{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_68219/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_68219","id":"gutenberg_68219","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68219","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Nationalism","Political science"],"text":"CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,\n                          C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.\n                       London: FETTER LANE, E.C.\n                    Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.\n\n                             [Illustration]\n\n                       Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.\n                     New York: G. P. PUTNAM\u2019S SONS.\n              Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.\n\n                        [_All Rights reserved_]\n\n\n\n\n                               DECADENCE\n\n                        _HENRY SIDGWICK MEMORIAL\n                                LECTURE_\n\n                                   by\n\n                             THE RIGHT HON.\n                       ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.P.\n\n                     [DELIVERED AT NEWNHAM COLLEGE,\n                           JANUARY 25, 1908]\n\n\n                               CAMBRIDGE\n                        at the University Press\n                                 1908\n\n\n\n\n                               Cambridge:\n                       PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.\n                        AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.\n\n\n\n\nDECADENCE.\n\n\nI must begin what I have to say with a warning and an apology. I must\nwarn you that the present essay makes no pretence to be an adequate\ntreatment of some compact and limited theme; but rather resembles those\nwandering trains of thought, where we allow ourselves the luxury of\nputting wide-ranging questions, to which our ignorance forbids any\nconfident reply. I apologise for adopting a course which thus departs\nin some measure from familiar precedent. I admit its perils. But it is\njust possible that when a subject, or group of subjects, is of great\ninherent interest, even a tentative, and interrogative, treatment of it\nmay be worth attempting.\n\nMy subject, or at least my point of departure, is Decadence. I do\nnot mean the sort of decadence often attributed to certain phases of\nartistic or literary development, in which an overwrought technique,\nstraining to express sentiments too subtle or too morbid, is deemed to\nhave supplanted the direct inspiration of an earlier and a simpler age.\nWhether these autumnal glories, these splendours touched with death,\nare recurring phenomena in the literary cycle: whether, if they be,\nthey are connected with other forms of decadence, may be questions well\nworth asking and answering. But they are not the questions with which I\nam at present concerned. The decadence respecting which I wish to put\nquestions is not literary or artistic, it is political and national.\nIt is the decadence which attacks, or is alleged to attack, great\ncommunities and historic civilisations: which is to societies of men\nwhat senility is to man, and is often, like senility, the precursor and\nthe cause of final dissolution.\n\nIt is curious how deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse are traces\nof the conviction that childhood, maturity, and old age, are stages\nin the corporate, as they are in the individual, life. \u201cA young and\nvigorous nation,\u201d \u201ca decrepit and moribund civilisation\u201d--phrases like\nthese, and scores of others containing the same implication, come as\ntrippingly from the tongue as if they suggested no difficulty and\ncalled for no explanation. To Macaulay (unless I am pressing his famous\nmetaphor too far) it seemed natural that ages hence a young country\nlike New Zealand should be flourishing, but not less natural that an\nold country like England should have decayed. Berkeley, in a well-known\nstanza, tells how the drama of civilisation has slowly travelled\nwestwards to find its loftiest development, but also its final\ncatastrophe, in the New World. While every man who is weary, hopeless,\nor disillusioned talks as if he had caught these various diseases from\nthe decadent epoch in which he was born.\n\nBut why _should_ civilisations thus wear out and great communities\ndecay? and what evidence is there that in fact they do? These\nquestions, though I cannot give to them any conclusive answers, are\nof much more than a merely theoretic interest. For if current modes\nof speech take decadence more or less for granted, with still greater\nconfidence do they speak of Progress as assured. Yet if both are\nreal they can hardly be studied apart, they must evidently limit and\nqualify each other in actual experience, and they cannot be isolated in\nspeculation.\n\nThough antiquity, Pagan and Christian, took a different view, it\nseems easier, _a priori_, to understand Progress than Decadence. Even\nif the former be limited, as presumably it is, by the limitation of\nhuman faculty, we should expect the ultimate boundary to be capable of\nindefinite approach, and we should _not_ expect that any part of the\nroad towards it, once traversed, would have to be retraced. Even in the\norganic world, decay and death, familiar though they be, are phenomena\nthat call for scientific explanation. And Weismann has definitely asked\nhow it comes about that the higher organisms grow old and die, seeing\nthat old age and death are not inseparable characteristics of living\nprotoplasm, and that the simplest organisms suffer no natural decay,\nperishing, when they do perish, by accident, starvation, or specific\ndisease.\n\nThe answer he gives to his own question is that the death of the\nindividual is so useful to the race, that Natural Selection has, in\nall but the very lowest species, exterminated the potentially immortal.\n\nOne is tempted to enquire, whether this ingenious explanation could be\nso modified as to apply not merely to individuals but to communities.\nIs it needful for the cause of civilisation as a whole, that the\norganised embodiment of each particular civilisation, if and when\nits free development is arrested, should make room for younger and\nmore vigorous competitors? And if so can we find in Natural Selection\nthe mechanism by which the principle of decay and dissolution shall\nbe so implanted in the very nature of human associations that a due\nsuccession among them shall always be maintained?\n\nTo this second question the answer must, I think, be in the negative.\nThe struggle for existence between different races and different\nsocieties has admittedly played a great part in social development. But\nto extend Weismann\u2019s idea from the organic to the social world, would\nimply a prolonged competition between groups of communities in which\ndecadence was the rule, and groups in which it was not;--ending in the\nsurvival of the first, and the destruction of the second. The groups\nwhose members suffered periodical decadence and dissolution would be\nthe fittest to survive: just as, on Weismann\u2019s theory, those species\ngain in competitive efficiency whom death has unburdened of the old.\n\nFew will say that in the petty fragment of human history which alone\nis open to our inspection, there is satisfactory evidence of any such\nlong drawn process. Some may even be disposed to ask whether there\nis adequate evidence of such a phenomenon as decadence at all. And\nit must be acknowledged that the affirmative answer should be given\nwith caution. Evidently we must not consider a diminution of national\npower, whether relative or absolute, as constituting by itself a proof\nof national decadence. Holland is not decadent because her place in\nthe hierarchy of European Powers is less exalted than it was two\nhundred and fifty years ago. Spain was not necessarily decadent at\nthe end of the seventeenth century because she had exhausted herself\nin a contest far beyond her resources either in money or in men. It\nwould, I think, be rash even to say that Venice was decadent at the\nend of the eighteenth century, though the growth of other Powers, and\nthe diversion of the great trade routes, had shorn her of wealth and\ninternational influence. These are misfortunes which in the sphere of\nsociology correspond to accident or disease in the sphere of biology.\nAnd what we are concerned to know is whether in the sphere of sociology\nthere is also anything corresponding to the decay of old age--a decay\nwhich may be hastened by accident or disease, which must be ended by\naccident or disease, but is certainly to be distinguished from both.\n\nHowever this question should be answered the cases I have cited are\nsufficient to shew where the chief difficulty of the enquiry lies.\nDecadence, even if it be a reality, never acts in isolation. It is\nalways complicated with, and often acts through, other more obvious\ncauses. It is always therefore possible to argue that to these causes,\nand not to the more subtle and elusive influences collectively\ndescribed as \u2019decadence,\u2019 the decline and fall of great communities is\nreally due.\n\nYet there are historic tragedies which (as it seems to me) do most\nobstinately refuse to be thus simply explained. It is in vain that\nhistorians enumerate the public calamities which preceded, and no doubt\ncontributed to, the final catastrophe. Civil dissensions, military\ndisasters, pestilences, famines, tyrants, tax-gatherers, growing\nburdens, and waning wealth--the gloomy catalogue is unrolled before our\neyes, yet somehow it does not in all cases wholly satisfy us: we feel\nthat some of these diseases are of a kind which a vigorous body politic\nshould easily be able to survive, that others are secondary symptoms of\nsome obscurer malady, and that in neither case do they supply us with\nthe full explanations of which we are in search.\n\nConsider for instance the long agony and final destruction of Roman\nImperialism in the West, the most momentous catastrophe of which we\nhave historic record. It has deeply stirred the imagination of mankind,\nit has been the theme of great historians, it has been much explained\nby political philosophers, yet who feels that either historians or\nphilosophers have laid bare the inner workings of the drama? Rome\nfell, and great was the fall of it. But why it fell, by what secret\nmines its defences were breached, and what made its garrison so\nfaint-hearted and ineffectual--this is not so clear.\n\nIn order to measure adequately the difficulty of the problem let us\nabstract our minds from historical details and compare the position of\nthe Empire about the middle of the second century, with its position\nin the middle of the third, or again at the end of the fourth, and\nask of what forces history gives us an account, sufficient in these\nperiods to effect so mighty a transformation. Or, still better, imagine\nan observer equipped with our current stock of political wisdom,\ntransported to Rome in the reign of Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius,\nand in ignorance of the event, writing letters to the newspapers on the\nfuture destinies of the Empire. What would his forecast be?\n\nWe might suppose him to examine, in the first place, the military\nposition of the State, its probable enemies, its capacities for\ndefence. He would note that only on its eastern boundary was there\nan organised military Power capable of meeting Rome on anything like\nequal terms, and this only in the regions adjacent to their common\nfrontier. For the rest he would discover no civilised enemy along\nthe southern boundary to the Atlantic or along its northern boundary\nfrom the Black Sea to the German Ocean. Warlike tribes indeed he\nwould find in plenty: difficult to crush within the limits of their\nnative forests and morasses, formidable it may be in a raid, but\nwithout political cohesion, military unity, or the means of military\nconcentration;--embarrassing therefore rather than dangerous.\nIf reminded of Varus and his lost legions, he would ask of what\nimportance, in the story of a world-power could be the loss of a\nfew thousand men surprised at a distance from their base amid the\nentanglements of a difficult and unknown country. Never, it would seem,\nwas Empire more fortunately circumstanced for purposes of home defence.\n\nBut (it might be thought) the burden of securing frontiers of such\nlength, even against merely tribal assaults, though easy from a\nstrictly military point of view, might prove too heavy to be long\nendured. Yet the military forces scattered through the Roman Empire,\nthough apparently adequate in the days of her greatness would,\naccording to modern ideas, seem hardly sufficient for purposes of\npolice, let alone defence. An army corps or less was deemed enough\nto preserve what are now mighty kingdoms, from internal disorder and\nexternal aggression. And if we compare with this the contributions,\neither in the way of money or of men, exacted from the territories\nsubject to Rome before the Empire came into being, or at any period of\nthe world\u2019s history since it dissolved away, the comparison must surely\nbe entirely in favour of the Empire.\n\nBut burdens which seem light, if measured by area, may be heavy if\nmeasured by ability to pay. Yet when has ability to pay been greater\nin the regions bordering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean than\nunder the Roman Empire? Travel round it in imagination, eastward\nfrom the Atlantic coast of Morocco till returning westward you reach\nthe head of the Adriatic Gulf, and you will have skirted a region,\nstill of immense natural wealth, once filled with great cities, and\nfertile farms, better governed during the Empire than it has ever been\ngoverned since (at least till Algeria became French and Egypt British);\nincluding among its provinces what were great states before the Roman\nrule, and have been great states since that rule decayed, divided\nby no international jealousies, oppressed by no fear of conquest,\nenterprising, cultured. Remember that to estimate its area of taxation\nand recruiting you must add to these regions Bulgaria, Servia, much\nof Austria and Bavaria, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain,\nand most of Britain, and you have conditions favourable to military\nstrength and economic prosperity rarely equalled in the modern world\nand never in the ancient.\n\nOur observer however might, very rightly, feel that a far-spreading\nEmpire like that of Rome, including regions profoundly differing in\nrace, history and religion, would be liable to other dangers than\nthose which arise from mere external aggression. One of the first\nquestions, therefore, which he would be disposed to ask, is whether\nso heterogeneous a state was not in perpetual danger of dissolution\nthrough the disintegrating influence of national sentiments. He would\nlearn probably, with a strong feeling of surprise, that with the single\nexception of the Jews, the constituent nations, once conquered, were\nnot merely content to belong to the Empire, but could scarcely imagine\nthemselves doing anything else: that the Imperial system appealed, not\nmerely to the material needs of the component populations, but also to\ntheir imagination and their loyalty; that Gaul, Spain, and Britain,\nthough but recently forced within the pale of civilisation, were as\nfaithful to the Imperial ideal as the Greek of Athens or the Hellenised\nOrientals of Syria; and that neither historic memories, nor local\npatriotism, neither disputed succession, nor public calamities, nor\nadministrative divisions, ever really shook the sentiment in favour of\nImperial Unity. There might be more than one Emperor: but there could\nonly be one Empire. Howsoever our observer might disapprove of the\nImperial system he would therefore have to admit that the Empire, with\nall its shortcomings, its absolutism and its bureaucracy, had solved\nmore successfully than any government, before or since, the problem of\ndevising a scheme which equally satisfied the sentiments of East and\nWest; which respected local feelings, encouraged local government; in\nwhich the Celt, the Iberian, the Berber, the Egyptian, the Asiatic,\nthe Greek, the Illyrian, the Italian were all at home, and which,\nthough based on conquest, was accepted by the conquered as the natural\norganisation of the civilised world.\n\nRome had thus unique sources of strength. What sources of weakness\nwould our observer be likely to detect behind her imposing exterior?\nThe diminution of population is the one which has (rightly I think)\nmost impressed historians: and it is difficult to resist the evidence,\neither of the fact, or of its disastrous consequences. I hesitate\nindeed to accept without qualification the accounts given us of the\nprogressive decay of the native Italian stock from the days of the\nGracchi to the disintegration of the Empire in the West: and when we\nread how the dearth of men was made good (in so far as it was made\ngood) by the increasing inflow of slaves and adventurers from every\ncorner of the known world, one wonders _whose_ sons they were who, for\nthree centuries and more, so brilliantly led the van of modern European\nculture, as it emerged from the darkness of the early Middle Ages.\nPassing by such collateral issues, however, and admitting depopulation\nto have been both real and serious, we may well ask whether it was not\nthe result of Roman decadence rather than its cause, the symptom of\nsome deep-seated social malady, not its origin. We are not concerned\nhere with the aristocracy of Rome, nor even with the people of Italy.\nWe are concerned with the Empire. We are not concerned with a passing\nphase or fashion, but with a process which seems to have gone on with\nincreasing rapidity, through good times as well as bad, till the final\ncataclysm. A local disease might have a local explanation, a transient\none might be due to a chance coincidence. But what can we say of a\ndisease which was apparently co-extensive with Imperial civilisation in\narea, and which exceeded it in duration?\n\nI find it hard to believe that either a selfish aversion to matrimony\nor a mystical admiration for celibacy, though at certain periods the\none was common in Pagan and the other in Christian circles, were\nmore than elements in the complex of causes by which the result was\nbrought about. Like the plagues which devastated Europe in the second\nand third centuries, they must have greatly aggravated the evil, but\nthey are hardly sufficient to account for it. Nor yet can we find\nan explanation of it in the discouragement, the sense of impending\ndoom, by which men\u2019s spirits were oppressed long before the Imperial\npower began visibly to wane, for this is one of the things which, if\nhistorically true, does itself most urgently require explanation.\n\nIt may be however that our wandering politician would be too well\ngrounded in Malthusian economics to regard a diminution of population\nas in itself an overwhelming calamity. And if he were pressed to\ndescribe the weak spots in the Empire of the Antonines he would be\ndisposed, I think, to look for them on the ethical rather than on the\nmilitary, the economic, or the strictly political sides of social life.\nHe would be inclined to say, as in effect Mr Lecky does say, that in\nthe institution of slavery, in the brutalities of the gladiatorial\nshows, in the gratuitous distribution of bread to the urban mobs, are\nto be found the corrupting influences which first weakened and then\ndestroyed the vigour of the State.\n\nI confess that I cannot easily accept this analysis of the facts. As\nregards the gladiatorial shows, even had they been universal throughout\nthe Empire, and had they flourished more rankly as its power declined,\nI should still have questioned the propriety of attributing too\nfar-reaching effects to such a cause. The Romans were brutal while they\nwere conquering the world: its conquest enabled them to be brutal with\nostentation; but we must not measure the ill consequences of their\nbarbaric tastes by the depth of our own disgusts, nor assume the Gothic\ninvasions to be the natural and fitting Nemesis of so much spectacular\nshedding of innocent blood.\n\nAs for the public distributions of corn, one would wish to have more\nevidence as to its social effects. But even without fully accepting the\ntheory of the latest Roman historian, who believes that, under the then\nprevailing conditions of transport, no very large city could exist in\nAntiquity, if the supply of its food were left to private enterprise,\nwe cannot seriously regard this practice, strange as it seems to us, as\nan important element in the problem. Granting for the sake of argument\nthat it demoralised the mob of Rome, it must be remembered that Rome\nwas not the Empire, nor did the mob of Rome govern the Empire, as once\nit had governed the Republic.\n\nSlavery is a far more important matter. The magnitude of its effects on\nancient societies, difficult as these are to disentangle, can hardly be\nexaggerated. But with what plausibility can we find in it the cause of\nRome\u2019s decline, seeing that it was the concomitant also of its rise?\nHow can that which in Antiquity was common to every state, have this\nexceptional and malign influence upon one? It would not in any case be\neasy to accept such a theory; but surely it becomes impossible when we\nbear in mind the enormous improvement effected under the Empire both in\nthe law and the practice of slavery. Great as were its evils, they were\ndiminishing evils--less ruinous as time went on to the character of the\nmaster, less painful and degrading to the slave. Who can believe that\nthis immemorial custom could, in its decline, destroy a civilisation,\nwhich, in its vigour, it had helped to create?\n\nOf course our observer would see much in the social system he was\nexamining which he would rightly regard as morally detestable and\npolitically pernicious. But the real question before him would not be\n\u2018are these things good or bad?\u2019 but \u2018are these things getting better\nor getting worse?\u2019 And surely in most cases he would be obliged to\nanswer \u2018getting better.\u2019 Many things moreover would come under his\nnotice fitted to move his admiration in a much less qualified manner.\nFew governments have been more anxious to foster an alien and higher\nculture, than was the Roman Government to foster Greek civilisation.\nIn so far as Rome inherited what Alexander conquered, it carried out\nthe ideal which Alexander had conceived. In few periods have the rich\nbeen readier to spend of their private fortunes on public objects.\nThere never was a community in which associations for every purpose of\nmutual aid or enjoyment sprang more readily into existence. There never\nwas a military monarchy less given to wars of aggression. There never\nwas an age in which there was a more rapid advance in humanitarian\nideals, or a more anxious seeking after spiritual truth. There was much\ndiscussion, there was, apart from politics, but little intolerance.\nEducation was well endowed, and its professors held in high esteem.\nPhysical culture was cared for. Law was becoming scientific. Research\nwas not forgotten. What more could be reasonably expected?\n\nAccording to our ordinary methods of analysis it is not easy to say\nwhat more _could_ be reasonably expected. But plainly much more was\nrequired. In a few generations from the time of which I am speaking\nthe Empire lost its extraordinary power of assimilating alien and\nbarbaric elements. It became too feeble either to absorb or to expel\nthem: and the immigrants who in happier times might have bestowed\nrenewed vigour on the commonwealth, became, in the hour of its decline,\na weakness and a peril. Poverty grew as population shrank. Municipal\noffice, once so eagerly desired, became the most cruel of burdens.\nAssociations connected with industry or commerce, which began by freely\nexchanging public service for public privilege, found their members\nsubjected to ever increasing obligations, for the due performance of\nwhich they and their children were liable in person and in property.\nThus while Christianity, and the other forces that made for mercy, were\ndiminishing the slavery of the slave, the needs of the Bureaucracy\ncompelled it to trench ever more and more upon the freedom of the\nfree. It was each man\u2019s duty (so ran the argument) to serve the\ncommonwealth: he could best serve the commonwealth by devoting himself\nto his calling if it were one of public necessity: this duty he should\nbe required under penalties to perform, and to devote if necessary to\nits performance, labour to the limits of endurance, fortune to the\nlast shilling, and family to the remotest generation. Through this\ncrude experiment in socialism, the civilised world seemed to be rapidly\nmoving towards a system of universal caste, imposed by no immemorial\ncustom, supported by no religious scruple, but forced on an unwilling\npeople by the Emperor\u2019s edict and the executioner\u2019s lash.\n\nThese things have severally and collectively been regarded as the\ncauses why in the West the Imperial system so quickly crumbled into\nchaos. And so no doubt they were. But they obviously require themselves\nto be explained by causes more general and more remote; and what were\nthese? If I answer as I feel disposed to answer--Decadence--you will\nproperly ask how the unknown becomes less unknown merely by receiving\na name. I reply that if there be indeed subtle changes in the social\ntissues of old communities which make them, as time goes on, less\nresistant to the external attacks and the internal disturbances by\nwhich all communities are threatened, overt recognition of the fact\nis a step in advance. We have not an idea of what \u2018life\u2019 consists in,\nbut if on that account we were to abstain from using the term, we\nshould not be better but worse equipped for dealing with the problems\nof physiology; while on the other hand if we could translate life\ninto terms of matter and motion to-morrow, we should still be obliged\nto use the word in order to distinguish the material movements which\nconstitute life or exhibit it, from those which do not. In like manner\nwe are ignorant of the inner character of the cell changes which\nproduce senescence. But should we be better fitted to form a correct\nconception of the life-history of complex organisms if we refused to\nrecognise any cause of death but accident or disease? I admit, of\ncourse, that the term \u2018decadence\u2019 is less precise than \u2018old age\u2019:\nas sociology deals with organisms far less definite than biology. I\nadmit also that it explains nothing. If its use is to be justified at\nall, the justification must depend not on the fact that it supplies an\nexplanation, but on the fact that it rules out explanations which are\nobvious but inadequate. And this may be a service of some importance.\nThe facile generalisations with which we so often season the study of\ndry historic fact; the habits of political discussion which induce us\nto catalogue for purposes of debate the outward signs that distinguish\n(as we are prone to think) the standing from the falling state, hide\nthe obscurer, but more potent, forces which silently prepare the\nfate of empires. National character is subtle and elusive; not to be\nexpressed in statistics nor measured by the rough methods which suffice\nthe practical moralist or statesman. And when through an ancient and\nstill powerful state there spreads a mood of deep discouragement, when\nthe reaction against recurring ills grows feebler, and the ship rises\nless buoyantly to each succeeding wave, when learning languishes,\nenterprise slackens, and vigour ebbs away, then, as I think, there is\npresent some process of social degeneration, which we must perforce\nrecognise, and which, pending a satisfactory analysis, may conveniently\nbe distinguished by the name of \u2018decadence.\u2019\n\nI am well aware that though the space I have just devoted to the\nillustration of my theme provided by Roman history is out of all\nproportion to the general plan of this address, yet the treatment of\nit is inadequate and perhaps unconvincing. But those who are most\nreluctant to admit that decay, as distinguished from misfortune, may\nlower the general level of civilisation, can hardly deny that in many\ncases that level may for indefinite periods shew no tendency to rise.\nIf decadence be unknown, is not progress exceptional? Consider the\nchanging politics of the unchanging East[1]. Is it not true that there,\nwhile wars and revolutions, dynastic and religious, have shattered\nancient states and brought new ones into being, every community, as\nsoon as it has risen above the tribal and nomad condition, adopts\nwith the rarest exceptions a form of government which, from its\nvery generality in Eastern lands, we habitually call an \u2018oriental\ndespotism\u2019? We may crystallise and re-crystallise a soluble salt as\noften as we please, the new crystals will always resemble the old ones.\nThe crystals, indeed, may be of different sizes, their component\nmolecules may occupy different positions within the crystalline\nstructure, but the structure itself will be of one immutable pattern.\nSo it is, or seems to be, with these oriental states. They rise, in\nturn, upon the ruins of their predecessors, themselves predestined\nto perish by a like fate. But whatever their origin or history, they\nare always either autocracies or aggregations of autocracies; and no\ndifferences of race, of creed, or of language seem sufficient to vary\nthe violent monotony of their internal history. In the eighteenth\ncentury theorists were content to attribute the political servitude of\nthe Eastern world to the unscrupulous machinations of tyrants and their\ntools. And such explanations are good as far as they go. But this, in\ntruth, is not very far. Intrigue, assassination, ruthless repression,\nthe whole machinery of despotism supply particular explanations of\nparticular incidents. They do not supply the general explanation of\nthe general phenomenon. They tell you how this ruler or that obtained\nabsolute power. They do not tell you why every ruler is absolute.\nNor can I furnish the answer. The fact remains that over large and\nrelatively civilised portions of the world popular government is\nprofoundly unpopular, in the sense that it is no natural or spontaneous\nsocial growth. Political absolutism not political freedom is the\nfamiliar weed of the country. Despots change but despotism remains: and\nif through alien influences, like those exercised by Greek cities in\nAsia, or by British rule in India, the type is modified, it may well be\ndoubted whether the modification could long survive the moment when its\nsustaining cause was withdrawn.\n\nNow it would almost seem as if in lands where this political type was\nnormal a certain level of culture (not of course the same in each\ncase) could not permanently be overpassed. If under the excitement of\nreligion or conquest, or else through causes more complicated and more\nobscure, this limit has sometimes been left behind, reaction has always\nfollowed, and decadence set in. Many people indeed, as I have already\nobserved, take this as a matter of course. It seems to them the most\nnatural thing in the world that the glories of the Eastern Khalifate\nshould decay, and that the Moors in Morocco should lose even the memory\nof the learning and the arts possessed but three centuries ago by the\nMoors in Spain. To me it seems mysterious. But whether it be easy of\ncomprehension or difficult, if only it be true, does it not furnish\nfood for disquieting reflexion? If there are whole groups of nations\ncapable on their own initiative of a certain measure of civilisation,\nbut capable apparently of no more, and if below them again there are\n(as I suppose) other races who seem incapable of either creating a\ncivilisation of their own, or of preserving unaided a civilisation\nimpressed upon them from without, by what right do we assume that\nno impassable limits bar the path of Western progress? Those limits\nmay not yet be in sight. Surely they are not. But does not a survey\nof history suggest that somewhere in the dim future they await our\napproach?\n\nIt may be replied that the history of Rome, on which I dwelt a moment\nago, shews that arrested progress, and even decadence, may be but the\nprelude to a new period of vigorous growth. So that even those races\nor nations which seem frozen into eternal immobility may base upon\nexperience their hopes of an awakening spring.\n\nI am not sure, however, that this is the true interpretation of the\nfacts. There is no spectacle indeed in all history more impressive\nthan the thick darkness settling down over Western Europe, blotting\nout all but a faint and distorted vision of Graeco-Roman culture, and\nthen, as it slowly rises, unveiling the variety and rich promise of the\nmodern world. But I do not think we should make this unique phenomenon\nsupport too weighty a load of theory. I should not infer from it that\nwhen some wave of civilisation has apparently spent its force, we\nhave a right to regard its withdrawing sweep as but the prelude to a\nnew advance. I should rather conjecture that in this particular case\nwe should find, among other subtle causes of decadence, some obscure\ndisharmony between the Imperial system and the temperament of the West,\nundetected even by those who suffered from it. That system, though\naccepted with contentment and even with pride, though in the days of\nits greatness it brought civilisation, commerce, and security in its\ntrain, must surely have lacked some elements which are needed to foster\namong Teutons, Celts, and Iberians the qualities, whatever these may\nbe, on which sustained progress depends. It was perhaps too oriental\nfor the occident, and it certainly became more oriental as time went\non. In the East it was, comparatively speaking, successful. If there\nwas no progress, decadence was slow; and but for what Western Europe\ndid, and what it failed to do, during the long struggle with militant\nMahommedanism, there might still be an Empire in the East, largely\nAsiatic in population, Christian in religion, Greek in culture, Roman\nby political descent.\n\nHad this been the course of events large portions of mankind would\ndoubtless have been much better governed than they are. It is not so\nclear that they would have been more \u2018progressive.\u2019 Progress is with\nthe West: with communities of the European type. And if _their_ energy\nof development is some day to be exhausted, who can believe that there\nremains any external source from which it can be renewed? Where are the\nuntried races competent to construct out of the ruined fragments of our\ncivilisation a new and better habitation for the spirit of man? They\ndo not exist: and if the world is again to be buried under a barbaric\nflood, it will not be like that which fertilised, though it first\ndestroyed, the western provinces of Rome, but like that which in Asia\nsubmerged for ever the last traces of Hellenic culture.\n\nWe are thus brought back to the question I put a few moments since.\nWhat grounds are there for supposing that we can escape the fate to\nwhich other races have had to submit? If for periods which, measured\non the historic scale, are of great duration, communities which have\nadvanced to a certain point appear able to advance no further; if\ncivilisations wear out, and races become effete, why should we expect\nto progress indefinitely, why for us alone is the doom of man to be\nreversed?\n\nTo these questions I have no very satisfactory answers to give, nor\ndo I believe that our knowledge of national or social psychology\nis sufficient to make a satisfactory answer possible. Some purely\ntentative observations on the point may, however, furnish a fitting\nconclusion to an address which has been tentative throughout, and aims\nrather at suggesting trains of thought, than at completing them.\n\nI assume that the factors which combine to make each generation what\nit is at the moment of its entrance into adult life are in the main\ntwofold. The one produces the raw material of society, the process\nof manufacture is effected by the other. The first is physiological\ninheritance, the second is the inheritance partly of external\nconditions of life, partly of beliefs[2], traditions, sentiments,\ncustoms, laws, and organisation--all that constitute the social\nsurroundings in which men grow up to maturity.\n\nI hazard no conjecture as to the share borne respectively by these two\nkinds of cause in producing their joint result. Nor are we likely to\nobtain satisfactory evidence on the subject till, in the interests of\nscience, two communities of different blood and different traditions\nconsent to exchange their children at birth by a universal process\nof reciprocal adoption. But even in the absence of so heroic an\nexperiment, it seems safe to say that the mobility which makes possible\neither progress or decadence, resides rather in the causes grouped\nunder the second head than in the physiological material on which\neducation, in the widest sense of that ambiguous term, has got to\nwork. If, as I suppose, acquired qualities are not inherited, the only\ncauses which could fundamentally modify the physiological character of\nany particular community are its intermixture with alien races through\nslavery, conquest, or immigration; or else new conditions which varied\nthe relative proportion in which different sections of the population\ncontributed to its total numbers. If, for example, the more successful\nmembers of the community had smaller families than the less successful;\nor if medical administration succeeded in extinguishing maladies to\nwhich persons of a particular constitution were specially liable; or\nif one strain in a mixed race had a larger birth rate than another--in\nthese cases and in others like them, there would doubtless be a change\nin the physiological factor of national character. But such changes\nare not likely, I suppose, to be considerable, except, perhaps, those\ndue to the mixture of races;--and that only in new countries whose\neconomic opportunities tempt immigrants widely differing in culture,\nand in capacity for culture, from those whose citizenship they propose\nto share.\n\nThe flexible element in any society, that which is susceptible of\nprogress or decadence, must therefore be looked for rather in the\nphysical and psychical conditions affecting the life of its component\nunits, than in their inherited constitution. This last rather supplies\na limit to variations than an element which does itself vary: though\nfrom this point of view its importance is capital. I at least find\nit quite impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely\ndifferent races with an identical environment, political, religious,\neducational, what you will, can ever make them alike. They have been\ndifferent and unequal since history began; different and unequal they\nare destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration.\n\nBut though the advance of each community is thus limited by its\ninherited aptitudes, I do not suppose that those limits have ever been\nreached by its unaided efforts. In the cases where a forward movement\nhas died away, the pause must in part be due to arrested development\nin the variable, not to a fixed resistance in the unchanging factor\nof national character. Either external conditions are unfavourable;\nor the sentiments, customs and beliefs which make society possible\nhave hardened into shapes which make its further self-development\nimpossible; or through mere weariness of spirit the community resigns\nitself to a contented, or perhaps a discontented, stagnation; or it\nshatters itself in pursuit of impossible ideals, or for other and\nobscurer reasons, flags in its endeavours, and falls short of possible\nachievement.\n\nNow I am quite unable to offer any such general analysis of the causes\nby which these hindrances to progress are produced or removed as would\nfurnish a reply to my question. But it may be worth noting that a\nsocial force has come into being, new in magnitude if not in kind,\nwhich must favourably modify such hindrances as come under all but the\nlast of the divisions in which I have roughly arranged them. This force\nis the modern alliance between pure science and industry. That on this\nwe must mainly rely for the improvement of the material conditions\nunder which societies live is in my opinion obvious, although no one\nwould conjecture it from a historic survey of political controversy.\nIts direct moral effects are less obvious; indeed there are many most\nexcellent people who would altogether deny their existence. To regard\nit as a force fitted to rouse and sustain the energies of nations\nwould seem to them absurd: for this would be to rank it with those\nother forces which have most deeply stirred the emotions of great\ncommunities, have urged them to the greatest exertions, have released\nthem most effectually from the benumbing fetters of merely personal\npreoccupations,--with religion, patriotism, and politics. Industrial\nexpansion under scientific inspiration, so far from deserving praise\nlike this, is in their view, at best, but a new source of material\nwell-being, at worst the prolific parent of physical ugliness in\nmany forms, machine made wares, smoky cities, polluted rivers, and\ndesecrated landscapes,--appropriately associated with materialism and\ngreed.\n\nI believe this view to be utterly misleading, confounding accident with\nessence, transient accompaniments with inseparable characteristics.\nShould we dream of thus judging the other great social forces of which\nI have spoken? Are we to ignore what religion has done for the world\nbecause it has been the fruitful excuse for the narrowest bigotries\nand the most cruel persecutions? Are we to underrate the worth of\npolitics, because politics may mean no more than the mindless clash of\nfactions, or the barren exchange of one set of tyrants or jobbers for\nanother? Is patriotism to be despised because its manifestations have\nbeen sometimes vulgar, sometimes selfish, sometimes brutal, sometimes\ncriminal? Estimates like these seem to me worse than useless. All great\nsocial forces are not merely capable of perversion, they are constantly\nperverted. Yet were they eliminated from our social system, were each\nman, acting on the advice, which Voltaire gave but never followed, to\ndisinterest himself of all that goes on beyond the limits of his own\ncabbage garden, decadence I take it, would have already far advanced.\n\nBut if the proposition I am defending may be wrongly criticised, it\nis still more likely to be wrongly praised. To some it will commend\nitself as a eulogy on an industrial as distinguished from a military\ncivilisation: as a suggestion that in the peaceful pursuit of wealth\nthere is that which of itself may constitute a valuable social tonic.\nThis may be true, but it is not my contention. In talking of the\nalliance between industry and science my emphasis is at least as much\non the word science as on the word industry. I am not concerned now\nwith the proportion of the population devoted to productive labour,\nor the esteem in which they are held. It is on the effects which I\nbelieve are following, and are going in yet larger measure to follow,\nfrom the intimate relation between scientific discovery and industrial\nefficiency, that I most desire to insist.\n\nDo you then, it will be asked, so highly rate the utilitarian aspect\nof research as to regard it as a source, not merely of material\nconvenience, but of spiritual elevation? Is it seriously to be ranked\nwith religion and patriotism as an important force for raising men\u2019s\nlives above what is small, personal, and self-centred? Does it not\nrather pervert pure knowledge into a new contrivance for making money,\nand give a fresh triumph to the \u2018growing materialism of the age\u2019?\n\nI do not myself believe that this age is either less spiritual or more\nsordid than its predecessors. I believe, indeed, precisely the reverse.\nBut however this may be, is it not plain that if a society is to be\nmoved by the remote speculations of isolated thinkers it can only\nbe on condition that their isolation is not complete? Some point of\ncontact they must have with the world in which they live, and if their\ninfluence is to be based on widespread sympathy, the contact must be\nin a region where there can be, if not full mutual comprehension, at\nleast a large measure of practical agreement and willing co-operation.\nPhilosophy has never touched the mass of men except through religion.\nAnd, though the parallel is not complete, it is safe to say that\nscience will never touch them unaided by its practical applications.\nIts wonders may be catalogued for purposes of education, they may be\nillustrated by arresting experiments, by numbers and magnitudes which\nstartle or fatigue the imagination; but they will form no familiar\nportion of the intellectual furniture of ordinary men unless they be\nconnected, however remotely, with the conduct of ordinary life. Critics\nhave made merry over the naive self-importance which represented\nman as the centre and final cause of the universe, and conceived the\nstupendous mechanism of nature as primarily designed to satisfy his\nwants and minister to his entertainment. But there is another, and an\nopposite, danger into which it is possible to fall. The material world,\nhowsoever it may have gained in sublimity, has, under the touch of\nscience, lost (so to speak) in domestic charm. Except where it affects\nthe immediate needs of organic life, it may seem so remote from the\nconcerns of men that in the majority it will rouse no curiosity, while\nof those who are fascinated by its marvels, not a few will be chilled\nby its impersonal and indifferent immensity.\n\nFor this latter mood only religion or religious philosophy can supply\na cure. But for the former, the appropriate remedy is the perpetual\nstimulus which the influence of science on the business of mankind\noffers to their sluggish curiosity. And even now I believe this\ninfluence to be underrated. If in the last hundred years the whole\nmaterial setting of civilised life has altered, we owe it neither to\npoliticians nor to political institutions. We owe it to the combined\nefforts of those who have advanced science and those who have applied\nit. If our outlook upon the Universe has suffered modifications in\ndetail so great and so numerous that they amount collectively to a\nrevolution, it is to men of science we owe it, not to theologians or\nphilosophers. On these indeed new and weighty responsibilities are\nbeing cast. They have to harmonise and to coordinate, to prevent the\nnew from being one-sided, to preserve the valuable essence of what is\nold. But science is the great instrument of social change, all the\ngreater because its object is not change but knowledge; and its silent\nappropriation of this dominant function, amid the din of political and\nreligious strife, is the most vital of all the revolutions which have\nmarked the development of modern civilisation.\n\nIt may seem fanciful to find in a single recent aspect of this\nrevolution an influence which resembles religion or patriotism in\nits appeals to the higher side of ordinary characters--especially\nsince we are accustomed to regard the appropriation by industry of\nscientific discoveries merely as a means of multiplying the material\nconveniences of life. But if it be remembered that this process brings\nvast sections of every industrial community into admiring relation\nwith the highest intellectual achievement, and the most disinterested\nsearch for truth; that those who live by ministering to the common\nwants of average humanity lean for support on those who search among\nthe deepest mysteries of Nature; that their dependence is rewarded\nby growing success; that success gives in its turn an incentive to\nindividual effort in no wise to be measured by personal expectation of\ngain; that the energies thus aroused may affect the whole character\nof the community, spreading the beneficent contagion of hope and high\nendeavour through channels scarcely known, to workers[3] in fields\nthe most remote; if all this be borne in mind it may perhaps seem not\nunworthy of the place I have assigned to it.\n\nBut I do not offer this speculation, whatever be its worth, as an\nanswer to my original question. It is but an aid to optimism, not a\nreply to pessimism. Such a reply can only be given by a sociology\nwhich has arrived at scientific conclusions on the life-history of\ndifferent types of society, and has risen above the empirical and\nmerely interrogative point of view which, for want of a better, I\nhave adopted in this address. No such sociology exists at present, or\nseems likely soon to be created. In its absence the conclusions at\nwhich I provisionally arrive are that we cannot regard decadence and\narrested development as less normal in human communities than progress;\nthough the point at which the energy of advance is exhausted (if,\nand when it is reached) varies in different races and civilisations:\nthat the internal causes by which progress is encouraged, hindered,\nor reversed, lie to a great extent beyond the field of ordinary\npolitical discussion, and are not easily expressed in current political\nterminology: that the influence which a superior civilisation,\nwhether acting by example or imposed by force, may have in advancing\nan inferior one, though often beneficent, is not likely to be self\nsupporting; its withdrawal will be followed by decadence, unless the\ncharacter of the civilisation be in harmony both with the acquired\ntemperament and the innate capacities of those who have been induced to\naccept it: that as regards those nations which still advance in virtue\nof their own inherent energies, though time has brought perhaps new\ncauses of disquiet, it has brought also new grounds of hope; and that\nwhatever be the perils in front of us, there are, so far, no symptoms\neither of pause or of regression in the onward movement which for more\nthan a thousand years has been characteristic of Western civilisation.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES:\n\n[1] The \u2018East\u2019 is a term most loosely used. It does not here include\nChina and Japan and _does_ include parts of Africa. The observations\nwhich follow have no reference either to the Jews or to the commercial\naristocracies of Ph\u0153nician origin.\n\n[2] Beliefs include knowledge.\n\n[3] This remark arises out of a train of thought suggested by two\nquestions which are very pertinent to the subject of the Address.\n\n(1) Is a due succession of men above the average in original capacity\nnecessary to maintain social progress? and\n\n(2) If so, can we discover any law according to which such men are\nproduced?\n\nI entertain no doubt myself that the answer to the first question\nshould be in the affirmative. Democracy is an excellent thing; but,\nthough quite consistent with progress, it is not progressive _per se_.\nIts value is regulative not dynamic; and if it meant (as it never does)\nsubstantial uniformity, instead of legal equality, we should become\nfossilised at once. Movement may be controlled or checked by the many;\nit is initiated and made effective by the few. If (for the sake of\nillustration) we suppose mental capacity in all its many forms to be\nmensurable and commensurable, and then imagine two societies possessing\nthe same average capacity--but an average made up in one case of equal\nunits, in the other of a majority slightly below the average and a\nminority much above it, few could doubt that the second, not the first,\nwould show the greatest aptitude for movement. It might go wrong, but\nit would go.\n\nThe second question--how is this originality (in its higher\nmanifestations called genius) effectively produced? is not so simple.\n\nExcluding education in its narrowest sense--which few would regard as\nhaving much to do with the matter--the only alternatives seem to be the\nfollowing:\n\nOriginal capacity may be no more than one of the ordinary variations\nincidental to heredity. A community may breed a minority thus\nexceptionally gifted, as it breeds a minority of men over six feet six.\nThere may be an average decennial output of congenital geniuses as\nthere is an average decennial output of congenital idiots--though the\nnumber is likely to be smaller.\n\nBut if this be the sole cause of the phenomenon, why does the same race\n_apparently_ produce many men of genius in one generation and few in\nanother? Why are years of abundance so often followed by long periods\nof sterility?\n\nThe most obvious explanation of this would seem to be that in some\nperiods circumstances give many openings to genius, in some periods\nfew. The genius is constantly produced; but it is only occasionally\nrecognised.\n\nIn this there must be some truth. A mob orator in Turkey, a religious\nreformer in seventeenth century Spain, a military leader in the\nSandwich islands, would hardly get their chance. Yet the theory of\nopportunity can scarcely be reckoned a complete explanation. For it\nleaves unaccounted for the _variety_ of genius which has in some\ncountries marked epochs of vigorous national development. Athens in\nthe fifth and fourth centuries, Florence in the fifteenth and early\nsixteenth centuries, Holland in the later sixteenth and seventeenth\ncenturies, are the typical examples. In such periods the opportunities\nof statesmen, soldiers, orators, and diplomatists, may have been\nspecially frequent. But whence came the poets, the sculptors, the\npainters, the philosophers and the men of letters? What peculiar\nopportunities had _they_?\n\nThe only explanation, if we reject the idea of a mere coincidence,\nseems to be, that quite apart from opportunity, the exceptional stir\nand fervour of national life evokes or may evoke qualities which in\nordinary times lie dormant, unknown even to their possessors. The\npotential Miltons are \u2018mute\u2019 and \u2018inglorious\u2019 not because they cannot\nfind a publisher, but because they have nothing they want to publish.\nThey lack the kind of inspiration which, on this view, flows from\nsocial surroundings where great things, though of quite another kind,\nare being done and thought.\n\nIf this theory be true (and it is not without its difficulties) one\nwould like to know whether these undoubted outbursts of originality\nin the higher and rarer form of genius, are symptomatic of a general\nrise in the number of persons exhibiting original capacity of a more\nordinary type. If so, then the conclusion would seem to be that some\nkind of widespread exhilaration or excitement is required in order to\nenable any community to extract the best results from the raw material\ntransmitted to it by natural inheritance.\n\n\n_Cambridge: Printed at the University Press._\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Note\n\n\nIn this file, text in _italics_ is indicated by underscores.\n\nOn page 41, \u201cGreek in culture Roman by political descent\u201d was corrected\nto \u201cGreek in culture, Roman by political descent.\u201d","title":"Decadence: Henry Sidgwick memorial lecture, 1908","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":8929}