{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_66706/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_66706","id":"gutenberg_66706","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/66706","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Military art and science -- Early works to 1800","War -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis is a complete unabridged transcription of Lionel Gile\u2019s translation\nof The Art of War. See additional notes at the end of the book.\n\n\n\n\n \u5b6b\u5b50\u5175\u6cd5\n\n Sun Tz\u016d\n on the\n Art of War\n\n THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD\n\n\n Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes\n\n BY\n LIONEL GILES, M.A.\n\n Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS.\n in the British Museum\n\n\n London\n LUZAC & C^o.\n 1910\n\n Printed by E. J. Bbill, Leyden (Holland).\n\n\n\n\n To my brother\n Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.\n in the hope that\n a work 2400 years old\n may yet contain lessons worth consideration\n by the soldier of to-day\n this translation\n is affectionately dedicated\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS\n\n\n Page\n Preface vii\n Introduction\n Sun Wu and his Book xi\n The Text of Sun Tz\u016d xxx\n The Commentators xxxiv\n Appreciations of Sun Tz\u016d xlii\n Apologies for War xliii\n Bibliography l\n Chap. I. Laying plans 1\n \u201e II. Waging War 9\n \u201e III. Attack by Stratagem 17\n \u201e IV. Tactical Dispositions 26\n \u201e V. Energy 33\n \u201e VI. Weak Points and Strong 42\n \u201e VII. Man\u0153uvring 55\n \u201e VIII. Variation of Tactics 71\n \u201e IX. The Army on the March 80\n \u201e X. Terrain 100\n \u201e XI. The Nine Situations 114\n \u201e XII. The Attack by Fire 150\n \u201e XIII. The Use of Spies 160\n Chinese Concordance 176\n Index 192\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n\nThe seventh volume of \u201cM\u00e9moires concernant l\u2019histoire, les sciences,\nles arts, les m\u0153urs, les usages, &c., des Chinois\u201d[1] is devoted to the\nArt of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, \u201cLes Treize Articles\nde Sun-tse,\u201d translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph\nAmiot. P\u00e8re Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a\nsinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly\nextensive. But his so-called translation of Sun Tz\u016d, if placed side\nby side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an\nimposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tz\u016d did not write, and\nvery little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from\nthe opening sentences of chapter 5:\u2014\n\n _De l\u2019habilet\u00e9 dans le gouvernement des Troupes._ Sun-tse dit:\n Ayez les noms de tous les Officiers tant g\u00e9n\u00e9raux que subalternes;\n inscrivez-les dans un catalogue \u00e0 part, avec la note des talents &\n de la capacit\u00e9 de chacun d\u2019eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec\n avantage lorsque l\u2019occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que\n tous ceux que vous devez commander soient persuad\u00e9s que votre\n principale attention est de les pr\u00e9server de tout dommage. Les\n troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l\u2019ennemi doivent \u00eatre comme\n des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des \u0153ufs. De vous \u00e0 l\u2019ennemi\n il ne doit y avoir d\u2019autre diff\u00e9rence que celle du fort au foible,\n du vuide au plein. Attaquez \u00e0 d\u00e9couvert, mais soyez vainqueur en\n secret. Voil\u00e0 en peu de mots en quoi consiste l\u2019habilet\u00e9 & toute\n la perfection m\u00eame du gouvernement des troupes.\n\nThroughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development\nin the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle\nSun Tz\u016d, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as\nby far the oldest and best compendium of military science. It was not\nuntil the year 1905 that the first English translation, by Capt. E. F.\nCalthrop, R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title \u201cSonshi\u201d (the\nJapanese form of Sun Tz\u016d)[2]. Unfortunately, it was evident that the\ntranslator\u2019s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to\ngrapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tz\u016d. He himself plainly\nacknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen \u201cthe\naccompanying translation would have been impossible.\u201d We can only\nwonder, then, that with their help it should have been so excessively\nbad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which\nnone can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard\npassages were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such offences are\nless pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Greek\nor Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be\ninsisted upon in translations from Chinese.\n\nFrom blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present\ntranslation is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate\nof my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tz\u016d deserved a\nbetter fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I\ncould hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors. Towards\nthe end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop\u2019s\ntranslation was published in London, this time, however, without any\nallusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three chapters were\nthen already in the printer\u2019s hands, so that the criticisms of Capt.\nCalthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to\nhis earlier edition. In the subsequent chapters I have of course\ntransferred my attention to the second edition. This is on the whole an\nimprovement on the other, though there still remains much that cannot\npass muster. Some of the grosser blunders have been rectified and\nlacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain number of new\nmistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is\nstartlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of \u201can army\nof Japanese commentators\u201d on Sun Tz\u016d (who are these, by the way?), not\na word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless,\nI venture to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more\nimportant \u201carmy.\u201d\n\nA few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In\nthe first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs,\nboth in order to facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of\nstudents generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun\nHsing-yen\u2019s edition; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join\ntwo or more of his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works,\nChinese writers seldom give more than the bare title by way of\nreference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered in\nconsequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun\nTz\u016d is concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of\nChinese characters, following in this the admirable example of Legge,\nthough an alphabetical arrangement has been preferred to the\ndistribution under radicals which he adopted. Another feature borrowed\nfrom \u201cThe Chinese Classics\u201d is the printing of text, translation and\nnotes on the same page; the notes, however, are inserted, according to\nthe Chinese method, immediately after the passages to which they\nrefer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has been to extract\nthe cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it seemed\nto present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself\nan important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of\nthis kind has hitherto been made directly accessible by translation.[3]\n\nI may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my\nsheets as they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a\nfinal revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the\nsubstance of my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few\ninstances to temper their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon,\nhowever, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited with more than\na rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a\nsword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either\ntext or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review,\neven from the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises \u201cmere\ntranslations,\u201d would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome.\nFor, after all, the worst fate I shall have to dread is that which\nbefell the ingenious paradoxes of George in _The Vicar of Wakefield_.\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n Sun Wu and his Book.\n\n\nSs\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien gives the following biography of Sun Tz\u016d:[4]\u2014\n\n \u5b6b\u5b50\u6b66 Sun Tz\u016d Wu was a native of the Ch\u2018i State. His _Art of War_\n brought him to the notice of \u95d4\u5eec Ho Lu,[5] King of \u5433 Wu. Ho Lu said\n to him: I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your\n theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?\n\n Sun Tz\u016d replied: You may.\n\n Ho Lu asked: May the test be applied to women?\n\n The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made\n to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tz\u016d divided them into\n two companies, and placed one of the King\u2019s favourite concubines\n at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their\n hands, and addressed them thus: I presume you know the difference\n between front and back, right hand and left hand?\n\n The girls replied: Yes.\n\n Sun Tz\u016d went on: When I say \u201cEyes front,\u201d you must look straight\n ahead. When I say \u201cLeft turn,\u201d you must face towards your left\n hand. When I say \u201cRight turn,\u201d you must face towards your right\n hand. When I say \u201cAbout turn,\u201d you must face right round towards\n the back.\n\n Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus\n explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to\n begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order\n \u201cRight turn.\u201d But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tz\u016d said:\n If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not\n thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame.\n\n So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order\n \u201cLeft turn,\u201d whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of\n laughter. Sun Tz\u016d said: If words of command are not clear and\n distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is\n to blame. But if his orders _are_ clear, and the soldiers\n nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.\n\n So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be\n beheaded. Now the King of Wu was watching the scene from the top\n of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite\n concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and\n hurriedly sent down the following message: We are now quite\n satisfied as to our general\u2019s ability to handle troops. If We are\n bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their\n savour. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded.\n\n Sun Tz\u016d replied: Having once received His Majesty\u2019s commission to\n be general of his forces, there are certain commands of His\n Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept.\n\n Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway\n installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When\n this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more;\n and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the\n right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or\n standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to\n utter a sound. Then Sun Tz\u016d sent a messenger to the King saying:\n Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and\n ready for Your Majesty\u2019s inspection. They can be put to any use\n that their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and\n water, and they will not disobey.\n\n But the King replied: Let our general cease drilling and return to\n camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the\n troops.\n\n Thereupon Sun Tz\u016d said: The King is only fond of words, and cannot\n translate them into deeds.\n\n After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tz\u016d was one who knew how to handle\n an army, and finally appointed him general. In the West, he\n defeated the Ch\u2018u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital;\n to the north, he put fear into the States of Ch\u2018i and Chin, and\n spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tz\u016d\n shared in the might of the King.\n\nAbout Sun Tz\u016d himself this is all that Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien has to tell us in\nthis chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant,\n\u5b6b\u81cf Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor\u2019s\ndeath, and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The\nhistorian speaks of him too as Sun Tz\u016d, and in his preface we read:\n\u5b6b\u5b50\u81cf\u811a\u800c\u8ad6\u5175\u6cd5 \u201cSun Tz\u016d had his feet cut off and yet continued to\ndiscuss the art of war.\u201d[6] It seems likely, then, that \u201cPin\u201d was a\nnickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless indeed the story\nwas invented in order to account for the name. The crowning incident\nof his career, the crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P\u2018ang\nCh\u00fcan, will be found briefly related on p. 40.\n\nTo return to the elder Sun Tz\u016d. He is mentioned in two other passages\nof the _Shih Chi_:\u2014\n\n In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, King of Wu, took\n the field with \u5b50\u80e5 Tz\u016d-hs\u00fc [i.e. \u4f0d\u54e1 Wu Y\u00fcan] and \u4f2f\u56ad Po P\u2018ei,\n and attacked Ch\u2018u. He captured the town of \u8212 Shu and slew the two\n prince\u2019s sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was then\n meditating a descent on \u90e2 Ying [the capital]; but the general Sun\n Wu said: \u201cThe army is exhausted.[7] It is not yet possible. We\n must wait\u201d....[8] [After further successful fighting,] in the\n ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu of Wu addressed Wu Tz\u016d-hs\u00fc and\n Sun Wu, saying: \u201cFormerly, you declared that it was not yet\n possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?\u201d The two men\n replied: \u201cCh\u2018u\u2019s general, \u5b50\u5e38 Tz\u016d-ch\u2018ang,[9] is grasping and\n covetous, and the princes of \u5510 T\u2018ang and \u8521 Ts\u2018ai both have a\n grudge against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand\n attack, you must win over T\u2018ang and Ts\u2018ai, and then you may\n succeed.\u201d Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat Ch\u2018u in five pitched\n battles and marched into Ying].[10]\n\nThis is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He\ndoes not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects\nof a wound in 496.\n\nIn the chapter entitled \u5f8b\u66f8 (the earlier portion of which M. Chavannes\nbelieves to be a fragment of a treatise on Military Weapons), there\noccurs this passage:[11]\n\n From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after\n the other: \u548e\u72af Kao-fan,[12] who was employed by the Chin State;\n Wang-tz\u016d,[13] in the service of Ch\u2018i; and Sun Wu, in the service of\n Wu. These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war\n (\u7533\u660e\u8ecd\u7d04).\n\nIt is obvious that Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien at least had no doubt about the\nreality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception,\nto be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on\nthe period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say\nmuch of such a work as the \u5433\u8d8a\u6625\u79cb _Wu Y\u00fceh Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_, which is\nsupposed to have been written by \u8d99\u66c4 Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D.\nThe attribution is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise,\nhis account would be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_\nand expanded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tz\u016d will be\nfound, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it\nworth noting are: 1) Sun Tz\u016d was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu\nTz\u016d-hs\u00fc. 2) He is called a native of Wu.[14] 3) He had previously\nlived a retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his\nability.[15]\n\nThe following passage occurs in \u6dee\u5357\u5b50 Huai-nan Tz\u016d: \u201cWhen sovereign and\nministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tz\u016d\nto encounter the foe.\u201d[16] Assuming that this work is genuine (and\nhitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest\ndirect reference to Sun Tz\u016d, for Huai-nan Tz\u016d died in 122 B.C., many\nyears before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world.\n\n\u5289\u5411 Liu Hsiang (B.C. 80\u20139) in his \u65b0\u5e8f says: \u201cThe reason why Sun Wu at\nthe head of 30,000 men beat Ch\u2018u with 200,000 is that the latter were\nundisciplined.\u201d[17]\n\n\u9127\u540d\u4e16 T\u00eang Ming-shih in his \u59d3\u6c0f\u8fa8\u8b49\u66f8 (completed in 1134) informs us\nthat the surname \u5b6b was bestowed on Sun Wu\u2019s grandfather by \u666f\u516c Duke\nChing of Ch\u2018i [547\u2013490 B.C.]. Sun Wu\u2019s father Sun \u99ae P\u2018ing, rose to be\na Minister of State in Ch\u2018i, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was \u9577\u537f\nCh\u2018ang-ch\u2018ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being\nfomented by the kindred of \u7530\u9b91 T\u2018ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom\nthe second, named \u660e Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this\naccount, then, Pin was the grandson of Wu,[18] which, considering that\nSun Pin\u2019s victory over \u9b4f Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed\nas chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by T\u00eang\nMing-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be\nplaced in them.\n\nAn interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han\nperiod is the short preface written by the great \u66f9\u64cd Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, or\n\u9b4f\u6b66\u5e1d Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tz\u016d. I shall give it in full:\u2014\n\n I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their\n advantage.[19] The _Lun Y\u00fc_ says: \u201cThere must be a sufficiency of\n military strength.\u201d[20] The _Shu Ching_ mentions \u201cthe army\u201d among\n the \u201ceight objects of government.\u201d[21] The _I Ching_ says: \u201c\u5e2b\n \u2018army\u2019 indicates firmness and justice; the experienced leader will\n have good fortune.\u201d[22] The _Shih Ching_ says: \u201cThe King rose\n majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops.\u201d[23] The\n Yellow Emperor, T\u2018ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears\n and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ss\u016d-ma\n Fa_ says: \u201cIf one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may\n rightfully be slain.\u201d[24] He who relies solely on warlike measures\n shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures\n shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch\u2018ai[25] on the one hand\n and Yen Wang on the other.[26] In military matters, the Sage\u2019s\n rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only\n when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven\n to it by necessity.[27]\n\n Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the\n work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tz\u016d\n was a native of the Ch\u2018i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote\n the _Art of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho L\u00fc, King of Wu. Its\n principles were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a\n general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Ch\u2018u State and\n entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch\u2018i and Chin in\n awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He\n was a descendant of Wu].[28] In his treatment of deliberation and\n planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field,[29]\n clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tz\u016d stands\n beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, however,\n have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and\n while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work\n abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the\n motive which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the\n whole.[30]\n\nOne thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that\nthe 13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is\nsupported by the internal evidence of I. \u00a7 15, in which it seems clear\nthat some ruler is addressed.\n\nIn the bibliographical section of the _Han Shu_,[31] there is an\nentry which has given rise to much discussion: \u5433\u5b6b\u5b50\u516b\u5341\u4e8c\u7bc7\u5716\u4e5d\u5377 \u201cThe\nworks of Sun Tz\u016d of Wu in 82 _p\u2018ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9\n_ch\u00fcan_.\u201d It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters\nknown to Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien, or those we possess to-day. Chang Shou-chieh\nin his \u53f2\u8a18\u6b63\u7fa9 refers to an edition of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s \u5175\u6cd5 of which the \u201c13\nchapters\u201d formed the first _ch\u00fcan_, adding that there were two other\n_ch\u00fcan_ besides.[32] This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk\nof these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tz\u016d\u2014we should\ncall them apocryphal\u2014similar to the \u554f\u7b54 _W\u00ean Ta_, of which a specimen\ndealing with the Nine Situations[33] is preserved in the \u901a\u5178 _T\u2018ung\nTien_, and another in Ho Shih\u2019s commentary. It is suggested that\nbefore his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tz\u016d had only written the 13\nchapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in the form of\nquestion and answer between himself and the King. \u7562\u4ee5\u73e3 Pi I-hs\u00fcn,\nauthor of the \u5b6b\u5b50\u6558\u9304 _Sun Tz\u016d Hs\u00fc Lu_, backs this up with a quotation\nfrom the _Wu Y\u00fceh Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_: \u201cThe King of Wu summoned Sun Tz\u016d, and\nasked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a\nchapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise\nhim.\u201d[34] As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the\nsame scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of\nchapters could not fail to be considerable.[35] Then the numerous\nother treatises attributed to Sun Tz\u016d[36] might also be included. The\nfact that the _Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tz\u016d except the 82\n_p\u2018ien_, whereas the Sui and T\u2018ang bibliographies give the titles of\nothers in addition to the \u201c13 chapters,\u201d is good proof, Pi I-hs\u00fcn\nthinks, that all of these were contained in the 82 _p\u2018ien_. Without\npinning our faith to the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Y\u00fceh\nCh\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises\ncited by Pi I-hs\u00fcn, we may see in this theory a probable solution of\nthe mystery. Between Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time\nfor a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the magic\nname of Sun Tz\u016d, and the 82 _p\u2018ien_ may very well represent a\ncollected edition of these lumped together with the original work. It\nis also possible, though less likely, that some of them existed in the\ntime of the earlier historian and were purposely ignored by him.[37]\n\nTu Mu, after Ts\u2018ao Kung the most important commentator on Sun Tz\u016d,\ncomposed the preface to his edition[38] about the middle of the ninth\ncentury. After a somewhat lengthy defence of the military art,[39] he\ncomes at last to Sun Tz\u016d himself, and makes one or two very startling\nassertions:\u2014\u201cThe writings of Sun Wu,\u201d he says, \u201coriginally comprised\nseveral hundred thousand words, but Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, the Emperor Wu Wei,\npruned away all redundancies and wrote out the essence of the whole,\nso as to form a single book in 13 chapters.\u201d[40] He goes on to remark\nthat Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d leaves a certain proportion\nof difficulties unexplained. This, in Tu Mu\u2019s opinion, does not\nnecessarily imply that he was unable to furnish a complete\ncommentary.[41] According to the _Wei Chih_, Ts\u2018ao himself wrote a\nbook on war in something over 100,000 words, known as the \u65b0\u66f8. It\nappears to have been of such exceptional merit that he suspects Ts\u2018ao\nto have used for it the surplus material which he had found in Sun\nTz\u016d. He concludes, however, by saying: \u201cThe _Hsin Shu_ is now lost, so\nthat the truth cannot be known for certain.\u201d[42]\n\nTu Mu\u2019s conjecture seems to be based on a passage in the \u6f22\u5b98\u89e3\u8a41 \u201cWei\nWu Ti strung together Sun Wu\u2019s Art of War,\u201d[43] which in turn may have\nresulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s\npreface: \u6545\u64b0\u7232\u7565\u89e3\u7109. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out,[44] is only a\nmodest way of saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase,[45] or in\nother words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, the theory has\nmet with very little acceptance. Thus, the \u56db\u5eab\u5168\u66f8 says:[46] \u201cThe\nmention of the 13 chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in\nexistence before the _Han Chih_, and that later accretions are not to\nbe considered part of the original work. Tu Mu\u2019s assertion can\ncertainly not be taken as proof.\u201d[47]\n\nThere is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed\nin the time of Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien practically as we have them now. That the\nwork was then well known he tells us in so many words: \u201cSun Tz\u016d\u2019s 13\nChapters and Wu Ch\u2018i\u2019s Art of War are the two books that people\ncommonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are\nwidely distributed, so I will not discuss them here.\u201d[48] But as we go\nfurther back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact\nwhich has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the great contemporary\nrecord, makes no mention whatever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as\na writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, that\nmany scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as\ngiven in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves frankly sceptical as\nto the existence of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of\nthis side of the case is to be found in the following disquisition by\n\u8449\u6c34\u5fc3 Yeh Shui-hsin:[49]\u2014\n\n It is stated in Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s history that Sun Wu was a native\n of the Ch\u2018i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho\n L\u00fc he crushed Ch\u2018u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in\n Tso\u2019s Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso\u2019s\n Commentary need not contain absolutely everything that other\n histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar\n plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K\u2018ao-shu,[50] Ts\u2018ao\n Kuei,[51] Chu Chih-wu[52] and Chuan Sh\u00ea-chu.[53] In the case of\n Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the\n omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given, in their\n due order, about his contemporaries Wu Y\u00fcan and the Minister\n P\u2018ei.[54] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed\n over?[55]\n\n In point of literary style, Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s work belongs to the same\n school as _Kuan Tz\u016d_,[56] the _Liu T\u2018ao_,[57] and the _Y\u00fceh Y\u00fc_,[58]\n and may have been the production of some private scholar living\n towards the end of the \u201cSpring and Autumn\u201d or the beginning of the\n \u201cWarring States\u201d period.[59] The story that his precepts were\n actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of big\n talk on the part of his followers.[60]\n\n From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty[61] down to the\n time of the \u201cSpring and Autumn,\u201d all military commanders were\n statesmen as well, and the class of professional generals, for\n conducting external campaigns, did not then exist. It was not\n until the period of the \u201cSix States\u201d[62] that this custom changed.\n Now although Wu was an uncivilised State, is it conceivable that\n Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great\n general and yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore,\n about Jang-ch\u00fc[63] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the\n reckless fabrication of theorising pundits. The story of Ho L\u00fc\u2019s\n experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous\n and incredible.[64]\n\nYeh Shui-hsin represents Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien as having said that Sun Wu\ncrushed Ch\u2018u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the\nimpression left on the reader\u2019s mind is that he at least shared in\nthese exploits; but the actual subject of the verbs \u7834, \u5165, \u5a01 and \u986f\nis certainly \u95d4\u5eec, as is shown by the next words: \u5b6b\u5b50\u8207\u6709\u529b\u7109.[65]\nThe fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly\nstated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tz\u016d was general on the\noccasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all.\nMoreover, as we know that Wu Y\u00fcan and Po P\u2018ei both took part in the\nexpedition, and also that its success was largely due to the dash and\nenterprise of \u592b\u69e9 Fu Kai, Ho Lu\u2019s younger brother, it is not easy to\nsee how yet another general could have played a very prominent part in\nthe same campaign.\n\n\u9673\u632f\u5b6b Ch\u2018\u00ean Ch\u00ean-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:[66]\u2014\n\n Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But\n the fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he\n is said to have served under Ho L\u00fc King of Wu, makes it uncertain\n what period he really belonged to.[67]\n\nHe also says:\u2014\n\n The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch\u2018i may be of genuine antiquity.[68]\n\nIt is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch\u2018\u00ean Ch\u00ean-sun, while\nrejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s\nhistory, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to\nthe work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hs\u00fc Lu_ fails\nto appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack\non Ch\u2018\u00ean Ch\u00ean-sun really misses its mark. He makes one or two points,\nhowever, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of\nour \u201c13 chapters.\u201d \u201cSun Tz\u016d,\u201d he says, \u201cmust have lived in the age\nof Ching Wang [519\u2013476], because he is frequently plagiarised in\nsubsequent works of the Chou, Ch\u2018in and Han dynasties.\u201d[69] The two\nmost shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch\u2018i and Huai-nan Tz\u016d,\nboth of them important historical personages in their day. The former\nlived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tz\u016d, and his death\nis known to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to\nLiu Hsiang, that \u66fe\u7533 Ts\u00eang Sh\u00ean delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had\nbeen entrusted to him by its author.[70] Now the fact that quotations\nfrom the _Art of War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found\nin so many authors of different epochs, establishes a very strong\nprobability that there was some common source anterior to them all,\u2014in\nother words, that Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s treatise was already in existence towards\nthe end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s antiquity\nis furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to\na number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps\nbe extended, is given in the _Hs\u00fc Lu_; and though some of the\ninterpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected\nthereby.[71] Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a\nscholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the\nstyle of the 13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth\ncentury. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove\nthe existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not\nhave hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not honestly\nbelieved the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that\nthe judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other\ninternal evidence is not far to seek. Thus, in XIII. \u00a7 1, there is an\nunmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had\nalready passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it\nrevived in a modified form.[72] The only warfare Sun Tz\u016d knows is that\ncarried on between the various feudal princes (\u8af8\u4faf), in which armoured\nchariots play a large part. Their use seems to have entirely died out\nbefore the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state\nwhich ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch\npresently.\n\nBut once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the\nchances of its being other than a _bon\u00e2 fide_ production are sensibly\ndiminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after.\nThat it should have been forged in the period immediately following\n473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to\nidentify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin\u2019s theory,\nthat the author was a literary recluse,[73] that seems to me quite\nuntenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading\nthe maxims of Sun Tz\u016d, it is that their essence has been distilled\nfrom a large store of personal observation and experience. They\nreflect the mind not only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare\nfaculty of generalisation, but also of a practical soldier closely\nacquainted with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing\nof the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all\nthe greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination\nof freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite\nexcludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the study.\nIf we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of\na military man living towards the end of the \u201cCh\u2018un Ch\u2018iu\u201d period, are\nwe not bound, in spite of the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept\nSs\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s account in its entirety? In view of his high repute as\na sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume that the records he\ndrew upon for Sun Wu\u2019s biography were false and untrustworthy? The\nanswer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if\nnot fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the story as told\nin the _Shih Chi_, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet\npointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tz\u016d in which he alludes\nto contemporary affairs. The first is in VI. \u00a7 21:\u2014\n\n Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Y\u00fceh exceed our\n own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of\n victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.\n\nThe other is in XI. \u00a7 30:\u2014\n\n Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should\n answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Y\u00fceh are enemies;\n yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught\n by a storm, they will come to each other\u2019s assistance just as the\n left hand helps the right.\n\nThese two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of\ncomposition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle\nbetween Wu and Y\u00fceh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hs\u00fcn. But what\nhas hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the\ncredibility of Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s narrative. As we have seen above, the\nfirst positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is\nthen spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu,\nso that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken\nplace, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier\nstill. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the\ncapture of Ying in 506, \u695a Ch\u2018u, and not Y\u00fceh, was the great hereditary\nenemy of Wu. The two states, Ch\u2018u and Wu, had been constantly at war\nfor over half a century,[74] whereas the first war between Wu and Y\u00fceh\nwas waged only in 510,[75] and even then was no more than a short\ninterlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch\u2018u.\nNow Ch\u2018u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural\ninference is that they were written at a time when Y\u00fceh had become the\nprime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch\u2018u had suffered the great\nhumiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found useful.\n\n B.C.\n\n 514 Accession of Ho Lu.\n\n 512 Ho Lu attacks Ch\u2018u, but is dissuaded from entering \u90e2 Ying, the\n capital. _Shih Chi_ mentions Sun Wu as general.\n\n 511 Another attack on Ch\u2018u.\n\n 510 Wu makes a successful attack on Y\u00fceh. This is the first war\n between the two states.\n\n 509 Ch\u2018u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at \u8c6b\u7ae0 Y\u00fc-chang.\n or\n 508\n\n 506 Ho Lu attacks Ch\u2018u with the aid of T\u2018ang and Ts\u2018ai. Decisive\n battle of \u67cf\u8209 Po-ch\u00fc, and capture of Ying. Last mention\n of Sun Wu in _Shih Chi_.\n\n 505 Y\u00fceh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is\n beaten by Ch\u2018in and evacuates Ying.\n\n 504 Ho Lu sends \u592b\u5dee Fu Ch\u2018ai to attack Ch\u2018u.\n\n 497 \u52fe\u8e10 Kou Chien becomes King of Y\u00fceh.\n\n 496 Wu attacks Y\u00fceh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at \u6a87\u674e Tsui-li.\n Ho Lu is killed.\n\n 494 Fu Ch\u2018ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of \u592b\u6912 Fu-chiao,\n and enters the capital of Y\u00fceh.\n\n 485 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tz\u016d-hs\u00fc.\n or\n 484\n\n 482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch\u2018ai.\n\n 478 Further attacks by Y\u00fceh on Wu.\n to\n 476\n\n 475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.\n\n 473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu.\n\nThe sentence quoted above from VI. \u00a7 21 hardly strikes me as one that\ncould have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather\nto imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against\nWu, and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may\nconclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which\ndate Y\u00fceh does not appear to have scored any notable success against\nWu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it\nmust have been during the period 505\u2013496, when there was a lull in\nthe hostilities, Wu having presumably been exhausted by its supreme\neffort against Ch\u2018u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the\ntradition connecting Sun Wu\u2019s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well\nhave seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period\n482\u2013473, when Y\u00fceh was once again becoming a very serious menace.[76]\nWe may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been,\nwas not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point\nthe negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of\nauthority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts\nare discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to\nexplain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu\nTz\u016d-hs\u00fc, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu\u2019s exploits, because\nthe latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the\nState.[77]\n\nHow then did the Sun Tz\u016d legend originate? It may be that the growing\ncelebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown\nto its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so\nwell versed in the science of war should have solid achievements\nto his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the\ngreatest feat of arms in Ho Lu\u2019s reign; it made a deep and lasting\nimpression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the\nshort-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time\nwent on, than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should\nbe popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in\nthe sense that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it\nwas actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Y\u00fcan,[78] Po\nP\u2018ei and Fu Kai?\n\nIt is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun\nTz\u016d\u2019s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this\nnecessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service\nof Wu about the time of Ho Lu\u2019s accession, and gathered experience,\nthough only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the\nintense military activity which marked the first half of that prince\u2019s\nreign.[79] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never\non an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless\npresent at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu\u2019s\nsudden collapse in the following year. Y\u00fceh\u2019s attack at this critical\njuncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have\nconvinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against\nwhom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was\nthus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous\nbook, which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the\nend, rather than the beginning, of Ho Lu\u2019s reign. The story of the\nwomen may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring\nabout the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any\nsource, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have\ntaken part in the death-struggle with Y\u00fceh, which began with the\ndisaster at Tsui-li.\n\nIf these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain\nirony in the fate which decreed that China\u2019s most illustrious man\nof peace should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war.\n\n\n The Text of Sun Tz\u016d.\n\nI have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s\ntext. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the\n\u201c13 chapters\u201d of which Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien speaks were essentially the same\nas those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely\ncirculated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from\ndiscussing them on that account.[80] Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:\u2014\n\n During the Ch\u2018in and Han dynasties Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s _Art of War_ was in\n general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have\n treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to\n expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that\n Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary on it.[81]\n\nAs we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that\nTs\u2018ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so\nobscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time\nonward so great, especially during the T\u2018ang and Sung dynasties, that\nit would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to\ncreep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the\nchief commentaries on Sun Tz\u016d were in existence, a certain \u5409\u5929\u4fdd Chi\nT\u2018ien-pao published a work in 15 _ch\u00fcan_ entitled \u5341\u5bb6\u5b6b\u5b50\u6703\u6ce8 \u201cSun Tz\u016d\nwith the collected commentaries of ten writers.\u201d[82] There was another\ntext, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of \u5927\u8208 Ta-hsing,[83]\nwhich also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in\nthe Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for\nsome reason or other no longer put into circulation.[84] Thus, until\nthe end of the 18th century, the text in sole possession of the field\nwas one derived from Chi T\u2018ien-pao\u2019s edition, although no actual copy\nof that important work was known to have survived. That, therefore,\nis the text of Sun Tz\u016d which appears in the War section of the great\nImperial encyclopaedia printed in 1726, the \u53e4\u4eca\u5716\u66f8\u96c6\u6210 _Ku Chin T\u2018u\nShu Chi Ch\u2018\u00eang_. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically\nthe same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the\n\u5468\u79e6\u5341\u4e00\u5b50 \u201cEleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch\u2018in dynasties\u201d\n[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop\u2019s first edition\nis evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese\nchannels. So things remained until \u5b6b\u661f\u884d Sun Hsing-yen [1752\u20131818], a\ndistinguished antiquarian and classical scholar,[85] who claimed to be\nan actual descendant of Sun Wu,[86] accidentally discovered a copy of\nChi T\u2018ien-pao\u2019s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the\n\u83ef\u9670 Hua-yin temple.[87] Appended to it was the \u907a\u8aaa _I Shuo_ of \u912d\u53cb\u8ce2\nCh\u00eang Yu-hsien, mentioned in the _T\u2018ung Chih_, and also believed to\nhave perished.[88] This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the \u53e4\u672c\nor \u539f\u672c \u201coriginal edition (or text)\u201d\u2014a rather misleading name, for it\ncannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tz\u016d in\nits pristine purity. Chi T\u2018ien-pao was a careless compiler,[89] and\nappears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased version\ncurrent in his day, without troubling to collate it with the earliest\neditions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tz\u016d, even\nolder than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried\nin the _T\u2018ung Tien_, Tu Yu\u2019s great treatise on the Constitution, the\nother similarly enshrined in the _T\u2018ai P\u2018ing Y\u00fc Lan_ encyclopaedia. In\nboth the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments,\nintermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of\ndifferent sections. Considering that the _Y\u00fc Lan_ takes us back to\nthe year 983, and the _T\u2018ung Tien_ about 200 years further still, to\nthe middle of the T\u2018ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts\nof Sun Tz\u016d can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilising them\ndoes not seem to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting\nunder Government instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the\ntext. This is his own account:\u2014\n\n Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tz\u016d which his\n editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient\n edition [of Chi T\u2018ien-pao] should be used, and that the text\n should be revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu\n Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second\n degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, probably\n surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut\n on blocks as a text-book for military men.[90]\n\nThe three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on\nthe text of Sun Tz\u016d prior to Sun Hsing-yen\u2019s commission, but we are\nleft in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate,\nthe new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of\nSun Hsing-yen and only one co-editor, \u5433\u4eba\u9a65 Wu J\u00ean-chi. They took the\n\u201coriginal text\u201d as their basis, and by careful comparison with the\nolder versions, as well as the extant commentaries and other sources\nof information such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very\nlarge number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what\nmust be accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to\nget to Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s original work. This is what will hereafter be\ndenominated the \u201cstandard text.\u201d\n\nThe copy which I have used belongs to a re-issue dated 1877. It is in\n6 _p\u00ean_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical\nworks in 83 _p\u00ean_.[91] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen\n(largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional\nview of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably\nconcise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts\u2018ao\nKung\u2019s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tz\u016d from\nthe _Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Ch\u00eang\nYu-hsien\u2019s _I Shuo_,[92] with author\u2019s preface, and next, a short\nmiscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled\n\u5b6b\u5b50\u6558\u9304 _Sun Tz\u016d Hs\u00fc Lu_, compiled by \u7562\u4ee5\u73e3 Pi I-hs\u00fcn. As regards the\nbody of the work, each separate sentence is followed by a note on the\ntext, if required, and then by the various commentaries appertaining\nto it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall now proceed to\ndiscuss briefly, one by one.\n\n\n The Commentators.\n\nSun Tz\u016d can boast an exceptionally long and distinguished roll of\ncommentators, which would do honour to any classic. \u6b50\u967d\u4fee Ou-yang Hsiu\nremarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete,\nand rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of\nwar, being inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment\nin a great variety of ways.[93]\n\n1. \u66f9\u64cd Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao or \u66f9\u516c Ts\u2018ao Kung, afterwards known as \u9b4f\u6b66\u5e1d Wei\nWu Ti [A.D. 155\u2013220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the\nearliest commentary on Sun Tz\u016d actually came from the pen of this\nextraordinary man, whose biography in the _San Kuo Chih_[94] reads\nlike a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that the world\nhas seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was\nespecially famed for the marvellous rapidity of his marches, which has\nfound expression in the line \u8aaa\u66f9\u64cd\u66f9\u64cd\u5c31\u5230 \u201cTalk of Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, and\nTs\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao will appear.\u201d Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great\ncaptain who \u201cmeasured his strength against Tung Cho, L\u00fc Pu and the two\nY\u00fcan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided\nthe Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is\nrecorded that whenever a council of war was held by Wei on the eve\nof a far-reaching campaign, he had all his calculations ready; those\ngenerals who made use of them did not lose one battle in ten;\nthose who ran counter to them in any particular saw their armies\nincontinently beaten and put to flight.\u201d[95] Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s notes on Sun\nTz\u016d, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic\nof the stern commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to\nconceive of them as the work of a mere _litt\u00e9rateur_. Sometimes,\nindeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible\nand stand no less in need of a commentary than the text itself.[96] As\nwe have seen, Ts\u2018ao Kung is the reputed author of the \u65b0\u66f8, a book on\nwar in 100,000 odd words, now lost, but mentioned in the \u9b4f\u5fd7.[97]\n\n2. \u5b5f\u6c0f M\u00eang Shih. The commentary which has come down to us under this\nname is comparatively meagre, and nothing about the author is known.\nEven his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T\u2018ien-pao\u2019s edition\nplaces him after Chia Lin, and \u9f02\u516c\u6b66 Ch\u2018ao Kung-wu also assigns him to\nthe T\u2018ang dynasty,[98] but this is obviously a mistake, as his work is\nmentioned in the \u968b\u66f8\u7d93\u7c4d\u5fd7. In Sun Hsing-yen\u2019s preface, he appears as\nM\u00eang Shih of the Liang dynasty [502\u2013557]. Others would identify him\nwith \u5b5f\u5eb7 M\u00eang K\u2018ang of the 3rd century. In the \u5b8b\u53f2\u85dd\u6587\u5fd7,[99] he is\nnamed last of the \u4e94\u5bb6 \u201cFive Commentators,\u201d the others being Wei Wu Ti,\nTu Mu, Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao and Chia Lin.\n\n3. \u674e\u7b4c Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan of the 8th century was a well-known writer on\nmilitary tactics. His \u592a\u767d\u9670\u7d93 has been in constant use down to the\npresent day. The \u901a\u5fd7 mentions \u95ab\u5916\u6625\u79cb (lives of famous generals from\nthe Chou to the T\u2018ang dynasty) as written by him.[100] He is also\ngenerally supposed to be the real author of the popular Taoist\ntract, the \u9670\u7b26\u7d93. According to Ch\u2018ao Kung-wu and the _T\u2018ien-i-ko_\ncatalogue,[101] he followed the \u592a\u4e59\u9041\u7532 text of Sun Tz\u016d, which differs\nconsiderably from those now extant. His notes are mostly short and to\nthe point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes from\nChinese history.\n\n4. \u675c\u4f51 Tu Yu (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun\nTz\u016d, his notes being taken from the _T\u2018ung Tien_, the encyclopaedic\ntreatise on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely\nrepetitions of Ts\u2018ao Kung and M\u00eang Shih, besides which it is believed\nthat he drew on the ancient commentaries of \u738b\u51cc Wang Ling and others.\nOwing to the peculiar arrangement of the _T\u2018ung Tien_, he has to explain\neach passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his\nown explanation does not agree with that of Ts\u2018ao Kung, whom he always\nquotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the \u201cTen\nCommentators,\u201d he was added to their number by Chi T\u2018ien-pao, being\nwrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.\n\n5. \u675c\u7267 Tu Mu (803\u2013852) is perhaps best known as a poet\u2014a bright star\neven in the glorious galaxy of the T\u2018ang period. We learn from Ch\u2018ao\nKung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was\nextremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read\nin the military history of the _Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_ and _Chan Kuo_ eras.[102]\nHis notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious,\nand replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s work is\nthus summarised by him: \u201cPractise benevolence and justice, but on the\nother hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency.\u201d[103]\nHe further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of\nthe thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Wu\u2019s death would, upon\nexamination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular,\nthe maxims contained in his book.[104] Tu Mu\u2019s somewhat spiteful\ncharge against Ts\u2018ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere.\n\n6. \u9673\u76a5 Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch\u2018ao\nKung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tz\u016d\nbecause Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and\nthat of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse.[105] Ou-yang\nHsiu, writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts\u2018ao Kung, Tu\nMu and Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tz\u016d (\u4e09\u5bb6), and\nobserves that Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu\u2019s shortcomings.\nHis commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of\nhis predecessors.\n\n7. \u8cc8\u6797 Chia Lin is known to have lived under the T\u2018ang dynasty, for\nhis commentary on Sun Tz\u016d is mentioned in the \u5510\u66f8 and was afterwards\nrepublished by \u7d00\u71ee Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those\nof M\u00eang Shih and Tu Yu.[106] It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in\npoint of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.\n\n8. \u6885\u582f\u81e3 Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean (1002\u20131060), commonly known by his \u201cstyle\u201d\nas Mei \u8056\u516a Sh\u00eang-y\u00fc, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His\ncommentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang\nHsiu, from which we may cull the following:\u2014\n\n Later scholars have misread Sun Tz\u016d, distorting his words and\n trying to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus,\n though commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved\n equal to the task. My friend Sh\u00eang-y\u00fc has not fallen into this\n mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun\n Tz\u016d\u2019s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings\n were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the\n author is not concerned with the military conditions prevailing\n under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties,[107] nor with\n the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War.[108]\n Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always\n deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling\n soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of\n victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are\n bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been\n obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their\n meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sh\u00eang-y\u00fc has brushed aside all\n the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring\n out the true meaning of Sun Tz\u016d himself. In this way, the clouds\n of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am\n convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down side by\n side with the three great commentaries; and for a great deal that\n they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant\n reason to thank my friend Sh\u00eang-y\u00fc.[109]\n\nMaking some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined\nto endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him\nabove Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao in order of merit.\n\n9. \u738b\u6673 Wang Hsi, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original\nin some of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei\nYao-ch\u2018\u00ean, and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond\nof comparing his own commentary with that of Ts\u2018ao Kung, but the\ncomparison is not often flattering to him. We learn from Ch\u2018ao Kung-wu\nthat Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tz\u016d, filling up lacunae\nand correcting mistakes.[110]\n\n10. \u4f55\u5ef6\u932b Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this\ncommentator is given as above by \u912d\u6a35 Ch\u00eang Ch\u2018iao in the _T\u2018ung Chih_,\nwritten about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply\nas \u4f55\u6c0f Ho Shih in the _Y\u00fc Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch\u2018ao Kung-wu\nas saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no\nreason to doubt Ch\u00eang Ch\u2018iao\u2019s statement, otherwise I should have\nbeen inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one \u4f55\u53bb\u975e\nHo Ch\u2018\u00fc-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled \u5099\u8ad6,\nwho lived in the latter part of the 11th century.[111] Ho Shih\u2019s\ncommentary, in the words of the _T\u2018ien-i-ko_ catalogue, \u6709\u6240\u88e8\u76ca\n\u201ccontains helpful additions\u201d here and there, but is chiefly remarkable\nfor the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic\nhistories and other sources.\n\n11. \u5f35\u9810 Chang Y\u00fc. The list closes with a commentator of no great\noriginality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid\nexposition. His commentary is based on that of Ts\u2018ao Kung, whose terse\nsentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion.\nWithout Chang Y\u00fc, it is safe to say that much of Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s\ncommentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and\ntherefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history,\nthe _T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, or the _Y\u00fc Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T\u2018ung\nChih_, which also names him as the author of the \u767e\u5c07\u50b3 \u201cLives of\nFamous Generals.\u201d[112]\n\nIt is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have\nflourished within so short a space of time. Ch\u2018ao Kung-wu accounts for\nit by saying: \u201cDuring the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire\nenjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practise the art\nof war. But when [Chao] Y\u00fcan-hao\u2019s rebellion came [1038\u201342] and the\nfrontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made\nstrenuous enquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became\nthe vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the\ncommentators of Sun Tz\u016d in our dynasty belong mainly to that\nperiod.\u201d[113]\n\nBesides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work\nhas not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely \u738b\u51cc Wang\nLing (often quoted by Tu Yu as \u738b\u5b50); \u5f35\u5b50\u5c19 Chang Tz\u016d-shang; \u8cc8\u8a61 Chia\nHs\u00fc of \u9b4f Wei;[114] and \u6c88\u53cb Sh\u00ean Yu of \u5433 Wu. The _T\u2018ang Shu_ adds\n\u5b6b\u93ac Sun Hao, and the _T\u2018ung Chih_ \u856d\u5409 Hsiao Chi, while the _T\u2018u Shu_\nmentions a Ming commentator, \u9ec3\u6f64\u7389 Huang Jun-y\u00fc. It is possible that\nsome of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other\ncommentaries, like Chi T\u2018ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above.\nCertainly in the case of the latter, the entry \u7d00\u5911\u6ce8\u5b6b\u5b50 in the _T\u2018ung\nK\u2018ao_, without the following note, would give one to understand that\nhe had written an independent commentary of his own.\n\nThere are two works, described in the _Ssu K\u2018u Ch\u2018\u00fcan Shu_[115] and no\ndoubt extremely rare, which I should much like to have seen. One is\nentitled \u5b6b\u5b50\u53c3\u540c, in 5 _ch\u00fcan_. It gives selections from four new\ncommentators, probably of the Ming dynasty, as well as from the eleven\nknown to us. The names of the four are \u89e3\u5143 Hsieh Y\u00fcan; \u5f35\u93ca Chang Ao;\n\u674e\u6751 Li Ts\u2018ai; and \u9ec3\u6cbb\u5fb5 Huang Chih-ch\u00eang. The other work is \u5b6b\u5b50\u5f5a\u5fb5\nin 4 _ch\u00fcan_, compiled by \u912d\u7aef Ch\u00eang Tuan of the present dynasty. It is\na compendium of information on ancient warfare, with special reference\nto Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s 13 chapters.\n\n\n Appreciations of Sun Tz\u016d.\n\nSun Tz\u016d has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of\nChina\u2019s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have\nstudied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned \u97d3\u4fe1 Han Hsin (_d._\nB.C. 196),[116] \u99ae\u7570 F\u00eang I (d. A.D. 34),[117] \u5442\u8499 L\u00fc M\u00eang (_d._\n219),[118] and \u5cb3\u98db Yo Fei (1103\u20131141).[119] The opinion of Ts\u2018ao Kung,\nwho disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military\nannals, has already been recorded.[120] Still more remarkable, in one\nway, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as \u8607\u6d35 Su Hs\u00fcn (the\nfather of Su Tung-p\u2018o), who wrote several essays on military topics,\nall of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tz\u016d. The following\nshort passage by him is preserved in the _Y\u00fc Hai:_[121]\u2014\n\n Sun Wu\u2019s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of\n conquering,[122] is very different indeed from what other books\n tell us.[123] Wu Ch\u2018i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they\n both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in popular\n speech as \u201cSun and Wu.\u201d But Wu Ch\u2018i\u2019s remarks on war are less\n weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and there\n is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s work, where the\n style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out.[124]\n\nThe \u6027\u7406\u5f5a\u8981, ch. 17, contains the following extract from the \u85dd\u5703\u6298\u8877\n\u201cImpartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature\u201d by \u912d\u539a Ch\u00eang Hou:\u2014\n\n Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all\n military men\u2019s training, but also compel the most careful\n attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse\n yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently\n practical. Such works as the _Lun Y\u00fc_, the _I Ching_ and the great\n Commentary,[125] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hs\u00fcn K\u2018uang\n and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tz\u016d.[126]\n\nChu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the\ncriticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with\nthe venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says,\n\u201cencourages a ruler\u2019s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless\nmilitarism.\u201d[127]\n\n\n Apologies for War.\n\nAccustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving\nnation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her\nexperience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern\nState can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point\nat which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great\nWall and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier\ncenturies before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube.\nWhat with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States,\nthe grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the\ncentralisation of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied\nthe overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions\nand minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one\nby one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never\nceased to resound in one portion or another of the Empire.\n\nNo less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom\nChina can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are\nfound emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po\nCh\u2018i stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch\u2018in was entering upon\nher final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy\nyears which followed the break-up of the Ch\u2018in dynasty are illumined\nby the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn\nis tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao\ndominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T\u2018ang dynasty,\none of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of\nLi Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T\u2018ai Tsung) was seconded by the\nbrilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear\ncomparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe.\n\nIn spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao\nTz\u016d downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature\nof Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed\nto militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of\nthe literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it\nworth while to collect and translate a few passages in which the\nunorthodox view is upheld. The following, by Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien, shows that\nfor all his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of\npeace at any price:\u2014\n\n Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish\n violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove\n difficulties and dangers, and to succour those who are in peril.\n Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will\n fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who carries\n in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger!\n When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him;\n when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the\n natural law which governs his being.... What then shall be said of\n those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and without\n any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their\n stale formulas about \u201cvirtue\u201d and \u201ccivilisation,\u201d condemning the\n use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to\n impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or,\n at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion,\n sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they\n obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The\n truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare\n the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so\n military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance\n in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be\n exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among\n those who bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious.[128]\n\nThe next piece is taken from Tu Mu\u2019s preface to his commentary on\nSun Tz\u016d:\u2014\n\n War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of\n government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch\u2018iu, both\n disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and\n hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their\n execution by flogging in the market-place, are all done by\n officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of\n fortified cities, the haling of women and children into captivity,\n and the beheading of traitors\u2014this is also work which is done by\n officials. The objects of the rack[129] and of military weapons\n are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference between\n the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the\n lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a\n small amount of force need be employed: hence the institution of\n torture and flogging. For more serious outbreaks of lawlessness,\n which are hard to suppress, a greater amount of force is\n necessary: hence the use of military weapons and wholesale\n decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get\n rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the\n good....[130]\n\n Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: \u201cHave you, Sir, acquired your\n military aptitude by study, or is it innate?\u201d Jan Yu replied: \u201cIt\n has been acquired by study.\u201d[131] \u201cHow can that be so,\u201d said\n Chi-sun, \u201cseeing that you are a disciple of Confucius?\u201d \u201cIt is a\n fact,\u201d replied Jan Yu; \u201cI was taught by Confucius. It is fitting\n that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military\n functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting\n has not yet gone very far.\u201d\n\n Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the\n \u201ccivil\u201d and the \u201cmilitary,\u201d and the limitation of each to a\n separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it\n was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate,\n it has come about that the members of the governing class are\n quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a\n shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject,\n they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and\n brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance of the way\n in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose\n sight of fundamental principles.[132]\n\n When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch\u2018\u00eang Wang, he\n regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of\n scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai\n revolted,[133] he sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius\n held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at\n Chia-ku,[134] he said: \u201cIf pacific negotiations are in progress,\n warlike preparations should have been made beforehand.\u201d He rebuked\n and shamed the Marquis of Ch\u2018i, who cowered under him and dared\n not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great\n Sages had no knowledge of military matters?[135]\n\nWe have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tz\u016d in high esteem. He\nalso appeals to the authority of the Classics:\u2014\n\n Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: \u201cI have\n never studied matters connected with armies and battalions.\u201d[136]\n Replying to K\u2018ung W\u00ean-tz\u016d, he said: \u201cI have not been instructed\n about buff-coats and weapons.\u201d[137] But if we turn to the meeting\n at Chia-ku,[138] we find that he used armed force against the men\n of Lai,[139] so that the marquis of Ch\u2018i was overawed. Again, when\n the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he ordered his officers to attack\n them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion.[140]\n He once uttered the words: \u201cIf I fight, I conquer.\u201d[141] And\n Jan Yu also said: \u201cThe Sage exercises both civil and military\n functions.\u201d[142] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or\n received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he\n did not specially choose matters connected with armies and\n fighting to be the subject of his teaching.[143]\n\nSun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tz\u016d, writes in similar strain:\u2014\n\n Confucius said: \u201cI am unversed in military matters.\u201d He also\n said: \u201cIf I fight, I conquer.\u201d[144] Confucius ordered ceremonies\n and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five\n classes of State ceremonial,[145] and must not be treated as an\n independent branch of study. Hence, the words \u201cI am unversed in\u201d\n must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired\n Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise\n stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can command the\n services of a good general like Sun Tz\u016d, who was employed by Wu\n Tz\u016d-hs\u00fc, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark\n added by Confucius: \u201cIf I fight, I conquer.\u201d[146]\n\n The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these\n words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant\n that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind\n persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over\n his father\u2019s books to no purpose,[147] as a proof that all\n military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have\n to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and\n the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and\n unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies\n of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials\n also require steady application and practice before efficiency is\n reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere\n novices to botch their work.[148] Weapons are baneful[149] and\n fighting perilous; and unless a general is in constant practice,\n he ought not to hazard other men\u2019s lives in battle.[150] Hence it\n is essential that Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s 13 chapters should be studied.[151]\n\n Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi[152] in the art of\n war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings,\n but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the\n consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He\n did not realise that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond\n verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung[153] and King Yen of\n Hs\u00fc[154] were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity.\n The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use\n of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on\n record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath,[155]\n and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise.[156] Can\n we then recklessly arraign Sun Tz\u016d for disregarding truth and\n honesty?[157]\n\n\n Bibliography.\n\nThe following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tz\u016d.\nThe notes on each have been drawn principally from the \u56db\u5eab\u5168\u66f8\u7c21\u660e\u76ee\u9304\n_Ss\u016d k\u2018u ch\u2018\u00fcan shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 _sqq._\n\n1. \u5433\u5b50 Wu Tz\u016d, in 1 _ch\u00fcan_ or 6 \u7bc7 chapters. By \u5433\u8d77 Wu Ch\u2018i (_d._\nB.C. 381). A genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65.\n\n2. \u53f8\u99ac\u6cd5 Ss\u016d-ma Fa, in 1 _ch\u00fcan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to\n\u53f8\u99ac\u7a70\u82f4 Ss\u016d-ma Jang-ch\u00fc of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must\nbe early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly\nto be met with in its pages.[158] See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64.\n\nThe _Ss\u016d K\u2018u Ch\u2018\u00fcan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three\ntreatises on war, _Sun Tz\u016d_, _Wu Tz\u016d_ and the _Ss\u016d-ma Fa_, are,\ngenerally speaking, only concerned with things strictly military\u2014the\nart of producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the\ncorrect theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans,\ntransport of goods and the handling of soldiers[159]\u2014in strong contrast\nto later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with\nmetaphysics, divination and magical arts in general.\n\n3. \u516d\u97dc Liu T\u2018ao, in 6 _ch\u00fcan_ or 60 chapters. Attributed to \u5442\u671b L\u00fc\nWang (or L\u00fc \u5c19 Shang, also known as \u592a\u516c T\u2018ai Kung) of the 12th century\nB.C.[160] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three\nDynasties.[161] \u9678\u5fb7\u660e Lu T\u00ea-ming (550\u2013625 A.D.) mentions the work, and\nenumerates the headings of the six sections, \u6587, \u6b66, \u864e, \u8c79, \u9f8d and \u72ac,\nso that the forgery cannot have been later than the Sui dynasty.\n\n4. \u5c09\u7e5a\u5b50 Wei Liao Tz\u016d, in 5 _ch\u00fcan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent.\nB.C.), who studied under the famous \u9b3c\u8c37\u5b50 Kuei-ku Tz\u016d. The \u6f22\u5fd7, under\n\u5175\u5bb6, mentions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the text we\npossess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main,\nthough the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the\nWarring States period.[162] It has been furnished with a commentary by\nthe well-known Sung philosopher \u5f35\u8f09 Chang Tsai.\n\n5. \u4e09\u7565 San L\u00fceh, in 3 _ch\u00fcan_. Attributed to \u9ec3\u77f3\u516c Huang-shih Kung, a\nlegendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang\n(_d._ B.C. 187) in an interview on a bridge.[163] But here again, the\nstyle is not that of works dating from the Ch\u2018in or Han period. The\nHan Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25\u201357] apparently quotes from it in one of\nhis proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted\nlater on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not\nbe far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420\u2013478 A.D.],\nor somewhat earlier.[164]\n\n6. \u674e\u885e\u516c\u554f\u5c0d Li Wei Kung W\u00ean Tui, in 3 sections. Written in the form\nof a dialogue between T\u2018ai Tsung and his great general \u674e\u9756 Li Ching,\nit is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider\nit a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art\nof war.[165]\n\n7. \u674e\u9756\u5175\u6cd5 Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded with the foregoing)\nis a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the _T\u2018ung Tien_, but\nnot published separately. This fact explains its omission from the\n_Ss\u016d K\u2018u Ch\u2018\u00fcan Shu_.\n\n8. \u63e1\u5947\u7d93 Wu Ch\u2018i Ching,[166] in 1 _ch\u00fcan_. Attributed to the legendary\nminister \u98a8\u540e F\u00eang Hou, with exegetical notes by \u516c\u5b6b\u5b8f Kung-sun Hung\nof the Han dynasty (_d._ B.C. 121), and said to have been eulogised by\nthe celebrated general \u99ac\u9686 Ma Lung (_d._ A.D. 300). Yet the earliest\nmention of it is in the \u5b8b\u5fd7. Although a forgery, the work is well put\ntogether.[167]\n\nConsidering the high popular estimation in which \u8af8\u845b\u4eae Chu-ko Liang\nhas always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work\non war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the \u5341\u516d\u7b56 Shih Liu Ts\u2018\u00ea (1\n_ch\u00fcan_), preserved in the \u6c38\u6a02\u5927\u5178 _Yung Lo Ta Tien_; (2) \u5c07\u82d1 Chiang\nY\u00fcan (1 _ch._); and (3) \u5fc3\u66f8 Hsin Shu (1 _ch._), which steals wholesale\nfrom Sun Tz\u016d. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered\ngenuine.\n\nMost of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain extensive sections\ndevoted to the literature of war. The following references may be\nfound useful:\u2014\n\n \u901a\u5178 T\u2018ung Tien (_circ\u00e2_ 800 A.D.), ch. 148\u2013162.\n\n \u592a\u5e73\u5fa1\u89bd T\u2018ai P\u2018ing Y\u00fc Lan (983), ch. 270\u2013359.\n\n \u6587\u737b\u901a\u8003 W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao (13th cent.), ch. 221.\n\n \u7389\u6d77 Y\u00fc Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.\n\n \u4e09\u624d\u5716\u6703 San Ts\u2018ai T\u2018u Hui (16th cent.), \u4eba\u4e8b ch. 7, 8.\n\n \u5ee3\u535a\u7269\u5fd7 Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.\n\n \u6f5b\u78ba\u985e\u66f8 Ch\u2018ien Ch\u2018io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.\n\n \u6df5\u9451\u985e\u51fd Y\u00fcan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206\u2013229.\n\n \u53e4\u4eca\u5716\u66f8\u96c6\u6210 Ku Chin T\u2018u Shu Chi Ch\u2018\u00eang (1726), section XXX,\n _esp._ ch. 81\u201390.\n\n \u7e8c\u6587\u737b\u901a\u8003 Hs\u00fc W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao (1784), ch. 121\u2013134.\n\n \u7687\u671d\u7d93\u4e16\u6587\u7de8 Huang Ch\u2018ao Ching Shih W\u00ean Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.\n\nThe bibliographical sections of certain historical works\nalso deserve mention:\u2014\n\n \u524d\u6f22\u66f8 Ch\u2018ien Han Shu, ch. 30.\n\n \u968b\u66f8 Sui Shu, ch. 32\u201335.\n\n \u820a\u5510\u66f8 Chiu T\u2018ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.\n\n \u65b0\u5510\u66f8 Hsin T\u2018ang Shu, ch. 57\u201360.\n\n \u5b8b\u53f2 Sung Shih, ch. 202\u2013209.\n\n \u901a\u5fd7 T\u2018ung Chih (_circ\u00e2_ 1150), ch. 68.\n\nTo these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the\nImperial Library:\u2014\n\n \u56db\u5eab\u5168\u66f8\u7e3d\u76ee\u63d0\u8981 Ss\u016d K\u2018u Ch\u2018\u00fcan Shu Tsung Mu T\u2018i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.\n\n\n\n\n I. \u8a08\u7bc7\n\n LAYING PLANS.\n\n\n This is the only possible meaning of \u8a08, which M. Amiot and Capt.\n Calthrop wrongly translate \u201cFondements de l\u2019art militaire\u201d and\n \u201cFirst principles\u201d respectively. Ts\u2018ao Kung says it refers to the\n deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his\n temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See \u00a7 26.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u5175\u8005\u570b\u4e4b\u5927\u4e8b\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.\n\n2. \u6b7b\u751f\u4e4b\u5730\u5b58\u4ea1\u4e4b\u9053\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u5bdf\u4e5f\n\nIt is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.\nHence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.\n\n3. \u6545\u7d93\u4e4b\u4ee5\u4e94\u6821\u4e4b\u4ee5\u8a08\u800c\u7d22\u5176\u60c5\n\nThe art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be\ntaken into account in one\u2019s deliberations, when seeking to determine\nthe conditions obtaining in the field.\n\n The old text of the _T\u2018ung Tien_ has \u6545\u7d93\u4e4b\u4ee5\u4e94\u6821\u4e4b\u8a08, etc. Later\n editors have inserted \u4e8b after \u4e94, and \u4ee5 before \u8a08. The former\n correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems necessary\n in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading\n in \u00a7 12, where the same words recur. I am inclined to think,\n however, that the whole sentence from \u6821 to \u60c5 is an interpolation\n and has no business here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must\n be right in saying that \u8a08 denotes the \u201cseven considerations\u201d in\n \u00a7 13. \u60c5 are the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about\n victory or defeat. The antecedent of the first \u4e4b is \u5175\u8005; of the\n second, \u4e94. \u6821 contains the idea of \u201ccomparison with the enemy,\u201d\n which cannot well be brought out here, but will appear in \u00a7 12.\n Altogether, difficult though it is, the passage is not so\n hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop in burking it\n entirely.\n\n4. \u4e00\u66f0\u9053\u4e8c\u66f0\u5929\u4e09\u66f0\u5730\u56db\u66f0\u5c07\u4e94\u66f0\u6cd5\n\nThese are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The\nCommander; (5) Method and discipline.\n\n It appears from what follows that Sun Tz\u016d means by \u9053 a principle\n of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tz\u016d in its moral aspect. One\n might be tempted to render it by \u201cmorale,\u201d were it not considered\n as an attribute of the _ruler_ in \u00a7 13.\n\n5. \u9053\u8005\u4ee4\u6c11\u8207\u4e0a\u540c\u610f\u4e5f\n\n6. \u6545\u53ef\u8207\u4e4b\u6b7b\u53ef\u8207\u4e4b\u751f\u800c\u6c11\u4e0d\u754f\u5371\n\n_The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with their\nruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,\nundismayed by any danger.\n\n The original text omits \u4ee4\u6c11, inserts an \u4ee5 after each \u53ef, and\n omits \u6c11 after \u800c. Capt. Calthrop translates: \u201cIf the ruling\n authority be upright, the people are united\u201d\u2014a very pretty\n sentiment, but wholly out of place in what purports to be a\n translation of Sun Tz\u016d.\n\n7. \u5929\u8005\u9670\u967d\u5bd2\u6691\u6642\u5236\u4e5f\n\n_Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.\n\n The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of \u9670\u967d.\n Thus M\u00eang Shih defines the words as \u525b\u67d4\u76c8\u7e2e \u201cthe hard and the\n soft, waxing and waning,\u201d which does not help us much. Wang Hsi,\n however, may be right in saying that what is meant is \u7e3d\u5929\u9053 \u201cthe\n general economy of Heaven,\u201d including the five elements, the four\n seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.\n\n8. \u5730\u8005\u9060\u8fd1\u96aa\u6613\u5ee3\u72f9\u6b7b\u751f\u4e5f\n\n_Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security;\nopen ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.\n\n \u6b7b\u751f (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here\n because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to\n turn these geographical features to account.\n\n9. \u5c07\u8005\u667a\u4fe1\u4ec1\u52c7\u56b4\u4e5f\n\n_The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity,\nbenevolence, courage and strictness.\n\n The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) \u4ec1 humanity or\n benevolence; (2) \u7fa9 uprightness of mind; (3) \u79ae self-respect,\n self-control, or \u201cproper feeling;\u201d (4) \u667a wisdom; (5) \u4fe1 sincerity\n or good faith. Here \u667a and \u4fe1 are put before \u4ec1, and the two\n military virtues of \u201ccourage\u201d and \u201cstrictness\u201d substituted for \u7fa9\n and \u79ae.\n\n10. \u6cd5\u8005\u66f2\u5236\u5b98\u9053\u4e3b\u7528\u4e5f\n\nBy _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of the\narmy in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the\nofficers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the\narmy, and the control of military expenditure.\n\n The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically\n unintelligible without commentary. I have followed the\n interpretation of Ts\u2018ao Kung, who joins \u66f2\u5236 and again \u4e3b\u7528. Others\n take each of the six predicates separately. \u66f2 has the somewhat\n uncommon sense of \u201ccohort\u201d or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop\n translates: \u201cPartition and ordering of troops,\u201d which only covers\n \u66f2\u5236.\n\n11. \u51e1\u6b64\u4e94\u8005\u5c07\u83ab\u4e0d\u805e\u77e5\u4e4b\u8005\u52dd\u4e0d\u77e5\u8005\u4e0d\u52dd\n\nThese five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows\nthem will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.\n\n12. \u6545\u6821\u4e4b\u4ee5\u8a08\u800c\u7d22\u5176\u60c5\n\nTherefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the\nmilitary conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in\nthis wise:\u2014\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ has an interpolated \u4e94 before \u8a08. It is obvious,\n however, that the \u4e94\u8005 just enumerated cannot be described as \u8a08.\n Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which\n he had omitted in \u00a7 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: \u201cFurther,\n with regard to these and the following seven matters, the\n condition of the enemy must be compared with our own.\u201d He does not\n appear to see that the seven queries or considerations which\n follow arise directly out of the Five heads, instead of being\n supplementary to them.\n\n13. \u66f0\u4e3b\u5b70\u6709\u9053\u5c07\u5b70\u6709\u80fd\u5929\u5730\u5b70\u5f97\u6cd5\u4ee4\u5b70\u884c\u5175\u8846\u5b70\u5f3a\u58eb\u5352\u5b70\u7df4\u8cde\u7f70\u5b70\u660e\n\n(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?\n\n I.e., \u201cis in harmony with his subjects.\u201d Cf. \u00a7 5.\n\n(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?\n\n(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?\n\n See \u00a7\u00a7 7, 8.\n\n(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?\n\n Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao (A.D.\n 155\u2013220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in\n accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to\n standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed\n his horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing\n his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by\n cutting off his hair. Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao\u2019s own comment on the present\n passage is characteristically curt: \u8a2d\u800c\u4e0d\u72af\u72af\u800c\u5fc5\u8a85 \u201cwhen you lay\n down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the\n offender must be put to death.\u201d\n\n(5) Which army is the stronger?\n\n Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean puts it, \u5167\u548c\u5916\u9644,\n which might be freely rendered \u201c_esprit de corps_ and \u2018big\n battalions.\u2019\u201d\n\n(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?\n\n Tu Yu quotes \u738b\u5b50 as saying: \u201cWithout constant practice, the\n officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;\n without constant practice, the general will be wavering and\n irresolute when the crisis is at hand.\u201d\n\n(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and\npunishment?\n\n \u660e, literally \u201cclear;\u201d that is, on which side is there the most\n absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and\n misdeeds summarily punished?\n\n14. \u543e\u4ee5\u6b64\u77e5\u52dd\u8ca0\u77e3\n\nBy means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.\n\n15. \u5c07\u807d\u543e\u8a08\u7528\u4e4b\u5fc5\u52dd\u7559\u4e4b\u5c07\u4e0d\u807d\u543e\u8a08\u7528\u4e4b\u5fc5\u6557\u53bb\u4e4b\n\nThe general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will\nconquer:\u2014let such a one be retained in command! The general that\nhearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:\u2014let\nsuch a one be dismissed!\n\n The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s treatise was\n composed expressly for the benefit of his patron \u95d4\u95ad Ho L\u00fc, king of\n the Wu State. It is not necessary, however, to understand \u6211 before\n \u7559\u4e4b (as some commentators do), or to take \u5c07 as \u201cgenerals under my\n command.\u201d\n\n16. \u8a08\u5229\u4ee5\u807d\u4e43\u7232\u4e4b\u52e2\u4ee5\u4f50\u5176\u5916\n\nWhile heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any\nhelpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.\n\n Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: \u201cWherefore, with\n regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage,\n and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises\n victory.\u201d Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy\n balderdash.\n\n17. \u52e2\u8005\u56e0\u5229\u800c\u5236\u6b0a\u4e5f\n\nAccording as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one\u2019s\nplans.\n\n Sun Tz\u016d, as a practical soldier, will have none of the \u201cbookish\n theoric.\u201d He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract\n principles; \u201cfor,\u201d as Chang Y\u00fc puts it, \u201cwhile the main laws of\n strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and\n sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting\n to secure a favourable position in actual warfare.\u201d On the eve of the\n battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the\n Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations\n were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find\n himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a\n critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: \u201cWho will\n attack the first to-morrow\u2014I or Bonaparte?\u201d \u201cBonaparte,\u201d replied Lord\n Uxbridge. \u201cWell,\u201d continued the Duke, \u201cBonaparte has not given me any\n idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can\n you expect me to tell you what mine are?\u201d[168]\n\n18. \u5175\u8005\u8a6d\u9053\u4e5f\n\nAll warfare is based on deception.\n\n The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by\n every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in\n so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by \u201cthe\n extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and\n deceived both friend and foe.\u201d\n\n19. \u6545\u80fd\u800c\u793a\u4e4b\u4e0d\u80fd\u7528\u800c\u793a\u4e4b\u4e0d\u7528\u8fd1\u800c\u793a\u4e4b\u9060\u9060\u800c\u793a\u4e4b\u8fd1\n\nHence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our\nforces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the\nenemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe\nwe are near.\n\n20. \u5229\u800c\u8a98\u4e4b\u4e82\u800c\u53d6\u4e4b\n\nHold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.\n\n \u53d6, as often in Sun Tz\u016d, is used in the sense of \u64ca. It is rather\n remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang\n Y\u00fc, refer \u4e82 to the enemy: \u201cwhen he is in disorder, crush him.\u201d It\n is more natural to suppose that Sun Tz\u016d is still illustrating the\n uses of deception in war.\n\n21. \u5be6\u800c\u5099\u4e4b\u5f3a\u800c\u907f\u4e4b\n\nIf he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in\nsuperior strength, evade him.\n\n The meaning of \u5be6 is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed\n to \u865b \u201cweak or vulnerable spots.\u201d \u5f3a, according to Tu Yu and other\n commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as\n to numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an\n extraordinarily far-fetched translation: \u201cIf there are defects,\n give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be\n strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you\u201d!\n\n22. \u6012\u800c\u6493\u4e4b\u5351\u800c\u9a55\u4e4b\n\nIf your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend\nto be weak, that he may grow arrogant.\n\n I follow Chang Y\u00fc in my interpretation of \u6012. \u5351 is expanded by Mei\n Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean into \u793a\u4ee5\u5351\u5f31. Wang Tz\u016d, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the\n good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a\n mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly\n pouncing upon him.\n\n23. \u4f5a\u800c\u52de\u4e4b\u89aa\u800c\u96e2\u4e4b\n\nIf he is taking his ease, give him no rest.\n\n This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean has the note:\n \u4ee5\u6211\u4e4b\u4f5a\u5f85\u5f7c\u4e4b\u52de \u201cwhile we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy\n to tire himself out.\u201d The _Y\u00fc Lan_ has \u5f15\u800c\u52de\u4e4b \u201cLure him on and\n tire him out.\u201d This would seem also to have been Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s\n text, judging by his comment \u4ee5\u5229\u52de\u4e4b.\n\nIf his forces are united, separate them.\n\n Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the\n commentators: \u201cIf sovereign and subject are in accord, put\n division between them.\u201d\n\n24. \u653b\u5176\u7121\u5099\u51fa\u5176\u4e0d\u610f\n\nAttack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.\n\n25. \u6b64\u5175\u5bb6\u4e4b\u52dd\u4e0d\u53ef\u5148\u50b3\u4e5f\n\nThese military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged\nbeforehand.\n\n This seems to be the way in which Ts\u2018ao Kung understood the\n passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text\n as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following\n explanation: \u201cIt is impossible to lay down rules for warfare\n before you come into touch with the enemy.\u201d This would be very\n plausible if it did not ignore \u6b64, which unmistakably refers to the\n maxims which Sun Tz\u016d has been laying down. It is possible, of\n course, that \u6b64 may be a later interpolation, in which case the\n sentence would practically mean: \u201cSuccess in warfare cannot be\n taught.\u201d As an alternative, however, I would venture to suggest\n that a second \u4e0d may have fallen out after \u53ef, so that we get:\n \u201cThese maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be\n imparted.\u201d\n\n26. \u592b\u672a\u6230\u800c\u5edf\u7b97\u52dd\u8005\u5f97\u7b97\u591a\u4e5f\u672a\u6230\u800c\u5edf\u7b97\u4e0d\u52dd\u8005\u5f97\u7b97\u5c11\u4e5f\u591a\u7b97\u52dd\u5c11\u7b97\u4e0d\u52dd\u800c\u6cc1\u65bc\u7121\u7b97\n\u4e4e\u543e\u4ee5\u6b64\u89c0\u4e4b\u52dd\u8ca0\u898b\u77e3\n\nNow the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his\ntemple ere the battle is fought.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a\n temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to\n take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of\n campaign. Capt. Calthrop misunderstands it as \u201cthe shrine of the\n ancestors,\u201d and gives a loose and inaccurate rendering of the\n whole passage.\n\nThe general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.\nThus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to\ndefeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to\nthis point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.\n\n\n\n\n II. \u4f5c\u6230\u7bc7\n\n WAGING WAR.\n\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung has the note: \u6b32\u6230\u5fc5\u5148\u7b97\u5176\u8cbb\u52d9 \u201cHe who wishes to fight\n must first count the cost,\u201d which prepares us for the discovery\n that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from\n the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u99b3\u8eca\u5343\u99df\u9769\u8eca\u5343\u4e58\u5e36\u7532\u5341\u842c\u5343\u91cc\u994b\u7ce7\u5247\u5167\u5916\u4e4b\u8cbb\u8cd3\u5ba2\u4e4b\u7528\u81a0\u6f06\u4e4b\u6750\n\u8eca\u7532\u4e4b\u5949\u65e5\u8cbb\u5343\u91d1\u7136\u5f8c\u5341\u842c\u4e4b\u5e2b\u8209\u77e3\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a\nthousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred\nthousand mail-clad soldiers,\n\n The \u99b3\u8eca were lightly built and, according to Chang Y\u00fc, used for\n the attack; the \u9769\u8eca were heavier, and designed for purposes of\n defence. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, it is true, says that the latter were light,\n but this seems hardly probable. Capt. Calthrop translates\n \u201cchariots\u201d and \u201csupply wagons\u201d respectively, but is not supported\n by any commentator. It is interesting to note the analogies\n between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In\n each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it\n did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of\n foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are\n informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen,\n and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would\n be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two\n chariots and a hundred men.\n\nwith provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_,\n\n 2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly\n since Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s time.\n\nthe expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of\nguests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots\nand armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.\n\n \u5247, which follows \u7ce7 in the _textus receptus_, is important as\n indicating the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it\n is omitted, so that he is led to give this meaningless translation\n of the opening sentence: \u201cNow the requirements of War are such\n that we need 1,000 chariots,\u201d etc. The second \u8cbb, which is\n redundant, is omitted in the _Y\u00fc Lan_. \u5343\u91d1, like \u5343\u91cc above, is\n meant to suggest a large but indefinite number. As the Chinese\n have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect to translate it\n \u201c1000 pieces of gold.\u201d\n\nSuch is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.\n\n Capt. Calthrop adds: \u201cYou have the instruments of victory,\u201d which\n he seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.\n\n2. \u5176\u7528\u6230\u4e5f\u52dd\u4e45\u5247\u920d\u5175\u632b\u92b3\u653b\u57ce\u5247\u529b\u5c48\n\nWhen you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the\nmen\u2019s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped.\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ omits \u52dd; but though \u52dd\u4e45 is certainly a bold phrase,\n it is more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in\n \u00a7 4, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u9813 (in the sense of \u201cto\n injure\u201d) instead of \u920d.\n\nIf you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.\n\n As synonyms to \u5c48 are given \u76e1, \u6bab, \u7aae and \u56f0.\n\n3. \u4e45\u66b4\u5e2b\u5247\u570b\u7528\u4e0d\u8db3\n\nAgain, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will\nnot be equal to the strain.\n\n \u4e45\u66b4\u5e2b means literally, \u201cIf there is long exposure of the army.\u201d\n Of \u66b4 in this sense K\u2018ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography\n of \u7ac7\u878d Tou Jung in the _Hou Han Shu_, where the commentary defines\n it by \u9732. Cf. also the following from the \u6230\u570b\u7b56: \u5c07\u8ecd\u4e45\u66b4\u9732\u65bc\u5916\n \u201cGeneral, you have long been exposed to all weathers.\u201d\n\n4. \u592b\u920d\u5175\u632b\u92b3\u5c48\u529b\u6bab\u8ca8\u5247\u8af8\u4faf\u4e58\u5176\u5e63\u800c\u8d77\u96d6\u6709\u667a\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u5584\u5176\u5f8c\u77e3\n\nNow, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength\nexhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to\ntake advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be\nable to avert the consequences that must ensue.\n\n Following Tu Yu, I understand \u5584 in the sense of \u201cto make good,\u201d\n i.e. to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as \u201cto make good\n plans\u201d\u2014for the future.\n\n5. \u6545\u5175\u805e\u62d9\u901f\u672a\u7779\u5de7\u4e4b\u4e45\u4e5f\n\nThus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has\nnever been seen associated with long delays.\n\n This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any\n of the commentators. Ts\u2018ao Kung, Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, M\u00eang Shih, Tu Yu, Tu\n Mu and Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean have notes to the effect that a general,\n though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer\n force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: \u201cHaste may be stupid, but at any\n rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted\n operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their\n train.\u201d Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: \u201cLengthy\n operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an\n empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness\n insures against the occurrence of such calamities.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc says:\n \u201cSo long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to\n clever dilatoriness.\u201d Now Sun Tz\u016d says nothing whatever, except\n possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better\n than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is\n something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may\n sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but\n foolish\u2014if only because it means impoverishment to the nation.\n Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following:\n \u201cTherefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in\n duration. But though conducted with the utmost art, if long\n continuing, misfortunes do always appear.\u201d It is hardly worth\n while to note the total disappearance of \u62d9\u901f in this precious\n concoction. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tz\u016d, the\n classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the\n mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome\n against that of Hannibal\u2019s isolated army, because it seemed to him\n that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in\n a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his\n tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their\n reversal, it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a\n negative presumption in their favour.\n\n6. \u592b\u5175\u4e45\u800c\u570b\u5229\u8005\u672a\u4e4b\u6709\u4e5f\n\nThere is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged\nwarfare.\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ has \u5716 instead of \u570b\u2014evidently the mistake of a scribe.\n\n7. \u6545\u4e0d\u76e1\u77e5\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u5bb3\u8005\u5247\u4e0d\u80fd\u76e1\u77e5\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u5229\u4e5f\n\nIt is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that\ncan thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.\n\n That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects\n of a long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in\n bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this\n interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context,\n whereas the rendering, \u201cHe who does not know the evils of war\n cannot appreciate its benefits,\u201d is distinctly pointless.\n\n8. \u5584\u7528\u5175\u8005\u5f79\u4e0d\u518d\u7c4d\u7ce7\u4e0d\u4e09\u8f09\n\nThe skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his\nsupply-waggons loaded more than twice.\n\n Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting\n for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh\n supplies, but crosses the enemy\u2019s frontier without delay. This may\n seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great\n strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value\n of time\u2014that is, being a little ahead of your opponent\u2014has counted\n for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest\n calculations with regard to commissariat. \u7c4d is used in the sense\n of \u8ce6. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ have the inferior reading \u85c9.\n The commentators explain \u4e0d\u4e09\u8f09 by saying that the waggons are\n loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is met\n by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The\n _Y\u00fc Lan_, however, reads \u518d here as well.\n\n9. \u53d6\u7528\u65bc\u570b\u56e0\u7ce7\u65bc\u6575\u6545\u8ecd\u98df\u53ef\u8db3\u4e5f\n\nBring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus\nthe army will have food enough for its needs.\n\n \u7528, \u201cthings to be used,\u201d in the widest sense. It includes all the\n impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.\n\n10. \u570b\u4e4b\u8ca7\u65bc\u5e2b\u8005\u9060\u8f38\u9060\u8f38\u5247\u767e\u59d3\u8ca7\n\nPoverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by\ncontributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a\ndistance causes the people to be impoverished.\n\n The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the\n next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,\n moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some\n corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese\n commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,\n and we get no help from them here. Sun Tz\u016d says that the cause of\n the people\u2019s impoverishment is \u9060\u8f38; it is clear, therefore, that\n the words have reference to some system by which the husbandmen\n sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why\n should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except\n because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming\n then that \u8ca7 ought to stand first in the sentence in order to\n balance \u8fd1 (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and\n thus getting rid of \u570b\u4e4b, we are still left with \u65bc\u5e2b, which latter\n word seems to me an obvious mistake for \u570b. \u201cPoverty in the army\u201d\n is an unlikely expression, especially as the general has just been\n warned not to encumber his army with a large quantity of supplies.\n If we suppose that \u5e2b somehow got written here instead of \u570b (a\n very simple supposition, as we have \u8fd1\u65bc\u5e2b in the next sentence),\n and that later on somebody, scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss\n \u570b\u4e4b to \u8ca7, without however erasing \u65bc\u5e2b, the whole muddle may be\n explained. My emended text then would be \u8ca7\u65bc\u570b\u8005, etc.\n\n11. \u8fd1\u65bc\u5e2b\u8005\u8cb4\u8ce3\u8cb4\u8ce3\u5247\u767e\u59d3\u8ca1\u7aed\n\nOn the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;\nand high prices cause the people\u2019s substance to be drained away.\n\n \u8fd1, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own\n territory. Ts\u2018ao Kung understands it of an army that has already\n crossed the frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the \u65bc, reading \u8fd1\u5e2b\u8005,\n but even so it is impossible to justify his translation \u201cRepeated\n wars cause high prices.\u201d\n\n12. \u8ca1\u7aed\u5247\u6025\u65bc\u4e18\u5f79\n\nWhen their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted\nby heavy exactions.\n\n Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where \u4e18\u6c11 has the same meaning as\n \u4e18\u5f79. \u4e18 was an ancient measure of land. The full table, as given\n by \u53f8\u99ac\u6cd5, may not be out of place here: 6 \u5c3a = 1 \u6b65; 100 \u6b65 = 1 \u755d;\n 100 \u755d = 1 \u592b; 3 \u592b = 1 \u5c4b; 3 \u5c4b = 1 \u4e95; 4 \u4e95 = 1 \u9091; 4 \u9091 = 1 \u4e18; 4\n \u4e18 = 1 \u7538. According to the _Chou Li_, there were nine husbandmen\n to a \u4e95, which would assign to each man the goodly allowance of\n 100 \u755d (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these\n measures were in Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s time is not known with any certainty.\n The lineal \u5c3a, however, is supposed to have been about 20 cm. \u6025\n may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.\n\n13. \u529b\u5c48\u8ca1\u6bab\u4e2d\u539f\u5167\u865b\u65bc\u5bb6\u767e\u59d3\u4e4b\u8cbb\u5341\u53bb\u5176\u4e03\n\n14. \u516c\u5bb6\u4e4b\u8cbb\u7834\u8eca\u7f77\u99ac\u7532\u80c4\u77e2\u5f29\u621f\u696f\u853d\u6ad3\u4e18\u725b\u5927\u8eca\u5341\u53bb\u5176\u516d\n\nWith this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of\nthe people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes\nwill be dissipated;\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ omits \u8ca1\u6bab. I would propose the emended reading\n \u529b\u5c48\u5247\u4e2d, etc. In view of the fact that we have \u8ca1\u7aed in the two\n preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that \u8ca1 is a scribe\u2019s\n mistake for \u5247, \u6bab having been added afterwards to make sense.\n \u4e2d\u539f\u5167\u865b\u65bc\u5bb6, literally: \u201cWithin the middle plains there is\n emptiness in the homes.\u201d For \u4e2d\u539f cf. _Shih Ching_ II. 3. vi. 3 and\n II. 5. ii. 3. With regard to \u5341\u53bb\u5176\u4e03, Tu Mu says: \u5bb6\u696d\u5341\u8017\u5176\u4e03\u4e5f,\n and Wang Hsi: \u6c11\u8cbb\u5927\u534a\u77e3; that is, the people are mulcted not of\n 3\u204410, but of 7\u204410, of their income. But this is hardly to be\n extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag:\n \u570b\u4ee5\u6c11\u7232\u672c\u6c11\u4ee5\u98df\u7232\u5929\u5c45\u4eba\u4e0a\u8005\u5b9c\u4e4e\u91cd\u60dc \u201cThe _people_ being regarded as\n the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people\u2019s\n heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and\n be careful of both?\u201d\n\nwhile Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,\nbreast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,\nprotective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to\nfour-tenths of its total revenue.\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ has several various readings here, the more important\n of which are \u75b2 for the less common \u7f77 (read _p\u2018i_^2), \u5e72 for \u853d,\n and \u5175\u725b for \u4e18\u725b, which latter, if right, must mean \u201coxen from the\n country districts\u201d (cf. _supra_, \u00a7 12). For the meaning of \u6ad3, see\n note on III, \u00a7 4. Capt. Calthrop omits to translate \u4e18\u725b\u5927\u8eca.\n\n15. \u6545\u667a\u5c07\u52d9\u98df\u65bc\u6575\u98df\u6575\u4e00\u937e\u7576\u543e\u4e8c\u5341\u937e\ud85a\udfbc\u79c6\u4e00\u77f3\u7576\u543e\u4e8c\u5341\u77f3\n\nHence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One\ncartload of the enemy\u2019s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one\u2019s\nown, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to\ntwenty from one\u2019s own store.\n\n Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of\n transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts\u2018ao Kung, a\n \u937e = 6 \u659b 4 \u3ab7, or 64 \u3ab7, but according to M\u00eang Shih, 10 \u659b make a\n \u937e. The \u77f3 picul consisted of 70 \u65a4 catties (Tu Mu and others say\n 120). \ud85a\udfbc\u79c6, literally, \u201cbeanstalks and straw.\u201d\n\n16. \u6545\u6bba\u6575\u8005\u6012\u4e5f\u53d6\u6575\u4e4b\u5229\u8005\u8ca8\u4e5f\n\nNow in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that\nthere may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their\nrewards.\n\n These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in\n accordance with Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s paraphrase. We may incontinently\n reject Capt. Calthrop\u2019s extraordinary translation of the first:\n \u201cWantonly to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden.\u201d Ts\u2018ao\n Kung quotes a jingle current in his day: \u8ecd\u7121\u8ca1\u58eb\u4e0d\u4f86\u8ecd\u7121\u8cde\u58eb\u4e0d\u5f80. Tu\n Mu says: \u201cRewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see\n the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils\n from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men\n may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc\n takes \u5229 as the direct object of \u53d6, which is not so good.\n\n17. \u6545\u8eca\u6230\u5f97\u8eca\u5341\u4e58\u5df2\u4e0a\u8cde\u5176\u5148\u5f97\u8005\u800c\u66f4\u5176\u65cc\u65d7\u8eca\u96dc\u800c\u4e58\u4e4b\u5352\u5584\u800c\u990a\u4e4b\n\nTherefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been\ntaken, those should be rewarded who took the first.\n\n Capt. Calthrop\u2019s rendering is: \u201cThey who are the first to lay\n their hands on more than ten of the enemy\u2019s chariots, should be\n encouraged.\u201d We should have expected the gallant captain to see\n that such Samson-like prowess deserved something more substantial\n than mere encouragement. The _T\u2018u Shu_ omits \u6545, and has \u4ee5\u4e0a in place\n of the more archaic \u5df2\u4e0a.\n\nOur own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the\nchariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured\nsoldiers should be kindly treated and kept.\n\n18. \u662f\u8b02\u52dd\u6575\u800c\u76ca\u5f3a\n\nThis is called, using the conquered foe to augment one\u2019s own strength.\n\n19. \u6545\u5175\u8cb4\u52dd\u4e0d\u8cb4\u4e45\n\nIn war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.\n\n As Ho Shih remarks: \u5175\u4e0d\u53ef\u73a9\u6b66\u4e0d\u53ef\u9ef7 \u201cSoldiers are not to be used as\n playthings. War is not a thing to be trifled with.\u201d Sun Tz\u016d here\n reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce.\n\n20. \u6545\u77e5\u5175\u4e4b\u5c07\u6c11\u4e4b\u53f8\u547d\u570b\u5bb6\u5b89\u5371\u4e4b\u4e3b\u4e5f\n\nThus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the\npeople\u2019s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be\nin peace or in peril.\n\n In the original text, there is a \u751f before the \u6c11.\n\n\n\n\n III. \u8b00\u653b\u7bc7\n\n ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.\n\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u5168\u570b\u7232\u4e0a\u7834\u570b\u6b21\u4e4b\u5168\u8ecd\u7232\u4e0a\u7834\u8ecd\u6b21\u4e4b\u5168\u65c5\u7232\u4e0a\u7834\u65c5\u6b21\u4e4b\u5168\u5352\u7232\u4e0a\u7834\u5352\u6b21\n\u4e4b\u5168\u4f0d\u7232\u4e0a\u7834\u4f0d\u6b21\u4e4b\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to\ntake the enemy\u2019s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it\nis not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than\nto destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire\nthan to destroy them.\n\n A \u8ecd \u201carmy corps,\u201d according to the _Ss\u016d-ma Fa_, consisted nominally\n of 12500 men; according to Ts\u2018ao Kung, a \u65c5 contained 500 men, a \u5352\n any number between 100 and 500, and a \u4f0d any number between 5 and\n 100. For the last two, however, Chang Y\u00fc gives the exact figures\n of 100 and 5 respectively.\n\n2. \u662f\u6545\u767e\u6230\u767e\u52dd\u975e\u5584\u4e4b\u5584\u8005\u4e5f\u4e0d\u6230\u800c\u5c48\u4eba\u4e4b\u5175\u5584\u4e4b\u5584\u8005\u4e5f\n\nHence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme\nexcellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy\u2019s\nresistance without fighting.\n\n Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the\n old Chinese general. Moltke\u2019s greatest triumph, the capitulation\n of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without\n bloodshed.\n\n3. \u6545\u4e0a\u5175\u4f10\u8b00\u5176\u6b21\u4f10\u4ea4\u5176\u6b21\u4f10\u5175\u4e0b\u653f\u653b\u57ce\n\nThus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy\u2019s plans;\n\n I.e., as Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan says (\u4f10\u5176\u59cb\u8b00\u4e5f), in their very inception.\n Perhaps the word \u201cbaulk\u201d falls short of expressing the full force\n of \u4f10, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might\n be content to foil the enemy\u2019s stratagems one after another, but\n an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly\n in his note: \u201cWhen the enemy has made a plan of attack against us,\n we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first.\u201d\n\nthe next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy\u2019s forces;\n\n Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tz\u016d, in\n speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or\n principalities into which the China of his day was split up.\n\nthe next in order is to attack the enemy\u2019s army in the field;\n\n When he is already in full strength.\n\nand the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.\n\n The use of the word \u653f is somewhat unusual, which may account for\n the reading of the modern text: \u5176\u4e0b\u653b\u57ce.\n\n4. \u653b\u57ce\u4e4b\u6cd5\u7232\u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2\u4fee\u6ad3\u8f52\u8f40\u5177\u5668\u68b0\u4e09\u6708\u800c\u5f8c\u6210\u8ddd\u95c9\u53c8\u4e09\u6708\u800c\u5f8c\u5df2\n\nThe rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.\n\n Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon\n it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before\n Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable\n that they would have been masters of the situation before the\n British were ready seriously to oppose them.\n\nThe preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements\nof war, will take up three whole months;\n\n It is not quite clear what \u6ad3 were. Ts\u2018ao Kung simply defines them\n as \u5927\u696f \u201clarge shields,\u201d but we get a better idea of them from Li\n Ch\u2018\u00fcan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were\n assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest\n a sort of Roman _testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were \u201cwhat\n are now termed \u5f6d\u6392\u201d (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks,\n according to K\u2018ang Hsi), but this is denied by Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao. See\n _supra_, II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city\n walls. Of \u8f52\u8f40 (_f\u00ean y\u00fcn_) we get a fairly clear description from\n several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on\n four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides,\n and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls,\n for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu\n Mu adds that they are now called \u6728\u9a62 \u201cwooden donkeys.\u201d Capt.\n Calthrop wrongly translates the term, \u201cbattering-rams.\u201d I follow\n Ts\u2018ao Kung in taking \u5177 as a verb, co-ordinate and synonymous with\n \u4fee. Those commentators who regard \u4fee as an adjective equivalent to\n \u9577 \u201clong,\u201d make \u5177 presumably into a noun.\n\nand the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three\nmonths more.\n\n The \u8ddd\u95c9 (or \u5819, in the modern text) were great mounds or ramparts\n of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy\u2019s walls in order to\n discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the\n \u6a13\u6ad3 fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu\n quotes the Tso Chuan: \u695a\u53f8\u99ac\u5b50\u53cd\u4e58\u5819\u800c\u7aba\u5b8b\u57ce\u4e5f.\n\n5. \u5c07\u4e0d\u52dd\u5176\u5fff\u800c\u87fb\u9644\u4e4b\u6bba\u58eb\u4e09\u5206\u4e4b\u4e00\u800c\u57ce\u4e0d\u62d4\u8005\u6b64\u653b\u4e4b\u707d\n\nThe general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to\nthe assault like swarming ants,\n\n Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants\n climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience\n at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place\n before his engines of war are ready.\n\nwith the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town\nstill remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.\n\n We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port\n Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u4e0d\u52dd\u5fc3\u4e4b\u5fff ... \u5247\u6bba\u58eb\u5352 ... \u653b\u57ce\u4e4b\u707d. For \u5176\u5fff the\n _Y\u00fc Lan_ has \u5fc3\u6012. Capt. Calthrop does not translate \u800c\u57ce\u4e0d\u62d4\u8005, and\n mistranslates \u6b64\u653b\u4e4b\u707d.\n\n6. \u6545\u5584\u7528\u5175\u8005\u5c48\u4eba\u4e4b\u5175\u800c\u975e\u6230\u4e5f\u62d4\u4eba\u4e4b\u57ce\u800c\u975e\u653b\u4e5f\u6bc1\u4eba\u4e4b\u570b\u800c\u975e\u4e45\u4e5f\n\nTherefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy\u2019s troops without any\nfighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he\noverthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.\n\n Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the \u570b, that is, the\n Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical\n instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin\n dynasty was acclaimed \u201cFather and mother of the people.\u201d\n\n7. \u5fc5\u4ee5\u5168\u722d\u65bc\u5929\u4e0b\u6545\u5175\u4e0d\u9813\u800c\u5229\u53ef\u5168\u6b64\u8b00\u653b\u4e4b\u6cd5\u4e5f\n\nWith his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire,\nand thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.\n\n Owing to the double meanings of \u5175, \u9813 [= \u920d] and \u5229, the latter\n part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning:\n \u201cAnd thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness\n remains perfect.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc says that \u5229 is \u201cthe advantage of a\n prosperous kingdom and a strong army.\u201d\n\nThis is the method of attacking by stratagem.\n\n8. \u6545\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u5341\u5247\u570d\u4e4b\u4e94\u5247\u653b\u4e4b\u500d\u5247\u5206\u4e4b\n\nIt is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy\u2019s one, to\nsurround him; if five to one, to attack him;\n\n Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.\n\nif twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.\n\n Note that \u4e4b does not refer to the enemy, as in the two preceding\n clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese.\n Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed,\n it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts\u2018ao Kung,\n however, gives a clue to Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s meaning: \u4ee5\u4e8c\u6575\u4e00\u5247\u4e00\u8853\u7232\u6b63\u4e00\u8853\u7232\u5947\n \u201cBeing two to the enemy\u2019s one, we may use one part of our army in\n the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.\u201d [For\n explanation of \u6b63 and \u5947, see V. 3, note.] Chang Y\u00fc thus further\n elucidates the point: \u201cIf our force is twice as numerous as that\n of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to\n meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he\n replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if\n to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front. This is what\n is meant by saying that \u201cone part may be used in the regular\n way, and the other for some special diversion.\u201d Tu Mu does not\n understand that dividing one\u2019s army is simply an irregular, just\n as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is\n too hasty in calling this a mistake.\u201d\n\n9. \u6575\u5247\u80fd\u6230\u4e4b\u5c11\u5247\u80fd\u9003\u4e4b\u4e0d\u82e5\u5247\u80fd\u907f\u4e4b\n\nIf equally matched, we can offer battle;\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase:\n \u4e3b\u5ba2\u529b\u6575\u60df\u5584\u8005\u6230 \u201cIf attackers and attacked are equally matched in\n strength, only the able general will fight.\u201d He thus takes \u80fd as\n though it were \u80fd\u8005, which is awkward.\n\nif slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ has \u5b88 instead of \u9003, which is hardly distinguishable\n in sense from \u907f in the next clause. The meaning, \u201cwe can _watch_ the\n enemy,\u201d is certainly a great improvement on the above; but\n unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the\n variant. Chang Y\u00fc reminds us that the saying only applies if the\n other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often\n more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.\n\nif quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.\n\n10. \u6545\u5c0f\u6575\u4e4b\u5805\u5927\u6575\u4e4b\u64d2\u4e5f\n\nHence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the\nend it must be captured by the larger force.\n\n In other words: \u201cC\u2019est magnifique; mais ce n\u2019est pas la guerre.\u201d\n\n11. \u592b\u5c07\u8005\u570b\u4e4b\u8f14\u4e5f\u8f14\u5468\u5247\u570b\u5fc5\u5f3a\u8f14\u9699\u5247\u570b\u5fc5\u5f31\n\nNow the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is\ncomplete at all points, the State will be strong; if the bulwark is\ndefective, the State will be weak.\n\n \u9699 cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt.\n Calthrop\u2019s translation, \u201cdivided in his allegiance.\u201d It is simply\n keeping up the metaphor suggested by \u5468. As Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan tersely puts\n it: \u9699\u7f3a\u4e5f\u5c07\u624d\u4e0d\u5099\u5175\u5fc5\u5f31 \u201c_Ch\u2018i_, gap, indicates deficiency; if the\n general\u2019s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly\n versed in his profession), his army will lack strength.\u201d\n\n12. \u6545\u541b\u4e4b\u6240\u4ee5\u60a3\u65bc\u8ecd\u8005\u4e09\n\nThere are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his\narmy:\u2014\n\n13. \u4e0d\u77e5\u8ecd\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u9032\u800c\u8b02\u4e4b\u9032\u4e0d\u77e5\u8ecd\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u9000\u800c\u8b02\u4e4b\u9000\u662f\u8b02\u7e3b\u8ecd\n\n(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of\nthe fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung weakly defines \u7e3b as \u5fa1 \u201ccontrol,\u201d \u201cdirect.\u201d Cf. \u00a7 17\n _ad fin._ But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors\n which from time to time illuminate Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s work, and is rightly\n explained by Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan as = \u7d46. He adds the comment:\n \u5982\u7d46\u9a65\u8db3\u7121\u99b3\u9a5f\u4e5f. \u201cIt is like tying together the legs of a\n thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop.\u201d One would naturally\n think of \u201cthe ruler\u201d in this passage as being at home, and trying\n to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the\n commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of\n T\u2018ai Kung: \u570b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u5f9e\u5916\u6cbb\u8ecd\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u5f9e\u4e2d\u5fa1 \u201cA kingdom should not be\n governed from without, an army should not be directed from\n within.\u201d Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or when\n in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the\n thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise,\n he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give\n wrong orders.\n\n14. \u4e0d\u77e5\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u4e8b\u800c\u540c\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u653f\u8005\u5247\u8ecd\u58eb\u60d1\u77e3\n\n(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers\na kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.\nThis causes restlessness in the soldier\u2019s minds.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s note is: \u8ecd\u5bb9\u4e0d\u5165\u570b\u570b\u5bb9\u4e0d\u5165\u8ecd\u79ae\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u6cbb\u5175\u4e5f, which may be\n freely translated: \u201cThe military sphere and the civil sphere are\n wholly distinct; you can\u2019t handle an army in kid gloves.\u201d And\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cHumanity and justice (\u4ec1\u7fa9) are the principles on\n which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and\n flexibility (\u6b0a\u8b8a), on the other hand, are military rather than\n civic virtues.\u201d \u540c\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u653f, \u201cto assimilate the governing of an\n army\u201d\u2014to that of a State, understood. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has \u6b32\n inserted before \u540c, here and in \u00a7 15.\n\n15. \u4e0d\u77e5\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u6b0a\u800c\u540c\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u4efb\u5247\u8ecd\u58eb\u7591\u77e3\n\n(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,\n\n That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.\n\nthrough ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to\ncircumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.\n\n I follow Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean here. The other commentators make \u4e0d\u77e5 etc.\n refer, not to the ruler, as in \u00a7\u00a7 13, 14, but to the officers he\n employs. Thus Tu Yu says: \u5c07\u82e5\u4e0d\u77e5\u6b0a\u8b8a\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ed8\u4ee5\u52e2\u4f4d \u201cIf a general is\n ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be\n entrusted with a position of authority.\u201d Tu Mu quotes \u9ec3\u77f3\u516c: \u201cThe\n skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man,\n the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in\n establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in\n action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the\n stupid man has no fear of death.\u201d The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u8ecd\u8986\u7591,\n which Tu Yu explains as \u8986\u6557 \u201cis utterly defeated.\u201d Capt. Calthrop\n gives a very inaccurate rendering: \u201cIgnorant of the situation of\n the army, to interfere in its dispositions.\u201d\n\n16. \u4e09\u8ecd\u65e2\u60d1\u4e14\u7591\u5247\u8af8\u4faf\u4e4b\u96e3\u81f3\u77e3\u662f\u8b02\u4e82\u8ecd\u5f15\u52dd\n\nBut when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come\nfrom the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into\nthe army, and flinging victory away.\n\n Most of the commentators take \u5f15 in the sense of \u596a, which it seems\n to bear also in the _Li Chi_, \u7389\u85fb, I. 18. [\u537b is there given as\n its equivalent, but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more\n usual sense, translating \u201cdraw ... back,\u201d which is hardly\n defensible.] Tu Mu and Wang Hsi, however, think \u5f15\u52dd means \u201cleading\n up to the _enemy\u2019s_ victory.\u201d\n\n17. \u6545\u77e5\u52dd\u6709\u4e94\u77e5\u53ef\u4ee5\u6230\u8207\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u6230\u8005\u52dd\u8b58\u8846\u5be1\u4e4b\u7528\u8005\u52dd\u4e0a\u4e0b\u540c\u6b32\u8005\u52dd\u4ee5\u865e\u5f85\u4e0d\u865e\u8005\u52dd\n\u5c07\u80fd\u800c\u541b\u4e0d\u5fa1\u8005\u52dd\u6b64\u4e94\u8005\u77e5\u52dd\u4e4b\u9053\u4e5f\n\nThus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He\nwill win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cIf he can fight, he advances and takes the\n offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the\n defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is\n right to take the offensive or the defensive.\u201d\n\n(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior\nforces.\n\n This is not merely the general\u2019s ability to estimate numbers\n correctly, as Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan and others make out. Chang Y\u00fc expounds the\n saying more satisfactorily: \u201cBy applying the art of war, it is\n possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice\n vers\u00e2_. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting\n the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tz\u016d says: \u2018With a superior force,\n make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult\n ground.\u2019\u201d\n\n(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout\nall its ranks.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung refers \u4e0a\u4e0b less well to sovereign and subjects.\n\n(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy\nunprepared.\n\n(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with\nby the sovereign.\n\n Tu Yu quotes \u738b\u5b50 as saying: \u6307\u6388\u5728\u541b\u6c7a\u6230\u5728\u5c07\u4e5f \u201cIt is the\n sovereign\u2019s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on\n battle is the function of the general.\u201d It is needless to dilate\n on the military disasters which have been caused by undue\n interference with operations in the field on the part of the home\n government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary\n success to the fact that he was not hampered by any central\n authority,\u2014that he was, in fact, \u5c07 and \u541b in one.\n\nVictory lies in the knowledge of these five points.\n\n Literally, \u201cThese five things are knowledge of the principle of\n victory.\u201d\n\n18. \u6545\u66f0\u77e5\u5f7c\u77e5\u5df1\u767e\u6230\u4e0d\u6b86\u4e0d\u77e5\u5f7c\u800c\u77e5\u5df1\u4e00\u52dd\u4e00\u8ca0\u4e0d\u77e5\u5f7c\u4e0d\u77e5\u5df1\u6bcf\u6230\u5fc5\u6b86\n\nHence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need\nnot fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not\nthe enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan cites the case of \u82fb\u5805 Fu Chien, prince of \u79e6 Ch\u2018in, who\n in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the \u6649 Chin Emperor.\n When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services\n of such men as \u8b1d\u5b89 Hsieh An and \u6853\u6c96 Huan Ch\u2018ung, he boastfully\n replied: \u201cI have the population of eight provinces at my back,\n infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they\n could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their\n whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?\u201d Nevertheless,\n his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the \u6ddd Fei River,\n and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.\n\nIf you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every\nbattle.\n\n The modern text, represented by the \u5317\u5802\u66f8\u9214 and _T\u2018u Shu_, has\n \u5fc5\u6557, which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to \u6b86 here,\n though the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ both have the latter. Chang\n Y\u00fc offers the best commentary on \u77e5\u5f7c\u77e5\u5df1. He says that these words\n \u201chave reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables\n you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand\n on the defensive.\u201d He adds: \u653b\u662f\u5b88\u4e4b\u6a5f\u5b88\u662f\u653b\u4e4b\u7b56 \u201cAttack is the\n secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack.\u201d It would\n be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.\n\n\n\n\n IV. \u5f62\u7bc7\n\n TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.\n\n\n \u5f62 is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally,\n \u201cform,\u201d \u201cbody,\u201d it comes to mean \u201cappearance,\u201d \u201cattitude\u201d or\n \u201cdisposition;\u201d and here it is best taken as something between, or\n perhaps combining, \u201ctactics\u201d and \u201cdisposition of troops.\u201d Ts\u2018ao\n Kung explains it as \u8ecd\u4e4b\u5f62\u4e5f\uff0c\u6211\u52d5\u5f7c\u61c9\u5169\u6575\u76f8\u5bdf\u60c5\u4e5f \u201cmarching and\n counter-marching on the part of the two armies with a view to\n discovering each other\u2019s condition.\u201d Tu Mu says: \u201cIt is through\n the \u5f62 dispositions of an army that its condition may be\n discovered. Conceal your dispositions (\u7121\u5f62), and your condition\n will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your\n dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads\n to defeat.\u201d Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can\n \u8b8a\u5316\u5176\u5f62\u56e0\u6575\u4ee5\u5236\u52dd \u201csecure success by modifying his tactics to meet\n those of the enemy.\u201d In the modern text, the title of the chapter\n appears as \u8ecd\u5f62, which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates \u201cthe\n order of battle.\u201d\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u6614\u4e4b\u5584\u6230\u8005\u5148\u7232\u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u4ee5\u5f85\u6575\u4e4b\u53ef\u52dd\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the\npossibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating\nthe enemy.\n\n2. \u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u5728\u5df1\u53ef\u52dd\u5728\u6575\n\nTo secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the\nopportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.\n\n That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has:\n \u201cThe causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the\n enemy\u2019s camp,\u201d which, though certainly an improvement on his\n previous attempt, is still incorrect.\n\n3. \u6545\u5584\u6230\u8005\u80fd\u7232\u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u4e0d\u80fd\u4f7f\u6575\u5fc5\u53ef\u52dd\n\nThus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,\n\n \u201cBy concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his\n tracks, and taking unremitting precautions\u201d (Chang Y\u00fc).\n\nbut cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.\n\n The original text reads \u4f7f\u6575\u4e4b\u53ef\u52dd, which the modern text has\n further modified into \u4f7f\u6575\u4e4b\u5fc5\u53ef\u52dd. Capt. Calthrop makes out the\n impossible meaning, \u201cand further render the enemy incapable of\n victory.\u201d\n\n4. \u6545\u66f0\u52dd\u53ef\u77e5\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u7232\n\nHence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able to\n_do_ it.\n\n Capt. Calthrop translates: \u201cThe conditions necessary for victory\n may be present, but they cannot always be obtained,\u201d which is more\n or less unintelligible.\n\n5. \u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u8005\u5b88\u4e5f\u53ef\u52dd\u8005\u653b\u4e5f\n\nSecurity against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat\nthe enemy means taking the offensive.\n\n For \u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in \u00a7\u00a7 1\u20133,\n in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The\n meaning they give, \u201cHe who cannot conquer takes the defensive,\u201d is\n plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that \u52dd should\n suddenly become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the\n _Y\u00fc Lan_ is \u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u5247\u5b88\u53ef\u52dd\u5247\u653b.\n\n6. \u5b88\u5247\u4e0d\u8db3\u653b\u5247\u6709\u9918\n\nStanding on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking,\na superabundance of strength.\n\n7. \u5584\u5b88\u8005\u85cf\u65bc\u4e5d\u5730\u4e4b\u4e0b\u5584\u653b\u8005\u52d5\u65bc\u4e5d\u5929\u4e4b\u4e0a\u6545\u80fd\u81ea\u4fdd\u800c\u5168\u52dd\u4e5f\n\nThe general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret\nrecesses of the earth;\n\n Literally, \u201chides under the ninth earth,\u201d which is a metaphor\n indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy\n may not know his whereabouts. The \u4e5d\u5730 of this passage have of\n course no connection with the \u4e5d\u5730 \u201cNine situations\u201d of chap. XI.\n\nhe who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of\nheaven.\n\n Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a\n thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is\n the opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts\u2018ao Kung,\n followed by Tu Yu, explains \u5730 as the hills, rivers, and other\n natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the\n attacked, and \u5929 as the phases of weather which may be turned to\n account by the attacking party. Capt. Calthrop\u2019s \u201cThe skilful in\n attack push to the topmost heaven\u201d conveys no meaning at all.\n\nThus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the\nother, a victory that is complete.\n\n Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following:\n \u201cIf these precepts be observed, victory is certain.\u201d\n\n8. \u898b\u52dd\u4e0d\u904e\u8846\u4eba\u4e4b\u6240\u77e5\u975e\u5584\u4e4b\u5584\u8005\u4e5f\n\nTo see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is\nnot the acme of excellence.\n\n As Ts\u2018ao Kung remarks, \u7576\u898b\u672a\u840c \u201cthe thing is to see the plant\n before it has germinated,\u201d to foresee the event before the action\n has begun. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when\n about to attack the vastly superior army of \u8d99 Chao, which was\n strongly entrenched in the city of \u6210\u5b89 Ch\u2018\u00eang-an, said to his\n officers: \u201cGentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and\n shall meet again at dinner.\u201d The officers hardly took his words\n seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had\n already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem,\n whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and\n inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story,\n see \u524d\u6f22\u66f8, chap. 34, \u97d3\u4fe1\u50b3. Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly\n with: \u201cA victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the\n common folk, may not be a true success.\u201d\n\n9. \u6230\u52dd\u800c\u5929\u4e0b\u66f0\u5584\u975e\u5584\u4e4b\u5584\u8005\u4e5f\n\nNeither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the\nwhole Empire says, \u201cWell done!\u201d\n\n True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: \u9670\u8b00\u6f5b\u904b\u653b\u5fc3\u4f10\u8b00\u52dd\u6575\u4e4b\u65e5\u66fe\u4e0d\u8840\u5203\n \u201cTo plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy\u2019s\n intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be\n won without shedding a drop of blood.\u201d Sun Tz\u016d reserves his\n approbation for things that\n\n \u201cthe world\u2019s coarse thumb\n And finger fail to plumb.\u201d\n\n10. \u6545\u8209\u79cb\u6beb\u4e0d\u7232\u591a\u529b\u898b\u65e5\u6708\u4e0d\u7232\u660e\u76ee\u805e\u96f7\u9706\u4e0d\u7232\u8070\u8033\n\nTo lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;\n\n \u79cb\u6beb is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn,\n when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in\n Chinese writers. Cf. Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tz\u016d,\n \u77e5\u5317\u904a, _et al._\n\nto see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of\nthunder is no sign of a quick ear.\n\n Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick\n hearing: \u70cf\ud86c\ude6c Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone;\n \u96e2\u6731 Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects\n no bigger than a mustard seed; and \u5e2b\u66e0 Shih K\u2018uang, a blind\n musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.\n\n11. \u53e4\u4e4b\u6240\u8b02\u5584\u6230\u8005\u52dd\u52dd\u6613\u52dd\u8005\u4e5f\n\nWhat the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins,\nbut excels in winning with ease.\n\n The original text, followed by the _T\u2018u Shu_, has \u52dd\u65bc\u6613\u52dd\u8005\u4e5f. But\n this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness\n of \u52dd\u52dd\u6613\u52dd\u8005\u4e5f, which means literally: \u201cone who, conquering, excels\n in easy conquering.\u201d Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says: \u201cHe who only sees the\n obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the\n surface of things, wins with ease.\u201d\n\n12. \u6545\u5584\u6230\u8005\u4e4b\u52dd\u4e5f\u7121\u667a\u540d\u7121\u52c7\u529f\n\nHence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit\nfor courage.\n\n Tu Mu explains this very well: \u201cInasmuch as his victories are\n gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world\n at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for\n wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has\n been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.\u201d\n\n13. \u6545\u5176\u6230\u52dd\u4e0d\u5fd2\u4e0d\u5fd2\u8005\u5176\u6240\u63aa\u5fc5\u52dd\u52dd\u5df2\u6557\u8005\u4e5f\n\nHe wins his battles by making no mistakes.\n\n Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao says: \u201cHe plans no superfluous marches, he devises no\n futile attacks.\u201d The connection of ideas is thus explained by\n Chang Y\u00fc: \u201cOne who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever\n though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on\n occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future\n and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make\n a blunder and therefore invariably win.\u201d Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan thinks that the\n character \u5fd2 should be \u8cb3 \u201cto have doubts.\u201d But it is better not to\n tamper with the text, especially when no improvement in sense is\n the result.\n\nMaking no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for\nit means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ omits \u5fc5. \u63aa is here = \u7f6e. Chia Lin says it is put for\n \u932f in the sense of \u96dc; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop\n altogether ignores the important word \u5fd2.\n\n14. \u6545\u5584\u6230\u8005\u7acb\u65bc\u4e0d\u6557\u4e4b\u5730\u800c\u4e0d\u5931\u6575\u4e4b\u6557\u4e5f\n\nHence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes\ndefeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.\n\n A \u4e0d\u53ef\u7232\u4e4b\u8a08 \u201ccounsel of perfection,\u201d as Tu Mu truly observes. \u5730\n need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the\n troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a\n wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.\n\n15. \u662f\u6545\u52dd\u5175\u5148\u52dd\u800c\u5f8c\u6c42\u6230\u6557\u5175\u5148\u6230\u800c\u5f8c\u6c42\u52dd\n\nThus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle\nafter the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat\nfirst fights and afterwards looks for victory.\n\n Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: \u201cIn warfare, first lay plans\n which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if\n you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength\n alone, victory will no longer be assured.\u201d\n\n16. \u5584\u7528\u5175\u8005\u4fee\u9053\u800c\u4fdd\u6cd5\u6545\u80fd\u7232\u52dd\u6557\u4e4b\u653f\n\nThe consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres\nto method and discipline;\n\n For \u9053 and \u6cd5, see _supra_, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Y\u00fc is\n wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as\n \u7232\u6230\u4e4b\u9053 and \u5236\u6575\u4e4b\u6cd5 respectively.\n\nthus it is in his power to control success.\n\n17. \u5175\u6cd5\u4e00\u66f0\u5ea6\u4e8c\u66f0\u91cf\u4e09\u66f0\u6578\u56db\u66f0\u7a31\u4e94\u66f0\u52dd\n\nIn respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;\nsecondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,\nBalancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.\n\n18. \u5730\u751f\u5ea6\u5ea6\u751f\u91cf\u91cf\u751f\u6578\u6578\u751f\u7a31\u7a31\u751f\u52dd\n\nMeasurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to\nMeasurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of\nchances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.\n\n It is not easy to distinguish the four terms \u5ea6\u91cf\u6578\u7a31 very clearly.\n The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,\n which enable us to \u91cf form an estimate of the enemy\u2019s strength, and\n to \u6578 make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are\n thus led to \u7a31 a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy\u2019s\n chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then \u52dd victory\n ensues. The chief difficulty lies in \u6578, which some commentators\n take as a calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly\n synonymous with \u91cf. Perhaps \u91cf is rather a consideration of the\n enemy\u2019s general position or condition (\u60c5 or \u5f62\u52e2), while \u6578 is\n the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu\n defines \u6578 as \u6a5f\u6578, and adds: \u5f3a\u5f31\u5df2\u5b9a\u7136\u5f8c\u80fd\u7528\u6a5f\u8b8a\u6578\u4e5f \u201cthe question\n of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the\n varied resources of cunning into play.\u201d Ho Shih seconds this\n interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that \u7a31 is\n given as logically consequent on \u6578; this certainly points to the\n latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop\u2019s version\n the less said the better.\n\n19. \u6545\u52dd\u5175\u82e5\u4ee5\u93b0\u7a31\u9296\u6557\u5175\u82e5\u4ee5\u9296\u7a31\u93b0\n\nA victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound\u2019s weight\nplaced in the scale against a single grain.\n\n Literally, \u201ca victorious army is like an \u93b0 _i_ (20 oz.) weighed\n against a \u9296 _shu_ (1\u204424 oz.); a routed army as a _shu_ weighed\n against an _i_.\u201d The point is simply the enormous advantage which\n a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one\n demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2,\n makes the \u93b0 to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi\u2019s\n statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan of the T\u2018ang\n dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.\n\n20. \u52dd\u8005\u4e4b\u6230\u6c11\u4e5f\u82e5\u6c7a\u7a4d\u6c34\u65bc\u5343\u4ede\u4e4b\u8c3f\u8005\u5f62\u4e5f\n\nThe onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up\nwaters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical\ndispositions.\n\n The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the\n general sense is plain. The _T\u2018u Shu_ omits \u6c11\u4e5f. A \u4ede = 8 \u5c3a or\n Chinese feet.\n\n\n\n\n V. \u57f6\u7bc7\n\n ENERGY.\n\n\n \u57f6 here is said to be an older form of \u52e2; Sun Tz\u016d, however, would\n seem to have used the former in the sense of \u201cpower,\u201d and the latter\n only in the sense of \u201ccircumstances.\u201d The fuller title \u5175\u52e2 is found\n in the _T\u2018u Shu_ and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into \u7a4d\u52e2\u4e4b\u8b8a\n \u201cthe application, in various ways, of accumulated power;\u201d and Chang Y\u00fc\n says: \u5175\u52e2\u4ee5\u6210\u7136\u5f8c\u4efb\u52e2\u4ee5\u53d6\u52dd \u201cWhen the soldiers\u2019 energy has reached its\n height, it may be used to secure victory.\u201d\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u6cbb\u8846\u5982\u6cbb\u5be1\u5206\u6578\u662f\u4e5f\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as\nthe control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their\nnumbers.\n\n That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with\n subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han\n Hsin\u2019s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to\n him: \u201cHow large an army do you think I could lead?\u201d \u201cNot more than\n 100,000 men, your Majesty.\u201d \u201cAnd you?\u201d asked the Emperor. \u201cOh!\u201d he\n answered, \u201cthe more the better\u201d (\u591a\u591a\u76ca\u8fa6\u8033). Chang Y\u00fc gives the\n following curious table of the subdivisions of an army:\u20145 men make\n a \u5217; 2 \u5217 make a \u706b; 5 \u706b make a \u968a; 2 \u968a make a \u5b98; 2 \u5b98 make a\n \u66f2; 2 \u66f2 make a \u90e8; 2 \u90e8 make a \u6821; 2 \u6821 make a \u88e8; 2 \u88e8 make a \u8ecd.\n A \u8ecd or army corps thus works out at 3200 men. But cf. III. \u00a7 1,\n note. For \u66f2, see I. \u00a7 10. It is possible that \u5b98 in that paragraph\n may also be used in the above technical sense.\n\n2. \u9b25\u8846\u5982\u9b25\u5be1\u5f62\u540d\u662f\u4e5f\n\nFighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from\nfighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting\nsigns and signals.\n\n One must be careful to avoid translating \u9b25\u8846 \u201cfighting _against_ a\n large number,\u201d no reference to the enemy being intended. \u5f62 is\n explained by Ts\u2018ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of\n which every soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or\n company, and thus confusion may be prevented. \u540d he explains as\n drums and gongs, which from the earliest times were used to sound\n the advance and the retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines \u5f62 as \u9673\u5f62\n \u201cmarshalling the troops in order,\u201d and takes \u540d as the flags and\n banners. Wang Hsi also dissents from Ts\u2018ao Kung, referring \u5f62 to\n the ordering of the troops by means of banners, drums and gongs,\n and \u540d to the various names by which the regiments might be\n distinguished. There is much to be said for this view.\n\n3. \u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u8846\u53ef\u4f7f\u5fc5\u53d7\u6575\u800c\u7121\u6557\u8005\u5947\u6b63\u662f\u4e5f\n\nTo ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy\u2019s\nattack and remain unshaken\u2014this is effected by man\u0153uvres direct and\nindirect.\n\n For \u5fc5, there is another reading \u7562, \u201call together,\u201d adopted by\n Wang Hsi and Chang Y\u00fc. We now come to one of the most interesting\n parts of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s treatise, the discussion of the \u6b63 and the \u5947.\n As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these\n two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English\n equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the\n commentators\u2019 remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li\n Ch\u2018\u00fcan: \u7576\u6575\u7232\u6b63\u508d\u51fa\u7232\u5947 \u201cFacing the enemy is _ch\u00eang_, making\n lateral diversions is _ch\u2018i_.\u201d Chia Lin: \u7576\u6575\u4ee5\u6b63\u9673\u53d6\u52dd\u4ee5\u5947\u5175 \u201cIn\n presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal\n fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal man\u0153uvres must be\n employed.\u201d Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean: \u52d5\u7232\u5947\u975c\u7232\u6b63\u975c\u4ee5\u5f85\u4e4b\u52d5\u4ee5\u52dd\u4e4b \u201c_Ch\u2018i_ is\n active, _ch\u00eang_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an\n opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.\u201d Ho Shih:\n \u6211\u4e4b\u6b63\u4f7f\u6575\u8996\u4e4b\u7232\u5947\u6211\u4e4b\u5947\u4f7f\u6575\u8996\u4e4b\u7232\u6b63\u6b63\u4ea6\u7232\u5947\u5947\u4ea6\u7232\u6b63 \u201cWe must cause the\n enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly\n designed, and _vice vers\u00e2_; thus _ch\u00eang_ may also be _ch\u2018i_, and\n _ch\u2018i_ may also be _ch\u00eang_.\u201d He instances the famous exploit of\n Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against \u81e8\u6649 Lin-chin (now\n \u671d\u9091 Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the\n Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent.\n [_Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the march on\n Lin-chin was \u6b63, and the surprise man\u0153uvre was \u5947. Chang Y\u00fc gives\n the following summary of opinions on the words: \u201cMilitary writers\n do not all agree with regard to the meaning of _ch\u2018i_ and _ch\u00eang_.\n \u5c09\u7e5a\u5b50 Wei Liao Tz\u016d [4th cent. B.C.] says: \u6b63\u5175\u8cb4\u5148\u5947\u5175\u8cb4\u5f8c \u2018Direct\n warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the\n rear.\u2019 Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u2018Going straight out to join battle is a\n direct operation; appearing on the enemy\u2019s rear is an indirect\n man\u0153uvre.\u2019 \u674e\u885b\u516c Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: \u2018In\n war, to march straight ahead is _ch\u00eang_; turning movements, on the\n other hand, are _ch\u2018i_.\u2019 These writers simply regard _ch\u00eang_ as\n _ch\u00eang_, and _ch\u2018i_ as _ch\u2018i_; they do not note that the two are\n mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two\n sides of a circle [see _infra_, \u00a7 11]. A comment of the T\u2018ang\n Emperor T\u2018ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: \u2018A _ch\u2018i_\n man\u0153uvre may be _ch\u00eang_, if we make the enemy look upon it as\n _ch\u00eang_; then our real attack will be _ch\u2018i_, and _vice vers\u00e2_.\n The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot\n fathom our real intent.\u2019\u201d To put it perhaps a little more clearly:\n any attack or other operation is \u6b63, on which the enemy has had his\n attention fixed; whereas that is \u5947, which takes him by surprise or\n comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a\n movement which is meant to be \u5947, it immediately becomes \u6b63.\n\n4. \u5175\u4e4b\u6240\u52a0\u5982\u4ee5\u78ac\u6295\u5375\u8005\u865b\u5be6\u662f\u4e5f\n\nThat the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against\nan egg\u2014this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.\n\n \u865b\u5be6, literally \u201cthe hollow and the solid,\u201d is the title of chap.\n VI. \u78ab _tuan_ is the _T\u2018u Shu_ reading, \u78ac _hsia_ that of the\n standard text. It appears from K\u2018ang Hsi that there has been much\n confusion between the two characters, and indeed, it is probable\n that one of them has really crept into the language as a mistake\n for the other.\n\n5. \u51e1\u6230\u8005\u4ee5\u6b63\u5408\u4ee5\u5947\u52dd\n\nIn all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but\nindirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u5f90\u767c\u5947\u5175\u6216\u64e3\u5176\u65c1\u6216\u64ca\u5176\u5f8c \u201cSteadily develop indirect\n tactics, either by pounding the enemy\u2019s flanks or falling on his\n rear.\u201d A brilliant example of \u201cindirect tactics\u201d which decided the\n fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts\u2019 night march round the\n Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.[169]\n\n6. \u6545\u5584\u51fa\u5947\u8005\u7121\u7aae\u5982\u5929\u5730\u4e0d\u7aed\u5982\u6c5f\u6cb3\u7d42\u800c\u5fa9\u59cb\u65e5\u6708\u662f\u4e5f\u6b7b\u800c\u5fa9\u751f\u56db\u6642\u662f\u4e5f\n\nIndirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and\nEarth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;\n\n \u5947 is the universally accepted emendation for \u5175, the reading of\n the \u5317\u5802\u66f8\u9214.\n\nlike the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four\nseasons, they pass away but to return once more.\n\n Tu Yu and Chang Y\u00fc understand this of the permutations of \u5947 and\n \u6b63. But at present Sun Tz\u016d is not speaking of \u6b63 at all, unless,\n indeed, we suppose with \u912d\u53cb\u8ce2 Ch\u00eang Yu-hsien that a clause\n relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has\n already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven\n in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered\n apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language,\n of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.\n\n7. \u8072\u4e0d\u904e\u4e94\u4e94\u8072\u4e4b\u8b8a\u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u807d\u4e5f\n\nThere are not more than five musical notes,\n\n \u5bae\u5546\u89d2\u5fae\u7fbd.\n\nyet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can\never be heard.\n\n8. \u8272\u4e0d\u904e\u4e94\u4e94\u8272\u4e4b\u8b8a\u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u89c0\u4e5f\n\nThere are not more than five primary colours,\n\n \u9751\u9ec3\u8d64\u767d\u9ed1 blue, yellow, red, white and black.\n\nyet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.\n\n9. \u5473\u4e0d\u904e\u4e94\u4e94\u5473\u4e4b\u8b8a\u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u5617\u4e5f\n\nThere are not more than five cardinal tastes,\n\n \u9178\u8f9b\u918e\u7518\u82e6 sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter.\n\nyet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.\n\n10. \u6230\u57f6\u4e0d\u904e\u5947\u6b63\u5947\u6b63\u4e4b\u8b8a\u4e0d\u53ef\u52dd\u7aae\u4e5f\n\nIn battle, there are not more than two methods of attack\u2014the direct\nand the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless\nseries of man\u0153uvres.\n\n11. \u5947\u6b63\u76f8\u751f\u5982\u5faa\u74b0\u4e4b\u7121\u7aef\u5b70\u80fd\u7aae\u4e4b\n\nThe direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like\nmoving in a circle\u2014you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the\npossibilities of their combination?\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ adds \u54c9. The final \u4e4b may refer either to the circle\n or, more probably, to the \u5947\u6b63\u4e4b\u8b8a understood. Capt. Calthrop is\n wrong with: \u201cThey are a mystery that none can penetrate.\u201d\n\n12. \u6fc0\u6c34\u4e4b\u75be\u81f3\u65bc\u6f02\u77f3\u8005\u57f6\u4e5f\n\nThe onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll\nstones along in its course.\n\n13. \u9dd9\u9ce5\u4e4b\u75be\u81f3\u65bc\u6bc1\u6298\u8005\u7bc0\u4e5f\n\nThe quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which\nenables it to strike and destroy its victim.\n\n For \u75be the _Y\u00fc Lan_ reads \u64ca, which is also supported by a\n quotation in the \u5442\u6c0f\u6625\u79cb [3rd cent. B.C.]. \u7bc0 in this context is a\n word which really defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu\n Mu says that it is equivalent to \u7bc0\u91cf\u9060\u8fd1 \u201cthe measurement or\n estimation of distance.\u201d But this meaning does not quite fit the\n illustrative simile in \u00a7 15. As applied to the falcon, it seems to\n me to denote that instinct of _self-restraint_ which keeps the\n bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together\n with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The\n analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being\n able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it\n will be most effective. When the \u201cVictory\u201d went into action at\n Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several\n minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with\n a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close\n range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc\n on the enemy\u2019s nearest ships. That was a case of \u7bc0.\n\n14. \u662f\u6545\u5584\u6230\u8005\u5176\u57f6\u96aa\u5176\u7bc0\u77ed\n\nTherefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt\nin his decision.\n\n Tu Yu defines \u7bc0 here by the word \u65b7, which is very like \u201cdecision\u201d\n in English. \u77ed is certainly used in a very unusual sense, even if,\n as the commentators say, it = \u8fd1. This would have reference to the\n measurement of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get\n near before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tz\u016d\n meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to our\n own idiom \u201cshort and sharp.\u201d Cf. Wang Hsi\u2019s note, which after\n describing the falcon\u2019s mode of attack, proceeds: \u5175\u4e4b\u4e58\u6a5f\u7576\u5982\u662f\u8033\n \u201cThis is just how the \u2018psychological moment\u2019 should be seized in\n war.\u201d I do not care for Capt. Calthrop\u2019s rendering: \u201cThe spirit of\n the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden.\u201d\n\n15. \u57f6\u5982\u5f4d\u5f29\u7bc0\u5982\u767c\u6a5f\n\nEnergy may be likened to the bending of a cross-bow; decision, to the\nreleasing of the trigger.\n\n \u201cEnergy\u201d seems to be the best equivalent here for \u57f6, because the\n comparison implies that the force is potential, being stored up in\n the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger.\n None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.\n\n16. \u7d1b\u7d1b\u7d1c\u7d1c\u9b25\u4e82\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e82\u4e5f\u6e3e\u6e3e\u6c8c\u6c8c\u5f62\u5713\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u6557\u4e5f\n\nAmid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder\nand yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array\nmay be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.\n\n \u5f62\u5713, literally \u201cformation circular\u201d, is explained by Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan as\n \u7121\u5411\u80cc\u4e5f \u201cwithout back or front.\u201d Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says: \u201cThe\n subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the\n various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the\n dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a\n battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder\n is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your\n dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite\n out of the question.\u201d It is a little difficult to decide whether\n \u9b25\u4e82 and \u5f62\u5713 should not be taken as imperatives: \u201cfight in\n disorder (for the purpose of deceiving the enemy), and you will be\n secure against real disorder.\u201d Cf. I. \u00a7 20: \u4e82\u800c\u53d6\u4e4b.\n\n17. \u4e82\u751f\u65bc\u6cbb\u602f\u751f\u65bc\u52c7\u5f31\u751f\u65bc\u5f4a\n\nSimulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear\npostulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.\n\n In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to\n tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts\u2018ao Kung\n throws out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: \u7686\u6bc1\u5f62\u533f\u60c5\u4e5f\n \u201cThese things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one\u2019s\n condition.\u201d But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: \u201cIf\n you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you\n must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display\n timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme\n courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the\n enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength.\u201d\n\n18. \u6cbb\u4e82\u6578\u4e5f\u52c7\u602f\u57f6\u4e5f\u5f4a\u5f31\u5f62\u4e5f\n\nHiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of\nsubdivision;\n\n See _supra_, \u00a7 1.\n\nconcealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of\nlatent energy;\n\n It is passing strange that the commentators should understand \u57f6\n here as \u201ccircumstances\u201d\u2014a totally different sense from that which\n it has previously borne in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says:\n \u898b\u6709\u5229\u4e4b\u52e2\u800c\u4e0d\u52d5\u6575\u4eba\u4ee5\u6211\u7232\u5be6\u602f\u4e5f \u201cseeing that we are favourably\n circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we\n are really afraid.\u201d\n\nmasking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical\ndispositions.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han\n Emperor: \u201cWishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to\n report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned,\n carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses,\n and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen.\n The result was that the spies one and all recommended the Emperor\n to deliver his attack.\u201d \u5a41\u656c Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying:\n \u201cWhen two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make\n an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen\n nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some _ruse_ on\n the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack.\u201d\n The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap\n and found himself surrounded at \u767d\u767b Po-t\u00eang.\u201d\n\n19. \u6545\u5584\u52d5\u6575\u8005\u5f62\u4e4b\u6575\u5fc5\u5f9e\u4e4b\u4e88\u4e4b\u6575\u5fc5\u53d6\u4e4b\n\nThus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains\ndeceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s note is \u898b\u7fb8\u5f62\u4e5f \u201cMake a display of weakness and\n want,\u201d but Tu Mu rightly points out that \u5f62 does not refer only to\n weakness: \u201cIf our force happens to be superior to the enemy\u2019s,\n weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if\n inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order\n that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy\u2019s movements should be\n determined by the signs that we choose to give him.\u201d The following\n anecdote of \u5b6b\u81cf Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu, is related at\n length in the \u53f2\u8a18, chap. 65: In 341 B.C., the \u9f4a Ch\u2018i State being\n at war with \u9b4f Wei, sent \u7530\u5fcc T\u2018ien Chi and Sun Pin against the\n general \u9f90\u6d93 P\u2018ang Ch\u00fcan, who happened to be a deadly personal\n enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said: \u201cThe Ch\u2018i State has a\n reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us.\n Let us turn this circumstance to account.\u201d Accordingly, when the\n army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to\n show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the\n night after only 20,000. P\u2018ang Ch\u00fcan pursued them hotly, saying to\n himself: \u201cI knew these men of Ch\u2018i were cowards: their numbers\n have already fallen away by more than half.\u201d In his retreat, Sun\n Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers\n would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark,\n and inscribed upon it the words: \u201cUnder this tree shall P\u2018ang\n Ch\u00fcan die.\u201d Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body\n of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they\n saw a light. Later on, P\u2018ang Ch\u00fcan arrived at the spot, and\n noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was\n written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of\n arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu\n Mu\u2019s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less dramatically but\n probably with more historical truth, makes P\u2018ang Ch\u00fcan cut his own\n throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.]\n\nHe sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.\n\n \u4e88 here = \u8207.\n\n20. \u4ee5\u5229\u52d5\u4e4b\u4ee5\u5352\u5f85\u4e4b\n\nBy holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of\npicked men he lies in wait for him.\n\n This would appear to be the meaning if we retain \u5352, which Mei\n Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean explains as \u7cbe\u5352 \u201cmen of spirit.\u201d The _T\u2018u Shu_ reads \u672c,\n an emendation suggested by \u674e\u9756 Li Ching. The meaning then would\n be, \u201cHe lies in wait with the main body of his troops.\u201d\n\n21. \u6545\u5584\u6230\u8005\u6c42\u4e4b\u65bc\u57f6\u4e0d\u8cac\u65bc\u4eba\u6545\u80fd\u64c7\u4eba\u800c\u4efb\u57f6\n\nThe clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does\nnot require too much from individuals.\n\n Tu Mu says: \u201cHe first of all considers the power of his army in\n the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and\n uses each man according to his capabilities. He does not demand\n perfection from the untalented.\u201d\n\nHence his ability to pick out the right men and to utilise combined\nenergy.\n\n Another reading has \u4e4b instead of \u57f6. It would be interesting if\n Capt. Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the\n Chinese: \u201cyet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to\n its limits.\u201d\n\n22. \u4efb\u57f6\u8005\u5176\u6230\u4eba\u4e5f\u5982\u8f49\u6728\u77f3\u6728\u77f3\u4e4b\u6027\u5b89\u5247\u975c\u5371\u5247\u52d5\u65b9\u5247\u6b62\u5713\u5247\u884c\n\nWhen he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were\nlike unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or\nstone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a\nslope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped,\nto go rolling down.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung calls this \u4efb\u81ea\u7136\u52e2 \u201cthe use of natural or inherent\n power.\u201d Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence\n entirely. In its stead he has: \u201cSo await the opportunity, and so\n act when the opportunity arrives\u201d\u2014another absolutely gratuitous\n interpolation. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ omits \u4efb.\n\n23. \u6545\u5584\u6230\u4eba\u4e4b\u57f6\u5982\u8f49\u5713\u77f3\u65bc\u5343\u4ede\u4e4b\u5c71\u8005\u57f6\u4e5f\n\nThus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a\nround stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So\nmuch on the subject of energy.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ omits \u5584. The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu\n Mu\u2019s opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid\n evolutions and sudden rushes. \u201cGreat results,\u201d he adds, \u201ccan thus\n be achieved with small forces.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n VI. \u865b\u5be6\u7bc7\n\n WEAK POINTS AND STRONG.\n\n\n Chang Y\u00fc attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:\n \u201cChapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive\n and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and\n indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with\n the theory of attack and defence, and then turns his attention to\n direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and\n combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of\n weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods\n arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and\n strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence the\n present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy.\u201d\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u5148\u8655\u6230\u5730\u800c\u5f85\u6575\u8005\u4f5a\u5f8c\u8655\u6230\u5730\u800c\u8da8\u6230\u8005\u52de\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of\nthe enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field\nand has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.\n\n Instead of \u8655, the _Y\u00fc Lan_ has in both clauses the stronger word\n \u64da. For the antithesis between \u4f5a and \u52de, cf. I. \u00a7 23, where\n however \u52de is used as a verb.\n\n2. \u6545\u5584\u6230\u8005\u81f4\u4eba\u800c\u4e0d\u81f4\u65bc\u4eba\n\nTherefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does\nnot allow the enemy\u2019s will to be imposed on him.\n\n The next paragraph makes it clear that \u81f4 does not merely mean, as\n Tu Mu says, \u4ee4\u6575\u4f86\u5c31\u6211 \u201cto make the enemy approach me,\u201d but rather\n to make him go in any direction I please. It is thus practically\n synonymous with \u5236. Cf. Tu Mu\u2019s own note on V. \u00a7 19. One mark of a\n great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at\n all.[170]\n\n3. \u80fd\u4f7f\u6575\u4eba\u81ea\u81f3\u8005\u5229\u4e4b\u4e5f\u80fd\u4f7f\u6575\u4eba\u4e0d\u5f97\u81f3\u8005\u5bb3\u4e4b\u4e5f\n\nBy holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach\nof his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible\nfor the enemy to draw near.\n\n In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second,\n he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have\n to defend.\n\n4. \u6545\u6575\u4f5a\u80fd\u52de\u4e4b\u98fd\u80fd\u98e2\u4e4b\u5b89\u80fd\u52d5\u4e4b\n\nIf the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;\n\n This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s\n interpretation of I. \u00a7 23.\n\nif well supplied with food, he can starve him out;\n\n \u98e2 is probably an older form than \u9951, the reading of the original\n text. Both are given in the \u8aaa\u6587.\n\nif quietly encamped, he can force him to move.\n\n The subject to \u80fd is still \u5584\u6230\u8005; but these clauses would read\n better as direct admonitions, and in the next sentence we find Sun\n Tz\u016d dropping insensibly into the imperative.\n\n5. \u51fa\u5176\u6240\u5fc5\u8da8\u8da8\u5176\u6240\u4e0d\u610f\n\nAppear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly\nto places where you are not expected.\n\n The original text, adopted by the _T\u2018u Shu_, has \u51fa\u5176\u6240\u4e0d\u8da8; it has\n been altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts\u2018ao\n Kung and Ho Shih, who evidently read \u5fc5\u8da8. The other reading would\n mean: \u201cAppear at points to which the enemy cannot hasten;\u201d but in\n this case there is something awkward in the use of \u8da8. Capt.\n Calthrop is wrong of course with \u201cappearing where the enemy is not.\u201d\n\n6. \u884c\u5343\u91cc\u800c\u4e0d\u52de\u8005\u884c\u65bc\u7121\u4eba\u4e4b\u5730\u4e5f\n\nAn army may march great distances without distress, if it marches\nthrough country where the enemy is not.\n\n We must beware of understanding \u7121\u4eba\u4e4b\u5730 as \u201cuninhabited country.\u201d\n Sun Tz\u016d habitually uses \u4eba in the sense of \u6575, e.g. _supra_, \u00a7 2.\n Ts\u2018ao Kung sums up very well: \u51fa\u7a7a\u64ca\u865b\u907f\u5176\u6240\u5b88\u64ca\u5176\u4e0d\u610f \u201cEmerge from\n the void [_q.d._ like \u201ca bolt from the blue\u201d], strike at\n vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in\n unexpected quarters.\u201d The difference of meaning between \u7a7a and \u865b\n is worth noting.\n\n7. \u653b\u800c\u5fc5\u53d6\u8005\u653b\u5176\u6240\u4e0d\u5b88\u4e5f\u5b88\u800c\u5fc5\u56fa\u8005\u5b88\u5176\u6240\u4e0d\u653b\u4e5f\n\nYou can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack\nplaces which are undefended.\n\n \u6240\u4e0d\u5b88 is of course hyperbolical; Wang Hsi rightly explains it as \u201cweak\n points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or\n the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the\n precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or\n provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst\n themselves.\u201d\n\nYou can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions\nthat cannot be attacked.\n\n _I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There\n is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter\n clause. Tu Mu, Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao, and Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean assume the meaning to be:\n \u201cIn order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend _even_\n those places that are not likely to be attacked;\u201d and Tu Mu adds: \u201cHow\n much more, then, those that will be attacked.\u201d Taken thus, however,\n the clause balances less well with the preceding\u2014always a\n consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the\n Chinese. Chang Y\u00fc, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying:\n \u201cHe who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of\n heaven [see IV. \u00a7 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard\n against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are\n precisely those that the enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled in\n defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it\n impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so,\n the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot\n attack.\u201d\n\n8. \u6545\u5584\u653b\u8005\u6575\u4e0d\u77e5\u5176\u6240\u5b88\u5584\u5b88\u8005\u6575\u4e0d\u77e5\u5176\u6240\u653b\n\nHence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know\nwhat to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not\nknow what to attack.\n\n An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.\n\n9. \u5fae\u4e4e\u5fae\u4e4e\u81f3\u65bc\u7121\u5f62\u795e\u4e4e\u795e\u4e4e\u81f3\u65bc\u7121\u8072\u6545\u80fd\u7232\u6575\u4e4b\u53f8\u547d\n\nO divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be\ninvisible, through you inaudible;\n\n Literally, \u201cwithout form or sound,\u201d but it is said of course with\n reference to the enemy. Chang Y\u00fc, whom I follow, draws no sharp\n distinction between \u5fae and \u795e, but Tu Mu and others think that \u5fae\n indicates the secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and \u795e the\n rapidity to be displayed in attack. The _Y\u00fc Lan_ text differs\n considerably from ours, reading: \u5fae\u4e4e\u5fae\u4e4e\u6545\u80fd\u96b1\u65bc\u5e38\u5f62\u795e\u4e4e\u795e\u4e4e\u6545\u80fd\u7232\u6575\n \u53f8\u547d.\n\nand hence we can hold the enemy\u2019s fate in our hands.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has \u6545\u80fd\u7232\u8b8a\u5316\u53f8\u547d. Capt. Calthrop\u2019s version of\n this paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from quoting\n it in full: \u201cNow the secrets of the art of offence are not to be\n easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood,\n of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy\n is mastered.\u201d\n\n10. \u9032\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u79a6\u8005\u885d\u5176\u865b\u4e5f\u9000\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u8ffd\u8005\u901f\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u53ca\u4e5f\n\nYou may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the\nenemy\u2019s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your\nmovements are more rapid than those of the enemy.\n\n The second member of the sentence is weak, because \u4e0d\u53ef\u53ca is nearly\n tautologous with \u4e0d\u53ef\u8ffd. The _Y\u00fc Lan_ reads \u9060 for \u901f.\n\n11. \u6545\u6211\u6b32\u6230\u6575\u96d6\u9ad8\u58d8\u6df1\u6e9d\u4e0d\u5f97\u4e0d\u8207\u6211\u6230\u8005\u653b\u5176\u6240\u5fc5\u6551\u4e5f\n\nIf we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even\nthough he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we\nneed do is to attack some other place that he will be obliged to\nrelieve.\n\n Tu Mu says: \u201cIf the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his\n line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have\n to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack\n against the sovereign himself.\u201d It is clear that Sun Tz\u016d, unlike\n certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal\n attacks.\n\n12. \u6211\u4e0d\u6b32\u6230\u756b\u5730\u800c\u5b88\u4e4b\u6575\u4e0d\u5f97\u8207\u6211\u6230\u8005\u4e56\u5176\u6240\u4e4b\u4e5f\n\nIf we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us\neven though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the\nground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in\nhis way.\n\n In order to preserve the parallelism with \u00a7 11, I should prefer to\n follow the _T\u2018u Shu_ text, which inserts \u96d6 before \u756b\u5730. This\n extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia\n Lin: \u96d6\u672a\u4fee\u58d8\u58cd \u201ceven though we have constructed neither wall nor\n ditch.\u201d The real crux of the passage lies in \u4e56\u5176\u6240\u4e4b\u4e5f. \u4e4b of\n course = \u81f3. Ts\u2018ao Kung defines \u4e56 by the word \u623e, which is perhaps\n a case of _obscurum per obscurius_. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, however, says:\n \u8a2d\u5947\u7570\u800c\u7591\u4e4b \u201cwe puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;\u201d\n and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative\n anecdotes\u2014one of \u8af8\u845b\u4eae Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying \u967d\u5e73\n Yang-p\u2018ing and about to be attacked by \u53f8\u99ac\u61ff Ss\u016d-ma I, suddenly\n struck his colours, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung\n open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping\n and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the\n intended effect; for Ss\u016d-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew\n off his army and retreated. What Sun Tz\u016d is advocating here,\n therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of\n \u201cbluff.\u201d Capt. Calthrop translates: \u201cand prevent the enemy from\n attacking by keeping him in suspense,\u201d which shows that he has not\n fully grasped the meaning of \u4e56.\n\n13. \u6545\u5f62\u4eba\u800c\u6211\u7121\u5f62\u5247\u6211\u5c08\u800c\u6575\u5206\n\nBy discovering the enemy\u2019s dispositions and remaining invisible\nourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy\u2019s must\nbe divided.\n\n The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Y\u00fc (after\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean) rightly explains it thus: \u201cIf the enemy\u2019s\n dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body;\n whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be\n obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from\n every quarter.\u201d \u5f62 is here used as an active verb: \u201cto make to\n appear.\u201d See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop\u2019s \u201cmaking feints\u201d\n is quite wrong.\n\n14. \u6211\u5c08\u7232\u4e00\u6575\u5206\u7232\u5341\u662f\u4ee5\u5341\u5171\u5176\u4e00\u4e5f\u5247\u6211\u8846\u800c\u6575\u5be1\n\nWe can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into\nfractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts\nof a whole,\n\n The original text has \u4ee5\u6575\u653b\u5176\u4e00\u4e5f, which in accordance with the\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ has been altered as above. I adopt the\n more plausible reading of the _T\u2018u Shu_: \u662f\u4ee5\u5341\u653b\u5176\u4e00\u4e5f, in spite of\n having to refer \u5341 to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus Tu Yu\n and Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean both regard \u5341 as the undivided force, consisting\n of so many parts, and \u4e00 as each of the isolated fractions of the\n enemy. The alteration of \u653b into \u5171 can hardly be right, though the\n true text might conceivably have been \u662f\u4ee5\u5341\u5171\u653b\u5176\u4e00\u4e5f.\n\nwhich means that we shall be many to the enemy\u2019s few.\n\n15. \u80fd\u4ee5\u8846\u64ca\u5be1\u8005\u5247\u543e\u4e4b\u6240\u8207\u6230\u8005\u7d04\u77e3\n\nAnd if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior\none, our opponents will be in dire straits.\n\n For \u64ca, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ have \u6575. Tu Yu, followed by\n the other commentators, arbitrarily defines \u7d04 as \u5c11\u800c\u6613\u52dd \u201cfew and\n easy to conquer,\u201d but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence\n absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop\u2019s translation: \u201cIn\n superiority of numbers there is economy of strength,\u201d its meaning\n is probably known to himself alone. In justification of my own\n rendering of \u7d04, I would refer to _Lun Y\u00fc_ IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).\n\n16. \u543e\u6240\u8207\u6230\u4e4b\u5730\u4e0d\u53ef\u77e5\u4e0d\u53ef\u77e5\u5247\u6575\u6240\u5099\u8005\u591a\u6575\u6240\u5099\u8005\u591a\u5247\u543e\u6240\u8207\u6230\u8005\u5be1\u77e3\n\nThe spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the\nenemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several\ndifferent points;\n\n Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant\u2019s victories by\n saying that \u201cwhile his opponents were kept fully employed\n wondering what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what\n he was going to do himself.\u201d\n\nand his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers\nwe shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.\n\n17. \u6545\u5099\u524d\u5247\u5f8c\u5be1\u5099\u5f8c\u5247\u524d\u5be1\u5099\u5de6\u5247\u53f3\u5be1\u5099\u53f3\u5247\u5de6\u5be1\u7121\u6240\u4e0d\u5099\u5247\u7121\u6240\u4e0d\u5be1\n\nFor should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;\nshould he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he\nstrengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen\nhis right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements\neverywhere, he will everywhere be weak.\n\n In Frederick the Great\u2019s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read:\n \u201cA defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment.\n Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to\n protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with\n their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard\n against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to\n avoid greater.\u201d\n\n18. \u5be1\u8005\u5099\u4eba\u8005\u4e5f\u8846\u8005\u4f7f\u4eba\u5099\u5df1\u8005\u4e5f\n\nNumerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible\nattacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make\nthese preparations against us.\n\n The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson\u2019s words, is \u201cto compel\n the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior\n force against each fraction in turn.\u201d\n\n19. \u6545\u77e5\u6230\u4e4b\u5730\u77e5\u6230\u4e4b\u65e5\u5247\u53ef\u5343\u91cc\u800c\u6703\u6230\n\nKnowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may\nconcentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.\n\n There is nothing about \u201cdefeating\u201d anybody in this sentence, as\n Capt. Calthrop translates. What Sun Tz\u016d evidently has in mind is\n that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of\n strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose\n of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at\n precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront\n the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful\n junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic\n and decisive was the appearance of Bl\u00fccher just at the critical\n moment on the field of Waterloo.\n\n20. \u4e0d\u77e5\u6230\u5730\u4e0d\u77e5\u6230\u65e5\u5247\u5de6\u4e0d\u80fd\u6551\u53f3\u53f3\u4e0d\u80fd\u6551\u5de6\u524d\u4e0d\u80fd\u6551\u5f8c\u5f8c\u4e0d\u80fd\u6551\u524d\u800c\u6cc1\u9060\u8005\n\u6578\u5341\u91cc\u8fd1\u8005\u6578\u91cc\u4e4e\n\nBut if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be\nimpotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour\nthe left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support\nthe van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are\nanything under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are\nseparated by several _li_!\n\n The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in\n precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is\n probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendez-vous in\n separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed\n date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed at\n haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place\n of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in\n detail. Chang Y\u00fc\u2019s note may be worth quoting here: \u201cIf we do not\n know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the\n day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited\n through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold\n will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we\n shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no\n mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear,\n especially if there is any great distance between the foremost\n and hindmost divisions of the army.\u201d\n\n21. \u4ee5\u543e\u5ea6\u4e4b\u8d8a\u4eba\u4e4b\u5175\u96d6\u591a\u4ea6\u595a\u76ca\u65bc\u52dd\u6557\u54c9\u6545\u66f0\u52dd\u53ef\u7232\u4e5f\n\nThough according to my estimate the soldiers of Y\u00fceh exceed our own in\nnumber, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.\n\n Capt. Calthrop omits \u4ee5\u543e\u5ea6\u4e4b, and his translation of the remainder\n is flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tz\u016d was in the service of the \u5433\n Wu State, it has been proposed to read \u5433 instead of \u543e\u2014a wholly\n unnecessary tampering with the text. Y\u00fceh coincided roughly with\n the present province of Chehkiang. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan very strangely takes\n \u8d8a not as the proper name, but in the sense of \u904e \u201cto surpass.\u201d No\n other commentator follows him. \u52dd\u6557 belongs to the class of\n expressions like \u9060\u8fd1 \u201cdistance,\u201d \u5927\u5c0f \u201cmagnitude,\u201d etc., to which\n the Chinese have to resort in order to express abstract ideas of\n degree. The _T\u2018u Shu_, however, omits \u6557.\n\nI say then that victory can be achieved.\n\n Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states\n ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by \u52fe\u8e10 Kou Chien and\n its incorporation in Y\u00fceh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s\n death. With his present assertion compare IV. \u00a7 4: \u52dd\u53ef\u77e5\u800c\u4e0d\u53ef\u7232\n (which is the obviously mistaken reading of the _Y\u00fc Lan_ here).\n Chang Y\u00fc is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy,\n which he thus goes on to explain: \u201cIn the chapter on Tactical\n Dispositions it is said, \u2018One may _know_ how to conquer without\n being able to _do_ it,\u2019 whereas here we have the statement that\n \u2018victory can be achieved.\u2019 The explanation is, that in the former\n chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under discussion,\n it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make\n certain of beating him. But the present passage refers\n particularly to the soldiers of Y\u00fceh who, according to Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s\n calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of\n the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can\n be achieved.\u201d\n\n22. \u6575\u96d6\u8846\u53ef\u4f7f\u7121\u9b25\u6545\u7b56\u4e4b\u800c\u77e5\u5f97\u5931\u4e4b\u8a08\n\nThough the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from\nfighting.\n\n Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates: \u201c_If_ the enemy be\n many in number, prevent him,\u201d etc.\n\nScheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of\ntheir success.\n\n This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of\n which present decided difficulties. Chang Y\u00fc explains \u77e5\u5f97\u5931\u4e4b\u8a08 as\n \u77e5\u5176\u8a08\u4e4b\u5f97\u5931. This is perhaps the best way of taking the words,\n though Chia Lin, referring \u8a08 to ourselves and not the enemy,\n offers the alternative of \u6211\u5f97\u5f7c\u5931\u4e4b\u8a08\u7686\u5148\u77e5\u4e5f \u201cKnow beforehand all\n plans conducive to our success and to the enemy\u2019s failure.\u201d\n\n23. \u4f5c\u4e4b\u800c\u77e5\u52d5\u975c\u4e4b\u7406\u5f62\u4e4b\u800c\u77e5\u6b7b\u751f\u4e4b\u5730\n\nRouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.\n\n Instead of \u4f5c, the _T\u2018ung Tien_, _Y\u00fc Lan_, and also Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan\u2019s\n text have \u5019, which the latter explains as \u201cthe observation of\n omens,\u201d and Chia Lin simply as \u201cwatching and waiting.\u201d \u4f5c is\n defined by Tu Mu as \u6fc0\u4f5c, and Chang Y\u00fc tells us that by noting the\n joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall\n be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the\n reverse. He instances the action of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the\n scornful present of a woman\u2019s head-dress to Ss\u016d-ma I, in order to\n goad him out of his Fabian tactics.\n\nForce him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.\n\n Two commentators, Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan and Chang Y\u00fc, take \u5f62\u4e4b in the sense\n of \u793a\u4e4b \u201cput on specious appearances.\u201d The former says: \u201cYou may\n either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness\u2014striking your\n colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength\u2014making\n a hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners.\u201d And the\n latter quotes V. 19, where \u5f62\u4e4b certainly seems to bear this sense.\n On the other hand, I would point to \u00a7 13 of this chapter, where \u5f62\n must with equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between\n the two interpretations, but the context here agrees better, I\n think, with the one that I have adopted. Another difficulty arises\n over \u6b7b\u751f\u4e4b\u5730, which most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of\n the \u6b7b\u5730 in XI. \u00a7 1, refer to the actual _ground_ on which the\n enemy is encamped. The notes of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean,\n however, seem to favour my view. The same phrase has a somewhat\n different meaning in I. \u00a7 2.\n\n24. \u89d2\u4e4b\u800c\u77e5\u6709\u9918\u4e0d\u8db3\u4e4b\u8655\n\nCarefully compare the opposing army with your own,\n\n Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to \u89d2; Ts\u2018ao\n Kung defines it simply as \u91cf. Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with\n the staggering translation \u201cFlap the wings\u201d! Can the Latin _cornu_\n (in its figurative sense) have been at the back of his mind?\n\nso that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is\ndeficient.\n\nCf. IV. \u00a7 6.\n\n25. \u6545\u5f62\u5175\u4e4b\u6975\u81f3\u65bc\u7121\u5f62\u7121\u5f62\u5247\u6df1\u9592\u4e0d\u80fd\u7aba\u77e5\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u8b00\n\nIn making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is\nto conceal them;\n\n The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. \u7121\u5f62 is\n perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_, \u00a7 9) as\n \u201cshowing no sign\u201d of what you mean to do, of the plans that are\n formed in your brain.\n\nconceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the\nsubtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.\n\n \u6df1\u9592 is expanded by Tu Mu into \u96d6\u6709\u9592\u8005\u6df1\u4f86\u7aba\u6211. [For \u9592, see XIII,\n note on heading.] He explains \u77e5\u8005 in like fashion:\n \u96d6\u6709\u667a\u80fd\u4e4b\u58eb\u4ea6\u4e0d\u80fd\u8b00\u6211\u4e5f \u201cthough the enemy may have clever and\n capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against\n us.\u201d\n\n26. \u56e0\u5f62\u800c\u932f\u52dd\u65bc\u8846\u8846\u4e0d\u80fd\u77e5\n\nHow victory may be produced for them out of the enemy\u2019s own\ntactics\u2014that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.\n\n All the commentators except Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan make \u5f62 refer to the enemy.\n So Ts\u2018ao Kung: \u56e0\u6575\u5f62\u800c\u7acb\u52dd. \u932f is defined as \u7f6e. The _T\u2018u Shu_ has\n \u63aa, with the same meaning. See IV. \u00a7 13. The _Y\u00fc Lan_ reads \u4f5c,\n evidently a gloss.\n\n27. \u4eba\u7686\u77e5\u6211\u6240\u4ee5\u52dd\u4e4b\u5f62\u800c\u83ab\u77e5\u543e\u6240\u4ee5\u5236\u52dd\u4e4b\u5f62\n\nAll men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see\nis the strategy out of which victory is evolved.\n\n _I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what\n they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which\n has preceded the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the\n first \u5f62 by \u201ctactics\u201d and the second by \u201cstrategy.\u201d\n\n28. \u6545\u5176\u6230\u52dd\u4e0d\u5fa9\u800c\u61c9\u5f62\u65bc\u7121\u7aae\n\nDo not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let\nyour methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.\n\n As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: \u201cThere is but one root-principle (\u7406)\n underlying victory, but the tactics (\u5f62) which lead up to it are\n infinite in number.\u201d With this compare Col. Henderson; \u201cThe rules\n of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week.\n They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams.\n But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like\n Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like\n Gibbon.\u201d\n\n29. \u592b\u5175\u5f62\u8c61\u6c34\u6c34\u4e4b\u884c\u907f\u9ad8\u800c\u8da8\u4e0b\n\nMilitary tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course\nruns away from high places and hastens downwards.\n\n \u884c is \u5289\u665d\u5b50 Liu Chou-tz\u016d\u2019s reading for \u5f62 in the original text.\n\n30. \u5175\u4e4b\u5f62\u907f\u5be6\u800c\u64ca\u865b\n\nSo in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is\nweak.\n\n Like water, taking the line of least resistance.\n\n31. \u6c34\u56e0\u5730\u800c\u5236\u6d41\u5175\u56e0\u6575\u800c\u5236\u52dd\n\nWater shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over\nwhich it flows;\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u5236\u5f62,\u2014the latter also \u5236\u884c. The\n present text is derived from Ch\u00eang Yu-hsien.\n\nthe soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is\nfacing.\n\n32. \u6545\u5175\u7121\u5e38\u52e2\u6c34\u7121\u5e38\u5f62\n\nTherefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare\nthere are no constant conditions.\n\n33. \u80fd\u56e0\u6575\u8b8a\u5316\u800c\u53d6\u52dd\u8005\u8b02\u4e4b\u795e\n\nHe who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby\nsucceed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.\n\n34. \u6545\u4e94\u884c\u7121\u5e38\u52dd\u56db\u6642\u7121\u5e38\u4f4d\u65e5\u6709\u77ed\u9577\u6708\u6709\u6b7b\u751f\n\nThe five elements\n\n Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.\n\nare not always equally predominant;\n\n That is, as Wang Hsi says: \u8fed\u76f8\u514b\u4e5f \u201cthey predominate alternately.\u201d\n\nthe four seasons make way for each other in turn.\n\n Literally, \u201chave no invariable seat.\u201d\n\nThere are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and\nwaxing.\n\n Cf. V. \u00a7 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the\n want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in\n Nature. The comparison is not very happy, however, because the\n regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tz\u016d mentions is by no means\n paralleled in war.\n\n\n\n\n VII. \u8ecd\u722d\u7bc7\n\n MAN\u0152UVRING.\n\n\n The commentators, as well as the subsequent text, make it clear\n that this is the real meaning of \u8ecd\u722d. Thus, Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan says that \u722d\n means \u8da8\u5229 \u201cmarching rapidly to seize an advantage\u201d; Wang Hsi\n says: \u722d\u8005\u722d\u5229\u5f97\u5229\u5247\u52dd \u201c\u2018Striving\u2019 means striving for an advantage;\n this being obtained, victory will follow;\u201d and Chang Y\u00fc:\n \u5169\u8ecd\u76f8\u5c0d\u800c\u722d\u5229\u4e5f \u201cThe two armies face to face, and each striving to\n obtain a tactical advantage over the other.\u201d According to the\n latter commentator, then, the situation is analogous to that of\n two wrestlers man\u0153uvring for a \u201chold,\u201d before coming to actual\n grips. In any case, we must beware of translating \u722d by the word\n \u201cfighting\u201d or \u201cbattle,\u201d as if it were equivalent to \u6230. Capt.\n Calthrop falls into this mistake.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u5c07\u53d7\u547d\u65bc\u541b\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: In war, the general receives his commands from the\nsovereign.\n\n For \u541b there is another reading \u5929, which Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan explains as\n \u606d\u884c\u5929\u7f70 \u201cbeing the reverent instrument of Heaven\u2019s chastisement.\u201d\n\n2. \u5408\u8ecd\u805a\u8846\u4ea4\u548c\u800c\u820d\n\nHaving collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend\nand harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung takes \u548c as referring to the \u548c\u9580 or main gate of the\n military camp. This, Tu Mu tells us, was formed with a couple of\n flags hung across. [Cf. _Chou Li_, ch. xxvii. fol. 31 of the\n Imperial edition: \u76f4\u65cc\u9580.] \u4ea4\u548c would then mean \u201csetting up his \u548c\u9580\n opposite that of the enemy.\u201d But Chia Lin\u2019s explanation, which has\n been adopted above, is on the whole simpler and better. Chang Y\u00fc,\n while following Ts\u2018ao Kung, adds that the words may also be taken\n to mean \u201cthe establishment of harmony and confidence between the\n higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;\u201d and he\n quotes a saying of Wu Tz\u016d (chap. 1 _ad init._): \u201cWithout harmony\n in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without\n harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed.\u201d In the\n historical romance \u6771\u5468\u5217\u570b, chap. 75, Sun Tz\u016d himself is\n represented as saying to \u4f0d\u54e1 Wu Y\u00fcan: \u5927\u51e1\u884c\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u5148\u9664\u5167\u60a3\u7136\u5f8c\u65b9\u53ef\u5916\u5f81\n \u201cAs a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all\n domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe.\u201d \u820d\n is defined as \u6b62. It here conveys the notion of encamping after\n having taken the field.\n\n3. \u83ab\u96e3\u65bc\u8ecd\u722d\u8ecd\u722d\u4e4b\u96e3\u8005\u4ee5\u8fc2\u7232\u76f4\u4ee5\u60a3\u7232\u5229\n\nAfter that, comes tactical man\u0153uvring, than which there is nothing\nmore difficult.\n\n I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of\n Ts\u2018ao Kung, who says: \u5f9e\u59cb\u53d7\u547d\u81f3\u65bc\u4ea4\u548c\u8ecd\u722d\u96e3\u4e5f \u201cFrom the time of\n receiving the sovereign\u2019s instructions until our encampment over\n against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult.\u201d\n It seems to me that the \u8ecd\u722d tactics or man\u0153uvres can hardly be\n said to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped,\n and Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao\u2019s note gives colour to this view: \u201cFor levying,\n concentrating, harmonising and intrenching an army, there are\n plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes\n when we engage in tactical operations.\u201d Tu Yu also observes that\n \u201cthe great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in\n seizing favourable positions.\u201d\n\nThe difficulty of tactical man\u0153uvring consists in turning the devious\ninto the direct, and misfortune into gain.\n\n \u4ee5\u8fc2\u7232\u76f4 is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical\n expressions of which Sun Tz\u016d is so fond. This is how it is\n explained by Ts\u2018ao Kung: \u793a\u4ee5\u9060\u901f\u5176\u9053\u91cc\u5148\u6575\u81f3\u4e5f \u201cMake it appear that\n you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive\n on the scene before your opponent.\u201d Tu Mu says: \u201cHoodwink the\n enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are\n dashing along with the utmost speed.\u201d Ho Shih gives a slightly\n different turn to the sentence: \u201cAlthough you may have difficult\n ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter, this is a\n drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of\n movement.\u201d Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two\n famous passages across the Alps\u2014that of Hannibal, which laid Italy\n at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which\n resulted in the great victory of Marengo.\n\n4. \u6545\u8fc2\u5176\u9014\u800c\u8a98\u4e4b\u4ee5\u5229\u5f8c\u4eba\u767c\u5148\u4eba\u81f3\u6b64\u77e5\u8fc2\u76f4\u4e4b\u8a08\u8005\u4e5f\n\nThus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy\nout of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach\nthe goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_.\n\n Chia Lin understands \u9014 as the _enemy\u2019s_ line of march, thus: \u201cIf\n our adversary\u2019s course is really a short one, and we can manage to\n divert him from it (\u8fc2\u4e4b) either by simulating weakness or by\n holding out some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in\n the race for good positions.\u201d This is quite a defensible view,\n though not adopted by any other commentator. \u4eba of course = \u6575,\n and \u5f8c and \u5148 are to be taken as verbs. Tu Mu cites the famous\n march of \u8d99\u5962 Chao Sh\u00ea in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of \u95bc\u8207\n O-y\u00fc, which was closely invested by a \u79e6 Ch\u2018in army. [It should be\n noted that the above is the correct pronunciation of \u95bc\u8207, as given\n in the commentary on the _Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, ch. 34. Giles\u2019\n dictionary gives \u201cY\u00fc-y\u00fc,\u201d and Chavannes, I know not on what\n authority, prefers to write \u201cYen-y\u00fc.\u201d The name is omitted\n altogether from Playfair\u2019s \u201cCities and Towns.\u201d] The King of Chao\n first consulted \u5ec9\u9817 Lien P\u2018o on the advisability of attempting a\n relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the\n intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then\n turned to Chao Sh\u00ea, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the\n march, but finally said: \u201cWe shall be like two rats fighting in a\n hole\u2014and the pluckier one will win!\u201d So he left the capital with\n his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped\n and began throwing up intrenchments. For 28 days he continued\n strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should\n carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch\u2018in general was\n overjoyed, and attributed his adversary\u2019s tardiness to the fact\n that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not\n actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner\n departed than Chao Sh\u00ea began a forced march lasting for two days\n and one night, and arrived on the scene of action with such\n astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding\n position on the \u5317\u5c71 \u201cNorth hill\u201d before the enemy had got wind of\n his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch\u2018in forces,\n who were obliged to raise the siege of O-y\u00fc in all haste and\n retreat across the border. [See \u53f2\u8a18, chap. 81.]\n\n5. \u6545\u8ecd\u722d\u7232\u5229\u8846\u722d\u7232\u5371\n\nMan\u0153uvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined\nmultitude, most dangerous.\n\n I here adopt the reading of the T\u2018ung Tien, Ch\u00eang Yu-hsien and the\n _T\u2018u Shu_, where \u8846 appears to supply the exact _nuance_ required\n in order to make sense. The standard text, on the other hand, in\n which \u8ecd is repeated, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators\n take it to mean that man\u0153uvres may be profitable, or they may be\n dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general. Capt.\n Calthrop translates \u8846\u722d \u201cthe wrangles of a multitude\u201d!\n\n6. \u8209\u8ecd\u800c\u722d\u5229\u5247\u4e0d\u53ca\u59d4\u8ecd\u800c\u722d\u5229\u5247\u8f1c\u91cd\u6350\n\nIf you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an\nadvantage, the chances are that you will be too late.\n\n The original text has \u6545 instead of \u8209; but a verb is needed to\n balance \u59d4.\n\nOn the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves\nthe sacrifice of its baggage and stores.\n\n \u59d4\u8ecd is evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who\n paraphrase the sentence as though it began with \u68c4\u8f1c. Absolute\n tautology in the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an\n impossibly fine distinction between \u68c4 and \u6350. I submit my own\n rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is\n some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear\n that Sun Tz\u016d does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken\n without supplies. Cf. _infra_, \u00a7 11.\n\n7. \u662f\u6545\u5377\u7532\u800c\u8da8\u65e5\u591c\u4e0d\u8655\u500d\u9053\u517c\u884c\u767e\u91cc\u800c\u722d\u5229\u5247\u64d2\u4e09\u5c07\u8ecd\n\nThus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats,\n\n \u5377\u7532 does not mean \u201cto discard one\u2019s armour,\u201d as Capt. Calthrop\n translates, but implies on the contrary that it is to be carried\n with you. Chang Y\u00fc says: \u7336\u6089\u7532\u4e5f \u201cThis means, in full panoply.\u201d\n\nand make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double\nthe usual distance at a stretch,\n\n The ordinary day\u2019s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one\n occasion, when pursuing \u5289\u5099 Liu Pei, Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao is said to have\n covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.\n\ndoing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of\nall your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.\n\n8. \u52c1\u8005\u5148\u7f77\u8005\u5f8c\u5176\u6cd5\u5341\u4e00\u800c\u81f3\n\nThe stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,\nand on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.\n\n For \u7f77, see II. \u00a7 14. The moral is, as Ts\u2018ao Kung and others point\n out: Don\u2019t march a hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage,\n either with or without impedimenta. Man\u0153uvres of this description\n should be confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said:\n \u201cThe hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the\n dangers of battle.\u201d He did not often call upon his troops for\n extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise,\n or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed\n everything to speed.[171]\n\n9. \u4e94\u5341\u91cc\u800c\u722d\u5229\u5247\u8e76\u4e0a\u5c07\u8ecd\u5176\u6cd5\u534a\u81f3\n\nIf you march fifty _li_ in order to outman\u0153uvre the enemy, you will\nlose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will\nreach the goal.\n\n \u8e76 is explained as similar in meaning to \u632b: literally, \u201cthe leader\n of the first division will be _torn away_.\u201d Cf. Tso Chuan, \u8944 19th\n year: \u662f\u8b02\u8e76\u5176\u672c \u201cThis is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up\n its roots.\u201d\n\n10. \u4e09\u5341\u91cc\u800c\u722d\u5229\u5247\u4e09\u5206\u4e4b\u4e8c\u81f3\n\nIf you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your army\nwill arrive.\n\n In the _T\u2018ung Tien_ is added: \u4ee5\u662f\u77e5\u8ecd\u722d\u4e4b\u96e3 \u201cFrom this we may know\n the difficulty of man\u0153uvring.\u201d\n\n11. \u662f\u6545\u8ecd\u7121\u8f1c\u91cd\u5247\u4ea1\u7121\u7ce7\u98df\u5247\u4ea1\u7121\u59d4\u7a4d\u5247\u4ea1\n\nWe may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost;\nwithout provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.\n\n \u59d4\u7a4d is explained by Tu Yu as \u82bb\u8349\u4e4b\u5c6c \u201cfodder and the like;\u201d by Tu\n Mu and Chang Y\u00fc as \u8ca1\u8ca8 \u201cgoods in general;\u201d and by Wang Hsi as\n \u85aa\u9e7d\u852c\u6750\u4e4b\u5c6c \u201cfuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.\u201d But I think what Sun Tz\u016d\n meant was \u201cstores accumulated in d\u00e9p\u00f4ts,\u201d as distinguished from\n \u8f1c\u91cd and \u7ce7\u98df, the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its\n march. Cf. _Chou Li_, ch. xvi. fol. 10: \u59d4\u4eba ... \u6582\u85aa\u82bb\u51e1\u758f\u6750\u6728\u6750\u51e1\n \u755c\u805a\u4e4b\u7269.\n\n12. \u6545\u4e0d\u77e5\u8af8\u4faf\u4e4b\u8b00\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u8c6b\u4ea4\n\nWe cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the\ndesigns of our neighbours.\n\n \u8c6b = \u5148. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan understands it as \u5099 \u201cguard against,\u201d which is\n hardly so good. An original interpretation of \u4ea4 is given by Tu Mu,\n who says it stands for \u4ea4\u5175 or \u5408\u6230 \u201cjoin in battle.\u201d\n\n13. \u4e0d\u77e5\u5c71\u6797\u96aa\u963b\u6cae\u6fa4\u4e4b\u5f62\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u884c\u8ecd\n\nWe are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar\nwith the face of the country\u2014its mountains and forests, its pitfalls\n\n \u96aa, defined as \u5751\u5879 (Ts\u2018ao Kung) or \u5751\u574e (Chang Y\u00fc).\n\nand precipices,\n\n \u963b, defined as \u4e00\u9ad8\u4e00\u4e0b.\n\nits marshes\n\n \u6cae, defined as \u6c34\u8349\u6f38\u6d33\u8005.\n\nand swamps.\n\n \u6fa4, defined as \u8846\u6c34\u6240\u6b78\u800c\u4e0d\u6d41\u8005.\n\n14. \u4e0d\u7528\u9109\u5c0e\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u5730\u5229\n\nWe shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we\nmake use of local guides.\n\n \u00a7\u00a7 12\u201314 are repeated in chap. XI. \u00a7 52.\n\n15. \u6545\u5175\u4ee5\u8a50\u7acb\u4ee5\u5229\u52d5\n\nIn war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.\n\n According to Tu Mu, \u7acb stands for \u7acb\u52dd. Cf. I. \u00a7 18. In the tactics\n of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical\n strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.[172]\n\nMove only if there is a real advantage to be gained.\n\n This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang\n Hsi, who has the brief note \u8a98\u4e4b\u4e5f \u201cEntice out the enemy\u201d (by\n offering him some apparent advantage).\n\n16. \u4ee5\u5206\u5408\u7232\u8b8a\u8005\u4e5f\n\nWhether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by\ncircumstances.\n\n17. \u6545\u5176\u75be\u5982\u98a8\u5176\u5f90\u5982\u6797\n\nLet your rapidity be that of the wind,\n\n The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only\n swift but, as Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean points out, \u7121\u5f62\u8de1 \u201cinvisible and\n leaves no tracks.\u201d\n\nyour compactness that of the forest.\n\n It is hardly possible to take \u5f90 here in its ordinary sense of\n \u201csedate,\u201d as Tu Yu tries to do. M\u00eang Shih comes nearer the mark in\n his note \u7de9\u884c\u9808\u6709\u884c\u5217 \u201cWhen slowly marching, order and ranks must be\n preserved\u201d\u2014so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural\n forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the\n quality of density or compactness. I think then that Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\n uses the right adjective in saying \u5982\u6797\u4e4b\u68ee\u7136.\n\n18. \u4fb5\u63a0\u5982\u706b\u4e0d\u52d5\u5982\u5c71\n\nIn raiding and plundering be like fire,\n\n Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: \u5982\u706b\u70c8\u70c8\u5247\u83ab\u6211\u6562\u66f7 \u201cFierce as a\n blazing fire which no man can check.\u201d\n\nin immovability like a mountain.\n\n That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to\n dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to\n entice you into a trap.\n\n19. \u96e3\u77e5\u5982\u9670\u52d5\u5982\u96f7\u9706\n\nLet your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move,\nfall like a thunderbolt.\n\n The original text has \u9707 instead of \u9706. Cf. IV. \u00a7 7. Tu Yu quotes a\n saying of T\u2018ai Kung which has passed into a proverb:\n \u75be\u96f7\u4e0d\u53ca\u63a9\u8033\u75be\u96fb\u4e0d\u53ca\u7791\u76ee \u201cYou cannot shut your ears to the thunder or\n your eyes to the lightning\u2014so rapid are they.\u201d Likewise, an attack\n should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.\n\n20. \u63a0\u9109\u5206\u8846\u5ed3\u5730\u5206\u5229\n\nWhen you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your\nmen;\n\n The reading of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts\u2018ao Kung, is\n \u6307\u5411\u5206\u8846, which is explained as referring to the subdivision of the\n army, mentioned in V. \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2, by means of banners and flags,\n serving to point out (\u6307) to each man the way he should go (\u5411).\n But this is very forced, and the ellipsis is too great, even for\n Sun Tz\u016d. Luckily, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ have the variant\n \u56ae, which not only suggests the true reading \u9109, but affords some\n clue to the way in which the corruption arose. Some early\n commentator having inserted \u5411 as the sound of \u9109, the two may\n afterwards have been read as one character; and this being\n interchangeable with \u5411, \u9109 must finally have disappeared\n altogether. Meanwhile, \u63a0 would have been altered to \u6307 in order to\n make sense. As regards \u5206\u8846, I believe that Ho Shih alone has\n grasped the real meaning, the other commentators understanding it\n as \u201cdividing the men into parties\u201d to search for plunder. Sun Tz\u016d\n wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by\n insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock,\n which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.\n\nwhen you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the\nbenefit of the soldiery.\n\n That this is the meaning, may be gathered from Tu Mu\u2019s note:\n \u958b\u571f\u62d3\u5883\u5247\u5206\u5272\u8207\u6709\u529f\u8005. The \u4e09\u7565 gives the same advice: \ud86c\ude6c\u5730\u88c2\u4e4b. \u5ed3\n means \u201cto enlarge\u201d or \u201cextend\u201d\u2014at the expense of the enemy,\n understood. Cf. _Shih Ching_, III. 1. vii. 1: \u618e\u5176\u5f0f\u5ed3 \u201chating all\n the great States.\u201d Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao also says \u5c6f\u5175\u7a2e\u8494 \u201cquarter your\n soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it.\u201d It is by\n acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded,\n that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most\n memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of \u73ed\u8d85 Pan\n Ch\u2018ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,\n those of \u798f\u5eb7\u5b89 Fu-k\u2018ang-an and \u5de6\u5b97\u68e0 Tso Tsung-t\u2018ang.\n\n21. \u61f8\u6b0a\u800c\u52d5\n\nPonder and deliberate\n\n Note that both these words, like the Chinese \u61f8\u6b0a, are really\n metaphors derived from the use of scales.\n\nbefore you make a move.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc quotes \u5c09\u7e5a\u5b50 as saying that we must not break camp until\n we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness\n of the opposing general. Cf. the \u201cseven comparisons\u201d in I. \u00a7 13.\n Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.\n\n22. \u5148\u77e5\u8fc2\u76f4\u4e4b\u8a08\u8005\u52dd\u6b64\u8ecd\u722d\u4e4b\u6cd5\u4e5f\n\nHe will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.\n\n See _supra_, \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4.\n\nSuch is the art of man\u0153uvring.\n\n With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But\n there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from\n an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the\n time when Sun Tz\u016d wrote. The style of this fragment is not\n noticeably different from that of Sun Tz\u016d himself, but no\n commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.\n\n23. \u8ecd\u653f\u66f0\u8a00\u4e0d\u76f8\u805e\u6545\u7232\u91d1\u9f13\u8996\u4e0d\u76f8\u898b\u6545\u7232\u65cc\u65d7\n\nThe Book of Army Management says:\n\n It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators\n give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean calls it\n \u8ecd\u4e4b\u820a\u5178 \u201can ancient military classic,\u201d and Wang Hsi, \u53e4\u8ecd\u66f8 \u201can old\n book on war.\u201d Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had\n gone on for centuries before Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s time between the various\n kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself\n improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been\n made and written down at some earlier period.\n\nOn the field of battle,\n\n Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.\n\nthe spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of\ngongs and drums.\n\n I have retained the words \u91d1\u9f13 of the original text, which recur in\n the next paragraph, in preference to the other reading \u9f13\u9438 \u201cdrums\n and bells,\u201d which is found in the _T\u2018ung Tien_, _Pei T\u2018ang Shu\n Ch\u2018ao_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_. \u9438 is a bell with a clapper. See _Lun Y\u00fc_ III.\n 24, _Chou Li_ XXIX. 15, 29. \u91d1 of course would include both gongs\n and bells of every kind. The _T\u2018u Shu_ inserts a \u4e4b after each \u7232.\n\nNor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution\nof banners and flags.\n\n24. \u592b\u91d1\u9f13\u65cc\u65d7\u8005\u6240\u4ee5\u4e00\u6c11\u4e4b\u8033\u76ee\u4e5f\n\nGongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and\neyes of the host\n\n The original text, followed by the _T\u2018u Shu_, has \u4eba for \u6c11 here\n and in the next two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, \u4eba is\n generally used in Sun Tz\u016d for the enemy.\n\nmay be focussed on one particular point.\n\n Note the use of \u4e00 as a verb. Chang Y\u00fc says:\n \u8996\u807d\u5747\u9f4a\u5247\u96d6\u767e\u842c\u4e4b\u8846\u9032\u9000\u5982\u4e00\u77e3 \u201cIf sight and hearing converge\n simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a\n million soldiers will be like those of a single man\u201d!\n\n25. \u6c11\u65e2\u5c08\u4e00\u5247\u52c7\u8005\u4e0d\u5f97\u7368\u9032\u602f\u8005\u4e0d\u5f97\u7368\u9000\u6b64\u7528\u8846\u4e4b\u6cd5\u4e5f\n\nThe host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either\nfor the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc quotes a saying: \u4ee4\u4e0d\u9032\u800c\u9032\u8207\u4ee4\u4e0d\u9000\u800c\u9000\u53a5\u7f6a\u60df\u5747 \u201cEqually\n guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat\n against orders.\u201d Tu Mu tells a story in this connection of \u5433\u8d77 Wu\n Ch\u2018i, when he was fighting against the Ch\u2018in State. Before the\n battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring,\n sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and\n returned to camp. Wu Ch\u2018i had the man instantly executed,\n whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: \u201cThis man\n was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded.\u201d Wu Ch\u2018i\n replied: \u201cI fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him\n beheaded because he acted without orders.\u201d\n\nThis is the art of handling large masses of men.\n\n26. \u6545\u591c\u6230\u591a\u706b\u9f13\u665d\u6230\u591a\u65cc\u65d7\u6240\u4ee5\u8b8a\u6c11\u4e4b\u8033\u76ee\u4e5f\n\nIn night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and\nin fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing\nthe ears and eyes of your army.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has the bad variant \u4fbf for \u8b8a. With regard to the\n latter word, I believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole\n phrase being slightly elliptical for \u201cinfluencing the movements of\n the army through their senses of sight and hearing.\u201d Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, Tu\n Mu and Chia Lin certainly seem to understand it thus. The other\n commentators, however, take \u6c11 (or \u4eba) as the enemy, and \u8b8a as\n equivalent to \u8b8a\u60d1 or \u8b8a\u4e82 \u201cto perplex\u201d or \u201cconfound.\u201d This does\n not agree so well with what has gone before, though on the other\n hand it renders the transition to \u00a7 27 less abrupt. The whole\n question, I think, hinges on the alternative readings \u6c11 and \u4eba.\n The latter would almost certainly denote the enemy. Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao\n alludes to \u674e\u5149\u5f3c Li Kuang-pi\u2019s night ride to \u6cb3\u967d Ho-yang at the\n head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with\n torches, that though the rebel leader \u53f2\u601d\u660e Shih Ss\u016d-ming had a\n large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage. [Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao\n gives the date as \u5929\u5bf3\u672b A.D. 756; but according to the \u65b0\u5510\u66f8 New\n T\u2018ang History, \u5217\u50b3 61, it must have been later than this, probably\n 760.]\n\n27. \u6545\u4e09\u8ecd\u53ef\u596a\u6c23\u5c07\u8ecd\u53ef\u596a\u5fc3\n\nA whole army may be robbed of its spirit;\n\n \u201cIn war,\u201d says Chang Y\u00fc, \u201cif a spirit of anger can be made to\n pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset\n will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy\u2019s soldiers will\n be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is\n therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their\n ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in\n this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit.\u201d Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan\n and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the _Tso Chuan_, \u838a\u516c\n year 10, \u00a7 1) of \u66f9\u528c Ts\u2018ao Kuei, a _prot\u00e9g\u00e9_ of Duke Chuang of Lu.\n The latter State was attacked by Ch\u2018i, and the Duke was about to\n join battle at \u9577\u52fa Ch\u2018ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy\u2019s\n drums, when Ts\u2018ao said: \u201cNot just yet.\u201d Only after their drums had\n beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then\n they fought, and the men of Ch\u2018i were utterly defeated. Questioned\n afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts\u2018ao Kuei\n replied: \u201cIn battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the\n first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the\n second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone\n altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at\n its height. Hence our victory.\u201d \u5433\u5b50 (chap. 4) puts \u201cspirit\u201d first\n among the \u201cfour important influences\u201d in war, and continues:\n \u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u8846\u767e\u842c\u4e4b\u5e2b\u5f35\u8a2d\u8f15\u91cd\u5728\u65bc\u4e00\u4eba\u662f\u8b02\u6c23\u6a5f \u201cThe value of a whole army\u2014a\n mighty host of a million men\u2014is dependent on one man alone: such\n is the influence of spirit!\u201d\n\na commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.\n\n Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with \u201cdefeat his general\u2019s\n ambition.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc says: \u5fc3\u8005\u5c07\u4e4b\u6240\u4e3b\u4e5f\u592b\u6cbb\u4e82\u52c7\u602f\u7686\u4e3b\u65bc\u5fc3 \u201cPresence\n of mind is the general\u2019s most important asset. It is the quality\n which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage\n into the panic-stricken.\u201d The great general \u674e\u9756 Li Ching (A.D.\n 571\u2013649) has a saying: \u592b\u653b\u8005\u4e0d\u6b62\u653b\u5176\u57ce\u64ca\u5176\u9673\u800c\u5df2\u5fc5\u6709\u653b\u5176\u5fc3\u4e4b\u8853\u7109\n \u201cAttacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or\n striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of\n assailing the enemy\u2019s mental equilibrium.\u201d [\u554f\u5c0d, pt. 3.]\n\n28. \u662f\u6545\u671d\u6c23\u92b3\u665d\u6c23\u60f0\u66ae\u6c23\u6b78\n\nNow a soldier\u2019s spirit is keenest in the morning;\n\n Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the\n battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight\n fasting, whereas Hannibal\u2019s men had breakfasted at their leisure.\n See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.\n\nby noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent\nonly on returning to camp.\n\n29. \u6545\u5584\u7528\u5175\u8005\u907f\u5176\u92b3\u6c23\u64ca\u5176\u60f0\u6b78\u6b64\u6cbb\u6c23\u8005\u4e5f\n\nA clever general, therefore,\n\n The \u6545, which certainly seems to be wanted here, is omitted in the\n _T\u2018u Shu_.\n\navoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is\nsluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_, for reasons of \u907f\u8af1 \u201cavoidance of personal names\n of the reigning dynasty,\u201d reads \u7406 for \u6cbb in this and the two next\n paragraphs.\n\n30. \u4ee5\u6cbb\u5f85\u4e82\u4ee5\u975c\u5f85\u8b41\u6b64\u6cbb\u5fc3\u8005\u4e5f\n\nDisciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub\namongst the enemy:\u2014this is the art of retaining self-possession.\n\n31. \u4ee5\u8fd1\u5f85\u9060\u4ee5\u4f5a\u5f85\u52de\u4ee5\u98fd\u5f85\u98e2\u6b64\u6cbb\u529b\u8005\u4e5f\n\nTo be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at\nease\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has \u9038 for \u4f5a. The two characters are practically\n synonymous, but according to the commentary, the latter is the\n form always used in Sun Tz\u016d.\n\nwhile the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the\nenemy is famished:\u2014this is the art of husbanding one\u2019s strength.\n\n32. \u7121\u8981\u6b63\u6b63\u4e4b\u65d7\u52ff\u64ca\u5802\u5802\u4e4b\u9673\u6b64\u6cbb\u8b8a\u8005\u4e5f\n\nTo refrain from intercepting\n\n \u9080 is the reading of the original text. But the \u5175\u66f8\u8981\u8a23 quotes the\n passage with \u8981 _yao_^1 (also meaning \u201cto intercept\u201d), and this is\n supported by the _Pei T\u2018ang Shu Ch\u2018ao_ the _Y\u00fc Lan_, and Wang\n Hsi\u2019s text.\n\nan enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking\nan army drawn up in calm and confident array:\n\n For this translation of \u5802\u5802, I can appeal to the authority of Tu\n Mu, who defines the phrase as \u7121\u61fc. The other commentators mostly\n follow Ts\u2018ao Kung, who says \u5927, probably meaning \u201cgrand and\n imposing\u201d. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, however, has \u90e8\u5206 \u201cin subdivisions,\u201d which is\n somewhat strange.\n\n\u2014this is the art of studying circumstances.\n\n I have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases \u6cbb\u6c23,\n \u6cbb\u5fc3, \u6cbb\u529b and \u6cbb\u8b8a, though \u6cbb really bears the same meaning in each\n case. It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of \u201cto govern\u201d\n or \u201ccontrol,\u201d but rather, as K\u2018ang Hsi defines it, = \u7c21\u7fd2 \u201cto\n examine and practise,\u201d hence \u201clook after,\u201d \u201ckeep a watchful eye\n upon.\u201d We may find an example of this use in the _Chou Li_, XVIII.\n fol. 46: \u6cbb\u5176\u5927\u79ae. Sun Tz\u016d has not told us to control or restrain\n the quality which he calls \u6c23, but only to observe the time at\n which it is strongest. As for \u5fc3, it is important to remember that\n in the present context it can only mean \u201cpresence of mind.\u201d To\n speak of \u201ccontrolling presence of mind\u201d is absurd, and Capt.\n Calthrop\u2019s \u201cto have the heart under control\u201d is hardly less so.\n The whole process recommended here is that of VI. \u00a7 2: \u81f4\u4eba\u800c\u4e0d\u81f4\u65bc\u4eba.\n\n33. \u6545\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u9ad8\u9675\u52ff\u5411\u80cc\u90b1\u52ff\u9006\n\nIt is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to\noppose him when he comes downhill.\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ reads \u500d for \u80cc.\n\n34. \u4f6f\u5317\u52ff\u5f9e\u92b3\u5352\u52ff\u653b\n\nDo not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers\nwhose temper is keen.\n\n35. \u990c\u5175\u52ff\u98df\u6b78\u5e2b\u52ff\u904f\n\nDo not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a\n metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that\n have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao and Chang Y\u00fc carefully\n point out that the saying has a wider application. The _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ reads \u8caa \u201cto covet\u201d instead of \u98df. The similarity of the two\n characters sufficiently accounts for the mistake.\n\nDo not interfere with an army that is returning home.\n\n The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by\n saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight\n to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore\n too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Y\u00fc quotes the words\n of Han Hsin: \u5f9e\u601d\u6771\u6b78\u4e4b\u58eb\u4f55\u6240\u4e0d\u514b \u201cInvincible is the soldier who\n hath his desire and returneth homewards.\u201d A marvellous tale is\n told of Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao\u2019s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the _San\n Kuo Chih_, \u6b66\u5e1d\u7d00: In 198 A.D., he was besieging \u5f35\u7e61 Chang Hsiu in\n \u7a70 Jang, when \u5289\u8868 Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to\n cutting off Ts\u2018ao\u2019s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off\n his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies,\n who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had\n engaged himself. In this desperate plight Ts\u2018ao waited until\n nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid\n an ambush in it. Then he marched on with his baggage-train, and\n when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the bird had flown,\n pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole army had\n passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts\u2018ao himself\n turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown\n into confusion and annihilated. Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao said afterwards:\n \u865c\u904f\u543e\u6b78\u5e2b\u800c\u8207\u543e\u6b7b\u5730\u6230\u543e\u662f\u4ee5\u77e5\u52dd\u77e3 \u201cThe brigands tried to check my\n army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate\n position: hence I knew how to overcome them.\u201d\n\n36. \u570d\u5e2b\u5fc5\u95d5\u7aae\u5bbc\u52ff\u8feb\n\nWhen you surround an army, leave an outlet free.\n\n This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The\n object, as Tu Mu puts it, is \u793a\u4ee5\u751f\u8def\u4ee4\u7121\u5fc5\u6b7b\u4e4b\u5fc3 \u201cto make him\n believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his\n fighting with the courage of despair.\u201d Tu Mu adds pleasantly:\n \u56e0\u800c\u64ca\u4e4b \u201cAfter that, you may crush him.\u201d\n\nDo not press a desperate foe too hard.\n\n For \u8feb, the _T\u2018u Shu_ reads \u8ffd \u201cpursue.\u201d Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao quotes the\n saying: \u9ce5\u7aae\u5247\u640f\u7378\u7aae\u5247\u566c \u201cBirds and beasts when brought to bay will\n use their claws and teeth.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc says: \u6575\u82e5\u711a\u821f\u7834\u91dc\u6c7a\u4e00\u6230\u5247\u4e0d\u53ef\u903c\n \u8feb\u4f86 \u201cIf your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his\n cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle,\n he must not be pushed to extremities.\u201d The phrase \u7aae\u5bbc doubtless\n originated with Sun Tz\u016d. The _P\u2018ei W\u00ean Y\u00fcn Fu_ gives four examples\n of its use, the earliest being from the _Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, and\n I have found another in chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih\n illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of \u7b26\u5f65\u537f Fu\n Yen-ch\u2018ing in ch. 251 of the \u5b8b\u53f2. That general, together with his\n colleague \u675c\u91cd\u5a01 Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior\n army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and\n desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits\n for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were\n reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture.\n Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch\u2018ing\n exclaimed: \u201cWe are desperate men. Far better to die for our\n country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!\u201d A strong\n gale happened to be blowing from the north-east and darkening the\n air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-wei was for waiting\n until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but\n luckily another officer, \u674e\u5b88\u8c9e Li Shou-ch\u00eang by name, was quicker\n to see an opportunity, and said: \u201cThey are many and we are few,\n but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be\n discernible; victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the\n wind will be our best ally.\u201d Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch\u2018ing made a\n sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed\n the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.\n [Certain details in the above account have been added from the\n \u6b74\u4ee3\u7d00\u4e8b\u5e74\u8868, ch. 78.]\n\n37. \u6b64\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u4e5f\n\nSuch is the art of warfare.\n\n Ch\u00eang Yu-hsien in his \u907a\u8aaa inserts \u5999 after \u6cd5. I take it that these\n words conclude the extract from the \u8ecd\u653f which began at \u00a7 23.\n\n\n\n\n VIII. \u4e5d\u8b8a\u7bc7\n\n VARIATION OF TACTICS.\n\n\n The heading means literally \u201cThe Nine Variations,\u201d but as Sun Tz\u016d\n does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already\n told us (V. \u00a7\u00a7 6\u201311) that such deflections from the ordinary\n course are practically innumerable, we have little option but to\n follow Wang Hsi, who says that \u201cNine\u201d stands for an indefinitely\n large number. \u201cAll it means is that in warfare \u7576\u6975\u5176\u8b8a we ought to\n vary our tactics to the utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts\u2018ao\n Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be [the latter\u2019s note is\n \u8b8a\u5176\u6b63\u5f97\u5176\u6240\u7528\u4e5d\u4e5f], but it has been suggested that they are\n connected with the Nine Situations\u201d\u2014of chap. XI. This is the view\n adopted by Chang Y\u00fc: see note on \u6b7b\u5730, \u00a7 2. The only other\n alternative is to suppose that something has been lost\u2014a\n supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends\n some weight.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u5c07\u53d7\u547d\u65bc\u541b\u5408\u8ecd\u805a\u8846\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: In war, the general receives his commands from the\nsovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.\n\n Repeated from VII. \u00a7 1, where it is certainly more in place. It\n may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a\n beginning to the chapter.\n\n2. \u572e\u5730\u7121\u820d\u8862\u5730\u5408\u4ea4\u7d76\u5730\u7121\u7559\u570d\u5730\u5247\u8b00\u6b7b\u5730\u5247\u6230\n\nWhen in difficult country, do not encamp.\n\n For explanation of \u572e\u5730, see XI. \u00a7 8.\n\nIn country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.\n\n See XI, \u00a7\u00a7 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits \u8862\u5730.\n\nDo not linger in dangerously isolated positions.\n\n \u7d76\u5730 is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning\n of chap. XI, but occurs later on (_ibid._ \u00a7 43, _q.v._). We may\n compare it with \u91cd\u5730 (XI. \u00a7 7). Chang Y\u00fc calls it a \u5371\u7d76\u4e4b\u5730,\n situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan says\n it is \u201ccountry in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or\n herds, vegetables or firewood;\u201d Chia Lin, \u201cone of gorges, chasms\n and precipices, without a road by which to advance.\u201d\n\nIn hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.\n\n See XI. \u00a7\u00a7 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has \u201cmountainous and wooded\n country,\u201d which is a quite inadequate translation of \u570d.\n\nIn a desperate position, you must fight.\n\n See XI. \u00a7\u00a7 10, 14. Chang Y\u00fc has an important note here, which must\n be given in full. \u201cFrom \u572e\u5730\u7121\u820d,\u201d he says, \u201cdown to this point,\n the Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five\n are given is that the subject is treated _en pr\u00e9cis_ (\u8209\u5176\u5927\u7565\u4e5f).\n So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics\n corresponding to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tz\u016d mentions only six\n variations; there again we have an abridgment. [I cannot\n understand what Chang Y\u00fc means by this statement. He can only be\n referring to \u00a7\u00a7 11\u201314 or \u00a7\u00a7 46\u201350 of chap. XI; but in both places\n all the nine grounds are discussed. Perhaps he is confusing\n these with the Six \u5730\u5f62 of chap. X.] All kinds of ground have\n corresponding military positions, and also a variation of tactics\n suitable to each (\u51e1\u5730\u6709\u52e2\u6709\u8b8a). In chap. XI, what we find\n enumerated first [\u00a7\u00a7 2\u201310] are the situations; afterwards\n [\u00a7\u00a7 11\u201314] the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that\n the \u4e5d\u8b8a \u201cNine Variations\u201d are simply the \u4e5d\u5730\u4e4b\u8b8a \u201cvariations of\n tactics corresponding to the Nine Grounds\u201d? It is said further\n on [\u00a7 5] that \u2018the general who does not understand the nine\n variations of tactics may be well acquainted with the features\n of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to\n practical account.\u2019 Again, in chap. XI [\u00a7 41] we read: \u2018The\n different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground\n (\u4e5d\u5730\u4e4b\u8b8a) and the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics\n must be carefully examined.\u2019 From a consideration of these\n passages the meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds\n are enumerated, Sun Tz\u016d recurs to these nine variations. He wishes\n here to speak of the Five Advantages [see _infra_, \u00a7 6], so he\n begins by setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably\n connected in practice, and therefore they are dealt with\n together.\u201d The weak point of this argument is the suggestion that\n \u4e94\u4e8b \u201cfive things\u201d can stand as a \u5927\u7567, that is, an abstract or\n abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less\n important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is\n not included amongst the nine at all.\n\n3. \u5857\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u7531\u8ecd\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u64ca\u57ce\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u653b\u5730\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u722d\u541b\u547d\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u53d7\n\nThere are roads which must not be followed,\n\n \u201cEspecially those leading through narrow defiles,\u201d says Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan,\n \u201cwhere an ambush is to be feared.\u201d\n\narmies which must not be attacked,\n\n More correctly, perhaps, \u201cthere are times when an army must not be\n attacked.\u201d Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao says: \u201cWhen you see your way to obtain a\n trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat,\n refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men\u2019s strength.\u201d\n\ntowns\n\n Capt. Calthrop says \u201ccastles\u201d\u2014an unfortunate attempt to introduce\n local colour.\n\nwhich must not be besieged,\n\n Cf. III. \u00a7 4. Ts\u2018ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from\n his own experience. When invading the territory of \u5f90\u5dde Hs\u00fc-chou,\n he ignored the city of \u83ef\u8cbb Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path,\n and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent\n strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than\n fourteen important district cities. Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cNo town should\n be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone,\n will not cause any trouble.\u201d \u8340\u7f43 Hs\u00fcn Ying, when urged to attack\n \u506a\u967d Pi-yang, replied: \u201cThe city is small and well-fortified; even\n if I succeed in taking it, \u2019t will be no great feat of arms;\n whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock.\u201d In the\n seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of\n war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of\n marches, countermarches and man\u0153uvres. He said: \u201cIt is a great\n mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of\n soldiers will gain a province.\u201d[173]\n\npositions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which\nmust not be obeyed.\n\n This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for\n authority, and Wei Liao Tz\u016d (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:\n \u5175\u8005\u51f6\u5668\u4e5f\u722d\u8005\u9006\u5fb7\u4e5f\u5c07\u8005\u6b7b\u5b98\u4e5f \u201cWeapons are baleful instruments,\n strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the\n negation of civil order!\u201d The unpalatable fact remains, however,\n that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military\n necessity. Cf. III. \u00a7 17. (5), X. \u00a7 23. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has \u5c07\u5728\u8ecd\n before \u541b\u547d, etc. This is a gloss on the words by Chu-ko Liang,\n which being repeated by Tu Yu became incorporated with the text.\n Chang Y\u00fc thinks that these five precepts are the \u4e94\u5229 referred\n to in \u00a7 6. Another theory is that the mysterious \u4e5d\u8b8a are here\n enumerated, starting with \u572e\u5730\u7121\u820d and ending at \u5730\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u722d, while\n the final clause \u541b\u547d\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u53d7 embraces and as it were sums up all\n the nine. Thus Ho Shih says: \u201cEven if it be your sovereign\u2019s\n command to encamp in difficult country, linger in isolated\n positions, etc., you must not do so.\u201d The theory is perhaps a\n little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.\n\n4. \u6545\u5c07\u901a\u65bc\u4e5d\u8b8a\u4e4b\u5229\u8005\u77e5\u7528\u5175\u77e3\n\nThe general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany\nvariation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.\n\n Before \u5229 in the original text there is a \u5730 which is obviously not\n required.\n\n5. \u5c07\u4e0d\u901a\u65bc\u4e5d\u8b8a\u4e4b\u5229\u8005\u96d6\u77e5\u5730\u5f62\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u5730\u4e4b\u5229\u77e3\n\nThe general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with\nthe configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his\nknowledge to practical account.\n\n Literally, \u201cget the advantage of the ground,\u201d which means not only\n securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural\n advantages in every possible way. Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cEvery kind of\n ground is characterised by certain natural features, and also\n gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How is it possible\n to turn these natural features to account unless topographical\n knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?\u201d\n\n6. \u6cbb\u5175\u4e0d\u77e5\u4e5d\u8b8a\u4e4b\u8853\u96d6\u77e5\u4e94\u5229\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u4eba\u4e4b\u7528\u77e3\n\nSo, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his\nplans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will\nfail to make the best use of his men.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says that the \u4e94\u5229 are \u4e0b\u4e94\u4e8b\u4e5f \u201cthe five things that\n follow;\u201d but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the\n five \u201cvariations\u201d contained in \u00a7 3. Chia Lin (who reads \u4e94\u8b8a here\n to balance the \u4e94\u5229) tells us that these imply five obvious and\n generally advantageous lines of action, namely: \u201cif a certain road\n is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must\n be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be\n besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and\n if consistent with military operations, the ruler\u2019s commands must\n be obeyed.\u201d But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a\n general to use these advantages. For instance, \u201ca certain road may\n be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in\n natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he\n will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack,\n but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with\n desperation, he will refrain from striking,\u201d and so on. Here the\n \u8b8a comes in to modify the \u5229, and hence we see the uselessness of\n knowing the one without the other\u2014of having an eye for weaknesses\n in the enemy\u2019s armour without being clever enough to recast one\u2019s\n plans on the spur of the moment. Capt. Calthrop offers this\n slovenly translation: \u201cIn the management of armies, if the art of\n the Nine Changes be understood [_sic_], a knowledge of the Five\n Advantages is of no avail.\u201d\n\n7. \u662f\u6545\u667a\u8005\u4e4b\u616e\u5fc5\u96dc\u65bc\u5229\u5bb3\n\nHence in the wise leader\u2019s plans, considerations of advantage and of\ndisadvantage will be blended together.\n\n \u201cWhether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,\u201d\n says Ts\u2018ao Kung, \u201cthe opposite state should be always present to\n your mind.\u201d\n\n8. \u96dc\u65bc\u5229\u800c\u52d9\u53ef\u4fe1\u4e5f\n\nIf our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may\nsucceed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.\n\n \u4fe1, according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to \u7533, and \u52d9\u53ef\u4fe1\u4e5f is\n paraphrased by Chang Y\u00fc as \u53ef\u4ee5\u4f38\u5df1\u4e4b\u4e8b. Tu Mu goes on to say: \u201cIf\n we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our\n minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy\n also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into\n our calculations.\u201d\n\n9. \u96dc\u65bc\u5bb3\u800c\u60a3\u53ef\u89e3\u4e5f\n\nIf, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always\nready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.\n\n A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of \u96dc\u65bc\u5bb3 \u201cto blend\n [thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage,\u201d but the meaning is as\n given. Tu Mu says: \u201cIf I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous\n position, I must consider not only the enemy\u2019s ability to injure\n me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy.\n If in my counsels these two considerations are properly blended,\n I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For instance, if I am\n surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the\n nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and\n crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a\n bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free\n myself from the enemy\u2019s toils.\u201d See the story of Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, VII.\n \u00a7 35, note. In his first edition, Capt. Calthrop translated \u00a7\u00a7 7\u20139\n as follows: \u201cThe wise man perceives clearly wherein lies advantage\n and disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not\n overlook the risks, and saves future anxiety.\u201d This has now been\n altered into: \u201cThe wise man considers well both advantage and\n disadvantage. He sees a way out of adversity, _and on the day of\n victory to danger is not blind_.\u201d Owing to a needless inversion of\n the Chinese, the words which I have italicised are evidently\n intended to represent \u00a7 8!\n\n10. \u662f\u6545\u5c48\u8af8\u4faf\u8005\u4ee5\u5bb3\u5f79\u8af8\u4faf\u8005\u4ee5\u696d\u8da8\u8af8\u4faf\u8005\u4ee5\u5229\n\nReduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;\n\n Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some\n of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:\u2014\u201cEntice away the\n enemy\u2019s best and wisest men, so that he may be left without\n counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the\n government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and\n deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his\n ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause\n deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt\n his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and\n unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc\n (after Wang Hsi) considers the \u5bb3 to be military chastisement: \u201cGet\n the enemy,\u201d he says, \u201cinto a position where he must suffer injury,\n and he will submit of his own accord.\u201d Capt. Calthrop twists Sun\n Tz\u016d\u2019s words into an absurdly barbarous precept: \u201cIn reducing an\n enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon him.\u201d\n\nmake trouble for them,\n\n \u696d is defined by Ts\u2018ao Kung as \u4e8b, and his definition is generally\n adopted by the commentators. Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in\n the sense of \u201cpossessions,\u201d or, as we might say, \u201cassets,\u201d which\n he considers to be \u5175\u8846\u570b\u5bcc\u4eba\u548c\u4ee4\u884c \u201ca large army, a rich exchequer,\n harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of commands.\u201d\n These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.\n\nand keep them constantly engaged;\n\n \u5f79, literally, \u201cmake servants of them.\u201d Tu Yu says \u4ee4\u4e0d\u5f97\u5b89\u4f5a\n \u201cprevent them from having any rest.\u201d\n\nhold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.\n\n M\u00eang Shih\u2019s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic\n use of \u8b8a: \u4ee4\u5fd8\u8b8a\u800c\u901f\u81f3 \u201ccause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons\n for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in\n our direction.\u201d\n\n11. \u6545\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u7121\u6043\u5176\u4e0d\u4f86\u6043\u543e\u6709\u4ee5\u5f85\u4e5f\u7121\u6043\u5176\u4e0d\u653b\u6043\u543e\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u53ef\u653b\u4e5f\n\nThe art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy\u2019s\nnot coming, but on our own readiness to receive him;\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u6709\u80fd\u4ee5\u5f85\u4e4b\u4e5f, but the conciser\n form is more likely to be right.\n\nnot on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the\nfact that we have made our position unassailable.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ insert \u543e\u4e5f after the first \u653b, and\n omit \u6709\u6240.\n\n12. \u6545\u5c07\u6709\u4e94\u5371\u5fc5\u6b7b\u53ef\u6bba\u4e5f\u5fc5\u751f\u53ef\u865c\u4e5f\u5fff\u901f\u53ef\u4fae\u4e5f\u5ec9\u6f54\u53ef\u8fb1\u4e5f\u611b\u6c11\u53ef\u7169\u4e5f\n\nThere are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)\nRecklessness, which leads to destruction;\n\n \u52c7\u800c\u7121\u616e \u201cBravery without forethought,\u201d as Ts\u2018ao Kung analyses it,\n which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad\n bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Y\u00fc, \u201cmust not be encountered\n with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain.\u201d Cf.\n Wu Tz\u016d, chap. IV _ad init._: \u51e1\u4eba\u8ad6\u5c07\u5e38\u89c0\u65bc\u52c7\u52c7\u4e4b\u65bc\u5c07\u4e43\u6578\u5206\u4e4b\u4e00\u8033\u592b\u52c7\u8005\n \u5fc5\u8f15\u5408\u8f15\u5408\u800c\u4e0d\u77e5\u5229\u672a\u53ef\u4e5f \u201cIn estimating the character of a general,\n men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting\n that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general\n should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly;\n and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is\n expedient, must be condemned.\u201d The _Ss\u016d-ma Fa_, too, makes the\n incisive remark \u4e0a\u6b7b\u4e0d\u52dd \u201cSimply going to one\u2019s death does not bring\n about victory.\u201d\n\n(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;\n\n \u5fc5\u751f is explained by Ts\u2018ao Kung of the man \u201cwhom timidity prevents\n from advancing to seize an advantage,\u201d and Wang Hsi adds, \u201cwho is\n quick to flee at the sight of danger.\u201d M\u00eang Shih gives the closer\n paraphrase \u5fd7\u5fc5\u751f\u53cd \u201che who is bent on returning alive,\u201d that is,\n the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tz\u016d knew, nothing\n is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks.\n T\u2018ai Kung said: \u5931\u5229\u5f8c\u6642\u53cd\u53d7\u5176\u6b83 \u201cHe who lets an advantage slip will\n subsequently bring upon himself real disaster.\u201d In 404 A.D., \u5289\u88d5\n Liu Y\u00fc pursued the rebel \u6853\ud852\udce5 Huan Hs\u00fcan up the Yangtsze and fought\n a naval battle with him at \u5d22\u5db8\u6d32 the island of Ch\u2018\u00eang-hung. The\n loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents\n were in great force. But Huan Hs\u00fcan, fearing the fate which was in\n store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to\n the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary,\n at a moment\u2019s notice. The natural result was that the fighting\n spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the\n loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all\n striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray, Huan\n Hs\u00fcan\u2019s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled\n for two days and nights without stopping. [_See_ \u6649\u66f8, chap. 99,\n fol. 13.] Chang Y\u00fc tells a somewhat similar story of \u8d99\u5b30\u9f4a Chao\n Ying-ch\u2018i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with\n the army of Ch\u2018u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him\n on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get\n across.\n\n(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;\n\n I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop\u2019s \u201cwhich brings\n insult.\u201d Tu Mu tells us that \u59da\u8944 Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357\n A.D. by \u9ec3\u7709 Huang Mei, \u9127\u7f8c T\u00eang Ch\u2018iang and others, shut himself\n up behind his walls and refused to fight. T\u00eang Ch\u2018iang said: \u201cOur\n adversary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make\n constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry\n and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed\n to be our prey.\u201d This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to\n fight, was lured on as far as \u4e09\u539f San-yuan by the enemy\u2019s\n pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.\n\n(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;\n\n This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really\n a defect in a general. What Sun Tz\u016d condemns is rather an\n exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned\n man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\n truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: \u5f87\u540d\u4e0d\u9867 \u201cThe seeker\n after glory should be careless of public opinion.\u201d\n\n(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and\ntrouble.\n\n Here again, Sun Tz\u016d does not mean that the general is to be\n careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise\n is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to\n the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy,\n because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the\n defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be\n the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce\n a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a\n hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It\n is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve\n Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical\n blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief\n came through the very man who started out with the distinct\n resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to\n sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our\n generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I\n remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always \u201cso\n good to his men.\u201d By this plea, had he but known it, he was only\n condemning him out of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s mouth.\n\n13. \u51e1\u6b64\u4e94\u8005\u5c07\u4e4b\u904e\u4e5f\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u707d\u4e5f\n\nThese are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct\nof war.\n\n14. \u8986\u8ecd\u6bba\u5c07\u5fc5\u4ee5\u4e94\u5371\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u5bdf\u4e5f\n\nWhen an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely\nbe found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of\nmeditation.\n\n\n\n\n IX. \u884c\u8ecd\u7bc7\n\n THE ARMY ON THE MARCH.\n\n\n The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in \u00a7 1\n than by this heading.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u8655\u8ecd\u76f8\u6575\u7d76\u5c71\u4f9d\u8c37\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and\nobserving signs of the enemy.\n\n The discussion of \u8655\u8ecd, as Chang Y\u00fc points out, extends from here\n down to \u4f0f\u59e6\u4e4b\u6240\u85cf\u8655\u4e5f (\u00a7\u00a7 1\u201317), and \u76f8\u6575 from that point down to\n \u5fc5\u8b39\u5bdf\u4e4b (\u00a7\u00a7 18\u201339). The rest of the chapter consists of a few\n desultory remarks, chiefly on the subject of discipline.\n\nPass quickly over mountains,\n\n For this use of \u7d76, cf. _infra_. \u00a7 3. See also \u8340\u5b50, ch. 1. fol. 2\n (standard edition of 1876): \u7d76\u6c5f\u6cb3; _Shih Chi_, ch. 27 _ad init._:\n \u5f8c\u516d\u661f\u7d76\u6f22.\n\nand keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.\n\n Tu Mu says that \u4f9d here = \u8fd1. The idea is, not to linger among\n barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass.\n Capt. Calthrop translates \u201ccamp in valleys,\u201d heedless of the very\n next sentence. Cf. Wu Tz\u016d, ch. 3: \u7121\u7576\u5929\u7ac8 \u201cAbide not in natural\n ovens,\u201d _i.e._ \u5927\u8c37\u4e4b\u53e3 \u201cthe openings of large valleys.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc\n tells the following anecdote: \u201c\u6b66\u90fd\u7f97 Wu-tu Ch\u2018iang was a robber\n captain in the time of the Later Han, and \u99ac\u63f4 Ma Y\u00fcan was sent to\n exterminate his gang. Ch\u2018iang having found a refuge in the hills,\n Ma Y\u00fcan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the\n favourable positions commanding supplies of water and forage.\n Ch\u2018iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of provisions\n that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know the\n advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys.\u201d\n\n2. \u8996\u751f\u8655\u9ad8\u6230\u9686\u7121\u767b\u6b64\u8655\u5c71\u4e4b\u8ecd\u4e5f\n\nCamp in high places,\n\n Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the\n surrounding country.\n\nfacing the sun.\n\n \u8996\u751f = \u9762\u967d. Tu Mu takes this to mean \u201cfacing south,\u201d and Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao\n \u201cfacing east.\u201d Cf. _infra_, \u00a7\u00a7 11, 13.\n\nDo not climb heights in order to fight.\n\n \u9686 is here simply equivalent to \u9ad8. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_\n read \u964d.\n\nSo much for mountain warfare.\n\n After \u5c71, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ insert \u8c37.\n\n3. \u7d76\u6c34\u5fc5\u9060\u6c34\n\nAfter crossing a river, you should get far away from it.\n\n \u201cIn order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,\u201d according to\n Ts\u2018ao Kung, and also, says Chang Y\u00fc, \u201cin order not to be impeded\n in your evolutions.\u201d The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u6575\u82e5\u7d76\u6c34 \u201cIf _the\n enemy_ crosses a river,\u201d etc. But in view of the next sentence,\n this is almost certainly an interpolation.\n\n4. \u5ba2\u7d76\u6c34\u800c\u4f86\u52ff\u8fce\u4e4b\u65bc\u6c34\u5167\u4ee4\u534a\u6fdf\u800c\u64ca\u4e4b\u5229\n\nWhen an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not\nadvance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army\nget across, and then deliver your attack.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u5ea6 for \u6fdf, without change of\n meaning. Wu Tz\u016d plagiarises this passage twice over:\u2014ch. II _ad\n fin._, \u6d89\u6c34\u534a\u6e21\u53ef\u64ca; ch. V, \u6575\u82e5\u7d76\u6c34\u534a\u6e21\u800c\u64ca. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan alludes to\n the great victory won by Han Hsin over \u9f8d\u4e14 Lung Ch\u00fc at the \u6ff0 Wei\n River. Turning to the _Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, fol. 6 _verso_, we\n find the battle described as follows: \u201cThe two armies were drawn\n up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered\n his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and\n construct a dam a little higher up. Then, leading half his army\n across, he attacked Lung Ch\u00fc; but after a time, pretending to have\n failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung\n Ch\u00fc was much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming:\n \u201cI felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!\u201d he pursued him\n and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a\n party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of\n water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung\n Ch\u00fc\u2019s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force\n which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Ch\u00fc himself being\n amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further bank, also\n scattered and fled in all directions.\u201d\n\n5. \u6b32\u6230\u8005\u7121\u9644\u65bc\u6c34\u800c\u8fce\u5ba2\n\nIf you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader\nnear a river which he has to cross.\n\n For fear of preventing his crossing. Capt. Calthrop makes the\n injunction ridiculous by omitting \u6b32\u6230\u8005.\n\n6. \u8996\u751f\u8655\u9ad8\u7121\u8fce\u6c34\u6d41\u6b64\u8655\u6c34\u4e0a\u4e4b\u8ecd\u4e5f\n\nMoor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.\n\n See _supra_, \u00a7 2. The repetition of these words in connection with\n water is very awkward. Chang Y\u00fc has the note: \u6216\u5cb8\u908a\u7232\u9673\u6216\u6c34\u4e0a\u6cca\u821f\u7686\n \u9808\u9762\u967d\u800c\u5c45\u9ad8 \u201cSaid either of troops marshalled on the river-bank,\n or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is\n essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun.\u201d The\n other commentators are not at all explicit. One is much tempted\n to reject their explanation of \u8996\u751f altogether, and understand it\n simply as \u201cseeking safety.\u201d [Cf. \u5fc5\u751f in VIII. \u00a7 12, and _infra_,\n \u00a7 9.] It is true that this involves taking \u8996 in an unusual, though\n not, I think, an impossible sense. Of course the earlier passage\n would then have to be translated in like manner.\n\nDo not move up-stream to meet the enemy.\n\n Tu Mu says: \u201cAs water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp\n on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open\n the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. This is implied above\n in the words \u8996\u751f\u8655\u9ad8. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that \u2018in river\n warfare we must not advance against the stream,\u2019 which is as\n much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of\n the enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the\n current and make short work of us.\u201d There is also the danger,\n noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on\n the water to be carried down to us. Capt. Calthrop\u2019s first version\n was: \u201cDo not cross rivers in the face of the stream\u201d\u2014a sapient\n piece of advice, which made one curious to know what the correct\n way of crossing rivers might be. He has now improved this into:\n \u201cDo not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of\n the river.\u201d\n\nSo much for river warfare.\n\n7. \u7d76\u65a5\u6fa4\u60df\u4e9f\u53bb\u7121\u7559\n\nIn crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them\nquickly, without any delay.\n\n Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the\n herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and\n exposed to attack.\n\n8. \u82e5\u4ea4\u8ecd\u65bc\u65a5\u6fa4\u4e4b\u4e2d\u5fc5\u4f9d\u6c34\u8349\u800c\u80cc\u8846\u6a39\u6b64\u8655\u65a5\u6fa4\u4e4b\u8ecd\u4e5f\n\nIf forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass\nnear you, and get your back to a clump of trees.\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous\n where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to\n protect the rear. Capt. Calthrop, with a perfect genius for going\n wrong, says \u201cin the neighbourhood of a marsh.\u201d For \u82e5 the _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ wrongly read \u7232, and the latter also has \u500d\n instead of \u80cc.\n\nSo much for operations in salt-marshes.\n\n9. \u5e73\u9678\u8655\u6613\u800c\u53f3\u80cc\u9ad8\u524d\u6b7b\u5f8c\u751f\u6b64\u8655\u5e73\u9678\u4e4b\u8ecd\u4e5f\n\nIn dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position\n\n This is doubtless the force of \u6613, its opposite being \u96aa. Thus, Tu\n Mu explains it as \u5766\u6613\u5e73\u7a69\u4e4b\u8655 \u201cground that is smooth and firm,\u201d and\n therefore adapted for cavalry; Chang Y\u00fc as \u5766\u6613\u7121\u574e\u9677\u4e4b\u8655 \u201clevel\n ground, free from depressions and hollows.\u201d He adds later on\n that although Sun Tz\u016d is discussing flat country, there will\n nevertheless be slight elevations and hillocks.\n\nwith rising ground to your right and on your rear,\n\n The Y\u00fc Lan again reads \u500d for \u80cc. Tu Mu quotes T\u2018ai Kung as saying:\n \u201cAn army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill\n or tumulus on its right.\u201d\n\nso that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.\n\n Wang Hsi thinks that \u5f8c\u751f contradicts the saying \u8996\u751f in \u00a7 2, and\n therefore suspects a mistake in the text.\n\nSo much for campaigning in flat country.\n\n10. \u51e1\u6b64\u56db\u8ecd\u4e4b\u5229\u9ec3\u5e1d\u4e4b\u6240\u4ee5\u52dd\u56db\u5e1d\u4e5f\n\nThese are the four useful branches of military knowledge\n\n Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3)\n marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon\u2019s \u201cMilitary Maxims,\u201d no.\n 1.\n\nwhich enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean asks, with some plausibility, whether \u5e1d is not a\n mistake for \u8ecd \u201carmies,\u201d as nothing is known of Huang Ti having\n conquered four other Emperors. The _Shih Chi_ (ch. I _ad init._)\n speaks only of his victories over \u708e\u5e1d Yen Ti and \u86a9\u5c24 Ch\u2018ih Yu.\n In the \u516d\u97dc it is mentioned that he \u201cfought seventy battles and\n pacified the Empire.\u201d Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s explanation is, that the Yellow\n Emperor was the first to institute the feudal system of vassal\n princes, each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore\n the title of Emperor. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan tells us that the art of war\n originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister \u98a8\u540e\n F\u00eang Hou.\n\n11. \u51e1\u8ecd\u559c\u9ad8\u800c\u60e1\u4e0b\u8cb4\u967d\u800c\u8ce4\u9670\n\nAll armies prefer high ground to low,\n\n \u201cHigh ground,\u201d says Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean, \u201cis not only more agreeable and\n salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low\n ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous\n for fighting.\u201d The original text and the _T\u2018u Shu_ have \u597d instead\n of \u559c.\n\nand sunny places to dark.\n\n12. \u990a\u751f\u800c\u8655\u5be6\u8ecd\u7121\u767e\u75be\u662f\u8b02\u5fc5\u52dd\n\nIf you are careful of your men,\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u5411\u6c34\u8349\u53ef\u653e\u7267\u990a\u755c \u201cMake for fresh water and pasture,\n where you can turn out your animals to graze.\u201d And the other\n commentators follow him, apparently taking \u751f as = \u7272. Cf. Mencius,\n V. 1. ix. 1, where \u990a\u7272\u8005 means a cattle-keeper. But here \u990a\u751f\n surely has reference to the health of the troops. It is the title\n of Chuang Tz\u016d\u2019s third chapter, where it denotes moral rather than\n physical well-being.\n\nand camp on hard ground,\n\n \u5be6 must mean dry and solid, as opposed to damp and marshy, ground.\n This is to be found as a rule in high places, so the commentators\n explain \u5be6 as practically equivalent to \u9ad8.\n\nthe army will be free from disease of every kind,\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cThe dryness of the climate will prevent the\n outbreak of illness.\u201d\n\nand this will spell victory.\n\n13. \u90b1\u9675\u9684\u9632\u5fc5\u8655\u5176\u967d\u800c\u53f3\u80cc\u4e4b\u6b64\u5175\u4e4b\u5229\u5730\u4e4b\u52a9\u4e5f\n\nWhen you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the\nslope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of\nyour soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.\n\n14. \u4e0a\u96e8\u6c34\u6cab\u81f3\u6b32\u6d89\u8005\u5f85\u5176\u5b9a\u4e5f\n\nWhen, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you\nwish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it\nsubsides.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ have a superfluous \u4e0b before \u6c34.\n\n15. \u51e1\u5730\u6709\u7d76\u6f97\u5929\u4e95\u5929\u7262\u5929\u7f85\u5929\u9677\u5929\u9699\u5fc5\u4e9f\u53bb\u4e4b\u52ff\u8fd1\u4e5f\n\nCountry in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running\nbetween,\n\n \u7d76\u6f97, explained by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean as \u524d\u5f8c\u96aa\u5cfb\u6c34\u6a6b\u5176\u4e2d.\n\ndeep natural hollows,\n\n \u5929\u4e95, explained as \u56db\u9762\u5cfb\u5742\u6f97\u58d1\u6240\u6b78 \u201cplaces enclosed on every side\n by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.\u201d\n\nconfined places,\n\n \u5929\u7262 \u201cnatural pens or prisons,\u201d explained as \u4e09\u9762\u74b0\u7d76\u6613\u5165\u96e3\u51fa\n \u201cplaces surrounded by precipices on three sides\u2014easy to get into,\n but hard to get out of.\u201d\n\ntangled thickets,\n\n \u5929\u7f85, explained as \u8349\u6728\u8499\u5bc6\u92d2\u93d1\u83ab\u65bd \u201cplaces covered with such dense\n undergrowth that spears cannot be used.\u201d\n\nquagmires\n\n \u5929\u9677, explained as \u5351\u4e0b\u6c59\ud84f\udf88\u8eca\u9a0e\u4e0d\u901a \u201clow-lying places, so heavy with\n mud as to be impassible for chariots and horsemen.\u201d\n\nand crevasses,\n\n \u5929\u9699 is explained by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean as \u5169\u5c71\u76f8\u5411\u6d1e\u9053\u72f9\u60e1 \u201ca narrow\n difficult way between beetling cliffs,\u201d but Ts\u2018ao Kung says\n \u5c71\u6f97\u8feb\u72f9\u5730\u5f62\u6df1\u6578\u5c3a\u9577\u6578\u4e08\u8005, which seems to denote something on a much\n smaller scale. Tu Mu\u2019s note is \u5730\u591a\u6e9d\u5751\u574e\u9677\u6728\u77f3 \u201cground covered\n with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and\n pitfalls.\u201d This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly\n enough as a defile or narrow pass: \u5169\u908a\u96aa\u7d76\u5f62\u72f9\u9577\u800c\u6578\u91cc, and Chang\n Y\u00fc takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the\n commentators certainly inclines to the rendering \u201cdefile\u201d. But the\n ordinary meaning of \u9699 (a crack or fissure) and the fact that \u7d76\u6f97\n above must be something in the nature of a defile, make me think\n that Sun Tz\u016d is here speaking of crevasses. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and\n _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u90c4 for \u9699, with the same meaning; the latter also\n has \u5927\u5bb3 after \u5929\u90c4\u2014a palpable gloss.\n\nshould be left with all possible speed and not approached.\n\n16. \u543e\u9060\u4e4b\u6575\u8fd1\u4e4b\u543e\u8fce\u4e4b\u6575\u80cc\u4e4b\n\nWhile we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to\napproach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them\non his rear.\n\n17. \u8ecd\u65c1\u6709\u96aa\u963b\u8523\u6f62\u4e95\u751f\u846d\u8466\u5c0f\u6797\u8619\u8588\u5fc5\u8b39\u8986\u7d22\u4e4b\u6b64\u4f0f\u59e6\u4e4b\u6240\u85cf\u8655\u4e5f\n\nIf in the neighbourhood of your camp\n\n The original text has \u8ecd\u884c, but \u65c1 has been generally adopted as\n yielding much better sense.\n\nthere should be any hilly country,\n\n \u96aa\u963b is \u90b1\u961c\u4e4b\u5730, according to Chang Y\u00fc.\n\nponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds,\n\n The original text omits \u8523 and \u751f, so that \u6f62 and \u4e95 join to make a\n pair: \u201cponds and basins.\u201d This is plausible enough at first sight,\n but there are several objections to the reading: (1) \u8523 is unlikely\n to have got into the text as a gloss on \u6f62; (2) it is easy to\n suppose, on the other hand, that \u8523 and afterwards \u751f (to restore\n the balance of the sentence) were omitted by a copyist who jumped\n to the conclusion that \u6f62 and \u4e95 must go together; (3) the sense,\n when one comes to consider it, actually requires \u8523, for it is\n absurd to talk of pools and ponds as in themselves suitable places\n for an ambush; (4) Li Ching (571\u2013649 A. D.) in his \u5175\u6cd5 \u201cArt\n of War\u201d has the words: \u8523\u6f62\u8619\u8588\u5247\u5fc5\u7d22\u5176\u4f0f. This is evidently a\n reminiscence of Sun Tz\u016d, so there can be little doubt that \u8523 stood\n in the text at this early date. It may be added that the _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ both have \u8523, and the latter also reads \u5e76 for \u4e95.\n\nor woods with thick undergrowth,\n\n I read \u5c0f\u6797 with the _Y\u00fc Lan_ in preference to \u5c71\u6797, given in the\n original text, which is accepted by the commentators without\n question. The text of the _T\u2018u Shu_ up to this point runs as\n follows: \u6f62\u4e95\u84b9\u846d\u6797\u6728\u8619\u8588\u8005.\n\nthey must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places\nwhere men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.\n\n The original text omits \u85cf, which has been restored from the _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_. The _T\u2018u Shu_ omits \u8655 as well, making \u6240 a\n substantive. On \u59e6 Chang Y\u00fc has the note: \u53c8\u616e\u59e6\u7d30\u6f5b\u96b1\u8998\u6211\u865b\u5be6\u807d\u6211\u865f\u4ee4\n \u4f0f\u59e6\u7576\u7232\u5169\u4e8b \u201cWe must also be on our guard against traitors who may\n lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and\n overhearing our instructions. _Fu_ and _chien_ are to be taken\n separately.\u201d\n\n18. \u6575\u8fd1\u800c\u975c\u8005\u6043\u5176\u96aa\u4e5f\n\nWhen the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on\nthe natural strength of his position.\n\n Here begin Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s remarks on the reading of signs, much of\n which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern\n manual like Gen. Baden-Powell\u2019s \u201cAids to Scouting.\u201d\n\n19. \u9060\u800c\u6311\u6230\u8005\u6b32\u4eba\u4e4b\u9032\u4e5f\n\nWhen he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for\nthe other side to advance.\n\n Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes\n to dislodge us. \u201cIf he came close up to us,\u201d says Tu Mu, \u201cand\n tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there\n would be less probability of our responding to the challenge.\u201d\n\n20. \u5176\u6240\u5c45\u8005\u6613\u5229\u4e5f\n\nIf his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.\n\n \u6613 is here the opposite of \u96aa in \u00a7 18. The reading of the _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_, \u5176\u6240\u8655\u8005\u5c45\u6613\u5229\u4e5f, is pretty obviously corrupt.\n The original text, which transposes \u6613 and \u8005, may very possibly be\n right. Tu Mu tells us that there is yet another reading:\n \u58eb\u722d\u5176\u6240\u5c45\u8005\u6613\u5229\u4e5f.\n\n21. \u8846\u6a39\u52d5\u8005\u4f86\u4e5f\u8846\u8349\u591a\u969c\u8005\u7591\u4e5f\n\nMovement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is\nadvancing.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung explains this as \u201cfelling trees to clear a passage,\u201d\n and Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cEvery army sends out scouts to climb high\n places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a\n forest are moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut\n down to clear a passage for the enemy\u2019s march.\u201d\n\nThe appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass\nmeans that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.\n\n Whenever the meaning of a passage happens to be somewhat elusive,\n Capt. Calthrop seems to consider himself justified in giving free\n rein to the imagination. Thus, though his text is here identical\n with ours, he renders the above: \u201cBroken branches and trodden\n grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be regarded with\n suspicion.\u201d Tu Yu\u2019s explanation, borrowed from Ts\u2018ao Kung, is as\n follows: \u201cThe presence of a number of screens or sheds in the\n midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled\n and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in order\n to make us suspect an ambush.\u201d It appears that these \u201cscreens\u201d\n were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the\n retreating enemy happened to come across.\n\n22. \u9ce5\u8d77\u8005\u4f0f\u4e5f\u7378\u99ed\u8005\u8986\u4e5f\n\nThe rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc\u2019s explanation is doubtless right: \u201cWhen birds that are\n flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means\n that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath.\u201d\n\nStartled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.\n\n An example of \u8986 _fou_^4 in the meaning of \u201cambuscade\u201d may be found\n in the _Tso Chuan_, \u96b1 9th year: \u541b\u7232\u4e09\u8986\u4ee5\u5f85\u4e4b. In the present\n passage, however, it is to be distinguished from \u4f0f just above, in\n that it implies onward motion on the part of the attacking force.\n Thus, Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan defines it as \u4e0d\u610f\u800c\u81f3, and Tu Mu as \u4f86\u8972\u6211\u4e5f.\n\n23. \u5875\u9ad8\u800c\u92b3\u8005\u8eca\u4f86\u4e5f\u5351\u800c\u5ee3\u8005\u5f92\u4f86\u4e5f\u6563\u800c\u689d\u9054\u8005\u6a35\u63a1\u4e5f\u5c11\u800c\u5f80\u4f86\u8005\u71df\u8ecd\u4e5f\n\nWhen there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots\nadvancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it\nbetokens the approach of infantry.\n\n \u9ad8\u800c\u92b3 \u201chigh and sharp,\u201d or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat\n exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the\n phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than\n men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same\n wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks,\n many abreast. According to Chang Y\u00fc, \u201cevery army on the march must\n have scouts (\u63a2\u5019\u4e4b\u4eba) some way in advance, who on sighting dust\n raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the\n commander-in-chief.\u201d Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: \u201cAs you move along,\n say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for\n the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting\n up, glitter of arms, etc.\u201d[174]\n\nWhen it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties\nhave been sent to collect firewood.\n\n There is some doubt about the reading \u6a35\u63a1. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and\n _Y\u00fc Lan_ have \u85aa\u63a1, and Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan proposes \u85aa\u4f86.\n\nA few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is\nencamping.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u201cIn apportioning the defences for a cantonment,\n light horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain\n the weak and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the\n small quantity of dust and its motion.\u201d\n\n24. \u8fad\u5351\u800c\u76ca\u5099\u8005\u9032\u4e5f\u8fad\u5f3a\u800c\u9032\u9a45\u8005\u9000\u4e5f\n\nHumble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is\nabout to advance.\n\n \u201cAs though they stood in great fear of us,\u201d says Tu Mu. \u201cTheir\n object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they\n will attack us.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc alludes to the story of \u7530\u55ae T\u2018ien Tan of\n the Ch\u2018i State, who in 279 B.C. was hard-pressed in his defence of\n \u537d\u58a8 Chi-mo against the Yen forces, led by \u9a0e\u52ab Ch\u2018i Chieh. In ch.\n 82 of the _Shih Chi_ we read: \u201cT\u2018ien Tan openly said: \u2018My only\n fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch\u2018i\n prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight against us;\n that would be the undoing of our city.\u2019 The other side being\n informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion;\n but those within the city were enraged at seeing their\n fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they\n should fall into the enemy\u2019s hands, were nerved to defend\n themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T\u2018ien Tan sent\n back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: \u2018What\n I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral\n tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this indignity on our\n forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.\u2019 Forthwith the\n besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in\n them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from\n the city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out\n and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. T\u2018ien Tan knew then\n that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But instead of a\n sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and ordered others\n to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were\n filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served out all\n the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular\n soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned\n with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were\n despatched to the enemy\u2019s camp to arrange terms of surrender,\n whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T\u2018ien Tan also\n collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the\n wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the\n prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their\n homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch\u2018i Chieh,\n in high good humour, granted their prayer; but his army now became\n increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T\u2018ien Tan got together\n a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, painted\n their bodies, dragon-like, with coloured stripes, and fastened\n sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their\n tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and\n drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in\n the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors.\n The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy\u2019s\n camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their\n tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their\n bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with\n whom they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had\n crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on\n the enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city\n itself, all those that remained behind making as much noise as\n possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until\n heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken,\n the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch\u2018i,\n who succeeded in slaying their general Ch\u2018i Chieh.... The result\n of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities\n which had belonged to the Ch\u2018i State.\u201d\n\nViolent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs\nthat he will retreat.\n\n I follow the original text here, also adopted by the _T\u2018u Shu_.\n The standard text reads \u8fad\u8a6d\u800c\u5f3a\u9032\u9a45\u8005\u9000\u4e5f on the strength of Ts\u2018ao\n Kung\u2019s commentary \u8a6d\u8a50\u4e5f, which shows that his text included\n the word \u8a6d. Strong as this ground is, I do not think it can\n counterbalance the obvious superiority of the other reading in\n point of sense. \u8a6d not only provides no antithesis to \u5351, but makes\n the whole passage absurd; for if the language of the enemy is\n calculated to deceive, it cannot be known as deceitful at the\n time, and can therefore afford no \u201csign.\u201d Moreover, the extra word\n in \u5f3a\u9032\u9a45\u8005 (an awkward locution, by the way) spoils the parallelism\n with \u76ca\u5099\u8005.\n\n25. \u8f15\u8eca\u5148\u51fa\u5c45\u5176\u5074\u8005\u9673\u4e5f\n\nWhen the light chariots\n\n The same, according to Tu Yu, as the \u99b3\u8eca of II. \u00a7 1.\n\ncome out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that\nthe enemy is forming for battle.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ omits \u51fa.\n\n26. \u7121\u7d04\u800c\u8acb\u548c\u8005\u8b00\u4e5f\n\nPeace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.\n\n Tu Yu defines \u7d04 as \u8981\u7d04, and Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan as \u8cea\u76df\u4e4b\u7d04 \u201ca treaty\n confirmed by oaths and hostages.\u201d Wang Hsi and Chang Y\u00fc, on the\n other hand, simply say \u7121\u6545 \u201cwithout reason,\u201d \u201con a frivolous\n pretext,\u201d as though \u7d04 bore the rather unusual sense of\n \u201cimportant.\u201d Capt. Calthrop has \u201cwithout consultation,\u201d which is\n too loose.\n\n27. \u5954\u8d70\u800c\u9673\u5175\u8005\u671f\u4e5f\n\nWhen there is much running about\n\n Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental\n banner.\n\nand the soldiers fall into rank,\n\n I follow the _T\u2018u Shu_ in omitting \u8eca after \u5175. Tu Mu quotes the\n _Chou Li_, ch. xxix. fol. 31: \u8eca\u9a5f\u5f92\u8da8\u53ca\u8868\u4e43\u6b62.\n\nit means that the critical moment has come.\n\n What Chia Lin calls \u6677\u523b\u4e4b\u671f, as opposed to \u5c0b\u5e38\u4e4b\u671f.\n\n28. \u534a\u9032\u534a\u9000\u8005\u8a98\u4e5f\n\nWhen some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.\n\n Capt. Calthrop is hardly right in translating: \u201cAn advance,\n followed by sudden retirement.\u201d It is rather a case of feigned\n confusion. As Tu Mu says: \u50de\u7232\u96dc\u4e82\u4e0d\u6574\u4e4b\u72c0.\n\n29. \u501a\u4ed7\u800c\u7acb\u8005\u98e2\u4e5f\n\nWhen the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from\nwant of food.\n\n \u4ed7 is here probably not a synonym for \u501a, but = \u5175 \u201ca weapon.\u201d The\n original text has \u6756\u800c\u7acb\u8005, which has been corrected from the\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_.\n\n30. \u6c72\u800c\u5148\u98ee\u8005\u6e34\u4e5f\n\nIf those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the\narmy is suffering from thirst.\n\n As Tu Mu remarks: \u89a9\u4e00\u4eba\u4e09\u8ecd\u53ef\u77e5\u4e5f \u201cOne may know the condition of a\n whole army from the behaviour of a single man.\u201d The \u5148 may mean\n either that they drink before drawing water for the army, or before\n they return to camp. Chang Y\u00fc takes the latter view. The _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ has the faulty reading \u6c72\u5f79\u5148\u98ee\u8005, and the _Y\u00fc Lan_, worse\n still, \u6c72\u8a2d\u98ee\u8005.\n\n31. \u898b\u5229\u800c\u4e0d\u9032\u8005\u52de\u4e5f\n\nIf the enemy sees an advantage to be gained\n\n Not necessarily \u201cbooty,\u201d as Capt. Calthrop translates it. The\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u5411\u4eba\u898b\u5229, etc.\n\nand makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.\n\n32. \u9ce5\u96c6\u8005\u865b\u4e5f\u591c\u547c\u8005\u6050\u4e5f\n\nIf birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.\n\n A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao\n says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.\n\nClamour by night betokens nervousness.\n\n Owing to false alarms; or, as Tu Mu explains it: \u6050\u61fc\u4e0d\u5b89\u6545\u591c\u547c\u4ee5\n \u81ea\u58ef\u4e5f \u201cFear makes men restless; so they fall to shouting at night\n in order to keep up their courage.\u201d The _T\u2018ung Tien_ inserts \u55a7\n before \u547c.\n\n33. \u8ecd\u64fe\u8005\u5c07\u4e0d\u91cd\u4e5f\u65cc\u65d7\u52d5\u8005\u4e82\u4e5f\u540f\u6012\u8005\u5026\u4e5f\n\nIf there is disturbance in the camp, the general\u2019s authority is weak.\nIf the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ omit \u65cc.\n\nIf the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.\n\n And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu\n understands the sentence differently: \u201cIf all the officers of an\n army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken\n with fatigue\u201d [owing to the exertions which he has demanded from\n them].\n\n34. \u7c9f\u99ac\u8089\u98df\u8ecd\u7121\u61f8\u7f3b\u4e0d\u8fd4\u5176\u820d\u8005\u7aae\u5bbc\u4e5f\n\nWhen an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,\n\n \u7c9f\u99ac\u8089\u98df is expanded by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean (following Tu Mu) into\n \u7d66\u7ce7\u4ee5\ud855\udf8a\u4e4e\u99ac\u6bba\u755c\u4ee5\u9957\u4e4e\u58eb, which is the sense I have given above. In\n the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and\n the horses chiefly on grass.\n\nand when the men do not hang their cooking-pots\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u7f36, which is much the same as \u7f3b, and the _Y\u00fc\n Lan_ \u7ba0, which is manifestly wrong.\n\nover the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents,\n\n For \u8fd4, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ both read \u53ca.\n\nyou may know that they are determined to fight to the death.\n\n For \u7aae\u5bbc, see VII. \u00a7 36. I may quote here the illustrative passage\n from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by\n the _P\u2018ei W\u00ean Y\u00fcn Fu_: \u201cThe rebel \u738b\u570b Wang Kuo of \u6881 Liang was\n besieging the town of \u9673\u5009 Ch\u2018\u00ean-ts\u2018ang, and \u7687\u752b\u5d69 Huang-fu Sung,\n who was in supreme command, and \u8463\u5353 Tung Cho were sent out against\n him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf\n ear to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and\n began to throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was\n now for advancing to the attack, but Cho said: \u2018It is a principle\n of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating\n host.\u2019 Sung answered: \u2018That does not apply here. What I am about\n to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined\n troops I am falling on a disorganised multitude, not a band of\n desperate men.\u2019 Thereupon he advanced to the attack unsupported by\n his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain.\u201d The\n inferior reading of the _T\u2018u Shu_ for \u00a7 34 is as follows: \u6bba\u99ac\u8089\u98df\u8005\n \u8ecd\u7121\u7ce7\u4e5f\u61f8\u7f3b\u4e0d\u8fd4\u5176\u820d\u8005\u7aae\u5bbc\u4e5f. The first clause strikes me as rather\n shallow for Sun Tz\u016d, and it is hard to make anything of \u61f8\u7f3b in\n the second without the negative. Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted,\n set down in his first edition: \u201cWhen they _cast away_ their\n cooking-pots.\u201d He now has: \u201cWhen the cooking-pots are hung up on\n the wall.\u201d\n\n35. \u8ac4\u8ac4\u7fd5\u7fd5\u5f90\u8a00\u5165\u5165\u8005\u5931\u8846\u4e5f\n\nThe sight of men whispering together\n\n \u8ac4\u8ac4 is well explained by Tu Mu as \u4e4f\u6c23\u8072\u4fc3 \u201cspeaking with bated\n breath.\u201d\n\nin small knots\n\n The _Shuo W\u00ean_ rather strangely defines \u7fd5 by the word \u8d77, but the\n _\u00carh Ya_ says \u5408 \u201cto join\u201d or \u201ccontract,\u201d which is undoubtedly its\n primary meaning. Chang Y\u00fc is right, then, in explaining it here by\n the word \u805a. The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts\u2018ao\n Kung says \u5931\u5fd7\u8c8c, Tu Yu \u4e0d\u771e, Tu Mu \u985a\u5012\u5931\u6b21\u8c8c, Chia Lin \u4e0d\u5b89\u8c8c, Mei\n Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean \u66e0\u8077\u4e8b, Wang Hsi \u60a3\u5176\u4e0a.\n\nor speaking in subdued tones\n\n \u5165\u5165 is said to be the same as \u5982\u5982.\n\npoints to disaffection amongst the rank and file.\n\n \u5931\u8846 is equivalent to \u5931\u5176\u8846\u5fc3, the subject of course being \u201cthe\n general,\u201d understood. In the original text, which seems to be\n followed by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus:\n \u8ac4\u8ac4\u7fd5\u7fd5\u5f90\u8207\u4eba\u8a00\u8005\u5931\u8846\u4e5f. Here it would be the general who is talking\n to his men, not the men amongst themselves. For \u7fd5, which is the\n chief stumbling-block in the way of this reading, the _T\u2018u Shu_\n gives the very plausible emendation \ud85e\udf08 (also read _hsi_, and\n defined by K\u2018ang Hsi as \u75be\u8a00 \u201cto speak fast\u201d). But this is\n unnecessary if we keep to the standard text.\n\n36. \u5c62\u8cde\u8005\u7a98\u4e5f\u6578\u7f70\u8005\u56f0\u4e5f\n\nToo frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his\nresources;\n\n Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is\n always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the\n men in good temper.\n\ntoo many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.\n\n Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted\n severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.\n\n37. \u5148\u66b4\u800c\u5f8c\u754f\u5176\u8846\u8005\u4e0d\u7cbe\u4e4b\u81f3\u4e5f\n\nTo begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy\u2019s\nnumbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.\n\n I follow the interpretation of Ts\u2018ao Kung: \u5148\u8f15\u6575\u5f8c\u805e\u5176\u8846\u5247\u5fc3\u60e1\u4e4b\u4e5f,\n also adopted by Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, Tu Mu and Chang Y\u00fc. Another possible\n meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean and Wang Hsi,\n is: \u201cThe general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then\n in terror lest they should mutiny, etc.\u201d This would connect the\n sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments. The\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u60c5 \u201caffection\u201d instead of \u7cbe.\n\n38. \u4f86\u59d4\u8b1d\u8005\u6b32\u4f11\u606f\u4e5f\n\nWhen envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign\nthat the enemy wishes for a truce.\n\n Tu Mu says: \u6240\u4ee5\u59d4\u8cea\u4f86\u8b1d\u6b64\u4e43\u52e2\u5df2\u7aae\u6216\u6709\u4ed6\u6545\u5fc5\u6b32\u4f11\u606f\u4e5f \u201cIf the enemy\n open friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that\n they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength\n is exhausted or for some other reason.\u201d But it hardly needs a Sun\n Tz\u016d to draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu Mu is\n supported by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean and Chang Y\u00fc, I cannot think that\n hostages are indicated by the word \u59d4.\n\n39. \u5175\u6012\u800c\u76f8\u8fce\u4e45\u800c\u4e0d\u5408\u53c8\u4e0d\u76f8\u53bb\u5fc5\u8b39\u5bdf\u4e4b\n\nIf the enemy\u2019s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for\na long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off\nagain, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and\ncircumspection.\n\n Capt. Calthrop falls into a trap which often lurks in the word \u76f8.\n He translates: \u201cWhen both sides, eager for a fight, face each\n other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring,\u201d\n etc. Had he reflected a little, he would have seen that this is\n meaningless as addressed to a commander who has control over the\n movements of his own troops. \u76f8\u8fce, then, does not mean that the two\n armies go to meet each other, but simply that the other side comes\n up to us. Likewise with \u76f8\u53bb. If this were not perfectly clear of\n itself, Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s paraphrase would make it so: \u6012\u800c\u4f86\u9006\u6211,\n etc. As Ts\u2018ao Kung points out, a man\u0153uvre of this sort may be only\n a _ruse_ to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying\n of an ambush.\n\n40. \u5175\u975e\u76ca\u591a\u4e5f\u60df\u7121\u6b66\u9032\u8db3\u4ee5\u5002\u529b\u6599\u6575\u53d6\u4eba\u800c\u5df2\n\nIf our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply\nsufficient;\n\n Wang Hsi\u2019s paraphrase, partly borrowed from Ts\u2018ao Kung, is\n \u6b0a\u529b\u5747\u8db3\u77e3. Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the _T\u2018u Shu_,\n is \u5175\u975e\u8cb4\u76ca\u591a, which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely:\n \u201cNumbers are no certain mark of strength.\u201d\n\nit only means that no direct attack can be made.\n\n Literally, \u201cno martial advance.\u201d That is to say, \u6b63 \u201c_ch\u00eang_\u201d\n tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem\n resorted to instead.\n\nWhat we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength,\nkeep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.\n\n This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed\n in squeezing very good sense out of it. The difficulty lies\n chiefly in the words \u53d6\u4eba, which have been taken in every possible\n way. I follow Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, who appears to offer the simplest\n explanation: \u60df\u5f97\u4eba\u8005\u52dd\u4e5f \u201cOnly the side that gets more men will\n win.\u201d Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s note, concise as usual to the verge of\n incomprehensibility, is \u53ae\u990a\u8db3\u4e5f. Fortunately we have Chang Y\u00fc to\n expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself:\n \u5175\u529b\u65e2\u5747\u53c8\u672a\u898b\u4fbf\u96d6\u672a\u8db3\u525b\u9032\u8db3\u4ee5\u53d6\u4eba\u65bc\u53ae\u990a\u4e4b\u4e2d\u4ee5\u5e76\u5175\u5408\u529b\u5bdf\u6575\u800c\u53d6\u52dd\u4e0d\u5fc5\u5047\u4ed6\n \u5175\u4ee5\u52a9\u5df1 \u201cWhen the numbers are even, and no favourable opening\n presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver\n a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our\n sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces\n and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the\n victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us.\u201d\n He then quotes from Wei Liao Tz\u016d, ch. 3: \u52a9\u5352\u540d\u7232\u5341\u842c\u5176\u5be6\u4e0d\u904e\u6578\u842c\u8033\n \u201cThe nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but\n their real value will be not more than half that figure.\u201d\n According to this interpretation, \u53d6\u4eba means \u201cto get recruits,\u201d not\n from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in\n the wake of a large army. This does not sound a very soldierly\n suggestion, and I feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tz\u016d\n meant. Chia Lin, on the other hand, takes the words in a different\n sense altogether, namely \u201cto conquer the enemy\u201d [cf. I. \u00a7 20]. But\n in that case they could hardly be followed by \u800c\u5df2. Better than\n this would be the rendering \u201cto make isolated captures,\u201d as\n opposed to \u6b66\u9032 \u201ca general attack.\u201d\n\n41. \u592b\u60df\u7121\u616e\u800c\u6613\u6575\u8005\u5fc5\u64d2\u65bc\u4eba\n\nHe who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is\nsure to be captured by them.\n\n The force of \u592b\u60df is not easy to appreciate. Ch\u2018\u00e9n Hao says \u6b8a\u7121\u9060\u616e\n \u4f46\u8f15\u6575\u8005, thus referring \u60df to the second verb. He continues, quoting\n from the _Tso Chuan_: \u8702\u8806\u6709\u6bd2\u800c\u51b5\u570b\u4e4e\u5247\u5c0f\u6575\u4ea6\u4e0d\u53ef\u8f15 \u201cIf bees and\n scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! [\u50d6\u516c,\n XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with\n contempt.\u201d\n\n42. \u5352\u672a\u89aa\u9644\u800c\u7f70\u4e4b\u5247\u4e0d\u670d\u4e0d\u670d\u5247\u96e3\u7528\u4e5f\u5352\u5df2\u89aa\u9644\u800c\u7f70\u4e0d\u884c\u5247\u4e0d\u53ef\u7528\u4e5f\n\nIf soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they\nwill not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, they will be\npractically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to\nyou, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.\n\n This is wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: \u201cIf the troops know\n the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are\n useless.\u201d\n\n43. \u6545\u4ee4\u4e4b\u4ee5\u6587\u9f4a\u4e4b\u4ee5\u6b66\u662f\u8b02\u5fc5\u53d6\n\nTherefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with\nhumanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.\n\n \u6587 and \u6b66, according to Ts\u2018ao Kung, are here equivalent to \u4ec1 and\n \u6cd5 respectively. Compare our two uses of the word \u201ccivil.\u201d \u664f\u5b50 Yen\n Tz\u016d [\u271d B.C. 493] said of \u53f8\u99ac\u7a70\u82f4 Ss\u016d-ma Jang-ch\u00fc: \u6587\u80fd\u9644\u8846\u6b66\u80fd\u5a01\u6575\u4e5f\n \u201cHis civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess\n kept his enemies in awe.\u201d Cf. Wu Tz\u016d, ch. 4 _init_.: \u592b\u7e3d\u6587\u6b66\u8005\u8ecd\u4e4b\n \u5c07\u4e5f\u517c\u525b\u67d4\u8005\u5175\u4e4b\u4e8b\u4e5f \u201cThe ideal commander unites culture with a\n warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination\n of hardness and tenderness.\u201d Again I must find fault with Capt.\n Calthrop\u2019s translation: \u201cBy humane treatment we obtain obedience;\n authority brings uniformity.\u201d\n\nThis is a certain road to victory.\n\n44. \u4ee4\u7d20\u884c\u4ee5\u6559\u5176\u6c11\u5247\u6c11\u670d\u4ee4\u4e0d\u7d20\u884c\u4ee5\u6559\u5176\u6c11\u5247\u6c11\u4e0d\u670d\n\nIf in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army\nwill be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read: \u4ee4\u7d20\u884c\u4ee5\u6559\u5176\u4eba\u8005\u4e5f\u4ee4\u7d20\u884c\u5247\u4eba\u670d\u4ee4\u7d20\n \u4e0d\u884c\u5247\u4eba\u4e0d\u670d.\n\n45. \u4ee4\u7d20\u4fe1\u8457\u8005\u8207\u8846\u76f8\u5f97\u4e5f\n\nIf a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his\norders being obeyed,\n\n The original text has \u4ee4\u7d20\u884c\u8005. \u4ee4\u7d20 is certainly awkward without\n \u884c, but on the other hand it is clear that Tu Mu accepted the\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ text, which is identical with ours. He says: \u201cA\n general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his\n men and also make his authority respected, so that when they\n come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline\n maintained, because they all trust and look up to him.\u201d What Sun\n Tz\u016d has said in \u00a7 44, however, would lead one rather to expect\n something like this: \u201cIf a general is always confident that his\n orders will be carried out,\u201d etc. Hence I am tempted to think that\n he may have written \u4ee4\u7d20\u4fe1\u884c\u8005. But this is perhaps too conjectural.\n\nthe gain will be mutual.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u4e0a\u4ee5\u4fe1\u4f7f\u6c11\u6c11\u4ee5\u4fe1\u670d\u4e0a\u662f\u4e0a\u4e0b\u76f8\u5f97\u4e5f \u201cThe general has\n confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile,\n having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual.\u201d He quotes a\n pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tz\u016d, ch. 4: \u4ee4\u4e4b\u4e4b\u6cd5\u5c0f\u904e\u7121\u66f4\u5c0f\u7591\u7121\u4e2d\n \u201cThe art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders\n and not to be swayed by petty doubts.\u201d Vacillation and fussiness\n are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army. Capt.\n Calthrop winds up the chapter with a final mistranslation of a\n more than usually heinous description: \u201cOrders are always obeyed,\n if general and soldiers are in sympathy.\u201d Besides inventing the\n latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert protasis and\n apodosis.\n\n\n\n\n X. \u5730\u5f62\u7bc7\n\n TERRAIN.\n\n\n Only about a third of the chapter, comprising \u00a7\u00a7 1\u201313, deals with\n \u5730\u5f62, the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The \u201csix\n calamities\u201d are discussed in \u00a7\u00a7 14\u201320, and the rest of the chapter\n is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less\n interesting, perhaps, on that account.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u5730\u5f62\u6709\u901a\u8005\u6709\u6302\u8005\u6709\u652f\u8005\u6709\u9698\u8005\u6709\u96aa\u8005\u6709\u9060\u8005\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit:\n(1) Accessible ground;\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says: \u9053\u8def\u4ea4\u9054 \u201cplentifully provided with roads and\n means of communication.\u201d\n\n(2) entangling ground;\n\nThe same commentator says: \u7db2\u7f85\u4e4b\u5730\u5f80\u5fc5\u639b\u7db4 \u201cNet-like country, venturing\ninto which you become entangled.\u201d\n\n(3) temporising ground;\n\n Tu Yu explains \u652f as \u4e45. This meaning is still retained in modern\n phrases such as \u652f\u6258, \u652f\u6f14 \u201cstave off,\u201d \u201cdelay.\u201d I do not know why\n Capt. Calthrop calls \u652f\u5730 \u201csuspended ground,\u201d unless he is\n confusing it with \u6302\u5730.\n\n(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights;\n\n The root idea in \u9698 is narrowness; in \u96aa, steepness.\n\n(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.\n\n It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this\n classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in\n the Chinaman\u2019s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions\n such as the above.\n\n2. \u6211\u53ef\u4ee5\u5f80\u5f7c\u53ef\u4ee5\u4f86\u66f0\u901a\n\nGround which can be freely traversed by both sides is called\n_accessible_.\n\n Generally speaking, \u5e73\u9678 \u201clevel country\u201d is meant. Cf. IX. \u00a7 9: \u8655\u6613.\n\n3. \u901a\u5f62\u8005\u5148\u5c45\u9ad8\u967d\u5229\u7ce7\u9053\u4ee5\u6230\u5247\u5229\n\nWith regard to ground of this nature,\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u5c45\u901a\u5730.\n\nbe before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,\n\n See IX. \u00a7 2. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u5148\u64da\u5176\u5730.\n\nand carefully guard your line of supplies.\n\n A curious use of \u5229 as a verb, if our text is right. The general\n meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, \u7121\u4f7f\u6575\u7d76\u5df1\u7ce7\u9053 \u201cnot to allow\n the enemy to cut your communications.\u201d Tu Mu, who was not a\n soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of\n fighting, goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line\n of communications by a wall (\u58d8), or enclosing it by embankments on\n each side (\u4f5c\u752c\u9053)! In view of Napoleon\u2019s dictum, \u201cthe secret of\n war lies in the communications,\u201d[175] we could wish that Sun Tz\u016d\n had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here\n and in I. \u00a7 10, VII. \u00a7 11. Col. Henderson says: \u201cThe line of\n supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as\n the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duellist who\n finds his adversary\u2019s point menacing him with certain death, and\n his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary\u2019s\n movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so\n the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds\n himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has\n not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or\n less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on\n ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will\n not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the\n surrender of his whole army.\u201d[176]\n\nThen you will be able to fight with advantage.\n\n Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.\n\n4. \u53ef\u4ee5\u5f80\u96e3\u4ee5\u8fd4\u66f0\u6302\n\nGround which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called\n_entangling_.\n\n Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating \u8fd4 \u201cretreat from it.\u201d\n\n5. \u6302\u5f62\u8005\u6575\u7121\u5099\u51fa\u800c\u52dd\u4e4b\u6575\u82e5\u6709\u5099\u51fa\u800c\u4e0d\u52dd\u96e3\u4ee5\u8fd4\u4e0d\u5229\n\nFrom a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may\nsally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your\ncoming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,\ndisaster will ensue.\n\n \u4e0d\u5229 (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean as\n \u5fc5\u53d7\u5236 \u201cyou will receive a check.\u201d\n\n6. \u6211\u51fa\u800c\u4e0d\u5229\u5f7c\u51fa\u800c\u4e0d\u5229\u66f0\u652f\n\nWhen the position is such that neither side will gain by making the\nfirst move, it is called _temporising_ ground.\n\n \u4ff1\u4e0d\u4fbf\u4e45\u76f8\u6301\u4e5f \u201cEach side finds it inconvenient to move, and the\n situation remains at a deadlock\u201d (Tu Yu).\n\n7. \u652f\u5f62\u8005\u6575\u96d6\u5229\u6211\u6211\u7121\u51fa\u4e5f\u5f15\u800c\u53bb\u4ee4\u6575\u534a\u51fa\u800c\u64ca\u4e4b\u5229\n\nIn a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an\nattractive bait,\n\n Tu Yu says \u4f6f\u80cc\u6211\u53bb \u201cturning their backs on us and pretending to\n flee.\u201d But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to\n quit our position. Here again \u5229 is used as a verb, but this time\n in a different sense: \u201cto hold out an advantage to.\u201d\n\nit will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus\nenticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come\nout, we may deliver our attack with advantage.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme\n of rhymes being _abcbdd_: \u5404\u5c45\u6240\u96aa\uff0c\u5148\u51fa\u5fc5\u6557\uff0c\u5229\u800c\u8a98\u6211\uff0c\u6211\u4e0d\u53ef\u611b\uff0c\u50de\u53bb\u5f15\u6575\uff0c\u534a\u51fa\u800c\u64ca.\n\n8. \u9698\u5f62\u8005\u6211\u5148\u5c45\u4e4b\u5fc5\u76c8\u4e4b\u4ee5\u5f85\u6575\n\nWith regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first,\n\n Capt. Calthrop says: \u201cDefiles, make haste to occupy.\u201d But this is\n a conditional clause, answering to \u82e5\u6575\u5148\u5c45\u4e4b in the next paragraph.\n\nlet them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.\n\n Because then, as Tu Yu observes, \u7686\u5236\u5728\u6211\u7136\u5f8c\u51fa\u5947\u4ee5\u5236\u6575 \u201cthe\n initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected\n attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.\u201d The commentators\n make a great pother about the precise meaning of \u76c8, which to the\n foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.\n\n9. \u82e5\u6575\u5148\u5c45\u4e4b\u76c8\u800c\u52ff\u5f9e\u4e0d\u76c8\u800c\u5f9e\u4e4b\n\nShould the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after\nhim if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly\ngarrisoned.\n\n10. \u96aa\u5f62\u8005\u6211\u5148\u5c45\u4e4b\u5fc5\u5c45\u9ad8\u967d\u4ee5\u5f85\u6575\n\nWith regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with your\nadversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there\nwait for him to come up.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u5730\u5f62\u96aa\u9698\u5c24\u4e0d\u53ef\u81f4\u65bc\u4eba \u201cThe particular advantage of\n securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then\n be dictated by the enemy.\u201d [For the enunciation of the grand\n principle alluded to, see VI. \u00a7 2]. Chang Y\u00fc tells the following\n anecdote of \u88f4\u884c\u5109 P\u2018ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619\u2013682), who was sent\n on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. \u201cAt nightfall\n he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely\n fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the\n army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly\n displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the\n extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P\u2018ei Hsing-chien,\n however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp\n moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm\n came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the\n depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed\n at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. \u2018How did\n you know what was going to happen?\u2019 they asked. P\u2018ei Hsing-chien\n replied: \u2018From this time forward be content to obey orders without\n asking unnecessary questions.\u2019 [See _Chiu T\u2018ang Shu_, ch. 84, fol.\n 12 _r_^o, and _Hsin T\u2018ang Shu_, ch. 108, fol. 5 _v_^o.] From this\n it may be seen,\u201d Chang Y\u00fc continues, \u201cthat high and sunny places\n are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are\n immune from disastrous floods.\u201d\n\n11. \u82e5\u6575\u5148\u5c45\u4e4b\u5f15\u800c\u53bb\u4e4b\u52ff\u5f9e\u4e5f\n\nIf the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but\nretreat and try to entice him away.\n\n The turning-point of \u674e\u4e16\u6c11 Li Shih-min\u2019s campaign in 621 A.D.\n against the two rebels, \u7ac7\u5efa\u5fb7 Tou Chien-t\u00ea, King of \u590f Hsia, and\n \u738b\u4e16\u5145 Wang Shih-ch\u2018ung, Prince of \u912d Ch\u00eang, was his seizure of the\n heights of \u6b66\u7262 Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-t\u00ea persisted in\n his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken\n prisoner. [See _Chiu T\u2018ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 _v_^o and also ch.\n 54.]\n\n12. \u9060\u5f62\u8005\u52e2\u5747\u96e3\u4ee5\u6311\u6230\u6230\u800c\u4e0d\u5229\n\nIf you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the\nstrength of the two armies is equal,\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u592b\u901a\u5f62\u5747\u52e2.\n\nit is not easy to provoke a battle,\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says that \u6311\u6230 means \u5ef6\u6575 \u201cchallenging the enemy.\u201d But\n the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,\n \u8fce\u6575 \u201cgoing to meet him.\u201d The point of course is, that we must not\n think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of\n which \u662f\u6211\u56f0\u6575\u92b3 \u201cwe should, be exhausted and our adversary fresh\n and keen.\u201d\n\nand fighting will be to your disadvantage.\n\n13. \u51e1\u6b64\u516d\u8005\u5730\u4e4b\u9053\u4e5f\u5c07\u4e4b\u81f3\u4efb\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u5bdf\u4e5f\n\nThese six are the principles connected with Earth.\n\n Or perhaps, \u201cthe principles relating to ground.\u201d See, however, I.\n \u00a7 8.\n\nThe general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to\nstudy them.\n\n Capt. Calthrop omits \u81f3\u4efb. Out of the foregoing six \u5730\u5f62, it will\n be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the\n configuration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to\n convey any definite geographical idea.\n\n14. \u6545\u5175\u6709\u8d70\u8005\u6709\u5f1b\u8005\u6709\u9677\u8005\u6709\u5d29\u8005\u6709\u4e82\u8005\u6709\u5317\u8005\u51e1\u6b64\u516d\u8005\u975e\u5929\u4e4b\u707d\u5c07\u4e4b\u904e\u4e5f\n\nNow an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from\nnatural causes,\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ reads \u5929\u5730\u4e4b\u707d.\n\nbut from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1)\nFlight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5)\ndisorganisation; (6) rout.\n\n I take exception to Capt. Calthrop\u2019s rendering of \u9677 and \u5d29 as\n \u201cdistress\u201d and \u201cdisorganisation,\u201d respectively.\n\n15. \u592b\u52e2\u5747\u4ee5\u4e00\u64ca\u5341\u66f0\u8d70\n\nOther conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another\nten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the former.\n\n Cf. III. \u00a7 10. The general\u2019s fault here is that of \u4e0d\u6599\u529b \u201cnot\n calculating the enemy\u2019s strength.\u201d It is obvious that \u52e2 cannot\n have the same force as in \u00a7 12, where it was equivalent to \u5175\u529b. I\n should not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Y\u00fc, to\n \u5c07\u4e4b\u667a\u52c7\u5175\u4e4b\u5229\u92b3 \u201cthe wisdom and valour of the general and the\n sharpness of the weapons.\u201d As Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan very justly remarks,\n \u82e5\u5f97\u5f62\u4fbf\u4e4b\u5730\u7528\u5947\u4f0f\u4e4b\u8a08\u5247\u53ef\u77e3 \u201cGiven a decided advantage in position,\n or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an\n ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of\n one to ten].\u201d\n\n16. \u5352\u5f3a\u540f\u5f31\u66f0\u5f1b\u540f\u5f3a\u5352\u5f31\u66f0\u9677\n\nWhen the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak,\nthe result is _insubordination_.\n\n \u5f1b \u201claxity\u201d\u2014the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt.\n Calthrop\u2019s \u201crelaxation\u201d is not good, on account of its ambiguity.\n Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of \u7530\u5e03 T\u2018ien Pu [_Hsin T\u2018ang Shu_,\n ch. 148], who was sent to \u9b4f Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an\n army against \u738b\u5ef7\u6e4a Wang T\u2018ing-ts\u2018ou. But the whole time he was in\n command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and\n openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys,\n several thousands at a time. T\u2018ien Pu was powerless to put a stop\n to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an\n attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed\n in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed\n suicide by cutting his throat.\n\nWhen the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the\nresult is _collapse_.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u540f\u5f3a\u6b32\u9032\u5352\u5f31\u8f12\u9677 \u201cThe officers are energetic and\n want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly\n collapse.\u201d Note that \u5f31 is to be taken literally of physical\n weakness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan\n makes \u9677 equivalent to \u6557, and Tu Mu explains it as \u9677\u6c92\u65bc\u6b7b\u5730\n \u201cstumbling into a death-trap.\u201d\n\n17. \u5927\u540f\u6012\u800c\u4e0d\u670d\u9047\u6575\u61df\u800c\u81ea\u6230\u5c07\u4e0d\u77e5\u5176\u80fd\u66f0\u5d29\n\nWhen the higher officers\n\n \u5927\u540f, according to Ts\u2018ao Kung, are the \u5c0f\u5c07 \u201cgenerals of inferior\n rank.\u201d But Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as\n simply convertible with \u5c07 or \u5927\u5c07.\n\nare angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle\non their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the\ncommander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to\nfight, the result is _ruin_.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung makes \u5927\u5c07, understood, the subject of \u6012, which seems\n rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi\u2019s note is: \u8b02\u5c07\u6012\u4e0d\u4ee5\u7406\u4e14\u4e0d\u77e5\u88e8\u4f50\u4e4b\u624d\u6fc0\u81f4\n \u5176\u5147\u61df\u5982\u5c71\u4e4b\u5d29\u58de\u4e5f \u201cThis means, the general is angry without just\n cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his\n subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings\n an avalanche of ruin upon his head.\u201d He takes \u80fd, therefore,\n in the sense of \u624d; but I think that Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao is right in his\n paraphrase \u4e0d\u9867\u80fd\u5426 \u201cthey don\u2019t care if it be possible or no.\u201d My\n interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean and\n Chang Y\u00fc. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the _Tso Chuan_, \u5ba3\u516c,\n XII. 3, showing how the great battle of \u90b2 Pi [597 B.C.] was lost\n for the \u6649 Chin State through the contumacy of \u5148\u7e20 Hsien Hu and\n the resentful spite of \u9b4f\u9321 Wei I and \u8d99\u65c3 Chao Chan. Chang Y\u00fc also\n alludes to the mutinous conduct of \u6b12\u9ef6 Luan Yen [_ibid._ \u8944\u516c,\n XIV. 3].\n\n18. \u5c07\u5f31\u4e0d\u56b4\u6559\u9053\u4e0d\u660e\u540f\u5352\u7121\u5e38\u9673\u5175\u7e31\u6a6b\u66f0\u4e82\n\nWhen the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are\nnot clear and distinct;\n\n Wei Liao Tz\u016d (ch. 4) says: \u4e0a\u7121\u7591\u4ee4\uff0c\u5247\u8846\u4e0d\u4e8c\u807d\uff0c\u52d5\u7121\u7591\u4e8b\uff0c\u5247\u8846\u4e0d\u4e8c\u5fd7 \u201cIf\n the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not\n wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation,\n the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.\u201d\n General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: \u201cThe secret of\n getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one\n nutshell\u2014in the clearness of the instructions they receive.\u201d[177]\n Assuming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much\n what Wei Liao Tz\u016d (_loc. cit._) goes on to say: \u672a\u6709\u4e0d\u4fe1\u5176\u5fc3\u800c\u80fd\u5f97\u5176\n \u529b\u8005\u4e5f. Cf. also Wu Tz\u016d ch. 3: \u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u5bb3\u7336\u8c6b\u6700\u5927\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u707d\u751f\u65bc\u72d0\u7591 \u201cthe\n most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst\n calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.\u201d\n\nwhen there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,\n\n \u540f\u5352\u7686\u4e0d\u62d8\u5e38\u5ea6 \u201cNeither officers nor men have any regular routine\u201d\n [Tu Mu].\n\nand the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is\nutter _disorganisation_.\n\n19. \u5c07\u4e0d\u80fd\u6599\u6575\u4ee5\u5c11\u5408\u8846\u4ee5\u5f31\u64ca\u5f3a\u5175\u7121\u9078\u92d2\u66f0\u5317\n\nWhen a general, unable to estimate the enemy\u2019s strength, allows an\ninferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment\nagainst a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the\nfront rank, the result must be a _rout_.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc paraphrases the latter part of the sentence \u4e0d\u9078\u9a4d\u52c7\u4e4b\u58eb\u4f7f\u7232\n \u5148\u92d2\u5175\u5fc5\u6557\u5317\u4e5f, and continues: \u51e1\u6230\u5fc5\u7528\u7cbe\u92b3\u7232\u524d\u92d2\u8005\u4e00\u5247\u58ef\u543e\u5fd7\u4e00\u5247\u632b\u6575\u5a01\u4e5f\n \u201cWhenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits\n should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to\n strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the\n enemy.\u201d Cf. the _primi ordines_ of Caesar (\u201cDe Bello Gallico,\u201d\n V. 28, 44 _et al._). There seems little to distinguish \u5317 from \u8d70\n in \u00a7 15, except that \u5317 is a more forcible word.\n\n20. \u51e1\u6b64\u516d\u8005\u6557\u4e4b\u9053\u4e5f\u5c07\u4e4b\u81f3\u4efb\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u5bdf\u4e5f\n\nThese are six ways of courting defeat,\n\n Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao makes them out to be: (1) \u4e0d\u91cf\u5be1\u8846 \u201cneglect to estimate\n the enemy\u2019s strength;\u201d (2) \u672c\u4e4f\u5211\u5fb7 \u201cwant of authority;\u201d (3)\n \u5931\u65bc\u8a13\u7df4 \u201cdefective training;\u201d (4) \u975e\u7406\u8208\u6012 \u201cunjustifiable anger;\u201d\n (5) \u6cd5\u4ee4\u4e0d\u884c \u201cnon-observance of discipline;\u201d (6) \u4e0d\u64c7\u9a4d\u679c \u201cfailure\n to use picked men.\u201d\n\nwhich must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a\nresponsible post.\n\n See _supra_, \u00a7 13.\n\n21. \u592b\u5730\u5f62\u8005\u5175\u4e4b\u52a9\u4e5f\u6599\u6575\u5236\u52dd\u8a08\u96aa\u9628\u9060\u8fd1\u4e0a\u5c07\u4e4b\u9053\u4e5f\n\nThe natural formation of the country is the soldier\u2019s best ally;\n\n Chia Lin\u2019s text has the reading \u6613 for \u52a9. Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao says: \u5929\u6642\u4e0d\u5982\n \u5730\u5229 \u201cThe advantages of weather and season are not equal to those\n connected with ground.\u201d\n\nbut a power of estimating the adversary,\n\n The insertion of a \u201cbut\u201d is necessary to show the connection of\n thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely\n wholly on natural advantages of terrain.\n\nof controlling the forces of victory,\n\n \u5236\u52dd is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in\n Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to\n imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.\n\nand of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u8a08\u6975\u96aa\u6613\u5229\u5bb3\u9060\u8fd1. I am decidedly\n puzzled by Capt. Calthrop\u2019s translation: \u201can eye for steepness,\n _command_ and distances.\u201d Where did he find the word which I have\n put in italics?\n\nconstitutes the test of a great general.\n\n A somewhat free translation of \u9053. As Chang Y\u00fc remarks, these are\n \u5175\u4e4b\u672c \u201cthe essentials of soldiering,\u201d ground being only a helpful\n accessory.\n\n22. \u77e5\u6b64\u800c\u7528\u6230\u8005\u5fc5\u52dd\u4e0d\u77e5\u6b64\u800c\u7528\u6230\u8005\u5fc5\u6557\n\nHe who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into\npractice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises\nthem, will surely be defeated.\n\n23. \u6545\u6230\u9053\u5fc5\u52dd\u4e3b\u66f0\u7121\u6230\u5fc5\u6230\u53ef\u4e5f\u6230\u9053\u4e0d\u52dd\u4e3b\u66f0\u5fc5\u6230\u7121\u6230\u53ef\u4e5f\n\nIf fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even\nthough the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory,\nthen you must not fight even at the ruler\u2019s bidding.\n\n Cf. VIII. \u00a7 3 _fin._ Huang-shih Kung of the Ch\u2018in dynasty, who\n is said to have been the patron of \u5f35\u826f Chang Liang and to have\n written the \u4e09\u7565, has these words attributed to him: \u51fa\u8ecd\u884c\u5e2b\u5c07\u5728\u81ea\u5c08\n \u9032\u9000\u5167\u5fa1\u5247\u529f\u96e3\u6210\u6545\u8056\u4e3b\u660e\u738b\u8dea\u800c\u63a8\u8f42 \u201cThe responsibility of setting an\n army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance and\n retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will\n hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened\n monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their\n country\u2019s cause [_lit._, kneel down to push the chariot wheel].\u201d\n This means that \u95ab\u5916\u4e4b\u4e8b\u5c07\u8ecd\u88c1\u4e4b \u201cin matters lying outside the\n zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute.\u201d\n Chang Y\u00fc also quotes the saying: \u8ecd\u4e2d\u4e0d\u805e\u5929\u5b50\u4e4b\u8a54 \u201cDecrees of the\n Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp.\u201d Napoleon, who\n has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence\n of action, speaks in the same sense: \u201cUn g\u00e9n\u00e9ral en chef n\u2019est pas\n \u00e0 couvert de ses fautes \u00e0 la guerre par un ordre de son souverain\n ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est \u00e9loign\u00e9 du champ\n d\u2019op\u00e9ration, et qu\u2019il conna\u00eet mal, ou ne conna\u00eet pas du tout le\n dernier \u00e9tat des choses.\u201d[178]\n\n24. \u6545\u9032\u4e0d\u6c42\u540d\u9000\u4e0d\u907f\u7f6a\u552f\u6c11\u662f\u4fdd\u800c\u5229\u5408\u65bc\u4e3b\u570b\u4e4b\u5bf3\u4e5f\n\nThe general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without\nfearing disgrace,\n\n It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all\n for a soldier is to retreat.\n\nwhose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for\nhis sovereign,\n\n \u5408, which is omitted by the _T\u2018u Shu_, is said by Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao to be\n equivalent to \u6b78. If it had to be separately translated, it would\n be something like our word \u201caccrue.\u201d\n\nis the jewel of the kingdom.\n\n A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese \u201chappy warrior.\u201d\n Such a man, says Ho Shih, \u7f6a\u53ca\u5176\u8eab\u4e0d\u6094\u4e5f \u201ceven if he had to suffer\n punishment, would not regret his conduct.\u201d\n\n25. \u8996\u5352\u5982\u5b30\u5152\u6545\u53ef\u8207\u4e4b\u8d74\u6df1\u8c3f\u8996\u5352\u5982\u611b\u5b50\u6545\u53ef\u8207\u4e4b\u4ff1\u6b7b\n\nRegard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into\nthe deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they\nwill stand by you even unto death.\n\n Cf. I. \u00a7 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging\n picture of the famous general Wu Ch\u2018i, from whose treatise on war\n I have frequently had occasion to quote: \u201cHe wore the same clothes\n and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to\n have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own\n surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship\n with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess,\n and Wu Ch\u2018i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier\u2019s mother,\n hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her,\n saying: \u2018Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and\n yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his\n sore.\u2019 The woman replied: \u2018Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a\n similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and\n finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he\n has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not\n where\u2019.\u201d Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan mentions \u695a\u5b50 the Viscount of Ch\u2018u, who invaded\n the small state of \u856d Hsiao during the winter. \u7533\u516c The Duke of\n Sh\u00ean said to him: \u201cMany of the soldiers are suffering severely\n from the cold.\u201d So he made a round of the whole army, comforting\n and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they\n were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. [_Tso Chuan_, \u5ba3\u516c,\n XII. 5]. Chang Y\u00fc alludes to the same passage, saying: \u6e29\u8a00\u4e00\u64ab\u58eb\u540c\n \u633e\u7e8a.\n\n26. \u539a\u800c\u4e0d\u80fd\u4f7f\u611b\u800c\u4e0d\u80fd\u4ee4\u4e82\u800c\u4e0d\u80fd\u6cbb\u8b6c\u5982\u9a55\u5b50\u4e0d\u53ef\u7528\u4e5f\n\nIf, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority\nfelt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and\nincapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:\n\n Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last\n he translates: \u201coverindulgence may produce disorder.\u201d\n\nthen your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are\nuseless for any practical purpose.\n\n Cf. IX. \u00a7 42. We read in the \u9670\u7b26\u7d93, pt. 2: \u5bb3\u751f\u4e8e\u601d \u201cInjury comes\n out of kindness.\u201d Li Ching once said that if you could make your\n soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu\n Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred\n in 219 A.D., when \u5442\u8499 L\u00fc M\u00eang was occupying the town of \u6c5f\u9675\n Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to\n molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force.\n Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who\n happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo\n hat (\u7b20) belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over\n his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. L\u00fc M\u00eang\n considered that the fact of his being also a native of \u6c5d\u5357 Ju-nan\n should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline,\n and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears\n rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity\n filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even\n articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. [_San Kuo\n Chih_, ch. 54, f. 13 _r_^o. & _v_^o.].\n\n27. \u77e5\u543e\u5352\u4e4b\u53ef\u4ee5\u64ca\u800c\u4e0d\u77e5\u6575\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u64ca\u52dd\u4e4b\u534a\u4e5f\n\nIf we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are\nunaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only\nhalfway towards victory.\n\n That is, as Ts\u2018ao Kung says, \u201cthe issue in this case is uncertain.\u201d\n\n28. \u77e5\u6575\u4e4b\u53ef\u64ca\u800c\u4e0d\u77e5\u543e\u5352\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u64ca\u52dd\u4e4b\u534a\u4e5f\n\nIf we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our\nown men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway\ntowards victory.\n\n Cf. III. \u00a7 13 (1).\n\n29. \u77e5\u6575\u4e4b\u53ef\u64ca\u77e5\u543e\u5352\u4e4b\u53ef\u4ee5\u64ca\u800c\u4e0d\u77e5\u5730\u5f62\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u6230\u52dd\u4e4b\u534a\u4e5f\n\nIf we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our\nmen are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of\nthe ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only\nhalfway towards victory.\n\n I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice\n distinction in meaning between \u64ca and \u653b. The latter is simply \u201cto\n attack\u201d without any further implication, whereas \u64ca is a stronger\n word which in nine cases out of ten means \u201cto attack with\n expectation of victory,\u201d \u201cto fall upon,\u201d as we should say, or even\n \u201cto crush.\u201d On the other hand, \u64ca is not quite synonymous with \u4f10,\n which is mostly used of operations on a larger scale, as of one\n State _making war_ on another, often with the added idea of\n invasion. \u5f81, finally, has special reference to the subjugation of\n rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.\n\n30. \u6545\u77e5\u5175\u8005\u52d5\u800c\u4e0d\u8ff7\u8209\u800c\u4e0d\u7aae\n\nHence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered;\nonce he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.\n\n The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his\n measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. \u201cHe does\n not move recklessly,\u201d says Chang Y\u00fc, \u201cso that when he does move,\n he makes no mistakes.\u201d Another reading substitutes \u56f0 for \u8ff7 and\n \u9813 for \u7aae. The latter variant only is adopted by the _T\u2018ung Tien_\n and _Y\u00fc Lan_. Note that \u7aae here means \u201cat the end of his _mental_\n resources.\u201d\n\n31. \u6545\u66f0\u77e5\u5f7c\u77e5\u5df1\u52dd\u4e43\u4e0d\u6b86\u77e5\u5730\u77e5\u5929\u52dd\u4e43\u53ef\u5168\n\nHence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your\nvictory will not stand in doubt;\n\n Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified.\n\nif you know Heaven and know Earth,\n\n \u5929 and \u5730 are transposed for the sake of the jingle between \u5929 and\n \u5168. The original text, however, has \u77e5\u5929\u77e5\u5730, and the correction\n has been made from the _T\u2018ung Tien_.\n\nyou may make your victory complete.\n\n As opposed to \u52dd\u4e4b\u534a, above. The original text has \u52dd\u4e43\u4e0d\u7aae, the\n corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of \u4e0d\u7aae in the\n preceding sentence. Here, however \u4e0d\u7aae would not be synonymous\n with \u4e0d\u56f0, but equivalent to \u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u7aae \u201cinexhaustible,\u201d \u201cbeyond\n computation.\u201d Cf. V. \u00a7 11. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has again supplied the\n true reading. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan sums up as follows: \u4eba\u4e8b\u5929\u6642\u5730\u5229\u4e09\u8005\u540c\u77e5\u5247\n \u767e\u6230\u767e\u52dd \u201cGiven a knowledge of three things\u2014the affairs of man, the\n seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth\u2014, victory\n will invariably crown your battles.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n XI. \u4e5d\u5730\u7bc7\n\n THE NINE SITUATIONS.\n\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan is not quite right in calling these \u52dd\u6575\u4e4b\u5730. As we shall\n see, some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military\n point of view. Wang Hsi more correctly says: \u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u5730\u5229\u5bb3\u6709\u4e5d\u4e5f\n \u201cThere are nine military situations, good and bad.\u201d One would like\n to distinguish the \u4e5d\u5730 from the six \u5730\u5f62 of chap. X by saying that\n the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features\n of the country, while the \u4e5d\u5730 have more to do with the condition\n of the army, being \u5730\u52e2 \u201csituations\u201d as opposed to \u201cgrounds.\u201d But\n it is soon found impossible to carry out the distinction. Both are\n cross-divisions, for among the \u5730\u5f62 we have \u201ctemporising ground\u201d\n side by side with \u201cnarrow passes,\u201d while in the present chapter\n there is even greater confusion.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u7528\u5175\u4e4b\u6cd5\u6709\u6563\u5730\u6709\u8f15\u5730\u6709\u722d\u5730\u6709\u4ea4\u5730\u6709\u8862\u5730\u6709\u91cd\u5730\u6709\u572e\u5730\u6709\u570d\u5730\u6709\u6b7b\u5730\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1)\nDispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open\nground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7)\ndifficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.\n\n2. \u8af8\u4faf\u81ea\u6230\u5176\u5730\u8005\u7232\u6563\u5730\n\nWhen a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive\nground.\n\n So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and\n anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the\n opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction.\n \u201cIn their advance,\u201d observes Tu Mu, \u201cthey will lack the valour of\n desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of\n refuge.\u201d The \u8005, which appears in the _T\u2018u Shu_, seems to have been\n accidentally omitted in my edition of the standard text.\n\n3. \u5165\u4eba\u4e4b\u5730\u800c\u4e0d\u6df1\u8005\u7232\u8f15\u5730\n\nWhen he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great\ndistance, it is facile ground.\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan and Ho Shih say \u8f15\u65bc\u9000\u4e5f \u201cbecause of the facility for\n retreating,\u201d and the other commentators give similar explanations.\n Tu Mu remarks: \u5e2b\u51fa\u8d8a\u5883\u5fc5\u711a\u821f\u6881\u793a\u6c11\u7121\u8fd4\u9867\u4e4b\u5fc3 \u201cWhen your army has\n crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in\n order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering\n after home.\u201d I do not think that \u201cdisturbing ground,\u201d Capt.\n Calthrop\u2019s rendering of \u8f15\u5730, has anything to justify it. If an\n idiomatic translation is out of the question, one should at least\n attempt to be literal.\n\n4. \u6211\u5f97\u5247\u5229\u5f7c\u5f97\u4ea6\u5229\u8005\u7232\u722d\u5730\n\nGround the possession of which imports great advantage to either side,\nis contentious ground.\n\n I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the\n dictionary, i.e. \u201cto be contended for\u201d\u2014Tu Mu\u2019s \u5fc5\u722d\u4e4b\u5730. Ts\u2018ao Kung\n says: \u53ef\u4ee5\u5c11\u52dd\u8846\u5f31\u52dd\u5f3a \u201cground on which the few and the weak can\n defeat the many and the strong,\u201d such as \u9628\u5589 \u201cthe neck of a pass,\u201d\n instanced by Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan. Thus, Thermopylae was a \u722d\u5730, because the\n possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the\n entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time.\n Cf. Wu Tz\u016d, ch. V. _ad init._: \u4ee5\u4e00\u64ca\u5341\u83ab\u5584\u65bc\u9628 \u201cFor those who have\n to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better\n than a narrow pass.\u201d When \u5442\u5149 L\u00fc Kuang was returning from his\n triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far\n as \u5b9c\u79be I-ho, laden with spoils, \u6881\u7199 Liang Hsi, administrator of\n \u6dbc\u5dde Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King\n of Ch\u2018in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the\n province. \u694a\u7ff0 Yang Han, governor of \u9ad8\u660c Kao-ch\u2018ang, counselled\n him, saying: \u201cL\u00fc Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west,\n and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in\n the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him,\n and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to\n occupy the defile at the mouth of the \u9ad8\u68a7 Kao-wu pass, thus\n cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are\n prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without\n moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,\n we could make a stand against him at the \u4f0a\u543e I-wu pass, which is\n nearer. The cunning and resource of \u5b50\u623f Tz\u016d-fang himself [i.e.\n \u5f35\u826f] would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of\n these two positions.\u201d Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice,\n was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader. [See \u6649\u66f8, ch. 122,\n fol. 3 _r_^o, and \u6b74\u4ee3\u7d00\u4e8b\u5e74\u8868, ch. 43, fol. 26.]\n\n5. \u6211\u53ef\u4ee5\u5f80\u5f7c\u53ef\u4ee5\u4f86\u8005\u7232\u4ea4\u5730\n\nGround on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.\n\n This is only a makeshift translation of \u4ea4, which according to\n Ts\u2018ao Kung stands for \u4ea4\u932f \u201cground covered with a network of\n roads,\u201d like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by\n Ho Shih, is \u4ea4\u901a \u201cground on which intercommunication is easy.\u201d In\n either case, it must evidently be \u5e73\u539f \u201cflat country,\u201d and\n therefore \u4e0d\u53ef\u675c\u7d76 \u201ccannot be blocked.\u201d Cf. \u901a\u5f62, X. \u00a7 2.\n\n6. \u8af8\u4faf\u4e4b\u5730\u4e09\u5c6c\u5148\u81f3\u800c\u5f97\u5929\u4e0b\u4e4b\u8846\u8005\u7232\u8862\u5730\n\nGround which forms the key to three contiguous states,\n\n \u6211\u8207\u6575\u76f8\u7576\u800c\u65c1\u6709\u4ed6\u570b\u4e5f \u201cOur country adjoining the enemy\u2019s and a third\n country conterminous with both.\u201d [Ts\u2018ao Kung.] M\u00eang Shih instances\n the small principality of \u912d Ch\u00eang, which was bounded on the\n north-east by \u9f4a Ch\u2018i, on the west by \u6649 Chin, and on the south by\n \u695a Ch\u2018u.\n\nso that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,\n\n \u5929\u4e0b of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into\n which China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent\n who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to\n become his allies. See _infra_, \u00a7 48. \u8846 appears at first sight to\n be \u201cthe masses\u201d or \u201cpopulation\u201d of the Empire, but it is more\n probably, as Tu Yu says, \u8af8\u4faf\u4e4b\u8846.\n\nis ground of intersecting highways.\n\n Capt. Calthrop\u2019s \u201cpath-ridden ground\u201d might stand well enough for\n \u4ea4\u5730 above, but it does not bring out the force of \u8862\u5730, which\n clearly denotes the central position where important highways meet.\n\n7. \u5165\u4eba\u4e4b\u5730\u6df1\u80cc\u57ce\u9091\u591a\u8005\u7232\u91cd\u5730\n\nWhen an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country,\nleaving a number of fortified cities in its rear,\n\n After \u591a, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ intercalates the gloss \u96e3\u4ee5\u8fd4.\n\nit is serious ground.\n\n Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that \u5175\u81f3\u6b64\u8005\u4e8b\u52e2\u91cd\u4e5f \u201cwhen an\n army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.\u201d Li\n Ch\u2018\u00fcan instances (1) the victorious march of \u6a02\u6bc5 Yo I into the\n capital of Ch\u2018i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch\u2018u, six years\n later, by the Ch\u2018in general \u767d\u8d77 Po Ch\u2018i.\n\n8. \u5c71\u6797\u96aa\u963b\u6cae\u6fa4\u51e1\u96e3\u884c\u4e4b\u9053\u8005\u7232\u572e\u5730\n\nMountain forests,\n\n Or simply, \u201cforests.\u201d I follow the _T\u2018u Shu_ in omitting the \u884c\n before \u5c71\u6797, given in the standard text, which is not only otiose\n but spoils the rhythm of the sentence.\n\nrugged steeps, marshes and fens\u2014all country that is hard to traverse:\nthis is difficult ground.\n\n \u572e _p\u2018i_^3 (to be distinguished from \u572f i^4) is defined by K\u2018ang\n Hsi (after the _Shuo W\u00ean_) as \u6bc1 \u201cto destroy.\u201d Hence Chia Lin\n explains \u572e\u5730 as ground \u7d93\u6c34\u6240\u6bc1 \u201cthat has been ruined by water\n passing over it,\u201d and Tu Yu simply as \u6cae\u6d33\u4e4b\u5730 \u201cswampy ground.\u201d But\n Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep\n hollows\u2014what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the\n expressive term \u5730\u7344 \u201cearth-hells.\u201d Compare the \u5929\u4e95 of IX. \u00a7 15.\n\n9. \u6240\u7531\u5165\u8005\u9698\u6240\u5f9e\u6b78\u8005\u8fc2\u5f7c\u5be1\u53ef\u4ee5\u64ca\u543e\u4e4b\u8846\u8005\u7232\u570d\u5730\n\nGround which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can\nonly retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy\nwould suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in\nground.\n\n10. \u75be\u6230\u5247\u5b58\u4e0d\u75be\u6230\u5247\u4ea1\u8005\u7232\u6b7b\u5730\n\nGround on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting\nwithout delay, is desperate ground.\n\n The situation, as pictured by Ts\u2018ao Kung, is very similar to the\n \u570d\u5730, except that here escape is no longer possible: \u524d\u6709\u9ad8\u5c71\u5f8c\u6709\u5927\u6c34\n \u9032\u5247\u4e0d\u5f97\u9000\u5247\u6709\u7919 \u201cA lofty mountain in front, a large river behind,\n advance impossible, retreat blocked.\u201d Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao says: \u4eba\u5728\u6b7b\u5730\u5982\n \u5750\u6f0f\u8239\u4f0f\u71d2\u5c4b \u201cto be on \u2018desperate ground\u2019 is like sitting in a\n leaking boat or crouching in a burning house.\u201d Tu Mu quotes\n from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus\n entrapped: \u201cSuppose an army invading hostile territory without the\n aid of local guides:\u2014it falls into a fatal snare and is at the\n enemy\u2019s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a\n pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together\n and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front,\n retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single\n file (\u9d08\u884c\u9b5a\u8cab\u4e4b\u56b4). Then, before there is time to range our\n soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength\n suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a\n breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a\n pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none\n of us has a moment\u2019s respite. If we simply maintain our ground,\n whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we\n have to sustain the enemy\u2019s attacks on front and rear. The country\n is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the\n necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,\n all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so\n narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten\n thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all\n points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:\u2014in this terrible\n plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the\n keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest\n effect?\u201d Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful\n close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians\n under Nicias and Demosthenes. [_See_ Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].\n\n11. \u662f\u6545\u6563\u5730\u5247\u7121\u4ee5\u6230\u8f15\u5730\u5247\u7121\u6b62\u722d\u5730\u5247\u7121\u653b\n\nOn dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt\nnot. On contentious ground, attack not.\n\n But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the\n advantageous position first. So Ts\u2018ao Kung. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan and others,\n however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already\n forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. In\n the \u5b6b\u5b50\u6558\u9304, when the King of Wu inquires what should be done in\n this case, Sun Tz\u016d replies: \u201cThe rule with regard to contentious\n ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the\n other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the\n enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to\n flee\u2014show your banners and sound your drums\u2014make a dash for other\n places that he cannot afford to lose\u2014trail brushwood and raise a\n dust\u2014confound his ears and eyes\u2014detach a body of your best troops,\n and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally\n forth to the rescue.\u201d\n\n12. \u4ea4\u5730\u5247\u7121\u7d76\u8862\u5730\u5247\u5408\u4ea4\n\nOn open ground, do not try to block the enemy\u2019s way.\n\n Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking\n force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of\n \u7121\u7d76. I follow that of Chang Y\u00fc (\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u5175\u963b\u7d76\u5176\u8def). The other\n is indicated in Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s brief note: \u76f8\u53ca\u5c6c\u4e5f \u201cDraw closer\n together\u201d\u2014_i.e._, see that a portion of your own army is not cut\n off. Wang Hsi points out that \u4ea4\u5730 is only another name for the\n \u901a\u5730 \u201caccessible ground\u201d of X. \u00a7 2, and says that the advice here\n given is simply a variation of \u5229\u7ce7\u9053 \u201ckeep a sharp eye on the line\n of supplies,\u201d be careful that your communications are not cut. The\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u7121\u76f8\u7d76.\n\nOn ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your\nallies.\n\n Or perhaps, \u201cform alliances with neighbouring states.\u201d Thus Ts\u2018ao\n Kung has: \u7d50\u8af8\u4faf\u4e5f. Capt. Calthrop\u2019s \u201ccultivate intercourse\u201d is\n much too timid and vague. The original text reads \u4ea4\u5408.\n\n13. \u91cd\u5730\u5247\u63a0\u572e\u5730\u5247\u884c\n\nOn serious ground, gather in plunder.\n\n On this, Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan has the following delicious note: \u6df1\u5165\u6575\u5883\u4e0d\u53ef\n \u975e\u7fa9\u5931\u4eba\u5fc3\u5982\u6f22\u9ad8\u7956\u5165\u79e6\u7121\u72af\u5a66\u5973\u7121\u53d6\u5bf3\u8ca8\u5f97\u4eba\u5fc3\u4e5f\u6b64\u7b4c\u4ee5\u63a0\u5b57\u7232\u7121\u63a0\u5b57 \u201cWhen\n an army penetrates far into the enemy\u2019s country, care must be\n taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow\n the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch\u2018in\n territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of\n valuables. [_Nota bene_: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause\n us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900\n A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then,\n I think that the true reading must be, not \u63a0 \u2018plunder\u2019, but \u7121\u63a0\n \u2018do not plunder\u2019.\u201d Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy\n commentator\u2019s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least,\n has no such illusions. He says: \u201cWhen encamped on \u2018serious\n ground,\u2019 there being no inducement as yet to advance further,\n and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a\n protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides,\n and keep a close watch on the enemy.\u201d Cf. also II. \u00a7 9: \u56e0\u7ce7\u65bc\u6575.\n\nIn difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.\n\n Or, in the words of VIII. \u00a72, \u7121\u820d \u201cdo not encamp.\u201d\n\n14. \u570d\u5730\u5247\u8b00\u6b7b\u5730\u5247\u6230\n\nOn hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u767c\u5947\u8b00 \u201cTry the effect of some unusual artifice;\u201d\n and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: \u5c45\u6b64\u5247\u7576\u6b0a\u8b00\u8a50\u8b4e\u53ef\u4ee5\u514d\u96e3 \u201cIn\n such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the\n circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the\n peril may be escaped.\u201d This is exactly what happened on the famous\n occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on\n the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the\n Dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle\n his foes was remarkably like that which T\u2018ien Tan had also\n employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. \u00a7 24,\n note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the\n horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals\n being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the\n passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of\n these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans\n that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal\u2019s army passed\n safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.\n 16, 17.]\n\nOn desperate ground, fight.\n\n For, as Chia Lin remarks: \u529b\u6230\u6216\u751f\u5b88\u9685\u5247\u6b7b \u201cif you fight with all\n your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if\n you cling to your corner.\u201d\n\n15. \u6240\u8b02\u53e4\u4e4b\u5584\u7528\u5175\u8005\u80fd\u4f7f\u6575\u4eba\u524d\u5f8c\u4e0d\u76f8\u53ca\u8846\u5be1\u4e0d\u76f8\u6043\u8cb4\u8ce4\u4e0d\u76f8\u6551\u4e0a\u4e0b\u4e0d\u76f8\u6276\n\nThose who were called skilful leaders of old\n\n \u6240\u8b02 is omitted in the _T\u2018u Shu_ text.\n\nknew how to drive a wedge between the enemy\u2019s front and rear;\n\n More literally, \u201ccause the front and rear to lose touch with each\n other.\u201d\n\nto prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to\nhinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,\n\n I doubt if \u8cb4\u8ce4 can mean \u201cofficers and men,\u201d as Capt. Calthrop\n translates. This is wanted for \u4e0a\u4e0b.\n\nthe officers from rallying their men.\n\n The reading \u6276, derived from the _Y\u00fc Lan_, must be considered very\n doubtful. The original text has \u6551, and the _T\u2018u Shu_ \u6536.\n\n16. \u5352\u96e2\u800c\u4e0d\u96c6\u5175\u5408\u800c\u4e0d\u9f4a\n\nWhen the enemy\u2019s men were scattered, they prevented them from\nconcentrating;\n\n Capt. Calthrop translates \u5352\u96e2 \u201cthey scattered the enemy,\u201d which\n cannot be right.\n\neven when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in\ndisorder.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s note makes the sense plain: \u6216\u5df2\u96e2\u800c\u4e0d\u80fd\u5408\u6216\u96d6\u5408\u800c\n \u4e0d\u80fd\u9f4a. All these clauses, of course, down to \u4e0d\u9f4a, are dependent\n on \u4f7f in \u00a7 15.\n\n17. \u5408\u65bc\u5229\u800c\u52d5\u4e0d\u5408\u65bc\u5229\u800c\u6b62\n\nWhen it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when\notherwise, they stopped still.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean connects this with the foregoing: \u7136\u80fd\u4f7f\u6575\u82e5\u6b64\u7576\u9808\u6709\u5229\u5247\n \u52d5\u7121\u5229\u5247\u6b62 \u201cHaving succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would\n push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there\n was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were.\u201d\n\n18. \u6562\u554f\u6575\u8846\u6574\u800c\u5c07\u4f86\u5f85\u4e4b\u82e5\u4f55\u66f0\u5148\u596a\u5176\u6240\u611b\u5247\u807d\u77e3\n\nIf asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array\nand on the point of marching to the attack,\n\n \u6562\u554f is like \u6216\u554f, introducing a supposed question.\n\nI should say: \u201cBegin by seizing something which your opponent holds\ndear; then he will be amenable to your will.\u201d\n\n Opinions differ as to what Sun Tz\u016d had in mind. Ts\u2018ao Kung thinks\n it is \u5176\u6240\u6043\u4e4b\u5229 \u201csome strategical advantage on which the enemy is\n depending.\u201d Tu Mu says: \u64da\u6211\u4fbf\u5730\u7567\u6211\u7530\u91ce\u5229\u5176\u7ce7\u9053\u65af\u4e09\u8005\u6575\u4eba\u4e4b\u6240\u611b\u60dc\u501a\n \u6043\u8005\u4e5f \u201cThe three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on\n the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to\n capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated\n land; (3) to guard his own communications.\u201d Our object then must\n be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render\n him helpless. [Cf. III. \u00a7 3.] But this exegesis unduly strains the\n meaning of \u596a and \u611b, and I agree with Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao, who says that\n \u6240\u611b does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is any\n person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy.\n By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw\n the other side on the defensive.\n\n19. \u5175\u4e4b\u60c5\u4e3b\u901f\u4e58\u4eba\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ca\u7531\u4e0d\u865e\u4e4b\u9053\u653b\u5176\u6240\u4e0d\u6212\u4e5f\n\nRapidity is the essence of war:\n\n \u5175\u4e4b\u60c5 means \u201cthe conditions of war,\u201d not, as Capt. Calthrop says,\n \u201cthe spirit of the troops.\u201d According to Tu Mu, \u6b64\u7d71\u8a00\u5175\u4e4b\u60c5\u72c0\n \u201cthis is a summary of leading principles in warfare,\u201d and he adds:\n \u6b64\u4e43\u5175\u4e4b\u6df1\u60c5\u5c07\u4e4b\u81f3\u4e8b\u4e5f \u201cThese are the profoundest truths of military\n science, and the chief business of the general.\u201d The following\n anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed\n by two of China\u2019s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., \u5b5f\u9054 M\u00eang Ta,\n governor of \u65b0\u57ce Hsin-ch\u2018\u00eang under the Wei Emperor W\u00ean Ti, was\n meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into\n correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State.\n The Wei general Ss\u016d-ma I was then military governor of \u5b9b Wan, and\n getting wind of M\u00eang Ta\u2019s treachery, he at once set off with an\n army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a\n specious message of friendly import. Ss\u016d-ma\u2019s officers came to him\n and said: \u201cIf M\u00eang Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the\n matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move.\u201d\n Ss\u016d-ma I replied: \u201cM\u00eang Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to\n go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before\n he has thrown off the mask.\u201d Then, by a series of forced marches,\n he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch\u2018\u00eang within the\n space of eight days. Now M\u00eang Ta had previously said in a letter\n to Chu-ko Liang: \u201cWan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of\n my revolt reaches Ss\u016d-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial\n Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be\n taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides,\n Ss\u016d-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will\n be sent against us are not worth troubling about.\u201d The next\n letter, however, was filled with consternation: \u201cThough only eight\n days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is\n already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!\u201d A\n fortnight later, Hsin-ch\u2018\u00eang had fallen and M\u00eang Ta had lost his\n head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was\n sent from \u5914\u5dde K\u2018uei-chou in Ss\u016d-ch\u2018uan to reduce the successful\n rebel \u856d\u9291 Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern\n \u8346\u5dde Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being\n then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would\n venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no\n preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time,\n and was just about to start when the other generals implored him\n to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous\n state for navigation. Li Ching replied: \u201cTo the soldier,\n overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never\n miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien\n even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the\n present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before\n his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is\n heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [_See_\n VII, \u00a7 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he\n gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in\n such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full\n fruits of victory will be ours.\u201d All came about as he predicted,\n and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that\n his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of\n death. [See _Hsin T\u2018ang Shu_, ch. 93, f. 1 _v_^o.]\n\ntake advantage of the enemy\u2019s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected\nroutes, and attack unguarded spots.\n\n20. \u51e1\u7232\u5ba2\u4e4b\u9053\u6df1\u5165\u5247\u5c08\u4e3b\u4eba\u4e0d\u514b\n\nThe following are the principles to be observed by an invading force:\nThe further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the\nsolidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail\nagainst you.\n\n21. \u63a0\u65bc\u9952\u91ce\u4e09\u8ecd\u8db3\u98df\n\nMake forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.\n\n Cf. _supra_, \u00a7 13. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan does not venture on a note here.\n\n22. \u8b39\u990a\u800c\u52ff\u52de\u4f75\u6c23\u7a4d\u529b\u904b\u5175\u8a08\u8b00\u7232\u4e0d\u53ef\u6e2c\n\nCarefully study the well-being of your men,\n\n \u8b39\u990a, according to Wang Hsi, means: \u64ab\u5faa\u98ee\u98df\u5468\u8b39\u4e4b \u201cPet them, humour\n them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them\n generally.\u201d\n\nand do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your\nstrength.\n\n Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: \u6c23\u5168\u529b\u76db\u4e00\u767c\u53d6\u52dd;\n and Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the\n famous general \u738b\u7fe6 Wang Chien, whose military genius largely\n contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded\n the Ch\u2018u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him.\n But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all\n invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In\n vain did the Ch\u2018u general try to force a battle: day after day\n Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but\n devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and\n confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well fed,\n sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing,\n and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them\n into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed,\n he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing\n themselves. The answer was, that they were contending with one\n another in putting the weight and long-jumping (\u6295\u77f3\u8d85\u8ddd). When\n Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic\n pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the\n required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this\n time the Ch\u2018u army, after repeating their challenge again and\n again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch\u2018in general\n immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the\n battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly\n afterwards, the whole of Ch\u2018u was conquered by Ch\u2018in, and the king\n \u8ca0\u82bb Fu-ch\u2018u led into captivity. [See _Shih Chi_, ch. 73, f. 5 _r_^o.\n It should be noted that, \u695a being a taboo character under the Ch\u2018in\n dynasty, the name figures as \u8346 throughout.]\n\nKeep your army continually on the move,\n\n In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It\n has struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not \u904b\u5175,\n but \u9023\u5175 \u201clink your army together\u201d [cf. _supra_ \u00a7 46, \u543e\u5c07\u4f7f\u4e4b\u5c6c],\n which would be more in keeping with \u4f75\u6c23\u7a4d\u529b. Capt. Calthrop cuts\n the Gordian knot by omitting the words altogether.\n\nand devise unfathomable plans.\n\n Ch\u2018ang Y\u00fc\u2019s paraphrase is: \u5e38\u7232\u4e0d\u53ef\u6e2c\u5ea6\u4e4b\u8a08.\n\n23. \u6295\u4e4b\u7121\u6240\u5f80\u6b7b\u4e14\u4e0d\u5317\u6b7b\u7109\u4e0d\u5f97\u58eb\u4eba\u76e1\u529b\n\nThrow your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they\nwill prefer death to flight.\n\n Cf. Nicias\u2019 speech to the Athenians: \u03a4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5 \u03be\u03cd\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b5, \u1f66 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2\n \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u1f42\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f74\n \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f45\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5, etc. [Thuc.\n VII. 77. vii.]\n\nIf they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.\n\n \u6b7b by itself constitutes the protasis, and \u7109 is the interrogative\n = \u5b89. Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with \u5f97: \u201cIf there be\n no alternative but death.\u201d But I do not see how this is to be got\n out of the Chinese. Chang Y\u00fc gives a clear paraphrase: \u58eb\u5352\u6b7b\u6230\u5b89\u4e0d\u5f97\u5fd7,\n and quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tz\u016d (ch. 3): \u4e00\u592b\u4ed7\u5294\u64ca\u65bc\u5e02\u842c\u4eba\u7121\u4e0d\u907f\u4e4b\u8005\n \u81e3\u8b02\u975e\u4e00\u4eba\u4e4b\u7368\u52c7\u842c\u4eba\u7686\u4e0d\u8096\u4e5f\u4f55\u5247\u5fc5\u6b7b\u8207\u5fc5\u751f\u56fa\u4e0d\u4f94\u4e5f \u201cIf one man were to run\n amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to\n get out of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had\n courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth\n is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do\n not meet on even terms.\u201d\n\nOfficers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.\n\n \u58eb\u4eba appears to stand for the more usual \u58eb\u5352. Chang Y\u00fc says: \u540c\u5728\n \u96e3\u5730\u5b89\u5f97\u4e0d\u5171\u7aed\u5176\u529b \u201cIf they are in an awkward place together, they\n will surely exert their united strength to get out of it.\u201d\n\n24. \u5175\u58eb\u751a\u9677\u5247\u4e0d\u61fc\u7121\u6240\u5f80\u5247\u56fa\u6df1\u5165\u5247\u62d8\u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2\u5247\u9b25\n\nSoldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is\nno place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of\na hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.\n\n Capt. Calthrop weakly says: \u201cthere is unity,\u201d as though the text\n were \u5247\u5c08, as in \u00a7 20. But \u62d8 introduces quite a new idea\u2014that of\n _tenacity_\u2014which Ts\u2018ao Kung tries to explain by the word \u7e1b \u201cto\n bind fast.\u201d\n\nIf there is no help for it, they will fight hard.\n\n25. \u662f\u6545\u5176\u5175\u4e0d\u4fee\u800c\u6212\u4e0d\u6c42\u800c\u5f97\u4e0d\u7d04\u800c\u89aa\u4e0d\u4ee4\u800c\u4fe1\n\nThus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be\nconstantly on the _qui vive_;\n\n Tu Mu says: \u4e0d\u5f85\u4fee\u6574\u800c\u81ea\u6212\u61fc. Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates \u4e0d\u4fee\n \u201cwithout warnings.\u201d\n\nwithout waiting to be asked, they will do your will;\n\n Literally, \u201cwithout asking, you will get.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc\u2019s paraphrase\n is: \u4e0d\u6c42\u7d22\u800c\u5f97\u60c5\u610f.\n\nwithout restrictions, they will be faithful;\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u4e0d\u7d04\u675f\u800c\u89aa\u4e0a.\n\nwithout giving orders, they can be trusted.\n\n This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding,\n except that \u89aa indicates the soldiers\u2019 attachment to their leader,\n and \u4fe1 the leader\u2019s attitude towards them. I rather doubt if\n \u4fe1 can mean \u201cthey will have confidence in their leader,\u201d as the\n commentary seems to indicate. That way, the sense is not nearly\n so good. On the other hand, it is just possible that here, as in\n VIII. \u00a7 8 and _infra_, \u00a7 55, \u4fe1 may = \u7533: \u201cwithout orders, they\n will carry out [their leader\u2019s plans].\u201d The whole of this\n paragraph, of course, has reference to \u201cdesperate ground.\u201d\n\n26. \u7981\u7965\u53bb\u7591\u81f3\u6b7b\u7121\u6240\u707d\n\nProhibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts.\n\n \u7965 is amplified by Ts\u2018ao Kung into \u5996\u7965\u4e4b\u8a00, and \u7591 into \u7591\u60d1\u4e4b\u8a08.\n Cf. the _Ss\u016d-ma Fa_, ch. 3: \u6ec5\u53b2\u7965.\n\nThen, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.\n\n The superstitious, \u201cbound in to saucy doubts and fears,\u201d\n degenerate into cowards and \u201cdie many times before their deaths.\u201d\n Tu Mu quotes Huang-shih Kung: \u7981\u5deb\u795d\u4e0d\u5f97\u7232\u540f\u58eb\u535c\u554f\u8ecd\u4e4b\u5409\u51f6\u6050\u4e82\u8ecd\u58eb\u4e4b\u5fc3\n \u201c\u2018Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no\n officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an\n army, for fear the soldier\u2019s minds should be seriously perturbed.\u2019\n The meaning is,\u201d he continues, \u201cthat if all doubts and scruples\n are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution\n until they die.\u201d The reading of the standard text is \u7121\u6240\u4e4b \u201cthere\n will be no refuge,\u201d which does not fit in well here. I therefore\n prefer to adopt the variant \u707d, which evidently stood in Li\n Ch\u2018\u00fcan\u2019s text.\n\n27. \u543e\u58eb\u7121\u9918\u8ca1\u975e\u60e1\u8ca8\u4e5f\u7121\u9918\u547d\u975e\u60e1\u58fd\u4e5f\n\nIf our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because\nthey have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long,\nit is not because they are disinclined to longevity.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc has the best note on this passage: \u8ca8\u8207\u58fd\u4eba\u4e4b\u6240\u611b\u4e5f\u6240\u4ee5\u71d2\u64f2\n \u8ca1\u5bf3\u5272\u68c4\u6027\u547d\u8005\u975e\u618e\u60e1\u4e4b\u4e5f\u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2\u4e5f \u201cWealth and long life are things for\n which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or\n fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not\n that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice.\u201d Sun\n Tz\u016d is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is\n for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow\n rich are not thrown in their way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking \u60e1 for\n the adjective, has: \u201cnot because money is a bad thing ... not\n because long life is evil.\u201d\n\n28. \u4ee4\u767c\u4e4b\u65e5\u58eb\u5352\u5750\u8005\u6d95\u9711\u895f\u5043\u81e5\u8005\u6d95\u4ea4\u9824\u6295\u4e4b\u7121\u6240\u5f80\u8005\u8af8\u528c\u4e4b\u52c7\u4e5f\n\nOn the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,\n\n The word in the Chinese is \u6d95 \u201csnivel.\u201d This is taken to indicate\n more genuine grief than tears alone.\n\nthose sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting\nthe tears run down their cheeks.\n\n Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts\u2018ao Kung says,\n \u7686\u6301\u5fc5\u6b7b\u4e4b\u8a08 \u201call have embraced the firm resolution to do or\n die.\u201d We may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally\n childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Y\u00fc alludes to the\n mournful parting at the \u6613 I River between \u8346\u8efb Ching K\u2018o and his\n friends, when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King\n of Ch\u2018in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all\n flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the\n following lines: \u98a8\u856d\u856d\u516e\uff0c\u6613\u6c34\u5bd2\uff0c\u58ef\u58eb\u4e00\u53bb\u516e\uff0c\u4e0d\u5fa9\u9084 \u201cThe shrill blast\n is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going\u2014Not to\n return.\u201d[179]\n\nBut let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage\nof a Chu or a Kuei.\n\n \u8af8 was the personal name of \u5c08\u8af8 Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu\n State and contemporary with Sun Tz\u016d himself, who was employed by\n \u516c\u5b50\u5149 Kung-tz\u016d Kuang, better known as Ho L\u00fc Wang, to assassinate\n his sovereign \u738b\u50da Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in\n the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his\n attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king\u2019s\n bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, \u66f9\u528c\n Ts\u2018ao Kuei (or Ts\u2018ao \u6cab Mo), performed the exploit which has made\n his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been\n thrice defeated by Ch\u2018i, and was just about to conclude a treaty\n surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts\u2018ao Kuei suddenly\n seized \u6853\u516c Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch\u2018i, as he stood on the altar\n steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the Duke\u2019s\n retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts\u2018ao Kuei proceeded to\n demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was being unjustly\n treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan Kung, in\n peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts\u2018ao Kuei\n flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the\n terrified assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As\n was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the\n bargain, but his wise old counsellor \u7ba1\u4ef2 Kuan Chung pointed out\n to him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that\n this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost\n in three pitched battles. [For another anecdote of Ts\u2018ao Kuei see\n VII. \u00a7 27, note; and for the biographies of these three bravos,\n Ts\u2018ao, Chuan and Ching, see _Shih Chi_, ch. 86.]\n\n29. \u6545\u5584\u7528\u5175\u8b6c\u5982\u7387\u7136\u7387\u7136\u8005\u5e38\u5c71\u4e4b\u8675\u4e5f\u64ca\u5176\u9996\u5247\u5c3e\u81f3\u64ca\u5176\u5c3e\u5247\u9996\u81f3\u64ca\u5176\u4e2d\u5247\u9996\u5c3e\u4ff1\u81f3\n\nThe skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the\n_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch\u2018ang mountains.\n\n \u7387\u7136 means \u201csuddenly\u201d or \u201crapidly,\u201d and the snake in question\n was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements.\n Through this passage, the term has now come to be used in the\n sense of \u201cmilitary man\u0153uvres.\u201d The \u5e38\u5c71 have apparently not been\n identified.\n\nStrike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at\nits tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle,\n\n Another reading in the _Y\u00fc Lan_ for \u4e2d is \u8179 \u201cbelly.\u201d\n\nand you will be attacked by head and tail both.\n\n30. \u6562\u554f\u5175\u53ef\u4f7f\u5982\u7387\u7136\u4e4e\u66f0\u53ef\u592b\u5433\u4eba\u8207\u8d8a\u4eba\u76f8\u60e1\u4e5f\u7576\u5176\u540c\u821f\u800c\u6fdf\u9047\u98a8\u5176\u76f8\u6551\u4e5f\u5982\u5de6\u53f3\u624b\n\nAsked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_,\n\n That is, as Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says, \u53ef\u4f7f\u5175\u9996\u5c3e\u7387\u7136\u76f8\u61c9\u5982\u4e00\u9ad4\u4e4e \u201cIs it\n possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly\n responsive to attack on the other, just as though they were parts\n of a single living body?\u201d\n\nI should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Y\u00fceh are enemies;\n\n Cf. VI. \u00a7 21.\n\nyet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a\nstorm, they will come to each other\u2019s assistance just as the left hand\nhelps the right.\n\n The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time\n of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same\n army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and\n fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been\n ruined through lack of co-operation, especially in the case of\n allied armies.\n\n31. \u662f\u6545\u65b9\u99ac\u57cb\u8f2a\u672a\u8db3\u6043\u4e5f\n\nHence it is not enough to put one\u2019s trust in the tethering of horses,\n\n \u65b9 is said here to be equivalent to \u7e1b.\n\nand the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.\n\n These quaint devices to prevent one\u2019s army from running away\n recall the Athenian hero S\u00f4phanes, who carried an anchor with him\n at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself\n firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough,\n says Sun Tz\u016d, to render flight impossible by such mechanical\n means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and\n unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic\n co-operation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the\n _shuai-jan_.\n\n32. \u9f4a\u52c7\u82e5\u4e00\u653f\u4e4b\u9053\u4e5f\n\nThe principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of\ncourage which all must reach.\n\n Literally, \u201clevel the courage [of all] as though [it were that of]\n one.\u201d If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it\n follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts\n must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a\n certain standard. Wellington\u2019s seemingly ungrateful description of\n his army at Waterloo as \u201cthe worst he had ever commanded\u201d meant no\n more than that it was deficient in this important particular\u2014unity\n of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections\n and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost\n certainly have lost the day.\n\n33. \u525b\u67d4\u7686\u5f97\u5730\u4e4b\u7406\u4e5f\n\nHow to make the best of both strong and weak\u2014that is a question\ninvolving the proper use of ground.\n\n This is rather a hard sentence on the first reading, but the key\n to it will be found, firstly, in the pause after \u5f97, and next, in\n the meaning of \u5f97 itself. The best equivalent for this that I\n can think of is the German \u201czur Geltung kommen.\u201d Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s\n paraphrase is: \u5175\u7121\u5f3a\u5f31\u7686\u5f97\u7528\u8005\u662f\u56e0\u5730\u4e4b\u52e2\u4e5f \u201cThe way to eliminate the\n differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to\n utilise accidental features of the ground.\u201d Less reliable troops,\n if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better\n troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position\n neutralises the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson\n says: \u201cWith all respect to the text books, and to ordinary\n tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground\n is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance\n is attached to the selection of positions ... and to the immense\n advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or\n attacking, from the proper utilisation of natural features.\u201d[180]\n\n34. \u6545\u5584\u7528\u5175\u8005\u651c\u624b\u82e5\u4f7f\u4e00\u4eba\u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2\u4e5f\n\nThus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were\nleading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.\n\n Tu Mu says: \u55a9\u6613\u4e5f \u201cThe simile has reference to the ease with which\n he does it.\u201d \u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2 means that he makes it impossible for his\n troops to do otherwise than obey. Chang Y\u00fc quotes a jingle, to be\n found in Wu Tz\u016d, ch. 4: \u5c07\u4e4b\u6240\u63ee\uff0c\u83ab\u4e0d\u5f9e\u79fb\uff0c\u5c07\u4e4b\u6240\u6307\uff0c\u83ab\u4e0d\u524d\u6b7b.\n\n35. \u5c07\u8ecd\u4e4b\u4e8b\u975c\u4ee5\u5e7d\u6b63\u4ee5\u6cbb\n\nIt is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy;\nupright and just, and thus maintain order.\n\n \u975c seems to combine the meanings \u201cnoiseless\u201d and \u201cimperturbable,\u201d\n both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy. Tu Mu\n explains \u5e7d as \u5e7d\u6df1\u96e3\u6e2c \u201cdeep and inscrutable,\u201d and \u6b63 as \u5e73\u6b63\u7121\u504f\n \u201cfair and unbiassed.\u201d Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean alone among the commentators\n takes \u6cbb in the sense of \u81ea\u6cbb \u201cself-controlled.\u201d \u5e7d and \u6cbb are\n causally connected with \u975c and \u6b63 respectively. This is not brought\n out at all in Capt. Calthrop\u2019s rendering: \u201cThe general should be\n calm, inscrutable, just and prudent.\u201d The last adjective,\n moreover, can in no sense be said to represent \u6cbb.\n\n36. \u80fd\u611a\u58eb\u5352\u4e4b\u8033\u76ee\u4f7f\u4e4b\u7121\u77e5\n\nHe must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and\nappearances,\n\n Literally, \u201cto deceive their eyes and ears\u201d\u2014\u611a being here used as\n a verb in the sense of \u8aa4.\n\nand thus keep them in total ignorance.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: \u6c11\u53ef\u8207\u6a02\u6210\n \u4e0d\u53ef\u8207\u616e\u59cb \u201cThe troops must not be allowed to share your schemes\n in the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy\n outcome.\u201d \u201cTo mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,\u201d is one of\n the first principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out.\n But how about the other process\u2014the mystification of one\u2019s own\n men? Those who may think that Sun Tz\u016d is over-emphatic on this\n point would do well to read Col. Henderson\u2019s remarks on Stonewall\n Jackson\u2019s Valley campaign: \u201cThe infinite pains,\u201d he says, \u201cwith\n which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff\n officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a\n commander less thorough would have pronounced useless\u201d\u2014etc.\n etc.[181] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou\n Han Shu_, \u201cPan Ch\u2018ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan\n and other Central Asian states with the object of crushing\n Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief\n commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the\n kingdoms of W\u00ean-su, Ku-mo and Wei-t\u2018ou, totalling 50,000 men. Pan\n Ch\u2018ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a\n council of war, and said: \u2018Our forces are now outnumbered and\n unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for\n us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The\n King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will\n then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening\n drum has sounded and then start.\u2019 Pan Ch\u2018ao now secretly released\n the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was\n thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter\n set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch\u2018ao\u2019s\n retreat in the west, while the King of W\u00ean-su rode eastwards with\n 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as\n Pan Ch\u2018ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his\n divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow\n hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The\n barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and were closely\n pursued by Pan Ch\u2018ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as\n trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle\n and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating,\n Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces.\n From that time forward, Pan Ch\u2018ao\u2019s prestige completely overawed\n the countries of the west.\u201d In this case, we see that the Chinese\n general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real\n plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in\n order to deceive the enemy.\n\n37. \u6613\u5176\u4e8b\u9769\u5176\u8b00\u4f7f\u4eba\u7121\u8b58\u6613\u5176\u5c45\u8fc2\u5176\u9014\u4f7f\u4eba\u4e0d\u5f97\u616e\n\nBy altering his arrangements and changing his plans,\n\n Wang Hsi thinks that this means, not using the same stratagem\n twice. He says: \u5df2\u884c\u4e4b\u4e8b\u5df2\u65bd\u4e4b\u8b00\u7576\u9769\u6613\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u518d\u4e4b.\n\nhe keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.\n\n Note that \u4eba denotes the _enemy_, as opposed to the \u58eb\u5352 of \u00a7 36.\n Capt. Calthrop, not perceiving this, joins the two paragraphs into\n one. Chang Y\u00fc quotes \u592a\u767d\u5c71\u4eba as saying: \u5175\u8cb4\u8a6d\u9053\u8005\u975e\u6b62\u8a6d\u6575\u4e5f\u6291\u8a6d\u6211\n \u58eb\u5352\u4f7f\u7531\u800c\u4e0d\u4f7f\u77e5\u4e4b\u4e5f \u201cThe axiom, that war is based on deception,\n does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must deceive\n even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting\n them know why.\u201d\n\nBy shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the\nenemy from anticipating his purpose.\n\n Wang Hsi paraphrases \u6613\u5176\u5c45 as \u8655\u6613\u8005 \u201ccamp on easy ground,\u201d and\n Chang Y\u00fc follows him, saying: \u5176\u5c45\u5247\u53bb\u96aa\u800c\u5c31\u6613. But this is an\n utterly untenable view. For \u8fc2\u5176\u9014, cf. VII. 4. Chia Lin, retaining\n his old interpretation of those words, is now obliged to explain\n \u6613\u5176\u5c45 as \u201ccause the enemy to shift his camp,\u201d which is awkward in\n the extreme.\n\n38. \u5e25\u8207\u4e4b\u671f\u5982\u767b\u9ad8\u800c\u53bb\u5176\u68af\u5e25\u8207\u4e4b\u6df1\u5165\u8af8\u4faf\u4e4b\u5730\u800c\u767c\u5176\u6a5f\n\nAt the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has\nclimbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him.\n\n I must candidly confess that I do not understand the syntax of\n \u5e25\u8207\u4e4b\u671f, though the meaning is fairly plain. The difficulty has\n evidently been felt, for Tu Mu tells us that one text omits \u671f\u5982.\n It is more likely, however, that a couple of characters have\n dropped out.\n\nHe carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.\n\n \u767c\u5176\u6a5f, literally, \u201creleases the spring\u201d (see V. \u00a7 15), that is,\n takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to\n return\u2014like \u9805\u7fbd Hsiang Y\u00fc, who sunk his ships after crossing a\n river. Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less\n well as \u767c\u5176\u5fc3\u6a5f \u201cputs forth every artifice at his command.\u201d But \u6a5f\n in this derived sense occurs nowhere else in Sun Tz\u016d.\n\n39. \u711a\u821f\u7834\u91dc\u82e5\u9a45\u7fa3\u7f8a\u800c\u5f80\u9a45\u800c\u4f86\u83ab\u77e5\u6240\u4e4b\n\nHe burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;\n\n Omitted in the _T\u2018u Shu_.\n\nlike a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way\nand that, and none knows whither he is going.\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ inserts another \u9a45 after \u7f8a. Tu Mu says: \u4e09\u8ecd\u4f46\u77e5\u9032\n \u9000\u4e4b\u547d\u4e0d\u77e5\u653b\u53d6\u4e4b\u7aef\u4e5f \u201cThe army is only cognisant of orders to\n advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of\n attacking and conquering.\u201d\n\n40. \u805a\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u8846\u6295\u4e4b\u65bc\u96aa\u6b64\u8b02\u5c07\u8ecd\u4e4b\u4e8b\u4e5f\n\nTo muster his host and bring it into danger:\u2014this may be termed the\nbusiness of the general.\n\n Sun Tz\u016d means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in\n aiming a blow at the enemy\u2019s heart. With \u6295\u4e4b\u65bc\u96aa cf. _supra_,\n \u00a7 23: \u6295\u4e4b\u7121\u6240\u5f80. Note how he returns again and again to this point.\n Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt\n a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies\n of to-day.\n\n41. \u4e5d\u5730\u4e4b\u8b8a\u5c48\u4f38\u4e4b\u5229\u4eba\u60c5\u4e4b\u7406\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u5bdf\u4e5f\n\nThe different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says: \u4e5d\u5730\u4e4b\u6cd5\u4e0d\u53ef\u62d8\u6ce5 \u201cOne must not be hide-bound in\n interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground.\n\nthe expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;\n\n The use of \u5c48\u4f38 \u201ccontraction and expansion\u201d may be illustrated by\n the saying \u5c48\u4ee5\u6c42\u4f38, which almost exactly corresponds to the French\n \u201cil faut reculer pour mieux sauter.\u201d[182] Capt. Calthrop, _more\n suo_, avoids a real translation and has: \u201cthe suiting of the means\n to the occasion.\u201d\n\nand the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must\nmost certainly be studied.\n\n42. \u51e1\u7232\u5ba2\u4e4b\u9053\u6df1\u5247\u5c08\u6dfa\u5247\u6563\n\nWhen invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that\npenetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means\ndispersion.\n\n Cf. _supra_, \u00a7 20.\n\n43. \u53bb\u570b\u8d8a\u5883\u800c\u5e2b\u8005\u7d76\u5730\u4e5f\u56db\u9054\u8005\u8862\u5730\u4e5f\n\nWhen you leave your own country behind, and take your army across\nneighbouring territory,\n\n Chang Y\u00fc\u2019s paraphrase is \u800c\u7528\u5e2b\u8005.\n\nyou find yourself on critical ground.\n\n This \u201cground\u201d is cursorily mentioned in VIII. \u00a7 2, but it does not\n figure among the Nine \u5730 of this chapter or the Six \u5730\u5f62 in chap.\n X. One\u2019s first impulse would be to translate it \u201cdistant ground\u201d\n (\u7d76\u57df is commonly used in the sense of \u201cdistant lands\u201d), but this,\n if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant\n here. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says it is \u9032\u4e0d\u53ca\u8f15\u9000\u4e0d\u53ca\u6563\u5728\u4e8c\u5730\u4e4b\u9593\u4e5f \u201ca position\n not far enough advanced to be called \u2018facile,\u2019 and not near enough\n to home to be called \u2018dispersive,\u2019 but something between the two.\u201d\n That, of course, does not explain the name \u7d76, which seems to imply\n that the general has severed his communications and temporarily\n cut himself off from his base. Thus, Wang Hsi says: \u201cIt is ground\n separated from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we\n have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence it is incumbent\n on us to settle our business there quickly.\u201d He adds that this\n position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not\n included among the \u4e5d\u5730. Capt. Calthrop gives but a poor rendering\n of this sentence: \u201cTo leave home and cross the borders is to be\n free from interference.\u201d\n\nWhen there are means of communication\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ reads \u901a for \u9054.\n\non all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.\n\n From \u56db\u9054 down to the end of \u00a7 45, we have some of the definitions\n of the early part of the chapter repeated in slightly different\n language. Capt. Calthrop omits these altogether.\n\n44. \u5165\u6df1\u8005\u91cd\u5730\u4e5f\u5165\u6dfa\u8005\u8f15\u5730\u4e5f\n\nWhen you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When\nyou penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.\n\n45. \u80cc\u56fa\u524d\u9698\u8005\u570d\u5730\u4e5f\u7121\u6240\u5f80\u8005\u6b7b\u5730\u4e5f\n\nWhen you have the enemy\u2019s strongholds on your rear,\n\n \u56fa = \u96aa\u56fa.\n\nand narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no\nplace of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.\n\n46. \u662f\u6545\u6563\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u4e00\u5176\u5fd7\u8f15\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u4f7f\u4e4b\u5c6c\n\nTherefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of\npurpose.\n\n This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the\n defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, \u00a7 11.\n\nOn facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between\nall parts of my army.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ has \u5176 instead of \u4e4b. The present reading is\n supported by the \u907a\u8aaa of Ch\u00eang Yu-hsien. As Tu Mu says, the object\n is to guard against two possible contingencies: \u4e00\u8005\u5099\u5176\u9003\u9038\u4e8c\u8005\u6050\n \u5176\u6575\u81f3 \u201c(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack\n on the part of the enemy.\u201d Cf. VII. \u00a7 17: \u5176\u5f90\u5982\u6797. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\n says: \u884c\u5247\u968a\u6821\u76f8\u7e7c\u6b62\u5247\u71df\u58d8\u806f\u5c6c \u201cOn the march, the regiments should be\n in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity\n between the fortifications.\u201d He seems to have forgotten, by the\n way, what Sun Tz\u016d says above: \u8f15\u5730\u5247\u7121\u6b62.\n\n47. \u722d\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u8da8\u5176\u5f8c\n\nOn contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.\n\n This is Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s interpretation. Chang Y\u00fc adopts it, saying:\n \u7576\u75be\u9032\u5176\u5f8c\u4f7f\u9996\u5c3e\u4ff1\u81f3 \u201cWe must quickly bring up our rear, so that\n head and tail may both reach the goal.\u201d That is, they must not be\n allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean offers\n another equally plausible explanation: \u6575\u672a\u81f3\u5176\u5730\u6211\u82e5\u5728\u5f8c\u5247\u7576\u75be\u8da8\u4ee5\u722d\u4e4b\n \u201cSupposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and\n we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to\n dispute its possession.\u201d \u5176 would thus denote the enemy, \u5f8c being\n the preposition, and \u8da8 would retain its usual intransitive sense.\n Cf. VII. \u00a7 4: \u5f8c\u4eba\u767c\u5148\u4eba\u81f3. Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao, on the other hand, assuming\n that the enemy has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. \u00a7 1,\n where Sun Tz\u016d warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His\n own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: \u82e5\u5730\u5229\u5728\u524d\u5148\n \u5206\u7cbe\u92b3\u4ee5\u64da\u4e4b\u5f7c\u82e5\u6043\u8846\u4f86\u722d\u6211\u4ee5\u5927\u8846\u8da8\u5176\u5f8c\u7121\u4e0d\u5c05\u8005 \u201cIf there is a favourable\n position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to\n occupy it; then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to\n make a fight for it, _you may fall quickly on their rear_ with your\n main body, and victory will be assured.\u201d It was thus, he adds,\n that Chao Sh\u00ea beat the army of Ch\u2018in. [See p. 57.] Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan would\n read \u591a for \u8da8, it is not easy to see why.\n\n48. \u4ea4\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u8b39\u5176\u5b88\u8862\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u56fa\u5176\u7d50\n\nOn open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences.\n\n As Wang Hsi says, \u61fc\u8972\u6211\u4e5f \u201cfearing a surprise attack.\u201d The\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads here \u56fa\u5176\u7d50 (see next sentence).\n\nOn ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.\n\n The _T\u2018ung Tien_ reads \u8b39\u5176\u5e02, which Tu Yu explains as \u201cwatching\n the market towns,\u201d \u8b8a\u4e8b\u4e4b\u7aef \u201cthe hotbeds of revolution.\u201d Capt.\n Calthrop translates \u56fa\u5176\u7d50 by the same words as \u5408\u4ea4 in \u00a7 12:\n \u201ccultivate intercourse.\u201d\n\n49. \u91cd\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u7e7c\u5176\u98df\u572e\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u9032\u5176\u5857\n\nOn serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of\nsupplies.\n\n The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder,\n not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home\n base. One text, indeed, gives the reading \u63a0\u5176\u98df. Cf. \u00a7 13. Capt.\n Calthrop\u2019s \u201cbe careful of supplies\u201d fails to render the force of \u7e7c.\n\nOn difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.\n\n Capt. Calthrop\u2019s \u201cdo not linger\u201d cannot be called a translation,\n but only a paraphrase of the paraphrase offered by Ts\u2018ao Kung:\n \u75be\u904e\u53bb\u4e5f \u201cPass away from it in all haste.\u201d\n\n50. \u570d\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u585e\u5176\u95d5\u6b7b\u5730\u543e\u5c07\u793a\u4e4b\u4ee5\u4e0d\u6d3b\n\nOn hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.\n\n \u610f\u6b32\u7a81\u570d\u793a\u4ee5\u5b88\u56fa \u201cTo make it seem that I mean to defend the\n position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through\n the enemy\u2019s lines\u201d [M\u00eang Shih]; \u4f7f\u58eb\u5352\u5fc5\u6b7b\u6230\u4e5f \u201cin order to make my\n soldiers fight with desperation\u201d [Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean]; \u61fc\u4eba\u6709\u8d70\u5fc3\n \u201cfearing lest my men be tempted to run away\u201d [Wang Hsi]. Tu Mu\n points out that this is the converse of VII. \u00a7 36, where it is the\n enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., \u9ad8\u6b61 Kao Huan, afterwards\n Emperor and canonised as \u795e\u6b66 Sh\u00ean-wu, was surrounded by a great\n army under \u723e\u6731\u5146 \u00carh-chu Chao and others. His own force was\n comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something\n under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very\n closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan,\n instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all\n the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of\n oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men\n saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their\n spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they\n charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke\n and crumbled under their onslaught. [See Tu Mu\u2019s commentary, and\n \u5317\u9f4a\u66f8 ch. 1, fol. 6.]\n\nOn desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness\nof saving their lives.\n\n Tu Yu says: \u711a\u8f1c\u91cd\u68c4\u7ce7\u98df\u585e\u4e95\u5937\u7ac8\u793a\u4e4b\u7121\u6d3b\u5fc5\u6b8a\u6b7b\u6230\u4e5f \u201cBurn your baggage\n and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up\n the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your\n men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death.\u201d Mei\n Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says epigrammatically: \u5fc5\u6b7b\u53ef\u751f \u201cThe only chance of life\n lies in giving up all hope of it.\u201d This concludes what Sun Tz\u016d has\n to say about \u201cgrounds\u201d and the \u201cvariations\u201d corresponding to them.\n Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we\n cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion\n in which it is treated. Sun Tz\u016d begins abruptly in VIII. \u00a7 2 to\n enumerate \u201cvariations\u201d before touching on \u201cgrounds\u201d at all, but\n only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent\n list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of\n ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then\n chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan\n to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first\n is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next\n chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds _par\n excellence_, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us\n down to \u00a7 14. In \u00a7\u00a7 43\u201345, fresh definitions are provided for nos.\n 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth\n ground noticed in chap VIII; and finally, the nine variations\n are enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the\n exception of 5, 6 and 7, being different from those previously\n given. Though it is impossible to account for the present state\n of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s text, a few suggestive facts may be brought into\n prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal\n with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an\n abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine\n Grounds. Several these are defined twice over, besides which there\n are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The\n length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of\n any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any inferences from\n these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s work\n cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his\n hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective and probably out of\n place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added\n by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.\n\n51. \u6545\u5175\u4e4b\u60c5\u570d\u5247\u79a6\u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2\u5247\u9b25\u904e\u5247\u5f9e\n\nFor it is the soldier\u2019s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance\nwhen surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to\nobey promptly when he has fallen into danger.\n\n \u904e\u5247\u5f9e is rendered by Capt. Calthrop: \u201cto pursue the enemy if he\n retreat.\u201d But \u904e cannot mean \u201cto retreat.\u201d Its primary sense is\n to pass over, hence to go too far, to exceed or to err. Here,\n however, the word has lost all implication of censure, and appears\n to mean \u201cto pass the boundary line dividing safety from danger,\u201d\n or, as Chang Y\u00fc puts it, \u6df1\u9677\u4e8e\u5371\u96e3\u4e4b\u5730 \u201cto be deeply involved in a\n perilous position.\u201d The latter commentator alludes to the conduct\n of Pan Ch\u2018ao\u2019s devoted followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in\n the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, fol. 1 _v_^o: \u201cWhen Pan Ch\u2018ao arrived at\n \u912f\u5584 Shan-shan, \u5ee3 Kuang, the King of the country, received him at\n first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards\n his behaviour underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss\n and negligent. Pan Ch\u2018ao spoke about this to the officers of his\n suite: \u2018Have you not noticed,\u2019 he said, \u2018that Kuang\u2019s polite\n intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have\n come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in\n a state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his\n lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told,\n can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more,\n then, those that are already manifest!\u2019 Thereupon he called one of\n the natives who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap\n for him, saying: \u2018Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who\n arrived some days ago?\u2019 The man was so taken aback that between\n surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan\n Ch\u2018ao, keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then\n summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all,\n and began drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their\n heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by\n addressing them thus: \u2018Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an\n isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some\n great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the\n Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the\n result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our\n royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to\n seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu, our bones will\n become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?\u2019 With\n one accord, the officers replied: \u2018_Standing as we do in peril of\n our lives, we will follow our commander through life and death_\u2019\n (\u4eca\u5728\u5371\u4ea1\u4e4b\u5730\u6b7b\u751f\u5f9e\u53f8\u99ac).\u201d For the sequel of this adventure, see\n chap. XII. \u00a7 1, note.\n\n52. \u662f\u6545\u4e0d\u77e5\u8af8\u4faf\u4e4b\u8b00\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u9810\u4ea4\u4e0d\u77e5\u5c71\u6797\u96aa\u963b\u6cae\u6fa4\u4e4b\u5f62\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u884c\u8ecd\u4e0d\u7528\u9109\u5c0e\u8005\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u5730\u5229\n\nWe cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are\nacquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on\nthe march unless we are familiar with the face of the country\u2014its\nmountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and\nswamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account\nunless we make use of local guides.\n\n These three sentences are repeated from VII. \u00a7\u00a7 12\u201314\u2014in order\n to emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I\n prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an\n antecedent to the following words. With regard to local guides,\n Sun Tz\u016d might have added that there is always the risk of going\n wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding\n such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, ordered a\n guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there\n was an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent,\n unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to\n understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his\n proper route, he took the army in that direction, the mistake not\n being discovered until they had almost arrived.\n\n53. \u56db\u4e94\u8005\u4e0d\u77e5\u4e00\u975e\u9738\u738b\u4e4b\u5175\u4e5f\n\nTo be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles\n\n Referring, I think, to what is contained in \u00a7\u00a7 54, 55. Ts\u2018ao Kung,\n thinking perhaps of the \u4e94\u5229 in VIII. \u00a7 6, takes them to be \u4e5d\u5730\u4e4b\n \u5229\u5bb3 \u201cthe advantages and disadvantages attendant on the nine\n varieties of ground.\u201d The _T\u2018u Shu_ reads \u6b64\u4e94\u8005.\n\ndoes not befit a warlike prince.\n\n \u9738\u738b, \u201cone who rules by force,\u201d was a term specially used for those\n princes who established their hegemony over other feudal states.\n The famous \u4e94\u9738 of the 7th century B.C. were (1) \u9f4a\u6853\u516c Duke Huan\n of Ch\u2018i, (2) \u6649\u6587\u516c Duke W\u00ean of Chin, (3) \u5b8b\u8944\u516c Duke Hsiang of Sung,\n (4) \u695a\u838a\u738b Prince Chuang of Ch\u2018u, (5) \u79e6\u7a46\u516c Duke Mu of Ch\u2018in. Their\n reigns covered the period 685\u2013591 B.C.\n\n54. \u592b\u9738\u738b\u4e4b\u5175\u4f10\u5927\u570b\u5247\u5176\u8846\u4e0d\u5f97\u805a\u5a01\u52a0\u65bc\u6575\u5247\u5176\u4ea4\u4e0d\u5f97\u5408\n\nWhen a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows\nitself in preventing the concentration of the enemy\u2019s forces. He\noverawes his opponents,\n\n Here and in the next sentence, the _Y\u00fc Lan_ inserts \u5bb6 after \u6575.\n\nand their allies are prevented from joining against him.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are\n so much affected by the Chinese: \u201cIn attacking a powerful state,\n if you can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in\n strength; if you have a superiority in strength, you will overawe\n the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will\n be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the\n enemy\u2019s allies will be prevented from joining her.\u201d The following\n gives a stronger meaning to \u5a01\u52a0: \u82e5\u5927\u570b\u4e00\u6557\u5247\u5c0f\u570b\u96e2\u800c\u4e0d\u805a\u77e3 \u201cIf the\n great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to\n summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and\n refrain from massing their forces.\u201d Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao and Chang Y\u00fc take\n the sentence in quite another way. The former says: \u201cPowerful\n though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be\n unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on\n external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening\n confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the\n enemy, he will surely be defeated.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc puts his view thus:\n \u201cIf we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be\n discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our\n display of military force is inferior by half to that of the\n enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join\n us.\u201d According to this interpretation, \u5176 would refer, not to the\n \u5927\u570b, but to the \u9738\u738b himself.\n\n55. \u662f\u6545\u4e0d\u722d\u5929\u4e0b\u4e4b\u4ea4\u4e0d\u990a\u5929\u4e0b\u4e4b\u6b0a\u4fe1\u5df1\u4e4b\u79c1\u5a01\u52a0\u65bc\u6575\u6545\u5176\u57ce\u53ef\u62d4\u5176\u570b\u53ef\u96b3\n\nHence he does not strive\n\n For \u722d the _Y\u00fc Lan_ reads \u4e8b.\n\nto ally himself with all and sundry,\n\n \u5929\u4e0b, as in \u00a7 6, stands for \u8af8\u4faf \u201cthe feudal princes,\u201d or the\n states ruled by them.\n\nnor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own\nsecret designs,\n\n For \u4fe1 (read _sh\u00ean_^1) in the meaning of \u4f38, cf. VIII. \u00a7 8. The\n commentators are unanimous on this point, and we must therefore\n beware of translating \u4fe1\u5df1\u4e4b\u79c1 by \u201csecretly self-confident\u201d or the\n like. Capt. Calthrop (omitting \u4e4b\u79c1) has: \u201che has confidence in\n himself.\u201d\n\nkeeping his antagonists in awe.\n\n The train of thought appears to be this: Secure against a\n combination of his enemies. \u80fd\u7d76\u5929\u4e0b\u4e4b\u4ea4\u60df\u5f97\u4f38\u5df1\u4e4b\u79c1\u5fd7\u5a01\u800c\u7121\u5916\u4ea4\u8005 \u201che\n can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his\n own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense with\n external friendships.\u201d (Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan.)\n\nThus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.\n\n This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch\u2018in State\n became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by\n which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her\n final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Y\u00fc, following up his\n previous note, thinks that Sun Tz\u016d is condemning this attitude of\n cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation. He again refers \u5176\n to the warlike prince, thus making it appear that in the end he is\n bound to succumb.\n\n56. \u65bd\u7121\u6cd5\u4e4b\u8cde\u61f8\u7121\u653f\u4e4b\u4ee4\u72af\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u8846\u82e5\u4f7f\u4e00\u4eba\n\nBestow rewards without regard to rule,\n\n Wu Tz\u016d (ch. 3) less wisely says: \u9032\u6709\u91cd\u8cde\u9000\u6709\u91cd\u5211 \u201cLet advance be\n richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished.\u201d\n\nissue orders\n\n \u61f8, literally, \u201chang\u201d or \u201cpost up.\u201d\n\nwithout regard to previous arrangements;\n\n \u675c\u59e6\u5aae \u201cIn order to prevent treachery,\u201d says Wang Hsi. The general\n meaning is made clear by Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s quotation from the _Ss\u016d-ma\n Fa:_ \u898b\u6575\u4f5c\u8a93\u77bb\u529f\u4f5c\u8cde \u201cGive instructions only on sighting the enemy;\n give rewards only when you see deserving deeds.\u201d \u7121\u653f, however,\n presents some difficulty. Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s paraphrase, \u8ecd\u6cd5\u4ee4\u4e0d\u61c9\u9810\u65bd\u61f8\u4e5f,\n I take to mean: \u201cThe final instructions you give to your army\n should not correspond with those that have been previously posted\n up.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc simplifies this into \u653f\u4e0d\u9810\u544a \u201cyour arrangements\n should not be divulged beforehand.\u201d And Chia Lin says: \u4e0d\u5b88\u5e38\u6cd5\u5e38\u653f\n \u201cthere should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements.\u201d Not\n only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often\n necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment.\n\nand you will be able to handle a whole army\n\n \u72af, according to Ts\u2018ao Kung, is here equal to \u7528. The exact meaning\n is brought out more clearly in the next paragraph.\n\nas though you had to do with but a single man.\n\n Cf. supra, \u00a7 34.\n\n57. \u72af\u4e4b\u4ee5\u4e8b\u52ff\u544a\u4ee5\u8a00\u72af\u4e4b\u4ee5\u5229\u52ff\u544a\u4ee5\u5bb3\n\nConfront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your\ndesign.\n\n Literally, \u201cdo not tell them words;\u201d _i.e._ do not give your\n reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague\n to \u201cgive no reasons\u201d for his decisions, and the maxim is even more\n applicable to a general than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates\n this sentence with beautiful simplicity: \u201cOrders should direct the\n soldiers.\u201d That is all.\n\nWhen the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them\nnothing when the situation is gloomy.\n\n58. \u6295\u4e4b\u4ea1\u5730\u7136\u5f8c\u5b58\u9677\u4e4b\u6b7b\u5730\u7136\u5f8c\u751f\n\nPlace your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into\ndesperate straits, and it will come off in safety.\n\n Compare the paradoxical saying \u4ea1\u8005\u5b58\u4e4b\u57fa\u6b7b\u8005\u751f\u4e4b\u672c. These words of\n Sun Tz\u016d were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the tactics\n he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded\n to on p. 28, In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao,\n and halted ten miles from the mouth of the \u4e95\u9658 Ching-hsing pass,\n where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight,\n he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was\n furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their\n way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy.\n \u201cWhen the men of Chao see me in full flight,\u201d Han Hsin said, \u201cthey\n will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be the\n sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set\n up the red banners of \u6f22 Han in their stead.\u201d Turning then to\n his other officers, he remarked: \u201cOur adversary holds a strong\n position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he\n sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear\n I should turn back and escape through the mountains.\u201d So saying,\n he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and\n ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the\n River \u6cdc Ti. Seeing this man\u0153uvre, the whole army of Chao broke\n into loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han\n Hsin, displaying the generalissimo\u2019s flag, marched out of the pass\n with drums beating, and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A\n great battle followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han\n Hsin and his colleague \u5f35\u8033 Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on\n the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another\n fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and\n to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but\n the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was\n fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for\n the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men\n of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the\n deserted walls, tore up the enemy\u2019s flags and replaced them by\n those of Han. When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the\n sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that\n the Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in\n wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic\n being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and\n completed the rout, killing a great number and capturing the rest,\n amongst whom was King \u6b47 Ya himself.... After the battle, some of\n Han Hsin\u2019s officers came to him and said: \u201cIn the _Art of War_ we\n are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river\n or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun Tz\u016d\n and T\u2018ai Kung. See IX. \u00a7 9, and note.] You, on the contrary,\n ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under\n these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?\u201d The\n general replied: \u201cI fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of\n War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: \u2018_Plunge your\n army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place\n it in deadly peril and it will survive_\u2019? Had I taken the usual\n course, I should never have been able to bring my colleagues\n round. What says the Military Classic (\u7d93)?\u2014\u2018Swoop down on the\n market-place and drive the men off to fight\u2019 (\u6bc6\u5e02\u4eba\u800c\u6230\u4e4b). [This\n passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tz\u016d.] If I had\n not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to\n fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own\n discretion, there would have been a general _d\u00e9bandade_, and it\n would have been impossible to do anything with them.\u201d The officers\n admitted the force of his argument, and said: \u201cThese are higher\n tactics than we should have been capable of.\u201d [See _Ch\u2018ien Han\n Shu_, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.]\n\n59. \u592b\u8846\u9677\u65bc\u5bb3\u7136\u5f8c\u80fd\u7232\u52dd\u6557\n\nFor it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm\u2019s way that it is\ncapable of striking a blow for victory.\n\n Danger has a bracing effect.\n\n60. \u6545\u7232\u5175\u4e4b\u4e8b\u5728\u65bc\u9806\u8a73\u6575\u4e4b\u610f\n\nSuccess in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to\nthe enemy\u2019s purpose.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u4f6f\u611a\u4e5f \u201cFeign stupidity\u201d\u2014by an appearance of\n yielding and falling in with the enemy\u2019s wishes. Chang Y\u00fc\u2019s note\n makes the meaning clear: \u201cIf the enemy shows an inclination to\n advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay\n on purpose that he may carry out his intention.\u201d The object is to\n make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.\n\n61. \u5e76\u6575\u4e00\u5411\u5343\u91cc\u6bba\u5c07\n\nBy persistently hanging on the enemy\u2019s flank,\n\n I understand the first four words to mean \u201caccompanying the enemy\n in one direction.\u201d Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u5e77\u5175\u5411\u6575 \u201cunite the soldiers\n and make for the enemy.\u201d But such a violent displacement of\n characters is quite indefensible. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean is the only\n commentator who seems to have grasped the meaning: \u96a8\u6575\u4e00\u5411\u7136\u5f8c\u767c\u4f0f\n \u51fa\u5947. The _T\u2018u Shu_ reads \u5e76\u529b.\n\nwe shall succeed in the long run\n\n Literally, \u201cafter a thousand _li_.\u201d\n\nin killing the commander-in-chief.\n\nAlways a great point with the Chinese.\n\n62. \u6b64\u8b02\u5de7\u80fd\u6210\u4e8b\u8005\u4e5f\n\n This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.\n\n The _T\u2018u Shu_ has \u662f\u8b02\u5de7\u65bc\u6210\u4e8b, and yet another reading, mentioned\n by Ts\u2018ao Kung, is \u5de7\u653b\u6210\u4e8b. Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence,\n after having thus translated the two preceding: \u201cDiscover the\n enemy\u2019s intentions by conforming to his movements. When these are\n discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even\n though he be one hundred leagues distant.\u201d\n\n63. \u662f\u6545\u653f\u8209\u4e4b\u65e5\u5937\u95dc\u6298\u7b26\u7121\u901a\u5176\u4f7f\n\nOn the day that you take up your command,\n\n \u653f\u8209 does not mean \u201cwhen war is declared,\u201d as Capt. Calthrop says,\n nor yet exactly, as Ts\u2018ao Kung paraphrases it, \u8b00\u5b9a \u201cwhen your\n plans are fixed,\u201d when you have mapped out your campaign. The\n phrase is not given in the _P\u2018ei W\u00ean Y\u00fcn Fu_. There being no\n causal connection discoverable between this and the preceding\n sentence, \u662f\u6545 must perforce be left untranslated.\n\nblock the frontier passes,\n\n \u5937 is explained by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean as \u6ec5\u585e.\n\ndestroy the official tallies,\n\n The _locus classicus_ for these tallies is _Chou Li_, XIV. fol. 40\n (Imperial edition): \u9580\u95dc\u7528\u7b26\u7bc0\u8ca8\u8cc4\u7528\u74bd\u7bc0\u9053\u8def\u7528\u65cc\u7bc0. The generic term\n thus appears to be \u7bc0, \u7b26 being the special kind used at city-gates\n and on the frontier. They were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half\n of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official in\n charge of a gate (\u53f8\u9580 or \u53f8\u95dc. Cf. the \u5c01\u4eba \u201cborder-warden\u201d of _Lun\n Y\u00fc_ III. 24, who may have had similar duties.) When this half was\n returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorised to open\n the gate and let the traveller through.\n\nand stop the passage of all emissaries.\n\n Either to or from the enemy\u2019s country.\n\n64. \u53b2\u65bc\u5eca\u5edf\u4e4b\u4e0a\u4ee5\u8a85\u5176\u4e8b\n\nBe stern in the council-chamber,\n\n Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the\n sovereign. \u5eca\u5edf indicates a hall or temple in the Palace. Cf. I.\n \u00a7 26. It is not clear if other officers would be present. Hardly\n anything can be made of \u52f5, the reading of the standard text, so I\n have adopted Tu Mu\u2019s conjecture \u53b2, which appears in the _T\u2018u Shu_.\n\nso that you may control the situation.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung explains \u8a85 by \u6cbb, and Ho Shih by \u8cac\u6210. Another reading\n is \u8b00, and Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean, adopting this, understands the whole\n sentence to mean: Take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy\n in your deliberations. Capt. Calthrop glides rather too smoothly\n over the rough places. His translation is: \u201cconduct the business\n of the government with vigilance.\u201d\n\n65. \u6575\u4eba\u958b\u95d4\u5fc5\u4e9f\u5165\u4e4b\n\nIf the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.\n\n This looks a very simple sentence, yet Ts\u2018ao Kung is the only\n commentator who takes it as I have done. M\u00eang Shih, followed by\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean and Chang Y\u00fc, defines \u958b\u95d4 as \u9593\u8005 \u201cspies,\u201d and\n makes \u5165 an active verb: \u201cIf spies come from the enemy, we must\n quickly let them in.\u201d But I cannot find that the words \u958b\u95d4 have\n this meaning anywhere else. On the other hand, they may be taken\n as two verbs, \u6216\u958b\u6216\u95d4, expressing the enemy\u2019s indecision whether\n to advance or retreat, that being the best moment to attack him.\n [Cf. _Tao T\u00ea Ching_, chap. X: \u5929\u9580\u958b\u95d4\u80fd\u7232\u96cc\u4e4e; also _Li Chi_, \u66f2\u79ae,\n I. ii. 25.] It is not easy to choose between this and Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s\n explanation; the fact that \u6575\u4eba\u958b\u6236 occurs shortly afterwards, in\n \u00a7 68, might be adduced in support of either. \u5fc5 must be understood\n in the sense of \u5b9c or \u7576. The only way to avoid this is to put \u958b\u95d4\n between commas and translate: \u201cIf we leave a door open, the enemy\n is sure to rush in.\u201d\n\n66. \u5148\u5176\u6240\u611b\u5fae\u8207\u4e4b\u671f\n\nForestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,\n\n Cf. _supra_, \u00a7 18.\n\nand subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.\n\n Capt. Calthrop hardly attempts to translate this difficult\n paragraph, but invents the following instead: \u201cDiscover what he\n most values, and plan to seize it.\u201d Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao\u2019s explanation,\n however, is clear enough: \u6211\u82e5\u5148\u596a\u4fbf\u5730\u800c\u6575\u4e0d\u81f3\u96d6\u6709\u5176\u5229\u4ea6\u595a\u7528\u4e4b\u662f\u4ee5\u6b32\u53d6\n \u5176\u611b\u60dc\u4e4b\u8655\u5fc5\u5148\u5fae\u8207\u6575\u4eba\u76f8\u671f\u8aa4\u4e4b\u4f7f\u5fc5\u81f3 \u201cIf I manage to seize a favourable\n position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the\n advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical account.\n He who intends, therefore, to occupy a position of importance\n to the enemy, must begin by making an artful appointment, so to\n speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there as\n well.\u201d Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean explains that this \u201cartful appointment\u201d is\n to be made through the medium of the enemy\u2019s own spies, who will\n carry back just the amount of information that we choose to give\n them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, \u6211\u5f8c\u4eba\u767c\u5148\u4eba\u81f3\n \u201cwe must manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before\n him\u201d (VII. \u00a7 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his\n marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture\n the place without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends\n some support to Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s interpretation of \u00a7 47.\n\n67. \u8e10\u58a8\u96a8\u6575\u4ee5\u6c7a\u6230\u4e8b\n\nWalk in the path defined by rule,\n\n \u58a8 stands for \u7e69\u58a8 \u201ca marking-line,\u201d hence a rule of conduct. See\n Mencius VII. 1. xli. 2. Ts\u2018ao Kung explains it by the similar\n metaphor \u898f\u77e9 \u201csquare and compasses.\u201d The baldness of the sentiment\n rather inclines me to favour the reading \u5257 adopted by Chia Lin in\n place of \u8e10, which yields an exactly opposite sense, namely:\n \u201cDiscard hard and fast rules.\u201d Chia Lin says: \u60df\u52dd\u662f\u5229\u4e0d\u53ef\u5b88\u4ee5\u7e69\u58a8\u800c\u7232\n \u201cVictory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be\n achieved by adhering to conventional canons.\u201d It is unfortunate\n that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense\n yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know,\n according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won\n his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.\n\nand accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive\nbattle.\n\n The last four words of the Chinese are omitted by Capt. Calthrop.\n Tu Mu says: \u96a8\u6575\u4eba\u4e4b\u5f62\u82e5\u6709\u53ef\u4e58\u4e4b\u52e2\u5247\u51fa\u800c\u6c7a\u6230 \u201cConform to the enemy\u2019s\n tactics until a favourable opportunity offers; then come forth and\n engage in a battle that shall prove decisive.\u201d\n\n68. \u662f\u6545\u59cb\u5982\u8655\u5973\u6575\u4eba\u958b\u6236\u5f8c\u5982\u812b\u514e\u6575\u4e0d\u53ca\u62d2\n\nAt first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives\nyou an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and\nit will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.\n\n As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison\n hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tz\u016d was thinking only\n of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee\n from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly\n rejected by Tu Mu. Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating \u514e\n \u201crabbit.\u201d Rabbits are not indigenous to China, and were certainly\n not known there in the 6th century B.C. The last sixteen\n characters evidently form a sort of four-line jingle. Chap. X, it\n may be remembered, closed in similar fashion.\n\n\n\n\n XII. \u706b\u653b\u7bc7\n\n THE ATTACK BY FIRE.\n\n\n Rather more than half the chapter (\u00a7\u00a7 1\u201313) is devoted to the subject\n of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u706b\u653b\u6709\u4e94\u4e00\u66f0\u706b\u4eba\u4e8c\u66f0\u706b\u7a4d\u4e09\u66f0\u706b\u8f1c\u56db\u66f0\u706b\u5eab\u4e94\u66f0\u706b\u968a\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first\nis to burn soldiers in their camp;\n\n So Tu Mu. Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan says: \u711a\u5176\u71df\u6bba\u5176\u58eb\u5352\u4e5f \u201cSet fire to the camp,\n and kill the soldiers\u201d (when they try to escape from the flames).\n Pan Ch\u2018ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan\n [see XI. \u00a7 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by\n the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal\n enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he\n exclaimed: \u201c\u2018Never venture, never win![183] The only course open\n to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under\n cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers.\n Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely;\n this will cool the King\u2019s courage and cover us with glory, besides\n ensuring the success of our mission.\u2019 The officers all replied\n that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the\n Intendant (\u5f9e\u4e8b). Pan Ch\u2018ao then fell into a passion: \u2018It is\n to-day,\u2019 he cried, \u2018that our fortunes must be decided! The\n Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our\n project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be brought\n to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant\n warriors.\u2019 All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as\n soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their\n way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time.\n Pan Ch\u2018ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind\n the enemy\u2019s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames\n shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their\n might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he\n posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to\n the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of\n drums and shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu,\n who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch\u2018ao slew three\n of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads\n of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a\n hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan\n Ch\u2018ao went back and informed \u90ed\u6042 Kuo Hs\u00fcn [the Intendant] of what\n he had done. The latter was greatly alarmed and turned pale.\n But Pan Ch\u2018ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand:\n \u2018Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think,\n Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.\u2019 This satisfied Kuo\n Hs\u00fcn, and Pan Ch\u2018ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan,\n showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was\n seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch\u2018ao took steps to\n allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king\u2019s\n son as hostage, he returned to make his report to \u7ac7\u56fa Tou Ku.\u201d\n [_Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.]\n\nthe second is to burn stores;\n\n Tu Mu says: \u7ce7\u98df\u85aa\u82bb \u201cProvisions, fuel and fodder.\u201d In order to\n subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, \u9ad8\u6f41 Kao K\u00eang\n recommended W\u00ean Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and\n burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved\n entirely successful. [\u968b\u66f8, ch. 41, fol. 2.]\n\nthe third is to burn baggage-trains;\n\n An example given is the destruction of \u8881\u7d39 Y\u00fcan Shao\u2019s waggons and\n impedimenta by Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao in 200 A.D.\n\nthe fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;\n\n Tu Mu says that the things contained in \u8f1c and \u5eab are the same. He\n specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf.\n VII. \u00a7 11.\n\nthe fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.\n\n No fewer than four totally diverse explanations of this sentence\n are given by the commentators, not one of which is quite\n satisfactory. It is obvious, at any rate, that the ordinary\n meaning of \u968a (\u201cregiment\u201d or \u201ccompany\u201d) is here inadmissible. In\n spite of Tu Mu\u2019s note, \u711a\u5176\u884c\u4f0d\u56e0\u4e82\u800c\u64ca\u4e4b, I must regard \u201ccompany\n burning\u201d (Capt. Calthrop\u2019s rendering) as nonsense pure and simple.\n We may also, I think, reject the very forced explanation given\n by Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan, Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean and Chang Y\u00fc, of whom the last-named\n says: \u711a\u5176\u968a\u4ed7\u4f7f\u5175\u7121\u6230\u5177 \u201cburning a regiment\u2019s weapons, so that the\n soldiers may have nothing to fight with.\u201d That leaves only two\n solutions open: one, favoured by Chia Lin and Ho Shih, is to take\n \u968a in the somewhat uncommon sense of \u201ca road,\u201d = \u96a7. The commentary\n on a passage in the \u7a46\u5929\u5b50\u50b3, quoted in _K\u2018ang Hsi_, defines \u968a\n (read _sui_) as \u8c37\u4e2d\u96aa\u963b\u9053 \u201ca difficult road leading through a\n valley.\u201d Here it would stand for the \u7ce7\u9053 \u201cline of supplies,\u201d which\n might be effectually interrupted if the country roundabout was\n laid waste with fire. Finally, the interpretation which I have\n adopted is that given by Tu Yu in the _T\u2018ung Tien_. He reads \u589c\n (which is not absolutely necessary, \u968a _chui_ being sometimes used\n in the same sense), with the following note: \u4ee5\u706b\u58ae\u6575\u71df\u4e2d\u4e5f\u706b\u589c\u4e4b\u6cd5\n \u4ee5\u9435\u7c60\u706b\u7740\u7bad\u982d\u9838\u5f3a\u5f29\u5c04\u6575\u71df\u4e2d \u201cTo drop fire into the enemy\u2019s camp. The\n method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows\n alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from\n powerful crossbows into the enemy\u2019s lines.\u201d\n\n2. \u884c\u706b\u5fc5\u6709\u56e0\u7159\u706b\u5fc5\u7d20\u5177\n\nIn order to carry out an attack with fire, we must have means available.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung thinks that \u59e6\u4eba \u201ctraitors in the enemy\u2019s camp\u201d are\n referred to. He thus takes \u56e0 as the efficient cause only. But\n Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao is more likely to be right in saying: \u9808\u5f97\u5176\u4fbf\u4e0d\u7368\u59e6\u4eba \u201cWe\n must have favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors\n to help us.\u201d Chia Lin says: \u56e0\u98a8\u71e5 \u201cWe must avail ourselves of wind\n and dry weather.\u201d\n\nThe material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.\n\n \u7159\u706b is explained by Ts\u2018ao Kung as \u71d2\u5177 \u201cappliances for making\n fire.\u201d Tu Mu suggests \u827e\u84bf\u837b\u8466\u85aa\u82bb\u818f\u6cb9\u4e4b\u5c6c \u201cdry vegetable matter,\n reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.\u201d Here we have the\n material cause. Chang Y\u00fc says: \ud86c\udf93\u706b\u4e4b\u5668\u71c3\u706b\u4e4b\u7269 \u201cvessels for\n hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires.\u201d\n\n3. \u767c\u706b\u6709\u6642\u8d77\u706b\u6709\u65e5\n\nThere is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special\ndays for starting a conflagration.\n\n A fire must not be begun \u5984 \u201crecklessly\u201d or \u5076\u7136 \u201cat haphazard.\u201d\n\n4. \u6642\u8005\u5929\u4e4b\u71e5\u4e5f\u65e5\u8005\u5bbf\u5728\u7b95\u58c1\u7ffc\u8eeb\u4e5f\u51e1\u6b64\u56db\u5bbf\u8005\u98a8\u8d77\u4e4b\u65e5\u4e5f\n\nThe proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days\nare those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the\nWall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;\n\n These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the\n \u4e8c\u5341\u516b\u5bae Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly\n to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus. The original text,\n followed by the _T\u2018u Shu_, has \u6708 in place of \u5bbf; the present\n reading rests on the authority of the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_.\n Tu Mu says: \u5bbf\u8005\u6708\u4e4b\u6240\u5bbf\u4e5f. For \u7b95\u58c1, both _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_\n give the more precise location \u620a\u7b95\u6771\u58c1. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean tells us\n that by \u7b95 is meant the tail of the \u9f8d Dragon; by \u58c1, the eastern\n part of that constellation; by \u7ffc and \u8eeb, the tail of the \u9d89 Quail.\n\nfor these four are all days of rising wind.\n\n \u6b64\u56db\u5bbf\u8005 is elliptical for \u6708\u5728\u6b64\u56db\u5bbf\u4e4b\u65e5. \u856d\u7e79 Hsiao I (afterwards\n fourth Emperor of the Liang dynasty, A.D. 552\u2013555) is quoted by Tu\n Yu as saying that the days \u4e19\u4e01 of spring, \u620a\u5df2 of summer, \u58ec\u7678 of\n autumn, and \u7532\u4e59 of winter bring fierce gales of wind and rain.\n\n5. \u51e1\u706b\u653b\u5fc5\u56e0\u4e94\u706b\u4e4b\u8b8a\u800c\u61c9\u4e4b\n\nIn attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible\ndevelopments:\n\n I take \u4e94 as qualifying \u8b8a, not \u706b, and therefore think that Chang\n Y\u00fc is wrong in referring \u4e94\u706b to the five methods of attack set\n forth in \u00a7 1. What follows has certainly nothing to do with these.\n\n6. \u706b\u767c\u65bc\u5167\u5247\u65e9\u61c9\u4e4b\u65bc\u5916\n\n(1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy\u2019s camp, respond at once\n\n The _Y\u00fc Lan_ incorrectly reads \u8ecd for \u65e9.\n\nwith an attack from without.\n\n7. \u706b\u767c\u800c\u5176\u5175\u975c\u8005\u5f85\u800c\u52ff\u653b\n\n(2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy\u2019s soldiers remain\nquiet, bide your time and do not attack.\n\n The original text omits \u800c\u5176. The prime object of attacking with\n fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not\n produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence\n the necessity for caution.\n\n8. \u6975\u5176\u706b\u529b\u53ef\u5f9e\u800c\u5f9e\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u5f9e\u800c\u6b62\n\n(3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up\nwith an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung says: \u898b\u53ef\u800c\u9032\u77e5\u96e3\u800c\u9000 \u201cIf you see a possible way,\n advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire.\u201d\n\n9. \u706b\u53ef\u767c\u65bc\u5916\u7121\u5f85\u65bc\u5167\u4ee5\u6642\u767c\u4e4b\n\n(4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do\nnot wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a\nfavourable moment.\n\n Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire\n breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the\n agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy\u2019s camp. \u201cBut,\u201d he\n continues, \u82e5\u6575\u5c45\u8352\u6fa4\u8349\u7a62\u6216\u71df\u6805\u53ef\u711a\u4e4b\u5730\u537d\u9808\u53ca\u6642\u767c\u706b\u4e0d\u5fc5\u66f4\u5f85\u5167\u767c\u4f5c\u7136\u5f8c\u61c9\u4e4b\u6050\n \u6575\u4eba\u81ea\u71d2\u91ce\u8349\u6211\u8d77\u706b\u7121\u76ca \u201cif the enemy is settled in a waste place\n littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp\n in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire\n against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not wait on in\n hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents\n should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus\n render our own attempts fruitless.\u201d The famous \u674e\u9675 Li Ling once\n baffled the \u55ae\u4e8e leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter,\n taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the\n Chinese general\u2019s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible\n vegetation in the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On\n the other hand, \u6ce2\u624d Po-ts\u2018ai, a general of the \u9ec3\u5dfe\u8cca Yellow\n Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect\n of this simple precaution. \u201cAt the head of a large army he was\n besieging \u9577\u793e Ch\u2018ang-sh\u00ea, which was held by \u7687\u752b\u5d69 Huang-fu Sung.\n The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness\n pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together\n and said: \u2018In war, there are various indirect methods of attack,\n and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here\n quotes Sun Tz\u016d, V. \u00a7\u00a7 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched\n their camp in the midst of thick grass (\u4f9d\u8349\u7d50\u71df), which will\n easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night,\n they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and\n attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement\n of T\u2018ien Tan.\u2019 [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze\n sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds\n together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after\n which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their\n way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts\n and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the\n city-walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid\n charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to\n headlong flight.\u201d [_Hou Han Shu_, ch. 71, f. 2 _r_^o.]\n\n10. \u706b\u767c\u4e0a\u98a8\u7121\u653b\u4e0b\u98a8\n\n(5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from\nthe leeward.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc, following Tu Yu, says: \u71d2\u4e4b\u5fc5\u9000\u9000\u800c\u9006\u64ca\u4e4b\u5fc5\u6b7b\u6230\u5247\u4e0d\u4fbf\u4e5f \u201cWhen\n you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it; if you\n oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately,\n which will not conduce to your success.\u201d A rather more obvious\n explanation is given by Tu Mu: \u201cIf the wind is in the east, begin\n burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack\n yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side,\n and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as\n your enemy.\u201d\n\n11. \u665d\u98a8\u4e45\u591c\u98a8\u6b62\n\nA wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon\nfalls.\n\n Cf. Lao Tz\u016d\u2019s saying: \u98c4\u98a8\u4e0d\u7d42\u671d \u201cA violent wind does not last the\n space of a morning.\u201d (_Tao T\u00ea Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean and\n Wang Hsi say: \u201cA day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night\n breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule.\u201d The\n phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is\n to be obtained is not apparent.\n\n12. \u51e1\u8ecd\u5fc5\u77e5\u6709\u4e94\u706b\u4e4b\u8b8a\u4ee5\u6578\u5b88\u4e4b\n\nIn every army, the five developments connected with fire must be\nknown, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the\nproper days.\n\n Tu Mu\u2019s commentary shows what has to be supplied in order to make\n sense out of \u4ee5\u6578\u5b88\u4e4b. He says: \u9808\u7b6d\u661f\ud860\udde0\u4e4b\u6578\u5b88\u98a8\u8d77\u4e4b\u65e5\u4e43\u53ef\u767c\u706b \u201cWe\n must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch for\n the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with\n fire.\u201d Chang Y\u00fc seems to take \u5b88 in the sense of \u9632: \u201cWe must not\n only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on\n our guard against similar attacks from them.\u201d\n\n13. \u6545\u4ee5\u706b\u4f50\u653b\u8005\u660e\u4ee5\u6c34\u4f50\u653b\u8005\u5f3a\n\nHence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;\n\n I have not the least hesitation in rejecting the commentators\u2019\n explanation of \u660e as = \u660e\u767d. Thus Chang Y\u00fc says: \u707c\u7136\u53ef\u4ee5\u53d6\u52dd \u201c...\n will _clearly_ [i.e. obviously] be able to gain the victory.\u201d This\n is not only clumsy in itself, but does not balance \u5f3a in the next\n clause. For \u660e \u201cintelligent,\u201d cf. _infra_, \u00a7 16, and _Lun Y\u00fc_ XII. 6.\n\nthose who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of\nstrength.\n\n Capt. Calthrop gives an extraordinary rendering of the paragraph:\n \u201c... if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be\n unquenchable. If water is to assist the attack, the flood must be\n overwhelming.\u201d\n\n14. \u6c34\u53ef\u4ee5\u7d76\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u596a\n\nBy means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all\nhis belongings.\n\n Ts\u2018ao Kung\u2019s note is: \u4f46\u53ef\u4ee5\u7d76\u6575\u9053\u5206\u6575\u8ecd\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u596a\u6575\u84c4\u7a4d \u201cWe can merely\n obstruct the enemy\u2019s road or divide his army, but not sweep away\n all his accumulated stores.\u201d Water can do useful service, but it\n lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the reason,\n Chang Y\u00fc concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of\n sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu\n Tz\u016d (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: \u5c45\u8ecd\u4e0b\u6fd5\u6c34\u7121\u6240\u901a\u9716\u96e8\u6578\u81f3\n \u53ef\u704c\u800c\u6c89\u5c45\u8ecd\u8352\u6fa4\u8349\u695a\u5e7d\u7a62\u98a8\u98c6\u6578\u81f3\u53ef\u711a\u800c\u6ec5 \u201cIf an army is encamped on\n low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and\n where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an\n army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds\n and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be\n exterminated by fire.\u201d\n\n15. \u592b\u6230\u52dd\u653b\u53d6\u800c\u4e0d\u4fee\u5176\u529f\u8005\u51f6\u547d\u66f0\u8cbb\u7559\n\nUnhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in\nhis attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the\nresult is waste of time and general stagnation.\n\n This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tz\u016d. The\n difficulty lies mainly in \u4e0d\u4fee\u5176\u529f, of which two interpretations\n appear possible. Most of the commentators understand \u4fee in the\n sense (not known to _K\u2018ang Hsi_) of \u8cde \u201creward\u201d or \u8209 \u201cpromote,\u201d\n and \u5176\u529f as referring to the merit of officers and men. Thus Ts\u2018ao\n Kung says: \u8cde\u5584\u4e0d\u8e30\u65e5 \u201cRewards for good service should not be\n deferred a single day.\u201d And Tu Mu: \u201cIf you do not take opportunity\n to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not\n carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue.\u201d \u8cbb\u7559 would then\n probably mean \u7559\u6eef\u8cbb\u8017 \u201cstoppage of expenditure,\u201d or as Chia Lin\n puts it, \u60dc\u8cbb \u201cthe grudging of expenditure.\u201d For several reasons,\n however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on the\n other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\n alone, whose words I will quote: \u6b32\u6230\u5fc5\u52dd\u653b\u5fc5\u53d6\u8005\u5728\u56e0\u6642\u4e58\u4fbf\u80fd\u4f5c\u7232\u529f\u4e5f\u4f5c\n \u7232\u529f\u8005\u4fee\u706b\u653b\u6c34\u653b\u4e4b\u985e\u4e0d\u53ef\u5750\u5b88\u5176\u5229\u4e5f\u5750\u5b88\u5176\u5229\u8005\u51f6\u4e5f \u201cThose who want to make\n sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the\n favourable moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from\n heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to such means of\n attack as fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and\n what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold on to the\n advantages they have got.\u201d This retains the more usual meaning of\n \u4fee, and also brings out a clear connection of thought with the\n previous part of the chapter. With regard to \u8cbb\u7559, Wang Hsi\n paraphrases it as \u8cbb\u8ca1\u8001\u5e2b \u201cexpending treasure and tiring out\n [_lit._, ageing] the army.\u201d \u8cbb of course is expenditure or waste\n in general, either of time, money or strength. But the soldier is\n less concerned with the saving of money than of time. For the\n metaphor expressed in \u201cstagnation\u201d I am indebted to Ts\u2018ao Kung,\n who says: \u82e5\u6c34\u4e4b\u7559\u4e0d\u5fa9\u9084\u4e5f. Capt. Calthrop gives a rendering which\n bears but little relation to the Chinese text: \u201cunless victory or\n possession be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and\n misfortunes arise. The war drags on, and money is spent.\u201d\n\n16. \u6545\u66f0\u660e\u4e3b\u616e\u4e4b\u826f\u5c07\u4fee\u4e4b\n\nHence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the\ngood general cultivates his resources.\n\n As Sun Tz\u016d quotes this jingle in support of his assertion in \u00a7 15,\n we must suppose \u4fee\u4e4b to stand for \u4fee\u5176\u529f or something analogous.\n The meaning seems to be that the ruler lays plans which the\n general must show resourcefulness in carrying out. It is now\n plainer than ever that \u4fee cannot mean \u201cto reward.\u201d Nevertheless, Tu\n Mu quotes the following from the \u4e09\u7565, ch. 2: \u9738\u8005\u5236\u58eb\u4ee5\u6b0a\u7d50\u58eb\u4ee5\n \u4fe1\u4f7f\u58eb\u4ee5\u8cde\u4fe1\u8870\u5247\u58eb\u758f\u8cde\u8667\u5247\u58eb\u4e0d\u7528\u547d \u201cThe warlike prince controls his\n soldiers by his authority, knits them together by good faith, and\n by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be\n disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be\n respected.\u201d\n\n17. \u975e\u5229\u4e0d\u52d5\u975e\u5f97\u4e0d\u7528\u975e\u5371\u4e0d\u6230\n\nMove not unless you see an advantage;\n\n \u8d77, the _Y\u00fc Lan\u2019s_ variant for \u52d5, is adopted by Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan and Tu Mu.\n\nuse not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not\nunless the position is critical.\n\n Sun Tz\u016d may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes\n so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao T\u00ea\n Ching_, ch. 69: \u543e\u4e0d\u6562\u7232\u4e3b\u800c\u7232\u5ba2\u4e0d\u6562\u9032\u5bf8\u800c\u9000\u5c3a \u201cI dare not take the\n initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance\n an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot.\u201d\n\n18. \u4e3b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u6012\u800c\u8208\u5e2b\u5c07\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u6120\u800c\u81f4\u6230\n\nNo ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own\nspleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.\n\n Again compare Lao Tz\u016d, ch. 68: \u5584\u6230\u8005\u4e0d\u6012. Chang Y\u00fc says that \u6120 is\n a weaker word than \u6012, and is therefore applied to the general as\n opposed to the sovereign. The _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u8ecd\n for \u5e2b, and the latter \u5408 for \u81f4.\n\n19. \u5408\u65bc\u5229\u800c\u52d5\u4e0d\u5408\u65bc\u5229\u800c\u6b62\n\nIf it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where\nyou are.\n\n This is repeated from XI. \u00a7 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an\n interpolation, for it is evident that \u00a7 20 ought to follow immediately\n on \u00a7 18. For \u52d5, the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ have \u7528. Capt. Calthrop\n invents a sentence which he inserts before this one: \u201cDo not make war\n unless victory may be gained thereby.\u201d While he was about it, he might\n have credited Sun Tz\u016d with something slightly less inane.\n\n20. \u6012\u53ef\u4ee5\u5fa9\u559c\u6120\u53ef\u4ee5\u5fa9\u6085\n\nAnger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by\ncontent.\n\n According to Chang Y\u00fc, \u559c denotes joy outwardly manifested in the\n countenance, \u6085 the inward sensation of happiness.\n\n21. \u4ea1\u570b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u5fa9\u5b58\u6b7b\u8005\u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u5fa9\u751f\n\nBut a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into\nbeing;\n\n The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this\n saying. See p. 50.\n\nnor can the dead ever be brought back to life.\n\n22. \u6545\u660e\u541b\u613c\u4e4b\u826f\u5c07\u8b66\u4e4b\u6b64\u5b89\u570b\u5168\u8ecd\u4e4b\u9053\u4e5f\n\nHence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of\ncaution.\n\n \u8b66, which usually means \u201cto warn,\u201d is here equal to \u6212. This is a\n good instance of how Chinese characters, which stand for ideas,\n refuse to be fettered by dictionary-made definitions. The _T\u2018u\n Shu_ reads \u6545\u66f0, as in \u00a7 16.\n\nThis is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.\n\n It is odd that \u5168\u8ecd should not have the same meaning here as in\n III. \u00a7 1, _q.v._ This has led me to consider whether it might not\n be possible to take the earlier passage thus: \u201cto preserve your\n own army (country, regiment, etc.) intact is better than to\n destroy the enemy\u2019s.\u201d The two words do not appear in the _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ or the _Y\u00fc Lan_. Capt. Calthrop misses the point by\n translating: \u201cthen is the state secure, and the army victorious in\n battle.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n XIII. \u7528\u9593\u7bc7\n\n THE USE OF SPIES.\n\n\n \u9593 is really a vulgar form of \u9592, and does not appear in the _Shuo\n W\u00ean_. In practice, however, it has gradually become a distinct\n character with special meanings of its own, and I have therefore\n followed my edition of the standard text in retaining this form\n throughout the chapter. In VI. \u00a7 25, on the other hand, the\n correct form \u9592 will be found. The evolution of the meaning \u201cspy\u201d\n is worth considering for a moment, provided it be understood that\n this is very doubtful ground, and that any dogmatism is out of\n place. The _Shuo W\u00ean_ defines \u9592 as \u969f (the old form of \u9699) \u201ca\n crack\u201d or \u201cchink,\u201d and on the whole we may accept \u5f90\u9347 Hs\u00fc Ch\u2018ieh\u2019s\n analysis as not unduly fanciful: \u592b\u9580\u591c\u9589\u9589\u800c\u898b\u6708\u5149\u662f\u6709\u9592\u969f\u4e5f \u201cAt\n night, a _door_ is shut; if, when it is shut, the light of the\n _moon_ is visible, it must come through a _chink_.\u201d From this\n it is an easy step to the meaning \u201cspace between,\u201d or simply\n \u201cbetween,\u201d as for example in the phrase \u5f80\u4f86\u9592\u8adc \u201cto act as a\n secret spy between enemies.\u201d Here \u8adc is the word which means \u201cspy;\u201d\n but we may suppose that constant association so affected the\n original force of \u9592, that \u8adc could at last be dropped altogether,\n leaving \u9592 to stand alone with the same signification. Another\n possible theory is that the word may first have come to mean \u8997 \u201cto\n peep\u201d (see \u535a\u96c5, quoted in _K\u2018ang Hsi_) which would naturally be\n suggested by \u201ccrack\u201d or \u201ccrevice,\u201d and afterwards the man who\n peeps, or spy.\n\n1. \u5b6b\u5b50\u66f0\u51e1\u8208\u5e2b\u5341\u842c\u51fa\u5175\u5343\u91cc\u767e\u59d3\u4e4b\u8cbb\u516c\u5bb6\u4e4b\u5949\u65e5\u8cbb\u5343\u91d1\u5167\u5916\u9a37\u52d5\u6020\u65bc\u9053\u8def\u4e0d\u5f97\u64cd\u4e8b\u8005\n\u4e03\u5341\u842c\u5bb6\n\nSun Tz\u016d said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching\nthem great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on\nthe resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a\nthousand ounces of silver.\n\n Cf. II. \u00a7\u00a7 1, 13, 14.\n\nThere will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down\nexhausted on the highways.\n\n \u6020\u65bc\u9053\u8def, which is omitted by the _Y\u00fc Lan_, appears at first sight\n to be explained by the words immediately following, so that the\n obvious translation would be \u201c(enforced) idleness along the line\n of march.\u201d [Cf. _Tao T\u00ea Ching_, ch. 30: \u5e2b\u4e4b\u6240\u8655\u8346\u68d8\u751f\u7109 \u201cWhere\n troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up.\u201d] The\n commentators, however, say that \u6020 is here equivalent to \u75b2\u2014a\n meaning which is still retained in the phrase \u5026\u6020. Tu Mu refers \u6020\n to those who are engaged in conveying provisions to the army. But\n this can hardly be said to emerge clearly from Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s text.\n Chang Y\u00fc has the note: \u201cWe may be reminded of the saying: \u2018On\n serious ground, gather in plunder\u2019 [XI. \u00a7 13]. Why then should\n carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?\u2014The\n answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of\n war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to\n \u2018forage on the enemy\u2019 only means that when an army is deeply\n engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided\n against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for\n corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted\n flow of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts\n (\u78e7\u9e75\u4e4b\u5730), where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home\n cannot be dispensed with.\u201d\n\nAs many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their\nlabour.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says: \u5ee2\u65bc\u8012\u801c \u201cMen will be lacking at the\n plough-tail.\u201d The allusion is to \u4e95\u7530 the system of dividing land\n into nine parts, as shown in the character \u4e95, each consisting\n of a \u592b or \u9803 (about 15 acres), the plot in the centre being\n cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other\n eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages\n were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II.\n \u00a7 12, note.] These groups of eight peasant proprietors were called\n \u9130. In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army,\n while the other seven contributed to its support (\u4e00\u5bb6\u5f9e\u8ecd\u4e03\u5bb6\u5949\u5f13).\n Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier\n to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.\n\n2. \u76f8\u5b88\u6578\u5e74\u4ee5\u722d\u4e00\u65e5\u4e4b\u52dd\u800c\u611b\u7235\u797f\u767e\u91d1\u4e0d\u77e5\u6575\u4e4b\u60c5\u8005\u4e0d\u4ec1\u4e4b\u81f3\u4e5f\n\nHostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the\nvictory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain\nin ignorance of the enemy\u2019s condition simply because one grudges\nthe outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments,\n\n \u201cFor spies\u201d is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the\n effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually\n mentioned at this point.\n\nis the height of inhumanity.\n\n Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting\n to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure\n which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept\n informed of the enemy\u2019s condition, and are ready to strike at the\n right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get\n this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to\n obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their\n services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively\n trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war\n lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden\n falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tz\u016d concludes\n that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime\n against humanity.\n\n3. \u975e\u4eba\u4e4b\u5c07\u4e5f\u975e\u4e3b\u4e4b\u4f50\u4e5f\u975e\u52dd\u4e4b\u4e3b\u4e5f\n\nOne who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign,\n\n An inferior reading for \u4e3b is \u4ec1, thus explained by Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean:\n \u975e\u4ee5\u4ec1\u4f50\u570b\u8005\u4e5f.\n\nno master of victory.\n\n This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in\n the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597\n B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince \u838a Chuang of the\n Ch\u2018u State: \u592b\u6587\u6b62\u6208\u7232\u6b66 ... \u592b\u6b66\u7981\u66b4\u6222\u5175\u4fdd\u5927\u5b9a\u529f\u5b89\u6c11\u548c\u8846\u8c50\u8ca1\u8005\u4e5f \u201cThe\n character for \u2018prowess\u2019 (\u6b66) is made up of \u6b62 \u2018to stay\u2019 and \u6208 \u2018a\n spear\u2019 (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the\n repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation\n of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the\n bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the\n princes, the diffusion of wealth.\u201d [_Tso Chuan_, \u5ba3\u516c XII. 3 _ad\n fin._]\n\n4. \u6545\u660e\u541b\u8ce2\u5c07\u6240\u4ee5\u52d5\u800c\u52dd\u4eba\u6210\u529f\u51fa\u65bc\u8846\u8005\u5148\u77e5\u4e5f\n\nThus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike\nand conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is\n_foreknowledge_.\n\n That is, knowledge of the enemy\u2019s dispositions, and what he means\n to do.\n\n5. \u5148\u77e5\u8005\u4e0d\u53ef\u53d6\u65bc\u9b3c\u795e\u4e0d\u53ef\u8c61\u65bc\u4e8b\u4e0d\u53ef\u9a57\u65bc\u5ea6\n\nNow this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;\n\n \u4ee5\u79b1\u7940 \u201cby prayers or sacrifices,\u201d says Chang Y\u00fc. \u9b3c are the\n disembodied spirits of men, and \u795e supernatural beings or \u201cgods.\u201d\n\nit cannot be obtained inductively from experience,\n\n Tu Mu\u2019s note makes the meaning clear: \u8c61, he says, is the same as\n \u985e reasoning by analogy; \u4e0d\u53ef\u4ee5\u4ed6\u4e8b\u6bd4\u985e\u800c\u6c42 \u201c[knowledge of the\n enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous cases.\u201d\n\nnor by any deductive calculation.\n\n Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan says: \u592b\u9577\u77ed\u95ca\u72f9\u9060\u8fd1\u5c0f\u5927\u537d\u53ef\u9a57\u4e4b\u65bc\u5ea6\u6578\u4eba\u4e4b\u60c5\u50de\u5ea6\u4e0d\u80fd\u77e5\u4e5f\n \u201cQuantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude, are\n susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions\n cannot be so calculated.\u201d\n\n6. \u5fc5\u53d6\u65bc\u4eba\u77e5\u6575\u4e4b\u60c5\u8005\u4e5f\n\nKnowledge of the enemy\u2019s dispositions can only be obtained from other\nmen.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean has rather an interesting note: \u9b3c\u795e\u4e4b\u60c5\u53ef\u4ee5\u7b6e\u535c\u77e5\u5f62\u6c23\u4e4b\n \u7269\u53ef\u4ee5\u8c61\u985e\u6c42\u5929\u5730\u4e4b\u7406\u53ef\u4ee5\u5ea6\u6578\u9a57\u552f\u6575\u4e4b\u60c5\u5fc5\u7531\u9593\u8005\u800c\u5f8c\u77e5\u4e5f \u201cKnowledge of the\n spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in\n natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of\n the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the\n dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies\n alone.\u201d\n\n7. \u6545\u7528\u9593\u6709\u4e94\u6709\u9109\u9593\u6709\u5167\u9593\u6709\u53cd\u9593\u6709\u6b7b\u9593\u6709\u751f\u9593\n\nHence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local\nspies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5)\nsurviving spies.\n\n8. \u4e94\u9593\u4ff1\u8d77\u83ab\u77e5\u5176\u9053\u662f\u8b02\u795e\u7d00\u4eba\u541b\u4e4b\u5bf3\u4e5f\n\nWhen these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the\nsecret system.\n\n \u9053 is explained by Tu Mu as \u5176\u60c5\u6cc4\u5f62\u9732\u4e4b\u9053 \u201cthe way in which facts\n leak out and dispositions are revealed.\u201d\n\nThis is called\n\n \u7232 is the reading of the standard text, but the _T\u2018ung Tien_, _Y\u00fc\n Lan_ and _T\u2018u Shu_ all have \u8b02.\n\n\u201cdivine manipulation of the threads.\u201d\n\n Capt. Calthrop translates \u795e\u7d00 \u201cthe Mysterious Thread,\u201d but Mei\n Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s paraphrase \u795e\u5999\u4e4b\u7db1\u7d00 shows that what is meant is the\n _control_ of a number of threads.\n\nIt is the sovereign\u2019s most precious faculty.\n\n \u201cCromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry\n leaders, had officers styled \u2018scout masters,\u2019 whose business it\n was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy,\n through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was\n traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy\u2019s moves thus\n gained.\u201d[184]\n\n9. \u9109\u9593\u8005\u56e0\u5176\u9109\u4eba\u800c\u7528\u4e4b\n\nHaving _local spies_\n\n \u9109\u9593 is the emended reading of Chia Lin and the _T\u2018u Shu_ for the\n unintelligible \u56e0\u9593, here and in \u00a7 7, of the standard text, which\n nevertheless reads \u9109\u9593 in \u00a7 22.\n\nmeans employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.\n\n Tu Mu says: \u201cIn the enemy\u2019s country, win people over by kind\n treatment, and use them as spies.\u201d\n\n10. \u5167\u9593\u8005\u56e0\u5176\u5b98\u4eba\u800c\u7528\u4e4b\n\nHaving _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy.\n\n \u5b98 includes both civil and military officials. Tu Mu enumerates the\n following classes as likely to do good service in this respect:\n \u201cWorthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have\n undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy\n for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions,\n or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others\n who are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that\n they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents,\n fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat\n (\u98dc\u8986\u8b8a\u8a50\u5e38\u6301\u5169\u7aef\u4e4b\u5fc3\u8005). Officials of these several kinds,\u201d he\n continues, \u201cshould be secretly approached and bound to one\u2019s\n interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able\n to find out the state of affairs in the enemy\u2019s country, ascertain\n the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb\n the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his\n ministers.\u201d The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing\n with \u201cinward spies,\u201d appears from an historical incident related\n by Ho Shih: \u201c\u7f85\u5c19 Lo Shang, Governor of \u76ca\u5dde I-chou, sent his\n general \u9697\u4f2f Wei Po to attack the rebel \u674e\u96c4 Li Hsiung of \u8700 Shu in\n his stronghold at \u90eb P\u2018i. After each side had experienced a number\n of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services\n of a certain \u6734\u6cf0 P\u2018o-t\u2018ai, a native of \u6b66\u90fd Wu-tu. He began by\n having him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to\n Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to co-operate with him\n from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right\n moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these\n promises, marched out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and\n others at their head with orders to attack at P\u2018o-t\u2018ai\u2019s bidding.\n Meanwhile, Li Hsiung\u2019s general, \u674e\u9a64 Li Hsiang, had prepared an\n ambuscade on their line of march; and P\u2018o-t\u2018ai, having reared\n long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the\n beacon-fire. Wei Po\u2019s men raced up on seeing the signal and began\n climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were\n drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo\n Shang\u2019s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom\n was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his\n forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy\n completely.\u201d [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho\n Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li\n Hsiung or that of his father Li \u7279 T\u2018\u00ea, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.]\n\n11. \u53cd\u9593\u8005\u56e0\u5176\u6575\u9593\u800c\u7528\u4e4b\n\nHaving _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy\u2019s spies and using\nthem for our own purposes.\n\n By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them\n from the enemy\u2019s service, and inducing them to carry back false\n information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen.\n Thus Tu Yu: \u56e0\u539a\u8cc2\u91cd\u8a31\u53cd\u4f7f\u7232\u6211\u9593\u4e5f. On the other hand, \u856d\u4e16\u8af4 Hsiao\n Shih-hsien in defining the \u53cd\u9593 says that we pretend not to\n have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false\n impression of what is going on (\u6575\u4f7f\u4eba\u4f86\u5019\u6211\u6211\u4f6f\u4e0d\u77e5\u800c\u793a\u4ee5\u865b\u4e8b).\n Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative\n definition; but that it is not what Sun Tz\u016d meant is conclusively\n proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy\n generously (\u00a7 21 _sqq._). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which\n converted spies were used with conspicuous success: 1) by T\u2018ien\n Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see _supra_, p. 90); 2) by Chao Sh\u00ea\n on his march to O-y\u00fc (see p. 57); and by the wily \u8303\u96ce Fan Ch\u00fc\n in 260 B.C., when Lien P\u2018o was conducting a defensive campaign\n against Ch\u2018in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P\u2018o\u2019s\n cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a\n series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the\n reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and\n were already in Fan Ch\u00fc\u2019s pay. They said: \u201cThe only thing which\n causes Ch\u2018in anxiety is lest \u8d99\u62ec Chao Kua should be made general.\n Lien P\u2018o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be\n vanquished in the long run.\u201d Now this Chao Kua was a son of the\n famous Chao Sh\u00ea. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed\n in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came\n to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who\n could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this\n overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such\n a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was\n appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This\n was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother\n and the veteran statesman \u85fa\u76f8\u5982 Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to\n succeed Lien P\u2018o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the\n redoubtable Po Ch\u2018i and the great military power of Ch\u2018in. He\n fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his\n communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46\n days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he\n was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting,\n it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword. [See\n \u6b77\u4ee3\u7d00\u4e8b\u5e74\u8868, ch. 19, ff. 48\u201350].\n\n12. \u6b7b\u9593\u8005\u7232\u8a91\u4e8b\u65bc\u5916\u4ee4\u543e\u9593\u77e5\u4e4b\u800c\u50b3\u65bc\u6575\n\nHaving _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of\ndeception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them\nto the enemy.\n\n \u50b3 is Li Ch\u2018\u00fcan\u2019s conjecture for \u5f85, which is found in the _T\u2018ung\n Tien_ and the _Y\u00fc Lan_. The _T\u2018u Shu_, unsupported by any good\n authority, adds \u9593\u4e5f after \u6575. In that case, the doomed spies would\n be those of the enemy, to whom our own spies had conveyed false\n information. But this is unnecessarily complicated. Tu Yu gives\n the best exposition of the meaning: \u201cWe ostentatiously do things\n calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe\n that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies\n are captured in the enemy\u2019s lines, they will make an entirely\n false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only\n to find that we do something quite different. The spies will\n thereupon be put to death.\u201d Capt. Calthrop makes a hopeless muddle\n of the sentence. As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions\n the prisoners released by Pan Ch\u2018ao in his campaign against\n Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to \u5510\u5109 T\u2018ang Chien, who\n in 630 A.D. was sent by T\u2018ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan \u9821\u5229\n Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver\n a crushing blow against him. Chang Y\u00fc says that the Turks revenged\n themselves by killing T\u2018ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we\n read in both the Old and the New T\u2018ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and\n ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on until\n 656. \u9148\u98df\u5176 Li I-chi[185] played a somewhat similar part in 203\n B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations\n with Ch\u2018i. He has certainly more claim to be described as a \u6b7b\u9593;\n for the King of Ch\u2018i, being subsequently attacked without warning\n by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of\n Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.\n\n13. \u751f\u9593\u8005\u53cd\u5831\u4e5f\n\n_Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the\nenemy\u2019s camp.\n\n This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a\n regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: \u751f\u9593\u8005\u5fc5\u53d6\u5167\u660e\u5916\u611a\u5f62\u52a3\u5fc3\u58ef\u8dab\u5065\u52c1\u52c7\n \u9591\u65bc\u9119\u4e8b\u80fd\u5fcd\u9951\u5bd2\u57a2\u803b\u8005\u7232\u4e4b \u201cYour surviving spy must be a man of\n keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby\n exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust,\n endowed with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed\n to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to\n put up with shame and ignominy.\u201d Ho Shih tells the following story\n of \u9054\u595a\u6b66 Ta-hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: \u201cWhen he was governor of\n Eastern Ch\u2018in, \u795e\u6b66 Sh\u00ean-wu of Ch\u2018i made a hostile movement upon\n \u6c99\u82d1 Sha-y\u00fcan. The Emperor T\u2018ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to\n spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three\n were on horseback and wore the enemy\u2019s uniform. When it was dark,\n they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy\u2019s camp and\n stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching\n the passwords used by the army. Then they got on their horses\n again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of\n night-watchmen (\u8b66\u591c\u8005); and more than once, happening to come\n across a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline,\n they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgelling! Thus\n they managed to return with the fullest possible information about\n the enemy\u2019s dispositions, and received warm commendation from the\n Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a\n severe defeat on his adversary.\u201d With the above classification it\n is interesting to compare the remarks of Frederick the Great:[186]\n \u201cEs giebt vielerley Sorten von Spions: 1. Geringe Leute, welche\n sich von diesem Handwerk meliren. 2. Doppelte Spions. 3. Spions\n von Consequenz, und endlich 4. Diejenigen, welche man zu diesem\n ungl\u00fccklichen Hankwerk zwinget.\u201d This of course is a bad\n cross-division. The first class (\u201cB\u00fcrgersleute, Bauern, Priesters,\n etc.\u201d) corresponds roughly to Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s \u201clocal spies,\u201d and the\n third to \u201cinward spies.\u201d Of \u201cDoppelte Spions\u201d it is broadly stated\n that they are employed \u201cum dem Feinde falsche Nachrichten\n aufzubinden.\u201d Thus they would include both converted and doomed\n spies. Frederick\u2019s last class of spies does not appear in Sun\n Tz\u016d\u2019s list, perhaps because the risk in using them is too great.\n\n14. \u6545\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u89aa\u83ab\u89aa\u65bc\u9593\u8cde\u83ab\u539a\u65bc\u9593\u4e8b\u83ab\u5bc6\u65bc\u9593\n\nHence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate\nrelations to be maintained than with spies.\n\n The original text and the _T\u2018u Shu_ have \u4e8b in place of the first\n \u89aa. Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean point out that the spy is privileged to\n enter even the general\u2019s private sleeping-tent. Capt. Calthrop has\n an inaccurate translation: \u201cIn connection with the armies, spies\n should be treated with the greatest kindness.\u201d\n\nNone should be more liberally rewarded.\n\n Frederick concludes his chapter on spies with the words: \u201cZu allem\n diesem f\u00fcge ich noch hinzu, dass man in Bezahlung der Spions\n freygebig, ja verschwenderisch seyn muss. Ein Mench, der um eures\n Dienstes halber den Strick waget, verdienet daf\u00fcr belohnet zu\n werden.\u201d\n\nIn no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.\n\n Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: \u51fa\u53e3\u5165\u8033\u4e5f, that is to say, all\n communications with spies should be carried on \u201cmouth-to-ear.\u201d\n Capt. Calthrop has: \u201cAll matters relating to spies are secret,\u201d\n which is distinctly feeble. An inferior reading for \u5bc6 is \u5be9. The\n following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who made\n perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: \u201cSpies\n are attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is\n never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor should\n they know one another. When they propose anything very material,\n secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives\n and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate\n anything to them but what it is absolutely necessary that they\n should know.\u201d[187]\n\n15. \u975e\u8056\u667a\u4e0d\u80fd\u7528\u9593\n\nSpies cannot be usefully employed\n\n This is the _nuance_ of Tu Yu\u2019s paraphrase \u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u9593\u4eba\u4e4b\u7528.\n\nwithout a certain intuitive sagacity.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says: \u77e5\u5176\u60c5\u50de\u8fa8\u5176\u90aa\u6b63\u5247\u80fd\u7528 \u201cIn order to use them, one\n must know fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between\n honesty and double-dealing.\u201d Wang Hsi takes \u8056 and \u667a separately,\n defining the former as \u901a\u800c\u5148\u8b58 \u201cintuitive perception\u201d and the\n latter as \u660e\u65bc\u4e8b \u201cpractical intelligence.\u201d Tu Mu strangely refers\n these attributes to the spies themselves: \u5148\u91cf\u9593\u8005\u4e4b\u6027\u8aa0\u5be6\u591a\u667a\u7136\u5f8c\u53ef\u7528\u4e4b\n \u201cBefore using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity\n of character and the extent of their experience and skill.\u201d But he\n continues: \u539a\u8c8c\u6df1\u60c5\u96aa\u65bc\u5c71\u5ddd\u975e\u8056\u4eba\u83ab\u80fd\u77e5 \u201cA brazen face and a crafty\n disposition are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes\n a man of genius to penetrate such.\u201d So that we are left in some\n doubt as to his real opinion on the passage.\n\n16. \u975e\u4ec1\u7fa9\u4e0d\u80fd\u4f7f\u9593\n\nThey cannot be properly managed without benevolence and\nstraightforwardness.\n\n Chang Y\u00fc says that \u4ec1 means \u201cnot grudging them honours and pay;\u201d\n \u7fa9, \u201cshowing no distrust of their honesty.\u201d \u201cWhen you have\n attracted them by substantial offers, you must treat them with\n absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their\n might.\u201d\n\n17. \u975e\u5fae\u5999\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u9593\u4e4b\u5be6\n\nWithout subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth\nof their reports.\n\n Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean says: \u201cBe on your guard against the possibility of\n spies going over to the service of the enemy.\u201d The _T\u2018ung Tien_\n and _Y\u00fc Lan_ read \u5bc6 for \u5999.\n\n18. \u5fae\u54c9\u5fae\u54c9\u7121\u6240\u4e0d\u7528\u9593\u4e5f\n\nBe subtle! be subtle!\n\n Cf. VI. \u00a7 9: \u5fae\u4e4e\u5fae\u4e4e. Capt. Calthrop translates: \u201cWonderful indeed\n is the power of spies.\u201d\n\nand use your spies for every kind of business.\n\n19. \u9593\u4e8b\u672a\u767c\u800c\u5148\u805e\u8005\u9593\u8207\u6240\u544a\u8005\u7686\u6b7b\n\nIf a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is\nripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret\nwas told.\n\n The Chinese here is so concise and elliptical that some expansion\n is necessary for the proper understanding of it. \u9593\u4e8b denotes\n important information about the enemy obtained from a surviving\n spy. The subject of \u672a\u767c, however, is not this information itself,\n but the secret stratagem built up on the strength of it. \u805e\u8005 means\n \u201cis heard\u201d\u2014by anybody else. Thus, word for word, we get: \u201cIf spy\n matters are heard before [our plans] are carried out,\u201d etc. Capt.\n Calthrop, in translating \u9593\u8207\u6240\u544a\u8005 \u201cthe spy who told the matter,\n and the man who repeated the same,\u201d may appeal to the authority of\n the commentators; but he surely misses the main point of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s\n injunction. For, whereas you kill the spy himself \u60e1\u5176\u6cc4 \u201cas a\n punishment for letting out the secret,\u201d the object of killing the\n other man is only, as Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao puts it, \u4ee5\u6ec5\u53e3 \u201cto stop his mouth\u201d\n and prevent the news leaking any further. If it had already been\n repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way,\n Sun Tz\u016d lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu\n Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put\n to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the secret\n unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him. The\n _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_ have the reading ... \u5148\u805e\u5176\u9593\u8005\u8207, etc.,\n which, while not affecting the sense, strikes me as being better\n than that of the standard text. The _T\u2018u Shu_ has ... \u805e\u8207\u6240\u544a\u8005,\n which I suppose would mean: \u201cthe man who heard the secret and the\n man who told it to him.\u201d\n\n20. \u51e1\u8ecd\u4e4b\u6240\u6b32\u64ca\u57ce\u4e4b\u6240\u6b32\u653b\u4eba\u4e4b\u6240\u6b32\u6bba\u5fc5\u5148\u77e5\u5176\u5b88\u5c07\u5de6\u53f3\u8b01\u8005\u9580\u8005\u820d\u4eba\u4e4b\u59d3\u540d\u4ee4\u543e\u9593\n\u5fc5\u7d22\u77e5\u4e4b\n\nWhether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to\nassassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding\nout the names of the attendants,\n\n \u5de6\u53f3 is a comprehensive term for those who wait on others, servants\n and retainers generally. Capt. Calthrop is hardly happy in\n rendering it \u201cright-hand men.\u201d\n\nthe aides-de-camp,\n\n \u8b01\u8005, literally \u201cvisitors,\u201d is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to\n \u4e3b\u544a\u4e8b\u8005 \u201cthose whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with\n information,\u201d which naturally necessitates frequent interviews\n with him. Chang Y\u00fc goes too far afield for an explanation in\n saying that they are \u5178\u8cd3\u5ba2\u4e4b\u5c07 \u201cthe leaders of mercenary troops.\u201d\n\nthe door-keepers and sentries\n\n \u95bd\u540f and \u5b88\u820d\u4e4b\u4eba.\n\nof the general in command.\n\n \u5b88\u5c07, according to Chang Y\u00fc, is simply \u5b88\u5b98\u4efb\u8077\u4e4b\u5c07 \u201ca general on\n active service.\u201d Capt. Calthrop is wrong, I think, in making \u5b88\u5c07\n directly dependent on \u59d3\u540d (... \u201cthe names of the general in\n charge,\u201d etc.).\n\nOur spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.\n\n As the first step, no doubt, towards finding out if any of these\n important functionaries can be won over by bribery. Capt. Calthrop\n blunders badly with: \u201cThen set the spies to watch them.\u201d\n\n21. \u5fc5\u7d22\u6575\u4eba\u4e4b\u9593\u4f86\u9593\u6211\u8005\u56e0\u800c\u5229\u4e4b\u5c0e\u800c\u820d\u4e4b\u6545\u53cd\u9593\u53ef\u5f97\u800c\u7528\u4e5f\n\nThe enemy\u2019s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out,\n\n \u5fc5\u7d22 is omitted by the _T\u2018ung Tien_ and _Y\u00fc Lan_. Its recurrence is\n certainly suspicious, though the sense may seem to gain by it. The\n _T\u2018u Shu_ has this variation: ... \u6575\u9593\u4e4b\u4f86\u9593\u543e\u8005, etc.\n\ntempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed.\n\n \u820d is probably more than merely \u5c45\u6b62 or \u7a3d\u7559 \u201cdetain.\u201d Cf. \u00a7 25 _ad\n fin._, where Sun Tz\u016d insists that these converted spies shall be\n treated well. Chang Y\u00fc\u2019s paraphrase is \u9928\u820d.\n\nThus they will become converted spies and available for our service.\n\n22. \u56e0\u662f\u800c\u77e5\u4e4b\u6545\u9109\u9593\u5167\u9593\u53ef\u5f97\u800c\u4f7f\u4e5f\n\nIt is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are\nable to acquire and employ local and inward spies.\n\n Tu Yu expands \u56e0\u662f\u800c\u77e5\u4e4b into \u56e0\u53cd\u6575\u9593\u800c\u77e5\u6575\u60c5 \u201cthrough conversion of\n the enemy\u2019s spies we learn the enemy\u2019s condition.\u201d And Chang Y\u00fc\n says: \u56e0\u662f\u53cd\u9593\u77e5\u5f7c\u9109\u4eba\u4e4b\u8caa\u5229\u8005\u5b98\u4eba\u4e4b\u6709\u9699\u8005\u8a98\u800c\u4f7f\u4e4b \u201cWe must tempt the\n converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which\n of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the\n officials are open to corruption.\u201d In the _T\u2018ung Tien_, \u9109 has been\n altered to \u56e0, doubtless for the sake of uniformity with \u00a7 9.\n\n23. \u56e0\u662f\u800c\u77e5\u4e4b\u6545\u6b7b\u9593\u7232\u8a91\u4e8b\u53ef\u4f7f\u544a\u6575\n\nIt is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed\nspy to carry false tidings to the enemy.\n\n \u201cBecause the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be\n deceived\u201d (Chang Y\u00fc). The _T\u2018ung Tien_ text, followed by the _Y\u00fc\n Lan_, has here the obviously interpolated sentence \u56e0\u662f\u53ef\u5f97\u800c\u653b\u4e5f.\n\n24. \u56e0\u662f\u800c\u77e5\u4e4b\u6545\u751f\u9593\u6709\u4f7f\u5982\u671f\n\nLastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on\nappointed occasions.\n\n Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.\n\n25. \u4e94\u9593\u4e4b\u4e8b\u4e3b\u5fc5\u77e5\u4e4b\u77e5\u4e4b\u5fc5\u5728\u65bc\u53cd\u9593\u6545\u53cd\u9593\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u539a\u4e5f\n\nThe end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of\nthe enemy;\n\n I have ventured to differ in this place from those commentators\u2014Tu\n Yu and Chang Y\u00fc\u2014who understand \u4e3b as \u4eba\u4e3b, and make \u4e94\u9593\u4e4b\u4e8b the\n antecedent of \u4e4b (the others ignoring the point altogether). It\n is plausible enough that Sun Tz\u016d should require the ruler to be\n familiar with the methods of spying (though one would rather\n expect \u5c07 \u201cgeneral\u201d in place of \u4e3b). But this involves taking \u77e5\u4e4b\n here in quite a different way from the \u77e5\u4e4b immediately following,\n as also from those in the previous sentences. \u4e4b there refers\n vaguely to the enemy or the enemy\u2019s condition, and in order to\n retain the same meaning here, I make \u4e3b a verb, governed by\n \u4e94\u9593\u4e4b\u4e8b. Cf. XI. \u00a7 19, where \u4e3b is used in exactly the same\n manner. The sole objection that I can see in the way of this\n interpretation is the fact that the \u6b7b\u9593, or fourth variety of spy,\n does not add to our knowledge of the enemy, but only misinforms\n the enemy about us. This would be, however, but a trivial\n oversight on Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s part, inasmuch as the \u201cdoomed spy\u201d is in\n the strictest sense not to be reckoned as a spy at all. Capt.\n Calthrop, it is hardly necessary to remark, slurs over the whole\n difficulty.\n\nand this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from\nthe converted spy.\n\n As explained in \u00a7\u00a7 22\u201324. He not only brings information himself,\n but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.\n\n Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the\n utmost liberality.\n\n26. \u6614\u6bb7\u4e4b\u8208\u4e5f\u4f0a\u646f\u5728\u590f\u5468\u4e4b\u8208\u4e5f\u5442\u7259\u5728\u6bb7\n\nOf old, the rise of the Yin dynasty\n\n Sun Tz\u016d means the \u5546 Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name\n was changed to Yin by \u76e4\u5e9a P\u2018an K\u00eang in 1401.\n\nwas due to I Chih\n\n Better known as \u4f0a\u5c39 I Yin, the famous general and statesman who\n took part in Ch\u2018\u00eang T\u2018ang\u2019s campaign against \u6840\u7678 Chieh Kuei.\n\nwho had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty\nwas due to L\u00fc Ya\n\n \u5442\u5c19 L\u00fc Shang, whose \u201cstyle\u201d was \u5b50\u7259, rose to high office\n under the tyrant \u7d02\u8f9b Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to\n overthrow. Popularly known as \u592a\u516c, a title bestowed on him by W\u00ean\n Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously\n identified with the \u516d\u97dc.\n\nwho had served under the Yin.\n\n There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to\n introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are\n by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly\n doubt that Sun Tz\u016d is holding up I Chih and L\u00fc Ya as illustrious\n examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His\n suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the\n intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcomings which these\n former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\n appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: \u201cI Yin\n and L\u00fc Ya,\u201d he says, \u201cwere not rebels against the Government\n (\u975e\u53db\u65bc\u570b\u4e5f). Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him.\n Yin could not employ the latter, hence Chou employed him. Their great\n achievements were all for the good of the people.\u201d Ho Shih is also\n indignant: \u4f0a\u5442\u8056\u4eba\u4e4b\u8026\u8c48\u7232\u4eba\u9593\u54c9\u4eca\u5b6b\u5b50\u5f15\u4e4b\u8005\u8a00\u4e94\u9593\u4e4b\u7528\u9808\u4e0a\u667a\u4e4b\u4eba\u5982\u4f0a\u5442\u4e4b\u624d\u667a\u8005\n \u53ef\u4ee5\u7528\u9593\u8462\u91cd\u4e4b\u4e4b\u8fad\u8033 \u201cHow should two divinely inspired men such as I and\n L\u00fc have acted as common spies? Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s mention of them simply means\n that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter which\n requires men of the highest mental calibre like I and L\u00fc, whose\n wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only\n emphasise this point.\u201d Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are\n mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of spies. But\n this is very weak, as it leaves totally unexplained the significant\n words \u5728\u590f and \u5728\u6bb7. Capt. Calthrop speaks, rather strangely, of \u201cthe\n province of Yin ... the country of Hsia ... the State of Chu ... the\n people of Shang.\u201d\n\n27. \u6545\u60df\u660e\u541b\u8ce2\u5c07\u80fd\u4ee5\u4e0a\u667a\u7232\u9593\u8005\u5fc5\u6210\u5927\u529f\u6b64\u5175\u4e4b\u8981\u4e09\u8ecd\u4e4b\u6240\u6043\u800c\u52d5\u4e5f\n\nHence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will\nuse the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying,\n\n Ch\u2018\u00ean Hao compares \u00a7 15: \u975e\u8056\u667a\u4e0d\u80fd\u7528\u9593. He points out that \u6e6f\u6b66\u4e4b\u8056\n \u4f0a\u5442\u5b9c\u7528 \u201cthe god-like wisdom of Ch\u2018\u00eang T\u2018ang and Wu Wang led them\n to employ I Yin and L\u00fc Shang.\u201d The _T\u2018u Shu_ omits \u60df.\n\nand thereby they achieve great results.\n\n Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: \u592b\u6c34\u6240\u4ee5\u80fd\u6fdf\u821f\u4ea6\u6709\u56e0\u6c34\u800c\u8986\u6c92\u8005\u9593\n \u6240\u4ee5\u80fd\u6210\u529f\u4ea6\u6709\u6191\u9593\u800c\u50be\u6557\u8005 \u201cJust as water, which carries a boat from\n bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on\n spies, while productive of great results, is oft-times the cause\n of utter destruction.\u201d\n\nSpies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an\narmy\u2019s ability to move.\n\n The antecedent to \u6b64 must be either \u9593\u8005 or \u7528\u9593\u8005 understood from\n the whole sentence. Chia Lin says that an army without spies is\n like a man without ears or eyes.\n\n\n\n\n CHINESE CONCORDANCE\n\n [PROPER NAMES ARE INDICATED BY AN ASTERISK]\n\nAi \u611b VIII. 12; X. 25, 26; XI. 18, 66; XIII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u9628 X. 21.\n\nan \u5b89 II. 20; V. 22; VI. 4; XII. 22.\n\nCha \u8a50 VII. 15.\n\nch\u2018a \u5bdf I. 2; VIII. 14; IX. 39; X. 13, 20; XI. 41.\n\nchan \u6230 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u9711 XI. 28.\n\nchang \u969c IX. 21.\n\n\u201e \u4ed7 IX. 29.\n\nch\u2018ang \u5e38 VI. 32, 34; X. 18; XI. 29.*\n\n\u201e \u9577 VI. 34.\n\n\u201e \u5617 V. 9.\n\nchao \u671d VII. 28.\n\nch\u00ea \u8005 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u6298 V. 13; XI. 63.\n\nch\u00ean \u8eeb XII. 4.*\n\nch\u2018\u00ean \u9673 VII. 32; IX. 25, 27; X. 18.\n\n\u201e \u5875 IX. 23.\n\nch\u00eang \u722d III. 7; VII. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 22: VIII. 3; XI. 1, 4, 11, 47,\n55; XIII. 2.\n\nch\u00eang \u6b63 V. 3, 5, 10, 11; VII. 32; XI. 35.\n\n\u201e \u653f III. 3, 14; IV. 16; VII. 23; XI. 32, 56, 63.\n\n\u201e \u6574 XI. 18.\n\nch\u2018\u00eang \u6210 III. 4; XI. 62; XIII. 4, 27.\n\n\u201e \u57ce II. 2; III. 3, 4, 5, 6; VIII. 3; XI. 7, 55; XIII. 20.\n\n\u201e \u4e58^2 II. 4, 17; XI. 19.\n\n\u201e \u4e58^4 II. 1, 17.\n\n\u201e \u7a31 IV. 17, 18, 19.\n\nchi \u8a08 I. 3, 12, 15, 16; VI. 22; VII. 4, 22; X. 21; XI. 22.\n\n\u201e \u53ca VI. 10; VII. 6; XI. 15, 19, 68.\n\n\u201e \u6c72 IX. 30.\n\n\u201e \u6025 II. 12.\n\n\u201e \u5df1 III. 18; IV. 2; VI. 18; X. 31; XI. 55.\n\n\u201e \u7d00 XIII. 8.\n\n\u201e \ud85a\udfbc II. 15.\n\n\u201e \u64ca VI. 15, 30; VII. 29, 32; VIII. 3; IX. 4; X. 7, 15, 19, 27, 28, 29;\nXI. 9, 29; XIII. 20.\n\nchi \u4e9f IX. 7, 15; XI. 65.\n\n\u201e \u6975 VI. 25; XII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u96c6 IX. 32; XI. 16.\n\n\u201e \u6fc0 V. 12.\n\n\u201e \u65e2 III. 16; VII. 25.\n\n\u201e \u75be V. 12, 13; VII. 17; IX. 12; XI. 10.\n\n\u201e \u6a5f V. 15; XI. 38.\n\n\u201e \u98e2 VI. 4; VII. 31; IX. 29.\n\n\u201e \u7a4d IV. 20; VII. 11; XI. 22; XII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u39b8 II. 14.\n\n\u201e \u7c4d II. 8.\n\n\u201e \u7b95 XII. 4.*\n\n\u201e \u6fdf IX. 4; XI. 30.\n\n\u201e \u7e7c XI. 49.\n\nch\u2018i \u5176 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u671f IX. 27; XI. 38, 66; XIII. 24.\n\n\u201e \u65d7 II. 17; VII. 23, 24, 26, 32; IX. 33.\n\n\u201e \u5668 III. 4.\n\n\u201e \u6f06 II. 1.\n\n\u201e \u8d77 II. 4; IX. 22; XII. 3, 4; XIII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u9699 III. 11; IX. 15.\n\n\u201e \u9f4a IX. 43; XI. 16, 32.\n\n\u201e \u4e03 II. 13; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u5947 V. 3, 5, 6, 10, 11.\n\n\u201e \u8c3f IV. 20; X. 25.\n\n\u201e \u6c23 VII. 27, 28, 29; XI. 22.\n\nchia \u5bb6 I. 25; II. 13, 14, 20; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u7532 II. 1, 14; VII. 7.\n\n\u201e \u52a0 V. 4; XI. 54, 55.\n\nchia \u846d IX. 17.\n\nchiang \u6c5f V. 6.\n\n\u201e \u5f4a V. 17, 18.\n\n\u201e \u5c07^1 XI. 18, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.\n\n\u201e \u5c07^4 I. 4, 9, 11, 13, 15; II. 15, 20; III. 5, 11, 17; VII. 1, 7, 9,\n27; VIII. 1, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14; IX. 33; X. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21;\nXI. 35, 40, 61; XII. 16, 18, 22; XIII. 3, 4, 20, 27.\n\n\u201e \u8523 IX. 17.\n\nch\u2018iang \u5f3a I. 13, 21; II. 18; III. 11; IX. 24; X. 16, 19; XII. 13.\n\nchiao \u4ea4 III. 3; VII. 2, 12; VIII. 2; IX. 8; XI. 1, 5, 12, 28, 48, 52,\n54, 55.\n\n\u201e \u6821 I. 3, 12.\n\n\u201e \u6559 IX. 44; X. 18.\n\n\u201e \u9a55 I. 22; X. 26.\n\n\u201e \u81a0 II. 1.\n\nch\u2018iao \u5de7 II. 5; XI. 62.\n\n\u201e \u6a35 IX. 23.\n\nchieh \u7aed II. 11, 12; V. 6.\n\n\u201e \u7686 VI. 27; XI. 33; XIII. 19.\n\n\u201e \u6212 XI. 19, 25.\n\n\u201e \u6f54 VIII. 12.\n\n\u201e \u7bc0 V. 13, 14, 15.\n\n\u201e \u89e3 VIII. 9.\n\n\u201e \u7d50 XI. 48.\n\nch\u2018ieh \u4e14 III. 16; XI. 23.\n\nch\u2018ieh \u602f V. 17, 18; VII. 25.\n\nchien \u9592 or \u9593 VI. 25; XIII. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u6f97 IX. 15.\n\n\u201e \u517c VII. 7.\n\n\u201e \u59e6 IX. 17.\n\n\u201e \u5805 III. 10.\n\n\u201e \u8ce4 IX. 11; XI. 15.\n\n\u201e \u8e10 XI. 67.\n\n\u201e \u898b I. 26; IV. 8, 10; VII. 23; IX. 31.\n\nch\u2018ien \u5343 II. 1; IV. 20; V. 23; VI. 6, 19; XI. 61; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u6dfa XI. 42, 44.\n\n\u201e \u524d VI. 17, 20; IX. 9; XI. 15, 45.\n\nchih \u77e5 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u667a I. 9; II. 4, 15; IV. 12; VIII. 7; XIII. 15, 27.\n\n\u201e \u4e4b _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u4e4b [=\u81f3] VI. 12; XI. 39.\n\n\u201e \u6b62 V. 22; XI. 11, 17; XII. 8, 11, 19.\n\n\u201e \u652f X. 1, 6, 7.\n\n\u201e \u76f4 VII. 3, 4, 22.\n\n\u201e \u5236 I. 7, 10, 17; VI. 27, 31; X. 21.\n\n\u201e \u5fd7 XI. 46.\n\n\u201e \u646f XIII. 26.*\n\n\u201e \u9dd9 V. 13.\n\n\u201e \u6cbb V. 1, 17, 18; VII. 29, 30, 31, 32; VIII. 6; X. 26; XI. 35.\n\n\u201e \u81f3 III. 16; V. 12, 13; VI. 3, 9, 25; VII. 4, 8, 9, 10; IX. 14, 37; X.\n13, 20; XI. 6, 26, 29; XIII. 2.\n\nchih \u81f4 VI. 2; XII. 18.\n\nch\u2018ih \u99b3 II. 1.\n\n\u201e \u65a5 IX. 7, 8.\n\nchin \u8fd1 I. 8, 19; II. 11; VI. 20; VII. 31; IX. 15, 16, 18; X. 21.\n\n\u201e \u9032 III. 13; VI. 10; VII. 25; IX. 19, 24, 28, 31, 40; X. 24; XI. 49.\n\n\u201e \u76e1 II. 7; XI. 23.\n\n\u201e \u91d1 II. 1; VII. 23, 24; XIII. 1, 2.\n\n\u201e \u8b39 IX. 17, 39; XL 22, 48.\n\n\u201e \u7981 XI. 26.\n\n\u201e \u895f XI. 28.\n\nch\u2018in \u89aa I. 23; IX. 42; XI. 25; XIII. 14.\n\n\u201e \u64d2 III. 10; VII. 7; IX. 41.\n\n\u201e \u4fb5 VII. 18.\n\n\u201e \u975c V. 22; VI. 23; VII. 30; IX. 18; XI. 35; XII. 7.\n\n\u201e \u65cc II. 17: VII. 23, 24, 26; IX. 33.\n\n\u201e \u4e95 IX. 15, 17.\n\n\u201e \u52c1 VII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u7d93 I. 3.\n\n\u201e \u7cbe IX. 37.\n\n\u201e \u8b66 XII. 22.\n\n\u201e \u5883 XI. 43.\n\nch\u2018ing \u60c5 I. 3, 12; XI. 19, 41, 51; XIII. 2, 6.\n\n\u201e \u8acb IX. 26.\n\nch\u2018ing \u8f15 IX. 25; XI. 1, 3, 11, 44, 46.\n\nchio \u89d2 VI. 24.\n\n\u201e \u7235 XIII. 2.\n\nchiu \u4e5d IV. 7; VIII. 4, 5, 6; XI. 41.\n\n\u201e \u4e45 II. 2, 3, 5, 6, 19; III. 6; IX. 39; XII. 11.\n\n\u201e \u6551 VI. 11, 20; XI. 15, 30.\n\nch\u2018iu \u6c42 IV. 15; V. 21; X. 24; XI. 25.\n\n\u201e \u4e18 II. 12, 14.\n\n\u201e \u90b1 VII. 33; IX. 13.\n\n\u201e \u79cb IV. 10.\n\nchiung \u7a98 IX. 36.\n\nch\u2018iung \u7aae V. 6, 10, 11; VI. 28; VII. 36; IX. 34; X. 30.\n\ncho \u62d9 II. 5.\n\nchou \u665d VII. 26, 28; XII. 11.\n\n\u201e \u821f XI. 30, 39.\n\n\u201e \u5468 III. 11: XIII. 26.*\n\n\u201e \u80c4 II. 14.\n\nchu \u4e3b I. 10, 13; II. 20; X. 23, 24; XI. 19, 20; XII. 16, 18; XIII. 3,\n25.\n\n\u201e \u8af8 II. 4; III. 16; VII. 12; VIII. 10; XI. 2, 6, 28,* 38, 52.\n\n\u201e \u8457 IX. 45.\n\n\u201e \u52a9 IX. 13; X. 21.\n\n\u201e \u8a85 XI. 64.\n\n\u201e \u5c6c XI. 6, 46.\n\nch\u2018u \u8655^3 VI. 1, 24, 30; VII. 7; IX. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13: XI. 68.\n\nch\u2018u \u8655^4 IX. 17.\n\n\u201e \u51fa I. 24; V. 6; VI. 5; IX. 25; X. 5, 6, 7; XIII. 1, 4.\n\nchuan \u5c08 VI. 13, 14; VII. 25; XI. 20, 42.\n\n\u201e \u8f49 V. 22, 23.\n\nch\u2018uan \u50b3 I. 25; XIII. 12.\n\nchui \u8ffd VI. 10.\n\n\u201e \u968a XII. I.\n\nchun \u8ac4 IX. 35.\n\n\u201e \u8846 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u91cd VII. 6, 11; IX. 33; XI. 1, 7, 13, 44, 49.\n\n\u201e \u937e II. 15.\n\n\u201e \u7d42 V. 6.\n\n\u201e \u4e2d II. 13; IX. 8; XI. 29.\n\nch\u2018ung \u885d VI. 10.\n\nch\u00fc \u5c45 IX. 20, 25; X. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11; XI. 37.\n\n\u201e \u8209 II. 1; IV. 10; VII. 6; X. 30; XI. 63.\n\n\u201e \u805a VII. 2; VIII. 1; XI. 40, 54.\n\n\u201e \u8eca II. 1, 14, 17; IX. 23, 25.\n\n\u201e \u5177 III. 4; XII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u4ff1 X. 25; XI. 29; XIII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u6cae VII. 13; XI. 8, 52.\n\n\u201e \u62d2 XI. 68.\n\n\u201e \u8ddd III. 4.\n\n\u201e \u62d8 XI. 24.\n\n\u201e \u61fc XI. 24.\n\nch\u2018\u00fc \u53bb I. 15; II. 13, 14; IX. 7, 15, 39; X. 7, 11; XI. 26, 38, 43.\n\nch\u2018\u00fc \u53d6 I. 20; II. 9, 16; V. 19; VI. 7, 33; IX. 40, 43; XII. 15; XIII.\n5, 6.\n\n\u201e \u5c48 II. 2, 4, 13; III. 2, 6; VIII. 10; XI. 41.\n\n\u201e \u8da8 VI. 1, 5, 29, 30; VII. 7: VIII. 10; XI. 47.\n\n\u201e \u9a45 IX. 24; XI. 39.\n\n\u201e \u8862 VIII. 2; XI. 1, 6, 12, 43, 48.\n\n\u201e \u66f2 I. 10.\n\nch\u00fcan \u5377 VII. 7.\n\n\u201e \u5026 IX. 33.\n\nch\u2018\u00fcan \u5168 III. 1, 7; IV. 7; X. 31; XII. 22.\n\n\u201e \u6b0a I. 17; III. 15; VII. 21; XI. 55.\n\nch\u00fceh \u7d76 VIII. 2; IX. 1, 3, 4, 7, 15; XI. 22, 43; XII. 14.\n\n\u201e \u6c7a IV. 20; XI. 67.\n\n\u201e \u8e76 VII. 9.\n\nch\u2018\u00fceh \u95d5 VII. 36; XI. 50.\n\nch\u00fcn \u541b III. 12, 17; VII. 1; VIII. 1, 3; XII. 22; XIII. 4, 8, 27.\n\n\u201e \u8ecd _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u5747 X. 12, 15.\n\nch\u2018\u00fcn \u7fa3 XI. 39.\n\n\u00carh \u4e8c I. 4; II. 15; IV. 17; VII. 10; XII. 1.\n\n\u00earh \u8033 IV. 10; VII. 24, 26; XI. 36.\n\n\u201e \u5152 X. 25.\n\n\u201e \u800c _passim_.\n\nFa \u6cd5 I. 4, 10, 13; II. 1; III. 1, 4, 7, 8; IV. 16, 17; VII. 1, 8, 9,\n22, 25, 33, 37; VIII. 1, 11; XI. 1, 56.\n\nFa \u767c V. 15; VII. 4; XI. 28, 38; XII. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10; XIII. 19.\n\n\u201e \u7f70 I. 13; IX. 36, 42.\n\n\u201e \u4f10 III. 3; XI. 54.\n\nfan \u53cd XIII. 7, 11, 13, 21, 25.\n\n\u201e \u8fd4 IX. 34; X. 4, 5.\n\n\u201e \u51e1 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u72af XI. 56, 57.\n\n\u201e \u7169 VIII. 12.\n\nfang \u65b9 V. 22; XI. 31.\n\n\u201e \u9632 IX. 13.\n\nfei \u8cbb II. 1, 13, 14; XII. 15; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u975e III. 2, 6; IV. 8, 9; IX. 40; X. 14; XI. 27, 53; XII. 17; XIII. 3,\n15, 16, 17.\n\nf\u00ean \u5206 III. 5, 8; V. 1; VI. 13, 14; VII. 10, 16, 20.\n\n\u201e \u5fff III. 5; VIII. 12.\n\n\u201e \u7d1b V. 16.\n\n\u201e \u711a XI. 39.\n\n\u201e \u8f52 III. 4.\n\nf\u00eang \u98a8 VII. 17; XI. 30; XII. 4, 10, 11.\n\n\u201e \u5949 II. 1; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u92d2 X. 19.\n\nfou \u7f3b IX. 34.\n\n\u201e \u8986 IX. 22.\n\nfu \u7b26 XI. 63.\n\n\u201e \u9644 III. 5; IX. 5, 42.\n\n\u201e \u592b _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u6276 XI. 15.\n\n\u201e \u5fa9 V. 6; VI. 28; XII. 20, 21.\n\n\u201e \u8986 VIII. 14; IX. 17.\n\n\u201e \u4f0f IX. 17, 22.\n\n\u201e \u8ca0 I. 14, 26; III. 18.\n\n\u201e \u670d IX. 42, 44; X. 17.\n\n\u201e \u91dc XI. 39.\n\n\u201e \u8d74 X. 25.\n\n\u201e \u8f14 III. 11.\n\nHai \u5bb3 II. 7; VI. 3; VIII. 7, 9, 10; XI. 57, 59.\n\nhan \u5bd2 I. 7.\n\nhao \u4eb3 IV. 10.\n\nh\u00eang \u6a6b X. 18.\n\nho \u5408 V. 5; VII. 2, 16; VIII. 1, 2; IX. 39; X. 19, 24; XI. 12, 16, 17,\n54; XII. 19.\n\n\u201e \u95d4 XI. 65.\n\n\u201e \u4f55 XI. 18.\n\n\u201e \u6cb3 V. 6.\n\n\u201e \u548c VII. 2; IX. 26.\n\nhou \u539a X. 26; XIII. 14, 25.\n\n\u201e \u4faf II. 4; III. 16; VII. 12; VIII. 10; XI. 2, 6, 52.\n\n\u201e \u5f8c _passim_.\n\nhsi \u6614 IV. 1; XIII. 26.\n\n\u201e \u559c IX. 11; XII. 20.\n\n\u201e \u595a VI. 21.\n\n\u201e \u7fd5 IX. 35.\n\n\u201e \u606f IX. 38.\n\n\u201e \u651c XI. 34.\n\nhsia \u4e0b III. 3, 7, 17; IV. 7, 9; VI. 29; IX. 11; XI. 6, 15, 55; XII. 10.\n\n\u201e \u590f XIII. 26.*\n\nhsia \u72f9 I. 8.\n\nhsiang \u76f8^1 V. 11; VII. 23; IX. 39, 45; XI. 15, 30; XIII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u76f8^4 IX. 1.\n\n\u201e \u9109 VII. 14, 20; XI. 52; XIII. 7, 9, 22.\n\n\u201e \u5411 VII. 33; XI. 61.\n\n\u201e \u8c61 VI. 29; XIII. 5.\n\n\u201e \u7965 XI. 26.\n\n\u201e \u8a73 XI. 60.\n\nhsiao \u5c0f III. 10; IX. 17.\n\nhsieh \u68b0 III. 4.\n\n\u201e \u99ed IX. 22.\n\n\u201e \u8b1d IX. 38.\n\nhsien \u5148 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u96aa I. 8; V. 14; VII. 13; IX. 17, 18; X. 1, 10, 21; XI. 8, 40, 52.\n\n\u201e \u9677 IX. 15; X. 14, 16; XI. 24, 58, 59.\n\nhsien \u8ce2 XIII. 4, 27.\n\nhsin \u4fe1 I. 9; IX. 45; XI. 25.\n\n\u201e \u5fc3 VII. 27, 30.\n\nhsing \u884c I. 13; V. 22; VI. 6, 29, 34; VII. 7, 13; IX. 42, 44; XI. 8, 13,\n52; XII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u5f62 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u8208 XII. 18: XIII. 1, 26.\n\n\u201e \u6027 V. 22.\n\nhsing \u59d3 II. 10, 11, 13; XIII. 1, 20.\n\nhsiu \u4fee III. 4; IV. 6; XI. 25; XII. 15, 16.\n\n\u201e \u4f11 IX. 38.\n\nhsiung \u51f6 XII. 15.\n\nhs\u00fc \u865b II. 13; V. 4; VI. 10; IX. 32.\n\n\u201e \u5f90 VII. 17; IX. 35.\n\n\u201e \u5bbf XII. 4.\n\nhs\u00fcan \u61f8 VII. 21; IX. 34; XI. 56.\n\n\u201e \u9078 X. 19.\n\nhs\u00fcn \u5faa V. 11.\n\nhu \u4e4e I. 26; VI. 9; XI. 30.\n\n\u201e \u547c IX. 32.\n\n\u201e \u6236 XI. 68.\n\nhua \u5316 VI. 33.\n\n\u201e \u756b VI. 12.\n\n\u201e \u8b41 VII. 30.\n\nhuan \u60a3 III. 12; VII. 3; VIII. 9.\n\n\u201e \u74b0 V. 11.\n\nhuang \u9ec3 IX. 10.*\n\n\u201e \u6f62 IX. 17.\n\nhui \u6bc1 III. 6; V. 13.\n\n\u201e \u96b3 XI. 55.\n\n\u201e \u6703 VI. 19.\n\nhun \u6e3e V. 16.\n\nhuo \u8ca8 II. 4, 16; XI. 27.\n\n\u201e \u706b VII. 18, 26; XII. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u60d1 III. 14, 16.\n\n\u201e \u6d3b XI. 50.\n\nI \u4e00 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u5df2 II. 17; III. 4; IV. 13; IX. 40, 42; XI. 24, 34, 51.\n\nI \u6613 I. 8; IV. 11; IX. 9, 20, 41; XI. 37.\n\n\u201e \u610f I. 5, 24; VI. 5; XI. 60.\n\n\u201e \u76ca II. 18; VI. 21; IX. 24, 40.\n\n\u201e \u93b0 IV. 19.\n\n\u201e \u7591 III. 15, 16; IX. 21; XI. 26.\n\n\u201e \u4f5a I. 23; VI. 1, 4; VII. 31.\n\n\u201e \u5f79 II. 8, 12; VIII. 10.\n\n\u201e \u4ea6 VI. 21; XI. 4.\n\n\u201e \u4fc5 IX. 1, 8.\n\n\u201e \u501a IX. 29.\n\n\u201e \u4f0a XIII. 26.*\n\n\u201e \u9091 XI. 7.\n\n\u201e \u9824 XI. 28.\n\n\u201e \u5937 XI. 63.\n\n\u201e \u7fa9 XIII. 16.\n\n\u201e \u87fb III. 5.\n\n\u201e \u7ffc XII. 4.*\n\n\u201e \u8619 IX. 17.\n\n\u201e \u4ee5 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u77e3 _passim_.\n\nJan \u7136 II. 1; XI. 29, 30, 58, 59.\n\njao \u64fe IX. 33.\n\n\u201e \u9952 XI. 21.\n\nj\u00ean \u4eba _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u4ec1 I. 9; XIII. 2, 16.\n\n\u201e \u4efb III. 15; V. 21, 22; X. 13, 20.\n\n\u201e \u4ede IV. 20; V. 23.\n\njih \u65e5 II. 1; IV. 10; V. 6; VI. 19, 20, 34; VII. 7; XI. 28, 63; XII. 3,\n4; XIII. 1, 2.\n\njo \u82e5 III. 9; IV. 19, 20; IX. 8; X. 5, 9, 11; XI. 18, 32, 34, 39, 56.\n\n\u201e \u5f31 III. 11; V. 17, 18; X. 16, 18, 19.\n\njou \u8089 IX. 34.\n\n\u201e \u67d4 XI. 33.\n\nju \u8fb1 VIII. 12.\n\n\u201e \u5165 IX. 35; XI. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u5982 V. _passim_; VII. 17, 18, 19; X. 25, 26; XI. 29, 30, 38, 68; XIII.\n24.\n\njui \u92ed II. 2, 4; VII. 28, 29, 34; IX. 23.\n\nK\u2018ai \u958b XI. 65, 68.\n\nkan \u6562 XI. 18, 30.\n\n\u201e \u79c6 II. 15.\n\nkang \u525b XI. 33.\n\nkao \u9ad8 VI. 11, 29; VII. 33; IX. 2, 6, 9, 11, 23: X. 3, 10; XI. 38.\n\n\u201e \u544a XI. 57; XIII. 19, 23.\n\nk\u00eang \u66f4 II. 17.\n\nko \u9769 II. 1; XI. 37.\n\nk\u2018o \u6e34 IX. 30.\n\n\u201e \u5ba2 II. 1; IX. 4, 5; XI. 20, 42.\n\n\u201e \u514b XI. 20.\n\n\u201e \u53ef _passim_.\n\nkou \u6e9d VI. 11.\n\nk\u2018ou \u5bbc VII. 36; IX. 34.\n\nku \u53e4 IV. 11; XI. 15.\n\n\u201e \u56fa VI. 7; XI. 24, 45, 48.\n\n\u201e \u6545 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u8c37 IX. 1.\n\n\u201e \u9f13 VII. 23, 24, 26.\n\nk\u2018u \u5eab XII. 1.\n\nkua \u5be1 III. 17; V. 1, 2; VI. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; XI. 9, 15.\n\n\u201e \u6302 X. 1, 4, 5.\n\nkuai \u4e56 VI. 12.\n\nkuan \u5b98 I. 10; XIII. 10.\n\n\u201e \u95dc XI. 63.\n\n\u201e \u89c0 I. 26; V. 8.\n\nkuang \u5ee3 I. 8; IX. 23.\n\nk\u2018uang \u6cc1 I. 26; VI. 20.\n\n\u201e \u8a91 XIII. 12, 23.\n\nkuei \u6b78 VII. 28, 29, 35; XI. 9.\n\n\u201e \u9b3c XIII. 5.\n\n\u201e \u8cb4 II. 11, 19; IX. 11; XI. 15.\n\n\u201e \u528c XI. 28.*\n\n\u201e \u8a6d I. 18.\n\nk\u2018uei \u7aba VI. 25.\n\n\u201e \u994b II. 1.\n\nk\u2018un \u56f0 IX. 36.\n\nkung \u516c II. 14; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u529f IV. 12; XIII. 4, 27.\n\n\u201e \u653b _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u5171 VI. 14.\n\nk\u2018ung \u6050 IX. 32.\n\nkuo \u570b I. 1; II. 3, 6, 9, 10, 20; III. 1, 6, 11; X. 24; XI. 43, 54, 55;\nXII. 21, 22.\n\n\u201e \u904e IV. 8; V. 7, 8, 9, 10; VIII. 13; X. 14; XI. 51.\n\n\u201e \u5f4d V. 15.\n\nk\u2018uo \u5ed3 VII. 20.\n\nLai \u4f86 VIII. 11; IX. 4, 21, 23, 38; X. 2; XI. 5, 18, 39; XIII. 21.\n\nlang \u5eca XI. 64.\n\nlao \u52de I. 23; VI. 1, 4, 6; VII. 31; IX. 31; XI. 22.\n\n\u201e \u7262 IX. 15.\n\nlei \u58d8 VI. 11.\n\n\u201e \u96f7 IV. 10; VII. 19.\n\nli \u540f IX. 33; X. 16, 17, 18.\n\n\u201e \u91cc II. 1; VI. 6, 19, 20; VII. 7, 9, 10; XI. 61; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u7406 VI. 23; XI. 33, 41.\n\n\u201e \u529b II. 2, 4, 13; IV. 10; VII. 31; IX. 40; XI. 22, 23; XII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u7acb IV. 14; VII. 15; IX. 29.\n\n\u201e \u96e2 I. 23; XI. 16.\n\n\u201e \u53b2 XI. 64.\n\n\u201e \u5229 _passim_.\n\nliang \u91cf IV. 17, 18.\n\n\u201e \u7ce7 II. 1, 8, 9; VII. 11; X. 3.\n\n\u201e \u826f XII. 16, 22.\n\nliao \u6599 IX. 40; X. 19, 21.\n\nlien \u5ec9 VIII. 12.\n\n\u201e \u7df4 I. 13.\n\nlin \u6797 VII. 13, 17; IX. 17; XI. 8, 52.\n\nling \u4ee4 I. 5, 13; IX. 4, 43, 44, 45; X. 7, 26; XI. 25, 28, 56; XIII. 12,\n20.\n\n\u201e \u9675 VII. 33; IX. 13.\n\nliu \u516d II. 14; X. 13, 14, 20.\n\n\u201e \u7559 I. 15; VIII. 2; IX. 7; XII. 15.\n\n\u201e \u6d41 VI. 31; IX. 6.\n\nlo \u7f85 IX. 15.\n\nlu \u865c VIII. 12.\n\n\u201e \u6ad3 II. 14; III. 4.\n\n\u201e \u8def XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u9678 IX. 9.\n\n\u201e \u797f XIII. 2.\n\nluan \u4e82 I. 20; III. 16; V. 16, 17, 18; VII. 30; IX. 33; X. 14, 18, 26.\n\n\u201e \u5375 V. 4.\n\nlun \u8f2a XI. 31.\n\nlung \u9686 IX. 2.\n\nl\u00fc \u616e VIII. 7; IX. 41; XI. 37; XII. 16.\n\n\u201e \u5442 XIII. 26.*\n\n\u201e \u65c5 III. 1.\n\n\u201e \u5c62 IX. 36.\n\nl\u00fceh \u63a0 VII. 18, 20; XI. 13, 21.\n\nMa \u99ac II. 14; IX. 34; XI. 31.\n\nmai \u8ce3 II. 11.\n\n\u201e \u57cb XI. 31.\n\nmei \u6bcf III. 18.\n\nm\u00ean \u9580 XIII. 20.\n\nmi \u7e3b III. 13.\n\n\u201e \u8ff7 X. 30.\n\n\u201e \u5bc6 XIII. 14.\n\nmiao \u5edf I. 26; XI. 64.\n\n\u201e \u5999 XII. 17.\n\nmin \u6c11 I. 5, 6; II. 20; IV. 20; VII. 24, 25, 26; VIII. 12: IX. 44; X. 24.\n\nming \u547d II. 20; VI. 9; VII. 1; VIII. 1, 3; XI. 27; XII. 15.\n\n\u201e \u540d IV. 12; V. 2; X. 24; XIII. 20.\n\nming \u660e I. 13; IV. 10; X. 18; XII. 13, 16, 22: XIII. 4, 27.\n\nmo \u6cab IX. 14.\n\n\u201e \u58a8 XI. 67.\n\n\u201e \u83ab I. 11; VI. 27; VII. 3; XI. 39; XIII. 8, 14.\n\nmou \u8b00 III. 3, 7; VI. 25; VII. 12; VIII. 2; IX. 26: XI. 14, 22, 37, 52.\n\nmu \u76ee IV. 10: VII. 24, 26; XI. 36.\n\n\u201e \u6728 V. 22.\n\n\u201e \u66ae VII. 28.\n\nNai \u4e43 I. 16; X. 31.\n\nnan \u96e3 III. 16; VII. 3, 19; IX. 42; X. 4, 5, 12; XI. 8.\n\nnao \u6493 I. 22.\n\nnei \u5167 II. 1, 13; IX. 4; XII. 6, 9; XIII. 1, 7, 10, 22.\n\nn\u00eang \u80fd _passim_.\n\nni \u990c VII. 35.\n\n\u201e \u9006 VII. 33.\n\nniao \u9ce5 V. 13; IX. 22, 32.\n\nnien \u5e74 XIII. 2.\n\nniu \u725b II. 14.\n\nnu \u6012 I. 22; II. 16; IX. 33, 39; X. 17; XII. 18, 20.\n\n\u201e \u5f29 II. 14; V. 15.\n\nn\u00fc \u5973 XI. 68.\n\nO \u904f VII. 35.\n\nPa \u62d4 III. 5, 6; XI. 55.\n\n\u201e \u9738 XI. 53, 54.\n\npai \u6557 I. 15; IV. 13, 14, 15, 16, 19; V. 3, 16; VI. 21; X. 20, 22; XI.\n59.\n\npan \u534a VII. 9; IX. 4, 28; X. 7, 27, 28, 29.\n\np\u2018ang \u65c1 IX. 17.\n\npao \u4fdd IV. 7, 16; X. 24.\n\n\u201e \u5bf3 X. 24; XIII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u5831 XIII. 13.\n\n\u201e \u66b4 II. 3; IX. 37.\n\n\u201e \u98fd VI. 4; VII. 31.\n\npei \u500d III. 8; VII. 7.\n\n\u201e \u5317 VII. 34; X. 14, 19; XI. 23.\n\n\u201e \u80cc VII. 33; IX. 8, 9, 13, 16; XI. 7, 45.\n\n\u201e \u5351 I. 22; IX. 23, 24.\n\n\u201e \u5099 I. 21, 24; VI. 16, 17, 18; IX. 24; X. 5.\n\np\u00ean \u5954 IX. 27.\n\np\u2018\u00eang \u5d29 X. 14, 17.\n\npi \u58c1 XII. 4.*\n\n\u201e \u907f I. 21; III. 9; VI. 29; VII. 29; X. 24.\n\n\u201e \u5f0a II. 4.\n\n\u201e \u853d II. 14.\n\n\u201e \u5fc5 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u5f7c III. 18; X. 2, 6, 31; XI. 4, 5, 9.\n\np\u2018i \u8b6c X. 26; XI. 29.\n\n\u201e \u572e VIII. 2; XI. 1, 8, 13, 49.\n\n\u201e \u7f77 II. 14; VII. 8.\n\np\u2018iao \u6f02 V. 12.\n\npien \u8b8a V. 7, 8, 9, 10; VI. 33; VII. 16, 26, 32; VIII. 4, 5, 6; XI. 41;\nXII. 5, 12.\n\npin \u8cd3 II. 1.\n\np\u2018in \u8ca7 II. 10.\n\nping \u5e76 XI. 61.\n\n\u201e \u4f75 IX. 40; XI. 22.\n\n\u201e \u5175 _passim_.\n\np\u2018ing \u5e73 IX. 9.\n\npo \u767e II. 10, 11, 13; III. 2, 18; VII. 7; IX. 12; XIII. 1. 2.\n\n\u201e \u8feb VII. 36.\n\np\u2018o \u7834 II. 14; III. 1; XI. 39.\n\npu \u4e0d _passim_.\n\nSai \u585e XI. 50.\n\nsan \u4e09 I. 4; II. 8; III. _passim_; IV. 17; V. 2; VII. 7, 10, 27; XI. 6,\n21, 40, 56; XII. 1; XIII. 14, 27.\n\n\u201e \u6563 IX. 23; XI. 1, 2, 11, 42, 46.\n\nsao \u71e5 XII. 4.\n\n\u201e \u9a37 XIII. 1.\n\ns\u00ea \u8272 V. 8.\n\nsha \u6bba II. 16; III. 5; VIII. 12, 14; XI. 6; XIII. 20.\n\nshan \u5c71 V. 23; VII. 13, 18; IX. 1, 2; XI. 8, 29, 52.\n\n\u201e \u5584 _passim_.\n\nshang \u4e0a I. 5; III. 1, 3, 17; IV. 7; VII. 9; IX. 6, 14; X. 21; XI. 15,\n64; XII. 10; XIII. 27.\n\n\u201e \u8cde I. 13; II. 17; IX. 36; XI. 56; XIII. 14.\n\nshao \u5c11 I. 26; III. 9; IX. 23; X. 19.\n\nsh\u00ea \u820d VII. 2; VIII. 2; IX. 34; XIII. 20, 21.\n\n\u201e \u8675 XI. 29.\n\n\u201e \u6d89 IX. 14.\n\nsh\u00ean \u6df1 VI. 11, 25; X. 25; XI. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u4fe1 VIII. 8; XI. 55. [See under _hsin_.]\n\n\u201e \u4f38 XI. 41.\n\n\u201e \u795e VI. 9, 33; XIII. 5, 8.\n\n\u201e \u751a XI. 24.\n\n\u201e \u613c XII. 22.\n\nsh\u00eang \u52dd _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u751f I. 2, 6, 8; IV. 18; V. 6, 11, 17; VI. 23, 34; VIII. 12; IX. 2, 6, 9,\n12, 17; XI. 58; XII. 21; XIII. 7, 13, 24.\n\n\u201e \u8072 V. 7; VI. 9.\n\n\u201e \u8056 XIII. 15.\n\nshih \u662f _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u77e2 II. 14.\n\n\u201e \u5931 IV. 14; VI. 22; IX. 35.\n\n\u201e \u77f3 II. 15; V. 12, 22, 23.\n\n\u201e \u59cb V. 6; XI. 68.\n\n\u201e \u793a I. 19; XI. 50.\n\n\u201e \u65bd XI. 56.\n\n\u201e \u5f1b X. 14, 16.\n\n\u201e \u6642 I. 7; V. 6; VI. 34; XII. 3, 4, 9.\n\n\u201e \u8b58 III. 17; XI. 37.\n\n\u201e \u57f6 V. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u52e2 I. 16, 17; VI. 32; X. 12, 15.\n\nshih \u5341 II. 1, 13, 14, 15, 17; III. 8; VI. 14, 20; VII. 8, 9, 10; X. 15;\nXIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u58eb I. 13; III. 5, 14, 15; XI. 23, 24, 27, 28, 36.\n\n\u201e \u5be6 I. 21; V. 4; VI. 30; IX. 12; XIII. 17.\n\n\u201e \u4f7f IV. 3; V. 3; VI. 3, 18, 22; X. 26; XI. _passim_; XIII. 16, 22, 23,\n24.\n\n\u201e \u4e8b I. 1; III. 14; XI, XIII. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u6043 VIII. 11; IX. 18; XI. 15, 31; XIII. 27.\n\n\u201e \u5e2b II. 1, 3, 10, 11; VII. 36; XI. 43; XII. 18; XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u8996 VII. 23; IX. 2, 6; X. 25.\n\n\u201e \u98df II. 9, 15; VII. 11, 35; IX. 34; XI. 21, 49.\n\nshou \u53d7 V. 3; VII. 1; VIII. 1, 3.\n\n\u201e \u5b88 IV. 5, 6, 7; VI. 7, 8, 12; XI. 48; XII. 12; XIII. 2, 20.\n\n\u201e \u624b XI. 30, 34.\n\n\u201e \u7378 IX. 22.\n\n\u201e \u9996 XI. 29.\n\n\u201e \u58fd XI. 27.\n\nshu \u6578 IV. 17, 18; V. 1, 18; VI. 20; IX. 36; XII. 12; XIII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u6a39 IX. 8, 21.\n\n\u201e \u5b70 I. 13; V. 11.\n\n\u201e \u9296 IV. 19.\n\n\u201e \u8f38 II. 10.\n\n\u201e \u6691 I. 7.\n\n\u201e \u8853 VIII. 6.\n\nshuai \u7387 XI. 29, 30.\n\n\u201e \u5e25 XI. 38.\n\nshui \u6c34 IV. 20; V. 12; VI. 29, 31, 32; IX. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 14; XII. 13,\n14.\n\nshun \u696f II. 14.\n\n\u201e \u9806 XI. 60.\n\nso \u6240 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u7d22 I. 3, 12; IX. 17; XIII. 20, 21.\n\nss\u016d \u6b7b I. 2, 6, 8; V. 6; VI. 23, 34; VIII. 2, 12; IX. 9, 10; X. 25; XI.\n_passim_; XII. 21; XIII. 7, 12, 19, 23.\n\n\u201e \u56db I. 4; IV. 17; V. 6; VI. 34; XI. 43, 53; XII. 1, 4.\n\n\u201e \u99df II. 1.\n\n\u201e \u53f8 II. 20; VI. 9.\n\n\u201e \u79c1 XI. 55.\n\nsu \u901f II. 5; VI. 10; VIII. 12; XI. 19.\n\n\u201e \u7d20 IX. 44, 45; XII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u7c9f IX. 34.\n\nsuan \u7b97 I. 26.\n\nsui \u96d6 II. 4; VI. 11, 21, 22; VIII. 5, 6; X. 7.\n\n\u201e \u96a8 XI. 67.\n\nsun \u5b6b _passim_.\n\nTa \u5927 I. 1; II. 14; III. 10; X. 17; XI. 54; XIII. 27.\n\n\u201e \u9054 IX. 23; XI. 43.\n\ntai \u5f85 III. 17; IV. 1; V. 20; VI. 1; VII. 30, 31; VIII. 11; IX. 14; X. 8,\n10; XI. 18; XII. 7, 9.\n\ntai \u6b86 III. 18; X. 31.\n\n\u201e \u6020 XIII. 1.\n\n\u201e \u5e36 II. 1.\n\ntan \u6bab II. 4, 13.\n\ntang \u7576 II. 15; XI. 30.\n\nt\u2018ang \u5802 VII. 32.\n\ntao \u9053 I. _passim_; III. 17; IV. 16; VII. 7; X. _passim_; XI. 8, 19, 20,\n32, 42; XII. 22; XIII. 1, 8.\n\n\u201e \u5c0e VII. 14; XI. 52; XIII. 21.\n\nt\u2018ao \u9003 III. 9.\n\nt\u00ea \u5f97 _passim_.\n\nt\u2018\u00ea \u5fd2 IV. 13.\n\nt\u00eang \u767b IX. 2; XI. 38.\n\nti \u5730 I. 2, 4, 8, 13; IV. 7, 14, 18; V. 6; VI. _passim_; VII. 14, 20;\nVIII. 2, 3, 5; IX. 13, 15; X. 1, 13, 21, 29, 31; XI. _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u6575 II. 9, 15, 16, 18; III. 9, 10; IV. 1, 2, 3, 14; V. 3, 19; VI, IX, X,\nXI, XIII. passim.\n\n\u201e \u5e1d IX. 10.\n\n\u201e \u9684 IX. 13.\n\nt\u2018i \u68af XI. 38.\n\n\u201e \u6d95 XI. 28.\n\nt\u2018iao \u6311 IX. 19; X. 12.\n\n\u201e \u689d IX. 23.\n\nt\u2018ien \u5929 I. 4, 7, 13; III. 7; IV. 7, 9; V. 6; IX. 15; X. 14, 31; XI. 6,\n55; XII. 4.\n\nting \u5b9a IX. 14.\n\nt\u2018ing \u807d I. 15, 16; V. 7; XI. 18.\n\n\u201e \u9706 IV. 10; VII. 19.\n\nto \u5ea6 IV. 18; VI. 21; XIII. 5.\n\n\u201e \u60f0 VII. 28, 29.\n\n\u201e \u596a VII. 27; XI. 18; XII. 14.\n\n\u201e \u591a I. 26; IV. 10; VI. 16, 21; VII. 26; IX. 21, 40; XI. 7.\n\nt\u2018o \u812b XI. 68.\n\ntou \u9b25 V. 2, 16; VI. 22; XI. 24, 51.\n\nt\u2018ou \u6295 V. 4; XI. 23, 28, 40, 58.\n\ntsa \u96dc II. 17; VIII. 7, 8, 9.\n\ntsai \u5728 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u707d III. 5; VIII. 13; X. 14; XI. 26.\n\n\u201e \u54c9 VI. 21; XIII. 18.\n\n\u201e \u518d II. 8.\n\n\u201e \u8f09 II. 8.\n\nts\u2018ai \u8ca1 II. 11, 12, 13; XI. 27.\n\n\u201e \u6750 II. 1.\n\n\u201e \u63a1 IX. 23.\n\nts\u2018ang \u85cf IV. 7; IX. 17.\n\ntsao \u65e9 XII. 6.\n\nts\u2018ao \u8349 IX. 8, 21.\n\n\u201e \u64cd XIII. 1.\n\nts\u00ea \u5247 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u64c7 V. 21.\n\n\u201e \u6fa4 VII. 13; IX. 7, 8; XI. 8, 52.\n\n\u201e \u8cac V. 21.\n\nts\u2018\u00ea \u5074 IX. 25.\n\n\u201e \u6e2c XI. 22.\n\nts\u2018\u00ea \u7b56 VI. 22.\n\ntso \u5de6 VI. 17, 20; XI. 30; XIII. 20.\n\n\u201e \u4f50 I. 16; XII. 13; XIII. 3.\n\n\u201e \u4f5c VI. 23.\n\n\u201e \u5750 XI. 28.\n\nts\u2018o \u632b II. 2, 4.\n\n\u201e \u63aa IV. 13.\n\n\u201e \u932f VI. 26.\n\ntsou \u8d70 IX. 27; X. 14, 15.\n\ntsu \u5352 I. 13; II. 17; III. 1; V. 20; VII. 34; IX. 42; X. 16, 18, 25, 27,\n28, 29; XI. 16, 28, 36.\n\n\u201e \u8db3 II. 3, 9; IV. 6; VI. 24; IX. 40; XI. 21, 31.\n\n\u201e \u963b VII. 13; IX. 17; XI. 8, 52.\n\ntsui \u7f6a X. 24.\n\nts\u2018un \u5b58 I. 2; XI. 10, 58; XII. 21.\n\ntsung \u7e31 X. 18.\n\nts\u2018ung \u5f9e V. 19; VII. 34; X. 9, 11; XI. 9, 51; XII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u8070 IV. 10.\n\ntu \u7779 II. 5.\n\n\u201e \u7368 VII. 25.\n\nt\u2018u \u5f92 IX. 23.\n\n\u201e \u514e XI. 68.\n\n\u201e \u9014 VII. 4; XI. 37.\n\n\u201e \u5857 VIII. 3; XI. 49.\n\ntuan \u77ed V. 14; VI. 34.\n\n\u201e \u7aef V. 11.\n\n\u201e \u78ab V. 4.\n\ntui \u61df X. 17.\n\nt\u2018ui \u9000 III. 13; VI. 10; VII. 25; IX. 24, 28; X. 24.\n\ntun \u6c8c V. 16.\n\n\u201e \u920d II. 2, 4.\n\n\u201e \u9813 III. 7.\n\ntung \u52d5 IV. 7; V. 19, 20, 22; VI. 4, 23; VII. 15, 18, 19, 21; IX. 21, 33;\nX. 30; XI. 17; XII. 17, 19; XIII. 1, 4, 27.\n\nt\u2018ung \u901a VIII. 4, 5; X. 1, 2, 3; XI. 63.\n\n\u201e \u540c I. 5; III. 14, 15, 17; XI. 30.\n\ntz\u016d \u5b50 I. 1; X. 25, 26; _et al._\n\n\u201e \u81ea IV. 7; VI. 3; X. 17; XI. 2.\n\n\u201e \u8f1c VII. 6, 11; XII. 1.\n\ntz\u2018\u016d \u6b64 _passim_.\n\nWai \u5916 I. 16; II. 1; XII. 6, 9; XIII. 1, 12.\n\nwan \u842c II. 1; XIII. 1.\n\nwang \u5f80 IX. 23; X. 2, 4; XI. 5, 23, 24, 28, 39, 45.\n\n\u201e \u4ea1 I. 2; VII. 11; XI. 10, 58; XII. 21.\n\n\u201e \u738b XI. 53, 54.\n\nwei \u7232 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u8b02 II. 18; III. 13, 16; IV. 11; VI. 33; IX. 12. 43; XI. 15, 40, 62;\nXIII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u754f I. 6; IX. 37.\n\n\u201e \u5371 I. 6; II. 20; V. 22; VII. 5; VIII. 12, 14; XII. 17.\n\n\u201e \u552f X. 24.\n\n\u201e \u60df IX. 7, 40, 41; XIII. 27.\n\n\u201e \u5c3e XI. 29.\n\nwei \u5a01 XI. 54, 55.\n\n\u201e \u672a _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u5473 V. 9.\n\n\u201e \u4f4d VI. 34.\n\n\u201e \u8588 IX. 17.\n\n\u201e \u59d4 VII. 6, 11; IX. 38.\n\n\u201e \u5fae VI. 9; XI. 66; XIII. 17, 18.\n\n\u201e \u570d III. 8; VII. 36; VIII. 2; XI. 1, 9, 14, 45, 50, 51.\n\n\u201e \u8466 IX. 17.\n\nw\u00ean \u6587 IX. 43.\n\n\u201e \u6120 XII. 18, 20.\n\n\u201e \u554f XI. 18, 30.\n\n\u201e \u805e I. 11; II. 5; IV. 10; VII. 23; XIII. 19.\n\nwo \u6211 VI. 11, 12, 13, 14, 27; X. 2, 6, 7, 8, 10; XI. 4, 5; XIII. 21.\n\n\u201e \u81e5 XI. 28.\n\nwu \u7121 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u52ff VII. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36; IX. 4, 15; X. 9, 11; XI. 22, 57; XII. 7.\n\n\u201e \u4e94 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u4f0d III. 1.\n\n\u201e \u543e _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u52d9 II. 15; VIII. 8.\n\n\u201e \u4fae VIII. 12.\n\n\u201e \u60e1 IX. 11; XI. 27, 30.\n\n\u201e \u6b66 IX. 40, 43.\n\n\u201e \u5433 XI. 30.*\n\nYa \u7259 XIII. 26.*\n\nyai \u9698 X. 1, 8; XI. 9, 45.\n\nyang \u7f8a XI. 39.\n\n\u201e \u4f6f VII. 34.\n\n\u201e \u990a II. 17; IX. 12; XI. 22, 55.\n\n\u201e \u967d I. 7; IX. 11, 13; X. 3, 10.\n\nyao \u8981 VII. 32; XIII. 27.\n\nyeh \u4e5f _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u696d VIII. 10.\n\n\u201e \u91ce XI. 21.\n\n\u201e \u8b01 XIII. 20.\n\n\u201e \u591c VII. 7, 26; IX. 32: XII. 11.\n\nyen \u7109 XI. 23.\n\n\u201e \u8a00 VII. 23; IX. 35; XI. 57.\n\n\u201e \u56b4 I. 9; X. 18.\n\n\u201e \u9a57 XIII. 5.\n\n\u201e \u7159 XII. 2.\n\n\u201e \u5043 XI. 28.\n\nyin \u5f15 III. 16; X. 7, 11.\n\n\u201e \u9670 I. 7; VII. 19; IX. 11.\n\n\u201e \u98ee IX. 30.\n\n\u201e \u95c9 III. 4.\n\n\u201e \u6bb7 XIII. 26.*\n\n\u201e \u56e0 I. 17; II. 9; VI. 26, 31, 33; XII. 2, 5; XIII. _passim_.\n\nying \u71df IX. 23.\n\n\u201e \u76c8 X. 8, 9.\n\n\u201e \u5b30 X. 25.\n\n\u201e \u61c9 VI. 28; XII. 5, 6.\n\n\u201e \u8fce IX. 4, 5, 6, 16, 39.\n\nyo \u7d04 VI. 15; IX. 26; XI. 25.\n\nyu \u6709 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u53f3 VI. 17, 20; IX. 9, 13; XI. 30; XIII. 20.\n\nyu \u7531 VIII. 3; XI. 9, 19.\n\n\u201e \u8a98 I. 20; VII. 4; IX. 28.\n\n\u201e \u53c8 III. 4; IX. 39.\n\n\u201e \u5e7d XI. 35.\n\nyung \u7528 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u52c7 I. 9; IV. 12; V. 17, 18; VII. 25; XI. 28, 32.\n\ny\u00fc \u96e8 IX. 14.\n\n\u201e \u65bc _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u4e88 V. 19.\n\n\u201e \u5fa1 III. 17.\n\n\u201e \u79a6 VI. 10; XI. 51.\n\n\u201e \u611a XI. 36.\n\n\u201e \u9047 X. 17; XI. 30.\n\n\u201e \u865e III. 17; XI. 19.\n\n\u201e \u8c6b VII. 12; XI. 52.\n\n\u201e \u8fc1 VII. 3, 4, 22; XI. 9, 37.\n\ny\u00fc \u9918 IV. 6; VI. 24; XI. 27.\n\n\u201e \u6b32 III. 17; VI. 11, 12; IX. 5, 14, 19, 38; XIII. 20.\n\n\u201e \u8207 _passim_.\n\ny\u00fcan \u9060 I. 8, 19; II. 10; VI. 20; VII. 31; IX. 3, 16, 19; X. 1, 12, 21.\n\n\u201e \u539f II. 13.\n\n\u201e \u6350 VII. 6.\n\n\u201e \u5713 V. 16, 22, 23.\n\ny\u00fceh \u66f0 _passim_.\n\n\u201e \u6708 III. 4; IV. 10; V. 6; VI. 34.\n\n\u201e \u8d8a VI. 21*; XI. 30*, 43.\n\n\u201e \u6085 XII. 20.\n\ny\u00fcn \u7d1c V. 16.\n\n\u201e \u8f2a III. 4.\n\n\u201e \u904b XI. 22.\n\n\n\n\n INDEX\n\n [The numerals refer to pages]\n\nAbstract ideas of degree, 50.\n\nAccessible ground, 100, 101, 119.\n\nAccommodating oneself to the enemy, 145, 148.\n\nAdaptation to circumstances, 23.\n\nAides-de-camp, 171.\n\n\u201cAids to Scouting,\u201d quoted, 88, 89, 107, 164.\n\nAlliances, 60, 119, 140, 142.\n\nAllotments of land, 62.\n\nAlps, crossings of the, 57.\n\nAmiot, P\u00e8re, vii, 1.\n\nAnger, succeeded by gladness, 159.\n\nArmy, divisions of the, 17, 33.\n\nArmy on the march, 140.\n\nArsenals, burning of, 151.\n\n\u201cArt of War,\u201d quoted by Han Hsin, 144.\n\nArt of war in a nutshell, 44.\n\nAthletics, 124.\n\nAttack, skill in, 28.\n\nAttack and defence, 25, 44.\n\nAutumn hair, 29.\n\n\nBaden-Powell, General. _See_ \u201cAids to Scouting.\u201d\n\nBaggage, 58.\n\nBaggage-train, 60.\n\nBaggage-trains, burning of, 151.\n\nBait, offered by the enemy, 68.\n\nBalancing of chances, 31.\n\nBanners. _See_ Flags and banners.\n\nBases of supply, 60.\n\nBeasts, startled, sign of surprise attack, 89.\n\nBelgians at Waterloo, 130.\n\nBenevolence to spies, 170.\n\nBiot\u2019s _Chou Li_, ix.\n\nBirds rising, sign of ambuscade, 89.\n\nBl\u00fccher, 48.\n\nBluster, 95.\n\nBoers, 18.\n\n\u201cBook of Army Management,\u201d 63.\n\nBuff-coats, 58.\n\nBurning one\u2019s boats, 133.\n\n\nCalamities, six, 105.\n\nCalthrop, Capt.: his edition of Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s text, xxxii; his translation\nof Sun Tz\u016d, viii; quoted, _passim_.\n\nCamp, shifting, 133.\n\nCamping, 80 _sqq._\n\nCannae, battle of, 11.\n\nCasinum, 140.\n\n\u201cCatalogue of Chinese Books,\u201d xxxiv.\n\n_Chan Kuo Ts\u2018\u00ea_, quoted, 10; referred to, xxiv.\n\n_Chan Tou Ta Chia Ping Fa_, xviii.\n\nChang Ao, a commentator, xlii.\n\nChang Hsiu, 69.\n\nChang Liang, li, 109, 116.\n\nChang Ni, 144.\n\nChang Shang-ying, lii.\n\nChang Shou-chieh, xvi, xvii.\n\nChang Tsai, li.\n\nChang Tz\u016d-shang, a commentator, xli.\n\nChang Y\u00fc\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xl; quoted, 5, 8, 9, 11, 20, 21, 22,\n24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 39, 42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 60,\n63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85,\n87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 97, 99, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 119, 124,\n125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 139, 141, 142, 143, 145, 152,\n155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 167, 170, 171, 172; referred to, 6, 15,\n17, 31, 36, 45, 71, 86, 95, 96, 106, 147, 153, 173.\n\nCh\u2018ang mountains, 128.\n\nCh\u2018ang-cho, battle of, 66.\n\nCh\u2018ang-sh\u00ea, siege of, 154.\n\nChao State, army of, 28, 143; defeated by Ch\u2018in, 166; King of, 57.\n\nChao Chan, 106.\n\nChao Kua, xlviii, 166.\n\nChao Sh\u00ea, famous march of, 57, 136; his use of spies, 166.\n\nChao Yeh, xiv.\n\nChao Ying-ch\u2018i, 78.\n\nChao Y\u00fcan-hao\u2019s rebellion, xli.\n\nCh\u2018ao Kung-wu, quoted, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, xli.\n\nChariots, 9, 91.\n\nChariot fighting, 15, 16.\n\nChariot wheels, burying of, 129.\n\nChavannes, M.: his \u201cM\u00e9moires Historiques\u201d referred to, xiii, xvi, xlvi,\n57.\n\nCh\u2018\u00ean Ch\u00ean-sun, quoted, xxiii.\n\nCh\u2018\u00ean Hao\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 30, 44, 56,\n62, 65, 69, 73, 81, 93, 97, 106, 108, 110, 117, 118, 122, 124, 133, 136,\n141, 147, 152, 170, 175; referred to, 18, 68.\n\nCh\u2018\u00ean-ts\u2018ang, siege of 94.\n\nCh\u00eang, principality of, 104, 116.\n\n_Ch\u00eang_ and _ch\u2018i_. See Tactics, direct and indirect.\n\nCh\u00eang Ch\u2018iao, xl.\n\nCh\u00eang Hou, quoted, xliii.\n\nCh\u00eang Hs\u00fcan\u2019s commentary on the _Chou Li_, xviii.\n\nCh\u00eang Tuan, xlii.\n\nCh\u00eang Yu-hsien\u2019s _I Shuo_, xxxii, xxxiv; referred to, 36, 53, 58, 70,\n136.\n\nCh\u2018\u00eang-an, city of, captured by Han Hsin, 28.\n\nCh\u2018\u00eang-hung, battle of, 78.\n\nCh\u2018\u00eang T\u2018ang, xvi, 173, 175.\n\nChi Hsieh, editor of commentaries on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxviii, xli.\n\nChi-mo, siege of, 90.\n\nChi T\u2018ien-pao\u2019s edition of Sun Tz\u016d, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, xxxvii.\n\nCh\u2018i State, xii, xvi, 128.\n\nCh\u2018i Chieh, 90.\n\nChia Hs\u00fc, a commentator, xli.\n\nChia-ku, meeting at, xlvii.\n\nChia Lin\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 20, 30, 34,\n46, 50, 57, 72, 75, 76, 86, 92, 94, 95, 97, 117, 120, 133, 143, 148,\n152, 157, 175; referred to, 51, 55, 62, 65, 96, 108, 164.\n\n_Chia Y\u00fc_, referred to, xlvii.\n\nChiang-ling, town of, 111.\n\n_Chiang Y\u00fcan_, a spurious work, lii.\n\nChieh Kuei, the tyrant, 173.\n\nChieh-li, a Turkish Khan, 167.\n\n_Ch\u2018ien Ch\u2018io Lei Shu_, liii.\n\n_Ch\u2018ien Fu Lun_, referred to, xxiv.\n\n_Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, quoted 81, 145, 167; referred to, li, 28, 34, 57, 69;\nbibliographical section of, quoted, xvii, xix, li; referred to, xviii,\nxx, liii.\n\nCh\u2018ih Yu, 84.\n\nChin State, xii, xvi, 106.\n\n_Chin Shu_, quoted, 78, 116; referred to, 123, 165.\n\nCh\u2018in State, 142.\n\nChina\u2019s experience of war, xliv.\n\nChinese characters, elasticity of, 159.\n\nChinese sentiment opposed to militarism, xliv.\n\nChing, Duke of Ch\u2018i, xv.\n\nChing-chou Fu, 123.\n\nChing-hsing pass, battle of, 143.\n\nChing K\u2018o, 127.\n\nChing Wang, period of, xxiii.\n\n_Chiu T\u2018ang Shu_, referred to, 104, 167; bibliographical section of,\nreferred to, liii.\n\n_Chou Ch\u2018in Shih I Tz\u016d_, text of Sun Tz\u016d in, xxxi.\n\nChou dynasty, 174.\n\nChou Hsin, the tyrant, l, 174.\n\n_Chou Li_, quoted, 14, 55, 60, 68, 92, 146; referred to, xxxix, xlviii,\n64; Biot\u2019s translation of, ix.\n\nChu Chih-wu, xxi.\n\nChu Fu\u2019s edition of Sun Tz\u016d, xvii, xxxi.\n\nChu Hsi, corrected by Legge, 32; quoted, xliii, xlvii.\n\nChu-ko Liang, 46, 51, 74, 82, 117, 122; supposititious works of, lii.\n\nChu-ko Wu-hou. _See_ Chu-ko Liang.\n\nCh\u2018u State, xii, xiii, xvi, 124; the hereditary enemy of Wu, xxvii;\nViscount of, 110.\n\nChuan Chu, xxi, 128.\n\nChuan Sh\u00ea-chu. _See_ Chuan Chu.\n\nChuang, Duke of Lu, 66.\n\nChuang, Prince of Ch\u2018u, 141, 162.\n\n_Chuang Tz\u016d_, referred to, 29, 85.\n\n_Chung Yung_, xix.\n\nCircumstances, art of studying, 68.\n\nClassics, compared with Sun Tz\u016d, xliii.\n\nClearness of orders, 107.\n\nClever fighter, the, 29, 41, 42.\n\nCohesion, 134.\n\nCollapse, one of the six calamities, 105, 106.\n\nColumns, marching in, 49.\n\nCommander, the, 2, 3. _See also_ General.\n\nCommander-in-chief, killing the, 145; presence of mind of the, 66.\n\nCommentary, native, on Sun Tz\u016d, ix, xxxiv _sqq._\n\nCommunications, line of, 101, 119.\n\nCompactness, 61.\n\nConfucius, and the art of war, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii; contemporary with\nSun Tz\u016d, xxx; violates extorted oath, xlix.\n\nConstellations, 153.\n\nContentious ground, 115, 118, 136.\n\nContraction and expansion, 134.\n\nConventional canons of warfare, 148.\n\nCo-operation, 129.\n\nCouncil-chamber, sternness in the, 146.\n\nCountry, natural features of, 60.\n\nCourage, one standard of, 130.\n\nCourant\u2019s \u201cCatalogue des Livres Chinois,\u201d lii.\n\nCowardice, 78.\n\nCritical ground, 134, 135.\n\nCromwell\u2019s use of spies, 164.\n\nCross-divisions, 100.\n\nCunning, 145.\n\n\nDanger, bracing effect of, 139, 145.\n\nDangerously isolated ground, 72.\n\nDeception, war based on, 6, 132.\n\nDecision, 37, 38.\n\nDeductive calculation, 163.\n\nDefence, skill in, 27.\n\nDeliberation, 63.\n\nDemosthenes, the Athenian general, 118.\n\nDesertion, 134, 136.\n\nDesperado, running amok, 125.\n\nDesperate foe, not to be pressed, 69, 94.\n\nDesperate ground, 72, 114, 117, 120, 125, 126, 135, 138, 143.\n\nDeviation, artifice of, 57, 63.\n\nDifficult ground, 71, 117, 120, 137.\n\nDisaffection, signs of, 95.\n\nDiscipline, 2, 3, 4, 98, 111.\n\nDisorder, seeming, 38.\n\nDisorganisation, 105, 107.\n\nDispersive ground, 114, 118, 135.\n\nDisposition of troops, 26.\n\nDispositions, concealment of, 51, 52; knowledge of the enemy\u2019s, 163.\n\nDissimulation, 61.\n\nDividing the enemy, 47.\n\nDivination, to be prohibited, 126.\n\n\u201cDivine manipulation of the threads,\u201d 164.\n\nDoor, left open by the enemy, 147.\n\nDoorkeepers, 171.\n\nDrums, 34, 64, 65.\n\nDust, sign of the enemy, 89.\n\n\nEarth, as opposed to Heaven, 2, 4, 27, 28, 113; six principles connected\nwith, 104.\n\nEconomy, false, 162.\n\nEnergy, 38, 39, 41; concentration of, 124.\n\nEntangling ground, 100, 102.\n\nEnterprise, the spirit of, 157.\n\nEnticing the enemy, 102.\n\n\u00carh-chu Chao, 138.\n\n_\u00carh Ya_, quoted, 94.\n\nExcellence, supreme, 17; the acme of, 28.\n\nExpenditure on war, 9, 10, 160.\n\n\nFabius Cunctator, 11, 120.\n\nFacile ground, 115, 118, 135, 136.\n\nFan Ch\u00fc\u2019s use of spies, 166.\n\nFei River, battle of the, 25.\n\nF\u00eang Hou, lii, 84.\n\nF\u00eang I, a student of Sun Tz\u016d, xlii.\n\nFire, as an aid to the attack, 156; dropping, 151, 152; five ways of\nattacking with, 150; material for, 152; proper seasons for attacking\nwith, 152, 153; to be started on the windward side, 155.\n\nFive advantages, the, 72, 74, 75.\n\nFive cardinal tastes, 36.\n\nFive cardinal virtues, 3.\n\nFive classes of State ceremonial, xlviii.\n\nFive dangerous faults, 77.\n\nFive developments in attacking with fire, 153 _sqq._\n\nFive elements, the, 53.\n\nFive essentials for victory, 23, 24.\n\nFive factors in war, 1.\n\nFive musical notes, 36.\n\nFive _Pa Wang_, xlix, 141.\n\nFive primary colours, 36.\n\nFlags and banners, 16, 34, 64, 65.\n\nFlat country, campaigning in, 83, 84.\n\nFlight, 105.\n\nForaging, 12, 15, 123, 161.\n\nForeknowledge, 163.\n\nForestalling the enemy, 147.\n\nForethought, want of, 97.\n\n\u201cForty-one Years in India,\u201d referred to, 35.\n\nFour seasons, the, 54.\n\nFrederick the Great, quoted, 48, 168, 169.\n\nFrontier passes, 146.\n\nFrontal attacks, 45.\n\nFu Ch\u2018ai, xvi.\n\nFu Chien, 25, 115.\n\nFu-ch\u2018u, King of Ch\u2018u, 124.\n\nFu Kai, xxiii, xxix.\n\nFu-k\u2018ang-an, 63.\n\nFu Yen-ch\u2018ing, 69, 70.\n\n\nGeneral, the, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 19, 21, 44, 55, 66, 77, 98, 107, 109,\n110, 130, 131, 134, 157, 159, 163, 171, 174.\n\nGenerals, professional, xxii.\n\nGeneralship, degrees of, 17, 18; the highest, 48.\n\nGiles\u2019 Biographical Dictionary, quoted, 128.\n\nGiles\u2019 Chinese-English Dictionary, referred to, 57, 134.\n\nGongs, 34, 64.\n\nGrant, General, 47.\n\nGreat Wall of China, xliv.\n\nGreeks, Homeric, 9.\n\nGrindstone and egg, 35.\n\nGround, high and low, 84; of intersecting highways, 71, 116, 119, 135,\n137; proper use of, 130.\n\nGrounds, the nine, 114, 134, 138.\n\nGuides, local, 60, 140.\n\n\nHan, red banners of, 144.\n\n_Han Chih_. See _Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, bibliographical section of.\n\n_Han Kuan Chieh Ku_, quoted, xx.\n\nHan Hsin, xliv, 28, 33, 34, 81, 143, 167; a student of Sun Tz\u016d, xlii;\nquoted, 68.\n\n_Han Shu_. See _Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_.\n\nHannibal, 11, 57, 66, 120, 140.\n\nHasty temper, 78.\n\nHearing, quick, 29.\n\nHeaven, 2, 4. 28, 113.\n\nHeights, precipitous, 100, 103.\n\nHemmed-in ground, 72, 117, 120, 135, 137.\n\nHenderson, Col., quoted, 6, 42, 48, 52, 59, 101, 130, 131.\n\nHerodotus, referred to, 129.\n\nHo Ch\u2018\u00fc-fei, xl.\n\n_Ho Kuan Tz\u016d_, referred to, xxiv.\n\nHo Lu (or Ho L\u00fc), King of Wu, xi, xiii, xvi, xvii, xviii, xxvi, 5, 128.\n\nHo Shih. _See_ Ho Yen-hsi.\n\nHo-yang, night ride to, 65.\n\nHo Yen-hsi\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xl; quoted, 11, 14, 16, 18, 21, 29,\n30, 34, 56, 69, 74, 110, 115, 116, 122, 147, 165, 166, 167, 168, 174;\nreferred to, xvii, 31, 43, 62, 152.\n\nHorses, tethering of, 129.\n\n_Hou Han Shu_, quoted, 10, 94, 132, 139, 151, 155; referred to, xlii.\n\nHsi, the graduate, xxxiii.\n\nHsia dynasty, 174.\n\nHsiang, Duke of Sung, xlix, 141.\n\nHsiang Chi, xlix, 133.\n\nHsiang Liang, xlix.\n\nHsiang Y\u00fc. _See_ Hsiang Chi.\n\nHsiao State, 110.\n\nHsiao Chi, a commentator, xli.\n\nHsiao Hsien, 123.\n\nHsiao I, 153, 166.\n\nHsiao Shih-hsien. _See_ Hsiao I.\n\nHsieh An, 25.\n\nHsieh Y\u00fcan, a commentator, xlii.\n\nHsien Hu, 106.\n\nHsin-ch\u2018\u00eang, town of, 122.\n\n_Hsin Hs\u00fc_, xiv.\n\n_Hsin Shu_ (by Ts\u2018ao Kung), xix, xxxvi.\n\n_Hsin Shu_ (a work attributed to Chu-ko Liang), lii.\n\n_Hsin T\u2018ang Shu_, referred to, 65, 104, 105, 123, 167; bibliographical\nsection of, referred to, xviii, liii.\n\n_Hsing Li Hui Yao_, quoted, xliii, xlviii.\n\n_Hsing Shih Pien Ch\u00eang Shu_, xv.\n\nHsiung-nu, 39, 139, 150.\n\nHs\u00fc Ch\u2018ieh, quoted, 160.\n\nHs\u00fc-chou, invaded by Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, 73.\n\n_Hs\u00fc W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, liii.\n\nHs\u00fcan Tsung, T\u2018ang Emperor, xxxii.\n\n_Hs\u00fcn Tz\u016d_, quoted, 80.\n\nHs\u00fcn Ying, 73.\n\nHu Yen, xiii.\n\nHua-pi, city of, 73.\n\nHua-yin temple, xxxii.\n\nHuai-nan Tz\u016d, plagiary of Sun Tz\u016d, xxiv; quoted, xiv.\n\nHuan, Duke of Ch\u2018i, 128, 141.\n\nHuan Ch\u2018ung, 25.\n\nHuan Hs\u00fcan, 78.\n\nHuang Ch\u2018ao Ching Shih W\u00ean Pien, liii.\n\nHuang Chih-ch\u00eang, a commentator, xlii.\n\nHuang Jun-y\u00fc, a commentator, xli.\n\nHuang Mei, 78.\n\nHuang-shih Kung, li; quoted, 109, 126.\n\nHuang Ti. _See_ Yellow Emperor.\n\nHuang-fu Sung, 94, 154, 155.\n\nHuman nature, to be studied, 134.\n\nHumanity, misplaced, xlix; soldiers to be treated with, 98.\n\nHusbanding one\u2019s strength, 67.\n\nHusbandry, impeded by war, 161.\n\n\nI river, 127.\n\nI Chih, 173, 174, 175.\n\n_I Ching_, quoted, xv.\n\nI-chou, 165.\n\nI-ho, 115.\n\n_I Pu Ch\u00ea Chung_, xliii.\n\n_I Shuo_. _See_ Ch\u00eang Yu-hsien.\n\nI-wu pass, 115.\n\nI Yin. _See_ I Chih.\n\nIliad, heroes of the, 127.\n\nImpoverishment of the people, 13, 14.\n\nInduction from experience, 163.\n\nInhumanity, the height of, 162.\n\nInsubordination, 105.\n\nIntuition necessary in dealing with spies, 169.\n\nInvading force, principles to be observed by an, 123.\n\n\nJackson, Stonewall, 59, 131.\n\nJan Yu, disciple of Confucius, xlvi, xlviii.\n\nJang, siege of, 69.\n\nJingles, 149, 158.\n\nJu-nan, 111.\n\nJulius Caesar, 12; his \u201cDe Bello Gallico\u201d referred to, 108.\n\nJunction of forces, 48.\n\n\nK\u2018ang Hsi\u2019s dictionary, referred to, 10, 18, 35, 68, 95, 117, 152, 157,\n160.\n\nKao-ch\u2018ang, 115.\n\nKao-fan. _See_ Hu Yen.\n\nKao Huan, afterwards Emperor, 137.\n\nKao K\u00eang, 151.\n\nKao Tsu, first Han Emperor, 33, 39, 119.\n\nKao Tsu, Sui Emperor, 168.\n\nKao-wu pass, 115.\n\nKhitans, 69.\n\nKhotan, 132.\n\nKiangnan rebels under Sui dynasty, 151.\n\nKindness to the soldiers, 110, 111.\n\nKou Chien, King of Y\u00fceh, xvi, 50.\n\n_Ku Chin T\u2018u Shu Chi Ch\u2018\u00eang_, quoted, xvi, xxxvii, xxxix; referred to,\nxix, xli, li, liii. _See also_ Sun Tz\u016d, _T\u2018u Shu_ text of.\n\nKuan Chung, 128.\n\n_Kuan Tz\u016d_, xxi.\n\nKuang, King of Shan-shan, 139, 151.\n\n_Kuang Po Wu Chih_, liii.\n\nKuang Wu, Han Emperor, li.\n\nKuei-ku Tz\u016d, li.\n\nK\u2018uei-chou, 123.\n\n_K\u2018un Wai Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_, xxxvi.\n\nKung-sun Hung, lii.\n\n_Kuo Ch\u2018ao Shih J\u00ean Ch\u00eang L\u00fceh_, xxxii.\n\nKuo Hs\u00fcn, 151.\n\nKutcha, King of, 132.\n\n\nLadder, kicking away the, 133.\n\nLadysmith, relief of, 79.\n\nLand-tenure, ancient system of, xxv, 161.\n\nLao Tz\u016d, the Tao of, 2; quoted, 155, 158. See also _Tao T\u00ea Ching_.\n\nLegge\u2019s \u201cChinese Classics,\u201d referred to, ix, xxiv, 23, 32.\n\nLengthy operations, 10, 11.\n\n_Li_, length of the, 9.\n\n_Li Chi_, referred to, 23, 147.\n\nLi Ching, the general, xliv, 41, 123, 167; quoted, 35, 66, 87, 111, 118;\nsupposed author of a work on war, lii.\n\n_Li Ching Ping Fa_, lii.\n\nLi Chu, 29.\n\nLi Ch\u2018\u00fcan\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxvi; quoted, 9, 11, 18, 21, 22, 24,\n25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 38, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 60, 65, 67, 68, 72, 73, 81,\n83, 84, 89, 92, 97, 105, 106, 110, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 136,\n142, 150, 158, 163, 167; referred to, 52, 95, 123, 127, 151.\n\nLi Hsiang, 165.\n\nLi Hsiung, 165.\n\nLi I-chi, 167.\n\nLi Kuang-pi, 65.\n\nLi Ling, 154.\n\nLi Shih-min, afterwards the Emperor T\u2018ai Tsung, xliv, lii, 35, 104, 167.\n\nLi Shou-ch\u00eang, 70.\n\n_Li Tai Chi Shih Nien Piao_, quoted, 70, 116, 166.\n\nLi T\u2018\u00ea, 165.\n\nLi Ts\u2018ai, a commentator, xlii.\n\nLi Wei-kung. _See_ Li Ching.\n\n_Li Wei Kung W\u00ean Tui_, lii.\n\nLiang, kingdom of, 94.\n\nLiang-chou, 115.\n\nLiang Hsi, 115.\n\nLien P\u2018o, 57, 166.\n\nLin-chin, in Shensi, 34.\n\nLin Hsiang-ju, 166.\n\nLine of least resistance, 53.\n\nLiu Chou-tz\u016d, 53.\n\nLiu Hsiang, quoted, xiv, xxiv.\n\nLiu Pei, 59.\n\nLiu Piao, 69.\n\n_Liu T\u2018ao_ (attributed to T\u2018ai Kung), xxi, l, li, 144, 174; quoted, 22,\n62, 78, 84.\n\nLiu Y\u00fc, 78.\n\nLivy, quoted, 66, 120, 140.\n\nLo Shang, 165.\n\nLo-yang, 104.\n\nLogs and stones, rolling, 41.\n\nLongevity, 127.\n\nLou Ching, 39.\n\nLu State, 128.\n\nLu T\u00ea-ming, quoted, li.\n\nL\u00fc Kuang, 115.\n\nL\u00fc M\u00eang, a disciplinarian, 111; a student of Sun Tz\u016d, xlii.\n\nL\u00fc Pu, xxxv.\n\nL\u00fc Shang, known as T\u2018ai Kung, l, 174, 175. See also _Liu T\u2018ao_.\n\n_L\u00fc Shih Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_, referred to, xxiv, 37.\n\nL\u00fc Wang (or Lii Ya). _See_ L\u00fc Shang.\n\nLuan Yen, 106.\n\n_Lun Y\u00fc_, quoted, xv, 146; referred to, xlvii, xlix, 47, 64, 156.\n\nLung Ch\u00fc, 81.\n\n\nMa Lung, lii.\n\nMa Tuan-lin, xl. See also _W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_.\n\nMa Y\u00fcan, 80.\n\nMaiden, coyness of a, 148.\n\nMansfield, Lord, 143.\n\nMantlets, 14, 18.\n\nMarches, forced, 59.\n\nMarengo, battle of, 57.\n\n\u201cMarshal Turenne,\u201d quoted, 73, 169; referred to, 61.\n\nMarshes, 60.\n\nMeasures, of land, 14; of length, 32; of weight, 15, 32.\n\nMei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxviii; quoted, 4, 6, 7, 11, 29,\n34, 38, 40, 44, 47, 61, 63, 79, 84, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 102,\n121, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 147, 148, 153, 155,\n157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 174; referred to, 15, 23, 43,\n46, 51, 106, 151.\n\n\u201cM\u00e9moires concernant les Chinois,\u201d quoted, vii.\n\n\u201cM\u00e9moires Historiques,\u201d referred to, xvi. _See also_ Chavannes.\n\n_Mencius_, quoted, xxv, xliii, 14, 85; referred to, 29, 32, 112, 148.\n\nM\u00eang K\u2018ang, xxxvi.\n\nM\u00eang Shih\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxvi; quoted, 2, 11, 15, 61, 77, 78,\n116, 137, 147.\n\nM\u00eang Ta, 122.\n\nMethod, 2, 3, 31.\n\n\u201cMilitary Classic,\u201d 144.\n\nMilitary tactics like water, 53.\n\nMilitary virtues, 22.\n\nMisfortune, three ways in which a ruler can cause, 21 _sqq._\n\nMistakes, making no, 30.\n\nModern text of Sun Tz\u016d. _See_ Sun Tz\u016d.\n\nModification of plans, 5.\n\nMoltke, 17.\n\nMoods, art of studying, 67.\n\nMoral Law, the, 2, 4, 31.\n\nMounds, used in sieges, 19.\n\nMountains, 80.\n\nMovable shelters, 18.\n\nMu, Duke of Ch\u2018in, 141.\n\n_Mu-so_, an instrument of torture, xlvi.\n\n_Mu T\u2018ien Tz\u016d Chuan_, 152.\n\nMystification of one\u2019s men, 131.\n\n\nNang Wa, xiii.\n\nNapoleon Bonaparte, 5, 12, 148; his passage across Alps, 57; not\nhampered by central authority, 24; his \u201cMaximes de Guerre,\u201d quoted, 84,\n109; his \u201cPens\u00e9es,\u201d quoted, 101.\n\nNelson, at Trafalgar, 37.\n\nNervousness, a sign of, 93.\n\nNicias, the Athenian general, 118; speech of, quoted, 125.\n\nNight-fighting, 65.\n\nNine grounds (or situations), the, 72, 114.\n\nNine punitive measures, the, xxxix.\n\nNine variations, the, 71, 72, 74, 138.\n\n\u201cNorth hill\u201d, battle of the, 57.\n\n\nO-y\u00fc, town of, 57.\n\nOmens, not to be regarded, 126.\n\nOnset of troops, 37, 38.\n\nOpen ground, 116, 119, 137.\n\nOpportunism, xlix.\n\nOrders, not to be divulged, 142, 143.\n\nOriginal text of Sun Tz\u016d. _See_ Sun Tz\u016d.\n\nOu-yang Hsiu, quoted, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxviii.\n\nOverawing the enemy, 141.\n\nOver-caution, 158.\n\nOver-solicitude for one\u2019s men, 79.\n\n\n_Pa Ch\u00ean T\u2018u_, xviii.\n\n_Pa Wang_, the five, 141.\n\nPan Ch\u2018ao, 63; at Shan-shan, 139, 150; his attack on Yarkand, 132, 167.\n\nP\u2018an K\u00eang, 173.\n\nP\u2018ang Ch\u00fcan, xii, 40.\n\nPasses, narrow, 100, 103.\n\nPeace, the true object of war, 162.\n\n_Pei Ch\u2018i Shu_, referred to, 138.\n\n_Pei Lun_, xl.\n\n_Pei T\u2018ang Shu Ch\u2018ao_, 25, 36, 64, 67.\n\nP\u2018ei Hsing-chien, 103.\n\n_P\u2018ei W\u00ean Y\u00fcn Fu_, quoted, 94; referred to, xlvi, 69, 146.\n\nPelliot, M., xxxvi.\n\nPi, battle of, 106.\n\nPi I-hs\u00fcn, xviii, xxvi, xxxiv. See also _Sun Tz\u016d Hs\u00fc Lu_.\n\nPi Kua, xxxiii.\n\nPi-yang, city of, 73.\n\nP\u2018i, siege of, 165.\n\nPicked soldiers in front rank, 107, 108.\n\n_Ping Fa Tsa Chan_, xviii.\n\nPing Shu Yao Ch\u00fceh, 67.\n\nPique, battles not to be fought out of, 158.\n\nPitfalls, 60.\n\nPlagiaries of Sun Tz\u016d, xxiii, xxiv.\n\nPlans, baulking the enemy\u2019s, 17; change of, 5, 132.\n\nPlataea, battle of, 129.\n\nPlayfair\u2019s \u201cCities and Towns of China\u201d, referred to. 57.\n\nPlunder, 62.\n\nPo Ch\u2018i xliv, 117, 166.\n\n_Po Chiang Chuan_, xli.\n\nPo P\u2018ei, xiii, xxiii, xxix.\n\nPo-t\u00eang, battle of, 39.\n\nPo-ts\u2018ai, a leader of the Yellow Turban rebels, 154.\n\n_Po Ya_, referred to, 160.\n\nP\u2018o-t\u2018ai, a spy, 165.\n\nPolybius, referred to, 120.\n\nPort Arthur, siege of, 19.\n\nPresence of mind, 66.\n\nPunishment, 95, 97, 98.\n\n\nRabbits, not indigenous to China, 149.\n\nRapidity, 12, 61; the essence of war, 122.\n\nRewards, 15, 95, 142.\n\nReward and punishment, constancy in, 4.\n\nRiches, soldiers not to acquire, 127.\n\nRiver, crossing a, 129.\n\nRiver warfare, 81, 82.\n\nRoberts, Lord, night march of, 35; on Sun Tz\u016d, xlii.\n\nRout, 105, 107.\n\nRuin, one of the six calamities, 105, 106.\n\nRuler, military commander independent of the, 109; the enlightened, 157,\n159, 174.\n\nRules of warfare, conventional, 148.\n\n\nSalt-marshes, 83.\n\n_San Kuo Chih_, quoted, 69, 111; referred to, xxxv, xli, xlii. See also\n_Wei Chih_.\n\n_San L\u00fceh_, li; quoted, 62, 158.\n\n_San Shih \u00carh Lei Ching_, xviii.\n\n_San Ts\u2018ai T\u2018u Hui_, liii.\n\nSan-y\u00fcan, 79.\n\n\u201cScience of War,\u201d quoted, 101, 130.\n\nScouts, 88, 89.\n\nScreens, grass, 88.\n\nSecrecy, 45, 131.\n\nSecrets, divulged by a spy, 170.\n\nSedan, capitulation of, 17.\n\nSelf-possession, 67.\n\nSensitiveness in a general, 79.\n\nSentries, 171.\n\nSerious ground, 117, 119, 135, 137.\n\nSeven considerations, 1, 4.\n\nSha-y\u00fcan, 168.\n\nShan-shan, 139; King of, 150, 151.\n\nShang dynasty, 173.\n\nSh\u00ean, Duke of, 110.\n\nSh\u00ean-wu of Ch\u2018i, 168.\n\nSh\u00ean Yu, a commentator, xli.\n\nShepherd driving sheep, 133.\n\nSheridan, General, 47.\n\n_Shih Chi_, objection to the chronology of, xxvi; quoted, xi, xiii, xv,\nxx, xlv, 40, 58, 80, 84, 90, 124, 128; referred to, xvi, xxii, xxiv,\nxxxiv, xlvi, xlvii, xlix, 1. _See also_ Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien.\n\n_Shih Ching_, quoted, xvi, 61, 62; referred to, 14.\n\nShih Huang Ti, 127, 142.\n\nShih K\u2018uang, 29.\n\n_Shih L\u2018iu Ts\u2018\u00ea_, lii.\n\nShih Ss\u016d-ming, the rebel leader, 65.\n\n_Shu Ching_, quoted, xv; referred to, xlvii, xlviii.\n\n_Shu Lu Chieh T\u2018i_, xxiii.\n\n_Shuai-jan_, the, xxvi, 128, 129.\n\n_Shuo W\u00ean_, quoted, 94, 117, 160.\n\nSicilian expedition, 118.\n\nSieges, 10, 18, 19, 73.\n\nSight, sharp, 29.\n\nSignal-fires, 65.\n\nSignals, 33.\n\nSigns, observation of, 88.\n\nSituations, the nine. _See_ Nine grounds.\n\nSix Chancellors of the Ch\u2018in State, 142.\n\n\u201cSix States\u201d period, xxii.\n\nSkilful fighter, the, 30.\n\nSkilful leaders of old, 120.\n\nSolidarity of troops, 123.\n\nS\u00f4phanes at Plataea, 129.\n\nSovereign, the, 55; the wise, 163.\n\nSpies, xlix, 52, 147, 148; converted, 90, 166, 172, 173; doomed, 167,\n172, 173; five classes of, 164; Frederick\u2019s classification of, 168;\nimportance of, 175; intimate relations to be maintained with, 168;\ninward, 165, 172; local, 164, 172; surviving, 167, 172; to be properly\npaid, 162, 169.\n\nSpirit, an army\u2019s, 65, 66.\n\nSpirits, 163.\n\n\u201cSpy,\u201d evolution of the character meaning, 160.\n\nSpying, end and aim of, 173.\n\n_Ss\u016d K\u2018u Ch\u2018\u00fcan Shu Chien Ming Mu Lu_, quoted, l, li, lii.\n\n_Ss\u016d K\u2018u Ch\u2018\u00fcan Tsung Mu T\u2018i Yao_, quoted, xx, xli, l; referred to, xl,\nlii, liii.\n\nSs\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien, xiv, xx; quoted, xi, xii, xlv; credibility of his\nnarrative, xxvi; his letter to J\u00ean An, referred to, xlvi; his mention\nof the 13 chapters, xxx. See also _Shih Chi_.\n\n_Ss\u016d-ma Fa_, l; quoted, xvi, 14, 17, 78, 126, 143.\n\nSs\u016d-ma I, 46, 51, 122.\n\nSs\u016d-ma Jang-ch\u00fc, xxii, 1, 98.\n\nStagnation, 157.\n\nStandard text of Sun Tz\u016d. _See_ Sun Tz\u016d.\n\nStellar Mansions, the twenty-eight, 153.\n\nStonewall Jackson, biography of, quoted, 42, 59, 131.\n\nStrategy and tactics, 52.\n\nStrength, great, 29.\n\nStupidity, to be feigned, 145.\n\nSu Hs\u00fcn, quoted, xlii.\n\n_Su Shu_, an ethical treatise, li.\n\nSubdivisions of an army. 17, 33, 39.\n\n_Sui Shu_, quoted, 151; bibliographical section of, quoted, xviii, xli;\nreferred to, xxxvi, liii.\n\nSun Hao, a commentator, xli.\n\nSun Hsing-yen, xxxii; his edition of Sun Tz\u016d, ix; his preface, xxxiv;\nquoted, xvi, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, xlviii.\n\nSun Pin, xii, xv, xvi, 40.\n\n_Sun Tz\u016d_, archaic words in, xxiv; bibliographical description of\nedition used, xxxiv; corruptions in the text of, xxxi; difficult\npassages in, xxxiv; state of the text, 138; probable date of the work,\nxxviii.\n\n\u2014Modern text, 25, 26, 27, 33.\n\n\u2014Original text, xxxii, xxxiii, 2, 16, 27, 29, 43, 47, 53, 58, 62, 64,\n67, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 95, 98, 113, 119, 121, 153, 154, 168.\n\n\u2014Standard text, xxxiv, 10, 58, 91, 95, 117, 127, 164.\n\n\u2014_T\u2018ai I Tun Chia_ text, xxxvi.\n\n\u2014_T\u2018u Shu_ text, xxxi, 16, 21, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 40, 43, 46,\n47, 50, 52, 58, 64, 67, 69, 84, 87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96 105, 110, 114,\n117, 120, 121, 133, 135, 140, 145, 146, 153, 159, 164, 167, 168, 171,\n172, 175.\n\n\u2014_T\u2018ung Tien_ text, xxxiii, 1, 10, 12, 19, 22, 23, 25, 41, 45, 47, 50,\n53, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 74, 77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91,\n92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 101, 104, 108, 112, 113, 117, 119, 136, 137, 152,\n153, 158, 159, 164, 167, 170, 171, 172.\n\n\u2014_Y\u00fc Lan_ text, xxxiii, 3, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 27, 37, 42, 45,\n47, 50, 52, 53, 62, 64, 67, 68, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92,\n93, 94, 95, 98, 108, 112, 121, 129, 141, 153, 158, 159, 161, 164, 167,\n170, 171, 172.\n\n_Sun Tz\u016d Hs\u00fc Lu_, xviii, xxxiv; quoted, xxiii, xxiv, 118.\n\n_Sun Tz\u016d Hui Ch\u00eang_, xlii.\n\n_Sun Tz\u016d Ts\u2018an T\u2018ung_, xlii.\n\n_Sun Tz\u016d W\u00ean Ta_, xvii.\n\nSun Wu, a practical soldier, xxv; conjectural outline of his life, xxix;\nnot a man of eminent position, xxviii; probable origin of the legend\nconnected with, xxix; Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s biography of, xi; supposititious\nworks of, xvii, xviii. See also _Sun Tz\u016d_.\n\n_Sun Wu Sun Tz\u016d_, xvii.\n\n_Sung Shih_, referred to, xlii; bibliographical section of, xvii, xxxi,\nxxxvi, lii, liii.\n\nSuperstitious doubts, 126.\n\nSupplies, 137, 161: line of, 101.\n\n\nTa-hsi Wu, 168.\n\n_Ta Ming I T\u2018ung Chih_, quoted, xxxii.\n\nTaboo character, 124.\n\nTactical man\u0153uvring, 56.\n\nTactician, the skilful, 128.\n\nTactics, direct and indirect, 20, 34 _sqq._; modification of, 52, 53;\nnot to be repeated, 52; variation of, 26, 71, 74.\n\nT\u2018ai Kung. _See_ L\u00fc Shang.\n\n_T\u2018ai Kung Ping Fa_, li.\n\n_T\u2018ai P\u2018ing Y\u00fc Lan_, xvi, xxxiii, liii. See also Sun Tz\u016d, _Y\u00fc Lan_ text.\n\nT\u2018ai-po Shan-j\u00ean, quoted, 132.\n\n_T\u2018ai Po Yin Ching_, xxxvi.\n\nT\u2018ai Tsung, the Emperor. _See_ Li Shih-min.\n\n_T\u2018ai Y\u00fcan Ching_, referred to, xxiv.\n\nTallies, official, 146.\n\nT\u2018ang, prince of, xiii.\n\nT\u2018ang, the Completer. _See_ Ch\u2018\u00eang T\u2019ang.\n\nT\u2018ang Chien, 167.\n\n_T\u2018ang Shu_, bibliographical section of, referred to, xxxviii, xli. See\nalso _Hsin T\u2018ang Shu_ and _Chiu T\u2018ang Shu_.\n\n_Tao T\u00ea Ching_, quoted, xlix, 147, 155, 158, 161.\n\nTemple, used for deliberations, 7, 8.\n\nTemporising ground, 100, 102.\n\nTenacity, 125.\n\nT\u00eang Ch\u2018iang, 78.\n\nT\u00eang Ming-shih, quoted, xv.\n\nTerrain, natural advantages of, 108; six kinds of, 100.\n\nTextual criticism and emendations, 1, 7, 13, 14, 25, 29, 30, 36, 41, 43,\n46, 47, 49, 71, 74, 86, 87, 91, 94, 99, 113, 117, 121, 124, 127, 133,\n158, 167.\n\nThermopylae, 115.\n\nThree ancient dynasties, the, xxxix.\n\nThucydides, quoted, 125; referred to, 118.\n\nTi river, 144.\n\nT\u2018ien Chi, 40.\n\n_T\u2018ien-i-ko_ catalogue, quoted, xxxvi, xl.\n\nT\u2018ien Pao, xv.\n\nT\u2018ien Pu, 105.\n\nT\u2018ien Tan, defender of Chi-mo, 90, 120, 155; his use of spies, 166.\n\nTime, value of, 12; waste of, 157.\n\nTou Chien-t\u00ea, King of Hsia, 104.\n\nTou Ku, 151.\n\nTrafalgar, battle of, 37.\n\nTraining of officers and men, 4.\n\nTrebia, battle of the, 66.\n\nTs\u2018ai, prince of, xiii.\n\nTs\u2018ao Kuei, mentioned in the _Tso Chuan_, xxi; on the advantage of\nspirit, 66; threatens Huan Kung, 128.\n\nTs\u2018ao Kung or Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, xix, xxxi, xxxvi, xlii, xliv, 4, 59, 69, 76,\n151; his commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl; quoted, 1,\n7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 44,\n46, 51, 52, 55, 56, 59, 60, 67, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 88,\n91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 104, 106, 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120,\n122, 125, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152,\n154, 156, 157; referred to, 19, 43, 62, 136; his preface, xx, xxxiv;\ntranslated, xv _sqq._\n\nTs\u00eang Sh\u00ean, xxiv.\n\n_Tso Chuan_, delivered to Wu Ch\u2018i, xxiv; has no mention of Sun Tz\u016d, xx,\nxxvi, xxviii; quoted, xxvii, xxix, xlix, 19, 59, 65, 89, 97, 106, 111,\n162; referred to, xxi, xlvii.\n\nTso Tsung-t\u2018ang, 63.\n\nTsui-li, battle of, xxx.\n\nTu Chung-wei, 69, 70.\n\nTu Mu\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii; quoted, 4, 11,\n14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44,\n45, 46, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77,\n78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 101,\n105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122, 124, 126, 131,\n133, 136, 137, 138, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157,\n158, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171, 175; referred to, 20, 65,\n73, 150; his preface, quoted, xix, xxxvii, xxxviii, xlv.\n\n_Tu Shu Chih_, lii.\n\nTu Yu, xxxiii; his notes on Sun Tz\u016d in the _T\u2018ung Tien_, xxxvii; quoted,\n4, 6, 11, 19, 23, 24, 36, 38, 47, 56, 60, 61, 62, 77, 83, 88, 91, 92,\n93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 116, 117, 120, 137, 138, 152, 153,\n166, 167, 169, 171, 172; referred to, 28, 51, 74, 155, 173.\n\n_T\u2018u Shu_ encyclopaedia. See _Ku Chin T\u2018u Shu Chi Ch\u2018\u00eang_.\n\n\u2014Text of Sun Tz\u016d in the. See _Sun Tz\u016d_.\n\nTung Cho, xxxv, 94.\n\n_T\u2018ung Chou Lieh Kuo_, quoted, 56.\n\n_T\u2018ung Chih_, referred to, xxxii, xxxvi, xl, xli, liii.\n\n_T\u2018ung Tien_, xvii, xxxiii, xxxvii, lii, liii. _See also_ Tu Yu.\n\n\u2014Text of Sun Tz\u016d in the. See _Sun Tz\u016d_.\n\nTurenne, Marshal, on deceiving the enemy, 61; on sieges, 73; on spies,\n169.\n\nTz\u016d-ch\u2018an, saying of, xlix.\n\nTz\u016d-ch\u2018ang. _See_ Nang Wa.\n\n\n\u201cUnterricht des K\u00f6nigs von Preussen,\u201d quoted, 168, 169.\n\nUxbridge, Lord, 5.\n\n\nValleys, 80.\n\nVictory, halfway towards, 111, 112; without fighting, 17.\n\nVirtues, the five cardinal, 3.\n\n\nWan, town of, 122.\n\nWang Chien, 124.\n\nWang Hsi\u2019s commentary on Sun Tz\u016d, xl; quoted, 1, 2, 11, 13, 14, 23, 26,\n33, 34, 38, 44, 52, 53, 55, 60, 61, 63, 71, 78, 84, 92, 94, 95, 96, 106,\n114, 117, 119, 124, 132, 133, 135, 137, 142, 155, 157, 169; referred to,\n67, 76.\n\nWang Kuo, the rebel, 94.\n\nWang Liao, 128.\n\nWang Ling, a commentator, xxxvii, xli. _See also_ Wang Tz\u016d.\n\nWang Shih-ch\u2018ung, 104.\n\nWang T\u2018ing-ts\u2018ou, 105.\n\nWang Tz\u016d, quoted, 4, 6, 24.\n\nWang-tz\u016d Ch\u2018eng-fu, xiii.\n\nWar, want of fixity in, 54.\n\nWarlike prince, 141, 158.\n\nWater, an aid to the attack, 156.\n\nWaterloo, battle of, 5, 48, 130.\n\nWeapons, 14.\n\nWeeping, 127.\n\nWei, kingdom of, xxxv; province of, 105.\n\nWei river, 81.\n\n_Wei Chih_ (in the _San Kuo Chih_), xix, xxxvi.\n\nWei I, 106.\n\n_Wei Liao Tz\u016d_, li; quoted, 35, 73, 97, 99, 107, 125; referred to, xxiv.\n\nWei Po, 165.\n\nWei Wu Ti. _See_ Ts\u2018ao Kung.\n\nWell-being of one\u2019s men, to be studied, 123.\n\nWellington, his description of his army at Waterloo, 130; on the eve of\nWaterloo, 5; saying, of, 110; skilful in dissimulation, 6.\n\nW\u00ean, Duke of Chin, 141.\n\n_W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, quoted, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, xli; referred to,\nxxi, xxiii, xxxvi, liii.\n\nW\u00ean-su, King of, 132.\n\nW\u00ean Ti, Emperor of Sui dynasty, 151.\n\nW\u00ean Wang, l, 174.\n\nWestern Sacred Mountain, xxxii.\n\nWind, days of, 153; duration of, 155.\n\n\u201cWords on Wellington,\u201d quoted, 5.\n\nWu, city of, xiv; king of, 118. _See also_ Ho Lu.\n\nWu State, xxv, 49, 50, 129, 159; dates in the history of, xxvii, xxviii;\nfirst mentioned in history, xxvii.\n\nWu Ch\u2018i, l, 64, 65, 110; compared with Sun Wu, xliii; plagiary of Sun\nTz\u016d, xxiv. See also _Wu Tz\u016d_.\n\n_Wu Ch\u2018i Ching_, lii.\n\nWu Huo, 29.\n\nWu J\u00ean-chi, xxxiii.\n\nWu-lao, heights of, 104.\n\nWu Nien-hu, xxxiii.\n\nWu-tu, town of, 165.\n\nWu-tu Ch\u2018iang, 80.\n\n_Wu Tz\u016d_, xix, l; quoted, 24, 56, 66, 77, 80, 81, 98, 107, 115, 131,\n142, 156; referred to, xxiv.\n\nWu Tz\u016d-Hs\u00fc, xxix, xlviii. _See also_ Wu Y\u00fcan.\n\nWu Wang, xvi, 20, 175.\n\nWu Y\u00fcan, xiii, xxiii, 56; a spurious treatise fathered on, xxix.\n\n_Wu Y\u00fceh Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_, quoted, xiv, xviii.\n\nWylie\u2019s \u201cNotes,\u201d referred to, xli, lii.\n\n\nYa, King of Chao, 144.\n\nYang Han, 115.\n\nYang-p\u2018ing, city of, 46.\n\nYangtsze river, 123.\n\nYao Hsiang, 78.\n\nYarkand, battle of, 132.\n\nYeh Shih or Yeh Shui-hsin, his theory about Sun Tz\u016d, xxi, xxiii, xxv;\non Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s style, xxiv.\n\nYellow Emperor, the, xvi, 84.\n\nYellow Turban rebels, 154.\n\nYen, King of Hs\u00fc, xvi, xlix.\n\nYen Shih-ku, 167.\n\nYen Ti, 84.\n\nYen Tz\u016d, quoted, 98.\n\n_Yin_ and _Yang_, 2.\n\nYin dynasty, 173, 174.\n\n_Yin Fu Ching_, xxxvi, 111.\n\nYing, capital of Ch\u2018u, xii, xiii, xvi, xxix.\n\nYing K\u2018ao-shu, xxi.\n\nYo Fei, a student of Sun Tz\u016d, xlii.\n\nYo I, 117.\n\n_Y\u00fc Hai_, quoted, xlii; referred to, xxxvi, xl, lii, liii.\n\n_Y\u00fc Lan_ encyclopaedia. See _T\u2018ai P\u2018ing Y\u00fc Lan_.\n\n\u2014Text of Sun Tz\u016d in the. See _Sun Tz\u016d_.\n\nY\u00fcan, the two, opponents of Ts\u2018ao Ts\u2018ao, xxxv.\n\n_Y\u00fcan Chien Lei Han_, liii.\n\nY\u00fcan Shao, 151.\n\nY\u00fceh State, 129; compared with Wu, xxvi, 49, 50; first mentioned in\nhistory, xxvii.\n\n_Y\u00fceh Ch\u00fceh Shu_, quoted, xiv.\n\n_Y\u00fceh Y\u00fc_, xxi.\n\n_Yung Lo Ta Tien_, lii.\n\n\n\n\n CORRIGENDA\n\n\n[Transcriber\u2019s note: the corrigenda listed below has been incorporated\ninto the text.]\n\nP. ix, _note_: For \u201cedition\u201d read \u201ctranslation.\u201d\n\n\u201e 14, line 3: For \u201cby\u201d read \u201cin the.\u201d\n\n\u201e 16, line 5: For \u201cT.\u201d read \u201c_T\u2018u Shu_.\u201d\n\n\u201e \u201e \u00a7 19, _note_: Before \u201cWar\u201d insert \u201cSoldiers are not to be used as\nplaythings.\u201d\n\n\u201e 17, \u00a7 1: \u5168\u8ecd, etc. The more I think about it, the more I prefer the\nrendering suggested on p. 159, \u00a7 22, _note_.\n\n\u201e \u201e \u00a7 1 _note_, and p. 78, line 6: Insert \u201cthe\u201d before \u201cSs\u016d-ma Fa.\u201d\n\n\u201e 33, note on heading: Cf. X. \u00a7 12, where \u52e2 is translated \u201cstrength,\u201d\nthough it might also be \u201cconditions.\u201d The three words \u57f7, \u57f6 and \u52e2 have\nbeen much confused. It appears from the _Shuo W\u00ean_ that the last\ncharacter is post-classical, so that Sun Tz\u016d must have used either \u57f7\nor \u57f6 in all senses.\n\n\u201e 45, line 1: For \u201csublety\u201d read \u201csubtlety.\u201d\n\n\u201e 63, line 4: M. Chavannes writes in the _T\u2018oung Pao_, 1906, p. 210:\n\u201cLe g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Pan Tch\u2018ao n\u2019a jamais port\u00e9 les armes chinoises jusque sur\nles bords de la mer Caspienne.\u201d I hasten to correct my statement on this\nauthority.\n\n\u201e 80, 9th line from the bottom: For \u56d7 read \u53e3.\n\n\u201e 109, \u00a7 23, _note_, and p. 126, 5th line from bottom: For \u201cHuang\nShih-kung\u201d read \u201cHuang-shih Kung.\u201d\n\n\u201e 124, line 7: For \u201cCh\u2018\u00ean\u201d read \u201cCh\u2018\u00ean Hao.\u201d\n\n\u201e 136, 11th line from bottom: Insert \u201cto\u201d before \u201cselect.\u201d\n\n\u201e 152, \u00a7 2: Substitute semi-colon for full stop after \u201cavailable.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n Footnotes\n\n[1] Published at Paris in 1782.\n\n[2] A rather distressing Japanese flavour pervades the work throughout.\nThus, King Ho Lu masquerades as \u201cKatsuryo,\u201d Wu and Y\u00fceh become \u201cGo\u201d and\n\u201cEtsu,\u201d etc. etc.\n\n[3] A notable exception is to be found in Biot\u2019s translation of the\n_Chou Li_.\n\n[4] _Shih Chi_, ch. 65.\n\n[5] Also written \u95d4\u95ad Ho L\u00fc. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.\n\n[6] _Shih Chi_, ch. 130, f. 6 _r_^o.\n\n[7] I note that M. Chavannes translates \u6c11\u52de \u201cle peuple est \u00e9puis\u00e9.\u201d\nBut in Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s own book (see especially VII \u00a7\u00a7 24\u201326) the ordinary\nmeaning of \u6c11 is \u201carmy,\u201d and this, I think, is more suitable here.\n\n[8] These words are given also in Wu Tz\u016d-hs\u00fc\u2019s biography, ch. 66, fol.\n3 _r_^o.\n\n[9] The appellation of \u56ca\u74e6 Nang Wa.\n\n[10] _Shih Chi_, ch. 31, fol. 6 _r_^o.\n\n[11] _Ibid._ ch. 25, fol. 1 _r_^o.\n\n[12] The appellation of \u72d0\u5043 Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year\n637.\n\n[13] \u738b\u5b50\u57ce\u7236 Wang-tz\u016d Ch\u2018\u00eang-fu, ch. 32, year 607.\n\n[14] The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to the \u8d8a\u7d76\u66f8,\na work of the Han dynasty, which says (ch. 2, fol. 3 _v_^o of my\nedition): \u5deb\u9580\u5916\u5927\u51a2\u5433\u738b\u5ba2\u9f4a\u5b6b\u6b66\u51a2\u4e5f\u53bb\u7e23\u5341\u91cc\u5584\u7232\u5175\u6cd5 \u201cTen _li_ outside the Wu\ngate [of the city of \u5433 Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great\nmound, raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch\u2018i who\nexcelled in the art of war, by the King of Wu.\u201d\n\n[15] \u5b6b\u5b50\u8005\u5433\u4eba\u4e5f\u5584\u7232\u5175\u6cd5\u8f9f\u5e7d\u5c45\u4e16\u4eba\u83ab\u77e5\u5176\u80fd.\n\n[16] \u541b\u81e3\u4e56\u5fc3\u5247\u5b6b\u5b50\u4e0d\u80fd\u4ee5\u61c9\u6575.\n\n[17] \u5b6b\u6b66\u4ee5\u4e09\u842c\u7834\u695a\u4e8c\u5341\u842c\u8005\u695a\u7121\u6cd5\u6545\u4e5f.\n\n[18] The _Shih Chi_, on the other hand, says: \u81cf\u4ea6\u5b6b\u6b66\u4e4b\u5f8c\u4e16\u5b50\u5b6b\u4e5f.\nI may remark in passing that the name \u6b66 for one who was a great\nwarrior is just as suspicious as \u81cf for a man who had his feet cut\noff.\n\n[19] An allusion to \u6613\u7d93, \u7e6b\u8fad, II. 2: \u5f26\u6728\u7232\u5f27\u5261\u6728\u7232\u77e2\u5f27\u77e2\u4e4b\u5229\u4ee5\u5a01\u5929\u4e0b \u201cThey\nattached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make\narrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe.\u201d\n\n[20] \u8ad6\u8a9e XII. 7.\n\n[21] \u66f8\u7d93 V. iv. 7.\n\n[22] \u6613\u7d93, 7th diagram (\u5e2b).\n\n[23] \u8a69\u7d93 III. 1. vii. 5.\n\n[24] \u53f8\u99ac\u6cd5 ch. 1 (\u4ec1\u672c) _ad init._ The text of the passage in the \u5716\u66f8\n_T\u2018u Shu_ (\u620e\u653f\u5178, ch. 85) is: \u662f\u6545\u6bba\u4eba\u5b89\u4eba\u6bba\u4e4b\u53ef\u4e5f.\n\n[25] The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and\noverthrown by \u52fe\u8e10 Kou Chien, King of Y\u00fceh, in 473 B.C. See _post_.\n\n[26] King Yen of \u5f90 Hs\u00fc, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in\nhis preface: \u4ec1\u800c\u6557 \u201cHis humanity brought him to destruction.\u201d See _Shih\nChi_ ch. 5, f. 1 _v_^o and M. Chavannes\u2019 note, _M\u00e9moires Historiques_,\ntom. II, p. 8.\n\n[27] _T\u2018u Shu_, _ibid._ ch. 90: \u64cd\u805e\u4e0a\u53e4\u6709\u5f27\u77e2\u4e4b\u5229\u8ad6\u8a9e\u66f0\u8db3\u5175\u5c19\u66f8\u516b\u653f\u66f0\u5e2b\u6613\u66f0\u5e2b\n\u8c9e\u4e08\u4eba\u5409\u8a69\u66f0\u738b\u8d6b\u65af\u6012\u7230\u5f81\u5176\u65c5\u9ec3\u5e1d \u6e6f\u6b66\u54b8\u7528\u5e72\u621a\u4ee5\u6fdf\u4e16\u4e5f\u53f8\u99ac\u6cd5\u66f0\u4eba\u6545\u6bba\u4eba\u6bba\u4e4b\u53ef\u4e5f\u6043\u6b66\n\u8005\u6ec5\u6043\u6587\u8005\u4ea1\u592b\u5dee\u5043\u738b\u662f\u4e5f\u8056\u4eba\u4e4b\u7528\u5175\u6222\u800c\u6642\u52d5\u4e0d\u5f97\u5df2\u800c\u7528\u4e4b.\n\n[28] The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T\u2018u Shu_, and\nmay be an interpolation. It was known, however, to \u5f35\u5b88\u7bc0 Chang Shou-chieh\nof the T\u2018ang dynasty, and appears in the _T\u2018ai P\u2018ing Y\u00fc Lan_.\n\n[29] Ts\u2018ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II,\nperhaps especially of \u00a7 8.\n\n[30] \u543e\u89c0\u5175\u66f8\u6230\u7b56\u591a\u77e3\u5b6b\u6b66\u6240\u8457\u6df1\u77e3\u5b6b\u5b50\u8005\u9f4a\u4eba\u4e5f\u540d\u6b66\u7232\u5433\u738b\u95d4\u95ad\u4f5c\u5175\u6cd5\u4e00\u5341\u4e09\u7bc7\u8a66\u4e4b\n\u5a66\u4eba\u5352\u4ee5\u7232\u5c07\u897f\u7834\u5f3a\u695a\u5165\u90e2\u5317\u5a01\u9f4a\u6649\u5f8c\u767e\u6b72\u9918\u6709\u5b6b\u81cf\u662f\u6b66\u4e4b\u5f8c\u4e5f\u5be9\u8a08\u91cd\u8209\u660e\u756b\u6df1\u5716\u4e0d\u53ef\u76f8\u8aa3\n\u800c\u4f46\u4e16\u4eba\u672a\u4e4b\u6df1\u4eae\u8a13\u8aaa\u6cc1\u6587\u7169\u5bcc\u884c\u65bc\u4e16\u8005\u5931\u5176\u65e8\u8981\u6545\u64b0\u7232\u7565\u89e3\u7109.\n\n[31] \u6f22\u66f8\u85dd\u6587\u5fd7\uff0c\u5175\u6b0a\u8b00.\n\n[32] The \u5b8b\u85dd\u6587\u5fd7 mentions two editions of Sun Tz\u016d in 3 _ch\u00fcan_, namely\n\u5b6b\u6b66\u5b6b\u5b50 and \u6731\u670d\u6821\u5b9a\u5b6b\u5b50.\n\n[33] See chap. XI.\n\n[34] \u5433\u738b\u53ec\u5b6b\u5b50\u554f\u4ee5\u5175\u6cd5\u6bcf\u9673\u4e00\u7bc7\u738b\u4e0d\u77e5\u53e3\u4e4b\u7a31\u5584.\n\n[35] \u6309\u6b64\u7686\u91cb\u4e5d\u5730\u7bc7\u7fa9\u8fad\u610f\u751a\u8a73\u6545\u5176\u7bc7\u5e19\u4e0d\u80fd\u4e0d\u591a\u4e5f.\n\n[36] Such as the \u516b\u9663\u5716, quoted in \u912d\u7384 Ch\u00eang Hs\u00fcan\u2019s commentary on the\n_Chou Li_, the \u6230\u9b2d\u5927\u7532\u5175\u6cd5 and \u5175\u6cd5\u96dc\u5360, mentioned in the \u968b\u5fd7 _Sui Chih_,\nand the \u4e09\u5341\u4e8c\u58d8\u7d93, in the _Hsin T\u2018ang Chih_.\n\n[37] On the other hand, it is noteworthy that \u5433\u5b50 _Wu Tz\u016d_, which is now\nin 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the _Han Chih_. Likewise, the \u4e2d\u5eb8\n_Chung Yung_ is credited with 49 chapters, though now in one only. In\nthe case of such very short works, one is tempted to think that \u7bc7 might\nsimply mean \u201cleaves.\u201d\n\n[38] See _T\u2018u Shu_, \u7d93\u7c4d\u5178, ch. 442, \u5f5a\u8003 2.\n\n[39] An extract will be found on p. xlv.\n\n[40] \u6b66\u6240\u8457\u66f8\u51e1\u6578\u5341\u842c\u8a00\u66f9\u9b4f\u6b66\u5e1d\u524a\u5176\u7e41\u5269\u7b46\u5176\u7cbe\u5207\u51e1\u5341\u4e09\u7bc7\u6210\u7232\u4e00\u7de8.\n\n[41] \u5176\u6240\u7232\u6ce8\u89e3\u5341\u4e0d\u91cb\u4e00\u6b64\u84cb\u975e\u66f9\u4e0d\u80fd\u76e1\u6ce8\u89e3\u4e5f.\n\n[42] \u4e88\u5c0b\u9b4f\u5fd7\u898b\u66f9\u81ea\u4f5c\u5175\u66f8\u5341\u9918\u842c\u8a00\u8af8\u5c07\u5f81\u6230\u7686\u4ee5\u65b0\u66f8\u5f9e\u4e8b\u5f9e\u4ee4\u8005\u514b\u6377\u9055\u6559\u8005\u8ca0\u6557\u610f\u66f9\u81ea\u65bc\n\u65b0\u66f8\u4e2d\u99b3\u9a5f\u5176\u8aaa\u81ea\u6210\u4e00\u5bb6\u4e8b\u696d\u4e0d\u6b32\u96a8\u5b6b\u6b66\u5f8c\u76e1\u89e3\u5176\u66f8\u4e0d\u7136\u8005\u66f9\u5176\u4e0d\u80fd\u8036\u4eca\u65b0\u66f8\u5df2\u4ea1\u4e0d\u53ef\u5fa9\u77e5.\n\n[43] \u9b4f\u6c0f\u7463\u9023\u5b6b\u6b66\u4e4b\u6cd5.\n\n[44] See \u5b6b\u5b50\u5175\u6cd5\u5e8f.\n\n[45] \u8b19\u8a00\u89e3\u5176\u89d5\u7565.\n\n[46] Ch. 99, fol. 5 _r_^o.\n\n[47] \u7136\u53f2\u8a18\u7a31\u5341\u4e09\u7bc7\u5728\u6f22\u5fd7\u4e4b\u524d\u4e0d\u5f97\u4ee5\u5f8c\u4f86\u9644\u76ca\u8005\u7232\u672c\u66f8\u7267\u4e4b\u8a00\u56fa\u672a\u53ef\u4ee5\u7232\u64da\u4e5f.\n\n[48] _Shih Chi_, ch. 65 _ad fin:_ \u4e16\u4fd7\u6240\u7a31\u5e2b\u65c5\u7686\u9053\u5b6b\u5b50\u5341\u4e09\u7bc7\u5433\u8d77\u5175\u6cd5\u4e16\u591a\u6709\u6545\u5f17\u8ad6.\n\n[49] \u8449\u9069 Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151\u20131223]. See \u6587\u737b\u901a\u8003,\nch. 221, ff. 7, 8.\n\n[50] See _Tso Chuan_ \u96b1\u516c, I. 3 _ad fin._ and XI. 3 _ad init._ He hardly\ndeserves to be bracketed with assassins.\n\n[51] See pp. 66, 128.\n\n[52] See _Tso Chuan_, \u50d6\u516c, XXX. 5.\n\n[53] See p. 128. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name.\n\n[54] _I.e._ Po P\u2018ei. See _ante_.\n\n[55] \u9077\u8f09\u5b6b\u6b66\u9f4a\u4eba\u800c\u7528\u65bc\u5433\u5728\u95d4\u95ad\u6642\u7834\u695a\u5165\u90e2\u7232\u5927\u5c07\u6309\u5de6\u6c0f\u7121\u5b6b\u6b66\u4ed6\u66f8\u6240\u6709\u5de6\u6c0f\u4e0d\u5fc5\n\u76e1\u6709\u7136\u7a4e\u8003\u53d4\u66f9\u528c\u71ed\u4e4b\u6b66\u9c44\u8a2d\u8af8\u4e4b\u6d41\u5fae\u8ce4\u66b4\u7528\u4e8b\u5de6\u6c0f\u672a\u5617\u907a\u800c\u6b66\u529f\u540d\u7ae0\u707c\u5982\u6b64\u4e43\u66f4\u95d5\u53c8\n\u540c\u6642\u4f0d\u54e1\u5bb0\u56ad\u4e00\u4e00\u9293\u6b21\u4e43\u7368\u4e0d\u53ca\u6b66\u90aa.\n\n[56] The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large\nadditions have been made by later hands. Kuan Chung died in 645 B.C.\n\n[57] See _Infra_, p. 1.\n\n[58] I do not know what work this is, unless it be the last chapter of\nthe \u570b\u8a9e. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear.\n\n[59] About 480 B.C.\n\n[60] \u8a73\u5473\u5b6b\u5b50\u8207\u7ba1\u5b50\u516d\u97dc\u8d8a\u8a9e\u76f8\u51fa\u5165\u6625\u79cb\u672b\u6230\u570b\u521d\u5c71\u6797\u8655\u58eb\u6240\u7232\u5176\u8a00\u5f97\u7528\u65bc\u5433\u8005\u5176\u5f92\n\u5938\u5927\u4e4b\u8aaa\u4e5f.\n\n[61] That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung.\n\n[62] In the 3rd century B.C.\n\n[63] Ss\u016d-ma Jang-ch\u00fc, whose family name was \u7530 T\u2018ien, lived in the\nlatter half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have\nwritten a work on war. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64, and _infra_, p. 1.\n\n[64] \u81ea\u5468\u4e4b\u76db\u81f3\u6625\u79cb\u51e1\u5c07\u5175\u8005\u5fc5\u8207\u805e\u570b\u653f\u672a\u6709\u7279\u5c07\u65bc\u5916\u8005\u516d\u570b\u6642\u6b64\u5236\u59cb\u6539\u5433\u96d6\u883b\u5937\u800c\u5b6b\u6b66\u7232\n\u5927\u5c07\u4e43\u4e0d\u7232\u547d\u537f\u800c\u5de6\u6c0f\u7121\u50b3\u7109\u53ef\u4e4e\u6545\u51e1\u8b02\u7a70\u82f4\u5b6b\u6b66\u8005\u7686\u8faf\u58eb\u5984\u76f8\u6a19\u6307\u975e\u4e8b\u5be6\u5176\u8a00\u95d4\u95ad\u8a66\u4ee5\u5a66\n\u4eba\u5c24\u7232\u5947\u96aa\u4e0d\u8db3\u4fe1.\n\n[65] See the end of the passage quoted from the _Shih Chi_ on p. xii.\n\n[66] In the \u66f8\u9304\u89e3\u984c, a classified catalogue of his family library.\n\n[67] See _W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, ch. 221, f. 9 _r_^o: \u4e16\u4e4b\u8a00\u5175\u8005\u7956\u5b6b\u6b66\u7136\n\u5b6b\u6b66\u4e8b\u5433\u95d4\u95ad\u800c\u4e0d\u898b\u65bc\u5de6\u50b3\u4e0d\u77e5\u679c\u4f55\u6642\u4eba\u4e5f.\n\n[68] See _Hs\u00fc Lu_, f. 14 _r_^o: \u5b6b\u5433\u6216\u662f\u53e4\u66f8.\n\n[69] \u6309\u5b6b\u5b50\u751f\u65bc\u656c\u738b\u4e4b\u4ee3\u6545\u5468\u79e6\u5169\u6f22\u8af8\u66f8\u7686\u591a\u8972\u7528\u5176\u6587. Here is a list of the\npassages in Sun Tz\u016d from which either the substance or the actual words\nhave been appropriated by early authors: VII. 9; IX. 17; I. 24 (\u6230\u570b\u7b56).\nIX. 23; IX. 1, 3, 7; V. 1; III. 18; XI. 58; VII. 31; VII. 24; VII. 26;\nIX. 15; IX. 4 (_bis_) (\u5433\u5b50). III. 8; IV. 7 (\u5c09\u7e5a\u5b50). VII. 19; V. 14;\nIII. 2 (\u9da1\u51a0\u5b50). III. 8; XI. 2; I. 19; XI. 58; X. 10 & VI. 1 (\u53f2\u8a18. Two\nof the above are given as quotations). V. 13; IV. 2 (\u5442\u6c0f\u6625\u79cb). IX. 11,\n12; XI. 30; I. 13; VII. 19 & IV. 7; VII. 32; VII. 25; IV. 20 & V. 23;\nIX. 43; V. 15; VII. 26; V. 4 & XI. 39; VIII. 11; VI. 4 (\u6dee\u5357\u5b50). V. 4\n(\u592a\u5143\u7d93). II. 20; X. 14 (\u6f5b\u592b\u8ad6).\n\n[70] See Legge\u2019s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that\nthe _Tso Chuan_ must have been written in the 5th century, but not\nbefore 424 B.C.\n\n[71] The instances quoted are:\u2014III. 14, 15: \u540c is said to be equivalent\nto \u660c; II. 15: \ud85a\udfbc = \u8401; VII. 28: \u6b78 = \u606f; XI. 60: \u8a73 = \u4f6f; XI. 24: the use\nof \u9b25 instead of \u9b2d (the later form); XI. 64: \u8a85 = \u6cbb; IX. 3: \u7d76 = \u8d8a;\nIII. 11: \u5468 and \u9699 antithetically opposed in the sense of \u7121\u7f3a and \u6709\u7f3a;\nXI. 56: \u72af = \u52d5; XI. 31: \u65b9 = \u7e1b.\n\n[72] See _Mencius_ III. 1. iii. 13\u201320.\n\n[73] \u5c71\u6797\u8655\u58eb need not be pressed to mean an actual dweller in the\nmountains. I think it simply denotes a person living a retired life\nand standing aloof from public affairs.\n\n[74] When Wu first appears in the _Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_ in 584, it is already at\nvariance with its powerful neighbour. The _Ch\u2018un Ch\u2018iu_ first mentions\nY\u00fceh in 537, the _Tso Chuan_ in 601.\n\n[75] This is explicitly stated in the _Tso Chuan_, \u662d\u516c XXXII, 2:\n\u590f\u5433\u4f10\u8d8a\u59cb\u7528\u5e2b\u65bc\u8d8a\u4e5f.\n\n[76] There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would\ntend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully\njustify the language used in XI. \u00a7 30.\n\n[77] See his preface to Sun Tz\u016d:\u2014\u5165\u90e2\u5a01\u9f4a\u6649\u4e4b\u529f\u6b78\u4e4b\u5b50\u80e5\u6545\u6625\u79cb\u50b3\u4e0d\u8f09\u5176\u540d\u8462\u529f\u6210\u4e0d\n\u53d7\u5b98.\n\n[78] With Wu Y\u00fcan himself the case is just the reverse:\u2014a spurious\ntreatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a\ngreat general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun\nWu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the\n5th century.\n\n[79] See _Tso Chuan_, \u5b9a\u516c, 4th year (506), \u00a7 14: \u81ea\u662d\u738b\u537d\u4f4d\u7121\u6b72\u4e0d\u6709\u5433\u5e2b\n\u201cFrom the date of King Chao\u2019s accession [515] there was no year in\nwhich Ch\u2018u was not attacked by Wu.\u201d\n\n[80] See _supra_, p. xx.\n\n[81] \u79e6\u6f22\u5df2\u4f86\u7528\u5175\u7686\u7528\u5176\u6cd5\u800c\u6216\u7955\u5176\u66f8\u4e0d\u80af\u6ce8\u4ee5\u50b3\u4e16\u9b4f\u6b66\u59cb\u7232\u4e4b\u6ce8.\n\n[82] See \u5b8b\u85dd\u6587\u5fd7.\n\n[83] Alluded to on p. xvii, note 3.\n\n[84] _Loc. cit._: \u8462\u5b8b\u4eba\u53c8\u5f9e\u5927\u8208\u6731\u6c0f\u8655\u898b\u660e\u4eba\u523b\u672c\u9918\u5247\u4e16\u7121\u50b3\u8005.\n\n[85] A good biographical notice, with a list of his works, will be found\nin the \u570b\u671d\u8a69\u4eba\u5fb5\u7565, ch. 48, fol. 18 _sqq._\n\n[86] Preface _ad fin._: \u543e\u5bb6\u51fa\u6a02\u5b89\u771e\u5b6b\u5b50\u4e4b\u5f8c\u5abf\u4f59\u5f92\u8b80\u7956\u66f8\u8003\u8a3c\u6587\u5b57\u4e0d\u901a\u65b9\u7565\u4ea6\u4eab\u627f\n\u5e73\u4e4b\u798f\u8005\u4e45\u4e5f \u201cMy family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended\nfrom Sun Tz\u016d. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor\u2019s work\nfrom a literary point of view, without comprehending the military\ntechnique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!\u201d\n\n[87] Hua-yin is about 14 miles from \u6f7c\u95dc T\u2018ung-kuan on the eastern\nborder of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those\nabout to make the ascent of the \u83ef\u5c71 or Western Sacred Mountain. It\nis mentioned in the \u5927\u660e\u4e00\u7d71\u5fd7 [A.D. 1461], ch. 32, f. 22, as the \u897f\u5dbd\u5edf:\u2014\u5728\n\u83ef\u9670\u7e23\u6771\u4e94\u91cc\u5edf\u6709\u5510\ud852\udce5\u5b97\u6240\u88fd\u83ef\u5c71\u7891 \u201cSituated five _li_ east of the district\ncity of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by\nthe T\u2018ang Emperor Hs\u00fcan Tsung [713\u2013755].\u201d\n\n[88] \u66e9\u4e88\u6e38\ud863\udd7f\u4e2d\u8b80\u83ef\u9670\u5dbd\u5edf\u9053\u85cf\u898b\u6709\u6b64\u66f8\u5f8c\u6709\u912d\u53cb\u8ce2\u907a\u8aaa\u4e00\u5377.\n\n[89] Cf. Sun Hsing-yen\u2019s remark _\u00e0 propos_ of his mistakes in the names\nand order of the commentators: \u5409\u5929\u4fdd\u4e4b\u4e0d\u6df1\u7a76\u6b64\u66f8\u53ef\u77e5.\n\n[90] \u570b\u5bb6\u4ee4\u7532\u4ee5\u5b6b\u5b50\u6821\u58eb\u6240\u50b3\u672c\u6216\u591a\u932f\u8b2c\u7576\u7528\u53e4\u672c\u662f\u6b63\u5176\u6587\u9069\u5433\u5ff5\u6e56\u592a\u5b88\u7562\u606c\u6eaa\u5b5d\u5ec9\u7686\u7232\u6b64\n\u5b78\u6240\u5f97\u6216\u904e\u4e8e\u4e88\u9042\u520b\u4e00\u7de8\u4ee5\u8ab2\u6b66\u58eb.\n\n[91] _See_ my \u201cCatalogue of Chinese Books\u201d (Luzac & Co., 1908),\nno. 40.\n\n[92] This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tz\u016d, namely:\nI. 2; 26; 16; II. 9 & 10; III. 3; III & VII; III. 17; IV. 4; 6; V. 3;\n10 & 11; 14; the headings of the 13 chapters, with special reference to\nchap. VII; VII. 5; 15 & 16; 27; 33, &c.; VIII. 1\u20136; IX. 11; X. 1\u201320;\nXI. 23; 31; 19; 43; VII. 12\u201314 & XI. 52; XI. 56; XIII. 15 & 16; 26;\nXIII in general.\n\n[93] Preface to Mei Yao-ch\u2018\u00ean\u2019s edition: \u5b6b\u5b50\u6ce8\u8005\u5c24\u591a\u6b66\u4e4b\u66f8\u672c\u65bc\u5175\u5175\u4e4b\u8853\u975e\n\u4e00\u800c\u4ee5\u4e0d\u7aae\u7232\u5947\u5b9c\u5176\u8aaa\u8005\u4e4b\u591a\u4e5f.\n\n[94] See \u9b4f\u66f8, ch. 1.\n\n[95] _Loc. cit.:_ \u7136\u524d\u4e16\u8a00\u5584\u7528\u5175\u7a31\u66f9\u516c\u66f9\u516c\u5617\u8207\u8463\u5442\u8af8\u8881\u89d2\u5176\u529b\u800c\u52dd\u4e4b\u9042\u8207\u5433\u8700\u5206\u6f22\u800c\n\u738b\u50b3\u8a00\u9b4f\u4e4b\u5c07\u51fa\u5175\u5343\u91cc\u6bcf\u5750\u8a08\u52dd\u6557\u6388\u5176\u6210\u7b97\u8af8\u5c07\u7528\u4e4b\u5341\u4e0d\u5931\u4e00\u4e00\u6709\u9055\u8005\u5175\u8f12\u6557\u5317.\n\n[96] Cf. \u5929\u4e00\u95a3\u85cf\u66f8\u7e3d\u76ee Catalogue of the library of the \u8303 Fan family at\nNingpo, \u5b50\u90e8, fol. 12 _v_^o: \u5176\u8a3b\u591a\u96b1\u8fad\u5f15\u800c\u4e0d\u767c \u201cHis commentary is frequently\nobscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the meaning.\u201d\n\n[97] See \u7389\u6d77, ch. 141 _ad init._\n\n[98] _W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, ch. 221, f. 9 _v_^o.\n\n[99] Ch. 207, f. 5 _r_^o.\n\n[100] It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently\ndiscovered chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the \u201cGrottos of\nthe Thousand Buddhas.\u201d _See_ B. E. F. E. O, t. VIII, nos. 3\u20134, p. 525.\n\n[101] _Loc. cit._\n\n[102] _W\u00ean Hsien T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, ch. 221, f. 9: \u4e16\u8b02\u7267\u6168\u7136\u6700\u559c\u8ad6\u5175\u6b32\u8a66\u800c\u4e0d\u5f97\u8005\n\u5176\u5b78\u80fd\u9053\u6625\u79cb\u6230\u570b\u6642\u4e8b\u751a\u535a\u800c\u8a73\u77e5\u5175\u8005\u6709\u53d6\u7109.\n\n[103] Preface to his commentary (_T\u2018u Shu_, \u7d93\u7c4d\u5178, ch. 442): \u6b66\u4e4b\u6240\u8ad6\u5927\u7d04\n\u7528\u4ec1\u7fa9\u4f7f\u6a5f\u6b0a\u4e5f.\n\n[104] _Ibid._: \u81ea\u6b66\u6b7b\u5f8c\u51e1\u5343\u6b72\u5c07\u5175\u8005\u6709\u6210\u8005\u6709\u6557\u8005\u52d8\u5176\u4e8b\u8de1\u7686\u8207\u6b66\u6240\u8457\u66f8\u4e00\u4e00\u76f8\u62b5\u7576.\n\n[105] _T\u2018ung K\u2018ao, loc. cit._: \u76a5\u4ee5\u66f9\u516c\u6ce8\u96b1\u5fae\u675c\u7267\u6ce8\u95ca\u8e08\u91cd\u7232\u4e4b\u6ce8\u4e91.\n\n[106] _Ibid._\n\n[107] The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was\nnominally existent in Sun Tz\u016d\u2019s day, it retained hardly a vestige of\npower, and the old military organisation had practically gone by the\nboard. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage.\n\n[108] See _Chou Li_, XXIX. 6\u201310.\n\n[109] See _T\u2018u Shu_, \u620e\u653f\u5178, ch. 90, f. 2 _v_^o: \u5f8c\u4e4b\u5b78\u8005\u5f92\u898b\u5176\u66f8\u53c8\u5404\u727d\u65bc\u5df1\n\u898b\u662f\u4ee5\u6ce8\u8005\u96d6\u591a\u800c\u5c11\u7576\u4e5f\u7368\u543e\u53cb\u8056\u516a\u4e0d\u7136\u5617\u8a55\u6b66\u4e4b\u66f8\u66f0\u6b64\u6230\u570b\u76f8\u50be\u4e4b\u8aaa\u4e5f\u4e09\u4ee3\u738b\u8005\u4e4b\u5e2b\u53f8\u99ac\n\u4e5d\u4f10\u4e4b\u6cd5\u6b66\u4e0d\u53ca\u4e5f\u7136\u4ea6\u611b\u5176\u6587\u7565\u800c\u610f\u6df1\u5176\u884c\u5e2b\u7528\u5175\u6599\u6575\u5236\u52dd\u4ea6\u7686\u6709\u6cd5\u5176\u8a00\u751a\u6709\u5e8f\u6b21\u800c\u6ce8\u8005\u6c68\n\u4e4b\u6216\u5931\u5176\u610f\u4e43\u81ea\u7232\u6ce8\u51e1\u81a0\u4e8e\u504f\u898b\u8005\u7686\u6289\u53bb\u5085\u4ee5\u5df1\u610f\u800c\u767c\u4e4b\u7136\u5f8c\u6b66\u4e4b\u8aaa\u4e0d\u6c68\u800c\u660e\u543e\u77e5\u6b64\u66f8\u7576\u8207\u4e09\n\u5bb6\u4e26\u50b3\u800c\u5f8c\u4e16\u53d6\u5176\u8aaa\u8005\u5f80\u5f80\u4e8e\u543e\u8056\u516a\u591a\u7109.\n\n[110] _T\u2018ung K\u2018ao_, ch. 221, f. 11 _r_^o: \u6673\u4ee5\u53e4\u672c\u6821\u6b63\u95d5\u8aa4.\n\n[111] See \u56db\u5eab\u5168\u66f8, ch. 99, f. 16 _v_^o.\n\n[112] This appears to be still extant. See Wylie\u2019s \u201cNotes,\u201d p. 91\n(new edition).\n\n[113] _T\u2018ung K\u2018ao, loc. cit._: \u4ec1\u5edf\u6642\u5929\u4e0b\u4e45\u627f\u5e73\u4eba\u4e0d\u7fd2\u5175\u5143\u660a\u65e2\u53db\u908a\u5c07\u6578\u6557\u671d\u5ef7\u9817\n\u8a2a\u77e5\u5175\u8005\u58eb\u5927\u592b\u4eba\u4eba\u8a00\u5175\u77e3\u6545\u672c\u671d\u6ce8\u89e3\u5b6b\u6b66\u66f8\u8005\u5927\u62b5\u7686\u5176\u6642\u4eba\u4e5f.\n\n[114] A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the\n_San Kuo Chih_, ch. 10.\n\n[115] Ch. 100, ff. 2, 3.\n\n[116] _See_ p. 144.\n\n[117] _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 17 _ad init._\n\n[118] _San Kuo Chih_, ch. 54, f. 10 _v_^o (commentary).\n\n[119] _Sung Shih_, ch. 365 _ad init._\n\n[120] The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting\nthemselves with Sun Tz\u016d are not behindhand in their praise. In this\nconnection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from\nLord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted\nprevious to publication: \u201cMany of Sun Wu\u2019s maxims are perfectly\napplicable to the present day, and no. 11 on page 77 is one that the\npeople of this country would do well to take to heart.\u201d\n\n[121] Ch. 140, f. 13 _r_^o.\n\n[122] _See_ IV. \u00a7 3.\n\n[123] The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2: \u6230\u5fc5\u514b.\n\n[124] \u6b66\u7528\u5175\u4e0d\u80fd\u5fc5\u514b\u8207\u66f8\u6240\u8a00\u9060\u751a\u5433\u8d77\u8207\u6b66\u4e00\u9ad4\u4e4b\u4eba\u7686\u8457\u66f8\u8a00\u5175\u4e16\u7a31\u4e4b\u66f0\u5b6b\u5433\u7136\u800c\u8d77\u4e4b\u8a00\n\u5175\u4e5f\u8f15\u6cd5\u5236\u8349\u7565\u7121\u6240\u7d71\u7d00\u4e0d\u82e5\u6b66\u4e4b\u66f8\u8a5e\u7d04\u800c\u7fa9\u76e1.\n\n[125] The _Tso Chuan_.\n\n[126] \u5b6b\u5b50\u5341\u4e09\u7bc7\u4e0d\u60df\u6b66\u4eba\u4e4b\u6839\u672c\u6587\u58eb\u4ea6\u7576\u76e1\u5fc3\u7109\u5176\u8a5e\u7d04\u800c\u7e1f\u6613\u800c\u6df1\u66a2\u800c\u53ef\u7528\u8ad6\u8a9e\u6613\u5927\u50b3\u4e4b\n\u6d41\u5b5f\u8340\u694a\u8457\u66f8\u7686\u4e0d\u53ca\u4e5f.\n\n[127] \u662f\u555f\u4eba\u541b\u7aae\u5175\u9ef7\u6b66\u4e4b\u5fc3.\n\n[128] _Shih Chi_, ch. 25, fol. 1: \u5175\u8005\u8056\u4eba\u6240\u4ee5\u8a0e\u5f4a\u66b4\u5e73\u4e82\u4e16\u5937\u96aa\u963b\u6551\u5371\u6b86\u81ea\u542b\u8840\u6234\n\u89d2\u4e4b\u7378\u898b\u72af\u5247\u6821\u800c\u51b5\u65bc\u4eba\u61f7\u597d\u60e1\u559c\u6012\u4e4b\u6c23\u559c\u5247\u611b\u5fc3\u751f\u6012\u5247\u6bd2\u87ab\u52a0\u60c5\u6027\u4e4b\u7406\u4e5f...\u8c48\u8207\u4e16\u5112\u95c7\u65bc\n\u5927\u8f03\u4e0d\u6b0a\u8f15\u91cd\u7325\u4e91\u5fb7\u5316\u4e0d\u7576\u7528\u5175\u5927\u81f3\u7a98\u8fb1\u5931\u5b88\u5c0f\u4e43\u4fb5\u72af\u524a\u5f31\u9042\u57f7\u4e0d\u79fb\u7b49\u54c9\u6545\u6559\u7b1e\u4e0d\u53ef\u5ee2\u65bc\u5bb6\u5211\n\u7f70\u4e0d\u53ef\u6350\u65bc\u570b\u8a85\u4f10\u4e0d\u53ef\u5043\u65bc\u5929\u4e0b\u7528\u4e4b\u6709\u5de7\u62d9\u884c\u4e4b\u6709\u9006\u9806\u8033.\n\n[129] The first instance of \u6728\u7d22 given in the _P\u2018ei W\u00ean Y\u00fcn Fu_ is from\nSs\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s letter to \u4efb\u5b89 J\u00ean An (see \u6587\u9078, ch. 41, f. 9 _r_^o),\nwhere M. Chavannes translates it \u201cla cangue et la cha\u00eene.\u201d But in the\npresent passage it seems rather to indicate some single instrument of\ntorture.\n\n[130] \u5175\u8005\u5211\u4e5f\u5211\u8005\u653f\u4e8b\u4e5f\u7232\u592b\u5b50\u4e4b\u5f92\u5be6\u4ef2\u7531\u5189\u6c42\u4e4b\u4e8b\u4e5f\u4eca\u8005\u64da\u6848\u807d\u8a1f\u68b0\u7e6b\u7f6a\u4eba\u7b1e\u6b7b\u4e8e\u5e02\u8005\n\u540f\u4e4b\u6240\u7232\u4e5f\u9a45\u5175\u6578\u842c\u6485\u5176\u57ce\u90ed\u7e8d\u5176\u59bb\u5b50\u65ac\u5176\u7f6a\u4eba\u4ea6\u540f\u4e4b\u6240\u7232\u4e5f\u6728\u7d22\u5175\u5203\u7121\u7570\u610f\u4e5f\u7b1e\u4e4b\u8207\u65ac\u7121\n\u7570\u5211\u4e5f\u5c0f\u800c\u6613\u5236\u7528\u529b\u5c11\u8005\u6728\u7d22\u7b1e\u4e5f\u5927\u800c\u96e3\u6cbb\u7528\u529b\u591a\u8005\u5175\u5203\u65ac\u4e5f\u4ff1\u671f\u65bc\u9664\u53bb\u60e1\u6c11\u5b89\u6d3b\u5584\u6c11.\n\n[131] Cf. _Shih Chi_, ch. 47, f. 11 _v_^o.\n\n[132] \u5b63\u5b6b\u554f\u4e8e\u5189\u6709\u66f0\u5b50\u4e4b\u6230\u5b78\u4e4b\u4e4e\u6027\u9054\u4e4b\u4e4e\u5c0d\u66f0\u5b78\u4e4b\u5b63\u5b6b\u66f0\u4e8b\u5b54\u5b50\u60e1\u4e4e\u5b78\u5189\u6709\u66f0\u537d\u5b78\u4e4b\u65bc\n\u5b54\u5b50\u8005\u5927\u8056\u517c\u8a72\u6587\u6b66\u4e26\u7528\u9069\u805e\u5176\u6230\u6cd5\u5be6\u672a\u4e4b\u8a73\u4e5f\u592b\u4e0d\u77e5\u81ea\u4f55\u4ee3\u4f55\u5e74\u4f55\u4eba\u5206\u7232\u4e8c\u9053\u66f0\u6587\u66f0\u6b66\u96e2\u800c\n\u4ff1\u884c\u56e0\u4f7f\u7e09\u7d33\u4e4b\u58eb\u4e0d\u6562\u8a00\u5175\u751a\u6216\u6065\u8a00\u4e4b\u82df\u6709\u8a00\u8005\u4e16\u4ee5\u7232\u9ea4\u66b4\u7570\u4eba\u4eba\u4e0d\u6bd4\ud84b\udfd9\u55da\u547c\u4ea1\u5931\u6839\u672c\u65af\u7232\u6700\n\u751a.\n\n[133] See _Shu Ching_, preface \u00a7 55.\n\n[134] See _Tso Chuan_, \u5b9a\u516c X. 2; _Shih Chi_, ch. 47, f. 4 _r_^o.\n\n[135] \u5468\u516c\u76f8\u6210\u738b\u5236\u79ae\u4f5c\u6a02\u5c0a\u5927\u5112\u8853\u6709\u6dee\u5937\u53db\u5247\u51fa\u5f81\u4e4b\u592b\u5b50\u76f8\u9b6f\u516c\u6703\u4e8e\u593e\u8c37\u66f0\u6709\u6587\u4e8b\u8005\u5fc5\u6709\n\u6b66\u5099\u53f1\u8fb1\u9f4a\u4faf\u4f0f\u4e0d\u6562\u52d5\u662f\u4e8c\u5927\u8056\u4eba\u8c48\u4e0d\u77e5\u5175\u4e4e.\n\n[136] _Lun Y\u00fc_, XV. 1.\n\n[137] _Tso Chuan_, \u54c0\u516c, XI. 7.\n\n[138] See _supra_.\n\n[139] _Tso Chuan_, \u5b9a\u516c, X. 2.\n\n[140] _Ibid._ XII. 5; _Chia Y\u00fc_, ch. 1 _ad fin._\n\n[141] I have failed to trace this utterance. See note 2 on p. xliii.\n\n[142] See _supra_.\n\n[143] \u6027\u7406\u5f59\u8981, _loc. cit._: \u6614\u543e\u592b\u5b50\u5c0d\u885b\u9748\u516c\u4ee5\u8ecd\u65c5\u4e4b\u4e8b\u672a\u4e4b\u5b78\u7b54\u5b54\u6587\u5b50\u4ee5\u7532\u5175\u4e4b\u4e8b\n\u672a\u4e4b\u805e\u53ca\u89c0\u593e\u8c37\u4e4b\u6703\u5247\u4ee5\u5175\u52a0\u840a\u4eba\u800c\u9f4a\u4faf\u61fc\u8cbb\u4eba\u4e4b\u4e82\u5247\u547d\u5c07\u58eb\u4ee5\u4f10\u4e4b\u800c\u8cbb\u4eba\u5317\u5617\u66f0\u6211\u6230\u5247\u514b\u800c\n\u5189\u6709\u4ea6\u66f0\u8056\u4eba\u6587\u6b66\u4e26\u7528\u5b54\u5b50\u8c48\u6709\u771e\u672a\u5b78\u672a\u805e\u54c9\u7279\u4ee5\u8ecd\u65c5\u7532\u5175\u4e4b\u4e8b\u975e\u6240\u4ee5\u7232\u8a13\u4e5f.\n\n[144] See _supra_.\n\n[145] _Viz._, \u8ecd\u79ae, the other four being \u5409, \u51f6, \u8cd3 and \u5609 \u201cworship,\nmourning, entertainment of guests and festive rites.\u201d See _Shu Ching_,\nII. 1. iii. 8, and _Chou Li_, IX. fol. 49.\n\n[146] Preface to Sun Tz\u016d: \u5b54\u5b50\u66f0\u8ecd\u65c5\u4e4b\u4e8b\u672a\u4e4b\u5b78\u53c8\u66f0\u6211\u6230\u5247\u514b\u5b54\u5b50\u5b9a\u79ae\u6b63\u6a02\u5175\u5247\u4e94\u79ae\n\u4e4b\u4e00\u4e0d\u5fc5\u4ee5\u7232\u5c08\u9580\u4e4b\u5b78\u6545\u4e91\u672a\u5b78\u6240\u7232\u8056\u4eba\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u77e5\u6216\u884c\u8ecd\u597d\u8b00\u5247\u5b78\u4e4b\u6216\u5584\u5c07\u5c07\u5982\u4f0d\u5b50\u80e5\u4e4b\u7528\n\u5b6b\u5b50\u53c8\u4f55\u5fc5\u81ea\u5b78\u4e4b\u6545\u53c8\u66f0\u6211\u6230\u5247\u514b\u4e5f.\n\n[147] See p. 166.\n\n[148] This is a rather obscure allusion to _Tso Chuan_, \u8944\u516c, XXXI. 4,\nwhere Tz\u016d-ch\u2018an says: \u5b50\u6709\u7f8e\u9326\u4e0d\u4f7f\u4eba\u5b78\u88fd\u7109 \u201cIf you have a piece of\nbeautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to make it up.\u201d\n\n[149] Cf. _Tao T\u00ea Ching_, ch. 31: \u5175\u8005\u4e0d\u7965\u4e4b\u5668.\n\n[150] Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Y\u00fc_,\nXIII. 29, 30.\n\n[151] \u4eca\u4e16\u6ce5\u5b54\u5b50\u4e4b\u8a00\u4ee5\u7232\u5175\u66f8\u4e0d\u8db3\u89c0\u53c8\u6ce5\u8d99\u62ec\u5f92\u80fd\u8b80\u7236\u66f8\u4e4b\u8a00\u4ee5\u7232\u6210\u6cd5\u4e0d\u8db3\u7528\u53c8\u898b\u5175\u66f8\u6709\n\u6b0a\u8b00\u6709\u53cd\u9593\u4ee5\u7232\u975e\u8056\u4eba\u4e4b\u6cd5\u7686\u4e0d\u77e5\u543e\u5112\u4e4b\u5b78\u8005\u540f\u4e4b\u6cbb\u4e8b\u53ef\u7fd2\u800c\u80fd\u7136\u53e4\u4eba\u7336\u6709\u5b78\u88fd\u4e4b\u61fc\u5175\u51f6\u6230\u5371\n\u5c07\u4e0d\u7d20\u7fd2\u672a\u53ef\u4ee5\u4eba\u547d\u7232\u5617\u8a66\u5247\u5341\u4e09\u7bc7\u4e4b\u4e0d\u53ef\u4e0d\u89c0\u4e5f.\n\n[152] Better known as Hsiang \u7fbd Y\u00fc [B.C. 233\u2013202].\n\n[153] The third among the \u4e94\u4f2f (or \u9738) enumerated on p. 141. For the\nincident referred to, see _Tso Chuan_, \u50d6\u516c, XXII. 4.\n\n[154] See _supra_, p. xvi, note 4.\n\n[155] _Shih Chi_, ch. 47, f. 7 _r_^o.\n\n[156] _Ibid._, ch. 38, f. 8 _v_^o.\n\n[157] \u9805\u6881\u6559\u7c4d\u5175\u6cd5\u7c4d\u7565\u77e5\u5176\u610f\u4e0d\u80af\u7adf\u5b78\u5352\u4ee5\u50be\u8986\u4e0d\u77e5\u5175\u6cd5\u4e4b\u5f0a\u53ef\u52dd\u8a00\u54c9\u5b8b\u8944\u5f90\u5043\u4ec1\u800c\u6557\u5175\n\u8005\u5371\u6a5f\u7576\u7528\u6b0a\u8b00\u5b54\u5b50\u7336\u6709\u8981\u76df\u52ff\u4fe1\u5fae\u670d\u904e\u5b8b\u4e4b\u6642\u5b89\u5f97\u5984\u8cac\u5b6b\u5b50\u4ee5\u8a00\u4e4b\u4e0d\u7d14\u54c9.\n\n[158] \u5176\u6642\u53bb\u53e4\u672a\u9060\u4e09\u4ee3\u907a\u898f\u5f80\u5f80\u65bc\u6b64\u66f8\u898b\u4e4b.\n\n[159] \u5176\u6700\u53e4\u8005\u7576\u4ee5\u5b6b\u5b50\u5433\u5b50\u53f8\u99ac\u6cd5\u7232\u672c\u5927\u62b5\u751f\u805a\u8a13\u7df4\u4e4b\u8853\u6b0a\u8b00\u904b\u7528\u4e4b\u5b9c\u800c\u5df2.\n\n[160] See p. 174. Further details on T\u2018ai Kung will be found in the\n_Shih Chi_, ch. 32 _ad init._ Besides the tradition which makes him a\nformer minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there\ngiven, according to which he would appear to have been first raised\nfrom a humble private station by W\u00ean Wang.\n\n[161] \u5176\u6587\u7fa9\u4e0d\u985e\u4e09\u4ee3.\n\n[162] \u5176\u8a00\u591a\u8fd1\u65bc\u6b63\u8207\u6230\u570b\u6b0a\u8b00\u9817\u6b8a.\n\n[163] See _Han Shu_, \u5f35\u826f\u50b3, ch. 40. The work is there called \u592a\u516c\u5175\u6cd5.\nHence it has been confused with the _Liu T\u2018ao_. The _T\u2018u Shu_\nattributes both the _Liu T\u2018ao_ and the _San L\u00fceh_ to T\u2018ai Kung.\n\n[164] \u5176\u6587\u4e0d\u985e\u79e6\u6f22\u9593\u66f8\u6f22\u5149\u6b66\u5e1d\u8a54\u96d6\u5617\u5f15\u4e4b\u5b89\u77e5\u975e\u53cd\u646d\u8a54\u4e2d\u6240\u5f15\u4e8c\u8a9e\u4ee5\u8b49\u5be6\u5176\u66f8\u8b02\u4e4b\u5317\u5b8b\n\u4ee5\u524d\u820a\u672c\u5247\u53ef\u77e3. Another work said to have been written by Huang-shih\nKung, and also included in the military section of the Imperial\nCatalogue, is the \u7d20\u66f8 _Su Shu_ in 1 _ch\u00fcan_. A short ethical treatise\nof Taoist savour, having no reference whatever to war, it is\npronounced a forgery from the hand of \u5f35\u5546\u82f1 Chang Shang-ying\n(_d._ 1121), who edited it with commentary. Correct Wylie\u2019s \u201cNotes,\u201d\nnew edition, p. 90, and Courant\u2019s \u201cCatalogue des Livres Chinois,\u201d\nno. 5056.\n\n[165] \u5176\u66f8\u96d6\u50de\u4ea6\u51fa\u65bc\u6709\u5b78\u8b58\u8b00\u7565\u8005\u4e4b\u624b\u4e5f. We are told in the \u8b80\u66f8\u5fd7 that the\nabove six works, together with Sun Tz\u016d, were those prescribed for\nmilitary training in the \u5143\u8c50 period (1078\u201385). See _Y\u00fc Hai_, ch. 140,\nf. 4 _r_^o.\n\n[166] Also written \u63e1\u6a5f\u7d93 and \u5e44\u6a5f\u7d93 _Wu Chi Ching_.\n\n[167] \u5176\u8a00\u5177\u6709\u689d\u7406.\n\n[168] \u201cWords on Wellington,\u201d by Sir W. Fraser.\n\n[169] \u201cForty-one Years in India,\u201d chap. 46.\n\n[170] See Col. Henderson\u2019s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed.,\nvol. II, p. 490.\n\n[171] _See_ Col. Henderson, _op. cit._ vol. I. p. 426.\n\n[172] For a number of maxims on this head, see \u201cMarshal Turenne\u201d\n(Longmans, 1907), p. 29.\n\n[173] \u201cMarshal Turenne,\u201d p. 50.\n\n[174] \u201cAids to Scouting,\u201d p. 26.\n\n[175] See \u201cPens\u00e9es de Napol\u00e9on I^{er},\u201d no. 47.\n\n[176] \u201cThe Science of War,\u201d chap. 2.\n\n[177] \u201cAids to Scouting,\u201d p. xii.\n\n[178] \u201cMaximes de Guerre,\u201d no. 72.\n\n[179] Giles\u2019 Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.\n\n[180] \u201cThe Science of War,\u201d p. 333.\n\n[181] \u201cStonewall Jackson,\u201d vol. I, p. 421.\n\n[182] See Giles\u2019 Dictionary, no. 9817.\n\n[183] \u4e0d\u5165\u864e\u7a74\u4e0d\u5f97\u864e\u5b50 \u201cUnless you enter the tiger\u2019s lair, you cannot get\nhold of the tiger\u2019s cubs.\u201d\n\n[184] \u201cAids to Scouting,\u201d p. 2.\n\n[185] _Ch\u2018ien Han Shu_, ch. 43, fol. 1. \u9854\u5e2b\u53e4 Yen Shih-ku _in loc._\nsays: \u98df\u97f3\u7570\u5176\u97f3\u57fa.\n\n[186] \u201cUnterricht des K\u00f6nigs von Preussen an die Generale seiner\nArmeen,\u201d cap. 12 (edition of 1794).\n\n[187] \u201cMarshal Turenne,\u201d p. 311.\n\n\n\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\n Text Notes:\n 1. The text contains Chinese characters. Character variants matching\n the printed text are used whenever possible rather than more\n common versions. Only Unicode normalized form C versions were\n used (see below). For best results, insure that the eReader has\n the latest Chinese font packages.\n\n 2. Italicized text is indicated with leading and trailing underscores\n (_). Superscript text is indicated with a leading caret (^). If\n more than one character, the text is wrapped in braces({}).\n Ordinal numbers with superscripts (i.e. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) are\n printed without the caret.\n\n 3. Footnotes have been renumbered and placed at the end of the\n book.\n\n 4. Smaller font text blocks such as contained in block quotes and\n annotation text is indented. The original printed text did not\n indent this text.\n\n 5. In the Introduction pages xi and xii, sentence groups in the\n quotation from Ss\u016d-ma Ch\u2018ien\u2019s biography of Sun Tz\u016d separated by\n em-dashes are now separated into paragraphs for clarity.\n\n 6. In the original book, several Chinese text lines were placed in\n the top quarter of a page and the translation in the bottom three\n quarters of the page. This transcription places each Chinese text\n line above its corresponding translation.\n\n 7. Missing quotation marks, capitalization, punctuation, and spaces\n silently corrected.\n\n 8. Except as mentioned above and in the Change List that follows,\n every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully\n as possible, including non-standard punctuation, inconsistently\n hyphenated words, etc. The corrigenda has already been\n incorporated into the text.\n\n Change List (page numbers from original printed book):\n\n Page x\n befel changed to\n befell\n\n Page xx\n then changed to\n them\n\n Page xxv\n abready changed to\n already\n\n Page xxxi\n surrived changed to\n survived\n\n Page xlviii footnote #1\n have changed to\n I have\n\n Page xlviii\n combine two instances of footnote #4\n\n Page 17\n according to Ss\u016d-ma Fa, changed to\n according to the _Ss\u016d-ma Fa_,\n\n Page 29 and 62\n Using variant \u7372 (U+7372) in place of \ud86c\ude6c (U+2B26C) since the latter\n code point is not handled by some TTS systems.\n\n Page 39\n meaniug changed to\n meaning\n\n Page 44\n succeding changed to\n succeeding\n\n Page 70\n exclained changed to\n exclaimed\n\n Page 125\n \u03c3\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b5 changed to\n \u03c3\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\n\n Page 136\n Chang Y\u00fc adopts its, changed to\n Chang Y\u00fc adopts it,\n\n Page 152\n the material for changed to\n The material for\n\n Page 154 and 156\n Using variant \u8352 (U+798F) in place of \ud878\udfb0 (U+2E3B0, \u2ff1\u8279\u3829) since the\n latter code point is rare in fonts.\n\n Page 168\n accompained changed to\n accompanied\n\n Page 171\n leaders of mercenary troops.\u201d. changed to\n leaders of mercenary troops.\u201d\n\n Several pages\n Using variant \u9699 (U+9699) in place of \ud863\udef6 (U+28EF6) since the latter\n code point is not handled by some TTS systems.\n\n Character changes to Unicode normalized form C versions:\n\n \u7bc0 (U+FA56) \u2192 \u7bc0 (U+7BC0)\n \u795e (U+FA19) \u2192 \u795e (U+795E)\n \u65e2 (U+FA42) \u2192 \u65e2 (U+65E2)\n \u7965 (U+FA1A) \u2192 \u7965 (U+7965)\n \u798f (U+FA1B) \u2192 \u798f (U+798F)\n \u9928 (U+FA2C) \u2192 \u9928 (U+9928)\n \u7956 (U+FA50) \u2192 \u7956 (U+7956)","title":"Sun Tz\u016d on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":84941}