would be\nbroken in every case of collision. For when, of two such units, one\nmoving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking unit must\nhave its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to velocity 2; must pass\nfrom velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of time, and without\npassing through intermediate velocities; must be moving with velocities\n4 and 2 at the same instant, which is impossible.\u201d On page 57 he\nacknowledges that any transition from one rate of motion to another is\ninconceivable; hence it does not help the matter to \u201cpass through\nintermediate velocities.\u201d It is just as great a contradiction and just\nas inconceivable that velocity 4 should become velocity 3.9999+, as it\nis that it should become velocity 2; for no change whatever of the\nmotion can be thought (as he confesses) without having two motions in\none time. Motion, in fact, is the synthesis of place and time, and\ncannot be comprehended except as their unity. The argument here quoted\nis only adduced by Mr. S. for the purpose of antithesis to other\narguments on the other side as weak as itself.\n\nOn page 241, Mr. Spencer deals with the question of the destructibility\nof matter: \u201cThe annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same\nreason that the creation of matter is unthinkable.\u201d (P. 54): \u201cMatter in\nits ultimate nature is as absolutely incomprehensible as space and\ntime.\u201d The nature of matter is unthinkable, its creation or\ndestructibility is unthinkable, and in this style of reasoning we can\nadd that its _indestructibility_ is likewise unthinkable; in fact the\nargument concerning self-existence will apply here. (P. 31):\n\u201cSelf-existence necessarily means existence without a beginning; and to\nform a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence\nwithout a beginning. Now by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive\nexistence through infinite past time, implies the conception of infinite\npast time, which is an impossibility.\u201d Thus, too, we might argue in a\nstrain identical; indestructibility implies existence through infinite\nfuture time, but by no mental effort can infinite time be conceived. And\nthus, too, we prove and disprove the persistence of force and motion.\nWhen occasion requires, the ever-convenient argument of\n\u201cinconceivability\u201d enters. It reminds one of Sir Wm. Hamilton\u2019s\n\u201cimbecility\u201d upon which are based \u201csundry of the most important\nphenomena of intelligence,\u201d among which he mentions the category of\ncausality. If causality is founded upon imbecility, and all experience\nupon _it_, it follows that all empirical knowledge rests upon\nimbecility.\n\nOn page 247, our author asserts that the first law of motion \u201cis in our\nday being merged in the more general one, that motion, like matter, is\nindestructible.\u201d It is interesting to observe that this so-called \u201cFirst\nlaw of motion\u201d rests on no better basis than very crude reflection.\n\n\u201cWhen not influenced by external forces, a moving body will go on in a\nstraight line with a uniform velocity,\u201d is Spencer\u2019s statement of it.\n\nThis abstract, supposed law has necessitated much scaffolding in Natural\nPhilosophy that is otherwise entirely unnecessary; it contradicts the\nidea of momentum, and is thus refuted:\n\nI. A body set in motion continues in motion after the impulse has ceased\nfrom without, for the reason that it retains momentum.\n\nII. Momentum is the product of weight by velocity, and weight is the\nattraction of the body in question to another body external to it. If\nall bodies external to the moving body were entirely removed, the latter\nwould have no weight, and hence the product of weight by velocity would\nbe zero.\n\nIII. The \u201cexternal influences\u201d referred to in the so-called \u201claw,\u201d mean\nchiefly attraction. Since no body could have momentum except through\nweight, another name for attraction, it follows that all free motion has\nreference to another body, and hence is curvilinear; thus we are rid of\nthat embarrassing \u201cstraight line motion\u201d which gives so much trouble in\nmechanics. It has all to be reduced back again through various processes\nto curvilinear movement.\n\nWe come, finally, to consider the central point of this system:\n\n\n THE CORRELATION OF FORCES.\n\n\nSpeaking of persistence of force, Mr. Spencer concedes (p. 252) that\nthis doctrine is not demonstrable from experience. He says (p. 254):\n\u201cClearly the persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no\ninductive proof is possible.\u201d (P. 255): \u201cBy the persistence of force we\nreally mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge\nand conception.\u201d (P. 257): \u201cThe indestructibility of matter and the\ncontinuity of motion we saw to be really corollaries from the\nimpossibility of establishing in thought a relation between something\nand nothing.\u201d (Thus what was established as a mental impotence is now\nmade to have objective validity.) \u201cOur inability to conceive matter and\nmotion destroyed is our inability to suppress consciousness itself.\u201d (P.\n258): \u201cWhoever alleges that the inability to conceive a beginning or end\nof the universe is a _negative_ result of our mental structure, cannot\ndeny that our consciousness of the universe as persistent is a positive\nresult of our mental structure. And this persistence of the universe is\nthe persistence of that unknown cause, power, or force, which is\nmanifested to us through all phenomena.\u201d This \u201cpositive result of our\nmental structure\u201d is said to rest on our \u201cinability to conceive the\nlimitation of consciousness\u201d which is \u201csimply the obverse of our\ninability to put an end to the thinking subject while still continuing\nto think.\u201d (P. 257): \u201cTo think of something becoming nothing, would\ninvolve that this substance of consciousness having just existed under a\ngiven form, should next assume no form, or should cease to be\nconsciousness.\u201d\n\nIt will be observed here that he is endeavoring to solve the First\nAntinomy of Kant, and that his argument in this place differs from\nKant\u2019s proof of the \u201cAntithesis\u201d in this, that while Kant proves that\n\u201cThe world [or universe] has no beginning,\u201d etc., by the impossibility\nof the origination of anything in a \u201cvoid time,\u201d that Mr. Spencer proves\nthe same thing by asserting it to be a \u201cpositive result of our mental\nstructure,\u201d and then proceeds to show that this is a sort of \u201cinability\u201d\nwhich has a subjective explanation; it is, according to him, merely the\n\u201csubstance of consciousness\u201d objectified and regarded as the law of\nreality.\n\nBut how is it with the \u201cThesis\u201d to that Antinomy, \u201cThe world _has_ a\nbeginning in time?\u201d Kant proves this apagogically by showing the\nabsurdity of an \u201cinfinite series already elapsed.\u201d That our author did\nnot escape the contradiction has already been shown in our remarks upon\nthe \u201cindestructibility of matter.\u201d While he was treating of the\nunknowable it was his special province to prove that self-existence is\nunthinkable. (P. 31): He says it means \u201cexistence without a beginning,\u201d\nand \u201cto conceive existence through infinite past time, implies the\nconception of infinite past time, which is an impossibility.\u201d Thus we\nhave the Thesis of the Antinomy supported in his doctrine of the\n\u201cunknowable,\u201d and the antithesis of the same proved in the doctrine of\nthe knowable.\n\nWe shall next find him involved with Kant\u2019s Third Antinomy.\n\nThe doctrine of the correlation is stated in the following passages:\n\n(P. 280): \u201cThose modes of the unknowable, which we call motion, heat,\nlight, chemical affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other,\nand into those modes of the unknowable which we distinguish as\nsensation, emotion, thought: these, in their turns, being directly or\nindirectly re-transformable into the original shapes. That no idea or\nfeeling arises, save as a result of some physical force expended in\nproducing it, is fast becoming a common-place of science; and whoever\nduly weighs the evidence, will see that nothing but an overwhelming bias\nin favor of a preconceived theory can explain its non-acceptance. How\nthis metamorphosis takes place\u2014how a force existing as motion, heat, or\nlight, can become a mode of consciousness\u2014how it is possible for a\u00ebrial\nvibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the forces\nliberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to emotion\u2014these\nare mysteries which it is impossible to fathom.\u201d (P. 284): \u201cEach\nmanifestation of force can be interpreted only as the effect of some\nantecedent force; no matter whether it be an inorganic action, an animal\nmovement, a thought, or a feeling. Either this must be conceded, or else\nit must be asserted that our successive states of consciousness are\nself-created.\u201d \u201cEither mental energies as well as bodily ones are\nquantitatively correlated to certain energies expended in their\nproduction, and to certain other energies they initiate; or else nothing\nmust become something and something, nothing. Since persistence of\nforce, being a _datum_ of consciousness, cannot be denied, its\nunavoidable corollary must be accepted.\u201d\n\nOn p. 294 he supports the doctrine that \u201cmotion takes the direction of\nthe least resistance,\u201d mentally as well as physically.\n\nHere are some of the inferences to be drawn from the passages quoted:\n\n1. Every act is determined from without, and hence does not belong to\nthe subject in which it manifests itself.\n\n2. To change the course of a force, is to make another direction \u201cthat\nof the least resistance,\u201d or to remove or diminish a resistance.\n\n3. But to change a resistance requires force, which (in motion) must act\nin \u201cthe direction of the least resistance,\u201d and hence it is entirely\ndetermined from without, and governed by the disposition of the forces\nit meets.\n\n4. Hence, of _will_, it is an absurdity to talk; _freedom_ or _moral\nagency_ is an impossible phantom.\n\n5. That there is self-determination in self-consciousness\u2014that it is\n\u201cself-created\u201d\u2014is to Mr. Spencer the absurd alternative which at once\nturns the scale in favor of the doctrine that mental phenomena are the\nproductions of external forces.\n\nAfter this, what are we to say of the following? (P. 501):\n\u201cNotwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, there will probably have\narisen in not a few minds the conviction that the solutions which have\nbeen given, along with those to be derived from them, are essentially\nmaterialistic. Let none persist in these misconceptions.\u201d (P. 502):\n\u201cTheir implications are no more materialistic than they are\nspiritualistic, and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic.\u201d\n\nIf we hold these positions by the side of Kant\u2019s Third Antinomy, we\nshall see that they all belong to the proof of the \u201cAntithesis,\u201d viz:\n\u201cThere is no freedom, but everything in the world happens according to\nthe laws of nature.\u201d The \u201cThesis,\u201d viz: \u201cThat a causality of freedom is\nnecessary to account fully for the phenomena of the world,\u201d he has not\nanywhere supported. We find, in fact, only those thinkers who have in\nsome measure mastered the third phase of culture in thought, standing\nupon the basis presented by Kant in the Thesis. The chief point in the\nThesis may be stated as follows: 1. If everything that happens\npresupposes a previous condition, (which the law of causality states,)\n2. This previous condition cannot be a permanent (or have been always in\nexistence); for, if so, its consequence, or the effect, would have\nalways existed. Thus the previous condition must be a thing which has\nhappened. 3. With this the whole law of causality collapses; for (_a_)\nsince each cause is an effect, (_b_) its determining power escapes into\na higher member of the series, and, (_c_) unless the law changes, wholly\nvanishes; there result an indefinite series of effects with no cause;\neach member of the series is a dependent, has its being in another,\nwhich again has its being in another, and hence cannot support the\nsubsequent term.\n\nHence it is evident that this Antinomy consists, first: in the setting\nup of the law of causality as having absolute validity, which is the\nantithesis. Secondly, the experience is made that such absolute law of\ncausality is a self-nugatory one, and thus it is to be inferred that\ncausality, to be at all, presupposes an origination in a \u201cself-moved,\u201d\nas Plato calls it. Aristotle (Metaphysics, xi. 6-7, and ix. 8) exhibits\nthis ultimate as the \u201cself-active,\u201d and the Scholastics take the same,\nunder the designation \u201c_actus purus_,\u201d for the definition of God.\n\nThe Antinomy thus reduced gives:\n\nI. Thesis: Self-determination must lie at the basis of all causality,\notherwise causality cannot be at all.\n\nII. Antithesis: If there is self-determination, \u201cthe unity of experience\n(which leads us to look for a cause) is destroyed, and hence no such\ncase could arise in experience.\u201d\n\nIn comparing the two proofs it is at once seen that they are of\ndifferent degrees of universality. The argument of the Thesis is based\nupon the nature of the thing itself, i. e. a pure thought; while that of\nthe Antithesis loses sight of the idea of \u201c_efficient_\u201d cause, and seeks\nmere continuity in the sequence of time, and thus exhibits itself as the\nsecond stage of thought, which leans on the staff of fancy, i. e. mere\n_representative_ thinking. This \u201cunity of experience,\u201d as Kant calls it,\nis the same thing, stated in other words, that Spencer refers to as the\n\u201cpositive result of our mental structure.\u201d In one sense those are true\nantinomies\u2014those of Kant, Hamilton, _et al._\u2014viz. in this: that the\n\u201c_representative_\u201d stage of thinking finds itself unable to shake off\nthe sensuous picture, and think \u201c_sub quadam specie \u00e6ternitatis_.\u201d To\nthe mind disciplined to the third stage of thought, these are no\nantinomies; Spinoza, Leibnitz, Plato and Aristotle are not confused by\nthem. The Thesis, properly stated, is a true universal, and exhibits its\nown truth, as that upon which the law of causality rests; and hence the\nantithesis itself\u2014less universal\u2014resting upon the law of causality, is\nbased upon the Thesis. Moreover, the Thesis does not deny an infinite\nsuccession in time and space, it only states that there must be an\nefficient cause\u2014just what the law of causality states, but shows, in\naddition, that this efficient cause must be a \u201cself-determined.\u201d\n\nOn page 282 we learn that, \u201cThe solar heat is the final source of the\nforce manifested by society.\u201d \u201cIt (the force of society) is based on\nanimal and vegetable products, and these in turn are dependent on the\nlight and heat of the sun.\u201d\n\nAs an episode in this somewhat abstract discussion, it may be diverting\nto notice the question of priority of discovery, touched upon in the\nfollowing note (p. 454): \u201cUntil I recently consulted his \u2018Outlines of\nAstronomy\u2019 on another question, I was not aware that, so far back as\n1833, Sir John Herschel had enunciated the doctrine that \u2018the sun\u2019s rays\nare the ultimate source of almost every motion which takes place on the\nsurface of the earth.\u2019 He expressly includes all geologic, meteorologic,\nand vital actions; as also those which we produce by the combustion of\ncoal. The late George Stephenson appears to have been wrongly credited\nwith this last idea.\u201d\n\nIn order to add to the thorough discussion of this important question,\nwe wish to suggest the claims of Thomas Carlyle, who, as far back as\n1830, wrote the following passage in his _Sartor Resartus_ (Am. ed. pp.\n55-6): \u201cWell sang the Hebrew Psalmist: \u2018If I take the wings of the\nmorning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Universe, God is\nthere.\u2019 Thou, too, O cultivated reader, who too probably art no\npsalmist, but a prosaist, knowing God only by tradition, knowest thou\nany corner of the world where at least force is not? The drop which thou\nshakest from thy wet hand, rests not where it falls, but to-morrow thou\nfindest it swept away; already, on the wings of the north wind, it is\nnearing the tropic of Cancer. How it came to evaporate and not lie\nmotionless? Thinkest thou there is aught motionless, without force, and\ndead?\n\n\u201cAs I rode through the Schwartzwald, I said to myself: That little fire\nwhich glows starlike across the dark-growing (nachtende) moor, where the\nsooty smith bends over his anvil, and thou hopest to replace thy lost\nhorseshoe\u2014is it a detached, separated speck, cut off from the whole\nuniverse, or indissolubly joined to the whole? Thou fool, that\nsmithy-fire was primarily kindled at the sun; is fed by air that\ncirculates from beyond Noah\u2019s deluge, from beyond the Dog star; it is a\nlittle ganglion, or nervous centre in the great vital system of\nimmensity.\u201d\n\nWe have, finally, to consider the correlation theory in connection with\nequilibrium.\n\nI. Motion results from destroyed equilibrium. The whole totality does\nnot correspond to itself, its ideal and real contradict each other. The\nmovement is the restoring of the equilibrium, or the bringing into unity\nof the ideal and real. To illustrate: a spring (made of steel, rubber,\nor any elastic material) has a certain form in which, it may exist\nwithout tension; this may be called the ideal shape, or simply the\nideal. If the spring is forced to assume another shape, its real shape\nbecomes different from the ideal; its equilibrium is destroyed, and\nforce is manifested as a tendency to restore the equilibrium (or unity\nof the ideal and real). Generalize this: all forces have the same\nnature; (_a_) _expansive_ forces arise from the ideal existing without\u2014a\ngas, steam, for example, ideally takes up a more extended space than it\nhas really; it expands to fill it. Or (_b_) contractive forces: the\nmultiplicity ideally exists within; e. g. attraction of gravitation;\nmatter trying to find the centre of the earth, its ideal. The will acts\nin this way: The ideal is changed first, and draws the real after it. I\nfirst destroy, in thought and will, the identity of ideal and real; the\ntension resulting is force. Thinking, since it deals with the universal\n(or the potential _and_ the actual) is an original source of force, and,\nas will result in the sequel from a reverse analysis (see below, V. 3,\n_c_) the _only_ source of force.\n\nII. Persistence of force requires an unrestorable equilibrium; in moving\nto restore one equilibrium, it must destroy another\u2014its equivalent.\n\nIII. But this contradicts the above developed conception of force as\nfollows: (_a_) Since force results from destroyed equilibrium, it\nfollows (_b_) that it requires as much force to destroy the equilibrium\nas is developed in the restoring of it (and this notion is the basis of\nthe correlation theory). But (_c_) if the first equilibrium (already\ndestroyed) can only be restored by the destroying of another equal to\nthe same, it has already formed an equilibrium with the second, and the\noccasion of the motion is removed.\n\nIf two forces are equal and opposed, which will give way?\n\nBy this dialectic consideration of force, we learn the insufficiency of\nthe theory of correlation as the ultimate truth. Instead of being \u201cthe\nsole truth, which transcends experience by underlying it\u201d (p. 258), we\nare obliged to confess that this \u201cpersistence of force\u201d rests on the\ncategory of causality; its thin disguise consists in the substitution of\nother words for the metaphysical expression, \u201cEvery effect must be equal\nto its cause.\u201d And this, when tortured in the crucible, confesses that\nthe only efficient cause is \u201c_causi sui_;\u201d hence the effect is equal to\nits cause, because it is the cause.\n\nAnd the correlation theory results in showing that force cannot be,\nunless self-originated.\n\nThat self-determination is the inevitable result, no matter what\nhypothesis be assumed, is also evident. Taking all counter-hypotheses\nand generalizing them, we have this analysis:\n\nI. Any and every being is determined from without through another. (This\ntheorem includes all anti-self-determination doctrines.)\n\nII. It results from this that any and every being is dependent upon\nanother and is a finite one; it cannot be isolated without destroying\nit. Hence it results that every being is an element of a whole that\nincludes _it_ as a subordinate moment.\n\nIII. Dependent being, as a subordinate element, cannot be said to\nsupport any thing attached to it, for its own support is not in itself\nbut in another, namely, the whole that includes it. From this it results\nthat no dependent being can depend upon another dependent being, but\nrather upon the including whole.\n\nThe including whole is therefore not a dependent; since it is for\nitself, and each element is determined through it, and for it, it may be\ncalled the _negative_ unity (or the unity which negates the independence\nof the elements).\n\n_Remark._\u2014A chain of dependent beings collapses into one dependent\nbeing. Dependence is not converted into independence by simple\nmultiplication. All dependence is thus an element of an independent\nwhole.\n\nIV. What is the _character_ of this independent whole, this _negative\nunity_? \u201cCharacter\u201d means determination, and we are prepared to say that\nits determination cannot be through another, for then it would be a\ndependent, and we should be referred again to the whole, including it.\nIts determination by which the multiplicity of elements arises is hence\nits own self-determination. Thus all finitude and dependence presupposes\nas its condition, self-determination.\n\nV. Self-determination more closely examined exhibits some remarkable\nresults, (which will throw light on the discussion of \u201cEssence and\nPhenomena\u201d above):\n\n(1.) It is \u201c_causa sui_;\u201d active and passive; existing dually as\ndetermining and determined; this self-diremption produces a distinction\nin itself which is again cancelled.\n\n(2.) As determiner (or active, or cause), it is the pure universal\u2014the\n_possibility of any_ determinations. But as _determined_ (passive or\neffect) it is the special, the particular, the one-sided reality that\nenters into change.\n\n(3.) But it is \u201cnegative unity\u201d of these two sides, and hence an\nindividual. The pure universal whose negative relation to itself as\ndeterminer makes the particular, completes itself to individuality\nthrough this act.\n\n(_a._) Since its pure universality is the substrate of its\ndetermination, and at the same time a self-related activity (or\nnegativity), it at once becomes its own object.\n\n(_b._) Its activity (limiting or determining)\u2014a pure negativity\u2014turned\nto itself as object, dissolves the particular in the universal, and thus\ncontinually realizes its subjectivity.\n\n(_c._) Hence these two sides of the negative unity are more properly\nsubject and object, and since they are identical (_causa sui_) we may\nname the result \u201cself-consciousness.\u201d\n\nThe absolute truth of all truths, then, is that self-consciousness is\nthe form of the Total. God is a Person, or rather _the_ Person. Through\nHis self-consciousness (thought of Himself) he makes Himself an object\nto Himself (Nature), and in the same act cancels it again into His own\nimage (finite spirit), and thus comprehends Himself in this\nself-revelation.\n\nTwo remarks must be made here: (1.) This is not \u201cPantheism;\u201d for it\nresults that God is a Person; and secondly Nature is a self-cancelling\nside in the process; thirdly, the so-called \u201cfinite spirit,\u201d or man, is\nimmortal, since otherwise he would not be the last link of the chain;\nbut such he is, because he can develop out of his sensuous life to pure\nthought, unconditioned by time and space, and hence he can surpass any\n_fixed_ \u201chigher intelligence,\u201d no matter how high created.\n\n(2.) It is the result that all profound thinkers have arrived at.\n\nAristotle (Metaphysics XI. 6 & 7) carries this whole question of motion\nback to its presupposition in a mode of treatment, \u201c_sub quadam specie\n\u00e6ternitatis_.\u201d He concludes thus: \u201cThe thinking, however, of that which\nis purely for itself, is a thinking of that which is most excellent in\nand for itself.\n\n\u201cThe thinking thinks itself, however, through participation in that\nwhich is thought by it; it becomes this object in its own activity, in\nsuch a manner that the subject and object are identical. For the\napprehending of thought and essence is what constitutes reason. The\nactivity of thinking produces that which is perceived; so that the\nactivity is rather that which Reason seems to have of a divine nature;\nspeculation [pure thinking] is the most excellent employment; if, then,\nGod is always engaged in this, as we are at times, He is admirable, and\nif in a higher degree, more admirable. But He _is_ in this pure\nthinking, and life too belongs to Him; for the activity of thought is\nlife. He is this activity. The activity, returning into itself, is the\nmost excellent and eternal life. We say, therefore, that God is an\neternal and the best living being. So that life and duration are\nuninterrupted and eternal; for this is God.\u201d\n\nWhen one gets rid of those \u201cimages of sense\u201d called by Spencer\n\u201cconceivables,\u201d and arrives at the \u201cunpicturable notions of\nintelligence,\u201d he will find it easy to reduce the vexed antinomies of\nforce, matter, motion, time, space and causality; arriving at the\nfundamental principle\u2014self-determination\u2014he will be able to make a\nscience of Biology. The organic realm will not yield to dualistic\nReflection. Goethe is the great pioneer of the school of physicists that\nwill spring out of the present activity of Reflection when it shall have\narrived at a perception of its method.\n\n_Resum\u00e9._\u2014Mr. Spencer\u2019s results, so far as philosophy is concerned, may\nbe briefly summed up under four general heads: 1. Psychology. 2.\nOntology. 3. Theology. 4. Cosmology.\n\n\n PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\n(1.) Conception is a mere picture in the mind; therefore what cannot be\npictured cannot be conceived; therefore the Infinite, the Absolute, God,\nEssence, Matter, Motion, Force\u2014anything, in short, that involves\nmediation\u2014cannot be conceived; hence they are unknowable.\n\n(2.) Consciousness is self-knowing; but that subject and object are one,\nis impossible. We can neither know ourselves nor any real being.\n\n(3.) All reasoning or explaining is the subsuming of a somewhat under a\nmore general category; hence the highest category is unsubsumed, and\nhence inexplicable.\n\n(4.) Our intellectual faculties may be improved to a certain extent, and\nbeyond this, no amount of training can avail anything. (Biology, vol. I,\np. 188.)\n\n(5.) The \u201csubstance of consciousness\u201d is the basis of our ideas of\npersistence of Force, Matter, etc.\n\n(6.) All knowing is relative; our knowledge of this fact, however, is\nnot relative but absolute.\n\n\n ONTOLOGY.\n\n\n(1.) All that we know is phenomenal. The reality passes all\nunderstanding. In the phenomenon the essence is \u201cmanifested,\u201d but still\nit is not revealed thereby; it remains hidden behind it, inscrutable to\nour perception.\n\n(2.) And yet, since all our knowledge is relative, we have an obscure\nknowledge of the hidden and inscrutable essence of the correlate of our\nknowledge of phenomena. We know that it exists.\n\n(3.) Though what is inconceivable is for that reason unknowable, yet we\nknow that persistence belongs to force, motion and matter; it is a\npositive result of our \u201cmental structure,\u201d although we cannot conceive\neither destructibility or indestructibility.\n\n(4.) Though self-consciousness is an impossibility, yet it sometimes\noccurs, since the \u201csubstance of consciousness\u201d is the object of\nconsciousness when it decides upon the persistence of the Universe, and\nof Force, Matter, etc.\n\n\n THEOLOGY.\n\n\nThe Supreme Being is unknown and unknowable; unrevealed and\nunrevealable, either naturally or supernaturally; for to reveal,\nrequires that some one shall comprehend what is revealed. The sole\ndoctrine of Religion of great value is the doctrine that God transcends\nthe human intellect. When Religion professes to reveal Him to man and\ndeclare His attributes, then it is irreligious. Though God is the\nunknown, yet personality, reason, consciousness, etc., are degrading\nwhen applied to Him. The \u201cThirty-nine Articles\u201d should be condensed into\none, thus: \u201cThere is an Unknown which I know that I cannot know.\u201c\n\n\u201cReligions are envelopes of truth which reveal to the lower, and conceal\nto the higher.\u201d \u201cThey are modes of manifestation of the unknowable.\u201d\n\n\n COSMOLOGY.\n\n\n\u201cEvolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a\ndefinite, coherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations\nand integrations.\u201d This is the law of the Universe. All progresses to an\nequilibration\u2014to a moving equilibrium.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION TO FICHTE\u2019S SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.\n TRANSLATED BY A. E. KROEGER.\n\n\n [NOTE.\u2014In presenting this \u201cIntroduction\u201d to the readers of the\n Journal of Speculative Philosophy, we believe we afford them the\n easiest means of gaining an insight into Fichte\u2019s great work on the\n Science of Knowledge. The present introduction was written by Fichte\n in 1797, three years after the first publication of his full system.\n It is certainly written in a remarkably clear and vigorous style, so\n as to be likely to arrest the attention even of those who have but\n little acquaintance with the rudiments of the Science of Philosophy.\n This led us to give it the preference over other essays, also\n written by Fichte, as Introductions to his Science of Knowledge. A\n translation of the Science of Knowledge, by Mr. Kroeger, is at\n present in course of publication in New York. This article is,\n moreover, interesting as being a more complete unfolding of the\n doctrine of Plato upon Method, heretofore announced.\u2014ED.]\n\n\n PRELIMINARY REMARKS.\n\n\n De re, qu\u00e6 agitur, petimus, ut homines, eam non opinionem, sed opus\n esse, cogitent ac pro certo habeant, non sect\u00e6 nos alicujus, aut\n placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis human\u00e6 fundamenta moliri.\n Deinde, ut, suis commodis \u00e6qui, in commune consulant, et ipsi in\n partem veniant.\u2014_Baco de Verulamio._\n\nThe author of the Science of Knowledge was soon convinced, through a\nslight acquaintance with the philosophical literature since the\nappearance of Kant\u2019s Critiques, that the object of this great man\u2014to\neffect a total reform in the study of philosophy, and hence of all\nscience\u2014had resulted in a failure, since not one of his numerous\nsuccessors appeared to understand what he had really spoken of. The\nauthor believed that he had understood the latter; he resolved to devote\nhis life to a representation\u2014totally independent from Kant\u2019s\u2014of that\ngreat discovery, and he will not give up this resolve. Whether he will\nsucceed better in making himself understood to his age, time alone can\nshow. At all events, he knows that nothing true and useful, which has\nonce been given to mankind, is lost, though only remote posterity should\nlearn how to use it.\n\nDetermined by my academical vocation, I wrote, in the first instance,\nfor my hearers, with whom it was in my power to explain myself in words\nuntil I was understood.\n\nThis is not the place to testify how much cause I have to be satisfied\nwith my efforts, and to entertain, of some of my students, the best\nhopes for science. That book of mine has also become known elsewhere,\nand there are various opinions afloat concerning it amongst the learned.\nA judgment, which even pretended to bring forth arguments, I have\nneither read nor heard, except from my students; but I have both heard\nand read a vast amount of derision, denunciation, and the general\nassurance that everybody is heartily opposed to this doctrine, and the\nconfession that no one can understand it. As far as the latter is\nconcerned, I will cheerfully assume all the blame, until others shall\nrepresent it so as to make it comprehensible, when students will\ndoubtless discover that my representation was not so very bad after all;\nor I will assume it altogether and unconditionally, if the reader\nthereby should be encouraged to study the present representation, in\nwhich I shall endeavor to be as clear as possible. I shall continue\nthese representations so long as I am convinced that I do not write\naltogether in vain. But I write in vain when nobody examines my\nargument.\n\nI still owe my readers the following explanations: I have always said,\nand say again, that my system is the same as Kant\u2019s. That is to say, it\ncontains the same view of the subject, but is totally independent of\nKant\u2019s mode of representation. I have said this, not to cover myself by\na great authority, or to support my doctrine except by itself, but in\norder to say the truth and to be just.\n\nPerhaps it may be proven after twenty years. Kant is as yet a sealed\nbook, and what he has been understood to teach, is exactly what he\nintended to eradicate.\n\nMy writings are neither to explain Kant, nor to be explained by his;\nthey must stand by themselves, and Kant must not be counted in the game\nat all. My object is\u2014let me say it frankly\u2014not to correct or amplify\nsuch philosophical reflections as may be current, be they called\nanti-Kant or Kant, but to totally eradicate them, and to effect a\ncomplete revolution in the mode of thinking regarding these subjects, so\nthat hereafter the Object will be posited and determined by Knowledge\n(Reason), and not _vice versa_; and this seriously, not merely in words.\n\nLet no one object: \u201cIf this system is true, certain axioms cannot be\nupheld,\u201d for I do not intend that anything should be upheld which this\nsystem refutes.\n\nAgain: \u201cI do not understand this book,\u201d is to me a very uninteresting\nand insignificant confession. No one can and shall understand my\nwritings, without having studied them; for they do not contain a lesson\nheretofore taught, but something\u2014since Kant has not been\nunderstood\u2014altogether new to the age.\n\nCensure without argument tells me simply that my doctrine does not\nplease; and this confession is again very unimportant; for the question\nis not at all, whether it pleases you or not, but whether it has been\nproven. In the present sketch I write only for those, in whom there\nstill dwells an inner sense of love for truth; who still value science\nand conviction, and who are impelled by a lively zeal to seek truth.\nWith those, who, by long spiritual slavery, have lost with the faith in\ntheir own conviction their faith in the conviction of others; who\nconsider it folly if anybody attempts to seek truth for himself; who see\nnothing in science but a comfortable mode of subsistence; who are\nhorrified at every proposition to enlarge its boundaries involving as a\nnew labor, and who consider no means disgraceful by which they can hope\nto suppress him who makes such a proposition,\u2014with those I have nothing\nto do.\n\nI should be sorry if _they_ understood me. Hitherto this wish of mine\nhas been realized; and I hope, even now, that these present lines will\nso confuse them that they can perceive nothing more in them than mere\nwords, while that which represents their mind is torn hither and thither\nby their ill-concealed rage.\n\n\n INTRODUCTION.\n\n\nI. Attend to thyself; turn _thine_ eye away from all that surrounds thee\nand into _thine_ own inner self! Such is the first task imposed upon the\nstudent by Philosophy. We speak of nothing that is without thee, but\nmerely of thyself.\n\nThe slightest self-observation must show every one a remarkable\ndifference between the various immediate conditions of his\nconsciousness, which we may also call representations. For some of them\nappear altogether dependent upon our freedom, and we cannot possibly\nbelieve that there is without us anything corresponding to them. Our\nimagination, our will, appears to us as free. Others, however, we refer\nto a Truth as their model, which is held to be firmly fixed, independent\nof us; and in determining such representations, we find ourselves\nconditioned by the necessity of their harmony with this Truth. In the\nknowledge of them we do not consider ourselves free, as far as their\ncontents are concerned. In short: while some of our representations are\naccompanied by the feeling of freedom, others are accompanied by the\nfeeling of necessity.\n\nReasonably the question cannot arise\u2014why are the representations\ndependent upon our freedom determined in precisely this manner, and not\notherwise? For in supposing them to be dependent upon our freedom, all\napplication of the conception of a ground is rejected; they are thus,\nbecause I so fashioned them, and if I had fashioned them differently,\nthey would be otherwise.\n\nBut it is certainly a question worthy of reflection\u2014what is the ground\nof the system of those representations which are accompanied by the\nfeeling of necessity and of that feeling of necessity itself? To answer\nthis question is the object of philosophy; and, in my opinion, nothing\nis philosophy but the Science which solves this problem. The system of\nthose representations, which are accompanied by the feeling of\nnecessity, is also called _Experience_\u2014internal as well as external\nexperience. Philosophy, therefore, to say the same thing in other words,\nhas to find the ground of all Experience.\n\nOnly three objections can be raised against this. Somebody might deny\nthat representations, accompanied by the feeling of necessity, and\nreferred to a Truth determined without any action of ours, do ever occur\nin our consciousness. Such a person would either deny his own knowledge,\nor be altogether differently constructed from other men; in which latter\ncase his denial would be of no concern to us. Or somebody might say: the\nquestion is completely unanswerable, we are in irremovable ignorance\nconcerning it, and must remain so. To enter into argument with such a\nperson is altogether superfluous. The best reply he can receive is an\nactual answer to the question, and then all he can do is to examine our\nanswer, and tell us why and in what matters it does not appear\nsatisfactory to him. Finally, somebody might quarrel about the\ndesignation, and assert: \u201cPhilosophy is something else than what you\nhave stated above, or at least something else besides.\u201d It might be\neasily shown to such a one, that scholars have at all times designated\nexactly what we have just stated to be Philosophy, and that whatever\nelse he might assert to be Philosophy, has already another name, and\nthat if this word signifies anything at all, it must mean exactly this\nScience. But as we are not inclined to enter upon any dispute about\nwords, we, for our part, have already given up the name of Philosophy,\nand have called the Science which has the solution of this problem for\nits object, the _Science of Knowledge_.\n\nII. Only when speaking of something, which we consider accidental, i. e.\nwhich we suppose might also have been otherwise, though it was not\ndetermined by freedom, can we ask for its ground; and by this very\nasking for its ground does it become accidental to the questioner. To\nfind the ground of anything accidental means, to find something else,\nfrom the determinedness of which it can be seen why the accidental,\namongst the various conditions it might have assumed, assumed precisely\nthe one it did. The ground lies\u2014by the very thinking of a ground\u2014beyond\nits Grounded, and both are, in so far as they are Ground and Grounded,\nopposed to each other, related to each other, and thus the latter is\nexplained from the former.\n\nNow Philosophy is to discover the ground of all experience; hence its\nobject lies necessarily _beyond all Experience_. This sentence applies\nto all Philosophy, and has been so applied always heretofore, if we\nexcept these latter days of Kant\u2019s misconstruers and their facts of\nconsciousness, i. e. of inner experience.\n\nNo objection can be raised to this paragraph; for the premise of our\nconclusion is a mere analysis of the above-stated conception of\nPhilosophy, and from the premise the conclusion is drawn. If somebody\nshould wish to remind us that the conception of a ground must be\ndifferently explained, we can, to be sure, not prevent him from forming\nanother conception of it, if he so chooses; but we declare, on the\nstrength of our good right, that _we_, in the above description of\nPhilosophy, wish to have nothing else understood by that word. Hence, if\nit is not to be so understood, the possibility of Philosophy, as we have\ndescribed it, must be altogether denied, and such a denial we have\nreplied to in our first section.\n\nIII. The finite intelligence has nothing beyond experience; experience\ncontains the whole substance of its thinking. The philosopher stands\nnecessarily under the same conditions, and hence it seems impossible\nthat he can elevate himself beyond experience.\n\nBut he can abstract; i. e. he can separate by the freedom of thinking\nwhat in experience is united. In Experience, _the Thing_\u2014that which is\nto be determined in itself independent of our freedom, and in accordance\nwith which our knowledge is to shape itself\u2014and the Intelligence\u2014which\nis to obtain a knowledge of it\u2014are inseparably united. The philosopher\nmay abstract from both, and if he does, he has abstracted from\nExperience and elevated himself above it. If he abstracts from the\nfirst, he retains an intelligence _in itself_, i. e. abstracted from its\nrelation to experience; if he abstract from the latter, he retains the\nThing _in itself_, i. e. abstracted from the fact that it occurs in\nexperience; and thus retains the Intelligence in itself, or the \u201cThing\nin itself,\u201d as the explanatory ground of Experience. The former mode of\nproceeding is called _Idealism_, the latter _Dogmatism_.\n\nOnly these two philosophical systems\u2014and of that these remarks should\nconvince everybody\u2014are possible. According to the first system the\nrepresentations, which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, are\nproductions of the Intelligence, which must be presupposed in their\nexplanation; according to the latter system they are the productions of\na thing in itself which must be presupposed to explain them. If anybody\ndesired to deny this, he would have to prove that there is still another\nway to go beyond experience than the one by means of abstraction, or\nthat the consciousness of experience contains more than the two\ncomponents just mentioned.\n\nNow in regard to the first, it will appear below, it is true, that what\nwe have here called Intelligence does, indeed, occur in consciousness\nunder another name, and hence is not altogether produced by abstraction;\nbut it will at the same time be shown that the consciousness of it is\nconditioned by an abstraction, which, however, occurs naturally to\nmankind.\n\nWe do not at all deny that it is possible to compose a whole system from\nfragments of these incongruous systems, and that this illogical labor\nhas often been undertaken; but we do deny that more than these two\nsystems are possible in a logical course of proceeding.\n\nIV. Between the object\u2014(we shall call the explanatory ground of\nexperience, which a philosophy asserts, the _object of that philosophy_,\nsince it appears to be only through and for such philosophy)\u2014between the\nobject of _Idealism_ and that of _Dogmatism_ there is a remarkable\ndistinction in regard to their relation to consciousness generally. All\nwhereof I am conscious is called object of consciousness. There are\nthree ways in which the object can be related to consciousness. Either\nit appears to have been produced by the representation, or as existing\nwithout any action of ours; and in the latter case, as either also\ndetermined in regard to its qualitativeness, or as existing merely in\nregard to its existence, while determinable in regard to its\nqualitativeness by the free intelligence.\n\nThe first relation applies merely to an imaginary object; the second\nmerely to an object of Experience; the third applies only to an object,\nwhich we shall at once proceed to describe.\n\nI can determine myself by freedom to think, for instance, the Thing in\nitself of the Dogmatists. Now if I am to abstract from the thought and\nlook simply upon myself, I myself become the object of a particular\nrepresentation. That I appear to myself as determined in precisely this\nmanner, and none other, e. g. as thinking, and as thinking of all\npossible thoughts\u2014precisely this Thing in itself, is to depend\nexclusively upon my own freedom of self-determination; I have made\nmyself such a particular object out of my own free will. I have not made\n_myself_; on the contrary, I am forced to think myself in advance as\ndeterminable through this self-determination. Hence I am myself my own\nobject, the determinateness of which, under certain conditions, depends\naltogether upon the intelligence, but the existence of which must always\nbe presupposed. Now this very \u201cI\u201d is the object of Idealism. The object\nof this system does not occur actually as something real in\nconsciousness, not as a _Thing in itself_\u2014for then Idealism would cease\nto be what it is, and become Dogmatism\u2014but as _\u201cI\u201d in itself_; not as an\nobject of Experience\u2014for it is not determined, but is exclusively\ndeterminable through my freedom, and without this determination it would\nbe nothing, and is really not at all\u2014but as something beyond all\nExperience.\n\nThe object of Dogmatism, on the contrary, belongs to the objects of the\nfirst class, which are produced solely by free Thinking. The Thing in\nitself is a mere invention, and has no reality at all. It does not occur\nin Experience, for the system of Experience is nothing else than\nThinking accompanied by the feeling of necessity, and can not even be\nsaid to be anything else by the dogmatist, who, like every philosopher,\nhas to explain its cause. True, the dogmatist wants to obtain reality\nfor it through the necessity of thinking it as ground of all experience,\nand would succeed, if he could prove that experience can be, and can be\nexplained only by means of it. But this is the very thing in dispute,\nand he cannot presuppose what must first be proven.\n\nHence the object of Idealism has this advantage over the object of\nDogmatism, that it is not to be deduced as the explanatory ground of\nExperience\u2014which would be a contradiction, and change this system itself\ninto a part of Experience\u2014but that it is, nevertheless, to be pointed\nout as a part of consciousness; whereas, the object of Dogmatism can\npass for nothing but a mere invention, which obtains validity only\nthrough the success of the system.\n\nThis we have said merely to promote a clearer insight into the\ndistinction between the two systems, but not to draw from it conclusions\nagainst the latter system. That the object of every philosophy, as\nexplanatory ground of Experience, must lie beyond all experience, is\nrequired by the very nature of Philosophy, and is far from being\nderogatory to a system. But we have as yet discovered no reasons why\nthat object should also occur in a particular manner within\nconsciousness.\n\nIf anybody should not be able to convince himself of the truth of what\nwe have just said, this would not make his conviction of the truth of\nthe whole system an impossibility, since what we have just said was only\nintended as a passing remark. Still in conformity to our plan we will\nalso here take possible objections into consideration. Somebody might\ndeny the asserted immediate self-consciousness in a free act of the\nmind. Such a one we should refer to the conditions stated above. This\nself-consciousness does not obtrude itself upon us, and comes not of its\nown accord; it is necessary first to act free, and next to abstract from\nthe object, and attend to one\u2019s self. Nobody can be forced to do this,\nand though he may say he has done it, it is impossible to say whether he\nhas done it correctly. In one word, this consciousness cannot be proven\nto any one, but everybody must freely produce it within himself. Against\nthe second assertion, that the \u201cThing in itself\u201d is a mere invention, an\nobjection could only be raised, because it were misunderstood.\n\nV. Neither of these two systems can directly refute the other; for their\ndispute is a dispute about the first principle; each system\u2014if you only\nadmit its first axiom\u2014proves the other one wrong; each denies all to the\nopposite, and these two systems have no point in common from which they\nmight bring about a mutual understanding and reconciliation. Though they\nmay agree on the words of a sentence, they will surely attach a\ndifferent meaning to the words.\n\n(Hence the reason why Kant has not been understood and why the Science\nof Knowledge can find no friends. The systems of Kant and of the Science\nof Knowledge are _idealistic_\u2014not in the general indefinite, but in the\njust described definite sense of the word; but the modern philosophers\nare all of them dogmatists, and are firmly resolved to remain so. Kant\nwas merely tolerated, because it was possible to make a dogmatist out of\nhim; but the Science of Knowledge, which cannot be thus construed, is\ninsupportable to these wise men. The rapid extension of Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy\u2014when it was thus misunderstood\u2014is not a proof of the\nprofundity, but rather of the shallowness of the age. For in this shape\nit is the most wonderful abortion ever created by human imagination, and\nit does little honor to its defenders that they do not perceive this. It\ncan also be shown that this philosophy was accepted so greedily only\nbecause people thought it would put a stop to all serious speculation,\nand continue the era of shallow Empiricism.)\n\nFirst. Idealism cannot refute Dogmatism. True, the former system has the\nadvantage, as we have already said, of being enabled to point out its\nexplanatory ground of all experience\u2014the free acting intelligence\u2014as a\nfact of consciousness. This fact the dogmatist must also admit, for\notherwise he would render himself incapable of maintaining the argument\nwith his opponent; but he at the same time, by a correct conclusion from\nhis principle, changes this explanatory ground into a deception and\nappearance, and thus renders it incapable of being the explanatory\nground of anything else, since it cannot maintain its own existence in\nits own philosophy. According to the Dogmatist, all phenomena of our\nconsciousness are productions of a _Thing in itself_, even our pretended\ndeterminations by freedom, and the belief that we are free. This belief\nis produced by the effect of the Thing upon ourselves, and the\ndeterminations, which we deduced from freedom, are also produced by it.\nThe only difference is, that we are not aware of it in these cases, and\nhence ascribe it to no cause, i. e. to our freedom. Every logical\ndogmatist is necessarily a Fatalist; he does not deny the fact of\nconsciousness, that we consider ourselves free\u2014for this would be against\nreason;\u2014but he proves from his principle that this is a false view. He\ndenies the independence of the _Ego_, which is the basis of the\nIdealist, _in toto_, makes it merely a production of the Thing, an\naccidence of the World; and hence the logical dogmatist is necessarily\nalso materialist. He can only be refuted from the postulate of the\nfreedom and independence of the _Ego_; but this is precisely what he\ndenies. Neither can the dogmatist refute the Idealist.\n\nThe principle of the former, the Thing in itself, is nothing, and has no\nreality, as its defenders themselves must admit, except that which it is\nto receive from the fact that experience can only be explained by it.\nBut this proof the Idealist annihilates by explaining experience in\nanother manner, hence by denying precisely what dogmatism assumes. Thus\nthe Thing in itself becomes a complete Chimera; there is no further\nreason why it should be assumed; and with it the whole edifice of\ndogmatism tumbles down.\n\nFrom what we have just stated, is moreover evident the complete\nirreconcilability of both systems; since the _results_ of the one\ndestroy those of the other. Wherever their union has been attempted the\nmembers would not fit together, and somewhere an immense gulf appeared\nwhich could not be spanned.\n\nIf any one were to deny this he would have to prove the possibility of\nsuch a union\u2014of a union which consists in an everlasting composition of\nMatter and Spirit, or, which is the same, of Necessity and Liberty.\n\nNow since, as far as we can see at present, both systems appear to have\nthe same speculative value, but since both cannot stand together, nor\nyet either convince the other, it occurs as a very interesting question:\nWhat can possibly tempt persons who comprehend this\u2014and to comprehend it\nis so very easy a matter\u2014to prefer the one over the other; and why\nskepticism, as the total renunciation of an answer to this problem, does\nnot become universal?\n\nThe dispute between the Idealist and the Dogmatist is, in reality, the\nquestion, whether the independence of the _Ego_ is to be sacrificed to\nthat of the Thing, or _vice versa_? What, then, is it, which induces\nsensible men to decide in favor of the one or the other?\n\nThe philosopher discovers from this point of view\u2014in which he must\nnecessarily place himself, if he wants to pass for a philosopher, and\nwhich, in the progress of Thinking, every man necessarily occupies\nsooner or later,\u2014nothing farther _than that he is forced to represent to\nhimself_ both: that he is free, and that there are determined things\noutside of him. But it is impossible for man to stop at this thought;\nthe thought of a representation is but a half-thought, a broken off\nfragment of a thought; something must be thought and added to it, as\ncorresponding with the representation independent of it. In other words:\nthe representation cannot exist alone by itself, it is only something in\nconnection with something else, and in itself it is nothing. This\nnecessity of thinking it is, which forces one from that point of view to\nthe question: What is the ground of the representations? or, which is\nexactly the same, What is that which corresponds with them?\n\nNow the _representation_ of the independence of the _Ego_ and that of\nthe Thing can very well exist together; but not the independence\n_itself_ of both. Only one can be the first, the beginning, the\nindependent; the second, by the very fact of being the second, becomes\nnecessarily dependent upon the first, with which it is to be\nconnected\u2014now, which of the two is to be made the first? Reason\nfurnishes no ground for a decision; since the question concerns not the\nconnecting of one link with another, but the commencement of the first\nlink, which as an absolute first act is altogether conditional upon the\nfreedom of Thinking. Hence the decision is arbitrary; and since this\narbitrariness is nevertheless to have a cause, the decision is dependent\nupon _inclination_ and _interest_. The last ground, therefore, of the\ndifference between the Dogmatist and the Idealist is the difference of\ntheir interest.\n\nThe highest interest, and hence the ground of all other interest, is\nthat which we feel _for ourselves_. Thus with the Philosopher. Not to\nlose his Self in his argumentation, but to retain and assert it, this is\nthe interest which unconsciously guides all his Thinking. Now, there are\ntwo grades of mankind; and in the progress of our race, before the last\ngrade has been universally attained, two chief kinds of men. The one\nkind is composed of those who have not yet elevated themselves to the\nfull feeling of their freedom and absolute independence, who are merely\nconscious of themselves in the representation of outward things. These\nmen have only a desultory consciousness, linked together with the\noutward objects, and put together out of their manifoldness. They\nreceive a picture of their Self only from the Things, as from a mirror;\nfor their own sake they cannot renounce their faith in the independence\nof those things, since they exist only together with these things.\nWhatever they are they have become through the outer World. Whosoever is\nonly a production of the Things will never view himself in any other\nmanner; and he is perfectly correct, so long as he speaks merely for\nhimself and for those like him. The principle of the dogmatist is: Faith\nin the things, for their own sake; hence, mediated Faith in their own\ndesultory self, as simply the result of the Things.\n\nBut whosoever becomes conscious of his self-existence and independence\nfrom all outward things\u2014and this men can only become by making something\nof themselves, through their own Self, independently of all outward\nthings\u2014needs no longer the Things as supports of his Self, and cannot\nuse them, because they annihilate his independence and turn it into an\nempty appearance. The _Ego_ which he possesses, and which interests him,\ndestroys that Faith in the Things; he believes in his independence, from\ninclination, and seizes it with affection. His Faith in himself is\n_immediate_.\n\nFrom this interest the various passions are explicable, which mix\ngenerally with the defence of these philosophical systems. The dogmatist\nis in danger of losing his Self when his system is attacked; and yet he\nis not armed against this attack, because there is something within him\nwhich takes part with the aggressor; hence, he defends himself with\nbitterness and heat. The idealist, on the contrary, cannot well refrain\nfrom looking down upon his opponent with a certain carelessness, since\nthe latter can tell him nothing which he has not known long ago and has\ncast away as useless. The dogmatist gets angry, misconstrues, and would\npersecute, if he had the power; the idealist is cold and in danger of\nridiculing his antagonist.\n\nHence, what philosophy a man chooses depends entirely upon what kind of\nman he is; for a philosophical system is not a piece of dead household\nfurniture, which you may use or not use, but is animated by the soul of\nthe man who has it. Men of a naturally weak-minded character, or who\nhave become weak-minded and crooked through intellectual slavery,\nscholarly luxury and vanity, will never elevate themselves to idealism.\n\nYou can show the dogmatist the insufficiency and inconsequence of his\nsystem, of which we shall speak directly; you can confuse and terrify\nhim from all sides; but you cannot _convince_ him, because he is unable\nto listen to and examine with calmness what he cannot tolerate. If\nIdealism should prove to be the only real Philosophy, it will also\nappear that a man must be born a philosopher, be educated to be one, and\neducate himself to be one; but that no human art (no external force) can\nmake a philosopher out of him. Hence, this Science expects few\nproselytes from men who have already formed their character; if our\nPhilosophy has any hopes at all, it entertains them rather from the\nyoung generation, the natural vigor of which has not yet been submerged\nin the weak-mindedness of the age.\n\nVI. But dogmatism is totally incapable of explaining what it should\nexplain, and this is decisive in regard to its insufficiency. It is to\nexplain the representation of things, and proposes to explain them as an\neffect of the Things. Now, the dogmatist cannot deny what immediate\nconsciousness asserts of this representation. What, then, does it assert\nthereof? It is not my purpose here to put in a conception what can only\nbe gathered in immediate contemplation, nor to exhaust that which forms\na great portion of the Science of Knowledge. I will merely recall to\nmemory what every one, who has but firmly looked within himself, must\nlong since have discovered.\n\nThe Intelligence, as such, _sees itself_, and this seeing of its self is\nimmediately connected with all that appertains to the Intelligence; and\nin this immediate uniting of _Being_ and _Seeing_ the nature of the\nIntelligence consists. Whatever is in the Intelligence, whatever the\nIntelligence is itself, the Intelligence is _for itself_, and only in so\nfar as it is this _for itself_ is it this, as Intelligence.\n\nI think this or that object! Now what does this mean, and how do I\nappear to myself in this Thinking? Not otherwise than thus: I produce\ncertain conditions within myself, if the object is a mere invention; but\nif the objects are real and exist without my invention, I simply\ncontemplate, as a spectator, the production of those conditions within\nme. They are within me only in so far as I contemplate them; my\ncontemplation and their Being are inseparably united.\n\nA Thing, on the contrary, is to be this or that; but as soon as the\nquestion is put: _For whom_ is it this? Nobody, who but comprehends the\nword, will reply: For itself! But he will have to add the thought of an\nIntelligence, _for_ which the Thing is to be; while, on the contrary,\nthe Intelligence is self-sufficient and requires no additional thought.\nBy thinking it as the Intelligence you include already that for which it\nis to be. Hence, there is in the Intelligence, to express myself\nfiguratively, a twofold\u2014Being and Seeing, the Real and the Ideal; and in\nthe inseparability of this twofold the nature of the Intelligence\nconsists, while the Thing is simply a unit\u2014the Real. Hence Intelligence\nand Thing are directly opposed to each other; they move in two worlds,\nbetween which there is no bridge.\n\nThe nature of the Intelligence and its particular determinations\nDogmatism endeavors to explain by the principle of Causality; the\nIntelligence is to be a production, the second link in a series.\n\nBut the principle of causality applies to a _real_ series, and not to a\ndouble one. The power of the cause goes over into an Other opposed to\nit, and produces therein a Being, and nothing further; a Being for a\npossible outside Intelligence, but not for the thing itself. You may\ngive this Other even a mechanical power, and it will transfer the\nreceived impression to the next link, and thus the movement proceeding\nfrom the first may be transferred through as long a series as you choose\nto make; but nowhere will you find a link which reacts back upon itself.\nOr give the Other the highest quality which you can give a\nthing\u2014Sensibility\u2014whereby it will follow the laws of its own inner\nnature, and not the law given to it by the cause\u2014and it will, to be\nsure, react upon the outward cause; but it will, nevertheless, remain a\nmere simple Being, a Being for a possible intelligence outside of it.\nThe Intelligence you will not get, unless you add it in thinking as the\nprimary and absolute, the connection of which, with this your\n_independent_ Being, you will find it very difficult to explain.\n\nThe series is and remains a simple one; and you have not at all\nexplained what was to be explained. You were to prove the connection\nbetween Being and Representation; but this you do not, nor can you do\nit; for your principle contains merely the ground of a Being, and not of\na Representation, totally opposed to Being. You take an immense leap\ninto a world, totally removed from your principle. This leap they seek\nto hide in various ways. Rigorously\u2014and this is the course of consistent\ndogmatism, which thus becomes materialism;\u2014the soul is to them no Thing\nat all, and indeed nothing at all, but merely a production, the result\nof the reciprocal action of Things amongst themselves. But this\nreciprocal action produces merely a change in the Things, and by no\nmeans anything apart from the Things, unless you add an observing\nintelligence. The similes which they adduce to make their system\ncomprehensible, for instance, that of the harmony resulting from sounds\nof different instruments, make its irrationality only more apparent. For\nthe harmony is not in the instruments, but merely in the mind of the\nhearer, who combines within himself the manifold into One; and unless\nyou have such a hearer there is no harmony at all.\n\nBut who can prevent Dogmatism from assuming the Soul as one of the\nThings, _per se_? The soul would thus belong to what it has postulated\nfor the solution of its problem, and, indeed, would thereby be made the\ncategory of cause and effect applicable to the Soul and the\nThings\u2014materialism only permitting a reciprocal action of the Things\namongst themselves\u2014and thoughts might now be produced. To make the\nUnthinkable thinkable, Dogmatism has, indeed, attempted to presuppose\nThing or the Soul, or both, in such a manner, that the effect of the\nThing was to produce a representation. The Thing, as influencing the\nSoul, is to be such, as to make its influences representations; GOD, for\ninstance, in Berkley\u2019s system, was such a thing. (His system is\ndogmatic, not idealistic.) But this does not better matters; we\nunderstand only mechanical effects, and it is impossible for us to\nunderstand any other kind of effects. Hence, that presupposition\ncontains merely words, but there is no sense in it. Or the soul is to be\nof such a nature that every effect upon the Soul turns into a\nrepresentation. But this also we find it impossible to understand.\n\nIn this manner Dogmatism proceeds everywhere, whatever phase it may\nassume. In the immense gulf, which in that system remains always open\nbetween Things and Representations, it places a few empty words instead\nof an explanation, which words may certainly be committed to memory, but\nin saying which nobody has ever yet thought, nor ever will think,\nanything. For whenever one attempts to think the manner in which is\naccomplished what Dogmatism asserts to be accomplished, the whole idea\nvanishes into empty foam. Hence Dogmatism can only repeat its principle,\nand repeat it in different forms; can only assert and re-assert the same\nthing; but it cannot proceed from what it asserts to what is to be\nexplained, nor ever deduce the one from the other. But in this deduction\nPhilosophy consists. Hence Dogmatism, even when viewed from a\nspeculative stand-point, is no Philosophy at all, but merely an impotent\nassertion. Idealism is the only possible remaining Philosophy. What we\nhave here said can meet with no objection; but it may well meet with\nincapability of understanding it. That all influences are of a\nmechanical nature, and that no mechanism can produce a representation,\nnobody will deny, who but understands the words. But this is the very\ndifficulty. It requires a certain degree of independence and freedom of\nspirit to comprehend the nature of the intelligence, which we have\ndescribed, and upon which our whole refutation of Dogmatism is founded.\nMany persons have not advanced further with their Thinking than to\ncomprehend the simple chain of natural mechanism, and very naturally,\ntherefore, the Representation, if they choose to think it at all,\nbelongs, in their eyes, to the same chain of which alone they have any\nknowledge. The Representation thus becomes to them a sort of Thing of\nwhich we have divers examples in some of the most celebrated\nphilosophical writers. For such persons Dogmatism is sufficient: for\nthem there is no gulf, since the opposite does not exist for them at\nall. Hence you cannot convince the Dogmatist by the proof just stated,\nhowever clear it may be, for you cannot bring the proof to his\nknowledge, since he lacks the power to comprehend it.\n\nMoreover, the manner in which Dogmatism is treated here, is opposed to\nthe mild way of thinking which characterizes our age, and which, though\nit has been extensively accepted in all ages, has never been converted\nto an express principle except in ours; i. e. that philosophers must not\nbe so strict in their logic; in philosophy one should not be so\nparticular as, for instance, in Mathematics. If persons of this mode of\nthinking see but a few links of the chain and the rule, according to\nwhich conclusions are drawn, they at once fill up the remaining part\nthrough their imagination, never investigating further of what they may\nconsist. If, for instance, an Alexander Von Ioch tells them: \u201cAll things\nare determined by natural necessity; now our representations depend upon\nthe condition of Things, and our will depends upon our representations:\nhence all our will is determined by natural necessity, and our opinion\nof a free will is mere deception!\u201d\u2014then these people think it mightily\ncomprehensible and clear, although there is no sense in it; and they go\naway convinced and satisfied at the stringency of this his\ndemonstration.\n\nI must call to mind, that the Science of Knowledge does not proceed from\nthis mild way of thinking, nor calculate upon it. If only a single link\nin the long chain it has to draw does not fit closely to the following,\nthis Science does not pretend to have established anything.\n\nVII. Idealism, as we have said above, explains the determinations of\nconsciousness from the activity of the Intelligence, which, in its view,\nis only active and absolute, not passive; since it is postulated as the\nfirst and highest, preceded by nothing, which might explain its\npassivity. From the same reason actual _Existence_ cannot well be\nascribed to the Intelligence, since such Existence is the result of\nreciprocal causality, but there is nothing wherewith the Intelligence\nmight be placed in reciprocal causality. From the view of Idealism, the\nIntelligence is a _Doing_, and absolutely nothing else; it is even wrong\nto call it _an Active_, since this expression points to something\nexisting, in which the activity is inherent.\n\nBut to assume anything of this kind is against the principle of\nIdealism, which proposes to deduce all other things from the\nIntelligence. Now certain _determined_ representations\u2014as, for instance,\nof a world, of a material world in space, existing without any work of\nour own\u2014are to be deduced from the action of the Intelligence; but you\ncannot deduce anything determined from an undetermined; the form of all\ndeductions, the category of ground and sequence, is not applicable here.\nHence the action of the Intelligence, which is made the ground, must be\na _determined_ action, and since the action of the Intelligence itself\nis the highest ground of explanation, that action must be so determined\n_by the Intelligence itself_, and not by anything foreign to it. Hence\nthe presupposition of Idealism will be this: the Intelligence acts, but\nby its very essence it can only act in a certain manner. If this\nnecessary manner of its action is considered apart from the action, it\nmay properly be called Laws of Action. Hence, there are necessary laws\nof the Intelligence.\n\nThis explains also, at the same time, the feeling of necessity which\naccompanies the determined representations; the Intelligence experiences\nin those cases, not an impression from without, but feels in its action\nthe limits of its own Essence. In so far as Idealism makes this only\nreasonable and really explanatory presupposition of necessary laws of\nthe Intelligence, it is called _Critical_ or _Transcendental Idealism_.\nA transcendent Idealism would be a system which were to undertake a\ndeduction of determined representations from the free and perfectly\nlawless action of the Intelligence: an altogether contradictory\npresupposition, since, as we have said above, the category of ground and\nsequence is not applicable in that case.\n\nThe laws of action of the Intelligence, as sure as they are to be\nfounded in the one nature of the Intelligence, constitute in themselves\na system; that is to say, the fact that the Intelligence acts in this\nparticular manner under this particular condition _is_ explainable, and\nexplainable because under a condition it has always a determined mode of\naction, which again is explainable from _one_ highest fundamental law.\nIn the course of its action the Intelligence gives itself its own laws;\nand this legislation itself is done by virtue of a higher necessary\naction or Representation. For instance: the law of Causality is not a\nfirst original law, but only one of the many modes of combining the\nmanifold, and to be deduced from the fundamental law of this\ncombination; this law of combining the manifold is again, like the\nmanifold itself, to be deduced from higher laws.\n\nHence, even Critical Idealism can proceed in a twofold manner. Either it\ndeduces this system of necessary modes of action, and together with it\nthe objective representations arising therefrom, really from the\nfundamental laws of the Intelligence, and thus causes gradually to arise\nunder the very eyes of the reader or hearer the whole extent of our\nrepresentations; or it gathers these laws\u2014perhaps as they are already\nimmediately applied to objects; hence, in a lower condition, and then\nthey are called categories\u2014gathers these laws somewhere, and now\nasserts, that the objects are determined and regulated by them.\n\nI ask the critic who follows the last-mentioned method, and who does not\ndeduce the assumed laws of the Intelligence from the Essence of the\nIntelligence, where he gets the material knowledge of these laws, the\nknowledge that they are just these very same laws; for instance, that of\nSubstantiality or Causality? For I do not want to trouble him yet with\nthe question, how he knows that they are mere immanent laws of the\nIntelligence. They are the laws which are immediately applied to\nobjects, and he can only have obtained them by abstraction from these\nobjects, i. e. from Experience. It is of no avail if he takes them, by a\nroundabout way, from logic, for logic is to him only the result of\nabstraction from the objects, and hence he would do indirectly, what\ndirectly might appear too clearly in its true nature. Hence he can prove\nby nothing that his postulated Laws of Thinking are really Laws of\nThinking, are really nothing but immanent laws of the Intelligence. The\nDogmatist asserts in opposition, that they are not, but that they are\ngeneral qualities of Things, founded on the nature of Things, and there\nis no reason why we should place more faith in the unproved assertion of\nthe one than in the unproved assertion of the other. This course of\nproceeding, indeed, furnishes no understanding that and why the\nIntelligence should act just in this particular manner. To produce such\nan understanding, it would be necessary to premise something which can\nonly appertain to the Intelligence, and from those premises to deduce\nbefore our eyes the laws of Thinking.\n\nBy such a course of proceeding it is above all incomprehensible how the\nobject itself is obtained; for although you may admit the unproved\npostulates of the critic, they explain nothing further than the\n_qualities_ and _relations_ of the Thing: (that it is, for instance, in\nspace, manifested in time, with accidences which must be referred to a\nsubstance, &c.) But whence that which has these relations and qualities?\nwhence then the substance which is clothed in these forms? This\nsubstance Dogmatism takes refuge in, and you have but increased the\nevil.\n\nWe know very well: the Thing arises only from an act done in accordance\nwith these laws, and is, indeed, nothing else than _all these relations\ngathered together by the power of imagination_; and all these relations\ntogether are the Thing. The Object is the original Synthesis of all\nthese conceptions. Form and Substance are not separates; the whole\nformness is the substance, and only in the analysis do we arrive at\nseparate forms.\n\nBut this the critic, who follows the above method, can only assert, and\nit is even a secret whence he knows it, if he does know it. Until you\ncause the whole Thing to arise before the eyes of the thinker, you have\nnot pursued Dogmatism into its last hiding places. But this is only\npossible by letting the Intelligence act in its whole, and not in its\npartial, lawfulness.\n\nHence, an Idealism of this character is unproven and unprovable. Against\nDogmatism it has no other weapon than the assertion that it is in the\nright; and against the more perfected criticism no other weapon than\nimpotent anger, and the assurance that you can go no further than itself\ngoes.\n\nFinally a system of this character puts forth only those laws, according\nto which the objects of external experience are determined. But these\nconstitute by far the smallest portion of the laws of the Intelligence.\nHence, on the field of Practical Reason and of Reflective Judgment, this\nhalf criticism, lacking the insight into the whole procedure of reason,\ngropes about as in total darkness.\n\nThe method of complete transcendental Idealism, which the Science of\nKnowledge pursues, I have explained once before in my Essay, _On the\nconception of the Science of Knowledge_. I cannot understand why that\nEssay has not been understood; but suffice it to say, that I am assured\nit has not been understood. I am therefore compelled to repeat what I\nhave said, and to recall to mind that everything depends upon the\ncorrect understanding thereof.\n\nThis Idealism proceeds from a single fundamental Law of Reason, which is\nimmediately shown as contained in consciousness. This is done in the\nfollowing manner: The teacher of that Science requests his reader or\nhearer to think freely a certain conception. If he does so, he will find\nhimself forced to proceed in a particular manner. Two things are to be\ndistinguished here: the act of Thinking, which is required\u2014the\nrealization of which depends upon each individual\u2019s freedom,\u2014and unless\nhe realizes it thus, he will not understand anything which the Science\nof Knowledge teaches; and the necessary manner in which it alone can be\nrealized, which manner is grounded in the Essence of the Intelligence,\nand does not depend upon freedom; it is something _necessary_, but which\nis only discovered in and together with a free action; it is something\n_discovered_, but the discovery of which depends upon an act of freedom.\n\nSo far as this goes, the teacher of Idealism shows his assertion to be\ncontained in immediate consciousness. But that this necessary manner is\nthe fundamental law of all reason, that from it the whole system of our\nnecessary representations, not only of a world and the determinedness\nand relations of objects, but also of ourselves, as free and practical\nbeings acting under laws, can be deduced. All this is a mere\npresupposition, which can only be proven by the actual deduction, which\ndeduction is therefore the real business of the teacher.\n\nIn realizing this deduction, he proceeds as follows: _He shows that the\nfirst fundamental law which was discovered in immediate consciousness,\nis not possible, unless a second action is combined with it, which again\nis not possible without a third action; and so on, until the conditions\nof the First are completely exhausted, and itself is now made perfectly\ncomprehensible in its possibility_. The teacher\u2019s method is a continual\nprogression from the conditioned to the condition. The condition becomes\nagain conditioned, and its condition is next to be discovered.\n\nIf the presupposition of Idealism is correct, and if no errors have been\nmade in the deduction, the last result, as containing all the conditions\nof the first act, must contain the system of all necessary\nrepresentations, or the total experience;\u2014a comparison, however, which\nis not instituted in Philosophy itself, but only after that science has\nfinished its work.\n\nFor Idealism has not kept this experience in sight, as the preknown\nobject and result, which it should arrive at; in its course of\nproceeding it knows nothing at all of experience, and does not look upon\nit; it proceeds from its starting point according to its rules, careless\nas to what the result of its investigations might turn out to be. The\nright angle, from which it has to draw its straight line, is given to\nit; is there any need of another point to which the line should be\ndrawn? Surely not; for all the points of its line are already given to\nit with the angle. A certain number is given to you. You suppose that it\nis the product of certain factors. All you have to do is to search for\nthe product of these factors according to the well-known rules. Whether\nthat product will agree with the given number, you will find out,\nwithout any difficulty, as soon as you have obtained it. The given\nnumber is the total experience; those factors are: the part of immediate\nconsciousness which was discovered, and the laws of Thinking; the\nmultiplication is the Philosophizing. Those who advise you, while\nphilosophizing, also to keep an eye upon experience, advise you to\nchange the factors a little, and to multiply falsely, so as to obtain by\nall means corresponding numbers; a course of proceeding as dishonest as\nit is shallow. In so far as those final results of Idealism are viewed\nas such, as consequences of our reasoning, they are what is called the\n_a priori_ of the human mind; and in so far as they are viewed, also\u2014if\nthey should agree with experience\u2014as given in experience, they are\ncalled _a posteriori_. Hence the _a priori_ and the _a posteriori_ are,\nin a true Philosophy, not two, but one and the same, only viewed in two\ndifferent ways, and distinguished only by the manner in which they are\nobtained. Philosophy anticipates the whole experience, _thinks_ it only\nas necessary; and, in so far, Philosophy is, in comparison with real\nexperience, _a priori_. The number is _a posteriori_, if regarded as\ngiven; the same number is _a priori_, if regarded as product of the\nfactors. Whosoever says otherwise knows not what he talks about.\n\nIf the results of a Philosophy do not agree with experience, that\nPhilosophy is surely wrong; for it has not fulfilled its promise of\ndeducing the whole experience from the necessary action of the\nintelligence. In that case, either the presupposition of transcendental\nIdealism is altogether incorrect, or it has merely been incorrectly\ntreated in the particular representation of that science. Now, since the\nproblem, to explain experience from its ground, is a problem contained\nin human reason, and as no rational man will admit that human reason\ncontains any problem the solution of which is altogether impossible; and\nsince, moreover, there are only two ways of solving it, the dogmatic\nsystem (which, as we have shown, cannot accomplish what it promises) and\nthe Idealistic system, every resolute Thinker will always declare that\nthe latter has been the case; that the presupposition in itself is\ncorrect enough, and that no failure in attempts to represent it should\ndeter men from attempting it again until finally it must succeed. The\ncourse of this Idealism proceeds, as we have seen, from a fact of\nconsciousness\u2014but which is only obtained by a free act of Thinking\u2014to\nthe total experience. Its peculiar ground is between these two. It is\nnot a fact of consciousness and does not belong within the sphere of\nexperience; and, indeed, how could it be called Philosophy if it did,\nsince Philosophy has to discover the ground of experience, and since the\nground lies, of course, beyond the sequence. It is the production of\nfree Thinking, but proceeding according to laws. This will be at once\nclear, if we look a little closer at the fundamental assertion of\nIdealism. It proves that the Postulated is not possible without a\nsecond, this not without a third, &c., &c.; hence none of all its\nconditions is possible alone and by itself, but each one is only\npossible in its union with all the rest. Hence, according to its own\nassertion, only the Whole is found in consciousness, and this Whole is\nthe experience. You want to obtain a better knowledge of it; hence you\nmust analyze it, not by blindly groping about, but according to the\nfixed rule of composition, so that it arises under your eyes as a Whole.\nYou are enabled to do this because you have the power of abstraction;\nbecause in free Thinking you can certainly take hold of each single\ncondition. For consciousness contains not only necessity of\nRepresentations, but also freedom thereof; and this freedom again may\nproceed according to rules. The Whole is given to you from the point of\nview of necessary consciousness; you find it just as you find yourself.\nBut the _composition_ of this Whole, the order of its arrangement, is\nproduced by freedom. Whosoever undertakes this act of freedom, becomes\nconscious of freedom, and thus establishes, as it were, a new field\nwithin his consciousness; whosoever does not undertake it, for him this\nnew field, dependent thereupon, does not exist. The chemist composes a\nbody, a metal for instance, from its elements. The common beholder sees\nthe metal well known to him; the chemist beholds, moreover, the\ncomposition thereof and the elements which it comprises. Do both now see\ndifferent objects? I should think not! Both see the same, only in a\ndifferent manner. The chemist\u2019s sight is _a priori_; he sees the\nseparates; the ordinary beholder\u2019s sight is _a posteriori_; he sees the\nWhole. The only distinction is this: the chemist must first analyze the\nWhole before he can compose it, because he works upon an object of which\nhe cannot know the rule of composition before he has analyzed it; while\nthe philosopher can compose without a foregoing analysis, because he\nknows already the rule of his object, of reason.\n\nHence the content of Philosophy can claim no other reality than that of\nnecessary Thinking, on the condition that you desire to think of the\nground of Experience. The Intelligence can only be thought as active,\nand can only be thought active in this particular manner! Such is the\nassertion of Philosophy. And this reality is perfectly sufficient for\nPhilosophy, since it is evident from the development of that science\nthat there is no other reality.\n\nThis now described complete critical Idealism, the Science of Knowledge\nintends to establish. What I have said just now contains the conception\nof that science, and I shall listen to no objections which may touch\nthis conception, since no one can know better than myself what I intend\nto accomplish, and to demonstrate the impossibility of a thing which is\nalready realized, is ridiculous.\n\nObjections, to be legitimate, should only be raised against the\nelaboration of that conception, and should only consider whether it has\nfulfilled what it promised to accomplish or not.\n\n\n\n\n ANALYTICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAY UPON THE \u00c6STHETICS OF HEGEL.\n [Translated from the French of M. Ch. B\u00e9nard by J. A. Martling.]\n\n\n ANALYSIS.\n\n\nHaving undertaken to translate into our language the \u00c6sthetics of Hegel,\nwe hope to render a new service to our readers, by presenting, in an\nanalysis at once cursory and detailed the outline of the ideas which\nform the basis of that vast work. The thought of the author will appear\nshorn of its rich developments; but it will be more easy to seize the\ngeneral spirit, the connection of the various parts of the work, and to\nappreciate their value. In order not to mar the clearness of our work,\nwe shall abstain from mingling criticism with exposition; but reserve\nfor the conclusion a general judgment upon this book, which represents\neven to-day the state of the philosophy of art in Germany.\n\nThe work is divided into three parts; the first treats _of the beautiful\nin art in general_; _the second, of the general forms of art in its\nhistoric development_; _the third contains the system of the arts\u2014the\ntheory of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry_.\n\n\n PART I.\n OF THE BEAUTIFUL IN ART.\n\n\nIn an extended introduction, Hegel lays the foundations of the science\nof the Beautiful: he defines its object, demonstrates its legitimacy,\nand indicates its method; he then undertakes to determine the nature and\nthe end of art. Upon each of these points let us endeavor to state, in a\nbrief manner, his thought, and, if it is necessary, explain it.\n\n\u00c6sthetics _is the science of the Beautiful_. The Beautiful manifests\nitself in nature and in art; but the variety and multiplicity of forms\nunder which beauty presents itself in the real world, does not permit\ntheir description and systematic classification. The science of the\nBeautiful has then as its principal object, art and its works; it is the\n_philosophy of the fine arts_.\n\nIs art a proper object of science? No, undoubtedly, if we consider it\nonly as an amusement or a frivolous relaxation. But it has a nobler\npurpose. It will even be a misconception of its true aim to regard it\nsimply as an auxiliary of morals and religion. Although it often serves\nas interpreter of moral and religious ideas, it preserves its\nindependence. Its proper object is to reveal truth under sensuous forms.\n\nNor is it allowable to say that it produces its effects by illusion.\nAppearance, here, is truer than reality. The images which it places\nunder our eyes are more ideal, more transparent, and also more durable\nthan the mobile and fugitive existences of the real world. The world of\nart is truer than that of nature and of history.\n\nCan science subject to its formulas the free creations of the\nimagination? Art and science, it is true, differ in their methods; but\nimagination, also, has its laws; though free, it has not the right to be\nlawless. In art, nothing is arbitrary; its ground _is the essence of\nthings_; its form is borrowed from the real world, and the Beautiful is\nthe accord, the harmony of the two terms. Philosophy recognizes in works\nof art the eternal content of its meditations, the lofty conceptions of\nintelligence, the passions of man, and the motives of his volition.\nPhilosophy does not pretend to furnish prescriptions to art, but is able\nto give useful advice; it follows it in its procedures, it points out to\nit the paths whereon it may go astray; it alone can furnish to criticism\na solid basis and fixed principles.\n\nAs to the method to be followed, two exclusive and opposite courses\npresent themselves. The one, _empiric_ and _historic_, seeks to draw\nfrom the study of the master-pieces of art, the laws of criticism and\nthe principles of taste. The other, _rational_ and _a priori_, rises\nimmediately to the idea of the beautiful, and deduces from it certain\ngeneral rules. Aristotle and Plato represent these two methods. The\nfirst reaches only a narrow theory, incapable of comprehending art in\nits universality; the other, isolating itself on the heights of\nmetaphysics, knows not how to descend therefrom to apply itself to\nparticular arts, and to appreciate their works. The true method consists\nin the union of these two methods, in their reconciliation and\nsimultaneous employment. To a positive acquaintance with works of art,\nto the discrimination and delicacy of taste necessary to appreciate\nthem, there should be joined philosophic reflection, and the capacity of\nseizing the Beautiful in itself, and of comprehending its\ncharacteristics and immutable laws.\n\nWhat is the nature of art? The answer to this question can only be the\nphilosophy of art itself; and, furthermore, this again can be perfectly\nunderstood only in its connection with the other philosophic sciences.\nOne is here compelled to limit himself to general reflections, and to\nthe discussion of received opinions.\n\nIn the first place, art is a product of human activity, a creation of\nthe mind. What distinguishes it from science is this, that it is the\nfruit of inspiration, not of reflection. On this account it can not be\nlearned or transmitted; it is a gift of genius. Nothing can possibly\nsupply a lack of talent in the arts.\n\nLet us guard ourselves meanwhile from supposing that, like the blind\nforces of nature, the artist does not know what he does, that reflection\nhas no part in his works. There is, in the first place, in the arts a\ntechnical part which must be learned, and a skill which is acquired by\npractice. Furthermore, the more elevated art becomes, the more it\ndemands an extended and varied culture, a study of the objects of\nnature, and a profound knowledge of the human heart. This is eminently\ntrue of the higher spheres of art, especially in Poetry.\n\nIf works of art are creations of the human spirit, they are not on that\naccount inferior to those of nature. They are, it is true, _living_,\nonly in appearance; but the aim of art is not to create living beings;\nit seeks to offer to the spirit an image of life clearer than the\nreality. In this, it _surpasses_ nature. There is also something divine\nin man, and God derives no less honor from the works of human\nintelligence than from the works of nature.\n\nNow what is the cause which incites man to the production of such works?\nIs it a caprice, a freak, or an earnest, fundamental inclination of his\nnature?\n\nIt is the same principle which causes him to seek in science food for\nhis mind, in public life a theatre for his activity. In science he\nendeavors to cognize the truth, pure and unveiled; in art, truth appears\nto him not in its pure form, but expressed by images which strike his\nsense at the same time that they speak to his intelligence. This is the\nprinciple in which art originates, and which assigns to it a rank so\nhigh among the creations of the human mind.\n\nAlthough art is addressed to the sensibility, nevertheless its direct\naim is not to excite sensation, and to give birth to pleasure. Sensation\nis changeful, varied, contradictory. It represents only the various\nstates or modifications of the soul. If then we consider only the\nimpressions which art produces upon us, we make abstraction of the truth\nwhich it reveals to us. It becomes even impossible to comprehend its\ngrand effects; for the sentiments which it excites in us, are explicable\nonly through the ideas which attach to them.\n\nThe sensuous element, nevertheless, occupies a large place in art. What\npart must be assigned to it? There are two modes of considering sensuous\nobjects in their connection with our mind. The first is that of simple\nperception of objects by the senses. The mind then knows only their\nindividual side, their particular and concrete form; the essence, the\nlaw, the substance of things escapes it. At the same time the desire\nwhich is awakened in us, is a desire to appropriate them to our use, to\nconsume them, to destroy them. The soul, in the presence of these\nobjects, feels its dependence; it cannot contemplate them with a free\nand disinterested eye.\n\nAnother relation of sensuous objects with spirit, is that of speculative\nthought or science. Here the intelligence is not content to perceive the\nobject in its concrete form and its individuality; it discards the\nindividual side in order to abstract and disengage from it the law, the\nuniversal, the essence. Reason thus lifts itself above the individual\nform perceived by sense, in order to conceive the pure idea in its\nuniversality.\n\nArt differs both from the one and from the other of these modes; it\nholds the mean between sensuous perception and rational abstraction. It\nis distinguished from the first in that it does not attach itself to the\nreal but to the appearance, to the form of the object, and in that it\ndoes not feel any selfish longing to consume it, to cause it to serve a\npurpose, to utilize it. It differs from science in that it is interested\nin this particular object, and in its sensuous form. What it loves to\nsee in it, is neither its materiality, nor the pure idea in its\ngenerality, but an appearance, an image of the truth, something ideal\nwhich appears in it; it seizes the connective of the two terms, their\naccord and their inner harmony. Thus the want which it feels is wholly\ncontemplative. In the presence of this vision the soul feels itself\nfreed from all selfish desire.\n\nIn a word, art purposely creates images, appearances, designed to\nrepresent ideas, to show to us the truth under sensuous forms. Thereby\nit has the power of stirring the soul in its profoundest depths, of\ncausing it to experience the pure delight springing from the sight and\ncontemplation of the Beautiful.\n\nThe two principles are found equally combined in the artist. The\nsensuous side is included in the faculty which creates\u2014the imagination.\nIt is not by mechanical toil, directed by rules learned by heart that he\nexecutes his works; nor is it by a process of reflection like that of\nthe philosopher who is seeking the truth. The mind has a consciousness\nof itself, but it cannot seize in an abstract manner the idea which it\nconceives; it can represent it only under sensuous forms. The image and\nthe idea coexist in thought, and cannot be separated. Thus the\nimagination is itself a gift of nature. Scientific genius is rather a\ngeneral capacity than an innate and special talent. To succeed in the\narts, there is necessary a determinate talent which reveals itself early\nunder the form of an active and irresistible longing, and a certain\nfacility in the manipulation of the materials of art. It is this which\nmakes the painter, the sculptor, the musician.\n\nSuch is the nature of art. If it be asked, what is its end, here we\nencounter the most diverse opinions. The most common is that which gives\nimitation as its object. This is the foundation of nearly all the\ntheories upon art. Now of what use to reproduce that which nature\nalready offers to our view? This puerile talk, unworthy of spirit to\nwhich it is addressed, unworthy of man who produces it, would only end\nin the revelation of its impotency and the vanity of its efforts; for\nthe copy will always remain inferior to the original. Besides, the more\nexact the imitation, the less vivid is the pleasure. That which pleases\nus is not imitation, but creation. The very least invention surpasses\nall the masterpieces of imitation.\n\nIn vain is it said that art ought to imitate beautiful Nature. To select\nis no longer to imitate. Perfection in imitation is exactness; moreover,\nchoice supposes a rule; where find the criterion? What signifies, in\nfine, imitation in architecture, in music, and even in poetry? At most,\none can thus explain descriptive poetry, that is to say, the most\nprosaic kind. We must conclude, therefore, that if, in its compositions,\nart employs the forms of Nature, and must study them, its aim is not to\ncopy and to reproduce them. Its mission is higher\u2014its procedure freer.\nRival of nature, it represents ideas as well as she, and even better; it\nuses her forms as symbols to express them; and it fashions even these,\nremodels them upon a type more perfect and more pure. It is not without\nsignificance that its works are styled the creations of the genius of\nman.\n\nA second system substitutes expression for imitation. Art accordingly\nhas for its aim, not to represent the external form of things, but their\ninternal and living principle, particularly the ideas, sentiments,\npassions, and conditions of the soul.\n\nLess gross than the preceding, this theory is no less false and\ndangerous. Let us here distinguish two things: the idea and the\nexpression\u2014the content and the form. Now, if Art is designed for\nexpression solely\u2014if expression is its essential object\u2014its content is\nindifferent. Provided that the picture be faithful, the expression\nlively and animated, the good and the bad, the vicious, the hideous, the\nugly, have the same right to figure here as the Beautiful. Immoral,\nlicentious, impious, the artist will have fulfilled his obligation and\nreached perfection, when he has succeeded in faithfully rendering a\nsituation, a passion, an idea, be it true or false. It is clear that if\nin this system the object of imitation is changed, the procedure is the\nsame. Art would be only an echo, a harmonious language; a living mirror,\nwhere all sentiments and all passions would find themselves reflected,\nthe base part and the noble part of the soul contending here for the\nsame place. The true, here, would be the real, would include objects the\nmost diverse and the most contradictory. Indifferent as to the content,\nthe artist seeks only to represent it well. He troubles himself little\nconcerning truth in itself. Skeptic or enthusiast indifferently, he\nmakes us partake of the delirium of the Bacchanals, or the unconcern of\nthe Sophist. Such is the system which takes for a motto the maxim, _Art\nis for art_; that is to say, mere expression for its own sake. Its\nconsequences, and the fatal tendency which it has at all times pressed\nupon the arts, are well known.\n\nA third system sets up _moral perfection_ as the aim of art. It cannot\nbe denied that one of the effects of art is to soften and purify manners\n(_emollit mores_). In mirroring man to himself, it tempers the rudeness\nof his appetites and his passions; it disposes him to contemplation and\nreflection; it elevates his thought and sentiments, by leading them to\nan ideal which it suggests,\u2014to ideas of a superior order. Art has, from\nall time, been regarded as a powerful instrument of civilization, as an\nauxiliary of religion. It is, together with religion, the earliest\ninstructor of nations; it is besides a means of instruction for minds\nincapable of comprehending truth otherwise than under the veil of a\nsymbol, and by images that address themselves to the sense as well as to\nthe spirit.\n\nBut this theory, although much superior to the preceding, is no more\nexact. Its defect consists in confounding the moral effect of art with\nits real aim. This confusion has inconveniences which do not appear at\nthe first glance. Let care be taken, meanwhile, lest, in thus assigning\nto art a foreign aim, it be not robbed of its liberty, which is its\nessence, and without which it has no inspiration\u2014that thereby it be not\nprevented from producing the effects which are to be expected from it.\nBetween religion, morals and art, there exists an eternal and intimate\nharmony; but they are, none the less, essentially diverse forms of\ntruth, and, while preserving entire the bonds which unite them, they\nclaim a complete independence. Art has its peculiar laws, methods and\njurisdiction; though it ought not to wound the moral sense, yet it is\nthe sense of the Beautiful to which it is addressed. When its works are\npure, its effect on the soul is salutary, but its direct and immediate\naim is not this result. Seeking it, it risks losing it, and does lose\nits own end. Suppose, indeed, that the aim of art should be to instruct,\nunder the veil of allegory; the idea, the abstract and general thought,\nmust be present in the spirit of the artist at the very moment of\ncomposition. It seeks, then, a form which is adapted to that idea, and\nfurnishes drapery for it. Who does not see that this procedure is the\nvery opposite of inspiration? There can be born of it only frigid and\nlifeless works; its effect will thus be neither moral nor religious; it\nwill produce only _ennui_.\n\nAnother consequence of the opinion which makes moral perfection the\nobject of art and its creations, is that this end is imposed so\ncompletely upon art, and controls it to such a degree, that it has no\nlonger even a choice of subjects. The severe moralist would have it\nrepresent moral subjects alone. Art is then undone. This system led\nPlato to banish poets from his republic. If, then, it is necessary to\nmaintain the agreement of morality and art, and the harmony of their\nlaws, their distinct bases and independence must also be recognized. In\norder to understand thoroughly this distinction between morals and art,\nit is necessary to have solved the moral problem. Morality is the\nrealization of the \u201cought\u201d by the free will; it is the conflict between\npassion and reason, inclination and law, the flesh and the spirit. It\nhinges upon an opposition. Antagonism is, indeed, the very law of the\nphysical and moral universe. But this opposition ought to be cancelled.\nThis is the destiny of beings who by their development and progress\ncontinually realize themselves.\n\nNow, in morals, this harmony of the powers of our being, which should\nrestore peace and happiness, does not exist. Morality proposes it as an\nend to the free will. The aim and the realization are distinct. Duty\nconsists in an incessant striving. Thus, in one respect, morals and art\nhave the same principle and the same aim; the harmony of rectitude, and\nhappiness of actions and law. But that wherein they differ is, that in\nmorals the end is never wholly attained. It appears separated from the\nmeans; the consequence is equally separated from the principle. The\nharmony of rectitude and happiness ought to be the result of the efforts\nof virtue. In order to conceive the identity of the two terms, it is\nnecessary to elevate one\u2019s self to a superior point of view, which is\nnot that of morals. In empirical science equally, the law appears\ndistinct from the phenomenon, the essence separated from its form. In\norder that this distinction may be cancelled, there is necessary a mode\nof thinking which is superior to that of reflection, or of empirical\nscience.\n\nArt, on the contrary, offers to us in a visible image, the realized\nharmony of the two terms of existence, of the law of beings and their\nmanifestation, of essence and form, of rectitude and happiness. The\nbeautiful is essence realized, activity in conformity with its end, and\nidentified with it; it is the force which is harmoniously developed\nunder our eyes, in the innermost of existences, and which cancels the\ncontradictions of its nature: happy, free, full of serenity in the very\nmidst of suffering and of sorrow. The problem of art is then distinct\nfrom the moral problem. The good is harmony sought for; beauty is\nharmony realized. So must we understand the thought of Hegel; he here\nonly intimates it, but it will be fully developed in the sequel.\n\nThe true aim of art is then to represent the Beautiful, to reveal this\nharmony. This is its only purpose. Every other aim, purification, moral\namelioration, edification, are accessories or consequences. The effect\nof the contemplation of the Beautiful is to produce in us a calm and\npure joy, incompatible with the gross pleasures of sense; it lifts the\nsoul above the ordinary sphere of its thoughts; it disposes to noble\nresolutions and generous actions by the close affinity which exists\nbetween the three sentiments and the three ideas of the Good, the\nBeautiful, and the Divine.\n\nSuch are the principal ideas which this remarkable introduction\ncontains. The remainder, devoted to the examination of works which have\nmarked the development of \u00e6sthetic science in Germany since Kant, is\nscarcely susceptible of analysis, and does not so much deserve our\nattention.\n\n_The first part_ of the science of \u00e6sthetics, which might be called the\nMetaphysics of the Beautiful, contains, together with the analysis of\nthe idea of the Beautiful, the general principles common to all the\narts. Thus Hegel here treats: _First, of the abstract idea of the\nBeautiful; second, of the Beautiful in nature; third, of the Beautiful\nin art, or of the ideal._ He concludes with an examination of the\nqualities of the artist. But before entering upon these questions, he\nthought it necessary to point out the place of art in human life, and\nespecially _its connections with religion and philosophy_.\n\nThe destination of man, the law of his nature, is to develop himself\nincessantly, to stretch unceasingly towards the infinite. He ought, at\nthe same time, to put an end to the opposition which he finds in himself\nbetween the elements and powers of his being; to place them in accord by\nrealizing and developing them externally. Physical life is a struggle\nbetween opposing forces, and the living being can sustain itself only\nthrough the conflict and the triumph of the force which constitutes it.\nWith man, and in the moral sphere, this conflict and progressive\nenfranchisement are manifested under the form of freedom, which is the\nhighest destination of spirit. Freedom consists in surmounting the\nobstacles which it encounters within and without, in removing the\nlimits, in effacing all contradiction, in vanquishing evil and sorrow,\nin order to attain to harmony with the world and with itself. In actual\nlife, man seeks to destroy that opposition by the satisfaction of his\nphysical wants. He calls to his aid, industry and the useful arts; but\nhe obtains thus only limited, relative, and transient enjoyments. He\nfinds a nobler pleasure in science, which furnishes food for his ardent\ncuriosity, and promises to reveal to him the laws of nature and to\nunveil the secrets of the universe. Civil life opens another channel to\nhis activity; he burns to realize his conceptions; he marches to the\nconquest of the right, and pursues the ideal of justice which he bears\nwithin him. He endeavors to realize in civil society his instinct of\nsociability, which is also the law of his being, and one of the\nfundamental inclinations of his moral nature.\n\nBut here, again, he attains an imperfect felicity; he encounters limits\nand obstacles which he cannot surmount, and against which, his will is\nbroken. He cannot obtain the perfect realization of his ideas, nor\nattain the ideal which his spirit conceives and toward which it aspires.\nHe then feels the necessity of elevating himself to a higher sphere\nwhere all contradictions are cancelled; where the idea of the good and\nof happiness in their perfect accord and their enduring harmony is\nrealized. This profound want of the soul is satisfied in three ways: in\n_art_, in _religion_, and in _philosophy_. The function of art is to\nlead us to the contemplation of the true, the infinite, under sensuous\nforms; for the beautiful is the unity, the realized harmony of two\nprinciples of existence, of the idea and the form, of the infinite and\nthe finite. This is the principle and the hidden essence of things,\nbeaming through their visible form. Art presents us, in its works, the\nimage of this happy accord where all opposition ceases, and where all\ncontradiction is cancelled. Such is the aim of art: to represent the\ndivine, the infinite, under sensuous forms. This is its mission; it has\nno other and this it alone can fulfil. By this title it takes its place\nby the side of religion, and preserves its independence. It takes its\nrank also with philosophy, whose object is the knowledge of the true, of\nabsolute truth.\n\nAlike then as to their general ground and aims, these three spheres are\ndistinguished by the form under which they become revealed to the spirit\nand consciousness of man. Art is addressed to sensuous perception and to\nthe imagination; religion is addressed to the soul, to the conscience,\nand to sentiment; philosophy is addressed to pure thought or to the\nreason, which conceives the truth in an abstract manner.\n\nArt, which offers us truth under sensuous forms, does not, however,\nrespond to the profoundest needs of the soul. The spirit is possessed of\nthe desire of entering into itself, of contemplating the truth in the\ninner recesses of consciousness. Above the domain of art, then, religion\nis placed, which reveals the infinite, and by meditation conveys to the\ndepths of the heart, to the centre of the soul, that which in art we\ncontemplate externally. As to philosophy, its peculiar aim is to\nconceive and to comprehend, by the intellect alone, under an abstract\nform, that which is given as sentiment or as sensuous representation.\n\nI. _Of the Idea of the Beautiful._\n\nAfter these preliminaries, Hegel enters upon the questions which form\nthe object of this first part. He treats, in the first place, of _the\nidea of the beautiful_ in itself, in its abstract nature. Freeing his\nthought from the metaphysical forms which render it difficult of\ncomprehension to minds not familiar with his system, we arrive at this\ndefinition, already contained in the foregoing: the Beautiful is the\ntrue, that is to say, the essence, the inmost substance of things; the\ntrue, not such as the mind conceives it in its abstract and pure nature,\nbut as manifested to the senses under visible forms. It is the sensuous\n_manifestation of the idea_, which is the soul and principle of things.\nThis definition recalls that of Plato: the Beautiful is the _splendor of\nthe true_.\n\nWhat are the characteristics of the beautiful? First, it is infinite in\nthis sense, that it is the divine principle itself which is revealed and\nmanifested, and that the form which expresses it, in place of limiting\nit, realizes it and confounds itself with it; second, it is free, for\ntrue freedom is not the absence of rule and measure, it is force which\ndevelops itself easily and harmoniously. It appears in the bosom of the\nexistences of the sensuous world, as their principle of life, of unity,\nand of harmony, whether free from all obstacle, or victorious and\ntriumphant in conflict, always calm and serene.\n\nThe spectator who contemplates beauty feels himself equally free, and\nhas a consciousness of his infinite nature. He tastes a pure pleasure,\nresulting from the felt accord of the powers of his being; a celestial\nand divine joy, which has nothing in common with material pleasures, and\ndoes not suffer to exist in the soul a single impure or gross desire.\n\nThe contemplation of the Beautiful awakens no such craving; it is\nself-sufficing, and is not accompanied by any return of the me upon\nitself. It suffers the object to preserve its independence for its own\nsake. The soul experiences something analogous to divine felicity; it is\ntransported into a sphere foreign to the miseries of life and\nterrestrial existence.\n\nThis theory, it is apparent, would need only to be developed to return\nwholly to the Platonic theory. Hegel limits himself to referring to it.\nWe recognize here, also, the results of the Kantian analysis.\n\nII. _Of the Beautiful in Nature._\n\nAlthough science cannot pause to describe the beauties of nature, it\nought, nevertheless, to study, in a general manner, the characteristics\nof the Beautiful, as it appears to us in the physical world and in the\nbeings which it contains. This is the subject of a somewhat extended\nchapter, with the following title: _Of the Beautiful in Nature_. Hegel\nherein considers the question from the particular point of view of his\nphilosophy, and he applies his theory of the _Idea_. Nevertheless, the\nresults at which he arrives, and the manner in which he describes the\nforms of physical beauty, can be comprehended and accepted independently\nof his system, little adapted, it must be confessed, to cast light upon\nthis subject.\n\nThe Beautiful in nature is the first manifestation of the Idea. The\nsuccessive degrees of beauty correspond to the development of life and\norganization in beings. Unity is an essential characteristic of it.\nThus, in the mineral, beauty consists in the arrangement or disposition\nof the parts, in the force which resides in them, and which reveals\nitself in this unity. The solar system offers us a more perfect unity\nand a higher beauty. The bodies in that system, while preserving entire\ntheir individual existence, co-ordinate themselves into a whole, the\nparts of which are independent, although attached to a common centre,\nthe sun. Beauty of this order strikes us by the regularity of the\nmovements of the celestial bodies. A unity more real and true is that\nwhich is manifested in organized and living beings. The unity here\nconsists in a relation of reciprocity and of mutual dependence between\nthe organs, so that each of them loses its independent existence in\norder to give place to a wholly ideal unity which reveals itself as the\nprinciple of life animating them.\n\nLife is beautiful in nature: for it is essence, force, the idea realized\nunder its first form. Nevertheless, beauty in nature is still wholly\nexternal; it has no consciousness of itself; it is beautiful solely for\nan intelligence which sees and contemplates it.\n\nHow do we perceive beauty in natural beings? Beauty, with living and\nanimate beings, is neither accidental and capricious movements, nor\nsimple conformity of those movements to an end\u2014the uniform and mutual\nconnection of parts. This point of view is that of the naturalist, of\nthe man of science; it is not that of the Beautiful. Beauty is total\nform in so far as it reveals the force which animates it; it is this\nforce itself, manifested by a totality of forms, of independent and free\nmovements; it is the internal harmony which reveals itself in this\nsecret accord of members, and which betrays itself outwardly, without\nthe eye\u2019s pausing to consider the relation of the parts to the whole,\nand their functions or reciprocal connection, as science does. The unity\nexhibits itself merely externally as the principle which binds the\nmembers together. It manifests itself especially through the\nsensibility. The point of view of beauty is then that of pure\ncontemplation, not that of reflection, which analyzes, compares and\nseizes the connection of parts and their destination.\n\nThis internal and visible unity, this accord, and this harmony, are not\ndistinct from the material element; they are its very form. This is the\nprinciple which serves to determine beauty in its inferior grades, the\nbeauty of the crystal with its regular forms, forms produced by an\ninternal and free force. A similar activity is developed in a more\nperfect manner in the living organism, its outlines, the disposition of\nits members, the movements, and the expression of sensibility.\n\nSuch is beauty in individual beings. It is otherwise with it when we\nconsider nature in its totality, the beauty of a landscape, for example.\nThere is no longer question here about an organic disposition of parts\nand of the life which animates them; we have under our eyes a rich\nmultiplicity of objects which form a whole, mountains, trees, rivers,\netc. In this diversity there appears an external unity which interests\nus by its agreeable or imposing character. To this aspect there is added\nthat property of the objects of nature through which they awaken in us,\nsympathetically, certain sentiments, by the secret analogy which exists\nbetween them and the situations of the human soul.\n\nSuch is the effect produced by the silence of the night, the calm of a\nstill valley, the sublime aspect of a vast sea in tumult, and the\nimposing grandeur of the starry heavens. The significance of these\nobjects is not in themselves; they are only symbols of the sentiments of\nthe soul which they excite. It is thus we attribute to animals the\nqualities which belong only to man, courage, fortitude, cunning.\nPhysical beauty is a reflex of moral beauty.\n\nTo recapitulate, physical beauty, viewed in its ground or essence,\nconsists in the manifestation of the concealed principle, of the force\nwhich is developed in the bosom of matter. This force reveals itself in\na manner more or less perfect, by unity in inert matter, and in living\nbeings by the different modes of organization.\n\nHegel then devotes a special examination to the external side, or to\nbeauty of form in natural objects. Physical beauty, considered\nexternally, presents itself successively under the aspects of\n_regularity_ and _symmetry_, of _conformity_ to law and of _harmony_;\nlastly, of _purity_ and simplicity of matter.\n\n1. _Regularity_, which is only the repetition of a form equal to itself,\nis the most elementary and simple form. In _symmetry_ there already\nappears a diversity which breaks the uniformity. These two forms of\nbeauty pertain to _quantity_, and constitute mathematical beauty; they\nare found in organic and inorganic bodies, minerals and crystals. In\nplants are presented less regular, and freer forms. In the organization\nof animals, this regular and symmetrical disposition becomes more and\nmore subordinated in proportion as we ascend to higher degrees of the\nanimal scale.\n\n2. _Conformity to a law_ marks a degree still more elevated, and serves\nas a transition to freer forms. Here there appears an accord more real\nand more profound, which begins to transcend mathematical rigor. It is\nno longer a simple numerical relation, where quantity plays the\nprincipal r\u00f4le; we discover a relation of quality between different\nterms. A law rules the whole, but it cannot be calculated; it remains a\nhidden bond, which reveals itself to the spectator. Such is the oval\nline, and above all, the undulating line, which Hogarth has given as the\nline of beauty. These lines determine, in fact, the beautiful forms of\norganic nature in living beings of a high order, and, above all, the\nbeautiful forms of the human body, of man and of woman.\n\n3. _Harmony_ is a degree still superior to the preceding, and it\nincludes them. It consists in a totality of elements essentially\ndistinct, but whose opposition is destroyed and reduced to unity by a\nsecret accord, a reciprocal adaptation. Such is the harmony of forms and\ncolors, that of sounds and movements, Here the unity is stronger, more\n_prononc\u00e9_, precisely because the differences and the oppositions are\nmore marked. Harmony, however, is not as yet true unity, spiritual\nunity, that of the soul, although the latter possesses within it a\nprinciple of harmony. Harmony alone, as yet, reveals neither the soul\nnor the spirit, as one may see in music and dancing.\n\nBeauty exists also in matter itself, abstraction being made of its form;\nit consists, then, in the unity and _simplicity_ which constitutes\n_purity_. Such is the purity of the sky and of the atmosphere, the\npurity of colors and of sounds; that of certain substances\u2014of precious\nstones, of gold, and of the diamond. Pure and simple colors are also the\nmost agreeable.\n\nAfter having described the beautiful in nature, in order that the\nnecessity of a beauty more exalted and more ideal shall be comprehended,\nHegel sets forth the _imperfections_ of real beauty. He begins with\nanimal life, which is the most elevated point we have reached, and he\ndwells upon the characteristics and causes of that imperfection.\n\nThus, first in the animal, although the organism is more perfect than\nthat of the plant, what we see is not the central point of life; the\nspecial seat of the operations of the force which animates the whole,\nremains concealed from us. We see only the outlines of the external\nform, covered with hairs, scales, feathers, skin; secondly, the human\nbody, it is true, exhibits more beautiful proportions, and a more\nperfect form, because in it, life and sensibility are everywhere\nmanifested\u2014in the color, the flesh, the freer movements, nobler\nattitudes, &c. Yet here, besides the imperfections in details, the\nsensibility does not appear equally distributed. Certain parts are\nappropriated to animal functions, and exhibit their destination in their\nform. Further, individuals in nature, placed as they are under a\ndependence upon external causes, and under the influence of the\nelements, are under the dominion of necessity and want. Under the\ncontinual action of these causes, physical being is exposed to losing\nthe fulness of its forms and the flower of its beauty; rarely do these\ncauses permit it to attain to its complete, free and regular\ndevelopment. The human body is placed under a like dependence upon\nexternal agents. If we pass from the physical to the moral world, that\ndependence appears still more clearly.\n\nEverywhere there is manifested diversity, and opposition of tendencies\nand interests. The individual, in the plenitude of his life and beauty,\ncannot preserve the appearance of a free force. Each individual being is\nlimited and particularized in his excellence. His life flows in a narrow\ncircle of space and time; he belongs to a determinate species; his type\nis given, his form defined, and the conditions of his development fixed.\nThe human body itself offers, in respect to beauty, a progression of\nforms dependent on the diversity of races. Then come hereditary\nqualities, the peculiarities which are due to temperament, profession,\nage, and sex. All these causes alter and disfigure the purest and most\nperfect primitive type.\n\nAll these imperfections are summed up in a word: the finite. Human life\nand animal life realize their idea only imperfectly. Moreover,\nspirit\u2014not being able to find, in the limits of the real, the sight and\nthe enjoyment of its proper freedom\u2014seeks to satisfy itself in a region\nmore elevated, that of _art_, or of the ideal.\n\nIII. _Of the beautiful in Art or of the Ideal._\n\nArt has as its end and aim the representation of the ideal. Now what is\nthe _ideal_? It is beauty in a degree of perfection superior to real\nbeauty. It is force, life, spirit, the essence of things, developing\nthemselves harmoniously in a sensuous reality, which is its resplendent\nimage, its faithful expression; it is beauty disengaged and purified\nfrom the accidents which veil and disfigure it, and which alter its\npurity in the real world.\n\nThe ideal, in art, is not then the contrary of the real, but the real\nidealized, purified, rendered conformable to its idea, and perfectly\nexpressing it. In a word, it is the perfect accord of the idea and the\nsensuous form.\n\nOn the other hand, the true ideal is not life in its inferior\ndegrees\u2014blind, undeveloped force\u2014but the soul arrived at the\nconsciousness of itself, free, and in the full enjoyment of its\nfaculties; it is life, but spiritual life\u2014in a word, spirit. The\nrepresentation of the spiritual principle, in the plenitude of its life\nand freedom, with its high conceptions, its profound and noble\nsentiments, its joys and its sufferings: this is the true aim of art,\nthe true ideal.\n\nFinally, the ideal is not a lifeless abstraction, a frigid generality;\nit is the spiritual principle under the form of the living individual,\nfreed from the bonds of the finite, and developing itself in its perfect\nharmony with its inmost nature and essence.\n\nWe see, thus, what are the characteristics of the ideal. It is evident\nthat in all its degrees it is calmness, serenity, felicity, happy\nexistence, freed from the miseries and wants of life. This serenity does\nnot exclude earnestness; for the ideal appears in the midst of the\nconflicts of life; but even in the roughest experiences, in the midst of\nintense suffering, the soul preserves an evident calmness as a\nfundamental trait. It is felicity in suffering, the glorification of\nsorrow, smiling in tears. The echo of this felicity resounds in all the\nspheres of the ideal.\n\nIt is important to determine, with still more precision, the relations\nof the _ideal_ and the _real_.\n\nThe opposition of the ideal and the real has given rise to two\nconflicting opinions. Some conceive of the ideal as something vague, an\nabstract, lifeless generality, without individuality. Others extol the\nnatural, the imitation of the real in the most minute and prosaic\ndetails. Equal exaggeration! The truth lies between the two extremes.\n\nIn the first place, the ideal may be, in fact, something external and\naccidental, an insignificant form or appearance, a common existence. But\nthat which constitutes the ideal, in this inferior degree, is the fact\nthat this reality, imitated by art, is a creation of spirit, and becomes\nthen something artificial, not real. It is an image and a metamorphosis.\nThis image, moreover, is more permanent than its model, more durable\nthan the real object. In fixing that which is mobile and transient, in\neternizing that which is momentary and fugitive\u2014a flower, a smile\u2014art\nsurpasses nature and idealizes it.\n\nBut it does not stop here. Instead of simply reproducing these objects,\nwhile preserving their natural form, it seizes their internal and\ndeepest character, it extends their signification, and gives to them a\nmore elevated and more general significance; for it must manifest the\nuniversal in the individual, and render visible the idea which they\nrepresent, their eternal and fixed type. It allows this character of\ngenerality to penetrate everywhere, without reducing it to an\nabstraction. Thus the artist does not slavishly reproduce all the\nfeatures of the object, and its accidents, but only the true traits,\nthose conformable to its idea. If, then, he takes nature as a model, he\nstill surpasses and idealizes it. Naturalness, faithfulness, truth,\nthese are not exact imitation, but the perfect conformity of the form to\nthe idea; they are the creation of a more perfect form, whose essential\ntraits represent the idea more faithfully and more clearly than it is\nexpressed in nature itself. To know how to disengage the operative,\nenergetic, essential and significant elements in objects,\u2014this is the\ntask of the artist. The ideal, then, is not the real; the latter\ncontains many elements insignificant, useless, confused and foreign, or\nopposed to the idea. The natural here loses its vulgar significance. By\nthis word must be understood the more exalted expression of spirit. The\nideal is a transfigured, glorified nature.\n\nAs to vulgar and common nature, if art takes it also for its object, it\nis not for its own sake, but because of what in it is true, excellent,\ninteresting, ingenuous or gay, as in _genre_ painting, in Dutch painting\nparticularly. It occupies, nevertheless, an inferior rank, and cannot\nmake pretensions to a place beside the grand compositions of art.\n\nBut there are other subjects\u2014a nature more elevated and more ideal. Art,\nat its culminating stage, represents the development of the internal\npowers of the soul, its grand passions, profound sentiments, and lofty\ndestinies. Now, it is clear that the artist does not find in the real\nworld, forms so pure and ideal that he may safely confine himself to\nimitating and copying. Moreover, if the form itself be given, expression\nmust be added. Besides, he ought to secure, in a just measure, the union\nof the individual and the universal, of the form and the idea; to create\na living ideal, penetrated with the idea, and in which it animates the\nsensuous form and appearance throughout, so that there shall be nothing\nin it empty or insignificant, nothing that is not alive with expression\nitself. Where shall he find in the real world, this just measure, this\nanimation, and this exact correspondence of all the parts and of all the\ndetails conspiring to the same end, to the same effect? To say that he\nwill succeed in conceiving and realizing the ideal, by making a\nfelicitous selection of ideas and forms, is to ignore the secret of\nartistic composition; it is to misconceive the entirely spontaneous\nmethod of genius,\u2014inspiration which creates at a single effort,\u2014to\nreplace it by a reflective drudgery, which only results in the\nproduction of frigid and lifeless works.\n\nIt does not suffice to define the ideal in an abstract manner; the ideal\nis exhibited to us in the works of art under very various and diverse\nforms. Thus sculpture represents it under the motionless features of its\nfigures. In the other arts it assumes the form of movement and of\naction; in poetry, particularly, it manifests itself in the midst of\nmost varied situations and events, of conflicts between persons animated\nby diverse passions. How, and under what conditions, is each art in\nparticular called upon to represent thus the ideal? This will be the\nobject of the theory of the arts. In the general exposition of the\nprinciples of art, we may, nevertheless, attempt to define the degrees\nof this development, to study the principal aspects under which it\nmanifests itself. Such is the object of those considerations, the title\nof which is, _Of the Determination of the Ideal_, and which the author\ndevelops in this first part of the work. We can trace only summarily the\nprincipal ideas, devoting ourselves to marking their order and\nconnection.\n\nThe gradation which the author establishes between the progressively\ndetermined forms of the ideal is as follows:\n\n1. The ideal, under the most elevated form, is the divine idea, the\ndivine such as the imagination can represent it under sensuous forms;\nsuch is the Greek ideal of the divinities of Polytheism; such the\nChristian ideal in its highest purity, under the form of God the Father,\nof Christ, of the Virgin, of the Apostles, etc. It is given above all to\nsculpture and painting, to present us the image of it. Its essential\ncharacteristics are calmness, majesty, serenity.\n\n2. In a degree less elevated, but more determined, in the circle of\nhuman life, the ideal appears to us, with man, as the victory of the\neternal principles which fill the human heart, the triumph of the noble\npart of the soul over the inferior and passionate. The noble, the\nexcellent, the perfect, in the human soul, is the moral and divine\nprinciple which is manifested in it, which governs its will, and causes\nit to accomplish grand actions; this is the true source of\nself-sacrifice and of heroism.\n\n3. But the idea, when it is manifested in the real world, can be\ndeveloped only under the form of _action_. Now, action itself has for\nits condition a conflict between principles and persons, divided as to\ninterests, ideas, passions, and characters. It is this especially that\nis represented by poetry\u2014the art _par excellence_, the only art which\ncan reproduce an action in its successive phases, with its\ncomplications, its sudden turns of fortune, its catastrophe and its\ndenouement.\n\n_Action_, if one considers it more closely, includes the following\nconditions: 1st. A world which serves it as a basis and theatre, _a form\nof society_ which renders it possible, and is favorable to the\ndevelopment of ideal figures. 2d. A determinate situation, in which the\npersonages are placed who render necessary the conflict between opposing\ninterests and passions, whence a collision may arise. 3d. An action,\nproperly so called, which develops itself in its essential moments,\nwhich has a beginning, a middle, and an end. This action, in order to\nafford a high interest, should revolve upon ideas of an elevated order,\nwhich inspire and sustain the personages, ennobling their passions, and\nforming the basis of their character.\n\nHegel treats, in a general manner, each of these points, which will\nappear anew, under a more special form, in the study of poetry, and\nparticularly of epic and dramatic poetry.\n\n1. The state of society most favorable to the ideal is that which allows\nthe characters to act with most freedom, to reveal a lofty and powerful\npersonality. This cannot be a social order, where all is fixed and\nregulated by laws and a constitution. Nor can it be the savage state,\nwhere all is subject to caprice and violence, and where man is dependent\nupon a thousand external causes, which render his existence precarious.\nNow the state intermediate between the barbarous state and an advanced\ncivilization, is the _heroic age_, that in which the epic poets locate\ntheir action, and from which the tragic poets themselves have often\nborrowed their subjects and their personages. That which characterizes\nheroes in this epoch is, above all, the independence which is manifested\nin their characters and acts. On the other hand, the hero is all of a\npiece; he assumes not only the responsibility of his acts and their\nconsequences, but the results of actions he has not perpetrated, of the\nfaults or crimes of his race; he bears in his person an entire race.\n\nAnother reason why the ideal existences of art belong to the mythologic\nages, and to remote epochs of history, is that the artist or the poet,\nin representing or recounting events, has a freer scope in his ideal\ncreations. Art, also, for the same reason, has a predilection for the\nhigher conditions of society, those of princes particularly, because of\nthe perfect independence of will and action which characterizes them. In\nthis respect, our actual society, with its civil and political\norganization, its manners, administration, police, etc., is prosaic. The\nsphere of activity of the individual is too restricted; he encounters\neverywhere limits and shackles to his will. Our monarchs themselves are\nsubject to these conditions; their power is limited by institutions,\nlaws and customs. War, peace, and treaties are determined by political\nrelations independent of their will.\n\nThe greatest poets have not been able to escape these conditions; and\nwhen they have desired to represent personages nearer to us, as Charles\nMoor, or Wallenstein, they have been obliged to place them in revolt\nagainst society or against their sovereign. Moreover, these heroes rush\non to an inevitable ruin, or they fall into the ridiculous situation, of\nwhich the Don Quixote of Cervantes gives us the most striking example.\n\n2. To represent the ideal in personages or in an action, there is\nnecessary not only a favorable world from which the subject is to be\nborrowed, but a situation. This situation can be either indeterminate,\nlike that of many of the immobile personages of antique or religious\nsculpture, or determinate, but yet of little earnestness. Such are also\nthe greater number of the situations of the personages of antique\nsculpture. Finally, it may be earnest, and furnish material for a\nveritable action. It supposes, then, an opposition, an action and a\nreaction, a conflict, a collision. The beauty of the ideal consists in\nabsolute serenity and perfection. Now, collision destroys this harmony.\nThe problem of art consists, then, in so managing that the harmony\nreappears in the denouement. Poetry alone is capable of developing this\nopposition upon which the interest, particularly, of tragic art turns.\n\nWithout examining here the nature of the different _collisions_, the\nstudy of which belongs to the theory of dramatic art, we must already\nhave remarked that the collisions of the highest order are those in\nwhich the conflict takes place between moral forces, as in the ancient\ntragedies. This is the subject of true classic tragedy, moral as well as\nreligious, as will be seen from what follows.\n\nThus the ideal, in this superior degree, is the manifestation of moral\npowers and of the ideas of spirit, of the grand movements of the soul,\nand of the characters which appear and are revealed in the development\nof the representation.\n\n3. In _action_, properly so-called, three things are to be considered\nwhich constitute its ideal object: 1. The general interests, the ideas,\nthe universal principles, whose opposition forms the very foundation of\nthe action; 2. The personages; 3. Their character and their passions, or\nthe motives which impel them to act.\n\nIn the first place, the eternal principles of religion, of morality, of\nthe family, of the state\u2014the grand sentiments of the soul, love, honor,\netc.\u2014these constitute the basis, the true interest of the action. These\nare the grand and true motives of art, the eternal theme of exalted\npoetry.\n\nTo these legitimate and true powers others are, without doubt, added;\nthe powers of evil; but they ought not to be represented as forming the\nreal foundation and end of the action. \u201cIf the idea, the end and aim, be\nsomething false in itself, the hideousness of the ground will allow\nstill less beauty of form. The sophistry of the passions may, indeed, by\na true picture, attempt to represent the false under the colors of the\ntrue, but it places under our eyes only a whited sepulchre. Cruelty and\nthe violent employment of force can be endured in representation, but\nonly when they are relieved by the grandeur of the character and\nennobled by the aim which is pursued by the _dramatis person\u00e6_.\nPerversity, envy, cowardice, baseness, are only repulsive.\n\n\u201cEvil, in itself, is stripped of real interest, because nothing but the\nfalse can spring from what is false; it produces only misfortune, while\nart should present to us order and harmony. The great artists, the great\npoets of antiquity, never give us the spectacle of pure wickedness and\nperversity.\u201d\n\nWe cite this passage because it exhibits the character and high moral\ntone which prevails in the entire work, as we shall have occasion to\nobserve more than once hereafter.\n\nIf the ideas and interests of human life form the ground of the action,\nthe latter is accomplished by the characters upon whom the interest is\nfastened. General ideas may, indeed, be personated by beings superior to\nman, by certain divinities like those which figure in ancient epic\npoetry and tragedy. But it is to man that action, properly so-called,\nreturns; it is he who occupies the scene. Now, how reconcile divine\naction and human action, the will of the gods and that of man? Such is\nthe problem which has made shipwreck of so many poets and artists. To\nmaintain a proper equipoise it is necessary that the gods have supreme\ndirection, and that man preserve his freedom and his independence\nwithout which he is no more than the passive instrument of the will of\nthe gods; fatality weighs upon all his acts. The true solution consists\nin maintaining the identity of the two terms, in spite of their\ndifference; in so acting that what is attributed to the gods shall\nappear at the same time to emanate from the inner nature of the\n_dramatis person\u00e6_ and from their character. The talent of the artist\nmust reconcile the two aspects. \u201cThe heart of man must be revealed in\nhis gods, personifications of the grand motives which allure him and\ngovern him within.\u201d This is the problem resolved by the great poets of\nantiquity, Homer, \u00c6schylus, and Sophocles.\n\nThe general principles, those grand motives which are the basis of the\naction, by the fact that they are living in the soul of the characters,\nform, also, the very ground of the _passions_; this is the essence of\ntrue pathos. Passion, here, in the elevated ideal sense, is, in fact,\nnot an arbitrary, capricious, irregular movement of the soul; it is a\nnoble principle, which blends itself with a great idea, with one of the\neternal verities of moral or religious order. Such is the passion of\nAntigone, the holy love for her brother; such, the vengeance of Orestes.\nIt is an essentially legitimate power of the soul which contains one of\nthe eternal principles of the reason and the will. This is still the\nideal, the true ideal, although it appears under the form of a passion.\nIt relieves, ennobles and purifies it; it thus gives to the action a\nserious and profound interest.\n\nIt is in this sense that passion constitutes the centre and true domain\nof art; it is the principle of emotion, the source of true pathos.\n\nNow, this moral verity, this eternal principle which descends into the\nheart of man and there takes the form of great and noble passion,\nidentifying itself with the will of the _dramatis person\u00e6_, constitutes,\nalso, their character. Without this high idea which serves as support\nand as basis to passion, there is no true character. Character is the\nculminating point of ideal representation. It is the embodiment of all\nthat precedes. It is in the creation of the characters, that the genius\nof the artist or of the poet is displayed.\n\nThree principal elements must be united to form the ideal character,\n_richness_, _vitality_, and _stability_. Richness consists in not being\nlimited to a single quality, which would make of the person an\nabstraction, an allegoric being. To a single dominant quality there\nshould be added all those which make of the personage or hero a real and\ncomplete man, capable of being developed in diverse situations and under\nvarying aspects. Such a multiplicity alone can give vitality to the\ncharacter. This is not sufficient, however; it is necessary that the\nqualities be moulded together in such a manner as to form not a simple\nassemblage and a complex whole, but one and the same individual, having\npeculiar and original physiognomy. This is the case when a particular\nsentiment, a ruling passion, presents the salient trait of the character\nof a person, and gives to him a fixed aim, to which all his resolutions\nand his acts refer. Unity and variety, simplicity and completeness of\ndetail, these are presented to us in the characters of Sophocles,\nShakspeare, and others.\n\nLastly, what constitutes essentially the ideal in character is\nconsistency and stability. An inconsistent, undecided, irresolute\ncharacter, is the utter want of character. Contradictions, without\ndoubt, exist in human nature, but unity should be maintained in spite of\nthese fluctuations. Something identical ought to be found throughout, as\na fundamental trait. To be self-determining, to follow a design, to\nembrace a resolution and persist in it, constitute the very foundation\nof personality; to suffer one\u2019s self to be determined by another, to\nhesitate, to vacillate, this is to surrender one\u2019s will, to cease to be\none\u2019s self, to lack character; this is, in all cases, the opposite of\nthe ideal character.\n\nHegel on this subject strongly protests against the characters which\nfigure in modern pieces and romances, and of which Werther is the type.\n\nThese pretended characters, says he, represent only unhealthiness of\nspirit, and feebleness of soul. Now true and healthy art does not\nrepresent what is false and sickly, what lacks consistency and decision,\nbut that which is true, healthy and strong. The ideal, in a word, is the\nidea realized; man can realize it only as a free person, that is to say,\nby displaying all the energy and constancy which can make it triumph.\n\nWe shall find more than once, in the course of the work, the same ideas\ndeveloped with the same force and precision.\n\nThat which constitutes the very ground of the ideal is the inmost\nessence of things, especially the lofty conceptions of the spirit, and\nthe development of the powers of the soul. These ideas are manifest in\nan action in which are placed upon the scene the grand interests of\nlife, the passions of the human heart, the will and the character of\nactors. But this action is itself developed in the midst of an external\nnature which, moreover, lends to the ideal, colors and a determinate\nform. These external surroundings must also be conceived and fashioned\nin the meaning of the ideal, according to the laws of _regularity_,\n_symmetry_, and _harmony_, of which mention has been made above. How\nought man to be represented in his relations with external nature? How\nought this prose of life to be idealized? If art, in fact, frees man\nfrom the wants of material life, it cannot, however, elevate him above\nthe conditions of human existence, and suppress these connections.\n\nHegel devotes a special examination to this new phase of the question of\nthe ideal, which he designates by this title\u2014_Of the external\ndetermination of the ideal_.\n\nIn our days we have given an exaggerated importance to this external\nside, which we have made the principal object. We are too unmindful that\nart should represent the ideas and sentiments of the human soul, that\nthis is the true ground of its works. Hence all these minute\ndescriptions, this external care given to the picturesque element or to\nthe local color, to furniture, to costumes, to all those artificial\nmeans employed to disguise the emptiness and insignificance of the\nsubject, the absence of ideas, the falsity of the situations, the\nfeebleness of the characters, and the improbability of the action.\n\nNevertheless, this side has its place in art, and should not be\nneglected. It gives clearness, truthfulness, life, and interest to its\nworks, by the secret sympathy which exists between man and nature. It is\ncharacteristic of the great masters to represent nature with perfect\ntruthfulness. Homer is an example of this. Without forgetting the\ncontent for the form, picture for the frame, he presents to us a\nfaultless and precise image of the theatre of action. The arts differ\nmuch in this respect. Sculpture limits itself to certain symbolic\nindications; painting, which has at its disposal means more extended,\nenriches with these objects the content of its pictures. Among the\nvarieties of poetry, the epic is more circumstantial in its descriptions\nthan the drama or lyric poetry. But this external fidelity should not,\nin any art, extend to the representation of insignificant details, to\nthe making of them an object of predilection, and to subordinating to\nthem the developments which the subject itself claims. The grand point\nin these descriptions is that we perceive a secret harmony between man\nand nature, between the action and the theatre on which it occurs.\n\nAnother species of accord is established between man and the objects of\nphysical nature, when, through his free activity, he impresses upon them\nhis intelligence and will, and appropriates them to his own use; the\nideal consists in causing misery and necessity to disappear from the\ndomain of art, in revealing the freedom which develops itself without\neffort under our eyes, and easily surmounts obstacles.\n\nSuch is the ideal considered under this aspect. Thus the gods of\npolytheism themselves have garments and arms; they drink nectar and are\nnourished by ambrosia. The garment is an ornament designed to heighten\nthe glory of the features, to give nobleness to the countenance, to\nfacilitate movement, or to indicate force and agility. The most\nbrilliant objects, the metals, precious stones, purple and ivory, are\nemployed for the same end. All concur to produce the effect of grace and\nbeauty.\n\nIn the satisfaction of physical wants the ideal consists, above all, in\nthe simplicity of the means. Instead of being artificial, factitious,\ncomplex, the latter emanate directly from the activity of man, and\nfreedom. The heroes of Homer themselves slay the oxen which are to serve\nfor the feast, and roast them; they forge their arms, and prepare their\ncouches. This is not, as one might think, a relic of barbarous manners,\nsomething prosaic; but we see, penetrating everywhere the delight of\ninvention, the pleasure of easy toil and free activity exercised on\nmaterial objects. Everything is peculiar to and inherent in his\ncharacter, and a means for the hero of revealing the force of his arm\nand the skill of his hand; while, in civilized society, these objects\ndepend on a thousand foreign causes, on a complex adjustment in which\nman is converted into a machine subordinated to other machines. Things\nhave lost their freshness and vitality; they remain inanimate, and are\nno longer proper, direct creations of the human person, in which the man\nloves to solace and contemplate himself.\n\nA final point relative to the external _form of the ideal_ is that which\nconcerns the _relation of works of art to the public_, that is to say,\nto the nation and epoch for which the artist or the poet composes his\nworks. Ought the artist, when he treats a subject, to consult, above\nall, the spirit, taste and manners of the people whom he addresses, and\nconform himself to their ideas? This is the means of exciting interest\nin fabulous and imaginary or even historic persons. But then there is a\nliability to distort history and tradition.\n\nOught he, on the other hand, to reproduce with scrupulous exactness the\nmanners and customs of another time, to give to the facts and the\ncharacters their proper coloring and their original and primitive\ncostume? This is the problem. Hence arise two schools and two opposite\nmodes of representation. In the age of Louis XIV., for example, the\nGreeks and Romans are conceived in the likeness of Frenchmen. Since\nthen, by a natural reaction, the contrary tendency has prevailed. Today\nthe poet must have the knowledge of an archeologist, and possess his\nscrupulous exactness, and pay close attention, above all, to local\ncolor, and historic verity has become the principal and essential aim of\nart.\n\nTruth here, as always, lies between the two extremes. It is necessary to\nmaintain, at the same time, the rights of art and these of the public,\nto have a proper regard for the spirit of the epoch, and to satisfy the\nexigencies of the subject treated. These are the very judicious rules\nwhich the author states upon this delicate point.\n\nThe subject should be intelligible and interesting to the public to\nwhich it is addressed. But this end the poet or the artist will attain\nonly so far as, by his general spirit, his work responds to some one of\nthe essential ideas of the human spirit and to the general interests of\nhumanity. The particularities of an epoch are not of true and enduring\ninterest to us.\n\nIf, then, the subject is borrowed from remote epochs of history, or from\nsome far-off tradition, it is necessary that, by our general culture, we\nshould be familiarized with it. It is thus only that we can sympathize\nwith an epoch and with manners that are no more. Hence the two essential\nconditions; that the subject present the general human character, then\nthat it be in relation with our ideas.\n\nArt is not designed for a small number of scholars and men of science;\nit is addressed to the entire nation. Its works should be comprehended\nand relished of themselves, and not after a course of difficult\nresearch. Thus national subjects are the most favorable. All great poems\nare national poems. The Bible histories have for us a particular charm,\nbecause we are familiar with them from our infancy. Nevertheless, in the\nmeasure that relations are multiplied between peoples, art can borrow\nits subjects from all latitudes and from all epochs. It should, indeed,\nas to the principal features, preserve, to the traditions, events, and\npersonages, to manners and institutions, their historic or traditional\ncharacter; but the duty of the artist, above all, is to place the idea\nwhich constitutes its content in harmony with the spirit of his own age,\nand the peculiar genius of his nation.\n\nIn this necessity lies the reason and excuse for what is called\nanachronism in art. When the anachronism bears only upon external\ncircumstances it is unimportant. It becomes a matter of more moment if\nwe attribute to the characters, the ideas, and sentiments of another\nepoch. Respect must be paid to historic truth, but regard must also be\nhad to the manners and intellectual culture of one\u2019s own time. The\nheroes of Homer themselves are more than were the real personages of the\nepoch which he presents; and the characters of Sophocles are brought\nstill nearer to us. To violate thus the rules of historic reality, is a\nnecessary anachronism in art. Finally, another form of anachronism,\nwhich the utmost moderation and genius can alone make pardonable, is\nthat which transfers the religious or moral ideas of a more advanced\ncivilization to an anterior epoch; when one attributes, for example, to\nthe ancients the ideas of the moderns. Some great poets have ventured\nupon this intentionally; few have been successful in it.\n\nThe general conclusion is this: \u201cThe artist should be required to make\nhimself the cotemporary of past ages, and become penetrated himself with\ntheir spirit. For if the substance of those ideas be true, it remains\nclear for all time. But to undertake to reproduce with a scrupulous\nexactness the external element of history, with all its details and\nparticulars,\u2014in a word, all the rust of antiquity, is the work of a\npuerile erudition, which attaches itself only to a superficial aim. We\nshould not wrest from art the right which it has to float between\nreality and fiction.\u201d\n\nThis first part concludes with an examination of the qualities necessary\nto an artist, such as imagination, genius, inspiration, originality,\netc. The author does not deem it obligatory to treat at much length this\nsubject, which appears to him to allow only a small number of general\nrules or psychological observations. The manner in which he treats of\nmany points, and particularly of the imagination, causes us to regret\nthat he has not thought it worth while to give a larger space to these\nquestions, which occupy the principal place in the majority of\n\u00e6sthetical treatises; we shall find them again under another form in the\ntheory of the arts.\n\n[The next number will continue this translation through the treatment of\nthe Symbolic, Classic, and Romantic forms of art.]\n\n\n\n\n NOTES ON RAPHAEL\u2019S \u201cTRANSFIGURATION.\u201d\n\n\n[Read before the St. Louis Art Society in November, 1866.]\n\n\n I. THE ENGRAVING.\n\n\nHe who studies the \u201cTransfiguration\u201d of Raphael is fortunate if he has\naccess to the engraving of it by Raphael Morghen. This engraver, as one\nlearns from the Encyclop\u00e6dia, was a Florentine, and executed this\u2014his\nmost elaborate work\u2014in 1795, from a drawing of Tofanelli, after having\ndiscovered that a copy he had partly finished from another drawing, was\nvery inadequate when compared with the original.\n\nUpon comparison with engravings by other artists, it seems to me that\nthis engraving has not received all the praise it deserves; I refer\nespecially to the seizing of the \u201cmotives\u201d of the picture, which are so\nessential in a work of great scope, to give it the requisite unity. What\nthe engraver has achieved in the present instance, I hope to be able to\nshow in some degree. But one will not be able to verify my results if he\ntakes up an engraving by a less fortunate artist; e.g.: one by Pavoni,\nof recent origin.\n\n\n II. HISTORICAL.\n\n\nIt is currently reported that Raphael painted the \u201cTransfiguration\u201d at\nthe instance of Cardinal Giulio de Medici, and that in honor of the\nlatter he introduced the two saints\u2014Julian and Lawrence\u2014on the mount;\nSt. Julian suggesting the ill-fated Giuliano de Medici, the Cardinal\u2019s\nfather, and St. Lawrence representing his uncle, \u201cLorenzo the\nMagnificent,\u201d the greatest of the Medici line, and greatest man of his\ntime in Italy. \u201cThe haughty Michael Angelo refused to enter the lists in\nperson against Raphael, but put forward as a fitting rival Sebastian del\nPiombo, a Venetian.\u201d Raphael painted, as his masterpiece, the\n\u201cTransfiguration,\u201d and Sebastian, with the help of Michael Angelo,\npainted the \u201cRaising of Lazarus.\u201d In 1520, before the picture was quite\nfinished, Raphael died. His favorite disciple, Giulio Romano, finished\nthe lower part of the picture (especially the demoniac) in the spirit of\nRaphael, who had completed the upper portion and most of the lower.\n\n\n III. LEGEND.\n\n\nThe Legend portrayed here\u2014slightly varying from the one in the New\nTestament, but not contradicting it\u2014is as follows: Christ goes out with\nhis twelve disciples to Mount Tabor,(?) and, leaving the nine others at\nthe foot, ascends with the favored three to the summit, where the scene\nof the Transfiguration takes place. While this transpires, the family\ngroup approach with the demoniac, seeking help from a miraculous source.\n\nRaphael has added to this legend the circumstance that two sympathetic\nstrangers, passing that way up the mount, carry to the Beatified One the\nintelligence of the event below, and solicit his immediate and gracious\ninterference.\n\nThe Testament account leads us to suppose the scene to be Mount Tabor,\nsoutheast of Nazareth, at whose base he had healed many, a few days\nbefore, and where he had held many conversations with his disciples. \u201cOn\nthe following day, when they were come down, they met the family,\u201d says\nLuke; but Matthew and Mark do not fix so precisely the day.\n\n\n IV. CHARACTERIZATION.\n\n\nIt may be safely affirmed that there is scarcely a picture in existence\nin which the individualities are more strongly marked by internal\nessential characteristics.\n\nAbove, there is no figure to be mistaken: Christ floats toward the\nsource of light\u2014the Invisible Father, by whom _all_ is made visible that\nis visible. On the right, Moses appears in strong contrast to Elias on\nthe left\u2014the former the law-giver, and the latter the spontaneous,\nfiery, eagle-eyed prophet.\n\nOn the mountain top\u2014prostrate beneath, are the three disciples\u2014one\nrecognizes on the right hand, John, gracefully bending his face down\nfrom the overpowering light, while on the left James buries his face in\nhis humility. But Peter, the bold one, is fain to gaze directly on the\nsplendor. He turns his face up in the act, but is, as on another\noccasion, mistaken in his estimate of his own endurance, and is obliged\nto cover his eyes, involuntarily, with his hand.\n\nBelow the mount, are two opposed groups. On the right, coming from the\nhamlet in the distance, is the family group, of which a demoniac boy\nforms the centre. They, without doubt, saw Christ pass on his way to\nthis solitude, and, at length, concluded to follow him and test his\nmight which had been \u201cnoised abroad\u201d in that region. It is easy to see\nthe relationship of the whole group. First the boy, actually\n\u201cpossessed,\u201d or a maniac; then his father\u2014a man evidently predisposed to\ninsanity\u2014supporting and restraining him. Kneeling at the right of the\nboy is his mother, whose fair Grecian face has become haggard with the\ntrials she has endured from her son. Just beyond her is her brother, and\nin the shade of the mountain, is her father. In the foreground is her\nsister. Back of the father, to the right, is seen an uncle (on the\nfather\u2019s side) of the demoniac boy, whose features and gestures show him\nto be a simpleton, and near him is seen the face of the father\u2019s sister,\nalso a weak-minded person. The parents of the father are not to be seen,\nfor the obvious reason that old age is not a characteristic of persons\npredisposed to insanity. Again, it is marked that in a family thus\npredisposed, some will be brilliant to a degree resembling genius, and\nothers will be simpletons. The whole group at the right are supplicating\nthe nine disciples, in the most earnest manner, for relief. The\ndisciples, grouped on the left, are full of sympathy, but their looks\ntell plainly that they can do nothing. One, at the left and near the\nfront, holds the books of the Law in his right hand, but the letter\nneeds the spirit to give life, and the mere Law of Moses does not help\nthe demoniac, and only excites the sorrowful indignation of the\nbeautiful sister in the foreground.\n\nThe curious student of the New Testament may succeed in identifying the\ndifferent disciples: Andrew, holding the books of the Law, is Peter\u2019s\nbrother, and bears a family resemblance. Judas, at the extreme left,\ncannot be mistaken. Matthew looks over the shoulder of Bartholomew, who\nis pointing to the demoniac; while Thomas\u2014distinguished by his youthful\nappearance\u2014bends over toward the boy with a look of intense interest.\nSimon (?), kneeling between Thomas and Bartholomew, is indicating to the\nmother, by the gesture with his left hand, the absence of the Master.\nPhilip, whose face is turned towards Judas, is pointing to the scene on\nthe mount, and apparently suggesting the propriety of going for the\nabsent one. James, the son of Alpheus, resembles Christ in features, and\nstands behind Jude, his brother, who points up to the mount while\nlooking at the father.\n\n\n V. ORGANIC UNITY.\n\n\n(_a_) Doubtless every true work of art should have what is called an\n\u201corganic unity.\u201d That is to say, all the parts of the work should be\nrelated to each other in such a way that a harmony of design arises. Two\nentirely unrelated things brought into the piece would form two centres\nof attraction and hence divide the work into two different works. It\nshould be so constituted that the study of one part leads to all the\nother parts as being necessarily implied in it. This common life of the\nwhole work is the central idea which necessitates all the parts, and\nhence makes the work an organism instead of a mere conglomerate or\nmechanical aggregate,\u2014a fortuitous concourse of atoms which would make a\nchaos only.\n\n(_b_) This central idea, however, cannot be represented in a work of art\nwithout contrasts, and hence there must be antitheses present.\n\n(_c_) And these antitheses must be again reduced to unity by the\nmanifest dependence of each side upon the central idea.\n\nWhat is the central idea of this picture?\n\n(_a_) Almost every thoughtful person that has examined it, has said:\n\u201cHere is the Divine in contrast with the Human, and the dependence of\nthe latter upon the former.\u201d This may be stated in a variety of ways.\nThe Infinite is there above, and the Finite here below seeking it.\n\n(_b_) The grandest antithesis is that between the two parts of the\nPicture, the above and the below. The transfigured Christ, there,\ndazzling with light; below, the shadow of mortal life, only illuminated\nby such rays as come from above. _There_, serenity; and here, rending\ncalamity.\n\nThen there are minor antitheses.\n\n(1) Above we have a Twofold. The three celestial light-seekers who soar\nrapturously to the invisible source of light, and below them, the three\ndisciples swooning beneath the power of the celestial vision. (2) Then\nbelow the mountain we have a similar contrast in the two groups; the one\nbroken in spirit by the calamity that \u201cpierces their own souls,\u201d and the\nother group powerfully affected by sympathy, and feeling keenly their\nimpotence during the absence of their Lord.\n\nAgain even, there appear other antitheses. So completely does the idea\npenetrate the material in this work of art, that everywhere we see the\nmirror of the whole. In the highest and most celestial we have the\nantithesis of Christ and the twain; Moses the law or letter, Elias the\nspirit or the prophet, and Christ the living unity. Even Christ himself,\nthough comparatively the point of repose of the whole picture, is a\ncontrast of soul striving against the visible body. So, too, the\nantitheses of the three disciples, John, Peter, James,\u2014grace, strength,\nand humility. Everywhere the subject is exhaustively treated; the family\nin its different members, the disciples with the different shades of\nsympathy and concern. (The maniac boy is a perfect picture of a being,\ntorn asunder by violent internal contradiction.)\n\n(_c_) The unity is no less remarkable. First, the absolute unity of the\npiece, is the transfigured Christ. To it, mediately or immediately,\neverything refers. All the light in the picture streams thence. All the\naction in the piece has its motive power in Him;\u2014first, the two\ncelestials soar to gaze in his light; then the three disciples are\nexpressing, by the posture of every limb, the intense effect of the same\nlight. On the left, the mediating strangers stand imploring Christ to\ndescend and be merciful to the miserable of this life. Below, the\ndisciples are painfully reminded of Him absent, by the present need of\nhis all-healing power, and their gestures refer to his stay on the\nmountain top; while the group at the right, are frantic in supplications\nfor his assistance.\n\nBesides the central unity, we find minor unities that do not contradict\nthe higher unity, for the reason that they are only reflections of it,\nand each one carries us, of its own accord, to the higher unity, and\nloses itself in it. To illustrate: Below, the immediate unity of all\n(centre of interest) is the maniac boy, and yet he convulsively points\nto the miraculous scene above, and the perfect unrest exhibited in his\nattitude repels the soul irresistibly to seek another unity. The Christ\nabove, gives us a comparatively serene point of repose, while the unity\nof the Below or finite side of the picture is an absolute antagonism,\nhurling us beyond to the higher unity.\n\nBefore the approach of the distressed family, the others were intently\nlistening to the grave and elderly disciple, Andrew, who was reading and\nexpounding the Scriptures to them. This was a different unity, and would\nhave clashed with the organic unity of the piece; the approach of the\nboy brings in a new unity, which immediately reflects all to the higher\nunity.\n\n\n VI. SENSE AND REASON _VS._ UNDERSTANDING.\n\n\nAt this point a few reflections are suggested to render more obvious,\ncertain higher phases in the unity of this work of art, which must now\nbe considered.\n\nA work of art, it will be conceded, must, first of all, appeal to the\nsenses. Equally, too, its content must be an idea of the Reason, and\nthis is not so readily granted by every one. But if there were no idea\nof the Reason in it, there would be no unity to the work, and it could\nnot be distinguished from any other work _not_ a work of art. Between\nthe Reason and the Senses there lies a broad realm, called the\n\u201cUnderstanding\u201d by modern speculative writers. It was formerly called\nthe \u201cdiscursive intellect.\u201d The Understanding applies the criterion\n\u201c_use_.\u201d It does not know _beauty_, or, indeed, anything which is _for\nitself_; it knows only what is good for something else. In a work of\nart, after it has asked what it is good for, it proceeds to construe it\nall into prose, for it is the _prose faculty_. It must have the picture\ntell us what is the _external fact_ in nature, and not trouble us with\nany transcendental imaginative products. It wants imitation of nature\nmerely.\n\nBut the artist frequently neglects this faculty, and shocks it to the\nuttermost by such things as the abridged mountain in this picture, or\nthe shadow cast toward the sun, that Eckermann tells of.\n\nThe artist must never violate the sensuous harmony, nor fail to have the\ndeeper unity of the Idea. It is evident that the sensuous side is always\ncared for by Raphael.\n\nHere are some of the effects in the picture that are purely sensuous and\nyet of such a kind that they immediately call up the idea. The source of\nlight in the picture is Christ\u2019s form; _below_, it is reflected in the\ngarments of the conspicuous figure in the foreground. Above, is Christ;\nopposite and below, a female that suggests the Madonna. In the same\nmanner Elias, or the inspired prophet, is the opposite to the maniac\nboy; the former inspired by the _celestial_; the latter, by the\n_demonic_. So Moses, the law-giver, is antithetic to the old disciple\nthat has the roll of the Law in his hand. So, too, in the posture, Elias\nfloats freely, while Moses is brought against the tree, and mars the\nimpression of free self-support. The heavy tables of the Law seem to\ndraw him down, while Elias seems to have difficulty in descending\nsufficiently to place himself in subordination to Christ.\n\nEven the contradiction that the understanding finds in the abridgment of\nthe mountain, is corrected sensuously by the perspective at the right,\nand the shade that the edge of the rock casts which isolates the above\nso completely from the below.\n\nWe see that Raphael has brought them to a secluded spot just near the\ntop of the mountain. The view of the distant vale tells us as\neffectually that this is a mountain top as could be done by a full\nlength painting of it. Hence the criticism rests upon a misunderstanding\nof the fact Raphael has portrayed.\n\n\n VII. ROMANTIC _vs._ CLASSIC.\n\n\nFinally, we must recur to those distinctions so much talked of, in order\nto introduce the consideration of the grandest strokes of genius which\nRaphael has displayed in this work.\n\nThe distinction of Classic and Romantic Art, of Greek Art from\nChristian: the former is characterized by a complete repose, or\nequilibrium between the Sense and Reason\u2014or between matter and form. The\nidea seems completely expressed, and the expression completely adequate\nto the idea.\n\nBut in Christian Art we do not find this equilibrium; but everywhere we\nfind an intimation that the idea is too transcendent for the matter to\nexpress. Hence, Romantic Art is self contradictory\u2014it _expresses_ the\n_inadequacy_ of _expression_.\n\n \u201cI have that within which passeth show;\n These but the _trappings_ and the _suits_ of woe.\u201d\n\nIn Gothic Architecture, all strives upward and seems to derive its\nsupport from above (i. e. the Spiritual, light). All Romantic Art points\nto a _beyond_. The Madonnas seem to say: \u201cI am a beyond which cannot be\nrepresented in a sensuous form;\u201d \u201ca saintly contempt for the flesh\nhovers about their features,\u201d as some one has expressed it.\n\nBut in this picture, Christ himself, no more a child in the Madonna\u2019s\narms, but even in his meridian glory, looks beyond, and expresses\ndependence on a Being who is not and cannot be represented. His face is\nserene, beatific; he is at unity with this Absolute Being, but the unity\nis an internal one, and his upraised gaze towards the source of light is\na plain statement that the True which supports him is not a sensuous\none. \u201cGod dwelleth not in temples made with hands; but those who would\napproach Him must do it in _spirit_ and in _truth_.\u201d\n\nThis is the idea which belongs to the method of all modern Art; but\nRaphael has not left this as the general spirit of the picture merely,\nbut has emphasized it in a way that exhibits the happy temper of his\ngenius in dealing with refractory subjects. And this last point has\nproved too much for his critics. Reference is made to the two saints\npainted at the left. How fine it would be, thought the Cardinal de\nMedici, to have St. Lawrence and St. Julian painted in there, to\ncommemorate my father and uncle! They can represent mediators, and\nthereby connect the two parts of the picture more closely!\n\nOf course, Raphael put them in there! \u201cAlas!\u201d say his critics, \u201cwhat a\nfatal mistake! What have those two figures to do there but to mar the\nwork! All for the gratification of a selfish pride!\u201d\n\nAlways trust an Artist to dispose of the Finite; he, of all men, knows\nhow to digest it and subordinate it to the idea.\n\nRaphael wanted just such figures in just that place. Of course, the most\nnatural thing in the world that could happen, would be the ascent of\nsome one to bear the message to Christ that there was need of him below.\nBut what is the effect of that upon the work as a piece of Romantic Art?\nIt would destroy that characteristic, if permitted in certain forms.\nRaphael, however, seizes upon this incident to show the entire spiritual\ncharacter of the upper part of the picture. The disciples are dazzled\nso, that even the firm Peter cannot endure the light at all. Is this a\nphysical light? Look at the messengers that have come up the mountain!\nDo their eyes indicate anything bright, not to say dazzling? They stand\nthere with supplicating looks and gestures, but see no transfiguration.\nIt must be confessed, Cardinal de Medici, that your uncle and father are\nnot much complimented, after all; they are merely natural men, and have\nno inner sense by which to see the Eternal Verities that illume the\nmystery of existence! Even if you are Cardinal, and they were Popes\u2019\ncounselors, they never saw anything higher in Religion than what should\nadd comfort to us here below!\n\nNo! The transfiguration, as Raphael clearly tells us, was a Spiritual\none: Christ, on the mountain with his favored three disciples, opened up\nsuch celestial clearness in his exposition of the truth, that they saw\nMoses and Elias, as it were, combined in one Person, and a new Heaven\nand a new Earth arose before them, and they were lost in that revelation\nof infinite splendor.\n\nIn closing, a remark forces itself upon us with reference to the\ncomparative merits of Raphael and Michael Angelo.\n\nRaphael is the perfection of Romantic Art. Michael Angelo is almost a\nGreek. His paintings all seem to be pictures of statuary. In his\ngrandest\u2014The Last Judgment\u2014we have the visible presence as the highest.\nArt with him could represent the Absolute. With Raphael it could only,\nin its loftiest flights, express its own impotence.\n\nWhether we are to consider Raphael or Michael Angelo as the higher\nartist, must be decided by an investigation of the merits of the \u201cLast\nJudgment.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.\n CHAPTER I.\n\n\nThe object of this series is to furnish, in as popular a form as\npossible, a course of discipline for those who are beginning the study\nof philosophy. Strictly _popular_, in the sense the word is used\u2014i. e.\nsignifying that which holds fast to the ordinary consciousness of men,\nand does not take flights beyond\u2014I am well aware, no philosophy can be.\nThe nearest approach to it that can be made, consists in starting from\nthe common external views, and drawing them into the speculative, step\nby step. For this purpose the method of definitions and axioms, with\ndeductions therefrom, as employed by Spinoza, is more appropriate at\nfirst, and afterwards a gradual approach to the _Dialectic_, or true\nphilosophic method. In the mathematical method (that of Spinoza just\nalluded to) the content may be speculative, but its form, never. Hence\nthe student of philosophy needs only to turn his attention to the\ncontent at first; when that becomes in a measure familiar, he can then\nthe more readily pass over to the true form of the speculative content,\nand thus achieve complete insight. A course of discipline in the\nspeculative content, though under an inadequate form, would make a grand\npreparation for the study of Hegel or Plato; while a study of these, or,\nin short, of any writers who employ speculative _methods_ in treating\nspeculative _content_\u2014a study of these without previous acquaintance\nwith the content is well nigh fruitless. One needs only to read the\ncomments of translators of Plato upon his speculative passages, or the\nprevailing verdicts upon Hegel, to be satisfied on this point.\n\nThe course that I shall here present will embody my own experience, to a\ngreat extent, in the chronological order of its development. Each lesson\nwill endeavor to present an _aper\u00e7u_ derived from some great\nphilosopher. Those coming later will presuppose the earlier ones, and\nfrequently throw new light upon them.\n\nAs one who undertakes the manufacture of an elegant piece of furniture\nneeds carefully elaborated tools for that end, so must the thinker who\nwishes to comprehend the universe be equipped with the tools of thought,\nor else he will come off as poorly as he who should undertake to make a\ncarved mahogany chair with no tools except his teeth and finger nails.\nWhat complicated machinery is required to transmute the rough ores into\nan American watch! And yet how common is the delusion that no\nelaboration of tools of thought is required to enable the commonest mind\nto manipulate the highest subjects of investigation. The alchemy that\nturned base metal into gold is only a symbol of that cunning alchemy of\nthought that by means of the philosopher\u2019s stone (scientific method)\ndissolves the base _facts_ of experience into universal truths.\n\nThe uninitiated regards the philosophic treatment of a theme as\ndifficult solely by reason of its technical terms. \u201cIf I only understood\nyour use of words, I think I should find no difficulty in your thought.\u201d\nHe supposes that under those bizarre terms there lurks only the meaning\nthat he and others put into ordinary phrases. He does not seem to think\nthat the concepts likewise are new. It is just as though an Indian were\nto say to the carpenter, \u201cI could make as good work as you, if I only\nhad the secret of using my finger-nails and teeth as you do the plane\nand saw.\u201d Speculative philosophy\u2014it cannot be too early inculcated\u2014does\n_not_ \u201cconceal under cumbrous terminology views which men ordinarily\nhold.\u201d The ordinary reflection would say that Being is the ground of\nthought, while speculative philosophy would say that thought is the\nground of Being; whether of other being, or of itself as being\u2014for it is\n_causa sui_.\n\nLet us now address ourselves to the task of elaborating our\ntechnique\u2014the tools of thought\u2014and see what new worlds become accessible\nthrough our mental telescopes and microscopes, our analytical scalpels\nand psychological plummets.\n\n\n I.\u2014A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI.\n\n\n_A priori_, as applied to knowledge, signifies that which belongs to the\nnature of the mind itself. Knowledge which is before experience, or not\ndependent on it, is _a priori_.\n\n_A posteriori_ or _empirical_ knowledge is derived from experience.\n\nA criterion to be applied in order to test the application of these\ncategories to any knowledge in question, is to be found in\n_universality_ and _necessity_. If the truth expressed has universal and\nnecessary validity it must be _a priori_, for it could not have been\nderived from experience. Of empirical knowledge we can only say: \u201cIt is\ntrue so far as experience has extended.\u201d Of _a priori_ knowledge, on the\ncontrary, we affirm: \u201cIt is universally and necessarily true and no\nexperience of its opposite can possibly occur; from the very nature of\nthings it must be so.\u201d\n\n\n II.\u2014ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL.\n\n\nA judgment which, in the predicate, adds nothing new to the subject, is\nsaid to be _analytical_, as e. g. \u201cHorse is an animal;\u201d\u2014the concept\n\u201canimal\u201d is already contained in that of \u201chorse.\u201d\n\n_Synthetical_ judgments, on the contrary, add in the predicate something\nnew to the conception of the subject, as e. g. \u201cThis rose is red,\u201d or\n\u201cThe shortest distance between two points is a straight line;\u201d\u2014in the\nfirst judgment we have \u201cred\u201d added to the general concept \u201crose;\u201d while\nin the second example we have _straightness_, which is quality, added to\n_shortest_, which is quantity.\n\n\n III.\u2014APODEICTICAL.\n\n\nOmitting the consideration of _a posteriori_ knowledge for the present,\nlet us investigate the _a priori_ in order to learn something of the\nconstitution of the intelligence which knows\u2014always a proper subject for\nphilosophy. Since, moreover, the _a priori analytical_ (\u201cA horse is an\nanimal\u201d) adds nothing to our knowledge, we may confine ourselves, as\nKant does, to _a priori synthetical_ knowledge. The axioms of\nmathematics are of this character. They are universal and necessary in\ntheir application, and we know this without making a single practical\nexperiment. \u201cOnly one straight line can be drawn between two points,\u201d or\nthe proposition: \u201cThe sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to\ntwo right angles,\u201d\u2014these are true in all possible experiences, and hence\ntranscend any actual experience. Take any _a posteriori_ judgment, e. g.\n\u201cAll bodies are heavy,\u201d and we see at once that it implies the\nrestriction, \u201cSo far as we have experienced,\u201d or else is a mere\nanalytical judgment. The _universal and necessary_ is sometimes called\nthe _apodeictical_. The conception of the _apodeictical_ lies at the\nbasis of all true philosophical thinking. He who does not distinguish\nbetween _apodeictic_ and _contingent_ judgments must pause here until he\ncan do so.\n\n\n IV. SPACE AND TIME.\n\n\nIn order to give a more exhaustive application to our technique, let us\nseek the universal conditions of experience. The mathematical truths\nthat we quoted relate to Space, and similar ones relate to Time. No\nexperience would be possible without presupposing Time and Space as its\nlogical condition. Indeed, we should never conceive our sensations to\nhave an origin outside of ourselves and in distinct objects, unless we\nhad the conception of Space _a priori_ by which to render it possible.\nInstead, therefore, of our being able to generalize particular\nexperiences, and collect therefrom the idea of Space and Time in\ngeneral, we must have added the idea of Space and Time to our sensation\nbefore it could possibly become an experience at all. This becomes more\nclear when we recur to the _apodeictic_ nature of Space and Time. Time\nand Space are thought as _infinites_, i. e. they can only be limited by\nthemselves, and hence are universally continuous. But no such conception\nas _infinite_ can be derived analytically from an object of experience,\nfor it does not contain it. All objects of experience must be _within_\nTime and Space, and not _vice versa_. All that is limited in extent and\nduration presupposes Time and Space as its logical condition, and this\nwe know, not from the senses but from the constitution of Reason itself.\n\u201cThe third side of a triangle is less than the sum of the two other\nsides.\u201d This we never measured, and yet we are certain that we cannot be\nmistaken about it. It is so in all triangles, present, past, future,\nactual, or possible. If this was an inference _a posteriori_, we could\nonly say: \u201cIt has been found to be so in all cases that have been\nmeasured and reported to us.\u201d\n\n\n V. MIND.\n\n\nMind has a certain _a priori_ constitution; this is our inference. It\nmust be so, or else we could never have any experience whatever. It is\nthe only way in which the possibility of _apodeictic_ knowledge can be\naccounted for. What I do not get from without I must get from within, if\nI have it at all. Mind, it would seem from this, cannot be, according to\nits nature, a finite affair\u2014a thing with properties. Were it limited in\nTime or Space, it could never (without transcending itself) conceive\nTime and Space as universally continuous or infinite. Mind is not within\nTime and Space, it is as universal and necessary as the _apodeictic_\njudgments it forms, and hence it is the substantial essence of all that\nexists. Time and Space are the logical conditions of finite existences,\nand Mind is the logical condition of Time and Space. Hence it is\nridiculous to speak of _my_ mind and _your_ mind, for mind is rather the\nuniversal substrate of all individuality than owned by any particular\nindividual.\n\nThese results are so startling to the one who first begins to think,\nthat he is tempted to reject the whole. If he does not do this, but\nscrutinizes the whole fabric keenly, he will discover what he supposes\nto be fallacies. We cannot anticipate the answer to his objections here,\nfor his objections arise from his inability to distinguish between his\nimagination and his thinking and this must be treated of in the next\nchapter. Here, we can only interpose an earnest request to the reader to\npersevere and thoroughly refute the whole argument before he leaves it.\nBut this is only one and the most elementary position from which the\nphilosophic traveller sees the Eternal Verities. Every perfect\nanalysis\u2014no matter what the subject be\u2014will bring us to the same result,\nthough the degrees of concreteness will vary,\u2014some leaving the solution\nin an abstract and vague form,\u2014others again arriving at a complete and\nsatisfactory view of the matter in detail.\n\n\n\n\n SEED LIFE.\n BY E. V.\n\n\n Ah! woe for the endless stirring,\n The hunger for air and light,\n The fire of the blazing noonday\n Wrapped round in a chilling night!\n\n The muffled throb of an instinct\n That is kin to the mystic To Be;\n Strong muscles, cut with their fetters,\n As they writhe with claim to be free.\n\n A voice that cries out in the silence,\n And is choked in a stifling air;\n Arms full of an endless reaching,\n While the \u201cNay\u201d stands everywhere.\n\n The burning of conscious selfhood,\n That fights with pitiless fate!\n God grant that deliverance stay not,\n Till it come at last too late;\n\n Till the crushed out instinct waver,\n And fainter and fainter grow,\n And by suicide, through unusing,\n Seek freedom from its woe.\n\n Oh! despair of constant losing\n The life that is clutched in vain!\n Is it death or a joyous growing\n That shall put an end to pain?\n\n\n\n\n A DIALOGUE ON IMMORTALITY.\n BY ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\n (Translated from the German, by Chas. L. Bernays.)\n\n\n_Philalethes._\u2014I could tell you that, after your death, you will be what\nyou were previous to your birth; I could tell you that we are never\nborn, and that we only seem to die\u2014that we have always been precisely\nthe same that we are now, and that we shall always remain the same\u2014that\n_Time_ is the apparatus which prevents us from being aware of all this;\nI could tell you that our consciousness stands always in the centre of\n_Time_\u2014never on one of its termini; and that any one among us,\ntherefore, has the immovable centre of the whole infinite _Time_ in\nhimself. I then could tell you that those who, by that knowledge, are\nassured that the present time always originates in ourselves, can never\ndoubt the indestructibility of their own essence.\n\n_Thrasymachus._\u2014All of that is too long and too ambiguous for me. Tell\nme, briefly, what I shall be after death.\n\n_Phil._\u2014All and nothing.\n\n_Thras._\u2014There we are! Instead of a solution to the problem you give me\na contradiction; that is an old trick.\n\n_Phil._\u2014To answer transcendental questions in language that is only made\nfor immanent perceptions, may in fact lead us into contradictions.\n\n_Thras._\u2014What do you mean by \u201ctranscendental\u201d and \u201cimmanent\u201d\nperceptions?\n\n_Phil._\u2014Well! _Transcendental_ perception is rather the knowledge,\nwhich, by exceeding any possibility of experience, tends to discover the\nessence of things as they are by themselves; _immanent_ perception it\nis, if it keeps inside of the limits of experience. In this case, it can\nonly speak of appearances. You, as an individual, end with your death.\nYet individuality is not your true and final essence, but only a mere\nappearance of it. It is not the _thing in itself_, but only its\nappearance, established in the form of time, thereby having a beginning\nand an end. That which is essential in you, knows neither of beginning\nnor ending, nor of Time itself; it knows no limits such as belong to a\ngiven individuality, but exists in all and in each. In the first sense,\ntherefore, you will become nothing after your death; in the second\nsense, you are and remain all. For that reason I said you would be all\nand nothing. You desired a short answer, and I believe that hardly a\nmore correct answer could be given _briefly_. No wonder, too, that it\ncontains a contradiction; for your life is in Time, while your\nimmortality is in Eternity.\n\n_Thras._\u2014Without the continuation of my individuality, I would not give\na farthing for all your \u201cimmortality.\u201d\n\n_Phil._\u2014Perhaps you could have it even cheaper. Suppose that I warrant\nto you the continuation of your individuality, but under the condition\nthat a perfectly unconscious slumber of death for three months should\nprecede its resuscitation.\n\n_Thras._\u2014Well, I accept the condition.\n\n_Phil._\u2014Now, in an absolutely unconscious condition, we have no measure\nof time; hence it is perfectly indifferent whether, whilst we lie asleep\nin death in the unconscious world, three months or ten thousand years\nare passing away. We do not know either of the one or of the other, and\nhave to accept some one\u2019s word with regard to the duration of our sleep,\nwhen we awake. Hence it is indifferent to you whether your individuality\nis given back to you after three months or after ten thousand years.\n\n_Thras._\u2014That I cannot deny.\n\n_Phil._\u2014Now, suppose that after ten thousand years, one had forgotten to\nawake you at all, then I believe that the long, long state of non-being\nwould become so habitual to you that your misfortune could hardly be\nvery great. Certain it is, any way, that you would know nothing of it;\nnay, you would even console yourself very easily, if you were aware that\nthe secret mechanism which now keeps your actual appearance in motion,\nhad not ceased during all the ten thousand years for a single moment to\nestablish and to move other beings of the same kind.\n\n_Thras._\u2014In that manner you mean to cheat me out of my individuality, do\nyou? I will not be fooled in that way. I have bargained for the\ncontinuation of my individuality, and none of your motives can console\nme for the loss of that; I have it at heart, and I never will abandon\nit.\n\n_Phil._\u2014It seems that you hold individuality to be so noble, so perfect,\nso incomparable, that there can be nothing superior to it; you therefore\nwould not like to exchange it for another one, though in that, you could\nlive with greater ease and perfection.\n\n_Thras._\u2014Let my individuality be as it may, it is always myself. It is\nI\u2014I myself\u2014who want to be. That is the individuality which I insist\nupon, and not such a one as needs argument to convince me that it may be\nmy own or a better one.\n\n_Phil._\u2014Only look about you! That which cries out\u2014\u201cI, I myself, wish to\nexist\u201d\u2014that is not yourself alone, but all that has the least vestige of\nconsciousness. Hence this desire of yours, is just that which is not\nindividual, but common rather to all without exception; it does not\noriginate in individuality, but in the very nature of existence itself;\nit is essential to anybody who lives, nay, it is that through which it\nis at all; it seems to belong only to the individual because it can\nbecome conscious only in the individual. What cries in us so loud for\nexistence, does so only through the mediation of the individual;\nimmediately and essentially it is the _will_ to exist or to live, and\nthis _will_ is one and the same in all of us. Our existence being only\nthe free work of the will, existence can never fail to belong to it, as\nfar, at least, as that eternally dissatisfied will, _can_ be satisfied.\nThe individualities are indifferent to the will; it never speaks of\nthem; though it seems to the individual, who, in himself is the\nimmediate percipient of it, as if it spoke only of his own\nindividuality. The consequence is, that the individual cares for his own\nexistence with so great anxiety, and that he thereby secures the\npreservation of his kind. Hence it follows that individuality is no\nperfection, but rather a restriction or imperfection; to get rid of it\nis not a loss but a gain. Hence, if you would not appear at once\nchildish and ridiculous, you should abandon that care for mere\nindividuality; for childish and ridiculous it will appear when you\nperceive your own essence to be the universal will to live.\n\n_Thras._\u2014You yourself and all philosophers are childish and ridiculous,\nand in fact it is only for a momentary diversion that a man of good\ncommon sense ever consents to squander away an idle hour with the like\nof you. I leave your talk for weightier matters.\n\n[The reader will perceive by the positions here assumed that\nSchopenhauer has a truly speculative stand-point; that he holds\nself-determination to be the only substantial (or abiding) reality. But\nwhile Aristotle and those like him have seized this more definitely as\nthe self-conscious thinking, it is evident that Schopenhauer seizes it\nonly from its immediate side, i. e. as the _will_. On this account he\nmeets with some difficulty in solving the problem of immortality, and\nleaves the question of conscious identity hereafter, not a little\nobscure. Hegel, on the contrary, for whom Schopenhauer everywhere\nevinces a hearty contempt, does not leave the individual in any doubt as\nto his destiny, but shows how individuality and universality coincide in\nself-consciousness, so that the desire for eternal existence is fully\nsatisfied. This is the legitimate result that _Philalethes_ arrives at\nin his last speech, when he makes the individuality a product of the\nwill; for if the will is the essential that he holds it to be, and the\nproduct of its activity is individuality, of course individuality\nbelongs eternally to it. At the close of his _Philosophy of Nature_,\n(Encyclop\u00e6dia, vol. II.,) Hegel shows how death which follows life in\nthe mere animal\u2014and in man as mere animal\u2014enters consciousness as one of\nits necessary elements, and hence does not stand opposed to it as it\ndoes to animal life. Conscious being (_Spirit_ or _Mind_ as it may be\ncalled,) is therefore immortal because it contains already, within\nitself, its limits or determinations, and thus cannot, like finite\nthings, encounter dissolution through external ones.\u2014ED.]\n\n\n\n\n GOETHE\u2019S THEORY OF COLORS.\n From an exposition given before the St. Louis Philosophical Society,\n Nov. 2nd, 1866.\n\n\nI.\u2014Color arises through the reciprocal action of light and darkness.\n\n(_a._) When a light object is seen through a medium that dims it, it\nappears of different degrees of yellow; if the medium is dark or dense,\nthe color is orange, or approaches red. Examples: the sun seen in the\nmorning through a slightly hazy atmosphere appears yellow, but if the\nair is thick with mist or smoke the sun looks red.\n\n(_b._) On the other hand a dark object, seen through a medium slightly\nilluminated, looks blue. If the medium is very strongly illuminated, the\nblue approaches a light blue; if less so, then indigo; if still less,\nthe deep violet appears. Examples: a mountain situated at a great\ndistance, from which very few rays of light come, looks blue, because we\nsee it through a light medium, the air illuminated by the sun. The sky\nat high altitudes appears of a deep violet; at still higher ones, almost\nperfectly black; at lower ones, of a faint blue. Smoke\u2014an illuminated\nmedium\u2014appears blue against a dark ground, but yellow or fiery against a\nlight ground.\n\n(_c._) The process of bluing steel is a fine illustration of Goethe\u2019s\ntheory. The steel is polished so that it reflects light like a mirror.\nOn placing it in the charcoal furnace a film of oxydization begins to\nform so that the light is reflected through this dimming medium; this\ngives a straw color. Then, as the film thickens, the color deepens,\npassing through red to blue and indigo.\n\n(_d._) The prism is the grand instrument in the experimental field of\nresearch into light. The current theory that light, when pure, is\ncomposed of seven colors, is derived from supposed actual verifications\nwith this instrument. The Goethean explanation is by far the simplest,\nand, in the end, it propounds a question which the Newtonian theory\ncannot answer without admitting the truth of Goethe\u2019s theory.\n\nII.\u2014The phenomenon of refraction is produced by interposing different\ntransparent media between the luminous object and the illuminated one,\nin such a manner that there arises an apparent displacement of one of\nthe objects as viewed from the other. By means of a prism the\ndisplacement is caused to lack uniformity; one part of the light image\nis displaced more than another part; several images, as it were, being\nformed with different degrees of displacement, so that they together\nmake an image whose edges are blurred in the line of displacement. If\nthe displacement were perfectly uniform, no color would arise, as is\ndemonstrated by the achromatic prism or lens. The difference of degrees\nof refraction causes the elongation of the image into a spectrum, and\nhence a mingling of the edges of the image with the outlying dark\nsurface of the wall, (which dark surface is essential to the production\nof the ordinary spectrum). Its _rationale_ is the following:\n\n(_a_) The light image refracted by the prism is extended over the dark\non one side, while the dark on the other side is extended over it.\n\n(_b_) The bright over the dark produces the blue in different degrees.\nThe side nearest the dark being the deepest or violet, and the side\nnearest the light image being the lightest blue.\n\n(_c_) On the other side, the dark over light produces yellow in\ndifferent degrees; nearest the dark we have the deepest color, (orange\napproaching to red) and on the side nearest the light, the light yellow\nor saffron tint.\n\n(_d_) If the image is large and but little refracted (as with a water\nprism) there will appear between the two opposite colored edges a\ncolorless image, proving that the colors arise from the mingling of the\nlight and dark edges, and not from any peculiar property of the prism\nwhich should \u201cdecompose the ray of light,\u201d as the current theory\nexpresses it. If the latter theory were correct the decomposition would\nbe throughout, and the whole image be colored.\n\n(_e_) If the image is a small one, or it is very strongly refracted, the\ncolored edges come together in the middle, and the mingling of the light\nyellow with the light blue produces _green_\u2014a new color which did not\nappear so long as the light ground appeared in the middle.\n\n(_f_) If the refraction is still stronger, the edges of the opposite\ncolors lap still more, and the green vanishes. The Newtonian theory\ncannot explain this, but it is to be expected according to Goethe\u2019s\ntheory.\n\n(_g_) According to Goethe\u2019s theory, if the object were a dark one\ninstead of a light one, and were refracted on a light surface, the order\nof colors would be reversed on each edge of the image. This is the same\nexperiment as one makes by looking through a prism at the bar of a\nwindow appearing against the sky. Where in the light image we had the\nyellow colors we should now expect the blue, for now it is dark over\nlight where before it was light over dark. So, also, where we had blue\nwe should now have yellow. This experiment may be so conducted that the\ncurrent doctrine that violet is refracted the most, and red the least,\nshall be refuted.\n\n(_h_) This constitutes the _experimentum crucis_. If the prism be a\nlarge water prism, and a black strip be pasted across the middle of it,\nparallel with its axis, so that in the midst of the image a dark shadow\nintervenes, the spectrum appears inverted in the middle, so that the red\nis seen where the green would otherwise appear, and those rays supposed\nto be the least refrangible are found refracted the most.\n\n(_i_) When the two colored edges do not meet in this latter experiment,\nwe have blue, indigo, violet, as the order on one side; and on the\nother, orange, yellow, saffron; the deeper colors being next to the dark\nimage. If the two colored edges come together the union of the orange\nwith the violet produces the perfect red (called by Goethe \u201c_purpur_\u201d).\n\n(_j_) The best method of making experiments is not the one that Newton\nemployed\u2014that of a dark room and a pencil of light\u2014but it is better to\nlook at dark and bright stripes on grounds of the opposite hue, or at\nthe bars of a window, the prism being held in the hand of the\ninvestigator. In the Newtonian form of the experiment one is apt to\nforget the importance of the dark edge where it meets the light.\n\n[For further information on this interesting subject the English reader\nis referred to Eastlake\u2019s translation of Goethe\u2019s Philosophy of Colors,\npublished in London.]\n\n\n\n\n THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.\n Vol. I. 1867. No. 2.\n\n\n SECOND PART OF GOETHE\u2019S FAUST.\n [Translated from Rosenkrantz\u2019s \u201cDeutsche Literatur,\u201d by D. J. Snider.]\n\n\nGoethe began nothing if the whole of the work did not hover before his\nmind. By this determinateness of plan he preserved a most persevering\nattachment to the materials of which he had once laid hold; they were\nelements of his existence, which for him were immortal, because they\nconstituted his inmost being. He could put off their execution for\nyears, and still be certain that his love for them would return, that\nhis interest in them would animate him anew. Through this depth of\nconception he preserved fresh to the end his original purpose; he needed\nnot to fear that the fire of the first enthusiasm would go out; at the\nmost different times he could take up his work again with youthful zeal\nand strength. Thus in the circle of his poetical labors, two conceptions\nthat are in internal opposition to one another, accompanied him through\nhis whole life. The one portrays a talented but fickle man, who, in want\nof culture, attaches himself to this person, then to that one, in order\nto become spiritually independent. This struggle carries him into the\nbreadth of life, into manifold relations whose spirit he longs to seize\nand appropriate; such is Wilhelm Meister. The other is the picture of an\nabsolutely independent personality that has cultivated its lordly power\nin solitary loftiness, and aspires boldly to subject the world to\nitself; such is Faust. In the development of both subjects there is a\ndecisive turning-point which is marked in the first by the \u201cTravels;\u201d in\nthe second, by the Second Part of the Tragedy. Up to this point, both in\nWilhelm Meister and in Faust, subjective conditions prevail, which\ngradually purify themselves to higher views and aims. For the one, the\nbetrothal with Natalia closes the world of wild, youthful desire; for\nthe other, the death of Margaret has the same effect. The one steps into\ncivil society and its manifold activity, with the earnest endeavor to\ncomprehend all its elements, to acquire, preserve, and beautify\nproperty, and to assist in illuminating and ennobling social relations;\nthe other takes likewise a practical turn, but from the summit of\nSociety, from the stand-point of the State itself. If, therefore, in the\napprenticeship and First Part of the Tragedy, on account of the excess\nof subjective conditions, a closer connection of the character and a\npassionate pathos are necessary, there appears, on the contrary, in the\nTravels and Second part of the Tragedy a thoughtfulness which moderates\neverything\u2014a cool designingness; the particular elements are sharply\ncharacterized, but the personages seem rather as supporters of universal\naims, in the accomplishment of which their own personality is submerged;\nthe Universal and its language is their pathos, and the interest in\ntheir history, that before was so remarkably fascinating, is blunted of\nits keenness.\n\nWe have seen Faust grow, fragment by fragment, before our eyes. So long\nas there existed only a First Part, two views arose. The one maintained\nthat it was in this incompleteness what it should be, a wonderful Torso;\nthat this magnificent poem only as a fragment could reflect the World in\norder to indicate that Man is able to grasp the Universe in a one-sided,\nincomplete manner only; that as the poet touched the mysteries of the\nWorld, but did not give a complete solution, so the Enigmatical, the\nProphetic, is that which is truly poetic, infinitely charming, really\nmystic. This view was considered as genial, particularly because it left\nto every one free play\u2014in fact, invited every one in his imagination to\nfill up the outlines; for it could not be defended from a philosophic\nnor from an artistic standpoint. Knowing seeks not half knowledge, Art\naims not at halfness of execution. If Dante in his Divine Comedy had\nneglected any element of nature or of history, if he had not wrought out\nall with equal perseverance in corresponding proportion, could it be\nsaid that his poem would stand higher without this completion? Or\nconversely, shall we praise it as a merit that Novalis\u2019 Ofterdingen has\nremained mere fragments and sketches? This would be the same as if we\nshould admire the Cologne Cathedral less than we now do were it\ncomplete. Another view supposed that a Second Part was indeed possible,\nand the question arose, in what manner shall this possibility be\nthought? Here again two opposite opinions showed themselves. According\nto the one, Faust must perish; reconciliation with God would be\nunbecoming to the northern nature of this Titanic character; the\nteeth-gnashing defiance, the insatiate restlessness, the crushing doubt,\nthe heaven-deriding fierceness, must send him to hell. In this the\nspirit of the old legend was expressed as it was at the time of the\nReformation\u2014for in the middle ages the redemption of the sinner through\nthe intercession of the Virgin Mary first appeared\u2014as the _Volksbuch_\nsimply but strikingly narrates it, as the Englishman, Marlowe, has\ndramatized it so excellently in his Doctor Faustus. But all this was not\napplicable to the Faust of Goethe, for the poet had in his mind an\nalteration of the old legend, and so another party maintained that Faust\nmust be saved. This party also asserted that the indication of the poet\nin the Prologue led to the same conclusion; that God could not lose his\nbet against the Devil; that the destruction of Faust would be\nblasphemous irony on Divine Providence. This assertion of the necessity\nof Faust\u2019s reconciliation found much favor in a time, like ours, which\nhas renounced not indeed the consciousness and recognition of Evil, but\nthe belief in a separate extra-human Devil; which purposes not merely\nthe punishment but also the improvement of the criminal; which seeks\neven to annul the death penalty, and transfer the atonement for murder\nto the inner conscience and to the effacing power of the Mind. But how\nwas Poetry to exhibit such a transition from internal strife to\ncelestial peace? Some supposed, as Hinrichs, that since Faust\u2019s despair\nresulted originally from science, which did not furnish to him that\nwhich it had at first promised, and since his childish faith had been\ndestroyed by scepticism, he must be saved through the scientific\ncomprehension of Truth, of the Christian Religion; that speculative\nPhilosophy must again reconcile him with God, with the World, and with\nhimself. They confessed indeed that this process\u2014study and\nspeculation\u2014cannot be represented in poetry, and therefore a Second Part\nof Faust was not to be expected. Others, especially poets, took Faust in\na more general sense; he was to penetrate not only Science but Life in\nits entirety; the most manifold action was to move him, and the sweat of\nlabor was to be the penance which should bring him peace and furnish the\nclearness promised by the Lord. Several sought to complete the work\u2014all\nwith indifferent success.\n\nIn what manner the poet himself would add a Second Part to the First,\nwhat standpoint he himself would take, remained a secret. Now it is\nunsealed; the poem is unrolled before us complete; with wondering look\nwe stand before it, with a beating heart we read it, and with modest\nanxiety, excited by a thousand feelings and misgivings, we venture\ncursorily to indicate the design of the great Master; for years shall\npass away before the meaning of the all-comprehensive poem shall be\nunveiled completely in its details. Still this explanation of\nparticulars in poetry is a subordinate matter. The main tendency of a\npoem must be seen upon its face, and it would be a sorry work if it did\nnot excite a living interest the first time that it was offered to the\nenjoyment of a people\u2014if this interest should result from microscopic\nexplanations and fine unravelling of concealed allusions\u2014if enthusiasm\nshould not arise from the poetry as well as from the learning and\nacuteness of the poet. Such particulars, which are hard to understand,\nalmost every great poem will furnish; latterly, the explanatory\nobservations on epic poems have become even stereotyped; it must be\npossible to disregard them; through ignorance of them nothing essential\nmust be lost.\n\nThe First Part had shown us Faust in his still cell, engaged in the\nstudy of all sciences. The results of his investigation did not satisfy\nthe boundless seeker, and as an experiment he bound himself to the Devil\nto see if the latter could not slake his burning thirst.\n\nThus he rushed into Life. Earthly enjoyment surrounded him, Love\nenchained him, Desire drove him to sudden, to bad deeds; in the mad\n_Walpurgisnach_ he reached the summit of waste worldliness. But deeper\nthan the Devil supposed, Faust felt for his Margaret; he desired to save\nthe unfortunate girl, but he was obliged to learn that this was\nimpossible, but that only endurance of the punishment of crime could\nrestore the harassed mind to peace. The simple story of love held\neverything together here in a dramatic form. The Prologue in Heaven, the\nWitch-kitchen, the _Walpurgisnacht_, and several contemplative scenes,\ncould be left out, and there still would remain a theatrical Whole of\nremarkable effect.\n\nThe relation to Margaret\u2014her death\u2014had elevated Faust above everything\nsubjective. In the continuation of his life, objective relations alone\ncould constitute the motive of action. The living fresh breath of the\nFirst Part resulted just from this fact, that everything objective,\nuniversal, was seized from the point of subjective interest; in the\nSecond Part the Universal, the Objective, stands out prominently;\nsubjective interests appear only under the presupposition of the\nObjective; the form becomes allegorical.\n\nA story, an action which rounds itself off to completion, is wanting,\nand therefore the dramatic warmth which pulsates through every scene of\nthe First Part is no longer felt. The unity which is traced through the\nweb of the manifold situations, is the universal tendency of Faust _to\ncreate a satisfaction for himself through work_. Mephistopheles has no\nlonger the position of a being superior by his great understanding and\nimmovable coldness, who bitterly mocks Faust\u2019s striving, but he appears\nrather as a powerful companion who skillfully procures the material\nmeans for the aims of Faust, and, in all his activity, only awaits the\nmoment when Faust shall finally acknowledge himself to be satisfied. But\nthe striving of Faust is infinite; each goal, when once reached, is\nagain passed by; nowhere does he rest, not in Society, not in Nature,\nnot in Art, not in War, not in Industry; only the thought of Freedom\nitself, the presentiment of the happiness of standing with a free people\nupon a free soil wrung from the sea, thrills the old man with a\nmomentary satisfaction\u2014and he dies. Upon pictures and woodcuts of the\nmiddle ages representations of dying persons are found, in which the\nDevil on one side of the death-bed and angels on the other await eagerly\nthe departing soul to pull it to themselves. Goethe has revived this old\nidea of a jealousy and strife between the angels and the Devil for Man.\nMephistopheles, with his horde of devils, struggles to carry away the\nsoul of Faust to hell, but he forgets himself in unnatural lust, and the\nangels bear the immortal part of Faust to that height where rest and\nillumination of the dying begin.\n\nSuch an allegorical foundation could not be developed otherwise than in\nhuge masses; the division of each mass in itself, so that all the\nelements of the thought lying at the bottom should appear, was the\nproper object of the composition. The First Part could also be called\nallegorical, in so far as it reflected the universal Essence of Spirit\nin the Individual; but it could not be said of it in any other sense\nthan of every poem; Allegory in its stricter sense was not to be found;\nthe shapes had all flesh and blood, and no design was felt. In the\nSecond Part everything passes over into the really Allegorical, to which\nGoethe, the older he grew, seems to have had the greater inclination;\nthe _Xenien_, the _Trilogie der Leidenschaft_, the _Lieder zur Loge_,\nthe _Maskenz\u00fcge_, _Epimenides Erwachen_, the cultivation of the Eastern\nmanners, all proceeded from a didactic turn which delighted in\nexpressing itself in gnomes, pictures, and symbolical forms. With\nwonderful acuteness, Goethe has always been able to seize the\ncharacteristic determinations, and unfold them in neat, living language;\nhowever, it lies in the nature of such poems that they exercise the\nreflective faculty more than the heart, and it was easy to foresee that\nthe Second Part of Faust would never acquire the popularity of the First\nPart; that it would not, as the latter, charm the nation, and educate\nthe people to a consciousness of itself, but that it would always have a\nsort of esoteric existence. Many will be repelled by the mythological\nlearning of the second and third acts; and the more so, as they do not\nsee themselves recompensed by the dialectic of an action; however, we\nwould unhesitatingly defend the poet against this reproach; a poem which\nhas to compass the immeasurable material of the world, cannot be limited\nin this respect. What learning has not Dante supposed in his readers?\nHumbly have we sought it, in order to acquire an understanding of his\npoem, in the certainty of being richly rewarded; the censure which has\nbeen cast upon it for this reason has effected nothing. Indeed, such\nfault-finders would here forget what the first acknowledged Part of\nFaust has compelled them to learn. With this difference of plan, the\nstyle must also change. Instead of dramatic pathos, because action is\nwanting, description, explanation, indication, have become necessary;\nand instead of the lively exchange of dialogue, the lyrical portion has\nbecome more prominent, in order to embody with simplicity the elements\nof the powerful world-life. The descriptions of nature deserve to be\nmentioned in particular. The most wanton fancy, the deepest feeling, the\nmost accurate knowledge, and the closest observation into the\nindividual, prevail in all these pictures with an indescribable charm.\nWe shall now give a short account of the contents of each act. In a more\ncomplete exposition we would point out the places in which the power of\nthe particular developments centers; in these outlines it is our design\nto confine ourselves to tracing out the universal meaning. To exhibit by\nsingle verses and songs the wonderful beauty of the language,\nparticularly in the lyrical portions, would seem to us as superfluous as\nthe effort to prove the existence of a divine Providence by anecdotes of\nstrange coincidences.\n\nThe first act brings us into social life; a multitude of shapes pass by\nus\u2014the most different wishes, opinions and humors are heard; still, a\nsecret unity, which we shall note even more closely, pervades the\nconfused tumult. In a delightful spot, lying upon the flowery sward, we\nsee Faust alone, tormented by deep pangs, seeking rest and slumber. Out\nof pure pity, indifferent whether the unfortunate man is holy or wicked,\nelves hover around him and fan him to sleep, in order that the past may\nbe sunk into the Lethe of forgetfulness; otherwise, a continuance of\nlife and endeavor is impossible. The mind has the power to free itself\nfrom the past, and throw it behind itself, and treat it as if it had\nnever been. The secret of renewing ourselves perpetually consists in\nthis, that we can destroy ourselves within ourselves, and, as a\nveritable Ph\u0153nix, be resurrected from the ashes of self-immolation.\nStill, this negative action suffices not for our freedom; the Positive\nmust be united to us; there must arise, with \u201ctremendous quaking,\u201d the\nsun of new activity and fresh endeavor, whereby the stillness of nightly\nrepose, the evanishment of all thoughts and feelings which had become\nstable, passes away in refreshing slumber. Faust awakened, feels every\npulse of nature beating with fresh life. The glare of the pure sunlight\ndazzles him\u2014the fall of waters through the chasms of the rock depicts to\nhim his own unrest; but from the sunlight and silvery vapor of the\nwhirlpool there is created the richly colored rainbow, which is always\nquietly glistening, but is forever shifting: it is Life. After this\nsolitary encouragement to new venture and endeavor, the court of the\nEmperor receives us, where a merry masquerade is about to take place.\nBut first, from all sides, the prosaic complaints of the Chancellor, the\nSteward, the Commander-in-Chief, the Treasurer, fall upon the ear of the\nEmperor; money, the cement of all relations, is wanting to the State;\nfor commerce, for pleasure, for luxury, money is the indispensable\nbasis. At this point, Mephistopheles presses forward to the place of the\nold court-fool, who has just disappeared, and excites the hope of\nbringing to light concealed treasure. To the Chancellor this way seems\nnot exactly Christian, the multitude raises a murmur of suspicion, the\nAstrologer discusses the possibility\u2014and the proposition is adopted.\nAfter this hopeful prospect, the masquerade can come off without any\nsecret anxieties disturbing their merriment. The nature of the company\nis represented in a lively manner. No one _is_ what he _seems_ to be;\neach has thrown over himself a concealing garment; each knows of the\nother that he is not that which his appearance or his language\nindicates; this effort to hide his own being, to pretend and to dream\nhimself into something different from himself\u2014to make himself a riddle\nto others in all openness, is the deepest, most piquant charm of social\ninterests.\n\nThe company will have enjoyment\u2014it unites itself with devotion to the\nfestive play, and banishes rough egotism, whose casual outbreaks the\nwatchful herald sharply reproves; but still, in the heart of every one,\nthere remains some intention, which is directed to the accomplishment of\nearthly aims. The young Florentine women want to please; the mother\nwishes her daughter to make the conquest of a husband; the fishermen and\nbird-catchers are trying their skill; the wood-chopper, buffoons, and\nparasites, are endeavoring, as well as they can, to make themselves\nvalid; the drunkard forgets everything over his bottle; the poets, who\ncould sing of any theme, drown each other\u2019s voices in their zeal to be\nheard, and to the satirist there scarcely remains an opportunity for a\ndry sarcasm. The following allegorical figures represent to us the inner\npowers which determine social life. First, the Graces appear, for the\nfirst demand of society is to behave with decency; more earnest are the\nParc\u00e6, the continuous change of duration\u2014still, they work only\nmechanically; but the Furies, although they come as beautiful maids,\nwork dynamically through the excitement of the passions. Here the aim is\nto conquer. _Victoria_ is throned high upon a sure-footed elephant,\nwhich Wisdom guides with skilful wand, while Fear and Hope go along on\neach side; between these the Deed wavers until it has reached the proud\nrepose of victory. But as soon as this happens, the quarrelsome, hateful\nThersites breaks forth, to soil the glory with his biting sneer. But his\nderision effects nothing. The Herald, as the regulating Understanding,\nand as distributive Justice, can reconcile the differences and mistakes\nwhich have arisen, and he strikes the scoffer in such a manner that he\nbursts and turns into an adder and a bat. Gradually the company returns\nto its external foundation; the feeling of _Wealth_ must secure to it\ninexhaustible pleasure. But Wealth is two-fold: the earthly, money\u2014the\nheavenly, poetry. Both must be united in society, if it would not feel\nweak and weary. The Boy Driver, that is, Poetry, which knows how to\nbring forth the Infinite in all the relations of life, and through the\nsame to expand, elevate and pacify the heart, is acknowledged by Plutus,\nthe God of common riches, as the one who can bestow that which he\nhimself is too poor to give. In the proud fullness of youth, bounding\nlightly around with a whip in his hand, the lovely Genius who rules all\nhearts, drives with horses of winged speed through the crowd. The\nbuffoon of Plutus, lean Avarice, is merrily ridiculed by the women;\nPoetry, warned by the fatherly love of Plutus, withdraws from the tumult\nwhich arises for the possession of the golden treasures. Gnomes, Giants,\nSatyrs, Nymphs, press on with bacchantic frenzy; earthly desire glows\nthrough the company, and it celebrates great Pan, Nature, as its God, as\nthe Giver of powerful Wealth and fierce Lust. A whirling tumult\nthreatens to seize hold of everybody\u2014a huge tongue of flame darts over\nall; but the majesty of the Emperor, the self-conscious dignity of man,\nputs an end to the juggling game of the half-unchained Earth-spirit, and\nrestores spiritual self-possession.\n\nStill Mephistopheles keeps the promise which he has made. He succeeds in\nrevivifying the company by fresh sums of money, obtained in conformity\nwith his nature, not by unearthing buried treasures from the heart of\nthe mountains by means of the wishing-rod, but by making paper-money! It\nis not, indeed, real coin, but the effect is the same, for in society\neverything rests upon the caprice of acceptance; its own life and\npreservation are thereby guaranteed by itself, and its authority, here\nrepresented by the Emperor, has infinite power. The paper notes, this\nmoney stamped by the airy imagination, spread everywhere confidence and\nlively enjoyment. It is evident that the means of prosperity have not\nbeen wanting, nor stores of eatables and drinkables, but a form was\nneeded to set the accumulated materials in motion, and to weave them\ninto the changes of circulation. With delight, the Chancellor, Steward,\nCommander-in-Chief, Treasurer, report the flourishing condition of the\narmy and the citizens; presents without stint give rise to the wildest\nluxury, which extends from the nobles of the realm down to the page and\nfool, and in such joyfulness everybody can unhesitatingly look about him\nfor new means of pleasure. Because the company has its essence in the\nproduction of the notes, its internal must strive for the artistic;\nevery one feels best when he, though known, remains unrecognized, and\nthus a theatrical tendency developes itself. For here the matter has\nnothing to do with the dramatic as real art, in reference to the egotism\nwhich binds the company together. The theatre collects the idle\nmultitude, and it has nothing to do but to see, to hear, to compare, and\nto judge. Theatrical enjoyment surpasses all other kinds in comfort, and\nis at the same time the most varied. The Emperor wishes that the great\nmagician, Faust, should play a drama before himself and the court, and\nshow Paris and Helen. To this design Mephistopheles can give no direct\naid; in a dark gallery he declares, in conversation with Faust, that the\nlatter himself must create the shapes, and therefore must go to the\nMothers. Faust shudders at their names. Mephistopheles gives him a small\nbut important key, with which he must enter the shadowy realm of the\nMothers for a glowing tripod, and bring back the same; by burning\nincense upon it, he would be able to create whatever shape he wished. As\na reason why _he_ is unable to form them, Mephistopheles says expressly\nthat he is in the service of big-necked dwarfs and witches, and not of\nheroines, and that the Heathen have their own Hell, with which he, the\nChristian and romantic Devil, has nothing to do. And yet he possesses\nthe key to it, and hence it is not unknown to him. And why does Faust\nshudder at the names of the Mothers? Who are these women who are spoken\nof so mysteriously? If it were said, the Imagination, _Mothers_ would be\nan inept expression; if it were said, the Past, Present and Future,\nFaust\u2019s shuddering could not be sufficiently accounted for, since how\nshould Time frighten him who has already lived through the terrors of\nDeath? From the predicates which are attached to the Mothers, how they\neverlastingly occupy the busy mind with all the forms of creation; how\nfrom the shades which surround them in thousand-fold variety, from the\nBeing which is Nothing, All becomes; how from their empty, most lonely\ndepth the living existence comes forth to the surface of Appearance;\nfrom such designations scarcely anything else can be understood by the\nrealm of the Mothers than the world of Pure Thought. This explanation\nmight startle at the first glance, but we need only put Idea for\nThought\u2014we need only remember the Idea-world of Plato in order to\ncomprehend the matter better. The eternal thoughts, the Ideas, are they\nnot the still, shadowy abyss, in which blooming Life buds, into whose\ndark, agitated depths it sends down its roots? Mephistopheles has the\nkey; for the Understanding, which is negative Determination, is\nnecessary in order not to perish in the infinite universality of\nThought; it is itself, however, only the Negative, and therefore cannot\nbring the actual Idea, Beauty, to appearance, but he, in his devilish\nbarrenness, must hand this work over to Faust; he can only recommend to\nthe latter moderation, so as not to lose himself among the phantoms, and\nhe is curious to know whether Faust will return. But Faust shudders\nbecause he is not to experience earthly solitude alone, like that of the\nboundless ocean, when yet star follows star, and wave follows wave; the\ndeepest solitude of the creative spirit, the retirement into the\ninvisible, yet almighty Thought, the sinking into the eternal Idea is\ndemanded of him. Whoever has had the boldness of this Thought\u2014whoever\nhas ventured to penetrate into the magic circle of the Logical, and its\nworld-subduing Dialectic, into this most simple element of infinite\nformation and transformation, has overcome all, and has nothing more to\nfear, as the Homunculus afterwards expresses it, because he has beheld\nthe naked essence, because Necessity has stripped herself to his gaze.\nBut it is also to be observed that the tripod is mentioned, for by this\nthere is an evident allusion to subjective Enthusiasm and individual\nImagination, by which the Idea in Art is brought out of its universality\nto the determinate existence of concrete Appearance. Beauty is identical\nin content with Truth, but its form belongs to the sphere of the\nSensuous.\u2014While Faust is striving after Beauty, Mephistopheles is\nbesieged by women in the illuminated halls, to improve their looks and\nassist them in their love affairs. After this delicate point is settled,\nno superstition is too excessive, no sympathetic cure too strange\u2014as,\nfor example, a tread of the foot\u2014and the knave fools them until they,\nwith a love-lorn page, become too much for him.\u2014Next the stage, by its\ndecorations, which represents Grecian architecture, causes a discussion\nof the antique and romantic taste; Mephistopheles has humorously taken\npossession of the prompter\u2019s box, and so the entertainment goes on in\nparlor fashion, till Faust actually appears, and Paris and Helen, in the\nname of the all-powerful Mothers, are formed from the incense which\nascends in magic power. The Public indulges itself in an outpouring of\negotistical criticism; the men despise the unmanly Paris, and interest\nthemselves deeply in the charms of Helen; the women ridicule the\ncoquettish beauty with envious moralizing, and fall in love for the\nnonce with the fair youth. But as Paris is about to lead away Helen,\nFaust, seized with the deepest passion for her wonderful beauty, falls\nupon the stage and destroys his own work. The phantoms vanish; still the\npurpose remains to obtain Helen; that is, the artist must hold on to the\nIdeal, but he must know that it is the Ideal. Faust confuses it with\ncommon Actuality, and he has to learn that absolute Beauty is not of an\nearthly, but of a fleeting, etherial nature.\n\nThe second act brings us away from our well-known German home to the\nbottom of the sea and its mysterious secrets. Faust is in search of\nHelen; where else can he find her, perfect Beauty, than in Greece? But\nfirst he seeks her, and meets therefore mere shapes, which unfold\nthemselves from natural existence, which are not yet actual humanity.\nIndeed, since he seeks natural Beauty\u2014for spiritual Beauty he has\nalready enjoyed in the heavenly disposition of Margaret\u2014the whole realm\nof Nature opens upon us; all the elements appear in succession; the\nrocks upon which the earnest Sphinxes rest, in which the Ants, Dactyls,\nGnomes work, give the surrounding ground; the moist waters contain in\ntheir bosom the seeds of all things. The holy fire infolds it with eager\nflame: according to the old legend, Venus sprang from the foam of the\nsea.\u2014Next we find ourselves at Wittenberg, in the ancient dwelling,\nwhere it is easy to see by the cob-webs, dried-up ink, tarnished paper,\nand dust, that many years have passed since Faust went out into the\nworld. Mephistopheles, from the old coat in which he once instructed the\nknowledge-seeking pupil, shakes out the lice and crickets which swarm\naround the old master with a joyful greeting, as also Parseeism makes\nAhriman the father of all vermin. Faust lies on his bed, sleeps and\ndreams the lustful story of Leda, which, in the end, is nothing more\nthan the most decent and hence producible representation of generation.\nWhile Mephistopheles in a humorous, and as well as the Devil can, even\nin an idyllic manner, amuses himself, while he inquires sympathetically\nafter Wagner of the present Famulus, a pupil who, in the meanwhile, has\nbecome a Baccalaureate, comes storming in, in order to see what the\nmaster is doing who formerly inculcated such wise doctrines, and in\norder to show what a prodigiously reasonable man he has himself become.\nA persiflage of many expressions of the modern German Natural Philosophy\nseems recognizable in this talk. Despising age, praising himself as the\ndawn of a new life, he spouts his Idealism, by means of which he creates\neverything, Sun, Moon and Stars, purely by the absoluteness of\nsubjective Thought. Mephistopheles, though the pupil assails him\nbitterly, listens to his wise speeches with lamb-like patience, and\nafter this refreshing scene, goes into Wagner\u2019s laboratory. The good man\nhas stayed at home, and has applied himself to Chemistry, to create,\nthrough its processes, men. To his tender, humane, respectable,\nintelligent mind, the common way of begetting children is too vulgar and\nunworthy of spirit. Science must create man; a real materialism will\nproduce him. Mephistopheles comes along just at this time, to whom\nWagner beckons silence, and whispers anxiously to him his undertaking,\nas in the glass retort the hermaphroditic boy, the Homunculus, begins to\nstir. But alas! the Artificial requires enclosed space. The poor fellow\ncan live only in the glass retort, the outer world is too rough for him,\nand still he has the greatest desire to be actually born. A longing,\nuniversal feeling for natural life sparkles from him with clear\nbrilliancy, and cousin Mephistopheles takes him along to the classic\n_Walpurgisnacht_, where Homunculus hopes to find a favorable moment.\nMephistopheles is related to the little man for this reason, because the\nlatter is only the product of nature, because God\u2019s breath has not been\nbreathed into him as into a real man.\n\nAfter these ironical scenes, the fearful night of the Pharsalian Fields\nsucceeds, where the antique world terminated its free life. This plain,\nassociated with dark remembrances and bloody shadows, is the scene of\nthe Classical _Walpurgisnacht_. Goethe could choose no other spot, for\njust upon this battle-field the spirit of Greek and Roman antiquity\nceased to be a living actuality. As an external reason, it is well known\nthat Thessaly was to the ancients the land of wizards, and especially of\nwitches, so that from this point of view the parallel with the German\nBlocksberg is very striking. Faust, driven by impatience to obtain\nHelen, is in the beginning sent from place to place to learn her\nresidence, until Chiron takes him upon the neck which had once borne\nthat most loving beauty, and with a passing sneer at the conjectural\ntroubles of the Philologist, tells him of the Argonauts, of the most\nbeautiful man, of Hercules, until he stops his wild course at the\ndwelling of the prophetic Manto, who promises to lead Faust to Helen on\nOlympus. Mephistopheles wanders in the meanwhile among Sphinxes,\nGriffons, Sirens, etc. To him, the Devil of the Christian and Germanic\nworld, this classic ground is not at all pleasing; he longs for the\nexcellent Blocksberg of the North, and its ghostly visages; with the\nLami\u00e6 indeed he resolves to have his own sport, but is roguishly\nbemocked; finally, he comes to the horrible Phorcyads, and after their\npattern he equips himself with one eye and a tusk for his own amusement;\nthat is, he becomes the absolutely Ugly, while Faust is wooing the\nhighest Beauty. In the Christian world the Devil is also represented as\nfundamentally ugly and repulsive; but he can also, under all forms,\nappear as an angel of light. In the Art-world, on the contrary, he can\nbe known only as the Ugly. In all these scenes there is a mingling of\nthe High and the Low, of the Horrible and the Ridiculous, of vexation\nand whimsicality, of the Enigmatical and the Perspicuous, so that no\nbetter contradictions could be wished for a _Walpurgisnacht_. The\nHomunculus on his part is ceaselessly striving to come to birth, and\nbetakes himself to Thales and Anaxagoras, who dispute whether the world\narose in a dry or wet way. Thales leads the little man to Nereus, who,\nhowever, refuses to aid the seeker, partly because he has become angry\nwith men, who, like Paris and Ulysses, have always acted against his\nadvice, and partly because he is about to celebrate a great feast.\nAfterwards they go to Proteus, who at first is also reticent, but soon\ntakes an interest in Homunculus, as he beholds his shining brilliancy,\nfor he feels that he is related to the changing fire, and gives warning\nthat as the latter can become everything, he should be careful about\nbecoming a man, for it is the most miserable of all existences. In the\nmeanwhile, the Peneios roars; the earth-shaking Seismos breaks forth\nwith a loud noise; the silent and industrious mountain-spirits become\nwakeful. But always more clearly the water declares itself as the womb\nof all things; the festive train of the Telchines points to the hoary\nCabiri; bewitchingly resound the songs of the Sirens; Hippocamps,\nTritons, Nereids, Pselli and Marsi arise from the green, pearl-decked\nground; the throne of Nereus and Galatea arches over the crystalline\ndepths; at their feet the eager Homunculus falls to pieces, and\nall-moving Eros in darting flames streams forth. Ravishing songs float\naloft, celebrating the holy elements, which the ever-creating Love holds\ntogether and purifies. Thales is just as little in the right as\nAnaxagoras; together, both are right, for Nature is kindled to perpetual\nnew life by the marriage of Fire and Water.\n\nThe difference between this _Walpurgisnacht_ and the one in the First\nPart lies in the fact, that the principle of the latter is the relation\nof Spirit to God. In the Christian world the first question is, what is\nthe position of man towards God; therefore there appear forms which are\nself-contradictory, lacerated spiritually, torn in pieces by the curse\nof condemnation to all torture. Classic Life has for its basis the\nrelation to Nature; the mysterious Cabiri were only the master-workmen\nof Nature. Nature finds in man her highest goal; in his fair figure, in\nthe majesty of his form she ends her striving; and therefore the\ncontradictions of the classic _Walpurgisnacht_ are not so foreign to\nMephistopheles, who has to do with Good and Bad, that he does not feel\nhis contact with them, but still they are not native to him. The general\ncontradiction which we meet with, and which also in Mephistopheles\nexpresses itself by the cloven foot at least, is the union of the human\nand animal frame; the human is at first only half existent, on earth in\nSphinxes, Oreads, Sirens, Centaurs; in water, in Hippocamps, Tritons,\nNymphs, Dorids, etc. For the fair bodies of the latter still share the\nmoist luxuriance of their element. Thus Nature expands itself in\ninnumerable creations in order to purify itself in man, in the\nself-conscious spirit, in order to pacify and shut off in him the\ninfinite impulse to formation, because it passes beyond him to no new\nform. He is the embodied image of God. The inclosed Homunculus, with his\nfiery trembling eagerness to pass over into an independent actuality,\nis, as it were, the serio-comic representation of this tendency, until\nhe breaks the narrow glass, and now is what he should be, the union of\nthe elements, for this is Eros according to the most ancient Greek\nconception, as we still find even in the Philosophers.\n\nIn the third act Goethe has adhered to the old legend, according to\nwhich, Faust, by means of Mephistopheles, obtained Helen as a concubine,\nand begat a son, Justus Faustus. Certainly, the employment of this\nfeature was very difficult; and still, even in our days, a poet, L.\nBechstein, in his Faust, has been wrecked upon this rock. He has Helen\nmarry Faust; they beget a child; but finally, when Faust makes his will,\nand turns away unlovingly from wife and child, it is discovered that the\nGrecian Helen, who in the copperplates is also costumed completely in\nthe antique manner, is a German countess of real flesh and blood, who\nhas been substituted by the Devil; an undeceiving which ought to excite\nthe deepest sympathy. Goethe has finely idealized this legend; he has\nexpressed therein the union of the romantic and classic arts. The third\nact, this Phantasmagory, is perhaps the most perfect of all, and\nexecuted in the liveliest manner. As noble as is the diction of the\nfirst and second acts, especially in the lyrical portions, it is here\nnevertheless by far surpassed. Such a majesty and simplicity, such\nstrength and mildness, unity and variety, in so small a space, are\nastonishing. First resounds the interchange of the dignity of \u00c6schylus\nand Sophocles, with the sharp-steeled wit of Aristophanes; then is heard\nthe tone of the Spanish romances, an agreeable, iambic measure, a sweet,\nravishing melody; finally, new styles break forth, like the fragments of\na prophecy; ancient and modern rhythms clash, and the harmony is\ndestroyed.\u2014Helen returns, after the burning of Troy, to the home of her\nspouse, Menelaus; the stewardess, aged, wrinkled, ugly, but experienced\nand intelligent, Phorcyas, receives her mistress in the citadel by\ncommand. Opposed to Beauty, as was before said, Mephistopheles can only\nappear as ugliness, because in the realm of beautiful forms, the Ugly is\nthe Wicked. There arises a quarrel between the graceful, yet pretentious\nyouth of the Chorus, and world-wise, yet stubborn Old Age. Helen has to\nappease it, and she learns with horror from Phorcyas that Menelaus is\ngoing to sacrifice her.\u2014Still, (as on the one hand Grecian fugitives,\nafter the conquest of Constantinople, instilled everywhere into German\nLife the taste for classic Beauty, and as, on the other hand, one of the\nOttomans in Theophania\u2014like Faust\u2014won a Helen, and thereby everywhere\narose a striving after the appropriation of the Antique,) the old\nstewardess saves her, and bears her through the air together with her\nbeautiful train, to the Gothic citadel of Faust, where the humble and\ngraceful behavior of the iron men towards the women, in striking\ncontrast to their hard treatment on the banks of the Eurotas, at once\nwins the female heart. The watchman of the tower, Lynceus, lost in\nwondering delight over the approaching beauty, forgets to announce her,\nand has brought upon himself a heavy punishment; but Helen, the cause of\nhis misdemeanor, is to be judge in his case, and she pardons him.\n\nFaust and all his vassals do homage to the powerful beauty, in whom the\nantique pathos soon disappears. In the new surroundings, in the mutual\nexchange of quick and confiding love, the sweet rhyme soon flows from\ntheir kissing lips. An attack of Menelaus interrupts the loving\ncourtship; but Valor, which in the battle for Beauty and favor of the\nladies, seeks its highest honor and purport, is unconquerable, and the\nswift might of the army victoriously opposes Menelaus. Christian\nchivalry protects the jewel of beauty which has fled to it for safety,\nagainst all barbarism pressing on from the East.\u2014Thus the days of the\nlovers pass rapidly away in secret grottoes amid pastoral dalliance; as\nonce Mars refreshed himself in the arms of Venus, so in the Middle Ages\nknights passed gladly from the storm of war to the sweet service of\nwomen in quiet trustfulness. Yet the son whom they beget, longs to free\nhimself from this idle, Arcadian life. The nature of both the mother and\nthe father drives him forward, and soon consummates the matter.\nBeautiful and graceful as Helen, the insatiate longing for freedom glows\nin him as in Faust. He strikes the lyre with wonderful, enchanting\npower; he revels wildly amid applauding maidens; he rushes from the\nbottom of the valley to the tops of the mountains, to see far out into\nthe world, and to breathe freely in the free air. His elastic desire\nraises him, a second Icarus, high in the clouds; but he soon falls dead\nat the feet of the parents, while an aureola, like a comet, streaks the\nHeavens. Thus perished Lord Byron. He is a poet more romantic than\nGoethe, to whom, however, Art gave no final satisfaction, because he had\na sympathy for the sufferings of nations and of mankind, which called\nhim pressingly to action. His poems are full of this striving. In them\nhe weeps away his grief for freedom. Walter Scott, who never passed out\nof the Middle Ages, is read more than Byron. But Byron is more powerful\nthan he, because the Idea took deeper root, and that demoniacal\ncharacter concentrated in itself all the struggles of our agitated time.\nDivine poesy softened not the wild sorrow of his heart, and the\nsacrifice of himself for the freedom of a beloved people and land could\nnot reproduce classic Beauty. The fair mother, who evidently did not\nunderstand the stormy, self-conscious character of her son, sinks after\nhim into the lower world. As everything in this phantasmagory is\nallegorical, I ask whether this can mean anything else than that freedom\nis necessary for beauty, and beauty also for freedom? Euphorion is\nboundless in his striving; the warnings of the parents avail not. He\ntopples over into destruction. But Helen, i.e. Beauty, cannot survive\nhim, for all beauty is the expression of freedom, of independence,\nalthough it does not need to know the fact. Only Faust, who unites all\nin himself, who strives to reach beyond Nature and Art, Present and\nPast, that is, the knowing of the True, survives her; upon her garments,\nwhich expand like a cloud, he moves forth. What remains now, since the\nimpulse of spiritual Life, the clarification of Nature in Art, the\nimmediate spiritual Beauty, have vanished? Nothing but Nature in her\nnakedness, whose choruses of Oreads, Dryads and Nymphs swarm forth into\nthe mountains, woods and vineyards, for bacchantic revelry; an invention\nwhich belongs to the highest effort of all poetry. It is a great\nkindness in the Devil, when Phorcyas at last discloses herself as\nMephistopheles, and where there is need, offers herself as commentator.\n\nThe life of Art, of Beauty, darkens like a mist; upon the height of the\nmountain, Faust steps out of the departing cloud, and looks after it as\nit changes to other forms. His restless mind longs for new activity. He\nwants to battle with the waters, and from them win land; that is, the\nland shall be his own peculiar property, since he brings it forth\nartificially. As that money which he gave to the Emperor was not coined\nfrom any metal, but was a product of Thought; as that Beauty which\ncharmed him was sought with trouble, and wrung from Nature, and as he,\nseizing the sword for the protection of Beauty, exchanged Love for the\nlabor of chivalry,\u2014so the land, the new product of his endeavor, not yet\nis, but he will first create it by means of his activity. A war of the\nEmperor with a pretender gives him an opportunity to realize his wish.\nHe supports the Emperor in the decisive battle. Mephistopheles is\nindifferent to the Right and to freedom; the material gain of the war is\nthe principal thing with him; so he takes along the three mighty\nrobbers, Bully, Havequick and Holdfast. (See 2d Samuel, 23: 8.) The\nelements must also fight\u2014the battle is won\u2014and the grateful Emperor\ngrants the request of Faust to leave the sea-shore for his possession.\nThe State is again pacified by the destruction of the pretender; a rich\nbooty in his camp repays many an injury; the four principal offices\npromise a joyful entertainment; but the Church comes in to claim\npossession of the ground, capital and interest, in order that the\nEmperor may be purified from the guilt of having had dealings with the\nsuspicious magician. Humbly the Emperor promises all; but as the\narchbishop demands tithe from the strand of the sea which is not yet in\nexistence, the Emperor turns away in great displeasure. The boundless\nrapacity of the Church causes the State to rise up against it. This act\nhas not the lyrical fire of the previous ones; the action, if the war\ncan thus be called, is diffuse; the battle, as broad as it is, is\nwithout real tension; the three robbers are allegorically true, if we\nlook at the meaning which they express, but are in other respects not\nvery attractive. In all the brilliant particulars, profound thoughts,\nstriking turns, piquant wit, and wise arrangement, there is still\nwanting the living breath, the internal connection to exhibit a complete\npicture of the war. And still, from some indications, we may believe\nthat this tediousness is designed, in order to portray ironically the\ndull uniformity, the spiritual waste of external political life, and the\nlittleness of Egotism. For it must be remembered that the war is a civil\nwar\u2014the genuine poetic war, where people is against people, falls into\nPhantasmagory. The last scene would be in this respect the most\nsuccessful. The continued persistency of the spiritual lord to obtain in\nthe name of the heavenly church, earthly possessions, the original\nacquiescence of the Emperor, but his final displeasure at the boundless\nshamelessness of the priest, are excellently portrayed, and the\npretentious pomp of the Alexandrine has never done better service.\n\nIn the fifth act we behold a wanderer, who is saved from shipwreck, and\nbrought to the house of an aged couple, Philemon and Baucis. He visits\nthe old people, eats at their frugal table, sees them still happy in\ntheir limited sphere, but listens with astonishment to them, as they\ntell of the improvements of their rich neighbor, and they express the\nfear of being ousted by him. Still, they pull the little bell of their\nchapel to kneel and pray with accustomed ceremony in presence of the\nancient God.\u2014The neighbor is Faust. He has raised dams, dug canals,\nbuilt palaces, laid out ornamental gardens, educated the people, sent\nout navies. The Industry of our time occupies him unceasingly; he revels\nin the wealth of trade, in the turmoil of men, in the commerce of the\nworld. That those aged people still have property in the middle of his\npossessions is extremely disagreeable to him, for just this little spot\nwhere the old mossy church stands, the sound of whose bell pierces his\nheart, where the airy lindens unfold themselves to the breeze, he would\nlike to have as a belvedere to look over all his creations at a glance.\nLike a good man whose head is always full of plans, he means well to the\npeople, and is willing to give them larger possessions where they can\nquietly await death, and he sends Mephistopheles to treat with them. But\nthe aged people, who care not for eating and drinking, but for comfort,\nwill not leave their happy hut; their refusal brings on disputes, and\nthe dwelling, together with the aged couple and the lindens, perishes by\nfire in this conflict between the active Understanding and the poetry of\nFeeling, which, in the routine of pious custom, clings to what is old.\nFaust is vexed over the turn which affairs have taken, particularly over\nthe loss of the beautiful lindens, but consoles himself with the purpose\nto build in their stead a watch-tower. Then before the palace, appear in\nthe night, announcing death, four hoary women, Starvation, Want, Guilt\nand Care, as the Furies who accompany the external prosperity of our\nindustrial century. Still, Care can only press through the key-hole of\nthe chamber of the rich man, and places herself with fearful suddenness\nat his side. The Negative of Thought is to be excluded by no walls. But\nFaust immediately collects himself again; with impressive clearness he\ndeclares his opinion of life, of the value of the earthly Present; Care\nhe hates, and does not recognize it as an independent existence. She\nwill nevertheless make herself known to him at the end of his life, and\npasses over his face and makes him blind. Still, Faust expresses no\nsolicitude, though deprived of his eyes by Care; no alteration is\nnoticed in him, he is bent only upon his aims; the energy of his tension\nremains uniform: Spirit, Thought, is the true eye; though the external\none is blinded, the internal one remains open and wakeful. The\ntransition from this point to the conclusion is properly this: that from\nthe activity of the finite Understanding, only a Finite can result. All\nindustry, for whose development Mephistopheles is so serviceable, as he\nonce was in war, cannot still the hunger of Spirit for Spirit. Industry\ncreates only an aggregate of prosperity, no true happiness. Our century\nis truly great in industrial activity. But it should only be the means,\nthe point of entrance for real freedom, which is within itself the\nInfinite. And Faust has to come to this, even on the brink of the grave.\nMephistopheles, after this affair with Care, causes the grave of the old\nman to be dug by the shaking Lemures. Faust supposes, as he hears the\nnoise of the spades, that his workmen are busily employed. Eagerly he\ntalks over his plans with Mephistopheles, and at last he glows at the\ngood fortune of standing upon free ground with a free people. Daily he\nfeels that man must conquer Freedom and Life anew, and the presentiment\nthat the traces of his uninterrupted striving would not perish in the\nAges, is the highest moment of his whole existence. This confession of\nsatisfaction kills him, and he falls to the earth dead. After trying\neverything, after turning from himself to the future of the race, after\nworking unceasingly, he has ripened to the acknowledgement that the\nIndividual only in the Whole, that Man only in the freedom of humanity\ncan have repose. Mephistopheles believes that he has won his bet, causes\nthe jaws of Hell to appear, and commands the Devils to look to the soul\nof Faust. But Angels come, strewing roses from above; the roses, the\nflowers of Love, cause pain where they fall; the Devils and\nMephistopheles himself complain uproariously. He lashes himself with the\nfalling roses, which cling to his neck like pitch and brimstone, and\nburn deeper than Hell-fire. First, he berates the Angels as hypocritical\npuppets, yet, more closely observed, he finds that they are most lovely\nyouths. Only the long cloaks fit them too modestly, for, from behind\nparticularly, the rascals had a very desirable look. While he is seeking\nout a tall fellow for himself, and is plunged wholly in his pederastic\nlust, the Angels carry away the immortal part of Faust to Heaven.\nMephistopheles now reproaches himself with the greatest bitterness,\nbecause he has destroyed, through so trivial a desire, the fruits of so\nlong a labor. This _reductio ad absurdum_ of the Devil must be\nconsidered as one of the happiest strokes of humor. The holy innocence\nof the Angels is not for him; he sees only their fine bodies; his\nlowness carries him into the Unnatural and Accidental, just where his\ngreatest interest and egotism come in play. This result will surprise\nmost people; but if they consider the nature of the Devil, it will be\nwholly satisfactory; in all cunning he is at last bemocked as a fool,\nand he destroys himself through himself.\n\nIn conclusion, we see a woody, rocky wilderness, settled with hermits.\nIt is not Heaven itself, but the transition to the same, where the soul\nis united to perfect clearness and happiness. Hence we find the glowing\ndevotion and repentance of the _Pater ecstaticus_, the contemplation of\nthe _Pater profundus_, the wrestling of the _Pater serapticus_, who,\ntaking into his eyes the holy little boys because their organs are too\nweak for the Earth, shows them trees, rocks, waterfalls. The Angels\nbring in Faust, who, as Doctor Marianus, in the highest and purest cell,\nwith burning prayer to the approaching queen of Heaven, seeks for grace.\nAround Maria is a choir of penitents, among whom are the Magna\nPeccatrix, the Mulier Samaritana, and Maria \u00c6gyptiaca. They pray for the\nearthly soul; and one of the penitents, once called Margaret, kneeling,\nventures a special intercession. The Mater Gloriosa appoints Margaret to\nlead the soul of Faust to higher spheres, for he shall follow her in\nanticipation. A fervent prayer streams from the lips of Doctor Marianus;\nthe Chorus mysticus concludes with the assurance of the certainty of\nbliss through educating, purifying love. Aspiration, the Eternal\nfeminine, is in Faust, however deeply he penetrates into every sphere of\nworldly activity. The analogy between Margaret and the Beatrice of Dante\nis here undeniable; also, the farther progress of Faust\u2019s life we must\nconsider similar, as he, like Dante, grows in the knowledge and feeling\nof the Divine till he arrives at its complete intuition; Dante beholds\nthe Trinity perfectly free and independent, without being led farther by\nanybody. From this point of view, that the poet wanted to exhibit\nreconciliation as becoming, as a product of infinite growth, is found\nthe justification of the fact that he alludes so slightly to God the\nFather, and to Christ the Redeemer, and, instead, brings out so\nprominently the worship of the Virgin, and the devotion of Woman.\nDevotion has a passive element which finds its fittest poetical support\nin women. These elements agree also very well with the rest of the poem,\nsince Goethe, throughout the entire drama, has preserved the costume of\nthe Middle Ages; otherwise, on account of the evident Protestant\ntendency of Faust, it would be difficult to find a necessary connection\nwith the other parts of the poem.\n\nAs regards the history of Faust in itself, dramatically considered, the\nfirst four acts could perhaps be entirely omitted. The fifth, as it\nshows us that all striving, if its content is not religion, (the freedom\nof the Spirit,) can give no internal satisfaction, as it shows us that\nin the earnest striving after freedom, however much we may err, still\nthe path to Heaven is open, and is only closed to him who does not\nstrive, would have sufficiently exhibited the reconciliation. But Goethe\nwants to show not only this conclusion, which was all the legend\ndemanded of him, but also the becoming of this result. Faust was for him\nand through him for the nation, and indeed for Europe, the\nrepresentative of the world-comprehending, self-conscious internality of\nSpirit, and therefore he caused all the elements of the World to\ncrystallize around this centre. Thus the acts of the Second Part are\npictures, which, like frescoes, are painted beside one another upon the\nsame wall, and Faust has actually become what was so often before said\nof him, a perfect manifestation of the Universe.\n\nIf we now cast a glance back to what we said in the beginning, of the\nopposition between the characters of Wilhelm Meister and Faust, that the\nformer was _the determined from without_, the latter _the\nself-determining from within_, we can also seize this opposition so that\nMeister is always in pursuit of Culture, Faust of Freedom. Meister is\ntherefore always desirous of new impressions, in order to have them work\nupon himself, extend his knowledge, complete his character. His capacity\nand zeal for Culture, the variety of the former, the diligence of the\nlatter, forced him to a certain tameness and complaisance in relation to\nothers. Faust on the contrary will himself work. He will possess only\nwhat he himself creates. Just for this reason he binds himself to the\nDevil, because the latter has the greatest worldly power, which Faust\napplies unsparingly for his own purposes, so that the Devil in reality\nfinds in him a hard, whimsical, insatiate master. To Wilhelm the\nacquaintance of the Devil would indeed have been very interesting from a\nmoral, psychological and \u00e6sthetic point of view, but he never would have\nformed a fraternity with him. This _autonomia_ and _autarkia_ of Faust\nhave given a powerful impulse to the German people, and German\nliterature. But if, in the continuation of Faust, there was an\nexpectation of the same Titanic nature, it was disappointed. The\nmonstrosity of the tendencies however, does not cease; a man must be\nblind not to see them. But in the place of pleasure, after the\ncatastrophe with Margaret, an active participation in the world enters;\na feature which Klinger and others have retained. But Labor in itself\ncan still give no satisfaction, but its content, too, must be\nconsidered. Or rather, the external objectivity of Labor is indifferent;\nwhether one is savant, artist, soldier, courtier, priest, manufacturer,\nmerchant, etc., is a mere accident; whether he wills Freedom or not, is\nnot accidental, for Spirit is in and for itself, free. With the narrow\nstudio, in fellowship with Wagner, Faust begins; with Trade, with\ncontests about boundaries, with his look upon the sea, which unites the\nnations, he ends his career.\n\nIn the World, Freedom indeed realizes itself, but as absolute, it can\nonly come to existence in God.\n\nIt is therefore right when Goethe makes the transition from civil to\nreligious freedom. Men cannot accomplish more than the realization of\nthe freedom of the nations, for Mankind has its concrete existence only\nin the nations; if the nations are free, it is also free. Faust must\nthus be enraptured by this thought in the highest degree. But with it,\nhe departs from the world\u2014Heaven has opened itself above him. But,\nthough Heaven sheds its grace, and lovingly receives the striving soul\nwhich has erred, still it demands repentance and complete purification\nfrom what is earthly. This struggle, this wrestling of the soul, I find\nexpressed in the most sublime manner in the songs of the hermits and the\nchoruses, and do not know what our time has produced superior in\nspiritual power, as well as in unwavering hope, though I must confess\nthat I am not well enough versed in the fertile modern lyric literature\nof Pietism, to say whether such pearls are to be found in it.\n\nMoreover, it is evident that the pliable Meister, and the stubborn\nFaust, are the two sides which were united in Goethe\u2019s genius. He was a\npoet, and became a courtier; he was a courtier, and remained a poet. But\nin a more extensive sense this opposition is found in all modern\nnations, particularly among the Germans. They wish to obtain culture,\nand therefore shun no kind of society if they are improved. But they\nwish also to be free. They love culture so deeply that they, perhaps,\nfor a while, have forgotten freedom. But then the Spirit warns them.\nThey sigh, like Faust, that they have sat so long in a gloomy cell over\nPhilosophy, Theology, etc. With the fierceness of lions, they throw all\nculture aside for the sake of freedom, and in noble delusion form an\nalliance\u2014even with the Devil.\n\n\n\n\n A CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.\n [Translated from the German of J. G. Fichte, by A. E. Kroeger.]\n\n\n [NOTE. Below we give to our readers the translation of another\n Introduction to the Science of Knowledge, written by Fichte\n immediately after the one published in our previous number. Whereas\n that first Introduction was written for readers who have as yet no\n philosophical system of their own, the present one is intended more\n particularly for those who have set philosophical notions, of which\n they require to be disabused.\u2014EDITOR.]\n\nI believe the first introduction published in this Journal to be\nperfectly sufficient for unprejudiced readers, i. e. for readers who\ngive themselves up to the writer without preconceived opinions, who, if\nthey do not assist him, also do not resist him in his endeavors to carry\nthem along. It is otherwise with readers who have already a\nphilosophical system. Such readers have adopted certain maxims from\ntheir system, which have become fundamental principles for them; and\nwhatsoever is not produced according to these maxims, is now pronounced\nfalse by them without further investigation, and without even reading\nsuch productions: it is pronounced false, because it has been produced\nin violation of their universally valid method. Unless this class of\nreaders is to be abandoned altogether\u2014and why should it be?\u2014it is, above\nall, necessary to remove the obstacle which deprives us of their\nattention; or, in other words, to make them distrust their maxims.\n\nSuch a preliminary investigation concerning the _method_, is, above all,\nnecessary in regard to the Science of Knowledge, the whole structure and\nsignificance whereof differs utterly from the structure and significance\nof all philosophical systems which have hitherto been current. The\nauthors of these previous systems started from some conception or\nanother; and utterly careless whence they got it, or out of what\nmaterial they composed it, they then proceeded to analyze it, to combine\nit with others, regarding the origin whereof they were equally\nunconcerned; and this their argumentation itself is their philosophy.\nHence their philosophy consists in _their own_ thinking. Quite different\ndoes the Science of Knowledge proceed. That which this Science makes the\nobject of its thinking, is not a dead conception, remaining passive\nunder the investigation, and receiving life only from it, but is rather\nitself living and active; generating out of itself and through itself\ncognitions, which the philosopher merely observes in their genesis. His\nbusiness in the whole affair is nothing further than to place that\nliving object of his investigation in proper activity, and to observe,\ngrasp and comprehend this its activity as a Unit. He undertakes an\nexperiment. It is his business to place the object in a position which\npermits the observation he wishes to make; it is his business to attend\nto all the manifestations of the object in this experiment, to follow\nthem and connect them in proper order; but it is not his business to\n_cause_ the manifestations in the object. That is the business of the\nobject itself: and he would work directly contrary to his purpose if he\ndid not allow the object full freedom to develop itself\u2014if he undertook\nbut the least interference in this, its self-developing.\n\nThe philosopher of the first mentioned sort, on the contrary, does just\nthe reverse. He produces a product of art. In working out his object he\nonly takes into consideration its matter, and pays no attention to an\ninternal self-developing power thereof. Nay, this power must be deadened\nbefore he undertakes his work, or else it might resist his labor. It is\nfrom the dead matter, therefore, that he produces something, and solely\nby means of his own power, in accordance with his previously\nresolved-upon conception.\n\nWhile thus in the Science of Knowledge there are two utterly distinct\nseries of mental activity\u2014that of the Ego, which the philosopher\nobserves, and that of the observations of the philosopher\u2014all other\nphilosophical systems have only _one_ series of thinking, viz: that of\nthe thoughts of the philosopher, for his object is not introduced as\nthinking at all.\n\nOne of the chief grounds of so many objections to and misunderstandings\nof the Science of Knowledge lies in this: that these two series of\nthinking have not been held apart, or that what belonged to the one has\nbeen taken to belong to the other. This error occurred because\nPhilosophy was held to consist only of one series. The act of one who\nproduces a work of art is most certainly\u2014since his object is not\nactive\u2014the appearance itself; but the description of him who has\nundertaken an experiment, is not the appearance itself, but the\nconception thereof.[1]\n\nAfter this preliminary remark, the further application whereof we shall\nexamine in the course of our article, let us now ask: how does the\nScience of Knowledge proceed to solve its problem?\n\nThe question it will have to answer, is, as we well know, the following:\nWhence comes the system of those representations which are accompanied\nby the feeling of necessity? Or, how do we to come claim objective\nvalidity for what is only subjective? Or, since objective validity is\ngenerally characterized as _being_, how do we come to accept a being?\nNow, since this question starts from a reflection that returns into\nitself\u2014starts from the observation, that the immediate object of\nconsciousness is after all merely consciousness itself,\u2014it seems clear\nenough that the question can speak of no other being than of a being for\nus. It would be indeed a complete contradiction, to mistake it for a\nquestion concerning some being which had no relation to our\nconsciousness. Nevertheless, the philosophers of our philosophical age\nare of all things most apt to plunge into such absurd contradictions.\n\nThe proposed question, how is a being for us possible? abstracts itself\nfrom all being; i. e. it must not be understood, as if the question\nposited a not-being; for in that case the conception of being would only\nbe negated, but not abstracted from. On the contrary, the question does\nnot entertain the conception of being at all, either positively or\nnegatively. The proposed question asks for the ground of the predicate\nof being, whether it be applied positively or negatively; but all ground\nlies beyond the grounded, i. e. is opposed to it. The answer must,\ntherefore, if it is to be an answer to this question, also abstract from\nall being. To maintain, _a priori_, in advance of an attempt, that such\nan abstraction is impossible in the answer, because it is impossible in\nitself, would be to maintain likewise, that such an abstraction is\nimpossible in the question; and hence, that the question itself is not\npossible, and that the problem of a science of metaphysics, as the\nscience which is to solve the problem of the ground of being for us, is\nnot a problem for human reason.\n\nThat such an abstraction, and hence such a question, is contrary to\nreason, cannot be proven by objective grounds to those who maintain its\npossibility; for the latter assert that the possibility and necessity of\nthe question is grounded upon the highest law of reason\u2014that of\nself-determination, (Practical legislation,) under which all other laws\nof reason are subsumed, and from which they are all derived, but at the\nsame time determined and limited to the sphere of their validity. They\nacknowledge the arguments of their opponents willingly enough, but deny\ntheir application to the present case; with what justice, their\nopponents can determine only by placing themselves upon the basis of\nthis highest law, but hence, also, upon the basis of an answer to the\ndisputed question, by which act they would cease to be opponents. Their\nopposition, indeed, can only arise from a subjective defect\u2014from the\nconsciousness that they never raised this question, and never felt the\nneed of an answer to it. Against this their position, no objective\ngrounds can, on the other hand, be made valid, by those who insist on an\nanswer to the question; for the doubt, which raises that question, is\ngrounded upon previous acts of freedom, which no demonstration can\ncompel from any one.\n\n\n III.\n\n\nLet us now ask: Who is it that undertakes the demanded abstraction from\nall being? or, in which of the two series does it occur? Evidently, in\nthe series of philosophical argumentation, for another series does not\nexist.\n\nThat, to which the philosopher holds, and from which he promises to\nexplain all that is to be explained, is the consciousness, the subject.\nThis subject he will, therefore, have to comprehend free from all\nrepresentation of being, in order first to show up in it the ground of\nall being\u2014of course, for itself. But if he abstracts from all being of\nand for the subject, nothing pertains to it but an acting. Particularly\nin relation to being is it the acting. The philosopher will, therefore,\nhave to comprehend it in its acting, and from this point the\naforementioned double series will first arise.\n\nThe fundamental assertion of the philosopher, as such, is this: as soon\nas the Ego is for itself, there necessarily arises for it at the same\ntime an external being; the ground of the latter lies in the former; the\nlatter is conditioned by the former. Self-consciousness and\nconsciousness of a Something which is not that Self, is necessarily\nunited; but the former is the conditioning and the latter the\nconditioned. To prove this assertion\u2014not, perhaps, by argumentation, as\nvalid for a system of a being in itself, but by observation of the\noriginal proceeding of reason, as valid for reason\u2014the philosopher will\nhave to show, firstly, how the Ego is and becomes for itself; and\nsecondly, that this its own being for itself is not possible, unless at\nthe same time there arises for it an external being, which is not it.\n\nThe first question, therefore, would be: how is the Ego for itself? and\nthe first postulate: think thyself! construe the conception of thyself,\nand observe how thou proceedest in this construction.\n\nThe philosopher affirms that every one who will but do so, must\nnecessarily discover that in the thinking of that conception, his\nactivity, as intelligence, returns into itself, makes itself its own\nobject.\n\nIf this is correct and admitted, the manner of the construction of the\nEgo, the manner of its being for itself, (and we never speak of another\nbeing,) is known; and the philosopher may then proceed to prove that\nthis act is not possible without another act, whereby there arises for\nthe Ego an external being.\n\nIt is thus, indeed, that the Science of Knowledge proceeds. Let us now\nconsider with what justice it so proceeds.\n\n\n IV.\n\n\nFirst of all: what in the described act belongs to the philosopher, as\nphilosopher, and what belongs to the Ego he is to observe? To the Ego\nnothing but the return to itself; everything else to the description of\nthe philosopher, for whom, as mere fact, the system of all experience,\nwhich in its genesis the Ego is now to produce under his observation,\nhas already existence.\n\nThe Ego returns _into itself_, is the assertion. Has it not then already\nbeing in advance of this return into itself, and independently thereof?\nNay, must it not already be for itself, if merely for the possibility of\nmaking itself the object of its action? Again, if this is so, does not\nthe whole philosophy presuppose what it ought first to explain?\n\nI answer by no means. First through this act, and only by means of it\u2014by\nmeans of an acting upon an acting\u2014does the Ego _originally_ come to be\n_for itself_. It is only _for the philosopher_ that it has previous\nexistence as a fact, because the philosopher has already gone through\nthe whole experience. He must express himself as he does, to be but\nunderstood, and he can so express himself, because he long since has\ncomprehended all the conceptions necessary thereunto.\n\nNow, to return to the observed Ego: what is this its return into itself?\nUnder what class of modifications of consciousness is it to be posited?\nIt is no _comprehending_, for a comprehending first arises through the\nopposition of a non-Ego, and by the determining of the Ego in this\nopposition. Hence it is a mere _contemplation_. It is therefore not\nconsciousness, not even self-consciousness. Indeed, it is precisely\nbecause this act alone produces no consciousness, that we proceed to\nanother act, through which a non-Ego originates for us, and that a\nprogress of philosophical argumentation and the required deduction of\nthe system of experience becomes possible. That act only places the Ego\nin the possibility of self-consciousness\u2014and thus of all other\nconsciousness\u2014but does not generate real consciousness. That act is but\na part of the whole act of the intelligence, whereby it effects its\nconsciousness; a part which only the philosopher separates from the\nwhole act, but which is not originally so separated in the Ego.\n\nBut how about the philosopher, as such? This self-constructing Ego is\nnone other than his own. He can contemplate that act of the Ego only in\nhimself, and, in order to contemplate it, must realize it. He produces\nthat act arbitrarily and with freedom.\n\nBut\u2014this question may and has been raised\u2014if your whole philosophy is\nerected upon something produced by an act of mere arbitrariness, does it\nnot then become a mere creature of the brain, a pure imaginary picture?\nHow is the philosopher going to secure to this purely subjective act its\nobjectivity? How will he secure to that which is purely empirical and a\nmoment of time\u2014i. e. the time in which the philosopher philosophizes\u2014its\noriginality? How can he prove that his present free thinking in the\nmidst of the series of his representations does correspond to the\nnecessary thinking, whereby he first became for himself, and through\nwhich the whole series of his representations has been started?\n\nI answer: this act is in its nature objective. I am for myself; this is\na fact. Now I could have thus come to be for myself only through an act,\nfor I am free; and only through this thus determined act, for only\nthrough it do I become for myself every moment, and through every other\nact something quite different is produced. That acting, indeed, is the\nvery conception of the Ego; and the conception of the Ego is the\nconception of that acting; both conceptions are quite the same; and that\nconception of the Ego can mean and can not be made to mean anything, but\nwhat has been stated. _It is so_, because _I make it so_. The\nphilosopher only makes clear to himself what he really thinks and has\never thought, when he thinks or thought _himself_; but that he does\nthink himself is to him immediate fact of consciousness. That question,\nconcerning the objectivity is grounded on the very curious\npresupposition that the Ego is something else than its own thought of\nitself, and that something else than this thought and outside of it\u2014God\nmay know what they do mean!\u2014is again the ground of it, concerning the\nactual nature of which outside something they are very much troubled.\nHence if they ask for such an objective validity of the thought, or for\na connection between this object and the subject, I cheerfully confess\nthat the Science of Knowledge can give them no instruction concerning\nit. If they choose to, they may themselves enter, in this or any other\ncase, upon the discovery of such a connection, until they, perhaps, will\nrecollect that this Unknown which they are hunting, is, after all, again\ntheir thought, and that whatsoever they may invent as its ground, will\nalso be their thought, and thus _ad infinitum_; and that, indeed, they\ncannot speak of or question about anything without at the same time\nthinking it.\n\nNow, in this act, which is arbitrary and in time, for the philosopher as\nsuch, but which is for the Ego\u2014which he constructs, by virtue of his\njust deduced right, for the sake of subsequent observations and\nconclusions\u2014necessarily and originally; in this act, I say, the\nphilosopher looks at himself, and immediately contemplates his own\nacting; he knows what he does, because _he does it_. Does a\nconsciousness thereof arise in him? Without doubt; for he not only\ncontemplates, but _comprehends_ also. He comprehends his act, as an\n_acting generally_, of which he has already a conception by virtue of\nhis previous experience; and as this _determined_, into itself\n_returning_ acting, as which he contemplates it in himself. By this\ncharacteristic determination he elevates it above the sphere of _general\nacting_.\n\n_What_ acting may be, can only be _contemplated_, not developed from and\nthrough conceptions; but that which this contemplation contains is\n_comprehended_ by the mere opposition of pure _being_. Acting is not\nbeing, and being is not acting. Mere conception affords no other\ndetermination for each link; their real essence is only discovered in\ncontemplation.\n\nNow this whole procedure of the philosopher appears to _me_, at least,\nvery possible, very easy, and even natural; and I can scarcely conceive\nhow it can appear otherwise to my readers, and how they can see in it\nanything mysterious and marvellous. Every one, let us hope, can think\n_himself_. He will also, let us hope, learn that by being required to\nthus think himself he is required to perform an act, dependent upon his\nown activity, an internal act; and that if he realizes this demand, if\nhe really affects himself through self-activity, he also most surely\n_acts_ thus. Let us further hope that he will be able to distinguish\nthis kind of acting from its _opposite_, the acting whereby he thinks\nexternal objects, and that he will find in the latter sort of thinking\nthe thinking and the thought to be opposites, (the activity, therefore,\ntending upon something distinct from itself,) while in the former\nthinking both were one and the same, (and hence the activity a return\ninto itself.) He will comprehend, it is to be hoped, that\u2014since the\nthought of himself arises _only_ in this manner, (an opposite thinking\nproducing a quite different thought)\u2014the thought of himself is nothing\nbut the thought of this act, and the word Ego nothing but the\ndesignation of this act\u2014that Ego and an _into itself returning activity_\nare completely identical conceptions. He will understand, let us hope,\nthat if he but for the present problematically presupposes with\ntranscendental Idealism that all consciousness rests upon and is\ndependent upon self-consciousness, he must also _think_ that return into\nitself as preceding and conditioning all other acts of consciousness;\nindeed as the primary act of the subject; and, since there is nothing\nfor him which is not in his consciousness, and since everything else in\nhis consciousness is conditioned by this act, and therefore cannot\ncondition the act in the same respect,\u2014as an act, utterly unconditioned\nand hence absolute _for him_; and he will thus further understand, that\nthe _above problematical presupposition_ and this _thinking of the Ego\nas originally posited through itself_, are again quite identical; and\nthat hence transcendental Idealism, if it proceeds systematically, can\nproceed in no other manner than it does in the Science of Knowledge.\n\nThis contemplation of himself, which is required of the philosopher, in\nhis realization of the act, through which the Ego arises for him, I call\n_intellectual contemplation_. It is the immediate consciousness that I\nact and what I act; it is that through which I know something, because I\ndo it. That there is such a power of intellectual contemplation cannot\nbe demonstrated by conceptions, nor can conception show what it is.\nEvery one must find it immediately in himself, or he will never learn to\nknow it. The requirement that we ought to show _it_ what it is by\nargumentation, is more marvellous than would be the requirement of a\nblind person, to explain to him, without his needing to use sight, what\ncolors are.\n\nBut it can be certainly proven to everyone in his own confessed\nexperience, that this intellectual contemplation does occur in every\nmoment of his consciousness. I can take no step, cannot move hand or\nfoot, without the intellectual contemplation of my self-consciousness in\nthese acts; only through this contemplation do I know that _I_ do it,\nonly through it do I distinguish my acting and in it myself from the\ngiven object of my acting. Everyone who ascribes an activity to himself\nappeals to this contemplation. In it is the source of life, and without\nit is death.\n\nBut this contemplation never occurs alone, as a complete act of\nconsciousness, as indeed sensuous contemplation also never occurs alone\nnor completes consciousness; both contemplations must be _comprehended_.\nNot only this, but the intellectual contemplation is also always\nconnected with a _sensuous_ contemplation. I cannot find myself acting\nwithout finding an object upon which I act, and this object in a\nsensuous contemplation which I comprehend; nor without sketching an\nimage of what I intend to produce by my act, which image I also\ncomprehend. Now, then, how do I know and how can I know what I intend to\nproduce, if I do not immediately contemplate myself in this sketching of\nthe image which I intend to produce, i. e. in this sketching of the\nconception of my _purpose_, which sketching is certainly an act. Only\nthe totality of this condition in uniting a given manifold completes\nconsciousness. I become conscious only of the conceptions, both of the\nobject upon which I act, and of the purpose I intend to accomplish; but\nI do not become conscious of the contemplations which are at the bottom\nof both conceptions.\n\nPerhaps it is only this which the zealous opponents of intellectual\ncontemplation wish to insist upon; namely, that that contemplation is\nonly possible in connection with a sensuous contemplation; and surely\nthe Science of Knowledge is not going to deny it. But this is no reason\nwhy they should deny intellectual contemplation. For with the same right\nwe might deny sensuous contemplation, since it also is possible only in\nconnection with intellectual contemplation; for whatsoever is to become\n_my_ representation must be related to me, and the consciousness (I)\noccurs only through intellectual contemplation. (It is a remarkable fact\nof our modern history of philosophy, that it has not been noticed as yet\nhow all that may be objected to intellectual contemplation can also be\nobjected to sensuous contemplation, and that thus the arguments of its\nopponents turn against themselves.)\n\nBut if it must be admitted that there is no immediate, isolated\nconsciousness of intellectual contemplation, how does the philosopher\narrive at a knowledge and isolated representation thereof? I answer,\ndoubtless in the same manner in which he arrives at the isolated\nrepresentation of sensuous contemplation, by drawing a conclusion from\nthe evident facts of consciousness. This conclusion runs as follows: I\npropose to myself, to think this or that, and the required thought\narises; I propose to myself, to do this or that, and the representation\nthat it is being done arises. This is a fact of consciousness. If I look\nat it by the light of the laws of mere sensuous consciousness, it\ninvolves no more than has just been stated, i. e. a sequence of certain\nrepresentations. I become conscious only of this _sequence_, in a series\nof time movements, and only such a time sequence can I assert. I can\nmerely state\u2014I know that if I propose to myself a certain thought, with\nthe characteristic that it is to have existence, the representation of\nthis thought, with the characteristic that it really has existence,\nfollows; or, that the representation of a certain manifestation, as one\nwhich ought to occur, is immediately followed in time by the\nrepresentation of the same manifestation as one which really did occur.\nBut I can, on no account, state that the first representation contains\nthe _real_ ground of the second one which followed; or, that by thinking\nthe first one the second one _became real_ for me. I merely remain\npassive, the placid scene upon which representations follow\nrepresentations, and am, on no account, the active principle which\nproduces them. Still I constantly assume the latter, and cannot\nrelinquish that assumption without relinquishing my self. What justifies\nme in it? In the sensuous ingredients I have mentioned, there is no\nground to justify such an assumption; hence it is a peculiar and\nimmediate consciousness, that is to say, a contemplation, and not a\nsensuous contemplation, which views a material and permanent being, but\na contemplation of a pure activity, which is not permanent but\nprogressive, not a being but a life.\n\nThe philosopher, therefore, discovers this intellectual contemplation as\nfact of consciousness, (for him it is a fact; for the original Ego a\nfact and act both together\u2014a deed-act,) and he thus discovers it not\nimmediately, as an isolated part of his consciousness, but by\ndistinguishing and separating what in common consciousness occurs in\nunseparated union.\n\nQuite a different problem it is to explain this intellectual\ncontemplation, which is here presupposed as fact, in its _possibility_,\nand by means of this explanation to defend it against the charge of\ndeception and deceptiveness, which is raised by dogmatism; or, in other\nwords, to prove the _faith_ in the reality of this intellectual\ncontemplation, from which faith transcendental idealism confessedly\nstarts\u2014by a something still higher; and to show up the interest which\nleads us to place faith in its reality, or in the system of Reason. This\nis accomplished by showing up the _Moral Law_ in us, in which the Ego is\ncharacterized as elevated through it above all the original\nmodifications, as impelled by an absolute, or in itself, (in the Ego,)\ngrounded activity; and by which the Ego is thus discovered to be an\nabsolute Active. In the consciousness of this law, which doubtless is an\nimmediate consciousness, and not derived from something else, the\ncontemplation of self-activity and freedom is grounded. _I am given to\nmyself through myself as something, which is to be active in a certain\nmanner; hence, I am given to myself through myself as something active\ngenerally; I have the life in myself, and take it from out of myself.\nOnly through this medium of the Moral Law do I see_ MYSELF; _and if I\nsee myself through that law, I necessarily see myself as self-active_;\nand it is thus that there arises in a consciousness\u2014which otherwise\nwould only be the consciousness of a sequence of my representations\u2014the\nutterly foreign ingredient of an _activity of myself_.\n\nThis intellectual contemplation is the only stand-point for all\nPhilosophy. From it all that occurs in consciousness may be explained,\nbut only from it. Without self-consciousness there is no consciousness\nat all; but self-consciousness is only possible in the way we have\nshown, i. e. I am only active. Beyond it I cannot be driven; my\nphilosophy then becomes altogether independent of all arbitrariness, and\na product of stern necessity; i. e. in so far as necessity exists for\nfree Reason; it becomes a product of _practical_ necessity. I _can_ not\ngo beyond this stand-point, because conscience says I _shall_ not go\nbeyond it; and thus transcendental idealism shows itself up to be the\nonly moral philosophy\u2014the philosophy wherein speculation and moral law\nare intimately united. Conscience says: I _shall_ start in my thinking\nfrom the pure Ego, and shall think it absolutely self-active; not as\ndetermined by the things, but as determining the things.\n\nThe conception of activity which becomes possible only through this\nintellectual contemplation of the self-active Ego, is the only one which\nunites both the worlds that exist for us\u2014the sensuous and the\nintelligible world. Whatsoever is opposed to my activity\u2014and I must\noppose something to it, for I am finite\u2014is the sensuous, and whatsoever\nis to arise through my activity is the intelligible (moral) world.\n\nI should like to know how those who smile so contemptuously whenever the\nwords \u201cintellectual contemplation\u201d is mentioned, think the consciousness\nof the moral law; or how they are enabled to entertain such conceptions\nas those of Virtue, of Right, &c., which they doubtless do entertain.\nAccording to them there are only two contemplations _a priori_\u2014Time and\nSpace. They surely form these conceptions of Virtue, &c., in Time, (the\nform of the inner sense,) but they certainly do not hold them to be time\nitself, but merely a certain filling up of time. What is it, then,\nwherewith they fill up time, and get a basis for the construction of\nthose conceptions? There is nothing left to them but Space; and hence\ntheir conceptions of Virtue, Right, &c., are perhaps quadrangular and\ncircular; just as all the other conceptions which they construct, (for\ninstance, that of a tree or of an animal,) are nothing but limitations\nof Space. But they do not conceive their Virtue and their Right in this\nmanner. What, then, is the basis of their construction? If they attend\nproperly, they will discover that this basis is activity in general, or\nfreedom. Both of these conceptions of virtue and right are to them\ncertain limitations of their general activity, exactly as their sensuous\nconceptions are limitations of space. How, then, do they arrive at this\nbasis of their construction? We will hope that they have not derived\nactivity from the dead permanency of matter, nor freedom from the\nmechanism of nature. They have obtained it, therefore, from immediate\ncontemplation, and thus they confess a third contemplation besides their\nown two.\n\nIt is, therefore, by no means so unimportant, as it appears to be to\nsome, whether philosophy starts from a fact or from a deed-act, (i. e.\nfrom an activity, which presupposes no object, but produces it itself,\nand in which, therefore, the _acting_ is immediately _deed_.) If\nphilosophy starts from a fact, it places itself in the midst of being\nand finity, and will find it difficult to discover therefrom a road to\nthe infinite and super-sensuous; but if it starts from a deed-act, it\nplaces itself at once in the point which unites both worlds and from\nwhich both can be overlooked at one glance.\n\n[Translators frequently use the term \u201cintuition\u201d for what I have here\ncalled \u201ccontemplation;\u201d \u201cDeed-Act\u201d is my rendering of \u201cThat-Handlung.\u201d\nA. E. K.]\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n NOTE. The same mistaking of one series of thinking in transcendental\n idealism for the other series, lies at the basis of the assertion,\n that besides the system of idealism, another realistic system is also\n possible as a logical and thorough system. The realism, which forces\n itself upon all, even the most decided idealist, namely, the\n assumption that things exist independently and outside of us, is\n involved in the idealistic system itself; and is moreover explained\n and deduced in that system. Indeed, the deduction of an objective\n truth, as well in the world of appearances as in the world of\n intellect, is the only purpose of all philosophy.\n\n It is the philosopher who says in _his own_ name: everything that is\n _for_ the Ego is also _through_ the Ego. But the Ego itself, in that\n philosopher\u2019s philosophy says: as sure as I am I, there exists outside\n of me a something, which exists _not_ through me. The philosopher\u2019s\n idealistic assertion is therefore met by the realistic assertion of\n the Ego in the same one system; and it is the philosopher\u2019s business\n to show from the fundamental principle of his philosophy how the Ego\n comes to make such an assertion. The philosopher\u2019s stand-point is the\n purely speculative; the Ego\u2019s stand-point in his system is the\n realistic stand-point of life and science; the philosopher\u2019s system is\n Science of Knowledge, whilst the Ego\u2019s system is common Science. But\n common Science is comprehensible only through the Science of\n Knowledge, the realistic system comprehensible only through the\n idealistic system. Realism forces itself upon us; but it has in itself\n no known and comprehensible ground. Idealism furnishes this ground,\n and is only to make realism comprehensible. Speculation has no other\n purpose than to furnish this comprehensibility of all reality, which\n in itself would otherwise remain incomprehensible. Hence, also,\n Idealism can never be a mode of thinking, but can only be\n _speculation_.\n\n\n\n\n NOTES ON MILTON\u2019S LYCIDAS.\n BY ANNA C. BRACKETT.\n\n\nEvery work of art, whether in sculpture, painting, or music, must have a\ndefinite content; and only in having such has it any claim to be so\ncalled. This content must be spiritual; that is, it must come from the\ninner spirit of the artist, and translate itself by means of the work\ninto spirit in the spectator or listener. Only in the recognition of\nthis inner meaning which lives behind the outside and shimmers through\nit, can consist the difference between the impression made on me by the\nsight of a beautiful painting, and that produced on an inferior animal,\nas the retina of his eye paints with equal accuracy the same object. For\nwhat is this sense of beauty which thrills through me, while the dog at\nmy side looks at the same thing and sees nothing in seeing all which the\neye can grasp? Is it not the response in me to the informing spirit\nbehind all the outward appearance?\n\nBut if this sense of beauty stops in passive enjoyment, if the sense of\nsight or of hearing is simply to be intoxicated with the feast spread\nbefore it, we must confess that our appreciation of beauty is a very\nsensuous thing. Content though some may be, simply to enjoy, in the\nminds of others the fascination of the senses only provokes unrest. We\nsay with Goethe: \u201cI would fain understand that which interests me in so\nextraordinary a manner;\u201d for this work of art, the product of mind,\ntouches me in a wonderful way, and must be of universal essence. Let me\nseek the reason, and if I find it, it will be another step towards \u201cthe\nsolvent word.\u201d\n\nAgain, in a true work of art this content must be essentially _one_;\nthat is, one profound thought to which all others, though they may be\nvisible, must be gracefully subordinate; otherwise we are lost in a\nmultiplicity of details, and miss the unity which is the sole sign of\nthe creative mind.\n\nNor need we always be anxious as to whether the artist consciously meant\nto say thus and so. Has there ever lived a true artist who has not\n\u201cbuilded better than he knew\u201d? If this were not so, all works of art\nwould lose their significance in the course of time. Are the\nhalf-uttered meanings of the statues of the Egyptian gods behind or\nbefore us to-day? Do they not perplex us with prophecies rather than\nremembrances as we wander amazed among them through the halls of the\nBritish Museum? A whole nation striving to say the one word, and dying\nbefore it was uttered! Have we heard it clearly yet?\n\nThe world goes on translating as it gains new words with which to carry\non the work. It is not so much the artist that is before his age as the\ndivine afflatus guiding his hand which leads not only the age but him.\nThrough that divine inspiration he speaks, and he says mysterious words\nwhich perhaps must wait for centuries to be understood. In that fact\nlies his right to his title; in that, alone, lies the right of his\nproduction to be called a work of art.\n\nDoubtless all readers are familiar with Dr. Johnson\u2019s criticisms on\nMilton\u2019s Lycidas, and these we might pass by without comment, for it\nwould evidently be as impossible for Dr. Johnson\u2019s mind to comprehend or\nbe touched by the poetry of Lycidas as for a ponderous sledge-hammer to\nbe conscious of the soft, perfume-laden air through which it might move.\nThe monody is censured by him because of its irregularly recurring\nrhymes, and in the same breath we are told that it is so full of art\nthat the author could not have felt sorrow while writing it. We know how\nintricately the rhymes are woven in Milton\u2019s sonnets, where he seems to\nhave taken all pains to select the most difficult arrangements, and to\ncarry them through without deviation, and we say only that the first\ncriticism contradicts the last. But some more appreciative critics,\nwhile touched by the beauty, repeat the same, and say there is \u201cmore\npoetry than sorrow\u201d in the poem. More poetry than sorrow! Sorrow is the\ngrand key note, and strikes in always over and through all the beauty\nand poetry like a wailing chord in a symphony, that is never absent\nlong, and ever and anon drowns out all the rest. Sorrow, pure and\nsimple, is the thread on which all the beautiful fancies are strung. It\nruns through and connects them all, and there is not a paragraph in the\nwhole poem that is not pierced by it. It is the occasion, the motive,\nthe inner inspiration, and the mastery over it is the conclusion of all.\nAround it, the constant centre, group themselves all the lovely\npictures, and they all face it and are subordinate to it.\n\nThe soul of the poet is so tossed by the immediate sorrow that it\nsurrenders itself entirely to it, and so, losing its will, is taken\npossession of by whatever thought, evoked by the spell of association,\nrises in his mind; as when he speaks of Camus and St. Peter. Ever and\nanon the will makes an effort to free itself and to determine its own\ncourse, but again and again the wave of sorrow sweeps up, and the vainly\nstruggling will goes down before it.\n\nNothing lay closer to Milton\u2019s heart than the interests of what he\nbelieved the true church; and nothing touched him more than the abuses\nwhich were then prevalent in the church of England. In the safe harbor\nof his father\u2019s country home, resting on his oars before the appointed\ntime for the race in which he was to give away all his strength and joy,\nsurrounded and inspired by the fresh, pure air from the granite rocks of\nPuritanism, all his growing strength was gathering its energies for the\nstruggle. This just indignation and honest protest must find its way in\nthe poem through the grief that sweeps over him, and which, because so\ndeep, touches and vivifies all his deepest thoughts. But even that\nstrong under current of conviction has no power long to steady him\nagainst the wave of sorrow which breaks above his head, none the less\npowerful because it breaks in a line of white and shivers itself into\ndrops which flash diamond colors in the warm and pure sunlight of his\ncultured imagination. More poetry than sorrow? Then there is more poetry\nin Lycidas than in any other poem of the same length in our language.\n\nIt would be impossible here to go through the poem with the close care\nto all little points which is necessary to enable one fully to\ncomprehend its exquisite beauty and finish. It is like one of\nBeethoven\u2019s symphonies, where at first we are so occupied with the one\ngrand thought that we surrender ourselves entirely to it, and think\nourselves completely satisfied. But as we appropriate that more and more\nfully, within and around it wonderful melodies start and twine, and this\nexperience is repeated again and again till the music seems almost\ninfinite in its content. Let us, then, briefly go over the burden of the\nmonody, our chief effort being to show how perfectly at one it is\nthroughout, how natural the seemingly abrupt changes,\u2014only pausing now\nand then to speak of some special beauty which is so marked that one\ncannot pass it by in silence. If we succeed in showing a continued and\nnatural thought in the whole and a satisfactory solution for the\ncollision which gives rise to the poem, our end will have been\naccomplished.\n\nMilton begins in due order by giving, as prelude, his reason for\nsinging. But he has written only seven full lines before, in the eighth,\nthe key-note is struck by the force of sorrow, which, after saying\n\u201cLycidas is dead,\u201d lingers on the strain and repeats, to heighten the\ngrief, \u201cdead ere his prime.\u201d The next line, the ninth, is still more\npathetic in its echoing repetition and its added cause for mourning. (In\npassing, let us say that the effect is greatly increased in reading this\nline if the first word be strongly emphasized.) Because he hath not left\nhis peer, all should sing for him. No more excuse is needed. Sorrow\npleases itself in calling up the neglected form, and then passionately\nturns to the only solace that it can have\u2014\u201cSome melodious tear.\u201d\n\nThis, of course, brings the image of the Muses, and as that thought\ncomes, once more we have a new attempt at a formal beginning in the\nsecond paragraph (line 15). First, is the invocation, and then,\nrecurring to the first thought, Milton says it is peculiarly appropriate\nfor _him_ to sing of Lycidas. Why? Because they had been so long\ntogether, and as the thought of happier things arises, the sweet\nmemories, linked by the chain of association, come thronging so\ntumultuously that he forgets himself in reverie. The music, at first\nslow and sweet, grows more and more strong and rapid till even the\nrustic dance-measure comes in merrily. Most naturally here the key-note\nis again struck by the force of contrast, and the despair of the sorrow\nthat wakes from the forgetfulness of pleasant dreams to the\nconsciousness of loss, strikes as rapidly its minor chords till it seems\nas if hope were entirely lost.\n\nNothing is more unreasonable than this despair of sorrow. Tossed in its\nown wild passion, it sees nothing clearly, and seeking for some adequate\ncause, heaps blindly unmerited reproaches on anything, on all things.\nSo, recoiling before its power, stung with its pain, the poet turns\nreproachfully to the nymphs, blaming them for their negligence. But\nbefore the words are fairly uttered he realizes his folly. Lycidas was\nbeloved by them, but if Calliope could not save even her own son, how\npowerless are they against the step of inevitable fate! This strikes\ndeep down in the thunder of the bass notes, and the thought comes which\nperhaps cannot be more powerfully expressed than by the old Hebrew\nrefrain, \u201cVanity of vanities, all is vanity.\u201d After all, why seek for\nanything, even for fame? Man\u2019s destiny is ruled by irresponsible\nnecessity. Life is worth nothing, and would it not be better, instead of\n\u201cscorning delights and living laborious days,\u201d to yield one\u2019s self to\nthe pleasures of the passing moment? \u201cAll is vanity and vexation of\nspirit.\u201d When any soul reaches this point, it seems as if help must come\nfrom outside of itself or it will go irrevocably down. Sorrow, despair,\nare always represented by darkness. Is it an accident that the celestial\nnotes which first strike through the descending bass, come from the god\nof light, Ph\u0153bus Apollo? Clear, and sweet, and sudden, they cleave the\nclosing shadows, the sunlight comes in again, and the music climbs up\nand grows serenely steady.\n\nRelieved from this Inferno the soul comes once more to\nself-consciousness, and in its effort to guide itself, what more natural\nthan that it should recur to the idea expressed in the fiftieth line,\nand attempt to make something like order by carrying out that idea.\nReason takes command, and the strain flows smoothly, till, by the\nexercise of her power, the true cause of the misfortune is recognized\nand a just indignation (line 100) takes its place. But in yielding to\nthis, the immediate feeling regains possession, reason resigns her sway,\nand the soul is set afloat again on the uncertain sea of association.\nSee how sudden and sweet the transition from fiery reproach and\ninvective to the gentlest tenderness, in line 102. It begins with a\nthunder peal and dies out in a wail of affection, expressed by the one\nword \u201csacred.\u201d This forms the connection between this paragraph and the\nnext, a delicate yet perfect link, for as all his love overflows in that\none word, the old happier days come up again; and where should these\nmemories carry him but to the university where they had found so much\ncommon pleasure and inspiration. Here the sorrow, before entirely\npersonal, becomes wider as the singer feels that others grieve with him\nfor lost talent and power.\n\nWere they not both destined for the church for which their university\nstudies were only a preparation? Most naturally the subtle chain of\nassociation brings up the thought of the great apostle with the keys of\nheaven and hell. How sorely the church needed true teachers! The earnest\nspirit that was ready to assail every form of wrong, eagerly followed\nout the thought which was in the future to burn into its very life. From\nline 113 to line 131 notice the succession of feelings. A sense of\nirreparable loss\u2014indignation\u2014mark the _three_ words, \u201ccreep,\u201d \u201cintrude,\u201d\nand \u201cclimb,\u201d no one of which could be spared. Then comes disgust,\nexpressed by \u201cBlind mouths.\u201d Ruskin, in his \u201cKings\u2019 Treasures,\u201d very\nhappily observes that no epithet could be more sweeping than this, for\nas the office of a bishop is to oversee the flock, and that of a pastor\nto feed it, the utter want of all qualification for the sacred office is\nhere most forcibly expressed. Contempt follows; then pity for those who,\ndesiring food, are fed only with wind; detestation of the secret and\ncorrupt practices of the Romish church; and finally hope, coming through\nthe possible execution of Archbishop Laud, whose death, it seemed to the\nyoung Puritan, was the only thing needed to bring back truth, simplicity\nand safety. Drifting with these emotions the singer has followed the\nlead of his fancies, and just as before, when light came with healing\nfor his despair, Hope recalls him to himself, till he returns again in\nline 132, as in line 85, to the regular style of his poem. He is as one\nwho, waking from wildering dreams, collects his fugitive thoughts, and\ntries to settle them down for the necessary routine of the day. A more\nregular and plainly accented strain, recognized as heard before, comes\ninto the music, as he pleases himself in fancying that the sad\nconsolation is still left him of ornamenting the hearse. It is useless\nto speak of the exquisite finish of these lines, or of how often one\nword, as \u201cfresh\u201d for instance, in line 138, calls up before the mind\nsuch pictures that one lingers and lingers over the passage, as the\npoet\u2019s fancy in vain effort lingered, striving to forget his sorrow.\nThis strain comes in like some of the repeating melodies in the second\npart of Beethoven\u2019s Fifth Symphony, where it seems as if the soul had\nfound a new, sweet thought, and was turning it over and over as loth to\npause, and as in sudden hope of some relief through its potency. But the\nheavy key-note strikes again through it all, in line 154, with a crash\nthat drowns all the sweetness and beauty. We hear the rush of the cruel,\ninsatiate sea, as its waves dash against the shore of the stormy\nHebrides, and the conflict of wave and wind takes possession of us. What\nthought is more desolate than that of a solitary human form, tossed\nhither and thither in the vast immensity of ocean! Perhaps, even now, it\nfloats by \u201cthe great vision of the guarded mount.\u201d It seems to the poet\nthat all should turn toward England in her sorrow, and it pains him to\nthink of St. Michael\u2019s steadfast eyes gazing across the waves of the bay\ntoward \u201cNamancos and Bayona\u2019s hold.\u201d \u201cRather turn hither and let even\nyour heavenly face relax with human grief, and ye, unheeding monsters of\nthe deep, have pity and bear him gently over the roughening waves.\u201d This\nhe says because he feels his own impotence. All the love he bears\nLycidas cannot serve him now; he is lost, and helpless, and alone, and\nuncared for. By opposition here, the light strikes in once more, and now\nwith a clearer, fuller glow than at either previous time. At first (line\n76) it came in the form of trust in \u201call-judging Jove\u201d; then (line 130)\nin hope, through belief in impersonal justice; now it takes the form of\nChristian faith. The music mounts higher and higher into celestial\nharmonies, losing entirely its original character, and sounds like a\nmajestic choral of triumph and peace.\n\nThis properly ends the poem with line 185. There is nothing more to be\nsaid. The tendency is all upward, and the collisions are overcome. One\nknows that here, and here for the first time, have we reached a movement\nthat is self-sustained. There is no more danger of being carried off our\nbasis by any wave of despairing sorrow. The soul has found a solution at\nlast, and it knows that it is a trustworthy one.\n\nThe music is finished; but now, that nothing may be wanting for perfect\neffect, we have the scenery added, and this in such word-painting as has\nnever been surpassed. Who could ever weary of line 187\u2014\u201cWhile the still\nmorn went out with sandals gray,\u201d\u2014either for its melody or for its\nsubtle appeal to our senses of hearing and sight? And the slowly growing\nand dying day! Who else has ever so \u201ctouched the tender stops\u201d of\nimagination?\n\nBut these woods and pastures are too full of haunting memories; we seek\nfor newer ones, where the soul, relieved from the associations which\nperpetually call up the loss of the human and now lifeless embodiment of\nspirit, shall be free to think only of the eternal holding and\npossessing which can be sundered by no accident of time or space.\n\n\n\n\n ANALYSIS OF HEGEL\u2019S \u00c6STHETICS.\n [Translated from the French of M. Ch. B\u00e9nard, by J. A. Martling.]\n Part II.\n OF THE GENERAL FORMS OF ART AND ITS HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT.\n\n\nThe first part of Hegel\u2019s \u00c6sthetics contains the questions relating to\nthe nature of art in general. The second unfolds its principal forms in\nthe different historic epochs. It is a species of philosophy of the\nhistory of art, and contains a great number of views and descriptions\nwhich cannot appear in this analysis. We shall take so much the more\ncare, without suffering ourselves to be turned aside by details, to\nindicate plainly the course of the ideas, and to omit nothing essential.\n\nThe idea of the Beautiful, or the Ideal, manifests itself under three\nessential and fundamental forms\u2014the _symbolic_, the _classic_, and the\n_romantic_. They represent the three grand epochs of history\u2014the\noriental, the Greek, and the modern.\n\nIn the East, thought, still vague and indeterminate, seeks its true\nexpression and cannot find it. In the presence of the phenomena of\nnature and of human life, spirit, in its infancy, incapable of seizing\nthe true sense of things, and of comprehending itself, exhausts itself\nin vain efforts to express certain grand, but confused or obscure\nconceptions. Instead of uniting and blending together in a harmonious\nwhole the content and the form, the idea and its image, it attains only\na rude and superficial approximation, and the result is the symbol with\nits enigmatic and mysterious meaning.\n\nIn classic art, on the contrary, this harmonious blending of the form\nand the idea is accomplished. Intelligence, having taken cognizance of\nitself and of its freedom, capable of self-control, of penetrating the\nsignificance of the phenomena of the universe, and of interpreting its\nlaws, finds here also the exact correspondence, the measure and the\nproportion which are the characteristics of beauty. Art creates works\nwhich represent the beautiful under its purest and most perfect form.\n\nBut spirit can not rest in this precise accord of the form and the idea,\nin which the infinite and the finite blend. When it comes to be\nreflected upon itself, to penetrate farther into the depths of its inner\nnature, to take cognizance of its spirituality and its freedom, then the\nidea of the infinite appears to it stripped of the natural forms which\nenvelop it. This idea, present in all its conceptions, can no longer be\nperfectly expressed by the forms of the finite world; it transcends\nthem, and then this unity, which constitutes the characteristic of\nclassic art, is broken. External forms, sensuous images, are no longer\nadequate to the expression of the soul and its free spirituality.\n\n\n I. Of Symbolic Art.\n\n\nAfter these general considerations, Hegel treats successively the\ndifferent forms of art. Before speaking of symbolic art, he furnishes an\nexposition of the _symbol_ in general.\n\nThe symbol is an image which represents an idea. It is distinguished\nfrom the signs of language in this, that between the image, and the idea\nwhich it represents, there is a natural relation, not an arbitrary or\nconventional one. It is thus that the lion is the symbol of courage; the\ncircle, of eternity; the triangle, of the Trinity.\n\nThe symbol, however, does not represent the idea perfectly, but by a\nsingle side. The lion is not merely courageous; the fox, cunning. Whence\nit follows that the symbol, having many meanings, is equivocal. This\nambiguity ceases only when the two terms are conceived separately and\nthen brought into relation; the symbol then gives place to _comparison_.\n\nThus conceived, the symbol, with its enigmatic and mysterious character,\nis peculiarly adapted to an entire epoch of history, to oriental art and\nits extraordinary creations. It characterizes that order of monuments\nand emblems by which the people of the East have sought to express their\nideas, and have been able to do it only in an equivocal and obscure\nmanner. These works of art present to us, instead of beauty and\nregularity, a strange, imposing, fantastic aspect.\n\nIn the development of this form of art in the East, many degrees are\nnoticeable. Let us first examine its origin.\n\nThe sentiment of art, like the religious sentiment or scientific\ncuriosity, is born of _wonder_. The man who is astonished at nothing\nlives in a state of imbecility and stupidity. This state ceases when his\nspirit, freeing itself from matter and from physical wants, is struck by\nthe spectacle of the phenomena of nature, and seeks their meaning, when\nit has the presentiment of something grand and mysterious in them, of a\nconcealed power which is revealed there.\n\nThen it experiences also the need of representing that inner sentiment\nof a general and universal power. Particular objects\u2014the elements, the\nsea, rivers, mountains\u2014lose their immediate sense and significance, and\nbecome for spirit images of this invisible power.\n\nIt is then that art appears; it arises from the necessity of\nrepresenting this idea by sensuous images, addressed at once to the\nsenses and the spirit.\n\nThe idea of an absolute power, in religions, is manifested at first by\nthe worship of physical objects. The Divinity is identified with nature\nitself. But this rude worship cannot endure. Instead of seeing the\nabsolute in real objects, man conceives it as a distinct and universal\nbeing; he seizes, although very imperfectly, the relation which unites\nthis invisible principle to the objects of nature; he fashions an image,\na symbol designed to represent it. Art is then the interpreter of\nreligious ideas.\n\nSuch is art in its origin; the symbolic form is born with it. Let us now\nfollow it in the successive stages of its development, and indicate its\nprogress in the East before it attained to the Greek ideal.\n\nThat which characterizes symbolic art is that it strives in vain to\ndiscover pure conceptions, and a mode of representation which befits\nthem. It is the conflict between the content and the form, both\nimperfect and heterogeneous. Hence the incessant struggle of these two\nelements of art, which vainly seek to harmonize. The stages of its\ndevelopment exhibit the successive phases or modes of this struggle.\n\nAt the outset, however, this conflict does not yet exist, or art is not\nconscious of it. The point of departure is a unity yet undivided, in\nwhose depths the discord between the two principles ferments. Thus the\ncreations of art, but little distinct from the objects of nature, are as\nyet scarcely symbols.\n\nThe end of this epoch is the disappearance of the symbol. It takes place\nby the reflective separation of the two terms. The idea being clearly\nconceived, the symbol on its side being perceived as distinct from the\nidea, from their conjunction arises the _reflex_ symbol, or the\ncomparison, the allegory, etc.\n\nThese principles having been laid down _a priori_, Hegel seeks among the\npeople of the East the forms of art which correspond to these various\ndegrees of oriental symbolism. He finds them chiefly among the ancient\nPersians, in India, and in Egypt.\n\n1. _Persian Art._\u2014At the first moment of the history of art, the divine\nprinciple, God, appears identified with nature and man. In the worship\nof the Lama, for example, a real man is adored as God. In other\nreligions the sun, the mountains, the rivers, the moon, and animals, are\nalso the objects of religious worship.\n\nThe spectacle of this unity of God and nature is presented to us in the\nmost striking manner in the life and religion of the ancient Persians,\nin the Zend-Avesta.\n\nIn the religion of Zoroaster, light is God himself. God is not\ndistinguished from light viewed as a simple expression, an emblem or\nsensuous image of the Divinity. If light is taken in the sense of the\ngood and just Being, of the conserving principle of the Universe, which\ndiffuses everywhere life and its blessings, it is not merely an image of\nthe good principle; the sovereign good itself is light. It is the same\nwith the opposition of light and darkness, the latter being considered\nas the impure element in every thing\u2014the hideous, the bad, the principle\nof death and destruction.\n\nHegel seeks to demonstrate this opinion by an analysis of the principal\nideas which form the content of the Zend-Avesta.\n\nAccording to him, the worship which the Zend-Avesta describes, is still\nless symbolic. All the ceremonies which it imposes as a religious duty\nupon the Parsees are those serious occupations that seek to extend to\nall, purity in the physical and moral sense. One does not find here any\nof those symbolic dances which imitate the course of the stars or any of\nthose religious acts which have no value except as images and signs of\ngeneral conceptions. There is, then, in it no art properly so-called.\nCompared with ruder images or with the insignificant idols of other\npeoples, the worship of light, as pure and universal substance, presents\nsomething beautiful, elevated, grand, more conformable to the nature of\nthe supreme good and of truth. But this conception remains vague; the\nimagination creates neither a profound idea nor a new form. If we see\nappearing general types, and the forms which correspond to them, it is\nthe result of an artificial combination, not a work of poetry and art.\n\nThus this unity of the invisible principle and visible objects,\nconstitutes only the first form of the symbol in art. To attain to the\nsymbolic form properly so-called, it is necessary that the distinction\nand the separation of the two terms appear clearly indicated and\nrepresented to us. It is this which takes place in the religion, art,\nand poetry of India, which Hegel calls the symbolic of the\n_imagination_.\n\n2. _Indian Art._\u2014The character of the monuments which betray a more\nadvanced form and a superior degree of art, is then the separation of\nthe two terms. Intelligence forms abstract conceptions, and seeks forms\nwhich express them. Imagination, properly so-called, is born; art truly\nbegins. It is not, however, yet the true symbol.\n\nWhat we encounter at first are the productions of an imagination which\nis in a state of complete ferment and agitation. In the first attempt of\nthe human spirit to separate the elements and to reunite them, its\nthought is still confused and vague. The principle of things is not\nconceived in its spiritual nature; the ideas concerning God are empty\nabstractions; at the same time the forms which represent Him bear a\ncharacter exclusively sensuous and material. Still plunged in the\ncontemplation of the sensuous world, having neither measure nor fixed\nrule to determine reality, man exhausts himself in useless efforts to\npenetrate the general meaning of the universe, and can employ, to\nexpress the profoundest thoughts, only rude images and representations,\nin which there flashes out the opposition between the idea and the form.\nThe imagination passes thus from one extreme to the other, lifting\nitself very high to plunge yet lower, wandering without support, without\nguide, and without aim, in a world of representations at once imposing,\nfantastic and grotesque.\n\nHegel characterizes the Indian mythology, and the art which corresponds\nto it, thus: \u201cIn the midst of these abrupt and inconsiderate leaps, of\nthis passage from one excess to another, if we find anything of grandeur\nand an imposing character in these conceptions, we see afterwards the\nuniversal being, precipitated into the most ignoble forms of the\nsensuous world. The imagination can escape from this contradiction only\nby extending indefinitely the dimensions of the form. It wanders amid\ngigantic creations, characterized by the absence of all measure, and\nloses itself in the vague or the arbitrary.\u201d\n\nHegel develops and confirms these propositions, by following the Indian\nimagination in the principal points which distinguish its art, its\npoetry, and its mythology. He makes it apparent that, in spite of the\nfertility, the splendor, and the grandeur of these conceptions, the\nIndians have never had a clear idea of persons and events\u2014a faculty for\nhistory; that in this continual mingling of the finite and the infinite,\nthere appears the complete absence of practical intelligence and reason.\nThought is suffered to run after the most extravagant and monstrous\nchimeras that the imagination can bring forth. Thus the conception of\nBrahma is the abstract idea of being with neither life nor reality,\ndeprived of real form and personality. From this idealism pushed to the\nextreme, the intelligence precipitates itself into the most unbridled\nnaturalism. It deifies objects of nature, the animals. The divinity\nappears under the form of an idiot man, deified because he belongs to a\ncaste. Each individual, because he is born in that caste, represents\nBrahma in person. The union of man with God is lowered to the level of a\nsimply material fact. Thence also the _r\u00f4le_ which the law of the\ngeneration of beings plays in this religion, which gives rise to the\nmost obscene representations. Hegel, at the same time, sets forth the\ncontradictions which swarm in this religion, and the confusion which\nreigns in all this mythology. He establishes a parallel between the\nIndian trinity and the Christian Trinity, and shows their difference.\nThe three persons of this trinity are not persons; each of them is an\nabstraction in relation to the others; whence it follows that if this\ntrinity has any analogy with the Christian Trinity, it is inferior to\nit, and we ought to be guarded against recognizing the Christian tenet\nin it.\n\nExamining next the part which corresponds to Greek polytheism, he\ndemonstrates likewise its inferiority; he makes apparent the confusion\nof those innumerable theogonies and cosmogonies which contradict and\ndestroy themselves; and where, in fine, the idea of natural and not of\nspiritual generation is uppermost, where obscenity is frequently pushed\nto the last degree. In the Greek fables, in the theogony of Hesiod in\nparticular, one frequently obtains at least a glimpse of a moral\nmeaning. All is more clear and more explicit, more strongly coherent,\nand we do not remain shut up in the circle of the divinities of nature.\n\nNevertheless, in refusing to Indian art the idea of the truly beautiful,\nand indeed of the truly sublime, Hegel recognizes that it offers to us,\nprincipally in its poetry, \u201cscenes of human life, full of attractiveness\nand sweetness, many agreeable images and tender sentiments, most\nbrilliant descriptions of nature, charming features of childlike\nsimplicity and artless innocence in love; at the same time,\noccasionally, much grandeur and nobleness.\u201d\n\nBut as to that which concerns fundamental conceptions in their totality,\nthe spiritual cannot disengage itself from the sensuous. We encounter\nthe most insipid triviality in connection with the most elevated\nsituations\u2014a complete absence of precision and proportion. The sublime\nis only the measureless; and as to whatever lies at the foundation of\nthe myth, the imagination, dizzy, and incapable of mastering the flight\nof the thought, loses itself in the fantastic, or brings forth only\nenigmas which have no significance for reason.\n\n3. _Egyptian Art._\u2014Thus the creations of the Indian imagination appear\nto realize only imperfectly the idea of the symbolic form itself. It is\nin Egypt, among the monuments of Egyptian art, that we find the type of\nthe true symbol. It is thus characterized:\n\nIn the first stage of art, we started from the confusion and identity of\ncontent and form, of spirit and nature. Next form and content are\nseparated and opposed. Imagination has sought vainly to combine them,\nand is successful only in making clear their disproportion. In order\nthat thought may be free, it is necessary that it get rid of its\nmaterial form\u2014that it destroy it. The _moment_ of destruction, of\nnegation, or annihilation, is then necessary in order that spirit arrive\nat consciousness of itself and its spirituality. This idea of death as a\n_moment_ of the divine nature is already contained in the Indian\nreligion; but it is only a changing, a transformation, and an\nabstraction. The gods are annihilated and pass the one into the other,\nand all in their turn into a single being\u2014Brahma, the universal being.\nIn the Persian religion the two principles, negative and positive\u2014Ormuzd\nand Ahriman\u2014exist separately and remain separated. Now this principle of\nnegation, of death and resurrection, as moments and attributes of the\ndivine nature, constitutes the foundation of a new religion; this\nthought is expressed in it by the forms of its worship, and appears in\nall its conceptions and monuments. It is the fundamental characteristic\nof the art and religion of Egypt. Thus we see the glorification of death\nand of suffering, as the annihilation of sensuous nature, appear in the\nconsciousness of peoples in the worships of Asia Minor, of Phrygia and\nPhoenicia.\n\nBut if death is a necessary \u201cmoment\u201d in the life of the absolute, it\ndoes not rest in that annihilation; this is, in order to pass to a\nsuperior existence, to arrive, after the destruction of visible\nexistence, by resurrection, at divine immortality. Death is only the\nbirth of a more elevated principle and the triumph of spirit.\n\nHenceforth, physical form, in art, loses its independent value and its\nseparate existence; still further, the conflict of form and idea ought\nto cease. Form is subordinated to idea. That fermentation of the\nimagination which produces the fantastic, quiets itself and is calm. The\nprevious conceptions are replaced by a mode of representation,\nenigmatic, it is true, but superior, and which offers to us the true\ncharacter of the symbol.\n\nThe idea begins to assert itself. On its side, the symbol takes a form\nmore precise; the spiritual principle is revealed more clearly, and\nfrees itself from physical nature, although it cannot yet appear in all\nits clearness.\n\nThe following mode of representation corresponds to this idea of\nsymbolic art: in the first place, the forms of nature and human actions\nexpress something other than themselves; they reveal the divine\nprinciple by qualities which are in real analogy with it. The phenomena\nand the laws of nature, which, in the different kingdoms, represent\nlife, birth, growth, death and the resurrection of beings, are\npreferred. Such are the germination and the growth of plants, the phases\nof the course of the sun, the succession of the seasons, the phenomena\nof the increase and decrease of the Nile, etc. Here, because of the real\nresemblance and of natural analogies, the fantastic is abandoned. One\nobserves a more intelligent choice of symbolic forms. There is an\nimagination which already knows how to regulate itself and to control\nitself\u2014which shows more of calmness and reason.\n\nHere then appears a higher conciliation of idea and form, and at the\nsame time an extraordinary tendency towards art, an irresistible\ninclination which is satisfied in a manner wholly symbolic, but superior\nto the previous modes. It is the proper tendency towards art, and\nprincipally towards the figurative arts. Hence the necessity of finding\nand fashioning a form, an emblem which may express the idea and may be\nsubordinated to it; of creating a work which may reveal to spirit a\ngeneral conception; of presenting a spectacle which may show that these\nforms have been chosen for the purpose of expressing profound ideas.\n\nThis emblematic or symbolic combination can be effected in various ways.\nThe most abstract expression is number. The symbolism of numbers plays a\nvery important part in Egyptian art. The sacred numbers recur\nunceasingly in flights of steps, columns, etc. There are, moreover,\nsymbolic figures traced in space, the windings of the labyrinth, the\nsacred dances which represent the movements of the heavenly bodies. In a\nhigher grade is placed the human form, already moulded to a higher\nperfection than in India. A general symbol sums up the principal idea;\nit is the ph\u0153nix, which consumes itself and rises from its ashes.\n\nIn the myths which serve for the transition, as those of Asia Minor\u2014in\nthe myth of Adonis mourned by Venus; in that of Castor and Pollux, and\nin the fable of Proserpine, this idea of death and resurrection is very\napparent.\n\nIt is Egypt, above all, which has symbolized this idea. Egypt is the\nland of the symbol. However, the problems are not resolved. The enigmas\nof Egyptian art were enigmas to the Egyptians themselves.\n\nHowever this may be in the East, the Egyptians, among eastern nations,\nare the truly artistic people. They show an indefatigable activity in\nsatisfying that longing for symbolic representation which torments them.\nBut their monuments remain mysterious and mute. The spirit has not yet\nfound the form which is appropriate to it; it does not yet know how to\nspeak the clear and intelligible language of spirit. \u201cThey were, above\nall, an architectural people; they excavated the soil, scooped out\nlakes, and, with their instinct of art, elevated gigantic structures\ninto the light of day, and executed under the soil works equally\nimmense. It was the occupation, the life of this people, which covered\nthe land with monuments, nowhere else in so great quantity and under\nforms so varied.\u201d\n\nIf we wish to characterize in a more precise manner the monuments of\nEgyptian art, and to penetrate the sense of them, we discover the\nfollowing aspects:\n\nIn the first place, the principal idea, the idea of death, is conceived\nas a \u201cmoment\u201d of the life of spirit, not as a principle of evil; this is\nthe opposite of the Persian dualism. Nor is there an absorption of\nbeings into the universal Being, as in the Indian religion. The\ninvisible preserves its existence and its personality; it preserves even\nits physical form. Hence the embalmings, the worship of the dead.\nMoreover, the imagination is lifted higher than this visible duration.\nAmong the Egyptians, for the first time, appears the clear distinction\nof soul and body, and the dogma of immortality. This idea, nevertheless,\nis still imperfect, for they accord an equal importance to the duration\nof the body and that of the soul.\n\nSuch is the conception which serves as a foundation for Egyptian art,\nand which betrays itself under a multitude of symbolic forms. It is in\nthis idea that we must seek the meaning of the works of Egyptian\narchitecture. Two worlds\u2014the world of the living and that of the dead;\ntwo architectures\u2014the one on the surface of the ground, the other\nsubterranean. The labyrinths, the tombs, and, above all, the pyramids,\nrepresent this idea.\n\nThe pyramid, image of symbolic art, is a species of envelope, cut in\ncrystalline form, which conceals a mystic object, an invisible being.\nHence, also, the exterior, superstitious side of worship, an excess\ndifficult to escape, the adoration of the divine principle in animals, a\ngross worship which is no longer even symbolic.\n\nHieroglyphic writing, another form of Egyptian art, is itself in great\npart symbolic, since it makes ideas known by images borrowed from\nnature, and which have some analogy with those ideas.\n\nBut a defect betrays itself, especially in the representations of the\nhuman form. In fact, though a mysterious and spiritual force is there\nrevealed, it is not true personality. The internal principle fails;\naction and impulse come from without. Such are the statues of Memnon,\nwhich are animate, have a voice, and give forth a sound, only when\nstruck by the rays of the sun. It is not the human voice which comes\nfrom within\u2014an echo of the soul. This free principle which animates the\nhuman form, remains here concealed, wrapped up, mute, without proper\nspontaneity, and is only animated under the influence of nature.\n\nA superior form is that of the Myth of Osiris, the Egyptian god, _par\nexcellence_\u2014that god who is engendered, born, dies and is resuscitated.\nIn this myth, which offers various significations, physical, historical,\nmoral, and religious or metaphysical, is shown the superiority of these\nconceptions over those of Indian art.\n\nIn general, in Egyptian art, there is revealed a profounder, more\nspiritual, and more moral character. The human form is no longer a\nsimple, abstract personification. Religion and art attempt to\nspiritualize themselves; they do not attain their object, but they catch\nsight of it and aspire to it. From this imperfection arises the absence\nof freedom in the human form. The human figure still remains without\nexpression, colossal, serious, rigid. Thus is explained those attitudes\nof the Egyptian statues, the arms stiff, pressed against the body,\nwithout grace, without movement, and without life, but absorbed in\nprofound thought, and full of seriousness.\n\nHence also the complication of the elements and symbols, which are\nintermingled and reflected the one in the other; a thing which indicates\nthe freedom of spirit, but also an absence of clearness and\ndefiniteness. Hence the obscure, enigmatic character of those symbols,\nwhich always cause scholars to despair\u2014enigmas to the Egyptians\nthemselves. These emblems involve a multitude of profound meanings. They\nremain there as a testimony of fruitless efforts of spirit to comprehend\nitself, a symbolism full of mysteries, a vast enigma represented by a\nsymbol which sums up all these enigmas\u2014the sphinx. This enigma Egypt\nwill propose to Greece, who herself will make of it the problems of\nreligion and philosophy. The sense of this enigma, never solved, and yet\nalways solving, is \u201cMan, _know thyself_.\u201d\u2014Such is the maxim which Greece\ninscribed on the front of her temples, the problem which she presented\nto her sages as the very end of wisdom.\n\n4. _Hebrew Poetry._\u2014In this review of the different forms of art and of\nworship among the different nations of the east, mention should be made\nof a religion which is characterized precisely by the rejection of all\nsymbol, and in this respect is little favorable to art, but whose poetry\nbears the impress of grandeur and sublimity. And thus Hegel designates\nHebrew Poetry by the title of _Art of the Sublime_. At the same time he\ncasts a glance upon Mahometan pantheism, which also proscribes images,\nand banishes from its temples every figurative representation of the\nDivinity.\n\nThe sublime, as Kant has well described it, is the attempt to express\nthe infinite in the finite, without finding any sensuous form which is\ncapable of representing it. It is the infinite, manifested under a form\nwhich, making clear this opposition, reveals the immeasurable grandeur\nof the infinite as surpassing all representation in finite forms.\n\nNow, here, two points of view are to be distinguished. Either the\ninfinite is the Absolute Being conceived by thought, as the immanent\nsubstance of things, or it is the Infinite Being as distinct from the\nbeings of the real world, but elevating itself above them by the entire\ndistance which separates it from the finite, so that, compared with it,\nthey are only pure nothing. God is thus purified from all contact, from\nall participation with sensuous existence, which disappears and is\nannihilated in his presence.\n\nTo the first point of view corresponds oriental pantheism. God is there\nconceived as the absolute Being, immanent in objects the most diverse,\nin the sun, the sea, the rivers, the trees, etc.\n\nA conception like this cannot be expressed by the figurative arts, but\nonly by poetry. Where pantheism is pure, it admits no sensuous\nrepresentation and proscribes images. We find this pantheism in India.\nAll the superior gods of the Indian mythology are absorbed in the\nAbsolute unity, or in Brahm. Oriental pantheism is developed in a more\nformal and brilliant manner in Mahometanism, and in particular among the\nPersian Mahometans.\n\nBut the truly sublime is that which is represented by Hebrew poetry.\nHere, for the first time, God appears truly as Spirit, as the invisible\nBeing in opposition to nature. On the other side, the entire universe,\nin spite of the richness and magnificence of its phenomena, compared\nwith the Being supremely great, is nothing by itself. Simple creation of\nGod, subject to his power, it only exists to manifest and glorify him.\n\nSuch is the idea which forms the ground of that poetry, the\ncharacteristic of which is sublimity. In the beautiful the idea pierces\nthrough the external reality of which it is the soul, and forms with it\na harmonious unity. In the sublime, the visible reality, where the\nInfinite is manifested, is abased in its presence. This superiority,\nthis exaltation of the Infinite over the finite, the infinite distance\nwhich separates them, is what the art of the sublime should express. It\nis religious art\u2014pre\u00ebminently, sacred art; its unique design is to\ncelebrate the glory of God. This r\u00f4le, poetry alone can fill.\n\nThe prevailing idea of Hebrew poetry is God as master of the world, God\nin his independent existence and pure essence, inaccessible to sense and\nto all sensuous representation which does not correspond to his\ngrandeur. God is the Creator of the universe. All gross ideas concerning\nthe generation of beings give place to that of a spiritual creation:\n\u201cLet there be light, and there was light.\u201d That sentence indicates a\ncreation by word\u2014expression of thought and of will.\n\nCreation then takes a new aspect, nature and man are no longer deified.\nTo the infinite is clearly opposed the finite, which is no longer\nconfounded with the divine principle as in the symbolic conceptions of\nother peoples. Situations and events are delineated more clearly. The\ncharacters assume a more fixed and precise meaning. They are human\nfigures which offer no more anything fantastic and strange; they are\nperfectly intelligible and accessible to us.\n\nOn the other side, in spite of his powerlessness and his nothingness,\nman obtains here freer and more independent place than in other\nreligions. The immutable character of the divine will gives birth to the\nidea of law to which man must be subject. His conduct becomes\nenlightened, fixed, regular. The perfect distinction of human and\ndivine, of finite and infinite, brings in that of good and evil, and\npermits an enlightened choice. Merit and demerit is the consequence of\nit. To live according to justice in the fulfilment of law is the end of\nhuman existence, and it places man in direct communication with God.\nHere is the principle and explanation of his whole life, of his\nhappiness and his misery. The events of life are considered as\nblessings, as recompenses, or as trials and chastisements.\n\nHere also appears the miracle. Elsewhere, all was prodigious, and, by\nconsequence, nothing was miraculous. The miracle supposes a regular\nsuccession, a constant order, and an interruption of that order. But the\nwhole entire creation is a perpetual miracle, designed for the\nglorification and praise of God.\n\nSuch are the ideas which are expressed with so much splendor, elevation\nand poetry, in the Psalms\u2014classic examples of the truly sublime\u2014in the\nProphets, and the sacred books in general. This recognition of the\nnothingness of things, of the greatness and omnipotence of God, of the\nunworthiness of man in his presence, the complaints, the lamentations,\nthe outcry of the soul towards God, constitute their pathos and their\nsublimity.\n\n\n Of the Reflex Symbol.\n\n\n_Fable, Apologue, Allegory, etc._\u2014We have run over the different forms\nwhich symbolism presents among the different people of the East, and we\nhave seen it disappear in the sublime, which places the infinite so far\nabove the finite that it can no longer be represented by sensuous forms,\nbut only celebrated in its grandeur and its power.\n\nBefore passing to another epoch of art, Hegel points out, as a\ntransition from the oriental symbol to the Greek ideal, a mixed form\nwhose basis is _comparison_. This form, which also belongs principally\nto the East, is manifested in different kinds of poetry, such as _the\nfable_, _the apologue_, _the proverb_, _allegory_, and _comparison_,\nproperly so-called.\n\nThe author develops in the following manner the nature of this form and\nthe place which he assigns to it in the development of art:\n\nIn the symbol, properly so-called, the idea and the form, although\ndistinct and even opposed, as in the sublime, are reunited by an\nessential and necessary tie; the two elements are not strangers to one\nanother, and the spirit seizes the relation immediately. Now the\nseparation of the two terms, which has already its beginning in the\nsymbol, ought also to be clearly effected, and find its place in the\ndevelopment of art. And as spirit works no longer spontaneously, but\nwith reflection, it is also in a reflective manner that it brings the\ntwo terms together. This form of art, whose basis is comparison, may be\ncalled the _reflexive symbolic_ in opposition to the _irreflexive_\nsymbolic, whose principal forms we have studied.\n\nThus, in this form of art, the connection of the two elements is no\nmore, as heretofore, a connection founded upon the nature of the idea;\nit is more or less the result of an artificial combination which depends\nupon the will of the poet, or his vigor of imagination, and on his\ngenius, for invention. Sometimes it starts from a sensuous phenomenon to\nwhich he lends a spiritual meaning, an idea, by making use of some\nanalogy. Sometimes it is an idea which he seeks to clothe with a\nsensuous form, or with an image, by a certain resemblance.\n\nThis mode of conception is clear but superficial. In the East it plays a\ndistinct part, or appears to prevail as one of the characteristic traits\nof oriental thought. Later, in the grand composition of classic or\nromantic poetry, it is subordinated; it furnishes ornaments and\naccessories, allegories, images and metaphors; it constitutes secondary\nvarieties.\n\nHegel then divides this form of art, and classes the varieties to which\nit gives rise. He distinguishes, for this purpose, two points of view:\nfirst, the case when the sensuous fact is presented first to spirit, and\nspirit afterwards gives it a signification, as in the _fable_, the\n_parable_, the _apologue_, the _proverb_, the _metamorphoses_; second,\nthe case where, on the other hand, it is the idea which appears first to\nthe spirit, and the poet afterwards seeks to adapt to it an image, a\nsensuous form, by way of comparison. Such are the _enigma_, the\n_allegory_, the _metaphor_, the _image_, and the _comparison_.\n\nWe shall not follow the author in the developments which he thinks\nnecessary to give to the analysis of each of these inferior forms of\npoetry or art.[2]\n\n\n II. Of Classic Art.\n\n\nThe aim of art is to represent the ideal, that is to say, the perfect\naccord of the two elements of the beautiful, the idea and the sensuous\nform. Now this object symbolic art endeavors vainly to attain. Sometimes\nit is nature with its blind force which forms the ground of its\nrepresentations; sometimes it is the spiritual Being, which it conceives\nin a vague manner, and which it personifies in inferior divinities.\nBetween the idea and the form there is revealed a simple affinity, an\nexternal correspondence. The attempt to reconcile them makes clearer the\nopposition; or art, in wishing to express spirit, only creates obscure\nenigmas. Everywhere there is betrayed the absence of true personality\nand of freedom. For these are able to unfold, only with the clear\nconsciousness of itself that spirit achieves. We have met, it is true,\nthis idea of the nature of spirit as opposed to the sensuous world,\nclearly expressed in the religion and poetry of the Hebrew people. But\nwhat is born of this opposition is not the Beautiful, it is the Sublime.\nA living sentiment of personality is further manifest in the East, in\nthe Arabic race. In the scorching deserts, in the midst of free space,\nit has ever been distinguished by this trait of independence and\nindividuality, which betrays itself by hatred of the stranger, thirst\nfor vengeance, a deliberate cruelty, also by love, by greatness of soul\nand devotion, and, above all, by passion for adventure. This race is\nalso distinguished by a mind free and clear, ingenious and full of\nsubtlety, lively, brilliant\u2014of which it has given so many proofs in the\narts and sciences. But we have here only a superficial side, devoid of\nprofundity and universality; it is not true personality supported on a\nsolid basis, on a knowledge of the spirit and of the moral nature.\n\nAll these elements, separate or united, cannot, then, present the Ideal.\nThey are antecedents, conditions, and materials, and, together, offer\nnothing which corresponds to the idea of real beauty. This ideal beauty\nwe shall find realized, for the first time, among the Greek race and in\nClassic art, which we now propose to characterize.\n\nIn order that the two elements of beauty may be perfectly harmonized, it\nis necessary that the first, the idea, be the spirit itself, possessed\nof the consciousness of its nature and of its free personality. If one\nis then asked, what is the form which corresponds to this idea, which\nexpresses the personal, individual spirit, the only answer is, _the\nhuman form_, for it alone is capable of manifesting spirit.\n\nClassic art, which represents free spirituality under an individual\nform, is then necessarily anthropomorphic. Anthropomorphism is its very\nessence, and we shall do it wrong to make of this a reproach. Christian\nart and the Christian religion are themselves anthropomorphic, and this\nthey are in a still higher degree since God made himself really man,\nsince Christ is not a mere divine personification conceived by the\nimagination, since he is both truly God and truly man. He passed through\nall the phases of earthly existence; he was born, he suffered, and he\ndied. In classic art sensuous nature does not die, but it has no\nresurrection. Thus this religion does not fully satisfy the human soul.\nThe Greek ideal has for basis an unchangeable harmony between the spirit\nand the sensuous form, the unalterable serenity of the immortal gods;\nbut this calm is somewhat frigid and inanimate. Classic art did not take\nin the true essence of the divine nature, nor penetrate the depths of\nthe soul. It could not unveil the innermost powers in their opposition,\nor re-establish their harmony. All this phase of existence, wickedness,\nmisfortune, moral suffering, the revolt of the will, gnawings and\nrendings of the soul, were unknown to it. It did not pass beyond the\nproper domain of sensuous beauty; but it represented it perfectly.\n\nThis ideal of classic beauty was realized by the Greeks. The most\nfavorable conditions for unfolding it were found combined among them.\nThe geographical position, the genius of that people, its moral\ncharacter, its political life, all could not but aid the accomplishment\nof that idea of classic beauty, whose characteristics are proportion,\nmeasure, and harmony. Placed between Asia and Europe, Greece realized\nthe accord of personal liberty and public manners, of the State and the\nindividual, of spirit general and particular. Its genius, a mixture of\nspontaneity and reflection, presented an equal fusion of contraries. The\nfeeling of this auspicious harmony pierces through all the productions\nof the Greek mind. It was the moment of youth in the life of humanity\u2014a\nfleeting age, a moment unique and irrevocable, like that of beauty in\nthe individual.\n\nArt attains then the culminating point of sensuous beauty under the form\nof plastic individuality. The worship of the Beautiful is the entire\nlife of the Greek race. Thus religion and art are identified. All forms\nof Greek civilization are subordinate to art.\n\nIt is important here to determine the new position of the artist in the\nproduction of works of art.\n\nArt appears here not as a production of nature, but as a creation of the\nindividual spirit. It is the work of a free spirit which is conscious of\nitself, which is self-possessed, which has nothing vague or obscure in\nits thought, and finds itself hindered by no technical difficulty.\n\nThis new position of the Greek artist manifests itself in content, form,\nand technical skill.\n\nWith regard to the content, or the ideas which it ought to represent, in\nopposition to symbolic art, where the spirit gropes and seeks without\npower to arrive at a clear notion, the artist finds the idea already\nmade in the dogma, the popular faith, and a complete, precise idea, of\nwhich he renders to himself an account. Nevertheless, he does not\nenslave himself with it; he accepts it, but reproduces it freely. The\nGreek artists received their subjects from the popular religion; which\nwas an idea originally transmitted from the East, but already\ntransformed in the consciousness of the people. They, in their turn,\ntransformed it into the sense of the beautiful; they both reproduced and\ncreated it.\n\nBut it is above all upon the form that this free activity concentrates\nand exercises itself. While symbolic art wearies itself in seeking a\nthousand extraordinary forms to represent its ideas, having neither\nmeasure nor fixed rule, the Greek artist confines himself to his\nsubject, the limits of which he respects. Then between the content and\nthe form he establishes a perfect harmony, for, in elaborating the form,\nhe also perfects the content. He frees them both from useless\naccessories, in order to adapt the one to the other. Henceforth he is\nnot checked by an immovable and traditional type; he perfects the whole;\nfor content and form are inseparable; he develops both in the serenity\nof inspiration.\n\nAs to the technical element, ability combined with inspiration belongs\nto the classic artist in the highest degree. Nothing restrains or\nembarrasses him. Here are no hindrances as in a stationary religion,\nwhere the forms are consecrated by usage; in Egypt, for example. And\nthis ability is always increasing. Progress in the processes of art is\nnecessary to the realization of pure beauty, and the perfect execution\nof works of genius.\n\nAfter these general considerations upon classic art, Hegel studies it\nmore in detail. He considers it 1st, in its development; 2d, in itself,\nas realization of the ideal; 3d, in the causes which have produced its\ndownfall.\n\n1. In what concerns the development of Greek art, the author dwells long\nupon the history and progress of mythology. This is because religion and\nart are confused. The central point of Greek art is Olympus and its\nbeautiful divinities.\n\nThe following are what are, according to Hegel, the principal stages of\nthe development of art, and of the Greek mythology.\n\nThe first stage of progress consists in a reaction against the Symbolic\nform, which it is interested in destroying. The Greek Gods came from the\nEast; the Greeks borrowed their divinities from foreign religions. On\nthe other hand, we can say they invented them: for invention does not\nexclude borrowing. They transformed the ideas contained in the anterior\ntraditions. Now upon what had this transformation any bearing? In it is\nthe history of polytheism and antique art, which follows a parallel\ncourse, and is inseparable from it.\n\nThe Grecian divinities are, first of all, moral personages invested with\nthe human form. The first development consists, then, in rejecting those\ngross symbols, which, in the oriental naturalism, form the object of\nworship, and which disfigure the representations of art. This progress\nis marked by the degradation of the animal kingdom. It is clearly\nindicated in a great number of ceremonies and fables of polytheism, by\nsacrifices of animals, sacred hunts, and many of the exploits attributed\nto heroes, in particular the labors of Hercules. Some of the fables of\n\u00c6sop have the same meaning. The metamorphoses of Ovid are also\ndisfigured myths, or fables become burlesque, of which the content, easy\nto be recognized, contains the same idea.\n\nThis is the opposite of the manner in which the Egyptians considered\nanimals. Nature, here, in place of being venerated and adored, is\nlowered and degraded. To wear an animal form is no longer deification;\nit is the punishment of a monstrous crime. The gods themselves are\nshamed by such a form, and they assume it only to satisfy the passions\nof the sensual nature. Such is the signification of many of the fables\nof Jupiter, as those of Dana\u00eb, of Europa, of Leda, of Ganymede. The\nrepresentation of the generative principle in nature, which constitutes\nthe content of the ancient mythologies, is here changed into a series of\nhistories where the father of gods and men plays a r\u00f4le but little\nedifying, and frequently ridiculous. Finally, all that part of religion\nwhich relates to sensual desires is crowded into the background, and\nrepresented by subordinate divinities: Circe, who changes men into\nswine; Pan, Silenus, the Satyrs and the Fauns. The human form\npredominates, the animal being barely indicated by ears, by little\nhorns, etc.\n\nAnother advance is to be noted in the _oracles_. The phenomena of\nnature, in place of being an object of admiration and worship, are only\nsigns by which the gods make known their will to mortals. These\nprophetic signs become more and more simple, till at last it is, above\nall, the voice of man which is the organ of the oracle. The oracle is\nambiguous, so that the man who receives it is obliged to interpret it,\nto blend his reason with it. In dramatic art, for example, man does not\nact solely by himself; he consults the gods, he obeys their will; but\nhis will is confounded with theirs; a place is reserved for his liberty.\n\nThe distinction between the _old_ and the _new_ divinities marks still\nmore this progress of moral liberty. Among the former, who personify the\npowers of nature, a gradation is already established. In the first\nplace, the untamed and lower powers, Chaos, Tartarus, Erebus; then\nUranus, Gea, the Giants and the Titans; in a higher rank, Prometheus, at\nfirst the friend of the new gods, the benefactor of men, then punished\nby Jupiter for that apparent beneficence; an inconsequence which is\nexplained through this, that if Prometheus taught industry to men, he\ncreated an occasion of discords and dissensions, by not giving them\ninstruction more elevated,\u2014morality, the science of government, the\nguarantees of property. Such is the profound sense of that myth, and\nPlato thus explains it in his dialogues.\n\nAnother class of divinities equally ancient, but already ethical,\nalthough they recall the fatality of the physical laws, are the\nEumenides, Dice, and the Furies. We see appearing here the ideas of\nright and justice, but of exclusive, absolute, strict, unconscious\nright, under the form of an implacable vengeance, or, like the ancient\nNemesis, of a power which abases all that is high, and re-establishes\nequality by levelling; a thing which is the opposite of true justice.\n\nFinally, this development of the classic ideal reveals itself more\nclearly in the _theogony_ and _genealogy_ of the gods, in their origin\nand their succession, by the abasement of the divinities of the previous\nraces; in the hostility which flashes out between them, in the\nresolution which has carried away the sovereignty from the old to place\nit in the hands of the new divinities. Meanwhile the distinction\ndevelops itself to the point of engendering strife, and the conflict\nbecomes the principal event of mythology.\n\nThis conflict is that of nature and spirit, and it is the law of the\nworld. Under the historic form, it is the perfecting of human nature,\nthe successive conquest of rights and property, the amelioration of laws\nand of the political constitution. In the religious representations, it\nis the triumph of the moral divinities over the powers of nature.\n\nThis combat is announced as the grandest catastrophe in the history of\nthe world: moreover, this is not the subject of a particular myth; it is\nthe principal, decisive fact, which constitutes the centre of this\nmythology.\n\nThe conclusion of all this in respect to the history of art and to the\ndevelopment of the ideal, is that art ought to act like mythology, and\nreject as unworthy all that is purely physical or animal, that which is\nconfused, fantastic, or obscure, all gross mingling of the material and\nthe spiritual. All these creations of an ill-regulated imagination find\nhere no more place; they must flee before the light of the Soul. Art\npurifies itself of all caprice, fancy, or symbolic accessory, of every\nvague and confused idea.\n\nIn like manner, the new gods form an organized and established world.\nThis unity affirms and perfects itself more in the later developments of\nplastic art and poetry.\n\nNevertheless, the old elements, driven back by the accession of moral\nforces, preserve a place at their side, or are combined with them. Such\nis, for example, the significance and the aim of the mysteries.\n\nIn the new divinities, who are ethical persons, there remains also an\necho, a reflex of the powers of nature. They present, consequently, a\ncombination of the physical and the ethical element, but the first is\nsubordinate to the second. Thus, Neptune is the sea, but he is besides\ninvoked as the god of navigation and the founder of cities; Apollo is\nthe Sun, the god of light, but he is also the god of spiritual light, of\nscience and of the oracles. In Jupiter, Diana, Hercules, and Venus, it\nis easy to discover the physical side combined with the moral sense.\n\nThus, in the new divinities, the elements of nature, after having been\ndebased and degraded, reappear and are preserved. This is also true of\nthe forms of the animal kingdom; but the symbolic sense is more and more\nlost. They figure no longer as accessories combined with the human form;\nbut are reduced to mere emblems or attributes\u2014indicating signs, as the\neagle by the side of Jupiter, the peacock before Juno, the dove near\nVenus, where the principal myth is no more than an accidental fact, of\nlittle importance in the life of the god, and which, abandoned to the\nimagination of the poets, becomes the text of licentious histories.\n\n2. After having considered the development of the ideal in Greek art, a\ndevelopment parallel to that of religion and mythology, we have to\nconsider it in its principal characteristics, such as it has emanated\nfrom the creative activity or from the imagination of the poet and the\nartist.\n\nThis mythology has its origin in the previous religions, but its gods\nare the creation of Homer and Hesiod. Tradition furnished the materials;\nbut the idea which each god ought to represent, and, besides, the form\nwhich expresses it in its purity and simplicity\u2014this is what was not\ngiven. This ideal type the poets drew from their genius, discovering\nalso the true form which befitted it. Thereby they were creators of that\nmythology which we admire in Greek art, and which is confounded with it.\n\nThe Greek gods have no less their origin in the spirit and the credences\nof the Greek people, and in the national belief; the poets were the\ninterpreters of the general thought, of what there was most elevated in\nthe imagination of the people. Henceforth, the artist, as we have seen\nabove, takes a position wholly different from that which he held in the\nEast. His inspiration is personal. His work is that of a free\nimagination, creating according to its own conceptions. The inspiration\ndoes not come from without; what they reveal is the ideas of the human\nspirit, what there is deepest in the heart of man. Also, the artists are\ntruly poets; they fashion, according to their liking, the content and\nthe form, in order to draw from them free and original figures.\nTradition is shorn, in their hands, of all that is gross, symbolic,\nrepulsive, and deformed; they eliminate the idea which they wish to\nillustrate, and individualize it under the human form. Such is the\nmanner, free, though not arbitrary, in which the Greek artists proceed\nin the creation of their works.\n\nThey are poets, but also prophets and diviners. They represent human\nactions in divine actions, and, reciprocally, without having the clear\nand decided distinctions. They maintain the union, the accord, of the\nhuman and the divine. Such is the significance of the greater part of\nthe apparitions of the gods in Homer, when the gods, for example,\nconsult the heroes, or interfere in the combats.\n\nMeanwhile, if we wish to understand the _nature of this ideal_, to\ndetermine, in a more precise manner, the character of the divinities of\nGreek art, the following remarks are suggested, considering them, at the\nsame time, on the _general_, the _particular_, and the _individual_\nsides.\n\nThe first attribute which distinguishes them is something general,\nsubstantial. The immortal gods are strangers to the miseries and to the\nagitations of human existence. They enjoy an unalterable calmness and\nserenity, from which they derive their repose and their majesty. They\nare not, however, vague abstractions, universal and purely ideal\nexistences. To this character of generality is joined individuality.\nEach divinity has his traits and proper physiognomy, his particular\nr\u00f4le, his sphere of activity, determined and limited. A just measure,\nmoreover, is here observed: the two elements, the general and the\nindividual, are in perfect accord.\n\nAt the same time, this moral character is manifested under an external\nand corporeal form itself, its most perfect expression, in which appears\nthe harmonious fusion of the external form with the internal principle\nanimating it.\n\nThis physical form, as well as the spiritual principle which is\nmanifested in it, is freed from all the accidents of material life, and\nfrom the miseries of finite existence. It is the human body with its\nbeautiful proportions and their harmony; all announces beauty, liberty,\ngrace. It is thus that this form, in its purity, corresponds to the\nspiritual and divine principle which is incarnate in it. Hence the\nnobleness, the grandeur, and the elevation of those figures, which have\nnothing in common with the wants of material life, and seem elevated\nabove their bodily existence. They are immortal divinities with human\nfeatures. The body, in spite of its beauty, appears as a superfluous\nappendage; and, nevertheless, it is an animated and living form which\npresents the indestructible harmony of the two principles, the soul and\nthe body.\n\nBut a contradiction presents itself between the spirit and the material\nform. This harmonious whole conceals a principle of destruction which\nwill make itself felt more and more. We may perceive in these figures an\nair of sadness in the midst of greatness. Though absorbed in themselves,\ncalm and serene, they lack freedom from care and inward satisfaction;\nsomething cold and impassive is found in their features, especially if\nwe compare them with the vivacity of modern sentiment. This divine\npeace, this indifference to all that is mortal and transient, forms a\ncontrast with the moral greatness and the corporeal form. These placid\ndivinities complain both of their felicity and of their physical\nexistence. We read upon their features the destiny which weighs them\ndown.\n\nNow, what is the particular art most appropriate to represent this\nideal? Evidently it is _sculpture_. It alone is capable of showing us\nthose ideal figures in their eternal repose, of expressing the perfect\nharmony of the spiritual principle and the sensuous form. To it has been\nconfided the mission of realizing this ideal in its purity, its\ngreatness, and its perfection.\n\nPoetry, above all, dramatic poetry, which makes the gods act, and draws\nthem into strife and combat contrary to their greatness and their\ndignity, is much less capable of answering this purpose.\n\nIf we consider these divinities in their particular, and no longer in\ntheir general character, we see that they form a plurality, a whole, a\ntotality, which is _polytheism_. Each particular god, while having his\nproper and original character, is himself a complete whole; he also\npossesses the distinctive qualities of the other divinities. Hence the\nrichness of these characters. It is for this reason that the Greek\npolytheism does not present a systematic whole. Olympus is composed of a\nmultitude of distinct gods, who do not form an established hierarchy.\nRank is not rigorously fixed, whence the liberty, the serenity, the\nindependence of the personages. Without this apparent contradiction, the\ndivinities would be embarrassed by one another, shackled in their\ndevelopment and power. In place of being true persons, they would be\nonly allegorical beings, or personified abstractions.\n\nAs to their sensuous representation, sculpture is, moreover, the art\nbest adapted to express this particular characteristic of the nature of\nthe gods. By combining with immovable grandeur the individuality of\nfeatures peculiar to each of them, it fixes in their statues the most\nperfect expression of their character, and determines its definite form.\nSculpture, here again, is more ideal than poetry. It offers a more\ndetermined and fixed form, while poetry mingles with it a crowd of\nactions, of histories and accidental particulars. Sculpture creates\nabsolute and eternal models; it has fixed the type of true, classic\nbeauty, which is the basis of all other productions of Greek genius, and\nis here the central point of art.\n\nBut in order to represent the gods in their true _individuality_, it\ndoes not suffice to distinguish them by certain particular attributes.\nMoreover, classic art does not confine itself to representing these\npersonages as immovable and self-absorbed; it shows them also in\nmovement and in action. The character of the gods then particularizes\nitself, and exhibits the special features of which the physiognomy of\neach god is composed. This is the accidental, positive, historic side,\nwhich figures in mythology and also in art, as an accessory but\nnecessary element.\n\nThese materials are furnished by history or fable. They are the\nantecedents, the local particulars, which give to the gods their living\nindividuality and originality. Some are borrowed from the symbolic\nreligions, which preserve a vestige thereof in the new creation; the\nsymbolic element is absorbed in the new myth. Others have a national\norigin, which, again, is connected with heroic times and foreign\ntraditions. Others, finally, spring from local circumstances, relating\nto the propagation of the myths, to their formation, to the usages and\nceremonies of worship, etc. All these materials fashioned by art, give\nto the Greek gods the appearance, the interest, and the charm, of living\nhumanity. But this traditional side, which in its origin had a symbolic\nsense, loses it little by little; it is designed only to complete the\nindividuality of the gods, to give to them a more human and more\nsensuous form, to add, through details frequently unworthy of divine\nmajesty, the side of the arbitrary and accidental. Sculpture, which\nrepresents the pure ideal, ought, without wholly excluding it in fact,\nto allow it to appear as little as possible; it represents it as\naccessory in the head-dress, the arms, the ornaments, the external\nattributes. Another source for the more precise determination of the\ncharacter of the gods is their intervention in the actions and\ncircumstances of human life. Here the imagination of the poet expands\nitself as an inexhaustible source in a crowd of particular histories, of\ntraits of character and actions, attributed to the gods. The problem of\nart consists in combining, in a natural and living manner, the actions\nof divine personages and human actions, in such a manner that the gods\nappear as the general cause of what man himself accomplishes. The gods,\nthus, are the internal principles which reside in the depths of the\nhuman soul; its own passions, in so far as they are elevated, and its\npersonal thought; or it is the necessity of the situation, the force of\ncircumstances, from whose fatal action man suffers. It is this which\npierces through all the situations where Homer causes the gods to\nintervene, and through the manner in which they influence events.\n\nBut through this side, the gods of classic art abandon, more and more,\nthe silent serenity of the ideal, to descend into the multiplicity of\nindividual situations, of actions, and into the conflict of human\npassions. Classic art thus finds itself drawn to the last degree of\nindividualization; it falls into the agreeable and the graceful. The\ndivine is absorbed in the finite which is addressed exclusively to the\nsensibility and no longer satisfies thought. Imagination and art,\nseizing this side and exaggerating it more and more, corrupt religion\nitself. The severe ideal gives place to merely sensuous beauty and\nharmony; it removes itself more and more from the eternal ideas which\nform the ground of religion and art, and these are dragged down to ruin.\n\n3. In fact, independently of the external causes which have occasioned\nthe _decadence_ of Greek art and precipitated its downfall, many\ninternal causes, in the very nature of the Greek ideal, rendered that\ndownfall inevitable. In the first place, the Greek gods, as we have\nseen, bear in themselves the germ of their destruction, and the defect\nwhich they conceal is unveiled by the representations of classic art\nitself. The plurality of the gods and their diversity makes them already\naccidental existences; this multiplicity cannot satisfy reason. Thought\ndissolves them and makes them return to a single divinity. Moreover, the\ngods do not remain in their eternal repose; they enter into action, take\npart in the interests, in the passions, and mingle in the collisions of\nhuman life. The multitude of relations in which they are engaged, as\nactors in this drama, destroys their divine majesty; contradicts their\ngrandeur, their dignity, their beauty. In the true ideal itself, that of\nsculpture, we observe something, the inanimate, impassive, cold, a\nserious air of silent mournfulness, which indicates that something\nhigher weighs them down\u2014destiny, supreme unity, blind divinity, the\nimmutable fate to which gods and men are alike subject.\n\nBut the principal cause is, that absolute necessity making no integral\npart of their personality, and being foreign to them, the particular\nindividual side is no longer restrained in its downward course; it is\ndeveloped more and more without hindrance and without limit. They suffer\nthemselves to be drawn into the external accidents of human life, and\nfall into all the imperfections of anthropomorphism. Hence the ruin of\nthese beautiful divinities of art is inevitable. The moral consciousness\nturns away from them and rejects them. The gods, it is true, are ethical\npersons, but under the human and corporeal form. Now, true morality\nappears only in the conscience, and under a purely spiritual form. The\npoint of view of the beautiful is neither that of religion nor that of\nmorality. The infinite, invisible spirituality is the divine for the\nreligious consciousness. For the moral consciousness, the good is an\nidea, a conception, an obligation, which commands the sacrifice of\nsense. It is in vain, then, to be enthusiastic over Greek art and\nbeauty, to admire those beautiful divinities. The soul does not\nrecognize herself wholly in the object of her contemplation or her\nworship. What she conceives as the true ideal is a God, spiritual,\ninfinite, absolute, personal, endowed with moral qualities, with\njustice, goodness, etc.\n\nIt is this whose image the gods of Greek polytheism, in spite of their\nbeauty, do not present us.\n\nAs to the _transition_ from the Greek mythology to a new religion and a\nnew art, it could no longer be effected in the domain of the\nimagination. In the origin of Greek art, the transition appears under\nthe form of a conflict between the old and the new gods, in the very\ndomain of art and imagination. Here it is upon the more serious\nterritory of history that this revolution is accomplished. The new idea\nappears, not as a revelation of art, nor under the form of myth and of\nfable, but in history itself, by the course of events, by the appearance\nof God himself upon earth, where he was born, lived, and arose from the\ndead. Here is a field of ideas which Art did not invent, and which it\nfinds too high for it. The gods of classic art have existence only in\nthe imagination; they were visible only in stone and wood; they were not\nboth flesh and spirit. This real existence of God in flesh and spirit,\nChristianity, for the first time, showed in the life and actions of a\nGod present among men. This transition cannot, then, be accomplished in\nthe domain of art, because the God of revealed religion is the real and\nliving God. Compared with him, his adversaries are only imaginary\nbeings, who cannot be taken seriously and meet him on the field of\nhistory. The opposition and conflict cannot, then, present the character\nof a serious strife, and be represented as such by Art or Poetry.\nTherefore, always, whenever any one has attempted to make of this\nsubject, among moderns, a poetic theme, he has done it in an impious and\nfrivolous manner, as in \u201cThe War of the Gods,\u201d by Parny.\n\nOn the other hand, it would be useless to regret, as has been frequently\ndone in prose and in verse, the loss of the Greek ideal and pagan\nmythology, as being more favorable to art and poetry than the Christian\nfaith, to which is granted a higher moral verity, while it is regarded\nas inferior in respect to art and the Beautiful.\n\nChristianity has a poetry and an art of its own; an ideal essentially\ndifferent from the Greek ideal and art. Here all parallel is\nsuperficial. Polytheism is anthropomorphism. The gods of Greece are\nbeautiful divinities under the human form. As soon as reason has\ncomprehended God as Spirit and as Infinite Being, there appear other\nideas, other sentiments, other demands, which ancient art is incapable\nof satisfying, to which it cannot attain, which call, consequently, for\na new art, a new poetry. Thus, regrets are superfluous; comparison has\nno more any significance, it is only a text for declamation. What one\ncould object to seriously in Christianity, its tendencies to mysticism,\nto asceticism, which, in fact, are hostile to art, are only\nexaggerations of its principle. But the thought which constitutes the\nground of Christianity, and true Christian sentiment, far from being\nopposed to art, are very favorable to it. Hence springs up a new art,\ninferior, it is true, in certain respects, to antique art\u2014in sculpture,\nfor example\u2014but which is superior in other respects, as is its idea when\ncompared with the pagan idea.\n\nIn all this, we are making but a _resum\u00e9_ of the ideas of the author. We\nmust do him the justice to say, that wherever he speaks of Christian\nart, he does it worthily, and exhibits a spirit free from all sectarian\nprejudice.\n\nIf we cast, meanwhile, a glance at the external causes which have\nbrought about this decadence, it is easy to discover them in the\nsituations of ancient society, which prophesy the downfall of both art\nand religion. We discover the vices of that social order where the state\nwas everything, the individual nothing by himself. This is the radical\nvice of the Greek state. In such an identification of man and the state,\nthe rights of the individual are ignored. The latter, then, seeks to\nopen for himself a distinct and independent way, separates himself from\nthe public interest, pursues his own ends, and finally labors for the\nruin of the state. Hence the egoism which undermines this society little\nby little, and the ever-increasing excesses of demagoguism.\n\nOn the other hand, there arises in the souls of the best a longing for a\nhigher freedom in a state organized upon the basis of justice and right.\nIn the meantime man falls back upon himself, and deserting the written\nlaw, religious and civil, takes his conscience for the rule of his acts.\nSocrates marks the advent of this idea. In Rome, in the last years of\nthe republic, there appears, among energetic spirits, this antagonism\nand this detachment from society. Noble characters present to us the\nspectacle of private virtues by the side of feebleness and corruption in\npublic morals.\n\nThis protest of moral consciousness against the increasing corruption\nfinds expression in art itself; it creates a form of poetry which\ncorresponds to it, _satire_.\n\nAccording to Hegel, _satire_, in fact, belongs peculiarly to the Romans;\nit is at least the distinctive and original characteristic, the salient\nfeature, of their poetry and literature. \u201cThe spirit of the Roman world\nis the dominance of the dead letter, the destruction of beauty, the\nabsence of serenity in manners, the ebbing of the domestic and natural\naffections\u2014in general, the sacrifice of individuality, which devotes\nitself to the state, the tranquil greatness in obedience to law. The\nprinciple of this political virtue, in its frigid and austere rudeness,\nsubdued national individualities abroad, while at home the law was\ndeveloped with the same rigor and the same exactitude of forms, even to\nthe point of attaining perfection. But this principle was contrary to\ntrue art. So one finds at Rome no art which presents a character of\nbeauty, of liberty, of grandeur. The Romans received and learned from\nthe Greeks sculpture, painting, music, epic lyric and dramatic poetry.\nWhat is regarded as indigenous among them is the comic farces, the\n_fescennines_ and _atellanes_. The Romans can claim as belonging to them\nin particular only the forms of art which, in their principle, are\nprosaic, such as the didactic poem. But before all we must place\nsatire.\u201d\n\n\n III. Of Romantic Art.\n\n\nThis expression, employed here to designate modern art, in its\nopposition to Greek or classic art, bears nothing of the unfavorable\nsense which it has in our language and literature, where it has become\nthe synonym of a liberty pushed even to license, and of a contempt for\nall law. Romantic art, which, in its highest development, is also\nChristian art, has laws and principles as necessary as classic art. But\nthe idea which it expresses being different, its conditions are also; it\nobeys other rules, while observing those that are the basis of all art\nand the very essence of the beautiful.\n\nHegel, in a general manner, thus characterizes this form of art,\ncontrasting it with antique art, the study of which we have just left.\n\nIn classic art, the spirit constitutes the content of the\nrepresentation; but it is combined with the sensuous or material form in\nsuch a manner that it is harmonized perfectly with it, and does not\nsurpass it. Art reached its perfection when it accomplished this happy\naccord, when the spirit idealized nature and made of it a faithful image\nof itself. It is thus that classic art was the perfect representation of\nthe ideal, the reign of beauty.\n\nBut there is something higher than the beautiful manifestation of spirit\nunder the sensuous form. The spirit ought to abandon this accord with\nnature, to retire into itself, to find the true harmony in its own\nworld, the spiritual world of the soul and the conscience. Now, that\ndevelopment of the spirit, which not being able to satisfy itself in the\nworld of sense, seeks a higher harmony in itself, is the fundamental\nprinciple of romantic art.\n\nHere beauty of form is no longer the supreme thing; beauty, in this\nsense, remains something inferior, subordinate; it gives place to the\nspiritual beauty which dwells in the recesses of the soul, in the depths\nof its infinite nature.\n\nNow in order thus to take possession of itself, it is essential that\nspirit have a consciousness of its relation to God, and of its union\nwith Him; that not only the divine principle reveal itself under a form\ntrue and worthy of it, but that the human soul, on its part, lift itself\ntoward God, that it feel itself filled with His essence, that the\nDivinity descend into the bosom of humanity. The anthropomorphism of\nGreek thought ought to disappear, in order to give place to\nanthropomorphism of a higher order.\n\nHence all the divinities of polytheism will be absorbed in a single\nDeity. God has no longer anything in common with those individual\npersonages who had their attributes and their distinct r\u00f4les, and formed\na whole, free, although subject to destiny.\n\nAt the same time God does not remain shut up in the depths of his being;\nhe appears in the real world also; he opens his treasures and unfolds\nthem in creation. He is, notwithstanding, revealed less in nature than\nin the moral world, or that of liberty. In fine, God is not an ideal,\ncreated by the imagination; he manifests himself under the features of\nliving humanity.\n\nIf we compare, in this respect, romantic art with classic art, we see\nthat Sculpture no longer suffices to express this idea. We should vainly\nseek in the image of the gods fashioned by sculpture that which\nannounces the true personality, the clear consciousness of self and\nreflected will. In the external this defect is betrayed by the absence\nof the eye, that mirror of the soul. Sculpture is deprived of the\nglance, the ray of the soul emanating from within. On the other hand,\nthe spirit entering into relation with external objects, this immobility\nof sculpture no longer responds to the longing for activity, which calls\nfor exercise in a more extended career. The representation ought to\nembrace a vaster field of objects, and of physical and moral situations.\n\nAs to the manner in which this principle is developed and realized,\nromantic art presents certain striking differences from antique art.\n\nIn the first place, as has been said, instead of the ideal divinities,\nwhich exist only for the imagination, and are only human nature\nidealized, it is God himself who makes himself man, and passes through\nall the phases of human life, birth, suffering, death, and resurrection.\nSuch is the fundamental idea which art represents, even in the circle of\nreligion.\n\nThe result of this religious conception is to give also to art, as the\nprincipal ground of its representations, strife, conflict, sorrow and\ndeath, the profound grief which the nothingness of life, physical and\nmoral suffering, inspire. Is not all this, in fact, an essential part of\nthe history of the God-Man, who must be presented as a model to\nhumanity? Is it not the means of being drawn near to God, of resembling\nhim, and of being united to him? Man ought then to strip off his finite\nnature, to renounce that which is a mere nothing, and, through this\nnegation of the real life, propose to himself the attainment of what God\nrealized in his mortal life.\n\nThe infinite sorrow of this sacrifice, this idea of suffering and of\ndeath, which were almost banished from classic art, find, for the first\ntime, their necessary place in Christian art. Among the Greeks death has\nno seriousness, because man attaches no great importance to his\npersonality and his spiritual nature. On the other hand, now that the\nsoul has an infinite value, death becomes terrible. Terror in the\npresence of death and the annihilation of our being, is imprinted\nstrongly on our souls. So also among the Greeks, especially before the\ntime of Socrates, the idea of immortality was not profound; they\nscarcely conceived of life as separable from physical existence. In the\nChristian faith, on the contrary, death is only the resurrection of the\nspirit, the harmony of the soul with itself, the true life. It is only\nby freeing itself from the bonds of its earthly existence that it can\nenter upon the possession of its true nature.\n\nSuch are the principal ideas which form the religious ground of romantic\nor Christian Art. In spite of some explanations which recall the special\nsystem of the author, one cannot deny that they are expressed with power\nand truthfulness.\n\nMeanwhile, beyond the religious sphere, there are developing certain\ninterests which belong to the mundane life, and which form also the\nobject of the representations of art; they are the passions, the\ncollisions, the joys and the sufferings which bear a terrestrial or\npurely human character, but in which appear notwithstanding the very\nprinciple which distinguishes modern thought, to-wit: a more vivid, more\nenergetic, and more profound sentiment of human _personality_, or, as\nthe author calls it, _subjectivity_.\n\nRomantic art differs no less from classic art in the form or the mode of\nrepresentation, than in the ideas which constitute the content of its\nworks. And, in the first place, one necessary consequence of the\npreceding principle is, the new point of view under which nature or the\nphysical world is viewed. The objects of nature lose their importance;\nor, at least, they cease to be divine. They have neither the symbolic\nsignification which oriental art gave them, nor the particular aspect in\nvirtue of which they were animated and personified in Greek art and\nmythology. Nature is effaced; she retires to a lower plane; the universe\nis condensed to a single point, in the focus of the human soul. That,\nabsorbed in a single thought, the thought of uniting itself to God,\nbeholds the world vanish, or regards it with an indifferent eye. We see\nalso appearing a heroism wholly different from antique heroism, a\nheroism of submission and resignation.\n\nBut, on the other hand, precisely through the very fact, that all is\nconcentrated in the focus of the human soul, the circle of ideas is\nfound to be infinitely enlarged. The interior history of the soul is\ndeveloped under a thousand diverse forms, borrowed from human life. It\nbeams forth, and art seizes anew upon nature, which serves as adornment\nand as a theatre for the activity of the spirit. Hence the history of\nthe human heart becomes infinitely richer than it was in ancient art and\npoetry. The increasing multitude of situations, of interests, and of\npassions, forms a domain as much more vast as spirit has descended\nfarther into itself. All degrees, all phases of life, all humanity and\nits developments, become inexhaustible material for the representations\nof art.\n\nNevertheless, art occupies here only a secondary place; as it is\nincapable of revealing the content of the dogma, religion constitutes\nstill more its essential basis. There is therefore preserved the\npriority and superiority which faith claims over the conceptions of the\nimagination.\n\nFrom this there results an important consequence and a characteristic\ndifference for modern art. It is that in the representation of sensuous\nforms, art no longer fears to admit into itself the real with its\nimperfections and its faults. The beautiful is no longer the essential\nthing; the ugly occupies a much larger place in its creations. Here,\nthen, vanishes that ideal beauty which elevates the forms of the real\nworld above the mortal condition, and replaces it with blooming youth.\nThis free vitality in its infinite calmness\u2014this divine breath which\nanimates matter\u2014romantic art has no longer, for essential aim, to\nrepresent these. On the contrary, it turns its back on this culminating\npoint of classic beauty; it accords, indeed, to the ugly a limitless\nr\u00f4le in its creations. It permits all objects to pass into\nrepresentation in spite of their accidental character. Nevertheless,\nthose objects which are indifferent or commonplace, have value only so\nfar as the sentiments of the soul are reflected in them. But at the\nhighest point of its development art expresses only spirit\u2014pure,\ninvisible spirituality. We feel that it seeks to strip itself of all\nexternal forms, to mount into a region superior to sense, where nothing\nstrikes the eye, where no sound longer vibrates upon the ear.\n\nFurthermore, we can say, on comparing in this respect ancient with\nmodern art, that the fundamental trait of romantic or Christian art is\nthe musical element, the lyric accent in poetry. The lyric accent\nresounds everywhere, even in epic and dramatic poetry. In the figurative\narts this characteristic makes itself felt, as a breath of the soul and\nan atmosphere of feeling.\n\nAfter having thus determined the general character of romantic art,\nHegel studies it more in detail; he considers it, successively, under a\ntwo-fold point of view, the religious and the profane; he follows it in\nits development, and points out the causes which have brought about its\ndecadence. He concludes by some considerations upon the present state of\nart and its future.\n\nLet us analyze rapidly the principal ideas contained in these chapters.\n\n1st. As to what concerns the religious side, which we have thus far been\nconsidering, Hegel, developing its principle, establishes a parallel\nbetween the religious idea in classic and romantic art; for romantic art\nhas also its ideal, which, as we have seen already, differs essentially\nfrom the antique idea.\n\nGreek beauty shows the soul wholly identified with the corporeal form.\nIn romantic art beauty no more resides in the idealization of the\nsensuous form, but in the soul itself. Undoubtedly one ought still to\ndemand a certain agreement between the reality and the idea; but the\ndeterminate form is indifferent, it is not purified from all the\naccidents of real existence. The immortal gods in presenting themselves\nto our eyes under the human form, do not partake of its wants and\nmiseries. On the contrary, the God of Christian art is not a solitary\nGod, a stranger to the conditions of mortal life; he makes himself man,\nand shares the miseries and the sufferings of humanity. The\nrepresentation of religious love is the most favorable subject for the\nbeautiful creations of Christian art.\n\nThus, in the first place, love in God is represented by the history of\nChrist\u2019s _redemption_, by the various phases of his life, of his\npassion, of his death, and of his resurrection. In the second place,\nlove in man, the union of the human soul with God, appears in the holy\nfamily, in the maternal love of the Virgin, and in the love of the\ndisciples. Finally, love in humanity is manifested by the spirit of the\nChurch, that is to say, by the Spirit of God present in the society of\nthe faithful, by the return of humanity to God, death to terrestrial\nlife, martyrdom, repentance and conversion, the miracles and the\nlegends.\n\nSuch are the principal subjects which form the ground of religious art.\nIt is the Christian ideal in whatever in it is most elevated. Art seizes\nit and seeks to express it\u2014but does this only imperfectly. Art is here\nnecessarily surpassed by the religious thought, and ought to recognize\nits own insufficiency.\n\nIf we pass from the religious to the _profane ideal_, it presents itself\nto us under two different forms. The one, although representing human\npersonality, yet develops noble and elevated sentiments, which combine\nwith moral or religious ideas. The other shows us only persons who\ndisplay, in the pursuit of purely human and positive interests,\nindependence and energy of character. The first is represented by\nchivalry. When we come to examine the nature and the principle of the\nchivalric ideal, we see that what constitutes its content is, in fact,\n_personality_. Here, man abandons the state of inner sanctification, the\ncontemplative for the active life. He casts his eyes about him and seeks\na theatre for his activity. The fundamental principle is always the\nsame, the soul, the human person, pursuing the infinite. But it turns\ntoward another sphere, that of action and real life. The Ego is replete\nwith self only, with its individuality, which, in its eyes, is of\ninfinite value. It attaches little importance to general ideas, to\ninterests, to enterprises which have for object general order. Three\nsentiments, in the main, present this personal and individual character,\n_honor_, _love_, and _fidelity_. Moreover, separate or united, they\nform, aside from the religious relationships which can be reflected in\nthem, the true content of chivalry.\n\nThe author analyzes these three sentiments; he shows in what they differ\nfrom the analogous sentiments or qualities in antique art. He endeavors,\nabove all, to prove that they represent, in fact, the side of human\npersonality, with its infinite and ideal character. Thus honor does not\nresemble bravery, which exposes itself for a common cause. Honor fights\nonly to make itself known or respected, to guarantee the inviolability\nof the individual person. In like manner _love_, also, which constitutes\nthe centre of the circle, is only the accidental passion of one person\nfor another person. Even when this passion is idealized by the\nimagination and ennobled by depth of sentiment, it is not yet the\nethical bond of the family and of marriage. Fidelity presents the moral\ncharacter in a higher degree, since it is disinterested; but it is not\naddressed to the general good of society in itself; it attaches itself\nexclusively to the person of a master. Chivalric fidelity understands\nperfectly well, besides, how to preserve its advantages and its rights,\nthe independence and the honor of the person, who is always only\nconditionally bound. The basis of these three sentiments is, then, free\npersonality. This is the most beautiful part of the circle which is\nfound beyond religion, properly so-called. All here has for immediate\nend, man, with whom we can sympathize through the side of personal\nindependence. These sentiments are, moreover, susceptible of being\nplaced in connection with religion in a multitude of ways, as they are\nable to preserve their independent character.\n\n\u201cThis form of romantic art was developed in the East and in the West,\nbut especially in the West, that land of reflection, of the\nconcentration of the spirit upon itself. In the East was accomplished\nthe first expansion of liberty, the first attempt toward enfranchisement\nfrom the finite. It was Mahometanism which first swept from the ancient\nsoil all idolatry, and religions born of the imagination. But it\nabsorbed this internal liberty to such a degree that the entire world\nfor it was effaced; plunged in an intoxication of ecstacy, the oriental\ntastes in contemplation the delights of love, calmness, and felicity.\u201d\n(Page 456.)\n\n3. We have seen human personality developing itself upon the theatre of\nreal life, and there displaying noble, generous sentiments, such as\nhonor, love and fidelity. Meanwhile it is in the sphere of real life and\nof purely human interests that liberty and independence of character\nappear to us. The ideal here consists only in energy and perseverance of\nwill, and passion as well as _independence of character_. Religion and\nchivalry disappear with their high conceptions, their noble sentiments,\nand their thoroughly ideal objects. On the contrary, what characterizes\nthe new wants, is the thirst for the joys of the present life, the\nardent pursuit of human interests in what in them is actual, determined,\nor positive. In like manner, in the figurative arts, man wishes objects\nto be represented in their palpable and visible reality.\n\nThe destruction of classic art commenced with the predominance of the\nagreeable, and it ended with satire. Romantic art ends in the\nexaggeration of the principle of personality, deprived of a substantial\nand moral content, and thenceforth abandoned to caprice, to the\narbitrary, to fancy and excess of passion. There is left further to the\nimagination of the poet only to paint forcibly and with depth these\ncharacters; to the artist, only to imitate the real; to the spirit, to\nexhibit its rigor in piquant combinations and contrasts.\n\nThis tendency is revealed under three principal forms: 1st,\n_Independence of individual character_, pursuing its proper ends, its\nparticular designs, without moral or religious aim; 2d, the exaggeration\nof the chivalric principle, and the spirit of _adventure_; 3d, the\nseparation of the elements, the union of which constitutes the very idea\nof art, through the destruction of art itself,\u2014that is to say, the\npredilection for common reality, _the imitation of the real_, mechanical\nability, caprice, fancy, and _humor_.\n\nThe first of these three points furnishes to Hegel the occasion for a\nremarkable estimate of the characters of Shakspeare, which represent, in\nan eminent degree, this phase of the Romantic ideal. The distinctive\ntrait of character of the _dramatis person\u00e6_ of Shakspeare is, in fact,\nthe energy and obstinate perseverance of a will which is exclusively\ndevoted to a specific end, and concentrates all its efforts for the\npurpose of realizing it. There is here no question either of religion or\nof moral ideas. They are characters placed singly face to face with each\nother, and their designs, which they have spontaneously conceived, and\nthe execution of which they pursue with the unyielding obstinacy of\npassion. Macbeth, Othello, Richard III., are such characters. Others, as\nRomeo, Juliet, and Miranda, are distinguished by an absorption of soul\nin a unique, profound, but purely personal sentiment, which furnishes\nthem an occasion for displaying an admirable wealth of qualities. The\nmost restricted and most common, still interest us by a certain\nconsistency in their acts, a certain brilliancy, an enthusiasm, a\nfreedom of imagination, a spirit superior to circumstances, which causes\nus to overlook whatever there is common in their action and discourse.\n\nBut this class, where Shakspeare excels, is extremely difficult to\ntreat. To writers of mediocrity, the quicksand is inevitable. They risk,\nin fact, falling into the insipid, the insignificant, the trivial, or\nthe repulsive, as a crowd of imitators have proven.\n\nIt has been vouchsafed only to a few great masters to possess enough\ngenius and taste to seize here the true and the beautiful, to redeem the\ninsignificance or vulgarity of the content by enthusiasm and talent, by\nthe force and energy of their pencil and by a profound knowledge of\nhuman passions.\n\nOne of the characteristics of romantic art is, that, in the religious\nsphere, the soul, finding for itself satisfaction in itself, has no need\nto develop itself in the external world. On the other hand, when the\nreligious idea no longer makes itself felt, and when the free will is no\nlonger dependent, except on itself, the _dramatis person\u00e6_ pursue aims\nwholly individual in a world where all appears arbitrary and accidental,\nand which seems abandoned to itself and delivered up to chance. In its\nirregular pace, it presents a complication of events, which intermingle\nwithout order and without cohesion.\n\nMoreover, this is the form which events affect in romantic, in\nopposition to classic art, where the actions and events are bound to a\ncommon end, to a true and necessary principle which determines the form,\nthe character, and the mode of development of external circumstances. In\nromantic art, also, we find general interests, moral ideas; but they do\nnot ostensibly determine events; they are not the ordering and\nregulating principle. These events, on the contrary, preserve their free\ncourse, and affect an accidental form.\n\nSuch is the character of the greater part of the grand events in the\nmiddle ages, the crusades, for example, which the author names for this\nreason, and which were the grand adventures of the Christian world.\n\nWhatever may be the judgment which one forms upon the crusades and the\ndifferent motives which caused them to be undertaken, it cannot be\ndenied, that with an elevated religious aim\u2014the deliverance of the holy\nsepulchre\u2014there were mingled other interested and material motives, and\nthat the religious and the profane aim did not contradict nor corrupt\nthe other. As to their general form, the crusades present utter absence\nof unity. They are undertaken by masses, by multitudes, who enter upon a\nparticular expedition according to their good pleasure, and their\nindividual caprice. The lack of unity, the absence of plan and\ndirection, causes the enterprises to fail, and the efforts and endeavors\nare wasted in individual exploits.\n\nIn another domain, that of profane life, the road is open also to a\ncrowd of adventurers, whose object is more or less imaginary, and whose\nprinciple is love, honor, or fidelity. To battle for the glory of a\nname, to fly to the succor of innocence, to accomplish the most\nmarvellous things for the honor of one\u2019s lady, such is the motive of the\ngreater part of the beautiful exploits which the romances of chivalry or\nthe poems of this epoch and subsequent epochs celebrate.\n\nThese vices of chivalry cause its ruin. We find the most faithful\npicture of it in the poems of Ariosto and Cervantes.\n\nBut what best marks the destruction of romantic art and of chivalry is\nthe _modern romance_, that form of literature which takes their place.\nThe romance is chivalry applied to real life; it is a protest against\nthe real, it is the ideal in a society where all is fixed, regulated in\nadvance by laws, by usages contrary to the free development of the\nnatural longings and sentiments of the soul; it is the chivalry of\ncommon life. The same principle which caused a search for adventures\nthrows the personages into the most diverse and the most extraordinary\nsituations. The imagination, disgusted with that which is, cuts out for\nitself a world according to its fancy, and creates for itself an ideal\nwherein it can forget social customs, laws, positive interests. The\nyoung men and young women, above all, feel the want of such aliment for\nthe heart, or of such distraction against _ennui_. Ripe age succeeds\nyouth; the young man marries and enters upon positive interests. Such is\nalso the _d\u00e9no\u00fbement_ of the greater part of romances, where prose\nsucceeds poetry, the real, the ideal.\n\nThe destruction of romantic art is announced by symptoms still more\nstriking, by the _imitation of the real_, and the appearance of the\n_humorous_ style, which occupies more and more space in art and\nliterature. The artist and the poet can there display much talent,\nenthusiasm and spirit; but these two styles are no less striking indexes\nof an epoch of decadence.\n\nIt is, above all, the humorous style which marks this decadence, by the\nabsence of all fixed principle and all rule. It is a pure play of the\nimagination which combines, according to its liking, the most different\nobjects, alters and overturns relations, tortures itself to discover\nnovel and extraordinary conceptions. The author places himself above the\nsubject, regards himself as freed from all conditions imposed by the\nnature of the content as well as the form, and imagines that all depends\non his wit and the power of his genius. It is to be observed, that what\nHegel calls the downfall of art in general, and of romantic art in\nparticular, is precisely what we call the romantic school in the art and\nliterature of our time.\n\nSuch are the fundamental forms which art presents in its historic\ndevelopment. If the art of the _renaissance_, or modern art properly so\ncalled, finds no place in this sketch, it is because it does not\nconstitute an original and fundamental form. The _renaissance_ is a\nreturn to Greek art; and as to modern art, it is allied to both Greek\nand Christian.\n\nBut it remains for us to present some conclusions upon the future\ndestiny of art\u2014a point of highest interest, to which this review of the\nforms and monuments of the past must lead. The conclusions of the\nauthor, which we shall consider elsewhere, are far from answering to\nwhat we might have expected from so remarkable a historic picture.\n\nWhat are, indeed, these conclusions? The first is, that the r\u00f4le of art,\nto speak properly, is finished\u2014at least, its original and distinct r\u00f4le.\nThe circle of the ideas and beliefs of humanity is completed. Art has\ninvested them with the forms which it was capable of giving them. In the\nfuture, it ought, then, to occupy a secondary place. After having\nfinished its independent career, it becomes an obscure satellite of\nscience and philosophy, in which are absorbed both religion and art.\nThis thought is not thus definitely formulated, but it is clearly enough\nindicated. Art, in revealing thought, has itself contributed to the\ndestruction of other forms, and to its own downfall. The new art ought\nto be elevated above all the particular forms which it has already\nexpressed. \u201cArt ceases to be attached to a determinate circle of ideas\nand forms; it consecrates itself to a new worship, that of humanity. All\nthat the heart of man includes within its own immensity\u2014its joys and its\nsufferings, its interests, its actions, its destinies\u2014become the domain\nof art.\u201d Thus the content is human nature; the form a free combination\nof all the forms of the past. We shall hereafter consider this new\neclecticism in art.\n\nHegel points out, in concluding, a final form of literature and poetry,\nwhich is the unequivocal index of the absence of peculiar, elevated and\nprofound ideas, and of original forms\u2014that sentimental poetry, light or\ndescriptive, which to-day floods the literary world and the\ndrawing-rooms with its verses; compositions without life and without\ncontent, without originality or true inspiration; a common-place and\nvague expression of all sentiment, full of aspirations and empty of\nideas, where, through all, there makes itself recognized an imitation of\nsome illustrious geniuses\u2014themselves misled in false and perilous ways;\na sort of current money, analogous to the epistolary style. Everybody is\npoet; and there is scarcely one true poet. \u201cWherever the faculties of\nthe soul and the forms of language have received a certain degree of\nculture, there is no person who cannot, if he take the fancy, express in\nverse some situation of the soul, as any one is in condition to write a\nletter.\u201d\n\nSuch a style, thus universally diffused, and reproduced under a thousand\nforms, although with different shadings, easily becomes fastidious.\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n\nWe hope to see those necessities of thought which underlie all\nPhilosophical systems. We set out to account for all the diversities of\nopinion, and to see identity in the world of thought. But necessity in\nthe realm of thought may be phenomenal. If there be anything which is\ngiven out as fixed, we must try its validity.\n\nMany of the \u201cimpossibilities\u201d of thought are easily shown to rest upon\nignorance of psychological appliances. The person is not able because he\ndoes not know _how_\u2014just as in other things. We must take care that we\ndo not confound the incapacity of ignorance with the necessity of\nthought. (The reader will find an example of this in Sir Wm. Hamilton\u2019s\n\u201cMetaphysics,\u201d page 527.) One of these \u201cincapacities\u201d arises from\nneglecting the following:\n\nAmong the first distinctions to be learned by the student in philosophy\nis that between the imaginative form of thinking and _pure_ thinking.\nThe former is a sensuous grade of thinking which uses _images_, while\nthe latter is a more developed stage, and is able to think objects in\nand for themselves. Spinoza\u2019s statement of this distinction applied to\nthe thinking of the Infinite\u2014his \u201cInfinitum imaginationis\u201d and\n\u201cInfinitum actu vel rationis\u201d\u2014has been frequently alluded to by those\nwho treat of this subject.\n\nAt first one might suppose that when finite things are the subject of\nthought, it would make little difference whether the first or second\nform of thinking is employed. This is, however, a great error. The\nPhilosopher must always \u201cthink things under the form of eternity\u201d if he\nwould think the truth.\n\n_Imagination_ pictures objects. It represents to itself only the\nbounded. If it tries to realize the conception of infinitude, it\nrepresents a limited somewhat, and then _Reflection_ or the\n_Understanding_ (a form of thought lying between Imagination and Reason)\npasses beyond the limits, and annuls them. This process may be continued\nindefinitely, or until _Reason_ (or pure thinking) comes in and solves\nthe dilemma. Thus we have a dialogue resulting somewhat as follows:\n\n_Imagination._ Come and see the Infinite just as I have pictured it.\n\n_Understanding._ [Peeping cautiously about it.] Where is your frame? Ah!\nI see it now, clearly. How is this! Your frame does not include all.\nThere is a \u201cbeyond\u201d to your picture. I cannot tell whether you intend\nthe inside or outside for your picture of the Infinite, I see it on\nboth.\n\n_Imag._ [Tries to extend the frame, but with the same result as before.]\nI believe you are right! I am well nigh exhausted by my efforts to\ninclude the unlimited.\n\n_Un._ Ah! you see the Infinite is merely the negative of the finite or\npositive. It is the negative of those conditions which you place there\nin order to have any representation at all.\n\n[While the Understanding proceeds to deliver a course of wise saws and\nmoral reflections on the \u201cinability of the Finite to grasp the\nInfinite,\u201d sitting apart upon its bipod\u2014for tripod it has none, one of\nthe legs being broken\u2014it self-complacently and oracularly admonishes the\nhuman mind to cultivate humility; Imagination drops her brush and pencil\nin confusion at these words. Very opportunely _Reason_ steps in and\ntakes an impartial survey of the scene.]\n\n_Reason._ Did you say that the Infinite is unknowable?\n\n_Un._ Yes. \u201cTo think is to limit, and hence to think the Infinite is to\nlimit it, and thus to destroy it.\u201d\n\n_Reason._ Apply your remarks to Space. Is not Space infinite?\n\n_Un._ If I attempt to realize Space, I conceive a bounded, but I at once\nperceive that I have placed my limits _within_ Space, and hence my\nrealization is inadequate. The Infinite, therefore, seems to be a beyond\nto my clear conception.\n\n_Reason._ Indeed! When you reflect on Space do you not perceive that it\nis of such a nature that it can be limited only by itself? Do not all\nits limits imply Space to exist in?\n\n_Un._ Yes, that is the difficulty.\n\n_Reason._ I do not see the \u201cdifficulty.\u201d If Space can be limited only by\nitself, its limit continues it, instead of bounding it. Hence it is\nuniversally continuous or infinite.\n\n_Un._ But a mere negative.\n\n_Reason._ No, not a mere negative, but the negative of all negation, and\nhence truly affirmative. It is the exhibition of the utter impossibility\nof any negative to it. All attempts to limit it, continue it. It is its\nown other. Its negative is itself. Here, then, we have a truly\naffirmative infinite in contradistinction to the _negative_ infinite\u2014the\n\u201cinfinite progress\u201d that you and Imagination were engaged upon when I\ncame in.\n\n_Un._ What you say seems to me a distinction in words merely.\n\n_Reason._ Doubtless. All distinctions are merely in words until one has\nlearned to see them independent of words. But you must go and mend that\ntripod on which you are sitting; for how can one think at ease and\nexhaustively, when he is all the time propping up his basis from\nwithout?\n\n_Un._ I cannot understand you. [Exit.]\n\n\n_Note._\n\nIt will be well to consider what application is to be made of these\ndistinctions to the mind itself, whose form is consciousness. In\nself-knowing, or consciousness, the subject knows itself\u2014it is its own\nobject. Thus in this phase of activity we have the affirmative Infinite.\nThe subject is its own object\u2014is continued by its other or object. This\nis merely suggested here\u2014it will be developed hereafter.\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n\nIn the first chapter we attained\u2014or at least made the attempt to\nattain\u2014some insight into the relation which Mind bears to Time and\nSpace. It appeared that Mind is a _Transcendent_, i. e. something which\nTime and Space inhere in, rather than a somewhat, conditioned by them.\nAlthough this result agrees entirely with the religious instincts of\nman, which assert the immortality of the soul, and the unsubstantiality\nof the existences within Time and Space, yet as a logical result of\nthinking, it seems at first very unreliable. The disciplined thinker\nwill indeed find the distinctions \u201ca priori and a posteriori\u201d\ninadequately treated; but his emendations will only make the results\nthere established more wide-sweeping and conclusive.\n\nIn the second chapter we learned caution with respect to the manner of\nattempting to realize in our minds the results of thought. If we have\nalways been in the habit of regarding Mind as a property or attribute of\nthe individual, we have conceived it not according to its true nature,\nbut have allowed Imagination to mingle its activity in the thinking of\nthat which is of a universal nature. Thus we are prone to say to\nourselves: \u201cHow can a mere attribute like Mind be the logical condition\nof the solid realities of Space and Time?\u201d In this we have quietly\nassumed the whole point at issue. No system of thinking which went to\nwork logically ever proved the Mind to be an attribute; only very\nelementary grades of thinking, which have a way of assuming in their\npremises what they draw out analytically in their conclusions, ever set\nup this dogma. This will become clearer at every step as we proceed.\n\nWe will now pursue a path similar to that followed in the first chapter,\nand see what more we can learn of the nature of Mind. We will endeavor\nto learn more definitely what constitutes its _a priori_ activity, in\norder, as there indicated, to achieve our object. Thus our present\nsearch is after the \u201cCategories\u201d and their significance. Taking the word\ncategory here in the sense of \u201ca priori determination of thought,\u201d the\nfirst question is: \u201cDo any categories exist? Are there any thoughts\nwhich belong to the nature of mind itself?\u201d It is the same question that\nLocke discusses under the head of \u201cInnate ideas.\u201d\n\n\n I.\n\n\n\u201cEvery act of knowing or cognizing is the translating of an unknown\nsomewhat into a known, as a scholar translates a new language into his\nown.\u201d If he did not already understand one language, he could never\ntranslate the new one. In the act of knowing, the object becomes known\nin so far as I am able to recognise predicates as belonging to it. \u201cThis\nis _red_;\u201d unless I know already what \u201cred\u201d means, I do not cognize the\nobject by predicating _red_ of it. \u201cRed is a color;\u201d unless I know what\n\u201ccolor\u201d means, I have not said anything intelligible\u2014I have not\nexpressed an act of cognition. The object becomes known to us in so far\nas we recognize its predicates\u2014and hence we could never know anything\nunless we had at least one predicate or conception with which to\ncommence. If we have one predicate through which we cognize some object,\nthat act of cognition gives us a new predicate; for it has dissolved or\n\u201ctranslated\u201d a somewhat, that before was unknown, into a known; the\n\u201cnot-me\u201d has, to that extent, become the \u201cme.\u201d Without any predicates to\nbegin with, all objects would remain forever outside of our\nconsciousness. Even consciousness itself would be impossible, for the\nvery act of self-cognition implies that the predicate \u201cmyself\u201d is well\nknown. It is an act of identification: \u201cI am myself;\u201d the subject is, as\npredicate, completely known or dissolved back into the subject. I\ncognize myself as myself; there is no alien element left standing over\nagainst me. Thus we are able to say that there must be an a priori\ncategory in order to render possible any act of knowing whatever.\nMoreover, we see that this category must be identical with the _Ego_\nitself, for the reason that the process of cognition is at the same time\na recognition; it predicates only what it recognizes. Thus,\nfundamentally, in knowing, Reason knows itself. Self-consciousness is\nthe basis of knowledge. This will throw light on the first chapter; but\nlet us first confirm this position by a psychological analysis.\n\n\n II.\n\n\nWhat is the permanent element in thought?\u2014It can easily be found in\nlanguage\u2014its external manifestation. Logic tells us that the expression\nof thought involves always a subject and predicate. Think what you\nplease, say what you please, and your thought or assertion consists of a\nsubject and predicate\u2014positive or negative\u2014joined by the copula, _is_.\n\u201cMan lives\u201d is equivalent to \u201cman is living.\u201d \u201cMan\u201d and \u201cliving\u201d are\njoined by the word \u201cis.\u201d If we abstract all content from thought, and\ntake its pure form in order to see the permanent, we shall have \u201cis\u201d the\ncopula,\u2014or putting a letter for subject and attribute, we shall have\n\u201c_a_ is _a_,\u201d (or \u201c_a_ is _b_,\u201d) for the universal form of thought. The\nmental act is expressed by \u201cis.\u201d In this empty \u201cis\u201d we have the category\nof pure Being, which is the \u201csummum genus\u201d of categories. Any predicate\nother than _being_ will be found to contain being _plus_ determinations,\nand hence can be subsumed under being. We shall get new light on this\nsubject if we examine the ordinary doctrine of _explanation_.\n\n\n III.\n\n\nIn order to explain something, we subsume it under a more general. Thus\nwe say: \u201cHorse is an animal;\u201d and, \u201cAn animal is an organic being,\u201d &c.\nA definition contains not only this subsumption, but also a statement of\nthe specific difference. We define _quadruped_ by subsuming it, (\u201cIt is\nan animal\u201d) and giving the specific difference (\u201cwhich has four feet\u201d).\n\nAs we approach the \u201csummum genus,\u201d the predicates become more and more\nempty; \u201cthey become more _extensive_ in their application, and less\n_comprehensive_ in their content.\u201d Thus they approach pure simplicity,\nwhich is attained in the \u201csummum genus.\u201d This pure simple, which is the\nlimit of subsumption and abstraction, is pure Being\u2014Being devoid of all\ndeterminateness. When we have arrived at Being, subsuming becomes simple\nidentifying\u2014Being is Being, or _a_ is _a_\u2014and this is precisely the same\nactivity that we found self-consciousness to consist of in our first\nanalysis, (I.) and the same activity that we found all mental acts to\nconsist of in our second analysis, (II.).\n\n\n IV.\n\n\nTherefore, we may affirm on these grounds, that the \u201csummum genus,\u201d or\nprimitive category, is the Ego itself in its simplest activity as the\n\u201cis\u201d (or pure _being_ if taken substantively).\n\nThus it happens that when the Mind comes to cognize an object, it must\nfirst of all recognize itself in it in its simplest activity,\u2014it must\nknow that the object _is_. We cannot know anything else of an object\nwithout presupposing the knowledge of its _existence_.\n\nAt this point it is evident that this category is not derived from\nexperience in the sense of _an impression from without_. It is the\nactivity of the Ego itself, and is its (the _Ego\u2019s_) first\nself-externalization (or its first becoming object to itself\u2014its first\nact of self-consciousness). The essential activity of the Ego itself\nconsists in recognizing itself, and this involves self-separation, and\nthen the annulling of this separation in the same act. For in knowing\nmyself as an object I separate the Ego from itself, but in the very act\nof _knowing_ it I make it identical again. Here are two negative\nprocesses involved in knowing, and these are indivisibly one:\u2014first, the\nnegative act of separation\u2014secondly, the negative act of annulling the\nseparation by the act of recognition. That the application of categories\nto the external world is a process of self-recognition, is now clear: we\nknow, in so far as we recognize predicates in the object,\u2014we say \u201cThe\nRose _is_, it is _red_, it is _round_, it is _fragrant_, &c.\u201d In this we\nseparate what belongs to the rose from it, and place it outside of it,\nand then, through the act of predication, unite it again. \u201cThe Rose\n_is_\u201d contains merely the recognition of being but being is separated\nfrom it and joined to it in the act of predication. Thus we see that the\nfundamental act of self-consciousness, which is a self-separation and\nself-identification united in one act of recognition,\u2014we see that this\nfundamental act is repeated in all acts of knowing. We do not know even\nthe rose without separating it from itself, and identifying the two\nsides thus formed. (This contains a deeper thought which we may suggest\nhere. That the act of knowing puts all objects into this crucible, is an\nintimation on its part that no object can possess true, abiding being,\nwithout this ability to separate itself from itself in the process of\nself-identification. Whatever cannot do this is no essence, but may be\nonly an element of a process in which it ceaselessly loses its identity.\nBut we shall recur to this again.)\n\nDoubtless we could follow out this activity through various steps, and\ndeduce all the categories of pure thought. This is what Plato has done\nin part; what Fichte has done in his Science of Knowledge,\n(\u201cWissenschaftslehre\u201d) and Hegel in his Logic. A science of these pure\nintelligibles unlocks the secret of the Universe; it furnishes that\n\u201cRoyal Road\u201d to all knowledge; it is the far-famed Philosopher\u2019s Stone\nthat alone can transmute the base dross of mere talent into genius.\n\n\n V.\n\n\nLet us be content if at the close of this chapter we can affirm still\nmore positively the conclusions of our first. Through a consideration of\nthe a priori knowledge of Time and Space, and their logical priority, as\nconditions, to the world of experience, we inferred the transcendency of\nMind. Upon further investigation, we have now discovered that there are\nother forms of the Mind more primordial than Space and Time, and more\nessentially related to its activity; for all the categories of pure\nthought\u2014Being, Negation, &c.,\u2014are applicable to Space and to Time, and\nhence more universal than either of them alone; these categories of pure\nthought, moreover, as before remarked, could never have been derived\nfrom experience. Experience is not possible without presupposing these\npredicates. \u201cThey are the tools of intelligence through which it\ncognizes.\u201d If we hold by this stand-point exclusively, we may say, with\nKant, that we furnish the subjective forms in knowing, and for this\nreason cannot know the \u201cthing in itself.\u201d If these categories are merely\nsubjective\u2014i. e. given in the constitution of the Mind itself\u2014and we do\nnot know what the \u201cthing in itself\u201d may be, yet we can come safely out\nof all skepticism here by considering the universal nature of these\ncategories or \u201cforms of the mind.\u201d For if Being, Negation and Existence\nare forms of mind and purely subjective, so that they do not belong to\nthe \u201cthing in itself,\u201d it is evident that such an object cannot _be_ or\n_exist_, or in any way have validity, either positively or negatively.\nThus it is seen from the nature of mind here exhibited, that Mind is the\n_noumenon_ or \u201cthing in itself\u201d which Philosophy seeks, and thus our\nthird chapter confirms our first.\n\n\n_Note._\n\nThe MATERIALISM of the present day holds that thought is a modification\nof force, correlated with heat, light, electricity, &c., in short, that\norganization produces ideas. If so, we are placed within a narrow\nidealism, and can only say of what is held for _truth_: \u201cI am so\ncorrelated as to hold this view,\u2014I shall be differently correlated\nto-morrow, perhaps, and hold another view.\u201d Yet in this very statement\nthe Ego takes the stand-point of universality\u2014it speaks of\npossibilities\u2014which it could never do, were it merely a correlate. For\nto hold a possibility is to be able to annul in thought the limits of\nthe real, and hence to elevate itself to the point of universality. But\nthis is _self_-correlation; we have a movement in a circle, and hence\nself-origination, and hence a spontaneous fountain of force. The Mind,\nin conceiving of the possible, annuls the real, and thus creates its own\nmotives; its acting according to motives, is thus acting according to\nits own acts\u2014an obvious circle again.\n\nIn fine, it is evident that the idealism which the correlationist\nlogically falls into is as strict as that of any school of professed\nidealism which he is in the habit of condemning. The _persistent force_\nis the general _idea_ of force, not found as any _real_ force, for each\n_real_ force is individualized in some particular way. But it is evident\nthat a particular force cannot be correlated with _force in general_,\nbut only with a special form like itself. But the general force is the\nonly abiding one\u2014each particular one is in a state of transition into\nanother\u2014a perpetual losing of individuality. Hence the true abiding\nforce is not a _real_ one existing objectively, but only an _ideal_ one\nexisting subjectively in thought. But through the fact that thought can\nseize the true and abiding which can exist for itself nowhere else, the\ncorrelationist is bound to infer the transcendency of Mind just like the\nidealist. Nay, more, when he comes to speak considerately, he will say\nthat Mind, for the very reason that it thinks the true, abiding force,\ncannot be correlated with any determined force.\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n\nPhilosophers usually begin to construct their systems in full view of\ntheir final principle. It would be absurd for one to commence a\ndemonstration if he had no clear idea of what he intended to prove. From\nthe final principle the system must be worked back to the beginning in\nthe Philosopher\u2019s mind before he can commence his demonstration. Usually\nthe order of demonstration which he follows, is not the order of\ndiscovery; in such case his system proceeds by external reflections. All\nmathematical proof is of this order. One constructs his demonstration to\nlead from the known to the unknown, and uses many intermediate\npropositions that do not of necessity lead to the intended result. With\nanother theorem in view, they might be used for steps to that, just as\nwell. But there is a certain inherent development in all subjects when\nexamined according to the highest method, that will lead one on to the\nexhaustive exposition of all that is involved therein. This is called\nthe _dialectic_. This dialectic movement cannot be used as a philosophic\ninstrument, unless one has seen the deepest _aper\u00e7u_ of Science; if this\nis not the case, the dialectic will prove merely destructive and not\nconstructive. It is therefore a mistake, as has been before remarked, to\nattempt to introduce the beginner of the study of Philosophy at once\ninto the dialectic. The content of Philosophy must be first presented\nunder its sensuous and reflective forms, and a gradual progress\nestablished. In this chapter an attempt will be made to approach again\nthe ultimate principle which we have hitherto fixed only in a general\nmanner as _Mind_. We will use the method of external reflection, and\ndemonstrate three propositions: 1. There is an independent being; 2.\nThat being is self-determined; 3. Self-determined being is in the form\nof personality, i. e. is an _Ego_.\n\n\n I.\n\n\n1. Dependent being, implying its complement upon which it depends,\ncannot be explained through itself, but through that upon which it\ndepends.\n\n2. This being upon which it depends cannot be also a dependent being,\nfor the dependent being has no support of its own to lend to another;\nall that it has is borrowed. \u201cA chain of dependent beings collapses into\none dependent being. Dependence is not converted into independence by\nmere multiplication.\u201d\n\n3. The dependent, therefore, depends upon the independent, and has its\nexplanation in it. Since all being is of one kind or the other, it\nfollows that all being is independent, or a complemental element of it.\nReciprocal dependence makes an independent including whole, which is the\n_negative unity_.\n\n_Definition._\u2014One of the most important implements of the thinker is the\ncomprehension of \u201cnegative unity.\u201d It is a unity resulting from the\nreciprocal cancelling of elements; e. g. _Salt_ is the negative unity of\n_acid_ and _alkali_. It is called _negative_ because it negates the\nindependence of the elements within it. In the negative unity _Air_, the\nelements oxygen and nitrogen have their independence negated.\n\n\n II.\n\n\n1. The independent being cannot exist without determinations. Without\nthese, it could not distinguish itself or be distinguished from nought.\n\n2. Nor can the independent being be determined (i. e. limited or\nmodified in any way) from without, or through another. For all that is\ndetermined through another is a dependent somewhat.\n\n3. Hence the independent being can be only a self-determined. If\nself-determined, it can exist through itself.\n\n\n_Note._\n\nSpinoza does not arrive at the third position, but, after considering\nthe second, arrives at the first one, and concludes, since determination\nthrough another makes a somewhat _finite_, that the independent being\nmust be _undetermined_. He does not happen to discover that there is\nanother kind of determination, to-wit, self-determination, which can\nconsist with independence. The method that he uses makes it entirely an\naccidental matter with him that he discovers what speculative results he\ndoes\u2014the dialectic method would lead inevitably to self-determination,\nas we shall see later. It is Hegel\u2019s _aper\u00e7u_ that we have in the third\nposition; with Spinoza the independent being remained an undetermined\n_substance_, but with Hegel it became a self-determining _subject_. All\nthat Spinoza gets out of his substance he must get in an arbitrary\nmanner; it does not follow from its definition that it shall have modes\nand attributes, but the contrary. This _aper\u00e7u_\u2014that the independent\nbeing, i. e. every really existing, separate entity, is\nself-determined\u2014is the central point of speculative philosophy. What\nself-determination involves, we shall see next.\n\n\n III.\n\n\n1. Self-determination implies that the _constitution_ or _nature_ be\nself-originated. There is nothing about a self-determined that is\ncreated by anything without.\n\n2. Thus self-determined being exists dually\u2014it is (_a_) as _determining_\nand (_b_) as _determined_. (_a_) As determining, it is the active, which\ncontains merely the possibility of determinations; (_b_) as determined,\nit is the passive result\u2014the matter upon which the subject acts.\n\n3. But since both are the same being, each side returns into\nitself:\u2014(_a_) as determining or active, it acts only upon its own\ndetermining, and (_b_) as passive or determined, it is, as result of the\nformer, the self-same active itself. Hence its movement is a movement of\nself-recognition\u2014a positing of distinction which is cancelled in the\nsame act. (In self-recognition something is made an object, and\nidentified with the subject in the same act.) Moreover, the determiner,\non account of its pure generality, (i. e. its having no concrete\ndeterminations as yet,) can only be _ideal_\u2014can only exist as the _Ego_\nexists in thought; not as a _thing_, but as a _generic_ entity. The\npassive side can exist only as the self exists in consciousness\u2014as that\nwhich is in opposition and yet in identity at the same time. No finite\nexistence could endure this contradiction, for all such must possess a\n_nature_ or _constitution_ which is self-determined; if not, each finite\ncould negate all its properties and qualities, and yet remain\nitself\u2014just as the person does when he makes abstraction of all, in\nthinking of the _Ego_ or pure self.\n\nThus we find again our former conclusion.\u2014All finite or dependent things\nmust originate in and depend upon independent or absolute being, which\nmust be an _Ego_. The _Ego_ has the form of Infinitude (see chapter\nII\u2014_the infinite is its own other_).\n\n_Resum\u00e9._ The first chapter states the premises which Kant lays down in\nhis Transcendental \u00c6sthetic, (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft) and draws the\ntrue logical conclusions which are positive and not negative, as he\nmakes them. The second chapter gives the Spinozan distinction of the\nInfinite of the Imagination and Infinite of Reason. The third chapter\ngives the logical results which Kant should have drawn from his\nTranscendental Logic. The fourth chapter gives Spinoza\u2019s fundamental\nposition logically completed, and is the great fundamental position of\nPlato, Aristotle and Hegel, with reference to the Absolute.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n One cannot but be astonished not to see, in this review of the\n principal forms of oriental art, Chinese art at least mentioned. The\n reason is, that, according to Hegel, art\u2014the fine arts, properly\n speaking\u2014have no existence among the Chinese. The spirit of that\n people seems to him anti-artistic and prosaic. He thus characterizes\n Chinese art in his philosophy of history: \u201cThis race, in general, has\n a rare talent for imitation, which is exercised not only in the things\n of daily life, but also in art. It has not yet arrived at the\n representation of the beautiful as beautiful. In painting, it lacks\n perspective and shading. European images, like everything else, it\n copies well. A Chinese painter knows exactly how many scales there are\n on the back of a carp, how many notches a leaf has; he knows perfectly\n the form of trees and the curvature of their branches; but the\n sublime, the ideal, and the beautiful, do not belong at all to the\n domain of his art and his ability.\u201d\u2014(_Philosophie der Geschichte._)\n\n\n\n\n MUSIC AS A FORM OF ART.\n [Read before the St. Louis Art Society, February, 1867.]\n\n\n I. Upon Art-Criticism.\n\n\nA work of art is the product of the inspired moment of the artist. It is\nnot to be supposed that he is able to give an account of his work in the\nterms of the understanding. Hence the artist is not in a strict sense a\ncritic. The highest order of criticism must endeavor to exhibit the\nunity of the work by showing how the various motives unfold from the\ncentral thought. Of course, the artist must be rare who can see his work\ndoubly\u2014first sensuously, and then rationally. Only some Michael Angelo\nor Goethe can do this. The common artist sees the sensuous form as the\nhighest possible revelation\u2014to him his _feeling_ is higher than the\nintellectual vision. And can we not all\u2014critics as well as\nartists\u2014sympathize with the statement that the mere calculating\nintellect, the cold understanding, \u201call light and no heat,\u201d can never\nrise into the realm where art can be appreciated? It is only when we\ncontemplate the truly speculative intellect\u2014which is called \u201clove\u201d by\nthe mystics, and by Swedenborg \u201cLove and wisdom united in a Divine\nEssence,\u201d\u2014that we demur at this supreme elevation of feeling or\nsentiment. The art critic must have all the feeling side of his nature\naroused, as the first condition of his interpretation; and, secondly, he\nmust be able to dissolve into thought the emotions which arise from that\nside. If feeling were more exalted than thought, this would be\nimpossible. Such, however, is the view of such critics as the Schlegels,\nwho belong to the romantic school. They say that the intellect considers\nonly abstractions, while the heart is affected by the concrete whole.\n\u201cSpectres and goitred dwarfs\u201d for the intellect, but \u201cbeauty\u2019s rose\u201d for\nthe feeling heart. But this all rests on a misunderstanding. The true\nart critic does not undervalue feeling. It is to him the essential basis\nupon which he builds. Unless the work of art affects his feelings, he\nhas nothing to think about; he can go no further; the work, to him, is\nnot a work of art at all. But if he is aroused and charmed by it, if his\nemotional nature is stirred to its depths, and he feels inspired by\nthose spiritual intimations of Eternity which true art always excites,\nthen he has a content to work upon, and this thinking of his, amounts\nsimply to a recognition in other forms, of this eternal element, that\nglows through the work of art.\n\nHence there is no collision between the artist and the critic, if both\nare true to their ideal.\n\nIt certainly is no injury to the work of art to show that it treats in\nsome form the Problem of Life, which is the mystery of the Christian\nreligion. It is no derogation to Beethoven to show how he has solved a\nproblem in music, just as Shakspeare in poetry, and Michael Angelo in\npainting. Those who are content with the mere feeling, we must always\nrespect if they really have the true art feeling, just as we respect the\nsimple piety of the uneducated peasant. But we must not therefore\nunderrate the conscious seizing of the same thing,\u2014not place St.\nAugustine or Martin Luther below the simple-minded peasant. Moreover, as\nour society has for its aim the attainment of an insight into art _in\ngeneral_, and not the exclusive enjoyment of any particular art, it is\nall the more important that we should hold by the only connecting\nlink\u2014the only universal element\u2014_thought_. For thought has not only\nuniversal _content_, like feeling, but also universal _form_, which\nfeeling has not.\n\nAnother reason that causes persons to object to art interpretation, is\nperhaps that such interpretation reminds them of the inevitable moral\nappended _ad nauseam_ to the stories that delighted our childhood. But\nit must be remembered that these morals are put forward as the _object_\nof the stories. The art critic can never admit for one moment that it is\nthe object of a work of art simply to be didactic. It is true that all\nart is a means of culture; but that is not its object. Its object is to\ncombine the idea with a sensuous form, so as to embody, as it were, the\nInfinite; and any motive external to the work of art itself, is at once\nfelt to be destructive to it.\n\n\n II. Upon the Interpretation of Art.\n\n\n1. The Infinite is not manifested _within_ any particular sphere of\nfinitude, but rather exhibits itself in the collision of a Finite with\nanother Finite _without_ it. For a Finite must by its very nature be\nlimited from without, and the Infinite, therefore, not only includes any\ngiven finite sphere, but also its negation (or the other spheres which\njoined to it make up the whole).\n\n2. \u201cArt is the manifestation of the Infinite in the Finite,\u201d it is said.\nTherefore, this must mean that art has for its province the treatment of\nthe collisions that necessarily arise between one finite sphere and\nanother.\n\n3. In proportion as the collision portrayed by art is comprehensive, and\na type of all collisions in the universe, is it a high work of art. If,\nthen, the collision is on a small scale, and between low spheres, it is\nnot a high work of art.\n\n4. But whether the collision presented be of a high order or of a low\norder, it bears a general resemblance to every other collision\u2014the\nInfinite is always like itself in all its manifestations. The lower the\ncollision, the more it becomes merely symbolical as a work of art, and\nthe less it adequately presents the Infinite.\n\nThus the lofty mountain peaks of Bierstadt, which rise up into the\nregions of clearness and sunshine, beyond the realms of change, do this,\nonly because of a force that contradicts gravitation, which continually\nabases them. The contrast of the high with the low, of the clear and\nuntrammelled with the dark and impeded, symbolizes, in the most natural\nmanner, to every one, the higher conflicts of spirit. It strikes a chord\nthat vibrates, unconsciously perhaps, but, nevertheless, inevitably. On\nthe other hand, when we take the other extreme of painting, and look at\nthe \u201cLast Judgment\u201d of Michael Angelo, or the \u201cTransfiguration\u201d of\nRaphael, we find comparatively no ambiguity; there the Infinite is\nvisibly portrayed, and the collision in which it is displayed is\nevidently of the highest order.\n\n5. Art, from its definition, must relate to Time and Space, and in\nproportion as the grosser elements are subordinated and the spiritual\nadequately manifested, we find that we approach a form of art wherein\nthe form and matter are both the products of spirit.\n\nThus we have arts whose matter is taken from (_a_) _Space_, (_b_)\n_Time_, and (_c_) _Language_ (the product of Spirit).\n\nSpace is the grossest material. We have on its plane, I. Architecture,\nII. Sculpture, and III. Painting. (In the latter, color and perspective\ngive the artist power to represent distance and magnitude, and\ninternality, without any one of them, in fact. Upon a piece of ivory no\nlarger than a man\u2019s hand a \u201cHeart of the Andes\u201d might be painted.) In\nTime we have IV. Music, while in Language we have V. Poetry (in the\nthree forms of Epic, Lyric, and Dramatic) as the last and highest of the\nforms of Art.\n\n6. An interpretation of a work of art should consist in a translation of\nit into the form of science. Hence, first, one must seize the general\ncontent of it\u2014or the collision portrayed. Then, secondly, the form of\nart employed comes in, whether it be Architecture, Sculpture, Painting,\nMusic, or Poetry. Thirdly, the relation which the content has to the\nform, brings out the superior merits, or the limits and defects of the\nwork of art in question. Thus, at the end, we have universalized the\npiece of art\u2014digested it, as it were. A true interpretation does not\ndestroy a work of art, but rather furnishes a guide to its highest\nenjoyment. We have the double pleasure of immediate sensuous enjoyment\nproduced by the artistic execution, and the higher one of finding our\nrational nature mirrored therein so that we recognize the eternal nature\nof Spirit there manifested.\n\n7. The peculiar nature of music, as contrasted with other arts, will, if\nexhibited, best prepare us for what we are to expect from it. The less\ndefinitely the mode of art allows its content to be seized, the wider\nmay be its application. Landscape painting may have a very wide scope\nfor its interpretation, while a drama of Goethe or Shakspeare definitely\nseizes the particulars of its collision, and leaves no doubt as to its\nsphere. So in the art of music, and especially instrumental music. Music\ndoes not portray an object directly, like the plastic arts, but it calls\nup the internal feeling which is caused by the object itself. It gives\nus, therefore, a reflection of our impressions excited in the immediate\ncontemplation of the object. Thus we have a reflection of a reflection,\nas it were.\n\nSince its material is Time rather than Space, we have this contrast with\nthe plastic arts: Architecture, and more especially Sculpture and\nPainting, are obliged to select a special moment of time for the\nrepresentation of the collision. As Goethe shows in the Laocoon, it will\nnot do to select a moment at random, but that point of time must be\nchosen in which the collision has reached its height, and in which there\nis a tension of all the elements that enter the contest on both sides. A\nmoment earlier, or a moment later, some of these elements would be\neliminated from the problem, and the comprehensiveness of the work\ndestroyed. When this proper moment is seized in Sculpture, as in the\nLaocoon, we can see what has been before the present moment, and easily\ntell what will come later. In Painting, through the fact that coloring\nenables more subtle effects to be wrought out, and deeper internal\nmovements to be brought to the surface, we are not so closely confined\nto the \u201csupreme moment\u201d as in Sculpture. But it is in Music that we\nfirst get entirely free from that which confines the plastic arts. Since\nits form is time, it can convey the whole movement of the collision from\nits inception to its conclusion. Hence Music is superior to the Arts of\nSpace, in that it can portray the internal creative process, rather than\nthe dead results. It gives us the content in its whole process of\ndevelopment in a _fluid_ form, while the Sculptor must fix it in a\n_frigid_ form at a certain stage. Goethe and others have compared Music\nto Architecture\u2014the latter is \u201cfrozen Music\u201d; but they have not compared\nit to Sculpture nor Painting, for the reason that in these two arts\nthere is a possibility of seizing the form of the individual more\ndefinitely, while in Architecture and Music the point of repose does not\nappear as the human form, but only as the more general one of\nself-relation or harmony. Thus quantitative ratios\u2014mathematical\nlaws\u2014pervade and govern these two forms of Art.\n\n8. Music, more definitely considered, arises from vibrations, producing\nwaves in the atmosphere. The cohesive attraction of some body is\nattacked, and successful resistance is made; if not, there is no\nvibration. Thus the feeling of victory over a foreign foe is conveyed in\nthe most elementary tones, and this is the distinction of _tone_ from\n_noise_, in which there is the irregularity of disruption, and not the\nregularity of self-equality.\n\nAgain, in the obedience of the whole musical structure to its\nfundamental scale-note, we have something like the obedience of\nArchitecture to Gravity. In order to make an exhibition of Gravity, a\npillar is necessary; for the solid wall does not isolate sufficiently\nthe function of support. With the pillar we can have exhibited the\neffects of Gravity drawing down to the earth, and of the support holding\nup the shelter. The pillar in classic art exhibits the equipoise of the\ntwo tendencies. In Romantic or Gothic Architecture it exhibits a\npreponderance of the aspiring tendency\u2014the soaring aloft like the plant\nto reach the light\u2014a contempt for mere gravity\u2014slender pillars seeming\nto be let down from the roof, and to draw up something, rather than to\nsupport anything. On the other hand, in Symbolic Architecture, (as found\nin Egypt) we have the overwhelming power of gravity exhibited so as to\ncrush out all humanity\u2014the Pyramid, in whose shape Gravity has done its\nwork. In Music we have continually the conflict of these two tendencies,\nthe upward and downward. The Music that moves upward and shows its\nground or point of repose in the octave above the scale-note of the\nbasis, corresponds to the Gothic Architecture. This aspiring movement\noccurs again and again in chorals; it\u2014like all romantic art\u2014expresses\nthe Christian solution of the problem of life.\n\n\n III. Beethoven\u2019s Sonata in C sharp minor.\n (_Opus 27, No._ 2.)\n\n\nThe three movements of this sonata which Beethoven called a\n_fantasie-sonata_, are not arranged in the order commonly followed.\nUsually sonatas begin with an _allegro_ or some quick movement, and pass\nover to a slow movement\u2014an _adagio_ or _andante_\u2014and end in a quick\nmovement. The content here treated could not allow this form, and hence\nit commences with what is usually the second movement. Its order is 1.\n_Adagio_, 2. _Allegretto_, 3. _Finale_ (presto agitato).\n\n(My rule with reference to the study of art may or may not be\ninteresting to others; it is this:\u2014always to select a masterpiece, so\nrecognized, and keep it before me until it yields its secret, and in its\nlight I am able to see common-place to be what it really is, and be no\nlonger dazzled by it. It requires faith in the commonly received verdict\nof critics and an immense deal of patience, but in the end one is\nrewarded for his pains. Almost invariably I find immediate impressions\nof uncultured persons good for nothing. It requires long familiarity\nwith the best things to learn to see them in their true excellence.)\n\nThis sonata is called by the Austrians the \u201cMoonlight Sonata,\u201d and this\nhas become the popular name in America. It is said to have been written\nby Beethoven when he was recovering from the disappointment of his hopes\nin a love-episode that had an unfortunate termination. (See Marx\u2019s \u201cL.\nv. Beethoven, Leben und Schaffen.\u201d From this magnificent work of\nArt-Criticism, I have drawn the outlines of the following\ninterpretation.) The object of his affection was a certain young\ncountess, Julia Guicciardi; and it appears from Beethoven\u2019s letter to a\nfriend at the time (about 1800) that the affection was mutual, but their\ndifference in rank prevented a marriage. When this sonata appeared (in\n1802) it was inscribed to her.\n\n\n _Adagio._\n\n\nThe first movement is a soft, floating movement, portraying the soul\nmusing upon a memory of what has affected it deeply. The surrounding is\ndim, as seen in moonlight, and the soul is lit up by a reflected light\u2014a\nglowing at the memory of a bliss that is past. It is not strange that\nthis has been called the Moonlight Sonata, just for this feeling of\nborrowed light that pervades it. As we gaze into the moon of memory, we\nalmost forget the reflection, and fancy that the sun of immediate\nconsciousness is itself present. But anon a flitting cloudlet (a twinge\nof bitter regret) obscures the pale beam, or a glance at the\nlandscape\u2014not painted now with colors as in the daytime, but only\n_clare-obscure_\u2014brings back to us the sense of our separation from the\nday and the real. Sadly the soft gliding movement continues, and distant\nand more distant grows the prospect of experiencing again the remembered\nhappiness. Only for a passing moment can the throbbing soul realize in\nits dreams once more its full completeness, and the plaintive minor\nchanges to major; but the spectral form of renunciation glides before\nits face, and the soul subsides into its grief, and yields to what is\ninevitable. Downward into the depths fall its hopes; only a sepulchral\necho comes from the bass, and all is still. Marx calls this \u201cthe song of\nthe renouncing soul.\u201d It is filled with the feeling of separation and\nregret; but its slow, dreamy movement is not that of stern resolution,\nwhich should accompany renunciation. Accordingly we have\n\n\n _Allegretto._\n\n\nThe present and real returns; we no longer dwell on the past; \u201cWe must\nseparate; only this is left.\u201d In this movement we awake from the dream,\nand we feel the importance of the situation. Its content is \u201cFarewell,\nthen;\u201d the phrase expressing this, lingers in its striving to shake off\nthe grasp and get free. The hands will not let go each other. The phrase\nruns into the next and back to itself, and will not be cut off. In the\ntrio there seems to be the echoing of sobs that come from the depth of\nthe soul as the sorrowful words are repeated. The buried past still\ncomes back and holds up its happy hours, while the shadows of the gloomy\nfuture hover before the two renunciants!\n\nThis movement is very short, and is followed by the\n\n\n _Finale_ (_Presto agitato_).\n\n\n\u201cNo grief of the soul that can be conquered except through action,\u201d says\nGoethe\u2014and Beethoven expresses the same conviction in the somewhat\nsentimental correspondence with the fair countess. This third movement\ndepicts the soul endeavoring to escape from itself; to cancel its\nindividualism through contact with the real.\n\nThe first movement found the being of the soul involved with\nanother\u2014having, as it were, lost its essence. If the being upon which it\ndepends reflects it back by a reciprocal dependence, it again becomes\nintegral and independent. This cannot be; hence death or renunciation.\nBut renunciation leaves the soul recoiling upon its finitude, and devoid\nof the universality it would have obtained by receiving its being\nthrough another which reciprocally depended upon it. Hence the necessity\nof Goethe\u2019s and Beethoven\u2019s solution\u2014the soul must find surcease of\nsorrow through action, through will, or practical self-determination.\n_Man becomes universal in his deed._\n\nHow fiercely the soul rushes into the world of action in this _Finale!_\nIn its impetuosity it storms through life, and ever and anon falls down\nbreathless before the collision which it encounters in leaping the\nchasms between the different spheres. In its swoon of exhaustion there\ncomes up from the memory of the past the ghost of the lost love that has\nall the while accompanied him, though unnoticed, in his frantic race.\nIts hollow tones reverberate through his being, and he starts from his\ndream and drowns his memory anew in the storm of action. At times we are\nelevated to the creative moment of the artist, and feel its inspiration\nand lofty enthusiasm, but again and again the exhausted soul collapses,\nand the same abysmal crash comes in at the bass each time. The grimmest\nloneliness, that touches to the core, comes intruding itself upon our\nrapture. Only in the contest with the \u201clast enemy\u201d we feel at length\nthat the soul has proved itself valid in a region where distinctions of\nrank sunder and divide no more.\n\nThis solution is not quite so satisfactory as could be desired. If we\nwould realize the highest solution, we must study the Fifth Symphony,\nespecially its second movement.\n\n\n IV. Beethoven\u2019s Fifth Symphony,\n (_Part II._)\n\n\nMarx finds in this symphony the problem so often treated by\nBeethoven\u2014the collision of freedom with fate. \u201cThrough night to day,\nthrough strife to victory!\u201d Beethoven, in his conversation with\nSchindler, speaking of the first \u201cmotive\u201d at the beginning, said, \u201cThus\nFate knocks at the door.\u201d This knocking of Fate comes in continually\nduring the first movement. \u201cWe have an immense struggle portrayed. Life\nis a struggle\u2014this seems to be the content of this movement.\u201d The soul\nfinds a solution to this and sings its p\u00e6an of joy.\n\nIn the second movement (_andante_) we have an expression of the more\nsatisfactory solution of the Problem of Life, which we alluded to when\nspeaking of the Sonata above.\n\nIt (\u201cThe storm-tossed soul\u201d) has in that consoling thought reached the\nharbor of infinite rest\u2014infinite rest in the sense of an \u201cactivity which\nis a true repose.\u201d\n\nThe soul has found this solution, and repeats it over to assure itself\nof its reality (1, 1, 1, 7, 1, 2, 1\u2014these are the notes which express\nit). Then it wishes to make the experience of the universality of this\nsolution\u2014it desires to try its validity in all the spheres where Fate\nruled previously. It sets out and ascends the scale three steps at a\ntime (5, 1, 1, 2, 3\u20141, 3, 3, 4, 5) it reaches 5 of the scale, and ought\nto reach 8 the next time. It looks up to it as the celestial sun which\nGothic Architecture points toward and aspires after. Could it only get\nthere, it would find true rest! But its command of this guiding thought\nis not yet quite perfect\u2014it cannot wield it so as to fly across the\nabyss and reach that place of repose without a leap\u2014a \u201cmortal leap.\u201d For\nthe ascent by threes has reached a place where another three would bring\nit to 7 of the scale\u2014the point of absolute unrest; to step four, is to\ncontradict the rhythm or method of its procedure. It pauses, therefore,\nupon 5\u2014it tries the next three thoughtfully twice, and then, hearing\nbelow once more the mocking tones of Fate, it springs over the chasm and\nclutches the support above, while through all the spheres there rings\nthe sound of exultation.\n\nBut to reach the goal by a leap\u2014to have no bridge across the gulf at the\nend of the road\u2014is not a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Hence\nwe have a manifold endeavor\u2014a striving to get at the true method, which\nwanders at first in the darkness, but comes at length to the light; it\ngets the proper form for its idea, and gives up its unwieldy method of\nthrees (1, 2, 3\u20143, 4, 5), and ascends by the infinite form of 1, 3, 5\u20143,\n5, 8\u20145, 8, 3, &c., which gives it a complete access to, and control\nover, all above and below.\n\nThe complete self-equipoise expressed in that solution which comes in at\nintervals through the whole, and the bold application of the first\nmethod, followed by the faltering when it comes to the defect\u2014the grand\nexultation over the final discovery of the true method\u2014all these are\nindescribably charming to the lover of music almost the first time he\nlistens to this symphony, and they become upon repetition more and more\nsuggestive of the highest that art can give.\n\n\n\n\n THE ALCHEMISTS.\n [\u201cRemarks upon Alchemy and the Alchemists, showing that the\nPhilosopher\u2019s Stone was a Symbol.\u201d\u2014Published by James Miller, New York,\n 1867.]\n\n\nWe have referred in a previous article to the transition of Religion\ninto Speculative Philosophy. The Mystics who present this phase of\nthought, \u201cexpress themselves, not in those universal categories that the\nSpirit of the race has formed in language for its utterance, but they\nhave recourse to symbols more or less ambiguous, and of insufficient\nuniversality to stand for the Archetypes themselves.\u201d The Alchemists\nbelong to this phase of spirit, and we propose to draw from the little\nbook named at the head of our article, some of the evidences of this\nposition. It is there shown that instead of the transmutation of metals,\nthe regeneration of man was in view. Those much-abused men agreed that\n\u201cThe highest wisdom consists in this,\u201d (quoting from the Arabic author,\nAlipili,) \u201cfor man to know himself, because in him God has placed his\neternal Word, by which all things were made and upheld, to be his Light\nand Life, by which he is capable of knowing all things, both in time and\neternity.\u201d While they claim explicitly to have as object of their\nstudies the mysteries of Spirit, they warn the reader against taking\ntheir remarks upon the metals in a literal sense, and speak of those who\ndo so, as being in error. They describe their processes in such a way as\nto apply to man alone; pains seem to have been taken to word their\ndescriptions so as to be utterly absurd when applied to anything else.\nIn speaking of the \u201cStone,\u201d they refer to three states, calling them\nblack, white and red; giving minute descriptions of each, so as to leave\nno doubt that man is represented, first, as in a \u201cfallen condition;\u201d\nsecondly, in a \u201crepenting condition;\u201d and thirdly, as \u201cmade perfect\nthrough grace.\u201d This subordination of the outer to the inner, of the\nbody to the soul, is the constantly recurring theme. Instead of seeking\na thing not yet found\u2014which would be the case with a stone for the\ntransmutation of metals, they agree in describing the \u201cStone\u201d as already\nknown. They refer constantly to such speculative doctrines as \u201cNature is\na whole everywhere,\u201d showing that their subject possesses universality.\nThis metal or mineral is described thus: \u201cMinerals have their roots in\nthe air, their heads and tops in the earth. Our Mercury is a\u00ebrial; look\nfor it, therefore, in the air and the earth.\u201d The author of the work\nfrom which we quote the passage, says by way of comment: \u201cIn this\npassage \u2018Minerals\u2019 and \u2018our Mercury\u2019 refer to the same thing, and it is\nthe subject of Alchemy, the Stone; and we may remember that Plato is\nsaid to have defined or described _Man_ as a growth having his root in\nthe air, his tops in the earth. Man walks indeed upon the surface of the\nearth, as if nothing impeded his vision of heaven; but he walks\nnevertheless at the bottom of the atmosphere, and between these two, his\n_root_ in air, he must work out his salvation.\u201d A great number of these\n\u201cHermetic writers\u201d established their reputation for wit and wisdom by\ndiscoveries in the practical world, and it is difficult to believe that\nsuch men as Roger Bacon, Van Helmont, Ramond Lulli, Jerome Cardan,\nGeber, (\u201cThe Wise\u201d), Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and\nothers not inferior, could have deceived themselves as the modern theory\nimplies, viz: that they were searching a chemical recipe for the\nmanufacture of gold. The symbolic form of statement was esteemed at that\ntime as the highest form of popular exposition for the Infinite and the\nreligious problems concerning God, the Soul and the Universe. It seems\nthat those writers considered such words as \u201cGod,\u201d \u201cSpirit,\u201d \u201cHeaven,\u201d\nand words of like deep import, as not signifying the thing intended only\nso far as the one who used them, comprehended them. Thus, if God was\nspoken of by one who sensuously imaged Him, here was idolatry, and the\nsecond commandment was broken. To the Platonist, \u201cGod\u201d was the name of\nthe Absolute Universal, and hence included _subject_ as well as _object_\nin thinking. Hence if one objectified God by conceiving Him, he\nnecessarily limited God, or rather, had no real knowledge of Him. Said\nSextus, the Pythagorean: \u201cDo not investigate the name of God, because\nyou will not find it. For everything which is called by a name, receives\nits appellation from that which is more worthy than itself, so that it\nis one person that calls, and another that hears. Who is it, therefore,\nthat has given a name to God? _God_, however, is not a name for God, but\nan indication of what we conceive of him.\u201d From such passages we can see\nwhy the Alchemists called this \u201cIneffable One,\u201d _Mercury_, _Luna_,\n_Sol_, _Argent vive_, _Ph\u0153bus_, _Sulphur_, _Antimony_, _Elixir_,\n_Alcahest_, _Salt_, and other whimsical names, letting the predicates\napplied determine the nature of what was meant. If a writer, speaking of\n\u201cAlcahest,\u201d should say that it is a somewhat that rises in the east, and\nsets in the west, gives light to the earth, and causes the growth of\nplants by its heat, &c., we should not misunderstand his meaning\u2014it\nwould be giving us the nature of the thing without the common name.\nEvery one attaches some sort of significance to the words \u201cLife,\u201d \u201cGod,\u201d\n\u201cReason,\u201d \u201cInstinct,\u201d &c., and yet who comprehends them? It is evident\nthat in most cases the word stands for the thing, and hence when one\nspeaks of such things by name, the hearer yawns and looks listless, as\nif he thought: \u201cWell, I know all about that\u2014I learned that when a child,\nin the Catechism.\u201d The Alchemists (and Du Fresnoy names nearly a\nthousand of these prolific writers) determined that no one should\nflatter himself that he knew the nature of the subject before he saw the\npredicates applied. Hence the strange names about which such spiritual\ndoctrines were inculcated. \u201cIf we have concealed anything,\u201d says Geber,\n\u201cye sons of learning, wonder not, for we have not concealed it from you,\nbut have delivered it in such language as that it may be hid from evil\nmen, and that the unjust and vile might not know it. But, ye sons of\nTruth, search, and you shall find this most excellent gift of God, which\nhe has reserved for you.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n EDITORIALS.\n\n\n ORIGINALITY.\n\n\nIt is natural that in America more than elsewhere, there should be a\npopular demand for originality. In Europe, each nation has, in the\ncourse of centuries, accumulated a stock of its own peculiar creations.\nAmerica is sneered at for the lack of these. We have not had time as yet\nto develop spiritual capital on a scale to correspond to our material\npretensions. Hence, we, as a people, feel very sensitive on this point,\nand whenever any new literary enterprise is started, it is met on every\nhand by inquiries like these: \u201cIs it original, or only an importation of\nEuropean ideas?\u201d \u201cWhy not publish something indigenous?\u201d It grows\ncynical at the sight of erudition, and vents its spleen with\nindignation: \u201cWhy rifle the graves of centuries? You are no hyena! Does\nnot the spring bring forth its flowers, and every summer its swarms of\ngnats? Why build a bridge of rotten coffin planks, or wear a wedding\ngarment of mummy wrappage? Why desecrate the Present, by offering it\ntime-stained paper from the shelves of the Past?\u201d\n\nIn so far as these inquiries are addressed to our own undertaking, we\nhave a word to offer in self-justification. We have no objection to\noriginality of the right stamp. An originality which cherishes its own\nlittle idiosyncrasies we despise. If we must differ from other people,\nlet us differ in having a wide cosmopolitan culture. \u201cAll men are alike\nin possessing defects,\u201d says Goethe; \u201cin excellencies alone, it is, that\ngreat differences may be found.\u201d\n\nWhat philosophic originality may be, we hope to show by the following\nconsideration:\n\nIt is the province of Philosophy to dissolve and make clear to itself\nthe entire phenomena of the world. These phenomena consist of two kinds:\n_first_, the products of nature, or immediate existence; _second_, the\nproducts of spirit, including what modifications man has wrought upon\nthe former, and his independent creations. These spiritual products may\nbe again subdivided into _practical_ (in which the _will_\npredominates)\u2014the institutions of civilization\u2014and _theoretical_ (in\nwhich the _intellect_ predominates)\u2014art, religion, science, &c. Not only\nmust Philosophy explain the immediate phenomena of nature\u2014it must also\nexplain the mediate phenomena of spirit. And not only are the\ninstitutions of civilization proper objects of study, but still more is\nthis theoretic side that which demands the highest activity of the\nphilosopher.\n\nTo examine the thoughts of man\u2014to unravel them and make them clear\u2014must\nconstitute the earliest employment of the speculative thinker; his first\nbusiness is to comprehend the thought of the world; to dissolve for\nhimself the solutions which have dissolved the world before him. Hence,\nthe prevalent opinion that it is far higher to be an \u201coriginal\ninvestigator\u201d than to be engaged in studying the thoughts of others,\nleaves out of view the fact that the thoughts of other men are just as\nmuch objective phenomena to the individual philosopher as the ground he\nwalks on. They need explanation just as much. If I can explain the\nthoughts of the profoundest men of the world, and make clear wherein\nthey differed among themselves and from the truth, certainly I am more\noriginal than they were. For is not \u201coriginal\u201d to be used in the sense\nof _primariness_, of approximation to the absolute, universal truth? He\nwho varies from the truth must be secondary, and owe his deflections to\nsomewhat alien to his being, and therefore be himself subordinate\nthereto. Only the Truth makes Free and Original. How many people stand\nin the way of their own originality! If an absolute Science should be\ndiscovered by anybody, we could all become absolutely original by\nmastering it. So much as I have mastered of science, I have dissolved\ninto me, and have not left it standing alien and opposed to me, but it\nis now my own.\n\nOur course, then, in the practical endeavor to elevate the tone of\nAmerican thinking, is plain: we must furnish convenient access to the\ndeepest thinkers of ancient and modern times. To prepare translations\nand commentary, together with original exposition, is our object.\nOriginality will take care of itself. Once disciplined in Speculative\nthought, the new growths of our national life will furnish us objects\nwhose comprehension shall constitute original philosophy without\nparallel. Meanwhile it must be confessed that those who set up this cry\nfor originality are not best employed. Their ideals are commonplace, and\ntheir demand is too easily satisfied with the mere whimsical, and they\ndo not readily enough distinguish therefrom the excellent.\n\n\n CONTENTS OF THE JOURNAL.\n\n\nThus far the articles of this journal have given most prominence to art\nin its various forms. The speculative content of art is more readily\nseen than that of any other form, for the reason that its sensuous\nelement allows a more genial exposition. The critique of the Second Part\nof Faust, by Rosencrantz, published in this number, is an eminent\nexample of the effect which the study of Speculative Philosophy has upon\nthe analytical understanding. Is not the professor of logic able to\nfollow the poet, and interpret the products of his creative imagination?\nThe portion of Hegel\u2019s \u00c6sthetics, published in this number, giving, as\nit does, the historical groundwork of art, furnishes in a genial form an\noutline of the Philosophy of History. Doubtless the characteristics of\nthe Anglo-Saxon mind make it difficult to see in art what it has for\nsuch nations as the Italians and Germans; we have the reflective\nintellect, and do not readily attain the standpoint of the creative\nimagination.\n\n\n STYLE.\n\n\nIn order to secure against ambiguity, it is sometimes necessary to make\ninelegant repetitions, and, to give to a limiting clause its proper\ndegree of subordination, such devices as parentheses, dashes, etc., have\nto be used to such a degree as to disfigure the page. Capitals and\nitalics are also used without stint to mark important words. The\nadjective has frequently to be used substantively, and, if rare, this\nuse is marked by commencing it with a capital.\n\nThere are three styles, which correspond to the three grades of\nintellectual culture. The sensuous stage uses simple, categorical\nsentences, and relates facts, while the reflective stage uses\nhypothetical ones, and marks relations between one fact and another; it\nintroduces antithesis. The stage of the Reason uses the disjunctive\nsentence, and makes an assertion exhaustive, by comprehending in it a\nmultitude of interdependencies and exclusions. Thus it happens that the\nstyle of a Hegel is very difficult to master, and cannot be translated\nadequately into the sensuous style, although many have tried it. A\nperson is very apt to blame the style of a deep thinker when he\nencounters him for the first time. It requires an \u201cexpert swimmer\u201d to\nfollow the discourse, but for no other reason than that the mind has not\nacquired the strength requisite to grasp in one thought a wide extent of\nconceptions.\n\n\n\n\n THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.\n Vol. I. 1867. No. 3.\n\n\n THE MONADOLOGY.\n [Translated from the French of LEIBNITZ, by F. H. HEDGE.]\n\n1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is merely a simple substance\nentering into those which are compound; simple, that is to say, without\nparts.\n\n2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for\nthe compound is only a collection or aggregate of simples.\n\n3. Where there are no parts, neither extension, nor figure, nor\ndivisibility is possible; and these Monads are the veritable Atoms of\nNature\u2014in one word, the Elements of things.\n\n4. There is thus no danger of dissolution, and there is no conceivable\nway in which a simple substance can perish naturally.\n\n5. For the same reason, there is no way in which a simple substance can\nbegin naturally, since it could not be formed by composition.\n\n6. Therefore we may say that the Monads can neither begin nor end in any\nother way than all at once; that is to say, they cannot begin except by\ncreation, nor end except by annihilation; whereas that which is\ncompounded, begins and ends by parts.\n\n7. There is also no intelligible way in which a Monad can be altered or\nchanged in its interior by any other creature, since it would be\nimpossible to transpose anything in it, or to conceive in it any\ninternal movement\u2014any movement excited, directed, augmented or\ndiminished within, such as may take place in compound bodies, where\nthere is change of parts. The Monads have no windows through which\nanything can enter or go forth. It would be impossible for any accidents\nto detach themselves and go forth from the substances, as did formerly\nthe Sensible Species of the Schoolmen. Accordingly, neither substance\nnor accident can enter a Monad from without.\n\n8. Nevertheless Monads must have qualities\u2014otherwise they would not even\nbe entities; and if simple substances did not differ in their qualities,\nthere would be no means by which we could become aware of the changes of\nthings, since all that is in compound bodies is derived from simple\ningredients, and Monads, being without qualities, would be\nindistinguishable one from another, seeing also they do not differ in\nquantity. Consequently, a _plenum_ being supposed, each place could in\nany movement receive only the just equivalent of what it had had before,\nand one state of things would be indistinguishable from another.\n\n9. Moreover, each Monad must differ from every other, for there are\nnever two beings in nature perfectly alike, and in which it is\nimpossible to find an internal difference, or one founded on some\nintrinsic denomination.\n\n10. I take it for granted, furthermore, that every created being is\nsubject to change\u2014consequently the created Monad; and likewise that this\nchange is continual in each.\n\n11. It follows, from what we have now said, that the natural changes of\nMonads proceed from an internal principle, since no external cause can\ninfluence the interior.\n\n12. But, besides the principle of change, there must also be a detail of\nchanges, embracing, so to speak, the specification and the variety of\nthe simple substances.\n\n13. This detail must involve multitude in unity or in simplicity: for as\nall natural changes proceed by degrees, something changes and something\nremains, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a\nplurality of affections and relations, although there are no parts.\n\n14. This shifting state, which involves and represents multitude in\nunity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what we call\nPerception, which must be carefully distinguished from _apperception_,\nor consciousness, as will appear in the sequel. Here it is that the\nCartesians have especially failed, making no account of those\nperceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this that has led them\nto suppose that spirits are the only Monads, and that there are no souls\nof brutes or other Entelechies. It is owing to this that they have\nvulgarly confounded protracted torpor with actual death, and have fallen\nin with the scholastic prejudice, which believes in souls entirely\nseparate. Hence, also, ill affected minds have been confirmed in the\nopinion that the soul is mortal.\n\n15. The action of the internal principle which causes the change, or the\npassage from one perception to another, may be called Appetition. It is\ntrue, the desire cannot always completely attain to every perception to\nwhich it tends, but it always attains to something thereof, and arrives\nat new perceptions.\n\n16. We experience in ourselves the fact of multitude in the simple\nsubstance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious\nincludes a variety in its object. Accordingly, all who admit that the\nsoul is a simple substance, are bound to admit this multitude in the\nMonad, and Mr. Boyle should not have found any difficulty in this\nadmission, as he has done in his dictionary\u2014Art. Rorarius.\n\n17. Besides, it must be confessed that Perception and its consequences\nare inexplicable by mechanical causes\u2014that is to say, by figures and\nmotions. If we imagine a machine so constructed as to produce thought,\nsensation, perception, we may conceive it magnified\u2014the same proportions\nbeing preserved\u2014to such an extent that one might enter it like a mill.\nThis being supposed, we should find in it on inspection only pieces\nwhich impel each other, but nothing which can explain a perception. It\nis in the simple substance, therefore\u2014not in the compound, or in\nmachinery\u2014that we must look for that phenomenon; and in the simple\nsubstance we find nothing else\u2014nothing, that is, but perceptions and\ntheir changes. Therein also, and therein only, consist all the internal\nacts of simple substances.\n\n18. We might give the name of Entelechies to all simple substances or\ncreated Monads, inasmuch as there is in them a certain completeness\n(perfection), (\u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c2). There is a sufficiency (\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1)\nwhich makes them the sources of their own internal actions, and, as it\nwere, incorporeal automata.\n\n19. If we choose to give the name of soul to all that has perceptions\nand desires, in the general sense which I have just indicated, all\nsimple substances or created Monads may be called souls. But as\nsentiment is something more than simple perception, I am willing that\nthe general name of Monads and Entelechies shall suffice for those\nsimple substances which have nothing but perceptions, and that the term\nsouls shall be confined to those whose perceptions are more distinct,\nand accompanied by memory.\n\n20. For we experience in ourselves a state in which we remember nothing,\nand have no distinct perception, as when we are in a swoon or in a\nprofound and dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not differ\nsensibly from a simple Monad; but since this state is not permanent, and\nsince the soul delivers herself from it, she is something more.\n\n21. And it does not by any means follow, in that case, that the simple\nsubstance is without perception: that, indeed, is impossible, for the\nreasons given above; for it cannot perish, neither can it subsist\nwithout affection of some kind, which is nothing else than its\nperception. But where there is a great number of minute perceptions, and\nwhere nothing is distinct, one is stunned, as when we turn round and\nround in continual succession in the same direction; whence arises a\nvertigo, which may cause us to faint, and which prevents us from\ndistinguishing anything. And possibly death may produce this state for a\ntime in animals.\n\n22. And as every present condition of a simple substance is a natural\nconsequence of its antecedent condition, so its present is big with its\nfuture.\n\n23. Then, as on awaking from a state of stupor, we become conscious of\nour perceptions, we must have had perceptions, although unconscious of\nthem, immediately before awaking. For each perception can have no other\nnatural origin but an antecedent perception, as every motion must be\nderived from one which preceded it.\n\n24. Thus it appears that if there were no distinction\u2014no relief, so to\nspeak\u2014no enhanced flavor in our perceptions, we should continue forever\nin a state of stupor; and this is the condition of the naked Monad.\n\n25. And so we see that nature has given to animals enhanced perceptions,\nby the care which she has taken to furnish them with organs which\ncollect many rays of light and many undulations of air, increasing their\nefficacy by their union. There is something approaching to this in odor,\nin taste, in touch, and perhaps in a multitude of other senses of which\nwe have no knowledge. I shall presently explain how that which passes in\nthe soul represents that which takes place in the organs.\n\n26. Memory gives to the soul a kind of consecutive action which imitates\nreason, but must be distinguished from it. We observe that animals,\nhaving a perception of something which strikes them, and of which they\nhave previously had a similar perception, expect, through the\nrepresentation of their memory, the recurrence of that which was\nassociated with it in their previous perception, and incline to the same\nfeelings which they then had. For example, when we show dogs the cane,\nthey remember the pain which it caused them, and whine and run.\n\n27. And the lively imagination, which strikes and excites them, arises\nfrom the magnitude or the multitude of their previous perceptions. For\noften a powerful impression produces suddenly the effect of long habit,\nor of moderate perceptions often repeated.\n\n28. In men as in brutes, the consecutiveness of their perceptions is due\nto the principle of memory\u2014like empirics in medicine, who have only\npractice without theory. And we are mere empirics in three-fourths of\nour acts. For example, when we expect that the sun will rise to-morrow,\nwe judge so empirically, because it has always risen hitherto. Only the\nastronomer judges by an act of reason.\n\n29. But the cognition of necessary and eternal truths is that which\ndistinguishes us from mere animals. It is this which gives us Reason and\nScience, and raises us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God; and it\nis this in us which we call a reasonable soul or spirit.\n\n30. It is also by the cognition of necessary truths, and by their\nabstractions, that we rise to acts of reflection, which give us the idea\nof that which calls itself \u201cI,\u201d and which lead us to consider that this\nor that is in us. And thus, while thinking of ourselves, we think of\nBeing, of substance, simple or compound, of the immaterial, and of God\nhimself. We conceive that that which in us is limited, is in him without\nlimit. And these reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our\nreasonings.\n\n31. Our reasonings are founded on two great principles, that of\n\u201c_Contradiction_,\u201d by virtue of which we judge that to be false which\ninvolves contradiction, and that to be true which is opposed to, or\nwhich contradicts the false.\n\n32. And that of the \u201c_Sufficient Reason_,\u201d by virtue of which we judge\nthat no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be\na sufficient reason why it is thus, and not otherwise, although these\nreasons very often cannot be known to us.\n\n33. There are also two sorts of truths\u2014those of reasoning and those of\nfact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is\nimpossible; those of fact are contingent, and their opposite is\npossible. When a truth is necessary, we may discover the reason of it by\nanalysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and truths, until we arrive at\nthose which are ultimate.[3]\n\n34. It is thus that mathematicians by analysis reduce speculative\ntheorems and practical canons to definitions, axioms and postulates.\n\n35. And finally, there are simple ideas of which no definition can be\ngiven; there are also axioms and postulates,\u2014in one word, _ultimate\nprinciples_, which cannot and need not be proved. And these are\n\u201cIdentical Propositions,\u201d of which the opposite contains an express\ncontradiction.\n\n36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for truths contingent, or\ntruths of fact\u2014that is, for the series of things diffused through the\nuniverse of creatures\u2014or else the process of resolving into particular\nreasons might run into a detail without bounds, on account of the\nimmense variety of the things of nature, and of the infinite division of\nbodies. There is an infinity of figures and of movements, present and\npast, which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing; and\nthere is an infinity of minute inclinations and dispositions of my soul,\npresent and past, which enter into the final cause of it.\n\n37. And as all this detail only involves other anterior or more detailed\ncontingencies, each one of which again requires a similar analysis in\norder to account for it, we have made no advance, and the sufficient or\nfinal reason must be outside of the series of this detail of\ncontingencies,[4] endless as it may be.\n\n38. And thus the final reason of things must be found in a necessary\nSubstance, in which the detail of changes exists eminently as their\nsource. And this is that which we call GOD.\n\n39. Now this Substance being a sufficient reason of all this detail,\nwhich also is everywhere linked together, _there is but one God, and\nthis God suffices_.\n\n40. We may also conclude that this supreme Substance, which is Only,[5]\nUniversal, and Necessary\u2014having nothing outside of it which is\nindependent of it, and being a simple series of possible beings\u2014must be\nincapable of limits, and must contain as much of reality as is possible.\n\n41. Whence it follows that God is perfect, perfection being nothing but\nthe magnitude of positive reality taken exactly, setting aside the\nlimits or bounds in that which is limited. And there, where there are no\nbounds, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.\n\n42. It follows also that the creatures have their perfections from the\ninfluence of God, but they have their imperfections from their proper\nnature, incapable of existing without bounds; for it is by this that\nthey are distinguished from God.\n\n43. It is true, moreover, that God is not only the source of existences,\nbut also of essences, so far as real, or of that which is real in the\npossible; because the divine understanding is the region of eternal\ntruths, or of the ideas on which they depend, and without Him there\nwould be nothing real in the possibilities, and not only nothing\nexisting, but also nothing possible.\n\n44. At the same time, if there be a reality in the essences or\npossibilities, or in the eternal truths, this reality must be founded in\nsomething existing and actual, consequently in the existence of the\nnecessary Being, in whom essence includes existence, or with whom it is\nsufficient to be possible in order to be actual.\n\n45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) possesses this privilege,\nthat he must exist if possible; and since nothing can hinder the\npossibility of that which includes no bounds, no negation, and\nconsequently no contradiction, that alone is sufficient to establish the\nexistence of God _a priori_. We have likewise proved it by the reality\nof eternal truths. But we have also just proved it _a posteriori_ by\nshowing that, since contingent beings exist, they can have their\nultimate and sufficient reason only in some necessary Being, who\ncontains the reason of his existence in himself.\n\n46. Nevertheless, we must not suppose, with some, that eternal verities,\nbeing dependent upon God, are arbitrary, and depend upon his will, as\nDes Cartes, and afterward M. Poiret, appear to have conceived. This is\ntrue only of contingent truths, the principle of which is fitness, or\nthe choice of the best; whereas necessary truths depend solely on His\nunderstanding, and are its internal object.\n\n47. Thus God alone is the primitive Unity, or the simple original\nsubstance of which all the created or derived Monads are the products;\nand they are generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations of the\nDivinity, from moment to moment, bounded by the receptivity of the\ncreature, of whose existence limitation is an essential condition.\n\n48. In God is _Power_, which is the source of all; then Knowledge, which\ncontains the detail of Ideas; and, finally, Will, which generates\nchanges or products according to the principle of optimism. And this\nanswers to what, in created Monads, constitutes the subject or the\nbasis, the perceptive and the appetitive faculty. But in God these\nattributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, and in the created\nMonads, or in the Entelechies (or _perfectihabiis_, as Hermolaus\nBarbarus translates this word), they are only imitations according to\nthe measure of their perfection.\n\n49. The creature is said to act externally, in so far as it possesses\nperfection, and to suffer from another (creature) so far as it is\nimperfect. So we ascribe action to the Monad, so far as it has distinct\nperceptions, and passion, so far as its perceptions are confused.\n\n50. And one creature is more perfect than another, in this: that we find\nin it that which serves to account _a priori_ for what passes in the\nother; and it is therefore said to act upon the other.\n\n51. But in simple substances this is merely an ideal influence of one\nMonad upon another, which can pass into effect only by the intervention\nof God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God one Monad has a right to demand\nthat God, in regulating the rest from the commencement of things, shall\nhave regard to it; for since a created Monad can have no physical\ninfluence on the interior of another, it is only by this means that one\ncan be dependent on another.\n\n52. And hence it is that actions and passions in creatures are mutual;\nfor God, comparing two simple substances, finds reasons in each which\noblige him to accommodate the one to the other. Consequently that which\nis active in one view, is passive in another\u2014active so far as what we\nclearly discern in it serves to account for that which takes place in\nanother, and passive so far as the reason of that which passes in it is\nfound in that which is clearly discerned in another.\n\n53. Now, as in the ideas of God there is an infinity of possible worlds,\nand as only one can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the\nchoice of God, which determines him to one rather than another.\n\n54. And this reason can be no other than fitness, derived from the\ndifferent degrees of perfection which these worlds contain, each\npossible world having a claim to exist according to the measure of\nperfection which it enfolds.\n\n55. And this is the cause of the existence of that Best, which the\nwisdom of God discerns, which his goodness chooses, and his power\neffects.\n\n56. And this connection, or this accommodation of all created things to\neach, and of each to all, implies in each simple substance relations\nwhich express all the rest. Each, accordingly, is a living and perpetual\nmirror of the universe.\n\n57. And as the same city viewed from different sides appears quite\ndifferent, and is perspectively multiplied, so, in the infinite\nmultitude of simple substances, there are given, as it were, so many\ndifferent worlds which yet are only the perspectives of a single one,\naccording to the different points of view of each Monad.\n\n58. And this is the way to obtain the greatest possible variety with the\ngreatest possible order\u2014that is to say, the way to obtain the greatest\npossible perfection.\n\n59. Thus this hypothesis (which I may venture to pronounce demonstrated)\nis the only one which properly exhibits the greatness of God. And this\nMr. Boyle acknowledges, when in his dictionary (Art. Rorarius) he\nobjects to it. He is even disposed to think that I attribute too much to\nGod, that I ascribe to him impossibilities; but he can allege no reason\nfor the impossibility of this universal harmony, by which each substance\nexpresses exactly the perfections of all the rest through its relations\nwith them.\n\n60. We see, moreover, in that which I have just stated, the _a priori_\nreasons why things could not be other than they are. God, in ordering\nthe whole, has respect to each part, and specifically to each Monad,\nwhose nature being representative, is by nothing restrained from\nrepresenting the whole of things, although, it is true, this\nrepresentation must needs be confused, as it regards the detail of the\nuniverse, and can be distinct only in relation to a small part of\nthings, that is, in relation to those which are nearest, or whose\nrelations to any given Monad are greatest. Otherwise each Monad would be\na divinity. The Monads are limited, not in the object, but in the mode\nof their knowledge of the object. They all tend confusedly to the\ninfinite, to the whole; but they are limited and distinguished by the\ndegrees of distinctness in their perceptions.\n\n61. And compounds symbolize in this with simples. For since the world is\na _plenum_, and all matter connected, and as in a _plenum_ every\nmovement has some effect on distant bodies, in proportion to their\ndistance, so that each body is affected not only by those in actual\ncontact with it, and feels in some way all that happens to them, but\nalso through their means is affected by others in contact with those by\nwhich it is immediately touched\u2014it follows that this communication\nextends to any distance. Consequently, each body feels all that passes\nin the universe, so that he who sees all, may read in each that which\npasses everywhere else, and even that which has been and shall be,\ndiscerning in the present that which is removed in time as well as in\nspace. \u201c\u03a3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bd\u03cc\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9 \u03a0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\u201d says Hippocrates. But each soul can read in\nitself only that which is distinctly represented in it. It cannot unfold\nits laws at once, for they reach into the infinite.\n\n62. Thus, though every created Monad represents the entire universe, it\nrepresents more distinctly the particular body to which it belongs, and\nwhose Entelechy it is: and as this body expresses the entire universe,\nthrough the connection of all matter in a _plenum_, the soul represents\nalso the entire universe in representing that body which especially\nbelongs to it.\n\n63. The body belonging to a Monad, which is its Entelechy or soul,\nconstitutes, with its Entelechy, what may be termed a living (thing),\nand, with its soul, what may be called an animal. And the body of a\nliving being, or of an animal, is always organic; for every Monad, being\na mirror of the universe, according to its fashion, and the universe\nbeing arranged with perfect order, there must be the same order in the\nrepresentative\u2014that is, in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently\nof the body according to which the universe is represented in it.\n\n64. Thus each organic living body is a species of divine machine, or a\nnatural automaton, infinitely surpassing all artificial automata. A\nmachine made by human art is not a machine in all its parts. For\nexample, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which are not\nartificial to us; they have nothing which marks the machine in their\nrelation to the use for which the wheel is designed; but natural\nmachines\u2014that is, living bodies\u2014are still machines in their minutest\nparts, _ad infinitum_. This makes the difference between nature and art,\nthat is to say, between the Divine art and ours.\n\n65. And the author of nature was able to exercise this divine and\ninfinitely wonderful art, inasmuch as every portion of nature is not\nonly infinitely divisible, as the ancients knew, but is actually\nsubdivided without end\u2014each part into parts, of which each has its own\nmovement. Otherwise, it would be impossible that each portion of matter\nshould express the universe.\n\n66. Whence it appears that there is a world of creatures, of living\n(things), of animals, of Entelechies, of souls, in the minutest portion\nof matter.\n\n67. Every particle of matter may be conceived as a garden of plants, or\nas a pond full of fishes. But each branch of each plant, each member of\neach animal, each drop of their humors, is in turn another such garden\nor pond.\n\n68. And although the earth and the air embraced between the plants in\nthe garden, or the water between the fishes of the pond, are not\nthemselves plant or fish, they nevertheless contain such, but mostly too\nminute for our perception.\n\n69. So there is no uncultured spot, no barrenness, no death in the\nuniverse\u2014no chaos, no confusion, except in appearance, as it might seem\nin a pond at a distance, in which one should see a confused motion and\nswarming, so to speak, of the fishes of the pond, without distinguishing\nthe fishes themselves.\n\n70. We see, then, that each living body has a governing Entelechy, which\nin animals is the soul of the animal. But the members of this living\nbody are full of other living bodies\u2014plants, animals\u2014each of which has\nits Entelechy, or regent soul.\n\n71. We must not, however, suppose\u2014as some who misapprehended my thought\nhave done\u2014that each soul has a mass or portion of matter proper to\nitself, or forever united to it, and that it consequently possesses\nother inferior living existences, destined forever to its service. For\nall bodies are in a perpetual flux, like rivers. Their particles are\ncontinually coming and going.\n\n72. Thus the soul does not change its body except by degrees. It is\nnever deprived at once of all its organs. There are often metamorphoses\nin animals, but never Metempsychosis\u2014no transmigration of souls. Neither\nare there souls entirely separated (from bodies), nor genii without\nbodies. God alone is wholly without body.\n\n73. For which reason, also, there is never complete generation nor\nperfect death\u2014strictly considered\u2014consisting in the separation of the\nsoul. That which we call generation, is development and accretion; and\nthat which we call death, is envelopment and diminution.\n\n74. Philosophers have been much troubled about the origin of forms, of\nEntelechies, or souls. But at the present day, when, by accurate\ninvestigations of plants, insects and animals, they have become aware\nthat the organic bodies of nature are never produced from chaos or from\nputrefaction, but always from seed, in which undoubtedly there had been\na _preformation_; it has been inferred that not only the organic body\nexisted in that seed before conception, but also a soul in that body\u2014in\none word, the animal itself\u2014and that, by the act of conception, this\nanimal is merely disposed to a grand transformation, to become an animal\nof another species. We even see something approaching this, outside of\ngeneration, as when worms become flies, or when caterpillars become\nbutterflies.\n\n75. Those animals, of which some are advanced to a higher grade, by\nmeans of conception, may be called _spermatic_; but those among them\nwhich remain in their kind\u2014that is to say, the greater portion\u2014are born,\nmultiply, and are destroyed, like the larger animals, and only a small\nnumber of the elect among them, pass to a grander theatre.\n\n76. But this is only half the truth. I have concluded that if the animal\ndoes not begin to be in the order of nature, it also does not cease to\nbe in the order of nature, and that not only there is no generation, but\nno entire destruction\u2014no death, strictly considered. And these _a\nposteriori_ conclusions, drawn from experience, accord perfectly with my\nprinciples deduced _a priori_, as stated above.\n\n77. Thus we may say, not only that the soul (mirror of an indestructible\nuniverse) is indestructible, but also the animal itself, although its\nmachine may often perish in part, and put off or put on organic spoils.\n\n78. These principles have furnished me with a natural explanation of the\nunion, or rather the conformity between the soul and the organized body.\nThe soul follows its proper laws, and the body likewise follows those\nwhich are proper to it, and they meet in virtue of the pre\u00ebstablished\nharmony which exists between all substances, as representations of one\nand the same universe.\n\n79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes, by appetitions,\nmeans and ends; bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes, or\nthe laws of motion. And the two kingdoms, that of efficient causes and\nthat of final causes, harmonize with each other.\n\n80. Des Cartes perceived that souls communicate no force to bodies,\nbecause the quantity of force in matter is always the same.\nNevertheless, he believed that souls might change the direction of\nbodies. But this was because the world was at that time ignorant of the\nlaw of nature, which requires the conservation of the same total\ndirection in matter. Had he known this, he would have hit upon my system\nof pre\u00ebstablished harmony.\n\n81. According to this system, bodies act as if there were no souls, and\nsouls act as if there were no bodies; and yet both act as though the one\ninfluenced the other.\n\n82. As to spirits, or rational souls, although I find that at bottom the\nsame principle which I have stated\u2014namely, that animals and souls begin\nwith the world and end only with the world\u2014holds with regard to all\nanimals and living things, yet there is this peculiarity in rational\nanimals, that although their spermatic animalcules, as such, have only\nordinary or sensitive souls, yet as soon as those of them which are\n_elected_, so to speak, arrive by the act of conception at human nature,\ntheir sensitive souls are elevated to the rank of reason and to the\nprerogative of spirits.\n\n83. Among other differences which distinguish spirits from ordinary\nsouls, some of which have already been indicated, there is also this:\nthat souls in general are living mirrors, or images of the universe of\ncreatures, but spirits are, furthermore, images of Divinity itself, or\nof the Author of Nature, capable of cognizing the system of the\nuniverse, and of imitating something of it by architectonic experiments,\neach spirit being, as it were, a little divinity in its own department.\n\n84. Hence spirits are able to enter into a kind of fellowship with God.\nIn their view he is not merely what an inventor is to his machine (as\nGod is in relation to other creatures), but also what a prince is to his\nsubjects, and even what a father is to his children.\n\n85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all spirits must\nconstitute the City of God\u2014that is to say, the most perfect state\npossible, under the most perfect of monarchs.\n\n86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world\nwithin the natural; and it is the most exalted and the most divine among\nthe works of God. It is in this that the glory of God most truly\nconsists, which glory would be wanting if his greatness and his goodness\nwere not recognized and admired by spirits. It is in relation to this\nDivine City that he possesses, properly speaking, the attribute of\n_goodness_, whereas his wisdom and his power are everywhere manifest.\n\n87. As we have established above, a perfect harmony between the two\nnatural kingdoms\u2014the one of efficient causes, the other of final\ncauses\u2014so it behooves us to notice here also a still further harmony\nbetween the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of\ngrace\u2014that is to say, between God considered as the architect of the\nmachine of the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine\nCity of Spirits.\n\n88. This harmony makes all things conduce to grace by natural methods.\nThis globe, for example, must be destroyed and repaired by natural\nmeans, at such seasons as the government of spirits may require, for the\nchastisement of some and the recompense of others.\n\n89. We may say, furthermore, that God as architect contains entirely God\nas legislator, and that accordingly sins must carry their punishment\nwith them in the order of nature, by virtue even of the mechanical\nstructure of things, and that good deeds in like manner will bring their\nrecompense, through their connection with bodies, although this cannot,\nand ought not always to, take place on the spot.\n\n90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good deed\nwithout its recompense, and no evil deed without its punishment, and all\nmust redound to the advantage of the good\u2014that is to say, of those who\nare not malcontents\u2014in this great commonwealth, who confide in\nProvidence after having done their duty, and who worthily love and\nimitate the Author of all good, pleasing themselves with the\ncontemplation of his perfections, following the nature of pure and\ngenuine Love, which makes us blest in the happiness of the loved. In\nthis spirit, the wise and good labor for that which appears to be\nconformed to the divine will, presumptive or antecedent, contented the\nwhile with all that God brings to pass by his secret will, consequent\nand decisive,\u2014knowing that if we were sufficiently acquainted with the\norder of the universe we should find that it surpasses all the wishes of\nthe wisest, and that it could not be made better than it is, not only\nfor all in general, but for ourselves in particular, if we are attached,\nas is fitting, to the Author of All, not only as the architect and\nefficient cause of our being, but also as our master and the final\ncause, who should be the whole aim of our volition, and who alone can\nmake us blest.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n _Primitifs._\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n i. e., Accidental causes.\n\nFootnote 5:\n\n _Unique._\n\n\n\n\n A CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.\n [Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.]\n\n\n [NOTE.\u2014The following completes Fichte\u2019s Second Introduction to the\n Science of Knowledge, or his Criticism of Philosophical Systems. In\n the first division of what follows, Fichte traces out his own\n transcendental standpoint in the Kantian Philosophy, and next\n proceeds, in the second division, to connect it with what was\n printed in our previous number, criticising without mercy the\n dogmatic standpoint. By the completion of this article, we have\n given to the readers of our _Journal_ Fichte\u2019s own great\n Introductions to that Science of Knowledge, which is about to be\n made accessible to American readers through the publishing house of\n Messrs. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia. Our readers are, therefore,\n especially prepared to enter upon a study of Fichte\u2019s wonderful\n system, for none of these Introductions, as indeed none of Fichte\u2019s\n works of Science, have ever before been published in the English\n language. In a subsequent number we shall print Fichte\u2019s \u201cSun-clear\n Statement regarding the true nature of the Science of Knowledge,\u201d a\n masterly exhibition of the treatment of scientific subjects in a\n popular form. We hope that all who have read, or will read these\n articles, will also enter upon a study of the great work which they\n are designed to prepare for; the study is worth the pains.\u2014EDITOR.]\n\n\n I.\n\n\nIt is not the habit of the _Science of Knowledge_, nor of its author, to\nseek protection under any authority whatever. The person who has first\nto see whether this doctrine agrees with the doctrine of somebody else\nbefore he is willing to be convinced by it, is not one whom this science\ncalculates to convince, because the absolute self-activity and\nindependent faith in himself which this science presupposes, is wanting\nin him.\n\nIt was therefore quite a different motive than a desire to recommend his\ndoctrines, which led the author of the Science of Knowledge to state\nthat his doctrine was in perfect harmony with Kant\u2019s doctrine, and was\nindeed the very same. In this opinion he has been confirmed by the\ncontinued elaboration of his system, which he was compelled to\nundertake. Nevertheless, all others who pass for students of Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy, and who have spoken on the subject\u2014whether they were friends\nor opponents of the Science of Knowledge\u2014have unanimously asserted the\ncontrary; and _by their advice_, even Kant himself, who ought certainly\nbest to understand himself, asserts the contrary. If the author of the\nScience of Knowledge were disposed towards a certain manner of thinking,\nthis would be welcome news to him. Moreover, since he considers it no\ndisgrace to have misunderstood Kant, and foresees that to have\nmisunderstood him will soon be considered no disgrace by general\nopinion, he ought surely not to hesitate to assume that disgrace,\nespecially as it would confer upon him the honor of being the first\ndiscoverer of a philosophy which will certainly become universal, and be\nproductive of the most beneficial results for mankind.\n\nIt is indeed scarcely explicable why friends and opponents of the\nScience of Knowledge so zealously contradict that assertion of its\nauthor, and why they so earnestly request him to prove it, although he\nnever promised to do so, nay, expressly refused, since such a proof\nwould rather belong to a future History of Philosophy than to a present\nrepresentation of that system. The opponents of the Science of Knowledge\nin thus calling for a proof, are certainly not impelled by a tender\nregard for the fame of the author of that Science; and the friends of it\nmight surely leave the subject alone, as I myself have no taste for such\nan honor, and seek the only honor which I know, in quite a different\ndirection. Do they clamor for this proof in order to escape my charge,\nthat they did not understand the writings of Kant? But such an\naccusation from the lips of the author of the Science of Knowledge is\nsurely no reproach, since he confesses as loudly as possible, that he\nalso has not understood them, and that only after he had discovered in\nhis own way the Science of Knowledge, did he find a correct and\nharmonious interpretation of Kant\u2019s writings. Indeed, that charge will\nsoon cease to be a reproach from the lips of anybody. But perhaps this\nclamor is raised to escape the charge that they did not recognize their\nown doctrine, so zealously defended by them, when it was placed before\nthem in a different shape from their own. If this is the case, I should\nlike to save them this reproach also, if there were not another\ninterest, which to me appears higher than theirs, and to which their\ninterest _shall_ be sacrificed. The fact is, I do not wish to be\nconsidered for one moment more than I am, nor to ascribe to myself a\nmerit which I do not possess.\n\nI shall therefore, in all probability, be compelled to enter upon the\nproof which they so earnestly demand, and hence improve the opportunity\nat present offered to me.\n\nThe Science of Knowledge starts, as we have just now seen, from an\nintellectual contemplation, from the absolute self-activity of the Ego.\n\nNow it would seem beyond a doubt, and evident to all the readers of\nKant\u2019s writings, that this man has declared himself on no subject more\ndecisively, nay, I might say contemptuously, than in denying this power\nof an intellectual contemplation. This denial seems so thoroughly rooted\nin the Kantian System, that, after all the elaboration of his\nphilosophy, which he has undertaken _since_[6] the appearance of the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_, and by means of which, as will be evident to\nany one, the propositions of that first work have received a far higher\nclearness and development than they originally possessed;\u2014he yet, in one\nof his latest works, feels constrained to repeat those assertions with\nundiminished energy, and to show that the present style of philosophy,\nwhich treats all labor and exertion with contempt, as well as a most\ndisastrous fanaticism, have resulted from the phantom of an intellectual\ncontemplation.\n\nIs any further proof needed, that a Philosophy, which is based on the\nvery thing so decidedly rejected by the Kantian System, must be\nprecisely the opposite of that system, and must be moreover the very\nsenseless and disastrous system, of which Kant speaks in that work of\nhis? Perhaps, however, it might be well first to inquire, whether the\nsame word may not express two utterly different conceptions in the two\nsystems. In Kant\u2019s terminology, all contemplation is directed upon a\n_Being_ (a permanent Remaining); and intellectual contemplation would\nthus signify in his system the immediate consciousness of a non-sensuous\nBeing, or the immediate consciousness (through pure thinking) of the\nthing per se; and hence a creation of the thing _per se_ through its\nconception, in nearly the same manner as the existence of God is\ndemonstrated from the mere conception of God;\u2014those who do so must look\nupon God\u2019s existence as a mere sequence of their thinking. Now Kant\u2019s\nsystem\u2014taking the direction it did take\u2014may have considered it necessary\nin this manner to keep the thing _per se_ at a respectful distance. But\nthe Science of Knowledge has finished the thing _per se_ in another\nmanner; that Science knows it to be the completest perversion of reason,\na purely irrational conception. To that science all being is necessarily\n_sensuous_, for it evolves the very conception of Being from the form of\nsensuousness. That science regards the intellectual contemplation of\nKant\u2019s system as a phantasm, which vanishes the moment one attempts to\nthink it, and which indeed is not worth a name at all. The intellectual\ncontemplation, whereof the Science of Knowledge speaks, is not at all\ndirected upon a Being, but upon an Activity; and Kant does not even\ndesignate it, (unless you wish to take the expression \u201c_Pure\napperception_\u201d for such a designation). Nevertheless, it can be clearly\nshown where in Kant\u2019s System it ought to have been mentioned. I hope\nthat the _categorical imperative_ of Kant occurs in consciousness,\naccording to his System. Now what sort of consciousness is this of the\ncategorical imperative? This question Kant never proposed to himself,\nbecause he never treated of the basis of _all_ Philosophy. In his\n_Critique of Pure Reason_ he treated only of theoretical Philosophy, and\ncould therefore not introduce the categorical imperative; in his\n_Critique of Practical Reason_, he treated only of practical Philosophy,\nwherein the question concerning the manner of consciousness could not\narise.\n\nThis consciousness is doubtless an immediate, but no sensuous\nconsciousness\u2014hence exactly what I call intellectual contemplation. Now,\nsince we have no classical author in Philosophy, I give it the latter\nname, with the same right with which Kant gives it to something else,\nwhich is a mere nothing; and with the same right I insist that people\nought first to become acquainted with the significance of my terminology\nbefore proceeding to judge my system.\n\nMy most estimable friend, the Rev. Mr. Schulz\u2014to whom I had made known\nmy indefinite idea of building up the whole Science of Philosophy on the\npure Ego, long before I had thoroughly digested that idea, and whom I\nfound less opposed to it than any one else\u2014has a remarkable passage on\nthis subject. In his review of Kant\u2019s _Critique of Pure Reason_, he\nsays: \u201cThe pure, active self-consciousness, in which really every one\u2019s\nEgo consists, must not be confounded\u2014for the very reason because it can\nand must teach us in an immediate manner\u2014with the _power of\ncontemplation_, and must not be made to involve the doctrine that we are\nin possession of a _supersensuous, intellectual power of contemplation_.\nFor we call _contemplation_ a _representation_, which is _immediately_\nrelated to an object. But pure self-consciousness is not representation,\nbut is rather that which first makes a representation to become really a\nrepresentation. If I say, \u2018I represent something to myself,\u2019 it\nsignifies just the same as if I said, \u2018I am conscious that I have a\nrepresentation of this object.\u2019\u201d\n\nAccording to Mr. Schulz, therefore, a representation is that whereof\nconsciousness is possible. Now Mr. Schulz also speaks of pure\nself-consciousness. Undoubtedly he knows whereof he speaks, and hence,\nas philosopher, he most truly has a representation of pure\nself-consciousness. It was not of this consciousness of the philosopher,\nhowever, that Mr. Schulz spoke, but of original consciousness; and hence\nthe significance of his assertion is this: Originally (i. e. in common\nconsciousness without philosophical reflection) mere self-consciousness\ndoes not constitute full consciousness, but is merely a necessary\ncompound, which makes full consciousness first possible. But is it not\nthe same with _sensuous_ contemplation? Does _sensuous_ contemplation\nconstitute a consciousness, or is it not rather merely that whereby a\nrepresentation first becomes a representation? Contemplation without\nconception is confessedly blind. How, then, can Mr. Schulz call\n(sensuous) contemplation (excluding from it self-consciousness)\nrepresentation? From the standpoint of the philosopher, as we have just\nseen, self-consciousness is equally representation; from the standpoint\nof original contemplation, sensuous contemplation is equally _not_\nrepresentation. Or does the conception constitute a representation? The\nconception without contemplation is confessedly empty. In truth,\nself-consciousness, sensuous contemplation, and conception, are, in\ntheir isolated separateness, not representations\u2014they are only that\nthrough which representations become possible. According to Kant, to\nSchulz, and to myself, a complete representation contains a threefold:\n1st. That whereby the representation relates itself to an object, and\nbecomes the representative of a _Something_\u2014and this we unanimously call\nthe _sensuous contemplation_ (even if I am myself the object of my\nrepresentation, it is by virtue of a sensuous contemplation, for then I\nbecome to myself a permanent in time); 2d. That through which the\nrepresentation relates itself to the subject, and becomes _my_\nrepresentation; this I also call contemplation (but _intellectual\ncontemplation_), because it has the same relation to the complete\nrepresentation which the sensuous contemplation has; but Kant and Schulz\ndo not want it called so; and, 3d. That through which both are united,\nand only in this union become representation; and this we again\nunanimously call _conception_.\n\nBut to state it tersely: what is really the Science of Knowledge in two\nwords? It is this: Reason is absolutely self-determined; Reason is only\nfor Reason; but for Reason there is also nothing but Reason. Hence,\neverything, which Reason is, must be grounded in itself, and out of\nitself, but not in or out of another\u2014some external other, which it could\nnever grasp without giving up itself. In short, the Science of Knowledge\nis transcendental idealism. Again, what is the content of the Kantian\nsystem in two words? I confess that I cannot conceive it possible how\nany one can understand even one sentence of Kant, and harmonize it with\nothers, except on the same presupposition which the Science of Knowledge\nhas just asserted. I believe that that presupposition is the everlasting\nrefrain of his system; and I confess that one of the reasons why I\nrefused to prove the agreement of the Science of Knowledge with Kant\u2019s\nsystem was this: It appeared to me somewhat too ridiculous and too\ntedious to show up the forest by pointing out the several trees in it.\n\nI will cite here one chief passage from Kant. He says: \u201cThe highest\nprinciple of the possibility of all contemplation in relation to the\nunderstanding is this: that all the manifold be subject to the\nconditions of the original unity of apperception.\u201d That is to say, in\nother words, \u201cThat something which is contemplated be also _thought_, is\nonly possible on condition that the possibility of the original unity of\napperception can coexist with it.\u201d Now since, according to Kant,\ncontemplation also is possible only on condition that it be thought and\ncomprehended\u2014otherwise it would remain blind\u2014and since contemplation\nitself is thus subject to the conditions of the possibility of\nthinking\u2014it follows that, according to Kant, not only Thinking\nimmediately, but by the mediation of thinking, contemplation also, and\nhence _all consciousness_, is subject to the conditions of the original\nunity of apperception.\n\nNow, what is this condition? It is true, Kant speaks of conditions, but\nhe states only one as a fundamental condition. What is this condition of\nthe original unity of apperception? It is this (see \u00a7 16 of the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_), \u201cthat my representations _can_ be\naccompanied by the \u2018_I_ think\u2019\u201d\u2014the word \u201c_I_\u201d alone is italicised by\nKant, and this is somewhat important; that is to say, _I am the\nthinking_ in this thinking.\n\nOf what \u201cI\u201d does Kant speak here? Perhaps of the Ego, which his\nfollowers quietly heap together by a manifold of representations, in no\nsingle one of which it was, but in all of which collectively it now is\nsaid to be. Then the words of Kant would signify this: I, who think D,\nam the same I who thought A, B and C, and it is only through the\nthinking of my manifold thinking, that I first became I to myself\u2014that\nis to say, the _identical_ in the manifold? In that case Kant would have\nbeen just such a pitiable tattler as these Kantians; for in that case\nthe possibility of all thinking would be conditioned, according to him,\nby another thinking, and by the thinking of this thinking; and I should\nlike to know how we could ever arrive at a thinking.\n\nBut, instead of tracing the consequences of Kant\u2019s statement, I merely\nintended to cite his own words. He says again: \u201cThis representation,\n\u2018_I_ think,\u2019 is an act of spontaneity, i. e. it cannot be considered as\nbelonging to \u2018sensuousness\u2019.\u201c (I add: and hence, also, not to inner\nsensuousness, to which the above described identity of consciousness\nmost certainly does belong.) Kant continues: \u201cI call it pure\napperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical (just\ndescribed) apperception, and because it is that self-consciousness,\nwhich, in producing the representation \u2018I think\u2019\u2014which must accompany\nall other representations, and is _in all consciousness one and the\nsame_\u2014can itself be accompanied by no other representation.\u201d\n\nHere the character of pure self-consciousness is surely clearly enough\ndescribed. It is in all consciousness the same\u2014hence undeterminable by\nany accident of consciousness; in it the Ego is only determined through\nitself, and is thus absolutely determined. It is also clear here, that\nKant could not have understood this pure apperception to mean the\nconsciousness of our individuality, nor could he have taken the latter\nfor the former; for the consciousness of my individuality, as an _I_, is\nnecessarily conditioned by, and only possible through, the consciousness\nof another individuality, a _Thou_.\n\nHence we discover in Kant\u2019s writings the conception of the _pure Ego_\nexactly as the Science of Knowledge has described it, and completely\ndetermined. Again, in what relation does Kant, in the above passage,\nplace this pure Ego to all consciousness? As _conditioning the same_.\nHence, according to Kant, the possibility of all consciousness is\nconditioned by the possibility of the pure Ego, or by pure\nself-consciousness, just as the Science of Knowledge holds. In thinking,\nthe conditioning is made the prior of the conditioned\u2014for this is the\nsignificance of that relation; and thus it appears that, according to\nKant, a systematic deduction of all consciousness, or, which is the\nsame, a System of Philosophy, must proceed from the pure Ego, just as\nthe Science of Knowledge proceeds; and Kant himself has thus suggested\nthe idea of such a Science.\n\nBut some one might wish to weaken this argument by the following\ndistinction: It is one thing to _condition_, and another to _determine_.\n\nAccording to Kant, all consciousness is only _conditioned_ by\nself-consciousness; i. e. the _content_ of that consciousness may have\nits ground in something else than self-consciousness; provided the\nresults of that grounding do not _contradict_ the conditions of\nself-consciousness; those results need not _proceed_ from\nself-consciousness, provided they do not cancel its possibility.\n\nBut, according to the Science of Knowledge, all consciousness is\n_determined_ through self-consciousness; i. e. everything which occurs\nin consciousness is _grounded_, _given_ and _produced_ by the conditions\nof self-consciousness, and a ground of the same in something other than\nself-consciousness does not exist at all.\n\nNow, to meet this argument, I must show that in the present case the\n_determinateness_ follows immediately from the _conditionedness_, and\nthat, therefore, the distinction drawn between both is not valid in this\ninstance. Whosoever says, \u201cAll consciousness is conditioned by the\npossibility of self-consciousness, _and as such I now propose to\nconsider it_,\u201d knows in this his investigation, nothing more concerning\nconsciousness, and abstracts from everything he may believe, further to\nknow concerning it. He deduces what is required from the asserted\nprinciple, and only what he thus has _deduced_ as consciousness is for\nhim consciousness, and everything else is and remains nothing. Thus the\nderivability from self-consciousness _determines_ for him the extent of\nthat which he holds to be consciousness, because he starts from the\npresupposition that all consciousness is _conditioned_ by the\npossibility of self-consciousness.\n\nNow I know very well that Kant has by no means _built up_ such a system;\nfor if he had, the author of the Science of Knowledge would not have\nundertaken that work, but would have chosen another branch of human\nknowledge for his field. I know that he has by no means _proven_ his\ncategories to be conditions of self-consciousness; I know that he has\nsimply asserted them so to be; that he has still less deduced time and\nspace, and that which in original consciousness is _inseparable_ from\nthem\u2014the matter which fills time and space\u2014as such conditions; since of\nthese he has not even expressly stated, as he has done in the case of\nthe categories, that they are such conditions. But I believe I know\nquite as well that Kant has _thought_ such a system; that all his\nwritings and utterances are fragments and results of this system, and\nthat his assertions get meaning and intention only through this\npresupposition. Whether he did not himself think this system with\nsufficient clearness and definiteness to enable him to utter it for\nothers; or whether he did, indeed, think it thus clearly and merely _did\nnot want_ so to utter it, as some remarks would seem to indicate, might,\nit seems to me, be left undecided; at least somebody else must\ninvestigate this matter, for I have never asserted anything on this\npoint.[7] But, however such an investigation may result, this _merit_\nsurely belongs altogether to the great man; that he first of all\nconsciously separated philosophy from external objects, and led that\nscience into the Self. This is the spirit and the inmost soul of all his\nphilosophy, and this also is the spirit and soul of the Science of\nKnowledge.\n\nI am reminded of a chief distinction which is said to exist between the\nScience of Knowledge and Kant\u2019s system, and a distinction which but\nrecently has been again insisted upon by a man who is justly supposed to\nhave understood Kant, and who has shown that he also has understood the\nScience of Knowledge. This man is Reinhold, who, in a late essay, in\nendeavoring to prove that I have done injustice to _myself_, and to\nother successful students of Kant\u2019s writings\u2014in stating what I have just\nnow reiterated and proved, i. e. that Kant\u2019s system and the Science of\nKnowledge are the same\u2014proceeds to remark: \u201cThe _ground_ of our\nassertion, that there is an external something corresponding to our\nrepresentations, is most certainly held by the _Critique of Pure Reason_\nto be contained in the Ego; but only in so far as _empirical knowledge_\n(experience) has taken place in the Ego as a fact; that is to say, the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_ holds that this empirical knowledge has its\nground in the pure Ego only in relation to its _transcendental content_,\nwhich is the _form_ of that knowledge; but in regard to its _empirical_\ncontent, which gives that knowledge objective validity, it is grounded\nin the Ego through a something _which is not the Ego_. Now, a scientific\nform of philosophy was not possible so long as that something, which is\nnot Ego, was looked for outside of the Ego as ground of the objective\nreality of the transcendental content of the Ego.\u201d\n\nThus Reinhold. I have not convinced my readers, or demonstrated my\nproof, until I have met this objection.\n\nThe (purely historical) question is this: Has Kant really placed the\nground of experience (in its empirical content) _in a something\ndifferent from the Ego_?\n\nI know very well that all the Kantians, except Mr. Beck, whose work\nappeared after the publication of the Science of Knowledge, have really\nunderstood Kant to say this. Nay, the last interpreter of Kant, Mr.\nSchulz, whom Kant himself has endorsed, thus interprets him. How often\ndoes Mr. Schulz admit that _the objective ground of the appearances is\ncontained in something which is a thing in itself_, &c., &c. We have\njust seen how Reinhold also interprets Kant.\n\nNow it may seem presumptuous for one man to arise and say: \u201cUp to this\nmoment, amongst a number of worthy scholars who have devoted their time\nand energies to the interpretation of a certain book, not a single one\nhas understood that book otherwise than _utterly falsely_; they all have\ndiscovered in that system the very doctrine which it refutes\u2014dogmatism,\ninstead of transcendental idealism; _and I alone understand it\nrightly_.\u201d Yet this presumption might be but seemingly so; for it is to\nbe hoped that other persons will adopt that one man\u2019s views, and that,\ntherefore, he will not always stand alone. There are other reasons why\nit is not very presumptuous to contradict the whole number of Kantians,\nbut I will not mention them here.\n\nBut what is most curious in this matter is this\u2014the discovery that Kant\ndid not intend to speak of a something different from the Ego, is by no\nmeans a new one. For ten years everybody could read the most thorough\nand complete proof of it in Jacobi\u2019s \u201cIdealism and Realism,\u201d and in his\n\u201cTranscendental Idealism.\u201d In those works, Jacobi has put together the\nmost evident and decisive passages from Kant\u2019s writings on this subject,\nin Kant\u2019s own words. I do not like to do again what has once been done,\nand cannot be done better; and I refer my readers with the more pleasure\nto those works, as they, like all philosophical writings of Jacobi, may\nbe even yet of advantage to them.\n\nA few questions, however, I propose to address to those interpreters of\nKant. Tell me, how far does the applicability of the categories extend,\naccording to Kant, particularly of the category of causality? Clearly\nonly to the field of appearances, and hence only to that which is\nalready in us and for us. But in what manner do we then come to accept a\nsomething different from the Ego, as the ground of the empirical content\nof Knowledge? I answer: only by drawing a conclusion from the grounded\nto the ground; hence by applying the category of causality. Thus,\nindeed, Kant himself discovers it to be, and hence rejects the\nassumption of _things, &c., &c., outside of us_. But his interpreters\nmake him forget for the present instance the validity of categories\ngenerally, and make him arrive, by a bold leap, from the world of\nappearances to the thing _per se_ outside of us. Now, how do these\ninterpreters justify this inconsequence?\n\nKant evidently speaks of a thing _per se_. But what is this thing to\nhim? A _noumenon_, as we can find in many passages of his writings.\nReinhold and Schulz also hold it to be a _noumenon_. Now, what is a\n_noumenon_? According to Kant, to Reinhold, and Schulz, a something,\nwhich our _thinking_\u2014by laws to be shown up, and which Kant has shown\nup\u2014_adds_ to the appearance, and which _must_ so be added in\n_thought_;[8] which, therefore, is produced _only through our thinking_;\nnot, however, through our _free_, but through a _necessary_ thinking,\nwhich is only _for our thinking_\u2014for us thinking beings.\n\nBut what do those interpreters make of this _noumenon_ or thing in\nitself? The thought of this thing in itself is grounded in sensation,\nand sensation they again assert to be grounded in the thing in itself.\nTheir globe rests on the great elephant, and the great elephant\u2014rests on\nthe globe. Their thing in itself, which is a mere thought, they say\n_affects_ the Ego. Have they then forgotten their first speech, and is\nthe thing, _per se_, which a moment ago was but a mere thought, now\nturned into something more? Or do they seriously mean to apply to a mere\nthought, the exclusive predicate of reality, i. e. causality? And such\nteachings are put forth as the astonishing discoveries of the great\ngenius, who, with his torch, lights up the retrograde philosophical\ncentury.\n\nIt is but too well known to me that the Kantianism of the Kantians is\nprecisely the just described system\u2014is really this monstrous composition\nof the most vulgar dogmatism, which allows things _per se_ to make\nimpressions upon us, and of the most decided idealism, which allows all\nbeing to be generated only through the thinking of the intelligence, and\nwhich knows nothing of any other sort of being. From what I am yet going\nto say on this subject, I except two men\u2014Reinhold, because with a power\nof mind and a love of truth which do credit to his heart and head, he\nhas abandoned this system, (which, however, he still holds to be the\nKantian system, and I only disagree with him on this purely historical\nquestion,) and Schulz, because he has of late been silent on\nphilosophical questions, which leaves it fair to assume that he has\nbegun to doubt his former system.\n\nBut concerning the others, it must be acknowledged by all who have still\ntheir inner sense sufficiently under control to be able to distinguish\nbetween being and thinking and not to mix both together, that a system\nwhich thus mixes being and thinking receives but too much honor if it is\nspoken of seriously. To be sure, very few men may be properly required\nto overcome the natural tendency towards dogmatism sufficiently to lift\nthemselves up to the free flight of Speculation. What was impossible for\na man of overwhelming mental activity like Jacobi, how can it be\nexpected of certain other men, whom I would rather not name? But that\nthese incurable dogmatists should have persuaded themselves that Kant\u2019s\n_Critique of Pure Reason_ was food for them; that they had the boldness\nto conclude\u2014since Kant\u2019s writings had been praised (God may know by what\nchance!) in some celebrated journal\u2014they might also now follow the\nfashion and become Kantians; that since then, for years, they, in their\nintoxication, have be-written many a ream of valuable paper, without\never, in all this time, having come to their senses, or understood but\none period of all they have written; that up to the present day, though\nthey have been somewhat rudely shaken, they have not been able to rub\nthe sleep out of their eyes, but rather prefer to beat and kick about\nthem, in the hope of striking some of these unwelcome disturbers of\ntheir peace; and that the German public, so desirous of acquiring\nknowledge, should have bought their blackened paper with avidity, and\nattempted to suck up the spirit of it\u2014nay, should even, perhaps, have\ncopied and recopied these writings without ever clearly perceiving that\nthere was no sense in them: all this will forever, in the annals of\nphilosophy, remain the disgrace of our century, and our posterity will\nbe able to explain these occurrences of our times only on the\npresupposition of a mental epidemic, which had taken hold of this age.\n\nBut, will these interpreters reply: your argument is, after all\u2014if we\nabstract from Jacobi\u2019s writings, which, to be sure, are rather hard to\nswallow, since they quote Kant\u2019s own words\u2014no more than this: it is\nabsurd; hence Kant cannot have meant to say it. Now, if we admit the\nabsurdity, as unfortunately we must, why, then, might not Kant have said\nthese absurdities, just as well as we others, amongst whom there are\nsome, of whom you yourself confess the merits, and to whom you doubtless\nwill not deny all sound understanding?\n\nI reply: to be the inventor of a system is one thing, and to be his\ncommentators and successors, another. What, in case of the latter, would\nnot testify to an absolute want of sound sense, might certainly evince\nit in the former. The ground is this: the latter are not yet possessed\nof the idea of the whole\u2014for if they were so possessed, there would be\nno necessity for them to study the system; they are merely to construct\nit out of the _parts_ which the inventor hands over to them; and all\nthese parts are, in their minds, not fully determined, rounded off, and\nmade smooth, until they are united into a natural whole. Now, this\nconstruction of the parts may require some time, and during this time it\nmay occur that these men determine some parts inaccurately, and hence\nplace them in contradiction with the whole, of which they are not yet\npossessed. The discoverer of the idea of the whole, on the contrary,\nproceeds from this idea, in which all parts are united, and these parts\nhe separately places before his readers, because only thus can he\ncommunicate the whole. The work of the former is a synthetizing of that\nwhich they do not yet possess, but are to obtain through the synthesis;\nthe work of the latter is an analyzing of that which he already\npossesses. It is very possible that the former may not be aware of the\ncontradiction in which the several parts stand to the whole which is to\nbe composed of them, for they may not have got so far yet as to compare\nthem. But it is quite certain that the latter, who proceeded from the\ncomposite, must have thought, or believed that he thought, the\ncontradiction which is in the parts of his representation\u2014for _he_\ncertainly at one time held all the parts together. It is not absurd to\nthink dogmatism now, and in another moment transcendental idealism; for\nthis we all do, and must do, if we wish to philosophize about both\nsystems; but it is absurd to think both systems as _one_. The\ninterpreters of Kant\u2019s system do not necessarily think it thus as one;\nbut the author of that system must certainly have done so if his system\nwas intended to effect such a union.\n\nNow, I, at least, am utterly incapable of believing such an absurdity on\nthe part of any one who has his senses; how, then, can I believe Kant to\nhave been guilty of it? Unless Kant, therefore, declares expressly in so\nmany words, _that he deduces sensation from an impression of the thing_,\n_per se_, or, to use his own terminology, _that sensation must be\nexplained in philosophy, from a transcendental object which exists\noutside of us_, I shall not believe what these interpreters tell us of\nKant. But if he does make this declaration, I shall consider the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_ rather as the result of the most marvellous\naccident than as the product of a mind.\n\nBut, say our opponents, does not Kant state expressly that \u201cThe object\nis given to us,\u201d and \u201cthat this is possible because the object affects\nus as in a certain manner,\u201d and \u201cthat there is a power of attaining\nrepresentations by the manner in which objects affect us, which power is\ncalled _sensuousness_.\u201d Nay, Kant says even this: \u201cHow should our\nknowledge be awakened into exercise if it were not done by objects that\ntouch our senses and partly produce representations themselves, while\npartly putting our power of understanding into motion, to compare,\nconnect and separate these representations, and thus to form the _raw\nmaterial_ of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge which is called\nexperience.\u201d Well, these are probably all the passages which can be\nadduced by our opponents. Now, putting merely passages against passages,\nand words against words, and abstracting altogether from the idea of the\nwhole, which I assume these interpreters never to have had, let me ask\nfirst, if these passages could really not be united with Kant\u2019s other\nfrequently repeated statements, viz., that it is folly to speak of an\nimpression produced upon us by an external transcendental object,\u2014how\ndid it happen that these interpreters preferred to sacrifice the many\nstatements, which assert a transcendental idealism, to these _few_\npassages, which assert a dogmatism, than _vice versa_? Doubtless because\nthey did not attempt the study of Kant\u2019s writings with an impartial\nmind, but had their heads full of that dogmatism\u2014which constitutes their\nvery being\u2014as the only correct system, which they assumed such a\nsensible man as Kant must necessarily also hold to be the only correct\nsystem; and because they thus did not seek to be taught by Kant, but\nmerely to be confirmed by him in their old way of thinking.\n\nBut cannot these seemingly opposite statements be united? Kant speaks in\nthese passages of _objects_. What this word is to signify, we clearly\nmust learn from Kant himself. He says: \u201cIt is the understanding which\nadds the object to the appearance, by _connecting_ the manifold of the\nappearance _in one consciousness_. When this is done, we say we know the\n_object_, for we have effected a synthetical unity in the manifold of\nthe contemplation, and the conception of this unity is the\nrepresentation of the object = X. _But this_ X _is not the\ntranscendental object_ (i. e. the thing _per se_), _for of that we know\nnot even so much_.\u201d\n\nWhat, then, is this object? That which the understanding _adds_ to the\nappearance, _a mere thought_. Now, the object affects\u2014i. e. _something\nwhich is a mere thought affects_. What does this mean? If I have but a\nspark of logic, it means simply: it affects in so far as it is; hence\n_it is only thought as affecting_. Let us now see what Kant means when\nhe speaks about the \u201cpower to obtain representations by the manner in\nwhich objects affect us.\u201d Since we only _think_ the affection itself, we\ndoubtless only think likewise that which is common to the affection. Or:\nif you posit an object with the thought that it has affected you, you\nthink yourself _in this case affected_; and if you think that this\noccurs in respect to _all_ the objects of your perception, you think\nyourself as _liable to be affected generally_\u2014or, in other words, you\nascribe to yourself, _through this your thinking_, receptivity or\nsensuousness.\n\nBut do we not thus assume, after all, _affection_ to explain knowledge?\nLet me state the difference in one word: it is true, all our knowledge\nproceeds from _an affection_, but not an affection _through an object_.\nThis is Kant\u2019s doctrine, and that of the Science of Knowledge. As Mr.\nBeck has overlooked this important point, and as Reinhold does not call\nsufficient attention to that which makes the positing of a non-Ego\npossible, I consider it proper to explain the matter in a few words. In\ndoing so I shall use my own terminology, and not Kant\u2019s, because I\nnaturally have my own more at my command.\n\nWhen I posit myself, I posit myself as a limited; in consequence of the\ncontemplation of my self-positing, I am finite.\n\nThis, my limitedness\u2014since it is the condition which makes my\nself-positing possible\u2014is an original limitedness. Somebody might wish\nto explain this still further, and either deduce the limitedness of\nmyself as the reflected, from my necessary limitedness as the\nreflecting; which would result in the statement: I am finite to myself,\nbecause I can think only the finite;\u2014or he might explain the limitedness\nof the reflecting from that of the reflected, which would result in the\nstatement: I can think only the finite, because I am finite. But such an\nexplanation would explain nothing, for I am originally neither the\nreflecting nor the reflected, but _both in their union_; which union I\ncannot think, it is true, because I separate, in thinking, the\nreflecting from the reflected.\n\nAll limitedness is, by its very conception, a _determined_, and not a\ngeneral limitedness.\n\nFrom the possibility of an Ego, we have thus deduced the necessity of a\n_general limitedness_ of the Ego. But the _determinedness_ of this\nlimitedness cannot be deduced, since it is, as we have seen, that which\nconditions all Egoness. Here, therefore, all deduction is at an end.\nThis _determinedness_ appears as the absolutely accidental, and\nfurnishes the _merely empirical_ of our knowledge. It is this\ndeterminedness, for instance, by virtue of which I am, amongst all\npossible rational beings, a _man_, and amongst all men this _particular_\nperson, &c., &c.\n\nThis, my limitation, in its determinedness, manifests itself as a\nlimitation of my practical power (here philosophy is therefore driven\nfrom the theoretical to the practical sphere); and the immediate\nperception of this limitation is a _feeling_ (I prefer to use this word\ninstead of Kant\u2019s \u201c_sensation_,\u201d for feeling only becomes sensation by\nbeing related in thinking to an object); for instance, the feeling of\nsweet, red, cold, &c.\n\nTo forget this original feeling, leads to a bottomless transcendental\nidealism, and to an incomplete philosophy, which cannot explain the\nsimply sensible predicates of objects. Now, the endeavor to explain this\noriginal feeling from the causality of a _something_, is the dogmatism\nof the Kantians, which I have just shown up, and which they would like\nto put on Kant\u2019s shoulders. This, their something, is the everlasting\nthing _per se_. All _transcendental_ explanation, on the contrary, stops\nat the immediate feeling, from the reason just pointed out. It is true,\nthe _empirical_ Ego, which transcendental idealism observes, explains\nthis feeling to itself by the law, \u201cNo limitation without a limiting;\u201d\nand thus, through contemplation of the limiting, produces extended\nmatter, of which it now, as of its ground, predicates the merely\nsubjective sensation of feeling; and it is only by virtue of this\nsynthesis that the Ego makes itself an object. The continued analysis\nand the continued explanation of its own condition, give to the Ego its\nown system of a universe; and the observation of the laws of this\nexplanation gives to the philosopher his science. It is here that Kant\u2019s\n_Realism_ is based, but his Realism is a _transcendental idealism_.\n\nThis whole determinedness, and hence also the total of feelings which it\nmakes possible, is to be regarded as _a priori_\u2014i. e. absolutely,\nwithout any action of our own\u2014determined. It is Kant\u2019s _receptivity_,\nand a particular of this receptivity is an _affection_. Without it,\nconsciousness is unexplainable.\n\nThere is no doubt that it is an immediate fact of consciousness\u2014I feel\n_myself_ thus or thus determined. Now, when the oft-lauded philosophers\nattempt to _explain_ this feeling, is it not clear that they attempt to\nappend something to it which is not immediately involved in the fact?\nand how can they do this, except through thinking, and through a\nthinking according to a category, which category is here that of the\nreal ground? Now, if they have not an immediate contemplation of the\nthing _per se_ and its relations, what else can they possibly know of\nthis category, but that they are compelled to think according to it?\nThey assert nothing but that _they_ are compelled to add in thought a\nthing as the ground of this feeling. But this we cheerfully admit in\nregard to the standpoint which they occupy. Their thing is produced by\ntheir thinking; and now it is at the same time to be a thing _per se_,\ni. e. not produced by thinking.\n\nI really do not comprehend them; I can neither think this thought, nor\nthink an understanding which does think it; and by this declaration, I\nhope I have done with them forever.\n\n\n VII.\n\n\nHaving finished this digression, we now return to our original\nintention, which was to describe the procedure of the Science of\nKnowledge, and to justify it against the attacks of certain\nphilosophers. We said, the philosopher observes himself in the act\nwhereby he constructs for himself the conception of himself; and we now\nadd, he also _thinks this act of his_.\n\nFor the philosopher, doubtless, knows whereof he speaks; but a mere\ncontemplation gives no consciousness; only that is known which is\nconceived and thought. This conception or comprehension of his activity\nis very well possible for the philosopher, since he is already in\npossession of experience; for he has a conception of _activity in\ngeneral, and as such_, namely, as the opposite of the equally well known\nconception of _Being_; and he also has a conception of this _particular_\nactivity, as that of an _intelligence_, i. e. as simply an ideal\nactivity, and not the real causality of the practical Ego; and moreover,\na conception of the peculiar character of this particular activity as an\n_in itself returning activity_, and not an activity directed upon an\nexternal object.\n\nBut here as well as everywhere it is to be well remembered that the\ncontemplation is and remains the basis of the conception, i. e. of that\nwhich is conceived in the conception. We cannot absolutely create or\nproduce by thinking; we can only think that which is immediately\ncontemplated by us. A thinking, which has no contemplation for its\nbasis, which does not embrace a contemplation entertained in the same\nundivided moment, is an empty thinking, or is really no thinking at all.\nAt the utmost it may be the thinking of a mere sign of the conception,\nand if this sign is a word, as seems likely, the mere thoughtless\nutterance of this word. I determine my contemplation by the thinking of\nan opposite; this and nothing else is the meaning of the expression\u2014I\ncomprehend the contemplation.\n\nThrough thinking, the activity, which the philosopher thinks, becomes\n_objective_ to him, i. e. it floats before him, in so far as he thinks\nit, as something which checks or limits the freedom (the\nundeterminedness) of his thinking. This is the true and original\nsignificance of objectivity. As certain as I think, I think a determined\nsomething; or, in other words, the freedom of my thinking, which might\nhave been directed upon an infinite manifold of objects, is now, when I\nthink, only directed upon that limited sphere of my thinking which the\npresent object fills. It is limited to this sphere. _I restrict myself_\nwith freedom to this sphere, if I contemplate _myself_ in the doing of\nit. _I am restricted_ by this sphere, if I contemplate only the _object_\nand forget myself, as is universally done on the standpoint of common\nthinking. What I have just now said is intended to correct the following\nobjections and misunderstandings.\n\nAll thinking is necessarily directed upon a being, say some. Now the Ego\nof the Science of Knowledge is not to have being; hence it is\nunthinkable, and the whole Science, which is built upon such a\ncontradiction, is null and void.\n\nLet me be permitted to make a preliminary remark concerning the spirit\nwhich prompts this objection. When the wise men, who urge it, take the\nconception of the Ego as determined in the Science of Knowledge, and\nexamine it by the rules of their logic, they doubtless think that\nconception, for how else could they compare and relate it to something\nelse? If they really could not think it, they would not be able to say a\nword about it, and it would remain altogether unknown to them. But they\nhave really, as we see, happily achieved the thinking of it, and so must\nbe able to think it. Yet, because according to their traditional and\nmisconceived rules, they _ought to have been_ unable to think it, they\nwould now rather deny the possibility of an act, while doing it, than\ngive up their rule; they would believe an old book rather than their own\nconsciousness. How little can these men be aware of what they really do!\nHow mechanically, and without any inner attention and spirit, must they\nproduce their philosophical specimens! Master Jourdan after all was\nwilling to believe that he had spoken prose all his lifetime, without\nknowing it, though it did appear rather curious; but these men, if they\nhad been in his place, would have proven in the most beautiful prose\nthat they could not speak prose, since they did not possess the rules of\nspeaking prose, and since the conditions of the possibility of a thing\nmust always precede its reality. Nay, if critical idealism should\ncontinue to be a burden to them, it is to be expected that they will\nnext go to Aristotle for advice as to whether they really live, or are\nalready dead and buried. By doubting the possibility of ever becoming\nconscious of their freedom and Egoness, they are covertly already\ndoubting this very point.\n\nTheir objection might therefore be summarily put aside, since it\ncontradicts, and thus annihilates itself. But let us see where the real\nground of the misunderstanding may be concealed.\n\nAll thinking necessarily proceeds from a being, say they. Now what does\nthis mean? If it is to mean what we have just shown up, namely, that\nthere is in all thinking a thought, an object of the thinking, to which\nthis particular thinking confines itself, and by which it seems to be\nlimited, then their premise must undoubtedly be admitted; and it is not\nthe Science of Knowledge which is going to deny it. This objectivity for\nthe mere thinking does doubtless also belong to the Ego, from which the\nScience of Knowledge proceeds; or, which means the same, to the act\nwhereby the Ego constructs itself for itself. But it is only through\nthinking and only for thinking that it has this objectivity; it is\nmerely an _ideal_ being.\n\nIf, however, the being, of their above assertion, is to mean not a _mere\nideal_, but a _real_ being, i. e. a something, limiting not only the\nideal, but also the actually productive, the practical activity of the\nEgo\u2014that is to say, a something permanent in time and persistent in\nspace\u2014then that assertion of theirs is unwarranted. If it were correct,\nno science of philosophy were possible, for the conception of the Ego\nwould be unthinkable; and self-consciousness, nay, even consciousness,\nwould also be impossible. If it were correct, we, it is true, should be\ncompelled to stop philosophizing; but this would be no gain to them, for\nthey would also have to stop refuting us. But do they not themselves\nrepudiate the correctness of their assertion? Do they not think\nthemselves every moment of their life as free and as having causality?\nDo they not, for instance, think themselves the free, active authors of\nthe very sensible and very original objections, which they bring up from\ntime to time against our system? Now, is then this \u201cthemselves\u201d\nsomething which checks and limits their causality, or is it not rather\nthe very opposite of the check, namely, the very causality itself? I\nmust refer them to what I have said in \u00a7 v. on this subject. If such a\nsort of being were ascribed to the Ego, the Ego would cease to be Ego;\nit would become a _thing_, and its conception would be annihilated. It\nis true that afterwards\u2014not afterwards as a posteriority in time, but\nafterwards in the series of the dependence of thinking\u2014we also ascribe\nsuch a being to the Ego, which, nevertheless, remains and must remain\nEgo in the original meaning of the word; this being consisting partly of\nextension and persistency in space, _and in this respect it becomes a\nbody_, and partly identity and permanency in time, and in this respect\nit becomes a soul. But it is the business of philosophy to prove, and\ngenetically to explain how the Ego comes to think itself thus, and all\nthis belongs not to that which is presupposed, but to that which is to\nbe deduced. The result, therefore, remains thus: the Ego is originally\nonly an act_ing_; if you but think it as an act_ive_, you have already\nan Empirical, and hence a conception of it, which must first be\ndeduced.[9]\n\nBut our opponents claim that they do not make their assertion without\nall proof; they want to prove it by logic, and, if God is willing, by\nthe logical proposition of contradiction.\n\nIf there is anything which clearly shows the lamentable condition of\nphilosophy as a science in these our days, it is that such occurrences\ncan take place. If anybody were to speak about mathematics, natural\nsciences, or any other science, in a manner which would indicate beyond\na doubt his complete ignorance concerning the first principles of such a\nscience, he would be at once sent back to the school from which he ran\naway too soon. But in philosophy it is not to be thus. If in philosophy\na man shows in the same manner his complete ignorance, we are, with many\nbows and compliments to the sharp-sighted man, to give him publicly that\nprivate schooling which he so sadly needs, and without betraying the\nleast smile or gesture of disgust. Have, then, the philosophers in two\nthousand years made clear not a single proposition which might now be\nconsidered as established for that science without further proof? If\nthere is such a proposition, it is certainly that of the distinction of\nlogic, as a purely formal science, from real philosophy or metaphysics.\nBut what is really the true meaning of this terrible logical proposition\nof contradiction which is to crush at one stroke our whole system? As\nfar as I know, simply this: _if_ a conception is already determined by a\ncertain characteristic, then it must not be determined by another\nopposite characteristic. But by what characteristic the conception is\noriginally to be characterized, this logical theorem does not say, nor\ncan say, for it presupposes the original determination, and is\napplicable only in so far as that is presupposed. Concerning the\noriginal determination another science will have to decide.\n\nThese wise men tell us that it is _contradictory_ not to determine a\nconception by the predicate of actual being. Yet how can this be\ncontradictory, unless the conception has first been thus determined by\nthe predicate of actual being, and has then had that predicate denied to\nit? But who authorized them to determine the conception by that\npredicate? Do not these adepts in logic perceive that they postulate\ntheir principle, and turn around in an evident circle? Whether there\nreally be a conception, which is originally\u2014by the laws of the\nsynthetizing, not of the merely analyzing reason\u2014_not determined by that\npredicate of actual being_, this they will have to go and learn from\ncontemplation; logic only warns them against afterwards again applying\nthe same predicate to that conception; of course also, in the same\nrespect, in which they have denied the determinability of the conception\nby that predicate.\n\nBut certainly if they have not yet elevated themselves to _the\nconsciousness_ of that contemplation, which is not determined by the\npredicate of being, (for that they should unconsciously possess that\ncontemplation itself, Reason herself has taken care of,) then _all\ntheir_ conceptions, which can be derived only from sensuous\ncontemplation, are very properly determined by the predicate of this\nactual being. In that case, however, they must not believe that logic\nhas taught them this asserted connection of thinking and being, for\ntheir knowledge of it is altogether derived from their unfortunate\nempirical self. They, standing on the standpoint of knowing no other\nconceptions than those derived from sensuous contemplation, would, of\ncourse, contradict _themselves_ if they were to think one of _their_\nconceptions without the predicate of actual being. We, on our part, are\nalso well content to let them retain this rule for themselves, since it\nis most assuredly universally valid for the whole sphere of _their_\npossible thinking; and to let them always carefully keep an eye on this\nrule, so that they may not violate it. As for ourselves, however, we\ncannot use this their rule any longer, for we possess a few conceptions\nmore, resting in a sphere over which their rule does not extend, and\nabout which they can speak nothing, since it does not exist for them.\nLet them, therefore, attend to their own business hereafter, and leave\nus to attend to ours. Even in so far as we grant them the rule, namely,\nthat every thinking must have an object of thinking; it is by no means a\nlogical rule, but rather one which logic presupposes, and through which\nlogic first becomes possible. _To think_, is the same as to determine\nobjects; both conceptions are identical; logic furnishes the _rules_ of\nthis determining, and hence presupposes clearly enough the determining\ngenerally as a part of consciousness. That all thinking has an object\ncan be shown only in contemplation. Think! and observe in this thinking\nhow you do it, and you will doubtless find that you oppose to your\nthinking an object of this thinking.\n\nAnother objection, somewhat related to the above, is this: If you do not\nproceed from a being, how can you, without being illogical, deduce a\nbeing? You will never be able to get anything else out of what you take\nin hand than what is already contained in it, unless you proceed\ndishonestly and use juggler tricks.\n\nI reply: Nor do we deduce being in the sense in which you use the word,\ni. e. as _being_, _per se_. What the philosopher takes up is an\n_acting_, which acts according to certain laws, and what he establishes\nis the series of necessary acts of this acting. Amongst these acts there\noccurs one which to the acting itself appears as a being, and which by\nlaws to be shown up, _must_ so appear to it. The philosopher who\nobserves the acting from a higher standpoint, never ceases to regard it\nas an acting. A being exists only for the observed Ego, which thinks\nrealistically; but for the philosopher there is acting, and only acting,\nfor he thinks idealistically.\n\nLet me express it on this occasion in all clearness: The essence of\ntranscendental idealism generally, and of the Science of Knowledge\nparticularly, consists in this, that the conception of being is not at\nall viewed as a _first_ and _original_ conception, but simply as a\n_derived_ conception; derived from the opposition of activity. Hence it\nis considered only as a _negative_ conception. The only positive for the\nidealist is _Freedom_; being is the mere negative of freedom. Only thus\nhas idealism a firm basis, and is in harmony with itself. But dogmatism,\nwhich believed itself safely reposing upon being, as a basis no further\nto be investigated or grounded, regards this assertion as a stupidity\nand horror, for it is its annihilation. That wherein the dogmatist,\namongst all the inflictions which he has experienced from time to time,\nstill found a hiding place\u2014namely, some original being, though it were\nbut a raw and formless _matter_\u2014is now utterly destroyed, and he stands\nnaked and defenceless. He has no weapons against this attack except the\nassurance of his hearty disgust, and his confession, that he does not\nunderstand, and positively cannot and will not think, what is required\nof him. We cheerfully give credence to this statement, and only beg that\nhe will also place faith in our assurance, that we find it not at all\ndifficult to think our system. Nay, if this should be too much for him,\nwe can even abstain from it, and leave him to believe whatever he\nchooses on this point. That we do not and cannot force him to adopt our\nsystem, because its adoption depends upon freedom, has already been\noften enough admitted.\n\nI say that the dogmatist has nothing left but the assurance of his\nincapacity, for the idea of intrenching himself behind general logic,\nand conjuring the shade of the Stagirite, because he knows not how to\ndefend his own body, is altogether new, and will find few imitators even\nin this universal state of despair; since the least school knowledge of\nwhat logic really is, will suffice to make every one reject this\nprotection.\n\nLet no one be deceived by these opponents, if they adopt the language of\nidealism, and admitting with their lips the correctness of its views,\nprotest that they know well enough that being is only to signify _being\nfor us_. They are dogmatists. For every one who asserts that all\nthinking and consciousness must proceed from a being, makes being\nsomething primary; and it is this which constitutes dogmatism. By such a\nconfusion of speech they but demonstrate the utter confusion of their\nconceptions; for what may a _being for us_ mean, which is, nevertheless,\nto be an original _not_-derived being? Who, then, are those \u201c_we_,\u201d for\nwhom alone this being is? Are they _intelligences_ as such? Then the\nstatement \u201cthere is something for the intelligence,\u201d signifies, this\nsomething is represented by the intelligence; and the statement \u201cit is\n_only_ for the intelligence,\u201d signifies, it is _only_ represented. Hence\nthe conception of a being, which, from a certain point of view, is to be\nindependent of the representation, must, after all, be derived from the\nrepresentation, since it is to be, only through it; and these men would,\ntherefore, be more in harmony with the Science of Knowledge than they\nbelieved. Or are those \u201c_we_\u201d themselves things, original things, things\nin themselves? How, then, can anything be _for_ them; how can they even\nbe for themselves, since the conception of a thing involves merely that\nit is, but not that the thing is _for itself_? What may the word _for_\nsignify to them? Is it, perhaps, but an innocent adornment which they\nhave adopted for the sake of fashion?\n\n\n VIII.\n\n\nThe Science of Knowledge has said, \u201cIt is not possible to abstract from\nthe Ego.\u201d This assertion may be regarded from two points of view\u2014either\nfrom the standpoint of common consciousness, and then it means, \u201cWe\nnever have another representation than that of ourselves; throughout our\nwhole life, and in all moments of our life, we think only I, I, I, and\nnothing but I.\u201d Or it may be viewed from the standpoint of the\nphilosopher, and then it will have the following significance: \u201cThe Ego\nmust necessarily be added in thought to whatever occurs in\nconsciousness;\u201d or as Kant expresses it, \u201cAll my representations must be\nthought as accompanied by\u2014I think.\u201d What nonsense were it to maintain\nthe first interpretation to be the true one, and what wretchedness to\nrefute it in that interpretation. But in the latter interpretation the\nassertion of the Science of Knowledge will doubtless be acceptable to\nevery one who is but able to understand it; and if it had only been thus\nunderstood before, we should long ago have been rid of the thing _per\nse_, for it would have been seen that we are always the Thinking,\nwhatever we may think, and that hence nothing can occur in us which is\nindependent of us, because it all is necessarily related to our\nthinking.\n\n\n IX.\n\n\n\u201cBut,\u201d confess other opponents of the Science of Knowledge, \u201cas far as\nour own persons are concerned, we cannot, under the conception of the\nEgo, think anything else than our own dear persons as opposed to other\npersons. Ego (I) signifies my particular person, named, for instance,\nCaius or Sempronius, as distinguished from other persons not so named.\nNow, if I should abstract, as the Science of Knowledge requires me to\ndo, from this individual personality, there would be nothing left to me\nwhich might be characterized as _I_; I might just as well call the\nremainder _It_.\u201d\n\nNow, what is the real meaning of this objection, so boldly put forth?\nDoes it speak of the original real synthesis of the conception of the\nindividual (their own dear persons and other persons), and do they\ntherefore mean to say, \u201cthere is nothing synthetized in this conception\nbut the conception of an object generally\u2014of the _It_, and of other\nobjects (_Its_)\u2014from which the first one is distinguished?\u201d Or does that\nobjection fly for protection to the common use of language, and do they\ntherefore mean to say, \u201cIn language, the word I (Ego) signifies only\nindividuality?\u201d As far as the first is concerned, every one, who is as\nyet possessed of his senses, must see that by distinguishing one object\nfrom its equals, i. e. from other objects, we arrive only at a\n_determined object_, but not at a determined _person_. The synthesis of\nthe conception of the personality is quite different. The _Egoness_ (the\nin itself returning activity, the subject-objectivity, or whatever you\nchoose to call it,) is originally opposed to the _It_, to the mere\nobjectivity; and the positing of these conceptions is absolute, is\nconditioned by no other positing, is thetical, not synthetical. This\nconception of the Egoness, which has arisen in our Self, is now\ntransferred to something, which in the first positing was posited as an\n_It_, as mere object, and is synthetically united with it; and it is\nonly through this conditional synthesis that there first arises for us a\n_Thou_. The conception of Thou arises from the union of the It and the\nI. The conception of the Ego in this opposition; hence, as conception of\nthe individual, is the synthesis of the I with itself. That which posits\nitself in the described act, not generally, but _as Ego_, is I; and that\nwhich in the same act is posited as Ego, not _through itself_, but\n_through me_, is Thou. Now it is doubtless possible to abstract from\nthis product of a synthesis, for what we ourselves have synthetized we\ndoubtless can analyze again, and when we so abstract, the remainder will\nbe the general Ego, i. e. the not-object. Taken in this interpretation,\nthe objection would be simply absurd.\n\nBut how if our opponents cling to the use of language? Even if it is\ntrue that the word \u201cI\u201d has hitherto signified in language only the\nindividual, would this make it necessary that a distinction in the\noriginal synthesis is not to be remarked and named, simply because it\nhas never before been noticed? But is it true? Of what use of language\ndo they speak? Of the philosophical language? I have shown already that\nKant uses the conception of the pure Ego in the same meaning I attach to\nit. If he says, \u201cI am the thinking in this thinking,\u201d does he then only\noppose himself to other persons, and not rather to all object of\nthinking generally? Kant says again, \u201cThe fundamental principle of the\nnecessary unity of apperception is itself identical, and hence an\nanalytical proposition.\u201d This signifies precisely what I have just\nstated, i. e. that the Ego arises through no synthesis, the manifold\nwhereof might be further analyzed, but through an absolute thesis. But\nthis Ego is the _Egoness_ generally; for the conception of individuality\narises clearly enough through synthesis, as I have just shown; and the\nfundamental principle of individuality is therefore a synthetical\nproposition. Reinhold, it is true, speaks of the Ego simply as of the\nrepresenting; but this does not affect the present case; for when I\ndistinguish myself as the representing from the represented, do I then\ndistinguish myself from other persons, and not rather from all object of\nrepresentation as such? But take even the case of these same much lauded\nphilosophers, who do not, like Kant and like the Science of Knowledge,\npresuppose the Ego in advance of the manifold of representation, but\nrather heap it together, out of that manifold; do they, then, hold their\none thinking in the manifold thinking to be only the thinking of the\nindividual, and not rather of the intelligence generally? In one word:\nis there any philosopher of repute, who before them has ventured to\ndiscover that the Ego signifies only the individual, and that if the\nindividuality is abstracted from, only an object in general remains?\n\nOr do they mean ordinary use of language? To prove this use, I am\ncompelled to cite instances from common life. If you call to anybody in\nthe darkness \u201cWho is there?\u201d and he, presupposing that his voice is\nwell-known to you, replies, \u201cIt is I,\u201d then it is clear that he speaks\nof himself as this particular person, and wishes to be understood: \u201cIt\nis I, who am named thus or thus, and it is not any one of all the\nothers, named otherwise;\u201d and he so desires to be understood, because\nyour question, \u201c_Who_ is there?\u201d presupposes already that it is a\nrational being who is there, and expresses only that you wish to know\nwhich particular one amongst all the rational beings it may be.\n\nBut if you should, for instance\u2014permit me this example, which I find\nparticularly applicable\u2014sew or cut at the clothing of some person, and\nshould unawares cut the person himself, then he would probably cry out:\n\u201cLook here, this is _I_; you are cutting _me_!\u201d Now, what does he mean\nto express thereby? Not that he is this particular person, named thus or\nthus, and none other; for that you know very well; but that that which\nwas cut was not his dead and senseless clothing, but his living and\nsensitive self, which you did not know before. By this \u201cIt is _I_,\u201d the\nperson does not distinguish himself from other _persons_, but from\n_things_. This distinction occurs continually in life; and we cannot\ntake a step or move our hand without making it.\n\nIn short, Egoness and Individuality are very different conceptions, and\nthe synthesis of the latter is clearly to be observed. Through the\nformer conception, we distinguish ourselves from all that is external to\nus\u2014not merely from all _persons_ that are external to us\u2014and hence we\nembrace by it not our particular personality, but our general\nspirituality. It is in this sense that the word is used, both in\nphilosophical and in common language. The above objection testifies,\ntherefore, not only to an unusual want of thought, but also to great\nignorance in philosophical literature.\n\nBut our opponents insist on their incapability to think the required\nconception, and we must place faith in their assertions. Not that they\nlack the general conception of the pure Ego, for if they did, they would\nbe obliged to desist from raising objections, just as a piece of log\nmust desist. But it is the _conception of this conception_ which they\nlack, and which they cannot attain. They have that conception in\nthemselves, but do not know _that_ they have it. The ground of this\ntheir incapability does not lie in any particular weakness of their\nthinking faculties, but in a weakness of their whole character. Their\nEgo, in the sense in which they take the word\u2014i. e. their individual\nperson\u2014is the last object of their acting, and hence also the limit of\ntheir explicit thinking. It is to them, therefore, the only true\nsubstance, and reason is only an accident thereof. Their person does not\nexist as a particular expression of reason; but reason exists to help\ntheir person through the world; and if the person could get along just\nas well without reason, we might discharge reason from service, and\nthere would be no reason at all. This, indeed, lurks in the whole system\nof their conceptions, and through all their assertions, and many of them\nare honest enough not to conceal it. Now, they are quite correct as far\nas they assert this incapacity in respect to their own persons\u2014they only\nmust not state as objective that which has merely subjective validity.\nIn the Science of Knowledge the relation is exactly reversed: Reason\nalone is in itself, and individuality is but accidental; reason is the\nobject, and personality the means to realize it; personality is only a\nparticular manner of manifesting reason, and must always more and more\nlose itself in the universal form of reason. Only reason is eternal;\nindividuality must always die out. And whosoever is not prepared to\nsuccumb to this order of things, will also never get at the true\nunderstanding of the Science of Knowledge.\n\n\n X.\n\n\nThis fact that they can never understand the Science of Knowledge unless\nthey first comply with certain conditions, has been told them often\nenough. They do not want to hear it again, and our frank warning affords\nthem a new opportunity to attack us. Every conviction, they assert, must\nbe capable of being communicated by conceptions\u2014nay, it must even be\npossible to compel its acknowledgment. They say it is a bad example to\nassert that our Science exists for only certain privileged spirits, and\nthat others cannot see or understand anything of it.\n\nLet us see, first of all, what the Science of Knowledge does assert on\nthis point. It does not assert that there is an original and inborn\ndistinction between men and men, whereby some are made capable of\nthinking and learning what the others, by their nature, cannot think or\nlearn. Reason is common to all, and is the same in all rational beings.\nWhatsoever one rational being possesses as a talent, all others possess\nalso. Nay, we have even in this present article expressly admitted that\nthe conceptions upon which the Science of Knowledge insists, are\nactually effective in all rational beings; for their efficacy furnishes\nthe ground of a possibility of consciousness. The pure Ego, which they\ncharge is incapable of thinking, lies at the bottom of all their\nthinking, and occurs in all their thinking, since all thinking is\npossible only through it. Thus far everything proceeds mechanically. But\nto get an insight into this asserted necessity\u2014to think again this\nthinking\u2014does not lie in mechanism, but, on the contrary, requires an\nelevation, through _freedom_, to a new sphere, which our immediate\nexistence does not place in our possession. Unless this faculty of\nfreedom has already existence, and has already been practised, the\nScience of Knowledge can accomplish nothing in a person. It is this\npower of freedom which furnishes the premises upon which the structure\nis to rest.\n\nThey certainly will not deny that every science and every art\npresupposes certain primary rudiments, which must first be acquired\nbefore we can enter into the science or art. \u201cBut,\u201d say they, \u201cif you\nonly require a knowledge of the rudiments, why do you not teach them to\nus, if we lack them? Why do you not place them before us definitely and\nsystematically? Is it not your own fault if you plunge us at once _in\nmedias res_, and require the public to understand you before you have\ncommunicated the rudiments?\u201d I reply: that is exactly the difficulty!\nThese rudiments cannot be systematically forced upon you\u2014they cannot be\ntaught to you by compulsion! In one word, they are a knowledge which we\ncan get only from ourselves. Everything depends upon this, that by the\nconstant use of freedom, with _clear consciousness_ of this freedom, we\nshould become thoroughly conscious and enamored of this our freedom.\nWhenever it shall have become the well-matured object of education\u2014from\ntenderest youth upwards\u2014to _develop_ the inner power of the scholar, but\nnot to _give it a direction_; to educate man for his own use, and as\ninstrument of his own will, but not as the soulless instrument of\nothers;\u2014then the Science of Knowledge will be universally and easily\ncomprehensible. Culture of the whole man, from earliest youth\u2014this is\nthe only way to spread philosophy. Education must first content itself\nto be more negative than positive\u2014more a mutual interchange _with_ the\nscholar than a working _upon_ him; more negative as far as possible\u2014i.\ne. education must at least propose to itself this negativeness as its\nobject, and must be positive only as a means of being negative. So long\nas education, whether with or without clear consciousness, proposes to\nitself the opposite object\u2014labors only for usefulness through others,\nwithout considering that the using principle lies also in the\nindividual; so long as education thus eradicates in earliest youth the\nroot of self-activity, and accustoms man not to determine himself but to\nawait a determination through others\u2014so long, talent for philosophy will\nalways remain an extraordinary favor of nature, which cannot be further\nexplained, and which may therefore be called by the indefinite\nexpression of \u201cphilosophical genius.\u201d\n\nThe chief ground of all the errors of our opponents may perhaps be this,\nthat they have never yet made clear to themselves what _proving_ means,\nand that hence they have never considered that there is at the bottom of\nall demonstration something absolutely undemonstrable.\n\nDemonstration effects only a conditioned, mediated certainty; by virtue\nof it, something is certain if another thing is certain. If any doubt\narises as to the certainty of this other, then this certainty must again\nbe appended to the certainty of a third, and so on. Now, is this\nretrogression carried on _ad infinitum_, or is there anywhere a final\nlink? I know very well that some are of the former opinion; but these\nmen have never considered that if it were so, they would not even be\ncapable of entertaining the idea of certainty\u2014no, not even of hunting\nafter certainty. For what this may mean: to be certain; they only know\nby being themselves certain of something; but if everything is certain\nonly on condition, then nothing is certain, and there is even no\nconditioned certainty. But if there is a final link, regarding which no\nquestion can be raised, why it is certain, then, there is an\nundemonstrable at the base of all demonstration.\n\nThey do not appear to have considered what it means: to have proven\nsomething to _somebody_. It means: we have demonstrated to him that a\ncertain other certainty is contained, by virtue of the laws of thinking,\nwhich he admits, in a certain first certainty which he assumes or\nadmits, and that he must necessarily assume the first if he assumes the\nsecond, as he says he does. Hence all communication of a conviction by\nproof, presupposes that both parts are at least agreed on something.\nNow, how could the Science of Knowledge communicate itself to the\ndogmatist, since they are positively _not agreed in a single point_, so\nfar as the _material_ of knowledge is concerned, and since thus the\ncommon point is wanting from which they might jointly start.[10]\n\nFinally, they seem not to have considered that even where there is such\na common point, no one can think into the soul of the other; that each\nmust calculate upon the self-activity of the other, and cannot furnish\nhim the necessary thoughts, but can merely advise how to construct or\nthink those thoughts. The relation between free beings is a reciprocal\ninfluence upon each other through freedom, but not a causality through\nmechanically effective power. And thus the present dispute returns to\nthe chief point of dispute, from which all our differences arise. They\npresuppose everywhere the relation of causality, because they indeed\nknow no higher relation; and it is upon this that they base their\ndemand: we ought to graft our conviction on their souls without any\nactivity on their own part. But we proceed from freedom, and\u2014which is\nbut fair\u2014presuppose freedom in them. Moreover, in thus presupposing the\nuniversal validity of the mechanism of cause and effect, they\nimmediately contradict themselves; what they say and what they do, are\nin palpable contradiction. For, in _presupposing_ the mechanism of cause\nand effect, they elevate themselves beyond it; their thinking of the\nmechanism is not contained in the mechanism itself. The mechanism cannot\nseize itself, for the simple reason that it is mechanism. Only free\nconsciousness can seize itself. Here, therefore, would be a way to\nconvince them of their error. But the difficulty is that this thought\nlies utterly beyond the range of their vision, and that they lack the\nagility of mind to think, when they think an object, not only the\nobject, but also their thinking of the object; wherefore this present\nremark is utterly incomprehensible to them, and is indeed written only\nfor those who are awake and see.\n\nWe reiterate, therefore, our assurance: we _will_ not convince them,\nbecause one cannot _will_ an impossibility; and we will not refute their\nsystem for them, because we cannot. True, we can refute it easily enough\n_for us_; it is very easy to throw it down\u2014the mere breath of a free man\ndestroys it. But we cannot refute it for _them_. We do not write, speak\nor teach _for them_, since there is positively no point from which we\ncould reach them. If we speak _of_ them, it is not for their own sake,\nbut for the sake of others\u2014to warn these against their errors, and\npersuade these not to listen to their empty and insignificant prattle.\nNow, they must not consider this, our declaration, as degrading for\nthem. By so doing, they but evince their bad conscience, and publicly\ndegrade themselves amongst us. Besides, they are in the same position in\nregard to us. They also cannot refute or convince us, or say anything,\nwhich could have an effect upon us. This we confess ourselves, and would\nnot be in the least indignant if they said it. What we tell them, we\ntell them not at all with the evil purpose of causing them anger, but\nmerely to save us and them unnecessary trouble. We should be truly glad\nif they were thus to accept it.\n\nMoreover, there is nothing degrading in the matter itself. Every one who\nto-day charges his brother with this incapacity, has once been\nnecessarily in the same condition. For we all are born in it, and it\nrequires time to get beyond it. If our opponents would only not be\ndriven into indignation by our declaration, but would reflect about it,\nand inquire whether there might not be some truth in it, they might then\nprobably get out of that incapacity. They would at once be our equals,\nand we could henceforth live in perfect peace together. The fault is not\nours, if we occasionally are pretty hard at war with them.\n\nFrom all this it also appears, which I consider expedient to remark\nhere, that a philosophy, in order to be a science, need not be\n_universally valid_, as some philosophers seem to assume. These\nphilosophers demand the impossible. What does it mean: a philosophy is\nreally universally valid? Who, then, are all these for whom it is to be\nvalid? I suppose not to every one who has a human face, for then it\nwould also have to be valid for children and for the common man, for\nwhom thinking is never object, but always the means for his real\npurpose. Universally valid, then, for the philosophers? But who, then,\nare the philosophers? I hope not all those who have received the degree\nof doctor from some philosophical faculty, or who have printed something\nwhich they call philosophical, or who, perhaps, are themselves members\nof some philosophical faculty? Indeed, how shall we even have a fixed\nconception of the philosopher, unless we have first a fixed conception\nof philosophy\u2014i. e. unless we first possess that fixed philosophy? It is\nquite certain that all those who believe themselves possessed of\nphilosophy, as a science, will deny to all those who do not recognize\ntheir philosophy the name of philosopher, and hence will make the\nacknowledgment of their philosophy the criterion of a philosopher. This\nthey must do, if they will proceed logically, for there is only one\nphilosophy. The author of the Science of Knowledge, for instance, has\nlong ago stated that he is of this opinion in regard to his system\u2014not\nin so far as it is an _individual representation_ of that system, but in\nso far as it is a system of _transcendental idealism_\u2014and he hesitates\nnot a moment to repeat this assertion. But does not this lead us into an\nevident circle? Every one will then say, \u201cMy philosophy is universally\nvalid for all philosophers;\u201d and will say so with full right if he only\nbe himself convinced, though no other mortal being should accept his\ndoctrine; \u201cfor,\u201d he will add, \u201che who does not recognize it as valid is\nno philosopher.\u201d\n\nConcerning this point, I hold the following: If there be but one man who\nis fully and at all times equally convinced of his philosophy, who is in\ncomplete harmony with himself in this his philosophy, whose free\njudgment in philosophizing agrees perfectly with the judgment daily life\nforces upon him, then in this one man philosophy has fulfilled its\npurpose and completed its circle; for it has put him down again at the\nvery same point from which he started with all mankind; and henceforth\nphilosophy as a science really exists, though no other man else should\ncomprehend and accept it; nay, though that one man might not even know\nhow to teach it to others.\n\nLet no one here offer the trivial objection that all systematic authors\nhave ever been convinced of the truth of their systems. For this\nassertion is utterly false, and is grounded only in this, that few know\nwhat conviction really is. This can only be experienced by having the\nfullness of conviction in one\u2019s self. Those authors were only convinced\nof one or the other point in their system, which perhaps was not even\nclearly conscious to themselves, but not of the whole of their\nsystem\u2014they were convinced only in certain moods. This is no conviction.\nConviction is that which depends on no time and no change of condition;\nwhich is not accidental to the soul, but which is the soul itself. One\ncan be convinced only of the unchangeably and eternally True: to be\nconvinced of error is impossible. But of such true convictions very few\nexamples may probably exist in the history of philosophy; perhaps but\none; perhaps not even this one. I do not speak of the ancients. It is\neven doubtful whether they ever proposed to themselves the great problem\nof philosophy. But let me speak of modern authors. Spinoza could not be\nconvinced; he could only _think_, not _put faith_ in his philosophy; for\nit was in direct contradiction with his necessary conviction in daily\nlife, by virtue of which he was forced to consider himself free and\nself-determined. He could be convinced of it only in so far as it\ncontained truth, or as it contained a part of philosophy as a science.\nHe was clearly convinced that mere objective reasoning would necessarily\nlead to his system; for in that he was correct; but it never occurred to\nhim that in thinking he ought to reflect upon his own thinking, and in\nthat he was wrong, and thus made his speculation contradictory to his\nlife. Kant might have been convinced; but, if I understand him\ncorrectly, he was not convinced when he wrote his _Critique_. He speaks\nof _a deception, which always recurs, although we know that it is a\ndeception_. Whence did Kant learn, as he was the first who discovered\nthis pretended deception, that it always recurs, and in whom could he\nhave made the experience that it did so recur? Only in himself. But to\nknow that one deceives one\u2019s self, and still to deceive one\u2019s self is\nnot the condition of conviction and harmony within\u2014it is the symptom of\na dangerous inner disharmony. My experience is that no deception recurs,\nfor reason contains no deception. Moreover, of what deception does Kant\nspeak? Clearly of the belief that things _per se_ exist externally and\nindependent of us. But who entertains this belief? Not common\nconsciousness, surely, for common consciousness only speaks _of itself_,\nand can therefore say nothing but that things exist for it (i. e. for\nus, on this standpoint of common consciousness); and that certainly is\nno deception, for it is our own truth. Common consciousness knows\nnothing of a thing _per se_, for the very reason that it is common\nconsciousness, which surely never goes beyond itself. It is a false\nphilosophy which first makes common consciousness assert such a\nconception, whilst only that false philosophy discovered it in _its_ own\nsphere. Hence this so-called deception\u2014which is easily got rid of, and\nwhich true philosophy roots out utterly\u2014that false philosophy has itself\nproduced, and as soon as you get your philosophy perfected, the scales\nwill fall from your eyes, and the deception will never recur. You will,\nin all your life thereafter, never believe to know more than that you\nare finite, and finite in _this determined_ manner, which you must\nexplain to yourself, by the existence of _such a determined world_; and\nyou will no more think of breaking through this limit than of ceasing to\nbe yourself. Leibnitz, also, may have been convinced, for, properly\nunderstood\u2014and why should he not have properly understood himself?\u2014he is\nright. Nay, more\u2014if highest ease and freedom of mind may suggest\nconviction; if the ingenuity to fit one\u2019s philosophy into all forms, and\napply it to all parts of human knowledge\u2014the power to scatter all doubts\nas soon as they appear, and the manner of using one\u2019s philosophy more as\nan instrument than as an object, may testify of perfect clearness; and\nif self-reliance, cheerfulness and high courage in life may be signs of\ninner harmony, then Leibnitz was perhaps convinced, and the only example\nof conviction in the history of philosophy.\n\n\n XI.\n\n\nIn conclusion, I wish to refer in a few words to a very curious\nmisapprehension. It is that of mistaking the Ego, as intellectual\ncontemplation, from which the Science of Knowledge proceeds, for the\nEgo, as idea, with which it concludes. In the Ego, as intellectual\ncontemplation, we have only the form of the Egoness, the in itself\nreturning activity, sufficiently described above. The Ego in this form\nis only _for the philosopher_, and by seizing it thus, you enter\nphilosophy. The Ego, as idea, on the contrary, is _for the Ego_ itself,\nwhich the philosopher considers. He does not establish the latter Ego as\nhis own, but as the idea of the natural but perfectly cultured man; just\nas a real being does not exist for the philosopher, but merely for the\nEgo he observes.\n\nThe Ego as idea is the rational being\u2014firstly, in so far as it\ncompletely represents in itself the universal reason, or as it is\naltogether rational and only rational, and hence it must also have\nceased to be individual, which it was only through sensuous limitation;\nand secondly, in so far as this rational being has also realized reason\nin the eternal world, which, therefore, remains constantly posited in\nthis idea. The world remains in this idea as world generally, as\n_substratum_ with these determined mechanical and organic laws; but all\nthese laws are perfectly suited to represent the final object of reason.\nThe idea of the Ego and the Ego of the intellectual contemplation have\nonly this in common, that in neither of them the thought of the\nindividual enters; not in the latter, because the Egoness has not yet\nbeen determined as individuality; and not in the former, because the\ndetermination of individuality has vanished through universal culture.\nBut both are opposites in this, that the Ego of the contemplation\ncontains only the _form_ of the Ego, and pays no regard to an actual\nmaterial of the same, which is only thinkable by its thinking of a\nworld; while in the Ego of the Idea the complete material of the Egoness\nis thought. From the first conception all philosophy proceeds, and it is\nits fundamental conception; to the latter it does not return, but only\ndetermines this idea in the practical part as highest and ultimate\nobject of reason. The first is, as we have said, original contemplation,\nand becomes a conception in the sufficiently described manner; the\nlatter is only idea, it cannot be thought determinately and will never\nbe actual, but will always more and more approximate to the actuality.\n\n\n XII.\n\n\nThese are, I believe, all the misunderstandings which are to be taken\ninto consideration, and to correct which a clear explanation may hope\nsomewhat to aid. Other modes of working against the new system cannot\nand need not be met by me.\n\nIf a system, for instance, the beginning and end, nay, the whole essence\nof which, is that individuality be theoretically forgotten and\npractically denied, is denounced as egotism, and by men who, for the\nvery reason because they are covertly theoretical egotists and overtly\npractical egotists, cannot elevate themselves into an insight into this\nsystem; if a conclusion is drawn from the system that its author has an\nevil heart, and if again from this evil-heartedness of the author the\nconclusion is drawn that the system is false; then arguments are of no\navail; for those who make these assertions know very well that they are\nnot true, and they have quite different reasons for uttering them than\nbecause they believed them. The system bothers them little enough; but\nthe author may, perhaps, have stated on other occasions things which do\nnot please them, and may, perhaps\u2014God knows, how or where!\u2014be in their\nway. Now such persons are perfectly in conformity with their mode of\nthinking, and it would be an idle undertaking to attempt to rid them of\ntheir nature. But if thousands and thousands who know not a word of the\nScience of Knowledge, nor have occasion to know a word of it, who are\nneither Jews nor Pagans, neither aristocrats nor democrats, neither\nKantians of the old or of the modern school, or of any school, and who\neven are not originals\u2014who might have a grudge against the author of the\nScience of Knowledge, because he took away from them the original ideas\nwhich they have just prepared for the public\u2014if such men hastily take\nhold of these charges, and repeat and repeat them again without any\napparent interest, other than that they might appear well instructed\nregarding the secrets of the latest literature; then it may, indeed, be\nhoped that for their own sakes they will take our prayer into\nconsideration, and reflect upon what they wish to say before they say\nit.\n\nFootnote 6:\n\n Critique of Practical Reason; Critique of the Power of Judgment; and\n Critique of a Pure Doctrine of Religion.\u2014_Translator._\n\nFootnote 7:\n\n For instance\u2014_Critique of Pure Reason_, p. 108: \u201cI purposely pass by\n the definition of these categories, _although I may be in possession\n of it_.\u201d Now, these categories can be defined, each by its determined\n relation to the possibility of self consciousness, and whoever is in\n possession of these definitions, is necessarily possessed of the\n Science of Knowledge. Again, p. 109: \u201c_In a system of pure reason_\n this definition might justly be required of me, but in the present\n work they would only obscure the main point.\u201d Here he clearly opposes\n two systems to each other\u2014the _System of Pure Reason_ and the \u201cpresent\n work,\u201d i. e. the _Critique of Pure Reason_\u2014and the latter is said\n _not_ to be the former.\n\nFootnote 8:\n\n Here is the corner stone of Kant\u2019s realism. I _must think_ something\n as thing in itself, i. e. as independent of _me, the empirical_,\n whenever I occupy the standpoint of the empirical; and because I _must\n think_ so, I never become conscious of this activity in my thinking,\n _since it is not free_. Only when I occupy the standpoint of\n philosophy can I _draw the conclusion_ that I am active in this\n thinking.\n\nFootnote 9:\n\n To state the main point in a few words: _All being_ signifies a\n _limitation of free activity_. Now this activity is regarded _either_\n as that of the mere intelligence, and then that which is posited as\n limiting this activity has a mere _ideal being, mere objectivity in\n regard to consciousness_.\u2014This objectivity is in every representation\n (even in that of the Ego, of virtue, of the moral law, &c., or in that\n of complete phantasms, as, for instance, a squared circle, a sphynx,\n &c.) _object of the mere representation_. Or the free activity is\n regarded as _having actual causality_; and then that which limits it,\n has _actual_ existence, the _real world_.\n\nFootnote 10:\n\n I have repeated this frequently. I have stated that I could absolutely\n have no point in common with certain philosophers, and that they are\n not, and cannot be, where I am. This seems to have been taken rather\n for an hyperbole, uttered in indignation, than for real earnest; for\n they do not cease to repeat their demand: \u201cProve _to us_ thy\n doctrine!\u201d I must solemnly assure them that I was perfectly serious in\n that statement, that it is my deliberate and decided conviction.\n Dogmatism proceeds from a _being_ as the Absolute, and hence its\n system never rises above being. Idealism knows no being, as something\n for itself existing. In other words: Dogmatism proceeds from\n necessity\u2014Idealism from freedom. They are, therefore, in two utterly\n different worlds.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION TO IDEALISM.\n [From the German of SCHELLING. Translated by TOM DAVIDSON.]\n\n\n I.\u2014IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. All knowing is based upon the agreement of an objective with a\nsubjective. For we _know_ only the true, and truth is universally held\nto be the agreement of representations with their objects.\n\n2. The sum of all that is purely objective in our knowledge we may call\nNature; while the sum of all that is subjective may be designated the\n_Ego_, or Intelligence. These two concepts are mutually opposed.\nIntelligence is originally conceived as that which solely\nrepresents\u2014Nature as that which is merely capable of representation; the\nformer as the conscious\u2014the latter as the unconscious. There is,\nmoreover, necessary in all knowledge a mutual agreement of the two\u2014the\nconscious and the unconscious _per se_. The problem is to explain this\nagreement.\n\n3. In knowledge itself, in my knowing, objective and subjective are so\nunited that it is impossible to say to which of the two the priority\nbelongs. There is here no first and no second\u2014the two are\ncontemporaneous and one. In my efforts to explain this identity, I must\nfirst have it undone. In order to explain it, inasmuch as nothing else\nis given me as a principle of explanation beyond these two factors of\nknowledge, I must of necessity place the one before the other\u2014set out\nfrom the one in order from it to arrive at the other. From which of the\ntwo I am to set out is not determined by the problem.\n\n4. There are, therefore, only two cases possible:\n\nA. _Either the objective is made the first, and the question comes to be\nhow a subjective agreeing with it is superinduced._\n\nThe idea of the subjective is not contained in the idea of the\nobjective; they rather mutually exclude each other. The subjective,\ntherefore, must be _superinduced_ upon the objective. It forms no part\nof the conception of Nature that there should be something intelligent\nto represent it. Nature, to all appearance, would exist even were there\nnothing to represent it. The problem may therefore likewise be expressed\nthus: How is the Intelligent superinduced upon Nature? or, How comes\nNature to be represented?\n\nThe problem assumes Nature, or the objective, as first. It is,\ntherefore, manifestly, a problem of natural science, which does the\nsame. That natural science really, and without knowing it, approximates,\nat least, to the solution of this problem can be shown here only\nbriefly.\n\nIf all knowledge has, as it were, two poles, which mutually suppose and\ndemand each other, they must reciprocally be objects of search in all\nsciences. There must, therefore, of necessity, be two fundamental\nsciences; and it must be impossible to set out from the one pole without\nbeing driven to the other. The necessary tendency of all natural\nscience, therefore, is to pass from Nature to the intelligent. This, and\nthis alone, lies at the bottom of the effort to bring theory into\nnatural phenomena. The final perfection of natural science would be the\ncomplete mentalization of all the laws of Nature into laws of thought.\nThe phenomena, that is, the material, must vanish entirely, and leave\nonly the laws\u2014that is, the formal. Hence it is that the more the\naccordance with law is manifested in Nature itself, the more the\nwrappage disappears\u2014the phenomena themselves become more mental, and at\nlast entirely cease. Optical phenomena are nothing more than a geometry\nwhose lines are drawn through the light; and even this light itself is\nof doubtful materiality. In the phenomena of magnetism all trace of\nmatter has already disappeared, and of those of gravitation; which even\nphysical philosophers believed could be attributed only to direct\nspiritual influence, there remains nothing but the law, whose action on\na large scale is the mechanism of the heavenly motions. The complete\ntheory of Nature would be that whereby the whole of Nature should be\nresolved into an intelligence. The dead and unconscious products of\nNature are only unsuccessful attempts of Nature to reflect itself, and\ndead Nature, so-called, is merely an unripe Intelligence; hence in its\nphenomena the intelligent character peers through, though yet\nunconsciously. Its highest aim, namely, that of becoming completely\nself-objective, Nature reaches only in its highest and last reflection,\nwhich is nothing else than man, or, more generally, what we call reason,\nby means of which Nature turns completely back upon itself, and by which\nis manifested that Nature is originally identical with what in us is\nknown as intelligent and conscious.\n\nThis may perhaps suffice to prove that natural science has a necessary\ntendency to render Nature intelligent. By this very tendency it is that\nit becomes natural philosophy, which is one of the two necessary\nfundamental sciences of philosophy.\n\nB. _Or the subjective is made the first, and the problem is, how an\nobjective is superinduced agreeing with it._\n\nIf all knowledge is based upon the agreement of these two, then the task\nof explaining this agreement is plainly the highest for all knowledge;\nand if, as is generally admitted, philosophy is the highest and loftiest\nof all sciences, it is certainly the main task of philosophy.\n\nBut the problem demands only the explanation of that agreement\ngenerally, and leaves it entirely undecided where the explanation shall\nbegin, what it shall make its first, and what its second. Moreover, as\nthe two opposites are mutually necessary to each other, the result of\nthe operation must be the same, from whichever point it sets out.\n\nTo make the objective the first, and derive the subjective from it, is,\nas has just been shown, the task of natural philosophy.\n\nIf, therefore, there is a transcendental philosophy, the only course\nthat remains for it is the opposite one, namely: to set out from the\nsubjective as the first and the absolute, and deduce the origin of the\nobjective from it.\n\nInto these two possible directions of philosophy, therefore, natural and\ntranscendental philosophy have separated themselves; and if all\nphilosophy must have for its aim to make either an Intelligence out of\nNature or a Nature out of Intelligence, then transcendental philosophy,\nto which the latter task belongs, is the other necessary fundamental\nscience of philosophy.\n\n\n II.\u2014COROLLARIES.\n\n\nIn the foregoing we have not only deduced the idea of transcendental\nphilosophy, but have also afforded the reader a glance into the whole\nsystem of philosophy, composed, as has been shown, of two principal\nsciences, which, though opposed in principle and direction, are\ncounter-parts and complements of each other. Not the whole system of\nphilosophy, but only one of the principal sciences of it, is to be here\ndiscussed, and, in the first place, to be more clearly characterized in\naccordance with the idea already deduced.\n\n1. If, for transcendental philosophy, the subjective is the starting\npoint, the only ground of all reality, and the sole principle of\nexplanation for everything else, it necessarily begins with universal\ndoubt regarding the reality of the objective.\n\nAs the natural philosopher, wholly intent upon the objective, seeks,\nabove all things, to exclude every admixture of the subjective from his\nknowledge, so, on the other hand, the transcendental philosopher seeks\nnothing so much as the entire exclusion of the objective from the purely\nsubjective principle of knowledge. The instrument of separation is\nabsolute scepticism\u2014not that half-scepticism which is directed merely\nagainst the vulgar prejudices of mankind and never sees the\nfoundation\u2014but a thorough-going scepticism, which aims not at individual\nprejudices, but at the fundamental prejudice, with which all others must\nstand or fall. For over and above the artificial and conventional\nprejudices of man, there are others of far deeper origin, which have\nbeen placed in him, not by art or education, but by Nature itself, and\nwhich pass with all other men, except the philosopher, as the principles\nof knowledge, and with the mere self-thinker as the test of all truth.\n\nThe one fundamental prejudice to which all others are reducible, is\nthis: that there are things outside of us; an opinion which, while it\nrests neither on proofs nor on conclusions (for there is not a single\nirrefragable proof of it), and yet cannot be uprooted by any opposite\nproof (_naturam furc\u00e2 expellas, tamen usque redibit_), lays claim to\nimmediate certainty; whereas, inasmuch as it refers to something quite\ndifferent from us\u2014yea, opposed to us\u2014and of which there is no evidence\nhow it can come into immediate consciousness, it must be regarded as\nnothing more than a prejudice\u2014a natural and original one, to be sure,\nbut nevertheless a prejudice.\n\nThe contradiction lying in the fact that a conclusion which in its\nnature cannot be immediately certain, is, nevertheless, blindly and\nwithout grounds, accepted as such, cannot be solved by transcendental\nphilosophy, except on the assumption that this conclusion is implicitly,\nand in a manner hitherto not manifest, not founded upon, but identical,\nand one and the same with an affirmation which is immediately certain;\nand to demonstrate this identity will really be the task of\ntranscendental philosophy.\n\n2. Now, even for the ordinary use of reason, there is nothing\nimmediately certain except the affirmation _I am_, which, as it loses\nall meaning outside of immediate consciousness, is the most individual\nof all truths, and the absolute prejudice, which must be assumed if\nanything else is to be made certain. The affirmation _There are things\noutside of us_, will therefore be certain for the transcendental\nphilosopher, only through its identity with the affirmation _I am_, and\nits certainty will be only equal to the certainty of the affirmation\nfrom which it derives it.\n\nAccording to this view, transcendental knowledge would be distinguished\nfrom ordinary knowledge in two particulars.\n\n_First_\u2014That for it the certainty of the existence of external objects\nis a mere prejudice, which it oversteps, in order to find the grounds of\nit. (It can never be the business of the transcendental philosopher to\nprove the existence of things in themselves, but only to show that it is\na natural and necessary prejudice to assume external objects as real.)\n\n_Second_\u2014That the two affirmations, _I am_ and _There are things outside\nof me_, which in the ordinary consciousness run together, are, in the\nformer, separated and the one placed before the other, with a view to\ndemonstrate as a fact their identity, and that immediate connection\nwhich in the other is only felt. By the act of this separation, when it\nis complete, the philosopher transports himself to the transcendental\npoint of view, which is by no means a natural, but an artificial one.\n\n3. If, for the transcendental philosopher, the subjective alone has\noriginal reality, he will also make the subjective alone in knowledge\ndirectly his object; the objective will only become an object indirectly\nto him, and, whereas, in ordinary knowledge, knowledge itself\u2014the act of\nknowing\u2014vanishes in the object, in transcendental knowledge, on the\ncontrary, the object, as such, will vanish in the act of knowing.\nTranscendental knowledge is a knowledge of knowing, in so far as it is\npurely subjective.\n\nThus, for example, in intuition, it is only the objective that reaches\nthe ordinary consciousness; the act of intuition itself is lost in the\nobject; whereas the transcendental mode of intuition rather gets only a\nglimpse of the object of intuition through the act. Ordinary thought,\ntherefore, is a mechanism in which ideas prevail, without, however,\nbeing distinguished as ideas; whereas transcendental thought interrupts\nthis mechanism, and in becoming conscious of the idea as an act, rises\nto the idea of the idea. In ordinary action, the acting itself is\nforgotten in the object of the action; philosophizing is also an action,\nbut not an action only. It is likewise a continued self-intuition in\nthis action.\n\nThe nature of the transcendental mode of thought consists, therefore,\ngenerally in this: that, in it, that which in all other thinking,\nknowing, or acting escapes the consciousness, and is absolutely\nnon-objective, is brought into consciousness, and becomes objective; in\nshort, it consists in a continuous act of becoming an object to itself\non the part of the subjective.\n\nThe transcendental art will therefore consist in a readiness to maintain\none\u2019s self continuously in this duplicity of thinking and acting.\n\n\n III.\u2014PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENT OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nThis arrangement is preliminary, inasmuch as the principles of\narrangement can be arrived at only in the science itself.\n\nWe return to the idea of science.\n\nTranscendental philosophy has to explain how knowledge is possible at\nall, supposing that the subjective in it is assumed as the chief or\nfirst element.\n\nIt is not, therefore, any single part, or any particular object of\nknowledge, but knowledge itself, and knowledge generally, that it takes\nfor its object.\n\nNow all knowledge is reducible to certain original convictions or\noriginal fore-judgments; these different convictions transcendental\nphilosophy must reduce to one original conviction; this one, from which\nall others are derived, is expressed in the first principle of this\nphilosophy, and the task of finding such is no other than that of\nfinding the absolutely certain, by which all other certainty is arrived\nat.\n\nThe arrangement of transcendental philosophy itself is determined by\nthose original convictions, whose validity it asserts. Those convictions\nmust, in the first place, be sought in the common understanding. If,\ntherefore, we fall back upon the standpoint of the ordinary view, we\nfind the following convictions deeply engraven in the human\nunderstanding:\n\nA. That there not only exists outside of us a world of things\nindependent of us, but also that our representations agree with them in\nsuch a manner that there is nothing else in the things beyond what they\npresent to us. The necessity which prevails in our objective\nrepresentations is explained by saying that the things are unalterably\ndetermined, and that, by this determination of the things, our ideas are\nalso indirectly determined. By this first and most original conviction,\nthe first problem of the philosophy is determined, _viz._: to explain\nhow representations can absolutely agree with objects existing\naltogether independently of them. Since it is upon the assumption that\nthings are exactly as we represent them\u2014that we certainly, therefore,\nknow things as they are in themselves\u2014that the possibility of all\nexperience rests, (for what would experience be, and where would\nphysics, for example, wander to, but for the supposition of the absolute\nidentity of being and seeming?) the solution of this problem is\nidentical with theoretical philosophy, which has to examine the\npossibility of experience.\n\nB. The second equally original conviction is, that ideas which spring up\nin us freely and without necessity are capable of passing from the world\nof thought into the real world, and of arriving at objective reality.\n\nThis conviction stands in opposition to the first. According to the\nfirst, it is assumed that objects are unalterably determined, and our\nideas by them; according to the other, that objects are alterable, and\nthat, too, by the causality of ideas in us. According to the first,\nthere takes place a transition from the real world into the world of\nideas, or a determining of ideas by something objective; according to\nthe second, a transition from the world of ideas into the real world, or\na determining of the objective by a (freely produced) idea in us.\n\nBy this second conviction, a second problem is determined, _viz._: how,\nby something merely thought, an objective is alterable, so as completely\nto correspond with that something thought.\n\nSince upon this assumption the possibility of all free action rests, the\nsolution of this problem is practical philosophy.\n\nC. But with these two problems we find ourselves involved in a\ncontradiction. According to B, there is demanded the dominion of thought\n(the ideal) over the world of sense; but how is this conceivable, if\n(according to A) the idea, in its origin, is already only the slave of\nthe objective? On the other hand, if the real world is something quite\nindependent of us, and in accordance with which, as their pattern, our\nideas must shape themselves (by A), then it is inconceivable how the\nreal world, on the other hand, can shape itself after ideas in us (by\nB). In a word, in the theoretical certainty we lose the practical; in\nthe practical we lose the theoretical. It is impossible that there\nshould be at once truth in our knowledge and reality in our volition.\n\nThis contradiction must be solved, if there is to be a philosophy at\nall; and the solution of this problem, or the answering of the question:\nHow can ideas be conceived as shaping themselves according to objects,\nand at the same time objects as shaping themselves to ideas?\u2014is not the\nfirst, but the highest, task of transcendental philosophy.\n\nIt is not difficult to see that this problem is not to be solved either\nin theoretical or in practical philosophy, but in a higher one, which is\nthe connecting link between the two, neither theoretical nor practical,\nbut both at once.\n\nHow at once the objective world conforms itself to ideas in us, and\nideas in us conform themselves to the objective world, it is impossible\nto conceive, unless there exists, between the two worlds\u2014the ideal and\nthe real\u2014a pre\u00ebstablished harmony. But this pre\u00ebstablished harmony\nitself is not conceivable, unless the activity, whereby the objective\nworld is produced, is originally identical with that which displays\nitself in volition, and _vice versa_.\n\nNow it is undoubtedly a _productive_ activity that displays itself in\nvolition; all free action is productive and productive only with\nconsciousness. If, then, we suppose, since the two activities are one\nonly in their principle, that the same activity which is productive\n_with_ consciousness in free action, is productive _without_\nconsciousness in the production of the world, this pre\u00ebstablished\nharmony is a reality, and the contradiction is solved.\n\nIf we suppose that all this is really the case, then that original\nidentity of the activity, which is busy in the production of the world,\nwith that which displays itself in volition, will exhibit itself in the\nproductions of the former, and these will necessarily appear as the\nproductions of an activity at once conscious and unconscious.\n\nNature, as a whole, no less than in its different productions, will, of\nnecessity, appear as a work produced with consciousness, and, at the\nsame time, as a production of the blindest mechanism. It is the result\nof purpose, without being demonstrable as such. The philosophy of the\naims of Nature, or teleology, is therefore the required point of union\nbetween theoretical and practical philosophy.\n\nD. Hitherto, we have postulated only in general terms the identity of\nthe unconscious activity, which has produced Nature, and the conscious\nactivity, which exhibits itself in volition, without having decided\nwhere the principle of this activity lies\u2014whether in Nature or in us.\n\nNow, the system of knowledge can be regarded as complete only when it\nreverts to its principle. Transcendental philosophy, therefore, could be\ncomplete only when that identity\u2014the highest solution of its whole\nproblem\u2014could be demonstrated in its principle, the _Ego_.\n\nIt is therefore postulated that, in the subjective\u2014in the consciousness\nitself\u2014that activity, at once conscious and unconscious, can be shown.\n\nSuch an activity can be no other than the _\u00e6sthetic_, and every work of\nart can be conceived only as the product of such. The ideal work of art\nand the real world of objects are therefore products of one and the same\nactivity; the meeting of the two (the conscious and the unconscious)\n_without_ consciousness, gives the real\u2014_with_ consciousness, the\n\u00e6sthetic world.\n\nThe objective world is only the primal, still unconscious, poetry of the\nmind; the universal _organum_ of philosophy, the key-stone of its whole\narch, is the philosophy of art.\n\n\n IV.\u2014ORGAN OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. The only immediate object of transcendental consideration is the\nsubjective (II.); the only organ for philosophizing in this manner is\nthe _inner sense_, and its object is such that, unlike that of\nmathematics, it can never become the object of external intuition. The\nobject of mathematics, to be sure, exists as little outside of\nknowledge, as that of philosophy. The whole existence of mathematics\nrests on intuition; it exists, therefore, only in intuition; and this\nintuition itself is an external one. In addition to this, the\nmathematician never has to deal immediately with the intuition\u2014the\nconstruction itself\u2014but only with the thing constructed, which, of\ncourse, can be exhibited outwardly; whereas the philosopher looks only\nat the act of construction itself, which is purely an internal one.\n\n2. Moreover, the objects of the transcendental philosopher have no\nexistence, except in so far as they are freely produced. Nothing can\ncompel to this production, any more than the external describing of a\nfigure can compel one to regard it internally. Just as the existence of\na mathematical figure rests on the outer sense, so the whole reality of\na philosophical idea rests upon the inner sense. The whole object of\nthis philosophy is no other than the action of Intelligence according to\nfixed laws. This action can be conceived only by means of a peculiar,\ndirect, inner intuition, and this again is possible only by production.\nBut this is not enough. In philosophizing, one is not only the object\nconsidered, but always at the same time the subject considering. To the\nunderstanding of philosophy, therefore, there are two conditions\nindispensable: first, that the philosopher shall be engaged in a\ncontinuous internal activity, in a continuous production of those primal\nactions of the intelligence; second, that he shall be engaged in\ncontinuous reflection upon the productive action;\u2014in a word, that he\nshall be at once the contemplated (producing) and the contemplating.\n\n3. By this continuous duplicity of production and intuition, that\nmust become an object which is otherwise reflected by nothing. It\ncannot be shown here, but will be shown in the sequel, that this\nbecoming-reflected on the part of the absolutely unconscious and\nnon-objective, is possible only by an \u00e6sthetic act of the\nimagination. Meanwhile, so much is plain from what has already been\nproved, that all philosophy is productive. Philosophy, therefore, no\nless than art, rests upon the productive faculty, and the difference\nbetween the two, upon the different direction of the productive\npower. For whereas production in art is directed outward, in order\nto reflect the unconscious by products, philosophical production is\ndirected immediately inward, in order to reflect it in intellectual\nintuition. The real sense by which this kind of philosophy must be\ngrasped, is therefore the \u00e6sthetic sense, and hence it is that the\nphilosophy of art is the true organum of philosophy (III.)\n\nOut of the vulgar reality there are only two means of exit\u2014poetry, which\ntransports us into an ideal world, and philosophy, which makes the real\nworld vanish before us. It is not plain why the sense for philosophy\nshould be more generally diffused than that for poetry, especially among\nthat class of men, who, whether by memory-work (nothing destroys more\ndirectly the productive) or by dead speculation (ruinous to all\nimaginative power), have completely lost the \u00e6sthetic organ.\n\n4. It is unnecessary to occupy time with common-places about the sense\nof truth, and about utter unconcern in regard to results, although it\nmight be asked, what other conviction can yet be sacred to him who lays\nhands upon the most certain of all\u2014that there are things outside of us?\nWe may rather take one glance more at the so-called claims of the common\nunderstanding.\n\nThe common understanding in matters of philosophy has no claims\nwhatsoever, except those which every object of examination has, _viz._,\nto be completely explained.\n\nIt is not, therefore, any part of our business to prove that what it\nconsiders true, is true, but only to exhibit the unavoidable character\nof its illusions. This implies that the objective world belongs only to\nthe necessary limitations which render self-consciousness (which is I)\npossible; it is enough for the common understanding, if from this view\nagain the necessity of its view is derived.\n\nFor this purpose it is necessary, not only that the inner works of the\nmental activity should be laid open, and the mechanism of necessary\nideas revealed, but also that it should be shown by what peculiarity of\nour nature it is, that what has reality only in our intuition, is\nreflected to us as something existing outside of us.\n\nAs natural science produces idealism out of realism, by mentalizing the\nlaws of Nature into laws of intelligence, or super-inducing the formal\nupon the material (I.), so transcendental philosophy produces realism\nout of idealism, by materializing the laws of Nature, or introducing the\nmaterial into the formal.\n\n\n\n\n GENESIS.\n By A. BRONSON ALCOTT.\n\n\n \u201cGod is the constant and immutable Good; the world is Good in a\n state of becoming, and the human soul is that in and by which the\n Good in the world is consummated.\u201d\u2014PLATO.\n\n\n I.\u2014VESTIGES.\n\n\nBehmen, the subtilest thinker on Genesis since Plato, conceives that\nNature fell from its original oneness by fault of Lucifer before man\nrose physically from its ruins; and moreover, that his present\nexistence, being the struggle to recover from Nature\u2019s lapse, is\nembarrassed with double difficulties by deflection from rectitude on his\npart. We think it needs no Lucifer other than mankind collectively\nconspiring, to account for Nature\u2019s mishaps, or Man\u2019s. Since, assuming\nman to be Nature\u2019s ancestor, and Nature man\u2019s ruins rather, himself is\nthe impediment he seeks to remove; and, moreover, conceiving Nature as\ncorresponding in large\u2014or macrocosmically\u2014to his intents, for whatsoever\nembarrassments he finds therein, himself, and none other, takes the\nblame. Eldest of creatures, and progenitor of all below him, personally\none and imperishable in essence, it follows that if debased forms appear\nin Nature, it must be consequent on Man\u2019s degeneracy prior to their\ngenesis. And it is only as he lapses out of his integrity, by debasing\nhis essence, that he impairs his original likeness, and drags it into\nthe prone shapes of the animal kingdom\u2014these being the effigies and\nvestiges of his individualized and shattered personality. Behold these\nupstarts of his loins, everywhere the mimics jeering at him saucily, or\ngaily parodying their fallen lord.\n\n \u201cMost happy he who hath fit place assigned\n To his beasts, and disaforestered his mind;\n Can use his horse, goat, wolf, and every beast,\n And is not ape himself to all the rest.\u201d[11]\n\nIt is man alone who conceives and brings forth the beast in him, that\nswerves and dies; perversion of will by mis-choice being the fate that\nprecipitates him into serpentine form, clothed in duplicity, cleft into\nsex,\n\n \u201cParts of that Part which once was all.\u201d\n\nIt is but one and the same soul in him, entertaining a dialogue with\nhimself, that is symbolized in The Serpent, Adam, and the Woman; nor\nneed there be fabulous \u201cParadises Lost or Regained,\u201d for setting in\nrelief this serpent symbol of temptation, this Lord or Lucifer in our\nspiritual Eden:\n\n \u201cFirst state of human kind,\n Which one remains while man doth find\n Joy in his partner\u2019s company;\n When two, alas! adulterate joined,\n The serpent made the three.\u201d\n\n\n II.\u2014THE DEUCE.\n\n\n \u201cI inquired what iniquity was, and found it to be no substance, but\n perversion of the Will from the Supreme One towards lower\n things.\u201d\u2014_St. Augustine._\n\nBetter is he who is above temptation than he who, being tempted,\novercomes; since the latter but suppresses the evil inclination in his\nbreast, which the former has not. Whoever is tempted has so far sinned\nas to entertain the tempting lust stirring within him, and betraying his\nlapse from singleness or holiness. The virtuous choose, and are virtuous\nby choice; while the holy, being one, are above all need of\ndeliberating, their volitions answering spontaneously to their desires.\nIt is the cleft personality, or _other_ within, that confronts and\nseduces the Will; the Adversary and Deuce we become individually, and\nthus impersonate in the Snake.[12]\n\n\n III.\u2014SERPENT SYMBOL.\n\n\nOne were an \u0152dipus to expound this serpent mythology; yet failing this,\nwere to miss finding the keys to the mysteries of Genesis, and Nature\nwere the chaos and abyss; since hereby the one rejoins man\u2019s parted\npersonality, and recreates lost mankind. Coeval with flesh, the symbol\nappears wherever traces of civilization exist, a remnant of it in the\nancient Phallus worship having come to us disguised in our May-day\ndance. Nor was it confined to carnal knowledge merely. The serpent\nsymbolized divine wisdom, also; and it was under this acceptation that\nit became associated with those \u201ctraditionary teachers of mankind whose\ngenial wisdom entitled them to divine honors.\u201d An early Christian sect,\ncalled Ophites, worshipped it as the personation of natural knowledge.\nSo the injunction, \u201cBe ye wise as serpents and harmless as doves,\u201d\nbecomes the more significant when we learn that _seraph_ in the original\nmeans a serpent; _cherub_, a dove; these again symbolizing facts in\nosteological science as connected with the latest theories of the\ninvertebrated cranium accepted by eminent naturalists, and so\nsubstantiating the symbol in nature; this being ophiomorphous, a series\nof spires, crowned, winged, webbed, finned, footed in structure, set\nerect, prone, trailing, as charged with life in higher potency or lower;\nman, supreme in personal uprightness, and holding the sceptre of\ndominion as he maintains his inborn rectitude, or losing his prerogative\nas he lapses from his integrity, thus debasing his form and parcelling\nhis gifts away in the prone shapes distributed throughout Nature\u2019s\nkingdoms; or, again, aspiring for lost supremacy, he uplifts and crowns\nhis fallen form with forehead, countenance, speech, thereby liberating\nthe genius from the slime of its prone periods, and restoring it to\nrectitude, religion, science, fellowship, the ideal arts.[13]\n\n \u201cUnless above himself he can\n Erect himself, how poor a thing is man.\u201d\n\n\n IV.\u2014EMBRYONS.\n\n\n \u201cThe form is in the archetype before it appears in the work, in the\n divine mind before it exists in the creature.\u201d\u2014_Leibnitz._\n\nAs the male impregnates the female, so mind charges matter with form and\nfecundity; the spermatic world being life in transmission and body in\nembryo. So the egg is a genesis and seminary of forms, (the kingdoms of\nanimated nature sleeping coiled in its yolk) and awaits the quickening\nmagnetism that ushers them into light. Herein the human embryon unfolds\nin series the lineaments of all forms in the living hierarchy, to be\nfixed at last in its microcosm, unreeling therefrom its faculties into\nfilamental organs, spinning so minutely the threads, \u201cthat were it\nphysically possible to dissolve away all other members of the body,\nthere would still remain the full and perfect figure of a man. And it is\nthis perfect cerebro-spinal axis, this statue-like tissue of filaments,\nthat, physically speaking, is the man.\u201c The mind above contains him\nspiritually, and reveals him physically to himself and his kind. Every\ncreature assists in its own formation, souls being essentially creative\nand craving form.\n\n\u201cFor the creature delights in the image of the Creator; and the soul of\nman will in a manner clasp God to herself. Having nothing mortal, she is\nwholly inebriated from God; for she glories in the harmony under which\nthe human body exists.\u201d[14]\n\n\n V.\u2014PROMETHEUS.\n\n\n \u201cImago Dei in animo; mundi, in corpore.\u201d\n\nMan is a soul, informed by divine ideas, and bodying forth their image.\nHis mind is the unit and measure of things visible and invisible. In him\nstir the creatures potentially, and through his personal volitions are\nconceived and brought forth in matter whatsoever he sees, touches, and\ntreads under foot. The planet he spins.\n\n He omnipresent is,\n All round himself he lies,\n Osiris spread abroad;\n Upstaring in all eyes.\n Nature his globed thought,\n Without him she were not,\n Cosmos from chaos were not spoken,\n And God bereft of visible token.\n\nA theosmeter\u2014an instrument of instruments\u2014he gathers in himself all\nforces, partakes in his plenitude of omniscience, being spirit\u2019s acme,\nand culmination in nature. A quickening spirit and mediator between mind\nand matter, he conspires with all souls, with the Soul of souls, in\ngenerating the substance in which he immerses his form, and wherein he\nembosoms his essence. Not elemental, but fundamental, essential, he\ngenerates elements and forces, expiring while consuming, and perpetually\nreplenishing his waste; the final conflagration a current fact of his\nexistence. Does the assertion seem incredible, absurd? But science,\ngrown luminous and transcendent, boldly declares that life to the senses\nis ablaze, refeeding steadily its flame from the atmosphere it kindles\ninto life, its embers the spent remains from which rises perpetually the\nnew-born Ph\u0153nix into regions where flame is lost in itself, and light\nits resolvent emblem.[15]\n\n \u201cThee, Eye of Heaven, the great soul envies not,\n By thy male force is all we have, begot.\u201d\n\n\n VI.\u2014IDEAL METHOD.\n\n\n \u201cIt has ever been the misfortune of the mere materialist, in his\n mania for matter on the one hand and dread of ideas on the other, to\n invert nature\u2019s order, and thus hang the world\u2019s picture as a man\n with his heels upwards.\u201d\u2014_Cudworth._\n\nThis inverse order of thought conducts of necessity to conclusions as\nderogatory to himself as to Nature\u2019s author. Assuming matter as his\nbasis of investigation, force as father of thought, he confounds\nfaculties with organs, life with brute substance, and must needs pile\nhis atom atop of atom, cement cell on cell, in constructing his column,\nsconce mounting sconce aspiringly as it rises, till his shaft of gifts\ncrown itself surreptitiously with the ape\u2019s glorified effigy, as\nNature\u2019s frontispiece and head. Life\u2019s atomy with life omitted\naltogether, man wanting. Not thus reads the ideal naturalist the Book of\nlives. But opening at spirit, and thence proceeding to ideas and finding\ntheir types in matter, life unfolds itself naturally in organs,\nfaculties begetting forces, mind moulding things substantially, its\nconnections and inter-dependencies appear in series and degrees as he\ntraces the leaves, thought the key to originals, man the connexus,\narchetype, and classifier of things; he, straightway, leading forth\nabreast of himself the animated creation from the chaos,\u2014the primeval\nAdam naming his mates, himself their ancestor, contemporary and\nsurvivor.\n\n\n VII.\u2014DIALOGIC.\n\n\nIf the age of iron and brass be hard upon us, fast welding its fetters\nand chains about our foreheads and limbs, here, too, is the Promethean\nfire of thought to liberate letters, science, art, philosophy, using the\nnew agencies let loose by the D\u00e6dalus of mechanic invention and\ndiscovery, in the service of the soul, as of the senses. Having\nrecovered the omnipresence in nature, graded space, tunnelled the abyss,\njoined ocean and land by living wires, stolen the chemistry of atom and\nsolar ray, made light our painter, the lightning our runner, thought is\npushing its inquiries into the unexplored regions of man\u2019s personality,\nfor whose survey and service every modern instrument lends the outlay\nand means\u2014facilities ample and unprecedented\u2014new instruments for the new\ndiscoverers. Using no longer contentedly the eyes of a toiling\ncircuitous logic, the genius takes the track of the creative thought,\nintuitively, cosmically, ontologically. A subtler analysis is finely\ndisseminated, a broader synthesis accurately generalized from the\nmaterials accumulated on the mind during the centuries, the globe\u2019s\ncontents being gathered in from all quarters: the book of creation,\nnewly illustrated and posted to date. The new Calculus is ours: an\norganon alike serviceable to naturalist and metaphysician: a Dialogic\nfor resolving things into thoughts, matter into mind, power into\npersonality, man into God, many into one; soul in souls seen as the\ncreative controlling spirit, pulsating in all bodies, inspiring,\nanimating, organizing, immanent in the atoms, circulating at centre and\ncircumference, willing in all wills, personally embosoming all persons\nan unbroken synthesis of Being.\n\nFootnote 11:\n\n \u201cHad man withstood the trial, his descendants would have been born one\n from another in the same way that Adam\u2014i. e. mankind\u2014was, namely, in\n the image of God; for that which proceeds from the Eternal has eternal\n manner of birth.\u201d\u2014_Behmen._\n\nFootnote 12:\n\n \u201cIt is a miserable thing to have been happy; and a self-contracted\n wretchedness is a double one. Had felicity always been a stranger to\n humanity, our present misery had been none; and had not ourselves been\n the authors of our ruins, less. We might have been made unhappy, but,\n since we are miserable, we chose it. He that gave our outward\n enjoyments might have taken them from us, but none could have robbed\n us of innocence but ourselves. While man knew no sin, he was ignorant\n of nothing that it imported humanity to know; but when he had sinned,\n the same transgression that opened his eyes to see his own shame, shut\n them against most things else but it and the newly purchased misery.\n With the nakedness of his body, he saw that of his soul, and the\n blindness and dismay of his faculties to which his former innocence\n was a stranger, and that which showed them to him made them. We are\n not now like the creatures we were made, having not only lost our\n Maker\u2019s image but our own; and do not much more transcend the\n creatures placed at our feet, than we come short of our ancient\n selves.\u201d\u2014_Glanvill._\n\nFootnote 13:\n\n \u201cI maintain that the different types of the human family have an\n independent origin, one from the other, and are not descended from\n common ancestors. In fact, I believe that men were created in nations,\n not in individuals; but not in nations in the present sense of the\n word; on the contrary, in such crowds as exhibited slight, if any,\n diversity among themselves, except that of sex.\u201d\u2014_Agassiz._\n\nFootnote 14:\n\n \u201cThou hast possessed my reins, thou hast covered me in my mother\u2019s\n womb. My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in a secret\n place, and there curiously wrought as in the lowest parts of the\n earth: there thine eyes did see my substance yet being imperfect: and\n in thy Book were all my members written, which in continuance were\n fashioned when as yet there was none of them.\u201d\u2014PSALM cxxxix: 13, 15,\n 16.\n\nFootnote 15:\n\n \u201cMan feeds upon air, the plant collecting the materials from the\n atmosphere and compounding them for his food. Even life itself, as we\n know it, is but a process of combustion, of which decomposition is the\n final conclusion; through this combustion all the constituents return\n back into air, a few ashes remaining to the earth from whence they\n came. But from these embers, slowly invisible flames, arise into\n regions where our science has no longer any value.\u201d\u2014_Schleiden._\n\n\n\n\n ANALYSIS OF HEGEL\u2019S \u00c6STHETICS.\n Translated from the French of CH. BENARD, by J. A. MARTLING.\n\n\n Part III.\n System of the Particular Arts.\n\n\nUnder the head of \u201cSystem of the Particular Arts,\u201d Hegel sets forth, in\nthis third part, the theory of each of the arts\u2014_Architecture_,\n_Sculpture_, _Painting_, _Music_ and _Poetry_.\n\nBefore proceeding to the division of the arts, he glances at the\ndifferent _styles_ which distinguish the different epochs of their\ndevelopment. He reduces them to three styles: the _simple_ or severe,\nthe _ideal_ or beautiful, and the graceful.\n\n1. At first the simple and natural style presents itself to us, but it\nis not the truly natural or true simplicity. That supposes a previous\nperfection. Primitive simplicity is gross, confused, rigid, inanimate.\nArt in its infancy is heavy and trifling, destitute of life and liberty,\nwithout expression, or with an exaggerated vivacity. Still harsh and\nrude in its commencements, it becomes by degrees master of form, and\nlearns to unite it intimately with content. It arrives thus at a severe\nbeauty. This style is the Beautiful in its lofty simplicity. It is\nrestricted to reproducing a subject with its essential traits.\nDisdaining grace and ornament, it contents itself with the general and\ngrand expression which springs from the subject, without the artist\u2019s\nexhibiting himself and revealing his personality in it.\n\n2. Next in order comes the beautiful style, the _ideal_ and pure style,\nwhich holds the mean between simple expression and a marked tendency to\nthe graceful. Its character is vitality, combined with a calm and\nbeautiful grandeur. Grace is not wanting, but there is rather a natural\ncarelessness, a simple complacency, than the desire to please\u2014a beauty\nindifferent to the exterior charms which blossom of themselves upon the\nsurface. Such is the ideal of the beautiful style\u2014the style of Phidias\nand Homer. It is the culminating point of art.\n\n3. But this movement is short. The ideal style passes quickly to the\ngraceful, to the agreeable. Here appears an aim different from that of\nthe realization of the beautiful, which pure art ought to propose to\nitself, to wit: the intention of pleasing, of producing an impression on\nthe soul. Hence arise works of a style elaborate with art, and a certain\nseeking for external embellishments. The subject is no more the\nprincipal thing. The attention of the artist is distracted by ornaments\nand accessories\u2014by the decorations, the trimmings, the simpering airs,\nthe attitudes and graceful postures, or the vivid colors and the\nattractive forms, the luxury of ornaments and draperies, the learned\nmaking of verse. But the general effect remains without grandeur and\nwithout nobleness. Beautiful proportions and grand masses give place to\nmoderate dimensions, or are masked with ornaments. The graceful style\nbegets the style _for effect_, which is an exaggeration of it. The art\nthen becomes altogether conspicuous; it calls the attention of the\nspectator by everything that can strike the senses. The artist\nsurrenders to it his personal ends and his design. In this species of\n_t\u00eate-\u00e0-t\u00eate_ with the public, there is betrayed through all, the desire\nof exhibiting his wit, of attracting admiration for his ability, his\nskill, his power of execution. This art\u2014without naturalness, full of\ncoquetry, of artifice and affectation, the opposite of the severe style\nwhich yields nothing to the public\u2014is the style of the epochs of\ndecadence. Frequently it has recourse to a last artifice, to the\naffectation of profundity and of simplicity, which is then only\nobscurity, a mysterious profundity which conceals an absence of ideas\nand a real impotence. This air of mystery, which parades itself, is in\nits turn, hardly better than coquetry; the principle is the same\u2014the\ndesire of producing an effect.\n\nThe author then passes to the _Division of the Arts_. The common method\nclasses them according to their means of representation, and the senses\nto which they are addressed. Two senses only are affected by the\nperception of the beautiful: _sight_, which perceives forms and colors,\nand _hearing_, which perceives sounds. Hence the division into _arts of\ndesign_ and _musical art_. _Poetry_, which employs speech, and addresses\nitself to the imagination, forms a domain apart. Without discarding this\ndivision, Hegel combines it with another more philosophical principle of\nclassification, and one which is taken no longer from the external means\nof art, but from their internal relation to the very content of the\nideas which it is to represent.\n\nArt has for object the representation of the ideal. The arts ought then\nto be classed according to the measure in which they are more or less\ncapable of expressing it. This gradation will have at the same time the\nadvantage of corresponding to historic progress, and to the fundamental\nforms of art previously studied.\n\nAccording to this principle, the arts marshal themselves, and succeed\none another, to form a regular and complete system, thus:\n\n1. First _Architecture_ presents itself. This art, in fact, is incapable\nof representing an idea otherwise than in a vague, indeterminate manner.\nIt fashions the masses of inorganic nature, according to the laws of\nmatter and geometrical proportions; it disposes them with regularity and\nsymmetry in such a manner as to offer to the eyes an image which is a\nsimple reflex of the spirit, a dumb symbol of the thought. Architecture\nis at the same time appropriated to ends which are foreign to it: it is\ndestined to furnish a dwelling for man and a temple for Divinity; it\nmust shelter under its roof, in its enclosure, the other arts, and, in\nparticular, sculpture and painting.\n\nFor these reasons architecture should, historically and logically, be\nplaced first in the series of the arts.\n\n2. In a higher rank is Sculpture, which already exhibits spirit under\ncertain determinate traits. Its object, in fact, is spirit\nindividualized, revealed by the human form and its living organism.\nUnder this visible appearance, by the features of the countenance, and\nthe proportions of the body, it expresses ideal beauty, divine calmness,\nserenity\u2014in a word, the classic ideal.\n\n3. Although retained in the world of visible forms, Painting offers a\nhigher degree of spirituality. To form, it adds the different phases of\nvisible appearance, the illusions of perspective, color, light and\nshades, and thereby it becomes capable, not only of reproducing the\nvarious pictures of nature, but also of expressing upon canvas the most\nprofound sentiments of the human soul, and all the scenes of ethical\nlife.\n\n4. But, as an expression of sentiment, _Music_ still surpasses painting.\nWhat it expresses is the soul itself, in its most intimate and profound\nrelations; and this by a sensuous phenomenon, equally invisible,\ninstantaneous, intangible\u2014sound\u2014sonorous vibrations, which resound in\nthe abysses of the soul, and agitate it throughout.\n\n5. All these arts culminate in Poetry, which includes them and surpasses\nthem, and whose superiority is due to its mode of expression\u2014_speech_.\nIt alone is capable of expressing all ideas, all sentiments, all\npassions, the highest conceptions of the intelligence, and the most\nfugitive impressions of the soul. To it alone is given to represent an\naction in its complete development and in all its phases. It is the\nuniversal art\u2014its domain is unlimited. Hence it is divided into many\nspecies, of which the principal are _epic_, _lyric_ and _dramatic_\npoetry.\n\nThese five arts form the complete and organized system of the arts.\nOthers, such as the _art of gardening, dancing, engraving, etc._, are\nonly accessories, and more or less connected with the preceding. They\nhave not the right to occupy a distinct place in a general theory; they\nwould only introduce confusion, and disfigure the fundamental type which\nis peculiar to each of them.\n\nSuch is the division adopted by Hegel. He combines it, at the same time,\nwith his general division of the forms of the historic development of\nart. Thus architecture appears to him to correspond more particularly to\nthe _symbolic_ type; sculpture is the _classic_ art, _par excellence_;\npainting and music fill the category of the _romantic_ arts. Poetry, as\nart universal, belongs to all epochs.\n\nI. ARCHITECTURE.\u2014In the study of architecture, Hegel follows a purely\nhistoric method. He limits himself to describing and characterizing its\nprincipal forms in the different epochs of history. This art, in fact,\nlends itself to an abstract theory less than the others. There are here\nfew principles to establish; and when we depart from generalities, we\nenter into the domain of mathematical laws, or into the technical\napplications, foreign to pure science. It remains, then, only to\ndetermine the sense and the character of its monuments, in their\nrelation to the spirit of the people, and the epochs to which they\nbelong. It is to this point of view that the author has devoted himself.\nThe division which he adopts on this subject, and the manner in which he\nexplains it, are as follows:\n\nThe object of architecture, independent of the positive design and the\nuse to which its monuments are appropriated, is to express a general\nthought, by forms borrowed from inorganic nature, by masses fashioned\nand disposed according to the laws of geometry and mechanics. But\nwhatever may be the ideas and the impressions which the appearance of an\nedifice produces, it never furnishes other than an obscure and enigmatic\nemblem. The thought is vaguely represented by those material forms which\nspirit itself does not animate.\n\nIf such is the nature of this art, it follows that, essentially\nsymbolic, it must predominate in that first epoch of history which is\ndistinguished by the symbolic character of its monuments. It must show\nitself there freer, more independent of practical utility, not\nsubordinated to a foreign end. Its essential object ought to be to\nexpress ideas, to present emblems, to symbolize the beliefs of those\npeoples, incapable as they are of otherwise expressing them. It is the\nproper language of such an epoch\u2014a language enigmatic and mysterious; it\nindicates the effort of the imagination to represent ideas, still vague.\nIts monuments are problems proposed to future ages, and which as yet are\nbut imperfectly comprehended.\n\nSuch is the character of oriental architecture. There the end is\nvalueless or accessory; the symbolic expression is the principal object.\nArchitecture is _independent_, and sculpture is confounded with it.\n\nThe monuments of Greek and Roman architecture present a wholly different\ncharacter. Here, the aim of utility appears clearly distinct from\nexpression. The purpose, the design of the monument comes out in an\nevident manner. It is a dwelling, a shelter, a temple, etc.\n\nSculpture, for its part, is detached from architecture, and assigns its\nend to it. The image of the god, enclosed in the temple, is the\nprincipal object. The temple is only a shelter, an external attendant.\nIts forms are regulated according to the laws of numbers, and the\nproportions of a learned eurythmy; but its true ornaments are furnished\nto it by sculpture. Architecture ceases then to be independent and\nsymbolic; it becomes dependent, subordinated to a positive end.\n\nAs to Christian architecture or that of the Middle Ages, it presents the\nunion of the two preceding characteristics. It is at once devoted to a\nuseful end, and eminently expressive or symbolic\u2014_dependent_ and\n_independent_. The temple is the house of God; it is devoted to the uses\nand ceremonies of worship, and shows throughout its design in its forms;\nbut at the same time these symbolize admirably the Christian idea.\n\nThus the symbolic, classic and romantic forms, borrowed from history,\nand which mark the whole development of art, serve for the division and\nclassification of the forms of architecture. This being especially the\nart which is exercised in the domain of matter, the essential point to\nbe distinguished is whether the monument which is addressed to the eyes\nincludes in itself its own meaning, or whether it is considered as a\nmeans to a foreign end, or finally whether, although in the service of a\nforeign end, it preserves its independence.\n\nThe _basis_ of the division being thus placed, Hegel justifies it by\ndescribing the characters of the monuments belonging to these three\nepochs. All this descriptive part can not be analyzed: we are obliged to\nlimit ourselves to securing a comprehension of the general features, and\nto noting the most remarkable points.\n\n(_a_) Since the distinctive characteristic of symbolic architecture is\nthe expression of a general thought, without other end than the\nrepresentation of it, the interest in its monuments is less in their\npositive design than in the religious conceptions of the people, who,\nnot having other means of expression, have embodied their thought, still\nvague and confused, in these gigantic masses and these colossal images.\nEntire nations know not how otherwise to express their religious\nbeliefs. Hence the symbolic character of the structures of the\nBabylonians, the Indians and the Egyptians, of those works which\nabsorbed the life of those peoples, and whose meaning we seek to explain\nto ourselves.\n\nIt is difficult to follow a regular order in the absence of chronology,\nwhen we review the multiplicity of ideas and forms which these monuments\nand these symbols present. Hegel thinks, nevertheless, that he is able\nto establish the following gradations:\n\nIn the first rank are the simplest monuments, such as seem only designed\nto serve as a bond of union to entire nations, or to different nations.\nSuch gigantic structures as the tower of Belus or Babylon, upon the\nshores of the Euphrates, present the image of the union of the peoples\nbefore their dispersion. Community of toil and effort is the aim and the\nvery idea of the work; it is the common work of their united efforts,\nthe symbol of the dissolution of the primitive family and of the\nformation of a vaster society.\n\nIn a rank more elevated, appear the monuments of a more determined\ncharacter, where is noticeable a mingling of architecture and sculpture,\nalthough they belong to the former. Such are those symbols which, in the\nEast, represent the generative force of nature; the _phallus_ and the\n_lingam_ scattered in so great numbers throughout Phrygia and Syria, and\nof which India is the principal seat; in Egypt, the obelisks, which\nderive their symbolic significance from the rays of the sun; the\nMemnons, colossal statues which also represent the sun and his\nbeneficent influence upon nature; the sphinxes, which one finds in Egypt\nin prodigious numbers and of astonishing size, ranged in rows in the\nform of avenues. These monuments, of an imposing sculpture, are grouped\nin masses, surrounded by walls so as to form buildings.\n\nThey present, in a striking manner, the twofold character indicated\nabove: free from all positive design, they are, above all, symbols;\nafterward, sculpture is confounded with architecture. They are\nstructures without roof, without doors, without aisles, frequently\nforests of colums where the eye loses itself. The eye passes over\nobjects which are there for their own sake, designed only to strike the\nimagination by their colossal aspect and their enigmatic sense, not to\nserve as a dwelling for a god, and as a place of assemblage for his\nworshippers. Their order and their disposition alone preserve for them\nan architectural character. You walk on into the midst of those human\nworks, mute symbols which remind you of divine things; your eyes are\neverywhere struck with the aspect of those forms and those extraordinary\nfigures, of those walls besprinkled with hieroglyphics, books of stone,\nas it were, leaves of a mysterious book. Everything there is\nsymbolically determined\u2014the proportions, the distances, the number of\ncolumns, etc. The Egyptians, in particular, consecrated their lives to\nconstructing and building these monuments, by instinct, as a swarm of\nbees builds its hive. This was the whole life of the people. It placed\nthere all its thought, for it could no otherwise express it.\n\nNevertheless, that architecture, in one point, by its chambers and its\nhalls, its tombs, begins to approach the following class, which exhibits\na more positive design, and of which the type is a house.\n\nA third rank marks the transition of symbolic to classic architecture.\nArchitecture already presents a character of utility, of conformity to\nan end. The monument has a precise design; it serves for a particular\nuse taken aside from the symbolic sense. It is a temple or a tomb. Such,\nin the first place, is the subterranean architecture of the Indians,\nthose vast excavations which are also temples, species of subterranean\ncathedrals, the caverns of Mithra, likewise filled with symbolic\nsculpture. But this transition is better characterized by the double\narchitecture, (subterranean and above ground) of the Egyptians, which is\nconnected with their worship of the dead. An individual being, who has\nhis significance and his proper value; the dead one, distinct from his\nhabitation which serves him only for covering and shelter, resides in\nthe interior. The most ancient of these tombs are the pyramids, species\nof crystals, envelopes of stone which enclose a kernel, an invisible\nbeing, and which serve for the preservation of the bodies. In this\nconcealed dead one, resides the significance of the _monument_ which is\nsubordinate to him.\n\nHere, then, _Architecture_ ceases to be independent. It divides itself\ninto two elements\u2014the end and the means; it is the means, and it is\nsubservient to an end. Further, sculpture separates itself from it, and\nobtains a distinct office\u2014that of shaping the image within, and its\naccessories. Here appears clearly the special design of architecture,\nconformity to an end; also it assumes inorganic and geometric forms, the\nabstract, mathematical form, which befits it in particular. The pyramid\nalready exhibits the design of a house, the rectangular form.\n\n(_b_) Classic architecture has a two-fold point of departure\u2014symbolic\narchitecture and necessity. The adaptation of parts to an end, in\nsymbolic architecture, is accessory. In the house, on the contrary, all\nis controlled, from the first, by actual necessity and convenience. Now\nclassic architecture proceeds both from the one and from the other\nprinciple, from necessity and from art, from the useful and from the\nbeautiful, which it combines in the most perfect manner. Necessity\nproduces regular forms, right angles, plane surfaces. But the end is not\nsimply the satisfaction of a physical necessity; there is also an idea,\na religious representation, a sacred image, which it has to shelter and\nsurround, a worship, a religious ceremonial. The temple ought then, like\nthe temple fashioned by sculpture, to spring from the creative\nimagination of the artist. There is necessary a dwelling for the god,\nfashioned by art and according to its laws.\n\nThus, while falling under the law of conformity to an end, and ceasing\nto be independent, architecture escapes from the useful and submits to\nthe law of the beautiful; or rather, the beautiful and useful meet and\ncombine themselves in the happiest manner. Symmetry, eurythmy, organic\nforms the most graceful, the most rich, and the most varied, join\nthemselves as ornaments to the architectural forms. The two points of\nview are united without being confounded, and form an harmonious whole;\nthere will be, at the same time, a useful, convenient and beautiful\narchitecture.\n\nWhat best marks the transition to Greek architecture, is the appearance\nof the column, which is its type. The column is a support. Therein is\nits useful and mechanical design; it fulfils that design in the most\nsimple and perfect manner, because with it the power of support is\nreduced to its minimum of material means. From another side, in order to\nbe adapted to its end and to beauty, it must give up its natural and\nprimitive form. The beautiful column comes from a form borrowed from\nnature; but carved, shaped, it takes a regular and geometric\nconfiguration. In Egypt, human figures serve as columns; here they are\nreplaced by caryatides. But the natural, primitive form is the tree, the\ntrunk, the flexible stock, which bears its crown. Such, too, appears the\nEgyptian column; columns are seen rising from the vegetable kingdom in\nthe stalks of the lotus and other trees; the base resembles an onion.\nThe leaf shoots from the root, like that of a reed, and the capital\npresents the appearance of a flower. The mathematical and regular form\nis absent. In the Greek column, on the contrary, all is fashioned\naccording to the mathematical laws of regularity and proportion. The\nbeautiful column springs from a form borrowed from nature, but fashioned\naccording to the artistic sense.\n\nThus the characteristic of classic architecture, as of architecture in\ngeneral, is the union of beauty and utility. Its beauty consists in its\nregularity, and although it serves a foreign end, it constitutes a whole\nperfect in itself; it permits its essential aim to look forth in all its\nparts, and through the harmony of its relations, it transforms the\nuseful into the beautiful.\n\nThe character of classic architecture being subordination to an end, it\nis that end which, without detriment to beauty, gives to the entire\nedifice its proper signification, and which becomes thus the principal\nregulator of all its parts; as it impresses itself on the whole, and\ndetermines its fundamental form. The first thing as to a work of this\nsort, then, is to know what is its purpose, its design. The general\npurpose of a Grecian temple is to hold the statue of a god. But in its\nexterior, the character of the temple relates to a different end, and\nits spirit is the life of the Greek people.\n\nAmong the Greeks, open structures, colonnades and porticoes, have as\nobject the promenade in the open air, conversation, public life under a\npure sky. Likewise the dwellings of private persons are insignificant.\nAmong the Romans, on the contrary, whose national architecture has a\nmore positive end in utility, appears later the luxury of private\nhouses, palaces, villas, theatres, circuses, amphitheatres, aqueducts\nand fountains. But the principal edifice is that whose end is most\nremote from the wants of material life; it is the temple designed to\nserve as a shelter to a divine object, which already belongs to the fine\narts\u2014to the statue of a god.\n\nAlthough devoted to a determinate end, this architecture is none the\nless free from it, in the sense, that it disengages itself from organic\nforms; it is more free even than sculpture, which is obliged to\nreproduce them; it invents its plan, the general configuration, and it\ndisplays in external forms all the richness of the imagination; it has\nno other laws than those of good taste and harmony; it labors without a\ndirect model. Nevertheless, it works within a limited domain, that of\nmathematical figures, and it is subjected to the laws of mechanics. Here\nmust be preserved, first of all, the relations between the width, the\nlength, the height of the edifice; the exact proportions of the columns\naccording to their thickness, the weight to be supported, the intervals,\nthe number of columns, the style, the simplicity of the ornaments. It is\nthis which gives to the theory of this art, and in particular of this\nform of architecture, the character of dryness and abstraction. But\nthere dominates throughout, a natural eurythmy, which their perfectly\naccurate sense enabled the Greeks to find and fix as the measure and\nrule of the beautiful.\n\nWe will not follow the author in the description which he gives of the\nparticular characteristics of architectural forms; we will omit also\nsome other interesting details upon building in wood or in stone as the\nprimitive type, upon the relation of the different parts of the Greek\ntemple. In here following Vitruvius, the author has been able to add\nsome discriminating and judicious remarks. What he says, in particular,\nof the column, of its proportions and of its design, of the internal\nunity of the different parts and of their effects as a whole, adds to\nwhat is already known a philosophical explication which satisfies the\nreason. We remark, especially, this passage, which sums up the general\ncharacter of the Greek temple: \u201cIn general, the Greek temple presents an\naspect which satisfies the vision, and, so to speak, surfeits it.\nNothing is very elevated, it is regularly extended in length and\nbreadth. The eye finds itself allured by the sense of extent, while\nGothic architecture mounts even beyond measurement, and shoots upward to\nheaven. Besides, the ornaments are so managed that they do not mar the\ngeneral expression of simplicity. In this, the ancients observe the most\nbeautiful moderation.\u201d\n\nThe connection of their architecture with the genius, the spirit, and\nthe life of the Greek people, is indicated in the following passage: \u201cIn\nplace of the spectacle of an assemblage united for a single end, all\nappears directed towards the exterior, and presents us the image of an\nanimated promenade. There men who have leisure abandon themselves to\nconversations without end, wherein rule gayety and serenity. The whole\nexpression of such a temple remains truly simple and grand in itself,\nbut it has at the same time an air of serenity, something open and\ngraceful.\u201d This prepares and conducts us to another kind of\narchitecture, which presents a striking contrast to the preceding\nChristian or Gothic architecture.\n\n(_c_) We shall not further attempt to reproduce, even in its principal\nfeatures, the description which Hegel gives, in some pages, of Romantic\nor Gothic architecture. The author has proposed to himself, as object,\nin the first place, to compare the two kinds of architecture, the Greek\nand the Christian, then to secure the apprehension of the relation of\nthis form of architecture to the Christian idea. This is what\nconstitutes the peculiar interest of this remarkable sketch, which, by\nits vigor and severity of design, preserves its distinctive merit when\ncompared with all descriptions that have been made of the architecture\nof the Middle Ages.\n\n_Gothic_ architecture, according to Hegel, unites, in the first place,\nthe opposite characters of the two preceding kinds. Notwithstanding,\nthis union does not consist in the simple fusion of the architectural\nforms of the East and of Greece. Here, still more than in the Greek\ntemple, the house furnishes the fundamental type. An architectural\nedifice which is the house of God, shows itself perfectly in conformity\nwith its design and adapted to worship; but the monument is also there\nfor its own sake, independent, absolute. Externally, the edifice\nascends, shoots freely into the air.\n\nThe conformity to the end, although it presents itself to the eyes, is\ntherefore effaced, and leaves to the whole the appearance of an\nindependent existence. The monument has a determinate sense, and shows\nit; but, in its grand aspect and its sublime calm, it is lifted above\nall end in utility, to something infinite in itself.\n\nIf we examine the relation of this architecture to the inner spirit and\nthe idea of Christian worship, we remark, in the first place, that the\nfundamental form is here the house wholly closed. Just as, in fact, the\nChristian spirit withdraws itself into the interior of the conscience,\njust so the church is an enclosure, sealed on all sides, the place of\nmeditation and silence. \u201cIt is the place of the reflection of the soul\ninto itself, which thus shuts itself up materially in space. On the\nother hand, if, in Christian meditation, the soul withdraws into itself,\nit is, at the same time, lifted above the finite, and this equally\ndetermines the character of the house of God. Architecture takes, then,\nfor its independent signification, elevation towards the infinite, a\ncharacter which it expresses by the proportions of its architectural\nforms.\u201d These two traits, depth of self-examination and elevation of the\nsoul towards the infinite, explain completely the Gothic architecture\nand its principal forms. They furnish also the essential differences\nbetween Gothic and Greek architecture.\n\nThe impression which the Christian church ought to produce in contrast\nwith this open and serene aspect of the Greek temple, is, in the first\nplace, the calmness of the soul which reflects into itself, then that of\na sublime majesty which shoots beyond the confines of sense. Greek\nedifices extend horizontally; the Christian church should lift itself\nfrom the ground and shoot into the air.\n\nThe most striking characteristic which the house of God presents, in its\nwhole and its parts, is, then, the free flight, the shooting in points\nformed either by broken arches or by right lines. In Greek architecture,\nexact proportion between support and height is everywhere observed.\nHere, on the contrary, the operation of supporting and the disposition\nat a right angle\u2014the most convenient for this end\u2014disappears or is\neffaced. The walls and the column shoot without marked difference\nbetween what supports and what is supported, and meet in an acute angle.\nHence the acute triangle and the ogee, which form the characteristic\ntraits of Gothic architecture.\n\nWe are not able to follow the author in the detailed explication of the\ndifferent forms and the divers parts of the Gothic edifice, and of its\ntotal structure.\n\n\n\n\n THE METAPHYSICS OF MATERIALISM.\n By D. G. BRINTON.\n\n\n_Ubi tres physici, ibi duo athei_,\u2014the proverb is something musty.\nNatural science is and always has been materialistic. The explanation is\nsimple. There is as great antagonism between chemical research and\nmetaphysical speculation, as there is between what\n\n \u201cYouthful poets dream,\n On summer\u2019s eve by haunted stream,\u201d\n\nand book-keeping by double entry, and nothing is more customary than to\ndeny what we do not understand. Of late years this scientific\nmaterialism has been making gigantic strides. Since the imposing fabric\nof the Hegelian philosophy proved but a house built on sands, the scales\nand metre have become our only gods.\n\nGermany\u2014mystic, metaphysical Germany\u2014strange to say, leads the van in\nthis crusade against all faith and all idealism. Vogt, the geologist,\nMoleschott, the physiologist, Virchow, the greatest of all living\nhistologists, B\u00fcchner, Tiedemann, Reuchlin, Meldeg, and many others, not\nonly hold these opinions, but have left the seclusion of the laboratory\nand the clinic to enter the arena of polemics in their favor. We do not\nmention the French and English advocates of \u201cpositive philosophy.\u201d Their\nname is Legion.\n\nIt is not our design to enter at all at large into these views, still\nless to dispute them, but merely to give the latest and most approved\ndefence of a single point of their position, a point which we submit is\nthe kernel of the whole controversy, and which we believe to be the very\nAchilles heel and crack in the armor of their panoply of argument\u2014that\nis, the _Theory of the Absolute_. Demonstrate the possibility of the\nAbsolute, and materialism is impossible; disprove it, and all other\nphilosophies are empty nothings,\u2014_vox et pr\u00e6terea nihil_. Here, and only\nhere, is materialism brought face to face with metaphysics; here is the\ncombat _\u00e0 l\u2019outrance_ in which one or the other must perish. No one of\nits apostles has accepted the proffered glaive more heartily, and\ndefended his position with more wary dexterity, than Moleschott, and it\nis mainly from his work, entitled _Der Kreislauf des Lebens_, that we\nillustrate the present metaphysics of materialism.\n\nOur first question is, What is the test of truth, what sanctions a law?\nUntil this is answered, all assertion is absurd, and until it is\nanswered correctly, all philosophy is vain. The response of the\nnaturalist is: \u201cThe necessary sequence of cause and effect is the prime\nlaw of the experimentalist\u2014a law which he does not ask from revelation,\nbut will find out for himself by observation.\u201d The source of truth is\nsensation; the uniform result of manifold experience is a law. Here a\ndouble objection arises: first, that the term \u201ca necessary sequence\u201d\npresupposes a law, and begs the question at issue; and, secondly, that,\nthis necessity unproved, such truth is nothing more than a probability,\nfor it is impossible to be certain that our next experiment may not have\nquite a different result. Either this is not the road to absolute truth,\nor absolute truth is unattainable. The latter horn of the dilemma is at\nonce accepted; we neither know, nor can know, a law to be absolute; to\nus, the absolute does not exist. Matter and force with their relations\nare there, but what we know of them is a varying quantity, is of this\nage or the last, of this man or that, dependent upon the extent and\naccuracy of empirical science; we cannot speak of what we do not know,\nand we know no law that conceivable experience might not contradict.\n\nBut how, objects the reader, can this be reconciled with the pure\nmathematics? Here seem to be laws above experience, laws admitting no\nexception.\n\nThe response leads us back to the origin of our notions of _Space_ and\n_Time_, on the the former of which mathematics is founded. The\nsupposition that they are innate ideas is of course rejected by the\nmaterialist; for he looks upon innate ideas as fables; he considers them\nperceptions derived positively from the senses, but they do not belong\nto the senses alone, nor are they perceptions merely; \u201cthey are ideas,\nbut ideas that without the sensuous perceptions of proximity and\nsequence could never have arisen. Nay, more\u2014the perception of space must\nprecede that of time,\u201d for it is only through the former that we can\nreach the latter. The plainest laws of space, those which were the\nearliest impressions on the _tabula rasa_ of the infant mind, and which\nthe hourly experience of life verifies, are called, by the\nmathematician, _axioms_, and on these simplest generalizations of our\nperceptions he bases the whole of his structure. Axioms, therefore, are\nthe uniform results of experiments, the possible conditions of which are\nextremely limited, and the factors of which have been subjected to all\nthese conditions.\n\nIt follows from a denial of the absolute that all existence is concrete.\nIndeed, we may say that the corner stone of the edifice of materialism\nis embraced in the terse sentence of Moleschott\u2014_all existence is\nexistence through attributes_. Existence _per se_ (_F\u00fcrsichsein_) is a\nmeaningless term, and substance apart from attribute, the _ens\nineffabile_, is a pedantic figment and nothing more. Finally, there can\nbe no attribute except through a relation.\n\nLet this trilogy of existence, attribute and relation, be clearly before\nthe mind, and the position that the positive philosophy bears to all\nothers becomes at once luminous enough. There is no existence apart from\nattributes, no attributes but through relations, no relations but to\nother existences. To exemplify: a stone is heavy, hard, colored, perhaps\nbitter to the taste. Now, says the idealist, this weight, this hardness,\nthis color, this bitterness, these are not the stone, they are merely\nits properties or attributes, and the stone itself is some substance\nbehind them all, to which they adhere and which we cannot detect with\nour senses; further, he might add, if a moderate in his school, these\nattributes are independently existent, the bitterness is there when we\nare not tasting it, and the attribute of color, though there be no\nlight. All this the materialist denies. To him, the attributes and\nnothing else constitute the stone, and these attributes have no\nexistence apart from their relations to other objects. The bitterness\nexists only in relation to the organs of taste, and the color to the\norgans of sight, and the weight to other bodies of matter. Nothing, in\nshort, can be said to exist to us that is not cognizable by our senses.\nBut, objects some one, there may be an existence which is not _to us_,\nwhich is as much beyond our ken as color is beyond the conception of the\nborn blind. The expression was used advisedly: no such existence can\nbecome the subject of rational language. \u201cDoes not all knowledge\npredicate a knower, consequently a relation of the subject to the the\nobserver? Such a relation is an attribute. Without it, knowledge is\ninconceivable. Neither God nor man can raise himself above the knowledge\nfurnished by these relations to his organs of apprehension.\u201d\n\nA disagreeable sequence to this logic will not fail to occur to every\none. If all knowledge comes from the organs of sense, then differently\nformed organs must furnish very different and contradictory knowledge,\nand one is as likely to be correct as another. The radiate animal, who\nsees the world through a cornea alone, must have quite another notion of\nlight, color, and relative size, from the spider whose eye is provided\nwith lenses and a vitreous humor. Consonantly with the theory, each of\nthese probably opposing views is equally true. This ugly dilemma is\nforeseen by our author, for he grants that \u201cthe knowledge of the insect,\nits knowledge of the action of the outer world, is altogether a\ndifferent one from that of man,\u201d but he avoids the ultimate result of\nthis reasoning.\n\nTo sum up the views of this school: matter is eternal, force is eternal,\nbut each is impossible without the other; what bears any relation to our\nsenses we either know or can know; what does not, it is absurd to\ndiscuss; the highest thought is but the physical elaboration of\nsensations, or, to use the expression of Carl Vogt, \u201cthought is a\nsecretion of the brain as urine is of the kidneys. Without phosphorus\nthere is no thought.\u201d \u201cAnd so,\u201d concludes Moleschott, \u201conly when thought\nis based on fact, only when the reason is granted no sphere of action\nbut the historical which arises from observation, when the perception is\nat the same time thought, and the understanding sees with consciousness,\ndoes the contradiction between Philosophy and Science disappear.\u201d\n\nThis, then, is the last word of materialism, this the solution it now\noffers us of the great problem of Life. We enter no further into its\nviews, for all collateral questions concerning the origin of the ideas\nof the true, the good and the beautiful, the vital force, and the\nspiritual life, depend directly on the question we have above mentioned.\nLet the reader turn back precisely a century to the _Syst\u00e8me de la\nNature_, so long a boasted bulwark of the rationalistic school, and\njudge for himself what advance, if any, materialism has made in\nfortifying this, the most vital point of her structure. Let him ask\nhimself anew whether the criticism of Hume on the law of cause and\neffect can in any way be met except after the example of Kant, by the\nassumption of the absolute idea, and we have little doubt what\nconclusion he will arrive at in reference to that system which, while it\nboasts to offer the only method of discovering truth, starts with the\nflat denial of all truth other than relative.\n\n\n\n\n LETTERS ON FAUST.\n By H. C. BROCKMEYER.\n\n\n I.\n\n\nDEAR H.\u2014Yours of a recent date, requesting an epistolary criticism of\n\u201cGoethe\u2019s Faust,\u201d has come to hand, and I hasten to assure you of a\ncompliance of some sort. I say a compliance of some sort, for I cannot\npromise you a criticism. This, it seems to me, would be both too little\nand too much; too little if understood in the ordinary sense, as meaning\na mere statement of the _relation_ existing between the work and myself;\ntoo much if interpreted as pledging an expression of a work of the\ncreative imagination, as a totality, in the terms of the understanding,\nand submitting the result to the canons of art.\n\nThe former procedure, usually called criticism, reduced to its simplest\nforms, amounts to this: that I, the critic, report to you, that I was\namused or bored, flattered or satirized, elevated or degraded, humanized\nor brutalized, enlightened or mystified, pleased or displeased, by the\nwork under consideration; and\u2014since it depends quite as much upon my own\nhumor, native ability, and culture acquired, which set of adjectives I\nmay be able to report, as it does upon the work\u2014I cannot perceive what\nearthly profit such a labor could be to you. For that which is clear to\nyou may be dark to me; hence, if I report that a given work is a\n\u201cperfect riddle to me,\u201d you will only smile at my simplicity. Again,\nthat which amuses me may bore you, for I notice that even at the\ntheatre, some will yawn with _ennui_ while others thrill with delight,\nand applaud the play. Now, if each of these should tell you how _he_\nliked the performance, the one would say \u201cexcellent,\u201d and the other\n\u201cmiserable,\u201d and you be none the wiser. To expect, therefore, that I\nintend to enter upon a labor of this kind, is to expect too little.\n\nBesides, such an undertaking seems to me not without its peculiar\ndanger; for it may happen that the work measures or criticises the\ncritic, instead of the latter the former. If, for example, I should tell\nyou that the integral and differential calculus is all fog to\nme\u2014mystifies me completely\u2014you would conclude my knowledge of\nmathematics to be rather imperfect, and thus use my own report of that\nwork as a sounding-lead to ascertain the depth of my attainment. Nay,\nyou might even go further, and regard the work as a kind of Doomsday\nBook, on the title page of which I had \u201cwritten myself down an ass.\u201d\nNow, as I am not ambitious of a memorial of this kind, especially when\nthere is no probability that the pages in contemplation\u2014Goethe\u2019s\nFaust\u2014will perish any sooner than the veritable Doomsday Book itself, I\nrequest you, as a special favor, not to understand of me that I propose\nengaging in any undertaking of this sort.[16]\n\nNor are you to expect an inquiry into the quantity or quality of the\nauthor\u2019s food, drink or raiment. For the present infantile state of\nanalytic science refuses all aid in tracing such _primary_ elements, so\nto speak, in the composition of the poem before us; and hence such an\ninvestigation would lead, at best, to very secondary and remote\nconclusions. Nor shall we be permitted to explore the likes and dislikes\nof the poet, in that fine volume of scandal, for the kindred reason that\nneither crucible, reagent nor retort are at hand which can be of the\nremotest service.\n\nBy the by, has it never occurred to you, when perusing works of the kind\nlast referred to, what a glowing picture the pious Dean of St.\nPatrick\u2019s, the _saintly Swift_, has bequeathed to us of their producers,\nwhen he places the great authors, the historical Gullivers of our race,\nin all their majesty of form, astride the public thoroughfare of a\nLiliputian age, and marches the inhabitants, in solid battalions,\nthrough between their legs? you recollect what he says?\n\nNor yet are you to expect a treat of that most delightful of all\ncompounds, the table talk and conversation\u2014or, to use a homely phrase,\nthe _literary dishwater_ retailed by the author\u2019s scullion. To expect\nsuch, or the like, would be to expect too little.\n\nOn the other hand, to expect that I shall send you an expression, in the\nterms of the understanding, of a work of the creative imagination, as a\ntotality, and submit the result to the canons of art, is to expect too\nmuch. For while I am ready, and while I intend to comply with the first\npart of this proposition, I am unable to fulfil the requirement of the\nlatter part\u2014that is, I am not able to submit the result to the canons of\nart. The reason for this inability it is not necessary to develop in\nthis connection any further than merely to mention that I find it\nextremely inconvenient to lay my hand upon the aforementioned canons\njust at this time.\n\nI must, therefore, content myself with the endeavor to summon before you\nthe _Idea_ which creates the poem\u2014each act, scene and verse\u2014so that we\nmay see the part in its relation to the whole, and the whole in its\nconcrete, organic articulation. If we succeed in this, then we may say\nthat we _comprehend_ the work\u2014a condition precedent alike to the\nbeneficial enjoyment and the rational judgment of the same.\n\n\n II.\n\n\nIn my first letter, dear friend, I endeavored to guard you against\nmisapprehension as to what you might expect from me. Its substance, if\nmemory serves me, was that I did not intend to write on Anthropology or\nPsychology, nor yet on street, parlor or court gossip, but simply about\na work of art.\n\nI deemed these remarks pertinent in view of the customs of the time,\nlest that, in my not conforming to them, you should judge me harshly\nwithout profit to yourself. With the same desire of keeping up a fair\nunderstanding with you, I must call your attention to some terms and\ndistinctions which we shall have occasion to use, and which, unless\nexplained, might prove shadows instead of lights along the path of our\nintercourse.\n\nI confess to you that I share the (I might say) abhorrence so generally\nentertained by the reading public, of the use of any general terms\nwhatsoever, and would avoid them altogether if I could only see how. But\nin reading the poem that we are to consider, I come upon such passages\nas these:\n\n (_Choir of invisible Spirits._)\n\n \u201cWoe! Woe!\n Thou hast destroyed it,\n The beautiful world!\n It reels, it crumbles,\n Crushed by a demigod\u2019s mighty hand!\u201d\n\nand I cannot see how we are to understand these spirits, or the poet who\ngave them voice, unless we attack this very general expression \u201cThe\nbeautiful world,\u201d here said to have been destroyed by Faust.\n\nI am, however, somewhat reconciled to this by the example of my\nneighbor\u2014a non-speculative, practical farmer\u2014now busily engaged in\nharvesting his wheat. For I noticed that he first directed his\nattention, after cutting the grain, to collecting and tying it together\nin bundles; and I could not help but perceive how much this facilitated\nhis labor, and how difficult it would have been for him to collect his\nwheat, grain by grain, like the sparrow of the field. Though wheat it\nwere, and not chaff, still such a mode of handling would reduce it even\nbelow the value of chaff.\n\nJust think of handling the wheat crop of these United States, the two\nhundred and twenty-five millions of bushels a year, in this manner! It\nis absolutely not to be thought of, and we must have recourse to\nagglomeration, if not to generalization. But the one gives us general\n_masses_, and the other general _terms_. The only thing that we can do,\ntherefore, is, in imitation of our good neighbor of the wheat field, to\nhandle bundles, bushels, and bags, or\u2014what is still better, if it can be\ndone by some daring system of intellectual elevators\u2014whole ship loads of\ngrain at a time, due care being taken that we tie wheat to wheat, oats\nto oats, barley to barley, and not promiscuously.\n\nNow, with this example well before our minds, and the necessity\nmentioned, which compels us to handle\u2014not merely the wheat crop of the\nUnited States for one year, but\u2014whatever has been raised by the\nintelligence of man from the beginning of our race to the time of Goethe\nthe poet, together with the ground on which it was raised, and the sky\nabove\u2014for no less than this seems to be contained in the expression \u201cThe\nbeautiful world\u201d\u2014I call your attention first to the expression \u201cform and\nmatter,\u201d which, when applied to works of intelligence, we must take the\nliberty of changing into the expression \u201cform and content,\u201d for since\nthere is nothing in works of this kind that manifests gravity, it can be\nof no use to say so, but may be of some injury.\n\nThe next is the expression \u201cworks of art,\u201d which sounds rather\nsuspicious in some of its applications\u2014sounds as if it was intended to\nconceal rather than reveal the worker. Now I take it that the \u201cworks of\nart\u201d are the works of the intelligence, and I shall have to classify\nthem accordingly. Another point with reference to this might as well be\nnoticed, and that is that the old expressions \u201cworks of art\u201d and \u201cworks\nof nature\u201d do not contain, as they were intended to, all the works that\npresent themselves to our observation\u2014the works of science, for example.\nBesides, we have government, society, and religion, all of which are\nundoubtedly distinct from the \u201cworks of art\u201d no less than from the\n\u201cworks of nature,\u201d and to tie them up in the same bundle with either of\nthem, seems to me to be like tying wheat with oats, and therefore to be\navoided, as in the example before our minds. This seems to be done in\nthe expression \u201cworks of self-conscious intelligence,\u201d and \u201cworks of\nnature.\u201d\n\nBut if we reflect upon the phrases \u201cworks of self-conscious\nintelligence\u201d and \u201cworks of nature,\u201d it becomes obvious that there must\nbe some inaccuracy contained in them; for how can two distinct subjects\nhave the same predicate? It would, therefore, perhaps be better to say\n\u201cthe works of self-conscious intelligence\u201d and the \u201c_products_ of\nnature.\u201d\n\nWithout further rasping and filing of old phrases, I call your\nattention, in the next place, to the most general term which we shall\nhave occasion to use\u2014\u201cthe world.\u201d\n\nUnder this we comprehend:\n\n I. The natural world\u2014Gravity.;\n II. The spiritual world\u2014Self-determination.\n\nI. Under the natural world we comprehend the terrestrial globe, and that\npart of the universe which is involved in its processes; these are:\n\n (_a_) (1.) Mechanic=Gravity, } Meteorologic=Electricity.\n (2.) Chemic=Affinity, }\n (_b_) (1.) Organic=Galvanism, } Vital=Sensation.\n (2.) Vegetative=Assimilation, }\n\nII. Under \u201cThe Spiritual World,\u201d the world of conscious intelligence, we\ncomprehend:\n\n (_a_) The real world=implement, mediation.\n (_b_) The actual world=self-determination.\n\n(_a_) The real world contains whatever derives the end of its existence\nonly, from self-conscious intelligence.\n\n (1.) The family=Affection.\n (2.) Society=Ethics, } Mediation.\n (3.) State=Rights, }\n\n(_b_) The actual world contains whatever derives the end and the _means_\nof its existence from self-conscious intelligence.\n\n (1.) Art=Manifestation, }\n (2.) Religion=Revelation, } Self-determination.\n (3.) Philosophy=Definition, }\n\nFrom this it appears that we have divided the world into three large\nslices\u2014the Natural, the Real, and the Actual\u2014with gravity for one and\nself-determination for the other extreme, and mediation between them.\n\n\n III.\n\n\nIn my last, I gave you some general terms, and the sense in which I\nintend to use them. I also gave you a reason why I should use them,\ntogether with an illustration. But I gave you no reason why I used these\nand no others\u2014or I did not advance anything to show that there are\n_objects_ to which they _necessarily apply_. I only take it for granted\nthat there are some objects presented to your observation and mine, that\ngravitate or weigh something, and others that do not. To each I have\napplied as nearly as I could the ordinary terms. Now this procedure,\nalthough very unphilosophical, I can justify only by reminding you of\nthe object of these letters.\n\nIf we now listen again to the chant of the invisible choir,\n\n \u201cThou hast destroyed it,\n The beautiful world,\u201d\n\nit will be obvious that this can refer only to the world of mediation\nand self-determination, to the world of spirit, of self-conscious\nintelligence, for the world of gravitation is not so easily affected.\nBut how is this\u2014how is it that the world of self-conscious intelligence\nis so easily affected, is so dependent upon the individual man? This can\nbe seen only by examining its genesis.\n\nIn the genesis of Spirit we have three stages\u2014manifestation,\nrealization, and actualization. The first of these, upon which the other\ntwo are dependent and sequent, falls in the individual man. For, in him\nit is that Reason manifests itself before it can realize, or embody\nitself in this or that political, social, or moral institution. And it\nis not merely necessary that it should so manifest itself in the\nindividual; it must also realize itself in these institutions before it\ncan actualize itself in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. For in this\nactualization it is absolutely dependent upon the former two stages of\nits genesis for a content. From this it appears that Art _shows_ what\nReligion _teaches_, and what Philosophy _comprehends_; or that Art,\nReligion, and Philosophy have the same content. Nor is it difficult to\nperceive why this world of spirit or self-conscious intelligence is so\ndependent upon the individual man.\n\nAgain, in the sphere of manifestation and reality, this content, the\nself-conscious intelligence, is the _self-consciousness_ of an\nindividual, a nation, or an age. And art, in the sphere of actuality, is\nthis or that work of art, this poem, that painting, or yonder piece of\nsculpture, with the self-consciousness of this or that individual,\nnation, or age, for its content. Moreover, the particularity (the\nindividual, nation, or age) of the content constitutes the individuality\nof the work of Art. And not only this, but this particularity of the\n_self-consciousness_ furnishes the very contradiction itself with the\ndevelopment and solution of which the work of art is occupied. For the\nself-consciousness which constitutes the content, being the self\nconsciousness of an individual, a nation, or an age, instead of being\nself-conscious intelligence in its pure universality, contains in that\nvery particularity the contradiction which, in the sphere of\nmanifestation and reality, constitutes the collision, conflict, and\nsolution.[17]\n\nNow, if we look back upon the facts stated, we have the manifestation,\nthe realization, and the actualization of self-conscious intelligence as\nthe three spheres or stages in the process which evolves and involves\nthe entire activity of man, both practical and theoretical. It is also\nobvious that the realization of self-conscious intelligence in the\nfamily, society, and the state, and its actualization in Art, Religion,\nand Philosophy, depend in their genesis upon its manifestation in the\nindividual. Hence a denial of the possibility of this manifestation is a\ndenial of the possibility of the realization and actualization also.\n\nNow if this denial assume the form of a conviction in the consciousness\nof an individual, a nation, or an age, then there results a\ncontradiction which involves in the sweep of its universality the entire\nspiritual world of man. For it is the self-consciousness of that\nindividual, nation, or age, in direct conflict with itself, not with\nthis or that particularity of itself, but with its entire content, in\nthe sphere of manifestation, with the receptivity for, the production\nof, and the aspiration after, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True,\nwithin the individual himself; in the sphere of realization with the\nFamily, with Society, and with the State; and finally, in the sphere of\nactuality with Art, Religion, and Philosophy.\n\nNow this contradiction is precisely what is presented in the\nproposition, \u201cMan cannot know truth.\u201d This you will remember was, in the\nhistory of modern thought, the result of Kant\u2019s philosophy. And Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy was the philosophy of Germany at the time of the conception\nof Goethe\u2019s Faust. And Goethe was the truest poet of Germany, and thus\nhe sings:\n\n \u201cSo then I have studied philosophy,\n Jurisprudence and medicine,\n And what is worse, Theology,\n Thoroughly, but, alas! in vain,\n And here I stand with study hoar,\n A fool, and know what I knew before;\n Am called Magister, nay, LL.D.,\n\n\n And for ten years, am busily\n Engaged, leading through fen and close,\n My trusting pupils by the nose;\n Yet see that nothing can be known.\n This burns my heart, this, this alone!\u201d\n\nHere, you will perceive in the first sentence of the poem, as was meet,\nthe fundamental contradiction, the theme, or the \u201cargument,\u201d as it is so\nadmirably termed by critics, is stated in its naked abstractness, just\nas Achilles\u2019 wrath is the first sentence of the Iliad.\n\nThis theme, then, is nothing more nor less than the self-consciousness\nin contradiction with itself, in conflict with its own content. Hence,\nif the poem is to portray this theme, this content, in its totality, it\nmust represent it in three spheres: first, Manifestation\u2014Faust in\nconflict with himself; second, Realization\u2014Faust in conflict with the\nFamily, Society, and the State; thirdly, Actualization\u2014Faust in conflict\nwith Art, Religion, and Philosophy.\n\nNow, my friend, please to examine the poem once more, reflect closely\nupon what has been said, and then tell how much of the poem can you\nspare, or how much is there in the poem as printed, which does not flow\nfrom or develop this theme?\n\n\n IV.\n\n\nIn my last, dear friend, I called your attention to the theme, to the\ncontent of the poem in a general way, stating it in the very words of\nthe poet himself. To trace the development of this theme from the\nabstract generality into concrete detail is the task before us.\n\nAccording to the analysis, we have to consider, first of all, the sphere\nof _Manifestation_.\n\nIn this we observe the three-fold relation which the individual sustains\nto self-conscious intelligence, viz: Receptivity for, and production of,\nand aspiration for, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. Now if it is\ntrue that man cannot know truth, then it follows that he can neither\nreceive nor produce the True. For how shall he know that whatever he may\nreceive and produce is true, since it is specially denied that he can\nknow it. This conclusion as conviction, however, does not affect\nimmediately the third relation\u2014the aspiration\u2014nor quench its gnawing.\nAnd this is the first form of conflict in the individual. Let us now\nopen the book and place it before us.\n\nThe historic origin of our theme places us in a German University, in\nthe professor\u2019s private studio.\n\nIt is well here to remember that it is a German University, and that the\noccupant of the room is a _German_ professor. Also that it is the\nreceived opinion that the Germans are a _theoretical_ people; by which\nwe understand that they act from conviction, and not from instinct.\nMoreover, that their conviction is not a mere holiday affair, to be\nrehearsed, say on Sunday, and left in charge of a minister, paid for the\npurpose, during the balance of the week, but an actual, vital fountain\nof action. Hence, the conviction of such a character being given, the\nacts follow in logical sequence.\n\nWith this remembered, let us now listen to the self-communion of the\noccupant of the room.\n\nIn bitter earnest the man has honestly examined, and sought to possess\nhimself of the intellectual patrimony of the race. In poverty, in\nsolitude, in isolation, he has labored hopefully, earnestly; and now he\ncasts up his account and finds\u2014what? \u201cThat nothing can be known.\u201d His\nhair is gray with more than futile endeavor, and for ten years his\nspecial calling has been to guide the students to waste their lives, as\nhe has done his own, in seeking to accomplish the impossible\u2014to know.\nThis is the worm that gnaws his heart! As compensation, he is free from\nsuperstition\u2014fears neither hell nor devil. But this sweeps with it all\nfond delusions, all conceit that he is able to know, and to teach\nsomething for the elevation of mankind. Nor yet does he possess honor or\nwealth\u2014a dog would not lead a life like this.\n\nHere you will perceive how the first two relations are negated by the\nconviction that man cannot know truth, and how, on the wings of\naspiration, he sallies forth into the realm of magic, of mysticism, of\nsubjectivity. For if reason, with its mediation, is impotent to create\nan object for this aspiration, let us see what emotion and imagination,\n_without_ mediation, can do for subjective satisfaction.\n\nAnd here all is glory, all is freedom! The imagination seizes the\ntotality of the universe, and revels in ecstatic visions. What a\nspectacle! But, alas! a spectacle only! How am I to know, to comprehend\nthe fountain of life, the centre of which articulates this totality?\n\nSee here another generalization: the practical world as a whole! Ah,\nthat is my sphere; here I have a firm footing; here I am master; here I\ncommand spirits! Approach, and obey your master!\n\n \u201c_Spirit._ Who calls?\n\n _Faust._ Terrific face!\n\n _Sp._ Art thou he that called?\n\n Thou trembling worm!\n\n _Faust._ Yes; I\u2019m he; am Faust, thy peer.\n\n _Sp._ Peer of the Spirit thou comprehendest\u2014not of me!\n\n _Faust._ What! not of thee! Of whom, then? I, the image of Deity\n itself, and not even thy peer?\u201c\n\nNo, indeed, Mr. Faust, thou dost not include within thyself the totality\nof the practical world, but only that part thereof which thou dost\ncomprehend\u2014only thy _vocation_, and hark! \u201cIt knocks!\u201d\n\nOh, death! I see, \u2019t is my vocation; indeed, \u201cIt is my famulus!\u201d\n\nAnd this, too, is merely a delusion; this great mystery of the practical\nworld shrinks to this dimension\u2014a bread-professorship.\n\nIt would seem so; for no theory of the practical world is possible\nwithout the ability to know truth. As individual, you may imitate the\nindividual, as the brute his kind, and thus transmit a craft; but you\ncannot seize the practical world in transparent forms and present it as\na harmonious totality to your fellow-man, for that would require that\nthese transparent intellectual forms should possess objective\nvalidity\u2014and this they have not, according to your conviction. And so it\ncannot be helped.\n\nBut see what a despicable thing it is to be a bread-professor!\n\nAnd is this the mode of existence, this the reality, the only reality to\nanswer the aspiration of our soul\u2014the aspiration which sought to seize\nthe universe, to kindle its inmost recesses with the light of\nintelligence, and thus illumine the path of life? Alas, Reason gave us\nerror\u2014Imagination, illusion\u2014and the practical world, the _Will_, a\nbread-professorship! Nothing else? Yes; a bottle of laudanum!\n\nLet us drink, and rest forever! But hold, is there nothing else, really?\nNo emotional nature? Hark! what is that? Easter bells! The recollections\nof my youthful faith in a revelation! They must be examined. We cannot\nleave yet.\n\nAnd see what a panorama, what a strange world lies embedded with those\nrecollections. Let us see it in all its varied character and reality, on\nthis Easter Sunday, for example.\n\n\n V.\n\n\nI have endeavored before to trace the derivation of the content of the\nfirst scene of the poem, together with its character, from the abstract\ntheme of the work. In it we saw that the fundamental conviction of Faust\nleaves him naked\u2014leaves him nothing but a bare avocation, a mere craft,\nand the precarious recollections of his youth (when he believed in\nrevealed truths) to answer his aspirations. These recollections arouse\nhis emotions, and rescue him from nothingness (suicide)\u2014they fill his\nsoul with a content.\n\nTo see this content with all its youthful charm, we have to retrace our\nchildhood\u2019s steps before the gates of the city on this the Easter\nfestival of the year\u2014you and I being mindful, in the meantime, that the\npublic festivals of the Church belong to the so-called external\nevidences of the truth of the Christian Religion.\n\nWell, here we are in the suburbs of the city, and what do we see? First,\na set of journeymen mechanics, eager for beer and brawls, interspersed\nwith servant girls; students whose tastes run very much in the line of\nstrong beer, biting tobacco, and the well-dressed servant girls\naforesaid; citizens\u2019 daughters, perfectly outraged at the low taste of\nthe students who run after the servant girls, \u201cwhen they might have the\nvery best of society;\u201d citizens dissatisfied with the new mayor of the\ncity\u2014\u201cTaxes increase from day to day, and nothing is done for the\nwelfare of the city.\u201d A beggar is not wanting. Other citizens, who\ndelight to speak of war and rumors of war in distant countries, in order\nto enjoy their own peace at home with proper contrast; also an \u201celderly\none,\u201d who thinks that she is quite able to furnish what the well-dressed\ncitizens\u2019 daughters wish for\u2014to the great scandal of the latter, who\nfeel justly indignant at being addressed in public by such an old witch\n(although, \u201cbetween ourselves, she did show us our sweethearts on St.\nAndrew\u2019s night\u201d); soldiers, who sing of high-walled fortresses and proud\nwomen to be taken by storm; and, finally, farmers around the linden\ntree, dancing a most furious gallopade\u2014a real Easter Sunday or Monday\n\u201cbefore the gate\u201d\u2014of any city in Germany, even to this day.\n\nAnd into this real world, done up in holiday attire, but not by the\npoet\u2014into this paradise, this very heaven of the people, where great and\nsmall fairly yell with delight\u2014Faust enters, assured that here he can\nmaintain his rank as a man; \u201chere I dare to be a man!\u201d And, sure enough,\nlisten to the welcome:\n\n \u201cNay, Doctor, \u2019tis indeed too much\n To be with us on such a day,\n To join the throng, the common mass,\n You, you, the great, the learned man!\n Take, then, this beaker, too,\u201d &c.\n\nAnd here goes\u2014a general health to the Doctor, to the man who braved the\npestilence for us, and who even now, does not think it beneath him to\njoin us in our merry-making\u2014hurrah for the Doctor; hip, hip, &c.\n\nAnd is not this something, dear friend? Just think, with honest Wagner,\nwhen he exclaims, \u201cWhat emotions must crowd thy breast, O great man,\nwhile listening to such honors?\u201d and you will also say with him:\n\n \u201cThrice blest the man who draws such profits rare,\n From talents all his own!\u201d\n\nWhy, see! the father shows you to his son; every one inquires\u2014presses,\nrushes to see you! The fiddle itself is hushed, the dancers stop. Where\nyou go, they fall into lines; caps and hats fly into the air! But a\nlittle more, and they would fall upon their knees, as if the sacred Host\npassed that way!\n\nAnd is not this great? Is not this the very goal of human ambition? To\nWagner, dear friend, it is; for the very essence of an avocation is, and\nmust be, \u201csuccess in life.\u201d But how does it stand with the man whose\nevery aspiration is the True, the Good, and the Beautiful? Will a hurrah\nfrom one hundred thousand throats, all in good yelling order, assist\nhim? _No._\n\nTo Wagner it is immaterial whether he _knows_ what he _needs_, provided\nhe sees the day when the man who has been worse to the people than the\nvery pestilence itself, receives public honors; but to Faust, to the man\nreally in earnest\u2014who is not satisfied when he has squared life with\nlife, and obtained zero for a result, or who does not merely _live to\nmake a living_, but demands a rational end for life, and, in default of\nthat rational end, spurns life itself\u2014to such a man this whole scene\npossesses little significance indeed. It possesses, however, _some_\nsignificance, even for him! For if it is indeed true that man cannot\nknow truth\u2014that the high aspiration of his soul has no object\u2014then this\nscene demonstrates, at least, that Faust possesses power over the\npractical world. If he cannot _know_ the world, he can at least swallow\na considerable portion of it, and this scene demonstrates that he can\nexercise a great deal of choice as to the parts to be selected; do you\nsee this conviction?\n\nDo you see this conviction? Do you see this dog? Consider it well; what\nis it, think you? Do you perceive how it encircles us nearer and\nnearer\u2014becomes more and more certain, and, if I mistake not, a luminous\nemanation of gold, of honor, of power, follows in its wake. It seems to\nme as if it drew soft magic rings, as future fetters, round our feet!\nSee, the circles become smaller and smaller-\u2019tis almost a certainty\u2014\u2019tis\nalready near; come, come home with as!\n\nThe temptation here spread before us by the poet, to consider the dog\n\u201c_well_,\u201d is almost irresistible; but all we can say in this place, dear\nfriend, is that if you will look upon what is properly called an\n_avocation_ in civil society, eliminate from it all higher ends and\nmotives other than the simple one of making a living\u2014no matter with what\npomp and circumstance\u2014no doubt you will readily recognize the POODLE.\nBut we must hasten to the studio to watch further developments, for the\nconflict is not as yet decided. We are still to examine the possibility\nof a divine revelation to man, who cannot know truth.\n\nAnd for this purpose our newly acquired conviction, that we possess\npower over the practical world\u2014although not as yet in a perfectly clear\nform before us\u2014comfortably lodged behind the stove, where it properly\nbelongs, we take down the original text of the New Testament in order to\nrealize its meaning, in our own loved mother tongue. It stands written:\n\u201cIn the beginning was the Word.\u201d Word? Word? Never! _Meaning_ it ought\nto be! Meaning what? Meaning? No; it is _Power_! No; _Deed_! Word,\nmeaning, power, deed\u2014which is it? Alas, how am I to know, unless I can\nknow truth? \u2019Tis even so, our youthful recollections dissolve in mist,\ninto thin air\u2014and nothing is left us but our newly acquired conviction,\nthe restlessness of which during this examination has undoubtedly not\nescaped your attention, dear friend. (\u201cBe quiet, there, behind the\nstove.\u201d \u201cSee here, poodle, one of us two has to leave this room!\u201d) What,\nthen, is the whole content of this conviction, which, so long as there\nwas the hope of a possibility of a worthy object for our aspiration,\nseemed so despicable? What is it that governs the practical world of\nfinite motives, the power that adapts means to ends, regardless of a\nfinal, of an infinite end? Is it not the Understanding? and although\nReason\u2014in its search after the _final end_, with its perfect system of\nabsolute means, of infinite motives and interests\u2014begets subjective\nchimeras, is it not demonstrated that the understanding possesses\nobjective validity? Nay, look upon this dog well; does it not swell into\ncolossal proportions\u2014is no dog at all, in fact, but the very power that\nholds absolute sway over the finite and negative\u2014the understanding\nitself\u2014Mephistopheles in proper form?\n\nAnd who calls this despicable? Is it not Reason, the power that begets\nchimeras, and it alone? And shall we reject the real, the actual\u2014all in\nfact that possesses objective validity\u2014because, forsooth, the power of\nsubjective chimeras declares it negative, finite, perishable? Never. \u201cNo\nfear, dear sir, that I\u2019ll do this. Precisely what I have promised is the\nvery aim of all my endeavor. Conceited fool that I was! I prized myself\ntoo highly\u201d\u2014claimed kin with the infinite. \u201cI belong only in thy\nsphere\u201d\u2014the finite. \u201cThe Great Spirit scorns me. Nature is a sealed book\nto me; the thread of thought is severed. Knowing disgusts me. In the\ndepths of sensuality I\u2019ll quench the burning passion.\u201d\n\nHere, then, my friend, we arrive at the final result of the conflict in\nthe first sphere of our theme\u2014in the sphere of manifestation\u2014that of the\nindividual. We started with the conviction _that man cannot know truth_.\nThis destroyed our spiritual endeavors, and reduced our practical\navocation to an absurdity. We sought refuge in the indefinite\u2014the\nmysticism of the past\u2014and were repelled by its subjectivity. We next\nexamined the theoretical side of the practical world, and found this\nlikewise an impossibility and suicide\u2014a mere blank nothingness\u2014as the\nonly resource. But here we were startled by our emotional nature, which\nunites us with our fellow-man, and seems to promise some sort of a\nbridge over into the infinite\u2014certainly demands such a transition.\nInvestigating this, therefore, with all candor, we found our fellow-men\nwonderfully occupied\u2014occupied like the kitten pursuing its own tail! At\nthe same time it became apparent that we might be quite a dog in this\nkitten dance, or that the activity of the understanding possessed\nobjective validity. With this conviction fairly established, although\nstill held in utter contempt, we examined the last resource: the\npossibility of a divine revelation of truth to men that cannot know\ntruth. The result, as the mere statement of the proposition would\nindicate, is negative, and thus the last chance of obtaining validity\nfor anything except the activity of the understanding vanishes utterly.\nBut with this our contempt for the understanding likewise vanishes. For\nwhatever our aspiration may say, it has no object to correspond to it,\nand is therefore merely subjective, a hallucination, a chimera, and the\nunderstanding is the highest attainable for us. Here, therefore, the\nsubjective conflict ends, for we have attained to objectivity, and this\nis the highest, since there is nothing else that possesses validity for\nman. Nor is this by any means contemptible in itself, for it is the\npower over the finite world, and the net result is: That if you and I,\nmy friend, have no reason, cannot know truth, we do have at least a\nstomach, a capacity for sensual enjoyment, and an understanding to\nadminister to the same\u2014to be its servant. This, at least, is\ndemonstrated by the kitten dance of the whole world.\n\nFootnote 16:\n\n In this connection, permit me, dear friend, to mention a discovery\n which I made concerning my son Isaac, now three years old. Just\n imagine my surprise when I found that every book in my\n possession\u2014Webster\u2019s Spelling-book not excepted\u2014is a perfect riddle to\n him, and mystifies him as completely as ever the works of Goethe,\n Hegel, Emerson, or any other thinking man, do or did the learned\n critics. But my parental pride, so much elated by the discovery of\n this remarkable precocity in my son\u2014a precocity which, at the age of\n three years, (!) shows him possessed of all the incapacity of such\n \u201clearned men\u201d\u2014was shocked, nay, mortified, by the utter want of\n appreciation which the little fellow showed of this, his exalted\n condition!\n\nFootnote 17:\n\n From this a variety of facts in the character and history of the\n different works of art become apparent. The degree of the effect\n produced, for example, is owing to the degree of validity attached to\n the two sides of the contradiction. If the duties which the individual\n owes to the family and the state come into conflict, as in the\n Antigone of Sophocles, and the consciousness of the age has not\n subordinated the ideas upon which they are based, but accords to each\n an equal degree of validity, we have a content replete with the\n noblest effects. For this is not a conflict between the abstract good\n and bad, the positive and the negative, but a conflict within the good\n itself. So likewise the universality of the effect is apparent from\n the content. If this is the self-consciousness of a nation, the work\n of art will be national. To illustrate this, and, at the same time, to\n trace the development of the particularity spoken of into a collision,\n we may refer to that great national work of art\u2014the Iliad of Homer.\n The particularity which distinguishes the national self-consciousness\n of the Greeks is the pre\u00ebminent validity attached by it to one of the\n before-mentioned modes of the actualization of self-conscious\n intelligence\u2014the sensuous. Hence its worship of the Beautiful. This\n pre\u00ebminence and the consequent subordination of the moral and the\n rational modes to it, is the root of the contradiction, and hence the\n basis of the collision which forms the content of the poem. Its motive\n modernized would read about as follows: \u201cThe son of one of our\n Senators goes to England; is received and hospitably entertained at\n the house of a lord. During his stay he falls in love and subsequently\n elopes with the young wife of his entertainer. For this outrage,\n perpetrated by the young hopeful, the entire fighting material of the\n island get themselves into their ships, not so much to avenge the\n injured husband as to capture the runaway wife.\u201d\n\n But\u2014now mark\u2014adverse winds ensue, powers not human are in arms against\n them, and before these can be propitiated, a princess of the blood\n royal, pure and undefiled, must be sacrificed!\u2014is sacrificed, and for\n what? That all Greece may proclaim to the world that pure womanhood,\n pure manhood, family, society, and the state, are nothing, must be\n sacrificed on the altar of the Beautiful. For in the sacrifice of\n Iphigenia, all that could perish in Helen, and more too\u2014for Iphigenia\n was pure and Helen was not\u2014was offered up by the Greeks, woman for\n woman, and nothing remained but the Beautiful, for which she\n henceforth became the expression. For in this alone did Helen excel\n Iphigenia, and all women.\n\n But how is this? Have not the filial, the parental, the social, the\n civil relations, sanctity and validity? Not as against the realization\n of the Beautiful, says the Greek. Nor yet the state? No; \u201cI do not go\n at the command of Agamemnon, but because I pledged fealty to Beauty.\u201d\n \u201cBut then,\u201d Sir Achilles, \u201cif the Beautiful should present itself\n under some individual form\u2014say that of Briseis\u2014you would for the sake\n of its possession disobey the will of the state?\u201d \u201cOf course.\u201d And the\n poet has to sing, \u201cAchilles\u2019 wrath!\u201d and not \u201cthe recovery of the\n runaway wife,\u201d the grand historical action.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n NECESSITY, CHANCE, FREEDOM.\n\n\n I.\n\n\nAll things are necessitated; each is necessitated by the totality of\nconditions; hence, whatever is must be so, and under the conditions\ncannot be otherwise.\n\n_Remark._\u2014This is the most exhaustive statement of the position of the\n\u201cunderstanding.\u201d Nothing seems more clear than this to the thinker who\nhas advanced beyond the sensuous grade of consciousness and the stages\nof Perception.\n\n\n II.\n\n\nBut things change\u2014something new begins and something old ceases; but,\nstill, in each case, the first principle must apply, and the new\nthing\u2014like the old\u2014be so \u201cbecause necessitated by the totality of\nconditions.\u201d\n\n_Remark._\u2014The reader will notice that with the conception of _change_\nthere enters a second stage of mediation. First, we have simple\nmediation in which the ground and grounded are both real. Secondly, we\nhave the passage of a potentiality into a reality, and _vice versa_.\nTherefore, with the consideration of change we have encountered a\ncontradiction which becomes apparent upon further attempt to adjust the\nidea of necessity to it.\n\n\n III.\n\n\nIf the same totality of conditions necessitates both states of the\nthing\u2014the new and the old\u2014it follows that this totality of conditions is\nadapted to both, and hence is indifferent to either, i. e. it allows\neither, and hence cannot be said to necessitate one to the exclusion of\nthe other, for it allows one to pass over into the other, thereby\ndemonstrating that it did not restrict or confine the first to be what\nit was. Hence it now appears that chance or contingency participated in\nthe state of the thing.\n\n\n IV.\n\n\nBut the states of the thing belong to the totality, and hence when the\nthing changes the totality also changes, and we are forced to admit two\ndifferent totalities as the conditions of the two different states of\nthe thing.\n\n_Remark._\u2014Here we have returned to our starting-point, and carried back\nour contradiction with us. In our zeal to relieve the thing from the\ndifficulty presented\u2014that of changing spontaneously\u2014we have posited\nduality in the original totality, and pushed our _change_ into _it_. But\nit is the same contradiction as before, and we must continue to repeat\nthe same process forever in the foolish endeavor to go round a circle\nuntil we arrive at its end, or, what is the same, its beginning.\n\n\n V.\n\n\nIf it requires a different totality of conditions to render possible the\nchange of a thing from one state to another, then if a somewhat changes\nthe totality changes. But there is nothing outside of the totality to\nnecessitate _it_, and it therefore must necessitate _itself_.\n\n\n VI.\n\n\nThus necessity and necessitated have proved in the last analysis to be\none. This, however, is necessity no longer, but spontaneity, for it\nbegins with itself and ends with itself. (_a_) As _necessitating_ it is\nthe active determiner which of course contains the _potentiality_ upon\nwhich it acts. Had it no potentiality it could not change. (_b_) As\n_necessitated_ it is the potentiality _plus_ the limit which its\nactivity has fixed there. (_c_) But we have here self-determination, and\nthus the _existence_ of the Universal in and for itself, which is the\n_Ego_.\n\n_Remark._\u2014It cannot be any other mode of existence than the Ego, for\nthat which dissolves all determinations and is the universal\npotentiality is only _one_ and cannot be distinguished into _modes_, for\nit creates and destroys these. The ego can abstract all else and yet\nabide\u2014it is the _actus purus_\u2014its negativity annulling all\ndeterminations and finitudes, while it is directed full on itself, and\nis in that very act complete self-recognition. (See proof of this in\nChapter IV., III., 3.)\n\n\n VII.\n\n\nThus the doctrine of necessity presupposes self-determination or Freedom\nas the form of the Total, and necessity is only one side\u2014the realized or\n_determined_ side\u2014of the process isolated and regarded in this state of\nisolation. Against this side stands the potentiality which, if isolated\nin like manner, is called Chance or Contingency.\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n OF MEDIATION.\n\n\nThe comprehension of mediation lies at the basis of the distinction of\nsensuous knowing from the _understanding_. The transition from\n_intuition_ to _abstract thinking_ is made at first unconsciously, and\nfor this reason the one who has begun the process of mediation handles\nthe \u201cmental spectres\u201d created by abstraction with the utmost na\u00efvet\u00e9,\nassuming for them absolute validity in the world at large. It is only\nthe speculative insight that gains mastery over such abstractions, and\nsees the Truth. If this view could be unfolded in a popular form, it\nwould afford a series of solvents for the thinker which are applicable\nto a great variety of difficult problems. For it must be remembered that\nthe abstract categories of the understanding\u2014such as _essence and\nphenomenon_, _cause and effect_, _substance and attribute_, _force and\nmanifestation_, _matter and form_, and the like, give rise to a series\nof _antinomies_, or contradictory propositions, when applied to the\nTotality. From the standpoint of mediation\u2014that of simple reflection,\n\u201ccommon sense\u201d so called\u2014these antinomies seem utterly insoluble. The\nreason of this is found in the fact that \u201ccommon sense\u201d places implicit\nfaith in these categories (just mentioned), and never rises to the\ninvestigation of them by themselves. To consider the validity of these\ncategories by themselves is called a _transcendental_ procedure, for it\npasses beyond the ordinary thinking which uses them without distrust.\n\nThe transcendental investigation shows that the insolubility attributed\nto these antinomies arises from the mistake of the thinker, who supposes\nthe categories he employs to be exhaustive. Speculative insight begins\nwith the perception that they are not exhaustive; that they have by a\nspecies of enchantment cast a spell upon the mind, under which every\nthing seems dual, and the weary seeker after Truth wanders through a\nrealm of abstractions each of which assumes the form of a solid\nreality\u2014now a giant, and now a dwarf, and now an impassible river,\nimpenetrable forest, or thick castle wall defended by dragons.\n\nThe following questions will illustrate the character of the problems\nhere described:\n\n\u201cWhy deal with abstractions\u2014why not hold fast by the concrete reality?\u201d\n\n(This position combats mediation under its form of _abstraction_.)\n\n\u201cCan we not know _immediately_ by intuition those objects that\nphilosophy strives in vain to comprehend? in short, are not God, Freedom\nand Immortality certain to us and yet indemonstrable?\u201d\n\n(This position combats mediation as involved in a _system_ of\nPhilosophy.)\n\nThese questions arise only in the mind that has already gone beyond the\ndoctrine that it attempts to defend, and hence a self refutation is\neasily drawn out of the source from whence they originate.\n\n\n ABSTRACTION.\n\n\n(_a_) It will be readily granted that all knowing involves\n_distinction_. We must distinguish one object from another.\n\n(_b_) But the process of distinguishing is a process that involves\nabstraction. For in separating this object from that, I contrast its\nmarks, properties, _attributes_, with those of the other. In seizing\nupon one characteristic I must isolate it from all others, and this is\nnothing more nor less than abstraction.\n\n(_c_) Therefore it is absurd to speak of knowing without abstraction,\nfor this enters into the simplest act of perception.\n\n(_d_) Nor is this a subjective defect, an \u201cimpotency of our mental\nstructure,\u201d as some would be ready to exclaim at this point. For it is\njust as evident that _things themselves_ obtain reality only through\nthese very characteristics. One thing preserves its distinctness from\nanother by means of its various _determinations_. Without these\ndeterminations all would collapse into _one_, nay, even \u201c_one_\u201d would\nvanish, for distinction being completely gone, _one-ness_ is not\npossible. This is the \u201c_Principle of Indiscernibles_\u201d enunciated by\nLeibnitz. Thus distinction is as necessary objectively as subjectively.\nThe thing _abstracts_ in order to be _real_. It defends itself against\nwhat lies without it by specializing itself into single properties, and\nthus becoming in each a mere abstraction.\n\n(_e_) Moreover, besides this prevalence of abstraction in the\n_theoretic_ field, it is still more remarkable in the _practical_ world.\nThe business man decries abstractions. He does not know that every act\nof the will is an abstraction, and that it is also preceded by an\nabstraction. When he exhorts you to \u201cleave off abstractions and deal\nwith concrete realities,\u201d he does this: (1.) he regards you as he thinks\nyou are; (2.) he conceives you as different, i. e. as a _practical_ man;\n(3.) he exhorts you to change from your real state to the possible one\nwhich he conceives of (through the process of abstraction). The simplest\nact with design\u2014that of going to dinner, for example\u2014involves\nabstraction. If I raise my arm on purpose, I first abstract from its\nreal position, and think it under another condition.\n\n(_f_) But the chief point in all this is to mark how the mind frees\nitself from the untruth of abstraction. For it must be allowed that all\nabstractions are false. The isolation of that which is not sufficient\nfor its own existence, (though as we have seen, a necessary constituent\nof the process of _knowing_ and of _existing_,) sets up an untruth as\nexistent. Therefore the mind thinks this isolation only as a moment of a\n_negative unity_, (i. e. as an element of a process). This leads us to\nthe consideration of mediation in the more general form, involved by the\nsecond question.\n\n\n IMMEDIATE KNOWING.\n\n\n(_a_) _Definition._\u2014\u201cImmediate\u201d is a predicate applied to what is\ndirectly through itself. The immediateness of anything is the phase that\nfirst presents itself. It is the undeveloped\u2014an _oak_ taken immediately\nis an _acorn_; man taken immediately is a child at birth.\n\n(_b_) _Definition._\u2014\u201cMediation\u201d signifies the process of realization. A\n_mediate_ or _mediated_ somewhat is what it is through another, or\nthrough a process.\n\n(_c_) _Principle._\u2014Any concrete somewhat exists through its relations to\nall else in the universe; hence all concrete somewhats are _mediated_.\n\u201cIf a grain of sand were destroyed the universe would collapse.\u201d\n\n(_d_) _Principle._\u2014An absolutely _immediate_ somewhat would be a pure\nnothing, for the reason that no determination could belong to it, (for\ndetermination is negative, and hence mediation). Hence all immediateness\nmust be phenomenal, or the result of abstraction from the concrete\nwhole, and this, of course, exhibits the contradiction of an immediate\nwhich is mediated (a \u201c_result_.\u201d)\n\n(_e_) The solution of this contradiction is found in\n\u201cself-determination,\u201d (as we have seen in former chapters). The\nself-determined is a mediated; it is _through the process_ of\ndetermination; but is likewise an _immediate_, for it is its own\nmediation, and hence it is the beginning and end\u2014_it begins with its\nresult, and ends in its beginning_, and thus it is a circular process.\n\nThis is the great _aper\u00e7u_ of all speculative philosophy.\n\n(_f_) _Definition._\u2014Truth is the form of the Total, or that which\nactually exists.\n\n(_g_) Hence a knowing of Truth must be a knowing of the self-determined,\nwhich is both immediate and mediate. This is a process or _system_.\nTherefore the knowing of it cannot be simply _immediate_, but must be in\nthe form of a system. Thus the so-called \u201cimmediate intuition\u201d is not a\nknowing of truth unless inconsistent with what it professes.\n\n\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF BAADER.\n\n\n [The following letter from Dr. Franz Hoffmann to the St. Louis\n Philosophical Society has been handed us for publication. It gives\n us pleasure to lay before our readers so able a presentation of the\n claims of Baader, and we trust that some of our countrymen will be\n led by it to investigate the original sources herein referred to.\n\n We are requested to correct a misstatement that occurs in the first\n paragraph regarding the objects of the Philosophical Society. It was\n not founded for the special purpose of \u201cstudying German Philosophy\n from Kant to Hegel,\u201d although it has many members who are occupied\n chiefly in that field. The Society includes among its members\n advocates of widely differing systems, all, however, working in the\n spirit of the Preamble to the Constitution, which says: \u201cThe object\n of this Society is to encourage the study and development of\n Speculative Philosophy; to foster an application of its results to\n Art, Science, and Religion; and to establish a philosophical basis\n for the professions of Law, Medicine, Divinity, Politics, Education,\n Art, and Literature.\u201d We are indebted to Dr. A. Strothotte for the\n translation of the letter.\u2014EDITOR.]\n\n\nW\u00dcRZBURG, Dec. 28, 1866.\n\n\n_Mr. President_: In the first number of Vol. XLIX of the \u201c_Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr Philosophie_,\u201d published at Halle, in Prussia, edited by Fichte,\nUlrici and Wirth, notice is taken of a philosophical society, organized\nat St. Louis, with the object of pursuing the study of German philosophy\nfrom Kant to Hegel.\n\nThis fact promises a correlation of philosophical movements between\nNorth America and Germany which is of great importance. I presume,\nhowever, that you have already been led, or that you will be led, to go\nback beyond Kant to the first traces of German philosophy, and proceed\nfrom Hegel to the present time.\n\nNow, although a thorough and comprehensive view of Hegel\u2019s philosophy is\nin the first place to be recommended, yet the other directions in the\nmovement of thought must not be lost sight of.\n\nIn the Berlin organ of the Philosophical Society of the Hegelians\u2014_Der\nGedanke_\u2014edited by Michelet, may be found, as you perhaps know, an index\nof the works of Hegel\u2019s school, by Rosenkranz, whereas on the other hand\nthe rich literature of the anti-Hegelian writers is nowhere met with in\nany degree of completeness. Many of them, however, are noticed in\nFichte\u2019s journal, and in the more recent works on the history of\nphilosophy, particularly in those of Erdmann, and still more in those of\nUeberweg.\n\nAmong the prominent movements in philosophical thinking, during and\nafter the time of Hegel, the profound utterances of a great and genial\nteacher, Franz Baader, reach a degree of prominence, even higher than is\nadmitted by Erdmann and Ueberweg. This may be readily perceived by\nreferring to the dissertation on Franz Baader, by Carl Philipp Fischer,\nof Erlangen, and still more by having recourse to Hamberger, Lutterbeck,\nand to my own writings.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI take the liberty of recommending to you and to the members of the\nPhilosophical Society of St. Louis, the study of the works of a\nphilosopher who certainly will have a great future, although his\ndoctrines in the progress of time may undergo modifications, reforms and\nfurther developments. If Hegel had lived longer, the influence of Baader\nupon him would have been greater yet than became visible during his last\nyears. He has thrown Schelling out of his pantheism, and pressed him\ntowards a semi-pantheism, or towards a deeper theism. The influence of\nBaader on the philosophers after Hegel\u2014J. H. Fichte, Weisse, Sempler, C.\nPh. Fischer and others\u2014is much greater than is commonly admitted.\nWhether they agree to it or not, still it is a fact that Baader is the\ncentral constellation of the movement of the German spirit, from\npantheism to a deeper ideal-realistic theism. Such a genius, whatever\nposition may be taken with regard to him, cannot be left unnoticed,\nwithout running the risk of being left behind the times. I ask nothing\nfor Baader, but to follow the maxim\u2014\u201cTry all and keep the best.\u201d I\nregret that so great a distance prevents me from sending your honorable\nSociety some of my explanatory writings, which are admitted to be clear\nand thorough. It may suffice if I add a copy of my prospectus; and let\nme here remark, that a collection of my writings, in four large volumes,\nwill be published by Deichert, in Erlangen. The first volume, perhaps,\nwill be ready at Easter, 1867.\n\nErdmann, in his elements of the history of philosophy, has treated of\nthe doctrines of Baader, too briefly it is true, but with more justice\nthan he has used in his former work on the history of modern philosophy,\nand he bears witness that his esteem of Baader increases more and more.\nBut he evidently assigns to him a wrong position, by considering Oken\nand Baader as extremes, and Hegel as the mean, while Oken and Hegel are\nthe extremes, and Baader the mean. The most important phenomenon in the\nschool of Hegel is the _Idee der Wissenschaft_ of Rosenkranz, (_Logik\nund Metaphysik_,) which represents Hegel in a sense not far distant from\nthe standpoint of Baader. * * * * * * * C. H. Fischer\u2019s Characteristics\nof Baader\u2019s Theosophy speaks with high favor of him, but still I have to\ntake several exceptions. According to my opinion, all the authors by him\nreferred to, as Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dauber and Baader, we\nmust call theosophers\u2014or call none of them so, but _philosophers_, in\norder to avoid misunderstanding. Then I do not see how Schelling can be\ncalled the \u201cmost genial philosopher of modern times,\u201d and yet Baader the\nmore, yea, the _most_ profound. Finally, a want of system must be\nadmitted, but too great importance is attributed to this. If, however,\nsystematism could decide here, then not Schelling but Hegel is the\ngreatest philosopher of modern times. At all events Fischer\u2019s Memorial\nat the Centennial Birthday of Baader is significant, and is written with\ngreat spirit and warmth. The most important work of C. Ph. Fischer,\nbearing on this subject, is his elements of the system of philosophy, or\n_Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences_. This is one of the most\nimportant of the works of the philosophers after Hegel and Baader. The\nAthen\u00e4um of Froschhammer, (Journal for Philosophy), appeared only for\nthree years. It had to cease its publication, because on the one side\nthe Ultramontanist party agitated against it, and on the other side it\nmet with insufficient support. Its reissue would be desirable, but just\nnow not practicable, for want of interest on the part of the public,\nalthough it could bear comparison with any other philosophical journal.\n\nHere let me say, that from Baader there proceeded a strong impulse\ntoward the revival of the study of the long-forgotten spiritual\ntreasures of the mystics and theosophers of the middle ages, and of the\ntime of the Reformation. From this impulse monographs have made their\nappearance about Scotus Erigena, Albertus Magnus\u2014at least biographies of\nthem\u2014Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, Nicholas Cusanus, Weigel,\nJ. B\u00f6hme, Oettinger, etc. The most important of these I deem to be\n_Scotus Erigena_, by Joh. Huber, Christlieb and Kaulich; _Meister\nEckhart_, by Bach, and _J. B\u00f6hme_, by J. Hamberger. Bach on _Eckhart_ is\nespecially instructive with respect to the connection between modern\nphilosophy and the theosophy of Eckhart and his school, to which also\nNicholas Cusanus belonged.\n\nI presume that it will yet be discovered that Copernicus was at least\nacquainted with Nicholas Cusanus, if he did not even sympathize with his\nphilosophy. The director of the observatory at Krakau, Kerlinski, is at\npresent preparing a monograph on Copernicus, which will probably throw\nlight on this subject. Prowe\u2019s pamphlet on Copernicus, which I have\nnoticed in Glaser\u2019s journal, refers to the investigations of Kerlinski,\nwho has recently published a beautiful edition of the works of\nCopernicus. As in the early ages, first in the Pythagorean school, they\napproached the true doctrine of the Universe, so in the middle ages it\nappears in the school of Eckhart, for in a certain sense, and with some\nrestriction, Nicholas Cusanus was the precursor of Copernicus.\n\nI beg you, my dear sir, to communicate this letter to your honorable\nSociety: should you see fit to publish it in a journal, you are at\nliberty to do so.\n\n I remain, Sir, with great respect,\n Truly, yours,\n DR. FRANZ HOFFMANN,\n _Prof. of Philos. at the University of W\u00fcrzburg_.\n\n\n\n\n IN THE QUARRY.\n By A. C. B.\n\n\n Impatient, stung with pain, and long delay,\n I chid the rough-hewn stone that round me lay;\n I said\u2014\u201cWhat shelter art thou from the heat?\n What rest art thou for tired and way-worn feet?\n What beauty hast thou for the longing eye?\n Thou nothing hast my need to satisfy!\u201d\n And then the patient stone fit answer made\u2014\n \u201cMost true I am no roof with welcome shade;\n I am no house for rest, or full delight\n Of sculptured beauty for the weary sight;\n Yet am I still, material for all;\n Use me as such\u2014I answer to thy call.\n Nay, tread me only under climbing feet,\n So serve I thee, my destiny complete;\n Mount by me into purer, freer air,\n And find the roof that archeth everywhere;\n So what but failure seems, shall build success;\n For all, as possible, thou dost possess.\u201d\n\n Who by the Universal squares his life,\n Sees but success in all its finite strife;\n In all that is, his truth-enlightened eyes\n Detect the May-be through its thin disguise;\n And in the Absolute\u2019s unclouded sun,\n To him the two already are the one.\n\n\n\n\n THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.\n Vol. I. 1867. No. 4.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION TO THE OUTLINES OF A SYSTEM OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY;\n OR,\n ON THE IDEA OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS AND THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A\n SYSTEM OF THIS SCIENCE.\n 1799.\n [Translated from the German of SCHELLING, by TOM DAVIDSON.]\n\n\n I.\nWHAT WE CALL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS A NECESSARY SCIENCE IN THE SYSTEM OF\n KNOWING.\n\n\nThe Intelligence is productive in two modes\u2014that is, either blindly and\nunconsciously, or freely and consciously;\u2014unconsciously productive in\nexternal intuition, consciously in the creation of an ideal world.\n\nPhilosophy removes this distinction by assuming the unconscious activity\nas originally identical, and, as it were, sprung from the same root with\nthe conscious; this identity is by it _directly_ proved in the case of\nan activity at once clearly conscious and unconscious, which manifests\nitself in the productions of genius, _indirectly_, outside of\nconsciousness, in the products of _Nature_, so far as in them all, the\nmost complete fusion of the Ideal with the Real is perceived.\n\nSince philosophy assumes the unconscious, or, as it may likewise be\ntermed, the real activity as identical with the conscious or ideal, its\ntendency will originally be to bring back everywhere the real to the\nideal\u2014a process which gives birth to what is called Transcendental\nPhilosophy. The regularity displayed in all the movements of Nature\u2014for\nexample, the sublime geometry which is exercised in the motions of the\nheavenly bodies\u2014is not explained by saying that Nature is the most\nperfect geometry; but conversely, by saying that the most perfect\ngeometry is what produces in Nature;\u2014a mode of explanation whereby the\nReal itself is transported into the ideal world, and those motions are\nchanged into intuitions, which take place only in ourselves, and to\nwhich nothing outside of us corresponds. Again, the fact that Nature,\nwherever it is left to itself, in every transition from a fluid to a\nsolid state, produces, of its own accord, as it were, regular\nforms\u2014which regularity, in the higher species of crystallization,\nnamely, the organic, seems to become purpose even; or the fact that in\nthe animal kingdom\u2014that product of the blind forces of Nature\u2014we see\nactions arise which are equal in regularity to those that take place\nwith consciousness, and even external works of art, perfect in their\nkind;\u2014all this is not explained by saying that it is an unconscious\nproductivity, though in its origin akin to the conscious, whose mere\nreflex we see in Nature, and which, from the stand-point of the natural\nview, must appear as one and the same blind tendency, which exerts its\ninfluence from crystallization upwards to the highest point of organic\nformation (in which, on one side, through the art-tendency, it returns\nagain to mere crystallization) only acting upon different planes.\n\nAccording to this view, inasmuch as Nature is only the visible organism\nof our understanding, Nature _can_ produce nothing but what shows\nregularity and design, and Nature is _compelled_ to produce that. But if\nNature can produce only the regular, and produces it from necessity, it\nfollows that the origin of such regular and design-evincing products\nmust again be capable of being proved necessary in Nature, regarded as\nself-existent and real, and in the relation of its forces;\u2014_that\ntherefore, conversely, the Ideal must arise out of the Real, and admit\nof explanation from it_.\n\nIf, now, it is the task of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the\nReal to the Ideal, it is, on the other hand, the task of Natural\nPhilosophy to explain the Ideal by the Real. The two sciences are\ntherefore but one science, whose two problems are distinguished by the\nopposite directions in which they move; moreover, as the two directions\nare not only equally possible, but equally necessary, the same necessity\nattaches to both in the system of knowing.\n\n\n II.\n SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nNatural Philosophy, as the opposite of Transcendental Philosophy, is\ndistinguished from the latter chiefly by the fact that it posits Nature\n(not, indeed, in so far as it is a product, but in so far as it is at\nonce productive and product) as the self-existent; whence it may be most\nbriefly designated as the Spinozism of Physics. It follows naturally\nfrom this that there is no place in this science for idealistic methods\nof explanation, such as Transcendental Philosophy is fitted to supply,\nfrom the circumstance that for it Nature is nothing more than the organ\nof self-consciousness, and everything in Nature is necessary merely\nbecause it is only through the medium of such a Nature that\nself-consciousness can take place; this mode of explanation, however, is\nas meaningless in the case of physics, and of our science which occupies\nthe same stand-point with it, as were the old teleological modes of\nexplanation, and the introduction of a universal reference to final\ncauses into the thereby metamorphosed science of Nature. For every\nidealistic mode of explanation, dragged out of its own proper sphere and\napplied to the explanation of Nature, degenerates into the most\nadventurous nonsense, examples of which are well known. The first maxim\nof all true natural science, viz., to explain everything by the forces\nof Nature, is therefore accepted in its widest extent in our science,\nand even extended to that region, at the limit of which all\ninterpretation of Nature has hitherto been accustomed to stop short; for\nexample, to those organic phenomena which seem to pre-suppose an analogy\nwith reason. For, granted that in the actions of animals there really is\nsomething which pre-supposes such analogy, on the principle of realism,\nnothing further would follow than that what we call reason is a mere\nplay of higher and necessarily unknown natural forces. For, inasmuch as\nall thinking is at last reducible to a producing and reproducing, there\nis nothing impossible in the thought that the same activity by which\nNature reproduces itself anew in each successive phase, is reproductive\nin thought through the medium of the organism (very much in the same\nmanner in which, through the action and play of light, Nature, which\nexists independently of it, is created immaterial, and, as it were, for\na second time), in which circumstance it is natural that what forms the\nlimit of our intuitive faculty, no longer falls within the sphere of our\nintuition itself.\n\n\n III.\n NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.\n\n\nOur science, as far as we have gone, is thoroughly and completely\nrealistic; it is therefore nothing other than Physics, it is only\n_speculative_ Physics; in its tendency it is exactly what the systems of\nthe ancient physicists were, and what, in more recent times, the system\nof the restorer of Epicurean philosophy is, viz., Lesage\u2019s Mechanical\nPhysics, by which the speculative spirit in physics, after a long\nscientific sleep, has again, for the first time, been awakened. It\ncannot be shown in detail here (for the proof itself falls within the\nsphere of our science), that on the mechanical or atomistic basis which\nhas been adopted by Lesage and his most successful predecessors, the\nidea of speculative physics is incapable of realization. For, inasmuch\nas the first problem of this science, that of inquiring into the\n_absolute_ cause of motion (without which Nature is not in itself a\nfinished whole), is absolutely incapable of a mechanical solution,\nseeing that mechanically motion results only from motion _ad infinitum_,\nthere remains for the real construction of speculative physics only one\nway open, viz., the dynamic, which lays down that motion arises not only\nfrom motion, but even from rest; that, therefore, there is motion in the\nrest of Nature, and that all mechanical motion is the merely secondary\nand derivative motion of that which is solely primitive and original,\nand which wells forth from the very first factors in the construction of\na nature generally (the fundamental forces).\n\nIn hereby making clear the points of difference between our undertaking\nand all those of a similar nature that have hitherto been attempted, we\nhave at the same time shown the difference between speculative physics\nand so-called empirical physics; a difference which in the main may be\nreduced to this, that the former occupies itself solely and entirely\nwith the original causes of motion in nature, that is, solely with the\ndynamical phenomena; the latter, on the contrary, inasmuch as it never\nreaches a final source of motion in nature, deals only with the\nsecondary motions, and even with the original ones only as mechanical\n(and therefore likewise capable of mathematical construction). The\nformer, in fact, aims generally at the inner spring-work and what is\n_non-objective_ in Nature; the latter, on the contrary, only at the\n_surface_ of Nature, and what is objective, and, so to speak, _outside_\nin it.\n\n\n IV.\n ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.\n\n\nInasmuch as our inquiry is directed not so much upon the phenomena of\nNature as upon their final grounds, and our business is not so much to\ndeduce the latter from the former as the former from the latter, our\ntask is simply this: to erect a science of Nature in the strictest sense\nof the term; and in order to find out whether speculative physics are\npossible, we must know what belongs to the possibility of a doctrine of\nNature viewed as science.\n\n(_a_) The idea of knowing is here taken in its strictest sense, and then\nit is easy to see that, in this acceptation of the term, we can be said\nto know objects only when they are such that we see the principles of\ntheir possibility, for without this insight my whole knowledge of an\nobject, e. g. of a machine, with whose construction I am unacquainted,\nis a mere seeing, that is, a mere conviction of its existence, whereas\nthe inventor of the machine has the most perfect knowledge of it,\nbecause he is, as it were, the soul of the work, and because it\npre\u00ebxisted in his head before he exhibited it as a reality.\n\nNow, it would certainly be impossible to obtain a glance into the\ninternal construction of Nature, if an invasion of Nature were not\npossible through freedom. It is true that Nature acts openly and freely;\nits acts however are never isolated, but performed under a concurrence\nof a host of causes, which must first be excluded if we are to obtain a\npure result. Nature must therefore be compelled to act under certain\ndefinite conditions, which either do not exist in it at all, or else\nexist only as modified by others.\u2014Such an invasion of Nature we call an\nexperiment. Every experiment is a question put to Nature, to which she\nis compelled to give a reply. But every question contains an implicit _\u00e0\npriori_ judgment; every experiment that is an experiment, is a prophecy;\nexperimenting itself is a production of phenomena. The first step,\ntherefore, towards science, at least in the domain of physics, is taken\nwhen we ourselves begin to produce the objects of that science.\n\n(_b_) We _know_ only the self-produced; knowing, therefore, in the\n_strictest_ acceptation of the term, is a _pure_ knowing _\u00e0 priori_.\nConstruction by means of experiment, is, after all, an absolute\nself-production of the phenomena. There is no question but that much in\nthe science of Nature may be known comparatively _\u00e0 priori_; as, for\nexample, in the theory of the phenomena of electricity, magnetism, and\neven light. There is such a simple law recurring in every phenomenon\nthat the results of every experiment may be told beforehand; here my\nknowing follows immediately from a known law, without the intervention\nof any particular experience. But whence then does the law itself come\nto me? The assertion is, that all phenomena are correlated in one\nabsolute and necessary law, from which they can all be deduced; in\nshort, that in natural science all that we know, we know absolutely _\u00e0\npriori_. Now, that experiment never leads to such a knowing, is plainly\nmanifest, from the fact that it can never get beyond the forces of\nNature, of which itself makes use as means.\n\nAs the final causes of natural phenomena are themselves not phenomenal,\nwe must either give up all attempt ever to arrive at a knowledge of\nthem, or else we must altogether put them into Nature, endow Nature with\nthem. But now, that which we put into Nature has no other value than\nthat of a pre-supposition (hypothesis), and the science founded thereon\nmust be equally hypothetical with the principle itself. This it would be\npossible to avoid only in one case, viz., if that pre-supposition itself\nwere involuntary, and as necessary as Nature itself. Assuming, for\nexample, what must be assumed, that the sum of phenomena is not a mere\nworld, but of necessity a Nature\u2014that is, that this whole is not merely\na product, but at the same time productive, it follows that in this\nwhole we can never arrive at absolute identity, inasmuch as this would\nbring about an absolute transition of Nature, in as far as it is\nproductive, into Nature as product, that is, it would produce absolute\nrest; such wavering of Nature, therefore, between productivity and\nproduct, will, of necessity, appear as a universal duplicity of\nprinciples, whereby Nature is maintained in continual activity, and\nprevented from exhausting itself in its product; and universal duality\nas the principle of explanation of Nature will be as necessary as the\nidea of Nature itself.\n\nThis absolute hypothesis must carry its necessity within itself, but it\nmust, besides this, be brought to empiric proof; for, inasmuch as all\nthe phenomena of Nature cannot be deduced from this hypothesis as long\nas there is in the whole system of Nature a single phenomenon which is\nnot necessary according to that principle, or which contradicts it, the\nhypothesis is thereby at once shown to be false, and from that moment\nceases to have validity as an hypothesis.\n\nBy this deduction of all natural phenomena from an absolute hypothesis,\nour knowing is changed into a construction of Nature itself, that is,\ninto a science of Nature _\u00e0 priori_. If, therefore, such deduction\nitself is possible, a thing which can be proved only by the fact, then\nalso a doctrine of Nature is possible as a science of Nature; a system\nof purely speculative physics is possible, which was the point to be\nproved.\n\n_Remark._\u2014There would be no necessity for this remark, if the confusion\nwhich still prevails in regard to ideas perspicuous enough in themselves\ndid not render some explanation with regard to them requisite.\n\nThe assertion that natural science must be able to deduce all its\nprinciples _\u00e0 priori_, is in a measure understood to mean that natural\nscience must dispense with all experience, and, without any intervention\nof experience, be able to spin all its principles out of itself\u2014an\naffirmation so absurd that the very objections to it deserve pity. _Not\nonly do we know this or that through experience, but we originally know\nnothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience_,\nand in this sense the whole of our knowledge consists of the data of\nexperience. These data become _\u00e0 priori_ principles when we become\nconscious of them as necessary, and thus every datum, be its import what\nit may, may be raised to that dignity, inasmuch as the distinction\nbetween _\u00e0 priori_ and _\u00e0 posteriori_ data is not at all, as many people\nmay have imagined, one originally cleaving to the data themselves, but\nis a distinction made solely _with respect to our knowing_, and the\n_kind_ of our knowledge of these data, so that every datum which is\nmerely historical for me\u2014i. e. a datum of experience\u2014becomes,\nnotwithstanding, an _\u00e0 priori_ principle as soon as I arrive, whether\ndirectly or indirectly, at insight into its internal necessity. Now,\nhowever, it must in all cases be possible to recognize every natural\nphenomenon as absolutely necessary; for, if there is no chance in nature\nat all, there can likewise be no original phenomenon of Nature\nfortuitous; on the contrary, for the very reason that Nature is a\nsystem, there must be a necessary connection for everything that happens\nor comes to pass in it, in some principle embracing the whole of Nature.\nInsight into this internal necessity of all natural phenomena becomes,\nof course, still more complete, as soon as we reflect that there is no\nreal system which is not, at the same time, an organic whole. For if, in\nan organic whole, all things mutually bear and support each other, then\nthis organization must have existed as a whole previous to its parts\u2014the\nwhole could not have arisen from the parts, but the parts must have\narisen out of the whole. _It is not, therefore_, WE KNOW _Nature, but\nNature_ IS, _\u00e0 priori_, that is, everything individual in it is\npredetermined by the whole or by the idea of a Nature generally. But if\nNature _is_ _\u00e0 priori_, then it must be possible to _recognize_ it _as_\nsomething that is _\u00e0 priori_, and this is really the meaning of our\naffirmation.\n\nSuch a science, like every other, does not deal with the hypothetical,\nor the merely probable, but depends upon the evident and the certain.\nNow, we may indeed be quite certain that every natural phenomenon,\nthrough whatever number of intermediate links, stands in connection with\nthe last conditions of a Nature; the intermediate links themselves,\nhowever, may be unknown to us, and still lying hidden in the depths of\nNature. To find out these links is the work of experimental research.\nSpeculative physics have nothing to do but to show the need of these\nintermediate links;[18] but as every new discovery throws us back upon a\nnew ignorance, and while one knot is being loosed a new one is being\ntied, it is conceivable that the complete discovery of all the\nintermediate links in the chain of Nature, and therefore also our\nscience itself, is an infinite task. Nothing, however, has more impeded\nthe infinite progress of this science than the arbitrariness of the\nfictions by which the want of profound insight was so long doomed to be\nconcealed. This fragmentary nature of our knowledge becomes apparent\nonly when we separate what is merely hypothetical from the pure out-come\nof science, and thereupon set out to collect the fragments of the great\nwhole of Nature again into a system. It is, therefore, conceivable that\nspeculative physics (the soul of real experiment) has, in all time, been\nthe mother of all great discoveries in Nature.\n\n\n V.\n OF A SYSTEM OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS GENERALLY.\n\n\nHitherto the idea of speculative physics has been deduced and developed;\nit is another business to show how this idea must be realized and\nactually carried out.\n\nThe author, for this purpose, would at once refer to his Outlines of a\nSystem of Natural Philosophy, if he had not reason to suspect that many\neven of those who might consider those Outlines worthy of their\nattention, would come to it with certain preconceived ideas, which he\nhas not presupposed, and which he does not desire to have pre-supposed.\n\nThe causes which may render an insight into the tendency of those\nOutlines difficult, are (exclusive of defects of style and arrangement)\nmainly, the following:\n\n1. That many persons, misled perhaps by the word _Natural Philosophy_,\nexpect to find transcendental deductions from natural phenomena, such\nas, in different fragments, exist elsewhere, and will regard natural\nphilosophy generally as a part of transcendental philosophy, whereas it\nforms a science altogether peculiar, altogether different from, and\nindependent of, every other.\n\n2. That the notions of dynamical physics hitherto diffused, are very\ndifferent from, and partially at variance with, those which the author\nlays down. I do not speak of the modes of representation which several\npersons, whose business is really mere experiment, have figured to\nthemselves in this connection; for example, where they suppose it to be\na dynamical explanation, when they reject a galvanic fluid, and accept\ninstead of it certain vibrations in the metals; for these persons, as\nsoon as they observe that they have understood nothing of the matter,\nwill revert, of their own accord, to their previous representations,\nwhich were made for them. I speak of the modes of representation which\nhave been put into philosophic heads by Kant, and which may be mainly\nreduced to this: that we see in matter nothing but the occupation of\nspace in definite degrees, in all difference of matter, therefore, only\nmere difference of occupation of space (i. e. density,) in all dynamic\n(qualitative) changes, only mere changes in the relation of the\nrepelling and attracting forces. Now, according to this mode of\nrepresentation, all the phenomena of Nature are looked at only on their\nlowest plane, and the dynamical physics of these philosophers begin\nprecisely at the point where they ought properly to leave off. It is\nindeed certain that the last result of every dynamical process is a\nchanged degree of occupation of space\u2014that is, a changed density;\ninasmuch, now, as the dynamical process of Nature is one, and the\nindividual dynamical processes are only shreds of the one fundamental\nprocess\u2014even magnetic and electric phenomena, viewed from this\nstand-point, will be, not actions of particular materials, but changes\nin the constitution of matter itself; and as this depends upon the\nmutual action of the fundamental forces, at last, changes in the\nrelation of the fundamental forces themselves. We do not indeed deny\nthat these phenomena at the extreme limit of their manifestation are\nchanges in the relation of the principles themselves; we only deny that\nthese changes are nothing more; on the contrary, we are convinced that\nthis so-called dynamical principle is too superficial and defective a\nbasis of explanation for all Nature\u2019s phenomena, to reach the real depth\nand manifoldness of natural phenomena, inasmuch as by means of it, in\npoint of fact, no qualitative change of matter _as_ such is\nconstructible (for change of density is only the external phenomenon of\na higher change). To adduce proof of this assertion is not incumbent\nupon us, till, from the opposite side, that principle of explanation is\nshown by actual fact to exhaust Nature, and the great chasm is filled up\nbetween that kind of dynamical philosophy and the empirical attainments\nof physics\u2014as, for example, in regard to the very different kinds of\neffects exhibited by simple substances\u2014a thing which, let us say at\nonce, we consider to be impossible.\n\nWe may therefore be permitted, in the room of the hitherto prevailing\ndynamic mode of representation, to place our own without further\nremark\u2014a procedure which will no doubt clearly show wherein the latter\ndiffers from the former, and by which of the two the Doctrine of Nature\nmay most certainly be raised to a Science of Nature.\n\n\n VI.\n INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.\n\n\n 1.\n\n\nAn inquiry into the Principle of speculative physics must be preceded by\ninquiries into the distinction between the speculative and the empirical\ngenerally. This depends mainly upon the conviction that between\nempiricism and theory there is such a complete opposition that there can\nbe no third thing in which the two may be united; that, therefore, the\nidea of Experimental Science is a mongrel idea, which implies no\nconnected thought, or rather, which cannot be thought at all. What is\npure empiricism is not science, and, _vice vers\u00e2_, what is science is\nnot empiricism. This is not said for the purpose of at all depreciating\nempiricism, but is meant to exhibit it in its true and proper light.\nPure empiricism, be its object what it may, is history (the absolute\nopposite of theory), and, conversely, history alone is empiricism.[19]\n\nPhysics, as empiricism, are nothing but a collection of facts, of\naccounts of what has been observed\u2014what has happened under natural or\nartificial circumstances. In what we at present designate physics,\nempiricism and science run riot together, and for that very reason they\nare neither one thing nor another.\n\nOur aim, in view of this object, is to separate science and empiricism\nas soul and body, and by admitting nothing into science which is not\nsusceptible of an _\u00e0 priori_ construction, to strip empiricism of all\ntheory, and restore it to its original nakedness.\n\nThe opposition between empiricism and science rests therefore upon this:\nthat the former regards its object in _being_\u2014as something already\nprepared and accomplished; science, on the other hand, views its object\nin _becoming_, and as something that has yet to be accomplished. As\nscience cannot set out from anything that is a product\u2014that is, a\nthing\u2014it must set out from the unconditioned; the first inquiry of\nspeculative physics is that which relates to the unconditioned in\nnatural science.\n\n\n 2.\n\n\nAs this inquiry is, in the Outlines, deduced from the highest\nprinciples, the following may be regarded as merely an illustration of\nthose inquiries:\n\nInasmuch as everything of which we can say that it _is_, is of a\nconditioned nature, it is only _being itself_ that can be the\nunconditioned. But seeing that individual being, as a conditioned, can\nbe thought only as a particular limitation of the productive activity\n(the sole and last substrate of all reality) _being itself_ is _thought_\nas the same productive activity _in its unlimitedness_. For the\nphilosophy of nature, therefore, nature is originally only productivity,\nand from this as its principle science must set out.\n\nSo long as we know the totality of objects only as the sum of being,\nthis totality is a mere world\u2014that is, a mere product for us. It would\ncertainly be impossible in the science of Nature to rise to a higher\nidea than that of being, if all permanence (which is thought in the idea\nof being) were not deceptive, and really a continuous and uniform\nreproduction.\n\nIn so far as we regard the totality of objects not merely as a product,\nbut at the same time necessarily as productive, it rises into _Nature_\nfor us, and this _identity of the product and the productivity_, and\nthis alone is implied, even in the ordinary use of language by the idea\nof Nature.\n\nNature as a mere product (_natura naturata_) we call Nature as object\n(with this alone all empiricism deals). Nature as productivity (_natura\nnaturans_) we call Nature as subject (with this alone all theory deals).\n\nAs the object is never unconditioned, something absolutely non-objective\nmust be put into Nature; this absolutely non-objective is nothing else\nbut that original productivity of Nature. In the ordinary view it\nvanishes in the product: conversely in the philosophic view the product\nvanishes in the productivity.\n\nSuch identity of the product and the productivity in the original\nconception of Nature is expressed by the ordinary views of Nature as a\nwhole, which is at once the cause and the effect of itself, and is in\nits duplicity (which goes through all phenomena) again identical.\nFurthermore, with this idea the identity of the Real and the Ideal\nagrees\u2014an identity which is thought in the idea of every product of\nNature, and in view of which alone the nature of art can be placed in\nopposition thereto. For whereas in art the idea precedes the act\u2014the\nexecution\u2014in Nature idea and act are rather contemporary and one; the\nidea passes immediately over into the product, and cannot be separated\nfrom it.\n\nThis identity is cancelled by the empirical view, which sees in Nature\nonly the effect (although on account of the continual wandering of\nempiricism into the field of science, we have, even in purely empirical\nphysics, maxims which presuppose an idea of Nature as subject\u2014as, for\nexample, Nature chooses the shortest way; Nature is sparing in causes\nand lavish in effects); it is also cancelled by speculation, which looks\nonly at _cause_ in Nature.\n\n\n 3.\n\n\nWe can say of Nature as object that it _is_, not of Nature as subject;\nfor this is being or productivity.\n\nThis absolute productivity must pass over into an empirical nature. In\nthe idea of absolute productivity, is the thought of an ideal infinity.\nThe ideal infinity must become an empirical one.\n\nBut empirical infinity is an infinite becoming. Every infinite series is\nbut the exhibition of an intellectual or ideal infinity. The original\ninfinite series (the ideal of all infinite series) is that wherein our\nintellectual infinity evolves itself, viz., _Time_. The activity which\nsustains this series is the same as that which sustains our\nconsciousness; consciousness, however, is _continuous_. Time, therefore,\nas the evolution of that activity, cannot be produced by composition.\nNow, as all other infinite series are only imitations of the originally\ninfinite series, Time, no infinite series can be otherwise than\ncontinuous. In the original evolution the retarding agent (without which\nthe evolution would take place with infinite rapidity) is nothing but\n_original reflection_; the necessity of reflection upon our acting in\nevery organic phase (continued duplicity in identity) is the secret\nstroke of art whereby our being receives _permanence_.\n\nAbsolute continuity, therefore, exists only for the intuition, but not\nfor the _reflection_. Intuition and reflection are opposed to each\nother. The infinite series is continuous for the productive\n_intuition_\u2014interrupted and composite for the _reflection_. It is on\nthis _contradiction_ between intuition and reflection that those\nsophisms are based, in which the possibility of all motion is contested,\nand which are solved at every successive step by the productive\nactivity. To the intuition, for example, the action of gravity takes\nplace with perfect continuity; to the reflection, by fits and starts.\nHence all the laws of mechanics, whereby that which is properly only the\nobject of the productive intuition becomes an object of reflection, are\nreally only laws for the reflection. Hence those fictitious notions of\nmechanics, the atoms of time in which gravitation acts, the law that the\nmoment of solicitation is infinitely small, because otherwise an\ninfinite rapidity would be produced in finite time, &c., &c. Hence,\nfinally, the assertion that in mathematics no infinite series can really\nbe represented as continuous, but only as advancing by fits and starts.\n\nThe whole of this inquiry into the opposition between reflection and the\nproductivity of the intuition, serves only to enable us to deduce the\ngeneral statement that in _all_ productivity, and in productivity alone,\nthere is absolute _continuity_\u2014a statement of importance in the\nconsideration of the whole of Nature; inasmuch, for example, as the law\nthat in Nature there is no leap, that there is a continuity of forms in\nit, &c., is confined to the original productivity of Nature, in which\ncertainly there must be continuity, whereas from the stand-point of\nreflection all things must appear _disconnected_ and _without_\ncontinuity\u2014placed beside each other, as it were; we must therefore admit\nthat both parties are right; those, namely, who assert continuity in\nNature\u2014for example, in organic Nature\u2014no less than those who deny it,\nwhen we take into consideration the difference of their respective\nstand-points; and we thereby, at the same time, arrive at the\ndistinction between dynamical and atomistic physics; for, as will soon\nbecome apparent, the two are distinguished only by the fact that the\nformer occupies the stand-point of _intuition_, the latter that of\n_reflection_.\n\n\n 4.\n\n\nThese general principles being presupposed, we shall be able, with more\ncertainty, to reach our aim, and make an exposition of the internal\norganism of our system.\n\n(_a_) In the idea of becoming, we think the idea of gradualness. But an\nabsolute productivity will exhibit itself empirically as a becoming with\ninfinite rapidity, whereby there results nothing real for the intuition.\n\n(Inasmuch as Nature must in reality be thought as engaged in infinite\nevolution, the permanence, the resting of the products of Nature\u2014the\norganic ones, for instance\u2014is not to be viewed as an absolute resting,\nbut only as an evolution proceeding with infinitely small rapidity or\nwith infinite tardiness. But hitherto evolution, with even finite\nrapidity, not to speak of infinitely small rapidity, has not been\nconstructed.)\n\n(_b_) That the evolution of Nature should take place with finite\nrapidity, and thus become an object of intuition, is not thinkable\nwithout an original limitation (a being limited) of the productivity.\n\n(_c_) But if Nature be absolute productivity, then the ground of this\nlimitation may lie _outside of it_. Nature is originally _only_\nproductivity; there can, therefore, be nothing determined in this\nproductivity (all determination is negation) and so products can never\nbe reached by it. If products are to be reached, the productivity must\npass from being undetermined to being determined\u2014that is, it must, as\npure productivity, be cancelled. If now the ground of determination of\nproductivity lay outside of Nature, Nature would not be originally\nabsolutely productivity. Determination, that is, negation, must\ncertainly come into Nature; but this negation, viewed from a higher\nstand-point, must again be positivity.\n\n(_d_) But if the ground of this limitation lies _within Nature itself_,\nthen Nature ceases to be _pure identity_. (Nature, in so far as it is\nonly productivity, is pure identity, and there is in it absolutely\nnothing capable of being distinguished. In order that anything may be\ndistinguished in it, its identity must be cancelled\u2014Nature must not be\nidentity, but duplicity.)\n\nNature must originally be an object to itself; this change of the pure\nsubject into a self-object is unthinkable without an original sundering\nin Nature itself.\n\nThis duplicity cannot therefore be further deduced physically; for, as\nthe condition of all Nature generally, it is the principle of all\nphysical explanation, and all physical explanation can only have for its\naim the reduction of all the antitheses which appear in Nature to that\noriginal antithesis in the heart of Nature, _which does not, however,\nitself appear_. Why is there no original phenomenon of Nature without\nthis duplicity, if in Nature all things are not mutually subject and\nobject to each other _ad infinitum_, and Nature even, in its origin, at\nonce product and productive?\n\n(_e_) If Nature is originally duplicity, there must be opposite\ntendencies even in the original productivity of Nature. (The positive\ntendency must be opposed by another, which is, as it were,\nanti-productive\u2014retarding production; not as the contradictory, but as\nthe negative\u2014the really opposite of the former.) It is only then that,\nin spite of its being limited, there is no passivity in Nature, when\neven that which limits it is again positive, and its original duplicity\nis a contest of really opposite tendencies.\n\n(_f_) In order to arrive at a product, these opposite tendencies must\nconcur. But as they are supposed equal, (for there is no ground for\nsupposing them unequal,) wherever they meet they will annihilate each\nother; the product is therefore = 0, and once more no product is\nreached.\n\nThis inevitable, though hitherto not very closely remarked contradiction\n(namely, that a product can arise only through the concurrence of\nopposite tendencies, while at the same time these opposite tendencies\nmutually annihilate each other) is capable of being solved only in the\nfollowing manner: There is absolutely no _subsistence_ of a product\nthinkable, _without a continual process of being reproduced_. The\nproduct must be thought as _annihilated at every step_, and at _every\nstep reproduced anew_. We do not really see the subsisting of a product,\nbut only the continual process of being reproduced.\n\n(It is of course very conceivable how the series 1-1+1-1... on to\ninfinity is thought as equal neither to 1 nor to 0. The reason however\nwhy this series is thought as =1/2 lies deeper. There is one absolute\nmagnitude (=1), which, though continually annihilated in this series,\ncontinually recurs, and by this recurrence produces, not itself, but the\nmean between itself and nothing.\u2014Nature, as object, is that which comes\nto pass in such an infinite series, and is = a fraction of the original\nunit, to which the never cancelled duplicity supplies the numerator.)\n\n(_g_) If the subsistence of the product is a continual process of being\nreproduced, then all _persistence_ also is only in nature as _object_;\nin nature as _subject_ there is only infinite _activity_.\n\nThe product is originally nothing but a mere point, a mere limit, and it\nis only from Nature\u2019s combatting against this point that it is, so to\nspeak, raised to a full sphere\u2014to a product. (Suppose, for illustration,\na stream; it is _pure identity_; where it meets resistance, there is\nformed a whirlpool; this whirlpool is not anything abiding, but\nsomething that every moment vanishes, and every moment springs up\nanew.\u2014In Nature there is originally nothing distinguishable; all\nproducts are, so to speak, still in solution, and invisible in the\nuniversal productivity. It is only when retarding points are given, that\nthey are thrown off and advance out of the universal identity.\u2014At every\nsuch point the stream breaks (the productivity is annihilated), but at\nevery step there comes a new wave which fills up the sphere).\n\nThe philosophy of nature has not to explain the productive (side) of\nnature; for if it does not posit this as in nature originally, it will\nnever bring it into nature. It has to explain the permanent. But the\nfact _that_ anything should become permanent in nature, can itself\nreceive its explanation only from that contest of nature _against all\npermanence_. The products would appear as mere points, if nature did not\ngive them extension and depth by its own pressure, and the products\nthemselves would last only an instant, if nature did not at every\ninstant crowd up against them.\n\n(_h_) This seeming product, which is reproduced at every step, cannot be\na really infinite product; for otherwise productivity would actually\nexhaust itself in it; in like manner it cannot be a finite product; for\nit is the force of the whole of nature that pours itself into it. It\nmust therefore be at once infinite and finite; it must be only seemingly\nfinite, but in infinite development.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe point at which this product originally comes in, is the universal\npoint of retardation in nature, the point from which all evolution in\nnature begins. But in nature, as it is evolved, this point lies not here\nor there, but everywhere where there is a product.\n\nThis product is a finite one, but as the infinite productivity of nature\nconcentrates itself in it, it must have a tendency to infinite\ndevelopment.\u2014And thus gradually, and through all the foregoing\nintermediate links, we have arrived at the construction of that infinite\nbecoming\u2014the empirical exhibition of an ideal infinity.\n\nWe behold in what is called nature (i. e. in this assemblage of\nindividual objects), not the primal product itself, but its evolution,\n(hence the point of retardation cannot remain _one_.)\u2014By what means\n_this_ evolution is again absolutely retarded, which must happen, if we\nare to arrive at a fixed product, has not yet been explained.\n\nBut through this product an original infinity evolves itself; this\ninfinity can never decrease. The magnitude which evolves itself in an\ninfinite series, is still infinite at every point of the line; and thus\nnature will be still infinite at every point of the evolution.\n\nThere is only one original point of retardation to productivity; but any\nnumber of points of retardation to evolution may be thought. Every such\npoint is marked for us by a product; but at every point of the evolution\nnature is still infinite; therefore nature is still infinite in every\nproduct, and in every one lies the germ of a universe.[20]\n\n(The question, by what means the infinite tendency is retarded in the\nproduct, is still unanswered. The original retardation in the\nproductivity of nature, explains only why the evolution takes place with\nfinite rapidity, but not why it takes place with infinitely small\nrapidity.)\n\n(_i_) The product evolves itself _ad infinitum_. In this evolution,\ntherefore, nothing can happen, which is not already a product\n(synthesis), and which might not divide up into new factors, each of\nthese again having its factors.\n\nThus even by an analysis pursued _ad infinitum_, we could never arrive\nat anything in nature which should be absolutely simple.\n\n(_k_) If however we _suppose_ the evolution as completed, (although it\n_never_ can be completed,) still the evolution could not stop at\nanything which was a product, but only at the purely productive.\n\nThe question arises, whether a final, such that it is no longer a\nsubstrate, but the cause of all substrate, no longer a product, but\nabsolutely productive\u2014we will not say _occurs_, for that is unthinkable,\nbut\u2014can at least be proved in experience.\n\n(_l_) Inasmuch as it bears the character of the unconditioned, it would\nhave to exhibit itself as something, which, although itself not in\nspace, is still the principle of all occupation of space.\n\nWhat occupies space is not matter, for matter is the occupied space\nitself. That, therefore, which occupies space cannot be matter. Only\nthat which is, is in space, not _being itself_.\n\nIt is self-evident that no positive external intuition is possible of\nthat which _is_ not in space. It would therefore have to be capable of\nbeing exhibited negatively. This happens in the following manner:\n\nThat which is in space, is, as such, mechanically and chemically\ndestructible. That which is not destructible either mechanically or\nchemically must therefore lie outside of space. But it is only the final\nground of all quality that has anything of this nature; for although one\nquality may be extinguished by another, this can nevertheless only\nhappen in a third product, C, for the formation and maintenance of which\nA and B, (the opposite factors of C,) must continue to act.\n\nBut this indestructible (somewhat), which is thinkable only as pure\nintensity, is, as the cause of all substrate, at the same time the\nprinciple of divisibility _ad infinitum_. (A body, divided _ad\ninfinitum_ still occupies space in the same degree with its smallest\npart.)\n\nThat, therefore, which is purely productive without being a product, is\nbut the final ground of quality. But every quality is a determinate one,\nwhereas productivity is originally indeterminate. In the qualities,\ntherefore, productivity appears as already retarded, and as it appears\nmost original in them generally, it appears in them most originally\nretarded.\n\nThis is the point at which our mode of conception diverges from those of\nthe currently so-called dynamical physics.\n\nOur assertion, briefly stated, is this:\u2014If the infinite evolution of\nnature were completed (which is impossible) it would separate up into\noriginal and simple actions, or, if we may so express ourselves, into\nsimple productivities. Our assertion therefore is not: There are in\nnature such simple actions; but only, they are the ideal grounds of the\nexplanation of quality. These _entelechies_ cannot actually be shown,\nthey do not _exist_; we have not therefore to explain here anything more\nthan is asserted, namely, that such original productivities must be\n_thought_ as the grounds of the explanation of all quality. This proof\nis as follows:\n\nThe affirmation that nothing which _is_ in space, that is, that nothing\nat all is mechanically simple, requires no demonstration. That,\ntherefore, which is in reality simple, cannot be thought as in space,\nbut must be thought as outside of space. But outside of space only pure\nintensity is thought. This idea of pure intensity is expressed by the\nidea of action. It is not the product of this action that is simple, but\nthe action itself abstracted from the product, and it must be simple in\norder that the product may be divisible _ad infinitum_. For although the\nparts are near vanishing, the intensity must still remain. And this pure\nintensity is what, even in infinite divisibility, sustains the\nsubstrate.\n\nIf, therefore, the assertion that affirms something simple as the basis\nof the explanation of quality is atomistic, then our philosophy is\natomistic. But, inasmuch as it places the simple in something that is\nonly productive without being a product, it is _dynamical atomistics_.\n\nThis much is clear, that if we admit an absolute division of nature into\nits factors, the last (thing) that remains over, must be something,\nwhich absolutely defies all division, that is, the simple. But the\nsimple can be thought only as dynamical, and as such it is not in space\nat all (it designates only what is thought as altogether outside of\nspace-occupation); there is therefore no intuition of it possible,\nexcept through its product. In like manner there is no measure for it\ngiven but its product. For to pure thought it is the mere _origin_ of\nthe product (as the point is only the origin of the line), in one word\npure _entelechy_. But that which is known, not in itself, but only in\nits product, is known altogether empirically. If, therefore, every\noriginal quality, as quality (not as substrate, in which quality merely\ninheres), must be thought as pure intensity, pure action, then qualities\ngenerally are only the absolutely empirical in our knowledge of nature,\nof which no construction is possible, and in respect to which there\nremains nothing of the philosophy of nature, save the proof that they\nare the absolute limit of its construction.\n\nThe question in reference to the ground of quality posits the evolution\nof nature as completed, that is, it posits something merely thought, and\ntherefore can be answered only by an ideal ground of explanation. This\nquestion adopts the stand-point of reflection (on the product), whereas\ngenuine dynamics always remain on the stand-point of intuition.\n\nIt must here, however, be at once remarked that if the ground of the\nexplanation of quality is conceived as an ideal one, the question only\nregards the explanations of quality, in so far as it is thought as\nabsolute. There is no question, for instance, of quality, in so far as\nit shows itself in the dynamical process. For quality, so far as it is\nrelative, there is certainly a [not merely ideal, but actually real]\nground of explanation and determination; quality in that case is\ndetermined by its opposite, with which it is placed in conflict, and\nthis antithesis is itself again determined by a higher antithesis, and\nso on back into infinity; so that, if this universal organization could\ndissolve itself, all matter likewise would sink back into dynamical\ninactivity, that is, into absolute defect of quality. (Quality is a\nhigher power of matter, to which the latter elevates itself by\nreciprocity.) It is demonstrated in the sequel that the dynamical\nprocess is a limited one for each individual sphere; because it is only\nthereby that definite points of relation for the determination of\nquality arise. This limitation of the dynamical process, that is, the\nproper determination of quality, takes place by means of no force other\nthan that by which the evolution is universally and absolutely limited,\nand this negative element is the only one in things that is indivisible,\nand mastered by nothing.\u2014The absolute relativity of all quality may be\nshown from the electric relation of bodies, inasmuch as the same body\nthat is positive with one is negative with another, and conversely. But\nwe might now henceforth abide by the statement (which is also laid down\nin the Outlines): _All quality is electricity_, and conversely, _the\nelectricity of a body is also its quality_, (for all difference of\nquality is equal to difference of electricity, and all [chemical]\nquality is reducible to electricity).\u2014Everything that is sensible for us\n(sensible in the narrower acceptation of the term, as colors, taste,\n&c.), is doubtless sensible to us only _through_ electricity, and the\nonly _immediately_ sensible (element) would then be electricity,[21] a\nconclusion to which the universal duality of every sense leads us\nindependently, inasmuch as in Nature there is properly only one duality.\nIn galvanism, sensibility, as a reagent, reduces all quality of bodies,\nfor which it is a reagent to an original difference. All bodies which,\nin a chain, at all affect the sense of taste or that of sight, be their\ndifferences ever so great, are either alkaline or acid, excite a\nnegative or positive shock, and here they always appear as active in a\nhigher than the merely chemical power.\n\nQuality considered as absolute is inconstructible, because quality\ngenerally is not anything absolute, and there is no other quality at\nall, save that which bodies show mutually in relation to each other, and\nall quantity is something in virtue of which the body is, so to speak,\nraised above itself.\n\nAll hitherto attempted construction of quality reduces itself to the two\nattempts; to express qualities by figures, and so, for each original\nquality, to assume a particular figure in Nature; or else, to express\nquality by analytical formul\u00e6 (in which the forces of attraction and\nrepulsion supply the negative and positive magnitudes.) To convince\noneself of the futility of this attempt, the shortest method is to\nappeal to the emptiness of the explanations to which it gives rise.\nHence we limit ourselves here to the single remark, that through the\nconstruction of all matter out of the two fundamental forces, different\ndegrees of density may indeed be constructed, but certainly never\ndifferent qualities as qualities; for although all dynamical\n(qualitative) changes appear, in their lowest stage, as changes of the\nfundamental forces, yet we see at that stage only the product of the\nprocess\u2014not the _process itself_\u2014and those changes are _what require\nexplanation_, and the ground of explanation must therefore certainly be\nsought in something higher.\n\nThe only possible ground of explanation for quality is an ideal one;\nbecause this ground itself presupposes something purely ideal. If any\none inquire into the final ground of quality, he transports himself back\nto the starting point of Nature. But where is this starting point? and\ndoes not all quality consist in this, that matter is prevented by the\ngeneral concatenation from reverting into its originality?\n\nFrom the point at which reflection and intuition separate, a separation,\nbe it remarked, which is possible only on the hypothesis of the\nevolutions being complete, physics divide into the two opposite\ndirections, into which the two systems, the atomistic and the dynamical,\nhave been divided.\n\nThe _dynamical_ system _denies_ the absolute evolution of Nature, and\npasses from Nature as synthesis (i. e. Nature as subject) to Nature as\nevolution (i. e. Nature as object); the atomistic system passes from the\nevolution, as the original, to Nature as synthesis; the former passes\nfrom the stand-point of intuition to that of reflection; the latter from\nthe stand-point of reflection to that of intuition.\n\nBoth directions are equally possible. If the analysis only is right,\nthen the synthesis must be capable of being found again through\nanalysis, just as the analysis in its turn can be found through the\nsynthesis. But whether the analysis is correct can be tested only by the\nfact that we can pass from it again to the synthesis. The synthesis\ntherefore is, and continues, the absolutely presupposed.\n\nThe problems of the one system turn exactly round into those of the\nother; that which, in atomical physics, is the cause of the\n_composition_ of Nature is, in dynamical physics, _that which checks\nevolution_. The former explains the composition of Nature by the force\nof cohesion, whereby, however, no continuity is ever introduced into it;\nthe latter, on the contrary, explains cohesion by the continuity of\nevolution. (All cohesion is originally only in the productivity.)\n\n_Both systems set out from something purely ideal._ Absolute synthesis\nis as much purely _ideal_ as absolute analysis. The Real occurs only in\nNature as _product_; but Nature is not product, either when thought as\nabsolute involution or as absolute evolution; product is what is\ncontained between the two extremes.\n\nThe first problem for both systems is to construct the product\u2014i. e.\nthat wherein those opposites become real. Both reckon with purely\n_ideal_ magnitudes so long as the product is not constructed: it is only\nin the _directions_ in which they accomplish this that they are opposed.\nBoth systems, as far as they have to deal with merely ideal factors,\nhave the same value, and the one forms the test of the other.\u2014That which\nis concealed in the depths of productive Nature must be reflected as\nproduct in Nature as Nature, and thus the atomistic system must be the\ncontinual reflex of the dynamical. In the Outlines, of the two\ndirections, that of atomistic physics has been chosen intentionally. It\nwill contribute not a little to the understanding of our science, if we\nhere demonstrate in the _productivity_ what was there shown in the\n_product_.\n\n(_m_) _In the pure productivity of Nature there is absolutely nothing\ndistinguishable except duality; it is only productivity dualized in\nitself that gives the product._\n\nInasmuch as the absolute productivity arrives only at producing _per\nse_, not at the producing of a determinate [somewhat], the tendency of\nNature, in virtue of which product is arrived at, must be the _negative_\nof productivity.\n\nIn Nature, in so far as it is real, there can no more be productivity\nwithout a product, than a product without productivity. Nature can only\napproximate to the two extremes, and it must be demonstrated _that_ it\napproximates to both.\n\n(\u03b1) _Pure productivity passes originally into formlessness._\n\nWherever Nature loses itself in formlessness, productivity exhausts\nitself in it. (This is what we express when we talk of a becoming\nlatent.)\u2014Conversely, wherever the form predominates\u2014i. e. wherever the\nproductivity is _limited_\u2014the productivity manifests itself; it appears,\nnot as a (representable) product, but _as_ productivity, although\npassing over into one product, as in the phenomena of heat. (The idea of\nimponderables is only a symbolic one.)\n\n(\u03b2) _If productivity passes into formlessness, then, objectively\nconsidered, it is the absolutely formless._\n\nThe boldness of the atomical system has been very imperfectly\ncomprehended. The idea which prevails in it, of an absolutely formless\n[somewhat] everywhere incapable of manifestation as determinate matter,\nis nothing other than the symbol of nature approximating to\nproductivity.\u2014The nearer to productivity the nearer to formlessness.\n\n(\u03b3) _Productivity appears as productivity only when limits are set to\nit._\n\nThat which is everywhere and in everything, is, for that very reason,\nnowhere.\u2014Productivity is fixed only by limitation.\u2014_Electricity exists_\nonly at that point at which limits are given, and it is only a poverty\nof conception that would look for anything else in its phenomena beyond\nthe phenomena of (limited) productivity.\u2014The condition of _light_ is an\nantithesis in the electric and galvanic, as well as in the chemical,\nprocess, and even light which comes to us without our co\u00f6peration (the\nphenomenon of productivity exerted all round by the sun) presupposes\nthat antithesis.[22]\n\n(\u03b4) _It is only limited productivity that gives the start to product._\n(The explanation of product must begin at the origination of the fixed\npoint at which the start is made.) _The condition of all formation is\nduality._ (This is the more profound signification that lies in Kant\u2019s\nconstruction of matter from opposite forces.)\n\nElectrical phenomena are the general scheme for the construction of\nmatter universally.\n\n(\u03b5) _In Nature, neither pure productivity nor pure product can ever be\narrived at._\n\nThe former is the negation of all product, the latter the negation of\nall productivity.\n\n(Approximation to the former is the absolutely decomposible, to the\nlatter the absolutely indecomposible, of the atomistics. The former\ncannot be thought without, at the same time, being the absolutely\nincomposible, the latter without, at the same time, being the absolutely\ncomposible.)\n\nNature will therefore originally be the middle [somewhat] arising out of\nthe two, and thus we arrive at the idea of _a productivity engaged in a\ntransition into product, or of a product that is productive ad\ninfinitum_. We hold to the latter definition.\n\nThe idea of the product (the fixed) and that of the productive (the\nfree) are mutually opposed.\n\nSeeing that what we have postulated is already product, it can, if it is\nproductive at all, be productive only in a _determinate way_. But\ndetermined productivity is (active) _formation_. That third [somewhat]\nmust therefore be _in the state of formation_.\n\nBut the product is supposed to be productive _ad infinitum_ (that\ntransition is never absolutely to take place); it will therefore at\nevery stage be productive in a determinate way; the productivity will\nremain, but not the product.\n\n(The question might arise how a transition from form to form is possible\nat all here, when _no_ form is fixed. Still, that _momentary_ forms\nshould be reached, has already been rendered possible by the fact that\nthe evolution cannot take place with infinite rapidity, in which case,\ntherefore, for every step at least, the form is certainly a determinate\none.)\n\nThe product will appear as in _infinite metamorphosis_.\n\n(From the stand-point of reflection, as continually on the leap from\nfluid to solid, without ever reaching, however, the required\nform.\u2014Organizations that do not live in the grosser element, at least\nlive on the deep ground of the a\u00ebrial sea\u2014many pass over, by\nmetamorphoses, from one element into another; and what does the animal,\nwhose vital functions almost all consist in contractions, appear to be,\nother than such a leap?)\n\nThe metamorphosis will not possibly take place _without rule_. For it\nmust remain within the original antithesis, and is thereby confined\nwithin limits.[23]\n\nThis accordance with rule will express itself solely by an internal\nrelationship of forms\u2014a relationship which again is not thinkable\nwithout an archetype which lies at the basis of all, and which, with\nhowever manifold divergences, they nevertheless all express.\n\nBut even with such a product, we have not that which we were in quest\nof\u2014a product which, while productive _ad infinitum_, remains _the same_.\nThat this product should remain the same seems unthinkable, because it\nis not thinkable without an absolute checking or suppression of the\nproductivity.\u2014The product would have to be checked, as the productivity\nwas checked, for it is still productive\u2014checked by dualization and\nlimitation resulting therefrom. But it must at the same time be\nexplained how the productive product can be checked at each individual\nstage of its formation, without its ceasing to be productive, or how,\n_by dualization itself the permanence of the productivity is secured_.\n\nIn this way we have brought the reader as far as the problem of the\nfourth section of the Outlines, and we leave him to find in it for\nhimself the solution along with the corollaries which it brings\nup.\u2014Meanwhile, we shall endeavor to indicate how the deduced product\nwould necessarily appear from the stand-point of _reflection_.\n\nThe product is the synthesis wherein the opposite extremes meet, which\non the one side are designated by the absolutely decomposible\u2014on the\nother as indecomposible.\u2014How continuity comes into the absolute\ndiscontinuity with which he sets out, the atomic philosopher endeavors\nto explain by means of cohesive, plastic power, &c., &c. In vain, for\ncontinuity is only _productivity_ itself.\n\nThe manifoldness of the forms which such product assumes in its\nmetamorphosis was explained by the difference in the stages of\ndevelopment, so that, parallel with every step of development, goes a\nparticular form. The atomic philosopher posits in nature certain\nfundamental forms, and as in it everything strives after form, and every\nthing which does form itself has also its _particular_ form, so the\nfundamental forms must be conceded, but certainly only as indicated in\nnature, not as actually existent.\n\nFrom the standpoint of reflection, the becoming of this product must\nappear as a continual striving of the original actions toward the\nproduction of a determinate form, and a continual recancelling of those\nforms.\n\nThus, the product would not be product of a simple tendency; it would be\nonly the visible expression of an internal proportion, of an internal\nequipoise of the original actions, which neither reduce themselves\nmutually to absolute formlessness, nor yet, by reason of the universal\nconflict, allow the production of a determinate and fixed form.\n\nHitherto (so long as we have had to deal merely with ideal factors),\nthere have been opposite directions of investigation possible; from this\npoint, inasmuch as we have to pursue a real product in its developments,\nthere is only one direction.\n\n(\u03b7) By the unavoidable separation of productivity into opposite\ndirections at every single step of development the product itself is\nseparated into _individual products_, by which, however, for that very\nreason, only different stages of development are marked.\n\nThat this is so may be shown _either_ in the products themselves, as is\ndone when we compare them with each other with regard to their form, and\nsearch out a continuity of formation\u2014an idea which, from the fact that\ncontinuity is never in the _products_ (for the reflection), but always\nonly in the _productivity_, can never be perfectly realized.\n\nIn order to find continuity in productivity, the successive steps of the\n_transition of productivity into product_ must be more clearly exhibited\nthan they have hitherto been. From the fact that the productivity gets\n_limited_, (_v. supra_,) we have in the first instance only the start\nfor a product, only the fixed point for the productivity generally. It\nmust be shown _how_ the productivity gradually materializes itself, and\nchanges itself into products ever more and more fixed, so as to produce\na _dynamical scale in nature_, and this is the real subject of the\nfundamental problem of the whole system.\n\nIn advance, the following may serve to throw light on the subject. In\nthe first place, a dualization of the productivity is demanded; the\ncause through which this dualization is effected remains in the first\ninstance altogether outside of the investigation. By dualization a\nchange of contraction and expansion is perhaps conditioned. This change\nis not something in matter, but is _matter itself_, and the first stage\nof productivity passing over into product. _Product_ cannot be reached\nexcept through a stoppage of this change, that is, through a third\n[somewhat] which _fixes_ that change itself, and thus matter in its\nlowest stage\u2014in the _first_ power\u2014would be an object of intuition; that\nchange would be seen in rest, or in equipoise, just as, conversely\nagain, by the suppression of the third [somewhat] matter might be raised\nto a higher power. Now it might be possible that those products just\ndeduced stood upon _quite different degrees_ of materiality, or of _that\ntransition_, or that those different degrees were more or less\n_distinguishable_ in the one than in the other; that is, a dynamical\nscale of those products would thereby have to be demonstrated.\n\n(_o_) In the _solution_ of the problem itself, we shall continue, in the\nfirst instance, in the direction hitherto taken, without knowing where\nit may lead us.\n\nThere are individual products brought into nature; but in these products\nproductivity, _as_ productivity, is held to be still always\ndistinguishable. Productivity has not yet absolutely passed over into\nproduct. The subsistence of the product is supposed to be a continual\nself-reproduction.\n\nThe problem arises: By what is this absolute transition\u2014exhaustion of\nthe productivity in the product\u2014prevented? or by what does its\nsubsistence become a continual self-reproduction?\n\nIt is absolutely unthinkable how the activity that everywhere tends\ntowards a product is prevented from going over into it _entirely_,\nunless that transition is prevented _by external influences_, and the\nproduct, if it is to subsist, is compelled at every step to reproduce\nitself _anew_.\n\nUp to this point, however, no trace has been discovered of a cause\nopposed to the product (to organic nature). Such a cause can, therefore,\nat present, only be postulated. We thought we saw the whole of nature\nexhaust itself in that product, and it is only here that we remark, that\nin order to comprehend such product, _something else_ must be\npresupposed, and a new antithesis must come into nature.\n\nNature has hitherto been for us absolute _identity_ in duplicity; here\nwe come upon an antithesis that must again take place _within_ the\nother. This antithesis must be capable of being shown in the deduced\nproduct itself, if it is capable of being deduced at all.\n\nThe deduced product is an activity _directed outwards_; this cannot be\ndistinguished as such without an activity _directed inwards from\nwithout_, (i. e. directed upon itself,) and this activity, on the other\nhand, cannot be thought, unless it is _pressed back_ (reflected) from\nwithout.\n\n_In the opposite directions, which arise through this antithesis lies\nthe principle for the construction of all the phenomena of life_\u2014on the\nsuppression of those opposite directions, life remains over, either as\n_absolute activity_ or _absolute receptivity_, since it is possible only\nas the perfect _inter-determination_ of receptivity and activity.\n\nWe therefore refer the reader to the Outlines themselves, and merely\ncall his attention to the higher stage of construction which we have\nhere reached.\n\nWe have above (_g_) explained the origin of a _product generally_ by a\nstruggle of nature against the original point of check, whereby this\npoint is raised to a full sphere, and thus receives permanence. Here,\nsince we are deducing a struggle of _external_ nature, not against a\nmere point, but against a _product_, the first construction rises for us\nto a _second_ power, as it were,\u2014we have a double product, and thus it\nmight well be shown in the sequel that organic nature generally is only\nthe higher power of the inorganic, and that it rises above the latter\nfor the very reason that in it even that which was already product\n_again_ becomes product.\n\nSince the product, which we have deduced as the most primary, drives us\nto a side of nature that is opposed to it, it is clear that our\nconstruction of the origin of a product generally is _incomplete_, and\nthat we have not yet, by a long way, satisfied our problem; (the problem\nof all science is to construct the origin of a fixed product.)\n\nA productive product, as such, can subsist only under the influence of\nexternal forces, because it is only thereby that productivity is\ninterrupted\u2014prevented from being extinguished in the product. For these\nexternal forces there must now again be a particular sphere; those\nforces must lie in a world which is _not productive_. But that world,\nfor this very reason, would be a world fixed and undetermined in every\nrespect. The problem\u2014how a product in nature is arrived at\u2014has therefore\nreceived a one-sided solution by all that has preceded. \u201cThe product is\nchecked by dualization of the productivity at every single step of\ndevelopment.\u201d But this is true only for the _productive_ product,\nwhereas we are here treating of a _non-productive_ product.\n\nThe contradiction which meets us here can be solved only by the finding\nof a _general_ expression for the construction of a _product generally_,\n(regardless of whether it is productive or has ceased to be so).\n\n * * * * *\n\nSince the existence of a world, that is _not productive_ (inorganic) is\nin the first instance merely postulated, in order to explain the\nproductive one, so its conditions can be laid down only hypothetically,\nand as we do not in the first instance know it at all except from its\nopposition to the productive, those conditions likewise must be deduced\nonly from this opposition. From this it is of course clear,\u2014what is also\nreferred to in the Outlines\u2014that this second section, as well as the\nfirst, contains throughout merely hypothetical truth, since neither\norganic nor inorganic nature is explained without our having reduced the\nconstruction of the two to a common expression, which, however, is\npossible only through the synthetic part.\u2014This must lead to the highest\nand most general principles for the construction of a _nature_\ngenerally; hence we must refer the reader who is concerned about a\nknowledge of our system altogether to that part. The hypothetical\ndeduction of an inorganic world and its conditions we may pass over here\nall the more readily, that they are sufficiently detailed in the\nOutlines, and hasten to the most general and the highest problem of our\nscience.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe most general problem of speculative physics may now be expressed\nthus: _To reduce the construction of organic and inorganic products to a\ncommon expression_.\n\nWe can state only the main principles of such a solution, and of these,\nfor the most part, only such as have not been completely educed in the\nOutlines themselves\u2014(3d principal section.)\n\n\n A.\n\n\nHere at the very beginning we lay down the principle that _as the\norganic product is the product in the second power, the_ ORGANIC\n_construction of the product_ must be, _at least, the sensuous image of\nthe_ ORIGINAL _construction of all product_.\n\n(_a_) In order that the productivity may be at all fixed at a point,\n_limits must be given_. Since _limits_ are the condition of the first\nphenomenon, the cause whereby limits are produced _cannot be a\nphenomenon_, it goes back into the interior of nature, or of each\nrespective product.\n\nIn organic nature, this limitation of productivity is shown by what we\ncall sensibility, which must be thought as the first condition of the\nconstruction of the organic product.\n\n(_b_) The immediate effect of confined productivity is a _change of\ncontraction and expansion_ in the matter already given, and as we now\nknow, constructed, as it were, for the second time.\n\n(_c_) Where this change stops, productivity passes over into product,\nand where it is again restored, product passes over into productivity.\nFor since the product must remain productive _ad infinitum_, _those\nthree stages of productivity_ must be _capable of being_ DISTINGUISHED\nin the product; the absolute transition of the latter into product is\nthe cancelling of product itself.\n\n(_d_) As these three stages are distinguishable in the _individual_, so\nthey must be distinguishable in _organic nature throughout_, and the\nscale of organizations is nothing more than a scale of _productivity\nitself_. (Productivity exhausts itself to degree _c_ in the product _A_,\nand can begin with the product _B_ only at the point where it left off\nwith _A_, that is, with degree _d_, and so on downwards to the\n_vanishing_ of all productivity. If we knew the absolute _degree_ of\nproductivity of the _earth_ for example\u2014a degree which is determined by\nthe earth\u2019s relation to the sun\u2014the limit of organization upon it might\nbe thereby more accurately determined than by incomplete\nexperience\u2014which must be incomplete for this reason, if for no other,\nthat the catastrophes of nature have, beyond doubt, swallowed the last\nlinks of the chain. A true system of Natural History, which has for its\nobject not the _products_ [of nature] but _nature itself_, follows up\nthe one productivity that battles, so to speak, against freedom, through\nall its windings and turnings, to the point at which it is at last\ncompelled to perish in the product.)\n\nIt is upon this dynamical scale, in the individual, as well as in the\nwhole of organic nature, that the construction of all organic phenomena\nrests.\n\n\n B.[24]\n\n\nThese principles, stated universally, lead to the following fundamental\nprinciples of a universal theory of nature.\n\n(_a_) Productivity must be _primarily_ limited. Since _outside_ of\nlimited productivity there is [only] _pure identity_ the limitation\ncannot be established by a difference already existing, and therefore\nmust be so by an _opposition_ arising in _productivity itself_\u2014an\nopposition to which we here revert as a first postulate.[25]\n\n(_b_) This difference thought _purely_ is the first condition of all\n[natural] activity, the productivity is attracted and repelled[26]\nbetween opposites (the primary limits); in this change of expansion and\ncontraction there arises necessarily a common element, but one which\nexists only _in change_. If it is to exist _outside_ of change, then the\n_change itself_ must become fixed. The _active_ in change is the\nproductivity sundered within itself.\n\n(_c_) It is asked:\n\n(\u03b1) By what means such change can be fixed at all; it cannot be fixed by\nanything that is contained as a link in change itself, and must\ntherefore be fixed by a _tertium quid_.\n\n(\u03b2) But this _tertium quid_ must be able to _invade_ that original\nantithesis; but _outside_ of that antithesis nothing _is_[27]; it (that\n_tertium quid_) must therefore be primarily contained in it, as\nsomething which is mediated by the antithesis, and by which in turn the\nantithesis is mediated; for otherwise there is no ground why it should\nbe primarily contained in that antithesis.\n\nThe antithesis is dissolution of identity. But nature is _primarily_\nidentity. _In_ that antithesis, therefore, there must again be a\nstruggle after identity. This struggle is immediately conditioned\n_through_ the antithesis; for if there was no antithesis, there would be\nidentity, absolute rest, and therefore no _struggle_ toward identity.\nIf, on the other hand, there were not identity in the antithesis, the\nantithesis itself could not endure.\n\nIdentity produced out of difference is indifference; that _tertium quid_\nis therefore a _struggle towards indifference_\u2014a struggle which is\nconditioned, by the difference itself, and by which it, on the other\nhand, is conditioned.\u2014(The difference must not be looked upon as a\ndifference at all, and is nothing for the intuition, except through a\nthird, which sustains it\u2014to which change itself adheres.)\n\nThis _tertium quid_, therefore, is all that is substrate in that primal\nchange. But substrate posits change as much as change posits substrate;\nand there is here no first and no second; but difference and struggle\ntowards indifference, are, as far time is concerned, one and\ncontemporary.\n\n_Axiom._ No identity in Nature is absolute, but all is only\nindifference.\n\nSince that _tertium quid_ itself _presupposes_ the primary antithesis,\nthe antithesis itself cannot be _absolutely_ removed by it; _the\ncondition of the continuance of that tertium quid_ [of that third\nactivity, or of Nature] _is the perpetual continuance of the\nantithesis_, just as, conversely, _the continuance of the antithesis is\nconditioned by the continuance of the tertium quid_.\n\nBut how, then, shall the antithesis be thought as continuing?\n\nWe have one primary antithesis, between the limits of which all Nature\nmust lie; if we assume that the factors of this antithesis can really\npass over into each other, or go together absolutely in some _tertium\nquid_ (some individual product), then the antithesis is removed, and\nalong with it the _struggle_, and so all the activity of nature. But\nthat the antithesis should endure, is thinkable only by its being\n_infinite_\u2014by the extreme limits being held asunder _in infinitum_\u2014_so\nthat always only the mediating links of the synthesis, never the last\nand absolute synthesis itself, can be produced_, in which case it is\nonly _relative points of indifference_ that are always attained, never\nabsolute ones, and every successively originated difference leaves\nbehind a new and still unremoved antithesis, and this again goes over\ninto indifference, which, in its turn, _partially_ removes the primary\nantithesis. Through the original antithesis and the struggle towards\nindifference, there arises a product, but the product partially does\naway with the antithesis; through the doing away of that part\u2014that is,\nthrough the origination of the product itself\u2014there arises a new\nantithesis, different from the one that has been done away with, and\nthrough it, a product different from the first; but even this leaves the\nabsolute antithesis unremoved, duality therefore, and through it a\nproduct, will arise anew, and so on to infinity.\n\nLet us say, for example, that by the product _A_, the antitheses _c_ and\n_d_ are united, the antitheses _b_ and _e_ still lie outside of that\nunion. This latter is done away with in _B_, but this product also\nleaves the antithesis _a_ and _f_ unremoved; if we say that _a_ and _f_\nmark the extreme limits, then the union of these will be that product\nwhich can never be arrived at.\n\nBetween the extremes _a_ and _f_, lie the antitheses _c_ and _d_, _b_\nand _e_; but the series of these intermediate antitheses is infinite;\nall these intermediate antitheses are included in the one absolute\nantithesis.\u2014In the product _A_, of _a_ only _c_, and of _f_ only _d_ is\nremoved; let what remains of _a_ be called _b_, and of _f_, _e_; these\nwill indeed, by virtue of the absolute struggle towards indifference,\nbecome again united, but they leave a new antithesis uncancelled, and so\nthere remains between _a_ and _f_ an infinite series of intermediate\nantitheses, and the product in which those absolutely cancel themselves\nnever _is_, but only _becomes_.\n\nThis infinitely progressive formation must be thus represented. The\noriginal antithesis would necessarily be cancelled in the primal product\n_A_. The product would necessarily fall at the indifference-point of _a_\nand _f_, but inasmuch as the antithesis is an absolute one, which can be\ncancelled only in an infinitely continued, never actual, synthesis, _A_\nmust be thought as the centre of an infinite periphery, (whose diameter\nis the infinite line _a f_.) Since in the product of _a_ and _f_, only\n_c_ and _d_ are united, there arises in it the new division _b_ and _e_,\nthe product will therefore divide up into opposite directions; at the\npoint where the struggle towards indifference attains the preponderance,\n_b_ and _e_ will combine and form a new product different from the\nfirst\u2014but between _a_ and _f_, there still lie an infinite number of\nantitheses; the indifference-point _B_ is therefore the centre of a\nperiphery which is comprehended in the first, but is itself again\ninfinite, and so on.\n\nThe antithesis of _b_ and _e_ in _B_ is _maintained_ through _A_,\nbecause it (_A_) leaves the antithesis _un-united_; in like manner the\nantithesis in _C_ is _maintained_ through _B_, because _B_, in its turn,\ncancels only a part of _a_ and _f_. But the antithesis in _C_ is\nmaintained through _B_, only in so far as _A_ maintains the antithesis\nin _B_.[28] What therefore in _C_ and _B_ results _from_ this\nantithesis\u2014[suppose, for example, the result of it were universal\ngravitation]\u2014is _occasioned_ by the common influence of _A_, so that _B_\nand _C_, and the infinite number of other products that come, as\nintermediate links between _a_ and _f_, are, in relation to _A_, only\n_one_ product.\u2014The _difference_, which remains over in _A_ after the\nunion of _c_ and _d_, is only _one_, into which then _B_, _C_, &c.,\nagain divide.\n\nBut the continuance of the antithesis is, in the case of every product,\nthe condition of the struggle towards indifference, and thus a struggle\ntowards indifference is maintained through _A_ in _B_, and through _B_\nin _C_.\u2014But the antithesis which _A_ leaves uncancelled, is only one,\nand therefore also this tendency in _B_, in _C_, and so on to infinity,\nis only conditioned and maintained through _A_.\n\nThe organization thus determined is no other than the organization of\nthe Universe in the system of gravitation.\u2014_Gravity_ is _simple_, but\nits _condition_ is duplicity.\u2014Indifference arises only out of\ndifference.\u2014The cancelled duality is matter, inasmuch as it is only\nmass.\n\nThe _absolute_ indifference-point exists nowhere, but is, as it were,\ndivided among several _single_ points.\u2014The Universe which forms itself\nfrom the centre towards the periphery, _seeks_ the point at which even\nthe extreme antitheses of nature cancel themselves; the impossibility of\nthis cancelling guarantees the infinity of the Universe.\n\nFrom every product _A_, the uncancelled antithesis is carried over to a\nnew one, _B_, the former thereby becoming the cause of duality and\ngravitation for _B_.\u2014(This carrying over is what is called action by\ndistribution, the theory of which receives light only at this\npoint.[29])\u2014Thus, for example, the sun, being only _relative_\nindifference, maintains, as far as its sphere of action reaches, the\nantithesis, which is the condition of weight upon the subordinate\nworld-bodies.[30]\n\nThe indifference is cancelled at every step, and at every step it is\nrestored. Hence, weight acts upon a body at rest as well as upon one in\nmotion.\u2014The universal restoration of duality, and its recancelling at\nevery step, can [that is] appear only as a _nisus_ against a third\n(somewhat). This third (somewhat) is therefore the pure zero\u2014abstracted\nfrom tendency it is nothing [= 0], therefore purely ideal, (marking only\ndirection)\u2014a _point_.[31] Gravity [the centre of gravity] is in the case\nof every total product only _one_ [for the antithesis is one], and so\nalso the relative indifference-point is only _one_. The\nindifference-point of the _individual_ body marks only the line of\ndirection of its tendency towards the universal indifference-point;\nhence this point may be regarded as the only one at which gravity acts;\njust as that, whereby bodies alone attain consistence for us, is simply\nthis tendency outwards.[32]\n\nVertical falling towards this point is not a simple, but a compound\nmotion, and it is a subject for wonder that this has not been perceived\nbefore.[33]\n\nGravity is not proportional to mass (for what is this mass but an\nabstraction of the specific gravity which you have hypostatized?); but,\nconversely, the mass of a body is only the expression of the momentum,\nwith which the antithesis in it cancels itself.\n\n(_d_) By the foregoing, the construction of matter in general is\ncompleted, but not the construction of specific difference in matter.\n\nThat which all the matter of _B_, _C_, &c., in relation to _A_ has\n_common_ under it, is the difference which is not cancelled by _A_, and\nwhich again cancels itself _in part_ in _B_ and _C_\u2014hence, therefore,\nthe gravity mediated by that difference.\n\nWhat _distinguishes B_ and _C_ from _A_ therefore, is the difference\nwhich is not cancelled by _A_, and which becomes the condition of\ngravity in the case of _B_ and _C_.\u2014Similarly, what distinguishes _C_\nfrom _B_ (if _C_ is a product subordinate to _B_), is the difference\nwhich is not cancelled by _B_, and which is again carried over to _C_.\nGravity, therefore, is not the same thing for the higher and for the\nsubaltern world-bodies, and there is as much variety in the central\nforces as in the conditions of attraction.\n\nThe means whereby, in the products _A_, _B_, _C_, which, in so far as\nthey are opposed to _each other_, represent products absolutely\n_homogeneous_ [because the antithesis is the same for the _whole\nproduct_,] another difference of individual products is possible, is the\npossibility of a difference of relation between the factors in the\ncancelling, so that, for example, in _X_, the positive factor, and in\n_Y_, the negative factor, has the preponderance, (thus rendering the one\nbody positively, and the other negatively, electric).\u2014All difference is\ndifference of electricity.[34]\n\n(_e_) That the identity of matter is not _absolute_ identity, but only\n_indifference_, can be proved from the possibility of again cancelling\nthe identity, and from the accompanying phenomena.[35] We may be\nallowed, for brevity\u2019s sake, to include this recancelling, and its\nresultant phenomena under the expression _dynamical process_, without,\nof course, affirming decisively whether anything of the sort is\neverywhere actual.\n\n_Now there will be exactly as many stages in the dynamical process as\nthere are stages of transition from difference to indifference._\n\n(\u03b1) The first stage will be marked by objects _in which the reproduction\nand recancelling of the antithesis at every step is still itself an\nobject of perception_.\n\nThe whole product is reproduced anew at every step,[36] that is, the\nantithesis which cancels itself in it, springs up afresh every moment;\nbut this reproduction of difference loses itself immediately in\n_universal_ gravity;[37] this reproduction, therefore, can be perceived\nonly in _individual_ objects, which seem to gravitate _towards each\nother_; since, if to the one factor of an antithesis is offered its\nopposite (in another) _both factors_ become _heavy with reference to\neach other_, in which case, therefore, the general gravity is not\ncancelled, but a special one occurs _within_ the general.\u2014An instance of\nsuch a mutual relation between two products, is that of the earth and\nthe magnetic needle, in which is distinguished the continual\nrecancelling of indifference in gravitation towards the poles[38]\u2014the\ncontinual sinking back into identity[39] in gravitation towards the\nuniversal indifference-point. Here, therefore, it is not the _object_,\nbut the _being-reproduced of the object_ that becomes object.[40]\n\n(\u03b2) At the first stage, _in_ the identity of the product, its duplicity\nagain appears; at the second, the antithesis will divide up and\ndistribute itself among different objects (_A_ and _B_). From the fact\nthat the one factor of the antithesis attained a _relative_\npreponderance in _A_, the other in _B_, there will arise, according to\nthe same law as in \u03b1, a _gravitation_ of the factors toward each other,\nand so a new difference, which, when the relative equiponderance is\nrestored in each, results in repulsion[41]\u2014(change of attraction and\nrepulsion, _second_ stage in which matter is seen)\u2014_electricity_.\n\n(\u03b3) At the second stage the one factor of the product had only a\n_relative_ preponderance;[42] at the _third_ it will attain an\n_absolute_ one\u2014by the two bodies _A_ and _B_, the original antithesis is\nagain completely represented\u2014matter will revert to the _first stage_ of\nbecoming.\n\nAt the _first stage_ there is still PURE _difference_, without substrate\n[for it was only out of it that a substrate arose]; at the second stage\nit is the _simple_ factors of two _products_ that are opposed to each\nother; at the third it is the PRODUCTS THEMSELVES that are opposed; here\nis difference in the _third_ power.\n\nIf two products are absolutely opposed to each other,[43] then in each\nof them singly indifference of gravity (by which alone each _is_) must\nbe _cancelled_, and they must gravitate to _each other_.[44] (In the\nsecond stage there was only a mutual gravitating of the factors to each\nother\u2014here there is a gravitating of the products.)[45]\u2014This process,\ntherefore, first assails the _indifferent (element) of the_ PRODUCT\u2014that\nis, the products themselves dissolve.\n\nWhere there is equal difference there is equal indifference; difference\nof _products_, therefore, can end only with _indifference of\nproducts_.\u2014(All hitherto deduced indifference has been only indifference\nof substrateless, or at least simple factors.\u2014Now we come to speak of an\nindifference of products.) This struggle will not cease till there\nexists a common product. The product, in forming itself, passes, from\nboth sides, through all the intermediate links that lie between the two\nproducts [for example, through all the intermediate stages of specific\ngravity], till it finds the point at which it succumbs to indifference,\nand the product is fixed.\n\n\n GENERAL REMARK.\n\n\nBy virtue of the first construction, the product is posited as identity;\nthis identity, it is true, again resolves itself into an antithesis,\nwhich, however, is no longer an antithesis cleaving to _products_, but\nan antithesis in the _productivity_ itself.\u2014The product, therefore, _as_\nproduct, is identity.\u2014But even in the sphere of products, there again\narises a duplicity in the second stage, and it is only in the third that\neven the duplicity of the _products_ again becomes _identity_ of the\nproducts.[46]\u2014There is therefore here also a progress from thesis to\nantithesis, and thence to synthesis.\u2014The last synthesis of matter closes\nin the chemical process; if composition is to proceed yet further in it,\nthen this circle must open again.\n\nWe must leave it to our readers themselves to make out the conclusions\nto which the principles here stated lead, and the universal\ninterdependence which is introduced by them into the phenomena of\nNature.\u2014Nevertheless, to give one instance: when in the chemical process\nthe bond of gravity is loosed, the phenomenon of _light_ which\naccompanies the chemical process in its greatest perfection (in the\nprocess of combustion), is a remarkable phenomenon, which, when followed\nout further, confirms what is stated in the Outlines, page 146:\u2014\u201cThe\naction of light must stand in secret interdependence with the action of\ngravity which the central bodies exercise.\u201d\u2014For, is not the indifference\ndissolved at every step, since gravity, as ever active, presupposes a\ncontinual cancelling of indifference?\u2014It is thus, therefore, that the\nsun, by the distribution exercised on the earth, causes a universal\nseparation of matter into the primary antithesis (and hence gravity).\nThis universal cancelling of indifference is what appears to us (who are\nendowed with life) as _light_; wherever, therefore, that indifference is\ndissolved (in the chemical process), there light _must_ appear to us.\nAccording to the foregoing, it is _one_ antithesis which, beginning at\nmagnetism, and proceeding through electricity, at last loses itself in\nthe chemical phenomena.[47] In the chemical process, namely, _the whole\nproduct_ + _E_ or - _E_ (the _positively_ electric body, in the case of\nabsolutely _unburnt_ bodies, is always the _more combustible_;[48]\nwhereas the _absolutely incombustible_ is the cause of all _negatively_\nelectric condition;) and if we may be allowed to invert the case, what\nthen are bodies themselves but condensed (confined) electricity? In the\nchemical process the whole body dissolves into + _E_ or - _E_. Light is\neverywhere the appearing of the _positive_ factor in the primary\nantithesis; hence, wherever the antithesis is restored, there is _light_\nfor us, because generally only the positive factor is beheld, and the\nnegative one is only felt.\u2014Is the connection of the diurnal and annual\ndeviations of the magnetic needle with light now conceivable\u2014and, if in\nevery chemical process the antithesis is dissolved, is it conceivable\nthat Light is the cause and beginning of all chemical process?[49]\n\n(_f_) The dynamical process is nothing but the second construction of\nmatter, and however many stages there are in the dynamical process,\nthere are the same number in the original construction of matter. This\naxiom is the converse of axiom _e_.[50] That which, in the dynamical\nprocess is perceived in the product, takes place _outside_ of the\nproduct with the simple factors of all duality.\n\nThe first start to original production is the limitation of productivity\nthrough the primitive antithesis, which, _as_ antithesis (and as the\ncondition of all construction), is distinguished only in _magnetism_;\nthe second stage of production is the _change_ of contraction and\nexpansion, and as such becomes visible only in _electricity_; finally,\nthe third stage is the transition of this change into indifference\u2014a\nchange which is recognized as such only in _chemical_ phenomena.\n\nMAGNETISM, ELECTRICITY AND CHEMICAL PROCESS are the _categories_ of the\noriginal construction of nature [matter]\u2014the latter escapes us and lies\noutside of intuition, the former are what of it remains behind, what\nstands firm, what is fixed\u2014the general schemes for the construction of\nmatter.[51]\n\nAnd\u2014in order to close the circle at the point where it began\u2014just as in\norganic nature, in the scale of sensibility, irritability, and formative\ninstinct, the secret of the production of the _whole of organic nature_\nlies in each individual, so in the scale of magnetism, electricity, and\nchemical process, so far as it (the scale) can be distinguished in the\nindividual body, is to be found the secret of the production of _Nature\nfrom itself_ [of the whole of Nature[52]].\n\n\n C.\n\n\nWe have now approached nearer the solution of our problem, which was: To\nreduce the construction of organic and inorganic nature to a common\nexpression.\n\nInorganic nature is the product of the _first_ power, organic nature of\nthe _second_[53]\u2014(this was demonstrated above; it will soon appear that\nthe latter is the product of a still higher power)\u2014hence the latter, in\nview of the former, appears contingent; the former, in view of the\nlatter, necessary. Inorganic nature can take its origin from _simple_\nfactors, organic nature only from products, which again become factors.\nHence an inorganic nature generally will appear as having been from all\neternity, the organic nature as _originated_.\n\nIn the organic nature, indifference can never be arrived at in the same\nway in which it is arrived at in inorganic nature, because life consists\nin nothing more than a continual _prevention of the attainment of\nindifference_ [a prevention of the absolute transition of productivity\ninto product] whereby manifestly there comes about only a condition\nwhich is, so to speak, extorted from Nature.\n\nBy organization, matter\u2014which has already been composed for the second\ntime by the chemical process\u2014is once more thrown back to the initial\npoint of formation (the circle above described is again opened); it is\nno wonder that matter always thrown back again into formation at last\nreturns as a perfect product.\n\nThe same stages, through which the production of Nature originally\npasses, are also passed through by the production of the organic\nproduct; only that the latter, even _in the first stage_, at least\nbegins with products of the _simple_ power.\u2014Organic production also\nbegins with limitation, not of the _primary_ productivity, but of the\n_productivity of a product_; organic formation also takes place through\nthe change of expansion and contraction, just as primary formation does;\nbut in this case it is a change taking place, not in the simple\nproductivity, but in the compound.\n\nBut there is all this, too, in the chemical process,[54] and yet in the\nchemical process indifference is attained. The vital process, therefore,\nmust again be a higher power of the chemical; and if the scheme that\nlies at the base of the latter is duplicity, the scheme of the former\nwill of necessity be _triplicity_ [the former will be a process of the\nthird power]. But the scheme of triplicity is [in reality] that [the\nfundamental scheme] of the galvanic process (Ritter\u2019s _Demonstration_,\n&c., p. 172); therefore the galvanic process (or the process of\nirritation) stands a power higher than the chemical, and the third\nelement, which the latter lacks and the former has, prevents\nindifference from being arrived at in the organic product.[55]\n\nAs irritation does not allow indifference to be arrived at in the\nindividual product, and as the antithesis is still there (for the\nprimary antithesis still pursues us),[56] there remains for nature no\nalternative but separation of the factors in _different_ products.[57]\nThe formation of the individual product, for that very reason, cannot be\na completed formation, and the product can never cease to be\nproductive.[58] The contradiction in Nature is this, that the product\nmust be _productive_ [i. e. a product of the third power], and that,\nnotwithstanding, the product, _as_ a product of the third power, must\npass over into indifference.[59]\n\nThis contradiction Nature tries to solve by mediating _indifference_\nitself through _productivity_, but even this does not succeed\u2014for the\nact of productivity is only the kindling spark of a new process of\nirritation; the product of productivity is a _new productivity_. Into\nthis as its product the productivity of the _individual_ now indeed\npasses over; the individual, therefore, ceases more rapidly or slowly to\nbe productive, and Nature reaches the indifference-point with it only\nafter the latter has got down to a product of the second power.[60]\n\nAnd now the result of all this?\u2014The condition of the inorganic (as well\nas of the organic) product, is duality. In any case, however, organic\n_productive product_ is so only from the fact _that the difference_\nNEVER _becomes indifference_.\n\nIt is [in so far] therefore impossible to reduce the construction of\norganic and of inorganic product to a _common_ expression, and the\nproblem is incorrect, and therefore the solution impossible. The problem\npresupposes that organic product and inorganic product are mutually\n_opposed_, whereas the latter is only the _higher power_ of the former,\nand is produced only by the higher power of the forces through which the\nlatter also is produced. Sensibility is only the higher power of\nmagnetism; irritability only the higher power of electricity; formative\ninstinct only the higher power of the chemical process.\u2014But sensibility,\nand irritability, and formative instinct are all only included in that\n_one_ process of irritation. (Galvanism affects them all).[61] But if\nthey are only the higher functions of magnetism, electricity, &c., there\nmust again be a higher synthesis for these in Nature[62]\u2014and this,\nhowever, it is certain, can be sought for only in Nature, in so far as,\nviewed as a whole, it is _absolutely_ organic.\n\nAnd this, moreover, is also the result to which the genuine Science of\nNature must lead, viz: that the difference between organic and\ninorganic nature is only in Nature as object, and that Nature as\noriginally-_productive_ soars above both.[63]\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere remains only one remark, which we may make, not so much on account\nof its intrinsic interest, as in order to justify what we said above in\nregard to the relation of our system to the hitherto so-called dynamical\nsystem. If it were asked, for instance, in what form our original\nantithesis, cancelled, or rather fixed, in the product, would appear\nfrom the stand-point of reflection, we cannot better designate what is\nfound in the product by analysis, than as _expansive_ and _attractive_\n(retarding) _force_, to which then however, gravitation must always be\nadded as the _tertium quid_, whereby those opposites become what they\nare.\n\nNevertheless, the designation is valid only for the stand-point of\nreflection or of _analysis_, and cannot be applied for _synthesis_ at\nall; and thus our system leaves off exactly at the point where the\nDynamical Physics of Kant and his successors begins, namely, at the\nantithesis as it presents itself in the product.\n\nAnd with this the author delivers over these Elements of a System of\nSpeculative Physics to the thinking heads of the age, begging them to\nmake common cause with him in this science, which opens up views of no\nmean order, and to make up by their own powers, acquirements and\nexternal relations, for what, in these respects, he lacks.\n\n [The notes not marked as \u201cRemarks of the original\u201d are by the German\n Editor.\u2014_Note of the Translator._]\n\nFootnote 18:\n\n Thus, for example, it becomes very clear through the whole course of\n our inquiry, that, in order to render the dynamic organization of the\n Universe evident in all its parts, we still lack that central\n phenomenon of which Bacon already speaks, which certainly lies in\n Nature, but has not yet been extracted from it by experiment. [_Remark\n of the Original._ Compare below, third note to \u201cGeneral Remark.\u201d]\n\nFootnote 19:\n\n If only those warm panegyrists of empiricism, who exalt it at the\n expense of science, did not, true to the idea of empiricism, try to\n palm off upon us as empiricism their own judgments, and what they have\n put into nature, and imposed upon objects; for though many persons\n think they can talk about it, there is a great deal more belonging to\n it than many imagine\u2014to eliminate purely the accomplished from Nature,\n and to state it with the same fidelity with which it has been\n eliminated.\u2014_Remark of the Original._\n\nFootnote 20:\n\n A traveller in Italy makes the remark that the whole history of the\n world may be demonstrated on the great obelisk at Rome; so, likewise,\n in every product of Nature. Every mineral body is a fragment of the\n annals of the earth. But what is the earth? Its history is interwoven\n with the history of the whole of Nature, and so passes from the fossil\n through the whole of inorganic and organic Nature, till it culminates\n in the history of the universe\u2014one chain.\u2014_Remark of the Original._\n\nFootnote 21:\n\n Volta already asks, with reference to the affection of the senses by\n galvanism\u2014\u201cMight not the electric fluid be the immediate cause of all\n flavors? Might it not be the cause of sensation in all the other\n senses?\u201d\u2014_Remark of the Original._\n\nFootnote 22:\n\n According to the foregoing experiments, it is at least not impossible\n to regard the phenomena of light and those of electricity as one,\n since in the prismatic spectrum the colors _may_ at least be\n considered as opposites, and the white light, which regularly falls in\n the middle, be regarded as the indifference-point; and for reasons of\n analogy one is tempted to consider _this_ construction of the\n phenomena of light as the real one.\u2014_Remark of the Original._\n\nFootnote 23:\n\n Hence wherever the antithesis is cancelled or deranged, the\n metamorphosis becomes irregular. For what is disease even but\n metamorphosis?\u2014_Remark of the Original._\n\nFootnote 24:\n\n From this point onwards, there are, as in the Outlines, additions in\n notes (similar to the few that have already been admitted into the\n text in brackets []). They are excerpted from a MS. copy of the\n author\u2019s.\n\nFootnote 25:\n\n The first postulate of natural science is an antithesis in the pure\n identity of Nature. This antithesis must be thought quite purely, and\n not with any other substrate besides that of activity; for it is the\n condition of all substrate. The person who cannot think activity or\n opposition without a substrate, cannot philosophize at all. For all\n philosophizing goes only to the deduction of a substrate.\n\nFootnote 26:\n\n The phenomena of electricity show the scheme of nature oscillating\n between productivity and product. This condition of oscillation or\n change, attractive and repulsive force, is the real condition of\n formation.\n\nFootnote 27:\n\n For it is the only thing that is given us to derive all other things\n from.\n\nFootnote 28:\n\n The whole of the uncancelled antithesis of _A_ is carried over to _B_.\n But again, it cannot entirely cancel itself in _B_, and is therefore\n carried over to _C_. The antithesis in _C_ is therefore maintained by\n _B_, but only in so far as _A_ maintains the antithesis which is the\n condition of _B_.\n\nFootnote 29:\n\n That is, distribution exists only, when the antithesis in a product is\n not absolutely but only relatively cancelled.\n\nFootnote 30:\n\n The struggle towards indifference attains the preponderance over the\n antithesis, at a greater or less distance from the body which\n exercises the distribution, (as, for example, at a certain distance,\n the action by distribution, which an electric or magnetic body\n exercises upon another body, appears as cancelled.) The difference in\n this distance is the ground of the difference of world-bodies in one\n and the same system, inasmuch, namely, as one part of the matter is\n subjected to indifference more than the rest. Since, therefore, the\n condition of all product is difference, difference must again arise at\n every step as the source of all existence, but must also be thought as\n again cancelled. By this continual reproduction and resuscitation\n creation takes place anew at every step.\n\nFootnote 31:\n\n It is precisely zero to which Nature continually strives to revert,\n and to which it would revert, if the antithesis were ever cancelled.\n Let us suppose the original condition of Nature = 0 (want of reality).\n Now zero can certainly be thought as dividing itself into 1 - 1 (for\n this = 0); but if we posit that this division as not infinite (as it\n is in the infinite series 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 ...), then Nature will as it\n were oscillate continually between zero and unity\u2014and this is\n precisely its condition.\n\nFootnote 32:\n\n Baader on the Pythagorean Square. 1798. (_Remark of the original._)\n\nFootnote 33:\n\n Except by the thoughtful author of a review of my work on the\n world-soul, in the W\u00fcrzburg _Gelehrte Anzeiger_, the only review of\n that work that has hitherto come under my notice. (_Remark of the\n original._)\n\nFootnote 34:\n\n It is here taken for granted that what we call the quality of bodies,\n and what we are wont to regard as something homogeneous, and the\n ground of all homogeneity is really only an expression for a cancelled\n difference.\n\nFootnote 35:\n\n In the M.S. copy the last part of this sentence reads as follows: The\n construction of quality ought necessarily to be capable of\n experimental proof, by the recancelling the identity, and of the\n phenomena which accompany it.\n\nFootnote 36:\n\n Every body must be thought as reproduced at every step\u2014and therefore\n also every total product.\n\nFootnote 37:\n\n The _universal_, however, is never perceived, for the simple reason\n that it is universal.\n\nFootnote 38:\n\n Whereby what was said above is confirmed,\u2014that falling toward the\n centre is a compound motion.\n\nFootnote 39:\n\n The reciprocal cancelling of opposite motions.\n\nFootnote 40:\n\n Or the object is seen in the first stage of becoming, or of transition\n from difference to indifference. The phenomena of magnetism even\n serve, so to speak, as an impulse, to transport us to the standpoint\n beyond the product, which is necessary in order to the construction of\n the product.\n\nFootnote 41:\n\n There will result the opposite effect\u2014a _negative_ attraction, that\n is, repulsion. Repulsion and attraction stand to each other as\n positive and negative magnitudes. Repulsion is only negative\n attraction\u2014attraction only negative repulsion; as soon, therefore, as\n the maximum of attraction is reached, it passes over into its\n opposite\u2014into repulsion.\n\nFootnote 42:\n\n If we designate the factors as + and - electricity, then, in the\n second stage, + electricity had a relative preponderance over -\n electricity.\n\nFootnote 43:\n\n If no longer the individual factors of the two products, but the whole\n products themselves are absolutely opposed to each other.\n\nFootnote 44:\n\n For product is something wherein antithesis cancels itself, but it\n cancels itself only through indifference of gravity. When, therefore,\n two products are opposed to each other, the indifference in each\n _individually_ must be absolutely cancelled, and the whole products\n must gravitate towards each other.\n\nFootnote 45:\n\n In the electric process, the whole product is not active, but only the\n one factor of the product, which has the relative preponderance over\n the other. In the chemical process in which the _whole product_ is\n active, it follows that the indifference of the whole product must be\n cancelled.\n\nFootnote 46:\n\n We have therefore the following scheme of the dynamical process:\n\n First stage: Unity of the product\u2014magnetism.\n\n Second stage: Duplicity of the products\u2014electricity.\n\n Third stage: Unity of the products\u2014chemical process.\n\nFootnote 47:\n\n The conclusions which may be deduced from this construction of\n dynamical phenomena are partly anticipated in what goes before. The\n following may serve for further explanation:\n\n The chemical process, for example, in its highest perfection is a\n process of combustion. Now I have already shown on another occasion,\n that the condition of light in the body undergoing combustion is\n nothing else but the maximum of its positive electrical condition. For\n it is always the positively electrical condition that is also the\n combustible. Might not, then, this coexistence of the phenomenon of\n light with the chemical process in its highest perfection give us\n information about the ground of every phenomenon of light in Nature?\n\n What happens, then, in the chemical process? Two whole products\n gravitate towards each other. The _indifference_ of the _individual_\n is therefore _absolutely_ cancelled. This absolute cancelling of\n indifference puts the whole body into the condition of light, just as\n the partial in the electric process puts it into a partial condition\n of light. Therefore, also the light\u2014what seems to stream to us from\n the sun\u2014is nothing else but the phenomenon of indifference cancelled\n at every step. For as gravity never ceases to act, its\n condition\u2014antithesis\u2014must be regarded as springing up again at every\n step. We should thus have in light a continual, visible appearing of\n gravitation, and it would be explained why, in the system of worlds,\n it is exactly those bodies which are the principal seat of gravity\n that are also the principal source of light. We should then, also,\n have an explanation of the connection in which the action of light\n stands to that of gravitation.\n\n The manifold effects of light on the deviations of the magnetic\n needle, on atmospheric electricity, and on organic nature, would be\n explained by the very fact that light is the phenomenon of\n indifference continually cancelled\u2014therefore, the phenomenon of the\n dynamical process continually rekindled. It is, therefore, one\n antithesis that prevails in all dynamical phenomena\u2014in those of\n magnetism, electricity and light; for example, the antithesis, which\n is the condition of the electrical phenomena must already enter into\n the first construction of matter. For all bodies are certainly\n electrical.\n\nFootnote 48:\n\n Or rather, conversely, the more combustible is always also the\n positively electric; whence it is manifest that the body which burns\n has merely reached the maximum of + electricity.\n\nFootnote 49:\n\n And indeed it is so. What then is the absolute incombustible?\n Doubtless, simply that wherewith everything else burns\u2014oxygen. But it\n is precisely this absolutely incombustible oxygen that is the\n principle of negative electricity, and thus we have a confirmation of\n what I have already stated in the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature,\n viz. that oxygen is a principle of a negative kind, and therefore the\n representative, as it were, of the power of attraction; whereas\n phlogiston, or, what is the same thing, positive electricity, is the\n representative of the positive, or of the force of repulsion. There\n has long been a theory that the magnetic, electric, chemical, and,\n finally, even the organic phenomena, are interwoven into one great\n interdependent whole. This must be established. It is certain that the\n connection of electricity with the process of combustion may be shown\n by numerous experiments. One of the most recent of these that has come\n to my knowledge I will cite. It occurs in Scherer\u2019s _Journal of\n Chemistry_. If a Leyden jar is filled with iron filings, and\n repeatedly charged and discharged, and if, after the lapse of some\n time, this iron is taken out and placed upon an isolator\u2014paper, for\n example\u2014it begins to get hot, becomes incandescent, and changes into\n an oxide of iron. This experiment deserves to be frequently repeated\n and more closely examined\u2014it might readily lead to something new.\n\n This great interdependence, which a scientific system of physics must\n establish, extends over the whole of Nature. It must, therefore, once\n established, spread a new light over the History of the whole of\n Nature. Thus, for example, it is certain that all geology must start\n from terrestrial magnetism. But terrestrial electricity must again be\n determined by magnetism. The connection of North and South with\n magnetism is shown even by the irregular movements of the magnetic\n needle. But again, with universal electricity, which, no less than\n gravity and magnetism, has its indifference point\u2014the universal\n process of combustion and all volcanic phenomena stand connected.\n\n Therefore, it is certain that there is one chain going from universal\n magnetism down to the volcanic phenomena. Still these are all only\n scattered experiments.\n\n In order to make this interdependence _fully_ evident, we need the\n central phenomenon, or central experiment, of which Bacon speaks\n oracularly\u2014(I mean the experiment wherein all those functions of\n matter, magnetism, electricity, &c., so run together in one phenomenon\n that the _individual_ function is distinguishable)\u2014proving that the\n one does not lose itself immediately in the other, but that each can\n be exhibited separately\u2014an experiment which, when it is discovered,\n will stand in the same relation to the _whole_ of Nature, as galvanism\n does to organic nature. [Compare this with the discourse on Faraday\u2019s\n latest discovery, (1832,) p. 15. Complete Works, 1st Div., last vol.]\n\nFootnote 50:\n\n Proof\u2014All dynamical phenomena are phenomena of transition from\n difference to indifference. But it is in this very transition that\n matter is primarily constructed.\n\nFootnote 51:\n\n In the already mentioned discourse on Faraday\u2019s latest discovery, the\n author cites the passage (p. 75, original edition,) as well as \u00a7 56\n sq. of the _General View of the Dynamical Process_ (likewise written\n _before_ the invention of the voltaic pile,) as a proof of his having\n _anticipated_ the discoveries which proved the _unity_ of the\n electrical and the chemical antithesis, and of the similar connection\n subsisting between magnetic and chemical phenomena. (See also Remark\n 2, p. 216.)\n\nFootnote 52:\n\n Every individual is an expression of the whole of Nature. As the\n existence of the _single_ organic individual rests on that scale, so\n does the whole of Nature. Organic nature maintains the whole wealth\n and variety of her products only by continually changing the relation\n of those three functions.\u2014In like manner inorganic Nature brings forth\n the whole wealth of her product, only by changing the relation of\n those three functions of matter _ad infinitum_; for magnetism,\n electricity, and chemical process are the functions of matter\n generally, and on that ground alone are they categories for the\n construction of all matter. This fact, that those three factors are\n not phenomena of special kinds of matter, but _functions of all\n matter_ universally, gives its real, and its innermost sense to\n dynamical physics, which, by this circumstance alone, rises far above\n all other kinds of physics.\n\nFootnote 53:\n\n That is, the organic product can be thought only as subsisting under\n the hostile pressure of an external nature.\n\nFootnote 54:\n\n The chemical process, too, has not substrateless or simple factors; it\n has products for factors.\n\nFootnote 55:\n\n The same deduction is already given in the Outlines, p. 163.\u2014What the\n dynamical action is, which according to the Outlines is also the cause\n of irritability, is now surely clear enough. It is the _universal\n action_ which is everywhere conditioned by the cancelment of\n indifference, and which at last tends towards intussusception\n (indifference of products) when it is not continually prevented, as it\n is in the process of irritation. (_Remark of the original._)\n\nFootnote 56:\n\n The abyss of forces, into which we here look down, opens with the one\n question; In the first construction of our earth, what can have been\n the ground of the fact that no genesis of new individuals is possible\n upon it, otherwise than under the condition of opposite powers?\n Compare an utterance of Kant on this subject, in his Anthropology.\n (_Remark of the original._)\n\nFootnote 57:\n\n The two factors can never be _one_, but must be separated into\n different products\u2014in order that thus the difference may be permanent.\n\nFootnote 58:\n\n In the product, indifference of the first and second powers is arrived\n at (for example, by irritation itself an origin of _mass_ [i. e.\n indifference of the first order] and even _chemical products_ [i. e.\n indifference of the second order] are reached), but indifference of\n the third power can never be reached, because it is a contradictory\n idea. (_Remark of the original._)\n\nFootnote 59:\n\n The product is productive only from the fact of its being a product of\n the third power. But the idea of a productive product is itself a\n contradiction. What is productivity is not product, and what is\n product is not productivity. Therefore a product of the third power is\n itself a contradictory idea. From this even is manifest what an\n extremely artificial condition life is\u2014wrenched, as it were, from\n Nature\u2014subsisting against her will.\n\nFootnote 60:\n\n Nothing shows more clearly the contradictions out of which life\n arises, and the fact that it is altogether only a heightened condition\n of _ordinary_ natural forces, than the contradiction of Nature in what\n she tries, but tries in vain, to reach through the _sexes_.\u2014Nature\n _hates_ sex, and where it does arise, it arises against her will. The\n diremption into sexes is an inevitable fate, with which, after she is\n once organic, she must put up, and which she can never overcome.\u2014By\n this very hatred of diremption she finds herself involved in a\n contradiction, inasmuch as what is odious to her she is compelled to\n develop in the most careful manner, and to lead to the summit of\n existence, as if she did it on purpose; whereas she is always striving\n only for a return into the identity of the genus, which, however, is\n chained to the (never to be cancelled) duplicity of the sexes, as to\n an inevitable condition. That she develops the individual only from\n compulsion, and for the sake of the genus, is manifest from this, that\n wherever in a genus she _seems_ desirous of maintaining the individual\n longer (though this is never really the case), she finds the genus\n becoming more uncertain, because she must hold the sexes farther\n asunder, and, as it were, make them flee from each other. In this\n region of Nature, the decay of the individual is not so visibly rapid\n as it is where the sexes are nearer to each other, as in the case of\n the rapidly withering flower, in which, from its very birth, they are\n enclosed in a calix as in a bride-bed, but in which, for that very\n cause, the _genus_ is better _secured_.\n\n Nature is the _laziest of animals_, and curses diremption, because it\n imposes upon her the necessity of activity; she is active only in\n order to rid herself of this necessity. The opposites must for ever\n shun, in order for ever to seek, each other; and for ever seek, in\n order never to find, each other; it is only in _this_ contradiction\n that the ground of all the activity of Nature lies. (_Remark of the\n original._)\n\nFootnote 61:\n\n Its effect upon the power of reproduction (as well as the reaction of\n particular conditions of the latter power upon galvanic phenomena) is\n less studied still than might be needful and useful.\u2014Vide Outlines, p.\n 177.\u2014(_Remark of the original._)\n\nFootnote 62:\n\n Compare above Remark, p. 197. (_Remark of the original._)\n\nFootnote 63:\n\n That it is therefore the same nature, which, by the same forces,\n produces organic phenomena, and the universal phenomena of Nature, and\n that these forces are in a heightened conditioned in organic nature.\n\n\n\n\n ANALYSIS OF HEGEL\u2019S \u00c6STHETICS.\n [Translated from the French of M. CH. BENARD, by J. A. MARTLING.]\n\n\nII. SCULPTURE.\u2014Architecture fashions and disposes of the masses of inert\nnature according to geometric laws, and it thus succeeds in presenting\nonly a vague and incomplete symbol of the thought. Its [thought\u2019s]\nprogress consists in detaching itself from physical existence, and in\nexpressing spirit in a manner more in conformity with its nature. The\nfirst step which art takes in this career does not yet indicate the\nreturn of spirit upon itself, which would render necessary a wholly\nspiritual mode of expression, and signs as immaterial as thought; but\nspirit appears under a corporeal, organized living form. What art\nrepresents is the animate, living body, and above all the human body,\nwith which the soul is completely identified. Such is the _r\u00f4le_ and the\nplace which belong to Sculpture.\n\nIt still resembles _architecture_ in this, that it fashions extended and\nsolid material; but it is distinguished from it in this, that this\nmaterial, in its hands, ceases to be foreign to spirit. The corporeal\nform blends with it, and becomes its living image. Compared to poetry,\nit seems at first to have the advantage over it of representing objects\nunder their natural and visible form, while speech expresses ideas only\nby sounds; but this plastic clearness is more than compensated by the\nsuperiority of language as a means of expression. Speech reveals the\ninnermost thoughts with a clearness altogether different from the lines\nof the figure, the countenance, and the attitudes of the body; further,\nit shows man in action\u2014active in virtue of his ideas and his passions;\nit retraces the various phases of a complete event. Sculpture represents\nneither the inmost sentiments of the soul, nor its definite passions. It\npresents the individual character only in general, and to such an extent\nas the body can express in a given moment, without movement, without\nliving action, without development. It yields also, in this respect, to\npainting, which, by the employment of color and the effects of light,\nacquires more of naturalness and truth, and, above all, a great\nsuperiority of expression. Thus, one might think at first that Sculpture\nwould do well to add to its own proper means those of painting. This is\na grave error; for that abstract form, deprived of color, which the\nstatuary employs is not an imperfection in it\u2014it is the limit which this\nart places upon itself.\n\nEach art represents a degree, a particular form of the beautiful, a\nmoment of the development of spirit, and expresses it excellently. To\nSculpture it belongs to represent the perfection of the bodily form,\nplastic beauty, life, soul, spirit animating a body. If it should desire\nto transcend this limit, it would fail entirely; the use of foreign\nmeans would alter the purity of its works.\n\nIt is with art here as with science; each science has its object,\npeculiar, limited, abstract; its circle, in which it moves, and where it\nis free. Geometry studies extension, and extension only; arithmetic,\nnumber; jurisprudence, the right; &c. Allow any one to encroach upon the\nothers, and to aim at universality; you introduce into its domain\nconfusion, obscurity, real imperfection. They develop differently\ndifferent objects; clearness, perfection, and even liberty, are to be\npurchased only at this price.\n\nArt, too, has many phases; to each a distinct art corresponds. Sculpture\nstops at form, which it fashions according to its peculiar laws; to add\ncolor thereto is to alter, to disfigure its object. Thereby it preserves\nits character, its functions, its independence; it represents the\nmaterial, corporeal side, of which architecture gives only a vague and\nimperfect symbol. It is given to painting, to substitute for this real\nform, a simple visible appearance, which then admits color, by joining\nto it the effects of perspective, of light and shade. But Sculpture\nought to respect its proper limits, to confine itself to representing\nthe corporeal form as an expression of the individual spirit, of the\nsoul, divested of passion and definite sentiment. In so doing, it can so\nmuch the better content itself with the human form in itself, in which\nthe soul is, as it were, spread over all points.\n\nSuch is also the reason why Sculpture does not represent spirit in\naction, in a succession of movements, having a determined end, nor\nengaged in those enterprises and actions which manifest a character. It\nprefers to present it in a calm attitude, or when the movement and the\ngrouping indicate only the commencement of action. Through this very\nthing, that it presents to our eyes spirit absorbed in the corporeal\nform, designed to manifest it in its entirety, there is lacking the\nessential point where the expression of the soul centres itself, the\nglance of the eye. Neither has it any need of the magic of colors,\nwhich, by the fineness and variety of their shadings, are fitted to\nexpress all the richness of particular traits of character, and to\nmanifest the soul, with all the emotions which agitate it. Sculpture\nought not to admit materials of which it has no need at the step where\nit stops. The image fashioned by it, is of a single color; it employs\nprimitive matter, the most simple, uniform, unicolored: marble, ivory,\ngold, brass, the metals. It is this which the Greeks had the ability\nperfectly to seize and hold.\n\nAfter these considerations upon the general character of Sculpture, and\nits connections with other arts, Hegel approaches the more special study\nand the theory of this art. He considers it\u20141st, in its principle; 2d,\nin its ideal; 3d, in the materials which it employs, as well as in its\nvarious modes of representation and the principal epochs of its historic\ndevelopment.\n\nWe are compelled to discard a crowd of interesting details upon each of\nthese points, and to limit ourselves to general ideas.\n\n1. To seize fully the principle of Sculpture and the essence of this\nart, it is necessary to examine, in the first place, what constitutes\nthe _content_ of its representations, then the corporeal _form_ which\nshould express it; last, to see how, from the perfect accord of the idea\nand the form, results the _ideal_ of Sculpture as it has been realized\nin Greek art.\n\nThe essential content of the representations of Sculpture is, as has\nbeen said, spirit incarnate in a corporeal form. Now, not every\nsituation of the soul is fitted to be thus manifested. Action, movement,\ndetermined passion, can not be represented under a material form; that\nought to show to us the soul diffused through the entire body, through\nall its members. Thus, what Sculpture represents is the individual\nspirit, or, according to the formula of the author, the spiritual\nindividuality in its essence, with its general, universal, eternal\ncharacter; spirit elevated above the inclinations, the caprices, the\ntransient impressions which flow in upon the soul, without profoundly\npenetrating it. This entire phase of the personal principle ought to be\nexcluded from the representations of Sculpture. The content of its works\nis the essence, the substantial, true, invariable part of character, in\nopposition to what is accidental and transient.\n\nNow, this state of spirit, not yet particularized, unalterable,\nself-centered, calm, is the divine in opposition to finite existence,\nwhich is developed in the midst of accidents and contingencies, the\nexhibition of which this world of change and diversity presents us.\n\nAccording to this, Sculpture should represent the divine in itself, in\nits infinite calm, and its eternal, immovable sublimity, without the\ndiscord of action and situation. If, afterward, affecting a more\ndeterminate mode, it represents something human in form and character,\nit ought still to thrust back all which is accidental and transient; to\nadmit only the fixed, invariable side, the ground of character. This\nfixed element is what Sculpture should express as alone constituting the\ntrue individuality; it represents its personages as beings complete and\nperfect in themselves, in an absolute repose freed from all foreign\ninfluence. The eternal in gods and men is what it is called upon to\noffer to our contemplation in perfect and unalterable clearness.\n\nSuch is the idea which constitutes the essential content of the works of\nSculpture. What is the _form_ under which this idea should appear? We\nhave seen, it is the body, the corporeal form. But the only form worthy\nto represent the spirit, is the _human form_. This form, in its turn,\nought to be represented, not in that wherein it approximates the animal\nform, but in its ideal beauty; that is to say, free, harmonious,\nreflecting the spirit in the features which characterize it, in all its\nproportions, its purity, the regularity of its lines, by its mien, its\npostures, etc. It should express spirit in its calmness, its\nserenity\u2014both soul and life, but above all, spirit.\n\nThese principles serve to determine the ideal of beauty under the\nphysical form.\n\nWe must take care, in the works of Sculpture, not to confound this\nmanner of looking at the perfect correspondence of the soul and bodily\nforms, with the study of the lineaments of the countenance, etc. The\nscience of Gall, or of Lavater, which studies the correspondence of\ncharacters with certain lineaments of face or forms of head, has nothing\nin common with the artistic studies of the works of the statuary. These\nseem, it is true, to invite us to this study; but its point of view is\nwholly different; it is that of the harmonious and necessary accord of\nforms, from which beauty results. The ground of Sculpture excludes,\nmoreover, precisely all the peculiarities of individual character to\nwhich the physiognomist attaches himself. The ideal form manifests only\nthe fixed, regular, invariable, although living and individual type. It\nis then forbidden to the artist, as far as regards the physiognomy, to\nrepresent the most expressive and determinate lineaments of the\ncountenance; for, beside looks, properly so-called, the expression of\nthe physiognomy includes many things which are reflected transiently\nupon the face, in the countenance or the carriage, the smile and the\nglance. Sculpture should interdict to itself things so transient, and\nconfine itself to the permanent traits of the expression of the spirit;\nin a word, it should incarnate in the human form the spiritual principle\nin its nature, at once general and individual, but not yet\nparticularized. To maintain these two terms in just harmony, is the\nproblem which falls to statuary, and which the Greeks have resolved.\n\nThe consequences to be deduced from these principles are the following:\n\nIn the first place, Sculpture is, more than the other arts, suited to\nthe ideal, and this because of the perfect adaptation of the form to the\nidea; in the second place, it constitutes the centre of classic art,\nwhich represents this perfect accord of the idea and the sensuous form.\nIt alone, in fact, offers to us those ideal figures, pure from all\nadmixture\u2014the perfect expression of physical beauty. It realizes, before\nour eyes, the union of the human and divine, under the corporeal form.\nThe sense of plastic beauty was given above all to the Greeks, and this\ntrait appears everywhere, not only in Greek art and Greek mythology, but\nin the real world, in historic personages: Pericles, Phidias, Socrates,\nPlato, Xenophon, Sophocles, Thucydides, those artistic natures, artists\nof themselves\u2014characters grand and free, supported upon the basis of a\nstrong individuality, worthy of being placed beside the immortal gods\nwhich Greek Sculpture represents.\n\n2. After having determined the principle of Sculpture, Hegel applies it\nto the study of the _beau ideal_, as the master-pieces of Greek art have\nrealized it. He examines successively and in detail the character and\nconditions of the _ideal form_ in the different parts of the human body,\n_the face_, _the looks_, _the bearing_, _the dress_. Upon all these\npoints he faithfully follows Winckelmann, recapitulates him, and\nconstantly cites him. The philosopher meanwhile preserves his\noriginality; it consists in the manner in which he systematizes that\nwhich is simply described in the History of Art, and in giving\nthroughout, the reason of that which the great critic, with his\nexquisite and profound sense, has so admirably seized and undeniably\nproved, but without being able to unfold the theory of it. The subject\ngathers, henceforth, new interest from this explication. We may cite, in\nparticular, the description of the Greek profile, which, in the hands of\nthe philosopher, takes the character of a geometric theorem. It is at\nthe same time an example which demonstrates unanswerably the absolute\ncharacter of physical beauty. The beauty of these lines has nothing\narbitrary; they indicate the superiority of spirit, and the pre-eminence\nof the forms which express it above those which are suited to the\nfunctions of the animal nature. What he afterwards says of the looks, of\nthe bearing, of the postures, of the antique dress compared with the\nmodern dress, and of its ideal character, presents no less interest. But\nall these details, where the author shows much of discrimination, of\ngenius even, and spirit, escape in the analysis. The article where he\ndescribes the particular attributes and the accessories which\ndistinguish the personages of Greek Sculpture, although in great part\nborrowed also from Winckelmann, shows a spirit familiarized with the\nknowledge of the works of antiquity.\n\n3. The chapter devoted to the different _modes_ of representation of the\nmaterials of Sculpture, and of its historic development, is equally full\nof just and delicate observations. All this is not alone from a\ntheorist, but from a connoisseur and an enlightened judge. The\nappreciation of the _materials of Sculpture_, and the comparison of\ntheir \u00e6sthetic value, furnish also to the author some very ingenious\nremarks upon a subject which seems scarcely susceptible of interest.\nFinally, in a rapid sketch, Hegel retraces the _historic development_ of\nSculpture, Egyptian Statuary, Etruscan art, the school of \u00c6gina, are\ncharacterized in strokes remarkable for precision.\n\nArrived at _Christian Sculpture_, without disputing the richness and the\nability which it has displayed in its works in wood, in stone, etc., and\nits excellence in respect to expression, Hegel maintains with reason,\nthat the Christian principle is little favorable to Sculpture; and that\nin wishing to express the Christian sentiment in its profundity and its\nvivacity, it passes its proper limits. \u201cThe self-inspection of the soul,\nthe moral suffering, the torments of body and of spirit, martyrdom and\npenitence, death and resurrection, the mystic depth, the love and\nout-gushing of the heart, are wholly unsuited to be represented by\nSculpture, which requires calmness, serenity of spirit, and in\nexpression, harmony of forms.\u201d Thus, Sculpture here remains rather an\nornament of architecture; it sculptures saints, bas reliefs upon the\nniches and porches of churches, turrets, etc. From another side, through\narabesques and bas reliefs, it approximates the principle of painting,\nby giving too much expression to its figures, or by making portraits in\nmarble and in stone. Sculpture comes back to its true principle, at the\nepoch of the _renaissance_, by taking for models the beautiful forms of\nGreek art.\n\n\n\n\n A DIALOGUE ON MUSIC.\n By EDWARD SOBOLEWSKI.\n\n\nQ. Tell me what is good music?\n\nA. Concerning tastes\u2014all fine natures\u2014not the \u201cfair sex\u201d only, possess,\nas Bossuet says, an instinct for harmony of forms, colors, style and\ntones, especially for the latter, because the nerves of the ear being\nmore exposed, are consequently more sensitive.\n\nDiscords massed together without system, produce a more disagreeable\neffect than ill-assorted colors; and on the other hand, the etherial\nbeauty of tone-poetry excites the soul more powerfully than the splendor\nof a Titian or Correggio.\n\nQ. This \u201cinstinct\u201d and \u201ctaste,\u201d are they one and the same?\n\nA. To a certain degree only\u2014though many amateurs, critics, musicians,\nand even composers, have had no other guide than a fine instinct.\n\nQ. You speak as Pistocchi to the celebrated Farinelli: \u201cA singer needs a\nhundred things, but a good voice is ninety-nine of them\u2014the hundredth is\nthe cultivation of the voice.\u201d\n\nA. The instinct of a delicate, sensitive organization, may go far, but I\nthink the hundredth thing is also necessary; therefore, one possessed of\nthe finest voice, but uncultivated, will sing sometimes badly, sometimes\npretty well, but never quite perfectly for a real judge.\n\nSo it is with taste. Depending on natural gifts alone, without\ncultivation\u2014you will be sometimes right\u2014as often wrong. In short, your\ntaste is good, if you find pleasure in those works only which are\ncomposed according to the principles of art; on the contrary, your taste\nis bad, false, corrupt, if you find pleasure in music full of faults and\ndefects.\n\nQ. Therefore, to be correct in taste, I must know the principles of the\nart; I must know the rules of \u201cHarmony, Rhythm and Form,\u201d and perhaps\nmuch more. Why, G. Weber has written three large volumes on \u201cHarmony\u201d\nalone. No, it is too difficult and takes too much time.\n\nA. Yet it is not so difficult as it seems. To understand music rightly,\nnothing is necessary but the knowledge of two keys\u2014major and minor; two\nkinds of time\u2014common and triple\u2014one simple chord and two cadences.\n\nQ. But Rhythm, Form?\n\nA. Form is Rhythm, and Rhythm is time.\n\nQ. Let us begin then with the keys, you speak of two only\u2014major and\nminor\u2014but I have heard something of Ambroseanic, Gregoryanic, Glareanic\nand Greek keys, wherein are composed the beautiful and sublime\ncompositions of Palestrina, Allegri, Lotti, that are performed annually\nduring Passion-week in the church of St. Peter, at Rome.\n\nA. Well, if you like to go so far back, we will speak about Ambrose,\nGregory, Glareanus, but there are no such things as \u201cGreek\u201d keys.\n\nThe knowledge we have of the music of the Greeks, is too slight and\nimperfect to enable us to assert positively anything concerning it; and\nas nothing important or necessary to modern art is involved, we may be\ncontent to let the music of the ancients rest in the obscurity which\nsurrounds it.\n\nWith the first Christians, who hated everything which came from the\ntemples of the heathens, arose our music.\n\nTheir religious songs were a production of the new soul which came into\nthem with Jesus Christ, and are the foundation of our great edifice of\nart, as it now exists. In the year 385, Saint Ambrose introduced four\nkeys, D, E, F, G; Pope Gregory, in 597, added four others to these, and\nnamed the four of Ambrose, \u201cauthentic moods,\u201d and his four, which began\non every fifth of the first four, \u201cplagalic.\u201d In these eight keys,\nwithout sharps or flats, are composed the liturgic songs of the Roman\nchurch, called \u201cGregorian chants.\u201d They are written in notes of equal\nvalue, without Rhythm or Metre, and are sung in unison with loud voice.\nGlareanus added to those eight keys, two more, A and C, with their\nplagal moods. To distinguish more clearly, some one called the key\nbeginning with \u201cD,\u201d Doric, \u201cE,\u201d Phrygic, \u201cF,\u201d Lydic, \u201cG,\u201d Mixolydic,\n\u201cA,\u201d \u00c6olic, and \u201cB,\u201d Tonic. These names are all we have borrowed from\nGreece.\n\nPalestrina, the preserver of our art, wrote his compositions in these\nkeys, and for the highest purity of harmony, rhythmical beauty, sublime\nsimplicity, and deep religious feeling, his works are still unrivalled.\n\nQ. Why don\u2019t you compose in the old keys and in Palestrina\u2019s style?\n\nA. They are used sometimes by Handel in his Oratorios, by Sebastian Bach\nin his fugues for organ and piano. Later, Beethoven has written an\nAndante in the Lydic mood in his string-quartette (A minor). I myself\nhave composed the first chorus of Vinvela, in the Mixolydic mood, and in\nComala, the song to the moon, in the Doric mood; but Handel, Bach,\nBeethoven, and myself, have written in our own style, and never imitated\nPalestrina\u2019s. Men in similar situations, only, have similar ideas. All\nolder works of music utter a language which we yet understand, but\ncannot speak. We feel its deep innermost accents, but we cannot tune the\nchords of our soul to that pitch which harmonizes in every respect with\nthat feeling. Palestrina\u2019s music sounds like that of another world; it\nis all quite simple; mostly common chords, here and there only a chord\nof the sixth; and always an irresistible charm.\n\nThis riddle is partially explained, if we observe how Palestrina\nselected the tones for the different parts in his choruses. Let us take\nthe third, c\u2014e; e. g. let the soprano and the alto sing this third, and\nyou will have the same harmonic sound that the piano or organ gives. But\nlet the tenor sing one of these tones, and soprano or alto the other,\nand the effect will be very different, although the tones are the same.\nPalestrina knew not only the particular sound of every tone in every\nvoice, but also the effect which such or such combinations would\nproduce.\n\nThis mystery is taught neither by a singing school, nor by a theory of\ncomposition, and few composers of to-day know it. How great and\nbeautiful is Beethoven\u2019s solemn mass in D! What an effect would it make,\nhad Beethoven possessed the same knowledge of voices that he had of\ninstruments? Now, unfortunately, one often overpowers the others, and\nthe enjoyment of this composition will be always greater for the eye\nthan the ear.\n\nWe will now go back to the old keys. These are taken from the music\nproduced at that time, as our two keys, major and minor, are taken from\nthe melodies of later times.\n\nThis seems very simple to us, but not to our great theorists. Gottfried\nWeber takes two keys, major c, d, e, f, g, a, b, c, and minor a, b, c,\nd, e, f, g _sharp_, the same rising and falling equally.\n\nHauptmann, the first teacher of harmony in the Conservatory of Music at\nLeipsic, says in his book, The Nature of Harmony and Metre, page 30\u2014\u201cThe\nkey is formed, when the common chord (c, e, g), after having gone\nthrough the subdominant-chord (f, a, c), and dominant-chord (g, b, d),\nhas come in opposition with itself; this opposition coupled together,\nbecomes _unity_ and the _key_.\u201d He finds in our music three keys, and\nnames them, the major, the minor, and the minor major.\n\nR. Wagner recognizes no key at all; for him exists a chromatic scale\nonly. He says: \u201cThe scale is the most closely united, the most\nintimately related family among tones.\u201d He does not like to stay long in\none key, and takes the continuous change of keys for a quality of the\nmusic of the future; therefore, he finds in Beethoven\u2019s last symphony,\nin the melody to Schiller\u2019s poem, a going _back_, because it has\nscarcely any modulation.\n\nWe will not be so lavish with keys as Hauptmann, nor so economical as R.\nWagner, neither are we of Weber\u2019s opinion. We find in C major the old\nGlareanic key, called also \u201cIonic;\u201d in our A minor of this day, a\n\u201c_mixtum compositum_\u201d of several old keys; it begins as the \u201c\u00c6olic\u201d a,\nb, c, d, e, f, takes then its seventh tone, g _sharp_, from the Lydic,\ntransposed a third higher; uses sometimes also the sixth of the last,\naccepts lastly the character of the Phrygic, transposed a fourth higher,\nand brings thus the tone b _flat_ into its scale, which has been already\nthe subject of much discussion, although that has never succeeded in\nthrowing this tone out of many melodies in A minor. We have melodies\nwhich are the pure A minor from the beginning to the end, wherein we\nfind f _sharp_ and f _natural_, g and g _sharp_, b and b _flat_, and the\nlast oftener than f _sharp_; therefore, we must build the scale of A\nminor, and its harmony, according to those different tones; it will\n\n be a, {b, c, d, e, {f, {g _sharp_, a,\n {b _flat_, {f _sharp_, {g _natural_.\n\nLet us proceed. The two kinds of time are common and triple. The rhythm\nof the first is\u2014__, that of the second\u2014__ __. The accentuation of\nsubdivisions is governed by the same law. It makes no difference whether\na piece of music is written in 2|3 or 2|4, or even 2|8 time; but good\ncomposers of music, writing in 2|4 time, intend the same to be of\nlighter rendition than those composed in 2|2 time, etc.\n\nConcerning harmony, there is one chord only\u2014all other harmonies are\npassing notes, inversions, prolongations, suspensions or retardations of\nchord-tones, or from sharped and diminished intervals. Harmony is a\nconnection of different melodies. Before chords were known, they\ndescanted, that is, they tried to sing to a melody, commonly a sacred\nhymn, called _cantus firmus_, different harmonical tones, and named this\npart, _Descant_; Italian, _soprano_; French, _Le dessus_. Later there\nwas added to the tenor (which performed the _cantus firmus_) a higher\npart, named _alto_, and lastly, a lower part was added called _bass_.\nThese four parts, though each melodious and independent in itself,\nharmonized closely with each other, all striving for the same aim.\n\nEven to-day we must necessarily call such music good, wherein every\nvoice acts independently of all others, and still in harmony with the\nsame, in order to express the reigning feeling, and sustain the various\nshades in contrast to non-acting and lifeless trabants, which may be\nstrikingly seen in many compositions, particularly in four-part songs\nfor male voices, by Abt, Gumbert, K\u00fccken, etc., wherein three voices\n(_Brummstimmen_) accompany the fourth with a growling sound escaping\ntheir closed lips.\n\nThe two cadences or musical phrases are the cadence on the tonic and the\ncadence on the dominant. The cadence on the tonic, consisting of the\nchord in the dominant, followed by that of the tonic, concludes the\nsense of the musical phrase, and is called \u201cperfect\u201d when the tonic is\nin the highest and lowest part. It corresponds to a period in language.\nThe cadence on the dominant consists of the tonic, or the chord of the\nsecond or fourth going to the dominant. The cadence of the dominant\nsuspends the sense of the musical phrase without concluding it. This is\nlikewise the case with the cadence on the tonic, if the tonic is not in\nthe highest and lowest part.\n\nQ. You say nothing of the great mistake wherein two fifths or octaves\nfollow each other?\n\nA. Of course, the true nature of the proper arrangement of parts\nexcludes all direct fifths.\n\nIt is considered by the new school \u201can exploded idea.\u201d Mozart himself\nmade use of fifths in the first finale of Don Giovanni.\n\nQ. I have heard something of these fifths, but was told it was \u201cirony,\u201d\nbeing contained in the minuet which Mozart composed for \u201ccountry\nmusicians\u201d?\n\nA. You also find octaves in S. Bach\u2019s \u201cMatthew Passion,\u201d p. 25, \u201cOn the\ncross,\u201d where surely no ironical meaning was intended.\n\nQ. Do you not say anything in regard to form?\n\nA. Form is an \u201cexploded idea\u201d also. The composers of the new school\nconstruct their vocal music so as to let the poem govern the music in\nrelation to metre and form; in their instrumental compositions, the form\nis governed by phantasy.\n\nQ. But what do you understand by a symphony, sonata or overture?\n\nA. I must again go back, in order to explain this properly.\n\nRevolutions often beat the path for new ideas. Palestrina towers great\nand unattainable in his compositions of sacred music, which breathe and\nexpress the purest catholicism.\n\nBut a Luther, Zwingli, and others came, followed soon by Handel and\nBach, who, about the middle of the eighteenth century, created a music\nfull of freshness, primitiveness and transporting power, which lived and\ndied with the reformers.\n\nThe three grand-masters, Palestrina, Handel and Bach, equal, but do not\nrival each other. We cannot judge them for the different sentiments they\nindulged in. The philosophers may settle which is the best religion, for\nto the necessity of one they all agree, but music cannot be chained by\ndogmas. Heaven is an orb, whose centre is everywhere. Palestrina\u2019s music\nis the language of the south, Handel\u2019s and Bach\u2019s that of the north.\nThough one sun illumes both lands\u2014though one ether spans both, yet in\nthe south the sun is milder, the ether purer. Flowers which there grow\nin wild abundance, the north must obtain by culture.\n\nWe must think at our work.\n\nThis necessity of thought is apparent in religion, language and art, and\ncan be seen most clearly in the greatest works of the German\ngrand-masters, in Bach\u2019s \u201cMatthew Passion,\u201d and Handel\u2019s \u201cIsrael.\u201d\n\nSebastian Bach\u2019s astonishing dexterity in thematical works is the reason\nthat even unto this day we do not find a symphony or overture\nappropriate for a concert, of which the single motive forming the\nprincipal thought of the movement is not worked up on the basis which he\nconstructed with such deep knowledge and skill.\n\nTo him we must retrace our steps, in order to perceive the true nature\nof our instrumental music, for we are as little masters of the course of\nour ideas, as of the circulation of the blood in our veins. Centuries\nhave passed, and although the first great instrumental-piece\u2014the\noverture\u2014was a French production, (Lulli was the first master in this\n_genre_ of art,) yet Bach and Handel impressed the first decided stamp\nupon it.\n\nLater, the overture was supplanted by the symphony, for the reason that\nit was of easier composition and execution than the former. The overture\nconsisted of a _grave_, followed by a _fugue_. The symphony was composed\nsomewhat in the style of a _fugue_ and that of the lively dances of that\ntime.\n\nShortly after this period, the dance-music was thought no longer\nfashionable, and was succeeded by two _Allegros_, with an _Andante_ or\n_Largo_ placed between them.\n\nFather Hayden felt hurt at the complete abandonment of dance-music, and\nagain adopted the minuet. Mozart also preferred the grave and majestic\ndancing-step of his ancestors, the minuet. But Beethoven\u2019s impetuous and\npassionate nature scoffed at the slow and gracious movements of the\nminuet, and revelled instead in the wild Scherzo, or in the capricious\ndemonical leaps of the old _Passepied_. Dark and mighty forms rose\nbefore the gloomy vision of his inner-man, acting powerfully upon the\nphantasy, and wherever they met this volcanic fire, always leaving a\ndeep impression.\n\nTwo comets ushered in the existence of our century; the one\nrevolutionized the exterior\u2014the other, the interior world. Especially\nwere the young generation touched by the electric sparks of their rays.\n\nNapoleon\u2019s battles were repeated a thousand times in the nurseries with\nlead and paper soldiers. Beethoven\u2019s melodies agitated the souls of the\nyoung generation in their working and dreaming hours. When the shoes of\nthe child became too small they were thrown aside; the lead and paper\nsoldiers shared the same fate; but the melodious tones grew with the\nsoul to more and more powerful chords. Beethoven\u2019s star shone brighter,\nwhile Napoleon\u2019s was already fading. Then we heard that Beethoven\nintended to destroy his great symphony called \u201cEroica.\u201d Napoleon, the\nconsul, to whom Beethoven designed to dedicate this great work, had sunk\nto Napoleon the Emperor, and Beethoven felt ashamed.\n\nMajesty of rank is often devoid of the grace and majesty of the soul.\nThe chord e^b, g, b^b wherewith the bass solemnly introduced the third\nsymphony (Eroica), and his inversions in the Scherzo b^b, e^b, g, b^b,\nand in the last movement e, b, b, e, this echo of the Marseillaise\nsuited no longer and should perish with it. Only then, when fate, in the\nicy deserts of Russia, clasped the grand General in its iron grip, and\nnever loosened its hold until it had crushed him, did the composer of\nthe Eroica comprehend that in the _marcia funebre_ contained in this\nsymphony, he had spoken in prophetic voice. The prophecy contained in\nthe last movement was destined to be fulfilled in the latter half of\nthis century.\n\nAs Beethoven poured out his soul in a prophetic epopee, so did Mozart\nembody his genius in his Don Giovanni. But as the sublime always acts\nmore powerfully upon youth than knowledge and beauty, so likewise was\nthe success of Beethoven greater than that of Mozart in this century.\nAltogether Mozart is generally appreciated better in riper years. \u201c_La\ndelicatesse du gout est une premi\u00e8re nuance de la sati\u00e9t\u00e9._\u201d\n\nMendelssohn, whose compositions ever flowed smoothly and quietly,\nunderstood well how to tune his harmonica to Mozart\u2019s tuning-fork.\n\nQ. You represent Beethoven as grave and solemn, and yet it appears he\nwas not a great despiser of dances. Take, for instance, his A major\nsymphony. Lively to overflowing, almost mad with frantic joy, is the\nfirst movement. Equal to a double quick-step, the last, about as the\npeasants of Saxony perform their dances, the Scherzo gay; and in the\nAndante, he even calls upon a lot of old bachelors and maiden-ladies,\nwith their hoop accompaniment, to fall in and execute their _tours_?\n\nA. What opposite views are often taken of the same thing by different\nminds! In the andante, in which you find so much humor, Marx observes\nthe sober view of life, at first the peaceful and untroubled step, but\ngrowing ever more and more painful, and suffering, fighting the battle\nof life; yet, be this as it may, such music is ever successful, even in\nspite of the biting criticism of Maria v. Weber, and the ferocious\nattacks of Oulibischeff.\n\nQ. A good dance is always successful, I believe?\n\nA. Mendelssohn knew this, as he also understood Beethoven and the\npublic, when he wrote his dance overture, \u201cA Summer-night\u2019s Dream.\u201d\nAuber, Herold and others wrote dance overtures _en masse_, and we often\nfind more piquant themes in them than Beethoven\u2019s A major symphony, or\nMendelssohn\u2019s Summer-night\u2019s Dream can boast of, yet we do not prefer\nthem for the concert.\n\nAll compositions for an orchestra, be they overture or symphony, must\nfirst contain a theme, which expresses the character of the principal\ncomposition. Second, the expansions of compositions in the style of a\nsymphony, must, according to my opinion, originate from _one theme_,\ngerminate from _one_ seed, growing larger and stronger all the time,\nuntil the swelling bud bursts into a beautiful blossom; yet there must\nnot be orange-blossoms on an oak-tree; all must fit harmoniously.\n\nThe theme, _sujet_, or _motive_, must be a fixed idea, such as \u201clove;\u201d\nit must be ever present\u2014the first at day-break, the last at night\u2014no\nother impression must be strong enough to erase it.\n\nIf, by the blossom, you understand the creation of a second thought,\noften called the second theme, even this second theme ought to be\ngoverned by the first, even this blossom ought to glow in the same\ncolors. It must be so twined around the heart of the composer, that\nnothing foreign could possibly enter it. Merely thematical productions\nare exercises for the pupil; compositions which merely contain parts\ncomposed by rule, are merely a musical exercise. Lobe certainly is\nwrong, if he thus teaches the art of composing.\n\nTrue, it is easy to point out how one part belongs here, the other\nthere, yet the composition must be a free expression of the soul.\n\nThird\u2014The finishing of the same. This must also be governed in its main\nparts by the predominating feeling, and only minor thoughts and\nimpressions must be used by the composer to fill up or cast away.\n\nLet us now turn, for illustration, to the theme of Wagner\u2019s overture to\nFaustus. In the introduction we first see it in the eighth measure, very\nmoderate, in the dominant d minor, commencing with the notes a \u0101 | b^b\nb^b. a | g _sharp_, and headed \u201cvery expressive,\u201d concerning which Von\nBulow observes, that it truly expresses the feeling and character of the\nlast lines of the motto which Wagner chose at the heading:\n\n \u201cThus life to me a dire burden is;\n Existence I despise, for death I wish.\u201d\n\nIf we designate the above-mentioned theme by figure I. we must name the\nfigure which already makes its appearance in the second measure, and\nwhich is of the utmost importance, to wit, d _sharp_, e, f, f, e, e, b,\nb, figure II., the first theme having been expressed by the violin, the\nsecond figure reappears again in the tenth measure, executed by the\nviola, growling like a furiously racked demon, while the wind\ninstruments, flute, oboe and clarionet, \u201cvery expressive,\u201d and yet full\nof sympathizing sorrow, intervene at the last quarter of the tenth\nmeasure with the motive, which we will call figure III. Figure II.\ncontinues rumbling in the quartette, relieved by another figure (IV.)\ndescending from above, which is introduced by the second violin in the\nfourteenth measure. Figure IV. now extends itself further above a\nchromatic bass, until in the nineteenth measure, in d major, a clear and\ndistinct new motive, gentle and forgiving in character (V.) makes its\nappearance.\n\nThese five motives which the composer so exquisitely leads before us, in\nhis very moderate introduction, now receive the finishing-touch in the\nallegro. Thus speaks Von Bulow.\n\nTruly, as Goethe says: \u201cIf you perform a piece, be sure to perform the\nsame in pieces.\u201d\n\nI will pass over the introduction, though I have as little taste for\nsuch \u201ctheme pieces\u201d succeeding each other, as for Opera-overtures, such\nas that of Tannh\u00e4user, where pilgrim-songs, the love-sick murmurings of\nthe voluptuous Venus, and the tedious Count\u2019s drawling sorrow for his\nonly daughter and heir, form a hash, which in the details, and in the\nheterogeneous compilation of the same, is unpalatable enough, but which\nis made unbearable by the soul-killing figures\u2014no! not figures, but by\nthe up and down strokes of monotonous bases, which continue for about\nsixty measures. Setting aside even all this, we may justly expect in the\nallegro the expansion of the principle theme I., yet we have no such\nthing; in place of the \u201cidea\u201d he produces after the first five measures\na worthless figure, fit for accompaniment only, which is supported on\nits tottering basis by the twenty-seven times repeated downstroke of the\nconductor only.\n\nQ. Excuse me; but the tone-picture, which Von Bulow, R. Wagner\u2019s friend\nand admirer, calls the forgiving voice (III), reappears twice in\nwind-instrument music?\n\nA. According to Lobe\u2019s system. Borrow a measure or two from a theme,\nthen a motive, which you may construct from this or that or a third\nfigure, and you have, besides the required unity, the grandest\nvariation.\n\nDo you know, my young friend, what a composer understands by an exploded\nidea? The technical! All who study the art of composing, as Lobe teaches\nit, may learn to become _compilers_ but _not composers_; or they must\ndrink elder-tea, till their visions appear black and blue to them, in\norder to evaporate the schooling they enjoyed. After twenty-seven\nmeasures of earthly smoke, there appears a solitary star, theme I.,\ncontinuing for four whole measures, followed by a little more mist.\n\nQ. No; I think Bulow says the mist is parted by a firm and punctuated\nmotive.\n\nA. If it is not firm, it is at least _fortissimo_. Enough, we again hear\nthirteen measures of unimportant music, concluded by d minor, followed\nby a new melody for a hautboy, which, as it repeats the two first notes\nof the first theme, may claim to be considered as belonging there,\nleading to a third in f major, in company with a tremulando, _\u00e0 la\nSamiel_, crescendo and diminuendo. We have now arrived at the point\nwhere we may look for the second theme, \u201cthe blossom,\u201d as we before\nsaid, but alas, in vain your tortured soul waits, no blossoms! The\nthermometer sinks again! With the cadence we again hear theme I., after\nfour measures we find ourselves once more in d _flat_ major\u2014no, in a\nminor, b _flat_ major or b _flat_ minor, or g minor, it is difficult to\nsay which, for this part may be said to belong in the \u201cmost inseparably\ncombined, the closest related family of all keys.\u201d Enough, we find\nourselves after twenty-six measures exactly at the very place we started\nfrom, before the performance of twenty-six measures, namely, in f major.\n\nThis movement of twenty-six measures might be wholly thrown out, without\none being any wiser\u2014a possibility which, in every good composition, must\nbe looked upon as a great fault, as all parts must be so closely united\nas to enforce the presence and support of each other.\n\nWe will now look at the second theme. In it no critic can find a fault.\nIt unravels itself smoothly, and, after forty-nine measures, conducts us\nagain to motive V. in the introduction, as likewise to figure II., which\nhere does not frown quite so much.\n\nFigure V. first appears in f, after twenty-two measures in g _flat_\nmajor, after fourteen more in A minor, after thirty-four in d minor, and\nafter another thirty-nine measures we at last hear theme I. again, in\nthe dominant of the bass, a Faustus with lantern jaws, sunken temples,\nsparse hair, but with a very, very magnificent bread-basket.\n\nThe blossom is larger than the whole tree. If it is not a miracle, it is\na wonderful abortion. Are you now curious as to the second part? Oh! it\nalmost appears like a fugue, the bass dies away, a fifth higher the\ncello commences, another fifth higher the viola in unison with the\nsecond violin; but as the composer has strayed already from d minor to b\nminor, he does not think it safe to stray further; the wind instruments\ncontinue by themselves in figure II.\n\nQ. Bulow says the cello and viola united, once more introduce the\nprincipal theme.\n\nA. Just so. After the bassoon has tried twice to begin the same, after\nabout thirty measures of worldly ether, more devoid of stars than the\nSouth Pole, it is headed \u201cwild!\u201d The leading theme once more begins in\nthe principal tonic (d minor), etc., afterwards enlarged, the first two\nnotes converted, caught up by the cello and the trumpet, wherein the\nbass-trombone is expected to perform the high A, and after twenty-eight\nmeasures of \u201chated existence\u201d the second theme in d major, together with\nthe finale, appears like a short bright ray of the glorious sun on a\nmisty winter day.\n\n \u201cHe, who reigns above my powers,\n Cannot shake the outer towers\u201d\u2014\n\nis Wagner\u2019s motto, which he has justly chosen for the heading of his\noverture, and I attempt no alteration only at the conclusion, and close\nwith\u2014\n\n \u201cIn such music existence a burden is,\n The future I hate, for the End I wish.\u201d\n\nQ. Bulow would also answer as Goethe:\n\n \u201cTo understand and write of living things,\n Try first to drive away the soul,\n The _parts_ will then remain within your hand!\u201d\n\nA. I have never found fault with these parts, excepting, perhaps, that I\nsaid the working out of the second theme is, in proportion to the first\ntheme, too extensive; in fact, there is nothing of the future contained\nin the overture.\n\nQ. No future?\n\nA. I mean to say, no music of the future\u2014not even a chromatic scale for\nthe fundamental key\u2014it moves entirely in the common form:\n\n Principal theme\u2014d minor;\n\n Second theme\u2014f major;\n\n Return to fundamental key;\n\n Second theme\u2014d major, and conclusion in this key.\n\nThe finish and working up is neat and careful, and many pretty and\nuncommon effects occur therein; still I do not think the same in its\nproper place for a concert.\n\nIt inherits nothing of the Bach; the _piece_ is well constructed, yet\nthe _small pieces_ cannot escape criticism. Even Beethoven, in the first\nmovements of his _Eroica_ makes us acquainted with all the parts he\nintends to work up, and in his c minor symphony he says plainly: Now\nobserve; the notes g g g e _flat_ compose the whole, nothing more. But\nafter that it is a rushing flow, an unbroken ring and song, pressing\nbreathlessly onward, which captivates and carries us along with its\nforce. To express myself plainly, I may say that we can perceive the\nwork _was done_ before it began.\n\nIt is true, and I will not deny that even he applied the file to\nheighten its polish, yet the whole structure stood finished to his\nvision before even these first four notes were penned.\n\nNo doubt R. Wagner also imagined a picture before he painted it, but\nsurely no musical one; the poetry was there\u2014the music had to be\nmanufactured. It is full of genius, and not untrue; but he does not\nallow sufficient freedom to the different instruments, and is,\nconsequently, not sufficiently \u201cobligato.\u201d\n\nThe parts succeed, instead of going in company or against each other.\n\nAlthough now one, then another instrument catches up a thought, yet the\nwhole appears more like a Quartette of Pleyel than one of\nBeethoven\u2019s\u2014the overture is not thought out polyphonically. Many,\nhowever, do not know what Polyphonism is; it has been written about in\nmany curious ways. The pupil will best learn to write music in a\npolyphonic manner, if, at the commencement, he invents at once a\ndouble-voiced movement, but in such a manner that one voice is not the\nsubordinate of the other; both are equally necessary to represent the\nmeaning of the thought he wishes to express.\n\nIn this manner he may or must continue in regard to the three or\nfour-voiced movements likewise.\n\nThe addition of voices to a melody satisfactory in itself, be they ever\nso well flourished, cannot properly be called polyphonism.\n\nPolyphonism, however, should be the ruling principle in all orchestral\nconcert compositions, although in some points, for instance, in the\nsecond theme, homophony may take its place.\n\nA well composed symphony or overture must not entertain the audience\nonly, but every performing musician must feel that he is not an\ninstrument or a machine, but a living and intelligent being.\n\nThe overture to Faustus so entirely ignores Polyphony, that it seems a\nvirtual denial of its effectiveness and importance in orchestral\ncomposition.\n\nRichard Wagner will never become a composer of instrumental music, but\nin his operas he has opened a new avenue, and his creations therein are\nsomething grand and sublime.\n\n\n\n\n SCHOPENHAUER\u2019S DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.\n Translated from the German, by C. L. BERNAYS.\n\n [We print below a condensed statement of the central doctrine of\n Arthur Schopenhauer. It is translated from his work entitled \u201c_Ueber\n den Willen in der Natur_,\u201d 2d ed., 1854, Frankfort\u2014pp. 19-23, and\n 63. To those familiar with the kernel of speculative truth, it is\n unnecessary to remark that the basis of the system herewith\n presented is thoroughly speculative, and resembles in some respects\n that of Leibnitz in the Monadology, printed in our last number. It\n is only an attempt to solve all problems through self-determination,\n and this in its immediate form as the will. Of course the\n immediateness (i. e. lack of development or realization) of the\n principle employed here, leads into difficulty, and renders it\n impossible for him to see the close relation he stands in to other\n great thinkers. Hence he uses very severe language when speaking of\n other philosophers. If the Will is taken for the \u201cRadical of the\n Soul,\u201d then other forms of self-determination, e. g. the grades of\n knowing, will not be recognized as possessing substantiality, and\n hence the theoretical mind will be subordinated to the practical;\u2014a\n result, again, which is the outcome of the Philosophy of Fichte. But\n Leibnitz seizes a more general _aper\u00e7u_, and identifies\n self-determination with cognition in its various stages; and hence\n he rises to the great principle of Recognition as the form under\n which all finitude is cancelled\u2014all multiplicity preserved in the\n unity of the Absolute.\u2014EDITOR.]\n\nThe idea of a soul as a metaphysical being, in whose absolute simplicity\nwill and intellect were an indissoluble unity, was a great and permanent\nimpediment to all deeper insight into natural phenomena. The cardinal\nmerit of my doctrine, and that which puts it in opposition to all the\nformer philosophies, is the perfect separation of the will from the\nintellect. All former philosophers thought will to be inseparable from\nthe intellect; the will was declared to be conditioned upon the\nintellect, or even to be a mere function of it, whilst the intellect was\nregarded as the fundamental principle of our spiritual existence. I am\nwell aware that to the future alone belongs the recognition of this\ndoctrine, but to the future philosophy the separation, or rather the\ndecomposition of the soul into two heterogeneous elements, will have the\nsame significance as the decomposition of water had to chemistry. Not\nthe soul is the eternal and indestructible or the very principle of life\nin men, but what I might call the Radical of the soul, and that is the\n_Will_. The so-called soul is already a compound; it is the combination\nof will and the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, intellect. The intellect is the secondary, the\n_posterius_ in any organism, and, as a mere function of the brain,\ndependent upon the organism. The will, on the contrary, is primary, the\n_prius_ of the organism, and the organism consequently is conditioned by\nit. For the will is the very \u201cthing in itself,\u201d which in conception\n(that is, in the peculiar function of the brain) exhibits itself as an\norganic body. Only by virtue of the forms of cognition, that is, by\nvirtue of that function of the brain\u2014hence only in conception\u2014one\u2019s body\nis something extended and organic, not outside of it, or immediately in\nself-consciousness. Just as the various single acts of the body are\nnothing but the various acts of the will portrayed in the represented\nworld, just so is the shape of this body as a totality the image of its\nwill as a whole. In all organic functions of the body, therefore, just\nas in its external actions, the will is the \u201c_agens_.\u201d True physiology,\non its height, shows the intellect to be the product of the physical\norganization, but true metaphysics show, that physical existence itself\nis the product, or rather the appearance, of a spiritual _agens_,\nto-wit, the will; nay, that matter itself is conditioned through\nconception, in which alone it exists. Perception and thought may well be\nexplained by the nature of the organism; the will never can be; the\ncontrary is true, namely, that every organism originates by and from the\nwill. This I show as follows:\n\nI therefore posit the will as the \u201cthing in itself\u201d\u2014as something\nabsolutely primitive; secondly, the simple visibility of the will, its\nobjectivation as our body; and thirdly, the intellect as a mere function\nof a certain part of that body. That part (the brain) is the\nobjectivated desire (or will) to know, which became represented: for the\nwill, to reach its ends, needs the intellect. This function again\npre-supposes the whole world as representation; it therefore\npre-supposes also the body as an object, and even matter itself, so far\nas existing only in representation, for an objective world without a\nsubject in whose intellect it stands, is, well considered, something\naltogether unthinkable. Hence intellect and matter (subject and object)\nonly relatively exist for each other, and in that way constitute the\napparent world.\n\nWhenever the will acts on external matter, or whenever it is directed\ntowards a known object, thus passing through the medium of knowledge,\nthen all recognize that the _agens_, which here is in action, is the\nwill, and they call it by that name. Yet, that is will not less which\nacts in the inner process that precedes those external actions as their\ncondition, which create and preserve the organic life and its substrate;\nand secretion, digestion, and the circulation of the blood, are its work\nalso. But just because the will was recognized only while leaving the\nindividual from which it started, and directing itself to the external\nworld, which precisely for that purpose now appears as perception, the\nintellect was regarded as its essential condition, as its sole element,\nand as the very substance out of which it was made, and thereby the very\nworst _hysteron proteron_ was committed that ever happened.\n\nBefore all, one should know how to discriminate between will and\narbitrariness (_Wille und Willk\u00fchr_), and one should understand that the\nfirst can exist without the second. Will is called arbitrariness where\nit is lighted by intellect, and whenever motives or conceptions are its\nmoving causes; or, objectively speaking, whenever external causes which\nproduce an act are mediated by a brain. The motive may be defined as an\nexternal irritation, by whose influence an image is formed in the brain,\nand under the mediation of which the will accomplishes its effect, that\nis, an external act of the body. With the human species the place of\nthat image may be occupied by a concept, which being formed from images\nof a similar kind, by omitting the differences, is no longer intuitive,\nbut only marked and fixed by words. Hence as the action of motives is\naltogether independent of any contact, they therefore can measure their\nrespective forces upon the will, on each other, and thereby permit a\ncertain choice. With the animals, that choice is confined to the narrow\nhorizon of what is visibly projected before them; among men it has the\nwide range of the _thinkable_, or of its concepts, as its sphere. Those\nmovements, therefore, which result from motives, and not from causes, as\nin the inorganic world, nor from mere irritation, as with the plants,\nare called arbitrary movements. These motives pre-suppose knowledge, the\nmedium of the motives, through which in this case causality is effected,\nirrespective of their absolute necessity in any other respect.\nPhysiologically, the difference between irritation and motive may be\ndescribed thus: Irritation excites a reaction _immediately_, the\nreaction issuing from the same part upon which the irritation had acted;\nwhilst a motive is an irritation, which must make a circuit through the\nbrain, where first an image is formed, and that image then originates\nthe ensuing reaction, which now is called an act of the free will. Hence\nthe difference between free and unfree movements does not concern the\nessential and primary, which in both is the will, but only the\nsecondary, that is, the way in which the will is aroused; to-wit,\nwhether it shows itself in consequence of some real cause, or of an\nirritation, or of a motive, that is, of a cause that had to pass through\nthe organ of the intellect.\n\nFree will or arbitrariness is only possible in the consciousness of men.\nIt differs from the consciousness of animals in this, that it contains\nnot only present and tangible representations, but abstract concepts,\nwhich, independent of the differences of time, act simultaneously and\nside by side, permitting thereby conviction or a conflict of motives;\nthis, in the strictest sense of the word, is called free will. Yet this\nvery free will or choice consists only in the victory of the stronger\nmotive over a weaker in a given individual character, by which the\nensuing action was determined, just as one impulse is overpowered by a\nstronger counter impulse, whereby the effect nevertheless appears with\nthe same necessity as the movement of a stone that has received an\nimpulse. The great thinkers of all times agree in this decidedly; while,\non the contrary, the vulgar will little understand the great truth, that\nthe mark of our liberty is not to be found in our single acts, but in\nour existence itself, and in its very essence. Whenever one has\nsucceeded to discriminate will from free will, or the arbitrary, and to\nconsider the latter as a peculiar species of the former, then there is\nno more room for any difficulty in discovering the will also in\noccurrences wherein intelligence cannot be traced.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe will is the original. It has created the world, but not through the\nmedium of an intellect either outside or inside of the world, for we\nknow of the intellect only through the mediation of the animal world,\nthe very last in creation. The will itself, the unintentional will which\nis discovered in everything, is the creator of the world. The animals,\ntherefore, are organized in accordance with their mode of living, and\ntheir mode of living is not shaped in conformity with their organs; the\nstructure of any animal is the result of its will to be what it is.\nNature, which never lies, tells us the same in its _na\u00efve_ way; it lets\nany being just kindle the first spark of its life on one of his equals,\nand then lets it finish itself before our eyes. The form and the\nmovement it takes from its own self, the substance from outside. This is\ncalled growth and development. Thus even empirically do all beings stand\nbefore us as their own work; but the language of nature is too simple,\nand therefore but few understand it.\n\nCognition, since all motives are dependent on it, is the essential\ncharacteristic of the animal kingdom. When animal life ceases, cognition\nceases also; and arrived at that point, we can comprehend the medium by\nwhich the influences from the external world on the movements of other\nbeings are effected only by analogy, whilst the will, which we have\nrecognized as the basis and as the very kernel of all beings, always and\neverywhere remains the same. On the low stage of the vegetable world,\nand of the vegetative life in the animal organizations, it is\n_irritation_, and in the inorganic world it is the mechanical relation\nin general which appears as the substitute or as the analogue of the\nintellect. We cannot say that the plants perceive the light and the sun,\nbut we see that they are differently affected by the presence or absence\nof the sun, and that they turn themselves towards it; and though in fact\nthat movement mostly coincides with their growth, like the rotation of\nthe moon with its revolution, that movement nevertheless exists, and the\ndirection of the growth of a plant is just in the same way determined\nand systematically modified as an action is by a motive. Inasmuch,\ntherefore, as a plant has its wants, though not of the kind which\nrequire a sensorium or an intellect, something analogous must take their\nplace to enable the will to seize at least a supply offered to it, if\nnot to go in quest of it. This is the susceptibility for irritation,\nwhich differs from the intellect, in that the motive and subsequent act\nof volition are clearly separated from each other, and the clearer, the\nmore perfect the intellect is; whilst at the mere susceptibility for an\nirritation, the feeling of the irritation and the resulting volition can\nno longer be discriminated. In the inorganic world, finally, even the\nsusceptibility for irritation, whose analogy with the intellect cannot\nbe mistaken, ceases, and there remains nothing but the varied reaction\nof the bodies against the various influences. This reaction is the\nsubstitute for the intellect. Whenever the reaction of a body differs\nfrom another, the influence also must be different, creating a different\naffection, which even in its dullness yet shows a remote analogy with\nthe intellect. If, for instance, the water in an embankment finds an\nissue and eagerly precipitates itself through it, it certainly does not\nperceive the break, just as the acid does not perceive the alkali, for\nwhich it leaves the metal; yet we must confess that what in all these\nbodies has effected such sudden changes, has a certain resemblance with\nthat which moves ourselves whenever we act in consequence of an\nunexpected motive. We therefore see that the intellect appears as the\nmedium of our motives, that is, as the medium of causality in regard to\nintellectual beings, as that which receives the change from the external\nworld, and which must be followed by a change in ourselves, as the\nmediator between both. On this narrow line, balances the whole world as\nrepresentation, i. e. that whole extensive world in space and time,\nwhich as such cannot be anywhere else but in our brain, just as dreams;\nfor the periods of their duration stand on the very same basis. Whatever\nto the animals and to man is given by his intellect as a medium of the\nmotives, the same is given to the plants by their susceptibility for\nirritation, and to inorganic bodies by their reaction on the various\ncauses, which in fact only differ in respect to the degree of volition;\nfor, just in consequence of the fact, that in proportion to their wants\nthe susceptibility for external impressions was raised to such a degree\nin the animals that a brain and a system of nerves had to develop\nitself, did consciousness, moreover, originate as a function of this\nbrain, and in this consciousness the whole objective world, whose forms\n(time, space and causality) are the rules for the exercise of this\nfunction. We therefore discover that the intellect is calculated only\nfor the subjective, merely to be a servant of the will, appearing only\n\u201c_per accidens_\u201d as a condition of animal life, where motives take the\nplace of irritation. The picture of the external world, which at this\nstage enters into the forms of time and space, is but the background on\nwhich motives represent themselves as ends; it is also the condition of\nthe connection of the external objects in regard to space and causality,\nbut yet is nothing else but the mediation and the tie between the motive\nand the will. What a leap would it be to take this picture to be the\ntrue, ultimate essence of things,\u2014this image of the world, which\noriginates accidentally in the intellect as a function of animal brains,\nwhereby the means to their ends are shown them, and their ways on this\nplanet cleared up! What a temerity to take this image and the connection\nof its parts to be the absolute rule of the world, the relations of the\nthings in themselves\u2014and to suppose that all that could just as well\nexist independently of our brain! And yet this supposition is the very\nground on which all the dogmatical systems previous to Kant were based,\nfor it is the implicit pre-supposition of their Ontology, Cosmology,\nTheology, and of all their Eternal Verities.\n\nBy this realistic examination we have gained very unexpectedly the\n_objective_ point of view of Kant\u2019s immortal discovery, arriving by our\nempirical, physiological way to the same point whence Kant started with\nhis transcendental criticism. Kant made the subjective his basis,\npositing consciousness; but from its _\u00e0 priori_ nature he comes to the\nresult, that all that happens in it can be nothing else but\nrepresentation. We, on the contrary, starting from the objective, have\ndiscovered what are the ends and the origin of the intellect, and to\nwhat class of phenomena it belongs. We discover in _our_ way, that the\nintellect is limited to mere representations, and that what is exhibited\nin it is conditioned by the subject, that is, a _mundane phenomenon_,\nand that just in the same way the order and the connection of all\nexternal things is conditioned by the subject, and is never a knowledge\nof what they are in themselves, and how they may be connected with each\nother. We, in our way, like Kant in his, have discovered that the world\nas representation, balances on that narrow line between the external\ncause (motive) and the produced effect (act of will) of intelligent\n(animal) beings, where the clear discrimination of the two commences.\n_Ita res accendent lumina rebus._\n\nOur objective stand-point is realistic, and therefore conditioned,\ninasmuch as starting from natural beings as posited, we have abstracted\nfrom the circumstance that their objective existence presupposes an\nintellect, in which they find themselves as representations; but Kant\u2019s\nsubjective and idealistic stand-point is equally conditioned, inasmuch\nas it starts from the intellect, which itself is conditioned by nature,\nin consequence of whose development up to the animal world it only comes\ninto existence. Holding fast to this, our _realistic-objective_\nstand-point, Kant\u2019s doctrine may be characterized thus: after Locke had\nabstracted the _r\u00f4le_ of the senses, under the name of \u201csecondary\nproperties,\u201d for the purpose of distinguishing things in themselves from\nthings as they appear, Kant, with far greater profundity, abstracted the\n_r\u00f4le_ of the brain functions [conceptions of the understanding]\u2014a less\nconsiderable _r\u00f4le_ than that of the senses\u2014and thus abstracted as\nbelonging to the subjective all that Locke had included under the head\nof primary properties. I, on the other hand, have merely shown why all\nstands thus in relation, by exhibiting the position which the intellect\nassumes in the System of Nature when we start realistically from the\nobjective as a datum, and take the WILL, of which alone we are\nimmediately conscious, as the true \u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6 of all metaphysics\u2014as the\nessence of which all else is only the phenomenon.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n COMPREHENSION AND IDEA.\n\n\n I.\n\n\nEverything, to be known, must be thought as belonging to a system. This\nresult was the conclusion of Chapter VI. To illustrate: acid is that\nwhich hungers for a base; its sharp taste is the hunger itself; it\nexists only in a tension. Hence to think an acid we must think a base;\nthe base is ideally in the acid, and is the cause of its sharpness. The\nunion of the acid and base gives us a salt, and in the salt we cannot\ntaste the acid nor the base distinctly, for each is thoroughly modified\nby the other, each is _cancelled_. We separate the acid and base again\nand there exist two contradictions\u2014acid and base\u2014each calling for the\nother, each asserting its complement to be itself. For the properties of\na somewhat are its _wants_, i. e. what it lacks of the total.\n\nSuch elements of a total as we are here considering, have been called\n\u201c_moments_\u201d by Hegel. The total is the \u201c_negative unity_\u201d (See Chap.\nIV.)\n\nIn the illustration we have salt as the negative unity of the moments,\nacid and base. The unity is called _negative_ because its existence\ndestroys each of the moments by adding the other to it. After the\nnegative unity exists, each of the moments is no longer in a tension,\nbut has become thoroughly modified by the other. The negative unity is\n_ideal_ when the moments are held asunder\u2014it is then potential, and\nthrough it each moment has its own peculiar properties.\n\nMore generally: every somewhat is _determined_ by another; its\ncharacteristic, therefore, is the manifestation of its other or of the\ncomplement which makes with it the total or negative unity.\n\nThe complete thought of any somewhat includes the phases or moments, as\nsuch, and their negative unity. This may properly be called the\n_comprehension_. To comprehend [_Begreifen_] we must seize the object in\nits totality; com-prehend = to seize together, just as con-ceive = to\ntake together; but conception is generally used in English to signify a\npicture of the object more or less general. Not the totality, but only\nsome of its characteristics, are grasped together in a conception. Hence\nconceptions are _subjective_, i. e. they do not correspond to the true\nobject in its entirety; but comprehension is _objective_ in the sense\nthat everything in its true existence is a comprehension. With this\ndistinction between conception and comprehension most people would deny,\nat once, the possibility of the latter as an act of human intelligence.\nSensuous knowing\u2014for the reason that it attributes validity to isolated\nobjects\u2014does not comprehend. Reflective knowing seizes the reciprocal\nrelations, but not in the negative unity. Comprehension\u2014whether one ever\ncan arrive at it or not\u2014should be the thought in its totality, wherein\nnegative unity and moments are thought together. Thus a true\ncomprehension is the thought of the self-determined, and we have not\nthoroughly comprehended any thing till we have traced it back through\nits various presuppositions to self-determination which must always be\nthe form of the total. (See chapters IV. & V.)\n\n\n II.\n\n\nThe name \u201cIdea\u201d is reserved for the deepest thought of Philosophy.[64]\nIn _comprehension_ we think a system of dependent moments in a negative\nunity. Thus in the comprehension the multiplicity of elements, thought\nin the moments, is destroyed in its negative unity, and there is,\nconsequently, only one independent being or totality. Let, once, each of\nthese moments develop to a totality, so that we have in each a\nrepetition of the whole, and we shall have a comprehension of\ncomprehensions\u2014a system of totalities\u2014and this is what Hegel means by\n\u201c_Idee_,\u201d or Idea. Plato arrives at this, but does not consistently\ndevelop it. He deals chiefly with the standpoint of comprehension, and\nhence has much that is _dialectical_. (The Dialectic is the process\nwhich arises when the abstract and incomplete is put under the form of\nthe true, or the apodeictic. To refute a category of limited\napplication, make it universal and it will contradict itself. Thus the\n\u201cIrony\u201d of Socrates consists in generously (!) assuming of any category\nall that his interlocutor wishes, and then letting it refute itself\nwhile he applies it in this and that particular instance with the air of\none who sincerely believes in it. Humor is of this nature; the author\nassumes the validity of the character he is portraying in regard to his\nweak points, and then places him in positions wherein these weaknesses\nprove their true nature.) Aristotle, on the other hand, writes from the\nstandpoint of the _Idea_ constantly, and therefore treats his subjects\nas systematic totalities independent of each other; this gives the\nappearance of empiricism to his writings. The following illustration of\nthe relation of comprehension to idea may be of assistance here:\n\nLet any totality = T be composed of elements, phases or moments = a + b\n+ c + d, &c. Each of these moments, a, b, c, &c., differs from the\nothers and from the total; they are in a negative unity just as acid and\nbase are, in a salt. The assertion of the negative unity cancels each of\nthe moments. The negative unity adds to _a_ the _b_, _c_, and _d_, which\nit lacks of the total; for a = T - b - c - &c.; and so too b = T - a - c\n- d - &c., and c = T - a - b - &c. Each demands all the rest to make its\nexistence possible, just as the acid cannot exist if its tension is not\nbalanced by a base. So far we have the Comprehension. If, now, we\nconsider these moments as being able to develop, like the Monads of\nLeibnitz, we shall have the following result: _a_ will absorb _b_ + _c_\n+ _d_ + _&c._, and thus become a totality and a negative unity for\nitself; _b_ may do likewise, and thus the others. Under this supposition\nwe have, instead of the first series of moments (a + b + c + d + &c.) a\nnew series wherein each moment has developed to a total by supplying its\ndeficiencies thus: a b c d &c., + b a c d &c., + c a b d &c., + d a b c\n&c. In the new series, each term is a negative unity and a totality, and\nhence no longer exists in a tension, and no longer can be cancelled by\nthe negative unity. Such a system of terms would offer us a manifold of\nindividuals, and yet a profound unity. This is the unity of the Idea,\nand it affords a concrete multiplicity. Leibnitz gives to his Monads the\npower of reflection, so that each is the mirror of the universe; hence,\nin each is found the whole, and the Totality is endlessly repeated;\n\u201ceverywhere the one and the all\u201d\u2014and this is the \u201cpreestablished\nharmony,\u201d no doubt. This is the highest point of view in philosophy\u2014true\nmultiplicity and true unity coexisting. Plato reaches it in his\nstatement in the Timaeus, that \u201cGod has made the world most like\nhimself, since he _in nowise possesses envy_.\u201d The ultimate purpose of\nthe universe is the reflection of God to himself. In this reflection,\nthe existence of independent self-determining totalities is presupposed;\nto all else he is a negative unity, and therefore destructive. To the\nrighteous, i. e. to those who perfect themselves by performing for\nthemselves the function of negative unity, He says: \u201cIn you I am well\npleased; I am reflected in you.\u201d But to the wicked he is a consuming\nfire, for they do not assume the function of negative unity, but leave\nit to be used toward them from outside. Thus, too, the lower orders of\nexistence perish through this, that their negative unity is not within\nbut without. If God is conceived merely as the negative unity, and the\ncreature not as self-determining, we have the standpoint of Pantheism.\nIt is the Brahm which becomes all, and all returns into him again. If we\nhad such a God we should only _seem_ to be, for when he looked at us and\n\u201cplaced us under the form of Eternity\u201d we should vanish. But in culture\neach of us absorbs his \u201cnot me,\u201d just as \u201ca,\u201d in the illustration given\nabove, became a b c d &c. Its _a_-ness was destroyed by its modifying\n(\u201crounding off\u201d) its own peculiarity by the peculiarities of the rest,\nand thus becoming \u201ccosmopolitan.\u201d This is justly esteemed the\nprofoundest and most sacred dogma of the Christian Religion when stated\nas the doctrine of the Trinity. The completest unity there obtains of\nindependent individualities. All higher forms of spirit repeat the same\nthought. Government, e. g. is the Legislative, the Judiciary, and the\nExecutive. Resist the Judiciary and it can, in the exercise of its\nfunction, assume executive powers. Each power is the entire organism\nviewed from the standpoint of one of its phases, just as _a b c_, _b a\nc_, _c a b_, are the same totality, but with different starting points\nassumed.\n\nThe self-determining being is the being which is its own other, and\nhence is its own negative unity. Thus it can never be a simple moment of\na higher being, but is essentially a _reflection_ of it. Recognition is\nthe highest deed; it belongs to the standpoint of the Idea. Upon the\nplane of comprehension, the unity and multiplicity are mutually\ndestructive; upon the plane of Idea they are mutually affirmative. The\nmore creatures in whom he can be reflected, the more affirmations of God\nthere are. The human spirit grows solely through recognition.\n\n * * * * *\n\n_Remark._ This is the only standpoint that is absolutely affirmative\u2014all\nothers being more or less negative, and, as a consequence, self-opposed.\nThe stage of _human culture_ is the most concrete illustration of it.\nThree human beings\u2014A, B, and C\u2014meet and form a community. As physical\nbeings they exclude, each the others. The more one eats, the less the\nothers have to eat. But spiritually it is the reverse: each has a\ndifferent experience, and their giving and taking, instead of\ndiminishing any one\u2019s share, _increases_ it. The experience of A is\nimparted to B, and conversely; and so also both share with C. By this, C\ngrows through the culture of A and B, and becomes C B A; B develops to B\nC A, and A to A C B; all is gain: no loss, except of _poverty_.\nLimitation by another makes a finite being. But self-determination is\nthe process of being one\u2019s own \u201cother\u201d or limit, and hence all\nself-determined beings are totalities or microcosms, which, though\nindependent, reflect each other, i. e. they make themselves in the same\nimage. Hence the \u201cPre\u00ebstablished Harmony\u201d exists among such beings. Each\nis its own negative. Cognition or mind is the form of being which\nembodies this.\n\nIn culture we have an absolutely affirmative process, for the reason\nthat the _negative_, involved in the cancelling of one\u2019s own\nidiosyncracies, is a negative of what is already negative. Hence the\nunity of God is not in anywise impaired by the existence of a\ncontinually increasing number of perfected beings. In proportion to\ntheir perfection they reflect Him, and their complete self-determination\nis just that complete realization of Him which completes his\nself-consciousness. This has been called Pantheism by those who confound\nthis standpoint with that of the Comprehension. Pantheism is impossible\nwith a proper insight into the nature of self-consciousness. A blind\nforce fulfilling its destiny, and giving rise to various orders of\nbeings which are to be re-absorbed by it,\u2014if one fancies this to be God,\ncall him a Pantheist, for God is then merely a negative unity, and\ncreation is only a series of _moments_. But if one considers God to\nbe the Absolute Person, and deduces all Theology from His\nself-consciousness, as Hegel does, he cannot be called a Pantheist\nconsistently by any one who believes in the Gospel of St. John. It is\neasy to see why Hegel has been and still is regarded as a Pantheist.\nWhen he asserts the self-consciousness of the creature to be the\ncompletion of the Divine self-consciousness, Hegel merely states the\nlogical constituents of the Christian idea of the Trinity. The\n\u201ccreature\u201d is the _Son_, which is \u201cin the beginning.\u201d All time must have\npresented and still presents the development of creatures into\nself-conscious beings. Our planet began a short time since to do this.\n\u201cThe fullness of time had come,\u201d and the final stage of reflection\n(which must always have existed in the Universe) began on the earth, or,\nto state it theologically, \u201cThe Son was sent to redeem this world.\u201d To\nthink that Hegel could regard God as becoming conscious in time\u2014as\npassing from an unconscious state to a conscious one\u2014is to suppose him\nthe weakest of philosophers. _Self-consciousness_ cannot be \u201cin time,\u201d\nfor it is the \u201cform of eternity,\u201d and thus time is not relative to it.\nThe \u201cfleeting show\u201d of History does not touch the self-consciousness of\nGod, nor does it touch any self-conscious being \u201cwhose soul is builded\nfar from accident.\u201d\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n WHAT IS THE TRUE ACTUAL?\n\n\n I.\u2014_Reality and Potentiality._\n\n\nThe immediate object before the senses undergoes change; the real\nbecomes potential, and that which was potential becomes real. Without\nthe potentiality we could have had no change. At first we are apt to\nconsider the real as the entire existence and to ignore the potential;\nbut the potential will not be treated thus. Whatever a thing _can_\nbecome is as valid as what it is already. The properties of a thing by\nwhich it exists for us, are its relations to other beings, and hence are\nrather its _deficiencies_ than its being _per se_. Thus the sharpness in\nthe acid was pronounced to be the hunger of the same for alkali; the\nsharper it was, the louder was its call for alkali. Thus the very\nconcreteness of a thing is rather the process of its potentialities. To\nillustrate this: we have a circle of possibilities belonging to a\nthing\u2014only one of them is real at a time; it is, for instance, water,\nwhose potentialities are vapor, liquid, and solid. Its reality is only a\npart of its total being, as in the case of water it was only one-third\nof itself at any given temperature. Yet the real is throughout qualified\nby the potential. In change, the real is being acted upon by the\npotential under the form of \u201coutside influences.\u201d The pyramid is not\nair, but the air continually acts upon it, and the pyramid is in a\ncontinual process of decomposition; its potentiality is continually\nexhibiting its nature. We know by seeing a thing undergo change what its\npotentialities are. In the process of change is manifested the activity\nof the potentialities which are thus negative to it. If a thing had no\nnegative it would not change. The real is nothing but the surface upon\nwhich the potential writes its nature; it is the field of strife between\nthe potentialities. The real persists in existence through the potential\nwhich is in continual process with it. Thus we are led to regard the\nproduct of the two as the constant. This we call _Actuality_.\n\n\n II.\u2014_Actuality._\n\n\nThe actual is a process, and is ever the same; its two sides, are the\nreal and the potential, and the real is manifested no more and no less\nthan the potentialities, in the process which constantly goes on. The\nreal is annulled by the potential, and the latter becomes the real, only\nto be again replaced. If in the circle of possibilities which make up\nthe entire being of a thing, that which is real bears a small proportion\nto the rest, the real is very unstable, for the potentialities are to\nthat extent actively negative to it. But let the sphere of the real be\nrelatively large, and we have a more stable being\u2014there is less to\ndestroy it and more to sustain it\u2014it is a higher order of being. If the\nwhole circle of its being were real it would coincide with its\nactuality, it would be self-related, exist for itself, and this would be\nthe existence of the _Idea_.\n\n\n III.\u2014_The Actual is the Rational._\n\n\nThe highest aim is toward perfection; and this is pursued in the\ncancelling of the finite, partial or incomplete, by adding to it its\nother or complement\u2014that which it lacks of the Total or Perfect. Since\nthis complement is the _potential_, and since this potential is and can\nbe the only agent that acts upon and modifies the real, it follows that\nall process is pursuant of the highest aim; and since the actual is the\nprocess itself, it follows that the actual is the realization of the\nBest or of the Rational. A somewhat has a low order of existence if the\nsphere of its reality is small compared to that of its potentiality. But\nthe lower its order the more swift and sure are the potentialities in\ntheir work. Hence no matter how bad anything is, the very best thing is\nbeing wrought upon it. Seize the moments of the world-history, and state\nprecisely what they lacked of the complete realization of spirit, and\none will see clearly that each phase perished by having just that added\nto it which it most of all needed.\n\n\n IV.\u2014\u201c_The Form of Eternity._\u201d\n\n\nTo think according to Reason is to think things under the form of\nEternity, says Spinoza (_Res sub quadam specie aeternitatis percipere_).\nThe Form of Eternity is what we have found as the true actual. The\nPhenomenal world is the constant spectacle wherein each and all is\nplaced under the form of Eternity. When this is done, all _immediate_\n(or mechanical) being appears in a state of transition; all _mediated_\nbeing appears as a merely relative, i. e. as existing in what lies\nbeyond it; all _absolutely mediated_ (i. e. self-determined) being\nappears in a state of development. In the first and second stages the\nindividual loses its identity. In the third stage the process is one of\nunfolding, and hence the continual realizing of a more vivid personal\nidentity. Thus the Form of Eternity is to the conscious being the\nrealization of his Immortality.\n\nFootnote 64:\n\n The word \u201cIdea\u201d does not have the sense here given it, except in\n Hegel, and in a very few translations of him. For the most part the\n word is used, (e. g. in Schelling\u2019s Philosophy of Nature in this\n number,) as a translation for the German \u201c_Begriff_,\u201d which we call\n \u201c_comprehension_,\u201d adopting the term in this sense from the author of\n the \u201cLetters on Faust.\u201d It will do no harm to use so expressive a word\n as comprehension in an objective sense as well as in a subjective one.\n The thought itself is _bizarre_, and not merely the word; it is\n useless to expect to find words that are used commonly in a\n speculative sense. One must seek a word that has several meanings, and\n grasp these meanings all together in one, to have the speculative use\n of a word. Spirit has formed words for speculative ideas by the\n deepest of instincts, and these words have been unavoidably split up\n into different meanings by the sensuous thinking, which always loses\n the connecting links.\n\n\n\n\n A THOUGHT ON SHAKESPEARE.\n BY ANNA C. BRACKETT.\n\n\nTo say that Shakespeare excels others by virtue of the genius which\nenables him to throw himself for the time completely into each of the\ncharacters he represents, is to say a very common-place thing, and yet\nit will bear repeating.\n\nHis spirit was so many-sided, so universal, that it was able to take all\nforms and perfectly to fit itself to each, so that he always gives us a\nconsistent character. His personages are individuals whose every word\nagrees with every other they have spoken, and while the spirit which\nmoves in them is Shakespeare, he is all, yet no one of them.\n\n \u201cThe water unchanged in every case,\n Doth take on the figure of the vase.\u201d\n\nHe does not consciously go to work to fashion a character, nor does he\nask himself what that character shall say under the given circumstances,\nbut his soul, being capable of all, takes on for the time the form of\nthe character, and then speaks the things which are most natural to\nitself in that form. So entirely is this the case, that a comparison of\nthe way in which one of his personages conducts himself under different\ncircumstances, is sure to amaze us as we discover the fine touches by\nwhich the unity of the character is preserved. Goethe\u2019s characters\ngrow\u2014are in a state of becoming. Shakespeare\u2019s are grown: they are\ncrystallized. The problem with Goethe is, the development of a character\nthrough growth; Shakespeare\u2019s: given a certain character and a certain\ncollision, how will the given character demean itself? The common man\nwith an effort could tell what _he himself_ would have done under such\nand such circumstances, but Shakespeare could have done _all things_,\nand grasping one side of himself he holds it, and shows it for one\nperson, and another for another. He never confuses\u2014never changes. The\ndivine inspiration sways him. The power to do this, the Universal which\ncan take on all and be all, is genius.\n\nThis is not claimed as new in any sense. I simply wish to illustrate its\ntruth with regard to the suitors of Portia, by noticing how perfectly\nthe feelings which each expresses after the result of his choice is\napparent, are the outcome of the feelings which decided the choice.\n\nThe three sets of comments on the caskets and their mottoes, betray\nthree entirely different men. Their minds move differently; they are\nactuated habitually by different motives, and the results of the same\nfailure in Morocco and Arragon are noticeably different. They are placed\nin precisely the same circumstances. They are both disappointed, but\nobserve how differently they demean themselves. Morocco wastes no words.\nHis mood changes instantly from a doubting hope to despondency and\nheartfelt grief, so powerful that it deprives him of all speech. He goes\nat once. But Arragon speaks as if he had been deceived. First\u2014\u201cHow much\nunlike art thou to Portia!\u201d That is, I was led to suppose one thing; I\nhave been misled. Then\u2014\u201cHow much unlike my hopes!\u201d but, indignation and\nwounded pride gaining the ascendency\u2014\u201c_and my deservings!_\u201d He re-reads\nthe motto, and grows more angry still. He has not been treated fairly,\nand at last, forgetting himself, he turns round to Portia with the\nfierce, direct question, \u201cAre my deserts no better?\u201d Portia shows her\nappreciation of his state of mind by her evasion, plainly intimating\nthat he had gone too far in his manner of addressing her. His very words\nare rough and uncourteous in their abruptness. His question was rude\nbecause so personal. In his haste he has not even noticed the writing,\nwhich now surprises him, as, feeling her quiet rebuke, he turns back to\nthe casket to hide his embarrassment, and he reads. During the reading\nhe begins to be conscious that he has been angry without reason, and\nthat he has not had control enough of himself to conceal the fact. That\nhe is not a fool is shown by his consciousness that he has behaved like\none in giving away to his temper, and as this consciousness begins to\ndawn on him, he is ashamed of himself for having been provoked, and\ndesires to be gone as soon as possible. He has had a revelation of\nhimself which is not agreeable, and he turns to depart, no longer angry\nwith Portia, but so angry with himself that he almost forgets to bid the\nlady adieu. But suddenly reminded that she is there, he assumes again\nhis usual, courtly, outside self, and half in apology for his anger and\nrudeness, which might have led her to suppose that he would forget his\npromise, half to recall himself to himself, he awkwardly ends the scene\nby assuring her that he means to keep his word.\n\nNow, why should Morocco never for one instant lose his gentlemanly\nbearing, while Arragon so wholly forgets himself? Turn back to the\ncomments before the choice, and we have the key at once.\n\nIn their remarks on the leaden chest we see at first how much more\nquickly than Morocco, Arragon rushes at conclusions. The former becomes\nat once thoughtful, and does not pass by even that unattractive metal\nwithout careful pausing. After reading all three mottoes once, he reads\nslowly the inscription on the leaden casket again, and begins to repeat\nit a second time. He feels thoroughly how much depends on the choice,\nand is self-distrustful. Finding that he can gain no suggestion from the\nlady, he commends himself for help to the gods before he proceeds. He is\nnot the man to be daunted by a threat, and thinks he detects in that\nvery threat a false ring. He is conscious of high motives, but not in\nvanity, and he decides, adversely, giving a reason. But Arragon, before\nsurveying the whole ground, decides at once about the first he sees, and\nthe summary way in which he dismisses all consideration of the leaden\ncasket, savors strongly of self-esteem. There is a sort of bravado in\nthe sudden words without a moment\u2019s pause: \u201cYou shall look fairer ere I\ngive or hazard!\u201d The very use of \u201cshall\u201d with the second person, forces\ninto view the will of the speaker. He does not turn to Portia. He is\nquite capable of directing his own actions without help from any god.\n\nAs Morocco considers the silver, the principal thing that attracts his\nattention is its \u201cvirgin hue.\u201d (Remark that Arragon under the same\ncircumstances calls it a \u201ctreasure house.\u201d) He again begins thoughtfully\nto repeat; and again mark the self-distrust. There is an exquisitely\ndelicate touch of this in\u2014\n\n \u201cIf thou be\u2019st rated by thy _estimation_,\n Thou dost deserve enough.\u201d\n\nRelying on the judgment of others, rather than on his own, but conscious\ntoo that there is good ground for the estimation in which he knows\nhimself held, the chivalrous admiration with which he looks up to the\nwoman he desires, comes in here suddenly with a doubt whether if all\nthat is thought of him is deserved, it is enough to win a pearl of so\ngreat price. His conscious manhood refuses, however, to weaken itself by\ndoubting, and he again repeats the clause on which he stopped before. He\ngoes back to the thought of the estimation in which he is held; he\nthinks of his noble birth, of his princely fortune, of his graces, and\nqualities of breeding, and enumerating all these, he proves his title to\na better nobility by the sudden thought that the love he bears her is\nenough to make him deserve her were she never so precious, and on that,\nand that alone, he rests his claim. But before deciding he will read\nagain from the gold casket, and his exclamations on it are only a\ncontinuation of his previous thought. It seems perfectly plain to him\nthat this must be the fortunate casket. In his generous love he forgets\nhimself entirely, and as it were to show her how wholly he believes in\nher, he makes his selection here. Why should he be angry at the failure?\nHe had no self-assertion to be wounded. If he deserved her, it was only\nbecause he loved her; and if he did not deserve her, it was only because\nshe was more than any one could deserve.\n\nAs Arragon, after passing by the lead, turns to the gold, he begins to\nbe a little more cautious, and repeats like Morocco. But his mind,\ninstead of turning at once to Portia as the only prize in the world\nwholly desirable, begins from a lofty eminence of superiority to\ncriticise others whom he calls the \u201cfool multitude.\u201d He will not choose\nwhat many men desire, because he prefers to keep out of the ranks. No\ndemocrat, but a proud aristocrat is he, and so the gold casket is set\naside. After reading from the next, he begins to criticise again. It\nseems as if he stood outside of all the world and coolly reviewed it. On\nconsideration he is quite sure that there is no danger of his losing his\nplace even if \u201ctrue honor were purchased by the merit of the wearer,\u201d\nand basing his choice on his belief that he deserves success, he orders\nperemptorily the opening of the \u201ctreasure house.\u201d\n\nIs it not most natural that with such feelings, such self-complacency,\nhe should be angry when he finds he has made a mistake? Nothing can be\nmore galling to a proud spirit than to discover that the estimation set\nupon him by others is lower than that he sets upon himself.\n\nIt was not our purpose to compare Bassanio\u2019s comments with the others.\nLet us say only that he evidently prizes sincerity above all other\nvirtues, and prefers a leaden casket that is lead all through, to a\ngolden one that is gold only on the outside, and so he wins the woman,\nwho, as she shows us a moment afterwards, is sincere enough to deserve\nto be won.\n\n\n\n\n LEONARDO DA VINCI\u2019S \u201cLAST SUPPER,\u201d\n AS TREATED BY GOETHE.\n\n\n [The following extracts from Goethe\u2019s treatment of the master-piece\n of Leonardo da Vinci were read at a meeting of the St. Louis Art\n Society, pending the discussion of a fine engraving of this\n celebrated picture. The MS. kindly presented to us by the translator\n we print, in order to give to those unacquainted with the original\n an exhibition of Goethe\u2019s thorough manner of penetrating the spirit\n of a work of art.\u2014EDITOR.]\n\n\nThe Last Supper * * * was painted upon the wall of the monastery _alle\nGrazie_, at Milan. The place where the picture is painted must first be\nconsidered, for here the skill of the artist appears in its most\nbrilliant light. What could be fitter and nobler for a refectory than a\nparting meal, which should be an object of reverence to the whole world\nfor all future time. Several years ago, when travelling, we beheld this\ndining-room still undestroyed. Opposite the entrance on the narrow side,\nstood the table of the prior, on both sides of him the tables of the\nmonks, all of which were raised a step from the floor\u2014and when the\nvisitor turned round, he saw painted on the fourth, above the doors,\nwhich are of but moderate height, a fourth table, and Christ and his\ndisciples seated at it, as if they belonged to the society. At meal\ntimes it must have been a telling sight, when the tables of the prior\nand Christ looked upon each other as two opposite pictures, and the\nmonks at their places found themselves enclosed between them. And just\non this account the skill of the artist was compelled to take the\nexisting tables of the monks as a pattern. Also, the table-cloth, with\nits folds still visible with its worked stripes and tied corners, was\ntaken from the wash-room of the monastery. The plates, dishes, cups, and\nother vessels, are like those which the monks used.\n\nHere was no attempt at imitating an uncertain antiquated costume; it\nwould have been highly improper to stretch out the holy company upon\ncushions in this place. No, the picture must be brought near to the\npresent; Christ must take his last supper with the Dominicans at Milan.\nAlso, in many other respects, the painting must have produced a great\neffect; the thirteen figures about ten feet above the floor, one-half\nlarger than life-size, take up the space of twenty-eight feet in length.\nOnly two whole figures can be seen at the opposite ends of the table,\nthe rest are half-figures; and here, too, the artist found his advantage\nin the necessity of the circumstances. Every moral expression belongs to\nthe upper part of the body, and the feet in such cases are everywhere in\nthe way. The artist has created here twelve half-figures, whose laps and\nknees are covered by the table and table-cloth, but whose feet are\nscarcely visible in the modest twilight beneath. Let us now imagine\nourselves in the place; let us consider the moral repose which prevails\nin such a monastic dining-hall, and let us admire the artist who has\ninfused into his picture, powerful emotion, passionate movement, and at\nthe same time has kept his work within the bounds of Nature, and thus\nbrings it in close contrast with the nearest reality.\n\nThe means of excitement by which the artist arouses the quiet holy\ngroup, are the words of the Master: \u201cThere is one among you who shall\nbetray me!\u201d They are spoken\u2014the whole company falls into disquiet; but\nhe inclines his head, with looks cast down; the whole attitude, the\nmotion of the arms, of the hands, everything repeats with heavenly\nsubmission the unhappy words: Yes, it is not otherwise, there is one\namong you who shall betray me!\n\nBefore we go farther, we must point out a happy device whereby Leonardo\nprincipally enlivened his picture; it is the motion of the hands; this\ndevice, however, only an Italian could discover. With his nation, the\nwhole body is full of animation; every limb participates in the\nexpression of feeling, of passion, even of thought. By various motions\nand forms of the hand, he expresses: \u201cWhat do I care!\u2014Come hither!\u2014This\nis a rogue! beware of him!\u2014He shall not live long!\u2014This is a main\npoint!\u2014Observe this well, my hearers!\u201d To such a national peculiarity\nLeonardo, who observed every characteristic point with the closest\nattention, must have turned his careful eye. In this respect, the\npresent picture is unique, and one can scarcely observe it enough. Every\nlook and movement perfectly correspond, and at the same time there is a\ncombined and contrasted position of the limbs, comprehensible at a\nglance, and wrought out in the most praiseworthy manner.\n\nThe figures on both sides of the Saviour may be considered by threes,\nand each of these again must be thought into a unity, placed in\nrelation, and still held in connection with its neighbors. First, on the\nright side of Christ, are John, Judas, and Peter. Peter the most\ndistant, in consonance with his violent character, when he hears the\nword of the Lord, hastens up behind Judas, who, looking up affrighted,\nbends forward over the table, and holds with his right hand firmly\nclosed, the purse, but with the left makes an involuntary nervous\nmovement, as if he would say: What\u2019s that? What does that mean? In the\nmeanwhile Peter has with his left hand seized the right shoulder of\nJohn, who is inclined towards him, and points to Christ, and at the same\ntime urges the beloved disciple to ask who the traitor is. He strikes a\nknife-handle, which he holds in his right hand, inadvertently into the\nribs of Judas, whereby the affrighted forward movement, which upsets the\nsalt-cellar, is happily brought out. This group may be considered as the\none which was first thought out by the artist; it is the most perfect.\n\nIf now upon the right hand of the Lord immediate vengeance is\nthreatened, with a moderate degree of motion, there arises upon his left\nthe liveliest horror and detestation of the treachery. James, the elder,\nbends back from fear, extends his arms, stares with his head bowed down\nas one who sees before him the monster which he has just heard of.\nThomas peers from behind his shoulder, and approaching the Saviour,\nraises the index of his right hand to his forehead. Philip, the third of\nthis group, rounds it off in the loveliest manner; he has risen, bends\ntoward the Master, lays his hands upon his breast, and declares with the\ngreatest clearness: Lord, it is not I! Thou knowest it! Thou seest my\npure heart. It is not I!\n\nAnd now, the last three figures of this group give us new material for\nthought; they talk with one another about the terrible thing which they\nhave just heard. Matthew, with a zealous motion, turns his face to the\nleft toward his two companions; his hands, on the contrary, he stretches\nwith rapidity towards his master, and thus, by the most ingenious\nartifice, unites his own group with the previous one. Thaddeus shows the\nmost violent surprise, doubt and suspicion; he has laid his left hand\nopen upon the table, and has raised the right in a manner as if he\nintended to strike his left hand with the back of the right\u2014a movement\nwhich one still sees in men of nature when they wish to express at an\nunexpected occurrence: Have I not said so? Have I not always supposed\nit? Simon sits at the end of the table, full of dignity\u2014we therefore see\nhis whole figure; he, the eldest of all, is clothed with rich folds; his\ncountenance and movements show that he is astonished and reflecting, not\nexcited, scarcely moved.\n\nIf we now turn our eyes to the opposite end of the table, we see\nBartholomew, who stands upon his right foot, with the left crossed over\nit; he is supporting his inclined body by resting both hands firmly upon\nthe table. He listens, probably to hear what John will find out from the\nLord; for, in general, the incitement of the favorite disciple seems to\nproceed from this entire side. James, the younger, beside and behind\nBartholomew, lays his left hand upon Peter\u2019s shoulder, just as Peter\nlays his upon the shoulder of John, but James does so mildly, seeking\nexplanation only, whereas Peter already threatens vengeance.\n\nAnd thus, as Peter reaches behind Judas, so James the younger reaches\nbehind Andrew, who, as one of the most important figures, shows with his\nhalf-raised arms, his expanded hands in front, a decided expression of\nhorror, which appears only once in this picture, while in other works of\nless genius, and of less profound thought, it recurs unfortunately only\ntoo often.\n\n\n COPIES GENERALLY.\n\n\nBefore we now come to imitations of our painting, of which the number\namounts to about thirty, we must make some reference to the subject of\ncopies generally. Such did not come into use until everybody confessed\nthat art had reached its culminating point, whereupon, inferior talents,\nlooking at the works of the greater masters, despaired of producing by\ntheir own skill anything similar, either in imitation of nature, or from\nthe idea; and art, which now dwindled into mere handicraft, began to\nrepeat its own creations. This inability on the part of most of the\nartists did not remain a secret to the lovers of art, who, not being\nable always to turn to the first masters, called upon and paid inferior\ntalents, inasmuch as they preferred, in order not to receive something\naltogether destitute of skill, to order imitations of recognized works,\nwith a view to being well served in some degree. This new procedure was\nfavored, from reasons of illiberality and overhaste by owners no less\nthan by artists, and art lowered itself advisedly by setting out with\nthe purpose to copy.\n\nIn the fifteenth century, as well as in the previous one, artists\nentertained a high idea of themselves and their art, and did not readily\ncontent themselves with repeating the inventions of others; hence we\nfind no real copies dating from that period\u2014a circumstance to which\nevery friend of the history of art will do well to give heed. Inferior\narts no doubt made use of higher patterns for smaller works, as in the\ncase of _Niello_ and other enamelled work, and, of course, when from\nreligious or other motives, a repetition was desired, people contented\nthemselves with an accurate imitation, which only approximately\nexpressed the movement and action of the original, without paying any\nclose regard to form and color. Hence in the richest galleries we find\nno copy previous to the sixteenth century.\n\nBut now came the time, when, through the agency of a few extraordinary\nmen\u2014among whom our Leonardo must be reckoned and considered as the\nfirst\u2014art in every one of its parts attained to perfection; people\nlearned to see and to judge better, and now the desire for imitations of\nfirst-class work was not difficult to satisfy, particularly in those\nschools to which large numbers of scholars crowded, and in which the\nworks of the master were greatly in request. And yet, at that time, this\ndesire was confined to smaller works which could be easily compared with\nthe originals and judged. As regards larger works, the case was quite\ndifferent at that time from what it was at a later period, because the\noriginal cannot be compared with the copies, and also because such\norders are rare. Thus, then, art, as well as its lovers, contented\nitself with copies on a small scale, and a great deal of liberty was\nallowed to the copyist, and the results of this arbitrary procedure\nshowed themselves, in an overpowering degree, in the few cases in which\ncopies on a large scale were desired. These indeed were generally copies\nof copies, and, what is more, generally executed from copies on a\nsmaller scale, worked out far away from the original, often from mere\ndrawings, or even perhaps from memory. Job-painters now increased by the\ndozen, and worked for lower prices; people made household ornaments of\npainting; taste died out; copies increased and darkened the walls of\nante-chambers and stair-cases; hungry beginners lived on poor pay, by\nrepeating the most important works on every scale; yea, many painters\npassed the whole of their lives in simply copying; but even then an\namount of deviation appeared in every copy, either a notion of the\nperson for whom it was painted, or a whim of the painter, or perhaps a\npresumptuous wish to be original.\n\nIn addition to this came the demand for worked tapestry, in which\npainting was not content to look dignified, except when tricked out with\ngold; and the most magnificent pictures were considered meagre and\nwretched, because they were grave and simple; therefore the copyist\nintroduced buildings and landscapes in the background, ornaments on the\ndresses, aureoles or crowns around the heads, and further, strangly\nformed children, animals, chimeras, grotesques, and other fooleries. It\noften happened, also, that an artist, who believed in his own powers of\ninvention, received by the will of a client who could not appreciate his\ncapabilities, a commission to copy another person\u2019s work, and since he\ndid so with reluctance, he wished to appear original here and there, and\ntherefore made changes or additions as knowledge, or perhaps vanity,\nsuggested. Such occurrences took place of course according to the\ndemands of place and time. Many figures were used for purposes quite\ndifferent from those for which they had been intended by their first\nproducers. Secular subjects were, by means of a few additions, changed\ninto religious ones; heathen gods and heroes had to submit to be martyrs\nand evangelists. Often also, the artist, for instruction or exercise to\nhimself, had copied some figure from a celebrated work, and now he added\nto it something of his own invention in order to turn it into a saleable\npicture. Finally, we may certainly ascribe a part of the corruption of\nart to the discovery and abuse of copper-plate engravings, which\nsupplied job-painters with crowds of foreign inventions, so that no one\nany longer studied, and painting at last reached such a low ebb that it\ngot mixed up with mechanical works. In the first place, the copper-plate\nengravings themselves were different from the originals, and whoever\ncopied them multiplied the changes according to his own or other\npeoples\u2019 conviction or whim. The same thing happened precisely in the\ncase of drawings; artists took sketches of the most remarkable subjects\nin Rome and Florence, in order to produce arbitrary repetitions of them\nwhen they returned home.\n\n\n COPIES OF THE SUPPER.\n\n\nIn view of the above, we shall be able to judge what is to be expected,\nmore or less, of copies of the Supper, although the earliest were\nexecuted contemporaneously; for the work made a great sensation, and\nother monasteries desired similar works. Of the numerous copies\nconsulted by the author [Vossi] we shall occupy ourselves here with only\nthree, since the copies at Weimar are taken from them; nevertheless, at\nthe basis of these lies a fourth, of which, therefore, we must first\nspeak. _Marco d\u2019Oggiono_, a pupil of Leonardo da Vinci\u2019s, though without\nany extensive talent, gained the praise of his school chiefly by his\nheads, although in them he is not always equal to himself. About the\nyear 1510, he executed a copy on a small scale, intending to use it\nafterwards for a copy on a larger scale. It was, according to tradition,\nnot quite accurate; he made it, however, the basis of a larger copy\nwhich is in the now suppressed monastery at Castellazzo, likewise in the\ndining-hall of the monks of those days. Everything about it shows\ncareful work; nevertheless the usual arbitrariness prevails in the\ndetails. And although Vossi has not been able to say much in its praise,\nhe does not deny that it is a remarkable monument, and that the\ncharacter of several of the heads, in which the expression is not\nexaggerated, is deserving of praise. Vossi has copied it, and on\ncomparison of the three copies we shall be able to pronounce judgment\nupon it from our own observation.\n\nA second copy, of which we likewise have the heads copied before us, is\nfound in fresco on the wall at Ponte Capriasca; it is referred to the\nyear 1565, and ascribed to Pierro Lovino. Its merits we shall learn in\nthe sequel; it has the peculiarity that the names of the figures are\nwritten underneath, a piece of foresight which aids us in arriving at a\ncorrect characterization of the different physiognomies.\n\nThe gradual destruction of the original we have described in sufficient\ndetail, and it was already in a very wretched condition when, in 1612,\nCardinal Frederico Borromeo, a zealous friend of art, endeavored to\nprevent the entire loss of the work, and commissioned a Milanese, Andrea\nBianchi, surnamed Vespino, to execute a full-sized copy. This artist\nfirst tried his skill on a few of the heads; being successful in these,\nhe proceeded and copied the whole of the figures, separately however,\nand afterwards put them together with the greatest possible care; the\npicture is at present to be found in the Ambrosiana library at Milan,\nand lies mainly at the basis of the most recent copy, executed by Vossi.\nThis was executed on the following occasion.\n\n\n LATEST COPY.\n\n\nThe Kingdom of Italy was decreed, and Prince Eug\u00e8ne, following the\nexample of Luigi Sforza, wished to glorify the beginning of his reign by\npatronizing the fine arts. Luigi had ordered a representation of the\nLast Supper of Leonardo; Eug\u00e8ne resolved to restore, as far as possible,\nthe painting that had been going to wreck for three hundred years in a\nnew picture, which, in order that it might be indestructible, was to be\ndone in mosaic, for which preparation had been made in an already\nexisting institution.\n\nVossi immediately receives the commission, and commences in the\nbeginning of May, 1807. He finds it advisable to execute a full-sized\ncartoon, takes up anew the studies of his youth, and applies himself\nentirely to Leonardo, studies his art-remains and his writings,\nparticularly the latter, because he is persuaded that a man who has\nproduced such splendid works must have worked on the most decided and\nadvantageous principles. He had made drawings of the heads in the copy\nat Ponte Capriasca, as well as of some other parts of it, likewise of\nthe heads and hands of the Castellazzo copy, and of that of Bianchi.\nThen he makes drawings of everything coming from Da Vinci himself, and\neven of what comes from some of his contemporaries. Moreover he looks\nabout for all the extant copies, and succeeds in making more or less\nacquaintance with twenty-seven; drawings and manuscripts of Da Vinci\u2019s\nare kindly sent to him from all quarters. In the working out of his\ncartoon, he adheres principally to the Ambrosiana copy; it alone is as\nlarge as the original. Bianchi, by means of thread-nets and transparent\npaper, had endeavored to give a most accurate copy of the original,\nwhich, although already very much injured, was not yet painted over.\n\nIn the end of October, 1807, the cartoon is ready; canvass grounded\nuniformly in one piece, and the whole immediately sketched out.\nHereupon, in order in some measure to regulate his tints, Vossi painted\nthe small portion of sky and landscape, which, on account of the depth\nand purity of the colors in the original, had still remained fresh and\nbrilliant. Hereupon he paints the head of Christ and those of the three\napostles at his left, and as for the dresses, he first paints those\nabout whose colors he had first arrived at certainly, with a view to\nselecting the rest according to the principles of the master and his own\ntaste. Thus he covered the whole of the canvass, guided by careful\nreflection, and kept his colors of uniform height and strength.\n\nUnfortunately, in this damp, deserted place, he was seized with an\nillness which compelled him to put a stop to his exertions;\nnevertheless, he employed this interval in arranging drawings,\ncopper-plate engravings, partly with a view to the Supper itself, partly\nto other works of the master; at the same time he was favored by\nfortune, which brought him a collection of drawings, purporting to come\nfrom Cardinal C\u00e6sar Monti, and containing, among other treasures,\nremarkable productions of Leonardo himself. He studied even the authors\ncontemporaneous with Leonardo, in order to make use of their opinions\nand wishes, and looked about him for everything that could further his\ndesign. Thus he took advantage of his sickness, and at last attained\nstrength to set about his work anew.\n\nNo artist or friend of art will leave unread the account of how he\nmanaged the details, how he thought out the characters of the faces and\ntheir expression, and even the motions of the hands, and how he\nrepresented them. In the same manner he thinks out the dishes, the room,\nthe back-ground, and shows that he has not decided upon any part without\nthe strongest reasons. What care he takes about representing the feet\nunder the table in correct attitudes, because this portion of the\noriginal had long been destroyed, and in the copies had been carelessly\ntreated!\n\n * * * * *\n\nOf the relation of the two copies\u2014the merits of the third can be shown\nonly to the eye, not to the mind in words\u2014we shall state in a few words\nthe most essential and most decided points, until we shall be fortunate\nenough, as we shall perhaps one day be, to be able to lay copies of\nthese interesting sheets before the friends of art.\n\n\n COMPARISON.\n\n\n_St. Bartholomew_, manly youth, sharp profile, compressed, clear face,\neyelid and brow pressed down, mouth closed, as if listening with\nsuspicion, a character completely circumscribed within itself. In\nVespino\u2019s copy no trace of individual characteristic features, a general\nkind of drawing-book face, listening with open mouth. Vossi has approved\nof this opening of the lips, and retained it, a procedure to which we\nshould be unable to lend our assent.\n\n_St. James_ the younger, likewise profile, relationship to Christ\nunmistakable, receives from the protruded, slightly opened lips,\nsomething individual, which again cancels this similarity. According to\nVespino, almost an ordinary, academical Christ, the mouth opened rather\nin astonishment than in inquiry. Our assertion that Bartholomew must\nhave his mouth closed, receives support from the fact that his neighbor\nhas his mouth open. Such a repetition Leonardo would never have endured;\non the contrary, the next figure,\n\n_St. Andrew_ has his mouth shut. Like persons advanced in life, he\npresses the lower lip rather against the upper. In the copy of Marco,\nthis head has something peculiar, not to be expressed in words; the eyes\nare introverted; the mouth, though shut, is still _na\u00efve_. The outline\nof the left side against the back ground forms a beautiful silhouette;\nenough of the other side of the forehead (eye, nose and beard) is seen\nto give the head a roundness and a peculiar life; on the contrary,\nVespino suppresses the left eye altogether, but shows so much of the\nleft temple and of the side of the beard as to produce in the uplifted\nface a full bold expression, which is indeed striking, but which would\nseem more suitable to clenched fists than to open hands stretched\nforward.\n\n_Judas_ locked up within himself, frightened, looking anxiously up and\nback, profile strongly dented, not exaggerated, by no means an ugly\nformation; for good taste would not tolerate any real monster in the\nproximity of pure and upright men. Vespino, on the other hand, has\nactually represented such a monster, and it cannot be denied that,\nregarded by itself, this head has much merit; it expresses vividly a\nmischievously bold malignity, and would make itself eminently\nconspicuous in a mob triumphing over an _Ecce Homo_, and crying out\n\u201cCrucify! crucify!\u201d It might be made to pass for Mephistopheles in his\nmost devilish moment. But of affright or dread, combined with\ndissimulation, indifference and contempt, there is not a trace; the\nbristly hair fits in with the _tout ensemble_ admirably; its\nexaggeration, however, is matched only by the force and violence of the\nrest of Vespino\u2019s heads.\n\n_St. Peter._\u2014Very problematical features. Even in Marco, it is merely an\nexpression of pain; of wrath or menace there is no sign; there is also a\ncertain anxiety expressed, and here Leonardo may not have been at one\neven with himself; for cordial sympathy with a beloved master, and\nthreatening against a traitor, are with difficulty united in one\ncountenance. Nevertheless, Cardinal Borromeo asserts that he saw such a\nmiracle in his time. However pleasant it might be to believe this, we\nhave reason to suppose that the art-loving cardinal expressed his own\nfeeling rather than what was in the picture; for otherwise we should be\nunable to defend our friend Vespino, whose Peter has an unpleasant\nexpression. He looks like a stern Capuchin monk, whose Lent sermon is\nintended to rouse sinners. It is strange that Vespino has given him\nbushy hair, since the Peter of Marco shows a beautiful head of short,\ncurled tresses.\n\n_St. John_ is represented by Marco in the spirit of Da Vinci; the\nbeautiful roundish face, somewhat inclined to oval, the hair smooth\ntowards the top of the head, but curling gently downwards, particularly\nwhere it bends round Peter\u2019s inserted hand, are most lovely; what we see\nof the dark of the eye is turned away from Peter\u2014a marvellously fine\npiece of observation, in that while he is listening with the intensest\nfeeling to the secret speech of his neighbor, he turns away his eyes\nfrom him. According to Vespino, he is a comfortable-looking, quiet,\nalmost sleepy youth, without any trace of sympathy.\n\nWe turn now to the left side of Christ, in order that the figure of the\nSaviour may come last in our description.\n\n_St. Thomas\u2019_ head and right hand, whose upraised fore-finger is bent\nslightly toward his brow to imply reflection. This movement, which is so\nmuch in keeping with a person who is suspicious or in doubt, has been\nhitherto misunderstood, and a hesitating disciple looked upon as\nthreatening. In Vespino\u2019s copy, likewise, he is reflective enough, but\nas the artist has again left out the retreating right eye, the result is\na perpendicular, monotonous profile, without any remnant of the\nprotruding, searching elements of the older copies.\n\n_St. James_ the Elder.\u2014The most violent agitation of the features, the\nmost gaping mouth, horror in his eye; an original venture of Leonardo\u2019s;\nyet we have reason to believe that this head, likewise, has been\nremarkably succesful with Marco. The working out is magnificent, whereas\nin the copy of Vespino all is lost; attitude, manner, mien, everything\nhas vanished, and dwindles down into a sort of indifferent generality.\n\n_St. Philip_, amiable and invaluable, resembles Raffaelle\u2019s youths,\ncollected on the left side of _The School of Athens_ about Bramante.\nVespino has, unfortunately, again suppressed the right eye, and as he\ncould not deny that there was something more than profile in the thing,\nhe has produced an ambiguous, strangely inclined head.\n\n_St. Matthew_, young, of undesigning nature, with curly hair, an anxious\nexpression in the slightly opened mouth, in which the teeth, which are\nvisible, express a sort of slight ferocity in keeping with the violent\nmovement of the figure. Of all this nothing remains in Vespino; he gazes\nbefore him, stiff and expressionless; one does not receive the remotest\nnotion of the violent movement of the body.\n\n_St. Thaddeus_, according to Marco, is likewise quite an invaluable\nhead; anxiety, suspicion, vexation, are expressed in every feature. The\nunity of this agitation of the countenance is extremely fine, and is\nentirely in keeping with the movement of the hands which we have already\nexplained. In Vespino, everything is again reduced to a general level;\nhe has also made the head still more unmeaning by turning it too much\ntowards the spectator, whereas, according to Marco, hardly a quarter of\nthe left side is seen, whereby the suspicious, askance-looking element\nis admirably portrayed.\n\n_St. Simon_ the Elder, wholly in profile, placed opposite the likewise\npure profile of young Matthew. In him the protruding under lip which\nLeonardo had such a partiality for in old faces, is most exaggerated;\nbut, along with the grave, overhanging brow, produces the most wonderful\neffect of vexation and reflection, in sharp contrast with the passionate\nmovement of young Matthew. In Vespino he is a good-natured old man in\nhis dotage, incapable of taking any interest in even the most important\noccurrence that might take place in his presence.\n\nHaving thus now thrown light upon the apostles, we turn to the form of\n_Christ_ himself. And here again we are met by the legend, that Leonardo\nwas unable to finish either Christ or Judas, which we readily believe,\nsince, from his method, it was impossible for him to put the last touch\nto those two extremes of portraiture. Wretched enough, in the original,\nafter all the darkening processes it had to undergo, may have been the\nappearance presented by the features of Christ, which were only\nsketched. How little Vespino found remaining, may be gleaned from the\nfact that he brought out a colossal head of Christ, quite at variance\nwith the purpose of Da Vinci, without paying the least attention to the\ninclination of the head, which ought of necessity to have been made\nparallel with the inclination of John\u2019s. Of the expression we shall say\nnothing; the features are regular, good-natured, intelligent, like those\nwe are accustomed to see in Christ, but without the very smallest\nparticle of sensibility, so that we should almost be unable to tell what\nNew Testament story this head would be welcome to.\n\nWe are here met and aided by the circumstance that connoisseurs assert,\nthat Leonardo himself painted the head of the Saviour at Castellazzo,\nand ventured to do in another\u2019s work what he had not been willing to\nundertake in his own principal figure. As we have not the original\nbefore us, we must say of the copy that it agrees entirely with the\nconception which we form of a noble man whose breast is weighed down by\npoignant suffering of soul, which he has endeavored to alleviate by a\nfamiliar word, but has thereby only made matters worse instead of\nbetter.\n\nBy these processes of comparison, then, we have come sufficiently near\nthe method of this extraordinary artist, such as he has clearly\nexplained and demonstrated it in writings and pictures, and fortunately\nit is in our power to take a step still further in advance. There is,\nnamely, preserved in the Ambrosiana library a drawing incontestably\nexecuted by Leonardo, upon bluish paper, with a little white and colored\nchalk. Of this the chevalier Vossi has executed the most accurate\n_fac-simile_, which is also before us. A noble youthful face, drawn from\nnature, evidently with a view to the head of Christ at the Supper. Pure,\nregular features, smooth hair, the head bent to the left side, the eyes\ncast down, the mouth half opened, the _tout ensemble_ brought into the\nmost marvellous harmony by a slight touch of sorrow. Here indeed we have\nonly the man who does not conceal a suffering of soul, but the problem,\nhow, without extinguishing this promise, at the same time to express\nsublimity, independence, power, the might of godhead, is one which even\nthe most gifted earthly pencil might well find hard to solve. In this\nyouthful physiognomy which hovers between Christ and John, we see the\nhighest attempt to hold fast by nature when the supermundane is in\nquestion.\n\n\n\n\n PAUL JANET AND HEGEL.[65]\n\n\n [In the following article the passages quoted are turned into\n English, and the original French is omitted for the sake of brevity\n and lucid arrangement. As the work reviewed is accessible to most\n readers, a reference to the pages from which we quote will answer\n all purposes.\u2014EDITOR.]\n\nSince the death of Hegel in 1831, his philosophy has been making a slow\nbut regular progress into the world at large. At home in Germany it is\nspoken of as having a right wing, a left wing, and a centre; its\ndisciples are very numerous when one counts such widely different\nphilosophers as Rosenkrantz, Michelet, Kuno Fischer, Erdmann, J. H.\nFichte, Strauss, Feuerbach, and their numerous followers. Sometimes when\none hears who constitute a \u201cwing\u201d of the Hegelian school, he is reminded\nof the \u201c_lucus a non_\u201d principle of naming, or rather of misnaming\nthings. But Hegelianism has, as we said, made its way into other\ncountries. In France we have the \u00c6sthetics \u201cpartly translated and partly\nanalyzed,\u201d by Professor B\u00e9nard; the logic of the small Encyclop\u00e6dia,\ntranslated with copious notes, by Professor Vera, who has gone bravely\non, with what seems with him to be a work of love, and given us the\n\u201cPhilosophy of Nature\u201d and the \u201cPhilosophy of Spirit,\u201d and promises us\nthe \u201cPhilosophy of Religion\u201d\u2014all accompanied with abundant introduction\nand commentary. We hear of others very much influenced by Hegel: M.\nTaine, for example, who writes brilliant essays. In English, too, we\nhave a translation of the \u201cPhilosophy of History,\u201d (in Bohn\u2019s Library;)\na kind of translation and analysis of the first part of the third volume\nof the Logic, (Sloman & Wallon, London, 1855); and an extensive and\nelaborate work on \u201cThe Secret of Hegel,\u201d by James Hutchison Stirling. We\nmust not forget to mention a translation of Schwegler\u2019s History of\nPhilosophy\u2014a work drawn principally from Hegel\u2019s labors\u2014by our American\nProfessor Seelye: and also (just published) a translation of the same\nbook by the author of the \u201cSecret of Hegel.\u201d Articles treating of Hegel\nare to be found by the score\u2014seek them in every text-book on philosophy,\nin every general Cyclop\u00e6dia, and in numerous works written for or\nagainst German Philosophy. Some of these writers tell us in one breath\nthat Hegel was a man of prodigious genius, and in the next they convict\nhim of confounding the plainest of all common sense distinctions. Some\nof them find him the profoundest of all thinkers, while others cannot\n\u201cmake a word of sense out of him.\u201d There seems to be a general\nunderstanding in this country and England on one point: all agree that\nhe was a Pantheist. Theodore Parker, Sir William Hamilton, Mansell,\nMorell, and even some of the English defenders of Hegelianism admit\nthis. Hegel holds, say some, that God is a _becoming_; others say that\nhe holds God to be _pure being_. These men are careful men\napparently\u2014but only _apparently_, for it must be confessed that if Hegel\nhas written any books at all, they are, every one of them, devoted to\nthe task of showing the inadequacy of such abstractions when made the\nhighest principle of things.\n\nThe ripest product of the great German movement in philosophy, which\ntook place at the beginning of this century, Hegel\u2019s philosophy is\nlikewise the concretest system of thought the world has seen. This is\ncoming to be the conviction of thinkers more and more every day as they\nget glimpses into particular provinces of his labor. B\u00e9nard thinks the\nPhilosophy of Art the most wonderful product of modern thinking, and\nspeaks of the Logic\u2014which he does not understand\u2014as a futile and\nperishable production. Another thinks that his Philosophy of History is\nimmortal, and a third values extravagantly his Philosophy of Religion.\nBut the one who values his Logic knows how to value all his labors. The\nHistory of Philosophy is the work that impresses us most with the\nunparalleled wealth of his thought; he is able to descend through all\nhistory, and give to each philosopher a splendid thought as the centre\nof his system, and yet never is obliged to confound different systems,\nor fail in showing the superior depth of modern thought. While we are\nadmiring the depth and clearness of Pythagoras, we are surprised and\ndelighted to find the great thought of Heraclitus, but Anaxagoras is a\nnew surprise; the Sophists come before us bearing a world-historical\nsignificance, and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle lead us successively to\nheights such as we had not dreamed attainable by any thinking.\n\nBut thought is no _immediate_ function, like the process of breathing or\nsleeping, or fancy-making: it is the profoundest mediation of spirit,\nand he who would get an insight into the speculative thinkers of\nwhatever time, must labor as no mere flesh and blood can labor, but only\nas spirit can labor: with agony and sweat of blood. A philosophy which\nshould explain the great complex of the universe, could hardly be\nexpected to be transparent to uncultured minds at the first glance. Thus\nit happens that many critics give us such discouraging reports upon\ntheir return from a short excursion into the true wonder-land of\nphilosophy. The Eternal Verities are miraculous only to those eyes which\nhave gazed long upon them after shutting out the glaring sunlight of the\nsenses.\n\nThose who criticise a philosophy must imply a philosophical method of\ntheir own, and thus measure themselves while they measure others. A\nliterary man who criticises Goethe, or Shakespeare, or Homer, is very\napt to lay himself bare to the shaft of the adversary. There are,\nhowever, in our time, a legion of writers who pass judgment as\nflippantly upon a system of the most comprehensive scope\u2014and which they\nconfess openly their inability to understand\u2014as upon a mere opinion\nuttered in a \u201ctable-talk.\u201d Even some men of great reputation give\ncurrency to great errors. Sir William Hamilton, in his notes to Reid\u2019s\nPhilosophy of \u201cTouch,\u201d once quoted the passage from the second part of\nFichte\u2019s _Bestimmung des Menschen_, (wherein onesided idealism is pushed\nto its downfall,) in order to show that Fichte\u2019s Philosophy ended in\nNihilism. The _Bestimmung des Menschen_ was a mere popular writing in\nwhich Fichte adopted the Kantian style of exhibiting the self-refutation\nof sense and reflection, in order to rest all ultimate truth in the\npostulates of the Practical Reason. Accordingly he shows the practical\nresults of his own system in the third part of the work in question, and\nenforces the soundest ethical views of life. He never thought of\npresenting his theoretical philosophy in that work. Thus, too, in\nHamilton\u2019s refutation of Cousin and Schelling: he polemicises against\nall \u201cDoctrines of the Absolute,\u201d saying that _to think is to limit;\nhence to think God would be to determine or limit Him_; and hence is\ninferred the impossibility of thinking God as he truly is. This, of\ncourse, is not pushed to its results by his followers, for then its\nskeptical tendency would become obvious. Religion demands that we shall\ndo the Will of God; this Will must, therefore, be known. But, again,\nWill is the realization or self-determination of one\u2019s nature\u2014from it\nthe character proceeds. Thus in knowing God\u2019s will we know his character\nor nature. If we cannot do this at all, no religion is possible; and in\nproportion as Religion is possible, the Knowledge of God is possible.\n\nIf it be said that the Absolute is unthinkable, in this assertion it is\naffirmed that all predicates or categories of thought are inapplicable\nto the Absolute, for to think is to predicate of some object, the\ncategories of thought; and in so far as these categories apply, to that\nextent is the Absolute thinkable. Since _Existence_ is a category of\nthought, it follows from this position that to predicate existence of\nthe Absolute is impossible; \u201ca questionable predicament\u201d truly for the\nAbsolute. According to this doctrine\u2014that all thought is limitation\u2014God\nis made Pure Being, or Pure Thought. This is also the result of Indian\nPantheism, and of all Pantheism; this doctrine concerning the mere\nnegative character of thought, in fact, underlies the Oriental tenet\nthat consciousness is finitude. To be consistent, all Hamiltonians\nshould become Brahmins, or, at least, join some sect of modern\nSpiritualists, and thus embrace a religion that corresponds to their\ndogma. However, let us not be so unreasonable as to insist upon the\nremoval of inconsistency\u2014it is all the good they have.\n\nAfter all this preliminary let us proceed at once to examine the work of\nProfessor Paul Janet, which we have named at the head of our article:\n\u201c_Essai sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel_.\u201d\n\nAfter considering the Dialectic of Plato in its various aspects, and\nfinding that it rests on the principle of contradiction, M. Janet\ngrapples Hegel, and makes, in order, the following points:\n\nI. TERMINOLOGY.\u2014He tells us that the great difficulty that lies in the\nway of comprehending German Philosophy is the abstract terminology\nemployed, which is, in fact, mere scholasticism preserved and applied to\nmodern problems. No nation of modern times, except the Germans, have\npreserved the scholastic form. He traces the obscurity of modern German\nphilosophy to \u201cAristotle subtilized by the schools.\u201d This he contrasts\nwith the \u201csimple and natural philosophy of the Scotch.\u201d [This\n\u201csimplicity\u201d arises from the fact that the Scotch system holds that\nimmediate sensuous knowing is valid. Of course this implies that they\nhold that the immediate existence of objects is a true existence\u2014that\nwhatever is, exists thus and so without any further grounds. This is the\ndenial of all philosophy, for it utterly ignores any occasion whatever\nfor it. But it is no less antagonistic to the \u201cnatural science\u201d of the\nphysicist: he, the physicist, finds the immediate object of the senses\nto be no permanent or true phase, but only a transitory one; the object\nis involved with other beings\u2014even the remotest star\u2014and changes when\nthey change. It is force and matter (two very abstract categories) that\nare to him the permanent and true existence. But force and matter cannot\nbe seen by the senses; they can only be thought.] Our author proceeds to\ntrace the resemblance between Hegel and Wolff: both consider and analyze\nthe pure concepts, beginning with Being. To M. Janet this resemblance\ngoes for much, but he admits that \u201cHegel has modified this order (that\nof Wolff) and rendered it more systematic.\u201d If one asks \u201c_How_ more\nsystematic?\u201d he will not find the answer. \u201cThe scholastic _form_ is\nretained, but not the _thought_,\u201d we are told. That such statements are\nput forward, even in a book designed for mere surface-readers may well\nsurprise us. That the mathematical method of Wolff or Spinoza\u2014a method\nwhich proceeds by definitions and external comparison, holding meanwhile\nto the principle of contradiction\u2014that such a method should be\nconfounded with that of Hegel which proceeds dialectically, i. e.\nthrough the internal movement of the categories to their contradiction\nor limit, shows the student of philosophy at once that we are dealing\nwith a _litt\u00e9rateur_, and not with a philosopher. So far from retaining\nthe form of Wolff it is the great object of Hegel (see his long prefaces\nto the \u201cLogik\u201d and the \u201cPh\u00e4nomenologie des Geistes\u201d) to supplant that\nform by what he considers the true method\u2014that of the _objective_\nitself. The objective method is to be distinguished from the arbitrary\nmethod of external reflection which selects its point of view somewhere\noutside of the object considered, and proceeds to draw relations and\ncomparisons which, however edifying, do not give us any exhaustive\nknowledge. It is also to be distinguished from the method of mere\nempirical observation which collects without discrimination a mass of\ncharacteristics, accidental and necessary, and never arrives at a\nvivifying soul that unites and subordinates the multiplicity. The\nobjective method seizes somewhat in its definition and traces it through\nall the phases which necessarily unfold when the object is placed in the\nform of _relation to itself_. An object which cannot survive the process\nof self-relation, perishes, i. e. it leads to a more concrete object\nwhich is better able to endure. This method, as we shall presently see,\nis attributed to Plato by M. Janet.\n\nThe only resemblance that remains to be noted between the scholastics\nand Hegel is this: they both treat of subtle distinctions in thought,\nwhile our modern \u201ccommon sense\u201d system goes only so far as to\ndistinguish very general and obvious differences. This is a questionable\nmerit, and the less ado made about it by such as take pride in it, the\nbetter for them.\n\nOur author continues: \u201cThe principal difficulty of the system of Kant is\nour ignorance of the ancient systems of logic. The Critique of Pure\nReason is modelled on the scholastic system.\u201d Could we have a more\nconclusive refutation of this than the fact that the great professors of\nthe ancient systems grossly misunderstand Kant, and even our essayist\nhimself mistakes the whole purport of the same! Hear him contrast Kant\nwith Hegel: \u201cKant sees in Being only the form of Thought, while Hegel\nsees in Thought only the form of Being.\u201d This he says is the great\ndifference between the Germans and French, interpreting it to mean:\n\u201cthat the former pursues the route of deduction, and the latter that of\nexperience\u201d!\n\nHe wishes to consider Hegel under three heads: 1st, The Beginning; 2d,\nthe dialectical deduction of the Becoming, and 3d, the term Dialectic.\n\nII. THE BEGINNING.\u2014According to M. Janet, Hegel must have used this\nsyllogism in order to find the proper category with which to commence\nthe Logic.\n\n(a) The Beginning should presuppose nothing;\n\n(b) Pure Being presupposes nothing;\n\n(c) Hence Pure Being is the Beginning.\n\nThis syllogism he shows to be inconclusive: for there are two\nbeginnings, (a) in the order of knowledge, (b) in the order of\nexistence. Are they the same? He answers: \u201cNo, the thinking\nbeing\u2014because it thinks\u2014knows itself before it knows the being which it\nthinks.\u201d Subject and object being identical in that act, M. Janet in\neffect says, \u201cit thinks itself before it thinks itself\u201d\u2014an argument that\nthe scholastics would hardly have been guilty of! The beginning is\nreally made, he says, with internal or external _experience_. He quotes\n(page 316) from Hegel a passage asserting that _mediation_ is essential\nto knowing. This he construes to mean that \u201cthe determined or concrete\n(the world of experience) is the essential condition of knowing!\u201d\nThrough his misapprehension of the term \u201cmediation,\u201d we are prepared for\nall the errors that follow, for \u201cmediation in knowing\u201d means with Hegel\nthat it involves a _process_, and hence can be true only in the form of\na system. The \u201cinternal and external experience\u201d appertains to what\nHegel calls immediate knowing. It is therefore not to be wondered at\nthat M. Janet thinks Hegel contradicts himself by holding Pure Being to\nbe the Beginning, and afterwards affirming mediation to be necessary. He\nsays (page 317), \u201cIn the order of knowing it is the mediate which is\nnecessarily first, while in the order of existence the immediate is the\ncommencement.\u201d Such a remark shows him to be still laboring on the first\nproblem of Philosophy, and without any light, for no _Speculative_\nPhilosopher (like Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, or Hegel) ever held that\nPure Being\u2014or the immediate\u2014is the first in the order of existence, but\nrather that God or Spirit (self-thinking, \u201cpure act,\u201d \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u201cLogos,\u201d\n&c.) is the first in the order of existence. In fact, M. Janet praises\nPlato and Aristotle for this very thing at the end of his volume, and\nthereby exhibits the unconsciousness of his procedure. Again, \u201cThe pure\nthought is the end of philosophy, and not its beginning.\u201d If he means by\nthis that the culture of consciousness ends in arriving at pure thought\nor philosophy, we have no objection to offer, except to the limiting of\nthe application of the term Philosophy to its preliminary stage, which\nis called the Phenomenology of Spirit. The arrival at pure thought marks\nthe beginning of the use of terms in a universal sense, and hence is the\nbeginning of philosophy proper. But M. Janet criticises the distinction\nmade by Hegel between Phenomenology and Psychology, and instances Maine\nde Biran as one who writes Psychology in the sense Hegel would write\nPhenomenology. But M. Biran merely manipulates certain unexplained\nphenomena,\u2014like the Will, for example\u2014in order to derive categories like\nforce, cause, &c. But Hegel shows in his Phenomenology the dialectical\nunfolding of consciousness through all its phases, starting from the\nimmediate certitude of the senses. He shows how certitude becomes\nknowledge of truth, and wherein it differs from it. But M. Janet (p.\n324) thinks that Hegel\u2019s system, beginning in empirical Psychology,\nclimbs to pure thought, \u201cand then draws up the ladder after it.\u201d\n\nIII. THE BECOMING.\u2014We are told by the author that consciousness\ndetermining itself as Being, determines itself as _a_ being, and not as\n_the_ being. If this be so we cannot think _pure being_ at all. Such an\nassertion amounts to denying the universal character of the Ego. If the\nposition stated were true, we could think neither being nor any other\nobject.\n\nOn page 332, he says, \u201cThis contradiction (of Being and non-being) which\nin the ordinary logic would be the negative of the _posited notion_, is,\nin the logic of Hegel, only an excitant or stimulus, which somehow\ndetermines spirit to find a third somewhat in which it finds the other\nconciliated.\u201d He is not able to see any procedure at all. He sees the\ntwo opposites, and thinks that Hegel empirically hunts out a concept\nwhich implies both, and substitutes it for them. M. Janet thinks (pp.\n336-7) that Hegel has exaggerated the difficulties of conceiving the\nidentity of Being and nought. (p. 338) \u201cIf the difference of Being and\nnought can be neither expressed nor defined, if they are as identical as\ndifferent\u2014if, in short, the idea of Being is only the idea of the pure\nvoid, I will say, not merely that Being transforms itself into Nothing,\nor passes into its contrary; I will say that there are not two\ncontraries, but only one term which I have falsely called Being in the\nthesis, but which is in reality only Non-being without restriction\u2014the\npure zero.\u201d He quotes from Kuno Fischer (p. 340) the following remarks\napplicable here:\n\n \u201cIf Being were in reality the pure void as it is ordinarily taken,\n Non-being would not express the same void a second time; but it\n would then be the non-void, i. e. the abhorrence of the void, or the\n immanent contradiction of the void.\u201d\u2014(and again from his \u201cLogik und\n Metaphysik\u201d II. \u00a7 29): \u201cThe logical Being contradicts itself; for\n thought vanishes in the immovable repose of Being. But as Being\n comes only from thought (for it is the act of thought), it\n contradicts thus itself in destroying thought. Consequently thought\n manifests itself as the negation of Being\u2014that is to say, as\n _Non-being_. The Non-being (logical) is not the total suppression of\n Being\u2014the pure zero\u2014it is not the mathematical opposition of Being\n to itself as a negative opposed to a positive, but it is the\n dialectical negative of itself, the immanent contradiction of Being.\n Being contradicts itself, hence is Non-being, and in the concept of\n Non-being, thought discovers the immanent contradiction of\n Being\u2014thought manifests itself at first as Being, and in turn the\n logical Being manifests itself as Non-being; thought can hence say,\n \u201cI am the Being which is not.\u201d\n\n\u201cSuch,\u201d continues our author, \u201cis the deduction of M. Fischer. It seems\nto me very much inferior in clearness to that of Hegel.\u201d How he could\nsay this is very mysterious when we find him denying all validity to\nHegel\u2019s demonstration. Although Fischer\u2019s explanation is mixed\u2014partly\ndialectical and partly psychological\u2014yet, as an explanation, it is\ncorrect. But as psychology should not be dragged into Logic, which is\nthe evolution of the forms of pure thinking, we must hold strictly to\nthe dialectic if we would see the \u201cBecoming.\u201d The psychological\nexplanation gets no further than the relation of Being and nought as\nconcepts. The Hegelian thought on this point is not widely different\nfrom that of Gorgias, as given us by Sextus Empiricus, nor from that of\nPlato in the Sophist. Let us attempt it here:\n\nBeing is the pure simple; as such it is considered under the form of\nself-relation. But as it is wholly undetermined, and has no content, it\nis pure nought or absolute negation. As such it is the negation by\nitself or the negation of itself, and hence its own opposite or Being.\nThus the simple falls through self-opposition into duality, and this\nagain becomes simple if we attempt to hold it asunder, or give it any\nvalidity by itself. Thus if Being is posited as having validity in and\nby itself without determination, (_omnis determinatio est negatio_), it\nbecomes a pure void in nowise different from nought, for difference is\ndetermination, and neither Being nor nought possess it. What is the\nvalidity of the nought? A negative is a relative, and a negative by\nitself is a negative related to itself, which is a self-cancelling. Thus\nBeing and nought, posited objectively as having validity, prove\ndissolving forms and pass over into each other. Being is a _ceasing_ and\nnought is a _beginning_, and these are the two forms of _Becoming_. The\nBecoming, dialectically considered, proves itself inadequate likewise.\n\nIV. THE DIALECTIC.\u2014To consider an object dialectically we have merely to\ngive it universal validity; if it contradicts itself then, _we_ are not\nin anywise concerned for the result; we will simply stand by and accept\nthe result, without fear that the true will not appear in the end. The\nnegative turned against itself makes short work of itself; it is only\nwhen the subjective reflection tries to save it by hypotheses and\nreservations that a merely negative result is obtained.\n\n(Page 369): \u201cIn Spinozism the development of Being is Geometric; in the\nSystem of Hegel it is organic.\u201d What could have tempted him to use these\nwords, it is impossible to say, unless it was the deep-seated national\nproclivity for epigrammatic statements. This distinction means nothing\nless (in the mouth of its original author) than what we have already\ngiven as the true difference between Wolff\u2019s and Hegel\u2019s methods; but M.\nJanet has long since forgotten his earlier statements. (Page 369) He\nsays, \u201cHegel\u2019s method is a faithful expression of the movement of\nnature,\u201d from which he thinks Hegel derived it empirically!\n\nOn page 372 he asks: \u201cWho proves to us that the dialectic stops at\n_Spirit_ as its last term? Why can I not conceive a spirit absolutely\nsuperior to mine, in whom the identity between subject and object, the\nintelligible and intelligence would be more perfect than it is with this\ngreat Philosopher [Hegel]? ***** In fact, every philosopher is a man,\nand so far forth is full of obscurity and feebleness.\u201d Spirit is the\nlast term in philosophy for the reason that it stands in complete\nself-relation, and hence contains its antithesis within itself; if it\ncould stand in opposition to anything else, then it would contain a\ncontradiction, and be capable of transition into a higher. M. Janet asks\nin effect: \u201cWho proves that the dialectic stops at God as the highest,\nand why cannot I conceive a higher?\u201d Judging from his attempt at\nunderstanding Hegel, however, he is not in a fair way to conceive \u201ca\nspirit in whom the identity between subject and object\u201d is more perfect\nthan in Hegel. \u201cWhat hinders\u201d is his own culture, his own self; \u201c_Du\ngleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, nicht mir_,\u201d said the World-spirit\nto Faust.\n\nHe asks, (p. 374): \u201cWhen did the \u2018pure act\u2019 commence?\u201d From Eternity; it\nalways commences, and is always complete, says Hegel. \u201cAccording to\nHegel, God is made from nought, by means of the World.\u201d Instead of this,\nHegel holds that God is self-created, and the world eternally created by\nhim (the Eternally-begotten Son). \u201cWhat need has God of Nature?\u201d God is\nSpirit; hence conscious; hence he makes himself an object to himself; in\nthis act he creates nature; hence Nature is His reflection. (P. 386):\n\u201cThe Absolute in Hegel is spirit only on condition that it thinks, and\nthinks _itself_; hence it is not _essentially_ Spirit, but only\n_accidentally_.\u201d To \u201c_think itself_\u201d is to be conscious, and, without\nthis, God would have no personality; and hence if Hegel were to hold any\nother doctrine than the one attributed to him, he would be a Pantheist.\nBut these things are not mere dogmas with Hegel; they appear as the\nlogical results of the most logical of systems. \u201cBut in Plato, God is a\nReason _in activity_, a living thought.\u201d M. Janet mentions this to show\nPlato\u2019s superiority; he thinks that it is absurd for Hegel to attribute\n_thinking_ to God, but thinks the same thing to be a great merit in\nPlato. (P. 392): \u201cBehold the Platonic deduction [or dialectic]: being\ngiven a pure idea, he shows that this idea, if it were _all alone_, [i.\ne. made universal, or placed in self-relation, or posited as valid for\nitself,] would be contradictory of itself, and consequently could not\nbe. Hence, if it exists, it is on condition that it mingles with another\nidea. Take, for example, the multiple: by itself, it loses itself in the\nindiscernible, for it would be impossible without unity.\u201d This would do\nvery well for a description of the Dialectic in Hegel if he would lay\nmore stress on the positive side of the result. Not merely does the\n\u201cpure idea mingle with another\u201d\u2014i. e. pass over to its opposite\u2014but it\n_returns_ into itself by the continuation of its own movement, and\nthereby reaches a concrete stage. Plato sometimes uses this complete\ndialectical movement, and ends affirmatively; sometimes he uses only the\npartial movement and draws negative conclusions.\n\nHow much better M. Janet\u2019s book might have been\u2014we may be allowed to\nremark in conclusion\u2014had he possessed the earnest spirit of such men as\nVera and Hutchison Stirling! Stimulated by its title, we had hoped to\nfind a book that would kindle a zeal for the study of the profoundest\nphilosophical subject, as treated by the profoundest of thinkers.\n\nFootnote 65:\n\n \u201cEssai sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel,\u201d par Paul Janet,\n Membre de L\u2019Institut, professeur \u00e0 la Facult\u00e9 des lettres de\n Paris.\u2014Paris, (Ladrange,) 1860.\n\n\n\n\n \u25cf Transcriber\u2019s Notes:\n \u25cb Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).\n Text that was in bold face is enclosed by equals signs (=bold=).\n \u25cb Footnotes have been moved to follow the articles in which they are\n referenced.","title":"The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":179253}