{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_6762/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_6762","id":"gutenberg_6762","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/6762","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Classical Antiquity","Philosophy","Political science -- Early works to 1800","Politics"],"text":"Produced by Eric Eldred\n\n\n\n\n\nA TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT\n\nBy Aristotle\n\n\nTranslated From The Greek Of Aristotle By William Ellis, A.M.\n\nLondon & Toronto Published By J M Dent & Sons Ltd. & In New York By E.\nP. Dutton &. Co\n\nFirst Issue Of This Edition 1912 Reprinted 1919, 1923, 1928\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe Politics of Aristotle is the second part of a treatise of which\nthe Ethics is the first part. It looks back to the Ethics as the Ethics\nlooks forward to the Politics. For Aristotle did not separate, as we are\ninclined to do, the spheres of the statesman and the moralist. In the\nEthics he has described the character necessary for the good life, but\nthat life is for him essentially to be lived in society, and when in the\nlast chapters of the Ethics he comes to the practical application of his\ninquiries, that finds expression not in moral exhortations addressed to\nthe individual but in a description of the legislative opportunities\nof the statesman. It is the legislator's task to frame a society which\nshall make the good life possible. Politics for Aristotle is not a\nstruggle between individuals or classes for power, nor a device for\ngetting done such elementary tasks as the maintenance of order and\nsecurity without too great encroachments on individual liberty. The\nstate is \"a community of well-being in families and aggregations\nof families for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life.\" The\nlegislator is a craftsman whose material is society and whose aim is the\ngood life.\n\nIn an early dialogue of Plato's, the Protagoras, Socrates asks\nProtagoras why it is not as easy to find teachers of virtue as it is to\nfind teachers of swordsmanship, riding, or any other art. Protagoras'\nanswer is that there are no special teachers of virtue, because virtue\nis taught by the whole community. Plato and Aristotle both accept the\nview of moral education implied in this answer. In a passage of the\nRepublic (492 b) Plato repudiates the notion that the sophists have a\ncorrupting moral influence upon young men. The public themselves,\nhe says, are the real sophists and the most complete and thorough\neducators. No private education can hold out against the irresistible\nforce of public opinion and the ordinary moral standards of society.\nBut that makes it all the more essential that public opinion and\nsocial environment should not be left to grow up at haphazard as they\nordinarily do, but should be made by the wise legislator the expression\nof the good and be informed in all their details by his knowledge. The\nlegislator is the only possible teacher of virtue.\n\nSuch a programme for a treatise on government might lead us to expect in\nthe Politics mainly a description of a Utopia or ideal state which\nmight inspire poets or philosophers but have little direct effect upon\npolitical institutions. Plato's Republic is obviously impracticable, for\nits author had turned away in despair from existing politics. He has no\nproposals, in that dialogue at least, for making the best of things as\nthey are. The first lesson his philosopher has to learn is to turn away\nfrom this world of becoming and decay, and to look upon the unchanging\neternal world of ideas. Thus his ideal city is, as he says, a pattern\nlaid up in heaven by which the just man may rule his life, a pattern\ntherefore in the meantime for the individual and not for the statesman.\nIt is a city, he admits in the Laws, for gods or the children of gods,\nnot for men as they are.\n\nAristotle has none of the high enthusiasm or poetic imagination of\nPlato. He is even unduly impatient of Plato's idealism, as is shown\nby the criticisms in the second book. But he has a power to see the\npossibilities of good in things that are imperfect, and the patience of\nthe true politician who has learned that if he would make men what\nthey ought to be, he must take them as he finds them. His ideal\nis constructed not of pure reason or poetry, but from careful and\nsympathetic study of a wide range of facts. His criticism of Plato in\nthe light of history, in Book II. chap, v., though as a criticism it is\ncuriously inept, reveals his own attitude admirably: \"Let us remember\nthat we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude\nof years, these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been\nunknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes\nthey are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge\nwhich they have.\" Aristotle in his Constitutions had made a study of one\nhundred and fifty-eight constitutions of the states of his day, and the\nfruits of that study are seen in the continual reference to concrete\npolitical experience, which makes the Politics in some respects a\ncritical history of the workings of the institutions of the Greek city\nstate. In Books IV., V., and VI. the ideal state seems far away, and\nwe find a dispassionate survey of imperfect states, the best ways of\npreserving them, and an analysis of the causes of their instability.\nIt is as though Aristotle were saying: \"I have shown you the proper and\nnormal type of constitution, but if you will not have it and insist on\nliving under a perverted form, you may as well know how to make the best\nof it.\" In this way the Politics, though it defines the state in the\nlight of its ideal, discusses states and institutions as they are.\nOstensibly it is merely a continuation of the Ethics, but it comes to\ntreat political questions from a purely political standpoint.\n\nThis combination of idealism and respect for the teachings of experience\nconstitutes in some ways the strength and value of the Politics, but it\nalso makes it harder to follow. The large nation states to which we are\naccustomed make it difficult for us to think that the state could be\nconstructed and modelled to express the good life. We can appreciate\nAristotle's critical analysis of constitutions, but find it hard to take\nseriously his advice to the legislator. Moreover, the idealism and the\nempiricism of the Politics are never really reconciled by Aristotle\nhimself.\n\nIt may help to an understanding of the Politics if something is said on\nthose two points.\n\nWe are accustomed since the growth of the historical method to the\nbelief that states are \"not made but grow,\" and are apt to be impatient\nwith the belief which Aristotle and Plato show in the powers of the\nlawgiver. But however true the maxim may be of the modern nation state,\nit was not true of the much smaller and more self-conscious Greek city.\nWhen Aristotle talks of the legislator, he is not talking in the\nair. Students of the Academy had been actually called on to give new\nconstitutions to Greek states. For the Greeks the constitution was not\nmerely as it is so often with us, a matter of political machinery. It\nwas regarded as a way of life. Further, the constitution within the\nframework of which the ordinary process of administration and passing\nof decrees went on, was always regarded as the work of a special man or\nbody of men, the lawgivers. If we study Greek history, we find that the\nposition of the legislator corresponds to that assigned to him by\nPlato and Aristotle. All Greek states, except those perversions\nwhich Aristotle criticises as being \"above law,\" worked under rigid\nconstitutions, and the constitution was only changed when the whole\npeople gave a commission to a lawgiver to draw up a new one. Such was\nthe position of the AEsumnetes, whom Aristotle describes in Book III.\nchap, xiv., in earlier times, and of the pupils of the Academy in the\nfourth century. The lawgiver was not an ordinary politician. He was\na state doctor, called in to prescribe for an ailing constitution. So\nHerodotus recounts that when the people of Cyrene asked the oracle of\nDelphi to help them in their dissensions, the oracle told them to go to\nMantinea, and the Mantineans lent them Demonax, who acted as a \"setter\nstraight\" and drew up a new constitution for Cyrene. So again the\nMilesians, Herodotus tells us, were long troubled by civil discord, till\nthey asked help from Paros, and the Parians sent ten commissioners\nwho gave Miletus a new constitution. So the Athenians, when they were\nfounding their model new colony at Thurii, employed Hippodamus of\nMiletus, whom Aristotle mentions in Book II, as the best expert in\ntown-planning, to plan the streets of the city, and Protagoras as the\nbest expert in law-making, to give the city its laws. In the Laws Plato\nrepresents one of the persons of the dialogue as having been asked\nby the people of Gortyna to draw up laws for a colony which they were\nfounding. The situation described must have occurred frequently in\nactual life. The Greeks thought administration should be democratic and\nlaw-making the work of experts. We think more naturally of law-making\nas the special right of the people and administration as necessarily\nconfined to experts.\n\nAristotle's Politics, then, is a handbook for the legislator, the expert\nwho is to be called in when a state wants help. We have called him a\nstate doctor. It is one of the most marked characteristics of Greek\npolitical theory that Plato and Aristotle think of the statesman as one\nwho has knowledge of what ought to be done, and can help those who call\nhim in to prescribe for them, rather than one who has power to control\nthe forces of society. The desire of society for the statesman's\nadvice is taken for granted, Plato in the Republic says that a good\nconstitution is only possible when the ruler does not want to rule;\nwhere men contend for power, where they have not learnt to distinguish\nbetween the art of getting hold of the helm of state and the art of\nsteering, which alone is statesmanship, true politics is impossible.\n\nWith this position much that Aristotle has to say about government is in\nagreement. He assumes the characteristic Platonic view that all men seek\nthe good, and go wrong through ignorance, not through evil will, and so\nhe naturally regards the state as a community which exists for the sake\nof the good life. It is in the state that that common seeking after\nthe good which is the profoundest truth about men and nature becomes\nexplicit and knows itself. The state is for Aristotle prior to the\nfamily and the village, although it succeeds them in time, for only when\nthe state with its conscious organisation is reached can man understand\nthe secret of his past struggles after something he knew not what. If\nprimitive society is understood in the light of the state, the state is\nunderstood in the light of its most perfect form, when the good after\nwhich all societies are seeking is realised in its perfection. Hence for\nAristotle as for Plato, the natural state or the state as such is the\nideal state, and the ideal state is the starting-point of political\ninquiry.\n\nIn accordance with the same line of thought, imperfect states, although\ncalled perversions, are regarded by Aristotle as the result rather of\nmisconception and ignorance than of perverse will. They all represent,\nhe says, some kind of justice. Oligarchs and democrats go wrong in\ntheir conception of the good. They have come short of the perfect state\nthrough misunderstanding of the end or through ignorance of the proper\nmeans to the end. But if they are states at all, they embody some common\nconception of the good, some common aspirations of all their members.\n\nThe Greek doctrine that the essence of the state consists in community\nof purpose is the counterpart of the notion often held in modern times\nthat the essence of the state is force. The existence of force is for\nPlato and Aristotle a sign not of the state but of the state's failure.\nIt comes from the struggle between conflicting misconceptions of the\ngood. In so far as men conceive the good rightly they are united. The\nstate represents their common agreement, force their failure to make\nthat agreement complete. The cure, therefore, of political ills is\nknowledge of the good life, and the statesman is he who has such\nknowledge, for that alone can give men what they are always seeking.\n\nIf the state is the organisation of men seeking a common good, power and\npolitical position must be given to those who can forward this end. This\nis the principle expressed in Aristotle's account of political justice,\nthe principle of \"tools to those who can use them.\" As the aim of the\nstate is differently conceived, the qualifications for government\nwill vary. In the ideal state power will be given to the man with most\nknowledge of the good; in other states to the men who are most truly\ncapable of achieving that end which the citizens have set themselves\nto pursue. The justest distribution of political power is that in which\nthere is least waste of political ability.\n\nFurther, the belief that the constitution of a state is only the\noutward expression of the common aspirations and beliefs of its members,\nexplains the paramount political importance which Aristotle assigns to\neducation. It is the great instrument by which the legislator can ensure\nthat the future citizens of his state will share those common beliefs\nwhich make the state possible. The Greeks with their small states had\na far clearer apprehension than we can have of the dependence of a\nconstitution upon the people who have to work it.\n\nSuch is in brief the attitude in which Aristotle approaches political\nproblems, but in working out its application to men and institutions\nas they are, Aristotle admits certain compromises which are not really\nconsistent with it.\n\n1. Aristotle thinks of membership of a state as community in pursuit of\nthe good. He wishes to confine membership in it to those who are capable\nof that pursuit in the highest and most explicit manner. His citizens,\ntherefore, must be men of leisure, capable of rational thought upon\nthe end of life. He does not recognise the significance of that less\nconscious but deep-seated membership of the state which finds its\nexpression in loyalty and patriotism. His definition of citizen includes\nonly a small part of the population of any Greek city. He is forced to\nadmit that the state is not possible without the co-operation of men\nwhom he will not admit to membership in it, either because they are not\ncapable of sufficient rational appreciation of political ends, like the\nbarbarians whom he thought were natural slaves, or because the leisure\nnecessary for citizenship can only be gained by the work of the artisans\nwho by that very work make themselves incapable of the life which\nthey make possible for others. \"The artisan only attains excellence\nin proportion as he becomes a slave,\" and the slave is only a living\ninstrument of the good life. He exists for the state, but the state does\nnot exist for him.\n\n2. Aristotle in his account of the ideal state seems to waver between\ntwo ideals. There is the ideal of an aristocracy and the ideal of what\nhe calls constitutional government, a mixed constitution. The principle\nof \"tools to those who can use them\" ought to lead him, as it does\nPlato, to an aristocracy. Those who have complete knowledge of the good\nmust be few, and therefore Plato gave entire power in his state into\nthe hands of the small minority of philosopher guardians. It is in\naccordance with this principle that Aristotle holds that kingship is\nthe proper form of government when there is in the state one man of\ntranscendent virtue. At the same time, Aristotle always holds that\nabsolute government is not properly political, that government is not\nlike the rule of a shepherd over his sheep, but the rule of equals\nover equals. He admits that the democrats are right in insisting that\nequality is a necessary element in the state, though he thinks they do\nnot admit the importance of other equally necessary elements. Hence he\ncomes to say that ruling and being ruled over by turns is an essential\nfeature of constitutional government, which he admits as an alternative\nto aristocracy. The end of the state, which is to be the standard of the\ndistribution of political power, is conceived sometimes as a good for\nthe apprehension and attainment of which \"virtue\" is necessary and\nsufficient (this is the principle of aristocracy), and sometimes as a\nmore complex good, which needs for its attainment not only \"virtue\" but\nwealth and equality. This latter conception is the principle on which\nthe mixed constitution is based. This in its distribution of political\npower gives some weight to \"virtue,\" some to wealth, and some to mere\nnumber. But the principle of \"ruling and being ruled by turns\" is not\nreally compatible with an unmodified principle of \"tools to those who\ncan use them.\" Aristotle is right in seeing that political government\ndemands equality, not in the sense that all members of the state should\nbe equal in ability or should have equal power, but in the sense that\nnone of them can properly be regarded simply as tools with which the\nlegislator works, that each has a right to say what will be made of his\nown life. The analogy between the legislator and the craftsman on which\nPlato insists, breaks down because the legislator is dealing with men\nlike himself, men who can to some extent conceive their own end in life\nand cannot be treated merely as means to the end of the legislator. The\nsense of the value of \"ruling and being ruled in turn\" is derived from\nthe experience that the ruler may use his power to subordinate the\nlives of the citizens of the state not to the common good but to his\nown private purposes. In modern terms, it is a simple, rough-and-ready\nattempt to solve that constant problem of politics, how efficient\ngovernment is to be combined with popular control. This problem arises\nfrom the imperfection of human nature, apparent in rulers as well as in\nruled, and if the principle which attempts to solve it be admitted as a\nprinciple of importance in the formation of the best constitution, then\nthe starting-point of politics will be man's actual imperfection, not\nhis ideal nature. Instead, then, of beginning with a state which would\nexpress man's ideal nature, and adapting it as well as may be to man's\nactual shortcomings from that ideal, we must recognise that the state\nand all political machinery are as much the expression of man's weakness\nas of his ideal possibilities. The state is possible only because\nmen have common aspirations, but government, and political power, the\nexistence of officials who are given authority to act in the name of the\nwhole state, are necessary because men's community is imperfect, because\nman's social nature expresses itself in conflicting ways, in the clash\nof interests, the rivalry of parties, and the struggle of classes,\ninstead of in the united seeking after a common good. Plato and\nAristotle were familiar with the legislator who was called in by the\nwhole people, and they tended therefore to take the general will or\ncommon consent of the people for granted. Most political questions are\nconcerned with the construction and expression of the general will, and\nwith attempts to ensure that the political machinery made to express the\ngeneral will shall not be exploited for private or sectional ends.\n\nAristotle's mixed constitution springs from a recognition of sectional\ninterests in the state. For the proper relation between the claims of\n\"virtue,\" wealth, and numbers is to be based not upon their relative\nimportance in the good life, but upon the strength of the parties which\nthey represent. The mixed constitution is practicable in a state where\nthe middle class is strong, as only the middle class can mediate between\nthe rich and the poor. The mixed constitution will be stable if it\nrepresents the actual balance of power between different classes in the\nstate. When we come to Aristotle's analysis of existing constitutions,\nwe find that while he regards them as imperfect approximations to the\nideal, he also thinks of them as the result of the struggle between\nclasses. Democracy, he explains, is the government not of the many but\nof the poor; oligarchy a government not of the few but of the rich.\nAnd each class is thought of, not as trying to express an ideal, but as\nstruggling to acquire power or maintain its position. If ever the class\nexisted in unredeemed nakedness, it was in the Greek cities of the\nfourth century, and its existence is abundantly recognised by Aristotle.\nHis account of the causes of revolutions in Book V. shows how far were\nthe existing states of Greece from the ideal with which he starts.\nHis analysis of the facts forces him to look upon them as the scene\nof struggling factions. The causes of revolutions are not described as\nprimarily changes in the conception of the common good, but changes in\nthe military or economic power of the several classes in the state. The\naim which he sets before oligarchs or democracies is not the good life,\nbut simple stability or permanence of the existing constitution.\n\nWith this spirit of realism which pervades Books IV., V., and VI.\nthe idealism of Books I., II., VII., and VIII. is never reconciled.\nAristotle is content to call existing constitutions perversions of\nthe true form. But we cannot read the Politics without recognising\nand profiting from the insight into the nature of the state which is\nrevealed throughout. Aristotle's failure does not lie in this, that he\nis both idealist and realist, but that he keeps these two tendencies\ntoo far apart. He thinks too much of his ideal state, as something to\nbe reached once for all by knowledge, as a fixed type to which actual\nstates approximate or from which they are perversions. But if we are to\nthink of actual politics as intelligible in the light of the ideal, we\nmust think of that ideal as progressively revealed in history, not as\nsomething to be discovered by turning our back on experience and having\nrecourse to abstract reasoning. If we stretch forward from what exists\nto an ideal, it is to a better which may be in its turn transcended, not\nto a single immutable best. Aristotle found in the society of his\ntime men who were not capable of political reflection, and who, as he\nthought, did their best work under superintendence. He therefore called\nthem natural slaves. For, according to Aristotle, that is a man's\nnatural condition in which he does his best work. But Aristotle also\nthinks of nature as something fixed and immutable; and therefore\nsanctions the institution of slavery, which assumes that what men are\nthat they will always be, and sets up an artificial barrier to their\never becoming anything else. We see in Aristotle's defence of slavery\nhow the conception of nature as the ideal can have a debasing influence\nupon views of practical politics. His high ideal of citizenship offers\nto those who can satisfy its claims the prospect of a fair life;\nthose who fall short are deemed to be different in nature and shut out\nentirely from approach to the ideal.\n\n\nA. D. LINDSAY.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nFirst edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and\nsecond book of OEconomica), 5 vols. by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495-8;\nre-impression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by\nGrynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550;\nlater editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis\n(Greek and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol. contains the Index by Bonitz,\n1831-70; Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols. 1848-74.\n\nENGLISH TRANSLATIONS: Edited by T. Taylor, with Porphyry's Introduction,\n9 vols., 1812; under editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, 1908.\n\nLater editions of separate works:\n\nDe Anima: Torstrik, 1862; Trendelenburg, 2nd edition, 1877, with English\ntranslation, E. Wallace, 1882; Biehl, 1884, 1896; with English, R. D.\nHicks, 1907.\n\nEthica: J. S. Brewer (Nicomachean), 1836; W. E. Jelf, 1856; J. E. T.\nRogers, 1865; A. Grant, 1857-8, 1866, 1874, 1885; E. Moore, 1871, 1878,\n4th edition, 1890; Ramsauer (Nicomachean), 1878, Susemihl, 1878, 1880,\nrevised by O. Apelt, 1903; A. Grant, 1885; I. Bywater (Nicomachean),\n1890; J. Burnet, 1900.\n\nHistoria Animalium: Schneider, 1812; Aubert and Wimmer, 1860, Dittmeyer,\n1907.\n\nMetaphysica: Schwegler, 1848; W. Christ, 1899.\n\nOrganon: Waitz, 1844-6.\n\nPoetica: Vahlen, 1867, 1874, with Notes by E. Moore, 1875; with English\ntranslation by E. R. Wharton, 1883, 1885; Uberweg, 1870, 1875; with\nGerman translation, Susemihl, 1874; Schmidt, 1875; Christ, 1878; I.\nBywater, 1898; T. G. Tucker, 1899.\n\nDe Republics, Atheniensium: Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F. G. Kenyon,\n1891, 3rd edition, 1892; Kaibel and Wilamowitz--Moel-lendorf, 1891, 3rd\nedition, 1898; Van Herwerden and Leeuwen (from Kenyon's text), 1891;\nBlass, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1903; J. E. Sandys, 1893.\n\nPolitica: Susemihl, 1872; with German, 1878, 3rd edition, 1882; Susemihl\nand Hicks, 1894, etc.; O. Immisch, 1909.\n\nPhysica: C. Prantl, 1879.\n\nRhetorica: Stahr, 1862; Sprengel (with Latin text), 1867; Cope and\nSandys, 1877; Roemer, 1885, 1898.\n\nENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ONE OR MORE WORKS: De Anima (with Parva\nNaturalia), by W. A. Hammond, 1902. Ethica: Of Morals to Nicomachus, by\nE. Pargiter, 1745; with Politica, by J. Gillies, 1797, 1804, 1813;\nwith Rhetorica and Poetica, by T. Taylor, 1818, and later editions.\nNicomachean Ethics, 1819; mainly from text of Bekker, by D. P. Chase,\n1847; revised 1861, and later editions with an introductory essay by\nG. H. Lewes (Camelot Classics), 1890; re-edited by J. M. Mitchell (New\nUniversal Library), 1906, 1910; with an introductory essay by Prof.\nJ.H. Smith (Everyman's Library), 1911; by R.W.Browne (Bohn's Classical\nLibrary), 1848, etc.; by R. Williams, 1869, 1876; by W. M. Hatch and\nothers (with translation of paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of\nRhodes), edited by E. Hatch, 1879; by F, H. Peters, 1881; J. E. C.\nWelldon, 1892; J. Gillies (Lubbock's Hundred Books), 1893. Historia\nAnimalium, by R. Creswell (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848; with\nTreatise on Physiognomy, by T. Taylor, 1809. Metaphysica, by T. Taylor,\n1801; by J. H. M'Mahon (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848. Organon, with\nPorphyry's Introduction, by O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library),\n1848. Posterior Analytics, E. Poste, 1850; E. S. Bourchier, 1901; On\nFallacies, E. Poste, 1866. Parva Naturalia (Greek and English), by G. R.\nT. Ross, 1906; with De Anima, by W. A. Hammond, 1902. Youth and Old Age,\nLife and Death and Respiration, W. Ogle, 1897. Poetica, with Notes\nfrom the French of D'Acier, 1705; by H. J. Pye, 1788, 1792; T. Twining,\n1789,1812, with Preface and Notes by H. Hamilton, 1851; Treatise on\nRhetorica and Poetica, by T. Hobbes (Bohn's Classical Library), 1850;\nby Wharton, 1883 (see Greek version), S. H. Butcher, 1895, 1898, 3rd\nedition, 1902; E. S. Bourchier, 1907; by Ingram Bywater, 1909. De\nPartibus Animalium, W. Ogle, 1882. De Republica Athenientium, by E.\nPoste, 1891; F. G. Kenyon, 1891; T. J. Dymes, 1891. De Virtutibus et\nVitiis, by W. Bridgman, 1804. Politica, from the French of Regius,\n1598; by W. Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley's Universal Library), 1893\n(Lubbock's Hundred Books); by E. Walford (with AEconomics, and Life by\nDr. Gillies) (Bohn's Classical Library), 1848; J. E. C. Welldon, 1883;\nB. Jowett, 1885; with Introduction and Index by H. W. C. Davis, 1905;\nBooks i. iii. iv. (vii.) from Bekker's text by W. E. Bolland, with\nIntroduction by A. Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other\nphilosophers), 1597, 1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica: A summary by T.\nHobbes, 1655 (?), new edition, 1759; by the translators of the Art of\nThinking, 1686, 1816; by D. M. Crimmin, 1812; J. Gillies, 1823;\nAnon. 1847; J. E. C. Welldon, 1886; R. C. Jebb, with Introduction\nand Supplementary Notes by J. E. Sandys, 1909 (see under Poetica and\nEthica). Secreta Secretorum (supposititious work), Anon. 1702; from the\nHebrew version by M. Gaster, 1907, 1908. Version by Lydgate and Burgh,\nedited by R. Steele (E.E.T.S.), 1894, 1898.\n\nLIFE, ETC.: J. W. Blakesley, 1839; A Crichton (Jardine's Naturalist's\nLibrary), 1843; J. S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates,\nAristotle, etc., 1871; G. Grote, Aristotle, edited by A. Bain and G.\nC. Robertson, 1872, 1880; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of\nAristotle, 1875, 1880; A. Grant (Ancient Classics for English readers),\n1877; T. Davidson, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals (Great\nEducators), 1892.\n\n\n\n\n\nA TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nAs we see that every city is a society, and every society Ed. is\nestablished for some good purpose; for an apparent [Bekker 1252a] good\nis the spring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the\nprinciple upon which they are every one founded, and this is more\nespecially true of that which has for its object the best possible, and\nis itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now this is\ncalled a city, and the society thereof a political society; for those\nwho think that the principles of a political, a regal, a family, and\na herile government are the same are mistaken, while they suppose that\neach of these differ in the numbers to whom their power extends, but\nnot in their constitution: so that with them a herile government is one\ncomposed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil and a regal of still\nmore, as if there was no difference between a large family and a small\ncity, or that a regal government and a political one are the same, only\nthat in the one a single person is continually at the head of public\naffairs; in the other, that each member of the state has in his turn a\nshare in the government, and is at one time a magistrate, at another\na private person, according to the rules of political science. But now\nthis is not true, as will be evident to any one who will consider this\nquestion in the most approved method. As, in an inquiry into every other\nsubject, it is necessary to separate the different parts of which it is\ncompounded, till we arrive at their first elements, which are the most\nminute parts thereof; so by the same proceeding we shall acquire a\nknowledge of the primary parts of a city and see wherein they differ\nfrom each other, and whether the rules of art will give us any\nassistance in examining into each of these things which are mentioned.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nNow if in this particular science any one would attend to its original\nseeds, and their first shoot, he would then as in others have the\nsubject perfectly before him; and perceive, in the first place, that it\nis requisite that those should be joined together whose species cannot\nexist without each other, as the male and the female, for the business\nof propagation; and this not through choice, but by that natural impulse\nwhich acts both upon plants and animals also, for the purpose of their\nleaving behind them others like themselves. It is also from natural\ncauses that some beings command and others obey, that each may obtain\ntheir mutual safety; for a being who is endowed with a mind capable\nof reflection and forethought is by nature the superior and governor,\nwhereas he whose excellence is merely corporeal is formect to be a\nslave; whence it follows that the different state of master [1252b] and\nslave is equally advantageous to both. But there is a natural difference\nbetween a female and a slave: for nature is not like the artists\nwho make the Delphic swords for the use of the poor, but for every\nparticular purpose she has her separate instruments, and thus her ends\nare most complete, for whatsoever is employed on one subject only,\nbrings that one to much greater perfection than when employed on many;\nand yet among the barbarians, a female and a slave are upon a level in\nthe community, the reason for which is, that amongst them there are none\nqualified by nature to govern, therefore their society can be nothing\nbut between slaves of different sexes. For which reason the poets say,\nit is proper for the Greeks to govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian\nand a slave were by nature one. Now of these two societies the domestic\nis the first, and Hesiod is right when he says, \"First a house, then\na wife, then an ox for the plough,\" for the poor man has always an ox\nbefore a household slave. That society then which nature has established\nfor daily support is the domestic, and those who compose it are called\nby Charondas _homosipuoi_, and by Epimenides the Cretan _homokapnoi_;\nbut the society of many families, which was first instituted for their\nlasting, mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most\nnaturally composed of the descendants of one family, whom some persons\ncall homogalaktes, the children and the children's children thereof: for\nwhich reason cities were originally governed by kings, as the barbarian\nstates now are, which are composed of those who had before submitted to\nkingly government; for every family is governed by the elder, as are the\nbranches thereof, on account of their relationship thereunto, which\nis what Homer says, \"Each one ruled his wife and child;\" and in this\nscattered manner they formerly lived. And the opinion which universally\nprevails, that the gods themselves are subject to kingly government,\narises from hence, that all men formerly were, and many are so now; and\nas they imagined themselves to be made in the likeness of the gods, so\nthey supposed their manner of life must needs be the same. And when many\nvillages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to\nform but one society, that society is a city, and contains in itself, if\nI may so speak, the end and perfection of government: first founded that\nwe might live, but continued that we may live happily. For which reason\nevery city must be allowed to be the work of nature, if we admit that\nthe original society between male and female is; for to this as their\nend all subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is the\nnature of it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that\ncertainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or\na house: besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which\nwe [1253a] desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is\nthat final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a city is\na natural production, and that man is naturally a political animal, and\nthat whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for society, must\nbe either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in Homer, who is\nreviled for being \"without society, without law, without family.\" Such\na one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition, and as solitary as\nthe birds. The gift of speech also evidently proves that man is a more\nsocial animal than the bees, or any of the herding cattle: for nature,\nas we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who enjoys\nit. Voice indeed, as being the token of pleasure and pain, is imparted\nto others also, and thus much their nature is capable of, to perceive\npleasure and pain, and to impart these sensations to others; but it is\nby speech that we are enabled to express what is useful for us, and what\nis hurtful, and of course what is just and what is unjust: for in\nthis particular man differs from other animals, that he alone has\na perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and it is a\nparticipation of these common sentiments which forms a family and a\ncity. Besides, the notion of a city naturally precedes that of a family\nor an individual, for the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts,\nfor if you take away the whole man, you cannot say a foot or a hand\nremains, unless by equivocation, as supposing a hand of stone to be\nmade, but that would only be a dead one; but everything is understood to\nbe this or that by its energic qualities and powers, so that when these\nno longer remain, neither can that be said to be the same, but something\nof the same name. That a city then precedes an individual is plain,\nfor if an individual is not in himself sufficient to compose a perfect\ngovernment, he is to a city as other parts are to a whole; but he that\nis incapable of society, or so complete in himself as not to want it,\nmakes no part of a city, as a beast or a god. There is then in all\npersons a natural impetus to associate with each other in this manner,\nand he who first founded civil society was the cause of the greatest\ngood; for as by the completion of it man is the most excellent of all\nliving beings, so without law and justice he would be the worst of all,\nfor nothing is so difficult to subdue as injustice in arms: but these\narms man is born with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may apply\nto the most opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be the most\nwicked, the most cruel, the most lustful, and most gluttonous being\nimaginable; for justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the\nstate is regulated, and these rules are the criterion of what is right.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nSINCE it is now evident of what parts a city is composed, it will be\nnecessary to treat first of family government, for every city is made\nup of families, and every family [1253b] has again its separate parts of\nwhich it is composed. When a family is complete, it consists of freemen\nand slaves; but as in every subject we should begin with examining into\nthe smallest parts of which it consists, and as the first and smallest\nparts of a family are the master and slave, the husband and wife, the\nfather and child, let us first inquire into these three, what each of\nthem may be, and what they ought to be; that is to say, the herile, the\nnuptial, and the paternal. Let these then be considered as the three\ndistinct parts of a family: some think that the providing what is\nnecessary for the family is something different from the government of\nit, others that this is the greatest part of it; it shall be considered\nseparately; but we will first speak of a master and a slave, that we\nmay both understand the nature of those things which are absolutely\nnecessary, and also try if we can learn anything better on this subject\nthan what is already known. Some persons have thought that the power of\nthe master over his slave originates from his superior knowledge, and\nthat this knowledge is the same in the master, the magistrate, and the\nking, as we have already said; but others think that herile government\nis contrary to nature, and that it is the law which makes one man a\nslave and another free, but that in nature there is no difference; for\nwhich reason that power cannot be founded in justice, but in force.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nSince then a subsistence is necessary in every family, the means of\nprocuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family, for\nwithout necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. As\nin all arts which are brought to perfection it is necessary that they\nshould have their proper instruments if they would complete their works,\nso is it in the art of managing a family: now of instruments some of\nthem are alive, others inanimate; thus with respect to the pilot of the\nship, the tiller is without life, the sailor is alive; for a servant\nis as an instrument in many arts. Thus property is as an instrument\nto living; an estate is a multitude of instruments; so a slave is an\nanimated instrument, but every one that can minister of himself is more\nvaluable than any other instrument; for if every instrument, at command,\nor from a preconception of its master's will, could accomplish its work\n(as the story goes of the statues of Daedalus; or what the poet tells us\nof the tripods of Vulcan, \"that they moved of their own accord into the\nassembly of the gods \"), the shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play\nof itself; nor would the architect want servants, or the [1254a] master\nslaves. Now what are generally called instruments are the efficients\nof something else, but possessions are what we simply use: thus with a\nshuttle we make something else for our use; but we only use a coat, or a\nbed: since then making and using differ from each other in species, and\nthey both require their instruments, it is necessary that these should\nbe different from each other. Now life is itself what we use, and not\nwhat we employ as the efficient of something else; for which reason the\nservices of a slave are for use. A possession may be considered in the\nsame nature as a part of anything; now a part is not only a part of\nsomething, but also is nothing else; so is a possession; therefore a\nmaster is only the master of the slave, but no part of him; but the\nslave is not only the slave of the master, but nothing else but that.\nThis fully explains what is the nature of a slave, and what are his\ncapacities; for that being who by nature is nothing of himself, but\ntotally another's, and is a man, is a slave by nature; and that man who\nis the property of another, is his mere chattel, though he continues a\nman; but a chattel is an instrument for use, separate from the body.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nBut whether any person is such by nature, and whether it is advantageous\nand just for any one to be a slave or no, or whether all slavery is\ncontrary to nature, shall be considered hereafter; not that it is\ndifficult to determine it upon general principles, or to understand\nit from matters of fact; for that some should govern, and others be\ngoverned, is not only necessary but useful, and from the hour of their\nbirth some are marked out for those purposes, and others for the other,\nand there are many species of both sorts. And the better those are who\nare governed the better also is the government, as for instance of man,\nrather than the brute creation: for the more excellent the materials\nare with which the work is finished, the more excellent certainly is the\nwork; and wherever there is a governor and a governed, there certainly\nis some work produced; for whatsoever is composed of many parts, which\njointly become one, whether conjunct or separate, evidently show the\nmarks of governing and governed; and this is true of every living thing\nin all nature; nay, even in some things which partake not of life, as\nin music; but this probably would be a disquisition too foreign to our\npresent purpose. Every living thing in the first place is composed of\nsoul and body, of these the one is by nature the governor, the other the\ngoverned; now if we would know what is natural, we ought to search for\nit in those subjects in which nature appears most perfect, and not in\nthose which are corrupted; we should therefore examine into a man who\nis most perfectly formed both in soul and body, in whom this is evident,\nfor in the depraved and vicious the body seems [1254b] to rule rather\nthan the soul, on account of their being corrupt and contrary to nature.\nWe may then, as we affirm, perceive in an animal the first principles\nof herile and political government; for the soul governs the body as the\nmaster governs his slave; the mind governs the appetite with a political\nor a kingly power, which shows that it is both natural and advantageous\nthat the body should be governed by the soul, and the pathetic part by\nthe mind, and that part which is possessed of reason; but to have no\nruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to all; and this holds\ntrue not only of man, but of other animals also, for tame animals are\nnaturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous that both should\nbe under subjection to man; for this is productive of their common\nsafety: so is it naturally with the male and the female; the one is\nsuperior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is governed;\nand the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to all\nmankind. Those men therefore who are as much inferior to others as the\nbody is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use of\nthem is their bodies, in which their excellence consists; and if what I\nhave said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is advantageous to\nthem to be always under government. He then is by nature formed a slave\nwho is qualified to become the chattel of another person, and on that\naccount is so, and who has just reason enough to know that there is such\na faculty, without being indued with the use of it; for other animals\nhave no perception of reason, but are entirely guided by appetite,\nand indeed they vary very little in their use from each other; for the\nadvantage which we receive, both from slaves and tame animals, arises\nfrom their bodily strength administering to our necessities; for it\nis the intention of nature to make the bodies of slaves and freemen\ndifferent from each other, that the one should be robust for their\nnecessary purposes, the others erect, useless indeed for what slaves are\nemployed in, but fit for civil life, which is divided into the duties of\nwar and peace; though these rules do not always take place, for slaves\nhave sometimes the bodies of freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it\nis evident that if some bodies are as much more excellent than others as\nthe statues of the gods excel the human form, every one will allow that\nthe inferior ought to be slaves to the superior; and if this is true\nwith respect to the body, it is still juster to determine in the same\nmanner, when we consider the soul; though it is not so easy to perceive\nthe beauty of [1255a] the soul as it is of the body. Since then some\nmen are slaves by nature, and others are freemen, it is clear that where\nslavery is advantageous to any one, then it is just to make him a slave.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nBut it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the contrary\nopinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become a slave two\ndifferent ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law is a certain\ncompact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is adjudged to be the\nproperty of the conquerors: but many persons who are conversant in law\ncall in question this pretended right, and say that it would be hard\nthat a man should be compelled by violence to be the slave and subject\nof another who had the power to compel him, and was his superior in\nstrength; and upon this subject, even of those who are wise, some think\none way and some another; but the cause of this doubt and variety of\nopinions arises from hence, that great abilities, when accompanied with\nproper means, are generally able to succeed by force: for victory is\nalways owing to a superiority in some advantageous circumstances; so\nthat it seems that force never prevails but in consequence of great\nabilities. But still the dispute concerning the justice of it remains;\nfor some persons think, that justice consists in benevolence, others\nthink it just that the powerful should govern: in the midst of these\ncontrary opinions, there are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that\nthe right of being master and governor ought not to be placed with those\nwho have the greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the\nright which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects\njust), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that\nthey say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon\nwhich the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that a\nman who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so, men of\nthe noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the descendants of\nslaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in war and sold: to\navoid this difficulty they say that such persons should not be called\nslaves, but barbarians only should; but when they say this, they do\nnothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature, which was what we\nat first said; for we must acknowledge that there are some persons\nwho, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves, but others in no\nsituation; thus also it is with those of noble descent: it is not only\nin their own country that they are Esteemed as such, but everywhere,\nbut the barbarians are respected on this account at home only; as if\nnobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other not\nso. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:\n\n  \"Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the\nimmortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage.\"\n\nThose who express sentiments like these, shew only that they distinguish\nthe slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from each other\nby their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it reasonable,\nthat as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a\ngood man should be descended; and this is what nature desires to do, but\nfrequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt\nhas some reason in it, and that these persons are not slaves, and those\nfreemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that in some instances\nit is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to both parties for\nthis man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and that it is right\nand just, that some should be governed, and others govern, in the manner\nthat nature intended; of which sort of government is that which a master\nexercises over a slave. But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both;\nfor the same thing is useful to the part and to the whole, to the body\nand to the soul; but the slave is as it were a part of the master, as if\nhe were an animated part of his body, though separate. For which reason\na mutual utility and friendship may subsist between the master and the\nslave, I mean when they are placed by nature in that relation to each\nother, for the contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to\nslavery by the law, or by conquest.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nIt is evident from what has been said, that a herile and a political\ngovernment are not the same, or that all governments are alike to each\nother, as some affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of freemen, the\nother to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for that is\nwhat prevails in every house; but a political state is the government of\nfree men and equals. The master is not so called from his knowing how to\nmanage his slave, but because he is so; for the same reason a slave and\na freeman have their respective appellations. There is also one sort of\nknowledge proper for a master, another for a slave; the slave's is of\nthe nature of that which was taught by a slave at Syracuse; for he for\na stipulated sum instructed the boys in all the business of a household\nslave, of which there are various sorts to be learnt, as the art of\ncookery, and other such-like services, of which some are allotted to\nsome, and others to others; some employments being more honourable,\nothers more necessary; according to the proverb, \"One slave excels\nanother, one master excels another:\" in such-like things the knowledge\nof a slave consists. The knowledge of the master is to be able properly\nto employ his slaves, for the mastership of slaves is the employment,\nnot the mere possession of them; not that this knowledge contains\nanything great or respectable; for what a slave ought to know how to do,\nthat a master ought to know how to order; for which reason, those who\nhave it in their power to be free from these low attentions, employ a\nsteward for this business, and apply themselves either to public affairs\nor philosophy: the knowledge of procuring what is necessary for a family\nis different from that which belongs either to the master or the slave:\nand to do this justly must be either by war or hunting. And thus much of\nthe difference between a master and a slave.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\n[1256a] As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by\nall means inquire into the nature of property in general, and the\nacquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the\nfirst place then, some one may doubt whether the getting of money is\nthe same thing as economy, or whether it is a part of it, or something\nsubservient to it; and if so, whether it is as the art of making\nshuttles is to the art of weaving, or the art of making brass to that\nof statue founding, for they are not of the same service; for the one\nsupplies the tools, the other the matter: by the matter I mean the\nsubject out of which the work is finished, as wool for the cloth and\nbrass for the statue. It is evident then that the getting of money is\nnot the same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to furnish\nthe means of the other to use them; and what art is there employed in\nthe management of a family but economy, but whether this is a part of\nit, or something of a different species, is a doubt; for if it is\nthe business of him who is to get money to find out how riches and\npossessions may be procured, and both these arise from various\ncauses, we must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is part of\nmoney-getting or something different, and in general, whether the same\nis not true of every acquisition and every attention which relates to\nprovision. But as there are many sorts of provision, so are the methods\nof living both of man and the brute creation very various; and as it is\nimpossible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes\nthe lives of animals so different from each other. Of beasts, some\nlive in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for procuring\nthemselves food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and\nothers on whatsoever they light on, nature having so distinguished\ntheir course of life, that they can very easily procure themselves\nsubsistence; and as the same things are not agreeable to all, but one\nanimal likes one thing and another another, it follows that the lives\nof those beasts who live upon flesh must be different from the lives of\nthose who live on fruits; so is it with men, their lives differ greatly\nfrom each other; and of all these the shepherd's is the idlest, for they\nlive upon the flesh of tame animals, without any trouble, while they are\nobliged to change their habitations on account of their flocks, which\nthey are compelled to follow, cultivating, as it were, a living farm.\nOthers live exercising violence over living creatures, one pursuing this\nthing, another that, these preying upon men; those who live near lakes\nand marshes and rivers, or the sea itself, on fishing, while others are\nfowlers, or hunters of wild beasts; but the greater part of mankind live\nupon the produce of the earth and its cultivated fruits; and the manner\nin which all those live who follow the direction of nature, and labour\nfor their own subsistence, is nearly the same, without ever thinking\nto procure any provision by way of exchange or merchandise, such are\nshepherds, husband-men, [1256b] robbers, fishermen, and hunters: some\njoin different employments together, and thus live very agreeably;\nsupplying those deficiencies which were wanting to make their\nsubsistence depend upon themselves only: thus, for instance, the same\nperson shall be a shepherd and a robber, or a husbandman and a hunter;\nand so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life which\nnecessity points out. This provision then nature herself seems to have\nfurnished all animals with, as well immediately upon their first origin\nas also when they are arrived at a state of maturity; for at the first\nof these periods some of them are provided in the womb with proper\nnourishment, which continues till that which is born can get food for\nitself, as is the case with worms and birds; and as to those which bring\nforth their young alive, they have the means for their subsistence for a\ncertain time within themselves, namely milk. It is evident then that we\nmay conclude of those things that are, that plants are created for the\nsake of animals, and animals for the sake of men; the tame for our use\nand provision; the wild, at least the greater part, for our provision\nalso, or for some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing us with\nclothes, and the like. As nature therefore makes nothing either\nimperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these\nthings for men: for which reason what we gain in war is in a certain\ndegree a natural acquisition; for hunting is a part of it, which it is\nnecessary for us to employ against wild beasts; and those men who being\nintended by nature for slavery are unwilling to submit to it, on which\noccasion such a. war is by nature just: that species of acquisition then\nonly which is according to nature is part of economy; and this ought to\nbe at hand, or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is necessary\nto be kept in store to live upon, and which are useful as well for the\nstate as the family. And true riches seem to consist in these; and the\nacquisition of those possessions which are necessary for a happy life is\nnot infinite; though Solon says otherwise in this verse:\n\n  \"No bounds to riches can be fixed for man;\"\n\nfor they may be fixed as in other arts; for the instruments of no art\nwhatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude; but\nriches are a number of instruments in domestic and civil economy; it is\ntherefore evident that the acquisition of certain things according\nto nature is a part both of domestic and civil economy, and for what\nreason.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nThere is also another species of acquisition which they [1257a]\nparticularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety; and by this\nindeed it seems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many\npersons suppose, from their near relation to each other, that this is\none and the same with that we have just mentioned, but it is not the\nsame as that, though not very different; one of these is natural, the\nother is not, but rather owing to some art and skill; we will enter into\na particular examination of this subject. The uses of every possession\nare two, both dependent upon the thing itself, but not in the same\nmanner, the one supposing an inseparable connection with it, the other\nnot; as a shoe, for instance, which may be either worn, or exchanged\nfor something else, both these are the uses of the shoe; for he who\nexchanges a shoe with some man who wants one, for money or provisions,\nuses the shoe as a shoe, but not according to the original intention,\nfor shoes were not at first made to be exchanged. The same thing holds\ntrue of all other possessions; for barter, in general, had its original\nbeginning in nature, some men having a surplus, others too little of\nwhat was necessary for them: hence it is evident, that the selling\nprovisions for money is not according to the natural use of things; for\nthey were obliged to use barter for those things which they wanted; but\nit is plain that barter could have no place in the first, that is to\nsay, in family society; but must have begun when the number of those\nwho composed the community was enlarged: for the first of these had all\nthings in common; but when they came to be separated they were obliged\nto exchange with each other many different things which both parties\nwanted. Which custom of barter is still preserved amongst many barbarous\nnations, who procure one necessary with another, but never sell\nanything; as giving and receiving wine for corn and the like. This\nsort of barter is not contradictory to nature, nor is it any species of\nmoney-getting; but is necessary in procuring that subsistence which is\nso consonant thereunto. But this barter introduced the use of money, as\nmight be expected; for a convenient place from whence to import what you\nwanted, or to export what you had a surplus of, being often at a great\ndistance, money necessarily made its way into commerce; for it is not\neverything which is naturally most useful that is easiest of carriage;\nfor which reason they invented something to exchange with each other\nwhich they should mutually give and take, that being really valuable\nitself, should have the additional advantage of being of easy\nconveyance, for the purposes of life, as iron and silver, or anything\nelse of the same nature: and this at first passed in value simply\naccording to its weight or size; but in process of time it had a certain\nstamp, to save the trouble of weighing, which stamp expressed its value.\n[1257b]\n\nMoney then being established as the necessary medium of exchange,\nanother species of money-getting soon took place, namely, by buying\nand selling, at probably first in a simple manner, afterwards with more\nskill and experience, where and how the greatest profits might be made.\nFor which reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly conversant\nabout trade, and the business of it to be able to tell where the\ngreatest profits can be made, being the means of procuring abundance\nof wealth and possessions: and thus wealth is very often supposed to\nconsist in the quantity of money which any one possesses, as this is the\nmedium by which all trade is conducted and a fortune made, others again\nregard it as of no value, as being of none by nature, but arbitrarily\nmade so by compact; so that if those who use it should alter their\nsentiments, it would be worth nothing, as being of no service for\nany necessary purpose. Besides, he who abounds in money often wants\nnecessary food; and it is impossible to say that any person is in good\ncircumstances when with all his possessions he may perish with hunger.\n\nLike Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable wish had everything he\ntouched turned into gold. For which reason others endeavour to procure\nother riches and other property, and rightly, for there are other riches\nand property in nature; and these are the proper objects of economy:\nwhile trade only procures money, not by all means, but by the exchange\nof it, and for that purpose it is this which it is chiefly employed\nabout, for money is the first principle and the end of trade; nor are\nthere any bounds to be set to what is thereby acquired. Thus also there\nare no limits to the art of medicine, with respect to the health which\nit attempts to procure; the same also is true of all other arts; no line\ncan be drawn to terminate their bounds, the several professors of them\nbeing desirous to extend them as far as possible. (But still the means\nto be employed for that purpose are limited; and these are the limits\nbeyond which the art cannot proceed.) Thus in the art of acquiring\nriches there are no limits, for the object of that is money and\npossessions; but economy has a boundary, though this has not: for\nacquiring riches is not the business of that, for which reason it should\nseem that some boundary should be set to riches, though we see the\ncontrary to this is what is practised; for all those who get riches add\nto their money without end; the cause of which is the near connection\nof these two arts with each other, which sometimes occasions the one to\nchange employments with the other, as getting of money is their common\nobject: for economy requires the possession of wealth, but not on\nits own account but with another view, to purchase things necessary\ntherewith; but the other procures it merely to increase it: so that some\npersons are confirmed in their belief, that this is the proper object\nof economy, and think that for this purpose money should be saved and\nhoarded up without end; the reason for which disposition is, that they\nare intent upon living, but not upon living well; and this desire being\nboundless in its extent, the means which they aim at for that purpose\nare boundless also; and those who propose to live well, often confine\nthat to the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense; so that as this also\nseems to depend upon what a man has, all their care is to get money,\nand hence arises the other cause for this art; for as this enjoyment is\nexcessive in its degree, they endeavour to procure means proportionate\nto supply it; and if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing in\nmoney, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all their\npowers to a purpose they were not by nature intended for. Thus, for\ninstance, courage was intended to inspire fortitude, not to get money\nby; neither is this the end of the soldier's or the physician's art,\nbut victory and health. But such persons make everything subservient to\nmoney-getting, as if this was the only end; and to the end everything\nought to refer.\n\nWe have now considered that art of money-getting which is not necessary,\nand have seen in what manner we became in want of it; and also that\nwhich is necessary, which is different from it; for that economy which\nis natural, and whose object is to provide food, is not like this\nunlimited in its extent, but has its bounds.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nWe have now determined what was before doubtful, whether or no the art\nof getting money is his business who is at the head of a family or a\nstate, and though not strictly so, it is however very necessary; for\nas a politician does not make men, but receiving them from the hand of\nnature employs them to proper purposes; thus the earth, or the sea, or\nsomething else ought to supply them with provisions, and this it is the\nbusiness of the master of the family to manage properly; for it is not\nthe weaver's business to make yarn, but to use it, and to distinguish\nwhat is good and useful from what is bad and of no service; and indeed\nsome one may inquire why getting money should be a part of economy when\nthe art of healing is not, as it is as requisite that the family should\nbe in health as that they should eat, or have anything else which is\nnecessary; and as it is indeed in some particulars the business both of\nthe master of the family, and he to whom the government of the state\nis entrusted, to see after the health of those under their care, but in\nothers not, but the physician's; so also as to money; in some respects\nit is the business of the master of the family, in others not, but of\nthe servant; but as we have already said, it is chiefly nature's, for\nit is her part to supply her offspring with food; for everything finds\nnourishment left for it in what produced it; for which reason\nthe natural riches of all men arise from fruits and animals. Now\nmoney-making, as we say, being twofold, it may be applied to two\npurposes, the service of the house or retail trade; of which the first\nis necessary and commendable, the other justly censurable; for it has\nnot its origin in [1258b] nature, but by it men gain from each other;\nfor usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune\nby money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally\nintended, namely exchange.\n\nAnd this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the\nbreeding of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury\nis money bred of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most\nagainst nature.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nHaving already sufficiently considered the general principles of this\nsubject, let us now go into the practical part thereof; the one is a\nliberal employment for the mind, the other necessary. These things are\nuseful in the management of one's affairs; to be skilful in the nature\nof cattle, which are most profitable, and where, and how; as for\ninstance, what advantage will arise from keeping horses, or oxen, or\nsheep, or any other live stock; it is also necessary to be acquainted\nwith the comparative value of these things, and which of them in\nparticular places are worth most; for some do better in one place, some\nin another. Agriculture also should be understood, and the management\nof arable grounds and orchards; and also the care of bees, and fish, and\nbirds, from whence any profit may arise; these are the first and most\nproper parts of domestic management.\n\nWith respect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method of doing\nthis is by merchandise, which is carried on in three different ways,\neither by sending the commodity for sale by sea or by land, or else\nselling it on the place where it grows; and these differ from each other\nin this, that the one is more profitable, the other safer. The second\nmethod is by usury. The third by receiving wages for work done, and\nthis either by being employed in some mean art, or else in mere bodily\nlabour. There is also a third species of improving a fortune, that is\nsomething between this and the first; for it partly depends upon\nnature, partly upon exchange; the subject of which is, things that are\nimmediately from the earth, or their produce, which, though they bear\nno fruit, are yet useful, such as selling of timber and the whole art of\nmetallurgy, which includes many different species, for there are various\nsorts of things dug out of the earth.\n\nThese we have now mentioned in general, but to enter into particulars\nconcerning each of them, though it might be useful to the artist, would\nbe tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, those are the most\nexcellent wherein chance has the least to do, and those are the meanest\nwhich deprave the body, those the most servile in which bodily strength\nalone is chiefly wanted, those most illiberal which require least skill;\nbut as there are books written on these subjects by some persons, as\nby Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, upon husbandry and\nplanting; and by others on other matters, [1259b] let those who have\noccasion consult them thereon; besides, every person should collect\ntogether whatsoever he hears occasionally mentioned, by means of which\nmany of those who aimed at making a fortune have succeeded in their\nintentions; for all these are useful to those who make a point of\ngetting money, as in the contrivance of Thales the Milesian (which was\ncertainly a gainful one, but as it was his it was attributed to\nhis wisdom, though the method he used was a general one, and would\nuniversally succeed), when they reviled him for his poverty, as if the\nstudy of philosophy was useless: for they say that he, perceiving by his\nskill in astrology that there would be great plenty of olives that year,\nwhile it was yet winter, having got a little money, he gave earnest for\nall the oil works that were in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a\nlow price, there being no one to bid against him; but when the season\ncame for making oil, many persons wanting them, he all at once let them\nupon what terms he pleased; and raising a large sum of money by that\nmeans, convinced them that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if\nthey chose it, but that that was not what they aimed at; in this manner\nis Thales said to have shown his wisdom. It indeed is, as we have\nsaid, generally gainful for a person to contrive to make a monopoly of\nanything; for which reason some cities also take this method when they\nwant money, and monopolise their commodities. There was a certain person\nin Sicily who laid out a sum of money which was deposited in his hand in\nbuying up all the iron from the iron merchants; so that when the dealers\ncame from the markets to purchase, there was no one had any to sell but\nhimself; and though he put no great advance upon it, yet by laying out\nfifty talents he made an hundred. When Dionysius heard this he permitted\nhim to take his money with him, but forbid him to continue any longer in\nSicily, as being one who contrived means for getting money inconsistent\nwith his affairs. This man's view and Thales's was exactly the same;\nboth of them contrived to procure a monopoly for themselves: it is\nuseful also for politicians to understand these things, for many states\nwant to raise money and by such means, as well as private families,\nnay more so; for which reason some persons who are employed in the\nmanagement of public affairs confine themselves to this province only.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nThere are then three parts of domestic government, the masters, of\nwhich we have already treated, the fathers, and the husbands; now the\ngovernment of the wife and children should both be that of free persons,\nbut not the [I259b] same; for the wife should be treated as a citizen of\na free state, the children should be under kingly power; for the male is\nby nature superior to the female, except when something happens contrary\nto the usual course of nature, as is the elder and perfect to the\nyounger and imperfect. Now in the generality of free states, the\ngovernors and the governed alternately change place; for an equality\nwithout any preference is what nature chooses; however, when one\ngoverns and another is governed, she endeavours that there should be a\ndistinction between them in forms, expressions, and honours; according\nto what Amasis said of his laver. This then should be the established\nrule between the man and the woman. The government of children should\nbe kingly; for the power of the father over the child is founded in\naffection and seniority, which is a species of kingly government; for\nwhich reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter \"the father of gods and\nmen,\" who was king of both these; for nature requires that a king should\nbe of the same species with those whom he governs, though superior in\nsome particulars, as is the case between the elder and the younger, the\nfather and the son.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nIt is evident then that in the due government of a family, greater\nattention should be paid to the several members of it and their virtues\nthan to the possessions or riches of it; and greater to the freemen\nthan the slaves: but here some one may doubt whether there is any other\nvirtue in a slave than his organic services, and of higher estimation\nthan these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and such-like habits, or\nwhether they possess only bodily qualities: each side of the question\nhas its difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein do\nthey differ from freemen? and that they do not, since they are men,\nand partakers of reason, is absurd. Nearly the same inquiry may be made\nconcerning a woman and a child, whether these also have their proper\nvirtues; whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and\nwhether a child is temperate or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be\ngeneral, whether the virtues of those who, by nature, either govern or\nare governed, are the same or different; for if it is necessary that\nboth of them should partake of the fair and good, why is it also\nnecessary that, without exception, the one should govern, the other\nalways be governed? for this cannot arise from their possessing these\nqualities in different degrees; for to govern, and to be governed, are\nthings different in species, but more or less are not. And yet it is\nwonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if\nhe who is to govern should not be temperate and just, how can he govern\nwell? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he\nwho is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will never do what he ought: it\nis evident then that both parties ought to be virtuous; but there is a\ndifference between them, as there is between those who by nature command\nand who by nature obey, and this originates in the soul; for in this\nnature has planted the governing and submitting principle, the virtues\nof which we say are different, as are those of a rational and an\nirrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be\nextended farther, and that there are in nature a variety of things which\ngovern and are governed; for a freeman is governed in a different manner\nfrom a slave, a male from a female, and a man from a child: and all\nthese have parts of mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus\na slave can have no power of determination, a woman but a weak one, a\nchild an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to\nmoral virtues; all must be supposed to possess them, but not in the\nsame manner, but as is best suited to every one's employment; on which\naccount he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his\nbusiness is entirely that of an architect, and reason is the architect;\nwhile others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for\ntheir station; from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is\ncommon to all those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and\na woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though\nSocrates thought otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in\ncommanding, the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in other\nparticulars: and this will be evident to those who will examine\ndifferent virtues separately; for those who use general terms deceive\nthemselves when they say, that virtue consists in a good disposition of\nmind, or doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much\nbetter who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those\nwho thus define them; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, we think\nof all persons, that their 'virtues should be applicable to their\ncharacters, for says he,\n\n  \"Silence is a woman's ornament,\"\n\nbut it is not a man's; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident that\nhis virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present situation,\nbut to that in which he will be complete, and his preceptor. In like\nmanner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we\nlaid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave was to employ him in\nwhat you wanted; so that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted\nin his station, only that he may not neglect his work through idleness\nor fear: some person may question if what I have said is true, whether\nvirtue is not necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often\nthrough idleness neglect their work, but the difference between them\nis very great; for a slave is connected with you for life, but the\nartificer not so nearly: as near therefore as the artificer approaches\nto the situation of a slave, just so much ought he to have of the\nvirtues of one; for a mean artificer is to a certain point a slave; but\nthen a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are,\nbut this is not true [1260b] of a shoemaker, or any other artist. It is\nevident then that a slave ought to be trained to those virtues which are\nproper for his situation by his master; and not by him who has the power\nof a master, to teach him any particular art. Those therefore are in the\nwrong who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to\nfollow their orders; for slaves want more instruction than children, and\nthus we determine this matter. It is necessary, I am sensible, for every\none who treats upon government, to enter particularly into the relations\nof husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the\nvirtues of each and their respective connections with each other; what\nis right and what is wrong; and how the one ought to be followed, and\nthe other avoided. Since then every family is part of a city, and each\nof those individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts\nought to correspond to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary, that\nboth the wives and children of the community should be instructed\ncorrespondent to the nature thereof, if it is of consequence to the\nvirtue of the state, that the wives and children therein should be\nvirtuous, and of consequence it certainly is, for the wives are one half\nof the free persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to\nbe formed. As then we have determined these points, we will leave\nthe rest to be spoken to in another place, as if the subject was now\nfinished; and beginning again anew, first consider the sentiments of\nthose who have treated of the most perfect forms of government.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nSince then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others\nbest for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they wish,\nit is necessary to examine into the polity of those states which are\nallowed to be well governed; and if there should be any others which\nsome persons have described, and which appear properly regulated, to\nnote what is right and useful in them; and when we point out wherein\nthey have failed, let not this be imputed to an affectation of wisdom,\nfor it is because there are great defects in all those which are already\nestablished, that I have been induced to undertake this work. We will\nbegin with that part of the subject which naturally presents itself\nfirst to our consideration. The members of every state must of necessity\nhave all things in common, or some things common, and not others,\nor nothing at all common. To have nothing in common is evidently\nimpossible, for society itself is one species of [1261a] community; and\nthe first thing necessary thereunto is a common place of habitation,\nnamely the city, which must be one, and this every citizen must have a\nshare in. But in a government which is to be well founded, will it be\nbest to admit of a community in everything which is capable thereof, or\nonly in some particulars, but in others not? for it is possible that the\ncitizens may have their wives, and children, and goods in common, as\nin Plato's Commonwealth; for in that Socrates affirms that all these\nparticulars ought to be so. Which then shall we prefer? the custom which\nis already established, or the laws which are proposed in that treatise?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nNow as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties, so\nneither does the cause for which he would frame his government in this\nmanner seem agreeable to reason, nor is it capable of producing that end\nwhich he has proposed, and for which he says it ought to take place; nor\nhas he given any particular directions for putting it in practice. Now\nI also am willing to agree with Socrates in the principle which he\nproceeds upon, and admit that the city ought to be one as much as\npossible; and yet it is evident that if it is contracted too much, it\nwill be no longer a city, for that necessarily supposes a multitude; so\nthat if we proceed in this manner, we shall reduce a city to a family,\nand a family to a single person: for we admit that a family is one in a\ngreater degree than a city, and a single person than a family; so that\nif this end could be obtained, it should never be put in practice, as it\nwould annihilate the city; for a city does not only consist of a large\nnumber of inhabitants, but there must also be different sorts; for were\nthey all alike, there could be no city; for a confederacy and a city are\ntwo different things; for a confederacy is valuable from its numbers,\nalthough all those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this\nis entered into for the sake of mutual defence, as we add an additional\nweight to make the scale go down. The same distinction prevails between\na city and a nation when the people are not collected into separate\nvillages, but live as the Arcadians. Now those things in which a city\nshould be one are of different sorts, and in preserving an alternate\nreciprocation of power between these, the safety thereof consists (as\nI have already mentioned in my treatise on Morals), for amongst freemen\nand equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern at the\nsame time, but either by the year, or according to some other regulation\nor time, by which means every one in his turn will be in office; as\nif the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and not\nalways be employed in the same calling. But as it is evidently better,\nthat these should continue to exercise their respective trades; so also\nin civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that the\ngovernment should continue in the same hands; but where it [1261b] is\nnot (as nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is just, be the\nadministration good or bad, that all should partake of it), there it is\nbest to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns\nsubmit to those who are at that time magistrates, as they will, in their\nturns, alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different\nmen: by the same method different persons will execute different\noffices. From hence it is evident, that a city cannot be one in the\nmanner that some persons propose; and that what has been said to be the\ngreatest good which it could enjoy, is absolutely its destruction, which\ncannot be: for the good of anything is that which preserves it.\nFor another reason also it is clear, that it is not for the best\nto endeavour to make a city too much one, because a family is more\nsufficient in itself than a single person, a city than a family; and\nindeed Plato supposes that a city owes its existence to that sufficiency\nin themselves which the members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is\nso desirable, the less the city is one the better.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nBut admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as much\nas possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place by\npermitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine (though\nthis is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is entirely one),\nfor the word All is used in two senses; if it means each individual,\nwhat Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for each person will\nsay, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his own property, and\nof everything else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own.\nBut those who have their wives and children in common will not say so,\nbut all will say so, though not as individuals; therefore, to use the\nword all is evidently a fallacious mode of speech; for this word is\nsometimes used distributively, and sometimes collectively, on account\nof its double meaning, and is the cause of inconclusive syllogisms in\nreasoning. Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their\nown, using the word all in its distributive sense, would be well, but is\nimpossible: in its collective sense it would by no means contribute to\nthe concord of the state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience\nattending this proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care\nof; for all men regard more what is their own than what others share\nwith them in, to which they pay less attention than is incumbent on\nevery one: let me add also, that every one is more negligent of what\nanother is to see to, as well as himself, than of his own private\nbusiness; as in a family one is often worse served by many servants than\nby a few. Let each citizen then in the state have a thousand children,\nbut let none of them be considered as the children of that individual,\nbut let the relation of father and child be common to them all, and they\nwill all be neglected. Besides, in consequence of this, [1262a] whenever\nany citizen behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it\nwould, might say, this is my son, or this man's or that; and in\nthis manner would they speak, and thus would they doubt of the whole\nthousand, or of whatever number the city consisted; and it would be\nuncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was to\ntake care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to say\nthis is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand or ten\nthousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms of government,\nwhere one man calls another his son, another calls that same person\nhis brother, another nephew, or some other relation, either by blood\nor marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while another\nregards him as one of the same parish and the same tribe; and it is\nbetter for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity than a son\nafter that manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some\npersons from suspecting that they are brothers and sisters, fathers and\nmothers to each other; for, from the mutual likeness there is between\nthe sire and the offspring, they will necessarily conclude in what\nrelation they stand to each other, which circumstance, we are informed\nby those writers who describe different parts of the world, does\nsometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there are wives in common who\nyet deliver their children to their respective fathers, being guided\nby their likeness to them. There are also some mares and cows which\nnaturally bring forth their young so like the male, that we can easily\ndistinguish by which of them they were impregnated: such was the mare\ncalled Just, in Pharsalia.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nBesides, those who contrive this plan of community cannot easily avoid\nthe following evils; namely, blows, murders involuntary or voluntary,\nquarrels, and reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be\nguilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly\nrelated to us; though not to those who are not connected to us by any\ntie of affinity: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen\noftener amongst those who do not know how they are connected to each\nother than those who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the\nfirst of these, they admit of a legal expiation, but amongst the latter\nthat cannot be done. It is also absurd for those who promote a\ncommunity of children to forbid those who love each other from indulging\nthemselves in the last excesses of that passion, while they do not\nrestrain them from the passion itself, or those intercourses which are\nof all things most improper, between a Father and a son, a brother and\na brother, and indeed the thing itself is most absurd. It is also\nridiculous to prevent this intercourse between the nearest relations,\nfor no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, while they think\nthat the relation of father and daughter, the brother and sister, is of\nno consequence at all. It seems also more advantageous for the state,\nthat the husbandmen should have their wives and children in common than\nthe military, for there will be less affection [1262b] among them\nin that case than when otherwise; for such persons ought to be under\nsubjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek after innovations.\nUpon the whole, the consequences of such a law as this would be directly\ncontrary to those things which good laws ought to establish, and which\nSocrates endeavoured to establish by his regulations concerning women\nand children: for we think that friendship is the greatest good which\ncan happen to any city, as nothing so much prevents seditions: and amity\nin a city is what Socrates commends above all things, which appears\nto be, as indeed he says, the effect of friendship; as we learn from\nAristophanes in the Erotics, who says, that those who love one another\nfrom the excess of that passion, desire to breathe the same soul, and\nfrom being two to be blended into one: from whence it would necessarily\nfollow, that both or one of them must be destroyed. But now in a city\nwhich admits of this community, the tie of friendship must, from that\nvery cause, be extremely weak, when no father can say, this is my son;\nor son, this is my father; for as a very little of what is sweet, being\nmixed with a great deal of water is imperceptible after the mixture, so\nmust all family connections, and the names they go by, be necessarily\ndisregarded in such a community, it being then by no means necessary\nthat the father should have any regard for him he called a son, or\nthe brothers for those they call brothers. There are two things which\nprincipally inspire mankind with care and love of their offspring,\nknowing it is their own, and what ought to be the object of their\naffection, neither of which can take place in this sort of community. As\nfor exchanging the children of the artificers and husbandmen with those\nof the military, and theirs reciprocally with these, it will occasion\ngreat confusion in whatever manner it shall be done; for of necessity,\nthose who carry the children must know from whom they took and to whom\nthey gave them; and by this means those evils which I have already\nmentioned will necessarily be the more likely to happen, as blows,\nincestuous love, murders, and the like; for those who are given from\ntheir own parents to other citizens, the military, for instance, will\nnot call them brothers, sons, fathers, or mothers. The same thing\nwould happen to those of the military who were placed among the other\ncitizens; so that by this means every one would be in fear how to act\nin consequence of consanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a\ncommunity of wives and children.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nWe proceed next to consider in what manner property should be regulated\nin a state which is formed after the most perfect mode of government,\nwhether it should be common or not; for this may be considered as a\nseparate question from what had been determined concerning [1263a] wives\nand children; I mean, whether it is better that these should be held\nseparate, as they now everywhere are, or that not only possessions but\nalso the usufruct of them should be in common; or that the soil should\nhave a particular owner, but that the produce should be brought together\nand used as one common stock, as some nations at present do; or on the\ncontrary, should the soil be common, and should it also be cultivated in\ncommon, while the produce is divided amongst the individuals for their\nparticular use, which is said to be practised by some barbarians; or\nshall both the soil and the fruit be common? When the business of\nthe husbandman devolves not on the citizen, the matter is much easier\nsettled; but when those labour together who have a common right of\npossession, this may occasion several difficulties; for there may not\nbe an equal proportion between their labour and what they consume; and\nthose who labour hard and have but a small proportion of the produce,\nwill certainly complain of those who take a large share of it and do but\nlittle for that. Upon the whole, as a community between man and man so\nentire as to include everything possible, and thus to have all things\nthat man can possess in common, is very difficult, so is it particularly\nso with respect to property; and this is evident from that community\nwhich takes place between those who go out to settle a colony; for they\nfrequently have disputes with each other upon the most common occasions,\nand come to blows upon trifles: we find, too, that we oftenest correct\nthose slaves who are generally employed in the common offices of the\nfamily: a community of property then has these and other inconveniences\nattending it.\n\nBut the manner of life which is now established, more particularly when\nembellished with good morals and a system of equal laws, is far superior\nto it, for it will have the advantage of both; by both I mean properties\nbeing common, and divided also; for in some respects it ought to be in\na manner common, but upon the whole private: for every man's attention\nbeing employed on his own particular concerns, will prevent mutual\ncomplaints against each other; nay, by this means industry will be\nincreased, as each person will labour to improve his own private\nproperty; and it will then be, that from a principle of virtue they will\nmutually perform good offices to each other, according to the proverb,\n\"All things are common amongst friends;\" and in some cities there are\ntraces of this custom to be seen, so that it is not impracticable, and\nparticularly in those which are best governed; some things are by this\nmeans in a manner common, and others might be so; for there, every\nperson enjoying his own private property, some things he assists his\nfriend with, others are considered as in common; as in Lacedaemon, where\nthey use each other's slaves, as if they were, so to speak, their own,\nas they do their horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in\na journey.\n\nIt is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make\nthe use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to it is\nthe particular [1263b] business of the legislator. And also with respect\nto pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is, that a man should\nthink he has something which he may call his own; for it is by no means\nto no purpose, that each person should have an affection for himself,\nfor that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover is justly censured; for\nwe mean by that, not one that simply loves himself, but one that loves\nhimself more than he ought; in like manner we blame a money-lover,\nand yet both money and self is what all men love. Besides, it is very\npleasing to us to oblige and assist our friends and companions, as well\nas those whom we are connected with by the rights of hospitality; and\nthis cannot be done without the establishment of private property, which\ncannot take place with those who make a city too much one; besides, they\nprevent every opportunity of exercising two principal virtues, modesty\nand liberality. Modesty with respect to the female sex, for this virtue\nrequires you to abstain from her who is another's; liberality, which\ndepends upon private property, for without that no one can appear\nliberal, or do any generous action; for liberality consists in imparting\nto others what is our own.\n\nThis system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good\nappearance and specious pretences to humanity; and when first proposed\nto any one, must give him great pleasure, as he will conclude it to be\na wonderful bond of friendship, connecting all to all; particularly\nwhen any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society,\nas arising from properties not being common, I mean the disputes which\nhappen between man and man, upon their different contracts with each\nother; those judgments which are passed in court in consequence of\nfraud, and perjury, and flattering the rich, none of which arise from\nproperties being private, but from the vices of mankind. Besides,\nthose who live in one general community, and have all things in common,\noftener dispute with each other than those who have their property\nseparate; from the very small number indeed of those who have their\nproperty in common, compared with those where it is appropriated,\nthe instances of their quarrels are but few. It is also but right to\nmention, not only the inconveniences they are preserved from who live in\na communion of goods, but also the advantages they are deprived of; for\nwhen the whole comes to be considered, this manner of life will be found\nimpracticable.\n\nWe must suppose, then, that Socrates's mistake arose from the principle\nhe set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a family and a\ncity ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely; for there\nis a point beyond which if a city proceeds in reducing itself to one, it\nwill be no longer a city.\n\nThere is also another point at which it will still continue to be a\ncity, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be\nworse than none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who\nsing in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to\nbe made one, and a community, as I have already said, by education;\nas property at Lacedaemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made\ncommon by their legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any\neducation, and think thereby to make his city excellent and respectable,\nwill be absurd, while he expects to form it by such regulations, and not\nby manners, philosophy, and laws. And whoever [1264a] would establish\na government upon a community of goods, ought to know that he should\nconsult the experience of many years, which would plainly enough inform\nhim whether such a scheme is useful; for almost all things have already\nbeen found out, but some have been neglected, and others which have been\nknown have not been put in practice. But this would be most evident, if\nany one could see such a government really established: for it would be\nimpossible to frame such a city without dividing and separating it into\nits distinct parts, as public tables, wards, and tribes; so that here\nthe laws will do nothing more than forbid the military to engage\nin agriculture, which is what the Lacedaemonians are at present\nendeavouring to do.\n\nNor has Socrates told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of government\nshould be pursued with respect to the individuals in the state where\nthere is a community of goods established; for though the majority\nof his citizens will in general consist of a multitude of persons of\ndifferent occupations, of those he has determined nothing; whether the\nproperty of the husbandman ought to be in common, or whether each person\nshould have his share to himself; and also, whether their wives and\nchildren ought to be in common: for if all things are to be alike common\nto all, where will be the difference between them and the military, or\nwhat would they get by submitting to their government? and upon what\nprinciples would they do it, unless they should establish the wise\npractice of the Cretans? for they, allowing everything else to their\nslaves, forbid them only gymnastic exercises and the use of arms. And if\nthey are not, but these should be in the same situation with respect to\ntheir property which they are in other cities, what sort of a community\nwill there be? in one city there must of necessity be two, and those\ncontrary to each other; for he makes the military the guardians of the\nstate, and the husbandman, artisans, and others, citizens; and all those\nquarrels, accusations, and things of the like sort, which he says are\nthe bane of other cities, will be found in his also: notwithstanding\nSocrates says they will not want many laws in consequence of their\neducation, but such only as may be necessary for regulating the streets,\nthe markets, and the like, while at the same time it is the education of\nthe military only that he has taken any care of. Besides, he makes the\nhusbandmen masters of property upon paying a tribute; but this would\nbe likely to make them far more troublesome and high-spirited than the\nHelots, the Penestise, or the slaves which others employ; nor has he\never determined whether it is necessary to give any attention to them\nin these particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith,\ntheir polity, their education, their laws; besides, it is of no little\nconsequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be framed so\nas to preserve the community of the military.\n\nBesides, if he makes the wives common, while the property [1264b]\ncontinues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the same\ncare which the man bestows upon his fields? nor will the inconvenience\nbe remedied by making property as well as wives common; and it is absurd\nto draw a comparison from the brute creation, and say, that the same\nprinciple should regulate the connection of a man and a woman which\nregulates theirs amongst whom there is no family association.\n\nIt is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has\ndone; for he would have persons of the same rank always in office, which\nbecomes the cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no account,\nbut more particularly amongst those who are of a courageous and warlike\ndisposition; it is indeed evidently necessary that he should frame his\ncommunity in this manner; for that golden particle which God has mixed\nup in the soul of man flies not from one to the other, but always\ncontinues with the same; for he says, that some of our species have\ngold, and others silver, blended in their composition from the moment of\ntheir birth: but those who are to be husbandmen and artists, brass and\niron; besides, though he deprives the military of happiness, he says,\nthat the legislator ought to make all the citizens happy; but it\nis impossible that the whole city can be happy, without all, or the\ngreater, or some part of it be happy. For happiness is not like\nthat numerical equality which arises from certain numbers when added\ntogether, although neither of them may separately contain it; for\nhappiness cannot be thus added together, but must exist in every\nindividual, as some properties belong to every integral; and if the\nmilitary are not happy, who else are so? for the artisans are not, nor\nthe multitude of those who are employed in inferior offices. The state\nwhich Socrates has described has all these defects, and others which are\nnot of less consequence.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nIt is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ\nafterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to consider\nbriefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates has\nthoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in what\nmanner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated, how\nproperty should be established, and government conducted.\n\nNow he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and soldiers,\nand from these he select a third part who are to be senators and govern\nthe city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman and artificer\nshall have any or what share in the government, or whether they shall\nhave arms, and join with the others in war, or not. He thinks also\nthat the women ought to go to war, and have the same education as the\nsoldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his treatise with\nmatter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to education, he has\nonly said what that of the guards ought to be.\n\n[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which that\ncontains, for he has there said but little concerning government; and\nthis government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a manner as\nto impart to its members a more entire community of goods than is to be\nfound in other cities, he almost brings round again to be the same\nas that other government which he had first proposed; for except the\ncommunity of wives and goods, he has framed both his governments alike,\nfor the education of the citizens is to be the same in both; they are in\nboth to live without any servile employ, and their common tables are to\nbe the same, excepting that in that he says the women should have common\ntables, and that there should be a thousand men-at-arms, in this, that\nthere should be five thousand.\n\nAll the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and\ninquisitive; but that they are all true it may probably be too much\nto say. For now with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be\nacknowledged that he would want the country of Babylonia for them, or\nsome one like it, of an immeasurable extent, to support five thousand\nidle persons, besides a much greater number of women and servants. Every\none, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it ought\nto be possible. It has been said, that a legislator should have two\nthings in view when he frames his laws, the country and the people. He\nwill also do well, if he has some regard to the neighbouring states, if\nhe intends that his community should maintain any political intercourse\nwith them, for it is not only necessary that they should understand that\npractice of war which is adapted to their own country, but to others\nalso; for admitting that any one chooses not this life either in\npublic or private, yet there is not the less occasion for their being\nformidable to their enemies, not only when they invade their country,\nbut also when they retire out of it.\n\nIt may also be considered whether the quantity of each person's property\nmay not be settled in a different manner from what he has done it in,\nby making it more determinate; for he says, that every one ought to have\nenough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had said to live well,\nwhich is the most comprehensive expression. Besides, a man may live\nmoderately and miserably at the same time; he had therefore better\nhave proposed, that they should live both moderately and liberally;\nfor unless these two conspire, luxury will come in on the one hand, or\nwretchedness on the other, since these two modes of living are the only\nones applicable to the employment of our substance; for we cannot say\nwith respect to a man's fortune, that he is mild or courageous, but we\nmay say that he is prudent and liberal, which are the only qualities\nconnected therewith.\n\nIt is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for\nthe increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance\nuncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of\nwomen who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it\nwould because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case\nwould not be the same in such a state which he proposes and those which\nnow actually unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the property\nis divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers what they will;\nbut as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they\nwere many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is more necessary\nthan even to regulate property, to take care that the increase of the\npeople should not exceed a certain number; and in determining that,\nto take into consideration those children who will die, and also those\nwomen who will be barren; and to neglect this, as is done in several\ncities, is to bring certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the\ncause of sedition and evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest\nlegislators, thought the families and the number of the citizens should\ncontinue the same; although it should happen that all should have\nallotments at the first, disproportionate to their numbers.\n\nIn Plato's Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter what\nwe think would be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in\nthat treatise to point out how the governors are to be distinguished\nfrom the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp\nought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought some to govern, and\nothers to be governed. But since he admits, that all their property may\nbe increased fivefold, why should he not allow the same increase to the\ncountry? he ought also to consider whether his allotment of the houses\nwill be useful to the community, for he appoints two houses to each\nperson, separate from each other; but it is inconvenient for a person\nto inhabit two houses. Now he is desirous to have his whole plan of\ngovernment neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but something between\nboth, which he calls a polity, for it is to be composed of men-at-arms.\nIf Plato intended to frame a state in which more than in any other\neverything should be common, he has certainly given it a right name;\nbut if he intended it to be the next in perfection to that which he had\nalready framed, it is not so; for perhaps some persons will give the\npreference to the Lacedaemonian form of government, or some other which\nmay more completely have attained to the aristocratic form.\n\nSome persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed\nof all others blended together, for which reason they commend that\nof Lacedaemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy,\na monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical\npart, the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be found\nthe democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some say, that\nin the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common meal and\ndaily course of life, in which the democratical form is represented.\nIt is also said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that the best form of\ngovernment must, be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though\nsuch a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any government at all,\nor if it is, the worst possible; those propose what is much better who\nblend many governments together; for the most perfect is that which is\nformed of many parts. But now in this government of Plato's there are\nno traces of a monarchy, only of an oligarchy and democracy; though he\nseems to choose that it should rather incline to an oligarchy, as is\nevident from the appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by\nlot is common to both; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a\nmember of the assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take part in the\nmanagement of public affairs, while others are passed over, makes the\nstate incline to an oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the\ngreater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their\nappointments may correspond with their fortunes.\n\nThe same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the\nmanner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all\nare obliged to vote for those who are senators of the first class,\nafterwards they vote for the same number out of the second, and then out\nof the third; but this compulsion to vote at the election of senators\ndoes not extend to the third and fourth classes and the first and second\nclass only are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this means he says\nhe shall necessarily have an equal number of each rank, but he is\nmistaken--for the majority will always consist of those of the first\nrank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason, that\nmany of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend the\nelections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not consist\nof a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be further proved by\nwhat we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form of\ngovernment.\n\nThere will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the\nsenate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect\nothers; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine\ntogether, though not very considerable, the election will always fall\naccording to their pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes\nconcerning government in his book of Laws.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nThere are also some other forms of government, which have been proposed\neither by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians, all of which\ncome much nearer to those which have been really established, or now\nexist, than these two of Plato's; for neither have they introduced the\ninnovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for\nthe women, but have been contented to set out with establishing such\nrules as are absolutely necessary.\n\nThere are some persons who think, that the first object of government\nshould be to regulate well everything relating to private property;\nfor they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions\nwhatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed,\nthat the fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought was\nnot difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled, but\nthat it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long\nestablished; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of\ncircumstances introduced by these means, that the rich should give\nmarriage portions, but never receive any, while the poor should always\nreceive, but never give.\n\nBut Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in\ncircumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no\ncitizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the\nlowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who\nwould establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to\nconsider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which each\nindividual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number of his\nchildren; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of provision, the\nlaw must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of the repeal, it\nwill have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to poverty, so\ndifficult is it for innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an\nequality of goods was in some degree serviceable to strengthen the bands\nof society, seems to have been known to some of the ancients; for Solon\nmade a law, as did some others also, to restrain persons from possessing\nas much land as they pleased. And upon the same principle there are laws\nwhich forbid men to sell their property, as among the Locrians, unless\nthey can prove that some notorious misfortune has befallen them. They\nwere also to preserve their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken\nthrough by the Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for\nby that means it was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain\nfortune to be qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods\nis established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people\nto live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live\nhard. Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator\nto establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium.\nBesides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a\nmanner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would\nbe of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should\nentertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of circumstances;\nbut this can never be attained unless they are properly educated under\nthe direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say, that this in\nwhat he himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality of property\nand one plan of education in his city. But he should have said\nparticularly what education he intended, nor is it of any service to\nhave this to much one; for this education may be one, and yet such as\nwill make the citizens over-greedy, to grasp after honours, or riches,\nor both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but also\nof honours, will occasion [1267a] seditions, but this upon contrary\ngrounds; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an inequality of\ngoods, by those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of\nhonours.\n\n  \"When good and bad do equal honours share.\"\n\nFor men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he\nthinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would\nthen have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy\nwhat they desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desire extend\nbeyond the common necessaries of life, they were be wicked to gratify\nthem; and not only so, but if their wishes point that way, they will do\nthe same to enjoy those pleasures which are free from the alloy of pain.\nWhat remedy then shall we find for these three disorders? And first,\nto prevent stealing from necessity, let every one be supplied with a\nmoderate subsistence, which may make the addition of his own industry\nnecessary; second to prevent stealing to procure the luxuries of life,\ntemperance be enjoined; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure in\nitself seek for it only in philosophy, all others want the assistance of\nmen.\n\nSince then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not\nfrom necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to keep him\nfrom the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief,\nbut tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would only be\nsalutary to prevent little crimes. He has also been very desirous to\nestablish such rules as will conduce to perfect the internal policy of\nhis state, and he ought also to have done the same with respect to\nits neighbours and all foreign nations; for the considerations of the\nmilitary establishment should take place in planning every government,\nthat it may not be unprovided in case of a war, of which he has said\nnothing; so also with respect to property, it ought not only to be\nadapted to the exigencies of the state, but also to such dangers as may\narise from without.\n\nThus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more\npowerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive\nout the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be able to\ngo to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of this he has\ndetermined nothing; it must indeed be allowed that it is advantageous to\na community to be rather rich than poor; probably the proper boundary is\nthis, not to possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful\nneighbour to attack you, any more than he would those who had not so\nmuch as yourself; thus when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus,\nEubulus advised him to consider what time it would require to take the\ncity, and then would have him determine whether it would answer, for\nthat he should choose, if it would even take less than he proposed,\nto quit the place; his saying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the\nbusiness and give over the siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an\nequality of goods amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet,\nto say truth, no very great one; for men of great abilities will stomach\ntheir being put upon a level with the rest of the community. For\nwhich reason they will very often appear ready for every commotion and\nsedition; for the wickedness of mankind is insatiable. For though\nat first two oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become\ncustomary, they continually want something more, until they set no\nlimits to their expectations; for it is the nature of our desires to be\nboundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose the\nfirst object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune, as\nto prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more than\ntheir own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it;\nand this may be done if they are kept in an inferior station, and not\nexposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the equality of goods, for\nhe has extended his regulation only to land; whereas a man's substance\nconsists not only in this, but also in slaves, cattle, money, and all\nthat variety of things which fall under the name of chattels; now there\nmust be either an equality established in all these, or some certain\nrule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears too by his\nlaws, that he intends to establish only a small state, as all the\nartificers are to belong to the public, and add nothing to the\ncomplement of citizens; but if all those who are to be employed in\npublic works are to be the slaves of the public, it should be done\nin the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly\nregulated it at Athens. From these particulars any one may nearly judge\nwhether Phaleas's community is well or ill established.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nHippodamus, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived the art of laying\nout towns, and separated the Pireus. This man was in other respects\ntoo eager after notice, and seemed to many to live in a very affected\nmanner, with his flowing locks and his expensive ornaments, and a coarse\nwarm vest which he wore, not only in the winter, but also in the\nhot weather. As he was very desirous of the character of a universal\nscholar, he was the first who, not being actually engaged in the\nmanagement of public affairs, sat himself to inquire what sort of\ngovernment was best; and he planned a state, consisting of ten thousand\npersons, divided into three parts, one consisting of artisans, another\nof husbandmen, and the third of soldiers; he also divided the lands into\nthree parts, and allotted one to sacred purposes, another to the public,\nand the third to individuals. The first of these was to supply what was\nnecessary for the established worship of the gods; the second was to\nbe allotted to the support of the soldiery; and the third was to be\nthe property of the husbandman. He thought also that there need only be\nthree sorts of laws, corresponding to the three sorts of actions which\ncan be brought, namely, for assault, trespasses, or death. He ordered\nalso that there should be a particular court of appeal, into which\nall causes might be removed which were supposed to have been unjustly\ndetermined elsewhere; which court should be composed of old men chosen\nfor that purpose. He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass\nsentence by votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on\nwhich he should write, that he found the party guilty, if it was so, but\nif not, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one\npart of the indictment but not of the other, he should express that\nalso on the tablet; for he disapproved of that general custom already\nestablished, as it obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they\ndetermined positively either on the one side or the other. He also made\na law, that those should be rewarded who found out anything for the good\nof the city, and that the children of those who fell in battle should be\neducated at the public expense; which law had never been proposed by any\nother legislator, though it is at present in use at Athens as well as in\nother cities, he would have the magistrates chosen out of the people\nin general, by whom he meant the three parts before spoken of; and that\nthose who were so elected should be the particular guardians of what\nbelonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans.\n\nThese are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in Hippodamus's\nplan. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his division of the\ncitizens into three parts; for the artisans, the husbandmen, and the\nsoldiers are to compose one community, where the husbandmen are to have\nno arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, which would in a manner\nrender them slaves to the soldiery. It is also impossible that the whole\ncommunity should partake of all the honourable employments in it--for\nthe generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily be\nappointed out of the soldiery, and indeed the most honourable\nmagistrates; but as the two other parts will not have their share in the\ngovernment, how can they be expected to have any affection for it? But\nit is necessary that the soldiery should be superior to the other two\nparts, and this superiority will not be easily gained without they are\nvery numerous; and if they are so, why should the community consist\nof any other members? why should any others have a right to elect the\nmagistrates? Besides, of what use are the husbandmen to this community?\nArtisans, 'tis true, are necessary, for these every city wants, and they\ncan live upon their business. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the\nsoldiers with provisions, they would be properly part of the community;\nbut these are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate\nit for their own use. Moreover, if the soldiers themselves are to\ncultivate that common land which is appropriated for their support,\nthere will be no distinction between the soldier and the husbandman,\nwhich the legislator intended there should be; and if there should be\nany others who are to cultivate the private property of the husbandman\nand the common lands of the military, there will be a fourth order in\nthe state which will have no share in it, and always entertain hostile\nsentiments towards it. If any one should propose that the same persons\nshould cultivate their own lands and the public ones also, then there\nwould be a deficiency [1268b] of provisions to supply two families,\nas the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the\nsoldiers also; and all these things would occasion great confusion.\n\nNor do I approve of his method of determining causes, when he would\nhave the judge split the case which comes simply before him; and thus,\ninstead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now when any matter\nis brought to arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer\ntogether upon the business that is before them; but when a cause is\nbrought before judges it is not so; and many legislators take care\nthat the judges shall not have it in their power to communicate their\nsentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion on the\nbench when one judge thinks a fine should be different from what another\nhas set it at; one proposing twenty minae, another ten, or be it more\nor less, another four, and another five; and it is evident, that in this\nmanner they will differ from each other, while some will give the whole\ndamages sued for, and others nothing; in this situation, how shall their\ndeterminations be settled? Besides, a judge cannot be obliged to perjure\nhimself who simply acquits or condemns, if the action is fairly and\njustly brought; for he who acquits the party does not say that he ought\nnot to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of\ntwenty minae. But he that condemns him is guilty of perjury if he\nsentences him to pay twenty minae while he believes the damages ought\nnot to be so much.\n\nNow with respect to these honours which he proposes to bestow on those\nwho can give any information useful to the community, this, though very\npleasing in speculation, is what the legislator should not settle, for\nit would encourage informers, and probably occasion commotions in the\nstate. And this proposal of his gives rise also to further conjectures\nand inquiries; for some persons have doubted whether it is useful or\nhurtful to alter the established law of any country, if even for the\nbetter; for which reason one cannot immediately determine upon what he\nhere says, whether it is advantageous to alter the law or not. We know,\nindeed, that it is possible to propose to new model both the laws and\ngovernment as a common good; and since we have mentioned this subject,\nit may be very proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for\nit contains some difficulties, as I have already said, and it may appear\nbetter to alter them, since it has been found useful in other sciences.\n\nThus the science of physic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so is\nthe gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and powers; so that one may lay\nit down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold good in\nthe art of government. And it may also be affirmed, that experience\nitself gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too simple and\nbarbarous; which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the city, and to\nbuy their wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all the remains of\nold laws which we have are very simple; for instance, a law in Cuma\nrelative to murder. If any person who prosecutes another for murder can\nproduce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the\naccused person shall be held guilty. Upon the whole, all persons ought\nto endeavour to follow what is right, and not what is established; and\nit is probable that the first men, whether they sprung out of the earth,\nor were saved from some general calamity, had very little understanding\nor knowledge, as is affirmed of these aborigines; so that it would be\nabsurd to continue in the practice of their rules. Nor is it, moreover,\nright to permit written laws always to remain without alteration; for\nas in all other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible to express\neverything in writing with perfect exactness; for when we commit\nanything to writing we must use general terms, but in every action there\nis something particular to itself, which these may not comprehend; from\nwhence it is evident, that certain laws will at certain times admit of\nalterations. But if we consider this matter in another point of view, it\nwill appear to require great caution; for when the advantage proposed is\ntrifling, as the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws\nis of bad consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some faults\nwhich either the legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for\nthe alterations will not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying\nthe magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought\nfrom the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the\none as the other. For a law derives all its strength from custom, and\nthis requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy matter\nto pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the\npower of laws. Besides, here is another question; if the laws are to be\naltered, are they all to be altered, and in every government or not, and\nwhether at the pleasure of one person or many? all which particulars\nwill make a great difference; for which reason we will at present drop\nthe inquiry, to pursue it at some other time.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nThere are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to the\ngovernment established at Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in almost all\nother states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do not promote\nthe best establishment possible? the other is whether there is anything,\nif we consider either the principles upon which it is founded or the\nexecutive part of it, which prevents the form of government that they\nhad proposed to follow from being observed; now it is allowed that in\nevery well-regulated state the members of it should be free from servile\nlabour; but in what manner this shall be effected is not so easy to\ndetermine; for the Penestse have very often attacked the Thessalians,\nand the Helots the Lacedaemonians, for they in a manner continually\nwatch an opportunity for some misfortune befalling them. But no such\nthing has ever happened to the Cretans; the [1269b] reason for which\nprobably is, that although they are engaged in frequent wars with the\nneighbouring cities, yet none of these would enter into an alliance with\nthe revolters, as it would be disadvantageous for them, who themselves\nalso have their villains. But now there is perpetual enmity between the\nLacedaemonians and all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians,\nand the Arcadians. Their slaves also first revolted from the Thessalians\nwhile they were engaged in wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the\nPerrabeans, and the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else,\nyet something very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with them;\nfor if you are remiss in your discipline they grow insolent, and think\nthemselves upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly\nused they are continually plotting against you and hate you. It is\nevident, then, that those who employ slaves have not as yet hit upon the\nright way of managing them.\n\nAs to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is hurtful\nto the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for as a man\nand his wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a city to be\ndivided into two parts, we must allow that the number of men and women\nwill be equal.\n\nIn whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we must\nlook upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it\nthere happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city\na collection of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently\naccomplished his design; but in the meantime the women were quite\nneglected, for they live without restraint in every improper indulgence\nand luxury. So that in such a state riches will necessarily be in\ngeneral esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their wives,\nwhich has been the case with many a brave and warlike people except\nthe Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who openly\npractise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem not improperly to\nhave joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of this character\nare greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys, for which\nreason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in their state were\ndone by the authority of the women. For what is the difference, if the\npower is in the hands of the women, or in the hands of those whom they\nthemselves govern? it must turn to the same account. As this boldness of\nthe women can be of no use in any common occurrences, if it was ever so,\nit must be in war; but even here we find that the Lacedaemonian women\nwere of the greatest disservice, as was proved at the time of the Theban\ninvasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities,\nbut made more disturbance than even the enemy.\n\nThe origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is\neasily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home\nupon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards the\nArcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end, their\nmilitary life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them to obey\nthe precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus\nendeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his laws, upon\ntheir refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that the women were\nthe causes of these things, and of course all the fault was theirs. But\nwe are not now considering where the fault lies, or where it does not\nlie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the\nwomen are not well regulated, as I have already said, it must not only\noccasion faults which are disgraceful to the state, but also increase\nthe love of money. In the next place, fault may be found with his\nunequal division of property, for some will have far too much, others\ntoo little; by which means the land will come into few hands, which\nbusiness is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it infamous for any\none either to buy or sell their possessions, in which he did right; but\nhe permitted any one that chose it to give them away, or bequeath them,\nalthough nearly the same consequences will arise from one practice as\nfrom the other. It is supposed that near two parts in five of the whole\ncountry is the property of women, owing to their being so often sole\nheirs, and having such large fortunes in marriage; though it would\nbe better to allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated\nproportion. Now every one is permitted to make a woman his heir if he\npleases; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives\nit to whom he pleases. From whence it happens that although the country\nis able to support fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the\nnumber does not amount to one thousand.\n\nAnd from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly\nregulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined for\nwant of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings\nthey used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to\nprevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars; it is\nalso affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand; but\nbe that as it will, an equality of property conduces much to increase\nthe number of the people. The law, too, which he made to encourage\npopulation was by no means calculated to correct this inequality;\nfor being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as [1270b]\npossible, to make them desirous of having large families he ordered that\nhe who had three children should be excused the night-watch, and that he\nwho had four should pay no taxes: though it is very evident, that while\nthe land was divided in this manner, that if the people increased there\nmust many of them be very poor.\n\nNor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the\nephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last\nimportance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so\nthat it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that office,\nwho, from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been many\ninstances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. And\nthese men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin\nthe city: and, because their power was too great and nearly tyrannical,\ntheir kings were obliged to natter them, which contributed greatly to\nhurt the state; so that it altered from an aristocracy to a democracy.\nThis magistracy is indeed the great support of the state; for the people\nare easy, knowing that they are eligible to the first office in it;\nso that, whether it took place by the intention of the legislator,\nor whether it happened by chance, this is of great service to their\naffairs; for it is necessary that every member of the state should\nendeavour that each part of the government should be preserved, and\ncontinue the same. And upon this principle their kings have always\nacted, out of regard to their honour; the wise and good from their\nattachment to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward of\nvirtue; and the common people, that they may support the ephori, of whom\nthey consist. And it is proper that these magistrates should be chosen\nout of the whole community, not as the custom is at present, which is\nvery ridiculous. The ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the last\nconsequence; but as it is quite accidental what sort of persons they may\nbe, it is not right that they should determine according to their own\nopinion, but by a written law or established custom. Their way of life\nalso is not consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too\nindulgent; whereas that of others is too severe; so that they cannot\nsupport it, but are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they\nmay enjoy some of the pleasures of sense. There are also great defects\nin the institution of their senators. If indeed they were fitly trained\nto the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit\nthat they would be useful to the government; but still it might be\ndebated whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine\npoints of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well\nas the body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the\nlegislator could not depend upon them as good men, their power must\nbe inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the\nmembers of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in\nmany public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if they\nhad been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not. But it\nmay be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the magistrates.\nThey have indeed in this particular very great power; but I affirm that\nthey should not be entrusted with this control in the manner they are.\nMoreover, the mode of choice which they make use of at the election of\ntheir senators is very childish. Nor is it right for any one to solicit\nfor a place he is desirous of; for every person, whether he chooses it\nor not, ought to execute any office he is fit for. But his intention was\nevidently the same in this as in the other parts of his government.\nFor making his citizens ambitious after honours, with men of that\ndisposition he has filled his senate, since no others will solicit for\nthat office; and yet the principal part of those crimes which men are\ndeliberately guilty of arise from ambition and avarice.\n\nWe will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful\nto the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a\nconsideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the\nlegislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable\nand completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them as\nnot being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that were at\nvariance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of the kings\nthe safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common meals at\nfirst well established: for these should rather have been provided at\nthe public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon, every one was\nobliged to buy his portion, although he might be very poor, and could by\nno means bear the expense, by which means the contrary happened to what\nthe legislator desired: for he intended that those public meals should\nstrengthen the democratic part of his government: but this regulation\nhad quite the contrary effect, for those who were very poor could not\ntake part in them; and it was an observation of their forefathers, that\nthe not allowing those who could not contribute their proportion to the\ncommon tables to partake of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other\npersons have censured his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without\nreason, as it gave rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is\nin a manner set up in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the\narmy for life.\n\n[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure,\nwhich Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution\nwas calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to\nmake them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state\ndepended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their victories:\nfor they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other employment\nthan war. In this particular also they were mistaken, that though they\nrightly thought, that those things which are the objects of contention\namongst mankind are better procured by virtue than vice, yet they\nwrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor was the public\nrevenue well managed at Sparta, for the state was worth nothing while\nthey were obliged to carry on the most extensive wars, and the subsidies\nwere very badly raised; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent of\ncountry, they were not exact upon each other as to what they paid in.\nAnd thus an event contrary to the legislator's intention took place;\nfor the state was poor, the individuals avaricious. Enough of the\nLacedaemonian government; for these seem the chief defects in it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nThe government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few\nparticulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its\ncontrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the\nconstitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete;\nand in general most new things are an improvement upon the old. For they\nsay, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles he\nwent abroad and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for the\nLycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first settled\nthere adopted that body of laws which they found already established by\nthe inhabitants; in like manner also those who now live near them have\nthe very laws which Minos first drew up.\n\nThis island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it\nis entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all the\nmaritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one side\nfrom Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from Triopium\nand Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the empire of\nthe sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others planted\ncolonies: at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily.\nThere is this analogy between the customs of the Lacedaemonians and\nthe Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds [1272a] for the one, the\ndomestic slaves for the other. Both states have their common meals, and\nthe Lacedaemonians called these formerly not _psiditia_ but _andpia_,\nas the Cretans do; which proves from whence the custom arose. In this\nparticular their governments are also alike: the ephori have the same\npower with those of Crete, who are called _kosmoi_; with this difference\nonly, that the number of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators\nare the same as those whom the Cretans call the council. There was\nformerly also a kingly power in Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved,\nand the command of their armies was given to the _kosmoi_. Every one\nalso has a vote in their public assembly; but this has only the power of\nconfirming what has already passed the council and the _kosmoi_.\n\nThe Cretans conducted their public meals better than the Lacedaemonians,\nfor at Lacedaemon each individual was obliged to furnish what was\nassessed upon him; which if he could not do, there was a law which\ndeprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned:\nbut in Crete they were furnished by the community; for all the corn and\ncattle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged\nto furnish, were divided into parts and allotted to the gods, the\nexigencies of the state, and these public meals; so that all the men,\nwomen, and children were maintained from a common stock. The legislator\ngave great attention to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as very\nuseful to the citizens. He also endeavoured, that his community might\nnot be too populous, to lessen the connection with women, by introducing\nthe love of boys: whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some\nother opportunity of considering. But that the public meals were better\nordered at Crete than at Lacedaemon is very evident.\n\nThe institution of the _kosmoi_, was still worse than that of the\nephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy and\nsome peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who will be\nelected: but the Lacedaemonians have this advantage which the others\nhave not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a share\nin the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the state:\nwhereas among the Cretans the _kosmoi_ are not chosen out of the people\nin general, but out of some certain families, and the senate out of the\n_kosmoi_. And the same observations which may be made on the senate at\nLacedaemon may be applied to these; for their being under no control,\nand their continuing for life, is an honour greater than they merit; and\nto have their proceedings not regulated by a written law, but left to\ntheir own discretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections,\nalthough the people share not in the management of public affairs, this\nis no proof of a well-constituted government, as the _kosmoi_ have no\nopportunity of being bribed like the ephori, as they live in an [1272b]\nisland far from those who would corrupt them.) But the method they take\nto correct that fault is absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very\noften either their fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire\ntogether and turn out the _kosmoi_. They are also permitted to resign\ntheir office before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by\nlaw it would be well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which\nis a bad rule to follow. But what is worst of all is, that general\nconfusion which those who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary\ncourse of justice; which sufficiently shows what is the nature of the\ngovernment, or rather lawless force: for it is usual with the principal\npersons amongst them to collect together some of the common people and\ntheir friends, and then revolt and set up for themselves, and come\nto blows with each other. And what is the difference, if a state is\ndissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually so alters in\nprocess of time as to be no longer the same constitution? A state like\nthis would ever be exposed to the invasions of those who were powerful\nand inclined to attack it; but, as has been already mentioned, its\nsituation preserves it, as it is free from the inroads of foreigners;\nand for this reason the family slaves still remain quiet at Crete, while\nthe Helots are perpetually revolting: for the Cretans take no part in\nforeign affairs, and it is but lately that any foreign troops have\nmade an attack upon the island; and their ravages soon proved the\nineffectualness of their laws. And thus much for the government of\nCrete.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nThe government of Carthage seems well established, and in many respects\nsuperior to others; in some particulars it bears a near resemblance\nto the Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the Cretans, the\nLacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things very like\neach other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many excellent\nconstitutions this may show how well their government is framed, that\nalthough the people are admitted to a share in the administration, the\nform of it remains unaltered, without any popular insurrections, worth\nnotice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a tyranny on the\nother. Now the Carthaginians have these things in common with the\nLacedaemonians: public tables for those who are connected together by\nthe tie of mutual friendship, after the manner of their Phiditia; they\nhave also a magistracy, consisting of an hundred and four persons,\nsimilar to the ephori, or rather selected with more judgment; for\namongst the Lacedaemonians, all the citizens are eligible, but amongst\nthe Carthaginians, they are chosen out of those of the better sort:\nthere is also some analogy between the king and the senate in both these\ngovernments, though the Carthaginian method of appointing their kings\nis best, for they do not confine themselves to one family; nor do\nthey permit the election to be at large, nor have they any regard to\nseniority; for if amongst the candidates there are any of greater merit\nthan the rest, these they prefer to those who may be older; for as their\npower is very extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account,\nthey may be very hurtful to the state, as they have always been to\nthe Lacedaemonians; also the greater part of those things which become\nreprehensible by their excess are common to all those governments which\nwe have described.\n\nNow of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established\ntheir mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and\ndemocracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy: for\ninstance, if the kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point in\ndebate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the people or\nno; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not\nonly to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but are finally\nto determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a right to speak\nagainst any matter whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not\npermitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other, have very\ngreat and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred, who are\nmagistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues longer than\nany other magistrates, for it commences before they come into office,\nand is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this particular the\nstate inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not elected by lot, but\nby suffrage, and are not permitted to take money, they are the greatest\nsupporters imaginable of an aristocracy.\n\nThe determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in one\ncourt and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same influence.\nThe constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an\noligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained\nby many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to\nbe persons of family only, but of fortune also; as it is impossible\nfor those who are in bad circumstances to support the dignity of their\noffice, or to be at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men\nof fortune to be magistrates make a state incline to an oligarchy,\nand men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of\nproceeding which took place in the polity of Carthage; for they have\nan eye to these two particulars when they elect their officers,\nparticularly those of the highest rank, their kings and their generals.\nIt must be admitted, that it was a great fault in their legislator not\nto guard against the constitution's degenerating from an aristocracy;\nfor this is a most necessary thing to provide for at first, that those\ncitizens who have the best abilities should never be obliged to do\nanything unworthy their character, but be always at leisure to serve the\npublic, not only when in office, but also when private persons; for if\nonce you are obliged to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at\nleisure to serve you, your greatest offices, of king and general,\nwill soon become venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more\nhonourable than virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in\nthe city-for what those who have the chief power regard as honourable\nwill necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general\nwill aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue,\nthere the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it\nis reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their places should\ngenerally make an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as\nit is absurd to suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be\ndesirous of gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the\nsame, especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy\nshould be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy.\nIt would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the\npoverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured\nthem sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.\n\nIt seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices,\nwhich was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one\nperson; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not\nmake the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state\nis not small it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons\nto have a share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not\nonly more usual, but everything is better and sooner done, when one\nthing only is allotted to one person: and this is evident both in the\narmy and navy, where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and\nis under command. But as their government inclines to an oligarchy, they\navoid the ill effects of it by always appointing some of the popular\nparty to the government of cities to make their fortunes. Thus they\nconsult this fault in their constitution and render it stable; but\nthis is depending on chance; whereas the legislator ought to frame his\ngovernment, that there the no room for insurrections. But now, if there\nshould be any general calamity, and the people should revolt from their\nrulers, there is no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws.\nAnd these are the particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the\nCarthaginian governments which seem worthy of commendation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nSome of those persons who have written upon government had never any\nshare in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything\nworthy of notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others\nwere legislators, some in their own cities, others were employed in\nregulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them only composed\na body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus; and\nSolon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been already mentioned.\nSome persons think that Solon was an excellent legislator, who could\ndissolve a pure oligarchy, and save the people from that slavery which\nhung over them, and establish the ancient democratic form of government\nin his country; wherein every part of it was so framed as to be well\nadapted to the whole. In the senate of Areopagus an oligarchy was\npreserved; by the manner of electing their [1274a] magistrates, an\naristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a democracy.\n\nSolon seems not to have altered the established form of government,\neither with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their\nmagistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in the\nstate by allotting the supreme judicial department to them; and for this\nsome persons blame him, as having done what would soon overturn that\nbalance of power he intended to establish; for by trying all causes\nwhatsoever before the people, who were chosen by lot to determine them,\nit was necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace who had got this\npower; which contributed to bring the government to that pure democracy\nit now is.\n\nBoth Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the\nlatter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended\nthe courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular\nproceeded increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. But\nit is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that it arose\nfrom accident; for the people being the cause of the naval victory\nover the Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted themselves\nunder factious demagogues, although opposed by the better part of the\ncitizens. He thought it indeed most necessary to entrust the people\nwith the choice of their magistrates and the power of calling them to\naccount; for without that they must have been slaves and enemies to the\nother citizens: but he ordered them to elect those only who were persons\nof good account and property, either out of those who were worth five\nhundred medimns, or those who were called xeugitai, or those of the\nthird census, who were called horsemen.\n\nAs for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were\nincapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western\nLocrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those\nalso in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some persons\nendeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the first person\nof note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in that business\nwhile he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the\nprophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion; and that\nLycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and Charondas of\nZaleucus; but those who advance this, advance what is repugnant to\nchronology. Philolaus also, of the family of the Bacchiades, was a\nTheban legislator. This man was very fond of Diocles, a victor in\nthe Olympic games, and when he left his country from a disgust at an\nimproper passion which his mother Alithoe had entertained for him, and\nsettled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where they both died, and\nwhere they still show their tombs placed in view of each other, but so\ndisposed, that one of them looks towards Corinth, the other does not;\nthe reason they give for this is, that Diodes, from his detestation of\nhis mother's passion, would have his tomb so placed that no one could\nsee Corinth from it; but Philolaus chose that it might be seen from his:\nand this was the cause of their living at Thebes. [1274b]\n\nAs Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he upon\nadoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in particular did\nto preserve the number of families. Charondas did nothing new, except\nin actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took into\nparticular consideration. He also drew up his laws with greater elegance\nand accuracy than even any of our present legislators. Philolaus\nintroduced the law for the equal distribution of goods; Plato that for\nthe community of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables\nfor the women; and one concerning drunkenness, that they might observe\nsobriety in their symposiums. He also made a law concerning their\nwarlike exercises; that they should acquire a habit of using both hands\nalike, as it was necessary that one hand should be as useful as the\nother.\n\nAs for Draco's laws, they were published when the government was already\nestablished, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning,\nexcept their severity on account of the enormity of their punishments.\nPittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up any form of\ngovernment; one of which was this, that if a drunken man beat any person\nhe should be punished more than if he did it when sober; for as\npeople are more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober, he paid no\nconsideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded\nonly the common benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a lawgiver to the\nThracian talcidians. There are some laws of his concerning murders and\nheiresses extant, but these contain nothing that any one can say is new\nand his own. And thus much for different sorts of governments, as well\nthose which really exist as those which different persons have proposed.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nEvery one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its\ndifferent forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a\ncity? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city\ndid this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy,\nor the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the\npolitician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government\nis a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a\ncollective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is\nevident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a\ncertain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to\ncall citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one\nwill not allow that this character is applicable to the same person; for\nthat man who would be a citizen in a republic would very often not be\none in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry many of those who\nacquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as honorary persons,\nfor instance, but those only who have a natural right to it.\n\nNow it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this\nsojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be\nsufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws,\nand may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different nations,\nbetween whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose, are allowed;\nalthough it very often happens, that sojourners have not a perfect right\ntherein without the protection of a patron, to whom they are obliged to\napply, which shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In\nlike manner, with respect to boys who are not yet enrolled, or old men\nwho are past war, we admit that they are in some respects citizens,\nbut not completely so, but with some exceptions, for these are not yet\narrived to years of maturity, and those are past service; nor is\nthere any difference between them. But what we mean is sufficiently\nintelligible and clear, we want a complete citizen, one in whom there\nis no deficiency to be corrected to make him so. As to those who are\nbanished, or infamous, there may be the same objections made and the\nsame answer given. There is nothing that more characterises a complete\ncitizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the\ngovernment.\n\nWith respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that\nno person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else\nnot till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as a\njuryman's, and a member of the general assembly: but probably some one\nmay say these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities\nany share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous to say that\nthose who have the principal power in the state bear no office in it.\nBut this objection is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about\nwords; as there is no general term which can be applied both to the\noffice of a juryman and a member of the assembly. For the sake of\ndistinction, suppose we call it an indeterminate office: but I lay it\ndown as a maxim, that those are citizens who could exercise it. Such\nthen is the description of a citizen who comes nearest to what all those\nwho are called citizens are. Every one also should know, that of the\ncomponent parts of those things which differ from each other in species,\nafter the first or second remove, those which follow have either nothing\nat all or very little common to each.\n\nNow we see that governments differ from each other in their form,\nand that some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as\npossible: for it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies\nand degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are without\nsuch faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter explained.\nHence it is clear that the office of a citizen must differ as\ngovernments do from each other: for which reason he who is called\na citizen has, in a democracy, every privilege which that station\nsupposes. In other forms of government he may enjoy them; but not\nnecessarily: for in some states the people have no power; nor have they\nany general assembly, but a few select men.\n\nThe trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons; as\nat Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before some\nof the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and so on;\nsome being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another: and thus\nat Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our former\ndescription of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some\ngovernments the office of a juryman and a member of the general assembly\nis not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons appointed\nfor these purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen\nor members of the general assembly, and this either for all causes and\nall public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one: and\nthis may be sufficient to show what a citizen is; for he who has a right\nto a share in the judicial and executive part of government in any\ncity, him we call a citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is\na collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the\npurposes of life.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nIn common use they define a citizen to be one who is sprung from\ncitizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only. Others\ncarry the matter still further, and inquire how many of his ancestors\nhave been citizens, as his grandfather, great-grandfather, etc., but\nsome persons have questioned how the first of the family could prove\nthemselves citizens, according to this popular and careless definition.\nGorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same doubt, and partly in\njest, says, that as a mortar is made by a mortar-maker, so a citizen is\nmade by a citizen-maker, and a Larisssean by a Larisssean-maker. This\nis indeed a very simple account of the matter; for if citizens are so,\naccording to this definition, it will be impossible to apply it to the\nfirst founders or first inhabitants of states, who cannot possibly claim\nin right either of their father or mother. It is probably a matter of\nstill more difficulty to determine their rights as citizens who are\nadmitted to their freedom after any revolution in the state. As, for\ninstance, at Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Clisthenes\nenrolled many foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes; and the\ndoubt with respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no,\nbut whether they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may\nhave this further [1276a] doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen\nwhen he is illegally made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is\nno citizen at all, were in the same predicament: but since we see some\npersons govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to govern, though not justly,\nand the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices,\nfor such a one we have defined a citizen to be, it is evident, that a\ncitizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen, but whether\njustly or unjustly so belongs to the former inquiry.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nIt has also been doubted what was and what was not the act of the city;\nas, for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy or a\ntyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts; as if\nthe right to receive the money was in the tyrant and not in the state,\nand many other things of the same nature; as if any covenant was founded\nfor violence and not for the common good. So in like manner, if anything\nis done by those who have the management of public affairs where a\ndemocracy is established, their actions are to be considered as the\nactions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or tyranny.\n\nAnd here it seems very proper to consider this question, When shall we\nsay that a city is the same, and when shall we say that it is different?\n\nIt is but a superficial mode of examining into this question to begin\nwith the place and the people; for it may happen that these may be\ndivided from that, or that some one of them may live in one place, and\nsome in another (but this question may be regarded as no very knotty\none; for, as a city may acquire that appellation on many accounts,\nit may be solved many ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one\ncommon place, when shall we say that they inhabit the same city, or that\nthe city is the same? for it does not depend upon the walls; for I can\nsuppose Peloponnesus itself surrounded with a wall, as Babylon was, and\nevery other place, which rather encircles many nations than one city,\nand that they say was taken three days when some of the inhabitants\nknew nothing of it: but we shall find a proper time to determine this\nquestion; for the extent of a city, how large it should be, and whether\nit should consist of more than one people, these are particulars that\nthe politician should by no means be unacquainted with. This, too, is a\nmatter of inquiry, whether we shall say that a city is the same while\nit is inhabited by the same race of men, though some of them are\nperpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we say that a river\nor a fountain is the same, though the waters are continually changing;\nor when a revolution takes place shall we [1276b] say the men are the\nsame, but the city is different: for if a city is a community, it is a\ncommunity of citizens; but if the mode of government should alter, and\nbecome of another sort, it would seem a necessary consequence that the\ncity is not the same; as we regard the tragic chorus as different from\nthe comic, though it may probably consist of the same performers: thus\nevery other community or composition is said to be different if the\nspecies of composition is different; as in music the same hands produce\ndifferent harmony, as the Doric and Phrygian. If this is true, it is\nevident, that when we speak of a city as being the same we refer to the\ngovernment there established; and this, whether it is called by the\nsame name or any other, or inhabited by the same men or different.\nBut whether or no it is right to dissolve the community when the\nconstitution is altered is another question.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nWhat has been said, it follows that we should consider whether the\nsame virtues which constitute a good man make a valuable citizen, or\ndifferent; and if a particular inquiry is necessary for this matter we\nmust first give a general description of the virtues of a good citizen;\nfor as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, so is a\ncitizen, although the province of one sailor may be different from\nanother's (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a boatswain,\nand so on, each having their several appointments), it is evident that\nthe most accurate description of any one good sailor must refer to\nhis peculiar abilities, yet there are some things in which the same\ndescription may be applied to the whole crew, as the safety of the ship\nis the common business of all of them, for this is the general centre of\nall their cares: so also with respect to citizens, although they may\nin a few particulars be very different, yet there is one care common to\nthem all, the safety of the community, for the community of the citizens\ncomposes the state; for which reason the virtue of a citizen has\nnecessarily a reference to the state. But if there are different sorts\nof governments, it is evident that those actions which constitute the\nvirtue of an excellent citizen in one community will not constitute it\nin another; wherefore the virtue of such a one cannot be perfect: but we\nsay, a man is good when his virtues are perfect; from whence it follows,\nthat an excellent citizen does not possess that virtue which constitutes\na good man. Those who are any ways doubtful concerning this question\nmay be convinced of the truth of it by examining into the best formed\nstates: for, if it is impossible that a city should consist entirely of\nexcellent citizens (while it is necessary that every one should do well\nin his calling, in which consists his excellence, as it is impossible\nthat all the citizens should have the same [1277a] qualifications) it\nis impossible that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the\nsame; for all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen: for\nfrom hence necessarily arise the perfection of the city: but that every\none should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible without\nall the citizens in a well-regulated state were necessarily virtuous.\nBesides, as a city is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of\nlife and body; the soul of reason and appetite; a family of a man and\nhis wife--property of a master and a slave; in the same manner, as a\ncity is composed of all these and many other very different parts, it\nnecessarily follows that the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the\nsame; as the business of him who leads the band is different from the\nother dancers. From all which proofs it is evident that the virtues of\na citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those virtues\nunited which constitute a good man and excellent citizen? for we say,\nsuch a one is an excellent magistrate and a prudent and good man; but\nprudence is a necessary qualification for all those who engage in public\naffairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education of those who are\nintended to command should, from the beginning, be different from other\ncitizens, as the children of kings are generally instructed in riding\nand warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says:\n\n  \"... No showy arts Be mine, but teach me what the state requires.\"\n\nAs if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to\nthemselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a\ngood magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the\nmagistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be\nthe same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some\nparticular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different\nfrom the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason declared that\nwas he deprived of his kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not\nknowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to\nknow how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things well\nis the virtue of an accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a good\nman consists only in being able to command, but the virtue of a good\ncitizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other, the\ncommendation of both of them is not the same. It appears, then, that\nboth he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn their\nseparate business: but that the citizen should be master of and\ntake part in both these, as any one may easily perceive; in a family\ngovernment there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform\nthe necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for to\ndo the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common family\nbusiness of the slave.\n\nThere are many sorts of slaves; for their employments are various: of\nthese the handicraftsmen are one, who, as their name imports, get their\nliving by the labour of their hands, and amongst these all mechanics are\nincluded; [1277b] for which reasons such workmen, in some states, were\nnot formerly admitted into any share in the government; till at length\ndemocracies were established: it is not therefore proper for any man\nof honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to\nlearn these servile employments without they have occasion for them for\ntheir own use; for without this was observed the distinction between a\nmaster and a slave would be lost. But there is a government of another\nsort, in which men govern those who are their equals in rank, and\nfreemen, which we call a political government, in which men learn to\ncommand by first submitting to obey, as a good general of horse, or a\ncommander-in-chief, must acquire a knowledge of their duty by\nhaving been long under the command of another, and the like in every\nappointment in the army: for well is it said, no one knows how to\ncommand who has not himself been under command of another. The virtues\nof those are indeed different, but a good citizen must necessarily be\nendowed with them; he ought also to know in what manner freemen ought\nto govern, as well as be governed: and this, too, is the duty of a good\nman. And if the temperance and justice of him who commands is different\nfrom his who, though a freeman, is under command, it is evident that the\nvirtues of a good citizen cannot be the same as justice, for instance\nbut must be of a different species in these two different situations, as\nthe temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different from each\nother; for a man would appear a coward who had only that courage which\nwould be graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a talker who\nshould take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of\nconsequence.\n\nThe domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the\nman's business to acquire subsistence, the woman's to take care of it.\nBut direction and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to\nthose who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for both\nparties; but with this the governed have no concern, it is theirs to\nentertain just notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while those\nwho govern are the musicians who play on them. And thus much to show\nwhether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same,\nor if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how far\ndifferent.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nBut with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those\nonly are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or whether\nthe mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those who are\nnot permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible\nthat the virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for these also\nare citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be citizens, where\nshall they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a] sojourners nor\nforeigners? or shall we say that there will no inconvenience arise from\ntheir not being citizens, as they are neither slaves nor freedmen:\nfor this is certainly true, that all those are not citizens who are\nnecessary to the existence of a city, as boys are not citizens in the\nsame manner that men are, for those are perfectly so, the others under\nsome conditions; for they are citizens, though imperfect ones: for\nin former times among some people the mechanics were either slaves or\nforeigners, for which reason many of them are so now: and indeed the\nbest regulated states will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen; but\nif it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue we have\ndescribed to every citizen or freeman, but to those only who are\ndisengaged from servile offices. Now those who are employed by one\nperson in them are slaves; those who do them for money are mechanics\nand hired servants: hence it is evident on the least reflection what is\ntheir situation, for what I have said is fully explained by appearances.\nSince the number of communities is very great, it follows necessarily\nthat there will be many different sorts of citizens, particularly\nof those who are governed by others, so that in one state it may be\nnecessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but in\nothers it may be impossible; as particularly in an aristocracy, where\nhonours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for it is impossible for\none who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to acquire the\npractice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired servants are not admitted\nto be citizens; because there a man's right to bear any office is\nregulated by his fortune; but mechanics are, for many citizens are very\nrich.\n\nThere was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the\ngovernment till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the\nlaw invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some\ndemocracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also\nobserved in many others with respect to natural children; but it is\nthrough want of citizens regularly born that they admit such: for these\nlaws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants; so,\nas their numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male or\nfemale slave of this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last\nof all they will admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were\nboth free.\n\nThat there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be as\ncompletely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from what\nhas been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's\ntreating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger or sojourner is\none who does not partake of the honours of the state: and whenever the\nright to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it is for the sake of\nthe inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it is plain whether the\nvirtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same or different:\nand we find that in some states it is the same, in others not; and also\nthat this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the\nlead, or are capable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone\nor in conjunction with others.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nHaving established these points, we proceed next to consider whether one\nform of government only should be established, or more than one; and if\nmore, how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences between\nthem. The form of government is the ordering and regulating of the city,\nand all the offices in it, particularly those wherein the supreme power\nis lodged; and this power is always possessed by the administration; but\nthe administration itself is that particular form of government which\nis established in any state: thus in a democracy the supreme power is\nlodged in the whole people; on the contrary, in an oligarchy it is in\nthe hands of a few. We say then, that the form of government in these\nstates is different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in\nothers. Let us first determine for whose sake a city is established;\nand point out the different species of rule which man may submit to in\nsocial life.\n\nI have already mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family,\nand the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally formed\nfor society, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign\nassistance, he will of his own accord desire to live with others; not\nbut that mutual advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables each\nperson to live more agreeably; and this is indeed the great object\nnot only to all in general, but also to each individual: but it is not\nmerely matter of choice, but they join in society also, even that they\nmay be able to live, which probably is not without some share of merit,\nand they also support civil society, even for the sake of preserving\nlife, without they are grievously overwhelmed with the miseries of it:\nfor it is very evident that men will endure many calamities for the sake\nof living, as being something naturally sweet and desirable. It is easy\nto point out the different modes of government, and we have already\nsettled them in our exoteric discourses. The power of the master, though\nby nature equally serviceable, both to the master and to the slave, yet\nnevertheless has for its object the benefit of the master, while the\nbenefit of the slave arises accidentally; for if the slave is destroyed,\nthe power of the master is at an end: but the authority which a man\nhas over his wife, and children, and his family, which we call domestic\ngovernment, is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection,\nor else for the common benefit of the whole: but its particular object\nis the benefit of the governed, as we see in other arts; in physic, for\ninstance, and the gymnastic exercises, wherein, if any benefit [1279a]\narise to the master, it is accidental; for nothing forbids the master of\nthe exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who exercises,\nas the steersman is always one of the sailors; but both the master of\nthe exercises and the steersman consider the good of those who are under\ntheir government. Whatever good may happen to the steersman when he is\na sailor, or to the master of the exercises when he himself makes one at\nthe games, is not intentional, or the object of their power; thus in all\npolitical governments which are established to preserve and defend the\nequality of the citizens it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as\nwas natural, every one expected that each of his fellow-citizens should\nin his turn serve the public, and thus administer to his private good,\nas he himself when in office had done for others; but now every one is\ndesirous of being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage\nwhich he makes of public business and being in office; as if places were\na never-failing remedy for every complaint, and were on that account so\neagerly sought after.\n\nIt is evident, then, that all those governments which have a common good\nin view are rightly established and strictly just, but those who have\nin view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong principles,\nand are widely different from what a government ought to be, for they\nare tyranny over slaves, whereas a city is a community of freemen.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nHaving established these particulars, we come to consider next the\ndifferent number of governments which there are, and what they are; and\nfirst, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined this,\ntheir defects will be evident enough.\n\nIt is evident that every form of government or administration, for the\nwords are of the same import, must contain a supreme power over the\nwhole state, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands\nof one person, or a few, or many; and when either of these apply their\npower for the common good, such states are well governed; but when the\ninterest of the one, the few, or the many who enjoy this power is alone\nconsulted, then ill; for you must either affirm that those who make\nup the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the\nadvantages of government. We usually call a state which is governed by\none person for the common good, a kingdom; one that is governed by\nmore than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy; either because the\ngovernment is in the hands of the most worthy citizens, or because it\nis the best form for the city and its inhabitants. When the citizens at\nlarge govern for the public good, it is called a state; which is also\na common name for all other governments, and these distinctions are\nconsonant to reason; for it will not be difficult to find one person,\nor a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but almost impossible to\nmeet with the majority [1279b] of a people eminent for every virtue;\nbut if there is one common to a whole nation it is valour; for this is\ncreated and supported by numbers: for which reason in such a state\nthe profession of arms will always have the greatest share in the\ngovernment.\n\nNow the corruptions attending each of these governments are these; a\nkingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy,\nand a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy where the good\nof one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy considers\nonly the rich, and a democracy only the poor; but neither of them have a\ncommon good in view.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nIt will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each\nof these states, which is not without some difficulty, for he who would\nenter into a philosophical inquiry into the principles of them, and not\ncontent himself with a superficial view of their outward conduct, must\npass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them.\nA tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy, where one person has\nan absolute and despotic power over the whole community and every member\ntherein: an oligarchy, where the supreme power of the state is lodged\nwith the rich: a democracy, on the contrary, is where those have it who\nare worth little or nothing. But the first difficulty that arises from\nthe distinctions which we have laid down is this, should it happen that\nthe majority of the inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for\nthis is a democracy) should be rich, the question is, how does this\nagree with what we have said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever\nhappen that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich,\nbut from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is\nwhat they call an oligarchy; it should seem then that our definition\nof the different states was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one\nsuppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority\nrich, and then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy\nwas a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the\nsupreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor, being\nmany in number, possessed it, still there will be another difficulty;\nfor what name shall we give to those states we have been describing? I\nmean, that in which the greater number are rich, and that in which the\nlesser number are poor (where each of these possess the supreme power),\nif there are no other states than those we have described. It seems\ntherefore evident to reason, that whether the supreme power is vested\nin the hands of many or few may be a matter of accident; but that it\nis clear enough, that when it is in the hands of the few, it will be\na government of the rich; when in the hands of the many, it will be a\ngovernment of the poor; since in all countries there are many poor and\nfew rich: it is not therefore the cause that has been already assigned\n(namely, the number of people in power) that makes the difference\nbetween the two governments; but an oligarchy and democracy differ in\nthis from each other, in the poverty of those who govern in the one,\nand the riches I28oa of those who govern in the other; for when the\ngovernment is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it\nis an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy:\nbut, as we have already said, the one will be always few, the other\nnumerous, but both will enjoy liberty; and from the claims of wealth and\nliberty will arise continual disputes with each other for the lead in\npublic affairs.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nLet us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and\na democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men have\nsome natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein only to\na certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely\njust; as, for instance, what is equal appears just, and is so; but not\nto all; only among those who are equals: and what is unequal appears\njust, and is so; but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals;\nwhich circumstance some people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the\nreason for which is, they judge for themselves, and every one almost is\nthe worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to\npersons, the same distinctions must be made with respect to persons\nwhich are made with respect to things, in the manner that I have already\ndescribed in my Ethics.\n\nAs to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their dispute\nis concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason\nabove assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and also\nbecause each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some\nparticulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for instance,\nif some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the\nwhole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose\nthem equal in the whole: but what is absolutely just they omit; for\nif civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing\nproperty, every one's right in the city would be equal to his fortune;\nand then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be\nvalid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should\nhave an equal share in the hundred along with him who brought in all the\nrest, either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired.\n\nNor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its\nmembers; but that they might live well: for otherwise a state might\nbe composed of slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for\nthese have no share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after their\nown choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from\ninjuries, or for a commercial intercourse: for then the Tyrrhenians and\nCarthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce\nsubsist, would be citizens of one city; for they have articles\nto regulate their exports and imports, and engagements for mutual\nprotection, and alliances for mutual defence; but [1280b] yet they\nhave not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are\ndifferent among the different people; nor does the one take any care,\nthat the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of\nthose who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or\nin any degree vicious, only that they do not injure any member of the\nconfederacy. But whosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in\na state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who\ncomposes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who\nwould found a city, truly deserving that name, and not nominally so,\nmust be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an\nalliance for self-defence; differing from those of the same cast which\nare made between different people only in place: for law is an agreement\nand a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the citizens of\ntheir intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to\nmake all the citizens just and good: and that this is fact is evident,\nfor could any one bring different places together, as, for instance,\nenclose Megara and Corinth in a wall, yet they would not be one city,\nnot even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this\ninter-community contributes much to make a place one city. Besides,\ncould we suppose a set of people to live separate from each other, but\nwithin such a distance as would admit of an intercourse, and that there\nwere laws subsisting between each party, to prevent their injuring one\nanother in their mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another\na husbandman, shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten\nthousand, still all that they would have together in common would be a\ntariff for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same\ncity. And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough,\nfor even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one\nshould live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be\nalliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and prevent\nany injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted\nto be a city by those who think correctly, if they preserved the same\ncustoms when they were together as when they were separate.\n\nIt is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor\nestablished for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other;\nbut that these things are the necessary consequences of a city, although\nthey may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a society of\npeople joining together with their families and their children to live\nagreeably for the sake of having their lives as happy and as independent\nas possible: and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live\nin one place and intermarry with each other: hence in all cities there\nare family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to\npromote friendship; for a love of sociability is friendship itself;\nso that the end then for which a city is established is, that the\ninhabitants of it may live happy, and these things are conducive to that\nend: for it is a community of families and villages for the sake of a\nperfect independent life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake\nof living well and happily. It is not therefore founded for the purpose\nof men's merely [1281a] living together, but for their living as men\nought; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to\nhave greater power in the city than those who are their equals in family\nand freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel\nthem in wealth but are below them in worth. It is evident from what\nhas been said, that in all disputes upon government each party says\nsomething that is just.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nIt may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to be lodged.\nShall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper\npersons, or one better than the rest, or with a tyrant? But whichever\nof these we prefer some difficulty will arise. For what? shall the\npoor have it because they are the majority? they may then divide among\nthemselves, what belongs to the rich: nor is this unjust; because truly\nit has been so judged by the supreme power. But what avails it to point\nout what is the height of injustice if this is not? Again, if the many\nseize into their own hands everything which belongs to the few, it is\nevident that the city will be at an end. But virtue will never destroy\nwhat is virtuous; nor can what is right be the ruin of the state:\ntherefore such a law can never be right, nor can the acts of a tyrant\never be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just; for he, from his\nunlimited power, compels every one to obey his command, as the multitude\noppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich, the few, should have\nthe supreme power? and what if they be guilty of the same rapine and\nplunder the possessions of the majority, that will be as right as the\nother: but that all things of this sort are wrong and unjust is evident.\nWell then, these of the better sort shall have it: but must not then all\nthe other citizens live unhonoured, without sharing the offices of the\ncity; for the offices of a city are its honours, and if one set of men\nare always in power, it is evident that the rest must be without honour.\nWell then, let it be with one person of all others the fittest for it:\nbut by this means the power will be still more contracted, and a greater\nnumber than before continue unhonoured. But some one may say, that it is\nwrong to let man have the supreme power and not the law, as his soul is\nsubject to so many passions. But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or\na democracy, how will it help us in our present doubts? for those things\nwill happen which we have already mentioned.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nOther particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to\nprove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather\nthan with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain\nwhat doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one\nindividual of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet\nwhen these many are joined together, it does not follow but they may be\nbetter qualified for it than those; and this not separately, but as a\ncollective body; as the public suppers exceed those which are given at\none person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person brings\nin his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together, they are\nlike one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands,\nand many intelligences: thus is it with respect to the manners and\nunderstandings of the multitude taken together; for which reason the\npublic are the best judges of music and poetry; for some understand\none part, some another, and all collectively the whole; and in this\nparticular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as they\nsay those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and as fine\npictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the several beautiful\nparts which were dispersed among different originals into one, although\nthe separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be handsomer than in\nthe picture.\n\nBut if this distinction is to be made between every people and every\ngeneral assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful\nwhether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a few,\nit is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to brutes:\nand indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but that nothing\nprevents what I have said being true of the people in some states. The\ndoubt then which we have lately proposed, with all its consequences, may\nbe settled in this manner; it is necessary that the freemen who compose\nthe bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but as\nthey are neither men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles\nof virtue, it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the\nstate, both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance; from\nthe one of which they will do what is wrong, from the other they will\nmistake: and yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the\ngovernment; for when there are many poor people who are incapable of\nacquiring the honours of their country, the state must necessarily have\nmany enemies in it; let them then be permitted to vote in the public\nassemblies and to determine causes; for which reason Socrates, and some\nother legislators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the\nstate, and also of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of\noffice, and only prevented their being magistrates by themselves;\nfor the multitude when they are collected together have all of them\nsufficient understanding for these purposes, and, mixing among those of\nhigher rank, are serviceable to the city, as some things, which alone\nare improper for food, when mixed with others make the whole more\nwholesome than a few of them would be.\n\nBut there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it\nseems, that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who\nwas then sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician; but\nsuch a one must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in every\nother practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give an\naccount of his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other arts:\nthose whose business is physic may be divided into three sorts, the\nfirst of these is he who makes up the medicines; the second prescribes,\nand is to the other as the architect is to the mason; the third is he\nwho understands the science, but never practises it: now these three\ndistinctions may be found in those who understand all other arts; nor\nhave we less opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the\nprinciples of the art than of those who practise it: and with respect\nto elections the same method of proceeding seems right; for to elect a\nproper person in any science is the business of those who are skilful\ntherein; as in geometry, of geometricians; in steering, of steersmen:\nbut if some individuals should know something of particular arts and\nworks, they do not know more than the professors of them: so that even\nupon this principle neither the election of magistrates, nor the censure\nof their conduct, should be entrusted to the many.\n\nBut probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to\nresume the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal\nindeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these\naffairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet when\nthey come together they will know them better, or at least not worse;\nbesides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the\nbest judge; namely, in those the works of which are understood by those\nwho do not profess them: thus he who builds a house is not the only\njudge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better;\nthus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made\nit; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has been said\nseems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is another\nthat follows: for it seems absurd that the power of the state should be\nlodged with those who are but of indifferent morals, instead of those\nwho are of excellent characters. Now the power of election and censure\nare of the utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some\nstates they entrust to the people; for the general assembly is the\nsupreme court of all, and they have a voice in this, and deliberate in\nall public affairs, and try all causes, without any objection to the\nmeanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but their treasurers,\ngenerals, and other great officers of state are taken from men of great\nfortune and worth. This difficulty also may be solved upon the same\nprinciple; and here too they may be right, for the power is not in the\nman who is member of the assembly, or council, but the assembly itself,\nand the council, and the people, of which each individual of the whole\ncommunity are the parts, I mean as senator, adviser, or judge; for which\nreason it is very right, that the many should have the greatest powers\nin their own hands; for the people, the council, and the judges are\ncomposed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more\nthan the property of any person or a few who fill the great offices of\nthe state: and thus I determine these points.\n\nThe first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme\npower should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or\nmagistrates, either one or more, should be authorised to determine those\ncases which the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is impossible\nfor them, in general language, to explain themselves upon everything\nthat may arise: but what these laws are which are established upon the\nbest foundations has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter\nof some question: but the laws of every state will necessarily be like\nevery state, either trifling or excellent, just or unjust; for it is\nevident, that the laws must be framed correspondent to the constitution\nof the government; and, if so, it is plain, that a well-formed\ngovernment will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nSince in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so\nparticularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding\nof civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this\nwhich is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that\njustice is a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers\nare agreed when they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and to\nwhom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we should know how\nwe are to determine what things are equal and what unequal; and in\nthis there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the\npolitician. Some persons will probably say, that the employments of the\nstate ought to be given according to every particular excellence of each\ncitizen, if there is no other difference between them and the rest of\nthe community, but they are in every respect else alike: for justice\nattributes different things to persons differing from each other in\ntheir character, according to their respective merits. But if this is\nadmitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such advantage will\nbe a claim for a greater share of the public rights. But that this is\nevidently absurd is clear from other arts and sciences; for with respect\nto musicians who play on the flute together, the best flute is not given\nto him who is of the best family, for he will play never the better for\nthat, but the best instrument ought to be given to him who is the best\nartist.\n\nIf what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still\nfurther: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the\nflute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them are\nmore valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art in a\nhigher degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes ought\nto be given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and fortune\nshould have a reference to the business in hand; but these have none.\nMoreover, according to this reasoning, every possible excellence might\ncome in comparison with every other; for if bodily strength might\ndispute the point with riches or liberty, even any bodily strength might\ndo it; so that if one person excelled in size more than another did in\nvirtue, and his size was to qualify him to take place of the other's\nvirtue, everything must then admit of a comparison with each other; for\nif such a size is greater than virtue by so much, it is evident another\nmust be equal to it: but, since this is impossible, it is plain that it\nwould be contrary to common sense to dispute a right to any office in\nthe state from every superiority whatsoever: for if one person is slow\nand the other swift, neither is the one better qualified nor the other\nworse on that account, though in the gymnastic races a difference in\nthese particulars would gain the prize; but a pretension to the offices\nof the state should be founded on a superiority in those qualifications\nwhich are useful to it: for which reason those of family, independency,\nand fortune, with great propriety, contend with each other for them; for\nthese are the fit persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist\nof all poor men than it can of all slaves But if such persons are\nrequisite, it is evident that those also who are just and valiant are\nequally so; for without justice and valour no state can be supported,\nthe former being necessary for its existence, the latter for its\nhappiness.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nIt seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all, or\nat least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and inquired\ninto; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the right of\nbeing considered as the necessary means of making the citizens happy, as\nwe have already said. As those who are equal in one particular are not\ntherefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular\nare not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all those governments\nwhich are established upon a principle which supposes they are, are\nerroneous.\n\nWe have already said, that all the members of the community will dispute\nwith each other for the offices of the state; and in some particulars\njustly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they\nhave the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right to the soil is\nvested in the community; and also because their fidelity is in general\nmost to be depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the\npoint with each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have\na right to a higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, for\nhonourable descent is everywhere of great esteem: nor is it an improper\nconclusion, that the descendants of men of worth will be men of worth\nthemselves; for noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family:\nfor the same reason also we justly say, that virtue has a right to put\nin her pretensions. Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary\nto society, that all others must yield her the precedence.\n\nLet us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few;\nand they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared\nwith them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they are. But\nshould it ever happen that all these should inhabit the [1283b] same\ncity, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as\nusually make up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason to\ndispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every\ncommunity which we have mentioned there is no dispute where the supreme\npower should be placed; for as these differ from each other, so do those\nin whom that is placed; for in one state the rich enjoy it, in others\nthe meritorious, and thus each according to their separate manners. Let\nus however consider what is to be done when all these happen at the same\ntime to inhabit the same city. If the virtuous should be very few in\nnumber, how then shall we act? shall we prefer the virtuous on account\nof their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city? or should\nthey be so many as almost entirely to compose the state?\n\nThere is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim\nthe honours of government: for those who found them either on fortune or\nfamily have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since\nit is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found\nricher than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be\njustly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is\nof the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon\nfamily merit: and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might\narise on the score of virtue, if there is one man better than all the\nother men of worth who are in the same community; it seems just, by the\nsame reasoning, that he should enjoy the supreme power. And upon this\nprinciple also, while the many suppose they ought to have the supreme\ncommand, as being more powerful than the few, if one or more than one,\nthough a small number should be found stronger than themselves, these\nought rather to have it than they.\n\nAll these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles\nare justly founded on which these persons would establish their right to\nthe supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:\nfor with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their\nfortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing\nhinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better\nor richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective\ncapacity.\n\nAs to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may\nanswer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would\nestablish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for\nthe use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the\ncircumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything\nconsists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will be\nadvantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common.\n\nNow, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government and\nalso in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition, it is\ntrue, is different in different states: the best is that in which a man\nis enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of virtue during his\nwhole life, both in his public and private state. But should there be\none person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue,\nthough not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue of the\nmany, or their political abilities, should be too inferior to come in\ncomparison with theirs, if more than one; or if but one, with his only;\nsuch are not to be considered as part of the city; for it would be doing\nthem injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their\ninferiors in virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them\nlike a god amongst men. From whence it is evident, that a system of laws\nmust be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and\npower. Such men, therefore, are not the object of law; for they are\nthemselves a law: and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to\ninclude them in the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what\nAntisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to\nbe admitted to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on\nthis account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for\nan equality seems the principal object of their government. For which\nreason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power, their\nfortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too\ngreat weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism, and leave\nthe city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the\nArgonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them in the\nship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason those who\nhate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to\nThrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be said in its defence;\nfor the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger in\nanswer to the business he was consulted about, but striking off those\nears of corn which were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to\na level; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what was\ndone, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood by it that he must\ntake off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to\ntyrants only; nor is it tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is\npractised both in oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in\na manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banishing those who\nare too great; and what is done in one city is done also by those who\nhave the supreme power in separate states; as the Athenians with respect\nto the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly\nacquired the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states\ninto subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them.\nThe King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians\nwhen they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a\nprinciple which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those\nwhich are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it;\nthese for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.\n\nThe same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for\na painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally\nlarge, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the\nshipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than it\nought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings\nlouder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is\ntherefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with\nfree states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the\nbenefit of their respective communities; upon which account when there\nis any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the reason\nupon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just; but it is\nbetter for the legislator so to establish his state at the beginning as\nnot to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an inconvenience\nshould arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. Not that\nthis was the use it was put to: for many did not regard the benefit of\ntheir respective communities, but made the ostracism a weapon in the\nhand of sedition.\n\nIt is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and\nuseful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is not\nentirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts\nabout the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may\nhave in strength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is\nvirtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out and\nbanish such a one; neither does it seem right to govern him, for that\nwould be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter and to govern\nhim: nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is for\nall persons quietly to submit to the government of those who are thus\neminently virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate\nstates.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nWhat has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to\ninquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted them\nto be one of those species of government which are properly founded. And\nhere let us consider whether a kingly government is proper for a city or\na country whose principal object is the happiness of the inhabitants,\nor rather some other. But let us first determine whether this is of one\nkind only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to know that it consists of\nmany different species, and that the forms of government are not the\nsame in all: for at Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by\nthe laws; for it is not supreme in all circumstances; but when the king\nquits the territories of the state he is their general in war; and all\nreligious affairs are entrusted to him: indeed the kingly power with\nthem is chiefly that of a general who cannot be called to an account for\nhis conduct, and whose command is for life: for he has not the power\nof life and death, except as a general; as they frequently had in\ntheir expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer; for when\nAgamemnon is affronted in council, he restrains his resentment, but when\nhe is in the field and armed with this power, he tells the Greeks:\n\n  \"Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight,\n   To dogs and vultures soon shall be a prey; For death is mine....\"\n\nThis, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the kingly\npower is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary, sometimes\nelective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met with among\nsome of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested with powers\nnearly equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects, bound by the laws\nand the customs of their country; for as the barbarians are by nature\nmore prone to slavery than the Greeks, and those in Asia more than those\nin Europe, they endure without murmuring a despotic government; for\nthis reason their governments are tyrannies; but yet not liable to be\noverthrown, as being customary and according to law. Their guards also\nare such as are used in a kingly government, not a despotic one; for the\nguards of their kings are his citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners.\nThe one commands, in the manner the law directs, those who willingly\nobey; the other, arbitrarily, those who consent not. The one, therefore,\nis guarded by the citizens, the other against them.\n\nThese, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and\nanother is that which in ancient Greece they called _aesumnetes_; which\nis nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference from that\nwhich is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in its not\nbeing according to law, but only in its not being according to the\nancient customs of the country. Some persons possessed this power for\nlife, others only for a particular time or particular purpose, as the\npeople of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were\nheaded by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we learn from a poem\nof his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having chosen Pittacus for\ntheir tyrant, and with one [1285b] voice extolling him to the skies who\nwas the ruin of a rash and devoted people. These sorts of government\nthen are, and ever were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies;\nbut inasmuch as they are elective, and over a free people, they are also\nkingly.\n\nA fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the\nheroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government,\naccording to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were\nat first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by collecting\nthem into civil society, or procuring them an establishment, became the\nkings of a willing people, and established an hereditary monarchy.\nThey were particularly their generals in war, and presided over their\nsacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to the priests: they were\nalso the supreme judges over the people; and in this case some of them\ntook an oath, others did not; they did, the form of swearing was by\ntheir sceptre held out.\n\nIn ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything\nwhatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they\nrelinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed, so\nthat, in some states, they left their kings only the right of presiding\nover the sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while to call\nby that name had only the right of being commander-in-chief in their\nforeign wars.\n\nThese, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms: the first is that of the\nheroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its rights\nin some particulars marked out; for the king was their general, their\njudge, and their high priest. The second, that of the barbarians; which\nis an hereditary despotic government regulated by laws: the third is\nthat which they call aesumnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The\nfourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few words, is nothing more\nthan an hereditary generalship: and in these particulars they differ\nfrom each other. There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is\nwhen one person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in\nthe manner that every state and every city has over those things which\nbelong to the public: for as the master of a family is king in his own\nhouse, so such a king is master of a family in his own city or state.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nBut the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say,\nbe reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last\nspoken of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are placed\nbetween these, which are as it were at the extremities, they having less\npower than an absolute government, and yet more than the Lacedaemonians;\nso that the whole matter in question may be reduced to these two points;\nthe one is, whether it is advantageous to the citizens to have the\noffice of general continue in one person for life, and whether it should\nbe confined to any particular families or whether every one should be\neligible: the other, whether [1286a] it is advantageous for one person\nto have the supreme power over everything or not. But to enter into the\nparticulars concerning the office of a Lacedaemonian general would be\nrather to frame laws for a state than to consider the nature and utility\nof its constitution, since we know that the appointing of a general is\nwhat is done in every state. Passing over this question then, we will\nproceed to consider the other part of their government, which is\nthe polity of the state; and this it will be necessary to examine\nparticularly into, and to go through such questions as may arise.\n\nNow the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is this,\nwhether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good laws? Those\nwho prefer a kingly government think that laws can only speak a general\nlanguage, but cannot adapt themselves to particular circumstances; for\nwhich reason it is absurd in any science to follow written rule; and\neven in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which\nthe law prescribed to him, after the fourth day; but if he did it sooner\nit was at his own peril: from whence it is evident, on the very same\naccount, that a government of written laws is not the best; and yet\ngeneral reasoning is necessary to all those who are to govern, and it\nwill be much more perfect in those who are entirely free from passions\nthan in those to whom they are natural. But now this is a quality which\nlaws possess; while the other is natural to the human soul. But some\none will say in answer to this, that man will be a better judge of\nparticulars. It will be necessary, then, for a king to be a lawgiver,\nand that his laws should be published, but that those should have no\nauthority which are absurd, as those which are not, should. But whether\nis it better for the community that those things which cannot possibly\ncome under the cognisance of the law either at all or properly should be\nunder the government of every worthy citizen, as the present method is,\nwhen the public community, in their general assemblies, act as judges\nand counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular\ncases, for one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon\ncomparison, inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this\nis what a city is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's\nportion: for this reason the multitude judge of many things better than\nany one single person. They are also less liable to corruption from\ntheir numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of\nan individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger\nor any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community\nshould be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they\nwill do nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those cases\nwhich the law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to propose may\nnot easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state should happen\nto be good men, should they prefer one uncorrupt governor or many\nequally good, is it not evident that they should choose the many? But\nthere may be divisions among [1286b] these which cannot happen when\nthere is but one. In answer to this it may be replied that all their\nsouls will be as much animated with virtue as this one man's.\n\nIf then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an\naristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident\nthat the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this\nwhether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike\ncan be met with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first\ngovernments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to find\na number of persons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the world\nwas then divided into small communities; besides, kings were appointed\nin return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind; but such\nactions are peculiar to good men: but when many persons equal in virtue\nappeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, but sought after\nan equality and established a free state; but after this, when they\ndegenerated, they made a property of the public; which probably gave\nrise to oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious, and the honours\nof government were reserved for the rich: and these afterwards turned\nto tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to democracies; for\nthe power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on account of their\nrapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to frame and\nestablish democracies: and as cities after that happened to increase,\nprobably it was not easy for them to be under any other government than\na democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly government in a state,\nwhat is to be done with the king's children? Is the family also to\nreign? But should they have such children as some persons usually have,\nit will be very detrimental. It may be said, that then the king who\nhas it in his power will never permit such children to succeed to his\nkingdom. But it is not easy to trust to that; for it is very hard and\nrequires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is\nalso a doubt concerning the power with which a king should be entrusted:\nwhether he should be allowed force sufficient to compel those who do\nnot choose to be obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his\ngovernment? for if he is to govern according to law and do nothing of\nhis own will which is contrary thereunto, at the same time it will\nbe necessary to protect that power with which he guards the law, This\nmatter however may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to\nhave a proper power, and such a one is that which will be sufficient\nto make the king superior to any one person or even a large part of the\ncommunity, but inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed\nguards for that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some\none advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow\nhim such.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\n[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just\nmentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king\ngoverning under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does\nnot of himself create any particular species of government, as we have\nalready said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or\ndemocracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many\nwho entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is\nthe government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an\nabsolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state\nis wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems\nto many that it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule\nover his fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature\nrequires that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take\nplace amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be\nhurtful to the body for those who are of different constitutions to\nobserve the same regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with\nrespect to the honours of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal\nin merit should be unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much\na man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this also by\nrotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that\nlaw should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle,\nif it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular\npersons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants\nof the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they\nsay, that it is unjust that where all are equal one person should\ncontinually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to\nadjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the\nlaw having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and\napplication of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides,\nit allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better\nestablished. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind,\nwould place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it,\ngives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for\npassion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men:\nfor which reason law is reason without desire.\n\nThe instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to\nbe wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it\nwould be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic;\nfor these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship\nbut earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the\nmanagement of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour.\nAnd, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that\nwhenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by\nhis enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession,\nhe then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure: and not only this\n[1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are ill call in other\nphysicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises,\nexercise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from\nself-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves.\nFrom whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek\nfor a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the moral law is far superior\nand conversant with far superior objects than the written law; for the\nsupreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the one, though he is\ninferior to the other. But as it is impossible that one person should\nhave an eye to everything himself, it will be necessary that the supreme\nmagistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then\nshould not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in\nthis manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the\nman of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are\ncertainly better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, \"Let two together\ngo:\" and also Agamemnon's wish; \"Were ten such faithful counsel mine!\"\nNot but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested\nwith supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law\ncannot, as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its\njurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then laws\ncomprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire and\nconsider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the best\nlaw should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come under the\ndeliberation of man into a law is impossible.\n\nNo one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some\nperson to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of\na written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one;\nfor though every one who decides according to the principles of the law\ndecides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person\ncan see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do\nbetter with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for we\nsee that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes and\nears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to\nthem and their government with part of their power; for if they are not\nfriends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they\nare friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a\nfriend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such\nshould govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are\nnearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nProbably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of\nothers; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of\na master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free state,\njust and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor the other\nperverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it. But it\nis evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither\nadvantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord over all\nwhere there are no established laws, but his will is the law; or where\nthere are; nor is it right that one who is good should have it over\nthose who are good; or one who is not good over those who are not good;\nnor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular\nmanner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been already\nmentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qualified\nfor a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a\ndemocratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who are\naccustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves to a\nfamily eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are naturally\nframed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue makes them\nworthy of the management of others: for a free state, a war-like people,\nformed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws which admit the\npoorest citizen to share the honours of the commonwealth according\nto his worth. But whenever a whole family or any one of another shall\nhappen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed all other persons in the\ncommunity, then it is right that the kingly power should be in them, or\nif it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of\nall; for this, as we have just mentioned, is not only correspondent\nto that principle of right which all founders of all states, whether\naristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard to (for\nin placing the supreme power they all think it right to fix it to\nexcellence, though not the same); but it is also agreeable to what\nhas been already said; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or\nostracise such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper\nto let him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to\nnature that what is highest should ever be lowest: but this would be\nthe case should such a one ever be governed by others. So that there can\nnothing else be done but to submit, and permit him continually to\nenjoy the supreme power. And thus much with respect to kingly power in\ndifferent states, and whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and\nto what, and in what manner.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nSince then we have said that there are three sorts of regular\ngovernments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is\nadministered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to\nhave one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the\nrest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner\nas will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the\nvirtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government\nwill be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner, and for those\nvery qualities which would procure a man the character of good, any\none would say, that the government of a state was a well-established\naristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to be education and\n[1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man,\nand the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.\n\nThese particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider\nwhat sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it\nis established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry concerning\nthis.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nIn every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some\none genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art alone\nto determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular\nexercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits it best: for\nthat body which is formed by nature the most perfect and superior to\nothers necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of what one kind\nthat must be which will suit the generality; and this is the business of\nthe gymnastic arts: and although any one should not desire to acquire\nan exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that\naccount, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master and\ninstruct the youth in them should be perfect therein: and we see that\nthis is what equally befalls the healing, shipbuilding, cloth-making,\nand indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art\nto find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be\nmost correspondent to our wish, while it received no molestation from\nwithout: and what particular species of it is adapted to particular\npersons; for there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the\nbest form: so that the legislator, and he who is truly a politician,\nought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect\nimaginable, but also that which is the best suited to any given\ncircumstances. There is, moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and\nhe ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be\nable to discern what sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when\nonce established, what would be the proper means to preserve it a long\ntime. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the\nbest form of government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not\nreceive every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all\nthis, it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting\nfor all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject,\nhowever speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in\ndescribing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to\nperceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It\nshould also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek only\nthe most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing [1289a]\nrather to treat of what is common, censure those under which they live,\nand extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedaemonian,\nor some other: but every legislator ought to establish such a form of\ngovernment as from the present state and disposition of the people who\nare to receive it they will most readily submit to and persuade the\ncommunity to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to\ncorrect the mistakes of an established government than to form a new\none; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot as to learn\nanything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the character of a\nlegislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to be able to\ncorrect the mistakes of a government already established, as we have\nbefore mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him who does\nnot know how many different forms of government there are: some persons\nthink that there is only one species both of democracy and oligarchy;\nbut this is not true: so that every one should be acquainted with the\ndifference of these governments, how great they are, and whence they\narise; and should have equal knowledge to perceive what laws are best,\nand what are most suitable to each particular government: for all\nlaws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is to be\ngoverned by them, and not the state to the laws: for government is a\ncertain ordering in a state which particularly respects the magistrates\nin what manner they shall be regulated, and where the supreme power\nshall be placed; and what shall be the final object which each community\nshall have in view; but the laws are something different from what\nregulates and expresses the form of the constitution-it is their office\nto direct the conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his office\nand the punishment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the\nfounders of laws should attend both to the number and the different\nsorts of government; for it is impossible that the same laws should be\ncalculated for all sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies,\nfor of both these governments there are many species, not one only.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nSince, then, according to our first method in treating of the different\nforms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three\nsorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states, and shown\nthe three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of becoming\ntyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free state,\ndemocratical: and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and\nkingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best\nis the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of\nthem desires to be established upon the principles of virtue: and as,\nmoreover, we have already determined wherein a kingly power and an\naristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be\ngoverned by a king, it now remains that we examine into a free state,\nand also these other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a\n[1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of these three excesses which must be\nthe worst of all, and which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of\nthe best and most holy must be the worst; for it must necessarily happen\neither that the name of king only will remain, or else that the king\nwill assume more power than belongs to him, from whence tyranny will\narise, the worst excess imaginable, a government the most contrary\npossible to a free state. The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for\nan aristocracy differs much from this sort of government: that which is\nleast so is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one\nof those writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not\nthe same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions,\nas a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all\nbad ones, the best.\n\nNow I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen into\nexcess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy was\nbetter than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this question\nwe shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire how many\ndifferent sorts of free states there are; since there are many\nspecies of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most\ncomprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government; or\nif there is any other like an aristocracy, well established; and also\nwhich of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is\npreferable for particular persons: for, probably, some may suit better\nwith an oligarchy than a democracy, and others better with a democracy\nthan an oligarchy; and afterwards in what manner any one ought to\nproceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean every\nspecies of democracy, and also of oligarchy. And to conclude, when we\nshall have briefly gone through everything that is necessary, we will\nendeavour to point out the sources of corruption, and stability, in\ngovernment, as well those which are common to all as those which are\npeculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly arise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nThe reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this,\nthat each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the first\nplace, we see that all cities are made up of families: and again, of\nthe multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the\nmiddle station; and that, both of the rich and poor, some will be used\nto arms, others not. We see also, that some of the common people are\nhusbandmen, others attend the market, and others are artificers. There\nis also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity\nin which they live: for instance, in the number of horses they breed;\nfor this cannot be supported without a large fortune: for which reason,\nin former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse became\nby that means oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions\nagainst the neighbouring cities; as the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the\nMagnetians, who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia.\nMoreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises\nfrom family and merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a]\nwhich make part of the city, they have been already mentioned in\ntreating of an aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each\ncity must necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a\nshare in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more.\n\nIt is evident then, that there must be many forms of government,\ndiffering from each other in their particular constitution: for the\nparts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For\ngovernment is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these\nthe community share between themselves, either as they can attain them\nby force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst\nthem, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of. There\nmust therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as\nthere are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority\nof some over others, and their different situations. And these seem\nchiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely, the north and\nthe south; and all the others are declinations from these. And thus in\npolitics, there is the government of the many and the government of\nthe few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an aristocracy may be\nconsidered as a species of oligarchy, as being also a government of the\nfew; and what we call a free state may be considered as a democracy: as\nin the winds they consider the west as part of the north, and the east\nas part of the south: and thus it is in music, according to some, who\nsay there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and\nall other species of composition they call after one of these names; and\nmany people are accustomed to consider the nature of government in the\nsame light; but it is both more convenient and more correspondent to\ntruth to distinguish governments as I have done, into two species: one,\nof those which are established upon proper principles; of which there\nmay be one or two sorts: the other, which includes all the different\nexcesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of government to\nthe most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the\nmore violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nWe ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it\nis a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for\neven in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should\nthey define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the\nhands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen\nhundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit\nthe three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although\nthey were free, and their equal in everything else; no one would say,\nthat this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when\nfew in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than\nthemselves, no one would say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when\nthe rest who are rich have no share in the administration. We should\nrather say, that a democracy is when the supreme power is in the [1290b]\nhands of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich:\nit happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in\nthe other the few; because there are many poor and few rich. And if the\npower of the state was to be distributed according to the size of the\ncitizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty,\nit would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are large and\nbeautiful is small.\n\nNor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient\nto describe these states; for since there are many species both of a\ndemocracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration;\nas we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the\nsupreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is a\ndemocracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these\ncities the honours of the state belong to some few particular families,\nwho first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are\nsuperior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for\nthere the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a\ndemocracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority,\nare invested with the power of the state. An oligarchy is a state where\nthe rich and those of noble families, being few, possess it.\n\nWe have now proved that there are various forms of government and have\nassigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are\neven more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the\nprinciple we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists\nnot of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend\nthe different species of animals we should first of all note those parts\nwhich every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also what is\nnecessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; besides\ncertain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these\nare the only parts of an animal and there are differences between them;\nnamely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and sensoriums: to\nwhich we must add their motive powers; the number of the combinations of\nall these must necessarily make up the different species of animals.\nFor it is not possible that the same kind of animal should have any\nvery great difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these are\ncollected, who happen to have these things similar in all, they make up\na species of animals of which there are as many as there are of these\ngeneral combinations of necessary parts.\n\nThe same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not made\nof one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is\nthose who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called\nmechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual arts, without which\nthe city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is\nabsolutely necessary, others in what contribute to the elegancies and\npleasures of life; the third sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these\nyour buyers, sellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your\nhired labourers or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not\nless useful than the other, without you would have the community slaves\nto every invader; but what cannot defend itself is unworthy of the name\nof a city; for a city is self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when\nSocrates, in Plato's Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed\nof four sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and\nthese are, according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and\nbuilders; he then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths,\nherdsmen for what cattle are necessary, and also merchants and\nvictuallers, and these are by way of appendix to his first list; as if\na city was established for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a\nshoe-maker and a husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the\nmilitary a part before the increase of territory and joining to the\nborders of the neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even\namongst them who compose his four divisions, or whoever have any\nconnection with each other, it will be necessary to have some one to\ndistribute justice, and determine between man and man. If, then, the\nmind is a more valuable part of man than the body, every one would\nwish to have those things more regarded in his city which tend to the\nadvantage of these than common matters, such are war and justice; to\nwhich may be added council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor\nis it of any consequence whether these different employments are filled\nby different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a\nsoldier and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are\nparts of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be\nso also. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive\nemployments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth\nare those who execute the different offices of the state, and without\nthese it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that\nthere should be some persons capable of governing and filling the places\nin the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the office of\nsenator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently treated, are\nthe only ones remaining. If, then, these things are necessary for a\nstate, that it may be happy and just, it follows that the citizens who\nengage in public affairs should be men of abilities therein. [1291b]\nSeveral persons think, that different employments may be allotted to the\nsame person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an artificer's; as also\nthat others may be both senators and judges.\n\nBesides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and\nthat he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the\nsame person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most\nobvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich;\nmoreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many, they\nseem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so that as\nthe one or the other prevail they form different states; and these are\nthe democracy and the oligarchy.\n\nBut that there are many different states, and from what causes they\narise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different\nspecies both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though\nthis indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also\nmany different sorts of common people, and also of those who are\ncalled gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen,\nartificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling,\nseamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in\ncarrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing,\nand of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum and\nByzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and Chios,\nthose who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these those who\nlive by their manual labour and have but little property; so that they\ncannot live without some employ: and also those who are not free-born\non both sides, and whatever other sort of common people there may be.\nAs for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished either by their\nfortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any\nsuch-like excellence which is attributed to them.\n\nThe most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that\nequality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state\ndirects; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich;\nnor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but\nthat both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons\nsuppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so\nby every department of government being alike open to all; but as the\npeople are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such\na state must be a democracy. This, then, is one species thereof. Another\nis, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census; but this\nshould be but small, and every one who was included in it should be\neligible, but as soon as he was below it should lose that right. [1292a]\nAnother sort is, in which every citizen who is not infamous has a share\nin the government, but where the government is in the laws. Another,\nwhere every citizen without exception has this right. Another is like\nthese in other particulars, but there the people govern, and not the\nlaw: and this takes place when everything is determined by a majority of\nvotes, and not by a law; which happens when the people are influenced by\nthe demagogues: for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there\nis no room for them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the\nstate: but where the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues\nabound: for there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing\none body; for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their\ncollective capacity.\n\nHomer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means this\nwe are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power separately,\nis uncertain. When the people possess this power they desire to be\naltogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law,\nand this is the time when flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there\nany difference between such a people and monarchs in a tyranny: for\ntheir manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over\nbetter persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others'\nedicts; their demagogues like the others' flatterers: but their greatest\nresemblance consists in the mutual support they give to each other, the\nflatterer to the tyrant, the demagogue to the people: and to them it is\nowing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people,\nand not in the laws; for they bring everything before them, as their\ninfluence is owing to their being supreme whose opinions they entirely\ndirect; for these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who\naccuse the magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on\ntheir conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as\nthe means of destroying all their offices.\n\nAny one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as\nbeing a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is\nnot in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be\nsupreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should be\ndetermined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a\ndemocracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such\nestablishment which centres all power in the votes of the people cannot,\nproperly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be general\nin their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several species of\ndemocracies.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nOf the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the\noffices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although the\nmajority, have no share in it; while all those who are included therein\ntake part in the management of public affairs. Another sort is, when\n[1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who upon any\nvacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of the\ncommunity at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out of\nany particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another sort of\noligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary nobility. The fourth is,\nwhen the power is in the same hands as the other, but not under the\ncontrol of law; and this sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a\ntyranny in monarchies, and to that particular species of democracies\nwhich I last mentioned in treating of that state: this has the\nparticular name of a dynasty. These are the different sorts of\noligarchies and democracies.\n\nIt should also be known, that it often happens that a free state, where\nthe supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet in\nconsequence of the established manners and customs of the people, may\nbe governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws may\ncountenance a more democratic form of government, these may make the\nstate inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when there\nhas been any alteration in the government; for the people do not easily\nchange, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees\nonly that one thing takes place of another; so that the ancient laws\nwill remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have\nbrought about a revolution in the state.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nIt is evident from what has been said, that there are as many different\nsorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up: for, of\nnecessity, either all ranks of the people which I have enumerated must\nhave a share in the government, or some only, and others not; for when\nthe husbandmen, and those only who possess moderate fortunes, have the\nsupreme power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get\ntheir livings by their employs, they have but little leisure for public\nbusiness: they will therefore establish proper laws, and never call\npublic assemblies but when there is a necessity for them; and they will\nreadily let every one partake with them in the administration of public\naffairs as soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires for\ntheir qualification: every one, therefore, who is qualified will have\nhis share in the government: for to exclude any would be to make the\ngovernment an oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend\nwithout they had a subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons,\ntherefore, this government is a species of democracy. Another species is\ndistinguished by the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every\none is eligible, to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is\nsupposed to have leisure to attend: for which reason in such a democracy\nthe supreme power will be vested in the laws, as there will be nothing\npaid to those who go to the public assemblies. A third species is where\nevery freeman has a right to a share in the government, which he will\nnot accept for the cause already assigned; for which reason here also\nthe supreme power will be in the law. The fourth species [1293a] of\ndemocracy, the last which was established in order of time, arose when\ncities were greatly enlarged to what they were at first, and when the\npublic revenue became something considerable; for then the populace, on\naccount of their numbers, were admitted to share in the management of\npublic affairs, for then even the poorest people were at leisure to\nattend to them, as they received wages for so doing; nay, they were more\nso than others, as they were not hindered by having anything of their\nown to mind, as the rich had; for which reason these last very often did\nnot frequent the public assemblies and the courts of justice: thus the\nsupreme power was lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are\nthe different sorts of democracies, and such are the causes which\nnecessarily gave birth to them.\n\nThe first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state are\nmen of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them leisure\nfor the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body,\nit necessarily follows that the supreme power must be in the laws, and\nnot in men; for as they are far removed from a monarchical government,\nand have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while\nthey are too many to be supported by the public, they will of course\ndetermine to be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if the\nmen of property in the state are but few, and their property is large,\nthen an oligarchy of the second sort will take place; for those who have\nmost power will think that they have a right to lord it over the others;\nand, to accomplish this, they will associate to themselves some who have\nan inclination for public affairs, and as they are not powerful enough\nto govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if\nthose few who have large fortunes should acquire still greater power,\nthe oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort; for they will\nget all the offices of the state into their own hands by a law which\ndirects the son to succeed upon the death of his father; and,\nafter that, when, by means of their increasing wealth and powerful\nconnections, they extend still further their oppression, a monarchical\ndynasty will directly succeed wherein men will be supreme, and not the\nlaw; and this is the fourth species of an oligarchy correspondent to the\nlast-mentioned class of democracies.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nThere are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one\nof which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the\nfour sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a\ndemocracy, and this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is\nalso a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other four,\nnamely, a state: but as this is seldom to be met with, it has escaped\nthose who have endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of\ngovernments, which [1293b] they fix at four only, as does Plato in his\nRepublic.\n\nAn aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is\nrightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most\nvirtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men\nmay propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is\nthere only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while in\nother states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover, there\nare some other states which are called by the same name, that differ\nboth from oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the rich but\nalso the virtuous have a share in the administration; and have therefore\nacquired the name of aristocracies; for in those governments wherein\nvirtue is not their common care, there are still men of worth and\napproved goodness. Whatever state, then, like the Carthaginians,\nfavours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort\nof aristocracy: when only the two latter are held in esteem, as at\nLacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous\ndemocracy. These are the two species of aristocracies after the first,\nwhich is the best of all governments. There is also a third, which is,\nwhenever a free state inclines to the dominion of a few.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nIt now remains for us to treat of that government which is particularly\ncalled a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the reason for my\nchoosing to place that free state here is, because this, as well\nas those aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not seem\nexcesses, yet, to speak true, they have all departed from what a perfect\ngovernment is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other\nforms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention a tyranny the\nlast of all governments, for it is of all others the least like one:\nbut as my intention is to treat of all governments in general, for this\nreason that also, as I have said, will be taken into consideration in\nits proper place.\n\nI shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we shall\nthe better understand its positive nature as we have already described\nan oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed nothing more\nthan a mixture of them, and it has been usual to call those which\nincline most to a democracy, a free state; those which incline most to\nan oligarchy, an aristocracy, because those who are rich are generally\nmen of family and education; besides, they enjoy those things which\nothers are often guilty of crimes to procure: for which reason they are\nregarded as men of worth and honour and note.\n\nSince, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger\npart of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that\nan oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and\nhonourable: now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government\nis in the hands of the good, there the laws should not be good, but bad;\nor, on the contrary, that where the government is in the hands of the\nbad, there the laws should be good; nor is a government well constituted\nbecause the laws are, without at the same time care is taken that they\nare observed; for to enforce obedience to the laws which it makes is one\nproof of a good constitution in the state-another is, to have laws well\ncalculated for those who are to abide by them; for if they are improper\nthey must be obeyed: and this may be done two ways, either by their\nbeing the best relative to the particular state, or the best absolutely.\nAn aristocracy seems most likely to confer the honours of the state on\nthe virtuous; for virtue is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an\noligarchy, and liberty of a democracy; for what is approved of by the\nmajority will prevail in all or in each of these three different states;\nand that which seems good to most of those who compose the community\nwill prevail: for what is called a state prevails in many communities,\nwhich aim at a mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for\nthe rich, they are usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and\nhonourable. As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the\nstate, freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is\nan attendant on two of the others, for virtue and riches are the origin\nof family), it is evident, that the conjuncture of the rich and the poor\nmake up a free state; but that all three tend to an aristocracy more\nthan any other, except that which is truly so, which holds the first\nrank.\n\nWe have already seen that there are governments different from a\nmonarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and wherein\nthey differ from each other; and also aristocracies and states properly\nso called, which are derived from them; and it is evident that these are\nnot much unlike each other.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nWe shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly\ncalled a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it\nought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are\nthe proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out\nwherein they differ from one another, and then from both these compose\na state of such parts of each of them as will show from whence they were\ntaken.\n\nThere are three different ways in which two states may be blended and\njoined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be adopted\nwhich the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance in the\njudicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if they do\nnot come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid for their\nattendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are not fined\nfor their neglect. Now these things, as being common to both, are fit\nto be observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed of both. This,\nthen, is one way in which they may be joined together. In the second\nplace, a medium may be taken between the different methods which each\nstate observes; for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the\npublic assembly is either confined by no census at all, or limited by a\nvery small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it but those whose census is\nhigh: therefore, as these two practices are contrary to each other, a\ncensus between each may be established in such a state. In the third\nplace, different laws of each community may be adopted; as, for\ninstance, as it seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy, that\nthe magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an aristocracy by vote, and\nin the one state according to a census, but not in the other: let, then,\nan aristocracy and a free state copy something from each of them; let\nthem follow an oligarchy in choosing their magistrates by vote, but a\ndemocracy in not admitting of any census, and thus blend together the\ndifferent customs of the two governments. But the best proof of a happy\nmixture of a democracy and an oligarchy is this, when a person may\nproperly call the same state a democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident\nthat those who speak of it in this manner are induced to it because both\nthese governments are there well blended together: and indeed this\nis common to all mediums, that the extremes of each side should be\ndiscerned therein, as at Lacedaemon; for many affirm that it is a\ndemocracy from the many particulars in which it follows that form of\ngovernment; as for instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of\ntheir children, for the rich and poor are brought up in the same manner;\nand their education is such that the children of the poor may partake of\nit; and the same rules are observed when they are youths and men, there\nis no distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and in their\npublic tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear\nonly such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, with\nrespect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a right\nto elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori.\nOthers consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows\nin many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by\nlot; in there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on\ncapital causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of\ntwo others ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state ought\nto have its means of preservation in itself, and not without; and when I\nsay in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance\nof their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad government, but to\nevery member of the community's not being willing that there should be\nthe least alteration in their constitution. Such is the method in which\na free state or aristocracy ought to be established.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nIt now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much\nto be said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since\nwe enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the\nbeginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly government,\nand entered into a particular examination of what was most properly\ncalled so, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not, and what\nit should be, and how established; and we divided a tyranny into two\npieces when we were upon this subject, because there is something\nanalogous between this and a kingly government, for they are both of\nthem established by law; for among some of the barbarians they elect a\nmonarch with absolute power, and formerly among the Greeks there were\nsome such, whom they called sesumnetes. Now these differ from each\nother; for some possess only kingly power regulated by law, and\nrule those who voluntarily submit to their government; others rule\ndespotically according to their own will. There is a third species of\ntyranny, most properly so called, which is the very opposite to kingly\npower; for this is the government of one who rules over his equals and\nsuperiors without being accountable for his conduct, and whose object is\nhis own advantage, and not the advantage of those he governs; for which\nreason he rules by compulsion, for no freemen will ever willingly submit\nto such a government. These are the different species of tyrannies,\ntheir principles, and their causes.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nWe proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner\nof life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that\nsuperior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that\neducation which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish,\nnor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to\nthat mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to,\nand that government which most cities may establish: for as to those\naristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect\nfor a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state we now\ngoing to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.\n\nThe opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one\ncommon principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is\ntrue, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue;\nand if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must\ncertainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by\nevery one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also\nnecessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of\ngovernment is the life of the city. In every city the people are divided\ninto three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who are\nbetween them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is best, it\nis evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred;\nfor that state is most submissive to reason; for those who are very\nhandsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the\ncontrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with\ndifficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious,\nthe other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising from their\ndifferent excesses: nor will they go through the different offices\nof the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who excel in\nstrength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how nor are\nwilling to submit to command: and this begins at home when they are\nboys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to\nobey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general and excessive\nwant of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too mean: so that\nthe one know not how to command, but to be commanded as slaves, the\nothers know not how to submit to any command, nor to command themselves\nbut with despotic power.\n\nA city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and\nmasters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other\ndespise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or political\ncommunity: for community supposes affection; for we do not even on the\nroad associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be\ncomposed as much as possible of equals; which will be most so when the\ninhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it follows, that that\ncity must be best framed which is composed of those whom we say are\nnaturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who will be\nbest assured of safety and protection; for they will neither covet what\nbelongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs,\nas the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting\nagainst any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live\nfree from danger: for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the\nmiddle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain, then,\nthat the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are\nin the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these\nare a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the\nother; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate;\nso that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from\npreponderating.\n\nIt is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to\npossess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too\nmuch, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be\nin the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from\nthe excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong\ndemocracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the\ncommunity are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a\nreason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different\nstates are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as\nbeing least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb\nthe community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least\nliable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are\nvery numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two\nextremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the\none half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is that\ndemocracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance than\noligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper number\nof men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses\narise, and the government is soon at an end.\n\nWe ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best\nlawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom\nwas Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not\na king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will\nshow us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies,\nothers to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle\nstate has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the\nrich or the poor, always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the\nadministration of public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy\nor an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and\nquarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or\nthe poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state;\nbut, as the record of their victory, one which inclines to their own\nprinciples, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy.\n\nThose who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the\nrespective forms of government in their own cities, established either\ndemocracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the\nstate, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government\nhas never been established where the supreme power has been placed\namongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few,\none man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded\nto give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an\nestablished custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an\nequality, but either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to\nsubmit.\n\nThus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be\ndifficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have\nseen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies,\nto which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in\nthe same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular\nexcellences and defects of each, after we have first described the best\npossible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst\nwhich is most distant from the medium, without any one has a particular\nplan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen,\nthat although one form of government may be better than another, yet\nthere is no reason to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in\nparticular circumstances and for particular purposes.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nAfter what has been said, it follows that we should now show what\nparticular form of government is most suitable for particular persons;\nfirst laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which desires\nto support the actual administration of the state ought always to be\nsuperior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality\nand quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family,\nand by quantity its relative populousness: now it may happen that\nquality may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed,\nand quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble may be greater\nthan the number of those of family, the number of the poor than that of\nthe rich; but not so that the quantity of the one shall overbalance the\nquality of the other; those must be properly adjusted to each other; for\nwhere the number of the poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned,\nthere a democracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have\nmore power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen; and the\ndemocracy will be a particular species according to that class of\nmen which may happen to be most numerous: thus, should these be the\nhusbandmen, it will be of these, and the best; if of mechanics and those\nwho hire themselves out, the worst possible: in the same manner it may\nbe of any other set between these two. But when the rich and the noble\nprevail more by their quality than they are deficient in quantity, there\nan oligarchy ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species,\naccording to the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in\nframing his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in\nthe middle rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should\nbe the object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be\nentrusted; and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or\nat least one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution;\nfor there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire\ntogether against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the\nother. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest\nbasis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is\nwhat the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their\nhatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is the\nmost proper person for both parties to trust to; now this arbitrator is\nthe middle rank.\n\nThose who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not\nonly in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the\ncommon people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must feel\na real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to\nthe state than those of the poor.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nThere are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich\ncraftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are\ntheir public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of\njustice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With\nrespect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in\nfining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with\nrespect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not\ngranting this indulgence to those who are within the census;\nwith respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for\nnon-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and\nthese very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some\nplaces every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public\nassemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy\nfine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might avoid\nbeing enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one nor the\nother. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect to their\nbearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are excused if\nthey have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method takes place\nif they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is no penalty on\none, but there is on the other: the consequence of which is, that the\nfear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and attend the\nother, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful contrivances\nof oligarchical legislators.\n\nThe contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a\nproper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give\nthe rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one\nwould properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the\npay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one\nwould share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free\nstate ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with respect\nto their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it ought to be,\nbut the rule that should direct upon this subject should be to make it\nas extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled in it make up\na greater part of the people than those who are not; for those who are\npoor, although they partake not of the offices of the state, are willing\nto live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them in their property: but\nthis is not an easy matter; for it may not always happen, that those who\nare at the head of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time\nof war the poor are accustomed to show no alacrity without they have\nprovisions found them; when they have, then indeed they are willing to\nfight.\n\nIn some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear arms,\nbut also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the state was\ncomposed of these latter only, for all the officers were soldiers who\nhad served their time. And the first states in Greece which succeeded\nthose where kingly power was established, were governed by the military.\nFirst of all the horse, for at that time the strength and excellence of\nthe army depended on the horse, for as to the heavy-armed foot they were\nuseless without proper discipline; but the art of tactics was not known\nto the ancients, for which reason their strength lay in their horse: but\nwhen cities grew larger, and they depended more on their foot, greater\nnumbers partook of the freedom of the city; for which reason what we\ncall republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient governments\nwere properly oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons\nin each state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient\nnumber of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to\nsubordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.\n\nWe have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others\ndifferent from those we have treated of: for there are more species of\ndemocracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what are\ntheir differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others\nwhich is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for\nparticular people.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nWe will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the\ngovernments next in order, and also to consider each of them in\nparticular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each: now\nthere are three things in all states which a careful legislator ought\nwell to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which\nproperly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and according\nto the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The first\nof these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second the officers of the\nstate, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be\nentrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, the\njudicial department.\n\nNow it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine\nconcerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact\nlaws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to\ncall the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now\nthese powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in general,\nor all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or some to\none, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some: to entrust\nall to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at\nequality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to the\ncitizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by turn, and\nnot altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in his state. In\nothers the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates,\nand they succeed to the offices of the community by proper divisions of\ntribes, wards, and other very small proportions, till every one in his\nturn goes through them: nor does the whole community ever meet together,\nwithout it is when new laws are enacted, or some national affair is\ndebated, or to hear what the magistrates have to propose to them.\nAnother method is for the people to meet in a collective body, but\nonly for the purpose of holding the comitia, making laws, determining\nconcerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of their\nmagistrates, while the remaining part of the public business is\nconducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and\nare chosen out of the whole community either by vote or ballot. Another\nmethod is for the people in general to meet for the choice of the\nmagistrates, and to examine into their conduct; and also to deliberate\nconcerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the\nmagistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose particular employments\nare such as necessarily require persons well skilled therein. A fourth\nmethod is for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public\nassembly, where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, and\nhave only the privilege of giving their opinions first; and this is the\nmethod of the most pure democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings\nin a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.\n\nThese, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in a\ndemocracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community\nonly, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs; for\nwhenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a\nmoderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many, and\nwhen they depart not from that line which the law has laid down, but\ncarefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible,\ncertainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of\ngovernment [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do\nnot partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for\nthat purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first,\nis an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each\nother, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede\nthe laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When\nsome persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and\npeace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and\nother things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or\nlot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some\nare chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people\nin general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if\nboth the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an\naristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different\nmethods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states,\nall of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous to\na democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a state\nwherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the laws, to\nhold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this particular\nto imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice; for\nthey fine those who are appointed to try causes if they do not attend,\nso should they reward the poor for coming to the public assemblies:\nand their counsels will be best when all advise with each other, the\ncitizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It is also\nadvisable when the council is to be composed of part of the citizens, to\nelect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is also\nproper, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not\nto pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as will make\nthem equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot.\n\nIn an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people to\nthe council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other states,\nwhom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose business\nshould be to propose first what they should afterwards enact. By this\nmeans the people would have a place in the administration of public\naffairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in\nthe government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote\nin whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose anything\ncontrary thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of\ndetermining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to\nfollow a contrary practice to what is established in democracies,\nfor the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not\nof condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to the\nmagistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for the\npower of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which is\nalways referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we determine\nconcerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose hands it\nshall be.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nWe now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch of\npublic business contains many different Parts, as how many there shall\nbe, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how\nlong each of them shall continue in place; for some make it six months,\nothers shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or\nwhether they should be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for\nthe same person may fill the same office several times, or he may not be\nallowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once: and also with respect to\nthe appointment of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose\nthem, and in what manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly\nto distinguish the different ways which may be followed; and then to\nshow which of these is best suited to such and such governments.\n\nNow it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the\nname of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office;\nbut every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be\nreckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place;\nfor these are to be considered as very different from civil magistrates:\nto these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are\nelected: there are some civil employments which belong to the citizens;\nand these are either when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as\nsoldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are, as in\ngoverning the women or educating the youth; and also some economic, for\nthey often elect corn-meters: others are servile, and in which, if they\nare rich, they employ slaves. But indeed they are most properly called\nmagistrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or decide\ncauses, or are in some command, the last more especially, for to command\nis peculiar to magistrates. But to speak truth, this question is of\nno great consequence, nor is it the province of the judges to decide\nbetween those who dispute about words; it may indeed be an object of\nspeculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are necessary in a\nstate, and how many, and what, though not most necessary, may yet be\nadvantageous in a well-established government, is a much more useful\nemployment, and this with respect to all states in general, as well as\nto small cities.\n\nIn extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one\nperson, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society,\nwhere some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in\noffice but once; and indeed everything is better done which has the\nwhole attention of one person, than when that [1299b] attention is\ndivided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary that a few of\nthe citizens should execute many employments; for their numbers are so\nsmall it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the\nsame time; for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small\nstates will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as\nlarge ones; but the one will not want to employ them so often as the\nother; so that different charges may be intrusted to the same person\nwithout any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each\nother, and for want of sufficient members in the community it will be\nnecessary. If we could tell how many magistrates are necessary in every\ncity, and how many, though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we\ncould then the better know how many different offices one might assign\nto one magistrate. It is also necessary to know what tribunals in\ndifferent places should have different things under their jurisdiction,\nand also what things should always come under the cognisance of the same\nmagistrate; as, for instance, decency of manners, shall the clerk of the\nmarket take cognisance of that if the cause arises in the market, and\nanother magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate everywhere:\nor shall there be a distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as,\nfor instance, in decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it\nrelates to a man, another when it relates to a woman?\n\nIn different states shall the magistrates be different or the same?\nI mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a\nmonarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it\nvary according to the different formation of the government? as in an\naristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are well\neducated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the\nfreemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities differ?\nFor it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes\notherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the magistrate have\ngreat powers, in that but small. There are also certain magistrates\npeculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers are not proper in a\ndemocracy, but a senate is; for one such order is necessary, whose\nbusiness shall be to consider beforehand and prepare those bills which\nshall be brought before the people that they may have leisure to\nattend to their own affairs; and when these are few in number the state\ninclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed must always be few\nfor they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both\nthese offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is superior to\nthe senator's, the one having only a democratical power, the other an\noligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate is lost in\nthose democracies, in which the people, meeting in one public assembly,\ntake all the business into their own hands; and this is likely to happen\neither when the community in general are in easy circumstances, or when\nthey are paid for their attendance; for they are then at leisure often\nto meet together and determine everything for themselves. A magistrate\nwhose business is to control the manners of the boys, or women, or who\ntakes any department similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy,\nnot in a democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the poor from\nappearing in public? neither is such a one to be met with in an\noligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And\nthus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the\nestablishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now, they\ndiffer from each other in three ways, from which, blended together,\nall the varieties which can be imagined arise. The first of these\ndifferences is in those who appoint the magistrates, the second consists\nin those who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment; and\neach of these three differ in three manners; for either all the citizens\nmay appoint collectively, or some out of their whole body, or some out\nof a particular order in it, according to fortune, family, or virtue, or\nsome other rule (as at Megara, where the right of election was amongst\nthose who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated\nthemselves by force of arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again,\nthese several modes may be differently formed together, as some\nmagistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole;\nsome out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot:\nand each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for\neither all may elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may\neither proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain\ndivision of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the\nwhole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others\nanother. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot\nof all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or\nsome one way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all,\nothers by the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods\nof electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of\nthese there are two adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the\nmagistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote or lot, or\nboth; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by vote. In a free state\nthe whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of\nthe whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or\nvote, or both: and they should elect either out of the whole community,\nor out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote.\nIn an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole\nbody of the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both: by lot\nis most correspondent to that form of government. In a free aristocracy,\nsome magistrates [1300b] should be chosen out of the community in\ngeneral, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, those\nby lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of\ncertain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others\nby both methods; but to choose them out of the whole community is not\ncorrespondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an\naristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of\nparticular persons, and this by vote. These then are all the different\nways of electing of magistrates; and they have been allotted according\nto the nature of the different communities; but what mode of proceeding\nis proper for different communities, or how the offices ought to be\nestablished, or with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean\nby the powers of a magistrate, what should be his particular province,\nas the management of the finances or the laws of the state; for\ndifferent magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of\nthe army differs from the clerk of the market.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nOf the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to\nconsider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same manner\nas we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges shall\nconsist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I mean\nwhether they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by for what\ncauses I mean, how many different courts shall be appointed; by how,\nwhether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first determine how\nmany different courts there ought to be. Now these are eight. The\nfirst of these is the court of inspection over the behaviour of the\nmagistrates when they have quitted their office; the second is to punish\nthose who have injured the public; the third is to take cognisance of\nthose causes in which the state is a party; the fourth is to decide\nbetween magistrates and private persons, who appeal from a fine laid\nupon them; the fifth is to determine disputes which may arise concerning\ncontracts of great value; the sixth is to judge between foreigners, and\nof murders, of which there are different species; and these may all be\ntried by the same judges or by different ones; for there are murders\nof malice prepense and of chance-medley; there is also justifiable\nhomicide, where the fact is admitted, and the legality of it disputed.\n\nThere is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae,\nwhich determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has\nrun away, to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair\nhappens but seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to determine\ncauses wherein strangers are concerned, and this whether they are\nbetween stranger and stranger or between a stranger and a citizen. The\neighth and last is for small actions, from one to five drachma's, or a\nlittle more; for these ought also to be legally determined, but not to\nbe brought before the whole body of the judges. But without entering\ninto any particulars concerning actions for murder, and those wherein\nstrangers are the parties, let us particularly treat of those courts\nwhich have the jurisdiction of those matters which more particularly\nrelate to the affairs of the community and which if not well conducted\noccasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity,\neither all persons must have a right to judge of all these different\ncauses, appointed for that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of\nall, some of them by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote,\nin others by lot. Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a]\nwill be just the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the\npeople only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part\neither by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in\nparticular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which\nmeans there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned.\nBesides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are\nchosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all\nthree may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote,\nlot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of these\nappointments that which admits all the community to be judges in all\ncauses is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints that\ncertain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the third,\nwhich appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but\nparticular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK V\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nWe have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it\nremains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations\nin government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the\ndestruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of\npolity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be\nused for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are\napplicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which\nare to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered\nseparately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought\nfirst to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all\nof which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and yet\nhave failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus\ndemocracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one\nthing are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal\nin liberty, they are equal in everything else; and oligarchies, from\nsupposing that those who are unequal in one thing are unequal in all;\nthat when men are so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to\neverything else. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are\nequal with others think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality\nwith them in everything; and those who are superior to others endeavour\nto get still more; and it is this more which is the inequality: thus\nmost states, though they have some notion of what is just, yet are\nalmost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not\nthat share in the administration which answers to his expectations, he\nbecomes seditious: but those who of all others have the greatest right\nto be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in virtue;\nfor they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too, some\npersons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain to\nbe on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who\nboast of their ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are\nthe origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations\nwhich men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they\nmay change the state already established into some other, as when\nthey propose to erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a\ndemocracy, or free state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy\nfrom these, or those from that; or else, when they have no objection\nto the established government, which they like very well, but choose to\nhave the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few\nor one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in\nwhich they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the\ngovernment is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same\nmanner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like\nmanner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend\nor contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts\nof it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some\npersons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta;\nand Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an\nalteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi\nthey established a senate. It is also necessary for all the magistrates\nat Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any new magistrate\nis created: the power of the archon also in that state partakes of the\nnature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the occasion of sedition,\nbut not when those who are unequal are treated in a different manner\ncorrespondent to that inequality. Thus kingly power is unequal when\nexercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim after an equality\nare the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold, either in number or\nvalue. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or\nthe same quantity; equality in value is by proportion as two exceeds\none, and three two by the same number-thus by proportion four exceeds\ntwo, and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of four\nthat one is of two; that is to say, half. Now, all agree in what is\nabsolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said they dispute\nconcerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in\none respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior\nin one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all; from whence\nchiefly arise two sorts of governments, a democracy and an oligarchy;\nfor nobility and virtue are to be found only [1302a] amongst a few;\nthe contrary amongst the many; there being in no place a hundred of\nthe first to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. But to\nestablish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is\nwrong, and this the example of those so established makes evident,\nfor none of them have been stable; and for this reason, that it is\nimpossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in its principles\nshould not at last meet with a bad end: for which reason in some things\nan equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in\nvalue. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an\noligarchy; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, for either\nthe few in power may conspire against each other or against the\npeople; but in a democracy only one; namely, against the few who aim\nat exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking of, of\na sedition of the people against themselves. Moreover, a government\ncomposed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy\nthan an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nSince we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions\nin governments, we must begin entirely with the first principles from\nwhence they arise. Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number;\nwhich we must first distinguish in general from each other, and\nendeavour to show in what situation people are who begin a sedition;\nand for what causes; and thirdly, what are the beginnings of political\ntroubles and mutual quarrels with each other. Now that cause which of\nall others most universally inclines men to desire to bring about a\nchange in government is that which I have already mentioned; for those\nwho aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition, if they see those\nwhom they esteem their equals possess more than they do, as well as\nthose also who are not content with equality but aim at superiority, if\nthey think that while they deserve more than, they have only equal with,\nor less than, their inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either just\nor unjust; just, when those who are inferior are seditious, that they\nmay be equal; unjust, when those who are equal are so, that they may\nbe superior. These, then, are the situations in which men will be\nseditious: the causes for which they will be so are profit and honour;\nand their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by\nmulcts, either on their own account or their friends, they will raise\na commotion in the state. The original causes which dispose men to the\nthings which I have mentioned are, taken in one manner, seven in number,\nin another they are more; two of which are the same with those that\nhave been already mentioned: but influencing in a different manner;\nfor profit and honour sharpen men against each other; not to get the\npossession of them for themselves (which was what I just now supposed),\nbut when they see others, some justly, others [1302b] unjustly,\nengrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence,\ncontempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state. There are\nalso other things which in a different manner will occasion revolutions\nin governments; as election intrigues, neglect, want of numbers, a too\ngreat dissimilarity of circumstances.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nWhat influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how\nthey may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when the\nmagistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than their\noffice gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other,\nbut against the state also who gave them their power; and this their\navarice has two objects, either private property or the property of the\nstate. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion sedition,\nis evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they\nsee others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things\nare done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary\nto their deserts, justly when they are according to them. Excessive\nhonours are also a cause of sedition when one person or more are greater\nthan the state and the power of the government can permit; for then\na monarchy or a dynasty is usually established: on which account the\nostracism was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though\nit is better to guard against such excesses in the founding of a state,\nthan when they have been permitted to take place, to correct them\nafterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of\nsedition, through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an\ninjury, that they may prevent it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the\nnobles conspired against the people on account of the decrees they\nexpected would pass against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition\nand conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have\nno share in the administration. The rich also even in democracies,\ndespising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better\nthemselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after the battle\nof Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration, the democracy\nwas destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the people was\nlost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing happened at Syracuse\nbefore the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there was the same sedition\nbefore the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in state will\nalso arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists\nof many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably to preserve its\nsymmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot was to\nbe four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might\notherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form, if it\nincrease beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition\nof parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may often\nincrease without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free\nstates. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a\nlittle after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in\na battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned\ninto a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were\nkilled by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several\nhusbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the\nunfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was\nreduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in\nthe Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in\na democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or\nproperties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments\nalso sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner\npeople; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of\nelection from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by\nnegligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to\nthe constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened\nat Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the\nelection of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a\ndemocratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very\noften great alterations silently take place in the form of government\nfrom people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the\ncensus was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a\nlittle and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state\nalso is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till\ntheir differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a\ncity cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every\ngiven time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto\nbeen originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted\ntheir neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable\nto revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians\nin founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the\nTraezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence came the\nproverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause\nhappened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had joined with\nthem in building the city; for they assuming upon these, on account of\nthe country being their own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new\ncitizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of\nthe city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those\nwho were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and\nalso the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The\nAppolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to\nthe freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the\nSyracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled\n[1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled\nwith each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of\nAmphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater\npart of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion\nseditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not\nsharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already\nmentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because\nthey have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal\nto them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion\ndisturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one\ncity; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the\ntown called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and\nthe Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the disposition of the\ncitizens is not the same, for those who live in the Piraeus are more\nattached to a popular government than those who live in the city\nproperly so called; for as the interposition of a rivulet, however\nsmall, will occasion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any\ntrifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions; but they will not\nso soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement between virtue\nand vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in\norder, one cause having more influence than another; one of which that I\nlast mentioned.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nBut seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from\nthem; for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling\nquarrels are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise\nbetween persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the\ncase with the Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the\ngovernment was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were\nin office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other\nseduced his mistress; he in his turn, offended with this, persuaded his\nfriend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this the whole city\ntook part either with the one or the other, and the government was\noverturned: therefore every one at the beginning of such disputes ought\nto take care to avoid the consequences; and to smother up all quarrels\nwhich may happen to arise amongst those in power, for the mischief lies\nin the beginning; for the beginning is said to be half of the business,\nso that what was then but a little fault will be found afterwards to\nbear its full proportion to what follows. Moreover, disputes between men\nof note involve the whole city in their consequences; in Hestiaea,\nafter the Median war: two brothers having a dispute about their paternal\nestate; he who was the poorer, from the other's having concealed part\nof the effects, and some money which his father had found, engaged the\npopular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of\nfashion. And at Delphos, [1304a] a quarrel about a wedding was the\nbeginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for\nthe bridegroom, being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting\nupon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her relations\nresenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred money into his\npocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious\nperson. At Mitylene also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right\nof heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the\nAthenians, in which Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man\nof fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in\nprocuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and\nexcited the Athenians to attack them, being the host of that state.\nThere was also a dispute at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance,\nbetween Mnasis, the father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of\nOnomarchus, which brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The government\ntoo of Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel that arose from an intended\nmarriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage,\nthe father of the young person to whom she was contracted, being archon,\npunishes him, upon which account he, resenting the affront, associated\nhimself with those who were excluded from any share in the government,\nand brought about a revolution. A government may be changed either into\nan oligarchy, democracy, or a free state; when the magistrates, or any\npart of the city acquire great credit, or are increased in power, as the\ncourt of Areopagus at Athens, having procured great credit during the\nMedian war, added firmness to their administration; and, on the other\nhand, the maritime force, composed of the commonalty, having gained the\nvictory at Salamis, by their power at sea, got the lead in the state,\nand strengthened the popular party: and at Argos, the nobles,\nhaving gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea against the\nLacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse,\nthe victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the common\npeople, they changed their free state into a democracy: and at Chalcis,\nthe people having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles,\nimmediately seized the government: and at Ambracia also the people,\nhaving expelled the tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the\nsupreme power in themselves. And this in general ought to be known,\nthat whosoever has been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether\nprivate persons, or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part\nof the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the\ncause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them\nthe honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they,\non account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with\ntheir former equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those\nparts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an\n[1304b] equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part\nwhich is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be\nnoticed; for if one party is so much more powerful than the other, as\nto be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the\ndanger: for which reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue\nwill never be the cause of seditions; for they will be too few for that\npurpose when compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the\ncauses of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and\nrevolutions therein are brought about in two ways, either by violence or\nfraud: if by violence, either at first by compelling them to submit to\nthe change when it is made. It may also be brought about by fraud in\ntwo different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived,\nwillingly consent to an alteration in their government, and are\nafterwards obliged by force to abide by it: as, for instance, when the\nfour hundred imposed upon the people by telling them that the king\nof Persia would supply them with money for the war against the\nLacedaemonians; and after they had been guilty of this falsity, they\nendeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power; or when they are\nat first persuaded and afterwards consent to be governed: and by one of\nthese methods which I have mentioned are all revolutions in governments\nbrought about.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nWe ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these\ncauses in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject\nto revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by\ninforming against men of property, they induce them to join together\nthrough self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies\nunite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is\nwhat any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island\nof Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness\nof the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with\neach other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes,\nprevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them,\nwho were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to\nconspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was\nbrought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by\nthe same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them,\nquitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and\noverthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy\nwas destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by\nconfiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were\nbanished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the\npeople in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at\nCume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed;\nand whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the\nsame revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues,\nto curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together,\neither by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on\npublic services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the\nfortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both\ndemagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and\nindeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason\nfor which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues\nwere of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their\neloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers\nare at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in\na military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as\ntyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too,\ntyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive\npowers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at\nMiletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence;\nand also because at that time the cities were not of that very great\nextent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed\nin husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an\nopportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants;\nwhich they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people;\nand this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of\nPisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in\nMegara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he\nhad seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for\naccusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a\ntyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular\nman in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from\nits ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if\nthere is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the\nelection is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in\noffice, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the\npeople superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least\nin a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and\nnot by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which\ndemocracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nThere are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a\nrevolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for\nthen every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if\none of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at\nNaxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which\narise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes\na revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the\nadministration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this\nhappened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who\nhad no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they\nwere admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger\nalso: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the\nsame time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is\nobserved the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it\nwas changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the\nhands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy\nwas destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the\ngovernment was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just\nmentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there\nwere many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of\ntheir disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the\nvictory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly\nat Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state\nflourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the\npeople were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so\nfew, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to\nrevolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of\nthe demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one\nwho flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their\ndemagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over\nthe thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred.\nThe others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy,\nand flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who\nflattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will\nalways happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect\nthemselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain\nranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos.\nAnd when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme\npower, the demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn\nthe government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when\nsome desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for\nthose who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the\npeople for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions\nwhen the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are\ndesirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves\nor to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported\nDionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a\ncolony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with\nthe rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against\nChares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they\nwill try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and\nthen quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour\nto detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the\nmembers of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very\neasily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of\nthis, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great\npower, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be\ndestroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the\nmanagement of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally,\nbut when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened\nonce at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a\nvery few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety, who\nheld their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to\npreserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at\nLacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of\nwar and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the\ngovernment is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they\ngive the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as\nTimophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general,\nthey will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear\nof this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in\nthe government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace,\nfrom their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the\nguardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will\nbe an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which\nhappened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power.\nThe same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political\nclubs, of which Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an\noligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting another, or\nfrom their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their\nmarriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown:\nand in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the\nsame account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person\nbeing condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's\nbeing guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion\nsuffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was\nthat at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them\npublicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought\nabout in oligarchies by those who could not brook the despotism which\nthose persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes\nalso may happen by accident in what we call a free state and in an\noligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen\naccording to a certain census; for it often happens that the highest\ncensus is fixed at first; so that a few only could have a share in\nthe government, in an oligarchy, or in a free state those of moderate\nfortunes only; when the city grows rich, through peace or some other\nhappy cause, it becomes so little that every one's fortune is equal to\nthe census, so that the whole community may partake of all the honours\nof government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little,\nand insensible approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions\nand seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they\nare owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter,\nnot into governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same\ngovernment; as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law\nto vest it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nCommotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons\nin power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in\nthis particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both\nthese states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of\na few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein\nthey chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to\nhappen when the generality of the people are high-spirited and think\nthemselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon,\ncalled the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others, descendants\nof citizens), who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were\nsent to found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are\ndisgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, to\nwhom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings:\nor when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the\nreign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans:\nand also when some are too poor and others too rich, which will most\nfrequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian\nwar, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called \"Eunomia;\"\nfor some persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might\nbe divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be\nhigher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's intention\nat Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's\nat Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from\nwant of a fixed administration of public affairs; the cause of which\nevil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic and\nthe oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an aristocracy from the\nsame causes, and also from virtue not being properly joined to power;\nbut chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the\ndemocratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free\nstates endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call\naristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other,\nand on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for\nthat state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy,\nand that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on\nwhich account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider\nthe foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live\nwhere equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank,\nvery often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole,\nwhichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party\nsupporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an\naristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change\ninto a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured,\ndirectly take part with the contrary side) and a free state into an\noligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys that\nequality he has a right to and fully possesses what is his own. And what\nI have been speaking of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates\nbeing elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a\nlower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of\nthe nobles possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too\nmuch of an oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching\ngreatly on the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well\ninured to war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every\none out of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as\nall aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to\nhave rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in\nthe hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they\nplease and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the\nLocrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state was\nneither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy\nchiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed by degrees,\nas we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general; and this\nhappens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever\nanything which in the least regards the state is treated with contempt,\nafter that something else, and this of a little more consequence, will\nbe more easily altered, until the whole fabric of government is entirely\nsubverted, which happened in the government of Thurium; for the law\nbeing that they should continue soldiers for five years, some young\nmen of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their\nofficers, despising those who had the management of public affairs,\nand imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first\nendeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to\ncontinue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that\nthe people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who\nare called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose\nit but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if\nthat law was not repealed they would permit the management of all other\npublic affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they\nendeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they\nfound that they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was\naltered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In\nshort, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or\nfrom without; from without when they have for their neighbour a state\nwhose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the\nsame thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both\nthe Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one,\nwhen conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the other the\ndemocracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions\nin governments.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nWe are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in\ngeneral and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first\nplace, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned\nfor their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for\nthings contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are\ncontrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much\ncare as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and\nthis ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence;\nfor an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in\na family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income;\nfor the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if\nevery part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense\nis true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together\nare large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of\nanything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place,\nno credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people\nwith false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The\ndifferent ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already\nmentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies\ncontinuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government,\nbut from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who\nhave a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who\nhave not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also\nintroducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office;\nnor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the\nproperty of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each\nother upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a\ndemocracy desire to have established in the state is not only just,\nbut convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which\nreason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which\nare established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one\ncontinue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of\nthe same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort\nof democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up\namongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both\naristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted\ninto dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are\nmagistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a\nlong time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies\nand oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state\nestablish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the\nother, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments\nare sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption\nat a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who\nare alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state;\nfor which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of\nthe constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they\nmay preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting\nthe state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care\nought also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes\nof the nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already\nengaged in them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil\nat its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the\npolitician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or\nfree state on account of the census, if that happens to continue the\nsame while the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take\na general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare\nit with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the\ncensus is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five\nyears; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it\nwas at the time when the census was first established in the state,\nlet there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these\naccording to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the census\nlarger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done in\noligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the one,\nan oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will\nbe changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or\ndemocracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies,\nmonarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a\nrank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour\nto confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short\ntime; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear\nprosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours\nwhich were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather\nby degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the\nlaw, that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his\nfortune or friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be\ncontrived that he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote\ninnovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living,\nthere ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of every\none, and see that these are not contrary to the genius of the state\nin which he lives, whether it may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any\nother form of government; and, for the same reason, those should be\nguarded against who are most prosperous in the city: the means of doing\nwhich is by appointing those who are otherwise to the business and the\noffices of the state. I mean, to oppose men of account to the common\npeople, the poor to the rich, and to blend both these into one body, and\nto increase the numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and\nthis will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of\ncondition. But above all, in every state it is necessary, both by the\nlaws and every other method possible, to prevent those who are employed\nby the public from being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy;\nfor then the people will not be so much displeased from seeing\nthemselves excluded from a share in the government (nay, they will\nrather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) as at\nsuspecting that the officers of the state steal the public money, then\nindeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because they are\ndeprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy\nthem. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an\naristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both\nthe rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to\na share in the government is democratical; that the rich should be\nin office is aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public\nemployment whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will\nnot desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had\nrather attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as\nthey want nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their\nfortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the\nprincipal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort.\nTo prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be\ndelivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of\nthe accounts be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions.\nBut, as the magistrates are to execute their offices without any\nadvantages, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who\nexecute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich\nshould be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor\neven the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It\nwould be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer to\nexhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments\nof plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is\nnecessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public\nemployments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to\nlet their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own\nrank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit\nany person to have more than one; for by this means property will be\nmore equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better\ncircumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy\nto allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a\npreference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an\noligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be filled\nonly by those who are best qualified to discharge them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nThere are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the\nfirst departments in government; first of all, an affection for the\nestablished constitution; second place, abilities every way completely\nequal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice\ncorrespondent to the nature of that particular state they are placed in;\nfor if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there\nmust be different species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all\nthese qualifications do not in the same persons, in what manner the\nchoice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is\nan accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b]\nconstitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall one\nprefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them the\ngenerality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which\nreason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than\nhis virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of\nconducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the state\nor manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these\nrequire greater virtue than the generality are possessed of, but only\nthat knowledge which is common to all. It may be asked, if a man has\nabilities equal to his appointment in the state, and is affectionate to\nthe constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since\nthese two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to\nthe public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are often\ndeficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs,\nthough they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their\nserving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws\ncontain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its\npreservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often\ninsisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it\ngreater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought\nnot to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect;\nnamely, to preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a\ndemocracy destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to\nan oligarchy destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue\nextend it to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a\nlittle from perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a\nflat one, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this\nparticularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of\nthe part is lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at\nall, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with\nother parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with\nrespect to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something\nvary from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if\nany one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will\nmake the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no\ngovernment at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore\nshould know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an\noligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue\nwithout rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of\ncircumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of\nanother form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an\ninequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in\ndemocracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people\nsuperior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the\nrich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak\nin favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to\nsupport those who are in administration against the people. The oaths\nalso which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they\nnow are; for, at present, in some places they swear, \"I will be adverse\nto the common people, and contrive all I can against them;\" whereas they\nought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their\noaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all things which I\nhave mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is,\nwhat is now most despised, to educate your children for the state; for\nthe most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of\nno service if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in\nthe principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law\nestablished; of an oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals\nin one man, there are in the city. But to educate a child fit for the\nstate, it must not be done in the manner which would please either those\nwho have the power in an oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but\nso as they may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments.\nBut now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up\ntoo delicately, and the children of the poor hardy with exercise\nand labour; so that they are both desirous of and able to promote\ninnovations. In democracies of the purest form they pursue a method\nwhich is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is, that they\ndefine liberty wrong: now, there are two things which seem to be the\nobjects of a democracy, that the people in general should possess the\nsupreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to\nbe equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law: now, their\nfreedom and equality consists in every one's doing what they please:\nthat is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; \"as his\ninclination guides,\" in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for\nno one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government,\nbut protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in\ndifferent states, and the means of their preservation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nIt now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of corruption,\nand means of preservation; and indeed almost the same things which have\nbeen said of other governments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a\nkingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of an\noligarchy and democracy; for which reason it is the worst that man\ncan submit to, as being composed of two, both of which are bad, and\ncollectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both\nthese states. These two species of monarchies arise from principles\ncontrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort\nof people against the multitude, and kings are appointed out of those,\nwho are chosen either for their superior virtue and actions flowing from\nvirtuous principles, or else from their noble descent; but a tyrant is\nchosen out of the meanest populace; an enemy to the better sort, that\nthe common people may not be oppressed by them. That this is true\nexperience convinces us; for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere\ndemagogues, who gained credit with the people by oppressing the nobles.\nSome tyrannies were established in this manner after the cities were\nconsiderably enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded\nthe power which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing\ndespotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the\nsuperior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed\nofficers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious\naffairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme power\nover all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was easy\nto establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was ready at\nhand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the honours of\nthe state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed originally the\nkingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours of the state.\nPansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens,\nDionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by having been\ndemagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of\nan aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as either virtue,\nfamily, beneficent actions, or these joined with power; for those who\nhave been benefactors to cities and states, or have it in their powers\nto be so, have acquired this honour, and those who have prevented a\npeople from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, or those who have\nfreed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of cities, or settlers of\ncolonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and Molossus. A king desires\nto be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may be\nsecure in the possession of it, and that the people in general meet with\nno injury; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to the\ncommon good, except for his own advantage; his only object is pleasure,\nbut a king's is virtue: what a tyrant therefore is ambitious of\nengrossing is wealth, but a king rather honour. The guards too of a king\nare citizens, a tyrant's foreigners.\n\nThat a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an\noligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as the\nonly means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of life;\nlike that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore deprives\nthem of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to persecute the\npopulace, to drive them out of the city and their own habitations. With\na democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and destroys them both\npublicly and privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and\nan impediment to the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies\nboth amongst those who desire to govern and those who desire not to be\nslaves; hence arose Periander's advice to Thrasybulus to take off the\ntallest stalks, hinting thereby, that it was necessary to make away with\nthe eminent citizens. We ought then in reason, as has been already\nsaid, to account for the changes which arise in a monarchy from the\nsame causes which produce them in other states: for, through injustice\nreceived, fear, and contempt, many of those who are under a monarchical\ngovernment conspire against it; but of all species of injustice,\ninjurious contempt has most influence on them for that purpose:\nsometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes.\nThe dissolution too of a kingdom and a tyranny are generally the same;\nfor monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are desirous to\nobtain. Of plots: some aim at the life of those who govern, others at\ntheir government; the first arises from hatred to their persons; which\nhatred may be owing to many causes, either of which will be sufficient\nto excite their anger, and the generality of those who are under the\ninfluence of that passion will join in a conspiracy, not for the sake\nof their own advancement, but for revenge. Thus the plot against\nthe children of Pisistratus arose from their injurious treatment of\nHarmodius's sister, and insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the\ninjury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius.\nPeriander the tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for\nsome improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was\nslain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had\nreceived from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for insulting\nhim on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the Cyprian in\nrevenge for having taken his son's wife away from him....\n\nMany also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have, through\nresentment, either killed those who caused them to be inflicted or\nconspired against them, even when they had kingly power, as at Mitylene\nMegacles, joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidee, who used\nto go about striking those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times,\nSmendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and dragging him away from\nhis wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against\nArchelaus, for he urged others on: the occasion of his resentment was\nhis having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for\nEuripides was greatly offended with him for having said something of the\nfoulness of his breath. And many others have been killed or conspired\nagainst on the same account. Fear too is a cause which produces the\nsame effects, as well in monarchies as in other states: thus Artabanes\nconspired against Xerxes through fear of punishment for having hanged\nDarius according to his orders, whom he supposed he intended to pardon,\nas the order was given at supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a]\ndethroned and killed in consequence of the contempt they were held in by\nthe people; as some one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him\nspinning with his wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of\nhim, it may very probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired\nagainst Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a\nconspiracy, and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's\nfriends will do this if they despise him; for from the confidence he\nplaces in them, they think that they shall not be found out. Those\nalso who think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king\nthrough contempt; for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the\ndanger, on account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it.\nThus a general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the\nmonarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and\nhis forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its effeminacy:\nthus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus, conspired\nagainst him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will excite men\nto enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain; as in the\ninstance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a\nbold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst kings, will\nof all others be most like to engage in sedition; for strength and\ncourage united inspire great bravery: whenever, therefore, these join\nin one person, he will be very ready for conspiracies, as he will easily\nconquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through love of glory\nand honour have a different motive in view from what I have already\nmentioned; for, like all others who embrace danger, they have only glory\nand honour in view, and think, not as some do, of the wealth and pomp\nthey may acquire, but engage in this as they would in any other noble\naction, that they may be illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a\ntyrant, not to succeed in his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt\nbut the number of those who act upon this principle is small, for we\nmust suppose they regard their own safety as nothing in case they should\nnot succeed, and must embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do)\nwhen he made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said,\nthat let the advantage he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to\nhave gained it; and that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had\ngained footing in his country, he should think his death sufficiently\nglorious. A tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other\nstates are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an\nopposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it;\nand what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of\nopposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny, as\nsays Hesiod, \"a potter against a potter;\" for the extreme of a democracy\nis a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from their\ndifferent forms of government--for which reason the Lacedaemonians\ndestroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during the prosperity\nof their state. Nor are they only destroyed from without, but also\nfrom within, when those who have no share in the power bring about a\nrevolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to Dionysius; to the first,\nby means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, who nattered Gelon's\nson, and induced him to lead a life of pleasure, that he himself might\ngovern; but the family joined together and endeavoured to support the\ntyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but those whom they made of their party\nseized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war\nagainst his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first\nexpelled and then killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly\ninduce men to conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of\nthese, namely hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is\noften the cause of their destruction: for though, for instance, those\nwho raised themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but\nthose who received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately\nall of them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they\nsoon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part\nof their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases\nthis is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels\nthem to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater\nobstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under\nthe direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion through\ncontempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and many\nothers. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is accompanied\nwith grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but hatred is free\nfrom it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction\nof a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government and an extreme\ndemocracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for these are divided\ntyrannies.\n\nKingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason\nthey are generally very stable; but they have many causes of subversion\nwithin; of which two are the principal; one is when those who are\nin power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they endeavour to\nestablish a tyranny by assuming greater power than the law gives them.\nA kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in our times, but\nrather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly government is one that\nis voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme power admitted upon great\noccasions: but where many are equal, and there are none in any respect\nso much better than another as to be qualified for the greatness and\ndignity of government over them, then these equals will not willingly\nsubmit to be commanded; but if any one assumes the government, either by\nforce or fraud, this is a tyranny. To what we have already said we shall\nadd, the causes of revolutions in an hereditary kingdom. One of these\nis, that many of those who enjoy it are naturally proper objects of\ncontempt only: another is, that they are insolent while their power is\nnot despotic; but they possess kingly honours only. Such a state is soon\ndestroyed; for a king exists but while the people are willing to obey,\nas their submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary.\nThese and such-like are the causes of the destruction of monarchies.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nMonarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have\nalready mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to\neach separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power\nof the king's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the\nless extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government\ncontinue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of\ncondition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the\nless.\n\nIt was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so\nlong; and the Lacedaemonians from their government's being from the\nbeginning divided into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced\ninto the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the\nephori; for by taking something from the power he increased the duration\nof the kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less, but bigger;\nas they say he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not ashamed\nto deliver down his kingdom to his children reduced from what he\nreceived it from his ancestors? No, says he, I give it him more lasting.\nTyrannies are preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one of\nwhich is when the power is delegated from one to the other, and in this\nmanner many tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Periander\nfounded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with\namongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive\nas anything can be to preserve a tyranny; namely, to keep down those who\nare of an aspiring disposition, to take off those who will not submit,\nto allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but\nto guard against everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual\nconfidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings of those who are at\nleisure to hold conversation with each other; and to endeavour by every\nmeans possible to keep all the people strangers to each other; for\nknowledge increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all strangers to\nappear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions\nmay be sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves seldom\nentertain any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which the\nPersians and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support slavery;\nand to endeavour to know what every one who is under their power does\nand says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women\nwhom the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out\nlisteners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people\ndare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one\ndoes, there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour\nthat the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with\neach other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the\nrich with each other. It is also advantageous for a tyranny that all\nthose who are under it should be oppressed with poverty, that they may\nnot be able to compose a guard; and that, being employed in procuring\ntheir daily bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against their\ntyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the votive\nedifices of the Cyposelidse, and the temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by\nthe Pisistratidae, and the works of Polycrates at Samos; for all these\nproduced one end, the keeping the people poor. It is necessary also to\nmultiply taxes, as at Syracuse; where Dionysius in the space of five\nyears collected all the private property of his subjects into his own\ncoffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war,\nthat they may have employment and continually depend upon their general.\nA king is preserved by his friends, but a tyrant is of all persons the\nman who can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his\ndesire and these chiefly in their power to destroy him. All these things\nalso which are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a tyranny,\nas permitting great licentiousness to the women in the house, that they\nmay reveal their husbands' secrets; and showing great indulgence to\nslaves also for the same reason; for slaves and women conspire not\nagainst tyrants: but when they are treated with kindness, both of them\nare abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also; and the people\ntoo in such a state desire to be despotic. For which reason flatterers\nare in repute in both these: the demagogue in the democracy, for he is\nthe proper flatterer of the people; among tyrants, he who will servilely\nadapt himself to their humours; for this is the business of [1314a]\nflatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst of\nwretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a liberal\nspirit will submit to; for they love the virtuous, but flatter none. Bad\nmen too are fit for bad purposes; \"like to like,\" as the proverb says. A\ntyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman; for he\nshould think, that no one deserved to be thought these but himself; for\nhe who supports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon\nthe superiority and the despotism of the tyrant: such men, therefore,\nthey naturally hate, as destructive to their government. A tyrant\nalso should rather admit strangers to his table and familiarity than\ncitizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no design\nagainst him. These and such-like are the supports of a tyranny, for\nit comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But all these things may be\ncomprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which a\ntyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens should be of\npoor abject dispositions; for such men never propose to conspire against\nany one. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each\nother; for while they have not this, the tyrant is safe enough from\ndestruction. For which reason they are always at enmity with those of\nmerit, as hurtful to their government; not only as they scorn to be\ngoverned despotically, but also because they can rely upon each other's\nfidelity, and others can rely upon theirs, and because they will not\ninform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that\nthey shall be totally without the means of doing anything; for no one\nundertakes what is impossible for him to perform: so that without power\na tyranny can never be destroyed. These, then, are the three objects\nwhich the inclinations of tyrants desire to see accomplished; for all\ntheir tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these three ends, that\ntheir people may neither have mutual confidence, power, nor spirit.\nThis, then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies: the other\nproceeds in a way quite contrary to what has been already described,\nand which may be discerned from considering to what the destruction of\na kingdom is owing; for as one cause of that is, making the government\napproach near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in\nmaking the government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely\npower, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be\nobliged to submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end.\nThis, then, as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars\ncarefully do and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a\ngreat attention [1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such\nprofuse presents as will offend the people; while they are to supply\nthe money out of the hard labour of their own hands, and see it given\nin profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact\naccount both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice some\ntyrants do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers of\nfamilies than tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money while\nyou have the supreme power of the state in your own hands. It is also\nmuch better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom to do this than to\nleave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their regents will\nbe much less desirous of making innovations, and they are more to be\ndreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for such of them as he\nsuspects he takes with him, but these regents must be left behind. He\nshould also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require such\nservices as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever they are\nwanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care\nthat he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but the\npublic's. His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable, so\nthat he should inspire those who approach him with veneration and not\nfear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is despised. If,\ntherefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to\nendeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of\nhimself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also take care not to\nappear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty, nor to suffer\nit in those under him: nor to permit the women of his family to treat\nothers haughtily; for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many\ntyrants. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly\ncontrary to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not\nonly continually indulge themselves in them for many days together, but\nthey seem also to desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may\nwonder at their happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in\nthese, and, if not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the\nsober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard;\nnot the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should\nalso be contrary to what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to\nimprove and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant;\nand, moreover., always to [1315a] seem particularly attentive to the\nworship of the gods; for from persons of such a character men entertain\nless fears of suffering anything illegal while they suppose that he who\ngoverns them is religious and reverences the gods; and they will be less\ninclined to raise insinuations against such a one, as being peculiarly\nunder their protection: but this must be so done as to give no occasion\nfor any suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also take care to show such\nrespect to men of merit in every particular, that they should not think\nthey could be treated with greater distinction by their fellow-citizens\nin a free state. He should also let all honours flow immediately from\nhimself, but every censure from his subordinate officers and judges. It\nis also a common protection of all monarchies not to make one person too\ngreat, or, certainly, not many; for they will support each other: but,\nif it is necessary to entrust any large powers to one person, to take\ncare that it is not one of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is\nupon every opportunity most ready for a revolution: and, if it should\nseem necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees,\nand not reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all\nkinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which\nyou must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a\ndelicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to\nthe quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour and\nprinciple when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never employ\npersonal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in\nwhich a father would correct his son, and not with contempt; and, upon\nthe whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater\nhonours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs\nagainst the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and\nguarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so\nthat they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore\nof those who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear\nto them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing\ntheir own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight\nwith an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at.\nAs all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the\npoor, it is necessary that both these should find equal protection from\nhim who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their\npower to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself\nthat party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have\nno occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of\ntheir arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his\nown forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be\nsuperfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which\nthe tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to\nappear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs,\nnot their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect\nthe middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should,\ntherefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his\ngovernment will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of\nimitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who\nperpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable.\nLet him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous\nto virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be\naltogether wicked, but only so in part.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nIndeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest\nduration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is\ntrue, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that\nthey used their power with moderation, and were in many particulars\nobedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never\nfell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his\ngovernment should be popular. He is reported also to have presented a\nperson with a crown who adjudged the victory to another; and some say\nthat it is the statue of that judge which is placed in the forum.\n\nThey say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court\nof the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of\nthe Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and\nsix months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander\nforty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the\nreason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed\nwithout guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an\nable general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it\nwas not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that\nout of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son\neighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest\nwe shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not\ncontinue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for\nGelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth.\nThrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other tyrannies have\ncontinued a very short time. We have now gone through the general cases\nof corruption and [1316a] means of preservation both in free states and\nmonarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon\nthe changes which different governments are liable to: but his discourse\nis faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the best\nand first governments are liable to; for he only assigns the general\ncause, of nothing being immutable, but that in time everything will\nalter [***tr.: text is unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature\nwill then produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in\nthis, probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some\npersons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but\nwhy should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed\ngovernment, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things\nthat exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the cause of the\nalteration of all things, we find that those which did not begin\nto exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so that, if\nanything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter\nat the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be\nchanged into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter,\nthey alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and\nnot into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other\nchanges; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it changes into\nan oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy\ninto a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as from a\ndemocracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect\nto a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in it; or\nif not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what other\nstate it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an\nindeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to\nalter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle\nwould be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as\nat Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as was\nAntileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or\ninto an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage.\nAn oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most\nof the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of\nPanaetius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of\nAnaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to\nsuppose, that a state is changed into an oligarchy because those who are\nin power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who\nare by far richer than their fellow citizens think it unfair that those\nwho have nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the state\nwith themselves, who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not\nallowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to\nprevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is\ncreditable, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is\nalso absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of\nthe poor and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them\nmore than to the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess\nnot equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no\none member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet\na democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich\nshould be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and\nthe other attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes,\nyet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury,\nand paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the\ngreater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who\nhave the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,\nthey will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,\nnothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is\nthere any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any\nother. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have\nspent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state,\nor if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise\nseditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do\nas they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although\nthere are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is\ntreating of the changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was\nbut one of each sort.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VI\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nWe have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the\nstate, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different\nmagistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and\nwhat is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the\ndestruction and preservation of governments are owing.\n\nAs there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other\nstates, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything which\nwe may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot\nto each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for\nthem; and also to inquire into the combinations of all these different\nmodes of government which we [1317a] have mentioned; for as these are\nblended together the government is altered, as from an aristocracy to\nbe an oligarchy, and from a free state to be a democracy. Now, I mean\nby those combinations of government (which I ought to examine into, but\nhave not yet done), namely, whether the deliberative department and the\nelection of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an\noligarchy, or the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part\nonly to an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy,\nor whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according\nto the nature of the government. But we will first consider what\nparticular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also\nwhat particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,\nwhat is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly, not\nonly which of these governments is best for a state, but also how\nit ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of\nbriefly.\n\nAnd first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same\ntime show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call\nan oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of\na democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the\nmanner in which these are compounded together different species of\ndemocracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of\nvarious natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being so\nmany democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned;\nnamely, there being different sorts of people; for in one country the\nmajority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired servants; if\nthe first of these is added to the second, and the third to both of\nthem, the democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or\nworse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same government; the\nother is that which we will now speak of. The different things which are\nconnected with democracies and seem to make part of these states, do,\nfrom their being joined to them, render them different from others: this\nattending a few, that more, and another all. It is necessary that he who\nwould found any state which he may happen to approve of, or correct one,\nshould be acquainted with all these particulars. All founders of states\nendeavour to comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the\nsame kind with it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have\nalready described in treating of the preservation and destruction of\ngovernments. I will now speak of these first principles and manners, and\nwhatever else a democratical state requires.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nNow the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have\nbeen accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for\nthey affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one\npart of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according\nto democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by\nworth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power\nshould be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority\ndetermine should be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have\nmore power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one\nmark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion\nof that state; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they\nsay, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live\nas he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence\narises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any\naccount, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as\nthat person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to\nthat equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and\nsuch being the government, it follows that such rules as the following\nshould be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out\nof all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all:\nthat all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those\noffices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no\ncensus, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any\noffice: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few,\nand very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should\nbe limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible:\nthat the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes\nwhatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or\nof ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large judge\nthe magistrates when they come out of office, and decide concerning\npublic affairs as well as private contracts: that the supreme power\nshould be in the public assembly; and that no magistrate should be\nallowed any discretionary power but in a few instances, and of no\nconsequence to public business. Of all magistrates a senate is best\nsuited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving\ntheir attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for then the\npeople will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have\nalready mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if\npossible, be a fund to pay all the citizens--who have any share in the\nmanagement of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges,\nand magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates,\nthe judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also\nthose officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be\npaid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of\nfamily, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a\ngovernment in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and\nmechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be\nfor life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been\nlong changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to\ndiminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things,\nthen, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that\nprinciple of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is,\nthat all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality,\nwhich seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the\npeople: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more\nshare in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that\nall should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the\nequality and liberty of the state best preserved.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nIn the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.\nShall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should be\nequal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power with\nthe five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this manner?\nbut divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out\nof the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the power of\ncreating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then established\naccording to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is\nguided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that\nis just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of an oligarchy\nsay, that that is just which those who have most approve of; and that we\nought to be directed by the value of property. Both the propositions are\nunjust; for if we agree with what the few propose we erect a tyranny:\nfor if it should happen that an individual should have more than the\nrest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice, this man alone\nhas a right to the supreme power; but if superiority of numbers is to\nprevail, injustice will then be done by confiscating the property of the\nrich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality is,\nwhich both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition\nof right which is common to them both; for they both say that what the\nmajority of the state approves of ought to be established. Be it so; but\nnot entirely: but since a city happens to be made up of two different\nranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which\nis approved of by both these, or the greater part: but should there be\nopposite sentiments, let that be established which shall be approved\nof by the greater part: but let this be according to the census; for\ninstance, if there should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and\nsix of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure,\nand the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five\nof the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together\nshould determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen\nto be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or\ncourt of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before\nthem, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But although,\nwith [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult\nto establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do than to persuade\nthose who have it in their power to encroach upon others to be guided\nthereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the\npowerful pay no regard thereunto.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nThere are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is composed\nof those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the\nmost ancient of any. I call that the first which every one would place\nso, was he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the\nhusbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed where the\nmajority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their property is\nbut small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold public\nassemblies, but will be continually employed in following their own\nbusiness, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they be\ndesirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their\nown business than meddle with state affairs and accept the offices of\ngovernment, which will be attended with no great profit; for the major\npart of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour (a proof of\nthis is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do\nnow submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual\noccupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon\nget rich, others are removed from poverty); besides, their having the\nright of election and calling their magistrates to account for their\nconduct when they come out of office, will satisfy their desire of\nhonours, if any of them entertain that passion: for in some states,\nthough the commonalty have not the right of electing the magistrates,\nyet it is vested in part of that body chosen to represent them: and it\nis sufficient for the people at large to possess the deliberative power:\nand this ought to be considered as a species of democracy; such was that\nformerly at Mantinsea: for which reason it is proper for the democracy\nwe have been now treating of to have a power (and it has been usual for\nthem to have it) of censuring their magistrates when out of office,\nand sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates\nshould be elected, and according to a certain census, which should vary\nwith the rank of their office, or else not by a census, but according\nto their abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus\nconstituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be\nalways filled with the best men with the approbation of the people;\nwho will not envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should\nbe content with this part in the administration; for they will not be\ngoverned by their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their\npower with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is\ndelegated to censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the\nstate to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do\nwhatsoever they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check\nto that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a]\nnecessary and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof\nshould be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are\nunblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident\nthat this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because\nthe people are such and have such powers as they ought to have. To\nestablish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which were\nobserved in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for\ninstance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain\nquantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly\nalso, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their original lot of\nland. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which forbade any one to\nadd to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to follow the law of\nthe Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this particular we are now\nspeaking of; for they having but very little ground, while they were\na numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, did not\ninclude all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a\nmanner that, according to the census, the poor had more power than\nthe rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds and\nherdsmen; for they have many things in common with them, and, by their\nway of life, are excellently qualified to make good soldiers, stout in\nbody, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of\nthe people of whom other democracies are composed are much worse than\nthese; for their lives are wretched nor have they any business with\nvirtue in anything they do; these are your mechanics, your exchange-men,\nand hired servants; as all these sorts of men frequent the exchange and\nthe citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly; whereas the\nhusbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet\ntogether; nor are they equally desirous of doing it with these others!\nWhen a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the land\nlies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a good\ndemocracy or a free state for the people in general will be obliged to\nlive in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy,\nthough there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal\nassembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in\nwhat manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it\nwill be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b] should\nproceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the people from\nthe rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without\ndistinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few\ncitizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless\nwell supported by laws and manners. We have already noticed almost every\ncause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have\ntaken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and\nmake the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they\ncould and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally\nborn, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say,\nif either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to\nthis state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed.\nThey ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common\npeople are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and\nthen stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the\nstate disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common\npeople, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of\nan insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it\nbecomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in\nsuch a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of\nincreasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the\ndemocracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities,\nand to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those\ncommon; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the\npeople together as much as possible; and that all former customs be\nbroken through. Moreover, whatsoever is practised in a tyranny\nseems adapted to a democracy of this species; as, for instance, the\nlicentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; for this to\na certain degree is useful in such a state; and also to overlook every\none's living as they choose; for many will support such a government:\nfor it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than as\nprudence would direct.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nIt is also the business of the legislator and all those who would\nsupport a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or\ntoo perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be\nconstituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a\nfew days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by\nall those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the\npreservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful,\nand by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those things\nwhich chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to suppose that\nthat is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of\ngovernment which contributes to make them more purely so, but what will\ncontribute to their duration: but our demagogues at present, to flatter\nthe people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts; for which\nreason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should\nact directly opposite to what they do, and enact a law to prevent\nforfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the\ntreasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses: for those who\nare of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their\npunishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to\ncondemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing\nby it: they should also take care that the causes which are brought\nbefore the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the\nutmost severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for\nit is not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for\nin all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to\neach other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in\nit as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately\nestablished are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common\npeople to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it,\nthis, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the\nnobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by\ntaxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice:\nwhich things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then,\nthe revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public\nassemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have\nvery extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days\nonly, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although\nthey should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did;\nand judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not\nchoose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly\nbe so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a\ndifferent conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at\npresent follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money\namongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply, while\nthe giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true patriot\nin a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the community are\nnot too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government; he\ntherefore should endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and\nas this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the\npublic money should be put by, and then divided at once amongst the\npoor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to\npurchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at least to give\neach of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of trade and\nhusbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at\nonce, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In\nthe meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be\nobliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this\nwas the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the\naffections of the people; for by continually sending some of their\ncommunity into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a\nsensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and\nsupplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to\nimitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the\npoor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain\nthe affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of\nelecting their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by\nlot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the\nadministration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the\nsame may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by\nvote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies\nought to be established.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nWhat has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how\nan oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state\nshould have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of\noligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some\nspecies of democracy.\n\nThe first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to\nwhat we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different\ncensus, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the\nlatter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the\nformer the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a\npart of the administration who was within the census; which should be\nso regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by means\nthereof be superior to those who have no share in the government; for\nthose who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to\nbe chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner\nought that oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to\nthat which is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest\nto a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it\nrequires the greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of\nsound and healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and\nwell found for sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while\na diseased body or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support\nthe [1321a] least shock; so the worst-established governments want most\nlooking after. A number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy;\nfor these are opposed to those rights which are founded in rank: on\nthe contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due\nregulation of the different orders in the society.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nAs the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of\npeople; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as those\nwho are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the horsemen,\nthe heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the\nnature of the country can admit a great number of horse; there a\npowerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety of the\ninhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support\nthe expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune.\nWhere the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior\nin power to the other, may be established; for the heavy-armed are\nrather made up of men of substance than the poor: but the light-armed\nand the sailors always contribute to support a democracy: but where the\nnumber of these is very great and a sedition arises, the other parts of\nthe community fight at a disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is\nto be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of\nlight-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed: for it is with\nthose that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an\ninsurrection; for these being lighter are easily a match for the horse\nand the heavy-armed: so that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops\nfrom these is to form it against itself: but as a city is composed of\npersons of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should\nteach their sons, while they were very young, a light and easy exercise;\nbut, when they are grown up, they should be perfect in every warlike\nexercise. Now, the admission of the people to any share in the\ngovernment should either be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or\nelse, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased\nfrom any mechanic employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen\naccording to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect\nto the magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to\nhave in a state, the services they are bound to do the public should be\nexpressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous\nof accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard their\nmagistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for their\nhonours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon entering into\ntheir offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and erect some public\nstructure, that the people partaking of the entertainment, and seeing\nthe city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public\nstructures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: add\nto this also, that the nobles will have their generosity recorded: but\nnow this is not the conduct which those who are at present at the head\nof an oligarchy pursue, but the contrary; for they are not more desirous\nof honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more\nproperly be called little democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on\nwhat principles a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nAfter what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the\nmagistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what\npurpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary magistrates\nno state can exist, nor without those which contribute to its dignity\nand good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that in small\nstates the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many: also to\nknow well what offices may be joined together, and what ought to be\nseparated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators\nin the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate should be\nappointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good order; for of\nnecessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers to\nsupply each other's mutual wants: and this is what is most productive\nof the comforts of life; for the sake of which men seem to have joined\ntogether in one community. A second care, and nearly related to the\nfirst, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in\nthe city, that they may be an ornament; and also to take care of all\nbuildings which are likely to fall: and to see that the highways are\nkept in proper repair; and also that the landmarks between different\nestates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that account;\nand all other business of the same nature. Now, this business may be\ndivided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities\nthey appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another\nthe fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the inspectors\nof the city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant nearly\nabout the same objects, only in the country, is to take care of what\nis done out of the city. The officers who have this employment we call\ninspectors of the lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business\nof all three of them is the same. There must also be other officers\nappointed to receive the public revenue and to deliver it out to those\nwho are in the different departments of the state: these are called\nreceivers or quaestors. There must also be another, before whom all\nprivate contracts and sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well\nas proceedings and declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided\namongst many, but there is one supreme over the rest; these are called\nproctors, notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose\nbusiness is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult;\nnamely, to take care that sentence is executed upon those who are\ncondemned; and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to\nhave the charge of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very\ndisagreeable on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will\nengage therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do,\nwill they be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most\nnecessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without\nthat judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society\ncould not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should\nnot be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the\nother courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which\nare ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst different\npersons. And as different magistrates judge different causes, let the\ncauses of the young be heard by the young: and as to those which are\nalready brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and another\nsee it executed: as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the care\nof the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of\nthe markets have passed, and the like in other cases: for by so much the\nless odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much\nthe easier will they be properly put in force: therefore for the same\npersons to pass the sentence and to execute it will subject them to\ngeneral hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they will be considered\nas the enemies of all. Thus one person has often the custody of the\nprisoner's body, while another sees the sentence against him executed,\nas the eleven did at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate\nthese offices, and to give great attention thereunto as equally\nnecessary with anything we have already mentioned; for it will certainly\nhappen that men of character will decline accepting this office, and\nworthless persons cannot properly be entrusted with it, as having\nthemselves rather an occasion for a guard than being qualified to guard\nothers. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from\nothers; nor should it be continually allotted to any individuals, but\nthe young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns\nto take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary\nmagistrates, ought to be first mentioned: next to these are others no\nless necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of\ngreat skill and fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city,\nand provide everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is,\nboth in war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take\ncare to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are\nsometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is\nonly one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are\nhorse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes\nput distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others under\nthem, according to their different divisions; all of which join together\nto make one military body: and thus much for this department. Since some\nof the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money,\nit is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment\nshould be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and\ncorrect any mismanagement therein. But besides all these magistrates\nthere is one who is supreme over them all, who very often has in his own\npower the disposal of the public revenue and taxes; who presides over\nthe people when the supreme power is in them; for there must be some\nmagistrate who has a power to summon them together, and to preside as\nhead of the state. These are sometimes called preadvisers; but where\nthere are many, more properly a council. These are nearly the civil\nmagistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other\npersons whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and\nthose who are to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper\nrepair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever\nelse belongs to public worship. This charge is sometimes entrusted to\none person, as in very small cities: in others it is delegated to many,\nand these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of\nholy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are\nthose who are appointed to have the general care of all those public\nsacrifices to the tutelar god of the state, which the laws do not\nentrust to the priests: and these in different states have different\nappellations. To enumerate in few words the different departments of\nall those magistrates who are necessary: these are either religion,\nwar, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbours, highways.\nBelonging to the courts of justice there are scribes to enroll private\ncontracts; and there must also be guards set over the prisoners, others\nto see the law is executed, council on either side, and also others to\nwatch over the conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst\nthe magistrates also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their\nadvice in public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy\nand have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very\nattentive to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves;\nsuch as those who have the government of the women; who are to see the\nlaws are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their\neducation. To these may be added those who have the care of their\ngymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public\nspectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are not\nof general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are obliged\nto employ their wives and children in servile offices for want of\nslaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust the\nsupreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and senators;\nguardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an\noligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning\nall magistrates.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VII\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nHe who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning what\ngovernment is best, ought first to determine what manner of living is\nmost eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also be equally\nuncertain what government is best: for, provided no unexpected accidents\ninterfere, it is highly probable, that those who enjoy the best\ngovernment will live the most happily according to their circumstances;\nhe ought, therefore, first to know what manner of life is most desirable\nfor all; and afterwards whether this life is the same to the man and\nthe citizen, or different. As I imagine that I have already sufficiently\nshown what sort of life is best in my popular discourses on that\nsubject, I think I may very properly repeat the same here; as most\ncertainly no one ever called in question the propriety of one of the\ndivisions; namely, that as what is good, relative to man, may be divided\ninto three sorts, what is external, what appertains to the body, and\nwhat to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make\na man happy: for no one would say that a man was happy who had no\nfortitude, no temperance, no justice, no prudence; but was afraid of the\nflies that flew round him: nor would abstain from the meanest theft if\nhe was either hungry or dry, or would murder his dearest friend for\na farthing; and also was in every particular as wanting in his\nunderstanding as an infant or an idiot. These truths are so evident that\nall must agree to them; though some may dispute about the quantity and\nthe degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is sufficient\nfor happiness; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all such\nthings, they endeavour to increase them without bounds: but to such we\nreply, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in these\ncases, that these external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them.\nAs to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or\nboth, certain it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose\nunderstandings are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although\ntheir fortune is but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of\nwealth, are deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects\nmay easily convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its\nboundary, as a machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either\nnecessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good\nquality of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful\nit is, if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well\nas noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject\ntake place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we allow\nthey are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if the soul\nis more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both in itself\nand with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that the best\naccidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the\nsake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is on this\naccount that wise men should desire them, not the soul for them. Let us\ntherefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much happiness as he\npossesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to their dictates; since\nfor this we have the example of GOD Himself, _who is completely happy,\nnot from any external good, but in Himself, and because such is His\nnature_. For good fortune is something different from happiness, as every\ngood which depends not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but\nit is not from fortune that any one is wise and just: hence it follows,\nthat that city is happiest which is the best and acts best: for no one\ncan do well who acts not well; nor can the deeds either of man or city\nbe praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or\nwise, or prudent in a man, the same things are just, wise, and prudent\nin a city.\n\nThus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon\nthis subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation\nof it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present\nsuppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and\nas a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments\nwhich virtue usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not\nconvinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered hereafter,\nat present we shall proceed according to our intended method.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nIt now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual\nman and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for\nwhosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the\nhappiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a\nlife which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the\ncity which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also\nif any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy\ncity the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require\nconsideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life\nto be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or\nwhether to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs;\nand also what form of government is to be preferred, and what\ndisposition of the state is best; whether the whole community should be\neligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and\nsome only: as this, therefore, is a subject of political examination\nand speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the first of\nthese is what we are at present engaged in, the one of these I am not\nobliged to speak to, the other is the proper business of my present\ndesign. It is evident that government must be the best which is so\nestablished, that every one therein may have it in his power to act\nvirtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue\nis most eligible, still doubt which is preferable a public life of\nactive virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without and\nspent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a\nphilosopher; and one of these two different modes of life both now\nand formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most\nvirtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no\nlittle consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense\nmust naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a\ncitizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is\nthe greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that\nstill is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others\nhold the quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life\nis the only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity\nof practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged\nin public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their\nsentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of\ngovernment is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states the\nobject of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so\nthat the generality of political institutions, wheresoever dispersed,\nif they have any one common object in view, have all of them this,\nto conquer and govern. It is evident, both from the laws of the\nLacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they\neducated their children, that all which they had in view was to make\nthem soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have power enough\nand reduce others to servitude are honoured on that account; as were the\nScythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some there are laws to\nheighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that at Carthage they\nallowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had\nserved campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia, that a man who had\nnot himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a halter; among\nthe Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of\nthe cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the\nIberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb\nas he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things\nof this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom.\nProbably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this\nsubject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business\nof a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern\nand tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for\nhow can that belong either to the politician or legislator which is\nunlawful? for that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but\nunjustly also: for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing\nof this in the arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor\nthe pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients,\nthe other to his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic\ngovernment is a political one, and what they would not allow to be just\nor proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise\nover others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but\nthink it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic\npower is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for\ndominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to\nassume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper\nobjects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or\nsacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild\nanimals which are eatable.\n\nNow a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself\nwhile it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be\nso situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its\nconstitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then\nhave no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of\nwar is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the\nmeans of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine\ncarefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may\npartake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which\nresults from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from\nothers. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring\nstates to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what\ngood offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the\nbest governments will be considered hereafter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nWe will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue\nis most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to\nboth these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political\ngovernments, and think that the life of one who is really free is\ndifferent from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:\nothers again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is\nimpossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that\nvirtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in\nsome particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that\nthe life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true, for\na slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common\nservile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing\nvirtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a\nsubmission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the government of\nfreemen differs not more from the government of slaves than slavery and\nfreedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been\nalready mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is\nalso wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many noble ends are\nproduced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already\ndetermined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme\npower is of all things best, as that will enable a man to command very\nmany useful services from others; so that he who can obtain this ought\nnot to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this\npurpose, the father should have no attention or regard for the son, or\nthe son for the father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most\neligible: but to be a member of the community and be in felicity is\nbest. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme\ngood was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others: but\nit is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere\nsupposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable\nwho thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by\nnature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a\nmaster to a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue\ncan never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst\nequals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is\nequal and right; but that equals should not partake of what is equal, or\nlike to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature\nis not right; therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the\ncommunity in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to\nfollow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must\nbe joined to the other also: and, if we are right in what we have now\nsaid, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that\nboth with respect to the community as well as the individual an active\nlife is the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to\nother persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical\nwhich are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more\nso whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment and\nunderstanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore\nis something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others\nfollow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the\nworkmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states\nwhich choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive;\nfor the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each\nother; for there are many opportunities for this among the different\ncitizens; the same thing is true of every individual: for, was it\notherwise, neither could the Deity nor the universe be perfect; to\nneither of whom can anything external separately exist. Hence it is\nevident that that very same life which is happy for each individual is\nhappy also for the state and every member of it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nAs I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and\nconsidered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I\nshould first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which one\nshould form according to one's wish; for no good state can exist without\na moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things therefore\nought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them such as are\nimpossible: I mean relative to the number of citizens and the extent\nof the territory: for as other artificers, such as the weaver and the\nshipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for their work,\nsince so much the better they are, by so much [1326a] superior will the\nwork itself necessarily be; so also ought the legislator and politician\nendeavour to procure proper materials for the business they have in\nhand. Now the first and principal instrument of the politician is the\nnumber of the people; he should therefore know how many, and what they\nnaturally ought to be: in like manner the country, how large, and what\nit is. Most persons think that it is necessary for a city to be large to\nbe happy: but, should this be true, they cannot tell what is a large one\nand what a small one; for according to the multitude of the inhabitants\nthey estimate the greatness of it; but they ought rather to consider its\nstrength than its numbers; for a state has a certain object in view, and\nfrom the power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its greatness\nought to be estimated; as a person might say, that Hippocrates was a\ngreater physician, though not a greater man, than one that exceeded him\nin the size of his body: but if it was proper to determine the strength\nof the city from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be\ncollected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it;\nfor in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and\nforeigners; but from those who are really part of the city and properly\nconstitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a proof of a\nlarge city, but in a state where a large number of mechanics inhabit,\nand but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great; for the greatness of\nthe city, and the number of men in it, are not the same thing. This too\nis evident from fact, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to\ngovern properly a very numerous body of men; for of all the states which\nappear well governed we find not one where the rights of a citizen are\nopen to an indiscriminate multitude. And this is also evident from the\nnature of the thing; for as law is a certain order, so good law is of\ncourse a certain good order: but too large a multitude are incapable of\nthis, unless under the government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends\nthe universe. Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually\nessential to beauty, the perfection of a city consists in the largeness\nof it as far as that largeness is consistent with that order already\nmentioned: but still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well\nas everything else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of\nthese, if they are neither too little nor too big, have their\nproper powers; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly\nconstructed, as a ship a span long is not properly a ship, nor one of\ntwo furlongs length, but when it is of a fit size; for either from its\nsmallness or from its largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with\na city; one that is too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of\nself-defence, but this is essential to a city: one that is too large is\ncapable of self-defence in what is necessary; but then it is a nation\nand not a city: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a form\nof government to it: for who would choose to be the general of such\nan unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a stentor? The\nfirst thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of such\nnumbers as will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live\nhappily in their political community: and it follows, that the more the\ninhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater will the city be:\nbut this must not be, as we have already said, without bounds; but what\nis its proper limit experience will easily show, and this experience is\nto be collected from the actions both of the governors and the governed.\nNow, as it belongs to the first to direct the inferior magistrates and\nto act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine causes\nwith justice nor issue their orders with propriety without they know the\ncharacters of their fellow-citizens: so that whenever this happens not\nto be done in these two particulars, the state must of necessity be\nbadly managed; for in both of them it is not right to determine too\nhastily and without proper knowledge, which must evidently be the case\nwhere the number of the citizens is too many: besides, it is more easy\nfor strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as they\nwill easily escape detection in so great a multitude. It is evident,\nthen, that the best boundary for a city is that wherein the numbers are\nthe greatest possible, that they may be the better able to be sufficient\nin themselves, while at the same time they are not too large to be under\nthe eye and government of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the\nextent of a city.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nWhat we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a country;\nfor as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will commend it\nif it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what will make the\ninhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to supply them\nwith all the necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty,\nwithout any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it should\nbe such as may enable the inhabitants to live at their ease with freedom\nand temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong in fixing this limit\nto the territory shall be considered more minutely hereafter, when\nwe come particularly to inquire into property, and what fortune is\nrequisite for a man to live on, and how and in what manner they ought\nto employ it; for there are many doubts upon this question, while each\nparty insists upon their own plan of life being carried to an excess,\nthe one of severity, the other of indulgence. What the situation of the\ncountry should be it is not difficult to determine, in some particulars\nrespecting that we ought to be advised by those who are skilful in\nmilitary affairs. It should be difficult of access to an enemy, but\neasy to the inhabitants: and as we said, that the number of [1327a]\ninhabitants ought to be such as can come under the eye of the\nmagistrate, so should it be with the country; for then it is easily\ndefended. As to the position of the city, if one could place it to one's\nwish, it is convenient to fix it on the seaside: with respect to\nthe country, one situation which it ought to have has been already\nmentioned, namely, that it should be so placed as easily to give\nassistance to all places, and also to receive the necessaries of life\nfrom all parts, and also wood, or any other materials which may happen\nto be in the country.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nBut with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea,\nthere are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or hurtful\nto a well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of persons\nbrought up under a different system of government is disserviceable\nto the state, as well by impeding the laws as by their numbers; for a\nmultitude of merchants must necessarily arise from their trafficking\nbackward and forward upon the seas, which will hinder the well-governing\nof the city: but if this inconvenience should not arise, it is evident\nthat it is better, both on account of safety and also for the easier\nacquisition of the necessaries of life, that both the city and the\ncountry should be near the sea; for it is necessary that those who are\nto sustain the attack of the enemy should be ready with their assistance\nboth by land and by sea, and to oppose any inroad, both ways if possible\nbut if not, at least where they are most powerful, which they may\ndo while they possess both. A maritime situation is also useful for\nreceiving from others what your own country will not produce, and\nexporting those necessaries of your own growth which are more than you\nhave occasion for; but a city ought to traffic to supply its own wants,\nand not the wants of others; for those who themselves furnish an open\nmarket for every one, do it for the sake of gain; which it is not proper\nfor a well-established state to do, neither should they encourage such\na commerce. Now, as we see that many places and cities have docks and\nharbours lying very convenient for the city, while those who frequent\nthem have no communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too\nfar off, but are surrounded by walls and such-like fortifications, it is\nevident, that if any good arises from such an intercourse the city will\nreceive it, but if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by\na law declaring and deputing whom the state will allow to have an\nintercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval power, it is by\nno means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain degree;\nand this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself, but also\nbecause it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the\nneighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as\nby land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the\nstate should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and enables\nher to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary that her\nforce should correspond with her actions. As for that multitude of\npeople which a maritime power creates, they are by no means necessary to\na state, nor ought they to make a part of the citizens; for the mariners\nand infantry, who have the command, are freemen, and upon these depends\na naval engagement: but when there are many servants and husbandmen,\nthere they will always have a number of sailors, as we now see happens\nto some states, as in Heraclea, where they man many triremes, though\nthe extent of their city is much inferior to some others. And thus we\ndetermine concerning the country, the port, the city, the sea, and a\nmaritime power: as to the number of the citizens, what that ought to be\nwe have already said.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nWe now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of the\ncommunity ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive who\nwill cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the most\ncelebrated, and also the other different nations of this habitable\nworld. Those who live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are\nfull of courage, but wanting in understanding and the arts: therefore\nthey are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not being politicians,\nthey cannot reduce their neighbours under their power: but the Asiatics,\nwhose understandings are quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are\ndeficient in courage; and therefore are always conquered and the\nslaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as it were between these\ntwo boundaries, so partake of them both as to be at the same time both\ncourageous and sensible; for which reason Greece continues free, and\ngoverned in the best manner possible, and capable of commanding the\nwhole world, could they agree upon one system of policy. Now this is the\ndifference between the Grecians and other nations, that the latter have\nbut one of these qualities, whereas in the former they are both happily\nblended together. Hence it is evident, that those persons ought to be\nboth sensible and courageous who will readily obey a legislator, the\nobject of whose laws is virtue. As to what some persons say, that the\nmilitary must be mild and tender to those they know, but severe and\ncruel to those they know not, it is courage which [1328a] makes any one\nlovely; for that is the faculty of the soul which we most admire: as\na proof of this, our resentment rises higher against our friends and\nacquaintance than against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus\naccusing his friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends\ninsult me? The spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit\nwho are of this disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It\nalso is not right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those\nyou know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who\nare of a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the\nwicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already\nsaid, against their friends, when they think they have injured them;\nwhich is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to\nreceive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury done\nthem, they consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying, \"Cruel\nare the wars of brothers;\" and this, \"Those who have greatly loved\ndo greatly hate.\" And thus we have nearly determined how many the\ninhabitants of a city ought to be, and what their natural disposition,\nand also the country how large, and of what sort is necessary; I say\nnearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as great accuracy in\nthose things which are the objects of the senses as in those which are\ninquired into by the understanding only.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nAs in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them\nwithout which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in\na political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be\nconsidered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one\nwhole is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the\ncommunity, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for\ninstance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit\nof one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this there is\nnothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the other\nuses it; as, for instance, between any instrument employed in making any\nwork, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between the house and\nthe builder, but the art of the builder is employed on the house. Thus\nproperty is necessary for states, but property is no part of the state,\nthough many species of it have life; but a city is a community of\nequals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life possible: but the\nhappiest life is the best which consists in the perfect practice of\nvirtuous energies: as therefore some persons have great, others little\nor no opportunity of being employed in these, it is evident that this\nis the cause of the difference there is between the different cities and\ncommunities there are to be found; for while each of these endeavour to\nacquire what is best by various and different means, they give [1328b]\nrise to different modes of living and different forms of government. We\nare now to consider what those things are without which a city cannot\npossibly exist; for what we call parts of the city must of necessity\ninhere in it: and this we shall plainly understand, if we know the\nnumber of things necessary to a city: first, the inhabitants must\nhave food: secondly, arts, for many instruments are necessary in life:\nthirdly, arms, for it is necessary that the community should have an\narmed force within themselves, both to support their government against\nthose of their own body who might refuse obedience to it, and also\nto defend it from those who might attempt to attack it from without:\nfourthly, a certain revenue, as well for the internal necessities of\nthe state as for the business of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief\nconcern, a religious establishment: sixthly in order, but first of all\nin necessity, a court to determine both criminal and civil causes. These\nthings are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every state; for a city\nis a number of people not accidentally met together, but with a purpose\nof ensuring to themselves sufficient independency and self-protection;\nand if anything necessary for these purposes is wanting, it is\nimpossible that in such a situation these ends can be obtained. It is\nnecessary therefore that a city should be capable of acquiring all these\nthings: for this purpose a proper number of husbandmen are necessary to\nprocure food, also artificers and soldiers, and rich men, and priests\nand judges, to determine what is right and proper.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nHaving determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all\nthese different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible\nto continue the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges,\nor counsellors; or shall we appoint different persons to each of those\nemployments which we have already mentioned; or shall some of them be\nappropriated to particulars, and others of course common to all? but\nthis does not take place in every state, for, as we have already said,\nit is possible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common to\nsome; and this is the difference between one government and another:\nfor in democracies the whole community partakes of everything, but in\noligarchies it is different.\n\nSince we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is\nadmitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we\nhave already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue;\nit follows, that in the best-governed states, where the citizens are\nreally men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should\nbe permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise,\nas being ignoble and destructive to virtue; neither should they be\nhusband-[1329a] men, that they may be at leisure to improve in virtue\nand perform the duty they owe to the state. With respect to the\nemployments of a soldier, a senator, and a judge, which are evidently\nnecessary to the community, shall they be allotted to different persons,\nor shall the same person execute both? This question, too, is easily\nanswered: for in some cases the same persons may execute them, in\nothers they should be different, where the different employments require\ndifferent abilities, as when courage is wanting for one, judgment for\nthe other, there they should be allotted to different persons; but when\nit is evident, that it is impossible to oblige those who have arms\nin their hands, and can insist on their own terms, to be always under\ncommand; there these different employments should be trusted to one\nperson; for those who have arms in their hands have it in their option\nwhether they will or will not assume the supreme power: to these two\n(namely, those who have courage and judgment) the government must be\nentrusted; but not in the same manner, but as nature directs; what\nrequires courage to the young, what requires judgment to the old; for\nwith the young is courage, with the old is wisdom: thus each will be\nallotted the part they are fit for according to their different merits.\nIt is also necessary that the landed property should belong to these\nmen; for it is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are\nthe men proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the\nrights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is\nnot entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the\nprinciple we at first set out with; for to be happy it is necessary\nto be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while he\nconsiders only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought\nto examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed\nproperty should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to\nhave husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There remains\nof the different classes of the people whom we have enumerated, the\npriests, for these evidently compose a rank by themselves; for neither\nare they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen nor the mechanics; for\nreverence to the gods is highly becoming every state: and since the\ncitizens have been divided into orders, the military and the council,\nand it is proper to offer due worship to the gods, and since it is\nnecessary that those who are employed in their service should have\nnothing else to do, let the business of the priesthood be allotted\nto those who are in years. We have now shown what is necessary to the\nexistence of a city, and of what parts it consists, and that husbandmen,\nmechanic, and mercenary servants are necessary to a city; but that\nthe parts of it are soldiers and sailors, and that these are always\ndifferent from those, but from each other only occasionally.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nIt seems neither now nor very lately to have been known [1329b] to those\nphilosophers who have made politics their study, that a city ought to\nbe divided by families into different orders of men; and that the\nhusbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other;\nwhich custom is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete; also\nSesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common meals seem\nalso to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been established\nin Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more remote period\nin Italy; for those who are the best judges in that country say that\none Italus being king of AEnotria., from whom the people, changing their\nnames, were called Italians instead of AEnotrians, and that part of\nEurope was called Italy which is bounded by the Scylletic Gulf on the\none side and the Lametic on the other, the distance between which\nis about half a day's journey. This Italus, they relate, made the\nAEnotrians, who were formerly shepherds, husbandmen, and gave them\ndifferent laws from what they had before, and to have been the first who\nestablished common meals, for which reason some of his descendants still\nuse them, and observe some of his laws. The Opici inhabit that part\nwhich lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are and formerly\nwere called Ausonians. The Chones inhabited the part toward Iapigia and\nthe Ionian Sea which is called Syrtis. These Chones were descended\nfrom the AEnotrians. Hence arose the custom of common meals, but the\nseparation of the citizens into different families from Egypt: for the\nreign of Sesostris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As\nwe ought to think that most other things were found out in a long, nay,\neven in a boundless time (reason teaching us that want would make us\nfirst invent that which was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then\nthose things which were requisite for the conveniences and ornament of\nlife), so should we conclude the same with respect to a political state;\nnow everything in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote antiquity,\nfor these people seem to be the most ancient of all others, and to have\nacquired laws and political order; we should therefore make a proper\nuse of what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have\nomitted. We have already said, that the landed property ought to belong\nto the military and those who partake of the government of the state;\nand that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of people;\nand how large and of what nature the country ought to be: we will first\ntreat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen, how many and\nof what sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold that property\nought to be common, as some persons have said, only thus far, in\nfriendship, it [1330a] should be their custom to let no citizen want\nsubsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed that they are\nproper in well-regulated cities; my reasons for approving of them shall\nbe mentioned hereafter: they are what all the citizens ought to partake\nof; but it will not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, to\nfurnish as much as they are ordered to do, and supply their own house\nbesides. The expense also of religious worship should be defrayed by the\nwhole state. Of necessity therefore the land ought to be divided into\ntwo parts, one of which should belong to the community in general, the\nother to the individuals separately; and each of these parts should\nagain be subdivided into two: half of that which belongs to the public\nshould be appropriated to maintain the worship of the gods, the other\nhalf to support the common meals. Half of that which belongs to the\nindividuals should be at the extremity of the country, the other half\nnear the city, so that these two portions being allotted to each person,\nall would partake of land in both places, which would be both equal and\nright; and induce them to act in concert with greater harmony in any war\nwith their neighbours: for when the land is not divided in this manner,\none party neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other\nmakes it a matter of too much consequence and more than is necessary;\nfor which reason in some places there is a law which forbids the\ninhabitants of the borders to have any vote in the council when they are\ndebating upon a war which is made against them as their private interest\nmight prevent their voting impartially. Thus therefore the country ought\nto be divided and for the reasons before mentioned. Could one have one's\nchoice, the husbandmen should by all means be slaves, not of the same\nnation, or men of any spirit; for thus they would be laborious in\ntheir business, and safe from attempting any novelties: next to these\nbarbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition\nto these we have already mentioned. Of these, let those who are\nto cultivate the private property of the individual belong to that\nindividual, and those who are to cultivate the public territory belong\nto the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for\nwhat reason it is very proper that they should have the promise of their\nliberty made them, as a reward for their services, shall be mentioned\nhereafter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nWe have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country should\ncommunicate both with the sea and the continent as much as possible.\nThere are these four things which we should be particularly desirous of\nin the position of the city with respect to itself: in the first place,\nhealth is to be consulted as the first thing necessary: now a city\nwhich fronts the east and receives the winds which blow from thence is\nesteemed most healthful; next to this that which has a northern position\nis to be preferred, as best in winter. It should next be contrived that\nit may have a proper situation for the business of government and for\ndefence in war: that in war the citizens may [1330b] have easy access\nto it; but that it may be difficult of access to, and hardly to be taken\nby, the enemy. In the next place particularly, that there may be plenty\nof water, and rivers near at hand: but if those cannot be found, very\nlarge cisterns must be prepared to save rain-water, so that there may\nbe no want of it in case they should be driven into the town in time of\nwar. And as great care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants,\nthe first thing to be attended to is, that the city should have a good\nsituation and a good position; the second is, that they may have good\nwater to drink; and this not be negligently taken care of; for what\nwe chiefly and most frequently use for the support of the body must\nprincipally influence the health of it; and this influence is what the\nair and water naturally have: for which reason in all wise governments\nthe waters ought to be appropriated to different purposes, and if they\nare not equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary water,\nthat which is to drink should be separated from that which is for other\nuses. As to fortified places, what is proper for some governments is\nnot proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel is proper for a\nmonarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a plain suits a democracy;\nneither of these for an aristocracy, but rather many strong places. As\nto the form of private houses, those are thought to be best and most\nuseful for their different purposes which are distinct and separate\nfrom each other, and built in the modern manner, after the plan of\nHippodamus: but for safety in time of war, on the contrary, they should\nbe built as they formerly were; for they were such that strangers could\nnot easily find their way out of them, and the method of access to\nthem such as an enemy could with difficulty find out if he proposed\nto besiege them. A city therefore should have both these sorts of\nbuildings, which may easily be contrived if any one will so regulate\nthem as the planters do their rows of vines; not that the buildings\nthroughout the city should be detached from each other, only in some\nparts of it; thus elegance and safety will be equally consulted. With\nrespect to walls, those who say that a courageous people ought not to\nhave any, pay too much respect to obsolete notions; particularly as\nwe may see those who pride themselves therein continually confuted by\nfacts. It is indeed disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so,\nto the enemy, to endeavour to take refuge within their walls--but since\nit very often happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful\nfor the bravery and courage of those few who oppose them to resist,\nif you would not suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the\nenemy, it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety\nunder the shelter and protection of walls more especially since so many\nmissile weapons and machines have been most ingeniously invented to\nbesiege cities with. Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall\nwould be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an\nenemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as if an individual should\nnot have a wall to his house lest it should be thought that the owner\nof it was a coward: nor should this be left unconsidered, that those who\nhave a city surrounded with walls may act both ways, either as if it had\nor as if it had not; but where it has not they cannot do this. If this\nis true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care must be taken\nthat they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a defence\nin time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the modern\nimprovements also: for as those who make offensive war endeavour by\nevery way possible to gain advantages over their adversaries, so should\nthose who are upon the defensive employ all the means already known, and\nsuch new ones as philosophy can invent, to defend themselves: for those\nwho are well prepared are seldom first attacked.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nAs the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in certain\ncompanies, and it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and\ntowers in proper places and at proper distances, it is evident that\nit will be very necessary to have some of these in the towers; let the\nbuildings for this purpose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to\ntemples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of\nthe chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and\ncontiguous to each other, except those temples which the law or the\noracle orders to be separate from all other buildings; and let these be\nin such a conspicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage of\nsituation, and in the neighbourhood of that part of the city which\nis best fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large\nsquare, like that which they call in Thessaly The Square of Freedom, in\nwhich nothing is permitted to be bought or sold; into which no mechanic\nnor husbandman, nor any such person, should be permitted to enter,\nunless commanded by the magistrates. It will also be an ornament to this\nplace if the gymnastic exercises of the elders are performed in it. It\nis also proper, that for performing these exercises the citizens should\nbe divided into distinct classes, according to their ages, and that the\nyoung persons should have proper officers to be with them, and that the\nseniors should be with the magistrates; for having them before their\neyes would greatly inspire true modesty and ingenuous fear. There ought\nto be another square [1331b] separate from this for buying and selling,\nwhich should be so situated as to be commodious for the reception\nof goods both by sea and land. As the citizens may be divided into\nmagistrates and priests, it is proper that the public tables of\nthe priests should be in buildings near the temples. Those of the\nmagistrates who preside over contracts, indictments, and such-like, and\nalso over the markets, and the public streets near the square, or some\npublic way, I mean the square where things are bought and sold; for I\nintended the other for those who are at leisure, and this for necessary\nbusiness. The same order which I have directed here should be observed\nalso in the country; for there also their magistrates such as the\nsurveyors of the woods and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily\nhave their common tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection\nagainst an enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper\nplaces, both to the gods and the heroes; but it is unnecessary to dwell\nlonger and most minutely on these particulars--for it is by no means\ndifficult to plan these things, it is rather so to carry them into\nexecution; for the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical\npart must depend upon fortune; for which reason we shall decline saying\nanything farther upon these subjects.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nWe will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a government\nought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered.\nAs there are two particulars on which the excellence and perfection of\neverything depend, one of these is, that the object and end proposed\nshould be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish it should be\nadapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may either agree\nor disagree with each other; for the end we propose may be good, but in\ntaking the means to obtain it we may err; at other times we may have\nthe right and proper means in our power, but the end may be bad,\nand sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of medicine the\nphysician does not sometimes know in what situation the body ought to\nbe, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he aims at. In\nevery art and science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge,\nnamely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it. Now it is evident\nthat all persons are desirous to live well and be happy; but that some\nhave the means thereof in their own power, others not; and this either\nthrough nature [1332a] or fortune; for many ingredients are necessary to\na happy life; but fewer to those who are of a good than to those who are\nof a bad disposition. There are others who continually have the means\nof happiness in their own power, but do not rightly apply them. Since\nwe propose to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which\na state may be best administered, and that state is best administered\nwhere the people are the happiest, it is evident that happiness is a\nthing we should not be unacquainted with. Now, I have already said in\nmy treatise on Morals (if I may here make any use of what I have there\nshown), that happiness consists in the energy and perfect practice of\nvirtue; and this not relatively, but simply; I mean by relatively, what\nis necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply, what is good and\nfair in itself: of the first sort are just punishments, and restraints\nin a just cause; for they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on\nthat account are virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any\nstate nor any individual should stand in need of them; but those actions\nwhich are intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good;\nthe others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are\nthe foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear\npoverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble mind;\nbut happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have already\ndetermined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of worth who\nconsiders what is good because it is virtuous as what is simply good; it\nis evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be worthy\nand simply good): this has led some persons to conclude, that the cause\nof happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should\nsuppose that the playing well upon the lyre was owing to the instrument,\nand not to the art. It necessarily follows from what has been said,\nthat some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the\nlegislator; for which reason in founding a city we earnestly wish that\nthere may be plenty of those things which are supposed to be under the\ndominion of fortune (for some things we admit her to be mistress over);\nbut for a state to be worthy and great is not only the work of fortune\nbut of knowledge and judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is\nnecessary that those citizens which are in the administration should\nbe worthy also; but as in our city every citizen is to be so, we must\nconsider how this may be accomplished; for if this is what every one\ncould be, and not some individuals only, it would be more desirable; for\nthen it would follow, that what might be done by one might be done\nby all. Men are worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by\nreason. In the first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any\nother animal; that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but\nit avails not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom\nmakes great alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of\nalteration either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better\nor the worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in\nvery few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason\nalso, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all\nthese accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were\npersuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many respects\ncontrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to be, to make\ngood members of a community, I have already determined; the rest of\nthis discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some things are\nacquired by habit, others by hearing them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nAs every political community consists of those who govern and of those\nwho are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of\ntheir lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it\nis evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this\ndistinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we\nbelieve, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place, being\nfar their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that the\nsuperiority of the governors over the governed might be evident beyond\na doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one always to\ngovern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not easy to\nobtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as Scylax\ninforms us they are in India, it is evident that for many reasons it is\nnecessary that all in their turns should both govern and be governed:\nfor it is just that those who are equal should have everything alike;\nand it is difficult for a state to continue which is founded in\ninjustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of innovation\nwill apply themselves to those who are under the government of the rest,\nand such will be their numbers in the state, that it will be impossible\nfor the magistrates to get the better of them. But that the governors\nought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the legislator therefore\nought to consider how this shall be, and how it may be contrived that\nall shall have their equal share in the administration. Now, with\nrespect to this it will be first said, that nature herself has directed\nus in our choice, laying down the selfsame thing when she has made some\nyoung, others old: the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter\nto command; for no one when he is young is offended at his being under\ngovernment, or thinks himself too good for it; more especially when he\nconsiders that he himself shall receive the same honours which he\npays when he shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be\nacknowledged that the governors and the governed are the same, in others\nthey are different; it is therefore necessary that their education\nshould be in [1333a] some respect the same, in others different: as they\nsay, that he will be a good governor who has first learnt to obey. Now\nof governments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the\nsake of him who commands; others for him who obeys: of the first sort is\nthat of the master over the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over\neach other. Now some things which are commanded differ from others; not\nin the business, but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many\nworks, even of a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen\nto perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not\nhonourable or dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end\nwhich is proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since\nthen we have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good\ngovernor is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he\ncommands should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator\nto consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is\nnecessary to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life.\nThe soul of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in\nitself, and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates:\nand according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be\ngood: but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult\nfor those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for\nthe inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is equally\nevident both in the works of art as well as in those of nature; but that\nis superior which has reason. Reason itself also is divided into\ntwo parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the theoretic and the\npractical; which division therefore seems necessary for this part also:\nthe same analogy holds good with respect to actions; of which those\nwhich are of a superior nature ought always to be chosen by those who\nhave it in their power; for that is always most eligible to every one\nwhich will procure the best ends. Now life is divided into labour and\nrest, war and peace; and of what we do the objects are partly necessary\nand useful, partly noble: and we should give the same preference to\nthese that we do to the different parts of the soul and its actions,\nas war to procure peace; labour, rest; and the useful, the noble. The\npolitician, therefore, who composes a body of laws ought to extend his\nviews to everything; the different parts of the soul and their actions;\nmore particularly to those things which are of a superior nature and\nends; and, in the same manner, to the lives of men and their different\nactions.\n\nThey ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b] for\nrest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but rather\nwhat is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the education of the\nchildren ought to tend, and of all the youths who want instruction. All\nthe Grecian states which now seem best governed, and the legislators who\nfounded those states, appear not to have framed their polity with a view\nto the best end, or to every virtue, in their laws and education; but\neagerly to have attended to what is useful and productive of gain: and\nnearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who have written\nlately, who, by praising the Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of\nthe intention of the legislator in making war and victory the end of\nhis government. But how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by\nargument, and has already been proved by facts (but as the generality of\nmen desire to have an extensive command, that they may have everything\ndesirable in the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have\nwritten on that state seem to approve of their legislator for having\nprocured them an extensive command by continually enuring them to\nall sorts of dangers and hardships): for it is evident, since the\nLacedemonians have now no hope that the supreme power will be in their\nown hand, that neither are they happy nor was their legislator wise.\nThis also is ridiculous, that while they preserved an obedience to their\nlaws, and no one opposed their being governed by them, they lost the\nmeans of being honourable: but these people understand not rightly\nwhat sort of government it is which ought to reflect honour on the\nlegislator; for a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power,\nand more consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought\nhappy, nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained\nthe people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a\ngreat inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every\ncitizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own\ncity; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he\nenjoyed such great honours.\n\nSuch reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true: but\na legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which are\nmost useful for them, both in their public and private capacities. The\nrendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their inferiors\nought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they may not\nthemselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the next place,\nhe should take care that the object of his government is the safety\nof those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in the third\nplace, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so. Reason\nindeed concurs with experience in showing that all the attention which\nthe legislator pays to the business of war, and all other rules which\nhe lays down, should have for their object rest and peace; since most\nof those states (which we usually see) are preserved by war; but, after\nthey have acquired a supreme power over those around them, are ruined;\nfor during peace, like a sword, they lose their brightness: the fault of\nwhich lies in the legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nAs there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a citizen,\nit is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have the same\nobject in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead to rest\nare necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is peace, of\nlabour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and those also\nwhose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for\nwe want a supply of many necessary things that we may be at rest. A city\ntherefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient; for, according to\nthe proverb, \"Rest is not for slaves;\" but those who cannot bravely face\ndanger are the slaves of those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and\npatience are necessary for labour, philosophy for rest, and temperance\nand justice in both; but these chiefly in time of peace and rest; for\nwar obliges men to be just and temperate; but the enjoyment of pleasure,\nwith the rest of peace, is more apt to produce insolence; those indeed\nwho are easy in their circumstances, and enjoy everything that can\nmake them happy, have great occasion for the virtues of temperance and\njustice. Thus if there are, as the poets tell us, any inhabitants in\nthe happy isles, to these a higher degree of philosophy, temperance, and\njustice will be necessary, as they live at their ease in the full plenty\nof every sensual pleasure. It is evident, therefore, that these virtues\nare necessary in every state that would be happy or worthy; for he who\nis worthless can never enjoy real good, much less is he qualified to\nbe at rest; but can appear good only by labour and being at war, but\nin peace and at rest the meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue\nshould not be cultivated as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not\ndiffer from others in their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in\n[1334b] imagining this good was to be procured by a particular virtue;\nbut since there are greater goods than those of war, it is evident\nthat the enjoyment of those which are valuable in themselves should be\ndesired, rather than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and\nby what means this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have\nalready assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom,\nand reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this\npurpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin by\nin education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve the\nmost entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason may\nerr from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the first\nplace, it is evident that in this as in other things, its beginning\nor production arises from some principle, and its end also arises from\nanother principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us, reason and\nintelligence are the end of nature; our production, therefore, and our\nmanners ought to be accommodated to both these. In the next place, as\nthe soul and the body are two distinct things, so also we see that the\nsoul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and not-reasoning, with\ntheir habits which are two in number, one belonging to each, namely\nappetite and intelligence; and as the body is in production before the\nsoul, so is the not-reasoning part of the soul before the reasoning; and\nthis is evident; for anger, will and desire are to be seen in children\nnearly as soon as they are born; but reason and intelligence spring up\nas they grow to maturity. The body, therefore, necessarily demands our\ncare before the soul; next the appetites for the sake of the mind; the\nbody for the sake of the soul.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nIf then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the\nchildren are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be\ngiven to matrimony; at what time and in what situation it is proper that\nthe citizens should engage in the nuptial contract. Now, with respect\nto this alliance, the legislator ought both to consider the parties and\ntheir time of life, that they may grow old at the same part of time, and\nthat their bodily powers may not be different; that is to say, the man\nbeing able to have children, but the woman too old to bear them; or, on\nthe contrary, the woman be young enough to produce children, but the man\ntoo old to be a father; for from such a situation discords and disputes\ncontinually arise. In the next place, with respect to the succession of\nchildren, there ought not to be too great an interval of time between\nthem and their parents; for when there is, the parent can receive no\nbenefit from his child's affection, or the child any advantage from his\nfather's protection; [1335a] neither should the difference in years be\ntoo little, as great inconveniences may arise from it; as it prevents\nthat proper reverence being shown to a father by a boy who considers him\nas nearly his equal in age, and also from the disputes it occasions in\nthe economy of the family. But, to return from this digression, care\nought to be taken that the bodies of the children may be such as will\nanswer the expectations of the legislator; this also will be affected\nby the same means. Since season for the production of children is\ndetermined (not exactly, but to speak in general), namely, for the man\ntill seventy years, and the woman till fifty, the entering into the\nmarriage state, as far as time is concerned, should be regulated by\nthese periods. It is extremely bad for the children when the father\nis too young; for in all animals whatsoever the parts of the young are\nimperfect, and are more likely to be productive of females than males,\nand diminutive also in size; the same thing of course necessarily holds\ntrue in men; as a proof of this you may see in those cities where the\nmen and women usually marry very young, the people in general are very\nsmall and ill framed; in child-birth also the women suffer more, and\nmany of them die. And thus some persons tell us the oracle of Traezenium\nshould be explained, as if it referred to the many women who were\ndestroyed by too early marriages, and not their gathering their fruits\ntoo soon. It is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon; for\nwomen who do so are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the bodies\nof men from acquiring their full size if they marry before their growth\nis completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents any\nfurther increase; for which reason the proper time for a woman to marry\nis eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for when\nthey marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they will\nalso cease to have children at a proper time; and moreover with respect\nto the succession of the children, if they have them at the time which\nmay reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving into perfection\nwhen their parents are sinking down under the load of seventy years.\nAnd thus much for the time which is proper for marriage; but moreover\na proper season of the year should be observed, as many persons do now,\nand appropriate the winter for this business. The married couple ought\nalso to regard the precepts of physicians and naturalists, each of whom\nhave treated on these [1335b] subjects. What is the fit disposition of\nthe body will be better mentioned when we come to speak of the education\nof the child; we will just slightly mention a few particulars. Now,\nthere is no occasion that any one should have the habit of body of a\nwrestler to be either a good citizen, or to enjoy a good constitution,\nor to be the father of healthy children; neither should he be infirm or\ntoo much dispirited by misfortunes, but between both these. He ought to\nhave a habit of labour, but not of too violent labour; nor should that\nbe confined to one object only, as the wrestler's is; but to such things\nas are proper for freemen. These things are equally necessary both for\nmen and women. Women with child should also take care that their diet is\nnot too sparing, and that they use sufficient exercise; which it will be\neasy for the legislator to effect if he commands them once every day\nto repair to the worship of the gods who are supposed to preside over\nmatrimony. But, contrary to what is proper for the body, the mind ought\nto be kept as tranquil as possible; for as plants partake of the nature\nof the soil, so does the child receive much of the disposition of the\nmother. With respect to the exposing or bringing up of children, let\nit be a law, that nothing imperfect or maimed shall be brought\nup,.......... As the proper time has been pointed out for a man and a\nwoman to enter into the marriage state, so also let us determine\nhow long it is advantageous for the community that they should have\nchildren; for as the children of those who are too young are imperfect\nboth in body and mind, so also those whose parents are too old are weak\nin both: while therefore the body continues in perfection, which (as\nsome poets say, who reckon the different periods of life by sevens)\nis till fifty years, or four or five more, the children may be equally\nperfect; but when the parents are past that age it is better they should\nhave no more. With respect to any connection between a man and a woman,\nor a woman and a man, when either of the parties are betrothed, let\nit be held in utter detestation [1336a] on any pretext whatsoever;\nbut should any one be guilty of such a thing after the marriage is\nconsummated, let his infamy be as great as his guilt deserves.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nWhen a child is born it must be supposed that the strength of its body\nwill depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will\nexamine into the nature of animals, and also observe those people who\nare very desirous their children should acquire a warlike habit, will\nfind that they feed them chiefly with milk, as being best accommodated\nto their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers: those\nmotions also which are natural to their age are very serviceable; and\nto prevent any of their limbs from being crooked, on account of their\nextreme ductility, some people even now use particular machines that\ntheir bodies may not be distorted. It is also useful to enure them to\nthe cold when they are very little; for this is very serviceable for\ntheir health; and also to enure them to the business of war; for which\nreason it is customary with many of the barbarians to dip their children\nin rivers when the water is cold; with others to clothe them very\nslightly, as among the Celts; for whatever it is possible to accustom\nchildren to, it is best to accustom them to it at first, but to do it\nby degrees: besides, boys have naturally a habit of loving the cold, on\naccount of the heat. These, then, and such-like things ought to be the\nfirst object of our attention: the next age to this continues till\nthe child is five years old; during which time it is best to teach him\nnothing at all, not even necessary labour, lest it should hinder his\ngrowth; but he should be accustomed to use so much motion as not to\nacquire a lazy habit of body; which he will get by various means and by\nplay also: his play also ought to be neither illiberal nor too laborious\nnor lazy. Their governors and preceptors also should take care what sort\nof tales and stories it may be proper for them to hear; for all these\nought to pave the way for their future instruction: for which reason\nthe generality of their play should be imitations of what they are\nafterwards to do seriously. They too do wrong who forbid by laws\nthe disputes between boys and their quarrels, for they contribute to\nincrease their growth--as they are a sort of exercise to the body:\nfor the struggles of the heart and the compression of the spirits give\nstrength to those who labour, which happens to boys in their disputes.\nThe preceptors also ought to have an eye upon their manner of life, and\nthose with whom they converse; and to take care that they are never\nin the company of slaves. At this time and till they are seven [1336b]\nyears old it is necessary that they should be educated at home. It\nis also very proper to banish, both from their hearing and sight,\neverything which is illiberal and the like. Indeed it is as much the\nbusiness of the legislator as anything else, to banish every indecent\nexpression out of the state: for from a permission to speak whatever is\nshameful, very quickly arises the doing it, and this particularly with\nyoung people: for which reason let them never speak nor hear any such\nthing: but if it appears that any freeman has done or said anything that\nis forbidden before he is of age to be thought fit to partake of the\ncommon meals, let him be punished by disgrace and stripes; but if a\nperson above that age does so, let him be treated as you would a\nslave, on account of his being infamous. Since we forbid his speaking\neverything which is forbidden, it is necessary that he neither sees\nobscene stories nor pictures; the magistrates therefore are to take care\nthat there are no statues or pictures of anything of this nature, except\nonly to those gods to whom the law permits them, and to which the law\nallows persons of a certain age to pay their devotions, for themselves,\ntheir wives, and children. It should also be illegal for young persons\nto be present either at iambics or comedies before they are arrived at\nthat age when they are allowed to partake of the pleasures of the table:\nindeed a good education will preserve them from all the evils which\nattend on these things. We have at present just touched upon this\nsubject; it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to\nit, to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary, or,\nif necessary, in what manner it must be done; at present we have only\nmentioned it as necessary. Probably the saying of Theodoras, the tragic\nactor, was not a bad one: That he would permit no one, not even the\nmeanest actor, to go upon the stage before him, that he might first\nengage the ear of the audience. The same thing happens both in our\nconnections with men and things: what we meet with first pleases best;\nfor which reason children should be kept strangers to everything which\nis bad, more particularly whatsoever is loose and offensive to good\nmanners. When five years are accomplished, the two next may be very\nproperly employed in being spectators of those exercises they will\nafterwards have to learn. There are two periods into which education\nought to be divided, according to the age of the child; the one is from\nhis being seven years of age to the time of puberty; the other from\nthence till he is one-and-twenty: for those who divide ages by the\nnumber seven [1337a] are in general wrong: it is much better to follow\nthe division of nature; for every art and every instruction is intended\nto complete what nature has left defective: we must first consider if\nany regulation whatsoever is requisite for children; in the next place,\nif it is advantageous to make it a common care, or that every one should\nact therein as he pleases, which is the general practice in most cities;\nin the third place, what it ought to be.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VIII\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nNo one can doubt that the magistrate ought greatly to interest himself\nin the care of youth; for where it is neglected it is hurtful to the\ncity, for every state ought to be governed according to its particular\nnature; for the form and manners of each government are peculiar to\nitself; and these, as they originally established it, so they usually\nstill preserve it. For instance, democratic forms and manners a\ndemocracy; oligarchic, an oligarchy: but, universally, the best manners\nproduce the best government. Besides, as in every business and art there\nare some things which men are to learn first and be made accustomed to,\nwhich are necessary to perform their several works; so it is evident\nthat the same thing is necessary in the practice of virtue. As there is\none end in view in every city, it is evident that education ought to be\none and the same in each; and that this should be a common care, and\nnot the individual's, as it now is, when every one takes care of his own\nchildren separately; and their instructions are particular also, each\nperson teaching them as they please; but what ought to be engaged in\nought to be common to all. Besides, no one ought to think that any\ncitizen belongs to him in particular, but to the state in general; for\neach one is a part of the state, and it is the natural duty of each part\nto regard the good of the whole: and for this the Lacedaemonians may be\npraised; for they give the greatest attention to education, and make\nit public. It is evident, then, that there should be laws concerning\neducation, and that it should be public.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nWhat education is, and how children ought to be instructed, is what\nshould be well known; for there are doubts concerning the business of\nit, as all people do not agree in those things they would have a child\ntaught, both with respect to their improvement in virtue and a happy\nlife: nor is it clear whether the object of it should be to improve\nthe reason or rectify the morals. From the present mode of education\nwe cannot determine with certainty to which men incline, whether to\ninstruct a child in what will be useful to him in life; or what tends to\nvirtue, and what is excellent: for all these things have their separate\ndefenders. As to virtue, there is no particular [1337b] in which they\nall agree: for as all do not equally esteem all virtues, it reasonably\nfollows that they will not cultivate the same. It is evident that what\nis necessary ought to be taught to all: but that which is necessary\nfor one is not necessary for all; for there ought to be a distinction\nbetween the employment of a freeman and a slave. The first of these\nshould be taught everything useful which will not make those who know\nit mean. Every work is to be esteemed mean, and every art and every\ndiscipline which renders the body, the mind, or the understanding of\nfreemen unfit for the habit and practice of virtue: for which reason all\nthose arts which tend to deform the body are called mean, and all those\nemployments which are exercised for gain; for they take off from the\nfreedom of the mind and render it sordid. There are also some liberal\narts which are not improper for freemen to apply to in a certain degree;\nbut to endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them is exposed to the\nfaults I have just mentioned; for there is a great deal of difference\nin the reason for which any one does or learns anything: for it is not\nilliberal to engage in it for one's self, one's friend, or in the cause\nof virtue; while, at the same time, to do it for the sake of another\nmay seem to be acting the part of a servant and a slave. The mode of\ninstruction which now prevails seems to partake of both parts.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nThere are four things which it is usual to teach children--reading,\ngymnastic exercises, and music, to which (in the fourth place) some add\npainting. Reading and painting are both of them of singular use in life,\nand gymnastic exercises, as productive of courage. As to music, some\npersons may doubt, as most persons now use it for the sake of pleasure:\nbut those who originally made it part of education did it because,\nas has been already said, nature requires that we should not only be\nproperly employed, but to be able to enjoy leisure honourably: for this\n(to repeat what I have already said) is of all things the principal.\nBut, though both labour and rest are necessary, yet the latter is\npreferable to the first; and by all means we ought to learn what we\nshould do when at rest: for we ought not to employ that time at play;\nfor then play would be the necessary business of our lives. But if this\ncannot be, play is more necessary for those who labour than those who\nare at rest: for he who labours requires relaxation; which play will\nsupply: for as labour is attended with pain and continued exertion, it\nis necessary that play should be introduced, under proper regulations,\nas a medicine: for such an employment of the mind is a relaxation to\nit, and eases with pleasure. [1338a] Now rest itself seems to partake of\npleasure, of happiness, and an agreeable life: but this cannot be theirs\nwho labour, but theirs who are at rest; for he who labours, labours for\nthe sake of some end which he has not: but happiness is an end which\nall persons think is attended with pleasure and not with pain: but all\npersons do not agree in making this pleasure consist in the same thing;\nfor each one has his particular standard, correspondent to his own\nhabits; but the best man proposes the best pleasure, and that which\narises from the noblest actions. But it is evident, that to live a life\nof rest there are some things which a man must learn and be instructed\nin; and that the object of this learning and this instruction centres in\ntheir acquisition: but the learning and instruction which is given for\nlabour has for its object other things; for which reason the ancients\nmade music a part of education; not as a thing necessary, for it is not\nof that nature, nor as a thing useful, as reading, in the common course\nof life, or for managing of a family, or for learning anything as useful\nin public life. Painting also seems useful to enable a man to judge\nmore accurately of the productions of the finer arts: nor is it like\nthe gymnastic exercises, which contribute to health and strength; for\nneither of these things do we see produced by music; there remains for\nit then to be the employment of our rest, which they had in view who\nintroduced it; and, thinking it a proper employment for freemen, to them\nthey allotted it; as Homer sings:\n\n   \"How right to call Thalia to the feast:\" \n\nand of some others he says:\n\n   \"The bard was call'd, to ravish every ear:\"\n\nand, in another place, he makes Ulysses say the happiest part of man's\nlife is\n\n   \"When at the festal board, in order plac'd, They hear the song.\"\n\nIt is evident, then, that there is a certain education in which a child\nmay be instructed, not as useful nor as necessary, but as noble and\nliberal: but whether this is one or more than one, and of what sort they\nare, and how to be taught, shall be considered hereafter: we are now got\nso far on our way as to show that we have the testimony of the ancients\nin our favour, by what they have delivered down upon education--for\nmusic makes this plain. Moreover, it is necessary to instruct children\nin what is useful, not only on account of its being useful in itself,\nas, for instance, to learn to read, but also as the means of acquiring\nother different sorts of instruction: thus they should be instructed\nin painting, not only to prevent their being mistaken in purchasing\npictures, or in buying or selling of vases, but rather as it makes\n[1338b] them judges of the beauties of the human form; for to be always\nhunting after the profitable ill agrees with great and freeborn\nsouls. As it is evident whether a boy should be first taught morals or\nreasoning, and whether his body or his understanding should be first\ncultivated, it is plain that boys should be first put under the care of\nthe different masters of the gymnastic arts, both to form their bodies\nand teach them their exercises.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nNow those states which seem to take the greatest care of their\nchildren's education, bestow their chief attention on wrestling, though\nit both prevents the increase of the body and hurts the form of it. This\nfault the Lacedaemonians did not fall into, for they made their children\nfierce by painful labour, as chiefly useful to inspire them with\ncourage: though, as we have already often said, this is neither the\nonly thing nor the principal thing necessary to attend to; and even with\nrespect to this they may not thus attain their end; for we do not find\neither in other animals, or other nations, that courage necessarily\nattends the most cruel, but rather the milder, and those who have the\ndispositions of lions: for there are many people who are eager both\nto kill men and to devour human flesh, as the Achaeans and Heniochi in\nPontus, and many others in Asia, some of whom are as bad, others worse\nthan these, who indeed live by tyranny, but are men of no courage. Nay,\nwe know that the Lacedaemonians themselves, while they continued those\npainful labours, and were superior to all others (though now they are\ninferior to many, both in war and gymnastic exercises), did not acquire\ntheir superiority by training their youth to these exercises,\nbut because those who were disciplined opposed those who were not\ndisciplined at all. What is fair and honourable ought then to take place\nin education of what is fierce and cruel: for it is not a wolf, nor any\nother wild beast, which will brave any noble danger, but rather a good\nman. So that those who permit boys to engage too earnestly in these\nexercises, while they do not take care to instruct them in what is\nnecessary to do, to speak the real truth, render them mean and vile,\naccomplished only in one duty of a citizen, and in every other respect,\nas reason evinces, good for nothing. Nor should we form our judgments\nfrom past events, but from what we see at present: for now they have\nrivals in their mode of education, whereas formerly they had not. That\ngymnastic exercises are useful, and in what manner, is admitted; for\nduring youth it is very proper to go through a course of those which\nare most gentle, omitting that violent diet and those painful exercises\nwhich are prescribed as necessary; that they may not prevent the growth\nof the body: and it is no small proof that they have this effect, that\namongst the Olympic candidates we can scarce find two or three who have\ngained a victory both when boys and men: because the necessary exercises\nthey went through when young deprived them of their strength. When they\nhave allotted three years from the time of puberty to other parts of\neducation, they are then of a proper age to submit to labour and a\nregulated diet; for it is impossible for the mind and body both to\nlabour at the same time, as they are productive of contrary evils to\neach other; the labour of the body preventing the progress of the mind,\nand the mind of the body.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nWith respect to music we have already spoken a little in a doubtful\nmanner upon this subject. It will be proper to go over again more\nparticularly what we then said, which may serve as an introduction to\nwhat any other person may choose to offer thereon; for it is no easy\nmatter to distinctly point out what power it has, nor on what accounts\none should apply it, whether as an amusement and refreshment, as sleep\nor wine; as these are nothing serious, but pleasing, and the killers of\ncare, as Euripides says; for which reason they class in the same order\nand use for the same purpose all these, namely, sleep, wine, and music,\nto which some add dancing; or shall we rather suppose that music tends\nto be productive of virtue, having a power, as the gymnastic exercises\nhave to form the body in a certain way, to influence the manners so as\nto accustom its professors to rejoice rightly? or shall we say, that it\nis of any service in the conduct of life, and an assistant to prudence?\nfor this also is a third property which has been attributed to it. Now\nthat boys are not to be instructed in it as play is evident; for those\nwho learn don't play, for to learn is rather troublesome; neither is\nit proper to permit boys at their age to enjoy perfect leisure; for to\ncease to improve is by no means fit for what is as yet imperfect; but it\nmay be thought that the earnest attention of boys in this art is for\nthe sake of that amusement they will enjoy when they come to be men and\ncompletely formed; but, if this is the case, why are they themselves\nto learn it, and not follow the practice of the kings of the Medes and\nPersians, who enjoy the pleasure of music by hearing others play, and\nbeing shown its beauties by them; for of necessity those must be\nbetter skilled therein who make this science their particular study\nand business, than those who have only spent so much time at it as was\nsufficient just to learn the principles of it. But if this is a reason\nfor a child's being taught anything, they ought also to learn the art of\ncookery, but this is absurd. The same doubt occurs if music has a power\nof improving the manners; for why should they on this account themselves\nlearn it, and not reap every advantage of regulating the passions or\nforming a judgment [1339b] on the merits of the performance by hearing\nothers, as the Lacedaemonians; for they, without having ever learnt\nmusic, are yet able to judge accurately what is good and what is\nbad; the same reasoning may be applied if music is supposed to be the\namusement of those who live an elegant and easy life, why should they\nlearn themselves, and not rather enjoy the benefit of others' skill.\nLet us here consider what is our belief of the immortal gods in this\nparticular. Now we find the poets never represent Jupiter himself as\nsinging and playing; nay, we ourselves treat the professors of these\narts as mean people, and say that no one would practise them but a\ndrunkard or a buffoon. But probably we may consider this subject more\nat large hereafter. The first question is, whether music is or is not\nto make a part of education? and of those three things which have\nbeen assigned as its proper employment, which is the right? Is it to\ninstruct, to amuse, or to employ the vacant hours of those who live at\nrest? or may not all three be properly allotted to it? for it appears\nto partake of them all; for play is necessary for relaxation, and\nrelaxation pleasant, as it is a medicine for that uneasiness which\narises from labour. It is admitted also that a happy life must be an\nhonourable one, and a pleasant one too, since happiness consists in both\nthese; and we all agree that music is one of the most pleasing things,\nwhether alone or accompanied with a voice; as Musseus says, \"Music's the\nsweetest joy of man;\" for which reason it is justly admitted into every\ncompany and every happy life, as having the power of inspiring joy.\nSo that from this any one may suppose that it is necessary to instruct\nyoung persons in it; for all those pleasures which are harmless are not\nonly conducive to the final end of life, but serve also as relaxations;\nand, as men are but rarely in the attainment of that final end, they\noften cease from their labour and apply to amusement, with no further\nview than to acquire the pleasure attending it. It is therefore useful\nto enjoy such pleasures as these. There are some persons who make play\nand amusement their end, and probably that end has some pleasure annexed\nto it, but not what should be; but while men seek the one they accept\nthe other for it; because there is some likeness in human actions to the\nend; for the end is pursued for the sake of nothing else that attends\nit; but for itself only; and pleasures like these are sought for, not\non account of what follows them, but on account of what has gone before\nthem, as labour and grief; for which reason they seek for happiness in\nthese sort of pleasures; and that this is the reason any one may easily\nperceive. That music should be pursued, not on this account only, but\nalso as it is very serviceable during the hours of relaxation from\nlabour, probably no [1340a] one doubts; we should also inquire whether\nbesides this use it may not also have another of nobler nature--and we\nought not only to partake of the common pleasure arising from it (which\nall have the sensation of, for music naturally gives pleasure, therefore\nthe use of it is agreeable to all ages and all dispositions); but also\nto examine if it tends anything to improve our manners and our souls.\nAnd this will be easily known if we feel our dispositions any way\ninfluenced thereby; and that they are so is evident from many other\ninstances, as well as the music at the Olympic games; and this\nconfessedly fills the soul with enthusiasm; but enthusiasm is an\naffection of the soul which strongly agitates the disposition. Besides,\nall those who hear any imitations sympathise therewith; and this when\nthey are conveyed even without rhythm or verse. Moreover, as music is\none of those things which are pleasant, and as virtue itself consists in\nrightly enjoying, loving, and hating, it is evident that we ought not\nto learn or accustom ourselves to anything so much as to judge right and\nrejoice in honourable manners and noble actions. But anger and mildness,\ncourage and modesty, and their contraries, as well as all other\ndispositions of the mind, are most naturally imitated by music and\npoetry; which is plain by experience, for when we hear these our very\nsoul is altered; and he who is affected either with joy or grief by the\nimitation of any objects, is in very nearly the same situation as if he\nwas affected by the objects themselves; thus, if any person is pleased\nwith seeing a statue of any one on no other account but its beauty, it\nis evident that the sight of the original from whence it was taken\nwould also be pleasing; now it happens in the other senses there is no\nimitation of manners; that is to say, in the touch and the taste; in the\nobjects of sight, a very little; for these are merely representations of\nthings, and the perceptions which they excite are in a manner common\nto all. Besides, statues and paintings are not properly imitations of\nmanners, but rather signs and marks which show the body is affected by\nsome passion. However, the difference is not great, yet young men ought\nnot to view the paintings of Pauso, but of Polygnotus, or any other\npainter or statuary who expresses manners. But in poetry and music there\nare imitations of manners; and this is evident, for different harmonies\ndiffer from each other so much by nature, that those who hear them are\ndifferently affected, and are not in the same disposition of mind when\none is performed as when another is; the one, for instance, occasions\ngrief 13406 and contracts the soul, as the mixed Lydian: others soften\nthe mind, and as it were dissolve the heart: others fix it in a firm\nand settled state, such is the power of the Doric music only; while the\nPhrygian fills the soul with enthusiasm, as has been well described by\nthose who have written philosophically upon this part of education; for\nthey bring examples of what they advance from the things themselves. The\nsame holds true with respect to rhythm; some fix the disposition, others\noccasion a change in it; some act more violently, others more liberally.\nFrom what has been said it is evident what an influence music has over\nthe disposition of the mind, and how variously it can fascinate it:\nand if it can do this, most certainly it is what youth ought to be\ninstructed in. And indeed the learning of music is particularly adapted\nto their disposition; for at their time of life they do not willingly\nattend to anything which is not agreeable; but music is naturally one\nof the most agreeable things; and there seems to be a certain connection\nbetween harmony and rhythm; for which reason some wise men held the soul\nitself to be harmony; others, that it contains it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nWe will now determine whether it is proper that children should be\ntaught to sing, and play upon any instrument, which we have before made\na matter of doubt. Now, it is well known that it makes a great deal of\ndifference when you would qualify any one in any art, for the person\nhimself to learn the practical part of it; for it is a thing very\ndifficult, if not impossible, for a man to be a good judge of what he\nhimself cannot do. It is also very necessary that children should have\nsome employment which will amuse them; for which reason the rattle of\nArchytas seems well contrived, which they give children to play with,\nto prevent their breaking those things which are about the house; for\nat their age they cannot sit still: this therefore is well adapted to\ninfants, as instruction ought to be their rattle as they grow up; hence\nit is evident that they should be so taught music as to be able to\npractise it. Nor is it difficult to say what is becoming or unbecoming\nof their age, or to answer the objections which some make to this\nemployment as mean and low. In the first place, it is necessary for them\nto practise, that they may be judges of the art: for which reason this\nshould be done when they are young; but when they are grown older the\npractical part may be dropped; while they will still continue judges of\nwhat is excellent in the art, and take a proper pleasure therein, from\nthe knowledge they acquired of it in their youth. As to the censure\nwhich some persons throw upon music, as something mean and low, it is\nnot difficult to answer that, if we will but consider how far we propose\nthose who are to be educated so as to become good citizens should be\ninstructed in this art, [1341a] and what music and what rhythms they\nshould be acquainted with; and also what instruments they should play\nupon; for in these there is probably a difference. Such then is the\nproper answer to that censure: for it must be admitted, that in some\ncases nothing can prevent music being attended, to a certain degree,\nwith the bad effects which are ascribed to it; it is therefore clear\nthat the learning of it should never prevent the business of riper\nyears; nor render the body effeminate, and unfit for the business of war\nor the state; but it should be practised by the young, judged of by the\nold. That children may learn music properly, it is necessary that they\nshould not be employed in those parts of it which are the objects of\ndispute between the masters in that science; nor should they perform\nsuch pieces as are wondered at from the difficulty of their execution;\nand which, from being first exhibited in the public games, are now\nbecome a part of education; but let them learn so much of it as to be\nable to receive proper pleasure from excellent music and rhythms; and\nnot that only which music must make all animals feel, and also slaves\nand boys, but more. It is therefore plain what instruments they should\nuse; thus, they should never be taught to play upon the flute, or any\nother instrument which requires great skill, as the harp or the like,\nbut on such as will make them good judges of music, or any other\ninstruction: besides, the flute is not a moral instrument, but rather\none that will inflame the passions, and is therefore rather to be used\nwhen the soul is to be animated than when instruction is intended. Let\nme add also, that there is something therein which is quite contrary to\nwhat education requires; as the player on the flute is prevented from\nspeaking: for which reason our forefathers very properly forbade the use\nof it to youth and freemen, though they themselves at first used it; for\nwhen their riches procured them greater leisure, they grew more animated\nin the cause of virtue; and both before and after the Median war their\nnoble actions so exalted their minds that they attended to every part of\neducation; selecting no one in particular, but endeavouring to collect\nthe whole: for which reason they introduced the flute also, as one\nof the instruments they were to learn to play on. At Lacedaemon the\nchoregus himself played on the flute; and it was so common at Athens\nthat almost every freeman understood it, as is evident from the tablet\nwhich Thrasippus dedicated when he was choregus; but afterwards they\nrejected it as dangerous; having become better judges of what tended to\npromote virtue and what did not. For the same reason many of the ancient\ninstruments were thrown aside, as the dulcimer and the lyre; as also\nthose which were to inspire those who played on them with pleasure, and\nwhich required a nice finger and great skill to play well on. What the\nancients tell us, by way of fable, of the flute is indeed very rational;\nnamely, that after Minerva had found it, she threw it away: nor are they\nwrong who say that the goddess disliked it for deforming the face of him\nwho played thereon: not but that it is more probable that she rejected\nit as the knowledge thereof contributed nothing to the improvement of\nthe mind. Now, we regard Minerva as the inventress of arts and sciences.\nAs we disapprove of a child's being taught to understand instruments,\nand to play like a master (which we would have confined to those who are\ncandidates for the prize in that science; for they play not to improve\nthemselves in virtue, but to please those who hear them, and gratify\ntheir importunity); therefore we think the practice of it unfit for\nfreemen; but then it should be confined to those who are paid for doing\nit; for it usually gives people sordid notions, for the end they have\nin view is bad: for the impertinent spectator is accustomed to make them\nchange their music; so that the artists who attend to him regulate their\nbodies according to his motions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nWe are now to enter into an inquiry concerning harmony and rhythm;\nwhether all sorts of these are to be employed in education, or whether\nsome peculiar ones are to be selected; and also whether we should\ngive the same directions to those who are engaged in music as part of\neducation, or whether there is something different from these two.\nNow, as all music consists in melody and rhythm, we ought not to be\nunacquainted with the power which each of these has in education; and\nwhether we should rather choose music in which melody prevails, or\nrhythm: but when I consider how many things have been well written upon\nthese subjects, not only by some musicians of the present age, but also\nby some philosophers who are perfectly skilled in that part of music\nwhich belongs to education; we will refer those who desire a very\nparticular knowledge therein to those writers, and shall only treat\nof it in general terms, without descending to particulars. Melody is\ndivided by some philosophers, whose notions we approve of, into moral,\npractical, and that which fills the mind with enthusiasm: they also\nallot to each of these a particular kind of harmony which naturally\ncorresponds therewith: and we say that music should not be applied to\none purpose only, but many; both for instruction and purifying the soul\n(now I use the word purifying at present without any explanation, but\nshall speak more at large of it in my Poetics); and, in the third place,\nas an agreeable manner of spending the time and a relaxation from the\nuneasiness of the mind. [1342a] It is evident that all harmonies are to\nbe used; but not for all purposes; but the most moral in education: but\nto please the ear, when others play, the most active and enthusiastic;\nfor that passion which is to be found very strong in some souls is to be\nmet with also in all; but the difference in different persons consists\nin its being in a less or greater degree, as pity, fear, and enthusiasm\nalso; which latter is so powerful in some as to overpower the soul: and\nyet we see those persons, by the application of sacred music to soothe\ntheir mind, rendered as sedate and composed as if they had employed\nthe art of the physician: and this must necessarily happen to the\ncompassionate, the fearful, and all those who are subdued by their\npassions: nay, all persons, as far as they are affected with those\npassions, admit of the same cure, and are restored to tranquillity with\npleasure. In the same manner, all music which has the power of purifying\nthe soul affords a harmless pleasure to man. Such, therefore, should be\nthe harmony and such the music which those who contend with each other\nin the theatre should exhibit: but as the audience is composed of two\nsorts of people, the free and the well-instructed, the rude the mean\nmechanics, and hired servants, and a long collection of the like, there\nmust be some music and some spectacles to please and soothe them; for as\ntheir minds are as it were perverted from their natural habits, so\nalso is there an unnatural harmony, and overcharged music which is\naccommodated to their taste: but what is according to nature gives\npleasure to every one, therefore those who are to contend upon the\ntheatre should be allowed to use this species of music. But in education\nethic melody and ethic harmony should be used, which is the Doric, as we\nhave already said, or any other which those philosophers who are skilful\nin that music which is to be employed in education shall approve of.\nBut Socrates, in Plato's Republic, is very wrong when he [1342b] permits\nonly the Phrygian music to be used as well as the Doric, particularly as\namongst other instruments he banishes the flute; for the Phrygian music\nhas the same power in harmony as the flute has amongst the instruments;\nfor they are both pathetic and raise the mind: and this the practice\nof the poets proves; for in their bacchanal songs, or whenever they\ndescribe any violent emotions of the mind, the flute is the instrument\nthey chiefly use: and the Phrygian harmony is most suitable to these\nsubjects. Now, that the dithyrambic measure is Phrygian is allowed by\ngeneral consent; and those who are conversant in studies of this sort\nbring many proofs of it; as, for instance, when Philoxenus endeavoured\nto compose dithyrambic music for Doric harmony, he naturally fell back\nagain into Phrygian, as being fittest for that purpose; as every one\nindeed agrees, that the Doric music is most serious, and fittest to\ninspire courage: and, as we always commend the middle as being between\nthe two extremes, and the Doric has this relation with respect to other\nharmonies, it is evident that is what the youth ought to be instructed\nin. There are two things to be taken into consideration, both what is\npossible and what is proper; every one then should chiefly endeavour to\nattain those things which contain both these qualities: but this is to\nbe regulated by different times of life; for instance, it is not easy\nfor those who are advanced in years to sing such pieces of music as\nrequire very high notes, for nature points out to them those which are\ngentle and require little strength of voice (for which reason some who\nare skilful in music justly find fault with Socrates for forbidding the\nyouth to be instructed in gentle harmony; as if, like wine, it would\nmake them drunk, whereas the effect of that is to render men bacchanals,\nand not make them languid): these therefore are what should employ those\nwho are grown old. Moreover, if there is any harmony which is proper for\na child's age, as being at the same time elegant and instructive, as the\nLydian of all others seems chiefly to be-These then are as it were the\nthree boundaries of education, moderation, possibility, and decorum.\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  ACHILLES, 76\n\n  Act of the city, what, 69\n\n  Actions, their original spring, i\n\n  Administration, 76;\n      whether to be shared by the whole community, 203\n\n  AEsumnetes, 96\n\n  AEthiopia, in what manner the power of the state is there regulated, 112\n\n  Alterations in government, whence they arise, 142;\n      what they are, 143\n\n  Ambractia, the government of, changed, 151\n\n  Andromadas Reginus, a lawgiver to the Thracian Calcidians, 65\n\n  Animals, their different provisions by nature, 14;\n      intended by nature for the benefit of man, 14;\n      what constitutes their different species, 113\n\n  Animals, tame, why better than wild, 8\n\n  Arbitrator and judge, their difference, 49\n\n  Architas his rattle, 248\n\n  Areopagus, senate of, 63\n\n  Argonauts refuse to take Hercules with them, 93\n\n  Aristocracies, causes of commotions in them, 157;\n      chief cause of their alteration, 158;\n      may degenerate into an oligarchy, 79\n\n  Aristocracy, what, 78;\n      treated of, 120;\n      its object, 121\n\n  Art, works of, which most excellent, 20\n\n  Artificers and slaves, their difference, 24\n\n  Assemblies, public, advantageous to a democracy, 134\n\n  Assembly, public, its proper business, 133\n\n  Athens, different dispositions of the citizens of, 149\n\n  Barter, its original, 15\n\n  Being, what the nature of every one is, 3\n\n  Beings, why some command, others obey, 2\n\n  Body by nature to be governed, 8;\n      requires our care before the soul, 232\n\n  Calchis, the government of, changed, 151\n\n  Calcidians, 65\n\n  Carthaginian government described, 60\n\n  Census in a free state should be as extensive as possible, 131;\n      how to be altered, 162\n\n  Charondas supposed to be the scholar of Zaleucus, 64\n\n  Child, how to be managed when first born, 235;\n      should be taught nothing till he is five years old, 235;\n      how then to be educated, 236\n\n  Children, the proper government of, 22;\n      what their proper virtues, 23;\n      what they are usually taught, 240\n\n  Cities, how governed at first, 3;\n      what, 3;\n      the work of nature, 3;\n      prior in contemplation to a family, or an individual, 4\n\n  Citizen, who is one? 66, 68;\n      should know both how to command and obey, 73\n\n  Citizens must have some things in common, 26;\n      should be exempted from servile labour, 51;\n      privileges different in different governments, 68;\n      if illegally made, whether illegal, 69;\n      who admitted to be, 75;\n      in the best states ought not to follow merchandise, 216\n\n  City, may be too much one, 27, 35;\n      what, 66, 82;\n      when it continues the same, 70;\n      for whose sake established, 76;\n      its end, 83;\n      of what parts made up, 113;\n      best composed of equals, 126\n\n  City of the best form, what its establishment ought to be, 149;\n      wherein its greatness consists, 149;\n      may be either too large or too small, 209;\n      what should be its situation, 211;\n      whether proper near the sea, 211;\n      ought to be divided by families into different sorts of men, 218\n\n  City and confederacy, their difference, 37;\n      wherein it should be one, 27\n\n  Command amongst equals should be in rotation, 101\n\n  Common meals not well established at Lacedaemon-well at Crete, 56;\n      the model from whence the Lacedaemonian was taken, 56;\n      inferior to it in some respects, 56\n\n  Community, its recommendations deceitful, 34;\n      into what people it may be divided, 194\n\n  Community of children, 29, 30;\n      inconveniences attending it, 31\n\n  Community of goods, its inconveniences, 28;\n      destructive of modesty and liberality, 34\n\n  Community of wives, its inconveniences, 27\n\n  Contempt a cause of sedition, 146\n\n  Courage of a man different from a woman's, 74\n\n  Courts, how many there ought to be, 140\n\n  Courts of justice should be few in a small state, 192\n\n  Cretan customs similar to the Lacedasmonian, 57;\n      assembly open to every citizen, 58\n\n  Cretans, their power, 58;\n      their public meals, how conducted 58\n\n  Crete, the government of, 57;\n      description of the island of 57\n\n  Customs at Carthage, Lacedaemon, and amongst the Scythians and\n  Iberians, concerning those who had killed an enemy, 204, 205\n\n  Dadalus's statues, 6.\n\n  Delphos, an account of a sedition there, 150\n\n  Demagogues, their influence in a democracy, 116.\n\n  Democracies, arose out of tyrannies, 100;\n      whence they arose, 142;\n      when changed into tyrannies, 153;\n      their different sorts, 184, 188;\n      general rules for their establishment, 185;\n      should not be made too perfect, 191\n\n  Democracy, what, 79, 80;\n      its definition, 112, 113;\n      different sorts of, 115, 118;\n      its object, 122;\n      how subverted in the Isle of Cos, 152\n\n  Democracy and aristocracy, how they may be blended together, 163\n\n  Democratical state, its foundation, 184\n\n  Despotic power absurd, 205\n\n  Dion, his noble resolution, 171\n\n  Dionysius, his taxes, 175\n\n  Dissolution of kingdoms and tyrannies, 169\n\n  Domestic employments of men and women different, 74\n\n  Domestic government, its object, 77\n\n  Domestic society the first, 3\n\n  Draco, 65\n\n  Dyrrachium, government of, 101\n\n  Economy and money-getting, difference, 17\n\n  Education necessary for the happiness of the city, 90;\n      of all things most necessary to preserve the state, 166;\n      what it ought to be, 166;\n      the objects of it, 228, 229;\n      should be taken care of by the magistrate, and correspond to\n          the nature of government, 238;\n      should be a common care, and regulated by laws, 238\n\n  Employment, one to be allotted to one person in an extensive government, 136\n\n  Employments in the state, how to be disposed of, 88-90;\n      whether all should be open to all, 216\n\n  Ephialtes abridges the power of the senate of Areopagus, 63\n\n  Ephori, at Sparta, their power too great, 54;\n      improperly chosen, 54;\n      flattered by their kings, 54;\n      the supreme judges, 55;\n      manner of life too indulgent, 55\n\n  Epidamnus, an account of a revolution there, 150\n\n  Equality, how twofold, 143;\n      in a democracy, how to be procured, 186\n\n  Euripides quoted, 72\n\n  Family government, of what it consists, 5\n\n  Father should not be too young, 232\n\n  Females and slaves, wherein they differ, 2;\n      why upon a level amongst barbarians, 3\n\n  Forfeitures, how to be applied, 192\n\n  Fortune improper pretension for power, 91\n\n  Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, 86\n\n  Free state treated of, 121;\n      how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, 122, 123\n\n  Friendship weakened by a community of children, 31\n\n  General, the office of, how to be disposed of, 98\n\n  Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, 3\n\n  Good, relative to man, how divided, 201\n\n  Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, 4\n\n  Good fortune something different from happiness, 202\n\n  Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, 28;\n      in what manner it should be in rotation, 28;\n      what, 66;\n      which best, of a good man or good laws, 98;\n      good, to what it should owe its preservation, 124;\n      what the best, 225\n\n  Government of the master over the slave sometimes reciprocally useful, ii\n\n  Governments, how different from each other, 67;\n      whether more than one form should be established, 76;\n      should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful--\n      instances of it, 93;\n      how compared to music, in;\n      in general, to what they owe their preservation, 160\n\n  Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference\n  from each other, i\n\n  Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, 23;\n      whether they should be the same persons or different, 227\n\n  Grecians, their superiority over other people, 213\n\n  Guards of a king natives, 96,168;\n      of a tyrant foreigners, 96, 168\n\n  Gymnastic exercises, when to be performed, 223;\n      how far they should be made a part of education, 242, 243\n\n  Happiness, wherein it consists, 207\n\n  Happy life, where most likely to be found, 202\n\n  Harmony, whether all kinds of it are to be used in education, 251\n\n  Helots troublesome to the Lacedaemonians, 87\n\n  Herdsmen compose the second-best democracy, 189\n\n  Hippodamus, an account of, 46;\n      his plan of government, 46, 47:\n      objected to, 47, 48\n\n  Homer quoted, 95, 116\n\n  Honours, an inequality of, occasions seditions, 44\n\n  Horse most suitable to an oligarchy, 195\n\n  Houses, private, their best form, 221\n\n  Human flesh devoured by some nations, 242\n\n  Husbandmen compose the best democracy, 189;\n      will choose to govern according to law, 118\n\n  Husbandry, art of, whether part of money-getting, 13\n\n  Instruments, their difference from each other, 6;\n      wherein they differ from possessions, 6\n\n  Italy, its ancient boundary, 218\n\n  Jason's declaration, 72\n\n  Judge should not act as an arbitrator, 48, 49;\n      which is best for an individual, or the people in general, 98, 99\n\n  Judges, many better than one, 102;\n      of whom to consist, 102;\n      how many different sorts are necessary, 141\n\n  Judicial part of government, how to be divided, 140\n\n  Jurymen, particular powers sometimes appointed to that office, 68\n\n  Justice, what, 88;\n      the course of, impeded in Crete, 59;\n      different in different situations, 74\n\n  King, from whom to be chosen 60;\n      the guardian of his people 168\n\n  King's children, what to be done with, 100\n\n  King's power, what it should be 100;\n      when unequal, 143\n\n  Kingdom, what, 78\n\n  Kingdoms, their object, 167;\n      how bestowed, 168;\n      causes of their dissolution, 173;\n      how preserved, 173\n\n  Kingly government in the heroic times, what, 96\n\n  Kingly power regulated by the laws at Sparta in peace, 95;\n      absolute in war, 95\n\n  Kings formerly in Crete, 58;\n      their power afterwards devolved to the kosmoi, 58;\n      method of electing them at Carthage, 60\n\n  Knowledge of the master and slave different from each other, ii\n\n  Kosmoi, the power of, 58;\n      their number, 58;\n      wherein inferior to the ephori, 58;\n      allowed to resign their office before their time is elapsed, 59\n\n  Lacedamonian customs similar to the Cretan, 57\n\n  Lacedaemonian government much esteemed, 41;\n      the faults of it, 53-56;\n      calculated only for war, 56;\n      how composed of a democracy and oligarchy, 124\n\n  Lacedaemonian revenue badly raised, 56, 57\n\n  Lacedaemonians, wherein they admit things to be common, 33\n\n  Land should be divided into two parts, 219\n\n  Law makes one man a slave, another free, 6;\n      whether just or not, 9;\n      at Thebes respecting tradesmen, 75;\n      nothing should be done contrary to it, 160\n\n  Law and government, their difference, 107, 108\n\n  Laws, when advantageous\n  to alter them, 49,50, 52;\n      of every state will be like the state, 88;\n      whom they should be calculated for, 92;\n      decide better than men, 101;\n      moral preferable to written, 102;\n      must sometimes bend to ancient customs, 117;\n      should be framed to the state, 107;\n      the same suit not all governments, 108\n\n  Legislator ought to know not only what is best, but what is practical, n\n\n  Legislators should fix a proper medium in property, 46\n\n  Liberty, wherein it partly consists, 184, 185\n\n  Life, happy, owing to a course of virtue, 125;\n      how divided, 228\n\n  Locrians forbid men to sell their property, 43\n\n  Lycophron's account of law, 82\n\n  Lycurgus gave over reducing the women to obedience, 53;\n      made it infamous for any one to sell his possessions, 53;\n      some of his laws censured, 54;\n      spent much time at Crete, 57;\n      supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64\n\n  Lysander wanted to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, 143\n\n  Magistrate, to whom that name is properly given, 136\n\n  Magistrates, when they make the state incline to an oligarchy, 61;\n      when to an aristocracy, 61;\n      at Athens, from whom to be chosen, 64;\n      to determine those causes which the law cannot be applied to, 88;\n      whether their power is to be the same, or different\n          in different communities, 137;\n      how they differ from each other, 138;\n          in those who appoint them, 138;\n      should be continued but a short time in democracies, 161;\n      how to be chosen in a democracy, 185;\n      different sorts and employments, 196\n\n  Making and using, their difference, 6\n\n  Malienses, their form of government, 131\n\n  Man proved to be a political animal, 4;\n      has alone a perception of good and evil, 4;\n      without law and justice the worst of beings, 5\n\n  Master, power of, whence it arises, as some think, 5\n\n  Matrimony, when to be engaged in, 232\n\n  Meals, common, established in Crete and Italy, 218;\n      expense of, should be defrayed by the whole state, 219\n\n  Mechanic employments useful for citizens, 73\n\n  Mechanics, whether they should be allowed to be citizens, 74, 75;\n      cannot acquire the practice of virtue, 75;\n      admitted to be citizens in an oligarchy, 75\n\n  Medium of circumstances best, 126\n\n  Members of the community, their different pretences to the employments\n  of the state, 90;\n      what natural dispositions they ought to be of, 213\n\n  Men, some distinguished by nature for governors, others to be governed, 7;\n      their different modes of living, 13;\n      worthy three ways, 226\n\n  Merchandise, three different ways of carrying it on, 20\n\n  Middle rank of men make the best citizens, 127;\n      most conducive to the preservation of the state, 128;\n      should be particularly attended to by the legislators, 130\n\n  Military, how divided, 194\n\n  Mitylene, an account of a dispute there, 150\n\n  Monarch, absolute, 100\n\n  Monarchies, their nature, 95, 96;\n      sometimes elective, 95;\n      sometimes hereditary, 95;\n      whence they sometimes arise, 146;\n      causes of corruption in them, 167;\n      how preserved, 173\n\n  Money, how it made its way into commerce, 16;\n      first weighed, 16;\n      afterwards stamped, 16;\n      its value dependent on agreement, 16;\n      how gained by exchange, 19\n\n  Money--getting considered at large, 17, 18\n\n  Monopolising gainful, 21; sometimes practised by cities, 21\n\n  Monopoly of iron in Sicily, a remarkable instance of the profit of it, 21\n\n  Music, how many species of it, in;\n      why a part of education, 240;\n      how far it should be taught, 242, 243;\n      professors of it considered as mean people, 244;\n      imitates the disposition of the mind, 246;\n      improves our manners, 246;\n      Lydian, softens the mind, 247;\n      pieces of, difficult in their execution, not to be taught to children, 249\n\n  Nature requires equality amongst equals, 101\n\n  Naval power should be regulated by the strength of the city, 212\n\n  Necessary parts of a city, what, 215\n\n  Nobles, the difference between them, no;\n      should take care of the poor, 193\n\n  Oath, an improper one in an oligarchy, 166\n\n  Officers of state, who they ought to be, 135;\n      how long to continue, 135;\n      who to choose them, 136\n\n  Offices, distinction between them, 67;\n      when subversive of the rights of the people, 130\n\n  Offspring, an instance of the likeness of, to the sire, 30\n\n  Oligarchies arise where the strength of the state consists in horse, no;\n      whence they arose, 142\n\n  Oligarchy admits not hired servants to be citizens, 75;\n      its object, 79;\n      what, 79, 81;\n      its definition, 112;\n      different sorts of, 117, 119;\n      its object, 122;\n      how it ought to be founded, 195\n\n  Onomacritus supposed to have drawn up laws, 64\n\n  Ostracism, why established, 93, 146;\n      its power, 93;\n      a weapon in the hand of sedition, 94\n\n  Painting, why it should be made a part of education, 241\n\n  Particulars, five, in which the rights of the people will be undermined, 130\n\n  Pausanias wanted to abolish the ephori, 143\n\n  People, how they should be made one, 35;\n      of Athens assume upon their victory over the Medes, 64;\n      what best to submit to a kingly government, 104;\n      to an aristocratic, 104;\n      to a free state, 104;\n      should be allowed the power of pardoning, not of condemning, 135\n\n  Periander's advice to Thrasy-bulus, 93, 169\n\n  Pericles introduces the paying of those who attended the court of justice, 64\n\n  Philolaus, a Theban legislator, quits his native country, 64\n\n  Phocea, an account of a dispute there, 150\n\n  Physician, his business, 86\n\n  Physicians, their mode of practice in Egypt, 98;\n      when ill consult others, 102\n\n  Pittacus, 65\n\n  Plato censured, 180\n\n  Poor excused from bearing arms and from gymnastic exercises in\n  an oligarchy, 131;\n      paid for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131\n\n  Power of the master, its object, 77\n\n  Power, supreme, where it ought to be lodged, 84;\n      why with the many, 85, 87\n\n  Powers of a state, different methods of delegating them to the citizens,\n  132-134\n\n  Preadvisers, court of, 135\n\n  Priesthood, to whom to be allotted, 217\n\n  Prisoners of war, whether they may be justly made slaves, 9\n\n  Private property not regulated the source of sedition, 42;\n      Phaleas would have it equal, 42;\n      how Phaleas would correct the irregularities of it, 43;\n      Plato would allow a certain difference in it, 43\n\n  Property, its nature, 12;\n      how it should be regulated, 32, 33;\n      the advantages of having it private, 34;\n      what quantity the public ought to have, 44;\n      ought not to be common, 219\n\n  Public assemblies, when subversive of the liberties of the people, 130\n\n  Public money, how to be divided, 193\n\n  Qualifications necessary for those who are to fill the first departments\n  in government, 164\n\n  Quality of a city, what meant by it, 129\n\n  Quantity, 129\n\n  Rest and peace the proper objects of the legislator, 230\n\n  Revolutions in a democracy, whence they arise, 152;\n      in an oligarchy, 156\n\n  Rich fined in an oligarchy for not bearing arms and attending the\n  gymnastic exercises, 131;\n      receive nothing for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131\n\n  Rights of a citizen, whether advantageous or not, 203\n\n  Seditions sometimes prevented by equality, 45;\n      their causes, 144-146;\n      how to be prevented, 163\n\n  Senate suits a democracy, 185\n\n  Shepherds compose the second-best democracy, 189\n\n  Slave, his nature and use, 6;\n      a chattel, 7;\n      by law, how, 9\n\n  Slavery not founded in nature but law, as some think, 6\n\n  Slaves, an inquiry into the virtues they are capable of, 23;\n      difficult to manage properly, 51;\n      their different sorts, 73\n\n  Society necessary to man, 77\n\n  Society, civil, the greatest blessing to man, 4;\n      different from a commercial intercourse, 82\n\n  Socrates, his mistakes on government, Book II. passim;\n      his division of the inhabitants, 38;\n      would have the women go to war, 38;\n      Aristotle's opinion of his discourses, 38;\n      his city would require a country of immeasurable extent, 39;\n      his comparison of the human species to different kinds of metals, 40;\n      his account of the different orders of men in a city imperfect, 3\n\n  Sojourners, their situation, 66\n\n  Solon's opinion of riches, 14;\n      law for restraining property, 43;\n      alters the Athenian government, 63\n\n  Soul by nature the governor over the body, and in what manner, 8;\n      of man how divided, 228, 231\n\n  Speech a proof that man was formed for society, 4\n\n  State, each, consists of a great number of parts, 109;\n      its disproportionate increase the cause of revolutions, 147;\n      firm, what, 159\n\n  Stealing, how to be prevented, 44\n\n  Submission to government, when it is slavery, 206\n\n  Supreme power should be ultimately vested in the laws, 101\n\n  Syracuse, the government of, languid, 151\n\n  Temperance in a man different from a woman, 74\n\n  Temples, how to be built, 223\n\n  Thales, his contrivance to get money, 21;\n      supposed to be the companion of Onomacritus, 64\n\n  Things necessary to be known for the management of domestic affairs, 19, 20;\n      necessary in the position of a city, 220\n\n  Tribunals, what different things they should have under their\n  jurisdictions, 137\n\n  Tyrannies, how established, 168;\n      how preserved, 174, 176;\n      of short duration, 180;\n      instances thereof, 180\n\n  Tyranny, what, 79;\n      not natural, 103;\n      whence it arises, 108;\n      treated of, 124;\n      contains all that is bad in all governments, 125\n\n  Tyrant, from whom usually chosen, 167;\n      his object, 168;\n      his guards, 168\n\n  Tyrants, many of them originally enjoyed only kingly power, 168;\n      the causes of their being conspired against, 169, 170;\n      always love the worst of men, 175\n\n  Uses of possessions, two, 15\n\n  Usury detested, 19\n\n  Venality to be guarded against, IDS\n\n  Village, what, 3\n\n  Virtue of a citizen has reference to the state, 71;\n      different in different governments, 71\n\n  Virtues different in different persons, 23, 24;\n      whether the same constitute a good man and a valuable citizen, 71\n\n  Walls necessary for a city, 222\n\n  War, what is gained by it in some degree a natural acquisition, 14;\n      not a final end, 205, 229\n\n  Wife, the proper government of, 22\n\n  Women, what their proper virtue, 23;\n      not to be indulged in improper liberties, 52;\n      had great influence at Lacedaemon, 52;\n      of great disservice to the Lacedemonians, 52;\n      why indulged by them, 53;\n      their proper time of marrying, 233;\n      how to be managed when with child, 234\n\n  Zaleucus, legislator of the Western Locrians, 64;\n      supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64","title":"Politics: A Treatise on Government","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":102339}