{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_65708/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_65708","id":"gutenberg_65708","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65708","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Islam and philosophy","Philosophy, Arab"],"text":"_The Gaekwad Studies\nin\nReligion and Philosophy: XI._\n\n                                  THE\n                        PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY\n                              OF AVERROES\n\n           Printed by Manibhai Mathurbhai Gupta at the \u201cArya\n            Sudharak\u201d Printing Press, Raopura, Baroda, and\n            Published by A. G. Widgery, the College, Baroda\n                               1-1-1921\n\n\n\n\n                                  THE\n                        PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY\n                              OF AVERROES\n\n                  Tractata translated from the Arabic\n\n                                  By\n\n                    MOHAMMAD JAMIL-UR-REHMAN M. A.\n\n                Professor of Islamic History, Hyderabad\n       Formerly Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study\n                         of Religions, Baroda.\n\n                                BARODA\n\n\n\n\n                              DEDICATION\n                                  to\n                          Dr. AZIMUDDIN AHMAD\n\n\nSIR,\n\nIt was at your feet that I first learned to appreciate historical and\nliterary research, and the following pages constitute the earliest\nfruits of that literary labour of mine the impetus for which I am proud\nto have received from you. I crave your indulgence for my taking the\nliberty of dedicating the same to your revered name, with the hope that\nit will not fail to attract the same generous sympathy from you as you\nhave always shown to your pupil.\n\n                                               MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR REHMAN\n\n\n\n\n                                PREFACE\n\n\nIt was as a Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study of\nReligions at the College, Baroda, that the present work was begun.\nThe subject was taken up in the first place as a parallel study to\nthat contained in a paper in the Indian Philosophical Review, Volume\nII, July 1918, pp. 24-32 entitled \u201cMaimonides and the Attainment of\nReligious Truth.\u201d But as I proceeded with my investigation I thought\nit might be best to let Averroes speak for himself. For this reason\nI have here translated certain treatises of Averroes, as edited in\nthe Arabic text by D. H. Muller in \u201cPhilosophie und Theologie von\nAverroes.\u201d Munich 1859. I am confident that the book will prove an\ninteresting one and will explain itself to the reader without any\nintroduction on my part. Though owing to my appointment at Hyderabad I\nresigned my position at Baroda soon after commencing this work I wish\nhere to express my thanks to Professor Alban G. Widgery of Baroda for\nhis constant sympathy with and encouragement for my work in and out of\nthe Seminar. He has also kindly accepted the book for inclusion in the\nGaekwad Studies in Religion and Philosophy. I am indebted to him for a\ncomplete revision of the manuscript and for the onerous work of seeing\nthe book through the press. I am also indebted to my brother Mutazid\nWali ur Rehman, B.A. for valuable help in rendering many obscure\npassages.\n\n                                               MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR REHMAN\n  _Osmania University,\n  Hyderabad._\n\n\n\n\n                               CONTENTS\n\n\n I. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of the Relation between\n Religion and Philosophy.\n\n I a. Appendix: On the Problem of Eternal Knowledge which Averroes has\n mentioned in his Decisive Discourse.\n\n II. An Exposition of the Methods of Argument concerning the Doctrines\n of the Faith, and a Determination of Doubts and misleading Innovation\n brought into the Faith through Interpretations.\n\n\n\n\n                                   I\n                A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION\n                                OF THE\n               RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\n                A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION\n                                OF THE\n             RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.[1]\n\n\nAnd after: Praise be to God for all His praiseworthy acts, and\nblessings on Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the Chosen One and His\nApostle. The purpose of the following treatise is to inquire through\nsacred Law[2] whether the learning of philosophy and other sciences\nappertaining thereto is permitted, or called dangerous, or commended\nby the Law, and if commended, is it only approved or made obligatory.\nWe maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to\nlook into creation and to ponder over it in order to be guided to the\nCreator,--in other words, to look into the meaning of existence. For\nthe knowledge of creation leads to the cognisance of the Creator,\nthrough the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the\nknowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of\nthe Creator. The Law encourages and exhorts us to observe creation.\nThus, it is clear that this is to be taken either as a religious\ninjunction or as something approved by the Law. But the Law urges\nus to observe creation by means of reason and demands the knowledge\nthereof through reason. This is evident from different verses of the\nQuran. For example the Quran says: \u201cWherefore take example _from them_,\nye who have eyes.\u201d[3] That is a clear indication of the necessity\nof using the reasoning faculty, or rather both reason and religion,\nin the interpretation of things. Again it says: \u201cOr do they not\ncontemplate the kingdom of heaven and earth and the things which God\nhath created.\u201d[4] This is a plain exhortation to encourage the use of\nobservation of creation. And remember that one whom God especially\ndistinguishes in this respect, Abraham, the prophet. For He says: \u201cAnd\nthis did we show unto Abraham: the kingdom of heaven and earth.\u201d[5]\nFurther He says: \u201cDo they not consider the camels, how they are\ncreated; and the heaven, how it is raised.\u201d[6] Or still again: \u201cAnd\n(who) meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord thou\nhast not created this in vain.\u201d[7] There are many other verses on this\nsubject: too numerous to be enumerated.\n\nNow, it being established that the Law makes the observation and\nconsideration of creation by reason obligatory--and consideration\nis nothing but to make explicit the implicit--this can only be done\nthrough reason. Thus we must look into creation with the reason.\nMoreover, it is obvious that the observation which the Law approves\nand encourages must be of the most perfect type, performed with the\nmost perfect kind of reasoning. As the Law emphasises the knowledge of\nGod and His creation by inference, it is incumbent on any who wish to\nknow God and His whole creation by inference, to learn the kinds of\ninference, their conditions and that which distinguishes philosophy\nfrom dialectic and exhortation from syllogism. This is impossible\nunless one possesses knowledge beforehand of the various kinds of\nreasoning and learns to distinguish between reasoning and what is not\nreasoning. This cannot be done except one knows its different parts,\nthat is, the different kinds of premises.\n\nHence, for a believer in the Law and a follower of it, it is necessary\nto know these things before he begins to look into creation, for\nthey are like instruments for observation. For, just as a student\ndiscovers by the study of the law, the necessity of knowledge of legal\nreasoning with all its kinds and distinctions, a student will find out\nby observing the creation the necessity of metaphysical reasoning.\nIndeed, he has a greater claim on it than the jurist. For if a jurist\nargues the necessity of legal reasoning from the saying of God:\n\u201cWherefore take example _from them_ O ye who have eyes,\u201d[8] a student\nof divinity has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf\nof metaphysical reasoning.\n\nOne cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in\nreligion because it did not exist in the early days of Islam. For legal\nreasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later\nages, and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also be our\nattitude towards philosophical reasoning. There is another reason why\nit should be so, but this is not the proper place to mention it. A\nlarge number of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical\nreasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from\nreligious ordinances. Now, as it is established that the Law makes the\nconsideration of philosophical reasoning and its kinds as necessary\nas legal reasoning, if none of our predecessors has made an effort to\nenquire into it, we should begin to do it, and so help them, until the\nknowledge is complete. For if it is difficult or rather impossible for\none person to acquaint himself single-handed with all things which it\nis necessary to know in legal matters, it is still more difficult in\nthe case of philosophical reasoning. And, if before us, somebody has\nenquired into it, we should derive help from what he has said. It is\nquite immaterial whether that man is our co-religionist or not; for the\ninstrument by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain\nin its usefulness, by its being in the hands of one of our own party,\nor of a foreigner, if it possesses the attributes of truth. By these\nlatter we mean those Ancients who investigated these things before the\nadvent of Islam.\n\nNow, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into\nphilosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the\nAncients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to\ntheir books and see what they have said in this connection. If all\nthat they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something\nwrong, we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this\nkind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can\nobserve the universe, and consider its general character. For so long\nas one does not know its general character one cannot know the created,\nand so long as he does not know the created, he can have no knowledge\nof the Creator. Thus we must begin an inquiry into the universe\nsystematically, such as we have learned from the trend of rational\ninference. It is also evident that this aim is to be attained by the\ninvestigation of one part of the universe after another, and that help\nmust be derived from predecessors, as is the case in other sciences.\nImagine that the science of geometry and astronomy had become extinct\nin our day, and a single individual desired to find out by himself the\nmagnitude of the heavenly bodies, their forms, and their distances from\none another. Even though he were the most sagacious of men, it would be\nas impossible for him as to ascertain the proportion of the sun and the\nearth and the magnitude of the other stars. It would only be attainable\nby aid of divine revelation, or something like it. If it be said to him\nthat the sun is a hundred and fifty or sixty times as big as the earth,\nhe would take it to be sheer madness on the part of the speaker, though\nit is an established fact in the science of astronomy, so that no one\nlearned in that science will have any doubt about it.\n\nThe science which needs most examples from other sciences is that of\nLaw. For the study of jurisprudence cannot be completed except in a\nvery long time. If a man today would himself learn of all the arguments\ndiscovered by the different disputants of diverse sects, in problems\nwhich have always excited contentions in all the big cities, except\nthose of Al-Maghrib, he would be a proper object to be laughed at on\naccount of the impossibility of the task, in spite of the existence of\nevery favourable circumstance. This is similar not only in the sciences\nbut also in the arts. For no one is capable of discovering by himself\nalone everything which is required. And if this is so in other sciences\nand arts, how is it possible in the art of arts--philosophy?\n\nThis being so, it becomes us to go back to the Ancients, and to see\nwhat observations and considerations they have made into the universe,\naccording to the tests of inference. We should consider what they have\nsaid in this connection and proved in their books, so that whatever may\nbe true in them we may accept and, while thanking them, be glad to know\nit, and whatever be wrong, we should be warned by it, be cautioned, and\nhold them excused for their mistake.\n\nFrom what has been said, it may be taken that a search into the books\nof the Ancients is enjoined by the Law, when their meaning and purpose\nbe the same as that to which the Law exhorts us. Anyone who prevents a\nman from pondering over these things, that is, a man who has the double\nquality of natural sagacity and rectitude in the Law, with the merit of\nlearning and disposition--turns away the people from the door by which\nthe Law invites them to enter into the knowledge of God, and that is\nthe door of observation which leads to the perfect knowledge of God.\nSuch an action is the extreme limit of ignorance and of remoteness from\nGod.\n\nIf, by studying these books, a man has been led astray and gone wrong\non account of some natural defect, bad training of the mind, inordinate\npassion, or the want of a teacher who might explain to him the true\nsignificance of things, by all or some of these causes, we ought not on\nthis account to prevent one fit to study these things from doing so.\nFor such harm is not innate in man, but is only an accident of training.\n\nIt is not right that a drug which is medically useful by its nature\nshould be discarded because it may prove harmful by accident. The\nProphet told a man whose brother was suffering with diarrhea to\ntreat him with honey. But this only increased the ailment. On his\ncomplaining, the Prophet said: \u201cGod was right and thy brother\u2019s stomach\nwas wrong.\u201d We would even say that a man who prevents another fit for\nit, from studying the books of philosophy, because certain worthless\npeople have been misled by them, is like a man who refused a thirsty\nman cold and sweet water, till he died, because some people under the\nsame circumstances have been suffocated by it and have died. For death\nby suffocation through drinking cold water is accidental, while by\nthirst it is natural and inevitable.\n\nThis state of things is not peculiar to this science only, but is\ncommon to all. How many jurists there are in whom jurisprudence has\nbecome the cause of worldliness and lack of piety? We should say that\na large majority of jurists are of this kind, although their science\nshould result in better action than other sciences which only lead to\nbetter knowledge.\n\nSo far, then, the position is established. Now, we Muslims firmly\nbelieve that our Law is divine and true. This very Law urges us and\nbrings us to that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God, and\nHis creation. This is a fact to which every Muslim will bear testimony\nby his very nature and temperament. We say this, because temperaments\ndiffer in believing: one will believe through philosophy; while another\nwill believe through dogmatic discourse, just as firmly as the former,\nas no other method appeals to his nature. There are others who believe\nby exhortation alone, just as others believe through inferences. For\nthis reason our divine Law invites people by all the three methods,\nwhich every man has to satisfy, except those who stubbornly refuse to\nbelieve, or those, according to whom these divine methods have not been\nestablished on account of the waywardness of their hearts. This is why\nthe mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world,\nfor his Law comprises all the three methods leading men towards God.\nWhat we say is quite clear from the following saying of God: \u201cInvite\nmen unto the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation, and\ndispute with them in the most condescending manner.\u201d[9]\n\nAs this Law is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge\nof God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not\ncontrary to Law, for truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies it and\nbears testimony to it. And if that is so, and rational observation is\ndirected to the knowledge of any existent objects, then the Law may be\nfound to be silent about it, or concerned with it. In the former case\nno dispute arises, as it would be equivalent to the absence of its\nmention in the Law as injunctory, and hence the jurist derives it from\nlegal conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it, either it will agree\nwith that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree\nwith it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, and if it is\nopposed to the Law, an interpretation is to be sought. Interpretation\nmeans to carry the meaning of a word from its original sense to a\nmetaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will\nnot conflict with the custom of the Arabian tongue. It is to avoid\nthe naming of an object, by simply mentioning its like, its cause,\nits attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the\ndefinition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. And if\nthe jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very befitting\nwould it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For\nthe jurist has only his fanciful conjectures to depend upon, while a\nlearned man possesses positive ones.\n\nWe hold it to be an established truth that if the Law is apparently\nopposed to a truth proved by philosophy it admits of an interpretation\naccording to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition\nwhich a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is\naccustomed to these things divine can experience for himself what we\nhave said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual\nand traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical\nconclusion will be found to be opposed to the Law, which when sifted\nand investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or\nalmost so, with it.\n\n                   *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of the Law are\nnot to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation.\nBut they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted.\nFor example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse\nof Equalisation[10] and on the Tradition of Descent,[11] while\nthe Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of\nthese--exoteric and esoteric--because of the differences of human\nnature and minds in verifying a thing. The existence of an opposed\nesoteric meaning is in order to call the attention of the learned to\nfind out a comprehensive interpretation. To this the following verse\nof the Quran refers: \u201cIt is he who hath sent down unto thee the book,\nwherein are some verses clear to be understood--they are the foundation\nof the book--and others are parabolical. But they whose hearts are\nperverse will follow that which is parabolical therein, out of love of\nschism, and a desire of the interpretation thereof; yet none knoweth\nthe interpretation thereof except God. But they who are well grounded\nin knowledge say: We believe therein, the whole is from our Lord, and\nnone will consider except the prudent.\u201d[12]\n\nHere it may be objected that in the Law there are things which all\nMuslims have agreed to take esoterically, while there are others on\nwhich they have agreed to put an interpretation, while there are some\nabout which they disagree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the\ninterpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise?\nWe would say that if the agreement is positive there is no need to\napply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. For this very reason\nAbu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and Abu Ma\u2019ali and other learned doctors have\nordained that a man does not become an unbeliever by forsaking the\ncommon agreement and applying the principle of interpretation in such\nthings. It will certainly be agreed that complete consensus of opinion\nis not possible in metaphysical questions, in the manner in which it is\npossible to establish it in practical things. For it is not possible to\nestablish unanimity of opinion at any time, unless we confine ourselves\nto a small period and know perfectly all the learned doctors living in\nit, that is, their personalities, their number and their views about\nany question to be quoted to us directly from them without a break in\nthe chain. With all this we should know for certain that the doctors\nliving at that time are agreed that there is no distinction of exoteric\nand esoteric meanings in the Law, that the knowledge of no proposition\nshould be concealed from anybody, and that the method of teaching the\nLaw should be the same with all men. But we know that a large number\nof people in the early days of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric\nmeanings of the Law, and thought that the esoteric meanings should\nnot be disclosed to an ignorant person who cannot understand them.\nFor example, Bukhari has related on the authority of Ali that he said\n\u201cTalk to men what they can understand. Do you intend to give the lie\nto God and His Apostle?\u201d There are many Traditions to the same effect\nrelated from other people. So, how is it possible to conceive of any\nconsensus of opinion coming down to us in metaphysical questions when\nwe definitely know that in every age there have been doctors who take\nthe Law to contain things the real significance of which should not be\ndisclosed to all men? But in practical affairs it is quite different.\nFor all persons are of opinion that they should be revealed to all men\nalike. In these things unanimity of opinion can be easily obtained if\nthe proposition is published, and no disagreement is reported. That may\nbe sufficient to obtain unanimity of opinion in practical things as\ndistinct from the sciences.\n\nIf it be maintained that one does not become an unbeliever by ignoring\nconsensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible\nin it, what shall we say of such Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr (Al\nFarabi) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna)? For Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has\ncharged them with positive infidelity in his book: _The Refutation\nof the Philosophers_, in regard to three things: The eternity of\nthe world; God\u2019s ignorance of particulars; and the interpretation\nconcerning the resurrection of bodies and the state of the Day of\nJudgment. To this we should reply that from what he has said it\nis not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity.\nFor in his book _Al Tafriqah bain\u2019al Islami w\u2019al Zindiqah_ he has\nexplained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of\nopinion is doubtful. Moreover we have definitely pointed out that it\nis not possible to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters,\nespecially when there are many people of the early times who have\nheld that there are interpretations which should not be disclosed to\nall but only to those who are fit for them and those are men who are\n\u201cwell grounded in knowledge\u201d[13], a divine injunction which cannot\nbe overlooked. For if such people do not know the interpretation in\nthese matters they will have no special criterion of truth for their\nfaith, which the common people have not, while God has described\nthem as believing in Him. This kind of faith is always produced by\nthe acceptance of the arguments, and that is not possible without a\nknowledge of interpretation. Otherwise, even the common people believe\nin the words of God without any philosophy whatever. The faith which\nthe Quran has especially ascribed to the learned must be a faith\nstrengthened with full arguments, which cannot be without a knowledge\nof the canons of interpretation. For God has said that the Law admits\nof interpretation which is its real significance, and this is what is\nestablished by arguments. Yet though this is so, it is impossible to\nestablish any well grounded consensus of opinion in the interpretations\nwhich God has ascribed to the learned men. That is quite evident to\nanyone with insight. But with this we see that Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali)\nhas made a mistake in ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers the\nopinion that God has no knowledge of particulars. They are only of\nopinion that the knowledge of God about particulars is quite different\nfrom ours. For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing.\nSuch knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes\nwith changes in the thing. On the other hand the knowledge of God is\nthe cause of an existent thing. Thus one who compares these two kinds\nof knowledge ascribes the same characteristics to two quite different\nthings--and that is extreme ignorance. When applied both to eternal\nand to transitory things the word _knowledge_ is used only in a formal\nfashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially\ndifferent. For instance the word _Jalal_ is applied both to great and\nsmall; and _sarim_ to light and darkness. We have no definition which\ncan embrace both these kinds of knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimun\nof our times have thought. We have treated this question separately at\nthe request of some of our friends.\n\nHow can it be supposed that the Peripatetic Philosophers say that God\nhas no knowledge of particulars when they are of opinion that man is\nsometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through\nvisions, and that he gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great\nand powerful Director, who directs everything? These philosophers\nare not only of opinion that God has no knowledge of details such as\nwe have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universals. For\nall known universals with us are also the effect of the existence of\na thing, while God\u2019s knowledge is quite other than this. From these\narguments it is concluded that God\u2019s knowledge is far higher than that\nit should be called universal or particular. There is therefore no\ndifference of opinion concerning the proposition, that is, whether they\nare called infidel or not.\n\nAs to the eternal or transitory nature of the world: I think that in\nthis matter the difference of opinion between the Asharite Mutakallimun\nand the Ancient Philosophers is for the most part a verbal difference,\nat least so far as the opinion of some of the Ancients is concerned.\nFor they are agreed on the fact that there are three kinds of\ncreation--the two extremes and a medial one. They again agree on the\nnomenclature of the two extremes, but they disagree as to the medial\none. As to the one extreme, it has come into existence from something\nother than itself, or from anything else--that is from a generative\ncause or matter--while time existed before it. All those things whose\nexistence is perceived by the senses, as water, animals, vegetation,\netc., are included in this. All Ancient and Asharite philosophers are\nagreed in denominating this creation _Originated_.\n\nThe other extreme is that which came into existence from nothing, not\nout of anything, and time did not precede it. The two parties are\nagreed in calling this _Eternal_. This extreme can be reached by logic.\nThis is God, the Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all.\n\nThe medial kind of creation is that which has neither been made from\nnothing, \u201cmatter,\u201d nor has time preceded it, but it has been created\nby some generative cause. In this is included the whole world. Again\nthey all agree on the existence of all the three categories of the\nuniverse. The Mutakallimun admit, or they ought to admit, that\nbefore the universe there was no time, for according to them time is\ncontemporaneous with motion and body. They are also agreed with the\nAncients that future time and creation have no end, but they differ as\nto past time and its creation. The Mutakallimun are of opinion that it\nhad a beginning.\n\nThis is the belief of Plato and his disciples, while Aristotle and\nhis followers are of opinion that it had no beginning, just as the\nfuture has no end. It is clear that the last mentioned kind of creation\nresembles both the _originated_ and the _eternal_ creation. So one who\nthinks that in the past creation there are more characteristics of the\neternal than the originated takes it to be eternal and vice versa.\nBut in reality it is neither truly originated nor eternal. For the\noriginated creation is necessarily subject to destruction while the\neternal is without a cause. There are some, for example, Plato and his\nfollowers, who have called it _infinitely originated_, for according\nto them time has no end. There is not here so great a difference about\nthe universe, for it to be made the basis of a charge of infidelity.\nIn fact, they should not be so charged at all, for opinions which are\nworthy of this are far removed from ours, those quite contrary to them,\nas the Mutakallimun have thought them to be in this proposition. I mean\nthat they take the words _originated_ and _eternal_ to be contrary\nexpressions, which our investigation has shown not to be the case.\n\nThe strange thing about all these opinions is that they are not in\nagreement with the literal sense of the Law. For if we look closely\nwe shall find many verses which tell us of the creation of the\nuniverse--that is, of its _originated_ nature. Creation and time are\nsaid to be without end. For according to the verse: \u201cIt is He who hath\ncreated the heavens and the earth in six days, but His Throne was above\nthe waters before the creation thereof\u201d[14] it is clear that there was\na universe before this one, and that is the throne and the water, and\na time which existed before that water. Then again the verse \u201cThe day\nwill come when the earth shall be changed into another earth and the\nheavens into other heavens\u201d[15] shows equally when taken literally that\nthere will be a universe after this one. Again, the verse: \u201cThen He set\nhis mind to the creation of heaven and it was smoke\u201d[16] shows that the\nheavens were created from something.\n\nWhatever the Mutakallimun say about the universe is not based on a\nliteral sense of the Law, but is an interpretation of it. For the Law\ndoes not tell us that God was even before mere non-existence, and\nmoreover, this is not found as an ordinance in it. How can we suppose\nthat there could be any consensus of opinion about the interpretation\nof verses by the Mutakallimun? In fact, there is much in the sayings\nof some philosophers which supports what we have quoted from the Law,\ntaken literally.\n\nThose who differ concerning these obscure questions have either reached\nthe truth and have been rewarded; or have fallen into error and have\nto be excused. For it is compulsory rather than voluntary to believe\na thing to be true, the proof of which has already been established;\nthat is, we cannot believe or disbelieve it as we like, as it depends\nupon our will to stand or not to do so. So, if one of the conditions of\nverification be freedom of choice, a learned man, and he alone, should\nbe held excused, if he makes a mistake on account of some doubt. Hence\nthe Prophet has said that if a magistrate judges rightly he receives\ntwo rewards, and if he makes a mistake he deserves only one. But what\nmagistrate is greater than one who judges the universe, whether it\nis so or not. These are the judges--the learned men--whom God has\ndistinguished with the knowledge of interpretation.\n\nIt is this kind of mistake of insight which learned people are\nquite apt to make when they look into those obscure questions the\ninvestigation of which the Law has imposed upon them. But the mistake\nthe common people make in these matters is sin pure and simple, whether\nin theoretical or in practical things. As a magistrate, ignorant of\nTradition, when he makes mistakes in judgment, cannot be held excused,\nso likewise a judge of the universe when not having the qualities of a\njudge is also not excusable, but is either a sinner or an unbeliever.\nIf it be a condition that a magistrate shall have capacity of\narbitration concerning the lawful and the forbidden, that is, knowledge\nof the principles of Law and their application through analogy--how\nmuch more befitting it is for an arbitrator of the universe to be armed\nwith fundamental knowledge of the mental sciences, and the way of\ndeducing results from them.\n\nMistake in the interpretation of the Law is thus of two kinds--a\nmistake which can be excused in one fit to look into the thing in which\nit has been committed, just as an expert physician is excused if he\ncommits an error in the application of his science; or a magistrate\nwhen he misjudges, and a mistake which is inexcusable in one not fit\nto investigate a thing. But the error which cannot be excused for\nanybody, and which, if it happens to show itself in relation to the\nvery principles of the Law, is infidelity, and if in universals is an\ninnovation, is that error which is committed in those things which have\nbeen settled by all arguments and so the knowledge of them is possible\nfor everybody, for instance, the acknowledgement of the existence of\nGod, of Prophecy, and of the happiness or the misery of the next world.\nThis is so, because all these three principles are proved by those\nthree methods, the justification of which a man cannot deny by any\nmeans, that is exhortative controversial and argumentative proofs. A\ndenier of such things, which are the very root of the principle of the\nLaw, is an unbeliever, a retrograde with his tongue and his heart, or\nthrough negligence, on account of his denying them in spite of proofs.\nFor if he be a man believing in arguments, he can verify them through\nthese or if he believes in controversy, he can verify through that;\nand if he believes in religions admonitions he can well justify them\nthrough these. And hence the Prophet has said: \u201cI have been commanded\nto fight with men till they say: \u2018There is no God but Allah\u2019 and\nbelieve in me\u201d that is, by any of these three means of attaining the\nFaith.\n\nBut there are things which, on account of their obscurity, cannot be\nunderstood by inference. So, God has favoured such of his creatures\nas cannot understand logic, either on account of their nature, habit,\nor lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such\nthings and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them.\nFor everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the\nhelp of dogmatic and exhortatory argument which are common to all\nmen. This is why the Law has been divided into two kinds: exoteric\nand esoteric. The exoteric part consists of those examples which have\nbeen coined to express certain meanings; while the esoteric is the\nmeanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in\nphilosophy.\n\nThese are the very four or five kinds of methods of knowing reality\nmentioned by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book called _Al Tafriqah\nbain al Islam wal Zindiqah_. If it so happens as we have said that\nwe can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods,\nthen we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them.\nSuch things should be taken literally and interpretation should find\nno place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the\nprinciples of the Law, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an\ninfidel. For instance, if a man believes that there is no happiness or\nmisery in the next world, and that the teaching is only an artifice to\nsafeguard the life and property of the people from one another and that\nthere is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an\nunbeliever.\n\nWhen this has once been established it will become clear to you that\ninterpretation is not lawful in the exoteric part of the Law. If the\ncanon of interpretation be used in the principles of the Law, it is\ninfidelity, and if used in general things it is an innovation. But\nthere is also a certain exoteric law which requires an interpretation\nfrom learned men. It is not misbelief for them to take it exoterically,\nbut it is so or is at least an innovation in religion if ignorant men\ntry to interpret or explain it.\n\nAmong these is the verse of Equalisation and the Tradition of Descent.\nFor the Prophet said of a Negro slave girl who told him that God was in\nheaven: \u201cEmancipate her, for she is a believer.\u201d For there are persons\nwho cannot believe a thing except through their imagination, that is,\nit is difficult for them to believe a thing which they cannot imagine.\nAmong these may be classed men who cannot understand a thing except\nwith a reference to space, and hence believe in God as though physical,\nnotwithstanding that these are the very persons who have dealt very\nharshly with those mentioned above. They ought to be told that things\nof his character are parabolical, and that we should pause and consider\nthe saying of God: \u201cYet none knoweth the interpretation thereof except\nGod.\u201d Although learned men agree that these are to be interpreted, they\ndiffer in the interpretation according to their knowledge of principles\nof philosophy. There is a third part of the Law which occupies an\nintermediate position, on account of some doubt about it. Some say that\nit should be taken exoterically, and that no interpretation should\nbe allowed in it; while there are others who say that they have some\nesoteric meaning, and should not be taken exoterically by the learned.\nThis is on account of the obscurity of their meaning. A learned man may\nbe excused if he makes a mistake about them.\n\nIf the Law is divided into these three parts, it may be asked: to which\nof these does the description of the state of the Day of Judgment\nbelong? We would reply that it is quite clear, on the very face of\nthe question, that it belongs to that part in which there is some\ndifference of opinion. For one group of men, who class themselves\namong philosophers, say that these things should be taken literally.\nFor, according to them, there is not a single argument which makes\ntheir literal sense absurd and unreasonable. This is the method of the\nAsharites. But another group of philosophers interpret them; but they\ndiffer very widely in the interpretation itself. Amongst these may be\nmentioned Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and a large number of Sufis. There\nare some who would amalgamate the two interpretations, as Abu Hamid has\ndone in some of his books. These questions are among those in which, if\nthe learned men err they are to be excused; otherwise, they are to be\nthanked and rewarded. For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day\nof Judgment, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation\nto the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny\nit. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the\nfundamentals of the Law, and it can be easily verified by any of the\nthree methods of argument common to all men. But one who is not learned\nshould take it exoterically, an interpretation in his case is unbelief,\nfor it leads to infidelity. We are thus of opinion that such people\nshould accept the literal sense, for interpretation will certainly\nlead them to infidelity. A learned man who discloses the discussions\nof these things to the common people helps them towards unbelief and\none who abets another in that direction is himself no better than an\nunbeliever. It is therefore unsuitable that these interpretations\nshould be published in any other than learned books, for in this way\nthey will reach none but the learned. But it is a mistake both in\nreligion and philosophy if they are put in other books, with dogmatic\nand exhortative arguments, as Abu Hamid has done. Although the author\u2019s\nintention was good, the idea thus to increase the number of learned\nmen, he caused a good deal of mischief through it. For, on account of\nthis method some people began to find fault with philosophy, and others\nto blame religion, and still others began to think of reconciling the\ntwo. It seems that this was the very aim which Abu Hamid had in view in\nwriting these books. He has tried to awaken the nature of men, for he\nnever attached himself to any particular way of thinking in his books.\nHe was an Asharite with the Asharites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a\nphilosopher with the philosophers, so much so that he was, as has been\nsaid: \u201cI am a Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if I meet a Ma\u2019adi I am\none of Banu Adnan.\u201d\n\nHence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except\nthe learned, from reading his books; as it is incumbent upon them to\nhinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be\nstudied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these\nbooks is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot\nunderstand philosophical books, only those endowed with superior\nnatures. People are on the whole destitute of learning and are aimless\nin their reading which they do without a teacher. Nevertheless they\nsucceed in leading others away from religion. It is an injustice to\nthe best kind of men and the best kind of creation; for in their case\njustice consists in the knowledge of the best things by the best\npeople, fit to know it. It should be remembered that the greater the\nthing is the higher will be the injustice done to it on account of\nignorance. Hence God says: \u201cPolytheism is a great injustice.\u201d[17]\n\nThese things we have thought proper to mention here, that is, in a\ndiscussion of the relation between philosophy and religion and the\ncanons of interpretation in Law. If these matters had not become\ncommonly known among men, we would not have said anything about them\nand would not have entered in a plea on behalf of the interpreters. For\nthese things are suitable only for mention in philosophical books.\n\nYou ought to be aware that the real purpose of the Law is to impart\nthe knowledge of truth and of right action. The knowledge of truth\nconsists in the cognisance of God and the whole universe with its\ninner significance, especially that of religion, and the knowledge\nof happiness or misery of the next world. Right action consists in\nfollowing those actions which are useful for happiness and avoiding\nthose which lead to misery. The knowledge of these actions has been\ncalled practical knowledge. This is divided into two kinds: external\nactions, the knowledge of which is called Fiqh, that is, Theology; and\nactions pertaining to feelings, such as gratitude, patience, and other\npoints of character to which the Law has urged us or from which it has\nprohibited us. This is called the knowledge of continence and of the\nnext world. Abu Hamid in his book _The Revivification of the Sciences\nof Religion_ seems to be inclined to this kind, and as the people have\nalways turned away from the former kind of knowledge and have turned\nthemselves to the second which leads them easily to piety, the book\nattained its name. But we have wandered from our own purpose and will\nnow return to it.\n\nIf the purpose of the Law is to impart the knowledge of truth and\nof right action, this cannot be attained except by one of the two\nmethods: _viz_, by conception or verification such as Mutakallimun have\nmaintained in their books. There are three methods of verification open\nto people: philosophy, dogmatics and exhortation. There are two methods\nof conception: either by the thing itself, or by its like. As all\npeople cannot by their nature understand and accept philosophical and\ndogmatic arguments, together with the difficulty of learning the use of\ninferences and the long time it takes to learn them, and the purpose\nof the Law being to be quite common among men, it is necessary that it\nshould contain all kinds of verifications and conceptions. Among the\nmethods of verification there are some which are meant for the common\npeople: that is, exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative being more\ncommon than the other. There is one method which is meant solely for\nthe learned, and that is the method of rational inference. Now, it is\nthe primary aim of the Law to improve the condition of the many without\nneglecting the few, and hence the method of conception and verification\nadopted are common to the majority.\n\nThese methods are of four kinds: the first is that which, while\nin particulars the same in both, that is, both exhortatively and\ndialectically, is still true by conception and verification. These\nare syllogisms of which the minor and the major premise are certain,\nbesides being easily imagined and well known. These are set before the\ndeductions which are drawn from them, and not from their likes. To\nthis kind of religious injunction there is no interpretation, and one\nwho denies them or puts an interpretation upon them is an infidel. The\nsecond kind is that the premises of which although well known or easily\nimagined are also positively established. Their conclusions are drawn\nby analogy. Upon these, that is, their conclusions, an interpretation\nmay be put. The third kind is just the reverse of the second, that is,\nthe conclusions are themselves intended and their premises are well\nknown or easily imagined without being positively established. Upon\nthese also--that is, upon the conclusions, no interpretation can be\nput, but the premises may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth kind is\nthat the premises of which are well-known or conjectural without being\npositively established. Their deductions are by analogy when that is\nintended. It is the duty of the learned men to interpret them and of\nthe common people to take them exoterically.\n\nIn short, all that should be interpreted can be grasped by philosophy\nalone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of\nthe common people to take it literally, both in conception and in\nverification. The reason for the latter is that they cannot understand\nmore. A student of law sometimes finds interpretations which have a\npreference over others, in a general way by verification: that is,\nthe argument is more convincing with the interpretations than with\nthe literal meanings. These interpretations are common and it is\npossible for them to be admitted by any whose speculative faculties\nhave been developed in controversy. Some of the interpretations of the\nAsharites and the Mutazilites are of this type, though the arguments\nof the Mutazilites are generally the more weighty. But it is the duty\nof the common people who are not capable of understanding more than\nexhortation to take them exoterically. Indeed, it is not proper for\nthem to know the interpretations at all.\n\nThus there are three groups into which men have been divided: Those who\nare not included amongst those who should know the interpretations.\nThese are common people who are guided by exhortation alone. They\nform a vast majority: for there is not a single rational being who\ncannot accept a result by this method. The second are dogmatic\ninterpreters. These are so, either by their nature only, or both by\nnature and habit. The third are those who can be definitely called\ninterpreters. These are the philosophers, both by nature and by\nphilosophical training. This kind of interpretation should not be\ndiscussed with the dogmatists, not to speak of the common people. If\nany of these interpretations are disclosed to those not fit to receive\nthem--especially philosophical interpretations--these being far higher\nthan common knowledge, they may be led to infidelity. For he wishes to\nnullify the exoteric meaning and to prove his interpretation. But if\nthe exoteric meaning is shown to be false without the interpretation\nbeing established, he falls into infidelity, if this concerns the\nprinciples of the Law. So, the interpretations should not be disclosed\nto the common people, and ought not to be put into exhortative or\ndoctrinal books--that is, books written with an expository purpose in\nview--as Abu Hamid has done.\n\nHence, it is necessary that the common people should be told that those\nthings which are exoteric, and yet cannot be understood easily, the\ninterpretations of which it is impossible for them to understand, are\nparabolical, and that no one knows the interpretation thereof except\nGod. We should stop at the following words of God: \u201cNone knoweth the\ninterpretation thereof except God.\u201d[18] This is also the answer to the\nquestion about some of those abstruse problems which the common people\ncannot understand: \u201cThey will ask thee concerning the spirit: answer:\nThe spirit was created at the command of my Lord, but ye have no\nknowledge given to you, except a little.\u201d[19] Again, one who interprets\nthese to persons not fit to receive them is an infidel, because he\nleads others to infidelity, which is quite in opposition to the purpose\nof the Law. This is especially the case when corrupt interpretations\nare put on the principles of the Law, as some men of our own times\ndo. We have known many people who think they are philosophers and\nhence claim to find out strange things through philosophy, which are\nin every way contrary to religion, and they do not admit of any other\ninterpretation. They think they must disclose these things to the\ncommon people. But by the disclosure of wrong notions they lead them to\neternal destruction.\n\nThe difference between their aim and that of the jurists can be made\nclear by the following example. Since it is not possible to make every\none an expert physician a certain physician laid down some principles\nfor the preservation of health and the prevention of diseases, and he\nallowed the use of some things but prohibited others. Now a man comes\nand tells the people that the principles laid down by that physician\nare not correct and declares them to be false, and they become\ndiscredited in the eyes of the people; or says that they are capable\nof interpretations which they cannot understand and cannot verify by\npractice. Do you think that people in these circumstances will ever\nact upon those things which are useful for their health and for the\nprevention of diseases or that the man himself will ever be capable of\nacting on them? No, he will be quite incapable of doing so and thus\nwill lead them all to destruction.\n\nThis is the case when those interpretations which they cannot\nunderstand are correct, to say nothing of those that are wrong. For\nthey will not believe in health to be preserved, nor disease to be\nprevented, to say nothing of the things which preserve health or\nprevent disease. This is the condition of that man who discloses\ninterpretations of the Law to the common people and those not fit to\nreceive them. And hence he is an unbeliever.\n\nThe simile which we have described above is a real parallel, and not\nmerely fanciful (as some may think) as it is correct in every respect.\nFor the relation of the medicine to the body is the same as that of the\nLaw to the soul. A physician is one who seeks to preserve the health\nwhen he finds it good and tries to restore it when it is missed. In the\nsame way a religious law-giver is one who takes care of the health of\nsouls, which is called piety. The Quran also makes clear its purpose,\nthrough religious action, by many verses. For instance: \u201cO true\nbelievers, a fast is ordained unto you as it was ordained those before\nyou, that ye may fear God\u201d[20] and \u201cTheir flesh is not accepted of\nGod, neither their blood; but your piety is accepted by Him\u201d[21] and:\n\u201cFor prayer preserveth a man from filthy crimes and from that which is\nblameable.\u201d[22] There are many other verses of the same nature in the\nQuran. Thus, we see, a religious law-giver seeks to establish this kind\nof health by religious knowledge and practice. This is the health upon\nwhich depends happiness and in the case of its absence the misery of\nthe next world.\n\nThis should have made it clear to you not merely that one should not\nspeak of the wrong interpretation. But also that it is not proper to\nput even true ones in the books of the common people. These correct\ninterpretations are of the faith which man has and of which the whole\ncreation was afraid to bear the burden. By this we refer to the\nfollowing verse of the Quran: \u201cWe proposed the faith unto the heavens,\nand the earth, and the mountains, and they refused to undertake the\nsame, and were afraid thereof, but man undertook it: verily he is\nunjust to himself and foolish.\u201d[23] These interpretations and the\nidea that their discussion is necessary in the Law have given rise to\nmany sects in Islam, so much so that they have denounced one another\nwith infidelity and innovations. This is especially the effect of\nwrong interpretations. The Mutazilites interpreted a large number\nof verses and Traditions and disclosed them to the people. So also\ndid the Asharites, though their interpretations were less in number.\nThey only succeeded in creating hatred and wars among men, destroying\nthe Law, and disuniting the people completely. To add to this, the\nmethod which they have adopted in proving these interpretations is\nadapted neither to the common people nor to the learned. For if you\nlook closely into it, you will find that it is not correct according\nto the norms of logic--this anyone who has had any training may see\nfor himself without the least effort. In fact, many of the principles\nupon which the Asharites build their conclusions are sophistical in\ntheir nature. They deny many fundamentals, like the proof of accidence,\nthe influence of one thing upon another, the necessity of cause and\neffects, abstract figures and the processes leading to them. Indeed,\nAsharite Mutakallimun have been in this respects unjust to Mohammadans,\nfor one of their sects has denounced as infidels all those who do not\nrecognise the existence of God by methods which they have devised for\nthe knowledge of Him: but in truth they themselves are in the wrong and\nare unbelievers.\n\nIt is upon this point that the difference of opinion arises. Some say\nthat the first principle is of reason, while others allege that it is\nof faith. That is to say they have thought that faith, even before\nknowing the methods common to all and to which the Law has made a\ncall on all, is the only method of arriving at truth. Thus they have\nmistaken the real purpose of the Law-giver, and being themselves in the\nwrong they have led others astray.\n\nIf it be alleged that the method that the Asharites and other\nMutakallimun have devised are not those general methods in the purpose\nof the Law-giver for the instruction of the common people, and that it\nis not possible without some method being adopted, then the question\narises: What are those methods which are given in the Law? We maintain\nthat these methods are to be found in the Quran alone. For, if we\nlook closely we shall find that in the Quran all the three kinds of\nmethods are laid down, for the whole of mankind, both for the majority\nand for the learned few. If we reflect we shall come to see that no\nbetter methods can be discovered for the instruction of the common\npeople than those mentioned in the Quran. Anyone who changes them by\ninterpretations which are neither clear in themselves nor clearer than\nothers to the common people, makes null and void their philosophy and\ntheir effect, the goal of which is the happiness of mankind. This is\nquite evident from the early and the later condition of Islam, for in\nthe early days Muslims sought perfect excellence and piety by acting\non those principles without putting any interpretation upon them. And\nthose among them who knew any interpretation did not disclose it. In\nthe later days interpretations were used, and piety decreased, the love\nfor others was lost, and they became divided into schisms and parties.\n\nHence one who cares to remove this innovation from the Law, should\nturn to the Book, and should pick up from it the existing arguments\nfor things whose belief is inculcated upon us. Further he should\ndeeply think over the esoteric meanings, as far as possible, without\nputting interpretations upon them, except when they are not quite\nclear to all. The assertions of the Book for the instructions of the\npeople, when thought over are things, with whose help we can reach a\nstage from which none but the learned in logic can differ about the\nesoteric meaning of that which is not clear. This peculiarity cannot\nbe found in any other assertions but that of the Book. There are\nthree peculiarities in the assertions, which have been explained in\nthe Quran, for the common people. First, that nothing can be found\nmore convincing and true than these. Secondly, that they can be\naccepted by every nature; and they are such that none can know their\ninterpretations, if there be any, except the learned in logic. Thirdly,\nthat they possess a call to the righteous, for correct interpretations.\nThis is neither to be found in the school of the Asharites nor in\nthat of the Mutazalites _i. e._ their interpretations are neither\ngenerally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor\nare they right in themselves. It is for this reason that innovation\nhas increased, and it is our desire to write about it, as far as it is\npossible for us, provided that we get leisure for it, have power to do\nit, and God gives us a respite in life. It is just possible that this\nmay be a beginning for the coming generation; because the breach of\nLaw, due to evil passions, and changed beliefs is simply aggrieving and\nsaddening. This is still enhanced by those, who ascribe themselves to\nphilosophy, because an injury from a friend is worse than the injury\nfrom an enemy. Philosophy is a companion and a foster-sister to the\nLaw. Hence an injury from this source is the worst kind of injury,\neven if we neglect the enmity, hatred, and animosity which is created\nbetween the two, although they are companions by nature and friends\nin reality. It has also been injured by many ignorant _friends_ who\nascribe themselves to it. These are the schisms which exist in Islam.\nMay God set all aright, help all to His love, and bring together their\nhearts for piety, and erase enmity and hatred by his favour and grace.\n\nIndeed God has removed much of evil, ignorance and the misleading\nways through this strong government, and has led the many to good,\nespecially the people who have walked in the path of scholasticism, and\nhave a liking for the knowledge of the Truth. Because it has called\nthe people to the knowledge of God by mediate paths, which are higher\nthan the depressions of the blind followers: and lower than that of the\nhigh-sounding Mutakallimun; and has called the learned to their duty of\nconsidering fully the principles of Law.\n\n\n                               FOOTNOTES\n\n[Footnote 1: A translation of Averroes\u2019 Kitab Fasl a\u2019l Maqal wa Taqrir\nma bain\u2019a\u2019l Shariata wa\u2019l Hikmati mina\u2019l Ittisal. Ed. by D. J. Muller,\nPhilosophie und Theologie von Averroes, Munich 1859.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _i. e._ Shariat. Compare Jewish Torah.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Quran lix, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Quran vii, 184.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Quran vi, 75.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Quran lxxxviii, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Quran iii, 176.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Quran lix, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Quran xvi, 126.]\n\n[Footnote 10: \u201cIt is he who hath created you whatsoever is on\nearth, and that set His mind to the creation of heaven and formed\nit into seven heavens; he knoweth all thing.\u201d Quran ii, 29. For an\ninterpretation of this see Raji\u2019s _Tafsiri Kabir_ vol. I. p. 249 et\nseq. Cairo. 1307. A. H. and Tabari\u2019s _Commentary_ vol. I. p. 146 et\nseq. Cairo. 1902 A. D.]\n\n[Footnote 11: \u201cVerily God comes down every night to the earth\u201d (Nibayah\nfi Gharibil Hadith by Ibu Athir vol. IV. p. 138 Cairo 1311 A. H.) For\nan interpretation see the above and Qustatain\u2019s Commentary on Bukari,\nvol. IX p. 178. Cairo. 1307 A. H.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Quran iii, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Quran iii, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Quran xi, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Quran xiv, 19.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Quran xli, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Quran xxxi, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Quran iii, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Quran xvii, 87.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Quran ii, 79.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Quran xxii, 38.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Quran xxix, 44.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Quran xxxiii, 67.]\n\n\n\n\n                                  Ia.\n\n                               APPENDIX.\n\n ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN\n                        HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE.\n\n\nMay God perpetuate your honour and bless you, and screen you always\nfrom the eyes of misfortune. Through your excellent intelligence and\ngood understanding you have learned a great part of all these sciences,\ntill your insight informed you of the doubt which arises concerning the\neternal knowledge of God, with its being at the same time concerned\nwith created things. Thus, in the interests of truth, it is now\nincumbent upon us to remove the doubt from your mind, after we have\nstated it clearly. For one who does not know the problem adequately\ncannot very well solve the doubt.\n\nThe question may be stated thus: If all this universe was in the\nknowledge of God before its creation, then, was it in His knowledge\nafter its creation as it was before it came into existence; or was it\nin His knowledge before its creation quite different from that after\nits coming into being? If we say that the knowledge of God about it\nafter its creation is quite different from that which it was before\nits creation, it becomes necessary for us to admit that the eternal\nknowledge is changeable; or that when the universe came into existence\nout of non-existence, then there is an addition to the eternal\nknowledge; which is impossible. Again, if we say that the knowledge of\nit was the same in both the conditions, then it would be said: Was the\ncreated universe the same before its coming into existence as it was\nafter its creation? To this objection it will have to be answered that\nit was not the same before its creation as it was after it, otherwise\nthe existent and the non-existent thing would be the same. When the\nopponent has admitted this much, he may be asked whether the real\nknowledge does not consist in the cognizance of an existent thing as\nit is. If he says: \u201cYes,\u201d then accordingly it becomes necessary that\nwhen a thing changes in itself the knowledge of it must also change,\notherwise it would be a knowledge of something other than the real\nobject. Thus it would then be necessary to admit one of two things:\neither the eternal knowledge itself will change, or the created things\nwould be unknown to God. And both of these alternatives are impossible\nwith regard to God. This doubt is still further strengthened by the\napparent condition of man, that is, the relation of his knowledge\nabout non-existent things by the supposition of their existence and\nits relation when the thing in question is found. It is self-evident\nthat both kinds of knowledge are different, otherwise God would have\nbeen ignorant of its existence at the time he found it. The argument\nwhich the Mutakallimun advance to meet this objection does not by any\nmeans deliver us from the doubt. They say that God knows the things\nbefore their coming into being, as they would be after they come into\nexistence. If they say that no change occurs, they fall into mistake.\nIf on the other hand they admit a change, they may be asked whether\nthis change was known in the eternal knowledge or not. Thus the first\ndoubt occurs again. On the whole it is difficult to imagine that the\nknowledge of a thing before and after its existence can be one and the\nsame.\n\nThis is the statement of the doubt in the briefest terms possible, as\nwe have put it for your sake. A solution of this doubt requires a very\nlong discussion, but here we intend to state a point which might easily\nsolve it. Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has also tried to solve this doubt in\nhis work: _The Refutation of the Philosophers_, but his method is by no\nmeans satisfactory. For he says something to this effect: he thinks the\nknown and the knowledge are not connected with each other, so that when\na change takes place in the one the other does not change in itself. So\nit is possible that it may happen in the case of Divine knowledge and\nthe things existent, that is, they may change in themselves while God\u2019s\nknowledge may remain the same. For instance a pillar may be on the\nright hand of Zaid, it may be changed to his left without any change\ntaking place in Zaid himself. But the illustration is not at all a\ncorrect one, for the relation has changed, that is, that which was on\nthe right side is now on the left. That in which no change has taken\nplace is the condition of that relation--Zaid. It being so, and the\nknowledge is only the relation itself, it is necessary that it should\nchange with a change in the thing known, as the change in the relation\nof the pillar to Zaid, for it is now on the left after being on the\nright.\n\nThe view which might solve this question is that it should be\nmaintained that the condition of eternal knowledge of existent things\nis quite other than the created knowledge with regard to them. For\nthe existence of a thing is the cause and means of our knowledge of\nit, while the eternal knowledge is itself the cause and means of the\nexistent thing. So if a change takes place in the eternal knowledge\nafter the coming into being of an existent thing, as it does in the\ncreated knowledge then it is involved that the former cannot be\nthe cause but only the effect of the existent things. Thus it is\nnecessary that there should be no change in it, as there is in the\ncreated knowledge. This mistake always occurs by our taking eternal\nknowledge to be like the created one, by an analogy from the seen\nto the unseen. The error in this analogy has already been exposed.\nJust as no change takes place in any agent after the creation of his\nact--that is, change of kind which was not found before--so no change\nin the eternal knowledge of God after the creation of the thing which\nwas in His knowledge. So this doubt is removed. At the same time it\nis not necessary for us to say that as there is no change in eternal\nknowledge, therefore, He does not know an existent at the time of\nits creation, as it is. But we must believe that He knows not by a\ncreated but by His eternal knowledge. For a change in knowledge with\na change of the existent thing is a condition of the knowledge which\ndepends upon the existent thing, such a knowledge being created. Thus\nthe relation of the eternal knowledge with the existent things is not\nthe same as that of the created knowledge. It is not that there is\nno connection between them at all as some philosophers are said to\nmaintain, who as the people think, say, at the time of doubt, that\nGod has no knowledge of particulars at all. But this is not as is\ncommonly supposed. They only say that He does not know particulars by\nany created knowledge, one of the conditions of which is its being\ncreated by them, by which it is an effect and not a cause. This is the\nlast of the things about it which must be remembered. For our reason\nleads us to the fact that God is the Knower of things, all of them\nemanating from Him. This is so because He is a knower, not because\nof His existence, nor of His existence in any form, but only because\nof His being a Knower. God has said, \u201cShall not He know all things\nwho hath created them, since He is the sagacious, the knowing.\u201d[24]\nThe arguments also tell us that He knows by a knowledge which may be\nakin to created knowledge. So it is necessary that there should be\nsome other knowledge for the existent things--and this is the eternal\nof God. Moreover, how is it possible to suppose that the Peripatetic\nPhilosophers think that the eternal knowledge does not include\nparticulars, while they say that these are a cause of admonition to us\nin our dreams, divine revelations, and other kinds of inspiration?\n\nThat is what we think about the solution of the problem--a solution in\nwhich there is no doubt or suspicion. God is the only helper to right\njudgment, and leader to truth. Peace be upon you, and blessings of God\nand His beatitude. God is the best knower of truth: and to Him is the\nreturn and the refuge.\n\n\n                               FOOTNOTES\n\n[Footnote 24: Quran lxvi, 14.]\n\n\n\n\n                                  II\n\n  AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF\n   THE FAITH, AND A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS AND MISLEADING\n                    INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.\n\n\n\n\n         AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING\n                       THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH\n                                  AND\n                  A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS\n                                  AND\n            MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.[25]\n\n\nAnd after--Praise be to God, who sets apart anyone whom He will for His\nknowledge, rendering him fit for understanding His Law and following\nHis path, informing him of the hidden recesses of His knowledge, the\nreal meaning of His inspiration, and the purpose of sending the Apostle\nto creatures, in spite of what has become clear about the doubt of the\ndoubters among the Prophet\u2019s own followers, and changes of meanings\nintroduced by the false among his own people. He has disclosed to him\nthat there are interpretations which God and His Apostle have not\nordered. May there be the most perfect blessings upon the Trusty of\nHis inspiration, and the Seal of His prophets, and upon his family and\nrelations.\n\nWe have already described in the foregoing tractate the conformity of\nphilosophy with the Law, and its other relations. We have said there\nthat the Law is of two kinds: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the\ncommon people is to follow the exoteric law; while the duty of learned\nmen is to follow the esoteric one. So the duty of the common people\nis to follow the meanings of the Law in their literal sense, leaving\naside every interpretation of it. The learned men are not permitted\nto expose their interpretations to the common people, as Ali, (upon\nwhom be peace) has said, \u201cTell the people what they can understand. Do\nyou wish to give the lie to God and His Apostle?\u201d So I thought that\nin the present book I should examine the exoteric meanings which the\nLaw intends the common people to follow, and in those, search the real\npurpose of the Law-giver, (on whom be peace) according to my ability\nand knowledge. For the people of His Law have been extremely disturbed,\nso much so that many misguided sects and different divisions, have been\nproduced, every one of which thinks that it is following the best Law,\nand that he who disagrees is either an innovator or an infidel whose\nlife and property is at stake. All this is directly opposed to the\npurpose of the Law-giver. Its cause lies in the misleading things about\nthe Law which have been put forward.\n\nIn our own times, there are four of these sects which are famous. In\nthe first place, there is the sect of the Asharites, and these are\nthe people who are commonly taken to be men of _Sunna_. Then there\nare Mutazilites, the sects of the Batinites, (Esoteric), and the\nsect of the Bombasts. Every one of these sects has its own peculiar\nbeliefs about God, and has turned many an exoteric word of the law\nto interpretations, which they have applied to those beliefs. They\nthink that theirs was the original Law which all the people are asked\nto follow, and he who deviates from it is either an innovator or an\ninfidel. But when you look into all their views and then examine the\npurpose of the Law, it would appear that a great part of them are\nrecent opinions and innovating interpretations. Of them I will mention\nhere those indispensable beliefs in the Law, without which Faith does\nnot become complete, and will search, in every one of them, the real\npurpose of the Law-giver, (peace be upon him,) beyond that which has\nbeen made the basis of the Law, and its beliefs before the coming\ninto use of incorrect interpretations. I will begin by explaining the\nintention of the Law-giver as to the beliefs which should be held by\nthe common people about God, and the methods which He adopted towards\nthem. All this is contained in the Divine Book. We will begin by an\nexposition of the methods which leads to the knowledge of the existence\nof the Creator, for this is the first thing which a student ought to\nknow. But before this, it is necessary that we should mention the\nopinions of the well-known sects.\n\nThe _Bombasts_ hold that the method of obtaining knowledge of the\nexistence of the Creator is by hearing and not by reason, that is,\nthe belief in His existence, the verification of which is incumbent\nupon all men, is enough to be taught by the Law-giver, and believed\nas an article of Faith, as is the case with his teachings about the\ncondition of the Day of Judgment, and others with which our reason has\nno power to deal. This is obviously a misleading sect, for it falls\nshort of the purpose of the Law, as regards the method adopted towards\nall the people, leading them to the knowledge of the existence of God,\nand calling them to the confession of His belief. It is quite evident\nfrom many verses of the Divine Book, that in it the people have been\ncalled to verify the existence of the Creator by arguments of reason\nwhich are mentioned in it. For instance, there are the following verses\nof the Quran, \u201cO men of Mecca, serve your Lord who has created you\nand those before you,\u201d[26] and \u201cIs there any doubt concerning God,\nthe Creator of heaven and earth?\u201d[27] and other verses on the subject\nfound therein. It is not fit for a man to say, that if these arguments\nhad been necessary for believing in God--that is, had his faith been\nnot completed without understanding them--the Prophet would not have\ninvited anybody to Islam without presenting to him all these arguments,\nfor the Arabs already knew the existence of the Creator, so that God\nhas said, \u201cIf thou asketh them who has created the heavens and the\nearth, they will surely answer, God,\u201d[28] and hence there was no use\ngiving arguments. It is impossible to find a man so stupid and dull,\nthat he cannot understand the arguments advanced by Law for the common\npeople, through the Prophet. This is to say the least. If there be\nfound such a man, then it is his duty to believe in God by hearing\nalone. So much for the ideas of the _Bombasts_ about the exoterics of\nthe Law.\n\nThe _Asharites_ are of opinion that the verification of the existence\nof God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have\nadopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by Law, and\nis not mentioned in the Quran, nor the people invited through it to\nbelieve. Their well-known method is founded upon the fact that the\nuniverse is a created thing, which is itself based upon the theory\nof the composition of atoms, and that the atom is a created thing,\nand that other bodies are created out of it. The method which they\nadopt for the exposition of the creation of an atom, which they call\n_al-Jauharat u\u2019l Faridah_ (sole Essence), is a misleading one even for\nmany religious men in the business of controversy, not to speak of the\ncommon people. And despite this it is a method devoid of philosophy,\nand does not lead to a belief in the existence of the Creator. For if\nwe suppose the universe is a created thing, it becomes necessary, as\nthey say, that its Creator must also be a \u201cCreated\u201d object. But a doubt\npresents itself about the existence of this created thing, which is\nnot in the power of scholastic theology to solve. And that is this,\nthat we can take this thing to be neither eternal nor created. For if\nwe take it as created, then it must require another created thing, and\nthis another, and so on to infinity. This is impossible. On the other\nhand, if we take Him as eternal, then it is necessary that his action\nin connection with the result must also be eternal. In this way the\nresults also become eternal. It is necessary for a created thing that\nits existence be dependent upon a created action. Their hypothesis can\nonly be proved if they admit that a created action can be performed by\nan eternal agent. For the result of the action might be dependent on\nthe action of the agent. But they do not admit it, for according to\ntheir principles what is coeval with created things is itself created.\nMoreover, if the agent sometimes acts and at other times remains\ninactive, it is necessary, that there be a condition better applicable\nin one state of things than in the other. Then about this condition\nthe same question will rise, and so it will go on till infinity. And\nwhat the Mutakallimun say in answer to this objection that the created\naction is the result of eternal intention, does not relieve us of our\ndoubt or satisfy our mind. For intention without action is dependent\nupon the act, and if the act is a created thing, then it is necessary\nthat the intention in connection with it must also be a created thing.\nIt makes no difference whether we take the intention as eternal or\ncreated, rising before the action or with it. So we may take it as\nwe like. All the same it is necessary for them to admit either of\nthe three things about the universe--either a created action, with a\ncreated intention or a created action and an eternal intention, or\nan eternal action with an eternal intention. But a created thing is\nimpossible from an eternal action without any expedient, even if we\nadmit for their sake, that it comes into existence by eternal action;\nand putting intention itself or the action, connected with the act is a\nthing which cannot be understood. This is supposing an act without an\nagent, with a result, without any intention. Intention is a condition\nof the action and not the action itself. Also it is necessary that this\neternal intention, should be connected with non-existence of a created\nthing, for a period of time which is indefinite. So if a created thing\nbe non-existence for an unknown period of time, then it does not become\nconnected with the intention at the time of its creation, except after\nthe completion of a time of which there is no limit, and that which has\nno limit has no end. So it becomes necessary that the intention should\nnever take the form of action, or a time without limit should come to\nan end, which is impossible. This is the argument of the Mutakallimun,\non which they rely in proving that the revolutions of the heavens are\ncreated. Moreover, it is necessary that to the intention which precedes\nthe object, and is connected with it, at a certain time, there should\nbe created in it at the time of creation of the object a determination\nfor doing so. For the determination for the creation of an object\ncannot be found before that time, because if at the time of action\nthere be found no additional quality in the agent, than that he had at\nthe time of intention, then action from him at that time would not be\nquite as necessary from him as inactivity. We may go on in this way,\nfinding all the obscure and intricate doubts, from which, not to speak\nof the common people, even clever men, learned in scholastic theology,\nin philosophy, cannot escape. So if the common people be burdened with\na knowledge of these things, it would be an unbearable problem for them.\n\nThen again the methods adopted by the Asharites in proving the\ncreation of the universe are defective for all classes of men. The\ncommon people, by their very nature, cannot understand them, and\nthey are at the same time in no way reasonable. So they are neither\nfit for the learned, nor for the masses. We warn our readers of them\nand say: The methods which they adopt are of two kinds. One of them,\nthe more famous of the two and upon which a majority of them relies,\nis based upon three premises, from which they derive the proof for\nthe creation of the universe. They are: (1) that essences cannot be\nseparated from accidents, that is, they cannot be devoid of them; (2)\nthat the accidents are created things; (3) that that which cannot be\nseparated from a created thing is itself created, that is, that which\ncannot be severed from the created thing is itself created. Now, if\nby the first premise which says that the essences cannot be separated\nfrom the accidents, they mean the bodies which stand by themselves,\nthen the premise is correct. But if by essence they mean the particle\nwhich cannot be divided, which they call _Sole Essence_, then there is\ndoubt about it, which is not easy to solve. For the existence of an\nindivisible essence is not well established in itself, and about it\nthere are many opposite and highly contradictory opinions, and it is\nnot in the power of scholastic theology to bring truth out of them.\nThat is the business of philosophers who are very few in number.\n\nThe arguments which Asharites use are for the most part exhortative.\nFor their famous argument on this is that they say that our first\nknowledge about a thing is, for instance, that an elephant is bigger\nthan an ant, for it is accepted that the former has more particles in\nit than the latter. If it be so, then it is made up of particles and is\nnot a compact whole in itself. So when the body is destroyed it changes\ninto particles, and when composed it is composed of them. But this is\nwrong. For they have taken a divisible quantity as a continuous one,\nand then thought that that which is applicable to the divisible is also\napplicable to the continuous. This is true about numbers, that is, we\nsay that a certain number is more than the other, by its containing\nmore particles in it, that is, more units. But it cannot be true of\na continuous quantity, of which we say that it is bigger or greater.\nIn this way everything may be enumerated without any reference to its\nbulk at all. And the science of mathematics becomes the science of\nnumber only. It is well-known that every bulk can be considered with\nregard to line, surface and volume. Moreover, a continuous quantity\nit is possible to cut in the middle and thus get two parts. But this\nis impossible in the units of number, nay, it is opposed to it. Then,\nagain, the body and other particles of a continuous quantity are\ncapable of being divided. But everything divisible is either divided\ninto other divisible quantities, or into indivisible ones. If it is\ndivided into indivisible ones then we have found particles which cannot\nbe divided. And if it is divided into other divisible parts, then again\nthe question arises whether these can be divided into divisible or\nindivisible parts. So if it can be divided a limitless number of times,\nthere would be limitless particles in a limited thing. But it is one of\nthe primary principles of knowledge that particles in a limited thing\nare limited.\n\nAmong the obscure doubts which can be attributed to the Asharites\nis the question whether if an atom is brought into being, this is\ndifferent from creation itself, for it is one of the accidents? When\nthe created thing exists the act of creation is non-existent for\naccording to their principles, the accidents cannot be separated from\ntheir essences. So this has compelled them to regard creation as\npertaining to the existent things and not for it. Then they may be\nasked; if creation implies the non-existence of a thing, with what\nis the act of the agent connected, for, according to them, there is\nno mean between existence and non-existence. If this be so, and,\naccording to them, the action of the agent is connected neither with\nnon-existence, nor with that which is and nevertheless brings about an\nexistence, it must be connected with a middle substance. This doubt\nhas compelled the Mutazilites to say that there is a substance, even\nin non-existence, which they call Matter or First Element. They should\nadmit that that which is non-existent can be made existent by action.\nBoth of these sects must also admit the existence of a void. These are\nquestions, which as you see, cannot be solved by dogmatics. Thus, it\nis clear that such a method cannot be made a basis of the knowledge\nof God, especially for the masses. We will shortly describe a clearer\nmethod of knowing God.\n\nNow as to the second premise, according to which it is said that all\nthe accidents are created things:--This is a premise concerning which\nthere are doubts, and its meaning is as hidden as the soul in a body.\nFor we have observed many bodies to be created and such is also the\ncase with some accidents. So there is no difference in transferring\nan observed object to the invisible, in both the cases. For if it is\nnecessary, with regard to accidents, to apply what applies of the\nvisible things to the invisible, that is, if we should suppose a thing\nwhich we have not seen, so created, by the analogy of that which we\nhave observed, then we should also apply it to the essences. Thus we\ncan become quite careless of proving the creation of accidents, as\ndistinct from that of essences. The creation of the accidents of the\nheavenly bodies is extremely doubtful to the observer just as there is\ndoubt in their essential creation. For the creation of their accidents\nis never perceived. So it is necessary that we should clearly observe\nthem. This is the method which surely and certainly leads pious people\nto the knowledge of God. This is the method of the chosen men, and that\nwith which God has particularly blessed the prophet Abraham. He says:\n\u201cAnd thus did We show unto Abraham the kingdom of heaven and earth,\nthat he might become of those who firmly believe.\u201d[29] For the whole\ndoubt concerns the heavenly bodies themselves. Many controversialists\nhave stopped here and believed that these are so many gods.\n\nAgain, time is one of the accidents, the creation of which it is\nimpossible to imagine, for it is necessary that the non-existence of\na thing be preceded by time. But in this case it cannot be imagined\nthat the non-existence of a thing can be preceded by itself, except\nby accepting time as existent. So also it is difficult to imagine the\ncreation of the space in which the universe is, for every existent\nthing occupies a former space. For if it is a void, as is the opinion\nof those who think that the void itself is space, its creation also,\nif we suppose it to be created, must been have preceded by another\nvoid. And if the space be a tangible body, as is the opinion of another\ngroup, then it should be contained in another body, which would require\nanother, and so on without limit. These are all obscure problems\nand the arguments which are brought to disprove the eternity of the\naccidents, are necessary for one who believes in the eternity of those\naccidents which can be perceived; that is, one who asserts that not all\nthe accidents are created. For they say that the accidents which can be\nperceived by the senses are created things. If they are not created,\nthen they will move from one place to another, or will be latent in the\nplace in which they are to appear, before they make their appearance.\nThen they disprove both of these arguments, and think that they have\nestablished that all the accidents are created things. But it has\nbecome apparent from what they have said, that the apparently created\nportions of the accidents are created, not those whose creation is not\napparent, nor those in whose case there is doubt, such as the accidents\nwhich are in the heavenly bodies, in their movement, in their shape,\netc., etc. So their arguments about the creation of all accidents, can\nbe interpreted by the analogy of the visible to the invisible. This\nis an exhortative argument, except in the suggestion of reasonable\narguments which depend here on the certainty of the similarity of the\ncharacter of the visible and the invisible.\n\nThe third premise which says, that that which cannot be separated\nfrom a created thing is itself created, is equivocal, for it can be\nunderstood in two ways: the thing which cannot be separated from the\nclass of created things, but can be removed from its units; and that\nwhich cannot be separated from any one of the things in question, as if\none were to say, \u201cThat which cannot be separated from this blackness\nin question.\u201d The second meaning is the correct one, that is it cannot\nbe separated from a certain accident, which is created, for it is\nabsolutely necessary that it should also be a created thing. For if it\nbe eternal it becomes devoid of that accident, from which we suppose\nthat it cannot separate. This separation is impossible. The first\nexplanation, and that is which they mean, does not necessarily involve\nthe creation of place, that is, that which is not separated from the\nclass of created things. For it is possible to imagine a single place,\nthat is, a body upon which follow accidents without limit, either\nopposed to one another or otherwise, as you were to say, movements\nwithout limit. Such is the opinion of many ancient philosophers about\nthe universe, that it is made little by little. This is why, when\nthe Mutakallimun saw the weakness of this premise, they resolved to\nmake it strong and secure, by making it clear, that according to\nthem, limitless accidents cannot follow upon a single point. For they\nmaintain that on this occasion it is necessary that there cannot be\nfound any other accident, except that there be an unlimited number of\naccidents before it at the place in question. This helps them to the\nimpossibility of their presence, for it is necessary that it should\nnot be there, except after the completion of an unlimited number. As\nthe limitless never ends, it follows that the thing which we have\nsupposed should not be there. For instance, consider the movement\nof the heavenly bodies, as we know them today. If there were before\nit limitless movements, then it is inevitable that this particular\nmovement should not occur. They give the example of a man, who said\nto another, \u201cI will not give you this dinar, till I have given you\nbefore it a limitless number of dinars.\u201d By this it is not possible\nfor him to give the dinar in question at all. But this example is not\na correct one. For in it there is a primary object, then a limit, and\nthen another object between them, which is without limit. For he has\nsaid it in a limited time. So he has stipulated that he would give the\ndinar between the time in which he is, and the time of which he speaks,\nbetween which there is a time without limit. This is the period in\nwhich he would give him the dinars without limit, which is impossible.\nSo it is quite clear that this example does not illustrate the object\nfor which it is given. Their opinion that the existence of a thing\nwhich is found after limitless things, is impossible, is not correct\nin all the cases. For the things which happen one after another are of\ntwo kinds: those which come to pass in cycles, and those which occur in\norder and arrangement. The things which occur in cycles are necessarily\nunlimited, except that something may interfere to prevent them. For\ninstance if the sun rises there must be its setting; if there is a\nsetting then it must rise, and if it rise it must have risen before.\nIn the same way, if there are clouds there must be vapours rising from\nthe earth; if there rise vapours from the earth, then it must be wet,\nif the earth is wet, there must have been rain, and if there was rain\nthere must have been clouds, and if thus there were clouds there must\nsimilarly have been clouds before them. Again among those things which\nhappen by order, is, for instance, the creation of man from man, and of\nthat man from another. If this happens by essence then it can be taken\nas limitless, for which the first link is not found, the last also\ncannot be ascertained. If this is by accident, as for instance, if man\nbe really made by some one other than man, who must be his father, then\nthe position of his father would be the same as that of an instrument\nin the hands of a maker. So it is not possible to find an agent doing\nlimitless actions, with countless different instruments. All these\nviews are not clear in this connection. We have mentioned them here,\nthat it may become known, that the arguments which these people advance\nare no arguments at all, nor are they reasonings fit for the masses,\nthat is, open and clear arguments which God has imposed upon all his\ncreatures for the sake of belief. It must now have become clear to you\nthat this method is neither philosophical nor according to Law.\n\nThe other method is that which Abul Maali has deduced and described\nin one of his tractates known as _Nizamiyyah_. He has based it upon\ntwo premises: in the first place, that the universe and all that it\ncontains may be conceived as other than what it really is. It may be\nquite consistent, for instance, if it may be imagined smaller than it\nis, or bigger, or of some other shape than it really has or having more\nbodies in number than it really contains or the movements which are\nmade in it may go in the opposite direction from that which they take\nnow. This may be so much so that it may become possible that a stone\nshould go upwards, and fire downwards, or that the movement starting\nin the east should start in the west, or the western from the eastern.\nThe second premise is that every transient thing is created, and for it\nthere is a creator; that is, an agent who made it in this way better\nthan in any other.\n\nThe first premise is exhortative and very elementary. Its fallacy\nis quite apparent with regard to some aspects of the universe--for\ninstance, the existence of man in some other form than he now\npossesses; while in some others there is doubt--for instance, whether\nthe movement from the east might change to one from the west and _vice\nversa_, for this is not known in itself. It is possible that for this\nthere may be a cause the existence of which is not evident, or it may\nbe one of those causes which are hidden from man. It is possible that\nwhatever of these things a man sees, is like one seeing for the first\ntime things of the manufacture of which he is ignorant. For such a\nman may think that all or parts of the thing may possibly be made in\njust the opposite fashion from that in which they really are made; and\nstill in spite of this idea the same work may be obtained from them\nfor which they were made. In this case there would be no art in them.\nBut its maker, and one who is associated with the maker in some of\nhis knowledge, know that the whole thing is just the opposite of what\nthat man has seen; and that there is nothing in it but that which is\nabsolutely necessary, or the existence of which makes it more perfect\nand complete, though outwardly it may not seem quite necessary in it.\nIt is quite clear that this manufactured thing, may in this connection,\nbe taken as an illustration of God\u2019s Creation--praised be its Great\nCreator.\n\nThis premise in being exhortative might be fit for all, but being\nuntrue and falsifying the wisdom of the Creator, is not fit for any.\nIt falsifies philosophy, because philosophy is nothing else but the\nknowledge of the causes of things. If there be no necessary causes for\na thing, which make its existence necessary in the form in which it\nexists, then there is no particular knowledge which may be attributed\nto the wise Creator. Just as if there had not been some necessary\ncauses for the existence of any manufactured thing, there would have\nbeen no art at all, and no wisdom by which its maker might be praised,\nand which might not be found in any man other than the maker. Where\nwould be found any wisdom in a man, if he could perform all his actions\nby any member of his body, or without any member at all, so much\nso that he could see with his ears, as he could see with his eyes,\nor smell with his eyes as he could with his nose. This is all only\nfalsifying philosophy, and the meaning for which God has called himself\nWise (_Hakim_)--High and Holy be his name from such imputations. We find\nthat Avicenna has also adopted this doctrine, for many reasons. He says\nthat everything, except the maker, when taken by itself, may either\nbe possible or allowable. Of the latter--that is, things allowable,\nthere are two kinds: One is allowable as regards its maker, the\nother is necessary as regards the maker; and possible as regards its\nessence. The only thing which is necessary, according to all reasons,\nis the first maker. This opinion is extremely incorrect. Because that\nwhich is possible in itself and its essence, will not possibly turn a\nnecessity beyond its maker, but by a change of the possible nature into\na necessary one. If it be said that by these words he means \u201cPossible\nwith regard to itself\u201d, that is, when the maker arises it will rise\nalso, then we would say that this rising is impossible. But this is\nnot the place to discuss the matter with this man. We ventured to talk\nof him, because of the many views which he has invented. Now we would\nreturn to our former theme. The second premise, which says that every\ntransient thing is created, is not in itself obvious. The philosophers\nhave differed about it. Plato allows that the apparently transient\nthing may be eternal, while Aristotle denies it. It is a very intricate\nmatter, and cannot be made clear except to the philosophers, that is,\nlearned men, whom God has set apart for His knowledge, and has in His\nBook, coupled their witness with that of Himself and His angels.\n\nAbul Maali has tried to make the premise clear by some other premises.\nFirst, that there should be something unique in every transient thing,\nwhich may make it more preferable by one of the two qualities. Second,\nthat this particular thing cannot be any other than that intended.\nThird, that the thing which exists by intention is created. Then he\nsays that a transient thing comes into existence by our intention,\nthat is it is produced by previous volition. For all the actions are\nperformed either by nature or by intention. And nature is not one of\nthe passing things which are alike, that is, it not only creates the\ndissimilar but does the both. For instance, sea-anemone will absorb\nthe yellow lob in the right side of the body and not in the left.\nBut intention is the thing which is particularly applicable to a\nthing opposed to its like. Then he adds that the universe is like its\ncreation and exists in the position in the atmosphere where it was\nmade. By the void he means another void in which the world was made. So\nhe concluded that the universe was made by intention. The premise which\nsays that it is intention which fixes the shape of a thing, is correct,\nbut that universe is surrounded by a void is wrong, or at least not\nclear. Then again according to their notions, his act of placing the\nvoid is bad. That is, it must be eternal, otherwise it would require\nanother void for it. The premise saying that in this connection\nintention is nothing but a created thing is not clear. For the\nintention of an action is connected with the desired act itself, for it\nis one of its adjuncts. And it is clear that when one adjunct is found\nwith the action the other must be there, for example the father and the\nson. If one be found potentially the other must also be so. Hence if\nthe intention of the action is created, then necessarily the desired\nact must also be created. If the intention of the action be eternal,\nthen the thing desired by that action must also be eternal. The\nintention which precedes the intended object, is said to be a potential\nintention only; that is, the intention which has not yet brought its\nintended object into being. This is quite clear, for when the intended\nobject has appeared, then it becomes an existent thing, which it was\nnot before the appearance of the intended object in action. When this\nbecomes the cause of the creation of an intended thing, only by means\nof action, then, if the Mutakallimun assert that intention is created,\nit becomes clear that the intended object must also be created. From\nthe Law it is clear that there is no need to go so deeply into the\nproblem as far as the masses are concerned. So it has not mentioned any\neternal or created intention, but has only said that it exists and the\nthings are created. So God says:--\u201cVerily, Our speech upon anything\nwhen We will the same is, that We only say unto it, Be; and it is.\u201d[30]\nThis has been so because the masses cannot understand the idea of\ncreated things from an eternal intention. But the fact is that the Law\nhas not mentioned whether the intention is created or eternal, this\nbeing a doubtful thing for many people. The Mutakallimun have also no\ncertain argument to advance for providing the possibility of a created\nintention for creation. For the principle with which they maintain\ntheir position for negating the existence of intention as eternal, is\nthe premise which we have already mentioned, that is, the thing which\ncannot be separated from the created thing is itself created. We will\nmention this again when talking of intention.\n\nFrom the foregoing it has become clear that the well-known methods\nadopted by Asharites for the knowledge of God are certain neither\nphilosophical, nor by Law. This would be quite clear to anyone who\nwould look closely into the kind of arguments advanced in the Divine\nBook about the knowledge of the existence of the Creator. For if you\nlook closely into this matter you will find that the arguments comprise\nboth qualities, those of being certain and at the same time clear,\nwithout being complex, that is, they have few premises.\n\nAs to the Sufis their method in theorising is not a philosophical\nmethod--that is, made up of a number of premises, and syllogisms.\nThey maintain that the knowledge of God, or of anything existent,\nis found in our own hearts, after its detachment from all physical\ndesires, and concentration of mind upon the desired object. In support\nof their principle they bring many an argument from the exoteric side\nof Law. For instance they quote the Divine words, \u201cAnd fear God, and\nGod will instruct you,\u201d[31] and, \u201cWhoever do their best endeavour to\nprompt our true religion, We will direct them unto Our ways;\u201d[32] and\nagain, \u201cIf ye fear God, He will grant you a distinction,\u201d[33] and\nmany other verses of this kind which are considered to be helpful for\ntheir purpose. We say that this method, if we suppose it to be real,\nis not meant for all people. Had this method been satisfactory for all\npeople then the philosophical method would have been quite futile, and\nits existence among the people would have been useless, and with it\nthe existence of the Quran. For that always invites us to theorising,\njudging, and admonishing by way of philosophy. We of course do not\ndeny that the control of physical desires is a condition for healthy\nthinking, as physical health is one of its conditions. For the control\nof desires is profitable in acquiring knowledge by itself, if it be\nmade a condition for it, just as health is a condition for education,\nthough it is not very useful for it. That is why our Law has invited\nall of us to this method and has insisted upon it, that is, for work,\nnot that it is sufficient in itself, as these people think, but that\nit is useful for thinking as we have already described. This would be\nquite clear to any one who cares to ponder and think over it.\n\nAs to the Mutazilites--their books have not reached us in sufficient\nnumber in this Peninsula (Spain) that we may be able to form a fair\nestimate of the method which they have adopted in this matter. But it\nseems that their methods are like those of the Asharites.\n\nIf now that it is clear that none of these methods are in accordance\nwith that by which the Law invites all the people, according to the\ndifference in their dispositions, to a confession of the existence\nof God, it may be asked: What is that method which the Law has\nlaid down in the Divine Book, and upon which the Companions of the\nProphet depended? We would say that the method which the Divine Book\nhas adopted, and by which it has invited all to believe, is, when\nthoroughly investigated from the Quran, dependent upon two principles.\nThe one is a knowledge of God\u2019s solicitude for man, and the creation of\neverything for his sake. We would call this the argument of solicitude.\nThe second is the creation of the essences of the existent things, as\nfor example, the creation of life in the minerals, and feeling and\nintelligence. We would call this method the \u201cargument of creation.\u201d\nThe first method is founded upon two principles: first that all the\nexistent things suit man; secondly, that this suitability must have\nexisted in the mind of the Maker before He intended to make the object\nin question, for it cannot be obtained by chance alone. Now their\nsuitability for the existence of man can be easily ascertained by the\nsuitability of day and night, sun and moon, for the existence of man.\nSuch is also the case with the suitability of the four seasons, and of\nthe place in which he lives, that is, the earth. It is also apparent\nwith respect to animals, vegetables, and minerals; and many other\nthings, such as rain, rivers, seas, the whole of the earth, water,\nfire and air. It is also evident from the different members of his\nbody, on account of their suitability for the preservation of his life\nand existence. On the whole, a knowledge of the benefit derived from\nall the existent things may be included in it. So it is necessary for\na man who wants to know God perfectly, to investigate the benefits\nderived from existent things. In the argument of creation is included\nthe existence of the animal world, the plant world, and the heavens.\nThis method is again based upon two principles, which can be found out\nby every man by his very nature. The one is that all things have been\nmade and created. This is quite clear in itself, in the case of animals\nand plants, as God has said, \u201cVerily the idols which ye invoke, beside\nGod, can never create a single fly, though they may all assemble for\nthat purpose.\u201d[34] We see an inorganic substance and then there is life\nin it. So we know for certain, that there is an inventor and bestower\nof life, and He is God. Of the heavens we know by their movements,\nwhich never become slackened, that they work for our benefit by divine\nsolicitude, and are subordinate to our welfare. Such an appointed and\nsubordinate object is always created for some purpose. The second\nprinciple is that for every created thing there is a creator. So it is\nright to say from the two foregoing principles that for every existent\nthing there is an inventor. There are many arguments, according to\nthe number of the created things, which can be advanced to prove this\npremise. Thus it is necessary for one who wants to know God as He\nought to be known, to acquaint himself with the essence of things, so\nthat he may get information about the creation of all things. For who\ncannot understand the real substance and purpose of a thing, cannot\nunderstand the minor meaning of its creation. It is to this that God\nrefers in the following verse, \u201cOr do they not contemplate the heaven\nand the earth, and the things which God has created?\u201d[35] And so a\nman who would follow the purpose of philosophy in investigating the\nexistence of things, that is, would try to know the cause which led to\nits creation, and the purpose of it would know the argument of kindness\nmost perfectly. These two arguments are those adopted by Law.\n\nThe verses of the Quran leading to a knowledge of the existence of God\nare dependent only on the two foregoing arguments. It will be quite\nclear to anyone who will examine closely the verses, which occur in the\nDivine Book in this connection. These, when investigated, will be found\nto be of three kinds: either they are verses showing the \u201carguments of\nkindness,\u201d or those mentioning the \u201carguments of creation,\u201d or those\nwhich include both the kinds of arguments. The following verses may\nbe taken as illustrating the argument of kindness. \u201cHave we not made\nthe earth for a bed, and the mountains for stakes to find the same?\nAnd have we not created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep\nfor rest; and made the night a garment to cover you; and destined the\nday to the gaining of your livelihood and built over you seven solid\nheavens; and placed therein a burning lamp? And do we not send down\nfrom the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance,\nthat we may thereby produce corn, and herbs, and gardens planted thick\nwith trees?\u201d[36] and, \u201cBlessed be He Who hath placed the twelve signs\nin the heavens; hath placed therein a lamp by day, and the moon which\nshineth by night;\u201d[37] and again, \u201cLet man consider his food.\u201d[38]\nThe following verses refer to the argument of invention, \u201cLet man\nconsider, therefore of what he is created. He is created of the seed\npoured forth, issuing from the loins, and the breast bones;\u201d[39] and,\n\u201cDo they not consider the camels, how they are created; the heaven,\nhow it is raised; the mountains, how they are fixed; the earth how it\nis extended;\u201d[40] and again, \u201cO man, a parable is propounded unto you;\nwherefore hearken unto it. Verily the idols which they invoke, besides\nGod, can never create a single fly, though they may all assemble for\nthe purpose.\u201d[41] Then we may point to the story of Abraham, referred\nto in the following verse, \u201cI direct my face unto Him Who hath created\nheaven and earth; I am orthodox, and not of the idolators.\u201d[42] There\nmay be quoted many verses referring to this argument. The verses\ncomprising both the arguments are also many, for instance, \u201cO men,\nof Mecca, serve your Lord, Who has created you, and those who have\nbeen before you: peradventure you will fear Him; Who hath spread the\nearth as a bed for you, and the heaven as a covering, and hath caused\nwater to descend from heaven, and thereby produced fruits for your\nsustenance. Set not up, therefore, any equals unto God, against your\nown knowledge.\u201d[43] His words, \u201cWho hath created you, and those who\nhave been before you,\u201d lead us to the argument of creation; while the\nwords, \u201cwho has spread the earth\u201d refer to the argument of divine\nsolicitude for man. Of this kind also are the following verses of the\nQuran, \u201cOne sign of the resurrection unto them is the dead earth; We\nquicken the same by rain, and produce therefrom, various sorts of\ngrain, of which they eat;\u201d[44] and, \u201cNow in the creation of heaven and\nearth, and the vicissitudes of night and day are signs unto those who\nare endowed with understanding, who remember God standing, and sitting,\nand lying on their sides; _and meditate on the creation of heaven and\nearth, saying O Lord, Thou hast not created this in vain, far be it\nfrom Thee, therefore deliver us from the torment of hell fire_.\u201d[45]\nMany verses of this kind comprise both the kinds of arguments.\n\nThis method is the right path by which God has invited men to a\nknowledge of His existence, and informed them of it through the\nintelligence which He has implanted in their nature. The following\nverse refers to this fixed and innate nature of man, \u201cAnd when the\nLord drew forth their posterity from the loins of the sons of Adam,\nand took them witness against themselves, Am I not your Lord? They\nanswered, Yea, we do bear witness.\u201d[46] So it is incumbent for one who\nintends to obey God, and follow the injunction of His Prophet, that\nhe should adopt this method, thus making himself one of those learned\nmen who bear witness to the divinity of God, with His own witness, and\nthat of His angels, as He says, \u201cGod hath borne witness, that there is\nno God but He, and the angels, and those who are endowed with wisdom\nprofess the same; who executeth righteousness; there is no God but He;\nthe Mighty, the Wise.\u201d[47] Among the arguments for both of themselves\nis the praise which God refers to in the following verse, \u201cNeither is\nthere any thing which doth not celebrate his praise; but ye understand\nnot their celebration thereof.\u201d[48]\n\nIt is evident from the above arguments for the existence of God that\nthey are dependent upon two categories of reasoning. It is also clear\nthat both of these methods are meant for particular people; that is,\nthe learned. Now as to the method for the masses. The difference\nbetween the two lies only in details. The masses cannot understand the\ntwo above mentioned arguments but only what they can grasp by their\nsenses; while the learned men can go further, and learn by reasoning\nalso, besides learning by sense. They have gone so far that a learned\nman has said, that the benefits the learned men derive from the\nknowledge of the members of human and animal body are a thousand and\none. If this be so, then this is the method which is taught both by\nLaw and by Nature. It is the method which was preached by the Prophet\nand the divine books. The learned men do not mention these two lines\nof reasonings to the masses, not because of their number, but because\nof a want of depth of learning on their part about the knowledge of a\nsingle thing only. The example of the common people, considering and\npondering over the universe, is like a man who looks into a thing, the\nmanufacture of which he does not know. For all that such a man can know\nabout it is that it has been made, and that there must be a maker of\nit. But, on the other hand the learned look into the universe, just as\na man knowing the art would do; try to understand the real purpose of\nit. So it is quite clear that their knowledge about the Maker, as the\nmaker of the universe, would be far better than that of the man who\nonly knows it as made. The atheists, who deny the Creator altogether,\nare like men who can see and feel the created things, but would not\nacknowledge any Creator for them, but would attribute all to chance\nalone, and that they come into being by themselves.\n\n\n                          OF THE UNITY OF GOD\n\nNow then if this is the method adopted by the Law, it may be asked:\nWhat is the way of proving the unity of God by means of the Law; that\nis, the knowledge of the religious formula that \u201cthere is no god, but\nGod.\u201d The negation contained in it is an addition to the affirmative,\nwhich the formula contains, while the affirmative has already been\nproved. What is the purpose of this negation? We would say that the\nmethod, adopted by the Law, of denying divinity to all but God is\naccording to the ordinance of God in the Quran, contained in the\nfollowing three verses. First, \u201cIf there were either in heaven or on\nearth gods beside God, verily both would be corrupted.\u201d[49] Secondly,\n\u201cGod has not begotten issue; neither is there any other God with him;\notherwise every other God would surely take away that which he has\ncreated; and some of them had enabled themselves over the others. Far\nbe it that from God, which they affirm of Him.\u201d[50] Thirdly, \u201cSay,\nunto the idolators, if there were gods with Him, as ye say, they would\nsurely seek an occasion of making some attempt against the possessor of\nthe Throne.\u201d[51] The argument contained in the first verse is implanted\nin our dispositions by our very nature. For it is well-known that if\nthere be two kings, and the orders of the one be as effectual as those\nof the other, it is not possible to have even a single city under their\nguidance. It is impossible to have one action of a single kind from\ntwo actors. So it is necessary that, if both of them begin work at the\nsame time, the city would be ruined, except in the case that one should\nwork and the other remain inactive. This is against our conception of\ndivinity. For when the two actions of the same kind are gathered upon\na single object, then that object must necessarily be destroyed. This\nis the meaning of the verse, \u201cIf there were either in the heaven or on\nearth gods besides God, both would be corrupted.\u201d The verse, \u201cEvery god\nhas surely taken away that which he had created,\u201d has been revealed in\nrefutation of the argument of those who believe in many gods, entrusted\nwith different works. For in this case it becomes incumbent that the\ngods doing different works be independent of one another, and that they\nshould not be existent at one and the same time. But as the world is\none it is necessary that there be not in it gods with different duties.\nThe third verse, \u201cSay unto the idolators if there were gods with him,\nas ye say, they would surely seek an occasion of making some attempt\nagainst the Possessor of the Throne,\u201d is like the first, an argument\nto prove the impossibility of the existence of two gods, whose duties\nare the same. This verse means that had there been in the world any\nother god, but the present one, able to create the world and those in\nit, so that his relation to it be that of a creator, then he must live\nwith God on the Throne. Thus there would be found two existent things\nof the same kind in a single place. But this is impossible. For when\nthe relation is one, the related must also be one, that is, they cannot\nbe gathered in a single place as they cannot live in it. The relation\nof God to the Throne is just its opposite: the Throne exists for Him,\nand not He for the Throne. That is what God has said, \u201cHis Throne is\nextended over heaven and earth, and the preservation of them is no\nburden unto him.\u201d[52] This is the argument by nature or by Law for\nproving the unity of God. The difference between the learned and the\nmasses is that the learned know more about the creation of the world,\nand the purpose of its different parts, like a single body, than the\ncommon people. It is to this that the latter part of the verse refers,\n\u201cGod forbid! and far, very far, be that which they utter! The seven\nheavens praise him, and the earth, and all who are therein: neither is\nthere anything which doth not celebrate His praise; but ye understand\nnot their celebration thereof: He is gracious and merciful.\u201d[53] The\nargument which the Asharites deduce from this verse, calling it the\n\u201cargument of impossibility,\u201d is neither in accordance with natural nor\nlegal arguments. It is not in accordance with nature, because what\nthey say is without any proof at all; while it is insufficient by Law,\nbecause the common people cannot understand it, not to speak of their\nbeing satisfied with it. They say, that if there be two gods, then it\nis more probable that they would differ. If this were to happen, then\nthere would be one of the following three cases, there being no fourth\nalternative. Either the desire of both of them would be accomplished,\nor the desire of neither would not. They say that it is impossible that\nthe desire of neither of them be accomplished, but if it be so then the\nuniverse would neither be existent nor non-existent. If the desire of\nboth of them be accomplished, then the universe would be both existent\nand non-existent at the same time. So there remains no alternative\nbut that the desire of one be accomplished, the other\u2019s remaining\nunfulfilled. So one whose desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and\nthe helpless cannot be a God. The weakness of this argument is that\nas it is possible to suppose that they differ, it is just as possible\nto presume that they agree, a fact more becoming to the gods than\ndifference of opinion. If they agree about the creation of the world,\nthey would be like two craftsmen agreed upon making something. If it\nbe so then it must be said that their actions help them to work and\nlive in a single place, except that some one may say, that perhaps one\nwould do one thing and the other quite another thing, or perhaps they\nwould work by turns. But this is an objection which cannot be advanced\nby the masses. But if any sceptic controversialist were to advance it,\nhe may be told that one who has power to create one thing has power\nto create the whole. So now again it comes to the same thing, whether\nthey agree or not, and how can they help each other in work? As to\nworking by turn, it would be a defect in both of them. It is more\nprobable that if there be two gods, there must be two universes. But\nas the universe is one, its Maker must also be one, for a single work\ncan only be done by one maker. So it is not necessary that we should\nunderstand the verse of God, \u201cand some of them had enabled themselves\nover the other,\u201d as pointing to disagreement alone, but it may be taken\nas true even in the case of argument, for this also leads to the same\nresult as disagreement would do. Here lies the difference between us\nand the Mutakallimun, about the meaning of this verse, though Abul\nMaali has said something almost expressing our own views. By the\nforegoing you would understand that the argument which the Mutakallimun\nhave deduced from this verse is not the one which it really contains.\nThe impossibility to which their argument leads is not one which\nshould be deduced from the verse in question. The impossibility which\nis deduced from the argument which they think is contained in the\nverse, is more than one impossibility, by their dividing it into\nthree parts, while there is no division in the verse itself. So the\nargument which they use is the one which is known to the logicians as\ndisjunctive syllogism, and is known in their science as definition\nand division. But the argument contained in the verse is one which is\nknown in logic as hypothetical syllogism, which is quite different\nfrom disjunctive syllogism. Any one who would look most cursorily\ninto this science would know the difference between the two. Then,\nagain, the impossibility which their argument points out is not that\nto which the argument of the Book leads. They say that universe will\neither be neither existent nor non-existent, or it will be existent\nand non-existent at the same time, or its god would be a helpless and\nweak god. These are impossible for ever, because of the impossibility\nof more than one. The impossibility which the verse refers to, is not\nso for ever, for in it it depends upon a certain period of time, that\nis when the universe is found corrupted at the time of its existence.\nFor he says \u201cIf there be any other god but God,\u201d the universe would\nbe found corrupted. Then he has made an exception that it is not\ncorrupted, and hence there must not be more than one God. So now it has\nbecome quite clear that this is the method by which God has invited the\npeople to believe in His existence, and negate the divinity of all but\nHim. These are the two propositions which are contained in the article\nof Faith, \u201cThere are no gods but He.\u201d So one who thinks over these two\npropositions, and believes in them by the method which we have pointed\nout, is a Muslim in reality, with a belief which is truly Islamic. But\nhe whose belief is not based upon these arguments, though he confesses\nthe article, he is a Muslim with the other Muslims, only on account of\nthe similarity of names.\n\n\n                         ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES\n\nThe attributes which the Divine Book has assigned to the Creator and\nMaker of the universe, are only the perfect forms of those which are\nfound in man, and these are seven in number: Knowledge, life, power,\nvolition, hearing, seeing and talking.\n\nNow as to knowledge, God in his Divine Book has said the following\n\u201cShall he not know all things who has created them?\u201d[54] The argument\ncontained in this verse is that a created thing always shows, by the\narrangement which it possesses,--its different parts being made for\nthe sake of one another for the benefit intended to be derived from\nthat thing,--that its maker is not nature only, but it must have been\nmade by one who has arranged all for the end in view. So he must have\na knowledge of it. For instance, when a man looks at a house he knows\nthat the foundation was laid for the sake of the walls, and the walls\nhave been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the\nhouse must have been built by a man knowing the art of building.\n\nThis quality is eternal, for it is not fitting that God should possess\nit for a time only. But we should not go down deep into this matter,\nand should not say, like the Mutakallimun, that He knows the created\nthings at the time of their creation, by His eternal knowledge,\nfor then it becomes necessary that the knowledge of the created\nthing at the time of its non-existence be the same which is absurd,\nwhen knowledge is said to be dependent upon the existent things.\nAs an existent thing is sometimes an action, and sometimes only a\npotentiality, it is necessary that the knowledge of the two existence\nbe different, as its time of being in potentiality is quite different\nfrom the time of its being in action. But this the Law does not\nexplain. On the other hand it maintains quite an opposite position:\nthat God knows the created thing at the time of its creation, as He\nhas said, \u201cThere falleth no leaf, but He knoweth it; neither is there\na single grain in the dark parts of the earth; neither a green thing,\nnor a dry thing, but it is written in the perspicuous book.\u201d[55] So\nit is necessary that we should lay down in Law that He knows a thing\nbefore it comes into being; knows a thing when it is, and not when\nit should have been; and knows when a thing has been destroyed at\nthe time of its destruction. This is what the injunctions of the Law\nestablish. It has been so because the masses cannot understand the\nuniverse through visible things, except in this way. The Mutakallimun\nhave no argument to advance against it, except that they say that the\nknowledge which changes with a change in the existent thing is itself\ncreated, while with God nothing created can be attached. They say so\nbecause they think that that which cannot be separated from the created\nthing is itself created. But we have already exposed the fallacy of\nthis argument. So it is established by the rules described, and it\nshould not be said that he knows the creation of the created, and the\ncorruption of the corrupted things, neither by created nor by eternal\nknowledge. This is an innovation in Islam, \u201cAnd is thy Lord forgetful\nof thee?\u201d[56]\n\nThe attribute of life is quite evident from the attribute of Knowledge.\nFor our observation shows that one of the conditions of knowledge is\nlife. According to the Mutakallimun the conditions of an observed\nobject can be applied to the unseen. What they have said about this is\nquite true.\n\nThe attribute of volition needs no proof, because it is one of the\nconditions of bringing forth a thing, that its maker must intend it.\nSuch is also the case with power: He must possess power. But to say\nthat He intended created things by eternal intention is innovation\nin religion, which was not known to the learned in Law, and cannot\nsatisfy the masses who have reached the stage of dogmatics. We should\nsay that He intends making a thing at the time of its creation, but\ndoes not intend at the time of its non-existence. So God says: \u201cVerily\nour speech unto anything when we will the same is that we say unto it,\nBe; and it is.\u201d[57] For, as we have said, the common people are never\ncompelled to advance the argument that He intends doing a thing by\neternal intention, but, as the Mutakallimun have said, that that by\nwhich the created things exist, is itself created.\n\nNow if it be asked, how the attribute of Speech be assigned to and\nproved in God, we would say that it can be ascribed to him on account\nof the attributes of Knowledge and Power of creation. For speech\nis nothing more than act on the part of the speaker to show to the\none addressed the knowledge which he has, or to disclose to him the\nknowledge which is in him. This is one of the actions of the maker. And\nwhen that created thing, which is really a creator, man, has power over\nthis faculty, because he knows and is powerful, how befitting it is\nthat it should be found in the real Creator. There is another condition\nfor this action, among the things which we can observe, and that is\nthat which must be the means of performing it: words. This being so,\nit becomes necessary that that action should be performed by God in\nthe heart of somebody, His chosen servant. It is not necessary that\nit should always be through the medium of words, and so created. But\nit may happen either through an angel; or through divine inspiration,\nthat is without the medium of words which He may create, but through an\nact to the hearer, which discloses to him the true nature of the thing\nmeant, or through words which He may create in the ears of him who has\nbeen specialised to hear His words. It is to these three methods that\nthe verse of the Quran refers, \u201cIt is not fit for a man that God should\nspeak unto him otherwise than by private revelation, or from behind\na veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, by His permission, that\nwhich He pleaseth.\u201d[58] So revelation is the disclosure of the intended\nsecrets to the inspired person without the medium of words which He\ncreated, but through an action done on the mind of the one addressed.\nSo God says, \u201cAfterwards He approached the Prophet and drew unto\nhim; until He was at the distance of two bows\u2019 length from him or yet\nnearer; and He revealed unto His servant that which He revealed.\u201d[59]\nThe speech from behind the veil is one which is performed through the\nmedium of words. This is the real speech, and that is the one which God\nspecially bestowed upon Moses, and so He has said, \u201cAnd God spake unto\nMoses, discoursing with him.\u201d[60] Now as to his words, \u201cor by sending a\nmessenger to reveal,\u201d this is the third kind mentioned above, that is,\nthrough the medium of some angels. Sometimes God speaks to the learned\nmen, who are the successors of the prophets, by disclosing arguments\nto them. On account of these causes it is true, when the learned men\nsay, that the Quran is the speech of God. It has now become clear to\nyou that the Quran, which is the speech of God, is eternal, but the\nwords expressing it are created by him, and are not human. From it are\nexcepted the Quranic words which we commonly use in our speech, that\nis, these words are our own actions, by the command of God, while the\nwords of the Quran are those created by God. He who does not understand\nthese things by this method, cannot understand this argument and cannot\ngrasp as to how the Quran is the word of God. The alphabets used in the\nQuran are our own invention, by the command of God. We have to respect\nthem, because of them are formed the words created by God, for the\npurpose which is not itself created. He who thought of words and not\nof meaning, that is, did not separate them, said that the Quran was\ncreated; while he who thought of the meaning which these words express,\nsaid the Quran was not created. But the truth lies in the middle of\nthese two extreme views. The Asharites deny that the speaker is the\nmaker of his own speech, for they think that if they admit it, they\nmust also admit that God is the maker of His speech. Again, when they\nbelieve, that the speech can only exist with the speaker, they think,\nthey must also believe, taking in view the two foregoing principles,\nthat God is Himself the creator of His words. In this case He Himself\nbecomes the place of created things. So they assert that God is the\nmaker of speech, but it is an eternal attribute in him, like knowledge,\netc. This is the time of the speech in our mind, but not of the speech\nwhich expresses what we have in our mind, that is, the words. As the\nMutazilites thought that speech is the action of the speaker, they said\nthat by speech is meant only the words uttered. So they believed that\nthe Quran is \u201cCreated.\u201d Since according to them the word is an action\nof the speaker, so it is not one of its conditions that it should exist\nwith the speaker. The Asharites on the other hand, insist that it is\none of its conditions that it should exist only with the speaker.\nThis is true in both the cases, that is in the case of ideas in our\nminds, and the words which express them. But in the case of God, it\nis the ideas which stand with Him, and not the words expressing them.\nSo when the Asharites laid it down as a condition, that the speech be\nabsolutely dependent upon the speaker, they deny that the speaker is\nthe maker of his speech; while on the other hand, the Mutazilites, when\nthey laid it down as a condition that the speaker is the maker of his\nspeech, ignored the existence of ideas in our minds. In this way there\nis some truth, and some falsehood, in the opinions of both of these\nsects, as must have become clear by what we have said.\n\nNow we come to the attributes of hearing and seeing. The Law has proved\nthem to be possessed by God by saying that hearing and seeing are the\ntwo essential qualities for knowing the meaning of things, which cannot\nbe acquired by intellect. So a maker must know everything about the\nobject which he is making, it is necessary that he should possess the\ntwo senses of hearing and seeing. So He must have these two faculties.\nAll this proves their existence in God, by means of the Law, through\nthe teaching of the knowledge which is found in him. Moreover, One\non whom the name of God and the Adorned is applied must necessarily\npossess all the senses. For it is useless for man to worship him\nwho cannot know that he is being worshipped, as God has said, \u201cO my\nfather, why dost thou worship that which heareth not, neither seeth,\nnor profiteth thee at all;\u201d[61] and, \u201cDo you therefore worship, beside\nGod, that which cannot profit you at all, nor can it hurt you?\u201d[62]\nThis is the power which has been ascribed to God, and which the Law has\ncommanded the common people to know and nothing else.\n\nOf the innovation which this question of attributes has given rise\nto, one is whether they are the same as Divine Essence or something\nadded to it, that is, whether they are found in the essence itself\n(_Nafsiyyah_), or are only applied to it, (_Maanawiyyah_). By\n_Nafsiyyah_ we mean those attributes which are found in the thing\nitself, and are not attached to it for the purpose of adding something\nto the essence, for existence, we say one or eternal. By _Maanawiyyah_\nwe mean the attributes which are applied to a thing for some purpose\nwhich is found in it. The Asharites say that these attributes are only\n_Maanawiyyah_, that is qualities which are only added to the Divine\nEssence. So they say that he knows by a knowledge which has been added\nto His essence, and lives by life attached to it and so on. This has\ncompelled them to admit that the Creator has a body, for there must be\nthe quality and the qualified, the bearer and the borne. This is the\ncondition of the body, so they must say that the essence is existent\nby itself, and the qualities exist through it, or they must say that\nthese attributes are independent of each other, then there must be a\nnumber of gods. This is the belief of the Christians, who say that the\nthree personifications are those of Existence, Life and Knowledge. God\nhas said about it the following, \u201cThey are certainly infidels, who\nsay, God is the third of the three.\u201d[63] One of them stands by itself,\nthe others being dependent upon the former. So it becomes necessary\nthat there should be essence, existing in itself, and the accidents\ndepending on something else. The place in which the essence and the\naccidents are found together must necessarily be a body. Such is also\nthe case with the Mutazilites about the question, that the essence and\nthe attributes are one and the same thing. This they think, is for\nthe primary principles of knowledge or may be opposed to them. For\nthey think that according to the primary principles knowledge must be\nexistent without the one knowing. But knowledge and the one knowing\ncannot be the same, except that it may be possible that the two may be\nvery close to each other, just as the father and the son. This teaching\nis very remote for the understanding of the masses, and to explain\nit to them in detail is innovation, for it would more likely mislead\nthan guide them to the right path. The Mutazilites have no argument\nto advance in proof of their proposition, for they have none. Such is\nalso the condition of the Mutakallimun in the case of denying a body\nto God. For when they have established it, they are compelled to admit\nthe creation of the body, because it is a body. We have already said\nthat they have no argument for it. Those who have such are the learned\npeople, the philosophers. It is at this point that the Christians have\nerred. They believe in the multiplicity of attributes that they are\nessences existing not by the help of another, but by themselves, like\nthe self, (_Zat_). They also believe that the qualities with these\nattributes are two in number--knowledge and life. So they say that\nGod is one from the three causes. That He is three they say because\nHe exists, lives and knows. They say that He is one, because He is a\ncollection of all the three qualities. And so there are three religious\nopinions among them. One party believes that they are all the self\n(_Zat_) alone without any number; the other only believes in numbers of\nqualities. This is divided into two parties: one which thinks that they\nexist by themselves, and the other which makes them exist by something\nelse. All this is in contrast with the purpose of the Law.\n\nIt being so, it is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge\nof these things to the common people should tell them as much as the\nLaw orders him to do--and that is only a confession of their existence\nwithout entering into details. For it is not possible for the common\npeople to believe and understand them at all. By common people here I\nmean all those who are unacquainted with the laws of reasoning, though\nthey may or may not know the science of scholastic theology. It is not\nin the power of scholastic theology to know of these things even when\nit is said that it is not a science of reasoning but of dogmatics, for\nthese things can never be clearly understood by dogmatics alone. So,\nby now, the extent of these questions which should be disclosed to the\ncommon people, and the method adopted for this purpose must have become\nclear to you by what we have said.\n\n\n                         OF DIVINE PERFECTION\n\nWe have already described the way which the Law pursues in teaching\nthe common people the existence of God, the denial of His having any\nassociates, and thereby the knowledge of His attributes, and the\nextent to which they have been explained in details in it, one after\nanother. It is really an addition to, and deduction from, and change\nand interpretation of this very limit and extent which has not been\nproductive of good to any and all the people. Now it remains for us\nto know the method which the Law has adopted in explaining to the\ncommon people the perfection of God and freedom from all defects, and\nthe length to which it has gone in detailing it, and the cause of\nrestricting its knowledge to them. Then we should mention the methods\nwhich it adopts in teaching the people the knowledge of His actions,\nand the latitude which it has allowed in this respect. Having done so,\nwe shall have accomplished the purpose for which we began this book.\n\nSo we say that the knowledge of things known as perfection and holiness\nare found in many verses of the Quran, the most clear and definite of\nthem being the following, \u201cThere is nothing like Him, and it is He who\nheareth and seeth;\u201d[64] and, \u201cShall God, therefore, Who createth, be\nas he who createth not.\u201d[65] The second verse is an argument for the\nverse \u201cthere is nothing like Him.\u201d For it is one of the characteristics\nof the dispositions of all the people to think that the Creator must\neither be unlike the things which He has created, or having qualities\nwhich may be different from these which He has given to the created;\notherwise he who is himself created cannot be a Creator. When we\nhave admitted that the created cannot be the creator then it becomes\nincumbent upon us to say that the qualities of the created should\neither be not found in the Creator, or found in Him in some different\nway than they are in the created. We say, \u201cin some different way,\u201d\nbecause we have proved the divine qualities to be those which are\nfound in the noblest of God\u2019s creatures, man, as knowledge, life,\npower, volition and so on. This is the meaning of the Tradition of\nthe Prophet, \u201cGod created Adam after His own image.\u201d So it has been\nestablished that the Law has denied the similarity between the Creator\nand the created with fitting arguments. The denial of similarity is\nof two kinds, first, that there may not be found in the Creator many\nqualities of the created; and secondly; there may be found in him the\nqualities of the created in so perfect and excellent a form as could\nnot be imagined. Of these two kinds it should be seen which one the Law\nhas explained, and about which it is reticent. We would also try to\nfind out the cause for this reticence.\n\nWe would say that the qualities of the created which have been denied\nby Law as pertaining to God are those which show some defects; for\nexample, death, as God says, \u201cAnd do ye not trust in him who liveth,\nand dieth not,\u201d[66] or sleep and things which lead to negligence and\ncarelessness, as regards senses and the protection of the existent\nthings, as He says, \u201cNeither slumber nor sleep seizeth Him.\u201d[67] Of\nsuch qualities are error and forgetfulness, as God has said, \u201cThe\nknowledge thereof is with my Lord, in the book of His decrees: my\nLord erreth not, neither doth He forget.\u201d[68] A knowledge of those\nqualities the existence of which has been denied in God is one of the\nnecessary things of common education and is why the Law has been very\nexplicit about them. It only warns us not to meddle with those things\nwhich are far from the primary principles of knowledge, because it\nknows the small limits of human knowledge, as God has said in many\ndifferent verses of the Quran, \u201cBut the greater part of men do not\nunderstand.\u201d For example He says, \u201cVerily the creation of heaven and\nearth is more considerable, than the creation of man; but the greater\npart of men do not understand,\u201d[69] and \u201cThe institution of God to\nwhich He has created mankind disposed; there is no change in what God\nhath created. This is the right religion; but the greater part of men\nknow it not.\u201d[70] Now it may be said, what is the proof--that is, the\nproof advanced by the Law--of the fact that these defects are not found\nin God. We would say that it is apparent from the universe itself. It\nis quite safe. No confusion or corruption overtakes it. Had the Creator\nbeen subject to negligence, carelessness, error or forgetfulness the\nwhole of the universe would have been destroyed. God has made this\nclear in many verses of the Quran. He says, \u201cVerily God sustaineth the\nheaven and the earth, lest they fail: and if they should fail, none\ncould support the same besides him;\u201d[71] and, \u201cThe preservation of both\nis not burden unto him, He is the high, the mighty.\u201d[72]\n\nIf our opinion be asked about the anthropomorphic attributes of God,\nwhether the Law has denied them as attributes to the Creator or is\nonly silent about them, we would say, that it is evident that the Law\nis quite silent about them, and their mention in it is quite near to\ntheir denial altogether. It has come to be so because the Quran in\nmany verses speaks of His hands and face, and these verses are taken\nas showing physical attributes which the Creator has bestowed upon the\ncreated, just as He has given him the qualities of power, volition and\nso on--qualities which are common between the Creator and created,\nexcept that they are more perfect in the former. On account of this\nmany Muslims believed that the Creator has a body different from all\nother bodies. Such is the case with the Hanbalites and their many\nfollowers. But in my opinion we should follow the path of the Law; and\nthis should neither deny nor try to prove them, and whenever asked\nby the common people to do so, we should answer with words of God,\n\u201cThere is nothing like him; and it is He who heareth and seeth,\u201d[73]\nin this way preventing them from questioning. It is so because of\nthree reasons. It is neither near to the first, nor to the second, nor\nto the third grade. This would be quite clear to you from the method\nadopted by the Mutakallimun. They say that the proof of the fact that\nHe is not a body is that it has been proved that all bodies are created\nthings. If they are asked to point out the method of proving the latter\nproposition, they adopt the method, which we have already pointed\nout, concerning the creation of accidents, that that which cannot be\nseparated from created things is itself created. You have already seen,\nfrom what we have said, that this method is not a philosophical one,\nand had it been so, even then a majority of the common people would not\nhave grasped it. Moreover, whatever these people have said about God,\nthat He is a Self (_Zat_) and divine attributes added to it, proves\nby itself that He has a body, on account of the denial of creation,\nrather an argument denying anthropomorphism. This is the first reason\nwhy the Law does not speak of these things in clear terms. The second\nreason is that common people think that all that is existent they can\nimagine and feel, all else being non-existent to them. So when they\nare told that there exists One who has no body, their imagination does\nnot work and He becomes almost non-existent to them, particularly so\nwhen they are told that He is neither outside our knowledge nor in\nit, neither above nor below. That is why the sect which believes in\nanthropomorphism thinks of those who deny it, that they also believe\nin it; while, on the other hand, the party thinks its opponents to\nbe believing in a number of gods. The third reason is that had the\nLaw denied anthropomorphism altogether there would have arisen many a\nmisgiving about what has been said concerning the Day of Judgment, and\nother beliefs.\n\nOf these one is the problem of Divine Vision which we find stated in\nauthentic Traditions. Those who have been very explicit in denying it\nare the two sects of the Asharites and the Mutazilites. The belief\nof the latter has driven them to deny the vision altogether; while\nthe Asharites have tried to make the two things agree, but this was\nimpossible for them to do. So they have taken refuge in many sophistic\narguments, the weakness of which we would show when talking of the\nDivine Vision. Another problem which rises out of this is that it\nevidently gives rise to a denial of the direction in which God is. For\nif He has no body then the Law becomes an allegory. For the advent of\nthe prophets is founded upon the fact that Divine Revelation is sent\nto them from the heaven. Upon this very principle is also based our\nreligion, for the Divine Book has come down from the heavens, as God\nsays, \u201cVerily we have sent down the same (the Quran) on a blessed\nnight.\u201d[74] The descending of the divine revelation from heaven is\nbased upon the fact of God\u2019s being there. So also is the descending\nand ascending of angels from heaven, as God says, \u201cUnto him ascendeth\nthe good speech; and the righteous work will He exalt;\u201d[75] and says\nHe, \u201cThe angels ascend up unto and the spirit.\u201d[76] We would mention\nall the things which the deniers of direction bring to prove their\nproposition when we come to talk of this problem.\n\nAnother difficulty which arises is that with the denial of\nanthropomorphism we shall have to deny movement to God, after which\nit would be difficult to explain with regard to the Day of Judgment,\nthat He would appear to the people at that moment, and would himself\nsuperintend their judgment, as He says, \u201cThy Lord shall come and the\nangels rank by rank.\u201d[77] It would also be difficult to explain the\nfamous Tradition of Descent, though its explanation would be, on the\nwhole easier than that of the former in spite of all that has been said\nabout it in the Law. So it is necessary that there should be disclosed\nto the common people nothing which might lead them to a disbelief in\nthe literal meanings of these things. This would be its effect upon the\nmind of the people if taken exoterically. But when it is interpreted\nit would come to either of two interpretations. Either interpretation\nwould overcome the exoteric side of it and of other things like it,\nthus destroying the Law altogether, and falsifying their purpose;\nor it will be said about all of them that they are only allegories,\nwhich would destroy the Law, and efface it from the mind of the people,\nwhile the man doing it would not know the sin he has committed with\nregard to Law. With all this, if you were to look into the arguments\nwhich the interpreters advance about these things, you would find\nall of them unreasonable, while the exoteric meanings are much more\nsatisfactory, that is, verification through them is more common and\nmuch better. This should become clearer to you when we begin to review\nthe arguments which they advance for a denial of anthropomorphism, and\ndiscuss the question of direction, as we may shortly do. You should\nalso know that the Law never intended to disclose the question of the\ndenial of this attribute completely to the common people, since it can\nbe done by an explanation of the soul, and the Law has not explained\nto the masses what the soul was. God says in the Quran, \u201cThey will\nask thee concerning the Soul; answer, The Soul was created at the\ncommand of my Lord; but ye have no knowledge given unto you except a\nlittle.\u201d[78] This is so, because it is difficult to establish reasons\nfor the common people for the existence of a thing existing by itself,\nwithout a body. Had the denial of this attribute been understood by the\nmasses then it would not have been enough for prophet Abraham to say in\nhis discussion with the infidel, \u201cWhen Abraham said, My Lord is He who\ngiveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and I kill.\u201d[79] On\nthe other hand he would have said, \u201cThou art a body, and God has not\none, for every body is created,\u201d as the Asharites would argue. So also\nit would have sufficed for Moses in his discussion with Pharoah about\nhis divinity; and for the Holy Prophet in case of the anti-christ,\ntelling the Faithful of the falsehood of his claims for divinity,\nbecause he would have a body while God has none. On the other hand\nhe told them that our God was not one-eyed. An argument proving the\nphysical defect in him was enough to falsify him. So you see that all\nthese are innovations in Islam, and have become the cause of its being\nsplit up into sects, into which the Prophet tells us that his people\nwould be divided.\n\nNow some one may object that the Law has not made it clear to the\ncommon people that God has or has not a body, then what should they\nbelieve about him. This is a question which will naturally arise in the\nmind of every man, and cannot be put away from him. So it would not\nsatisfy the common people to let them know of a thing, the existence\nof which they should believe, that it is not made of matter. We should\nsay that they should be answered with the answer given by Law--That\nHe is the Light, for this is the quality which God has assigned to\nhimself in His Book, for describing himself, He says, \u201cGod is the\nlight of heaven and earth.\u201d[80] The prophet has also assigned to him\nthe game quality in an authentic Tradition. It says that he was asked\nwhether he had seen God, and he answered, \u201cHe was Light, and I saw\nhim.\u201d The Tradition of the Night Journey says that when the Prophet\nneared the lote-tree,[81] it was completely covered with light, which\ndid not hide it from his sight. There is also a Tradition in the book\nof Muslim which says that God is a curtain of light, which, if opened,\nwould burn the opener, and yet God would not be seen. In some other\nreadings of this very Tradition it is said that He is seventy curtains\nof light. It should be known that this illustration is especially fit\nfor God, for it comprises the two things, that He can be felt, our\neyes and intellect being powerless to see or comprehend him, and in\nspite of this He is not a body too. Now according to the common people\nthe existent thing is one which can be felt, while the non-existent\nthing is that which they cannot feel. So light being the best of the\nthings felt, it is but fitting that the best existing thing should be\nlikened unto it. There is another cause for it which should be noticed.\nThe condition of His existence to the learned people, when they begin\nto ponder over him, is like the condition of the eyes when they look\ntowards the sun. But such is not the condition of the eyes of the bat.\nSo this quality fittingly describes the condition of the two classes of\npeople. Moreover, God is the cause of the existence of things, and of\nour knowledge of them. This is also the quality of the light in showing\ncolours, and of our seeing them. So God has very fittingly named\nhimself Light. When it is said that He is Light then there remains no\ndoubt as to His Vision on the Day of Judgment. From these it must have\nbecome clear to you what the primary belief of the Law was about this\nattribute, and what are the innovations which rose in it afterwards.\nThe Law is silent about it because there is not found in the universe\nanything unseen without a body, except that which is found by arguments\namong things seen as existent with this quality, and that is the soul.\nAs the belief of the soul was impossible for the masses, it was also\nimpossible for them to understand the existence of a Being who exists\nwithout a body. Hence they cannot understand it about God.\n\n\n                             OF DIRECTION\n\nThis is a quality which all the people learned in Law have tried to\nprove, until the Mutazilites denied it, and were followed by the\nlater Asharites, like Abul Maali and those who follow him. All the\nexoterics of the Law go to prove it. For God says, \u201cAnd eight shall\nbear the Throne of thy Lord on that Day;\u201d[82] and \u201cHe governeth all\nthe things from heaven even to the earth: hereafter shall they return\nunto him, on the Day whose length shall be a thousand years, of those\nwhich ye compute.\u201d[83] Again, He says, \u201cThe angels ascend unto him\nand the spirit;\u201d[84] and, \u201cAre Ye secure that He who dwelleth in\nheaven will not cause the earth to swallow you up? and behold, it\nshall shake.\u201d[85] There are many other verses of this kind which, if\ninterpreted, would turn the whole of the Law into interpretation; and\nif taken allegorically, would make it an allegory. All the religious\nlaws are based upon the principle that God is in heaven, from whence\nhe sends down angels to His Prophets with revelations, that from the\nheaven, the religious books used to descend, and that towards it was\nthe Night Journey of the Prophet, till he reached near the lote-tree.\nAll the philosophers are, moreover, agreed that God and His Angels\nare in heaven, as is the case with all the religions. The doubt which\nled them to deny this idea of direction was that they thought that by\nbelieving in direction it would be necessary to believe in space, which\nin its turn leads to a belief in anthropomorphism. But we say that this\nis not necessarily the case, for direction can exist without space. It\nis nothing but the surfaces of the body surrounding it, which are six\nin number. That is why we say that there is an above and a below, right\nand left and before and behind for an animal. Or they are the surfaces\nof a body surrounded by another body having the above-mentioned six\ndirections. So the directions, which are the surfaces of the body\nitself, are not the spaces of the body in any respect. But the surfaces\nof the surrounding bodies are space for it. The atmosphere surrounding\nman, and the surfaces of the sky surrounding the surfaces of the\natmosphere, for they are the spaces for it. Such is also the case with\ndifferent surrounding and forming spaces for one another. As to the\nlast sky it is evident that beyond it there must be no body. For had it\nbeen so, it would be necessary that beyond it be another body and so\non to infinity. So there is no space at all for the last body of the\nuniverse, for it is not possible that in it be found any body, it being\nnecessary that there be found a body in every space. So when there\nis an argument for the existence of a thing in that direction, it is\nnecessary that it be not a body. So one who denies His existence there\ngoes against his own ideas. He is existent, has a body, is not existent\nwithout a body. They cannot say that beyond the universe is a void.\nFor the impossibility of a void has been made quite certain in the\nphilosophical sciences. For that upon which the name void is commonly\napplied, are nothing but dimensions (_Abad_), in which there are no\nbodies. For when these dimensions are once removed, there remains\nnothing but non-existence. But if the void be supposed as existent, it\nis necessary to admit the existence of accidents in something not a\nbody, for dimensions are accidents by their having a quality. But it is\nsaid by the Ancients and established by past religions that that place\nis the dwelling place of the spirits, God and angels. This place has no\nspace, and is not governed by time, because everything governed by time\nand space can be corrupted. And it is necessary that the things there\nbe uncorrupted and uncreated. This has been made quite clear by what\nI have said, for there cannot be found in that place anything but one\nwhich is existent and at the same time can be felt, or is altogether\nnon-existent. It is self-evident that an existent object is always\nreferred to by its existence; that is, it is said that it exists, that\nis, it has an existence. So if anything exists there, it must be the\nnoblest of all, and it is necessary that that existent thing should\nbe referred to by the best portion of the universe, which are the\nheavens. God has said concerning the nobility of the heavens, \u201cVerily\nthe creation of heaven and earth is more considerable than the creation\nof man: but the greater part of men do not understand.\u201d[86] All this is\nperfectly clear to the learned men \u201cWell grounded in knowledge.\u201d[87]\n\nNow it has become clear to you that belief in direction is necessary\nby religion and reason, and that it forms a part of the Law, which\nis based upon it. A denial of the principles is a denial of all the\nreligions. The cause of the difficulty in their understanding this, and\nin their denial of anthropomorphism is, that there cannot be found in\nthe visible world an illustration of such a thing. This was just the\nreason why the Law did not expressly deny an anthropomorphism. For to\nthe common people verification of an invisible object can only come\nwhen its existence be known in the visible world, as knowledge, which\nbeing a condition for their own existence as visible, could to them\nbecome a condition for the existence of an invisible Maker. Now as\nthe case of the visible was unknown in the visible on the part of the\nmany, and none knew it but those who were well-grounded in knowledge,\nthe Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of\nthe Soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything,\nthen the Law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example\ndid not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then\nmany examples are given, as in the case of an account of the Day of\nJudgment. The doubt which arises out of a denial of direction, on the\npart of those denying it, is that the common people cannot comprehend\nit, particularly so, because they have not been given before hand to\nunderstand that God has no body. So it is necessary to take the action\nof the Law as our example, otherwise we will have to interpret that\nwhich the Law itself has not expressly said.\n\nWith regard to these problems of the Law, the people may be divided\ninto three classes. In the first place there are people who cannot\nnotice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the\nLaw has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest\nin number, and may be described as the masses. Then the second group\nof men is one which has doubts; but has not power to solve them. These\nare above the masses and below the learned people. It is for them\nthat there are found in the Law allegorical sayings, and it is they\nwhom God has censured. For there is no allegory in the Law for the\nlearned or the common people, and it is in this light that all the\nallegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood. Their example\nas regards the Law is like the example of the bread of wheat which\nthough a useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove\nharmful to some. Such is also the case with religious teaching: it\nis useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. The\nfollowing words of God point to the same thing. \u201cHe will not thereby\nmislead any except the transgressors.\u201d[88] But this is found only in\na few verses of the Quran about a few people. Most of the verses are,\nhowever, those which speak of things invisible for which there is no\nexample in the visible world. So they are expressed by the things\nnearest to them in the visible world, on account of their similarity.\nSome people take the illustration as the thing illustrated, and hence\nthey fall into confusion and doubt. This is what is called allegorical\nin the Law, and is not meant for the learned or the common people,\nwhich in reality form two groups of men. For these are the people who\nare really healthy, and delicate food is only fit for them. The other\ngroup is a group of sick men who are always few in number. So God has\nsaid, \u201cBut they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is\nparabolical therein, out of love of schism.\u201d[89] These are the dogmatic\nand the scholastic theologians. The worst which these people have\ndone in respect to the Law is that they have interpreted much which\nthey thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their\ninterpretation was the thing intended, and that God had mentioned it\nparabolically only to test and try His creatures. God forbid that\nwe should ever have such an idea about Him. The Divine Book is a\nmiracle of clearness and lucidity. So it is far from the real purpose\nof the Law for one to say about a thing which is not parabolical,\nthat it is so, and then set about interpreting it according to his\nown ideas, telling the people that their duty lies in believing\nhis interpretations. They have done so in the case of the verse of\nEqualisation on the Throne, and others, saying that their exoteric\nmeaning is only parabolical. On the whole many interpretations, which\nthese people maintain to be the real purpose of the Law, when intently\nlooked into and deciphered, are found wanting in arguments, and not\nserving the purpose which the exoteric meaning would have with regard\nto the common people. The primary purpose of knowledge for the common\npeople is action, so that which is most useful in action is most\nsuitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge\nis both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the\nLaw, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and\nthen discloses it to the common people, is like a man, who finds a\nmedicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the\nhealth of all, or of a majority of the people; then there came a man\nwith whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness\nof his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought\nthat by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as\ncomposing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug\ncommonly known by that name--but another which he really meant, but\nused this name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. So he took out the\nfirst drug from the compound, and placed another in its stead, which\nhe thought to be the one intended by the first physician. Then he\ntold the people that this was the medicine intended. The people began\nto use that \u201cimproved\u201d medicine, and many of them got injured by it.\nThen there came another group of men, who, seeing the people sick on\naccount of that medicine, thought of curing them. So they changed some\nof its drugs with some other than the first one, then presented it to\nthe people for quite another disease than that intended by the first\nphysician. Then there appeared another group which interpreted the\nmedicine in quite another way than the two preceding groups had done.\nThe fourth group gave a new interpretation to the drug and prescribed\nit for a fourth kind of disease. So as time went on with that great\nmedicine, the interpretations of it took hold of the people instead of\nthe drugs, and they changed and transformed it altogether. As a result\nthe people were attacked by many different kinds of diseases, till the\nusefulness of the medicine was altogether lost. Such is the condition\nof those sects which have risen in Islam. For every one of them has\nmade interpretations quite different from the others, and maintained\nthat its interpretation shows the real purpose of the Law, which was\nat last rent to piece, and lost its primary purpose altogether. The\nProphet, knowing that a thing like this would necessarily happen among\nhis people, said, \u201cMy people will shortly be divided into seventytwo\nsects. All of them will be in hell, except one.\u201d By this one he meant\nthe sect which followed the exoteric meanings of the Law, without\nmaking any interpretations which may be disclosed to the people. If you\nwere to look into the Law and see the corruption which it has suffered\nup to this time, through interpretations, the truth of this example\nwould become clear to you.\n\nThe first to make a change in the religion--the great medicine--were\nthe Kharijites, who were followed by the Mutazilites. They were\nsucceeded by the Asharites, after whom came the Sufis. Last of all came\nAl-Ghazzali, who went to the extreme and corrupted everything. He it is\nwho explained philosophy to the common people, and disclosed to them\nthe opinions of the philosophers as he understood them to be. This he\ndid in a book called _Al-Maqasid_, in which he thought he was refuting\nthem. He planned his _Refutation of the Philosophers_, and charged\nthem with infidelity in respect to three questions, tearing them to\npieces, as he thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; and calling\nthem innovators as regards other opinions. In this book he has advanced\nmany specious arguments and confused reasonings, which have led astray\nmany people both from religion and philosophy. Then he said in his\nbook _Jawahir al-Quran_ that the arguments which he had mentioned in\nhis _Refutation_ were controversial in their nature, while in fact\nthey were mentioned in his _Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi_. Then in his\n_Mishkat ul Anwar_ he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He\nsays that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the\nfirst heaven, and that it is not He from whom this movement originates,\nare precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned\nin divine science. He has said in many places that divine science\nexists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science. In\nhis book _Munqidh min al Dalal_ he has gone against the philosophers\nand maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and\nmeditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the\nrank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his _Kimiya\ni Saadat_. Men have become divided into parties on account of this\nconfusion. One party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other\nagreed to interpret the Law, and make it conform to philosophy. All\nthis is wrong. The Law should be taken literally; and the conformity of\nreligion to philosophy should not be told to the common people. For by\nan exposition of it we should be exposing the results of philosophy to\nthem, without their having intelligence enough to understand them. It\nis neither permitted nor desirable to expose anything of the result of\nphilosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no\narguments either with the learned people who have a mastery over both\nthe subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the\nLaw. So his action brought disorder in respect to both of these things,\nreligion and philosophy, in the mind of the common people, while he\nsaved them for the others. The disorder in religion came through his\nexposing those interpretations which should not be exposed; and so\nalso the disorder in philosophy was the result of his mentioning those\nthings in his books which should not be put in the works on philosophy.\nNow it was the result of his treatment of the subjects that many people\ndo not know the difference between the two, because of his bringing\nboth of them together. He has also insisted upon the fact that he knew\nthe cause of doing so, as he did in his _Al Tafriqa bain al Islami\nwa-z Zindiqah_. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations\nand has decided that their interpreters were not infidels though they\nmay go against the consensus of opinion. Since he has done so, he is\ndangerous to the Law for some reasons, to philosophy for others, and to\nboth for some other reasons. So this man, by disclosing them, has shown\nthat he is dangerous for both the things in reality and profitable to\nthem only by accident. For teaching philosophy to one who is not fit\nfor it, will either falsify philosophy or religion absolutely or will\nshow conformity between them by accident only. The right thing would\nhave been not to disclose philosophy to the common people at all. But\nif teaching of it was absolutely necessary, then only that section of\nthe people should have been taught who saw that religion was opposed\nto philosophy, in order to show them that it was not so. And also it\nmight have been taught to those people who thought that philosophy\nis opposed to religion. This may have been shown to either of these\nsections, that in reality they did not possess a knowledge of their\nsubstance and truth, that is, of religion and philosophy. Moreover,\nthey would know that the opinion about religion, that it was opposed to\nphilosophy was one which was either about some innovation in religion,\nand not about its principles, or is an error in understanding that is,\na wrong interpretation of it, as was shown in the case of knowledge\nabout particulars and other things. That is why we were compelled in\nthis book to explain the principles of religion. These principles,\nwhen intently looked into will be found in perfect agreement with\nphilosophy. Such is also the case with the opinion which says this\nphilosophy is opposed to religion. It only shows that the man has not\nhad a sufficient training in either philosophy or religion. This is the\nreason that we were compelled to explain it in our tractate entitled\n_Fasl al Maqal fi Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia_.\n\nNow that this has become clear we would return to our former theme.\nThe only problem which remains for us to solve, out of those which we\nproposed is that of Divine Vision. It is thought for some reasons,\nthat it forms a part of the problem which we have just discussed, on\naccount of the words of God, \u201cThe sight comprehendeth him not, but He\ncomprehendeth the sight.\u201d[90] And hence the Mutazilites have denied\nit, setting aside the arguments found in the Law, in spite of their\ngreatness in number and fame, a very shameful act on their part. The\ncause of this doubt of the Law that since the Mutazilites denied\nphysical attributes, and believed in exposing their ideas to every one,\nit became necessary for them to deny direction also. And having once\ndenied direction they must also deny the Vision, for the thing seen\nmust be in some direction to one who sees it. To prove their point they\nare constrained to set aside the traditional religion. They neglected\nthe Traditions because they were only isolated things which should not\nbe believed, if found opposed to the teachings of the Quran, that is,\nopposed to the verse, \u201cThe sight comprehendeth Him not.\u201d The Asharites\ntried to mix together the two beliefs, that is, the denial of physical\nattributes, and the possibility of vision of One having no body, by\nmeans of our senses. It became difficult for them to prove it, and\nthey took refuge in many sophistical and conjectural arguments, that\nis arguments which are thought to be correct but are in reality wrong.\nIt is so because it is possible to have the same grades in arguments\nas there are among men. Just as there may be found men with perfect\nexcellence and those below them, till we may have a man who thinks\nhimself learned and yet he is not, being only a pedant, so there are\narguments which are extremely certain, and those below them, then,\nthere are specious arguments, and those which though really false seem\nto be true. The statements of the Asharites in regard to this question\nare of two kinds: those refuting the arguments of the Mutazilites, and\nthose proving the possibility of the Vision of One having no body, and\nthat there is no difficulty in our believing it. The statements by\nwhich they have opposed the Mutazilites in their argument, that the\nthing seen must have a direction for one who sees it, is that some\nof them say that it is applied only to the visible, and not to the\ninvisible, world; and that it is not one of those cases in which the\ncondition of the one can be applied to the other. According to them\nit is possible for a man to see an object having no direction, for he\nsees by his power of sight only that which comes before his eyes. In\nthis they have mixed together the senses of sight with intelligence,\nfor the latter can perceive that which has no direction, that is, no\nspace; but for the perception of the eye there is a condition, that the\nthing to be perceived be in a direction, not only that but a particular\ndirection too. So if we take the eye to be endowed with the power of\nseeing, then it is not possible except under very limited conditions.\nThese are three in number-light, the intervention of a transparent body\nbetween the eye and the object seen, and the possession of necessary\ncolours by the object. A refutation of these conditions in the eyes is\nalso a refutation of those primary principles of knowledge which are\nknown to all. It would be a refutation of the sciences of philosophy\nand mathematics. The Asharites also maintain that one of the conditions\nas we have said, for example, is that every rational being has a life,\nit being apparent in the visible world as a condition for knowledge.\nHence we say to them that these are also conditions for seeing things\nin the visible world. So according to their own principle is the\ncase of the visible and the invisible. In his book _Al Maqasid_ Abu\nHamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose the premise that every object\nperceivable must be in some direction to the one seeing it. He says\nthat a man sees himself reflected in a mirror and sees himself not in\nany other direction but the opposite one. Hence he can see his self in\nan opposite direction too. But this is a mistake, because what he sees\nis not his self but only an image of it. This image is in the opposite\ndirection, being in the mirror, placed there.\n\nOf the arguments which they advance to prove the vision of an object\nhaving no body, two are famous ones. Of these the more famous is one\nwhich says that an object seen is either because it has some colour, or\nbecause it has a body, or it is a colour, or because it is existent.\nSometimes they mention many other causes than really do exist. They\nsay that it is wrong to suppose that it must be a body, otherwise, no\ncolour would be visible, it being also incorrect to suppose the space\nto be the colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions in the premise\nhave been refuted we shall have to believe that only an existent object\nwill be seen. The mistake in this statement is quite clear. For an\nobject is visible because of itself. This is the case with the colour\nand the body: the colour being visible by itself, and the body through\nthe colour. That is why a thing which has no colour cannot be seen.\nHad the existence of a thing been the only condition of visibility, it\nwould have been possible to see the sound and the senses. In that case\nseeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one,\nwhich is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it\nhave obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to _hear_\nthe colour, and _see_ the sounds. But this is against nature, as man\nhas understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of\nseeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite\ndistinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the\norgan of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn\ncolour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen,\nshould be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily\nanswer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be\nseen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the\nsense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which\nsounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of\nsound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that\nit is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If\nthey say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is\nneither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing\nboth. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the\ncase of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun\nadmit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a\nphilosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous\nfor it.\n\nNow the second method which Mutakallimun have adopted for proving the\npossibility of Divine Vision is that which has been mentioned by Abul\nMaali in his book, _Al Irshad_. It says that the senses can only feel\nthe substance (_Zat_) of things, but that which separates the existent\nthing from one another is not to be found in the substance only. So\nthe senses cannot perceive the substance, which is common to all the\nexistent things. They can only perceive a thing because it exists.\nBut all this is absurd, which is quite clear from the fact that if\nsight were only able to perceive things then it would not have been\npossible for it to differentiate between white and black, for there is\nno difference between things about those qualities which are common\nto all. This also becomes impossible as regards all the other senses.\nThe sense of seeing could not perceive different kinds of colours;\nthe sense of hearing cannot differentiate between tastes. It would be\nnecessary that the objects perceived by the senses be all of a kind,\nand there should be no difference between objects perceived by seeing\nand apprehended by hearing. This is contrary to that which man commonly\nunderstands. In reality the senses perceive the substance of things by\nthe power which is vouchsafed to them. The cause of this mistake lies\nin the fact that that which perceives a substance, is thought to be the\nthing perceived. Had there not been said so much about these things,\nand so much respect for those who said it, it would not have satisfied\nanybody with a strong common sense.\n\nThe cause of such a perplexing situation in the Law, which has\ncompelled its votaries to take refuge in such worthless arguments,\nas would bring a smile to the lips of anybody who has made the least\neffort to distinguish between different kinds of arguments, is the\nexposition of anthropomorphic qualities of God to the common people,\na fact which has been prohibited by God and His Prophet. It is so\nbecause it is very difficult for a man to believe at the same time that\nthere exists One without a body, who can be seen with our eyes. For\nthe things which the senses comprehend are in the bodies or the bodies\nthemselves. Hence the Mutakallimun have tried to prove that the Divine\nVision will be an addition to our existing qualities at that moment.\nThis also should not have been disclosed to the common people. For\nsince their intellect cannot go beyond their imagination that which\nthey cannot imagine is non-existent for them. To imagine a thing which\nhas no body is not possible, and hence a belief in the existence of\nan object which they cannot imagine, is impossible for them. It was\nfor this reason that the Law refused to disclose this secret to them,\nand described God, for their sake, in terms which they can imagine,\nascribing to him the attributes of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c.\n&c., at the same time telling them that He is not like anything which\ncan be imagined. Had the intention of the Law been to make clear to\nthe masses the fact of His having no body, it would not have mentioned\nthese things in detail. But as light was the highest of imaginable\nthings, it was given to them as an illustration of God, for it is the\nbest known of the things both to the senses and to the imagination.\n\nSuch is also the case in respect to the possibility of their\nunderstanding the things of the Day of Judgment. These have also\nbeen mentioned in terms which they can imagine. So now when the Law\nhas adopted this course about the apparent description of God, there\narises no doubt about him. For when it is said that He is Light or that\nthere is a curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned in the Quran and\nauthentic Traditions, and when it is said that the Faithful will see\nHim on the Day of Judgement as they see the sun, there arises no doubt\nor suspicion out of it for the common or the learned people. It is so\nbecause to the learned it is quite clear that that condition will be\nan addition to our former knowledge. But when this is disclosed to\nthe common people, they cannot understand it, and hence they either\ndisbelieve the whole of the Law, or consider its exponent to be an\ninfidel. So one who adopts a method other than that laid down by the\nLaw in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little\nintently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that\nthe Law has not given illustration of those things for the common\npeople, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed\nthe learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So\nit is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about\nthe instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together.\nFor in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is\nthat the Prophet has said, \u201cWe, the prophets, have been commanded to\nadapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them\naccording to their intelligence.\u201d He who tries to instruct all the\npeople in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a\nman who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against\napparent laws and reason.\n\nFrom the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine\nvision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take\nthe words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without\nproving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since\nthe first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God\u2019s purity,\nand the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time\nto begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our\npurpose in writing this tractate will be over.\n\n\n                         OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD\n\nIn this section we will take up five questions, around which all others\nin this connection revolve. In the first place a proof of the creation\nof the universe; secondly, the advent of the prophets; thirdly,\npredestination and fate; fourthly, Divine justice and injustice; and\nfifthly, the Day of Judgment.\n\nFirst Problem: the Creation of the Universe:--The Law teaches that the\nuniverse was invented and created by God, and that it did not come\ninto being by chance or by itself. The method adopted by the Law for\nproving this is not the one upon which the Asharites have depended.\nFor we have already shown that those methods are not specially certain\nfor the learned, nor common enough to satisfy all the classes of men.\nThe methods which are really serviceable are those which have a very\nfew premises, and the results of which fall very near to the commonly\nknown ideas. But in instructing the common people the Law does not\nfavour statements composed of long and complete reasonings, based\nupon different problems, So everyone who, in teaching them, adopts a\ndifferent course, and interprets the Law according to it, has lost\nsight of its purpose and gone astray from the true path. And so also,\nthe Law in giving illustrations for its reasonings uses only those\nwhich are present before us. Whatever has been thought necessary for\nthe common people to know, has been explained to them by the nearest\navailable examples, as in the case of the Day of Judgment. But whatever\nwas unnecessary for them to know, they have been told that it was\nbeyond their knowledge, as the words of God about the Soul.[91] Now\nthat we have established this, it is necessary that the method adopted\nby the Law for teaching the creation of the universe to the common\npeople be such as would be acknowledged by all. It is also necessary\nthat since there cannot be found anything present to illustrate the\ncreation of the universe the Law must have used the examples of the\ncreation of things in the visible world.\n\nSo the method adopted by Law is that the universe was made by God. If\nwe look intently into the verse pertaining to this subject we shall\nsee that the method adopted is that of divine solicitude, which we\nknow to be one of those which prove the existence of God. When a man\nsees a thing made in a certain shape, proportion and fashion, for a\nparticular advantage is derived from it, and purpose which is to be\nattained, so that it becomes clear to him, that had it not been found\nin that shape, and proportion, then that advantage would have been\nwanting in it, he comes to know for certain that there is a maker of\nthat thing, and that he had made it in that shape and proportion, for\na set purpose. For it is not possible that all those qualities serving\nthat purpose be collected in that thing by chance alone. For instance,\nif a man sees a stone on the ground in a shape fit for sitting, and\nfinds its proportions and fashion of the same kind, then he would\ncome to know that it was made by a maker, and that he had made it and\nplaced it there. But when he sees nothing in it, which may have made\nit fit for sitting then he becomes certain that its existence in the\nplace was by chance only, without its being fashioned by any maker.\nSuch is also the case with the whole of the universe. For when a man\nsees the sun, the moon, and all the stars, which are the cause of the\nfour seasons, of days and nights, of rain, water and winds, of the\ninhabitation of the parts of the earth, of the existence of man, and\nof the being of all the animals and the plants and of the earth being\nfit for the habitation of a man, and other animals living on it; and\nthe water fit for the animals living in it; and the air fit for birds,\nand if there be anything amiss in this creation and edifice, the whole\nworld would come to confusion and disorder, then he would come to know\nwith certainty that it is not possible that this harmony in it for the\ndifferent members of the universe--man, animals, and plants--be found\nby chance only. He will know that there is one who determined it, and\nso one who made it by intention, and that is God, exalted and magnified\nmay He be. He would know with certainty that the universe is a created\nthing, for he would necessarily think that it is not possible that in\nit should be found all this harmony, if it be not made by some one,\nand had come into existence by chance alone. This kind of argument is\nquite definite and at the same time clear, and some have mentioned it\nhere. It is based upon two principles which are acknowledged by all.\nOne of them being, that the universe, with all its component parts, is\nfound fit for the existence of man and things; secondly, that which is\nfound suitable in all its parts, for a single purpose, leading to a\nsingle goal, is necessarily a created thing. So those two principles\nlead us naturally to admit that the universe is a created thing, and\nthat there is a maker of it. Hence \u201cthe argument of analogy\u201d leads to\ntwo things at one and the same time, and that is why it is the best\nargument for proving the existence of God. This kind of reasoning is\nalso found in the Quran in many verses in which the creation of the\nuniverse is mentioned. For instance, \u201cHave We not made the earth a\nbed, and the mountains for shelter to fix the same? And have We not\ncreated you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep for rest and made\nthe night a garment to cover you, and destined the day to a gaining of\na livelihood; and built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a\nburning lamp? And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth\nrain, water pouring down in abundance, that We may hereby produce corn\nand herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees.\u201d[92] If we ponder over\nthis verse it would be found that our attention has been called to the\nsuitability of the different parts of the universe for the existence\nof man. In the very beginning we are informed of a fact well-known to\nall--and that is that the earth has been created in a way which has\nmade it suitable for our existence. Had it been unstable, or of any\nother shape, or in any other place, or not of the present proportion,\nit would not have been possible to be here, or at all created on it.\nAll this is included in the words, \u201cHave We not made the earth a\nbed for you?\u201d for in a bed are collected together all the qualities\nof shape, tranquility, and peace, to which may be added those of\nsmoothness and softness. So how strange is this wonderful work and\nhow excellent this blessedness, and how wonderful this collection of\nall the qualities! This is so because in the word _mihad_ (bed) are\nbrought together all those qualities, which are found in the earth,\nrendering it suitable for the existence of man. It is a thing which\nbecomes clear to the learned after much learning and a long time, \u201cBut\nGod will appropriate His mercy unto whom He pleaseth.\u201d[93] Then as to\nthe divine words, \u201cAnd the mountains for stakes,\u201d--they tell us of the\nadvantage to be found in the tranquility of the earth on account of\nthe mountains. For had the earth been created smaller than it is now,\nthat is, without mountains it would have been quivered by the motion\nof other elements, the water and the air, and would have been shaken\nand thus displaced. This would naturally have been the cause of the\ndestruction of the animal world. So when its tranquility is in harmony\nwith those living on it, it did not come into being by chance alone,\nbut was made by some one\u2019s intention, and determination. Certainly it\nwas made by One who intended it, and determined it, for the sake of\nthose living on it. Then He calls our attention to the suitability of\nthe existence of night and day for animals. He says, \u201cAnd made the\nnight a garment to cover you; and destined the day to a gaining of your\nlivelihood.\u201d He means to say that He has made the night like a covering\nand clothing for all the things, from the heat of the sun. For had\nthere been no setting of the sun at night, all the things, whose life\nhas been made dependent upon the sun, would have perished--that is, the\nanimals and the plants. As clothing protects the people from the heat\nof the sun, in addition to its being a covering, so God likened the\nnight to it. This is one of the most beautiful of the metaphors. There\nis also another advantage in the night for the animals: their sleep in\nit is very deep, after the setting of the sun, which keeps faculties in\nmotion, that is, wide awake. So God has said, \u201cAnd appointed your sleep\nfor rest,\u201d on account of the darkness of the night. Then He says, \u201cAnd\nbuilt over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp.\u201d Here\nby the word building He means their creation, and their harmony with\nthe created things, and their arrangement and system. By strength He\nmeans that power of revolution and motion which is never slackened, and\nnever overtaken by fatigue; and they never fall like other roofs and\nhigh edifices. To this refer the words of God, \u201cAnd made the heaven a\nroof well-supported.\u201d[94] By all this He shows their fitness in number,\nshape, fashion, and movement, for the existence of those who live on\nthe earth round it. Were one of the heavenly bodies, not to speak of\nall, to stop for a moment all would be chaos on the face of the earth.\nSome people think the blast of the last trumpet, which will be the\ncause of the thunderbolt, will be nothing but a stop in the revolution\nof the heavenly bodies. Then He tells us of the advantage of the sun\nfor those living on the earth and says, \u201cAnd placed therein a burning\nlamp.\u201d He calls it a lamp because in reality it is all darkness, and\nlight covers the darkness of the night, and if there be no lamp, man\ncan get no advantage out of his sense of sight at night time; and in\nthe same way if there were no sun the animals can have no benefit of\ntheir sense of seeing. He calls our attention to this advantage of the\nsun, ignoring others because it is the noblest of all the advantages\nand the most apparent of all. Then He tells us of His kindness in\nsending down rain, for the sake of the plants and the animals. The\ncoming down of rain in an appointed proportion, and at an appointed\nseason, for the cultivated fields cannot be by chance alone, but is\nthe result of divine solicitude for us all. So He says, \u201cAnd do We\nnot send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down\nin abundance that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens\nplanted thick with trees.\u201d There are many verses of the Quran on this\nsubject. For instance, He says, \u201cDo ye not see how God hath created the\nseven heavens, one above another, and hath placed the moon therein for\na light, and hath appointed the sun for a taper? God hath also provided\nand caused you to bring forth corn from the earth.\u201d[95] If we were to\ncount all such verses and comment upon them showing the kindness of\nthe Creator for the created, it would take too many volumes. We do not\nintend to do it in this book. If God should grant us life and leisure\nwe shall write a book to show the kindness of God to which He has\ncalled our attention.\n\nIt should be known that this kind of argument is just contrary to that\nwhich the Asharites think leads to the knowledge of God. They think\nthat the creation does not lead us to the knowledge of God through any\nof His goodness, but through possibility, that is, the possibility\nwhich is found in all things, which we can understand to be of his\nshape or of quite a contrary one. But if this possibility be found\nalike in both the cases, then there is no wisdom in the creation of the\nuniverse, and there is found no harmony between man and the parts of\nit. For, as they think, if it is possible for the things to have any\nother form than they have now, then there can exist no harmony between\nman and other existent things by the creation of which God has obliged\nman and commanded him to be thankful to Him. This opinion, by which the\ncreation of man, as a part of the universe, is just as possible, for\ninstance, as his creation in the void, is like the opinion of those who\nsay that man exists but he could have been created in quite a different\nshape, and yet could perform actions like a man. According to them it\nis also possible that he may have formed the part of another universe\nquite different from the existing one. In that case the blessing of the\nuniverse can have no obligation for man, for they are not necessary for\nhis purpose. Hence man is quite careless of them and they of him. So\ntheir existence is no blessing to him. This is all against the nature\nof man.\n\nOn the whole, a man who denies the existence of the effects arranged\naccording to the causes in the question of arts, or whose wisdom\ncannot understand it, then he has no knowledge of the art of its\nMaker. So also a man who denies the existence of an order of effects\nin accordance with causes in this universe, denies the existence of\nthe Creator altogether. Their saying that God is above these causes,\nand that they cannot have any bearing on the effects by His command,\nis very far from the true nature of philosophy, nay, it is a destroyer\nof it. For if it is possible to have the same effects with other than\nthe prescribed causes just in the same degree as by them, then where\nis the greatness in producing the effects from the known Causes? It is\nso because the effects from the causes have one of the following three\nreasons. Either the existence of the causes will be in place of the\neffects by compulsion, as a man\u2019s taking his food; or their being more\nperfect that is, the effect becoming better and more perfect through\nthem, as a man\u2019s having two eyes, or they may have neither a better nor\na more compulsive effect. In this case the existence of the effect and\nthe cause would be by chance, without any intention at all; and hence,\nthere would be no greatness found in it. For instance, if the shape\nof human hand, the number of the fingers, and their length be neither\nnecessary nor adding any perfection in its work in seizing things of\ndifferent kind, then the actions of the hand from this shape, and\nnumber of parts, would be by chance alone. If it be so, then it makes\nno difference whether a man is given a hand or a hoof, or something\nelse, like the different animals, for their particular actions. On the\nwhole, if we ignore the causes and their effects, then there remains\nnothing to refute the arguments of those who believe in the creation of\nthe universe by chance alone, that is, those who say that there is no\nCreator at all, and that which has come into being in this universe is\nthe result of material causes. For taking one of the two alternatives\nit is not more possible that it may have happened by chance, than done\nby an independent Actor. So when the Asharites say that the existence\nof one or more possibilities shows that there is a particular Maker of\nthese things, they can answer and say that the existence of things by\none of these possibilities was by chance alone, for intention works as\none of the causes, and that which happens without any means or cause\nis by chance. We see that many things come into being in this way.\nFor example, the elements mix together by chance, and then by this\nunintentional mixing there is produced a new thing. They mix again,\nand this quite unintentionally produces quite a new thing. In this\nway every kind of creation may be said to have come into existence by\nchance.\n\nWe say that it is necessary that there be found order and arrangement,\nthe more perfect and finished than what can be imagined. This mixing\ntogether of elements is limited and prearranged, and things produced\nby them are sure to happen, and no disorder has ever happened in them.\nBut all this could not happen by chance alone, for that which happens\nin this way by chance is of the least value. It is to this that God\nrefers, \u201cIt is the work of the Lord, who has rightly disposed all\nthings.\u201d[96] I would like to know what completeness can be found in\nthings made by chance, for such things are by no means better than\ntheir opposites. To this God refers in the following words, \u201cThou\ncanst not see in the Creation of the most Merciful any unfitness or\ndisproportion. Lift thy eyes again to heaven, and _look whether thou\nseest any flaw_.\u201d[97] But what defect can be greater than that all the\nthings can be found with any other quality than they really possess.\nFor the non-existent quality may be better than the existing one.\nIn this way, if one thinks that were the Eastern movement to become\nWestern and vice versa, there would be no difference in the universe,\nthen he has destroyed philosophy altogether. He is like a man who\nthinks that were the right side of the animals to become left, and\nvice versa, there would be no difference at all for one of the two\nalternatives is there. For as it is possible to say that it is made\naccording to one alternative by an independent Maker, so it is possible\nto assert that it was all made by chance alone. For we see so many\nthings coming into being by themselves.\n\nIt is quite clear to you that all the people see that lower kinds of\ncreation could have been made in a different way from that in which\nthey really are and as they see this lower degree in many things they\nthink that they must have been made by chance. But in the higher\ncreation they know that it is impossible to have been made in a more\nperfect and excellent form than that given to it by the Creator. So\nthis opinion, which is one of the opinions of the Mutakallimun is both\nagainst the Law and philosophy. What we say is that the opinion of\npossibility in creation is closer to a complete denial of God, than\nleading us nearer to Him. At the same time it falsifies philosophy. For\nif we do not understand that there is a mean between the beginnings\nand ends of the creation, upon which is based the ends of things, then\nthere can neither be any order nor any method in it. And if they be\nwanting then there can be no proof of the existence of an intelligent\nand knowing Maker; for taking them together with cause and effect\nwe are led to the fact that they must have been created by wisdom\nand knowledge. But on the other hand the existence of either of two\npossibilities shows that they may have been performed by a not-knowing\nMaker and by chance alone. Just as a stone falling on the earth may\nfall in any place, on any side, and in any form. It will show the want\nof the existence either of a creator at all or at least of a wise and\nknowing Creator. The thing which has compelled the Mutakallimun of the\nAsharites to adopt this opinion is a denial of the action of those\nnatural forces which God has put in all things, as He has endowed them\nwith life, power and so forth. They avoided the opinion that there was\nany other creator but God, and God forbid that there be any other, for\nhe is the only creator of the causes and they are made effective by\nHis command only. We will talk of this in detail when discoursing on\nFate and Predestination. They were also afraid that by admitting the\nnatural causes they might be accused of saying that the universe came\ninto being by chance only. They would have known that a denial of it\nmeans a denial of a great part of the arguments, which can be advanced\nfor a proof of the existence of God. One who denies any part of God\u2019s\ncreation denies His work which falls very near to a denial of a part\nof His attributes. On the whole as their opinion is based upon hasty\nconclusions, which come to the mind of a man by superficial thought\nand as apparently it appears that the word \u201cintention\u201d can be applied\nto one who has power to do bad or otherwise, they saw that if they did\nnot admit that all the creation is possible, they would not be able to\nsay that it came into existence by the action of an intending creator.\nSo they say that all the creation is possible so that they may prove\nthat the creator is an intelligent one. They never thought of the order\nwhich is necessary in things made, and with that their coming from an\nintelligent creator. These people have also ignored the blame they will\nhave to bear in thus denying wisdom to the creator; or maintaining that\nchance should be found governing creation. They know, as we have said,\nthat it is necessary, on account of the order existent in nature, that\nit must have been brought into being by some knowing creator, otherwise\nthe order found in it would be by chance. When they were compelled to\ndeny the natural forces, they had to deny with them a large number of\nthose forces which God has made subservient to His command for the\ncreation and preservation of things. For God has created some things\nfrom causes which He has produced from outside, these are the heavenly\nbodies; there are other things which He has made by causes placed in\nthe things themselves, that is, the soul, and other natural forces,\nby which he preserves those things. So how wicked is the man who\ndestroyeth philosophy, and \u201cinventeth a lie about God.\u201d[98]\n\nThis is only a part of the change which has taken place in the Law,\nin this and other respects, which we have already mentioned, and will\nmention hereafter. From all this it must have become clear to you\nthat the method which God had adopted for teaching His creatures that\nthe universe is made and created by Him is the method of kindness\nand wisdom, towards all His creatures and especially towards man.\nIt is a method which bears the same relation to our intellect, as\nthe sun bears to our senses. The method which it has adopted towards\nthe common people about this problem, is that of illustration from\nthings observed. But as there was nothing which could be given as an\nillustration, and as the common people cannot understand a thing, an\nillustration of which they cannot see, God tells us that the universe\nwas created in a certain time out of a certain thing, which He made.\nHe tells us His condition before the creation of the universe, \u201cHis\nthrone was above the waters.\u201d[99] He also says, \u201cVerily your Lord is\nGod who created the heavens and the earth in six days,\u201d[100] and \u201cThen\nHe set His mind to the creation of the heavens, and it was smoke.\u201d[101]\nIn addition to these there are other verses of the Book, pertaining to\nthis subject. So it is incumbent that nothing out of them should be\ninterpreted for the common people, and nothing should be presented to\nthem in explaining it but this illustration. For one who changes it,\nmakes the wisdom of the Law useless. If it be said that the Law teaches\nabout the universe that it is created, and made out of nothing and in\nno time, then it is a thing which even the learned cannot understand,\nnot to speak of the common people. So we should not deviate in this\nmatter of the Law, from the method laid down in it for instructing\nthe common people, and should not tell them except this regarding the\ncreation of the universe, which is found alike in the Quran, the Bible,\nand other revealed books. The wonder is that the example in the Quran\nis quite in accordance with the creation of the things in the visible\nworld. But the Law does not say so, which is a warning to the learned\npeople that the creation of the universe is not like the creation of\nall other things. He has used the words _creation_ and _flaw_, because\nthey connote two things,--Conception of the things that can be seen,\nand the creation of the things which the learned prove in the invisible\nworld. So the use of the words _creation_ (Huduth) and _eternal_ is an\ninnovation in religion, and the cause of great doubt and corruption of\nthe belief of the common people, especially of the argumentative among\nthem. This has greatly perplexed the Mutakallimun of the Asharites,\nand has proved them in great doubt. For if they explain that God\nintends doing things by an eternal intention--which, as we said, is an\ninnovation--they have put it down that the universe is _created_. Then\nthey are asked how can a created thing come from an eternal intention.\nThey answer that the eternal intention became connected with the action\nat the time of the creation especially, and that is the time in which\nthe universe was made. Then they may be asked, that if the relation\nof the intending Creator towards the created thing at the time of its\nnon-existence be the same as at the time of its creation, then that\ncreated thing is by no means better than the other thing, when at the\ntime of its making, the action which was not found in its non-existence\nis not connected with it. If the relation be different then there must\nnecessarily be a created intention otherwise the created result of an\naction would come from an eternal action, for what is necessary of it\nin action, is necessary also in intention. If it be said that when the\ntime of its making comes it is found done; it may be asked: is it so\nby an eternal or a created action? If they say by an eternal action,\nthey admit the existence of a created thing by an eternal action; and\nif they say by a created action, then there must be a created intention\nalso. They may say that intention is the action itself, but this is\nimpossible. For intention is the only cause of the action in the\nintender. If an intender, intending to do an act in a certain time,\nfinds that act quite another than that which he intended, then that\nact would have come into being without any intender at all. At the\nsame time, if it is thought that from a created intention there can\nonly be a created thing, then as a rule an eternal intention should\ngive an eternal thing, otherwise the result of a created or eternal\nintention would be the same, which is impossible. All these doubts\nare found in Islam only through the Mutakallimun, by their explaining\nthings in Law, which God had forbidden them to do. For in the Quran it\nis not said whether intention is created or eternal. So they neither\nadhere to the exoteric meanings of the Law, which may have given them\nbeatitude and salvation, nor did they attain the degree of certain and\nexact knowledge, so that they may have had this blessing. Hence they\nare neither to be counted among the learned nor among the masses, who\nbelieve and have strong faith. They are the people \u201cwhose hearts are\nperverse\u201d[102] and \u201cwhose hearts are diseased.\u201d[103] They say things by\ntheir tongues which are quite contrary to those which they believe in\ntheir hearts, a cause of which is their tenacity, and love of upholding\ntheir opinions at any cost. By a repetition of attitudes like these\nthey become quite devoid of all philosophy, as we see the case of\nthose who are completely accustomed to the Asharite school of thought,\nand are well pleased with it, even to the degree of love. They are\ncertainly veiled on account of their habit and environment.\n\nWhat we have said about this question is enough for our purpose. Now we\nwould take up the second problem.\n\nProblem Second: Prophetic Mission:--There are two points which are to\nbe discussed in this problem. First, the proof of the coming of the\nprophets; and secondly an explanation of the fact that the man claiming\nto be a prophet is really so and does not lie. Many people are desirous\nof proving the existence of the prophets by analogy--and such are the\nMutakallimun. They say that it is proved that God speaks and intends,\nand is the master of His creatures. It is quite consistent for such a\nbeing in the visible world to send a messenger to his dependent people.\nHence such a thing is also possible in the unseen world. They have\nthought of making this valid for proving the advent of the prophets, by\nabsurd and far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins should use. They\nsay that it is possible both in the observed and unseen world. In the\nobserved world it is quite evident, that when a man stands up before a\nking and says, \u201cO ye men, I am the messenger of the king towards you\u201d\nand produces credentials for his claim, it is necessary to acknowledge\nhim to be true. They say that in the case of the prophets, the\ncredentials are the miracles which they perform. For certain reasons\nthis method is quite fit and satisfactory for the common people,\nbut when investigated there appear many flaws in the principle. Our\nacknowledgement of a man who claims to be the messenger of a king is\nnot true unless we know that the symbols which he has are those of the\nroyal messenger, which can only happen, if a king tells his subjects\nthat whenever they happen to see such and such symbols with a man,\nwhich are particularly his, they should take him as his messenger. When\nthis is so, one can object, from where does it appear that performance\nof miracles is the special sign of the prophets? This can be proved\nneither by law nor by reason. To prove it by religion is still more\nimpossible; it does not admit it. Reason alone cannot affirm that they\nare the special symbols of prophecy, except that in many cases they\nwere found in people who claimed to be prophets and in none other. So\nin this case a proof of anyone\u2019s prophecy is based upon two premises.\nFirst, the man who claims to be a prophet has performed a miracle, and\nsecondly, everyone who performs a miracle is a prophet.\n\nNow as to the premise that the claimant for prophecy has performed\nmiracles we can say that it pertains to our senses after we have\nadmitted that there are actions performed by men, which can neither\nbe made by wondrous workmanship or by some particular forces, but are\nbeyond our conception. The second premise can only be true when we\nadmit the existence of the prophets, and that the miracles are only\nperformed by those who are the true claimants for prophetic mission.\nWe would say that this premise is not true but for those who believe\nthe existence of the prophets and the miracles. For instance if it has\nbecome clear to man, that the universe is created, then he certainly\nknows that the world exists and the Creator too. This being so, a man\ncan object and say how can we say that one who performs the miracles\nis a prophet, when the prophetic mission itself remains unproved? Even\nafter we admit the existence of miracle in the manner in which it\nmay seem quite impossible, it is necessary that the two sides of the\npremise be admitted first and then the one can be applied to the other.\nOne cannot say that the existence of the prophets can be proved by\nreason, because of its possibility. For the possibility to which they\nrefer is in fact really ignorance, and is not found in the nature of\nthings. For instance, if we say that it is possible that it will rain\nor not, then the possibility is found in the nature of things, that\nis, it is felt that a thing may sometimes be, and at others not be, as\nin the case of rain. Here, reason can exactly decide the possibility\nof a thing by its nature. The necessary (_wajib_) is quite contrary to\nit; that is, it is a thing the existence of which is always found.\nIn this case reason can always decide without a mistake, because its\nnature cannot be changed or transformed. So when one party admits the\nexistence of a prophet, at a certain time it appears that the prophetic\nmission is a thing whose existence is possible and the other party says\nthat it cannot feel it, then that possibility becomes mere ignorance in\nits case. Now we believe in the existence of this possibility because\nwe have known the prophets. We say that a knowledge of the messengers\nfrom man, leads us to a belief in the existence of messengers from God,\nas the existence of a messenger from Anir, leads us to the conclusion\nof there being a messenger from Zaid also. This requires a similarity\nin the natural dispositions of both men and it is here where the\ndifficulty lies. If we suppose this possibility by itself even in the\nfuture, it will only be by the means of the known fact and not by our\nknowledge and reason. Now one of the premises of this possibility has\ncome into existence. For the possibility is in our knowledge, and the\nfact in itself is an established one, by one of the two alternatives,\nthat is, whether he sent a messenger or did not. So we have nothing\nin this case but sheer ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir sent\nany messengers in the past or did not, which is quite different from\nour doubting, whether or not he will send any in future. So when we do\nnot know about Zaid, for instance, whether he has or has not sent any\nmessenger in the past, it is not correct for us to suppose anybody to\nbe his messenger, if he happens to have his symbols upon him. We can\nadmit his claim only after we know that Zaid did send a messenger. So\nwhen we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, and the miracles,\nthen how can it be correct for us to say that one who performs the\nmiracles is a prophet. We cannot believe in this by hearing only, for\nthis faculty is not the thing by which such things can be proved. At\nthe same time we cannot claim this premise to be true by experience\nand habit, except that the miracles performed by the prophets can be\nseen by one who believes in their mission, and has never seen them to\nhave been performed by anybody else, so that they may be taken as a\nconvincing sign for distinguishing a prophet of God, from one who is\nnot, that is a distinction between one whose claim is right, and one\nwhose claim is wrong.\n\nBy these things it is seen that the Mutakallimun have missed the\nwhole purpose of the argument from miracles because they have put\npossibility in the place of real existence, possibility which is in\nreality ignorance. Then they have believed in the premise that every\none who performs miracles is a prophet, which cannot be true except\nwhen the miracles prove the prophetic mission itself, and the sender of\nmessengers. It is not by reason that we can believe in these marvelous\nthings, which happen again and again, and are divine, as a conclusive\nproof of the existence of prophetic mission, except that one who can do\nsuch things is an excellent person, and that such persons cannot lie.\nBut it can prove the prophetic mission of a person only when we admit\nthat the mission does exist, and that such marvelous things cannot be\nperformed by any person, however good he may be, except by one who is a\na prophet. The miracles cannot prove the prophetic mission of a person,\nbecause there is no connection between them and reason, except that\nwe admit that the miracles are one of the works of the prophets, just\nas curing is the work of the physicians, so that one who can cure is\ncertainly a physician. This is one of the fallacies of the argument.\nMoreover, if we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, by\nputting the idea of possibility, which is in fact ignorance, in place\nof certainty, and make miracles a proof of the truth of man who claims\nto be a prophet it becomes necessary that they should not be used by a\nperson, who says that they can be performed by others than prophets,\nas the Mutakallimun do. They think that the miracles can be performed\nby the magicians and saints. The condition which they attach with them\nis that miracles prove a man to be a prophet, when he at the same time\nclaims to be so, for the true prophet can perform them as opposed to\nthe false ones. This is an argument without any proof, for it can be\nunderstood either by hearing or reason. That is, it is said that one\nwhose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot perform miracles, but as\nwe have already said, when they cannot be performed by a liar, then\nthey can only be done by the good people, whom God has meant for this\npurpose. These people, if they speak a lie, are not good, and hence\ncannot perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy the people who\nthink miracles to be possible from the magicians, for they certainly\nare not good men. It is here that the weakness of the argument lies.\nHence some people have thought that the best thing is to believe that\nthey cannot be performed but by the prophets and hence magic is only\nimagination, and not a change of essence. Among these are also men who\ndeny all sorts of marvelous things from the saints.\n\nIt is clear to you from the life of the prophet, peace be upon him,\nthat he never invited any man or community to believe in his prophecy,\nand that which he has brought with him from God, by means of the\nperformance of any miracles, in support of his claim, such as changing\none element into another. Whatever miracles did appear from him were\nonly performed in the natural course of things, without on his part\nany intention of contention or competition. The following words of\nthe Quran will make this clear; \u201cAnd they say: We will by no means\nbelieve in thee, until thou cause a spring of water to gush forth\nfor us out of the earth, and thou have a garden of palm-trees and\nvines, and thou cause rivers to spring forth from the midst thereof in\nabundance; or thou cause the heaven to fall down in pieces upon us, as\nthou hast given out, or thou bring down God and the angels to vouch\nfor thee; or thou have a house of gold, or thou ascend by a ladder to\nheaven; neither will we believe thy ascending thither alone, until\nthou cause a book to descend unto us, bearing witness of thee which we\nmay read. Answer: My Lord be praised, Am I other than a man sent as\nan apostle?\u201d[104] Then again, \u201cNothing hindered us from sending thee\nwith miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with\nimposture.\u201d[105] The thing by which we invited the people to believe in\nhim, and with which he vied with them is the Quran. For says God, \u201cSay,\nverily, if men and genii were purposely assembled, that they might\nproduce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like unto\nit, although the one of them assigned the other.\u201d[106] Then further he\nsays, \u201cwill they say, He hath forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore\nten chapters like unto it forged by yourself.\u201d[107] This being the case\nthe miracle of the Prophet with which he vied with the people and which\nhe advanced as an argument for the truth of his claim to the prophetic\nmission, was the Quran. If it be said, that this is quite clear, but\nhow does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, and that it proves his\nprophecy, while just now we have proved the weakness of the proof of\nprophecy by means of miracles without any exceptions in the case of\nany prophet. Besides the people have differed in taking the Quran to\nbe a miracle at all. For in their opinion one of the conditions of a\nmiracle is that it should be quite different from any act which may\nhave become habitual. But the Quran is of this sort, because it is only\nword, though it excels all created words. So it becomes a miracle by\nits superiority only, that is, the impossibility for people bringing\nanything like it, on account of its being highly eloquent. This being\nthe case it differs from the habitual, not in genus but in details\nonly, and that which differs in this way is of the same genus. Some\npeople say that it is a miracle by itself, and not by its superiority.\nThey do not lay it down as a condition for miracles that they should\nbe quite different from the habitual, but think that it should be\nsuch a habitual act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. We would\nreply that it is as the objectors say, but the thing about it is not\nas they have thought. That the Quran is an evidence of his prophecy,\nis based, we believe, upon two principles, which are found in the Book\nitself. The first being that the existence of the class of men called\nprophets and apostles is well-known. They are the men who lay down\nlaws for the people by divine revelation, and not by human education.\nTheir existence can be denied only by the people who deny repeated\naction, as the existence of all things which we have not seen--the\nlives of the famous thinkers and so forth. All the philosophers, and\nother men are agreed, except those who pay no regard to their words,\n(and they are the Materialists), that there are men to whom have been\nrevealed many commandments for the people, to perform certain good\nactions, by which their beatitude may be perfected; and to make them\ngive up certain wrong beliefs and vicious actions. This is the business\nof divine apostles. The second principle is, that everyone who does\nthis work, that is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. This\nprinciple is also quite in accordance with human nature. For as it\nis known that the business of medicine is to cure a disease, and one\nwho can cure is a physician, so it is also known that the business of\nthe prophets is to give law to the people by divine revelation, and\none who does so is a prophet. The Book mentions the first principle\nin the following:--\u201cVerily We have revealed Our will unto thee, as We\nhave revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets who succeeded him, and\nWe have revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac and Jacob,\nand the tribes, and unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron and\nSolomon; and we have given thee the Quran as We gave the Psalms unto\nDavid; some apostles have We sent, whom We have mentioned unto thee,\nand God spake unto Moses discoursing with him,\u201d[108] and again: \u201cSay,\nI am not alone among the apostles.\u201d[109] The second principle is that\nMohammed, peace be upon him, has done the work of a prophet, that is,\nhas given Law to the people by divine revelation. This also can be\nknown from the Quran, where God mentions it. He says, \u201cO men, now is\nan evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and We have sent down\nunto you manifest light.\u201d[110] By _manifest light_ is meant the Quran.\nAgain He says, \u201cO men, now is the apostle come unto you from your Lord;\nbelieve, therefore, it will be better for you,\u201d[111] and again, \u201cBut\nthose among them who are well-grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who\nbelieve in that which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which\nhath been sent down unto the prophets before thee;\u201d[112] and again \u201cGod\nis the witness of the revelation which He hath sent down unto thee; He\nsent it down with his special knowledge; the angels are also witness\nthereof; but God is a sufficient witness.\u201d[113] If it be said, how can\nthe first principle be known, that is, that there is a class of men\nwho give the Law to the people by divine revelation; and so also, how\nto know the second principle, that is, that which the Quran contains,\nabout beliefs and actions, is of divine origin? We would answer that\nthe first principle can be known by the information which these men\ngive about the existence of things, which were not found before, but\ncome into existence after they have informed the people about them, and\nin a specified time; and by their command for doing certain things, and\nteaching certain precepts which do not resemble the common things and\nactions, which can be taught by human agency. This is so because if the\nmiracles be of the kind of laying down Laws, proving that they cannot\nbe laid down by human education, but only through divine revelation,\nthen it is prophecy. But the miracles which do not take the form of\nlaws, as the dividing of the sea, etc., do not necessarily prove the\nprophecy of anyone. But they can only be used as supplements to the\nformer, if they fall very near to it. But standing alone they cannot\nprove it, and so by themselves alone they do not lead to a cognizance\nof the prophets, if the other kind of miracles, which are its\nconclusive proofs, be not found in them. So according to this principle\nmust be understood the proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, that\nis, the miracles of knowledge and deeds are its conclusive proofs\nwhile others only make it strong, and can be used as witnesses. So\nnow it has become clear to you that men of this kind do exist, and\nhow can men be sure of them, except by their repeated appearance; as\nis the case with physicians and other kinds of men. If it be asked:\nHow can it be proved that the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a\nmiracle which is the business of the prophets to perform, as curing is\nthe business of a physician, we would say that this can be known in\nmany ways:--First, the precepts which it contains about knowledge and\ndeeds, cannot be acquired by learning, but only by divine revelation;\nsecondly, by the information which it gives about hidden things; and\nthirdly, by its poetry, which is quite different from that which can\nbe achieved by imagination or repetition of verses, that is, it is\nknown that it is of quite a different kind from the poetry of Arabic\nspeaking people, whether the language be acquired and learned, as is\nthe case with non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as it is with the\nArabs themselves. The first reason is the most weighty one. If it be\nasked how can it be known that the laws which contain both knowledge\nand precepts about deeds are of divine origin, so much so that they\ndeserve the name of the word of God, we would say also that this also\ncan be known in many ways. First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be\nacquired except after a knowledge of God, and of human happiness and\nmisery; and the acts by which this happiness can be acquired, as\ncharity and goodness and the works which divert men from happiness\nand produce eternal misery, such as evil and wickedness. Again the\nknowledge of human happiness and misery requires a knowledge of the\nsoul and its substance, and whether it has eternal happiness or not.\nIf it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery;\nand also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the\ncase of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does\nnot give health, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be\nused in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason\nwe find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater\npart of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a\nknowledge through it would be better. Again a perfect knowledge of God\nrequires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the\nquantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the\ncommon people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this,\nor at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education,\nlearning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting\nlearning, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and\ngiving information about the conditions of the Day of Judgment. When\nall this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be\nno doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through\nthe agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about\nit, \u201cSay, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they\nmight produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like\nit.\u201d This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety\nand certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered\nman, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit,\nwho had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with\nthe Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was perfected in\nlong periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, \u201cThou\ncouldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write\nit with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the\ndivine origin thereof.\u201d[114] Hence God has repeatedly told the people\nthis quality of His prophet. \u201cIt is He who hath raised up among the\nilliterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves,\u201d[115] and, \u201cThose\nwho shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet.\u201d[116] This matter\ncan also be known by another method--that of comparison of this Law\nwith the others. For, if the business of the prophets be the giving\nof laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who\nbelieve in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the\nteachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which\nare contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books\nand religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an\nunlimited degree. On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called\nthe words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation\nfrom the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they\ncontain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it is clear that the\nQuran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to\nbe called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you\ncould know the past books--the Old and New Testaments. But that is not\npossible because they have been changed to a great extent. Were we to\ndescribe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superiority\nof the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day\nof Judgment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would\nrequire many volumes with a confession of our own short-comings in\ndealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has\nbeen called the last of the divine dispensations. The Prophet, peace be\non him, has said, \u201cHad Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped\nfollowing me,\u201d and the Prophet was right, on account of the universal\nnature of the teachings of the Quran, and its regulations. That is it\nis able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the\nhuman race. So God has said, \u201csay, O men, Verily I am the messenger of\nGod unto you all.\u201d[117] The Prophet has said, \u201cI have been sent both to\nthe white and the black nations.\u201d\n\nThe case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some\nfoods which agree with all, or most of the people. Such is the case\nwith religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant\nfor some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was\nmeant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet\nexcels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation,\nwhich makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said\ninforming us of his superiority over other prophets, \u201cThere is no\nprophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would\nhave believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my\nfollowers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment.\u201d All that we\nhave said must have made it clear to you that the proof of the prophecy\nof the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of\nturning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses,\nor of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the\nprophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the\nprophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any\nmeans conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,--they\nnot being acts which make a prophet.\n\nNow as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For\ninstance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were\nto say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that\nhe could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other\ncured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be\nonly for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it\nwould be outward satisfaction alone. The first is far better. The only\nreason by which the common people can be satisfied in this respect is\nthat one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can\ncertainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of\nthe reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the\nconditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name\nof a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that\nthere comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has\nordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all\nhis fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God\ndistinguished him with his revelations.\n\nOn the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist,\nand that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can\nbecome a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fit\nto be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted\nwith regard to the common people. For the doubts and objections which\nwe have described about unnatural miracles are not perceived by the\nmasses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends\nupon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural ones. What\nwe have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the\nsake of truth.\n\nProblem Third: Of Fate and Predestination. This is one of the most\nintricate problems of religion. For if you look into the traditional\narguments about this problem you will find them contradictory; such\nalso being the case with arguments of reason. The contradiction in the\narguments of the first kind is found in the Quran and the Traditions.\nThere are many verses of the Quran, which by their universal nature,\nteach that all the things are predestined, and that man is compelled\nto do his acts; then there are verses which say that man is free in\nhis acts and not compelled in performing them. The following verses\ntell us that all the things are by compulsion, and are predestined,\n\u201cEverything have We created bound by a fixed degree;\u201d[118] again, \u201cWith\nHim everything is regulated according to a determined measure.\u201d[119]\nFurther, He says, \u201cNo accident happeneth in the earth, nor in your\npersons, but the same was entered in the Book verily it is easy with\nGod.\u201d[120] There may be quoted many other verses on this subject. Now,\nas to the verses which say that man can acquire deeds by free will,\nand that things are only possible and not necessary, the following may\nbe quoted: \u201cOr He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck), because of that\nwhich their crew have merited; though He pardoneth many things.\u201d[121]\nAnd again, \u201cWhatever misfortune befalleth you is sent you by God,\nfor that which your hands have deserved.\u201d[122] Further, He says,\n\u201cBut they who commit evil, equal thereunto.\u201d[123] Again, He says,\n\u201cIt shall have the good which it gaineth, and it shall have the evil\nwhich it gaineth.\u201d[124] and, \u201cAnd as to Thamud, We directed them,\nbut they loved blindness better than the true directions.\u201d[125]\nSometimes contradiction appears even in a single verse of the Quran.\nFor instance, He says, \u201cAfter a misfortune hath befallen you (you had\nalready attained two equal advantages), do you say, whence cometh\nthis? Answer, This is from yourselves.\u201d[126] In the next verse, He\nsays, \u201cAnd what happenth unto you, on the day whereon the two armies\nmet, was certainly by permission of the Lord.\u201d[127] Of this kind also\nis the verse, \u201cWhatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God;\nand whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself;\u201d[128] while the\npreceding verse says, \u201cAll is from God.\u201d[129]\n\nSuch is also the case with the Traditions. The Prophet says, \u201cEvery\nchild is born in the true religion; his parents afterwards turn him\ninto a Jew or a Christian.\u201d On another occasion he said, \u201cThe following\npeople have been created for hell, and do the deeds of those who are\nfit for it. These have been created for heaven, and do deeds fit for\nit.\u201d The first Tradition says that the cause of disbelief is one\u2019s own\nenvironments; while faith and belief are natural to man. The other\nTradition says that wickedness and disbelief are created by God, and\nman is compelled to follow them.\n\nThis condition of things has led Muslims to be divided into two\ngroups. The one believed that man\u2019s wickedness or virtue is his own\nacquirement, and that according to these he will be either punished\nor rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party\nis quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his\ndeeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to adopt a mean\nbetween these two extreme views. They say that man can do action, but\nthe deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God.\nBut this is quite meaningless. For if the deed and the power of doing\nit be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the\nact. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this\nproblem.\n\nAs we have said there is another cause of difference of opinion\nabout this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the\ncontradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator\nof his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things\nwhich are not done according to the will of God, or His authority.\nSo there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslims are\nagreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were\nto suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled\nto do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and\nfreedom. Again, if man is compelled to do certain deeds, then on him\nhas been imposed a task which he cannot bear; and when he is made to\nbear a burden, there is no difference between his work and the work\nof inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has no power, neither has\nthe man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have\nmade capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task,\nsuch as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his _Nizamiyyah_, that\nman is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He\nhas established it upon the impossibility of imposing a task which one\ncannot bear, in order to avoid the principle formerly disproved by the\nMutazilites, on account of its being unfit by reason. The succeeding\nAsharites have opposed them. Moreover if man had no power in doing a\ndeed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil,\nand that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring\ngoodness. In this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as\nagriculture etc., would become useless. So also would become useless\nall those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion\nof danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine etc. such a\ncondition is quite contrary to all that is intelligible to man.\n\nNow it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction\nwhich is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we\nwould say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is\nnot to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by\nmeans of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evident that\nGod has created in us power by which we can perform deeds which are\ncontradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except\nby the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the\nremoval of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed\nby the conjunction of both these things at the same time. This being\nso the deeds attributed to us are done by our intention, and by the\nfitness of the causes which are called the _Predestination_ of God,\nwhich He has furnished for us from outside. They neither complete the\nworks which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause\nof our intending them--one of the two things. For intention is produced\nin us by our imagination, or for the verification of a thing, which in\nitself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us.\nFor instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention,\nand move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing\nwhich it is better to shun, we leave it without intention. Hence our\nintentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves.\nTo this the following words of God, refer \u201cEach of them hath angels,\nmutually succeeding each other, before him and behind him; they watch\nhim by the command of God.\u201d[130] As these outside causes take this\ncourse according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never\ngo astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them,\nand our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on\nthe whole, but by _their_ fitness, so it is necessary that actions\ntoo should also be within well-defined limits, that is, they be found\nin a given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary\nbecause our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us;\nand all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes,\nare themselves limited, and are found in a given quantity only. This\nrelation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes,\nbut also between them and the causes which God has created in our\nbody, and the well-defined order existing between the inner and outer\ncauses. This is what is meant by Fate and predestination, which is\nfound mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also\nthe \u201cPreserved Tablet.\u201d[131] God\u2019s knowledge of these causes, and that\nwhich pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one\ncan have a full knowledge of these things except God, and hence He\nis the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said,\n\u201cSay, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden\nbesides God.\u201d[132] A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret\nthings, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing,\nbefore it comes into being. And as the arrangement and order of causes\nbring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be\na knowledge of the existence or non-existence of a thing at a certain\ntime. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what\nthings would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised\nbe He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes.\nThis is what is meant by the \u201ckeys of the secret,\u201d in the following\nwords of God, \u201cwith Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth\nthem besides Himself.\u201d[133]\n\nAll that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we\ncan acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination\nand fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by\nthose verses and Traditions which are apparently contradictory. When\ntheir universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions\nshould vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised\nbefore, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The\nexistent things from our volition are completed by two things: our\nintention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referred to\nonly by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a\ngood answer, and here reason is in perfect agreement with religion,\nbut it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there\nare creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the\nMuslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that\nwhatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can\nbe answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can\nbe understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator\nbut God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot be called\ncreators, except speaking figuratively. Their existence also depends\nupon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves\ntheir existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after\ntheir actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when\ncauses come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there\nbeen no divine protection they could not have existed for the least\nmoment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that a man who makes\nany of the causes to be co-existent with God is like a man who makes\nthe pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says\nthat the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He means that\n_writing_ is a word which may be applied to both, but in reality they\nhave no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no\ndifference between them. Such is also the case with the word _Creator_,\nwhen applied to God and the Causes. We say that in this illustration\nthere are doubts. It should have been clearly shown, whether the scribe\nwas the Creator of the essence (_Jawhar_) of pen, a preserver of it, as\nlong as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after\nit is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the\npen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences\n(_Jawahir_) of everything which come into contact with its causes, which\nare so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no\ncreator but God--a reason which agrees with our feelings, reason and\nreligion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which\nproduce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that\nwhich God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that\nwhich surround the universe from outside. This is quite clear in the\nmovement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the\nmoon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it\nis on this arrangement and order which God has put in their movements\nthat our existence and that of all other things depends. So even if we\nimagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other\nposition, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them,\nall the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so\nbecause of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the\nthings which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects\nof the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the\ncase with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the\ngreater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number,\nor all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not\nbeen those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating\nthem that could not exist even for a single moment after birth. But\nwe say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of\nthe animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement\nof the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not\neven for a twinkling of the eye. So praised be the \u201cSagacious, the\nKnowing.\u201d[134] God has called our attention to this fact in His book,\n\u201cAnd He hath subjected the night and the day to your service; and the\nsun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His\nCommand;\u201d[135] again, \u201cSay, what think ye, if God should cover you with\nperpetual night, until the day of Resurrection;\u201d[136] and again, \u201cOf\nHis mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the\none, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance,\nby your industry; in the other;\u201d[137] and, \u201cAnd He obligeth whatever is\nin heaven or on earth to serve you.\u201d[138] Further He says, \u201cHe likewise\ncompelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their\ncourses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your\nservice,\u201d[139] There may be quoted many other verses on the subject.\nHad there been any wisdom in their existence by which God has favoured\nus, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to\nbe grateful to Him.\n\nThe second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things\nproduced out of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; and\nmovements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences\nand substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect\nthe accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For\ninstance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real\ncreator of the child, and the life in it. Such is also the case with\nagriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed\nscattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So\nthere is no creator but God, while created things are but essences. To\nthis refer the words of God. \u201cO men, a parable is propounded unto you,\ntherefore, hearken unto it. Verily the idols which ye invoke, besides\nGod, can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for\nthe purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn\nthe same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned.\u201d[140]\nThis is where the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said,\n\u201cI give life and kill.\u201d[141] When Abraham saw that he could understand\nit, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, \u201cVerily, God\nbringeth the sun from the east; do thou bring it from the west.\u201d\n\nOn the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be\nunderstood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in\nTradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not\napply to the created things by any near or far-fetched metaphor, for\nthe meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God\nhas said, \u201cGod created you, and that which ye know.\u201d It should be\nknown that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of\nthem, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is\nthe knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the\nknowledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing\nwhich is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not\nseen by us. For the unseen in this matter must always be understood by\na reference to the seen.\n\nSo those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for\nevery action there is an actor. It being so, the agreement of the\nMuslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect,\nif we understand by it the denial of the existence of an agent in the\nvisible world. For from the existence of the agent in it, we have\nbrought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we\nhave once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world,\nit becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His\ncommand and will. It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds,\nand that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is\nthe case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the\nmiddle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot\nfind it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling\nand the movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their\nadmitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if\nthey are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are\ncompelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling\nof hand and voluntary movement, which they would call acquired. So\nthere is no difference between them, except in their names, which never\neffect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.\n\nFourth Problem:--Divine Justice and Injustice. The Asharites have\nexpressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and\nreligion; about this problem. They have explained it in a way in which\nreligion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They\nsay that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite\nopposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within\nthe limits of religious actions, so when a man\u2019s action is just with\nregard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls\nit to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been\nimposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within\nthe four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His\nactions about such things are just. They have laid down that there\nis nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say\nthat there is nothing which may in itself be called good or bad is\nsimply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad.\nSo according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor\nevil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it\nwould have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with\nany kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and\nreason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied\ninjustice to himself. He says \u201cGod hath borne witness that there is\nno God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom\nprofess the same, who executeth righteousness;\u201d[142] and \u201cThy God is\nnot unjust towards His servants;\u201d[143] and again, \u201cVerily God will not\ndeal unjustly with men in any respect; but men deal unjustly with their\nown souls.\u201d[144] It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading\nthe people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many\na verse of the Quran, \u201cThat He leads as well as misleads the people?\u201d\nHe says, \u201cGod causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom\nHe pleaseth;\u201d[145] and, \u201cIf we had pleased, we had certainly given\nevery soul its direction.\u201d[146] We would say that these verses cannot\nbe taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently\ncontradict them--the verses in which God denies injustice to himself.\nFor instance, He says, \u201cHe liketh not ingratitude (_Kufr_) in His\nservant.\u201d[147] So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even\nfrom them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement\nof the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like,\nand orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding\nsuch a view about him, for it is pure infidelity. That God has not\nmisled the people and has not caused them to err will be clear to you\nfrom the following verses: \u201cWherefore be thou orthodox and set thy\nface towards true religion, the institution of God, to which He hath\ncreated man kindly disposed;\u201d[148] and, \u201cwhen thy Lord drew forth\ntheir posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam.\u201d[149] A Tradition\nof the Prophet says, \u201cEvery child is born according to the divine\nconstitution.\u201d\n\nThese being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile\nthem so that they may agree with reason. The verse, \u201cVerily God will\ncause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth\u201d\nrefers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have\nbeen endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go\nastray by their very nature, and led to it by inner and outer causes.\nThe meaning of the verse, \u201cIf we had pleased, we have given unto every\nsoul its direction,\u201d is that He thought of not creating people ready to\nerr, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have\ndone so. But as the dispositions of men are different the words may\nmislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which\nspeak of misleading the people. For instance, \u201cHe will thereby mislead\nmany, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby\nexcept the transgressors\u201d[150]; and, \u201cWe have appointed the vision\nwhich we showed thee, and also the tree cursed in the Quran,\u201d[151] and\nthe verses about the number of angels of hell. \u201cThus doth God cause\nto err whom He pleaseth and He directeth whom He pleaseth.\u201d[152] It\nmeans that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the\nsick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one may object and\nask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared\nto err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that\ndivine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in\nits being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His\nvery creation, are such that they require some men, though very few,\nto be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the\nouter causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which\nrequires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the\ndivine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not\nbeen created things in which there is little evil and much good, for\nthe good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or\nthere had been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is\nwell known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones,\nis better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little\nevil. This very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels\nwhen God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a\nvicegerent, that is, a man. \u201cWhen God said to the angels, I am going\nto place a substitute on earth, they said, wilt thou place there one\nwho will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise,\nand sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know\nnot.\u201d[153] He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that\nwhen there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers\nthe evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction\nof the other. So from all these it is clear how misleading can be\nattributed to Him, in spite of His justice, and injustice disproved.\nThe causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the\ncauses of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes\nof direction to good in which there is found nothing which may lead to\nerring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good\nhave those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this\napplies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictory\nverses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations,\nwhich you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this\nproblem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this\nmethod. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the\nCreator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations\nhave done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the\ncreator of evil. So now they know that He is the Creator of both. As\nmisleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary\nthat it should be attributed to Him, like the creation of evil. But\nthis should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created\ngood for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good--on account of\ntheir connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil\nwould be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its\nnecessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not\nhave existed at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But\nif you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare\nit to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its\nexistence is better than non-existence, that is,--good. Now the verse\nof the Quran \u201cNo account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do;\nbut an account shall be demanded of them,\u201d means that He does nothing\nbecause it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need\ndoing a thing. If it be so, God needs that thing for His own existence,\nbecause of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being--and God is\nfree from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something\ngood by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that\nHe may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection\nrequires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be\nevident, that He is not just in the same way as man is just. But it is\nnot right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions\nare neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For\nit cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time\nfalsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For\nif we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that\nthere are things which are just and good in themselves and others which\nare evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same\nway as man is, it becomes necessary to admit there is some defect in\nhim. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for\nwhich he is just, and so he is dependent upon another.\n\nIt should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to\nbe told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told\nit who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the\ncommon people is confronted by these contradictions in the universal\nverses, and Tradition. Such people must believe in the exoteric\nmeanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common\npeople cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to\nGod is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is\nimpossible (_Mustahil_) and they think that God has power over it, and\nthen told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some\ndefect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is\nweak. As the existence of things free from evil was possible according\nto the masses, God has said, \u201cIf we had pleased, we had certainly given\nevery soul its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me\nmust necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell\nwith genii and men, altogether.\u201d[154] This verse means one thing to\nthe common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to\nmean that it is not incumbent upon him that He should create a class of\nmen to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought\nwe could create men with whom evil could not be attached, but would\nhave been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his\nguidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with\nthe fifth question.\n\nProblem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:--The Day of\nJudgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the\nlearned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about\nthe conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ\nabout its condition, but about the visible things by which they should\nexplain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are\nsome religions which have made it only spiritual, that is, meant only\nfor the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and\nspiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony\nof divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned\nmen, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present\nworld, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon\nprinciples, admitted by all to be true. One of them is that when it is\nclear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but\nfor some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of\ntheir life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category.\nGod himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the\ncreated things. He says in the Quran, \u201cWe have created the heavens and\nthe earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion\nof the unbelievers.\u201d[155] Again, He says, describing and praising\nthe learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of\nthis existence, \u201cWho remember God standing, and sitting, and lying\non their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth,\nsaying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee\ntherefore, deliver us from the torment of hell fire.\u201d[156] The ultimate\npurpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in\nother things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran.\nHe says, \u201cDid ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye\nshould not be brought again before us,\u201d[157] and, \u201cDoth man think, that\nhe shall be left at full liberty, without control?\u201d[158] and further\non He says, \u201cI have not created genii and men for any other end, but\nthat they should serve me.\u201d[159] That is the genius out of all creation\nwhich could know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance\nof knowing God, \u201cWhat reason have I that I should not worship him who\nhath created me? for unto him shall ye return.\u201d[160] Now it being clear\nthat man has been created for a certain work, it is evident that the\nwork should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has\nbeen created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none\nother; that is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is necessary\nthat the real purpose of man\u2019s creation be those deeds which are found\nin him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational\npowers. As there are two portions of the rational powers,--practical\nand theoretical--it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded\nof him. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be\nfound in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection\nin those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard\nit are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by\ndivine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also\nappears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards\nthem. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught\nthem the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people,\nboth in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught\nthem the theoretical knowledge of things, which all the people should\nknow, such as the knowledge of God, angels, of higher creation, and of\ngoodness. In this way they also taught them the quantity of the acts\nwhich would be necessary to make the souls excel in virtue. This is\nespecially the case with our religion, Islam, for when compared with\nother religions, it is found that it is absolutely _the_ best religion.\nHence it was the last of divine dispensations.\n\nNow divine revelation has informed us in all the religions that the\nsoul will live, and all the argument of the learned people have\nestablished the same. The souls are freed from physical desires after\ndeath. If they be pure, their purity is doubled by this freedom from\ndesires. If they be evil this separation increases their depravity,\nfor they are troubled by the evil which they have already earned, and\ntheir regret increases about the opportunities which they lost before\ntheir separation from the body, for this purification is not possible\nwithout it. It is to this that following verse refers:--A soul would\nsay, \u201cAlas, for that I have been negligent in my duties towards God:\nVerily I have been one of the scorners.\u201d[161] All the religions agree\nabout this condition of man, and call it his last goodness or misery.\nThis being so, there could not be found in the visible world anything\nwhich may be given as an illustration, so there is a difference in its\ndescription in the revelations given to different prophets. We mean\nto say, that there is a difference in illustrating the condition of\nthe good and bad soul on that occasion. There are some which have not\ngiven any illustrations of that happiness or misery which the good and\nbad souls will have there. They have only said that the conditions\nthere would be only spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have\ngiven instances from the visible world; that is, they have given the\nexamples of the pleasures here for the pleasures of the next world,\nafter deducting the trouble borne in acquiring them, and in the same\nway, they have illustrated the misery there, by the example of misery\nhere, after deducting the pleasure which we derive from it. Either the\npeople of these religions received from God revelations which those did\nnot receive who made the next world purely spiritual, or they saw, that\nillustrations from things visible are best understood by the common\npeople and that they are best led so or checked from an action through\nthem. So they said that God will put back the good souls in their\nrespective bodies, and the best possible ease--in paradise. The bad\nsouls will also return to their bodies, where they will be in the worst\npossible misery, which they call hell-fire.\n\nThis is true of our religion, Islam, in illustrating the conditions\nof the next world. There are many verses of the Quran which contain\narguments as to the possibilities of the conditions of that world,\nwhich can be understood and verified by all. For our reason cannot\napprehend these things more than the possibility of knowing which is\ncommon to all, and which is of the kind of analogy of the existence\nof the like from the being of the like, that is of its coming into\nbeing. It is an analogy of the coming into being of the small from the\nexistence of the big and the great. For instance, God says, \u201cAnd He\npropoundeth unto us a comparison and forgetteth His Creation.\u201d[162]\nIn these verses the argument used is the analogy of the return of the\nbeginning, when both are equal. In the following verse the argument of\nthose is refuted who differentiate between the real and _return_ of the\nsame thing. He says, \u201cHe giveth you fire out of a green tree.\u201d[163]\nThe doubt is that the birth was from heat and moisture, while the\nreturn will be from cold and dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact\nthat God can create the contrary from the contrary, as He can create\nthe like from the like. The analogy is drawn from the existence of\nthe little from the great. For example, God says, \u201cIs not He who has\ncreated the Heavens and the earth able to create new creatures like\nunto them! yea, certainly; for He is the wise Creator.\u201d[164] These\nverses have two arguments for proving the resurrection and at the same\ntime refuting the arguments of those denying it. Were we to quote the\nverses which give this proof our discourse would be lengthened. But all\nof them are of the kind we have mentioned.\n\nSo, as we have already said, all the religions are agreed that there\nis a blessing or misery for the human soul after death, but differ in\nillustrating the conditions of that moment and in explaining it to\nthe common people. It seems that the illustration in our religion is\nthe most perfect of all for the understanding of the people, and at\nthe same time most inciting of them all to gain for their souls the\nadvantages of that day. And it is the many with whom lies the primary\npurpose of religion. The spiritual illustration would be least inciting\nto the common people for desiring the things of hereafter. So they\nwould have little liking for it, while they would fear the physical\nillustration. So it seems that the physical illustration would be most\nexciting to them, than the spiritual, while the latter would appeal\nonly to the controversialists among the scholastic theologians, who are\nalways very few in number. Hence we find that the Muslims have been\ndivided into three parties about the meaning of the conditions of the\nDay of Judgment. One party says that that existence would be just like\nour present one, as regards pleasures and enjoyments, that is, they\nthink that both are of the same genius, but differ in perpetuity and\ntermination: the one is for ever and the others come to an end. The\nother party thinks that the two existences are different. But this is\nagain subdivided into two parties. The one thinks that that existence\nwith our present faculties is spiritual, but has been described as\nphysical. For this there are many religious arguments which it would\nbe useless to repeat here. The other party says that that existence is\nphysical only; but they at the same time believe, that the body will\nbe different from our present body. This is only transient, that will\nbe eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that\neven Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is related of him that he\nsaid, \u201cThere is nought in this world of the hereafter, but names.\u201d It\nseems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its\npossibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement\naccording to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the\nsecond is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look\nso impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because\nthe material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one\nbody to another, i. e.; one and the same matter is found in many people\nand in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for\ntheir matter is the same. For instance a man dies and his body becomes\ndissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into\nvegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another\nman comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then\nour aforesaid view cannot be true.\n\nThe truth about this question is that man should follow that which he\nhimself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which\nmay deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be\ndenying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account\nof a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both\nby religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal\nnature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or\ninformation in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would\nsay that it is found in the Quran itself. God says, \u201cGod taketh unto\nhimself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which\ndie not He also taketh in their sleep.\u201d[165] In this verse sleep and\ndeath have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change\nin its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For\nhad it not been so it would not have come to its former condition\nafter awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not\neffect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change\nin its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the\nwork of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only\na cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like\nthat of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the\neyes of the young, he would begin to see like him.\n\nThis is all that we thought of in an exposition of the beliefs of our\nreligion, Islam. What remains for us is to look into things of religion\nin which interpretation is allowed and not allowed. And if allowed,\nthen who are the people to take advantage of it? With this thing we\nwould finish our discourse.\n\nThe things found in the Law can be divided into five kinds. But in the\nfirst place, there are only two kinds of things: indivisible and the\ndivisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind\nwhich is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The\nsecond is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant\nbut is only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds.\nFirst, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that\nthey can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies,\nwhich cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour.\nNone can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot\nbe known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by\nthis far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former:\nthey can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is\njust what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is\nmerely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to\ncomprehend. The fourth kind is quite opposite to the former. The thing\nof which it is an example, is easily understood; while it is difficult\nto know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first\nkind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are\nfar-fetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are\nwell-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any\nbut the learned. The interpretation of its opposite--that which can be\nunderstood on both the sides--is just what is wanted, and an exposition\nof it is necessary. The case of the third kind is like the case of the\nabove. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the\ndifficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the\npeople to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet;\n\u201cThe black stone is God\u2019s action on Earth,\u201d etc. etc. That which can\nbe easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it\nis example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular\npersons and learned men. Those who understand that it is only an\nillustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it\nillustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be\nunderstood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration\nshould be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding.\nThis would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.\n\nThe law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid\n(Al Ghazzali) in his book, _Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga_. It\nshould be understood that one thing has five existences which he calls\nby the name of _essential_ (_Zati_); sensual (_Hissi_); rational (_Agli_);\nimaginative (_Khayali_) and doubtful (_Shilbhi_). So at the time of doubt\nit should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy\nthe man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called _essential_\nthen an illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also\nincluded the following traditions of the Prophet, \u201cWhatever the\nearlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven\nand hell.\u201d \u201cBetween my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a\ngarden of paradise;\u201d and \u201cThe earth will eat up the whole of a man\nexcept the extremity of the tail.\u201d All these, it can easily be known\nare but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate,\nit is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to\ngive an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This\nkind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but\nwhen used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid has not decided about\nthe occasion when both the sides of the question--the illustration\nand the illustrated--be both far-fetched and difficult to understand.\nIn this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without\nany foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no\nbasis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many\nplaces in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the\nMutazalites.\n\nThe fourth kind of occasion is quite opposite to the former. In this\nit is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when\nonce understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated.\nIn the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about\nthose people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such\nand such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at\nall. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them\nis not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of\nthe views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. It\nis also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant\nfrom the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the\nillustrated. For these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is\ngiven, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when\ndisclosed are denied by the common people, Such has been the case with\nthe Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them. When this work\nof interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between\nthese occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom\nthe interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion,\nat last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with\nunbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law.\n\nFrom what we have already said the amount of mischief done by\ninterpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire\nour purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and\nwhen interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult\nportions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These\nare all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated.\n\nThe purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took\nit up because we thought that it was the most important of all\npurposes--connected with God and the Law.\n\n\n                               FOOTNOTES\n\n[Footnote 25: A translation of _Al-Kashf\u2019an Manhij i\u2019l Adillah fi\nAqaid il Millah, we Tarif ma Waqa fiha bi Hasb i\u2019l Ta\u2019wil min Shubhi\u2019l\nMuzighah wa Bid\u2019ill Mudillah_.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Quran ii, 19.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Quran xiv, 11.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Quran xxxix, 39.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Quran vi, 75.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Quran xvi, 42.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Quran ii, 282.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Quran xxix, 69.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Quran viii, 29.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Quran xxii, 72.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Quran vii, 184.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Quran lxxvii, 6-16.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Quran xxv, 62.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Quran lxxx, 24.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Quran lxxxvi, 6.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Quran lxxxviii, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Quran xxii, 72.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Quran vi, 79. The story referred to will be found in the\npreceding verses.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Quran ii, 19.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Quran xxxvi, 33.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Quran iii, 188.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Quran vii, 171.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Quran iii, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Quran xvii, 46.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Quran xxi, 22.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Quran xxiii, 93.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Quran xvii, 44.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Quran ii, 256.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Quran xvii, 45, 46.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Quran lxxvii, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Quran vi, 59.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Quran xix, 65.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Quran xvi, 42.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Quran xlii, 50.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Quran liii, 8, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Quran iv, 162.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Quran xix, 43.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Quran xxi, 67.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Quran v, 77.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Quran xlii, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Quran xvi, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Quran xxv, 60.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Quran ii, 256.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Quran xx, 54.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Quran xxxv, 39.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Quran xxx, 29.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Quran xxxv, 41.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Quran ii, 256.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Quran xlii, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Quran xliv, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Quran xxxv, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Quran lxx, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Quran lxxxix, 23.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Quran xvii, 87.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Quran ii, 260.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Quran xxiv, 35.]\n\n[Footnote 81: He also saw him another time, by the lote-tree, beyond\nwhich there is no passing: near it is the garden of eternal abode.\n_When the lote-tree covered that which it covered_, his eye-sight\nturned not aside, nor did it wander: and he really beheld some of the\ngreater signs of his Lord. (Quran lii, 16, 18.) The lote-tree is the\nlimit beyond which neither angel nor man can pass. It stands in the\nseventh heaven, on the right hand of the Throne of God.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Quran lxix, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Quran xxxii, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Quran lxx, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Quran lxvii, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Quran xl, 59.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Quran iii, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Quran ii, 24.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Quran iii, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Quran vi, 103.]\n\n[Footnote 91: They will ask the concerning the Soul: answer, The Soul\nwas created at the command of my Lord: but ye have no knowledge given\nunto you, except a little.--(Quran xxii, 85.)]\n\n[Footnote 92: Quran lxxvii, 3, et. seq.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Quran ii, 99.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Quran xxi, 33.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Quran lxxi, 14-16.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Quran xxvii, 90.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Quran lxvii, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Quran iii, 88.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Quran xi, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Quran vii, 52.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Quran xli, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Quran iii, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Quran ii, 8.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Quran xvii, 92-95.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Quran, xvii, 61.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Quran xvii, 90.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Quran xi, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Quran iv, 161, 162.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Quran xlvi, 8.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Quran iv, 173.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Quran iv, 168.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Quran iv, 160.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Quran iv, 164.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Quran xxix, 47.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Quran lxii, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Quran vii, 156.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Quran vii, 156.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Quran liv, 49.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Quran xiii, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Quran lvii, 22.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Quran xlii, 32.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Quran xlii, 32.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Quran x, 28.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Quran ii, 278.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Quran xli, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Quran iii, 159.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Quran iii, 160.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Quran iv, 81.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Quran iv, 80.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Quran xiii, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Quran lxxxv, 22.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Quran xxvii, 67.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Quran vi, 59.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Quran lxvii, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Quran xvi, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Quran xxviii, 71.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Quran xviii, 73.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Quran xlv, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Quran xiv, 37.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Quran xxii, 72.]\n\n[Footnote 141: \u201cHast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham\nconcerning his Lord, because God had given him the Kingdom? When\nAbraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered,\nI give life and kill, Abraham said, verily God bringeth the sun from\nthe east do thou bring it from the west; whereupon the infidel was\nconfounded; for God directeth not the ungodly people.\u201d Quran ii, 260.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Quran iii, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Quran xli, 46.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Quran x, 45.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Quran xiv, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Quran xxxii, 11.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Quran xxxix, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Quran xxx, 29.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Quran vii, 171.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a\nparable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for they who\nbelieve will know it to be true from their Lord; but the unbelievers\nwill say, what meaneth by this parable? He will thereby mislead etc.\n(Quran ii, 24).]\n\n[Footnote 151: Quran xvii, 62. By the _vision_ may be meant the\nProphet\u2019s night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at\nHudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his vision about the\nOmayyeds.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Quran lxxiv, 34.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Quran ii, 28.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Quran xxxii, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Quran xxxviii, 26.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Quran iii, 188.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Quran xxiii, 117.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Quran lxxv, 36.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Quran li, 56.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Quran xxxvi, 21.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Quran xxxix, 57.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Quran xxxvi, 78.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Quran xxxvi, 80.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Quran xxxxvi, 81.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Quran xxxix, 43.]\n\n\n                        Transcriber\u2019s Notes\n\nThe cover image was created by the transcriber, and is placed in the\nPublic Domain. Obvious typographical errors and variable spelling\nwere corrected. Quran reference formatting has been made uniform to\ne.g. \u201cQuran xxv, 60.\u201d The following corrections have been made to the\ntext:\n\n Page   Original               New\n ----------------------------------------------------------------\n 14     cogniscance            cognisance\n 28     heavena                heavens\n 30     concensus              consensus\n 53     cogniscance            cognisance\n 60     necessarry             necessary\n 60     shonld                 should\n 60     interpretes            interprets\n 64     Qnran                  Quran\n 67     tbe                    the\n 69     Mutazalites            Mutazilites\n 71     Mutakallimum           Mutakallimun\n 76     he                     be\n 91     upo                    upon\n 97     nevertheles            nevertheless\n 98     nonexistent            non-existent\n 129    no                     not\n 135    s                      is\n 137    controvertialist       controversialist\n 143    Mutakalimun            Mutakallimun\n 147    bows                   bows\u2019\n 161    Quran                  Quran xxx, 28. [Footnote 46]\n 162    Quran                  Quran xxxv, 41. [Footnote 47]\n 166    ii                     10 [Footnote 51]\n 174    Maati                  Maali\n 186    by                     be\n 193    Quran                  Quran vi, 103. [Footnote 66]\n 194    th                     the\n 198    imposible              impossible\n 207    excep                  except [Footnote 67]\n 219    beeause                because\n 222    pre-arranged           prearranged\n 244    there-of               thereof\n 251    repeatsd               repeated\n 251    appearence             appearance\n 257    Qnran                  Quran [Footnote 93]\n 259    distingished           distinguished\n 261    Quran LIVI             Quran liv,\n 262    Quarn                  Quran [Footnote 102]\n 265    Mutazlites             Mutazilites\n 265    intellegible           intelligible\n 266    perfom                 perform\n 266    use                    us\n 269    YXVII                  XXVII [Footnote 108]\n 270    things                 things:\n 274                           [Removed duplicate footnote 111. Numbers\n                               of the subsequent footnotes corrected.]\n 276    [118]                  [Removed second, unused footnote anchor]\n 277    alsays                 always\n 277    in                     an\n 278    thay                   they\n 278    their                  there\n 278    there                  their\n 279    Injusitce              Injustice\n 280                           [Added footnote anchors,\n                               footnotes on next page]\n 282                           [Added footnote anchors]\n 282    Quran, XXXV, 9         [Removed footnote, as no matching \n                               quran quote was found in the text]\n 283                           [Added footnote anchors]\n 285    in-spite               in spite\n 285                           [Added footnote anchor]\n 286    contradictary          contradictory\n 286    Crertor                Creator\n 286    attributd              attributed\n 289    131 Quran, XXX, 14.    131 Quran, XXXII, 14.\n 292    that                   That\n 293    theoratical            theoretical\n 295    that is, ... world;    [Removed duplicate part]\n 296    mirsery                misery\n 296    possiblities           possibilities\n 299    divded                 divided\n 300    enternal               eternal\n 300    reilgious              religious\n 304    farfetched             far-fetched\n 305    than                   then\n 306    occassion              occasion\n 306    irrelevently           irrelevantly\n 306    Mutazalites            Mutazilites\n 307    man                    men\n 308    interperetation        interpretation","title":"The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":52385}