{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_66225/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_66225","id":"gutenberg_66225","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/66225","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Physics","Civilization","Nobel Prizes in Literature","Science","Science and state"],"text":"ICARUS\n\nOR\n\nTHE FUTURE OF SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\nBY THE SAME AUTHOR\n\nThe A.B.C. OF ATOMS\n\n12mo., cloth $2.00\n\n\nIn the last few years the study of Radioactivity has brought about\namazing advances in our knowledge of the properties and nature of the\nAtom; and into this fascinating wonderland of the infinitely small\nyet infinitely complex and infinitely full of energy, Mr. Russell\nintroduces us.\n\n\n  E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY\n  681 Fifth Avenue, New York\n\n\n\n\n  ICARUS\n\n  OR\n\n  The Future of Science\n\n  BY\n  BERTRAND RUSSELL\n\n\n  [Illustration]\n\n\n  NEW YORK\n  E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY\n  681 FIFTH AVENUE\n\n\n\n\n  Copyright, 1924\n  By E. P. Dutton & Company\n\n  _All Rights Reserved_\n\n  First printing, April, 1924\n  Second printing, June, 1924\n  Third printing, October, 1924\n  Fourth printing, December, 1924\n  Fifth Printing, December, 1924\n  Sixth Printing, June, 1925\n  Seventh Printing, June, 1925\n\n\n  Printed in the United States of America\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                PAGE\n      I.  Introductory                             5\n     II.  Effects of the Physical Sciences        15\n    III.  The Increase of Organization            23\n     IV.  The Anthropological Sciences            43\n          Conclusion                              57\n\n\n\n\nICARUS\n\nOR\n\nTHE FUTURE OF SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\nI. INTRODUCTORY\n\n\nMr. Haldane\u2019s _Daedalus_ has set forth an attractive picture of the\nfuture as it may become through the use of scientific discoveries\nto promote human happiness. Much as I should like to agree with his\nforecast, a long experience of statesmen and governments has made\nme somewhat sceptical. I am compelled to fear that science will be\nused to promote the power of dominant groups, rather than to make men\nhappy. Icarus, having been taught to fly by his father Daedalus, was\ndestroyed by his rashness. I fear that the same fate may overtake the\npopulations whom modern men of science have taught to fly. Some of the\ndangers inherent in the progress of science while we retain our present\npolitical and economic institutions are set forth in the following\npages.\n\nThis subject is so vast that it is impossible, within a limited space,\nto do more than outline some of its aspects. The world in which we live\ndiffers profoundly from that of Queen Anne\u2019s time, and this difference\nis mainly attributable to science. That is to say, the difference would\nbe very much less than it is but for various scientific discoveries,\nbut resulted from those discoveries by the operation of ordinary human\nnature. The changes that have been brought about have been partly\ngood, partly bad; whether, in the end, science will prove to have been\na blessing or a curse to mankind, is to my mind, still a doubtful\nquestion.\n\nA science may affect human life in two different ways. On the one\nhand, without altering men\u2019s passions or their general outlook, it may\nincrease their power of gratifying their desires. On the other hand,\nit may operate through an effect upon the imaginative conception of\nthe world, the theology or philosophy which is accepted in practice by\nenergetic men. The latter is a fascinating study, but I shall almost\nwholly ignore it, in order to bring my subject within a manageable\ncompass. I shall confine myself almost wholly to the effect of science\nin enabling us to gratify our passions more freely, which has hitherto\nbeen far the more important of the two.\n\nFrom our point of view, we may divide the sciences into three groups:\nphysical, biological, and anthropological. In the physical group I\ninclude chemistry, and broadly speaking any science concerned with the\nproperties of matter apart from life. In the anthropological group I\ninclude all studies specially concerned with man: human physiology and\npsychology (between which no sharp line can be drawn), anthropology,\nhistory, sociology, and economics. All these studies can be illuminated\nby considerations drawn from biology; for instance, Rivers threw a new\nlight on parts of economics by adducing facts about landed property\namong birds during the breeding season. But in spite of their\nconnection with biology--a connection which is likely to grow closer\nas time goes on--they are broadly distinguished from biology by their\nmethods and data, and deserve to be grouped apart, at any rate in a\nsociological inquiry.\n\nThe effect of the biological sciences, so far, has been very small. No\ndoubt Darwinism and the idea of evolution affected men\u2019s imaginative\noutlook; arguments were derived in favour of free competition, and\nalso of nationalism. But these effects were of the sort that I propose\nnot to consider. It is probable that great effects will come from\nthese sciences sooner or later. Mendelism might have revolutionized\nagriculture, and no doubt some similar theory will do so sooner\nor later. Bacteriology may enable us to exterminate our enemies by\ndisease. The study of heredity may in time make eugenics an exact\nscience, and perhaps we shall in a later age be able to determine at\nwill the sex of our children. This would probably lead to an excess\nof males, involving a complete change in family institutions. But\nthese speculations belong to the future. I do not propose to deal with\nthe possible future effects of biology, both because my knowledge of\nbiology is very limited, and because the subject has been admirably\ntreated by Mr. Haldane.[1]\n\n    [1] See his _Daedalus, or Science and the Future_.\n\nThe anthropological sciences are those from which, _a priori_, we might\nhave expected the greatest social effects, but hitherto this has not\nproved to be the case, partly because these sciences are mostly still\nat an early stage of development. Even economics has not so far had\nmuch effect. Where it has seemed to have, this is because it advocated\nwhat was independently desired. Hitherto, the most effective of the\nanthropological sciences has been medicine, through its influence\non sanitation and public health, and through the fact that it has\ndiscovered how to deal with malaria and yellow fever. Birth-control is\nalso a very important social fact which comes into this category. But\nalthough the future effect of the anthropological sciences (to which I\nshall return presently) is illimitable, the effect up to the present\nhas been confined within fairly narrow limits.\n\nOne general observation to begin with. Science has increased man\u2019s\ncontrol over nature, and might therefore be supposed likely to increase\nhis happiness and well-being. This would be the case if men were\nrational, but in fact they are bundles of passions and instincts.\nAn animal species in a stable environment, if it does not die out,\nacquires an equilibrium between its passions and the conditions of\nits life. If the conditions are suddenly altered, the equilibrium is\nupset. Wolves in a state of nature have difficulty in getting food, and\ntherefore need the stimulus of a very insistent hunger. The result is\nthat their descendants, domestic dogs, over-eat if they are allowed to\ndo so. When a certain amount of something is useful, and the difficulty\nof obtaining it is diminished, instinct will usually lead an animal to\nexcess in the new circumstances. The sudden change produced by science\nhas upset the balance between our instincts and our circumstances, but\nin directions not sufficiently noticed. Over-eating is not a serious\ndanger, but over-fighting is. The human instincts of power and rivalry,\nlike the dog\u2019s wolfish appetite will need to be artificially curbed, if\nindustrialism is to succeed.\n\n\n\n\nII. EFFECTS OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES\n\n\nMuch the greatest part of the changes which science has made in social\nlife is due to the physical sciences, as is evident when we consider\nthat they brought about the industrial revolution. This is a trite\ntopic, about which I shall say as little as my subject permits. There\nare, however, some points which must be made.\n\nFirst, industrialism, still has great parts of the earth\u2019s surface to\nconquer. Russia and India are very imperfectly industrialized; China\nhardly at all. In South America there is room for immense development.\nOne of the effects of industrialism is to make the world an economic\nunit: its ultimate consequences will be very largely due to this\nfact. But before the world can be effectively organized as a unit, it\nwill probably be necessary to develop industrially all the regions\ncapable of development that are at present backward. The effects of\nindustrialism change as it becomes more wide-spread; this must be\nremembered in any attempt to argue from its past to its future.\n\nThe second point about industrialism is that it increases the\nproductivity of labour, and thus makes more luxuries possible. At\nfirst, in England, the chief luxury achieved was a larger population\nwith an actual lowering of the standard of life. Then came a golden age\nwhen wages increased, hours of labour diminished, and simultaneously\nthe middle-class grew more prosperous. That was while Great Britain\nwas still supreme. With the growth of foreign industrialism, a new\nepoch began. Industrial organizations have seldom succeeded in becoming\nworld-wide, and have consequently become national. Competition,\nformerly between individual firms, is now mainly between nations,\nand is therefore conducted by methods quite different from those\ncontemplated by the classical economists.\n\nModern industrialism is a struggle between nations for two things,\nmarkets and raw materials, as well as for the sheer pleasure of\ndominion. The labour which is set free from providing the necessaries\nof life tends to be more and more absorbed by national rivalry.\nThere are first the armed forces of the State; then those who\nprovide munitions of war, from the raw minerals up to the finished\nproduct; then the diplomatic and consular services; then the teachers\nof patriotism in schools; then the Press. All of these perform\nother functions as well, but the chief purpose is to minister to\ninternational competition. As another class whose labours are devoted\nto the same end, we must add a considerable proportion of the men\nof science. These men invent continually more elaborate methods of\nattack and defence. The net result of their labours is to diminish the\nproportion of the population that can be put into the fighting line,\nsince more are required for munitions. This might seem a boon, but in\nfact war is now-a-days primarily against the civilian population, and\nin a defeated country they are liable to suffer just as much as the\nsoldiers.\n\nIt is science above all that has determined the importance of raw\nmaterials in international competition. Coal and iron and oil,\nespecially, are the bases of power, and thence of wealth. The nation\nwhich possesses them, and has the industrial skill required to utilize\nthem in war, can acquire markets by armed force, and levy tribute\nupon less fortunate nations. Economists have underestimated the part\nplayed by military prowess in the acquisition of wealth. The landed\naristocracies of Europe were, in origin, warlike invaders. Their defeat\nby the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution, and the fear which this\ngenerated in the Duke of Wellington, facilitated the rise of the middle\nclass. The wars of the eighteenth century decided that England was\nto be richer than France. The traditional economist\u2019s rules for the\ndistribution of wealth hold only when men\u2019s actions are governed by\nlaw, i.e. when most people think the issue unimportant. The issues that\npeople have considered vital have been decided by civil wars or wars\nbetween nations. And for the present, owing to science, the art of\nwar consists in possessing coal, iron, oil, and the industrial skill\nto work them. For the sake of simplicity, I omit other raw materials,\nsince they do not affect the essence of our problem.\n\nWe may say, therefore, speaking very generally, that men have used\nthe increased productivity which they owe to science for three chief\npurposes in succession: first, to increase the population; then, to\nraise the standard of comfort; and, finally, to provide more energy to\nwar. This last result has been chiefly brought about by competition for\nmarkets, which led to competition for raw materials, especially the raw\nmaterials of munitions.\n\n\n\n\nIII. THE INCREASE OF ORGANIZATION\n\n\nThe stimulation of nationalism which has taken place in modern times\nis, however, due very largely to another factor, namely the increase\nof organization, which is of the very essence of industrialism.\nWherever expensive fixed capital is required, organization on a large\nscale is of course necessary. In view of the economies of large scale\nproduction, organization in marketing also becomes of great importance.\nFor some purposes, if not for all, many industries come to be organized\nnationally, so as to be in effect one business in each nation.\n\nScience has not only brought about the need of large organizations,\nbut also the technical possibility of their existence. Without\nrailways, telegraphs, and telephones, control from a centre is very\ndifficult. In ancient empires, and in China down to modern times,\nprovinces were governed by practically independent satraps or\nproconsuls, who were appointed by the central government, but decided\nalmost all questions on their own initiative. If they displeased the\nsovereign, they could only be controlled by civil war, of which the\nissue was doubtful. Until the invention of the telegraph, ambassadors\nhad a great measure of independence, since it was often necessary to\nact without waiting for orders from home. What applied in politics\napplied also in business: an organization controlled from the\ncentre had to be very loosely knit, and to allow much autonomy to\nsubordinates. Opinion as well as action was difficult to mould from a\ncentre, and local variations marred the uniformity of party creeds.\n\nNow-a-days all this is changed. Telegraph, telephone, and wireless make\nit easy to transmit orders from a centre: railways and steamers make\nit easy to transport troops in case the orders are disobeyed. Modern\nmethods of printing and advertising make it enormously cheaper to\nproduce and distribute one newspaper with a large circulation than many\nwith small circulations; consequently, in so far as the Press controls\nopinion, there is uniformity, and, in particular, there is uniformity\nof news. Elementary education, except in so far as religious\ndenominations introduce variety, is conducted on a uniform pattern\ndecided by the State, by means of teachers whom the State has trained,\nas far as possible, to imitate the regularity and mutual similarity\nof machines produced to standard. Thus the material and psychological\nconditions for a great intensity of organization have increased _pari\npassu_, but the basis of the whole development is scientific invention\nin the purely physical realm. Increased productivity has played its\npart, by making it possible to set apart more labour for propaganda,\nunder which head are to be included advertisement, the cinema, the\nPress, education, politics, and religion. Broadcasting is a new method\nlikely to acquire great potency as soon as people are satisfied that\nit is _not_ a method of propaganda.\n\nPolitical controversies, as Mr. Graham Wallas has pointed out, ought\nto be conducted in quantitative terms. If sociology were one of the\nsciences that had affected social institutions (which it is not), this\nwould be the case. The dispute between anarchism and bureaucracy at\npresent tends to take the form of one side maintaining that we want\nno organization, while the other maintains that we want as much as\npossible. A person imbued with the scientific spirit would hardly even\nexamine these extreme positions. Some people think that we keep our\nrooms too hot for health, others that we keep them too cold. If this\nwere a political question, one party would maintain that the best\ntemperature is the absolute zero, the other that it is the melting\npoint of iron. Those who maintained any intermediate position would be\nabused as timorous time-servers, concealed agents of the other side,\nmen who ruined the enthusiasm of a sacred cause by tepid appeals to\nmere reason. Any man who had the courage to say that our rooms ought to\nbe neither very hot nor very cold would be abused by both parties, and\nprobably shot in No Man\u2019s Land. Possibly some day politics may become\nmore rational, but so far there is not the faintest indication of a\nchange in this direction.\n\nTo a rational mind, the question is not: Do we want organization or do\nwe not? The question is: How much organization do we want, and where\nand when and of what kind? In spite of a temperamental leaning to\nanarchism, I am persuaded that an industrial world cannot maintain\nitself against internal disruptive forces without a great deal\nmore organization than we have at present. It is not the amount of\norganization, but its kind and its purposes, that cause our troubles.\nBut before tackling this question, let us pause for a moment to ask\nourselves what is the measure of the intensity of organization in a\ngiven community.\n\nA man\u2019s acts are partly determined by spontaneous impulse, partly by\nthe conscious or unconscious effects of the various groups to which he\nbelongs. A man who works (say) on a railway or in a mine is, in his\nworking-hours almost entirely determined in his actions by those who\ndirect the collective labour of which he forms part. If he decides\nto strike, his action is again not individual, but determined by his\nUnion. When he votes for Parliament, party caucuses have limited his\nchoice to one of two or three men, and party propaganda has induced\nhim to accept _in toto_ one of the two or three blocks of opinions\nwhich form the rival party programmes. His choice between the parties\nmay be individual, but it may also be determined by the action of\nsome group, such as a trade union, which collectively supports one\nparty. His newspaper-reading exposes him to great organized forces; so\ndoes the cinema, if he goes to it. His choice of a wife is probably\nspontaneous, except that he must choose a woman of his own class. But\nin the education of his children he is almost entirely powerless: they\nmust have the education which is provided. Organization thus determines\nmany vital things in his life. Compare him with a handicraftsman or\npeasant-proprietor who cannot read and does not have his children\neducated, and it becomes clear what is meant by saying that\nindustrialism has increased the intensity of organization. To define\nthis term, we must, I think, exclude the unconscious effects of groups,\nexcept as causes facilitating the conscious effects. We may define the\nintensity of organization to which a given individual is subject as\nthe proportion of his acts which is determined by the orders or advice\nof some group, expressed through democratic decisions or executive\nofficers. The intensity of organization in a community may then be\ndefined as the average intensity for its several members.\n\nThe intensity of organization is increased not only when a man belongs\nto more organizations, but also when the organizations to which he\nalready belongs play a larger part in his life, as, for example, the\nState plays a larger part in war than in peace.\n\nAnother matter which needs to be treated quantitatively is the\ndegree of democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy in an organization. No\norganization belongs completely to any one of the three types. There\nmust be executive officers, who will often in practice be able to\ndecide policy, even if in theory they cannot do so. And even if their\npower depends upon persuasion, they may so completely control the\nrelevant publicity that they can always rely upon a majority. The\ndirectors of a railway company, for instance, are to all intents and\npurposes uncontrolled by the shareholders, who have no adequate means\nof organizing an opposition if they should wish to do so. In America,\na railroad president is almost a monarch. In party politics, the power\nof leaders, although it depends upon persuasion, continually increases\nas printed propaganda becomes more important. For these reasons, even\nwhere formal democracy increases, the real degree of democratic control\ntends to diminish, except on a few questions which rouse strong popular\npassions.\n\nThe result of these causes is that, in consequence of scientific\ninventions which facilitate centralization and propaganda, groups\nbecome more organized, more disciplined, more group-conscious,\nand more docile to leaders. The effect of leaders on followers is\nincreased, and the control of events by a few prominent personalities\nbecomes more marked.\n\nIn all this there would be nothing very tragic, but for the fact, with\nwhich science has nothing to do, that organization is almost wholly\nnational. If men were actuated by the love of gain, as the older\neconomists supposed, this would not be the case; the same causes which\nhave led to national trusts would have led to international trusts.\nThis has happened in a few instances, but not on a sufficiently wide\nscale to affect politics or economics very vitally. Rivalry is, with\nmost well-to-do energetic people, a stronger motive than love of money.\nSuccessful rivalry requires organization of rival forces; the tendency\nis for a business such as oil, for example, to organize itself into two\nrival groups, between them covering the world. They might, of course,\ncombine, and they would no doubt increase their wealth if they did\nso. But combination would take the zest out of life. The object of a\nfootball team, one might say, is to kick goals. If two rival teams\ncombined, and kicked the ball alternately over the two goals, many more\ngoals would be scored. Nevertheless no one suggests that this should\nbe done, the object of a football team being not to kick goals but\nto win. So the object of a big business is not to make money, but to\nwin in the contest with some other business. If there were no other\nbusiness to be defeated, the whole thing would become uninteresting.\nThis rivalry has attached itself to nationalism, and enlisted the\nsupport of the ordinary citizens of the countries concerned; they\nseldom know what it is that they are supporting, but, like the\nspectators at a football-match, they grow enthusiastic for their own\nside. The harm that is being done by science and industrialism is\nalmost wholly due to the fact that, while they have proved strong\nenough to produce a _national_ organization of economic forces, they\nhave not proved strong enough to produce an international organization.\nIt is clear that political internationalism such as the League of\nNations was supposed to inaugurate, will never be successful until we\nhave economic internationalism, which would require, as a minimum, an\nagreement between various national organizations dividing among them\nthe raw materials and markets of the world. This, however, can hardly\nbe brought about while big business is controlled by men who are so\nrich as to have grown indifferent to money, and to be willing to risk\nenormous losses for the pleasure of rivalry.\n\nThe increase of organization in the modern world has made the ideals\nof liberalism wholly inapplicable. Liberalism, from Montesquieu to\nPresident Wilson, was based upon the assumption of a number of more or\nless equal individuals or groups, with no differences so vital that\nthey were willing to die sooner than compromise. It was supposed that\nthere was to be free competition between individuals and between ideas.\nExperience has shown, however, that the existing economic system is\nincompatible with all forms of free competition except between States\nby means of armaments. I should wish, for my part, to preserve free\ncompetition between ideas, though not between individuals and groups,\nbut this is only possible by means of what an old-fashioned liberal\nwould regard as interferences with personal liberty. So long as the\nsources of economic power remain in private hands, there will be no\nliberty except for the few who control those sources.\n\nSuch liberal ideals as free trade, free press, unbiased education,\neither already belong to the past or soon will do so. One of the\ntriumphs of early liberalism in England was the establishment of\nparliamentary control over the army; this was the _casus belli_ in the\nCivil War, and was decided by the Revolution of 1688. It was effective\nso long as Parliament represented the same class from which army\nofficers were drawn. This was still the case with the late Parliament,\nbut may cease to be the case with the advent of a Labour Government.\nRussia, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Bavaria have shown in recent years\nhow frail democracy has become; east of the Rhine it lingers only\nin outlying regions. Constitutional control over armaments must,\ntherefore, be regarded as another liberal principal which is rapidly\nbecoming obsolete.\n\nIt would seem probable that, in the next fifty years or so, we shall\nsee a still further increase in the power of governments, and a\ntendency for governments to be such as are desired by the men who\ncontrol armaments and raw materials. The forms of democracy may survive\nin western countries, since those who possess military and economic\npower can control education and the press, and therefore can usually\nsecure a subservient democracy. Rival economic groups will presumably\nremain associated with rival nations, and will foster nationalism in\norder to recruit their football teams.\n\nThere is, however, a hopeful element in the problem. The planet is\nof finite size, but the most efficient size for an organization\nis continually increased by new scientific inventions. The world\nbecomes more and more of an economic unity. Before very long the\ntechnical conditions will exist for organizing the whole world as one\nproducing and consuming unit. If, when that time comes, two rival\ngroups contend for mastery, the victor may be able to introduce that\nsingle world-wide organization that is needed to prevent the mutual\nextermination of civilized nations. The world which would result\nwould be, at first, very different from the dreams of either liberals\nor socialists; but it might grow less different with the lapse of\ntime. There would be at first economic and political tyranny of\nthe victors, a dread of renewed upheavals, and therefore a drastic\nsuppression of liberty. But if the first half-dozen revolts were\nsuccessfully repressed, the vanquished would give up hope, and accept\nthe subordinate place assigned to them by the victors in the great\nworld-trust. As soon as the holders of power felt secure, they would\ngrow less tyrannical and less energetic. The motive of rivalry being\nremoved, they would not work so hard as they do now, and would soon\ncease to exact such hard work from their subordinates. Life at first\nmight be unpleasant, but it would at least be possible, which would be\nenough to recommend the system after a long period of warfare. Given a\nstable world-organization, economic and political, even if, at first,\nit rested upon nothing but armed force, the evils which now threaten\ncivilization would gradually diminish, and a more thorough democracy\nthan that which now exists might become possible. I believe that, owing\nto men\u2019s folly, a world-government will only be established by force,\nand will therefore be at first cruel and despotic. But I believe that\nit is necessary for the preservation of a scientific civilization,\nand that, if once realized, it will gradually give rise to the other\nconditions of a tolerable existence.\n\n\n\n\nIV. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SCIENCES\n\n\nIt remains to say something about the future effects of the\nanthropological sciences. This is of course extremely conjectural,\nbecause we do not know what discoveries will be made. The effect\nis likely to be far greater than we can now imagine, because these\nsciences are still in their infancy. I will, however, take a few points\non which to hang conjectures. I do not wish to be supposed to be\nmaking prophecies: I am only suggesting possibilities which it may be\ninstructive to consider.\n\nBirth-control is a matter of great importance, particularly in\nrelation to the possibility of a world-government, which could hardly\nbe stable if some nations increased their population much more\nrapidly than others. At present, birth-control is increasing in all\ncivilized countries, though in most it is opposed by governments. This\nopposition is due partly to mere superstition and desire to conciliate\nthe Catholic vote, partly to the desire for large armies and severe\ncompetition between wage-earners, so as to keep down wages. In spite\nof the opposition of governments, it seems probable that birth-control\nwill lead to a stationary population in most white nations within the\nnext fifty years. There can be no security that it will stop with a\nstationary population; it may go on to the point where the population\ndiminishes.\n\nThe increase in the practice of birth-control is an example of a\nprocess contrary to that seen in industrialism: it represents a\nvictory of individual over collective passions. Collectively, Frenchmen\ndesire that France should be populous, in order to be able to defeat\nher enemies in war. Individually, they desire that their own families\nshould be small, in order to increase the inheritance of their children\nand to diminish the expense of education. The individual desire has\ntriumphed over the collective desire, and even, in many cases, over\nreligious scruples. In this case, as in most others, the individual\ndesire is less harmful to the world than the collective desire: the man\nwho acts from pure selfishness does less damage than the man who is\nactuated by \u201cpublic spirit.\u201d For, since medicine and sanitation have\ndiminished the infant death-rate, the only checks to over-population\nthat remain (apart from birth-control) are war and famine. So long\nas this continues to be the case, the world must either have a nearly\nstationary population, or employ war to produce famine. The latter\nmethod, which is that favoured by opponents of birth-control, has been\nadopted on a large scale since 1914; it is however somewhat wasteful.\nWe require a certain number of cattle and sheep, and we take steps\nto secure the right number. If we were as indifferent about them as\nwe are about human beings, we should produce far too many, and cause\nthe surplus to die by the slow misery of under-feeding. Farmers would\nconsider this plan extravagant, and humanitarians would consider it\ncruel. But where human beings are concerned, it is considered the only\nproper course, and works advocating any other are confiscated by the\npolice if they are intelligible to those whom they concern.\n\nIt must be admitted, however, that there are certain dangers. Before\nlong the population may actually diminish. This is already happening\nin the most intelligent sections of the most intelligent nations;\ngovernment opposition to birth-control propaganda gives a biological\nadvantage to stupidity, since it is chiefly stupid people whom\ngovernments succeed in keeping in ignorance. Before long, birth-control\nmay become nearly universal among the white races; it will then not\ndeteriorate their quality, but only diminish their numbers, at a time\nwhen uncivilized races are still prolific and are preserved from a high\ndeath-rate by white science.\n\nThis situation will lead to a tendency--already shown by the\nFrench--to employ more prolific races as mercenaries. Governments will\noppose the teaching of birth-control among Africans, for fear of losing\nrecruits. The result will be an immense numerical inferiority of the\nwhite races, leading probably to their extermination in a mutiny of\nmercenaries. If, however, a world-government is established, it may see\nthe desirability of making subject races also less prolific, and may\npermit mankind to solve the population question. This is another reason\nfor desiring a world-government.\n\nPassing from quantity to quality of population, we come to the\nquestion of eugenics. We may perhaps assume that, if people grow less\nsuperstitious, governments will acquire the right to sterilize those\nwho are not considered desirable as parents. This power will be\nused, at first, to diminish imbecility, a most desirable object. But\nprobably, in time, opposition to the government will be taken to prove\nimbecility, so that rebels of all kinds will be sterilized. Epileptics,\nconsumptives, dipsomaniacs and so on will gradually be included; in\nthe end, there will be a tendency to include all who fail to pass the\nusual school examinations. The result will be to increase the average\nintelligence; in the long run, it may be greatly increased. But\nprobably the effect upon really exceptional intelligence will be bad.\nMr. Micawber, who was Dickens\u2019s father, would hardly have been regarded\nas a desirable parent. How many imbeciles ought to outweigh one Dickens\nI do not profess to know.\n\nEugenics has, of course, more ambitious possibilities in a more\ndistant future. It may aim not only at eliminating undesired types,\nbut at increasing desired types. Moral standards may alter so as to\nmake it possible for one man to be the sire of a vast progeny by\nmany different mothers. When men of science envisage a possibility\nof this kind, they are prone to a type of fallacy which is common\nalso in other directions. They imagine that a reform inaugurated by\nmen of science would be administered as men of science would wish,\nby men similar in outlook to those who have advocated it. In like\nmanner women who advocated votes for women used to imagine that the\nwoman voter of the future would resemble the ardent feminist who won\nher the vote; and socialist leaders imagine that a socialist State\nwould be administered by idealistic reformers like themselves. These\nare, of course, delusions; a reform, once achieved, is handed over\nto the average citizen. So, if eugenics reached the point where it\ncould increase desired types, it would not be the types desired by\npresent-day eugenists that would be increased, but rather the types\ndesired by the average official. Prime Ministers, Bishops, and others\nwhom the State considers desirable might become the fathers of half the\nnext generation. Whether this would be an improvement it is not for me\nto say, as I have no hope of ever becoming either a Bishop or a Prime\nMinister.\n\nIf we knew enough about heredity to determine, within limits, what\nsort of population we would have, the matter would of course be in the\nhands of State officials, presumably elderly medical men. Whether they\nwould really be preferable to Nature I do not feel sure. I suspect that\nthey would breed a subservient population, convenient to rulers but\nincapable of initiative. However, it may be that I am too sceptical of\nthe wisdom of officials.\n\nThe effects of psychology on practical life may in time become very\ngreat. Already advertisers in America employ eminent psychologists\nto instruct them in the technique of producing irrational belief;\nsuch men may, when they have grown more proficient, be very useful in\npersuading the democracy that governments are wise and good. Then,\nagain, there are the psychological tests of intelligence, as applied\nto recruits for the American army during the war. I am very sceptical\nof the possibility of testing anything except average intelligence\nby such methods, and I think that, if they were widely adopted, they\nwould probably lead to many persons of great artistic capacity being\nclassified as morons. The same thing would have happened to some\nfirst-rate mathematicians. Specialized ability not infrequently goes\nwith general disability, but this would not be shown by the kind of\ntests which psychologists recommended to the American government.\n\nMore sensational than tests of intelligence is the possibility of\ncontrolling the emotional life through the secretions of the ductless\nglands. It will be possible to make people choleric or timid, strongly\nor weakly sexed, and so on, as may be desired. Differences of emotional\ndisposition seem to be chiefly due to secretions of the ductless\nglands, and therefore controllable by injections or by increasing\nor diminishing the secretions. Assuming an oligarchic organization\nof society, the State could give to the children of holders of power\nthe disposition required for command, and to the children of the\nproletariat the disposition required for obedience. Against the\ninjections of the State physicians the most eloquent Socialist oratory\nwould be powerless. The only difficulty would be to combine this\nsubmissiveness with the necessary ferocity against external enemies;\nbut I do not doubt that official science would be equal to the task.\n\nIt is not necessary, when we are considering political consequences,\nto pin our faith to the particular theories of the ductless glands,\nwhich may blow over, like other theories. All that is essential in\nour hypothesis is the belief that physiology will in time find ways of\ncontrolling emotion, which it is scarcely possible to doubt. When that\nday comes, we shall have the emotions desired by our rulers, and the\nchief business of elementary education will be to produce the desired\ndisposition, no longer by punishment or moral precept, but by the far\nsurer method of injection or diet. The men who will administer this\nsystem will have a power beyond the dreams of the Jesuits, but there\nis no reason to suppose that they will have more sense than the men\nwho control education to-day. Technical scientific knowledge does not\nmake men sensible in their aims, and administrators in the future, will\nbe presumably no less stupid and no less prejudiced than they are at\npresent.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nIt may seem as though I had been at once gloomy and frivolous in some\nof my prognostications. I will end, however, with the serious lesson\nwhich seems to me to result. Men sometimes speak as though the progress\nof science must necessarily be a boon to mankind, but that, I fear,\nis one of the comfortable nineteenth-century delusions which our more\ndisillusioned age must discard. Science enables the holders of power\nto realize their purposes more fully than they could otherwise do. If\ntheir purposes are good, this is a gain; if they are evil, it is a\nloss. In the present age, it seems that the purposes of the holders\nof power are in the main evil, in the sense that they involve a\ndiminution, in the world at large, of the things men are agreed in\nthinking good. Therefore, at present, science does harm by increasing\nthe power of rulers. Science is no substitute for virtue; the heart is\nas necessary for a good life as the head.\n\nIf men were rational in their conduct, that is to say, if they acted\nin the way most likely to bring about the ends that they deliberately\ndesire, intelligence would be enough to make the world almost a\nparadise. In the main, what is in the long run advantageous to one\nman is also advantageous to another. But men are actuated by passions\nwhich distort their view; feeling an impulse to injure others, they\npersuade themselves that it is to their interest to do so. They\nwill not, therefore, act in the way which is in fact to their own\ninterest unless they are actuated by generous impulses which make\nthem indifferent to their own interest. This is why the heart is as\nimportant as the head. By the \u201cheart\u201d I mean, for the moment, the\nsum-total of kindly impulses. Where they exist, science helps them\nto be effective; where they are absent, science only makes men more\ncleverly diabolic.\n\nIt may be laid down as a general principle to which there are few\nexceptions that, when people are mistaken as to what is to their own\ninterest, the course they believe to be wise is more harmful to others\nthan the course that really is wise. There are innumerable examples of\nmen making fortunes because, on moral grounds, they did something which\nthey believed to be contrary to their own interests. For instance,\namong early Quakers there were a number of shopkeepers, who adopted\nthe practice of asking no more for their goods than they were willing\nto accept, instead of bargaining with each customer, as everybody else\ndid. They adopted this practice because they held it to be a lie to\nask more than they would take. But the convenience to customers was so\ngreat that everybody came to their shops and they grew rich. (I forget\nwhere I read this, but if my memory serves me it was in some reliable\nsource). The same policy _might_ have been adopted from shrewdness,\nbut in fact no one was sufficiently shrewd. Our unconscious is more\nmalevolent than it pays us to be; therefore the people who do most\ncompletely what is in fact to their interest are those who, on moral\ngrounds, do what they believe to be against their interest.\n\nFor this reason, it is of the greatest importance to inquire whether\nany method of strengthening kindly impulses exists. I have no doubt\nthat their strength or weakness depends upon discoverable physiological\ncauses; let us assume that it depends upon the glands. If so, an\ninternational secret society of physiologists could bring about the\nmillennium by kidnapping, on a given day, all the rulers of the world,\nand injecting into their blood some substance which would fill them\nwith benevolence towards their fellow-creatures. Suddenly M. Poincare\nwould wish well to Ruhr miners, Lord Curzon to Indian nationalists,\nMr. Smuts to the natives of what was German South West Africa, the\nAmerican Government to its political prisoners and its victims in Ellis\nIsland. But alas, the physiologists would first have to administer the\nlove-philtre to themselves before they would undertake such a task.\nOtherwise, they would prefer to win titles and fortunes by injecting\nmilitary ferocity into recruits. And so we come back to the old\ndilemma: only kindliness can save the world, and even if we knew how to\nproduce kindliness we should not do so unless we were already kindly.\nFailing that, it seems that the solution which the Houynhnms adopted\ntowards the Yahoos, namely extermination, is the only one; apparently\nthe Yahoos are bent on applying it to each other.\n\nWe may sum up this discussion in a few words. Science has not given\nmen more self-control, more kindliness, or more power of discounting\ntheir passions in deciding upon a course of action. It has given\ncommunities more power to indulge their collective passions, but,\nby making society more organic, it has diminished the part played\nby private passions. Men\u2019s collective passions are mainly evil; far\nthe strongest of them are hatred and rivalry directed towards other\ngroups. Therefore at present all that gives men power to indulge their\ncollective passions is bad. That is why science threatens to cause the\ndestruction of our civilization. The only solid hope seems to lie in\nthe possibility of world-wide domination by one group, say the United\nStates, leading to the gradual formation of an orderly economic and\npolitical world-government. But perhaps, in view of the sterility of\nthe Roman Empire, the collapse of our civilization would in the end be\npreferable to this alternative.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\nPunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a\npredominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they\nwere not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation\nmarks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left\nunbalanced.\n\nTable of Contents added by Transcriber.","title":"Icarus : $b or, The future of science","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":7143}