{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_67599/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_67599","id":"gutenberg_67599","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67599","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Patriotism","Thesis (Ph. D.)"],"text":"A Critical Analysis of Patriotism\n  As an Ethical Concept\n\n\n  BY\n  CLARENCE REIDENBACH\n\n\n  A DISSERTATION\n  PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE\n  GRADUATE SCHOOL OF YALE UNIVERSITY\n  IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF\n  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY\n  MAY 1, 1918\n\n\n\n\n  TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n                                                              Page\n\n  PART I. THE IMPULSES OF PATRIOTISM\n\n  Chapter I. The Impulses of Attachment                          9\n\n  Chapter II. The Impulses of Antipathy                         16\n\n\n  PART II. THE HABITUATION OF PATRIOTISM\n\n  Chapter III. The Deliberate Habituation                       27\n\n  Chapter IV. The Spontaneous Habituation                       35\n\n\n  PART III. THE BELIEFS OF PATRIOTISM\n\n  Chapter V. The Country as Protector of Self                   45\n\n  Chapter VI. The Oneness of Country and Self                   52\n\n  Chapter VII. The Intrinsic Value of One\u2019s Country             57\n\n\n  PART IV. THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PATRIOTISM\n\n  Chapter VIII. The Will to National Individuality              71\n\n  Chapter IX. The Nation as an Individual                       85\n\n  Chapter X. The Ethical Value of Patriotism in the\n  Concrete                                                      99\n\n\n  NOTES\n\n\n  BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nPatriotism is a live issue. It is almost impossible for any one to be\nneutral about it. All men seem to feel that the issue involved is one\nthat touches the fundamental interests of their lives. Patriotism is an\nimportant concept.\n\nBut not all men take the same stand regarding patriotism. There is hot\ndisagreement upon the question of its moral value. Some champion it\nas one of the noblest of all virtues; others spurn it as one of the\nbasest. Therefore it is highly desirable to arrive at a fair judgment\nof the ethical value of patriotism.\n\nOne of the chief reasons for the radical disagreement about the\nmorality of patriotism is that there are widely different assumptions\nas to its nature. It is a sentiment of manifold varieties, and the word\npatriotism may carry quite different implications to different minds.\nThe first necessary step, then, before one can pass an ethical judgment\nupon it, is to find out what the core of patriotism is.\n\nThis dissertation begins, therefore, by undertaking to determine the\nnature of patriotism, and with no more of a clue in hand than the one\nthat it is \u201cthe love of country\u201d tries, by an inductive investigation\nof what has actually been called patriotism, to bring together the\nimportant facts in which patriotism is manifested. Hence, while the\nmain purpose of the essay is an ethical one, a large portion of it\nis given to inductive analysis. The first three parts are mainly\nanalytical. The fourth part endeavors to unify in a central concept the\ndata gathered together in the preceding parts, and, in the light of\nthat concept and all the facts, to evaluate patriotism as an ethical\nideal. It may be noted here that the first three parts are printed\nas they were in the typewritten form presented to Yale University as\na thesis, but that part four has undergone much rearrangement and\nrevision. Chapter eight has been largely rewritten; chapter nine is\nentirely new; and what here appears as chapter ten has been somewhat\nchanged.\n\nAcknowledgement is hereby made to the members of the faculty of\nthe department of philosophy in Yale University for many helpful\ncriticisms. Especially is a debt owed to Professor Charles A.\nBennett, who suggested the field of patriotism as a fruitful one for\ninvestigation, under whose direction the work was done, and whose\ncriticisms and suggestions have made more definite than would otherwise\nhave been the case, the problems involved. Thanks are due to Professor\nLuther A. Weigle, who read the manuscript, and helped to clarify and\nmake accurate the expression of the ideas. And my gratitude is given to\nmy wife, whose assistance in the final preparation of the manuscript\nwas invaluable, and who by her constant helpfulness and loyalty made it\npossible for the whole work to be brought to completion.\n\nIndianapolis, January, 1920.\n\n\n\n\n  PART I\n\n  THE IMPULSES OF PATRIOTISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE IMPULSES OF ATTACHMENT\n\n\nWhen in 1914 the great war broke out, the world was astounded. There\nwere forces at work which men were confident would make another\nwar between first-class powers impossible. International relations\nand groupings, such as those of commerce, labor, art, science, and\nlearning, had increased in strength and number. The terribleness and\nwaste of war were deemed to be so fully realized that modern nations\nwould have no taste for armed conflict. But the war came on, and\nthere must have been mighty causes to be able to produce so gigantic\na result. What were they? What could be the nature of such tremendous\ncauses, that yet remained concealed and in their issuance so took men\nby surprise? The factors were various, and some, of course, had been\nnoted, but one factor which was unnoticed by the general public and yet\nwhich is one of fundamental importance is the r\u00f4le taken in patriotism\nby men\u2019s unreasoned dispositions of character. If the phenomenon of\npatriotism is to be fully understood, it must be analyzed with a\nview of discovering what are these deeply ingrained sets of mind and\ncharacter which are its raw material and which make it so powerful.[1]\n\nPatriotism is a complex sentiment. There is, in other words, no single\ninstinctive response in all human beings to the stimulus, country.\nWhat, then, are some of the dispositions of which patriotism is\ncomposed? There are impulses which make primarily for attachment,\nand there are those that make primarily for antipathy. One of the\nmost important of the impulses of attachment is the disposition of\ngregariousness. Hobbes, indeed, and others after him, built their\ntheories of the state upon the doctrine that man would have been able\nto live alone had not the company of others been forced upon him, but\nthat there is an impulse of gregariousness seems indisputable. It is\nsimply an observable fact that there are species of animals that not\nonly live in herds, packs, or flocks, but which also show uneasiness\nand distress at being separated from their fellows. James cites the\nobservation of Galton on the gregariousness of the South African\ncattle.[2] If an individual of this species were separated from the\nherd it would direct its whole activity towards getting back once\nmore, and when its object was attained, would plunge into the heart\nof the herd as if to bathe its very body in contact with its fellows.\nNow man, as well as other animals, lives a group life, and it seems\nalmost inevitable that he should develop an impulse parallel to the\noutward facts of his existence, even were it not probable that he has\ninherited gregariousness as a psychical disposition from his animal\nancestors. That the impulse is actually present in the human species\nis shown by the fact that there is in man a strong abhorrence of\nprolonged solitude. Professor James\u2019 words on this point have come to\nbe almost classical: \u201cTo be alone is one of the greatest evils for him\n[the normal man]. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of\ntorture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to adopt. To\none long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint or\na human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting\nof experiences.\u201d[3] But the impulse is also apparent in more normal\nexperiences. So much do men desire the company of others that it is not\nonly an element of recreation usually, but the more serious tasks of\nlife often derive their value not more because of the ostensible end\nsought after than because of the human association which is involved.\n\nWilfred Trotter[4] has made gregariousness central in his study\nof society. He begins by approving of the method of those who\nhave come at the study from the standpoint of the instincts, but\nexpresses dissatisfaction with the limits of their results, that\nis, dissatisfaction with the kind of analysis that would explain\nman by referring the whole of his conduct to the instincts of\nself-preservation, nutrition, and sex. Such an explanation, he finds,\nhas been historically attempted, but after it has gone as far as it\ncould, there has always been left over an unexplained X. Trotter\naccepts self-preservation, nutrition, and sex as fundamental instincts,\nbut completes the list by bringing forward the instinct of the herd\nwhich he offers as the explanation of all human activity which was\nleft unexplained by the other three instincts mentioned above. To\nTrotter there have been two great epoch-making forward steps in the\nevolution of life. The first came with the change from unicellular\nto multicellular organisms, the great advantage of which was to make\nthe _group_ of cells the unit of selection, thus to some extent\nrelieving the single cell of the burden of the struggle for existence,\nand permitting it a greater chance for variability without running\na greater risk of extinction. This arrangement, says Trotter, had\nimportant influences upon all the cells comprised in the organism. The\nsecond great evolutionary advance came with the change from solitary to\ngregarious animals, and was attended by modifications just as profound\nas had accompanied the advance from unicellular to multicellular\norganisms. Here again the power of natural evolution operated upon the\ngroup as a unit, thus permitting once more greater variability on the\npart of the individual. Association in the herd became increasingly\nvaluable in the struggle for existence, and tended to become more and\nmore strongly fixed as a disposition of animal nature, a fact which\nhad fundamental influence upon the mental characteristics of the\nindividual. There are psychological traits which would not exist but\nfor the fact of gregariousness. Shyness, embarrassment, fear, anger,\nlove, sympathy, sorrow, and gratitude would be devoid of meaning apart\nfrom their connection with social relations.\n\nThe first important result of the instinct of gregariousness is that\nit makes for homogeneity. That is, it is an impulse making primarily\nfor attachment. Each individual tends to become thoroughly assimilated\nin the life of the group; the group\u2019s ways have a vital meaning to\nhim. Sensitiveness to the behavior of his fellows is heightened, and\nresistiveness to the suggestions of the herd is lowered. A suggestion\nfrom outside is likely to be rejected, and direct experience tends to\nhave little meaning, if its teachings are at variance with the beliefs\nof the group. Altruism arises; it is a natural product of the situation\nwhere the conditions of life are such that each individual is of\nnecessity constantly in the habit of regarding the welfare of others\nas well as that of himself. Danger from the outside stimulates each\nindividual, and spreads fear through the whole group. The herd huddles\ntogether, and each shares in the panic of all. Loneliness at such a\ntime is unbearable.\n\nNow man is a social creature, and has the characteristics that result\nfrom herd instinct. He tends to become solidified with those of his\nown kind, and feel uncomfortable when out of touch with them; to be\nsuggestible to the influences of his group, and resistive to the\ninfluences of other groups; to feel altruism towards those of his own\nherd and aversion towards those of other herds; to be aroused when the\nnation is threatened, and huddle in the group in the face of danger.\nAll these characteristics under the proper stimuli are manifested\nby patriotism. A definition of patriotism from the standpoint of\nattachment to the group is that of Sumner: \u201cPatriotism is loyalty to\nthe civic group to which one belongs by birth or other group bond. It\nis a sentiment of fellowship and co\u00f6peration in all the hopes, work,\nand sufferings of the group.[5]\n\nThe herd is not tolerant of the nonconformist. The nonconformist has\nin a way become a stranger. He has put himself out of touch with the\ngroup. The group knows him and his ways, but he has not permitted\nhimself to be thoroughly assimilated by it. And the very thing that\nthe herd desires and insists upon is homogeneity. In the words of one\nwriter, \u201cThe crowd not only needs to make adherents and thus maintain\nits existence and increase in volume and power; it needs no less to\nassimilate, to digest, the individuals which it swallows up.\u201d[6] The\nindividual, then, cannot be too insistent upon the expression of his\nown personality. His life, even his inner life, must conform to that of\nthe group. His emotions will not be a matter merely of his own concern.\n\u201cHerd-union does not intensify all emotions. It intensifies those\nwhich are felt in common, but it actually deadens and shuts down those\nwhich are only felt by the individual.\u201d[7] And independent thought is\neven more taboo. \u201cThought ... is markedly individual and personal....\nThought is critical, and the Herd wants unanimity, not criticism.\nConsequently Herd-union deadens thought.\u201d[8] Hence the nonconformist\ngets himself disliked, and the outcome of the situation has usually\nbeen to submerge the individual, and assimilate him to the group. The\nmoral of the tale is that patriotism acts in that way. \u201cPatriotism,\nwhich is the crowd-emotion of a Nation, makes at times supreme claims\non every citizen and enforces them by public opinion so powerful that\nfew can or desire to evade them.\u201d[9]\n\nThese observations throw light upon the question whether patriotism\nis a _political_ or _national_ emotion. Is patriotism attachment to\nthe government or state, or is it love of one\u2019s national group? There\ncan be no doubt that it is the latter rather than the former. It is an\noutgrowth of tribal feeling. Bertrand Russell is only overstating a\ntruth when he says that \u201cTribal feeling, which always underlay loyalty\nto the sovereign, has remained as strong as it ever was, and is now the\nchief support for the power of the State.\u201d[10]\n\nThere is an egoistic element in the attachment of patriotism. It is an\nadhesion to one\u2019s own, and one\u2019s own is but an extension of himself.\nPatriotism is a personal matter. That is, it is based upon a personal\nrelationship. One cleaves to his group not on account of its intrinsic\nworth simply but because of what it is worth _to him_. The majority\nof men are most loyal to what is nearest themselves. Each one of them\nseems to himself to be the center of his sphere, and things vary in\nimportance in direct ratio to their nearness to the center. This fact\ngives the key to a very common kind of patriotism. It is simply the\nloyalty that men feel to the extension of their own ego.\n\n\u201cOne\u2019s own\u201d includes the people of his group, _i. e._, the people who\nare most like himself. These people share many things in common with\nhimself. They have similar habits and customs, and all this conduces to\nrender them one\u2019s own. \u201cOne\u2019s own\u201d also includes the soil. It is that\nwhich is beneath one\u2019s very feet; it sustains one; it nourishes one.\nFurthermore, one knows it as he cannot know any strange land, and as no\nstranger can know his land. He lives in it throughout the whole year,\nand knows it intimately in all its peculiarities and changing moods.\nConsequently, his patriotism has in it a love of the \u201cland where his\nfathers died.\u201d Virgil understood the meaning of this love of the soil.\nHe himself felt it keenly, and because of it refused to accept the old\nhome estate of a Roman sent into exile. It was characteristic that he\nmade \u00c6neas lament Troy even when he was going out to establish Rome\nitself. It was because of this understanding, in part at least, that he\nwas led to urge the Romans to get back to the soil, realizing that from\na love of _the soil_ to a love of _our soil_ is but a step.[11]\n\nHowever, what one has been used to should not be taken as the only\nkind of the patriotism of attachment that there is. If adhesion to\none\u2019s own could not be overcome, loyalty to one\u2019s earliest home would\nquite uniformly be stronger than patriotism. But sometimes one begins\nto feel that his childhood was spent in cramped quarters, and that\nhis early opinions were inadequate. The emotion that he may be very\nlikely to feel under such conditions is not that of affection but\nthat of contempt and disgust. Quite often when there is a conflict\nbetween loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the community, loyalty to\nthe nation proves the stronger. Another indication that men are not\ninseparably bound to what they have been used to is that they change\ntheir nation, adopt another country, and side with it even against\nthe country of their birth. Some time ago there appeared in one of\nthe large newspapers a letter from a naturalized German in which was\nthis sentence: \u201cPerhaps you would appreciate your American citizenship\nbetter if, like me, you had been born and brought up in Germany.\u201d[12]\n\nA reason for this attachment to one\u2019s own is the impulse which impels\none to want to feel at home in his world. It is an impulse which craves\norder; and it shows itself in a desire for a unified world. There\nseems to be an esthetic element in it; the normal mind with a sense of\nbeauty cannot endure chaos. It represents a rational demand; it is, for\ninstance, a driving force in philosophy. It finds another root in the\ndesire for safety. One wants a friendly world in which he feels sure\nof himself and where he can live freely without being troubled by the\nstrange or unknown. Now one\u2019s country presents a world that he knows\nand can find his way in; consequently, it satisfies this demand for a\nunified world organized about one\u2019s own life, and by virtue of this\ncharacter it is able to furnish an additional item in the stimuli to\npatriotism.\n\nMan is attached to his country very much as he is attached to himself;\nhe could not very well help the one any more than he could help the\nother. But what is in one way a mere expression of egoism becomes also\nan affection. Unless there is some special reason for the contrary,\none is likely to cherish a real affection for that with which he has\nlong been associated, and especially so, if it has been of use to him.\nThis fact gives justification for the popular definition of patriotism\nas \u201cthe _love_ of country.\u201d This affection even may be selfish, but\nit may also take on a more altruistic character. Altruism naturally\nand perforce develops in a gregarious society. And, moreover, the\nparental instinct adds its strength. The protection of the home is a\nstrong sentiment in patriotism. And the tender emotion of the parental\ninstinct may be extended to others besides offspring. Patriotism\ngets colored by it, and becomes very much like it. McDougall says\nthat, \u201cLike the fully developed parental sentiment, the patriotism\nof many men is a fusion of this quasi-altruistic extension of\nthe self-regarding sentiment with the truly altruistic sentiment\nof love.\u201d[13] Patriotism is, then, in part egoistic and in part\naltruistic. In a nation beset with enemies it will indeed take the form\nof animosity toward the enemy, but in a prosperous nation will direct\nitself very frequently to internal improvement. And it may be said that\nit retains something of altruism as well as egoism even in war. It is,\neven while being combative towards the _out-group_, altruistic towards\nthe _in-group_.[14]\n\nThe spirit of attachment in patriotism may even go so far as to\nbecome a worship. Religious impulse has frequently been an element\nin patriotism. Religion and patriotism were almost the same thing\nin Israel. But there are modern parallels. A clergyman not long ago\nwas reported to have said that the men who died upon the field of\nbattle (he was thinking of men of his own nation) would straightway\nreach heaven, since they had died for their fellow men. It is evident\nthat being a patriot held something of a religious fervor for that\nclergyman. Probably the Kaiser feels a religious exaltation which\nsustains him in the belief that he is the instrument of God.\n\nAlfred Loisy[15] opposes Christianity and patriotism to one another,\nmuch to the credit of patriotism. According to Loisy, the teachings of\nChristianity and patriotism are incompatible, and those of Christianity\nare quite inadequate for the present crisis. Therefore patriotism is\nmuch nobler and not only should but will supplant Christianity. The\nonly living faith, so he says, is that of devotion to one\u2019s country.\nFor that men will sacrifice. \u201cCertainly,\u201d says Loisy, \u201cit is an august\nlife for which a man will sacrifice his own without grudging it; but\nit is not for a blessed immortality in the company of Christ and the\nsaints; it is for the life of the country.\u201d[16] This account of what\nLoisy says is set down here not so much because it gives an idea of\npatriotism, but because through it Loisy passionately expresses his\nown ideal. In his book there breathes a most intense love for France.\nThis love, he says, is the absorbing passion of the people of France,\nand is what unites them. Again we quote his own words: \u201cThere are a\nfaith and love in which it [the army] is unanimous [as against the\nlack of unanimity in Christianity]: the love of our country, and an\nimperishable belief in her future; over these sentiments, all are in\ncommunion, and the whole country agrees with the army. Here is our\ncommon religion: one which has no unbelievers; in which those who are\nfaithful to the old creed may fraternize indiscriminately with the\nadherents of the newer principles.... Differences [of religion] count\nno longer in face of the absorbing interest, the burning passion, the\ntrue religion, both of this and of every moment, namely devotion to the\nimmortality of France.\u201d[17] \u201cSo long as we live, we are determined to\nlive in our own way; and that which gives us our vigour now against the\ninvader is neither a lust of conquest, nor the hate which an unjust,\ncruel, and fanatical enemy deserves, but the love of our ancient\nFrance, who is our all, whom we yearn to preserve, and whom we are\nvowed to save.\u201d[18] Here is a devotion which amounts to a religion,\nand it furnishes an example of the working of the religious impulse in\npatriotism.\n\nIt is not yet time to draw final conclusions, but it is not out of\nplace to note in passing that patriotism was not condemned by its\negoistic ingredients, and is not now justified by its elements of\naltruism. Viewed as a religion, one may say that it is too likely\nto become fanatical. The willingness to die upon the battlefield,\nrather than goodness, becomes the final test of the desirable citizen.\nMoreover, the injury worked upon others is apt to be overlooked.\nAs a religion, patriotism has the strength, but not the necessary\nuniversality. What it does is wrongly to elevate _a good_ to the\nstandard of _the Good_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE IMPULSES OF ANTIPATHY\n\n\nThe impulses of antipathy have played an important role in the\ndevelopment of patriotism. When one becomes aware of the existence of\nother peoples unlike himself, the sense of difference which arises\nis liable to take on the character of a strong and active aversion\nto and depreciation of them. Nothing is more common than the feeling\nthat one\u2019s own people is a kind of chosen race, and that all other\nraces are inferior. A speaker who had lived many years among the\nNavajo Indians once said that they regarded and called themselves \u201cThe\nPeople.\u201d They were at the top of mankind; the Mexicans ranked next to\nthem; the Americans came third and last. This was their arrangement of\nall the peoples that they knew. The same attitude appears in civilized\nman. He is characterized by self-satisfaction, and the peculiarities\nof others, even of dialect and pronunciation, are enough to call\nforth contempt and ridicule. It follows that strangers can easily\nbe enemies. In Latin, the word _hostis_ which at first meant simply\n_stranger_ or _foreigner_ came later to mean _enemy_. The words of\nLoisy are again appropriate: \u201cIn the lower stages of human evolution,\na foreigner is not far from being an enemy, if he be not one actually.\nIn the higher stages of our evolution, among people who think they\nare really civilized, he still seems in practice to be of another\nspecies, because he has a different mentality, and unusual ways. Each\nseparate human group has thus a fashion of collective egoism, whence\ncomes self-satisfaction, a pride which may possess dignity, which\nmay be a power, but which also may become a source of blindness and\nwickedness.\u201d[19] This antipathy to foreigners has been strong even\nwhen other forces appeared to be in the ascendancy. Such was the case,\nfor instance, when religion seemed to have the center of the stage;\nnationalistic jealousy was a factor in the movements which centered\nabout Wiclif, Huss, Luther, Henry VIII, and John Knox. These men could\nall count upon antipathy to foreigners. And the same antipathy shows\nitself today in the fact that the peoples of different nations not only\nhate the enemy, but also show a lack of solicitude about their allies.\nIn the outcry for increased production in the spring of 1917, some\nindividuals expressed themselves as being ready to plant for American\nconsumption, but unwilling that any of the products should go to\nforeigners. And the \u201cforeigners\u201d that were in mind in some instances\nwere the Canadians, our next-door neighbors. It may be added, however,\nthat it does not seem as if there is in race hatred any insurmountable\nobstacles to overcoming it. Races which are thrown into contact become\naccustomed to one another, and are able to live in harmony.\n\nThe form assumed by the general impulse of aversion or antipathy\nmay be either defensive or aggressive, and may tend toward either\nself-preservation or self-assertion. There are nations which of their\nown motion will not be warlike, but in which the warlike temper will\nflare up when they are once attacked. In such nations patriotism has\nbeen associated with the fight for freedom. Sometimes it seems as\nif the definition of the patriot was that he was one who defended\nhis country\u2019s liberty. This love of freedom is featured in American\nexpressions of patriotism. A verse from \u201cHail, Columbia,\u201d will serve as\nan example:\n\n  \u201cImmortal patriots! rise once more:\n  Defend your rights, defend your shore:\n  Let no rude foe with impious hand\n  Let no rude foe with impious hand\n  Invade the shrine where sacred lies\n  Of toil and blood the well-earned prize.\u201d\n\nThe call in this verse is that for defense.\n\nThere is an instinct that attends this impulse to self-preservation\nthat strikes one forcibly as being prominent in the patriotism of the\npresent time, and that is fear. It is an impulse that manifests itself\nwhen one\u2019s existence or vital interests are threatened. The peoples of\nthe world today are in an excitement of fear because each one of them\nbelieves that national existence and the personal values that depend\nupon it are endangered. There is a reason why it is easy for nations,\nwhile trusting in their own good intentions, to be suspicious of one\nanother. When the individual looks at his own country, he is likely to\nsee the common people who are all about him and are like himself. And,\nsince he feels that his own purposes are good, he can easily credit\ngood motives to his fellow-citizens. But when, on the other hand, he\nlooks into another country, he is likely to see the governing class\nlooming up, since that is the class that figures most prominently\nin the newspapers. And it is this class which is likely to be most\naggressively nationalistic, and is, moreover, the object of very little\nunderstanding by the ordinary man. Hence, while he thinks that all the\ngood people that he knows cannot comprise anything that is inhuman, he\ncan believe that there may very well be foreign monsters. The result is\nfear, fear of other countries, a fear that breaks out into a panic when\ndanger arises, and drives men to seek the safety of the fatherland. Now\nthe present is a time of panic, and the impulse of fear has put its\nimpress deep upon current patriotism.\n\nBut what is feared tends to become hated too, and so patriotism gets\ntinged with hate. Examples of it are at hand. This war has produced\nits \u201cHymn of Hate,\u201d so labeled, and others not so labeled. Many of the\nPsalms are expressions of patriotic hate, and since the war began have\nbeen read as such. J. M. Robertson[20] contends that patriotism is\nnothing else but fear and hatred. To his mind patriotism is not love\nor affection at all, and the only apparent affection there may be, is\nthat which is compelled by the necessity for common action against an\nenemy. Fear itself, Robertson points out, implies a hostile impulse;\nlove and hate, cohesion and repulsion, are to him strictly correlative\nterms; there is no love which is not linked with hate. \u201cIt is not,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cbrotherhood, or sympathy, or goodwill that unites the general\npopulation in a flush of passion against another population: the\nostensible brotherhood of the moment is merely a passing product of the\nunion of egoisms.\u201d[21]\n\nIt is certain that in great measure Robertson is right. But one may\nwell doubt the truth of the assertion that it is necessary to hate in\norder to love. It is not necessary to hate one woman in order to love\nanother, or to have an enemy in order to possess a friend. Neither does\nit seem essential in the nature of things to hate one country in order\nto be able to love another. Moreover, hatred is not unqualifiedly a\nterm of opprobrium. How can one rightly care for anything without in\nsome way resenting attacks upon it? There are such things as righteous\nwrath and righteous hatred if they be directed against what is evil.\n\nThese remarks upon fear and hatred throw further light upon some of the\nphenomena of patriotism already touched upon. One can better understand\nnow the frantic excitement that often attends a national crisis; fear\n\u201cmore than ... any other instinct, tends to bring to an end at once all\nother mental activity, riveting the attention upon its object to the\nexclusion of all others.\u201d[22] New light is thrown upon the solidarity\nthe group shows. Under the stimulus of fear, the herd instinctively\nunites. Unity is the basis of morale. And the individual subordinates\nhimself to the group; his normal intolerance of isolation is heightened\nin the presence of fear. And a corollary of all this is that the\npatriotism of fear is destructive of thought, but is prolific in unity\nof emotion and action.\n\nSelf-assertion is an attitude which under the conflict of interests\nwith others may be induced. And in the external affairs of nations,\nit may be brought to triumph over the motive of security. The means\nby which this is done is through the argument that only by taking\nan aggressive part can one defend himself, the argument in other\nwords, that the best defense is a good offense. The result is that\nthe distinction between defensive and offensive warfare is liable\nto be obliterated, a fact which adds to the perplexities of the\nproblem of war. \u201cThe feeling that war is always defensive wrecks the\npeace propaganda. The word defensive is capable of being stretched\nindefinitely. It is not confined necessarily to preventing an invasion.\nA people will feel that it is fighting a defensive war if it attacks\na nation which may attack it in the future.... Or the people may feel\nthat what it regards as its legitimate expansion is being thwarted....\nSo by imperceptible gradations every war can be justified, and, as a\nmatter of fact, is justified as defensive.\u201d[23] When once a war is\nstarted, a people will support it, even if it is aggressive, and if one\ncouples with this the fact that when a nation arms in self-defense,\nit acquires the means of aggression, he can understand how easily a\npatriotism which supports only a policy of self-preservation can be\nbrought to support a policy of self-assertion.\n\nOne way in which the will to self-assertion is likely to manifest\nitself is as an impulse to expansion. A stationary condition is not\nsatisfactory to the group; it desires to reach out. This impulse shows\nitself in churches and orders of all kinds by the constant demand for\nnew members. The group wants to see itself grow. But if nations grow,\nthey are apt to think that they need more land. And when this occurs\ntheir patriotism will attach itself to the desire for expansion, and\nbecome imperialism. J. M. Robertson couples the words _Patriotism and\nEmpire_ in the title of a book, and in that book he says, \u201cPatriotism\nconventionally defined as the love of country, ... turns out rather\nobviously to stand for love of more country.\u201d[24] And where there is\ncoupled with this the impulse of acquisition, it becomes plain why the\neconomic rivalry of nations has been so important in bringing about the\nsituation out of which war arises.\n\nThe impulse of expansion undergoes but a slight change to become the\nwill to domination. This latter is a primitive impulse. The Indian was\ntaught to despise manual labor, but to glory in the overcoming and\nplundering of other tribes. It is still dominant in the race. What men\ndesire, at least in the Western world, is power, and they would rather\nexercise dominion over others than be free themselves. Goethe puts the\nidea in poetical form:\n\n  \u201cHow often has it arisen! Yes, and it will arise\n  Ever and evermore! No man yields sovereignty\n  Unto his fellow: none will yield to him\n  Who won the power by force, and by force keeps his hold.\n  For man, who cannot rule his own unruly heart,\n  Is hot to rule his neighbor, bind him to his will.\u201d[25]\n\nThe desire for dominion was awakened by the Napoleonic aggressions,\nand has played a great part in fanning the flame of nationalism in the\nnineteenth century. It has given nationalism an aggressive and militant\ncharacter. And the people of a democratic country are not immune from\nthe virus; they as well as kings sometimes give themselves up to the\nthirst for domination, a fact which has at least some bearing upon\nwhether or not democracy will make the world safe. The citizen rarely\ndisputes the external sovereignty of his country. Consequently the fact\nof internal democracy by no means gives assurance that a country will\nuniformly abstain from assuming the attitude of a dynastic state when\nit faces the world. Democracy often ceases at the water\u2019s edge.\n\nPride is a part of patriotism. Men walk with heads up and chests out\nat the consciousness of belonging to a conquering or respected nation.\nThe triumphal processions of the Romans were a spectacle that no doubt\nstirred patriotism of this variety in noble Roman hearts. They could\n\u201cpoint with pride\u201d to their glory. And a little touch of glory makes\nthe whole world kin; modern men in their swelling national pride are of\nthe same stock as the ancient men of Rome. Men now identify themselves\nwith their group, and feel that along with it, they themselves rise or\nfall in importance. If the country submits to another\u2019s will, they hang\ntheir heads in shame; if it imposes upon another its own will, they\nhold their heads high. An important practical consequence of national\npride is that no people now would voluntarily consent to peace without\nhonor, which is food for thought in the planning of peace.\n\nThe patriotism of pride is not loath to meet its adversary upon the\nfield of honor. When nations have a lively sense of power and prestige,\na situation is created which furnishes admirable fuel for trouble.\nFor insecure pride will induce fear, and fearful pride will allow no\nnation to do other than to resent insults, real or supposed, promptly\nand bitterly. Material interests need not clash in order that a war be\nprovoked. If the patriot says to himself that the country\u2019s honor has\nbeen assailed, the fight is on, no matter what the insult may consist\nin; it may have to do with only a matter of mere punctilio. An insult\nhas been offered, and injured pride does not enjoy itself until it\nreaps revenge. Of course the crime is that the insult is a public one.\n\u201cThe act that, more certainly than any other, provokes vengeful emotion\nis the public insult, which, if not immediately resented, lowers one\nin the eyes of one\u2019s fellows. Such an insult calls out one\u2019s positive\nself-feeling, with its impulse to assert oneself and to make good one\u2019s\nvalue and power in the public eye.\u201d[26]\n\nBut it does not happen that any one country is allowed to assert\nitself without opposition. Others will follow the example, attempt to\nassert themselves, and make good their prestige. What then happens\nis that there is a race for power, and patriotism becomes a spirit\nof rivalry or emulation.[27] The fact is that what most of us desire\nis not only well-being but prestige, not only the _Good_, but the\n_Better_ or the _Best_. Athletic contests are invested with such great\ninterest not only because they may be good games, but because they\nare _contests_, contests perhaps between traditional rivals, or are\nfor the championship of this, that, or the other. It is likewise with\ncountries. National welfare is viewed at the present time very largely\nas a competitive success. And affairs have come to such a condition\nthat no one country dares to let up in its vigilance in the universal\ncompetition. Individually it is helpless. If it relaxes, its competitor\nwill monopolize all the advantages, its own prestige will be lowered,\nand it will be inviting aggression in which it will be preyed upon.\nThere doesn\u2019t seem to be much help for the situation except in the\nconcerted action of nations. But in the meanwhile the struggle goes on,\nand patriots throw themselves into the spirit of it with abandon.\n\nIt should be said that it is not inevitable that the impulse of rivalry\nshould issue exclusively in destructive conflict. One does not need to\ndestroy his competitor in order that he himself should be benefited,\nand in fact enlightened competition does desire the preservation and\nwelfare of the competitors. One way in which the emulative impulse\ndiffers from the combative impulse, for instance, is just this, that it\ndoes seek to preserve a defeated competitor. The possibility is, then,\nthat patriotism may be sublimated into a higher and more innocent form\nof rivalry than what we have at present.\n\nWe have, however, to deal with the present fact that the rivalry of\nnations is likely to issue in war. And hence it becomes necessary to\ntake into consideration the impulse of pugnacity. The plain fact is\nthat war has a fascination. Even if one\u2019s own country be not involved,\none turns eagerly to the war news in the daily papers. History is\nthe history of wars. The attractiveness of war is expressed in the\nfollowing verse of Richard Le Gallienne:\n\n  \u201cWar\n  I abhor\n  And yet how sweet\n  The sound along the marching street\n  Of drum and fife! and I forget\n  Wet eyes of widows, and forget\n  Broken old mothers, and the whole\n  Dark butchery without a soul.\u201d\n\nThere is that about the martial life which excites enthusiasm, and that\nenthusiasm gets connected with patriotism. Patriotism runs at high tide\nin war times.[28]\n\nAnd now, does the presence of the instinct of pugnacity compel at once\nan unfavorable verdict on patriotism? There is no doubt that pugnacity\nmay lead to what is undesirable; it does become \u201cdark butchery without\na soul.\u201d Is patriotism for that to be condemned? In answer to this two\nthings may be said. To begin with, militancy may be a good, and can no\nmore be condemned in the abstract than can pacifism. There is no ground\nfor saying that pacifism is a virtue in itself. One might be pacifistic\nsimply because he did not care about his fellow men, or simply because\nhe was afraid to fight. Nonresistance is indeed under some conditions a\ngood, and so is the impulse of pugnacity. Totally devoid of it, neither\nthe individual nor the nation can live in other than pusillanimous\ncowardice; their ideals will not be much, and from them shall be taken\neven the little that they have. In the second place, patriotism does\nnot issue exclusively in war. It has already been shown that it has a\npositive character of attachment, and may develop without reference to\nwar, but wholly with reference to the pursuits of peace.\n\nThe analysis of the impulses of patriotism has emphasized the truth of\na proposition that was stated at the beginning; patriotism is a complex\nphenomenon. It is, as it actually appears, composed of a wide variety\nof impulses, which appear in shifting combinations, and show themselves\nnow in one person and time and now in another.\n\nThe conclusion may also be drawn that there has been found here no\nground for passing a final verdict either favorable or unfavorable upon\npatriotism. There has been found in the instinctive basis of patriotism\nan element which gives it its tremendous power, but that result does\nnot answer the question regarding the moral worth of patriotism.\nInstincts are just tendencies that taken simply as instincts have no\nmoral character at all. Their moral worth depends upon the way in which\nthey are used. Consequently, before one can estimate the worth of\npatriotism, he must see how these impulses are used in it.\n\nThe impulses themselves are not patriotism. They form raw material\nfor and give character to it, but they themselves are not patriotism.\nThey serve equally well as raw material for other human interests far\nremoved from this one. Instincts alone are unorganized, and are capable\nof being shaped into an indefinite number of meanings. The further\nquestion that will ultimately have to be answered is that concerning\nwhat the organizing factor is that can ever give to any combination\nof impulses the meaning,--patriotism. That investigation will next be\nentered upon.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\nTHE HABITUATION OF PATRIOTISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE DELIBERATE HABITUATION\n\n\nOne way by which the impulses and dispositions of human character are\namalgamated in patriotism is by habituation. The habits of patriotism\nare just as powerful and important as the impulses. The impulses,\nin fact, are molded into habits, and are profoundly modified by the\nenvironment and regimen to which they are subjected. The habits become\nthe masters of the impulses. Thought at this point enters into the\nproblem, but it is not the individual\u2019s own thought; it is the thought\nof the society which surrounds him. His articles of faith are habits\nacquired from society. \u201c... It is through habit that the influence\nof intelligence has most control over the lives of the majority of\ncivilized men.\u201d[29] On the part of the individual, the thought is\ninvoluntary, or at least unvoluntary, and is accompanied by like\naction. Most of man\u2019s beliefs are nonrational, even though he supposes\nthat he has come to hold them by his own free and deliberate choice.\nSociety holds tremendous power over the building of character; in large\nmeasure, it controls the material that the mind has to work on. And\nthis control is of primary importance. \u201c... The essential fact which\nhas made the Great Society possible is the discovery, handed down by\ntradition and instruction, that Thought can be fed by deliberately\ncollected material, and stimulated, sustained, and to a certain extent,\ncontrolled by an effort of will.\u201d[30]\n\nNow, the patriotic spirit, along with other dispositions, may be\nacquired as a habit, and the mold into which patriotism runs is\nnotoriously with most men a matter of circumstances and habituation.\nAlong this line, it is interesting to speculate as to what American\npatriotism would be if this country had never separated from England,\nif the thirteen colonies had not been able to form a federation, or\nif the South had been successful in the Civil War. The loyalty of\nAmericans would have been totally different, but no doubt would be just\nas devoted as it actually is. It is a historical fact that English\npatriotism has modified itself to correspond to the expansion of the\nempire. In view of all this, one can hardly resist the conclusion that\npatriotism depends quite largely upon habituation and use and wont.\nPatriotism is a national habit; and it is a habit which even were it\nproved to be nothing but evil, would not be easily broken, since it is\nacquired from life\u2019s earliest years onward.\n\n  \u201cThe superstitions of our early years,\n  E\u2019en when we know them to be nothing more,\n  Lose not for that their hold upon our hearts;\n  Not all are free who ridicule their chains.\u201d[31]\n\nThere are two kinds of the habituation of patriotism, deliberate and\nspontaneous, conscious and unconscious, direct and indirect. The more\nobvious of the two is that of conscious and deliberate habituation.\nThere are agencies that are constantly being used with deliberate\npurpose towards the regimentation of the populace in patriotism.\n\u201cPatriotism is systematically cultivated by anniversaries, pilgrimages,\nsymbols, songs, recitations, etc.\u201d[32] There are numerous patriotic\nsocieties, such as the Grand Army of the Republic, the Daughters of the\nAmerican Revolution, the Sons of Veterans, the Woman\u2019s Relief Corps,\nthe Daughters of the Confederacy, and others.[33]\n\nBut there are other and more important forces back of the inculcation\nof patriotism. In most countries the state with all its power is\nvigilant lest patriotism be allowed to become otiose. And it has means\nat its disposal that range from the selection and repression of news to\nthe active use of all sorts of influences which sway the mind of the\npublic. And these influences do not go unemployed. There are those in\nthe state who have a special interest in arousing a strong sentiment\nof patriotism. Conspicuous among such are the professional soldiers.\nThey, of course, want a solidified population. Their training has\nemphasized their appreciation of the value of obedience and uniformity.\nThese virtues are essentials in the discipline of an army, and in\nterms of military logic they seem to be essentials in the organization\nof a country. J. M. Robertson has a division of a book which he has\ndevoted to a discussion of the regimentation of militarism.[34] But\nthe guardianship of the patriotic fire within the state is not turned\nover entirely into soldierly hands. Other interests, whose nature and\nmotives in contrast with the straightforward purposes of the country\u2019s\nguardians are such as to make it difficult to describe them in the\ndispassionate spirit of scientific and philosophic discourse, are ready\nwith their assistance. And, of course, the ordinary civilian temper is\nnot averse to the rigorous regimentation of patriotic loyalty.\n\nHegel[35] thought that it was both right and necessary that the\nstate should control public opinion. He considered that the people\nhad no opinions of very great worth. \u201c... The people, in so far as\nthis term signifies a special part of the citizens, does not know what\nit wills. To know what we will, and further what the absolute will,\nnamely, reason, wills, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight,\nand is therefore not the property of the people.\u201d[36] Public opinion\nwithout the guidance of the state was unorganized and dangerous. \u201cThe\nmany as individuals, whom we are prone to call the people, are indeed\na collective whole, but merely as a multitude or formless mass, whose\nmovement and action would be elemental, void of reason, violent, and\nterrible.\u201d[36] Therefore it was necessary for the proper source of\nauthority to organize public opinion. And, of course, this work of\norganization and direction was to be the task of the officials of the\nstate. \u201cThe highest state officials have necessarily deeper and more\ncomprehensive insight into the workings and needs of the state, and\nalso greater skill and wider practical experience.\u201d[37] There are\nothers who do not hold Hegel\u2019s philosophical system that yet agree with\nhim in upholding the high sovereignty and controlling supervision of\nthe state.\n\nEcclesiastical institutions often serve as habituators of nationalistic\nspirit. The rise of nationalism in Spain affords an interesting\nexample, for religious motives were at the height of their strength\nin those days. Ferdinand and Isabella got control of the hierarchical\nreligious organizations in their dominions by taking from the Pope and\nto themselves the power to name the prelates of the Catholic church\nin Spain. The Crusading Orders had great vogue in the country, and\nFerdinand got himself elected to the office of Grand Master in the most\nimportant of them. These measures accomplished, they were made to tell\nby the rulers of Spain in the process of furthering their dynastic and\nnationalistic ambitions. In Japan, Bushido, a mixture of Confucian and\nShinto elements, is a spirit of patriotism which is at the disposal\nof the state. In Germany, the pastors of the established churches are\nstate officials; they are state-appointed and state-paid, and they\nreflect the state\u2019s purposes. In all Christian countries, including\nour own, the churches observe the national patriotic holidays both in\ntime of war and peace, and in time of war preach patriotism from the\npulpits, sometimes at the solicitation of the state, sometimes of their\nown volition.\n\nThe newspapers are of cardinal importance as agencies of the\ninculcation of patriotism. It is natural that the newspapers should be\ninsurgently patriotic. They are dependent upon the public for their\nsubsistence. And the mass of the public is conservative. Consequently,\nthe newspapers are as a rule conservative also. Now patriotism is a\nvenerable virtue easy for the public to believe in, and it is almost\ninevitable that journalism should play up that virtue. It is also\nalmost as inevitable that the patriotism of the press should be of\nthe militant kind. To take that character is simply to follow the\nline of least resistance. Public opinion reacts upon the press and\ncircumscribes its initiative. And when a people becomes inflamed\nagainst another people, the newspapers as a rule (there are, of course,\nsome that are independent in their thought and leadership) have to fall\nin line; the sheet that opposed the trend of public emotion would have\nto pay for its folly. The newspapers, moreover, on the whole represent\nthe gentlemanly business class, and wars promise most to the interests\nof that class. Conflict is quite apt to grow out of economic rivalry,\nwhence it naturally follows that those who are most nearly concerned in\nthat rivalry (and the newspapers are controlled by such as are of that\nclass) will be most interested in the prosecution of a war which bids\nfair to enlarge the economic opportunities of their own country.\n\nAlong with the newspapers as habituators of patriotism go also less\nephemeral kinds of literature. \u201cThe Man Without a Country,\u201d[38] for\ninstance, has a definite patriotic purpose. And patriotic orations,\nsongs, and poetry have the same purpose. Sometimes these compositions\nare not jingoistic, but very often they are. Wordsworth\u2019s poetry,\nfor instance, is of the nonjingoistic character; it is strongly\nmarked by love of the soil. But Wordsworth was of unusually broad\nsympathies, and his is not the kind of poetry usually made use of in\nteaching patriotism. J. M. Robertson has written an essay in which he\ncalled attention to the proclivity of poets to write in a jingoistic\nstrain.[39] Virgil, himself a man of broad sympathies, wrote the \u00c6neid\nat the request of Augustus, whose empire-building purposes needed an\nepic after the model of Homer about the founding of Rome.\n\nAn important habituator of patriotism in the training of the young is\nthe public school system. The public schools are almost always used\nby those who have them in charge for the maintenance of the existing\norder. But the \u201cexisting order\u201d quite regularly means the political\none, and hence the road is opened for the teaching of patriotism.\nPrussia seems to be an extreme case of the deliberate use of the\nschools for pushing the pet programs of the politically favored\nclasses. \u201cIn Prussia the avowed use of the schools, not for the spread\nof truth but for the \u2018War against social-democracy\u2019 may be in part\nresponsible for that absence of Love between members of different\nclasses, that class-war of which the growth of social-democracy is only\none symptom.\u201d[40] Prussia also exhibits a peculiarly active brand\nof patriotism. It has been commonly assumed in the United States\nthat education will make for democracy but it is not necessarily so.\nEducation, instead of being aimed at freeing and developing the mind,\nmay be aimed only at regimentation in a certain system of ideas. The\nfact of the business is that as a rule it is so aimed, even where there\nis no such clear and persistent purpose as there is in Prussia; it\nis all too easy to fall into the rut of doing the same old things in\nthe same old way. It is simply easier to inculcate the same old ideas\nthan it is to teach the ever-varying young idea how to shoot. And what\neducation turns out under such methods is not free and independent\nthinkers, but a habituated uniform product. \u201cSchool education, unless\nit is regulated by the best knowledge and good sense, will produce\nmen and women who are all of one pattern, as if turned in a lathe....\nAny institution which runs for years in the same hands will produce\na type.... In the continental schools and barracks, in newspapers,\nbooks, etc., what is developed by education is dynastic sentiment,\nnational sentiment, soldierly sentiment.\u201d[41] And so the schools are\nused for the maintenance of patriotism,--patriotism which only too\noften is narrow and militaristic. An example of the better kind of\npurpose to teach patriotism is that in view in Bosanquet\u2019s lecture on\nthe subject.[42] An example of the kind which is likely not to be so\ntemperate and well-considered is that which grows out of the demand\nfor the teaching of patriotism which arises under the stimulus of war.\nOn May 17, 1917, there appeared in a small-town newspaper[43] an\narticle dated from New York City, and which was evidently furnished by\nsome news association. The headlines were as follows: \u201cCollege Course\nin Patriotism. Chicago\u2019s Mayor Starts Chair in Lincoln University.\nStudents True Americans.\u201d The opening paragraph ran thus: \u201cFor the\nfirst time in the history of American education a chair has been\nestablished for the teaching of American Patriotism. Inspired by the\nwork being done by the Lincoln Memorial University, William Hale\nThompson, Mayor of Chicago, will provide $25,000 for this purpose.\u201d A\nlittle further on occurred the sentence, \u201cPlans have already been made\nfor the opening of the Patriotism Department.\u201d These plans may not have\nbeen actually carried out, and if they were, may have obtained solid\nresults, but the sound of the article was such as would lead one to\nsuspect that what was accomplished would rather prove to be superficial\nand sensational. This whole attempt has been cited here not because it\nis an isolated incident, but for the reason that it is an illustration,\nextreme though it may be, of a tendency.\n\nThe public schools have textbooks for the purpose of training in\npatriotic loyalty, books which tell of the duties of citizens, and are\nreplete with songs and poems to illustrate the points brought out.[44]\nThe schools of our land make it a part of their chief business to\nteach loyalty to the country. For this business history is plastic\nmaterial. \u201cHistory, in every country, is so taught as to magnify that\ncountry: children learn to believe that their own country has always\nbeen in the right and almost always victorious, that it has produced\nalmost all the great men, and that it is in all respects superior to\nall other countries. Since these beliefs are flattering, they are\neasily absorbed, and hardly ever dislodged from instinct by later\nknowledge.\u201d[45] The unpleasant facts are not brought out. Americans,\nfor example, do not usually have it called to their attention that in\nthe War of 1812, most of their vessels were tied up in port at the end\nof the war, their national capital was captured by the enemy, they won\nonly one important land battle and that after the war was over, and\nthat their representatives in the peace negotiations had to surrender\nthe principle for which the war was fought. The war ended because both\nsides were willing to return to the _status quo ante_. The patriotic\nbias dominates even the historian himself. \u201cNo historian ever gets out\nof the mores of his own society of origin.... Even if he rises above\nthe limitations of party, he does not get outside the patriotic and\nethical horizon in which he has been educated, especially when he deals\nwith the history of other countries and other times than his own. Each\nhistorian regards his own nation as the torchbearer of civilization;\nits mores give him his ethical standards by which he estimates whatever\nhe learns of other peoples.... In modern Russian literature may be\nfound passages about the \u2018Civilizing mission\u2019 of Russia which might\nbe translated, _mutatis mutandis_, from passages in English, French,\nor German literature about the civilizing mission of England, France,\nor Germany. Probably the same is true of Turkish, Hindoo, or Chinese\nliterature. The patriotism of the historian rules his judgment,\nespecially as to excuses and apologies for things done in the past, and\nmost of all as to the edifying omissions,--a very important part of the\ntask of the historian.... There is a compulsion on the historian to act\nin this way, for if he wrote otherwise, his fellow-countrymen would\nignore his work.\u201d[46]\n\nThe habituation of patriotism finds in _symbols_ an instrument\nadmirably suited to its purpose. The mind really reacts more strongly\nto symbols than it does to the facts of sense-experience. The potency\nof symbols does not suffer from the admixture of distractions by\nwhich direct sense-experience is accompanied. Symbols are more purely\nmeaning, and they come with the momentum of their meaning. Now the\nword \u201ccountry,\u201d embodying an abstract and fairly simple idea, serves\nas a symbol and produces a pure emotion as in art. Other words and\nphrases could be named that are similar in the responses that they\nelicit. \u201cThe Monroe Doctrine\u201d is one of the pet symbols of the United\nStates. In patriotic poetry and hymnology the flag is featured. It is\na symbol of the country. Children are taught to sing about the flag,\nby means of which a symbol is implanted in their minds, the love of\nmusic is appealed to, and patriotism is connected with their childhood\nsentiments. The appeal of symbols comes home to one when he stands\nat the dividing line between two countries, at Niagara Falls, let us\nsay, and gazes upon two flags, one of them his own and the other not.\nAt the present time Great Britain is our ally, but the emotion upon\nbeholding the British flag is nothing as compared with the feeling of\naffection experienced upon beholding the American flag. The British\nemblem, though respected, is strange; the American flag is one\u2019s\nown. Sumner discusses what he calls the tyranny of the apparatus of\nsuggestion, that is, symbols or tokens, and from him is worth quoting\nthe following pertinent passage: \u201cThe tyranny is greatest in regard to\n\u2018American\u2019 and \u2018Americanism.\u2019 Who dare say that he is not \u2018American\u2019?\nWho dare repudiate what is declared to be \u2018Americanism\u2019? It follows\nthat if anything is base and bogus it is always labeled \u2018American.\u2019\nIf a thing is to be recommended which cannot be justified, it is put\nunder \u2018Americanism.\u2019 Who does not shudder at the fear of being called\n\u2018unpatriotic\u2019? And to repudiate what any one chooses to call \u2018American\u2019\nis to be unpatriotic. If there is any document of Americanism, it is\nthe Declaration of Independence. Those who have Americanism especially\nin charge have repudiated the doctrine that \u2018governments derive their\njust powers from the consent of the governed,\u2019 because it stood in the\nway of what they wanted to do. They denounce those who cling to the\ndoctrine as un-American. Then we see what Americanism and patriotism\nare. They are the duty laid upon us all to applaud, follow, and obey\nwhatever a ruling clique of newspapers and politicians chooses to\nsay or wants to do. \u2018England\u2019 has always been, amongst us, a kind of\ncounter token, or token of things to be resisted and repudiated. The\n\u2018symbols\u2019 or \u2018tokens\u2019 always have this utility for suggestion. They\ncarry a coercion with them and overwhelm people who are not trained to\nverify assertions and dissect fallacies.\u201d[47] When one\u2019s attention\nis called to these things, it cannot help but impose upon him the\nobligation of examining the bases and nature of his own patriotic\nenthusiasm.\n\nThe deliberate habituation of patriotism has a bearing upon the problem\nof peace. Knowledge of other peoples will not bring harmony and mutual\ngoodwill unless it is sympathetic knowledge, and, if it is to be\nsympathetic, our mental prepossessions must be shaped so as to open our\nminds to a just appreciation of unwelcome facts and ways at variance\nwith our own. And to accomplish this, the teaching of patriotism will\nhave to be directed towards the realizing of the devoutly to be wished\nconsummation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE SPONTANEOUS HABITUATION\n\n\nThe spontaneous habituation of patriotism has no conscious and set\npurpose, institution, or program. This is the habituation that makes\nitself felt from the mere fact that individuals in a society tend\nmore and more to become assimilated to one another. Germany affords\nan extreme example of the deliberate habituation in patriotism.\nEvery agency within the empire, including state, church, newspapers,\nschools, and so on, has been used towards securing a uniform result,\nthat of nationalistic passion. But every country offers an example\nof the spontaneous habituation of patriotism. There is no less of\nnationalistic loyalty among the Allies than there is in Germany. It is\ninteresting that the two kinds of habituation have come into combat.\n\u201cAmong the number of embattled principles and counter principles which\nthis war has brought into the field, we must include as not the least\ninteresting the duel between conscious national direction on the one\nside and unconscious national will and knowledge on the other.\u201d[48] In\nthe spontaneous habituation of patriotism we are dealing with a more\nsubtle and powerful force than the deliberate habituation. The former\ngoes deeper than the latter into human life. What we try to teach may\nnot be learned, but what we are sets copy in the copybook of life. \u201cThe\ngenuine beliefs, though not usually the professed precepts, of parents\nand teachers are almost unconsciously acquired by most children; and\neven if they depart from these beliefs in later life, something of\nthem remains deeply implanted, ready to emerge in a time of stress or\ncrisis.\u201d[49]\n\nIt is natural that the citizens of a country should be thus habituated.\nIn fact, in large measure, they habituate themselves. The basis of\nit is first of all that men are alike, and are faced with similar\nproblems. The fact that men have like instincts, instincts, moreover,\nthat have to adjust themselves to identical life conditions,\nmakes it easy to assimilate them to one another and to the group.\nSuggestibility is one of these dispositions of human nature. McDougall\ndefines it as \u201ca process of communication resulting in the acceptance\nwith conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of\nlogically adequate grounds for its acceptance.\u201d[50] Suggestion, of\ncourse, is not omnipotent. There is, for one thing, what is known as\na contra-suggestion, that is, behavior in which people do just the\nopposite to what one tries to persuade them to do. Early in the regime\nof Mr. Herbert Hoover as food administrator one butcher reported that\nhis customers wanted meat more on meatless than on any other days. And\nthere is always the possibility that suggestion may be disregarded\naltogether. But human beings are interdependent, and are open to\nguidance through suggestions from the ideas and practices of their\nfellows. An individual cannot think everything out for himself. Some\nhardly ever do any serious thinking and even the more serious take\nthe bulk of their thoughts, at least in other fields than their own\nspecial one, upon suggestion. Choice is exhausting. It is hard business\nthinking, and we are likely to shirk the irksomeness of it if we can.\n\u201cEither to be exceptional or to appreciate the exceptional requires a\nconsiderable expenditure of energy, and no one can afford this in many\ndirections.\u201d[51] The chances are, then, that except in such cases as\nwhere for some reason we are specially critical, an idea suggested will\nfind lodgement in the mind and tend to issue in action; and this fact\nis tremendously important in the understanding of a social phenomenon\nsuch as patriotism.\n\nIt is rather ominous that today political thought does not seem to be\nas active as it once was. \u201cMy own impression,\u201d says Graham Wallas,\n\u201cformed after questioning a good many people in different parts of\nEngland is that, in our country, the quantity of such discussion\n[serious discussion on public questions] which takes place ... is\ndiminishing.\u201d[52] The great cause of this is the modern industrial\nsystem, and it is likely that what is true of England is true also of\nAmerica. And if serious _discussion_ is diminishing it means probably\nthat men are doing less serious _thinking_ on political subjects, and\nthat they are likely to become more suggestible with regard to them.\nThe application to the subject of patriotism is obvious.\n\nImitation[53] is another disposition of human nature that is close\nto that of suggestibility. There is contra-imitation as well as\ncontra-suggestion, and besides imitation there is also invention. But\nit is a powerful social force. For the interdependence of man makes for\nimitation as well as suggestibility. And society really owes a great\ndeal to it. An invention in social living cannot hope to survive unless\nit is freely adopted by masses who have no thought of stopping to\nreason out its utility. And the effect of imitation is that it causes\nan immense impetus towards uniformity and solidarity within the group.\n\u201c... Men and other animals imitate what they see others, _especially\nthey of their own species_, do.\u201d[54] And imitation of one\u2019s own\ngroup tends to assimilate him to it, to habituate him in its ways,\nand secure his loyalty to it and its ideals, which is to say, that\nimitation is a factor in the making of patriotism.\n\nThe fact that suggestion and imitation exercise their greatest force\nwithin the group makes it pertinent to recognize the part that _the\ngroup_ plays in the process of habituation in patriotism. The fact is\nthat because of the individual\u2019s membership in a group, the suggestions\nthat come to him impinge upon his consciousness with a good deal of\nforce. They strike him from all directions at almost the same time,\nand have a multiple dynamic behind them. Now the nation is a group.\nThe space-annihilating devices of the present day in conjunction with\nthe photographs and vivid descriptive reporting of the newspapers have\nextended and intensified the connections between the individual and his\nnational group. The crowd for the individual may now well be, and in\ntime of national crisis is, the people of his country.\n\nThis, however, is especially true of city populations, a fact which\nmust have allowance made for it in the gauging of public opinion. It is\nthe voice of the city-population that has too often been taken as the\nexpression of public opinion. \u201cThe voice of \u2018the people\u2019 is very often\nnowadays only the voice of the city crowd, faintly re-echoed, if echoed\nat all, in the smaller towns. Sometimes also the noise is that of a few\neditors of newspapers.\u201d[55] Another fact which ought to be noted is\nthat there are prestige-groups within society. Examples of such are an\nold-fashioned aristocracy, the governing class, and in a democracy, the\nmajority. Such groups often exercise compelling coercive power.\n\nThe coerciveness of the crowd makes for national unity, but it has\nunwelcome features. It is too likely to lead to a high disregard of the\nrights of the nonconformist and an unsympathetic and uncompromising\nattitude towards other nations. There are no incentives to broad-minded\nthought and sympathy within a homogeneous crowd. Opposition is the real\nmatrix out of which reason and tolerance are extracted. The government\nof the United States of America had a tolerant spirit stamped upon it\nbecause the makers of our institutions were many men of many minds. The\nonly way to do justice to their differences was by compromise. Close\nagreement confirms convictions, but does not stimulate the imagination.\n\u201cWhere all think alike, no one thinks very much. But whatever he does\nthink, he can think with all his soul.\u201d[56] Without the differences it\nis more than likely that America would not have been quite so tolerant.\nIt follows that the nation, because it has no critic to which it\nlistens, is likely to be hard-minded, fanatical, and unyielding.\n\nThe atmosphere in which the individual lives and moves and has\nhis being is that of his people\u2019s customs or mores. These are\nintellectualized folkways. Folkways are the group\u2019s ways of dealing\nwith its environment. Mores are the folkways plus the convictions\nas to their relation to welfare. Sumner defines them as follows:\n\u201cThe mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical\ngeneralizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and\ninherent in them, as they grow.\u201d[57] Tradition, which is crowd-memory,\nperpetuates the mores, and they become the life _milieu_ of the\nindividuals of each generation. A large part of one\u2019s education,\nespecially his moral education, is gained from the traditions and mores\nof his people. And their teachings are all the more authoritative\nbecause one is almost wholly unconscious of learning from them. \u201cWe\nlearn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and\nbreathe. The masses never learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe,\nand they never know any reason why the mores are what they are. The\njustification of them is that when we wake to consciousness of life\nwe find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition,\ncustom, and habit.... The most important fact about the mores is their\ndominion over the individual. Arising he knows not whence or how,\nthey meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit\nof ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental\nprocesses. They bring to him codes of action, standards, and rules of\nethics.\u201d[58]\n\nThe mores have a bearing upon patriotism in various ways. In the first\nplace, they are _teachers_ of loyalty. They teach loyalty to the group\nand to country. Patriotism has become imbedded in the mores, and when\none learns from them, he becomes indoctrinated with patriotism. The\nconcept of patriotism has a long history, and has become a venerable\nideal. It is not possible that the masses should escape having it\ntaught them. The Japanese provide an example of a race that _par\nexcellence_ shows the effects of centuries of training in nationalistic\nloyalty; it has given to them a marvellous solidarity. \u201cIn the war with\nRussia, in 1904, this people showed what a group is capable of when it\nhas a strong ethos. They understand each other; they act as one man;\nthey are capable of discipline to the death. Our western tacticians\nhave had rules for the percentage of loss which troops would endure,\nstanding under fire, before breaking and running. The rule failed\nfor the Japanese. They stood to the last man. Their prowess at Port\nArthur against the strongest fortifications, and on the battlefields\nof Manchuria, surpassed all record. They showed what can be done in\nthe way of concealing military and naval movements when every soul in\nthe population is in a voluntary conspiracy not to reveal anything.\nThese traits belong to a people which has been trained by generations\nof invariable mores.\u201d[59] One of the most thoroughly grounded ideals of\nthe Japanese mores is that of patriotism.\n\nIn view of the function of the mores as teachers of loyalty, it becomes\nnecessary to recognize that peace is not going to be easily provided\nfor by facile external arrangements or even by the use of information,\npersuasion, and reason. If patriotic loyalty is in such large part a\nmatter of habituation, then a change in it will have to be something of\na matter of habituation too.\n\nThe mores are the _objects_ of loyalty. One gets into the way of\nsaying, \u201cThese ways are my ways and I am going to stick by them. They\nare mine; I am going to preserve and foster them, and no one shall take\nthem from me.\u201d Loyalty to the mores forms national character. It is\ntradition which forms a nation of British, Saxon, and Norman strains.\nTradition unites Walloon and Fleming in Belgium, Breton and Gens du\nMidi in France.[60] The likenesses of a people owe no more to the\nfact of race than to that of the mores. And so the mores become what\nthe patriot is conscious of being loyal to. His patriotism is not so\nmuch love of country as love of the mores. The mores for such a spirit\nof loyalty are the country. When it sings, its song should be, \u201cMy\n_mores_, \u2019tis of thee, of thee I sing.\u201d What it claims for itself is\nthe right to be true to the traditions of its own people. When asked to\njustify its allegiance, it in turn asks the question:\n\n  \u201cAnd who are they who best may claim our trust?\n  Surely our own people, of whose blood we are;\n  Who from our infancy have proved their love,\n  And never have deceived us, save, perchance,\n  When kindly guile was wholesomer for us\n  Than truth itself.\u201d[61]\n\nThe loyalty to national customs stiffens patriotism, and because of\nthat is, from the standpoint of the patriot, highly desirable, but the\nproblem that it sets is that of preventing it from being satisfied to\nremain a mere unreasoning superstition.\n\nThe mores get embodied in character, and come to be a veritable\n_spirit_ of loyalty. They grow out of the life of the people, and\nreturn to that life. They become actually constituent in personality.\nThe mores become a part of ourselves; we not only think of them, we\nthink with them. They are so natural that we do not notice them.\n\u201cThe more thoroughly American a man is, the less he can perceive\nAmericanism. He will embody it; all he does, says, or writes will\nbe full of it; but he can never truly see it, simply because he has\nno exterior point of view from which to look at it.\u201d[62] Under such\nconditions, how could one help being patriotic? It is not something\nthat he strives after; it is to be what he cannot help being. He is\npatriotic simply because he is himself.\n\nSome conclusions from the study of the habits of patriotism may now\nbe drawn. The complexity of patriotism has further manifested itself.\nAnd it is evident that the habits of patriotism, like the impulses,\nmay be either good or bad, or so far as the motive of the individual\nis concerned, ethically colorless. The patriotism of habituation is\nnatural, like breathing. The habituated patriot will go with the\ngroup, and groups like individuals sometimes fall into bad habits. But\ngroups also acquire good habits, and will in those matters be worth\nserving. Habituation and conformity in such a case will be valuable.\nTheir weakening would often be really disastrous. \u201cThere are cases in\nwhich the discrediting of tradition is like picking out the mortar that\nholds together the fabric of society.\u201d[63] There are times when the\ndiscrediting of patriotism would mean the destruction of the nation.\n\nThe great objection to the patriotism of habituation is that it cannot\ncriticize itself. The lack of criticism will, of course, make for\noverwhelming strength. In commenting upon the patriotism of the present\ntime, Russell has written as follows: \u201cThis instinct [patriotism], just\nbecause, in its intense form, it was new and unfamiliar, had remained\nuninfected by thought, not paralyzed or devitalized by doubt and cold\ndetachment.\u201d[64] But it is just an accident if such patriotism is good.\nIt may easily be the patriotism of the man who takes the stand, \u201cMy\ncountry, right or wrong,\u201d a position which, while there is something\nto be said for it on the ground that countries are fundamental\ninstitutions which must not be lightly abandoned to destruction, is\nhardly one to be striven for as an ethical ideal. The road to goodness\nis not by chance, but by intelligent self-direction. And the goodness\nof patriotism rests upon the use of intelligence. Patriotism could not\nas matters now stand be done away with by criticism, but its nature\ncould be molded. We could habituate ourselves to admire and serve in\nour life what really was to be admired and served.\n\nBut the process of habituation, while it produces a powerful spirit\nof group loyalty, can hardly give a full account of the rise of a\nconscious ideal like patriotism. The question would remain, \u201cWhy the\nhabituation, and why so much insistence upon it?\u201d The process implies\na reason for its existence. And reasons become effective through the\naction of an intelligent agent. The objection to a theory like that\nof Sumner is that by it social activity is looked at too exclusively\non the outside when it ought also to be looked at on the inside. The\ntheory does not do justice to the initiative of the mind. The mores\nfor the most part seem almost to be active entities, which, starting\nfrom environmental conditions, develop themselves. Minds are held in\ntheir grip. But mores are products of human activity and reflection,\nand if one would understand them, he must understand the mind, with\nnot only its impulses, but also its ways of thought. Sumner\u2019s own work\nshows that he believes in something beyond the mores, and that he has\nan ideal of acting above them. His confidence is placed in thought. He\nbelieves that he at least can reflect upon the group ways, and that a\nscience, or perhaps even a philosophy, of the mores can be established.\nThe following are his own words: \u201cSince it appears that the old mores\nare mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and\nneeds to which they are adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth,\nand easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to\nhealthful life, it follows that _free and rational criticism_ of\ntraditional mores is essential to societal welfare.\u201d[65]\n\nHuman beings are moved not only by instincts and habits, but also by\nreasons. And it is with the reasoned beliefs of patriotism that the\nfollowing part will deal.\n\n\n\n\nPART III\n\nTHE BELIEFS OF PATRIOTISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE COUNTRY AS PROTECTOR OF SELF\n\n\nPatriotism has reasons upon which it rests; it is not a mere\ninstinctive reaction, nor yet simply a habit.[66] Thought exists, and\nmen think. Graham Wallas says that there is an impulse to think. \u201cThis\nindependent action of Intelligence is, I believe, in its simplest\nforms as \u2018natural\u2019 to us, as much due to inherited disposition, as is\nthe working of anyone of the usual list of instincts.\u201d[67] There is\na rationale of patriotism. Patriotism may be unreasoned, but is not\nfor that necessarily unreasonable. It may coincide with the passions\nof the masses, but may nevertheless rest on logical grounds, and on\nideals. It may be the object of conscious choice. The treatment of the\nimmigrant shows that we have a belief that patriotism can be chosen by\nthe individual. We insist on the loyalty of the German-American, which\nbeing interpreted means that we are demanding loyalty to a country\nof choice rather than to the country of birth. And for those born\nAmericans, we adopt the injunction of Tennyson,\n\n  \u201cLove thou thy land, with love far-brought\n  From out the storied Past, and used\n  Within the Present, but transfused\n  Thro\u2019 future time by power of thought.\u201d[68]\n\nThe fact that men do think and have ideals is one of the very reasons\nwhy patriotism is now so strong.\n\nWhat are the reasons urged why one should be patriotic? One belief is\nthat one owes his earthly salvation to his country. It is a belief\nthat expresses on the level of consciousness the impulse to seek\nsafety and help. Men believe that the country is the protector in this\npresent world of all the values of life. It is the feeling that Spencer\nexpressed when he apostrophized the state in the following language: \u201cI\nsupposed you were to act the part of an Argus-eyed and Briareus-armed\nguardian, ever watching over my interests, ever ready to step in and\ndefend them; so that whether sleeping or waking, absorbed in business\nor immersed in pleasure, I might have the gratifying consciousness of\nbeing carefully shielded from injury.\u201d[69] Webster appealed to the same\nfeeling in his reply to Hayne: \u201cIt is to that Union we owe our safety\nat home, and our consideration and dignity abroad.... It has been to us\nall a copious fountain of national, social, personal happiness.\u201d[70]\nAnd the patriot feels that for the protection that he has received he\nmust show his gratitude. In return for the blessings of the country,\nhe will offer up the sacrifice of patriotism. If one asks the plain\nman why he is patriotic, why he thinks, for instance, that he ought to\nenlist, the answer that is often made is that, \u201cThe country has done a\nlot for me, and now she needs me. I am going to do what I can for my\ncountry.\u201d\n\nThe country affords protection within the group that it organizes.\nAnd for this reason, the citizens will support the state. They feel\nthat government is a good thing; it guarantees justice and fair play.\nAnd patriotism with them will grow out of that feeling. It will, of\ncourse, be a give and take affair. It will not be selfless, altruistic\ndevotion. Patriotism of this kind demands that justice be consistently\ndispensed. Most men will not long serve a state that treats them\nunfairly. No patriotism will survive flagrant and continued injustice.\nAnd, in truth, why should it? Green states the answer: \u201cIf the\nauthority of any government--its claim on our obedience--is held to be\nderived not from an original covenant, or from any covenant, but from\nthe function which it serves in maintaining those conditions of freedom\nwhich are conditions of the moral life, then no act of the people in\nrevocation of a prior act need be reckoned necessary to justify its\ndissolution. _If it ceases to serve this function, it loses its claim\non our obedience._\u201d[71]\n\nA country is a peace unit. And men will welcome it as such, for there\nis in men an impulse to peace. The state in modern times arose in\npart as a keeper of the peace. The church was once the power that\npoliced Europe, and when that was so, men gave the church their supreme\nallegiance. But the time came when the fear of God was no longer a\nsufficient power to keep men in order, so it became necessary for some\nother agency than the church to take up the task. Semi-official bodies\narose whose business it was to preserve peace, but they passed away.\nThere was then no power to keep the lawless forces in check. The nobles\nof feudalism fought with one another, and were petty and irresponsible\ntyrants over their people. Their regime became unbearable. Consequently\nthe people united with the kings, and a central power was established\nthat stopped the wars of the nobles and cities, and gave peace.\n\nThe state within its boundaries is the preserver of law and order. And\nthe discharge of that function recommends the state to its citizens.\nHobbes[72] exalted the state because of his desire for order. The\nEngland of his day was torn by civil war. Even J. S. Mill[73]\nexpressed some sympathy with speculative Toryism, as for instance it\nappeared in Wordsworth, because what it meant in such a case, Mill\nsaid, was the proposition that man ought to be governed. Patriotic\neloquence takes account of the benefit that the state affords as the\npreserver of the peace. Josiah Quincy, Jr., called for patriotic\nloyalty to country on the ground that in it \u201cEach individual, of\nwhatever condition, has the consciousness of living under known laws,\nwhich secure equal rights, and guarantee to each whatever portion of\nthe goods of life, be it great or small, chance or talent or industry\nmay have bestowed.\u201d[74]\n\nThe civilized life itself at present depends upon the state. The word\ncivilization is derived from a stem meaning \u201cstate.\u201d Civilization is\nthat which is possible to men in states, that is, where peace, law,\nand order prevail. The state has been a tremendous gain because it\nhas been a larger integration of men, a larger unit of co\u00f6peration.\nJust that is its primary function,--to make it possible for men to\nlive together. And without the exercise of that function by the state,\nwe should be likely to be plunged back again into the chaos of petty\nwarring factions. Now patriotism gets connected with this desire that\ngovernment be preserved. The patriot is very apt to feel that if _his_\ncountry should be destroyed, it would be a blow at the very foundations\nof all government and safety. He connects civilization with his own\nstate, and feels that, \u201c... they who assail the idea, the ideal, of\nthe country itself, assail all civilized life and, so far forth, are\nsuicides as well as traitors.\u201d[75]\n\nBut the state does not stop with the bare maintenance of law and order.\nIt does other things which are believed to be for the general welfare.\nIt looks out for education, transportation, sanitation, the care of\nthe infirm, and so forth; it works for better social, industrial, and\nclass conditions. The state, in other words, is felt to have a right\nto do all those things which will promote the welfare of mankind.\nMill said, \u201c... it is not admissible that the protection of persons\nand that of property are the sole purposes of government. The ends of\ngovernment are as comprehensive as those of the social union.\u201d[76]\nAnd Aristotle[77] intimated that the state should not only make bare\nexistence possible, but should promote the good life.\n\nThe result has been that men have taken an attitude toward the state\nvery much like the attitude that they have taken toward God. To many\npeople the state has become God. They feel that all the values of life\ndepend upon it, as Plato[78] felt that all the values of life depended\nupon the state that he described. That does not mean that they go\ndirectly to the state for everything that they want; they do not do\nthat with God. They simply expect the state somehow to guarantee these\nvalues, and to supply them only as a last resort. But they will go to\nit for everything that they want and which they can secure in no other\nway. In the following quotation, the state is described in terms that\nmight almost refer to Providence: \u201cNo American boy or girl ... lived\na day, even, at the beginning of his life, when he was not protected\nby the law of the United-States. From that moment the United-States\nwatched over him in ways perhaps which he never thought of. Perhaps the\nschool in which these words are read would not have existed except for\nthe United-States laws with regard to education. Very likely the bread\nand butter which the boy had for breakfast could never have existed but\nthat the country called the United-States had made laws and carried on\ngovernment in such ways that the grain could be raised, that the cattle\ncould be fed, and the butter made. It is in a thousand such ways as\nthis that the country in which we live takes care of us in every hour\nof our lives.... The tie which binds you and me to the country which\ntakes care of us is a tie as real and it involves duties as distinct\nas the ties which bind a boy to his mother to whom he owes his life\nand who has always taken care of him.\u201d[79] What happens when a country\ntowards which men have felt in this way, calls for the allegiance of\nits citizens? Their loyalty will be accorded it in the same measure as\nthe completeness with which they have trusted to it.\n\nThe state is the only institution in a given area that embodies the\ngeneral will, and consequently it federates the largest number of\nloyalties among the people who live there. A class organization could\nnot federate so many loyalties. It could not be done, for instance, by\nsyndicalistic organizations.[80] If a man were a member of all such\norganizations that he was eligible to, his whole life would still lack\nunity. There must, then, be something that will unify the life of the\nindividual, and unify the whole of society. The fact of the matter is\nthat the state at the present time is, and in the predictable future is\nlikely to be, the factor which does this. And it is therefore likely\nalso to continue to draw the supreme loyalty of men.\n\nOne kind of patriotism is, then, based upon the belief that the country\nis the preserver of law and order. If necessary, the patriot will place\nhimself at the service of the state in order to help it discharge\nits function as a police power. And he feels it to be necessary also\nto show his patriotism in his own obedience to the laws. In the\nCrito,[81] Socrates, who had shown his patriotism upon the battlefield,\nshowed it again by submitting himself to the laws of that country which\nby its institutions had nourished and protected him. Bosanquet cites\nthis action of Socrates, and himself adds the comment: \u201cThat is one\nthing; true patriotism is the law-abiding spirit.\u201d[82]\n\nThe state also acts as a protector against aggressions from without,\nand on this account men cling to it. The patriot _fears_ other\nnations; he believes that they are actuated by sinister designs. The\nfoe in patriotic songs and poetry is always \u2018haughty\u2019 and \u2018wicked.\u2019\nHe believes also that if the opportunity is presented, they will\nwork those sinister designs against his country. Nor is the fear\naltogether groundless. To say the least, most governments cannot be\ntrusted to look after the interests of their competitors as well\nas they look after their own, and the way in which the world is at\npresent organized makes it seem necessary for each nation to look\nout for itself. Even Russell says that \u201cthe fear by which the State\nis strengthened is reasonable under present circumstances.\u201d[83] Then\nwhy should not the state protect its own interests and the interests\nof its citizens? The citizen himself will not admit that the state\u2019s\nprotection should simply be limited to the prevention of the harm that\nhis fellow-citizens might do. He will say: \u201cWhen we agreed that it was\nthe essential function of the state to protect--to administer the law\nof equal freedom--to maintain men\u2019s rights--we virtually assigned to\nit the duty, not only of shielding each citizen from the trespasses\nof his neighbours, but of defending him, in common with the community\nat large, against foreign aggression.\u201d[84] The efforts to provide\nprotection has indeed proved to be too big a job for even the state,\nacting alone, and has led to alliances between states. Such alliance is\ndeemed essential. Diplomatic isolation could not now be tolerated by\nscarcely any government or population but the most primitive. Perhaps\nin this very direction lies a way to world internationalism. But the\nprotection is still state protection; the alliances themselves are the\nresults of the activities of states.\n\nThe fear of other states sometimes gets expressed as the belief that\n_existence_ itself, both national and personal, is threatened. Loisy\ngives vent to this belief: \u201cAre we then right to be patriotic, even\nat the risk of being less or not at all Christian? Doubtless; because\nour only chance of living is bound up with our patriotism.\u201d[85] What\nhe seems to fear is French extermination. But more often the patriot\nbelieves that by his loyalty, his own and his country\u2019s freedom are\npreserved. Patriotism is a demand for freedom. Zimmerman a long time\nago pointed out that nearly every people glories in its real or\nsupposed freedom. \u201cNot a few nations,\u201d he says, \u201care seen resembling\nthe primitive Greeks, in overvaluing themselves on their real liberty;\nand others, like the degenerate Greeks, priding themselves only on\nthe shadow of an antiquated liberty.\u201d[86] The United States came into\nexistence only after a severe fight for liberty, and consequently\nAmerican patriotism has had the ideal of freedom deeply impressed upon\nit. The words of Patrick Henry come the nearest to being classical.\n\u201cIs life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price\nof chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course\nothers may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!\u201d[87]\nThe Constitution enumerates liberty next to the possession of life\namong the inalienable rights of men. Lincoln expressed it again in his\nGettysburg address. \u201c... We here highly resolve that these dead shall\nnot have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new\nbirth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people,\nand for the people, shall not perish from the earth.\u201d[88] The notes\nof freedom and self-rule of the people are the dominant ones in the\npassage with which Lincoln closed the speech. It has been the President\nof the United States who has most clearly and consistently defined the\naim of the Allies in this present war as that of making the world safe\nfor democracy, _i. e._, for freedom. But the countries which are called\nautocratic also insist that they are fighting for freedom, and they are\nproclaiming to their peoples that they are fighting on the defensive,\nand in the cause of liberty. The ideal of freedom is dear to all.\n\nAlong with the demand for freedom goes the insistence that _those\nthings which are of great value_ to one shall be held sacred. The\ndefense of homes is a cause that arouses masculine patriotism. There\nis an old saying found in Bacon that \u201cLove of his country begins in a\nman\u2019s own house.\u201d[89] The patriot will sacrifice for his home; and he\nwill die that his posterity may enjoy the privileges of a free country.\n\nThe _pursuit of happiness_ is another of the privileges that men\ndeem inalienable. And the pursuit of happiness in grown-ups seems to\nbe mostly the pursuit of trade. Consequently they will prize what\nprotects, and hate what threatens business. One hates the invader of\nhis country because he does not want the means of his livelihood to\npass under the control of an unsympathetic power. The land is the form\nof wealth that is inevitably seized by the invader. And patriotism,\nbecause of this, gains another connection with the soil. \u201c...\nPatriotism envelops the real estate because the real estate nourishes\nthe lives and careers of the patriots.... The emotions of loyalty\nand value congregate about the \u2018vital interests\u2019 of our lives.\u201d[90]\nThe laying on of burdens of taxation too grievous to be borne is an\nunwarrantable interference with the pursuit of happiness. And so\npatriotism often starts over taxes. It was so in the formation of the\nUnited States. The following extract from a speech by Samuel Adams\nto the newly elected representatives to the Massachusetts colonial\nlegislature from Boston, will show what the drift then was: \u201c... As\nyou represent a town which lives by its trade,\u201d he said, \u201cwe expect\nin a very particular manner, though you make it the object of your\nattention to support our commerce in all its just rights, to vindicate\nit from all unreasonable impositions and promote its prosperity.\u201d[91]\nThe trader looks to his government for protection, and when he receives\nit, he has a particular reason for desiring the continued good health\nof his country. The same holds true of workingmen. John Dewey says:\n\u201c... The simple fact of the case is that at present workingmen have\nmore to gain from their own national state in the way of legislative\nand administrative concessions than they have from some other state, or\nfrom any international organization.\u201d[92] And as long as this is true,\ntradesmen, laborers, and all others who have anything to gain by it\nwill be patriots, and violent patriots.\n\nWhat kind of patriotism is it that rests upon the belief in one\u2019s\ncountry as the protector of self? Is it patriotism at all? It is\nnot that disinterested love of country that the common man has been\nformally taught to regard as patriotism. But it is loyalty to country,\nand whatever answers to that description must be patriotism. It no\ndoubt makes the state a kind of business affair. The primary motive\nis that of prudence. A man defends his country because he needs it.\nBut some men serve God in that way, and we call it religion. And so\nthis profit-and-loss attachment to country may come under the term\npatriotism. One reason, therefore, for patriotism is that the country\nis needful for the protection of life\u2019s values. But, on the other\nhand, the attachment to country is not patriotism, if the country is\nlooked at _merely_ as means. Patriotism views the country somehow as\nend. If the real and only motive which is getting expressed is that of\nself-interest, any show of patriotism is after all mere _camouflage_.\nThe point is that men will actually come to feel real gratitude and\nlove for the country which has protected them. It is a psychological\nfact that affection attaches itself to what has been useful. In this\nway and for this reason, affection attaches itself to country, and\nbecomes patriotism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE ONENESS OF COUNTRY AND SELF\n\n\nThe patriot identifies himself with his country. He believes that he\nand his country are one. This belief is the coming to consciousness of\nthe impulse to cling to one\u2019s own. And this conviction becomes another\nreason for patriotism. Patriotic loyalty of this kind is not a business\naffair. It will not abandon the country even if the latter should prove\nunsuccessful in providing protection, but will remain steadfast through\nall the country\u2019s vicissitudes. One\u2019s country may fail to protect\nhim, but if it is still a recognizable expression of himself, he will\nlove it. The government or state may be faulty, and yet the patriot\nwill still be true. Veblen intimates that one might just as well have\nforeign officials as home-grown capitalists administer one\u2019s affairs of\ngovernment.[93] But the patriot is not likely to be persuaded to think\nVeblen\u2019s way, and the reason is that the home-grown capitalists somehow\nseem closer than the foreign officials. It is quite true that there are\nthose who refuse to be patriotic because their country does not give\nthem what they believe to be justice. Anarchists are not patriotic.\nSocialists sometimes are not patriotic. Some among the laboring classes\nhave come to wear their patriotic allegiance but lightly. But the issue\nfor them has ceased to be merely that of getting justice. It has come\nto the point where the injustice of the industrial situation has gone\nso far that the dissatisfied classes do not even recognize themselves\nin the state that is supposed to represent them. And when that feeling\nof strangeness creeps into a man\u2019s heart, he is no longer likely to be\na patriot. Patriotism is rendered to a country that is one\u2019s own. In\nview of this, it seems rather significant that the rise of nationalism\nhas been cotemporal with the rise of democracy.\n\nThe country is a part of one\u2019s objectified self. And one cannot be\na self without being objectified. He has to come to expression in\nsome way, and he has to have the means and material through which to\nexpress himself. The individual would lose in individuality if his\ngroup were broken up. He cannot be a normal human being independent\nof the group; and the group for the civilized man includes \u201ccountry.\u201d\n\u201cIn a profound sense, man is born under the relations of country and\nof government. He can no more live a rational, civilized life without\na country, and apart from government, than without the family and\napart from the social order. Scarce human is the individual to whom\nare applicable Homer\u2019s contemptuous words,--\u2018No tribe, nor state, nor\nhome hath he.\u2019\u201d[94] The country pours itself into the individual.\nJacks says: \u201cThe distinction between our own thoughts and the nation\u2019s\nthoughts is being obliterated. Ask the first honest man you meet to\ntell you what he is thinking, and if he answers faithfully, he will\ntell you something of what the nation is thinking.\u201d[95] The patriot\ninstinctively feels the oneness between his country and himself, and\noften has a clear belief concerning it. Washington spoke of \u201cthat\ncountry, in whose service I have spent the prime of my life; for whose\nsake I have consumed so many anxious days and watchful nights, and\n_whose happiness, being extremely dear to me, will always constitute\nno inconsiderable part of my own_.\u201d[96] Washington identified himself\nwith America, and so do all patriots identify themselves with their\ncountry. If the patriot were asked why one should love his country, his\nreply might very well be, \u201cWhy should one love himself?\u201d\n\nThe identification of oneself with his country is greatly helped out\nby the fact that the country is an outgrowth of the family. The idea\nof kinship has been extended to the national group. The nation is\nbelieved to be of one race. McDougall in speaking of the self-regarding\ninstinct calls attention to the fact that it is extended to others,\nand says: \u201c... This extension should not, and usually does not, stop\nshort at the family; in primitive societies the tribe and the clan,\nwhich are the collective objects of the regards of other tribes and\nclans, become also the objects of this sentiment; and among ourselves\nthe growing child is led on in the same way to identify himself with,\nand to extend his self-regarding sentiment to his school, his college,\nhis town, his profession as a class or collective unit, and finally to\nhis country or nation as a whole.[97] The extension of the sentiment\nculminates in its application to the country, and this application has\nbeen historically possible because the country has been believed to be\nthe organization of a homogeneous race.\n\nBut the feeling of oneness with the country does not rest solely upon\nthe belief in blood kinship. Ethnologists are now pretty well agreed\nthat there are no pure races, and that nationality does not coincide\nwith race homogeneity. C. D. Burns points out that the Belgians, at\nthe time they were seeking nationality, were of different blood. \u201cThe\ngroup had asserted their common ambition and their distinction from all\nother groups. They were not all the same blood or language, but their\ntraditions and purposes were the same.\u201d[98] It is not exclusively\na common ancestry, then, that provides the basis for one to feel at\none with his country. It is not so much a question of genesis as of\ncondition. One feels at home in a country which in general has the\nsame sort of character and life as his own. The largest factor is that\nof a common consciousness, no matter how produced. What this means\nmay be understood from the words of Bosanquet: \u201cBroadly speaking, the\nlimit of a country or nation is the limit of a common experience, such\nthat the people share the same mind and feelings, and can understand\neach other\u2019s ways of living and make allowance for each other so that\nthe same laws and institutions are acceptable and workable for all of\nthem.\u201d[99] The patriot in a foreign land feels truly like an innocent\nabroad, but his own country is home, sweet home to him.\n\nThe love of the country as one\u2019s objectified self coincides with the\ndesire for attachment. Man, in other words, wants to objectify himself.\nHe is not satisfied with solipcism. He wants a world, and a world that\nsomehow represents himself. Without that he is a lost soul. \u201cThe man\nwithout a country\u201d is pathetic because he has no attachment, no fixed\nworld that he can call his own. The country provides a satisfying\nobject of attachment, in which the patriot\u2019s soul can be at rest.\n\nPatriotism is devotion to a cause, and the cause is one\u2019s own. The\npatriot has made it his by his own choice. It is a part of himself.\nRoyce in speaking of patriotic loyalty says: \u201cThis plan of the patriot\nhas two features: (1) It is through and through a social plan, obedient\nto the general will of one\u2019s country, submissive; (2) it is through\nand through an exaltation of the self, of the inner man, who now feels\nglorified through his sacrifice, dignified in his self-surrender, glad\nto be his country\u2019s servant and martyr,--yet sure that through this\nvery readiness for self-destruction he wins the rank of hero.\u201d[100]\nThe call of _war_ is not only a call to sacrifice, but also a call to\nself-expression. Royce continues: \u201cThis war-spirit, for the time at\nleast, makes self-sacrifice seem to be self-expression, makes obedience\nto the country\u2019s call seem to be the proudest sort of display of one\u2019s\nown powers. Honor now means submission, and to obey means to have one\u2019s\nway. Power and service are at one. Conformity is no longer opposed to\nhaving one\u2019s own will. One has no will but that of the country.\u201d[101]\nPatriotism in this character simplifies the problem of duty. It\nprovides a cause into which one can throw himself with all his heart,\navoid the conflict of a divided mind, and it is able to do all this\nfor a man for the reason that the cause is his own. It makes a joy out\nof a duty. An expression of the joy that comes to one in the service\nof his country\u2019s cause is to be found in the words supposed to have\nbeen uttered by Epaminondas when he was dying upon the battlefield.\nZimmermann cites the incident: \u201cEpaminondas, the Theban, when lying\non the ground mortally wounded with a spear at the battle of Leuctra,\nall that troubled him was the event of the battle, and what was to\nbecome of his arms; but on his shield being held up to him, and with\nassurances that the day had gone for the Theban side, he said to the\nbystanders with a cheerful countenance, \u2018Let not this day, friends, be\nconsidered as the end of my life, but as the beginning of my happiness\nand the consummation of my glory. I have the satisfaction of leaving\nmy country victorious, haughty Sparta humbled, and Greece freed.\u2019\nThen drawing the spear out of his breast, he expired.\u201d[102] Even if\nEpaminondas did not express any such dramatic sentiment, it was a\ncommon enough experience among mankind to be the subject of a credible\nbit of fiction. The joy was in the fact that the cause had triumphed, a\ncause that he had made his own. The patriot identifies himself with his\ncountry; in it he sees himself; and he shares its sorrows and successes.\n\nThe patriot is provincial. He begins his life of attachment by being\nloyal to what is nearest the center of his own interests. And such\nattachment is natural. We are not likely to be so vitally interested in\nfar-away things as in the things that are near. It is simply a case of\nwhere the power of gravitation varies in inverse ratio to the distance\nbetween the gravitating bodies. Now, the patriot\u2019s own nation is nearer\nto him than is any other, and consequently to it he renders his warmest\ndevotion. Even many who deplore the narrowness of nationalism and\nthemselves do not share that narrowness, do nevertheless have a warm\ndevotion for their own country. This devotion, strong in spite of a\nconsciousness of the country\u2019s shortcomings, shows itself in Cowper\u2019s\nline:\n\n  \u201cEngland, with all thy faults, I love thee still.\u201d[103]\n\nThe patriot believes that he is an unnatural son if he is not devoted\nto his country. To turn against the country is comparable to turning\nagainst his own mother. And of course no real man of flesh and blood\nand the ordinary feelings of normal human beings, would do such a thing\nas that. The traitor is abnormal, and is something amounting to almost\na monster. All normal men are believed to thrill to the sentiment,\n\n  \u201cThis is my own, my native land!\u201d[104]\n\nThe country is so close that it is felt to be inhuman baseness not to\nbe true to the ties that bind one to it.\n\nPatriotism is, then, in part a clinging to the nation as an expression\nof one\u2019s own life. The patriot fiercely resents attacks upon the\nnation, for they are attacks upon himself. They assail the periphery\nof his personality. He wants his country to be free because in it he\nfinds himself expressed, and because he claims the right to continue\nhis self-expression through the country. Therefore he hates conquest by\nan enemy. He would rather die fighting than be subjugated, because in\ndying for his country he asserts himself in one last final defiant act.\nIt is a supreme act of self-assertion. The country is the patriot\u2019s, it\nis vital to him, and while life lasts he will not see it perish from\nthe earth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE INTRINSIC VALUE OF ONE\u2019S COUNTRY\n\n\nThe patriot believes that his country is intrinsically a fundamental\nvalue. It is a cause that is worthy. He sees various things in the\ncountry that furnish the bases for this belief. Sometimes he beholds in\nthe state a sacred or semi-sacred institution. A philosophy which put\nthe theory of the state in such a way as to furnish a basis for this\nbelief was that of Hegel. For Hegel, the state was the development of\nthe absolute Idea in the world. The state did not arise in response to\nthe needs of men, as philosophers like Mill and Spencer[105] have held,\nand as would probably be held by the patriot who looks upon the country\nas protector or expression of himself. Hegel said, \u201cIt is a very\ndistorted account of the matter when the state, in demanding sacrifices\nfrom the citizens, is taken to be simply the civic community, whose\nobject is merely the security of life and property. Security cannot\npossibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured.... The\nnation as a state is the spirit substantively realized and directly\nreal. Hence, it is the absolute power on earth.\u201d[106] Hegel felt that\nway about the Prussian State. And others have felt almost the same way\nabout their state. The desire for a solid and immutable condition of\nlife that the view represents is a fundamental one. And when Hegel or\nany one else takes that view of his state, he is at once likely to be a\ndevoted patriot.\n\nThe popular parallel to Hegel\u2019s conclusion is the belief that the\ncountry comes from God. Men seem to want to feel that their origins are\nworthy of reverence, and that they are especially favored. In ancient\ntimes most people traced their ancestry back to their God. The Japanese\ndo the same thing in modern times, and have a religion which is the\nexpression of that belief. The Shinto religion inculcates reverence for\nthe sovereign, ancestral memory, filial piety, nature worship, and the\nbelief that the imperial family, which is descended from their god,\nis the fountain head of the whole nation. These elements have been\ninfused into Bushido, which Nitobe calls _The Soul of Japan_, and which\nembodies and inculcates the Japanese national ideals. But the belief in\nthe semi-sacred character of the nation is common in all countries. How\noften do we hear it said that America is God\u2019s Modern Chosen People.\nAnd at least one of the sovereigns of Europe does not cease to mention\nthe patriotism of his tutelary god not only in his prayers, but also in\nhis proclamations.\n\nThis belief in the sacredness of one\u2019s country has in monarchies a\nsplendid symbol to which to attach itself in the person of the king or\nemperor. The ruling classes encourage this attachment; they themselves\nfeel that they rule by divine right. They have inherited the belief\nfrom the traditions of the Middle Ages and from such philosophical\ntheories as that of Hegel. And the people, also habituated to a certain\nextent in those ideas, share the same belief. If they are thoroughly\nloyal, they take an attitude towards their king similar to that assumed\nby religious devotees towards their God. But emperor-worship is not\nat all necessary to state-worship. Many who no longer believe in the\ndivine right of kings still believe in the divine right of states. The\nstate is still often looked upon as sacred and sovereign. The Greek\nconception of the omnipotent polis is in the _hinterland_ of our minds.\nThere has come down from the Middle Ages a habit of sovereignty which\nthe world has not shaken off. And, moreover, men want a supreme power\nwhich guarantees safety. Patriotism thrives in such soil. When people\nare possessed of these beliefs, patriotism with them can become almost\na religion.\n\nThe belief that one has a glorious country is a form of the belief in\nits value. This kind of patriotism is fed by contemplation of the great\nnames of the past and the deeds of conquering heroes. It can attach\nitself to any characteristic in which the country excels. Some of the\nreasons for patriotism advanced in a school textbook ran somewhat as\nfollows: Our country is a great nation. Our territory is big. We have\nan immense population. Our wealth is surpassingly great. Our power is\ntremendous. Our educational standards are high. And we are the great\nexponent of a land of freedom.[107] The moral was that any American\nboy or girl ought to recognize that he lived in a grand and glorious\ncountry. One of the very common causes of pride is the extent of\ncommerce, and in this way the economic factor makes another connection\nwith patriotism. A few years ago, one of the potent reasons for the\nproposal to subsidize an American merchant marine was that the country\ndid not like to feel that the flag was not floating over the sea as it\nonce had.\n\nThe consciousness of national glory grows on the pride of power. The\nbelief in the country\u2019s greatness fuses with and derives dynamic from\nthe impulse to power. National power is precious to a certain type of\npatriot. It is even more precious than peace. \u201cThe plain fact is that\npeople do not prize tranquillity above all other goods. They desire\ninfluence and power, and are willing to accept the responsibilities\nand the suffering that these entail.\u201d[108] These facts throw light upon\nthe patriotism of aggressive nations. The patriots of those nations\nglory in their country\u2019s glory, and grow great in the consciousness of\nits power. Imperialism grows out of this temper. And once a country is\nembarked on a career of imperialism, it is hardly to be satisfied short\nof dominion over the world. Even then it will sigh for new worlds to\nconquer. And this characteristic of an insatiable lust for glory should\nnot be lost sight of when we are considering the taming of an enemy by\nnonresistance.\n\nThe patriotism that feeds upon the country\u2019s glory is jealous of the\nnational prestige. Prestige is glory. And a nation cannot continue\nto glory either at home or abroad if it suffers its prestige to be\nlowered. Consequently it must sometimes fight simply to protect that\nprestige. Many of our citizens during the period of crisis with Mexico\nover the exploits of Villa and also during the critical time in our\naffairs with Germany before war was declared, believed that if we did\nnot fight, our prestige value would be lowered all over the world, and\nthat we should be deprived of the power of acting effectively in world\npolitics. The desire of a nation for revenge also is the desire, as\nmuch as anything else, to restore her fallen prestige.\n\nSolicitude for the country\u2019s honor is another outgrowth of the\npatriotism that delights in national glory. One kind of honor is that\nof Belgium standing up in the face of aggression for its integrity and\nfor its loyalty to its international obligations. A weaker kind is very\nmuch like the desire for prestige. It is a desire for the respect of\nothers. It appears in the reason that Nitobe gives for Japan\u2019s opening\nits doors to the western world. \u201cThe sense of honor which cannot bear\nbeing looked down upon as an inferior power,--that was the strongest of\nmotives.\u201d[109] This sense of honor will lead to high achievements, but\nthe tragedy is that it will so easily lead to war. C. D. Broad says,\n\u201c... It is chiefly when people can be persuaded that questions of honor\nare involved that they can be got to fight.\u201d[110] And when a war is\nstarted, no country wants to accept defeat. Each one emblazons on its\nsword the device which is said to have been on the sword of a faithful\nknight of feudal times: \u201cNever draw me without right; never sheathe me\nwithout honor.\u201d\n\nThe trouble which is implicit in the situation is that nations believe\nthat their glory and welfare are matters of competitive success. It\nis all too commonly believed that the gain of one nation must mean\nthe loss of another. Consequently, the attitude that is taken on all\nsides is simply that of intelligent self-interest. Jealousy arises\nout of such a situation, and jealousy is one of the effective causes\nof war. One of the most significant factors in the diplomatic history\npreceding the present war was that of the rivalry of the great European\npowers for strategic land areas, and for control of the important sea\nroutes of the world. There has been a problem of the Mediterranean, the\nAdriatic, Constantinople, the North Sea, the Baltic, the China Sea, the\nPersian Gulf, and so on. Germany, younger than the other nations, has\nbeen making a desperate effort to catch up with them, and the present\nwar is in great part the outgrowth of the friction arising out of that\neffort.[111]\n\nBut it is encouraging that the glory of nations does not consist\nexclusively in competitive success, and that there are those who\nrealize it. There are those who see that the true good of all countries\nmay be worked out at the same time. J. S. Mill expressed a high ideal\nof patriotism when he said: \u201cI believe that the good of no country can\nbe obtained by any means but such as tend to that of all countries,\nnor ought to be sought otherwise, even if attainable.\u201d[112] This may\nbe matched by a passage from American patriotic eloquence uttered by\nno less a patriot than Charles Sumner: \u201cI hope to rescue those terms\n[national glory], so powerful over the minds of men, from the mistaken\nobjects to which they are applied, from deeds of war and the extension\nof empire, that henceforward they may be attached only to acts of\njustice and humanity.\u201d[113] The highest good of nations really lies in\nthe use of those things which do not perish in the using and of which\nthere is enough for all. They are the things of the mind and of the\nspirit. The hope is that the rivalry of nations may be transferred from\ndestructive to constructive pursuits. Much better would be friendly\nrivalry in the accomplishments of science, art, scholarship, social\nwelfare, and like things.\n\nThe belief in the value of one\u2019s country sometimes expresses itself\nin the conviction that the country embodies lofty ideals. Patriots\nbelieve that their nation represents a great tradition, and stands for\nideals that are important to the human race. A country may be said to\nbe organized about these beliefs. A people is not really effectively\nunified until it is held together by the power of a common ideal. And\nthat ideal is a source of strength to patriotism. This idealistic\ncharacter has impressed itself upon even the warlike temper of peoples.\nThey do not usually fight over causes that are avowedly materialistic\nand predatory. It takes a big idea to appeal to the people. \u201c...\nPeoples in their larger corporate activities are not mercenary, but\nidealist. They know that wars do not \u2018pay\u2019 in the low, material sense.\nThey are not seeking present ease and comfort, seldom a present good\nof any kind, but the triumph of an ideal which they associate with\ntheir national life. Their _method_ may be wrong, but their _purpose_\nis essentially altruistic, perhaps the least selfish of any activity\nwe know.\u201d[114] And the ideal that moves a people must be a morally high\nideal, or at least must seem to be so. A government could scarcely hope\nto win a hard war without having first enlisted the community\u2019s moral\nconvictions.\n\nIdeals are in part inherited from the nation\u2019s past. What has united\nin the past has been these common ideals; and it is because there\nwere such that the memory of the past is so valuable. But for the\nidealist the future is fully as important as the past. A people is\nheld together by what Green calls its \u201csocial expectation.\u201d[115] What\nbinds us together in America is not so much the past as the future. Our\npast is a vital factor in our unity. It is remarkable how the various\nelements in our population can apparently so naturally appropriate\n\u201cthe Puritan fathers\u201d as their own. The Puritan fathers were only\none element in the founding of the United States, and at least\nthree-quarters of the present inhabitants of this land have no physical\ninheritance from them, but a far greater proportion of the American\npeople count themselves as their spiritual progeny. Nevertheless, the\nAmerican people contains great heterogeneous groups and masses who\nhave never been assimilated to the Puritan ideals or traditions. There\nis no common past for all our people. We root back into many lands\nand many traditions. The tie that really binds is what we believe to\nbe our common destiny, the ideals that we believe ourselves to be\nprogressively realizing. The roots of our unity are in the sky.\n\nThe ideals which a nation believes that it exemplifies are various.\nSometimes it is that of good government. Virgil felt that Rome was\nspreading peace and order throughout the world.[116] Sometimes it is\nthe ideal of justice. The patriot seems to feel that in his country\u2019s\njust cause eternal justice itself is being incarnated. \u201cA patriot he\n[Washington] was in the highest sense, not because he loved his country\nwith a selfish love, but because he loved justice on the broadest\nscale, and believed that the cause of his country was that of eternal\njustice.\u201d[117] But the ideal which has been exploited perhaps more\nthan any other is that of freedom. Patriots thrill at the thought\nthat not only is their country the guardian of their freedom, but is\nthe champion of freedom throughout all the world. This ideal has the\nhonor of having most keenly aroused the consciences of states. \u201cIt is\na curious fact that practically every case in which altruistic action\nhas been professed by or recommended to a nation has been a case in\nwhich the \u2018liberty\u2019 of some human beings was in question. Thus both the\nantislavery and the Bulgarian agitations [in England] were questions\nof liberty; and the whole Palmerstonian policy was directed against\ntyranny. There is indeed some ground for believing that the positive\ninternational moral sense has at present only developed with regard to\nfreedom. There are many people, especially in this country, who would\nsay that it is the duty of a state, regardless of its own interests, to\nprotect the freedom of another state, especially if the inhabitants of\nthe latter are of kindred race to themselves.\u201d[118]\n\nPatriotism often rests upon the belief in the value of the country\u2019s\ncivilization. The civilization of a country is its art, culture,\ncustoms, and in general its way of living. It is its _kultur_. Loisy\nspeaks for France, \u201c... though we do not brag of our culture, we are\nsure that the ruin of France would be no gain to civilization....\nWe are safeguarding a notable portion of our human inheritance from\nthe madness of the destroyer.\u201d[119] Sometimes the element of the\ncivilization cherished most is that of religion. The Jewish patriotism\nwas an example of this. Sometimes there is a belief that one\u2019s own\nnation has a way of doing things better than others. Germany is an\nexample. At other times, pride is founded upon the greatness of one\u2019s\ninstitutions. The English and Americans feel such pride. Sometimes\npatriotism waxes enthusiastic over economic accomplishment. The\nfollowing is an expression of patriotism which, while it will no doubt\nbe astonishing to most people, nevertheless seems to be sincere: \u201cIt\nis an element of patriotism to reverence the successful business\nman of America, and Our Nation must request and heed the advice and\nadmonitions of men experienced in affairs.\u201d[120] The context shows that\nthe author likes the _status quo_ of industry and wealth, and wants\nmore of the same thing.\n\nEach state group has its own history, and is convinced that it\nmakes its own contribution to the world\u2019s civilization. The patriot\napplies to his own country the spirit that was expressed by Mazzini:\n\u201cEvery people has its special mission, which will co\u00f6perate towards\nthe fulfillment of the general mission of Humanity. That mission\nconstitutes its nationality. Nationality is sacred.\u201d[121] The sense of\nhaving a mission possessed Israel; it possesses Germany; it possesses\nAmerica. Longfellow wrote to America,\n\n  \u201cHumanity with all its fears,\n  With all the hopes of future years,\n  Is hanging breathless on thy fate.\u201d[122]\n\nIn fact, the number of the civilizing missions that the world is\nfavored with is identically equal to the number of countries that have\neach a national consciousness. The consciousness of being the anointed\none sometimes strikes the level of the ludicrous. The following is not\nan example,--for the New Englander: \u201cAs from the first to this day, let\nNew England continue to be an example to the world of the blessings of\nfree government, and of the means and capacity of men to maintain it.\nAnd in all times to come, as in all times past, may Boston be among the\nforemost and boldest to exemplify and uphold whatever constitutes the\nprosperity, the happiness, and the glory of New England.\u201d[123]\n\nThe patriotism that justifies itself with the reason that the country\nis an intrinsic value often expresses itself in a desire for a better\ncountry. Patriotism is not exclusively love of country just as it is.\nIt is love of an ideal country. The actual country becomes a subject of\ncriticism. Literary men have often satirized their country at the same\ntime that they loved it. And the criticism may be all the more bitter\nbecause the love is great. The country\u2019s shortcomings are felt by those\nwho love it the most. The following lines inflict the faithful wound of\na true patriot:\n\n  \u201cThe ever-lustrous name of patriot\n  To no man may be denied because he saw\n  Where in his country\u2019s wholeness lay the flaw,\n  Where, on her whiteness, the unseemly blot.\n  England! thy loyal sons condemn thee.--What!\n  Shall we be meek who from thine own breasts draw\n  Our fierceness? Not ev\u2019n _thou_ shalt overawe\n  Us, thy proud children nowise basely got.\n  Be this the measure of our loyalty--\n  To feel thee noble and weep thy lapse the more.\n  This truth by thy true servants is confess\u2019d--\n  Thy sins, who love thee most, do most deplore.\n  Know thou thy faithful! Best they honour thee\n  Who honour in thee only what is best.\u201d[124]\n\nPatriotism consequently does not mean blind devotion to country, right\nor wrong. And the plain fact is that there actually are patriots who\ndo not conceive that devotion to country must be consistent even at\nthe expense of one\u2019s moral convictions. Loyalty to country with them\ndoes not set aside loyalty to the moral law. The following lines are\ntaken from an essay commendatory to patriotism: \u201cLet patriotism wholly\nconform itself to the moral law; let it judge all things, national as\nwell as individual, by the unalterable, supreme, standard of right\nand wrong; let it sanction no blind following of the flag, nor any\nunethical exalting of the country\u2019s dominance above the country\u2019s\nrighteousness; let it reject the notion that because war has been\ndeclared, patriots must enlist; let it repudiate the idea that because\na war has been begun, it must be allowed to end only when victory has\nbeen secured;--and there will not only be fewer wars, but also, on one\nside at least, wars more in keeping with justice and truth.\u201d[125] The\nauthor is a patriot, but his patriotism is directed by a high ethical\nideal.\n\nIt follows that patriotism is not inextricably bound up with jingoism.\nPatriotism is not exclusively a war-time virtue. In truth pacifists may\nwell assert, and do sometimes, that they are patriots, and differ from\nother patriots only in the way in which they show their patriotism.\nThere are uses for the patriot in time of peace as well as in time\nof war. A practical statesman in a patriotic address has said, \u201cWe\nneed men who will not only be ready to sacrifice for their country in\ntime of war, but who will not be a menace to it in time of peace! We\nwant patriots in finance. We want patriotism in the organization of\ncorporations. We want patriots in the conduct of public utilities. We\nwant patriots in rendering loyal obedience to the law.\u201d[126] Washington,\nwho was a patriot in war, preferred peace, and was a patriot in peace\nas well as in war. When he was about to resign his commission as\ncommander-in-chief of the army, he wrote his \u201cLetter to the Governors\u201d\nin which he made suggestions for putting the Federal Government on\na right basis. His \u201cFarewell Address\u201d was characterized by paternal\nsolicitude for the future of his country. On both occasions Washington,\nfirst in peace as well as in war, expressed what was a true spirit of\npatriotism.\n\nThe patriotism that looks within the country demands public spirit.\nIt calls for unselfishness on the part of the individual and devotion\nto the betterment of the country. J. S. Mill\u2019s _Autobiography_ shows\nin its pages that Mill was actuated in his work by an unselfish and\ndevoted public spirit. High-minded patriots demand everyday devotion\nto the country. Bosanquet tells us what patriotism means to him. He\nsays: \u201cIn their patriotism, their feeling for the community, Hegel\ntells us, people are apt to follow their custom of being generous\nbefore they are just, and excuse themselves by a potential romantic\nmagnanimity for a lack of prosaic everyday loyalty to the commonwealth.\nBut it is this latter, the sense of daily duty, which is real\npatriotism--the foundation and seed-plot of the former.\u201d[127]\n\nThis public spirit means, for one thing, that the individual himself\nbe a good citizen. \u201c... Patriotism demands that, in ourselves, we\nbe good and true. The country\u2019s worthy citizen must be personally\nworthy,--emulous of culture, devoted to virtue. No man personally\ndishonorable, can be patriotic in the highest degree.\u201d[128] It means,\nfor another thing, that a man shall be interested in the welfare of\nthe people of his country. Although an enthusiasm for the people\nsometimes weakens nationalistic feeling, as in the case of Tolstoy,\nnevertheless patriotism often derives great strength from humanitarian\nsympathy. This sympathy shows itself nowadays in the desire for a\ngreater measure of justice in the relations between the classes. In a\npatriotic address, John Grier Hibben says: \u201cIn the throes of its new\nbirth the world today needs a new industrial conscience, a new sense\nof social responsibility, a new standard of national integrity. We\nmust realize that the strength of a nation lies ultimately not in its\nnatural resources, or in its method of efficiency, or in its numerical\nsuperiority, or in its army, or navy, but in its moral and spiritual\nvigor.\u201d[129] Even J. M. Robertson, who on the whole thinks that\npatriotism is a bad thing, has for the nation an ideal of \u201cscientific\nsocial development.\u201d[130] It is easy to see in his book that he has\na large sympathy with \u201cthe people\u201d not only of other countries, but\nalso of his own. That is his patriotism. The International Reform\nBureau published a book entitled \u201cPatriotic Studies.\u201d And it was not,\nas one might suppose, a series of learned articles on the subject\nof Patriotism. It was a compilation of Congressional documents of\nthe years 1888-1905 for the study of public questions. The questions\ntreated in this volume were the following: \u201c1. Moral and Social\nFunctions of Education. 2. Municipal Reform. 3. Immigration. 4. The\nLord\u2019s Day and the Rest Day. 5. The Labor Problem. 6. The Family. 7.\nNational Reforms. 8. Amusements, With Special Reference to Purity.\n9. Gambling. 10. Prevention and Punishment of Crime. 11. The Liquor\nProblem. 12. The New Charity.\u201d[131] All this was considered by an\nInternational Bureau of Reform to be \u201cpatriotic studies.\u201d Patriotism\nthen, reveals itself in the doing of those things that aim at the\ntrue welfare of mankind within a country. And such activities are\npatriotism. \u201cIn the peace movement, the temperance reform, the\njudicious and practicable schemes for the abolition of bondage, the\nattempts to discover a more Christian organization of society;--in\nevery association and all efforts that seek the highest welfare of man,\nand prepare the way for his free culture and rightful enjoyment, as a\ncreature of God, the American idea justifies itself and culminates;\nand by strengthening this tendency, and only thus can Patriotism be\nfaithful to its law, and vindicate its nature.\u201d[132]\n\nIt is quite consistent with patriotism that the country should be\ncherished as the servant of humanity. The ideal of service sometimes\nbecomes a reason for patriotism. Mazzini\u2019s[133] patriotism was of\nthis kind. His ideal was that a nation should claim not its own\naggrandizement, but its right to serve humanity as a distinct group.\nThis kind of patriotism is that which Royce would recommend as an\nexample of the best loyalty. \u201cEnlightened loyalty takes no delight in\ngreat armies or in great navies for their own sake. If it consents to\nthem, it views them merely as transiently necessary calamities. It has\nno joy in national prowess, except in so far as that prowess means\na furtherance of universal loyalty.... We want loyalty to loyalty\ntaught by helping many people to be loyal to their own special causes,\nand by showing them that loyalty is a precious common human good, and\nthat it can never be a good to harm any man\u2019s loyalty except solely in\nnecessary defense of our own loyalty.... And so, a cause is good, not\nonly for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a _loyalty\nto loyalty_, that is, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my\nfellows.\u201d[134] And Royce, in his last book, made the application to\npatriotism: \u201cLet us, with all our might, with whatever moral influence\nwe possess, with our own honor, with our lives if necessary, be ready,\nif ever and whenever the call comes to our people, to sacrifice for\nmankind as Belgium has sacrificed; to hazard all, as Belgium has\nhazarded all, _for the truer union of mankind and for the future of\nhuman brotherhood_\u201d.[135] The truest patriot, from this point of view,\nwill be the man whose insight will reveal to him what his nation can\nmost naturally and best do for humanity, and who uses his powers to win\nthe devotion of the nation to the ideal of performing that service.\n\nWhat conclusions now are yielded by the bearings of the reasons of\npatriotism? Is patriotism either justified or discredited by them?\nOnce more it is apparent that no ground has been reached upon which\nalone to base a general judgment. To begin with, no reason simply as\nsuch is either good or bad; some of the reasons of patriotism are good\nand some are evil. Moreover, these beliefs are often based merely upon\nimpulse and regimentation. There is \u201cinstinctive inference as well\nas ... instinctive impulse.\u201d[136] One will hunt reasons for what he\nbelieves; many of his reasons are simply after-thoughts. And sometimes\nbeliefs are not as accurate as instincts and habits. A man\u2019s feelings\nmay often have more meaning than his beliefs. So the fact that a thing\nappears to be reasoned does not necessarily make it reasonable.\n\nThe reasons found in patriotism are another element adding to its\ncomplexity. And the complexity is all the more involved because\nimpulses and habits have remained in patriotism along with reasons.\nPatriotism is composed of all three,--impulses, habits, and reasons.\nThe nature of patriotism will have to be found in a concept that\nunifies all these elements, and its ethical value can be clearly\nassessed only in the light of that concept. Therefore, the nature and\nvalue of patriotism will be the objects of attention in the remaining\nchapters.\n\n\n\n\nPART IV\n\nTHE NATURE AND VALUE OF PATRIOTISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE WILL TO NATIONAL INDIVIDUALITY\n\n\nPatriotism is a complex sentiment. It grows out of a great variety of\nroots and reasons, and finds expression in many forms. In the preceding\nparts of this treatise these foundations and expressions of patriotism\nhave been dealt with. They throw light upon the questions of why\npatriotism is and why it is what it is. It remains for patriotism to be\ndefined.\n\nNo one of the many causes or appearances of the sentiment adequately\ndefines it. Those who fix upon some one impulse, habit, or reason, and\ntry to fit all the facts of patriotism into that, oversimplify the\nsituation. They leave out essential features. This would hold true of\nJ. M. Robertson,[137] who makes patriotism to consist of the impulses\nof fear and hatred. There are important kinds of patriotism, directed\ntoward the internal improvement of the country for instance, which\ncannot be so classified. If one followed the clue of Trotter,[138] he\nwould explain the phenomenon as the result of the herd instinct. But\npatriotism is not purely instinctive. Veblen[139] would lead one to make\nthe economic motive and the impulse of rivalry or emulation prominent.\nBut patriotism is something more than a contest and a contest, too,\nwhich is mainly for material goods. Loisy[140] would make patriotism a\nworthy religion, and recommend it as such. But the love of country does\nnot always attain the dignity that it has in Loisy. Powers[141] makes\nmen\u2019s interest in their civilization the root of their patriotism. But\nhe opens his book with the recognition that men do fight over material\nthings. None of these accounts can be used as an adequate basis from\nwhich to define and present the central concept of patriotism.\n\nYet patriotism is one. There is a common center about which all the\nimpulses, habits, and beliefs of the sentiment cluster. There is a\nconcept \u201cpatriotism.\u201d It is that concept, though perhaps inarticulate,\nwhich guides even in the gathering of material for its own definition.\nIt will be enlarged after the preliminary examination, but it is\npresent from the beginning.\n\nThe clue that one really has in hand when he sets out to study\npatriotism is the popular definition that it is \u201cthe love of\ncountry.\u201d[142] And it is a hopeful clue from which to start. It does\nlead one to the material that he seeks. Moreover, it shows what\npatriotism has meant in racial wisdom, the wisdom of the plain people\nwho have long and intimately been associated with and been most moved\nby the sentiment.\n\nIt must be said that in one way the result of an examination of this\npopular definition is negative. The preliminary study made in this\ndissertation shows that. Patriotism is hardly to be defined simply as\nthe love of country. Devotion to one\u2019s native land is in one phase an\nexalted and intelligent loyalty to country as an ideal, but it may show\nanother character. Its nature has instinctive roots. It may be no more\nthan a habit. Even the reasoned support of country is not exclusively\nwhat may be described as love; at any rate, it not uncommonly appears\nas a quite self-interested affection. The conduct of patriots has\noften been such as to cause wonder if the emotion consuming them were\nreally pure, unmixed love. It has frequently seemed that there was\nmixed in a full portion of hate. The phrase, \u201cthe love of country,\u201d\ncovers a multitude of sins. Patriotism is a pure white light, but\nseems to be one in the sense that it can be broken up and any color\ndesired extracted from it. Love of country, in view of such facts as\nthese, frequently gets to look like something not quite the same as the\nexalted sentiment of school textbooks and Fourth-of-July oratory.\n\nAnd yet there must have been some considerations that led to the\ndefinition of patriotism as the love of country. Out of what facts did\nthe definition grow? In the light of all the instincts, habits, and\nreasons of patriotism, what does it seem that the phrase \u201cthe love of\ncountry\u201d covers?\n\nIt seems obvious, for one thing, that patriotism is an attitude\ntoward country. It is easily seen that \u201ccountry\u201d is a constant in the\nphenomena of patriotism. The country is the object of the patriot\u2019s\nemotions. Patriotism, in other words, has to do with \u201cmother country\u201d\nor \u201cfatherland.\u201d And that is to say that patriotism is a feeling of\nnationality. \u201cPatriotism is the sentiment in which consciousness of\nnationality normally expresses itself.\u201d[143] One would not know where\nto look for patriotism at all if to begin with he did not know in a\ngeneral way that it was this nationalistic sentiment. Generically,\npatriotism is like family pride, civic pride, team spirit, university\nspirit, and the like; specifically, it is nationalistic spirit. It\nmight be necessary that this be said only for the sake of completeness\nwere there not a confusion of language on the subject. It is, strictly\nspeaking, a strange and metaphorical use of words to talk about\n\u201cpatriots of the world.\u201d Such a combination of words may serve a\nuseful purpose of propagandism in furthering a desirable spirit of\ninternationalism or cosmopolitanism, and it may in time take on the\nfurther connotation, but it is not historically accurate. Patriotism in\nits meaning as a word and as a matter of fact has to do with a country,\nand it will serve to keep thinking clear if we hold the term to its\nhistorical meaning. Patriotism is the sentiment of attachment to one\u2019s\nnational group.\n\nThe quality of the sentiment impresses one. Patriotism is not merely\nconsciousness of nationality. It is more active and explosive than\nthat. It is not even such an emotion as that of thankfulness for the\ncountry. Thankfulness or joy, is the feeling of returning soldiers as\nthey land back upon American shores. Is that feeling of satisfaction\nwith the homeland at getting back, patriotism? A kind of love of\ncountry it may be said to be. But ask the man in the street if it is\npatriotism, and he will hesitate. He will, however, be quite sure that\nit is not anything like as patriotic as the acts of the same soldiers\nin going across to Europe, or in breaking up socialistic parades\nafter they get back. The mere joy at being once more in the bosom of\none\u2019s country doesn\u2019t seem to be patriotism _par excellence_. There\nappears to be a great difference between liking one\u2019s country and\nloving it. The immigrant may like his new home, like it better than\nany other, and still not be patriotic. What is it that must be added\nto turn the liking of country into patriotism? Patriots demand homage\nto the country. Faith must be shown by works. Patriotism is a passion\ninspiring active allegiance. It is devotion that means service, if\nnecessary \u201cthe service.\u201d The patriot is solicitous for his native land.\nHe not only pronounces his country good; he also wants some good for\nit. He is, moreover, determined upon that good. That it be secured\nand maintained is part of his ruling purpose. In sum, his _will_ is\nset upon it. Patriotism has it as an essential characteristic that it\nincludes a _will_ towards one\u2019s country.\n\nWhat is it that the patriot wills? Briefly, he is vitally interested in\nthe _selfhood_ of his country. The thought of _self_ as to the country\nis always present. Patriotism is the will that the country do some such\nthing as be, remain, express, or develop itself. The thorough-going\npatriot in so far as he is such, is interested in the country, the\nwhole country, and nothing but the country.[144] It becomes the _this_\nof his consciousness and affection. He has just one object in the\nfocus of his interests, and that object is _this country_. The patriot\nsays, \u201c_This_,--_this_ is my own, my native land.\u201d Patriotism shows an\nintense singleness of affection. The country for the patriot is _the\none_.\n\nAnd now, the fact that patriotism is a will toward the country as it\nis in and for itself may be expressed in another way by saying that\nthe patriot has a will toward the country as an individual, and his\nwill as to its selfhood is a will toward its individuality. A self is\nan individual considered as an identity. The country has an individual\nplace in the patriot\u2019s heart; and he desires a singleness of the\ncountry corresponding to his singleness of affection. Love of country\nhas done what all love does; it has individualized its object. It makes\nits object the one, the individual, of its devotion. It is with country\nas with woman. A man can love but one.[144] It is the one to him. And\nhe wants it to be the one among all others. What it means to him he\nwants it to be objectively.\n\nAnd so patriotism may be described as the will to national\nindividuality. It is individualism expressed upon the national plane.\nOne can see what it is when he observes the reaction of patriots to\nany suggestion touching the identity of their country. Opposition to\nthe proposal for a league of nations is patriotism. It is narrow,\nperhaps, but nevertheless patriotism it is. Those who oppose the idea\nare actuated by the fear that loyalty to the league will develop at the\nexpense of loyalty to the nation. The patriot feels for his country,\nputs himself in its place, and cannot bear to see its selfhood or\nindividuality impaired.\n\nIt should be noted that the will to individuality may exist in strong\nmeasure when the external basis for it seems to be weak, and _vice\nversa_. Switzerland has an active patriotism with a heterogeneous\npeople, while Sweden has a weaker patriotism with a homogeneous people.\nHowever, this merely amounts to saying that patriotism is sometimes\nweak and sometimes strong. The nature of patriotism remains the same.\nThere is simply a stronger set of stimuli urging it to express itself\nin the one case than in the other. And the fact of individuality is not\nexclusively the stimulus to the will to it. There might be a will to an\nindividuality which as yet existed only in ideal, and there can be a\nreal individuality which leads only to a very weak fervor for itself.\nIn the case of Switzerland and Sweden, the explanation is that the\nSwiss have had to fight for their identity much more than the Swedish.\nThere must, however, be an actual individuality at least possible in\norder to justify the will. What we are at present concerned with is the\ndescription of patriotism as a sentiment. Where there is patriotism\nit is such as described, whatever the stimuli may be. National\nindividuality is what the Swiss aim at. The next chapter will take up\nthe question of whether or not patriotism finds a real individuality\nto rest itself upon. An integrating spectroscope is a spectroscope the\nslit of which is illuminated by light from every part of the source\nunder examination; this concept of the will to national individuality\nis the integrating spectroscope of the data of patriotism.\n\nBut the term individuality is an elastic one. It is necessary that it\nshould be so. It has to be able to cover a great deal as a concept\ndefining patriotism, for the manifestations of patriotism are various.\nPatriotism is so manifold that the limits of the definition cannot\nbe drawn too closely. Individuality is a comprehensive term. It is,\nhowever, comprehensible. What does it mean? What are the main forms\nthat the will to national individuality takes? And are the main forms\nof patriotism discovered in the answer to that question? Does a\nknowledge of the characteristics of an individual furnish the material\nfor the understanding of the tendencies of patriotism?\n\nThe first characteristic of an individual is that it is unique. This\nproposition is agreed upon by practically all philosophers whatever\nmay be the school of metaphysics to which they belong. All would\nagree with Royce, for instance, in saying that, \u201cAn individual is\nunique. There is no other of its individual kind. If Socrates is an\nindividual, then there is only one Socrates in the universe. If you are\nan individual, then in reality there is no other precisely capable of\ntaking your place. If God is an individual, then, as ethical monotheism\nbegan by saying, _There is no Other_.\u201d[145] \u201cTaken individually\u201d means\ntaken separately. Individuality means, in some sense, separateness.\nAn individual case is a distinct or isolated case. When, therefore,\none demands that he be allowed to be an individual, he means that he\ndemands the right _to be and remain himself_.\n\nAnd just this is a fundamental demand in patriotism. It is of no use\nto tell a country, even though it seems to others an insignificant\none, that it will be better off in another country; that its citizens\ncould enjoy to a greater extent the physical satisfactions of life; and\nthat they will be able to share in a greater _kultur_. They will not\nlisten. They do not wish to live more comfortably as animals; they do\nnot wish to live under the \u00e6gis of some one else\u2019s greatness, no matter\nhow great that may be. An individual will hardly consent to unself\nhimself. The citizens of any country wish to be themselves, and retain\ntheir own national individuality. Veblen[146] suggests that so far as\ncreature comforts are concerned, we might all be fairly well off if we\nvoluntarily surrendered to Germany. Art might also be furthered. And\nin view of the high cost of resistance, so Veblen says, it might be\nwell to accept the German imperial rule. But Veblen also knows that no\nnation will listen to his proposal. And why? It is simply because we do\nnot live primarily for creature comforts, or that a classical science\nand philosophy should be developed. Self-preservation is the first\nlaw of nature. We want to exist, and exist as separate and unique. We\nwant to be ourselves, and have an individuality that has a continuous\nhistory of its own. At its lowest terms, the will to individuality is a\nwill to live. France will not listen to a counsel to negate that will;\nneither will Belgium; neither will Britain; neither will America; and\nneither will Germany. Patriotism seeks to make the country unique; that\nvery will itself becomes a factor making for the uniqueness of the\ncountry. The country is what the patriot wills; it is his; he cherishes\nit; and in its place he will accept no other. The will to uniqueness,\nwhich is a form of the will to individuality, does in fact turn out to\nbe one of the important forms of patriotism.\n\nIn the second place, an individual is a unitary being. It is one\nwhole, an individuum. In comparison with others, it is separate;\nin its own inner constitution, it is a unity. It is _one_ in both\nits external and internal relations. Unity is of two grades, simple\nand complex. The simple unity means solidarity and that in the last\nanalysis the individual cannot be further subdivided. An atom would\nbe an individual of this kind. But in our actual experience we do not\nmeet with such individuals. What we ordinarily mean by an individual\nis not that which is such by virtue of its indivisibility. Taken\njust as a physical fact, it is divisible. It is when we take it as\na fact of meaning that we see what we ordinarily have in mind as an\nindividual. An individual is such because nothing can be subtracted\nfrom it without destroying its distinctive character. It is a unity not\nbecause of physical indivisibility, not because it is a simple unit,\nbut because, even in complexity, it has in it a _principle of unity_.\nThe richness of variety in it only contributes to the richness of its\nindividuality. Bosanquet has made the distinction between the two kinds\nof individuals. \u201cIndividuality, it has been said, has _prima facie_ two\nextremes. An \u2018atom\u2019 may claim it, on the ground that it is less than\ncan be divided; a world may claim it, on the ground that its positive\nnature is ruined if anything is added or taken away.\u201d[147] In another\nplace he says that an individuality is \u201ca world self-complete.\u201d[148]\nThe principle that individuality means unity and the distinction\nbetween the two kinds of unity are well summed up in the following\nquotation: \u201cThat individuality always involves some sort of unity\nwill hardly be denied. That which is in no sense one is in no sense\nan individual; and the more truly a thing can be called one, the more\ntruly can it be called an individual. We must distinguish, however,\nbetween two aspects of unity,--the quantitative aspect or numerical\nunity, and the qualitative aspect or inner coherence.\u201d[149] The atom\nwas an example of numerical individuality; the qualitative individual\nwould be exemplified in the life of a man. A human being can of course\nbe rent limb from limb, but so far as bodily life is concerned he\nceases then to be a man; his identity as a human individual has been\ndestroyed.\n\nNow a country is an individual by virtue of being a qualitative unity.\nIt is a unity in difference. Aristotle says: \u201cA state is not made up\nonly of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do\nnot constitute a state.\u201d[150] The unity of a country is not a simple\nbut a complex unity. It is often quite rudimentary, but its essentials\nare there, if there is any country at all. And those essentials may\nbe developed. They at least exist as the material for an ideal unity.\nNational individuality, to be sure, is often an ideal rather than a\npresent fact. But the patriot holds just this unity of his country\nin ideal, and strives towards it. His is a will to national unity,\nnational individuality. There were in the revolutionary period two\nmovements developing side by side,--the movements towards independence\nand unity. Washington was a patriot not only because he sought for\nseparation from England, but because he consistently counselled _unity_\nas among the colonies. Lincoln was a patriot not in the sense that he\nstood for the separation of his country from other countries (there was\nno call for that), but in that he stood for the preservation of the\nunity of the United States. He preserved the Union. The nationalistic\nmovements of the nineteenth century in Europe were directed in large\npart towards unity. The Germans and Italians strove to the end that\nall their people might be united. Those movements were struggles for\nnational unity, and hence struggles for national individuality.\n\nThe stimulus of war brings out in supreme degree the demand of the\npatriot for national unity. The present war has compelled unity\nwithin each individual nation to an unparalleled extent. The whole\npopulation in each country has had to be organized for the war. The\ncivil and military populations are not now as distinct as they once\nwere. \u201cThe war is waged not only by the soldier but by the baker, the\nmanufacturer, the engineer, the farmer, the small investor, the women.\nUnless, therefore, the emotions of the entire country can be keyed up\nto volunteer pitch and maintained at the point of fighting efficiency,\nthe war machine loses momentum.\u201d[151] The patriot sees the necessities\nof the times, and insists upon absolute unity. It is the form that his\nwill to national individuality then takes.\n\nThe patriot ought, however, to remember that unity does not mean\nsolidarity, and that a true individual is not one which has to be\nmaintained by the suppression of all differences. The patriot insists\nso strongly upon unity, no doubt, because he believes that to act\nas one is the only way in which the national individuality can be\npreserved. But he should remember, as some one has remarked, that \u201ca\nsolid front does not necessitate a solid head.\u201d The unity of patriotism\nis one of will, and moreover is one of good will. There cannot be\nnational unity on any basis that ignores that fact. The honest pacifist\nshould be treated accordingly. On the other hand, there is no reason\nwhy the pacifist should be made the recipient of peculiar honors or\nthe object of special solicitude. He has thrown his opinion into the\narena of human affairs, and will have to take his chances. And he in\nhis turn should remember that the patriot is fighting for priceless\npossessions, more valuable than any material possessions, his own\nindividuality and the individuality of his country. If the pacifist has\na right to insist upon his opinion, he must accord the patriot the same\nright to insist upon his. What will take place if the patriot happens\nto have a large majority, and deems it most fair to enact a selective\ndraft law? The pacifist can do no other than insist upon his inmost\nconvictions. But neither can the patriot. There is inevitably a clash,\nand the problem is to be solved not only as a question of right, but\nalso of expediency. It may easily be most expedient, it usually is so,\nfor the patriot to grant easy terms to the pacifist. And the latter\u2019s\nright to free speech and agitation, as long as he does not actually\nbreak or incite to the breaking of a law, is really indisputable. But\nthe danger to national individuality may be great. It is conceivable\nthat an aggressive enemy may be at the very doors. In that case, the\nnonconformist will have to become in some sense a martyr. If his\ncountry needs him, he ought either to serve or pay the penalty. He\nmight have to suffer imprisonment. Or he might find it wisest and most\neffective to martyr his convictions to the extent of performing some\npatriotic service, even to bearing arms. The fact that the majority\ndiffers from him might well be an indication that he is wrong, and that\nhe should revise his opinions or at least not insist upon them too\nstrongly; and moreover, if one martyrs his convictions to the extent of\nhelping win the war, he may expect then to get a more ready hearing\nfor his opinions. One is always listened to more respectfully when he\nhas identified himself with the group than when he has cut himself off\nfrom it. Conformity for the present might prove the best method of\nmaking his ideals effective in the long run. It is often easier to work\nfrom the inside than from the outside. The chick within the shell is in\nthe very best position in the world for breaking through it.\n\nBut the essential point is that patriotism insists on unity within the\nnation. There is no nation engaged in the war which is not insisting\nupon the utmost unity of action and even of thought. And this rests\nback upon the unity that had already really been developed. If each\ncountry had not developed and marshaled its resources to such an\nextent in peace time, they could not be so mobilized in war time, and\nindeed there would be no need for it; the enemy would not be bringing\nsuch resources to bear. It is just the very complexity and unity in\ncomplexity in modern nations that makes war so drastic, and makes it so\nnecessary that neither side should neglect the bringing of any of its\nresources to bear upon the waging of the war. The will to unity, a form\nof the will to individuality, is quite characteristic of patriotism.\n\nA characteristic of individuality in human beings and their\ninstitutions is that an individual is self-directing; its destiny\nis worked out from within. The following quotation sums up what is\nmeant: \u201cWe pass on to the third factor in individuality. We have\nspoken of it as completeness or self-sufficiency; but in its higher\ndegrees it may also be called self-direction. That some measure of\nindependence is essential to our notion of individuality will hardly\nbe questioned.\u201d[152] The phrase \u201chave some individuality\u201d means, in\npart at least, that one make his actions the expression of his own true\nself. It means to think and act for oneself. If one does not do that,\nwe say that he is not a real individual. If one is not self-directing,\nand is subject to the will of another, his individuality is, in so far,\ntaken from him, and he becomes a part of the individuality of that\nother. If he is integrated in the other\u2019s will, he really in a true\nsense ceases to be even unique. Fite says: \u201cAs a spiritual individual\nI am found in every action that expresses my meaning, whether it be\nthat of my hand, my typewriter, my servant, or my political party; and\nany object that refuses to express my meaning, though it be a member\nof my own body, is so far not truly myself.\u201d[153] It follows that one\nhas to be free and independent to be an individual. And this is the\nreason that freedom is so precious; not because the free man will\nlive in better material circumstances, but because he wants to be an\nindividual. He wants to be himself, and have his chance of working out\nhis life in his own way.\n\nAnd patriotism involves just this demand for liberty. The patriot\nwants his country to be free. It must, to satisfy him, be not only a\nrecognizable separate unit as among the peoples of the world, but must\nrun its own affairs. He wants it to be self-directing and autonomous.\nHe cannot bear to have his country used as a thing, or a mere piece of\nmechanism at the mercy of another\u2019s will. Any one who is patriotic in\nChina will not be satisfied with a situation where any foreign power\nhas concessions over parts of his country\u2019s soil. Weak governments\nfrequently find it necessary to guard their neutrality, and they do it\njealously because the patriotic spirit will not permit them to allow\nothers to put them in subjection as a means to the furtherance of alien\ndesigns. Belgium is an instance. Belgium does not want to be a roadway\nor the battlefield of Europe. She does not want to be a pawn in a game.\nShe wants her territory to be the expression of her own free life. To\nstand for her neutrality is to stand for her sovereignty, and to assert\nherself. Belgium might utterly perish, but in doing so, she would\nhave asserted herself, and she would rather die in that magnificent\nself-assertion than to be the tool of another. It is not often that a\nsupposedly sovereign power will, like Luxemburg, allow its neutrality\nto be disregarded without a struggle. President Wilson understood the\nsensitiveness of patriots when he insisted that no foreign troops\nshould be landed in Russia without her consent. Patriotism is often\nthought of altogether as the fight for freedom. The patriot insists\nupon the freedom, the autonomy, the sovereignty of his country; the\nwill to self-direction is one of the moving forces of patriotism.\n\nTo be a true individual is to have some significance of one\u2019s own.\nIndividuality comes to mean marked individuality. It stands for\nthe opposite of the quality of being common. The phrase \u201chave some\nindividuality\u201d often means to have something for which one stands, and\nsomething that is really significant in the world. It means that one\u2019s\nactivities should be the expression of a life plan which is his, and\nwhich has real value. This characteristic takes a step beyond those of\nmere separateness and independence. When we say of one that he has no\nindividuality, we do not mean that he is not numerically separate from\nother men, but, in part at least, that he has no _life plan_ which is\nspecially his own. He has no significance. The man who is an individual\nis one who has a specific character. And if he prides himself upon\nbeing an individual he wants to \u201cbe somebody.\u201d He has \u201cself-respect.\u201d\nHe regards himself as significant. He wants not only to count as one;\nhe wants to _count_.\n\nAnd, again, this is a characteristic of patriotism. Patriotism is a\nwill to be nationally significant. It is national pride. It is\nnational ambition, a will to self-respect and the respect of others, a\nwill to national standing, greatness, distinction, importance, power.\nThe existence of this will to be significant is why nations are so\nsensitive on points of honor and prestige. Their national significance\nis lowered if they allow, let us say, a public insult to go unavenged.\nIt is a reason why nations cannot back down in a war when it once gets\nstarted, and why they can all be for peace after the war, but not while\nit is being waged. National significance, as national significance\nnow goes, will not permit them to do other than win the war. This\nis why states like to regard themselves as \u201cpowers,\u201d for it is as a\n\u201cpower\u201d that a nation finds itself significant in world politics. It\nis why countries fight for their \u201ccivilization.\u201d The predominance of\ntheir civilization means the fulfillment of their desire for national\nsignificance. It is why the knowledge of the history and literature of\none\u2019s country is likely to produce patriotism; such knowledge creates\nboth a conviction of the country\u2019s significance and the desire to\nrealize it further.\n\nThe grounds upon which a country asserts its significance is an\nimportant matter. As long as military prowess and possession of much\nterritory are esteemed to be things of great importance, the nations\nwill strive to be significant by being distinguished for those things.\nIf the ideals of mankind can be more largely turned to constructive\nactivities, the nations will strive to be significant along those\nlines. There are patriots whose ideals are of the latter type. They\nseek the internal development of their country as a means of making\nit more worth while and hence more significant. The significance\nthat they seek is not merely that which glories in the admiration\nand perhaps envy of the world; it is not a significance adjudged by\na jury of mankind, but one that they themselves find in making their\ncountry approximate an ideal. Patriotism is the will to be nationally\nsignificant; another main characteristic of the will to individuality\nis what is working in important manifestations of patriotism.\n\nAn individual, at least a finite individual, is one of a community.\nAnd its individuality, therefore, rests upon a \u201cbroad basis of\nlikeness.\u201d[154] The conscious individual, for instance, does not\nstrive to make his individuality consist in absolute difference. He\nwants to be different only within certain limits. He does not want\nto be \u201coutlandish.\u201d He wants in certain broad ways to be like his\nfellows. He would, if it were called to his attention, agree that his\nindividuality rested in great measure upon membership in his community.\n\nIt is impossible for one to avoid seeing the fact that he is one in\na world with others. The human individual is a social animal.[155]\nAnd this fact is formulative of his very individuality. Fite says,\n\u201cNot only does ... intercourse with others broaden the range of your\nself-consciousness; it also furnishes the basis of contrast through\nwhich you become aware of yourself, and define yourself, and are\nenabled to assert yourself as a distinct and unique individual.\u201d[156]\nTwo points are involved in what Fite says. First, we become\nself-conscious in contrast with others; we know ourselves in that way.\nSecond, our own individuality becomes richer because others exist.\nWhat they have become broadens one\u2019s own vision of the range of human\npossibilities by so much the more; and that broader vision enriches\nand enlarges one\u2019s own life. One will, then, find his life expanded\nby the multiplication of his social relations. \u201cIf our argument has\nshown anything, it has shown that through the extension of his social\nrelations, the individual becomes, not less, but more of an individual,\nand acquires a greater individual freedom.\u201d[157] The high integration\nof society is not necessarily inimical to the development of the\nindividual. The fact is that as society has been builded into larger\nwholes, the individual has also become more and more significant. Royce\nsays, \u201c... our time shows us that _individualism and collectivism are\ntendencies, each of which, as our social order grows, intensifies\nthe other_.\u201d[158] And Royce draws this conclusion: \u201cNo individual\nhuman self can be saved except through the ceasing to be a _mere_\nindividual.\u201d[159]\n\nThe existence of others has important consequences for one\u2019s practical\nattitude toward life. When one becomes aware of such existence he\ncan no longer act as if it were not. \u201cWhen I have perceived even a\nchair standing in my way I can no longer proceed as if it were not\nthere.\u201d[160] And one\u2019s conduct will usually be more radically changed\nwhen it is human individuals that are in the way. The same knowledge\nwhich shows one himself shows him also other human beings who are just\nas real and important as himself, and upon the basis of that knowledge\nhe can logically and ethically find no good reason for treating them\nmerely as means for the furtherance of his own interests. He cannot\nsimply walk over them as if they were not there. But if one is even\nwise, he will adopt no such ruthless plan of life. He will realize\nthat consideration for others is best for himself. He will not only\nhave less trouble, but he will also find his individuality enriched\nby his intercourse with other free beings who have their own meaning.\nOne cannot be a positive reality unless his neighbors are also. And if\nthese things are true, it means that the interests of the individuals\nof a community may be harmonized. When each one understands his own\ntrue nature, he at the same time realizes that his own good is best\nfound in harmony with the others of his community. Individualism,\nrightly interpreted, attains the results desired by those who place\nthe emphasis upon collectivism. Howison says: \u201cThe very quality of\npersonality is, that a person is a being who recognizes others as\nhaving a reality as unquestionable as his own, and who thus sees\nhimself as a member of a moral republic, standing to other persons in\nan immutable relationship of reciprocal duties and rights, himself\nendowed with dignity, and acknowledging the dignity of all the\nrest.\u201d[161] This is an ideal of individuality as it appears in persons.\nThe enlightened individual is really concerned about finding his proper\nplace in his world.\n\nDoes patriotism recognize that individuality involves membership in a\ncommunity? Does the patriot actually wish to realize the individuality\nof his country in that way? The answer is that he often does. There\nare patriots who have their hearts in the desire that their country\nbe a good neighbor. This desire is, of course, not always present in\nthe patriotic state of mind. But neither are the other characteristics\nof individuality always invariably present. Some of them are always\npresent, and together they make up the will to individuality which is\nthe essence of patriotism. It must be admitted that only too often\ndoes the patriot think of the individuality of his country as realized\napart from or at the expense of others. The more generous notion of\npatriotism is still as much a problem as a fact. And yet, in times of\npeace at least, the patriot sees the good of countries other than his\nown. It is a defensible proposition that even the common man is capable\nof and actually does possess such vision. Certainly there are examples\nof illustrious patriots in whom it is found. The following has been\npenned concerning Professor Royce: \u201c... his ethical idealism is best\nunderstood as an interpretation of the spirit of modern civilization\nas it had found expression in his native land. Not that there was\nanything of the Chauvinist in Royce. If there were aught of value in\nour social and political ideals it was due to the fact that they rested\non principles that cross the boundaries between nations, and might\nequally serve as the basis of that community of nations to which he\nhopefully looked forward.\u201d[162] But one can also place in evidence\nthe very words of one of the greatest patriots of all time, Joseph\nMazzini. Mazzini was devoted to the ideal of serving humanity. He wrote\nto the laboring people of his country: \u201cYour first duties--first as\nregards importance--are, as I have already told you, towards Humanity.\nYou are _men_ before you are either citizens or fathers.\u201d[163] But he\nwas also an ardent patriot. He was devoted to Italy, to her freedom,\nunity, and significance. And he thought that Italians, like all other\nmen, could serve humanity effectively only by being in association.\n\u201cThis means [of effective association],\u201d he says, \u201cwas provided for\nyou by God when he gave you a country; when, as a wise overseer of\nlabor distributes the various branches of employment according to the\ndifferent capacities of the workman, he divided Humanity into distinct\ngroups or nuclei upon the face of the earth, thus creating the germ\nof Nationalities.\u201d[164] The duty of a nation was to be the servant of\nhumanity, but that was also its glory and its right to be. Patriotism\nand internationalism were complementary. \u201cIn labouring for our own\ncountry on the right principle, we labour for Humanity. Our country\nis the fulcrum of the lever we have to wield for the common good.\nIf we abandon that fulcrum, we run the risk of rendering ourselves\nuseless not only to humanity, but to our country itself. Before men can\n_associate_ with the nations of which humanity is composed, they must\nhave a National existence. There is no true association except among\nequals. It is only through our country that we can have a recognized\n_collective_ existence.\u201d[165] This, then, patriotism quite often\nactually is. And once more, in its positive recognition of the country\nas truly one of a community, patriotism turns out to be the working of\nthe will to national individuality. This last phase is an altruistic\nform of the will.\n\nThe concept of the will to national individuality, derived from the\npopular definition of patriotism as the love of country and wrought\nout in the light of the data which clusters about that popular idea,\nproves to be a seminal principle. If one follows out the various forms\nof the will, he comes to the main forms of patriotism. He could, by a\nknowledge of the characteristics of the will to individuality, foretell\nin general what the manifestations of patriotism would be found to be.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE NATION AS AN INDIVIDUAL\n\n\nPatriotism is the will to national individuality. What justification\nfor its existence is there in the groundwork of fact? Is there really\nany individuality for the will to rest itself upon? Is the country an\nindividual?\n\nThere are those who deny that patriotism really has anything objective\nto feed upon. It is hard, they say, to find anything that the flag\nstands for or to which one addresses his choral chant when he sings,\n\u201cMy Country! \u2019tis of thee.\u201d They ask what one\u2019s country can mean to\nhim. When one speaks of country, is he not thinking of that spot of\nearth which he calls home, those activities and institutions which\nhe has seen working in his own community, or perhaps only the map? A\ncountry as big as the United States, for example, can hardly be said\nto be appreciated by the mind of a single man. Most of the country\nno one has ever even seen. The \u201ccollective mind\u201d is shown to be a\nfiction. A people does not form a \u201cperson,\u201d but remains only a group\nof individuals. And the corollary seems to be that the only ground\non which to posit a nation has been taken away. The state is said\nto be unreal and artificial. Peoples may be the product of history;\na state can be made in a day. Ponsonby looks upon a nation as such\na construction: \u201cA nation is not in its composition primarily a\ngeographical nor a racial, but a political unit.... It must be able\nto uphold its independent political sovereignty.\u201d[166] Without the\nnecessity for a common defense, that is, there would be no nation.\nCharles Kingsley remarked in the preface to one of his books that while\nthere can be loyalty to a king or a queen, there cannot be loyalty to\none\u2019s country.[167] And so it is that a \u201ccountry\u201d is an abstraction.\nFor the ordinary patriot at least there really is no such thing. The\ncountry is not an individual, and there is no individuality in it for\nthe citizen to rest his patriotism upon. Patriotism is thus left up in\nthe air.\n\nNow one is not driven to the extreme view of the nation as a \u201cperson\u201d\nin order to answer the criticisms suggested in the foregoing. That\nthe state is a \u201cperson\u201d is a well-known theory. It is held by those\nimpressed by the philosophy of Hegel. It is reflected everywhere in the\nterms they use. They talk constantly of such things as a \u201ccollective\nmind\u201d and a \u201cgeneral will.\u201d But the state is not personal in the sense\nin which human beings are personal. We expect a person to have a body,\na brain, and a nervous system. A state or nation has none such. But a\nthing does not have to be a person in order to be an individual. Not\nall individuals are personal. All individuals have inner unity. The\nnation has such unity, and it is this which the philosophers feel whose\ntheory has just been described. They are the \u201cunity philosophers.\u201d\nAnd they feel a unity in a state which they seek to describe in terms\nof personality. We all feel the unity. For instance, we assume a\ncontinuity as existent in a country. Even a democratic country must\nthrough successive administrations employ the same policy abroad.\nOnly we do not feel it necessary to describe the unity in terms of\npersonality. The conception of organization will serve to explain the\nunity we find in the nation. What the organization is like is further\nto appear.\n\nAn indication that a great people forms a unit is the fact that it is a\ngrowth. The ties that bind the nation together are, in a larger sphere,\nvery much like those that bind together the family and the tribe. The\nties of kinship were likely the first that bound together associations\nof men. Perhaps what first appeared was an undifferentiated horde. But\nat least the family must have been the first of any close associations\nof men. The great majority of students are united on this point.\nMcDougall says: \u201cPrimitive human society was probably a comparatively\nsmall group of near blood relatives.\u201d[168] Green says, \u201cEvery form of\nright first appeared within societies founded on kinship, these being\nnaturally the societies within which the constraining conception of a\ncommon well being is first operative.\u201d[169] Sumner\u2019s words reflect his\nview: \u201cThe kin tie, which had been the primitive mode of association\nand coherence in groups, began to break down in the sixth century,\nB. C., in Greece. It was superseded by the social tie of a common\nreligious faith and ritual. The Pythagorean and Orphic sects developed\nthis tie.\u201d[170] The religious bond succeeded the kin tie in this case.\nThe well-knit state or _polis_ seems to have come even later. At any\nrate, civil units come later than kin units, and grow out of them. The\nEskimos now have no civil organization outside of the family. But it is\nonly in backward areas that no larger unit than that of the family has\narisen. A process of integration has been working, and it is a process\nwhich has resulted in nations. Spencer speaks on this point, \u201c... In\nthe earliest stage of civilization, when the repulsive force is strong\nand the aggressive force weak, only small communities are possible;\na modification of character causes these tribes, and satrapies,\nand _gentes_ and feudal lordships, and clans, to coalesce into\nnations.\u201d[171] Friction and growing interests between families would\nin some cases draw them together into a tribe; the same process would\ndraw tribes into a nation. The conception that holds these societies\ntogether is that of a common well-being. But the conception first arose\nin a natural group, the family, and was gradually extended through the\ntribe and up to the nation. Green points out that while force has been\nused in the formation of states, \u201cit has only formed states as it has\noperated in and through a pre-existing medium of political, or tribal,\nor family rights.\u201d[172] A people is a natural product of natural\nforces. It at least is not an artificial creation.\n\nNow a nation is formed when a people is organized under an institution,\na state. What of the state? Is it an artificial creation? It is charged\nthat states come to be ends in themselves, cut themselves off from the\npeople, and cause wars over artificial values.\n\nSome philosophers, those who uphold the high sovereignty of the\nstate, in capital letters, really identify the state with the nation.\nIf this view be accepted the whole case of the critics of the state\nas artificial is, of course, at once disposed of. But the state is\nnot identical with the nation. A state may embrace several nations.\nThe British empire is such a super-national state. The state is an\ninstitutional organization. And yet there is good ground upon which to\nmaintain that the state is not an artificial creation. As a people is\na growth so also is the state. It is true, as is sometimes asserted,\nthat states can be made in a day and that there can be artificial\nstates, that is, states not resting upon a homogeneous people, but it\nis not true that _the_ state was made in a day. As a people, the raw\nmaterial of a nation, grew out of the family and tribe units, so the\nstate which is the institution of a people, grew out of the political\ninstitutions of the family and the tribe. The first institutions of\nmen, as for instance that of the family, were probably the result\nof natural unreflective co\u00f6peration. They resulted almost as do the\neffects of a natural law. The actions which gave rise to them were in\na way like the tropisms of primitive organisms. \u201cGenuinely primitive\nassociation must have been blind, without forethought of advantage\nto those participating.\u201d[173] Upon these unreflective associations\nstates grew, also without forethought on the whole, although some\nreflection no doubt entered into the process. Spencer says, \u201cMen did\nnot deliberately establish political arrangements, but grew into them\nunconsciously--probably had no conception of an associated condition\nuntil they found themselves in it.\u201d[174] Men did not go about it\ndeliberately to form a state as represented in the contract theory\nof Hobbes, but waked up to find they were in a state which had grown\nout of their actions in pursuance of satisfaction for their needs.\nThe state did not precede man\u2019s political character, but arose out of\nit. Men recognized common rights and duties, and the state arose in\ntheir efforts to safeguard and give expression to them. Thus Green\nsays, \u201cThe state, or the sovereign as a characteristic institution of\nthe state, does not create rights, but gives fuller reality to rights\nalready existing. It secures and extends the exercise of powers, which\nmen, influenced in dealing with each other by an idea of common good,\nhad recognized in each other as capable of direction to that common\ngood, and had already in a certain measure secured to each other in\nconsequence of that recognition.\u201d[175]\n\nThe maturity of nations has come in the modern period. Likewise\npatriotism, in the strong degree in which we know it, is comparatively\nmodern. The United States, Germany, Italy are modern states. Tribal\nloyalty was once the strongest bond. But the tribe settled down to and\ncame to rule a definite extent of territory. Localized tribes formed\nsmall units of government. The government was not the representative\nof the will of the whole people, but expressed the will of the man or\nsmall group of men strong enough to possess the seat of authority.\nGradually government became more representative. In time small states\narose. There were such city-states as Athens. These small states did\nnot organize all the people of the same race as those under their\njurisdiction. And when they were enlarged by conquest, they were\nrepresentative of only a comparatively small group near the seat of\ngovernment. All conquests were ruled from the outside and from the\nheight of superior power. This power became capable of tremendous\nextension. The city of Rome became ruler of a large empire. Then ensued\nthe medi\u00e6val period in which the notion of catholicity was dominant,\nand in whose political thinking the all-inclusive and sovereign empire\nwas the ideal. The period of nationalism had not yet come. The empires\nof Rome and of Charlemagne were not nations. Their strength depended\nnot upon the spirit of the whole, but upon the existence of a strong\nforce at the center. The fact should be noted that the dialectic\ntoward nationalism has not been in a simple straight line. Sometimes\nthere have been cases of dissolution on the part of large and strong\nintegrations of government. But on the whole there is a pretty clear\nmovement toward larger and larger governmental integrations, and these\nintegrations have in the main been forced to follow the building up of\npeoples. The medi\u00e6val empires fell. The papacy became distrusted as a\ncorrupt and tyrannical foreign power. The bloody chaos of feudalism\nbecame unbearable. The Crusades acquainted men with others who were\nlike or unlike themselves. The Renaissance heightened the emotions of\nmen, and prepared the soil for nationalistic passion. Peoples became\nwelded together, and at the beginning of the modern period nations\nemerged which took up into themselves the feudalistic establishments\nand city-states which had flourished during the Middle Ages. These\nnations met the needs of men, and persisted. They entrenched\nthemselves, and gathered force. Thus they came to the beginning of\nthe nineteenth century when the spirit of nationalism was fanned\ninto a consuming flame by the wars of Napoleon, and when again the\nnationalistic passion was ministered to by the romantic movement which\naroused once more the emotional side of human nature. The crowning\nheight of the process has been reached at the present time when the\nGreat War has made nationalistic loyalty the ruling passion of mankind.\n\nA state, then, is the outgrowth of the life of a people. The people is\na growth, and the state is an institution which has grown along with\nthe people. Therefore it would seem as if there were good indications\nfor calling each of them real.\n\nWhat makes a nation? The elements of a nation show both objective\nreality and inner unity. There are, roughly, three things which\nenter into the makeup of a country. The first of these is a people\nwith a common language, customs, traditions, history, and land with\nits associations. Sometimes religion has been an element. In the\ncase of cultured peoples, literature has also been such. \u201cThe dawn\nof English nationality coincided with the dawn of a truly English\nliterature.\u201d[176] We have already seen how such a people grows. It is a\nnatural group; it is based on instinctive association and the stress of\nthe struggle for existence. The instincts of patriotism are themselves\ninstrumental in forming the objective basis of patriotism. They make\nfor the solidarity of a people. This people doesn\u2019t have to belong to\none race, for it may be made up of a fusion of races. There may be\na diversity of classes and interests within the nation. It does not\nhave to be absolutely homogeneous, for only a very small group indeed\ncould be such. Similars do not constitute a nation. A country is a\nqualitative individual. A unity can be obtained in diverse elements.\nThe things that have been named seem to be sufficient to weld together\nsuch a unity, a people. A people is an objective reality, and one of\nthe bases of a nation.\n\nThe second element is an organization, an institution, in other words,\na state. The Poles have a common language, customs, traditions, and\nland, but they have no government of their own, and do not form a\nnation. A nation comes into being when a state is formed by a people.\nThe state, if a true one, grows out of the life of the people, and is\nto the people what the body is to the soul. The state and the people\nform a unity. Moreover, the institution is just as real as the people\nand their desires, and with the people forms the objective basis of a\nnation.\n\nThe third element is that of a common consciousness. This is built upon\nand implied in the conditions already named. A people and a state are\nboth external and internal facts. The raw material of which they are\nformed is external and objective. But that raw material does not come\nto its full meaning until there is added to it a consciousness in which\nit is taken up in unity. There would really be no unified people and\nno state, as the expression of united political life, in spite of the\nexternal elements which are necessary to the being of people and state,\nunless there existed in the individuals\u2019 minds a common consciousness\nor consciousness of community. The very existence of a common language\ntestifies to the existence of a common consciousness, as do common\ncustoms, traditions, history, literature, and ideals. A land even is\nsomething which a people possesses, and which furnishes a common bond\nbetween the individuals of the group. There was a time when the land\nwas literally a common possession, in the sense that there was no\nprivate property, but ownership is not the only way in which a people\ncan have a common interest in the land; there may be many associations\nbesides that of common ownership connected with it. Esthetic\nappreciation is one of them. Affection for the scenes of childhood is\nanother. Esenwein, in describing the art of Gogol, the Russian author,\nuses the following phrases: \u201cRarely do power and delicacy unite in a\nstylist as they do in Gogol. For the one [power], we may find an origin\nin his love for the sun-steeped and snow-blown plains of his native\nCossack country....\u201d[177] What gifted writers have felt other more\ncommon folk have felt also.\n\nThese things, then, imply a common consciousness. This consciousness is\na recognition and ratification of existing interrelationships, and such\na community of thought and feeling and will is fundamentally important\nin the unity of a nation. \u201cNo mere interaction will constitute a social\nrelation. Nor yet an interaction of otherwise self-conscious agents.\nNot merely must each agent know himself, he must know the others....\nUnless there be on both sides a perfect consciousness of self and of\nother, and of the relations of self and other--in a word, perfect\nmutual understanding--there will be, so far, no completely social\nrelation. _A social relation is a self-conscious relation.... In other\nwords, society is constituted by mutual understanding_.\u201d[178] This\nunderstanding is that which enables the group to act as one. \u201cThrough\nthis mutual knowledge the group, like the individual, is enabled\nto assert itself as an independent force.\u201d[179] Mazzini understood\nthat the unity of a country rested upon a sense of oneness in the\nminds of the people: \u201cCountry is not a mere zone of territory. The\ntrue country is the Idea to which it gives birth; it is the thought\nof love, the sense of communion which unites in one all the sons of\nthat territory.\u201d[180] Here we get a suggestion regarding the unity\nof Switzerland. It is, in large part, a unity in idea. That is not\nsaying that it has no objective basis. The Swiss have a common land and\nother bonds of oneness. But the strongest bond seems to be that of a\nconception of common welfare. The unity of Switzerland has, of course,\nbeen stimulated from without. One of the most potent reasons for Swiss\nunity is that of necessity for defence. They must be one to preserve\ntheir freedom. But the fact is that whatever the stimulus was, whatever\nthe difficulties that stood in the way, however diverse the original\nmaterials may have been, the Swiss are now one in the beliefs of the\nindividual members of the nation, and that feeling of communion is\nactually unity in fact.\n\nIt is true, then, that in one way the essence of an institution is in\nidea. \u201cPerhaps the Identical, in this matter of groups, is neither a\nreal person nor a nominalist fiction. Let us call it an idea....\u201d[181]\nAll true unity is really contributed by the mind. The external falls\napart, and becomes a mere congeries and not a unity when not held\ntogether in idea. The external elements form the materials for a unity;\nthey make up the basis of an institution; they aid in giving rise to a\ncommon consciousness; but it is the common consciousness itself that is\nthe essence of the unity. In this way the will to individuality as an\ninner fact will in turn make for individuality in objective reality.\nOnly, it should be noted on the other hand, when the unity is based on\nexternal grounds, it is not a mere fiction, and is not left up in the\nair.\n\nTo have a common consciousness, the individuals of a group do not have\nto be acquainted by sense experience with all their land or its people.\nImagination and sympathy are means by which men feel themselves one of\na society and parts of an institution. And if, even after imagination\nand sympathy have come to one\u2019s help, a country and its ideals are said\nto be abstract and vague, even so, it is such abstract things that\nbecome a cause, and it is such vague ideals that have the greatest\nmotive power. They possess us. We think with them rather than of them,\nand they become a spirit in which we approach all things. It is not\nnecessary that we should have an exact formula of them in order to make\nthem real. Realities do not only then come to exist when we have a\nclear-cut formula for them, nor do ideas first have being when they are\nput into formal expression.\n\nOne quest of men has been, consciously or unconsciously, to create\nfor themselves a unified world. In doing this they have, among other\nthings, formed themselves into nations. Nations have met their needs,\nand helped them to feel at home in their world. Countries are real, and\ncome close home. With this in mind we can appreciate the feeling of\nthe traveler abroad who has a sense of the wholeness of his home-land\nand longs for it. The following quotation is an illustration of this\nfeeling at the same time that it catalogues some of the elements that\ngo into the makeup of a country. \u201cEvery time his passport is presented,\nevery time he enters a new dominion or crosses a new frontier, every\ntime he is delayed at the custom-house, or questioned by a policeman,\nor challenged by a sentinel, every time he is perplexed by a new\nlanguage, or puzzled by a new variety of coinage or currency,--he\nthanks his God with fresh fervency that through all the length\nand breadth of that land, beyond the swelling floods, which he is\nprivileged and proud to call his own land, there is a common language,\na common currency, a common Constitution, common laws and liberties, a\ncommon inheritance of glory from the past, and, if it be only true to\nitself, a common destiny of glory for the future!\u201d[182]\n\nIs there anything to indicate that the organizing principles of a\nnation are permanently necessary ones? The ultimate existence and value\nof patriotism will be involved in the answer to that question. Is\npatriotism called for by the fundamental order of reality?\n\nOne of the essential centers of life is a community, a neighborhood,\nthose who live near enough to one another that the interests of their\nlives are closely interwoven by the fact of association in space. This\nwould seem to be a self-evident proposition. Mazzini hit the truth when\nhe said that mankind had been placed in groups or nuclei upon the face\nof the earth. The community is an irreducible minimum of association\namong mankind. It is a permanent association, and the sentiments that\ngrow out of it will be permanent. There is true reason why one of the\nfundamental virtues is that of being a good neighbor. And Veblen was\nright in saying, \u201cEven with no patriotism, love of country, and use\nand wont as it runs in one\u2019s home area and among one\u2019s own people,\nwould not pass.\u201d[183] Patriotism seems to be vitally connected with a\npermanent sentiment, community spirit.\n\nA community is attached to the soil. It has its basis in a local area.\nThat is what makes a community. In other words, it is organized upon\nthe geographical principle. The geographical principle is one of the\npermanently necessary principles of human association. Now a nation\nis so associated. A country must have a territory, and it is the only\ninstitution of which this can be said. \u201cA nation ... is primarily a\ngroup of men and women related physically.... The state represents not\nthe common interests of those who are intellectual, or musical, or\nreligious, but chiefly the common interest of those who live in the\nsame district.\u201d[184] Patriotism is loyalty to one\u2019s _native land_. At\nleast one fundamental principle of a country is a permanent one, the\ngeographical principle. We have here a suggestion as to why the soil\nis so important in patriotism. Patriotism is nourished by the soil.\nThe soil not only is what sustains the vital economic interests of\nthose who live upon it, but is the basis of the existence of the nation\nitself. Without the land, and land is _country_, there would be no\npatriotism.\n\nThere has arisen of late the contention that it would be better\nto do away with the geographical principle of government. Russell\nsays, \u201cThere is no reason why all governmental units should be\ngeographical.\u201d[185] It is felt that if geographical frontiers were\ndestroyed the cause of peace would be furthered. \u201cWhen civil war breaks\nout in a country, no real fighting is possible until the contending\nfactions are organized on separate territory.\u201d[186] It is worse when\ntrouble with another country arises. \u201cIn domestic affairs we live\nwith and know the men who disagree with us; in foreign affairs the\nopposition lives behind a frontier, and probably speaks a different\nlanguage.\u201d[187] But it is not clear that we shall gain anything by\nheeding these suggestions to obliterate national frontiers. The\nsubstitute planned is that of syndicalistic organizations. But under\nsuch an arrangement frontiers would be infinitely multiplied. Men of\nconflicting loyalties and interests would be in touch everywhere. It\nwould simply be an exchange of one antagonism for another. And class\nwars would be no better than nationalistic wars. It would be no better\nto have class against class than nation against nation. So what we come\nback to is governmental organization upon the geographical principle.\nAnd this means that we come back to some such unit as the nation. And\nwhy not? Environment makes people alike, and to have a homogeneous\npeople is one of the necessities of a successful government. Moreover,\nwe must form an attachment somewhere, else live entirely alone. And it\nis right to begin where we are.\n\n  \u201cGod gave all men all earth to love,\n    But since our hearts are small,\n  Ordained for each one spot should prove\n    Beloved over all.\u201d\n\nWe have said that the territorial arrangement is an inescapable\none in government, and that the community is a unit below which we\ncannot go. But there cannot help but be interests growing up between\ncommunities. And historically these interests have led to association\nof communities. Rivalry and friction arise. War follows. The medi\u00e6val\ncity-states fought with one another. New York and New Jersey are\nrivals; the writer recalls one occasion when New Jersey was threatening\nsuit against New York for befouling the Hudson River. The only\nsafeguard against internecine warfare between communities is a more\ncomprehensive power. So a larger unit grows. And these units must be\nstill further integrated. The process will not stop until it comes to\nthe nation with its government, the state. How much further it will go\nwill be disclosed by future events.\n\nIs the state a permanently necessary institution? The principle of\nintegration embodied in the state is a fundamental one. It is the\nprinciple of co\u00f6peration for co\u00f6peration. The good of any institution\nis that of co\u00f6peration for some end. The primary end of the state is\nthat of co\u00f6peration itself. Its purpose is that of enabling men to live\nand work together in peace. Loyalty to the national group is loyalty to\nthe principle of human co\u00f6peration. The most valuable thing about the\nstate is not that it does this or that, but that it gets men working\ntogether. It provides the setting for further cooperation. In its\nprotection against enemies either within or without the group, it is\nacting to keep the co\u00f6peration of the members of the group from being\ninterfered with.\n\nThus it will be seen that the state is essentially a peace unit. There\nare those who deny this. There are two theories of the state. One is\nthat it is a peace unit. The other is that it is a war unit. It is,\naccording to this latter view, organized for the waging of war. Because\nof this latter view there has been of late a great deal of opposition\nto and criticism of the state. It is alleged that all the other things\nbesides fighting which the state once did have been taken over by other\nagencies better fitted to do them, and that really the only thing which\nthe state now has as its purpose is that of declaring and making war.\nThe citizens co\u00f6perate in the state only when they have a fight on with\nanother state. But it may be replied that it is hardly fair to charge\nall our troubles in war to the state. Wars have been waged where there\nwas no state in the modern sense; they have been carried on by other\nagencies than states; and states have lived together peaceably. Savage\nindividuals, savage tribes, feudal barons have all fought. Race riots\nhave given vent to hatred. Representatives of labor and capital have\nfought pitched battles. The United States and Canada have lived side\nby side without ever having found it necessary to declare war or even\nfortify the frontier.\n\nAnd the state is really a peace unit. It exists primarily for the\npurpose of keeping order within the area of its jurisdiction. It\nbecomes apparent here how some of the beliefs of patriotism are\nwell-founded. The state is needed as the protector of one\u2019s self.\nIn the Middle Ages, in the absence of any other agency to provide\nprotection, there grew up voluntary associations, founded and operated\nusually by warriors, and called _regna_, whose business it was to keep\nthe peace. Here was an attempt to do the work of the state. But the\nattempt failed, and there are now no such organizations. One would not\nmiss the mark far in hazarding the opinion that they failed because\nthey did not represent a peace unit composed of an integrated people\noccupying a given extent of territory. What has been said here would\nindicate that what we need to do is so to extend the integration of\nsociety that the whole world will be a peace unit. The whole problem of\nkeeping peace should be made an internal problem. There should be no\nfoes without.\n\nThe state is the ultimate protector of all the values of life. The\ncitizen was right when he believed that his earthly salvation depended\nupon his state. The state itself does not usually furnish the goods\nof life, although it does on occasion furnish them. That is not its\nprimary business. It does not even guarantee the goods of life. Much,\nof course, depends upon the individual himself. But the just state\ndoes ultimately protect the individual in all rightful opportunities\nin which he as an individual or in voluntary association with others\ncannot protect himself. The civilized life itself at present depends\nupon the state. The very word \u201ccivilization\u201d is derived from a term\nmeaning \u201cstate.\u201d It is that which is possible where there is a settled\norder provided by the state. One can imagine what the state means if\nhe pictures himself at the fringe of civilization where he would miss\nthe many values of life which the state makes possible. The state does\nits work for the most part noiselessly, but it is just because it is so\nefficient that it is so noiseless. We are not conscious of its working,\nand therefore assume that it is otiose. But it is with us all the time,\nand providing the opportunity for all the values of life. The state\nis a kind of second nature which does not guarantee happy living, but\noffers the opportunities for such a life.\n\nThe state does, however, go beyond its primary purpose. It has not,\nas a matter of fact, been restricted purely to acting the part of\npoliceman or night-watchman. Philosophers have disputed a good deal\nabout the functions of the state. But when all is said and done it has\nbeen found necessary for the state to engage in some activities which\nwere not purely those of providing protection, but were designed to\npromote positively the general welfare. The state truly, as Aristotle\nsaid, even though it has originated in the bare needs of life, has\ncontinued for the sake of the good life. The state strives to aid\nmen in a positive way. Some community interests thought to be in\nthe province of the state are those of education, transportation,\ncommunication, sanitation, taxation, and the maintenance of economic\njustice. And this positive character of the state\u2019s functions renders\npatriotism all the more strongly entrenched.\n\nAs already has been intimated, syndicalistic organizations are being\nput forward as rivals of the state. Industry is one of the chief\ninterests of men, and is especially virulent at the present time.\nThere are those who would organize society according to occupation.\nAnd when society was completely organized in this way there would be,\nso it is thought, no further excuse for the existence of the state.\nAll the legitimate common concerns of men would be taken care of by\nsyndicalistic organizations. The economic arguments for or against\nsyndicalism are of secondary importance in this connection; the point\nof interest is that which bears on syndicalism as a principle of\ngovernment. Graham Wallas has studied these questions. He points to\nthe medi\u00e6val experience under the guild system. He says that quarrels\nbetween the crafts were rife, as were quarrels between the craftsmen\nand the merchants; that the people hated strangers as well as the\npolice; that the public health was neglected; and that the cities\nfound it impossible to keep order in their own streets during a trade\ndispute.[188] The fact is that the growth of power on the part of Labor\nand Capital and the conflicts arising because of that power render the\nstate more necessary rather than less so.\n\nThere is a true sense in which the state embodies the general will.\nIt is, in the area of its jurisdiction, the representatives not of a\nclass, but of all the people living in that area. It is the repository\nof the collective will of its citizens. Therefore, it is fitted to\nkeep the peace, and to be for the purpose of keeping peace, the user\nof force. The cry has been raised, \u201cWhy is the state armed? No other\ninstitution feels it necessary to be equipped with an armament.\u201d But\nthe truth is that it is just because the state is armed that no other\ninstitution needs to be. One police force is enough. We shall always\nneed the state to keep other institutions in harmony. And institutions\nwhich exist for other purposes than that of the maintenance of law and\norder will have to submit to regulation by the state for the sake of\nlaw and order. It will be the state\u2019s business, among other things, to\nmaintain a democracy of institutions.\n\nThe state, because of the generality of its character, plays an\nimportant role in federating the loyalties of men. Economic interests,\nreligious interests, and so on, do not exhaust the catalogue of human\nactivities. Each individual will have touch with other individuals with\nwhom he would not outside the state be organized in any institution.\nOne may have a neighbor who is of another trade or church. The state\nbrings one into a common life with his neighbors. The state\u2019s character\nas a power helps it to occupy this role as federator of loyalties. It\nis back of all the institutions of life; it sustains them. Consequently\nthe loyalties given to the other institutions tend to head up in the\nstate. It is a universal, too, because its unifying principle, that of\nspace, is so universal. Such a principle is very general, and may be\nempty unless enriched by many differentiations within itself; the life\nthat it unifies may be very meagre without those differentiations, but\ngenerality is akin to universality, and just because the principle is\nso general, it may act as a unifier of many in one. A loyalty that\nshall be an organizer of all loyalties is needed. For the individual,\neven after he is a member of all the voluntary organizations to which\nhe is eligible, there ought to be that which will unify his whole\nlife. So likewise there ought to be that which will unify the whole\nof mankind. The state and the church seem to be the only institutions\nwhich in ideal are capable of achieving these results. And at the\npresent time we seem nearer a universal political than religious\nunification of mankind. Human nature is a long way from being ready to\nwarrant putting one\u2019s trust in it as the guarantee of peace and justice\nbecause each human being loves his neighbor as himself. At any rate,\nthe state will have a fundamental purpose as an integration of mankind\nfor so long a time to come that it may be said to be permanently\nnecessary. The character of the state as being the condition of all the\nvalues of civilized life, the embodiment of the general will, and the\nfederator of human loyalties, throws light upon the phenomenon that\nwhen the state calls the individual every other loyalty must go.\n\nThe state seems still to be entitled to its place in the sun. But we\nmust keep ourselves at the point where we can criticize our political\nloyalties. Some states on occasion need reform. The morality of nations\nmust be criticized. States have grown in response to the needs of human\nbeings. They must be kept subservient to those needs. The state is not\ndivine. There is no divine right of kings, and there is no divine right\nof states, except as these institutions meet the real needs of real\nhuman beings. The state has justified its existence, but that doesn\u2019t\nmean that the existence of any particular kind of state is justified.\n\nIn other words, patriotism seems to be necessitated by the fundamental\norder of reality. Its existence is justified. Patriotism is essentially\na fundamental human good. But that fact doesn\u2019t justify all that is\nfound in patriotism. Consequently, the problem is not only to evaluate\npatriotism as an essential ideal, but also to criticize the faults and\nvirtues of its different forms. Something of that criticism will be the\neffort of the concluding chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE ETHICAL VALUE OF PATRIOTISM IN THE CONCRETE\n\n\nPatriotism serves a necessary purpose, and is therefore a fundamental\nhuman good. In some form it is existentially necessary. The problem of\npatriotism now becomes, then, \u201cWhat is its form to be?\u201d For patriotism\nas it actually appears in persons and nations is not all good. It may\nbe, as an individual possession, morally colorless. There are barnacles\nattached to the ship of state. Zimmermann made a keen remark when he\nsaid, \u201cThe love of one\u2019s country, however extolled, is, in many cases,\nno more than the love of an ass for its stall.\u201d[189] It may be either\nnoble or narrow. There is a higher and lower patriotism. It depends\non how it expresses itself. Before the ethical value of nationalistic\nloyalty can be fully determined it must be looked at in its concrete\nforms. The varying motives and effects of patriotism must be considered.\n\nWhy is patriotism noble? The reason why it has been popularly extolled\nis that it is a form of unselfishness. There is hardly another cause\nin the world today that calls forth such heroic self-sacrifice as the\ncause of one\u2019s country. Royce included the state among the causes\nthat have organized men in unselfish devotion. He said, \u201c... we have\ncertain human activities that do now already tend to the impersonal\norganization of the life of those engaged in them. Such activities\nare found in the work of art, in the pursuit of truth, and in genuine\npublic spirit. Beauty, Knowledge, _and the State_, are three ideal\nobjects that _do actually claim from those who serve them harmony,\nfreedom from selfishness, and a wholly impersonal devotion_.\u201d[190] And\nunselfishness is one of the fundamental human virtues. It makes the\nindividual himself a better man, and is most certainly needed in the\nstructure of society.\n\nPatriotism has the tendency to make men idealists. It is hard enough to\nget men\u2019s thoughts off of purely material things, and whatever can draw\ntheir devotion to an ideal cause is, so far, worth while.\n\nPatriotism has made for co\u00f6peration among men. The primary purpose\nof the state is that of co\u00f6peration, that is, of making it possible\nfor men successfully to _live together_. That, on the face of it,\nis a noble purpose. And the state has actually secured a larger\nrange of co\u00f6peration than what had been attained before it. It has\nsecured a wider range of peace. It is a larger peace unit. Hence,\nthe state as an integration of men is a gain, and is not, if it is\navoidable, to be destroyed. It would not, for instance, be a gain\nto condemn even Germany to destruction as long as any other mode of\ntreatment is possible. Of course this argument assumes that the state\nis indispensable as an institution for the integration of mankind.\nBut it really is indispensable. An irreducible unit of society is\na community--those living in close contact in some given limited\nterritory. Hence, the territorial principle is an inescapable one in\nthe organization of society. And, if so, communities will, by their\nconflicts, if by nothing else, be organized into states. That is what\nhas happened. No organization of society on any other plan is likely to\nfind it possible to dispense with the state. And now, if the state is\nso necessary and valuable in the organization of society, patriotism as\na force that preserves the state and its benefits is of value to men.\n\nBut the relations of patriotism to war and internationalism are now\nits most crucial problems. It is often argued that while patriotism\nhas done and does what is claimed for it, it has in large measure\noutlived its usefulness, and is a prolific source of the world\u2019s\ngreatest troubles at the present time in that it makes for jealousy,\nconflict, and war. Patriotism is said to be divisive, when thought of\nin world terms. Hasn\u2019t it, therefore, outlived its usefulness, and\nisn\u2019t it time to entrust the keeping of the co\u00f6peration of men to a\nstill larger institution that shall be worldwide, and thus avoid the\nconflicts of the present? The feeling that prompts this argument is\nembodied in the following words: \u201c... a striking factor in today\u2019s\nthinking is the perception of the immoral consequences of patriotism.\nWe see that while devotion to country entails the final sacrifice of\nself, it entails also the most inhumane sacrifice of others. We have\nnot yet been able to think the matter out. Distraught, we reverence the\nmen who are dying for their separate flags and strain our eyes beyond\nthe battlefields for the oriflamme of internationalism.\u201d[191] It is\nevident that when countries go to war, all cannot be right, and that\nfact puts the patriots of some country in a false position. One cannot\ntake simply the attitude of uncritical patriotism. The good man and\nthe good patriot are not necessarily one and the same. If the contrary\nwere true, then neither we nor the Germans would have any moral grounds\nupon which to be indignant at one another. Not all causes become just\nsimply for the reason that one\u2019s country chooses to defend them.\nAristotle called attention to the fact of varying governments in the\nworld, and drew the following conclusion: \u201cIf, then, there are many\nforms of government, it is evident that the virtue of the good citizen\ncannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that a good man is he who\nhas perfect virtue. Hence, it is evident that the good citizen need\nnot of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.\u201d[192] A\nlarger view than that of uncritical patriotism is therefore needed, and\nthe critic says that such is just what the patriot cannot be expected\nto attain. The critic makes the charge that the co\u00f6peration that has\nbeen gained in patriotism is an obstruction in the way of attaining a\nlarger co\u00f6peration. Patriotism, in other words, is not a proper force\nfor saving the world. For one thing, it contents a man with his own\ncountry; the patriot doesn\u2019t strive for any higher organization of men,\nand so the spirit of progress is deadened. Moreover, so the critic\nsometimes says, patriotism is simply a co\u00f6peration for conflict. It is\nsetting men at each other\u2019s throats.\n\nIt will have to be admitted first of all that patriotism may be the\nkind of force that its critic describes it to be. And if it were\nirrevocably and wholly committed to be such a spirit, one would have\nto pass an unfavorable verdict upon it. Whatever its benefits might\notherwise be, the world would not tolerate it, if that meant to be\nforever confronted with the possibility of another conflict such as the\npresent one. It may, however, be pleaded that the present internecine\nconflict of patriots is not a permanent condition of mankind. It is\na stage through which the race is having to pass in its development\ntowards world-wide organization. And it is not altogether strange that\nin the process, patriotism should be a temporary difficulty, just as\nfamily, clan, and provincial pride once were. The factors making for a\nworld integration have not yet fully found themselves, and of course,\nare not adequate for the job of overcoming the prejudices of patriots.\nMoreover, it is natural for any stage of progress gained to be a bar\nto further progress. Each stage has to be sharply and definitely\nconceived in order to be reached, but that in turn makes it a bar to\nfurther development. The vision of the next step simply doesn\u2019t come\neasily to men\u2019s minds. Moreover, it is easy for them to take achieved\nresults as final. Those results have to be taken seriously, if they are\nto yield their full value. And besides, a stage of progress doesn\u2019t\nknow itself simply as a link in a single logical line of development;\nit has many individual interests of its own,--interests which may\ngive it a tendency to fly out of what has been the line of progress.\nOther things, too, get mixed up with it that tend to pull it out of\nits straight and narrow path. Patriotism has been mixed up with\nand betrayed by junkeristic, dynastic, and profiteering interests.\nPatriotism itself surely should not have to bear the full blame for\nthe faults of those evil companions, although patriotism, it must be\nadmitted, has been in bad company. In the light of all the facts, it\nseems most accurate to say that patriotism taken as a whole does offer\ndifficulties in the way of welding men into larger peace units. But\nafter all they are only difficulties, and not impassable barriers. They\nare practical rather than theoretical, not rational and necessary. They\noffer no grounds for a final condemnation of patriotism.\n\nIt does not seem to be fair, at any rate, to say that patriotism is\na disintegrating factor in world affairs. There is no larger unit of\ncooperation that it is breaking up. And patriotism can claim for itself\nthat it has come in as a force making for larger groupings of men. If\npatriotism were at one sudden blow stricken out of the world, we should\nbe set backward rather than forward in the process of winning the\nconditions of world peace.\n\nPatriotism cannot be set down as an ultimate enemy of peace on earth\nand good will among men because it sometimes supports a war. The\npurpose of a state is not primarily that of waging war, but that of\nenabling men to live together in peace. And correspondingly patriotism\nis not exclusively or mainly a war-waging virtue. In fact, it more\ncommonly expresses itself as a peaceful and constructive public spirit.\nPatriotism, as matters now stand, is not likely to cause the opening\nof hostilities, although it will support a war which has already been\nstarted. And it is, even in war, usually a defensive rather than an\noffensive attitude. This is virtually proved by the fact that all the\nbelligerent countries have to make their peoples believe that they are\nfighting a defensive war. That is the way in which the martial spirit\nof patriots has to be appealed to. And it is a significant thing that\nsuch is the case. It indicates that the destruction of patriotism\nis not necessary to the attainment of world peace, but that the end\nmay be secured simply through the decay of the bellicose spirit. As\na matter of fact, the conscience of the world has already undergone\ngreat changes with regard to war. It is probable that the earliest\nsavage state was that of almost incessant warfare. And in those days,\nit wasn\u2019t necessary to find any pretext for opening hostilities. The\nsufficient reason for an attack was that the other group had something\nthat the party of the first part wanted. The earliest stage of savage\nand even civilized life, therefore, was one in which wars could quite\nuniformly be frankly wars of aggression. The stage in which the present\ngeneration seems to be living is that of \u201cwars of defense.\u201d There are\nsome signs that the next era will be that of peace. The whole world\nis getting tired of war, and longing for internationalism. And, what\nis new, these feelings are springing up all over the world _at the\nsame time_. Perhaps we are already in the transitional period. At any\nrate, it does not seem to be quite accurate to charge that patriotism\nis the first cause of wars in these days. It is safe to say that the\npopulations of the world wanted peace in 1914. Something else is the\nfirst cause of wars. A dispute arises between two governments, and\npatriotism, to be sure, adds fuel to the flames. But patriotism in\nitself is for the most part peaceful until it is fanned into fury.\n\nBut even if patriotism does go to war, it is not simply for that to\nbe condemned without further ado. The resistance that a nation offers\nis often really a service to the cause of integration in the world.\n_For world co\u00f6peration cannot be based upon world conquest._ That is\nnot the way to a broader unity. And whoever opposes such conquest is\nthe friend of true unity. There can be such a thing as an integration\non a thoroughly bad principle. A robber band or a conscienceless\nmonopolistic \u201ctrust\u201d would be examples of just such an organization.\nAnd there also may be a thoroughly _unholy alliance_ in the political\nrealm. It is just that which the spirit of patriotism is at the\npresent time preventing. World domination and world brotherhood are\nincompatible, and that proposition right now just as truly has a\npractical application, although in a different way, for those who\nlive west of the Rhine as for those who live on the other side. If it\nis wrong for Germany to build up a world-empire on the principle of\ndomination, it is wrong for us to let her do it. Integration implies\na unity of differences. There can, then, be no true integration\nwhere significant differences are ignored. And there will be no just\norganization of all the peoples of the world where the individuality\nof some of the parts is disregarded. Within the nation, we demand that\nthe individuality of each unit be respected. The pacifist makes that\ndemand for himself. And it is just as much right that the individuality\nof each nation should be respected in the community of which it is a\npart. The nation occupies the same position with regard to the world\nthat the individual occupies with regard to the country. Similar rights\nand similar duties may be claimed for both. It is fair that the\nsame organizing principle should be applied on both the national and\ninternational levels, namely, unity in difference.\n\nIn other words, the same principles of justice and liberty that must\nguide within the nation must also be normative of the relations between\nstates. The integration of a nation is one of will, and, moreover, one\nof _good will_. The same thing can be said of a world organization.\n_The permanent integration of the world will have to be upon the basis\nof good will._ And that cannot have been accomplished where a great\nmany apparently within the fold are not in it at heart. Peace wouldn\u2019t\nnecessarily mean good will or true integration. If, for instance, we\nvoluntarily surrendered to Germany, as the pacifists sometimes urge,\nand showed good will on our part, that wouldn\u2019t necessarily call forth\nthe same spirit on the part of Germany. Their spirit might simply be\nthat of exaggerated egoism. But on the other hand, will it make for\ngood will to go on fighting Germany? In the long run, it seems to be\nthe way that is necessary to follow in order to bring her to a frame of\nmind where she can be co\u00f6perated with.\n\nIt is therefore not completely out of harmony with the cause of world\nco\u00f6peration that a state should sometimes go to war. And the nation\nitself has rights and duties. It would not be any more morally good\nfor a country to consent to its extinction or the serious crippling\nof its individuality than it would be for the human individual to\ncommit suicide or incapacitate himself. The state fights for its\nindividuality, and individuality is a thing worth fighting for. It is\nright that each individual nation should have the privilege of living a\nlife of its own, that is, as long as it does not forfeit its privilege\nby ignoring the rights of others.\n\nThe recognition of the tendencies and power of patriotism shut one\nup to the conclusion that a world organization will have to be\nestablished along the lines of internationalism rather than those\nof cosmopolitanism. Each group has its own consciousness which will\nhave to be taken into account. Wallas says that, \u201cIn England the\n\u2018particularism\u2019 of trades and professions and the racial feeling of\nWales and Ulster, of Scotland or Catholic Ireland, seem to be growing\nstronger and not weaker.\u201d[193] It will be the same with patriotism\nin a world organization. The successful line of development in world\norganization seems to be one in which the preceding stages are not\nwiped out, but are preserved and made the basis of a new integration.\nTherefore, it seems as if the next larger grouping or groupings of men\nwill have to be joined onto nationalism. Sumner stated a truth when he\nsaid, \u201c... changes which run with the mores are easily brought about,\nbut ... changes which are opposed to the mores require long and patient\neffort, if they are possible at all.\u201d[194] If a reform is to be made in\nthe direction of a world integration, it will, if it wishes to succeed,\nhave to be joined onto patriotism.\n\nBut there are reasons why it is better that we should develop into\ninternationalism rather than cosmopolitanism. The latter contains\nfundamental dangers. It makes too much for detachment, aloofness, and\nselfishness. The Stoics were an example of how cosmopolitanism passed\ninto those things. The eighteenth century was an \u201cage of Reason\u201d which\ntended towards cosmopolitanism, and it was a cosmopolitanism which\nthough enlightened was chill and abstract. Cosmopolitanism tends to\nreduce all life to a mediocre type. This danger is well pointed out in\nthe following words: \u201cI believe largely in the comparative permanence\nof what we call racial characteristics; I sincerely hope they will not\nbe merged into a common humanity.... Nearly every group of peoples has\ndeveloped its own mentality, its own psychology, ideas and ideals. We\nneed to preserve the difference between those ideas and ideals. If you\nmerge them, you get a common--a very common--humanity. All progress\ntakes place in the reaction between extremes. All philosophy has arisen\nfrom a mixture of races which brought to one another different ideas\nand ideals.\u201d[195] The condition of progress is the preservation of\nnational characteristics. But, what is even more important, there are\nin cosmopolitanism grave moral dangers involved. G. F. Barbour says:\n\u201cThe great meeting-places where the currents of Oriental and Occidental\nlife have come together have indeed produced a vivid and brilliant type\nof life, but hardly one that has been morally stable and sound.\u201d[196]\nEach side finds it easy to adopt the vices of the other, but not the\nvirtues, and both sides are liable to become superficial. The brilliant\nbut shallow and immoral life of Corinth in the days of Paul offers an\nexample.\n\nThe problem at the present time is to federate groups. Individuals have\nalready become unified. But what sets the problem gives rise also to a\nhope. The existence of groups will prove an aid in the accomplishment\nof world unification. And the wise humanitarian will work through the\ngroups that already exist, that is, countries.\n\nWorld cosmopolitanism would, at least at present, leave the individual\ncold; he could not comprehend it, and could not be intelligently loyal\nto it. Hence, in order to get effective sympathy and action among\nmen, there must exist a group of the size and meaning that is able to\nappeal to the individual. There must be aroused something like what\nRoyce called \u201cprovincialism.\u201d Provincialism might be interpreted in\none way as loyalty to that integration of men whose individuality\nexpressed the individuality of oneself. And from it will be derived\ndynamic for humanitarianism. Royce said that, \u201c... philanthropy that\nis not founded upon a personal loyalty of the individual to his own\nfamily and to his own personal duties is notoriously a worthless\nabstraction.\u201d[197] And the application was that \u201cthe province will not\nserve the nation best by forgetting itself, but by loyally emphasizing\nits own duty to the nation and therefore its right to attain and to\ncultivate its own unique wisdom.\u201d[198] Therefore Royce said that,\n\u201cEvery one ... ought, ideally speaking, to be provincial,--and that no\nmatter how cultivated, or humanitarian, or universal in purpose or in\nexperience he may be or may become.\u201d[199] Provincialism did not mean\nexclusiveness or jealousy. To Royce, \u201c... our province, like our own\nindividuality, ought to be to all of us rather an ideal than a mere\nboast.... The better aspect of our provincial consciousness is always\nits longing for the improvement of the community.\u201d[200] But the point\nis that the spirit of provincialism is a useful force in securing\nthe attachment of men. And the clue that one finds in it is that the\nbest way to get a world integration is to do it by the federation of\nnationalities. The organization of patriotic loyalties would secure\nan integration that would hang together. Under such an arrangement,\nthe patriot would contribute strength to internationalism by his very\nattachment and loyalty to his own nation. Nationalism would thus become\na spur to a wider humanitarian impulse. And patriotism can, if properly\neducated, be counted upon to support international government. The\npatriot himself will develop an insistent demand for internationalism\nwhen he once clearly sees, what is true, that the individuality of his\nown nation is best realized in a community of nations where legitimate\nnational differences are synthesized in justice.\n\nThis program of the unification of nationalities is to be taken\nseriously. Emphasis must be laid not only on nationality but also upon\nunification. The patriot must really recognize that he has another\nloyalty than that to country, namely, that to internationalism. It\nis plain that improvements can be made upon the present world order,\nand the most important thing to do is to work towards some kind of\narrangement whereby national disputes can be settled according to\ninternational law, and the peace can be kept at the same time that\njustice is done. As a matter of fact, most thoughtful individuals do\nlong for some kind of internationalism at the same time that they are\npatriotic. In a situation like the present many are torn by a conflict\nbetween loyalty to humanitarianism on the one hand and patriotism on\nthe other. And it is a situation with which the individual cannot deal\nsatisfactorily alone. There must be an end put to the system which\nmakes such conflicts possible. But one must remember also that the\nnation is just about as helpless as the individual. The nation, too, is\nfaced with a conflict of loyalties which it cannot by itself solve. The\nrescue must come out of a concerted action of nations. The situation\nmust be dealt with in the very beginning by an international act. It is\nnot to be expected that any one country can deal adequately with the\npresent world problems. The disarmament or non-resistance of any one\nnation will not be a solution, and it seems unreasonable for any one\nto counsel his own country to take any such action. However, we must\nrelate our patriotism to internationalism. \u201cWe must keep patriotism,\nand yet go beyond it, if we are to save what is best in patriotism\nitself, just as for the sake of religion, religious men had to go\nbeyond their own willingness to die for their own faith. Toleration\ndemanded not irreligion, but a better religion, and we might have a\nbetter patriotism if we could remember that we are also citizens of the\nworld.\u201d[201] The nations must be in some respects like the planets in\nthe system of the universe. The planets have each a free swing in their\nown orbits, but they do not collide. Each helps to hold all the rest\nin place, and together they all form one system. We all have, at the\npresent time, in addition to the duty of winning the war, the further\nobligation of working for permanent conditions of peace. We may fairly\nclaim that we have inherited this war and are not really responsible\nfor it, but if we do not discharge our international duties both now\nand when the conditions of peace are being planned at the end of this\npresent conflict, _we shall be responsible for the next war_.\n\nIt is a reassuring fact to the internationalist at the same time\nthat it is a justification for the continued existence of patriotism\nthat there actually have been and are tendencies making not only for\ncloser relations between nations, but also for the moralizing of those\nrelations.[202] In material things countries have been drawn closer\nand closer together. They are not economic wholes. They are debtors\nand creditors of one another. They do not keep improved methods of\nindustry in the country where they originated; even improved methods\nof war have not been so restricted. And they are interdependent in\nnon-material things. Physicians and surgeons do not hide their ideas\nwithin their own group. And art and science, of course, have long\nbeen ties that have bound together associations of the citizens of\ndiverse countries. There is, in short, a wide unofficial intercourse\nbetween the citizens of different countries, a fact which leads Burns\nto exclaim, \u201cNor will even diplomatic subtleties be able to keep us\nback: for trust between the citizens of diverse states is trust between\nthe states, and the official governments will soon have to submit to\nthe new situation.\u201d[203] But states as such consider themselves to be\nin moral relations with one another. What else can it mean that they\nhave foreign secretaries, and employ an extensive diplomatic service\nwhich does a continuous business; that they have been increasingly\ntaking common action for the control of disease or the management of\npostal and telegraphic communication; that they have been more and more\nconcluding such peace treaties as exist, for instance, between England\nand the United States?[204]\n\nThe present war even is proving that the nations of the world are\nclosely interrelated. The struggle is world-wide, and it could not\nhave assumed such tremendous proportions were not every part of the\nworld in close touch with all the rest. And it is significant that\nthe contestants are alliances. Lippman well remarks: \u201cThe process of\nfusion has gone so far that war itself has ceased to be a national\nenterprise.\u201d[205] The existence of alliance is portentous of the\nrelations of the future. It will do something towards creating a\nfeeling of sympathy between the citizens of the allied countries,\nand it will show that the nations can work together. And if they can\nco\u00f6perate in war, it ought to be fairly easy for them to draw the\nconclusion that they can act together in peace. Moreover, if the Allies\nwin the present war, the peace that will result will be representative\nof the interests of a large group of very different peoples. It is\nencouraging, too, in the attitude of at least one nation that President\nWilson, at the very time when he went to war, declared for a league\nof nations. We should do well to remind ourselves that one form of\npatriotism finds its satisfaction in its country as a good neighbor and\na servant of humanity.\n\nThe observation of moral relations as expressed in the \u201crules of\nwar\u201d has received a jolt in this present conflict. But that doesn\u2019t\nnecessarily mean that the morality of nations is smashed. The\nessential moral temper of the world is shown by the horror that\nhas been manifested at the atrocities that have been committed.\nAnd, moreover, every belligerent nation has been eager to justify\nitself before the world. That in itself is an indication that a world\nsentiment has been formed on the conduct of nations in the declaring\nand waging of war. A century ago militarists did not need to bother\nthemselves much about the world\u2019s opinion. The moral relationships of\nstates in war is further illustrated by the fact that we even hear what\nis officially announced in the war bulletins of our enemies, and that\nwe send word to them upon questions in which they still have a common\ninterest with ourselves.[206] In view of all these facts it may well be\nasked what forces are doing any better in the direction of a broader\nintegration of mankind than the several countries and the patriotic\ncitizens of those countries.\n\nThe fact of the business is that patriotism is a stage in the growth\nof loyalty. States and nations are steps in the process of world\nintegration. After families, tribes, city-states, and all the rest,\nhave come nations. Nations must have the loyalty of mankind because\nthey are the largest peace units so far attained, and because they\nwill be the foundations of larger peace units. The next step in the\norganization of the race seems to be that of internationalism. And the\nlogic of history seems to indicate that international government will\ncome. The tendency of societal organization has been toward larger and\nlarger wholes. \u201cThe tendency to the enlargement of the social unit has\nbeen going on with certain temporary relapses throughout human history.\nThough repeatedly checked by the instability of the larger units, it\nhas always resumed its activity, so that it should probably be regarded\nas a fundamental biological drift the existence of which is a factor\nwhich must always be taken into account in dealing with the structure\nof human society.\u201d[207] The process of enlargement is still carrying\non. States and nations have actually grown very close together, and are\nincreasingly establishing official relations between themselves. And\nthe temper of the patriotic spirit has become such that on the whole\nit will not only welcome but further international government. In this\ncharacter patriotism shows itself to be a force making not only for\nthe salvation of the one country but of mankind. This is at once its\njustification and an indication of what there is in it that the morally\ngood man ought to approve and support. If the fundamental justification\nof patriotism is that it strengthens the principle of co\u00f6peration\namong men and makes for peace, then its continued vindication will\nbe in its further support and extension of the primary principle for\nwhich it stands. There is good reason why its relations to war and\ninternationalism are crucial problems of patriotism. The fundamental\ngood of the nation is that it is a peace unit, and if patriotism comes\nto the place where it stands for war more than for peace, and is in\nthe way of larger groupings of men, it will have defeated itself. The\nhigher patriotism is that which looks toward internationalism.\n\nThe practical ethical problem in patriotism is that of separating the\ngood from the evil, and of preserving the former while allowing the\nlatter to fall into disuse. It is fairly certain that nationalism and\npatriotism could not be destroyed even if one thought that such was the\nbest thing to do. Some form of an organization of men based upon the\ngeographical principle is with us to stay in at least the predictable\nfuture. And countries will not consent to extinction. _Patriotism is\nthe will to national individuality_, and patriots will insist upon that\nindividuality. In view of these facts, it seems that our salvation does\nnot lie in breaking up the units that already exist, but in securing\na larger measure of co\u00f6peration between them. And it is all the more\nsure that we should proceed in that way for the reason that patriotism\nsecures things of great value in the world. If we destroyed it, we\nshould lose the good along with the evil. This can be illustrated.\nPatriotism in one way is national pride. And pride often causes\ntrouble. But on the other hand, it often causes good. It may be said\nof national pride along with Zimmerman: \u201cVirtues and vices are often\nput in motion by the same spring. It is the philosopher\u2019s part to make\nknown these springs, and the legislator to profit by them. Pride is\nthe gem of so many talents and apparent virtues, that to destroy it is\nwrong, it should only be turned to good.\n\n \u201c_Were men not proud what merit should we miss!_\u201d[208]\n\nIf patriotism were destroyed, it is likely that we should be forced to\nrecreate it.\n\nThe literature on the subject of the details of reconstruction after\nthe war proposes two main lines of approach. Some writers place the\ngreatest stress upon the readjustment of the arrangements of national\nand international government. For instance, this school emphasizes the\nneed for the international control of backward countries and the main\nhighways upon the seas. Lippmann says, \u201c... the supreme task of world\npolitics is not the prevention of war, but a satisfactory organization\nof mankind. Peace will follow that.\u201d[209] The idea seems to be that\nif the causes of friction are effectively removed, trouble will not\narise. Another school of writers places its reliance upon broadening\nthe vision of men. Powers represents this method of approach. He\nsays, \u201cThe chief remedy--perhaps we may say the only remedy--for ills\nthat flesh is heir to, is to be found in the increased intelligence\nand forbearance of men.\u201d[210] These methods will have to be used\nin conjunction with each other. It is not safe in the near future\nto trust entirely to human nature as long as irritating causes of\nfriction remain, and by removing the causes of friction we may allow\nthe belligerent type of patriotism to fall into disuse. But neither\nwill any merely external arrangements provide security so long as human\nnature finds its glory in a chauvinistic patriotism. Patriotism is the\n_will_ to national individuality. It is a major task of mankind to see\nthat that will is intellectualized and ethicized.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\nPART I\n\n[1] There is a widespread recognition among psychologists and\nstudents of character that the study of conduct should begin with\nthese unreasoned impulses. For examples of such a recognition see the\nfollowing: Jas. R. Angell, _Chapters from Modern Psychology_, pp. 24,\n25; Wm. McDougall, _An Introduction to Social Psychology_, pp. 2,\n3, 43; Gilbert Murray, Herd Instinct and the War, a lecture in _The\nInternational Conflict_ by Murray and others, p. 23; Wilfred Trotter,\n_The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War_, p. 15; Graham Wallas,\n_The Great Society_, p. 41; E. B. Holt, _The Freudian Wish_, p. 132;\nWalter Lippmann, _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, p. 50; A. F. Shand, _The\nFoundations of Character_, Introduction, pp. 1-9.\n\n[2] Cf. Francis Galton: _Inquiries Into Human Faculty and Its\nDevelopment_, p. 72.\n\n[3] Wm. James: _The Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, p. 430. Quoted\nby Wm. McDougall: _Social Psychology_, pp. 85, 86.\n\n[4] Wilfred Trotter: _The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War_.\nOther writers have emphasized gregariousness, but Trotter\u2019s book is the\nmost elaborate and important in recent literature. Aristotle declared\nthat man was a social animal. See _Politics_, Book I, Chap. I. Cf. also\nMcDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 84.\n\n[5] W. G. Sumner: _Folkways_, p. 15.\n\n[6] Martin Conway: _The Crowd in Peace and War_, p. 76.\n\n[7] Gilbert Murray: _Herd Instinct and the War_, p. 34.\n\n[8] _Ibid._, p. 37.\n\n[9] Conway: _The Crowd_, p. 79.\n\n[10] Bertrand Russell: _Why Men Fight_, p. 51.\n\n[11] We have been following here an article by Anne C. E. Allinson\nentitled \u201cVirgil and the New Patriotism\u201d in the _Yale Review_, October,\n1917.\n\n[12] Prof. Max F. Meyer, of the University of Missouri, in a letter in\nthe _New York Times_ of August 16, 1917.\n\n[13] McDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 208. Footnote.\n\n[14] The terms _out-group_ and _in-group_ are borrowed from Sumner. See\nW. G. Sumner: _Folkways_.\n\n[15] Alfred Loisy: _The War and Religion_.\n\n[16] _Ibid._, p. 65.\n\n[17] _Ibid._, p. 62.\n\n[18] _Ibid._, p. 20.\n\n[19] _Ibid._, p. 79.\n\n[20] J. M. Robertson: _Patriotism and Empire_.\n\n[21] _Ibid._, p. 36.\n\n[22] Wm. McDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 55.\n\n[23] Walter Lippmann: _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, p. 208.\n\n[24] J. M. Robertson: _Patriotism and Empire_, p. 138.\n\n[25] Goethe: _Faust_, Part II, Act 2. The translation here used is\nquoted by F. M. Stawell: Patriotism and Humanity. _I. J. E._, April,\n1915, p. 299.\n\n[26] McDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 140.\n\n[27] For a book that emphasizes the emulative impulse in its account of\nthe behavior of nations see Thorstein Veblen: _The Nature of Peace_.\nCf. pp. 31 ff.\n\n[28] William James has contended that the center of the problem of\npeace and war is that there is an impulse of pugnacity. Cf. The Moral\nEquivalent of War and Remarks at the Peace Banquet in _Memories and\nStudies_.\n\n\nPART II\n\n[29] Graham Wallas: _The Great Society_, p. 50.\n\n[30] _Ibid._, p. 50.\n\n[31] Lessing: _Nathan the Wise_, Act IV, Scene IV. The translation used\nhere is that of the edition of Geo. Alex. Kohut. New York, 1917.\n\n[32] W. G. Sumner: _Folkways_, p. 23.\n\n[33] For data concerning such societies in America see Sydney Aaron\nPhillips: _Patriotic Societies of the United States_. No less than\nforty-four are listed.\n\n[34] J. M. Robertson: _Patriotism and Empire_. Part II. The Militarist\nRegimen.\n\n[35] Hegel: _The Philosophy of Right_, Dyde\u2019s edition.\n\n[36] _Ibid._, p. 310.\n\n[37] _Ibid._, pp. 313, 314.\n\n[38] Edward Everett Hale: _The Man Without a Country_.\n\n[39] J. M. Robertson: The Jingoism of Poets. See his _Criticisms_, Vol.\nII.\n\n[40] Graham Wallas: _The Great Society_, p. 153.\n\n[41] Sumner: _Folkways_, pp. 630, 631.\n\n[42] The Teaching of Patriotism. In _Social and International Ideals_.\nLect. I.\n\n[43] _The Citizen_ of Milford, Conn.\n\n[44] Cf. Harry Pratt Judson: _The Young American_; Ella Lyman Cabot and\nOthers: _A Course in Citizenship_; Constance D\u2019Arcy Mackay: _Patriotic\nPlays_ and _Pageants for Young People_.\n\n[45] Russell: _Why Men Fight_, pp. 160, 161.\n\n[46] W. G. Sumner: _Folkways_, pp. 635, 636.\n\n[47] _Ibid._, p. 177.\n\n[48] Trotter: _Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War_, p. 205.\n\n[49] Russell: _Why Men Fight_, p. 154.\n\n[50] McDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 97.\n\n[51] Cooley: _Human Nature and the Social Order_, p. 265.\n\n[52] Graham Wallas: _The Great Society_, pp. 281, 282.\n\n[53] M. Gabriel Tarde has made more of this disposition than any other\nwriter. See Tarde: _The Laws of Imitation_. His definition of imitation\nis on p. XIV, in preface to the second edition.\n\n[54] Sumner: _Folkways_, p. 5. Italics mine.\n\n[55] C. D. Burns: _The Morality of Nations_, p. 106.\n\n[56] Lippmann: _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, p. 51.\n\n[57] Sumner: _Folkways_, p. 30.\n\n[58] _Ibid._, pp. 77, 173, 174.\n\n[59] _Ibid._, p. 71.\n\n[60] Cf. C. D. Burns: _The Morality of Nations_, pp. 14, 15.\n\n[61] Lessing: _Nathan the Wise_, Act III, Sc. VII. Kohut\u2019s edition.\n\n[62] Cooley: _Human Nature and the Social Order_, p. 36. Quoted by\nRoss: _Social Psychology_, p. 4.\n\n[63] Ross: _Social Psychology_, p. 273.\n\n[64] Russell: _Why Men Fight_, p. 236. The fact that patriotism has\nbeen relatively uncriticized is not its only source of strength; it is\nan important one.\n\n[65] Sumner: _Folkways_, p. 95. Italics mine.\n\n\nPART III\n\n[66] The beliefs, however, are often closely related to the impulses\nand habits, and may simply be the latter raised to the level of\nconsciousness. In fact, when an impulse or a habit gets raised to the\nconscious level, it becomes a belief.\n\n[67] Graham Wallas: _The Great Society_, p. 36.\n\n[68] Alfred Tennyson. Poem has no title. Stanza given is the opening\none. See _The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson_, London and New York,\nMacMillan Co., 1892, p. 64.\n\n[69] Herbert Spencer: _Social Statics_, p. 283.\n\n[70] Daniel Webster: Reply to Hayne. Jan. 26, 1830.\n\n[71] Green: Works. Vol. II. _The Principles of Political Obligation_,\np. 384. Italics mine.\n\n[72] Cf. Thomas Hobbes: _Leviathan_.\n\n[73] J. S. Mill. In letter to John Sterling, Oct. 20-22, 1831. Elliott:\n_Letters_, Vol. I, p. 15.\n\n[74] Josiah Quincy, Jr.: Second Centennial of Boston. Sept. 17, 1830.\n\n[75] L. T. Chamberlin: _Patriotism and The Moral Law_, p. 10.\n\n[76] J. S. Mill: _Principles of Political Economy_, Vol. II, p. 397.\n\n[77] Cf. Aristotle: _Politics_, Bk. I, Chap. 1, p. 3. Jowett\u2019s edition.\n\n[78] Cf. Plato: _The Republic_.\n\n[79] Edward Everett Hale: _The Man Without a Country_. Preface, pp. IV,\nV. School edition; Boston; Little, Brown, and Co.; 1905.\n\n[80] The term \u201csyndicalism\u201d as here used means roughly the principle\nthat societal control should be in the hands of organizations based\nupon the fact of common occupation. Cf. G. D. H. Cole: _The World of\nLabour_.\n\n[81] Plato: _Crito_, pp. 371 ff. Jowett\u2019s edition.\n\n[82] Bernard Bosanquet: _Social and International Ideals_, p. 8.\n\n[83] Bertrand Russell: _Why Men Fight_, p. 55.\n\n[84] Herbert Spencer: _Social Statics_, pp. 296, 297.\n\n[85] Loisy: _The War and Religion_, pp. 36, 37.\n\n[86] Zimmermann: _On National Pride_, p. 94.\n\n[87] Patrick Henry: Speech in Virginia Legislature, 1775.\n\n[88] Abraham Lincoln: Gettysburg Address. Nov. 19, 1863.\n\n[89] Bacon: _De Augmentis Scientarum_, B. VI, Ch. III. (Spedding and\nEllis). Quoted by Alexander F. Shand: _The Foundations of Character_,\np. 7.\n\n[90] Walter Lippmann: _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, pp. 74, 75.\n\n[91] Samuel Adams: Protest of Boston Against Taxation. May 24, 1764.\n\n[92] John Dewey: Progress, _I. J. E._, April, 1916, p. 321.\n\n[93] Cf. Veblen: _The Nature of Peace_, pp. 166, 167.\n\n[94] Chamberlain: _Patriotism and The Moral Law_, p. 6.\n\n[95] L. P. Jacks: _The Changing Mind of a Nation at War_, pp. 78, 79.\nJacks is talking of war-time conditions.\n\n[96] George Washington: Letter to the Governors. June 18, 1783. Italics\nmine.\n\n[97] McDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 207.\n\n[98] C. D. Burns: _The Morality of Nations_, p. 11.\n\n[99] Bosanquet: _Social and International Ideals_, p. 3.\n\n[100] Royce: _The Philosophy of Loyalty_, p. 40.\n\n[101] _Ibid._, p. 41.\n\n[102] Zimmermann: _On National Pride_, pp. 280, 281.\n\n[103] William Cowper: The Task, II, 206.\n\n[104] Sir Walter Scott: The Lay of the Last Minstrel. Canto Sixth.\n\n[105] Cf. Mill: _On Liberty_; and Spencer: _Social Statics_.\n\n[106] Hegel: _The Philosophy of Right_, pp. 330, 337.\n\n[107] Cf. H. P. Judson: _The Young American_. Chap. I, pp. 9, 10.\n\n[108] H. H. Powers: _The Things Men Fight For_, p. 283.\n\n[109] Nitobe: _Bushido, The Soul of Japan_, p. 116.\n\n[110] C. D. Broad: The Prevention of War. _I. J. E._, Jan., 1916, p.\n243.\n\n[111] For a clear statement of the diplomatic aims of the different\nnations in this present war see H. H. Powers: _The Things Men Fight\nFor_.\n\n[112] J. S. Mill: Letter dated Oct. 25, 1865. Elliott: _Letters_. Vol.\nII, p. 47.\n\n[113] Chas. Sumner: The True Grandeur of Nations. Boston, July 4, 1845.\n\n[114] Powers: _The Things Men Fight For_, p. 340.\n\n[115] Green: Works. Vol. II. _The Principles of Political Obligation_,\np. 338.\n\n[116] See Anne C. E. Allinson: Virgil and the New Patriotism, _Yale\nReview_, Oct., 1917, p. 158.\n\n[117] King: Washington or Greatness. In _Patriotism and Other Papers_,\npp. 72, 73.\n\n[118] L. S. Woolf: International Morality. _I. J. E._, Oct., 1915, p.\n18.\n\n[119] Loisy: _The War and Religion_, p. 21.\n\n[120] Elroy Headley: _Patriotic Essays_, Introduction, p. XV.\n\n[121] Mazzini: 1834. Quoted by Rose: _Nationality in Modern History_,\np. 74.\n\n[122] Longfellow: The Building of the Ship.\n\n[123] Josiah Quincy, Jr. Speech at Second Centennial of Boston, Sept.\n17, 1830.\n\n[124] Wm. Watson: The True Patriotism. See _The Poems of William\nWatson_, New York and London, Macmillan Co., 1893, p. 76.\n\n[125] Chamberlin: _Patriotism and The Moral Law_, pp. 24, 25.\n\n[126] Chas. E. Hughes: _Addresses Before the Empire State Society, S.\nA. R._ Nov. 26, 1906.\n\n[127] Bosanquet: _Social and International Ideals_, preface, pp. VI,\nVII.\n\n[128] Chamberlin: _Patriotism and The Moral Law_, p. 14.\n\n[129] John Grier Hibben: _The Higher Patriotism_, p. 18.\n\n[130] J. M. Robertson: _Patriotism and Empire_, p. 202.\n\n[131] International Reform Bureau: _Patriotic Studies_, 1888-1905.\n\n[132] Thos. S. King: _Patriotism and Other Papers_, p. 49.\n\n[133] Cf. E. A. Venturi: _Joseph Mazzini_, with two essays by Mazzini:\n_Thoughts on Democracy_ and _The Duties of Man_.\n\n[134] Royce: _Loyalty_, pp. 214, 215, 118.\n\n[135] Royce: Duties of Americans in the Present War. In _The Hope of\nthe Great Community_, pp. 3, 4. Italics mine.\n\n[136] Graham Wallas: _Human Nature in Politics_, p. 100.\n\n\nPART IV\n\n[137] J. M. Robertson: _Patriotism and Empire_.\n\n[138] W. Trotter: _The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War_.\n\n[139] T. Veblen: _The Nature of Peace_.\n\n[140] Loisy: _The War and Religion_.\n\n[141] H. H. Powers: _The Things Men Fight For_.\n\n[142] Cf. statement of procedure in the preface.\n\n[143] Sophie Bryant: _Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics_,\nVol. IX, p. 678:2.\n\n[144] Of course, one can care about the fate of countries other than\nhis own and be interested in institutions of another order, the church,\nfor instance, but when he does these things, he does them in his\ncharacter as something other than a patriot. No person is merely a\npatriot. In so far as he is a patriot his interest is absorbed in his\ncountry.\n\n[145] Royce: _The World and the Individual_, Vol. I, p. 292.\n\n[146] Veblen: _The Nature of Peace_. Cf. Chap. IV, Peace Without Honour.\n\n[147] Bosanquet: _The Principle of Individuality and Value_, p. 68.\n\n[148] _Ibid._, margin of p. 68.\n\n[149] E. B. Talbot: Individuality and Freedom. _Philosophical Review_,\nNovember, 1909, p. 600.\n\n[150] Aristotle: _Politics_. Book II, Chap. 2, p. 28. Jowett\u2019s\ntranslation.\n\n[151] Gertrude B. King: The Servile Mind. _I. J. E._, July, 1916, p.\n503.\n\n[152] Ellen B. Talbot: Individuality and Freedom. _Philosophical\nReview_, November, 1909, p. 603.\n\n[153] Warner Fite: _Individualism_, p. 14.\n\n[154] Ellen B. Talbot: Individuality and Freedom. _Philosophical\nReview_, November, 1909, p. 602.\n\n[155] Cf. Aristotle: _Politics_. Book I, Chap. 2, p. 4. Jowett\u2019s\nedition.\n\n[156] Warner Fite: _Individualism_, p. 126.\n\n[157] _Ibid._, p. 122.\n\n[158] Royce: _The Problem of Christianity_, Vol. I, p. 152.\n\n[159] _Ibid._, preface, p. XXV.\n\n[160] Fite: _Individualism_, p. 173.\n\n[161] Howison: _The Limits of Evolution_, p. 7.\n\n[162] C. M. Bakewell: Royce As an Interpreter of American Ideals. _I.\nJ. E._, p. 307, April, 1917, Vol. XXVII.\n\n[163] Joseph Mazzini: _On the Duties of Man_, Ch. V. In E. A. Venturi:\n_Joseph Mazzini_, p. 312.\n\n[164] _Ibid._, p. 313.\n\n[165] _Ibid._, pp. 314, 315.\n\n[166] Arthur Ponsonby, _I. J. E._, Jan., 1915, pp. 143, 144.\n\n[167] Cited by Edward Everett Hale: _The Man Without a Country_,\nintroduction, p. VIII.\n\n[168] McDougall: _Social Psychology_, p. 85.\n\n[169] Green: _Works_, Vol. II, _Principles of Political Obligation_, p.\n523.\n\n[170] Sumner: _Folkways_, pp. 566, 567.\n\n[171] Spencer: _Social Statics_, p. 300.\n\n[172] Green: _Works_, Vol. II, _Principles of Political Obligation_,\ntable of contents, p. XXXV, for p. 446.\n\n[173] H. C. Brown: Human Nature and the State, _I. J. E._, Jan., 1916,\np. 179.\n\n[174] Spencer: _Social Statics_, p. 279.\n\n[175] Green: _Works_, Vol. II, _Principles of Political Obligation_, p.\n444.\n\n[176] Rose: _Nationality in Modern History_, p. 12.\n\n[177] J. Berg Esenwein: _Short Story Masterpieces: Russian_.\nIntroduction to Gogol, p. 67.\n\n[178] Warner Fite: _Individualism_, p. 100. Italics mine. The last\nsentence, also, comes before the rest of the passage in the author\u2019s\nown text.\n\n[179] _Ibid._, p. 112.\n\n[180] Joseph Mazzini: _On the Duties of Man_, Ch. V. In E. A. Venturi:\n_Joseph Mazzini_, p. 317.\n\n[181] Ernest Barker: The Discredited State, _Political Quarterly_,\nFeb., 1915, p. 111.\n\n[182] Robert C. Winthrop: The Patriot Traveler in a Foreign Land. See\nH. P. Judson: _The Young American_, p. 118.\n\n[183] Veblen: _The Nature of Peace_, p. 142.\n\n[184] C. D. Burns: _The Morality of Nations_, pp. 7, 65.\n\n[185] Russell: _Why Men Fight_, p. 151.\n\n[186] Lippmann: _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, p. 38.\n\n[187] _Ibid._, p. 50.\n\n[188] Cf. Graham Wallas: _The Great Society_, p. 308.\n\n[189] Zimmermann: _On National Pride_, p. 137.\n\n[190] Royce: _The Religious Aspect of Philosophy_, p. 212. Italics mine.\n\n[191] Anne C. E. Allinson: Virgil and the New Patriotism, _Yale\nReview_, October, 1917, p. 141.\n\n[192] Aristotle: _Politics_, Book III, Ch. 3, p. 72. Jowett\u2019s\ntranslation.\n\n[193] Graham Wallas: _The Great Society_, p. 10.\n\n[194] Sumner: _Folkways_, p. 94.\n\n[195] A. C. Haddon: _Universal Races Congress, Record of Proceedings_,\nLondon, 1911, p. 26. Quoted by G. F. Barbour, _I. J. E._, Oct., 1913,\npp. 14, 15. Footnote.\n\n[196] G. F. Barbour, _I. J. E._, Oct., 1913, p. 15.\n\n[197] Royce: _Provincialism_, p. 99. In _Race Questions and Other\nAmerican Problems_.\n\n[198] _Ibid._, p. 99.\n\n[199] _Ibid._, p. 65.\n\n[200] _Ibid._, pp. 100, 102.\n\n[201] F. Melian Stawell, _I. J. E._, April, 1915, pp. 296, 297.\n\n[202] C. D. Burns and L. S. Woolf have made a good deal of these\ntendencies. Cf. C. D. Burns: _The Morality of Nations_, and L. S.\nWoolf: _International Government_.\n\n[203] C. D. Burns: _The Morality of Nations_, p. 237.\n\n[204] For these and similar facts see C. D. Burns: The State and\nIts External Relations. _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_,\n1915-1916, p. 300.\n\n[205] Lippmann: _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, p. 45.\n\n[206] The _New York Times_ of Nov. 27, 1917, contained a report to\nthe effect that the United States Government was preparing to notify\nBerlin of the steps that had been taken in the United States regarding\nthe internment of unnaturalized Germans in this country. It was the\npurpose to inform Germany of the number of those interned, who they\nwere, and how they were treated. The object was to reassure Germany\nthat the interned Germans were not being ill-treated, and so to protect\nAmericans interned in Germany.\n\n[207] Trotter: _The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War_, pp. 121,\n122.\n\n[208] Zimmerman: _On National Pride_, p. 306.\n\n[209] Lippmann: _The Stakes of Diplomacy_, p. 224.\n\n[210] H. H. 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A.        _Joseph Mazzini._ With two essays by Mazzini:\n                        _Thoughts on Democracy_ and _The Duties of Man_.\n                        London, 1875.\n\n  Wallas, Graham        _Human Nature in Politics._ London, 1908.\n\n                        _The Great Society._ New York, 1914.\n\n  Washington, George    _Letter to the Governors_, 1783.\n\n                        _Farewell Address_, 1796.\n\n  Watson, J. B.         _Behavior._ New York, 1914.\n\n  Watson, William       _The True Patriotism._ In _Works_. New York,\n                        London, etc., 1893.\n\n  Webster, Daniel       _Reply to Hayne_, 1830.\n\n  Wordsworth, William   _Complete Poetical Works._ London, 1909.\n\n  Woolf, L. S.          _International Morality._ International Journal\n                        of Ethics, October, 1915.\n                        _International Government._ Fabian Research\n                        Department. London, 1916.\n\n  Zimmerman, J. G.      _On National Pride._ Translated from the German.\n                        London, 1771.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Note\n\nIn a few cases, obvious errors in punctuation have been corrected.\n\nPage 28: \u201cessentials in the disipline\u201d changed to \u201cessentials in the\ndiscipline\u201d\n\nPage 32: \u201cThere is a compusion\u201d changed to \u201cThere is a compulsion\u201d\n\nPage 33: \u201cis is put under\u201d changed to \u201cit is put under\u201d\n\nPage 47: \u201cit is not admissable\u201d changed to \u201cit is not admissible\u201d\n\nPage 48: \u201cties which binds\u201d changed to \u201cties which bind\u201d\n\nPage 81: \u201cwill be to be nationally\u201d changed to \u201cwill to be nationally\u201d\n\nPage 85: \u201cexistence in there\u201d changed to \u201cexistence is there\u201d\n\nPage 103: \u201cAt at rate\u201d changed to \u201cAt any rate\u201d","title":"A Critical Analysis of Patriotism As an Ethical Concept: A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 1, 1918","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":46644}