{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_66566/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_66566","id":"gutenberg_66566","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/66566","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Islamic philosophy -- History"],"text":"THE\n HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM\n\n BY\n Dr. T. J. DE BOER,\n UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN.\n\n TRANSLATED\n (with the sanction of the Author)\n BY\n EDWARD R. JONES B.D.\n\n\n LONDON\n LUZAC & CO., 46, GREAT RUSSELL STREET,\n 1903.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR\u2019S PREFATORY NOTE.\n\n\nThis edition of Dr. de Boer\u2019s recent work is produced in the hope that\nit may prove interesting to not a few English readers, and especially\nthat it may be of service to younger students commencing to study the\nsubject which is dealt with in the following pages. The translator has\naimed at nothing more than a faithful reproduction of the original. His\nbest thanks are due to the accomplished author, for his kindness in\nrevising the proof-sheets of the version, as it passed through the\nPress.\n\n E. R. J.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe following is the first attempt which has been made, since the\nappearance of Munk\u2019s excellent sketch [1], to present in connected form\na History of Philosophy in Islam. This work of mine may therefore be\nregarded as a fresh initiation,\u2014not a completion of such a task. I\ncould not know of all that had been done by others, in the way of\npreliminary study in this field; and when I did know of the existence\nof such material, it was not always accessible to me. As for manuscript\nassistance, it was only in exceptional cases that this was at my\ndisposal.\n\nConforming to the conditions which I had to meet, I have in the\nfollowing account refrained from stating my authorities. But anything\nwhich I may have taken over, nearly word for word or without testing\nit, I have marked in foot-references. For the rest, I deeply regret\nthat I cannot duly indicate at present how much I owe, as regards\nappreciation of the sources, to men like Dieterici, de Goeje,\nGoldziher, Houtsma, Aug. M\u00fcller, Munk, N\u00f6ldeke, Renan, Snouck\nHurgronje, van Vloten, and many, many others.\n\nSince the completion of this volume an interesting monograph on Ibn\nSina [2] has appeared, which farther extends its survey over the\nearlier history of Philosophy in Islam. It gives rise to no occasion,\nhowever, to alter substantially my conception of the subject.\n\nFor all bibliographical details I refer the reader to \u201cdie\nOrientalische Bibliographie\u201d, Brockelmann\u2019s \u201cGeschichte der Arabischen\nLitteratur\u201d, and Ueberweg\u2014Heinze\u2019s \u201cGrundriss der Geschichte der\nPhilosophie\u201d II3, p. 213 sqq. In the transcription of Arabic names I\nhave been more heedful of tradition and German pronunciation, than of\nconsistency. Be it noted only that z is to be pronounced as a soft s,\nand th like the corresponding English sound [3]. In the Index of\nPersonal Names, accents signify length.\n\nAs far as possible I have confined myself to Islam. On that ground Ibn\nGebirol and Maimonides have received only a passing notice, while other\nJewish thinkers have been entirely omitted, although, philosophically\nconsidered, they belong to the Muslim school. This, however, entails no\ngreat loss, for much has been written already about the Jewish\nphilosophers, whereas Muslim thinkers have hitherto been sadly\nneglected.\n\n\n Groningen (Netherlands).\n\n T. J. de Boer.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nIntroduction.\n\n PAGE\n\n 1. The Theatre 1\u20136\n 1. Ancient Arabia 1\n 2. The first Caliphs. Medina. The Shi\u02bbites 2\n 3. The Omayyads. Damascus, Basra and Kufa 3\n 4. The Abbasids. Bagdad 3\n 5. Minor States. Fall of the Caliphate 5\n\n 2. Oriental Wisdom 6\u201311\n 1. Semitic Speculation 6\n 2. Persian Religion. Zrwanism 8\n 3. Indian Wisdom 8\n\n 3. Greek Science 11\u201330\n 1. The Syrians 11\n 2. The Christian Churches 11\n 3. Edessa and Nisibis 12\n 4. Harran 13\n 5. Gondeshapur 14\n 6. Syriac Translations 14\n 7. Philosophy among the Syrians 16\n 8. Arabic Translations 17\n 9. The Philosophy of the Translators 19\n 10. Range of Tradition 21\n 11. Continuation of Neo-Platonism 22\n 12. The \u201cBook of the Apple\u201d 24\n 13. The \u201cTheology of Aristotle\u201d 25\n 14. Conception of Aristotle 27\n 15. Philosophy in Islam 28\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nPhilosophy and Arab Knowledge.\n\n 1. Grammatical Science 31\u201335\n 1. The several Sciences 31\n 2. The Arabic Language. The Koran 31\n 3. The Grammarians of Basra and Kufa 32\n 4. Grammar influenced by Logic. Metrical Studies 33\n 5. Grammatical Science and Philosophy 35\n\n 2. Ethical Teaching 36\u201341\n 1. Tradition and Individual Opinion (Sunna,\n Hadith, Ra\u02bcy) 36\n 2. Analogy (Qiyas). Consensus of the Congregation\n (Idjma) 37\n 3. Position and Contents of the Muslim Ethical\n System (al-Fiqh) 38\n 4. Ethics and Politics 40\n\n 3. Doctrinal Systems 41\u201364\n 1. Christian Dogmatic 41\n 2. The Kalam 42\n 3. The Mutazilites and their Opponents 43\n 4. Human and Divine Action 44\n 5. The Being of God 46\n 6. Revelation and Reason 48\n 7. Abu-l-Hudhail 49\n 8. Nazzam 51\n 9. Djahiz 53\n 10. Muammar and Abu Hashim 54\n 11. Ashari 55\n 12. The Atomistic Kalam 57\n 13. Mysticism or Sufism 62\n\n 4. Literature and History 65\u201371\n 1. Literature 65\n 2. Abu-l-Atahia. Mutanabbi. Abu-l-Ala. Hariri 65\n 3. Annalistic. Historical Tradition 67\n 4. Masudi and Muqaddasi 69\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nThe Pythagorean Philosophy.\n\n 1. Natural Philosophy 72\u201380\n 1. The Sources 72\n 2. Mathematical Studies 73\n 3. Natural Science 75\n 4. Medicine 76\n 5. Razi 77\n 6. The Dahrites 80\n\n 2. The Faithful Brethren of Basra 81\u201396\n 1. The Karmatites 81\n 2. The Brethren and their Encyclopaedia 82\n 3. Eclecticism 84\n 4. Knowledge 85\n 5. Mathematics 87\n 6. Logic 89\n 7. God and the World 90\n 8. The Human Soul 92\n 9. Philosophy of Religion 93\n 10. Ethics 94\n 11. Influence of the Encyclopaedia 95\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nThe Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of The East.\n\n 1. Kindi 97\u2013106\n 1. His Life 97\n 2. Relation to Theology 99\n 3. Mathematics 100\n 4. God; World; Soul 101\n 5. Doctrine of the Spirit (\u02bbaql) 102\n 6. Kindi as an Aristotelian 104\n 7. The School of Kindi 105\n\n 2. Farabi 106\u2013128\n 1. The Logicians 106\n 2. Farabi\u2019s Life 107\n 3. Relation to Plato and Aristotle 108\n 4. Farabi\u2019s Conception of Philosophy 110\n 5. His Logic 111\n 6. His Metaphysics. Being. God 114\n 7. The Celestial World 115\n 8. The Terrestrial World 117\n 9. The Human Soul 118\n 10. The Spirit in Man 119\n 11. Farabi\u2019s Ethics 121\n 12. His Politics 122\n 13. The Future Life 123\n 14. General Survey of Farabi\u2019s System 124\n 15. Effects of his Philosophy. Sidjistani 126\n\n 3. Ibn Maskawaih 128\u2013131\n 1. His Position 128\n 2. The Nature of the Soul 128\n 3. The Principles of his Ethics 129\n\n 4. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 131\u2013148\n 1. His Life 131\n 2. His Work 132\n 3. Branches of Philosophy. Logic 134\n 4. Metaphysics and Physics 135\n 5. Anthropology and Psychology 139\n 6. The Reason 141\n 7. Allegorical Representation of the Doctrine of\n the Reason 143\n 8. Esoteric Teaching 144\n 9. Ibn Sina\u2019s Time. Beruni 145\n 10. Behmenyar 146\n 11. Survival of Ibn Sina\u2019s Influence 147\n\n 5. Ibn al-Haitham (Alhazen) 148\u2013153\n 1. Scientific Movement turning Westward 148\n 2. Ibn al-Haitham\u2019s Life and Works 149\n 3. Perception and Judgment 150\n 4. Slender effect left by his Teaching 152\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nThe Outcome of Philosophy in The East.\n\n 1. Gazali 154\u2013168\n 1. Dialectic and Mysticism 154\n 2. Gazali\u2019s Life 155\n 3. Attitude towards his Time: Hostility to\n Aristotelianism 158\n 4. The World as the Production of God\u2019s Free\n Creative Might 159\n 5. God and Divine Providence 162\n 6. Doctrine of the Resurrection 163\n 7. Gazali\u2019s Theology 164\n 8. Experience and Revelation 166\n 9. Estimate of Gazali\u2019s Position and Teaching 168\n\n 2. The Epitomists 169\u2013171\n 1. Position of Philosophy in the East, after\n Gazali\u2019s Time 169\n 2. Philosophical Culture 170\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nPhilosophy in The West.\n\n 1. Beginnings 172\u2013175\n 1. The Age of the Omayyads 172\n 2. The Eleventh Century 174\n\n 2. Ibn Baddja (Avempace) 175\u2013181\n 1. The Almoravids 175\n 2. Ibn Baddja\u2019s Life 176\n 3. The Character of his Works 177\n 4. His Logic and Metaphysics 177\n 5. His Opinions regarding Soul and Spirit 178\n 6. The Individual Man 179\n\n 3. Ibn Tofail (Abubacer) 181\u2013187\n 1. The Almohads 181\n 2. Ibn Tofail\u2019s Life 182\n 3. \u201cHai ibn Yaqzan\u201d 182\n 4. \u201cHai\u201d and the Development of Humanity 184\n 5. \u201cHai\u2019s\u201d Ethics 185\n\n 4. Ibn Roshd (Averroes) 187\u2013199\n 1. His Life 187\n 2. Ibn Roshd and Aristotle 188\n 3. Logic. Attainability of Truth 189\n 4. The World and God 191\n 5. Body and Spirit 193\n 6. Spirit and Spirits 194\n 7. Estimate of Ibn Roshd as a Thinker 196\n 8. Summary of his Views on the Relations of\n Theology, Religion and Philosophy to one\n another. Practical Philosophy 197\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nConclusion.\n\n 1. Ibn Khaldun 200\u2013208\n 1. The Conditions of his Time 200\n 2. Ibn Khaldun\u2019s Life 201\n 3. Philosophy and Worldly Experience 202\n 4. Philosophy of History. Historical Method 204\n 5. The Subject of History 205\n 6. Characterization 206\n\n 2. The Arabs and Scholasticism 208\u2013213\n 1. Political Situation. The Jews 208\n 2. Palermo and Toledo 209\n 3. Parisian Averroism in the Thirteenth Century 211\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nI. INTRODUCTION.\n\n\n1. The Theatre.\n\n1. In olden time the Arabian desert was, as it is at this day, the\nroaming-ground of independent Bedouin tribes. With free and healthy\nminds they contemplated their monotonous world, whose highest charm was\nthe raid, and whose intellectual treasure was the tribal tradition.\nNeither the achievements of social labour, nor the accomplishments of\nelegant leisure were known to them. Only on the borders of the desert,\nin regularly constituted communities, which often had to suffer from\nthe incursions of those Bedouins, a higher degree of civilization had\nbeen attained. This was the case in the South, where the ancient\nkingdom of the Queen of Sheba continued its existence in Christian\ntimes under Abyssinian or Persian overlordship. On the West lay Mecca\nand Medina (Yathrib), by an old caravan route; and Mecca in particular,\nwith its market safe-guarded by a temple, was the centre of a brisk\ntraffic. Lastly on the North, two semi-sovereign States had been formed\nunder Arab princes: towards Persia, the kingdom of the Lakhmids in\nHira; and towards Byzantium the dominion of the Gassanids in Syria. In\nspeech and poetry, however, the unity of the Arab nation was set forth\nto some extent even before Mohammed\u2019s time. The poets were the \u2018men of\nknowledge\u2019 for their people. Their incantations held good as oracles,\nfirst of all for their several tribes, but no doubt extending their\ninfluence often beyond their own particular septs.\n\n2. Mohammed and his immediate successors, Abu Bekr, Omar, Othman and\nAli (622\u2013661) succeeded in inspiring the free sons of the desert,\ntogether with the more civilized inhabitants of the coast-lands, with\nenthusiasm for a joint enterprise. To this circumstance Islam owes its\nworld-position: for Allah showed himself great, and the world was quite\nsmall for those who surrendered themselves to him (Muslims). In a short\ntime the whole of Persia was conquered, and the East-Roman empire lost\nits fairest provinces,\u2014Syria and Egypt.\n\nMedina was the seat of the first Caliphs or representatives of the\nprophet. Then Mohammed\u2019s brave son-in-law Ali, and Ali\u2019s sons, fell\nbefore Moawiya, the able governor of Syria. From that time dates the\nexistence of the party of Ali (Shi\u02bbites), which in the course of\ndiverse vicissitudes,\u2014now reduced to subjection, now in detached places\nattaining power,\u2014lives on in history, until it finally incorporates\nitself with the Persian kingdom in definite opposition to Sunnite\nIslam.\n\nIn their struggle against the secular power the Shi\u02bbites availed\nthemselves of every possible weapon,\u2014even of science. Very early there\nappears among them the sect of the Kaisanites, which ascribes to Ali\nand his heirs a superhuman secret lore, by the help of which the inner\nmeaning of the Divine revelation first becomes clear, but which demands\nfrom its devotees not less faith in, and absolute obedience to, the\npossessor of such knowledge, than does the letter of the Koran. (Cf.\nIII, 2 \u00a7 1).\n\n3. After the victory of Moawiya, who made Damascus the capital of the\nMuslim empire, the importance of Medina lay mainly in the spiritual\nprovince. It had to content itself with fostering, partly under Jewish\nand Christian influences, a knowledge of the Law and Tradition. In\nDamascus, on the other hand, the Omayyads (661\u2013750) conducted the\nsecular government. Under their rule the empire spread from the\nAtlantic to districts beyond the frontiers of India and Turkestan, and\nfrom the Indian Ocean to the Caucasus and the very walls of\nConstantinople. With this development, however, it had reached its\nfarthest extension.\n\nArabs now assumed everywhere the leading position. They formed a\nmilitary aristocracy; and the most striking proof of their influence is\nthe fact, that conquered nations with an old and superior civilization\naccepted the language of their conquerors. Arabic became the language\nof Church and State, of Poetry and Science. But while the higher\noffices in the State and the Army were administered by Arabs in\npreference, the care of the Arts and Sciences fell, first of all, to\nNon-Arabs and men of mixed blood. In Syria school-instruction was\nreceived from Christians. The chief seats of intellectual culture,\nhowever, were Basra and Kufa, in which Arabs and Persians, Muslims,\nChristians, Jews and Magians rubbed shoulders together. There, where\ntrade and industry were thriving, the beginnings of secular science in\nIslam must be sought for,\u2014beginnings themselves due to\nHellenistic-Christian and Persian influences.\n\n4. The Omayyads were succeeded by the Abbasids (750\u20131258). To obtain\nthe sovereignty, the latter had granted concessions to the Persians,\nand had utilized religio-political movements. During the first century\nof their rule (i.e. up to about 860), though only during that period,\nthe greatness of the empire continued to increase, or at least it held\nits own. In the year 762, Mansur, the second ruler of this house,\nfounded Bagdad as the new capital,\u2014a city which soon outshone Damascus\nin worldly splendour, and Basra and Kufa in intellectual illumination.\nConstantinople alone could be compared to it. Poets and scholars,\nparticularly from the North-Eastern provinces, met together in Bagdad\nat the court of Mansur (754\u2013775), of Harun (786\u2013809), of Mamun\n(813\u2013833), and others. Several of the Abbasids had a liking for secular\nculture, whether for its own sake or to adorn their court, and although\nthey may often have failed to recognize the value of artists and\nlearned men, these at any rate could appreciate the material benefits\nconferred upon them by their patrons.\n\nFrom the time of Harun at least, there existed in Bagdad a library and\na learned institute. Even under Mansur, but especially under Mamun and\nhis successors, translation of the scientific literature of the Greeks\ninto the Arabic tongue went forward, largely through the agency of\nSyrians; and Abstracts and Commentaries bearing upon these works were\nalso composed.\n\nJust when this learned activity was at its highest, the glory of the\nempire began to decline. The old tribal feuds, which had never been at\nrest under the Omayyads, had seemingly given place to a firmly-knit\npolitical unity; but other controversies,\u2014theological and metaphysical\nwranglings, such as in like manner accompanied the decay of the\nEast-Roman empire,\u2014were prosecuted with ever-increasing bitterness. The\nservice of the State, under an Eastern despotism, did not require men\nof brilliant parts. Promising abilities accordingly were often ruined\nin luxurious indulgence, or flung away upon sophistry and the show of\nlearning. On the other hand, for the defence of the empire the Caliphs\nenlisted the sound and healthy vigour of nations who had not been so\nmuch softened by over-civilization,\u2014first the Iranian or Iranianized\npeople of Khorasan, and then the Turks.\n\n5. The decline of the empire became more and more evident. The power of\nthe Turkish soldiery, uprisings of city mobs and of peasant labourers,\nShi\u02bbite and Ismaelite intrigues on all sides, and in addition the\ndesire for independence shown by the distant provinces,\u2014were either the\ncauses or the symptoms of the downfall. Alongside of the Caliphs, who\nwere reduced to the position of spiritual dignitaries, the Turks ruled\nas Mayors of the Palace; and all round, in the outlying regions of the\nempire, independent States were gradually formed, until an utterly\nastounding body of minor States appeared. The most influential ruling\nhouses, more or less independent, were the following: in the West, to\nsay nothing of the Spanish Omayyads (cf. VI, 1), the Aglabids of\nNorth-Africa, the Tulunids and Fatimids of Egypt, and the Hamdanids of\nSyria and Mesopotamia; in the East, the Tahirids and Samanids, who were\nby slow degrees supplanted by the Turks. It is at the courts of these\npetty dynasties that the poets and scholars of the next period (the\n10th and 11th centuries) are to be found. For a short time Haleb\n(Aleppo), the seat of the Hamdanids, and for a longer time Cairo, built\nby the Fatimids in the year 969,\u2014have a better claim to be regarded as\nthe home of intellectual endeavour than Bagdad itself. For another\nbrief space lustre is shed on the East by the court of the Turk, Mahmud\nof Ghazna, who had become master of Khorasan in the year 999.\n\nThe founding of the Muslim Universities also falls within this period\nof petty States and Turkish administration. The first one was erected\nin Bagdad in the year 1065; and from that date the East has been in\npossession of Science, but only in the form of stereotyped\nrepublications. The teacher conveys the teaching which has been handed\ndown to him by his teachers; and in any new book hardly a sentence will\nbe found which does not appear in older books. Science was rescued from\ndanger; but the learned men of Transoxiana, who, upon hearing of the\nestablishment of the first Madrasah, appointed a solemn memorial\nservice, as tradition tells, to be held in honour of departed science,\nhave been shewn to be correct in their estimate. [4]\n\nThen,\u2014in the 13th century,\u2014there came storming over the Eastern regions\nof Islam the resounding invasion of the Mongols, who swept away\nwhatever the Turks had spared. No culture ever flourished there again,\nto develope from its own resources a new Art or to stimulate a revival\nof Science.\n\n\n\n\n2. Oriental Wisdom.\n\n1. Prior to its contact with Hellenism, the Semitic mind had proceeded\nno farther in the path of Philosophy than the propounding of enigmas,\nand the utterance of aphoristic wisdom. Detached observations of\nNature, but especially of the life and fate of Man, form the basis of\nsuch thinking; and where comprehension ceases, resignation to the\nalmighty and inscrutable will of God comes in without difficulty. We\nhave become familiar with this kind of wisdom from the Old Testament;\nand that it was developed in like manner among the Arabs, is shewn to\nus by the Bible story of the Queen of Sheba, and by the figure of the\nwise Loqman in the Arab tradition.\n\nBy the side of this wisdom there was found everywhere the Magic of the\nsorcerer,\u2014a knowledge which was authenticated by command over outward\nthings. But it was only in the priestly circles of ancient\nBabylonia,\u2014under what influences and to what extent we do not precisely\nknow,\u2014that men rose to a more scientific consideration of the world.\nTheir eyes were turned from the confusion of earthly existence to the\norder of the heavens. They were not like the Hebrews, who never got\nbeyond the wondering stage [5], or who saw merely an emblem of their\nown posterity in the countless stars [6]; they resembled rather the\nGreeks who came to understand the Many and the Manifold in their\nsublunary forms, only after they had discovered the harmony of the All\nin the unity and steadiness of the movement of the heavens. The only\ndrawback was that much mythological by-play and astrological pretence\nwas interwoven with what was good, as in fact was the case also in\nHellenism. This Chaldaean wisdom, from the time of Alexander the Great,\nbecame pervaded, in Babylonia and Syria, with Hellenistic and later\nwith Hellenistic-Christian ideas, or else was supplanted by them. In\nthe Syrian city of Harran only, up to the time of Islam, the old\nheathenism held its ground, little affected by Christian influences.\n(Cf. I, 3, \u00a7 4).\n\n2. Of more importance than any Semitic tradition, was the contribution\nmade to Islam by Persian and Indian wisdom. We do not need to enter\nhere upon the question as to whether Oriental wisdom was originally\ninfluenced by Greek philosophy, or Greek philosophy by Oriental wisdom.\nWhat Islam carried away directly from Persians and Indians may be\nlearned with tolerable certainty from Arabic sources, and to this we\nmay confine ourselves.\n\nPersia is the land of Dualism, and it is not improbable that its\ndualistic religious teaching exercised an influence upon theological\ncontroversy in Islam, either directly or through the Manichaeans and\nother Gnostic sects. But much greater, in worldly circles, was the\ninfluence wielded by that system which, according to tradition, came to\nbe even publicly recognized, under the Sasanid Yezdegerd II\n(438/9\u2013457), viz. Zrwanism (Cf. III, 1, \u00a7 6). In this system the\ndualistic view of the world was superseded by setting up endless Time,\n(zrwan, Arab. dahr) as the paramount principle, and identifying it with\nFate, the outermost heavenly sphere or the movement of the heavens.\nThis doctrine, pleasing to philosophic intellects, has secured, with or\nwithout the guise of Islam, a prominent place for itself in Persian\nliterature and in the views of the people, up to our own day. By\ntheologians, however, and no less by philosophers of the Idealistic\nschools, it was disavowed as Materialism, Atheism and so forth.\n\n3. India was regarded as the true land of wisdom. In Arab writers we\noften come upon the view that there the birthplace of philosophy is to\nbe found. By peaceful trading, in which the agents between India and\nthe West were principally Persians, and next as a result of the Muslim\nconquest, acquaintance with Indian wisdom spread far and wide. Much of\nit was translated under Mansur (754\u2013775) and Harun (786\u2013809), partly by\nmeans of the intervening step of Persian (Pahlawi) versions, and partly\nfrom the Sanskrit direct. Many a deliverance of ethical and political\nwisdom, in the dress of proverbs, was taken over from the fables and\ntales of India, such as the Tales of the Panchatantra, translated from\nthe Pahlawi by Ibn al-Moqaffa in Mansur\u2019s time, and others. It was,\nhowever, Indian Mathematics and Astrology,\u2014the latter in combination\nwith practical Medicine and Magic,\u2014that mainly influenced the\nbeginnings of secular wisdom in Islam. The Astrology of the Siddhanta\nof Brahmagupta, which was translated from the Sanskrit, under Mansur,\nby Fazari assisted by Indian scholars, was known even before Ptolemy\u2019s\nAlmagest. A wide world, past and future, was thereby opened up. The\nhigh figures with which the Indians worked produced a powerful,\nperplexing impression upon the sober Muslim annalists, just as, on the\nother hand, Arab merchants, who in India and China put the age of our\ncreated world at a few thousand years, exposed themselves to the utmost\nridicule.\n\nNor did the logical and metaphysical speculations of the Indians remain\nunknown to the Muslims. These produced, however, much less effect on\nscientific development than did their Mathematics and Astrology. The\ninvestigations of the Indians, associated with their sacred books and\nwholly determined by a religious purpose, have certainly had a lasting\ninfluence upon Persian Sufism and Islamic Mysticism. But,\u2014once for\nall,\u2014Philosophy is a Greek conception, and we have no right, in\ndeference to the taste of the day, to allot an undue amount of space in\nour description to the childish thoughts of pious Hindoos. What has\nbeen advanced by these meditative penitents about the deceptive show of\neverything sensuous, may often possess a poetic charm, just as it\nagrees perhaps with those observations on the evanescence of all that\nis earthly, which the East had access to in Neo-Pythagorean and\nNeo-Platonic sources; but it has contributed just as little of\nimportance as these did, towards the explanation of phenomena or the\nawakening of the scientific spirit. Not the Indian imagination, but the\nGreek mind was needed to direct the reflective process to the knowledge\nof the Real. The best example of this is furnished by Arabic\nMathematics. In the opinion of those who know the subject best, almost\nthe only thing Indian in it is the Arithmetic, while the Algebra and\nthe Geometry are Greek, preponderatingly, if not exclusively. Hardly a\nsingle Indian penetrated to the notion of pure mathematics. Number,\neven in its highest form, remained always something concrete; and in\nIndian Philosophy knowledge in the main continued to be only a means.\nDeliverance from the evil of existence was the aim, and Philosophy a\npathway to the life of blessedness. Hence the monotony of this\nwisdom,\u2014concentrated, as it was, upon the essence of all things in its\nOne-ness,\u2014as contrasted with the many-branched science of the Hellenes,\nwhich strove to comprehend the operations of Nature and Mind on all\nsides.\n\nOriental wisdom, Astrology and Cosmology delivered over to Muslim\nthinkers material of many kinds, but the Form,\u2014the formative\nprinciple,\u2014came to them from the Greeks. In every case where it is not\nmere enumeration or chance concatenation that is taken in hand, but\nwhere an attempt is made to arrange the Manifold according to positive\nor logical points of view, we may conclude with all probability that\nGreek influences have been at work.\n\n\n\n\n3. Greek Science.\n\n1. Just as the commercial intercourse between India and China and\nByzantium was conducted principally by the Persians, so in the remote\nWest, as far even as France, the Syrians came forward as the agents of\ncivilization. It was Syrians who brought wine, silk &c. to the West.\nBut it was Syrians also who took Greek culture from Alexandria and\nAntioch, spreading it eastward and propagating it in the schools of\nEdessa and Nisibis, Harran and Gondeshapur. Syria was the true neutral\nground, where for centuries the two world-powers, the Roman and the\nPersian, came in contact with one another, either as friends or as\nfoes. In such circumstances, the Christian Syrians played a part\nsimilar to the one which in later days fell to the share of the Jews.\n\n2. The Muslim conquerors found the Christian church split up into three\nmain divisions,\u2014to say nothing of many sects. The Monophysite church,\nalongside of the Orthodox State-church, preponderated in Syria proper,\nand the Nestorian church in Persia. The difference between the\ndoctrinal systems of these churches was perhaps not without importance\nfor the development of Muslim Dogmatics. According to the teaching of\nthe Monophysites, God and Man were united in one nature in Christ,\nwhereas the Orthodox, and in a still more pronounced manner the\nNestorians, discriminated between a Divine nature and a human nature in\nhim. Now nature means, above everything, energy or operative principle.\nThe question, accordingly, which is at issue, is whether the Divine,\nand the human Willing and Acting are one and the same in Christ or\ndifferent. The Monophysites, from speculative and religious motives,\ngave prominence to the Unity in Christ their God, at the expense of the\nhuman element: The Nestorians, on the other hand, emphasized, in\ncontrast with the Divine element, all that is specially characteristic\nof human Being, Willing and Acting. The latter view, however, favoured\nby political circumstances and conditions of culture, offers freer play\nto philosophical speculations on the world and on life. In point of\nfact the Nestorians did most for the cultivation of Greek Science.\n\n3. Syriac was the language both of the Western and of the Eastern or\nPersian Church; but Greek was also taught along with it in the Cloister\nschools. Rasain and Kinnesrin must be mentioned as being centres of\nculture in the Western or Monophysite Church. Of more importance, at\nthe outset at least, was the school of Edessa, inasmuch as the dialect\nof Edessa had risen to the position of the literary language; but in\nthe year 489 the school there was closed because of the Nestorian views\nheld by its teachers. It was then re-opened in Nisibis, and, being\npatronized by the Sasanids on political grounds, it disseminated\nNestorian belief and Greek knowledge throughout Persia.\n\nInstruction in these schools had a pre-eminently Biblical and\necclesiastical character, and was arranged to meet the needs of the\nChurch. However, physicians or coming students of medicine also took\npart in it. The circumstance that they frequently belonged to the\necclesiastical order does not do away with the distinction between\ntheological study and the pursuit of secular knowledge. It is true that\naccording to the Syro-Roman code, Teachers (learned Priests) and\nPhysicians were entitled in common to exemption from taxation and to\nother privileges; but the very fact that priests were regarded as\nhealers of the soul, while physicians had merely to patch up the body,\nseemed to justify the precedence accorded to the former. Medicine\nalways remained a secular matter; and, by the regulations of the School\nof Nisibis (from the year 590), the Holy Scriptures were not to be read\nin the same room with books that dealt with worldly callings.\n\nIn medical circles the works of Hippocrates, Galen and Aristotle were\nhighly prized; but in the cloisters Philosophy was understood to be\nfirst of all the contemplative life of the ascetic, and \u201cthe one thing\nneedful\u201d was the only thing cared for.\n\n4. The Mesopotamian city of Harran, in the neighbourhood of Edessa,\ntakes a place of its own. In this city, especially when it began to\nflourish again after the Arab conquest, ancient Semitic paganism comes\ninto association with mathematical and astronomical studies and\nNeo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic speculation. The Harranaeans or\nSabaeans, as they were called in the 9th and 10th centuries, traced\ntheir mystic lore back to Hermes Trismegistus, Agathodaemon, Uranius\nand others. Numerous pseudepigraphs of the later Hellenism were adopted\nby them in good faith, and some perhaps were forged in their own\ncircle. A few of them became active as translators and learned authors,\nand many kept up a brisk scientific intercourse with Persian and Arab\nscholars from the 8th to the 10th century.\n\n5. In Persia, at Gondeshapur, we find an Institution for philosophical\nand medical studies established by Khosrau Anosharwan (521\u2013579). Its\nteachers were principally Nestorian Christians; but Khosrau, who had an\ninclination for secular culture, extended his toleration to\nMonophysites as well as to Nestorians. At that time, just as was the\ncase later at the court of the Caliphs, Christian Syrians were held in\nspecial honour as medical men.\n\nFarther, in the year 529, seven philosophers of the Neo-Platonic\nschool, who had been driven away from Athens, found a place of refuge\nat the court of Khosrau. Their experiences there, however, may have\nresembled those of the French free-thinkers of the 18th century at the\nRussian court. At all events they longed to get home again; and the\nking was sufficiently liberal-minded and magnanimous to allow them to\ngo, and in his treaty of peace with Byzantium of the year 549 to\nstipulate in their case for freedom of religious opinion. Their stay in\nthe Persian kingdom was doubtless not wholly devoid of influence.\n\n6. The period of Syriac translations of profane literature from the\nGreek extends perhaps from the 4th to the 8th century. In the 4th\ncentury collections of aphorisms were translated. The first translator,\nhowever, who makes his appearance avowing his name, is Probus, \u201cPriest\nand physician in Antioch\u201d (1st half of the 5th century?). Possibly he\nwas merely an expounder of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of\nthe Isagoge of Porphyry. Better known is Sergius of Rasain,\u2014who died at\nthe age of 70 or so, probably in Constantinople, about 536,\u2014a\nMesopotamian monk and physician, whose studies, which were probably\npursued in Alexandria itself, took in the whole range of Alexandrian\nscience, and whose translations not only embraced Theology, Morals and\nMysticism, but even Physics, Medicine and Philosophy. Even after the\nMuslim conquest the learned activity of the Syrians continued. Jacob of\nEdessa (circa 640\u2013708) translated Greek theological writings; but he\noccupied himself besides with Philosophy, and in answer to a question\nrelative thereto he pronounced that it was lawful for Christian\necclesiastics to impart the higher instruction to children of Muslim\nparents. There was thus a felt need of culture among the latter.\n\nThe translations of the Syrians, particularly of Sergius of Rasain, are\ngenerally faithful; but a more exact correspondence with the original\nis shewn in the case of Logic and Natural Science than in Ethical and\nMetaphysical works. Much that is obscure in these last has been\nmisunderstood or simply omitted, and much that is pagan has been\nreplaced by Christian material. For instance, Peter, Paul and John\nwould come upon the scene in room of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.\nDestiny and the Gods were obliged to give place to the one God; and\nideas like World, Eternity, Sin and the like were recast in a Christian\nmould. The Arabs, however, in subsequent times went to a much greater\nlength with the process of adaptation to their language, culture and\nreligion than the Syrians. This may perhaps be partly explained by the\nMuslim horror of everything heathen, but partly too by their greater\nfaculty of adaptation.\n\n7. Apart from a few mathematical, physical and medical writings, the\nSyrians interested themselves in two subjects,\u2014the first consisting of\nmoralizing collections of aphorisms, put together into a kind of\nhistory of Philosophy, and, generally, of mystical Pythagorean-Platonic\nwisdom. This is found principally in pseudepigraphs, which bear the\nnames of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plutarch, Dionysius and others. The\ncentre of interest is a Platonic doctrine of the Soul, subjected to a\nlater Pythagorean, Neo-Platonic, or Christian form of treatment. In the\nSyrian cloisters Plato is even turned into an oriental monk, who built\na cell for himself in the heart of the wilderness, far away from the\ndwellings of men, and after three years\u2019 silent brooding over a verse\nof the Bible was led to a recognition of the Tri-Unity of God.\n\nA second subject of interest was added, in Aristotle\u2019s Logic. Among the\nSyrians, and for a longer period among the Arabs also, Aristotle was\ncommonly known almost solely as a logician. This knowledge, just as in\nthe early scholasticism of the West, extended to the Categories, the\nHermeneutics, and the first Analytics as far as the Categorical\nFigures. They stood in need of the Logic in order to comprehend the\nwritings of Greek ecclesiastical teachers, since these, at least in\nform, were influenced thereby. But as they did not possess it complete,\nas little did they possess it pure. They had it before them only in a\nNeo-Platonic redaction, as may be seen, for example, from the work of\nPaulus Persa, which was written in Syriac for Khosrau Anosharwan. In\nthat work knowledge is placed above faith, and philosophy is defined as\nthe process by which the soul becomes conscious of its own inner\nessence, in which, like a God as it were, it sees all things.\n\n8. What the Arabs owe to the Syrians is expressed by this circumstance\namongst others,\u2014that Arab scholars held Syriac to be the oldest, or the\nreal (natural) language. The Syrians, it is true, produced nothing\noriginal; but their activity as translators was of advantage to\nArab-Persian science. It was Syrians almost without exception, who,\nfrom the 8th century to the 10th, rendered Greek works into Arabic,\neither from the older Syriac versions or from those which had been in\npart improved by them, and in part re-arranged. Even the Omayyad\nprince, Khalid ibn Yezid (died 704), who occupied himself with Alchemy\nunder the guidance of a Christian monk, is said to have provided for\ntranslations of works on Alchemy from Greek into Arabic. Proverbs,\nmaxims, letters, wills, and in short whatever bore on the history of\nphilosophy, were at a very early time collected and translated. But it\nwas not till the reign of Mansur that a commencement was made with the\ntranslation into Arabic\u2014partly from Pahlawi versions\u2014of those writings\nof the Greeks which deal with Natural Science, Medicine and Logic. Ibn\nal-Moqaffa, an adherent of Persian Dualism, took a leading part in this\ntask, from whom later workers must have marked themselves off by their\nterminology. None of his philosophical translations have come down to\nus. Other material too, belonging to the 8th century has gone amissing.\nThe earliest specimen of this work of translation which we possess\ndates from the 9th century, the time of Mamun and his successors.\n\nThe translators of the 9th century were, for the most part, medical\nmen; and Hippocrates and Galen were among the first to be translated\nafter Ptolemy and Euclid. But let us confine ourselves to Philosophy,\nin the narrower sense. A translation of the Tim\u00e4us of Plato is said to\nhave come from Yuhanna or Yakhya ibn Bitriq (in the beginning of the\n9th century), as well as Aristotle\u2019s \u2018Meteorology\u2019, the \u2018Book of\nAnimals\u2019, an epitome of the \u2018Psychology\u2019, and the tract \u2018On the World\u2019.\nTo Abdalmasikh ibn Abdallah Naima al-Himsi (circa 835) is to be\nascribed a rendering of the \u2018Sophistics\u2019 of Aristotle, in addition to\nthe Commentary of John Philoponus upon the \u2018Physics\u2019, as well as the\nso-called \u2018Theology of Aristotle\u2019,\u2014a paraphrased epitome of the Enneads\nof Plotinus. Qosta ibn Luqa al-Balabakki (circa 835) is said to have\ntranslated the Commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and John\nPhiloponus upon the \u2018Physics\u2019 of Aristotle, and in part, Alexander\u2019s\nCommentary on the \u2018De generatione et corruptione\u2019, as well as the\n\u2018Placita Philosophorum\u2019 of the Pseudo-Plutarch, and other works.\n\nThe most productive translators were Abu Zaid Honain ibn Ishaq\n(809?-873), his son, Ishaq ibn Honain (\u2020 910 or 911), and nephew\nHobaish ibn al-Hasan. Seeing that they worked together, there is a good\ndeal which is ascribed, now to the one and now to the other. Not a\nlittle material must have been prepared, under their oversight, by\ndisciples and subordinates. Their activity extended over the whole\nrange of the science of that day. Existing translations were improved,\nand new ones added. The father preferred to work at versions of medical\nauthors, but the son turned more to the rendering of philosophical\nmaterial.\n\nThe work of the translators was still proceeding in the 10th century.\nAmong those who especially distinguished themselves were Abu Bishr\nMatta ibn Yunus al-Qannai (\u2020 940), Abu Zakarya Yakhya ibn Adi\nal-Mantiqi (\u2020 974), Abu Ali Isa ibn Ishaq ibn Zura (\u2020 1008), and\nfinally, Abu-l-Khair al-Hasan ibn al-Khammar (born 942), a pupil of\nYakhya ibn Adi\u2019s, of whose writings, besides translations,\ncommentaries, and so forth, a tract is mentioned, on the Harmony\nbetween Philosophy and Christianity.\n\nFrom the time of Honain ibn Ishaq the activity of the translators was\nalmost wholly confined to Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian\nwritings, and to epitomes of them, to paraphrases of their contents and\nto commentaries upon them.\n\n9. These translators are not to be regarded as specially great\nphilosophers. Their work was seldom entered upon spontaneously, but\nalmost always at the command of some Caliph or Vizir or other person of\nnote. Outside of their own department of study, usually Medicine, they\nwere chiefly interested in Wisdom,\u2014that is, in pretty stories with a\nmoral, in anecdotes, and in oracular sayings. The expressions which we\nmerely bear with in intercourse, in narrative or on the stage, as being\ncharacteristic utterances with certain persons, were admired and\ncollected by these worthy people for the sake of the wisdom contained\nin them, or perhaps even for no more than the rhetorical elegance of\ntheir form. As a rule, those men continued true to the Christian faith\nof their fathers. The traditional story of Ibn Djebril gives a good\nidea both of their way of thinking and of the liberal-mindedness of the\nCaliphs. When Mansur wanted to convert him to Islam, he is said to have\nreplied: \u201cIn the faith of my fathers I will die: where they are, I wish\nalso to be, whether in heaven or in hell\u201d. Whereupon the Caliph\nlaughed, and dismissed him with a rich present.\n\nOnly a small portion has been saved of the original writings of these\nmen. A short dissertation by Qosta ibn Luqa on the distinction between\nSoul and Spirit (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, ruh), preserved in a Latin translation, has\nbeen frequently mentioned and made use of. According to it, the Spirit\nis a subtle material, which from its seat in the left ventricle of the\nheart animates the human frame and brings about its movements and\nperceptions. The finer and clearer this Spirit is, the more rationally\nthe man thinks and acts: there is but one opinion upon this point. It\nis more difficult, however, to predicate anything sure, and universally\nvalid, of the Soul. The deliverances of the greatest philosophers\noccasionally differ, and occasionally contradict each other. In any\ncase the Soul is incorporeal, for it adopts qualities, and, in fact,\nqualities of the most opposite nature at one and the same time. It is\nuncompounded and unchangeable, and it does not, like the Spirit, perish\nwith the body. The Spirit only acts as an intermediary between the Soul\nand the Body, and it is in this way that it becomes a secondary cause\nof movement and perception.\n\nThe statement which has just been given regarding the Soul is found in\nmany of the later writers. But by slow degrees, as the Aristotelian\nphilosophy thrusts Platonic opinions more and more into the background,\nanother pair of opposites come into full view. Physicians alone\ncontinue to speak of the importance of the \u2018ruh\u2019 or Spirit of Life.\nPhilosophers institute a comparison between Soul and Spirit or Reason\n(\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u02bbaql). The Soul is now reduced to the domain of the perishable,\nand sometimes, in Gnostic fashion, even to the lower and evil realm of\nthe desires. The rational Spirit,\u2014as that which is highest, that which\nis imperishable in man\u2014is exalted above the Soul.\n\nIn this notice, however, we are anticipating history: let us return to\nour translators.\n\n10. The most valuable portion of the legacy which the Greek mind\nbequeathed to us in art, poetry, and historical composition, was never\naccessible to the Orientals. It would even have been difficult for them\nto understand it, seeing that they lacked the due acquaintance with\nGreek life, and the relish for it. For them the history of Greece began\nwith Alexander the Great, surrounded with the halo of legend; and the\nposition which Aristotle held beside the greatest prince of ancient\ntimes must have assuredly conduced to the acceptance of the\nAristotelian philosophy at the Muslim court. Arab historians counted up\nthe Greek princes, on to Cleopatra, and then the Roman Emperors; but a\nThucydides, for example, was not known to them, even by name. Of Homer\nthey had not picked up much more than the sentence, that \u201cone only\nshould be the ruler\u201d. They had not the least idea of the great Greek\ndramatists and lyric poets. It was only through its Mathematics,\nNatural Science and Philosophy, that Greek antiquity could bring its\ninfluence to bear upon them. They had come to know something of the\ndevelopment of Greek Philosophy, from Plutarch, Porphyry and others, as\nwell as from the writings of Aristotle and Galen. A good deal of\nlegendary matter, however, was mingled with their information; and the\naccount which passed in the East, of the doctrines of the Pre-Socratic\nphilosophers can only be referred by us to the pseudepigraphs which\nthey consulted, or perhaps even to the opinions which had been\ndeveloped in the East itself, and which they endeavoured to support\nwith the authority of old Greek sages. But still, in every case, our\nthoughts must turn first of all to some Greek original.\n\n11. It may be affirmed generally that the Syro-Arabs took up the thread\nof philosophy, precisely where the last of the Greeks had let it fall,\nthat is, with the Neo-Platonic explanation of Aristotle, along with\nwhose philosophy the works of Plato were also read and expounded. Among\nthe Harranaeans, and for a long time in several Muslim sects, it was\nPlatonic or Pythagorean-Platonic studies which were prosecuted with\nmost ardour,\u2014with which much that was Stoic or Neo-Platonic was\nassociated. Extraordinary interest was taken in the fate of Socrates,\nwho had suffered a martyr\u2019s death in heathen Athens for his rational\nbelief. The Platonic teaching regarding the Soul and Nature exercised\ngreat influence. The Pythian utterance: \u201cKnow thyself\u201d,\u2014handed down as\nthe motto of the Socratic wisdom, and interpreted in a Neo-Platonic\nsense,\u2014was ascribed by the Muslims to Ali, Mohammed\u2019s son-in-law, or\neven put into the mouth of the Prophet himself. \u201cHe who knows himself,\nknows God his Lord thereby\u201d: this was the text for Mystic speculations\nof all kinds.\n\nIn medical circles and at the worldly court, the works of Aristotle\ncame more and more into favour, first of all of course the Logic and a\nfew things from the Physical writings. The Logic\u2014so they thought\u2014was\nthe only new thing the Stagyrite had discovered: in all the other\nsciences he agreed throughout with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras,\nSocrates and Plato. Accordingly Christian and Sabaean translators, and\nthe circle influenced by them, drew their psychologico-ethical,\npolitical and metaphysical instruction without hesitation from the\nPre-Aristotelian sages.\n\nWhat bore the names of Empedocles, Pythagoras &c., was, naturally,\nspurious. Their wisdom is traced either to Hermes or to other wise men\nof the East. Thus Empedocles must have been a disciple of King David\u2019s,\nand afterwards of Loqman the Wise: Pythagoras must have sprung from the\nschool of Solomon,\u2014and so on. Writings which are cited in Arabic works\nas Socratic are, in so far as they are genuine, Platonic dialogues in\nwhich Socrates appears. Their quotations from Plato\u2014not to speak of\nspurious writings\u2014have a more or less comprehensive range: they are\ntaken from the Apology, Krito, the Sophistes, Phaedrus, the Republic,\nPhaedo, Tim\u00e4us and the Laws. That does not mean, however, that they\npossessed complete translations of all these works.\n\nThis much is certain,\u2014that Aristotle did not reign as sole lord from\nthe very outset. Plato, as they understood him, taught the Creation of\nthe world, the Substantiality of the Spiritual, and the Immortality of\nthe Soul. That teaching did no harm to the Faith. But Aristotle, with\nhis doctrine of the Eternity of the World, and his less spiritualistic\nPsychology and Ethics, was regarded as dangerous. Muslim theologians of\nthe 9th and 10th centuries, from various camps, wrote therefore against\nAristotle. But circumstances altered. Philosophers arose by-and-by who\nrejected the Platonic doctrine of the One World-Soul, of which the\nsouls of men are only transient parts, and sought grounds for their\nhope of immortality from Aristotle who attributed so great a\nsignificance to the Individual Substance.\n\n12. The conception which was entertained of Aristotle in the period\nmost remote, is best shown by the writings which were foisted upon him.\nNot only did they get his genuine works with Neo-Platonic\ninterpretations attached to them,\u2014not only was the treatise: \u201cOn the\nworld\u201d unhesitatingly acknowledged as Aristotelian, but he was also\nregarded as the author of many late-Greek productions, in which a\nPythagorising Platonism or Neo-Platonism, or even a barren Syncretism\nwas quite frankly taught.\n\nLet us take here as our first example \u201cthe Book of the Apple\u201d [7],\nwherein Aristotle plays the same part as Socrates in the Phaedo of\nPlato. As his end draws near, the Philosopher is visited by some of his\ndisciples who find him in a cheerful frame of mind. This leads them to\nrequest their departing Master to give them some instruction about the\nEssence and Immortality of the Soul. Thereupon he discourses somewhat\nas follows:\u2014\u201cThe Essence of the Soul consists in knowing,\u2014in fact, in\nPhilosophy, which is the highest form of knowing. A perfect knowledge\nof the truth constitutes therefore the blessedness which after death\nawaits the soul which is devoted to knowing. And just as knowing is\nrewarded with a higher knowledge,\u2014so the punishment for not-knowing\nconsists in a deeper ignorance. And really, there is nothing in Heaven\nor Earth, after all, except knowing and not-knowing, and the recompence\nwhich these two severally bring with them. Farther,\u2014virtue is not\nessentially different from knowing; nor does vice differ essentially\nfrom not-knowing. The relation of virtue to knowing, or of vice to\nnot-knowing, is like that of water to ice: i.e. it is the same thing\nin a different form.\n\nIn knowing,\u2014which is the divine essence of the Soul,\u2014the Soul finds\nnaturally its only true joy, and not in eating and drinking and sensual\npleasure. For, sensual pleasure is a flame which merely warms for a\nshort time; but the thinking Soul,\u2014which longs for its deliverance from\nthe murky world of the senses,\u2014is a pure light that sheds a radiance\nfar and wide. The Philosopher therefore is not afraid of death, but\nmeets it gladly, when the Deity summons him. The enjoyment, which his\nlimited knowledge affords him here is a guarantee to him of the rapture\nwhich the unveiling of the great world of the Unknown will procure him.\nEven already he knows something of this, for it is only through\nknowledge of the invisible, that the proper estimate of the sensible,\non which he prides himself, is at all possible. He who comes to know\nhis own self in this life, possesses in that very knowledge of himself\nthe assurance of comprehending all things with an eternal knowledge,\u2014i.\ne. of being immortal.\u201d\n\n13. In the second place the so-called \u201cTheology of Aristotle\u201d may be\nreferred to. In it Plato is represented as the Ideal-Man, who gains a\nknowledge of all things by means of an intuitive thinking, and thus has\nno need of the logical resources of Aristotle. Indeed, the highest\nreality\u2014Absolute Being\u2014is not apprehended by thinking, but only in an\necstatic Vision. \u201cOften was I alone with my soul\u201d, says\nAristotle-Plotinus, on this point. \u201cDivested of the body, I entered as\npure substance into my proper self, turning back from all that is\nexternal to what is within. I was pure knowing there, at once the\nknowing and the known. How astonished I was to behold beauty and\nsplendour in my proper self, and to recognize that I was a part of the\nsublime Divine world, endowed even with creative life! In this\nassurance of self, I was lifted above the world of the senses, ay, even\nabove the world of spirits, up to the Divine state, where I beheld a\nlight so fair that no tongue can tell it, nor ear understand\u201d.\n\nThe soul forms the centre of the discussions in the \u2018Theology\u2019 also.\nAll true human science is science of the soul or knowledge of\nself,\u2014knowledge of its essence, it is true, coming first, and next in\norder, though less complete, knowledge of the operations of that\nessence. In such knowledge, to which exceedingly few attain, the\nhighest wisdom consists, which does not admit of being fully understood\nin the form of ideas, and which therefore the philosopher like a\nskilful artist and wise lawgiver represents, for us men, in ever\nbeautiful figures in religious service. In this function precisely, the\nwise man comes forward as the potent, self-sufficing magician, whose\nknowledge lords it over the multitude, seeing that they remain always\nbound in the fetters of outward things, of presentations and desires.\n\nThe soul stands in the centre of the All. Above it are God and\nIntelligence, beneath it\u2014Matter and Nature. Its coming from God through\nIntelligence into Matter, its presence in the body, its return on\nhigh\u2014these are the three stadia in which its life and that of the world\nrun their course. Matter and Nature, Sense-perception and Presentation\nhere lose their significance almost entirely. All things exist by\nIntelligence (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u02bbaql). Intelligence constitutes all things, and in\nIntelligence all things are One. The Soul too is Intelligence, but, so\nlong as it stays in the body, it is Intelligence in hope, Intelligence\nin the form of longing. It longs for what is above, for the good and\nblessed stars, which spend their contemplative existence as sources of\nlight, exalted above presentation and effort.\n\nThat then is the oriental Aristotle, as he was acknowledged by the\nearliest Peripatetics in Islam [8].\n\n14. We need not wonder that the Easterns did not succeed in reaching an\nunadulterated conception of the Aristotelian philosophy. Our critical\napparatus for discriminating between the genuine and the spurious was\nnot in their possession. It must have proved even more difficult for\nthem, to familiarize themselves with the world of Greek civilization,\nthan for the Christian scholars of the Middle Ages, which had never\nentirely lost living touch with antiquity. In the East men remained\ndependent on Neo-Platonic redactions and interpretations. A part of the\nscientific system, to wit, the Politics of Aristotle, was a-wanting;\nand so, as a matter of course, the Laws or the Republic of Plato took\nits place. Only a few were aware of the difference between the two.\n\nAnother determining motive deserves notice. In their Neo-Platonic\nsources even, the Muslims came upon a harmonizing exposition of the\nGreek philosophers, and they felt constrained to adopt it. The first\nadherents of Aristotle were bound to assume a polemical and apologetic\nattitude. In opposition to, or in conformity with, the voice of the\nMuslim community, they required a coherent philosophy, in which the One\nTruth must be found. The same reverence, which Mohammed in his day had\npaid to the sacred writings of the Jews and of the Christians, was\nshewn afterwards by Muslim scholars towards the works of Greek\nphilosophers; but these learned men exhibited greater familiarity with\ntheir models, and less originality. In their eyes the old philosophers\nwere invested with an authority, to which it was their duty to submit.\nThe earliest Muslim thinkers were so fully convinced of the superiority\nof Greek knowledge that they did not doubt that it had attained to the\nhighest degree of certainty. The thought of making farther and\nindependent investigations did not readily occur to an Oriental, who\ncannot imagine a man without a teacher as being anything else than a\ndisciple of Satan. In accordance, therefore, with the precedent set by\nHellenistic philosophers, an attempt had to be made to demonstrate the\nexistence of the harmony between Plato and Aristotle,\u2014and, in\nparticular, to shelve tacitly those doctrines which gave offence, or to\nexhibit them in a sense which was not too decidedly contrary to Muslim\nDogmatics. In order to humour the opponents of Aristotle or of\nPhilosophy in general, prominence was given to wise and edifying\nsayings out of the philosopher\u2019s works,\u2014both the genuine and the\nspurious,\u2014that so the way might be prepared for the reception of his\nscientific thoughts. To the initiated, however, the teaching of\nAristotle, like that of other schools and sects, was set forth as a\nhigher truth, to which the positive faith of the multitude and the more\nor less firmly established system of the theologians were merely\npreliminary steps.\n\n15. Muslim Philosophy has always continued to be an Eclecticism which\ndepended on their stock of works translated from the Greek. The course\nof its history has been a process of assimilation rather than of\ngeneration. It has not distinguished itself, either by propounding new\nproblems or by any peculiarity in its endeavours to solve the old ones.\nIt has therefore no important advances in thought to register. And yet,\nfrom a historical point of view, its significance is far greater than\nthat of a mere intermediary between classical antiquity and Christian\nScholasticism. To follow up the reception of Greek ideas into the mixed\ncivilization of the East is a subject of historical interest possessing\na charm entirely its own, especially if one can forget at the same time\nthat once there were Greeks. But the consideration of this occurrence\nbecomes important also by its presenting an opportunity for comparison\nwith other civilizations. Philosophy is a phenomenon so unique\u2014so\nthoroughly indigenous and independent a growth of Grecian soil\u2014that one\nmight regard it as being exempt from the conditions of general\ncivilized life, and as being explicable only per se. Now the History of\nPhilosophy in Islam is valuable, just because it sets forth the first\nattempt to appropriate the results of Greek thinking, with greater\ncomprehensiveness and freedom than in the early Christian dogmatics.\nAcquaintance with the conditions which made such an attempt possible,\nwill permit us to reach conclusions, by way of analogical\nreasonings\u2014though with precaution, and for the present at least, to a\nvery limited extent\u2014as to the reception of Graeco-Arab science in the\nChristian Middle Ages, and will perhaps teach us a little about the\nconditions under which Philosophy arises in general.\n\nWe can hardly speak of a Muslim philosophy in the proper sense of the\nterm. But there were many men in Islam who could not keep from\nphilosophizing; and even through the folds of the Greek drapery, the\nform of their own limbs is indicated. It is easy to look down on these\nmen, from the high watch-tower of some School-Philosophy, but it will\nbe better for us to get to know them and to comprehend them in their\nhistorical environment. We must leave to special research the tracing\nof each thought up to its origin. Our aim in what follows can be\nnothing more than to point out what the Muslims constructed out of the\nmaterials which were before them.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nII. PHILOSOPHY AND ARAB KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n1. Grammatical Science.\n\n1. By Muslim scholars of the 10th century the sciences were divided\ninto \u2018Arab Sciences\u2019 and \u2018Old\u2019- or \u2018Non-Arab Sciences\u2019. To the former\nbelonged Grammar, Ethics and Dogmatics, History and Knowledge of\nLiterature; to the latter Philosophy, Natural Science and Medicine. In\nthe main the division is a proper one. The last-named branches are not\nonly those which were determined the most by foreign influences, but\nthose too which never became really popular. And yet the so called\n\u2018Arab Sciences\u2019 are not altogether pure native products. They too arose\nor were developed in places in the Muslim empire where Arabs and\nNon-Arabs met together, and where the need was awakened of reflecting\non those subjects which concern mankind the most,\u2014Speech and Poetry,\nLaw and Religion,\u2014in so far as differences or inadequacies appeared\ntherein. In the mode in which this came about, it is easy to trace the\ninfluence of Non-Arabs, particularly of Persians; and the part taken by\nGreek Philosophy in the process asserts itself in ever-growing\nimportance.\n\n2. The Arabic language,\u2014in which the Arabs themselves took particular\ndelight, for its copious vocabulary, its wealth of forms and its\ninherent capability of cultivation,\u2014was peculiarly fitted to take a\nleading position in the world. If it is compared, for example, with the\nunwieldy Latin, or even with the turgid Persian, it is found to be\nspecially distinguished by the possession of short Abstract-forms,\u2014a\nproperty of great service in scientific expression. It is capable of\nindicating the finest shades of meaning; but just because of its richly\ndeveloped stock of synonyms, it offers temptations to deviate from the\nAristotelian rule,\u2014that the use of synonyms is not permissible in exact\nscience. A language so elegant, expressive, and difficult withal, as\nArabic was, necessarily invited much examination, when it had become\nthe polite language of the Syrians and the Persians. Above all, the\nstudy of the Koran, and the recital and interpretation of it demanded\nprofound attention to be devoted to the language. Unbelievers, also,\nmay have thought that they could point out grammatical errors in the\nsacred Book; and therefore examples were gathered out of ancient poems\nand out of the living speech of the Bedouins, to support the\nexpressions of the Koran. To these examples remarks were, no doubt,\nadded upon grammatical accuracy in general. On the whole, the living\nusage formed the standard, but in order to save the authority of the\nKoran, it was certainly not applied without artifice. This proceeding\nwas regarded, all the same, by simple believers, with a measure of\nsuspicion. Masudi tells us even of some grammarians from Basra, who,\nwhen on a pleasure trip, took to going through a Koran Imperative, and\nfor that reason(?) were soundly cudgelled by country folk engaged in\ndate-gathering.\n\n3. The Arabs trace their grammatical science, like so many other\nthings, to Ali, to whom is ascribed even Aristotle\u2019s tripartite\ndivision of speech. In reality the study began to be cultivated in\nBasra and Kufa. Its earliest development is involved in obscurity, for\nin the Grammar of Sibawaih (\u2020 786) we have a finished system,\u2014a\ncolossal work\u2014, which, like Ibn Sina\u2019s Canon of Medicine in after\ntimes, could only be explained by later generations as the production\nof many scholars working in collaboration. We are but ill-informed even\non the points of difference between the schools of Basra and Kufa. The\nBasra grammarians, like the school of Bagdad in subsequent times, must\nhave conceded a great influence to Qiyas (Analogy) in the determination\nof grammatical phenomena, while those of Kufa allowed many idiomatic\nforms which diverged from Qiyas. On this ground, to mark the contrast\nbetween the Basra grammarians and those of Kufa, the former were called\n\u2018the Logic people\u2019. Their terminology differed in detail from that of\nthe Kufa school. Many, whose heads had been turned by logic, in the\nopinion of the genuine Arabs, must have gone decidedly too far in their\ncaptious criticism of the language; but on the other side caprice was\nraised to the position of rule.\n\nIt was from no mere accident that the school of Basra was the first to\navail itself of logical resources. Generally speaking, it was at Basra\nthat the influence of philosophic doctrines first appeared, and among\nits grammarians were to be found many Shi\u02bbites and Mutazilites, who\nreadily permitted foreign wisdom to influence their doctrinal teaching.\n\n4. Grammatical science, in so far as it was not confined, to the\ncollecting of Examples, Synonyms &c., when so determined by the\nsubjects specially treated, was affected by the Aristotelian Logic.\nEven before the Muslim era, Syrians and Persians had studied the\ntreatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f11\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, with Stoic and Neo-Platonic additions. Ibn\nal-Moqaffa, who at first was intimate with the grammarian Khalil (v.\ninfra), then made accessible to the Arabs all that existed in Pahlawi\nof a grammatical or logical nature. In conformity therewith the various\nkinds of Sentences were enumerated,\u2014at one time five, at another eight\nor nine, as well as the three parts of speech,\u2014Noun, Verb and Particle.\nAfterwards some scholars, like Djahiz, included syllogistic figures\namong the Rhetorical figures; and in later representations there was\nmuch disputation about Sound and Idea. The question was discussed\nwhether language is the result of ordinance or a product of nature; but\ngradually the philosophic view preponderated, that it came by\nordinance.\n\nNext to Logic the influence of the preparatory or mathematical sciences\nfalls to be noticed here. Like the prose of ordinary intercourse and\nthe rhymes of the Koran, the verses of the poets were not only\ncollected but also arranged according to special principles of\nclassification,\u2014for example, according to metre. After Grammar Prosody\narose. Khalil (\u2020 791), the teacher of Sibawaih, to whom the first\napplication of Qiyas to grammatical science was attributed, is said\neven to have created metrical science. While language came to be\nregarded as the national, conventional element in poetry, the notion\nwas entertained that what was natural, and common to all populations,\nwould be found in their metre. Thabit ibn Qorra (836\u2013901) therefore\nmaintained, in his classification of the sciences, that metre was\nsomething essential, and the study of metre a natural science, and\ntherefore a branch of philosophy.\n\n5. Grammatical science, nevertheless, limited as it was to the Arabic\nlanguage, retained its peculiarities, upon which this is not the place\nto enter. At all events, it is an imposing production of the\nkeenly-observing and diligently-collecting Arab intelligence,\u2014a\nproduction of which the Arabs might well be proud. An apologist of the\n10th century, who was engaged in combating Greek philosophy, said: \u201cHe\nwho is acquainted with the subtleties and profundities of Arab poetry\nand versification, knows well that they surpass all such things as\nnumbers, lines and points, which are wont to be advanced in proof of\ntheir opinions, by people who idly dream that they are capable of\nunderstanding the essence of things. I cannot see the substantial\nadvantage of things like numbers, lines and points, if, in spite of the\ntrifling profit which may attend them, they do harm to the Faith and\nare followed by consequences, against which we have to invoke the help\nof God.\u201d Men would not have their delight in the minutiae of their\nlanguage disturbed by general philosophic speculations. Many a\nword-form, originating with the translators of foreign works, was held\nin detestation by purist Grammarians. The beautiful art of calligraphy,\nmore decorative in its nature than constructive, like Arabic art in\ngeneral, became developed in noble, delicate forms, and met with a\nwider expansion than scientific research into the language. In the very\ncharacters of the Arabic speech, we may still see the subtlety of the\nintelligence which formed them, although at the same time we may see a\nlack of energy, which is observable in the entire development of Arab\nculture.\n\n\n\n\n2. Ethical Teaching.\n\n1. The believing Muslim, in so far as custom did not maintain its\ndominion over him, had at first the Word of God and the example of His\nProphet as his rule of conduct and opinion. After the Prophet\u2019s death,\nthe Sunna of Mohammed was followed, in cases where the Koran gave no\ninformation,\u2014that is to say, men acted and decided, as Mohammed had\ndecided or acted, according to the Tradition of his Companions. But\nfrom the time of the conquest of countries in possession of an old\ncivilization, demands which were altogether new were made of Islam.\nInstead of the simple conditions of Arab life, usages and institutions\nwere met with there, in regard to which the Sacred Law gave no precise\ndirection, and to meet which no tradition or interpretation of\ntradition presented itself. Every day added thus to the number of\nindividual cases which had not been provided for, and yet about which\none had to come to a decision, whether according to custom, or his own\nsense of right. In the old-Roman provinces, Syria and Mesopotamia,\nRoman law must have long continued to exercise an important influence.\n\nThose jurists who attributed to their own opinion (Ra\u02bcy, opinio)\nalongside of the Koran and Sunna, a subsidiary authority to determine\nthe law, were called \u2018Adherents of the Ra\u02bcy\u2019. One of them, Abu Hanifa\nof Kufa (\u2020 767), the founder of the Hanifite School, became specially\nfamous. But even in Medina, before the appearance of the school of\nMalik (715\u2013795), as well as in that school, a harmless though\nrestricted deference was at first paid to the Ra\u02bcy. By slow degrees,\nhowever, and in the course of opposing a Ra\u02bcy which was becoming a\npretext for much arbitrariness, the view gained ground, that in\neverything the Tradition (hadith) respecting the Sunna of the Prophet\nwas to be followed. Thereupon traditions were collected from all\nquarters, and explained\u2014and in large numbers even forged\u2014; and a system\nof criteria to determine their genuineness was formed, which, however,\nlaid more stress upon the external evidence and the appropriateness of\nthe traditionary material than upon consistency and historic truth. As\na consequence of this development, the \u2018people of the Ra\u02bcy\u2019, who were\nchiefly located in Iraq (Babylonia), were now confronted by the\n\u2018Adherents of the Tradition\u2019, or the Medina school. Even Shafii\n(767\u2013820), the founder of the third school of Law, who in general held\nto the Sunna, was numbered with the partisans of Tradition, in\ncontradistinction no doubt to Abu Hanifa.\n\n2. Logic introduced a new element into this controversy,\u2014viz. Qiyas or\nAnalogy. There had been, of course, stray applications of Qiyas, even\nin earlier times; but, to lay down Qiyas as a principle, a foundation\nor a source of law,\u2014presupposed the influence of scientific reflection.\nAlthough the terms Ra\u02bcy and Qiyas may be used as synonyms, yet there is\nin the latter term, less suggestion of the presence and operation of\nindividual predilection than there is in Ra\u02bcy. The more one grew\naccustomed to employ Qiyas in grammatical and logical researches, the\nmore readily could he include this principle in the institutes of\njurisprudence, whether by way of reasoning from one instance to\nanother, or from the majority of instances to the remainder (i.e.\nanalogically), or by way of seeking rather for some common ground\ngoverning various cases, from which the conduct proper in a particular\ncase might be deduced (i.e. syllogistically) [9].\n\nThe application of Qiyas appears to have come into use, first and most\nextensively, in the Hanifite school, but afterwards also in the school\nof Shafii,\u2014though with a more limited range. In connection therewith,\nthe question\u2014whether language was capable of expressing the Universal,\nor could merely denote the Particular\u2014became important for ethical\ndoctrine.\n\nThe logical principle of Qiyas never attained to great repute. Much\nmore emphasis was laid,\u2014next to the Koran and the Sunna, the historic\nfoundations of the Law\u2014, upon the Idjma, that is, the Consensus of the\nCongregation of the faithful. The Consensus of the Congregation or,\npractically, of the most influential learned men in it,\u2014who may be\ncompared to the fathers and teachers of the Catholic Church,\u2014is the\nDogmatical principle, which, contested only by a few, has proved the\nmost important instrument in establishing the Muslim Ethical System.\nTheory, however, continues to assign a certain subordinate place to\nQiyas, as a fourth source of moral guidance, after Koran, Sunna and\nIdjma.\n\n3. The Muslim Ethical System (al-fiqh = \u2018the knowledge\u2019) take into\naccount the entire life of the believer, for whom the Faith itself is\nthe first of all duties. Like every innovation the system at first\nencountered violent opposition:\u2014commandment was now turned into\ndoctrinal theory, and believing obedience into abstruse pursuit of\nknowledge: that called for protestation alike from plain pious people\nand from wise statesmen. But gradually the \u2018knowing\u2019 men or men learned\nin the Law (ulam\u0101, or in the West, faqihs) were recognized as the true\nheirs of the prophets. The Ethical system was developed before the\nDoctrinal, and it has been able to hold the leading position up to the\npresent day. Nearly every Muslim knows something of it, seeing it is\npart of a good religious upbringing. According to the great\nChurch-father Gazali, \u2018the Fiqh\u2019 is the daily bread of believing souls,\nwhile the Doctrine is only valuable as a Medicine for the sick.\n\nWe are not called upon here to enter into the minutiae of the fine-spun\ncasuistic of the Fiqh. The main subject handled in it is an ideal\nrighteousness, which can never be illustrated in all its purity in our\nimperfect world. We are acquainted now with its principles, and with\nthe position which it holds in Islam. Let us merely add a brief notice\nof the division of moral acts which was formulated by ethical teachers.\nAccording to this classification there are:\n\n\n 1. Acts, the practice of which is an absolute duty and is therefore\n rewarded, and the omission of which is punished:\n 2. Acts which are recommended by the Law, and are the subject of\n reward, but the neglect of which does not call for punishment:\n 3. Acts which are permitted, but which in the eyes of the Law are a\n matter of indifference:\n 4. Acts which the Law disapproves of, but does not hold as\n punishable:\n 5. Acts which are forbidden by the Law and which demand\n unconditional punishment [10].\n\n\n4. Greek philosophic enquiries have had a two-fold influence upon the\nEthics of Islam. With many of the sectaries and mystics, both orthodox\nand heretic, an ascetic system of Ethics is found, coloured by\nPythagorean-Platonic views. The same thing appears with philosophers,\nwhom we shall afterwards meet again. But in orthodox circles the\nAristotelian deliverance,\u2014that virtue consists in the just mean\u2014, found\nmuch acceptance, because something similar stood in the Koran, and\nbecause, generally, the tendency of Islam was a catholic one,\u2014one\nconciliatory of opposites.\n\nMore attention indeed was given to Politics than to Ethics, in the\nMuslim empire, and the struggles of political parties were the first\nthing to occasion difference of opinion. Disputes about the Im\u00e2mat,\ni.e. the headship in the Muslim Church, pervade the entire history of\nIslam; but the questions discussed have commonly more of a personal and\npractical than a theoretical importance, and therefore a history of\nphilosophy does not need to consider them very fully. Hardly anything\nof philosophic value emerges in them. Even in the course of the first\ncenturies there was developed a firm body of constitutional law\ncanonically expressed; but this, like the ideal system of duty, was not\nparticularly heeded by strong rulers,\u2014who viewed it as mere theological\nbrooding,\u2014while, on the other hand, by weak princes it could not be\napplied at all.\n\nJust as little is it worth our while to examine minutely the numerous\n\u2018mirrors of Princes\u2019, which were such favourites, in Persia especially,\nand in whose wise moral saws, and maxims of political sagacity, the\ncourtly circles found edification.\n\nThe weight of philosophic endeavour in Islam lies on the theoretical\nand intellectual side. With the actual proceedings of social and\npolitical life they are able to make but a scanty compromise. Even the\nArt of the Muslims, although it exhibits more originality than their\nScience, does not know how to animate the crude material, but merely\nsports with ornamental forms. Their Poetry creates no Drama, and their\nPhilosophy is unpractical.\n\n\n\n\n3. Doctrinal Systems.\n\n1. In the Koran there had been given to Muslims a religion, but no\nsystem,\u2014precepts but no doctrines. What is contrary to logic\ntherein,\u2014what we account for by the shifting circumstances of the\nProphet\u2019s life, and his varying moods,\u2014was simply accepted by the first\nbelievers, without asking questions about the How and Why. But in the\nconquered countries they were faced by a fully-formed Christian\nDogmatic as well as by Zoroastrian and Brahmanic theories. We have laid\nfrequent stress already upon the great debt which the Muslims owe to\nthe Christians; and the doctrinal system has certainly been determined\nthe most by Christian influences. In Damascus the formation of Muslim\nDogmas was affected by Orthodox and Monophysite teaching, and in Basra\nand Bagdad rather perhaps by Nestorian and Gnostic theories. Little of\nthe literature belonging to the earliest period of this movement has\ncome down to us, but we cannot be wrong in assigning a considerable\ninfluence to personal intercourse and regular school-instruction. Not\nmuch was learned in the East at that time out of books, any more than\nit is to-day: more was learned from the lips of the teacher. The\nsimilarity between the oldest doctrinal teachings in Islam and the\ndogmas of Christianity is too great to permit any one to deny that they\nare directly connected. In particular, the first question about which\nthere was much dispute, among Muslim Scholars, was that of the Freedom\nof the Will. Now the freedom of the will was almost universally\naccepted by Oriental Christians. At no time and in no place perhaps was\nthe Will-problem\u2014first in the Christology, but afterward in the\nAnthropology\u2014so much discussed from every point as in the Christian\ncircles of the East at the time of the Muslim conquest.\n\nBesides these considerations which are partly of an a priori character,\nthere are also detached notices which indicate that some of the\nearliest Muslims, who taught the Freedom of the Will, had Christian\nteachers.\n\nA number of purely philosophic elements from the Gnostic systems, and\nafterwards from the translation-literature, associated themselves with\nthe Hellenistic-Christian influences.\n\n2. An assertion, expressed in logical or dialectic fashion, whether\nverbal or written, was called by the Arabs,\u2014generally, but more\nparticularly in religious teaching\u2014a Kalam (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), and those who\nadvanced such assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name was\ntransferred from the individual assertion to the entire system, and it\ncovered also the introductory, elementary observations on Method,\u2014and\nso on. Our best designation for the science of the Kalam is\n\u2018Theological Dialectics\u2019 or simply \u2018Dialectics\u2019; and in what follows we\nmay translate Mutakallimun by \u2018Dialecticians\u2019.\n\nThe name Mutakallimun, which was at first common to all the\nDialecticians, was in later times applied specially to the\nAntimutazilite and Orthodox theologians. In the latter case it might be\nwell, following the sense, to render the term by Dogmatists or\nSchoolmen. In fact while the first dialecticians had the Dogma still to\nform, those who came later had only to expound and establish it.\n\nThe introduction of Dialectics into Islam was a violent innovation, and\nit was vehemently denounced by the party of the Tradition. Whatever\nwent beyond the regular ethical teaching was heresy to them, for faith\nshould be obedience, and not,\u2014as was maintained by the Murdjites and\nMutazilites\u2014, knowledge. By the latter it was laid down without reserve\nthat speculation was one of the duties of believers. Even to this\ndemand the times became reconciled, for according to tradition the\nProphet had said already: \u2018The first thing which God created was\nKnowledge or Reason\u2019.\n\n3. Very numerous are the various opinions which found utterance in the\ndays even of the Omayyads, but especially in those of the early\nAbbasids. The farther they diverged from one another, the more\ndifficult it was for the men of the Tradition to come to an\nunderstanding with them; but gradually certain compact doctrinal\ncollections stood out distinctly, of which the rationalist system of\nthe Mutazilites, the successors of the Qadarites, was most widely\nextended, particularly among Shi\u02bbites. From Caliph Mamun\u2019s time down to\nMutawakkil\u2019s, it even received State recognition; and the Mutazilites,\nwho had been in earlier days oppressed and persecuted by the temporal\npower, now became Inquisitors of the Faith themselves, with whom the\nsword supplied the place of argument. About the same time, however,\ntheir opponents the Traditionalists commenced to build up a system of\nbelief. Upon the whole there was no lack of intermediary forms between\nthe naive Faith of the multitude and the Gnosis of the dialecticians.\nIn contrast to the spiritualistic stamp of Mutazilitism these\nintermediary forms took an anthropomorphic character with regard to the\ndoctrine of the Deity, and a materialistic character with regard to the\ntheory of man and the universe (Anthropology and Cosmology). The soul,\nfor example, was conceived of by them as corporeal, or as an accident\nof the body, and the Divine Essence was imagined as a human body. The\nreligious teaching and art of the Muslims were greatly averse to the\nsymbolical God-Father of the Christians, but there was an abundance of\nabsurd speculations about the form of Allah. Some went so far as to\nascribe to him all the bodily members together, with the exception of\nthe beard and other privileges of oriental manhood.\n\nIt is impossible to discuss in detail all the Dialectic sects, which\noften made their first appearance in the form of political parties.\nFrom the standpoint of the history of Philosophy it is enough to give\nhere the chief doctrines of the Mutazilites, in so far as they can lay\nclaim to general interest.\n\n4. The first question, then, concerned man\u2019s conduct and destiny. The\nforerunners of the Mutazilites, who were called Qadarites, taught the\nFreedom of the human Will; and the Mutazilites, even in later times,\nwhen their speculations were directed more to theologico-metaphysical\nproblems, were first and foremost pointed to as the supporters of the\ndoctrine of Divine Righteousness,\u2014which gives rise to no evil, and\nrewards or punishes man according to his deserts\u2014, and, in the second\nplace, as the confessors, or avowed supporters of the Unity of God,\ni.e. the absence of properties from his Essence considered per se [or\nthe predicateless character of the essential nature of God]. The\nsystematic statement of their doctrines must have been influenced by\nthe Logicians (v. IV, 2 \u00a7 1); for even in the first half of the 10th\ncentury, the Mutazilite system began with the confession of the Unity\nof God, while the doctrine of God\u2019s Righteousness, announced as it is\nin all his works, is relegated to the second place.\n\nThe responsibility of man, as well as the holiness of God, who is\nincapable of directly causing man\u2019s sinful actions, had to be saved by\nasserting the freedom of the Will. Man must therefore be lord of his\nactions; but he is lord of these only, for few entertained any doubt\nthat the energy which confers ability to act at all, and the power of\ndoing either a good or a bad action come to man from God. Hence the\nnumerous subtle discussions,\u2014amalgamated with a criticism of the\nphilosophic conception of Time\u2014on the question whether the power, which\nGod creates in man, is bestowed previous to the action, or\ncoincidentally and simultaneously therewith: For, did the power precede\nthe act, then it would either have to last up to the time of the act,\nwhich would belie its accidental character (cf. II, 3 \u00a7 12), or have\nceased to exist before the act,\u2014in which case it might have been\ndispensed with altogether.\n\nFrom human conduct speculation passed on to consider the operations of\nnature. Instead of God and man, the antithesis in this case is God and\nnature. The productive and generative powers of nature were recognized\nas means or proximate causes; and some endeavoured to investigate them.\nIn their opinion, however, nature herself, like all the world, was a\nwork of God, a creature of his wisdom: And just as the omnipotence of\nGod was limited in the moral kingdom by his holiness or\nrighteousness,\u2014so in the natural world it was limited by his wisdom.\nEven the presence of evil and mischief in the world was accounted for\nby the wisdom of God, who sends everything for the best. A production\nor object of Divine activity, evil is not. \u201cGod may be able,\nindeed,\u201d\u2014so an earlier generation had maintained\u2014\u201cto act wickedly and\nunreasonably, but he would not do it.\u201d The later Mutazilites taught, on\nthe other hand, that God has no power at all to do anything which is in\nthis way repugnant to his nature. Their opponents, who regarded God\u2019s\nunlimited might and unfathomable will as directly operative in all\ndoing and effecting were indignant at this teaching, and compared its\npropounders to the dualistic Magians. Consistent Monism was on the side\nof these opponents, who did not care to turn man and nature into\ncreators\u2014next to and under God\u2014of their acts or operations.\n\n5. The Mutazilites, it is clear from the foregoing, had a different\nidea of God from that which was entertained by the multitude and by the\nTraditionalists. This became specially evident, as speculation\nadvanced, in the doctrine of the Divine attributes. From the very\nbeginning the Unity of God was strongly emphasized in Islam; but that\ndid not prevent men from bestowing upon him many beautiful names\nfollowing human analogy, and ascribing to him several attributes. Of\nthese the following came gradually into greatest prominence, under the\ninfluence assuredly of Christian dogmatics:\u2014viz.: Wisdom, Power, Life,\nWill, Speech or Word, Sight and Hearing. The last two of these\u2014Sight\nand Hearing\u2014were the first to be explained in a spiritual sense, or\nentirely set aside. But the absolute Unity of the Godhead did not\nappear to be compatible with any plurality of co-eternal attributes.\nWould not that be the Trinity of the Christians, who before now had\nexplained the three Persons of the One Divine Being as attributes? In\norder to avoid this inconvenience they sought sometimes to derive\nseveral attributes out of others by a process of abstraction, and to\nrefer them to a single one\u2014for instance to Knowledge or Power\u2014and\nsometimes to apprehend them each and all as being states of the Divine\nessence, or to identify them with the essence itself, in which case of\ncourse their significance nearly disappeared. Occasionally an attempt\nwas made through refinements of phraseology to save something of that\nsignificance. While, for example, a philosopher, denying the\nattributes, maintained that God is by his essence a Being who knows, a\nMutazilite dialectian expressed it thus: God is a Being who knows, but\nby means of a knowledge, which He himself is.\n\nIn the opinion of the Traditionalists the conception of God was in this\nway being robbed of all its contents. The Mutazilites hardly got beyond\nnegative determinations,\u2014that God is not like the things of this\nworld,\u2014that he is exalted above Space, Time, Movement, and so on; but\nthey held fast to the doctrine that he is the Creator of the world.\nAlthough little could be asserted regarding the Being of God, it was\nthought he could be known from his works.\n\nFor the Mutazilites as well as for their opponents, the Creation was an\nabsolute act of God, and the existence of the world an existence in\ntime. They energetically combated the doctrine of the eternity of the\nworld,\u2014a doctrine supported by the Aristotelian philosophy, and which\nhad been widely spread throughout the East.\n\n6. We have already found \u2018Speech\u2019 or \u2018the Word\u2019, given as one of the\neternal attributes of God; and, probably by way of conformity with the\nChristian doctrine of the Logos, there was taught in particular the\neternity of the Koran which had been revealed to the Prophet. This\nbelief in an eternal Koran by the side of Allah, was downright\nidolatry, according to the Mutazilites; and in opposition thereto the\nMutazilite Caliphs proclaimed it as a doctrine accepted by the\nState,\u2014that the Koran had been created: Whoever denied this doctrine\nwas publicly punished. Now although the Mutazilites in maintaining this\ndogma were more in harmony with the original Islam than their\nopponents, yet history has justified the latter, for pious needs proved\nstronger than logical conclusions. Many of the Mutazilites, in the\nopinion of their brethren in the faith, were far too ready to make\nlight of the Koran, the Word of God. If it did not agree with their\ntheories, it received ever new interpretations. In actual fact reason\nhad more weight with many than the revealed Book. By comparing not only\nthe three revealed religions together, but these also with Persian and\nIndian religious teaching and with philosophic speculation, they\nreached a natural religion, which reconciled opposites. This was built\nup on the basis of an inborn knowledge, universally necessary,\u2014that\nthere is one God, who, as a wise Creator, has produced the world, and\nalso endowed Man with reason that he may know his Creator and\ndistinguish between Good and Evil. Contrasted with this Natural or\nRational Religion, acquaintance with the teaching of revelation is then\nsomething adventitious,\u2014an acquired knowledge.\n\nBy this contention the most consistent of the Mutazilites had broken\naway from the consensus of the Muslim religious community, and had thus\nactually put themselves outside the general faith. At first they still\nappealed to that consensus,\u2014which they were able to do as long as the\nsecular power was favourably disposed to them. That condition, however,\ndid not last long, and they soon learned by experience what has often\nbeen taught since,\u2014that the communities of men are more ready to accept\na religion sent down to them from on high, than an enlightened\nexplanation of it.\n\n7. Following up this survey let us take a closer view of one or two of\nthe most considerable of the Mutazilites, that the general picture may\nnot be wanting in individual features.\n\nLet us first glance at Abu-l-Hudhail al-Allaf, who died about the\nmiddle of the 9th century. He was a famous dialectician, and one of the\nfirst who allowed philosophy to exercise an influence on their\ntheological doctrines.\n\nThat an attribute should be capable of inhering in a Being in any way\nis not conceivable, in the opinion of Abu-l-Hudhail: It must either be\nidentical with the Being or different from it. But yet he looks about\nfor some way of adjustment. God is, according to him, knowing, mighty,\nliving, through knowledge, might and life, which are his very essence;\nand just as men had done even before this, on the Christian side, he\nterms these three predicates the Modi (wudjuh) of the Divine Being. He\nagrees also that hearing, seeing and other attributes are eternal in\nGod, but only with regard to the world which was afterwards to be\ncreated. Besides, it would be easy enough for him and for others, who\nwere affected by the philosophy of the day, to interpret these and\nsimilar expressions\u2014such as God\u2019s \u2018beholding\u2019 on the last day, [11]\u2014in\na spiritual sense, since generally they regarded seeing and hearing as\nspiritual acts. For example, Abu-l-Hudhail maintained that motion was\nvisible, but not palpable, because it was not a body.\n\nThe Will of God, however, is not to be regarded as eternal. On the\ncontrary, Abu-l-Hudhail assumes absolute declarations of Will as being\ndifferent both from the Being who wills and the object which is willed.\nThus the absolute Word of Creation takes an intermediate position\nbetween the eternal Creator and the transient created world. These\ndeclarations of God\u2019s Will form a kind of intermediate essence, to be\ncompared with the Platonic Ideas or the Sphere-spirits, but perhaps\nregarded rather as immaterial powers than as personal spirits.\nAbu-l-Hudhail distinguishes between the absolute Word of Creation and\nthe accidental Word of Revelation, which is announced to men in the\nform of command and prohibition, appearing as matter and in space, and\nwhich is thus significant only for this transient world. The\npossibility of living in accordance with the Divine word of revelation,\nor of resisting it, exists therefore in this life alone. Binding\ninjunction and prohibition presuppose Freedom of Will and capability of\nacting in accordance therewith. On the other hand in the future life\nthere are no obligations in the form of laws, and, accordingly, no\nlonger any freedom: everything there depends on the absolute\ndetermination of God. Nor will there be any motion in the world beyond,\nfor as motion has once had a beginning, it must, at the end of the\nworld, come to a close in everlasting rest. Abu-l-Hudhail, therefore,\ncould not have believed in a resurrection of the body.\n\nHuman actions he divides into Natural and Moral, or Actions of the\nmembers, and Actions of the heart. An action is moral, only when we\nperform it without constraint. The moral act is Man\u2019s own property,\nacquired by his own exertions, but his knowledge comes to him from God,\npartly through Revelation, and partly through the light of Nature.\n\nAnterior even to any revelation man is instructed in duty by Nature,\nand thus is fully enabled to know God, to discern Good from Evil, and\nto live a virtuous, honest and upright life.\n\n8. Noteworthy as a man and a thinker is a younger contemporary of\nAbu-l-Hudhail\u2019s, and apparently a disciple of his, commonly called\nAl-Nazzam, who died in the year 845. A fanciful, restless, ambitious\nman, not a consistent thinker, but yet a bold and honest one,\u2014such is\nthe representation of him given us by Djahiz, one of his pupils. The\npeople considered him a madman or a heretic. A good deal in his\nteaching is in touch with what passed among the Orientals as the\nPhilosophy of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (Cf. also Abu-l-Hudhail).\n\nIn the opinion of Nazzam God can do absolutely no evil thing; in fact\nhe can only do that which he knows to be the best thing for his\nservants. His omnipotence reaches no farther than what he actually\ndoes. Who could hinder him from giving effect to the splendid\nexuberance of his Being? A Will, in the proper sense of the term,\u2014which\ninvariably implies a need,\u2014is by no means to be attributed to God. The\nWill of God, on the contrary, is only a designation of the Divine\nagency itself, or of the commands which have been conveyed to men.\nCreation is an act performed once for all, in which all things were\nmade at one and the same time, so that one thing is contained in\nanother, and so that in process of time the various specimens of\nminerals, plants and animals, as well as the numerous children of Adam,\ngradually emerge from their latent condition and come to the light.\n\nNazzam, like the philosophers, rejects the theory of atoms (v. II, 3 \u00a7\n12), but then he can only account for the traversing of a definite\ndistance, by reason of the infinite divisibility of space, by\npostulating leaps. He holds bodily substances to be composed of\n\u2018accidents\u2019 instead of atoms. And just as Abu-l-Hudhail could not\nconceive of the inherence of attributes in an essence, so Nazzam can\nonly imagine the accident as the substance itself or as a part of the\nsubstance. Thus \u2018Fire\u2019 or \u2018the Warm\u2019, for instance, exists in a latent\ncondition in wood, but it becomes free when, by means of friction, its\nantagonist \u2018the Cold\u2019 disappears. In the process there occurs a motion\nor transposition, but no qualitative change. Sensible qualities, such\nas colours, savours and odours, are, in Nazzam\u2019s view, bodies.\n\nEven the soul or the intellect of Man he conceives to be a finer kind\nof body. The soul, of course, is the most excellent part of man: it\ncompletely pervades the body, which is its organ, and it must be termed\nthe real and true Man. Thoughts and aspirations are defined as\nMovements of the Soul.\n\nIn matters of Faith and in questions of Law Nazzam rejects both the\nconsensus of the congregation and the analogical interpretation of the\nLaw, and appeals in Shi\u02bbite fashion to the infallible Imam. He thinks\nit possible for the whole body of Muslims to concur in admitting an\nerroneous doctrine, as, for instance, the doctrine that Mohammed has a\nmission for all mankind in contradistinction to other prophets. Whereas\nGod sends every prophet to all mankind.\n\nNazzam, besides, shares the view of Abu-l-Hudhail as to the knowledge\nof God and of moral duties by means of the reason. He is not\nparticularly convinced of the inimitable excellence of the Koran. The\nabiding marvel of the Koran is made to consist only in the fact that\nMohammed\u2019s contemporaries were kept from producing something like to\nthe Koran.\n\nHe has certainly not retained much of the Muslim Eschatology. At least\nthe torments of hell are in his view resolved into a process of\nconsuming by fire.\n\n9. Many syncretistic doctrines, but all devoid of originality, have\ncome down to us from the school of Nazzam. The most famous man, whom it\nproduced was the elegant writer and Natural-Philosopher Djahiz (\u2020 869),\nwho demanded of the genuine scholar that he should combine the study of\nTheology with that of Natural Science. He traces in all things the\noperations of Nature, but also a reference in these operations to the\nCreator of the world. Man\u2019s reason is capable of knowing the Creator,\nand in like manner of comprehending the need of a prophetic revelation.\nMan\u2019s only merit is in his will, for on the one hand all his actions\nare interwoven with the events of Nature, and on the other his entire\nknowledge is necessarily determined from above. And yet no great\nsignificance appears to accrue to the Will, which is derived from\n\u2018knowing\u2019. At least Will in the Divine Being is quite negatively\nconceived of, that is, God never operates unconsciously, or with\ndislike to his work.\n\nIn all this there is little that is original. His ethical ideal is \u2018the\nmean\u2019, and the style of his genius is also mediocre. It is only in\ncompiling his numerous writings that Djahiz has shown any excess.\n\n10. With the earlier Mutazilites reflections on Ethics and Natural\nPhilosophy predominate; with those who come later Logico-metaphysical\nmeditations prevail. In particular Neo-Platonic influences are to be\ntraced here.\n\nMuammar, whose date cannot be accurately determined, although it may be\nset down as about the year 900, has much in common with those who have\njust been named. But he is far more emphatic in his denial of the\nexistence of Divine attributes, which he regards as being contradictory\nof the absolute unity of the Divine essence. God is high above every\nform of plurality. He knows neither himself nor any other being, for\n\u2018knowing\u2019 would presuppose a plurality in him. He is even to be called\nHyper-eternal. Nevertheless he is to be recognized as Creator of the\nworld. He has only created bodies, it is true; and these of themselves\ncreate their Accidents, whether through operation of Nature or by Will.\nThe number of these accidents is infinite, for in their essence they\nare nothing more than the intellectual relations of thought. Muammar is\na Conceptualist. Motion and Rest, Likeness and Unlikeness, and so on,\nare nothing in themselves, and have merely an intellectual or ideal\nexistence. The soul, which is held to be the true essence of Man, is\nconceived of as an Idea or an immaterial substance, though it is not\nclearly stated how it is related to the body or to the Divine essence.\nThe account handed down is confused.\n\nMan\u2019s will is free, and,\u2014properly speaking,\u2014Willing is his only act,\nfor the outward action belongs to the body (Cf. Djahiz).\n\nThe school of Bagdad, to which Muammar seems to belong, was\nconceptualist. With the exception of the most general predicates,\u2014those\nof Being and Becoming, it made Universals subsist only as notions or\nconcepts. Abu Hashim of Basra (\u2020 933) stood nearer to Realism. The\nattributes of God, as well as Accidents and Genus-notions in general,\nwere regarded by him as something in a middle position between Being\nand Not-Being: he called them Conditions or Modes. He designated Doubt\nas a requisite in all knowing. A simple Realist he was not.\n\nMutazilite thinkers indulged in dialectic quibbling even about\n\u2018Not-Being\u2019. They argued that Not-Being, as well as Being, must come to\npossess a kind of reality, seeing that it may become the subject of\nthought: at least man tries to think of \u2018Nothing\u2019 rather than not think\nat all.\n\n11. In the 9th century several dialectic systems had been formed in the\ncontest against the Mutazilites, one of which, viz. the Karramite\nsystem, held its ground till long after the 10th century. There arose,\nhowever, from the ranks of the Mutazilites a man whose mission it was\nto reconcile antagonistic views, and who set up that doctrinal system\nwhich was acknowledged as orthodox first in the East, and, later,\nthroughout the whole of Islam. This was Al-Ashari (873\u2013935), who\nunderstood how to render to God the things that are God\u2019s, and to man\nthe things that are man\u2019s. He rejected the rude anthropomorphism of the\nAntimutazilite dialecticians, and set God high above all that is bodily\nand human, while he left to the Deity his omnipotence, and his\nuniversal agency. With him Nature lost all her efficaciousness; but for\nman a certain distinction was reserved, consisting in his being able to\ngive assent to the works which were accomplished in him by God, and to\nclaim these as his own. Nor was Man\u2019s sensuous-spiritual being\ninterfered with: He was permitted to hope for the resurrection of the\nbody and the beholding of God. As regards the Koranic revelation,\nAshari distinguished between an eternal Word in God, and the Book as we\npossess it, which latter was revealed in Time.\n\nIn the detailed statement of his doctrines Ashari showed no originality\nin any way, but merely arranged and condensed the material given him,\u2014a\nproceeding which could not be carried out without discrepancies. The\nmain thing, however, was that his Cosmology, Anthropology and\nEschatology did not depart too far from the text of the Tradition for\nthe edification of pious souls, and that his theology, in consequence\nof a somewhat spiritualized conception of God was not altogether\nunsatisfactory even to men of higher culture.\n\nAshari relies upon the revelation contained in the Koran. He does not\nrecognize any rational knowledge with regard to Divine things that is\nindependent of the Koran. The senses are not in general likely to\ndeceive us, but on the other hand our judgment may easily do so. We\nknow God, it is true, by our reason, but only from Revelation, which is\nthe one source of such knowledge.\n\nAccording to Ashari, then, God is first of all the omnipotent Creator.\nFarther he is omniscient: he knows what men do and what they wish to\ndo: he knows also what happens, and how that which does not happen\nwould have happened, if it had happened. Moreover all predicates which\nexpress any perfection are applicable to God, with the proviso that\nthey apply to him in another and higher sense than to his creatures. In\ncreating and sustaining the world God is the sole cause: all worldly\nevents proceed continually and directly from him. Man, however, is\nquite conscious of the difference between his involuntary movements,\nsuch as shivering and shaking, and those which are carried out in the\nexercise of his will and choice.\n\n12. The most characteristic theory which the dialectic of the Muslims\nhas fashioned, is their doctrine of Atoms. The development of this\ndoctrine is still wrapped in great obscurity. It was advocated by the\nMutazilites but particularly by their opponents before the time of\nAshari. Our sketch shows how it was held in the Asharite school, where\npartly perhaps it was first developed.\n\nThe Atomic doctrine of the Muslim dialecticians had its source, of\ncourse, in Greek Natural Philosophy; but its reception and farther\ndevelopment were determined by the requirements of theological Polemic\nand Apologetic. The like phenomenon may be observed in the case of\nindividual Jews and among believing Catholics. It is impossible to\nsuppose that Atomism was taken up in Islam, merely because Aristotle\nhad fought against it. Here we have to register a desperate struggle\nfor a religious advantage, and one in which weapons are not chosen at\nwill: It is the end that decides. Nature has to be explained, not from\nherself but from some divine creative act; and this world must be\nregarded not as an eternal and divine order of things, but as a\ncreature of transient existence. God must be thought of and spoken of\nas a freely-working and almighty Creator, not as an impersonal cause or\ninactive primeval source. Accordingly, from the earliest times the\ndoctrine of the creation is placed at the apex of Muslim dogmatics, as\na testimony against the pagan-philosophical view of the eternity of the\nworld and the efficient operations of Nature. What we perceive of the\nsensible world,\u2014say these Atomists,\u2014is made up of passing \u2018accidents\u2019\nwhich every moment come and go. The substratum of this \u2018change\u2019 is\nconstituted by the (bodily) substances; and because of changes\noccurring in or on these substances, they cannot be thought of as\nthemselves unchangeable. If then they are changeable, they cannot be\npermanent, for that which is eternal does not change. Consequently\neverything in the world, since everything changes, has come into being,\nor has been created by God.\n\nThat is the starting-point. The changeableness of all that exists\nargues an eternal, unchangeable Creator. But later writers, under the\ninfluence of Muslim philosophers, infer from the possible or contingent\ncharacter of everything finite, the necessary existence of God.\n\nBut let us come back to the world. It consists of Accidents and their\nsubstrata,\u2014Substances. Substance and Accident or Quality are the two\ncategories by means of which reality is conceived. The remaining\ncategories either come under the category of Quality, or else are\nresolved into relations, and modifications of thought, to which,\nobjectively, nothing corresponds. Matter, as possibility, exists only\nin thought: Time is nothing other than the coexistence of different\nobjects, or simultaneity in presentation; and Space and Size may be\nattributed to bodies indeed, but not to the individual parts (Atoms),\nof which bodies are composed.\n\nBut, generally speaking, it is Accidents which form the proper\npredicates of substances. Their number in every individual substance is\nvery great, or even infinite as some maintain, since of any pair\nwhatever of opposite determinations,\u2014and these include negatives\nalso,\u2014the one or the other is attributable to every substance. The\nnegative \u2018accident\u2019 is just as real as the positive. God creates also\nPrivation and Annihilation, though certainly it is not easy to discover\na substratum for these. And seeing that no Accident can ever have its\nplace elsewhere than in some substance, and cannot have it in another\nAccident, there is really nothing general or common in any number of\nsubstances. Universals in no wise exist in individual things: They are\nConcepts.\n\nThus there is no connection between substances: they stand apart, in\ntheir capacity of atoms equal to one another. In fact they have a\ngreater resemblance to the Homoeomeries of Anaxagoras than to the\nextremely small particles of matter of the Atomists. In themselves they\nare non-spatial (without makan), but they have their position (hayyiz),\nand by means of this position of theirs they fill space. It is thus\nunities not possessing extension, but conceived of as points,\u2014out of\nwhich the spatial world of body is constructed. Between these unities\nthere must be a void, for were it otherwise any motion would be\nimpossible, since the atoms do not press upon one another. All change,\nhowever, is referred to Union and Separation, Movement and Rest.\nFarther operative relations between the Atom-substances, there are\nnone. The Atoms exist then, and enjoy their existence, but have nothing\nat all to do with one another. The world is a discontinuous mass,\nwithout any living reciprocal action between its parts.\n\nThe ancients had prepared the way for this conception by their theory,\namongst other things, of the discontinuous character of Number. Was not\nTime defined as the tale or numbering of Motion? Why should we not\napply that doctrine to Space, Time and Motion? The Dialecticians did\nthis; and the \u2018skepsis\u2019 of the older philosophy may have contributed\nits influence in the process. Like the substantial, corporeal\nworld,\u2014Space, Time and Motion were decomposed into atoms devoid of\nextension, and into moments without duration. Time becomes a succession\nof many individual \u2018Nows\u2019, and between every two moments of time there\nis a void. The same is the case with Motion: between every two\nmovements there is a Rest. A quick motion and a slow motion possess the\nsame speed, but the latter has more points of Rest. Then, in order to\nget over the difficulty of the empty space, the unoccupied moment of\ntime, and the pause for rest between two movements, the theory of a\nLeap is made use of. Motion is to be regarded as a leaping onward from\none point in space to another, and Time as an advance effected in the\nsame manner from one moment to another.\n\nIn reality they had no use at all for this fantastic theory of a Leap:\nit was a mere reply to unsophisticated questioning. With perfect\nconsistency they had cut up the entire material world, as it moves in\nspace and time, into Atoms with their Accidents. Some no doubt\nmaintained, that although accidents every moment disappear, yet\nsubstances endure, but others made no difference in this respect. They\ntaught that substances, which are in fact points in space, exist only\nfor a point of time, just like Accidents. Every moment God creates the\nworld anew, so that its condition at the present moment has no\nessential connection with that which has immediately preceded it or\nthat which follows next. In this way there is a series of worlds\nfollowing one another, which merely present the appearance of one\nworld. That for us there is anything like connection or Causality in\nphenomena proceeds from the fact that Allah in his inscrutable will\ndoes not choose either to-day or to-morrow to interrupt the usual\ncourse of events by a miracle,\u2014which however he is able at any moment\nto do. The disappearance of all causal connection according to the\nAtomistic Kalam is vividly illustrated by the classical instance of\n\u2018the writing man.\u2019 God creates in him,\u2014and that too by an act of\ncreation which is every moment renewed\u2014first the will, then the faculty\nof writing, next the movement of the hand, and lastly the motion of the\npen. Here one thing is completely independent of the other.\n\nNow if against this view the objection is urged, that along with\nCausality or the regular succession of worldly events, the possibility\nof any knowledge is taken away, the believing thinker replies, that\nAllah verily foreknows everything, and creates not only the things of\nthe world and what they appear to effect, but also the knowledge about\nthem in the human soul, and we do not need to be wiser than He. He\nknows best.\n\nAllah and the World, God and Man,\u2014beyond these antitheses Muslim\ndialectic could not reach. Besides God, there is room only for\ncorporeal substances and their accidents. The existence of human souls\nas incorporeal substances, as well as generally the existence of pure\nSpirits,\u2014both of which doctrines were maintained by philosophers, and,\nthough less definitely, by several Mutazilites,\u2014would not harmonize\nproperly with the Muslim doctrine of the transcendent nature of God,\nwho has no associate. The soul belongs to the world of body. Life,\nSensation, Rational endowment, are accidents, just as much as Colour,\nTaste, Smell, Motion and Rest. Some assume only one soul-atom:\nAccording to others several finer soul-atoms are mingled with the\nbodily atoms. At all events thinking is attached to one single Atom.\n\n13. It was not every good Muslim that could find mental repose in\ndialectic. The pious servant of God might yet, in another way, draw\nsomewhat nearer to his Lord. This need,\u2014existing in Islam at the very\noutset, strengthened too by Christian and Indo-Persian influences, and\nintensified under more highly developed conditions of\ncivilization,\u2014evoked in Islam a series of phenomena, which are usually\ndesignated as Mysticism or Sufism. [12] In this development of a Muslim\norder of Holy men, or of a Muslim Monkish system, the history of\nChristian monks and cloisters in Syria and Egypt, as well as that of\nIndian devotees, is repeated. In this matter then we have at bottom to\ndeal with religious or spiritual practice; but practice always mirrors\nitself in thought, and receives its theory. In order to bring about a\nmore intimate relationship with the Godhead, many symbolical acts and\nmediating persons were required. Such persons then endeavoured to\ndiscover the mysteries of the symbols for themselves and to disclose\nthem to the initiated, and to establish, besides, their own mediatory\nposition in the scale of universal being. In particular, Neo-Platonic\ndoctrines,\u2014partly drawn from the turbid source of the Pseudo-Dionysius\nthe Areopagite and the holy Hierotheos (Stephen bar Sudaili?)\u2014had to\nlend their aid in this work. The Indian Yoga too, at least in Persia,\nseems to have exercised considerable influence. For the most part\nMysticism kept within the pale of Orthodoxy, which was always sensible\nenough to allow a certain latitude to poets and enthusiasts. As regards\nthe doctrine that God works all in all, Dialecticians and Mystics were\nagreed; but extreme Mysticism propounded the farther doctrine that God\nis all in all. From this a heterodox Pantheism was developed, which\nmade the world an empty show, and deified the human Ego. Thus the Unity\nof God becomes Universal Unity; his universal activity Universal\nExistence. Besides God, there exist at the most only the attributes and\nconditions of the Sufi souls that are tending towards him. A psychology\nof feeling is developed by the Sufi teachers. In their view, while our\nconceptions come to the soul from without, and our exertions amount to\nthe externalizing of what is within, the true essence of our soul\nconsists in certain states or feelings of inclination and\ndisinclination. The most essential of all these is Love. It is neither\nfear nor hope, but Love that lifts us up to God. Blessedness is not a\nmatter of \u2018knowing\u2019 or of \u2018willing\u2019: it is Union with the loved one.\nThese Mystics did away with the world (as ultimately they did with the\nhuman soul) in a far more thorough-going fashion than the Dialecticians\nhad done. By the latter the world was sacrificed to the arbitrary\ncharacter of God in Creation; by the former to the illuminating, loving\nnature of the Divine Being. The confusing multiplicity of things, as\nthat appears to sense and conception, is removed in a yearning after\nthe One and Beloved being. Everything, both in Being and Thinking, is\nbrought to one central point. Contrast with this the genuine Greek\nspirit. In it a wish was cherished for a still greater number of\nsenses, to enable men to get a somewhat better acquaintance with this\nfair world. But these Mystics blame the senses for being too many,\nbecause their number brings disorder into their felicity.\n\nHuman nature, however, always asserts herself. Those men who renounce\nthe world and the senses, frequently run riot in the most sensual\nfantasies, till far advanced in life. We need not wonder after all,\nthat many troubled themselves very little indeed about religious\ndoctrine, or that the ascetic morality of the Sufis often went to the\nother extreme.\n\nThe task of following out in detail the development of Sufism, however,\nbelongs to the history of Religion rather than to the history of\nPhilosophy. Besides, we find the philosophical elements which it took\nup, in the Muslim philosophers whom we shall meet with farther on.\n\n\n\n\n4. Literature and History.\n\n1. Arabic Poetry and Annalistic were developed independently of the\nlearning of the schools. But as time went on, Literature and Historical\nComposition could not remain untouched by foreign influences. A few\nnotices, confirmatory of this statement, must suffice us here.\n\nThe introduction of Islam involved no break with the poetical tradition\nof the Arab race, such as had been occasioned by Christianity in the\nTeutonic world. The secular literature of the times even of the\nOmayyads handed down many wise sayings, partly taken from ancient\nArabic poetry, which rivalled the preachings of the Koran. Abbasid\nCaliphs, like Mansur, Harun and Mamun, had more literary culture than\nCharlemagne. The education of their sons was not confined to the\nreading of the Koran: it embraced acquaintance also with the ancient\npoets and with the history of the nation. Poets and literary men were\ndrawn to the courts and rewarded in princely fashion. In these\ncircumstances, Literature underwent the influence of scholarly culture\nand philosophical speculation, although, in most cases, in a very\nsuperficial manner. The result is specially exhibited in sceptical\nutterances, frivolous mockery of what is most sacred, and glorification\nof sensual pleasure. At the same time, however, wise sayings, serious\nreflections and mystic speculations made their way into the originally\nsober and realistic poetry of the Arabs. The place of the first natural\nfreshness of representation was now taken by a wearisome play on\nthoughts and sentiments, and even on mere words, metres and rhymes.\n\n2. The unpleasant Abu-l-Atahia (748\u2013828), in his effeminate poetry, is\nnearly always talking about unhappy love and a longing for death. He\ngives expression to his wisdom in the following couplet:\n\n\n \u201cThe mind guide thou with cautious hesitation:\n \u2019Gainst sin use the best shield, Renunciation\u201d.\n\n\nWhoever possesses any faculty for appreciating life and the poetry of\nNature will find little to enjoy in his world-renouncing songs; and\njust as little satisfaction will be afforded him in the verses of\nMutanabbi (905\u2013965), frightfully tedious in their contents, although\nepigrammatic in their form. And yet Mutanabbi has been praised as the\ngreatest Arabic poet.\n\nIn like manner people have unduly extolled Abu-l-Ala al-Maarri\n(973\u20131058) as a philosophic poet. His occasionally quite respectable\nsentiments and sensible views are not philosophy, nor does the affected\nthough often hackneyed expression of these amount to poetry. Under more\nfavourable conditions,\u2014for he was blind and not surpassingly rich,\u2014this\nman might perhaps have rendered some service in the subordinate walks\nof criticism as a philologist or a historical writer. But, in place of\nan enthusiastic acceptance of life\u2019s duties, he is led to preach the\njoyless abandonment of them, and to grumble generally at political\nconditions, the opinions of the orthodox multitude, and the scientific\nassertions of the learned, without being able himself to advance\nanything positive. He is almost entirely wanting in the gift of\ncombination. He can analyse, but he does not hit upon any synthesis,\nand his learning bears no fruit. The tree of his knowledge has its\nroots in the air, as he himself confesses in one of his letters, though\nin a different sense. He leads a life of strict celibacy and\nvegetarianism, as becomes a pessimist. As he puts it in his poems \u201call\nis but an idle toy: Fate is blind; and Time spares neither the king who\npartakes of the joys of life, nor the devout man who spends his nights\nin watching and prayer. Nor does irrational belief solve for us the\nenigma of existence. Whatever is behind those moving heavens remains\nhidden from us for ever: Religions, which open up a prospect there,\nhave been fabricated from motives of self-interest. Sects and factions\nof all kinds are utilized by the powerful to make their dominion\nsecure, though the truth about these matters can only be whispered. The\nwisest thing then is to keep aloof from the world, and to do good\ndisinterestedly, and because it is virtuous and noble to do so, without\nany outlook for reward\u201d.\n\nOther literary men had a more practical philosophy, and could make\ntheir weight more felt in the world. They subscribed to the wise\ndoctrine of the Theatre-Manager in Goethe\u2019s Faust: \u201cHe who brings much,\nwill something bring to many\u201d. The most perfect type of this species is\nHariri (1054\u20131122), whose hero, the beggar and stroller, Abu Zaid of\nSerug, teaches as the highest wisdom:\n\n\n \u201cHunt, instead of being hunted;\n All the world\u2019s a wood for hunting.\n If the falcon should escape you,\n Take, content, the humble bunting:\n If you finger not the dinars,\n Coppers still are worth the counting\u201d [13].\n\n\n3. The Annalistic of the ancient Arabs, like their Poetry, was\ndistinguished by a clear perception of particulars, but was incapable\nof taking a general grasp of events. With the vast extension of the\nempire their view was necessarily widened. First a great mass of\nmaterial was gathered together. Their historical and geographical\nknowledge was advanced by means of journeys undertaken to collect\ntraditions, or for purposes of administration and trade, or simply to\nsatisfy curiosity, more than it could have been by mere religious\npilgrimages. Characteristic methods of research, brought to bear upon\nthe value of tradition as a source of our knowledge, were elaborated.\nWith the same subtlety which they displayed in Grammar, they portioned\nout, in endless division and subdivision, the extended field of their\nobservation, in a fashion more truly \u2018arabesque\u2019 than lucid; and in\nthis way they formed a logic of history which must have appeared to an\noriental eye much finer than the Aristotelian Organon with its austere\nstructure. Their tradition,\u2014in authenticating which they were, as a\nrule, less particular in practice than in theory,\u2014was by many made\nequal in value to the evidence of the senses, and preferred to the\njudgment of the reason, which so easily admitted fallacious inferences.\n\nThere were always people, however, who impartially handed down\ncontradictory reports, alongside of one another. Others, although\nexhibiting consideration for the feelings and requirements of the\npresent, did not withhold their more or less well-founded judgment on\nthe past, for it is often easier to be discerning in matters of history\nthan in the affairs of the living world.\n\nNew subjects of enquiry came up, together with new modes of treatment.\nGeography included somewhat of Natural Philosophy, for example in the\ngeography of climate; while historical composition brought within the\nrange of its description intellectual life, belief, morals, literature\nand science. Acquaintance also with other lands and nations invited\ncomparison on many points; and thus an international, humanistic or\ncosmopolitan element was introduced.\n\n4. A representative of the humanistic attitude of mind is met with in\nMasudi, who died about the year 956. He appreciates, and is interested\nin, everything that concerns humanity. Everywhere he is learning\nsomething from the men he meets with: and in consequence the reading of\nbooks, which occupies his privacy, is not without fruit. But it is\nneither the narrow, everyday practices of life and religion, nor the\nairy speculations of Philosophy, that specially appeal to him. He knows\nwhere his strength lies; and up to the last, when he is spending his\nold age in Egypt, far from his native home, he finds his\nconsolation,\u2014the medicine of his soul,\u2014in the study of History. History\nfor him is the all-embracing science: it is his philosophy; and its\ntask is to set forth the truth of that which was and is. Even the\nwisdom of the world, together with its development, becomes the subject\nof History; and without it all knowledge would long since have\ndisappeared. For learned men come and go; but History records their\nintellectual achievements, and thereby restores the connection between\nthe past and the present. It gives us unprejudiced information about\nevents and about the views of men. Of course Masudi leaves it often to\nthe intelligent reader to find out for himself the due synthesis of the\nfacts and the individual opinion of the author.\n\nA successor of his, the geographer Maqdasi, or Muqaddasi, who wrote in\nthe year 985, deserves to be mentioned with high commendation. He\njourneyed through many countries, and exercised the most varied\ncallings, in order to acquaint himself with the life of his time. He is\na true Abu Zaid of Serug (cf. II, 4 \u00a7 2), but one with an object before\nhim.\n\nHe sets to work in critical fashion, and holds to the knowledge which\nis gained by research and enquiry, not by faith in tradition or by mere\ndeductions of the reason. The geographical statements in the Koran he\nexplains by the limited intellectual horizon of the ancient Arabs, to\nwhich Allah must have seen fit to adapt himself.\n\nHe describes then, sine ira et studio, the countries and races he has\nseen with own eyes. His plan is to set down, in the first place,\nresults gathered from his own experience and observation; next, what he\nhas heard from trustworthy people; and last of all what he has met with\nin books. The following sentences are extracted from his\ncharacterization of himself.\n\n\u201cI have given instruction in the common subjects of education and\nmorals: I have come forward as a preacher, and I have made the minaret\nof the mosque resound with the call to prayer. I have been present at\nthe meetings of the learned and the devotions of the pious. I have\npartaken of broth with Sufis, gruel with monks, and ship\u2019s-fare with\nsailors. Many a time I have been seclusion itself, and then again I\nhave eaten forbidden fruit against my better judgment. I associated\nwith the hermits of Lebanon, and in turn I lived at the court of the\nPrince. In wars I have participated: I have been detained as a captive\nand thrown into prison as a spy. Powerful princes and ministers have\nlent me their ear, and anon I have joined a band of robbers, or sat as\na retail-dealer in the bazaar. I have enjoyed much honour and\nconsideration, but I have likewise been fated to listen to many curses\nand to be reduced to the ordeal of the oath, when I was suspected of\nheresy or evil deeds\u201d.\n\nWe are accustomed at the present day to picture to ourselves the\nOriental as a being who, in contemplative repose, is completely bound\nto his ancestral faith and usages. This representation is not quite\ncorrect, but still it agrees better with the situation which now exists\nthan it does with the disposition of Islam in the first four centuries,\nfor during that period it was inclined to take into its possession not\nonly the outward advantages of the world, but also the intellectual\nacquisitions of Mankind.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIII. THE PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. Natural Philosophy.\n\n1. Euclid and Ptolemy, Hippocrates and Galen, some portion of\nAristotle, and, in addition, an abundant Neo-Platonic\nLiterature,\u2014indicate the elements of Arabic Natural Philosophy. It is a\npopular philosophy, which, chiefly through the instrumentality of the\nSabaeans of Harran, found acceptance with the Shi\u02bbites and other sects,\nand which in due course impressed not only court circles, but also a\nlarge body of educated and half-educated people. Stray portions of it\nwere taken from the writings of the \u201cLogician\u201d,\u2014Aristotle,\u2014e.g. from\nthe \u201cMeteorology\u201d, from the work \u201cOn the Universe\u201d, which has been\nattributed to him, from the \u201cBook of Animals\u201d, from the \u201cPsychology\u201d,\nand so on; but its general character was determined by\nPythagorean-Platonic teaching, by the Stoics, and by subsequent\nastrologers and alchemists. Human curiosity and piety were fain to read\nthe secrets of the Deity in the book of his Creation, and they\nproceeded in this search far beyond practical requirements, which\nmerely called for a little arithmetic to serve in the division of\ninheritances and in trade, and a little astronomy besides, to determine\nthe proper times for celebrating the functions of religion. Men\nhastened to gather wisdom from every quarter, and in so doing they\nmanifested a conviction, which Masudi accurately expressed, when he\nsaid: \u201cWhatever is good should be recognized, whether it is found in\nfriend or foe\u201d. Indeed Ali, the prince of believers, is reported to\nhave said: \u201cThe wisdom of the world is the believer\u2019s strayed sheep:\ntake it back, even though it come from the unbelieving\u201d.\n\n2. Pythagoras is the presiding genius of Mathematical study in Islam.\nGreek and Indian elements are mingled in it, it is true, but everything\nis regarded from a Neo-Pythagorean point of view. Without studying such\nbranches of Mathematics, as Arithmetic and Geometry, Astronomy and\nMusic, no one, they said, becomes a philosopher or an educated\nphysician. The Theory of Numbers,\u2014prized more highly than Mensuration,\nbecause it appeals less to the outward vision, and should bring the\nmind nearer the essence of things,\u2014gave occasion to the most\nextravagant puerilities. God is, of course, the great Unity, from whom\neverything proceeds, who himself is no number, but who is the First\nCause of Number. But above all, the number Four,\u2014the number of the\nelements and so on,\u2014was held in high favour by the philosophers; and\nby-and-by nothing in heaven or earth was spoken of or written about,\nexcept in sentences of four clauses and in discourses under four heads.\n\nThe transition from Mathematics to Astronomy and Astrology was rapid\nand easy. The old Eastern methods, which came into their hands,\ncontinued to be applied even by the court-astrologers of the Omayyads,\nbut with still greater thoroughness at the Abbasid court. In this way\nthey arrived at speculations which ran counter to the revealed Faith,\nand which therefore could never be approved of by the guardians of\nreligion. The only antithesis which existed for the Believer was\u2014God\nand the World, or this life and the next; but for the Astrologer there\nwere two worlds, one of the Heavens and another of the Earth, while God\nand the life beyond were in the far distance. According to the\ndifferent conceptions entertained of the relation which subsisted\nbetween the heavenly bodies and sublunary things, either a rational\nAstronomy was developed, or a fantastic Astrology. Only a few kept\nentirely free from Astrological delusions. As long, in fact, as the\nscience was dominated by the Ptolemaic system, it was easier for the\ncompletely uneducated man to jeer at what was absurd in it than it was\nfor the learned investigator to disprove the same. For the latter\nindeed this earth with its forms of life was a product of the forces of\nthe heavens, a reflection of celestial light, an echo of the eternal\nharmony of the Spheres. Those then who ascribed conception and will to\nthe Spirits of the stars and spheres, held them as the representatives\nof Divine providence, and thus traced to their agency both what is good\nand what is evil, seeking also to foretell future events from the\nsituation of their orbs, by means of which they bring their influence\nto bear upon earthly things in accordance with steadfast laws. Others,\nit is true, had their doubts about this secondary providence, on\ngrounds of experience and reason, or from the Peripatetic belief that\nthe blessed existences of the heavens are Spirits of pure intellect,\nexalted above conception and will, and in consequence above all\nparticularity that appeals to the senses, so that their providential\ninfluence is directed only to the good of the whole, but never can have\nreference to any individual occurrence.\n\n3. In the domain of Natural Science Muslim learned men collected a rich\nbody of material; but hardly in any case did they succeed in really\ntreating it scientifically. In the separate Natural sciences, the\ndevelopment of which we cannot follow up in this place, they clung to\ntraditional systems. To establish the wisdom of God and the operations\nof Nature,\u2014which was regarded as a power or emanation of the\nWorld-Soul,\u2014alchemistic experiments were instituted, the magical\nvirtues of talismans tested, the effects of Music upon the emotions of\nmen and animals investigated, and observations made on physiognomy,\nwhile attempts were also set on foot to explain the wonders of the life\nof sleep and of dreams, as well as those of soothsaying and prophecy,\n&c. As might be expected, the centre of interest was Man, as the\nMicrocosm which must combine in itself all the elements and powers of\nthe world together. The essential part of Man\u2019s being was held to be\nthe Soul; and its relation to the World-Soul, and its future lot were\nmade subjects of enquiry. There was also a good deal of speculation\nabout the faculties of the soul and their localization in the heart and\nthe brain. One or two adhered to Galen, but others went farther than he\ndid, and made out five inner senses corresponding to the five outer\nones,\u2014a theory which, along with similar natural mysteries, was traced\nto Apollonius of Tyana.\n\nObviously the most diverse attitudes towards religious doctrine were\npossible in the study of Mathematical and Physical Science. But the\npropaedeutic sciences, as soon as they came forward on their own\naccount, were always dangerous to the Faith. The assumption of the\neternity of the world, and of an uncreated matter in motion from all\neternity,\u2014was readily combined with Astronomy. And if the movement of\nthe Heavens is eternal, so too are, no doubt, the changes which take\nplace on earth. All the kingdoms of Nature then, according to many\nteachers, being eternal, the race of man is eternal also, wheeling\nround and round in an orbit of its own. There is therefore nothing new\nin the world: the views and ideas of men repeat themselves like\neverything else. All that can possibly be done, maintained or known,\nhas already been and will again be.\n\nAdmirable discourse and lamentation were expended upon this theme,\nwithout much advancing thereby the interests of Science.\n\n4. The science of Medicine, which on obvious grounds was favoured by\nthe ruling powers, appears to have proved somewhat more useful. Its\ninterests furnished one of the reasons, and not the least considerable,\nwhich induced the Caliphs to commission so many men to translate Greek\nauthors. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the teachings of\nMathematics and Natural Science, together with Logic, also affected\nMedicine intimately. The old-fashioned doctor was disposed to be\nsatisfied with time-honoured magical formulae, and other empirical\nexpedients; but modern society in the ninth century required\nphilosophical knowledge in the physician. He had to know the \u201cnatures\u201d\nof foods, stimulants or luxuries, and medicaments, the humours of the\nbody, and in every case the influence of the stars. The physician was\nbrother to the astrologer, whose knowledge commanded his respect,\nbecause it had a more exalted object than medical practice. He had to\nattend the lectures of the alchemist, and to practise his art in\naccordance with the methods of Mathematics and Logic. It was not enough\nfor the fanatics of education in the ninth century that a man had to\nspeak, believe and behave in accordance with Qiyas,\u2014that is to say,\nwith logical correctness: he must, over and above, submit to be treated\nmedically in accordance with Qiyas. The principles of Medicine were\ndiscussed in learned assemblies at the court of Wathik (842\u2013847) like\nthe foundations of Doctrine and Morals. The question, in fact, was\nasked, prompted by a work of Galen\u2019s, whether Medicine relies upon\ntradition, experience or rational knowledge, or whether on the other\nhand it derives its support from the principles of Mathematics and\nNatural Science by means of logical deduction (Qiyas).\n\n5. The Natural Philosophy, which has just been rapidly sketched,\nactually stood for Philosophy with the most of the scholars of the\nninth century, as contrasted with theological dialectic, and was styled\nPythagorean. It lasted even into the tenth century, when its most\nimportant representative was the famous physician Razi (\u2020 923 or 932).\nBorn in Rai he received a mathematical education and studied Medicine\nand Natural Philosophy with great diligence. He was averse to dialectic\nand was only acquainted with Logic as far as the categorical figures of\nthe First Analytics. After having practised as director of the hospital\nin his native city and in Bagdad, he entered upon his travels and\nresided at various princely courts, amongst others at the court of the\nSamanid Mansur ibn Ishaq, to whom he dedicated a work on Medicine.\n\nRazi has a high opinion of the medical profession and of the study\nwhich it demands. The wisdom of a thousand years, contained in books,\nhe prizes more than the experiences of the individual man gained in one\nshort life, but he prefers even these to deductions of the \u201cLogicians\u201d\nwhich have not been tested by experience.\n\nHe thinks that the relation between the body and the soul is determined\nby the soul. And seeing that in this way the circumstances and\nsufferings of the soul admit of being discerned by means of the\nphysiognomy, the medical man has to be at the same time a physician of\nthe soul. Therefore he drew up a system of spiritual medicine,\u2014a kind\nof Dietetic of the Soul. The precepts of Muslim law, like the\nprohibition of wine, and so on, gave him no concern, but his\nfreethinking seems to have led him into pessimism. In fact he found\nmore evil than good in the world, and described inclination as the\nabsence of disinclination.\n\nHigh though the value was which Razi put upon Aristotle and Galen, he\ndid not give himself any special trouble to gain a more profound\ncomprehension of their works. He was a devoted student of Alchemy,\nwhich in his view was a true art, based on the existence of a primeval\nmatter,\u2014an art indispensable to philosophers, and which, he believed,\nhad been practised by Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and\nGalen. In opposition to Peripatetic teaching he assumed that the body\ncontained in itself the principle of movement, a thought which might\ncertainly have proved a fruitful one in Natural Science, if it had been\nrecognized and farther developed.\n\nRazi\u2019s Metaphysic starts from old doctrines, which his contemporaries\nascribed to Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Mani and others. At the apex of his\nsystem stand five co-eternal principles,\u2014the Creator, the Universal\nSoul, the First or Primeval matter, Absolute Space, and Absolute Time\nor Eternal Duration. In these the necessary conditions of the actually\nexisting world are given. The individual sense-perceptions, generally,\npresuppose an existing Matter, just as the grouping of different\nperceived objects postulates Space. Perceptions of change farther\nconstrain us to assume the condition of Time. The existence of living\nbeings leads us to recognize a Soul; and the fact that some of these\nliving beings are endowed with Reason, i.e.\u2014have the faculty of\nbringing the Arts to the highest perfection,\u2014necessitates our belief in\na wise Creator, whose Reason has ordered everything for the best.\n\nNotwithstanding the eternity of his five principles, Razi thus speaks\nof a Creator and even gives a story of Creation. First then a simple,\npure, spiritual Light was created, the material of Souls, which are\nsimple, spiritual substances, of the nature of Light. That\nLight-material or Upper-world, from which souls descended, is also\ncalled Reason, or Light of the Light of God. The Light is followed by\nthe Shadow, from which the Animal Soul is created, for the service of\nthe Rational Soul. But simultaneously with the simple, spiritual light,\nthere existed from the first a composite form, which is Body, from the\nshadow of which now issue the four \u201cnatures\u201d, Warmth and Cold, Dryness\nand Moistness. From these four natures at last are formed all heavenly\nand earthly bodies. The whole process, however, is in operation from\nall eternity, without beginning in time, for God was never inactive.\n\nThat Razi was an astrologer is plain from his own utterances. The\nheavenly bodies consist indeed, according to him, of the same elements\nas earthly things, and the latter are continually exposed to the\ninfluences of the former.\n\n6. Razi had to maintain a polemical attitude in two directions. On the\none side he impugned the Muslim Unity of God, which could not bear to\nbe associated with any eternal soul, matter, space or time; and on the\nother side he attacked the Dahrite system, which does not acknowledge\nany Creator of the world. This system, which is frequently mentioned by\nMuslim authors, with due aversion of course, appears to have found\nnumerous representatives, though none of any importance. The adherents\nof the \u2018Dahr\u2019 (v. I, 2, \u00a7 2) are represented to us as Materialists,\nSensualists, Atheists, Believers in the transmigration of souls, and so\non; but we learn nothing more definite about their doctrines. In any\ncase the Dahrites had no need to trace all that exists to a principle\nwhich was of spiritual essence and creative efficiency. Muslim\nPhilosophy, on the other hand, did stand in need of such a principle,\nif it should only conform in some degree to the teaching of the faith.\nNatural Philosophy was not suited for the furtherance of this object,\nas it showed more interest in the manifold and often contrary\noperations of Nature than in the One Cause of all. Such aim was better\nattained by Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism, whose logico-metaphysical\nspeculations endeavoured to trace all existence to one highest\nexistence, or to derive all things from one supreme operative\nprinciple. But before we attend to this direction of thought, which\ncommenced to appear even in the ninth century, we have still to give\nsome account of an attempt to blend Natural Philosophy and the\nteachings of the Faith into a Philosophy of Religion.\n\n\n\n\n2. The Faithful Brethren of Basra.\n\n1. In the East, where every religion formed a State within the State, a\npolitical party invariably made its appearance in the additional\ncharacter of a religious sect, just to gain adherents in some way or\nother. As a matter of principle indeed, Islam knew no distinction\nbetween men,\u2014no caste or social standing. But property and education\nhave the same influence everywhere; and in their train degrees of piety\nand stages of knowledge began to be set up, according as a community or\nparty permitted of adjustment. Thus there arose secret societies having\ndifferent grades, of which the highest and perhaps the next highest\npossessed an esoteric doctrine, which borrowed a good deal from the\nNatural Philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreans. In furtherance of their\nobject, which was to conquer political power, every expedient was\nregarded as lawful. For the initiated the Koran was explained\nallegorically. They traced their mystic lore, it is true, back to\nprophets with Biblical and Koranic names, but heathen philosophers were\nat the bottom of it all. Philosophy was completely transformed into a\nmythology of politics. The high intelligences and souls, which\ntheoretic thinkers had recognized in the stars and planets, embodied\nthemselves in human beings for the work of actual Politics; and it was\ndeclared to be a religious duty to assist these embodied intelligences\nin the establishment of an earthly kingdom of righteousness. The\nassociations which acted in this way may best be compared to societies,\nwhich up to the days of Saint-Simonism and kindred phenomena in last\ncentury were wont to appear in countries where freedom of thought was\nrestricted.\n\nIn the second half of the ninth century Abdallah ibn Maimun, head of\nthe Karmatite party, was the originator of a movement of this kind. He\nwas a Persian oculist, trained in the school of the Natural\nPhilosophers. He proved able to associate both believers and\nfreethinkers in a confederacy to endeavour to compass the overthrow of\nthe Abbasid government. To the one set he was a conjurer, to the other\na pious ascetic or learned philosopher. His colours were white, because\nhis religion was that of the pure light, to which the soul was to\nascend after its earthly wanderings. The duties inculcated were\ncontempt for the body, disregard of the Material, community of goods\nfor all the confederate brethren, as well as self-surrender to the\nconfederacy, and fidelity and obedience to their chiefs, even to\ndeath,\u2014for the society had its grades. In accordance with the sequence\nof existence, viz., God, Reason, Soul, Space and Time, they conceived\nthe revelation of God to be made in history and in the constitution of\ntheir own brotherhood.\n\n2. The chief homes of Karmatite activity were Basra and Kufa. Now we\nfind in Basra in the second half of the tenth century a small\nassociation of men, whose confederacy aims at having four grades. We do\nnot know, to be sure, how far the brethren succeeded in realizing the\nideal organization of their confederacy. To the first grade belong\nyoung men of from 15 to 30 years of age, whose souls are being formed\nin the natural way: these must be completely submissive to their\nteachers. The second grade,\u2014from 30 to 40 years of age\u2014are introduced\nto secular wisdom, and receive an analogical knowledge of things. In\nthe third grade,\u2014from 40 to 50 years of age\u2014the Divine law of the world\nbecomes known in more adequate form: that constitutes the stage of the\nprophets. Finally, in the highest grade, when one is over 50 years old,\nhe comes to see the true reality of things, just like the blessed\nangels: he is exalted then above Nature, Doctrine and Law.\n\nFrom this brotherhood there has come down to us a\nprogressively-advancing Encyclopaedia of the Sciences of that day. It\nconsists of 51 (originally perhaps 50) treatises, the contents of which\nare of such varied nature and origin that the redactors or compilers\nhave not succeeded in establishing a complete harmony among them. In\ngeneral, however, there is found in this Encyclopaedia an eclectic\nGnosticism built on a foundation of Natural Science, and provided with\na political background. The scheme sets out with mathematical\nconsiderations, continually playing with numbers and letters, and\nproceeds through Logic and Physics,\u2014referring everything, however, to\nthe Soul and its powers,\u2014in order to approach at last, in a mystical\nand magical fashion, the knowledge of the Godhead. The whole\nrepresentation is that of the doctrine of a persecuted sect, with the\npolitical features peeping out here and there. We see also something of\nsuffering and struggle,\u2014something of the oppressions to which the men\nof this Encyclopaedia or their predecessors were exposed, and something\nof the hope they cherished and the patience they preached. They seek in\nthis spiritualistic philosophy, consolation or redemption: It is their\nreligion. \u2018Faithful to death,\u2019\u2014so runs the expression\u2014shall the\nbrethren be, for to meet death for a friend\u2019s welfare, is the true Holy\nwar. In life\u2019s pilgrimage through this world,\u2014thus the obligatory\njourney to Mecca is allegorized\u2014, one must aid the other by all the\nmeans in his power. The rich must communicate to others a share of\ntheir material goods, and the wise a share of their intellectual\npossessions. But yet knowledge, as we have it in the Encyclopaedia, was\nprobably reserved for initiated members of the highest grade.\n\nIt must be allowed, however, that this confraternity of the Faithful\nBrethren of Basra seems to have led a quiet existence, as perhaps was\nthe case also with a branch-settlement of theirs in Bagdad. The\nrelation of the Brethren to the Karmatites may have resembled that of\nthe more peaceful Baptists to the revolutionary Anabaptists of the\n\u2018King of Sion\u2019. [14]\n\nThe names of the following have been given to us by later writers, as\nhaving been members of the Brotherhood and collaborators of the\nEncyclopaedia, viz.: Abu Sulaiman Mohammed ibn Mushir al-Busti, called\nal-Muqaddasi; Abu-l-Hasan Ali ibn Harun al-Zandjani; Mohammed ibn\nAkhmed al-Nahradjuri; Al-Aufi and Zaid ibn Rifaa. In the time of their\nactivity the Caliphate had already been forced to make an entire\nsurrender of its secular power into the hands of the Shi\u02bbite dynasty of\nthe Buyids. Probably this circumstance was favourable to the appearance\nof an Encyclopaedia, in which Shi\u02bbite and Mutazilite doctrines together\nwith the results of Philosophy were comprehended in one popular system.\n\n3. The Brethren themselves avow their eclecticism. They wish to collect\nthe wisdom of all nations and religions. Noah and Abraham, Socrates and\nPlato, Zoroaster and Jesus, Mohammed and Ali are all prophets of\ntheirs. Socrates, and Jesus and his apostles, no less than the children\nof Ali, are honoured as holy martyrs of their rational faith. The\nreligious law in its literal sense is pronounced good for the ordinary\nman,\u2014a medicine for weak and ailing souls: the deeper philosophic\ninsight is for strong intelligences. Though the body is devoted to\ndeath, dying means rising again to the pure life of the Spirit, for\nthose who during their earthly existence have been awakened by means of\nphilosophic considerations out of careless slumber and foolish sleep.\nThis is impressed with endless repetition, by means of legends and\nmyths of later-Greek, Judaeo-Christian, Persian or Indian origin. Every\ntransitory thing is here turned into an emblem. On the ruins of\npositive religion and unsophisticated opinion a spiritualistic\nphilosophy is built up, embracing all the knowledge and endeavour of\nhuman kind, so far as these came within the Brethren\u2019s field of view.\nThe aim of their philosophizing is given as \u2018the assimilation of the\nsoul to God, in the degree possible for man\u2019.\n\nIn this scheme, the negative tendencies of the Brethren, are kept\nsomewhat in the background, for reasons which are quite intelligible.\nBut their criticism of human society and of positive religions is\nexhibited with least reserve in the \u2018Book of the Animal and the Man\u2019,\nin which the figurative dress makes it possible for them to represent\nanimals as saying what might he questionable if heard from a human\nmouth.\n\n4. The eclectic character of the scheme, and the far from systematic\nmethod adopted in its subdivisions render it difficult to give a\ncoherent exposition of the philosophy of the Brethren. But still the\nmost important tenets, though sometimes loosely connected, must here be\nset forth with a measure of order.\n\nThe mental activity of Man falls to be divided, according to the\nEncyclopaedia, into Art and Science. Now Science or Knowledge is the\nform assumed within the knowing soul by that which is known, or a\nhigher, finer, more intellectual mode of existence of whatever is\nrealized in outward substance. Art on the other hand consists in\nprojecting the form from the artist-soul into matter. Knowledge is\npotentially present in the soul of the disciple, but it becomes actual\nonly through the teaching activity of a master, who carries knowledge\nas a reality within his own mind. But whence did it come to the first\nmaster? The Brethren answer, that according to the philosophers he\ngained it by his own reflection, while, according to the theologians,\nhe received it through prophetic illumination; \u201cbut in our view there\nare various ways or instrumentalities by which knowledge may be\nattained. From the intermediate position of the soul, between the\nworlds of body and of mind it results that there are open to it three\nways or sources of knowledge. Thus by means of the senses the soul is\nmade acquainted with what is beneath it, and through logical inference\nwith what is above it, and finally with itself by rational\nconsideration or direct intuition. Of these kinds of knowledge the\nsurest and the most deserving of preference is knowledge of one\u2019s self.\nWhen human knowledge attempts to go farther than this, it proves itself\nto be limited in many ways. Therefore one must not philosophize\nstraight away about questions like the origin or the eternity of the\nworld, but make his first essays with what is simpler. And only through\nrenunciation of the world, and righteous conduct, does the soul lift\nitself gradually up to the pure knowledge of the Highest.\u201d\n\n5. After secular instruction in Grammar, Poetry and History, and after\nreligious education and doctrine, philosophic study should begin with\nthe mathematical branches. Here everything is set forth in\nNeo-Pythagorean and Indian fashion. Not only numbers but even the\nletters of the alphabet are employed in childish trifling. It was\nparticularly convenient for the Brethren that the number of letters in\nthe Arabic alphabet is 28, or 4 multiplied by 7. Instead of proceeding\naccording to practical and real points of view, they give the rein to\nfancy in all the sciences, in accordance with grammatical analogies and\nrelations of numbers. Their Arithmetic does not investigate Number as\nsuch, but rather its significance. No search is made for any more\nsuitable mode of expressing number in the case of phenomena; but things\nare themselves explained in accordance with the system of numbers. The\nTheory of number is Divine wisdom, and is above Things, for things are\nonly formed after the pattern of numbers. The absolute principle of all\nexistence and thought is the number One. The science of number,\ntherefore, is found at the beginning, middle, and end of all\nphilosophy. Geometry, with its figures addressing the eye, serves\nmerely to make it more easily understood by beginners, but Arithmetic\nalone is true and pure science. And yet Geometry too is divided into a\nsensible form of it which deals with lines, surfaces and solids, and a\npure or spiritual form which treats of the dimensions or properties of\nthings, such as length, breadth and depth. The object both of\nArithmetic and Geometry is to conduct the soul from the sensible to the\nspiritual.\n\nFirst of all then they lead us to consider the stars. Now the\nEncyclopaedia offers us, in its Astrology,\u2014and nothing else could be\nexpected\u2014teaching which is exceedingly fantastic and sometimes\nself-contradictory. The whole of it is pervaded by the conviction that\nthe stars not merely foretell the future, but directly influence or\nbring about every thing that happens beneath the moon. Fortune and\nmisfortune come equally from them. Jupiter, Venus and the Sun bring\nfortune; misfortune is brought, on the other hand, by Saturn, Mars and\nthe Moon; while the effects produced by the planet Mercury have in them\nboth bad and good. Mercury is the lord of education and science: we owe\nto him our knowledge, which comprises bad and good. In the same way too\nthe other planets have all their several spheres of influence; and man\nin the course of life, if he is not prematurely snatched away,\nexperiences successively the influences of the whole of the heavenly\nbodies. The Moon causes his body to grow and Mercury forms his mind.\nThen he comes under the sway of Venus. The Sun gives him family, riches\nor dominion; Mars, bravery and noble-mindedness. Thereupon, under the\nguidance of Jupiter, he prepares, by means of religious exercises, for\nthe journey to the world beyond, and he attains rest under the\ninfluence of Saturn. Many men, however, do not live long enough, or are\nnot enabled by circumstances, to develope their natural capacities in\nunbroken sequence. God therefore graciously sends them his prophets, by\nwhose teaching they may, even in a short time and under unfavourable\ncircumstances, form their natures completely.\n\n6. According to the Encyclopaedia, Logic is related to Mathematics. In\nfact just as Mathematics conducts from the sensible to the\nintellectual, so Logic takes an intermediate position between Physics\nand Metaphysics. In Physics we have to do with bodies; in Metaphysics,\nwith pure Spirits; but Logic treats of the ideas of the latter as well\nas of the representations of the former in our soul. Yet in range and\nimportance Logic is inferior to Mathematics. For the subject of\nMathematics is regarded not merely as an intermediary, but also as the\nessence of the All, while on the other hand Logic remains completely\nrestricted to psychic forms as an intermediary between body and mind.\nThings are regulated by numbers, but our presentations and ideas by\nthings.\n\nThe logical observations of the Brethren start from Porphyry\u2019s\nIntroduction, and the Categories, the Hermeneutics and the Analytics of\nAristotle. They present nothing original, or very little.\n\nTo the five terms of Porphyry, a sixth,\u2014the \u2018Individual\u2019\u2014is added, no\ndoubt for the sake of symmetry. Three of these,\u2014Genus, Species,\nIndividual,\u2014are then called Objective Qualifications and\nthree,\u2014Difference, Property, Accident\u2014Abstract or Conceptional\nQualifications. The Categories are Genus-conceptions, of which the\nfirst is Substance, the other nine denoting its Accidents. The whole\nsystem of Concepts is farther developed by a division into species. But\nbesides Division, there are three additional logical methods in use:\nAnalysis, Definition and Deduction. Analysis is the method for\nbeginners, because it permits a knowledge of what is individual. More\nsubtle, however, as disclosing to us what is spiritual,\u2014are Definition\nand Deduction, the former investigating the essential nature of\nSpecies, and the latter that of Genera. The Senses apprise us of the\nexistence of things; but acquaintance with the essence of things is\ngained by reflection. The information which is conveyed to us by the\nsenses is small, as it were the letters of the alphabet. Of greater\nimportance considerably are the principles of rational knowledge, just\nas words have more significance than letters; but the most important\nknowledge of all, lies in the propositions which have been derived from\nthose principles, and which the human mind gains for itself or\nappropriates, in contradistinction to that knowledge which Nature or\nthe Divine revelation has imparted to it.\n\n7. From God, the highest Being, who is exalted above all distinctions\nand oppositions both of the Material and the Spiritual, the whole world\nis derived by the path of Emanation. If now and again a Creation is\nspoken of, that is only to be understood as a form of adaptation to\ntheological language. The gradation then of the Emanations is exhibited\nas follows: 1. The Creative Spirit (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u02bbaql); 2. The Passive Spirit,\nor the All-Soul or World-Soul; 3. The First Material; 4. The Operative\nNature, a power of the World-Soul; 5. The Absolute Body, called also,\nthe Second Material; 6. The World of the Spheres; 7. The Elements of\nthe Sublunary World; 8. The Minerals, Plants and Animals composed of\nthese elements. These then are the eight Essences which,\u2014together with\nGod, the Absolute One, who is in everything and with\neverything\u2014complete the series of Original Essences corresponding to\nthe nine Cardinal Numbers.\n\nSpirit, Soul, Original Matter, and Nature are simple; but with Body we\nenter the realm of the Composite. Here all is composed of Matter and\nForm, or,\u2014to adopt another principle of division,\u2014of Substance and\nAccident. The first Substances are Matter and Form; the first Accidents\nor Properties, Space, Motion and Time, to which in the opinion of the\nBrethren may perhaps be added Tone and Light. Matter is one; all\nplurality and diversity come from the Forms. Substance is designated\nalso as the constitutive, material Form, while Accident is the\ncompleting, spiritual Form. The Encyclopaedia does not express itself\nclearly on these points. But in any case Substantiality is looked for\nrather in the Universal than in the Particular, and Form is put before\nMatter. The Substantial Form, like a spectre, frightens off every\nattempt of the philosopher to investigate thoroughly the domain of the\nMaterial. The Forms wander at their own sweet will like lords through\nthe lower world of Matter. No trace is discoverable of any inner\nrelation between Matter and Form. Not only in thought, but also in\nreality they keep themselves separate.\n\nFrom the account which has been given an idea may now be formed of the\nstory of Nature as the Brethren viewed it. They have been represented\nas the Darwinists of the tenth century, but nothing could more\ninappropriate. The various realms of Nature, it is true, yield\naccording to the Encyclopaedia an ascending and connected series; but\nthe relation is determined not by bodily structure, but by the inner\nForm or Soul-Substance. The Form wanders in mystic fashion from the\nlower to the higher and vice versa, not in accordance with inner laws\nof formation, or modified to suit external conditions, but in\naccordance with the influences of the stars, and, in the case of Man at\nleast, in accordance with practical and theoretical behaviour. To give\na history of Evolution in the modern sense of the term was very far\nfrom the thought of the Brethren. For example they expressly insist\nthat the horse and the elephant resemble Man more than the ape does,\nalthough the bodily likeness is greater in the last-named. In fact in\ntheir system the body is a matter of quite secondary consideration: the\ndeath of the body is called the birth of the soul. The soul alone is an\nefficient existence, which procures the body for itself.\n\n8. The teaching of the Brethren concerning Nature is therefore merged\nalmost completely in Psychology. Let us confine ourselves here to the\nhuman soul. It stands in the centre of the All; and just as the World\nis a huge man, Man is a little world.\n\nThe human soul has emanated from the World-soul; and the souls of all\nindividuals taken together constitute a substance which might be\ndenominated the Absolute Man or the Spirit of Humanity. Every\nindividual soul, however, is involved in Matter, and must gradually be\nformed into spirit. To that end it possesses many faculties or powers,\nand of these the speculative faculties are the choicest, for knowledge\nis the very life of the soul.\n\nThe soul of the child is at first like a white sheet of paper. What the\nfive senses convey to it is first presented, then judged, and lastly\nstored up, in the front, middle, and hinder parts of the brain\nrespectively. Through the faculty of speech and the art of writing,\nwhich make up the number of the internal senses to five, corresponding\nto the number of the External, the contents of Presentation are then\nrealized.\n\nAmong the external senses, Hearing takes precedence of Sight; for\nSight, a mere slave of the moment, is occupied with what is actually\npresent to the sense, whereas Hearing apprehends also what is past, and\nis conscious of the harmony of the tuneful spheres. Hearing and Sight\nconstitute the group of the intellectual senses, whose effect must\ncontinue time without end.\n\nWhile Man then possesses the external senses in common with the lower\nanimals, the specific nature of human reason is notified in Judgment,\nSpeech and Action. Reason judges of good and bad, and in conformity\nwith that judgment the will is determined. But in particular the\nsignificance which Language has for the soul\u2019s life of cognition is to\nbe emphasised. A concept which cannot be denoted by some expression in\nsome language is not thinkable at all. The word is the body of the\nthought, which cannot exist absolutely per se.\n\nBut it is difficult to see how this understanding of the relation\nbetween concept and expression is to square with other opinions of the\nBrethren.\n\n9. At its highest stage the teaching of the Brethren becomes a\nPhilosophy of Religion. Its purpose is a reconciliation between Science\nand Life, Philosophy and Faith. Now in these matters men differ\ngreatly. The ordinary man requires a sensuous worship of God; but just\nas the souls of animals and plants are beneath the soul of the ordinary\nman, so above it are the souls of the philosopher and the prophet with\nwhom the pure angel is associated. In the higher stages the soul is\nraised also above the lower popular religion with its sensuous\nconceptions and usages.\n\nNo doubt Christianity and the Zoroastrian faith appeared to the\nBrethren to be more perfect religious revelations. \u2018Our Prophet,\nMohammed\u2019, they said, \u2018was sent to an uncivilized people, composed of\ndwellers in the desert, who neither possessed a proper conception of\nthe beauty of this world, nor of the spiritual character of the world\nbeyond. The crude expressions of the Koran, which are adapted to the\nunderstanding of that people, must be understood in a spiritual sense\nby those who are more cultured\u2019.\n\nBut the truth is not presented in its purity even in the other national\nreligions. There is a rational faith above them all for which the\nBrethren moreover tried to find a metaphysical derivation. Between God\nand his first creature, the Creative Spirit, there is interposed by way\nof hypostasis the Divine World-Law (n\u00e2m\u00fbs). That World-Law extends over\neverything, and is the wise arrangement of a merciful Creator, who\nintends evil to no one. Belief in a God of Anger, in the punishment of\nHell and the like, the Brethren declare to be irrational. Such a faith\ndoes harm to the soul. The ignorant sinful soul finds its hell even in\nthis life and in its own body. On the other hand, Resurrection is the\nseparation of the soul from its body, and the great Resurrection at the\nlast day is the separation of the Universal soul from the world, and\nits return to God. This turning to God indeed is the aim in all\nreligions.\n\n10. The ethical system of the Brethren has an ascetic, spiritualistic\ncharacter, although here too their eclecticism is shewn. According to\nit man is acting rightly, when he follows his proper nature;\n\u2018praiseworthy is the free act of the soul; admirable are the actions\nwhich have proceeded from rational consideration; and lastly, obedience\nto the Divine World-Law is worthy of the reward of being raised to the\ncelestial world of spheres. But this requires longing for what is\nabove; and therefore the highest virtue is Love, which strives after\nunion with God, the first loved one, and which is evinced even in this\nlife in the form of religious patience and forbearance with all created\nbeings. Such love gains in this life serenity of soul, freedom of heart\nand peace with the whole world, and in the life to come ascension to\nEternal Light.\u2019\n\nAfter all this we need not wonder that the body was depreciated a good\ndeal. \u2018Our true essence is the soul, and the highest aim of our\nexistence should be to live, with Socrates, devoted to the Intellect,\nand with Christ, to the Law of Love. Nevertheless the body must be\nproperly treated and looked after in order that the soul may have time\nto attain its full development.\u2019 In this view the Brethren set up an\nideal type of human culture, whereof the features were borrowed from\nthe characteristics of various nations. \u2018The ideal, and morally perfect\nman, should be of East-Persian derivation, Arabic in faith, of Irak,\ni.e. Babylonian, education, a Hebrew in astuteness, a disciple of\nChrist in conduct, as pious as a Syrian Monk, a Greek in the individual\nsciences, an Indian in the interpretation of all mysteries, but lastly\nand especially, a Sufi in his whole spiritual life.\u2019\n\n11. The attempt to establish in this way a reconciliation between\nknowledge and faith satisfied neither side. Theological dialecticians\nlooked down upon the interpretation of the Koran given by the Brethren,\njust as the divines of our day look down upon the N. T. exegesis of\nCount Tolstoi. And the more rigid Aristotelians regarded the\nPythagorean-Platonic tendency of the Encyclopaedia much as a modern\nprofessor of philosophy is wont to look upon Spiritism, Occultism, and\nphenomena of that nature. But the writings, or at any rate the\nopinions, of the Faithful Brethren of Basra have exercised an important\ninfluence on the great body of the educated or half-educated world,\u2014an\ninfluence to which eloquent attestation is borne by the very fact that\nso many manuscripts, mostly of recent date, are to be met with, of this\nextensive Encyclopaedia. Among many sects within the world of Islam,\nsuch as the Batinites, the Ismaelites, the Assassins, the Druses, or\nwhatever may be their names, we find again the same doctrines in the\nmain. In this form Greek wisdom has best succeeded in making itself at\nhome in the East, while the Aristotelian School-Philosophy would only\nthrive, with few exceptions, in the hothouse-cultivation bestowed upon\nit at the courts of princely patrons. The great religious father,\nGazali, is ready enough to toss aside the wisdom of the Brethren as\nmere popular philosophy, but he does not hesitate to take over what was\ngood in them. He owes more to their body of ideas than he would perhaps\nhave cared to avow. And their treatises have been turned to profit by\nothers besides, particularly in Encyclopaediac works. The influence of\nthe Encyclopaedia continues even yet in the Muslim East. In vain was it\nburned in Bagdad in the year 1150, along with the writings of Ibn Sina.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIV. THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF THE EAST.\n\n\n1. Kindi. [15]\n\n1. Kindi is related in various ways to the Mutazilite Dialecticians and\nthe Neo-Pythagorean Natural-Philosophers of his time, and we might\ntherefore have dealt with him among the latter, even before Razi (v.\nIII, 1, \u00a7 5). But yet tradition with one accord represents him as the\nfirst Peripatetic in Islam. What justification exists for this\ntraditionary view will be seen in what follows, so far as an inference\ncan be drawn from the few and imperfectly-preserved writings of this\nphilosopher which have come down to us.\n\nAbu Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (i.e. of the tribe of Kinda) was of\nArabian origin, and therefore was called the \u201cArabian\u201d philosopher, to\ndistinguish him from the numerous non-Arab associates of his, who had\ntaken to the study of secular wisdom. He traced his genealogy to the\nold Kinda princes, although whether he was entitled to do so we need\nnot seek to decide. The South-Arabian tribe of Kinda was in any case\nfarther advanced in outward civilization than other tribes. Many\nKindite families too had for long been settlers in Iraq (Babylonia);\nand there, in the town of Kufa, of which his father was governor, our\nphilosopher was born, probably in the beginning of the ninth century.\nHe received his education, it would appear, partly in Basra, and\nthereafter in Bagdad, and therefore in the headquarters of the culture\nof his time. Here he came to put a higher value upon Persian\ncivilization and Greek wisdom than upon old Arab virtue and the Muslim\nfaith. He maintained even,\u2014no doubt, following others\u2014, that Kakhtan,\nthe ancestor of the South-Arabians was a brother of Yaunan\u2019s, from whom\nthe Greeks were descended. It was possible to make an observation of\nthat kind in Bagdad at the Abbasid court, for there they knew of no\nnationality, and regarded the ancient Greeks with admiration.\n\nIt is not known how long Kindi remained at court, or what position he\nheld there. He is mentioned as a translator of Greek works into Arabic,\nand is said to have revised and improved translations made by others,\nfor example, in the case of the so-called \u201cTheology of Aristotle\u201d.\nNumerous servants and disciples, whose names have been handed down to\nus, were probably set to this work under his supervision. Farther, he\nmay have rendered services to the court in the capacity of astrologer\nor physician, and perhaps even in the administration of the revenues.\nBut in later years he was dismissed, when he with others was made to\nsuffer from the restoration of orthodoxy under Mutawakkil (847\u2013861);\nand his library was for a long time confiscated. As regards personal\ncharacter, tradition reproaches him with having been niggardly,\u2014a\nstigma, however, which appears to have rested upon many other literary\nmen and lovers of books.\n\nThe year of Kindi\u2019s death is as little known as that of his birth. He\nappears thus to have been out of court-favour when he died, or at least\nto have been in a subordinate position. It is strange that Masudi (v.\nII, 4 \u00a7 4), who had a great regard for him, is utterly silent on this\npoint; but it seems in the highest degree probable from one of his\nastrological treatises that he was still alive subsequent to the year\n870. The expiry of some petty astronomical cycle was imminent at that\ndate, and this was being utilized by the Karmatites for the overthrow\nof the reigning family. In this matter, however, Kindi was loyal enough\nto make out the prolongation, for about 450 years, of the State\u2019s\nexistence, menaced though it was by a planetary conjunction. His\nprincely patron might well be satisfied; and history conformed to the\ntime predicted, to within half-a-century. [16]\n\n2. Kindi was a man of extraordinary erudition, a Polyhistor: he had\nabsorbed the whole learning and culture of his time. But although he\nmay have set down and communicated observations of his own as a\ngeographer, a historian of civilization and a physician, he was in no\nrespect a creative genius. His theological views bear a Mutazilite\nstamp. He wrote specially on Man\u2019s power of action, and the time of its\nappearance, i.e. whether it was before the act or whether it was\nsynchronous with the act. The righteousness and the unity of God he\nexpressly emphasized. In opposition to the theory,\u2014known at that time\nas Indian or Brahmanic,\u2014that Reason is the sole and sufficient source\nof knowledge, he defended prophecy, while yet he sought to bring it\ninto harmony with reason. His acquaintance with various systems of\nreligion impelled him to compare them together, and he found as a\ncommon element in them all the belief that the world was the work of a\nFirst Cause, One and Eternal, for whom our knowledge furnishes us with\nno more precise designation. It is however the duty of the discerning\nto recognize this First Cause as divine; and God himself has shewn them\nthe way thereto, and has sent them ambassadors to bear witness for him,\nwho are instructed to promise everlasting bliss to the obedient, and to\nthreaten corresponding punishment to those who do not obey.\n\n3. Kindi\u2019s actual philosophy, like that of his contemporaries,\nconsists, first and especially, of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy,\nin which Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism merge into one another.\nAccording to him no one can be a philosopher without studying\nMathematics. Fanciful play upon letters and numbers is frequently met\nwith in his writings. Mathematics he also applied to Medicine in his\ntheory of the compound remedies. In fact he based the efficacy of these\nremedies, like the effect of music, upon geometrical proportion. It is\nhere a matter of the proportionality of the sensible qualities, warm,\ncold, dry and moist. If a remedy has to be warm in the first degree, it\nmust possess double the warmth of the equable mixture,\u2014in the second\ndegree, four times as much, and so on. Kindi seems to have entrusted\nthe decision of this point to Sense, particularly to the sense of\nTaste, so that in him we might have a hint of the proportional relation\nexisting between stimulus and sensation. Yet that view, though quite\noriginal, was with him a mere piece of mathematical play. However,\nCardan, a philosopher of the Renaissance, on the ground of this\ndoctrine, reckoned him among the twelve most subtle-minded thinkers.\n\n4. In Kindi\u2019s opinion, as has already been said, the world is a work of\nGod, but His influence in its descent is transmitted through many\nintermediate agencies. All higher existence affects the lower, but that\nwhich is caused has no influence upon its cause, standing as this does\nabove it in the scale of Being. In all the events of the world there is\na pervading causality, which makes it possible for us, from our\nknowledge of the cause, to foretell the future,\u2014for example, of the\npositions of the heavenly bodies. Farther, in any single existing\nthing, if it is thoroughly known, we possess a mirror, in which we may\nbehold the entire scheme of things.\n\nIt is to the Spirit or Mind that the higher reality and all activity\nbelong, and matter has to dispose itself in conformity with the desire\nof the Spirit. Midway between the Spirit of God and the material and\nbodily world stands the Soul, and it is the Soul which first called\ninto being the world of the Spheres. From this Soul of the world the\nHuman Soul is an emanation. In its nature, that is, in its operations,\nit is bound to the body with which it is united, but in its spiritual\nessence it is independent of the body; and thus the influences of the\nstars, which are limited to physical occurrences, do not affect it.\nKindi goes on to say that our Soul is an uncompounded, imperishable\nsubstance, descended from the world of reason into that of the senses,\nbut endowed with a recollection of its earlier condition. It does not\nfeel at home here, for it has many needs, the satisfaction of which is\ndenied to it, and which consequently are attended with painful\nemotions. Verily there is nothing constant in this world of coming and\ngoing, in which we may be deprived at any moment of what we love. Only\nin the world of reason is stability to be found. If then we desire to\nsee our wishes fulfilled, and would not be deprived of what is dear to\nus, we must turn to the eternal blessings of reason, to the fear of\nGod, to science, and to good works. But if we follow merely after\nmaterial possessions in the belief that we can retain them, we are\npursuing an object which does not really exist.\n\n5. Kindi\u2019s theory of knowing corresponds to the ethical and\nmetaphysical duality of the sensible and the spiritual. According to it\nour knowledge is either knowledge conveyed by the senses, or knowledge\nacquired by the reason: that which lies between,\u2014the Fancy or\nImagination,\u2014is called a mediating faculty. The senses, then, apprehend\nthe Particular, or the material Form, but the reason conceives the\nUniversal,\u2014species and genera, or the spiritual Form. And just as that\nwhich is perceived is one with Sense-Perception, so too that which is\nconceived by the reason is one with Reason itself.\n\nHere then emerges for the first time the doctrine of the Reason or of\nthe Spirit or Mind, (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u02bbaql) in a form in which, merely modified\nsomewhat, it occupies a large space with the later Muslim philosophers.\nIt continued to be a characteristic feature of philosophy in Islam\nthroughout its whole course. And just as in the controversy regarding\nUniversals in the Christian Middle Ages an objective and scientific\ninterest is made evident also, so in the philosophical discussions of\nthe Muslims concerning the thinking Spirit, the subjective requirement\nof intellectual culture is brought conspicuously to the front.\n\nKindi has a fourfold division of the Spirit [17]: first the Spirit\nwhich is ever real,\u2014the Cause and the Essence of all that is spiritual\nin the world,\u2014thus without doubt God or the First Spirit produced;\nsecond, Spirit as the Reasoning capacity or Potentiality of the human\nsoul; third, as the Habit or actual possession of the soul, which it\ncan make use of at any moment, just as, for example, the writer can\nmake use of his art; fourth and last, as Activity, by which a reality\nwithin the soul may be carried over to the reality that is without. The\nActivity last named appears, according to Kindi, to be the act of man\nhimself, while to the First Cause,\u2014to the ever-existing Spirit,\u2014he\nascribes the carrying of Potentiality into Habit, or the realisation of\nthe Possible. The real Spirit or Mind we have thus received from above,\nand the third \u02bbaql is therefore called \u02bbaql mustafad, (Lat. intellectus\nadeptus sive adquisitus). The fundamental view of antiquity\u2014that all\nour knowledge about things must come from a source outside of us\u2014,\nruns, in the form of this doctrine of the \u02bbaql mustafad or Spirit which\nwe receive from above, through the whole of Arabian Philosophy, and\nthence passes into Christian Philosophy. Unfortunately the theory is\nnearly correct, as far as this philosophy is itself concerned, for the\n\u2018Active Spirit\u2019, which has created it, is in reality the Neo-Platonic\nAristotle.\n\nMan has always attributed to his God or Gods the highest of his own\npossessions. Muslim theologians directly attribute to the divine agency\nthe moral actions of men. But in the opinion of the philosophers,\nKnowing is of more importance than Doing. The latter, having more to do\nwith the lower world of the senses, may possibly be Man\u2019s own; but his\nhighest knowledge, the pure Reason, comes from above,\u2014from the Divine\nEssence.\n\nIt is clear that the doctrine of the Spirit, as it stands in Kindi,\ngoes back to the \u2018Nous\u2019-doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his\nsecond book \u201cOn the Soul\u201d. But Alexander expressly maintained that\naccording to Aristotle there is a threefold \u2018Nous\u2019. Kindi says on the\ncontrary that he is representing the opinion of Plato and Aristotle. In\nthis the Neo-Pythagorean and the Neo-Platonic views unite: for in\neverything the number \u2018Four\u2019 must be pointed out, and Plato and\nAristotle brought into agreement.\n\n6. Let us now sum up: Kindi is a Mutazilite theologian and Neo-Platonic\nphilosopher with Neo-Pythagorean additions. Socrates, the martyr of\nAthenian heathenism, is his ideal: on him, his fate and his teaching he\nhas composed several works; and he seeks to combine Plato and Aristotle\nin Neo-Platonic fashion.\n\nTradition nevertheless calls him the first who followed Aristotle in\nhis writings; and assuredly this representation is not altogether\nunfounded. In the long list of his works Aristotle takes a prominent\nplace. He was not satisfied with merely translating him, but he studied\nhis translated works and endeavoured to improve and explain them. At\nall events the Aristotelian Physics, with the commentary of Alexander\nof Aphrodisias, had an important influence upon him. Such assertions as\nthat the world is only potentially unending and not actually so, and\nthat motion is continuous, and the like, point rather in that\ndirection. The Natural-Philosophers of that day, as well as the\nFaithful Brethren, said for instance, that motion had as little\ncontinuity as number. But farther, Kindi resolutely turned away from\nthe marvel-mongering philosophy of the time, by declaring Alchemy an\nimposture. That which nature alone could produce, he held to be beyond\nthe power of man. Whoever then gives himself up to alchemistic\nexperiments, is in his opinion deceiving either himself or others. The\nfamous physician, Razi, attempted to controvert this view of Kindi\u2019s.\n\n7. The influence of Kindi as a teacher and an author has operated\nmainly through his Mathematics, Astrology, Geography and Medicine. His\nmost faithful and certainly his most notable disciple was Akhmed ibn\nMohammed al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi (\u2020 899), a government-official and\nfriend of the Caliph Mutadid, to whose negligence or caprice he fell a\nvictim. He worked at Alchemy and Astrology, strove to gain a knowledge\nof the wisdom and might of the Creator from the wonders of creation,\nand prosecuted the study of Geography and History. Another disciple of\nKindi\u2019s has become better known,\u2014Abu Mashar (\u2020 885), who, however, owes\nall his reputation to Astrology. He is said to have become, when 47\nyears of age, an admirer of Kindi\u2019s,\u2014though up till then he had been a\nfanatical opponent of philosophy,\u2014having been attracted to the pursuit\nof Astrology, by a superficial study of Mathematics. Whether this be\ntruth or fiction, such a course of education is at all events\ncharacteristic of that inquisitive grasping at half-understood\nknowledge, which peculiarly belongs to the first centuries of Arab\nScience.\n\nThe school of Kindi went in no way beyond the master. Of its literary\nactivity hardly any sample has been preserved to us beyond a stray\nquotation or two. It is of course possible that in the treatises of the\nFaithful Brethren, something of it may have been saved, but this cannot\nbe determined, in the present state of our knowledge.\n\n\n\n\n2. Farabi.\n\n1. In the tenth century the Logicians or Metaphysicians are\ndistinguished from the Natural-Philosophers. The former follow a more\nrigorous method than the Dialecticians, and treat of other subjects\nthan those which are dealt with by the Physical school. They have\nrepudiated Pythagoras, to entrust themselves to the guidance of\nAristotle, of course in Neo-Platonic guise.\n\nWe have here to do with two directions of scientific interest. The\nNatural-Philosophers are more or less concerned with the plenitude of\nthe concrete phenomena of Nature, as in Geography and Ethnology. They\ninvestigate in all directions the effects of things, and think the\nessential nature of these is only to be discerned in such effect or\nworking. When they do ascend beyond Nature, Soul and Spirit, to the\nDivine Essence, then the definition of it to which they confine\nthemselves, or which they adopt by preference, is\u2014\u2018the First Cause\u2019,\nor,\u2014\u2018the wise Creator\u2019, whose goodness and wisdom appear from his\nworks.\n\nThe Logicians proceed in a very different way. The occurrence of the\nParticular has only a subordinate value in their eyes,\u2014the value,\nmerely, of an illustration of its deducibility from the Universal.\nWhile the Physicists start from effects or operations, the Logicians\nseek to comprehend things from principles. Everywhere they enquire\nafter the Idea or Essence of things, up to the highest. For them,\u2014to\nmake the contrast more intelligible by an example\u2014, God is not, first\nof all, \u2018the wise Creator\u2019, but first of all \u2018the necessarily existing\nBeing\u2019.\n\nIn the order of time the Logicians come after the Physical school, just\nas the Mutazilite Dialectic on its part (v. II, 3 \u00a7\u00a7 4 and 5) brought\nwithin the scope of its consideration first God\u2019s Working, and then his\nBeing.\n\nWe have already come to recognize Razi as the most important\nrepresentative of the philosophical direction taken by the Physicists;\nand as for the Logical and Metaphysical efforts,\u2014for which Kindi and\nothers had prepared the way,\u2014they culminate with Razi\u2019s younger\ncontemporary Abu Nasr ibn Mohammed ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzlag al-Farabi.\n\n2. We cannot say much with certainty about the course of Farabi\u2019s\noutward life and training. He was a quiet man, devoted to a life of\nphilosophy and contemplation, sheltered by the powerful, and assuming\nat last the dress of a Sufi. His father is said to have been a Persian\ngeneral, and he himself was born at Wasidj, a small fortified place in\nthe district of Farab in Turkish Transoxiana. It was in Bagdad, and\npartly at the hands of a Christian preceptor Yohanna ibn Hailan, that\nhe received his education. This embraced both literary and mathematical\nsubjects, forming the equivalent of the \u2018Trivium\u2019 and \u2018Quadrivium\u2019 of\nmedi\u00e6val Christendom. One or two of his writings, particularly on\nMusic, give evidence still of his mathematical training. Legend credits\nhim with ability to speak in all the languages of the world, seventy in\nnumber. That he understood Turkish and Persian,\u2014an a priori\nprobability,\u2014is manifest from his works. Arabic he writes clearly, and\nwith a certain grace, although now and then his fondness for synonyms\nand parallel clauses interferes with the precision of philosophical\nexpression.\n\nThe philosophy in which Farabi was initiated sprung from the school of\nMerv; and perhaps its members had given greater attention to\nmetaphysical questions than the men of Harran and Basra with their\nmarked leaning to Natural Philosophy.\n\nFrom Bagdad, where he had long lived and worked, he went to Haleb\n(Aleppo), in consequence doubtless of political disturbances, and there\nhe settled at the brilliant court of Saif-addaula; but he must have\nspent his closing years not at court but in retirement. He died at\nDamascus, while on a journey, in December, 950; and it is reported that\nhis prince, attired as a Sufi, pronounced over him his funeral oration.\nWe are told that he was eighty years of age, and it is otherwise\nprobable that he was a very old man. His contemporary, and partner in\nstudy, Abu Bishr Matta died ten years before him, and his pupil Abu\nZakariya Yakhya ibn Adi in the year 971, at the age of eighty-one.\n\n3. The chronological order of the works of Farabi has not been\ndetermined. Shorter treatises in which he comes into touch with the\nDialecticians and Natural-Philosophers, if these are at all genuine in\nthe form handed down to us, may have been popular or juvenile\nproductions of his; but his mature powers were applied to the study of\nAristotle\u2019s writings, for which reason the name given him by the East\nwas \u2018the Second Teacher\u2019, that is, \u2018the Second Aristotle\u2019.\n\nSince his day the number and order of the works composed by Aristotle\nor at least attributed to him, which have been paraphrased and\ncommented on after Farabi\u2019s example, remain upon the whole fixed. First\ncome the eight Logical treatises, viz., the Categories; the\nHermeneutics; the First Analytics; the Second Analytics; the Topics;\nthe Sophistics; Rhetoric; and the Poetics: It is to these that the\nIsagoge of Porphyry is the introduction. Then follow the eight\ntreatises which deal with Physical subjects, viz., Auscultatio Physica;\nDe Coelo et Mundo; De Generatione et Corruptione; the Meteorology; the\nPsychology; De Sensu et Sensato; the Book of Plants; and the Book of\nAnimals. Lastly come the Metaphysics, the Ethics, the Politics and so\non.\n\nThe so-called \u201cTheology of Aristotle\u201d was still considered by Farabi to\nbe a genuine work. In Neo-Platonic fashion, and with some attempt at\nadaptation to the Muslim faith, he seeks to demonstrate that Plato and\nAristotle harmonize with one another. The need which he experiences is\nnot for a discriminating criticism, but for a conclusive and\ncomprehensive view of the world; and the satisfaction of this\nneed,\u2014which is rather a religious than a scientific one,\u2014induces him to\noverlook philosophic differences. Plato and Aristotle must differ from\neach other only in method, in phraseology, and in relation to practical\nlife: their doctrine of wisdom is the same. They are the \u2018Im\u0101ms\u2019 or\n\u2018highest authorities\u2019 in philosophy; and seeing that they were two,\nindependent, original minds, the authority which is constituted by\ntheir agreement has more validity in the eyes of Farabi than the faith\nof the whole Muslim community, who with blind confidence follow the\nguidance of one.\n\n4. Farabi is counted among the physicians, but he seems not to have\nbeen in actual practice. He was entirely devoted to the spiritual\nhealing art. Purity of Soul he denominated the condition and fruit of\nall philosophizing, and he demanded love of truth even though it should\noppose Aristotle. Then the judgment has to be trained by means of\nGeometry and Logic for the study of physical and mental science.\nFarabi, however, pays but little heed to the separate branches of\nstudy: his powers are concentrated on Logic, Metaphysics, and the\nprinciples of Physics. Philosophy for him is the science of all Being\nas such, in the acquisition of which science we come to resemble the\nGodhead. It is the one, all-embracing science, which pictures the world\nto us as a Universe. Farabi\u2019s charge against the Dialecticians is, that\nthey employ as a basis for their demonstrations the deliverances of\nordinary consciousness without testing them; and the\nNatural-Philosophers he blames for continually occupying themselves\nmerely with the effect of things, and thus never getting beyond the\ncontrasts of worldly phenomena by attaining to a unified conception of\nthe All. He would confront the former by setting Thought on a proper\nfoundation; and in opposition to the latter he would thoroughly\ninvestigate the subject of the One First Cause of all that exists.\nConsequently we shall be taking the best way to do justice to his\nhistorical and dogmatic position, if we endeavour to give some account,\nfirst of his Logic, next of his Metaphysics, and finally of his Physics\nand Practical Philosophy.\n\n5. The Logic of Farabi is not a mere analysis of scientific thinking:\nit contains in addition many remarks on grammar, and discussions on the\ntheory of knowledge. While grammar is limited to the language of one\npeople, Logic, on the other hand, has to regulate the expression in\nlanguage of the aggregate intelligence of mankind. From the simplest\nelements of speech it must advance to the most complex forms,\u2014from the\nword to the sentence, and on to discourse.\n\nLogic falls into two divisions, according as its subjects stand related\nto actuality; the first of these comprising the doctrine of Ideas and\nDefinitions (tasawwur), and the second, the doctrine of Judgments,\nInferences, and Proofs (tasdiq). Ideas,\u2014with which are classed\nDefinitions, though in a mere loose, outward juxtaposition,\u2014have in\nthemselves no relation to actuality, that is to say, they are neither\ntrue nor false. Among \u2018Ideas\u2019 Farabi recognizes here the simplest\npsychological forms, that is, both the representations of individual\nobjects arising from Sense-Perception, and those ideas which have been\nstamped upon the mind from the first, such as the Necessary, the\nActual, the Possible. Such representations and ideas are immediately\ncertain. A man\u2019s mind may be directed to these, and his soul made\nobservant of them, but they cannot be demonstrated to him, nor can they\nbe explained by deriving them from what is known, seeing that they are\nalready clear in themselves, and that too with the highest degree of\ncertitude.\n\nBy combining representations or ideas, judgments result, and these may\nbe either true or false. To obtain a foundation for these judgments we\nhave to go back through the processes of Inference and of Proof to\ncertain propositions originally conveyed to the understanding,\nimmediately obvious, and admitting of no farther confirmation. Such\npropositions,\u2014the fundamental propositions or Axioms of all\nScience,\u2014there must be for Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Ethics.\n\nThe doctrine of Proof, by which, starting from what is known and\nwell-established, we arrive at a knowledge of something formerly\nunknown, is, according to Farabi, Logic properly so called.\nAcquaintance with the leading Concepts (the Categories), and with their\nsynthesis in Judgment (Hermeneutics) and in Inference (First Analytics)\nfurnishes only the introduction thereto. And in the Proof-doctrine the\nchief point is to ascertain the Norms or principles of a universally\nvalid and necessary Science, which Philosophy has to be. Here the Law\nof Contradiction is looked upon as the highest of these principles, by\nwhich law the truth or necessity of a proposition, and at the same time\nthe untruth or impossibility of the contrary, become known in one\nsingle cognitive act. From this point of view the Platonic Dichotomy is\nto be preferred, as a scientific method, to the Aristotelian Polytomy.\nAnd Farabi is not content with the formal side of the doctrine of\nproof. That doctrine has to be more than a methodology which points out\nthe right way to the truth: it must itself point out the truth; it must\ngenerate science. It not only deals with judgments as material for the\nsyllogism, but it enquires also into the truth which they contain, with\nreference to the particular sciences concerned. It is not a mere\nimplement; it is rather a constituent part of philosophy.\n\nAs we have seen, the theory of proof terminates in necessary knowledge,\ncorresponding to necessary existence. But besides this there is the\ngreat province of the Possible, from which we can gain only a probable\nknowledge. The different degrees then of probability, or the modes in\nwhich we attain to a knowledge of the Possible, are discussed in the\nTopics, and with them are associated Sophistic, Rhetoric and Poetics.\nIn other connections these last three subjects are mainly concerned\nwith practical aims, but in Farabi\u2019s hands they are combined with the\nTopics into a Dialectic of the Seeming. He proceeds to say that true\nscience can be built up only on the necessary propositions of the\nSecond Analytics, but that Probability shades off into the mere phantom\nof truth, from the topical or dialectic judgments down to the poetical.\nThus Poetry stands at the very bottom of the scale, being in Farabi\u2019s\nopinion a lying and immoral absurdity.\n\nIn the addendum to the Isagoge of Porphyry, our philosopher has also\ngiven expression to his views on the question of \u2018Universals\u2019. He finds\nthe Particular not only in things and in sense-perception but also in\nthought. In like manner the Universal exists not merely as an\n\u2018accident\u2019 in individual things, but also as a \u2018substance\u2019 in mind. The\nmind of man abstracts the Universal from things, but it had an\nexistence of its own before these. Virtually therefore the triple\ndistinction of the \u2018ante rem\u2019, \u2018in re\u2019 and \u2018post rem\u2019 already occurs in\nFarabi.\n\nDoes mere \u2018being\u2019 also belong to the Universals? Is existence, in\neffect, a predicate? This question which caused so much mischief in\nphilosophy was fully and correctly answered by Farabi. According to\nhim, existence is a grammatical or logical relation, but not a category\nof actuality which makes any assertion about things. The existence of a\nthing is nothing but the thing itself.\n\n6. The trend of thought found in the Logic asserts itself also in the\nMetaphysics. Instead of the Changeable and the Everlasting, there\nemerge the ideas of the Possible and the Necessary.\n\nEverything in fact that exists, is, in Farabi\u2019s view, either a\nnecessary or a possible thing; there is no third kind of Being. Now\nsince all which is possible presupposes for its realisation a Cause,\nwhile yet the chain of causes cannot be traced back without end, we see\nourselves compelled to assume that there is a Being, existing of\nnecessity, uncaused, possessing the highest degree of perfection and an\neternal plenitude of reality, self-sufficing, without any change, who\nas absolute Mind and pure goodness and thinking,\u2014being the thinking and\nthe thought in one nature,\u2014loves the all-transcending goodness and\nbeauty of that nature, which is his own. This Being cannot be proved to\nexist, because he himself is the proof and first cause of all things,\nin whom truth and reality coincide. And it is involved in the very idea\nof such a Being, that he should be one, and one only, for if there were\ntwo first and absolute Beings, they would have to be partly alike and\npartly different,\u2014in which case, however, the simplicity of each would\nbe destroyed. A Being who is the most perfect of all, must be one\nalone.\n\nThis first Existence, one alone, and of a verity real, we call God; and\nsince in him all things are one, without even difference in kind, no\ndefinition of his Being can be supplied. Yet man bestows upon him the\nnoblest names, expressive of all that is most honoured and esteemed in\nlife, because in the mystic impulse thereto, words lose their usual\nsignificance, transcending all discrepancy. Some names refer to his\nessential nature, others to his relation to the world, without\nprejudicing, however, the unity of his essence; but they are all to be\nunderstood metaphorically, and we can interpret them only according to\nfeeble analogy. Of God, as the most perfect Being, we ought properly to\nhave also the most complete idea. At least our mathematical notions are\nmore perfect than our notions of physics, because the former refer to\nthe more perfect objects. But with the most perfect object of all we\nfare as with the most brilliant light: by reason of the weakness of our\neyes we cannot bear it. Thus the imperfections inherent in Matter cling\nto our understanding.\n\n7. We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings\nwhich proceed from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes\nthe All, for his knowledge is the highest power: In his cognizance of\nhimself the world comes into being: The cause of all things is not the\nwill of an almighty Creator, but the knowledge of the Necessary. From\neternity the Forms or Types of things are in God, and from him\neternally proceeds also his own image, termed \u2018the Second All\u2019 or \u2018the\nfirst created Spirit\u2019, which moves the outermost celestial Sphere. In\nsuccession to this Spirit, come, one out of the other, the eight\nSpirits of the Spheres, all of which are unique in their several kinds\nand perfect, and these are the creators of the celestial bodies. These\nnine Spirits, called \u2018Celestial Angels\u2019, together form the second grade\nof Being. In the third grade stands the Reason, active in Humanity,\nwhich is also termed the Holy Spirit and which unites heaven and earth.\nThe Soul is in the fourth grade. These two, the Reason and the Soul, do\nnot remain by themselves in their strict original One-ness, but\nmultiply in accordance with the great number of human beings. Lastly\nappear Form and Matter, as Beings of the fifth and sixth orders; and\nwith them the series of Spiritual existences is closed. The first three\ngrades, God, the Spirits of the Spheres, and the Active Reason, remain\nSpirit per se; but the three which follow,\u2014Soul, Form and Matter,\nalthough incorporeal, yet enter into relation with Body.\n\nThe Corporeal, which is held to originate in the imagination of the\nSpirit, has also its six grades: Celestial Bodies, Human Bodies, Bodies\nof Lower Animals, Bodies of Plants, Minerals, and Elementary Bodies.\n\nThe influence of Farabi\u2019s Christian preceptor is probably still to be\nseen in these speculations, following as they do the number Three. That\nnumber had the same significance in them that the number Four had with\nthe Natural-Philosophers. The terminology also bears out this idea.\n\nThat, however, is merely external: It is Neo-Platonism that contributes\nthe contents. Here the Creation, or Emanation of the world, appears as\nan eternal, intellectual process. By the first created Spirit thinking\nof its Author, the second Sphere-spirit comes into being; while, by the\nsame Spirit thinking of itself and thus realizing itself, there\nproceeds from it the first Body, or the uppermost celestial Sphere. And\nso the process goes on in necessary succession, down to the lowest\nSphere, that of the Moon, in entire accordance with the Ptolemaic\nSphere-system,\u2014as it is known to every well-educated person at least\nfrom Dante\u2019s \u201cCommedia\u201d,\u2014and in the Neo-Platonic manner of derivation.\nThe Spheres together form an unbroken order, for all that exists is a\nUnity. The creation and preservation of the world are one and the same.\nAnd not only is the unity of the Divine Being portrayed in the world,\nbut the Divine righteousness is also expressed in the beautiful order\nwhich there prevails. The logical order of the world is at the same\ntime a moral order.\n\n8. The sublunary world of this earth is, of course, wholly dependent on\nthe world of the celestial spheres. Yet the influence from above bears\nin the first place, as we know a priori, upon the necessary order of\nthe whole, although in the second place the individual thing also is\nmade to happen, but only according to natural reciprocal action, and\ntherefore by rules which experience teaches us. Astrology, which\nattributes everything that is contingent or extraordinary to the stars\nand their conjunctions, is combated by Farabi. There is no certain\nknowledge of the Contingent; and,\u2014as Aristotle also has taught,\u2014much of\nwhat happens on this earth possesses in a high degree the character of\nthe Contingent or the Possible. The celestial world, on the other hand,\nhas another and a more perfect nature, which operates according to\nnecessary laws. It can bestow upon this earthly world only that which\nis good; and therefore it is a complete mistake to maintain that some\nstars bring good luck, and others ill luck. The nature of the heavens\nis one, and it is uniformly good. The conclusion then at which Farabi\narrives, by these reflections is this: Knowledge, capable of\ndemonstration, and perfectly certain, is afforded by Mathematical\nAstronomy alone; the physical study of the heavens yields a probable\nknowledge; but the tenets and vaticinations of Astrology merit an\nexceedingly hesitating belief.\n\nOveragainst the simplicity of the celestial world we have the sublunary\nkingdom of the four natures,\u2014the kingdom of contrasts and of change.\nEven in this realm, in the midst of its plurality, we meet with the\nunity of an ascending series, from the Elements up to Man. Farabi is\nunable to advance much that is original on this subject. True to his\nlogical standpoint, he gives himself very little concern about the\nNatural Sciences, among which, in reliance upon the original unity of\nmatter, he seems without any hesitation to have counted Alchemy. We\nturn at once to his Doctrine of Man or of the Human Soul, which\npresents a measure of interest.\n\n9. The powers or divisions of the Human Soul are, in Farabi\u2019s opinion,\nnot of co-ordinate rank, but constitute an ascending series. The lower\nfaculty is Material for the higher; and this again is the Form for the\nfirst, while the highest power of all, viz. Thinking, is non-material,\nand is Form for all the Forms which precede. The life of the Soul is\nraised from things of sense to thought, by means of the power of\nRepresentation; but in all the faculties there is involved Effort or\nWill. Every theory has its obverse side in practice; and Inclination\nand Disinclination are inseparable from the perceptions furnished by\nthe senses. To the representations of these the soul takes up an\nattitude of assent or dissent, by affirming or denying. Finally,\nThought passes judgment on Good and Bad, gives to the Will its motives,\nand constructs Art and Science. All Perception, Representation or\nThought is attended with a certain effort to reach the necessary\nconsequence, just as warmth radiates from the substance of fire.\n\nThe Soul is that which gives completeness (Entelechia) to the existence\nof the body; but that which gives completeness to the existence of the\nSoul is the Mind, or the Spirit (\u02bbaql). The Spirit only is the real\nMan.\n\n10. Accordingly the discussion turns mainly on the Mind or Spirit. In\nthe human Spirit everything earthly is raised to a higher mode of\nexistence, which is lifted out of the categories of the Corporeal. Now\nas a capability or potentiality, Mind or Spirit is present in the Soul\nof the Child; and it becomes actual Spirit in the course of its\napprehension of bodily forms in experience by means of the Senses and\nthe representative faculty. But this transition from possibility to\nactuality,\u2014the realisation thus of experience,\u2014is not Man\u2019s own act,\nbut is brought about by the Superhuman Spirit, which has sprung from\nthe last Sphere-Spirit, that of the Moon. In this way Man\u2019s knowledge\nis represented as being a contribution from above, and not a knowledge\nwhich has been acquired in mental struggle. In the light of the Spirit\nwhich stands above us, our understanding descries the Forms of the\nCorporeal; and thereby experience is amplified into rational knowledge.\nExperience, in fact, takes in only the Forms which have been abstracted\nfrom the world of Matter. But there are in existence also,\u2014before and\nabove material things,\u2014Forms and general entities, in the pure Spirits\nof the Spheres. Man now receives information from these \u2018detached\nForms\u2019: it is only by means of their influence that his actual\nexperience becomes explicable to him. From God down to the Spirit of\nMankind, the higher Form affects only that which immediately succeeds\nit. Every intermediate Form stands in a relation of \u2018receptive\u2019\nactivity to what is above it, and of \u2018conferring\u2019 activity to what is\nbelow it. In its relation to the Human Spirit, which is influenced from\nabove (\u02bbaql mustafad), the Superhuman Spirit, produced from the last\nSphere-Spirit, is to be called \u2018active\u2019 or \u2018creative\u2019 (\u02bbaql fa\u02bb\u02bb\u00e2l).\nYet it is not continually active, because its effectiveness is\nrestrained by its material. But God is the completely-real,\neternally-active Spirit.\n\nThe Spirit in Man is threefold: according as it is (1) Possible, (2)\nActual, and (3) Influenced from above. Now in the sense of Farabi, this\nmeans\u2014that (1) the spiritual potentiality in Man is, by means of (2)\nrealizing the knowledge which is gained by experience, (3) led to the\nknowledge of the Supersensible, which precedes all experience, and\nitself induces the experience.\n\nThe grades of Spirit and its knowledge correspond to the grades of\nexistence. The lower strives wistfully to reach the higher, and the\nhigher lifts the lower up to its own level. The Spirit which stands\nabove us, and which has lent to all earthly things their Forms, seeks\nto bring these scattered Forms together that they may become one in\nlove. First of all he collects them in Man. And indeed the possibility\nand truth of human knowledge depend on the fact that the same Spirit\nwho bestowed upon the Corporeal its figure, also gives Idea to Man. The\nscattered Forms of the earthly are found again in the Human Spirit, and\nthereby it comes to resemble the last of the Celestial Spirits. Unity\nwith that Celestial Spirit,\u2014and in this an approach to God,\u2014is the aim\nand the blessedness of the Spirit of Man.\n\nNow the question whether such a union is possible before Man\u2019s death\nis, in Farabi\u2019s opinion, either a doubtful one, or one which should be\nanswered in the direct negative. The highest thing that can be attained\nin this life, is rational knowledge. But separation from the body gives\nto the rational soul the complete freedom which belongs to spirit. But\ndoes it then continue to exist as an individual soul? Or is it merely a\nMoment of the higher World-Intelligence? On this point Farabi expresses\nhimself ambiguously, and with a lack of consistency, in his various\nwritings. Men,\u2014so the expression runs,\u2014disappear in death; one\ngeneration follows another; and like is joined to like, each in its own\nclass. And forasmuch as rational souls are not bound to space, they\nmultiply without end, just as thought is added to thought, and power to\npower. Every soul reflects on itself and all others that are like to\nit; and the more it so reflects, the more intense is its joy (Cf.\ninfra, \u00a7 13).\n\n11. We come now to Farabi\u2019s practical philosophy. In his Ethics and\nPolitics we are brought into a somewhat closer relation to the life and\nbelief of the Muslims. One or two general points of view may be brought\nforward.\n\nJust as Logic has to give an account of the principles of knowledge, so\nEthics have to deal with the fundamental rules of conduct, although, in\nthe latter, somewhat more value is attached to practice and experience\nthan in the theory of knowledge. In the treatment of this subject\nFarabi agrees sometimes with Plato, and sometimes with Aristotle; but\noccasionally, in a mystic and ascetic fashion, he goes farther than\neither of them. In opposition to the Theologians, who recognize, no\ndoubt, a knowledge gained by Reason, but not rules of conduct taught by\nReason, Farabi frequently affirms with emphasis that Reason decides\nwhether a thing is good or evil. Why should not that Reason, which has\nbeen imparted to us from above, decide upon conduct, seeing that the\nhighest virtue certainly consists in knowing? In vigorously accentuated\nterms Farabi declares that if one man knew everything that stands in\nthe writings of Aristotle, but did not act in accordance with his\nknowledge, while another man shaped his conduct in accordance with\nAristotle\u2019s teaching, without being acquainted with it, the preference\nwould have to be assigned to the former. Knowledge takes a higher\nposition than the moral act; otherwise it could not decide upon the\nact.\n\nBy its very nature the Soul desires. In so far as it perceives and\nrepresents, it has a will, just like the lower animals. But man alone\npossesses freedom of choice, seeing that this rests upon rational\nconsideration. Pure thought is the sphere of freedom. Thus it is a\nfreedom which depends upon motives furnished by thinking,\u2014a freedom\nwhich is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the last resort it\nis determined by the rational nature of God. In this sense Farabi is a\nDeterminist.\n\nOn account of the opposition offered by matter, the freedom of man, as\nthus conceived, can only imperfectly vindicate its lordship over the\nSensible. It does not become perfect till the rational soul has been\nenfranchised from the bonds of matter and the wrappings of error,\u2014in\nthe life of the Spirit. But that is the highest blessedness which is\nstriven after for its own sake, and consequently it is plainly the\nGood. Such good the Human Soul is seeking, when it turns to the Spirit\nabove it, just as the Spirits of the heavens do, when they draw near to\nthe Highest.\n\n12. Even in the Ethics little regard is had to actual moral conditions;\nbut in his Politics Farabi withdraws still farther from real life. In\nhis oriental way of looking at things, the ideal Republic of Plato\nmerges into \u2018the Philosopher as Ruler\u2019. Men, having been brought\ntogether by a natural want, submit themselves to the will of a single\nperson, in whom the State, be it good or bad, is, so to speak,\nembodied. A State therefore is bad, if the head of it is, as regards\nthe principles of the Good, either ignorant or in error, or quite\ndepraved. On the other hand the good or excellent State has only one\ntype, that namely in which the philosopher is ruler. And Farabi endows\nhis \u2018Prince\u2019 with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is\nPlato in the mantle of the Prophet Mohammed.\n\nIn the description of rulers representative of the ideal Prince,\u2014for\nthere may be more than one existing together, and Prince and minister\nmay divide governing-virtue and wisdom between them,\u2014we come nearer the\nMuslim political theory of that day. But the expressions are wrapped in\nobscurity: the lineage, for example, which is proper for a Prince, and\nhis duty of taking the lead in the holy war,\u2014are not clearly signified.\nAll indeed is left floating in philosophic mist.\n\n13. Morality reaches perfection only in a State which at the same time\nforms a religious community. Not only does the condition of the State\ndetermine the temporal lot of its citizens, but also their future\ndestiny. The souls of citizens in an \u201cignorant\u201d State are devoid of\nreason, and return to the elements as sensible Forms, in order to be\nunited anew with other beings,\u2014men or lower animals. In States which\nare \u201cin error\u201d, and in those which are \u201cdepraved\u201d, the leader alone is\nresponsible, and punishment awaits him in the world beyond; but the\nsouls which have been led into error share the fate of the ignorant. On\nthe other hand, if the good and \u2018knowing\u2019 souls only maintain their\nground, they enter the world of pure Spirit; and the higher the stage\nof knowledge to which they have attained in this life, the higher will\ntheir position be after death, in the order of the All, and the more\nintense their blessed delight.\n\nIn all likelihood expressions of this kind are only the outer wrapping\nof a mystico-philosophical belief in the absorption of the Human Spirit\ninto the World-Spirit and finally into God. For,\u2014as Farabi\nteaches,\u2014although the world, deductively considered (i.e. logically\nand metaphysically), is something different from God, yet inductively\nthe present world is regarded by the soul as being identical with the\nnext, because in everything, even in his Unity, God is himself the All.\n\n14. If we now take a general survey of Farabi\u2019s system, it exhibits\nitself as a fairly consistent Spiritualism,\u2014or,\u2014to be more\nprecise,\u2014Intellectualism. The Corporeal,\u2014that which appeals to the\nSenses,\u2014as it originates in the imagination of the Spirit, might be\ndesignated \u201ca confused presentation\u201d. The only true existence is\nSpirit, although it assumes various degrees. God alone is entirely\nunmixed and pure Spirit, while those Spirits, which eternally proceed\nfrom him, already have in them the element of plurality. The number of\nprimary Spirits has been determined by the Ptolemaic cosmology, and\ncorresponds to the celestial hierarchy. The farther any one of them is\nremoved from the first, so much the less part has it in the Being of\nthe pure Spirit. From the last World-Spirit Man receives his essential\nnature, that is\u2014Reason. There is no gap in all the system; the Universe\nis a beautiful and well-ordered whole. The Evil and the Bad are the\nnecessary consequence of finiteness in individual things; but the Good\nwhich characterizes the Universe is set thereby in bolder relief.\n\nCan this fair order of the Universe, from all eternity emanating from\nGod, ever be destroyed, or can it even flow back to God? A sustained\nstreaming-back to the Godhead, there doubtless is. The longing of the\nSoul is directed to what is above and advancing knowledge purifies it\nand leads it upwards. But how far? Neither philosophers nor prophets\nhave been able to return a clear answer to this question. And the\nwisdom of both of these,\u2014both philosophy and prophecy,\u2014Farabi derives\nfrom the creative World-Spirit above us. Now and again he speaks of\nprophecy as if it represented the highest stage of human knowledge and\naction. But that cannot be his real view;\u2014at least it is not the\nlogical consequence of his theoretical philosophy. According to it\neverything prophetic,\u2014in dream, vision, revelation and so on,\u2014belongs\nto the sphere of the Imagination or Representation, and thus takes an\nintermediate position between Sense-Perception and pure Rational\nKnowledge. Although, in his Ethics and Politics, he attaches a high\neducational importance to religion, it is always regarded as inferior\nin absolute worth to knowledge acquired through pure reason.\n\nFarabi lived perpetually in the world of the Intellect. A king in the\nmental realm, a beggar in worldly possessions, he felt happy with his\nbooks, and with the birds and flowers of his garden. To his people,\u2014the\nMuslim community,\u2014he could be only very little. In his political and\nethical teaching there was no proper place for worldly matters or for\nthe \u2018holy war\u2019. His philosophy did not satisfy any need appertaining to\nthe senses, while it spoke against the life of imagination belonging\nboth to the senses and the intellect, as that life gives special\nexpression to itself in the creations of Art and in religious fancies.\nHe was lost in the abstractions of pure Spirit. As a pious, holy man,\nhe was an object of wonder to his contemporaries, and by a few\ndisciples he was honoured as the personification of wisdom; but by the\ngenuine scholars of Islam he was always decried as a heretic. There\nwas, of course, ground enough for this: just as Natural Philosophy\neasily led to Naturalism and Atheism, the Monotheism of the Logicians\nimperceptibly conducted to Pantheism.\n\n15. Farabi had no great following of disciples: Abu Zakariya Yakhya ibn\nAdi, a Jacobite Christian, became known as a translator of Aristotelian\nworks; but a pupil of Zakariya\u2019s came to be more spoken of, called Abu\nSulaiman Mohammed ibn Tahir ibn Bahram al-Sidjistani, who gathered\nabout him in Bagdad, in the second half of the tenth century, the\nlearned men of his time. The conversational discussions which they\nconducted, and the philosophical instructions which were imparted by\nthe master, have been to some extent preserved, and we can clearly see\nthe outcome of the school. Just as Natural Philosophy drifted into a\nsecret lore, and the school of Kindi abandoned Philosophy for the\nseparate branches of Mathematical and Physical Science, so the logical\ntendency of Farabi passed into a philosophy of words. Distinctions and\ndefinitions form the subject of these conferences. Individual points in\nthe history of philosophy and in the several sciences are discussed\nalso, without any systematic connection; but almost never does any\npositive interest in these subjects appear. The Human Soul occupies the\nforeground entirely, just as in the case of the Faithful Brethren,\nexcept that these last dealt rather with the marvellous operations of\nthe Soul, while the Logicians pondered over its rational essence and\nits elevation to the Supra-rational. The Sidjistani Society trifled\nwith words and concepts, instead of with numbers and letters after the\nfashion of the Brethren; but the end in both cases was\u2014a mystical\nSufism.\n\nIt is therefore no matter of astonishment that in the learned meetings\nof Abu Sulaiman, as reported by his pupil Tauhidi (\u2020 1009),\nEmpedocles, Socrates, Plato and others are oftener mentioned than\nAristotle. A very miscellaneous society came together in those\nmeetings. No question was asked as to the country from which any one\ncame, or the religion to which he adhered. They lived in the\nconviction,\u2014derived from Plato, that every opinion contained a measure\nof truth, just as all things shared in a common existence, and all\nsciences in an actual knowledge which was one and the same. On that\nassumption alone could they have conceived that every one might start\nwith maintaining that his own opinion was the true one, and that the\nscience which he cultivated was the science most to be preferred. And\nfor that very reason there is no conflict between Religion and\nPhilosophy, however vehement the assertions may be on these two sides.\nOn the contrary Philosophy confirms the doctrines of Religion, just as\nthe latter brings the results of Philosophy to perfection. If\nPhilosophical Knowledge is the essence and end of the Soul of man,\nReligious Belief is its life, or the way to that end; and as Reason is\nGod\u2019s vicegerent on earth, it is impossible for Reason and Revelation\nto contradict each other.\n\nIt is not worth while to accentuate particular points in these\nconversational discussions, the tenor of which we have given. The\nappearance of Sidjistani and his circle is important in the history of\nculture; but it has no significance as regards the development of\nPhilosophy in Islam. What was to Farabi the very life of his Spirit,\nbecomes in this Society a subject merely of clever conversation.\n\n\n\n\n3. Ibn Maskawaih.\n\n1. We have arrived at the point of time when the tenth century is\npassing into the eleventh. Farabi\u2019s school has apparently died out; and\nIbn Sina,\u2014destined to awaken into fresh life the philosophy of his\npredecessor,\u2014is still a youth. Here however we have to make mention of\na man, more allied, it is true, to Kindi than to Farabi, but who yet\nagrees with the latter in essential points, by reason of employing the\nsame sources with him. He affords an instance also of the fact that the\nmost sagacious minds of his time were not disposed to follow Farabi\ninto the region of Logico-Metaphysical speculation.\n\nThis man is Abu Ali ibn Maskawaih, physician, philologist and\nhistorian, who was the treasurer and friend of the Sultan Adudaddaula,\nand who died full of years in 1030. Amongst other things he has left us\na philosophical system of Ethics which up to this day is valued in the\nEast. It is a combination of material taken from Plato, Aristotle,\nGalen and the Muslim Religious Law, although Aristotle predominates in\nit. It commences with a treatise on the Essential Nature of the Soul.\n\n2. The Soul of Man, as Ibn Maskawaih explains, is a simple, incorporeal\nsubstance, conscious of its own existence, knowledge and working. That\nit must be of a spiritual nature\u2014follows from the very fact that it\nappropriates at one and the same time Forms the most opposed to each\nother, for example, the notions of white and black, while a body can\nonly take up one of the two forms at a time. Farther, it apprehends\nboth the forms of the Sensible and those of the Spiritual in the same\nspiritual manner, for Length is not \u2018long\u2019 in the soul, nor does it\nbecome \u2018longer\u2019 in the memory. Accordingly the knowledge and endeavour\nof the soul extend far beyond its own body: even the entire world of\nsense cannot satisfy it. Moreover it possesses an inborn rational\nknowledge, which cannot have been bestowed by the Senses, for it is by\nmeans of this knowledge that it determines the True and the False, in\nthe course of comparing and distinguishing between the objects\npresented to it in Sense-Perception,\u2014thus supervising and regulating\nthe Senses. Finally, it is in Self-Consciousness, or knowing of its own\nknowing, that the spiritual unity of the soul is most clearly shewn,\u2014a\nunity, in which thinking, that which thinks, and that which is\nthought\u2014all coincide.\n\nThe human soul is distinguished from the souls of the lower animals\nparticularly by rational reflection as the principle of its conduct,\ndirected towards the Good.\n\n3. That by which a Being, possessed of will, attains the end or the\nperfection of his nature is, in general terms, \u2018good\u2019. A certain\ncapability, therefore, or disposition, directed to an end is requisite,\nin order to be good. But as regards their capability men differ very\nessentially. Only a few,\u2014Maskawaih thinks,\u2014are by nature good, and\nnever become bad, since what is by nature, does not change; while on\nthe other hand, many are by nature bad, and never become good. Others,\nhowever, who at first are neither good nor bad, are definitely turned\neither in the one direction or the other, through upbringing and social\nintercourse.\n\nNow the Good is either a general good or a particular good. There is an\nabsolute Good, which is identical with the highest Being and the\nhighest knowledge; and all the good together strive to attain to it.\nBut for every individual person a particular Good presents itself\nsubjectively under the aspect of Happiness or Pleasure; and this\nconsists in the full and active manifestation of his own essential\nnature,\u2014in the complete realisation of his inmost being.\n\nSpeaking generally,\u2014Man is good and happy, if he acts as Man: Virtue is\nhuman excellence. But since humanity is presented as occupying\ndifferent levels in different individuals, Happiness or the Good is not\nthe same for all. And because an individual man, if he were left to his\nown resources could not realize all the good things that might\notherwise be obtained, it is necessary that many should live together.\nAs a consequence of this condition, the first of duties, or the\nfoundation of all the virtues, is a general love for humankind, without\nwhich no society is possible. It is only along with, and among other\nhuman beings that the individual man attains perfection;\u2014so that Ethics\nmust be Social Ethics. Friendship therefore is not, as Aristotle would\nhave it, an expansion of Self-love, but a limitation of it, or a kind\nof love of one\u2019s neighbour. And this, like virtue in general, can find\na field of exercise only in society, or in citizenship, and not in the\npious monk\u2019s renunciation of the world. The hermit, who thinks he is\nliving temperately and righteously, is deceived as to the character of\nhis actions: they may be religious, but moral they certainly are not;\nand therefore the consideration of them does not belong to Ethics.\n\nBesides, in Ibn Maskawaih\u2019s opinion, the Religious Law when rightly\napprehended, pre-eminently accords with an Ethics of Benevolence.\nReligion is a moral training for the people. Its prescriptions, with\nregard to the worship of God in common and the pilgrimage to Mecca for\ninstance, have plainly in view the cultivation of the love of one\u2019s\nneighbour in the widest acceptation.\n\nIn certain special points Ibn Maskawaih has not been successful in\ncombining harmoniously the ethical doctrines of the Greeks,\u2014which he\nincorporates in his Scheme,\u2014either with one another or with the Law of\nIslam. That however we pass over; and in any case we ought not only to\npraise in general terms his attempt to give a system of Ethics which\nshould be free from the casuistry of the Moralists and the asceticism\nof the Sufis, but also to recognize in the execution of his design the\ngood sense of a man of wide culture.\n\n\n\n\n4. Ibn Sina.\n\n1. Abu Ali al-Hosain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina (Avicenna) was born at\nEfshene in the neighbourhood of Bokhara, in the year 980, of a family\nconnected with the public service. He received his secular and\nreligious education at home, where Persian and anti-Muslim traditions\nwere still full of life and vigour. Then the youth, precocious alike in\nbody and in mind, studied philosophy and medicine in Bokhara. He was\nseventeen years old when he had the good fortune to cure the prince,\nNukh ibn Mansur, and to obtain the privilege of access to his library.\nFrom that time forward he was his own teacher, in scientific research\nand in practice, and proved able to turn to account the life and\nculture of his time. He kept continually venturing his fortunes in the\npolitical working of the smaller States: Probably he could never have\nsubmitted to a great prince, any more than to a teacher in Science. He\nwandered on from court to court, at one time employed in\nState-Administration, at another as a teacher and author, until he\nbecame vizir of Shems Addaula in Hamadan. After the death of this\nprince he was consigned to prison by his son, for some months. He then\nproceeded farther afield, to the court of Ala Addaula in Ispahan. And\nat last, having returned to Hamadan, which Ala Addaula had conquered,\nhe died there in 1037, at the age of 57; and there his grave is pointed\nout to this day.\n\n2. The notion that Ibn Sina pushed on beyond Farabi and reached a purer\nAristotelianism, is perhaps the greatest error which has found a\nfooting in the history of Muslim Philosophy. What did this our man of\nthe world in reality care for Aristotle? It was not his concern to\ncommit himself wholly to the spirit of any system. He took what was to\nhis liking, wherever he found it, but he had a preference for the\nshallow paraphrases of Themistius. Thus he became the great philosopher\nof accommodation in the East, and the true forerunner of\ncompendium-writers for the whole world. He knew how to group with skill\nhis material, collected as it was from every quarter, and to present it\nin an intelligible form, although not without sophistry. Every moment\nof his life was fully employed. In the daytime he attended to State\naffairs or gave instruction to his pupils: the evening was devoted to\nthe social enjoyments of friendship and love; and many a night found\nhim engaged in composition, pen in hand, and goblet within reach lest\nhe should fall asleep. Time and circumstances determined the direction\nof this activity. If at the prince\u2019s court he had the requisite\nleisure, and a library at hand, he wrote his Canon of Medicine or the\ngreat Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. While travelling, he composed\nepitomes and smaller works. In prison he wrote poems and pious\nmeditations, but always in a pleasing form; in fact his smaller\nmystical writings have a poetic charm about them. When commissioned to\ndo so, he put even Science, Logic and Medicine into verse,\u2014a practice\nwhich came more and more into vogue from the tenth century onwards. Add\nto this that he wrote Persian and Arabic at will, and you get the\npicture of a most accomplished man. His life was superabundantly rich\nboth in work and in enjoyment. In geniality, of course he was inferior\nto his older compatriot, the poet Firdausi (940\u20131020), and in\nscientific talent to his contemporary Beruni (v. infra \u00a7 9), men still\nof importance in our eyes. Ibn Sina, however, was the true expression\nof his time; and upon this fact have been founded his great influence\nand historic position. He did not, like Farabi, withdraw from common\nlife to become immersed in the commentators of Aristotle, but he\nblended in himself Greek science and Oriental wisdom. Enough\ncommentaries, he thought, had already been written on the ancient\nauthors: it was now time for men to construct a philosophy of their\nown,\u2014in other words, to give a modern form to the ancient doctrines.\n\n3. In Medicine Ibn Sina gives diligent endeavour to produce a\nsystematic account of that science, but here he proves by no means an\nexact logician. He assigns a large place, at least theoretically, to\nExperience, and describes in detail the conditions under which alone,\nfor example, the efficacy of remedies can be ascertained. But the\nphilosophical principles which are involved in Medicine, must be taken\nover in the form of lemmas from Philosophy itself.\n\nPhilosophy proper is divided into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. In\nits entirety it embraces the science of all Existence as such, and of\nthe principles of all the separate sciences, whereby, as far as is\nhumanly possible, the Soul which is devoted to philosophy, attains the\nhighest perfection. Now Existence is either spiritual, when it is the\nsubject of Metaphysics, or corporeal, when it is discussed in Physics,\nor intellectual, when it forms the theme of Logic. The subjects of\nPhysics can neither exist, nor be thought of as existing, without\nMatter. The Metaphysical, however is quite devoid of Matter; while the\nLogical is an abstraction from the Material. The Logical has a certain\nlikeness to the Mathematical, in so far as the subjects of Mathematics\nmay also be abstractions from matter. But yet the Mathematical always\nremains capable of being represented and constructed, while on the\nother hand the Logical, as such, has its existence only in the\nintellect, as, for instance, Identity, Unity and Plurality,\nUniversality and Particularity, Essentiality and Contingency, and so\non. Consequently Logic is the Science of the Determinate Forms of\nThought.\n\nIn the more detailed treatment of his subject Ibn Sina conforms\nentirely to Farabi\u2019s Logic. This agreement would perhaps be more\napparent to us, if the logical works of his predecessor were extant in\na more complete form. He frequently lays stress on the defectiveness of\nthe intellectual constitution in man, which is urgently in need of a\nlogical rule. Just as the physiognomist infers from the external\nfeatures the character of the nature within, so the logician is called\nupon to derive from known premises that which is unknown. How easy it\nis for the errors of appearance and desire to insinuate themselves into\na process of that kind! A struggle with Sense is required in order that\nthe life of representation may be elevated to the pure truth of the\nReason, through which any knowledge of a necessary kind is gained. The\ndivinely-inspired man, but he alone, can dispense with Logic, precisely\nas the Bedouin is independent of an Arabic Grammar.\n\nThe question of Universals is also treated in a manner similar to that\nwhich is adopted by Farabi. Prior to any plurality, every thing has an\nexistence in the Mind of God and of the Angels (the Sphere-Spirits);\nthen as material form it enters upon plurality, to be raised finally in\nthe intellect of man to the universality of the Idea. Now just as\nAristotle has distinguished between First Substance (Individual) and\nSecond Substance (cogitable as a Universal), so Ibn Sina similarly\nmakes a distinction between First and Second Notion or Intention\n(Ma\u02bbn\u00e2, intentio). The First is referred to the things themselves, the\nSecond to the disposition of our own thought.\n\n4. In Metaphysics and Physics Ibn Sina is differentiated from Farabi\nchiefly through the fact that, by not deriving Matter from God, he\nplaces the Spiritual at a higher elevation above all that is Material,\nand in consequence heightens the importance of the Soul as an\nintermediary between the Spiritual and the Corporeal.\n\nFrom the conception of the Possible and the Necessary, the existence of\na Necessary Being plainly follows. According to Ibn Sina we should not\nseek to demonstrate the existence of a Creator from his works, but\nrather should deduce, from the possible character of all that is, and\nall that is thinkable in the world, the existence of a First and\nNecessary Being, whose essence and existence are one.\n\nNot only is every sublunary thing of a \u2018possible\u2019 nature, but even the\nheavens are, in themselves, merely \u2018possible\u2019. Their existence becomes\n\u2018necessary\u2019 through another existence which transcends all\n\u2018possibility\u2019 and therefore all plurality and mutability. The\n\u2018absolutely Necessary\u2019 is an unbending Unity, from which nothing\nmultiplex can proceed. This first One is the God of Ibn Sina, of whom\nmany attributes may of course be predicated, such as thought &c., but\nonly in the sense of negation or relation, and in such a way that they\ndo not affect the Unity of his essence.\n\nOut of the first One accordingly,\u2014One only can proceed, viz.,\u2014the first\nWorld-Spirit. It is in this latter Spirit that Plurality has its\norigin. In fact by thinking of its own Cause, it generates a third\nSpirit, the governor of the outermost Sphere; when again, it thinks of\nitself, a Soul is produced, by means of which the Sphere-Spirit\nexercises its influence; and, in the third place, inasmuch as it is in\nitself a \u2018possible\u2019 existence, there emerges from it a Body, viz., the\noutermost Sphere. And so the process goes on: Every Spirit, thus\ngenerated, except of course the last of the series, liberates from\nitself a trinity,\u2014Spirit, Soul and Body; for, since the Spirit cannot\nmove the Body directly, it needs the Soul to bring its effectiveness\ninto operation. Finally comes the Active Spirit (\u02bbaql fa\u02bb\u02bb\u00e2l), closing\nthe series, and generating no farther pure (separate) Spirit, but\nproducing and directing the material of what is earthly, as well as\ncorporeal forms and human souls.\n\nThe whole of this process,\u2014which is not to be represented as occurring\nin time, takes place in a substratum,\u2014that of Matter. Matter is the\neternal and pure possibility of all that exists, and at the same time\nthe limitation of the operation of the Spirit. It is the principle of\nall individuality.\n\nNow this teaching must certainly have presented a dreadful appearance\nto believing Muslims. Mutazilite dialecticians had doubtless asserted\nthat God can do nothing evil, and nothing irrational; but now\nPhilosophy was maintaining that, God instead of being able to do all\nthat is possible is only in a position to effect that which is in its\nown nature possible, and that only the first World-Spirit proceeds from\nhim directly.\n\nAs for the rest Ibn Sina makes every endeavour to conform to the\npopular belief. Everything exists, he says, through God\u2019s appointment,\nboth the Good and the Evil, but it is only the former that meets with\nhis glad approval. Evil is either a non-existent thing, or,\u2014in so far\nas it proceeds from God,\u2014an accidental thing. Suppose that He, to avoid\nthe evils which of necessity cling to the world, had kept it from\ncoming into being,\u2014that would have been the greatest evil of all. The\nworld could not be better or more beautiful than it actually is. The\nDivine Providence, administered as it is by the Souls of the Heavens,\nis found in the world\u2019s fair order. God and the pure Spirits know the\nUniversal only, and therefore are unable to attend to the Particular;\nbut the Souls of the celestial Spheres, to whose charge falls the\nrepresentation of what is individual, and through whom Spirit acts upon\nBody, render it possible to admit a providential care for the\nindividual thing and the individual person, and to account for\nrevelation, and so on. Farther, the sudden rise and disappearance of\nsubstances (Creation and Annihilation), in contrast to the constant\nmovement,\u2014that is, the gradual passing of the Possible into the\nActual,\u2014seem to Ibn Sina to indicate nothing impossible. In general,\nthere is a predominant want of clearness in his views regarding the\nrelation of the forms of Existence,\u2014Spirit and Body, Form and Matter,\nSubstance and Accident. A place at all events is left for Miracle. In\npassionate forms of excitement in the Soul, which often generate in\nourselves great heat or cold, we have, according to Ibn Sina, phenomena\nanalogous to miraculous effects produced by the World-Soul, although it\nusually follows the course of Nature. Our philosopher himself, however,\nmakes a very moderate use of any of these possibilities. Astrology and\nAlchemy he combated on quite rational grounds; and yet soon after his\ndeath astrological poems were attributed to him; and in Turkish\nRomance-Literature he appears as a magician, of course to represent an\nancient Mystic.\n\nIbn Sina\u2019s theory of Physics rests entirely on the assumption that a\nbody can cause nothing. That which causes,\u2014is in every case a Power, a\nForm, or a Soul, the Spirit operating through such instrumentality. In\nthe realm of the Physical there are accordingly countless Powers, the\nchief grades of which, from the lower to the higher, are\u2014the Forces of\nNature, the Energies of Plants and Animals, Human Souls and\nWorld-Souls.\n\n5. Farabi was above all things interested in pure Reason: he loved\nThinking for its own sake, Ibn Sina, on the other hand, is concerned\nthroughout with the Soul. In his Medicine it is man\u2019s Body which he\nlooks to; and similarly, in his Philosophy his eyes are fixed on man\u2019s\nSoul. The very name of his great Philosophical Encyclopaedia is\u2014\u2018The\nHealing\u2019 (that is\u2014of the Soul). His system centres in Psychology.\n\nHis theory of human nature is dualistic. Body and Soul have no\nessential connection with one another. All bodies are produced, under\nthe influence of the stars, from the mingling of the Elements; and in\nthis way the human body also is produced, but from a combination in\nwhich the finest proportion is observed. A spontaneous generation of\nthe body, just like the extinction and restoration of the human race,\nis therefore possible. The Soul, however, is not to be explained from\nsuch mixture of the Elements. It is not the inseparable Form of the\nbody, but is accidental to it. From the Giver of Forms, that is\u2014from\nthe Active Spirit over us, every Body receives its own Soul, which is\nadapted to it and to it alone. From its very beginning each Soul is an\nindividual substance, and it developes increasing individuality\nthroughout its life in the body. It must be admitted that this does not\nagree with the contention that Matter is the principle of\nindividuality. But the Soul is the \u201cinfant prodigy\u201d of our philosopher.\nHe is not a credulous man, and he often cautions us against too ready\nan acceptance of mysteries in the life of the Soul; but still he has\nthe art himself of relating many things about the numerous wonderful\npowers and possible influences of the Soul, as it wanders along the\nhighly intricate pathways of life, and crosses the abysses of Being and\nNot-Being.\n\nThe speculative faculties are the choicest of all the powers of the\nSoul. Acquaintance with the world is conveyed to the rational soul by\nthe External and Internal Senses. In particular a full account is given\nby Ibn Sina of his theory of the Internal Senses, or the\nsensuous-spiritual faculties of representation, which have their seat\nin the brain.\n\nMedical Philosophers commonly assumed three Internal Senses or stages\nof the representative process: 1. Gathering the several\nsense-perceptions into one collective image in the fore part of the\nbrain; 2. Transforming or remodelling this representation of the\ngeneral Sense, with the help of representations already existing, thus\nconstituting apperception proper, in the middle region; 3. Storing up\nthe \u2018apperceived\u2019 representation in the Memory, which was held to\nreside in the hinder part of the brain. Ibn Sina, however, carries the\nanalysis somewhat farther. He distinguishes in the anterior portion of\nthe brain the Memory of the Sensible,\u2014or the treasure-house of the\ncollective images,\u2014from the General or Co-ordinating Sense. Farther, he\nmakes out Apperception,\u2014the function of the middle region of the\nbrain,\u2014to be in part brought about unconsciously, under the influence\nof the sensible and appetent life, as is the case also with the lower\nanimals, and, on the other hand, to take place in part consciously,\nwith the co-operation of the Reason. In the first case the\nrepresentation preserves its reference to the individual thing,\u2014thus\nthe sheep knows the hostility of the wolf,\u2014but in the second case, the\nrepresentation is extended to the Universal. Then, in the hinder part\nof the brain, the Representative Memory, or store-house of the\nrepresentations formed by combined Sensuous Impression and Rational\nReflection, follows as a fifth power. In this way five Internal Senses\n[18] correspond to the five External Senses, although with quite\nanother reference than the five Internal Senses of the Faithful\nBrethren. The question which is raised\u2014as to whether one should farther\nseparate Recollection, as a special faculty, from Memory,\u2014remains\nunanswered.\n\n6. At the apex of the intellectual powers of the Soul stands the\nReason. There is indeed a Practical Reason also, but in its action we\nhave been only multiplying ourselves mediately: On the other hand, in\nSelf-Consciousness, or the pure recognition of our essential nature,\nthe unity of our Reason is directly exhibited. But instead of keeping\ndown the lower powers of the Soul, the Reason lifts them up, refining\nSense-Perception, and generalizing Presentation. Reason, which at first\nis a mere capacity for Thought, becomes elaborated gradually,\u2014in that\nMaterial which is conveyed to it by the external and internal\nsenses,\u2014into a finished readiness in Thought. Through exercise the\ncapability becomes reality. This comes about through the\ninstrumentality of experience, but under guidance and enlightenment\nfrom above,\u2014from the \u2018Giver of the Forms\u2019, who as Active Spirit imparts\nthe Ideas to the Reason. The Soul of man, however, does not possess any\nmemory for the pure ideas of Reason, for memory always presupposes a\ncorporeal substratum. As often then as the Rational Soul comes to know\nanything, that knowledge flows to it on each occasion from above; and\nthinking Souls do not differ in the range and contents of their\nknowledge, but in the readiness with which they put themselves in\ncommunication with the Spirit over us, in order to receive their\nknowledge.\n\nThe Rational Soul, which rules over that which is under it, and comes\nto know the higher by means of the enlightenment given by the\nWorld-Spirit, is then the real Man,\u2014brought into existence, but as\nunmixed essence, as individual substance, indestructible, immortal. On\nthis point the clearness of Ibn Sina\u2019s teaching marks it off from that\nof Farabi; and, since his time, the assumption of the individual\nimmortality of the human Souls, which have come into being, is regarded\nin the East as Aristotelian, and the opposite doctrine as Platonic.\nThus a better understanding prevails between his philosophy and the\naccepted religion. The human body and the whole world of sense furnish\nthe Soul with a school for its training. But after the death of the\nbody, which puts an end to this body for ever, the Soul continues to\nexist in a more or less close connection with the World-Spirit. In this\nunion with the Spirit over us,\u2014which is not to be conceived as a\ncomplete unification,\u2014the blessedness of the good, \u2018knowing\u2019 souls\nconsists. The lot of the others is eternal misery; for just as bodily\ndefects lead to disease, so punishment is the necessary consequence of\nan evil condition of Soul. In the same way too, the rewards of Heaven\nare apportioned according to the degree of soundness or rationality\nwhich the Soul has attained in its life on earth. The pure Soul is\ncomforted amidst the sufferings of Time by its prospect of Eternity.\n\nThe highest is of course, reached only by a few; for on the pinnacle of\nTruth there is no room for the many; but one presses forward after\nanother, to reach the source of the knowledge of God, welling forth on\nits lonely height.\n\n7. To express his view of the Human Reason, Ibn Sina employs and\nexplains poetical traditions,\u2014a favourite proceeding in the Persian\nliterature. First and foremost our interest is awakened by the\nallegorical figure of Hai ibn Yaqzan. It represents the ascent of the\nSpirit out of the Elements, and through the realms of Nature, of the\nSouls, and of the Spirits, up to the throne of the Eternal One. Hai\npresents himself to the philosopher in the form of an old man with an\nair of youth about him, and offers his services as guide. The wanderer\nhas been striving to reach a knowledge of Earth and Heaven, by means of\nhis outer and inner senses. Two ways open out before him, one to the\nWest, the way of the Material and the Evil, the other to the Rising\nSun, the way of Spiritual and ever-pure Forms; and along that way Hai\nnow conducts him. Together they reach the well of Divine wisdom, the\nfountain of everlasting youth, where beauty is the curtain of beauty,\nand light the veil of light,\u2014the Eternal Mystery.\n\nHai ibn Yaqzan is thus the guide of individual, thinking Souls: he is\nthe Eternal Spirit who is over mankind, and operates in them.\n\nA similar meaning is found by our philosopher in the frequently\nremodelled late-Greek legend of the brothers Salaman and Absal. Salaman\nis the World-Man, whose wife (i.e., the World of the Senses) falls in\nlove with Absal, and contrives by a stratagem to wile him into her\narms. But before the decisive moment, a flash of lightning comes down\nfrom heaven, and reveals to Absal the wantonness of the action which he\nhad nearly committed, and raises him from the world of sensual\nenjoyment to that of pure spiritual contemplation.\n\nIn another passage the soul of the philosopher is compared to a bird,\nwhich with great trouble escapes from the snares of the earth,\ntraversing space in its flight, until the Angel of Death delivers it\nfrom the last of its fetters.\n\nThat is Ibn Sina\u2019s Mysticism. His soul has needs, for which his\nmedicine-chest provides no resource, and which the life of a court\ncannot satisfy.\n\n8. The theoretical development of Ethics and Politics may be left to\nthe teachers of the \u2018fiqh\u2019. Our philosopher feels himself on the level\nof a inspired person, exalted like a God above all human laws.\nReligious or Civil Law is binding only on the Many. Mohammed\u2019s object\nwas, to civilize the Bedouins; and, in order to aid in accomplishing\nthat object, he preached, among other doctrines, that of the\nResurrection of the Body. They would never have understood the meaning\nof purely spiritual blessedness; and so he had to educate them by\nsetting before them the prospect of bodily pleasure or pain. As for the\nAscetics,\u2014notwithstanding their willingness to renounce entirely the\nworld and the senses,\u2014they chime in with this sensuous multitude (whose\nworship of God consists in the observance of outward forms), in respect\nthat they practise their works of piety with an eye to a reward also,\neven though it be a heavenly one. Higher than the many or the pious\nstand those who truly worship God in spiritual love, entertaining\nneither hope nor fear. Their peculiar possession is Freedom of the\nSpirit.\n\nBut this secret should not be revealed to the multitude; and the\nphilosopher confides it only to his favourite pupils.\n\n9. In the course of his travels Ibn Sina met with many of the learned\nmen of his time; but it would appear that these interviews did not give\nrise to any enduring intimacies. Just as he feels indebted to Farabi\nalone, of all those who preceded him, so the only persons of his own\nday, whom he sees fit to thank, are the princes who patronized him. He\ncriticized unfavourably Ibn Maskawaih (v. IV, 3), whom he met with\nstill more frequently. With Beruni, his superior in research, he\nconducted a correspondence, but it was soon broken off.\n\nBeruni (973\u20131048) deserves a short notice here, to illustrate the\ncharacter of the time, although Kindi and Masudi have a better claim to\nbe called his masters, than Farabi and the younger Ibn Sina. He was\nparticularly occupied in the study of Mathematics, Astronomy, Geography\nand Ethnology; and he was a keen observer and a good critic. For many a\nsolution of his difficulties, however, he was indebted to Philosophy;\nand he continually bestowed attention upon it, as one of the phenomena\nof civilization.\n\nBeruni brings into striking prominence the harmony which exists between\nthe Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy, Indian wisdom, and many of the\nSufi views. No less striking is his recognition of the superiority of\nGreek Science, when compared with the attempts and performances of the\nArabs and the Indians. \u2018India\u2019, he says, \u2018not to mention Arabia, has\nproduced no Socrates: there no logical method has expelled phantasy\nfrom science\u2019. But yet he is ready to do justice to individual Indians,\nand he quotes with approval the following, as the teaching of the\nadherents of Aryabhata: \u201cIt is enough for us to know that which is\nlighted up by the sun\u2019s rays. Whatever lies beyond, though it should be\nof immeasurable extent, we cannot make use of; for what the sunbeam\ndoes not reach, the senses do not perceive, and what the senses do not\nperceive, we cannot know\u201d.\n\nFrom this we may gather what Beruni\u2019s philosophy was: Only\nsense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, yield sure\nknowledge; and for the uses of life we need a practical philosophy,\nwhich enables us to distinguish friend from foe. He doubtless did not\nhimself imagine that he had said all that could be said on the subject.\n\n10. From the school of Ibn Sina, we have had more names handed down,\nthan we have had writings preserved. Djuzdjani annexes to his\nAutobiography an account of the life of the master. And, farther, we\nhave one or two short metaphysical treatises by Abu-l-Hasan Behmenyar\nibn al-Marzuban, which are nearly in complete agreement with the system\nof his teacher. But Matter appears to lose somewhat of its\nsubstantiality: as Possibility of Existence it becomes a relation of\nthought.\n\nAccording to Behmenyar, God is the pure, uncaused Unity of Necessary\nExistence,\u2014not the living, all-producing Creator. True enough, He is\nthe cause of the world, but the effect is given necessarily and\nsynchronously with the cause; otherwise the cause would not be perfect,\nbeing capable of change. Essentially, though not in point of time, the\nexistence of God precedes that of the world. Three predicates thus\npertain to the highest existence, viz., that it is (1) essentially\nfirst, (2) self-sufficing, and (3) necessary. In other words God\u2019s\nessential nature is the Necessity of his Existence. All that can\npossibly be,\u2014owes its existence to this Absolutely Necessary Being.\n\nNow that is quite in harmony with the doctrines of Ibn Sina; and the\nsame is the case with the disciple\u2019s scheme of the world and his\ndoctrine of Souls. Whatever has once attained to full reality,\u2014the\nvarious Sphere-Spirits according to their kind, Primeval Matter, and\nthe individually different Souls of Men,\u2014all lasts for ever. Nothing\nthat is completely real can pass away, inasmuch as the completely real\nhas nothing to do with mere possibility.\n\nThe characteristic of all that is spiritual is its knowledge of its own\nessential nature. Will is nothing else, in Behmenyar\u2019s opinion, than\nthe knowledge of that which is the necessary outcome of that nature.\nFarther, the life and the joy of rational souls consist in\nself-knowledge.\n\n11. Ibn Sina achieved a far-reaching influence. His Canon of Medicine\nwas highly esteemed even in the West, from the 13th century to the\n16th, and it is still the authority for medical treatment among the\nPersians of the present day. On Christian Scholasticism his influence\nwas important. Dante placed him between Hippocrates and Galen; and\nScaliger maintained that he was Galen\u2019s equal in Medicine, and much his\nsuperior in Philosophy.\n\nFor the East he stood and yet stands as the Prince of Philosophy. In\nthat region Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism continues to be known under\nthe form which was given it by Ibn Sina. Manuscripts of his works\nabound,\u2014an evidence of his popularity,\u2014while commentaries on his\nwritings, and epitomes of them, are countless. He was studied by\nphysicians and statesmen, and even by theologians: It was only a few\nwho went farther back and consulted his sources.\n\nFrom the very first, of course, he had many enemies, and they were more\nnoisy in their demonstrations than his friends. Poets cursed him:\ntheologians either chimed in with him, or tried to refute him. And in\nBagdad in the year 1150, the Caliph Mustandjid consigned to the flames\nIbn Sina\u2019s writings, as part of a certain judge\u2019s philosophical\nlibrary.\n\n\n\n\n5. Ibn al-Haitham.\n\n1. After the days of Ibn Sina and his school, little more attention was\npaid to the cultivation of Speculative Philosophy in the Eastern\nregions of the Muslim empire. In these lands Arabic was forced more and\nmore to yield to Persian, both in life and in literature. That the\nPersian tongue is not so well adapted for abstract logical and\nmetaphysical discussion\u2014might be only of quite secondary importance, in\nconnection with this decline in speculation; but the conditions of\ncivilization, and with them the subjects which interested men, were\nsadly changed. Ethics and Politics came more to the front, although\nwithout assuming an actually new form. But in the later Persian\nliterature the predominant place was unmistakeably held by Poetry,\npartly of a free-thinking tendency, partly, and indeed\npreponderatingly, of a mystic kind, which satisfied the need for\nwisdom, experienced by people of culture.\n\nFrom about the middle of the 10th century, the scientific movement\nwhich originated at Bagdad had in part turned westward. We have already\nfound Farabi in Syria, and Masudi in Egypt: In the latter country Cairo\nwas becoming a second Bagdad.\n\n2. In Cairo, at the beginning of the 11th century, we come upon one of\nthe most considerable mathematicians and physicists in all the Middle\nAges, Abu Ali Mohammed ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Haitham (Alhazen). He had\nformerly been a government-official in Basra, his native town.\nConfiding too much in the practical value of his mathematical\nknowledge, he imagined that he could regulate the inundations of the\nNile; but having been summoned on that account by the Caliph al-Hakim,\nhe became aware, soon after his arrival, of the futility of his\nefforts. Thereupon he fell into disgrace as a public official, and went\ninto hiding till the Caliph\u2019s death, in 1021. From that time he devoted\nhimself to literary and scientific work, up to his own death, in 1038.\n\nHis chief strength is shown in mathematics and its practical\napplication; but he also devoted great attention to the writings of\nGalen and Aristotle, nor did he confine that attention to the physical\ntreatises. By his own confession he had, in a spirit of doubt about\neverything, been engaged, from his youth up, in considering the various\nviews and doctrines of men, until he came to recognize in all of them\nmore or less successful attempts to approximate to the truth. Moreover\ntruth for him was only that which was presented as material for the\nfaculties of sense-perception, and which received its form from the\nunderstanding, being thus the logically-elaborated perception. To seek\nsuch truth was his aim in the study of philosophy. In his view\nphilosophy should be the basis of all the sciences. He found it in the\nwritings of Aristotle, inasmuch as that sage had best understood how to\nknit sense-perception into a coherent whole with rational knowledge.\nWith eagerness therefore he studied and illustrated Aristotle\u2019s works,\nfor the use and profit of mankind, as well as to exercise his own\nintellect and provide a treasure and consolation for his old age. Of\nthese labours, however, nothing seems to have been preserved for us.\n\nThe most important of Ibn al-Haitham\u2019s writings is the \u201cOptics\u201d, which\nhas come down to us in a Latin translation and redaction. In it he\nshows himself to be an acute mathematical thinker, always taking pains\nwith the analysis of hypotheses and of the actual examples. A Western,\nbelonging to the 13th century (Vitello), was able to give a more\nmethodical account of the whole subject; but yet in keenness of\nobservation on specific points, Ibn al-Haitham may be reckoned his\nsuperior.\n\n3. Ibn al-Haitham\u2019s thinking is expressed in quite a mathematical\nstyle. The Substance of a body consists, according to him, of the sum\nof its essential attributes, just as a whole is equal to the sum of its\nparts, and a concept to the sum of its marks.\n\nIn the \u201cOptics\u201d the psychological remarks on Seeing and on\nSense-Perception in general\u2014are of special interest for us. Here he\nexerts himself to separate the individual Moments of the Perception,\nand to give prominence to the condition of Time as characterizing the\nwhole process.\n\nPerception then is a compound process, arising out of (1) sensation,\n(2) comparison of several sensations or of the present sensation with\nthe memory-image which has been gradually formed in the soul as a\nresult of earlier sensations, and (3) recognition, in such fashion that\nwe recognize the present percept as equivalent to the memory-image.\nComparison and recognition are not activities of the Senses, which\nmerely receive impressions passively, but they devolve upon the\nUnderstanding as the faculty of judgment. Ordinarily the whole process\ngoes forward unconsciously or semi-consciously, and it is only through\nreflection that it is brought within our consciousness, and that the\napparently simplex is separated into its component parts.\n\nThe process of Perception is gone through very quickly. The more\npractice a man has in this respect, and the oftener a perception is\nrepeated, the more firmly is the memory-image stamped upon the soul,\nand the more rapidly is recognition or perception effected. The cause\nof this is that the new sensation is supplemented by the image which is\nalready present in the soul. One might thus be disposed to think that\nPerception was an instantaneous act, at least after long practice.\nThat, however, would be erroneous, for not only is every sensation\nattended by a corresponding change localized in the sense-organ, which\ndemands a certain time, but also, between the stimulation of the organ\nand the consciousness of the perception an interval of time must\nelapse, corresponding to the transmission of the stimulus for some\ndistance along the nerves. That it needs time, for example, to perceive\na colour, is proved by the rotating circle of colours, which shows us\nmerely a mixed colour, because on account of the rapid movement we have\nno time to perceive the individual colours.\n\nComparison and Recognition are, according to Ibn al-Haitham, the\nsignificant Mental Moments of Perception. On the other hand Sensation\ntallies with the Material; and the Sense experiencing the sensation\nexhibits a passive attitude. Properly all sensation is in itself a kind\nof discomfort, which ordinarily does not make itself felt, but which\nemerges into consciousness under very strong stimuli, for example,\nthrough too bright a light. A pleasurable character accrues only to the\ncompleted perception, that is to the recognition which lifts the\nmaterial given in sensation, up to the mental form.\n\nThe comparison and recognition, which are put in operation in\nPerception, constitute an unconscious judgment and conclusion. The\nchild is already drawing a conclusion, when of two apples he chooses\nthe finer one. As often as we comprehend a connection, we are\nconcluding. But, since judging and concluding are quickly settled, men\nare easily misled in this matter, and frequently they regard as an\noriginal concept that which is merely a judgment derived by a process\nof ratiocination. In the case of everything which is announced to us as\nan axiom, we should be on our guard and trace it up, to see whether it\ncannot be derived from something more simple.\n\n4. This appeal of our philosopher had little effect in the East. It is\ntrue that in Mathematics and Astronomy he created somewhat of a school;\nbut his Aristotelian philosophy had comparatively few admirers. We know\nonly one of his scholars who is counted among the Philosophers,\nAbu-l-Wafa Mubasshir ibn Fatik al-Qaid, an Egyptian emir, who in the\nyear 1053 produced a work made up of proverbial wisdom, anecdotes in\nillustration of the history of philosophy, and so on. Hardly anything\ncan be traced in it which is the result of his own thinking. It should\nhave been pleasant reading. And the inhabitants of Cairo in after times\nfound edification,\u2014more even than in such a work,\u2014in the tales of the\nThousand and One Nights.\n\nThe East set the stigma of heresy upon Ibn al-Haitham and his works,\nand now it has almost completely forgotten him. A disciple of\nMaimonides, the Jewish philosopher, relates that he was in Bagdad on\nbusiness, when the library of a certain philosopher, (who died in 1214)\nwas burned there. The preacher, who conducted the execution of the\nsentence, threw into the flames, with his own hands, an astronomical\nwork of Ibn al-Haitham, after he had pointed to a delineation therein\ngiven of the sphere of the earth, as an unhappy symbol of impious\nAtheism.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nV. THE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE EAST.\n\n\n1. Gazali.\n\n1. We have already seen that the theological movement in Islam was\nstrongly influenced by Philosophy. Not only the Mutazilite, but also\nthe Antimutazilite Dialectic drew its opinions and the arguments with\nwhich it supported its own teaching or disputed that of its opponents,\nfor the most part out of the writings of the philosophers. Out of these\none took just what he was able to make use of: the rest he left in\npeace, or else he endeavoured to refute it. Thus numerous writings came\ninto existence, directed against some particular philosophical\ndoctrine, or some individual philosopher. No attempt, however, had been\nmade before the time of Gazali, to direct an attack from general points\nof view and after thorough-going study, against the entire system of\nPhilosophy which had been built up in the East on a Greek foundation.\n\nGazali\u2019s undertaking had also a positive side. Along with the Dialectic\nwhich sought to make the doctrines of the Faith intelligible, or even\nto provide them with a rational basis, there were movements in Islam of\na mysticism which tended to a conception of dogma, profound and full of\nfeeling. Its wish was, not to comprehend or demonstrate the contents of\nthe Faith, but to learn them by experience and live in them through the\nSpirit. The highest certitude ought to belong to the Faith. Ought it\nthen to be in the power of any to transform it into a derived\nknowledge? Or must its tenets be principles of the Reason, neither\ncapable of farther proof, nor requiring it? But the fundamental\nprinciples of the Reason, when once they are known, must be universally\nrecognized; and universal recognition is lacking in the case of the\ntenets of the Faith. From what other source does unbelief arise? Thus\nthe questioning proceeded; and it seemed to many that the only way out\nof these doubts was to base religious doctrine upon an inner,\nsupra-rational illumination. At first this came about unconsciously,\nunder a mystic impulse, whereby the contents of moral and religious\nteaching were often brought into neglect. Gazali took part in this\nmovement also. That which had perhaps been typified by the Salimites\nand Karramites, Antimutazilite sects, he set forth completely and in a\ndignified style; and ever since his time Mysticism both sustains and\ncrowns the Temple of Learning in Orthodox Islam.\n\n2. The story of this man\u2019s life is a remarkable one; and, in order to\nunderstand the effectiveness of his work, it is absolutely essential to\nexamine it with a measure of detail. He was born at Tos in Khorasan in\nthe year 1059, being thus a countryman of the great poet Firdausi. And\njust as the latter furnishes a proof of the old glory of the Persian\nnation, so Gazali was destined to be a \u201ctestimony and ornament\u201d for all\nfuture Islam. Even his early education,\u2014obtained after his father\u2019s\ndeath, in the house of a Sufi friend,\u2014was rather cosmopolitan than\nnational in its direction. Farther, any limitation was displeasing to\nthe youth\u2019s restless and fanciful spirit. He did not feel at home in\nthe hair-splitting casuistry of the teachers of Morals with their\nprecise formulas: he regarded it as a worldly knowledge, from which he\nturned away, to immerse his spirit in the knowledge of Allah. Then he\nstudied theology in Nishabur with the Im\u0101m al-Haramain, who died in\n1085; and at the same time he may himself have begun to write and to\nteach, and, perhaps even thus early, to entertain doubts of his own\nscience. Thereafter he was in attendance at the court of Nizam al-Mulk,\nthe Vizir of the Seldjuk prince, until in 1091 he was appointed a\nProfessor in Bagdad. It was during this time at all events that he\nbusied himself most with philosophy. But it was not pure love for the\nscience, which impelled him to that study, but the longing of his heart\nto find a solution of the doubts which assailed his understanding. Not\nany explanation of the events of the world, nor any clearing up of his\nown thinking, but peace of mind and the experience of a higher reality\nconstituted the object which he strove to reach. He subjected to a\nthorough study the writings of the philosophers, in particular those of\nFarabi and Ibn Sina; and, following chiefly the system of the latter,\nhe composed a Compendium of Philosophy, regarding it objectively, but\nstill with some appearance of sympathy with its contents. He said,\u2014at\nfirst in a kind of whisper to pacify his own mind, but afterwards\npublicly in self-defence,\u2014that he composed that work in order that he\nmight follow up the statement of the doctrines of philosophy with the\nrefutation of the same. And that refutation did appear, probably not\nlong after. It was the famous \u201cDestruction of the Philosophers\u201d,\u2014which\nwas composed in all likelihood while he was still in Bagdad, or shortly\nafter he had left it.\n\nBut by the end of four years, viz. in 1095, Gazali had discontinued his\nwork of teaching in Bagdad, attended though it had been with outward\nsuccess. His mind, continually in a state of doubt, probably found no\nsatisfaction in dogmatic prelections. He was alternately attracted and\nrepelled by his own brilliant position, and he came to think that he\ncould, and that he should, fight against the world and its wisdom in\nsome other way, to more purpose. Ambition with him embraced far more\nthan this world. Profounder still his musings became; and during an\nillness of his, the inner call presented itself to his soul. He had\nsecretly to prepare for the work, by means of Sufi exercises,\u2014perhaps\neven to assume the character of a religious and political reformer. At\nthe very time that the Crusaders were equipping themselves in the West\nagainst Islam, Gazali was preparing himself to be the spiritual\nchampion of the Muslim faith. His conversion was not of a violent\ncharacter, like that of St. Augustine, but was rather to be compared to\nthe experience of St. Jerome, who was summoned in a dream from his\nCiceronian predilections to practical Christianity.\n\nFor ten years Gazali travelled here and there, dividing his time\nbetween pious exercises and literary work. In the first part of that\nperiod it may be conjectured that he wrote his principal\ntheologico-ethical work, \u201cThe Revival of Religious Sciences\u201d: towards\nthe end he endeavoured to exercise influence as a reformer. His\njourneyings led him by way of Damascus and Jerusalem\u2014before it was\ntaken by the Crusaders,\u2014Alexandria, Mecca and Medina, back to his home.\n\nAfter his return Gazali once more engaged in teaching for a short time\nin Nishabur; and he died in Tos, his native town, on the 19th of\nDecember, 1111. His closing years were chiefly devoted to pious\ncontemplation and the study of the Traditions, which as a youth he\ncould never remember. A beautifully complete and rounded life, in which\nthe end comes back to the beginning!\n\n3. Gazali passes in review the spiritual tendencies of his time. These\nare: the Dialectic of the Theologians; Sufi Mysticism; Pythagorean\nPopular Philosophy; and Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism. That which\nDialectic desires to establish is also the object of his own faith; but\nits arguments appear to him rather weak, and many of its assertions on\nthat account open to question. He feels most in sympathy with the Sufi\nMysticism: to it he owes his dearest possession, viz., the\nestablishment of his own faith in Personality,\u2014so that he can postulate\nas an inner experience that which the Dialecticians attempt to derive\nby a process of reasoning. He thanks also the Popular Philosophy for\nthe instruction it gives, particularly in Mathematics, which he fully\nrecognizes as a science, together with its Astronomical deductions. He\nconcedes the validity of its Physics, where that is not in conflict\nwith the Faith. But Aristotelianism,\u2014as it has been taught by Farabi\nand Ibn Sina, with as much subservience to authority as has been\nexhibited by the Theologians,\u2014seems to him to be the enemy of Islam;\nand in the name of all the Muslim schools and tendencies of thought\ntogether, he feels bound to do battle with it, as from a catholic\nstandpoint. And in truth he does this with Aristotle\u2019s own\nweapons,\u2014those of Logic; for the axioms of thought which Logic lays\ndown are, in his eyes, just as firmly established as the propositions\nof Mathematics. Fully alive to this, he starts from the Principle of\nContradiction, to which, according to his contention, God himself\nsubmits. Of the Physico-Metaphysical doctrines of Philosophy then, he\nattacks three in particular: 1. That the world is eternal; 2. That God\ntakes cognizance only of the Universal, and that consequently there is\nno special providence; 3. That the Soul alone is immortal, and\ntherefore a Resurrection of the Body is not to be looked for. In the\nrefutation of these doctrines Gazali is in many respects dependent on\nthe Christian commentator on Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who also\nhas written against the doctrine of the eternity of the world\nmaintained by Proclus.\n\n4. (1) The world, according to the philosophers, is a sphere of finite\nextent but of infinite duration. From all eternity, it proceeds from\nGod, even as the effect is in existence at the same time with the\ncause. Gazali, on the contrary, is of opinion that it is not admissible\nto put such different constructions on the notions of Space and Time\nrespectively; and he holds that the Divine Causality should be defined\nas free Creative Might.\n\nFirst then as to Space and Time: we are as little able to imagine an\noutermost boundary of Space as a beginning or end of Time. He who\nbelieves in an endless Time, must, in consistency with that notion of\nhis, assume also the existence of an infinite Space. To say that Space\nanswers to the external sense, and Time on the other hand to the\ninternal,\u2014does not alter the case, for we do not after all get rid of\nthe Sensible. Just as Space bears a relation to Body, so does Time to\nthe movement of Body. Both are merely relations of things, created in\nand with the things of the world, or rather relations between our\nconceptions, which God creates in us.\n\nStill more important is that which Gazali advances about Causality. The\nPhilosophers distinguish between an operation of God, of Spiritual\nBeings endowed with will, of the Soul, of Nature, of Chance and the\nlike; but for Gazali, just as for the orthodox Kalam, there is really\nonly one causality, that of the \u2018Willing\u2019 Being. He completely puts\naside the causality of Nature, which is reducible without remainder\ninto a relation of Time. We see one definite phenomenon (Cause)\nregularly succeeded by another definite phenomenon (Effect); but how\nthe latter results from the former is left an enigma for us. Of\noperation in the objects of Nature we know nothing. Farther, any\nalteration is in itself inconceivable. That any one thing should become\na different thing is incomprehensible to thought, which may just as\nwell ask about facts as about causes. A thing either exists, or it does\nnot exist; but not even Divine Omnipotence can transform one existing\nthing into another thing. It creates or else annihilates.\n\nAnd yet it is a fact of our consciousness that we do effect something.\nIf we \u2018will\u2019 anything, and possess the power to carry it out, we claim\nthe result as our act. Action, proceeding from a free will, and\nconscious of the exertion of power, is the only causality of which we\nknow; and we argue from this to the Divine Being. But by what right?\nThe warrant for such a conclusion Gazali thinks that he finds in his\nown personal experience of the image of God in his soul; while on the\nother hand he declines to credit Nature with the likeness to God which\nbelongs to his own soul.\n\nFor him accordingly, God, in so far as he can be known from the world,\nis the Almighty Being, free in will and efficient in operation. No\nspatial limit may be set to his causative activity, which yet the\nphilosophers do, when they grant only his influence in his first\ncreated work. But on the other hand He can limit his own work both in\nSpace and Time, so that this finite world has only a finite duration.\nThat God should call the world into existence out of nothing by an\nabsolute act of creation\u2014seems to the Philosophers to be absurd. They\nrecognize only an exchange of Accidents or Forms in the one material, a\npassing of the actual from possibility to possibility. But does nothing\nnew ever come then into being? Is not every apprehension of the\nsenses,\u2014asks Gazali,\u2014and every spiritual perception, something entirely\nnew, which either exists or else does not exist, but at whose coming\ninto existence the contrary does not cease, and at whose vanishing from\nexistence, the opposite does not make its appearance? Consider farther\nthe numerous individual souls which, according to Ibn Sina\u2019s system,\nmust be in existence: have not these come into being, absolutely new?\n\nThere is no end to the putting of questions. The representative process\nwanders about in all directions and far; and thought leads us on ad\ninfinitum. The chain of causation can nowhere be brought to an end, any\nmore than Space or Time. In order then that there should be a definite,\nfinal Existence,\u2014and in postulating this, Gazali is at one with the\nPhilosophers\u2014, we need an Eternal Will as First Cause, different from\neverything else.\n\nWe may at all events make this acknowledgement to Gazali, that Ibn\nSina\u2019s fantastic doctrine of Forms and Souls makes no stand against his\ncriticism.\n\n5. (2) We have now come to the idea of God. In the view of the\nPhilosophers, God is the highest Being, and his essence is Thought.\nThat which He knows, comes into existence, emanating from his\nabundance; but he has not positively \u2018willed\u2019 it, for all Willing\npresupposes a deficiency,\u2014a need\u2014, and is conditioned by some change in\nthe Being that wills. Willing is movement in the material: completely\nreal Spirit wills nothing. Therefore God beholds his creation in a\ncontemplation which is undisturbed by any wish. He recognizes himself,\nor even his first Creature, or, according to Ibn Sina, the Universal,\nthe eternal Genera and Species of all things.\n\nBut according to Gazali there must eternally belong to God a Will, as\none of his eternal attributes. In a conventional way he grants, it is\ntrue, that in metaphysical and ethical considerations knowing precedes\nwilling, but he is convinced that unity of Being does not more reside\nin knowing than in willing. Not only the multiplicity of the objects of\nknowledge, and their different relations to the knowing Subject, but\neven Self-Consciousness, or knowing about the knowing, considered per\nse, is an endless process. An act of will is absolutely necessary to\nbring it to a conclusion. In directing the attention and in\nself-communing an original \u201cWilling\u201d is in operation; and thus even\nDivine knowledge comes to a conclusion as a coherent unity, in its\nPersonality, by means of an original eternal Will. In place of the\nassertion of the Philosophers that God wills the world, because he\nthinks of it as the best, Gazali substitutes the statement: \u201cGod has\ncognizance of the world because he wills it and in his willing it\u201d.\n\nMust not then He, who wills and creates all, have cognizance of his\nwork down to the smallest part of its material? Just as his eternal\nwill is the cause of all individual things, so his eternal knowledge\nembraces at one and the same time every particular thing, without the\nunity of his nature being thereby taken away. There is consequently a\nProvidence.\n\nTo the objection that Divine Providence makes every particular event a\nnecessary event, Gazali, like St. Augustine, replies that this\nfore-knowledge is not distinguishable from knowledge in memory,\u2014that is\nto say, that God\u2019s knowledge is exalted above every distinction of\ntime.\n\nIt may be questioned whether, in order to save the eternal, almighty,\ncreative Will, Gazali has not sacrificed to that absolute might both\nthe temporary character of the world, which he would like to prove, and\nthe freedom of human action, from which he sets out, and which he would\nnot altogether surrender. This world of shadows and images, as he calls\nit, vanishes for the sake of God.\n\n6. (3) The third question, with regard to which Gazali separates\nhimself from the Philosophers, has less philosophic interest. It refers\nto the Resurrection of the Body. According to the Philosophers it is\nonly the Soul that is immortal, either in its individuality or as a\npart of the World-Soul: The Body on the other hand is perishable.\nAgainst this Dualism, which in theory led to an ascetic Ethics, but\nwhich in practice was easily converted into Libertinism, the religious\nand moral feeling of Gazali rose in rebellion. If the flesh is to have\nits obligations, it must in turn be invested with its rights. The\npossibility of the Resurrection cannot be denied, for the reunion of\nthe Soul with its (new) bodily frame is not more wonderful than its\nfirst union with the earthly body, which has been assumed even by the\nPhilosophers. Surely then every soul at the resurrection-time may\nobtain a new body suited to it. But in any case Man\u2019s real essence is\nthe Soul; and it is of little consequence what the material is, out of\nwhich its heavenly body is formed.\n\n7. Even from these last propositions it is clear that Gazali\u2019s theology\ndid not remain unaffected by philosophical speculation. Like the\nFathers of the Western Church, he had, whether consciously or\nunconsciously, appropriated a good deal from philosophy; and for that\nreason his theology was long proscribed as a heretical innovation by\nthe Muslims of the West. In reality his teaching regarding God, the\nWorld, and the human Soul exhibits many elements which are foreign to\nthe oldest type of Islam, and which may be traced back,\u2014partly through\nthe intervening agency of Christian and Jewish writers and partly\nthrough that of more recent Muslim authors,\u2014to heathen wisdom.\n\nAllah, Lord of the Worlds, God of Mohammed, is for Gazali a living\npersonality it is true, but yet far less anthropomorphic than he\nappeared to simple Faith or in the Antimutazilite dogma. The surest way\nof coming to know him must be to refuse to attribute to him any of the\nproperties of his creatures. But that does not mean that he possesses\nno attributes: the very reverse is the case. The plurality of his\nqualities does not prejudice the Unity of his Being. Analogies are\npresented in the bodily world: A thing certainly cannot be both black\nand white at the same time, but it may well be cold and also dry. Only,\nif the qualities of men are attributed to God, they must be understood\nin another and higher sense, for he is pure Spirit. Besides omniscience\nand omnipotence, pure goodness and omnipresence belong to Him. By means\nof this omnipresence this world and the next are brought in a manner\nnearer to one another than by the usual representation.\n\nThe conception of God is thus spiritualized. But resurrection and the\nfuture life are also regarded as being much more spiritual in character\nthan the present life. Such a conception is facilitated by the doctrine\nof the Gnostic Philosophy, that there are three or four worlds. One\nabove the other in regular order rise the Earthly and Sensible World of\nMen, the World of Celestial Spirits, to which our Soul belongs, the\nWorld of Supra-celestial Angels, and lastly God himself, as the World\nof purest Light and most perfect Spirit. The pious and enlightened Soul\nascends from the lower world through the heavens till it is face to\nface with God, for it is of spiritual nature and its resurrection-body\nis of celestial essence.\n\nIn a manner corresponding to the different worlds and grades of Souls,\nmen themselves differ from one another. The man of sensuous nature must\nbe content with the Koran and Tradition: he should not venture beyond\nthe letter of the Law. The study of duty is his bread of life;\nphilosophy would be a deadly poison to him. He who cannot swim should\nnot venture into the sea.\n\nHowever there are always people who go into the water for the purpose\nof learning to swim. They want to elevate their faith into knowledge,\nbut in the process they may easily fall into doubt and unbelief. For\nthem, in Gazali\u2019s opinion, a useful remedy may be found in the study of\nDoctrine and Polemics directed against Philosophy.\n\nThose, however, have reached the highest degree of human perfection,\nwho, without any laborious cogitation, experience in themselves by\nmeans of an inward and Divine illumination the truth and the reality of\nthe Spiritual World. Such are the prophets and pious mystics, among\nwhom Gazali himself may be reckoned. They see God in everything,\u2014Him,\nand Him alone\u2014, and in Nature just as in the life of their own Soul;\nbut they see Him best in the Soul, for although it is not Divine it has\nat least a likeness to the Divine. How altered now is every outward\nthing! That which seems to be in existence outside of us, becomes a\ncondition or a property of the Soul, which in the consciousness of its\nunion with God, advances to the highest bliss. All things then become\none in Love. The true service of God transcends fear of punishment and\nhope of reward, attaining to Love of God in the Spirit. The perfect\nservant of God is raised above endurance and thanksgiving,\u2014which\nconstitute the obligation of the pious wanderer upon the earth, so long\nas he remains imperfect\u2014, so that even in this world he loves and\npraises God with joy of heart.\n\n8. From what has been said it follows that there are three stages of\nBelief or Certainty. First, the belief of the multitude, who believe\nwhat some man worthy of belief declares to them, for instance, that\nSo-and-so is in the house; secondly, the knowledge of the learned,\ngained by deduction: they have heard So-and-so speaking, and conclude\nthat he is in the house; but thirdly we have the immediate certainty of\nthe \u2018knowing\u2019 ones, for they have entered the house and seen the person\nwith their own eyes.\n\nIn contradistinction to the Dialecticians and Philosophers, Gazali\neverywhere lays stress upon experience. The former, with their\nUniversal Ideas, in the first place fail to do justice to the\nmultiplicity which attaches to this world of sense. The sensible\nqualities of things,\u2014even the number of the stars for example,\u2014we come\nto know only through experience, and not from pure Ideas. Much less,\nhowever, do such Ideas exhaust the heights and depths of our inner\nbeing. That which the friend of God knows intuitively, remains hidden\nfor ever from the discursive intellect of the learned. A very small\nnumber attain to this height of knowledge, where they meet with the\nApostles of God and Prophets of all times. It is the duty then of the\nSpirits who stand at a lower level to strive to follow them.\n\nBut now how are we to recognize the superior Spirit whom we need as our\nguide? That is a question, on which every religiously-determined\nsystem, which cannot do without human intermediaries, must founder, if\nconsidered purely in the light of the understanding. Even Gazali\u2019s\nanswer is indecisive. This much is certain to him, that grounds\nfurnished by the reason alone cannot decide this question. The Prophet\nand Teacher who has been actually inspired by God is recognized by\nmerging ourselves in his peculiar personality, through the experience\nof an inward relationship. The truth of Prophecy is authenticated by\nthe moral influence which it exercises upon the Soul. Of the\ntruthfulness of God\u2019s word in the Koran we acquire a moral, not a\ntheoretical certainty. The detached miracle is not capable of\nconvincing; but the revelation as a whole, together with the\npersonality of the Prophet, through whom the revelation has been\nconveyed, produce an irresistible impression upon the kindred soul.\nThen, wholly carried away by such impression, the soul renounces the\nworld, to walk in the way of God.\n\n9. Gazali is without doubt the most remarkable figure in all Islam. His\ndoctrine is the expression of his own personality. He abandoned the\nattempt to understand this world. But the religious problem he\ncomprehended much more profoundly than did the philosophers of his\ntime. These were intellectual in their methods, like their Greek\npredecessors, and consequently regarded the doctrines of Religion as\nmerely the products of the conception or fancy or even caprice of the\nlawgiver. According to them Religion was either blind obedience, or a\nkind of knowledge which contained truth of an inferior order.\n\nOn the other hand Gazali represents Religion as the experience of his\ninner Being. It is for him more than Law and more than Doctrine: it is\nthe Soul\u2019s experience.\n\nIt is not every one who has this experience of Gazali\u2019s. But even those\nwho cannot follow him in his mystic flight, when he transcends the\nconditions of any possible experience, will at least be constrained to\nacknowledge that his aberrations in searching for the highest are not\nless important for the history of the Human Mind than the apparently\nsurer paths taken by the philosophers of his time, through a land which\nothers had discovered before them.\n\n\n\n\n2. The Epitomists.\n\n1. In a history of scholarly Education as conducted in the Muslim\nnations, this subject would necessarily have a larger space assigned\nit: but here we shall dismiss it in a few words.\n\nThat Gazali has annihilated philosophy in the East, for all time to\ncome, is an assertion frequently repeated but wholly erroneous, and one\nwhich evidences neither historical knowledge nor understanding.\nPhilosophy in the East has since his day numbered its teachers and\nstudents by hundreds and by thousands. The teachers of the Faith have\nno more discontinued their dialectical arguments in support of Doctrine\nthan the teachers of Morals have abandoned their hair-splitting\ncasuistry. General culture too has adopted an element of philosophical\nlearning.\n\nBut it is true that Philosophy did not succeed in conquering for itself\na commanding position, or in retaining the consideration which it once\nenjoyed. According to an Arab anecdote a Philosopher, who had been\nthrown into prison, on being asked what he was fit for, by a man who\nwanted to purchase him as a slave, is said to have replied: \u201cFor\nfreedom\u201d. Philosophy needs freedom. And where was this Freedom to be\nmet with in the East? Freedom from material cares, freedom to exemplify\nunprejudiced thinking, tended continually to dwindle away from regions\nwhere no enlightened despots were to be found, able to warrant and\nprotect it. But that is just a symptom of the general decay of\ncivilization. And although travellers from the West in the twelfth\ncentury praised highly the culture of the East, it had, in comparison\nwith earlier times, at least begun to decline. In no department did\nthey pass the mark which had been reached of old: Minds were now too\nweak to accomplish such a feat. Literary production became stagnant,\nand the only merit which belongs to the voluminous compilers of the\nfollowing centuries is that of elegant selection. Ethical and religious\ndoctrine had ended in Mysticism; and the same was the case with\nPhilosophy. After the time of Ibn Sina, the Prince of Philosophy, no\none felt called upon to come forward with independent views. The day\nhad come for Abridgements, Commentaries, Glosses, and Glosses upon\nGlosses. The learned world occupied their time in school with work of\nthat nature, while the believing multitude placed themselves more and\nmore under the guidance of the Dervish orders.\n\n2. That which general education borrowed most from philosophical\nPropaedeutics was a little Mathematics &c., naturally exceedingly\nelementary as a rule. By sectaries and mystics a good deal was taken\nover from Pythagorean-Platonic wisdom. In particular these doctrines\nhad to be drawn upon in order to support the belief in saints and\nmiracles; and a barren syncretistic Theosophy was tricked out\ntherewith. The system even enrolled Aristotle among its teachers, of\ncourse the spurious Aristotle, but it turned him into a disciple of\nAgathodaemon and Hermes.\n\nThe more sober-minded thinkers, on the other hand, kept to\nAristotelianism, so far as it agreed with their own views or with the\northodox Faith. The system of Ibn Sina was almost universally followed\nby them; and it was only a few that went back to Farabi, or that\nendeavoured to combine the two. Very little notice was taken of\nPhysical and Metaphysical doctrines: Ethics and Politics were rather\nmore attended to. Logic was the only subject universally studied; for\nit could be admirably conveyed in scholastic form; and, as pure Formal\nLogic, it was an instrument which every one was able to make use of. In\nfact with the resources of Logic everything might be proved; and even\nif the demonstration should be recognized as faulty, there was this\nconsolation that the averment might still be true, although its\ndemonstration had not been properly conducted.\n\nEven in the Encyclopaedia of Abu Abdallah al-Khwarizmi, a production of\nthe last quarter of the tenth century, a larger space was assigned to\nLogic than to Physics and Metaphysics. The very same thing was done in\nmany later encyclopaedias and compilations. The Dogmatists also\ncommenced their system with logical and epistemological considerations,\nin which a traditional eulogy was pronounced over \u201cknowing\u201d. And from\nthe twelfth century onwards there arose a whole multitude of separate\narrangements of the Aristotelian Organon. Here may be mentioned\nonly,\u2014as being much used, commented on, and so forth,\u2014the works of\nAbhari (\u2020 1264), who gave a short summary of the whole \u2018Logic\u2019 under\nthe title of \u201cIsagudji\u201d (\u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae); and the works of Qazwini (\u2020 1276).\n\nAt the greatest University in the Muslim world, that of Cairo, the\nEpitomes of the 13th and 14th centuries are used, up to this day. There\nthe word still is, as for a long time it was with ourselves: \u201cFirst of\nall a College of Logic\u201d, and, we need scarcely add, with no better\nresult. They indulge themselves, within the limits of the Law, in the\nluxury of studying the rules of thinking discovered by the ancient\nphilosophers, but all the while they smile at these men and at the\nMutazilite Dialecticians, who \u201cbelieved in Reason!\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVI. PHILOSOPHY IN THE WEST.\n\n\n1. Beginnings.\n\n1. Western North-Africa, Spain and Sicily are reckoned as forming the\nMuslim West. North-Africa, to begin with, is of subordinate importance:\nSicily is regulated by Spain, and is soon overthrown by the Normans of\nLower Italy. For our purpose Muslim Spain or Andalusia first falls to\nbe considered.\n\nThe drama of culture in the East passes here through a second\nrepresentation. Just as Arabs there intermarried with Persians, so in\nthe West they intermarry with Spaniards. And instead of Turks and\nMongols we have here the Berbers of North-Africa, whose rude force is\nflung into the play of more refined civilization with a blighting\ninfluence ever on the increase.\n\nAfter the fall of the Omayyads in Syria (750), a member of that House,\nAbderrakhman ibn Moawiya, betook himself to Spain, where he contrived\nto work his way up to the dignity of Emir of Cordova and all Andalusia.\nThis Omayyad overlordship lasted for more than 250 years, and after a\npassing system of petty States, it attained its greatest brilliancy\nunder Abderrakhman III (912\u2013961), the first who assumed the title of\nCaliph, and his son al-Hakam II (961\u2013976). The tenth century was for\nSpain, what the ninth was for the East,\u2014the time of highest material\nand intellectual civilization. If possible, it was more fresh and\nnative here than in the East, and, if it be true that all theorizing\nbetokens either a lack or a stagnation of the power of production, it\nwas more productive also: The sciences, and Philosophy in particular,\nhad far fewer representatives in Spain. Speaking generally, we may say\nthat the relations of intellectual life took a simpler form. There was\na smaller number of strata in the new culture than in the old. No doubt\nthere were, besides Muslims, Jews and Christians in Spain, who in the\ntime of Abderrakhman III played their part in this cultivated life, of\nthe Arabic stamp, in common with the rest. But of adherents of\nZoroaster, atheists and such like, there were none. Even the sects of\nEastern Islam were almost unknown. Only one school of Law, that of\nMalik, was admitted. No Mutazilite dialectic troubled the peace of the\nFaith. True enough the Andalusian poets glorified the trinity of Wine,\nWoman and Song; but flippant free-thinking on the one hand, and gloomy\ntheosophy and renunciation of the world on the other, rarely found\nexpression.\n\nOn the whole, intellectual culture was dependent upon the East. From\nthe tenth century onwards many journeys in search of knowledge were\nundertaken thither from Spain, by way of Egypt and as far as Eastern\nPersia, for the purpose of attending the prelections of scholars of\nrenown. And farther, educational requirements in Andalusia attracted to\nit many a learned Eastern who found no occupation in his own home.\nBesides, al-Hakam II caused books to be copied, all over the East, for\nhis library, which is said to have contained 400,000 volumes.\n\nThe West was mainly interested in Mathematics, Natural Science,\nAstrology and Medicine, precisely as was the case at first in the East.\nPoetry, History and Geography were cultivated with ardour. But the mind\nwas not yet \u201csicklied o\u2019er with the pale cast of thought\u201d, for when\nAbdallah ibn Masarra of Cordova, under Abderrakhman III, brought home\nwith him from the East a system of Natural Philosophy, he had to submit\nto see his writings consigned to the flames.\n\n2. In the year 1013 Cordova, \u201cthe Gem of the World\u201d, was laid waste by\nthe Berbers, and the kingdom of the Omayyads was split up into a number\nof minor States. Its second bloom fills up the eleventh century,\u2014the\nMedicean age of Spain, in which Art and Poetry still flourish in\nluxuriant growth at the courts of the various cities, upon the ruins of\nancient splendour. Art grows refined; poetry becomes sage, and\nscientific thought subtle. Intellectual nutriment continues to be\nfetched from the East; and Natural Philosophy, the writings of the\nFaithful Brethren, and Logic from the school of Abu Sulaiman\nal-Sidjistani find admission one after the other. Towards the close of\nthe century it is possible to trace the influence even of the writings\nof Farabi, and the \u201cMedicine\u201d of Ibn Sina becomes known.\n\nThe beginnings of philosophical reflection are found chiefly with the\nnumerous men of culture among the Jews. Eastern Natural Philosophy\nproduces a powerful and quite singular impression upon the mind of Ibn\nGebirol, the Avencebrol of Christian authors; and Bakhya ibn Pakuda is\ninfluenced by the Faithful Brethren. Even the religious poetry of the\nJews is affected by the philosophical movement; and what speaks therein\nis not the Jewish Congregation seeking after God, but the Soul rising\ntowards the Supreme Spirit.\n\nAmong the Muslims, however, the number of those who addressed\nthemselves to a thorough study of Philosophy was very limited. No\nmaster gathered about him a numerous band of disciples; and meetings of\nthe learned, for the discussion of philosophical subjects, were\nscarcely ever held. The individual thinker must have felt very lonely\nin these circumstances. In the West, just as in the East, Philosophy\nwas developed subjectively; but here it was more the concern of a few\nisolated individuals; and, besides, it stood more apart from the faith\nof the mass of the people. In the East there were countless\nintermediary agencies between faith and knowledge,\u2014between the\nphilosophers and the believing community. The problem of the individual\nthinker, confronted by political society and the faith of narrow-minded\nfanatical multitudes, was accordingly realized more acutely in the\nWest.\n\n\n\n\n2. Ibn Baddja.\n\n1. Towards the end of the eleventh century, when Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn\nYakhya ibn al-Saig ibn Baddja (Avempace) was born in Saragossa, the\nfair kingdom of Andalusia was approaching the time of its disappearance\nin a system of petty States. It was threatened from the North by the\nless civilized but yet powerful and brave Christian knights. But the\nBerber dynasty of the Almoravids came to the rescue, who were not only\nfirmer in the faith but also wiser in their policy than the voluptuous\nruling race of Spain. Then the time of refined culture and free enquiry\nseemed gone for ever. Only traditionalists, of the strictest rite,\nventured to make a public appearance, while philosophers, unless they\nkept concealed, were persecuted or put to death.\n\n2. But barbarous lords have their caprices, being fond of\nappropriating, at least superficially, the culture of those who have\nbeen subjugated by them. Thus Abu Bekr ibn Ibrahim, brother-in-law of\nthe Almoravid prince Ali,\u2014who was for some time Governor of Saragossa,\nmade Ibn Baddja his intimate friend and first minister, thereby giving\ngreat offence to his Faqihs and soldiers. Now this was a man, skilled\nboth in the theory and practice of the Mathematical Sciences,\nparticularly Astronomy and Music, as well as an adept in Medicine, and\none who was devoted to speculative studies in Logic, Natural Philosophy\nand Metaphysics; and in the opinion of the fanatics he was an utterly\nabandoned atheist and immoral person.\n\nWe know nothing more of the outward life of Ibn Baddja except that he\nwas in Seville in the year 1118, after the fall of Saragossa, and that\nhe composed several of his works there, afterwards betaking himself to\nthe Almoravid court in Fez, where he died in 1138. According to\ntradition he met his death by poison, administered at the instigation\nof a jealous physician. His short life, as he himself confesses, had\nnot been a happy one; and he had often longed for death, as a final\nrefuge. Material want, and, above all, intellectual isolation, may have\nweighed down his spirits. His extant writings abundantly evince that he\nwas unable to feel at home in that day and that environment.\n\n3. He conforms almost entirely to Farabi, the quiet, solitary Eastern.\nLike him he was little given to systematizing. His original treatises\nare but few in number; and they consist chiefly of brief expositions of\nAristotelian and other philosophical works. His observations are of a\ndesultory character: Now he makes a beginning in one place; again, he\nstarts afresh in another. In continually renewed approaches he\nendeavours to get nearer Greek thought, and to penetrate from every\npossible side to ancient science. He does not discard philosophy, and\nhe does not deal conclusively with it. On a first glance, that produces\na puzzling impression; but, in the sombre impulse which is upon him,\nthe philosopher has become aware of the path he is pursuing. In\nsearching for truth and righteousness, he is coming upon another\nthing,\u2014unity and joy in his own life. In his opinion, Gazali took the\nmatter much too easily, when he thought he could be happy only in the\nfull possession of the truth comprehended by means of Divine\nillumination. In his love for the truth, which is concealed rather than\nrevealed by the sensuous images of religious mysticism, the philosopher\nmust be strong enough to renounce that happiness. Only pure thinking,\nundisturbed by any sensuous desire, is privileged to behold the supreme\nGodhead.\n\n4. In his logical writings Ibn Baddja hardly departs from Farabi. Even\nhis physical and metaphysical theories agree generally with the views\nof the master. But perhaps the mode, in which he represents the history\nof the development of the human spirit and the position of man in\nknowledge and in life, may claim a measure of interest. There are two\nkinds of existence, according to his view,\u2014one which is moved, and one\nwhich is not moved. That which is moved is corporeal and limited, but\nits everlasting movement cannot be explained by finite Body. On the\ncontrary, in order to explain this endless movement, an unending power\nis needed, or an eternal essence, namely Spirit. Now while the\ncorporeal or the natural is moved from without, and the Spirit, itself\nunmoved, confers movement upon the corporeal, the Soul-substance\noccupies a middle position, being that which moves itself. The relation\nbetween the natural and the psychical presents as little difficulty to\nIbn Baddja as to his predecessors; but the great problem is this:\u2014\u2018How\nare the Soul and the Spirit related to each other, that is to say in\nMan?\u2019\n\n5. Ibn Baddja starts with the assumption that Matter cannot exist\nwithout some Form, while Form may exist by itself, without Matter.\nOtherwise, in fact, absolutely no change is thinkable, because that is\nrendered possible only by the coming and going of substantial Forms.\n\nThese Forms then, from the hylic up to the purely spiritual, constitute\na series, to which the development of the human spirit corresponds, in\nso far as it realizes the rational ideal. Man\u2019s task is to comprehend\nall the spiritual Forms together; first the intelligible Forms of all\nthat is corporeal, then the sensible-spiritual presentations of the\nSoul, next the human Spirit itself and the Active Spirit over it, and\nlastly the pure Spirits of the celestial spheres. By rising through\nsuccessive stages from the individual and sensible, the presentation of\nwhich constitutes the material on which the Spirit operates, Man\nattains to the superhuman and the Divine. Now his guide in this process\nis Philosophy, or the knowledge of the universal, which issues from\nknowledge of the particular through study and reflection, aided however\nby the enlightening Spirit from above. Contrasted with this knowledge\nof the universal or the infinite,\u2014in which Being, and becoming the\nobject of cognition coincide,\u2014all perception and presentation prove\ndeceptive. Thus it is by rational knowledge, and not by religious and\nmystical dreaming, with the sensuous invariably clinging thereto, that\nthe human Spirit arrives at perfection. Thinking is the highest bliss,\nfor its very purpose is to reach all that is intelligible. But since\nthat is the universal, the continued existence of individual human\nSpirits beyond this life cannot be assumed. It may be that the\nSoul,\u2014which apprehends the particular in the life of sensuous-spiritual\npresentation, and notifies its existence in separate desires and\nactions,\u2014has the faculty of continuing that existence after death, and\nof receiving reward or punishment; but the Spirit or the rational part\nof the Soul is one in all. It is only the Spirit of the entirety of\nMankind, or, in other words, the one Intellect, Mind or Spirit in\nHumanity,\u2014and that too in its union with the active Spirit over\nit,\u2014which is eternal. This theory, which made its way into the\nChristendom of the Middle Ages, under the name of Averroes\u2019 Theory, is\nthus found even with Ibn Baddja, if not quite distinctly conceived, at\nall events more clearly given than with Farabi.\n\n6. Every man does not rise to such a height of contemplation. The\ngreater number grope about continually in the dark; they merely see the\nadumbrations of things, and like shadows they will pass away. Some see\nthe Light, it is true, and the coloured world of things, but very few\nindeed recognize the essence of what they have seen. It is only the\nlatter, the blessed ones, who attain to life eternal,\u2014in which state\nthey themselves become Light.\n\nBut now, how does the individual man get to this stage of knowledge and\nblessed existence? Through action directed by reason, and the free\ncultivation of his intellectual powers. Action directed by reason is\nfree action, that is, action in which there is a consciousness of\npurpose. If one, for instance, breaks a stone to pieces, because he has\nstumbled against it, he is behaving without purpose, like a child or a\nlower animal; but if he does this in order that others may not stumble\nagainst the stone, his action must be called manlike, and directed by\nreason.\n\nIn order to be able to live as a man should, and to act in a rational\nway, the individual man, must as far as circumstances permit, withdraw\nfrom society. The name borne by the Ethics of Ibn Baddja is \u201cGuidance\nto the Solitary\u201d. It demands self-culture. Generally, however, one may\navail himself of the advantages attending social life in man, without\nincluding in the bargain its disadvantages. The wise may associate\nthemselves in larger or smaller unions; such indeed is their duty, if\nthey light upon one another; and then they form a State within the\nState. Naturally they endeavour to live in such a manner that neither\nphysician nor judge is necessary among them. They grow up like plants\nin the open air, and do not stand in need of the gardener\u2019s skill. They\nkeep at a distance from the lower enjoyments and sentiments of the\nmultitude. They are strangers to the movements of worldly society. And\nas they are friends among themselves, this life of theirs is wholly\ndetermined by Love. Then too as friends of God, who is the Truth, they\nfind repose in union with the superhuman Spirit of Knowledge.\n\n\n\n\n3. Ibn Tofail.\n\n1. The sovereignty over Western Islam remained with the Berbers, but\nthe Almohads speedily took the place of the Almoravids. Mohammed ibn\nTumart, the founder of the new dynasty, had, from the year 1121, come\nforward as Mahdi. Under his successors Abu Yaaqub Yusuf (1163\u20131184) and\nAbu Yusuf Yaaqub (1184\u20131198), their sovereignty, which was centred in\nMarocco, reached its culminating point.\n\nThe Almohads brought with them a startling novelty in theology: The\nsystem of Ashari and Gazali, which till then had been branded as\nheretical, was adopted in the West. That meant an infusion of\nintellectualism into the teaching of the Faith,\u2014a proceeding which\ncould not be altogether satisfactory either to the adherents of the old\nFaith or to freethinkers, but which may have incited many to farther\nphilosophizing. Hitherto an attitude of repudiation had been maintained\ntowards all reasoning in matters of faith; and, even later, many\npoliticians and philosophers were of opinion that the faith of the\nmultitude should not be violently disturbed, nor elevated to knowledge,\nbut that the provinces of Religion and of Philosophy should be kept\nscrupulously separate.\n\nThe Almohads were interested in questions of theology, but yet Abu\nYaaqub and his successors manifested, as far as political conditions\npermitted, such an appreciation of secular knowledge, that philosophy\nwas enabled to enjoy a brief period of prosperity at their court.\n\n2. We find Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn Abdalmalik ibn Tofail al-Qaisi\n(Abubacer) in the position of Vizir and Body-Physician to Abu Yaaqub,\nafter holding an appointment as Secretary in Granada. His place of\nbirth was the small Andalusian town of Guadix, and he died in Marocco,\nthe seat of Government, in the year 1185. The life that lies between\nappears to have been by no means eventful. He was fonder of books than\nof men, and in his sovereign\u2019s great library he gathered, by reading,\nmuch information which he required for his art, or which met his ardent\nthirst for knowledge. He was the dilettante of the philosophers of the\nWest, and was more given to contemplative enjoyment than scientific\nwork. Rarely did he set himself to write. We need not perhaps put\nabsolute faith in his assertion that he could have fundamentally\nimproved the Ptolemaic system. Many Arabs made a like assertion,\nwithout carrying it into effect.\n\nOf Ibn Tofail\u2019s poetic ventures, one or two poems have been preserved\nto us. But his principal endeavour, like that of Ibn Sina, was to\ncombine Greek Science and Oriental Wisdom into a modern view of the\nworld. That was to him a personal concern, just as it was to Ibn\nBaddja. He too occupied his mind with the relation of the individual\nman to Society and its prejudices. But he went farther: Ibn Baddja, as\na rule made out the individual thinker or a small association of\nindependent thinkers, as constituting a State within the State,\u2014a copy,\nas it were, of the great total, or a model for happier times: Ibn\nTofail on the other hand, turned to consider the original.\n\n3. He states the case clearly, in his work \u201cHai ibn Yaqzan\u201d. The\nscenery is contributed by two islands, on one of which he sets human\nsociety with its conventions, and on the other an individual man, who\nis being developed naturally. This society as a whole is governed by\nlower impulses, subjected only to some measure of outward restraint by\na grossly sensuous religion. But out of this society two men, called\nSalaman and Asal (Absal, cf. IV, 4 \u00a7 7), rise to rational knowledge and\ncontrol of their desires. Accommodating himself to the popular\nreligion, the first, who is of a practical turn of mind, contrives to\nrule the people; but the second, being of speculative disposition and\nmystic leanings, wanders off to the island which lay opposite, and\nwhich he imagines to be uninhabited,\u2014there to devote himself to study\nand ascetic discipline.\n\nOn that island, however, our Hai ibn Yaqzan,\u2014i.e. \u2018the Active one, the\nson of the Vigilant\u2019,\u2014had been trained into a perfect philosopher. Cast\nupon the island when a child, or else brought into existence there by\nspontaneous generation, he had been suckled by a gazelle, and then had\nbeen in the course of time left, like a Robinson Crusoe, and that\nentirely, to his own resources. Yet he had secured a material\nexistence, and farther, by observation and reflection, had acquired a\nknowledge of Nature, the heavens, God, and his own inner being, until\nafter seven times seven years he had attained to that which is highest,\nviz., the Sufi vision of God, the state of ecstasy. In this situation\nhe was found by Asal. After they had come to understand each other,\u2014for\nat first Hai was still without speech,\u2014it was found that the philosophy\nof the one and the religion of the other were two forms of the same\ntruth, except that in the first form it was somewhat less veiled. But\nwhen Hai came to know that on the opposite island an entire people\ncontinued in darkness and error, he resolved to proceed thither and\nreveal the truth to them. Here, however, he was brought to learn by\nexperience that the multitude were incapable of a pure apprehension of\nthe truth, and that Mohammed had acted wisely in giving the people\nsensuous forms instead of full light. After this result therefore he\nrepaired again with his friend Asal to the uninhabited island, to serve\nGod in spirit and in truth till the hour of death.\n\n4. Ibn Tofail has devoted by far the largest portion of his romance to\nthe course of Hai\u2019s development; but he cannot certainly have thought\nthat the individual man, left to himself, is able, with the resources\nof Nature alone and without the help of society, to advance so far as\nHai did. And yet his conception is perhaps rather more historical, than\ncertain views which have been entertained since his day, e.g. by some\nof the Rationalists of the 18th century. Many little touches in his\nwork shew that Hai was intended to represent humanity as it stands\noutside of revelation. That which is accomplished in him, is the\ndevelopment of Indian, Persian and Greek wisdom. One or two hints\npointing in that direction, but which cannot be farther followed out\nhere, may help to lend probability to this view. Thus it is\nsignificant, to begin with, that Hai lives on the island of Ceylon, the\nclimate of which was held to be such as to render spontaneous\ngeneration possible, where also, according to the legend, Adam, the\nfirst man, had been created, and where the Indian king came to the Wise\nMan. Then Hai\u2019s first religious sentiment of wonder, after he had\nstruggled up out of the primary, animal stage, through shame and\ncuriosity, is elicited by fire, which has been discovered by him,\u2014a\ncircumstance which recalls to us the Persian religion. And his farther\nspeculations are borrowed from Greco-Arabic Philosophy.\n\nThe affinity to Ibn Sina\u2019s Hai, which Ibn Tofail himself indicates, is\nclear: Only, the figure of Hai in this case presents a more human\nappearance. With Ibn Sina the character of Hai represents the\nSuperhuman Spirit, but the hero of Ibn Tofail\u2019s romance seems to be the\npersonification of the natural Spirit of Mankind illuminated from\nabove; and that Spirit must be in accordance with the Prophet-Soul of\nMohammed when rightly understood, whose utterances are to be\ninterpreted allegorically.\n\nIbn Tofail has thus arrived at the same result as his Eastern\npredecessors. Religion must still be kept up for the ordinary man,\nbecause he cannot go beyond it. It is only a few who rise to an\nunderstanding of religious symbols; and very rarely indeed does any one\nattain to the unrestrained contemplation of the highest reality. This\nlast truth he accentuates with the greatest emphasis. Even if we do\nfind in Hai the representative of human nature, we cannot gainsay this\ntruth; for the representation given sets forth the supreme perfection\nof Man as consisting in submerging his own self in the World-Spirit, in\nthe most lonely quietude, and withdrawn from all that is sensuous.\n\nIt is true that this condition is attained only in mature age, in\nwhich, besides, a human friend has been met with; and attention to what\nis material, and to the arts and sciences, forms the natural\npreliminary stage of spiritual perfection. Thus Ibn Tofail is permitted\nto look back without regret or shame upon his life spent at court.\n\n5. We have already met frequently with the philosophical views, which\nHai developed in his seven life-periods. But even his practical\nbehaviour is specially considered by Ibn Tofail. Sufi exercises, as\nthey are still observed among the religious orders of the East, and as\nthey had been recommended even by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, have\ntaken the place of the observances of religious worship enjoined by the\nMuslim Law. And Hai forms for himself in the seventh period of his life\na system of Ethics which has a Pythagorean appearance.\n\nHai has set before him as the aim of his action,\u2014to seek for the One in\nall things and to unite himself to the absolute and the self-existing.\nHe sees in fact all Nature striving to reach this Highest Being. He is\nfar above the view that everything on the earth exists for the sake of\nMan. Animals and plants likewise live for themselves and for God; and\nthus he is not permitted to deal capriciously with them. He now\nrestricts his bodily wants to what is absolutely necessary. Ripe fruits\nare preferred by him, the seeds of which he piously consigns to the\nsoil, taking anxious precaution that no kind may die out through his\navidity. And only in extreme need does he touch animal food, in which\ncase he seeks in like manner to spare the species. \u2018Enough for life,\nnot enough for sleep\u2019 is his motto.\n\nThat has reference to his bodily attitude towards the earthly; but the\nliving principle binds him to the heavens, and, like the heavens, he\nstrives to be useful to his surroundings, and to keep his own life\npure. He therefore tends the plants and protects the animals about him,\nin order that his island may become a paradise. He pays scrupulous\nattention to the cleanliness of his person and his clothing, and\nendeavours to give a harmonious turn to all his movements, in\nconformity with those of the heavenly bodies.\n\nIn this way he is gradually rendered capable of elevating his own self\nabove earth and heaven to the pure Spirit. That is the condition of\necstasy, which no thought, no word, no image has ever been able to\ncomprehend or express.\n\n\n\n\n4. Ibn Roshd.\n\n1. Abu-l-Walid Mohammed ibn Akhmed ibn Mohammed ibn Roshd (Averroes)\nwas born at Cordova, of a family of lawyers, in the year 1126. There\ntoo he made himself master of the learned culture of his time. In 1153\nhe is said to have been presented to the prince Abu Yaaqub by Ibn\nTofail; and we possess a report of that occurrence, full of character.\nAfter the introductory phrases of politeness the prince asked him:\n\u201cWhat is the opinion of philosophers about the heavens? Are they\neternal, or have they been brought into existence?\u201d Ibn Roshd\ncautiously replied that he had not given attention to philosophy.\nThereupon the prince commenced to discuss the subject with Ibn Tofail,\nand, to the astonishment of the listener, shewed that he was acquainted\nwith Aristotle, Plato, and the philosophers and theologians of Islam.\nThen Ibn Roshd also spoke out freely, and won the favour of his\nhigh-placed master. His lot was fixed: He was destined to interpret\nAristotle, as no one before him had done, that mankind might be put in\ncomplete and genuine possession of science.\n\nHe was, besides, a jurist and a physician. We find him in 1169 in the\nposition of judge in Seville, and shortly afterwards in Cordova. Abu\nYaakub, now Caliph, nominates him his Body-Physician in the year 1182;\nbut, a short time after, he is again judge in his native city, as his\nfather and grandfather had been. Circumstances, however, change for the\nworse. Philosophers are pronounced accursed, and their writings are\ncommitted to the flames. In his old age Ibn Roshd is banished by Abu\nYusuf to Elisana (Lucena, near Cordova), but yet he dies in Marocco the\ncapital, on the 10th December, 1198.\n\n2. It was upon Aristotle that his activity was concentrated. All that\nhe could procure of that philosopher\u2019s works, or about them, he\nsubjected to diligent study and careful comparison. Writings of the\nGreeks, which are now lost either entirely or in part, were still known\nto Ibn Roshd in translated form. He goes critically and systematically\nto work: He paraphrases Aristotle and he interprets him, now with\ncomparative brevity, and anon in greater detail, both in moderate-sized\nand in bulky commentaries. He thus merits the name of \u201cthe\nCommentator\u201d, which also is assigned to him in Dante\u2019s \u201cCommedia\u201d [19].\nIt looks as if the Philosophy of the Muslims had been fated in him to\ncome to an understanding of Aristotle, just that it might then expire,\nafter that end had been attained. Aristotle for him is the supremely\nperfect man, the greatest thinker, the philosopher who was in\npossession of an infallible truth. New discoveries in Astronomy, Art or\nPhysics could make no alteration in that respect. Of course it is\npossible to misunderstand Aristotle: Ibn Roshd himself came to have a\ndifferent and better understanding of many a point which he took from\nthe works of Farabi and Ibn Sina; but yet he lived continually in the\nbelief that Aristotle, when rightly understood, corresponds to the\nhighest knowledge which is attainable by man. In the eternal revolution\nof worldly events Aristotle has reached a height which it is impossible\nto transcend. Men who have come after him are frequently put to the\ncost of much trouble and reflection to deduce the views which readily\ndisclosed themselves to the first master. Gradually, however, all doubt\nand contradiction are reduced to silence, for Aristotle is one who is\nmore than man, destined as it were by Providence to illustrate how far\nthe human race is capable of advancing in its approximation to the\nWorld-Spirit. As being the sublimest incarnation of the Spirit of\nMankind, Ibn Roshd would like to call his master the \u2018Divine\u2019 Teacher.\n\nIt will be shewn by what follows, that even in the instance of Ibn\nRoshd, unmeasured admiration for Aristotle did not suffice to bring\nabout a perfect comprehension of his thoughts. He allows no opportunity\nto pass of doing battle with Ibn Sina, and, upon occasion, he parts\ncompany with Farabi and Ibn Baddja,\u2014men to whom he owes a great deal.\nHe carps at all his predecessors, in a far more disagreeable fashion\nthan Aristotle did in the case of his teacher Plato. And yet he himself\nis far from having got beyond the interpretation of Neo-Platonic\nexpositors and the misconceptions of Syrian and Arab translators.\nFrequently he follows even the superficial Themistius in opposition to\nthe judicious Alexander of Aphrodisias, or else he tries to combine\ntheir views.\n\n3. Ibn Roshd is above all a fanatical admirer of the Aristotelian\nLogic. Without it one cannot be happy, and it is a pity that Plato and\nSocrates were ignorant of it! The happiness of men is measured by the\ndegree of their logical attainments. With the discernment of a critic\nhe recognizes Porphyry\u2019s \u201cIsagoge\u201d as superfluous, but he still counts\nthe \u201cRhetoric\u201d and the \u201cPoetics\u201d as forming part of the Organon. And\nthen the oddest misapprehensions are met with. For example, Tragedy and\nComedy are turned into Panegyrics and Lampoons; poetical probability\nhas to be content with signifying either truth capable of\ndemonstration, or deceptive appearance; recognition on the stage\n(\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) becomes Apodictic judgment, and so on. Of course he has\nabsolutely no conception of the Greek world; and that is venial, for he\ncould not have had any notion of it. And yet we do not readily excuse\none who has been so severe a critic of others.\n\nLike his predecessors, Ibn Roshd lays especial emphasis upon Grammar,\nas far as it is common to all languages. This common principle, and\ntherefore the universal one, Aristotle, he thinks, keeps always before\nhim in his Hermeneutics, and even in the Rhetoric. Accordingly the Arab\nphilosopher is also bound to adhere to it, although in illustrating\nuniversal rules he may take his examples from the Arabic language and\nliterature. But it is universal rules which form his object, for\nscience is the knowledge of the universal.\n\nLogic smooths the path for the ascent of our cognition from sensuous\nparticularity to pure rational truth. The multitude will always live in\nthe sensuous element, groping about in error. Defective mental parts\nand poor education, and depraved habits to boot, prevent them from\nmaking any advance. But still it must be within the power of some to\narrive at a knowledge of truth. The eagle looks the sun in the face,\nfor if no being could look at him, Nature would have made something in\nvain. Whatever shines there is meant to be seen; and so whatever exists\nis meant to be known, were it only by one single man. Now truth exists;\nand the love for it which fills our hearts would have been all in vain,\nif we could not approach it. Ibn Roshd thinks that he has come to know\nthe truth in the case of many things, and even that he has been able to\ndiscover absolute Truth. He would not, with Lessing, have cared to\nresign himself to a mere search for it.\n\nTruth, in fact, has been given him in Aristotle; and from that\nstandpoint he looks down upon Muslim theology. Certainly he recognizes\nthat religion has a truth of its own, but theology is repugnant to him.\nIt wants to prove what cannot be proved in this way. Revelation, as\ncontained in the Koran,\u2014according to the teaching of Ibn Roshd and\nothers, and similarly of Spinoza in later times,\u2014does not aim at making\nmen learned, but at making them better. Not knowledge, but obedience or\nmoral practice is the aim of the lawgiver, who knows that human welfare\ncan only be realized in society.\n\n4. That which especially distinguishes Ibn Roshd from those who\npreceded him, and in particular from Ibn Sina, is the unequivocal mode\nin which he conceives of the world as an eternal process of \u2018becoming\u2019.\nThe world as a whole is an eternally necessary unity, without any\npossibility of non-existence or of different existence. Matter and Form\ncan only be separated in thought. Forms do not wander like ghosts\nthrough dull Matter, but are contained in it after the manner of germs.\nThe Material Forms, in the guise of natural forces, operate in an\neternal process of generation, never separated from matter, but yet\ndeserving to be called divine. Absolute origination or extinction there\nis none, for all happening is a transition from potentiality to\nactuality, and from actuality back to potentiality, in which process\nlike is ever generated by like and by that alone.\n\nBut there is a graded order in the world of Being. The material or\nsubstantial Form stands midway between mere Accident and pure (or\nseparate) Form. Substantial Forms also exhibit varieties of\ndegree,\u2014intermediate conditions between potentiality and actuality.\nAnd, finally, the whole system of Forms, from the nethermost hylic Form\nup to the Divine Essence, the original Form of the whole, constitutes\none compact structure rising tier upon tier.\n\nNow the eternal process of Becoming, within the given System,\npresupposes an eternal movement, and that again an eternal Mover. If\nthe world had had an origin, we might have reasoned from it to another\nand a similarly originated corporeal world, which had produced it, and\nso on without end. If again it had been a \u2018possible\u2019 entity, we might\nhave inferred a \u2018possible\u2019 entity out of which it had proceeded, and so\non ad infinitum. And according to Ibn Roshd, it is only the hypothesis\nof a world moved as a unity and of eternal necessity, that yields us\nthe possibility of inferring a Being, separate from the world, yet\neternally moving it, who in his continually producing that movement and\nmaintaining the fair order of the All, may legitimately be called the\nAuthor of the world, and who in the Spirits that move the Spheres,\u2014for\nevery separate kind of movement demands its separate\nprinciple,\u2014possesses agents to give effect to his activity.\n\nThe essence of the First Mover, or of God, as well as of the\nSphere-Spirits, is found by Ibn Roshd in Thought, in which unity of\nBeing is given him. Thought which is identical with its object is the\nsole positive definition of the Divine Essence; but Being and Unity\nabsolutely synchronize with such Thought. In other words, Being and\nUnity are not annexed to the Essence, but are given only in Thought,\njust like all universals. Thought produces everywhere the general in\nthe particular. It is true that the universal as a disposition is\noperative in things, but the universal qua universal exists in the\nunderstanding alone. Or, in possibility (or potentiality) it exists in\nthings, but it exists actually in the understanding,\u2014that is, it has\nmore Being,\u2014a higher kind of existence,\u2014in the understanding than in\nthings.\n\nIf now the question is asked,\u2014\u2018Does Divine Thought take in merely the\ngeneral, or does it take in the particular too?\u2019, Ibn Roshd replies,\n\u2018It does not directly take in either the one or the other, for the\nDivine Essence transcends both of them. Divine Thought produces the All\nand embraces the All. God is the principle, the original Form, and the\nfinal aim of all things. He is the order of the world, the\nreconciliation of all opposites, the All itself in its highest mode of\nexistence.\u2019 It follows of course from this theory, that there can be no\ntalk of a Divine Providence in the ordinary sense of the term.\n\n5. Two kinds of Being we know: one which is moved, and one which causes\nmotion, though itself unmoved,\u2014or a corporeal and a spiritual. But it\nis in the spiritual that the higher unity or perfection of all Being\nlies, and that too in graded order. It is thus no abstract unity. The\nfarther the Sphere-Spirits are from the First, so much the less simple\nare they. All know themselves, but in their knowledge there is at the\nsame time a reference to the First Cause. The result is a kind of\nparallelism between the corporeal and the spiritual. There is something\nin the lower Spirits which corresponds to the composition of the\ncorporeal out of Matter and Form. What is mingled with the purely\nspiritual is of course no mere Matter, that could suffer anything, but\nyet it is something resembling Matter,\u2014something which has the faculty\nof taking to itself something else. Otherwise the multiplicity of\nintelligibilia could not be brought into harmony with the unity of the\nSpirit which apprehends them.\n\nMatter suffers, but Spirit receives. This parallelism, with its subtle\ndistinction, has been introduced by Ibn Roshd with special reference to\nthe human Spirit.\n\n6. Ibn Roshd is firmly of opinion that the human soul is related to its\nbody, as Form is to Matter. He is completely in earnest on this point.\nThe theory of numerous immortal souls he most decidedly rejects,\ncombating Ibn Sina. The soul has an existence only as a completion of\nthe body with which it is associated.\n\nAs regards empirical psychology he has anxiously endeavoured to keep by\nAristotle, in opposition to Galen and others; but in the doctrine of\nthe \u201cnous\u201d he diverges from his master not inconsiderably, without\nbeing aware of it. His conception,\u2014springing from Neo-Platonic\nviews,\u2014of the Material Reason, is peculiar. It is not a mere aptitude\nor capacity of the human soul, neither is it equivalent to the\nsensuous-spiritual life of presentation, but it is something above the\nsoul, and above the individual. The Material Reason is eternal,\nimperishable Spirit, as eternal and imperishable as the pure Reason or\nthe Active Spirit over us. The ascription of a separate existence to\nMatter in the domain of the corporeal, is here transferred by Ibn\nRoshd,\u2014following of course Themistius and others,\u2014to the region of the\nspiritual.\n\nThe Material Reason is thus eternal substance. The natural aptitudes,\nor the capacity of the human individual for intellectual knowledge Ibn\nRoshd denominates the Passive Reason. That comes into being and\ndisappears, with men as individuals, but the Material Reason is\neternal, like Man as a race.\n\nBut a measure of obscurity remains, and it could hardly have been\notherwise, about the relation between the Active Spirit and the\nReceptive Spirit, (if we may for the time use this last term for the\nMaterial Reason). The Active Spirit renders intelligible the\npresentations of the human soul, while the Receptive Spirit absorbs\nthese intelligibilia. The life of the soul in individual men thus forms\nthe meeting-place of this mystic pair of lovers. And such places differ\nvery greatly. It depends on the entire capacity of a man\u2019s soul, and on\nthe disposition of his perceptions, in what degree the Active Spirit\ncan elevate these to intelligibility, and how far the Receptive Spirit\nis in a position to make them a portion of its own contents. This\nexplains why men are not all at the same stage of spiritual knowledge.\nBut the sum of spiritual knowledge in the world continues unaltered,\nalthough the partition of it undergoes individual variations. By a\nnecessity of nature, the Philosopher re-appears, without fail, whether\nan Aristotle or an Ibn Roshd, in whose brain Being becomes Idea. It is\ntrue that the thoughts of individual men occur in the element of time,\nand that the Receptive Spirit is changeable, so far as the individual\nhas a part in it; but considered as the Reason of the Human Race, that\nSpirit is eternally incapable of change, like the Active Spirit from\nthe last Sphere above us.\n\n7. On the whole, three great heresies set the system of Ibn Roshd in\nopposition to the theology of the three world-religions of his time:\nfirst, the eternity of the material world and of the Spirits that move\nit; next, the necessary causal nexus in all that happens in the world,\nso that no place is left for providence, miracle, and the like; and,\nthirdly, the perishable nature of all that is individual, by which\ntheory individual immortality is also taken away.\n\nConsidered logically the assumption of a number of independent\nSphere-Spirits under God does not appear to have any sufficient basis.\nBut Ibn Roshd, like his predecessors, gets over this difficulty by\nasserting that these Sphere-Spirits do not differ individually but only\nin kind. Their sole purpose was to explain the different movements in\nthe system of the world, so long as its unity was still unknown. After\nthe Ptolemaic system of the world had been put aside, and these\nintermediary Spirits had become superfluous, men identified the Active\nSpirit with God, as, for the matter of that, they had even in earlier\ntimes attempted to do, on speculative and religious grounds. It was\nmerely one step farther, to identify even the eternal Spirit of Man\nwith God. Ibn Roshd did neither of these things, at least according to\nthe strict letter of his writings; but his system, when consistently\ncarried out, made it possible to take these steps, and in this way to\narrive generally at a Pantheistic conception of the world. On the other\nhand Materialism might easily find support in the system, however\ndecidedly our philosopher contended against such a view; for where the\neternity, form and efficacy of all that is material are so strongly\nemphasized, as was done by him, Spirit may indeed still receive the\nname of king, but seemingly by the favour merely of the material.\n\nIbn Roshd deserves at all events to be called a bold and consistent\nthinker, although not an original one. Theoretical philosophy was\nsufficient for him; but yet he owed it to his time and his position to\ncome to an understanding with religion and practice. We may devote a\nfew words to this point.\n\n8. Ibn Roshd often takes the opportunity of expressing himself against\nthe uneducated rulers and obscurantist theologians of his own day; but\nhe continues to prefer life as a citizen to a solitary life. He even\nthanks his opponents for many a piece of instruction,\u2014and that is a\npleasing touch of character. He thinks that the solitary life produces\nno arts or sciences, and that one can at the most enjoy in it what has\nbeen gained already, or perhaps improve it a little. But every one\nshould contribute to the weal of the whole community: even women as\nwell as men should be of service to society and the State. In this\nopinion Ibn Roshd agrees with Plato (for he was not acquainted with the\nPolitics of Aristotle), and he remarks with entire good sense that a\ngreat deal of the poverty and distress of his time arises from the\ncircumstance that women are kept like domestic animals or house plants\nfor purposes of gratification, of a very questionable character\nbesides, instead of being allowed to take part in the production of\nmaterial and intellectual wealth, and in the preservation of the same.\n\nIn his Ethical system our philosopher animadverts with great severity\nupon the doctrine of the professors of Law, that a thing is good or bad\nonly because God so willed it. On the contrary, says he, everything has\nits moral character from nature or in conformity with reason. The\naction which is determined by rational discernment is moral. It is not,\nof course, the individual Reason, but the Reason which looks to the\nwelfare of the community or State, to which appeal must be made in the\nlast instance.\n\nIbn Roshd regards religion also from a statesman\u2019s point of view. He\nvalues it on account of its moral purpose. It is Law, not Learning. He\nis therefore constantly engaged in fighting the Theologians, who wish\nto understand intellectually, instead of obeying with docile faith. He\nmakes it a reproach to Gazali, that he has allowed philosophy to\nexercise an influence upon his religious doctrine, and thereby has led\nmany into doubt and unbelief. The people should believe, exactly in\naccordance with what stands in the Book. That is Truth,\u2014Truth meant no\ndoubt for a bigger sort of children, to whom we convey it in the form\nof stories. Whatever goes beyond this, comes of evil. For example, the\nKoran has two proofs of the existence of God, which are evident to\nevery one, viz: the Divine care of everything, especially of human\nbeings,\u2014and the production of life in plants, animals, &c. These\ndeliverances should not be disturbed, nor should the literal\nacceptation of revelation be quibbled about, in the theological\nfashion. For, the proofs which theologians adduce of the existence of\nGod can make no stand against a scientific criticism, any more than the\nproof which is furnished from the notion of the possible and the\nnecessary, in Farabi and Ibn Sina. All this leads to Atheism and\nLibertinism. In the interests of morality, and therefore of the State,\nthis semi-theology should be fought against.\n\nOn the other hand, philosophers who have attained to knowledge are\npermitted to interpret the Word of God in the Koran. In the light of\nthe highest truth they understand what is aimed at therein; and they\ntell merely just so much of it to the ordinary man as he is capable of\napprehending. In this way the most admirable harmony results. Religious\nprecept and philosophy are in agreement with one another, precisely\nbecause they are not seeking the same thing. They are related as\npractice and theory. In the philosopher\u2019s conception of religion, he\nallows its validity in its own domain, so that philosophy by no means\nrejects religion. Philosophy, however, is the highest form of truth,\nand at the same time the most sublime religion. The religion of the\nphilosopher, in fact, is the knowledge of all that exists.\n\nBut yet this view has the appearance of being irreligious; and a\npositive religion can never be content to recognize the leading\nposition of philosophy in the realm of truth. It was only natural that\nthe theologians of the West, like their brethren of the East should\nseek to profit by the favour of circumstances, and take no rest until\nthey had reduced the mistress to the position of the handmaid of\nTheology.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVII. CONCLUSION.\n\n\n1. Ibn Khaldun.\n\n1. The Philosophy of Ibn Roshd, and his interpretation of Aristotle,\nhave had extremely little effect upon the Muslim world. Many of his\nworks, in the original, are lost, and we have them only in Hebrew and\nLatin translations. He had no disciples or followers. In retired\ncorners no doubt many a free-thinker or Mystic might be met with, to\nwhose mind it looked sufficiently fantastic to toil earnestly with\nphilosophic questions of a theoretical kind; but Philosophy was not\npermitted to influence general culture or the condition of affairs.\nBefore the victorious arms of the Christians the material civilization\nas well as the intellectual culture of the Muslims retreated farther\nand farther. Spain became like Africa, where the Berber was ruler. The\ntimes were serious: the very existence of Islam in these regions was at\nstake. Men made ready for fighting against the enemy, or even against\none another; and pious brethren everywhere formed unions for mystic\nobservances. In the Sufi orders of these people, a few philosophical\nformulae at least were still preserved in safety. When, towards the\nmiddle of the thirteenth century, the emperor Frederick II submitted a\nnumber of philosophical questions to the Muslim scholars of Ceuta, the\nAlmohad Abdalwahid charged Ibn Sabin, founder of a Mystic order, to\nreply to them. He did so, drawling forth in a pedantic tone the views\nboth of ancient and recent philosophers, and affording a glimpse of the\nSufi secret,\u2014that God is the reality of all things. The only thing,\nhowever, which we can learn from his answers, may be said to be, that\nIbn Sabin had read books, of which he thought the Emperor Frederick had\nnot the faintest notion.\n\n2. In small State-systems, the Muslim civilization of the West drifted\naway, now rising, now falling. But before it vanished completely, a man\nappeared, who endeavoured to discover the law of its formation, and who\nthought to found therewith a new philosophical discipline,\u2014the\nPhilosophy of Society or of History. That remarkable man was Ibn\nKhald\u00fbn, born at Tunis is the year 1332, of a family belonging to\nSeville. There he also received his upbringing, and there he was next\ninstructed in philosophy, partly by a teacher who had been trained in\nthe East. After studying all known sciences, he occupied himself\nsometimes in the service of the Government, and sometimes in travel,\nproving everywhere an excellent observer. He served various princes in\nthe capacity of secretary, and he was ambassador at several courts in\nSpain and Africa: as such he visited the Christian court of Peter the\nCruel in Seville. He was also at the court of Tamerlane in Damascus. He\nhad thus acquired a wide and full experience of the world, when he died\nat Cairo in the year 1406.\n\nIn character perhaps he does not take a high rank; but a measure of\nvanity, dilettantism and the like, may readily be forgiven to the man\nwho, above all others in his time, lived for Science.\n\n3. Ibn Khald\u00fbn was not satisfied with the School-Philosophy, as he had\ncome to know it. His picture of the world would not fit its\nconventional framing. If he had been somewhat more given to theorizing,\nhe might no doubt have constructed a system of Nominalism. Philosophers\npretend to know everything; but the universe seems to him too great to\nbe capable of being comprehended by our understanding. There are more\nbeings and things, infinitely more, than Man can ever know. \u201cGod\ncreates what you know nothing of\u201d. Logical deductions frequently do not\nagree with the empirical world of individual things, which becomes\nknown by observation alone. That we can reach truth by merely applying\nthe rules of Logic, is a vain imagination: therefore reflection on what\nis given in experience is the task of the scientific man. And he must\nnot rest satisfied with his own individual experience; but, with\ncritical care he must draw upon the sum of the collected experience of\nmankind, which has been handed down.\n\nBy nature the soul is devoid of knowledge; but yet by nature it has the\npower of reflecting on the experience which is given, and elaborating\nit. In the course of such reflection, there frequently springs forth,\nas if by inspiration, the proper middle term, by means of which the\ninsight which has been gained may be arranged and explained according\nto the rules of Formal Logic. Logic does not produce knowledge: it\nmerely traces the path which our reflection ought to take: it points\nout how we arrive at knowledge; and it has the farther value of being\nable to preserve us from error, and to sharpen the intellect and keep\nit to accuracy in thinking. It is therefore an auxiliary science, and\nought to be cultivated even for its own sake by one or two qualified\nmen, called specially to that task; but it does not possess the\nfundamental importance which is attributed to it by the Philosophers.\nThe path which it indicates for our reflection to take, is at need\nfollowed by scientific talent in any individual science, quite\nindependently of logical guidance.\n\nIbn Khald\u00fbn is a sober thinker. He combats Alchemy and Astrology on\nrational grounds. To the Mystic rationalism of the Philosophers he\nopposes frequently the simple doctrines of his religion, whether from\npersonal conviction, or from political considerations. But religion\nexercises no greater influence upon his scientific opinions than\nNeo-Platonic Aristotelianism. Plato\u2019s Republic, the\nPythagorean-Platonic Philosophy, but without its marvel-mongering\noutgrowths, and the historical works of his oriental forerunners,\nparticularly of Masudi, have had most influence on the development of\nhis thoughts.\n\n4. Ibn Khald\u00fbn comes forward with a claim to establish a new\nphilosophical discipline, of which Aristotle had no conception.\nPhilosophy is the science of what exists, developed from its own\nprinciples or reasons. But what the Philosophers advance, about the\nhigh Spirit-world and the Divine Essence, does not correspond thereto:\nthat which they say on these subjects is incapable of proof. We know\nour world of men much better; and a more certain deliverance may be\ngiven regarding it, by means of observation and inner mental\nexperience. Here facts permit of being authenticated, and their causes\ndiscovered. Now, so far as the latter process is feasible in History,\ni.e. so far as historical events are capable of being traced back to\ntheir causes, and historical laws capable of being discovered, History\ndeserves actually to be called Science and a part of Philosophy. Thus\nthe idea of History as Science clearly emerges. It has nothing to do\nwith curiosity, frivolousness, general benefit, edifying effect &c. It\nshould, although in the service of the higher purposes of life,\ndetermine nothing except facts, endeavouring to find out their causal\nnexus. The work must be done in a critical, unprejudiced spirit. The\ngoverning principle which rules here is this,\u2014that the cause\ncorresponds to the effect,\u2014that is to say, that like events presuppose\nthe same conditions, or, that under the same circumstances of\ncivilization the like events will occur. Now, as it is a probable\nassumption that the nature of men and of society undergoes no change by\nthe advance of time, or no considerable change, a living comprehension\nof the present is the best means of investigating the past. That which\nis fully known and is under our very eyes permits us to form\nretrospective conclusions in regard to the less fully known events of\nan earlier time: it promises even a glance into the future. In every\ninstance, therefore, tradition must be tested by the present; and if it\ntells us of things which are impossible now, we must for that very\nreason doubt its truth. Past and Present are as like one another as two\ndrops of water. If understood absolutely, that might have been said\neven by Ibn Roshd. But according to Ibn Khald\u00fbn it is only quite\ngenerally valid as a principle of research. In detail it suffers many a\nlimitation; and in any case it has itself to be established by facts.\n\n5. What then is the subject of History as a philosophical discipline?\nIbn Khald\u00fbn answers that it is the Social life,\u2014the collective,\nmaterial and intellectual culture of Society. History has to show how\nmen work and provide themselves with food, why they contend with each\nother and associate in larger communities under single leaders, how at\nlast they find in a settled life leisure for the cultivation of the\nhigher arts and sciences, how a finer culture comes into bloom in this\nway out of rude beginnings, and how again this in time dies away.\n\nThe forms of Society which replace one another are, in the opinion of\nIbn Khald\u00fbn; 1) Society in the Nomad condition; 2) Society under a\nMilitary Dynasty; and 3) Society after the City type. The first\nquestion is that of food. Men and nations are differentiated by their\neconomical position, as nomads, settled herdsmen, agriculturists. Want\nleads to rapine and war, and to subjection to a monarch who will lead\nthem. Thus dynastic authority is developed. This again founds for\nitself a city, where division of labour or mutual assistance produces\nprosperity. But this prosperity leads to degenerate idleness and\nluxury. Labour has in the first place brought about prosperity; but\nnow, at the highest stage of civilization, men get others to labour for\nthem, and often without any direct equivalent, because regard or even\nservility to the upper classes, and extortionate treatment of the\nlower, secure success. But, all the same, men are coming to depend upon\nothers. Needs are always growing more clamant, and taxes more\noppressive. Rich spendthrifts and tax-payers grow poor, and their\nunnatural life makes them ill and miserable. [20] The old warlike\ncustoms have been refined away, so that people are no longer capable of\ndefending themselves. The bond,\u2014formed by a sense of belonging to one\ncommunity, or the bond of Religion,\u2014by the help of which the necessity\nand the will of the chief knit the individual members together in older\ndays, is relaxed, for the citizens are not pious. Everything,\ntherefore, is ready to break up from within. And then appears a new and\npowerful nomad race from the desert, or a people not so greatly\nover-civilized, but possessed of a firmer public spirit; and it falls\nupon the effeminate city. Thereafter a new State is formed, which\nappropriates the material and intellectual wealth of the old culture,\nand the same history is repeated. It fares with States and the larger\nassociations of men, just as with single families: their history is\nbrought to a close, in from three to six generations. The first\ngeneration founds; the second maintains, as perhaps the third or even\nfarther generations also do; the last demolishes. That is the cycle of\nall civilization.\n\n6. According to August M\u00fcller the theory of Ibn Khald\u00fbn is in\nconformity with the history of Spain, West Africa and Sicily, from the\neleventh to the fifteenth century,\u2014from the study of which, in fact, it\nwas taken. His own historical work is a compilation, it is true. In\ndetail he is often at fault, when he criticizes tradition with the help\nof his theory; but there is an abundance of fine psychological and\npolitical observation in his philosophical Introduction, and as a whole\nit is a masterly performance. The ancients never dealt thoroughly with\nthe problem of History. They have bequeathed to us great works of art\nin their historical compositions, but no philosophical establishment of\nHistory as a Science. That mankind, though existing from all eternity,\nlong failed to attain to much of the higher civilization, was explained\nby elementary occurrences, such as earthquakes, floods, and the like.\nOn the other hand Christian philosophy regarded History with its\nvicissitudes as the realization of, or the preparation for, the kingdom\nof God upon the earth. Now Ibn Khald\u00fbn was the first to endeavour,\u2014with\nfull consciousness and in a statement amply substantiated,\u2014to derive\nthe development of human society from proximate causes. The conditions\nof race, climate, production of commodities, and so on, are discussed,\nand are set forth in their effect upon the sensuous and intellectual\nconstitution of man and of society. In the course which is run by\ncivilization he finds an intimate conformity to Law. He searches\neverywhere for natural causes, with the utmost completeness which was\npossible for him. He also asserts his belief that the chain of causes\nand effects reaches its conclusion in an Ultimate Cause. The series\ncannot go on without end, and therefore we argue that there is a God.\nBut this deduction, as he calls it, properly means this,\u2014that we are\nnot in a position to become acquainted with all things and the manner\nof their operation: it is virtually a confession of our ignorance.\nConscious ignorance is even a kind of knowledge; but knowledge should\nbe pursued, as far as possible. In clearing the way for his new\nscience, Ibn Khald\u00fbn considers that he has merely indicated the main\nproblems, and merely suggested generally the method and the subject of\nthe science. But he hopes that others will come after him to carry on\nhis investigations and propound fresh problems, with sound\nunderstanding and sure knowledge.\n\nIbn Khald\u00fbn\u2019s hope has been realized, but not in Islam. As he was\nwithout forerunners, he remained without successors. But yet his work\nhas been of lasting influence in the East. Many Muslim statesmen who,\nfrom the fifteenth century onwards, drove so many a European sovereign\nor diplomatist to despair, had studied in our philosopher\u2019s school.\n\n\n\n\n2. The Arabs and Scholasticism.\n\n1. To the victor belongs the bride. In the wars which were waged in\nSpain between Christians and Muslims, the former had often come under\nthe influence of the attractions of Moorish fair ones. Many a Christian\nknight had celebrated \u201cthe nine-days\u2019 religious rite\u201d with a Moorish\nwoman. But besides material wealth and sensual enjoyment, the charm of\nintellectual culture had also its effect upon the conqueror. And Arab\nScience thus presented the appearance of a lovely bride to the eyes of\nmany men who felt their want of knowledge.\n\nIt was the Jews especially who played the part of matchmakers in the\ntransaction. The Jews had participated in all the transformations of\nMuslim intellectual culture: many of them wrote in Arabic, and others\ntranslated Arabic writings into Hebrew; not a few philosophical works\nby Muslim authors owe their preservation to the latter circumstance.\n\nThe development of this Jewish study of philosophy culminated in\nMaimonides (1135\u20131204), who sought, chiefly under the influence of\nFarabi and Ibn Sina, to reconcile Aristotle with the Old Testament. In\npart he expounded the doctrines of philosophy from the text of\nrevelation, and in part he restricted the Aristotelian philosophy to\nwhat belongs to this earth, while a knowledge of that which is above\nit, had to be gained from the Word of God.\n\nIn the various Muslim States, at the time when they were most\nflourishing, the Jews had shewn an interest in scientific work, and\nthey had not only been tolerated, but even regarded with favour. Their\nposition, however, was altered, when those States were together\noverthrown, and when the decline of their civilization ensued. Expelled\nby fanatical mobs they fled for refuge to Christian lands, and\nparticularly to Southern France, there to fulfil their mission as the\ndisseminators of culture.\n\n2. The Muslim world and the Christian world of the West came into\ncontact at two points,\u2014in Lower Italy and in Spain. At the court of the\nEmperor Frederick II in Palermo, Arab science was eagerly cultivated\nand made accessible to Latinists. The Emperor and his son Manfred\npresented the Universities of Bologna and Paris with translations of\nphilosophical works, partly rendered from the Arabic, and partly direct\nfrom the Greek.\n\nOf much greater importance and influence, however, was the activity of\ntranslators in Spain. In Toledo, which had been re-captured by the\nChristians, there existed a rich Arabic Mosque-library, the renown of\nwhich, as a centre of culture, had penetrated far into the Christian\ncountries of the North. Arabs of mixed lineage and Jews, some of them\nconverts to Christianity, worked together there, along with Spanish\nChristians. Fellow-workers were present from all countries. Thus\nco-operated as translators, for example, Johannes Hispanus and\nGundisalinus (first half of the twelfth century), Gerard of Cremona\n(1114\u20131187), Michael the Scot and Hermann the German (between 1240 and\n1246). We are not yet in possession of sufficiently detailed\ninformation regarding the labours of these men. Their translations may\nbe called faithful, to the extent that every word in the Arabic\noriginal, or the Hebrew (or Spanish?) version has some Latin word\ncorresponding to it; but they are not generally distinguished by an\nintelligent appreciation of the subject matter. To understand these\ntranslations thoroughly is a difficult thing, for one who is not\nconversant with Arabic. Many Arabic words which were taken over as they\nstood, and many proper names, disfigured beyond recognition, flit about\nwith the air of ghosts. All this may well have produced sad confusion\nin the brains of Latinist students of Philosophy; and the thoughts,\nwhich were being disclosed afresh, had themselves at least an equally\nperplexing tendency.\n\nThe activity of translators kept pace generally with the interest shewn\nby Christian circles, and this interest followed a development similar\nto that which we had occasion to observe in Eastern and Western Islam\n(cf. VI, 1 \u00a7 2). The earliest translations were those of works on\nMathematical Astrology, Medicine, Natural Philosophy, and Psychology,\nincluding Logical and Metaphysical material. As time went on, people\nrestricted themselves more to Aristotle and commentaries upon him; but,\nat first, a preference was shewn for everything that met the craving\nfor the marvellous.\n\nKindi became known chiefly as a physician and an astrologer. Ibn Sina\nproduced a notable effect by his \u2018Medicine\u2019, and his empirical\npsychology, and also by his Natural Philosophy and his Metaphysics.\nCompared with him, Farabi and Ibn Baddja exercised a less considerable\ninfluence. Lastly came the Commentaries of Ibn Roshd (Averroes); and\nthe reputation which they gained, along with that which was secured by\nIbn Sina\u2019s Canon of Medicine, has been longest maintained.\n\n3. What then does the Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages owe to\nthe Muslims? The answer to this question lies properly outside the\nscope of the present monograph. It is a special task, which\nnecessitates the ransacking of many folios, none of which I have read.\nIn general terms it may be affirmed that in the translations from the\nArabic a twofold novelty was disclosed to the Christian West. In the\nfirst place men came to possess Aristotle, both in his Logic and in his\nPhysics and Metaphysics, more completely than they had hitherto known\nhim. But still this circumstance was only of passing importance, though\nstimulating for the moment, for erelong all his writings were\ntranslated much more accurately, direct from the Greek into Latin. The\nmost important result, however, was\u2014that from the writings of the\nArabs, particularly of Ibn Roshd, a peculiar conception of the\nAristotelian doctrines, as constituting the highest truth, came to the\nknowledge of men. This was bound to give occasion for contradiction, or\nfor compromise, between theology and philosophy, or even for denial of\nthe Church\u2019s creed. Thus the influence of Muslim Philosophy upon the\nscholastic development of Church dogma was partly of a stimulating,\npartly of a disintegrating character; for, in the Christian world,\nphilosophy and theology were not yet able to proceed side by side in an\nattitude of mutual indifference, as doubtless happened in the case of\nMuslim thinkers. Christian Dogmatic had adopted too much Greek\nPhilosophy already in the first centuries of its development, to admit\nof such an attitude: it could even assimilate a little more. It was\ntherefore relatively easier to get the better of the simple teachings\nof Islam than the complicated dogmas of Christianity.\n\nIn the twelfth century, when the influence of the Arabs commenced to\noperate in that field, Christian Theology exhibited a Neo-Platonic,\nAugustinian character. That character continued to be kept up with the\nFranciscans, even in the thirteenth century. Now the\nPythagorean-Platonic tendency, in Muslim thought, harmonized well with\nthis. Ibn Gebirol (Avencebrol, v. VI, 1 \u00a7 2) was, for Duns Scotus, an\nauthority of the first rank. On the other hand, the great Dominicans,\nAlbert and Thomas, who decided the future of the doctrine of the\nChurch, adopted a modified Aristotelianism, with which a good deal out\nof Farabi, but especially out of Ibn Sina and Maimonides, agreed quite\nwell.\n\nA more profound influence emanates from Ibn Roshd, but not till about\nthe middle of the thirteenth century, and, in fact, in Paris, the\ncentre of the Christian scientific education of that time. In the year\n1256 Albertus Magnus writes against Averroes; and fifteen years later\nThomas Aquinas controverts the Averroists. Their leader is Siger of\nBrabant (known from 1266), member of the Parisian Faculty of Arts. He\ndoes not shrink from the rigorous, logical results of the Averroist\nsystem. And just as Ibn Roshd censures Ibn Sina, so Siger criticizes\nthe great Albert and the saintly Thomas, although in terms of the\nutmost respect. It is true that he asseverates his submission to\nRevelation; but still, his reason confirms what Aristotle,\u2014as he is\nexpounded, in doubtful cases, by Ibn Roshd,\u2014has taught in his works.\nThis subtle intellectualism of his, however, does not please the\ntheologians. At the instance of the Franciscans, it would seem, who\nperhaps wished also to strike at the Aristotelianism of the Dominicans,\nhe was persecuted by the Inquisition, till he died in prison at Orvieto\n(circa 1281\u20131284). Dante, who possibly knew nothing of his heresies has\nplaced Siger in Paradise as the representative of secular wisdom. The\ntwo champions of Muslim Philosophy, on the other hand, he met with in\nthe vestibule of the Inferno, in the company of the great and wise men\nof Greece and Rome. Ibn Sina and Ibn Roshd there end the series of the\ngreat men of heathendom, towards whom succeeding ages, like Dante, have\nso often lifted up their eyes in admiration.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\n[1] S. Munk, \u201cM\u00e9langes de Philosophie juive et arabe\u201d, Paris 1859.\n\n[2] Carra de Vaux, \u201cAvicenne\u201d, Paris 1900.\n\n[3] [Translator\u2019s Note: In this version the transliteration has been\nadapted as far as possible to English sounds.]\n\n[4] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, \u201cMekka\u201d, II, p. 228 sq.\n\n[5] Job XXXVIII.\n\n[6] Gen. XV:5.\n\n[7] The dialogue has received this name from the circumstance that\nduring the conversation Aristotle holds in his hand an apple, the smell\nof which keeps awake what remains of his vital powers. At the close,\nhis hand drops powerless, and the apple falls to the ground.\n\n[8] Farther, an epitome of the \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae of Proclus, was\nheld even in later times to be a genuine work of Aristotle\u2019s.\n\n[9] Examples of both methods occur, but usually Qiyas is equivalent to\nAnalogy. However, in the philosophical terminology which owes its\norigin to the Translators, Qiyas always stands for \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, while\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 is rendered by the Arabic mithl.\n\n[10] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje in ZDMG, LIII p. 155.\n\n[11] For this the Mystics introduced a sixth sense.\n\n[12] Ascetics were called Sufis, from their coarse woollen garment, or\nS\u00fbf.\n\n[13] V. R\u00fcckerts Uebers. d. Makamen II, p. 219.\n\n[14] [Translator\u2019s note.\u2014\u2018John of Leyden\u2019.]\n\n[15] Cf. my Article \u201cOn Kindi and his School\u201d in Stein\u2019s \u2018Archiv f\u00fcr\nGeschichte der Philosophie XIII\u2019, p. 153 sqq., from which I have taken\nover, without much alteration, not a little that appears in this\nchapter.\n\n[16] [Translator\u2019s note.\u2014The Bagdad Caliphate lasted up to the death of\nMustassim (A.H. 656 or A.D. 1258), i.e. for 400 Mohammedan years\nafter A.H. 256 or A.D. 870].\n\n[17] The Arabic \u02bbaql (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2) is usually translated by Reason and\nIntelligence (Lat. intellectus and intelligentia). I prefer however the\nrendering, Geist, Spirit or Mind, because the expression includes God\nand the pure (separate) spirits of the spheres. Moreover it is hard to\ndecide how far the personification of Reason was carried by individual\nthinkers.\n\n[18] [Translator\u2019s note.\u2014Accordingly Ibn Sina\u2019s Five Internal Senses\nare: A. The General or Co-ordinating Sense; 2. Memory of the Collective\nsense-images; 3. Unconscious Apperception, referring to individuals; 4.\nConscious Apperception, with generalization; 5. Memory of the higher\napperceptions].\n\n[19] \u201cAverrois, che\u2019l gran comento feo\u201d Canto IV.\n\n[20] Ibn Khald\u00fbn speaks only of rich people who have grown poor, and\nsays nothing of the misery of the proletariate, and that which prevails\nin large cities, as we know it. He lived too in smaller cities, for the\nmost part, and till late in life admired Cairo from a distance.","title":"The History of Philosophy in Islam","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":60899}