{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_68421/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_68421","id":"gutenberg_68421","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68421","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Language & Communication","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Persuasion (Rhetoric)","Public speaking"],"text":"_The ETHICS of_\n                                Rhetoric\n\n\n\n\n                             _The ETHICS of_\n                                Rhetoric\n\n                         _By_ RICHARD M. WEAVER\n\n                    \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f36\u03bf\u03bd\n                  \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03c5\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n                       \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f24\u03b8\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n\n              Thus it happens that rhetoric is an offshoot\n                of dialectic and also of ethical studies.\n\n                         \u2014ARISTOTLE, _Rhetoric_\n\n                             [Illustration]\n\n                Chicago \u00b7 HENRY REGNERY COMPANY \u00b7 _1953_\n\n        Copyright 1953 by Henry Regnery Company. Copyright under\n        International Copyright Union. Manufactured in the United\n       States of America. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:\n                                53-8796.\n\n                     Second Printing, December, 1963\n\n\n\n\nTable of Contents\n\n\n                                                                      PAGE\n\n       I. THE PHAEDRUS AND THE NATURE OF RHETORIC                        3\n\n      II. DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC AT DAYTON, TENNESSEE                   27\n\n     III. EDMUND BURKE AND THE ARGUMENT FROM CIRCUMSTANCE               55\n\n      IV. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DEFINITION              85\n\n       V. SOME RHETORICAL ASPECTS OF GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES            115\n\n      VI. MILTON\u2019S HEROIC PROSE                                        143\n\n     VII. THE SPACIOUSNESS OF OLD RHETORIC                             164\n\n    VIII. THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCE                               186\n\n      IX. ULTIMATE TERMS IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC                      211\n\n          INDEX                                                        233\n\n\n\n\nAcknowledgments\n\n\nAcknowledgments with thanks are due the following: Charles Scribner\u2019s\nSons for the passage from Allen Tate\u2019s \u201cThe Subway,\u201d from _Poems\n1922-1947_; Karl Shapiro and Random House, Inc., for the passage from\n_Essay on Rime_; and the Viking Press, Inc., for the passage from\nSherwood Anderson\u2019s _A Story Teller\u2019s Story_.\n\n\n\n\n                             _The ETHICS of_\n                                Rhetoric\n\n\n\n\nChapter I\n\nTHE _PHAEDRUS_ AND THE NATURE OF RHETORIC\n\n\nOur subject begins with the threshold difficulty of defining the question\nwhich Plato\u2019s _Phaedrus_ was meant to answer. Students of this justly\ncelebrated dialogue have felt uncertain of its unity of theme, and the\ntendency has been to designate it broadly as a discussion of the ethical\nand the beautiful. The explicit topics of the dialogue are, in order:\nlove, the soul, speechmaking, and the spoken and written word, or what\nis generally termed by us \u201ccomposition.\u201d The development looks random,\nand some of the most interesting passages appear _jeux d\u2019esprit_. The\nrichness of the literary art diverts attention from the substance of the\nargument.\n\nBut a work of art which touches on many profound problems justifies\nmore than one kind of reading. Our difficulty with the _Phaedrus_ may\nbe that our interpretation has been too literal and too topical. If we\nwill bring to the reading of it even a portion of that imagination which\nPlato habitually exercised, we should perceive surely enough that it is\nconsistently, and from beginning to end, about one thing, which is the\nnature of rhetoric.[1] Again, that point may have been missed because\nmost readers conceive rhetoric to be a system of artifice rather than an\nidea,[2] and the _Phaedrus_, for all its apparent divagation, keeps very\nclose to a single idea. A study of its rhetorical structure, especially,\nmay give us the insight which has been withheld, while making us feel\nanew that Plato possessed the deepest divining rod among the ancients.\n\nFor the imaginative interpretation which we shall now undertake, we have\nboth general and specific warrant. First, it scarcely needs pointing\nout that a Socratic dialogue is in itself an example of transcendence.\nBeginning with something simple and topical, it passes to more general\nlevels of application; and not infrequently, it must make the leap into\nallegory for the final utterance. This means, of course, that a Socratic\ndialogue may be about its subject implicitly as well as explicitly. The\nimplicit rendering is usually through some kind of figuration because\nit is the nature of this meaning to be ineffable in any other way. It\nis necessary, therefore, to be alert for what takes place through the\nanalogical mode.\n\nSecond, it is a matter of curious interest that a warning against\nliteral reading occurs at an early stage of the _Phaedrus_. Here in the\nopening pages, appearing as if to set the key of the theme, comes an\nallusion to the myth of Boreas and Oreithyia. On the very spot where the\ndialogue begins, Boreas is said to have carried off the maiden. Does\nSocrates believe that this tale is really true? Or is he in favor of a\nscientific explanation of what the myth alleges? Athens had scientific\nexperts, and the scientific explanation was that the north wind had\npushed her off some rocks where she was playing with a companion. In this\nway the poetical story is provided with a factual basis. The answer of\nSocrates is that many tales are open to this kind of rationalization,\nbut that the result is tedious and actually irrelevant. It is irrelevant\nbecause our chief concern is with the nature of the man, and it is\nbeside the point to probe into such matters while we are yet ignorant\nof ourselves. The scientific criticism of Greek mythology, which may\nbe likened to the scientific criticism of the myths of the Bible in\nour own day, produces at best \u201ca boorish sort of wisdom (\u1f00\u03b3\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u1fb3).\u201d It is a limitation to suppose that the truth of the story\nlies in its historicity. The \u201cboorish sort of wisdom\u201d seeks to supplant\npoetic allegation with fact, just as an archaeologist might look for the\nfoundations of the Garden of Eden. But while this sort of search goes\non the truth flies off, on wings of imagination, and is not recoverable\nuntil the searcher attains a higher level of pursuit. Socrates is\nsatisfied with the parable, and we infer from numerous other passages\nthat he believed that some things are best told by parable and some\nperhaps discoverable only by parable. Real investigation goes forward\nwith the help of analogy. \u201cFreud without Sophocles is unthinkable,\u201d a\nmodern writer has said.[3]\n\nWith these precepts in mind, we turn to that part of the _Phaedrus_\nwhich has proved most puzzling: why is so much said about the absurd\nrelationship of the lover and the non-lover? Socrates encounters Phaedrus\noutside the city wall. The latter has just come from hearing a discourse\nby Lysias which enchanted him with its eloquence. He is prevailed upon to\nrepeat this discourse, and the two seek out a shady spot on the banks of\nthe Ilissus. Now the discourse is remarkable because although it was \u201cin\na way, a love speech,\u201d its argument was that people should grant favors\nto non-lovers rather than to lovers. \u201cThis is just the clever thing\nabout it,\u201d Phaedrus remarks. People are in the habit of preferring their\nlovers, but it is much more intelligent, as the argument of Lysias runs,\nto prefer a non-lover. Accordingly, the first major topic of the dialogue\nis a eulogy of the non-lover. The speech provides good subject matter\nfor jesting on the part of Socrates, and looks like another exhibition\nof the childlike ingeniousness which gives the Greeks their charm. Is it\nmerely a piece of literary trifling? Rather, it is Plato\u2019s dramatistic\npresentation of a major thesis. Beneath the surface of repartee and\nmock seriousness, he is asking whether we ought to prefer a neuter form\nof speech to the kind which is ever getting us aroused over things and\nprovoking an expense of spirit.\n\nSophistications of theory cannot obscure the truth that there are but\nthree ways for language to affect us. It can move us toward what is good;\nit can move us toward what is evil; or it can, in hypothetical third\nplace, fail to move us at all.[4] Of course there are numberless degrees\nof effect under the first two heads, and the third, as will be shown, is\nan approximate rather than an absolute zero of effect. But any utterance\nis a major assumption of responsibility, and the assumption that one can\navoid that responsibility by doing something to language itself is one of\nthe chief considerations of the _Phaedrus_, just as it is of contemporary\nsemantic theory. What Plato has succeeded in doing in this dialogue,\nwhether by a remarkably effaced design, or unconsciously through the\nformal pressure of his conception, is to give us embodiments of the three\ntypes of discourse. These are respectively the non-lover, the evil lover,\nand the noble lover. We shall take up these figures in their sequence and\nshow their relevance to the problem of language.\n\nThe eulogy of the non-lover in the speech of Lysias, as we hear it\nrepeated to Socrates, stresses the fact that the non-lover follows a\npolicy of enlightened self-interest. First of all, the non-lover does\nnot neglect his affairs or commit extreme acts under the influence of\npassion. Since he acts from calculation, he never has occasion for\nremorse. No one ever says of him that he is not in his right mind,\nbecause all of his acts are within prudential bounds. The first point\nis, in sum, that the non-lover never sacrifices himself and therefore\nnever feels the vexation which overtakes lovers when they recover from\ntheir passion and try to balance their pains with their profit. And the\nnon-lover is constant whereas the lover is inconstant. The first argument\nthen is that the non-lover demonstrates his superiority through prudence\nand objectivity. The second point of superiority found in non-lovers is\nthat there are many more of them. If one is limited in one\u2019s choice to\none\u2019s lovers, the range is small; but as there are always more non-lovers\nthan lovers, one has a better chance in choosing among many of finding\nsomething worthy of one\u2019s affection. A third point of superiority is that\nassociation with the non-lover does not excite public comment. If one is\nseen going about with the object of one\u2019s love, one is likely to provoke\ngossip; but when one is seen conversing with the non-lover, people merely\nrealize that \u201ceverybody must converse with somebody.\u201d Therefore this\nkind of relationship does not affect one\u2019s public standing, and one is\nnot disturbed by what the neighbors are saying. Finally, non-lovers are\nnot jealous of one\u2019s associates. Accordingly they do not try to keep one\nfrom companions of intellect or wealth for fear that they may be outshone\nthemselves. The lover, by contrast, tries to draw his beloved away from\nsuch companionship and so deprives him of improving associations. The\nargument is concluded with a generalization that one ought to grant\nfavors not to the needy or the importunate, but to those who are able to\nrepay. Such is the favorable account of the non-lover given by Lysias.\n\nWe must now observe how these points of superiority correspond to those\nof \u201csemantically purified\u201d speech. By \u201csemantically purified speech\u201d we\nmean the kind of speech approaching pure notation in the respect that\nit communicates abstract intelligence without impulsion. It is a simple\ninstrumentality, showing no affection for the object of its symbolizing\nand incapable of inducing bias in the hearer. In its ideal conception,\nit would have less power to move than 2 + 2 = 4, since it is generally\nadmitted that mathematical equations may have the beauty of elegance, and\nhence are not above suspicion where beauty is suspect. But this neuter\nlanguage will be an unqualified medium of transmission of meanings from\nmind to mind, and by virtue of its minds can remain in an unprejudiced\nrelationship to the world and also to other minds.\n\nSince the characteristic of this language is absence of anything like\naffection, it exhibits toward the thing being represented merely a sober\nfidelity, like that of the non-lover toward his companion. Instead of\npassion, it offers the serviceability of objectivity. Its \u201cenlightened\nself-interest\u201d takes the form of an unvarying accuracy and regularity in\nits symbolic references, most, if not all of which will be to verifiable\ndata in the extramental world. Like a thrifty burgher, it has no\nromanticism about it; and it distrusts any departure from the literal\nand prosaic. The burgher has his feet on the ground; and similarly the\nlanguage of pure notation has its point-by-point contact with objective\nreality. As Stuart Chase, one of its modern proponents, says in _The\nTyranny of Words_: \u201c_If we wish to understand the world and ourselves,\nit follows that we should use a language whose structure corresponds to\nphysical structure_\u201d[5] (italics his). So this language is married to the\nworld, and its marital fidelity contrasts with the extravagances of other\nlanguages.\n\nIn second place, this language is far more \u201cavailable.\u201d Whereas\nrhetorical language, or language which would persuade, must always be\nparticularized to suit the occasion, drawing its effectiveness from\nmany small nuances, a \u201cutility\u201d language is very general and one has\nno difficulty putting his meaning into it if he is satisfied with a\nparaphrase of that meaning. The 850 words recommended for Basic English,\nfor example, are highly available in the sense that all native users of\nEnglish have them instantly ready and learners of English can quickly\nacquire them. It soon becomes apparent, however, that the availability\nis a heavy tax upon all other qualities. Most of what we admire as\nenergy and fullness tends to disappear when mere verbal counters are\nused. The conventional or public aspect of language can encroach upon the\nsuggestive or symbolical aspect, until the naming is vague or blurred. In\nproportion as the medium is conventional in the widest sense and avoids\nall individualizing, personalizing, and heightening terms, it is common,\nand the commonness constitutes the negative virtue ascribed to the\nnon-lover.\n\nFinally, with reference to the third qualification of the non-lover,\nit is true that neuter language does not excite public opinion. This\nfact follows from its character outlined above. Rhetorical language on\nthe other hand, for whatever purpose used, excites interest and with it\neither pleasure or alarm. People listen instinctively to the man whose\nspeech betrays inclination. It does not matter what the inclination is\ntoward, but we may say that the greater the degree of inclination, the\ngreater the curiosity or response. Hence a \u201cstyle\u201d in speech always\ncauses one to be a marked man, and the public may not be so much\nimpressed\u2014at least initially\u2014by what the man is for or against as by the\nfact that he has a style. The way therefore to avoid public comment is\nto avoid the speech of affection and to use that of business, since, to\necho the original proposition of Lysias, everybody knows that one must do\nbusiness with others. From another standpoint, then, this is the language\nof prudence. These are the features which give neuter discourse an appeal\nto those who expect a scientific solution of human problems.\n\nIn summing up the trend of meaning, we note that Lysias has been praising\na disinterested kind of relationship which avoids all excesses and\nirrationalities, all the dementia of love. It is a circumspect kind of\nrelationship, which is preferred by all men who wish to do well in the\nworld and avoid tempestuous courses. We have compared its detachment\nwith the kind of abstraction to be found in scientific notation. But as\nan earnest of what is to come let us note, in taking leave of this part,\nthat Phaedrus expresses admiration for the eloquence, especially of\ndiction, with which the suit of the non-lover has been urged. This is our\nwarning of the dilemma of the non-lover.\n\nNow we turn to the second major speech of the dialogue, which is made\nby Socrates. Notwithstanding Phaedrus\u2019 enthusiastic praise, Socrates is\ndissatisfied with the speech of the non-lover. He remembers having heard\nwiser things on the subject and feels that he can make a speech on the\nsame theme \u201cdifferent from this and quite as good.\u201d After some playful\nexchange, Socrates launches upon his own abuse of love, which centers\non the point that the lover is an exploiter. Love (\u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2) is defined as\nthe kind of desire which overcomes rational opinion and moves toward\nthe enjoyment of personal or bodily beauty. The lover wishes to make\nthe object of his passion as pleasing to himself as possible; but to\nthose possessed by this frenzy, only that which is subject to their will\nis pleasant. Accordingly, everything which is opposed, or is equal or\nbetter, the lover views with hostility. He naturally therefore tries to\nmake the beloved inferior to himself in every respect. He is pleased if\nthe beloved has intellectual limitations because they have the effect of\nmaking him manageable. For a similar reason he tries to keep him away\nfrom all influences which might \u201cmake a man of him,\u201d and of course the\ngreatest of these is divine philosophy. While he is working to keep him\nintellectually immature, he works also to keep him weak and effeminate,\nwith such harmful result that the beloved is unable to play a man\u2019s part\nin crises. The lover is, moreover, jealous of the possession of property\nbecause this gives the beloved an independence which he does not wish\nhim to have. Thus the lover in exercising an unremitting compulsion over\nthe beloved deprives him of all praiseworthy qualities, and this is the\nprice the beloved pays for accepting a lover who is \u201cnecessarily without\nreason.\u201d In brief, the lover is not motivated by benevolence toward the\nbeloved, but by selfish appetite; and Socrates can aptly close with the\nquotation: \u201cAs wolves love lambs, so lovers love their loves.\u201d The speech\nis on the single theme of exploitation. It is important for us to keep\nin mind the object of love as here described, because another kind of\nlove with a different object is later introduced into the dialogue, and\nwe shall discuss the counterpart of each.\n\nAs we look now for the parallel in language, we find ourselves\nconfronting the second of the three alternatives: speech which influences\nus in the direction of what is evil. This we shall call base rhetoric\nbecause its end is the exploitation which Socrates has been condemning.\nWe find that base rhetoric hates that which is opposed, or is equal\nor better because all such things are impediments to its will, and\nin the last analysis it knows only its will. Truth is the stubborn,\nobjective restraint which this will endeavors to overcome. Base rhetoric\nis therefore always trying to keep its objects from the support which\npersonal courage, noble associations, and divine philosophy provide a man.\n\nThe base rhetorician, we may say, is a man who has yielded to the wrong\naspects of existence. He has allowed himself to succumb to the sights\nand shows, to the physical pleasures which conspire against noble life.\nHe knows that the only way he can get a following in his pursuits (and\na following seems necessary to maximum enjoyment of the pursuits) is to\nwork against the true understanding of his followers. Consequently the\nthings which would elevate he keeps out of sight, and the things with\nwhich he surrounds his \u201cbeloved\u201d are those which minister immediately to\ndesire. The beloved is thus emasculated in understanding in order that\nthe lover may have his way. Or as Socrates expresses it, the selfish\nlover contrives things so that the beloved will be \u201cmost agreeable to him\nand most harmful to himself.\u201d\n\nExamples of this kind of contrivance occur on every hand in the\nimpassioned language of journalism and political pleading. In the\nworld of affairs which these seek to influence, the many are kept in a\nstate of pupillage so that they will be most docile to their \u201clovers.\u201d\nThe techniques of the base lover, especially as exemplified in modern\njournalism, would make a long catalogue, but in general it is accurate\nto say that he seeks to keep the understanding in a passive state by\nnever permitting an honest examination of alternatives. Nothing is more\nfeared by him than a true dialectic, for this not only endangers his\nfavored alternative, but also gives the \u201cbeloved\u201d\u2014how clearly here are\nthese the \u201clambs\u201d of Socrates\u2019 figure\u2014some training in intellectual\nindependence. What he does therefore is dress up one alternative in all\nthe cheap finery of immediate hopes and fears, knowing that if he can\nthus prevent a masculine exercise of imagination and will, he can have\nhis way. By discussing only one side of an issue, by mentioning cause\nwithout consequence or consequence without cause, acts without agents or\nagents without agency,[6] he often successfully blocks definition and\ncause-and-effect reasoning. In this way his choices are arrayed in such\nmeretricious images that one can quickly infer the juvenile mind which\nthey would attract. Of course the base rhetorician today, with his vastly\naugmented power of propagation, has means of deluding which no ancient\nrhetor in forum or market place could have imagined.\n\nBecause Socrates has now made a speech against love, representing it\nas an evil, the non-lover seems to survive in estimation. We observe,\nhowever, that the non-lover, instead of being celebrated, is disposed of\ndialectically. \u201cSo, in a word, I say that the non-lover possesses all the\nadvantages that are opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover.\u201d\nThis is not without bearing upon the subject matter of the important\nthird speech, to which we now turn.\n\nAt this point in the dialogue, Socrates is warned by his monitory spirit\nthat he has been engaging in a defamation of love despite the fact that\nlove is a divinity. \u201cIf love is, as indeed he is, a god or something\ndivine, he can be nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that\nhe was evil.\u201d These discourses were then an impiety\u2014one representing\nnon-love as admirable and the other attacking love as base. Socrates\nresolves to make amends, and the recantation which follows is one of the\nmost elaborate developments in the Platonic system. The account of love\nwhich emerges from this new position may be summarized as follows.\n\nLove is often censured as a form of madness, yet not all madness is evil.\nThere is a madness which is simple degeneracy, but on the other hand\nthere are kinds of madness which are really forms of inspiration, from\nwhich come the greatest gifts conferred on man. Prophecy is a kind of\nmadness, and so too is poetry. \u201cThe poetry of the sane man vanishes into\nnothingness before that of the inspired madman.\u201d Mere sanity, which is\nof human origin, is inferior to that madness which is inspired by the\ngods and which is a condition for the highest kind of achievement. In\nthis category goes the madness of the true lover. His is a generous state\nwhich confers blessings to the ignoring of self, whereas the conduct of\nthe non-lover displays all the selfishness of business: \u201cthe affection of\nthe non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence and follows mortal\nand parsimonious rules of conduct will beget in the beloved soul the\nnarrowness which common folk praise as virtue; it will cause the soul to\nbe a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years and a fool below the\nearth at last.\u201d It is the vulgar who do not realize that the madness of\nthe noble lover is an inspired madness because he has his thoughts turned\ntoward a beauty of divine origin.\n\nNow the attitude of the noble lover toward the beloved is in direct\ncontrast with that of the evil lover, who, as we have seen, strives\nto possess and victimize the object of his affections. For once the\nnoble lover has mastered the conflict within his own soul by conquering\nappetite and fixing his attention upon the intelligible and the divine,\nhe conceives an exalted attitude toward the beloved. The noble lover now\n\u201cfollows the beloved in reverence and awe.\u201d So those who are filled with\nthis kind of love \u201cexhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one,\nbut endeavor by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness\nof the god whom they honor.\u201d Such is the conversion by which love turns\nfrom the exploitative to the creative.\n\nHere it becomes necessary to bring our concepts together and to think\nof all speech having persuasive power as a kind of \u201clove.\u201d[7] Thus,\nrhetorical speech is madness to the extent that it departs from the\nline which mere sanity lays down. There is always in its statement a\nkind of excess or deficiency which is immediately discernible when\nthe test of simple realism is applied. Simple realism operates on a\nprinciple of equation or correspondence; one thing must match another,\nor, representation must tally with thing represented, like items in\na tradesman\u2019s account. Any excess or deficiency on the part of the\nrepresentation invokes the existence of the world of symbolism, which\nsimple realism must deny. This explains why there is an immortal feud\nbetween men of business and the users of metaphor and metonymy, the poets\nand the rhetoricians.[8] The man of business, the narrow and parsimonious\nsoul in the allusion of Socrates, desires a world which is a reliable\nmateriality. But this the poet and rhetorician will never let him have,\nfor each, with his own purpose, is trying to advance the borders of the\nimaginative world. A primrose by the river\u2019s brim will not remain that\nin the poet\u2019s account, but is promptly turned into something very much\nlarger and something highly implicative. He who is accustomed to record\nthe world with an abacus cannot follow these transfigurations; and\nindeed the very occurrence of them subtly undermines the premise of his\nbusiness. It is the historic tendency of the tradesman, therefore, to\nconfine passion to quite narrow channels so that it will not upset the\ndecent business arrangements of the world. But if the poet, as the chief\ntransformer of our picture of the world, is the peculiar enemy of this\nmentality, the rhetorician is also hostile when practicing the kind of\nlove proper to him. The \u201cpassion\u201d in his speech is revolutionary, and it\nhas a practical end.\n\nWe have now indicated the significance of the three types of lovers; but\nthe remainder of the _Phaedrus_ has much more to say about the nature\nof rhetoric, and we must return to one or more points to place our\nsubject in a wider context. The problem of rhetoric which occupied Plato\npersistently, not only in the _Phaedrus_ but also in other dialogues\nwhere this art is reviewed, may be best stated as a question: if truth\nalone is not sufficient to persuade men, what else remains that can be\nlegitimately added? In one of the exchanges with Phaedrus, Socrates puts\nthe question in the mouth of a personified Rhetoric: \u201cI do not compel\nanyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is\nof any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim\nis this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give\nthe art of persuasion.\u201d\n\nNow rhetoric as we have discussed it in relation to the lovers consists\nof truth plus its artful presentation, and for this reason it becomes\nnecessary to say something more about the natural order of dialectic\nand rhetoric. In any general characterization rhetoric will include\ndialectic,[9] but for the study of method it is necessary to separate\nthe two. Dialectic is a method of investigation whose object is the\nestablishment of truth about doubtful propositions. Aristotle in the\n_Topics_ gives a concise statement of its nature. \u201cA dialectical problem\nis a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice or avoidance,\nor to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to\nthe solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something\non which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold a\ncontrary opinion to the philosophers, or the philosophers to the masses,\nor each of them among themselves.\u201d[10] Plato is not perfectly clear\nabout the distinction between positive and dialectical terms. In one\npassage[11] he contrasts the \u201cpositive\u201d terms \u201ciron\u201d and \u201csilver\u201d with\nthe \u201cdialectical\u201d terms \u201cjustice\u201d and \u201cgoodness\u201d; yet in other passages\nhis \u201cdialectical\u201d terms seem to include categorizations of the external\nworld. Thus Socrates indicates that distinguishing the horse from the\nass is a dialectical operation;[12] and he tells us later that a good\ndialectician is able to divide things by classes \u201cwhere the natural\njoints are\u201d and will avoid breaking any part \u201cafter the manner of a bad\ncarver.\u201d[13] Such, perhaps, is Aristotle\u2019s dialectic which contributes to\ntruth and knowledge.\n\nBut there is a branch of dialectic which contributes to \u201cchoice or\navoidance,\u201d and it is with this that rhetoric is regularly found joined.\nGenerally speaking, this is a rhetoric involving questions of policy, and\nthe dialectic which precedes it will determine not the application of\npositive terms but that of terms which are subject to the contingency of\nevaluation. Here dialectical inquiry will concern itself not with what\nis \u201ciron\u201d but with what is \u201cgood.\u201d It seeks to establish what belongs in\nthe category of the \u201cjust\u201d rather than what belongs in the genus _Canis_.\nAs a general rule, simple object words such as \u201ciron\u201d and \u201chouse\u201d have\nno connotations of policy, although it is frequently possible to give\nthem these through speech situations in which there is added to their\nreferential function a kind of impulse. We should have to interpret in\nthis way \u201cFire!\u201d or \u201cGold!\u201d because these terms acquire something through\nintonation and relationship which places them in the class of evaluative\nexpressions.\n\nAny piece of persuasion, therefore, will contain as its first process a\ndialectic establishing terms which have to do with policy. Now a term of\npolicy is essentially a term of motion, and here begins the congruence of\nrhetoric with the soul which underlies the speculation of the _Phaedrus_.\nIn his myth of the charioteer, Socrates declares that every soul is\nimmortal because \u201cthat which is ever moving is immortal.\u201d Motion, it\nwould appear from this definition, is part of the soul\u2019s essence. And\njust because the soul is ever tending, positive or indifferent terms\ncannot partake of this congruence. But terms of tendency\u2014goodness,\njustice, divinity, and the like\u2014are terms of motion and therefore may\nbe said to comport with the soul\u2019s essence. The soul\u2019s perception of\ngoodness, justice, and divinity will depend upon its proper tendency,\nwhile at the same time contacts with these in discourse confirm and\ndirect that tendency. The education of the soul is not a process of\nbringing it into correspondence with a physical structure like the\nexternal world, but rather a process of rightly affecting its motion. By\nthis conception, a soul which is rightly affected calls that good which\nis good; but a soul which is wrongly turned calls that good which is\nevil. What Plato has prepared us to see is that the virtuous rhetorician,\nwho is a lover of truth, has a soul of such movement that its dialectical\nperceptions are consonant with those of a divine mind. Or, in the\nlanguage of more technical philosophy, this soul is aware of axiological\nsystems which have ontic status. The good soul, consequently, will not\nurge a perversion of justice as justice in order to impose upon the\ncommonwealth. Insofar as the soul has its impulse in the right direction,\nits definitions will agree with the true nature of intelligible things.\n\nThere is, then, no true rhetoric without dialectic, for the dialectic\nprovides that basis of \u201chigh speculation about nature\u201d without which\nrhetoric in the narrower sense has nothing to work upon. Yet, when the\ndisputed terms have been established, we are at the limit of dialectic.\nHow does the noble rhetorician proceed from this point on? That the\nclearest demonstration in terms of logical inclusion and exclusion often\nfails to win assent we hardly need state; therefore, to what does the\nrhetorician resort at this critical passage? It is the stage at which\nhe passes from the logical to the analogical, or it is where figuration\ncomes into rhetoric.\n\nTo look at this for a moment through a practical illustration, let us\nsuppose that a speaker has convinced his listeners that his position is\n\u201ctrue\u201d as far as dialectical inquiry may be pushed. Now he sets about\nmoving the listeners toward that position, but there is no way to move\nthem except through the operation of analogy. The analogy proceeds by\nshowing that the position being urged resembles or partakes of something\ngreater and finer. It will be represented, in sum, as one of the steps\nleading toward ultimate good. Let us further suppose our speaker to be\narguing for the payment of a just debt. The payment of the just debt is\nnot itself justice, but the payment of this particular debt is one of the\nmany things which would have to be done before this could be a completely\njust world. It is just, then, because it partakes of the ideal justice,\nor it is a small analogue of all justice (in practice it will be found\nthat the rhetorician makes extensive use of synecdoche, whereby the small\npart is used as a vivid suggestion of the grandeur of the whole). It is\nby bringing out these resemblances that the good rhetorician leads those\nwho listen in the direction of what is good. In effect, he performs a\ncure of souls by giving impulse, chiefly through figuration, toward an\nideal good.\n\nWe now see the true rhetorician as a noble lover of the good, who works\nthrough dialectic and through poetic or analogical association. However\nhe is compelled to modulate by the peculiar features of an occasion, this\nis his method.\n\nIt may not be superfluous to draw attention to the fact that what we\nhave here outlined is the method of the _Phaedrus_ itself. The dialectic\nappears in the dispute about love. The current thesis that love is\npraiseworthy is countered by the antithesis that love is blameworthy.\nThis position is fully developed in the speech of Lysias and in the first\nspeech of Socrates. But this position is countered by a new thesis\nthat after all love is praiseworthy because it is a divine thing. Of\ncourse, this is love on a higher level, or love re-defined. This is the\nregular process of transcendence which we have noted before. Now, having\nrescued love from the imputation of evil by excluding certain things\nfrom its definition, what does Socrates do? Quite in accordance with our\nanalysis, he turns rhetorician. He tries to make this love as attractive\nas possible by bringing in the splendid figure of the charioteer.[14] In\nthe narrower conception of this art, the allegory is the rhetoric, for\nit excites and fills us with desire for this kind of love, depicted with\nmany terms having tendency toward the good. But in the broader conception\nthe art must include also the dialectic, which succeeded in placing love\nin the category of divine things before filling our imaginations with\nattributes of divinity.[15] It is so regularly the method of Plato to\nfollow a subtle analysis with a striking myth that it is not unreasonable\nto call him the master rhetorician. This goes far to explain why those\nwho reject his philosophy sometimes remark his literary art with mingled\nadmiration and annoyance.\n\nThe objection sometimes made that rhetoric cannot be used by a lover\nof truth because it indulges in \u201cexaggerations\u201d can be answered as\nfollows. There is an exaggeration which is mere wantonness, and with\nthis the true rhetorician has nothing to do. Such exaggeration is purely\nimpressionistic in aim. Like caricature, whose only object is to amuse,\nit seizes upon any trait or aspect which could produce titillation\nand exploits this without conscience. If all rhetoric were like this,\nwe should have to grant that rhetoricians are persons of very low\nresponsibility and their art a disreputable one. But the rhetorician we\nhave now defined is not interested in sensationalism.\n\nThe exaggeration which this rhetorician employs is not caricature but\nprophecy; and it would be a fair formulation to say that true rhetoric is\nconcerned with the potency of things. The literalist, like the anti-poet\ndescribed earlier, is troubled by its failure to conform to a present\nreality. What he fails to appreciate is that potentiality is a mode of\nexistence, and that all prophecy is about the tendency of things. The\ndiscourse of the noble rhetorician, accordingly, will be about real\npotentiality or possible actuality, whereas that of the mere exaggerator\nis about unreal potentiality. Naturally this distinction rests upon a\nsupposal that the rhetorician has insight, and we could not defend him\nin the absence of that condition. But given insight, he has the duty\nto represent to us the as yet unactualized future. It would be, for\nexample, a misrepresentation of current facts but not of potential ones\nto talk about the joys of peace in a time of war. During the Second World\nWar, at the depth of Britain\u2019s political and military disaster, Winston\nChurchill likened the future of Europe to \u201cbroad sunlit uplands.\u201d Now if\none had regard only for the hour, this was a piece of mendacity such as\nthe worst charlatans are found committing; but if one took Churchill\u2019s\npremises and then considered the potentiality, the picture was within\nbounds of actualization. His \u201cexaggeration\u201d was that the defeat of the\nenemy would place Europe in a position for long and peaceful progress.\nAt the time the surface trends ran the other way; the actuality was a\nvalley of humiliation. Yet the hope which transfigured this to \u201cbroad\nsunlit uplands\u201d was not irresponsible, and we conclude by saying that the\nrhetorician talks about both what exists simply and what exists by favor\nof human imagination and effort.[16]\n\nThis interest in actualization is a further distinction between pure\ndialectic and rhetoric. With its forecast of the actual possibility,\nrhetoric passes from mere scientific demonstration of an idea to\nits relation to prudential conduct. A dialectic must take place _in\nvacuo_, and the fact alone that it contains contraries leaves it an\nintellectual thing. Rhetoric, on the other hand, always espouses one of\nthe contraries. This espousal is followed by some attempt at impingement\nupon actuality. That is why rhetoric, with its passion for the actual, is\nmore complete than mere dialectic with its dry understanding. It is more\ncomplete on the premise that man is a creature of passion who must live\nout that passion in the world. Pure contemplation does not suffice for\nthis end. As Jacques Maritain has expressed it: \u201clove ... is not directed\nat possibilities or pure essences; it is directed at what exists; one\ndoes not love possibilities, one loves that which exists or is destined\nto exist.\u201d[17] The complete man, then, is the \u201clover\u201d added to the\nscientist; the rhetorician to the dialectician. Understanding followed by\nactualization seems to be the order of creation, and there is no need for\nthe role of rhetoric to be misconceived.\n\nThe pure dialectician is left in the theoretical position of the\nnon-lover, who can attain understanding but who cannot add impulse to\ntruth. We are compelled to say \u201ctheoretical position\u201d because it is by\nno means certain that in the world of actual speech the non-lover has\nmore than a putative existence. We have seen previously that his speech\nwould consist of strictly referential words which would serve only as\ndesignata. Now the question arises: at what point is motive to come\ninto such language? Kenneth Burke in _A Grammar of Motives_ has pointed\nto \u201cthe pattern of embarrassment behind the contemporary ideal of a\nlanguage that will best promote good action by entirely eliminating the\nelement of exhortation or command. Insofar as such a project succeeded,\nits terms would involve a narrowing of circumference to a point where\nthe principle of personal action is eliminated from language, so that an\nact would follow from it only as a non-sequitur, a kind of humanitarian\nafter-thought.\u201d[18]\n\nThe fault of this conception of language is that scientific intention\nturns out to be enclosed in artistic intention and not _vice versa_.\nLet us test this by taking as an example one of those \u201cfact-finding\ncommittees\u201d so favored by modern representative governments. A language\nin which all else is suppressed in favor of nuclear meanings would be\nan ideal instrumentality for the report of such a committee. But this\ncommittee, if it lived up to the ideal of its conception, would have\nto be followed by an \u201cattitude-finding committee\u201d to tell us what its\nexplorations really mean. In real practice the fact-finding committee\nunderstands well enough that it is also an attitude-finding committee,\nand where it cannot show inclination through language of tendency,\nit usually manages to do so through selection and arrangement of the\notherwise inarticulate facts. To recur here to the original situation in\nthe dialogue, we recall that the eloquent Lysias, posing as a non-lover,\nhad concealed designs upon Phaedrus, so that his fine speech was really a\nsheep\u2019s clothing. Socrates discerned in him a \u201cpeculiar craftiness.\u201d One\nmust suspect the same today of many who ask us to place our faith in the\nneutrality of their discourse. We cannot deny that there are degrees of\nobjectivity in the reference of speech. But this is not the same as an\nassurance that a vocabulary of reduced meanings will solve the problems\nof mankind. Many of those problems will have to be handled, as Socrates\nwell knew, by the student of souls, who must primarily make use of the\nlanguage of tendency. The soul is impulse, not simply cognition; and\nfinally one\u2019s interest in rhetoric depends on how much poignancy one\nsenses in existence.[19]\n\nRhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot finally be justified\nlogically. It can only be valued analogically with reference to some\nsupreme image. Therefore when the rhetorician encounters some soul\n\u201csinking beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice\u201d he seeks\nto re-animate it by holding up to its sight the order of presumptive\ngoods. This order is necessarily a hierarchy leading up to the ultimate\ngood. All of the terms in a rhetorical vocabulary are like links in a\nchain stretching up to some master link which transmits its influence\ndown through the linkages. It is impossible to talk about rhetoric as\neffective expression without having as a term giving intelligibility\nto the whole discourse, the Good. Of course, inferior concepts of the\nGood may be and often are placed in this ultimate position; and there\nis nothing to keep a base lover from inverting the proper order and\nsaying, \u201cEvil, be thou my good.\u201d Yet the fact remains that in any\npiece of rhetorical discourse, one rhetorical term overcomes another\nrhetorical term only by being nearer to the term which stands ultimate.\nThere is some ground for calling a rhetorical education necessarily\nan aristocratic education in that the rhetorician has to deal with an\naristocracy of notions, to say nothing of supplementing his logical and\npathetic proofs with an ethical proof.\n\nAll things considered, rhetoric, noble or base, is a great power in the\nworld; and we note accordingly that at the center of the public life of\nevery people there is a fierce struggle over who shall control the means\nof rhetorical propagation. Today we set up \u201coffices of information,\u201d\nwhich like the sly lover in the dialogue, pose as non-lovers while\npushing their suits. But there is no reason to despair over the fact that\nmen will never give up seeking to influence one another. We would not\ndesire it to be otherwise; neuter discourse is a false idol, to worship\nwhich is to commit the very offense for which Socrates made expiation in\nhis second speech.\n\nSince we want not emancipation from impulse but clarification of impulse,\nthe duty of rhetoric is to bring together action and understanding into\na whole that is greater than scientific perception.[20] The realization\nthat just as no action is really indifferent, so no utterance is without\nits responsibility introduces, it is true, a certain strenuousity into\nlife, produced by a consciousness that \u201cnothing is lost.\u201d Yet this is\npreferable to that desolation which proceeds from an infinite dispersion\nor feeling of unaccountability. Even so, the choice between them is\nhardly ours to make; we did not create the order of things, but being\naccountable for our impulses, we wish these to be just.\n\nThus when we finally divest rhetoric of all the notions of artifice\nwhich have grown up around it, we are left with something very much\nlike Spinoza\u2019s \u201cintellectual love of God.\u201d This is its essence and\nthe _fons et origo_ of its power. It is \u201cintellectual\u201d because, as we\nhave previously seen, there is no honest rhetoric without a preceding\ndialectic. The kind of rhetoric which is justly condemned is utterance\nin support of a position before that position has been adjudicated with\nreference to the whole universe of discourse[21]\u2014and of such the world\nalways produces more than enough. It is \u201clove\u201d because it is something in\naddition to bare theoretical truth. That element in addition is a desire\nto bring truth into a kind of existence, or to give it an actuality\nto which theory is indifferent. Now what is to be said about our last\nexpression, \u201cof God\u201d? Echoes of theological warfare will cause many to\ndesire a substitute for this, and we should not object. As long as we\nhave in ultimate place the highest good man can intuit, the relationship\nis made perfect. We shall be content with \u201cintellectual love of the\nGood.\u201d It is still the intellectual love of good which causes the noble\nlover to desire not to devour his beloved but to shape him according to\nthe gods as far as mortal power allows. So rhetoric at its truest seeks\nto perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, links in\nthat chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can\napprehend and only the soul have affection for. This is the justified\naffection of which no one can be ashamed, and he who feels no influence\nof it is truly outside the communion of minds. Rhetoric appears, finally,\nas a means by which the impulse of the soul to be ever moving is redeemed.\n\nIt may be granted that in this essay we have gone some distance from\nthe banks of the Ilissus. What began as a simple account of passion\nbecomes by transcendence an allegory of all speech. No one would think of\nsuggesting that Plato had in mind every application which has here been\nmade, but that need not arise as an issue. The structure of the dialogue,\nthe way in which the judgments about speech concentre, and especially the\nclose association of the true, the beautiful, and the good, constitute a\nunity of implication. The central idea is that all speech, which is the\nmeans the gods have given man to express his soul, is a form of eros, in\nthe proper interpretation of the word. With that truth the rhetorician\nwill always be brought face to face as soon as he ventures beyond the\nconsideration of mere artifice and device.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II\n\nDIALECTIC AND RHETORIC AT DAYTON, TENNESSEE\n\n\nWe have maintained that dialectic and rhetoric are distinguishable\nstages of argumentation, although often they are not distinguished by\nthe professional mind, to say nothing of the popular mind. Dialectic is\nthat stage which defines the subject satisfactorily with regard to the\n_logos_, or the set of propositions making up some coherent universe\nof discourse; and we can therefore say that a dialectical position is\nestablished when its relation to an opposite has been made clear and\nit is thus rationally rather than empirically sustained. Despite the\ninconclusiveness of Plato on this subject, we shall say that facts are\nnever dialectically determined\u2014although they may be elaborated in a\ndialectical system\u2014and that the urgency of facts is never a dialectical\nconcern. For similar reasons Professor Adler, in his searching study of\ndialectic, maintains the position that \u201cFacts, that is non-discursive\nelements, are never determinative of dialectic in a logical or\nintellectual sense....\u201d[22]\n\nWhat a successful dialectic secures for any position therefore, as we\nnoted in the opening chapter, is not actuality but possibility; and what\nrhetoric thereafter accomplishes is to take any dialectically secured\nposition (since positive positions, like the \u201cposition\u201d that water\nfreezes at 32\u00b0F., are not matters for rhetorical appeal) and show its\nrelationship to the world of prudential conduct. This is tantamount to\nsaying that what the specifically rhetorical plea asks of us is belief,\nwhich is a preliminary to action.\n\nIt may be helpful to state this relationship through an example less\ncomplex than that of the Platonic dialogue. The speaker who in a\ndialectical contest has taken the position that \u201cmagnanimity is a virtue\u201d\nhas by his process of opposition and exclusion won our intellectual\nassent, inasmuch as we see the abstract possibility of this position in\nthe world of discourse. He has not, however, produced in us a resolve to\npractice magnanimity. To accomplish this he must pass from the realm of\npossibility to that of actuality; it is not the logical invincibility\nof \u201cmagnanimity\u201d enclosed in the class \u201cvirtue\u201d which wins our assent;\nrather it is the contemplation of magnanimity _sub specie_ actuality.\nAccordingly when we say that rhetoric instills belief and action, we are\nsaying that it intersects possibility with the plane of actuality and\nhence of the imperative.[23]\n\nA failure to appreciate this distinction is responsible for many lame\nperformances in our public controversies. The effects are, in outline,\nthat the dialectician cannot understand why his demonstration does not\nwin converts; and the rhetorician cannot understand why his appeal is\nrejected as specious. The answer, as we have begun to indicate, is that\nthe dialectic has not made reference to reality, which men confronted\nwith problems of conduct require; and the rhetorician has not searched\nthe grounds of the position on which he has perhaps spent much eloquence.\nTrue, the dialectician and the rhetorician are often one man, and the\ntwo processes may not lie apart in his work; but no student of the art\nof argumentation can doubt that some extraordinary confusions would\nbe prevented by a knowledge of the theory of this distinction. Beyond\nthis, representative government would receive a tonic effect from any\nimprovement of the ability of an electorate to distinguish logical\npositions from the detail of rhetorical amplification. The British,\nthrough their custom of putting questions to public speakers and to\nofficers of government in Parliament, probably come nearest to getting\nsome dialectical clarification from their public figures. In the United\nStates, where there is no such custom, it is up to each disputant\nto force the other to reveal his grounds; and this, in the ardor of\nshoring up his own position rhetorically, he often fails to do with\nany thoroughness. It should therefore be profitable to try the kind of\nanalysis we have explained upon some celebrated public controversy, with\nthe object of showing how such grasp of rhetorical theory could have made\nthe issues clearer.\n\nFor this purpose, it would be hard to think of a better example than the\nScopes \u201cevolution\u201d trial of a generation ago. There is no denying that\nthis trial had many aspects of the farcical, and it might seem at first\nglance not serious enough to warrant this type of examination. Yet at the\ntime it was considered serious enough to draw the most celebrated trial\nlawyers of the country, as well as some of the most eminent scientists;\nmoreover, after one has cut through the sensationalism with which\njournalism and a few of the principals clothed the encounter, one finds a\nunique alignment of dialectical and rhetorical positions.\n\nThe background of the trial can be narrated briefly. On March 21, 1925,\nthe state of Tennessee passed a law forbidding the teaching of the theory\nof evolution in publicly supported schools. The language of the law was\nas follows:\n\n    Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state\n    of Tennessee, that it shall be unlawful for any teacher in\n    any of the universities, normals and all other public schools\n    of the state, which are supported in whole or in part by the\n    public school funds of the state, to teach any theory that\n    denies the story of the Divine creation of man as taught in the\n    Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower\n    order of animals.\n\nThat same spring John T. Scopes, a young instructor in biology in the\nhigh school at Dayton, made an agreement with some local citizens to\nteach such a theory and to cause himself to be indicted therefor with\nthe object of testing the validity of the law. The indictment was duly\nreturned, and the two sides prepared for the contest. The issue excited\nthe nation as a whole; and the trial drew as opposing counsel Clarence\nDarrow, the celebrated Chicago lawyer, and William Jennings Bryan, the\nformer political leader and evangelical lecturer.\n\nThe remarkable aspect of this trial was that almost from the first the\ndefense, pleading the cause of science, was forced into the role of\nrhetorician; whereas the prosecution, pleading the cause of the state,\nclung stubbornly to a dialectical position. This development occurred\nbecause the argument of the defense, once the legal technicalities were\ngot over, was that evolution is \u201ctrue.\u201d The argument of the prosecution\nwas that its teaching was unlawful. These two arguments depend upon\nrhetoric and dialectic respectively. Because of this circumstance, the\nfamous trial turned into an argument about the orders of knowledge,\nalthough this fact was never clearly expressed, if it was ever discerned,\nby either side, and that is the main subject of our analysis. But before\ngoing into the matter of the trial, a slight prologue may be in order.\n\nIt is only the first step beyond philosophic na\u00efvete to realize that\nthere are different orders of knowledge, or that not all knowledge is of\nthe same kind of thing. Adler, whose analysis I am satisfied to accept\nto some extent, distinguishes the orders as follows. First there is the\norder of facts about existing physical entities. These constitute the\nsimple data of science. Next come the statements which are statements\nabout these facts; these are the propositions or theories of science.\nNext there come the statements about these statements: \u201cThe propositions\nwhich these last statements express form a partial universe of discourse\nwhich is the body of philosophical opinion.\u201d[24]\n\nTo illustrate in sequence: the anatomical measurements of\n_Pithecanthropus erectus_ would be knowledge of the first order. A\ntheory based on these measurements which placed him in a certain group\nof related organisms would be knowledge of the second order. A statement\nabout the value or the implications of the theory of this placement would\nbe knowledge of the third order; it would be the judgment of a scientific\ntheory from a dialectical position.\n\nIt is at once apparent that the Tennessee \u201canti-evolution\u201d law was a\nstatement of the third class. That is to say, it was neither a collection\nof scientific facts, nor a statement about those facts (_i.e._, a\ntheory or a generalization); it was a statement about a statement (the\nscientists\u2019 statement) purporting to be based on those facts. It was,\nto use Adler\u2019s phrase, a philosophical opinion, though expressed in the\nlanguage of law. Now since the body of philosophical opinion is on a\nlevel which surmounts the partial universe of science, how is it possible\nfor the latter ever to refute the former? In short, is there any number\nof facts, together with generalizations based on facts, which would be\nsufficient to overcome a dialectical position?\n\nThroughout the trial the defense tended to take the view that science\ncould carry the day just by being scientific. But in doing this, one\nassumes that there are no points outside the empirical realm from which\none can form judgments about science. Science, by this conception, must\ncontain not only its facts, but also the means of its own evaluation, so\nthat the statements about the statements of science are science too.\n\nThe published record of the trial runs to approximately three hundred\npages, and it would obviously be difficult to present a digest of all\nthat was said. But through a carefully selected series of excerpts, it\nmay be possible to show how blows were traded back and forth from the\ntwo positions. The following passages, though not continuous, afford the\nclearest picture of the dialectical-rhetorical conflict which underlay\nthe entire trial.\n\n                THE COURT (_in charging the grand jury_)\n\n    You will bear in mind that in this investigation you are not\n    interested to inquire into the policy of this legislation.[25]\n\n                              THE DEFENSE\n\n    _Mr. Darrow_: I don\u2019t suppose the court has considered the\n    question of competency of evidence. My associates and myself\n    have fairly definite ideas as to it, but I don\u2019t know how\n    the counsel on the other side feel about it. I think that\n    scientists are competent evidence\u2014or competent witnesses here,\n    to explain what evolution is, and that they are competent on\n    both sides.\n\n                            THE PROSECUTION\n\n    _Attorney-General Stewart_: If the Court please, in this\n    case, as Mr. Darrow stated, the defense is going to insist on\n    introducing scientists and Bible students to give their ideas\n    on certain views of this law, and that, I am frank to state,\n    will be resisted by the state as vigorously as we know how to\n    resist it. We have had a conference or two about the matter,\n    and we think that it isn\u2019t competent evidence; that is, it is\n    not competent to bring into this case scientists who testify as\n    to what the theory of evolution is or interpret the Bible or\n    anything of that sort.\n\n                              THE DEFENSE\n\n    _Mr. Neal_: The defendant moves the court to quash the\n    indictment in this case for the following reasons: In\n    that it violates Sec. 12, Art. XI, of the Constitution of\n    Tennessee: \u201cIt shall be the duty of the general assembly in\n    all future periods of the government to cherish literature\n    and science....\u201d I want to say that our main contention after\n    all, may it please your honor, is that this is not a proper\n    thing for any legislature, the legislature of Tennessee or\n    the legislature of the United States, to attempt to make and\n    assign a rule in regard to. In this law there is an attempt to\n    pronounce a judgment and a conclusion in the realm of science\n    and in the realm of religion.\n\n                            THE PROSECUTION\n\n    _Mr. McKenzie_: Under the law you cannot teach in the common\n    schools the Bible. Why should it be improper to provide that\n    you cannot teach this other theory?\n\n                              THE DEFENSE\n\n    _Mr. Darrow_: Can a legislative body say, \u201cYou cannot read\n    a book or take a lesson or make a talk on science until you\n    first find out whether you are saying against Genesis\u201d? It can\n    unless that constitutional provision protects me. It can. Can\n    it say to the astronomer, you cannot turn your telescope upon\n    the infinite planets and suns and stars that fill space, lest\n    you find that the earth is not the center of the universe and\n    that there is not any firmament between us and the heaven? Can\n    it? It could\u2014except for the work of Thomas Jefferson, which\n    has been woven into every state constitution in the Union, and\n    has stayed there like a flaming sword to protect the rights of\n    man against ignorance and bigotry, and when it is permitted to\n    overwhelm them then we are taken in a sea of blood and ruin\n    that all the miseries and tortures and carrion of the middle\n    ages would be as nothing.... If today you can take a thing\n    like evolution and make it a crime to teach it in the public\n    schools, tomorrow you can make it a crime to teach it in the\n    private schools, and the next year you can make it a crime to\n    teach it to the hustings or in the church. At the next session\n    you may ban books and the newspapers.\n\n    _Mr. Dudley Field Malone_: So that there shall be no\n    misunderstanding and that no one shall be able to misinterpret\n    or misrepresent our position we wish to state at the beginning\n    of the case that the defense believes that there is a direct\n    conflict between the theory of evolution and the theories of\n    creation as set forth in the Book of Genesis.\n\n    Neither do we believe that the stories of creation as set forth\n    in the Bible are reconcilable or scientifically correct.\n\n    _Mr. Arthur Garfield Hays_: Our whole case depends upon proving\n    that evolution is a reasonable scientific theory.\n\n                            THE PROSECUTION\n\n    _Mr. William Jennings Bryan, Jr._ (in support of a motion to\n    exclude expert testimony): It is, I think, apparent to all that\n    we have now reached the heart of this case, upon your honor\u2019s\n    ruling, as to whether this expert testimony will be admitted\n    largely determines the question of whether this trial from now\n    on will be an orderly effort to try the case upon the issues,\n    raised by the indictment and by the plea or whether it will\n    degenerate into a joint debate upon the merits or demerits\n    of someone\u2019s views upon evolution.... To permit an expert to\n    testify upon this issue would be to substitute trial by experts\n    for trial by jury....\n\n                              THE DEFENSE\n\n    _Mr. Hays_: Are we entitled to show what evolution is? We are\n    entitled to show that, if for no other reason than to determine\n    whether the title is germane to the act.\n\n                            THE PROSECUTION\n\n    _Mr. William Jennings Bryan_: An expert cannot be permitted\n    to come in here and try to defeat the enforcement of a law by\n    testifying that it isn\u2019t a bad law and it isn\u2019t\u2014I mean a bad\n    doctrine\u2014no matter how these people phrase the doctrine\u2014no\n    matter how they eulogize it. This is not the place to prove\n    that the law ought never to have been passed. The place to\n    prove that, or teach that, was to the state legislature....\n    The people of this state passed this law, the people of the\n    state knew what they were doing when they passed the law, and\n    they knew the dangers of the doctrine\u2014that they did not want it\n    taught to their children, and my friends, it isn\u2019t\u2014your honor,\n    it isn\u2019t proper to bring experts in here and try to defeat the\n    purpose of the people of this state by trying to show that\n    this thing they denounce and outlaw is a beautiful thing that\n    everybody ought to believe in.... It is this doctrine that\n    gives us Nietzsche, the only great author who tried to carry\n    this to its logical conclusion, and we have the testimony of\n    my distinguished friend from Chicago in his speech in the Loeb\n    and Leopold case that 50,000 volumes have been written about\n    Nietzsche, and he is the greatest philosopher in the last\n    hundred years, and have him pleading that because Leopold read\n    Nietzsche and adopted Nietzsche\u2019s philosophy of the super-man,\n    that he is not responsible for the taking of human life. We\n    have the doctrine\u2014I should not characterize it as I should\n    like to characterize it\u2014the doctrine that the universities\n    that had it taught, and the professors who taught it, are much\n    more responsible for the crime that Leopold committed than\n    Leopold himself. That is the doctrine, my friends, that they\n    have tried to bring into existence, they commence in the high\n    schools with their foundation of evolutionary theory, and we\n    have the word of the distinguished lawyer that this is more\n    read than any other in a hundred years, and the statement of\n    that distinguished man that the teachings of Nietzsche made\n    Leopold a murderer.... (_Mr. Bryan reading from a book by\n    Darrow_) \u201cI will guarantee that you can go to the University of\n    Chicago today\u2014into its big library and find over 1,000 volumes\n    of Nietzsche, and I am sure I speak moderately. If this boy\n    is to blame for this, where did he get it? Is there any blame\n    attached because somebody took Nietzsche\u2019s philosophy seriously\n    and fashioned his life on it? And there is no question in\n    this case but what it is true. Then who is to blame? The\n    university would be more to blame than he is. The scholars of\n    the world would be more to blame than he is. The publishers\n    of the world\u2014and Nietzsche\u2019s books are published by one of\n    the biggest publishers in the world\u2014are more to blame than he\n    is. Your honor, it is hardly fair to hang a 19-year-old boy\n    for the philosophy that was taught him at the university.\u201d...\n    Your honor, we first pointed out that we do not need any\n    experts in science. Here is one plain fact, and the statute\n    defines itself, and it tells the kind of evolution it does not\n    want taught, and the evidence says that this is the kind of\n    evolution that was taught, and no number of scientists could\n    come in here, my friends, and override that statute or take\n    from the jury its right to decide this question, so that all\n    the experts they could bring would mean nothing. And when it\n    comes to Bible experts, every member of the jury is as good an\n    expert on the Bible as any man they could bring, or that we\n    could bring.\n\n                              THE DEFENSE\n\n    _Mr. Malone_: Are we to have our children know nothing about\n    science except what the church says they shall know? I\n    have never seen any harm in learning and understanding, in\n    humility and open-mindedness, and I have never seen clearer\n    the need of that learning than when I see the attitude of the\n    prosecution, who attack and refuse to accept the information\n    and intelligence, which expert witnesses will give them.\n\n                            THE PROSECUTION\n\n    _Mr. Stewart_: Now what could these scientists testify to?\n    They could only say as an expert, qualified as an expert upon\n    this subject, I have made a study of these things and from my\n    standpoint as such an expert, I say that this does not deny the\n    story of divine creation. That is what they would testify to,\n    isn\u2019t it? That is all they could testify about.\n\n    Now, then, I say under the correct construction of the act,\n    that they cannot testify as to that. Why? Because in the\n    wording of this act the legislature itself construed the\n    instrument according to their intention.... What was the\n    general purpose of the legislature here? It was to prevent\n    teaching in the public schools of any county in Tennessee that\n    theory which says that man is descended from a lower order of\n    animals. That is the intent and nobody can dispute it under the\n    shining sun of this day.\n\n                               THE COURT\n\n    Now upon these issues as brought up it becomes the duty of the\n    Court to determine the question of the admissibility of this\n    expert testimony offered by the defendant.\n\n    It is not within the province of the Court under these issues\n    to decide and determine which is true, the story of divine\n    creation as taught in the Bible, or the story of the creation\n    of man as taught by evolution.\n\n    If the state is correct in its insistence, it is immaterial,\n    so far as the results of this case are concerned, as to\n    which theory is true; because it is within the province of\n    the legislative branch, and not the judicial branch of the\n    government to pass upon the policy of a statute; and the policy\n    of this statute having been passed upon by that department of\n    the government, this court is not further concerned as to its\n    policy; but is interested only in its proper interpretation\n    and, if valid, its enforcement.... Therefore the court is\n    content to sustain the motion of the attorney-general to\n    exclude expert testimony.\n\n                            THE PROSECUTION\n\n    _Mr. Stewart_ (during Mr. Darrow\u2019s cross-examination of Mr.\n    Bryan): I want to interpose another objection. What is the\n    purpose of this examination?\n\n    _Mr. Bryan_: The purpose is to cast ridicule upon everybody\n    who believes in the Bible, and I am perfectly willing that the\n    world shall know that these gentlemen have no other purpose\n    than ridiculing every Christian who believes in the Bible.\n\n                              THE DEFENSE\n\n    _Mr. Darrow_: We have the purpose of preventing bigots and\n    ignoramuses from controlling the education of the United\n    States, and you know it, and that is all.\n\n    Statements of Noted Scientists as Filed into Record by Defense\n    Counsel\n\n    _Charles H. Judd, Director of School of Education, University\n    of Chicago_: It will be impossible, in my judgment, in the\n    state university, as well as in the normal schools, to teach\n    adequately psychology or the science of education without\n    making constant reference to all the facts of mental\n    development which are included in the general doctrine of\n    evolution.... Whatever may be the constitutional rights of\n    legislatures to prescribe the general course of study of public\n    schools it will, in my judgment, be a serious national disaster\n    if the attempt is successful to determine the details to be\n    taught in the schools through the vote of legislatures rather\n    than as a result of scientific investigation.\n\n    _Jacob G. Lipman, Dean of the College of Agriculture, State\n    University of New Jersey_: With these facts and interpretations\n    of organic evolution left out, the agricultural colleges and\n    experimental stations could not render effective service to our\n    great agricultural industry.\n\n    _Wilbur A. Nelson, State Geologist of Tennessee_: It,\n    therefore, appears that it would be impossible to study or\n    teach geology in Tennessee or elsewhere, without using the\n    theory of evolution.\n\n    _Kirtley F. Mather, Chairman of the Department of Geology,\n    Harvard University_: Science has not even a guess as to the\n    original source or sources of matter. It deals with immediate\n    causes and effects.... Men of science have as their aim the\n    discovery of facts. They seek with open eyes, willing to\n    recognize it, as Huxley said, even if it \u201csears the eyeballs.\u201d\n    After they have discovered truth, and not till then, do they\n    consider what its moral implications may be. Thus far, and\n    presumably always, truth when found is also found to be right,\n    in the moral sense of the word.... As Henry Ward Beecher said,\n    forty years ago, \u201cIf to reject God\u2019s revelation in the book is\n    infidelity, what is it to reject God\u2019s revelation of himself in\n    the structure of the whole globe?\u201d\n\n    _Maynard M. Metcalf, Research Specialist in Zoology, Johns\n    Hopkins University_: Intelligent teaching of biology or\n    intelligent approach to any biological science is impossible if\n    the established fact of evolution is omitted.\n\n    _Horatio Hackett Newman, Professor of Zoology, University\n    of Chicago_: Evolution has been tried and tested in every\n    conceivable way for considerably over half a century. Vast\n    numbers of biological facts have been examined in the light of\n    this principle and without a single exception they have been\n    entirely compatible with it.... The evolution principle is thus\n    a great unifying and integrating scientific conception. Any\n    conception that is so far-reaching, so consistent, and that has\n    led to so much advance in the understanding of nature, is at\n    least an extremely valuable idea and one not lightly to be cast\n    aside in case it fails to agree with one\u2019s prejudices.\n\nThus the two sides lined up as dialectical truth and empirical fact. The\nstate legislature of Tennessee, acting in its sovereign capacity, had\npassed a measure which made it unlawful to teach that man is connatural\nwith the animals through asserting that he is descended from a \u201clower\norder\u201d of them. (There was some sparring over the meaning of the\ntechnical language of the act, but this was the general consensus.) The\nlegal question was whether John T. Scopes had violated the measure. The\nphilosophical question, which was the real focus of interest, was the\nright of a state to make this prescription.\n\nWe have referred to the kind of truth which can be dialectically\nestablished, and here we must develop further the dialectical nature of\nthe state\u2019s case. As long as it maintained this dialectical position, it\ndid not have to go into the \u201cfactual\u201d truth of evolution, despite the\noutcry from the other side. The following considerations, then, enter\ninto this \u201cdialectical\u201d prosecution.\n\nBy definition the legislature is the supreme arbiter of education within\nthe state. It is charged with the duty of promoting enlightenment and\nmorality, and to these ends it may establish common schools, require\nattendance, and review curricula either by itself or through its agents.\nThe state of Tennessee had exercised this kind of authority when it\nhad forbidden the teaching of the Bible in the public schools. Now if\nthe legislature could take a position that the publicly subsidized\nteaching of the Bible was socially undesirable, it could, from the same\nauthority, take the same position with regard to a body of science. Some\npeople might feel that the legislature was morally bound to encourage\nthe propagation of the Bible, just as some of those participating in\nthe trial seemed to think that it was morally bound to encourage the\npropagation of science. But here again the legislature is the highest\ntribunal, and no body of religious or scientific doctrine comes to it\nwith a compulsive authority. In brief, both the Ten Commandments and the\ntheory of evolution belonged in the class of things which it could elect\nor reject, depending on the systematic import of propositions underlying\nthe philosophy of the state.\n\nThe policy of the anti-evolution law was the same type of policy which\nDarrow had by inference commended only a year earlier in the famous trial\nof Loeb and Leopold. This clash is perhaps the most direct in the Scopes\ncase and deserves pointing out here. Darrow had served as defense counsel\nfor the two brilliant university graduates who had conceived the idea\nof committing a murder as a kind of intellectual exploit, to prove that\ntheir powers of foresight and care could prevent detection. The essence\nof Darrow\u2019s plea at their trial was that the two young men could not be\nheld culpable\u2014at least in the degree the state claimed\u2014because of the\ninfluences to which they had been exposed. They had been readers of a\nsystem of philosophy of allegedly anti-social tendency, and they were\nnot to be blamed if they translated that philosophy into a sanction of\ntheir deed. The effect of this plea obviously was to transfer guilt from\nthe two young men to society as a whole, acting through its laws, its\nschools, its publications, etc.\n\nNow the key thing to be observed in this plea was that Darrow was not\nasking the jury to inspect the philosophy of Nietzsche for the purpose\neither of passing upon its internal consistency or its contact with\nreality. He was asking precisely what Bryan was asking of the jury at\nDayton, namely that they take a strictly dialectical position outside it,\nviewing it as a partial universe of discourse with consequences which\ncould be adjudged good or bad. The point to be especially noted is that\nDarrow did not raise the question of whether the philosophy of Nietzsche\nexpresses necessary truth, or whether, let us say, it is essential to an\nunderstanding of the world. He was satisfied to point out that the state\nhad not been a sufficiently vigilant guardian of the forces molding the\ncharacter of its youth.\n\nBut the prosecution at Dayton could use this line of argument without\nchange. If the philosophy of Nietzsche were sufficient to instigate young\nmen to criminal actions, it might be claimed with even greater force that\nthe philosophy of evolution, which in the popular mind equated man with\nthe animals, would do the same. The state\u2019s dialectic here simply used\none of Darrow\u2019s earlier definitions to place the anti-evolution law in a\nfavorable or benevolent category. In sum: to Darrow\u2019s previous position\nthat the doctrine of Nietzsche is capable of immoral influence, Bryan\nresponded that the doctrine of evolution is likewise capable of immoral\ninfluence, and this of course was the dialectical countering of the\ndefense\u2019s position in the trial.\n\nThere remains yet a third dialectical maneuver for the prosecution. On\nthe second day of the trial Attorney-General Stewart, in reviewing the\nduties of the legislature, posed the following problem: \u201cSupposing then\nthat there should come within the minds of the people a conflict between\nliterature and science. Then what would the legislature do? Wouldn\u2019t\nthey have to interpret?... Wouldn\u2019t they have to interpret their\nconstruction of this conflict which one should be recognized or higher or\nmore in the public schools?\u201d\n\nThis point was not exploited as fully as its importance might seem to\nwarrant; but what the counsel was here declaring is that the legislature\nis necessarily the umpire in all disputes between partial universes.\nTherefore if literature and science should fall into a conflict, it would\nagain be up to the legislature to assign the priority. It is not bound\nto recognize the claims of either of these exclusively because, as we\nsaw earlier, it operates in a universe with reference to which these are\npartial bodies of discourse. The legislature is the disposer of partial\nuniverses. Accordingly when the Attorney-General took this stand, he came\nthe nearest of any of the participants in the trial to clarifying the\nstate\u2019s position, and by this we mean to showing that for the state it\nwas a matter of legal dialectic.\n\nThere is little evidence to indicate that the defense understood the\nkind of case it was up against, though naturally this is said in a\nphilosophical rather than a legal sense. After the questions of law were\nsettled, its argument assumed the substance of a plea for the truth of\nevolution, which subject was not within the scope of the indictment. We\nhave, for example, the statement of Mr. Hays already cited that the whole\ncase of the defense depended on proving that evolution is a \u201creasonable\nscientific theory.\u201d Of those who spoke for the defense, Mr. Dudley Field\nMalone seems to have had the poorest conception of the nature of the\ncontest. I must cite further from his plea because it shows most clearly\nthe trap from which the defense was never able to extricate itself.\nOn the fifth day of the trial Mr. Malone was chosen to reply to Mr.\nBryan, and in the course of his speech he made the following revealing\nutterance: \u201cYour honor, there is a difference between theological and\nscientific men. Theology deals with something that is established and\nrevealed; it seeks to gather material which they claim should not be\nchanged. It is the Word of God and that cannot be changed; it is\nliteral, it is not to be interpreted. That is the theological mind. It\ndeals with theology. The scientific mind is a modern thing, your honor.\nI am not sure Galileo was the one who brought relief to the scientific\nmind; because, theretofore, Aristotle and Plato had reached their\nconclusions and processes, by metaphysical reasoning, because they had no\ntelescope and no microscope.\u201d The part of this passage which gives his\ncase away is the distinction made at the end. Mr. Malone was asserting\nthat Aristotle and Plato got no further than they did because they lacked\nthe telescope and the microscope. To a slight extent perhaps Aristotle\nwas what we would today call a \u201cresearch scientist,\u201d but the conclusions\nand processes arrived at by the metaphysical reasoning of the two are\ndialectical, and the test of a dialectical position is logic and not\nocular visibility. At the risk of making Mr. Malone a scapegoat we must\nsay that this is an abysmal confusion of two different kinds of inquiry\nwhich the Greeks were well cognizant of. But the same confusion, if it\ndid not produce this trial, certainly helped to draw it out to its length\nof eight days. It is the assumption that human laws stand in wait upon\nwhat the scientists see in their telescopes and microscopes. But harking\nback to Professor Adler: facts are never determinative of dialectic in\nthe sense presumed by this counsel.\n\nExactly the same confusion appeared in a rhetorical plea for truth which\nMr. Malone made shortly later in the same speech. Then he said: \u201cThere is\nnever a duel with truth. The truth always wins and we are not afraid of\nit. The truth is no coward. The truth does not need the law. The truth\ndoes not need the forces of government. The truth does not need Mr.\nBryan. The truth is imperishable, eternal and immortal and needs no human\nagency to support it. We are ready to tell the truth as we understand it\nand we do not fear all the truth that they can present as facts.\u201d It is\ninstantly apparent that this presents truth in an ambiguous sense. Malone\nbegins with the simplistic assumption that there is a \u201cstandard\u201d truth,\na kind of universal, objective, operative truth which it is heinous to\noppose. That might be well enough if the meaning were highly generic,\nbut before he is through this short passage he has equated truth with\nfacts\u2014the identical confusion which we noted in his utterance about Plato\nand Aristotle. Now since the truth which dialectic arrives at is not a\ntruth of facts, this peroration either becomes irrelevant, or it lends\nitself to the other side, where, minus the concluding phrase, it could\nserve as a eulogium of dialectical truth.\n\nSuch was the dilemma by which the defense was impaled from the beginning.\nTo some extent it appears even in the expert testimony. On the day\npreceding this speech by Malone, Professor Maynard Metcalf had presented\ntestimony in court regarding the theory of evolution (this was on the\nfourth day of the trial; Judge Raulston did not make his ruling excluding\nsuch testimony until the sixth day) in which he made some statements\nwhich could have been of curious interest to the prosecution. They are\neffectually summarized in the following excerpt: \u201cEvolution and the\ntheories of evolution are fundamentally different things. The fact of\nevolution is a thing that is perfectly and absolutely clear.... The\nseries of evidences is so convincing that I think it would be entirely\nimpossible for any normal human being who was conversant with the\nphenomena to have even for a moment the least doubt even for the fact of\nevolution, but he might have tremendous doubts as to the truth of any\nhypothesis....\u201d\n\nWe first notice here a clear recognition of the kinds of truth\ndistinguished by Adler, with the \u201cfact\u201d of evolution belonging to the\nfirst order and theories of evolution belonging to the second. The\nsecond, which is referred to by the term \u201chypothesis,\u201d consists of facts\nin an elaboration. We note furthermore that this scientist has called\nthem fundamentally different things\u2014so different that one is entitled\nto have not merely doubts but \u201ctremendous doubts\u201d about the second.\nNow let us imagine the dialecticians of the opposite side approaching\nhim with the following. You have said, Professor Metcalf, that the\nfact of evolution and the various theories of evolution are two quite\ndifferent things. You have also said that the theories of evolution are\nso debatable or questionable that you can conceive of much difference\nof opinion about them. Now if there is an order of knowledge above this\norder of theories, which order you admit to be somewhat speculative,\na further order of knowledge which is philosophical or evaluative, is\nit not likely that there would be in this realm still more alternative\npositions, still more room for doubt or difference of opinion? And if all\nthis is so, would you expect people to assent to a proposition of this\norder in the same way you expect them to assent to, say, the proposition\nthat a monkey has vertebrae? And if you do make these admissions, can\nyou any longer maintain that people of opposite views on the teaching of\nevolution are simply defiers of the truth? This is how the argument might\nhave progressed had some Greek Darwin thrown Athens into an uproar; but\nthis argument was, after all, in an American court of law.\n\nIt should now be apparent from these analyses that the defense was\nnever able to meet the state\u2019s case on dialectical grounds. Even if it\nhad boldly accepted the contest on this level, it is difficult to see\nhow it could have won, for the dialectic must probably have followed\nthis course: First Proposition, All teaching of evolution is harmful.\nCounter Proposition, No teaching of evolution is harmful. Resolution,\nSome teaching of evolution is harmful. Now the resolution was exactly\nthe position taken by the law, which was that some teaching of evolution\n(i.e., the teaching of it in state-supported schools) was an anti-social\nmeasure. Logically speaking, the proposition that \u201cSome teaching of\nevolution is harmful,\u201d does not exclude the proposition that \u201cSome\nteaching of evolution is not harmful,\u201d but there was the fact that the\nlaw permitted some teaching of evolution (e.g., the teaching of it in\nschools not supported by the public funds). In this situation there\nseemed nothing for the defense to do but stick by the second proposition\nand plead for that proposition rhetorically. So science entered the\njuridical arena and argued for the value of science. In this argument the\nchief topic was consequence. There was Malone\u2019s statement that without\nthe theory of evolution Burbank would not have been able to produce his\nresults. There was Lipman\u2019s statement that without an understanding of\nthe theory of evolution the agricultural colleges could not carry on\ntheir work. There were the statements of Judd and Nelson that large\nareas of education depended upon a knowledge of evolution. There was\nthe argument brought out by Professor Mather of Harvard: \u201cWhen men are\noffered their choice between science, with its confident and unanimous\nacceptance of the evolutionary principle, on the one hand, and religion,\nwith its necessary appeal to things unseen and improvable, on the other,\nthey are much more likely to abandon religion than to abandon science.\nIf such a choice is forced upon us, the churches will lose many of their\nbest educated young people, the very ones upon whom they must depend for\nleadership in coming years.\u201d\n\nWe noted at the beginning of this chapter that rhetoric deals with\nsubjects at the point where they touch upon actuality or prudential\nconduct. Here the defense looks at the policy of teaching evolution and\npoints to beneficial results. The argument then becomes: these important\nbenefits imply an important beneficial cause. This is why we can say that\nthe pleaders for science were forced into the non-scientific role of the\nrhetorician.\n\nThe prosecution incidentally also had an argument from consequences,\nalthough it was never employed directly. When Bryan maintained that the\nphilosophy of evolution might lead to the same results as the philosophy\nof Nietzsche had led with Loeb and Leopold, he was opening a subject\nwhich could have supplied such an argument, say in the form of a concrete\ninstance of moral beliefs weakened by someone\u2019s having been indoctrinated\nwith evolution. But there was really no need: as we have sought to show\nall along, the state had an immense strategic advantage in the fact that\nlaws belong to the category of dialectical determinations, and it clung\nfirmly to this advantage.\n\nAn irascible exchange which Darrow had with the judge gives an idea of\nthe frustration which the defense felt at this stage. There had been an\nargument about the propriety of a cross-examination.\n\n    _The Court_: Colonel [Darrow], what is the purpose of\n    cross-examination?\n\n    _Mr. Darrow_: The purpose of cross-examination is to be used on\n    trial.\n\n    _The Court_: Well, isn\u2019t that an effort to ascertain the truth?\n\n    _Mr. Darrow_: No, it is an effort to show prejudice. Nothing\n    else. Has there been any effort to ascertain the truth in this\n    case? Why not bring in the jury and let us prove it?\n\nThe truth referred to by the judge was whether the action of Scopes\nfell within the definition of the law; the truth referred to by Darrow\nwas the facts of evolution (not submitted to the jury as evidence);\nand \u201cprejudice\u201d was a crystallized opinion of the theory of evolution,\nexpressed now as law.\n\nIf we have appeared here to assign too complete a forensic victory to the\nprosecution, let us return, by way of recapitulating the issues, to the\nrelationship between positive science and dialectic. Many people, perhaps\na majority in this country, have felt that the position of the State\nof Tennessee was absurd because they are unable to see how a logical\nposition can be taken without reference to empirical situations. But it\nis just the nature of logic and dialectic to be a science without any\ncontent as it is the nature of biology or any positive science to be a\nscience of empirical content.\n\nWe see the nature of this distinction when we realize that there is never\nan argument, in the true sense of the term, about facts. When facts are\ndisputed, the argument must be suspended until the facts are settled.\nNot until then may it be resumed, for all true argument is about the\nmeaning of established or admitted facts. And since this meaning is\nalways expressed in propositions, we can say further that all argument\nis about the systematic import of propositions. While that remains so,\nthe truth of the theory of evolution or of any scientific theory can\nnever be settled in a court of law. The court could admit the facts into\nthe record, but the process of legal determination would deal with the\nmeaning of the facts, and it could not go beyond saying that the facts\ncomport, or do not comport, with the meanings of other propositions.\nThus its task is to determine their place in a system of discourse and\nif possible to effect a resolution in accordance with the movement of\ndialectic. It is necessary that logic in its position as ultimate arbiter\npreserve this indifference toward that actuality which is the touchstone\nof scientific fact.\n\nIt is plain that those who either expected or hoped that science would\nwin a sweeping victory in the Tennessee courtroom were the same people\nwho believe that science can take the place of speculative wisdom.\nThe only consolation they had in the course of the trial was the\nembarrassment to which Darrow brought Bryan in questioning him about the\nBible and the theory of evolution (during which Darrow did lead Bryan\ninto some dialectical traps). But in strict consideration all of this\nwas outside the bounds of the case because both the facts of evolution\nand the facts of the Bible were \u201citems not in discourse,\u201d to borrow a\nphrase employed by Professor Adler. That is to say, their correctness had\nto be determined by scientific means of investigation, if at all; but\nthe relationship between the law and theories of man\u2019s origin could be\ndetermined only by legal casuistry, in the non-pejorative sense of that\nphrase.\n\nAs we intimated at the beginning, a sufficient grasp of what the case\nwas about would have resulted in there being no case, or in there being\nquite a different case. As the events turned out science received, in\nthe popular estimation, a check in the trial but a moral victory, and\nthis only led to more misunderstanding of the province of science in\nhuman affairs. The law of the State of Tennessee won a victory which was\nregarded as pyrrhic because it was generally felt to have made the law\nand the lawmakers look foolish. This also was a disservice to the common\nweal. Both of these results could have been prevented if it had been\nunderstood that science is one thing and law another. An understanding of\nthat truth would seem to require some general dissemination throughout\nour educated classes of a _Summa Dialectica_. This means that the\neducated people of our country would have to be so trained that they\ncould see the dialectical possibility of the opposites of the beliefs\nthey possess. And that is a very large order for education in any age.\n\n\n\n\nChapter III\n\nEDMUND BURKE AND THE ARGUMENT FROM CIRCUMSTANCE\n\n\nWe are now in position to affirm that the rhetorical study of an argument\nbegins with a study of the sources. But since almost any extended\nargument will draw upon more than one source we must look, to answer the\ninquiry we are now starting, at the prevailing source, or the source\nwhich is most frequently called upon in the total persuasive effort.\nWe shall say that this predominating source gives to the argument an\naspect, and our present question is, what can be inferred from the\naspect of any argument or body of arguments about the philosophy of its\nmaker? All men argue alike when they argue validly because the modes\nof inference are formulas, from which deviation is error. Therefore\nwe characterize inference only as valid or invalid. But the reasoner\nreveals his philosophical position by the source of argument which\nappears most often in his major premise because the major premise tells\nus how he is thinking about the world. In other words, the rhetorical\ncontent of the major premise which the speaker habitually uses is the\nkey to his primary view of existence. We are of course excluding artful\nchoices which have in view only _ad hoc_ persuasions. Putting the matter\nnow figuratively, we may say that no man escapes being branded by the\npremise that he regards as most efficacious in an argument. The general\nimportance of this is that major premises, in addition to their logical\nfunction as part of a deductive argument, are expressive of values, and\na characteristic major premise characterizes the user.\n\nTo see this principle in application, let us take three of the chief\nsources of argument recognized by the classical rhetoricians. We may\nlook first at the source which is _genus_. All arguments made through\ngenus are arguments based on the nature of the thing which is said\nto constitute the genus. What the argument from genus then says is\nthat \u201cgeneric\u201d classes have a nature which can be predicated of their\nspecies. Thus _man_ has a nature including _mortality_, which quality\ncan therefore be predicated of the man Socrates and the man John Smith.\nThe underlying postulate here, that things have a nature, is of course a\ndisputable view of the world, for it involves the acceptance of a realm\nof essence. Yet anyone who uses such source of argument is committed to\nthis wider assumption. Now it follows that those who habitually argue\nfrom genus are in their personal philosophy idealists. To them the idea\nof genus is a reflection of existence. We are saying, accordingly, that\narguments which make predominant use of genus have an aspect through\nthis source, and that the aspect may be employed to distinguish the\nphilosophy of the author. It will be found, to cite a concrete example,\nthat John Henry Newman regularly argues from genus; he begins with the\nnature of the thing and then makes the application. The question of what\na university is like is answered by applying the idea of a university.\nThe question of what man ought to study is answered by working out a\nconception of the nature of man. And we shall find in a succeeding essay\nthat Abraham Lincoln, although he has become a patron for liberals and\npragmatists, was a consistent user of the argument from genus. His\nrefusal to hedge on the principle of slavery is referable to a fixed\nconcept of the nature of man. This, then, will serve to characterize the\nargument from genus.\n\nAnother important source of argument is _similitude_. Whereas those\nwho argue from genus argue from a fixed class, those who argue from\nsimilitude invoke essential (though not exhaustive) correspondences.\nIf one were to say, for example, that whatever has the divine attribute\nof reason is likely to have also the divine attribute of immortality,\none would be using similitude to establish a probability. Thinkers\nof the analogical sort use this argument chiefly. If required to\ncharacterize the outlook it implies, we should say that it expresses\nbelief in a oneness of the world, which causes all correspondence to have\nprobative value. Proponents of this view tend to look toward some final,\ntranscendental unity, and as we might expect, this type of argument\nis used widely by poets and religionists.[26] John Bunyan used it\nconstantly; so did Emerson.\n\nA third type we shall mention, the type which provides our access\nto Burke, is the argument from _circumstance_. The argument from\ncircumstance is, as the name suggests, the nearest of all arguments to\npurest expediency. This argument merely reads the circumstances\u2014the\n\u201cfacts standing around\u201d\u2014and accepts them as coercive, or allows them to\ndictate the decision. If one should say, \u201cThe city must be surrendered\nbecause the besiegers are so numerous,\u201d one would be arguing not from\ngenus, or similitude, but from a present circumstance. The expression\n\u201cIn view of the situation, what else are you going to do?\u201d constitutes a\nsort of proposition-form for this type of argument. Such argument savors\nof urgency rather than of perspicacity; and it seems to be preferred\nby those who are easily impressed by existing tangibles. Whereas the\nargument from consequence attempts a forecast of results, the argument\nfrom circumstance attempts only an estimate of current conditions\nor pressures. By thus making present circumstance the overbearing\nconsideration, it keeps from sight even the nexus of cause and effect.\nIt is the least philosophical of all the sources of argument, since\ntheoretically it stops at the level of perception of fact.\n\nBurke is widely respected as a conservative who was intelligent enough\nto provide solid philosophical foundations for his conservatism. It\nis perfectly true that many of his observations upon society have a\nconservative basis; but if one studies the kind of argument which Burke\nregularly employed when at grips with concrete policies, one discovers a\nstrong addiction to the argument from circumstance. Now for reasons which\nwill be set forth in detail later, the argument from circumstance is the\nargument philosophically appropriate to the liberal. Indeed, one can\ngo much further and say that it is the argument fatal to conservatism.\nHowever much Burke eulogized tradition and fulminated against the\nFrench Revolution, he was, when judged by what we are calling aspect of\nargument, very far from being a conservative; and we suggest here that\na man\u2019s method of argument is a truer index in his beliefs than his\nexplicit profession of principles. Here is a means whereby he is revealed\nin his work. Burke\u2019s voluminous controversies give us ample opportunity\nto test him by this rule.\n\nThere is some point in beginning with Burke\u2019s treatment of the existing\nCatholic question, an issue which drew forth one of his earliest\npolitical compositions and continued to engage his attention throughout\nhis life. As early as 1765 he had become concerned with the extraordinary\nlegal disabilities imposed upon Catholics in Ireland, and about this time\nhe undertook a treatise entitled _Tract on the Popery Laws_. Despite the\nfact that in this treatise Burke professes belief in natural law, going\nso far as to assert that all human laws are but declaratory, the type\nof argument he uses chiefly is the secular argument from circumstance.\nAfter a review of the laws and penalties, he introduces his \u201ccapital\nconsideration.\u201d\n\n    The first and most capital consideration with regard to this,\n    as to every object, is the extent of it. And here it is\n    necessary to premise: this system of penalty and incapacity\n    has for its object no small sect or obscure party, but a very\n    numerous body of men\u2014a body which comprehends at least two\n    thirds of the whole nation: it amounts to 2,800,000 souls,\n    a number sufficient for the materials constituent of a great\n    people.[27]\n\nHe then gave his reason for placing the circumstance first.\n\n    This consideration of the magnitude of the object ought to\n    attend us through the whole inquiry: if it does not always\n    affect the reason, it is always decisive on the importance of\n    the question. It not only makes itself a more leading point,\n    but complicates itself with every other part of the matter,\n    giving every error, minute in itself, a character and a\n    significance from its application. It is therefore not to be\n    wondered at, if we perpetually recur to it in the course of\n    this essay.[28]\n\nThe _Tract_ was planned in such a way as to continue this thought, while\naccompanying it with discussion of the impediment to national prosperity,\nand of \u201cthe impolicy of those laws, as they affect the national\nsecurity.\u201d This early effort established the tenor of his thinking on the\nsubject.\n\nWhile representing Bristol in Parliament, Burke alienated a part of\nhis constituency by supporting Sir George Savile\u2019s measure to ease\nthe restraints upon Catholics. In the famous _Speech to the Electors\nof Bristol_ he devoted a large portion of his time to a justification\nof that course, and here, it is true, he made principal use of the\nargument from genus (\u201cjustice\u201d) and from consequence. The argument from\ncircumstance is not forgotten, but is tucked away at the end to persuade\nthe \u201cbigoted enemies to liberty.\u201d There, using again his criterion of the\n\u201cmagnitude of the object,\u201d he said:\n\n    Gentlemen, it is possible you may not know that the people\n    of that persuasion in Ireland amount to at least sixteen or\n    seventeen hundred thousand souls. I do not at all exaggerate\n    the number. A nation to be _persecuted_! Whilst we were masters\n    of the sea, embodied with America and in alliance with half\n    the powers of the continent, we might, perhaps, in that remote\n    corner of Europe, afford to tyrannize with impunity. But there\n    is a revolution in our affairs which makes it prudent for us to\n    be just.[29]\n\nDuring the last decade of his life, Burke wrote a series of letters\nupon the Catholic question and upon Irish affairs, in which, of\ncourse, this question figured largely. In 1792 came _A Letter to Sir\nHercules Langrishe, M.P._, upon the propriety of admitting Catholics\nto the elective franchise. Here we find him taking a pragmatic view\nof liberality toward Catholics. He reasoned as follows regarding the\nrestoration of the franchise:\n\n    If such means can with any probability be shown, from\n    circumstances, rather to add strength to our mixed\n    ecclesiastical and secular constitution, than to weaken it;\n    surely they are means infinitely to be preferred to penalties,\n    incapacities, and proscriptions continued from generation to\n    generation.[30]\n\nIn this instance the consideration of magnitude took a more extended form:\n\n    How much more, certainly, ought they [the disqualifying laws]\n    to give way, when, as in our case, they affect, not here and\n    there, in some particular point or in their consequence,\n    but universally, collectively and directly, the fundamental\n    franchises of a people, equal to the whole inhabitants of\n    several respectable kingdoms and states, equal to the subjects\n    of the kings of Sardinia or of Denmark; equal to those of the\n    United Netherlands, and more than are to be found in all the\n    states of Switzerland. This way of proscribing men by whole\n    nations, as it were, from all the benefits of the constitution\n    to which they were born, I never can believe to be politic or\n    expedient, much less necessary for the existence of any state\n    or church in the world.[31]\n\nGreatly exercised over events in France, Burke came to think of\nChristianity as the one force with enough cohesion to check the spread\nof the Revolution. Then in 1795 he wrote the _Letter to William Smith,\nEsq._ Here he described Christianity as \u201cthe grand prejudice ... which\nholds all the other prejudices together\u201d;[32] and such prejudices, as\nhe visualized them, were essential to the fabric of society. He told\nhis correspondent candidly: \u201cMy whole politics, at present, center in\none point; and to this the merit or demerit of every measure (with me)\nis referable; that is, what will most promote or depress the cause of\nJacobinism.\u201d[33] In a second letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, written in\nthe same year, he could say: \u201cIn the Catholic Question I considered only\none point. Was it at the time, and in the circumstances, a measure which\ntended to promote the concord of the citizens.\u201d[34]\n\nOnly once did Burke approach the question of religion through what may be\nproperly termed an argument from definition. In the last year of his life\nhe composed _A Letter on the Affairs of Ireland_, one passage of which\nconsiders religion not in its bearing upon some practical measure, but\nwith reference to its essential nature.\n\n    Let every man be as pious as he pleases, and in the way that he\n    pleases; but it is agreeable neither to piety nor to policy to\n    give exclusively all manner of civil privileges and advantages\n    to a _negative_ religion\u2014such is the Protestant without a\n    certain creed; and at the same time to deny those privileges to\n    men whom we know to agree to an iota in every one _positive_\n    doctrine, which all of us, who profess religion authoritatively\n    taught in England, hold ourselves, according to our faculties,\n    bound to believe.[35]\n\nIt is not purely an argument from definition, but it contains such an\nargument, and so contrasts with his dominant position on a subject which\nengaged much of his thought and seems to have filled him with sincere\nfeeling.\n\nWe shall examine him now on another major subject to engage his\nstatesmanship, the rebellion of the North American Colonies against Great\nBritain. By common admission today, Burke\u2019s masterpiece of forensic\neloquence is the speech moving his resolutions for conciliation with that\ndisaffected part of the Empire, delivered in the House of Commons on\nMarch 22, 1775. In admiring the felicities with which this great oration\nundoubtedly abounds, it is easy to overlook the fact that it is from\nbeginning to end an argument from circumstance. It is not an argument\nabout rights or definitions, as Burke explicitly says at two or three\npoints; it is an argument about policy as dictated by circumstances.\nIts burden is a plea to conciliate the colonies because they are waxing\ngreat. No subtlety of interpretation is required to establish this truth,\nbecause we can substantially establish it in the express language of\nBurke himself.\n\nTo see the aspect of this argument, it is useful to begin by looking\nat the large alternatives which the orator enumerates for Parliament\nin the exigency. The first of these is to change the spirit of the\nColonies by rendering it more submissive. Circumventing the theory of\nthe relationship of ruler and ruled, Burke sets aside this alternative\nas impractical. He admits that an effort to bring about submission would\nbe \u201cradical in its principle\u201d (_i.e._, would have a root in principle);\nbut he sees too many obstacles in geography, ethnology, and other\ncircumstances to warrant the trial.\n\nThe second alternative is to prosecute the Colonists as criminal. At this\npoint, the \u201cmagnitude of the object\u201d again enters his equation, and he\nwould distinguish between the indictment of a single individual and the\nindictment of a whole people as things different in kind. The number and\nvigor of the Americans constitute an embarrassing circumstance. Therefore\nhis thought issues in the oft-quoted statement \u201cI do not know the method\nof drawing up an indictment against a whole people.\u201d[36] This was said,\nit should be recalled, despite the fact that history is replete with\nproceedings against rebellious subjects.[37] But Burke had been an agent\nfor the colony of New York; he had studied the geography and history of\nthe Colonies with his usual industry; and we may suppose him to have had\na much clearer idea than his colleagues in Parliament of their power to\nsupport a conflict.\n\nIt is understandable, by this view, that his third alternative should\nbe \u201cto comply with the American spirit as necessary.\u201d He told his\nfellow Commoners plainly that his proposal had nothing to do with the\nlegal right of taxation. \u201cMy consideration is narrow, confined, and\nwholly limited to the policy of the question.\u201d[38] This policy he\nlater characterizes as \u201csystematic indulgence.\u201d The outcome of this\ndisjunctive argument is then a measure to accommodate a circumstance.\nThe circumstance is that America is a growing country, of awesome\npotentiality, whose strength, both actual and imminent, makes it\nadvisable for the Mother Country to overlook abstract rights. In a\nperoration, the topic of abstract rights is assigned to those \u201cvulgar and\nmechanical politicians,\u201d who are \u201cnot fit to turn a wheel in the machine\u201d\nof Empire.[39]\n\nWith this conclusion in mind, it will be instructive to see how the\norator prepared the way for his proposal. The entire first part of his\ndiscourse may be described as a depiction of the circumstance which\nis to be his source of argument. After a circumspect beginning, in\nwhich he calls attention to the signs of rebellion and derides the\nnotion of \u201cpaper government,\u201d he devotes a long and brilliant passage\nto simple characterization of the Colonies and their inhabitants. The\nunavoidable effect of this passage is to impress upon his hearers the\nsize and resources of this portion of the Empire. First he takes up the\nrapidly growing population, then the extensive trade, then the spirit\nof enterprise, and finally the personal character of the Colonists\nthemselves. Outstanding even in this colorful passage is his account of\nthe New England whaling industry.\n\n    Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice,\n    and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses\n    of Hudson\u2019s Bay and Davis\u2019s Straits, whilst we are looking\n    for them beneath the Arctic Circle, we hear that they have\n    pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they\n    are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen Serpent\n    of the South. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and\n    romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but\n    a stage and resting-place in the progress of their victorious\n    industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to\n    them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know\n    that whilst some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon\n    on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude and pursue\n    their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what\n    is vexed by their fisheries; no climate that is not witness\n    to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the\n    activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of\n    English enterprise ever carried this most perilous mode of hard\n    industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this\n    recent people; a people who are still, as it were, but in the\n    gristle; and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood.[40]\n\nIt is the spectacle of this enterprise which induces Burke to \u201cpardon\nsomething to the spirit of liberty.\u201d\n\nThe long recital is closed with an appeal which may be fitly regarded\nas the _locus classicus_ of the argument from circumstance. For with\nthis impressive review of the fierce spirit of the colonists before\nhis audience, Burke declares: \u201cThe question is, not whether the spirit\ndeserves praise or blame, but\u2014what, in the name of God, shall we do with\nit?\u201d[41] The question then is not what is right or wrong, or what accords\nwith our idea of justice or our scheme of duty; it is, how can we meet\nthis circumstance? \u201cI am not determining a point of law; I am restoring\ntranquillity.\u201d[42] The circumstance becomes the cue of the policy. We\nmust remind ourselves that our concern here is not to pass upon the\nmerits of a particular controversy, but to note the term which Burke\nevidently considered most efficacious in moving his hearers. \u201cPolitical\nreason,\u201d he says, elsewhere, \u201cis a computing principle.\u201d[43] Where does\npolitical reason in this instance leave him? It leaves him inevitably in\nthe middle, keeping the Colonies, but not as taxable parts of the Empire,\nallowing them to pay their own charge by voluntary grants. In Burke\u2019s\ncharacteristic view, the theoretic relationship has been altered by the\nmedium until the thirteen (by his count fourteen) colonies of British\nNorth America are left halfway between colonial and national status. The\nposition of the Tories meant that either the Colonies would be colonies\nor they would terminate their relationship with the Empire. Burke\u2019s case\nwas that by concession to circumstance they could be retained in some\nform, and this would be a victory for policy. Philosophers of starker\nprinciple, like Tom Paine, held that a compromise of the Burkean type\nwould have been unacceptable in the long run even to the Americans, and\nthe subsequent crystallization of American nationality seems to support\nthis view. But Burke thought he saw a way to preserve an institution by\nmaking way for a large corporeal fact.\n\nIt must be confessed that Burke\u2019s interest in the affairs of India,\nand more specifically in the conduct of the East India Company, is not\nreconcilable in quite the same way with the thesis of this chapter.\nCertainly there is nothing in mean motives or contracted views to explain\nwhy he should have labored over a period of fourteen years to benefit\na people with whom he had no contact and from whom he could expect no\ndirect token of appreciation. But it must be emphasized that the subject\nof this essay is methods, and even in this famous case Burke found some\nopportunity to utilize his favorite source.\n\nIn 1783, years before the impeachment of Warren Hastings, he made a long\nspeech in Parliament attacking Fox\u2019s East India Bill. He was by then\ndeeply impressed by the wrongs done the Indians by British adventurers,\nyet it will be observed that his _habitus_ reveals itself in the\nfollowing passages. He said of the East India Company:\n\n    I do not presume to condemn those who argue _a priori_ against\n    the propriety of leaving such extensive political power in the\n    hands of a company of merchants. I know much is, and much more\n    may be, said against such a system. But, with my particular\n    ideas and sentiments, I cannot go that way to work. I feel\n    an insuperable reluctance in giving my hand to destroy any\n    established institution of government, upon a theory, however\n    plausible it may be.[44]\n\nThen shortly he continued:\n\n    To justify us in taking the administration of their affairs\n    out of the hands of the East India Company, as my principles,\n    I must see several conditions. 1st, the object affected by the\n    abuse must be great and important. 2nd, the abuse affecting\n    the great object ought to be a great abuse. 3rd, it ought to\n    be habitual and not accidental. 4th, it ought to be utterly\n    incurable in the body as it now stands constituted.[45]\n\nIt is pertinent to observe that Burke\u2019s first condition here is exactly\nthe first condition raised with reference to the Irish Catholics and\nwith reference to the American Colonies. It is further characteristic of\nhis method that the passages cited above are followed immediately by a\ndescription of the extent and wealth and civilization of India, just as\nthe plea for approaching the Colonies with reconciliation was followed\nby a vivid advertisement of their extent and wealth and enterprise. The\nargument is for justice, but it is conditioned upon a circumstance.\n\nWhen Burke undertook the prosecution of Hastings in 1788, these\nconsiderations seemed far from his mind. The splendid opening charge\ncontains arguments strictly from genus, despite the renunciation of\nsuch arguments which we see above. He attacked the charter of the East\nIndia Company by showing that it violated the idea of a charter.[46]\nHe affirmed the natural rights of man, and held that they had been\ncriminally denied in India.[47] He scorned the notion of geographical\nmorality. These sound like the utterances of a man committed to abstract\nright. Lord Morley has some observations on Burke which may contain\nthe explanation. His study of Burke\u2019s career led him to feel that\n\u201cdirect moral or philanthropic apostleship was not his function.\u201d[48]\nOf his interest in India, he remarked: \u201cIt was reverence rather\nthan sensibility, a noble and philosophic conservatism rather than\nphilanthropy, which raised the storm in Burke\u2019s breast against the\nrapacity of English adventurers in India, and the imperial crimes of\nHastings.\u201d[49] If it is true that Burke acted out of reverence rather\nthan out of sensibility or philanthropy, what was the reverence of? It\nwas, likely, for storied India, for an ancient and opulent civilization\nwhich had brought religion and the arts to a high point of development\nwhile his ancestors were yet \u201cin the woods.\u201d There is just enough of\ndeference for the established and going concern, for panoply, for that\nwhich has prestige, to make us feel that Burke was again impressed\u2014with\nan intended consequence which was noble, of course; but it is only fair\nto record this component of the situation.\n\nThe noble and philosophic conservatism next translated itself into a\nviolent opposition to the French Revolution, which was threatening to\nbring down a still greater structure of rights and dignities, though in\nthis instance in the name of reform and emancipation.\n\nThe French Revolution was the touchstone of Burke. Those who have\nregarded his position on this event as a reversal, or a sign of fatigue\nand senescence, have not sufficiently analyzed his methods and his\nsources. Burke would have had to become a new man to take any other stand\nthan he did on the French Revolution. It was an event perfectly suited to\nmark off those who argue from circumstance, for it was one of the most\nradical revolutions on record, and it was the work of a people fond of\nlogical rigor and clear demonstration.\n\nWhy Burke, who had championed the Irish Catholics, the American\ncolonists, and the Indians should have championed on this occasion the\nnobility and the propertied classes of Europe is easy to explain. For him\nEurope, with all its settlements and usages, was the circumstance; and\nthe Revolution was the challenge to it. From first to last Burke saw the\ngrand upheaval as a contest between inherited condition and speculative\ninsight. The circumstance said that Europe should go on; the Revolution\nsaid that it should cease and begin anew.[50] Burke\u2019s position was not\nselfish; it was prudential within the philosophy we have seen him to hold.\n\nActually his _Reflections on the Revolution in France_ divides itself\ninto two parts. The first is an attempt, made with a zeal which seems\nalmost excessive, to prove that the British government was the product\nof slow accretion of precedent, that it is for that reason a beneficent\nand stable government, and that the British have renounced, through their\nchoice of methods in the past, any theoretical right to change their\ngovernment by revolution. The second part is a miscellany of remarks on\nthe proceedings in France, in which many shrewd observations of human\nnature are mingled with eloquent appeals on behalf of the _ancien r\u00e9gime_.\n\nBurke appears terrified by the thought that the ultimate sources and\nsanctions of government should be brought out into broad daylight for the\ninspection of everyone, and the first effort was to clothe the British\ngovernment with a kind of concealment against this sort of inspection,\nwhich could, of course, result in the testing of that government by\nwhat might have been or might yet be. The second effort was to show\nthat France, instead of embarking on a career of progress through her\ndaring revolution, \u201chad abandoned her interest, that she might prostitute\nher virtue.\u201d It will be observed that in both of these, a presumed\nwell-being is the source of his argument. Therefore we have the familiar\nrecourse to concrete situation.\n\n    Circumstances (which with some gentlemen, pass for nothing)\n    give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing\n    color and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what\n    render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious\n    to mankind. Abstractedly speaking, government, as well as\n    liberty, is good; yet could I, in common sense, ten years ago,\n    have felicitated France upon her enjoyment of a government (for\n    she then had a government) without inquiring what the nature\n    of the government was, or how it was administered? Can I now\n    congratulate the same nation on its freedom?[51]\n\nIn his _Letter to a Member of the National Assembly_ (1791) he said:\n\n    What a number of faults have led to this multitude of\n    misfortunes, and almost all from this one source\u2014that of\n    considering certain general maxims, without attending to\n    circumstances, to times, to places, to conjectures, and to\n    actors! If we do not attend scrupulously to all of these, the\n    medicine of today becomes the poison of tomorrow.[52]\n\nThis was the gist of such advice as Burke had for the French. That they\nshould build on what they had instead of attempting to found _de novo_,\nthat they should adapt necessary changes to existing conditions, and\nabove all that they should not sacrifice the sources of dignity and\ncontinuity in the state\u2014these made up a sort of gospel of precedent and\ngradualism which he preached to the deaf ears across the Channel. We\nbehold him here in his characteristic political position, but forced to\ndig a little deeper, to give his theorems a more general application,\nand, it is hardly unjust to say, to make what really constitutes a\ndenial of philosophy take on some semblance of philosophy. Yet Burke was\ncertainly never at a greater height rhetorically in defending a reigning\ncircumstance. Let us listen to him for a moment on the virtues of old\nEurope.\n\n    But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters,\n    economists, and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of\n    Europe is extinguished forever. Never, never more shall we\n    behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud\n    submission, that dignified obedience, the subordination of\n    the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the\n    spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the\n    cheap defense of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment, is\n    gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity\n    of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired\n    courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever\n    it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by\n    losing all its grossness.\n\n    This mixed system of opinion and sentiment had its origin in\n    the ancient chivalry; and the principle, though varied in its\n    appearance by the varying state of human affairs, subsisted and\n    influenced through a long succession of generations, even to\n    the time we live in. If it should ever be totally extinguished,\n    the loss I fear will be great. It is this which has given its\n    character to modern Europe. It is this which has distinguished\n    it under all its forms of government, and distinguished it\n    to its advantage, from the states of Asia, and possibly from\n    those states which flourished in the most brilliant periods\n    of the antique world. It was this, which, without confounding\n    ranks, has produced a noble equality and handed it down through\n    all the gradations of social life. It was this opinion which\n    mitigated kings into companions, and raised private men to be\n    fellows with kings. Without force or opposition, it subdued the\n    fierceness of pride and power; it obliged sovereigns to submit\n    to the soft collar of social esteem, compelled stern authority\n    to submit to elegance, and gave a dominating vanquisher of laws\n    to be subdued by manners.\n\n    But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions which\n    made power gentle and obedience liberal, which harmonized the\n    different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation,\n    incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify\n    and soften private society, are to be dissolved by the new\n    conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery\n    of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas,\n    furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the\n    heart owns and the imagination ratifies, as necessary to cover\n    the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to\n    dignity in our own estimation, are to be exposed as ridiculous,\n    absurd, and antiquated fashions.[53]\n\nWith the writings on French affairs, Burke\u2019s argument from circumstance\ncame full flower.\n\nThese citations are enough to show a partiality toward argument of\nthis aspect. But a rehearsal of his general observations on politics\nand administration will show it in even clearer light. Burke had an\nobsessive dislike of metaphysics and the methods of the metaphysician.\nThere is scarcely a peroration or passage of appeal in his works which\ndoes not contain a gibe, direct or indirect, at this subject. In the\n_Speech On American Taxation_ he said, \u201cI do not enter into these\nmetaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them.\u201d[54] This\nscience he regarded as wholly incompatible with politics, yet capable of\ndeluding a certain type of politician with its niceties and exactitudes.\nWhenever Burke introduced the subject of metaphysics, he was in effect\narguing from contraries; that is to say, he was asserting that what\nis metaphysically true is politically false or unfeasible. For him,\nmetaphysical clarity was at the opposite pole from political prudence. As\nhe observed in the _Reflections_, \u201cThe pretended rights of these theories\nare all extremes; and in proportion as they are metaphysically true,\nthey are morally and politically false.\u201d[55] In the first letter to Sir\nHercules Langrishe, he ridiculed \u201cthe metaphysicians of our times, who\nare the most foolish of men, and who, dealing in universals and essences,\nsee no difference between more and less.\u201d[56] It will be noted that\nthis last is a philosophical justification for his regular practice of\nweighing a principle by the scale of magnitude of situation. The \u201cmore\nand less\u201d thus becomes determinative of the good. \u201cMetaphysics cannot\nlive without definition, but prudence is cautious how she defines,\u201d[57]\nhe said in the _Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs_. And again in the\n_Reflections_, \u201cThese metaphysic rights, entering into common life, like\nrays of light which pierce into a dense medium are by the laws of nature\nrefracted from a straight line. Indeed, in the gross and complicated\nmass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of man undergo\nsuch a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to\ntalk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original\ndirection.\u201d[58] Finally, there is his clear confession, \u201cWhenever I speak\nagainst a theory, I mean always a weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded\ntheory, and one of the ways of discovering that it is a false theory is\nby comparing it with practice.\u201d This is the philosophical explanation of\nthe source in circumstance of Burke\u2019s characteristic argument.\n\nIn a brilliant passage on the American character, he had observed that\nthe Americans were in the habit of judging the pressure of a grievance\nby the badness of the principle rather than _vice versa_. Burke\u2019s own\nhabit, we now see, was fairly consistently the reverse: he judged the\nbadness of the principle by the pressure of the grievance; and hence we\nare compelled to suppose that he believed politics ought to be decided\nempirically and not dialectically. Yet a consequence of this position is\nthat whoever says he is going to give equal consideration to circumstance\nand to ideals (or principles) almost inevitably finds himself following\ncircumstances while preserving a mere decorous respect for ideals.\n\nBurke\u2019s doctrine of precedent, which constitutes a central part of his\npolitical thought, is directly related with the above position. If one\nis unwilling to define political aims with reference to philosophic\nabsolutes, one tries to find guidance in precedent. We have now seen that\na principal topic of the _Reflections_ is a defense of custom against\ninsight. Burke tried with all his eloquence to show that the \u201cmanly\u201d\nfreedom of the English was something inherited from ancestors, like a\nvaluable piece of property, increased or otherwise modified slightly to\nmeet the needs of the present generation, and then reverently passed on.\nHe did not want to know the precise origin of the title to it, nor did\nhe want philosophical definition of it. In fact, the statement of Burke\nwhich so angered Thomas Paine\u2014that Englishmen were ready to take up arms\nto prove that they had no right to change their government\u2014however brash\nor paradoxical seeming, was quite in keeping with such conviction. Since\nhe scorned that freedom which did not have the stamp of generations of\napproval upon it, he attempted to show that freedom too was a matter of\nprecedent.\n\nYet this is an evasion rather than an answer to the real question which\nis lying in wait for Burke\u2019s political philosophy. It is essential to see\nthat government either moves with something in view or it does not, and\nto say that people may be governed merely by following precedent begs the\nquestion. What line do the precedents mark out for us? How may we know\nthat this particular act is in conformity with the body of precedents\nunless we can abstract the essence of the precedents? And if one extracts\nthe essence of a body of precedents, does not one have a \u201cspeculative\nidea\u201d? However one turns, one cannot evade the truth that there is no\npractice without theory, and no government without some science of\ngovernment. Burke\u2019s statement that a man\u2019s situation is the preceptor of\nhis duty cannot be taken seriously unless one can isolate the precept.\n\nThis dilemma grows out of Burke\u2019s own reluctance to speculate about\nthe origin and ultimate end of government. \u201cThere is a sacred veil to\nbe drawn over the beginnings of all governments,\u201d he declared in his\nsecond day\u2019s speech at the trial of Warren Hastings.[59] To the abstract\ndoctrines of the French Revolution, he responded with a \u201cphilosophic\nanalogy,\u201d by which governments are made to come into being with\nsomething like the indistinct remoteness of the animal organism. This\npolitical organism is a \u201cmysterious incorporation,\u201d never wholly young\nor middle-aged or old, but partly each at every period, and capable,\nlike the animal organism, of regenerating itself through renewal of\ntissue. It is therefore modified only through the slow forces that\nproduce evolution. But to the question of what brings on the changes\nin society, Burke was never able to give an answer. He had faced the\nproblem briefly in the _Tract on the Popery Laws_, where he wrote: \u201cIs,\nthen, no improvement to be brought into society? Undoubtedly, but not by\ncompulsion\u2014but by encouragement, but by countenance, favor, privileges,\nwhich are powerful and are lawful instruments.\u201d[60] These, however, are\nthe passive forces which admit change, not the active ones which initiate\nit. The prime mover is still to seek. If such social changes are brought\nabout by immanent evolutionary forces, they are hardly voluntary; if on\nthe other hand they are voluntary, they must be identifiable with some\npoint in time and with some agency of initiation. It quickly becomes\nobvious that if one is to talk about the beginnings of things, about the\nnisus of growth or of accumulation of precedents, and about final ends,\none must shift from empirical to speculative ground. Burke\u2019s attachment\nto what was _de facto_ prevented him from doing this in political theory\nand made him a pleader from circumstance at many crucial points in his\nspeeches. One can scarcely do better than quote the judgment of Sir James\nPrior in his summation of Burke\u2019s career: \u201cHis aim therefore in our\ndomestic policy, was to preserve all our institutions in the main as they\nstood for the simple reason that under them the nation had become great,\nand prosperous, and happy.\u201d[61] This is but a generalized translation of\nthe position \u201cIf it exists, there is something to be said in its favor,\u201d\nwhich we have determined as the aspect of the great orator\u2019s case.\n\nThat position is, moreover, the essential position of Whiggism as a\npolitical philosophy. It turns out to be, on examination, a position\nwhich is defined by other positions because it will not conceive ultimate\ngoals, and it will not display on occasion a sovereign contempt for\ncircumstances as radical parties of both right and left are capable of\ndoing. The other parties take their bearing from some philosophy of\nman and society; the Whigs take their bearings from the other parties.\nWhatever a party of left or right proposes, they propose (or oppose) in\ntempered measure. Its politics is then cautionary, instinctive, trusting\nmore to safety and to present success than to imagination and dramatic\nboldness of principle. It is, to make the estimate candid, a politics\nwithout vision and consequently without the capacity to survive.\n\n\u201cThe political parties which I call great,\u201d Tocqueville wrote in\n_Democracy in America_, \u201care those which cling to principles rather\nthan to their consequences, to general and not to special cases, to\nideas and not to men.\u201d[62] Manifestly the Whig Party is contrary to this\non each point. The Whigs do not argue from principles (_i.e._, genera\nand definitions); they are awed not merely by consequences but also by\ncircumstances; and as for the general and the special, we have now heard\nBurke testify on a dozen occasions to his disregard of the former and\nhis veneration of the latter. There is indeed ground for saying that\nBurke was more Whig than the British Whigs of his own day themselves,\nbecause at the one time when the British Whig Party took a turn in the\ndirection of radical principle, Burke found himself out of sympathy with\nit and, before long, was excluded from it. This occurred in 1791, when\nthe electrifying influence of the French Revolution produced among the\nliberals of the age a strong trend toward the philosophic left. It was\nthis trend which drew from Burke the _Appeal from the New to the Old\nWhigs_, with its final scornful paragraph in which he refused to take his\nprinciples \u201cfrom a French die.\u201d This writing was largely taken up with\na defense of his recently published _Reflections on the Revolution in\nFrance_, and it is here relevant to note how Burke defines his doctrine\nas a middle course. \u201cThe opinions maintained in that book,\u201d he said,\n\u201cnever can lead to an extreme, because their foundation is laid in an\nopposition to extremes.\u201d[63] \u201cThese doctrines do of themselves gravitate\nto a middle point, or to some point near a middle.\u201d[64] \u201cThe author of\nthat book is supposed to have passed from extreme to extreme; but he has\nalways actually kept himself in a medium.\u201d[65]\n\nActually the course of events which caused this separation was the same\nas that which led to the ultimate extinction of the Whig point of view\nin British political life. In the early twentieth century, when a world\nconflict involving the Empire demanded of parties a profound basis in\nprinciple, the heirs of the Whig party passed from the scene, leaving\ntwo coherent parties, one of the right and one of the left. That is\npart of our evidence for saying that a party which bases itself upon\ncircumstance cannot outlast that circumstance very long; that its claim\nto make smaller mistakes (and to have smaller triumphs) than the extreme\nparties will not win it enduring allegiance; and that when the necessity\narises, as it always does at some time, to look at the foundations of the\ncommonwealth, Burke\u2019s wish will be disregarded, and only deeply founded\ntheories will be held worthy. A party does not become great by feasting\non the leavings of other parties, and Whiggism\u2019s bid for even temporary\nsuccess is often rejected. A party must have its own principle of\nmovement and must not be content to serve as a brake on the movements of\nothers. Thus there is indication that Whiggism is a recipe for political\nfailure, but before affirming this as a conclusion, let us extend our\nexamination further to see how other parties have fared with circumstance\nas the decisive argument.\n\nThe American Whig Party showed all the defects of this position in an\narena where such defects were bound to be more promptly fatal. It is just\nto say that this party never had a set of principles. Lineal descendants\nof the old Federalists, the American Whigs were simply the party of\nopposition to that militant democracy which received its most aggressive\nleadership from Andrew Jackson. It was, generally speaking, the party of\nthe \u201cbest people\u201d; that is to say, the people who showed the greatest\nrespect for industry and integrity, the people in whose eyes Jackson was\n\u201cthat wicked man and vulgar hero.\u201d Yet because it had no philosophical\nposition, it was bound to take its position from that of the other party,\nas we have seen that Whiggism is doomed to do. During most of its short\nlife it was conspicuously a party of \u201couts\u201d arrayed against \u201cins.\u201d\n\nIt revealed the characteristic impotence in two obvious ways. First, it\npinned its hopes for victory on brilliant personalities rather than on\ndialectically secured positions. Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, who between\nthem represented the best statesmanship of the generation, were among its\nleaders, but none of them ever reached the White House. The beau ideal of\nthe party was Clay, whose title \u201cthe Great Compromiser\u201d seems to mark him\nas the archetypal Whig. Finally it discovered a politically \u201cpractical\u201d\ncandidate in William Henry Harrison, soldier and Indian fighter, and\nthrough a campaign of noise and irrelevancies, put him in the Presidency.\nBut this success was short, and before long the Whigs were back battling\nunder their native handicaps.\n\nSecond, frustrated by its series of reverses, it decided that what the\npatient needed was more of the disease. Whereas at the beginning it had\nbeen only relatively pragmatic in program and had preserved dignity in\nmethod, it now resolved to become completely pragmatic in program and as\npragmatic as its rivals the Democrats in method. Of the latter step, the\n\u201ccoonskin and hard-cider\u201d campaign on behalf of Harrison was the proof.\nWe may cite as special evidence the advice given to Harrison\u2019s campaign\nmanager by Nicholas Biddle of Philadelphia. \u201cLet him [the candidate] say\nnot a single word about his principles or his creed\u2014let him say nothing,\npromise nothing. Let the use of pen and ink be wholly forbidden.\u201d[66] E.\nMalcolm Carroll in his _Origins of the Whig Party_ has thus summed up\nthe policy of the Whig leaders after their round with Jackson: \u201cThe most\nactive of the Whig politicians and editors after 1836, men like Weed,\nGreeley, Ewing of Ohio, Thaddeus Stevens, and Richard Houghton of Boston,\npreferred success to a consistent position and, therefore, influenced\nthe party to make its campaign in the form of appeal to popular emotion\nand, for this purpose, to copy the methods of the Democratic Party.\u201d[67]\nThis verdict is supported by Paul Murray in his study of Whig operations\nin Georgia: \u201cThe compelling aim of the party was to get control of the\nexisting machinery of government, to maintain that control, and, in some\ncases, to change the form of government the better to serve the dominant\ninterest of the group.\u201d[68] Murray found that the Whigs of Georgia\n\u201cnaturally had a respect for the past that approached at times the\nunreasonable reverence of Edmund Burke for eighteenth century political\ninstitutions.\u201d[69]\n\nBut a party whose only program is an endorsement of the _status quo_ is\ndestined to go to pieces whenever the course of events brings a principle\nstrongly to the fore. The American Union was moving toward a civil\nconflict in which ideological differences, as deep as any that have\nappeared in modern revolutions, were to divide men. As always occurs in\nsuch crises, the compromisers are regarded as unreliable by both sides\nand are soon ejected from the scene. It now seems impossible that the\nWhig Party, with its political history, could have survived the fifties.\nBut the interesting fact from the standpoint of theoretical discussion\nis that the Democratic Party, because it was a radically based party,\nwas able to take over and defend certain of the defensible earlier Whig\npositions. Murray points out the paradoxical fact that the Democratic\nParty \u201cpurloined the leadership of conservative property interests in\nGeorgia and the South.\u201d[70] It is no less paradoxical that it should have\npurloined the defense of the states\u2019 rights doctrine thirty years after\nJackson had threatened to hang disunionists.\n\nThe paradox can be resolved only by seeing that the Whig position was one\nof self-stultification; and this is why a rising young political leader\nin Illinois of Whig affiliation left the party to lead a re-conceived\nRepublican Party. The evidence of Lincoln\u2019s life greatly favors the\nsupposition that he was a conservative. But he saw that conservatism to\nbe politically effective cannot be Whiggism, that it cannot perpetually\nargue from circumstance. He saw that to be politically effective\nconservatism must have something more than a temperamental love of\nquietude or a relish for success. It must have some ideal objective. He\nfound objectives in the moral idea of freedom and the political idea of\nunion.\n\nThe political party which Abraham Lincoln carried to victory in 1860 was\na party with these moral objectives. The Whigs had disintegrated from\ntheir own lack of principle, and the Republicans emerged with a program\ncapable of rallying men to effort and sacrifice\u2014which are in the long\nrun psychologically more compelling than the stasis of security. But\nafter the war and the death of the party\u2019s unique leader, all moral\nidealism speedily fell away.[71] Of the passion of revenge there was\nmore than enough, so that some of the victor\u2019s measures look like the\nmeasures of a radical party. But the elevation of Grant to the presidency\nand the party\u2019s conduct during and after the Gilded Age show clearly\nthe declining interest in reform. Before the end of the century the\nRepublican Party had been reduced in its source of appeal to the Whig\nargument from circumstance (or in the case of the tariff to a wholly\ndishonest argument from consequences). For thirty or forty years its case\ncame to little more than this: we are the richest nation on earth with\nthe most widely distributed prosperity; therefore this party advocates\nthe _status quo_. The argument, whether embodied in the phrase \u201cthe full\ndinner pail\u201d or \u201ctwo cars in every garage\u201d has the same source. Murray\u2019s\njudgment of the Whig party in Georgia a hundred years ago: \u201cMany facts in\nthe history of the party might impel one to say that its members regarded\nthe promotion of prosperity as the supreme aim of government,\u201d[72] can\nbe applied without the slightest change to the Republican Party of the\n1920\u2019s. But when the circumstance of this _status quo_ disappeared about\n1930, the party\u2019s source of argument disappeared too, and no other has\nbeen found since. It became the party of frustration and hatred, and like\nthe Whig Party earlier, it clung to personalities in the hope that they\nwould be sufficient to carry it to victory. First there was the grass\nroots Middle Westerner Alf Landon; then the glamorous new convert to\ninternationalism Wendell Willkie; then the gang-buster and Empire State\ngovernor Thomas Dewey. Finally, to make the parallel complete, there came\nthe military hero General Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower can be called the\nWilliam Henry Harrison of the Republican Party. He is \u201cagainst\u201d what the\nDemocrats are doing, and he is admired by the \u201cbest\u201d people. All this\nis well suited to take minds off real issues through an outpouring of\nnational vanity and the enjoyment of sensation.\n\nThe Republican charge against the incumbent administration has been\nconsistently the charge of \u201cbungling,\u201d while those Republicans who have\nbased their dissent on something more profound and clear-sighted have\ngenerally drawn the suspicion and disapproval of the party\u2019s supposedly\npractical leaders. Of this the outstanding proof is the defeat of the\nleadership of Taft. To look at the whole matter in an historical frame\nof reference, there has been so violent a swing toward the left that the\nDemocrats today occupy the position once occupied by the Socialists; and\nthe Republicans, having to take their bearings from this, now occupy\nthe center position, which is historically reserved for liberals.\nTheir series of defeats comes from a failure to see that there is an\nintellectually defensible position on the right. They persist with the\nargument from circumstance, which never wins any major issues, and\nsometimes, as we have noted, they are left without the circumstance.\n\nI shall suggest that this story has more than an academic interest for\nan age which has seen parliamentary government exposed to insults, some\nopen and vicious, some concealed and insidious. There are in existence\nmany technological factors which themselves constitute an argument from\ncircumstance for one-party political rule. Indeed, if the trend of\ncircumstances were our master term, we should almost certainly have to\nfavor the one-party efficiency system lately flourishing in Europe. The\ncentralization of power, the technification of means of communication,\nthe extreme peril of political divisiveness in the face of modern weapons\nof war, all combine to put the question, \u201cWhat is the function of a party\nof opposition in this streamlined world anyhow?\u201d Its proper function is\nto talk, but talking, unless it concerns some opposition of principles,\nis but the wearisome contention of \u201cins\u201d and \u201couts.\u201d Democracy is a\ndialectical process, and unless society can produce a group sufficiently\nindifferent to success to oppose the ruling group on principle rather\nthan according to opportunity for success, the idea of opposition becomes\ndiscredited. A party which can argue only from success has no rhetorical\ntopic against the party presently enjoying success.\n\nThe proper aim of a political party is to persuade, and to persuade\nit must have a rhetoric. As far as mere methods go, there is nothing\nto object to in the argument from circumstance, for undeniably it has\na power to move. Yet it has this power through a widely shared human\nweakness, which turns out on examination to be shortsightedness. This\nshortsightedness leads a party to positions where it has no policy, or\nonly the policy of opposing an incumbent. When all the criteria are\nbrought to bear, then, this is an inferior source of argument, which\nreflects adversely upon any habitual user and generally punishes with\nfailure. Since, as we have seen, it is grounded in the nature of a\nsituation rather than in the nature of things, its opposition will\nnot be a dialectically opposed opposition, any more than was Burke\u2019s\nopposition to the French Revolution. And here, in substance, I would\nsay, is the great reason why Burke should not be taken as prophet by the\npolitical conservatives. True, he has left many wonderful materials which\nthey should assimilate. His insights into human nature are quite solid\npropositions to build with, and his eloquence is a lesson for all time in\nthe effective power of energy and imagery. Yet these are the auxiliary\nrhetorical appeals. For the rhetorical appeal on which it will stake its\nlife, a cause must have some primary source of argument which will not\nbe embarrassed by abstractions or even by absolutes\u2014the general ideas\nmentioned by Tocqueville. Burke was magnificent at embellishment, but of\nclear rational principle he had a mortal distrust. It could almost be\nsaid that he raised \u201cmuddling through\u201d to the height of a science, though\nin actuality it can never be a science. In the most critical undertaking\nof all, the choice of one\u2019s source of argument, it would be blindness\nto take him as mentor. To find what Burke lacked, we now turn to the\nAmerican Abraham Lincoln, who despite an imperfect education, discovered\nthat political arguments must ultimately be based on genus or definition.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IV\n\nABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DEFINITION\n\n\nAlthough most readers of Lincoln sense the prevailing aspect of his\narguments, there has been no thoughtful treatment of this interesting\nsubject. Albert Beveridge merely alludes to it in his observation\nthat \u201cIn trials in circuit courts Lincoln depended but little on\nprecedents; he argued largely from first principles.\u201d[73] Nicolay and\nHay, in describing Lincoln\u2019s speech before the Republican Banquet in\nChicago, December 10, 1856, report as follows: \u201cThough these fragments\nof addresses give us only an imperfect reflection of the style of\nMr. Lincoln\u2019s oratory during this period, they nevertheless show its\nessential characteristics, a pervading clearness of analysis, and that\nstrong tendency toward axiomatic definition which gives so many of his\nsentences their convincing force and durable value.\u201d[74] W. H. Herndon,\nwho had the opportunity of closest personal observation, was perhaps\nthe most analytical of all when he wrote: \u201cNot only were nature, man,\nand principle suggestive to Mr. Lincoln; not only had he accurate and\nexact perceptions, but he was causative; his mind apparently with an\nautomatic movement, ran back behind facts, principles, and all things to\ntheir origin and first cause\u2014to the point where forces act at once as\neffect and cause.\u201d[75] He observed further in connection with Lincoln\u2019s\npractice before the bar: \u201cAll opponents dreaded his originality, his\ncondensation, definition, and force of expression....\u201d[76]\n\nOur feeling that he is a father of the nation even more convincingly than\nWashington, and that his words are words of wisdom when compared with\nthose of the more intellectual Jefferson and the more academic Wilson\nstrengthen the supposition that he argued from some very fundamental\nsource. And when we find opinion on the point harmonious, despite the\nwide variety of description his character has undergone, we have enough\ninitial confirmation to go forward with the study\u2014a study which is\nimportant not alone as showing the man in clearer light but also as\nshowing upon what terms conservatism is possible.\n\nIt may be useful to review briefly the argument from definition. The\nargument from definition, in the sense we shall employ here, includes all\narguments from the nature of the thing. Whether the genus is an already\nrecognized convention, or whether it is defined at the moment by the\norator, or whether it is left to be inferred from the aggregate of its\nspecies, the argument has a single postulate. The postulate is that there\nexist classes which are determinate and therefore predicable. In the\nancient proposition of the schoolroom, \u201cSocrates is mortal,\u201d the class\nof mortal beings is invoked as a predicable. Whatever is a member of the\nclass will accordingly have the class attributes. This might seem a very\neasy admission to gain, but it is not so from those who believe that\ngenera are only figments of the imagination and have no self-subsistence.\nSuch persons hold, in the extreme application of their doctrine, that\nall deduction is unwarranted assumption; or that attributes cannot be\ntransferred by imputation from genus to species. The issue here is very\ndeep, going back to the immemorial quarrel over universals, and we\nshall not here explore it further than to say that the argument from\ndefinition or genus involves a philosophy of being, which has divided and\nprobably will continue to divide mankind. There are those who seem to\nfeel that genera are imprisoning bonds which serve only to hold the mind\nin confinement. To others, such genera appear the very organon of truth.\nWithout going into that question here, it seems safe to assert that those\nwho believe in the validity of the argument from genus are idealists,\nroughly, if not very philosophically, defined. The evidence that Lincoln\nheld such belief is overwhelming; it characterizes his thinking from an\nearly age; and the greatest of his utterances (excepting the Gettysburg\nAddress, which is based upon similitude) are chiefly arguments from\ndefinition.\n\nIn most of the questions which concerned him from the time he was a\nstruggling young lawyer until the time when he was charged with the\nguidance of the nation, Lincoln saw opportunity to argue from the nature\nof man. In fact, not since the Federalist papers of James Madison had\nthere been in American political life such candid recourse to this term.\nI shall treat his use of it under the two heads of argument from a\nconcept of human nature and argument from a definition of man.\n\nLincoln came early to the conclusion that human nature is a fixed and\nknowable thing. Many of his early judgments of policy are based on a\ntheory of what the human being _qua_ human being will do in a given\nsituation. Whether he had arrived at this concept through inductive\nstudy\u2014for which he had varied opportunity\u2014or through intuition is, of\ncourse, not the question here; our interest is in the reasoning which\nthe concept made possible. It appears a fact that Lincoln trusted in a\nuniform predictability of human nature.\n\nIn 1838, when he was only twenty-nine years old, he was invited to\naddress the Young Men\u2019s Lyceum of Springfield on the topic \u201cThe\nPerpetuation of Our Political Institutions.\u201d In this instance, the\nyoung orator read the danger to perpetuation in the inherent evil of\nhuman nature. His argument was that the importance of a nation or\nthe sacredness of a political dogma could not withstand the hunger of\nmen for personal distinction. Now the founders of the Union had won\ndistinction through that very role, and so satisfied themselves. But\noncoming men of the same breed would be looking for similar opportunity\nfor distinction, and possibly would not find it in tasks of peaceful\nconstruction. It seemed to him quite possible that in the future bold\nnatures would appear who would seek to gain distinction by pulling down\nwhat their predecessors had erected. To a man of this nature it matters\nlittle whether distinction is won \u201cat the expense of emancipating slaves\nor enslaving freemen.\u201d[77] The fact remains that \u201cDistinction will be his\nparamount object,\u201d and \u201cnothing left to be done in the way of building\nup, he would set boldly to the task of pulling down.\u201d[78] In this way\nLincoln held personal ambition to be distinctive of human nature, and he\nwas willing to predict it of his fellow citizens, should their political\ninstitutions endure \u201cfifty times\u201d as long as they had.\n\nAnother excellent example of the use of this source appears in a speech\nwhich Lincoln made during the Van Buren administration. Agitation over\nthe National Bank question was still lively, and a bill had been put\nforward which would have required the depositing of Federal funds in five\nregional subtreasuries, rather than in a National Bank, until they were\nneeded for use. At a political discussion held in the Illinois House\nof Representatives, Lincoln made a long speech against the proposal in\nwhich he drew extensively from the topic of the nature of human nature.\nHis reasoning was that if public funds are placed in the custody of\nsubtreasurers, the duty and the personal interest of the custodians\nmay conflict. \u201cAnd who that knows anything of human nature doubts\nthat in many instances interest will prevail over duty, and that the\nsubtreasurer will prefer opulent knavery in a foreign land to honest\npoverty at home.\u201d[79] If on the other hand the funds were placed with a\nNational Bank, which would have the privilege of using the funds, upon\npayment of interest, until they are needed, the duty and interest of\nthe custodian would coincide. The Bank plan was preferable because we\nalways find the best performance where duty and self-interest thus run\ntogether.[80] Here we see him basing his case again on the infallible\ntendency of human nature to be itself.\n\nA few years later Lincoln was called upon to address the Washingtonian\nTemperance Society, which was an organization of reformed drink addicts.\nThis speech is strikingly independent in approach, and as such is\nprophetic of the manner he was to adopt in wrestling with the great\nproblems of union and slavery. Instead of following the usual line of\nthe temperance advocate, with its tone of superiority and condemnation,\nhe attacked all such approaches as not suited to the nature of man. He\nimpressed upon his hearers the fact that their problem was the problem\nof human nature, \u201cwhich is God\u2019s decree and can never be reversed.\u201d\nHe then went on to say that people with a weakness for drink are not\ninferior specimens of the race but have heads and hearts that \u201cwill\nbear advantageous comparison with those of any other class.\u201d The appeal\nto drink addicts was to be addressed to men, and it could not take\nthe form of denunciation \u201cbecause it is not much in the nature of man\nto be driven to anything; still less to be driven about that which is\nexclusively his own business.\u201d When one seeks to change the conduct of a\nbeing of this nature, \u201cpersuasion, kind, unassuming persuasion should\never be adopted.\u201d He then summed up his point: \u201cSuch is man and so must\nhe be understood by those who would lead him, even to his own best\ninterests.\u201d[81]\n\nOne further instance of this argument may be cited. About 1850 Lincoln\ncompiled notes for an address to young men on the subject of the\nprofession of law. Here again we find a refreshingly candid approach,\nlooking without pretense at the creature man. One piece of advice which\nLincoln urged upon young lawyers was that they never take their whole fee\nin advance. To do so would place too great a strain upon human nature,\nwhich would then lack the needful spur to industry. \u201cWhen fully paid\nbeforehand, you are more than a common mortal if you can feel the same\ninterest in the case, as if something was still in prospect for you, as\nwell as for your client.\u201d[82] As in the case of the subtreasury bill,\nLincoln saw the yoking of duty and self-interest as a necessity of our\nnature.\n\nThese and other passages which could be produced indicate that he viewed\nhuman nature as a constant, by which one could determine policy without\nmuch fear of surprise. Everything peripheral Lincoln referred to this\ncenter. His arguments consequently were the most fundamental seen since a\ngroup of realists framed the American government with such visible regard\nfor human passion and weakness. Lincoln\u2019s theory of human nature was\ncompletely unsentimental; it was the creation of one who had taken many\nbuffetings and who, from early bitterness and later indifference, never\naffiliated with any religious denomination. But it furnished the means of\nwisdom and prophecy.\n\nWith this habit of reasoning established, Lincoln was ideally equipped to\ndeal with the great issue of slavery. The American civil conflict of the\nlast century, when all its superficial excitements have been stripped\naside, appears another debate about the nature of man. Yet while other\npolitical leaders were looking to the law, to American history, and to\nthis or that political contingency, Lincoln looked\u2014as it was his habit\nalready to do\u2014to the center; that is, to the definition of man. Was\nthe negro a man or was he not? It can be shown that his answer to this\nquestion never varied, despite willingness to recognize some temporary\nand perhaps even some permanent minority on the part of the African race.\nThe answer was a clear \u201cYes,\u201d and he used it on many occasions during the\nfifties to impale his opponents.\n\nThe South was peculiarly vulnerable to this argument, for if we look at\nits position, not through the terms of legal and religious argument,\noften ingeniously worked out, but through its actual treatment of the\nnegro, that position is seen to be equivocal. To illustrate: in the\nSouthern case he was not a man as far as the \u201cinalienable rights\u201d go,\nand the Dred Scott decision was to class him as a chattel. Yet on the\ncontrary the negro was very much a man when it came to such matters\nas understanding orders, performing work, and, as the presence of the\nmulatto testified, helping to procreate the human species. All of the\narguments that the pro-slavery group was able to muster broke against the\nstubborn fact, which Lincoln persistently thrust in their way, that the\nnegro was somehow and in some degree a man.\n\nFor our first examination of this argument, we turn to the justly\ncelebrated speech at Peoria, October 16, 1854. Lincoln had actually begun\nto lose interest in politics when the passage of the highly controversial\nKansas-Nebraska Bill in May, 1854, reawakened him. It was as if his moral\nnature had received a fresh shock from the tendencies present in this\nbill; and he began in that year the battle which he waged with remarkable\nconsistency of position until he won the presidency of the Union six\nyears later. The Speech at Peoria can be regarded as the opening gun of\nthis campaign.\n\nThe speech itself is a rich study in logic and rhetoric, wherein one\nfinds the now mature Lincoln showing his gift for discovering the\nessentials of a question. After promising the audience to confine himself\nto the \u201cnaked merits\u201d of the issue and to be \u201cno less than national in\nall the positions\u201d he took, he turned at once to the topic of domestic\nslavery. Here arguments from the genus \u201cman\u201d follow one after another.\nLincoln uses them to confront the Southern people with their dilemma.\n\n    Equal justice to the South, it is said, requires us to consent\n    to the extension of slavery to new countries. That is to say,\n    inasmuch as you do not object to my taking my hog to Nebraska,\n    therefore I must not object to your taking your slave. Now, I\n    admit that this is perfectly logical, if there is no difference\n    between hogs and Negroes. But while you thus require me to deny\n    the humanity of the Negro, I wish to ask whether you of the\n    South, yourselves, have ever been willing to do as much?[83]\n\nIf the Southern people regard the Negro only as an animal, how do they\nexplain their attitude toward the slave dealer?\n\n    You despise him utterly. You do not recognize him as a friend,\n    or even as an honest man. Your children must not play with his;\n    they may rollick freely with the little Negroes, but not with\n    the slave dealer\u2019s children. If you are obliged to deal with\n    him, you try to get through the job without so much as touching\n    him. It is common with you to join hands with men you meet,\n    but with the slave dealer you avoid the ceremony\u2014instinctively\n    shrinking from the snaky contact. If he grows rich and retires\n    from business, you still remember him, and still keep up the\n    ban of non-intercourse upon him and his family. Now why is\n    this? You do not so treat the man who deals in corn, cotton, or\n    tobacco?[84]\n\nMoreover, if the Negro is merely property, and is incapable of any\nsort of classification, what category is there to accommodate the free\nNegroes?\n\n    And yet again. There are in the United States and Territories,\n    including the District of Columbia, 433,643 free blacks. At\n    five hundred dollars per head, they are worth over two hundred\n    millions of dollars. How comes this vast amount of property\n    to be running about without owners? We do not see free horses\n    or free cattle running at large. How is this? All these free\n    blacks are the descendants of slaves, or have been slaves\n    themselves; and they would be slaves now but for something\n    which has operated on their white owners, inducing them at vast\n    pecuniary sacrifice to liberate them. What is that something?\n    Is there any mistaking it? In all these cases it is your sense\n    of justice and human sympathy continually telling you that the\n    poor Negro has some natural right to himself\u2014that those who\n    deny it and make mere merchandise of him deserve kickings,\n    contempt, and death.[85]\n\nThe argument is clinched with a passage which puts the Negro\u2019s case\nin the most explicit terms one can well conceive of. \u201cMan\u201d and\n\u201cself-government,\u201d Lincoln argues, cannot be defined without respect to\none another.\n\n    The doctrine of self-government is right\u2014absolutely and\n    eternally right\u2014but it has no just application as here\n    attempted. Or perhaps I should rather say that whether it has\n    such application depends upon whether a Negro is not or is a\n    man. If he is not a man, in that case he who is a man may as a\n    matter of self-government do just what he pleases with him.\n\n    But if the Negro is a man, is it not to that extent a total\n    destruction of self-government to say that he too shall not\n    govern himself? When the white man governs himself, that\n    is self-government; but when he governs himself and also\n    governs another man, that is more than self-government\u2014that is\n    despotism. If the Negro is a man, why then my ancient faith\n    teaches me that \u201call men are created equal,\u201d and that there can\n    be no moral right in connection with one man\u2019s making a slave\n    of another.[86]\n\nLincoln knew the type of argument he had to oppose, and he correctly\ngauged its force. It was the argument from circumstance, which he\ntreated as such argument requires to be treated. \u201cLet us turn slavery\nfrom its claims of \u2018moral right\u2019 back upon its existing legal rights and\nits argument of \u2018necessity.\u2019\u201d[87] He did not deny the \u201cnecessity\u201d; he\nregarded it as something that could be taken care of in course of time.\n\nAfter the formation of the Republican Party, he often utilized his source\nin definition to point out the salient difference between Republicans and\nDemocrats. The Democrats were playing up circumstance (the \u201cnecessity\u201d\nalluded to in the above quotation) and to consequence (the saving of the\nUnion through the placating of all sections) while the Republicans stood,\nat first a little forlornly, upon principle. As he put it during a speech\nat Springfield in 1857:\n\n    The Republicans inculcate, with whatever of ability they can,\n    that the Negro is a man, that his bondage is cruelly wrong, and\n    that the field of his oppression ought not to be enlarged. The\n    Democrats deny his manhood; deny, or dwarf to insignificance,\n    the wrong of his bondage; so far as possible crush all sympathy\n    for him, and cultivate and excite hatred and disgust against\n    him; compliment themselves as Union-savers for doing so; and\n    call the indefinite outspreading of his bondage \u201ca sacred right\n    of self-government.\u201d[88]\n\nIn the long contest with Douglas and the party of \u201cpopular sovereignty,\u201d\nLincoln\u2019s principal charge was that his opponents, by straddling issues\nand through deviousness, were breaking down the essential definition of\nman. Repeatedly he referred to \u201cthis gradual and steady debauching of\npublic opinion.\u201d He made this charge because those who advocated local\noption in the matter of slavery were working unremittingly to change the\nNegro \u201cfrom the rank of a man to that of a brute.\u201d \u201cThey are taking him\ndown,\u201d he declared, \u201cand placing him, when spoken of, among reptiles and\ncrocodiles, as Judge Douglas himself expresses it.\n\n\u201cIs not this change wrought in your minds a very important change? Public\nopinion in this country is everything. In a nation like ours this popular\nsovereignty and squatter sovereignty have already wrought a change in the\npublic mind to the extent I have already stated. There is no man in this\ncrowd who can contradict it.\n\n\u201cNow, if you are opposed to slavery honestly, I ask you to note that\nfact, and the like of which is to follow, to be plastered on, layer after\nlayer, until very soon you are prepared to deal with the Negro everywhere\nas with a brute.\u201d[89]\n\nWe feel that the morality of intellectual integrity lay behind such\nresistance to the breaking down of genera. Lincoln realized that the\nprice of honesty, as well as of success in the long run, is to stay out\nof the excluded middle.\n\nIn sum, we see that Lincoln could never be dislodged from his position\nthat there is one genus of human beings; and early in his career as\nlawyer he had learned that it is better to base an argument upon one\nincontrovertible point than to try to make an impressive case through a\nwhole array of points. Through the years he clung tenaciously to this\nconcept of genus, from which he could draw the proposition that what\nis fundamentally true of the family will be true also of the branches\nof the family.[90] Therefore since the Declaration of Independence had\ninterdicted slavery for man, slavery was interdicted for the negro in\nprinciple. Here is a good place to point out that whereas for Burke\ncircumstance was often a deciding factor, for Lincoln it was never more\nthan a retarding factor. He marked the right to equality affirmed by\nthe signers of the Declaration of Independence: \u201cThey meant simply to\ndeclare the right, so that enforcement of it might follow as fast as\ncircumstances would permit.\u201d[91] And he recognized the stubborn fact of\nthe institution of American slavery. But he did not argue any degree of\nrightness from the fact. The strategy of his whole anti-slavery campaign\nwas that slavery should be restricted to the states in which it then\nexisted and in this way \u201cput in course of ultimate extinction\u201d\u2014a phrase\nwhich he found expressive enough to use on several occasions.\n\nThere is quite possibly concealed here another argument from definition,\nexpressible in the proposition that which cannot grow must perish. To\nfix limits for an institution with the understanding that it shall never\nexceed these is in effect to pass sentence of death. The slavery party\nseems to have apprehended early that if slavery could not wax, it would\nwane, and hence their support of the Mexican War and the Kansas-Nebraska\nBill. Lincoln\u2019s inflexible defense of the terms of the old Northwest\nOrdinance served notice that he represented the true opposition. In this\nway his definitive stand drew clear lines for the approaching conflict.\n\nTo gain now a clearer view of Lincoln\u2019s mastery of this rhetoric, it\nwill be useful to see how he used various arguments from definition\nwithin the scope of a single speech, and for this purpose we may choose\nthe First Inaugural Address, surely from the standpoint of topical\norganization one of the most notable American state papers. The long\npolitical contest, in which he had displayed acumen along with tenacity,\nhad ended in victory, and this was the juncture at which he had to lay\ndown his policy for the American Union. For some men it would have been\nan occasion for description mainly; but Lincoln seems to have taken\nthe advice he had given many years before to the Young Men\u2019s Lyceum of\nSpringfield: \u201cPassion has helped us but can do so no more.... Reason,\ncold, calculating, unimpassioned reason\u2014must furnish all the materials\nfor our future support and defense....\u201d[92] Without being cold, the\nspeech is severely logical, and much of the tone is contributed by the\ntype of argument preferred.\n\nOf the fourteen distinguishable arguments in this address, eight are\narguments from definition or genus. Of the six remaining, two are from\nconsequences, two from circumstances, one from contraries, and one from\nsimilitude. The proportion tells its own story. Now let us see how the\neight are employed:\n\n1. _Argument from the nature of all government._ All governments have a\nfundamental duty of self-preservation. \u201cPerpetuity is implied, if not\nexpressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments.\u201d[93]\nThis means of course that whatever is recognized as a government has\nthe obligation to defend itself from without and from within, and\nwhatever menaces the government must be treated as a hostile force. This\nargument was offered to meet the contention of the secessionists that the\nConstitution nowhere authorized the Federal government to take forcible\nmeasures against the withdrawing states. Here Lincoln fell back upon the\nbroader genus \u201call government.\u201d\n\n2. _Argument from the nature of contract._ Here Lincoln met the argument\nthat the association of the states is \u201cin the nature of a contract\nmerely.\u201d His answer was that the rescinding of a contract requires the\nassent of all parties to it. When one party alone ceases to observe it,\nthe contract is merely violated, and violation affects the material\ninterests of all parties. By this interpretation of the law of contract,\nthe Southern states could not leave the Union without a general consent.\n\n3. _Argument from the nature of the American Union._ Here Lincoln\nbegan with the proposition that the American Union is older than\nthe Constitution. Now since the Constitution was formed \u201cto make a\nmore perfect union,\u201d it must have had in view the \u201cvital element of\nperpetuity,\u201d since the omission of this element would have left a less\nperfect union than before. The intent of the Constitution was that \u201cno\nState upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union.\u201d\nTherefore the American Union, as an instrument of government, had in its\nlegal nature protection against this kind of disintegration.\n\n4. _Argument from the nature of the chief magistrate\u2019s office._ Having\nthus defined the Union, Lincoln next looked at the duties which its\nnature imposed upon the chief magistrate. He defined it as \u201csimple duty\u201d\non the chief magistrate\u2019s part to see that the laws of this unbroken\nunion \u201cbe faithfully executed in all the states.\u201d Obviously the argument\nwas to justify active measures in defense of the Union. As Lincoln\nconceived the definition, it was not the duty of the chief magistrate\nto preside over the disintegration of the Union, but to carry on the\nexecutive office just as if no possibility of disintegration threatened.\n\nThus far, it will be observed, the speech is a series of deductions, each\none deriving from the preceding definition.\n\n5. _Argument from the nature of majority rule._ This argument, with\nits fine axiomatic statements, was used by Lincoln to indicate how\nthe government should proceed in cases not expressly envisaged by the\nConstitution. Popular government demands acquiescence by minorities\nin all such cases. \u201cIf the minority will not acquiesce, the majority\nmust, or the government will cease. There is no other alternative; for\ncontinuing the government is acquiescence on one side or the other.\n\n\u201cIf a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make\na precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them; for a minority\nof their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be\ncontrolled by such a minority.\u201d[94] The difficulty of the Confederacy\nwith states\u2019 rights within its own house was to attest to the soundness\nof this argument.\n\n6. _Argument from the nature of the sovereignty of the people._ Here\nLincoln conceded the right of the whole people to change its government\nby constitutional reform or by revolutionary action. But he saw this\nright vested in the people as a whole, and he insisted that any change\nbe carried out by the modes prescribed. The institutions of the country\nwere finally the creations of the sovereign will of the people. But\nuntil a will on this issue was properly expressed, the government had a\ncommission to endure as before.\n\n7. _Second argument from the nature of the office of chief magistrate._\nThis argument followed the preceding because Lincoln had to make it clear\nthat whereas the people, as the source of sovereign power, had the right\nto alter or abolish their government, the chief magistrate, as an elected\nservant, had no such right. He was chosen to conduct the government\nthen in existence. \u201cHis duty is to administer the present government as\nit came into his hands, and to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his\nsuccessor.\u201d[95]\n\n8. _Second argument from the nature of the sovereignty of the people._\nIn this Lincoln reminds his audience that the American government does\nnot give its officials much power to do mischief, and that it provides a\nreturn of power to the people at short intervals. In effect, the argument\ndefines the American type of government and a tyranny as incompatible\nfrom the fact that the governors are up for review by the people at\nregular periods.\n\nIt can hardly be overlooked that this concentration upon definition\nproduces a strongly legalistic speech, if we may conceive law as a\nprocess of defining actions. Every important policy of which explanation\nis made is referred to some widely accepted American political theory.\nIt has been said that Lincoln\u2019s advantage over his opponent Jefferson\nDavis lay in a flexible-minded pragmatism capable of dealing with issues\non their own terms, unhampered by metaphysical abstractions. There may\nbe an element of truth in this if reference is made to the more confined\nand superficial matters\u2014to procedural and administrative detail. But\none would go far to find a speech more respectful toward the established\nprinciples of American government\u2014to defined and agreed upon things\u2014than\nthe First Inaugural Address.\n\nAlthough no other speech by Lincoln exhibits so high a proportion of\narguments from definition, the First Message to Congress (July 4, 1861)\nmakes a noteworthy use of this source. The withdrawal of still other\nstates from the Union, the Confederate capture of Fort Sumter, and\nensuing military events compelled Lincoln to develop more fully his\nanti-secessionist doctrine. This he did in a passage remarkable for its\ntreatment of the age-old problem of freedom and authority. What had to be\nmade determinate, as he saw it, was the nature of free government.\n\n    And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United\n    States. It presents to the whole family of man the question of\n    whether a constitutional republic or democracy\u2014a government\n    of the people by the same people\u2014can or cannot maintain its\n    territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It\n    presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few\n    in numbers to control administration according to organic law\n    in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case,\n    or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense,\n    break up their government, and thus practically put an end to\n    free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask: \u201cIs there,\n    in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?\u201d \u201cMust a\n    government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of\n    its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?\u201d[96]\n\nThen looking at the doctrine of secession as a question of the whole and\nits parts, he went on to say:\n\n    This relative matter of national power and State rights, as a\n    principle, is no other than the principle of generality and\n    locality. Whatever concerns the whole should be confined to the\n    whole\u2014to the General Government; while whatever concerns only\n    the State should be left exclusively to the State. This is all\n    there is of original principle about it. Whether the National\n    Constitution in defining boundaries between the two has applied\n    the principle with exact accuracy is not to be questioned. We\n    are all bound by that defining without question.[97]\n\nOne further argument, occurring in a later speech, deserves special\nattention because of the clear way in which it reveals Lincoln\u2019s method.\nWhen he delivered his Second Annual Message to Congress on December\n1, 1862, he devoted himself primarily to the subject of compensated\nemancipation of the slaves. This was a critical moment of the war for\nthe people of the border states, who were not fully committed either\nway, and who were sensitive on the subject of slavery. Lincoln hoped\nto gain the great political and military advantage of their adherence.\nThe way in which he approaches the subject should be of the highest\ninterest to students of rhetoric, for the opening part of the speech is\nvirtually a copybook exercise in definition. There he faces the question\nof what constitutes a nation. \u201cA nation may be said to consist of its\nterritory, its people, and its laws.\u201d Here we see in scholarly order\nthe genus particularized by the differentiae. Next he enters into a\ncritical discussion of the differentiae. The notion may strike us as\ncurious, but Lincoln proceeds to cite the territory as the enduring\npart. \u201cThe territory is the only part which is of a certain durability.\n\u2018One generation passeth away and another cometh, but the earth abideth\nforever.\u2019 It is of the first importance to duly consider and estimate\nthis ever-enduring part.\u201d[98] Now, Lincoln goes on to say, our present\nstrife arises \u201cnot from our permanent part, not from the land we\ninhabit, not from our national homestead.\u201d It is rather the case that\n\u201cOur strife pertains to ourselves\u2014to the passing generations of men; and\nit can without convulsion be hushed forever with the passing of one\ngeneration.\u201d[99] The present generation will soon disappear, and our\nlaws can be modified by our will. Therefore he offers a plan whereby all\nowners will be indemnified and all slaves will be free by the year 1900.\n\nSeen in another way, what Lincoln here does is define \u201cnation\u201d and then\ndivide the differentiae into the permanent and the transitory; finally\nhe accommodates his measure both to the permanent part (a territory to\nbe wholly free after 1900) and the transitory part (present men and\ninstitutions, which are to be \u201cpaid off\u201d).\n\nIt is the utterance of an American political leader; yet it is veritably\nScholastic in its method and in the clearness of its lines of reasoning.\nIt is, at the same time, a fine illustration of pressing toward the ideal\ngoal while respecting, but not being deflected by, circumstances.\n\nIt seems pertinent to say after the foregoing that one consequence of\nLincoln\u2019s love of definition was a war-time policy toward slavery which\nlooked to some like temporizing. We have encountered in an earlier speech\nhis view that the Negro could not be classified merely as property. Yet\nit must be remembered that in the eyes of the law Negro slaves were\nproperty; and Lincoln was, after all, a lawyer. Morally he believed them\nnot to be property, but legally they were property; and the necessity\nof walking a line between the moral imperative and the law will explain\nsome of his actions which seem not to agree with the popular conception\nof the Great Emancipator. The first serious clash came in the late\nsummer of 1861, when General Fremont, operating in Missouri, issued a\nproclamation freeing all slaves there belonging to citizens in rebellion\nagainst the United States. Lincoln first rebuked General Fremont and then\ncountermanded his order. To O. H. Browning, of Quincy, Illinois, who had\nwritten him in support of Fremont\u2019s action, he responded as follows:\n\n    You speak of it as the only means of saving the government. On\n    the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the government. Can\n    it be pretended that it is any longer the Government of the\n    United States\u2014any government of constitution and laws\u2014wherein a\n    general or a president may make permanent rules of property by\n    proclamation?[100]\n\nThis was the doctrine of the legal aspect of slavery which was to be\namplified in the Second Annual Message to Congress:\n\n    Doubtless some of those who are to pay, and not to receive,\n    will object. Yet the measure is both just and economical. In a\n    certain sense the liberation of the slaves is the destruction\n    of property\u2014property acquired by descent or by purchase, the\n    same as any other property.... If, then, for a common object\n    this property is to be sacrificed, is it not just that it be\n    done at a common charge?[101]\n\nIt is a truism that as a war progresses, the basis of the war changes,\nand our civil conflict was no exception. It appears to have become\nincreasingly clear to Lincoln that slavery was not only the fomenting\ncause but also the chief factor of support of the secessionist\nmovement, and finally he came to the conclusion that the \u201cdestruction\u201d\nof this form of property was an indispensable military proceeding.\nEven here though\u2014and contrary to the general knowledge of Americans\ntoday\u2014definitions were carefully made. The final document was not a\nproclamation to emancipate slaves, but a proclamation to confiscate the\nproperty of citizens in rebellion \u201cas a fit and necessary measure for\nsuppressing said rebellion.\u201d Its terms did not emancipate all slaves, and\nas a matter of fact slavery was legal in the District of Columbia until\nsome time after Lincoln\u2019s death.\n\nIn view of Lincoln\u2019s frequent reliance upon the argument from\ndefinition, it becomes a matter of interest to inquire whether he appears\nto have realized that many of his problems were problems of definition.\nOne can of course employ a type of argument without being aware of much\nmore than its _ad hoc_ success, but we should expect a reflective mind\nlike Lincoln\u2019s to ponder at times the abstract nature of his method.\nFurthermore, the extraordinary accuracy with which he used words is\nevidence pointing in the same direction. Sensitivity on the score of\ndefinitions is tantamount to sensitivity on the score of names, and we\nfind the following in the First Message to Congress:\n\n    It might seem, at first thought, to be of little difference\n    whether the present movement at the South be called \u201csecession\u201d\n    or \u201crebellion.\u201d The movers, however, well understand the\n    difference. At the beginning they knew they could never raise\n    their reason to any respectable magnitude by any name which\n    implies violation of law.[102]\n\nLincoln must at times have viewed his whole career as a battle against\nthe \u201cminers and sappers\u201d of those names which expressed the national\nideals. His chief charge against Douglas and the equivocal upholders\nof \u201csquatter sovereignty\u201d was that they were trying to circumvent\ndefinitions, and during the war period he had to meet the same sort of\nattempts. Lincoln\u2019s most explicit statement by far on the problem appears\nin a short talk made at one of the \u201cSanitary Fairs\u201d it was his practice\nto attend. Speaking this time at Baltimore in the spring of 1864, he gave\none of those timeless little lessons which have made such an impression\non men\u2019s minds.\n\n    The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty,\n    and the American people, just now, are much in want of one.\n    We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do\n    not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty may\n    mean for each man to do as he pleases, with himself, and with\n    the product of his labor; while with others the same word may\n    mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the\n    product of other men\u2019s labor. Here are two, not only different,\n    but incompatible things, called by the same name, liberty.\n    And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective\n    parties, called by two different and incompatible names\u2014liberty\n    and tyranny.\n\n    The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep\u2019s throat, for which\n    the sheep thanks the shepherd as his liberator, while the wolf\n    denounces him for the same act, as the destroyer of liberty,\n    especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly, the sheep and\n    the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty;\n    and precisely the same difference prevails today among us\n    human creatures, even in the North, and all professing to love\n    liberty.[103]\n\nSo the difficulty appeared in his time, and it should hardly be necessary\nto point out that no period of modern history has been more in need of\nthis little homily on the subject of definition than the first half of\nthe twentieth century.\n\nThe relationship between words and essences did then occur to Lincoln as\na problem, and we can show how he was influenced in one highly important\nparticular by his attention to this relationship.\n\nFairly early in his struggle against Douglas and others whom he\nconceived to be the foes of the Union, Lincoln became convinced that\nthe perdurability of laws and other institutions is bound up with the\nacceptance of the principle of contradiction. Or, if that seems an unduly\nabstract way of putting the matter, let us say that he came to repudiate,\nas firmly as anyone in practical politics may do, those people who try by\nrelativistic interpretations and other sophistries to evade the force of\nsome basic principles. The heart of Lincoln\u2019s statesmanship, indeed, lay\nin his perception that on some matters one has to say \u201cYes\u201d or \u201cNo,\u201d that\none has to accept an alternative to the total exclusion of the other,\nand that any weakness in being thus bold is a betrayal. Let us examine\nsome of the stages by which this conviction grew upon him.\n\nIt seems not generally appreciated that this position comprises the\nessence of the celebrated \u201cHouse Divided\u201d speech, delivered before the\nRepublican State Convention at Springfield, June 16, 1858. There he said:\n\u201c\u2018A house divided against itself cannot stand.\u2019 I believe this government\ncannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the\nUnion to be dissolved\u2014I do not expect the house to fall\u2014but I do expect\nit will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the\nother.\u201d[104] How manifest it is that Lincoln\u2019s position was not one of\n\u201ctolerance,\u201d as that word is vulgarly understood today. It was a definite\ninsistence upon right, with no regard for latitude and longitude in moral\nquestions. For Lincoln such questions could neither be relativistically\ndecided nor held in abeyance. There was no middle ground. In the light of\nAmerican political tradition the stand is curiously absolute, but it is\nthere\u2014and it is genuinely expressive of Lincoln\u2019s matured view.\n\nDouglas had made the fatal mistake of looking for a position in the\nexcluded middle. He had been trying to get slavery admitted into the\nterritories by feigning that the institution was morally indifferent. His\nplatform declaration had been that he did not care \u201cwhether it is voted\nup or voted down\u201d in the territories. That statement made a fine opening\nfor Lincoln, which he used as follows in his reply at Alton:\n\n    Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in\n    slavery, but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong\n    in it; because no man can logically say he don\u2019t care whether\n    a wrong is voted up or down. He may say he don\u2019t care whether\n    an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically\n    have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing. He\n    contends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to\n    have them. So they have if it is not a wrong. But if it is a\n    wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do a wrong.[105]\n\nIn a speech at Cincinnati the following year, he used a figure from the\nBible to express his opposition to compromise. \u201cThe good old maxims of\nthe Bible are applicable, and truly applicable, to human affairs, and in\nthis, as in other things, we may say here that he who is not for us is\nagainst us; he who gathereth not with us scattereth.\u201d[106] In the Address\nat Cooper Union Institute, February 27, 1860, Lincoln took long enough\nto describe the methodology of this dodge by Douglas and his supporters.\nIt was, as we have indicated, an attempt to squeeze into the excluded\nmiddle. \u201cLet us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances\nwherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored\u2014contrivances such\nas groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong: vain\nas the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead\nman; such as a policy of \u2018don\u2019t care\u2019 on a question about which all\ntrue men do care....\u201d[107] Finally, and most eloquently of all, there\nis the brief passage from his \u201cMeditation on the Divine Will,\u201d composed\nsometime in 1862. \u201cThe will of God prevails. In great contests each party\nclaims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one\nmust be, wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing at the same\ntime.\u201d[108] God too is a rational being and will not be found embracing\nboth sides of a contradictory. Where mutual negation exists, God must be\nfound on one side, and Lincoln hopes, though he does not here claim, that\nGod is in the Union\u2019s corner of this square of opposition.\n\nThe fact that Lincoln\u2019s thought became increasingly logical under the\npressure of events is proof of great depths in the man.\n\nNow as we take a general view of Lincoln\u2019s habit of defining in its\nrelation to his political thought, we see that it gave him one quality\nin which he is unrivalled by any other American leader\u2014the quality of\nperspective. The connection of the two is a necessary one. To define is\nto assume perspective; that is the method of definition. Since nothing\ncan be defined until it is placed in a category and distinguished from\nits near relatives, it is obvious that definition involves the taking\nof a general view. Definition must see the thing in relation to other\nthings, as that relation is expressible through substance, magnitude,\nkind, cause, effect, and other particularities. It is merely different\nexpression to say that this is a view which transcends: perspective,\ndetachment, and capacity to transcend are all requisites of him who would\ndefine, and we know that Lincoln evidenced these qualities quite early\nin life,[109] and that he employed them with consummate success when the\nfuture of the nation depended on his judgment.\n\nLet us remember that Lincoln was a leader in the most bitter partisan\ntrial in our history; yet within short decades after his death he had\nachieved sanctuary. His name is now immune against partisan rancor, and\nhe has long ceased to be a mere sectional hero. The lesson of these\nfacts is that greatness is found out and appreciated just as littleness\nis found out and scorned, and Lincoln proved his greatness through his\nhabit of transcending and defining his objects. The American scene of his\ntime invites the colloquial adjective \u201cmessy\u201d\u2014with human slavery dividing\nmen geographically and spiritually, with a fluid frontier, and with the\nproblems of labor and capital and of immigration already beginning to\nexert their pressures\u2014but Lincoln looked at these things in perspective\nand refused to look at them in any other way.\n\nFor an early example of this characteristic vision of his, we may go\nback to the speech delivered before the Young Men\u2019s Lyceum in 1838. The\nopening is significant. \u201cIn the great journal of things happening under\nthe sun, we the American people, find our account running under date\nof the nineteenth century of the Christian era. We find ourselves in\nthe peaceful possession of the fairest portion of the earth as regards\nextent of territory, fertility of soil, and salubrity of climate.\u201d[110]\nSo Lincoln takes as his point of perspective all time, of which the\nChristian era is but a portion; and the entire earth, of which the United\nStates can be viewed as a specially favored part. This habit of viewing\nthings from an Olympian height never left him. We might cite also the\nopening of the Speech at Peoria, and that of the Speech at the Cooper\nUnion Institute; but let us pass on twenty-five years and re-read the\nfirst sentence of the Gettysburg Address. \u201cFourscore and seven years ago\nour fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in\nliberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.\u201d\nAgain tremendous perspective, suggesting almost that Lincoln was looking\nat the little act from some ultimate point in space and time. \u201cFourscore\nand seven years ago\u201d carries the listener back to the beginning of the\nnation. \u201cThis continent\u201d again takes the whole world into purview. \u201cOur\nfathers\u201d is an auxiliary suggestion of the continuum of time. The phrase\nfollowing defines American political philosophy in the most general terms\npossible. The entire opening sentence, with its sustained detachment,\nsounds like an account of the action to be rendered at Judgment Day.\nIt is not Abe Lincoln who is speaking the utterance, but the voice of\nmankind, as it were, to whom the American Civil War is but the passing\nvexation of a generation. And as for the \u201cbrave men, living and dead, who\nstruggled here,\u201d it takes two to make a struggle, and is there anything\nto indicate that the men in gray are excluded? There is nothing explicit,\nand therefore we may say that Lincoln looked as far ahead as he looked\nbehind in commemorating the event of Gettysburg.\n\nThis habit of perspective led Lincoln at times to take an extraordinarily\nobjective view of his own actions\u2014more frequently perhaps as he neared\nthe end of his career. It was as if he projected a view in which history\nwas the duration, the world the stage, and himself a transitory actor\nupon it. Of all his utterances the Second Inaugural is in this way the\nmost objective and remote. Its tone even seems that of an actor about\nto quit the stage. His self-effacement goes to the extent of impersonal\nconstructions, so that in places Lincoln appears to be talking about\nanother person. \u201cAt this second appearing to take the oath of the\nPresidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than\nthere was at the first.\u201d \u201cAt this second appearing\u201d! Is there any way of\ngathering, except from our knowledge of the total situation, who is thus\nappearing? Then after a generalized review of the military situation,\nhe declares: \u201cWith high hope for the future, no prediction in regard\nto it is ventured.\u201d Why \u201cis ventured\u201d rather than \u201cI venture\u201d? Lincoln\nhad taught himself to view the war as one of God\u2019s processes worked out\nthrough human agents, and the impersonality of tone of this last and most\ndeeply meditative address may arise from that habit. Only once, in the\nmodest qualifying phrase \u201cI trust,\u201d does the pronoun \u201cI\u201d appear; and the\nfinal classic paragraph is spoken in the name of \u201cus.\u201d There have been\nfew men whose processes of mind so well deserve the epithet _sub specie\naeternitatis_ as Lincoln\u2019s.\n\nIt goes without further demonstration that Lincoln transcended the\npassions of the war. How easy it is for a leader whose political and\npersonal prestige are at stake to be carried along with the tide of\nhatred of a people at war, we have, unhappily, seen many times. No other\nvictor in a civil conflict has conducted himself with more humanity, and\nthis not in some fine gesture after victory was secured\u2014although there\nwas that too\u2014but during the struggle, while the issue was still in doubt\nand maximum strain was placed upon the feelings. Without losing sight of\nhis ultimate goal, he treated everyone with personal kindness, including\npeople who went out of their way in attempts to wound him. And probably\nit was his habit of looking at things through objective definitions which\nkept him from confusing being logically right with being personally\nright. In the \u201cMeditation on the Divine Will\u201d he wrote, \u201cIn the present\ncivil war it is quite possible that God\u2019s purpose is something different\nfrom the purpose of either party....\u201d[111] That could be written only\nby one who has attained the highest level of self-discipline. It\nexplains too why he should write, in his letter to Cuthbert Bullitt: \u201cI\nshall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious\ndealing.\u201d[112] Lastly, there is the extraordinary confession of common\nguilt in the Second Inaugural Address, which, if it had been honored by\nthe government he led, would have constituted a step without precedent in\nhistory in the achievement of reconciliation after war. It is supposable,\nLincoln said, that God has given \u201cto both North and South this terrible\nwar.\u201d Hardly seventy-five years later we were to see nations falling\ninto the ancient habit of claiming exclusive right in their quarrels and\neven of demanding unconditional surrender. As late as February, 1865,\nLincoln stood ready to negotiate, and his offer, far from requiring\n\u201cunconditional surrender,\u201d required but one condition\u2014return of the\nseceded states to the Union.\n\nThere is, when we reflect upon the matter, a certain morality in clarity\nof thought, and the man who had learned to define with Euclid and who had\nkept his opponents in argument out of the excluded middle, could not be\npushed into a settlement which satisfied only passion. The settlement had\nto be objectively right. Between his world view and his mode of argument\nand his response to great occasions there is a relationship so close that\nto speak of any one apart is to leave the exposition incomplete.\n\nWith the full career in view, there seems no reason to differ with\nHerndon\u2019s judgment that Lincoln displayed a high order of \u201cconservative\nstatesmanship.\u201d[113] It is true that Lincoln has been placed in almost\nevery position, from right to left, on the political arc. Our most\nradical parties have put forward programs in his name; and Professor\nJ. G. Randall has written an unconvincing book on \u201cLincoln the Liberal\nStatesman.\u201d Such variety of estimate underlines the necessity of\nlooking for some more satisfactory criterion by which to place the man\npolitically. It will not do to look simply at the specific measures he\nhas supported. If these were the standard, George Washington would have\nto be regarded as a great progressive; Imperial Germany would have to\nbe regarded as liberal, or even as radical, by the token of its social\nreforms. It seems right to assume that a much surer index to a man\u2019s\npolitical philosophy is his characteristic way of thinking, inevitably\nexpressed in the type of argument he prefers. In reality, the type of\nargument a man chooses gives us the profoundest look we get at his\nprinciple of integration. By this method Burke, who was partial to the\nargument from circumstance, must be described as a liberal, whose blast\nagainst the French Revolution was, even in his own words, an attack\nfrom center against an extreme. Those who argue from consequence tend\nto go all out for action; they are the \u201cradicals.\u201d Those who prefer\nthe argument from definition, as Lincoln did, are conservatives in the\nlegitimate sense of the word. It is no accident that Lincoln became the\nfounder of the greatest American conservative party, even if that party\nwas debauched soon after his career ended. He did so because his method\nwas that of the conservative.\n\nThe true conservative is one who sees the universe as a paradigm of\nessences, of which the phenomenology of the world is a sort of continuing\napproximation. Or, to put this in another way, he sees it as a set\nof definitions which are struggling to get themselves defined in the\nreal world. As Lincoln remarked of the Framers of the Declaration of\nIndependence: \u201cThey meant to set up a standard maxim for free society,\nwhich should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly\nlooked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly\nattained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading\nand deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of\nlife to all people of all colors everywhere.\u201d[114] This paradigm acts\nboth as an inspiration to action and as a constraint upon over-action,\nsince there is always a possibility of going beyond the schemata into\nan excess. Lincoln opposed both slavery and the Abolitionists (the\nAbolitionists constituted a kind of \u201caction\u201d party); yet he was not\na middle-of-the-roader. Indeed, for one who grew up a Whig, he is\nastonishingly free from tendency to assume that \u201cthe truth lies somewhere\nin between.\u201d The truth lay where intellect and logic found it, and he was\nnot abashed by clearness of outline.\n\nThis type of conservative is sometimes found fighting quite briskly\nfor change; but if there is one thing by which he is distinguished,\nit is a trust in the methods of law. For him law is the embodiment of\nabstract justice; it is not \u201cwhat the courts will decide tomorrow,\u201d or a\ncalculation of the forces at work in society. A sentence from the First\nInaugural Address will give us the conservative\u2019s view of pragmatic\njurisprudence: \u201cI do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in\nofficial and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts\nwhich stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find\nimpunity in having them held to be unconstitutional.\u201d[115] The essence of\nLincoln\u2019s doctrine was not the seeking of a middle, but reform according\nto law; that is, reform according to definition. True conservatism can be\nintellectual in the same way as true classicism. It is one of the polar\npositions; and it deserves an able exponent as well as does its vivifying\nopposite, true radicalism.\n\nAfter Lincoln had left the scene, the Republican Party, as we have\nnoted, was unable to meet the test of victory. It turned quickly to the\nworship of Mammon, and with the exception of the ambiguous Theodore\nRoosevelt, it never found another leader. No one understood better than\nLincoln that the party would have to succeed upon principle. He told his\nfollowers during the campaign of 1858: \u201cnobody has ever expected me to\nbe President. In my poor, lean, lank face nobody has even seen that any\ncabbages were sprouting out. These are disadvantages all, taken together,\nthat the Republicans labor under. We have to fight this battle upon\nprinciple and upon principle alone.\u201d[116] For two generations this party\nlived upon the moral capital amassed during the anti-slavery campaign,\nbut after that had been expended, and terrible issues had to be faced,\nit possessed nothing. It was less successful than the British Tories\nbecause it was either ignorant or ashamed of the good things it had to\noffer. Today it shows in advanced form that affliction which has overcome\nthe \u201cgood elements\u201d in all modern nations in the face of the bold and\nenterprising bad ones.\n\nLet it be offered as a parting counsel that parties bethink themselves\nof how their chieftains speak. This is a world in which one often gets\nwhat one asks for more directly or more literally than one expects. If\na leader asks only consequences, he will find himself involved in naked\ncompetition of forces. If he asks only circumstance, he will find himself\nintimidated against all vision. But if he asks for principle, he may\nget that, all tied up and complete, and though purchased at a price,\npaid for. Therefore it is of first importance whether a leader has the\ncourage to define. Nowhere does a man\u2019s rhetoric catch up with him more\ncompletely than in the topics he chooses to win other men\u2019s assent.\n\n\n\n\nChapter V\n\nSOME RHETORICAL ASPECTS OF GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES\n\n\nIn an earlier part of this work we defined rhetoric as something which\ncreates an informed appetition for the good. Such definition must\nrecognize the rhetorical force of things existing outside the realm of\nspeech; but since our concern is primarily with spoken rhetoric, which\ncannot be disengaged from certain patterns or regularities of language,\nwe now turn our attention to the pressure of these formal patterns.\n\nAll students of language concede to it a certain public character.\nInsofar as it serves in communication, it is a publicly-agreed-upon\nthing; and when one passes the outer limits of the agreement, one\nabandons comprehensibility. Now rhetoric affects us primarily by setting\nforth images which inform and attract. Yet because this setting forth is\naccomplished through a public instrumentality, it is not free; it is tied\nmore or less closely to the formalizations of usage. The more general and\nrigid of these formalizations we recognize as grammar, and we shall here\nspeak of grammar as a system of forms of public speech. In the larger\naspect, discourse is at once bound and free, and we are here interested\nto discover how the bound character affects our ability to teach and to\npersuade.\n\nWe soon realize that different ways of saying a thing denote different\ninterests in saying it, or to take this in reverse as we do when we\nbecome conscious users of language, different interests in a matter will\ndictate different patterns of expression. Rhetoric in its practice is a\nmatter of selection and arrangement, but conventional grammar imposes\nrestraints upon both of these. All this amounts to saying what every\nsensitive user of language has sometimes felt; namely, that language\nis not a purely passive instrument, but that, owing to this public\nacceptance, while you are doing something with it, it is doing something\nwith you, or with your intention.[117] It does not exactly fight back;\nrather it has a set of postures and balances which somehow modify your\nthrusts and holds. The sentence form is certainly one of these. You pour\ninto it your meaning, and it deflects, and molds into certain shapes.\nThe user of language must know how this counterpressure can be turned\nto the advantage of his general purpose. The failure of those who are\ncareless, or insensitive, to the rhetoric of grammar is that they allow\nthe counter force to impede their design, whereas a perspicacious use\nof it will forward the design. One cannot, for example, employ just any\nmodifier to stand for a substantive or just any substantive to express a\nquality, or change a stabilized pattern of arrangement without a change\nin net effect, although some of these changes register but faintly. But\nstyle shows through an accumulation of small particulars, and the artist\nin language may ponder a long while, as Conrad is said to have done, over\nwhether to describe a character as \u201cpenniless\u201d or \u201cwithout a penny.\u201d\n\nIn this approach, then, we are regarding language as a standard objective\nreality, analyzable into categories which have inherent potentialities. A\nknowledge of these objective potentialities can prevent a loss of force\nthrough friction. The friction we refer to occurs whenever a given unit\nof the system of grammar is tending to say one thing while the semantic\nmeaning and the general organization are tending to say another. A\nlanguage has certain abilities or even inclinations which the wise user\ncan draw into the service of his own rhetorical effort. Using a language\nmay be compared to riding a horse; much of one\u2019s success depends upon an\nunderstanding of what it _can_ and _will_ do. Or to employ a different\nfigure in illustration, there is a kind of use of language which goes\nagainst the grain as that grain is constituted by the categories, and\nthere is a kind which facilitates the speaker\u2019s projection by going with\nit. Our task is an exploration of the congruence between well understood\nrhetorical objectives and the inherent character of major elements in\nmodern English.\n\nThe problem of which category to begin with raises some questions. It\nis arguable that the rhetoric of any piece is dependent upon its total\nintention, and that consequently no single sentence can be appraised\napart from the tendency of the whole discourse. Our position does not\ndeny that, since we are assuming merely that within the greater effect\nthere are lesser effects, cooperating well or ill. Having accepted that\nlimitation, it seems permissible for us to begin with the largest unit of\ngrammar, which is the sentence. We shall take up first the sentence as\nsuch and then discriminate between formal types of sentences.\n\nBecause a sentence form exists in most if not all languages, there\nis some ground to suppose that it reflects a necessary operation of\nthe mind, and this means not simply of the mind as psychologically\nconstituted but also as logically constrained.\n\nIt is evident that when the mind frames a sentence, it performs the\nbasic intellectual operation of analysis and re-synthesis. In this\ncomplete operation the mind is taking two or more classes and uniting\nthem at least to the extent at which they share in a formal unity. The\nunity itself, built up through many such associations, comes to have an\nexistence all its own, as we shall see. It is the repeated congruence\nin experience or in the imagination of such classes as \u201csun-heat,\u201d\n\u201csnow-cold,\u201d which establishes the pattern, but our point is that the\npattern once established can become disciplinary in itself and compel us\nto look for meaning within the formal unity it imposes. So it is natural\nfor us to perceive through a primitive analysis the compresence of sun\nand hot weather, and to combine these into the unity \u201cthe sun is hot\u201d;\nbut the articulation represented by this joining now becomes a thing in\nitself, which can be grasped before the meaning of its component parts\nis evident. Accordingly, although sentences are supposed to grow out of\nmeanings, we can have sentences before meanings are apparent, and this\nis indeed the central point of our rhetoric of grammar. When we thus\ngrasp the scope of the pattern before we interpret the meaning of the\ncomponents, we are being affected by grammatical system.\n\nI should like to put this principle to a supreme sort of test by using a\nfew lines of highly modern verse. In Allen Tate\u2019s poem \u201cThe Subway\u201d we\nfind the following:\n\n    I am become geometries, and glut\n    Expansions like a blind astronomer\n    Dazed, while the wordless heavens bulge and reel\n    In the cold reverie of an idiot.\n\nI do not propose to interpret this further than to say that the features\npresent of word classification and word position cause us to look for\nmeaning along certain lines. It seems highly probable that we shall have\nto exercise much imagination to fit our classes together with meaning\nas they are fitted by formal classification and sentence order (\u201cI am\nbecome geometries\u201d); yet it remains true that we take in the first line\nas a formal predication; and I do not think that this formal character\ncould ever be separated entirely from the substance in an interpretation.\nOnce we gain admission of that point with regard to a sentence, some\nrhetorical status for grammar has been definitely secured.\n\nIn total rhetorical effect the sentence seems to be peculiarly \u201cthe thing\nsaid,\u201d whereas all other elements are \u201cthe things named.\u201d And accordingly\nthe right to utter a sentence is one of the very greatest liberties; and\nwe are entitled to little wonder that freedom of utterance should be, in\nevery society, one of the most contentious and ill-defined rights. The\nliberty to impose this formal unity is a liberty to handle the world, to\nremake it, if only a little, and to hand it to others in a shape which\nmay influence their actions. It is interesting to speculate whether the\nGreeks did not, for this very reason, describe the man clever at speech\nas \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2, an epithet meaning, in addition to \u201cclever,\u201d \u201cfearful\u201d and\n\u201cterrible.\u201d The sentence through its office of assertion is a force\nadding itself to the forces of the world, and therefore the man clever\nwith his sentences\u2014which is to say with his combinations\u2014was regarded\nwith that uneasiness which we feel in the presence of power. The changes\nwrought by sentences are changes in the world rather than in the physical\nearth, but it is to be remembered that changes in the world bring about\nchanges in the earth. Thus this practice of yoking together classes of\nthe world, of saying \u201cCharles is King\u201d or \u201cMy country is God\u2019s country\u201d\nis a unique rhetorical fact which we have to take into account, although\nit stands somewhat prior to our main discussion.\n\nAs we turn now to the different formal types of sentences, we shall\nfollow the traditional grammatical classification and discuss the\nrhetorical inclination of each in turn.\n\nThrough its form, the simple sentence tends to emphasize the discreteness\nof phenomena within the structural unity. To be more specific, its\npattern of subject-verb-object or complement, without major competing\nelements, leaves our attention fixed upon the classes involved: \u201cCharles\nis King.\u201d The effect remains when the simple sentence compounds its\nsubject and predicate: \u201cPeaches and cantaloupes grew in abundance\u201d; \u201cMen\nand boys hunted and fished.\u201d The single subject-predicate frame has\nthe broad sense of listing or itemizing, and the list becomes what the\nsentence is about semantically.\n\nSentences of this kind are often the unconscious style of one who sees\nthe world as a conglomerate of things, like the child; sometimes they\nare the conscious style of one who seeks to present certain things as\neminent against a background of matter uniform or flat. One can imagine,\nfor example, the simple sentence \u201cHe never worked\u201d coming after a long\nand tedious recital which it is supposed to highlight. Or one can imagine\nthe sentence \u201cThe world is round\u201d leaping out of a context with which it\ncontrasts in meaning, in brevity, or in sententiousness.\n\nThere is some descriptive value in saying that the simple sentence is\nthe most \u201clogical\u201d type of sentence because, like the simple categorical\nproposition, it has this function of relating two classes. This fact,\ncombined with its usual brevity and its structural simplicity, makes it a\nuseful sentence for beginnings and endings (of important meaning-groups,\nnot so much of formal introductions and conclusions). It is a sentence\nof unclouded perspective, so to speak. Nothing could be more beautifully\nanticipatory than Burke\u2019s \u201cThe proposition is peace.\u201d\n\nAt the very minimum, we can affirm that the simple sentence tends to\nthrow subject and predicate classes into relief by the structure it\npresents them in; that the two-part categorical form of its copulation\nindicates a positive mood on the part of the user, and that its brevity\noften induces a generality of approach, which is an aid to perspicuous\nstyle. These opportunities are found out by the speaker or writer who\nsenses the need for some synoptic or dramatic spot in his discourse. Thus\nwhen he selects the simple sentence, he is going \u201cwith the grain\u201d; he is\nputting the objective form to work for him.\n\nThe complex sentence has a different potentiality. Whereas the simple\nsentence emphasizes through its form the co-existence of classes (and it\nmust be already apparent that we regard \u201cthings existing or occurring\u201d\nas a class where the predicate consists only of a verb), the complex\nsentence emphasizes a more complex relationship; that is to say, it\nreflects another kind of discriminating activity, which does not\nstop with seeing discrete classes as co-existing, but distinguishes\nthem according to rank or value, or places them in an order of cause\nand effect. \u201cRome fell because valor declined\u201d is the utterance of a\nreflective mind because the conjunction of parts depends on something\nascertainable by the intellect but not by simple perception. This is\nevidence that the complex sentence does not appear until experience has\nundergone some refinement by the mind. Then, because it goes beyond\nsimple observation and begins to perceive things like causal principle,\nor begins to grade things according to a standard of interest, it brings\nin the notion of dependence to supplement that of simple togetherness.\nAnd consequently the complex sentence will be found nearly always to\nexpress some sort of hierarchy, whether spatial, moral, or causal, with\nits subordinate members describing the lower orders. In simple-sentence\nstyle we would write: \u201cTragedy began in Greece. It is the highest form\nof literary art.\u201d There is no disputing that these sentences, in this\nsequence, could have a place in mature expression. But they do not have\nthe same effect as \u201cTragedy, which is the highest form of literary art,\nbegan in Greece\u201d or \u201cTragedy, which began in Greece, is the highest\nform of literary art.\u201d What has occurred is the critical process of\nsubordination. The two ideas have been transferred from a conglomerate to\nan articulated unity, and the very fact of subordination makes inevitable\nthe emergence of a focus of interest. Is our passage about the highest\nform of literary art or about the cultural history of Greece? The form of\nthe complex sentence makes it unnecessary to waste any words in explicit\nassertion of that. Here it is plain that grammatical form is capital upon\nwhich we can draw, provided that other necessities have been taken care\nof.\n\nTo see how a writer of consummate sensibility toward expression-forms\nproceeded, let us take a fairly typical sentence from Henry James:\n\n    Merton Densher, who passed the best hours of each night at the\n    office of his newspaper, had at times, during the day, a sense,\n    or at least an appearance, of leisure, in accordance with\n    which he was not infrequently to be met, in different parts of\n    the town, at moments when men of business were hidden from the\n    public eye.[118]\n\nLeaving aside the phrases, which are employed by James in extension and\nrefinement of the same effect, we see here three dependent clauses used\nto explain the contingencies of \u201cMerton Densher had an appearance of\nleisure.\u201d These clauses have the function of surrounding the central\nstatement in such a fashion that we have an intricate design of thought\ncharacterized by involution, or the emergence of one detail out of\nanother. James\u2019 famous practice of using the dependent clause not only\nfor qualification, but for the qualification of qualification, and in\nsome cases for the qualification of qualification of qualification,\nindicates a persistent sorting out of experience expressive of the\nhighly civilized mind. Perhaps the leading quality of the civilized\nmind is that it is sophisticated as to causes and effects (also as to\nother contiguities); and the complex sentence, required to give these a\nscrupulous ordering, is its natural vehicle.\n\nAt the same time the spatial form of ordering to which the complex\nsentence lends itself makes it a useful tool in scientific analysis, and\none can find brilliant examples of it in the work of scientists who have\nbeen skillful in communication. When T. H. Huxley, for instance, explains\na piece of anatomy, the complex sentence is the frame of explanation. In\nalmost every sentence it will be observed that he is focussing interest\nupon one part while keeping its relationship\u2014spatial or causal\u2014clear with\nreference to surrounding parts. In Huxley\u2019s expository prose, therefore,\none finds the dominant sentence type to consist of a main clause at the\nbeginning followed by a series of dependent clauses which fill in these\nfacts of relationship. We may follow the pattern of the sentences in his\naccount of the protoplasm of the common nettle:\n\n    Each stinging-needle tapers from a broad base to a slender\n    summit, which, though rounded at the end, is of such\n    microscopic fineness that it readily penetrates, and breaks off\n    in, the skin. The whole hair consists of a very delicate outer\n    case of wood, closely applied to the inner surface of which\n    is a layer of semi-fluid matter full of innumerable granules\n    of extreme minuteness. This semi-fluid lining is protoplasm,\n    which thus constitutes a kind of bag, full of limpid liquid,\n    and roughly corresponding in form with the interior of the hair\n    which it fills.[119]\n\nThis is, of course, the \u201cloose\u201d sentence of traditional rhetorical\nanalysis, and it has no dramatic force; yet it is for this very reason\nadapted to the scientist\u2019s purpose.[120] The rhetorical adaptation shows\nin the accommodation of a little hierarchy of details.\n\nThis appears to be the sentence of a developed mentality also, because it\nis created through a patient, disciplined observation, and not through\nimpression, as the simple sentence can be. To the infant\u2019s mind, as\nWilliam James observed in a now famous passage, the world is a \u201cbuzzing,\nblooming confusion,\u201d and to the immature mind much older it often appears\nsomething done in broad, uniform strokes. But to the mind of a trained\nscientist it has to appear a cosmos\u2014else, no science. So in Huxley the\nobjective world is presented as a series of details, each of which has\nits own cluster of satellites in the form of minor clauses. This is the\nway the world has to be reported when our objective is maximum perception\nand minimum desire to obtrude or influence.\n\nHenry James was explaining with a somewhat comparable interest a\ndifferent kind of world, in which all sorts of human and non-material\nforces are at work, and he tried with extreme conscientiousness to\nmeasure them. In that process of quantification and qualification the\ncomplex sentence was often brought by him to an extraordinary height of\nramification.\n\nIn summation, then, the complex sentence is the branching sentence, or\nthe sentence with parts growing off other parts. Those who have used\nit most properly have performed a second act of analysis, in which the\nobjects of perception, after being seen discretely, are put into a ranked\nstructure. This type of sentence imposes the greatest demand upon the\nreader because it carries him farthest into the reality existing outside\nself. This point will take on importance as we turn to the compound\nsentence.\n\nThe structure of the compound sentence often reflects a simple\nartlessness\u2014the uncritical pouring together of simple sentences, as in\nthe speech of Huckleberry Finn. The child who is relating an adventure\nis likely to make it a flat recital of conjoined simple predications,\nbecause to him the important fact is that the things were, not that\nthey can be read to signify this or that. His even juxtapositions\nare therefore sometimes amusing, for now and then he will produce a\ncoordination that unintentionally illuminates. This would, of course, be\na result of lack of control over the rhetoric of grammar.\n\nOn the other hand, the compound sentence can be a very \u201cmature\u201d sentence\nwhen its structure conforms with a settled view of the world. The latter\npossibility will be seen as we think of the balance it presents. When\na sentence consists of two main clauses we have two predications of\nsimilar structure bidding for our attention. Our first supposal is that\nthis produces a sentence of unusual tension, with two equal parts (and\nof course sometimes more than two equal parts) in a sort of competition.\nYet it appears on fuller acquaintance that this tension is a tension of\nstasis, and that the compound sentence has, in practice, been markedly\nfavored by periods of repose like that of the Eighteenth century. There\nis congeniality between its internal balance and a concept of the\nworld as an equilibrium of forces. As a general rule, it appears that\nwhereas the complex sentence favors the presentation of the world as\na system of facts or as a dynamism, the compound sentence favors the\npresentation of it in a more or less philosophical picture. This world as\na philosophical cosmos will have to be a sort of compensatory system. We\nknow from other evidences that the Eighteenth century loved to see things\nin balance; in fact, it required the idea of balance as a foundation\nfor its institutions. Quite naturally then, since motives of this kind\nreach into expression-forms, this was the age of masters of the balanced\nsentence\u2014Dryden, Johnson, Gibbon, and others, the _genre_ of whose style\nderives largely from this practice of compounding. Often the balance\nwhich they achieved was more intricate than simple conjunction of main\nclauses because they balanced lesser elements too, but the informing\nimpulse was the same. That impulse was the desire for counterpoise, which\nwas one of the powerful motives of their culture.\n\nIn this pattern of balance, various elements are used in the offsettings.\nThus when one attends closely to the meanings of the balanced parts,\none finds these compounds recurring: an abstract statement is balanced\n(in a second independent clause) by a more concrete expression of the\nsame thing; a fact is balanced by its causal explanation; a statement of\npositive mode is balanced by one of negative mode; a clause of praise\nis balanced by a clause of qualified censure; a description of one part\nis balanced by a description of a contrasting part, and so on through\na good many conventional pairings. Now in these collocations cause and\neffect and other relationships are presented, yet the attempt seems not\nso much to explore reality as to clothe it in decent form. Culture is a\ndelicate reconciliation of opposites, and consequently a man who sees\nthe world through the eyes of a culture makes effort in this direction.\nWe know that the world of Eighteenth century culture was a rationalist\nworld, and in a rationalist world everything must be \u201caccounted for.\u201d\nThe virtue of the compound sentence is that its second part gives \u201cthe\nother half,\u201d so to speak. As the pattern works out, every fact has its\ncause; every virtue is compensated for by a vice; every excursion into\ngenerality must be made up for by attention to concrete circumstances\nand vice versa. The perfection of this art form is found in Johnson and\nGibbon, where such pairings occur with a frequency which has given rise\nto the phrase \u201cthe balanced style.\u201d When Gibbon, for example, writes of\nreligion in the Age of the Antonines: \u201cThe superstition of the people was\nnot embittered by any mixture of theological rancour; nor was it confined\nby the chains of any speculative system,\u201d[121] we have almost the feeling\nthat the case of religion has been settled by this neat artifice of\nexpression. This is a \u201cjust\u201d view of affairs, which sees both sides and\nleaves a kind of balanced account. It looks somewhat subjective, or\nat least humanized; it gives us the gross world a little tidied up by\nthought. Often, moreover, this balance of structure together with the\nact of saying a thing equivocally\u2014in the narrower etymological sense of\nthat word\u2014suggests the finality of art. This will be found true of many\nof the poetical passages of the King James Bible, although these come\nfrom an earlier date. \u201cThe heavens declare the glory of God; and the\nfirmament sheweth his handiwork\u201d; \u201cMan cometh forth as a flower and is\ncut down; he fleeth also as a shadow and continueth not.\u201d By thus stating\nthe matter in two ways, through balanced clauses, the sentence achieves a\ndegree of formal completeness missing in sentences where the interest is\nin mere assertion. Generally speaking the balanced compound sentence, by\nthe very contrivedness of its structure, suggests something formed above\nthe welter of experience, and this form, as we have by now substantially\nsaid, transfers something of itself to the meaning. In declaring that\nthe compound sentence may seem subjective, we are not saying that it is\narbitrary, its correspondence being with the philosophical interpretation\nrather than with the factual reality. Thus if the complex sentence is\nabout the world, the compound sentence is about our idea about the world,\ninto which some notion of compensation forces itself. One notices that\neven Huxley, when he draws away from his simple expositions of fact and\nseeks play for his great powers of persuasion, begins to compound his\nsentences. On the whole, the compound sentence conveys that completeness\nand symmetry which the world _ought_ to have, and which we manage to\nget, in some measure, into our most satisfactory explanations of it.\nIt is most agreeable to those ages and those individuals who feel that\nthey have come to terms with the world, and are masters in a domain. But\nunderstandably enough, in a world which has come to be centrifugal and\ninfinite, as ours has become since the great revolutions, it tends to\nseem artificial and mechanical in its containment.\n\nSince the difference between sentence and clause is negligible as far as\nthe issues of this subject are concerned, we shall next look at the word,\nand conclude with a few remarks on some lesser combinations. This brings\nup at once the convention of parts of speech. Here again I shall follow\nthe traditional classification, on the supposition that categories to\nwhich usage is referred for correction have accumulated some rhetorical\nforce, whatever may be said for the merits of some other and more\nscientific classification.\n\n\n_The Noun_\n\nIt is difficult not to feel that both usage and speculation agree on the\nrhetorical quality of nouns. The noun derives its special dignity from\nbeing a _name_ word, and names persist, in spite of all the cautions of\nmodern semanticists, in being thought of as words for substances. We\napprehend the significance of that when we realize that in the ancient\nphilosophical regimen to which the West is heir, and which influences\nour thought far more than we are aware at any one moment, substances\nare assigned a higher degree of being than actions or qualities.\nSubstance is that which primordially _is_, and one may doubt whether\nrecent attempts to revolutionize both ontology and grammar have made any\nimpression at all against this feeling. For that reason a substantive\ncomes to us as something that is peculiarly fulfilled;[122] or it is like\na piece in a game which has superior powers of movement and capture. The\nfact that a substantive is the word in a sentence which the other words\nare \u201cabout\u201d in various relationships gives it a superior status.[123]\n\nNouns then express things whose being is completed, not whose being\nis in process, or whose being depends upon some other being. And that\nno doubt accounts for the feeling that when one is using nouns, one\nis manipulating the symbols of a self-subsistent reality.[124] There\nseems little doubt that an ancient metaphysical system, grown to be an\n_habitus_ of the mind through long acceptance, gives the substantive word\na prime status, and this fact has importance when we come to compare the\nnoun with the adjective in power to convince by making real. Suffice it\nto say here that the noun, whether it be a pointer to things that one\ncan touch and see, as _apple_, _bird_, _sky_, or to the more or less\nhypothetical substances such as _fairness_, _spook_, _nothingness_, by\nrule stands at the head of things and is ministered to by the other parts\nof speech and by combinations.\n\n\n_The Adjective_\n\nThe adjective is, by the principle of determination just reviewed, a word\nof secondary status and force. Its burden is an attribute, or something\nadded. In the order of being to which reference has been made, the noun\ncan exist without the adjective, but not the adjective without the noun.\nThus we can have \u201cmen\u201d without having \u201cexcellent men\u201d; but we cannot have\n\u201cexcellent\u201d without having something (if only something understood) to\nreceive the attribution. There are very practical rhetorical lessons to\nbe drawn from this truth. Since adjectives express attributes which are\nconceptually dispensable to the substances wherein they are present, the\nadjective tends to be a supernumerary. Long before we are aware of this\nfact through analysis, we sense it through our resentment of any attempt\nto gain maximum effect through the adjective. Our intuition of speech\nseems to tell us that the adjective is question-begging; that is to\nsay, if the thing to be expressed is real, it will be expressed through\na substantive; if it is expressed mainly through adjectives, there is\nsomething defective in its reality, since it has gone for secondary\nsupport.[125] If someone should say to us, \u201cHave some white milk,\u201d we\nmust suppose either that the situation is curious, other kinds of milk\nbeing available, or that the speaker is trying to impose upon us by a\npiece of persiflage. Again, a mountain is a mountain without being called\n\u201chuge\u201d; if we have to call it huge, there is some defect in the original\nimage which is being made up. Of course there are speech situations in\nwhich such modifiers do make a useful contribution, but as a general\nrule, to be applied with discretion, a style is stronger when it depends\nmainly upon substantives sharp enough to convey their own attributes.\n\nFurthermore, because the class of the adjective contains so many\nterms of dialectical import, such as _good_, _evil_, _noble_, _base_,\n_useful_, _useless_, there is bound to exist an initial suspicion of\nall adjectives. (Even when they are the positive kind, as is true with\nmost limiting adjectives, there lurk the questions \u201cWho made up the\nstatistics?\u201d and \u201cHow were they gathered?\u201d) The dialectical adjective\nis too often a \u201cfighting word\u201d to be used casually. Because in its very\norigin it is the product of disputation, one is far from being certain in\nadvance of assent to it. How would you wish to characterize the world?\nIf you wish to characterize it as \u201cround,\u201d you will win a very general\nassent, although not a universal one. But if you wish, with the poet, to\ncharacterize it as \u201csorry,\u201d you take a position in respect to which there\nare all sorts of contrary positions. In strictest thought one might say\nthat every noun contains its own analysis, but an adjective applied to\na noun is apparatus brought in from the outside; and the result is the\nobject slightly \u201cfictionized.\u201d Since adjectives thus initiate changes in\nthe more widely received substantive words, one has to have permission\nof his audience to talk in adjectives. Karl Shapiro seems to have had\nsomething like this in mind in the following passage from his _Essay on\nRime_:\n\n                  for the tyrannical epithet\n    Relies upon the adjective to produce\n    The image; and no serious construction\n    In rime can build upon the modifier.[126]\n\nOne of the common mistakes of the inexperienced writer, in prose as\nwell as poetry, is to suppose that the adjective can set the key of a\ndiscourse. Later he learns what Shapiro indicates, that nearly always\nthe adjective has to have the way prepared for it. Otherwise, the\nadjective introduced before its noun collapses for want of support.\nThere is a perceptible difference between \u201cthe irresponsible conduct of\nthe opposition with regard to the Smith bill\u201d and \u201cthe conduct of the\nopposition with regard to the Smith bill has been irresponsible,\u201d which\nis accounted for in part by the fact that the adjective comes after the\nsubstantive has made its firm impression. In like manner we are prepared\nto receive Henley\u2019s\n\n    Out of the night that covers me,\n    Black as the Pit from pole to pole\n\nbecause \u201cnight\u201d has preceded \u201cblack.\u201d I submit that if the poem had begun\n\u201cBlack as ...\u201d it would have lost a great deal of its rhetorical force\nbecause of the inherent character of the opening word. The adjective\nwould have been felt presumptuous, as it were, and probably no amount of\nsupplementation could have overcome this unfortunate effect.\n\nI shall offer one more example to show that costly mistakes in emphasis\nmay result from supposing that the adjective can compete with the\nnoun. This one came under my observation, and has remained with me as\na classical instance of rhetorical ineptitude. On a certain university\ncampus \u201cPeace Week\u201d was being observed, and a prominent part of the\nprogram was a series of talks. The object of these talks was to draw\nattention to those forces which seemed to be leading mankind toward a\nthird world war. One of the speakers undertook to point out the extent\nto which the Western nations, and especially the United States, were\nat fault. He declared that a chief source of the bellicose tendency of\nthe United States was its \u201cproud rectitude,\u201d and it is this expression\nwhich I wish to examine critically. The fault of the phrase is that it\nmakes \u201crectitude\u201d the villain of the piece, whereas sense calls for\nmaking \u201cpride.\u201d If we are correct in assigning the substantive a greater\nintrinsic weight, then it follows that \u201crectitude\u201d exerts the greater\nforce here. But rectitude is not an inciter of wars; it is rather that\nrectitude which is made rigid or unreasonable by pride which may be a\nfactor in the starting of wars, and pride is really the provoking agent.\nFor the most fortunate effect, then, the grammatical relationship should\nbe reversed, and we should have \u201crectitude\u201d modifying \u201cpride.\u201d But since\nthe accident of linguistic development has not provided it with an\nadjective form of equivalent meaning, let us try \u201cpride of rectitude.\u201d\nThis is not the best expression imaginable, but it is somewhat better\nsince it turns \u201cproud\u201d into a substantive and demotes \u201crectitude\u201d to\na place in a prepositional phrase. The weightings are now more in\naccordance with meaning: what grammar had anomalously made the chief word\nis now properly tributary, and we have a closer delineation of reality.\nAs it was, the audience went away confused and uninspired, and I have\nthought of this ever since as a situation in which a little awareness\nof the rhetoric of grammar\u2014there were other instances of imperceptive\nusage\u2014could have turned a merely well-intentioned speech into an\neffective one.\n\nHaving laid down this relationship between adjective and substantive\nas a principle, we must not ignore the real or seeming exceptions. For\nthe alert reader will likely ask, what about such combinations as \u201cnew\npotatoes,\u201d \u201cdrunk men,\u201d \u201ca warlike nation\u201d? Are we prepared to say that\nin each of these the substantive gets the major attention, that we are\nmore interested in \u201cpotatoes\u201d than in their being \u201cnew,\u201d in \u201cmen\u201d than\ntheir being \u201cdrunk,\u201d and so forth? Is that not too complacent a rule\nabout the priority of the substantive over the adjective?\n\nWe have to admit that there are certain examples in which the adjective\nmay eclipse the substantive. This may occur (1) when one\u2019s intonation (or\nitalics) directs attention to the modifier: \u201c_white_ horses\u201d; \u201c_five_\ndollars, not four.\u201d (2) when there is a striking clash of meaning between\nthe adjective and the substantive, such that one gives a second thought\nto the modifier: \u201ca murderous smile\u201d; \u201ca gentleman gambler.\u201d (3) when the\nadjective is naturally of such exciting associations that it has become a\nsort of traditional introduction to matter of moment: \u201ca warlike nation\u201d;\n\u201ca desperate deed\u201d; etc. Having admitted these possibilities of departure\nfrom the rule, we still feel right in saying that the rule has some\nforce. It will be found useful in cases which are doubtful, which are the\ncases where no strong semantic or phonetic considerations override the\ngrammatical pattern. In brief, when the immediate act of our mind does\nnot tell us whether an expression should be in this form or the other,\nthe principle of the relationship of adjective and substantive may settle\nthe matter with an insight which the particular instance has not called\nforth.\n\n\n_The Adverb_\n\nThe adverb is distinguished from the other parts of speech by its\nsuperior mobility; roughly speaking, it can locate itself anywhere in\nthe sentence, and this affords a clue to its character. \u201cCertainly the\nday is warm\u201d; \u201cThe day certainly is warm\u201d; \u201cThe day is certainly warm\u201d;\n\u201cThe day is warm certainly\u201d are all \u201cnormal\u201d utterances. This superior\nmobility, amounting to a kind of detachment, makes the adverb peculiarly\na word of judgment. Here the distinction between the adverb and the\nadjective seems to be that the latter depends more upon public agreement\nand less upon private intention in its applications. It is a matter of\ncommon observation that the adverb is used frequently to express an\nattitude which is the speaker\u2019s projection of himself. \u201cSurely the war\nwill end soon\u201d is not, for example, a piece of objective reporting but\nan expression of subjective feeling. We of course recognize degrees of\ndifference in the personal or subjective element. Thomas Carlyle is\nmuch given to the use of the adverb, and when we study his adverbs in\ncontext, we discover that they are often little more than explosions of\nfeeling. They are employed to make more positive, abrupt, sensational,\nor intense whatever his sentence is otherwise saying. Indeed, take from\nCarlyle his adverbs and one robs him of that great hortatory sweep which\nmakes him one of the great preachers in English literature. On the other\nhand Henry James, although given to this use to comparable extent, gets\na different effect from his adverbs. With him they are the exponents\nof scrupulous or meticulous feeling; they are often in fact words of\ndefinite measure. When James says \u201cfully\u201d or \u201cquickly\u201d or \u201cbravely\u201d he\nis usually expressing a definite perception, and sometimes the adverb\nwill have its own phrasal modifier to give it the proper direction or\nlimitation of sense. Therefore James\u2019 adverbs, instead of having a merely\nexpletive force, as do many of Carlyle\u2019s, tend to integrate themselves\nwith his more objective description. All this amounts to saying that\nadverbial \u201cjudgments\u201d can be differently based; and the use of the adverb\nwill affect a style accordingly.\n\nThe caution against presumptuous use of the adjective can be repeated\nwith somewhat greater force for the adverb. It is the most tempting\nof all the parts of speech to question-beg with. It costs little, for\ninstance, to say \u201ccertainly,\u201d \u201csurely,\u201d or even \u201cterribly,\u201d \u201cawfully,\u201d\n\u201cundoubtedly\u201d; but it often costs a great deal to create the picture\nupon which these words are a justifiable verdict. Asking the reader\nto accept them upon the strength of simple assertion is obviously a\nform of taking without earning. We realize that a significant part of\nevery speech situation is the character of the speaker; and there are\ncharacters who can risk an unproved \u201ccertainly\u201d or \u201cundoubtedly.\u201d They\nbring to the speech situation a kind of ethical proof which accentuates\ntheir language. Carlyle\u2019s reflective life was so intense, as we know from\n_Sartor Resartus_ and other sources, that it wins for him a certain right\nto this asseverative style. As a general rule, though, it will be found\nthat those who are most entitled to this credit use it least, which is to\nsay, they prefer to make their demonstrations. We point out in summary\nthat the adverb is frequently dependent upon the character of its user,\nand that, since it is often the qualifier of a qualifier, it may stand\nat one more remove from what we have defined as the primary symbol. This\nis why beginners should use it least\u2014should use it only after they have\ndemonstrated that they can get their results by other means.\n\n\n_The Verb_\n\nThe verb is regularly ranked with the noun in force, and it seems\nthat these two parts of speech express the two aspects under which we\nhabitually see phenomena, that of determinate things and that of actions\nor states of being. Between them the two divide up the world at a pretty\nfundamental depth; and it is a commonplace of rhetorical instruction\nthat a style made up predominantly of nouns and verbs will be a vigorous\nstyle. These are the symbols of the prime entities, words of stasis and\nwords of movement (even when the verb is said to express a \u201cstate of\nbeing,\u201d we accept that as a kind of modal action, a process of going on,\nor having existential quality), which set forth the broad circumstances\nof any subject of discussion. This truth is supported by the facts that\nthe substantive is the heart of a grammatical subject and the verb of a\ngrammatical predicate.\n\nWhen we pass beyond the matter of broad categorization to look at the\nverb\u2019s possibilities, we find the greatest need of instruction to lie\nin the verb epithet. It may be needless to impress any literate person\nwith the verb\u2019s relative importance, but it is necessary to point out,\neven to some practiced writers, that the verb itself can modify the\naction it asserts, or, so to put it, can carry its own epithet. Looking\nat the copious supply of verbs in English, we often find it possible to\nchoose one so selective in meaning that no adverb is needed to accompany\nit. If we wish to assert that \u201cthe man moves _quickly_,\u201d we can say,\ndepending on the tone of our passage and the general signification,\nthat he hastens, _rushes_, _flies_, _scrambles_, _speeds_, _tears_,\n_races_, _bolts_, to name only a few. If we wish to assert that a man\nis not telling the truth, we have the choice of _lies_, _prevaricates_,\n_falsifies_, _distorts_, _exaggerates_, and some others. As this may seem\nto treat the matter at too didactic a level, let us generalize by saying\nthat there is such a thing as the characterizing verb, and that there is\nno telling how many words could have been saved, how many passages could\nhave dispensed with a lumbering and perhaps inaccurate adverb, if this\nsimple truth about the verb were better appreciated. The best writers\nof description and narration know it. Mark Twain\u2019s most vivid passages\nare created largely through a frequent and perceptive use of the verb\nepithet. Turn to almost any page of _Life on the Mississippi_:\n\n    Ship channels are buoyed and lighted, and therefore it is\n    a comparatively easy undertaking to learn to run them;\n    clear-water rivers, with gravel bottoms, change their channels\n    very gradually, and therefore one needs to learn them but once;\n    but piloting becomes another matter when you apply it to vast\n    streams like the Mississippi and the Missouri, whose alluvial\n    banks cave and change constantly, whose snags are always\n    hunting up new quarters, whose sand-bars are never at rest,\n    whose channels are forever dodging and shirking, and whose\n    obstructions must be confronted in all nights and all weathers\n    without the aid of a single lighthouse or a single buoy, for\n    there is neither light nor buoy to be found anywhere in all\n    this three or four thousand miles of villainous river.[127]\n\nHere there occurs not just action, but expressive action, to which\nsomething is contributed by Twain\u2019s subtle appreciation of modal\nvariations in the verb.\n\nThere is a rough parallelism between the use of the complex sentence,\nwith its detail put away in subordinate constructions, and the use of\nthe verb epithet. In both instances the user has learned to dispense\nwith a second member of equal or nearly equal weight in order to get an\neffect. As the adverbial qualification is fused with the verb, so in\nlesser degree, of course, is the detail of the complex sentence fused\nwith its principal assertion. These devices of economy and compression,\nalthough they may be carried to a point at which the style seems forced\nand unnatural, are among the most important means of rhetoric.\n\n\n_The Conjunction_\n\nThe conjunction, in its simple role as joiner, seems not to have much\ncharacter, yet its use expresses of relatedness of things, which is bound\nto have signification. As either coordinator or subordinator of entities,\nit puts the world into a condition of mutual relationship through which\na large variety of ideas may be suggested. From the different ways in\nwhich this relationship is expressed, the reader will consciously and\neven unconsciously infer different things. Sometimes the simple \u201cand\n... and\u201d coordination is the expression of childlike mentality, as we\nsaw in our discussion of the compound sentence. On the other hand, in\na different speech situation it can produce a quite different effect:\nreaders of the King James version of the Bible are aware of how the \u201cand\u201d\nwhich joins long sequences of verses sets up a kind of expectancy which\nis peculiarly in keeping with sacred text. One gets the feeling from the\nreiteration of \u201cand\u201d that the story is confirmed and inevitable; there\nare no contingencies, and everything happens with the double assurance of\nsomething foretold. When this pattern is dropped, as it is in a recent\n\u201cAmerican\u201d version of the Bible, the text collapses into a kind of news\nstory.\n\nThe frequent use of \u201cbut\u201d to join the parts of a compound sentence seems\nto indicate a habit of mind. It is found congenial by those who take a\n\u201cbalanced view,\u201d or who are uneasy over an assertion until it has been\nqualified or until some recognition has been made of its negative. Its\ninfluence is in the direction of the cautious or pedantic style because\nit makes this sort of disjunction, whereas \u201cand\u201d generously joins\neverything up.\n\nSince conjunctions are usually interpreted as giving the plot of one\u2019s\nthought, it is essential to realize that they have implicit meanings.\nThey usually come at points where a pause is natural, and there is a\ntemptation, if one may judge by indulgence in the habit, to lean upon\nthe first one that comes to mind without reflecting critically upon its\nsignificance, so that although the conjunction may formally connect at\nthis point, its semantic meaning does not aid in making the connection\nprecise. A common instance of this fault is the casual interchange of\n\u201ctherefore\u201d and \u201cthus.\u201d \u201cTherefore\u201d means \u201cin consequence of,\u201d but \u201cthus\u201d\nmeans \u201cin this manner\u201d and so indicates that some manner has already\nbeen described. \u201cHence\u201d may take the place of \u201ctherefore\u201d but \u201cthus\u201d may\nnot. \u201cAlso\u201d is a connective used with unimaginative regularity by poor\nspeakers and writers, for whom it seems to signalize the next thought\ncoming. Yet in precise meaning \u201calso\u201d signifies only a mechanical sort of\naddition such as we have in listing one item after another. To signalize\nthe extension of an idea, \u201cmoreover\u201d is usually more appropriate than\n\u201calso.\u201d Although \u201cwhile\u201d is often used in place of \u201cwhereas\u201d to mean \u201con\nthe other hand,\u201d it has its other duty of signifying \u201cat the same time.\u201d\n\u201cWhereas,\u201d despite its pedantic or legalistic overtone, will be preferred\nin passages where precise relationship is the governing consideration.\nOn the whole it would seem that the average writer suffers, in the\ndepartment, from nothing more than poverty of vocabulary. What he does\n(what every writer does to some extent) is to keep on hand a small set\nof conjunctions and to use them in a sort of rotation without giving\nattention to how their distinctive meanings could further his purpose.\n\n\n_The Preposition_\n\nThe preposition too is a word expressing relationships, but this\ndefinition gives only a faint idea of its great resources. When the false\nrules about the preposition have been set aside, it is seen that this\nis a tremendously inventive word. Like the adverb, it is a free rover,\nstanding almost anywhere; it is constantly entering into combinations\nwith verbs and nouns, in which it may direct, qualify, intensify, or even\nadd something quite new to the meaning; at other times it combines with\nsome other preposition to produce an indispensable idiom. It has given us\n\u201cget out,\u201d \u201cput over,\u201d \u201ccome across,\u201d \u201ceat up,\u201d \u201cbutt in,\u201d \u201coff of,\u201d \u201cin\nbetween,\u201d and many other expressions without which English, especially\non the vital colloquial level, would be poorer indeed. Thornton Wilder\nmaintains that it is in this extremely free use of the preposition that\nmodern American English shows its superiority over British English.\nSuch bold use of prepositional combinations gives to American English\na certain flavor of the grand style, which British English has not had\nsince the seventeenth century. Melville, an author working peculiarly\non his own, is characterized in style by this imaginative use of the\npreposition.\n\nConsidered with reference to principle, the preposition seems to do\nwhat the adverb does, but to do it with a kind of substantive force.\n\u201cGroundward,\u201d for example, seems weak beside \u201ctoward the ground,\u201d\n\u201clengthwise\u201d beside \u201calong the length of,\u201d or \u201ccentrally\u201d beside \u201cin\nthe center of.\u201d The explanation may well lie in the preposition\u2019s\ncharacteristic position; as a regular orderer of nouns and of verbs, it\ntakes upon itself something of their solidity of meaning. \u201cWhat is that\nfor?\u201d and \u201cWhere did you send it to?\u201d lose none of their force through\nbeing terminated by these brief words of relationship.\n\n\n_The Phrase_\n\nIt will not be necessary to say much about the phrase because its\npossibilities have been fairly well covered by our discussion of the noun\nand adjective. One qualifying remark about the force of the prepositional\nphrase, however, deserves making. The strength normally found in the\npreposition can be greatly diminished by connection with an abstract\nnoun. That is to say, when the terminus of the preposition is lacking in\nvigor or concreteness, the whole expression may succumb to vagueness,\nin which cases the single adjective or adverb will be stronger by\ncomparison. Thus the idea conveyed by \u201clazy\u201d is largely frustrated by \u201cof\na lazy disposition\u201d; that of \u201cmercenary\u201d by \u201cof a mercenary character\u201d;\nthat of \u201cdeep\u201d by \u201cof depth,\u201d and so on.\n\nAfter the prepositional phrase, the most important phrasal combination\nto examine, from the standpoint of rhetorical usages, is the participial\nphrase. We could infer this truth from the fact alone that the Greeks\nmade a very extensive use of the participle, as every student of that\nmarvellous language knows. Greek will frequently use a participle where\nEnglish employs a dependent clause or even a full sentence, so that the\nEnglish expression \u201cthe man who is carrying a spear\u201d would be in Greek\n\u201cthe spear carrying man\u201d; \u201cthe one who spoke\u201d would be \u201cthe one having\nspoken\u201d and further accordingly, with even more economy of language\nthan these examples indicate. I am disposed to think that the Greeks\ndeveloped this habit because they were very quick to see opportunities of\nsubordination. The clarity and subtlety of the Greek language derives in\nno small part from this highly \u201corganized\u201d character, in which auxiliary\nthoughts are compactly placed in auxiliary structures, where they permit\nthe central thought to emerge more readily. In English the auxiliary\nstatus of the participle (recognized formally through its classification\nas an adjective) is not always used to like advantage.\n\nOne consequence of this is that although English intonation and normal\nword order tend to make the last part of a sentence the most emphatic,\nunskillful writers sometimes lose this emphasis by concluding a sentence\nwith a participial phrase. We may take as examples \u201cHe returned home\nin September, having been gone for a year\u201d; and \u201cHaving been gone for\na year, he returned home in September.\u201d The second of these puts the\nweightier construction in the emphatic position. Of course the matter\nof their relative merit cannot be separated from their purpose; there\nare sentences whose total meanings are best served by a _retardo_ or\n_diminuendo_ effect at the end, and for such closes the participial\nphrase is well suited for reasons already given. But in the majority of\nutterances it contributes best by modifying at some internal position,\nor by expressing some detail or some condition at the beginning of the\nsentence. The latter use may be quite effective in climactic orderings,\nand it will be found that journalists have virtually stereotyped this\nopening for their \u201clead\u201d sentences: \u201cThreatened with an exhausted food\nsupply by the strike, hospitals today made special arrangements for the\ndelivery of essentials\u201d; \u201cReaching a new high for seven weeks, the stock\nmarket yesterday pushed into new territory.\u201d This form is a successful if\noften crude result of effort toward compact and dramatic presentation.\n\nBut to summarize our observations on the participial phrase in English:\nIt is formally a weak member of the grammatical family; but it is useful\nfor economy, for shaded effects, and sometimes the phrase will contain\nwords whose semantic force makes us forget that they are in a secondary\nconstruction. Perhaps it is enough to say that the mature writer has\nlearned more things that can be done with the participle, but has also\nlearned to respect its limitations.\n\n\n_In Conclusion_\n\nI can imagine being told that this chapter is nothing more than an\nexposition of prejudices, and that every principle discussed here can\nbe defied. I would not be surprised if that were proved through single\nexamples, or small sets of examples. But I would still hazard that if\nthese show certain tendencies, my examples show stronger ones, and\nwe have to remember that there is such a thing as a vector of forces\nin language too. Even though an effect may sometimes be obtained by\ncrowding or even breaking a rule, the lines of force are still there,\nto be used by the skillful writer scientifically, and grammar is a kind\nof scientific nomenclature. Beyond this, of course, he will use them\naccording to art, where he will be guided by his artistic intuition, and\nby the residual cautions of his experience.\n\nIn the long view a due respect for the canons of grammar seems a part\nof one\u2019s citizenship? One does not remain uncritical; but one does \u201cgo\nalong.\u201d It has proved impossible to show that grammar is determined\nby the \u201cbest people,\u201d or by the pedants, or by any other presumptive\nauthority, and this is more reason for saying that it incorporates the\npeople as a whole. Therefore the attitude of unthinking adoption and\nthe attitude of personal defiance are both dubious, because they look\naway from the point where issues, whenever they appear, will be decided.\nThat point seems to be some communal sense about the fitness of a word\nor a construction for what has communal importance, and this indicates\nat least some suprapersonal basis. Much evidence could be offered to\nshow that language is something which is born psychological but is ever\nstriving to become logical. At this task of making it more logical\neverybody works more or less. Like the political citizenship defined by\nAristotle, language citizenship makes one a potential magistrate, or one\nempowered to decide. The work is best carried on, however, by those who\nare aware that language must have some connection with the intelligential\nworld, and that is why one must think about the rhetorical nature even of\ngrammatical categories.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VI\n\nMILTON\u2019S HEROIC PROSE\n\n\nThere are many who have wished that Milton were living at this hour,\nbut not all have taken into account the fact that his great polemical\nwritings demand an heroic kind of attention which modern education does\nnot discipline the majority of our citizens to give. Even in the last\ncentury W. E. Channing was moved to lament \u201cthe fastidiousness and\neffeminacy of modern readers\u201d when faced with Milton\u2019s prose writings.\nHe went on to say, in a passage which may serve to introduce our topic,\n\u201cTo be universally intelligible is not the highest merit. A great mind\ncannot, without injurious constraint, shrink itself to the grasp of\ncommon passive readers.\u201d It is wrong therefore to expect it to sacrifice\ngreat qualities \u201cthat the multitude may keep pace with it.\u201d[128]\n\nThe situation which gave rise to Channing\u2019s complaint has grown\nmeasurably worse by our day, when the common passive reader determines\nthe level of most publications. The mere pursuance of Milton\u2019s meaning\nrequires an enforcement of attention, and the perception of his judgments\nrequires an active sensibility incompatible with a state of relaxation.\nThere is nothing in Milton for the reader who must be put at ease and\ntreated only to the quickly apprehensible. But along with this turning\naway from the difficult, there is another cause at work, a feeling,\nquite truly grounded, that Milton\u2019s very arduousness of spirit calls for\nelevation on the part of the reader. Milton assumes an heroic stance, and\nhe demands a similar stance of those who would meet him. An age which\nhas come to suspect this as evidence of aristocratic tendency will then\navoid Milton also for a moral reason, preferring, even when it agrees\nwith him, to have the case stated in more plebeian fashion. Therefore\nthe reading of Milton is more than a problem in communication; it is a\nproblem also of gaining insight, or even of developing sympathy with the\naristocratic intellectualism which breathes through all he wrote.\n\nIt can be shown that all of the features which make up Milton\u2019s arduous\nstyle proceed from three or four sources. The first of these is the\nprimacy of the concept. What this primacy signifies is that in his prose\nMilton wrote primarily as a thinker and not as an artificer. That is\nto say, his units of composition are built upon concepts and not upon\nconventionalized expository patterns. For him the linguistic sentence was\na means, to be expanded and shaped as the driving force of the thought\nrequired. Or perhaps it would be more meaningful to say that for him the\nsentence was an accommodation-form. He will put into it as much or as\nlittle as he needs, and often, as we shall see presently, he needed a\ngreat deal. This use of the sentence as an accommodation-form produces\nwhat is perhaps the most obvious feature of his style, the long period.\nWhat length must a sentence have to be called \u201clong\u201d? Of course our usual\nstandard is the sentence we are accustomed to, and in present-day writing\nthat sentence will run 20-30 words, to cite an average range for serious\nwriting. Milton\u2019s sentences very frequently run 60-80 words, and many\nwill exceed 100, the length of an average paragraph today.[129]\n\nTo examine Milton\u2019s method with the lengthy period, we may well begin\nwith the second sentence of _Of Reformation in England_, an outstanding\nspecimen of 373 words.\n\n    Sad it is to think how that doctrine of the gospel, planted by\n    teachers divinely inspired, and by them winnowed and sifted\n    from the chaff of overdated ceremonies, and refined to such a\n    spiritual height and temper of purity, and knowledge of the\n    Creator, that the body, with all the circumstances of time\n    and place, were purified by the affections of the regenerate\n    soul, and nothing left impure but sin; faith needing not the\n    weak and fallible office of the senses, to be either the\n    ushers or interpreters of heavenly mysteries, save where our\n    Lord himself in his sacraments ordained; that such a doctrine\n    should, through the grossness and blindness of her professors,\n    and the fraud of deceivable traditions, drag so downwards, as\n    to backslide into the Jewish beggary of old cast rudiments,\n    and stumble forward another way into the new-vomited paganism\n    of sensual idolatry, attributing purity or impurity to things\n    indifferent, that they might bring the inward acts of the\n    spirit to the outward and customary eye-service of the body,\n    as if they could make God earthly and fleshly, because they\n    could not make themselves heavenly and spiritual; they began to\n    draw down all the divine intercourse between God and the soul,\n    yea, the very shape of God himself, into an exterior and bodily\n    form, urgently pretending a necessity and obligement of joining\n    the body in a formal reverence, and worship circumscribed; they\n    hallowed it, they fumed it, they sprinkled it, they bedecked\n    it, not in robes of pure innocency, but of pure linen, with\n    other deformed and fantastic dresses, in palls and mitres,\n    gold and gewgaws fetched from Aaron\u2019s old wardrobe, or the\n    flamins vestry: then was the priest set to con his motions and\n    his postures, his liturgies and his lurries, till the soul by\n    this means of overbodying herself, given up justly to fleshly\n    delights, bated her wing apace downward: and finding the ease\n    she had from her visible and sensuous colleague the body, in\n    performance of religious duties, her pinions now broken, and\n    flagging, shifted off from herself the labor of high soaring\n    any more, forgot her heavenly flight, and left the dull and\n    droiling carcase to plod in the old road, and drudging trade of\n    outward conformity.[130]\n\nWith reference to accommodation, let us attend to the scope of this\nsentence. It contains nothing less than a history of Christianity\nfrom the Protestant reformer\u2019s point of view. Four stages are given\nin this history: the early revelation of true Christianity; its later\nmisinterpretation through the \u201cgrossness and blindness\u201d of its followers;\nthe growth of institutionalism; and finally the atrophy of true religion\nproduced by undue attention to outward circumstance. It is, as we see,\na complete narration, dressed out with many illuminating details. We\nshall discover that Milton habitually prolongs a sentence thus until it\nhas covered the unit of its subject. He feels no compulsion to close the\nperiod out of regard for some established norm, since he has his eye on\na different criterion of completeness. In line with the same practice,\nsome of his sentences are so fitted that they contain complete arguments,\nor even an argument preceded by its expository narration. As an example\nof the sentence containing a unit of argument, we may note the following\nfrom _The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce_.\n\n_And yet there follows upon this a worse temptation: for if he be such\nas hath spent his youth unblameably, and laid up his chiefest earthly\ncomforts in the enjoyments of a contented marriage, nor did neglect that\nfurtherance which was to be obtained therein by constant prayers; when he\nshall find himself bound fast to an uncomplying discord of nature, or, as\nit often happens, to an image of earth and phlegm, with whom he looked\nto be the copartner of a sweet and gladsome society, and sees withal\nthat his bondage is now inevitable; though he be almost the strongest\nChristian, he will be ready to despair in virtue, and mutiny against\nDivine Providence; and this doubtless is the reason of those lapses, and\nthat melancholy despair, which we see in many wedded persons, though\nthey understand it not, or pretend other causes, because they know no\nremedy; and is of extreme danger: therefore when human frailty surcharged\nis at such a loss, charity ought to venture much, lest an overtossed\nfaith endanger to shipwreck.[131]_ This sentence contains a complete\nhypothetical syllogism, which can be abstracted as follows:\n\n    If the rigidity of the marriage relationship is not relaxed by\n    charity, Christians will despair of finding their solace in\n    that relationship.\n\n    The rigidity of the marriage relationship is not at present\n    relaxed by charity.\n\n    Christians do despair of finding solace within that\n    relationship (as shown by \u201cthose lapses and that melancholy\n    despair, which we see in many wedded persons\u201d).\n\nThus the argument prescribes the content of the sentence and marshals it.\n\nLet us look next at a specimen from the _Areopagitica_ embodying not only\nthe full syllogism but also a preparatory exposition.\n\n    When a man writes to the world, he summons up all his reason\n    and deliberation to assist him; he searches, meditates, is\n    industrious, and likely consults and confers with his judicious\n    friends; after all which done, he takes himself to be informed\n    in what he writes, as well as any that writ before him; if\n    in this most consummate act of his fidelity and ripeness, no\n    years, no industry, no former proof of his abilities can bring\n    him to that state of maturity, as not to be still mistrusted\n    and suspected, unless he carry all his considerate diligence,\n    all his midnight watchings, and expense of Palladian oil, to\n    the hasty view of an unleisured licenser, perhaps much his\n    younger, perhaps far his inferior in judgment, perhaps one who\n    never knew the labor of bookwriting; and if he be not repulsed,\n    or slighted, must appear in print like a puny with his\n    guardian, and his censor\u2019s hand on the back of his title to be\n    his bail and surety, that he is no idiot or seducer; it cannot\n    be but a dishonor and derogation the author, to the book, to\n    the privilege and dignity of learning.[132]\n\nIn this utterance of 197 words, every detail pertains to the one concept\nof the responsibility and dignity of learning; yet closer inspection\nreveals that a two-part structure is accommodated. First there is the\n\u201cnarration,\u201d a regular part of the classical oration, here setting forth\nthe industry and conscientiousness of authors. This is followed by a\nhypothetical argument saying, in effect, that if all these guarantees\nof sober and honest performance are not enough to entitle authors to\nliberty, there can be no respect for learning or learned men in the\ncommonwealth. Thus the sentence is prolonged, one might say, until\nthe speech is made, and the speech is not a series of loosely related\nassertions but a structure defined by standard principles of logic and\nrhetoric.\n\nApart from mere length, which as Whatley and other writers on style\nobserve, imposes a burden upon the memory too great to be expected of\neveryone, there is in the longer Miltonic sentence the additional tax of\ncomplexity. Of course Milton was somewhat influenced by Latin grammar,\nbut here we are less interested in measuring literary influences than in\nanalyzing the reading problem which he presents in our day. That problem\nis created largely by his intricate elaboration within the long period.\nFor an especially apt illustration of this I should like to return to _Of\nReformation in England_ and follow the sentence which introduces that\nwork.\n\n    Amidst those deep and retired thoughts, which, with every man\n    Christianly instructed, ought to be most frequent, of God and\n    of his miraculous ways and works among men, and of our religion\n    and works, to be performed to him; after the story of our\n    Saviour Christ, suffering to the lowest bent of weakness in the\n    flesh, and presently triumphing to the highest pitch of glory\n    in the spirit, which drew up his body also; till we in both be\n    united to him in the revelation of his kingdom, I do not know\n    of anything more worthy to take up the whole passion of pity\n    on the one side, and joy on the other, than to consider first\n    the foul and sudden corruption, and then, after many a tedious\n    age, the long deferred, but much more wonderful and happy\n    reformation of the church in these latter days.[133]\n\nIt will be agreed, I feel, that the following features require a more\nthan ordinary effort of attention and memory: (1) The rhetorical\ninterruptions, whereby _which_ is separated from its verb _ought to be_,\nand _thoughts_ is separated from its prepositional modifier _of God\nand of his miraculous works and ways among men_.\u2014(2) The progressive\nparticularization of _our Saviour Christ_, wherein the substantive is\nmodified by two participial constructions, _suffering to the lowest\nbent of weakness in the flesh_ and _triumphing to the highest pitch\nof glory in the spirit_; wherein again the substantive _spirit_ takes\na modifier in the clause _which drew up his body also_, and the verb\n_drew up_ of the clause is qualified by the adverbial clause _till we in\nboth be united to him in the revelation of his kingdom_. This is a type\nof elaboration in which, as the account unfolds, each detail seems to\nrequire a gloss, which is offered in a construction of some weight or\nlength.\u2014(3) The extensive parallelism of the last part, beginning with\n_the whole passion of pity on the one side_.\u2014(4) The suspended structure\nwhich withholds the topic phrase of the tract, _happy reformation of the\nchurch_, until almost the end of the sentence.\n\nAll of these qualities of length, scope, and complexity made the Miltonic\nsentence a formidable construction, and we are curious to know why he\nwas able to use it with public success. The first circumstance we must\ntake into account is that he lived in a tough-minded period of Western\nculture. It was a time when the foundations of the state were being\nsearched out; when the relationship between religion and political\nauthority was being re-defined, to the disregard of old customs; and\nwhen sermons were powerful arguments, beginning with first principles\nand moving down through a long chain of deductions. It was a time in\nwhich every thinking man virtually had to be either a revolutionary or\na counter-revolutionary; and there is something in such intellectual\nclimate which scorns prettification and mincing measure. The public\ntherefore met Milton\u2019s impassioned interest with an equal passion. But by\npublic we do not mean here the half-educated masses of today; Milton\u2019s\npublic was rather a sternly educated minority, which had been taught to\nrecognize an argument when it saw one, and even to analyze its source.\n\nFurther evidence of the absorbing interest in the argumentative burden\nof prose expression may be seen in the way he employs the extended\nmetaphor. Milton grew up in the age of the metaphysical conceit. We\nnow understand that for Elizabethans and Jacobeans a metaphor went far\nbeyond mere ornamentation to enter into the very heart of a predication.\nRosemund Tuve in particular has shown that for the poets of the period an\nimage was an argument, so understood and so used.[134] We would hardly\nexpect it to be any less so in prose. When Milton brings in a metaphor,\nhe makes full use of its probative value, and this involved, along with\nconfidence in the architectonic power of the image, a belief that it\naffirmed something about the case in point. Thus the metaphor was not\nidle or decorative merely, and it dominated the passage to the eclipse of\nsentence units. This will explain why, when Milton begins a metaphor, he\nwill scarcely abandon it until the last appropriate application has been\nmade and the similitude established beyond reasonable question.\n\nThe _Areopagitica_ teems with brilliant extended figures, of which two\nwill be cited. Here is an image of truth, carried through three sentences.\n\n    Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine master,\n    and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on: but when he\n    had ascended, and his apostles after him were laid asleep,\n    then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that\n    story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how\n    they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed\n    her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to\n    the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends\n    of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search\n    that Isis made after the body of Osiris, went up and down\n    gathering limb by limb still as they could find them. We have\n    not found them all, lords and commons, nor ever shall do, till\n    her master\u2019s second coming; he shall bring together every\n    joint and member, and shall mold them into an immortal feature\n    of loveliness and perfection. Suffer not these licensing\n    prohibitions to stand at every place of opportunity forbidding\n    and disturbing them that continue seeking, that continue to do\n    our obsequies to the torn body of our martyred saint.[135]\n\nAnd here is Milton\u2019s defense of the intellectually free community,\nrendered in a military metaphor.\n\n    First, when a city shall be as it were besieged and blocked\n    about, her navigable river infested, inroads and incursions\n    round, defiance and battle oft rumored to be marching up,\n    even to her walls and suburb trenches; that then the people,\n    or the greater part, more than at other times, wholly taken\n    up with the study of highest and most important matters to be\n    reformed, should be disputing, reasoning, reading, inventing,\n    discoursing, even to a rarity and admiration, things not before\n    discoursed or written of, argues first a singular good will,\n    contentedness, and confidence in your prudent foresight, and\n    safe government, lords and commons; and from thence derives\n    itself to a gallant bravery and well grounded contempt of\n    their enemies, as if there were no small number of as great\n    spirits among us, as was his who, when Rome was nigh besieged\n    by Hannibal, being in the city, bought that piece of ground\n    at no cheap rate, whereupon Hannibal himself encamped his own\n    regiment.[136]\n\nMilton\u2019s concept of church government according to Scripture is thus\npresented in _The Reason of Church Government Urged Against Prelaty_:\n\n    Did God take such delight in measuring out the pillars,\n    arches, and doors of a material temple? Was he so punctual and\n    circumspect in lavers, altars and sacrifices soon after to be\n    abrogated, lest any of these should have been made contrary to\n    his mind? Is not a far more perfect work, more agreeable to his\n    perfections, in the most perfect state of the church militant,\n    the new alliance to God to man? Should not he rather now by his\n    own prescribed discipline have cast his line and level upon the\n    soul of man, which is his rational temple, and, by the divine\n    square and compass thereof, form and regenerate in us the\n    lovely shapes of virtues and graces, the sooner to edify and\n    accomplish that immortal stature of Christ\u2019s body, which is his\n    church, in all her glorious lineaments and proportions?[137]\n\nWhat we are especially called upon to note in these examples is the\nboldness of figuration, by which the concept survives the pressure of\nmany, and sometimes rather concrete, tests of correspondence, as the\nanalogy enlarges. The author\u2019s faith in the figure as an organizing\nprinciple is likely evidence that he sees the world as form, the more\nof which can be drawn out the better. To a later day, any figure\ncarried beyond modest length runs the danger of turning into an ironic\ncommentary upon its analogue, but to Milton, as to the seventeenth\ncentury generally, it was a window to look through. Now quite literally\nthe conceit is a concept, and we have found it to be another organizing\nmedium of this intellectual prose, and a second proof that some texture\nof thought precedes the mere linguistic expression, and holds itself\nsuperior to it.\n\nWhile the primacy of the concept is responsible for these formal features\nof style, we must look elsewhere for the source of its vigor. Certainly\nanother reason that Milton is a taxing author to read is the restless\nenergy that permeates his substance. He never allows the reader to\nremain inert, and this is because there were few things toward which\nMilton himself was indifferent. One revelation of the active mind is\nthe zeal and completeness with which it sorts things according to some\nscale of values; and judged by that standard Milton\u2019s mind is active\nin the extreme. To approach this a little more systematically, what\none discovers with one\u2019s first reading of the prose is that Milton\nis constantly attentive to the degrees of things, and his range of\nvaluations, extending from those things which can be described only\nthrough his elegant curses to those which require the language of\nreligious or poetic eulogy, is very great. Indeed, \u201cthings indifferent,\u201d\nto employ a phrase used by Milton himself, play a very small part in his\nwriting, which rather tends to be juridical in the highest measure. And\nthe vitality contributed by this awareness of difference he increased\nby widening the gulf between the bad and the good. These contrarieties\nare managed in various ways: sometimes they are made up of single nouns\nof opposed meaning; sometimes of other parts of speech or of phrases;\nbut always it would take a dull reader to miss the opposed valuations.\nA sentence from The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce will afford some\ngood examples.\n\n    Hence it is, that error supports custom, custom countenances\n    error: and these two between them would persecute and chase\n    away all truth and solid wisdom out of human life, were it not\n    that God, rather than man, once in many ages calls together\n    the prudent and religious counsels of men, deputed to repress\n    the encroachments, and to work off the inveterate blots and\n    obscurities wrought upon our minds by the subtle insinuating\n    of error and custom; who, with the numerous and vulgar train\n    of their followers, make it their chief design to envy and cry\n    down the industry of free reasoning, under the terms of humor\n    and innovation; as if the womb of teeming truth were to be\n    closed up, if she presume to bring forth aught that sorts not\n    with their unchewed notions and suppositions.[138]\n\nThe vigor of this passage arises from a continuing series of contrasts,\ncomprising the following: _error and custom_ with _truth and solid\nwisdom; God_ with _man_; _prudent and religious counsels_ with\n_encroachments_ and also with _inveterate blots and obscurities; subtle\ninsinuating of error and custom_ with _industry of free reasoning_; and\n_womb of teeming truth_ with _unchewed notions and suppositions_.\n\nHere is another passage, from _Of Reformation in England_.\n\n    So that in this manner the prelates, both then and ever since,\n    coming from a mean and plebeian life on a sudden to be lords of\n    stately palaces, rich furniture, delicious fare, and princely\n    attendance, thought the plain and homespun verity of Christ\u2019s\n    gospel unfit any longer to hold their lordships\u2019 acquaintance,\n    unless the poor threadbare matron were put into better clothes;\n    her chaste and modest vail, surrounded with celestial beams,\n    they overlaid with wanton tresses, and in a staring tire\n    bespeckled her with all the gaudy allurements of a whore.[139]\n\nIn this the clash is between _plebeian life_ and _stately palaces_,\n_rich furniture_, etc.; _homespun verity_ and _lordship\u2019s acquaintance_;\n_threadbare matron_ and _better clothes_; _chaste and modest vail_ and\n_wanton tresses_, _staring tire_, and _gaudy allurements of a whore_.\nLastly I should like to take a sentence from the same work, which has\nbeen admired by Aldous Huxley for its energy.\n\n    Thus then did the spirit of unity and meekness inspire and\n    animate every joint and sinew of the mystical body; but now\n    the gravest and worthiest minister, a true bishop of his\n    fold, shall be reviled and ruffled by an insulting and only\n    canon-wise prelate, as if he were some slight paltry companion:\n    and the people of God, redeemed and washed with Christ\u2019s blood,\n    and dignified with so many glorious titles of saints and sons\n    in the gospel, are now no better reputed than impure ethnics\n    and lay dogs; stones, pillars, and crucifixes, have now the\n    honour and the alms due to Christ\u2019s living members; the table\n    of communion, now become a table of separation, stands like\n    an exalted platform on the brow of the quire, fortified with\n    bulwark and barricado, to keep off the profane touch of the\n    laics, whilst the obscene and surfeited priest scruples not\n    to paw and mammock the sacramental bread as familiarly as his\n    tavern biscuit.[140]\n\nIn this typical specimen of Milton\u2019s vehemence, _gravest and worthiest\nminister, a true bishop_ contrasts with _insulting and only canon-wise\nprelate_ and with _slight paltry companion_; _the people of God, redeemed\nand washed with Christ\u2019s blood, and dignified with so many glorious\ntitles of saints and sons in the gospel_ with _impure ethnics_ and _lay\ndogs_; _stones, pillars, and crucifixes_ with _Christ\u2019s living members_;\n_communion_ with _separation_; _fortified with bulwark and barricado_\nwith the earlier _unity and meekness_; _obscene_, _surfeited_, _paw_, and\n_mammock_ with _priest_; and _sacramental bread_ with _tavern biscuit_.\n\nThe effect of such sustained contrast is to produce a high degree of\ntonicity, and here in a word is why Milton\u2019s prose seems never relaxed.\nHis pervading consciousness of the combat of good and evil caused him to\nengage in constant projections of that combat. In a manner of speaking,\nMilton always writes from a \u201cprejudice,\u201d which proves to be on inspection\nhis conviction as a Christian and as a political and moral preacher,\nthat, as the good has been judged, the duty of a publicist is to show\nit separated with the utmost clearness of distinction from the bad.\nAccordingly Milton\u2019s expositions, if one follows them intently, cause one\nto accept one thing and reprobate another unceasingly.\n\nIn consequence there appears in many passages a quality of style which\nI shall call the superlative mode. His very reaching out toward the two\nextremes of a gauge of value drives him to couch expression in terms\nraised to their highest degree. Often we see this in the superlative\nform of the adjective. But we see it also in his employment of words\nwhich even in their grammatically positive forms have acquired a kind\nof superlative sense. Finally we see it on occasion in a pattern\nof incremental repetition which he uses to impress us with his most\nimpassioned thoughts. The wonderful closing prayer from _Of Reformation\nin England_ contains examples of all of these superlatives. Here are the\nclosing paragraphs.\n\n    And now we know, O thou our most certain hope and defence,\n    that thine enemies have been consulting all the sorceries of\n    the great whore, and have joined their plots with that sad\n    intelligencing tyrant that mischiefs the world with his mines\n    of Ophir, and lies thirsting to revenge his naval ruins that\n    have larded our seas: but let them all take counsel together,\n    and let it come to nought; let them decree, and do thou cancel\n    it; let them gather themselves, and be scattered; let them\n    embattle themselves, and be broken, for thou art with us.\n\n    Then, amidst the hymns and hallelujahs of saints, some one\n    may perhaps be heard offering at high strains in new and\n    lofty measures, to sing and celebrate thy divine mercies and\n    marvellous judgments in this land throughout all ages; whereby\n    this great and warlike nation, instructed and inured to the\n    fervent and continual practice of truth and righteousness,\n    and casting far from her the rags of her old vices, may\n    press on hard to that high and happy emulation to be found\n    the soberest, wisest, and most Christian people at that day,\n    when thou, the eternal and shortly-expected King, shalt open\n    the clouds to judge the several kingdoms of the world, and\n    distributing national honours and rewards to religious and\n    just commonwealths, shalt put an end to all earthly tyrannies,\n    proclaiming thy universal and mild monarchy through heaven and\n    earth; where they undoubtedly, that by their labors, counsels\n    and prayers, have been earnest for the common good of religion\n    and their country, shall receive above the inferior orders of\n    the blessed, the regal addition of principalities, legions,\n    and thrones into their glorious titles, and in supereminence\n    of beatific vision, progressing the dateless and irrevoluble\n    circle of eternity, shall clasp inseparable hands with joy and\n    bliss, in overmeasure, for ever.\n\n    But they contrary, that by the impairing and diminution of the\n    true faith, the distresses and servitude of their country,\n    aspire to high dignity, rule, and promotion here, after a\n    shameful end in this life (which God grant them), shall be\n    thrown down eternally into the darkest and deepest gulf of\n    hell, where under the despiteful control, the trample and spurn\n    of all the other damned, that in the anguish of their torture,\n    shall have no other ease than to exercise a raving and bestial\n    tyranny over them as their slaves and negroes, they shall\n    remain in that plight for ever, the basest, the lowermost,\n    the most dejected, most underfoot, and downtrodden vassals of\n    perdition.[141]\n\nLet us mark the bristling superlatives. Of adjectives in superlative\nform we find _most certain_, _soberest_, _wisest_, _most Christian_,\n_darkest_, _deepest_, _basest_, _lowermost_, _most dejected_, _most\nunderfoot_, and _[most] downtrodden_. Of those words which have a\nsuperlative force or meaning, I would list\u2014allowing that this must be a\nmatter of judgment\u2014_naught_, _cancel_, _broken_, _marvellous_, _fervent_,\n_eternal_, _universal_, _undoubtedly_, _supereminence_, _beatific_,\n_dateless_, _irrevoluble_, _eternity_, _inseparable_, _overmeasure_, _for\never_, and _eternally_. But the most interesting form of the superlative\nmode is the pattern of repetition by which Milton, through a progressive\naccumulation of substantives and adjectives, builds up a crescendo.\nFirst there will be one or more groups of two, then perhaps a group of\nthree, and finally, for the supreme effect, a breathtaking collocation of\nfive. Such a pattern appears in the concluding sentence of the prayer:\n_impairing_ and _diminution_; _distresses_ and _servitude_; _dignity_,\n_rule_, and _promotion_; _darkest_ and _deepest_; _control_, _trample_,\nand _spurn_; _raving_ and _bestial_; _slaves_ and _negroes_; _basest_,\n_lowermost_, _most dejected_, _most underfoot and downtrodden_. Here, it\nwill be noticed, the sequence is 2-2-3-2-3-2-2-5. The pattern in itself\nis revealing. First there are two pairs which ready us for attaining the\ngroup of three; then another pair to rest upon before we attain the group\nof three again; then two more pairs for a longer respite while we ready\nourselves for the supreme effort of the group of five.\n\nThe prayer is not, of course, an ordinary passage; yet what is seen here\nis discoverable in some measure in all of Milton\u2019s prose. He wrote in\nthis superlative vein because his principal aim was the divorcement of\ngood and evil. To show these wide apart, he had to talk in terms of best\nand worst, and being a rhetorician of vast resources, he found ways of\nmaking the superlative even more eminent than our regular grammatical\nforms make it, which naturally marks him as a great creative user of the\nlanguage.\n\nThe topic of grouping appropriately introduces another aspect of Milton\u2019s\nstyle which I shall refer to more specifically as systematic collocation.\nNo one can read him with the object of forming some descriptive image of\nhis prose without being impressed by his frequent use of pairs of words\nsimilar in meaning to express a single object or idea. These pairs will\nbe comprised, in a roughly equal number of instances, of nouns and of\nadjectives, though fairly often two verbs will make up the collocation\nand occasionally two adverbs. It seems probable that these pairs, more\nthan any other single feature of the style, give the impression of\nthickness, which is in turn the source of the impression of strength. Or\nto present this in another way, what the pairs create is the effect of\ndimension. It needs no proving at this stage that Milton had too well\nstored a mind and too genuine a passion to coast along on mere fluency.\nIf he used two words where another author would use one, that fact\naffords presumption that his second word had its margin of meaningful\naddition to contribute. And so we find it: these pairs of substantives\ngive his prose a dimensional quality, because this one will show one\naspect of the thing named and that one another. It would require a rather\nlong list to include the variety of aspects which Milton will bring out\nby his practice of double naming; sometimes it is in form and substance,\nor the conceptual and the material nature of the thing; sometimes it is\nappearance and meaning; sometimes process and tendency; sometimes one\nmodifier will express the active and another the passive nature of the\nthing described. Always the practice causes his subject matter to convey\nthis sensation of depth and realness, which is a principal factor in the\nvitality of his style.\n\nWe shall look at some examples of this highly interesting method. The\nfirst is from the _Areopagitica_. I have italicized the pairs.\n\n    Methinks I see in my mind a _noble_ and _puissant_ nation\n    rousing herself like a strong man after a sleep, and shaking\n    her invincible locks: methinks I see her as an eagle mewing\n    her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full\n    midday beam, _purging_ and _unscaling_ her long abused sight at\n    the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise\n    of _timorous_ and _flocking_ birds, with those also that love\n    the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in\n    their envious gabble, would prognosticate a year of _sects_ and\n    _schisms_.[142]\n\n_Noble_ and _puissant_ direct attention to ethical and to physical\nattributes; _purging_ and _scaling_ do not form so complementary a\npair but perhaps denote two distinct phases of a process; _timorous_\nand _flocking_ is an excellent pair to show inward nature and outward\nbehavior, and must be accounted one of the most successful uses of\nthe method; _sects_ and _schisms_ would seem to refer to social or\necclesiastical and to theological aspects of division.\n\nIn a sentence from _Of Reformation in England_, he says: \u201cBut what do I\nstand reckoning upon _advantages_ and _gains_ lost by the _misrule_ and\n_turbulency_ of the prelates?\u201d[143] _Advantages_ and _gains_ stand for\ntwo sorts of progress made prior to the _misrule_ and _turbulency_ of the\nprelates, which in turn signify the formal outward policies and the inner\nspirit of ambition and presumption. From the _Doctrine and Discipline of\nDivorce_: \u201cThe _ignorance_ and _mistake_ of this high point hath heaped\nup one huge half of all the misery that hath been since Adam.\u201d[144] Here\n_ignorance_ would seem to describe a passive lack of awareness, whereas\n_mistake_ describes active misapprehension or misapplication. Finally\nhere are examples from _Animadversions upon the Remonstrant\u2019s Defence\nAgainst Smectymnuus_.\n\n    We all know that in _private_ or _personal_ injuries, yea,\n    in public sufferings for the cause of Christ, his _rule_ and\n    _example_ teaches us to be so far from a readiness to speak\n    evil, as not to answer the reviler in his language, though\n    never so much provoked: yet in the _detecting_ and _convincing_\n    of any notorious enemy to _truth_ and his _country\u2019s peace_,\n    especially that is conceited to have a _voluble_ and _smart_\n    fluence of tongue, and in the vain confidence of that, and out\n    of a more tenacious cling to worldly respects, stands up for\n    all the rest to justify a _long usurpation_ and _convicted\n    pseudepiscopy_ of prelates, with all their ceremonies,\n    liturgies and tyrannies, which _God_ and _man_ are now ready to\n    _explode_ and _hiss out of the land_: I suppose, and more than\n    suppose, it will be nothing disagreeing from Christian meekness\n    to handle such a one in a rougher accent, and to send home his\n    haughtiness well bespurted with his own holy water.[145]\n\nHere _private_ and _personal_ may be taken as giving us two aspects of\nthe individual; _rule_ and _example_ differ as abstract and concrete;\n_detecting_ and _convincing_ (the latter apparently in the older sense of\n\u201covercoming\u201d) denote two stages of a process; _truth_ and _his country\u2019s\npeace_ may be taken to express the metaphysical and the embodied forms\nof the same thing; _voluble_ and _smart_ seem to refer to what is\nperceivable by the senses and by the intellect respectively; _long\nusurpation_ and _convicted pseudepiscopy_ differ as simple action and\naction which has been judged: _God_ and _man_ bring together the divine\nand the human; _explode_ and _hiss out of the land_ again express two\nstages of a process.\n\nIn the manner here indicated, these collocations serve to give the style\na wonderful richness of thought. The reader feels that he is being shown\nboth the _esse_ and the _potesse_ of the object named. At least, he gets\na look at its manifold nature. The way in which Milton fills out the\nsubject for his reader is at once lavish and perspicuous. Just as his\nfigures were seen to have a prolonged correspondence, beyond what the\ncasual or unthinking writer would bring to view, so his substantives and\npredicates are assembled upon a principle of penetration or depth of\ndescription.\n\nOur general impression of Milton\u2014an impression we get in some degree\nof all the great writers of his period and of the Elizabethan period\nbefore it\u2014is that his thought dominates the medium. While the distinction\nbetween what is said and the form of saying it can never be drawn\nabsolutely, it is yet to be remarked that some writers seem to compose\nwith an awareness of how their matter will look upon the page, or how\nit will sound in the parlor; others seem to keep their main attention\nupon currently preferred terms and idioms. Again, some writers seem to\naccept the risk of suspension, transposition, and involution out of\nconscious elegance; Milton seems rather to require them out of strength\nof purpose. He was not a writer of writing, but consistently a writer of\nsubstance, and the language was his instrumentality, which he used with\nthe familiar boldness of a master. One would go far to find a better\nillustration of the saying of John Peale Bishop that the English language\nis like a woman; it is most likely to yield after one has shown it a\nlittle violence. All of the great prose writers of the Elizabethan age\nand the Seventeenth century were perfectly capable of showing it that\nviolence, and I believe this is the true reason that a lover of eloquence\ntoday reacts their works with irrepressible admiration. The tremendous\nsuspensions and ramifications they were willing to create; their\nreadiness to make function the test of grammar and to coin according\nto need, through all of which a rational, though not always a formal\nor codified syntax survives\u2014these things bespeak a sort of magisterial\nattitude toward language which has been lost in the intervening centuries.\n\nIt is quite possible that long years of accumulated usage tend to act\nas a deterrent to a free and imaginative use of language. So many\nstereotypes have had time to form themselves, and so many manuals\nof usage have been issued that the choice would seem to lie between\nsimple compliance and open rebellion. Either one uses the language as\nthe leaders of one\u2019s social and business world use it, or one makes a\ndecisive break and uses it in open defiance of the conventionalized\npatterns. We may remember in this connection that when the new movement\nin modern literature got underway in the second decade of this century,\nits leaders proved themselves the most defiant and brash kind of rebels\nas they embarked upon the work of resuscitation and refurbishment, and\nit was to the Elizabethans especially that they looked for sanction and\nguidance. But the rebel with this program faces a dilemma: he cannot\ninfuse life into the old forms that he knows are depriving expression of\nall vitality, and he exhausts himself in the campaign to smash and get\nrid of them.\n\nThat is partly an historical observation, and our interest is in laying\nbare the movement of a great eloquence. Yet if we had to answer whether\nsome heroic style like that of Milton cannot be formed for our own day,\nwhen millions might rejoice to hear a sonorous voice speaking out of a\ndeep learning in our traditions, our answer would surely be, yes. And if\nasked how, we would begin our counsel by telling the writer to heed the\nadvice in Emerson\u2019s _American Scholar_\u2014better indeed than Emerson heeded\nit himself\u2014to look upon himself not as a writer but as a man writing, and\nto try to live in that character. As long as one does that, it is most\nlikely that the concept will dominate the medium, and that one will use,\nwith inventive freedom, such conventionality as is necessary to language.\nA timid correctness, like perfect lucidity, sometimes shows that more\nattention has been devoted to the form than to the thought, and this may\ngive the writing a kind of hard surface which impedes sympathy between\nwriter and reader. Finally, one should remember that people like to feel\nthey are hearing of the solid fact and substance of the world, and those\nepithets which give us glimpses of its concreteness and contingency\nare the best guarantors of that. The regular balancing of abstract and\nconcrete modifiers, which we meet regularly in Shakespeare, mirrors,\nindeed, the situation all of us face in daily living, where general\nprinciples are clear in theory but are conditioned in their application\nto the concrete world. The man of eloquence must be a lover of \u201cthe\nworld\u2019s body\u201d to the extent of being able to give it a fond description.\n\nWith these conditions practically realized, we might again have orators\nof the heroic mold. But the change would have to include the public also,\nfor, on a second thought suggested by Whitman, to have great orators\nthere must be great audiences too.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VII\n\nTHE SPACIOUSNESS OF OLD RHETORIC\n\n\nFew species of composition seem so antiquated, so little available for\nany practical purpose today, as the oratory in which the generation\nof our grandparents delighted. The type of discourse which they would\nride miles in wagons to hear, or would regard as the special treat of\nsome festive occasion, fills most people today with an acute sense of\ndiscomfort. Somehow, it makes them embarrassed. They become conscious\nof themselves, conscious of pretensions in it, and they think it well\nconsigned to the museum. But its very ability to inspire antipathy, as\ndistinguished from indifference, suggests the presence of something\ninteresting.\n\nThe student of rhetoric should accordingly sense here the chance for a\ndiscovery, and as he begins to listen for its revealing quality, the\nfirst thing he becomes aware of is a \u201cspaciousness.\u201d This is, of course,\na broad impression, which requires its own analysis. As we listen more\ncarefully, then, it seems that between the speech itself and the things\nit is meant to signify, something stands\u2014perhaps it is only an empty\nspace\u2014but something is there to prevent immediate realizations and\nreferences. For an experience of the sensation, let us for a moment go\nback to 1850 and attune our ears to an address by Representative Andrew\nEwing, on the subject of the sale of the public lands.\n\n    We have afforded a refuge to the down-trodden nations of the\n    Old World, and organized system of internal improvement and\n    public education, which have no parallel in the history of\n    mankind. Why should we not continue and enlarge the system\n    which has so much contributed to these results? If our Pacific\n    Coast should be lined with its hundred cities, extending from\n    the northern boundary of Oregon down to San Diego; if the vast\n    interior hills and valleys could be filled with lowing herds\n    and fruitful fields of a thriving and industrious people; and\n    if the busy hum of ten thousand workshops could be daily heard\n    over the placid waters of the Pacific, would our government be\n    poorer or our country less able to meet her obligations than at\n    present?[146]\n\nDespite the allusions to geographical localities, does not the\nspeaker seem to be speaking _in vacuo_? His words do not impinge\nupon a circumambient reality; his concepts seem not to have definite\ncorrespondences, but to be general, and as it were, mobile.\n\u201cSpread-eagle\u201d and \u201chigh-flown\u201d are two modifiers with which people have\nsought to catch the quality of such speech.\n\nIn this work we are interested both in causes and the moral quality\nof causes, and when an orator appears to speak of subjects without an\nimmediate apperception of them, we become curious about the kind of world\nhe is living in. Was this type of orator sick, as some have inferred?\nWas he suffering from some kind of auto-intoxication which produces\ninsulation from reality? Charles Egbert Craddock in her novel _Where\nthe Battle Was Fought_ has left a satirical picture of the type. Its\npersonification is General Vayne, who holds everything up to a \u201cmoral\nmagnifying glass.\u201d \u201cThrough this unique lens life loomed up as a rather\nlarge affair. In the rickety courthouse in the village of Chattalla,\nfive miles out there to the south, General Vayne beheld a temple of\njustice. He translated an office-holder as the sworn servant of the\npeople. The State was this great commonwealth, and its seal a proud\nescutcheon. A fall in cotton struck him as a blow to the commerce of\nthe world. From an adverse political fortune he augured the swift ruin\nof the country.\u201d[147] There is the possibility that this type was sick\nwith a kind of vanity and egocentricity, and that has frequently been\noffered as a diagnosis. But on the other hand, there is the possibility\nthat such men were larger than we, with our petty and contentious style,\nand because larger more exposed in those limitations which they had. The\nheroes in tragedies also talk bigger than life. Perhaps the source of our\ndiscomfort is that this kind of speech comes to us as an admonition that\nthere were giants in the earth before us, mighty men, men of renown. But\nbefore we are ready for any conclusion, we must isolate the cause of our\nintimation.\n\nAs we scan the old oratory for the chief offender against modern\nsensibility, we are certain to rank in high position, if not first,\n_the uncontested term_. By this we mean the term which seems to invite\na contest, but which apparently is not so regarded in its own context.\nMost of these are terms which scandalize the modern reader with their\ngenerality, so that he wonders how the speaker ever took the risk of\nusing them. No experienced speaker interlards his discourse with terms\nwhich are themselves controversial. He may build his case on one or two\nsuch terms, after giving them _ad hoc_ definitions, but to multiply them\nis to create a force of resistance which almost no speech can overcome.\nYet in this period we have speeches which seem made up almost from\nbeginning to end of phrases loose in scope and but weakly defensible.\nYet the old orator who employed these terms of sweeping generality knew\nsomething of his audience\u2019s state of mind and was confident of his\neffect. And the public generally responded by putting him in the genus\n\u201cgreat man.\u201d This brings us to the rhetorical situation, which must be\ndescribed in some detail.\n\nWe have said that this orator of the old-fashioned mold, who is using\nthe uncontested term, passes on his collection of generalities in full\nexpectation that they will be received as legal tender. He is taking a\nvery advanced position, which could be undermined easily, were the will\nto do so present. But the will was not present, and this is the most\nsignificant fact in our explanation. The orator had, in any typical\naudience, not only a previously indoctrinated group, but a group of quite\nsimilar indoctrination. Of course, we are using such phrases for purposes\nof comparison with today. It is now a truism that the homogeneity of\nbelief which obtained three generations ago has largely disappeared. Such\nbelief was, in a manner of conceiving it, the old orator\u2019s capital. And\nit was, if we may trust the figure further, an initial asset which made\nfurther operations possible.\n\nIf we knew how this capital is accumulated, we would possess one of\nthe secrets of civilization. All we know is that whatever spells the\nessential unity of a people in belief and attachment contains the\nanswer. The best we can do at this stage is look into the mechanism of\nrelationship between this level of generality and the effectiveness of a\nspeech.\n\nWe must keep in mind that \u201cgeneral\u201d is itself a relative modifier, and\nthat the degree of generality with which one may express one\u2019s thoughts\nis very wide. One may refer, for example, to a certain event as a\n_murder_, a _crime_, an _act_, or an _occurrence_. We assume that none\nof these terms is inherently falsifying, because none of them is in any\nprior sense required. Levels of generality do not contradict one another;\nthey supplement one another by bringing out different foci of interest.\nEvery level of generality has its uses: the Bible can tell the story of\ncreation in a few hundred words, and it is doubtless well that it should\nbe told there in that way. Let us therefore take a guarded position here\nand claim only that one\u2019s level of generality tells something of one\u2019s\napproach to a subject. We shall find certain refinements of application\npossible as we go on.\n\nWith this as a starting point, we should be prepared for a more intensive\nlook at the diction of the old school. For purposes of this analysis\nI shall choose something that is historically obscure. Great occasions\nsometimes deflect our judgment by their special circumstances. The\npassage below is from a speech made by the Honorable Charles J. Faulkner\nat an agricultural fair in Virginia in 1858. Both speaker and event have\npassed into relative oblivion, and we can therefore view this as a fairly\nstock specimen of the oratory in vogue a hundred years ago to grace local\ncelebrations. Let us attend to it carefully for its references.\n\n    If we look to the past or to the present we shall find that the\n    permanent power of any nation has always been in proportion to\n    its cultivation of the soil\u2014those republics which during the\n    earlier and middle ages, were indebted for their growth mainly\n    to commerce, did for a moment, indeed, cast a dazzling splendor\n    across the pathway of time; but they soon passed from among\n    the powers of the earth, leaving behind them not a memorial of\n    their proud and ephemeral destiny whilst other nations, which\n    looked to the products of the soil for the elements of their\n    strength, found in each successive year the unfailing sources\n    of national aggrandizement and power. Of all the nations\n    of antiquity, the Romans were most persistently devoted to\n    agriculture, and many of the maxims taught by their experience,\n    and transmitted to us by their distinguished writers, are not\n    unworthy, even at this time, of the notice of the intelligent\n    farmers of this valley. It was in their schools of country\n    life\u2014a _vita rustica_\u2014as their own great orator informs us,\n    that they imbibed those noble sentiments which rendered the\n    Roman name more illustrious than all their famous victories,\n    and there, that they acquired those habits of labor, frugality,\n    justice and that high standard of moral virtue which made them\n    the easy masters of their race.[148]\n\nA modern mind trained in the habit of analysis will be horrified by the\nnumber of large and unexamined phrases passing by in even this brief\nexcerpt. \u201cPermanent power of any nation\u201d; \u201cearlier and middle ages\u201d;\n\u201ccast a dazzling splendor across the pathway of time\u201d; \u201cproud and\nephemeral destiny\u201d; \u201cnoble sentiments which rendered the Roman name more\nillustrious\u201d; and \u201chigh standards of moral virtue\u201d are but a selection.\nComparatively speaking, the tone of this oration is fairly subdued, but\nit is in the grand style, and these phrases are the medium. With this\npassage before us for reference, I wish to discuss one matter of effect,\nand one of cause or enabling condition.\n\nIt will be quickly perceived that the phrases in question have\nresonances, both historical and literary, and that this resonance is what\nwe have been calling spaciousness. Instead of the single note (prized for\npurposes of analysis) they are widths of sound and meaning; they tend\nto echo over broad areas and to call up generalized associations. This\nresonance is the interstice between what is said and the thing signified.\nIn this way then the generality of the phrase may be definitely linked\nwith an effect.\n\nBut the second question is our principal interest: how was the orator\nable to use them with full public consent when he cannot do so today?\n\nI am going to suggest that the orator then enjoyed a privilege which\ncan be compared to the lawyer\u2019s \u201cright of assumption.\u201d This is the\nright to assume that precedents are valid, that forms will persist, and\nthat in general one may build today on what was created yesterday. What\nmankind has sanctified with usage has a presumption in its favor. Such\npresumption, it was felt, instead of being an obstacle to progress,\nfurnishes the ground for progress. More simply, yesterday\u2019s achievements\nare also contributions to progress. It is he who insists upon beginning\nevery day _de novo_ who denies the reality of progress. Accordingly,\nconsider the American orator in the intellectual climate of this time. He\nwas comfortably circumstanced with reference to things he could \u201cknow\u201d\nand presume everyone else to know in the same way. Freedom and morality\nwere constants; the Constitution was the codification of all that was\npolitically feasible; Christianity of all that was morally authorized.\nRome stood as an exemplum of what may happen to nations; the American\nand French Revolutions had taught rulers their necessary limitations.\nCivilization has thought over its thousands of years of history and has\nmade some generalizations which are the premises of other arguments but\nwhich are not issues themselves. When one asserts that the Romans had\na \u201chigh standard of moral virtue which made them the easy masters of\ntheir race,\u201d one is affirming a doctrine of causality in a sweeping way.\nIf one had to stop and \u201cprove\u201d that moral virtue makes one master, one\nobviously would have to start farther down the ladder of assumption.\nBut these things were not in the area of argument because progress was\npositive and that meant that some things have to be assimilated as\ntruths. Men were not condemned to repeat history, because they remembered\nits lessons. To the extent that the mind had made its summations, it was\nfree to go forward, and forward meant in the direction of more inclusive\nconceptions. The orator who pauses along the way to argue a point which\nno one challenges only demeans the occasion. Therefore the orator of the\nperiod we have defined did not feel that he had to argue the significance\nof everything to which he attached significance. Some things were fixed\nby universal enlightened consensus; and they could be used as steps for\ngetting at matters which were less settled and hence were proper subjects\nfor deliberation. Deliberation is good only because it decreases the\nnumber of things it is necessary to deliberate about.\n\nConsequently when we wonder how he could use such expressions without\ntrace of compunction, we forget that the expressions did not need\napology. The speaker of the present who used like terms would, on the\ncontrary, meet a contest at every step of the way. His audience would not\nswallow such clusters of related meanings. But at that time a number of\nunities, including the unity of past and present, the unity of moral sets\nand of causal sets, furnished the ground for discourse in \u201cuncontested\nterms.\u201d Only such substratum of agreement makes possible the panoramic\ntreatment.\n\nWe can infer important conclusions about a civilization when we know that\nits debates and controversies occur at outpost positions rather than\nwithin the citadel itself. If these occur at a very elementary level, we\nsuspect that the culture has not defined itself, or that it is decayed\nand threatened with dissolution. Where the chief subject of debate\nis the relative validity of Homoiousianism and Homoousianism, or the\nconventions of courtly love, we feel confident that a great deal has been\ncached away in the form of settled conclusions, and that such shaking\nas proceeds from controversies of this kind, although they may agitate\nthe superstructure, will hardly be felt as far down as the foundations.\nI would say the same is suggested by the great American debate over\nwhether the Constitution was a \u201cconstitution\u201d or a \u201ccompact,\u201d despite its\nunfortunate sequel.\n\nAt this stage of cultural development the commonplaces of opinion and\nconduct form a sort of _textus receptus_, and the emendations are\nconfined to minor matters. Conversely, when the disagreement is over\nextremely elementary matters, survival itself may be at stake. It seems\nto me that modern debates over the validity of the law of contradiction\nmay be a disagreement of this kind. The soundness of a culture may\nwell be measured by this ability to recognize what is extraneous. One\nknows what to do with the extraneous, even if one decides upon a policy\nof temporary accommodation. It is when the line dividing us from the\nextraneous begins to fade that we are assailed with destructive doubts.\nDisagreements over the most fundamental subjects leave us puzzled as to\n\u201cwhere we are\u201d if not as to \u201cwhat we are.\u201d The speaker whom we have been\ncharacterizing felt sure of the demarcation. That gave him his freedom,\nand was the source of his simplicity.\n\nWhen we reflect further that the old oratory had a certain judicial\nflavor about it, we are prompted to ask whether thinking as then\nconceived did not have a different status from today\u2019s thinking. One is\nled to make this query by the suggestion that when the most fundamental\npropositions of a culture are under attack, then it becomes a duty to\n\u201cthink for one\u2019s self.\u201d Not that it is a bad thing to think; yet when the\nwhole emphasis is upon \u201cthinking for one\u2019s self,\u201d it is hard to avoid a\nfeeling that certain postulates have broken down, and the most courage\nwe can muster is to ask people, not to \u201cthink in a certain direction,\u201d\nbut to \u201cthink for themselves.\u201d Where the primary directive of thinking is\nknown, the object of thinking will not be mere cerebral motion (as some\nexponents of the policy of thinking for one\u2019s self leave us to infer),\nbut rather the object of such thinking, or knowledge. This is a very\nrudimentary proposition, but it deserves attention because the modern\ntendency has reversed a previous order. From the position that only\npropositions are interesting because they alone make judgments, we are\npassing to a position in which only evidence is interesting because it\nalone is uncontaminated by propositions. In brief, interest has shifted\nfrom inference to reportage, and this has had a demonstrable effect\nupon the tone of oratory. The large resonant phrase is itself a kind of\ncondensed proposition; as propositions begin to sink with the general\nsagging of the substructure, the phrases must do the same. Obviously we\nare pointing here to a profound cultural change, and the same shifts can\nbe seen in literature; the poet or novelist may feel that the content\nof his consciousness is more valid (and this will be true even of those\nwho have not formulated the belief) than the formal arrangement which\nwould be produced by selection, abstraction, and arrangement. Or viewed\nin another respect, experiential order has taken precedence over logical\norder.\n\nThe object of an oration made on the conditions obtained a hundred years\nago was not so much to \u201cmake people think\u201d as to remind them of what they\nalready thought (and again we are speaking comparatively). The oratorical\nrostrum, like the church, was less of a place for fresh instruction\nthan for steady inculcation. And the orator, like the minister, was\none who spoke from an eminent degree of conviction. Paradoxically, the\nspeaker of this vanished period had more freedom to maneuver than has his\nemancipated successor. Man is free in proportion as his surroundings have\na determinate nature, and he can plan his course with perfect reliance\nupon that determinateness. It is an admitted axiom that we have rules in\none place so that we can have liberty in another; we put certain things\nin charge of habit so as to be free in areas where we prize freedom.\nManifestly one is not \u201cfree\u201d when one has to battle for one\u2019s position at\nevery moment of time. This interrelationship of freedom and organization\nis one of the permanent conditions of existence, so that it has been said\neven that perfect freedom is perfect compliance (\u201cone commands nature by\nobeying her\u201d).\n\nIn the province we are considering, man is free to the extent that he\nknows that nature is, what God expects, what he himself is capable of.\nFreedom moves on a set of presuppositions just as a machine moves on a\nset of ball bearings which themselves preserve definite locus. It is\nwhen these presuppositions are tampered with that men begin to grow\nconcerned about their freedom. One can well imagine that the tremendous\nself-consciousness about freedom today, which we note in almost every\nutterance of public men, is evidence that this crucial general belief\nis threatened. It is no mere paradox to say that when they cry liberty,\nthey mean belief\u2014the belief that sets one free from prior concerns. A\ncorroborating evidence is that fact that nearly all large pleas for\nliberty heard today conclude with more or less direct appeals for unity.\n\nWe may now return to our more direct concern with rhetoric. Since\naccording to this demonstration oratory speaks from an eminence and\nhas a freedom of purview, its syllogism is the \u201crhetorical syllogism\u201d\nmentioned by Demetrius\u2014the enthymeme.[149] It may not hurt to state that\nthis is the syllogism with one of the three propositions missing. Such a\nsyllogism can be used only when the audience is willing to supply the\nmissing proposition. The missing proposition will be \u201cin their hearts,\u201d\nas it were; it will be their agreement upon some fundamental aspect of\nthe issue being discussed. If it is there, the orator does not have to\nsupply it; if it is not there, he may not be able to get it in any way\u2014at\nleast not as orator. Therefore the use of the rhetorical syllogism is\ngood concrete evidence that the old orator relied upon the existence of\nuncontested terms or fixations of belief in the minds of his hearers.\nThe orator was logical, but he could dispense with being a pure logician\nbecause that third proposition had been established for him.\n\nThese two related considerations, the accepted term and the conception\nof oratory as a body of judicious conclusions upon common evidence, go\nfar toward explaining the quality of spaciousness. Indeed, to say that\noratory has \u201cspaciousness\u201d is to risk redundancy once the nature of\noratory is understood. Oratory is \u201cspacious\u201d in the same way that liberal\neducation is liberal; and a correlation can be shown between the decline\nof liberal education (the education of a freeman) and the decline of\noratory. It was one of Cicero\u2019s observations that the orator performs at\n\u201cthe focal point at which all human activity is ultimately reviewed\u201d; and\nCicero is, for connected reasons, a chief source of our theory of liberal\neducation.[150]\n\nThus far we have rested our explanation on the utility of the generalized\nstyle, but this is probably much too narrow an account. There is also an\naesthetic of the generalization, which we must now proceed to explore.\nLet us pause here momentarily to re-define our impression upon hearing\nthe old orator. The feature which we have been describing as spaciousness\nmay be translated, with perhaps a slight shift of viewpoint, as opacity.\nThe passages we have inspected, to recur to our examples, are opaque\nin that we cannot see through them with any sharpness. And it was no\ndoubt the intention of the orator that we should not see through them\nin this way. The \u201cmoral magnifying glass\u201d of Craddock\u2019s General Vayne\nmade objects larger, but it did not make them clearer. It rather had the\neffect of blurring lines and obscuring details.\n\nWe are now in position to suggest that another factor in the choice of\nthe generalized phrase was aesthetic distance. There is an aesthetic, as\nwell as a moral, limit to how close one may approach an object; and the\nforensic artists of the epoch we describe seem to have been guided by\nthis principle of artistic decorum. Aesthetic distance is, of course, an\nessential of aesthetic treatment. If one sees an object from too close,\none sees only its irregularities and protuberances. To see an object\nrightly or to see it as a whole, one has to have a proportioned distance\nfrom it. Then the parts fall into a meaningful pattern, the dominant\neffect emerges, and one sees it \u201cas it really is.\u201d A prurient interest in\ncloseness and a great remoteness will both spoil the view. To recall a\nfamous example in literature, neither Lilliputian nor Brobdingnagian is\nman as we think we know him.\n\nThus it can be a sign not only of philosophical ignorance but also\nof artistic bad taste to treat an object familiarly or from a near\nproximity. At the risk of appearing fanciful we shall say that objects\nhave not only their natures but their rights, which the orator is bound\nto respect, since he is in large measure the ethical teacher of society.\nBy maintaining this distance with regard to objects, art manages to\n\u201cidealize\u201d them in a very special sense. One does not mean by this that\nit necessarily elevates them or transfigures them, but it certainly does\nkeep out a kind of officious detail which would only lower the general\neffect. What the artistic procedure tends to do, then, is to give us\na \u201cgeneric\u201d picture, and much the same can be said about oratory. The\ntrue orator has little concern with singularity\u2014or, to recall again a\nfamous instance, with the wart on Cromwell\u2019s face\u2014because the singular\nis the impertinent. Only the generic belongs, and by obvious connection\nthe language of the generic is a general language. In the old style,\npresentation kept distances which had, as one of their purposes, the\nobscuring of details. It would then have appeared the extreme of bad\ntaste to particularize in the manner which has since, especially in\ncertain areas of journalism, become a literary vogue. It would have been\nbeyond the pale to refer, in anything intended for the public view, to\na certain cabinet minister\u2019s false teeth or a certain congressman\u2019s\nshiny dome. Aesthetically, this was not the angle of vision from which\none takes in the man, and there is even the question of epistemological\ntruthfulness. Portrait painters know that still, and journalists knew it\na hundred years ago.\n\nIt will be best to illustrate the effect of aesthetic distance. I have\nchosen a passage from the address delivered by John C. Breckinridge,\nVice-President of the United States, on the occasion of the removal of\nthe Senate from the Old to the New Chamber, January 4, 1859. The moment\nwas regarded as solemn, and the speaker expressed himself as follows:\n\n    And now the strifes and uncertainties of the past are finished.\n    We see around us on every side the proofs of stability and\n    improvement. This Capitol is worthy of the Republic. Noble\n    public buildings meet the view on every hand. Treasures of\n    science and the arts begin to accumulate. As this flourishing\n    city enlarges, it testifies to the wisdom and forecast that\n    dictated the plan of it. Future generations will not be\n    disturbed with questions concerning the center of population\n    or of territory, since the steamboat, the railroad and the\n    telegraph have made communication almost instantaneous. The\n    spot is sacred by a thousand memories, which are so many\n    pledges that the city of Washington, founded by him and\n    bearing his revered name, with its beautiful site, bounded\n    by picturesque eminences, and the broad Potomac, and lying\n    within view of his home and his tomb, shall remain forever the\n    political capital of the United States.\n\nAt the close of the address, he said:\n\n    And now, Senators, we leave this memorable chamber, bearing\n    with us, unimpaired, the Constitution received from our\n    forefathers. Let us cherish it with grateful acknowledgments\n    of the Divine Power who controls the destinies of empires\n    and whose goodness we adore. The structures reared by man\n    yield to the corroding tooth of time. These marble walls\n    must molder into ruin; but the principles of constitutional\n    liberty, guarded by wisdom and virtue, unlike material\n    elements, do not decay. Let us devoutly trust that another\n    Senate in another age shall bear to a new and larger Chamber,\n    the Constitution vigorous and inviolate, and that the last\n    generations of posterity shall witness the deliberations of the\n    Representatives of American States still united, prosperous,\n    and free.[151]\n\nWe shall hardly help noting the prominence of \u201copaque\u201d phrases. \u201cProofs\nof stability and improvement\u201d; \u201cnoble public buildings\u201d; \u201ctreasures of\nscience and the arts\u201d; \u201cthis flourishing city\u201d; \u201ca thousand memories\u201d;\n\u201cthis beautiful site\u201d; and \u201cstructures reared by man\u201d seem outstanding\nexamples. These all express objects which can be seen only at a distance\nof time or space. In three instances, it is true, the speaker mentions\nthings of which his hearers might have been immediately and physically\nconscious, but they receive an appropriately generalized reference. The\npassage admits not a single intrusive detail, nor is anything there\nsupposed to have a superior validity or probativeness because it is\npresent visibly or tangibly. The speech is addressed to the mind, and\ncorrespondingly to the memory.[152] The fact that the inclusiveness\nwas temporal as well as spatial has perhaps special significance for\nus. This \u201ccontinuity of the past with the present\u201d gave a dimension\nwhich our world seems largely to have lost; and this dimension made\npossible a different pattern of selection. It is not experiential data\nwhich creates a sense of the oneness of experience. It is rather an\nact of mind; and the practice of periodically bringing the past into a\nmeditative relationship with the present betokens an attitude toward\nhistory. In the chapter on Lincoln we have shown that an even greater\ndegree of remoteness is discernible in the First and Second Inaugural\nAddresses, delivered at a time when war was an ugly present reality. And\nfurthermore, at Gettysburg, Lincoln spoke in terms so \u201cgeneric\u201d that it\nis almost impossible to show that the speech is not a eulogy of the men\nin gray as well as the men in blue, inasmuch as both made up \u201cthose who\nstruggled here.\u201d Lincoln\u2019s faculty of transcending an occasion is in fact\nonly this ability to view it from the right distance, or to be wisely\ngeneric about it.\n\nWe are talking here about things capable of extremes, and there is a\ndegree of abstraction which results in imperception; but barring those\ncases which everyone recognizes as beyond bounds, we should reconsider\nthe idea that such generalization is a sign of impotence. The distinction\ndoes not lie between those who are near life and those who are remote\nfrom it, but between pertinence and impertinence. The intrusive detail so\nprized by modern realists does not belong in a picture which is a picture\nof something. One of the senses of \u201cseeing\u201d is metaphorical, and if one\ngets too close to the object, one can no longer in this sense \u201csee.\u201d It\nis the _theoria_ of the mind as well as the work of the senses which\ncreates the final picture.\n\nOne can show this through an instructive contrast with modern journalism,\nparticularly that of the _Time_ magazine variety. A considerable part of\nits material, and nearly all of its captions, are made up of what we have\ndefined as \u201cimpertinences.\u201d What our forensic artist of a century ago\nwould have regarded as lacking significance is in these media presented\nas the pertinent because it is very near the physical manifestation of\nthe event. And the reversal has been complete, because what for this\nartist would have been pertinent is there treated as impertinent since\nit involves matter which the average man does not care to reflect upon,\nespecially under the conditions of newspaper reading. Thus even the\nepistemology which made the old oratory possible is being relegated.\n\nWe must take notice in this connection that the lavish use of detail is\nsometimes defended on the ground that it is illustration. The argument\nruns that illustration is a visual aid to education, and therefore\nan increased use of illustration contributes to that informing of\nthe public which journals acknowledge as their duty. But a little\nreflection about the nature of illustration will show where this idea is\ntreacherous. Illustration, as already indicated, implies that something\nis being illustrated, so that in the true illustration we will have a\nconjunction of mind and pictorial manifestation. But now, with brilliant\ntechnological means, the tendency is for manifestation to outrun the\nidea, so that the illustrations are vivid rather than meaningful or\ncommunicative. Thus, whereas today the illustration is looking for an\nidea to express, formerly the idea was the original; and it was looking,\noften rather fastidiously, for some palpable means of representation.\nThe idea condescended, one might say, from an empyrean, to suffer\nillustrative embodiment.\n\nTo make this difference more real, let us study an example of the older\nmethod of illustration. The passage below examined is from an address\nby Rufus Choate on \u201cThe Position and Function of the American Bar as an\nElement of Conservatism in the State,\u201d delivered before the Law School\nin Cambridge, July 3, 1845.\n\n    But with us the age of this mode and degree of reform is over;\n    its work is done. The passage of the sea; the occupation and\n    culture of a new world, the conquest of independence\u2014these were\n    our eras, these our agency of reform. In our jurisprudence of\n    liberty, which guards our person from violence and our goods\n    from plunder, and which forbids the whole power of the state\n    itself to take the ewe lamb, or to trample on a blade of grass\n    of the humblest citizen without adequate remuneration: which\n    makes every dwelling large enough to shelter a human life\n    its owner\u2019s castle which winds and rain may enter, but which\n    the government cannot,\u2014in our written constitution, whereby\n    the people, exercising an act of sublime self-restraint,\n    have intended to put it out of their power forever to be\n    passionate, tumultuous, unwise, unjust, whereby they have\n    intended, by means of a system of representation, by means of\n    the distribution of government into departments independent,\n    coordinate for checks and balances; by a double chamber\n    of legislation, by the establishment of a fundamental and\n    permanent organic law; by the organization of a judiciary whose\n    function, whose loftiest function it is to test the legislation\n    of the day by the standard of all time,\u2014constitutions, whereby\n    all these means they have intended to secure a government of\n    laws, not of men, of reason, not of will; of justice, not of\n    fraud,\u2014in that grand dogma of equality,\u2014equality of right, of\n    burthens, of duty, of privileges, and of chances, which is the\n    very mystery of our social being\u2014to the Jews a stumbling block;\n    to the Greeks foolishness,\u2014our strength, our glory,\u2014in that\n    liberty which we value not solely because it is a natural right\n    of man; not solely because it is a principle of individual\n    energy and a guaranty of national renown; not at all because it\n    attracts a procession and lights a bonfire, but because, when\n    blended with order, attended by law, tempered by virtue, graced\n    by culture, it is a great practical good; because in her right\n    hand are riches and honor and peace, because she has come down\n    from her golden and purple cloud to walk in brightness by the\n    weary ploughman\u2019s side, and whisper in his ear as he casts his\n    seed with tears, that the harvest which frost and mildew and\n    cankerworm shall spare, the government shall spare also; in\n    our distribution into separate and kindred states, not wholly\n    independent, not quite identical, in \u201cthe wide arch of ranged\n    empire\u201d above\u2014these are they in which the fruits of our age and\n    our agency of reform are embodied; and these are they by which,\n    if we are wise,\u2014if we understand the things that belong to our\n    peace\u2014they may be perpetuated.[153]\n\nWe note in passing the now familiar panorama. One must view matters\nfrom a height to speak without pause of such things as \u201coccupation and\nculture of a new world,\u201d \u201cconquest of independence,\u201d and \u201cfundamental and\npermanent organic law.\u201d Then we note that when the orator feels that he\nmust illustrate, the illustration is not through the impertinent concrete\ncase, but through the poeticized figment. At the close of the passage,\nwhere the personification of liberty is encountered, we see in clearest\nform the conventionalized image which is the traditional illustration.\nLiberty, sitting up in her golden and purple cloud, descends \u201cto walk in\nbrightness by the weary ploughman\u2019s side.\u201d In this flatulent utterance\nthere is something so typical of method (as well as indicative of the\nphilosophy of the method) that one can scarcely avoid recalling that\nthis is how the gods of classical mythology came down to hold discourse\nwith mortals; it is how the god of the Christian religion came into\nthe world for the redemption of mankind; it is how the _logos_ is made\nincarnate. In other words, this kind of manifestation from above is, in\nour Western tradition, an archetypal process, which the orators of that\ntradition are likely to follow implicitly. The idea is supernal; it may\nbe brought down for representation; but casual, fortuitous, individual\nrepresentations are an affront to it. Consequently the representations\nare conventionalized images, and work with general efficacy.\n\nThis thought carries us back to our original point, which is that\nstandards of pertinence and impertinence have very deep foundations,\nand that one may reveal one\u2019s whole system of philosophy by the stand\none takes on what is pertinent. We have observed that a powerful trend\ntoday is toward the unique detail and the illustration of photographic\nrealism, and this tendency claims to be more knowledgeable about reality.\nIn the older tradition which we set out to examine, the abstracted truth\nand the illustration which is essentially a construct held a like favor.\nIt was not said, because there was no contrary style to make the saying\nnecessary, but it was certainly felt that these came as near the truth\nas one gets, if one admits the existence of non-factual kinds of truth.\nThe two sides do not speak to one another very well across the gulf, but\nit is certainly possible to find, and it would seem to be incumbent upon\nscholars to find, a conception broad enough to define the difference.\n\nOne further clue we have as to how the orator thought and how he\nsaw himself. There will be observed in most speeches of this era a\nstylization of utterance. It is this stylization which largely produces\ntheir declamatory quality. At the same time, as we begin to infer causes,\nwe discover the source of its propriety; the orator felt that he was\nspeaking for corporate humanity. He had a sense of stewardship which\nwould today appear one of the presumptions earlier referred to. The\nindividual orator was not, except perhaps in certain postures, offering\nan individual testimonial. He was the mouthpiece for a collective brand\nof wisdom which was not to be delivered in individual accents. We may\nsuppose that the people did not resent the stylizations of the orator any\nmore than now they resent the stylizations of the Bible. \u201cThat is the\nway God talks.\u201d The deity should be above mere novelties of expression,\ntransparent devices of rhetoric, or importunate appeals for attention. It\nis enough for him to be earnest and truthful; we will rise to whatever\npatterns of expression it has pleased him to use. Stylization indicates\nan attitude which will not concede too much, or certainly will not\nconcede weakly or complacently. As in point of historical sequence\nthe language of political discourse succeeded that of the sermon, some\nof the latter\u2019s dignity and self-confidence persisted in the way of\nformalization. Thus when the orator made gestures toward the occasion,\nthey were likely to be ceremonious rather than personal or spontaneous,\nthe oration itself being an occasion of \u201cstyle.\u201d The modern listener is\nvery quick to detect a pattern of locution, but he is prone to ascribe it\nto situations of weakness rather than of strength.\n\nOf course oratory of the broadly ruminative kind is acceptable only when\nwe accredit someone with the ability to review our conduct, our destiny,\nand the causes of things in general. If we reach a condition in which no\nman is believed to have this power, we will accordingly be impatient with\nthat kind of discourse. It should not be overlooked that although the\nmasses in any society are comparatively ill-trained and ignorant, they\nare very quick to sense attitudes, through their native capacity as human\nbeings. When attitudes change at the top of society, they are able to\nsee that change long before they are able to describe it in any language\nof their own, and in fact they can see it without ever doing that. The\nmasses thus follow intellectual styles, and more quickly than is often\nsupposed, so that, in this particular case, when a general skepticism of\npredication sets in among the leaders of thought, the lower ranks are\nsoon infected with the same thing (though one must make allowance here\nfor certain barriers to cultural transmission constituted by geography\nand language). This principle will explain why there is no more appetite\nfor the broadly reflective discourse among the general public of today\nthan among the _\u00e9lite_. The stewardship of man has been hurt rather than\nhelped by the attacks upon natural right, and at present nobody knows\nwho the custodians (in the old sense of \u201cwatchers\u201d) are. Consequently\nit is not easy for a man to assume the ground requisite for such a\ndiscourse. Speeches today either are made for entertainment, or they\nare political speeches for political ends. And the chief characteristic\nof the speech for political ends is that it is made for immediate\neffect, with the smallest regard for what is politically true. Whereas\nformerly its burden was what the people believed or had experienced, the\nburden now tends to be what they wish to hear. The increased reliance\nupon slogans and catchwords, and the increased use of the argument from\ncontraries (_e.g._, \u201cthe thing my opponent is doing will be welcomed by\nthe Russians\u201d) are prominent evidences of the trend.[154]\n\nLastly, the old style may be called, in comparison with what has\nsucceeded, a polite style. Its very diffuseness conceals a respect for\nthe powers and limitations of the audience. Bishop Whatley has observed\nthat highly concentrated expression may be ill suited to persuasion\nbecause the majority of the people are not capable of assimilating\nconcentrated thought. The principle can be shown through an analogy\nwith nutrition. It is known that diet must contain a certain amount\nof roughage. This roughage is not food in the sense of nutriment; its\nfunction is to dilute or distend the real food in such a way that it\ncan be most readily assimilated. A concentrate of food is, therefore,\nnot enough, for there has to be a certain amount of inert matter to\nfurnish bulk. Something of a very similar nature operates in discourse.\nWhen a piece of oratory intended for a public occasion impresses us as\ndistended, which is to say, filled up with repetition, periphrasis,\nlong grammatical forms, and other impediments to directness, we should\nrecall that the diffuseness all this produces may have a purpose. The\norator may have made a close calculation of the receptive powers of his\naudience and have ordered his style to meet that, while continuing to\n\u201csound good\u201d at every point. This represents a form of consideration for\nthe audience. There exists quite commonly today, at the opposite pole,\na syncopated style. This style, with its suppression of beats and its\nconsequent effect of hurrying over things, does not show that type of\nconsideration. It does not give the listener the roughage of verbiage\nto chew on while meditating the progress of the thought. Here again\n\u201cspaciousness\u201d has a quite rational function in enforcing a measure, so\nthat the mind and the sentiments too can keep up with the orator in his\ncourse.\n\nPerhaps this is as far as we can go in explaining the one age to another.\nWe are now in position to realize that the archaic formalism of the old\norator was a structure imparted to his speech by a logic, an aesthetic,\nand an epistemology. As a logician he believed in the deduced term, or\nthe term whose empirical support is not at the moment visible. As an\naesthetician he believed in distance, and that not merely to soften\noutline but also to evoke the true picture, which could be obscured by\nan injudicious and prying nearness. As an epistemologist he believed, in\naddition to the foregoing, that true knowledge somehow had its source\nin the mind of minds, for which we are on occasion permitted to speak a\npart. All this gave him a peculiar sense of stature. He always talked\nlike a big man. Our resentment comes from a feeling that with all his\nair of confidence he could not have known half as much as we know. But\neverything depends on what we mean by knowing; and the age or the man who\nhas the true conception of that will have, as the terms of the case make\napparent, the key to every other question.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VIII\n\nTHE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL SCIENCE\n\n\nOne of the serious problems of our age is the question of how\nscientific information, which is largely the product of special tools\nof investigation, shall be communicated to the non-specialist world.\nA few sciences operate in fields of theory so abstract that they can\ncreate their own symbology, and most of what they transmit to the public\nwill be in the form of highly generalized translation. But there are\nother sciences whose very success depends upon some public understanding\nof what they are trying to solve, and these are faced with peculiar\nproblems of communication. None are in so difficult a position as social\nscience. The social sciences have been, since their institution, jealous\nof their status as science, and that is perhaps understandable. But\ntheir data is the everyday life of man in society, and naturally if\nthere is an area of scientific discovery upon which the general public\nshould be posted, it is just this one of the laws of social phenomena.\nCaught between this desire to remain scientific and the necessity of\npublic expression, most social scientists are in a dilemma. They have\nnot devised (and possibly they cannot devise) their own symbology to\nrival that of the mathematician and physicist. On the other hand, they\nhave not set themselves to learn the principles of sound rhetorical\nexposition. The result is that the publications of social scientists\ncontain a large amount of conspicuously poor writing, which is now under\ngrowing attack.[155] Some of these attacks have been perceptive as well\nas witty; but I feel that no one has yet made the point which most needs\nmaking, which is that the social scientists will never write much better\nuntil they make terms with some of the traditional rules of rhetoric.\n\nI propose in the study which follows to ignore the isolated small faults\nand instead to analyze the sources of pervasive vices. I shall put the\ninquiry in the form of a series of questions, which lead to cardinal\nprinciples of conception and of choice.\n\n\nI\n\n_Does the writing of social scientists suffer from a primary\nequivocation?_ The charge against social science writing which would be\nmost widely granted is that it fails to convince us that it deals clearly\nwith realities. This impression may lead to the question of whether the\nsocial scientist knows what he is talking about. Now this is a serious,\nnot a frivolous, question, involving matters of logic and epistemology;\nit is a question, furthermore, that one finds the social scientists\nconstantly putting to themselves and answering in a variety of ways. Any\nfield of study is liable to a similar interrogation; in this instance it\nmerely asks whether those who interpret social behavior in scientific\nterms are aware of the kind of data they are handling. Are they dealing\nwith facts, or concepts, or evaluations, or all three? The answer given\nto this question will have a definite bearing upon their problem of\nexpression, and let us see how this can happen in a concrete instance.\n\nWe have had much to say in preceding chapters about the distinction\nbetween positive and dialectical terms; and nowhere has the ignoring\nof this distinction had worse results than in the literature of social\nscience. We have seen, to review briefly, that the positive term\ndesignates something existing simply in the objective world: the chair,\nthe tree, the farm. Arguments over positive terms are not arguments in\nthe true sense, since the point at issue is capable of immediate and\npublic settlement, just as one might settle an \u201cargument\u201d over the width\nof a room by bringing in a publicly-agreed-upon yardstick. Consequently\na rhetoric of positive terms is a rhetoric of simple description, which\nrequires only powers of accurate observation and reporting.\n\nIt is otherwise with dialectical terms. These are terms standing for\nconcepts, which are defined by their negatives or their privations.\n\u201cJustice\u201d is a dialectical term which is defined by \u201cinjustice\u201d; \u201csocial\nimprovement\u201d is made meaningful by the use of \u201cprivation of social\nimprovement.\u201d To say that a family has an income of $800.00 a year is\npositive; to say that the same family is underprivileged is dialectical.\nIt can be underprivileged only with reference to families which have\nmore privileges. So it goes with the whole range of terms which reflect\njudgments of value; \u201cunjust,\u201d \u201cpoor,\u201d \u201cunderpaid,\u201d \u201cundesirable\u201d are all\nterms which depend on something more than the external world for their\nsignificance.\n\nNow here is where the social scientist crosses a divide that he seldom\nacknowledges and often seems unaware of. One cannot use the dialectical\nterm in the same manner as one uses the positive term because the\ndialectical term always leaves one committed to something. It is a\ntruth easily seen that all dialectical terms make presumptions from the\nplain fact that they are \u201cpositional\u201d terms. A writer no sooner employs\none than he is engaged in an argument. To say that the universe is\npurposeless is to join in argument with all who say it is purposeful.\nTo say that a certain social condition is inequitable is to ally\noneself with the reformers and against the standpatters. In all such\ncases the presumption has to do with the scope of the term and with its\nrelationship to its opposite, and these can be worked out only through\nthe dialectical method we have analyzed in other chapters. When the\nreader of social science comes to such terms, he is baffled because he\nhas not been warned of the presumptions on which they rest. Or, to be\nmore exact, he has not been prepared for presumptions at all. He finds\nhimself reading at a level where the facts have been subsumed, and where\nthe exposition is a process of adjusting categories. The writer has\npassed with indifference from what is objectively true to what is morally\nor imaginatively true. The reader\u2019s uneasiness comes from a feeling that\nthe categories themselves are the things which should have been examined.\nJust here, however, may lie the crux of the difficulty.\n\nIt begins to look as though the social scientist working with his regular\nhabits is actually a dialectician without a dialectical basis. His\ndilemma is that he can neither use his terms with the simple directness\nof the natural scientist pointing to physical factors, nor with the\nassurance of a philosopher who has some source for their meaning in the\nsystem from which he begins his deduction. Or, the social scientist\nis trying to characterize the world positively in terms which can be\nmade good only dialectically. He can never make them good dialectically\nas long as he is by theory entirely committed to empiricism. This\nexplains why to the ordinary beholder there seem to be so many smuggled\nassumptions in the literature of social science. It will explain,\nmoreover, why so much of its expression is characterized by diffuseness\nand by that verbosity which is certain to afflict a dialectic without a\nmetaphysic or an ontology. This uncertainty of the social scientist about\nthe nature of his datum often leads him to treat empirical situations as\nif they carried moral sanction, and then to turn around and treat some\npoint of contemporary mores\u2014which is by definition a \u201cmoral\u201d question\u2014as\nif it had only empirical aspects. In direct consequence, when the\nsocial scientist should be writing \u201cpositively,\u201d like a crack newspaper\nreporter, one finds him writing like Hegel, and, when the stage of his\nexposition might warrant his writing more or less like Hegel, one finds\nhim employing dialectical terms as if they had positive designations.\n\nParadoxically, his very reverence for facts may tend to make him sound\nlike Hegel or some other master of categorical thinking. Anyone sampling\nthe literature of social science cannot fail to be impressed with the\nproportion of space given to definition. Indeed, one of the most\nconvincing claims of the science is that our present-day knowledge of\nman is defective because our definitions are simplistic. His behavior is\nmuch more varied than the unscientific suppose; and therefore a central\nobjective of social study is definition, which will take this variety\ninto account and supplant our present \u201cprejudiced\u201d definitions. With this\nin mind, the social scientist toils in library or office to prepare the\nbest definitions he can of human nature, of society, and of psychosocial\nenvironment.\n\nThe danger for him in this laudable endeavor seems twofold. First, one\nmust remark that the language of definition is inevitably the language\nof generality because only the generalizable is definable. Singulars and\nindividuals can be described but not defined; _e.g._, one can define\nman, but one can only describe Abraham Lincoln. The greater, then, his\nsolicitude for the factual and the concrete, the more irresistibly is he\nborne in the direction of abstract language, which alone will encompass\nhis collected facts. His dissertations on human society begin with\nobeisance to facts, but the logic of his being a scientist condemns\nhim to abstraction. He is forced toward the position of the proverbial\nrevolutionary, who loves mankind but has little charity for those\nparticular specimens of it with whom he must associate.\n\nIn the second place and more importantly, the definition of non-empirical\nterms is itself a dialectical process. All such definition takes the form\nof an argument which must prove that the _definiendum_ is one thing and\nnot another thing. The limits of the definition are thus the boundary\nbetween the things and the not-thing. Someone might inquire at this stage\nof our account whether the natural scientists, who must also define, are\nnot equally liable under this point of the argument. The distinction\nis that definitions in natural science have a different ontological\nbasis. The properties about which they generalize exist not in logical\nconnection but in empirical conjunction, as when \u201cmammal,\u201d \u201cvertebrate,\u201d\nand \u201cquadruped\u201d are used to distinguish the genus _Felis_. The doctrine\nof \u201cnatural kinds\u201d thus remains an empirical classification, as does\nthe traditional classification of elements.[156] Consequently the genus\n_Felis_ has a reality in the form of compresent positive attributes\nwhich \u201cslum\u201d cannot have. The establishment of the genus is not a\nmatter of negating or depriving other classes, but of naming what is\nthere. On the other hand one could never arrive positivistically at a\ndefinition of \u201cslum\u201d because its meaning is contingent upon judgment (and\ntheoretically our standard of living might move up to where Westchester,\nGrosse Point, and Winnetka are regarded as slums). Thus \u201cslum\u201d no more\nexists objectively than does \u201cbad weather.\u201d There are collections of\nsticks and stones which the dialectician may call \u201cslums,\u201d just as there\nare processions of the elements which he may call \u201cbad.\u201d But these are\npositive things only in a reductionist equation. Of course, the natural\nscientist works always with reductionist equations; but the social\nscientist, unless he is an extreme materialist, must work with the full\nequation.\n\nIt is a grave imputation, but at the heart of the social scientist\u2019s\nunsatisfactory expression lies this equivocation. Remedy here can come\nonly with a clearer defining of province and of responsibility.\n\n\nII\n\n_Is social science writing marred by \u201cpedantic empiricism\u201d?_ The natural\ndesire of everyone to carry away something from his reading encounters\nin this literature curious obstacles. Its authors often seem unduly\ncoy about their conclusions. After the reader has been escorted on an\nextensive tour of facts and definitions, he is likely to be told that\nlittle can be affirmed at this stage of the inquiry. So it is that,\nhowever much we read, we are made to feel that what we are reading is\npreliminary. We come almost to look for a formula at the close of a\nsocial science monograph which takes an excessively modest view of its\nachievement while expressing the hope that someone else may come along\nand do something with the data there offered. Burgess and Cottrell\u2019s\n_Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage_ provides an illustration.\nAfter presenting their case, the authors say: \u201cIn this study, as in many\nothers, the most significant contribution is not to be found in any\none finding but in the degree to which the study opens up a new field\nto further research.\u201d[157] Again, from an article appearing in _Social\nForces_: \u201cThe findings here mentioned are merely suggestive; and they are\noffered in no sense as proof of our hypothesis of folk-urban personality\ndifferences. The implementation of the analysis given here would demand\na field project incorporating the type of methodological consciousness\nadvocated above. Thus we need to utilize standard projective devices,\nbut must be prepared to develop, in terms of situational demands,\nadditional analytic instruments.\u201d[158] And Herman C. Beyle in a chapter\non the data and method of political science, which constitute the\nunderpinning of his whole study, can only say that \u201cthe foregoing\ncomments on the data and technology of political science have been\noffered as most tentative statements intended to provide a background\nfor the testing and application of the technique here proposed, that\nof attribute-cluster-bloc identification and analysis.\u201d[159] \u201cMost\ntentative\u201d becomes a sort of leitmotiv. Everything sounds like a\nprolegomenon to the real thing. Exclamations that social scientists are\ntaking in one another\u2019s washing or are only trying to make work for\nthemselves are inspired by this kind of performance.\n\nBut, even after one has made allowance for the fact that social science\nis not one of the exact sciences and that its disciples work in a field\nwhere induction is far from complete, their fear of commitment still\nseems obsessive. They could at least have the courage of the facts which\nthey have accumulated. Virtually everyone who is seeking scientific\nenlightenment on this level knows that conclusions are given in the\nlight of evidence available, and that hypothesis always extends some\ndistance beyond what is directly observable. Indeed, everyone makes use\nof the method of scientific investigation, as T. H. Huxley liked to\nassure his audiences, but not everyone finds necessary such an armor of\nqualifications as is likely to appear here: \u201cOn the basis of available\nevidence, it is not unreasonable to suppose\u201d; \u201cIt may not be improbable\nin view of these findings\u201d; \u201cThe present survey would seem to indicate.\u201d\nAll these rhetorical contortions are forms of needless hedging.\n\nIt would be a different matter if such formulas of reservation made the\nconclusion more precise. But in the majority of cases it could be shown\nthat the conclusion is obvious enough in terms of the discussion itself,\nand they serve only to make it sound timid. These scholars move to a\ntune of \u201cinduction never ends,\u201d and their scholarship often turns into a\npedantic empiricism. They seem to be waiting for the fact that will bring\nwith it the revelation. But that fact will never arrive; experience does\nnot tell us what we are experiencing, and at some point they are going\nto have to give names to their findings\u2014even at the expense of becoming\ndialecticians.\n\nIf the needlessly hedged statement is one result of pedantic empiricism,\nanother occurs in what might be called \u201cpedantic analysis.\u201d This is\nanalysis for analysis\u2019 sake, with no real thought of relevance or\napplication or, indeed, of a resynthesis which might redeem the whole\nundertaking. Just as it is assumed that an endless collection of data\nwill necessarily yield fruits, so it is assumed that a remorseless\npartitioning will illuminate. But analysis can be carried so far that it\nseems to lose all bearing upon points at issue. The writer shows himself\na sort of _virtuoso_ at analysis, and one feels that his real interest\nlies in demonstrating how thoroughly a method can be followed. Let us\nlook, for example, at a passage from an article entitled \u201cCourtship as a\nSocial Institution in the United States, 1930-1945.\u201d The author has said\nthat activities of courtship show different patterns and that sometimes\nthe patterns need to be harmonized:\n\n    To be compatible, patterns should be adapted to the following\n    components: (1) the _hominid component_, which is the\n    biological human being; (2) the _social component_, which\n    includes the potentialities for social relations as they are\n    affected by \u201cthe number of human beings in the situation, their\n    distribution in space, their ages, their sex, their native\n    ability to interstimulate and interact, the interference of\n    environmental hindrances or helps, and the presence and amount\n    of certain types of social equipment\u201d; (3) the _environmental\n    component_, or all the \u201cnatural\u201d features of the situation\n    except the hominid, the social, the psychological and\n    artifactual components; it includes topography, physiography,\n    flora, fauna, weather, geology, soil, etc.; (4) the\n    _psychological component_, defined as the principles involving\n    the acquisition and performance of human customs not adequately\n    explained on purely biological principles; (5) the _artifactual\n    component_, which consists collectively of the material results\n    and adjuncts of human customary activities.[160]\n\nIt is not always safe for the layman to generalize about the value of\nspecific sociological findings, but I am inclined to think that this is\nverbiage, resulting from analysis pushed beyond any useful purpose. There\nis a real if obscure relationship between the vitality of what one is\nsaying and the palatability of one\u2019s rhetoric. No rhythm, no _tournure_\nof phrase, no architecture of the sentences could make this a good piece\nof writing, for its content lies on the outer fringe of significance. It\nis the nature of such pedantry to habit itself in a harsh and crabbed\nstyle.\n\nThe primary step in literary composition is _invention_, or the\ndiscovering of something to talk about. No writer is finally able to\nmake good the claim that his subject matter is one thing and his style\nof expression another; the subject matter enters into the expression\ninevitably and extensively, although sometimes in ways too subtle for\nelucidation. What of the invention of this passage? If we take the word\nin its etymological sense of \u201cfinding,\u201d are not these distinctions\n\u201cfindings\u201d for findings\u2019 sake? Analysis carried to such a humorless\nextreme reflects discredit upon the very principle of division which was\nemployed.\n\nIt may appear contradictory to call the social scientist a \u201ctendentious\ndialectician\u201d and a \u201cpedantic empiricist\u201d at the same time. But the\ncontradiction is inherent in his situation and merely expresses the\nequivocation found earlier. In all likelihood the empiricism is an\nattempt to compensate for the dialectic. If a writer feels guilty about\nhis dialectic exercises (his definitions), he may seek to counterweight\nthem with long empirical inquiries. The object of the empirical analysis\nis primarily to give the work a scientific aspect and only secondarily to\nprove something. In fact, this is almost the pattern of inferior social\nscience literature.\n\n\nIII\n\n_Does social science writing suffer from a melioristic bias?_ This\nquestion directs our attention to the matter of vocabulary. There is\ndanger in criticising any writer\u2019s vocabulary through application of\nsimple principles, because demands vary widely. For some purposes a small\nvocabulary of denotative terms will be satisfactory. Other purposes\ncannot be adequately met without a large and learned vocabulary which\nmay, incidentally, sound pretentious. Our question then becomes whether\nthe ends of social science are being well served by the means employed.\nFor example, social scientists are often charged with addiction to\npolysyllabic vocabulary. Other men of learning show the same addiction,\nbut there are special reasons for weighing critically the polysyllabic\ndiction of social scientists.\n\nOf course, when one faces the issue concretely, one discovers that there\nis no single standard by which a word is classified \u201cbig.\u201d Some words\nare called \u201cbig\u201d because they actually have four or five syllables and\nhence are measurably so; other words of one or two syllables are called\n\u201cbig\u201d because, coming out of technical or scientific vocabularies, they\nare unfamiliar to the average man;[161] others, actually no longer, are\ncalled \u201cbig\u201d because of the company they keep; that is to say, they are\nwords of learned or dignified association. Sometimes a word seems big\nwhen it is simply too pretentious for the kind of thing it is describing.\nReaders of H. L. Mencken will recall that he obtained many of his best\nsatirical effects by describing what was essentially picayune or tawdry\nin a vocabulary of grandiloquence.\n\nA cursory inspection will show that social scientists are given to words\nwhich are \u201cbig\u201d in yet another respect: they have a Latin origin. Even\nin analysis of simple phenomenon the reader comes to expect a parade of\nterms which seem to go by on stilts, as if it were important to keep from\ntouching the ground. Without raising questions of semantic theory, one\ninclines to wonder about their relationship to their referents. In course\nof time one may come to suspect that the words employed are not dictated\nby the subject matter, but by some active principle out of sociological\ntheory. To see whether that suspicion has a foundation, let us try a test\non a specimen of this language.\n\nThe passage which will be used is fairly representative of the ordinary\nsocial science prose to be encountered in articles and reports. The\nsubject is expressed in the title \u201cSocial Nearness among Welfare\nInstitutions\u201d:\n\n    It was noticed in the preceding sections that the social\n    welfare organizational milieu presents an interdependence,\n    a formal solidarity, a coerced feeling of unity. However\n    divergent the specific objectives of each organization,\n    theoretically they all have a common purpose, the care of the\n    so-called underprivileged. Whether they execute what they\n    profess or not is a different question and one which does not\n    fall within the confines of these pages.[162]\n\nThere occur in this short excerpt about a dozen words of Latin origin\nfor which equivalents of Anglo-Saxon (or old English, if the name is\npreferred) origin are available, and this without giving up presumably\noperational terms like \u201corganizational\u201d and \u201cmilieu.\u201d[163] In place of\n\u201cnoticed,\u201d why not \u201cseen\u201d? In place of \u201cdivergent,\u201d why not \u201cunlike\u201d?\nIn place of \u201cobjective,\u201d why not \u201cgoal\u201d? Instead of \u201cexecute what they\nprofess,\u201d why not \u201cdo what they say\u201d? Did these terms not suggest\nthemselves to the writer, or were they deliberately passed by?\n\nIt might be arbitrary to insist that any one of these substitutes is\nbetter than the original, but the piling-up of such terms causes language\nto take on a special aspect. There are, of course, margins within which\npreference in terminology means little, but a preference for Latinate\nterms as marked as this must be, to employ one of their customary\nexpressions, \u201csignificant.\u201d\n\nThat significance lies in the kind of attitude that social scientists\nmust have in order to practice social science. It seems beyond dispute\nthat all social science rests upon the assumption that man and society\nare improvable. That is its origin and its guiding impulse. The man\nwho does not feel that social behavior and social institutions can be\nbettered through the application of scientific laws, or through some\nphilosophy finding its basic support in them, is surely out of place in\nsociology. There would really be nothing for him to do. He could only sit\non the sidelines and speculate dourly, like Nietzsche, or ironically,\nlike Santayana. The very profession which the true social scientist\nadopts compels him to be a kind of a priori optimist. This is why a large\npart of social science writing displays a _melioristic bias_. It is under\ncompulsion, often unconsciously felt, I am sure, to picture things a\nlittle better than they are. Such expression provides a kind of proof\nthat its theories are \u201cworking.\u201d\n\nAn indubitable connection exists between the melioristic bias and a\nLatinate vocabulary. Even a moderate sensitivity to the overtones of\nlanguage will tell one that diction of Latin derivation tends to be\neuphemistic. For this there seem to be both extrinsic and intrinsic\ncauses. It is a commonplace of historical knowledge that after the Norman\nConquest the Anglo-Saxons were forced into a servile role. They were sent\ninto the fields to do chores for the Norman overlords, and Anglo-Saxon\nnames have clung to the things with which they worked. Thus to the\nAnglo-Saxon in the field the animal was \u201ccow\u201d; to the Norman, when the\nsame animal was served at his table, it was \u201cbeef\u201d (L. _bos_, _bovis_).\nSo \u201ccalf\u201d is translated \u201cveal\u201d; \u201cthegn\u201d becomes \u201cservant\u201d; \u201cfolk\u201d becomes\n\u201cpeople,\u201d and so on. This distinction of common and elegant terms\npersists in an area of our vocabulary today. Another circumstance was\nthat Latin for centuries constituted the language of learning and of the\nprofessions throughout Europe, and from the fourteenth century onward,\nthere occurred a large amount of \u201clearned borrowing.\u201d[164] This reflects\nthe fact that those cultures which carried civility and _politesse_ to\nhighest perfection drew from a Latin source. Finally, I would suggest\nthat the greater number of syllables in many Latinate terms is a factor\nin the effect. Whatever the complete explanation, the truth remains that\nto give a thing a Latinate name is to couple it with social prestige and\nwith the world of ideas, whereas to give it a name out of Anglo-Saxon\nis to forgo such dignifying associations. Thus \u201ccombat\u201d sounds more\ndignified than \u201cfight\u201d; \u201clabor\u201d has resonances which \u201cwork\u201d does not\nhave; \u201cimpecunious\u201d seems to indicate a more hopeful condition than\n\u201cneedy\u201d or \u201cpenniless\u201d; \u201cinvoluntary separation\u201d sounds less painful than\n\u201cgetting fired.\u201d The list could be extended indefinitely. With exceptions\ntoo few to make a difference, the Anglo-Saxon word is plain and workaday,\nwhereas the word of Latin derivation seems to invest whatever it\ndescribes with a certain upward tendency. Of course, the Anglo-Saxon word\nhas its potencies, but they are not those of the other. It seems to cling\nto the brute empirical fact, while its Latinate counterpart seems at once\nto become ideological, with perhaps a slight aura of hortation about it.\nWhenever one hears the average man condemning a piece of discourse as\n\u201cflowery,\u201d it is most likely that he is pointing, with the only term at\nhis command, to an excess of Latinate diction.\n\nIn the same connection, let us remember that the last few years have\nseen much newspaper wit at the expense of the language of government\nbureaucracy, which is even more responsive to the melioristic bias. The\nbureaucrat lives in a world where nothing is incorrigible; the solution\nto every contemporary difficulty waits only for the devising of some\nappropriate administrative machinery. Compared with him, the social\nscientist is a realist, for social science at least begins by admitting\nthat many situations leave something to be desired. The bureaucrat\u2019s\nworld is prim and proper and aseptic, and his language reflects it\n(perhaps one could say that the discourse of the bureaucrat is social\nscience \u201cpoliticalized\u201d). At any rate, here we might profitably look\nat a specimen of bureaucratic parlance from Masterson and Phillips\u2019\n_Federal Prose_, a recently published burlesque of official language.\nThe authors posed for themselves as one exercise the problem of how a\nbureaucrat would express the ancient adage \u201cToo many cooks spoil the\nbroth.\u201d Their translation is a caricature, but, like caricature, it\nbrings out the dominant features of the subject: \u201cUndue multiplicity\nof personnel assigned either concurrently or consecutively to a single\nfunction involves deterioration of quality in the resultant product\nas compared with the product of the labor of an exact sufficiency of\npersonnel.\u201d[165] One notices, first of all, the leap into polysyllabic\ndiction, along with the total disappearance of those homely entities\n\u201ccooks\u201d and \u201cbroth.\u201d \u201cPersonnel,\u201d for example, is an abstract dignifier,\nand \u201cresultant product\u201d is safe, since it does not leave the writer on\nrecord as affirming that the concoction in question actually is broth.\nHe is further protected by the expunging of \u201cspoil,\u201d with its positive\nassertion, and he can hide behind the relativity of \u201cdeterioration of\nquality ... as compared with....\u201d\n\nSuch language, when used to express the phenomenology of social and\npolitical behavior, gives a curious impression of being foreign to\nits subject matter. The impression of foreignness may be explained as\nfollows. In all writing which has come to be regarded as wisdom about the\nhuman being, there is an undertone of the sardonic. Man at his best is a\nsort of caricature of himself, and even when we are eulogizing him for\nhis finer attributes, there has to be a minor theme of depreciation, much\nas a vein of comedy weaves in and out of a great tragedy. The \u201cgreat\u201d\nactions of history appear either sublime or ridiculous, depending on\none\u2019s standpoint, and it may be the part of sagacity to regard them as\nboth at the same time. This note of the sardonic is found in biblical\nwisdom, in Plato\u2019s realism of situations, and even in Aristotle\u2019s\ndry categorizing. It appears in the _Federalist_ papers,[166] as the\nauthors, while debating political theory in high terms, kept a cagey eye\nupon economic man. Man is neither an angel nor any kind of disembodied\nspirit, and the attempt to treat him as such only arouses our sense of\nthe ridiculous. The comic animal must be there before we can grant that\nthe representation is \u201ctrue.\u201d The typical social science report, even\nwhen it discusses situations in which baseness and irrationality figure\nprominently, does not get in this ingredient. Every social fact may be\nserious, but not every social action is serious because action is not\nfully explainable without motive. It is this abstract man which causes\nsome of us to wonder about the predications of an unhumanistic social\nscience.\n\nThe remedy might be to employ, except where the necessity of\nconceptualizing makes it difficult, something nearer the language of\nthe biblical parable (one shudders to think how our bureaucrat would\nrender \u201cA sower went forth to sow\u201d), or the language of the best British\njournalism. I have often felt that writers on social science might learn\na valuable lesson from the limpid prose of the _Manchester Guardian_.\nThere one usually finds statement without eulogistic or dyslogistic\ntendency, adequacy without turgidity. It is perhaps the nearest thing\nwe have in practice to that supposititious reality, objective language.\nThere is some truth in the observation of John Peale Bishop that, whereas\nAmerican English is more vigorous, English English is far more accurate.\nA good reportorial medium will be, to a considerable extent, an English\nEnglish, and it will reflect something of the English genius for fact.\n\nTo sum up, the melioristic bias is a deflection toward language which\nglosses over reality without necessarily giving us a philosophic\nvocabulary. One could go so far as to say that such language is\ncomparatively lacking in responsibility. It is the language that one\nexpects from those who have become insulated or daintified. It carries\na slight suggestion of denial of evil, which in lay circles, as in\nsome ecclesiastical ones, is among the greatest heresies. Perhaps the\nsociologist would inspire more confidence as a social physician if his\nlanguage had more of the candor described above, and almost certainly he\nwould get a better understanding of his diagnosis.\n\n\nIV\n\n_Do the social scientists lose more than they gain by a distrust of\nmetaphor?_ Dr. Johnson once remarked of Swift, \u201cThe rogue never hazards\na metaphor,\u201d and that may well be the reaction of anyone who has plowed\nthrough the drab pages of a contemporary sociologist. It has long\nbeen suspected that sociologists and poets have little confidence in\none another, and here their respective procedures come into complete\ncontrast. The poet works mainly with metaphor, and the sociologist will\nhave none of it. Which is right? Or, if each is doing instinctively the\nthing that is right for him, must we affirm that the works they produce\nare of very unequal importance?\n\nOne can readily see how the social scientist might be guided by the\nsimple impression that, since metaphor characterizes the language of\npoetry, it has, for that very reason, no place in the language of\nscience. Or, if he should become more analytical, he might conclude\nthat metaphor, through its very operation of analogy or transference,\nimplies the existence of a realm which positivistic study denies. To use\nmetaphor, then, would be to pass over to the enemy. But he would be a\nvery limited kind of sociologist, a sort of doctrinaire mechanist, not\nfully posted on all the resources open to scientific inquiry.\n\nThere are two more or less familiar theories of the nature of metaphor.\nOne holds that metaphor is mere decoration. It is like the colored lights\nand gewgaws one hangs on a Christmas tree; the tree is an integral tree\nwithout them, but they do add sparkle and novelty and so are good things\nfor such occasions. So the metaphors used in language are pleasurable\naccessories, which give it a certain charm and lift but which are\nsupererogatory when one comes down to the business of understanding what\nis said. This theory has been fully discredited not only by those who\nhave analyzed the language of poetry, but also by those who have gone\nfurthest into the psychology of language itself and have explored the\n\u201cmeaning of meaning.\u201d\n\nA second theory holds that metaphor is a useful concession to our feeble\nimagination. We are all children of Adam to the extent that we crave\nmaterial embodiments. Even the most highly trained of us are wearied by\nlong continuance of abstract communication; we want the thing brought\ndown to earth so that we can see it. For the same reason that principles\nhave to be put into fables for children, the abstract conceptions of\nmodern science require figures for their popular expression. Thus the\nuniverse of Einstein is represented as \u201clike\u201d the surface of an orange;\nor the theory of entropy is illustrated by the figure of a desert\non which Arabs are riding their camels hither and thither. From the\nstandpoint of rhetoric, this theory has some validity. Visualization is\nan aid to seeing relationships, and there are rhetorical situations which\ndemand some kind of picturization. Many skilled expositors will follow\nan abstract proposition with some easy figure which lets us down to\nearth or enables us to get a bearing. There is some value, then, in the\n\u201cincarnation\u201d of concepts. On this ground alone one could defend the use\nof metaphors in communication.[167]\n\nThere is yet another theory, now receiving serious attention, that\nmetaphor is itself a means of discovery. Of course, metaphor is intended\nhere in the broadest sense, requiring only some form of parallelism.[168]\nBut when its essential nature is understood, it is hard to resist the\nthought that metaphor is one of the most important heuristic devices,\nleading us from a known to an unknown, but subsequently verifiable,\nfact of principle. Thus George de Santillana, writing on \u201cAspects of\nScientific Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century,\u201d can declare, \u201cThere\nis never a \u2018strict induction\u2019 but contains a considerable amount of\ndeduction, starting from points chosen analogically.\u201d[169] In other\nwords, analogy formulates and to some extent directs the inquiry. Any\ninvestigation must start from certain minimal likenesses, and that may\nconceal the truth that some analogy lies at the heart of all assertion.\nEven Bertrand Russell is compelled to accept analogy as one of the\npostulates required to validate the scientific method because it provides\nthe antecedent probability necessary to justify an induction.[170]\n\nWe might go so far as to admit the point of George Lundberg, who has\ngiven attention to the underlying theory of social science, that\nartists and philosophers make only \u201callegations\u201d about the world, which\nscientists must put to the test.[171] For the inquiry may go from\nallegation to allegation, through a series of metaphorical constructs.\nThis in no wise diminishes the role of metaphor but rather recognizes the\nrole it has always had. If we should speak, for example, of the \u201cdance of\nlife,\u201d we would be using a metaphor of considerable illuminating power,\nin that it rests upon a number of resemblances, some of which are hidden\nor profound. If we push it vigorously, we may be surprised at some of\nthe insights which will turn up. Our na\u00efve question, \u201cWhat is it like?\u201d\nwhich we ask of anything we are confronting for the first time, is the\nintellect\u2019s cry for help. Unless it is like something in some measure, we\nshall never get to understand it.\n\nThe usual student of literature is prone to feel that there is more\nsocial psychology in _Hamlet_ than in a dozen volumes on the theory of\nthe subject. Hamlet is a category, a kind of concrete universal; why\nwould he yield less as a factor in an analysis than some operational\ndefinition? At least one social psychologist has felt no hesitation about\nemploying this kind of factor, the only difference being that his is\nBabbitt, of more recent creation. Ellsworth Faris, in developing a thesis\nthat every person has several selves, presents his meaning as follows:\n\n    Moreover, whatever the list of personalities or roles may be,\n    there is always room for one more, and indeed for many more.\n    When war comes, Babbitt will probably be a member of the\n    committee for public defense. He may become a member of a law\n    enforcement league yet to be formed. He may divorce his wife\n    or elope with his stenographer or misuse the mails and become\n    a Federal prisoner in Leavenworth. Each experience will mean\n    a new role with new personal attitudes and a new axiological\n    conception of himself.[172]\n\nThis is none the less illuminating because Babbitt is not the product of\na controlled scientific induction. He is a sort of \u201calleged\u201d symbol which\nworks very well in a psychological equation. Surely, it is enlightening\nto know that some men are like Babbitt and others like Hamlet, or\nthat we all have our Babbitt and Hamlet phases. But here we should be\nprimarily interested in the fact that the Lynds\u2019 _Middletown_ (1929)\nfollowed rather than preceded Lewis\u2019s _Main Street_ (1920). In the best\nof literary and sociological worlds, _Main Street_ directs attention to\nMiddletown, and _Middletown_ reduces Main Street to an operable entity.\n\nThe task of taking language away from poetry is a larger operation than\nappears at first, and in the eyes of some students an impossible one,\neven if it were desirable. We are all like Emerson\u2019s scholar in that the\nordinary affairs of life come to us business and go from us poetry\u2014at\nleast as soon as we start expressing them in speech. Many words which\nwe think of as prosaic literalisms can be shown to have their origin in\nlong-forgotten comparisons. The word \u201cdepend\u201d analogizes the action\nof hanging from; \u201ccontact\u201d analogizes a relationship. \u201cDiscoverer\u201d and\n\u201cdetect\u201d stand for the literal operation of taking off a covering,\nhence exposing to view. A \u201cprofound study\u201d apparently goes back to our\nperception of physical depth. In this way the meaning which we attach\nto these words is transferred from their analogues; and, of course,\nthe process is more obvious in language that is more consciously\nmetaphorical. It thus becomes plain that somewhere one has to come to\nterms with metaphor anyhow, and there is a way to turn the necessity into\na victory.\n\n\nV\n\n_Is the expression of social science affected by a caste spirit?_ The\nfact that social scientists are, in general, dedicated to the removal of\ncaste, or at least to a refutation of caste presumptions, unfortunately\ndoes not prevent their becoming a caste. Circumstances exist all the\nwhile to make them an _\u00e9lite_. For one thing, the scientific method of\nprocedure sets them off pretty severely from the average man, with his\ncommon-sense approach to social problems. Not only is he likely to be\nnonplussed by techniques and terminologies; he is also likely to be\nrepelled by what scientists consider one of their greatest virtues\u2014their\ndetachment. Finally, it has to be admitted that social scientists\u2019\nextensive patronage by universities, foundations, and governments serves\nto give them a protected status while they work. Every other group\nso situated has tended to create a jargon, and thus far the social\nscientists have not been an exception. Their jargon is a product partly\nof imitation and partly of defense-mindedness.\n\nNaturally one of the first steps in entering a profession is to master\nthe professional language. A display of familiarity with the language is\npopularly taken as a sign of orthodoxy and acceptance; and thus there\narises a temptation to use the special nomenclature freely even when one\nhas doubts about its aptness. This condition affects especially the young\nones who are seeking recognition and establishment\u2014the graduate students\nand the instructors\u2014in general, the probationers in the field. Departure\nfrom orthodoxy can be interpreted as a sign of ignorance or as a sign of\nindependence, and, in the case of those who have not passed probation,\nwe usually interpret it as the former. Accordingly, there is a degree\nof risk involved in changing the pattern of speech laid down by one\u2019s\ncolleagues. So the problem of what one has to do to show that one belongs\ncan be a problem of style. It is entirely possible that many young social\nscientists do not write so well as they could because of this inhibition.\nThey are in the position of having to satisfy teachers and critics, and\nthey produce what is expected or what they think is expected. In this\nway a natural gift for the direct phrase and the lucid arrangement can\nbe swallowed up in tortuosities. The pattern can be broken only by some\ngifted revolutionary or by someone invested with all the honors of the\nguild.\n\nIt is, moreover, true, as Harold Laski has pointed out, that every\nprofession builds up a distrust of innovation, and especially of\ninnovation from the outside.[173] It requires an unusual degree of\nhumility to see that the solution to our problem may have to come\nfrom someone outside our number, perhaps from some na\u00efve person\nwhose advantage is that he can see the matter only in broad outline.\nProfessions and bureaucracies are on guard against this sort of person,\nand one of the barriers they unconsciously set up is just this one of\njargon. If certain government policies were announced in the language of\nthe barbershop, their absurdity might become overwhelmingly apparent.\nIf certain projects in social science research (or in language and\nliterature research, for that matter) were explained in the language\nof the daily news report, their futility might become embarrassingly\nclear. One can only surmise how an experienced political reporter\nwould phrase the findings in Beyle\u2019s _Identification and Analysis of\nAttribute-Cluster-Blocs_, but one has a notion that his account would\nsound very little like the original. Would it be unfair? The reply that\nsuch language would destroy essential meanings in the original would\nhave to be weighed along with the alternative possibility that the\nlanguage was used in the first place because it was euphemistic, in\nthe sense we have outlined, or protective. A user of such language may\nfeel safe because the definition of terms is, in a way, his possession.\nAnd so technical language, as sometimes employed, may be Pickwickian,\ninasmuch as it serves not just scientifically but also pragmatically. The\naverage citizen, faced with sociological explanations and bureaucratic\ncommuniques, may feel as poor culprits used to feel when confronted with\nlaw Latin.\n\n\nVI\n\nThe rhetorical obligation of the scientists has been aptly expressed by\nT. Swann Harding in a discussion of the general character of scientific\nwriting. \u201cScientists,\u201d he says, \u201cgain nothing by showing off, and the\nsimpler they can make their reports the better. Even their technical\nreports can be made very much simpler without loss of accuracy or\nprecision. Nor is there really any valid substitute for a good working\nknowledge of English composition and rhetoric.\u201d[174] The last statement\nis true with certain qualifications, which ought to be made explicit.\nIn a final estimate of the problem it has to be recognized that social\nscience writing cannot be judged altogether by literary standards. It\nis expression with a definite assignment of duty; and those who have\nmade a comparative study of methods and styles know that every formula\nof expression incurs its penalty. It is a rule in the realm of writing\nthat one pays for the choice one makes. The payment is exacted when the\nform of expression becomes too exclusively what it is. In course of use\na defined style becomes its own enemy. If one\u2019s writing is abstract,\nit will accommodate ideas, but it will fatigue the reader. If it is\nconcrete, it will divert and relieve; but it may become cloying, and it\nwill have difficulty in encompassing ideas. If it is spare, it will come\nto seem abrupt; if it practices a degree of circumlocution, it will first\nseem elegant but will come to seem inflated. The lucid style is suspected\nof oversimplifying. And so the dilemma goes.\n\nNow the social scientist has to write about a kind of thing, and,\nnotwithstanding his uncertain allocation of facts and concepts, he may\nas well accept his penalty at the beginning. He can never make it a\nprimary goal to be \u201cpleasing,\u201d and for this reason the purely literary\nperformance is not for him. Dramatistic presentation, a leading source\nof interest in all literary production, is largely, if not entirely,\nout of his reach. The only kind of writing that gets people emotionally\ninvolved contains some form of dramatic conflict, which requires a\ndichotomy of opposites. Yet the only dichotomy that social science (as a\nscience) contemplates is that of the norm and the deviate, and these two\nare supposed to exist in an empirical rather than in a moral context,\nand the injunction is implicit that all we shall do is observe. The\nwork, then, is going to be either purely descriptive, or critical with\nreference to the norm-deviate opposition. Not many people are going to\ndevelop a sense of poignant concern over such presentations. To a certain\nextent _Middletown_ did catch the popular imagination, but the contrast\ndeveloped here was between what the American observably was through the\neyes of detached social scientists and his picture of himself, with its\ncompound of self-esteem, aspiration, and social mythology. The community\nempirically found was put on the stage to challenge the community\nsentimentally and otherwise conceived. The same will hardly hold for the\ntypical case of scientific norm and empirically discovered deviate, for\nno such ideas are involved in the contrast. _Recent Social Trends in the\nUnited States_,[175] for example, the monumental report of President\nHoover\u2019s Research Committee on Social Trends, could not look to this\nkind of interest for its appeal. Unless, therefore, we regard metaphor as\na means of dramatistic presentation, this resource is not ordinarily open\nto social science.\n\nYet within the purpose which the social scientist sets himself there\nis a considerable range of rhetorical possibility, which he ignores\nat needless expense. Rhetoric is, among other things, a process of\ncoordination and subordination which is very close to the essential\nthought process. That is to say, in any coherent piece of discourse there\noccur promotion and demotion of thoughts, and this is accomplished not\nsolely through logical outlining and subsumation. It involves matters\nof sequence, of quantity, and some understanding of the rhetorical\naspects of grammatical categories. These are means to clear and effective\nexpression, and the failure to see and use them as means can produce\na condition in which means and ends seem not discriminated, or even a\nsubversion in which means seem to manipulate ends. That condition is\none which social science, along with every other instrumentality of\neducation, should be combating in the interest of a reasonable world.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IX\n\nULTIMATE TERMS IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC\n\n\nWe have shown that rhetorical force must be conceived as a power\ntransmitted through the links of a chain that extends upward toward\nsome ultimate source. The higher links of that chain must always be of\nunique interest to the student of rhetoric, pointing, as they do, to some\nprime mover of human impulse. Here I propose to turn away from general\nconsiderations and to make an empirical study of the terms on these\nhigher levels of force which are seen to be operating in our age.\n\nWe shall define term simply here as a name capable of entering into a\nproposition. In our treatment of rhetorical sources, we have regarded the\nfull predication consisting of a proposition as the true validator. But\na single term is an incipient proposition, awaiting only the necessary\ncoupling with another term; and it cannot be denied that single names\nset up expectancies of propositional embodiment. This causes everyone\nto realize the critical nature of the process of naming. Given the name\n\u201cpatriot,\u201d for example, we might expect to see coupled with it \u201cBrutus,\u201d\nor \u201cWashington,\u201d or \u201cParnell\u201d; given the term \u201chot,\u201d we might expect to\nsee \u201csun,\u201d \u201cstove,\u201d and so on. In sum, single terms have their potencies,\nthis being part of the phenomenon of names, and we shall here present\na few of the most noteworthy in our time, with some remarks upon their\netiology.\n\nNaturally this survey will include the \u201cbad\u201d terms as well as the \u201cgood\u201d\nterms, since we are interested to record historically those expressions\nto which the populace, in its actual usage and response, appears to\nattribute the greatest sanction. A prescriptive rhetoric may specify\nthose terms which, in all seasons, ought to carry the greatest potency,\nbut since the affections of one age are frequently a source of wonder to\nanother, the most we can do under the caption \u201ccontemporary rhetoric\u201d is\nto give a descriptive account and withhold the moral until the end. For\ndespite the variations of fashion, an age which is not simply distraught\nmanages to achieve some system of relationship among the attractive and\namong the repulsive terms, so that we can work out an order of weight\nand precedence in the prevailing rhetoric once we have discerned the\n\u201crhetorical absolutes\u201d\u2014the terms to which the very highest respect is\npaid.\n\nIt is best to begin boldly by asking ourselves, what is the \u201cgod term\u201d of\nthe present age? By \u201cgod term\u201d we mean that expression about which all\nother expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving dominations and\npowers. Its force imparts to the others their lesser degree of force,\nand fixes the scale by which degrees of comparison are understood. In\nthe absence of a strong and evenly diffused religion, there may be\nseveral terms competing for this primacy, so that the question is not\nalways capable of definite answer. Yet if one has to select the one term\nwhich in our day carries the greatest blessing, and\u2014to apply a useful\ntest\u2014whose antonym carries the greatest rebuke, one will not go far\nwrong in naming \u201cprogress.\u201d This seems to be the ultimate generator of\nforce flowing down through many links of ancillary terms. If one can\n\u201cmake it stick,\u201d it will validate almost anything. It would be difficult\nto think of any type of person or of any institution which could not\nbe recommended to the public through the enhancing power of this word.\nA politician is urged upon the voters as a \u201cprogressive leader\u201d; a\ncommunity is proud to style itself \u201cprogressive\u201d; technologies and\nmethodologies claim to the \u201cprogressive\u201d; a peculiar kind of emphasis in\nmodern education calls itself \u201cprogressive,\u201d and so on without limit.\nThere is no word whose power to move is more implicitly trusted than\n\u201cprogressive.\u201d But unlike some other words we shall examine in the course\nof this chapter, its rise to supreme position is not obscure, and it\npossesses some intelligible referents.\n\nBefore going into the story of its elevation, we must prepare ground by\nnoting that it is the nature of the conscious life of man to revolve\naround some concept of value. So true is this that when the concept is\nwithdrawn, or when it is forced into competition with another concept,\nthe human being suffers an almost intolerable sense of being lost. He has\nto know where he is in the ideological cosmos in order to coordinate his\nactivities. Probably the greatest cruelty which can be inflicted upon\nthe psychic man is this deprivation of a sense of tendency. Accordingly\nevery age, including those of rudest cultivation, sets up some kind of\nsign post. In highly cultivated ages, with individuals of exceptional\nintellectual strength, this may take the form of a metaphysic. But with\nthe ordinary man, even in such advanced ages, it is likely to be some\nidea abstracted from religion or historical speculation, and made to\ninhere in a few sensible and immediate examples.\n\nSince the sixteenth century we have tended to accept as inevitable an\nhistorical development that takes the form of a changing relationship\nbetween ourselves and nature, in which we pass increasingly into the\nrole of master of nature. When I say that this seems inevitable to us,\nI mean that it seems something so close to what our more religious\nforebears considered the working of providence that we regard as impiety\nany disposition to challenge or even suspect it. By a transposition\nof terms, \u201cprogress\u201d becomes the salvation man is placed on earth to\nwork out; and just as there can be no achievement more important than\nsalvation, so there can be no activity more justified in enlisting our\nsympathy and support than \u201cprogress.\u201d As our historical sketch would\nimply, the term began to be used in the sixteenth century in the sense\nof continuous development or improvement; it reached an apogee in\nthe nineteenth century, amid noisy demonstrations of man\u2019s mastery of\nnature, and now in the twentieth century it keeps its place as one of the\nleast assailable of the \u201cuncontested terms,\u201d despite critical doubts in\ncertain philosophic quarters. It is probably the only term which gives\nto the average American or West European of today a concept of something\nbigger than himself, which he is socially impelled to accept and even to\nsacrifice for. This capacity to demand sacrifice is probably the surest\nindicator of the \u201cgod term,\u201d for when a term is so sacrosanct that the\nmaterial goods of this life must be mysteriously rendered up for it, then\nwe feel justified in saying that it is in some sense ultimate. Today\nno one is startled to hear of a man\u2019s sacrificing health or wealth for\nthe \u201cprogress\u201d of the community, whereas such sacrifices for other ends\nmay be regarded as self-indulgent or even treasonable. And this is just\nbecause \u201cprogress\u201d is the coordinator of all socially respectable effort.\n\nPerhaps these observations will help the speaker who would speak against\nthe stream of \u201cprogress,\u201d or who, on the other hand, would parry some\nblow aimed at him through the potency of the word, to realize what a\nmomentum he is opposing.\n\nAnother word of great rhetorical force which owes its origin to the\nsame historical transformation is \u201cfact.\u201d Today\u2019s speaker says \u201cIt is\na fact\u201d with all the gravity and air of finality with which his less\nsecular-minded ancestor would have said \u201cIt is the truth.\u201d[176] \u201cThese\nare facts\u201d; \u201cFacts tend to show\u201d; and \u201cHe knows the facts\u201d will be\nrecognized as common locutions drawing upon the rhetorical resource\nof this word. The word \u201cfact\u201d went into the ascendent when our system\nof verification changed during the Renaissance. Prior to that time,\nthe type of conclusion that men felt obligated to accept came either\nthrough divine revelation, or through dialectic, which obeys logical\nlaw. But these were displaced by the system of verification through\ncorrespondence with physical reality. Since then things have been\ntrue only when measurably true, or when susceptible to some kind of\nquantification. Quite simply, \u201cfact\u201d came to be the touchstone after the\ntruth of speculative inquiry had been replaced by the truth of empirical\ninvestigation. Today when the average citizen says \u201cIt is a fact\u201d or says\nthat he \u201cknows the facts in the case,\u201d he means that he has the kind of\nknowledge to which all other knowledges must defer. Possibly it should\nbe pointed out that his \u201cfacts\u201d are frequently not facts at all in the\netymological sense; often they will be deductions several steps removed\nfrom simply factual data. Yet the \u201cfacts\u201d of his case carry with them\nthis aura of scientific irrefragability, and he will likely regard any\nquestioning of them as sophistry. In his vocabulary a fact is a fact, and\nall evidence so denominated has the prestige of science.\n\nThese last remarks will remind us at once of the strongly rhetorical\ncharacter of the word \u201cscience\u201d itself. If there is good reason for\nplacing \u201cprogress\u201d rather than \u201cscience\u201d at the top of our series, it is\nonly that the former has more scope, \u201cscience\u201d being the methodological\ntool of \u201cprogress.\u201d It seems clear, moreover, that \u201cscience\u201d owes its\npresent status to an hypostatization. The hypostatized term is one\nwhich treats as a substance or a concrete reality that which has only\nconceptual existence; and every reader will be able to supply numberless\nillustrations of how \u201cscience\u201d is used without any specific referent.\nAny utterance beginning \u201cScience says\u201d provides one: \u201cScience says there\nis no difference in brain capacity between the races\u201d; \u201cScience now\nknows the cause of encephalitis\u201d; \u201cScience says that smoking does not\nharm the throat.\u201d Science is not, as here it would seem to be, a single\nconcrete entity speaking with one authoritative voice. Behind these large\nabstractions (and this is not an argument against abstractions as such)\nthere are many scientists holding many different theories and employing\nmany different methods of investigation. The whole force of the word\nnevertheless depends upon a bland assumption that all scientists meet\nperiodically in synod and there decide and publish what science believes.\nYet anyone with the slightest scientific training knows that this is very\nfar from a possibility. Let us consider therefore the changed quality\nof the utterance when it is amended to read \u201cA majority of scientists\nsay\u201d; or \u201cMany scientists believe\u201d; or \u201cSome scientific experiments have\nindicated.\u201d The change will not do. There has to be a creature called\n\u201cscience\u201d; and its creation has as a matter of practice been easy,\nbecause modern man has been conditioned to believe that the powers and\nprocesses which have transformed his material world represent a very\nsure form of knowledge, and that there must be a way of identifying that\nknowledge. Obviously the rhetorical aggrandizement of \u201cscience\u201d here\nparallels that of \u201cfact,\u201d the one representing generally and the other\nspecifically the whole subject matter of trustworthy perception.\n\nFurthermore, the term \u201cscience\u201d like \u201cprogress\u201d seems to satisfy a primal\nneed. Man feels lost without a touchstone of knowledge just as he feels\nlost without the direction-finder provided by progress. It is curious\nto note that actually the word is only another name for knowledge (L.\n_scientia_), so that if we should go by strict etymology, we should\ninsist that the expression \u201cscience knows\u201d (_i.e._, \u201cknowledge knows\u201d)\nis pure tautology. But our rhetoric seems to get around this by implying\nthat science is _the_ knowledge. Other knowledges may contain elements of\nquackery, and may reflect the selfish aims of the knower; but \u201cscience,\u201d\nonce we have given the word its incorporation, is the undiluted essence\nof knowledge. The word as it comes to us then is a little pathetic in its\nappeal, inasmuch as it reflects the deeply human feeling that somewhere\nsomehow there must be people who know things \u201cas they are.\u201d Once God or\nhis ministry was the depository of such knowledge, but now, with the\ngeneral decay of religious faith, it is the scientists who must speak _ex\ncathedra_, whether they wish to or not.\n\nThe term \u201cmodern\u201d shares in the rhetorical forces of the others thus far\ndiscussed, and stands not far below the top. Its place in the general\nordering is intelligible through the same history. Where progress is\nreal, there is a natural presumption that the latest will be the best.\nHence it is generally thought that to describe anything as \u201cmodern\u201d is\nto credit it with all the improvements which have been made up to now.\nThen by a transference the term is applied to realms where valuation is,\nor ought to be, of a different source. In consequence, we have \u201cmodern\nliving\u201d urged upon us as an ideal; \u201cthe modern mind\u201d is mentioned as\nsomething superior to previous minds; sometimes the modifier stands alone\nas an epithet of approval: \u201cto become modern\u201d or \u201cto sound modern\u201d are\nexpressions that carry valuation. It is of course idle not to expect an\nage to feel that some of its ways and habits of mind are the best; but\nthe extensive transformations of the past hundred years seem to have\ngiven \u201cmodern\u201d a much more decisive meaning. It is as if a difference of\ndegree had changed into a difference of kind. But the very fact that a\nword is not used very analytically may increase its rhetorical potency,\nas we shall see later in connection with a special group of terms.\n\nAnother word definitely high up in the hierarchy we have outlined is\n\u201cefficient.\u201d It seems to have acquired its force through a kind of\nno-nonsense connotation. If a thing is efficient, it is a good adaptation\nof means to ends, with small loss through friction. Thus as a word\nexpressing a good understanding and management of cause and effect, it\nmay have a fairly definite referent; but when it is lifted above this\nand made to serve as a term of general endorsement, we have to be on our\nguard against the stratagems of evil rhetoric. When we find, to cite a\nfamiliar example, the phrase \u201cefficiency apartments\u201d used to give an\nattractive aspect to inadequate dwellings, we may suspect the motive\nbehind such juxtaposition. In many similar cases, \u201cefficient,\u201d which is\na term above reproach in engineering and physics, is made to hold our\nattention where ethical and aesthetic considerations are entitled to\npriority. Certain notorious forms of government and certain brutal forms\nof warfare are undeniably efficient; but here the featuring of efficiency\nunfairly narrows the question.\n\nAnother term which might seem to have a different provenance but which\nparticipates in the impulse we have been studying is \u201cAmerican.\u201d One must\nfirst recognize the element of national egotism which makes this a word\nof approval with us, but there are reasons for saying that the force of\n\u201cAmerican\u201d is much more broadly based than this. \u201cThis is the American\nway\u201d or \u201cIt is the American thing to do\u201d are expressions whose intent\nwill not seem at all curious to the average American. Now the peculiar\neffect that is intended here comes from the circumstance that \u201cAmerican\u201d\nand \u201cprogressive\u201d have an area of synonymity. The Western World has long\nstood as a symbol for the future; and accordingly there has been a very\nwide tendency in this country, and also I believe among many people in\nEurope, to identify that which is American with that which is destined\nto be. And this is much the same as identifying it with the achievements\nof \u201cprogress.\u201d The typical American is quite fatuous in this regard: to\nhim America is the goal toward which all creation moves; and he judges\na country\u2019s civilization by its resemblance to the American model. The\nmatter of changing nationalities brings out this point very well. For a\ncitizen of a European country to become a citizen of the United States\nis considered natural and right, and I have known those so transferring\ntheir nationality to be congratulated upon their good sense and their\nanticipated good fortune. On the contrary, when an American takes out\nBritish citizenship (French or German would be worse), this transference\nis felt to be a little scandalous. It is regarded as somehow perverse,\nor as going against the stream of things. Even some of our intellectuals\ngrow uneasy over the action of Henry James and T. S. Eliot, and the\nmasses cannot comprehend it at all. Their adoption of British citizenship\nis not mere defection from a country; it is treason to history. If\nAmericans wish to become Europeans, what has happened to the hope of\nthe world? is, I imagine, the question at the back of their minds. The\ntremendous spread of American fashions in behavior and entertainment must\nadd something to the impetus, but I believe the original source to be\nthis prior idea that America, typifying \u201cprogress,\u201d is what the remainder\nof the world is trying to be like.\n\nIt follows naturally that in the popular consciousness of this country,\n\u201cun-American\u201d is the ultimate in negation. An anecdote will serve to\nillustrate this. Several years ago a leading cigarette manufacturer\nin this country had reason to believe that very damaging reports were\nbeing circulated about his product. The reports were such that had\nthey not been stopped, the sale of this brand of cigarettes might\nhave been reduced. The company thereupon inaugurated an extensive\nadvertising campaign, the object of which was to halt these rumors in\nthe most effective way possible. The concocters of the advertising copy\nevidently concluded after due deliberation that the strongest term of\ncondemnation which could be conceived was \u201cun-American,\u201d for this was\nthe term employed in the campaign. Soon the newspapers were filled with\nadvertising rebuking this \u201cun-American\u201d type of depreciation which\nhad injured their sales. From examples such as this we may infer that\n\u201cAmerican\u201d stands not only for what is forward in history, but also for\nwhat is ethically superior, or at least for a standard of fairness not\nmatched by other nations.\n\nAnd as long as the popular mind carries this impression, it will be\nfutile to protest against such titles as \u201cThe Committee on un-American\nactivities.\u201d While \u201cAmerican\u201d and \u201cun-American\u201d continue to stand for\nthese polar distinctions, the average citizen is not going to find much\nwrong with a group set up to investigate what is \u201cun-American\u201d and\ntherefore reprehensible. At the same time, however, it would strike him\nas most droll if the British were to set up a \u201cCommittee on un-British\nActivities\u201d or the French a \u201cCommittee on un-French Activities.\u201d The\nAmerican, like other nationals, is not apt to be much better than he has\nbeen taught, and he has been taught systematically that his country is\na special creation. That is why some of his ultimate terms seem to the\ngeneral view provincial, and why he may be moved to polarities which\nrepresent only local poles.\n\nIf we look within the area covered by \u201cAmerican,\u201d however, we find\nsignificant changes in the position of terms which are reflections\nof cultural and ideological changes. Among the once powerful but now\nwaning terms are those expressive of the pioneer ideal of ruggedness and\nself-sufficiency. In the space of fifty years or less we have seen the\nphrase \u201ctwo-fisted American\u201d pass from the category of highly effective\nimages to that of comic anachronisms. Generally, whoever talks the older\nlanguage of strenuosity is regarded as a reactionary, it being assumed\nby social democrats that a socially organized world is one in which\ncooperation removes the necessity for struggle. Even the rhetorical trump\ncards of the 1920\u2019s, which Sinclair Lewis treated with such satire, are\ncomparatively impotent today, as the new social consciousness causes\nterms of centrally planned living to move toward the head of the series.\n\nOther terms not necessarily connected with the American story have\npassed a zenith of influence and are in decline; of these perhaps\nthe once effective \u201chistory\u201d is the most interesting example. It is\nstill to be met in such expressions as \u201cHistory proves\u201d and \u201cHistory\nteaches\u201d; yet one feels that it has lost the force it possessed in the\nprevious century. Then it was easy for Byron\u2014\u201cthe orator in poetry\u201d\u2014to\nwrite, \u201cHistory with all her volumes vast has but one page\u201d; or for the\ncommemorative speaker to deduce profound lessons from history. But people\ntoday seem not to find history so eloquent. A likely explanation is that\nhistory, taken as whole, is conceptual rather than factual, and therefore\na skepticism has developed as to what it teaches. Moreover, since the\nteachings of history are principally moral, ethical, or religious, they\nmust encounter today that threshold resentment of anything which savors\nof the prescriptive. Since \u201chistory\u201d is inseparable from judgment of\nhistorical fact, there has to be a considerable community of mind\nbefore history can be allowed to have a voice. Did the overthrow of\nNapoleon represent \u201cprogress\u201d in history or the reverse? I should say\nthat the most common rhetorical uses of \u201chistory\u201d at the present are by\nintellectuals, whose personal philosophy can provide it with some kind of\ndefinition, and by journalists, who seem to use it unreflectively. For\nthe contemporary masses it is substantially true that \u201chistory is bunk.\u201d\n\nAn instructive example of how a coveted term can be monopolized may be\nseen in \u201callies.\u201d Three times within the memory of those still young,\n\u201callies\u201d (often capitalized) has been used to distinguish those fighting\non our side from the enemy. During the First World War it was a supreme\nterm; during the Second World War it was again used with effect; and\nat the time of the present writing it is being used to designate that\nnondescript combination fighting in the name of the United Nations in\nKorea. The curious fact about the use of this term is that in each case\nthe enemy also has been constituted of \u201callies.\u201d In the First World\nWar Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey were \u201callies\u201d; in the Second,\nGermany and Italy; and in the present conflict the North Koreans and the\nChinese and perhaps the Russians are \u201callies.\u201d But in the rhetorical\nsituation it is not possible to refer to them as \u201callies,\u201d since we\nreserve that term for the alliance representing our side. The reason\nfor such restriction is that when men or nations are \u201callied,\u201d it is\nimplied that they are united on some sound principle or for some good\ncause. Lying at the source of this feeling is the principle discussed\nby Plato, that friendship can exist only among the good, since good\nis an integrating force and evil a disintegrating one. We do not, for\nexample, refer to a band of thieves as \u201cthe allies\u201d because that term\nwould impute laudable motives. By confining the term to our side we make\nan evaluation in our favor. We thus style ourselves the group joined for\npurposes of good. If we should allow it to be felt for a moment that the\nopposed combination is also made up of allies, we should concede that\nthey are united by a principle, which in war is never done. So as the\nusage goes, we are always allies in war and the enemy is just the enemy,\nregardless of how many nations he has been able to confederate. Here is\nclearly another instance of how tendencies may exist in even the most\ninnocent-seeming language.\n\nNow let us turn to the terms of repulsion. Some terms of repulsion are\nalso ultimate in the sense of standing at the end of the series, and\nno survey of the vocabulary can ignore these prime repellants. The\ncounterpart of the \u201cgod term\u201d is the \u201cdevil term,\u201d and it has already\nbeen suggested that with us \u201cun-American\u201d comes nearest to filling that\nrole. Sometimes, however, currents of politics and popular feeling cause\nsomething more specific to be placed in that position. There seems indeed\nto be some obscure psychic law which compels every nation to have in\nits national imagination an enemy. Perhaps this is but a version of the\ntribal need for a scapegoat, or for something which will personify \u201cthe\nadversary.\u201d If a nation did not have an enemy, an enemy would have to be\ninvented to take care of those expressions of scorn and hatred to which\npeoples must give vent. When another political state is not available\nto receive the discharge of such emotions, then a class will be chosen,\nor a race, or a type, or a political faction, and this will be held up\nto a practically standardized form of repudiation. Perhaps the truth\nis that we need the enemy in order to define ourselves, but I will not\nhere venture further into psychological complexities. In this type of\nstudy it will be enough to recall that during the first half century\nof our nation\u2019s existence, \u201cTory\u201d was such a devil term. In the period\nfollowing our Civil War, \u201crebel\u201d took its place in the Northern section\nand \u201cYankee\u201d in the Southern, although in the previous epoch both of\nthese had been terms of esteem. Most readers will remember that during\nthe First World War \u201cpro-German\u201d was a term of destructive force. During\nthe Second World War \u201cNazi\u201d and \u201cFascist\u201d carried about equal power\nto condemn, and then, following the breach with Russia, \u201cCommunist\u201d\ndisplaced them both. Now \u201cCommunist\u201d is beyond any rival the devil term,\nand as such it is employed even by the American president when he feels\nthe need of a strong rhetorical point.\n\nA singular truth about these terms is that, unlike several which were\nexamined in our favorable list, they defy any real analysis. That is\nto say, one cannot explain how they generate their peculiar force of\nrepudiation. One only recognizes them as publicly-agreed-upon devil\nterms. It is the same with all. \u201cTory\u201d persists in use, though it has\nlong lost any connection with redcoats and British domination. Analysis\nof \u201crebel\u201d and \u201cYankee\u201d only turns up embarrassing contradictions of\nposition. Similarly we have all seen \u201cNazi\u201d and \u201cFascist\u201d used without\nrational perception; and we see this now, in even greater degree,\nwith \u201cCommunist.\u201d However one might like to reject such usage as mere\nignorance, to do so would only evade a very important problem. Most\nlikely these are instances of the \u201ccharismatic term,\u201d which will be\ndiscussed in detail presently.\n\nNo student of contemporary usage can be unmindful of the curious\nreprobative force which has been acquired by the term \u201cprejudice.\u201d\nEtymologically it signifies nothing more than a prejudgment, or a\njudgment before all the facts are in; and since all of us have to\nproceed to a great extent on judgments of that kind, the word should\nnot be any more exciting than \u201chypothesis.\u201d But in its rhetorical\napplications \u201cprejudice\u201d presumes far beyond that. It is used, as a\nmatter of fact, to characterize unfavorably any value judgment whatever.\nIf \u201cblue\u201d is said to be a better color than \u201cred,\u201d that is prejudice.\nIf people of outstanding cultural achievement are praised through\ncontrast with another people, that is prejudice. If one mode of life is\npresented as superior to another, that is prejudice. And behind all is\nthe implication, if not the declaration, that it is un-American to be\nprejudiced.\n\nI suspect that what the users of this term are attempting, whether\nconsciously or not, is to sneak \u201cprejudiced\u201d forward as an uncontested\nterm, and in this way to disarm the opposition by making all positional\njudgments reprehensible. It must be observed in passing that no people\nare so prejudiced in the sense of being committed to valuations as those\nwho are engaged in castigating others for prejudice. What they expect\nis that they can nullify the prejudices of those who oppose them, and\nthen get their own installed in the guise of the _sensus communis_. Mark\nTwain\u2019s statement, \u201cI know that I am prejudiced in this matter, but I\nwould be ashamed of myself if I weren\u2019t\u201d is a therapeutic insight into\nthe process; but it will take more than a witticism to make headway\nagainst the repulsive force gathered behind \u201cprejudice.\u201d\n\nIf the rhetorical use of the term has any rational content, this probably\ncomes through a chain of deductions from the nature of democracy; and\nwe know that in controversies centered about the meaning of democracy,\nthe air is usually filled with cries of \u201cprejudice.\u201d If democracy is\ntaken crudely to mean equality, as it very frequently is, it is then\na contradiction of democracy to assign inferiority and superiority on\nwhatever grounds. But since the whole process of evaluation is a process\nof such assignment, the various inequalities which are left when it\nhas done its work are contradictions of this root notion and hence are\n\u201cprejudice\u201d\u2014the assumption of course being that when all the facts are\nin, these inequalities will be found illusory. The man who dislikes a\ncertain class or race or style has merely not taken pains to learn that\nit is just as good as any other. If all inequality is deception, then\nsuperiorities must be accounted the products of immature judgment. This\naffords plausible ground, as we have suggested, for the coupling of\n\u201cprejudice\u201d and \u201cignorance.\u201d\n\nBefore leaving the subject of the ordered series of good and bad terms,\none feels obliged to say something about the way in which hierarchies can\nbe inverted. Under the impulse of strong frustration there is a natural\ntendency to institute a pretense that the best is the worst and the worst\nis the best\u2014an inversion sometimes encountered in literature and in\nsocial deportment. The best illustration for purpose of study here comes\nfrom a department of speech which I shall call \u201cGI rhetoric.\u201d The average\nAmerican youth, put into uniform, translated to a new and usually barren\nenvironment, and imbued from many sources with a mission of killing, has\nundergone a pretty severe dislocation. All of this runs counter to the\nbenevolent platitudes on which he was brought up, and there is little\nground for wonder if he adopts the inverted pose. This is made doubly\nlikely by the facts that he is at a passionate age and that he is thrust\ninto an atmosphere of superinduced excitement. It would be unnatural\nfor him not to acquire a rhetoric of strong impulse and of contumacious\ntendency.\n\nWhat he does is to make an almost complete inversion. In this special\nworld of his he recoils from those terms used by politicians and other\ncivilians and by the \u201ctop brass\u201d when they are enunciating public\nsentiments. Dropping the conventional terms of attraction, this uprooted\nand specially focussed young man puts in their place terms of repulsion.\nTo be more specific, where the others use terms reflecting love, hope,\nand charity, he uses almost exclusively terms connected with the\nexcretory and reproductive functions. Such terms comprise what Kenneth\nBurke has ingeniously called \u201cthe imagery of killing.\u201d By an apparently\nuniversal psychological law, faeces and the act of defecation are linked\nwith the idea of killing, of destruction, of total repudiation\u2014perhaps\nthe word \u201celimination\u201d would comprise the whole body of notions. The\nreproductive act is associated especially with the idea of aggressive\nexploitation. Consequently when the GI feels that he must give his speech\na proper show of spirit, he places the symbols for these things in places\nwhich would normally be filled by prestige terms from the \u201cregular\u201d list.\nFor specimens of such language presented in literature, the reader is\nreferred to the fiction of Ernest Hemingway and Norman Mailer.\n\nAnyone who has been compelled to listen to such rhetoric will recall\nthe monotony of the vocabulary and the vehemence of the delivery. From\nthese two characteristics we may infer a great need and a narrow means\nof satisfaction, together with the tension which must result from\nmaintaining so arduous an inversion. Whereas previously the aim had been\nto love (in the broad sense) it is now to kill; whereas it had been\nfreedom and individuality, it is now restriction and brutalization. In\ntaking revenge for a change which so contradicts his upbringing he is\nquite capable, as the evidence has already proved, of defiantly placing\nthe lower level above the higher. Sometimes a clever GI will invent\ncombinations and will effect metaphorical departures, but the ordinary\nones are limited to a reiteration of the stock terms\u2014to a reiteration,\nwith emphasis of intonation, upon \u201cthe imagery of killing.\u201d[177] Taken as\na whole, this rhetoric is a clear if limited example of how the machine\nmay be put in reverse\u2014of how, consequently, a sort of devil worship may\nget into language.\n\nA similar inversion of hierarchy is to be seen in the world of\ncompetitive sports, although to a lesser extent. The great majority of\nus in the Western world have been brought up under the influence, direct\nor indirect, of Christianity, which is a religion of extreme altruism.\nIts terms of value all derive from a law of self-effacement and of\nconsideration for others, and these terms tend to appear whenever we try\nto rationalize or vindicate our conduct. But in the world of competitive\nsports, the direction is opposite: there one is applauded for egotistic\ndisplay and for success at the expense of others\u2014should one mention in\nparticular American professional baseball? Thus the terms with which an\nathlete is commended will generally point away from the direction of\nChristian passivity, although when an athlete\u2019s character is described\nfor the benefit of the general public, some way is usually found to place\nhim in the other ethos, as by calling attention to his natural kindness,\nhis interest in children, or his readiness to share his money.\n\nCertainly many of the contradictions of our conduct may be explained\nthrough the presence of these small inverted hierarchies. When, to\ncite one further familiar example, the acquisitive, hard-driving local\ncapitalist is made the chief lay official of a Christian church, one\nknows that in a definite area there has been a transvaluation of values.\n\nEarlier in the chapter we referred to terms of considerable potency whose\nreferents it is virtually impossible to discover or to construct through\nimagination. I shall approach this group by calling them \u201ccharismatic\nterms.\u201d It is the nature of the charismatic term to have a power which is\nnot derived, but which is in some mysterious way given. By this I mean\nto say that we cannot explain their compulsiveness through referents\nof objectively known character and tendency. We normally \u201cunderstand\u201d\na rhetorical term\u2019s appeal through its connection with something we\napprehend, even when we object morally to the source of the impulse.\nNow \u201cprogress\u201d is an understandable term in this sense, since it rests\nupon certain observable if not always commendable aspects of our world.\nLikewise the referential support of \u201cfact\u201d needs no demonstrating.\nThese derive their force from a reading of palpable circumstance. But\nin charismatic terms we are confronted with a different creation: these\nterms seem to have broken loose somehow and to operate independently\nof referential connections (although in some instances an earlier\nhistory of referential connection may be made out). Their meaning seems\ninexplicable unless we accept the hypothesis that their content proceeds\nout of a popular will that they _shall_ mean something. In effect, they\nare rhetorical by common consent, or by \u201ccharisma.\u201d As is the case with\ncharismatic authority, where the populace gives the leader a power which\ncan by no means be explained through his personal attributes, and\npermits him to use it effectively and even arrogantly, the charismatic\nterm is given its load of impulsion without reference, and it functions\nby convention. The number of such terms is small in any one period, but\nthey are perhaps the most efficacious terms of all.\n\nSuch rhetorical sensibility as I have leads me to believe that one of\nthe principal charismatic terms of our age is \u201cfreedom.\u201d The greatest\nsacrifices that contemporary man is called upon to make are demanded in\nthe name of \u201cfreedom\u201d; yet the referent which the average man attaches\nto this word is most obscure. Burke\u2019s dictum that \u201cfreedom inheres\nin something sensible\u201d has not prevented its breaking loose from all\nanchorages. And the evident truth that the average man, given a choice\nbetween exemption from responsibility and responsibility, will choose\nthe latter, makes no impression against its power. The fact, moreover,\nthat the most extensive use of the term is made by modern politicians\nand statesmen in an effort to get men to assume more responsibility (in\nthe form of military service, increased taxes, abridgement of rights,\netc.) seems to carry no weight either.[178] The fact that what the\nAmerican pioneer considered freedom has become wholly impossible to\nthe modern apartment-dwelling metropolitan seems not to have damaged\nits potency. Unless we accept some philosophical interpretation, such\nas the proposition that freedom consists only in the discharge of\nresponsibility, there seems no possibility of a correlation between the\nuse of the word and circumstantial reality. Yet \u201cfreedom\u201d remains an\nultimate term, for which people are asked to yield up their first-born.\n\nThere is plenty of evidence that \u201cdemocracy\u201d is becoming the same kind of\nterm. The variety of things it is used to symbolize is too weird and too\ncontradictory for one to find even a core meaning in present-day usages.\nMore important than this for us is the fact, noted by George Orwell,\nthat people resist any attempt to define democracy, as if to connect it\nwith a clear and fixed referent were to vitiate it. It may well be that\nsuch resistance to definition of democracy arises from a subconscious\nfear that a term defined in the usual manner has its charisma taken away.\nThe situation then is that \u201cdemocracy\u201d means \u201cbe democratic,\u201d and that\nmeans exhibit a certain attitude which you can learn by imitating your\nfellows.\n\nIf rationality is measured by correlations and by analyzable content,\nthen these terms are irrational; and there is one further modern\ndevelopment in the creation of such terms which is strongly suggestive\nof irrational impulse. This is the increasing tendency to employ in the\nplace of the term itself an abbreviated or telescoped form\u2014which form is\nnearly always used with even more reckless assumption of authority. I\nseldom read the abbreviation \u201cU S\u201d in the newspapers without wincing at\nthe complete arrogance of its rhetorical tone. Daily we see \u201cU S Cracks\nDown on Communists\u201d; \u201cU S Gives OK to Atomic Weapons\u201d; \u201cU S Shocked by\nDeath of Official.\u201d Who or what is this \u201cU S\u201d? It is clear that \u201cU S\u201d\ndoes not suggest a union of forty-eight states having republican forms\nof government and held together by a constitution of expressly delimited\nauthority. It suggests rather an abstract force out of a new world of\nforces, whose will is law and whom the individual citizen has no way to\nplacate. Consider the individual citizen confronted by \u201cU S\u201d or \u201cFBI.\u201d As\nlong as terms stand for identifiable organs of government, the citizen\nfeels that he knows the world he moves around in, but when the forces of\ngovernment are referred to by these bloodless abstractions, he cannot\navoid feeling that they are one thing and he another. Let us note while\ndealing with this subject the enormous proliferation of such forms\nduring the past twenty years or so. If \u201cU S\u201d is the most powerful and\nprepossessing of the group, it drags behind it in train the previously\nmentioned \u201cFBI,\u201d and \u201cNPA,\u201d \u201cERP,\u201d \u201cFDIC,\u201d \u201cWPA,\u201d \u201cHOLC,\u201d and \u201cOSS,\u201d to\ntake a few at random. It is a fact of ominous significance that this use\nof foreshortened forms is preferred by totalitarians, both the professed\nand the disguised. Americans were hearing the terms \u201cOGPU,\u201d \u201cAMTORG\u201d and\n\u201cNEP\u201d before their own government turned to large-scale state planning.\nSince then we have spawned them ourselves, and, it is to be feared, out\nof similar impulse. George Orwell, one of the truest humanists of our\nage, has described the phenomenon thus: \u201cEven in the early decades of\nthe twentieth century, telescoped words and phrases had been one of the\ncharacteristic features of political language; and it had been noticed\nthat the tendency to use abbreviations of this kind was most marked in\ntotalitarian countries and totalitarian organizations. Examples were such\nwords as Nazi, Gestapo, Comintern, Inprecor, Agitprop.\u201d[179]\n\nI venture to suggest that what this whole trend indicates is an\nattempt by the government, as distinguished from the people, to confer\ncharismatic authority. In the earlier specimens of charismatic terms we\nwere examining, we beheld something like the creation of a spontaneous\ngeneral will. But these later ones of truncated form are handed down from\nabove, and their potency is by fiat of whatever group is administering\nin the name of democracy. Actually the process is no more anomalous than\nthe issuing of pamphlets to soldiers telling them whom they shall hate\nand whom they shall like (or try to like), but the whole business of\nswitching impulse on and off from a central headquarters has very much\nthe meaning of _Gleichschaltung_ as that word has been interpreted for\nme by a native German. Yet it is a disturbing fact that such process\nshould increase in times of peace, because the persistent use of such\nabbreviations can only mean a serious divorce between rhetorical impulse\nand rational thought. When the ultimate terms become a series of bare\nabstractions, the understanding of power is supplanted by a worship of\npower, and in our condition this can mean only state worship.\n\nIt is easy to see, however, that a group determined upon control will\nhave as one of its first objectives the appropriation of sources of\ncharismatic authority. Probably the surest way to detect the fabricated\ncharismatic term is to identify those terms ordinarily of limited power\nwhich are being moved up to the front line. That is to say, we may\nsuspect the act of fabrication when terms of secondary or even tertiary\nrhetorical rank are pushed forward by unnatural pressure into ultimate\npositions. This process can nearly always be observed in times of\ncrisis. During the last war, for example, \u201cdefense\u201d and \u201cwar effort\u201d\nwere certainly regarded as culminative terms. We may say this because\nalmost no one thinks of these terms as the natural sanctions of his\nmode of life. He may think thus of \u201cprogress\u201d or \u201chappiness\u201d or even\n\u201cfreedom\u201d; but \u201cdefense\u201d and \u201cwar effort\u201d are ultimate sanctions only\nwhen measured against an emergency situation. When the United States was\npreparing for entry into that conflict, every departure from our normal\nway of life could be justified as a \u201cdefense\u201d measure. Plants making\nbombs to be dropped on other continents were called \u201cdefense\u201d plants.\nCorrespondingly, once the conflict had been entered, everything that\nwas done in military or civilian areas was judged by its contribution\nto the \u201cwar effort.\u201d This last became for a period of years the supreme\nterm: not God or Heaven or happiness, but successful effort in the war.\nIt was a term to end all other terms or a rhetoric to silence all other\nrhetoric. No one was able to make his claim heard against \u201cthe war\neffort.\u201d\n\nIt is most important to realize, therefore, that under the stress of\nfeeling or preoccupation, quite secondary terms can be moved up to the\nposition of ultimate terms, where they will remain until reflection\nis allowed to resume sway. There are many signs to show that the term\n\u201caggressor\u201d is now undergoing such manipulation. Despite the fact that\nalmost no term is more difficult to correlate with objective phenomena,\nit is being rapidly promoted to ultimate \u201cbad\u201d term. The likelihood is\nthat \u201caggressor\u201d will soon become a depository for all the resentments\nand fears which naturally arise in a people. As such, it will function as\ndid \u201cinfidel\u201d in the mediaeval period and as \u201creactionary\u201d has functioned\nin the recent past. Manifestly it is of great advantage to a nation\nbent upon organizing its power to be able to stigmatize some neighbor as\n\u201caggressor,\u201d so that the term\u2019s capacity for irrational assumption is a\ngreat temptation for those who are not moral in their use of rhetoric.\nThis passage from natural or popular to state-engendered charisma\nproduces one of the most dangerous lesions of modern society.\n\nAn ethics of rhetoric requires that ultimate terms be ultimate in some\nrational sense. The only way to achieve that objective is through\nan ordering of our own minds and our own passions. Every one of\npsychological sophistication knows that there is a pleasure in willed\nperversity, and the setting up of perverse shibboleths is a fairly common\nsource of that pleasure. War cries, school slogans, coterie passwords,\nand all similar expressions are examples of such creation. There may\nbe areas of play in which these are nothing more than a diversion; but\nthere are other areas in which such expressions lure us down the roads\nof hatred and tragedy. That is the tendency of all words of false or\n\u201cengineered\u201d charisma. They often sound like the very gospel of one\u2019s\nsociety, but in fact they betray us; they get us to do what the adversary\nof the human being wants us to do. It is worth considering whether the\nreal civil disobedience must not begin with our language.\n\nLastly, the student of rhetoric must realize that in the contemporary\nworld he is confronted not only by evil practitioners, but also, and\nprobably to an unprecedented degree, by men who are conditioned by the\nevil created by others. The machinery of propagation and inculcation is\ntoday so immense that no one avoids entirely the assimilation and use\nof some terms which have a downward tendency. It is especially easy to\npick up a tone without realizing its trend. Perhaps the best that any\nof us can do is to hold a dialectic with himself to see what the wider\ncircumferences of his terms of persuasion are. This process will not\nonly improve the consistency of one\u2019s thinking but it will also, if the\nforegoing analysis is sound, prevent his becoming a creature of evil\npublic forces and a victim of his own thoughtless rhetoric.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] Cf. A. E. Taylor, _Plato: the Man and his Work_ (New York, 1936), p.\n300.\n\n[2] Cf. P. Albert Duhamel, \u201cThe Concept of Rhetoric as Effective\nExpression,\u201d _Journal of the History of Ideas_, X, No. 3 (June, 1949),\n344-56 _passim_.\n\n[3] James Blish, \u201cRituals on Ezra Pound,\u201d _Sewanee Review_, LVIII\n(Spring, 1950), 223.\n\n[4] The various aesthetic approaches to language offer refinements of\nperception, but all of them can be finally subsumed under the first head\nabove.\n\n[5] _The Tyranny of Words_ (New York, 1938), p. 80. T. H. Huxley in Lay\nSermons (New York, 1883), p. 112, outlined a noticeably similar ideal\nof scientific communication: \u201cTherefore, the great business of the\nscientific teacher is, to imprint the fundamental, irrefragable facts of\nhis science, not only by words upon the mind, but by sensible impressions\nupon the eye, and ear, and touch of the student in so complete a manner,\nthat every term used, or law enunciated should afterwards call up vivid\nimages of the particular structural, or other, facts which furnished the\ndemonstration of the law, or illustration of the term.\u201d\n\n[6] That is, by mentioning only parts of the total situation.\n\n[7] It is worth recalling that in the Christian New Testament, with its\nheavy Platonic influence, God is identified both with _logos_, \u201cword,\nspeech\u201d (_John_ 1:1); and with _agape_, \u201clove\u201d (2 _John_ 4:8).\n\n[8] The users of metaphor and metonymy who are in the hire of businessmen\nof course constitute a special case.\n\n[9] Cf. 277 b: \u201cA man must know the truth about all the particular things\nof which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything\nseparately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide\nthem by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way\nhe must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of\nspeech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse\naccordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious\ndiscourses, and simple talks to the simple soul.\u201d\n\n[10] 104 b.\n\n[11] 263 a.\n\n[12] 260 b.\n\n[13] 265 a.\n\n[14] In the passage extending from 246 a to 256 d.\n\n[15] Cf. 263 d ff.\n\n[16] Indeed, in this particular rhetorical duel we see the two types of\nlovers opposed as clearly as illustration could desire. More than this,\nwe see the third type, the non-lover, committing his ignominious failure.\nBritain and France had come to prefer as leaders the rhetoricless\nbusinessman type. And while they had thus emasculated themselves, there\nappeared an evil lover to whom Europe all but succumbed before the\nmistake was seen and rectified. For while the world must move, evil\nrhetoric is of more force than no rhetoric at all; and Herr Hitler,\nemploying images which rested on no true dialectic, had persuaded\nmultitudes that his order was the \u201cnew order,\u201d _i.e._, the true\npotentiality. Britain was losing and could only lose until, reaching\nback in her traditional past, she found a voice which could match his\naccents with a truer grasp of the potentiality of things. Thus two men\nconspicuous for passion fought a contest for souls, which the nobler won.\nBut the contest could have been lost by default.\n\n[17] \u201cAction: the Perfection of Human Life,\u201d _Sewanee Review_, LVI\n(Winter, 1948), 3.\n\n[18] _A Grammar of Motives_ (New York, 1945), p. 90.\n\n[19] Without rhetoric there seems no possibility of tragedy, and in\nturn, without the sense of tragedy, no possibility of taking an elevated\nview of life. The role of tragedy is to keep the human lot from being\nrendered as history. The cultivation of tragedy and a deep interest\nin the value-conferring power of language always occur together. The\n_Phaedrus_, the _Gorgias_, and the _Cratylus_, not to mention the works\nof many teachers of rhetoric, appear at the close of the great age of\nGreek tragedy. The Elizabethan age teemed with treatises on the use of\nlanguage. The essentially tragic Christian view of life begins the long\ntradition of homiletics. Tragedy and the practice of rhetoric seem to\nfind common sustenance in preoccupation with value, and then rhetoric\nfollows as an analyzed art.\n\n[20] Cf. Maritain, _op. cit._, pp. 3-4: \u201cThe truth of practical intellect\nis understood not as conformity to an extramental being but as conformity\nto a right desire; the end is no longer to know what is, but to bring\ninto existence that which is not yet; further, the act of moral choice\nis so individualized, both by the singularity of the person from which\nit proceeds and the context of the contingent circumstances in which it\ntakes place, that the practical judgment in which it is expressed and by\nwhich I declare to myself: this is what I must do, can be right only if,\n_hic et nunc_, the dynamism of my will is right, and tends towards the\ntrue goods of human life.\n\nThat is why practical wisdom, _prudentia_, is a virtue indivisibly moral\nand intellectual at the same time, and why, like the judgment of the\nconscience itself, it cannot be replaced by any sort of theoretical\nknowledge or science.\u201d\n\n[21] Socrates\u2019 criticism of the speech of Lysias (263 d ff.) is that the\nlatter defended a position without having submitted it to the discipline\nof dialectic.\n\n[22] Mortimer J. Adler, _Dialectic_ (New York, 1927), p. 75.\n\n[23] Cf. Adler, _op. cit._, pp. 243-44: Dialectic \u201cis a kind of thinking\nwhich satisfies these two values: in the essential inconclusiveness of\nits process, it avoids ever resting in belief, or in the assertion of\ntruth; through its utter restriction to the universe of discourse and its\ndisregard for whatever reference discourse may have toward actuality, it\nis barren of any practical issue. It can make no difference in the way of\nconduct.\u201d\n\n[24] Adler, _op. cit._, p. 224.\n\n[25] All quotations are given verbatim from _The World\u2019s Most Famous\nCourt Trial_ (National Book Company, Cincinnati, 1925), a complete\ntranscript.\n\n[26] Hosea 12:10 \u201cI have also spoken unto the prophets, and have\nmultiplied visions, and by the ministry of the prophets I have used\nsimilitudes.\u201d\n\n[27] _Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke_ (London, 1855-64), VI,\n18-19. Hereafter referred to as _Works_.\n\n[28] _Loc. cit._\n\n[29] _Works_, II, 155.\n\n[30] _Works_, III, 315.\n\n[31] _Works_, III, 317.\n\n[32] _Works_, VI, 52.\n\n[33] _Loc. cit._\n\n[34] _Works_, VI, 57.\n\n[35] _Works_, VI, 88.\n\n[36] _Works_, I, 476.\n\n[37] It is interesting to compare this with his statement in _An Appeal\nfrom the New to the Old Whigs_ (_Works_, III, 77): \u201cThe number engaged\nin crimes, instead of turning them into laudable acts, only augments the\nquantity and intensity of the guilt.\u201d\n\n[38] _Works_, I, 479.\n\n[39] _Works_, I, 509.\n\n[40] _Works_, I, 462.\n\n[41] _Works_, I, 469.\n\n[42] _Works_, I, 480.\n\n[43] _Works_, II, 335.\n\n[44] _Works_, II, 179-80.\n\n[45] _Works_, II, 180.\n\n[46] _Works_, VII, 23.\n\n[47] _Works_, VII, 99-100.\n\n[48] John Morley, _Burke_ (New York, 1879), p. 127.\n\n[49] _Ibid._, p. 129.\n\n[50] If further evidence of Burke\u2019s respect for circumstance were needed,\none could not do better than cite his sentence from the _Reflections_\ndepicting the \u201ccircumstance\u201d of Bourbon France (_Works_, II, 402).\n\u201cIndeed, when I consider the face of the kingdom of France; the multitude\nand opulence of her cities; the useful magnificence of her spacious\nhigh roads and bridges; the opportunity of her artificial canals and\nnavigations opening the conveniences of maritime communication through a\ncontinent of so immense an extent; when I turn my eyes to the stupendous\nworks of her ports and harbours, and to her whole naval apparatus,\nwhether for war or trade; when I bring before my view the number of\nher fortifications, constructed with so bold and masterly skill, and\nmade and maintained at so prodigious a charge, presenting an armed\nfront and impenetrable barrier to her enemies upon every side; when I\nrecollect how very small a part of that extensive region is without\ncultivation, and to what complete perfection the culture of many of the\nbest productions of the earth have been brought in France; when I reflect\non the excellence of her manufactures and fabrics, second to none but\nours, and in some particulars not second; when I contemplate the grand\nfoundations of charity, public and private; when I survey the state of\nall the arts that beautify and polish life; when I reckon the men she has\nbred for extending her fame in war, her able statesmen, the multitude\nof her profound lawyers and theologians, her philosophers, her critics,\nher historians and antiquaries, her poets and her orators, sacred and\nprofane: I behold in all this something which awes and commands the\nimagination, which checks the mind on the brink of precipitate and\nundiscriminate censure, and which demands that we should very seriously\nexamine, what and how great are the latent vices that could authorize us\nat once to level so spacious a fabric with the ground.\u201d\n\n[51] _Works_, II, 282.\n\n[52] _Works_, II, 551.\n\n[53] _Works_, II, 348-49.\n\n[54] _Works_, I, 432.\n\n[55] _Works_, II, 335.\n\n[56] _Works_, III, 317-18.\n\n[57] _Works_, III, 16.\n\n[58] _Works_, II, 334.\n\n[59] _Works_, VII, 60.\n\n[60] _Works_, VI, 34.\n\n[61] _A Life of Edmund Burke_ (London, 1891), p. 523.\n\n[62] _Democracy in America_ (Cambridge [Mass.], 1873), I, 226.\n\n[63] _Works_, III, 109.\n\n[64] _Loc. cit._\n\n[65] _Works_, III, 36.\n\n[66] Quoted in Marquis James, _Life of Andrew Jackson_ (Indianapolis,\n1937), p. 740.\n\n[67] _Origins of the Whig Party_ (Durham, N. C., 1925), p. 227.\n\n[68] _The Whig Party in Georgia_, 1825-1853 (Chapel Hill, 1948), p. 192.\n\n[69] _Ibid._\n\n[70] _Op. cit._, p. 206.\n\n[71] Most of Lincoln\u2019s associates in Illinois\u2014including David Davis,\nOrville H. Browning, John M. Palmer, Lyman Trumbull, Leonard Swett, and\nWard Hill Lamon\u2014who had been ardent Republicans before the war, left the\nparty in the years following. See David Donald, _Lincoln\u2019s Herndon_ (New\nYork, 1948), p. 263.\n\n[72] _Op. cit._, p. 203.\n\n[73] _Abraham Lincoln_ (Boston and New York, 1928), II, 549.\n\n[74] John G. Nicolay and John Hay, _Abraham Lincoln: A History_ (New\nYork, 1904), II, 46.\n\n[75] _Herndon\u2019s Lincoln_ (Springfield, Ill., 1921), III, 594.\n\n[76] _Ibid._, p. 595.\n\n[77] _The Life and Writings of Abraham Lincoln_, ed. Philip van Doren\nStern (New York, 1940), p. 239. This source, hereafter referred to as\n_Writings_, is the most complete one-volume edition of Lincoln\u2019s works.\n\n[78] _Loc. cit._\n\n[79] _Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln_, ed. Marion Mills Miller (New\nYork, 1907), II, 41. This speech is not included in Stern\u2019s _Writings_.\n\n[80] This may impress some as an unduly cynical reading of human nature,\nbut it will be found much closer to Lincoln\u2019s settled belief than many\nrepresentations made with the object of eulogy. Herndon, for example,\nreports that he and Lincoln sometimes discussed the question of whether\nthere are any unselfish human actions, and that Lincoln always maintained\nthe negative. Cf. Herndon, _op. cit._, III, 597.\n\n[81] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 263-64.\n\n[82] _Ibid._, p. 330.\n\n[83] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 359-60.\n\n[84] _Ibid._, pp. 360-61.\n\n[85] Stern, _Writings_, p. 361.\n\n[86] _Ibid._, p. 362.\n\n[87] Stern, _Writings_, p. 375.\n\n[88] _Ibid._, p. 427.\n\n[89] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 549-50.\n\n[90] Cf. the remark in \u201cNotes for Speeches\u201d (_Ibid._, pp. 497-98):\n\u201cSuppose it is true that the Negro is inferior to the white in the gifts\nof nature; is it not the exact reverse of justice that the white should\nfor that reason take from the Negro any of the little which he has had\ngiven to him?\u201d\n\n[91] Stern, _Writings_, p. 422.\n\n[92] Stern, _Writings_, p. 241.\n\n[93] _Ibid._, p. 649.\n\n[94] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 652-53.\n\n[95] Stern, _Writings_, p. 656.\n\n[96] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 667-68.\n\n[97] Stern, _Writings_, p. 671.\n\n[98] _Ibid._, p. 736.\n\n[99] Stern, _Writings_, p. 737.\n\n[100] Stern, _Writings_, p. 682.\n\n[101] _Ibid._, p. 740.\n\n[102] Stern, _Writings_, p. 669.\n\n[103] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 810-11.\n\n[104] Stern, _Writings_, p. 429.\n\n[105] Stern, _Writings_, pp. 529-30.\n\n[106] _Ibid._, p. 558.\n\n[107] _Ibid._, p. 591.\n\n[108] _Ibid._, p. 728.\n\n[109] The homeric fits of abstraction, which almost every contemporary\nreports, are highly suggestive of the mind which dwells with essences.\n\n[110] Stern, _Writings_, p. 231.\n\n[111] Stern, _Writings_, p. 728.\n\n[112] _Ibid._, p. 710.\n\n[113] _Op. cit._, III, 610.\n\n[114] Stern, _Writings_, p. 423.\n\n[115] _Ibid._, p. 649.\n\n[116] Stern, _Writings_, p. 452.\n\n[117] To mention a simple example, the sarcasm uttered as a pleasantry\nsometimes leaves a wound because its formal signification is not entirely\nremoved by the intonation of the user or by the speech situation.\n\n[118] _The Wings of the Dove_ (Modern Library ed., New York, 1937), p. 53.\n\n[119] \u201cOn the Physical Basis of Life,\u201d _Lay Sermons, Addresses and\nReviews_ (New York, 1883), pp. 123-24.\n\n[120] On this point it is pertinent to cite Huxley\u2019s remark in another\nlay sermon, \u201cOn the Study of Zoology\u201d (_ibid._, p. 110): \u201cI have a strong\nimpression that the better a discourse is, as an oration, the worse it is\nas a lecture.\u201d\n\n[121] _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_ (Bury\u2019s ed., London, 1900),\nI, 28.\n\n[122] Cf. Kenneth Burke, _Attitudes Toward History_ (New York, 1937), I,\n82-83: \u201cLooking over the titles of books written by Huysmans, who went\n_from_ naturalism, _through_ Satanism, _to_ Catholicism, we find that\nhis titles of the naturalistic period are with one exception nouns, all\nthose of the transitional period are prepositions actually or in quality\n(\u201cA-Vau-l\u2019Eau,\u201d \u201cEn Rade,\u201d \u201cA Rebours,\u201d \u201cLa Bas,\u201d \u201cEn Route\u201d) and all in\nhis period of Catholic realism are nouns.\u201d\n\n[123] In German all nouns are regularly capitalized, and the German word\nfor noun substantive is _Hauptwort_ or \u201chead word.\u201d In this grammatical\nvision the noun becomes a sort of \u201ccaptain\u201d in the sentence.\n\n[124] Cf. Aristotle, _Rhetoric_, 1410 b: \u201cAnd let this be our fundamental\nprinciple: for the receiving of information with ease, is naturally\npleasing to all; and nouns are significant of something; so that all\nthose nouns whatsoever which produce knowledge in the mind, are most\npleasing.\u201d\n\n[125] Compare the following passage by Carl Sandburg in \u201cTrying to\nWrite,\u201d _Atlantic Monthly_, Vol. 186, No. 3 (September, 1950), p. 33: \u201cI\nam still studying verbs and the mystery of how they connect nouns. I am\nmore suspicious of adjectives than at any other time in all my born days.\u201d\n\n[126] _Essay on Rime_ (New York, 1945), p. 43, ll. 1224-1227.\n\n[127] _Life on the Mississippi_ (New York, 1903), p. 73.\n\n[128] \u201cRemarks on the Character and Writings of John Milton,\u201d _The Works\nof William E. Channing, D.D._ (Boston, 1894), p. 503.\n\n[129] Some correlation appears to exist between the mentality of an era\nand the average length of sentence in use. The seventeenth century, the\nmost introspective, philosophical, and \u201crevolutionary\u201d era of English\nhistory, wrote the longest sentence in English literature. The next era,\nbroadly recognized as the eighteenth century, swung in the opposite\ndirection, with a shorter and much more modelled or contrived sentence.\nThe nineteenth century, again turned a little solemn and introspective,\nwrote a somewhat long and loose one. Now comes the twentieth century,\nwith its journalism and its syncopated tempo, to write the shortest\nsentence of all.\n\n[130] _The Prose Works of John Milton_, ed. J. A. St. John (London,\n1909-14), II, 364-65. Hereafter referred to as _Works_.\n\n[131] _Works_, III, 194.\n\n[132] _Works_, II, 78-79.\n\n[133] _Works_, II, 364.\n\n[134] See her _Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery_ (Chicago, 1947), pp.\n284-99.\n\n[135] _Works_, II, 89.\n\n[136] _Works_, II, 93-94.\n\n[137] _Works_, II, 446.\n\n[138] _Works_, III, 172.\n\n[139] _Works_, II, 382.\n\n[140] _Works_, II, 377-78.\n\n[141] _Works_, II, 418-19.\n\n[142] _Works_, II, 94.\n\n[143] _Works_, II, 401.\n\n[144] _Works_, III, 175.\n\n[145] _Works_, III, 42-43.\n\n[146] _The Congressional Globe_, Thirty-first Congress, First Session\n(June 21, 1850), p. 1250.\n\n[147] _Where the Battle Was Fought_ (Boston and New York, 1900), p. 4.\n\n[148] _Address Delivered by Hon. Charles J. Faulkner before the Valley\nAgricultural Society of Virginia, at their Fair Grounds near Winchester,\nOctober 21, 1858_ (Washington, 1858), pp. 3-4.\n\n[149] _On Style_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 321.\n\n[150] See Norman J. DeWitt, \u201cThe Humanist Should Look to the Law,\u201d\n_Journal of General Education_, IV (January, 1950), 149. Although it\nis not our concern here, it probably could be shown that the essential\nrequirements of oratory themselves depend upon a certain organization\nof society, such as an aristocratic republicanism. When Burke declares\nthat a true natural aristocracy \u201cis formed out of a class of legitimate\npresumptions, which, taken as generalities, must be admitted for actual\ntruths\u201d (_Works_ [London, 1853-64], III, 85-86) my impression is that he\nhas in mind something resembling our \u201cuncontested term.\u201d The \u201clegitimate\npresumptions\u201d are the settled things which afford the plane of maneuver.\n\n[151] _Address Preceding the Removal of the Senate from the Old to the\nNew Chamber: Delivered in the Senate of the United States, January 4,\n1859_ (Washington, 1859), (Printed at the Office of the Congressional\nGlobe), pp. 5, 7.\n\n[152] There is commentary in the fact that the long commemorative\naddress, with its assembled memories, was a distinctive institution of\nnineteenth-century America. Generalizations and \u201cdistance\u201d were on such\noccasions the main resources.\n\n[153] _The Position and Function of the American Bar, as an Element of\nConservatism in the State: An Address Delivered before the Law School in\nCambridge_, July 3, 1845. From _Addresses and Orations of Rufus Choate_\n(Boston: Little, Brown, 1891), pp. 141-43.\n\n[154] A distinction must be made between \u201cuncontested terms\u201d and slogans.\nThe former are parts of the general mosaic of belief; the latter are\nuncritical aspirations, or at the worst, shibboleths.\n\n[155] _E.g._, Samuel T. Williamson, \u201cHow to Write Like a Social\nScientist,\u201d _Saturday Review of Literature_, XXX, No. 40 (October 4,\n1947), 17.\n\n[156] See Bertrand Russell, \u201cThe Postulate of Natural Kinds or of Limited\nVariety,\u201d _Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits_ (New York: Simon &\nSchuster, 1948), pp. 438-44.\n\n[157] (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939), p. 349.\n\n[158] Melvin Seeman, \u201cAn Evaluation of Current Approaches to Personality\nDifferences in Folk and Urban Societies,\u201d _Social Forces_, XXV (December,\n1946), 165.\n\n[159] _Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs_ (Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 214.\n\n[160] Donald L. Taylor, \u201cCourtship as a Social Institution in the United\nStates, 1930-1945,\u201d _Social Forces_, XXV (October, 1946), 68.\n\n[161] For example: \u201cid,\u201d \u201cion,\u201d \u201calga.\u201d\n\n[162] Samuel H. Jameson, \u201cSocial Nearness among Welfare Institutions,\u201d\n_Sociology and Social Research_, XV (March-April, 1931), 322.\n\n[163] The natural scientists, too, use many Latinate terms, but these are\nchiefly \u201cname\u201d words, for which there are no real substitutes.\n\n[164] See J. B. Greenough and G. L. Kittredge, _Words and Their Ways in\nEnglish Speech_ (New York, 1931), pp. 94-99.\n\n[165] James R. Masterson and Wendell Brooks Phillips, _Federal Prose:\nHow to Write in and/or for Washington_ (Chapel Hill: University of North\nCarolina Press, 1948), p. 10.\n\n[166] Cf., for example, Madison in No. 10.\n\n[167] It is possible that there exists also a concrete understanding,\nwhich differs qualitatively from abstract or scientific understanding and\nis needed to supplement it, particularly when we are dealing with moral\nphenomena (see Andrew Bongiorno, \u201cPoetry as an Educational Instrument,\u201d\n_Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors_, XXXIII\n[Autumn, 1947], 508-9).\n\n[168] Cf. Aristotle, \u2018_Rhetoric_, 1410 b: \u201c... for when the poet calls\nold age \u2018stubble,\u2019 he produces in us a knowledge and information by means\nof a common genus; for both are past their prime.\u201d\n\n[169] _International Encyclopedia of Unified Science_ (Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press, 1941), II, No. 8, 7.\n\n[170] _Op. cit._, p. 487.\n\n[171] _Foundations of Sociology_ (New York: Macmillan, 1939), p. 383.\n\n[172] \u201cThe Nature of Human Nature,\u201d _American Journal of Sociology_,\nXXXII (July, 1926), 17.\n\n[173] \u201cThe Limitations of the Expert,\u201d _Harper\u2019s_, CLXII (December,\n1930), 102-3.\n\n[174] \u201cThe Sad Estate of Scientific Publication,\u201d _American Journal of\nSociology_, XLVII (January, 1942), 600.\n\n[175] (2 vols.; New York, 1933.)\n\n[176] It is surely worth observing that nowhere in the King James Version\nof the Bible does the word \u201cfact\u201d occur.\n\n[177] Compare Sherwood Anderson\u2019s analysis of the same phenomenon in\n_A Story Teller\u2019s Story_ (New York, 1928), p. 198: \u201cThere was in the\nfactories where I worked and where the efficient Ford type of man was\njust beginning his dull reign this strange and futile outpouring of men\u2019s\nlives in vileness through their lips. Ennui was at work. The talk of the\nmen about me was not Rabelaisian. In old Rabelais there was the salt of\ninfinite wit and I have no doubt that the Rabelaisian flashes that came\nfrom our own Lincoln, Washington, and others had point and a flare to\nthem.\n\nBut in the factories and in army camps!\u201d\n\n[178] One is inevitably reminded of the slogan of Oceania in Orwell\u2019s\n_Nineteen Eighty-four_: \u201cFreedom is Slavery.\u201d\n\n[179] \u201cPrinciples of Newspeak,\u201d _Nineteen Eighty-four_ (New York, 1949),\np. 310.\n\n\n\n\nIndex\n\n\n  Abbreviated names, 229-30\n\n  _Address Preceding the Removal of the Senate from the Old to the New\n        Chamber_, 176-77\n\n  Adler, Mortimer J., 27, 30-31\n\n  Aesthetic distance, 175-79\n\n  \u201caggressor,\u201d 231-32\n\n  \u201callies,\u201d 221-22\n\n  \u201cAmerican,\u201d 218-20\n\n  Anderson, Sherwood, 226\n\n  _Animadversions upon the Remonstrant\u2019s Defence against Smectymnuus_,\n        160\n\n  _Areopagitica_, 147, 150, 159\n\n  Aristotle\n    definition of dialectical problem, 15-16\n    cited, 128, 203\n\n\n  Beveridge, Albert, 85\n\n  Beyle, Herman C., 192\n\n  _Bible_, 14, 214\n\n  Bishop, John Peale, 161, 201\n\n  Blish, James, 5\n\n  Bongiorno, Andrew, 203\n\n  Breckinridge, John C., 176\n\n  Bryan, William Jennings, 36-39, 41\n\n  Bryan, William Jennings, Jr., 35\n\n  Burke, Edmund\n    on the Catholic question, 58-62\n    policy toward American colonies, 62-65\n    policy toward India, 65-68\n    policy toward the French Revolution, 68-72\n    on metaphysics, 72-73\n\n  Burke, Kenneth, 22, 128, 225\n\n\n  Carlyle, Thomas, 133\n\n  Carroll, E. Malcolm, 79\n\n  Caste spirit, 206-8\n\n  Channing, W. E., 143\n\n  Charismatic terms, 227-32\n\n  Chase, Stuart, 8\n\n  Choate, Rufus, 179\n\n  Churchill, Winston, 20\n\n  Cicero, 174\n\n  Circumstance, argument from, defined, 57\n\n  \u201cCommunist,\u201d 222-23\n\n  Craddock, Charles Egbert, 165\n\n\n  Darrow, Clarence, 32, 34-35, 41\n\n  Demetrius, _On Style_, 173\n\n  \u201cdemocracy,\u201d 228-29\n\n  _Democracy in America_, Tocqueville\u2019s, 76\n\n  DeWitt, Norman J., 174\n\n  Dialectical terms, 48, 52-53, 187-88;\n    Plato on, 16\n\n  _Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce_, 146, 153\n\n  Duhamel, P. Albert, 3\n\n\n  \u201cefficient,\u201d 217-18\n\n  Eisenhower, Dwight D., 81\n\n  Epistemology, in relation to oratory, 178-82\n\n  Ewing, Representative Andrew, 164-65\n\n\n  \u201cfact,\u201d 214-15\n\n  Faris, Ellsworth, 205\n\n  Faulkner, Charles J., 168\n\n  _Federal Prose_, 199-200\n\n  \u201cfreedom,\u201d 228\n\n\n  Genus, argument from, defined, 56\n\n  GI rhetoric, 225-26\n\n  Greek language, 140\n\n\n  Harding, T. Swann, 208\n\n  Hay, John, 85\n\n  Hays, Arthur Garfield, 35-36\n\n  Henley, W. E., 131\n\n  Herndon, W. H., 85, 89, 111-12\n\n  \u201chistory,\u201d 220-21\n\n  Huxley, T. H., 8, 122-23\n\n\n  Inverted hierarchies, 224-27\n\n\n  Jackson, Andrew, 78\n\n  James, Henry, 121-22, 123, 133-34\n\n  Jameson, Samuel H., 197\n\n\n  Laski, Harold, 207\n\n  Latinate terms, 196-201\n\n  Lincoln, Abraham\n    argument from genus \u201cman,\u201d 87-95\n    _First Inaugural Address_, 96-100\n    on definition, 104-5\n    and the excluded middle, 105-7\n    his perspective, 108-11\n\n  Lundberg, George, 204\n\n  Lysias, speech of, 5-7\n\n\n  Malone, Dudley Field, 35, 39, 47-48\n\n  Maritain, Jacques, 21, 24\n\n  Mather, Kirtley F., 42-43, 51\n\n  Melioristic bias, 195-201\n\n  Metaphor, attitude of social scientists toward, 202-6\n\n  Metcalf, Maynard, 49\n\n  Milton, John\n    primacy of the concept, 144-52\n    extended metaphor, use of, 150-52\n    antithetical expressions, use of, 152-55\n    superlative mode, 155-58\n    systematic collocation, use of, 158-61\n\n  \u201cmodern,\u201d 217\n\n  Morley, John, 67\n\n  Murray, Paul, 79, 80, 81\n\n\n  Nicolay, John G., 85\n\n\n  _Of Reformation in England_, 145, 148, 154, 156\n\n  Orwell, George, 228, 229, 230\n\n\n  Parts of speech\n    noun, 127-28\n    adjective, 129-33\n    adverb, 133-34\n    verb, 135-36\n    conjunction, 137-38\n    preposition, 138-39\n\n  Pedantic empiricism, 191-95\n\n  Phrases, 139-41\n\n  Plato\n    method of transcendence, 4-5, 18-19\n    on madness as a form of inspiration, 13\n    definition of positive and dialectical terms, 16\n    on the nature of the soul, 17\n\n  _Position and Function of the American Bar, as an Element of\n        Conservatism in the State, The_, 179-81\n\n  \u201cprejudice,\u201d 223-24\n\n  Primary equivocation, 187-91\n\n  Prior, James, 75-76\n\n  \u201cprogress,\u201d 212-14\n\n\n  _Reason of Church Government Urged Against Prelaty_, 151\n\n  Rhetorical syllogism, 173\n\n  Right of assumption, 169\n\n  Russell, Bertrand, 191, 204\n\n\n  Sandburg, Carl, 129\n\n  Santillana, George de, 203-4\n\n  \u201cscience,\u201d 215-16\n\n  Seeman, Melvin, 192\n\n  \u201csemantically purified\u201d speech, 7-10\n\n  Sentence\n    defined, 117-18\n    grammatical types of, 119-27\n\n  Shapiro, Karl, 130\n\n  Similitude, argument from, defined, 56-57\n\n  Spinoza, B., 25\n\n  Stewart, Attorney-general of Tennessee, 32, 33, 39, 41, 46-47\n\n  Stylization, 182-83\n\n\n  Tate, Allen, 118\n\n  Taylor, A. E., 3\n\n  Taylor, Donald J., 194\n\n  Tennessee anti-evolution law, 29-30\n\n  Tocqueville, Alexis de, 76\n\n  Tuve, Rosemund, 150\n\n  Twain, Mark, 136, 224\n\n\n  Uncontested terms, 166-71, 184\n\n\n  _Where the Battle Was Fought_, 165\n\n  Whig political philosophy, 76-80\n\n  Williamson, Samuel T., 186","title":"The ethics of rhetoric","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":77662}