{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_68574/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_68574","id":"gutenberg_68574","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68574","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Biology","Evolution"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Notes\n\nObvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations\nin hyphenation have been standardised but all other spelling,\npunctuation and accents remains unchanged.\n\nItalics are represented thus _italic_, bold thus =bold=.\n\nA reference to Monism as \u201cdestructive of culture, etc.\u201d in the index\nto page 450, which does not exist, has been changed to 350.\n\nThe repetition of section titles on consecutive pages has been removed.\n\n\n\n\n                      THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION\n\n\n                        [publisher\u2019s monogram]\n\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                 NEW YORK \u00b7 BOSTON \u00b7 CHICAGO \u00b7 DALLAS\n                        ATLANTA \u00b7 SAN FRANCISCO\n\n                       MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED\n                      LONDON \u00b7 BOMBAY \u00b7 CALCUTTA\n                               MELBOURNE\n\n                   THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.\n                                TORONTO\n\n\n                           THE CASE AGAINST\n                               EVOLUTION\n\n                                  BY\n\n                 GEORGE BARRY O\u2019TOOLE, PH.\u202fD., S.T.D.\n\n      PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AND PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF PHILOSOPHY,\n              ST. VINCENT ARCHABBEY; PROFESSOR OF ANIMAL\n                      BIOLOGY, SETON HILL COLLEGE\n\n                               New York\n\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n\n                                 1926\n\n                         _All rights reserved_\n\n\n                           COPYRIGHT, 1925,\n                       BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.\n\n                       Set up and electrotyped.\n                        Published April, 1925.\n\n                       Reprinted February, 1926.\n\n\n             _Printed in the United States of America by_\n                J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\n                             TO MY MOTHER\n\n\n\n\n                                ADDENDA\n\n\nNOTE TO PAGE 23.\u2014\n\nAs a result of recent investigations on the sex chromosomes and\nchromosome numbers in mammals, Theophilus S. Painter reaches the\nconclusions that polyploidy cannot be invoked to explain evolution\nwithin this class. After giving a table of chromosome numbers for 7 out\nof the 9 eutherian orders, Painter concludes: \u201cThe facts recorded above\nare of especial interest in that they indicate a unity of chromosome\ncomposition above the marsupial level and effectively dispose of the\nsuggestion that extensive polyploidy may have occurred within this\nsubclass.\n\n\u201cIn the marsupials the chromosome number is a low one and in the\nopossum is 22. At first sight it might appear that the eutherian\ncondition might have arisen from this by tetraploidy. There are two\nobjections, however. In the first place the bulk of the chromatin\nin marsupials is about the same as in the eutheria, using the sex\nchromosome as our measure. In the second place, polyploidy could\nscarcely occur successfully in animals with X-Y sex chromosomes, as\nmost mammals possess, because of the complication occurring in the\nsex chromosome balance\u201d (_Science_, April 17, 1925, p. 424). As the\nX-Y type of sex chromosomes occurs widely not only among vertebrates,\nbut also among insects, nematodes, and echinoderms, Painter\u2019s latter\nobjection excludes evolution by polyploidy from a large portion of the\nanimal kingdom.\n\n\nNOTE TO PAGE 90.\u2014\n\nEspecially reprehensible, in this respect, are the reconstructions of\nthe Pithecanthropus, the Eoanthropus, and other alleged pitheco-human\nlinks modeled by McGregor and others. These imaginative productions,\nin which cranial fragments are arbitrarily completed and fancifully\noverlayed with a veneering of human features, have no scientific\nvalue or justification. It is consoling, therefore, to note that\nthe great French pal\u00e6ontologist, Marcelin Boule, in his recent book\n\u201cLes Hommes Fossiles\u201d (Paris, 1921), has entered a timely protest\nagainst the appearance of such reconstructions in serious scientific\nworks. \u201cDubois and Manouvrier,\u201d he says, \u201chave given reconstructions\nof the skull and even of the head (of the Pithecanthropus). These\nattempts made by medical men, are much too hypothetical, because we\ndo not possess a single element for the reconstruction of the basis\nof the brain case, or of the jawbones. We are surprised to see that a\ngreat pal\u00e6ontologist, Osborn, publishes efforts of this kind. Dubois\nproceeded still farther in the realm of imagination when he exhibited\nat the universal exposition of Paris a plastic and painted reproduction\nof the Pithecanthropus\u201d (_op. cit._, p. 105). And elsewhere he remarks:\n\u201cSome true savants have published portraits, covered with flesh and\nhair, not only of the Neandertal Man, whose skeleton is known well\nenough today, but also of the Man of Piltdown, whose remnants are so\nfragmentary; of the Man of Heidelberg, of whom we have only the lower\njawbone; of the Pithecanthropus, of whom there exists only a piece of\nthe cranium and ... two teeth. Such reproductions may have their place\nin works of the lowest popularization. But they very much deface the\nbooks, though otherwise valuable, into which they are introduced.\u201d\n... \u201cMen of science\u2014and of conscience\u2014know the difficulties of such\nattempts too well to regard them as anything more than a pastime\u201d (_op.\ncit._, p. 227).\n\n\nNOTE TO PAGE 342.\u2014\n\nA fourth possibility is suggested by the case of the so-called skull\nof the Galley Hill Man, of whose importance as a prehistoric link Sir\nArthur Keith held a very high opinion, but which has since turned out\nto be no skull at all, but merely an odd-shaped piece of stone.\n\n\n\n\n                               CONTENTS\n\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n\n    FOREWORD                                                          xi\n\n\n                      PART I\u2014EVOLUTION IN GENERAL\n\n    CHAPTER\n\n    I THE PRESENT CRISIS IN EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT                       1\n\n    II HOMOLOGY AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION                   31\n\n    III FOSSIL PEDIGREES                                              66\n\n\n                    PART II\u2014THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS\n\n    I THE ORIGIN OF LIFE                                             131\n\n    II THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL                                  189\n\n    III THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN BODY                                 268\n\n    AFTERWORD                                                        349\n\n    GLOSSARY\n\n    INDEX TO AUTHORS\n\n    INDEX OF SUBJECTS\n\n\n\n\n                               FOREWORD\n\n\nThe literature on the subject of evolution has already attained such\nvast dimensions that any attempt to add to it has the appearance of\nbeing both superfluous and presumptuous. It is, however, in the fact\nthat the generality of modern works are frankly partisan in their\ntreatment of this theme that the publication of the present work finds\njustification.\n\nFor the philosophers and scientists of the day evolution is evidently\nsomething which admits of no debate and which must be maintained at\nall costs. These thinkers are too intent upon making out a plausible\ncase for the theory to take anything more than the mildest interest in\nthe facts opposed to it. If they advert to them at all, it is always\nto minimize, and never to accentuate, their antagonistic force. For\nthe moment, at any rate, the minds of scientific writers are closed to\nunfavorable, and open only to favorable, evidence, so that one must\nlook elsewhere than in their pages for adequate presentation of the\ncase against evolution.\n\nThe present work aims at setting forth the side of the question\nwhich it is now the fashion to suppress. It refuses to be bound by\nthe convention which prescribes that evolution shall be leniently\ncriticized. It proceeds, in fact, upon the opposite assumption, namely,\nthat a genuinely scientific theory ought not to stand in need of\nindulgence, but should be able, on the contrary, to endure the acid\ntest of merciless criticism.\n\nEvolution has been termed a \u201cnecessary hypothesis.\u201d We have no quarrel\nwith the phrase, provided it really means evolution as an hypothesis,\nand not evolution as a dogma. For, obviously, the problem of a gradual\ndifferentiation of organic species cannot even be investigated upon\nthe fixistic assumption, inasmuch as this assumption destroys the\nproblem at the very outset. Unless we assume the possibility, at least,\nthat modern species of plants and animals may have been the product of\na gradual process, there is no problem to investigate. It is, however,\na far cry from the possibility to the actuality; and the mere fact that\nan hypothesis is necessary as an incentive to investigation does not\nby any means imply that the result of the investigation will be the\nvindication of its inspirational hypothesis. On the contrary, research\noften results in the overthrow of the very hypothesis which led to its\ninception. We can, therefore, quite readily admit the necessity of\nevolution as an hypothesis, while rejecting its necessity as a dogma.\n\nAssent to evolution as a dogma is advocated not only by materialists,\nwho see in evolutionary cosmogony proof positive of their monism and\nthe complete overthrow of the idea of Creation, but also by certain\nCatholic scientists, who seem to fear that religion may become involved\nin the anticipated ruin of fixism. Thus all resistance to the theory\nof evolution is deprecated by Father Wasmann and Canon Dorlodot on the\nassumption that the ultimate triumph of this theory is inevitable,\nand that failure to make provision for this eventuality will lead to\njust such another blunder as theologians of the sixteenth century\nmade in connection with the Copernican theory. Recollection of the\nGalileo incident is, doubtless, salutary, in so far as it suggests\nthe wisdom of caution and the imperative necessity of close contact\nwith ascertained facts, but a consideration of this sort is no warrant\nwhatever for an uncritical acceptance of what still remains unverified.\nHistory testifies that verification followed close upon the heels of\nthe initial proposal of the heliocentric theory, but the whole trend\nof scientific discovery has been to destroy, rather than to confirm,\nall definite formulations of the evolutional theory, in spite of the\nimmense erudition expended in revising them.\n\nThere is, in brief, no parity at all between Transformism and the\nCopernican theory. Among other points of difference, Tuccimei notes\nespecially the following: \u201cThe Copernican system,\u201d he remarks,\n\u201cexplains _that which is_, whereas evolution attempts to explain _that\nwhich was_; it enters, in other words, into the problem of origins, an\ninsoluble problem in the estimation of many illustrious evolutionists,\naccording to whom no experimental verification is possible, given\nthe processes and factors in conjunction with which the theory was\nproposed. But what is of still greater significance for those who\ndesire to see a parallelism between the two theories is the fact\nthat the Copernican system became, with the discoveries of Newton, a\ndemonstrated thesis, scarcely fifty years after the death of Galileo;\nthe theory of evolution, on the other hand, is at the present day no\nlonger able to hold its own even as an hypothesis, so numerous are its\nincoherencies and the objections to it raised by its own partisans.\u201d\n(\u201cLa Decadenza di una Teoria,\u201d 1908, p. 11.)\n\nThe prospect, then, of a renewal of the Galileo episode is exceedingly\nremote. Far more imminent to the writer seems the danger that the\nwell-intentioned rescuers of religion may be obliged to perform a\nmost humiliating _volte face_, after having accepted all too hastily\na doctrine favored only for the time being in scientific circles. It\nis, in fact, by no means inconceivable that the scientific world will\neventually discard the now prevalent dogma of evolution. In that case\nthose who have seen fit to reconcile religion with evolution will have\nthe questionable pleasure of unreconciling it in response to this\nreversal of scientific opinion.\n\nOn the whole, the safest attitude toward evolution is the agnostic\none. It commits us to no uncertain position. It does not compromise\nour intellectual sincerity by requiring us to accept the dogmatism\nof scientific orthodoxy as a substitute for objective evidence. It\nprecludes the possible embarrassment of having to unsay what we\nformerly said. And last, but not least, it is the attitude of simple\ntruth; for the truest thing that Science is, or ever will be, able to\nsay concerning the problem of organic origins is that she knows nothing\nabout it.\n\nIn the present work, we shall endeavor to show that Evolution has long\nsince degenerated into a dogma, which is believed in spite of the\nfacts, and not on account of them. The first three chapters deal with\nthe theory in general, discussing in turn its genetical, morphological,\nand geological aspects. The last three chapters are devoted to the\nproblem of origins, and treat of the genesis of life, of the human\nsoul, and of the human body, respectively.\n\nWhile this book is in no sense a work of \u201cpopular science,\u201d I have\nsought to broaden its scope and interest by combining the scientific\nwith the philosophic viewpoint. Certain portions of the text are\nunavoidably technical, but there is much, besides, that the general\nreader will be able to follow without difficulty. Students, especially\nof biology, geology, and experimental psychology, may use it to\nadvantage as supplementary reading in connection with their textbooks.\n\nI wish to acknowledge herewith my indebtedness to the Editor of the\n_Catholic Educational Review_, Rev. George Johnson, Ph. D., to whose\nsuggestion and encouragement the inception of this work was largely\ndue. I desire also to express my sincere appreciation of the services\nrendered in the revision of the manuscript by the Rev. Edward Wenstrup,\nO.S.B., Professor of Zo\u00f6logy, St. Vincent College, Pennsylvania.\n\n                                                        BARRY O\u2019TOOLE.\n\n    ST. VINCENT ARCHABBEY,\n    January 30, 1925.\n\n\n\n\n                                PART I\n\n                         EVOLUTION IN GENERAL\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER I\n\n              THE PRESENT CRISIS IN EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT\n\n\nThree prominent men, a scientist, a publicist, and an orator, have\nrecently made pronouncements on the theory of Evolution. The trio, of\ncourse, to whom allusion is made, are Bateson, Wells, and Bryan. As\na result of their utterances, there has been a general reawakening\nof interest in the problem to which they drew attention. Again and\nagain, in popular as well as scientific publications, men are raising\nand answering the question: \u201cIs Darwinism dead?\u201d Manifold and various\nare the answers given, but none of them appears to take the form\nof an unqualified affirmation or negation. Some reply by drawing a\ndistinction between Darwinism, as a synonym for the theory of evolution\nin general, and Darwinism, in the sense of the particular form of that\ntheory which had Darwin for its author. Modern research, they assure\nus, has not affected the former, but has necessitated a revision of\nideas with respect to the latter. There are other forms of evolution\nbesides Darwinism, and, as a matter of fact, not Darwin, but Lamarck\nwas the originator of the scientific theory of evolution. Others,\nthough imitating the prudence of the first group in their avoidance of\na categorical answer, prefer to reply by means of a distinction based\nupon their interpretation of the realities of the problem rather than\nupon any mere terminological consideration.\n\nOf the second group, some, like Osborn, distinguish between the _law_\nof evolution and the theoretical _explanations_ of this law proposed by\nindividual scientists. The existence of the law itself, they insist, is\nnot open to question; it is only with respect to hypotheses explanatory\nof the aforesaid law that doubt and disagreement exist. The obvious\nobjection to such a solution is that, if evolution is really a law of\nnature, it ought to be reducible to some clear-cut mathematical formula\ncomparable to the formulations of the laws of constant, multiple, and\nreciprocal proportion in chemistry, or of the laws of segregation,\nassortment, and linkage in genetics. Assuming, then, that it is a\ngenuine law, how is it that today no one ventures to formulate this\nevolutional law in definite and quantitative terms?\n\nOthers, comprising, perhaps, a majority, prefer to distinguish between\nthe _fact_ and the _causes_ of evolution. Practically all scientists,\nthey aver, agree in accepting evolution as an established fact; it is\nonly with reference to the agencies of evolution that controversy and\nuncertainty are permissible. To this contention one may justly reply\nthat, by all the canons of linguistic usage, a fact is an observed or\nexperienced event, and that hitherto no one in the past or present\nhas ever been privileged to witness with his senses even so elemental\na phenomenon in the evolutionary process as the actual origin of a\nnew and genuine organic species. If, however, the admission be made\nthat the term \u201cfact\u201d is here used in an untechnical sense to denote\nan inferred event postulated for the purpose of interpreting certain\nnatural phenomena, then the statement that the majority of modern\nscientists agree as to the \u201cfact\u201d of evolution may be allowed to stand,\nwith no further comment than to note that the formidable number and\nprestige of the advocates fail to intimidate us. Considerations of this\nsort are wholly irrelevant, for in science no less than in philosophy\nauthority is worth as much as its arguments and no more.\n\nThe limited knowledge of the facts possessed by the biologists of\nthe nineteenth century left their imaginations perilously unfettered\nand permitted them to indulge in a veritable orgy of theorizing. Now,\nhowever, that the trail blazed by the great Augustinian Abbot, Mendel,\nhas been rediscovered, work of real value is being done with the seed\npan, the incubator, the microtome, etc., and the wings of irresponsible\nspeculation are clipped. Recent advances in this new field of Mendelian\ngenetics have made it possible to subject to critical examination\nall that formerly went under the name of \u201cexperimental evidence\u201d of\nevolution. Even with respect to the inferential or circumstantial\nevidence from pal\u00e6ontology, the enormous deluge of fossils unearthed\nby the tireless zeal of modern investigators has annihilated, by its\nsheer complexity, the hasty generalizations and facile simplifications\nof a generation ago, forcing the adoption of a more critical\nattitude. Formerly, a graded series of fossil genera sufficed for\nthe construction of a \u201cpal\u00e6ontological pedigree\u201d; now, the worker in\nthis field demands that the chain of descent shall be constructed\nwith species, instead of genera, for links\u2014\u201cNot till we have linked\nspecies into lineages, can we group them into genera.\u201d (F. A. Bather,\n_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 264.) This remarkable progress in\nscientific studies has tended to precipitate the crisis in evolutionary\nthought, which we propose to consider in the present chapter. Before\ndoing so, however, it will be of advantage to formulate a clear\nstatement of the problem at issue.\n\nEvolution, or transformism, as it is more properly called, may be\ndefined as the theory which regards the present species of plants and\nanimals as modified descendants of earlier forms of life. Nowadays,\ntherefore, the principal use of the term evolution is to denote the\ndevelopmental theory of organic species. It is, however, a word of many\nsenses. In the eighteenth century, for example, it was employed in a\nsense at variance with the present usage, that is, to designate the\nnon-developmental theory of embryological encasement or preformation\nas opposed to the developmental theory of epigenesis. According\nto the theory of encasement, the adult organism did not arise by\nthe generation of new parts (epigenesis), but by a mere \u201cunfolding\u201d\n(_evolutio_) of pre\u00ebxistent parts. At present, however, evolution is\nused as a synonym for transformism, though it has other meanings,\nbesides, being sometimes used to signify the formation of inorganic\nnature as well as the transformation of organic species.\n\nEvolution, in the sense of transformism, is opposed to fixism, the\nolder theory of Linn\u00e9, according to whom no _specific_ change is\npossible in plants and animals, all organisms being assumed to have\npersisted in essential sameness of type from the dawn of organic life\ndown to the present day. The latter theory admits the possibility of\nenvironmentally-induced modifications, which are non-germinal and\ntherefore non-inheritable. It also admits the possibility of germinal\nchanges of the varietal, as opposed to the specific, order, but it\nmaintains that all such changes are confined within the limits of the\nspecies, and that the boundaries of an organic species are impassable.\nTransformism, on the contrary, affirms the possibility of specific\nchange, and assumes that the boundaries of organic species have\nactually been traversed.\n\nWhat, then, is an organic species? It may be defined as a group of\norganisms endowed with the _hardihood_ necessary to survive and\npropagate themselves under natural conditions (_i.e._ in the wild\nstate), exhibiting a common inheritable type, differing from one\nanother by no major germinal difference, perfectly interfertile with\none another, but _sexually incompatible_ with members of an alien\nspecific group, in such wise that they produce hybrids wholly, or\npartially, sterile, when crossed with organisms outside their own\nspecific group.\n\nDavid Starr Jordan has wisely called attention to the requisite of\nviability and survival under natural conditions. \u201cA species,\u201d he says,\n\u201cis not merely a form or group of individuals distinguished from other\ngroups by definable features. A complete definition involves longevity.\nA species is a kind of animal or plant which has run the gauntlet\nof the ages and persisted.... A form is not a species until it has\n\u2018stood.\u2019\u201d (_Science_, Oct. 20, 1922, p. 448.)\n\nSexual (gametic) incompatibility as a criterion of specific\ndistinction, presupposes the bisexual or biparental mode of\nreproduction, namely, syngamy, and is therefore chiefly applicable\nto the metista, although, if the view tentatively proposed by the\nprotozo\u00f6logist, E. A. Minchin, be correct, it would also be applicable\nto the protista. According to this view, no protist type is a\ntrue species, unless it is maintained by syngamy (_i.e._ bisexual\nreproduction)\u2014\u201cNot until syngamy was acquired,\u201d says Minchin, \u201ccould\ntrue species exist among the Protista.\u201d (\u201cAn Introduction to the Study\nof the Protozoa,\u201d p. 141.)\n\nTo return, however, to the metista, the horse (_Equus caballus_) and\nthe ass (_Equus asinus_) represent two distinct species under a common\ngenus. This is indicated by the fact that the mule, which is the hybrid\noffspring of their cross, is entirely sterile, producing no offspring\nwhatever, when mated with ass, horse, or mule. Such total sterility,\nhowever, is not essential to the proof of specific differentiation; it\nsuffices that the hybrid be less fertile than its parents. As early as\n1686, sterility (total or partial) of the hybrid was laid down by John\nRay as the fundamental criterion of specific distinction. Hence Bateson\ncomplains that Darwinian philosophy flagrantly \u201cignored the chief\nattribute of species first pointed out by John Ray that the product of\ntheir crosses is frequently sterile in a greater or lesser degree.\u201d\n(_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, p. 58.)\n\nAccordingly, the sameness of type required in members of the same\nspecies refers rather to the genotype, that is, the sum-total of\ninternal hereditary factors latent in the germ, than to the phenotype,\nthat is, the expressed somatic characters, viz. the color, structure,\nsize, weight, and all other perceptible properties, in terms of which a\ngiven plant or animal is described. Thus it sometimes happens that two\ndistinct species, like the pear-tree and the apple-tree, resemble each\nother more closely, as regards their external or somatic characters,\nthan two varieties belonging to one and the same species. Nevertheless,\nthe pear-tree and the apple-tree are so unlike in their germinal\n(genetic) composition that they cannot even be crossed.\n\nAccording to all theories of transformism, new species arise through\nthe transformation of old species, and hence evolutionists are at\none in affirming the occurrence of specific change. When it comes,\nhowever, to assigning the agencies or factors, which are supposed to\nhave brought about this transmutation of organic species, there is a\nwide divergence of opinion. The older systems of transformism, namely,\nLamarckism and Darwinism, ascribed the modification of organic species\nto the operation of the external factors of the environment, while the\nlater school of orthogenesis attributed it to the exclusive operation\nof factors residing within the organism itself.\n\nLamarckism, for example, made the formation of organs a response to\nexternal conditions imposed by the environment. The elephant, according\nto this view, being maladjusted to its environment by reason of its\nclumsy bulk, developed a trunk by using its nose to compensate for\nits lack of pliancy and agility. Here the use or function precedes\nthe organ and molds the latter to its need. Darwinism agrees with\nLamarckism in making the environment the chief arbiter of modification.\nIts explanation of the elephant\u2019s trunk, however, is negative rather\nthan positive. This animal, it tells us, developed a trunk, because\nfailure to vary in that useful direction would have been penalized by\nextermination.\n\nWilson presents, in a very graphic manner, the appalling problem\nwhich confronts evolutionists who seek to explain the adaptations of\norganisms by means of environmental factors. Referring, apparently, to\nHenderson\u2019s \u201cFitness of the Environment,\u201d he says: \u201cIt has been urged\nin a recent valuable work ... that fitness is a reciprocal relation,\ninvolving the environment no less than the organism. This is both\na true and suggestive thought; but does it not leave the naturalist\nfloundering amid the same old quicksands? The historical problem\nwith which he has to deal must be grappled at closer quarters. He is\neverywhere confronted with specific devices in the organism that must\nhave arisen long after the conditions of environment to which they\nare adjusted. Animals that live in water are provided with gills.\nWere this all, we could probably muddle along with the notion that\ngills are no more than lucky accidents. But we encounter a sticking\npoint in the fact that gills are so often accompanied by a variety of\ningenious devices, such as reservoirs, tubes, valves, pumps, strainers,\nscrubbing brushes, and the like, that are obviously tributary to the\nmain function of breathing. Given water, asks the naturalist, how has\nall this come into existence and been perfected? The question is an\ninevitable product of our common sense.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1915, p. 405.)\n\nImpressed with the difficulty of accounting for the phenomena of\norganic adaptation by means of the far too general and unspecific\ninfluence of the environment, the orthogenetic school of transformism\ninaugurated by N\u00e4geli, Eimer, and K\u00f6lliker repudiated this explanation,\nand sought to explain organic evolution on the sole basis of internal\nfactors, such as \u201cdirective principles,\u201d or germinal determinants.\nAccording to this conception, the elephant first developed his trunk\nunder the drive of some internal agency, and afterwards sought out an\nenvironment in which the newly-developed trunk would be useful. In\nother words, orthogenesis makes the organ precede the function, and is\ntherefore the exact reverse of Lamarckism.\n\nEvolutionists in general, as we have said, regard our present plants\nand animals as the modified progeny of earlier forms, understanding\nby \u201cmodified\u201d that which is the product of a trans-specific,\nas distinguished from a varietal or intra-specific, change. To\nsubstantiate the claim that changes of specific magnitude have actually\ntaken place, they appeal to two principal kinds of evidence, namely:\n(a) empirical evidence based on such variations as are now observed\nto occur among living organisms; (b) inferential evidence, which\naposterioristically deduces the common ancestry of allied organic\ntypes from their resemblances and their sequence in geological time.\nHence, if we omit as negligible certain subsidiary arguments, the\nwhole evidence for organic evolution may be summed up under three\nheads: (1) the genetic evidence grounded on the facts of variation;\n(2) the zo\u00f6logical evidence based on homology, that is, on structural\nresemblance together with all further resemblances (physiological and\nembryological), which such similarity entails; (3) the pal\u00e6ontological\nevidence which rests on the gradual approximation of fossil types to\nmodern types, when the former are ranged in a series corresponding to\nthe alleged chronological order of their occurrence in the geological\nstrata. It is the bearing of recent genetical research upon the first\nof these three lines of evidence that we propose to examine in the\npresent chapter, an objective to which a brief and rather eclectic\nhistorical survey of evolutionary thought appears to offer the easiest\navenue of approach.\n\nWhile many bizarre speculations on the subject of transformism had\nbeen hazarded in centuries prior to the nineteenth, the history\nof this conception, as a scientific hypothesis, dates from the\npublication of Lamarck\u2019s \u201cPhilosophie Zoologique\u201d in 1809. According\nto Lamarck, organic species are changed as a result of the _indirect_\ninfluence of the external conditions of life. A change in environment\nforces a change of habit on the part of the animal. A change in the\nanimal\u2019s habits results in adaptation, that is, in the development or\nsuppression of organs through use or disuse. The adaptation, therefore,\nthus acquired was not directly imposed by the environment, but only\nindirectly\u2014that is, through the mediation of habit. Once acquired\nby the individual animal, however, the adaptation was, so Lamarck\nthought, taken up by the process of inheritance and perpetuated by\nbeing transmitted to the animal\u2019s offspring. The net result would be a\nprogressive differentiation of species due to this indirect influence\nof a varying environment.\n\nSuch was the theory of Lamarck, and it is sound and plausible in all\nrespects save one, namely, the unwarranted assumption that acquired\nadaptations are inheritable, since these, to quote the words of the\nHarvard zo\u00f6logist, G. H. Parker, \u201care as a matter of fact just the\nclass of changes in favor of the inheritance of which there is the\nleast evidence.\u201d (\u201cBiology and Social Problems,\u201d 1914, p. 103.)\n\nThe next contribution to the philosophy of transformism was made by\nCharles Darwin, when, in the year 1859, he published his celebrated\n\u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d In this work, the English naturalist bases the\nevolution of organic species upon the assumed spontaneous tendency\nof organisms to vary minutely from their normal type in every\npossible direction. This spontaneous variability gives rise to slight\nvariations, some of which are advantageous, others disadvantageous to\nthe organism. The enormous fecundity of organisms multiplies them in\nexcess of the available food supply, and more, accordingly, are born\nthan can possibly survive. In the ensuing competition or struggle for\nexistence, individuals favorably modified survive and propagate their\nkind, those unfavorably modified perish without progeny. This process\nof elimination Darwin termed natural selection. Only individuals\nfavored by it were privileged to propagate their kind, and thus it\nhappened that these minute variations of a useful character were seized\nupon and perpetuated \u201cby the strong principle of _inheritance_.\u201d In\nthis way, these slight but useful modifications would tend gradually\nto accumulate from generation to generation in the direction favored\nby \u201cnatural selection,\u201d until, by the ensuing summation of innumerable\nminor differences verging in the same direction, a major difference\nwould be produced. The end-result would be a progressive _divergence_\nof posterity from the common ancestral type, whence they originally\nsprang, ending in a multiplicity of new forms or species, all differing\nto a greater or lesser extent from the primitive type. The contrary\nhypothesis of a possible _convergence_ of two originally diverse types\ntowards eventual similarity Darwin rejected as an extremely improbable\nexplanation of the observed resemblance of organic forms, which, not\nwithout reason, he thought it more credible to ascribe to their assumed\ndivergence from a common ancestral type.\n\nSuch was the scheme of evolution elaborated by Charles Darwin. His\nhypothesis leaves the origin of variations an unsolved mystery. It\nassumes what has never been proved, namely, the efficacy of \u201cnatural\nselection.\u201d It rests on what has been definitely disproved by factual\nevidence, namely, the inheritability of the slight variations, now\ncalled fluctuations, which, not being transmitted even, by the\nhereditary process, cannot possibly accumulate from generation to\ngeneration, as Darwin imagined. Moreover, fluctuations owe their\norigin to variability in the external conditions of life (_e.g._ in\ntemperature, moisture, altitude, exposure, soil, food, etc.), being\ndue to the _direct_ influence or pressure of the environment, and not\nto any spontaneous tendency within the organism itself. Hence Darwin\nerred no less with respect to the spontaneity, than with respect to the\ninheritability and summation, of his \u201cslight variations.\u201d\n\nThe subsequent history of Lamarckian and Darwinian Transformism is\nbriefly told. That both should pass into the discard was inevitable,\nbut, thanks to repeated revisions undertaken by loyal adherents, their\ndemise was somewhat retarded. In vain, however, did the Neo-Darwinians\nattempt to do for Darwinism what the Neo-Lamarckians had as futilely\nstriven to do for Lamarckism. The revisers succeeded only in\nprecipitating a lethal duel between these two rival systems, which\nhas proved disastrous to both. The controversy begun in 1891 between\nHerbert Spencer and August Weismann marked the climax of this fatal\nconflict.\n\nSpencer refused to see any value whatever in Darwin\u2019s principle of\nnatural selection, while other Neo-Lamarckians, less extreme, were\ncontent to relegate it to the status of a subordinate factor in\nevolution. Darwin had considered it \u201cthe most important means of\nmodification,\u201d but it is safe to say that no modern biologist attaches\nvery much importance to natural selection as a means of accounting for\nthe differences which mark off one species from another. In fact, if\nnatural selection has enjoyed, or still continues to enjoy, any vogue\nat all, it is not due to its value in natural science (which, for all\npractical intents and purposes, is nil), but solely to its appeal as\n\u201cmechanistic solution\u201d; for nothing further is needed to commend it to\nmodern thinkers infected with what Wasmann calls _Theophobia_. Natural\nselection, in making the organism a product of the concurrence of blind\nforces unguided by Divine intelligence, a mere fortuitous result, and\nnot the realization of purpose, has furnished the agnostic with a\nmiserable pretext for omitting God from his attempted explanation of\nthe universe. \u201cHere is the knot,\u201d exclaims Du Bois-Reymond, \u201chere the\ngreat difficulty that tortures the intellect which would understand the\nworld. Whoever does not place all activity wholesale under the sway of\nEpicurean chance, whoever gives only his little finger to teleology,\nwill inevitably arrive at Paley\u2019s discarded \u2018Natural Theology,\u2019 and\nso much the more necessarily, the more clearly he thinks and the\nmore independent his judgment.... The possibility, ever so distant,\nof banishing from nature its seeming purpose, and putting a blind\nnecessity everywhere in the place of final causes, appears, therefore,\nas one of the greatest advances in the world of thought, from which\na new era will be dated in the treatment of these problems. To have\nsomewhat eased the torture of the intellect which ponders over the\nworld-problem will, as long as philosophical naturalists exist, be\nCharles Darwin\u2019s greatest title to glory.\u201d (_Darwin versus Galiani_,\n\u201cReden,\u201d Vol. I, p. 211.)\n\nBut however indispensable the selection principle may be to a\nphilosophy which proposes to banish the Creator from creation, its\nscientific insolvency has become so painfully apparent that biologists\nhave lost all confidence in its power to solve the problem of organic\norigins. It is recognized, for example, that natural selection would\nsuppress, rather than promote, development, seeing that organs\nhave utility only in the state of perfection and are destitute of\nselection-value while in the imperfect state of transition. Again, the\nspecific differences that diversify the various types of plants and\nanimals are notoriously deficient in selection-value, and therefore the\npresent differentiation of species cannot be accounted for by means of\nthe principle of natural selection. Finally, unless one is prepared\nto make the preposterous assumption that the environment is a telic\nmechanism expressly designed for shaping organisms, he is under logical\nnecessity of admitting that the influence of natural selection cannot\nbe anything else than purely destructive. There is, as Wilson points\nout, no aprioristic ground for supposing that natural selection could\ndo anything more than maintain the _status quo_, and as for factual\nproofs of its effectiveness in a positive sense, they are wholly\nwanting. Professor Caullery of the Sorbonne, in his Harvard lecture\nof Feb. 24, 1916, assures us that, \u201csince the time of Darwin, natural\nselection has remained a purely speculative idea and that no one has\nbeen able to show its efficacy in concrete indisputable examples.\u201d\n\nConsiderations of this sort induced not only Neo-Lamarckians, but\nmany non-partisans as well, to take the field against the Darwinian\nSelection Principle. Thus Spencer\u2019s caustic attack became a forerunner\nof others, and eminent biologists, like Fleischmann, Driesch, T. H.\nMorgan, and Bateson, have in turn poured the vials of their satire\nupon the attempts of Neo-Darwinians to rehabilitate the philosophy\nof natural selection. Wm. Bateson warns those, who persist in their\ncredulity with reference to the Darwinian account of organic teleology,\nthat they \u201cwill be wise henceforth to base this faith frankly on the\nimpregnable rock of superstition and to abstain from direct appeals\nto natural fact.\u201d This admonition forms the conclusion of a scathing\ncriticism of what he styles the \u201cfustian of Victorian philosophy.\u201d\n\u201cIn the face of what we know,\u201d it runs, \u201cof the distribution of\nvariability in nature, the scope claimed for natural selection must\nbe greatly reduced. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest is\nundeniable so long as it is applied to the organism as a whole, but to\nattempt by this principle to find value in all definiteness of parts\nand functions, and in the name of science to see fitness everywhere,\nis mere eighteenth century optimism. Yet it was in its application to\nthe parts, to the details of specific difference, to the spots on the\npeacock\u2019s tail, to the coloring of an orchid flower, and hosts of such\nexamples, that the potency of natural selection was urged with greatest\nemphasis. Shorn of these pretensions the doctrine of the survival of\nfavored races is a truism, helping scarcely at all to account for the\ndiversity of species. Tolerance plays almost as considerable a part.\nBy these admissions the last shred of that teleological fustian with\nwhich Victorian philosophy loved to clothe the theory of evolution is\ndestroyed.\u201d (_Heredity_, \u201cPresidential Address to Brit. Ass\u2019n. for\nAdvanc. of Science,\u201d Aug. 14, 1914.) Nor is this all. The Darwinian\nSelection Principle is reproached with having retarded the progress\nof science. It is justly accused of having discouraged profound and\npainstaking analysis by putting into currency its shallow and spurious\nsolution of biological problems. \u201cToo often in the past,\u201d says Edmund\nWilson, \u201cthe facile formulas of natural selection have been made use of\nto carry us lightly over the surface of unsuspected depths that would\nhave richly repaid serious exploration.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1915, p. 406.)\n\nIn retaliation for the destructive criticism of natural selection,\nthe Neo-Darwinians have proceeded to pulverize the Lamarckian tenet\nconcerning the inheritability of acquired adaptations. Weismann, having\nlaid down his classic distinction between the _soma_ (comprising the\nvegetative or tissue cells in contact with the environment) and the\n_germ_ (_i.e._ the sequestered reproductive cells or gametes, which are\nsheltered from environmental vicissitudes), showed that the Lamarckian\nassumption that a change in the somatic cells (which constitute the\norganism of the individual) is registered in the germ cells (which\nconstitute the vehicle of racial inheritance), is supported neither\nby _a priori_ probability nor by any facts of observation. Germ cells\ngive rise by division to somatic or tissue cells, but the converse is\nnot true; for, once a cell has become differentiated and specialized\ninto a tissue cell, it can never again give rise by division to germ\ncells, but only to other tissue cells of its own kind. Hence the\npossibility of a change in the tissue being transmitted to the germ\nhas no antecedent probability in its favor. Neither is it grounded on\nthe facts of observation. Bodily mutilations of the parent are not\ntransmitted to the offspring. The child of a blacksmith is not born\nwith a more developed right arm than that of a tailor\u2019s child. When\nthe ovaries from a white rabbit are grafted into a black rabbit, whose\nown ovaries have been previously removed, the latter, if mated to a\nwhite male, will produce spotlessly white young. Hence the offspring\ninherit the characters of the germ track of the white female, whence\nthe ovaries were derived, without being influenced in the least by the\npigmented somatic cells of the nurse-body (_i.e._ the black female),\ninto which the ovaries were grafted. Kammerer\u2019s experiments, in which\nyoung salamanders were found to exhibit at birth the coloration, which\ntheir parents had acquired through the action of sunlight, fail to\nconvince, because, in this case, the bodies of the parents are not\nsufficiently impervious to light to preclude its direct action upon\nthe gametes while in the reproductive organs of the parents. Hence we\ncannot be sure but that the coloration of the offspring derived from\nthese gametes is due to the direct agency of sunlight rather than to\nthe intermediate influence of the modified somatic cells upon the germ\nplasm.\n\nThe same objection holds true of the recent experiments, in which\nthe germ cells have been modified by modifying the interior medium\nor internal environment by means of antibodies and hormones. No\none doubts the possibility of influencing heredity by a direct\nmodification of the germ cells, especially when, as is always the\ncase in these experiments, the modification produced is destructive\nrather than constructive. The experiments, therefore, of Prof. M.\nF. Guyer of Wisconsin University, in which a germinally-transmitted\neye defect was produced by injecting pregnant female rabbits with\nan antilens serum derived from fowls immunized to the crystalline\nlens of rabbits as antigen, are beside the mark. To demonstrate\nthe Lamarckian thesis one must furnish evidence of a constructive\naddition to inheritance by means of prior somatic acquisition. The\ntransmission of defects artificially produced is not so much a process\nof inheritance (transmission of type) as rather one of degeneracy\n(failure to equate the parental type).[1] Commenting on Guyer\u2019s\nsuggestion that an organism capable of producing antibodies that are\ngerminally-destructive, may also be able to produce constructive\nbodies, Prof. Edwin S. Goodrich says: \u201cThe real weakness of the theory\nis that it does not escape from the fundamental objections we have\nalready put forward as fatal to Lamarckism. If an effect has been\nproduced, either the supposed constructive substance was present from\nthe first, as an ordinary internal environmental condition necessary\nfor the normal development of the character, or it must have been\nintroduced from without by the application of a new stimulus. The same\nobjection does not apply to the destructive effect. No one doubts that\nif a factor could be destroyed by a hot needle or picked out with a\nfine forceps the effect of the operation would persist throughout\nsubsequent generations.\u201d (_Science_, Dec. 2, 1921, p. 535.)\n\n    [1] A good definition of degeneracy is that of A. F. Tredgold,\n    who says: \u201cI venture to define degeneracy as \u2018a retrograde\n    condition of the individual resulting from a pathological\n    variation of the germ cell.\u2019\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1918,\n    p. 548.)\n\nBut in demonstrating against the Neo-Lamarckians that somatic\nmodifications unrepresented in the germ plasm could have no\nsignificance in the process of racial evolution, Weismann had _proved\ntoo much_. His argument was no less telling against Darwinism than\nit was against Lamarckism. Darwin\u2019s \u201cindividual differences\u201d or\n\u201cslight variations,\u201d now spoken of as fluctuations, were quite as\nunrepresented and unrecorded in the germ cells as Lamarck\u2019s \u201cacquired\nadaptations.\u201d There can be no \u201csummation of individual differences\u201d\nfor the simple reason that fluctuations have no germinal basis and\nare therefore uninheritable\u2014\u201cWe must bear in mind the fact,\u201d says\nProf. Edmund Wilson, \u201cthat Darwin often failed to distinguish between\nnon-inheritable fluctuations and hereditary mutations of small degree.\u201d\n(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 406.) Fluctuations, as we have\nseen, are due to variability in the environmental conditions, _e.g._\nin access to soil nutrients, etc. As an instance of fluctuational\nvariation the seeds of the ragweed may be cited. Normally these\nseeds have six spines, but around this average there is considerable\nfluctuation in individual seeds, some having as many as nine spines\nand others no more than one. Yet the plants reared from nine-spine\nseeds, even when similarly mated, show no greater tendency to produce\nnine-spine seeds than do plants reared from one-spine seeds.\n\nTo meet the difficulty presented by the non-inheritability of the\nLamarckian adaptation and the Darwinian fluctuation, De Vries\nsubstituted for them those rare and abruptly-appearing inheritable\nvariations, which he called mutations[2] and regarded as elementary\nsteps in the evolutionary process. This new version of transformism\nwas announced by De Vries in 1901, and more fully explained in his\n\u201cDie Mutations-Theorie\u201d (Leipzig, 1902-1903). Renner has shown that De\nVries\u2019 new forms of \u0152nothera were cases of complex hybridization rather\nthan real mutants, as the forms produced by mutation are now called.\nNevertheless, the work of Morgan, Bateson, and others leaves little\ndoubt as to the actual occurrence of _factorial_ mutants, while Dr.\nAlbert F. Blakeslee has demonstrated the existence of _chromosomal_\nmutants. When unqualified, the term mutant usually denotes the\nfactorial mutant, which arises from a change in one or more of the\nconcatenated genes (hereditary factors) of a single chromosome (nuclear\nthread) in the germinal (_i.e._ gametic) complex. All such changes\nare called factorial mutations. They are hereditarily transmissible,\nand affect the somatic characters of the race permanently, although,\nin rare cases, such as that of the bar-eyed Drosophila mutant, the\nphenomenon of _reversion_ has been observed. The chromosomal mutant,\non the contrary, is not due to changes in the single factors or genes,\nbut to duplication of one or more entire chromosomes (linkage-groups)\nin the gametic complex. Like the factorial mutant, it produces a\npermanent and heritable modification. The increase in nuclear material\ninvolved in chromosomal mutation (_i.e._ duplication) seems to cause a\nproportionate increase in the cytoplasmic mass of the single somatic\ncells, which manifests itself in the phenotype as giantism. De\nVries\u2019 _\u0152nothera gigas_ is a chromosomal mutant illustrative of this\nphenomenon. Besides the foregoing, there is the _pseudomutant_ produced\nby the factorial recombination, which results from a _crossover_,\n_i.e._ an exchange of genes or factors between two germinal chromosomes\nof the same synaptic pair. This reciprocal transfer of genes from one\nhomologous chromosome to another happens, in a certain percentage of\ncases, during synapsis. The percentage can be artificially increased by\nexposing young female hybrids to special conditions of temperature.\n\n    [2] The term mutation had been used long before and in a\n    similar sense by the German pal\u00e6ontologist Waagen, who employed\n    it to designate the variations of a specific type that succeed\n    one another in successive strata, a thing which rarely occurs.\n    (Cf. Waagen\u2019s _Die Formenreihe des Ammonites subradiatus_,\n    Geognost. pal\u00e4ont. Beitr., Berlin, 1869.)\n\nIf these new mutant forms could be regarded as genuine new species,\nthen the fact that such variations are heritable and come within the\nrange of actual observation, would constitute the long-sought empirical\nproof of the reality of evolution. Consciously or subconsciously,\nhowever, De Vries recognized that this was not the case; for he refers\nto mutants as \u201celementary species,\u201d and does not venture to present\nthem as authentic organic species.\n\nThe factorial mutant answers neither the endurance test nor the\nintersterility test of a genuine species. It would, doubtless, be\ngoing too far to regard all such mutant forms as examples of germinal\ndegeneracy, but it cannot be denied that all of them, when compared\nto the wild type, are in the direction of unfitness, none of them\nbeing viable and prosperous under the severe conditions obtaining in\nthe wild state. Bateson, who seems to regard all mutant characters as\nrecessive and due to germinal loss, declares: \u201cEven in Drosophila,\nwhere hundreds of genetically distinct factors have been identified,\nvery few new dominants, that is to say positive additions, have been\nseen, and I am assured that none of them are of a class which could be\nexpected to be viable under natural conditions. I understand even that\nnone are certainly viable in the homozygous state.\u201d (Toronto Address,\n_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, p. 59.) \u201cGarden or greenhouse products,\u201d\nsays D. S. Jordan, \u201care immensely interesting and instructive, but\nthey throw little light on the origin of species. To call them species\nis like calling dress-parade cadets \u2018soldiers.\u2019 I have heard this\ndefinition of a soldier, \u2018one that has stood.\u2019 It is easy to trick out\na group of boys to look like soldiers, but you can not define them as\nsuch until they have \u2018stood.\u2019\u201d (_Science_, Oct. 20, 1922.) In a word,\nfactorial mutants, owing, as they do, their survival exclusively to\nthe protection of artificial conditions, could never become the hardy\npioneers of new species.\n\nBateson insists that the mutational variation represents a change of\nloss. \u201cAlmost all that we have seen,\u201d he says, \u201care variations in\nwhich we recognize that elements have been lost.\u201d (_Science_, Jan.\n20, 1922, p. 59.) In his Address to the British Association (1914),\nhe cites numerous examples tending to show that mutant characters are\nbut diminutions or intensifications of characters pre-existent in the\nwild or normal stock, all of which are explicable as effects of the\nloss (total or partial) of either positive, or inhibitive (epistatic)\nhereditary factors (genes). One of these instances illustrating the\nsubtractive nature of the factorial mutation is that of the Primula\n\u201cCoral King,\u201d a salmon-colored mutant, which was suddenly given off\nby a red variety of Primula called \u201cCrimson King.\u201d Such a mutation\nis obviously based on the loss of a germinal factor for color. The\nloss, however, is sometimes partial rather than total, as instanced in\nthe case of the purple-edged Picotee sweet pea, which arose from the\nwholly purple wild variety by fractionation of the genetic factor for\npurple pigment. Even where the mutational variation appears to be one\nof gain, as happens when a positive character appears _de novo_ in the\nphenotype, or when a dilute parental character is intensified in the\noffspring, it is, nevertheless, interpretable as a result of germinal\nloss, the loss, namely, total or partial, of a genetic inhibitor. Such\ninhibitive genes or factors are known to exist. Bateson has shown,\nfor example, that the whiteness of White Leghorn chickens is due, not\nto the absence of color-factors, but to the presence of a genetic\ninhibitor\u2014\u201cThe white of White Leghorns,\u201d he says, \u201cis not, as white\nin nature often is, due to the loss of the color elements, but to the\naction of something which inhibits their expression.\u201d (Address to the\nBrit. Ass\u2019n., Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 368.) Thus the sudden\nappearance in the offspring of a character not visibly represented in\nthe parents may be due, not to germinal acquisition, but the loss of\nan inhibitory gene, whose elimination allows the somatic character\npreviously suppressed by it to appear. Hence Bateson concludes: \u201cIn\nspite of seeming perversity, therefore, we have to admit that there is\nno evolutionary change which in the present state of our knowledge we\ncan positively declare to be not due to loss.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 375.)\n\nAnother consideration, which disqualifies the factorial mutant for the\nr\u00f4le of a new species, is its failure to pass the test of interspecific\nsterility. When individuals from two distinct species are crossed,\nthe offspring of the cross is either completely sterile, as instanced\nin the mule, or at least partially so. But when, for example, the\nsepia-eyed mutant of the vinegar fly is back-crossed with the red-eyed\nwild type, whence it originally sprang, the product of the cross is\na red-eyed hybrid, which is perfectly fertile with other sepia-wild\nhybrids, with wild flies, and with sepia mutants. This proves that\nthe sepia-eyed mutant has departed, so to speak, only a varietal,\nand not a specific, distance away from the parent stock. Ordinary\nor factorial mutation does not, therefore, as De Vries imagined,\nproduce new species. These mutants do, indeed, meet the requirement of\npermanent transmissibility, for their distinctive characters cannot\nbe obliterated by any amount of crossing. Nevertheless, the factorial\nmutation falls short of being an empirical proof of evolution, because\nit is a varietal, and not a specific, change. In other words, factorial\nmutants are new varieties and not new species. Only a heritable change\nbased on germinal acquisition of sufficient magnitude to produce\ngametic incompatibility between the variant and the parent type would\nconstitute direct evidence of the transmutation of species, provided,\nof course, that the variant were also capable of survival under the\nnatural conditions of the wild state.\n\nIn his Toronto address of December 28, 1921, Wm. Bateson announced\nthe failure of De Vries\u2019 Mutation Theory, when he said: \u201cBut that\nparticular and essential bit of the theory of evolution, which is\nconcerned with the origin and nature of species remains utterly\nmysterious. We no longer feel as we used to do, that the process of\nvariation, now contemporaneously occurring, is the beginning of a work\nwhich needs merely the element of time for its completion; for even\ntime cannot complete that which has not yet begun. The conclusion in\nwhich we were brought up that species are a product of a summation of\nvariations ignored the chief attribute of species first pointed out by\nJohn Ray that the product of their crosses is frequently sterile in\ngreater or less degree. Huxley, very early in the debate, pointed out\nthis grave defect in the evidence, but before breeding researches had\nbeen made on a large scale no one felt the objection to be serious.\nExtended work might be trusted to supply the deficiency. It has not\ndone so, and the significance of the negative evidence can no longer be\ndenied....\n\n\u201cIf species have a common origin where did they pick up the ingredients\nwhich produce this sexual incompatibility? Almost certainly it is a\nvariation in which something has been added. We have come to see that\nvariations can very commonly\u2014I do not say always\u2014be distinguished as\npositive and negative.... Now we have no difficulty in finding evidence\nof variation by loss, but variations by addition are rarities, even\nif there are any such which must be so accounted. The variations to\nwhich interspecific sterility is due are obviously variations in which\nsomething is apparently added to the stock of ingredients. It is one of\nthe common experiences of the breeder that when a hybrid is partially\nsterile, and from it any fertile offspring can be obtained, the\nsterility, once lost, disappears. This has been the history of many,\nperhaps most, of our cultivated plants of hybrid origin.\n\n\u201cThe production of an indubitably sterile hybrid from completely\nfertile parents which has arisen under critical observation is the\nevent for which we wait. Until this event is witnessed, our knowledge\nof evolution is incomplete in a vital respect. From time to time such\nan observation is published, but none has yet survived criticism.\u201d\n(_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, pp. 58, 59.)\n\nBut what of the chromosomal mutant? For our knowledge of this type\nof mutation we are largely indebted to Blakeslee\u2019s researches and\nexperiments on the Jimson weed (_Datura stramonium_). According to\nBlakeslee, chromosomal mutants result from duplication, or from\nreduction, of the chromosomes, and they are classified as _balanced_ or\n_unbalanced_ types according as all, or only some, of the chromosomal\nlinkage-groups are similarly doubled or reduced. If only one of the\nhomologous chromosomes of a synaptic pair is doubled, the mutant\nis termed a _triploid_ form. It is balanced when one homologous\nchromosome is doubled in every synaptic pair, but if one or more\nchromosomes be added to, or subtracted from, this balanced triploid\ncomplex, the mutant is termed an unbalanced triploid. When all the\nchromosomes of the normal diploid complex are uniformly doubled, we\nhave a balanced _tetraploid_ race. The subtraction or addition of\none or more chromosomes in the case of a balanced tetraploid complex\nrenders it an unbalanced tetraploid mutant. The retention in somatic\ncells of the haploid number of chromosomes characteristic of gametes\nand gametophytes gives a balanced _haploid_ mutant, from which hitherto\nno unbalanced haploids have been obtained. The normal diploid type and\nthe balanced tetraploid type are said to constitute an _even_ balance,\nwhile balanced triploids and haploids constitute an _odd_ balance. The\nodd balances and all the unbalanced mutants are largely sterile. Thus,\nfor example, more than 80% of the pollen of the haploid mutant is bad.\n\u201cThe normal Jimson Weed,\u201d says Blakeslee, \u201cis diploid (2n) with a total\nof 24 chromosomes in somatic cells. In previous papers the finding of\ntetraploids (4n) with 48 chromosomes and triploids (3n) with 36 was\nreported, as well as unbalanced mutants with 25 chromosomes represented\nby the formula (2n + 1). The finding of two haploid or 1n plants, which\nwe are now able to report, adds a new chromosomal type to the balanced\nseries of mutants in _Datura_. This series now stands: 1n, 2n, 3n, 4n.\nSince a series of unbalanced mutants has been obtained from each of\nthe other balanced types by the addition or subtraction of one or more\nchromosomes, it is possible that a similar series of unbalanced mutants\nmay be obtainable from our new haploid plants, despite the great\nunbalance which would thereby result.\u201d (_Science_, June 16, 1923, p.\n646.) The haploid mutant, of which Blakeslee speaks, has, of course, 12\nunpaired chromosomes in its somatic cells.\n\nThe balanced triploid is, like the haploid mutant, largely sterile,\nand is only obtainable by crossing the tetraploid race with the normal\ndiploid plant. Since, then, the product of the cross of the diploid\nand tetraploid races is sterile, the tetraploid race fulfills the\nsterility test of a distinct species. Whether or not it fulfills\nthe endurance test of survival under natural condition is doubtful,\ninasmuch as diploid Daturas are about three times as prolific as the\ntetraploid race. Moreover, as Blakeslee himself confessed in a lecture\nat Woods Hole attended by the present writer in the summer of 1923, the\norigin of a balanced tetraploid form from the normal diploid type by\nsimultaneous duplication of all the chromosomes in the diploid complex,\nis an event that has yet to be witnessed. Nor is any gradual transition\nfrom the diploid to the tetraploid race, by way of unbalanced types\nand triploids, conceivable, seeing that such forms are too sterile\nto maintain themselves, and are, in fact, incapable of transmitting\ntheir own type in the absence of artificial intervention. There are,\nit is true, some instances, in which diploid and tetraploid races\nand species occur together in cultivation and in nature. In certain\ncases, this tetraploidy is merely apparent, being due to fragmentation\nof the chromosomes; in other cases, it is really due to chromosomal\nduplication, giving rise to genuine tetraploid forms. The question\nis often hard to decide, the mere number of the chromosomes being\nnot, in itself, a safe criterion. Of the actual origin, however, of\ntetraploid from diploid races we have as yet no observational evidence.\nHence Blakeslee\u2019s researches on the chromosomal mutant have so far\nfailed to furnish experimental proof of the origin of a genuine new\nspecies. Besides, waiving all other considerations, the limits within\nwhich chromosomal duplication is possible are of necessity so narrow,\nthat, at best, this phenomenon can only be invoked to explain a very\nsmall range of variation. In fact, it is doubtful whether haploidy,\ntriploidy, and tetraploidy have any important bearing whatever upon the\nproblem of the origin of species. (See Addenda.)\n\nThe mutation, then, in so far as we have experimental knowledge of it,\ndoes not fulfill requirements of a specific change. It cannot even be\nregarded as an _elementary step_ in the direction of such a change.\nWith this admission, De-Vriesianism becomes obsolete, descending like\nits predecessors, Lamarckism and Darwinism, into the charnel-house of\ndiscarded systems whose value is historic, but no longer scientific.\nWhen we enquire into the reason of this common demise of all the\nclassic systems of transformism, we find it to reside in the progress\nof the new science of Mendelian genetics, whose foundations were laid\nby an Augustinian monk of the nineteenth century. Six years after\nthe appearance of Darwin\u2019s \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d Gregor Johann Mendel\npublished a short paper entitled \u201cVersuche \u00fcber Pflanzen-hybriden,\u201d\nwhich, unnoticed at the time by a scientific world preoccupied with\nDarwinian fantasies, was destined, on its coming to light at the\nbeginning of the present century, to administer the final _coup de\ngrace_ to all the elaborate schemes of evolution that had preceded or\nfollowed its initial publication. It took half a century, however,\nbefore the dust of Darwinian sensationalism subsided sufficiently, to\npermit the \u201crediscovery\u201d of Mendel\u2019s solid and genuine contribution\nto biological science. But the Pr\u00e4lat of the abbey at Br\u00fcnn never\nlived to see the day of his triumph. The true genius of his century,\nhe died unhonored and unsung, a pretender being crowned in his stead.\nFor Coulter says of Darwin: \u201cHe died April 19, 1882, probably the most\nhonored scientific man in the world.\u201d (_Evolution_, 1916, p. 35.)\n\nWithin the small dimensions of the paper, of which we have spoken,\nMendel had compressed the results of years of carefully conceived and\naccurately executed experimentation reduced to precise statistical\nform and interpreted with a penetrating sagacity of the highest order.\nIt is no exaggeration to say that his discovery has revolutionized\nthe science of biology, giving it, for the first time, mathematical\nformulas comparable to those of chemistry. His two laws of inheritance,\nnamely, the law of segregation and the law of independent assortment\nof characters, have, as previously intimated, become the basis of the\nnew science of Genetics. His analysis of biparental reproduction has\ninterpreted for us the cytological phenomena of synapsis, meiosis, and\nsyngamy, has explained for us the instability of hybrids, has placed\nWeismann\u2019s speculations concerning the autonomy and continuity of the\ngerm plasm on a firm basis of experimental fact, has clarified all our\nnotions respecting the mode and range of hereditary transmission, and\nhas, in a word, opened our eyes to that new and hitherto unexplored\nrealm of nature which Bateson calls \u201cthe world of gametes.\u201d\n\nEfforts have been made to construct systems of transformism along\nMendelian lines, but none of them has met with notable success.\nLotsy, for example, sought to explain all variation on the basis of\nthe rearrangement of pre\u00ebxistent genetic factors brought about by\ncrossing. But such a solution of the problem is very unsatisfactory.\nIn the first place, the generality of hybrid (heterozygous) forms are\nruled out on the score of instability. The phenotype of hybrids is\ndirectly dependent, not on the genes themselves, but on the diploid\ncombination of genes contained in the zygote. This combination,\nhowever, is always dissolved in the process of gamete-formation, by the\nsegregative reduction division which occurs in the reproductive organs\nof the hybrid. Hybrids, therefore, do not _breed true_, if propagated\nby sexual reproduction. To maintain constancy of type in hybrids, one\nmust resort to somatogenic reproduction (_i.e._ vegetative growth from\nstems, etc.). Certain violets, in fact, as well as blackberries, are\nmaintained in a state of constant hybridism by means of this sort of\nreproduction, even in nature. In the case of _balanced lethals_ (_i.e._\nfactors causing death in the pure or homozygous state), the hybrid\nphenotype may be maintained even by sexual reproduction, inasmuch as\nall the pure (homozygous) offspring are non-viable. Two lethals are\nsaid to be balanced, when they occur, the first in one and the second\nin the other homologous chromosome of the same synaptic pair. \u201cSuch a\nfactorial situation would maintain a state of constant heterozygosis,\nthe fixed hybridism of an impure species ... the hybrid will breed true\nuntil the relative position of the lethals are changed by a crossover,\nor the genetical constitution in these respects is altered by a\nmutation.\u201d (Davis, _Science_, Feb. 3, 1922, p. 111.) As is evident,\nhowever, the condition of balanced lethals involves a considerable\nreduction in fertility.\n\nHybridization, moreover, is successful between varieties of the same\nspecies rather than between distinct species. Interspecific crosses\nare in some cases entirely unproductive, in other cases productive\nof wholly-sterile, hybrids, and in still other cases productive of\nsemisterile hybrids. When semisterile hybrids are obtainable from an\ninterspecific cross, the phenotype can be kept constant by somatogenic\nreproduction, but, as we shall see in a later chapter, this kind of\nreproduction does not counteract senescence, and stock thus propagated\nusually plays out within a determinate period. Finally, the mixture\nof incompatible germinal elements involved in an interspecific cross\ntends to produce forms, which are subnormal in their viability and\nvitality. The conclusions of Goodspeed and Clausen are the following:\n\u201c(1) As a consequence of modern Mendelian developments, the Mendelian\nfactors may be considered as making up a reaction system, the elements\nof which exhibit more or less specific relations to one another; (2)\nstrictly Mendelian results are to be expected only when the contrast is\nbetween factor differences within a common Mendelian reaction system\nas is ordinarily the case in varietal hybrids; (3) when distinct\nreaction systems are involved, as in species crosses, the phenomena\nmust be viewed in the light of a contrast between systems rather than\nbetween specific factor differences, and the results will depend upon\nthe degree of mutual compatibility displayed between the specific\nelements of the two systems.\u201d (_Amer. Nat._, 51 (1917), p. 99.) To\nthese conclusions may be added the pertinent observation of Bradley\nMoore Davis: \u201cOf particular import,\u201d he says, \u201cis the expectation\nthat lethals most frequently owe their presence to the heterozygous\ncondition since the mixing of diverse germ plasms seems likely to lead\nto the breaking down of delicate and vital adjustments in proportion\nrelative to the degree of protoplasmic confusion, and this means\nchemical and physical disturbance.\u201d (_Science_, Feb. 3, 1923, p. 111.)\n\nBut crossing produces, in the second filial generation (F\u2082), pure\n(homozygous) as well as hybrid (heterozygous) forms.\u2156 In some cases\nthese pure forms are new, the phenotype being different from that\nof either pure grandparent. Such a result is produced by _random\nassortment_ of the chromosomes in gamete and zygote formation, and\noccurs when the genes for two or more pairs of contrasted characters\nare located in different chromosome pairs. The phenomenon is formulated\nin Mendel\u2019s Second Law, the law of independent assortment. The novelty,\nhowever, of the true-breeding forms thus produced is not absolute,\nbut relative. There is no origination of new hereditary factors. It\nis simply a recombination of the old genes of different stocks, the\ngenes themselves undergoing no intrinsic alteration. The combination\nis new, but not the elements combined. In addition to chromosomal\nrecombination, we have factorial recombination by means of crossovers.\nThis, too, can produce new and true-breeding forms of a fixed nature,\nbut here, likewise, it is the combination, and not the elements\ncombined, which is new. The \u201cnew\u201d forms thus produced are called, as we\nhave seen, pseudomutants. When pseudomutations, that is, crossovers,\noccur in conjunction with the condition of balanced lethals, they\nclosely simulate genuine factorial mutations. This is exemplified in\nthe case of De Vries\u2019 _\u0152nothera Lamarckiana_, which is the product of\na crossover supervening upon a situation of balanced lethals. In cases\nof this kind, the crossover releases hitherto suppressed recessive\ncharacters, giving the appearance of real mutation. \u201cThe workers with\nDrosophila,\u201d says Davis, \u201cseem inclined to believe that much of the\nphenomena simulating mutation in their material is in reality the\nappearance of characters set free by the breaking of lethal adjustments\nwhich held the characters latent. Well-known workers have arrived at\nsimilar conclusions for _\u0152nothera_ material and are not content to\naccept as evidence of mutations the behavior of _Lamarckiana_ and some\nother forms when they throw their marked variants.\u201d (_Science_, Feb. 3,\n1922, p. 111.)\n\nThe new forms, however, resulting from random assortment and crossovers\ncannot be regarded as new species. \u201cAnalysis,\u201d says Bateson, \u201chas\nrevealed hosts of transferable characters. Their combinations suffice\nto supply in abundance series of types which might pass for new\nspecies, and certainly would be so classed if they were met with in\nnature. Yet critically tested, we find that they are not distinct\nspecies and we have no reason to suppose any accumulation of characters\nof the same order would culminate in the production of distinct\nspecies. Specific difference therefore must be regarded as probably\nattaching to the base upon which these transferables are implanted, of\nwhich we know absolutely nothing at all. Nothing that we have witnessed\nin the contemporary world can colorably be interpreted as providing the\nsort of evidence required.\u201d (_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, pp. 59, 60.)\n\nAnyone thoroughly acquainted with the results of genetical analysis and\nresearch will find it impossible to escape the conviction that there\nis no such thing as experimental evidence for evolution. In spite of\nthe enormous advances made in the fields of genetics and cytology,\nthe problem of the origin of species is, scientifically speaking,\nas mysterious as ever. No variation of which we have experience is\ninterpretable as the transmutation of a specific type, and David Starr\nJordan voices an inevitable conclusion when he says: \u201cNone of the\ncreated \u2018new species\u2019 of plant or animal I know of would last five\nyears in the open, nor is there the slightest evidence that any new\nspecies of field or forest or ocean ever originated from mutation,\ndiscontinuous variation, or hybridization.\u201d (_Science_, Oct. 20, 1922,\np. 448.)\n\n\u201cIn any case,\u201d as Professor Caullery tells us in his Harvard lecture\non the \u201cProblem of Evolution,\u201d \u201cwe do not see in the facts emerging\nfrom Mendelism, how evolution, in the sense that morphology suggests,\ncan have come about. And it comes to pass that some of the biologists\nof greatest authority in the study of Mendelian heredity are led, with\nregard to evolution, either to a more or less complete agnosticism,\nor to the expression of ideas quite opposed to those of the preceding\ngeneration; ideas which would almost take us back to creationism.\u201d\n(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 334.) It is, of course, impossible\nwithin the limits of a single chapter to convey any adequate impression\nof all that Mendel\u2019s epoch-making achievement portends, but what\nhas been said is sufficient to give some idea of the acuteness of\nthe crisis through which the theory of organic evolution is passing\nas a result of his discovery. In its classic forms of Lamarckism,\nDarwinism and De-Vriesianism, the survival of the theory is out of the\nquestion. Whether or not it can be rehabilitated in any form whatever\nis a matter open to doubt. Transfixed by the innumerable spears of\nmodern objections, its extremity calls to mind the plight of the Lion\nof Lucerne. Possibly, it is destined to find a rescuer in some great\ngenius of the future, but of one thing, at least, we may be perfectly\ncertain, namely, that, even if rejuvenated, it will never again resume\nthe lineaments traced by Charles Darwin. In the face of this certainty,\nit is almost pitiful to hear the die-hards of Darwinism bolstering up a\nlost cause with the wretched quibble that, though natural selection has\nbeen discredited as an explanation of the differentiation of species,\nDarwinism \u201cin its essentials\u201d survives intact. For, if there is any\nfeature which, beyond all else, deserves to be called an essential of\nDarwin\u2019s system, surely it is natural selection. For Darwin it was \u201cthe\nmost important\u201d agency of transformation (cf. \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d\n6th ed., p. 5). Apart from his hypothesis of the summation through\ninheritance of slight variations (\u201cfluctuations\u201d), now completely\ndemolished by the new science of genetics, it represented his sole\ncontribution to the philosophy of transformism. It alone distinguishes\nDarwinism from Lamarckism, its prototype. Without it the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies\u201d would be Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. With it\nDarwin\u2019s fame should stand or fall. Therefore, since Darwin erred in\nmaking it \u201cthe most important means of modification,\u201d Darwinism is\ndead, and no grief of mourners can resuscitate the corpse. \u201cThrough\nthe last fifty years,\u201d says Bateson, \u201cthis theme of the natural\nselection of favored races has been developed and expounded in writings\ninnumerable. Favored races certainly can replace others. The argument\nis sound, but we are doubtful of its value. For us that debate stands\nadjourned. We go to Darwin for his incomparable collection of facts.\nWe would fain emulate his scholarship, his width, and his power of\nexposition, but to us he speaks no more with philosophical authority.\nWe read his scheme of evolution as we would those of Lucretius or\nof Lamarck, delighting in their simplicity and their courage.\u201d\n(_Heredity_, Presid. Add. to British Assoc. for Advanc. of Science,\nSmith. Inst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 365.)\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER II\n\n             HOMOLOGY AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION\n\n\nThe recent revival of interest in the problem of evolution seems to\nhave called forth two very opposite expressions of opinion from those\nwho profess to represent Catholic thought on this subject. M. Henri\nde Dorlodot, in his \u201cLe Darwinisme,\u201d appears in the r\u00f4le of an ardent\nadmirer of Darwin and an enthusiastic advocate of the doctrine of\nTransformism. The contrary attitude is adopted by Mr. Alfred McCann,\nwhose \u201cGod\u2014or Gorilla\u201d is bitterly antagonistic not only to Darwinism\nbut to any form whatever of the theory of Transformism. Both of these\nworks possess merits which it would be unjust to overlook. Dorlodot\ndeserves credit for having shown conclusively that there is absolutely\nnothing in the Scriptures, or in Patristic tradition, or in Catholic\ntheology, or in the philosophy of the Schools, which conflicts with\nour acceptance of organic evolution as an hypothesis explanatory of\ncertain biological facts. In like manner, it must be acknowledged that,\neven after a liberal discount has been made in penalty of its bias and\nscientific inaccuracy, Mr. McCann\u2019s book still contains a formidable\nresidue of serious objections, which the friends of evolution will\nprobably find it more convenient to sidestep than to answer.\n\nUnfortunately, however, neither of these writers maintains that\nbalanced mental poise which one likes to see in the defenders of\nCatholic truth. Dorlodot seems too profoundly impressed with the\ndesirability of occupying a popular position to do impartial justice\nto the problem at issue, and his anxiety to keep in step with the\nmajority blinds him apparently to the flaws of that \u201cDarwinism\u201d\nwhich he praises. Had he been content with a simple demarcation of\nnegative limits, there would be no ground for complaint. But, when\nhe goes so far as to bestow unmerited praise upon the author of the\nmechanistic \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d and the materialistic \u201cDescent of\nMan\u201d; when, by confounding Darwinism with evolution, he consents\nto that historical injustice which allows Darwin to play Jacob to\nLamarck\u2019s Esau, and which leaves the original genius of Mendel in\nobscurity while it accords the limelight of fame to the unoriginal\nexpounder of a borrowed conception; when, by means of the sophistry of\nanachronism, he speciously endeavors to bring the speculations of an\nAugustine or an Aquinas into alignment with those of the ex-divinity\nstudent of Cambridge; when he assumes that Fixism is so evidently wrong\nthat its claims are unworthy of consideration, whereas Transformism\nis so evidently right that we can dispense with the formality of\nexamining its credentials; when, in a word, he expresses himself not\nmerely in the sense, but in the very stereotyped cant phrases of a\ndead philosophy, we realize, with regret, that his conclusions are\nbased, not on any reasoned analysis of the evidence, but solely upon\nthe dogmatism of scientific orthodoxy, that his thought is cast in\nantiquated molds, and that for him, apparently, the sixty-five years\nof discovery and disillusionment, which have intervened since the\npublication of the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d have passed in vain.\n\nBut, if Dorlodot represents the extreme of uncritical approval, Mr.\nMcCann represents the opposite, and no less reprehensible, extreme of\nbiased antagonism, that is neither fair in method nor conciliatory in\ntone. Instead of adhering to the time-honored practice of Catholic\ncontroversialists, which is rather to overstate than to understate the\nargument of an adversary, Mr. McCann tends, at times, to minimize, in\nhis restatement, the force of an opponent\u2019s reasoning. He frequently\nbelittles with mere flippant sneer, and is only too ready to question\nthe good faith of those who do not share his convictions. Thus, when\nMcCann ridicules Wells and accuses him of pure romancing, because the\nlatter speaks of certain hairy \u201cwild women\u201d of the Caves, he himself\nseems to be ignorant of the fact that a pal\u00e6olithic etching has been\nfound representing a woman so covered with hair that she had no need of\nother apparel (the bas-relief from Laugerie-Basse carved on reindeer\npalm\u2014cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, p. 540 and Plate 2).\n\nMr. McCann may object, with truth, that this is far from being a\nproof that the primitive representatives of the human race were hairy\nindividuals, but the fact suffices, at least, to acquit Mr. Wells of\nthe charge of unscrupulous invention. Hence, while we have no wish\nto excuse the lamentable lack of scientific conscientiousness so\nmanifestly apparent in the writings of popularizers of evolution, like\nWells, Osborn, and Haeckel, nevertheless common justice, not to speak\nof charity, constrains us to presume that, occasionally at least, their\ndepartures from the norm of objective fact were due to ordinary human\nfallibility or to the mental blindness induced by preconceptions,\nrather than to any deliberate intent to deceive. And we feel ourselves\nimpelled to make this allowance for unconscious inaccuracy all the\nmore readily that we are confronted with the necessity of extending\nthe selfsame indulgence to Mr. McCann himself. Thus we find that the\nseventh illustration in \u201cGod\u2014or Gorilla\u201d (opposite p. 56) bears the\nlegend: \u201cSkeletons of man and _chimpanzee_ compared,\u201d when, in point\nof fact, the ape skeleton in question is not that of a chimpanzee\n(_Troglodytes niger_) at all, but of an Orang-utan (_Simia satyrus_),\nas the reader may verify for himself by consulting Plate VI of the\nEnglish version of Wasmann\u2019s \u201cModern Biology,\u201d where the identical\nillustration appears above its proper title: \u201cSkeleton of an adult\nOrang-utan.\u201d Since the error is repeated in the index of illustrations\nand in the legend of the third illustration of the appendix, it is\nimpossible, in this instance, to shift the responsibility from Mr.\nMcCann to the printer. In any case, it is sincerely to be hoped that\nthis, and several other infelicitous errors will be rectified in the\nnext edition of \u201cGod\u2014or Gorilla.\u201d\n\nIn the next chapter we shall have occasion to refer again to Dorlodot\u2019s\nbook. For the present, however, his work need not concern us, while\nin that of Mr. McCann we single out but one point as germane to our\nsubject, namely, the latter\u2019s inadequate rebuttal of the evolutionary\nargument from homology. The futility of his method, which consists in\nmatching insignificant differences against preponderant resemblances,\nand in exclaiming with ironic incredulity: \u201cNote extraordinary\nresemblances!\u201d becomes painfully evident, so soon as proper\npresentation enables us to appreciate the true force of the argument he\nis striving to refute. _Functionally_ the foot of a Troglodyte ape may\nbe a \u201chand,\u201d but _structurally_ it is the homologue of the human foot,\nand not of the human hand; nor is this homology effectually disposed\nof by stressing the dissimilarity of the hallux, whilst one remains\ndiscreetly reticent concerning the similarity of the calcaneum. For\ntwo reasons, therefore, the irrelevance of Mr. McCann\u2019s reply is of\nspecial interest here: (1) because it illustrates concretely the danger\nof rendering a refutation inconsequential and inept by failing to plumb\nthe full depth of the difficulty one is seeking to solve; (2) because\nit shows that it is vain to attempt to remove man\u2019s body from the scope\nof this argument by citing the inconsiderable structural differences\nwhich distinguish him from the ape, so that, unless the argument from\nhomology proves upon closer scrutiny to be inherently _inconclusive_,\nits applicability to the human body is a foregone conclusion, and\nimplies with irresistible logic the common ancestry of men and apes.\n\nSuch are the reflections suggested by the meager measure of justice\nwhich Mr. McCann accords to the strongest zo\u00f6logical evidence in favor\nof evolution, and they contain in germ a feasible program for the\npresent chapter, which, accordingly, will address itself: first, to the\ntask of ascertaining the true significance of homology in the abstract\nas well as the full extent of its application in the concrete; second,\nto that of determining with critical precision its intrinsic value as\nan argument for the theory of transmutation.\n\n_Homology_ is a technical term used by the systematists of botany,\nzo\u00f6logy and comparative anatomy to signify basic structural similarity\nas distinguished from superficial functional similarity, the latter\nbeing termed _analogy_. Organisms are said to exemplify the phenomenon\nof homology when, beneath a certain amount of external diversity, they\npossess in common a group of correlated internal resemblances of such a\nnature that the organisms possessing them appear to be constructed upon\nthe same fundamental plan. In cases of this kind, the basic similarity\nis frequently masked by a veneer of unlikeness, and it is only below\nthis shallow surface of divergence that we find evidences of the\nidentical structure or common type.\n\nThus organs of different animals are said to be homologous when they\nare composed of like parts arranged in similar relation to one another.\nHomologous organs correspond bone for bone and tissue for tissue, so\nthat each component of the one finds its respective counterpart in\nthe other. The organs in question may be functionally specialized\nand externally differentiated for quite different purposes, but the\nsuperficial diversity serves only to emphasize, by contrast, the\nunderlying identity of structure which persists intact beneath it.\nThus, for example, the wing of a pigeon, the flipper of a whale, the\nforeleg of a cat, and the arm of a man are organs differing widely in\nfunction as well as outward appearance, but they are called homologous,\nnone the less, because they all exhibit the same basic plan, being\ncomposed of similar bones similarly disposed with respect to one\nanother.\n\nOrgans, on the other hand, are called analogous which, though\nfundamentally unlike in structure, are, nevertheless, superficially\nmodified and specialized for one and the same function. The wing of\na bird and the wing of an insect furnish a trite instance of such\nanalogy. Functionally they subserve the same purpose, but structurally\nthey bear no relation to each other. In like manner, though both are\ndevoted to the same function, there exists between the leg of a man and\nthe leg of a spider a fundamental disparity in structure.\n\nAt times, specialization for the selfsame function involves the\nemergence of a similar modification or uniform structural adaptation\nfrom a substrate of basic dissimilarity. In these instances of parallel\nmodifications appearing on the surface of divergent types, we have\nsomething more than mere functional resemblance. Structure is likewise\ninvolved, albeit superficially, in the modification which brings\nabout this external uniformity. In such cases, analogy is spoken of\nas _convergence_, a phenomenon of which the mole and the mole-cricket\nconstitute a typical example. The burrowing legs of the insect are,\nso far as outward appearance goes, the exact replica on a smaller\nscale of those of the mole, though, fundamentally, their structure is\nquite unlike, the mole being built on the endoskeletal plan of the\nvertebrates, whereas the mole-cricket is constructed on the exoskeletal\nplan characteristic of the arthropods. Speaking of the first pair of\nlegs of the mole-cricket, Thomas Hunt Morgan says: \u201cBy their use the\nmole-cricket makes a burrow near the surface of the ground, similar\nto, but of course much smaller than, that made by the mole. In both\nof these cases the adaptation is the more obvious, because, while the\nleg of the mole is formed on the same general plan as that of other\nvertebrates, and the leg of the mole-cricket has the same fundamental\nstructure as that of other insects, yet in both cases the details of\nstructure and the general proportions have been so altered that the\nleg is fitted for entirely different purposes from those to which the\nlegs of other vertebrates and other insects are put.\u201d (Quoted by Dwight\nin \u201cThoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,\u201d p. 235.) In the analogies of\nconvergence, therefore, we have the exact converse of the phenomenon so\noften encountered in connection with homology. The latter exhibits a\ncontrast between basic identity and superficial diversity, the former a\ncontrast between superficial convergence and fundamental divergence.\n\nNow the extreme importance of homology is manifest from the fact that\nthe taxonomists of zo\u00f6logy and botany have found it to be the most\nsatisfactory basis for a scientific classification of animals and\nplants. In both of these sciences, organisms are arranged in groups\naccording as they possess in common certain points of resemblance\nwhereby they may be referred to this, or that, general type. The\nresemblance is most complete between members of the same species, which\ndo not differ from one another by any major difference, though they may\nexhibit certain minor differences justifying their subdivision into\nvarieties or races. These morphological considerations, however, must,\nin the case of an organic species, be supplemented by the additional\nphysiological criteria of perfect sexual compatibility and normal\nviability, as we have already had occasion to note in the previous\nchapter. When organisms, though distinguished from one another by\nsome major difference, agree, notwithstanding, in the main elements\nof structure, the several species to which they belong are grouped\nunder a common genus, and similarly genera are grouped into families.\nA _relative_ major difference, such as a difference in the size of\nthe teeth, suffices for the segregation of a new species, while an\n_absolute_ difference, such as a difference in the number of teeth or\nthe possession of an additional organ, suffices for the segregation of\na new genus. In practice, however, the classifications of systematists\nare often very arbitrary, and we find the latter divided into two\nfactions, the \u201clumpers\u201d who wish to reduce the number of systematic\ngroups and the \u201csplitters\u201d who have a passion for breaking up larger\ngroups into smaller ones on the basis of tenuous differences. Above\nthe families are the orders, and they, in turn, are assembled in still\nlarger groups called classes, until finally we reach the phyla or\nbranches, which are the supreme categories into which the plant and\nanimal kingdoms are divided. As we ascend the scale of classification,\nthe points of resemblance between the organisms classified are\nconstantly decreasing in number, while the points of difference\nincrease apace. Hence, whereas members of the same species have very\nmuch in common, members of the same phylum have very little in common,\nand members of different phyla show such structural disparity that\nfurther correlation on the basis of similarities becomes impossible\n(in the sense, at least, of a reliable and consistent scheme of\nclassification), all efforts to relate the primary phyla to one another\nin a satisfactory manner having proved abortive.\n\nWithin the confines of each phylum, however, homology is the basic\nprinciple of classification. But the scientist is not content to note\nthe bare fact of its existence. He seeks an explanation, he wishes to\nknow the _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of homology. Innumerable threads of similarity\nrun through the woof of divergence, and the question arises: How can\nwe account for the co\u00ebxistence of this woof of diversity with a warp\nof similarity? Certainly, if called upon to explain the similarity\nexistent between members of one and the same species, even the man in\nthe street would resort instinctively to the principle of inheritance\nand the assumption of common ancestry, exclaiming: \u201cLike sire, like\nson!\u201d It is a notorious fact that children resemble their parents,\nand since members of the same species are sexually compatible and\nperfectly interfertile, there is no difficulty whatever in the way of\naccepting the presumption of descent from common ancestral stock as a\nsatisfactory solution of the problem of specific resemblance. Now, it\nis precisely this selfsame principle of heredity which the Transformist\ninvokes to account for generic, no less than for specific, similarity.\nIn fact, he presses it further still, and professes to see therein\nthe explanation of the resemblances observed between members of the\ndifferent families, orders, and classes, which systematists group\nunder a common phylum. This, of course, amounts to a bold extension of\nthe principle of inheritance far beyond the barriers of interspecific\nsterility to remote applications that exceed all possibility of\nexperimental verification. Transformists answer this difficulty,\nhowever, by contending that the period, during which the human race\nhas existed, has been, geologically speaking, all too brief, and\ncharacterized by environmental conditions much too uniform, to afford\nus a favorable opportunity for ascertaining the extreme limits to which\nthe genetic process may possibly extend; and, even apart from this\nconsideration, they say, racial development (phylogeny) may be, like\nembryological development (ontogeny) an irreversible process, in which\ncase no recurrence whatever of its past phenomena are to be expected in\nour times.\n\nBe that as it may, the evolutionist interprets the resemblances of\nhomology as surviving vestiges of an ancient ancestral type, which\nhave managed to persist in the descendants notwithstanding the\ntransformations wrought in the latter by the process of progressive\ndivergence. Moreover, just as the existence of a common ancestor is\ninferred from the _fact_ of resemblance, so the relative position\nin time of the common ancestor is inferred from the _degree_ of\nresemblance. The common ancestor of forms closely allied is assumed to\nhave been proximate, that of forms but distantly resembling each other\nis thought to have been remote. Thus the common ancestor of species\ngrouped under the same genus is supposed to have been less remote\nthan the common ancestor of all the genera grouped under one family.\nThe same reasoning is applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to the ancestry of\nfamilies, orders and classes.\n\nThe logic of such inferences may be questioned, but there is no\nblinking the fact that, in practice, the genetic explanation of\nhomology is assumed by scientists to be the only reasonable one\npossible. In fact, so strong is their confidence in the necessity of\nadmitting a solution of this kind, that they do not hesitate to make it\npart and parcel of the definition of homology itself. For instance, on\npage 130 of Woodruff\u2019s \u201cFoundations of Biology\u201d (1922), we are informed\nthat homology signifies \u201ca fundamental similarity of structure based on\ndescent from a common antecedent form.\u201d The Yale professor, however,\nhas been outdone in this respect by Professor Calkins of Columbia, who\ndiscards the anatomical definition altogether and substitutes, in lieu\nthereof, its evolutionary interpretation. \u201cWhen organs have the same\nancestry,\u201d he says, \u201cthat is, when they come from some common part of\nan ancestral type, they are said to be homologous.\u201d (\u201cBiology,\u201d p.\n165.) In short, F. A. Bather is using a consecrated formula culled from\nthe modern biological creed when he says: \u201cThe old form of diagnosis\nwas _per genus et differentiam_. The new form is _per proavum et\nmodificationem_.\u201d (_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 259.)\n\nA moment\u2019s reflection, however, will make it clear that, in thus\nconfounding the definition proper with its theoretical interpretation,\nthe modern biologist is guilty of a logical atrocity. Homology, after\nall, is a simple anatomical fact, which can be quite adequately\ndefined in terms of observation; nor is the definition improved in\nthe least by having its factual elements diluted with explanatory\ntheory. On the contrary, the definition is decidedly weakened by such\nredundancy. And as for those who insist on defining homology in terms\nof atavistic assumption instead of structural affinity, their procedure\nis tantamount to defining the clear by means of the obscure, an actual\neffect by means of a possible cause. Moreover, this attempt to load\nthe dice in favor of Transformism by tampering with the definition of\nhomology ends by defeating its own purpose. For, if homology is to\nserve as a legitimate argument for evolution, then obviously evolution\nmust not be included in its definition; otherwise, the conclusion is\nanticipated in the premise, the question is begged, and the argument\nitself rendered a vicious circle.\n\nHaving formed a sufficiently clear conception of homology as a\nstatic fact, we are now in a position to consider the problem of its\ncausality with reference to the solution proposed by evolutionists.\nTransmutation, they tell us, results from the interaction of a\ntwofold process, namely, the conservative and similifying process\ncalled _inheritance_, and progressive and diversifying process known\nas _variation_. Inheritance by transmitting the ancestral likeness\ntends to bring about uniformity. Variation by diverting old currents\ninto new channels adjust organisms to new situations and brings about\nmodification. Homology, therefore, is the effect of inheritance, while\nadaptedness or modification is the product of variation.\n\nAs here used, the term inheritance denotes something more than a mere\nrecurrence of parental characters in the offspring. It signifies a\nprocess of genuine transmission from generation to generation. Strictly\nspeaking, it is not the _characters_, such as coloration, shape, size,\nchemical composition, structural type, and functional specificity, that\nare \u201cinherited,\u201d but rather the hereditary _factors_ or chromosomal\n_genes_, which are actually transmitted, and of which the characters\nare but an external expression or manifestation. Hence, it is scarcely\naccurate to speak of \u201cinherited,\u201d as distinguished from \u201cacquired,\u201d\ncharacters. As a matter of fact, all somatic characters are joint\nproducts of the interaction of germinal and environmental factors.\nConsequently, the external character would be affected no less by a\nchange in the environmental factors than by a change in the germinal\nfactors. In a word, somatic characters are not the exclusive expression\nof the genetic factors, but are equally dependent upon environmental\ninfluence, and hence it is only to the extent that these characters\nare indicative of the specific constitution of the germ plasm that\nwe may speak of them as \u201cinherited,\u201d remembering that what is really\ntransmitted to the offspring is a complex of genes or germinal\nfactors, and not the characters themselves. The sense is, therefore,\nthat \u201cinherited\u201d characters are manifestative of what is contained\nin the germ plasm, whereas \u201cacquired\u201d characters have no specific\ngerminal basis, but are a resultant of the interaction between the\nsomatic cells and the environment. In modern terminology, as we have\nseen, the aggregate of germinal factors transmitted in the process of\nreproduction is called the genotype, while the aggregate of somatic\ncharacters which manifest these germinal factors externally is spoken\nof as the phenotype. Only the genotype is transmitted, the phenotype\nbeing the subsequent product of the interplay of genetic factors and\nenvironmental stimuli, dependent upon, and expressive of, both.\n\nVariation, therefore, may be based upon a change in the germ plasm,\nor in the environment, or in both. If it rests exclusively upon an\nextraordinary change in the environmental conditions, the resulting\nmodification is non-inheritable, and will disappear so soon as the\nexceptional environmental stimulus that evoked it is withdrawn. If,\non the contrary, it is based upon a germinal change, it will manifest\nitself, even under ordinary, i.e. unchanged or uniform environmental\ninfluence. In this case, the modification is inheritable in the sense\nthat it is the specific effect of a transmissible germinal factor,\nwhich has undergone alteration.\n\nAs we have seen in the foregoing chapter, there are three kinds of\ngerminal change which result in \u201cinheritable\u201d modifications. The\nfirst is called factorial mutation, and is initiated by an alteration\noccurring in one or more of the chromosomal genes. The second is called\nchromosomal mutation, and is caused by duplication (or reduction) of\nthe chromosomes. The third may be termed recombination, one type of\nwhich results from the crossover or exchange of genes between pairing\nchromosomes (\u201cpseudomutation\u201d), the other from random assortment in\naccordance with the Mendelian law of the independence of allelomorphic\npairs. This so-called \u201crandom assortment of the chromosomes\u201d is the\nresult of the shuffling and free deals of the chromosomal cards of\nheredity which take place twice in the life-cycle of organisms:\nviz. first, in the process of gametic reduction (meiosis); second,\nin the chance meeting of variously-constituted sperms and eggs in\nfertilization. A mischance of the first of these \u201cfree deals\u201d is\nbewailed in the following snatch from a parody belonging to the Woods\nHole anthology.\n\n    \u201cOh chromosomes, my chromosomes,\n        How sad is my condition!\n    My grandsire\u2019s gift for writing well\n    Has gone to some lost polar cell\n    And so I write this doggerel,\n        I cannot do much better.\u201d\n\nThese kinds of variation, however, in so far as they fall within the\nrange of actual observation, are confined within the limits of the\norganic species. Intra-specific variation, however, will not suffice.\nTo account for the adaptive modifications superimposed upon underlying\nstructural identity, Transformism is obliged to assume the possibility\nof trans-specific variation. Yet in none of the foregoing processes of\nvariation do we find a valid factual basis for this assumption.\n\nFactorial mutation, for instance, waiving its failure to produce\nnaturally-viable forms, or to meet the physiological sterility test\nof a new species, admits of interpretation as a change of loss due\nto the \u201cdropping out\u201d of a gene from the germinal complex. Bateson\u2019s\nconception of evolution as a process consisting in the gradual loss of\ninhibitive genes, whose elimination releases suppressed potentialities,\nseems rather incredible. Many will be inclined to see in Castle\u2019s\nfacetious epigram a _reductio ad absurdum_ of Bateson\u2019s suggestion;\nfor, according to the latter\u2019s view, as the Harvard professor remarks,\nwe should have to regard _man_ as _a simplified am\u0153ba_. Certainly,\nit seems nothing short of a contradiction to ascribe the progressive\ncomplication of the phenotype to a simplification of the genotype by\nloss.\n\nOn the other hand, not only is there no experimental evidence of a\ngerminal change by positive acquisition, that is, by the addition of\ngenes, but it is hard to conceive how such a change could come about.\n\u201cAt first,\u201d admits Bateson, \u201cit may seem rank absurdity to suppose\nthat the primordial form or forms of protoplasm could have contained\ncomplexity enough to produce the divers types of life.\u201d \u201cBut,\u201d he\nasks, \u201cis it easier to imagine that these powers could have been\nconveyed by extrinsic addition? Of what nature could these additions\nbe? Additions of material can not surely be in question. We are told\nthat salts of iron in the soil may turn a pink hydrangea blue. The\niron cannot be passed on to the next generation. How can iron multiply\nitself? The power to assimilate iron is all that can be transmitted. A\ndisease-producing organism like the pebrine of silkworms can in a very\nfew cases be passed on through the germ cells. But it does not become\npart of the invaded host, and we can not conceive it taking part in the\ngeometrically ordered processes of segregation. These illustrations\nmay seem too gross; but what refinement will meet the requirements of\nthe problem, that the thing introduced must be, as the living organism\nitself is, capable of multiplication and of subordinating itself in a\ndefinite system of segregation?\u201d (_Heredity_, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1915, p. 373.)\n\nNor can we agree with Prof. T. H. Morgan\u2019s contention that the\nforegoing difficulty of Bateson has been solved by the discovery of\nthe chromosomal mutation. All unbalanced chromosomal mutants are\nsubnormal in their viability and vitality, not to speak of their marked\nsterility. Haploidy represents a regressive, rather than a progressive,\nstep. The triploid mutant is sterile. The tetraploid race of Daturas\nis inferior in fertility to the normal diploid plant. The origin of\nbalanced tetraploidy from diploidy must be presumed, since it has never\nbeen observed. Moreover, tetraploidy represents only quantitative, and\nnot qualitative, progress. The increased mass of the nucleus produces\nan enlargement of the cytoplasm, the result of which is giantism. This\neffect, however, is not specific; for giant and normal races possessing\neach the same number of chromosomes are known to exist in nature. Hence\ngiantism may be due to other causes besides chromosomal duplication.\nThe only effect of this doubling is a reinforcement and intensification\nof the former effect of the genetic factors, their specificity\nremaining unchanged. Double doses are substituted for single doses of\nthe factors, but nothing really new is added. Morgan himself recognizes\nthat this mere repetition of identical genes is insufficient, and that\ntheir multiplication must be qualitative as well as numerical, to\nanswer the specifications of a progressive step in evolution. Hence he\nsuggests that the chromosomal mutation is subsequently supplemented by\nappropriate factorial mutation. Once this supposition is made, however,\nall the objections we have mentioned in connection with factorial\nmutation (_e.g._ the subnormality of its products, its intra-specific\nnature, etc.) return to plague the speculator, and, in addition to\nthese, he is confronted with the new difficulty of explaining how the\nredundance of duplicate genes can be removed and replaced by co\u00f6rdinate\ndifferentiation in their respective specificities. Now we have no\nfactual evidence whatever of such a solidaric redifferentiation of the\ngerminal factors, that would modify harmoniously the composition and\nr\u00f4le of each and every gene in the factorial complex. Nor is there\nany possibility whatever of accounting for this telic superregulation\nof the germinal regulators upon a purely mechanistic basis. How can\nthe ultimate chemical determinants of heredity be thus redetermined?\nConsequently, although there is gametic incompatibility between diploid\nraces and the tetraploid races, which are said to have arisen from\nthe former, we are not, nevertheless, warranted, by what has been\nexperimentally verified, in regarding tetraploid races as new species,\nor as progressive steps in the process of organic evolution.\n\nTo conclude, therefore, we have experimental verification of the\nefficacy of the similifying process said to have been at work in\nevolution, namely, inheritance. The same, however, cannot be said of\nthe correlative diversifying process of trans-specific variation, which\nis said to have superficially modified old structures into new species.\nThe latter process, accordingly, is but a pure postulate of science\nknown to us only through the effect hypothetically assigned to it,\nnamely, the adaptive modification.\n\nThe adaptation, however, of which there is question here is not to be\nconfounded with the \u201cacquired adaptation\u201d of Lamarckian fame; for,\nunlike the latter, it is an inheritable modification rooted in the germ\nplasm. Adaptations of this sort do, indeed, adjust the organism to\nits external environment, but they are innate and not acquired. Hence\nthey are often spoken of as _preadaptations_; for they precede, in a\nsense, the organism\u2019s contact with the environing element to which\nthey adjust it. They may possibly, it is true, have been acquired in\nthe distant past, but they have now a specific germinal foundation,\nand no one was ever privileged to witness their initial production _de\nnovo_. The whale, for example, though fundamentally a warm-blooded\nmammal, is superficially a fish, by reason of such a preadaptation\nto its marine environment. Preadaptation is of common occurrence,\nespecially among parasites, symbiotes, commensals, and inquilines.\nWasmann cites innumerable instances of beetles and flies so profoundly\nmodified, in accommodation to their mode of life as guests in termite\nnests, that the systematist hesitates to classify them under any of the\naccepted orders of insects. Here the adaptive modification so disturbs\nthe underlying homology as to make of these creatures taxonomical\nambiguities. In the case of _Termitomyia_, he tells us, \u201cthe whole\ndevelopment of the individual has been so modified that it resembles\nthat of a viviparous mammal rather than that of a fly.\u201d (\u201cThe Problem\nof Evolution,\u201d pp. 14, 15.)\n\nSuch modifications, however, amount to major, and not merely minor,\ndifferences. We are not dealing, therefore, with varietal distinctions\nhere, but with specific, generic, and even ordinal differences. With\nreference to the phenomenon of adaptive modification,[3] three things,\nconsequently, are worthy of note: (1) it has the semblance of being\nadventitious to the underlying structural uniformity; (2) it is of\nsuch magnitude that it cannot be ascribed to variation within the\nspecies; (3) it has been appropriated by the hereditary process, in the\nsense that it is now an \u201cinherited\u201d character based on the transmission\nof specific germinal factors.\n\n    [3] It may be remarked, in passing, that experimental genetics\n    and mutation furnish no clue to the origin of adaptive\n    characters. The Lamarckian idea alone gives promise in this\n    direction. Orthogenesis leaves unsolved the mystery of\n    preadaptation; yet only orthogenetic systems of evolution can\n    be constructed on the basis of genetical facts. \u201cMutations\n    and Mendelism,\u201d says Kellogg, \u201cmay explain the origin of new\n    species in some measure, but they do not explain adaptation in\n    the slightest degree.\u201d (_Atlantic Monthly_, April, 1924, pp.\n    488, 489.) We have seen in the previous chapter that they are\n    impotent to explain in _any_ measure the origin of new species.\n\nNow it is claimed that for the occurrence of this kind of modification\nin conjunction with homology only one rational explanation is\npossible, and that explanation is evolution. If this contention be a\nsound one, and Dorlodot, who claims certitude for the evolutionary\nsolution, insists that it is such, then, in the name of sheer\nlogical consistency, but one course lies open to us. We cannot stop\nat Wasmann\u2019s comma,[4] we must press on to the very end of the\nevolutionary sentence and sing with the choristers of Woods Hole:\n\n    [4] Rev. Erich Wasmann, S. J., accepts the evolutionary\n    inference from homology as regards _plants_ and _animals_. When\n    it comes to _man_, however, he attempts to draw the line, and\n    argues painstakingly against the assumption of a bestial origin\n    of the human body.\n\n    \u201cIt\u2019s a long way from Amphioxus,\n      It\u2019s a long way to us;\n    It\u2019s a long way from Amphioxus,\n      To the meanest human cuss.\n    Good-bye fins and gill slits;\n      Welcome skin and hair.\n    It\u2019s a long, long way from Amphioxus,\n      But we came from there.\u201d\n\nIn this predicament it will not do, as we shall see presently, to adopt\nMr. McCann\u2019s expedient of balancing anatomical differences against\nanatomical resemblances. To do so is to court certain and ignominious\ndefeat. We must, therefore, examine the argument dispassionately. If it\nbe solid, we must accept it and give it general application. If it be\nunsound, we must detect its flaws and expose them. Intellectual honesty\nallows us no alternative!\n\nMoreover, in weighing the argument from organic homology we must not\nlose sight of the two important considerations previously stressed:\n(1) that the inference of common ancestry in the case of homologous\nforms is based, not upon this or that particular likeness, but upon an\nentire group of co\u00f6rdinated resemblances; (2) that the resemblances\ninvolved are not exterior similarities, but deep-seated structural\nuniformities perfectly compatible with diversities of a superficial and\nfunctional character. \u201cNothing,\u201d says Dr. W. W. Keen, \u201ccould be more\nunlike externally than the flipper of a whale and the arm of a man.\nYet you find in the flipper the shoulderblade, humerus, radius, ulna,\nand a hand with the bones of four fingers masked in a mitten of skin.\u201d\n(_Science_, June 9, 1922, p. 605.)\n\nIn fact, the resemblances may, in certain instances, be so deeply\nsubmerged that they no longer appear in the adult organism at all and\nare only in evidence during a transitory phase of the embryological\nprocess. In such cases, the embryo or larva exhibits, at a particular\nstage, traces of a uniformity completely obliterated from the adult\nform. In short, though frequently presented as a distinct argument,\nembryological similarity, together with all else of value that can\nstill be salvaged from the wreck of the M\u00fcller-Haeckel Law of Embryonic\nRecapitulation, is, at bottom, identical with the general evolutionary\nargument from homology. In the latter argument we are directed to\nlook beneath the modified surface of the adult organism for surviving\nvestiges of the ancestral type. In the former, we are bidden to go\ndeeper still, to the extent, that is, of descending into the very\nembryological process itself, in order to discover lingering traces\nof the ancestral likeness, which, though now utterly deleted from the\ntransformed adult, are yet partially persistent in certain embryonic\nphases.\n\nIn sectioning a larval specimen of the fly-like termite-guest known\nas _Termitoxenia Heimi_, Father Wasmann came across a typical\nexemplification of this embryological atavism. In the adult insect, a\npair of oar-like appendages replace the wings characteristic of the\n_Diptera_ (flies). These appendages are organs of exudation, which\nelaborate a secretion whereof the termites are very fond, and thereby\nrender their possessors welcome guests in the nests of their hosts. The\nappendages, therefore, though now undoubtedly inherited characters,\nare the specific means by which these inquilines are adapted to their\npeculiar environment and mode of life among the termites. Moreover, the\norgans in question not only differ from wings functionally, but, in the\nadult, they bear no structural resemblance whatever to the wings of\nflies. Nevertheless, on examining his sections of the above-mentioned\nspecimen, Wasmann found a developmental stage of brief duration during\nwhich wing veins appeared in the posterior branches of the embryonic\nappendages. Now, assuming that Wasmann\u2019s technique was faultless,\nhis specimen normal, and his interpretation correct, it is rather\ndifficult to avoid his conclusion that we have here, in this transitory\nlarval phase, the last surviving vestige of ancestral wings now wholly\nobliterated from the adult type, that, consequently, this wingless\ntermite guest is genetically related to the winged _Diptera_, and that\nwe must see in the appendages aboriginal wings diverted from their\nprimitive function and respecialized for the quite different purpose of\nserving as organs of exudation, (cf. \u201cModern Biology,\u201d p. 385.) Indeed,\nphenomena of this kind seem to admit of no other explanation than the\natavistic one. It should be remembered, however, that Wasmann does not\nappear to have verified the observation in more than one specimen,\nand that a larger number of representative specimens would have to be\naccurately sectioned, strained, examined and interpreted, before any\nreliable conclusion could be drawn.[5]\n\n    [5] This transitory lymphatic, or tracheal venation appearing\n    in the appendages at the stenogastric stage may not have the\n    particular significance that Father Wasmann assigns. Such\n    venation, even if vestigial and aborted, need not necessarily\n    be a vestige of former _wing_ venation. To demonstrate the\n    validity of the atavistic interpretation, all other possible\n    interpretations would have to be definitively excluded.\n\nSuch, in its most general aspect, is the atavistic solution of the\nproblem presented by the homology of types. In it, similarity and\ndiversity are harmoniously reconciled, in the sense that they affect,\nrespectively, different structural, or different developmental, levels.\nIt is futile, therefore, to look for contradictions where they do not\nexist. In a word, the attempt to create opposition between a group of\nbasic and correlated uniformities, on the one hand, and some particular\nexternal difference, on the other, is not only abortive, but absolutely\nirrelevant as well. The reason is obvious. Only when likeness is\nassociated with unlikeness is it an argument for Transmutation.\nLikeness alone would demonstrate Immutability by indicating a process\nof pure inheritance as distinguished from the process of variation.\nHence evolutionists do not merely concede the co\u00ebxistence of diversity\nwith similarity, they gladly welcome this fact as vitally necessary to\ntheir contention.\n\nNow it is precisely this point which Mr. McCann, like many other\ncritics of evolution, fails utterly to apprehend. Consequently, his\nefforts to extricate the human foot from the toils of simian homology\nare entirely unavailing. To offset the force of the argument in\nquestion, it is by no means sufficient, as he apparently imagines, to\npoint to the fact that, unlike the hallux of the ape, the great toe in\nman is non-opposable (cf. \u201cGod\u2014or Gorilla,\u201d pp. 183, 184, and legends\nunder cuts opposite pp. 184 and 318). The evolutionist will reply\nat once that the non-opposability of man\u2019s great toe is correlated\nwith the specialization of the human foot for progression only, as\ndistinguished from prehension; while, in the ape, whose foot has\nretained both the progressive and the prehensile function, the hallux\nis naturally opposable in adaptation to the animal\u2019s arboreal habits.\nHe will then call attention to the undeniable fact that, despite these\nadaptational differences, the bones in the foot of a Troglodyte ape\nare, bone for bone, the counterparts of the bones in the human foot\nand not of those in the human hand. He will readily concede, that,\nso far as function and adaptedness go, this simian foot is a \u201chand,\u201d\nbut he will not fail to point out that it is, at the same time, a\n_heeled_ hand equipped with a calcaneum, a talus, a navicular, a\ncuboid, and all other structural elements requisite to ally it to\nthe human foot and distinguish it from the human hand. In fact, Mr.\nMcCann\u2019s own photographs of the gorilla skeleton show these features\nquite distinctly, though he himself, for some reason or other, fails\nto speak of them. It is to be feared, however, that his adversaries\nmay not take a charitable view of his reticence concerning the simian\nheel, but may be inclined to characterize his silence as \u201cdiscreet,\u201d\nall the more so, that he himself has uncomplimentarily credited them\nwith similar discretions in their treatment of unmanageable facts.\nIn short, Mr. McCann\u2019s case against homology resembles the Homeric\nhero, Achilles, in being vulnerable at the \u201cheel.\u201d At all events, the\nhomology itself is an undeniable fact, and it is vain to tilt against\nthis fact in the name of adaptational adjustments like \u201copposability\u201d\nand \u201cnon-opposability.\u201d Since, therefore, our author has failed to\nprove that this feature is too radical to be classed as an adaptive\nmodification, our only hope of exempting the human skeleton from the\napplication of the argument in question is to show that argument itself\nis inconsequential.\n\nMr. McCann\u2019s predicament resembles that of the unlucky disputant, who\nhaving allowed a questionable major to pass unchallenged, strives to\nretrieve his mistake by picking flaws in a flawless minor. As Dwight\nhas well said of the human body, \u201cit differs in degree only from that\nof apes and monkeys,\u201d and \u201cif we compare the individual bones with\nthose of apes we cannot fail to see the correspondence.\u201d (\u201cThoughts\nof a Catholic Anatomist,\u201d p. 149.) In short, there exists no valid\nanatomical consideration whatever to justify us in subtracting the\nhuman frame from the extension of the general conclusion deduced from\nhomology. Whosoever, therefore, sees in the homology of organic forms\nconclusive evidence of descent from a common ancestor, cannot, without\ngrave inconsistency, reject the doctrine of the bestial origin of man.\nHe may still, it is true, exclude the human mind or soul from the\nevolutionary account of origins, but, if homology is, in any sense, a\nsound argument for common descent, the evolutionary origin of the human\nbody is a foregone conclusion, and none of the anatomical \u201cdifferences\nin degree\u201d will avail to spare us the humiliation of sharing with the\nape a common family-tree. It remains for us, then, to re\u00ebxamine the\nargument critically for the purpose of determining as precisely as\npossible its adequacy as a genuine demonstration.\n\nTo begin with, it must be frankly acknowledged that here the theory\nof transformism is, to all appearances, upon very strong ground. Its\nfirst strategic advantage over the theory of immutability consists in\nthe fact that, unlike the latter, its attitude towards the problem is\npositive and not negative. When challenged to explain the structural\nuniformities observed in organic Nature, the theory of immutability is\nmute, because it knows of no second causes or natural agencies adequate\nto account for the facts. It can only account for homology by ascribing\nthe phenomenon exclusively to the unity of the First Cause, and, while\nthis may, of course, be the true and sole explanation, to assume it\nis tantamount to removing the problem altogether from the province of\nnatural science. Hence it is not to be wondered at that scientists\nprefer the theory of transformism, which by assigning intermediate\ncauses between the First Cause and the ultimate effects, vindicates\nthe problem of organic origins for natural science, in assuming the\nphenomena to be proximately explicable by means of natural agencies.\nAsked whether he believes that God created the now exclusively arboreal\nSloth (_Bradypus_) in a tree, the most uncompromising defender of\nfixism will hesitate to reply in the affirmative. Yet, in this case,\nwhat is nowadays, at least, an inherited preadaptation, dedicates the\nanimal irrevocably to tree-life, and makes its survival upon the ground\nimpossible.\n\nAnalogous preadaptations occur in conjunction with the phenomena of\nparasitism, symbiosis and commensalism, all of which offer instances\nof otherwise disparate and unrelated organisms that are inseparably\nbound together, in some apparently capricious and fortuitous respect,\nby a preadaptation of the one to the other. Parasites, guests, or\nsymbiotes, as the case may be, they are now indissolubly wedded to\nsome determinate species of host by reason of an appropriate and\ncongenital adjustment. For all that, however, the association seems\nto be a contingent one, and it appears incredible that the associates\nwere always united, as at present, by bonds of reciprocal advantage,\nmutual dependence, or one-sided exploitation. Yet the basis of the\nrelationship is in each case a now inherited adaptation, which, if it\ndoes not represent the primitive condition of the race, must at some\ntime have been acquired. For phenomena such as these, orthogenesis,\nwhich makes an organ the exclusive product of internal factors,\nconceiving it as a preformed mechanism that subsequently selects a\nsuitable function, has no satisfactory explanation. Lamarckism, which\nasserts the priority of function and makes the environment mold the\norgan, is equally inacceptable, in that it flouts experience and\nignores the now demonstrated existence of internal hereditary factors.\nBut, if between these two extremes some evolutionary _via media_ could\nbe found, one must confess that it would offer the only conceivable\n\u201cnatural explanation\u201d of preadaptation.[6] All this, of course, is pure\nspeculation, but it serves to show that here, at any rate, the theory\nof Transformism occupies a position from which it cannot easily be\ndislodged.\n\n    [6] Vernon Kellogg has expressed this same view in a recent\n    article, though he frankly admits that it is an as yet\n    unrealized desideratum. \u201cAltogether,\u201d he says, \u201cit must be\n    fairly confessed that evolutionists would welcome the discovery\n    of the actual possibility and the mechanism of transferring\n    into the heredity of organisms such adaptive changes as can\n    be acquired by individuals in their lifetime. It would give\n    them an explanation of evolution, especially of adaptation,\n    much more satisfactory than any other explanation at present\n    claiming the acceptance of biologists.\u201d (_Atlantic Monthly_,\n    April, 1924, p. 488.)\n\nBut, besides the advantage of being able to offer a \u201cnatural\nexplanation\u201d of the association of homology with adaptation,\nTransformism enjoys the additional advantage of being able to make\nthe imagination its partisan by means of a visual appeal. Such an\nappeal is always more potent than that of pure logic stripped of\nsensuous imagery. When it comes to vividness and persuasiveness, the\nsyllogism is no match for the object-lesson. Retinal impressions have\na hypnotic influence that is not readily exorcised by considerations\nof an abstract order\u2014\u201c_Segnius irritant demissa per aurem, Quam quae\nsunt oculis subjecta fidelibus_,\u201d says Horace, in the \u201cArs Poetica.\u201d\nPhilosophers may distinguish between the magnetic appeal of a graphic\npresentation and the logical cogency of the doctrine so presented,\nbut there is no denying that, in practice, imagination is often\nmistaken for reason and persuasion for conviction. Be that as it may,\nthe ordinary method of bringing home to the student the evolutionary\nsignificance of homology is certainly one that utilizes to the full all\nthe advantages of visual presentation. Given a class of impressionable\npremedics and coeds; given an instructor\u2019s table with skeletons of a\nman, a flamingo, an ape and a dog hierarchically arranged thereon;\ngiven an instructor sufficiently versed in comparative osteology to\ndirect attention to the points in which the skeletons concur: and there\ncan be no doubt whatever as to the psychological result. The student\nforms spontaneously the notion of a common vertebrate type, and the\ninstructor assures him that this \u201cgeneral type\u201d is not, as it would\nbe with respect to other subject matter, a mere universal idea with\nno formal existence outside the mind, but rather a venerable family\nlikeness, posed for originally by a single pair of ancestors (or\ncould it possibly have been, by one self-fertilizing hermaphrodite?)\nand recopied from generation to generation, with certain variations\non the original theme, by the hand of an artist called Heredity.\nThis explanation may be true, but logically consequential it is not.\nHowever, if the dialectic is poor, the pedagogy is beyond reproach,\nand the solution proposed has in its favor the fact that it accords\nwell with the student\u2019s limited experience. He is aware of the\ntruism that children resemble their parents. Why look for more\nrecondite explanations when one so obvious is at hand? The atavistic\ntheory gratifies his instinct for simplification, and, if he be of a\nmechanistic turn of mind, the alternative conception of creationism\nis quite intolerable. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that\nthe \u201cinference\u201d of common descent from the data of homology is not\na ratiocination at all, it is only a simple apprehension, a mere\nabstraction of similarity from similars\u2014\u201c_Unde quaecumque inveniuntur\nconvenire in aliqua intentione intellecta_,\u201d says Aquinas, \u201c_voluerunt\nquod convenirent in una re_.\u201d (_In lib. II sent._, _dist._ 17, _q.\nI_, _a._ 1) Philosophy tells us that the oneness of the universal is\nconceptual and not at all extramental or real, but the transformist\ninsists that the universal types of Zo\u00f6logy and Botany are endowed with\nreal as well as logical unity, that real unity being the unity of the\ncommon ancestor.\n\nCertainly, from the standpoint of practical effectiveness, the\nevolutionary argument leaves little to be desired. The presentation is\ngraphic and the solution simple. But for the critic, to whom logical\nsequence is of more moment than psychological appeal, this is not\nenough. To withstand the gnawing tooth of Time and the remorseless\nprobing of corrosive human reason, theories must rest on something\nsounder than a mirage of visual imagery!\n\n    Tell me where is fancy bred,\n    Or in the heart or in the head?\n    How begot, how nourished?\n        Reply, reply.\n    It is engendered in the eyes,\n    With gazing fed; and fancy dies\n    In the cradle where it lies.\n\nBut is it fair thus to characterize the \u201ccommon ancestors\u201d of\nTransformism as figments which, like all other abstractions, have no\nextramental existence apart from the concrete objects whence they\nwere conceived? To be sure, their claim to be real entities cannot be\nsubstantiated by direct observation or experiment, and so a factual\nproof is out of the question. Man, the late-comer, not having been\npresent at the birth of organic forms, can give no reliable testimony\nregarding their parentage. In like manner, no _a priori_ proof from the\nprocess of inheritance is available, because heredity, as revealed to\nus by the experimental science of Genetics, can account for specific\nresemblances only, and cannot be invoked, at present, as an empirically\ntested explanation for generic, ordinal, or phyletic resemblances. It\nhas still to be demonstrated experimentally that the hereditary process\nis transcendental to limits imposed by specific differentiation.\nThere remains, however, the _a posteriori_ argument, which interprets\nhomology and adaptation as univocal effects ascribable to no other\nagency than the dual process of inheritance and variation. What are we\nto think of this argument? Does it generate certainty in the mind, or\nmerely probability?\n\nA moment\u2019s reflection will bring to light the preliminary flaw of\nincomplete enumeration of possibilities. To suppose that inheritance\nalone can account for structural resemblance is an unwarranted\nassumption. Without a doubt, there are other similifying influences at\nwork in Nature besides inheritance. True, inheritance is one possible\nexplanation of the similarity of organisms, but it is not the _only_\none. Even among the chemical elements of inorganic nature we find\nanalogous uniformities or \u201cfamily traits,\u201d which, in the absence of\nany reproductive process whatever, we cannot possibly attribute to\ninheritance. Mendel\u00e9eff\u2019s discovery of the periodicity of the elements,\narranged in the order of their atomic weights, is well-known. At\neach interval of an octave, a succession of chemical types, similar\nto those of the preceding octave, recur. Hence elements appearing in\nthe same vertical column of the Periodic Table have many properties\nin common and exhibit what may be called a family resemblance. Now,\nwe have in the process of atomic disintegration, as observed in\nradioactive elements and interpreted by the electronic theory of atomic\nstructure, a reasonably satisfactory basis upon which to account for\nthe existence of these inorganic uniformities. Here analogous chemical\nconstitution, produced in accordance with a general law, results in\nuniformity that implies a similar, rather than an identical, cause. The\nhypothesis of parallelistic derivation from similar independent origins\naccounts quite as well for the observed uniformities as does the\nhypothesis of divergent derivation from a single common origin. Why,\nthen, should we lean so heavily on the already overtaxed principle of\ninheritance, when parallelism is as much a possibility in the organic\nworld as it is an actuality in the inorganic world?\n\nAs to the contrast here drawn between inheritance and other similifying\nfactors, it is hardly necessary to remark that we are speaking of\ninheritance as defined in terms of Mendelian experiment and cytological\nobservation. In the so-called chemical theory of inheritance, the\ndistinction would be meaningless and the contrast would not exist.\nEhrlich\u2019s disciple, Adami, sets aside all self-propagating germinal\ndeterminants, like the chromomeres, in favor of a hypothetical\n\u201cbiophoric molecule,\u201d which is to be conceived as a benzine-like\nring bristling with sidechains. Around this determining core the\nfuture organism is built up in definite specificity, as an arch is\nconstructed about a template. Adami has merely applied Paul Ehrlich\u2019s\nideas concerning metabolism and immunity to the question of heredity,\ncommandeering for this purpose the latter\u2019s entire toolkit of\nreceptors, haptophores, amboceptors, etc., as though this grotesque\nparaphernalia of crude and clumsy mechanical symbols (which look\nfor all the world like the wrenches of a machinist, or the lifters\nused by the cook to remove hot lids from the kitchen range) could\nthrow any valuable light whatsoever on the exceedingly complex, and\nmanifestly vital, phenomenon of inheritance. It does not even deserve\nto be called a chemical theory, for, as Starling correctly remarks\nconcerning Ehrlich\u2019s conception, \u201cthough chemical in form,\u201d it is not\nso in reality, because \u201cit does not explain the phenomenon by reference\nto the known laws of chemistry.\u201d (Cf. _Physiology_, ed. of 1920,\np. 1084.) In a word, the theory of heredity, which seeks to strip\ninheritance of its uniqueness as a vital process by identifying it with\nthe more general physicochemical processes occurring in the organism,\nis a groundless speculation, that, far from explaining, flouts the very\nobservational data which it pretends to elucidate. _Kurz und gut!_\nto requite the mechanist, Sch\u00e4fer, with his own Danielesque phrase,\nhere, as elsewhere, the mechanists have succeeded in extracting from\nthe facts, not what the facts themselves proclaim, but what pre\u00ebxisted\nin their own highly-cultured imaginations so well-stocked with cogs,\ncranks, ball bearings, and other \u00e6sthetic imagery emanating from\npolytechnic schools and factories.\n\nBut in arguing from the existence of parallelism in the inorganic\nworld to its possibility in the organic world, we are less liable\nto displease the mechanists than those other extremists, the\nneo-vitalists, who will be prone to deny all parity between living, and\ninanimate, matter. Fortunately, we are in a position to appease the\nscruples of the latter by referring to the facts of _convergence_ as\nuniversally accepted evidence that the phenomenon of parallelism occurs\nin animate, no less than inanimate, nature. Admitting, therefore, that\nthe laws of organic morphology are of a higher order than those which\nregulate atomic, molecular, and multimolecular structure, these facts\nattest, nevertheless, that parallelisms arise in organisms of separate\nancestry which are due, not to heredity, but to the uniform action\nof universal morphogenetic forces. Hence general laws can be invoked\nto account for organic uniformities with the same right that they\nare invoked to account for resemblances existing between the various\nmembers of a chemical \u201cfamily\u201d like the Halogens. And why should this\nnot be so? Organisms have much in common that transcends any possible\nscheme of evolution and that cannot be brought into alignment with the\nposition arbitrarily assigned them in the evolutionary family-tree.\nThey all originate as single cells. Their common means of growth and\nreproduction is mitotic cell division. This leads to the production\nof a _somatella_, among the protista, and of a _soma_ differentiated\nby histogenesis into two or three primary tissues, among the metista.\nAll these fundamental processes are strikingly uniform throughout\nthe entire plant and animal world. In these universal properties of\nliving matter, therefore, we have a common basis for general structural\nand organizational laws, which, though irreducible to the \u201ccommon\nancestors\u201d of Transformism, is quite adequate to account for both the\nhomologies and analogies of living matter. Accept this basis of general\nlaws regulating the development of living matter, and there is no\ndifficulty in seeing why the problems posed by exposure to analogous\nenvironmental conditions are solved in parallel fashion by organisms,\nirrespective of whether they are nearly, or distantly, related in the\nsense of morphology. Transformism, on the other hand, can only account\nfor homology at the expense of convergence, and for convergence at the\nexpense of homology. So far as a common ancestral basis is concerned,\nthe two kinds of resemblance are, from the very nature of the case,\nirreducible phenomena.\n\nIt is only, in fact, by surrendering the principle that similarity\nentails community of origin, and by falling back on the suggested\ncommon basis of general laws, that Transformism makes room in its\nsystem for the troublesome facts of convergence. \u201cIt might be\nreiterated in passing,\u201d says Dwight, \u201cthat this \u2018convergence\u2019 business\nis a very ticklish one. We have been taught almost word for word\nthat resemblance implies relationship, or almost predicates it; but\naccording to this doctrine it has nothing to do with it whatever.\u201d\n(\u201cThoughts of a Cath. Anat.,\u201d p. 190.) And in a subsequent chapter\nhe says: \u201cNo very deep knowledge of comparative anatomy is needed\nfor us to know that very similar adaptations for particular purposes\nare found in very diverse animals. The curious low grade mammal,\nthe _Ornithorhynchus_, with a hairy coat and the bill of a duck, is\na familiar instance. We all know that the whales have the general\nform of the fish, although they are mammals, and going more into\ndetails we know that the whale\u2019s flipper is on the same general plan\nas that of the ancient saurians.... The origin of the eye, according\nto evolutionary doctrines, has been a very difficult problem, which\ngets worse rather than better the more you do for it. Even if we could\npersuade ourselves that certain cells blundered along by the lucky\nmating of individuals in whom they were a bit better developed than in\nthe others till they came to form a most complicated organ of sight, it\nwould be a sufficient tax on our credulity to believe that this could\ncome off successfully in some extraordinary lucky species; but that it\nshould have turned out so well with all kinds of vertebrates is really\ntoo much to ask us to swallow. But this is not all: eyes are very\nwidely spread among different classes of invertebrates. More wonderful\nstill, the eyes of certain molluscs and crustacea are on stalks, and\nthis is found also in various and very different families of fishes.\nHow did this happen? Was it by way of descent from the molluscs or the\ncrustacea? If not, how could chance have brought about such a similar\nresult in diverse forms?\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 233-236.)\n\nIt may be objected that the resemblances of convergence are superficial\nanalogies, not to be confounded with fundamental homologies. This\ncontention may be disputed; for, as we shall see in the next chapter,\nthere are cases where the convergence is admittedly radical, and\nnot merely superficial. The distinction, moreover, between shallow\nand basic characters is somewhat arbitrary, and its validity is\noften questionable. When the skeletal homology that relates the\namphibia to the mammals, for instance, is traced to the root of the\nvertebrate family tree, we find it all but disappearing in a primitive\nAmphioxus-like chordate, whose so-called skeleton contains no trace of\nbone or cartilage. Hence, if we go back far enough, the homologies of\ntoday become the convergences of a geological yesterday, and we find\nthe vertebrate type of skeleton arising independently in reptiles,\nmammals, amphibia, and fishes.\n\nAgain, there are times when convergent analogies appear to be more\nrepresentative of the common racial heritage than the underlying\nstructure itself, tempting the evolutionist to fly in the face of\nthe orthodox interpretation, which rigidly rules out analogy in\nfavor of homology, and refuses to accept the eloquent testimony\nof a remarkable resemblance merely because of a slight technical\ndiscrepancy in the structural substrate. A large pinching claw, or\nchela, for example, occurs in two organisms belonging to the phylum\nof the arthropods, namely, the lobster and the African scorpion. Both\nchel\u00e6 are practically identical in structure, but, unfortunately, the\nchela of the lobster arises from a different appendage than that from\nwhich the scorpion\u2019s chela emerges. If they arose from corresponding\nappendages, they would be pronounced \u201chomologous organs\u201d and acclaimed,\nwithout hesitation, as strong evidence in favor of the common origin\nof all the arthropods. In proof of this, we call attention to the\nimportance attached to the adaptations affecting homologous bones in\nfossil \u201chorses.\u201d As it is, however, the two chel\u00e6 are analogous, and\nnot homologous, organs. Hence, technically speaking, the two chel\u00e6 are\nutterly unrelated structures. To the eye of common sense, however, the\nlikeness appears to be far more important than the difference, and the\naverage person will be inclined to view the resemblance as evidence of\na community of type. In fact, the tendency to discard superficial, and\nto retain only fundamental, uniformities, is dangerous to the theory of\nTransformism. When we confine our attention to what is really basic, we\nfind that the resemblances become so generalized and widespread that\nspecific conclusions as to descent become impossible, and we lose all\nsense of direction in a clueless labyrinth of innumerable, yet mutually\ncontradictory, possibilities.\n\nFinally, it may be noted in passing that, though it is customary\nwith evolutionists to regard homologous characters as the tenaciously\npersistent heritage of primeval days, and to look upon adaptational\ncharacters as adventitious and accessory to the aforesaid primitive\nheritage, the supposedly older and more fundamental characters fail to\ngive, by the manifestation of greater fixity, any empirical evidence\nwhatever of their being more deeply or firmly rooted in the hereditary\nprocess than the presumably newer adaptational characters. We have,\ntherefore, no experimental warrant for appropriating homologous,\nrather than adaptational, characters to the process of inheritance.\n\u201cIt is sometimes asserted,\u201d says Goodrich, \u201cthat old-established\ncharacters are inherited, and that newly begotten ones are not, or are\nless constant, in their reappearance. This statement will not bear\ncritical examination. For, on the one hand, it has been conclusively\nshown by experimental breeding that the newest characters may be\ninherited as constantly as the most ancient.... While, on the other\nhand, few characters in plants can be older than the green color\ndue to chlorophyll, yet it is sufficient to cut off the light from\na germinating seed for the greenness to fail to appear. Again, ever\nsince Devonian times vertebrates have inherited paired eyes; yet,\nas Professor Stockard has shown, if a little magnesium chloride is\nadded to the sea water in which the eggs of the fish _Fundulus_ are\ndeveloping, they will give rise to embryos with one median cyclopean\neye! Nor is the suggestion any happier that the, so to speak, more\ndeep-seated and fundamental characters are more constantly inherited\nthan the trivial or superficial. A glance at the organisms around\nus, or the slightest experimental trial, soon convinces us that the\napparently least important character may reappear as constantly as\nthe most fundamental. But while an organism may live without some\ntrivial character, it can rarely do so when a fundamental character is\nabsent, hence such incomplete individuals are seldom met in Nature.\u201d\n(_Science_, Dec. 2, 1921, p. 530.)\n\nBut, whether it be upon, or beneath, the surface, similitude of _any\nkind_ suffices to establish our contention that inheritance is not the\nonly similifying influence present in organisms, and that resemblance\nis perfectly compatible with independence of ancestry. We have,\ntherefore, an alternative for inheritance in the explanation of organic\nuniformities, and by the admission of this alternative, which, for the\nrest, is factually attested by the universally acknowledged phenomena\nof convergence, the inference of common descent from structural\nresemblance is shorn of the last remnant of its demonstrative force, as\nan _a posteriori_ argument.\n\nBut a still more serious objection to the evolutionary interpretation\nof homology and preadaptation arises from its intrinsic _incoherency_.\nEvolution, as previously stated, is assumed to be the resultant of\na twofold process, namely, _inheritance_ and _variation_. The first\nis a conservative and similifying process, which transmits. The\nsecond is a progressive and diversifying process, which diverts.\nTo the former process are due the uniformities of homology, to\nthe latter the deviations of adaptation. Upon the admission of\nevolutionists themselves, however, neither of these processes behaves\nin a manner consistent with its general nature, and both of them\nare flagrantly unfaithful to the principal r\u00f4les assigned to them.\nNowadays the hereditary process transmits _adaptational_, as well\nas _homologous_, characters. If, then, adaptational characters are\nmore recent than homologous characters, there must have been a time\nwhen inheritance ceased to _similify_ and become a _diversifying_\nprocess by transmitting what it did not receive from the previous\ngeneration. There were times when, not content with simply reiterating\nthe past, it began to divert former tendencies into novel channels.\nIn other words, inheritance becomes dualized into a paradoxical\nprocess, which both perpetuates the old and appropriates the new.\nThe same inconsistency is manifest in the process of variation,\nwhich capriciously produces _convergent_, no less than _divergent_,\nadaptations. In two fundamentally identical structures, like the wing\nof a bird and the foreleg of a cat, variation is said to have produced\ndiverse adaptations. In two fundamentally diverse structures, like\nthe head of an octopus and the head of a frog, variation is said to\nhave produced an identical adaptation, namely, the vertebrate type of\neye. It appears, therefore, that the essentially diversifying process\nof variation can become, on occasion, a simplifying process, which,\ninstead of solving environmental problems in an original manner,\nprefers to employ uniform and standardized solutions, and to cling to\nits old stereotyped methods. Inheritance similifies and diversifies,\nvariation converges and diverges. It is futile to attempt to reduce\neither of these protean processes to a condition that even approximates\nconsistency. The evolutionist blows hot and cold with the same breath.\nVerily, his god is Proteus, or the double-headed Janus!\n\n_Summa summarum_: The evolutionary argument from homology is defective\nin three important respects: (1) in its lack of experimental\nconfirmation; (2) in its incomplete enumeration of the disjunctive\npossibilities; (3) in its inability to construct a scheme of\ntransmutation that synthesizes inheritance and variation in a logically\ncoherent, and factually substantiated formula. The first two defects\nare not necessarily fatal to the argument as such. Though they destroy\nits pretensions to conclusiveness, they do not preclude the fulfilment\nof the moderate claim made in its behalf by Prof. T. H. Morgan, who\nsays: \u201cIn this sense (_i.e._, as previously stated) the argument from\ncomparative anatomy, while not a demonstration, carries with it, I\nthink, a high degree of probability.\u201d (\u201cA Critique of the Theory of\nEvolution,\u201d p. 14.) The third defect is more serious. The apparently\nirreducible antagonism which the evolutionary assumption introduces\nbetween inheritance and variation has been sensed even by the adherents\nof transformism themselves, and they have searched in vain for a\nformula, which, without sacrificing the facts, would bring into concord\nthe respective r\u00f4les of these discordant factors. \u201cIt follows,\u201d says\nOsborn, \u201cas an unprejudiced conclusion from our present evidence that\nupon Weismann\u2019s principle we can explain inheritance but not evolution,\nwhile with Lamarck\u2019s principle and Darwin\u2019s selection principle we\ncan explain evolution, but not, at present, inheritance. Disprove\nLamarck\u2019s principle and we must assume that there is some third factor\nin evolution of which we are ignorant.\u201d (_Popular Science Monthly_,\nJan., 1905.) The point is well taken, and unless, as Osborn suggests,\nthere is a _tertium quid_ by means of which the discord can be resolved\ninto ultimate harmony, we see no way of liberating the theory of\nTransmutation from this embarrassing dilemma.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER III\n\n                           FOSSIL PEDIGREES\n\n       \u201c_By dint of such great efforts we succeeded only in piecing\n       together genial romances more or less historical._\u201d\u2014B. Grassi,\n       Prof. of Comparative Anatomy, Univ. of Rome, \u201cLa vita\u201d (1906),\n       p. 227.\n\n\n                  \u00a7 1. =The Argument in the Abstract=\n\nThe pal\u00e6ontological argument for evolution is based upon the observed\ngradual approximation in type of the earlier forms of life, as\nrepresented by the fossils still preserved in successive geological\nstrata, to the later forms of life, as represented by the contemporary\nspecies constituting our present flora and fauna. Here the observed\ndistribution in time supplements and confirms the argument drawn from\nmere structural affinity. Here we are no longer dealing with the\nspatial gradation of contemporary forms, arranged on a basis of greater\nor lesser similarity (the gradation whence the zo\u00f6logist derives his\nargument for evolution), but with a temporal gradation, which is\nsimultaneously a morphological series and an historical record. The\nlower sedimentary rocks contain specimens of organic life very unlike\nmodern species, but, the higher we ascend in the geological strata,\nthe more closely do the fossil forms resemble our present organisms.\nIn fact, the closeness of resemblance is directly proportional to the\nproximity in time, and this seems to create a presumption that the\nlater forms of life are the modified descendants of the earlier forms.\nConsidered in the abstract, at least, such an argument is obviously\nmore formidable than the purely anatomical argument based on the\ndegrees of structural affinity observable in contemporary forms. It\nought, therefore, to be extremely persuasive, provided, of course,\nit proceeds in rigorous accord with indubitably established facts and\nrules out relentlessly the alloy of uncritical assumptions.\n\nHere, likewise, we find the theory of transformism asserting its\nsuperiority over the theory of immutability, on the ground that\nevolutionism can furnish a natural explanation for the gradational\ndistribution of fossil types in the geological strata, whereas the\ntheory of permanence resorts, it is said, to a supernaturalism\nof reiterated \u201cnew creations\u201d alternating with \u201ccatastrophic\nexterminations.\u201d Now, if this claim is valid, and it can be shown\nconclusively that fixism is inevitably committed to a postulate of\nsuperfluously numerous \u201ccreations,\u201d then the latter theory is shorn\nof all right to consideration by Occam\u2019s Razor: _Entia non sunt\nmultiplicanda sine ratione._ It is rather difficult to conceive of the\nCreator as continually blotting out, and rewriting, the history of\ncreation, as ruthlessly exterminating the organisms of one age, only\nto repopulate the earth subsequently with species differing but little\nfrom their extinct predecessors\u2014_ad quid perditio haec_? Such procedure\nhardly comports with the continuity, regularity and irrevisable\nperfection to be expected in the works of that Divine Wisdom, which\n\u201creacheth ... from end to end mightily and disposeth all things\nsweetly\u201d (_Wisdom_, viii; 1), which \u201cordereth all things in measure,\nand number and weight.\u201d (_Wis._ xi; 21.)\n\nFollowing the lead of other evolutionists, Wasmann has striven to\nsaddle fixism with the fatuity of periodic catastrophism and \u201ccreation\non the installment plan.\u201d But even Cuvier, who is credited with\nhaving originated the theory of catastrophism, did not go to the\nabsurd extreme of hypothecating reiterated creations, but sought\nto explain the repopulation of the earth after each catastrophe\nby means of migrations from distant regions unaffected by the\ncatastrophe. Historically, too, fixism has had its uniformitarian, as\nwell as its catastrophic, versions. In fact, Huxley classifies both\nuniformitarianism and catastrophism as fixistic systems, when he\nsays: \u201cI find three more or less contradictory systems of geologic\nthought ... standing side by side in Britain. I shall call one of them\nCatastrophism, another Uniformitarianism, the third Evolutionism.\u201d\n(\u201cLay Sermons,\u201d p. 229.) Obviously, then, fixism is separable from\nthe hypothesis of repeated catastrophes alternating with repeated\n\u201ccreations.\u201d Stated in proper terms, it is at one with evolutionism\nin rejecting as undemonstrated and improbable the postulate of\nreiterated cataclysms. It freely acknowledges that, in the absence\nof positive evidence of their occurrence, the presumption is against\nextraordinary events, like wholesale catastrophes. It sanctions\nthe uniformitarian tenet that ordinary cosmic processes are to be\npreferred to exceptional ones as a basis of geological explanation,\nand it repudiates as unscientific any recourse to the unusual or\nthe miraculous in accounting for natural phenomena. Its sole point\nof disagreement with evolutionism is its refusal to admit organic\nchanges of _specific_ magnitude. It does, however, admit germinal\nchanges of _varietal_ magnitude. It also recognizes that the external\ncharacters of the phenotype are the joint product of germinal factors\nand environmental stimuli, and admits, in consequence, the possibility\nof purely _somatic changes_ of considerable profundity being induced\nby widespread and persistent alterations in environmental conditions.\nLike Darwin, the uniformitarian fixist ascribes the origination of\norganic life to a single vivifying act on the part of the Creator, an\nact, however, that was _formative_ rather than _creative_, because the\nprimal forms of life, whether few or many, were all evolved through\nDivine influence from pre\u00ebxistent inorganic matter. Unlike Darwin, he\nascribes the continuation of organic life to generative processes that\nwere univocal (_generationes univocae_), and not gradually-equivocal\n(_generationes paulatim aequivocae_). In the next chapter, we shall see\nthat, in attributing the initial formation of species to a Divine act,\nneither Darwin nor the creationists exposed themselves to the charge of\nexplaining the \u201cnatural\u201d by means of the \u201cmiraculous.\u201d And, as for the\nprocess by which living forms were continued upon earth, the univocal\nreproductive process upheld by fixism is more manifestly a natural\nprocess than the gradually-equivocal generation of variable inheritance\nhypothecated by the theory of transmutation. The sole matter of dispute\nbetween the two views is whether the life-cycles of organisms are\ncircles or spirals.\n\nBut all this, it will be said, is purely negative. Merely to refrain\nfrom any recourse to the extraordinary or the supernatural is by no\nmeans sufficient. \u201cNatural explanations\u201d must be explanatory as well\nas natural. Unless there be a simplification, a reduction of plurality\nto unity, a resolution of many particular problems into a common\ngeneral problem, we have no explanation worthy of the name. Granting,\ntherefore, that uniformitarian fixism does not recur to the anomalous\nor the miraculous, it still lies open to the charge of failing in its\nfunction as an explanation, because it multiplies origins in both space\nand time. Transformism, on the contrary, is said to elucidate matters,\ninasmuch as it unifies origins spatially and temporally.\n\nThat transformism successfully plausibleizes a unification of origins\nin space, is true only in a limited and relative sense. The most\nthat can be said for the assumption, that resemblances rest on the\nprinciple of common inheritance, is that it permits of a numerical\nreduction of origins, but this numerical reduction will, by an\nintrinsic necessity, always fall short of absolute unification. The\nmonophyletic derivation of all organic forms from one primordial cell\nor protoblast is a fantastic dream, for which, from the very nature\nof things, natural science does not, and can not, furnish even the\nsemblance of an objective basis. The ground is cut from under our feet,\nthe moment we attempt to extend the principle of descent outside the\nlimits of an organic phylum. The sole basis of inference is a group\nof uniformities, and, unless these uniformities predominate over the\ndiversities, there can be no rational application of the principle of\ntransformism. Hence, the hypothesis, that organisms are consanguineous\nnotwithstanding their differences, loses all value as a solution\nat the point where resemblances are outweighed by diversities. The\ntransmutation assumed to have taken place must be never so complete as\nto have obliterated all recognizable vestiges of the common ancestral\ntype. \u201cWhenever,\u201d says Driesch, \u201cthe theory that, in spite of their\ndiversities, the organisms are related by blood, is to be really useful\nfor explanation, it must necessarily be assumed in every case that\nthe steps of change, which have led the specific form A to become the\nspecific form B, have been such as only to change in part that original\nform A. That is to say: the similarities between A and B must never be\novershadowed by their diversities.\u201d (\u201cScience and Philosophy of the\nOrganism,\u201d v. I, p. 254.) When, therefore, the reverse is true and\ndiversities are prevalent over uniformities, we are left without clue\nor compass in the midst of a labyrinth of innumerable possibilities.\nSuch are the limits imposed by the very nature of the evidence itself,\nand the scientists, who transgress these limits, by attempting to\ncorrelate the primary phyla, are on a par with those unconvincible\ngeniuses, who continually besiege the Patent Office with schemes ever\nnew and weird for realizing the chimera of \u201cperpetual motion.\u201d\n\nThus scientific transformism is unable to simplify the problem beyond a\ncertain irreducible plurality of forms, lesser only in degree than the\nplurality postulated by fixism. This being the case, the attempts of\nWasmann and Dorlodot to prune the works of Creation with Occam\u2019s Razor\nare not only presumptuous, but precarious as well. _Qui nimis probat,\nnihil probat!_ If it be unworthy of God to multiply organic origins\nin space, then monophyletic descent is the only possible alternative,\nand polyphyletic transformism falls under the same condemnation as\nfixism. Yet the polyphyletic theory of descent is that to which both\nWasmann and Dorlodot subscribe, as it is, likewise, the only kind of\ntransformism which science can ever hope to plausibleize. Besides, too\nclose a shave with Occam\u2019s Razor would eliminate creation altogether,\nsince all theologians cheerfully admit that it was the result of a free\nand unnecessary act on the part of God. When we apply our _rationes\nconvenientiae_ to the Divine operations, we must not make the mistake\nof applying them to the Divine action itself instead of the created\neffects of that action. We may be competent to discern disorder and\nirregularity in finite things, but we are wholly incompetent to\nprescribe rules for Divine conduct. To say that God is constrained\nby His infinite Wisdom to indirect, rather than direct, production,\nor that He must evolve a variety of forms out of living, rather than\nnon-living, matter, is to be guilty of ridiculous anthropomorphism.\nThere is no _a priori_ reason, founded upon the Divine attributes,\nwhich restricts God\u2019s creative action to the production of this, or\nthat, number of primordial organisms, or which obliges him to endow\nprimitive organisms with the power of transmutation.\n\nBut the fact that these _rationes convenientiae_ fail to establish\nthe _a priori_ necessity of a unification of organic origins in\nspace, does not imply that they are without value in suggesting the\nunification of organic origins in time. Order and regularity are not\nexcluded by spatial multiplicity, but they may easily be excluded by\nthe incongruities of an irregular succession of events. Indeterminism\nand chance are, indeed, inseparable from the course of Nature. There is\nin matter an unlimited potentiality, incommensurate with the limited\nefficacy of natural agencies. Hence it evades the absolute control of\nall finite factors and forces. But the anomalies and irregularities,\nwhich are contingent upon the limitation or frustration of second\ncauses unable to impose an iron necessity upon evasive matter, are\nnot referable to the First Cause, but rather to the finite efficacy\nof second causes. Such anomalies in natural processes, consequently,\nare not inconsistent with infinite wisdom and power on the part of\nthe Creator. If, on the contrary, the anomaly occurs, not in the form\nof an accidental frustration of a natural agency, but in the form\nof an intrusive \u201cnew creation,\u201d the irregularity in question would\nthen be referable to the Creator Himself, and such derogations of\norder are inadmissible, except as manifestations of the supernatural.\nIn fact, the abrupt and capricious insertion of a \u201cnew creation\u201d\ninto an order already constituted, say, for instance, the sudden\nintroduction of Angiosperms in the Comanchian period, or of mammals in\nthe Tertiary, would be out of harmony with both reason and revelation.\nUnless there is a positive reason for supposing the contrary, we must\npresume that, subsequent to the primordial constitution of things,\nthe Divine influence upon the world has been concurrent rather than\nrevolutionizing. Hence a theory of origins, compatible with the\nsimultaneous \u201ccreation\u201d of primal organisms, is decidedly preferable\nto a theory, which involves successive \u201ccreations\u201d at random. That\ntransformism dispenses with the need of assuming a succession of\n\u201ccreative\u201d acts, is perfectly obvious, and, unless fixism can emulate\nits rival system in this respect, it cannot expect to receive serious\nattention.\n\nBut once fixism assumes the simultaneousness of organic origins,\nit encounters, in the absence of modern organic types from ancient\ngeological strata, a new and formidable difficulty. Cuvier\u2019s theory\nof numerous catastrophes followed by wholesale migrations of the\nforms, which had escaped extinction, is tantamount to an appeal to the\nextraordinary and the improbable for purposes of explanation, and this,\nas we have seen, is an expedient, which natural science is justified\nin refusing to sanction. Nor does the appeal to the incompleteness of\nthe geological record offer a more satisfactory solution. It is tax\nenough, as we shall see, upon our credulity, when the transformist\nseeks to account thereby for the absence of intermediate types, but\nto account in this fashion for the absence of pal\u00e6ozoic Angiosperms\nand mammals is asking us to believe the all-but-incredible. It would\nnot, therefore, be advisable for the fixist to appropriate the line of\ndefense suggested for him by Bateson\u2014\u201cIt has been asked how do you\n_know_ for instance that there were no mammals in Pal\u00e6ozoic times? May\nthere not have been mammals somewhere on the earth though no vestige of\nthem has come down to us? We may feel confident there were no mammals\nthen, but are we sure? In very ancient rocks most of the great orders\nof animals are represented. The absence of the others might by no great\nstress of imagination be ascribed to accidental circumstances.\u201d But the\nsudden rise of the Angiosperms in the early part of the Mesozoic era is\nan instance of _de novo_ origin that is not so easily explained away.\nHence Bateson continues: \u201cHappily, however, there is one example of\nwhich we can be sure. There were no Angiosperms\u2014that is to say \u2018higher\nplants\u2019 with protected seeds\u2014in the carboniferous epoch. Of that age we\nhave abundant remains of a worldwide and rich flora. The Angiosperms\nare cosmopolitan. By their means of dispersal they must immediately\nhave become so. Their remains are very readily preserved. If they\nhad been in existence on the earth in carboniferous times they must\nhave been present with the carboniferous plants, and must have been\npreserved with them. Hence we may be sure that they did appear on earth\nsince those times. We are not certain, using certain in the strict\nsense, that Angiosperms are the lineal descendants of the carboniferous\nplants, but it is much easier to believe that they are than that they\nare not.\u201d (_Science_, Jan. 20, 1922, p. 58.)\n\nIt would thus appear, that not all the organic types of either the\nplant, or the animal, kingdom are of equal antiquity, and that the\nbelated rise of unprecedented forms has the status of an approximate\ncertainty, wherewith every theory of origins must inevitably reckon.\nHow, then, is the fixist to reconcile this successive appearance of\norganisms with the simultaneous \u201ccreation\u201d advocated by St. Augustine\nand St. Thomas of Aquin? Unless there be some other gradual process\nbesides transmutation, to bridge the interval between the creative\nfiat and the eventual appearance of modern types, there seems to be no\nescape from the dilemma.\n\nThis brings us to St. Augustine\u2019s theory of the evolution of organic\nlife from inorganic matter, which Dorlodot sophistically construes\nas supporting the theory of descent. According to St. Augustine, for\nwhose view the Angelic Doctor expressed a deliberate preference, the\ncreation of the corporeal world was the result of a single creative\nact, having an immediate effect in the case of minerals, and a remote\nor postponed effect in the case of plants and animals (cf. \u201cDe Genesi\nad litteram,\u201d lib. V, c. 5). Living beings, therefore, were created,\nnot in actuality, but in germ. God imparted to the elements the\npower of producing the various plants and animals in their proper\ntime and place. Hence living beings were created causally rather\nthan formally, by the establishment of causal mechanisms or natural\nagencies especially ordained to bring about the initial formation of\nthe ancestral forms of life. The Divine act initiating these \u201cnatural\nprocesses\u201d (_rationes seminales, rationes causales_) in inorganic, and\nnot in living, matter, was instantaneous, but the processes, which\nterminated in the formation of plants and animals, in their appointed\ntime and place, were in themselves gradual and successive. Thus by an\ninflux of Divine power the earth was made pregnant with the promise\nof every form of life\u2014\u201c_Sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse\nmundus est gravidus causis nascentium._\u201d (Augustine, lib. III, \u201cde\nTrinitate,\u201d c. 9.)\n\nBy reason of this doctrine, the Louvain professor claims that\nSt. Augustine was an evolutionist, and so, indeed, he was, if by\nevolution is meant a gradual production of organisms from inorganic\nmatter. But if, on the contrary, by evolution is meant a progressive\ndifferentiation and multiplication of organic species by transmutation\nof pre\u00ebxistent forms of life, or, in other words, if evolution is taken\nin its usual sense as synonym for transformism, then nothing could\nbe more absurdly anachronistic than to ascribe the doctrine to St.\nAugustine. The subject of the gradual process postulated by the latter\nwas, not living, but _inorganic_, matter, and the process was conceived\nas leading to the _formation_, and not the transformation, of species.\nThe idea of variable inheritance did not occur to St. Augustine, and he\nconceived organisms, once they were in existence, as being propagated\nexclusively by univocal reproduction (_generatio univoca_). It is the\nfixist, therefore, rather than the transformist, who is entitled to\nexploit the Augustinian hypothesis. In fact, it is only the vicious\nambiguity and unlimited elasticity of the term evolution, which avail\nto extenuate the astounding confusion of ideas and total lack of\nhistoric sense, that can bracket together under a common term the\nideology of Darwin and the view of St. Augustine.\n\n\n                   \u00a7 2. The Argument in the Concrete\n\nBut it is our task to criticize the theory of transformism, and not to\nthrow a life-line to fixism, by advocating gradual formation of species\nas the only feasible alternative to gradual transformation of species.\nPerhaps, this particular life-line will not be appreciated any way;\nfor the fixist may, not without reason, prefer to rest his case on the\ncontention that the intrinsic _time-value_ of geological formations is\nfar too problematic for certain conclusions of any sort. In maintaining\nthis position, he will have the support of some present-day geologists,\nand can point, as we shall see, to facts that seem to bear out his\ncontention. In fact, the cogency of the pal\u00e6ontological argument\nappears to be at its maximum in the abstract, and to evaporate the\nmoment we carry it into the concrete. The lute seems perfect, until we\nbegin to play thereon, and then we discover certain rifts that mar the\neffect. It is to these rifts that our attention must now be turned.\n\nThe first and most obvious flaw, in the evolutionary interpretation\nof fossil series, is the confounding of succession with filiation.\nThinkers, from time immemorial, have commented on the deep chasm\nof distinction, which divides historical from causal sequence, and\nphilosophers have never ceased to inveigh against the sophistical\nsnare of: _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc._ That one form of life has\nbeen subsequent in time to another form of life is, in itself, no\nproof of descent. \u201cLet us suppose,\u201d says Bather, \u201call written records\nto be swept away, and an attempt made to reconstruct English history\nfrom coins. We could set out our monarchs in true order, and we might\nsuspect that the throne was hereditary; but if on that assumption\nwe were to make James I, the son of Elizabeth\u2014well, but that\u2019s\njust what pal\u00e6ontologists are constantly doing. The famous diagram\nof the Evolution of the Horse which Huxley used in his American\nlectures has had to be corrected in the light of the fuller evidence\nrecently tabulated in a handsome volume by Prof. H. F. Osborn and\nhis coadjutors. _Pal\u00e6otherium_, which Huxley regarded as a direct\nancestor of the horse, is now held to be only a collateral, as the\nlast of the Tudors were collateral ancestors of the Stuarts. The later\n_Ancitherium_ must be eliminated from the true line as a side branch\u2014a\nYoung Pretender. Sometimes an apparent succession is due to immigration\nof a distant relative from some other region\u2014\u2018The glorious House of\nHanover and Protestant Succession.\u2019 It was, you will remember, by such\nmigrations that Cuvier explained the renewal of life when a previous\nfauna had become extinct. He admitted succession but not descent.\u201d\n(_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 261.)\n\nBut, if succession does not imply descent, descent, at least, implies\nsuccession, and the fact that succession is the necessary corollary of\ndescent, may be used as a corrective for the erroneous allocations made\nby neontologists on the basis of purely morphological considerations.\nThe _priority_ of a type is the _sine qua non_ condition of its\nbeing accepted as _ancestral_. It is always embarrassing when, as\nsometimes happens, a \u201cdescendant\u201d turns out to be older than, or even\nco\u00ebval with, his \u201cancestor.\u201d If, however, the historical position of\na form can be made to coincide with its anatomical pretensions to\nancestry, then the inference of descent attains to a degree of logical\nrespectability that is impossible in the case of purely zo\u00f6logical\nevidence. Recent years have witnessed a more drastic application of the\nhistorical test to morphological speculations, and the result has been\na wholesale revision of former notions concerning phylogeny. \u201cI could\neasily,\u201d says Bather, \u201coccupy the rest of this hour by discussing the\nprofound changes wrought by this conception on our classification. It\nis not that orders and classes hitherto unknown have been discovered,\nnot that some erroneous allocations have been corrected, but the whole\nbasis of our system is being shifted. So long as we were dealing with\na horizontal section across the tree of life\u2014that is to say, with\nan assemblage of approximately contemporaneous forms\u2014or even with a\nnumber of such horizontal sections, so long were we confined to simple\ndescription. Any attempt to frame a causal connection was bound to be\nspeculative.\u201d (_Ibidem_, p. 258.) Whether zo\u00f6logists will take kindly\nto this \u201cshifting of the whole basis\u201d of classification, remains to be\nseen. Personally, we think they would be very ill-advised to exchange\nthe solid observational basis of homology for the scanty facts and\nfanciful interpretations of pal\u00e6ontologists.\n\nThe second stumbling block in the path of Transformism is the\noccurrence of convergence. We have seen that, in the pal\u00e6ontological\nargument, descent is inferred conjointly from similarity and\nsuccession, and that, in the abstract, this argument is very\npersuasive. One of the concrete phenomena, however, that tend to make\nit inconsequential, is the undoubted occurrence of convergence. Prof.\nH. Woods of Cambridge, in the Introduction to the 5th edition of his\n\u201cPal\u00e6ontology\u201d (1919), speaks of three kinds of convergence (cf.,\npp. 14, 15, 16), which, as a matter of convenience, we may term the\nparallelistic, the radical, and the adaptational, types of convergence.\nA brief description of each type will serve to elucidate its nature and\nits significance:\n\n(1) Parallelistic convergence implies the appearance of parallel\nmodifications in the homologous parts of organisms regarded as\ndiverging from common stock in two distinct collateral lines, that\nwere independent at the time of the appearance in both of the said\nparallel modifications. Speaking of the fossil c\u0153lenterates known as\n_Graptolites_, Professor Woods says: \u201cIn some genera the hydrothec\u00e6\nof different species show great variety of form, those of one species\nbeing often much more like those of a species belonging to another\ngenus than to other species of the same genus.\u201d (\u201cPal\u00e6ontology,\u201d 5th\ned., 1919, p. 69.) As another instance of this phenomenon, the case\nof the fossil ungulates of South America, spoken of as _Litopterna_,\nmay be cited, and the case is peculiarly interesting because of its\nbearing on that _pi\u00e8ce de r\u00e9sistance_ of pal\u00e6ontological evidence,\nthe Pedigree of the Horse. \u201cThe second family of Litopterna,\u201d says\nWm. B. Scott, \u201cthe Proterotheriid\u00e6, were remarkable for their many\ndeceptive resemblances to horses. Even though those who contend that\nthe Litopterna should be included in the Perissodactyla should prove to\nbe in the right, there can be no doubt that the proterotheres were not\nclosely related to the horses, but formed a most striking illustration\nof the independent acquisition of similar characters through parallel\nor convergent development. The family was not represented in the\nPleistocene, having died out before that epoch, and the latest known\nmembers of it lived in the upper Pliocene.... Not that this remarkable\ncharacter was due to grotesque proportions; on the contrary, they\nlooked far more like the ordinary ungulates of the northern hemisphere\nthan did any of their South American contemporaries; it is precisely\nthis resemblance that is so notable.... The feet were three-toed,\nexcept in one genus (_Thoatherium_) in which they were single-toed, and\nnearly or quite the whole weight was carried upon the median digit, the\nlaterals being mere dew-claws. The shape of the hoofs and the whole\nappearance of the foot was surprisingly like those of the three-toed\nhorses, but there were certain structural differences of such great\nimportance, in my judgment, as to forbid the reference of these\nanimals, not merely to the horses, but even to the perissodactyls.\u201d (\u201cA\nHistory of Land Mammals in the Western Hemisphere,\u201d p. 499.)\n\nFor this sort of parallelism, the Lamarckian and Darwinian types of\nevolution by addition can offer no rational explanation. It could,\nperhaps, be accounted for upon the Batesonian hypothesis of evolution\nby loss of inhibition, that is to say, the coincident appearance of\nconvergent characters in collateral lines might be interpreted as\nbeing due to a parallel loss in both lines of the inhibitive genes,\nwhich had suppressed the convergent feature in the primitive or common\nstock. We say that the convergence _might_ be so interpreted, because\nthe interpretation in question would, at best, be merely optional\nand not at all necessary; for in the third, or adaptational, type of\nconvergence, we shall see instances of parallel modifications occurring\nin completely independent races, whose morphology and history alike\nexclude all possibility of hereditary connection between them. Hence,\neven in the present case, nothing constrains us to accept the genetic\ninterpretation.\n\n(2) Radical convergence, which Woods styles heterogenetic hom\u0153omorphy,\nis described by him as follows: \u201cSometimes two groups of individuals\nresemble each other so closely that they might be regarded as belonging\nto the same genus or even to _the same species_ (italics mine), but\nthey have descended from different ancestors since they are found to\ndiffer in development (ontogeny) or in their pal\u00e6ontological history;\nthis phenomenon, of forms belonging to different stocks approaching\none another in character, is known as convergence or heterogenetic\nhom\u0153omorphy, and may occur at the same geological period or at widely\nseparated intervals. Thus the form of oyster known as _Gryphaea_ has\noriginated independently from oysters of the ordinary type in the Lias,\nin the O\u00f6lites, and again in the Chalk; these forms found at different\nhorizons closely resemble one another and have usually been regarded as\nbelonging to one genus (_Gryphaea_), but they have no direct genetic\nconnection with one another.\u201d (\u201cPal\u00e6ontology,\u201d 5th ed., 1919, p. 15.)\nComment is almost superfluous. If even _specific_ resemblance is no\nproof of common origin, then what right have we to interpret any\nresemblance whatever in this sense? With such an admission, the whole\nbottom drops out of the evolutionary argument. When the theory of\ndescent is forced to account for heterogenetic resemblance at expense\nof all likelihood and consistency, when it cannot save itself except by\nblowing hot and cold with one breath, one is tempted to exclaim: \u201cOh,\nwhy bother with it!\u201d\n\n(3) Adaptational convergence is the occurrence of parallel\nmodifications due to analogous specialization in unrelated forms,\nwhose phylogeny has been obviously diverse. \u201cAlso, animals belonging\nto quite distinct groups,\u201d says Woods, \u201cmay, when living under similar\nconditions, come to resemble one another owing to the development of\nadaptive modifications, though they do not really approach one another\nin essential characters; thus analogous or parallel modifications may\noccur in independent groups\u2014such are the resemblances between flying\nreptiles (_Ornithosaurs_) and birds, and between sharks, icthyosaurs\nand dolphins.\u201d (_Op. cit._, p. 16.) As this type of convergence has\nbeen discussed in a previous article, with reference to the mole and\nmole-cricket, it need not detain us further.\n\nAll these types of convergence, but especially the second type, are\nfactual evidence of the compatibility of resemblance with independent\norigin, and the fact of their occurrence tends to undermine the\ncertainty of the phylogenetic inferences based on fossil evidence;\nall the more so, that, thanks to its bad state of preservation, and\nthe impossibility of dissection, even superficial resemblances may\ngive rise to false interpretations. And, as for the cases of radical\nconvergence, there is no denying that they strike at the very heart of\nthe theory of descent.\n\nThe third difficulty for Transformism arises from the discontinuity\nof the geological record. It was one of the very first discrepancies\nto be discovered between evolutionary expectation and the actual\nresults of research. The earliest explorations revealed a state of\naffairs, that subsequent investigations have failed to remedy: on\nthe one hand, namely, a notable absence of intermediate species to\nbridge the gaps between the fossil genera, and on the other hand,\nthe sudden and simultaneous appearance of numerous new and allied\ntypes unheralded by transitional forms. Since Darwin had stressed the\ngradualness of transmutation, the investigators expected to find the\ntransitional means more numerous than the terminal extremes, and were\nsurprised to find, in the real record of the past, the exact reverse\nof their anticipation. They found that the classes and families of\nanimals and plants had always been as widely separated and as sharply\ndifferentiated as they are today, and that they had always formed\ndistinct systems, unconnected by transitional links. The hypothetical\n\u201cgeneralized types,\u201d supposed to combine the features of two or three\nfamilies, have never been found, and most probably never will be;\nfor it is all but certain that they never existed. Occasionally, it\nis true, pal\u00e6ontologists have discovered isolated types, which they\ninterpreted as annectant forms, but a single pier does not make a\nbridge, and only too often it chanced that the so-called annectant\ntype, though satisfactory from the morphological standpoint, was more\nrecent than the two groups, to which it was supposed to be ancestral.\nBut it will make matters plainer, if we illustrate what is meant by the\ndiscontinuity or incompleteness of the fossil record, by reference to\nsome concrete series, such as the so-called Pedigree of the Horse.\n\nWhenever a series of fossils, arranged in the order of their historical\nsequence, exhibits a gradation of increasing resemblance to the latest\nform, with which the series terminates, such a series is called a\npal\u00e6ontological pedigree, and is said to represent so many stages in\nthe racial development or phylogeny of the respective modern type. The\nclassical example of this sort of \u201cpedigree\u201d is that of the Horse.\nIt is, perhaps, one of the most complete among fossil \u201cgenealogies,\u201d\nand yet, as has been frequently pointed out, it is, as it stands,\nextremely incomplete. Modern representatives of the _Equidae_, namely,\nthe horse, the ass and the zebra, belong to a common genus, and are\nseparated from one another by differences which are merely specific,\nbut the differences which separate the various forms, that compose\nthe \u201cpedigree of the Horse,\u201d are generic. We have, to borrow Gerard\u2019s\nsimile, nothing more than the piers of the evolutionary bridge, without\nthe arches, and we do not know whether there ever were any arches.\nThere is, indeed, a sort of progression, _e.g._, from the four-toed\nto a one-toed type, so that the morphological gradation does, in some\ndegree, coincide with temporal succession. But, on the other hand, the\nfossil forms, interpreted as stages in the phylogeny of the Horse, are\nseparated from one another by gaps so enormous, that, in the absence\nof intermediate species to bridge the intervals, it is practically\nimpossible, particularly in the light of our experimental knowledge\nof Genetics, to conceive of any transition between them. Nor is this\nall. The difficulty is increased tenfold, when we attempt to relate the\n_Equidae_ to other mammalian groups. Fossil ungulates appear suddenly\nand contemporaneously in the Tertiary of North America, South America\nand Europe, without any transitional precursors, to connect them with\nthe hypothetical proto-mammalian stock, and to substantiate their\ncollaterality with other mammalian stocks.\n\nTo all such difficulties the evolutionist replies by alleging the\nincompleteness of the geological record, and modern handbooks\non pal\u00e6ontology devote many pages to the task of explaining why\nincompleteness of the fossil record is just what we should expect,\nespecially in the case of terrestrial animals. The reasons which\nthey assign are convincing, but this particular mode of solving the\ndifficulty is a rather precarious one. Evolutionists should not\nforget that, in sacrificing the substantial completeness of the\nrecord to account for the absence of intermediate species, they are\nsimultaneously destroying its value as a proof of the relative position\nof organic types in time. Yet this, as we have seen, is precisely the\nfeature of greatest strategic value in the pal\u00e6ontological \u201cevidence\u201d\nfor evolution. We must have absolute _certainty_ that the reputed\n\u201cancestor\u201d was in existence prior to the appearance of the alleged\n\u201cdescendant,\u201d or the peculiar force of the pal\u00e6ontological argument\nis lost. It would be preposterous for the progeny to be prior to,\nor even co\u00ebval with, the progenitor, and so we must be quite sure\nthat what we call \u201cposterity\u201d is really posterior in time. Now the\nsole argument that pal\u00e6ontology can adduce for the posteriority of\none organic type as compared with another is the negative evidence\nof its non-occurrence, or rather of its non-discovery, in an earlier\ngeological formation. The lower strata do not, so far as is known,\ncontain the type in question, and so it is concluded that this\nparticular form had no earlier history. Such an inference, as is\nclear, is not only liable to be upset by later discoveries, but has\nthe additional disadvantage of implicitly assuming the substantial\ncompleteness of the fossil record, whereas the absence of intermediate\nspecies is only explicable by means of the assumed incompleteness of\nthe selfsame record. The evolutionist is thus placed in the dilemma\nof choosing between a substantially complete, and a substantially\nincomplete, record. Which of the alternatives, he elects, matters very\nlittle; but he must abide by the consequences of his decision, he\ncannot eat his cake and have it.\n\nWhen the evolutionist appeals to the facts of pal\u00e6ontology, it goes\nwithout saying that he does so in the hope of showing that the\ndifferences, which divide modern species of plants and animals,\ndiminish as we go backward in time, until the stage of identity is\nreached in the unity of a common ancestral type. Hence from the very\nnature of the argument, which he is engaged in constructing, he is\ncompelled to resort to intermediate types as evidence of the continuity\nof allied species with the hypothetical ancestor, or common type,\nwhence they are said to have diverged. Now, even supposing that his\nefforts in this direction were attended with a complete measure of\nsuccess, evidence of this kind would not of itself, as we shall see,\nsuffice to demonstrate the common origin of the extremes, between\nwhich a perfect series of intergradent types can be shown to mediate.\nUnquestionably, however, unless such a series of intergradent fossil\nspecies can be adduced as evidence of the assumed transition, the\npresumption is totally against the hypothesis of transformism.\n\nNow, as a matter of fact, the geological record rarely offers any\nevidence of the existence in the past of intermediate species. For\nthose, who have implicit confidence in the _time-value_ of geological\n\u201cformations,\u201d there are indications of a general advance from lower to\nhigher forms, but, even so, there is little to show that this seeming\nprogress is to be interpreted as an increasing divergence from common\nancestral types. With but few exceptions, the fossil record fails to\nshow any trace of transitional links. Yet pedigrees made up of diverse\ngenera are poor evidence for filiation or genetic continuity, so long\nas no intermediate species can be found to bridge the chasm of generic\ndifference. By intermediate species, we do not mean the fabulous\n\u201cgeneralized type.\u201d Annectants of this kind are mere abstractions,\nwhich have never existed, and never could have existed. We refer rather\nto actual fossil types separated from one another by differences not\ngreater than specific; for \u201cnot until we have linked species into\nlineages,\u201d can fossil pedigrees lay claim to serious attention.\n\nBut let us suppose the case for evolution to be ideally favorable, and\nassume that in every instance we possessed a perfect gradation of forms\nbetween two extremes, such, for example, as occurs in the Ammonite\nseries, even then we would be far from having a true demonstration of\nthe point at issue. Bateson has called our attention to the danger of\nconfounding sterile and instable _hybrids_ with intergradent species.\n\u201cExamine,\u201d he says, \u201cany two thoroughly distinct species which meet\neach other in their distribution, as for instance, _Lychnis diurna_\nand _vespertina_ do. In areas of overlap are many intermediate forms.\nThese used to be taken to be transitional steps, and the specific\ndistinctness of _vespertina_ and _diurna_ was on that account\nquestioned. Once it is known that these supposed intergrades are merely\nmongrels between the two species the transition from one to the other\nis practically beyond our powers of imagination to conceive. If both\nthese can survive, why has their common parent perished? Why, when\nthey cross, do they not reconstruct it instead of producing partially\nsterile hybrids? I take this example to show how entirely the facts\nwere formerly misrepresented.\u201d (_Heredity_, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1915, p. 369.)\n\nSimilarly, T. H. Morgan has shown, with reference to _mutants_,\nthe fallacy of inferring common descent from the phenomenon of\nintergradence, and what holds true for a series of intergradent mutants\nwould presumably also hold true of a series of intergradent species,\ncould such a series be found and critically distinguished from hybrid\nand mutational intermediates. In short, the Darwinian deduction of\ncommon origin from the existence of intergradence must now be regarded\nas a thoroughly discredited argument. \u201cBecause we can often arrange\nthe series of structures in a line extending from the very simple\nto the more complex, we are apt to become unduly impressed by this\nfact and conclude that if we found the complete series we should find\nall the intermediate steps and that they have arisen in the order\nof their complexity. This conclusion is not necessarily correct.\u201d\n(\u201cA Critique of the Theory of Evolution,\u201d p. 9.) Having cited such\na series of gradational mutations ranging between the long-winged,\nand completely wingless condition, in the case of the Vinegar Fly\n(_Drosophila melanogaster_), as well as two similar graded series based\non pigmentation and eye color, he concludes: \u201cThese types, with the\nfluctuations that occur within each type, furnish a complete series of\ngradations; yet historically they have arisen independently of each\nother. Many changes in eye color have appeared. As many as thirty or\nmore races differing in eye color are now maintained in our cultures.\nSome of them are so similar that they can scarcely be separated from\neach other. It is easily possible beginning with the darkest eye color,\nsepia, which is a deep brown, to pick out a perfectly graded series\nending with pure white eyes. But such a serial arrangement would give\na totally false idea of the way the different types have arisen; and\nany conclusion based on the existence of such a series might very well\nbe entirely erroneous, for the fact that such a series exists bears\nno relation to the order in which its members have appeared.\u201d (_Op.\ncit._, pp. 12, 13.) Such facts must give us pause in attaching undue\nimportance to phenomena like the occurrence of a gradual complication\nof sutures in the Chalk Ammonites, particularly as parallel series\nof perfectly similar sutures occurs \u201cby convergence\u201d in the fossil\nCeratites, which have no genetic connection with the Ammonites. (Cf.\nWoods\u2019 \u201cPal\u00e6ontology,\u201d 5th ed., p. 16.)\n\nBut, if even mutational and specific intergradents are not sufficient\nevidence of common ancestry, what shall we say of a discontinuous\nseries, whose links are separate genera, orders, or even classes,\ninstead of species. Even the most enthusiastic transformist is forced\nto admit the justice of our insistence that the gaps which separate the\nmembers of a series must be reduced from differences of the generic,\nto differences of the specific, order, before that series can command\nany respect as hypothetical \u201cgenealogy.\u201d \u201cYou will have observed,\u201d says\nF. A. Bather, \u201cthat the precise methods of the modern pal\u00e6ontologist,\non which this proof is based, are very different from the slap-dash\nconclusions of forty years ago. The discovery of _Arch\u00e6opteryx_, for\ninstance, was thought to prove the evolution of birds from reptiles.\nNo doubt it rendered that conclusion extremely probable, especially\nif the major promise\u2014that evolution was the method\u2014were assumed. But\nthe fact of evolution is precisely what men were then trying to prove.\nThese jumpings from class to class or from era to era, by aid of a few\nisolated stepping-stones, were what Bacon calls anticipations \u201chasty\nand premature but very effective, because as they are collected from a\nfew instances, and mostly from those which are of familiar occurrence,\nthey immediately dazzle the intellect and fill the imagination.\u201d (_Nov.\nOrg._, I, 28.) No secure step was taken until the modern pal\u00e6ontologist\nbegan to affiliate mutation with mutation and species with species,\nworking his way back, literally inch by inch, through a single small\ngroup of strata. Only thus could he base on the laboriously collected\nfacts a single true interpretation; and to those who preferred the\nbroad path of generality his interpretations seemed, as Bacon says\nthey always \u201cmust seem, harsh and discordant\u2014almost like mysteries of\nfaith.\u201d ... Thus by degrees we reject the old slippery stepping-stones\nthat so often toppled us into the stream, and, foot by foot, we build\na secure bridge over the waters of ignorance.\u201d (_Science_, Sept. 17,\n1920, pp. 263, 264.)\n\nWe cannot share Bather\u2019s confidence in the security of a bridge\ncomposed of even linked species. Let such a series be never so perfect,\nlet the gradation be never so minute, as it might conceivably be\nmade, when not merely distinct species, but also hybrids, mutants\nand fluctuants are available as stopgaps, the bare fact of such\nintergradation tells nothing whatever concerning the problem of\ngenetical origin and specific relationship. The species-by-species\nmethod does, however, represent the very minimum of requirement imposed\nupon the pal\u00e6ontologist, who professes to construct a fossil pedigree.\nBut, when all is said and done, such a method, even at its best,\nfalls considerably short of the mark. However perfectly intergradent\na series of fossils may be, the fact remains that these petrified\nremnants of former life cannot be subjected to breeding tests, and\nthat, in the consequent absence of genetical experimentation, we have\nno means of determining the real bearing of these facts upon the\nproblem of interspecific relationship. Only the _somatic_ characters\nof extinct floras and faunas have been conserved in the rock record of\nthe past, and even these are often rendered dubious, as we shall see\npresently, by their imperfect state of preservation. Now, it is solely\nin conjunction with breeding experiments, that somatic characters can\ngive us any insight into the nature of the _germinal constitution_\nof an organism, which, after all, is the cardinal consideration upon\nwhich the whole question of interspecific relationship hinges. All\ninferences, therefore, regarding the descent of fossil forms are\nirremediably speculative and conjectural. When we are dealing with\nliving forms, we can always check up the inferences based on somatic\ncharacteristics by means of genetical experiments, and in so doing\nwe have found that it is as unsafe to judge of an organism from the\nexclusive standpoint of its external characters as it is to judge of\na book by the cover; for, apart from the check of breeding tests, it\nis impossible to say just which somatic characters are genetically\nsignificant, and which are not. Forms externally alike may be so\nunlike in germinal constitution as to be sexually incompatible; forms\nexternally unlike may be readily crossed without any discernible\ndiminution of fertility. \u201cWho could have foreseen,\u201d exclaims Bateson,\n\u201cthat the apple and the pear\u2014so like each other that their botanical\ndifferences are evasive\u2014could not be crossed together, though\nspecies of _Antirrhinum_ (Snapdragon) so totally unlike each other\nas _majus_ and _molle_ can be hybridized, as Baur has shown, without\na sign of impaired fertility?\u201d (_Heredity_, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1915, p. 370.) We cannot distinguish between alleged specific, and\nmerely mutational (varietal), change, nor between hybridizations and\nfactorial, chromosomal, or pseudo-, mutations, solely on the basis\nof such external characters as are preserved for us in fossils. It\nis impossible, therefore, to demonstrate trans-specific variation by\nany evidence that Pal\u00e6ontology can supply. The pal\u00e6ontologist (_pace_\nOsborn) is utterly incompetent to pass judgment on the problem of\ninterspecific relationship. As Bateson remarks: \u201cIn discussing the\nphysiological problem of interspecific relationship evidence of a more\nstringent character is now required; and a naturalist acquainted with\ngenetical discoveries would be as reluctant to draw conclusions as to\nthe specific relationship of a series of fossils as a chemist would be\nto pronounce on the nature of a series of unknown compounds from an\ninspection of them in a row of bottles.\u201d (_Science_, April 17, 1922,\np. 373.) \u201cWhen the modern student of variation and heredity,\u201d says T.\nH. Morgan, \u201clooks over the different \u2018continuous\u2019 series, from which\ncertain \u2018laws\u2019 and \u2018principles\u2019 have been deduced, he is struck by two\nfacts: that the gaps, in some cases, are enormous as compared with the\nsingle changes with which he is familiar, and (what is more important)\nthat they involve numerous parts in many ways. The geneticist says to\nthe pal\u00e6ontologist, since you do not know, and from the nature of your\ncase can never know, whether your differences are due to one change or\nto a thousand, you cannot with certainty tell us anything about the\nhereditary units which have made the process of evolution possible.\u201d\n(_Op. cit._, pp. 26, 27.) And without accurate knowledge on this\nsubject, we may add, there is no possibility of demonstrating specific\nchange or genetic relationship in the case of any given fossil.\n\nIn our discussion of the third defect in the fossil \u201cevidence,\u201d\nallusion was made to a fourth, namely, its imperfect state of\npreservation. The stone record of bygone days has been so defaced by\nthe metamorphism of rocks, by the solvent action of percolating waters,\nby erosion, weathering and other factors of destruction, that, like a\nfaded manuscript, it becomes, even apart from its actual _lacunae_,\nexceedingly difficult to decipher. So unsatisfactory, indeed, is the\ncondition of the partially obliterated facts that human curiosity,\npiqued at their baffling ambiguity, calls upon human imagination\nto supply what observation itself fails to reveal. Nor does the\ninvitation remain unheeded. Romance hastens to the rescue of uncertain\nScience, with an impressive display of \u201creconstructed fossils,\u201d and\nthe hesitation of critical caution is superseded by the dogmatism of\narbitrary assumption. Scattered fragments of fossilized bones are\nintegrated into skeletons and clothed by the magic of creative fancy\nwith an appropriate musculature and flesh, re\u00ebnacting for us the\nmarvelous vision of Ezekiel: \u201cAnd the bones came together, each one to\nits joint. And I beheld and, lo, there were sinews upon them, and the\nflesh came upon them: and the skin was stretched over them.\u201d (Chap.\nXXXVII, 7, 8.) \u201cIt is also true,\u201d says Osborn (who, like Haeckel,\nevinces a veritable mania for \u201cretouching\u201d incomplete facts), \u201cthat\nwe know the mode of origin of the human species; our knowledge of\nhuman evolution has reached a point not only where a number of links\nare thoroughly known but the characters of the missing links can be\nvery clearly predicated.\u201d (_Science_, Feb. 24, 1922.) We will not\ndispute his contention; for it is perfectly true, that, in each and\nevery case, all the missing details can be so exactly predicated that\nthe resulting description might well put to shame the account of a\ncontemporary eyewitness. The only difficulty is that such predication\nis the fruit of pure imagination. Scientific reconstructions, whether\nin the literary, plastic, or pictorial, form, are no more scientific\nthan historical novels are historical. Both are the outcome of a\npsychological weakness in the human makeup, namely, its craving for a\n\u201cfinished picture\u201d\u2014a craving, however, that is never gratified save at\nthe expense of the fragmentary basis of objective fact.[7]\n\n    [7] See Addenda.\n\nIn calling into question, however, the scientific value of the\nso-called \u201cscientific reconstruction,\u201d so far as its pretensions to\nprecision and finality are concerned, it is not our intention to\ndiscredit those tentative restorations based upon Cuvier\u2019s Law of\nCorrelation, provided they profess to be no more than provisional\napproximations. Many of the structural features of organisms are\nphysiologically interdependent, and there is frequently a close\ncorrelation among organs and organ-systems, between which no causal\nconnection or direct physiological dependence is demonstrable. In\nvirtue of this principle, one structural feature may connote another,\nin which case it would be legitimate to supply by inference any\nmissing structure implied in the actual existence of its respective\ncorrelative. But if any one imagines that the law of correlation\nenables a scientist to restore the lost integrity of fossil types\nwith any considerable degree of accuracy and finality, he greatly\noverestimates the scope of the principle in question. At best it is\nnothing more than an empirical generalization, which must not be\npressed to an extent unwarranted by the inductive process, that first\nestablished it. \u201cCertain relations of structure,\u201d says Bather, \u201cas\nof cloven hoofs and horns with a ruminant stomach, were observed, but\nas Cuvier himself insisted, the laws based on such facts were purely\nempirical.\u201d (_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 258.) The pal\u00e6ontologist,\nthen, is justified in making use of correlation for the purpose of\nreconstructing a whole animal out of a few fragmentary remains, but to\nlook for anything like photographic precision in such \u201crestorations\u201d of\nextinct forms is to manifest a more or less complete ignorance of the\nnature and scope of the empirical laws, upon which they are based.\n\nThe imprudence of taking these \u201creconstructions\u201d of extinct forms\ntoo seriously, however, is inculcated not merely by theoretical\nconsiderations, but by experience as well. Even in the case of the\nmammoth, a comparatively recent form, whose skeletal remains had\nbeen preserved more completely and perfectly than those of other\nfossil types, the discovery of a complete carcass buried in the ice\nof the Siberian \u201ctaiga\u201d on the Beresovka river showed the existing\nrestorations to be false in important respects. All, without exception,\nstood in need of revision, proving, once and for all, the inadequacy\nof fossil remains as a basis for exact reconstruction. E. Pfizenmayer,\na member of the investigating expedition, comments on the fact as\nfollows: \u201cIn the light of our present knowledge of the mammoth,\nand especially of its exterior, the various existing attempts at a\nrestoration need important corrections. Apart from the many fanciful\nsketches intended to portray the exterior of the animal, all the more\ncarefully made restorations show the faults of the skeleton, hitherto\nregarded as typical, on which they are based, especially the powerful\nsemicircular and upward-curved tusks, the long tail, etc.\n\n\u201cAs these false conceptions of the exterior of the mammoth, both\nwritten and in the form of pictures, are contained in all zo\u00f6logical\nand pal\u00e6ontological textbooks, and even in scientific monographs, it\nseems necessary to construct a more nearly correct picture, based on\nour present knowledge. I have ventured on this task, because as a\nmember of the latest expedition for mammoth remains, I was permitted\nnot only to become acquainted with this newest find while still in its\nplace of deposit and to take part in exhuming it, but also to visit\nthe zo\u00f6logical museum of St. Petersburg, which is so rich in mammoth\nremains, for the purpose of studying the animal more in detail.\u201d\n(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1906, pp. 321, 322.) The example is but\none of many, which serve to emphasize not merely the inadequacy of\nthe generality of pal\u00e6ontological restorations, but also the extreme\ndifficulty which the pal\u00e6ontologist experiences in interpreting aright\nthe partially effaced record of a vanished past.\n\nThe fifth and most critical flaw in the fossil \u201cevidence\u201d for evolution\nis to be found in the anomalies of the actual distribution of fossils\nin time. It is the boast of evolutionary Pal\u00e6ontology that it is able\nto enhance the cogency of the argument from mere structural resemblance\nby showing, that, of two structurally allied forms, one is more ancient\nthan the other, and may, therefore, be presumed to be ancestral to the\nlater form. Antecedence in time is the _sine qua non_ qualification\nof a credible ancestor, and, unless the relative priority of certain\norganic types, as compared with others, can be established with\nabsolute certainty, the whole pal\u00e6ontological argument collapses, and\nthe boast of evolutionary geology becomes an empty vaunt.\n\nWhenever the appearance of a so-called annectant type is antedated by\nthat of the two forms, which it is supposed to connect, this fact is,\nnaturally, a deathblow to its claim of being the \u201ccommon ancestor,\u201d\neven though, from a purely morphological standpoint, it should\npossess all the requisites of an ancestral type. Commenting upon the\nstatement that a certain genus \u201cis a truly annectant form uniting the\nMelocrinidae and the Platycrinidae,\u201d Bather takes exception as follows:\n\u201cThe genus in question appeared, so far as we know, rather late in the\nLower Carboniferous, whereas both Platycrinidae and Melocrinidae were\nalready established in Middle Silurian time. How is it possible that\nthe far later form should unite these two ancient families? Even a\n_m\u00e9salliance_ is inconceivable.\u201d (_Science_, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 260.)\n\nCertainty, therefore, with respect to the comparative antiquity of\nthe fossiliferous strata is the indispensable presupposition of any\npal\u00e6ontological argument attempting to show that there is a gradual\napproximation of ancient, to modern, types. Yet, of all scientific\nmethods of reckoning, none is less calculated to inspire confidence,\nnone less safeguarded from the abuses of subjectivism and arbitrary\ninterpretation, than that by which the relative age of the sedimentary\nrocks is determined!\n\nIn order to date the strata of any given series with reference to\none another, the pal\u00e6ontologist starts with the principle that, in\nan undisturbed area, the deeper sediments have been deposited at an\nearlier period than the overlying strata. Such a criterion, however,\nis obviously restricted in its application to local areas, and is\navailable only at regions of outcrop, where a vertical section of the\nstrata is visibly exposed. To trace the physical continuity, however,\nof the strata (if such continuity there be) from one continent to\nanother, or even across a single continent, is evidently out of\nthe question. Hence, to correlate the sedimentary rocks of a given\nregion with those of another region far distant from the former,\nsome criterion other than stratigraphy is required. To supply this\nwant, recourse has been had to _index fossils_, which have now\ncome into general use as age-markers and means of stratigraphical\ncorrelation, where the criterion of _superposition_ is either absent\nor inapplicable. Certain fossil types are assumed to be infallibly\nindicative of certain stratigraphical horizons. In fact, when it\ncomes to a decision as to the priority or posteriority of a given\ngeological formation, index fossils constitute the court of last\nappeal, and even the evidences of actual stratigraphical sequence and\nof physical texture itself are always discounted and explained away,\nwhenever they chance to conflict with the presumption that certain\nfossil forms are typical of certain geological periods. If, for\nexample, the superposed rock contains fossils alleged to be typical\nof an \u201cearlier\u201d stratigraphic horizon than that to which the fossils\nof the subjacent rock belong, the former is pronounced to be \u201colder,\u201d\ndespite the fact that the actual stratigraphic order conveys the\nopposite impression. \u201cWe still regard fossils,\u201d says J. W. Judd, \u201cas\nthe \u2018medals of creation,\u2019 and certain types of life we take to be as\ntruly characteristic of definite periods as the coins which bear the\nimage and superscription of a Roman emperor or of a Saxon king.\u201d (Cf.\nSmithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 356.) Thus it comes to pass, in the\nlast analysis, that fossils, on the one hand, are dated according to\nthe consecutive strata, in which they occur, and strata, on the other\nhand, are dated according to the fossils which they contain.\n\nSuch procedure, if not actually tantamount to a _vicious circle_,\nis, to say the least, in imminent danger of becoming so. For, even\nassuming the so-called empirical generalization, that makes certain\nfossils typical of certain definitely-aged geological \u201cformations,\u201d to\nbe based upon induction sufficiently complete and analytic to insure\ncertainty, at least, in the majority of instances, and taking it for\ngranted that we are dealing with a case, where the actual evidence of\nstratigraphy is not in open conflict with that of the index fossils,\nwho does not see that such a system of chronology lends itself only\ntoo readily to manipulation of the most arbitrary kind, whenever the\npet preconceptions of the evolutionary chronologist are at stake? How,\nthen, can we be sure, in a given case, that a verdict based exclusively\non the \u201cevidence\u201d of index fossils will be reliably _objective_? It is\nto be expected that the evolutionist will refrain from the temptation\nto give himself the benefit of every doubt? Will there not be an\nalmost irresistible tendency on the part of the convinced transformist\nto revise the age of any deposit, which happens to contain fossils\nthat, according to his theory, ought not to occur at the time hitherto\nassigned?\n\nThe citation of a concrete example will serve to make our meaning\nclear. A series of fresh-water strata occur in India known as the\nSiwalik beds. The formation in question was originally classed\nas Miocene. Later on, however, as a result, presumably, of the\nembarrassing discovery of the genus _Equus_ among the fossils of\nthe Upper Siwalik beds, Wm. Blanford saw fit to mend matters by\ndistinguishing the Upper, from the Lower, beds and assigning the\nformer (which contain fossil horses) to the Pliocene period. The title\nMiocene being restricted by this ingenious step to beds destitute\nof equine remains, namely the Nahun, or Lower Siwalik, deposits,\nall danger of the horse proving to be older than his ancestors\nwas happily averted. A mere shifting of the conventional labels,\napparently, was amply sufficient to render groundless the fear, to\nwhich Professor A. Sedgwick had given expression in the following\nterms: \u201cThe genus _Equus_ appears in the upper Siwalik beds, which\nhave been ascribed to the Miocene age.... If _Equus_ really existed\nin the Upper Miocene, it was antecedent to some of its supposed\nancestors.\u201d (\u201cStudents\u2019 Textbook of Zo\u00f6logy,\u201d p. 599.) Evidently, the\nHorse must reconcile himself perforce to the pedigree assigned to him\nby the American Museum of Natural History; for he is to be given but\nscant opportunity of escaping it. This classic genealogy has already\nentailed far too great an expenditure of time, money and erudition to\npermit of any reconsideration; and should it chance, in the ironic\nperversity of things, that the Horse has been so inconsiderate as to\nleave indubitable traces of himself in any formation earlier than\nthe Pliocene, it goes without saying that the formation in question\nwill at once be dated ahead, in order to secure for the \u201cancestors\u201d\nthat priority which is their due. An elastic criterion like the index\nfossil is admirably adapted for readjustments of this sort, and the\nevolutionist who uses it need never fear defeat. The game he plays can\nnever be a losing one, because he gives no other terms than: Heads I\nwin, tails you lose.\n\nIn setting forth the foregoing difficulties, we have purposely\nrefrained from challenging the cardinal dogma of orthodox pal\u00e6ontology\nconcerning the unimpeachable time-value of index fossils as\nage-markers. The force of these considerations, therefore, must be\nacknowledged even by the most fanatical adherents of the aforesaid\ndogma. Our forbearance in this instance, however, must not be construed\nas a confession that the dogma in question is really unassailable. On\nthe contrary, not only is it not invulnerable, but there are many and\nweighty reasons for rejecting it lock, stock, and barrel.\n\nThe pal\u00e6ontological dogma, to which we refer, is reducible to the\nfollowing tenets: (1) The earth is swathed with fossiliferous strata,\nin much the same fashion that an onion is covered with a succession of\ncoats, and these strata are universal over the whole globe, occurring\nalways in the same invariable order and characterized not by any\npeculiar uniformity of external appearance, physical texture, or\nmineral composition, but solely by peculiar groups of fossil types,\nwhich enable us to distinguish between strata of different ages and\nto correlate the strata of one continent with their counterparts in\nanother continent\u2014\u201cEven the minuter divisions,\u201d says Scott, \u201cthe\nsubstages and zones of the European Jura, are applicable to the\nclassification of the South American beds.\u201d (\u201cIntroduction to Geology,\u201d\np. 681.) (2) In determining the relative age of a given geological\nformation, its characteristic fossils form the exclusive basis of\ndecision, and all other considerations, whether lithological or\nstratigraphic, are subordinated to this\u2014\u201cThe character of the rocks,\u201d\nsays H. S. Williams, \u201ctheir composition or their mineral contents have\nnothing to do with settling the question as to the particular system\nto which the new rocks belong. The fossils alone are the means of\ncorrelation.\u201d (\u201cGeological Biology,\u201d pp. 37, 38.)\n\nTo those habituated to the common notion that stratigraphical sequence\nis the foremost consideration in deciding the comparative age of rocks,\nthe following statement of Sir Archibald Geikie will come as a distinct\nshock: \u201cWe may even demonstrate,\u201d he avers, \u201cthat in some mountainous\nground the strata have been turned completely upside down, if we can\nshow that the fossils in what are now the uppermost layers ought\nproperly to lie underneath those in the beds below them.\u201d (\u201cTextbook,\u201d\ned. of 1903, p. 837.) In fact, the pal\u00e6ontologist, H. A. Nicholson,\nlays it down as a general principle that, wherever the physical\nevidence (founded on stratigraphy and lithology) is at variance with\nthe biological evidence (founded on the presence of typical fossil\norganisms), the latter must prevail and the former must be ignored: \u201cIt\nmay even be said,\u201d he tells us, \u201cthat in any case where there should\nappear to be a clear and decisive discordance between the physical and\nthe pal\u00e6ontological evidence as to the age of a given series of beds,\nit is the former that is to be distrusted rather than the latter.\u201d\n(\u201cAncient Life History of the Earth,\u201d p. 40.)\n\nGeorge McCready Price, Professor of Geology at a denominational college\nin Kansas, devotes more than fifty pages of his recent work, \u201cThe New\nGeology\u201d (1923), to an intensely destructive criticism of this dogma of\nthe supremacy of fossil evidence as a means of determining the relative\nage of strata. To cite Price as an \u201cauthority\u201d would, of course, be\nfutile. All orthodox geologists have long since anathematized him, and\noutlawed him from respectable geological society. Charles Schuchert\nof Yale refers to him as \u201ca fundamentalist harboring a geological\nnightmare.\u201d (_Science_, May 30, 1924, p. 487.) Arthur M. Miller of\nKentucky University speaks of him as \u201cthe man who, while a member of no\nscientific body and absolutely unknown in scientific circles, has ...\nhad the effrontery to style himself a \u2018geologist.\u2019\u201d (_Science_, June\n30, 1922, pp. 702, 703.) Miller, however, is just enough to admit that\nhe is well-informed on his subject, and that he possesses the gift of\npersuasive presentation. \u201cHe shows,\u201d says Miller, \u201ca wide familiarity\nwith geological literature, quoting largely from the most eminent\nauthorities in this country and in Europe. Any one reading these\nwritings of Price, which possess a certain charm of literary style,\nand indicate on the part of the author a gift of popular presentation\nwhich makes one regret that it had not been devoted to a more laudable\npurpose, must constantly marvel at the character of mind of the man who\ncan so go into the literature of the subject and still continue to hold\nsuch preposterous opinions.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 702.)\n\nIn the present instance, however, our interest centers, not on the\nunimportant question of his official status in geological circles,\nbut exclusively on the objective validity of his argument against the\nchronometric value of the index fossil. All citations, therefore, from\nhis work will be supported, in the sequel, by collateral testimony\nfrom other authors of recognized standing. It is possible, of course,\nto inject irrelevant issues. Price, for example, follows Sir Henry\nHoworth in his endeavor to substitute an aqueous catastrophe for the\nglaciation of the Quaternary Ice Age, and he adduces many interesting\nfacts to justify his preference for a deluge. But this is neither\nhere nor there; for we are not concerned with the merits of his \u201cnew\ncatastrophism.\u201d It is his opportune revival in modern form of the\nforgotten, but extremely effective, objection raised by Huxley and\nSpencer against the alleged universality of synchronously deposited\nfossiliferous sediments, that constitutes our sole preoccupation here.\nIt is Price\u2019s merit to have shown that, in the light of recently\ndiscovered facts, such as \u201cdeceptive conformities\u201d and \u201coverthrusts,\u201d\nthis objection is far graver than it was when first formulated by the\nauthors in question.\n\nMere snobbery and abuse is not a sufficient answer to a difficulty\nof this nature, and we regret that men, like Schuchert, have replied\nwith more anger than logic. The orthodox geologist seems unnecessarily\npetulant, whenever he is called upon to verify or substantiate the\nfoundational principles of lithic chronology. One frequently hears him\nmake the excuse that \u201cgeology has its own peculiar method of proof.\u201d To\nclaim exemption, however, from the universal criterions of criticism\nand logic is a subterfuge wholly unworthy of a genuine science, and, if\nPrice insists on discussing a subject, which the orthodox geologist\nprefers to suppress, it is the latter, and not the former, who is\nreally reactionary.\n\nPrice begins by stating the issue in the form of a twofold question:\n(1) How can we be sure, with respect to a given fauna (or flora), say\nthe Cambrian, that at one time it monopolized our globe to the complete\nexclusion of all other typical faunas (or floras), say the Devonian,\nor the Tertiary, of which it is assumed that they could not, by any\nstretch of imagination, have been contemporaneous, on either land or\nsea, with the aforesaid \u201colder\u201d fauna (or flora)? (2) Do the formations\n(rocks containing fossils) universally occur in such a rigidly\ninvariable order of sequence with respect to one another, as to warrant\nour being sure of the starting-point in the time-scale, or to justify\nus in projecting any given local order of succession into distant\nlocalities, for purposes of chronological correlation?\n\nHis response to the first of these questions constitutes what may be\ncalled an aprioristic refutation of the orthodox view, by placing\nthe evolutionary pal\u00e6ontologist in the trilemma: (a) of making the\nawkward confession that, except within limited local areas, he has no\nmeans whatever of distinguishing between a geographical distribution\nof co\u00ebval fossil forms among various habitats and a chronological\ndistribution of fossils among sediments deposited at different times;\n(b) or of denying the possibility of geographical distribution in the\npast, by claiming dogmatically that the world during Cambrian times,\nfor example, was totally unlike the modern world, of which alone we\nhave experimental knowledge, inasmuch as it was then destitute of\nzo\u00f6logical provinces, districts, zones, and other habitats peculiar to\nvarious types of fauna, so that the whole world formed but one grand\nhabitat, extending over land and sea, for a limited group of organisms\nmade up exclusively of the lower types of life; (c) or of reviving\nthe discredited onion-coat theory of Abraham Werner under a revised\nbiological form, which asserts that the whole globe is enveloped with\nfossiliferous rather than mineral strata, whose order of succession\nbeing everywhere the same enables us to discriminate with precision\nand certainty between cases of distribution in time and cases of\ndistribution in space.\n\nIn his response to the second question, Professor Price adduces\nnumerous factual arguments, which show that the invariable order of\nsequence postulated by the theory of the time-value of index fossils,\nnot only finds no confirmation in the actual or concrete sequences\nof fossiliferous rocks, but is often directly contradicted thereby.\n\u201cOlder\u201d rocks may occur above \u201cyounger\u201d rocks, the \u201cyoungest\u201d may\noccur in immediate succession to the \u201coldest,\u201d Tertiary rocks may be\ncrystalline, consolidated, and \u201cold in appearance,\u201d while Cambrian\nand even pre-Cambrian rocks sometimes occur in a soft, incoherent\ncondition, that gives them the physical appearance of being as young\nas Pleistocene formations. These exceptions and objections to the\n\u201cinvariable order\u201d of the fossiliferous strata accumulate from day to\nday, and it is only by means of Procrustean tactics of the most drastic\nsort that the facts can be brought into any semblance of harmony with\nthe current dogmas, which base geology upon evolution rather than\nevolution upon geology.\n\nPrice, then, proposes for serious consideration the possibility that\nCretaceous dinosaurs and even Tertiary mammals may have been living on\nthe land at the same time that the Cambrian graptolites and trilobites\nwere living in the seas. \u201cWho,\u201d he exclaims, \u201cwill have the hardihood,\nthe real dogmatism to affirm in a serious way that Cambrian animals\nand seaweeds were for a long time the only forms of life existing\nanywhere on earth?\u201d Should we, nevertheless, make bold enough to aver\nthat for countless centuries a mere few of the lower forms of life\nmonopolized our globe, as one universal habitat unpartitioned into\nparticular biological provinces or zones, we are thereupon confronted\nwith two equally unwelcome alternatives. We must either fly in the\nface of experience and legitimate induction by denying the existence\nin the past of anything analogous to our present-day geographical\ndistribution of plants and animals into various biological provinces,\nor be prepared to show by what infallible criterion we are enabled\nto distinguish between synchronously deposited formations indicative\nof a geographical distribution according to regional diversity, and\nconsecutively deposited formations indicative of comparative antiquity.\n\nThe former alternative does not merit any consideration whatever.\nThe latter, as we shall presently see, involves us in an assumption,\nfor which no defense either aprioristic or factual is available. We\ncan, indeed, distinguish between spatial, and temporal, distribution\nwithin the narrow limits of a single locality by using the criterion\nof superposition; for in regions of outcrop, where one sedimentary\nrock overlies another, the obvious presumption is that the upper rock\nwas deposited at a later date than the lower rock. But the criterion\nof superposition is not available for the correlation of strata in\nlocalities so distant from each other that no physical evidence of\nstratigraphic continuity is discernible. Moreover the induction, which\nprojects any local order of stratigraphical sequence into far distant\nlocalities on the sole basis of fossil taxonomy, is logically unsound\nand leads to conclusions at variance with the actual facts. Hence the\nalleged time-value of index fossils becomes essentially problematic,\nand affords no basis whatever for scientific certainty.\n\nAs previously stated, the sequence of strata is visible only in regions\nof outcrop, and nowhere are we able to see more than mere parts of two\nor, at most, three systems associated together in a single locality.\nMoreover, each set of beds is of limited areal extent, and the limits\nare frequently visible to the eye of the observer. In any case, their\nvisible extent is necessarily limited. It is impossible, therefore, to\ncorrelate the strata of one continent with those of another continent\nby tracing stratigraphic continuity. Hence, in comparing particular\nhorizons of various ages and in distinguishing them from other horizons\nover large areas, we are obliged to substitute induction for direct\nobservation. Scientific induction, however, is only valid when it\nrests upon some universal uniformity or invariable sequence of nature.\nHence, to be specific, the assumption that the time-scale based on the\nEuropean classification of fossiliferous strata is applicable to the\nentire globe as a whole, is based on the further assumption that we are\nsure of the universality of fossiliferous stratification over the face\nof the earth, and that, as a matter of fact, fossils are always and\neverywhere found in the same order of invariable sequence.\n\nBut this is tantamount to reviving, under what Spencer calls \u201ca\ntranscendental form,\u201d the exploded \u201conion-coat\u201d hypothesis of Werner\n(1749-1817). Werner conceived the terrestrial globe as encircled\nwith successive mineral envelopes, basing his scheme of universal\nstratification upon that order of sequence among rocks, which he had\nobserved within the narrow confines of his native district in Germany.\nHis hypothesis, after leading many scientists astray, was ultimately\ndiscredited and laughed out of existence. For it finally became evident\nto all observers that Werner\u2019s scheme did not fit the facts, and men\nwere able to witness with their own eyes the simultaneous deposition,\nin separate localities, of sediments which differed radically in\ntheir mineral contents and texture. Thus it came to pass that this\nclassification of strata according to their mineral nature and physical\nappearance lost all value as an absolute time-scale, while the theory\nitself was relegated to the status of a curious and amusing episode in\nthe history of scientific fiascos.\n\nThanks, however, to Wm. Smith and to Cuvier, the discarded onion-coat\nhypothesis did not perish utterly, but was rehabilitated and bequeathed\nto us in a new and more subtle form. Werner\u2019s fundamental idea of\nthe universality of a given kind of deposit was retained, but his\nmineral strata were replaced by fossiliferous strata, the lithological\nonion-coats of Werner being superseded by the biological onion-coats\nof our modern theory. The geologist of today discounts physical\nappearance, and classifies strata according to their fossil, rather\nthan their mineral, contents, but he stands committed to the same old\npostulate of universal deposits. He has no hesitation in synchronizing\nsuch widely-scattered formations as the Devonian deposits of New\nYork State, England, Germany, and South America. He pieces them all\ntogether as parts of a single system of rocks. He has no misgiving as\nto the universal applicability of the European scheme of stratigraphic\nclassification, but assures us, in the words of the geologist, Wm. B.\nScott, that: \u201cEven the minuter divisions, the subdivisions and zones of\nthe European Jura, are applicable to the classification of the South\nAmerican beds.\u201d (\u201cIntroduction to Geology,\u201d p. 681f.) The limestone and\nsandstone strata of Werner are now things of the past, but, in their\nstead, we have, to quote the criticism of Herbert Spencer, \u201cgroups of\nformations which everywhere succeed each other in a given order, and\nare severally everywhere of the same age. Though it may not be asserted\nthat these successive systems are universal, yet it seems to be tacitly\nassumed that they are so.... Though probably no competent geologist\nwould contend that the European classification of strata is applicable\nto the globe as a whole, yet most, if not all geologists, write as\nthough it were so.... Must we not say that though the onion-coat\nhypothesis is dead, its spirit is traceable, under a transcendental\nform, even in the conclusions of its antagonists.\u201d (\u201cIllustrations of\nUniversal Progress,\u201d pp. 329-380, ed. of 1890.)\n\nBut overlooking, for the moment, the mechanical absurdity involved in\nthe notion of a regular succession of universal layers of sediment,\nand conceding, for the sake of argument, that the substitution of\nfossiliferous, for lithological, strata may conceivably have remedied\nthe defects of Werner\u2019s geological time-scale, let us confine ourselves\nto the one question, which, after all, is of prime importance, whether,\nnamely, without the aid of Procrustean tactics, the actual facts\nof geology can be brought into alignment with the doctrine of an\ninvariable order of succession among fossil types, and its sequel,\nthe intrinsic time-value of index fossils. The question, in other\nwords, is whether or not a reliable time-scale can be based on the\nfacts of fossiliferous stratification as they are observed to exist in\nthe concrete. Price\u2019s answer is negative, and he formulates several\nempirical laws to express the concrete facts, on which he bases his\ncontention. The laws and facts to which he appeals may be summarized as\nfollows:\n\n1. The concrete facts of geology do not warrant our singling out any\nfossiliferous deposit as unquestionably the oldest, and hence we have\nno reliable _starting-point_ for our time-scale, because:\n\n(_a_) We may lay it down as an empirical law that \u201cany kind of\nfossiliferous rock (even the \u2018youngest\u2019), that is, strata belonging to\nany of the systems or other subdivisions, may rest directly upon the\nArch\u00e6an or primitive crystalline rocks, without any other so-called\n\u2018younger\u2019 strata intervening; also these rocks, Permian, Cretaceous,\nTertiary, or whatever thus reposing directly on the Arch\u00e6an may be\nthemselves crystalline or wholly metamorphic in texture. And this\napplies not alone to small points of contact, but to large areas.\u201d\n\n(_b_) Conversely: any kind of fossiliferous strata (even the \u201coldest\u201d)\nmay not only constitute the surface rocks over wide areas,[8] but may\nconsist of loose, unconsolidated materials, thus in both position and\ntexture resembling the \u201clate\u201d Tertiaries or the Pleistocene\u2014\u201cIn some\nregions, notably in the Baltic province and in parts of the United\nStates,\u201d says John Allen Howe, alluding to the Cambrian rocks around\nthe Baltic Sea and in Wisconsin, \u201cthe rocks still retain their\noriginal horizontality of deposition, the muds are scarcely indurated,\nand the sands are incoherent.\u201d (Encycl. Brit., vol. V, p. 86.)\n\n    [8] \u201cIt is a common occurrence,\u201d says Charles Schuchert, \u201con\n    the Canadian Shield to find the Arch\u00e6ozoic formations overlain\n    by the most recent Pleistocene glacial deposits, and even\n    these may be absent. It appears as if in such places no rocks\n    had been deposited, either by the sea or by the forces of the\n    land, since Arch\u00e6ozoic time, and yet geologists know that the\n    shield has been variously covered by sheets of sediments formed\n    at sundry times in the Proterozoic, Pal\u00e6ozoic, and, to a more\n    limited extent, in the Mesozoic.\u201d (\u201cTextbook of Geology,\u201d ed.\n    of 1920, II, p. 569.) It may be remarked that, when geologists\n    \u201cknow\u201d such things, they know them in spite of the facts!\n\nA large number of striking instances are cited by Price to substantiate\nthe foregoing rule and its converse. The impression left is that not\nonly is the starting-point of the time-scale in doubt, but that, if\nwe were to judge the age of the rocks by their physical appearance\nand position, we could not accept the conventional verdicts of\nmodern geology, which makes fossil evidence prevail over every other\nconsideration.\n\n2. When two contiguous strata are parallel to each other, and\nthere is no indication of disturbance in the lower bed, nor any\nevidence of erosion along the plane of contact, the two beds are\nsaid to exhibit conformity, and this is ordinarily interpreted\nby geologists as a sign that the upper bed has been laid down in\nimmediate sequence to the lower, and that there has been a substantial\ncontinuity of deposition, with no long interval during which the\nlower bed was exposed as surface to the agents of erosion. When\nsuch a conformity exists, as it frequently does, between a \u201crecent\u201d\nstratum, above, and what is said (according to the testimony of the\nfossils) to be a very \u201cancient\u201d stratum, below, and though the two\nare so alike lithologically as to be mistaken for one and the same\nformation, nevertheless, such a conformity is termed a \u201cnon-evident\ndisconformity,\u201d or \u201cdeceptive conformity,\u201d implying that, inasmuch\nas the \u201clost interval,\u201d representing, perhaps, a lapse of \u201cseveral\nmillion years,\u201d is entirely unrecorded by any intervening deposition,\nor any erosion, or any disturbance of the lower bed, we should not\nhave suspected that so great a hiatus had intervened, were it not for\nthe testimony of the fossils. Price cites innumerable examples, and\nsums them up in the general terms of the following empirical law:\n\u201cAny sort of fossiliferous formation may occur on top of any other\n\u2018older\u2019 fossiliferous formation, with all the physical evidences of\nperfect conformity, just as if these alleged incongruous or mismated\nformations had in reality followed one another in quick succession.\u201d\n\nA quotation from Schuchert\u2019s \u201cTextbook of Geology,\u201d (1920), may be\ngiven by way of illustration: \u201cThe imperfection,\u201d we read, \u201cof the\ngeologic column is greatest in the interior of North America and more\nso in the north than in the south. This imperfection is in many places\nvery marked, since an entire period or several periods may be absent.\nWith such great breaks in the local sections the natural assumption\nis that these gaps are easily seen in the sequence of the strata,\nbut in many places the beds lie in such perfect conformity upon one\nanother that the breaks are not noticeable by the eye and can be\nproved to exist only by the entombed fossils on each side of a given\nbedding plane.... Stratigraphers are, as a rule, now fully aware of the\nimperfections in the geologic record, but the rocks of two unrelated\nformations may rest upon each other with such absolute conformability\nas to be completely deceptive. For instance, in the Bear Grass quarries\nat Louisville, Ky., a face of limestone is exposed in which the\nabsolute conformability of the beds can be traced for nearly a mile,\nand yet within 5 feet of vertical thickness is found a Middle Silurian\ncoral bed overlain by another coral zone of Middle Devonian. The\nparting between these two zones is like that between any two limestone\nbeds, but this insignificant line represents a stratigraphic hiatus\nthe equivalent of the last third of Silurian and the first of Devonian\ntime. But such disconformities are by no means rare, in fact are very\ncommon throughout the wide central basin area of North America.\u201d (_Op.\ncit._, II, pp. 586-588.)\n\nIn such cases, the stratigraphical relations give no hint of any\nenormous gap at the line of contact. On the contrary, there is\nevery evidence of unbroken sequence, and the physical appearances\nare as if these supposed \u201cgeological epochs\u201d had never occurred\nin the localities, of which there is question. Everything points\nto the conclusion that the alleged long intervals of time between\nsuch perfectly conformable, and, often, lithologically identical,\nformations are a pure fiction elaborated for the purpose of bolstering\nup the dogma of the universal applicability of the European\nclassification of fossiliferous rocks. Why not take the facts as we\nfind them? Why resort to tortuous explanations for the mere purpose of\nsaving an arbitrary time-scale? Why insist on a definite time-value\nfor fossils, when it drives us to the extremity of discrediting the\nobjective evidence of physical facts in deference to the preconceptions\nof orthodox geology? Were it not for theoretical considerations, these\nstratigraphic facts would be taken at their face value, and the need\nof saving the reputation of the fossil as an infallible time index is\nnot sufficiently imperative to warrant so drastic a revision of the\nphysical evidence.\n\n3. The third class of facts militating against the time-value of\nindex fossils, are what Price describes as \u201cdeceptive conformities\nturned upside down,\u201d and what orthodox geology tries to explain away\nas \u201cthrusts,\u201d \u201cthrust faults,\u201d \u201coverthrusts,\u201d \u201clow-angle faulting,\u201d\netc.[9] In instances of this kind we find the accepted order of the\nfossiliferous strata reversed in such a way that the \u201cyounger\u201d strata\nare conformably overlain by \u201colder\u201d strata, and the \u201colder\u201d strata are\nsometimes interbedded between \u201cyounger\u201d strata. \u201cIn many places all\nover the world,\u201d says Price, \u201cfossils have been found in a relative\norder which was formerly thought to be utterly impossible. That is,\nthe fossils have been found in the \u2018wrong\u2019 order, and on such a scale\nthat there can be no mistake about it. For when an area 500 miles long\nand from 20 to 50 miles wide is found with Pal\u00e6ozoic rocks on top,\nor composing the mountains, and with Cretaceous beds underneath, or\ncomposing the valleys, and running under these mountains all around,\nas in the case of the Glacier National Park and the southern part of\nAlberta, the old notion about the exact and invariable order of the\nfossils has to be given up entirely.\u201d\n\n    [9] Thus, to explain away \u201cwrong sequences\u201d of fossils, Heim\n    and Rothpletz postulate the great Glaurus overthrust in the\n    Alps, Geikie the great overthrust in Scotland, McConnell,\n    Campbell, and Willis a great overthrust along the eastern\n    front of the Rockies in Montana and Alberta, while Hayes\n    recognizes numerous overthrusts in the southern Appalachians.\n    \u201cThe deciphering of such great displacements,\u201d says Pirrson,\n    speaking of thrust faults, \u201cis one of the greatest triumphs of\n    modern geological research.\u201d (\u201cTextbook of Geology,\u201d 1920, I,\n    p. 367.) Desperate measures are evidently justifiable, when it\n    is a question of saving the time-value of fossils!\n\nPrice formulates his third law as follows: \u201cAny fossiliferous\nformation, \u2018old\u2019 or \u2018young,\u2019 may occur conformably on any other\nfossiliferous formation, \u2018younger\u2019 or \u2018older.\u2019\u201d The corollary of this\nempirical law is that we are no longer justified in regarding any\nfossils as intrinsically older than other fossils, and that our present\nclassification of fossiliferous strata has a _taxonomic_, rather than a\n_historical_, value.\n\nLow-angle faulting is the phenomenon devised by geologists to meet\nthe difficulty of \u201cinverted sequence,\u201d when all other explanations\nfail. Immense mountain masses are said to have been detached from\ntheir roots and pushed horizontally over the surface (without\ndisturbing it in the least), until they came finally to rest in\nperfect conformity upon \u201cyounger\u201d strata, so that the plane of\nslippage ended by being indistinguishable from an ordinary horizontal\nbedding plane. These gigantic \u201coverthrusts\u201d or \u201cthrust faults\u201d are a\nrather unique phenomenon. Normal faulting is always at a high angle\nclosely approaching the vertical, but \u201cthrust faults\u201d are at a low\nangle closely approximating the horizontal, and there is enormous\ndisplacement along the plane of slippage. The huge mountain masses are\nsaid to have been first lifted up and then thrust horizontally for\nvast distances, sometimes for hundreds of miles, over the face of the\nland, being thus pushed over on top of \u201cyounger\u201d rocks, so as to repose\nupon the latter in a relation of perfectly conformable superposition.\nR. G. McConnell, of the Canadian Survey, comments on the remarkable\nsimilarity between these alleged \u201cthrust planes\u201d and ordinary\nstratification planes, and he is at a loss to know why the surface\nsoil was not disturbed by the huge rock masses which slid over it for\nsuch great distances. Speaking of the Bow River Gap, he says: \u201cThe\nfault plane here is nearly horizontal, and the two formations, viewed\nfrom the valley appear to succeed one another conformably,\u201d and then\nhaving noted that the underlying Cretaceous shales are \u201cvery soft,\u201d he\nadds that they \u201chave suffered little by the sliding of the limestones\nover them.\u201d (_An. Rpt. 1886_, part D., pp. 33, 34, 84.) _Credat Iudaeus\nApella, non ego!_\n\nSchuchert describes the Alpine overthrust as follows: \u201cThe movement\nwas both vertical and thrusting from the south and southeast, from\nthe southern portion of Tethys, elevating and folding the Tertiary\nand older strata of the northern areas of this mediterranean into\noverturned, recumbent, and nearly horizontal folds, and pushing the\nsouthern or Lepontine Alps about 60 miles to the northward into the\nHelvetic region. Erosion has since carved up these overthrust sheets,\nleaving remnants lying on foundations which belong to a more northern\nportion of the ancient sea. Most noted of these residuals of overthrust\nmasses is the Matterhorn, a mighty mountain without roots, a stranger\nin a foreign geologic environment,\u201d (Pirsson & Schuchert\u2019s \u201cTextbook of\nGeology,\u201d 1920, II, p. 924.)\n\nWith such a convenient device as the \u201coverthrust\u201d at his disposal, it\nis hard to see how any possible concrete sequence of fossiliferous\nstrata could contradict the preconceptions of an evolutionary\ngeologist. The hypotheses and assumptions involved, however, are so\ntortuous and incredible, that nothing short of fanatical devotion to\nthe theory of transformism can render them acceptable. \u201cExamples,\u201d\nsays Price, \u201cof strata in the \u2018wrong\u2019 order were first reported from\nthe Alps nearly half a century ago. Since that time, whole armfuls\nof learned treatises in German, in French, and in English have been\nwritten to explain the wonderful conditions there found. The diagrams\nthat have been drawn to account for the strange order of the strata\nare worthy to rank with the similar ones by the Ptolemaic astronomers\npicturing the cycles and epicycles required to explain the peculiar\nbehavior of the heavenly bodies in accordance with the geocentric\ntheory of the universe then prevailing.... In Scandinavia, a district\nsome 1,120 miles long by 80 miles wide is alleged to have been pushed\nhorizontally eastward \u2018at least 86 miles.\u2019 (Schuchert.) In Northern\nChina, one of these upside down areas is reported by the Carnegie\nResearch Expedition to be 500 miles long.\u201d (\u201cThe New Geology,\u201d 1923,\npp. 633, 634.)\n\nNor are the epicyclic subterfuges of the evolutionary geologist\nconfined to \u201cdeceptive conformities\u201d and \u201coverthrusts.\u201d His inventive\ngenius has hit upon other methods of explaining away inconvenient\nfacts. When, for example, \u201cyounger\u201d fossils are found interbedded with\n\u201colder\u201d fossils, and the discrepancy in time is not too great, he rids\nhimself of the difficulty of their premature appearance by calling\nthem a \u201cpioneer colony.\u201d Similarly, when a group of \u201ccharacteristic\u201d\nfossils occur in one age, skip another \u201cage,\u201d and recur in a third,\nhe recognizes the possibility of \u201crecurrent faunas,\u201d some of these\nfaunas having as many as five successive \u201crecurrences.\u201d Clearly, the\nassumption of gradual approximation and the dogma that the lower\npreceded the higher forms of life are things to be saved at all costs,\nand it is a foregone conclusion that no facts will be suffered to\nconflict with these irrevisable articles of evolutionary faith. \u201cWhat\nis the use,\u201d exclaims Price, \u201cof pretending that we are investigating\na problem of natural science, if we already know beforehand that the\nlower and more generalized forms of animals and plants came into\nexistence first, and the higher and the more specialized came only long\nafterwards, and that specimens of all these successive types have been\npigeonholed in the rocks in order to help us illustrate this wonderful\ntruth?\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 667, 668.)\n\nThe predominance of extinct species in certain formations is said to\nbe an independent argument of their great age. Most of the species of\norganisms found as fossils in Cambrian, Ordovician, and Silurian rocks\nare extinct, whereas modern types abound in Cretaceous and Tertiary\nrocks. Hence it is claimed that the former must be vastly older than\nthe latter. But this argument gratuitously assumes the substantial\nperfection of the stone record of ancient life and unwarrantedly\nexcludes the possibility of a sudden impoverishment of the world\u2019s\nflora and fauna as the result of a sweeping catastrophe, of which our\npresent species are the fortunate survivors. Now the fact that certain\nfloras and faunas skip entire systems of rocks to reappear only in\nlater formations is proof positive that the record of ancient life is\nfar from being complete, and we have in the abundant fossil remains of\ntropical plants and animals, found in what are now the frozen arctic\nregions, unmistakable evidence of a sudden catastrophic change by\nwhich a once genial climate \u201cwas abruptly terminated. For carcasses of\nthe Siberian elephants were frozen so suddenly and so completely that\nthe flesh has remained untainted.\u201d (Dana.) Again, the mere _fact_ of\nextinction tells us nothing about the _time_ of the extinction. For\nthis we are obliged to fall back on the index fossil whose inherent\ntime-value is based on the theory of evolution and not on stratigraphy.\nHence the argument from extinct species is not an independent argument.\n\nTo sum up, therefore, the aprioristic evolutional series of fossils\nis not a genuine time-scale. The only safe criterion of comparative\nage is that of stratigraphic superposition, and this is inapplicable\noutside of limited local areas.[10] The index fossil is a reliable\nbasis for the chronological correlation of beds only in case one is\nalready convinced on other grounds of the actuality of evolution, but\nfor the unbiased inquirer it is destitute of any inherent time-value.\nIn other words, we can no longer be sure that a given formation is\nold merely because it happens to contain Cambrian fossils, nor that a\nrock is young merely because it chances to contain Tertiary fossils.\nOur present classification of rocks according to their fossil contents\nis purely arbitrary and artificial, being tantamount to nothing more\nthan a mere taxonomical classification of the forms of ancient life on\nour globe, irrespective of their comparative antiquity. This scheme\nof classification is, indeed, universally applicable, and places can\nusually be found in it for new fossiliferous strata, whenever and\nwherever discovered. Its universal applicability, however, is due not\nto any prevalent order of invariable sequence among fossiliferous\nstrata, but solely to the fact that the laws of biological taxonomy\nand ecology are universal laws which transcend spatial and temporal\nlimitation. If a scheme of taxonomy is truly scientific, all forms of\nlife, whether extant or extinct, will fit into it quite readily.\n\n    [10] \u201cAll that geology can prove,\u201d says Huxley, \u201cis local order\n    of succession.\u201d (\u201cDiscourses Biological and Geological,\u201d pp.\n    279-288.)\n\nThe anomalies of spatial distribution constitute a sixth difficulty\nfor transformistic pal\u00e6ontology. In constructing a phylogeny the\nmost diverse and widely-separated regions are put under tribute to\nfurnish the requisite fossils, no heed being paid to what are now\nat any rate impassable geographical barriers, not to speak of the\nclimatic and environmental limitations which restrict the migrations\nof non-cosmopolitan species within the boundaries of narrow habitats.\nHypothetical lineages of a modern form of life are frequently\nconstructed from fossil remains found in two or more continents\nseparated from one another by immense distances and vast oceanic\nexpanses. When taxed with failure to plausibleize this procedure,\nthe evolutionist meets the difficulty by hypothecating wholesale and\ndevious migrations to and fro, and by raising up alleged land bridges\nto accommodate plants and animals in their suppositional migrations\nfrom one continent to another, etc.\n\nThe European horse, with his so-called ancestry interred, partly in\nthe Tertiary deposits of Europe, but mostly in those of North America,\nis a typical instance of these anomalies in geographical distribution.\nIt would, of course, be preposterous to suppose that two independent\nlines of descent could have fortuitously terminated in the production\nof one and the same type, namely, the genus _Equus_. Moreover, to admit\nfor a moment that the extinct American _Equus_ and the extant European\n_Equus_ had converged by similar stages from distinct origins would be\nequivalent, as we have seen, to a surrender of the basic postulate that\nstructural similarity rests on the principle of inheritance. Nothing\nremains, therefore, but to hypothecate a Tertiary land bridge between\nEurope and North America.\n\nModern geologists, however, are beginning to resent these arbitrary\ninterferences with their science in the interest of biological\ntheories. Land bridges, they rightly insist, should be demonstrated by\nmeans of positive geological evidence and not by the mere exigencies of\na hypothetical genealogy. Whosoever postulates a land bridge between\ncontinents should be able to adduce solid reasons, and to assign a\nmechanism capable of accomplishing the five-mile uplift necessary to\nbring a deep-sea bottom to the surface of the hydrosphere. Such an\nidea is extravagant and not to be easily entertained in our day, when\ngeologists are beginning to understand the principle of _isostasy_.\nTo-day, the crust of the earth, that is, the entire surface of the\nlithosphere, is conceived as being constituted of earth columns,\nall of which rest with equal weight upon the level of complete\ncompensation, which exists at a depth of some 76 miles below land\nsurfaces. At this depth viscous flows and undertows of the earth take\nplace, compensating all differences of gravitational stress. Hence the\nmaterials constituting a mountain column are thought to be less dense\nthan those constituting the surrounding lowland columns, and for this\nreason the mountains are buoyed up above the surrounding landscape. The\ncolumns under ocean bottoms, on the contrary, are thought to consist\nof heavy materials like basalt, which tend to depress the column. To\nraise a sea floor, therefore, some means of producing a dilatation of\nthese materials would have to be available. Arthur B. Coleman called\nattention to this difficulty in his Presidential Address to the\nGeological Society of America (December 29, 1915), and we cannot do\nbetter than quote his own statement of the matter here:\n\n\u201cAdmitting,\u201d he says, \u201cthat in the beginning the lithosphere bulged\nup in places, so as to form continents, and sagged in other places,\nso as to form ocean beds, there are interesting problems presented as\nto the permanence of land and seas. All will admit marginal changes\naffecting large areas, but these encroachments of the sea on the\ncontinents and the later retreats may be of quite a subordinate kind,\nnot implying an interchange of deep-sea bottoms and land surfaces.\nThe essential permanence of continents and oceans has been firmly\nheld by many geologists, notably Dana among the older ones, and seems\nreasonable; but there are geologists, especially pal\u00e6ontologists, who\ndisplay great recklessness in rearranging land and sea. The trend of a\nmountain range, or the convenience of a running bird, or a marsupial\nafraid to wet his feet seems sufficient warrant for hoisting up any sea\nbottom to connect continent with continent. A Gondwana Land arises in\nplace of an Indian Ocean and sweeps across to South America, so that a\nspore-bearing plant can follow up an ice age; or an Atlantis ties New\nEngland to Old England to help out the migrations of a shallow-water\nfauna; or a \u2018Lost Land of Agulhas\u2019 joins South Africa and India.\n\n\u201cIt is curious to find these revolutionary suggestions made at a\ntime when geodesists are demonstrating that the earth\u2019s crust over\nlarge areas, and perhaps everywhere, approaches a state of isostatic\nequilibrium, and that isostatic compensation is probably complete at a\ndepth of only 76 miles\u201d ... and (having noted the difference of density\nthat must exist between the continental, and submarine, earth columns)\nColeman would have us bear in mind \u201cthat to transform great areas of\nsea bottom into land it would be necessary either to expand the rock\nbeneath by several per cent or to replace heavy rock, such as basalt,\nby lighter materials, such as granite. There is no obvious way in which\nthe rock beneath a sea bottom can be expanded enough to lift it 20,000\nfeet, as would be necessary in parts of the Indian Ocean, to form a\nGondwana land; so one must assume that light rocks replace heavy ones\nbeneath a million square miles of ocean floor. Even with unlimited\ntime, it is hard to imagine a mechanism that could do the work, and\nno convincing geological evidence can be brought forward to show that\nsuch a thing ever took place.... The distribution of plants and animals\nshould be arranged for by other means than by the wholesale elevation\nof ocean beds to make dry land bridges for them.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt.\nfor 1916, pp. 269-271.)\n\nA seventh anomaly of pal\u00e6ontological phylogeny is what may be described\nas contrariety of direction. We are asked to believe, for example, that\nin mammals racial development resulted in dimensional increase. The\nprimitive ancestor of mammoths, mastodons, and elephants is alleged to\nhave been the _Moeritherium_, \u201ca small tapirlike form, from the Middle\nEocene Qasr-el-Sagha beds of the Fay\u00fbm in Egypt.... _Moeritherium_\nmeasured about 3\u00bd feet in height.\u201d (Lull: Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1908, pp. 655, 656.) The ancestor of the modern horse, we are told,\nwas \u201ca little animal less than a foot in height, known as _Eohippus_,\nfrom the rocks of the Eocene age.\u201d (Woodruff: \u201cFoundations of Biology,\u201d\np. 361.) In the case of insects, on the other hand, we are asked to\nbelieve the exact reverse, namely, that racial development brought\nabout dimensional reduction. \u201cIn the middle of the Upper Carboniferous\nperiods,\u201d says Anton Handlirsch, \u201cthe forest swamps were populated\nwith cockroaches about as long as a finger, dragonfly-like creatures\nwith a wing spread of about 2\u00bd feet, while insects that resemble our\nMay flies were as big as a hand.\u201d (\u201cDie fossilen Insekten, und die\nPhylogenie der recenten Formen,\u201d 1908, L. c., p. 1150.) Contrasting one\nof these giant pal\u00e6ozoic dragonflies, _Meganeura monyi_ Brongn., with\nthe largest of modern dragonflies, _Aeschna grandis_ L., Chetverikov\nexclaims with reference to the latter: \u201cWhat a pitiful pigmy it is and\nits specific name (_grandis_) sounds like such a mockery.\u201d (Smithson.\nInst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 446.) Chetverikov, it is true, proposes a\nteleological reason for this progressive diminution, but the fact\nremains that for dysteleological evolutionism, which dispenses with\nthe postulate of a Providential co\u00f6rdination and regulation of natural\nagencies, this _diminuendo_ of the \u201cevolving\u201d insects stands in\nirreconcilable opposition to the _crescendo_ of the \u201cevolving\u201d mammals,\nand constitutes a difficulty which a purely mechanistic philosophy can\nnever surmount.\n\nNot to prolong excessively this already protracted enumeration of\ndiscrepancies between fossil fact and evolutionary assumption, we\nshall mention, as an eighth and final difficulty, the indubitable\npersistence of _unchanged_ organic types from the earliest geological\nepochs down to the present time. This phenomenon is all the more\nwonderful in view of the fact that the decision as to which are to be\nthe \u201colder\u201d and which the \u201cyounger\u201d strata rests with the evolutionary\ngeologist, who is naturally disinclined to admit the antiquity of\nstrata containing modern types, and whose position as arbiter enables\nhim to date formations aprioristically, according to the exigencies of\nthe transformistic theory. Using, as he does, the absence of modern\ntypes as an express criterion of age, and having, as it were, his pick\namong the various fossiliferous deposits, one would expect him to be\neminently successful in eliminating from the stratigraphic groups\nselected for senior honors all strata containing fossil types identical\nwith modern forms. Since, however, even the most ingenious sort of\ngeological gerrymandering fails to make this elimination complete, we\nmust conclude that the evidence for persistence of type is inescapable\nand valid under any assumption.\n\nWhen we speak of persistent types, we mean generic and specific,\nrather than phyletic, types, although it is assuredly true that the\npersistence of the great phyla, from their abrupt and contemporaneous\nappearance in Cambrian and pre-Cambrian rocks down to the present day,\nconstitutes a grave difficulty for progressive evolution in general\nand monophyletic evolution in particular. All the great invertebrate\ntypes, such as the protozoa, the annelida, the brachiopoda, and large\ncrustaceans called eurypterids, are found in rocks of the Proterozoic\ngroup, despite the damaged condition of the Arch\u00e6an record, while\nin the Cambrian they are represented by a great profusion of forms.\n\u201cThe Lower Cambrian species,\u201d says Dana, \u201chave not the simplicity of\nstructure that would naturally be looked for in the earliest Pal\u00e6ozoic\nlife. They are perfect of their kind and highly specialized structures.\nNo steps from simple kinds leading up to them have been discovered; no\nline from the protozoans up to corals, echinoderms, or worms, or from\neither of these groups up to brachiopods, mollusks, trilobites, or\nother crustaceans. This appearance of abruptness in the introduction\nof Cambrian life is one of the striking facts made known by geology.\u201d\n(\u201cManual,\u201d p. 487.) Thus, as we go backward in time, we find the great\norganic phyla retaining their identity and showing no tendency to\nconverge towards a common origin in one or a few ancestral types. For\nthis reason, as we shall see presently, geologists are beginning to\nrelegate the evolutionary process to unknown depths below the explored\nportion of the \u201cgeological column.\u201d What may lurk in these unfathomed\nprofundities, it is, of course, impossible to say, but, if we are to\njudge by that part of the column which is actually exposed to view,\nthere is no indication whatever of a steady progression from lower, to\nhigher, degrees of organization, and it takes all the imperturbable\nidealism of a scientific doctrinaire to discern in such random, abrupt,\nand unrelated \u201corigins\u201d any evidence of what Blackwelder styles \u201ca\nslow but steady increase in complexity of structure and in function.\u201d\n(_Science_, Jan. 27, 1922, p. 90.)\n\nBut, while the permanence of phyletic types excludes progress, that\nof generic and specific types excludes change, and hence it is in\nthe latter phenomenon, especially, that the theory of transformism\nencounters a formidable difficulty. Pal\u00e6obotany furnishes numerous\nexamples of the persistence of unchanged plant forms. Ferns identical\nwith the modern genus _Marattia_ occur in rocks of the Pal\u00e6ozoic group.\nCycads indistinguishable from the extant genera _Zamia_ and _Cycas_ are\nfound in strata belonging to the Triassic system, etc., etc.\n\nThe same is true of animal types. In all the phyla some genera and\neven species have persisted unchanged from the oldest strata down to\nthe present day. Among the Protozoa, for example, we have the genus\n_Globigerina_ (one of the Foraminifera), some modern species of which\nare identical with those found in the Cretaceous. To quote the words\nof the Protozoologist, Charles A. Kofoid: \u201cThe Protozoa are found\nin the oldest fossiliferous rocks and the genera of _Radiolaria_\ntherein conform rather closely to genera living today, while the\nfossil _Dinoflagellata_ of the flints of Delitzsch are scarcely\ndistinguishable from species living in the modern seas. The striking\nsimilarities of the most ancient fossil Protozoa to recent ones afford\nsome ground for the inference that the Protozoa living today differ but\nlittle from those when life was young.\u201d (_Science_, April 6, 1923, p.\n397.)\n\nThe Metazoa offer similar examples of persistence. Among the\nC\u0153lenterata, we have the genus _Springopora_, whose representatives\nfrom the Carboniferous limestones closely resemble some of the\npresent-day reef builders of the East Indies. Species of the brachiopod\ngenera _Lingula_ and _Crania_ occurring in the Cambrian rocks are\nindistinguishable from species living today, while two other modern\ngenera of the Brachiopoda, namely, _Rhynchonella_ and _Discina_,\nare represented among the fossils found in Mesozoic formations.\n_Terebratulina striata_, a fossil species of brachiopod occurring in\nthe rocks belonging to the Cretaceous system, is identical with our\nmodern species _Terebratulina caput serpentis_. Among the Mollusca such\ngenera as _Arca_, _Nucula_, _Lucina_, _Astarte_, and _Nautilus_ have\nhad a continuous existence since the Silurian, while the genera _Lima_\nand _Pecten_ can be traced to the Permian. One genus _Pleurotomaria_\ngoes back to pre-Cambrian times. As to Tertiary fossils, Woods informs\nus that \u201cin some of the later Cainozoic formations as many as 90 per\ncent of the species of mollusks are still living.\u201d (\u201cPal\u00e6ontology,\u201d\n1st ed., p. 2.) Among the Echinodermata, two genera, _Cidaris_ (a\nsea urchin) and _Pentacrinus_ (a crinoid) may be mentioned as being\npersistent since the Triassic (\u201coldest\u201d system of the Mesozoic group).\nAmong the Arthropoda, the horseshoe crab _Limulus polyphemus_ has\nhad a continuous existence since the Lias (_i.e._ the lowest series\nof the Jurassic system). Even among the Vertebrata we have instances\nof persistence. The extant Australian genus _Ceratodus_, a Dipnoan,\nhas been in existence since the Triassic. Among the fossils of the\nJurassic (middle system of the Mesozoic group), _Sharks_, _Rays_, and\n_Chimaeroids_ occur in practically modern forms, while some of the\nso-called \u201cganoids\u201d are extremely similar to our present sturgeons and\ngar pikes\u2014\u201cSome of the Jurassic fishes approximate the teleosts so\nclosely that it seems arbitrary to call them ganoids.\u201d (Scott.)\n\nThe instances of persistence enumerated above are those acknowledged by\nevolutionary pal\u00e6ontologists themselves. This list could be extended\nsomewhat by the addition of several other examples, but even so, it\nwould still be small and insufficient to tip the scales decisively\nin favor of fixism. On the other hand, we must not forget that the\npaucity of this list is due in large measure to the fact that our\npresent method of classifying fossiliferous strata was deliberately\nframed with a view to excluding formations containing modern types\nfrom the category of \u201cancient\u201d beds. Moreover, orthodox pal\u00e6ontology\nhas minimized the facts of persistence to an extent unwarranted even\nby its own premises. As the following considerations indicate, the\nactual number of persistent types is far greater, even according to the\nevolutionary time-scale, than the figure commonly assigned.\n\nFirst of all, we must take into account the deplorable, if not\nabsolutely dishonest, practice, which is in vogue, of inventing new\nnames for the fossil duplicates of modern species, in order to mask or\nobscure an identity which conflicts with evolutionary preconceptions.\nWhen a given formation fails to fit into the accepted scheme by\nreason of its fossil anachronisms, or when, to quote the words of\nPrice, \u201cspecies are found in kinds of rock where they are not at all\nexpected, and where, according to the prevailing theories, it is\nquite incredible that they should be found ... the not very honorable\nexpedient is resorted to of inventing a new name, specific or even\ngeneric, to disguise and gloss over the strange similarity between them\nand the others which have already been assigned to wholly different\nformations.\u201d (\u201cThe New Geology,\u201d p. 291.) The same observation is\nmade by Heilprin. \u201cIt is practically certain,\u201d says the latter, \u201cthat\nnumerous forms of life, exhibiting no distinctive characters of their\nown, are constituted into distinct species for no other reason than\nthat they occur in formations widely separated from those holding\ntheir nearest kin.\u201d (\u201cGeographical and Geological Distribution of\nAnimals,\u201d pp. 183, 184.) An instance of this practice occurs in the\nforegoing list, where a fossil brachiopod identical with a modern\nspecies receives the new specific name \u201c_striata_.\u201d Its influence is\nalso manifest in the previously quoted apology of Scott for calling\nteleost-like fish \u201cganoids.\u201d\n\nWe must also take into account the imperfection of the fossil record,\nwhich is proved by the fact that most of the acknowledged \u201cpersistent\ntypes\u201d listed above \u201cskip\u201d whole systems and even groups of \u201clater\u201d\nrocks (which are said to represent enormous intervals of time), only\nto reappear, at last, in modern times. It is evident that their\nexistence has been continuous, and yet they are not represented in the\nintervening strata. Clearly, then, the fossil record is imperfect, and\nwe must conclude that many of our modern types actually did exist in\nthe remote past, without, however, leaving behind any vestige of their\nformer presence.\n\nAgain, we must frankly confess our profound ignorance with respect to\nthe total number and kinds of species living in our modern seas. Hence\nour conventional distinction between \u201cextinct\u201d and \u201cextant\u201d species has\nonly a provisory value. Future discoveries will unquestionably force\nus to admit that many of the species now classed as \u201cextinct\u201d are in\nreality living forms, which must be added to our list of \u201cpersistent\ntypes.\u201d \u201cIt is by no means improbable,\u201d says Heilprin, \u201cthat many of\nthe older genera, now recognized as distinct by reason of our imperfect\nknowledge concerning their true relationships, have in reality\nrepresentatives in the modern sea.\u201d (_Op. cit._ pp. 203, 204.)\n\nFinally, the whole of our present taxonomy of plants and animals, both\nliving and fossil, stands badly in need of revision. Systematists,\nas we have seen in the second chapter, base their classifications\nmainly on what they regard as basic or homologous structures, in\ncontradistinction to superficial or adaptive characters. Both kinds\nof structure, however, are purely somatic, and somatic characters,\nas previously observed, are not, by themselves, a safe criterion for\ndiscriminating between varieties and species. In the light of recent\ngenetical research, we cannot avoid recognizing that there has been\nfar too much \u201csplitting\u201d of organic groups on the basis of differences\nthat are purely fluctuational, or, at most, mutational. Moreover,\nthe distinction between homologous and adaptive structures is often\narbitrary and largely a matter of personal opinion, especially when\nnumerous specimens are not available. What the \u201cCambridge Natural\nHistory\u201d says in allusion to the Asteroidea is of general application.\n\u201cWhile there is considerable agreement,\u201d we read, \u201camongst authorities\nas to the number of families, or minor divisions of unequivocal\nrelationship, to be found in the class Asteroidea, there has been\ngreat uncertainty both as to the number and limits of the orders\ninto which the class should be divided, and also as to the limits of\nthe various species. The difficulty about the species is by no means\nconfined to the group Echinodermata; in all cases where the attempt\nis made to determine species by an examination of a few specimens\nof unknown age there is bound to be uncertainty; the more so, as it\nbecomes increasingly evident that there is no sharp line to be drawn\nbetween local varieties and species. In Echinodermata, however, there\nis the additional difficulty that the acquisition of ripe genital cells\ndoes not necessarily mark the termination of growth; the animals can\ncontinue to grow and at the same time slightly alter their characters.\nFor this reason many of the species described may be merely immature\nforms....\n\n\u201cThe disputes, however, as to the number of orders included in the\nAsteroidea proceed from a different cause. The attempt to construct\ndetailed phylogenies involves the assumption that one set of\nstructures, which we take as the mark of the class, has remained\nconstant, whilst the others which are regarded as adaptive, may have\ndeveloped twice or thrice. As the two sets of structures are about\nof equal importance it will be seen to what an enormous extent the\npersonal equation enters in the determination of these questions.\u201d\n(_Op. cit._, vol. I, pp. 459, 460.)\n\nIn dealing with fossil forms, these difficulties of the taxonomist\nare intensified: (1) by the sparse, badly-preserved, and fragmentary\ncharacter of fossil remains; (2) by the fact that here breeding\nexperiments are impossible, and hence the diagnosis based on external\ncharacters cannot be supplemented by a diagnosis of the germinal\nfactors. Fossil taxonomy is, in consequence, extremely arbitrary and\nunreliable. Many fossil forms classed as distinct species, or even\nas distinct genera, may be nothing more than fluctuants, mutants,\nhybrids, or immature stages of well-known species living today.\nAgain, many fossils mistaken for distinct species are but different\nstages in the life-history of a single species, a mistake, which is\nunavoidable, when specimens are few and the age of the specimens\nunknown. The great confusion engendered in the classification of\nthe hydrozoa by nineteenth-century ignorance of the alternation of\nhydroid and medusoid generations is a standing example of the danger\nof classifying forms without a complete knowledge of the entire\nlife-cycle. When due allowance is made for mutation, hybridization,\nmetagenesis, polymorphism, age and metamorphosis, the number of\ndistinct fossil species will undergo considerable shrinkage. Nor must\nwe overlook the possibility of environmentally-induced modifications.\nMany organisms, such as mollusks, undergo profound alteration as a\nresult of some important, and, perhaps, relatively permanent, change in\ntheir environmental conditions, though such alterations affect only the\nphenotype, and do not involve a corresponding change in the specific\ngenotype, _i.e._ the germinal constitution of the race.\n\nIn the degree that these considerations are taken into account the\nnumber of \u201cextinct\u201d fossil species will diminish and the number of\n\u201cpersistent\u201d species will increase. This is a consummation devoutly to\nbe wished for, but it means that hundreds of thousands of described\nspecies must needs be reviewed for the purpose of weeding out the\nduplicates, and who will have the knowledge, the courage, or even the\nspan of life, necessary to accomplish so gigantic a task?\n\nBut so far as the practical purposes of our argument are concerned, the\naccepted list of persistent types needs no amplification. It suffices,\nas it stands, to establish the central fact (which, for the rest,\nis admitted by everyone) that some generic and even specific types\nhave remained unchanged throughout the enormous lapse of time which\nhas intervened between the deposition of the oldest strata and the\nadvent of the present age. Our current theories, far from diminishing\nthe significance of this fact, tend to intensify it by computing the\nduration of such persistence in millions, rather than in thousands, of\nyears. Now, whatever one\u2019s views may be on the subject of transformism,\nthis prolonged permanence of certain genera and species is an\nindubitable _fact_, which is utterly irreconcilable with a _universal\nlaw_ of organic evolution. The theory of transformism is impotent\nto explain an exception so palpable as this; for persistence and\ntransmutation cannot be subsumed under one and the same principle. That\nwhich accounts for change cannot account for _unchange_. Yet unchange\nis an observed fact, while the change, in this case, is an inferred\nhypothesis. Hence, even if we accept the principle of transformism,\nthere will always be scope for the principle of permanence. The\nextraordinary tenacity of type manifested by persistent genera and\nspecies is a phenomenon deserving of far more careful study and\ninvestigation than the evolutionally-minded scientist of today deigns\nto bestow upon it. To the latter it may seem of little consequence,\nbut, to the genuine scientist, the actual persistence of types should\nbe of no less interest than their possible variability.\n\nWith these reflections, our criticism of the pal\u00e6ontological argument\nterminates. The enumeration of its various deficiencies was not\nintended as a refutation. To disprove the theory of organic evolution\nis a feat beyond our power to accomplish. We can only adduce negative\nevidence, whose scope is to show that the various evolutionary\narguments are inconsequential or inconclusive. We cannot rob the\ntheory of its intrinsic possibility, and sheer justice compels us to\nconfess that certain facts, like those of symbiotic preadaptation,\nlend themselves more readily to a transformistic, than to a fixistic,\ninterpretation. On the other hand, nothing is gained by ignoring\nflaws so obvious and glaring as those which mar the cogency of\npal\u00e6ontological \u201cevidence.\u201d The man who would gloss them over is\nno true friend either of Science or of the scientific theory of\nEvolution! They represent so many real problems to be frankly faced\nand fully solved, before the pal\u00e6ontological argument can become a\ngenuine demonstration. But until such time as a demonstration of this\nsort is forthcoming, the evolutionist must not presume to cram his\nunsubstantiated theory down our reasonably reluctant throats. To accept\nas certain what remains unproved, is to compromise our intellectual\nsincerity. True certainty, which rests on the recognition of objective\nnecessity, will never be attainable so long as difficulties that sap\nthe very base of evolutionary argumentation are left unanswered; and,\nas for those who, in the teeth of discordant factual evidence, profess,\nnevertheless, to have certainty regarding the \u201cfact\u201d of evolution, we\ncan only say that such persons cannot have a very high or exacting\nconception of what scientific certainty really means.\n\nFor the rest, it cannot even be said that the pal\u00e6ontological record\nfurnishes good circumstantial evidence that our globe has been the\nscene of a process of organic evolution. In fact, so utterly at\nvariance with this view is the total impression conveyed by the\nvisible portion of the geological column, that the modern geologist\nproposes, as we have seen, to probe depths beneath its lowest strata\nfor traces of that alleged transmutation, which higher horizons do\nnot reveal. There are six to eight thick terranes below the Cambrian,\nwe are told, and igneous masses that were formerly supposed to be\nbasal have turned out to be intrusions into sedimentary accumulations,\nall of which, of course, is fortunate for the theory of organic\nevolution, as furnishing it with a sadly needed new court of appeal.\nThe bottom, so to speak, has dropped out of the geological column,\nand Prof. T. C. Chamberlin announces the fact as follows: \u201cThe sharp\ndivision into two parts, a lifeless igneous base and a sedimentary\nfossiliferous superstructure, has given place to the general concept\nof continuity with merely minor oscillations in times and regions of\nmajor activity. Life has been traced much below the Cambrian, but\nits record is very imperfect. The recent discoveries of more ample\nand varied life in the lower Pal\u00e6ozoic, particularly the Cambrian,\nimplies, under current evolutional philosophy, a very great downward\nextension of life. In the judgment of some biologists and geologists,\nthis extension probably reaches below all the pre-Cambrian terranes\nas yet recognized, though this pre-Cambrian extension is great. The\n\u2018Azoic\u2019 bottom has retired to depths unknown. This profoundly changes\nthe life aspect of the \u2018column.\u2019\u201d (_Science_, Feb. 8, 1924, p. 128.)\nAll this is doubtless true, but such an appeal, from the known to the\nunknown, from the actual to the possible, is not far-removed from a\nconfession of scientific insolvency. Life must, of course, have had\nan earlier history than that recorded in the pre-Cambrian rocks. But\neven supposing that some portion of an earlier record should become\naccessible to us, it could not be expected to throw much light on the\nproblem of organic origins. Most of the primordial sediments have long\nsince been sapped and engulfed by fiery magmas, while terranes less\ndeep have, in all probability, been so metamorphosed that every trace\nof their fossil contents has perished. The sub-Arch\u00e6an beginnings of\nlife will thus remain shrouded forever in a mystery, which we have\nno prospect of penetrating. Hence it is the exposed portion of the\ngeological column which continues and will continue to be our sole\nsource of information, and it is pre\u00ebminently on this basis that the\nevolutionary issue will have to be decided.\n\nYet what could be more enigmatic than the rock record as it stands?\nFor in nature it possesses none of that idealized integrity and\ncoherence, with which geology has invested it for the purpose of\nmaking it understandable. Rather it is a mighty chaos of scattered\nand fragmentary fossiliferous formations, whose baffling complexity,\ndiscontinuity, and ambiguity tax the ingenuity of the most sagacious\ninterpreters. Transformism is the key to one possible synthesis, which\nmight serve to unify that intricate mass of facts, but it is idle to\npretend that this theory is the unique and necessary corollary of\nthe facts as we find them. The pal\u00e6ontological argument is simply a\ntheoretical construction which presupposes evolution instead of proving\nit. Its classic pedigrees of the horse, the camel, and the elephant\nare only credible when we have assumed the \u201cfact\u201d of evolution, and\neven then, solely upon condition that they claim to approximate,\nrather than assign, the actual ancestry of the animals in question.\nIn pal\u00e6ontology, as in the field of zo\u00f6logy, evolution is not a\nconclusion, but an interpretation. In pal\u00e6ontology, otherwise than\nin the field of genetics, evolution is not amenable to the check of\nexperimental tests, because here it deals not with that which is, but\nwith that which _was_. Here the sole objective basis is the mutilated\nand partially obliterated record of a march of events, which no one\nhas observed and which will never be repeated. These obscure and\nfragmentary vestiges of a vanished past, by reason of their very\nincompleteness, lend themselves quite readily to all sorts of theories\nand all sorts of speculations. Of the \u201cStone Book of the Universe\u201d\nwe may say with truth that which Oliver Wendell Holmes says of the\nprivately-interpreted Bible, namely, that its readers take from it the\nsame views which they had previously brought to it. \u201cI am, however,\nthoroughly persuaded,\u201d say the late Yves Delage, \u201cthat one is or is not\na transformist, not so much for reasons deduced from natural history,\nas for motives based on personal philosophic opinions. If there existed\nsome other scientific hypothesis besides that of descent to explain\nthe origin of species, many transformists would abandon their present\nopinion as not being sufficiently demonstrated.... If one takes his\nstand upon the exclusive ground of the facts, it must be acknowledged\nthat the formation of one species from another species has not been\ndemonstrated at all.\u201d (\u201cL\u2019her\u00e9dit\u00e9 et les grands probl\u00e8mes de la\nbiologie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale,\u201d Paris, 1903, pp. 204, 322.)\n\n\n\n\n                                  II\n\n                        THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER I\n\n                          THE ORIGIN OF LIFE\n\n\n               \u00a7 1. The Theory of Spontaneous Generation\n\nStrictly speaking, the theory of Transformism is not concerned with the\ninitial production of organic species, but rather with the subsequent\ndifferentiation and multiplication of such species by transmutation\nof the original forms. This technical sense, however, is embalmed\nonly in the term transformism and not in its synonym evolution. The\nsignification of the latter term is less definite. It may be used\nto denote any sort of development or origination of one thing from\nanother. Hence the problem of the formation of organic species is\nfrequently merged with the problem of the transformation of species\nunder the common title of evolution.\n\nThis extension of the evolutionary concept, in its widest sense, to the\nproblem of the origin of life on our globe is known as the hypothesis\nof abiogenesis or spontaneous generation. It regards inorganic matter\nas the source of organic life not merely in the sense of a _passive\ncause_, out of which the primordial forms of life were produced, but\nin the sense of an _active cause_ inasmuch as it ascribes the origin\nof life to the exclusive agency of dynamic principles inherent in\ninorganic matter, namely, the physicochemical energies that are native\nto mineral matter. Life, in other words, is assumed to have arisen\nspontaneously, that is, by means of a synthesis and convergence of\nforces resident in inorganic matter, and not through the intervention\nof any exterior agency.\n\nThe protagonists of spontaneous generation, therefore, assert not\nmerely a passive, but an active, evolution of living, from lifeless\nmatter. As to the fact of the origin of the primal organisms from\ninorganic matter, there is no controversy whatever. All agree that, at\nsome time or other, the primordial plants and animals emanated from\ninorganic matter. The sole point of dispute is whether they arose from\ninorganic matter by active evolution or simply by passive evolution.\nThe passive evolution of mineral matter into plants and animals is an\neveryday occurrence. The grass assimilates the nitrates of the soil,\nand is, in turn, assimilated by the sheep, whose flesh becomes the food\nof man, and mineral substance is thus finally transformed into human\nsubstance. In the course of metabolic processes, the inorganic molecule\nmay doff its mineral type and don, in succession, the specificities of\nplant, animal, and human protoplasm; and this transition from lower\nto higher degrees of perfection may be termed an evolution. It is\nan ascent of matter from the lowermost grade of an inert substance,\nthrough the intermediate grades of vegetative and animal life, up\nto the culminating and ultimate term of material perfection, in\nthe partial constitution of a human nature and personality, in the\nconcurrence as a coagent in vegetative and sensile functions, and\nin the indirect participation, as instrument, in the higher psychic\nfunctions of rational thought and volition.\n\nAt the present time, the inorganic world is clearly the exclusive\nsource of all the matter found in living beings. All living beings\nconstruct their bodies out of inorganic substances in the process of\nnutrition, and render back to the inorganic world, by dissimilation and\ndeath, whatever they have taken from it. We must conclude, therefore,\nthe matter of the primordial organisms was likewise derived from the\ninorganic world. But we are not warranted in concluding that this\nprocess of derivation was an active evolution. On the contrary, all\nevidence is against the supposition that brute matter is able to evolve\nof itself into living matter. It can, indeed, be transformed into\nplants, animals, and men through the action of an appropriate external\nagent (_i.e._ solely through the agency of the living organism), but\nit cannot acquire the perfections of living matter by means of its\nown inherent powers. It cannot vitalize, or sensitize, itself through\nthe unaided activity of its own physicochemical energies. Only when\nit comes under the superior influence of pre\u00ebxistent life can it\nascend to higher degrees of entitive perfection. It does not become\nof itself life, sensibility, and intelligence. It must first be drawn\ninto communion with what is already alive, before it can acquire life\nand sensibility, or share indirectly in the honors of intelligence (as\nthe substrate of the cerebral imagery whence the human mind abstracts\nits conceptual thought). Apart from this unique influence, inorganic\nmatter is impotent to raise itself in the scale of existence, but, if\ncaptured, molded, and transmuted by a living being, it may progress to\nthe point of forming with the human soul one single nature, one single\nsubstance, one single person. The evolution of matter exemplified in\norganic metabolism is obviously passive, and such an evolution of\nthe primal organisms out of non-living matter even the opponents of\nthe hypothesis of spontaneous generation concede. But spontaneous\ngeneration implies an active evolution of the living from the lifeless,\nand this is the point around which the controversy wages. It would, of\ncourse, be utterly irrational to deny to the Supreme Lord and Author of\nLife the power of vivifying matter previously inanimate and inert, and\nhence the origin of organic life from inorganic matter by a formative\n(not creative) act of the Creator is the conclusion to which the denial\nof abiogenesis logically leads.\n\nThe hypothesis of spontaneous generation is far older than the theory\nof transformism. It goes back to the Greek predecessors of Aristotle,\nat least, and may be of far greater antiquity. It was based, as is well\nknown, upon an erroneous interpretation of natural facts, which was\nuniversally accepted up to the close of the 17th century. As we can\ndo no more than recount a few outstanding incidents of its long and\ninteresting history here, the reader is referred to the VII chapter of\nWasmann\u2019s \u201cModern Biology\u201d and the VIII chapter of Windle\u2019s \u201cVitalism\nand Scholasticism\u201d for the details which we are obliged to omit.\n\n\n                  \u00a7 2. The Law of Genetic Continuity\u2014\n\nFrom time immemorial the sudden appearance of maggots in putrescent\nmeat had been a matter of common knowledge, and the ancients were\nmisled into regarding the phenomenon as an instance of a _de novo_\norigin of life from dead matter. The error in question persisted until\nthe year 1698, when it was decisively disproved by a simple experiment\nof the Italian physician Francesco Redi. He protected the meat from\nflies by means of gauze. Under these conditions, no maggots appeared\nin the meat, while the flies, unable to reach the meat, deposited\ntheir eggs on the gauze. Thus it became apparent that the maggots were\nlarval flies, which emerged from fertilized eggs previously deposited\nin decaying meat by female flies. Antonio Vallisnieri, another\nItalian, showed that the fruit-fly had a similar life-history. As a\nresult of these discoveries, Redi rejected the theory of spontaneous\ngeneration and formulated the first article of the Law of Genetic Vital\nContinuity: _Omne vivum ex vivo_.\n\nMeanwhile, the first researches conducted by means of the newly\ninvented compound microscope disclosed what appeared to be fresh\nevidence in favor of the discarded hypothesis. The unicellular\norganisms known as infusoria were found to appear suddenly in hay\ninfusions, and their abrupt appearance was ascribed to spontaneous\ngeneration. Towards the end of the 18th century, however, a Catholic\npriest named Lazzaro Spallanzani refuted this new argument by\nsterilizing the infusions with heat and by sealing the containers as\nprotection against contamination by floating spores or cysts. After\nthe infusions had been boiled for a sufficient time and then sealed,\nno organisms could be found in them, no matter how long they were kept.\nWe now know that protozoa and protophytes do not originate _de novo_ in\ninfusions. Their sudden appearance in cultures is due to the deposition\nof spores or cysts from the air, etc.\n\nThe possibility that the non-germination of life in sterilized\ninfusions kept in sealed containers might be due to the absence of\noxygen, removed by boiling and excluded by sealing, left open a\nsingle loophole, of which the 19th century defenders of abiogenesis\nproceeded to avail themselves. Pasteur, however, by employing\nsterilized cultures, which he aerated with filtered air exclusively,\nsucceeded in depriving his opponents of this final refuge, and\nthereby completely demolished the last piece of evidence in favor\nof spontaneous generation. Prof. Wm. Sydney Thayer, in an address\ndelivered at the Sorbonne, May 22, 1923, gives the following account\nof Pasteur\u2019s experiments in this field: \u201cThen, naturally (1860-1876)\ncame the famous studies on spontaneous generation undertaken against\nthe advice of his doubting masters, Biot and Dumas. On the basis of\ncareful and well-conceived experiments he demonstrated the universal\npresence of bacteria in air, water, dust; he showed the variation in\ndifferent regions of the bacterial content of the air; he demonstrated\nthe permanent sterility of media protected from contamination, and he\ninsisted on the inevitable derivation of every living organism from\none of its kind. \u2018No,\u2019 he said, \u2018there is no circumstance known today\nwhich justifies us in affirming that microscopic organisms have come\ninto the world, without parents like themselves. Those who made this\nassertion have been the playthings of illusions or ill-made experiments\ninvalidated by errors which they have not been able to appreciate or\nto avoid.\u2019 In the course of these experiments he demonstrated the\nnecessity of reliable methods of sterilization for instruments or\nculture media, of exposure for half an hour to moist heat at 120\u00b0 or to\ndry air at 180\u00b0. And behold! our modern procedures of sterilization\nand the basis of antiseptic surgery.\u201d (_Science_, Dec. 14, 1923, p.\n477.) Pasteur brought to a successful completion the work of Redi and\nSpallanzani. Henceforth spontaneous generation was deprived of all\ncountenance in the realm of biological fact.\n\nMeanwhile, the cytologists and embryologists of the last century\nwere adding article after article to the law of genetic cellular\ncontinuity, thus forging link by link the fatal chain of severance\nthat inexorably debars abiogenesis from the domain of natural science.\nWith the formulation of the great Cell Theory by Schleiden and Schwann\n(1838-1839), it became clear that the cell is the fundamental unit\nof organization in the world of living matter. It has proved to be,\nat once, the simplest organism capable of independent existence and\nthe basic unit of structure and function in all the more complex\nforms of life. The protists (unicellular protozoans and protophytes)\nconsist each of a single cell, and no simpler type of organism is\nknown to science. The cell is the building brick out of which the\nhigher organisms or metists (_i.e._ the multicellular and tissued\nmetazoans and metaphytes) are constructed, and all multicellular\norganisms are, at one time or other in their career, reduced to the\nsimplicity of a single cell (_v.g._ in the zygote and spore stages).\nThe somatic or tissue cells, which are associated in the metists to\nform one organic whole, are of the same essential type as germ cells\nand unicellular organisms, although the parallelism is more close\nbetween the unicellular organism and the germ cell. The germ cell, like\nthe protist, is equipped with all the potentialities of life, whereas\ntissue cells are specialized for one function rather than another. The\nprotist is a generalized and physiologically-balanced cell, one which\nperforms all the vital functions, and in which the suppression of one\nfunction leads to the destruction of all the rest; while the tissue\ncell is a specialized and physiologically-unbalanced cell limited to\na single function, with the other vital functions in abeyance (though\ncapable of manifesting themselves under certain circumstances).\nNormally, therefore, the tissue cell is functionally incomplete, a part\nand not a whole, whereas the protist is an independent individual,\nbeing, at once, the highest type of cell and the lowest type of\norganism.\n\nAccording to the classic definition of Franz Leydig and Max Schultze,\nthe cell is a mass of protoplasm containing a nucleus, both protoplasm\nand nucleus arising through division of the corresponding elements of\na pre\u00ebxistent cell. In this form the definition is quite general and\napplies to all cells, whether tissue cells, germ cells, or unicellular\norganisms. Moreover, it embodies two principles which still further\ndetermine the law of genetic cellular continuity, namely: _Omnis\ncellula ex cellula_, enunciated by Virchow in 1855, and Flemming\u2019s\nprinciple: _Omnis nucleus ex nucleo_, proclaimed in 1882. In this way,\nCytology supplemented Redi\u2019s formula that every living being is from\na pre\u00ebxistent living being, by adding two more articles, namely, that\nevery living cell is from a pre\u00ebxistent cell, and every new cellular\nnucleus is derived by division from a pre\u00ebxistent cellular nucleus. Now\nneither the nucleus nor the cell-body (the cytoplasm or extranuclear\narea of the cell) is capable of an independent existence. The\ncytoplasm of the severed nerve fibre, when it fails to re\u00ebstablish its\nconnection with the neuron nucleus, degenerates. The enucleated am\u0153ba,\nthough capable of such vital functions as depend upon destructive\nmetabolism, can do nothing which involves constructive metabolism, and\nis, therefore, doomed to perish. The sperm cell, which is a nucleus\nthat has sloughed off most of its cytoplasm, disintegrates, unless\nit regains a haven in the cytoplasm of the egg. Life, accordingly,\ncannot subsist in a unit more simply organized than the cell. No\norganism lives which is simpler than the cell, and the origin of all\nhigher forms of life is reducible, as we shall see, to the origin of\nthe cell. Consequently, new life can originate in no other way than\nby a process of cell-division. All generation or reproduction of new\nlife is dependent upon the division of the cell-body and nucleus of a\npre\u00ebxistent living cell.\n\nHaeckel, it is true, has attempted to question the status of the cell\nas the simplest of organisms, by alleging the existence of cytodes\n(non-nucleated cells) among the bacteria and the blue-green alg\u00e6.\nFurther study, however, has shown that bacteria and blue-green alg\u00e6\nhave a distributed nucleus, like that of certain ciliates, such as\n_Dileptus gigas_ and _Trachelocerca_. In such forms the entire cell\nbody is filled with scattered granules of chromatin called chromioles,\nand this diffuse type of nucleus seems to be the counterpart of the\nconcentrated nuclei found in the generality of cells. At any rate,\nthere is a temporary aggregation of the chromioles at critical stages\nin the life-cycle (such as cell-division), and these scattered\nchromatin granules undergo division, although their distribution to\nthe daughter-cells is not as regular as that obtaining in mitosis. All\nthis is strongly suggestive of their nuclear nature, and cells with\ndistributed nuclei cannot, therefore, be classified as cytodes. In\nfact, the polynuclear condition is by no means uncommon. _Param\u0153cium\naurelia_, for example, has a macronucleus and a micronucleus, and\nthe _Uroleptus mobilis_ has eight macronuclei and from two to four\nmicronuclei. The difference between the polynuclear and diffuse\ncondition seems to be relatively unimportant. In fact, the distributed\nnucleus differs from the morphological nucleus mainly in the absence\nof a confining membrane. From the functional standpoint, the two\nstructures are identical. Hence the possession of a nucleus or its\nequivalent is, to all appearances, a universal characteristic of cells.\nHaeckel\u2019s \u201ccytodes\u201d have proved to be purely imaginary entities. The\nverdict of modern cytologists is that Shultze\u2019s definition of the cell\nmust stand, and that the status of the cell as the simplest of organic\nunits capable of independent existence is established beyond the\npossibility of prudent doubt.\n\nWith the progressive refinement of microscopic technique, it has become\napparent that the law of genetic continuity applies not merely to the\ncell as a whole and to its major parts, the nucleus and the cell-body,\nbut also to the minor components or organelles, which are seen to\nbe individually self-perpetuating by means of growth and division.\nThe typical cell nucleus, as is well known, is a spherical vesicle\ncontaining a semisolid, diphasic network of basichromatin (formerly\n\u201cchromatin\u201d) and oxychromatin (linin) suspended in more fluid medium\nor ground called nuclear sap. When the cell is about to divide, the\nbasichromatin resolves itself into a definite number of short threads\ncalled chromosomes. Now, Boveri found that, in the normal process of\ncell-division known as mitosis, these nuclear threads or chromosomes\nare each split lengthwise and divided into two exactly equivalent\nhalves, the resulting halves being distributed in equal number to the\ntwo daughter-cells produced by the division of the original cell.\nHence, in the year 1903, Boveri added a fourth article to the law of\ngenetic vital continuity, namely: _Omne chromosoma ex chromosomate_.\n\nBut the law in question applies to cytoplasmic as well as nuclear\ncomponents. In physical appearance, the cell-body or cytoplasm\nresembles an emulsion with a clear semiliquid external phase called\nhyaloplasm and an internal phase consisting mainly of large spheres\ncalled macrosomes and minute particles called microsomes, all of which,\ntogether with numerous other formed bodies, are suspended in the clear\nhyaloplasm (hyaline ground-substance). Now certain of these cytoplasmic\ncomponents have long been known to be _self-perpetuating_ by means\nof growth and division, maintaining their continuity from cell to\ncell. The plastids of plant cells, for example, divide at the time of\ncell-division, although their distribution to the daughter-cells does\nnot appear to be as definite and regular as that which obtains in the\ncase of the chromosomes. Similarly, the centrioles or division-foci\nof animal cells are self-propagating by division, but here the\ndistribution to the daughter-cells is exactly equivalent and not at\nrandom as in the case of plastids. In the light of recent research\nit looks as though two other types of cytoplasmic organelles must be\nadded to the list of cellular components, which are individually\nself-perpetuating by growth and division, namely, the chondriosomes\nand the Golgi bodies\u2014\u201cboth mitochondria and Golgi bodies are able to\nassimilate, grow, and divide in the cytoplasm.\u201d (Gatenby.) Wilson is\nof opinion that the law of genetic continuity may have to be extended\neven to those minute granules and particles of the cytosome, which were\nformerly thought to arise _de novo_ in the apparently structureless\nhyaloplasm. Speaking of the emulsified appearance of the starfish and\nsea urchin eggs, he tells us that their protoplasm shows \u201ca structure\nsomewhat like that of an emulsion, consisting of innumerable spheroidal\nbodies suspended in a clear continuous basis or hyaloplasm. These\nbodies are of two general orders of magnitude, namely: larger spheres\nor macrosomes rather closely crowded and fairly uniform in size, and\nmuch smaller microsomes irregularly scattered between the macrosomes,\nand among these are still smaller granules that graduate in size\ndown to the limit of vision with any power (_i.e._ of microscope)\nwe may employ.\u201d (_Science_, March 9, 1923, p. 282.) Now, the limit\nof microscopic vision by the use of the highest-power oil-immersion\nobjectives is one-half the length of the shortest waves of visible\nlight, that is, about 200 submicrons (the submicron being one millionth\nof a millimeter). Particles whose diameter is less than this cannot\nreflect a wave of light, and are, therefore, invisible so far as the\nmicroscope is concerned. By the aid of the ultramicroscope, however,\nwe are enabled to see the halos formed by particles not more than four\nsubmicrons in diameter, which, however, represents the limit of the\nultramicroscope, and is the diameter hypothetically assigned to the\nprotein multimolecule. Since, therefore, we find the particles in the\nprotoplasm of the cell body graduating all the way down to the limit\nof this latter instrument, and since on the very limit of microscopic\nvision we find such minute particles as the centrioles \u201ccapable of\nself-perpetuation by growth and division, and of enlargement to form\nmuch larger bodies,\u201d we cannot ignore the possibility that the\nultramicroscopic particles may have the same powers and may be the\nsources or \u201cformative foci\u201d of the larger formed bodies, which were\nhitherto thought to arise _de novo_.\n\nCertainly, pathology, as we shall see, tells us of ultramicroscopic\ndisease-germs, which are capable of reproduction and maintenance of a\nspecific type, and experimental genetics makes us aware of a linear\nalignment of submicroscopic genes in the nuclear chromosomes, each\ngene undergoing periodic division and perpetual transmission from\ngeneration to generation. The cytologist, therefore, to quote the words\nof Wilson, \u201ccannot resist the evidence that the appearance of a simple\nhomogeneous colloidal substance is deceptive; that it is in reality a\ncomplex, heterogeneous, or polyphasic system. He finds it difficult to\nescape the conclusion, therefore, that the visible and the invisible\ncomponents of the protoplasmic system differ only in their size and\ndegree of dispersion; that they belong to a single continuous series,\nand that the visible structure of protoplasm may give us a rough\nmagnified picture of the invisible.\u201d (_Ibidem_, p. 283.)\n\nIt would seem, therefore, that we must restore to honor, as the fifth\narticle of the law of cellular continuity, the formula, which Richard\nAltmann enunciated on purely speculative grounds in 1892, but which\nthe latest research is beginning to place on a solid factual basis,\nnamely: _Omne granulum ex granulo_. \u201cFor my part,\u201d says the great\ncytologist, Wilson, \u201cI am disposed to accept the probability that\nmany of these particles, as if they were submicroscopical plastids,\nmay have a persistent identity, perpetuating themselves by growth and\nmultiplication without loss of their specific individual type.\u201d And\nhe adds that the facts revealed by experimental embryology (_e.g._,\nthe existence of differentiated zones of specific composition in\nthe cytoplasm of certain eggs) \u201cdrive us to the conclusion that the\nsubmicroscopical components of the hyaloplasm are segregated and\ndistributed according to an ordered system.\u201d (_Ibidem_, p. 283.)\nThe structure of the cell has often been likened to a heterogeneous\nsolution, that is, to a complex polyphasic colloidal system, but this\npower of perpetual division and orderly assortment possessed by the\ncell as a whole and by its single components is the unique property\nof the living protoplasmic system, and is never found in any of the\ncolloidal systems known to physical chemistry, be they organic or\ninorganic.\n\nCells, then, originate solely by division of pre\u00ebxistent cells and even\nthe minor components of the cellular system originate in like fashion,\nnamely: by division of their respective counterparts in the pre\u00ebxistent\nliving cell. Here we have the sum and substance of the fivefold law of\ngenetic continuity, whose promulgation has relegated the hypothesis\nof spontaneous generation to the realms of empty speculation. Waiving\nthe possibility of an _a priori_ argument, by which abiogenesis might\nbe positively excluded, there remains this one consideration, which\nalone is scientifically significant, that, so far as observation goes\nand induction can carry us, the living cell has absolute need of a\nvital origin and can never originate by the exclusive agency of the\nphysicochemical forces native to inorganic matter. If organic life\nexists in simpler terms than the cell, science knows nothing of it, and\nno observed process, simple or complicated, of inorganic nature, nor\nany artificial synthesis of the laboratory, however ingenious, has ever\nsucceeded in duplicating the wonders of the simplest living cell.\n\n\n             \u00a7 3. Chemical Theories of the Origin of Life\n\nIn fact, the very notion of a chemical synthesis of living matter\nis founded on a misconception. It would, indeed, be rash to set\nlimits to the chemist\u2019s power of synthesizing organic compounds, but\nliving protoplasm is not a single chemical compound. Rather it is\na complex system of compounds, enzymes and organelles, co\u00f6rdinated\nand integrated into an organized whole by a persistent principle of\nunity and finality. Organic life, to say nothing at all of its unique\ndynamics, is a morphological as well as a chemical problem; and,\nwhile it is conceivable that the chemist might synthesize all the\ncompounds found in dead protoplasm, to reproduce a single detail of\nthe ultramicroscopic structure of a living cell lies wholly beyond his\npower and province. \u201cLong ago,\u201d says Wilson (in the already quoted\naddress on the \u201cPhysical Basis of Life\u201d), \u201cit became perfectly plain\nthat what we call protoplasm is not chemically a single substance. It\nis a mixture of many substances, a mixture in high degree complex, the\nseat of varied and incessant transformations, yet one which somehow\nholds fast for countless generations to its own specific type. The\nevidence from every source demonstrates that the cell is a complex\norganism, a microcosm, a living system.\u201d (_Science_, March 9, 1923, p.\n278.)\n\nWith the chemist, analysis must precede synthesis, and it is only after\na structural formula has been determined by means of quantitative\nanalysis supplemented by analogy and comparison, that a given compound\ncan be successfully synthesized. But living protoplasm and its\nstructures elude such analysis. Intravitous staining is inadequate even\nas a means of qualitative analysis, and tests of a more drastic nature\ndestroy the life and organization, which they seek to analyze. \u201cWith\none span,\u201d says Am\u00e9 Pictet, Professor of Chemistry at the University\nof Geneva, \u201cwe will now bridge the entire distance separating the\nfirst products of plant assimilation from its final product, namely,\nliving matter. And it should be understood at the outset that I employ\nthis term \u2018living matter\u2019 only as an abbreviation, and to avoid long\ncircumlocution. You should not, in reality, attribute life to matter\nitself; it has not, it cannot have both living molecules and dead\nmolecules. Life requires an organization, which is that of cellular\nstructure, but it remains, in contradistinction to it, outside the\ndomain of strict chemistry. It is none the less true that the content\nof a living cell must differ in its chemical nature from the content of\na dead cell. It is entirely from this point of view that the phenomenon\nof life pertains to my subject.... A living cell, both in its chemical\ncomposition and in its morphological structure, is an organism of\nextraordinary complexity. The protoplasm that it incloses is a mixture\nof very diverse substances. But if there be set aside on the one hand\nthose substances which are in the process of assimilation and on the\nother those which are the by-products of nutrition, and which are in\nthe process of elimination, there remain the protein or albuminous\nsubstances, and these must be considered, if not the essential factor\nof life, at least the theater of its manifestations.... Chemistry,\nhowever, is totally ignorant, or nearly so, of the constitution of\nliving albumen, for chemical methods of investigation at the very\noutset kill the living cell. The slightest rise in temperature,\ncontact with the solvent, the very powerful effect of even the mildest\nreactions cause the transformation that needs to be prevented, and the\nchemist has nothing left but dead albumen.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1916, pp. 208, 209.)\n\nChemical analysis associated with physical analysis by means of the\npolariscope, spectroscope, x-rays, ultramicroscope, etc. is extremely\nuseful in determining the structure of inorganic units like the atom\nand the molecule. Both, too, throw valuable light on the problem of the\nstructure of non-living multimolecules such as the crystal units of\ncrystalloids and the ultramicrons of colloids, but they furnish no clue\nto the submicroscopical morphology of the living cell. Such methods do\nnot enable us to examine anything more than the \u201cphysical substrate\u201d\nof life, and that, only after it has been radically altered; for it\nis not the same after life has flown. At all events, the integrating\nprinciple, the formative determinant, which binds the components of\nliving protoplasm into a unitary system, which makes of them a single\ntotality instead of a mere sum or fortuitous aggregate of disparate\nand unco\u00f6rdinated factors, and which gives to them a determinate and\npersistent specificity that can hold its own amid a perpetual fluxion\nof matter and continual flow of energy, this is forever inaccessible to\nthe chemist, and constitutes a phenomenon of which the inorganic world\naffords no parallel.\n\nWith these facts in mind, we can hardly fail to be amused whenever\ncertain simple chemical reactions obtained _in vitro_ are hailed as\n\u201cclue to the origin of life.\u201d When it was found, for instance, that,\nunder certain conditions, an aldehyde (probably formaldehyde) is\nformed in a colloidal solution of chlorophyll in water, if exposed to\nsunlight, the discovery gave rise to Bach\u2019s formaldehyde-hypothesis;\nfor Alexis Bach saw in this reaction \u201ca first step in the origin of\nlife.\u201d As formaldehyde readily undergoes aldol condensation into\na syrupy fluid called formose, when a dilute aqueous solution of\nformaldehyde is saturated with calcium hydroxide and allowed to\nstand for several days, there was no difficulty in conceiving the\ntransition from formaldehyde to the carbohydrates; for formose is a\nmixture containing several hexose sugars, and Fischer has succeeded in\nisolating therefrom acrose, a simple sugar having the same formula as\nglucose, namely: C\u2086H\u2081\u2082O\u2086. Glyceraldehyde undergoes a similar\ncondensation. In view of these facts, carbohydrate-production in green\nplants was interpreted as a photosynthesis of these substances from\nwater and carbon dioxide, with chlorophyll acting a sensitizer to\nabsorb the radiant energy necessary for the reaction. The first step in\nthe process was thought to be a reduction of carbonic acid to formic\nacid and then to formaldehyde, the latter being at once condensed into\nglucose, which in turn was supposed to be dehydrated and polymerized\ninto starch. From the carbohydrates thus formed and the nitrates of the\nsoil the plant could then synthesize proteins, while oxidation of the\ncarbohydrates into fatty acids would lead to the formation of fats.\nHence Bach regarded the formation of formaldehyde in the presence of\nwater, carbon dioxide, chlorophyll, and sunlight as the \u201cfirst step in\nthe production of life.\u201d Bateson, however, does not find the suggestion\na very helpful one, and evaluates it at its true worth in the following\ncontemptuous aside: \u201cWe should be greatly helped,\u201d he says, \u201cby\nsome indication as to whether the origin of life has been single or\nmultiple.\u201d Modern opinion is, perhaps, inclined to the multiple theory,\nbut we have no real evidence. Indeed, the problem still stands outside\nthe range of scientific investigation, and when we hear the spontaneous\nformation of formaldehyde mentioned as a possible first step in\nthe origin of life, we think of Harry Lauder in the character of a\nGlasgow schoolboy pulling out his treasures from his pocket\u2014\u201cThat\u2019s a\nwassher\u2014for makkin\u2019 motor cars.\u201d (\u201cPresidential Address,\u201d cf. Smithson.\nInst. Rpt. for 1915, p. 375.)\n\nBach, moreover, takes it for granted that the formation of formaldehyde\nis really the first step in the synthesis performed by the green plant,\nand he claims that formaldehyde is formed when carbon dioxide is passed\nthrough a solution of a salt of uranium in the presence of sunlight.\nFenton makes a similar claim in the case of magnesium, asserting that\ntraces of formaldehyde are discernible when metallic magnesium is\nimmersed in water saturated with carbon dioxide. But at present it\nbegins to look as though the spontaneous formation and condensation of\nformaldehyde had nothing to do with the process that actually occurs\nin green plants. Certain chemists, while admitting that an aldehyde\nis formed when chlorophyll, water, and air are brought together in\nthe presence of sunlight, deny that the aldehyde in question is\nformaldehyde, and they also draw attention to the fact that this\naldehyde may be formed in an atmosphere entirely destitute of carbon\ndioxide. In fact, the researches conducted by Willst\u00e4tter and Stoll,\nand later (in 1916) by J\u00f6rgensen and Kidd tend to discredit the common\nnotion that carbohydrate-production in plants is the result of a direct\nunion of water and carbon dioxide. Botany textbooks still continue to\nparrot the traditional view. We cannot any longer, however, be sure but\nthat the term photosynthesis may be a misnomer.\n\nCarbohydrate-formation in plants seems to be more analogous to\ncarbohydrate-formation in animals than was formerly thought to be the\ncase. In animals, as is well known, glycogen or animal starch is formed\nnot by direct synthesis, but by de\u00e4mination and reduction of proteins.\nIn a similar way, it is thought that the production of carbohydrates\nin plants may be due to a breaking down of the phytyl ester in\nchlorophyll, the chromogen group functioning (under the action of\nlight) alternately as a dissociating enzyme in the formation of sugars\nand a synthesizing enzyme in the reconstruction of chlorophyll. Phytol\nis an unsaturated alcohol obtained when chlorophyll is saponified by\nmeans of caustic alkalis. Its formula is C\u2082\u2080H\u2083\u2089OH, and chlorophyll\nconsists of a chromogen group containing magnesium (MgN\u2084C\u2083\u2082H\u2083\u2080O) united\nto a diester of phytyl and methyl alcohols.\n\nExperimental results are at variance with the theory that chlorophyll\nacts as a sensitizer in bringing about a reduction of carbonic\nacid, after the analogy of eosin, which in the presence of light\naccelerates the decomposition of silver salts on photographic plates.\nWillst\u00e4tter found that, when a colloidal solution of the pure extract\nof chlorophyll in water is exposed to sunlight and an atmosphere\nconsisting of carbon dioxide exclusively, no formaldehyde is formed,\nbut the chlorophyll is changed into yellow ph\u00e6ophytin owing to the\nremoval of the magnesium from the chromogen group by the action of the\ncarbonic acid. J\u00f6rgensen, on the other hand, discovered that in an\natmosphere of pure oxygen, formaldehyde is formed, apparently by the\nsplitting off and reduction of the phytyl ester of chlorophyll. Soon,\nhowever, the formaldehyde is oxidized to formic acid, which replaces\nthe chlorophyllic magnesium with hydrogen, thus causing the green\nchlorophyll to degenerate into yellow ph\u00e6ophytin and finally to lose\nits color altogether. The dissociation of the chromogen group may be\ndue to the fact that the reaction takes place _in vitro_, and may not\noccur in the living plant. At all events, it would seem that plants,\nlike animals, manufacture carbohydrates by a destructive rather than a\nconstructive process, and that water and carbon dioxide serve rather\nas materials for the regeneration of chlorophyll than as materials out\nof which sugars are directly synthesized.\n\nA new theory has been proposed by Dr. Oskar Baudisch, who seems to\nhave sensed the irrelevance of the formaldehyde hypothesis, and to\nhave sought another solution in connection with the chromogen group of\nchlorophyll. He finds a more promising starting-point in formaldoxime,\nwhich, he claims, readily unites with such metals as magnesium and iron\nand with formaldehyde, in the presence of light containing ultra-violet\nrays, to form organic compounds analogous to the chromogen complexes\nin chlorophyll and h\u00e6moglobin. Oximes are compounds formed by the\ncondensation of one molecule of an aldehyde with one molecule of\nhydroxylamine (NH\u2082OH) and the elimination of a molecule of water. Hence\nDr. Baudisch imagines that, given formaldoxime (H\u2082C:N\u00b7OH), magnesium,\nand ultra-violet rays, we might expect a spontaneous formation of\nchlorophyll leading eventually to the production of organic life. \u201cIt\nis his theory that life may have been caused through the direct action\nof sunlight upon water, air, and carbon dioxide in the ancient geologic\npast when, he believes, sunlight was more intense and contained\nmore ultra-violet light and the air contained more water vapor and\ncarbon dioxide than at the present time.\u201d (_Science_, April 6, 1923,\nSupplement XII.)\n\nThis is the old Spencerian evasion, the fatuous appeal to \u201cconditions\nunlike those we know,\u201d the unverified and unverifiable assumption\nthat an unknown past must have been more favorable to spontaneous\ngeneration than the known present. In arch\u00e6ozoic times, the temperature\nwas higher, the partial pressure of atmospheric carbon dioxide\ngreater, the percentage of ultra-violet rays in sunlight larger.\nSuch contentions are interesting, if true, but, for all that, they\nmay, \u201clike the flowers that bloom in the spring,\u201d have nothing to do\nwith the case. Nature does not, and the laboratory cannot, reproduce\nthe conditions which are said to have brought about the spontaneous\ngeneration of formaldoxime and its progressive transmutation into\nphycocyanin, chlorophyll and the blue-green alg\u00e6. What value, then,\nhave these conjectures? If it be the function of natural science to\ndiscount actualities in favor of possibilities, to draw arguments from\nignorance, and to accept the absence of disproof as a substitute for\ndemonstration, then the expedient of invoking the unknown in support\nof a speculation is scientifically legitimate. But, if the methods of\nscience are observation and induction, if it proceeds according to the\nprinciple of the uniformity of nature, and does not utterly belie its\nclaim of resting upon factual realities rather than the figments of\nfancy, then all this hypothecation, which is so flagrantly at variance\nwith the actual data of experience and the unmistakable trend of\ninductive reasoning, is not science at all, but sheer credulity and\nsuperstition.\n\nWhen we ask by what right men of science presume to lift the veil of\nmystery from a remote past, which no one has observed, we are told that\nthe justification of this procedure is the principle of the uniformity\nof nature or the invariability of natural laws. Nature\u2019s laws are the\nsame yesterday, today, and forever. Hence the scientist, who wishes\nto penetrate into the unknown past, has only to \u201cprolong the methods\nof nature from the present into the past.\u201d (Tyndall.) If we reject\nthe soundness of this principle, we automatically cut ourselves off\nfrom all certainty regarding that part of the world\u2019s history which\nantecedes human observation. Either nature\u2019s laws change, or they do\nnot. If they never change, then Spontaneous Generation is quite as\nmuch excluded from the past as it is from the present. If, however, as\nHamann and Fechner explicitly maintain, nature\u2019s laws do change, then,\nobviously, no knowledge whatever is possible respecting the past, since\nit is solely upon the assumption of the immutable constancy of such\nlaws that we can venture to reconstruct prehistory.\n\nThe puerile notion that the synthesis of organic substances in the\nlaboratory furnishes a clue to the origin of organic life on earth is\ndue to a confusion of organic, with living and organized, substances.\nIt is only in the production of organic substances that the chemist\ncan vie with the plant or animal. These are lifeless and unorganized\ncarbon compounds, which are termed organic because they are elaborated\nby living organisms as a metaplastic by-product of their metabolism.\nSuch substances, however, are not to be confounded with animate matter,\n_e.g._ a living cell and its organelles, or even with organized matter,\n_e.g._ dead protoplasm. These the chemist cannot duplicate; for\nvitality and organization, as we have seen, are things that elude both\nhis analysis and his synthesis. Even with respect to the production of\norganic substances, the parallelism between the living cell and the\nchemical laboratory is far from being a perfect one. Speaking of the\nmetaplastic or organic products of cells, Benjamin Moore says: \u201cMost\nof these are so complex that they have not yet been synthesized by the\norganic chemist; nay, even of those that have been synthesized, it may\nbe remarked that all proof is wanting that the syntheses have been\ncarried out in identically the same fashion and by the employment of\nthe same forms of energy in the case of the cell as in the chemist\u2019s\nlaboratory. The conditions in the cell are widely different, and at the\ntemperature of the cell and with such chemical materials as are at hand\nin the cell no such organic syntheses have been artificially carried\nout by the forms of energy extraneous to living tissue.\u201d (\u201cRecent\nAdvances in Physiology and Bio-Chemistry,\u201d p. 10.) Be that as it may,\nhowever, the prospect of a laboratory synthesis of an organic substance\nlike chlorophyll affords no ground whatever for expecting a chemical\nsynthesis of living matter. The chlorophyllic tail is inadequate to\nthe task of wagging the dog of organic life. In this connection, Yves\nDelage\u2019s sarcastic comment on Schaaffhausen\u2019s theory is worthy of\nrecall. The latter had suggested (in 1892) that life was initiated by a\nchemical reaction, in which water, air, and mineral salts united under\nthe influence of light and heat to produce a colorless _Protococcus_,\nwhich subsequently acquired chlorophyll and became a _Protococcus\nviridis_. \u201cIf the affair is so simple,\u201d writes Delage, \u201cwhy does\nnot the author produce a few specimens of this _protococcus_ in his\nlaboratory? We will gladly supply him with the necessary chlorophyll.\u201d\n(\u201cLa structure du protoplasma et les th\u00e9ories sur l\u2019h\u00e9r\u00e9dit\u00e9,\u201d p. 402.)\n\nAnother consideration, which never appears to trouble the visionaries\nwho propound theories of this sort, is the fact that the inert elements\nand blind forces of inorganic nature are, if left to themselves,\nutterly impotent to duplicate even so much as the feats of the\nchemical laboratory, to say nothing at all of the more wonderful\nachievements possible only to living organisms. In the laboratory,\nthe physicochemical forces of the mineral world are co\u00f6rdinated,\nregulated, and directed by the guiding intelligence of the chemist.\nIn that heterogeneous conglomerate, which we call brute matter, no\nsuch guiding principle exists, and the only possible automatic results\nare those which the fortuitous concurrence of blind factors avails to\nproduce. Chance of this kind may vie with art in the production of\nrelatively simple combinations or systems, but where the conditions are\nas complex as those, which the synthesis of chlorophyll presupposes,\nchance is impotent and regulation absolutely imperative. How much more\nis this true, when there is question of the production of an effect\nso complicatedly telic as the living organism! \u201cI venture to think,\u201d\nsays Sir William Tilden, in a letter to the London _Times_ (Sept. 10,\n1912), \u201cthat no chemist will be prepared to suggest a process by which,\nfrom the interaction of such materials (viz., inorganic substances),\nanything approaching a substance of the nature of a proteid could be\nformed or, if by a complex series of changes a compound of this kind\nwere conceivably produced, that it would present the characters of\nliving protoplasm.\u201d In the concluding sentence of his letter, the\ngreat chemist seems to deprecate even the discussion of a chemical\nsynthesis of living matter, whether spontaneous or artificial. \u201cFar\nbe it from any man of science,\u201d he says, \u201cto affirm that any given set\nof phenomena is not a fit subject of inquiry and that there is any\nlimit to what may be revealed in answer to systematic and well-directed\ninvestigation. In the present instance, however, it appears to me that\nthis is not a field for the chemist nor one in which chemistry is\nlikely to afford any assistance whatever.\u201d In any case, the idea that a\nchaos of unassorted elements and undirected forces could succeed where\nthe skill of the chemist fails is preposterous. No known or conceivable\nprocess, or group of processes, at work in inorganic nature, is equal\nto the task. Chance is an explanation only for minds insensible to the\nbeauty and order of organic life.\n\nDarwin inoculated biological science with this Epicurean metaphysics,\nwhen, in his \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d he ascribed discriminating and\nselective powers of great delicacy and precision to the blind factors\nof a heterogeneous and variable environment. He compared natural\nselection to artificial selection, and in so doing, he was led\nastray by a false implication of his own analogy\u2014\u201cI have called this\nprinciple,\u201d he says, \u201cby which each slight variation, if useful, is\npreserved, by the term natural selection, in order to mark its relation\nto man\u2019s power of selection.\u201d (\u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d 6th ed., c. III,\np. 58.) Having likened the unintelligent and fortuitous selection\nand elimination exercised by the environment to the intelligent and\npurposive selection and elimination practiced by animal breeders and\nhorticulturists, he pressed the analogy to the unwarranted extent of\nattributing to a blind, lifeless, and impersonal aggregate of minerals,\nliquids, and gases superhuman powers of discretion. To preserve\neven the semblance of parity, he ought first to have expurgated the\nprocess of artificial selection by getting rid of the element of\nhuman intelligence, which lurks therein, and vitiates its parallelism\nwith the unconscious and purposeless havoc wrought at random by the\nblind and unco\u00f6rdinated agencies of the environment. If inorganic\nnature were a vast and multifarious mold, a preformed sieve with\nholes of different sizes, a separator for sorting coins of various\ndenominations, Darwin\u2019s idea would be, in some degree, defensible, but\nthis would only transfer the problem of cosmic order and intelligence\nfrom the organism to the environment. As a matter of fact, the\nmechanism of the environment is far too _simple_ in its structure\nand too _general_ in its influence to account for the complexities\nand specificities of organisms, that is, for the morphology and\nspecific differences of plants and animals. Hence the selective work\nof the environment is negligible in the positive sense, and consists,\nfor the most part, in a tendency to eliminate the abnormal and the\nsubnormal. On the other hand, the environment as well as the organism\nis fundamentally teleological, and the environmental mechanism, though\nsimple and general, is nevertheless expressly preadapted for the\nmaintenance of organic life. Henderson, the bio-chemist of Harvard, has\nshown conclusively, in his \u201cFitness of the Environment\u201d (1913), that\nthe environment itself has been expressly selected with this finality\nin view, and that the inorganic world, while not the active cause, is,\nnevertheless, the pre\u00f6rdained complement of organic life.\n\nSimple constructions may, indeed, be due to pure accident as well\nas deliberate art, inasmuch as they presuppose but few and easy\nconditions. Complex constructions, on the contrary, provided they be\nsystematic and not chaotic, are not producible by accident, but only\nby art, because they require numerous and complicated conditions.\nOperating individually, the unconscious factors of inorganic nature\ncan produce simple and homogeneous constructions such as crystals.\nOperating in unco\u00f6rdinated concurrence with one another, these blind\nand unrelated agencies produce complex chaotic formations such as\nmountains and islands, mere heterogeneous conglomerates, destitute\nof any determinate size, shape, or symmetry, constructions in which\nevery single item and detail is the result of factors each of\nwhich is independent of the other. In short, the efficacy of the\nunconscious and uncoordinated physicochemical factors of inorganic\nnature is limited to fortuitous results, which serve no purpose,\nembody no intelligible law, convey no meaning nor idea, and afford\nno \u00e6sthetic satisfaction, being mere aggregates or sums rather than\nnatural units and real totalities. But it does not extend to the\nproduction of complex systematic formations such as living organisms\nor human artefacts. Left to itself, therefore, inorganic nature might\nconceivably duplicate the simplest artefacts such as the chipped flints\nof the savage, and it might also construct a complex heterogeneous\nchaos of driftwood, mud, and sand like the Great Raft of the Red River,\nbut it would be utterly impotent to construct a complicated telic\nsystem comparable to an animal, a clock, or even an organic compound,\nlike chlorophyll.\n\nIn this connection, it is curious to note how extremely myopic the\nscientific materialist can be, when there is question of recognizing\na manifestation of Divine intelligence in the stupendous teleology of\nthe living organism, and how incredibly lynx-eyed he becomes, when\nthere is question of detecting evidences of human intelligence in the\neoliths alleged to have been the implements of a \u201cTertiary Man.\u201d In\nthe latter case, he is never at a loss to determine the precise degree\nof chipping, at which an eolith ceases to be interpretable as the\nfortuitous product of unconscious processes, and points infallibly to\nthe intelligent authorship of man, but he grows strangely obtuse to\nthe psychic implications of teleology, when it comes to explaining the\nsymmetry of a starfish or the beauty of a Bird of Paradise.\n\nIn conclusion, it is clear that the hypothesis of a spontaneous\norigin of organic life from inorganic matter has in its favor neither\nfactual evidence nor aprioristic probability, but is, on the contrary,\nruled out of court by the whole force of the scientific principle of\ninduction. To recapitulate, there are no subcellular organisms, and\nall cellular organisms (which is the same as saying, all organisms),\nbe they unicellular or multicellular, originate exclusively by\nreproduction, that is, by generation from living parents of the same\norganic type or species. This is the law of genetic vital continuity,\nwhich, by the way, Aristotle had formulated long before Harvey, when\nhe said: \u201cIt appears that all living beings come from a germ, and the\ngerm from parents.\u201d (\u201cDe Generatione Animalium,\u201d lib. I, cap. 17.) All\nreproduction, however, is reducible to a process of cell-division. That\nsuch is the case with unicellular organisms is evident from the very\ndefinition of a cell. That it is also true of multicellular organisms\ncan be shown by a review of the various forms of reproduction occurring\namong plants and animals.\n\n\n                 \u00a7 4. =Reproduction and Rejuvenation=\n\nReproduction, the sole means by which the torch of life is relayed\nfrom generation to generation, the exclusive process by which\nliving individuals arise and races are perpetuated, consists in the\nseparation of a germ from the parent organism as a physical basis for\nthe development of a new organism. The germ thus separated may be\nmany-celled or one-celled, as we shall see presently, but the separated\ncells, be they one or many, have their common and exclusive source in\nthe process of mitotic cell-division. In a few cases, this divisional\npower or energy of the cell seems to be perennial by virtue of an\ninherent inexhaustibility. In most cases, however, it is perennial by\nvirtue of a restorative process involving nuclear reorganization. In\nthe former cases, which are exceptional, the cellular stream of life\nappears to flow onward forever with steady current, but as a general\nrule it ebbs and flows in cycles, which involve a periodic rise\nand fall of divisional energy. The phenomena of the life-cycle are\ncharacteristic of most, perhaps all, organisms. The complete life-cycle\nconsists of three phases or periods, namely: an adolescent period of\nhigh vitality, a mature period of balanced metabolism, and a senescent\nperiod of decline. Each life-cycle begins with the germination of the\nnew organism and terminates with its death, and it is reproduction\nwhich constitutes the connecting link between one life-cycle and\nanother.\n\nReproduction, as previously intimated, is mainly of two kinds, namely:\nsomatogenic reproduction, which is less general and confined to the\nmetists, and cytogenic reproduction, which is common to metists and\nprotists, and which is the ordinary method by which new organisms\noriginate. Reproduction is termed somatogenic, when the germ separated\nfrom the body of the parent consists of a whole mass of somatic or\ntissue cells not expressly set aside and specialized for reproductive\npurposes. Reproduction is termed cytogenic, when the germ separated\nfrom the parent or parents consists of a single cell (_e.g._ a spore,\ngamete, or zygote) dedicated especially to reproductive purposes.\n\nCytogenic reproduction may be either nonsexual (agamic) or sexual,\naccording as the cell which constitutes the germ is an agamete or\na gamete. An agamete is a germ cell not specialized for union with\nanother complementary cell, or, in other words, it is a reproductive\ncell incapable of syngamy, _e.g._ a spore. A gamete, on the other hand,\nis a reproductive cell (germ cell) specialized for the production of a\nzygote (a synthetic or diploid germ cell) by union with a complementary\ncell, _e.g._ an egg, or a sperm.\n\nNonsexual cytogenic reproduction is of three kinds, according to the\nnature of the agamete. When a unicellular organism gives rise to two\nnew individuals by simple cell-division, we have fissiparation or\nbinary fission. When a small cell or bud is formed and separated by\ndivision from a larger parent cell, we have budding (gemmation) or\nunequal fission. When the nucleus of the parent cell divides many\ntimes to form a number of daughter-nuclei, which then partition the\ncytoplasm of the parent cell among themselves so as to form a large\nnumber of reproductive cells called spores, we have what is known\nas sporulation or multiple fission. The first and second kind of\nnonsexual reproduction are confined to the protists, but the third\nkind (sporulation) also occurs among the metists.\n\nSexual cytogenic reproduction is based upon gametes or mating germ\ncells. Since complementary gametes are specialized for union with each\nother to form a single synthetic cell, the zygote, the number of their\nnuclear threads or chromosomes is reduced to one half (the _haploid\nnumber_) at the time of maturation, so that the somatic or tissue cells\nof the parent organism have double the number (the _diploid number_)\nof chromosomes present in the reduced or mature gametes. Hence, when\nthe gametes unite to form a zygote, summation is prevented and the\ndiploid number of chromosomes characteristic of the given species of\nplant or animal is simply restored by the process of syngamy or union.\nThe process by which the number of chromosomes is reduced in gametes is\ncalled _meiosis_, and, among the metists, it is distinct from syngamy,\nwhich, in their case, is a separate process called fertilization. Among\nthe protists, we have, besides fertilization, another type of syngamy\ncalled conjugation, which combines meiosis with fertilization.\n\nIn sexual reproduction, we have three kinds of gametes, namely:\nisogametes, anisogametes, and heterogametes. In the type of sexual\nreproduction known as isogamy, the complementary gametes are exactly\nalike both in size and shape. There is no division of labor between\nthem. Each of the fusing gametes is equally fitted for the double\nfunction which they must perform, namely, the kinetic function, which\nenables them to reach each other and unite by means of movement,\nand the trophic function which consists in laying up a store of\nfood for the sustenance of the developing embryo. In anisogamy, the\ncomplementary gametes are alike in shape, but unlike in size, and\nhere we have the beginning of that division of labor, upon which the\ndifference of gender or sex is based. The larger or female gamete is\ncalled a macrogamete. It is specialized for the trophic rather than\nthe kinetic function, being rendered more inert by having a large\namount of yolk or nutrient material stored up within it. The smaller\nor male gamete is called a microgamete. It is specialized for the\nkinetic function, since it contains less yolk and is the more agile of\nthe two. In anisogamy, however, the division of labor is not complete,\nbecause both functions are still retained by either gamete, albeit\nin differing measure. In the heterogamy, the differentiation between\nthe male and female gametes is complete, and they differ from each\nother in structure as well as size. The larger or female gamete has\nno motor apparatus and retains only the trophic function. The kinetic\nfunction is sacrificed to the task of storing up a food supply for the\nembryo. Such a gamete is called a hypergamete or egg. The smaller or\nmale gamete is known, in this case, as a hypogamete or sperm. It has a\nmotor apparatus, but no stored-up nutrients, and has even sloughed off\nmost of its cytoplasm, in its exclusive specialization for the motor\nfunction. In heterogamy, accordingly, the division of labor is complete.\n\nWe may distinguish two principal kinds of sexual reproduction, namely:\nunisexual reproduction and bisexual reproduction. When a single gamete\nsuch as an unfertilized egg gives rise (with, or without, chromosomal\nreduction) to a new organism, we have unisexual reproduction or\nparthenogenesis. Parthenogenesis from a reduced egg gives rise to an\norganism having only the haploid number of chromosomes, as is the case\nwith the drone or male bee, but unreduced eggs give rise to organisms\nhaving the diploid number of chromosomes. Parthenogenesis, as we shall\nsee presently, can, in some cases, be induced by artificial means.\nWhen reproduction takes place from a zygote or diploid germ cell\nformed by the union of two gametes, we have what is known as bisexual\nreproduction or syngamy. It is, perhaps, permissible to distinguish a\nthird or intermediate kind of sexual reproduction, for which we might\ncoin the term autosexual. What we refer to as autosexual reproduction\nis usually known as autogamy, and occurs when a diploid nucleus is\nformed in a germ cell by the union (or, we might say, reunion) of\ntwo daughter-nuclei derived from the same mother-nucleus. Autogamy\noccurs not only among the protists (_e. g._ _Am\u0153ba albida_), but also\namong the metists, as is the case with the brine shrimp, _Artemia\nsalina_, in which the diploid number of chromosomes is restored\nafter reduction by a reunion of the nucleus of the second polar body\nwith the reduced nucleus of the egg. Autogamy is somewhat akin to\nkleistogamy, which occurs among hermaphroditic metists of both the\nplant and animal kingdoms. The violet is a well-known example. In\nkleistogamy or self-fertilization, the zygote is formed by the union of\ntwo gametes derived from the same parent organism. Strictly speaking,\nhowever, kleistogamy is not autogamy, but syngamy, and must, therefore,\nbe classed as bisexual reproduction. It is, of course, necessarily\nconfined to hermaphrodites.\n\nLoeb\u2019s experiments in artificial parthenogenesis have been\nsensationally misinterpreted by some as an artificial production of\nlife. What Jacques Loeb really did was to initiate development in an\nunfertilized egg by the use of chemical and physical excitants. The\nwriter has repeated these experiments with the unfertilized eggs of the\ncommon sea urchin, _Arbacia punctulata_, using very dilute butyric acid\nand hypertonic sea water as stimulants. Cleavage had started within an\nhour and a half after the completion of the aforesaid treatment, and\nthe eggs were in the gastrula stage by the following morning (9 hours\nlater). In three days, good specimens of the larval stage known as the\npluteus could be found swimming in the normal sea water to which the\neggs had been transferred from the hypertonic solution. Since mature\nsea urchin eggs undergo reduction before insemination takes place,\nthe larval sea urchins arising from these artificially activated\neggs had the reduced or haploid number of chromosomes instead of the\ndiploid number possessed by normal larv\u00e6 arising from eggs activated\nby the sperm. For, in fertilization, the sperm not only activates the\negg, but is also the means of securing biparental inheritance, by\ncontributing its quota of chromosomes to the zygotic complex. Hence,\nit is only in the former function, _i. e._ of initiating cleavage in\nthe egg, that a chemical excitant can replace the sperm. In any case,\nit is evident that these experiments do not constitute an exception\nto the law of genetic cellular continuity. The artificially activated\negg comes from the ovaries of a living female sea urchin, and in this\nthere is small consolation for the exponent of abiogenesis. The terse\ncomment of an old Irish Jesuit sizes up the situation very aptly: \u201cThe\nBlue Flame Factory,\u201d he said, \u201chas announced another discovery of the\nsecret of life. A scientist made an egg and hatched an egg. The only\nunfortunate thing was that the egg he hatched was not the egg he made.\u201d\nHow an experiment of this sort could be interpreted as an artificial\nproduction of life is a mystery. The only plausible explanation is that\ngiven by Professor Wilson, who traces it to the popular superstition\nthat the egg is a lifeless substrate, which is animated by the sperm.\nThe idea owes its origin to the spermists of the 17th century, who\ndefended this doctrine against the older school of preformationists\nknown as ovists. It is now, however, an embryological commonplace that\negg and sperm are both equally cellular, equally protoplasmic, and\nequally vital.\n\nThe phenomena of the life-cycle in organisms find their explanation in\nwhat, perhaps, is inherent in all living matter, namely, a tendency to\ninvolution and senescence. This tendency, in the absence of a remedial\nprocess of rejuvenation, leads inevitably to death. Living matter seems\nto \u201crun down\u201d like a clock, and to stand in similar need of a periodic\n\u201crewinding.\u201d This reinvigoration of protoplasm is accomplished by means\nof several different types of nuclear reorganization. Since no nuclear\nreorganization occurs in somatogenic reproduction, there seem to be\nlimits to this type of propagation. Plants, like the potato and the\napple, cannot be propagated indefinitely by means of tubers, shoots,\nstems, etc. The stock plays out in time, and, ever and anon, recourse\nmust be had to seedlings. Hence a process of nuclear reorganization\nseems, in most cases, at least, to be essential for the restoration of\nvitality and the continuance of life. Whether this need of periodic\nrenewal is absolutely universal, we cannot say. The banana has been\npropagated for over a century by the somatogenic method, and there\nare a few other instances in which there appears to be no limit to\nthis type of reproduction. Nevertheless, the tendency to decline is\nso common among living beings that the rare exceptions serve only to\nconfirm (if they do not follow) the general rule.\n\nIn cytogenic reproduction three kinds of rejuvenation by means of\nnuclear reorganization are known: (1) amphimixis or syngamy; (2)\nautomixis or autogamy; (3) endomixis. In amphimixis or syngamy, two\ngametic (haploid) nuclei of different parental lineage are commingled\nto form the diploid nucleus of the zygote, which is consequently of\nbiparental origin. In automixis or autogamy, two reduced or haploid\nnuclei of the same parental lineage unite to form a diploid nucleus,\nthe uniting nuclei being daughter-nuclei derived from a common parent\nnucleus. In endomixis, the nucleus of the exhausted cell disintegrates\nand fuses with the cytoplasm, out of which it is reformed or\nreconstructed as the germinal nucleus of a rejuvenated cellular series.\nEndomixis occurs as a periodic phenomenon among the protists, and it\nappears to be homologous with parthenogenesis among metists. In certain\nciliates, like the Param\u0153cium, endomixis and syngamy are facultative\nmethods of rejuvenation. This has been proved most conclusively\nby Professor Calkins\u2019 work on _Uroleptus mobilis_, an organism in\nwhich both endomixis and conjugation are amenable to experimental\ncontrol. Nonsexual reproduction in this protozoan (by binary fission)\nis attended with a gradual weakening of metabolic activity, which\nincreases with each successive generation. The initial rate of division\nand metabolic energy can, however, be restored either by conjugation\n(of two individuals), or by endomixis, which takes place (in a single\nindividual) during encystment. The race, however, inevitably dies\nout, if both encystment and conjugation are prevented. Even in such\nprotists as do not exhibit the phenomenon of nuclear reorganization\nthrough sexual reproduction, Kofoid points to the phenomenon of\nalternating periods of rest and rapid cell-division as evidence that\nsome process of periodically-recurrent nuclear organization must exist\nin the organisms, which do not conjugate. This process of nuclear\nreorganization manifested by periodic spurts of renewed divisional\nenergy is, according to Kofoid, a more primitive mode of rejuvenation\nthan endomixis. \u201cThe phenomenon of endomixis,\u201d he says, \u201cappears to be\nsomewhat more like that of parthenogenesis than a more primitive form\nof nuclear reorganization.\u201d (_Science_, April 6, 1923, p. 403.) At all\nevents, it seems safe to conclude that the tendency to senescence is\npretty general among living organisms, and that this tendency, unless\ncounteracted by a periodic reorganization of the nuclear genes, results\ninevitably in the deterioration and final extinction of the race.\n\nIn this inexhaustible power of self-renewal inherent in all forms\nof organic life, the mechanist and the upholder of abiogenesis\nencounter an insuperable difficulty. In inorganic nature, where the\nperpetual-motion device is a chimera, and the law of entropy reigns\nin unchallenged supremacy, nothing analogous to it can be found. The\nactivity of all non-living units of nature, from the hydrogen atom\nto the protein multimolecule, is rigidly determined by the principle\nof the degradation of energy. The inorganic unit cannot operate\notherwise than by externalizing and dissipating irreparably its own\nenergy-content. Nor is its reconstruction and replenishment with energy\never again possible except through the wasteful expenditure of energy\nborrowed from some more richly endowed inorganic unit. In order to pay\nPaul a little, Peter must be robbed of much. Wheresoever atoms are\nbuilt up into complex endothermic molecules, the constructive process\nis rigidly dependent upon the administration thereto of external\nenergy, which in the process of absorption must of necessity fall from\na higher level of intensity. And when the energy thus absorbed by the\ncomplex molecule is again set free by combustion, it is degraded to a\nstill lower potential, from which, without external intervention, it\ncan never rise again to its former plane of intensity. The phenomena\nof radioactivity tell the same tale. All the heavier atoms, at least,\nare constantly disintegrating with a concomitant discharge of energy.\nThere is no compensating process, however, enabling such an atom to\nre-integrate and recharge itself at stated intervals; and, once it\nhas broken down into its component protons and electrons, \u201cnot all\nthe king\u2019s horses nor all the king\u2019s men can ever put Humpty-Dumpty\ntogether again.\u201d In a word, none of the inorganic units of the mineral\nworld exhibits that wonderful power of autonomous recuperation which\na unicellular ciliate manifests when it rejuvenates itself by means\nof endomixis. The inorganic world knows of no constructive process\ncomparable to this. It is only in living beings that we find what\nJames Ward describes as the \u201ctendency to disturb existing equilibria,\nto reverse the dissipative processes which prevail throughout the\ninanimate world, to store and build up where they are ever scattering\nand pulling down, the tendency to conserve individual existence against\nantagonistic forces, to grow and to progress, not inertly taking the\neasier way but seemingly striving for the best, retaining every vantage\nsecured, and working for new ones.\u201d (\u201cOn the Conservation of Energy,\u201d\nI, p. 285.)\n\nSumming up, then, we have seen that the reproductive process, whereby\nthe metists or multicellular organism originate, resolves itself\nultimately into a process of cell-division. The same is true of the\nprotists or unicellular organisms. For all cells, whether they be\nprotists, germ cells, or somatic cells, originate in but one way, and\nthat is, from a pre\u00ebxistent living cell by means of cell-division.\nNeither experimentation nor observation has succeeded in revealing so\nmuch as a single exception to the universal law of genetic cellular\ncontinuity, and the hypothesis of spontogenesis is outlawed, in\nconsequence, by the logic of scientific induction. Even the hope that\nfuture research may bring about an amelioration of its present status\nis entirely unwarranted in view of the manifest dynamic superiority\nof the living organism as compared with any of the inert units of the\ninorganic world. \u201cWhatever position we take on this question,\u201d says\nEdmund B. Wilson, in the conclusion of his work on the Cell, \u201cthe same\ndifficulty is encountered; namely, the origin of that co\u00f6rdinated\nfitness, that power of active adjustment between internal and external\nrelations, which, as so many eminent biological thinkers have insisted,\novershadows every manifestation of life. The nature and origin of this\npower is the fundamental problem of biology. When, after removing\nthe lens of the eye in the larval salamander, we see it restored in\nperfect and typical form by regeneration from the posterior layer of\nthe iris, we behold an adaptive response to changed conditions of which\nthe organism can have no antecedent experience either ontogenetic or\nphylogenetic, and one of so marvelous a character that we are made\nto realize, as by a flash how far we still are from a solution of\nthis problem.\u201d Then, after discussing the attempt of evolutionists to\nbridge the enormous gap that separates living, from lifeless nature,\nhe continues: \u201cBut when all these admissions are made, and when the\nconserving action (_sic_) of natural selection is in the fullest degree\nrecognized, we cannot close our eyes to two facts: first, that we are\nutterly ignorant of the manner in which the idioplasm of the germ cell\ncan so respond to the influence of the environment as to call forth\nan adaptive variation; and second, that the study of the cell has on\nthe whole seemed to widen rather than to narrow the enormous gap that\nseparates even the lowest forms of life from the inorganic world.\u201d\n(\u201cThe Cell,\u201d 2nd edit., pp. 433, 434.)\n\n\n                  \u00a7 5. A \u201cNew\u201d Theory of Abiogenesis\n\nSince true science is out of sympathy with baseless conjectures and\ngratuitous assumptions, one would scarcely expect to find scientists\nopposing the inductive trend of the known facts by preferring mere\npossibilities (if they are even such) to solid actualities. As a matter\nof fact, however, there are not a few who obstinately refuse to abandon\npreconceptions for which they can find no factual justification. The\nbio-chemist, Benjamin Moore, while conceding the bankruptcy of the\nold theory of spontaneous generation, which looked for a _de novo_\norigin of living cells in sterilized cultures, has, nevertheless,\nthe hardihood to propose what he is pleased to term a _new_ one.\nImpressed by the credulity of Charlton Bastian and the autocratic tone\nof Sch\u00e4fer, he sets out to defend as plausible the hypothesis that\nthe origination of life from inert matter may be a contemporaneous,\nperhaps, daily, phenomenon, going on continually, but invisible to us,\nbecause its initial stages take place in the submicroscopic world.\nBy the time life has emerged into the visible world, it has already\nreached the stage at which the law of genetic continuity prevails,\nbut at stages of organization, which lie below the limit of the\nmicroscope, it is not impossible, he thinks, that abiogenesis may\noccur. To plausibleize this conjecture, he notes that the cell is a\nnatural unit composed of molecules as a molecule is a natural unit\ncomposed of atoms. He further notes, that, in addition to the cell,\nthere is in nature another unit higher than the monomolecule, namely,\nthe _multimolecule_ occurring in both crystalloids and colloids.\nThe monomolecule consists of atoms held together by atomic valence,\nwhereas the multimolecule consists of molecules whose atomic valence\nis completely saturated, and which are, consequently, held together by\nwhat is now known as _molecular_ or _residual valence_. Moore cites\nthe crystal units of sodium bromide and sodium iodide as instances of\nmultimolecules. The crystal unit of ordinary salt, sodium chloride, is\nan ordinary monomolecule, with the formula NaCl. In the case of the\nformer salts the crystal units consist of multimolecules of the formula\nNaB\u00b7(H\u2082O)\u2082 and NaI\u00b7(H\u2082O)\u2082, the water of crystallization not being\nmechanically confined in the crystals, but combined with the respective\nsalt in the exact ratio of two molecules of water to one of the salt.\nJudged by all chemical tests, such as heat of formation, the law of\ncombination in fixed ratios, the manifestation of selective affinity,\netc., the multimolecule is quite as much entitled to be considered a\nnatural unit as is the monomolecule.\n\nBut it is not in the crystalloidal multimolecule, but in the larger\nand more complex multimolecule of colloids (viscid substances like\ngum arabic, gelatine, agar-agar, white of egg, etc.), that Moore\nprofesses to see a sort of intermediate between the cell and inorganic\nunits. Such colloids form with a dispersing medium (like water) an\nemulsion, in which the dispersed particles, known as ultramicrons or\n\u201csolution aggregates,\u201d are larger than monomolecules. It is among\nthese multimolecules of colloids that Moore would have us search for\na transitional link connecting the cell with the inorganic world.\nBorrowing Herbert Spencer\u2019s dogma of the complication of homogeneity\ninto heterogeneity, he asserts that such colloidal multimolecules\nwould tend to become more and more complex, and consequently more and\nmore instable, so that their instability would gradually approach the\nchronic instability or constant state of metabolic fluxion manifest in\nliving organisms. The end-result would be a living unit more simply\norganized than the cell, and evolution seizing upon this submicroscopic\nunit would, in due time, transform it into cellular life of every\nvariety and kind. _Ce n\u2019est que le premier pas qui co\u00fbte!_\n\nIt should be noted that this so-called law is a mere vague formula\nlike the \u201claw\u201d of natural selection and the \u201claw\u201d of evolution. The\nfacts which it is alleged to express are not cited, and its terms\nare far from being quantitative. It is certainly not a law in the\nsense of Arrh\u00e9nius, who says: \u201cQuantitative formulation, that is,\nthe establishing of a connection, expressed by a formula, between\ndifferent quantitatively measurable magnitudes, is the peculiar feature\nof a law.\u201d (\u201cTheories of Chemistry,\u201d Price\u2019s translation, p. 3.) Now,\nchemistry, as an exact science, has no lack of laws of this kind, but\nno branch of chemistry, whether physical, organic, or inorganic, knows\nof any _law of complexity_, that can be stated in either quantitative,\nor descriptive, terms. We will, however, let Moore speak for himself:\n\n\u201cIt may then be summed up as a general law universal in its application\nto all matter, ... a law which might be called the Law of Complexity,\nthat matter so far as its energy environment will permit tends to\nassume more and more complex forms in labile equilibrium. Atoms,\nmolecules, colloids, and living organisms, arise as a result of the\noperations of this law, and in the higher regions of complexity it\ninduces organic evolution and all the many thousands of living forms....\n\n\u201cIn this manner we can conceive that the hiatus between non-living and\nliving things can be bridged over, and there awakens in our minds the\nconception of a kind of spontaneous production of life of a different\norder from the old. The territory of this spontaneous generation of\nlife lies not at the level of bacteria, or animalcul\u00e6, springing forth\ninto life from dead organic matter, but at a level of life lying deeper\nthan anything the microscope can reveal, and possessing a lower unit\nthan the living cell, as we form our concept of it from the tissues of\nhigher animals and plants.\n\n\u201cIn the future, the stage at which colloids begin to be able to\ndeal with external energy forms, such as light, and build up in\nchemical complexity, will yield a new unit of life opening a vista of\npossibilities as magnificent as that which the establishment of the\ncell as a unit gave, with the development of the microscope, about a\ncentury ago.\u201d (\u201cOrigin and Nature of Life,\u201d pp. 188-190.)\n\nHaving heard out a rhapsody of this sort, one may be pardoned a little\nimpatience at such a travesty on science. Again we have the appeal from\nrealities to fancies, from the seen to unseen. Moore sees no reason\nto doubt and is therefore quite sure that an unverified occurrence\nis taking place \u201cat a level of life lying deeper than anything the\nmicroscope can reveal.\u201d The unknown is a veritable paradise for\nirresponsible speculation and phantasy. It is well, however, to keep\none\u2019s feet on the _terra firma_ of ascertained facts and to make one\u2019s\nignorance a motive for caution rather than an incentive to reckless\ndogmatizing.\n\nTo begin with, it is not to a single dispersed particle or ultramicron\nthat protoplasm has been likened, but to an emulsion, comprising both\nthe dispersed particles and the dispersing medium, or, in other words,\nto the colloidal system as a whole. Moreover, even there the analogy\nis far from being perfect, and is confined exclusively, as Wilson has\npointed out, to a rough similarity of structure and appearance. The\ncolloidal system is obviously a mere _aggregate_ and not a _natural\nunit_ like the cell, and its dispersed particles (ultramicrons) do\nnot multiply and perpetuate themselves by growth and division as do\nthe living components or formed bodies of the cell. As for the single\nultramicron or multimolecule of a colloidal solution, it may, indeed,\nbe a natural unit, but it only resembles the cell in the sense that,\nlike the latter, it is a complex of constituent molecules. Here,\nhowever, all resemblance ceases; for the ultramicron does not display\nthe typically vital power of self-perpetuation by growth and division,\nwhich, as we have seen, is characteristic not only of the cell as a\nwhole, but of its single components or organelles. Certainly, the\ndistinctive phenomena of colloidal systems cannot be interpreted as\nprocesses of multiplication. There is nothing suggestive of this vital\nphenomenon in the reversal of phase, which is caused by the addition\nof electrolytes to oil emulsions, or in gelation, which is caused by\na change of temperature in certain hydrophilic colloids. Thus the\naddition of the salt of a bivalent cation (_e.g._ CaCl\u2082 or BaCl\u2082)\nto an oil-in-water emulsion (if soap is used as the emulsifier) will\ncause the external or continuous phase (water) to become the internal\nor discontinuous phase. Vice versa, a water-in-oil emulsion can be\nreversed into an oil-in-water emulsion, under the same conditions,\nby the addition of the salt of a monovalent cation (_e. g._ NaOH).\nSolutions of hydrophilic colloids, like gelatine or agar-agar, can\nbe made to \u201cset\u201d from the semifluid state of a hydrosol into the\nsemisolid state of a hydrogel, by lowering the temperature, after\nwhich the opposite effect can be brought about by again raising the\ntemperature. In white of egg, however, once gelation has taken place,\nthrough the agency of heat, it is impossible to reconvert the \u201cgel\u201d\ninto a \u201csol\u201d (solution). In such phenomena, it is, perhaps, possible\nto see a certain parallelism with some processes taking place in the\ncell, _e. g._ the osmotic processes of absorption and excretion, but to\nconstrue them as evidence of propagation by growth and division would\nbe preposterous.\n\nNor is the subterfuge of relegating the question to the obscurity\nof the submicroscopic world of any avail; for, as a matter of\nfact, submicroscopic organisms actually do exist, and manage,\nprecisely by virtue of this uniquely vital power of multiplication\nor reproductivity, to give indirect testimony of their invisible\nexistence. The micro\u00f6rganisms, for example, which cause the disease\nknown as Measles are so minute that they pass through the pores\nof a porcelain filter, and are invisible to the highest powers of\nthe microscope. Nevertheless, they can be bred in the test tube\ncultures of the bacteriologist, where they propagate themselves for\ngenerations without losing the definite specificity, which make\nthem capable of producing distinctive pathological effects in the\norganisms of higher animals, including man. Each of these invisible\ndisease germs communicates but one disease, with symptoms that are\nperfectly characteristic and definite. Moreover, they are specific in\ntheir choice of a host, and will not infect any and every organism\npromiscuously. Finally, they never arise _de novo_ in a healthy\nhost, but must always be transmitted from a diseased to a healthy\nindividual. The microscopist is tantalized, to quote the words of\nWilson, \u201cwith visions of disease germs which no eye has yet seen,\nso minute as to pass through a fine filter, yet beyond a doubt\nself-perpetuating and of specific type.\u201d (_Science_, March 9, 1923,\np. 283.) Submicroscopic dimensions, therefore, are no obstacle to\nthe manifestation of such vital properties as reproduction, genetic\ncontinuity, and typical specificity; and we must conclude that, if\nany of the ultramicrons of colloids possessed them, their minute size\nwould not debar them from manifesting the fact. As it is, they fail to\nshow any vital quality, whereas the submicroscopic disease germs give\nevidence of possessing all the characteristics of visible cells.\n\nIn fine, the radical difference between inorganic units, like atoms,\nmolecules, and multimolecules, and living units, like protozoans and\nmetazoans, is so obvious that it is universally admitted. Not all,\nhowever, are in accord when it comes to assigning the fundamental\nreason for the difference in question. Benjamin Moore postulates a\nunique physical energy, peculiar to living organisms and responsible\nfor all distinctively vital manifestations. This unique form of energy,\nunlike all other forms, he calls \u201cbiotic energy,\u201d denying at the same\ntime that it is a vital force. (Cf. _op. cit._, pp. 224-226.) Moore\nseems to be desirous of dressing up vitalism in the verbal vesture of\nmechanism. He wants the game, without the name. But, if his \u201cbiotic\nenergy\u201d is unlike all other forms of energy, it ought not to parade\nunder the same name, but should frankly call itself a \u201cvital force.\u201d\nSomewhat similar in nature is Osborn\u2019s suggestion that the peculiar\nproperties of living protoplasm may be due to the presence of a\nunique chemical element called Bion. (Cf. \u201cThe Origin and Evolution\nof Life,\u201d 1917, p. 6.) Now, a chemical element unlike other chemical\nelements is not a chemical element at all. Osborn\u2019s Bion, like Moore\u2019s\nbiotic energy, ought, by all means, to make up its mind definitely on\nHamlet\u2019s question of \u201cto be, or not to be.\u201d The policy of \u201cIt is, and\nit is not,\u201d is not likely to win the approval of either mechanists or\nvitalists.\n\n\n          \u00a7 6. Hylomorphism versus Mechanism and Neo-vitalism\n\nMechanism and Neo-vitalism represent two extreme solutions of this\nproblem of accounting for the difference between living and lifeless\nmatter. Strictly speaking, it is an abuse of language to refer to\nmechanism as a solution at all. Its first pretense at solving the\nproblem is to deny that there is any problem. But facts are facts and\ncannot be disposed of in this summary fashion. Forced, therefore, to\nface the actual fact of the uniqueness of living matter, mechanists\nconcede the inadequacy of their physicochemical analogies, but\nobstinately refuse to admit the legitimacy of any other kind of\nexplanation. Confronted with realities, which simply must have _some_\nexplanation, they prefer to leave them unexplained by their own theory\nthan have them explained by any other. They recognize the difference\nbetween a living animal and a dead animal (small credit to them for\ntheir perspicacity!), but deny that there is anything present in the\nformer which is not present in the latter.\n\nNeo-vitalism, on the other hand, is, at least, an attempt at solving\nthe problem in the positive sense. It ascribes the unique activities of\nliving organisms to the operation of a superphysical and superchemical\nenergy or force resident in living matter. This unique dynamic\nprinciple is termed _vital force_. It is not an entitive nor a static\nprinciple, but belongs to the category of efficient or active causes,\nbeing variously described as an agent, energy, or force. To speak\nprecisely, the term agent denotes an active being or substance; the\nterm energy denotes the proximate ground in the agent of a specific\nactivity; while the term force denotes the activity or free, kinetic,\nor activated phase of a given energy. In practice, however, these\nterms are often used interchangeably. Thus Driesch, who, like all\nother Neo-vitalists, makes the vital principle a dynamic factor\nrather than an entitive principle, refers to the vital principle as a\n\u201cnon-material,\u201d \u201cnon-spatial\u201d _agent_, though the term _energy_ would\nbe more precise. To this active or dynamic vital principle Driesch\ngives a name, which he borrowed from Aristotle, that is, _entelechy_.\nIn so doing, however, he perverted, as he himself confesses, the true\nAristotelian sense of the term in question: \u201cThe term,\u201d he says,\n\u201c... is not here used in the proper Aristotelian sense.\u201d (\u201cHistory and\nTheory of Vitalism,\u201d p. 203.) His admission is quite correct. At the\ncritical point, Driesch, for all his praise of Aristotle, deserts\nthe Stagirite and goes over to the camp of Plato, Descartes, and the\nNeo-vitalists!\n\nDriesch\u2019s definition is as follows: \u201cEntelechy is an agent _sui\ngeneris_, non-material and non-spatial, but acting \u2018into\u2019 space.\u201d\n(_Op. cit._, p. 204.) Aristotle\u2019s use of the term in this connection\nis quite different. He uses it, for example, in a static, rather than\na dynamic, sense: \u201cThe term \u2018entelechy,\u2019\u201d he says, \u201cis used in two\nsenses; in one it answers to knowledge, in the other to the exercise of\nknowledge. Clearly in this case it is analogous to knowledge.\u201d (\u201cPeri\nPsyches,\u201d Bk. II, c. 1.) Knowledge, however, is only a _second_ or\nstatic _entelechy_. Hence, in order to narrow the sense still further\nAristotle refers to the _soul_ as a _first_ entelechy, by which he\ndesignates a purely _entitive_ principle, that is, a constituent of\nbeing or substance (cf. _op. cit._ _ibidem_). The _first_, or entitive,\nentelechy, therefore, is to be distinguished from all secondary\nentelechies, whether of the _dynamic_ order corresponding to kinetic\nenergy or force, or of the _static_ order corresponding to potential\nenergy. Neither is it an _agent_, because it is only a partial\nconstituent of the total agent, that is, of the total active being or\nsubstance. Hence, generally speaking, _that which acts_ (the agent)\nis not entelechy, but the total composite of entelechy and matter,\n_first entelechy_ being consubstantial with matter and not a separate\nexistent or being. In fine, according to Aristotelian philosophy,\nentelechy (that is, \u201cfirst\u201d or \u201cprime\u201d entelechy) is not an agent nor\nan energy nor a force. In other words, it is totally removed from the\ncategory of efficient or active causes. The second difference between\nDriesch and Aristotle with respect to the use of the term entelechy\nlies in the fact that Driesch uses it as a synonym for the soul or\nvital principle, whereas, according to Aristotle, _entelechy is common\nto the non-living units of inorganic nature as well as the living\nunits_ (organisms) _of the organic world_. All vital principles or\nsouls are entelechies, but not all entelechies are vital principles.\nAll material beings or substances, whether living or lifeless, are\nreducible, in the last analysis, to two consubstantial principles or\ncomplementary constituents, namely, entelechy and matter. Entelechy\nis the binding, type-determining principle, the source of unification\nand specification, which makes of a given natural unit (such as a\nmolecule or a protozoan) a single and determinate whole. Matter is\nthe determinable and potentially-multiple element, the principle of\ndivisibility and quantification, which can enter indifferently into the\ncomposition of this or that natural unit, and which owes its actual\nunity and specificity to the entelechy which here and now informs\nit. It is entelechy which makes a chemical element distinct from its\nisobare, a chemical compound distinct from its isomer, a param\u0153cium\ndistinct from an am\u0153ba, a maple distinct from an oak, and a bear\ndistinct from a tiger.\n\nThe molecular entelechy finds expression in what the organic chemist\nand the stereochemist understand by valence, that is, the static aspect\nof valence considered as the structural principle of a molecule.\nHence it is entelechy which makes a molecule of urea [O:C:(NH\u2082)\u2082]\nan entirely different substance from its isomer ammonium cyanate\n[NH\u2084\u00b7O\u00b7C:N], although the material substrate of each of these molecular\nunits consists of precisely the same number and kinds of atoms.\nSimilarly, it is the atomic entelechy which gives to the isotopes of\nStrontium chemical properties different from those of the isotopes of\nRubidium, although the mass and corpuscular (electronic and protonic)\ncomposition of their respective atoms are identical. It is the vital\nentelechy or soul, which causes a fragment cut from a Stentor to\nregenerate its specific protoplasmic architecture instead of the type\nwhich would be regenerated from a similar fragment cut from another\nciliate such as Dileptus.\n\nIn all the tridimensional units of nature, both living and non-living,\nthe hylomorphic analysis of Aristotle recognizes an essential dualism\nof matter and entelechy. Hence it is not in the presence and absence\nof an entelechy (as Driesch contends) that living organisms differ\nfrom inorganic units. The sole difference between these two classes of\nunits is one of autonomy and inertia. The inorganic unit is inert, not\nin the sense that it is destitute of energy, but in the sense that it\nis incapable of self-regulation and rigidly dependent upon external\nfactors for the utilization of its own energy-content. The living\nunit, on the other hand, is endowed with dynamic autonomy. Though\ndependent, in a general way, upon environmental factors for the energy\nwhich it utilizes, nevertheless the determinate form and direction of\nits activity is not imposed in all its specificity by the aforesaid\nenvironmental factors. The living being possesses a certain degree of\nindependence with respect to these external forces. It is autonomous\nwith a special law of immanent finality or reflexive orientation, by\nwhich all the elements and energies of the living unit are made to\nconverge upon one and the same central result, namely, the maintenance\nand development of the organism both in its capacity as an individual\nand in its capacity as the generative source of its racial type.\n\nThe entelechies of the inert units of inorganic nature turn the\nforces of these units in an _outward direction_, so that they are\nincapable of operating upon themselves, of modifying themselves, or\nof regulating themselves. They are only capable of operating upon\nother units outside themselves, and in so doing they irreparably\nexternalize their energy-contents. All physicochemical action is\n_transitive_ or _communicable_ in character, whereas vital action\nis of the _reflexive_ or _immanent_ type. Mechanical action, for\nexample, is intermolar (_i.e._ an exchange between large masses of\ninorganic matter); physical action is intermolecular; chemical action\nis interatomic; while in radioactive and electrical phenomena we have\nintercorpuscular action. Hence all the forms of activity native to the\ninorganic world are reducible to _interaction_ between discontinuous\nand unequally energized masses or particles. Always it is a case of\none mass or particle operating upon another mass or particle distinct\nfrom, and spatially external to, itself. The effect or positive change\nproduced by the action is received into another unit distinct from the\nagent or active unit, which can never become the receptive subject of\nthe effect generated by its own activity. The living being, on the\ncontrary, is capable of operating upon itself, so that what is modified\nby the action is not outside the agent but within it. The reader does\nnot modify the book, but modifies himself by his reading. The blade\nof grass can nourish not only a horse, but its very self, whereas a\nmolecule of sodium nitrate is impotent to nourish itself, and can\nonly nourish a subject other than itself, such as the blade of grass.\nHere the active source and receptive subject of the action is one and\nthe same unit, namely, the living organism, which can operate upon\nitself in the interest of its own perfection. In chemical synthesis\ntwo substances interact to produce a third, but in vital assimilation\none substance is incorporated into another without the production of\na third. Thus hydrogen unites with oxygen to produce water. But in\nthe case of assimilation the reaction may be expressed thus: Living\nprotoplasm plus external nutriment equals living protoplasm increased\nin quantity but unchanged in specificity. Addition or subtraction\nalters the nature of the inorganic unit, but does not change the nature\nof the living unit. In chemical change, entelechy is the variant and\nmatter is the constant, but in metabolic change, matter is the variant\nand entelechy the constant. \u201cLiving beings,\u201d says Henderson, \u201cpreserve,\nor tend to preserve, an ideal form, while through them flows a steady\nstream of energy and matter which is ever changing, yet momentarily\nmolded by life; organized, in short.\u201d (\u201cFitness of the Environment,\u201d\n1913, pp. 23, 24.) The living unit maintains its own specific type\namid a constant flux of matter and flow of energy. It subjugates the\nalien substances of the inorganic world, eliminates their mineral\nentelechies and utilizes their components and energies for its own\npurposes. The soul or vital entelechy, therefore, is more powerful than\nthe entelechies of inorganic units which it supplants. It turns the\nforces of living matter _inward_, so that the living organism becomes\ncapable of _self-regulation_ and of striving for the attainment of\nself-perfection. It is this _reflexive orientation_ of all energies\ntowards self-perfection that is the unique characteristic of the living\nbeing, and not the nature of the energies themselves. The energies by\nwhich vital functions are executed are the ordinary physicochemical\nenergies, but it is the vital entelechy or soul which elevates them\nto a higher plane of efficiency and renders them capable of reflexive\nor vital action. There is, in short, no such thing as a special vital\nforce. The radical difference between living and non-living units does\nnot consist in the possession or non-possession of an entelechy, nor\nyet in the peculiar nature of the forces displayed in the execution of\nvital functions, but solely in the orientation of these forces towards\nan inner finality.\n\n\n                      \u00a7 7. The Definition of Life\n\nLife, then, may be defined as the capacity of reflexive or\nself-perfective action. In any action, we may distinguish four things:\n(1) the agent, or source of the action; (2) the activity or internal\ndetermination differentiating the agent in the active state from the\nselfsame agent in the inactive state; (3) the patient or receptive\nsubject; (4) the effect or change produced in the patient by the\nagent. Let us suppose that a boy named Tom kicks a door. Here Tom is\nthe agent, the muscular contraction in his leg is the activity, the\ndoor is the patient or recipient, while the dent produced in the door\nis the effect or change of which the action is a production. In this\naction, the effect is produced not in the cause or agent, but in a\npatient outside of, and distinct from, the agent, and the otherness of\ncause and effect is consequently complete. Such an action is termed\ntransitive, which is the characteristic type of physicochemical action.\nIn another class of actions, however, (those, namely, that are peculiar\nto living beings) the otherness of cause and effect is only partial\nand relative. When the agent becomes ultimately the recipient of the\neffect or modification wrought by its own activity, that is, when\nthe positive change produced by the action remains within the agent\nitself, the action is called immanent or reflexive action. Since,\nhowever, action and passion are opposites, they can co\u00ebxist in the same\nsubject only upon condition that said subject is differentiated into\npartial otherness, that is, organized into a plurality of distinct and\ndissimilar parts or components, one of which may act upon another.\nHence only the organized unit or organism, which combines unity or\ncontinuity of substance with multiplicity and dissimilarity of parts\nis capable of immanent action. The inorganic unit is capable only of\ntransitive action, whose effect is produced in an exterior subject\nreally distinct from the agent. The living unit or organism, however,\nis capable of both transitive action and immanent (reflexive) action.\nIn such functions as thought and sensation, the living agent modifies\nitself and not an exterior patient. In the nutritive or metabolic\nfunction the living being perfects itself by assimilating external\nsubstances to itself. It develops, organizes, repairs, and multiplies\nitself, holding its own and perpetuating its type from generation to\ngeneration.\n\nLife, accordingly, is the capacity of tending through any form of\nreflexive action to an ulterior perfection of the agent itself.\nThis capacity of an agent to operate of, and upon, itself for the\nacquisition of some perfection exceeding its natural equilibrial state\nis the distinctive attribute of the living being. Left to itself, the\ninorganic unit tends exclusively to conservation or to loss, never\nto positive acquisition in excess of equilibrial exigencies; what\nit acquires it owes exclusively to the action of external factors.\nThe living unit, on the contrary, strives in its vital operations to\nacquire something for itself, so that what it gets it owes to itself\nand not (except in a very general sense) to the action of external\nfactors. All the actions of the living unit, both upon itself and upon\nexternal matter, result sooner or later in the acquisition on the part\nof the agent of a positive perfection exceeding and transcending the\nmere exigencies of equilibration. The inorganic agent, on the contrary,\nwhen in the state of tension, tends only to return to the equilibrial\nstate by alienation or expenditure of its energy; otherwise, it\ntends merely to conserve, by virtue of inertia, the state of rest or\nmotion impressed upon it from without. In the chemical changes of\ninorganic units, the tendency to loss is even more in evidence. Such\nchanges disrupt the integrity of the inorganic unit and dissipate its\nenergy-content, and the unit cannot be reconstructed and recharged,\nexcept at the expense of a more richly endowed inorganic unit. The\nliving organism, however, as we see in the case of the param\u00e6cium\nundergoing endomixis, is capable of counteracting exhaustion by\nrecharging itself.\n\nThe difference between transitive and reflexive action is not an\naccidental difference of _degree_, but an essential difference of\n_kind_. In reflexive actions, the source of the action and the\nrecipient of the effect or modification produced by it are one and the\nsame substantial unit or being. In transitive actions, the receptive\nsubject of the positive change is an alien unit distinct from the\nunit, which puts forth the action. Hence a reflexive action is not\nan action which is _less_ transitive; it is an action which is _not\nat all_ transitive, but intransitive. The difference, therefore,\nbetween the living organism, which is capable of both reflexive and\ntransitive action, and the inorganic unit, which is only capable\nof transitive action, is _radical_ and _essential_. This being the\ncase, an evolutionary transition from an inert multimolecule to a\nreflexively-operating cell or cytode, becomes inconceivable. Evolution\nmight, at the very most, bring about intensifications and combinations\nof the transitive agencies of the physicochemical world, but never\nthe _volte face_, which would be necessary to reverse the centrifugal\norientation of forces characteristic of the inorganic unit into the\ncentripetal orientation of forces which makes the living unit capable\nof self-perfective action, self-regulation, and self-renewal. The idea,\ntherefore, of a spontaneous derivation of living units from lifeless\ncolloidal multimolecules must be rejected, not merely because it finds\nno support in the facts of experience, but also because it is excluded\nby aprioristic considerations.\n\n\n                     \u00a7 8. An Inevitable Corollary\n\nBut, if inorganic matter is impotent to vitalize itself by means of its\nnative physicochemical forces, the inevitable alternative is that the\ninitial production of organisms from inorganic matter was due to the\naction of some supermaterial agency. Certain scientists, like Henderson\nof Harvard, while admitting the incredibility of abiogenesis, prefer\nto avoid open conflict with mechanism and materialism by declaring\ntheir neutrality. \u201cBut while biophysicists like Professor Sch\u00e4fer,\u201d\nsays Henderson, \u201cfollow Spencer in assuming a gradual evolution of the\norganic from the inorganic, biochemists are more than ever unable to\nperceive how such a process is possible, and without taking any final\nstand prefer to let the riddle rest.\u201d (\u201cFitness of the Environment,\u201d\np. 310, footnote.) Not to take a decisive stand on this question,\nhowever, is tantamount to making a compromise with what is illogical\nand unscientific; for both logic and the inductive trend of biological\nfacts are arrayed against the hypothesis of spontaneous generation.\n\nIn the first place, it is manifest that organic life is neither\nself-explanatory nor eternal. Hence it must have had its origin in the\naction of some external agency. Life as it exists today depends upon\nthe precedence of numerous unbroken chains of consecutive cells that\nextend backward into a remote past. It is, however, a logical necessity\nto put an end to this retrogradation of the antecedents upon which the\nactual existence of our present organisms depends. The infinite cannot\nbe spanned by finite steps; the periodic life-process could not be\nrelayed through an unlimited temporal distance; and a cellular series\nwhich never started would never arrive. Moreover, we do not account for\nthe existence of life by extending the cellular series interminably\nbackward. Each cell in such a series is derived from a predecessor,\nand, consequently, no cell in the series is self-explanatory. When it\ncomes to accounting for its own existence, each cell is a zero in the\nway of explanation, and adding zeros together indefinitely will never\ngive us a positive total. Each cell refers us to its predecessor for\nthe explanation of why it exists, and none contains within itself the\nsufficient explanation of its own existence. Hence increasing even to\ninfinity the number of these cells (which fail to explain themselves)\nwill give us nothing else but a zero in the way of explanation. If,\ntherefore, the primordial cause from which these cellular chains are\nsuspended is not the agency of the physicochemical forces of inorganic\nnature, it follows that the first active cause of life must have been a\n_supermaterial_ and _extramundane agency_, namely, the Living God and\nAuthor of Life.\n\nAs a matter of fact, no one denies that life has had a beginning on\nour globe. The physicist teaches that a beginning of our entire solar\nsystem is implied in the law of the degradation of energy, and various\nattempts have been made to determine the time of this beginning.\nThe older calculations were based on the rate of solar radiation;\nthe more recent ones, however, are based on quantitative estimates\nof the disintegration products of radioactive elements. Similarly,\nthe geologist and the astronomer propound theories of a gradual\nconstitution of the cosmic environment, which organic life requires\nfor its support, and all such theories imply a _de novo_ origin or\nbeginning of life in the universe. Thus the old _nebular hypothesis_ of\nLaplace postulated a hot origin of our solar system incompatible with\nthe co\u00ebxistence of organic life, which, as the experiments of Pasteur\nand others have shown, is destroyed, in all cases, at a temperature\njust above 45\u00b0 Centigrade (113\u00b0 Fahrenheit). Even the enzymes or\norganic catalysts, which are essential for bio-chemical processes,\nare destroyed at a temperature between 60\u00b0 and 70\u00b0 Centigrade. This\nexcludes the possibility of the contemporaneousness of protoplasm\nand inorganic matter, and points to a beginning of life in our solar\nsystem. Moreover, independently of this theory, the geologist sees\nin the primitive crystalline rocks (granites, diorites, basalts,\netc.) and in the extant magmas of volcanoes evidences of an azoic\nage, during which temperatures incompatible with the survival of even\nthe blue-green alg\u00e6 or the most resistent bacterial spores must have\nprevailed over the surface of the globe. In fact, it is generally\nrecognized by geologists that the igneous or pyrogenic rocks, which\ncontain no fossils, preceded the sedimentary or fossiliferous rocks.\nThe new _planetesimal hypothesis_, it is true, is said to be compatible\nwith a cold origin of the universe. Nevertheless, this theory assumes\na very gradual condensation of our cosmos out of dispersed gases and\nstar dust, whereas life demands as the _sine qua non_ condition of its\nexistence a differentiated environment consisting of a lithosphere, a\nhydrosphere, and an atmosphere. Hence, it is clear that life did not\noriginate until such an appropriate environment was an accomplished\nfact. All theories of cosmogony, therefore, point to a beginning of\nlife subsequent to the constitution of the inorganic world.\n\nNow, it is impossible for organic life to antecede itself. If,\ntherefore, it has had a beginning in the world, it must have had a\nfirst active cause distinct from itself; and the active cause, in\nquestion, must, consequently, have been either something intrinsic, or\nsomething extrinsic, to inorganic matter. The hypothesis, however, of\na spontaneous origin of life through the agency of forces intrinsic\nto inorganic matter is scientifically untenable. Hence it follows that\nlife originated through the action of an immaterial or spiritual agent,\nnamely, God, seeing that there is no other assignable agency capable of\nbringing about the initial production of life from lifeless matter.\n\n\n                         \u00a7 9. Futile Evasions\n\nMany and various are the efforts made to escape this issue. One group\nof scientists, for example, attempt to rid themselves of the difficulty\nby diverting our attention from the problem of a beginning of organic\nlife in the universe to the problem of its translation to a new\nhabitat. This legerdemain has resulted in the theories of _cosmozoa_\nor _panspermia_, according to which life originates in a favorable\nenvironment, not by reason of spontaneous generation, but by reason\nof importation from other worlds. This view has been presented in two\nforms: (1) the \u201cmeteorite\u201d theory, which represents the older view\nheld by Thomson and Helmholtz; (2) the more recent theory of \u201ccosmic\npanspermia\u201d advocated by Svante Arrh\u00e9nius, with H. E. Richter and F.\nJ. Cohn as precursors. Sir Wm. Thompson suggested that life might have\nbeen salvaged from the ruins of other worlds and carried to our own by\nmeans of meteorites or fragments thrown off from life-bearing planets\nthat had been destroyed by a catastrophic collision. These meteorites\ndischarged from bursting planets might carry germs to distant planets\nlike the earth, causing them to become covered with vegetation. Against\nthis theory stands the fatal objection that the transit of a meteorite\nfrom the nearest stellar system to our own would require an interval\nof 60,000,000 years. It is incredible that life could be maintained\nthrough such an enormous lapse of time. Even from the nearest planet\nto our earth the duration of the journey would be 150 years. Besides,\nmeteorites are heated to incandescence while passing through the\natmosphere, and any seeds they might contain would perish by reason of\nthe heat thus generated, not to speak of the terrific impact, which\nterminates the voyage of a meteorite.\n\nArrh\u00e9nius suggests a method by which micro\u00f6rganisms might be conveyed\nthrough intersidereal space with far greater dispatch and without any\nmineral vehicle such as a meteorite. He notes that particles of cosmic\ndust leave the sun as a coronal atmosphere and are propelled through\nintervening space by the pressure of radiation until they reach the\nhigher atmosphere of the earth (viz. at a height of 100 kilometers from\nthe surface of the latter), where they become the electrically charged\ndust particles of polar auroras (_v.g._ the aurora borealis). The motor\nforce, in this case, is the same as that which moves the vanes of a\nCrookes\u2019 radiometer. Lebedeff has verified Clerk-Maxwell\u2019s conceptions\nof this force and has demonstrated its reality by experiments. It is\ncalculated that in the immediate vicinity of a luminous surface like\nthat of the sun the pressure exerted by radiation upon an exposed\nsurface would be nearly two milligrams per square centimeter. On\na nontransparent particle having a diameter of 1.5 microns, the\npressure of radiation would just counterbalance the force of universal\ngravitation, while on particles whose diameter was 0.16 of a micron,\nthe pressure of radiation would be ten times as great as the pull of\ngravitation. Now bacterial spores having a diameter of O.3 to O.2 of a\nmicron are known to bacteriologists, and the ultramicroscope reveals\nthe presence of germs not more than O.1 of a micron in size.[11] Hence\nit is conceivable that germs of such dimensions might be wafted\nto limits of our atmosphere, and might then be transported by the\npressure of radiation to distant planets or stellar systems, provided,\nof course, they could escape the germicidal action of oxidation,\ndesiccation, ultra-violet rays, etc. Arrh\u00e9nius calculates that their\njourney from the earth to Mars would, under such circumstances, occupy\na period of only 20 days. Within 80 days they could reach Jupiter,\nand they might arrive at Neptune on the confines of our solar system\nafter an interval of 3 weeks. The transit to the constellation of the\nCentaur, which contains the solar system nearest to our own (the one,\nnamely, whose central sun is the star Alpha), would require 9,000 years.\n\n    [11] Recently, by means of photography with short-length light\n    waves, the bacteria of \u201cFoot-and-mouth disease,\u201d invisible to\n    the highest power microscope, have been revealed as rods about\n    100 submicrons (_i.e._ O.1 micron, or O.0001 millimeter) in\n    length. (_cf._ _Science_, May 30, 1924, Supplement X.) Germs\n    of this dimension could be as easily transported by radiation\n    as the alleged electrically charged stardust in the aurora\n    borealis. It may be of interest, however, to note, in this\n    connection, that the most recent theory of the aurora borealis\n    discards stardust in favor of nitrogen snow. Lars Vegard, a\n    Norwegian professor, ascribes the peculiar greenish tint in the\n    Northern Lights to the action of solar radiations on nitrogen\n    snow, which he assumes to exist at an altitude of more than\n    60 miles above the earth. When he condensed crystals of solid\n    nitrogen on a copper plate by freezing with liquid hydrogen,\n    he found that these crystals, after bombardment with cathode\n    rays, emit a light of green color, which gives the same strong\n    green spectrum line as the spectrum of the aurora. As the\n    solid nitrogen evaporates, it begins to emit the reddish light\n    characteristic of nitrogen gas. This phenomenon would explain\n    the changes of color that occur in the aurora borealis. (_cf._\n    _Science_, April 18, 1924, Suppl. X.)\n\nArrh\u00e9nius\u2019 theory, however, that \u201clife is an eternal rebeginning\u201d\nexplains nothing and leaves us precisely where we were. In the\nmetaphysical as well as the scientific sense, it is an evasion and\nnot a solution. To the logical necessity of putting an end to the\nretrogradation of the subalternate conditions, upon which the realities\nof the present depend for their actual existence, we have already\nadverted. Moreover, the reasons which induce the scientist to postulate\na beginning of life in our world are not based on any distinctive\npeculiarity of that world, but are universally applicable, it being\nestablished by the testimony of the spectroscope that other worlds are\nnot differently constituted than our own. Hence Sch\u00e4fer voices the\ngeneral attitude of scientific men when he says: \u201cBut the acceptance\nof such theories of the arrival of life on earth does not bring us any\nnearer to a conception of its actual mode of origin; on the contrary,\nit merely serves to banish the investigation of the question to\nsome conveniently inaccessible corner of the universe and leaves us\nin the unsatisfactory condition of affirming not only that we have\nno knowledge as to the mode of origin of life\u2014which is unfortunately\ntrue\u2014but that we never can acquire such knowledge\u2014which it is to be\nhoped is not true. Knowing what we know, and believing what we believe,\n... we are, I think (without denying the possibility of the existence\nof life in other parts of the universe), justified in regarding these\ncosmic theories as inherently improbable.\u201d (Dundee Address of 1912, cf.\nSmithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 503.)\n\nDismissing, therefore, all evasions of this sort, we may regard as\nscientifically established the conclusion that, so far as our knowledge\ngoes, inorganic nature lacks the means of self-vivification, and that\nno inanimate matter can become living matter without first coming\nunder the influence of matter previously alive. Given, therefore,\nthat the conditions favorable to life did not always prevail in our\ncosmos, it follows that life had a beginning, for which we are obliged\nto account by some postulate other than abiogenesis. This conclusion\nseems inescapable for those who concede the scientific absurdity of\nspontaneous generation, but, by some weird freak of logic, not only\nis it escaped, but the very opposite conclusion is reached through\nreasoning, which the exponents are pleased to term philosophical, as\ndistinguished from scientific, argumentation. The plight of these\n\u201chard-headed worshippers of fact,\u201d who plume themselves on their\ncontempt for \u201cmetaphysics,\u201d is sad indeed. Worsted in the experimental\nfield, they appeal the case from the court of facts to that aprioristic\nphilosophy. \u201cPhysic of metaphysic begs defence, and metaphysic calls\nfor aid on sense!\u201d\n\nLife, they contend, either had no beginning or it must have begun\nin our world as the product of spontaneous generation. But all the\nscientific theories of cosmogony exclude the former alternative.\nConsequently, not only is it not absurd to admit spontaneous\ngeneration, but, on the contrary, it is absurd not to admit it. It\nis in this frame of mind that August Weismann is induced to confide\nto us \u201cthat spontaneous generation, in spite of all the vain attempts\nto demonstrate it, remains for me a logical necessity.\u201d (\u201cEssays,\u201d p.\n34, Poulton\u2019s Transl.) The presupposition latent in all such logic is,\nof course, the assumption that nothing but matter exists; for, if the\npossibility of the existence of a supermaterial agency is conceded,\nthen obviously we are not compelled by _logical necessity_ to ascribe\nthe initial production of organic life to the exclusive agency of the\nphysicochemical energies inherent in inorganic matter. Weismann should\ndemonstrate his suppressed premise that matter coincides with reality\nand that spiritual is a synonym for nonexistent. Until such time as\nthis unverified and unverifiable affirmation is substantiated, the\nphilosophical proof for abiogenesis is not an argument at all, it is\ndogmatism pure and simple.\n\nBut, they protest, \u201cTo deny spontaneous generation is to proclaim\na miracle\u201d (N\u00e4geli), and natural science cannot have recourse to\n\u201cmiracles\u201d in explaining natural phenomena. For the \u201cscientist,\u201d\nmiracles are always absurd as contradicting the uniformity of nature,\nand to recur to them for the solution of a scientific problem is,\nto put it mildly, distinctly out of the question. Hence Haeckel\nregards spontaneous generation as more than demonstrated by the bare\nconsideration that no alternative remains except the unspeakable\nscientific blasphemy implied in superstitious terms like \u201cmiracle,\u201d\n\u201ccreation,\u201d and \u201csupernatural.\u201d For a \u201cthinking man,\u201d the mere mention\nof these abhorrent words is, or ought to be, argument enough. \u201cIf\nwe do not accept the hypothesis of spontaneous generation,\u201d Haeckel\nexpostulates, \u201cwe must have recourse to the miracle of a _supernatural\ncreation_.\u201d (Italics his\u2014\u201cHistory of Creation,\u201d I, p. 348, Lankester\u2019s\nTransl.) It would be a difficult matter, indeed, to cram more blunders\ninto one short sentence! We will not, and need not, undertake to defend\nthe supernatural here. Suffice it to say, that the initiation of life\nin inorganic matter by the Author of Life would not be a creation, nor\na miracle, nor a phenomenon pertaining to the supernatural order.\n\nThe principle of the minimum forbids us to postulate the superfluous,\nand a creative act would be superfluous in the production of the first\norganisms. Inorganic nature contains all the material elements found in\nliving organisms, and all organisms, in fact, derive their matter from\nthe inorganic world. If, therefore, they are thus dependent _in their\ncontinuance_ upon a supply of matter administered by the inorganic\nworld, it is to be presumed that they were likewise dependent on that\nsource of matter _in their first origin_. In other words, the material\nsubstrata of the first organisms were not produced anew, but derived\nfrom the elements of the inorganic world. Hence they were not created,\nbut formed out of pre\u00ebxistent matter. A _creative_ act would involve\n_total_ production, and exclude the pre\u00ebxistence of the constituent\nmaterial under a different form. A _formative_ act, on the contrary, is\na _partial_ production, which presupposes the material _out of which_ a\ngiven thing is to be made. Hence the Divine act, whereby organic life\nwas first educed from the passive potentiality of inorganic matter, was\nformative and not creative. Elements pre\u00ebxistent in the inorganic world\nwere combined and intrinsically modified by impressing upon them a new\nspecification, which raised them in the entitive and dynamic scale, and\nintegrated them into units capable of self-regulation and reflexive\naction. This modification, however, was intrinsic to the matter\ninvolved and nothing was injected into matter from without. Obviously,\ntherefore, the production of the first organisms was not a creation,\nbut a formation.\n\nStill less was it a miracle; for a miracle is a visible interposition\nin the course of nature by a power superior to the powers of nature. A\ngiven effect, therefore, is termed miraculous with express reference\nto some existing natural agency, whose efficacy it, in some way,\nexceeds. If there existed in inorganic nature some natural process\nof self-vivification, then any Divine interposition to produce\nlife independently of this natural agency, would be a miraculous\nintervention. As a matter of fact, however, inorganic nature is\ndestitute of this power of self-vitalization, and consequently no\nnatural agency was superseded or overridden by the initial imparting\nof life to lifeless matter. Life was not ordained to originate in any\nother way. Given, therefore, this impotence of inorganic nature, it\nfollows that an initial vivification of matter by Divine power was\ndemanded by the very nature of things. The Divine action did not come\ninto competition, as it were, with existing natural agencies, but was\nput forth in response to the exigencies of nature itself. It cannot,\ntherefore, be regarded as miraculous.\n\nNor, finally, is there any warrant for regarding such an initial\nvivification of matter as supernatural. Only that is supernatural which\ntranscends the nature, powers, and exigencies of all things created\nor creatable. But, as we have seen, if life was to exist at all, a\nprimal animation of inanimate matter by Divine power was demanded\nby the very nature of things. Here the Divine action put forth in\nresponse to an exigency of nature and terminated in the constitution\nof living nature itself. Now, the effect of a Divine action, by which\nthe natures of things are initially constituted, plainly pertains to\nthe order of nature, and has nothing to do with the supernatural. Hence\nthe primordial constitution by Divine power of living nature was not a\nsupernatural, but a purely natural, event.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER II\n\n                     THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL\n\n\n                        \u00a7 1. Matter and Spirit\n\nWe live in an age in which scientific specialization is stressed as the\nmost important means of advancing the interests of human knowledge; and\nspecialism, by reason of its many triumphs, seems to have deserved, in\nlarge measure, the prestige which it now enjoys. It has, however, the\ndistinct disadvantage of fostering provincialism and separatism. This\nlopsided learning of the single track mind is a condition that verges\non paranoia, leads to na\u00efve contempt for all knowledge not reducible to\nits own set of formul\u00e6, and portends, in the near future, a Babel-like\nconfusion of tongues. In fact, the need of a corrective is beginning\nto be felt in many quarters. This corrective can be none other than\nthe general and synthetic science of philosophy; it is philosophy\nalone that can furnish a common ground and break down the barriers of\nexclusiveness which immure the special sciences within the minds of\nexperts.\n\nScientists readily admit the advantage of philosophy in theory, but in\npractice their approval is far from being unqualified. A subservient\nphilosophy, which accepts without hesitation all the current dogmas\nof contemporary science, is one thing, and a critical philosophy\nventuring to apply the canons of logic to so-called scientific proof\nis quite another. Philosophy of the latter type is promptly informed\nthat it has no right to any opinion whatever, and that only the\nscientific specialist is qualified to speak on such subjects. But the\ndisqualification, which is supposed to arise from lack of special\nknowledge, is just as promptly forgotten, when there is question of\nphilosophy in the r\u00f4le of a pliant sycophant, and the works of a Wells\nor a van Loon are lauded to the skies, despite the glaring examples of\nscientific inaccuracy and ignorance, in which they abound.\n\nThis partiality is sometimes carried to a degree that makes it\nperfectly preposterous. Thus it is by no means an infrequent thing to\nfind scientists dismissing, as unworthy of a hearing, a philosopher\nlike Hans Driesch, who spent the major portion of his life in\nbiological research, and combined the technical discipline of a\nscientist with the mental discipline of a logician. The chemist, H.\nE. Armstrong, for instance, sees in the mere label \u201cphilosopher\u201d a\nsufficient reason for barring his testimony. \u201cPhilosophers,\u201d jeers\nthe chemist, with flippant irrelevance, \u201cmust go to school and study\nin the purlieus of experimental science, if they desire to speak with\nauthority on these matters.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 528.)\nSuch is his comment on Driesch, yet Driesch did nothing at all, if he\ndid not do far more than Armstrong prescribes as a prerequisite for\nauthoritative speaking. In James Harvey Robinson, on the contrary, we\nhave an example of the tendency of scientists to coddle philosophers\nwho assume a docile, deferential, and submissive attitude towards\nevery generalization propounded in the name of natural science. In\nsheer gratitude for his uncritical acquiescence, his incapacitation\nas a nonspecialist is considerately overlooked, and he can confess,\nwithout the slightest danger of discrediting his own utterances: \u201cI am\nnot ... a biologist or pal\u00e6ontologist. But I have had the privilege\nof consorting familiarly with some of the very best representatives\nof those who have devoted their lives to the patient study of the\nmatters involved in this controversy. I think I quite understand\ntheir attitude.\u201d (_Harper\u2019s Magazine,_ June, 1922, p. 68.) By his own\ntestimony he is a scientific amateur, but this does not, in the least,\nprevent him from \u201cspeaking with authority\u201d or from being lionized in\nscientific circles as an evolutionary \u201cdefender of the faith.\u201d Clearly,\nit is the nature of their respective views, and not the possession or\nabsence of technical knowledge, which makes Robinson a favorite, and\nDriesch a _persona non grata_, with \u201cthe very best representatives\u201d\nof contemporary science. \u201cScience,\u201d says a writer in the _Atlantic\nMonthly_ (Oct., 1915), \u201chas turned all philosophy out of doors except\nthat which clings to its skirts; it has thrown contempt on all learning\nthat does not depend upon it; and it has bribed the sketches by giving\nus immense material comforts.\u201d\n\nHere, however, we are concerned with the fact, rather than the justice,\nof this discrimination which the scientific world makes between\nphilosopher and philosopher. Certain it is that Robinson has received\nno end of encomiums from scientists, who apparently lack the literary\ngifts to expound their own philosophy, and that his claim to represent\nthe views of a large and influential section of the scientific world\nis, in all probability, entirely correct. It is this manifest approval\nof scientific men which lends especial interest to the remarks of\nthis scientific dilettante, and we shall quote them as expressing the\nprevalent scientific view on the origin of man, a view which, with but\nslight variations, has persisted from the time of Darwin down to the\npresent day.\n\n\u201cThe recognition,\u201d says Robinson, \u201cthat mankind is a species of animal,\nis, like other important discoveries, illuminating.\u201d (_Science_, July\n28, 1922, p. 74.) To refer to the recognition of man\u2019s animality as\na _discovery_ is a conceit too stupid for mere words to castigate.\nSurely, there was no need of the profound research or delicate\nprecision of modern science to detect the all too obvious similarity\nexisting between man and beast. Mankind did not have to await the\nadvent of an \u201cenlightened\u201d nineteenth, or twentieth century to be\nassured of the truth of a commonplace so trite and palpable. Even the\n\u201cbenighted\u201d scholastics of medieval infamy had wit enough to define man\nas a rational animal. Indeed, it would be a libel on human intelligence\nto suppose that anyone, in the whole history of human thought, was ever\nsufficiently fatuous to dispute the patent fact that man is a sentient\norganism compounded of flesh, blood, bone, and sinew like the brute.\nThe \u201cdiscovery\u201d that man is a species of animal dates from the year one\nof human existence, and it is now high time for the novelty of this\ndiscovery to be worn off.\n\nEven as a difficulty against human superiority and immortality, the\n\u201crecognition\u201d is by no means recent. We find it squarely faced in\na book of the Old Testament, the entire book being devoted to the\nsolution of the difficulty in question. \u201cI said in my heart concerning\nthe estate of the sons of men ... that they might see they are\nthemselves beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth\nbeasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth so dieth the\nother; yea, they have all one breath; so that man hath no preeminence\nabove a beast; for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the\ndust, and all return to dust. Who knoweth the spirit of man whether it\ngoeth upward, and the spirit of the beast whether it goeth downward to\nthe earth?\u201d (_Ecclesiastes_, III: 18-21.) The sacred writer insists\nthat, so far as the body is concerned, man and the brute stand on the\nsame level; but what of the human soul? Is it, he asks, resolvable into\nmatter like the soul of a beast, or is it a supermaterial principle\ndestined, not for time, but for eternity? At the close of the book, the\nconclusion is reached that the latter alternative is the true solution\nof the riddle of human nature\u2014\u201cthe dust returneth to the earth whence\nit was, and the spirit returneth to God who gave it.\u201d (Ch. XII, v. 7.)\n\nCenturies, therefore, before the Christian era, this problem was\nformulated by Ecclesiastes, the Jew, and also, as we shall presently\nsee, by Aristotle, the coryph\u00e6us of Greek philosophy. Nay, from time\nimmemorial man, contrasting his aspirations after immortality with\nthe spectacle of corporal death, has appreciated to the full the\nsignificance of his own animality. Never was there question of whether\nman is, or is not, just as thoroughly an animal as any beast, but\nrather of whether, his animal nature being unhesitatingly conceded,\nwe are not, none the less, forced to recognize in him, over and above\nthis, the existence of a spiritual mind or soul, differentiating\nhim from the brute and constituting him a being unique, despite the\nunmistakable homologies discernible between bestial organisms and the\nhuman body. Everywhere and always mankind as a whole have manifested,\nby the universal and uniquely human practice of burying the dead, their\nunswerving and indomitable conviction that man is spirit as well as\nflesh, an animal, indeed, yet animated by something not present in the\nanimal, namely, a spiritual soul, deathless and indestructible, capable\nof surviving the decay of the organism and of persisting throughout\neternity.\n\nBut, if the human mind or soul is spiritual, it is clear that it cannot\nbe a product of organic evolution, any more than it can be a product of\nparental generation. On the contrary, each and every human soul must\nbe an immediate creation of the Author of Nature, not evolved from the\ninternal potentiality of matter, but infused into matter from without.\nThe human soul is created in organized matter, but not from it. Nor\ncan the Divine action, in this case, be regarded as a supernatural\ninterposition; for it supplements, rather than supersedes, the natural\nprocess of reproduction; and, since it is not in matter to produce\nspirit, a creative act is demanded by the very nature of things.\n\nEvolution is nothing more nor less than a transmutation of matter,\nand a transmutation of matter cannot terminate in the annihilation of\nmatter and the constitution of non-matter or spirit. If nothing of the\n_terminus a quo_ persists in the final product, we have substitution,\nand not transmutation. The evolution of matter, therefore, cannot\nprogress to a point where all materiality is eliminated. Hence,\nwhatever proceeds from matter, either as an emanation or an action,\nwill, of necessity, be material. It should be noted, however, that by\nmaterial we do not mean corporeal; for material denotes not merely\nmatter itself, but everything that intrinsically depends on matter.\nThe term, therefore, is wider in its sense than corporeal, because\nit comprises, besides matter, all the properties, energies, and\nactivities of matter. Hence whatever is incapable of existence and\nactivity apart from matter (whether ponderable or imponderable) belongs\nto the material, as distinguished from the spiritual, order of things.\nThe soul of a brute, for example, is not matter, but it is material,\nnevertheless, because it is totally dependent on the matter of the\norganism, apart from which it has neither existence nor activity of its\nown.\n\nIn the constitution of the sentient or animal soul, matter reaches\nthe _culmination of its passive evolution_. True, its inherent\nphysicochemical forces do not suffice to bring about this consummation,\nwherewith its internal potentiality is exhausted. Nevertheless, the\nemergence of an animal soul from matter is conceivable, given an agency\ncompetent to educe it from the intrinsic potentiality of matter;\nfor, in the last analysis, the animal soul is simply an internal\nmodification of matter itself. But, if spirit is that which exists, or\nis, at least, capable of existence, apart from matter, it goes without\nsaying that spirit is neither _derivable_ from, nor _resolvable_ into,\nmatter of any kind. Consequently, it cannot be evolved from matter,\nbut must be produced in matter by creation (_i.e._ total production).\n_To make the human mind or soul a product of evolution is equivalent\nto a denial of its spirituality_, because it implies that the human\nsoul like that of the brute, is inherent in the potentiality of matter,\nand is therefore a purely material principle, totally dependent on\nthe matter, of which it is a perfection. Between such a soul and the\nsentient principle present in the beast, there would be no essential\ndifference of kind, but only an accidental difference of degree; and\nthis is precisely what Darwin and his successors have spared no effort\nto demonstrate. James Harvey Robinson is refreshingly frank on this\nsubject, and we will therefore let him be spokesman for those who are\nmore reticent:\n\n\u201cIt is the extraordinarily illuminating discovery (_sic_) of man\u2019s\nanimalhood rather than evolution in general that troubles the routine\nmind. Many are willing to admit that it looks as if life had developed\non the earth slowly, in successive stages; this they can regard as a\nmerely curious fact and of no great moment if only man can be defended\nas an honorable exception. The fact that we have an animal body may\nalso be conceded, but surely man must have a soul and a mind altogether\ndistinct and unique from the very beginning bestowed on him by the\nCreator and setting him off an immeasurable distance from any mere\nanimal. But whatever may be the religious and poetic significance of\nthis compromise it is becoming less and less tenable as a scientific\nand historic truth. The _facts_ indicate that man\u2019s _mind_ is quite as\nclearly of animal extraction as his body.\u201d (_Science_, July 28, 1922,\np. 95\u2014italics his.)\n\nThis language has, at least, the merit of being unambiguous, and leaves\nus in no uncertainty as to where the writer stands. It discloses,\nlikewise, the animus which motivates his peculiar interest in\ntransformistic theories. If evolution were incapable of being exploited\nin behalf of materialistic philosophy, Mr. Robinson, we may be sure,\nwould soon lose interest in the theory, and would once more align\nhimself with the company, which he has so inappropriately deserted,\nnamely, \u201cthe routine minds\u201d that regard evolution \u201cas a merely curious\nfact of no great moment.\u201d Be that as it may, his final appeal is to\nthe \u201cfacts,\u201d and it is to the facts, accordingly, that we shall go;\nbut they will not be the irrelevant \u201cfacts\u201d of anatomy, physiology,\nand pal\u00e6ontology. Sciences such as these confine their attention to\nthe external manifestations of human life, and can tell us nothing of\nman\u2019s inner consciousness. It does not, therefore, devolve upon them\nto pronounce final judgment upon the origin of _man_. For that which\nis the distinguishing characteristic of man is not his animal nature,\nthat he shares in common with the brute, but his rational nature, which\nalone differentiates him from \u201ca beast that wants discourse of reason.\u201d\nWe cannot settle the question as to whether or not man\u2019s _mind_ is\n\u201cof animal extraction\u201d by comparing his _body_ with the bodies of\nirrational vertebrates. To institute the requisite comparison between\nthe rational mentality of man and the purely sentient consciousness of\nirrational animals falls within the exclusive competence of psychology,\nwhich studies the internal manifestations of life as they are presented\nto the intuition of consciousness, rather than biology, which studies\nlife according to such of its manifestations as are perceptible to the\nexternal senses. Hence it is within the domain of psychology alone,\nthat man can be studied on his distinctively human, or rational, side,\nand it is to this science, accordingly, that we must turn in our search\nfor facts that are germane to the problem of the origin of man and\nthe genesis of the human mind. How little, indeed, does he know of\nhuman nature, whose knowledge of it is confined to man\u2019s insignificant\nanatomy and biology, and who knows nothing of the triumphs of human\ngenius in literature, art, science, architecture, music, and a thousand\nother fields! Psychology alone can evaluate these marvels, and no other\nscience can be of like assistance in solving the problem of whether man\nis, or is not, unique among all his fellows of the animal kingdom.\n\n\n                     \u00a7 2. The Science of the Soul\n\nAs a distinct science, psychology owes its origin to Aristotle, whose\n\u201c_Peri Psyches_\u201d is, in all probability, the first formal treatise on\nthe subject. Through his father, Nichomachus, who was court physician\nto Philip of Macedon, he became acquainted, at an early age, with\nbiological lore in the form of such medical botany, anatomy, and\nphysiology as were commonly known in prescientific days. Subsequently,\nhis celebrated pupil, Alexander the Great, placed at his disposal a\nvast library, together with extensive opportunities for biological\nresearch. This enabled the philosopher to criticize and summarize the\nobservations and speculations of his predecessors in the field, and\nto improve upon them by means of personal reflection and research. In\nwriting his psychology, he was naturally forced to proceed on the basis\nof the facts discoverable by internal experience (introspection) and\nunaided external observation. Of such facts as are only accessible by\nmeans of instrumentation and systematic experimentation, he could, of\ncourse, know nothing, since their exploration awaited the advent of\nmodern mechanical and optical inventions. But the factual foundation\nof his treatise, though not extensive, was solid, so far as it went,\nand his selection, analysis, and evaluation of the materials at hand\nwas so accurate and judicious, that the broad outlines of his system\nhave been vindicated by the test of time, and all the results of\nmodern experimental research fit, with surprising facility, into the\nframework of his generalizations, revision being nowhere necessary\nsave in nonessentials and minor details. Wilhelm Wundt, the Father of\nExperimental Psychology, pays him the following tribute: \u201cThe results\nof my labors do not square with the materialistic hypothesis, nor do\nthey with the dualism of Plato or Descartes. It is only the animism\nof Aristotle which, by combining psychology with biology, results as\na plausible metaphysical conclusion from Experimental Psychology.\u201d\n(\u201cGrundz\u00fcge der physiologischen Psychologie,\u201d 4te Auflage, II, C. 23,\nS. 633.)\n\nLiterally translated, the title of Aristotle\u2019s work signifies a\n_treatise concerning the soul_. It set a precedent for the scholastic\ndoctors of the thirteenth century, and _de anima_ became with them a\ntechnical designation for all works dealing with this theme. In the\nsixteenth century the selfsame usage was embalmed in the Greek term\npsychology, which was coined with a view to rendering the elliptic\nLatin title by means of a single word. Melanchthon is credited with\nhaving originated the term, which, in its original use as well as its\netymology, denoted a science of the _psyche_ or soul.\n\nTowards the close of the seventeenth century, however, the meaning of\nthe term in question began to undergo a marvelous evolution, of which\nthe end is not yet. The process was initiated by Descartes, under whose\nauspices psychology was changed from a science of the _soul_ into a\nscience of the _mind_. Then, under the influence of Hume and Kant, the\n_noumenal mind_ disappeared, leaving only _phenomenal consciousness_.\nRecently, with the advent of Watson, even consciousness itself has\nbeen discarded and psychology has become a science of _behavior_.\nAnd here, for the time being, at any rate, the process has come to a\nstop, just one step short of complete nihilism. Woodworth quotes the\nfollowing waggish comment: \u201cFirst psychology lost its soul, then it\nlost its mind, then it lost consciousness; it still has behavior of\na kind.\u201d (\u201cPsychology, the Science of Mental Life,\u201d p. 2, footnote.)\nThis gradual degeneration of psychology from animism into behaviorism\nis one of the greatest ironies in the history of human thought. All\nof this, however, was latent in the corrosive Cartesian principle of\n\u201cscientific doubt.\u201d _Facilis descensus Averni!_ It is easy to question\nthe validity of this or that kind of human knowledge, but difficult to\narrest, or even foresee, the consequences which the remorseless logic\nof scepticism portends.\n\nDisintegration set in, as has been said, when Descartes substituted\nhis _psychophysical dualism_ of _mind_ and _matter_ for Aristotle\u2019s\n_hylomorphic dualism_ of _soul_ and _body_. The French philosopher,\nin an appendix to his \u201cMeditations,\u201d which dates from 1670, expressly\nrejects the Aristotelian term of soul or _psyche_, and announces his\npreference for mind or spirit, in the following words: \u201cThe substance\nin which thought immediately resides is here called mind (mens,\nesprit). I here speak, however, of mens (mind) rather than anima\n(soul), for the latter is equivocal, being frequently applied to denote\nwhat is material\u201d (\u201cReply to the Second Objections,\u201d p. 86). Henceforth\npsychology ceased to be a science of the soul, and became, instead, a\nscience of the mind.\n\nDescartes, one must bear in mind, divided the universe into two great\nrealms of being, namely: the conscious and the unconscious, the\n_psychic_ world of mind and the _physical_ world of matter, unextended\nsubstance which thinks and extended substance which moves. In man\nthese two substantial principles were conceived as being united by the\ntenuous link of mere contact, the spirit or mind remaining separate\nfrom, and unmingled with, its material partner, the body. The main\ntrouble with this dualism is that it draws the line of demarcation\nat the wrong place. Reason and sense-consciousness are bracketed\ntogether above the line as being equally spiritual; physiological\nprocesses and processes purely physicochemical are coupled below the\nline as being equally mechanical. Now, when a brain-function such\nas sense-perception is introduced, like another Trojan Horse, into\nthe citadel of spiritualism, it is a comparatively easy task for\nmaterialism to storm and sack that citadel by demonstrating with a\nthousand neuro-physiological facts that all sensory functions are\nrigidly correlated with neurological processes, that they are, in\nshort, functions of the nervous system, and therefore purely material\nin nature. On the other hand, once we retreat from the trench of\ndistinction between the processes of unconscious or vegetative life\nand the physicochemical processes of the inorganic world, that moment\nwe have lost the strategic position in the conflict with mechanism,\nand nothing avails to stay its triumphant onrush. Hence, from first to\nlast, it is perfectly clear that the treacherous psychophysical dualism\nof Descartes has done far more harm to the cause of spiritualism than\nall the assaults of materialism. There is a Latin maxim which says:\n_Extrema sese tangunt_\u2014\u201cExtremes come in contact with each other.\u201d The\nultraspiritualism of Descartes by confounding spiritual, with organic\nconsciousness, leads by the most direct route to the opposite extreme\nof crass materialism.\n\nAristotle\u2019s dualism of matter and form, which is but a physical\napplication of his transcendental dualism of potency (_dynamis_) and\nact (_entelechy_), is very different from the Cartesian dualism of the\nphysical and the psychic. According to the Aristotelian view, as we\nhave seen in the last chapter, all the physical entities or substantial\nunits of nature (both living and inorganic) are fundamentally _dual_\nin their essence, each consisting of a definitive principle called\nentelechy and a plastic principle called matter. Entelechy is the\nintegrating determinant, the source of the unit\u2019s coherence and\nof its differentiation from units of another type. Matter is the\ndeterminable and quantifying factor, in virtue of which the unit is\npotentially-multiple and endowed with mass. In the electro-chemical\nreactions of non-living substances (synthesis, analysis, and\ntransmutation), entelechy is the variant and matter is the constant;\nin the metabolic activities of living substances (assimilation and\ndissimilation), matter is the variant and entelechy is the constant.\nThis persistent entelechy of the living unit or organism is what\nAristotle terms the _psyche_ or soul. The latter, therefore, may\nbe defined as the vital principle or primary source of life in the\norganism.\n\nBut in using such terms as \u201csoul\u201d and \u201cvital principle\u201d we are\nemploying expressions against which not merely rabid mechanists,\nbut many conservative biologists as well, see fit to protest. The\nopposition of the latter, however, is found on closer scrutiny to be\n_nominal_ rather than _real_. It is the _name_ which offends; they have\nno objection to the _thing signified_. Wilson, to cite a pertinent\nexample, rejects as meaningless all such terms as \u201cvital principle,\u201d\n\u201csoul,\u201d etc. \u201cThey are words,\u201d he avers, \u201cthat have been written into\ncertain spaces that are otherwise blank in our record of knowledge,\nand as far as I can see no more than this.\u201d (\u201cBiology,\u201d p. 23, 1908.)\nYet he himself affirms again and again the existence of the reality\nwhich these terms (understood in their Aristotelian sense) denote.\nIn discussing the relation of the tissue cell to the multicellular\nbody, for instance, he speaks of \u201ca formative power pervading the\ngrowing mass as a whole.\u201d (\u201cThe Cell,\u201d 2nd ed., p. 59), and, in his\nrecent lecture on the \u201cPhysical Basis of Life,\u201d he makes allusion\nto \u201cthe integrating and unifying principle in the vital processes.\u201d\n(_Science_, March 9, 1923, p. 284.) It would seem, therefore, that\nWilson\u2019s aversion to such terms as soul and vital principle is based\non the _dynamic_ sense assigned to them by the neo-vitalists, who, as\nwe have seen, regard the vital principle as a force _sui generis_ or\na _unique agent_, which operates intrusively among physicochemical\nfactors in the r\u00f4le of an active or efficient cause of vital functions.\nThat such is really the case, appears from his rhetorical question:\n\u201cShall we then join hands with the neo-vitalists in referring the\nunifying and regulatory principle to the _operation_ of an unknown\npower, a directive _force_, an arch\u00e6us, an entelechy or a soul?\u201d (_Loc.\ncit._, p. 285\u2014italics mine.) The objection, however, does not apply\nto these terms used in their Aristotelian sense. In the philosophy of\nthe Stagirite, the soul, like all other entelechies, is a cause in the\n_entitive_, but not in the _dynamic_, order of things. Its efficacy is\n_formal_, not _efficient_. It is not an agent, but a specifying type.\nThe organism must be integrated, specified, and existent _before_ it\ncan operate, and hence its integration and specification by the soul\nis prior to all vital activity. The soul is a constituent of being\nand not an immediate principle of action. The soul is not even an\nentity (in the sense of a complete and separate being), but rather an\nincomplete entity or constituent of an entity. It takes a complete\nentity to be an agent, and the soul or vital entelechy is not an\nindependent existent, which is somehow inserted into the organism,\nbut an incomplete being which has no existence of its own, but only\ncoexistence, in the composite that it forms with the organism. Nor is\nthere any such thing as a special vital force resident in the organism.\nThe executive factors in all vital operations of the organic order are\nthe physicochemical energies, which are native to matter in general.\nThese forces, as we have seen, receive a reflexive orientation and are\nelevated to a higher plane of efficiency by reason of their association\nwith an entelechy superior to the binding and type-determining\nprinciples present in inorganic units, but they are not supplanted or\nsuperseded by a new executive force. Wilson\u2019s fear, therefore, that\nthe experimental analysis of life is discouraged by vitalism, inasmuch\nas this conception _subtracts something from the efficiency of the\nphysicochemical forces_, is groundless in the case of hylomorphic\nvitalism, but is well-founded in the case of such systems as the\nneo-vitalism of Driesch and the spiritualism of Descartes.\n\nSumming up, therefore, we may say that the soul, like other\nentelechies, is consubstantial with its material substrate, the body.\nTrue it is more autonomous than are the inflexible entelechies of\ninorganic nature, inasmuch as it is independent of any given atom,\nmolecule, or cell in the organic aggregate. Such a degree of freedom,\nfor example, is not possessed by the most complex molecules, which show\nno other flexibility than tautomerism, even this small readjustment\ninvolving a change in their specificity. But this autonomy does not\npreclude the essential dependence of the soul upon the body. Generally\nspeaking, the soul is incapable of existence apart from its total\nsubstrate, the organism. We say, _generally speaking_, because, as\npreviously intimated, an exception must be made in the case of the\n_human soul_, which, being, as we shall see, a self-subsistent and\nspiritual entelechy, is by itself, apart from its material substrate,\na sufficient subject of existence, and is therefore capable of\nsurviving the dissolution of its complementary principle, the organism.\nNevertheless, even in man, the soul forms one substance with the\norganism, and the organism participates as a co\u00ebfficient factor in\nall his vital functions, both physiological and psychic, excluding\nonly the _superorganic_ or _spiritual_ functions of rational thought\nand volition, whose agent and recipient is the _soul alone_. In man,\nthen, soul and body unite to form a single substance, a single nature,\nand a single person. Apart from the body, the human soul is, indeed,\na complete entity, in the sense that it is capable of subsistence\n(independent existence), but, in another sense, it is not a complete\nentity, because apart from the body it cannot constitute a complete\nnature or complete personality. It is this essential incompleteness of\nthe discarnate human soul that forms the natural basis of the Christian\ndoctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead.\n\nHere, however, it is important to note the difference between the\nhylomorphic spiritualism of Aristotle and the psychophysical\nspiritualism of Descartes. By the latter _all_ conscious or physic\nfunctions are regarded as spiritual. The former, however, recognizes\nthe fundamental difference which exists between the lower or\nanimal, and the higher or rational functions of our conscious life.\nSense-perception and sensual emotion belong to the former class, and\nmust be regarded as _organic_ functions, whose agent and subject is\nneither the soul alone nor the organism alone, but the soul-informed\norganism or substantial composite of body and soul. Rational thinking\nand willing, on the contrary, are classified as _superorganic_ or\n_spiritual_ functions, inasmuch as they exclude the co\u00e4gency of the\norganism and have the soul alone for their active cause and receptive\nsubject.\n\nThe soul, in fine, is the formal principle or primary source of the\nthreefold life in man, namely, the metabolic life, which man shares\nwith plants, the sentient life, which he shares with animals, and the\nrational life, which is uniquely human. The human soul is often spoken\nof as the mind. In their dictionary sense, both terms denote one and\nthe same reality, namely, the human entelechy or vital principle in\nman, but the connotation of these terms is different. The term soul\nsignifies the vital principle in so far as it is the primary source\nof every kind of life in man, that is, vegetative, sentient, and\nrational. The term mind, however, connoting conscious rather than\nunconscious life, signifies the vital principle in so far as it is the\nroot and ground of our conscious life (both sentient and rational).\nHere, however, the distinction is of no great moment, and the terms\nmay be regarded as synonymous. The definitions which we have given\nare, of course, blasphemous in the ears of our modern neo-Kantian\nphenomenalists, whose preference is for a _functional_, rather than a\n_substantial_, mind or soul; but we will pay our respects to them later.\n\nIt is clear, however, from what has been said, that, for evidences of\nthe superiority and spirituality of the human soul, we must recur,\nnot to the external manifestations of our nutritive life, but to\nthe internal manifestations of our conscious life. The latter are\nwholly inaccessible to the external senses and perceptible only to the\nintuition of consciousness, introspection, or internal experience,\nas it is variously called. All our self-knowledge rests on the basis\nof introspection, and without it the science of psychology would be\nimpossible. In fact, not only psychology, but the physical sciences\nas well, depend for their validity on the testimony of consciousness;\nfor the external world is only knowable to the extent that it enters\nthe domain of our consciousness. Recently, as we have seen, a tendency\nto discredit internal experience has arisen among materialistic\nextremists. This \u201ctendency,\u201d to quote the words of Keyser, \u201cmost\nnotably represented by the behaviorist school of psychologists (like\nProfessor Watson, for example), is manifest in the distrust of\nintrospections as a means of knowledge of mental phenomena and in the\ngrowing dependence of psychology upon external observation of animal\nand human behavior and upon physiological experiment, as if matter\nwere regarded \u2018as something much more solid and indubitable than\nmind\u2019 (Bertrand Russell).\u201d\u2014C. J. Keyser, _Science_, Nov. 25, 1921,\np. 520. Since, however, all our knowledge depends on the validity of\nconsciousness, such a tendency is suicidal and destructive of all\nscience, whether physical or psychological. The attempts, therefore, of\nmechanists, like Loeb, and behaviorists, like Watson, to dispense with\nconsciousness overreach themselves. For how can the mechanists _know_\nthat there are such things as tropisms, tactisms, or reaction-systems,\nhow can the behaviorist _study_ such things as \u201csituations,\u201d\n\u201cadjustments,\u201d and S-R-bonds, how can the materialist _become aware_\nof the existence of molecules and atoms, except through the medium of\ntheir own conscious or psychic states? States of matter can be known\nonly by means of states of mind, and the former, therefore, cannot\nbe any more real than the latter. \u201cWhat, after all,\u201d asks Cardinal\nMercier, \u201cis a fact of nature if the mind has not seized, examined,\nand assimilated it? True, the information of consciousness is often\nprecarious. For this reason we do well to aid and control it by\nscientific apparatus. These apparatus, however, can only aid, never\nsupplant, introspection. The telescope does not replace the eye, but\nextends its vision.\u201d (\u201cRelation of Exp. Psych. to Philosophy,\u201d pp. 40,\n41\u2014Trans. of Wirth.)\n\n\n                   \u00a7 3. The Nature of the Human Soul\n\nNow our inner consciousness bears unmistakable witness to the existence\nwithin us of an abiding subject of our thoughts, feelings, and desires.\nIn biology, the soul is revealed to us as a binding-principle, that\nobstructs dissolution of the organism, and a persistent type that\nmaintains its identity amid an incessant flux of matter and flow\nof energy. Clearer still is testimony of introspective psychology,\nwhich reveals all our psychic activities and states as successive\nmodifications of this permanent \u201cI,\u201d \u201cself,\u201d \u201cpersonality,\u201d or \u201cmind,\u201d\naccording as we choose to express it. Human language proves this\nmost forcibly; for the intramental facts and data of our conscious\nlife simply cannot be so much as intelligibly expressed, much less,\ndefined, or differentiated from the extramental facts of the physical\nworld, without using terms that include a reference to this selfsame\npersistent subject of thought, feeling, and volition. Even inveterate\nphenomenalists, like Wundt, James, and Titchener, are obliged to\nsubmit to this inexorable linguistic law, in common with their\nunscientific brethren, the generality of mankind, although they do\nso only after futile attempts at a \u201cscientific revision\u201d of grammar,\nand with much grumbling over the \u201cbarbarous conceptions\u201d of the\ngross-headed aborigines who invented human language. Be that as it\nmay, no formulation of mental facts is possible except in terms that\neither denote or connote this permanent source and ground of human\nthought and feeling, as is apparent, for example, from such phrases\nas: \u201c_I_ think,\u201d \u201c_I_ wish,\u201d \u201c_I_ hear\u201d; \u201c_mental_ states\u201d (_i. e._ of\nthe mind); _psychic_ functions (_i. e._ of the psyche); _subjective_\nidealism (_i. e._ of the subject); a _conscious_ act (from _con-scire_:\n\u201cto know along with,\u201d because in conscious acts the subject is known\nalong with the object). The phenomenalists occasionally succeed, in\ntheir \u201cmost precise\u201d passages, in omitting to mention the person,\nknower, or thinker behind thought, but they do so only at the cost of\nsubstituting _personal pronouns_, and of thus bringing back through\nthe window what they have just ejected by way of the door. Our\nconsciousness, therefore, makes us invincibly aware of the _existence_\nof a superficially variable, but radically unchangeable, subject of\nour mental life. It does not, however, tell us anything concerning the\n_nature_ of this primary ground of thought, whether, for example, it is\nidentical with the cerebral cortex, or something distinct therefrom,\nwhether it is phenomenal or substantial, dynamic or entitive, spiritual\nor material. To decide these questions the unanalyzed factual data of\ninternal experience do not suffice, but they do suffice to establish\nthe reality of the ego or subject of thought. Later we shall see that\nthe analysis of these data, when taken in conjunction with other facts,\nforces us to predicate of the soul such attributes as substantiality,\nsimplicity, and spirituality, but here they are cited solely for their\nfactual force and not for their logical implications.\n\nThe phenomenalistic schools of Interactionism and Psychophysical\nParallelism deny the _substantiality_ of the soul, and seek to resolve\nit into sourceless and subjectless processes. A phenomenal mind or\nsoul, however, could not be the primary ground of mental life, for the\nsimple reason that phenomena presuppose a supporting medium (otherwise\nthey would be self-maintaining, and therefore, substantial). Now that\nwhich presupposes cannot be a primary principle, but only a secondary,\nor tertiary principle. Consequently, a functional mind could not be\nthe primary and irreducible ground of mental life, but only that _of\nwhich_ it is a function, whether that something is a material, or a\nspiritual substance. For the present, we are not interested in the\nnature of this ultimate substrate, we are content with the fact that\nit really exists. Phenomenalists (like Wundt, Paulsen, and James)\nare very inconsistent when they admit material molecules as the\nextended substrate of extramental or physical phenomena, while denying\nthe existence of the mind or ego as the inextended substrate of\nintramental or psychic phenomena. All substance, whether material or\nspiritual, is inaccessible to the senses. Even material substrates are\nmanifested only by their phenomena, being in themselves supersensible\nand \u201cmetaphysical.\u201d If, then, the human understanding is inerrant in\nascribing a material substrate to extramental phenomena, then it is\nequally inerrant in attributing to intramental phenomena the intimate\nsubstrate called mind, whether this substrate be a spiritual substance,\nor a material substance like the substrate of physical phenomena\nand that of organic life. As a matter of fact, the Psychophysical\nParallelists actually do reduce mental phenomena to a material\nsubstrate (viz. the cerebral cortex). Their phenomenalism, which we\nwill refute presently, is but a disingenuous attempt to gloss over\ntheir fundamental materialism. At all events, they are willing to admit\nan ultimate substantial ground of thought and volition, provided it is\nnot claimed that this substrate is of a spiritual nature. The _bare\nexistence_ of some substrate, however, is all that we assert, for the\npresent.\n\nBefore leaving this topic, we wish to call attention to the fact that\nthe subject of thought and desire is _active_ as well as _passive_.\nMind, in other words, is not merely a persistent medium wherein passive\nmental states are maintained, but an active and synthetic principle\nas well. Mental processes, like those of judgment, reasoning, and\nrecognition, require a unitary and unifying principle, which actively\nexamines and compares our impressions and thoughts, in order to discern\ntheir relations to one another and to itself. Materialistic psychology,\nin spite of the plain testimony of consciousness, is all for ignoring\nthe mind in its _active r\u00f4le_ as the percipient of the identities and\ndiscrepancies of thought, and for regarding mind as a mere complex of\nmental states or transient flux of fleeting imagery. It is well, then,\nto bear in mind the indubitable facts of internal experience, to which\nCardinal Mercier calls attention. \u201cEnglish psychology,\u201d he observes,\n\u201chad attempted a kind of anatomy of consciousness. It made all consist\nin passive sensations or impressions. These impressions came together,\nfused, dissociated under the guidance of certain laws, principally\nthose of similarity and dissimilarity. The whole process was entirely\npassive without the intervention of any active subject. It was\npsychology without a soul. Now that things are being examined a little\nmore closely, psychologists find that there are a lot of conscious\nstates that are without the slightest doubt active on the part of the\nsubject. There are a number of mental states upon which the subject\nbrings his _attention_ to bear, and attention (from _ad-tendere_)\nmeans activity. Ordinarily we do not know the intensity of a sensation\nwithout _comparing_ it with another preceding one. This work of\ncomparison, or, as the English call it, discrimination, is necessarily\n_activity_. The Associationists had confounded the fact of co\u00ebxistence\nwith the perception of similarity or dissimilarity. Supposing even\nthat the co\u00ebxistence of two mental states were entirely passive, it\nstill remains true that the notion of their similarity or dissimilarity\nrequires an _act of perception_. It is absolutely impossible to\nconceive psychical life without an _active subject_ which _perceives_\nitself as living, _notes_ the impressions it receives, _compares_ its\nacts, _associates_ and _dissociates_ them; in a word, there can be\nno psychology without a perceiving subject which psychologists call\n_esprit_, or with the English, \u2018mind.\u2019\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 52-54\u2014italics\nhis.)\n\nThe conflict between phenomenalism and the clear testimony of\nconsciousness is summed up in the following words of T. Fontaine: \u201cIf\nall things are phenomena, then we ourselves can be nothing more than\nevents unknown to one another; in order, then, that such events may\nappear to us united, so that we may be able to declare their succession\nwithin us, it is necessary that something else besides them should\nexist; and this something else, this link that binds them together,\nthis principle that is conscious of their succession, can be nothing\nelse than a non-event or non-phenomenon, namely, a substance, an ego\nsubstantially distinct from sensations.\u201d (\u201cLa sensation et la pens\u00e9e,\u201d\np. 23.)\n\nFor the phenomenalists, mind is but a collective term for the\nphenomenal series of our transitory thoughts and feelings. With\nWundt, they discard the substantial or entitive soul for a dynamic or\nfunctional one, \u201c_die aktuelle Seele_.\u201d (Cf. Grundz. der Phys. Psych.,\ned. 5th, III, p. 758 _et seq._) Thought antecedes itself by becoming\nits own thinker; for Titchener tells us: \u201cThe passing thought would\nseem to be the thinker.\u201d (\u201cPr. of Psych.,\u201d I, p. 342.) We do not think,\nbut thought thinks; John does not walk, but walking walks; aeroplanes\ndo not fly, but flight flies; air does not vibrate, but vibration\nvibrates. The phenomenalist _objectivates his subjective abstractions_,\ndivorces processes from their agents, and substantializes phenomena.\nThe source of his error is a confusion of the ideal, with the real,\norder of things. Because it is possible for us _to consider_ a thought\napart from any determinate thinker, by means of a mental abstraction,\nhe very falsely concludes that it is possible for a thought _to exist_\nwithout a concrete thinker. It would be obviously absurd to suppose\nthat the so-called Grignard reaction could occur without definite\nreactants, merely because we can think of it without specifying any\nparticular kind of _alkyl halide_; it would be preposterous to infer,\nfrom the fact that vibration can be considered independently of any\nconcrete medium such as air, water, or ether, that therefore a pure\nvibration can exist without any vibrating medium; and it is equally\nabsurd to project an abstraction like subjectless thought into the\nrealm of existent reality. Abstractions are ideal entities of the mind;\nthey can have no real existence outside the domain of thought. Hence\nto assign a real or extralogical existence to actions, modalities, and\nproperties, in isolation from the concrete subjects, to which they\nbelong, is a procedure that is not legitimate in any other world than\nAlice\u2019s Wonderland, where, we are told, the Cheshire Cat left behind\nhis notorious grin long after his benign countenance had faded from\nview. His faceless grin is a fitting comment on the neo-Kantian folly\nof those who, as L. Chiesa says, \u201cspeak of phenomena without substance,\nof sensations without subject, of thoughts without the Ego, to which\nthey belong, imitating in this way the poets, who personify honor,\nvirtue, beauty, etc. Now all this proceeds exclusively from a confusion\nof the subjective abstraction with the reality, and from the assumption\nthat the phenomenon, for example, exists without substance, because we\nare able (by means of abstraction) to consider the former independently\nof the latter.\u201d (\u201cLa Base del Realismo,\u201d p. 39.) In other words, the\nmind is capable of separating (representatively, of course, and not\nphysically) its own phenomena from itself, but this is no warrant for\ntransferring the abstractions thus formed from the ideal, to the real,\norder of things.\n\nSo much for the soul\u2019s substantiality, but it is a _simple_, as\nwell as a substantial, principle, that is to say, it is inextended,\nuncompounded, incorporeal, and not dispersed into quantitative parts\nor particles. In other words, it is not a composite of constituent\nelements or complex of integral parts, but something really distinct\nfrom the body and pertaining to a different order of reality than\nmatter. This, as we have seen, does not necessarily mean that it\nis immaterial, in the sense of being intrinsically independent of\nmatter. In a word, simplicity does not involve spirituality (absolute\nimmateriality). Not only plant and animal souls, but even mineral\nentelechies, are simple, in the negative sense of excluding extension,\ncorporeality and dispersal into quantitative parts, but they are, none\nthe less, intrinsically dependent on matter and are therefore material\nprinciples.\n\nThat the soul or vital entelechy is really distinct from its material\nsubstrate is apparent from the perennial process of metabolism enacted\nin the living organism. In this process, matter is the variant and\nentelechy or specific type is the constant. Hence the two principles\nare not only distinct, but separable. Moreover, the soul\u2019s r\u00f4le as a\nbinding-principle that obstructs dissolution is incompatible with its\ndispersal into quantitative parts; for such a principle, far from being\nable to bind, would require binding itself, and could not, therefore,\nbe the primary source of unification in the organism. Finally, the soul\nmust be incorporeal; since, if it were a corporeal mass, it could not\nbe \u201ca formative power pervading the growing mass as a whole\u201d (Wilson);\nfor this would involve the penetration of one body by another.\nConsequently, the soul is a simple, inextended, incorporeal reality\nundispersed into quantitative parts.\n\nIntrospective psychology bears witness to the same truth; for\nconsciousness reinforced by memory attests _the substantial permanence\nof our personal identity_. We both think and regulate our practical\nconduct in accordance with this sense of unchanging personal identity.\nAll recognition of the past means simply this, that we perceive the\nsubstantial identity of our present, with our past, selves throughout\nall the experiences and vicissitudes of life. There is an inmost core\nof our being which is unchanging and which remains always identical\nwith itself, in spite of the flow of thought and the metabolic changes\nof the life-cycle. It is this that gives us the sense of being\nalways identically the same person, from infancy to maturity, and\nfrom maturity to old age. It is this that constitutes the thread of\ncontinuity which links our yesterdays with today, and makes us morally\nresponsible for all the deliberate deeds of a lifetime. Courts of law\ndo not acquit a criminal because he is in a different frame of mind\nfrom that which induced him to commit murder, nor do they excuse him on\nthe score that metabolism has made him a different mass of flesh from\nthat which perpetrated the crime. Such philosophies as phenomenalism\nand materialism are purely academic. Even their advocates dare not\nreduce them to consistent practice in everyday life.\n\nNor can the cases of _alternating personalities_ be adduced as\ncounterevidence. In the first place, these cases are psychopathic\nand not normal. In the second, they are due, not to a modification\nof _personality itself_, but to a modification in the _perception of\npersonality_. Since this perception is, as we shall see, extrinsically\ndependent on cerebral imagery, any neuropathic affection is liable\nto modify the perception of personality by seriously disturbing\nthe imagery, on which it depends. But (_pace_ Wundt and James) the\nperception of personality is one thing, and personality itself quite\nanother. Perception does not produce its objects, but presupposes\nthem, and self-perception is no exception to this rule. Introspection,\ntherefore, does not create our personality, but reveals and represents\nit. If then to the intuition of consciousness our personality appears\nas an unchanging principle that remains always substantially identical\nwith itself, it follows that this perception must be terminated by\nsomething more durable than a flux of transient molecules or a stream\nof fleeting thought. Unless this perceptive act has for its object some\nunitary and uniformly persistent reality distinct from our composite,\ncorruptible bodies, and not identified with our transitory thoughts,\nthis sense of permanent personal identity would be utterly impossible.\nMaterialism, which recognizes nothing more in man than a decaying\norganism, a mere vortex of fluent molecules, is at a loss to account\nfor our consciousness of being always the same person. Phenomenalism,\nwhich identifies mind or self with the \u201cthought-stream,\u201d is equally\nimpotent to account for this sense of our abiding sameness.\n\nJames\u2019 attempt at a phenomenalistic explanation of the persistent\ncontinuity of self, on the assumption that each passing thought knows\nits receding predecessor and becomes known, in turn, by its successor,\nis puerile. To pass over other flaws, this absurd theory encounters an\ninsuperable difficulty in _sleep_, which interrupts, for a considerable\ninterval, the flow of conscious thought. Thought is a transient\nreality, which passes, so far as its actuality is concerned, and can\nonly remain in the form of a permanent effect. Unless, therefore, there\nwere some _persistent medium_ in which the last waking thought could\nleave a permanent vestige of itself, the process of relaying the past\ncould never be resumed, and we would lose our personal identity every\ntwenty-four hours. The mind, or subject of thought, then, must be an\nabiding and unitary principle distinct from our composite bodies, and\nfrom our manifold and fleeting thoughts.\n\nFinally, to the two foregoing attributes of the human soul\n(substantiality and simplicity), we must add a third and crowning\nattribute, namely, _spirituality_. It is this, and this alone, that\ndifferentiates the human from the bestial soul, which latter is but\nan incomplete complement of matter, incapable of existence apart from\nmatter, and doomed to perish with the dissolution of the organism, as\nthe cylindrical form of a candle perishes with the consumption of the\nwax by the flame.\n\nAll the psychic activities of the brute, such as sensation,\nobject-perception, imagination, associative memory, sensual emotion,\netc., are organic functions of the sensitivo-nervous type. In\nall of them the agent and recipient is not the soul alone, but\nthe psycho-organic composite of soul and organism, that is, the\nsoul-informed sensory and central neurons of the cerebrospinal system.\nThe sensory neurons are nerve cells that transmit centerward the\nexcitations of physical stimuli received by the external sense organs\nor receptors, in which their axon-fibers terminate. These receptors\nand sensory neurons are extended material organs proportioned and\nspecialized for receiving physical impressions from external bodies,\neither directly through surface-contact with the bodies themselves\nor their derivative particles (_e.g._ in touch, taste and smell), or\nindirectly through surface-contact with an extended vibrant medium such\nas air, water, or ether (_e.g._ in hearing and sight). The central\nneurons of the cerebral cortex are, as it were, the tablets, upon which\nthe excitations transmitted thither by the sensory neurons, record the\nextended neurograms that constitute the physical basis of the concrete\nimagery of memory and imagination. Interior senses, then, like memory\nand imagination, merely continue and combine what was pre\u00ebxistent in\nthe exterior senses. Their composite imagery is rigidly proportioned\nto the extended neurograms imprinted on the cerebral neurons, and\nthese neurograms, in turn, are determined both qualitatively and\nquantitatively by the physical impressions received by the receptors,\nand these impressions, finally, are exactly proportioned to the action\nof the material stimuli in contact with the receptors. Thus the\ncomposite images of imagination as well as those of direct perception\nare proportioned to the underlying neurograms of the cortex and\ncorrespond exactly, as regards quality, intensity, and extensity, to\nthe original stimulus affecting the external receptors. Hence men born\nblind can never imagine color, nor can men born deaf ever imagine\nsound. An inextended principle, such as the discarnate soul, cannot\nreceive or record impressions from extended vibrant media, or from\nextended corporeal masses. For this the soul requires the intrinsic\nco\u00f6peration of material receptors. Now, the highest cognitive and\nappetitive functions of the brute (_e.g._ sense-perception and emotion)\nare, as has been stated, of the sensitivo-nervous or psycho-organic\ntype, that is, they are functions in which the material organism\nintimately co\u00f6perates; brute animals give no indication of having so\nmuch as a single function, which proceeds from the soul alone and\nwhich is not communicated to the organism. Hence the bestial soul is\n\u201ctotally immersed\u201d in matter; as regards both operation and existence,\nit is \u201cintrinsically dependent\u201d upon its material complement, the\norganism. It never operates save in conjunction with the latter, and\nits _sole reason for existence_ is adequately summed up in saying that\nit exists, not for its own sake, but merely _to vivify and sensitize\nthe organism_. Consequently, the brute soul, though inextended and\nincorporeal, belongs, not to the spiritual, but to the material, order\nof things.\n\nIs the human soul equally material in nature, or does it belong to the\nspiritual category of being? The state of the question has long since\nbeen formulated for us by Aristotle: \u201cA further difficulty,\u201d he says,\n\u201carises as to whether all attributes of the soul are also shared by\nthat which has the soul or whether any of them are peculiar to the soul\nitself: a problem which it is imperative, and yet by no means easy, to\nsolve. It would appear that in most cases it neither acts nor is acted\nupon apart from the body: as, _e.g._, in anger, courage, desire, and\nsensation in general. Thought, if anything, would seem to be peculiar\nto the soul. Yet if thought is a sort of imagination, or something not\nindependent of imagination, it will follow that not even thought is\nindependent of the body. If, then, there be any functions or affections\nof the soul that are peculiar to it, it will be possible for the soul\nto be separated from the body: if, on the other hand, there is nothing\npeculiar to it, the soul will not be capable of separate existence.\u201d\n(\u201cPeri Psyches,\u201d Bk. I, chap. I, 9.) We shall see that the human\nsoul has certain operations which it discharges independently of the\nintrinsic co\u00e4gency of the organism, _e.g._, abstract thought (not to be\nconfounded with the concrete imagery of the imagination) and deliberate\nvolition (to be distinguished from the urge of the sensual appetite).\nHence, over and above the organic functions, which it discharges in\nconjunction with the material organism, the human soul has superorganic\nfunctions, of which it is itself, in its own right, the exclusive agent\nand recipient. In other words, it exists _for its own sake_ and not\nmerely to perfect the body.\n\nThe Aristotelian argument for the spirituality of the human soul\nconsists in the application of a self-evident principle or axiom to\ncertain facts of internal experience. The axiom in question is the\nfollowing: \u201cThe nature of an agent is revealed by its action\u201d; or,\nto phrase it somewhat differently: \u201cEvery being operates after the\nsame manner that it exists.\u201d The factual data, to which reference is\nmade, are man\u2019s higher psychic functions, in which the soul alone\nis the active cause and receptive subject, namely: the rational or\nsuperorganic functions of thinking and willing. The argument may be\nformulated thus: Every agent exists after the same manner that it\noperates. But in rational cognition and volition the soul acts without\nthe co-agency of the material organism. Therefore the human soul can\nexist without the coexistence of the material organism. But this is\ntantamount to saying that it is a spiritual reality irreducible to\nmatter and incapable of derivation from matter. For we define that\nas spiritual, which exists, or is, at least, capable of existing,\nwithout matter. Consequently, the human soul is a supermaterial and\nimmortal principle, which does not need the body to maintain itself in\nexistence, and can, on that account, survive the death and dissolution\nof its material complement, the organism. Such a reality, as we\nhave seen, cannot be a product of evolution, but can only come into\nexistence by way of creation.\n\nThe axiom, that activity is the expression or manifestation of the\nentity which underlies it, needs but little elucidation. In the\ngenesis of human knowledge, the dynamic is prior to both the static\nand the entitive. We deduce the nature of the cause from the changes\nor effects that it produces. Action, in short, is the primary datum\nupon which our knowledge of being rests. It is the spectrum of solar\nlight emitted by them, which enables us to determine the nature of\nthe chemical elements present in the distant Sun. It is the reaction\nof an unknown compound with a test reagent that furnishes the chemist\nwith a clue to its composition and structure. It is the special type\nof tissue degeneration caused by the specific toxin engendered by an\ninvisible disease germ that enables the pathologists to identify the\nlatter, etc., etc. So much for the axiom. Regarding the psychological\nfacts, a more lengthy exposition is required. To begin with, there\nis _prima facie_ evidence against the contention that the higher\npsychic functions in man are independent of the organism. Injury and\ndegeneration of the cerebral cortex result (very often, at least) in\ninsanity and idiocy. Reason, therefore, is in some way dependent upon\nthe organism. Babies, too, are incapable of rational thought until\nsuch a time as the nervous system is fully developed. Obviously,\nthen, rational functions cannot be spiritual, inasmuch as they are not\nindependent of the organism.\n\nThis time-honored objection of materialists is based on a\nmisapprehension. It falsely assumes that spirituality excludes _every_\nkind of dependence upon a material organism, and that our assertion\nof the soul\u2019s independence of matter is an unqualified assertion.\nThis, however, is far from being the case. It is only _intrinsic_\n(subjective), and not _extrinsic_ (objective), independence of the\norganism which is here affirmed. An analogy from the sense of sight\nwill serve to make clear the meaning of this distinction. In the act\nof seeing a tree, for example, our sight is dependent upon a twofold\ncorporeal element, namely, the _eye_ and the _tree_. It is dependent\nupon the eye as upon a corporeal element intrinsic to the visual sense,\nthe eye being a constituent part of the agent and subject of vision;\nfor it is not the soul alone which sees, but rather the soul-informed\nretina and neurons of the psycho-organic composite. The eye enters as\nan essential ingredient into the intimate constitution of the visual\nsense. It is a _constituent part_ of the _specific cause_ of vision,\nand it can therefore be said with perfect propriety that the _eye\nsees_. Such dependence upon a material element is called intrinsic or\nsubjective dependence, and is utterly incompatible with spirituality on\nthe part of that which is thus dependent. But the dependence of sight\nupon an external corporeal factor, like a tree or any other visible\nobject, is of quite a different nature. Here the corporeal element is\noutside of the seeing subject and does not enter as an ingredient into\nthe composition of the principal and specific agent of vision. True the\ntree, which is seen, is co\u00efnstrumental as a provoking stimulus and an\nobjective exemplar, but its concurrence is of an extrinsic nature, not\nto be confounded with the intrinsic co-agency of the eye in the act of\nvision. Hence, in no sense whatever can the tree be said to see; for\nthe tree is merely an object, not the principal and specific cause,\nof vision. When the dependence of an agent upon a corporeal element\nis of this sort, it is termed extrinsic or objective dependence. Such\ndependence upon a material element is _perfectly compatible with\nspirituality_, which does, indeed, exclude all materiality from the\nspecific agent and subject of a psychic act, but does not necessarily\nexclude materiality from the object contemplated in such an act. Hence\nthe fact that the thinking soul must abstract its rational concepts\nfrom the concrete imagery of a cerebral sense, like the imagination,\nin no wise detracts from its spirituality, because the dependence of\nabstract thought upon such imagery is objective or extrinsic, and not\nsubjective or intrinsic.\n\nPsychologists of the sensationalist school have striven to obscure\nthe fundamental distinction which exists between rational thought and\nthe concomitant cerebral imagery. It is, however, far too manifest\nto escape attention, as the healthy reaction of the modern school of\nW\u00fcrzburg indicates. \u201cIt cost me great resolution,\u201d says Dr. F. E.\nSchultze, a member of this school, \u201cto say, that, on the basis of\nimmediate experiment, appearances and sensible apprehensions are not\nthe only things that can be experienced. But finally I had to resign\nmyself to my fate.\u201d (\u201cBeitrag zur Psychologie des Zeitbewusstseins,\u201d p.\n277.)\n\nBut thought is not only distinct from imagery, often there is marked\ncontrast between the two, both as regards subjective, and objective,\ncharacters. Thus our thought may be perfectly clear, precise, and\npertinent, while the accompanying imagery is obscure, fragmentary,\nand irrelevant. \u201cWhat enters into consciousness so fragmentarily, so\nsporadically, so very accidentally as our mental images,\u201d exclaims Karl\nB\u00fchler (also of W\u00fcrzburg), \u201ccan not be looked upon as the well-knitted,\ncontinuous content of our thinking.\u201d (_Archiv. f\u00fcr die ges. Psychol._,\n9, 1907, p. 317.) The same contrast exists with respect to their\nobjective characters. Imagination represents by means of one and the\nsame image what reason represents by means of two distinct concepts,\n_e.g._ an oasis and a mirage; and, _vice versa_, reason represents\nunder the single general concept of a rose objects that imagination\nis forced to represent by means of two distinct images, _e.g._, a\nyellow, and a white rose. Imagery depicts only the superficial or\nexterior properties of an object, whereas thought penetrates beneath\nthe phenomenal surface to interior properties and supersensible\nrelationships. The sensory percept apprehends the existence of a fact,\nwhile the rational concept analyzes its nature. Hence sense-perception\nis concerned with the _reality of existence_, while thought is\nconcerned with the _reality of essence_.\n\nCertain American psychologists employ the term _imageless thought_\nto designate abstract concepts. The expression is liable to be\nmisunderstood. It should not be construed as excluding all concomitance\nand concurrence of sensible imagery, in relation to the process of\nthought. What is really meant is that sensible appearances do not make\nup the sum-total of our internal experiences, but that we are also\naware of mental acts and states which are not reducible to imagery.\nIn other words, we experience thought; and thought and imagery,\nthough concomitant, are not commensurable. The clarity and coherence\nof thought does not depend on the clarity or germaneness of the\naccompanying imagery, nor is it ever adequately translatable into terms\nof that imagery. Thus the universal triangle of geometry, which is not\nright, nor oblique, nor isosceles, neither scalene nor equilateral,\nneither large nor small, neither here nor there, neither now nor then,\nis not visualizable in terms of concrete imagery, although we are\nclearly conscious of its significance in geometrical demonstrations.\nImagery differs according to the person, one man being a visualist,\nanother an audist, another a tactualist, another a motor-verbalist,\netc. But thought is the same in all, and consequently it is thought,\nand not imagery, which we convey by means of speech. Helen Keller,\nwhose imagery is mainly motor and tactile, can exchange views with an\naudist or visualist on the subject of geometry, even though the amount\nof imagery which she has in common with such persons is negligible.\n\u201c_Eine Bedeutung_,\u201d says B\u00fchler, \u201c_kann man \u00fcberhaupt nicht vorstellen,\nsondern nur wissen_,\u201d and Binet, in the last sentence of his \u201cL\u2019\u00c9tude\nexp\u00e9rimentale de l\u2019intelligence,\u201d formulates the following conclusion:\n\u201cFinally\u2014and this is the main fact, fruitful in consequences for the\nphilosophers\u2014the entire logic of thought escapes our imagery.\u201d\n\nNevertheless, thought does not originate in the total absence of\nimagery, but requires a minimal substrate of sensible images, upon\nwhich it is objectively, if not subjectively, dependent. The nature\nof this objective dependence is explained by the Scholastic theory\nconcerning the origin of concepts. According to this theory, the\ngenesis of our general and abstract knowledge is as follows: (1) We\nbegin with sense-perception, say of boats differing in shape, size,\ncolor, material, location, etc. (2) Imagination and sense-memory retain\nthe composite and concrete imagery synthesized or integrated from the\nimpressions of the separate external senses and representing the boats\nin all their factual particularity, individuality, and materiality,\nas existent here and now, or there and then, as constructed of such\nand such material (_e.g._, of wood, or steel, or iron, or concrete),\nas having determinate sizes, shapes, and tonnages, as painted white,\nor gray, or green, as propelled by oar, or sail, or turbine, etc. (3)\nThen the _active intellect_ exerts its abstractive influence upon this\nconcrete imagery, accentuating the essential features which are common\nto all, and suppressing the individuating features which are peculiar\nto this or that boat, so that the essence of a boat may appear to the\n_cognitive intellect_ without its concomitant individuation\u2014the essence\nof a boat being, in this way, isolated from the peculiarities thereof\nand its various qualities from their subject (representatively, of\ncourse, and not physically). (4) The imagery thus predisposed, being\nno longer immersed in matter, but dematerialized by the dispositive\naction of the active intellect, becomes co\u00efnstrumental with the\nlatter in producing a determination in the cognitive intellect. (5)\nUpon receiving this determination, the cognitive intellect, which\nhas hitherto been, as it were, a blank tablet with nothing written\nupon it, reacts to express the essence or nature of a boat by means\nof a spiritual representation or concept\u2014the abstractive act of the\nactive intellect is _dispositive_, inasmuch as it _presents_ what\nis common to all the boats perceived without their differentiating\npeculiarities; the abstractive act of the cognitive intellect,\nhowever, is _cognitive_, inasmuch as it _considers_ the essence of a\nboat without considering its individuation. Such is the abstractive\nprocess by which our general and abstract concepts are formed. From a\ncomparison of two concepts of this sort the process of judgment arises,\nand from the comparison of two concepts with a third arises the process\nof mediate inference or reasoning. Volition, too, is consequent upon\nconception, and hence an act of the will (our rational appetite), such\nas the desire of sailing in a boat, entails the pre\u00ebxistence of some\nconceptual knowledge of the nature of a boat. Volition, therefore,\npresupposes thought, and thought presupposes imagination, which\nsupplies the sensible imagery that undergoes the aforesaid process\nof analysis or abstraction. Such imagery, however, is a function of\nthe cerebral cortex, and, for this reason, the normal exercise of the\nimagination presupposes the cerebral cortex in a normal physiological\ncondition; and anything that disturbs this normal condition of the\ncortex will directly disturb the imagery of the imagination, and\ntherefore indirectly impede the normal exercise of conceptual thought,\nwhich is abstracted from such imagery. Hence it is clear that the\nactivity of both the intellect and the will is objectively dependent\nupon the organic activity of the imagination, and, in consequence,\n_indirectly_ dependent upon the physiological condition of the cerebral\ncortex, which is the organ of the imagination. Since, however, this\ndependence is objective rather than subjective, it does not, as we have\nseen, conflict with the spirituality of rational thought.\n\nThe nature of conceptual thought is such as to exclude the\nparticipation of matter as a constituent of its specific agent\nand receptive subject. The objects of a cerebral sense like the\nimagination are endowed with extension, color, shape, volume, mass,\ntemperature, and other physical properties, in virtue of which they\ncan set up vibrations in an extended medium or modify an extended\norgan by immediate physical contact. But, while imagination makes\nus conscious of objects capable of stimulating extended material\norgans, the objects, of which we are conscious in abstract thinking,\nare divested of all the sensible properties, extension, and specific\nenergies, which would enable them to modify a material neuron, or\nproduce a physical impression upon a material receptor of any kind\nwhatever. Between an extended material receptor, like a sense-organ or\na cerebral neuron, and the nondimensional, dematerialized object or\ncontent of an abstract thought, like science, heroism, or morality,\nthere is no conceivable proportion. How can a material organ be\naffected by what is supersensible, unextended, imponderable, invisible,\nintangible, and uncircumscribed by the limitations of space and time?\nExtended receptors are necessary for picking up the vibrations of a\ntridimensional medium (like air or ether), and they are, likewise,\nessential for the reception of impressions produced by surface-contact\nwith an exterior corporeal mass. In short, sensory neurons are needed\nto receive and transmit inward the quantitative and measurable\nexcitations of the material stimuli of the external world, and central\nneurons are required as tablets upon which these incoming excitations\nmay imprint _extended neurograms_, that are proportionate in intensity\nand extensity to the external stimulus apprehended, and that underlie\nand determine the concrete imagery (of which they are the physical\nbasis). But when it comes to perceiving and representing the _meaning_\nof duty, truth, error, cause, effect, psychology, means, end, entity,\nlogarithms, etc., our mind can derive no benefit from the co\u00f6peration\nof a material organ. In such thinking we are conscious of that which\ncould not make an impression nor leave a record upon material receptors\nlike neurons. To employ a material organ for the purpose of perceiving\nabstract essences and qualities would be as futile and pointless as an\nattempt to stop a nondimensional, unextended, intangible baseball with\na catcher\u2019s glove. Hence the services of material centers and receptors\nmay be dispensed with, so far as rational thought is concerned.\nRational thought cannot utilize the intrinsic co\u00e4gency of the organism,\nand it is therefore a superorganic or spiritual function.\n\nThat conceptual thought is in no wise communicated to the organism,\nbut subjected in the spiritual soul alone, is likewise apparent from\nthe data furnished by introspection. The conceiving mind apprehends\neven material objects according to an abstract or spiritualized mode\nof representation. In other words, in conceiving material objects\nwe expurgate them of their materiality and material conditions,\nendowing them with a dematerialized mode of mental existence which\nthey could never have, if subjected in their own physical matter, or\nin the organized matter of the cerebral cortex. Thus, in forming our\nconcept of a material object like a boat, we spiritualize the boat\nby separating (representatively, of course, and not physically) its\nnature or essence from the determinate matter (_e.g._, wood, or steel)\nof which it is made, and by divesting it of the material and concrete\nconditions which define not only its physical existence outside of\nus, but also its imaginal existence within us as a concrete image\nin our imagination. In other words, we isolate the type or form of\na given object from its material substrate and liberate it from the\nlimiting material and concrete individuation, which confine it to a\nsingle material subject and localize it definitely in space and time.\nNow, it is axiomatic that whatever is received is received according\nto the nature of the receiver. Water, for example, assumes the form\nof the receptacle into which it is poured, and a picture painted\nupon canvas is necessarily extended according to the extension of\nthe canvas. If, therefore, our intellect endows even the material\nobjects, which it perceives, with a dematerialized or spiritualized\nmode of representation, it follows that the intellect itself is a\nspiritual power and not an organic sense immersed in concretifying\nand individualizing matter. Certainly, this ideal or spiritualized\nmode of existence does not emanate from the material object without\nnor yet from its vicarious material image in our organic imagination\n(which, in point of fact, is absolutely impotent to imagine anything\nexcept concrete, singular things in all their determinate individuation\nand quantification). Thought, then, with its _abstract mode of\npresentation_, cannot, like imagery, be subjected in the animated or\nsoul-informed cortex, but must have the spiritual mind alone as its\nreceptive subject. Our abstract or dematerialized mode of conceiving\nmaterial objects is a subjective character of thought, proceeding from,\nand manifesting, the spirituality of the human mind, which represents\neven material objects in a manner that accords with its own spiritual\nnature.\n\nBut it is not only in the process of abstraction, but also in that\nof _reflection_, that rational thought manifests its superorganic or\nspiritual character. The human mind knows that it knows and understands\nthat it understands, thinks of its own thoughts and of itself as\nthe agent and subject of its thinking. It is conscious of its own\nconscious acts, that is to say, it reflects upon itself and its own\nacts, becoming an object to itself. The thinking ego becomes an\nobject of observation on the part of the thinking ego, which acquires\nself-knowledge by this process of reflective thought. In introspection,\nthat which observes is identical with that which is observed. Now such\na capacity of self-observation cannot reside in matter, cannot be\nspatially commensurate with a material organ nor inseparably attached\nthereto. It is possible only to an immaterial or spiritual principle,\ndevoid of mass and extension, and not subject to the law of the\nimpenetrability of matter. In virtue of the law of impenetrability,\nno two material particles, no two bodies, no two integral parts of the\nsame body, can occupy one and the same place. One part of a body can,\nindeed, act on another part extrinsic to itself; but one and the same\npart or particle cannot act upon itself. To become at once observed\nand observer, a material organ would have to split itself in two, so\nthat the part watched could be distinct from, and spatially external\nto, the part watching. The power of perfect reflection, therefore, must\nreside in the spiritual soul, and cannot be bound to, and co\u00ebxtensive\nwith, a material organ. Only in this supposition can there be a return\nof the subject upon and into itself, only in this supposition can\nthere be that identification of observed and observer implied by the\nprocess of reflection. H. Gr\u00fcnder, in his \u201cPsychology without a Soul,\u201d\ngives a graphic _reductio ad absurdum_ of the contrary assumption:\n\u201cA fairy tale,\u201d he says, \u201ctells of a knight who was beheaded by his\nvictorious foe. But, strange to relate, the vanquished knight rose to\nhis feet, seized his severed head and bore it off, as in triumph. The\nmost remarkable part, however, of the story is that with a last effort\nof gallantry he took his own head, and\u2014kissed its brow. The climax of\nthis fairy tale is no more absurd than the assumption that a material\norgan can know itself and philosophize on itself. Only if we admit with\nthe scholastics a simple soul intrinsically independent of any bodily\norganism, can we explain the possibility of perfect psychological\nreflexion.\u201d (_Cf._ pp. 193, 194.)\n\nFor the rest the impossibility of introspection on the part of a\nmaterial organ is so evident that the materialists themselves freely\nconcede it, and being unwilling to admit the spirituality of the human\nintellect, they are forced to resort to the disingenuous expedient\nof denying the _fact_ of reflection on the part of the human mind.\n\u201cIt is obvious,\u201d says Auguste Comte, \u201cthat by an invincible necessity\nthe human mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own. We\nunderstand that a man can observe himself as a moral agent, because\nin that case he can watch himself under the action of the passions\nwhich animate him, precisely because the organs that are the seat\nof those passions are distinct from those that are destined for the\nfunctions of observation.... But it is manifestly impossible to observe\nintellectual phenomena whilst they are being produced. The individual\nthinking cannot divide himself in two, so that one half may think\nand the other watch the process. Since the organ observing and the\none to be observed are identical, there can be no self-observation.\u201d\n(\u201cCours de philosophie positive,\u201d li\u00e8re le\u00e7on.) But an argument is\nof no avail against a fact, and, as a matter of fact, we do reflect.\nIt is by introspection or reflective thought that we discriminate\nbetween our present and our past thoughts, and become conscious of our\nown consciousness. Our intellect even reflects upon its own act of\nreflection, and so on indefinitely, so that, unless we are prepared\nto accept the absurd alternative of an infinite series of thinkers,\nwe have no choice but to identify the subject knowing with the\nsubject known. That our intellect is conscious of its own operations\nand attentive to its own thoughts, is an evident fact of internal\nexperience, and it is preposterous to tilt against facts by means\nof syllogisms. When Zeno concocted his aprioristic \u201cproof\u201d of the\nimpossibility of translatory movement, his sophism was refuted by the\nsimple process of walking\u2014_solvitur ambulando_. In like manner, the\nComtean sophism concerning the impossibility of reflection is refuted\nby the simple act of mental reflection\u2014_solvitur reflectendo_. For the\nrest, we readily concede Comte\u2019s contention that an organ is incapable\nof reflection or self-observation, but we deny his tacit assumption\nthat our cognitive powers are _all_ of the organic type. Our intellect,\nwhich attends to its own phenomena, thinks of its own thought and\nreasons upon its own reasoning, cannot be bound to, or coextensive\nwith, a material organ, but must be free from any corporeal organ and\nrooted in a spiritual principle. In a word, reflective thought is a\nsuperorganic function expressing the spiritual nature of the human mind.\n\nAnother proof of the superorganic nature of the human intellect as\ncompared with sentiency, both exterior and interior, is one adduced by\nAristotle himself: \u201cBut that the impassivity of the sense,\u201d he says,\n\u201cis different from that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense\norgans and at sense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the\nsensible object has been too intense; thus it cannot hear sound after\nvery loud noises, and after too powerful colors or odors it can neither\nsee nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking on an\nobject of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to think of\ninferior objects. For sense-perception is not independent of the body,\nwhereas the intellect is.\u201d (\u201cPeri Psyches,\u201d Bk. III, Ch. iv, 5.)\n\nThis temporary incapacitation of the senses consequent upon powerful\nstimulation is a common experience embalmed in such popular expressions\nas \u201ca deafening noise,\u201d \u201ca blinding flash,\u201d \u201ca dazzling light,\u201d \u201ca\nnumbing pain,\u201d etc. Weber\u2019s law of the differential threshold tells\nus that the intensity of sensation does not increase in the same\nproportion as that of the stimulus. On the contrary, the more intense\nthe previous stimulus has been, the greater must be the increment\nadded to the subsequent stimulus before it can produce a perceptible\nincrease in the intensity of sensation. In short, stimulation of the\nsenses temporarily decreases their sensitivity with reference to\nsupervening stimuli. The reason for this momentary loss of the power to\nreact normally is evidently due to the organic nature of the senses.\nTheir activity entails a definite and rigidly proportionate process\nof destructive metabolism in their bodily substrate, the organism. In\nother words, the exercise of sense-perception involves a commensurate\nprocess of decomposition in the neural tissue, which must afterwards\nbe compensated by a corresponding assimilation of nutrient material,\nbefore the sense can again react with its pristine vigor. This process\nof recuperation requires time and temporarily inhibits the reactive\npower of the sense in question, the duration of this repair work being\ndetermined by the amount of neural decomposition caused by the reaction\nof the sense to the previous stimulus. When, therefore, a weaker\nstimulus supervenes in immediate succession to a stronger one, the\nsense is incapable of perceiving it. All organic activity, in short,\nsuch as sense-perception and imagination, is rigidly regulated by the\nmetabolic law of waste and repair.\n\nWith the intellect, however, the case is quite different. The intellect\nis neither debilitated nor stupefied by the discovery of truths that\nare exceptionally profound, or unusually abstruse, or strikingly\nevident; nor is it temporarily incapacitated thereby from understanding\nsimpler, easier, or less evident truths. On the contrary, the more\ncomprehensive, the more penetrating, the more perspicuous, the more\nsublime our intellectual vision is, so much the more is our intellect\ninvigorated and enthused in its pursuit of truth, and its knowledge\nof the highest truths renders it not less, but more, apt for the\nunderstanding of simple and ordinary truths. Obviously, then, the\nintellect is not bound to a corruptible organ like the senses, but has\nfor its subject a spiritual principle that is intrinsically independent\nof the organism.\n\nIn opposition to this contention, it may be urged that a prolonged\nexercise of intellectual activity results in the condition commonly\nknown as brain-fag. But this fatigue of the brain is not, as a matter\nof fact, the _direct_ effect of intellectual activity; rather it is the\ndirect effect of the activity of the imagination, and only _indirectly_\nthe effect of intellectual thought. The intellect, as we have seen,\nrequires a constant flow of associated and aptly co\u00f6rdinated imagery\nas the substrate of its contemplation. Now, the imagination, which\nsupplies this imagery, is a cerebral sense, whose activity is directly\nproportionate to, and commensurate with, the metabolic processes at\nwork in the cortical cells. Its exercise is directly dependent upon\nthe energy released by the decomposition of the cerebral substance.\nProlonged activity of the imagination, therefore, involves the\ndestruction of a considerable amount of the cortical substance, and\nresults in temporary incapacitation or paralysis of the imagination,\nwhich must then be compensated by a process of repair in the cortical\nneurons, before the imagination can resume its normal mode of\nfunctioning. Brain-fag, then, is due to the activity of the imagination\nrather than that of the intellect. That such is the case appears from\nthe fact that after the initial exertion, which results from the\nimagination being forced to assemble an appropriate and systematized\ndisplay of illustrative imagery as subject-matter for the contemplation\nof the intellect, the latter is henceforth enabled to proceed with ease\nalong the path of a given science, its further progress being smooth\nand unhampered. Once the preliminary work imposed upon the imagination\nis finished, the sense of effort ceases and intellectual investigation\nand study may subsequently reach the highest degrees of concentration\nand intensity, without involving corresponding degrees of fatigue or\ndepression on the part of the cerebral imagination, just as, conversely\nspeaking, the activity of the cerebral imagination may reach degrees\nof intensity extreme enough to induce brain-fag in psychic operations\nwherein the concomitant intellectual activity is reduced to a minimum,\n_e. g._, in the task of memorizing a poem, or recitation. Here, in the\nall but complete absence of intellectual activity, the same fatigue\nresults as that induced by a prolonged period of analytic study or\ninvestigation, in which imaginative activity and rational thinking are\nconcomitant. The point to be noted, in this latter case, is that the\nintellect does not show the same dependence upon the physiological\nvicissitudes as the imagination. The imagery of our imagination, being\nrigidly correlated with the metabolic processes of waste and repair\nat work in the cerebral cortex, manifests correspondingly variable\ndegrees of intensity and integrity, but the intensity of thought is\nnot dependent upon this alternation of excitation and inhibition in\nthe cortex. Hence, while the concomitant imagery is fitful, sporadic,\nand fragmentary, intellectual thought itself is steady, lucid,\nand continuous. The intensity of thought does not vary with the\nfluctuations of neural metabolism, and may reach a maximum without\ninvolving corresponding fatigue in the brain. The brain-fag, therefore,\nwhich results from study does not correspond to the height of our\nintellectual vision, but is due to the intensity of the concomitant\nimaginative process.\n\nThe intellect, therefore, is not subject to the metabolic laws\nwhich rigidly regulate organic functions like sense-perception\nand imagination. Man\u2019s capacity for logical thought is frequently\nunaffected by the decline of the organism which sets in after maturity.\nAll organic functions, however, such as sight, hearing, sense-memory,\nare impaired in exact proportion to the deterioration of the organism,\nwhich is the inevitable sequel of old age. The intellectual powers, on\nthe contrary, remain unimpaired, so long as the cortex is sound enough\nto furnish the required minimum of imagery, upon which intellectual\nactivity is objectively dependent. There are, in fact, many cases on\nrecord where men have remained perfectly sane and rational, despite the\nfact that notable portions of the cerebral cortex had been destroyed by\naccident or disease (_e. g._, tumors). Intellectual thought, therefore,\nis a superorganic function, having its source in a spiritual principle\nand not in a corruptible organ.\n\nSuch is the spiritualism of Aristotle. That this conception differs\nprofoundly from the ultraspiritualism of Descartes, it is scarcely\nnecessary to remark. The position assumed by the latter was always\nuntenable, but it is now, more than ever, indefensible in the face\nof that overwhelming avalanche of facts whereby modern physiological\npsychology demonstrates the close interdependence and correlation\nexistent between psychic and organic states. Such facts are exploited\nby materialists as arguments against spiritualism, though it is evident\nthat they have force only against Cartesian spiritualism, and are\nbereft of all relevance with respect to Aristotelian spiritualism,\nwhich they leave utterly intact and unscathed. In the latter system,\nsense-perception, imagination, and emotion are acknowledged to be\ndirectly dependent on the organism. Again, spiritual functions like\nthinking and willing are regarded as objectively or extrinsically\ndependent upon the imagination, which, in turn, is directly dependent\non a material organ, namely: the brain. Hence even the rational\noperations of the mind are indirectly dependent upon the cerebral\ncortex. The spiritualism of Aristotle, therefore, by reason of its\ndoctrine concerning the direct dependence of the lower, and the\nindirect dependence of the higher, psychic functions upon the material\norganism, is able to absorb into its own system all the supposedly\nhostile facts amassed by Materialism, thereby rendering them futile\nand inconsequential as arguments against the spirituality of the human\nsoul. In confronting this philosophy, the materialistic scientist finds\nhimself disarmed and impotent, and it is not to be wondered at, that,\nafter indulging in certain abusive epithets and a few cant phrases,\nsuch as \u201cmetaphysics\u201d or \u201cmedieval\u201d (invaluable words!), he prudently\nretires from the lists without venturing to so much as break a lance in\ndefense of his favorite dogma, that nothing is spiritual, because all\nis matter. In this predicament, the Cartesian caricature proves a boon\nto the materialist, as furnishing him with the adversary he prefers,\na man of straw, and enabling him to demonstrate his paltry tin-sword\nprowess. Of a truth, Descartes performed an inestimable service for\nthese modern \u201cassassins of the soul,\u201d when he relieved them of the\nnecessity of crossing swords with the hylomorphic dualism of Aristotle\nby the substitution of a far less formidable antagonist, namely, the\npsychophysical dualism of mind and matter.\n\nThe proofs advanced, in the previous pages, for the spirituality of\nthe human soul are based upon the superorganic function of rational\nthought. A parallel series of arguments can be drawn from the\nsuperorganic function of rational volition. The cognitive intellect\nhas for its necessary sequel the appetitive will, which may be defined\nas spiritual tendency inclining us toward that which the intellect\napprehends as good. The objects of such volition are frequently\nabstract and immaterial ideals transcendent to the sphere of concrete\nand material goods, _e. g._, virtue, glory, religion, etc. The will of\nman, moreover, is free, in the sense that it can choose among various\nmotives, and is not compelled to follow the line of least resistance,\nas is the electric current when passing through a shunt of steel and\ncopper wire. Like the self-knowing intellect, the self-determining\nwill is capable of reflective action, that is, it can will to will.\nHaving its own actions within its own control, it is itself the\nprincipal cause of its own decisions, and thus becomes responsible for\nits conduct, wherever its choice has been conscious and deliberate.\nExternal actions, which escape the control of the will, and even\ninternal actions of the will itself, which are indeliberate, are not\nfree and do not entail responsibility. Our courts of law and our whole\nlegal system rests on the recognition of man\u2019s full responsibility for\nhis deliberate voluntary acts. The distinction between premeditated\nmurder, which is punished, and unpremeditated homicide, which is not,\nis purely moral, and not physical, depending for its validity upon the\nfact of human freedom. It is this exemption from physical determinism,\nthat makes man a moral agent, subject to duties, amenable to moral\nsuasion, and capable of merit or demerit. Finally, the will of man\nis insatiable, invincible, and inexhaustible. The aspirations of the\nwill are boundless, whereas our animal appetites are easily cloyed by\ngratification. There is no freezing point for human courage. The animal\nor sensual appetites wear out and decline with old age, but virtue and\nwill-power do not necessarily diminish with the gradual deterioration\nof the material organism. Willing, therefore, is a superorganic or\nspiritual function. Activity which is bound to a material organ cannot\ntend towards supersensible ideals, cannot escape physical determinism,\ncannot achieve the reflective feat of spurring itself to action, cannot\navoid exhaustion, cannot elude rigid regulation by the laws of organic\nmetabolism. For this reason, the brute, whose psychic functions are\nof the organic type exclusively, is destitute of freedom, morality,\nand responsibility. Deliberate volition, therefore, like conceptual\nthought, has its source and subject in man\u2019s spiritual soul, and is not\na function of the material organism.[12]\n\n    [12] To develop the argument drawn from rational volition\n    for the spirituality of the human soul would carry us too\n    far afield. Those who wish to pursue the subject further\n    may consult Chapter VIII of Gr\u00fcnder\u2019s monograph entitled\n    \u201cPsychology without a Soul,\u201d also his monograph on \u201cFree Will.\u201d\n\n    G. H. Parker of Harvard, though admitting the fact of human\n    freedom, tries to explain it away in terms of materialism. The\n    following is the description which he gives of his theory: \u201cIt\n    is a materialist view which, however, recognizes in certain\n    types of organized matter a degree of free action consistent\n    with human behavior and the resultant responsibility.\u201d\n    (_Science_, June 13, 1924, p. 520.) Freedom, in other words,\n    \u201cemerges\u201d from matter having a peculiar \u201ctype of organization.\u201d\n\n    This view must be interpreted in the light of the philosophy\n    of \u201cEmergent Evolution,\u201d which Parker holds in common with C.\n    Lloyd Morgan and R. W. Sellars. The philosophy in question\n    recognizes in nature an ascending scale of more and more\n    complexly organized units, starting with protons and electrons,\n    at the bottom, and culminating in the human organism, at the\n    top. At each higher level of this cosmic scale we find higher\n    units formed by coalescence of the simpler units of a lower\n    level. These higher units, however, are _something more_ than\n    a mere summation of the lower units; for, in addition to\n    _additive_ properties that can be predicted from a knowledge\n    of the components, they exhibit genuinely _new_ properties\n    which, not being mere sums of the properties of the component\n    units, are unpredictable on that basis. Given, for example, the\n    weight of two volumes of hydrogen and one volume of oxygen, we\n    could predict an _additive_ property such as the _weight_ of\n    the compound, _i.e._ the water, formed by their combination.\n    Other properties, of the compound, however, such as liquidity,\n    are not foreshadowed by the properties of the component\n    gases. Similarly, the weight of carbon disulphid (CS\u2082) is\n    an additive function of the combining weights of sulphur and\n    carbon, but the other properties of this mobile liquid are\n    not predictable on the basis of the properties of sulphur and\n    carbon. Hence _two_ kinds of properties are distinguished: (1)\n    _additive_ (quantitative) properties called _resultants_, which\n    are predictable; (2) _specificative_ (qualitative) properties\n    called _emergents_, which are unprecedented and unpredictable.\n    Freedom and intelligence, accordingly, are pronounced to be\n    _emergents_ of matter organized to that degree of complexity\n    which we find in man.\n\n    This dualism of resultance and emergence is merely a new\n    verbal vesture for the hylomorphic dualism of Aristotle. The\n    _additive_ properties (_resultants_) are based on _matter_,\n    which is the principle of _continuity_. The _specificative_\n    (constituitive or qualitative) properties called emergents\n    are rooted in _entelechy_ (form), which is the principle of\n    _novelty_. In fact, entelechy (form) itself is _an emergent of\n    matter_ just as the specificative properties are _emergents_\n    of matter, with the sole difference that _entelechy_ is\n    _the primary emergent_ of matter, whereas the specificative\n    or qualitative properties are _secondary emergents_. For\n    in Aristotelian philosophy, entelechy is not, as it is in\n    Neo-vitalism, \u201can alien principle inserted into matter\u201d\n    abruptly and capriciously \u201cat the level of life,\u201d but a\n    _primary emergent_ and _constituent_ of matter both living\n    and non-living. In fine, entelechy is an _emergent_ of matter\n    in all the units of nature from the simplest atom to the\n    most complex plant or animal organism. The only entelechy,\n    which is not an _emergent_, but an _insert_ into matter, is\n    the _spiritual human soul_. Neither the human soul nor the\n    _superorganic_ functions rooted in it, namely, abstraction,\n    reflection, and election, are _emergents_. Here we have\n    _novelty without continuity_, and therefore not _emergence_\n    (eduction), but _insertion_ (infusion).\n\n    In his \u201cEmergent Evolution,\u201d 1923, Lloyd Morgan lays it down\n    as axiomatic that _emergence involves continuity_\u2014\u201cThere\n    may often be resultants,\u201d he says, \u201cwithout emergence; but\n    there are no emergents that do not involve resultant effects\n    also. Resultants give quantitative continuity which underlies\n    new constitutive steps in emergence.\u201d (_Op. cit._, p. 5.)\n    Now our proofs for human spirituality consist precisely in\n    the _complete exclusion of quantitative continuity_ between\n    _organic_ functions (_e. g._ sensation) and _superorganic_\n    functions (_e. g._ conceptual thought and free volition).\n    Hence, by the very axiom which Morgan himself formulates,\n    the human soul and its _superorganic functions_ are excluded\n    from the category of material _emergents_. If there can be no\n    emergence without quantitative continuity, then the human soul\n    is not an _emergent from_, but an _insert into_, matter. _Free\n    choice_, too, it is needless to say, is not an _emergent of\n    matter_, but an _expression of the supermaterial nature of the\n    human soul_. So much for the new-old dualism of emergence and\n    resultance.\n\nTwo additional facts may be cited as bringing into strong relief\nthe basic contrast existing between the higher or rational, and the\nlower or animal psychosis in man. The first is the occurrence of\nirreconcilable opposition or conflict. The imagination, for example,\nantagonizes the intellect by visualizing as an extended speck of chalk\nor charcoal the mathematical point, which the intellect conceives\nas destitute of extension and every other property except position.\nSimilarly, the effort of our rational will to be faithful to duty\nand to uphold ideals is antagonized by the sensual impulses of the\nanimal appetite, which seek immediate gratification at the expense of\nremote considerations that are higher. Such antagonism is incompatible\nwith any identification of the warring factors, that is, of our\nrational, with our sentient, functions; for, wherever opposition is in\nevidence, there _a fortiori_ a real distinction must be recognized.\nThe understanding and the will, therefore, differ radically from sense\nand sensual appetite. The second significant fact is the domination\nexerted by reason and will over the cognitive and appetitive functions\nof the organic or sentient order. Our intellect criticizes, evaluates\nand corrects the data of sense-perception, it discriminates between\nobjective percepts and illusions and hallucinations, it distinguishes\ndreams from realities, it associates and dissociates imagery for\npurposes of comparison, contrast, illustration, or analysis. Moreover,\nit not only shows its superiority to sense by supervising, revising,\nand appraising the data of sentient experience, but it manifests its\ndiscontent at the inaccuracy and limitation of sense by the invention\nand use of instrumentation (_e. g._ ear trumpets, spectacles,\nmicroscopes, telescopes, spectroscopes, polariscopes, periscopes,\netc.) to remedy the defects or increase the range of sense-perception,\netc. This phenomenon is without parallel among brute animals, and is\na patent manifestation of the superiority of human psychology. In\nlike manner, the will demonstrates its preeminence over the organic\nor animal appetite, by exerting supreme control over the passions and\nimpulses of our lower nature. In fact, it is able to bridle and repress\nthe impulses of sensuality even in the immediate presence of sensible\nstimuli that would irresistibly determine the brute to a gratification\nof its animal lusts; and it can force the struggling and reluctant\nflesh to undergo a crucifixion for supersensible motives that make\nno appeal to the beast. The understanding and the will, therefore,\nare essentially superior to the organic psychosis that they control,\nnamely, the sentient consciousness and sensual appetite, which we share\nin common with the brute, but which, in the latter, give no evidence\nwhatever of rational or moral control.\n\n\n                    \u00a7 4. Darwinian Anthropomorphism\n\nThe spiritual mind of man represents an eminence to which evolving\nmatter can never attain. This, then, is the hill that must needs be\nlaid low, if the path of Darwinian materialism is to be a smooth one.\nThere is, therefore, nothing very surprising in the fact that Darwin\nand his followers, from Huxley down to Robinson, have done all in\ntheir power to obscure and belittle the psychological differences\nbetween man and the brute. The objective of their strategy is twofold,\nnamely, the _brutalization of man_ and its converse, the _humanization\nof the brute_. The ascent will be easier to imagine, if man can be\ndepressed, and the brute raised, to levels that are not far apart.\nTo this end, the Darwinian zealots have, on the one hand, spared no\npains to minimize the superiority and dignity of human reason by the\ndissemination of sensistic associationism, psychophysical parallelism,\nand various other forms of \u201cpsychology without a soul\u201d; and they have\nstriven, on the other hand, to exalt to the utmost the psychic powers\nof the brute by means of a crude and credulous anthropomorphism, which,\nfor all its scientific pretensions, is quite indistinguishable from the\nna\u00efvet\u00e9 of the author of \u201cBlack Beauty\u201d[13] and the sentimentality of\nS. P. C. A. fanatics, vegetarians, anti-vivisectionists, etc. The first\nof these tendencies we have already discussed, the second remains to be\nconsidered.\n\n    [13] Title of a horse\u2019s autobiography by Anna Sewall, the\n    horse\u2019s _alter ego_.\n\nWhen it comes to anthropomorphizing the brute, Darwin has not been\noutdistanced by the most reckless of his disciples. Three entire\nchapters of the \u201cDescent of Man\u201d are filled with this \u201cvulgar\npsychology\u201d (as Wundt so aptly styles it). It is the sum and substance\nof the entire fabric of argumentation, which he erects in support of\nhis thesis that \u201cthe difference in mind between man and the higher\nanimals is certainly one of degree and not of kind.\u201d (_Cf._ _op.\ncit._, chs. III-V.) Haeckel, Huxley, and Clifford attained to equal\nproficiency in the sport. Subsequent philosophers parroted their bold\nmetaphors and smart aphorisms, and the game went on merrily till\nthe close of the century. Then a badly needed reaction set in under\nthe auspices of Wundt, Lloyd Morgan, and Thorndike, who insisted on\nabandoning this na\u00efve impressionism in favor of more critical methods.\n\nIn his \u201cVorlesungen \u00fcber die Menschen und Tierseele\u201d (cf. 2nd ed., p.\n370), Wundt proclaims his rupture with the impressionistic school in\nthe following terms: \u201cThe one great defect of this popular psychology\nis that it does not take mental processes for what they show themselves\nto be to a direct and unprejudiced view, but imports into them the\nreflections of the observer about them. The necessary consequence for\nanimal psychology is that the mental actions of animals, from the\nlowest to the highest, are interpreted as acts of the understanding.\nIf any vital manifestation of the organism is capable of possible\nderivation from a series of reflections and inferences, that is taken\nas sufficient proof that these reflections and inferences actually led\nup to it. And, indeed, in the absence of a careful analysis of our\nsubjective perceptions we can hardly avoid this conclusion. Logical\nreflection is the logical process most familiar to us, because we\ndiscover its presence when we think about any object whatsoever. So\nthat for popular psychology mental life in general is dissolved in\nthe medium of logical reflection. The question whether there are not\nperhaps other mental processes of a simpler nature is not asked at\nall, for the one reason that whenever self-observation is required, it\ndiscovers this reflective process in the human consciousness. The same\nidea is applied to feelings, impulses, and voluntary actions which are\nregarded, if not as acts of intelligence, still as effective states\nwhich belong to the intellectual sphere.\n\n\u201cThis mistake, then, springs from ignorance of exact psychological\nmethods. It is unfortunately rendered worse by the inclination of\nanimal psychologists to see the intellectual achievements of animals\nin the most brilliant light.... Unbridled by scientific criticism the\nimagination of the observer ascribes ph\u00e6nomena in perfectly good faith\nto motives which are entirely of its own invention. The facts reported\nmay be wholly true; the interpretation of the psychologist, innocently\nwoven in with his account of them, puts them from first to last in a\ntotally wrong light. You will find a proof of this on nearly every page\nof the works on animal psychology.\u201d (English Translation by Creighton &\nTitchener, p. 341.)\n\nWundt\u2019s warning against taking at their face value popular, or even\nso-called scientific, accounts of wonderful feats performed by animals\nis very salutary. The danger of subjective humanization of bestial\nconduct is always imminent. We are unavoidably obliged to employ\nthe analogy of our own animal nature and sentient consciousness as\nour principal clue to an understanding of brute psychology, but we\nmust beware of pressing this analogy based on our own consciousness\nto the uncritical extreme of interpreting in terms of our highest\npsychic operations animal behavior that, in itself, admits of a far\nsimpler explanation. According to the principle of the minimum, it is\nunscientific to assume in a given agent the presence of anything that\nis not rigidly required for the explanation of its observed phenomena.\nWe must refrain, therefore, from reading into the consciousness of an\nanimal what is not really there. We must abstain from transporting\nour own viewpoint and personality into a brute, by imagining, with\nDarwin, that we discern a \u201csense of humor,\u201d or a \u201chigh degree of\nself-complacency\u201d in some pet animal, like a dog. In general, we can\nrest assured that animals are quite innocent of the motivation we\nascribe to them. All their manifestations of the psychic order are\nadequately explicable in terms of sensory experience, associative\nmemory, instinct, and the various automatisms of their innate and\nconditioned reflexes. There is no ground whatever for supposing the\nbrute to possess the superorganic power of understanding commonly known\nas _intelligence_.\n\nEtymologically speaking, the abstract term \u201cintelligence,\u201d together\nwith the corresponding concrete term \u201cintellect,\u201d is derived from the\nLatin: _intus-legere_, signifying to \u201cread within,\u201d the fitness of the\nterm being based upon the fact that the intellect can penetrate beneath\nthe outer appearances of things to _inner_ aspects and relations,\nwhich are hidden from the senses. In its proper and most general\nusage, intelligence denotes a cognoscitive power of abstraction and\ngeneralization, which, by means of conceptual comparison, discovers the\nsupersensible relationships existent between the realities conceived,\nin such wise as to apprehend substances beneath phenomena, causes\nbehind effects, and remote ends beyond proximate means.\n\nCertain animal psychologists, however, refuse to reserve the\nprerogative of intelligence for man. Bouvier\u2019s \u201cLa Vie Psychique des\nInsectes\u201d (1918), for example, contains the following statement:\n\u201cChoice of a remarkably intellectual nature, is even more noticeable\nin the instinctive manifestations of individual memory. The animal,\nendowed with well-developed senses and nervous system, not only\nreacts to new necessities by new acts, but associates the stored\nup impressions of new sensations and thereby appropriately directs\nits further activities. Thus, by an intelligent process, new habits\nare established, which by heredity become part of the patrimony of\ninstinct, modifying the latter and constituting elements essential\nto its evolution. Of these instincts acquired through an intelligent\napprenticeship Forel was led to say that they are reasoning made\nautomatic, and it is to them particularly that we may apply the idea\nof certain biologists that instincts are habits which have become\nhereditary and automatic.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 454.)\n\nIt is extremely doubtful, however, whether Bouvier is here using the\nterm intelligence in its proper sense. Indeed, his words convey the\nimpression that what he means by intelligence is an _ability to profit\nby experience_. Now, ability to profit by experience may, under one\nset of circumstances, involve the power of logical reflection and\ninference, while, under another set of circumstances, it may imply\nnothing more than the power of associative memory. In the latter case,\nthe facts are explicable without any recourse to psychic powers of\na superorganic nature, and, in point of fact, it often happens that\nthe very zo\u00f6psychologists, who insist on attributing this sort of\n\u201cintelligence\u201d to brutes, are most emphatic in denying that brutes are\nendowed with _reason_. In any case, it is unfortunate that the word\nintelligence is now used in two entirely different senses. This new and\nimproper sense, being unrelated to the etymology, and out of harmony\nwith the accepted use of the term, serves only to engender a confusion\nof ideas. It should be suppressed, in order to avoid misunderstandings.\n\nThat men should be deluded, however, into crediting animals with\n\u201cintelligence\u201d (properly so-called) is not at all surprising, when\nwe reflect on the source of this misapprehension; for we find\ncombined in the animal two important factors, whose association\nclosely simulates intelligence, namely, _sentient consciousness_\nand _unconscious teleology_. Now teleology is not _inherent_ or\n_subjective_ intelligence, but rather an _objective expression_ and\n_product_ of intelligence. It exists in unconscious mechanisms like\nphonographs and adding machines, and it is, likewise, manifest in\nunconscious organisms like plants. Here, however, there is no danger of\nconfounding it with conscious intelligence, because machines and plants\ndo not possess consciousness in any form whatever. But in animals,\non the contrary, teleology is intimately associated with sentient\nconsciousness. Here the teleological automatisms of instinct are not\nwholly blind and mechanical, but are guided by sense-perception and\nassociative memory. It is this combination of teleology with sentient\n\u201cdiscernment\u201d (as Fabre styles it) that conveys the illusory impression\nof a conscious intelligence. Careful analysis, however, of the facts,\nin conjunction with judicious experiments, will, in every instance,\nenable the observer to distinguish between this deceptive semblance\nof intelligence and that inherent rational power of abstraction,\nclassification, and inference which is the unique prerogative of the\nhuman being. A genuine intelligence of this sort need not be invoked to\nexplain any of the phenomena of brute psychology. All of them, from the\nhighest to the lowest, are explicable in terms of the sensitivo-nervous\nfunctions. To illustrate the truth of this statement let us cite a few\ntypical examples of animal behavior, that are sometimes regarded as\nmanifestations of intelligent or rational consciousness on the part of\nthe brute.\n\nAnimals, it is pointed out, learn by experience. The tiny chick that\nhas been stung by a wasp, for instance, learns to avoid such noxious\ncreatures for the future. This is, indeed, \u201clearning by experience.\u201d\nObviously, however, it does not consist in an inference of a new truth\nfrom an old truth. On the contrary, it amounts to nothing more than\na mere association of imagery, formed in accordance with the _law of\ncontiguity in time_, sanctioned by the animal\u2019s sensual appetite, and\npersistently conserved in its sentient memory. A bond of association is\nformed between the visual image of the wasp and the immediately ensuing\nsensation of pain. Thereafter the wasp and the pain are associated in\na single complex, which the sensile memory of the animal permanently\nretains. We are dealing with a mere _association of contiguity_,\nand nothing further is required to explain the future avoidance of\nwasps by the chick. The abilities acquired by animals through the\ntrial and error method are to be explained in the same way. A horse\nconfined within an enclosure, for example, seeks egress to the fresh\ngrass of the pasture. The fact that repeated exits through the gate\nof the enclosure have associated the image of its own access to the\npasture with the particular spot where the gate is located induces\nit to approach the gate. Its quest, however, is balked by the fact\nthat the gate is closed and latched. Thereupon, it begins to chafe\nunder the urge of frustrated appetite. Certain actions ensue, some\nspontaneous and others merely reflex movements. It paws the ground,\nprances about, and rubs its nose against the gate. Its futile efforts\nto pass through the closed gate continue indefinitely and aimlessly,\nuntil, by some lucky accident, its nose happens to strike against the\nlatch and lift it sufficiently to release the gate. This causes the\ngate to swing ajar, and the horse rushes out to food and freedom. By\nthe law of contiguity, the vision of free egress through the gate is\nthereafter firmly associated in the horse\u2019s sense-memory with the\nfinal sensation experienced in its nose just prior to the advent\nof the agreeable eventuation of its prolonged efforts. Henceforth\nthe animal will be able to release itself from the enclosure by\nrepeating the concatenated series of acts that memory associates with\nthe pleasurable result. On the second occasion, however, the more\nremote of its futile acts will have been forgotten, and the process\nof opening the gate will occupy less time, though probably a certain\namount of useless pawing and rubbing will still persist. Gradually,\nhowever, the number of inefficacious actions will diminish, until,\nafter many repetitions of the experience, only those actions which\ndirectly issue in the desirable result will remain in the chain of\nimpressions retained by memory, all others being eliminated. For, by\na teleological law, making for economy of effort, all impressions\nnot immediately and constantly connected with the gratification of\nanimal appetites tend to be inhibited. Pawlow\u2019s experiments on dogs\nshow that impressions which coincide in time with such gratification\ntend to be recalled by a return of the appetitive impulse, but are\nsoon disconnected from such association and inhibited, if they recur\nindependently of the recurrence of gratification. For this reason,\nthe horse tends to remember more vividly those actions which are more\nclosely connected with the pleasurable result, and, as its superfluous\nactions are gradually suppressed by a protective process of inhibition,\nit gradually comes to run through the series of actions necessary to\nopen the gate with considerable accuracy and dispatch.\n\nThe point to be noted, however, is that the horse does not\n_discursively analyze_ this concatenated series of associated\nstimulators and actions; for, let the concrete circumstances be changed\nnever so little, the horse will at once lose its laboriously acquired\nability to open the gate. Such, for example, will be the result, if the\nposition of the gate be transferred to another part of the enclosure.\nThe horse, therefore, is incapable of adapting its acquired ability to\nnew conditions. It can only rehearse the original series in all its\ninitial concreteness and stereotyped specificity; and it must, whenever\nthe circumstances are changed, begin once more at the beginning, and\nrearrive by trial and error at its former solution of the problem. The\nreason is that the horse merely _senses_, but does not _understand_,\nits own solution of the problem. The sense, however, cannot abstract\nfrom the here and now. Consequently, the human infant of two summers is\nenabled by its dawning intelligence to _adapt old means to new ends_,\nbut the ten-year-old horse cannot adjust its abilities to the slightest\nchange in the concrete conditions surrounding the original acquisition\nof a useful habit. The cognitive powers of an animal are confined to\nthe sphere of concrete singularity, it has no power to abstract or\ngeneralize.\n\nThe selfsame observation applies to the tricks which animals \u201clearn\u201d\nthrough human training. Their sensitive memory is very receptive and\nretentive. Hence, by means of a judicious alternation of \u201crewards\u201d and\n\u201cpenalties\u201d (_e.g._ of sugar and the whip), a man can, as it were,\ninscribe his own thoughts on the tablets of the brute\u2019s memory, in such\na way as to force the latter to form habits that appear to rest upon a\nbasis of intelligence. And so, indeed, they do, but the intelligence is\nthat of the trainer and not that of the animal, which is as destitute\nof intrinsic intelligence as is a talking phonograph, upon whose\nrecords a man can inscribe his thoughts far more efficiently than he\ncan write them in terms of the neurographic imagery of the canine,\nequine, or simian memory.\n\nThe trained monkey always renders back without change the original\nlesson imparted by its human trainer. The lesson as first received\nbecomes an immutable reaction-basis for the future. With a school\nchild, however, the case is quite different. It does, indeed, receive\n\u201can historical basis of reaction,\u201d when the teacher illustrates the\nprocess of multiplication by means of an example on the blackboard.\nBut it does not receive this information passively and render it back\nin the original stereotyped form. On the contrary, it analyzes the\ninformation received, and is able thereafter to reapply the analyzed\ninformation to new problems differing in specificity from the problem\nthat the teacher originally worked out on the blackboard. The human\npupil does not, like the monkey or the phonograph, render back what\nit has received in unaltered specificity. His reaction differs from\nits original passive basis. To borrow the words of Driesch, he \u201cuses\nthis basis, but he is not bound to it as it is. He dissolves the\ncombined specificities that have created the basis.\u201d (\u201cThe Problem of\nIndividuality,\u201d pp. 27, 28.) The brute, therefore, cannot \u201clearn,\u201d\nor \u201cbe taught\u201d in the sense of intellectual comprehension and\nenlightenment. \u201cWe see,\u201d says John Burroughs somewhere, \u201cthat the caged\nbird or beast does not reason because no strength of bar or wall can\nconvince it that it cannot escape. It cannot be convinced because it\nhas no faculties that are convinced by evidence. It continues to dash\nitself against the bars not until it is convinced, but until it is\nexhausted. Then slowly a new habit is formed, the cage habit. When we\ntrain an animal to do stunts, we do not teach it or enlighten it in any\nproper sense, but we compel it to form new habits.\u201d\n\nHuman beings, however, can be _taught_ and _enlightened_ under the most\nadverse circumstances. Even those unfortunates are susceptible to it,\nwho, like Laura Bridgman, Helen Keller, Martha Obrecht, Marie Heurtin,\nand others, have been blind and deaf and dumb from infancy or birth.\nWith nearly all the light of sensibility extinguished, there was,\nnevertheless, latent within them something of which a perfectly normal\nape, for all the integrity of its senses, is essentially destitute,\nnamely, the superorganic power of reason. Reason, however, is\nextrinsically dependent on organic sensibility, and, consequently, \u201cthe\ngates of their souls\u201d were closed to human converse, until such a time\nas the patient kindness and ingenuity of their educators devised means\nof reciprocal communication on a basis of tactile signals. Thereupon\nthey revealed an intelligence perfectly akin to that of their rescuers.\nYears of similar education, however, would be futile in the case of an\nape. The \u201cgates of the soul\u201d would never open, because the ape has no\nrational soul, to which the most ingenious trainer might gain access,\nin which respect it differs fundamentally from even the lowest savage.\nA being that lacks reason may be _trained_ by means of instruction, but\nit can never be _enlightened_ by it.\n\nAnother consideration, that is occasionally urged in proof of bestial\nintelligence, is the fact that birds, mammals, and even insects\ncommunicate with one another by means of sounds or equivalent signals,\nwhich are sometimes remarkably diversified in quality and consequent\nefficacy. \u201cSince fowls,\u201d writes Darwin, \u201cgive distinct warnings for\ndanger on the ground, or in the sky, from hawks ..., may not some\nunusually wise ape-like animal have imitated the growl of a beast of\nprey, and thus told his fellow monkeys the nature of the expected\ndanger? This would have been a first step in the formation of a\nlanguage.\u201d (\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d 2nd ed., ch. III, pp. 122, 123.) This is\nsaltatory logic with a vengeance! Darwin leaps at one bound across the\nentire chasm between irrationality and rationality, without pausing\nto build even the semblance of a bridge. Given an animal with the\nforesight and inventiveness requisite to employ onomatop\u0153ia for the\n_purpose_ of specifying the _nature_ of an expected _danger_, in the\n_interest_ of its fellows, and we need not trouble ourselves further\nabout plausibleizing any transition; for so \u201cunusually wise\u201d an ape\nis already well across the gap that separates reason from unreason,\nand far on its way towards the performance of all the feats of which\nreason is capable. After swallowing the camel of so much progress, it\nwould be straining at a gnat to deny such a paragon of simian genius\nthe mere power of articulate speech. Of course, if imagination rather\nthan logic, is to be the dominant consideration in science, there is\nno difficulty in imagining animals to be capable of thinking or doing\nanything we choose to ascribe to them, as witness _\u00c6sop\u2019s Fables_.\nBut, if sober and critical judgment be in order, then, evidently, from\nthe simple fact that an animal has diversified cries manifestative\nof different emotions or degrees of emotion (_e.g._ of fear or rage)\nand capable of arousing similar emotions in other animals of the\nsame species, it by no means follows that such an irrational animal\ncan _adapt a means to an end_ by using mimicry _in order to give\nnotification_ of approaching danger, and _to specify the nature of the\ndanger_ in question.\n\nThis stupid anthropomorphism arises from Darwin\u2019s failure to appreciate\nthe fundamental distinction that exists between the \u201clanguage\u201d of\nanimals, which is indicative, emotional, and inarticulate, and human\nlanguage, which is descriptive, conceptual, and articulate. Brute\nanimals, under the stress of a determinate passion or emotion, give\nvent impulsively and unpremeditatedly to instinctive cries indicative\nof their peculiar emotional state. Moreover, these emotionalized sounds\nare capable of arousing kindred emotions in the breasts of other\nanimals of the same species, since organisms of the same species are\nsyntonic with (_i.e._ attuned to) one another. Hence these reflex or\ninstinctive cries have, no doubt, a teleological value, inasmuch as\nthey serve to protect the race by inciting a peculiar flight-reaction\nin those that are not in immediate contact with the fear-inspiring\nobject. This so-called warning, however, is given without reflection or\nintention on the part of the frightened animal, and is simply sensed,\nbut not interpreted, by the other animals that receive it.\n\nThis premised, it is easy to discriminate between bestial and human\nlanguage. The former is not articulate, that is to say, the sounds of\nwhich it is composed have not been elaborated by analysis and synthesis\ninto phonetic elements and grammatical forms. In the second place, it\nis emotional and not conceptual, because it is manifestative of the\nemotions or passions (which are functions of the organic or sensual\nappetite), and not of rational concepts. In the third place, it is\nindicative, that is, it merely signalizes a determinate emotional\nstate, as a thermometer indicates the temperature, or a barometer\nthe atmospheric pressure. It is not, therefore, descriptive, in the\nsense of being selected and arranged in syntactic sequence for the\nexpress purpose of making others realize one\u2019s own experiences. The\nrational language of man, on the contrary, is not emotional. Only a\nnegligible portion of the human vocabulary is made up of emotional\ninterjections. It consists, for the most part, of sounds descriptive of\nthought, to express which an elaborate system of vowels and consonants\nare discriminated and articulated on the basis of social agreement,\nthe result being a conventional vocal code invented and used for the\nexpress purpose of conveying, not emotions or imagery, but general and\nabstract concepts.\n\n\n                \u00a7 5. The True Significance of Instinct\n\nA third class of facts commonly cited as evidence of bestial\nintelligence are the remarkable phenomena of _instinct_.[14] The beaver\nacts as though it were acquainted with the principles of hydraulics\nand engineering, when it maintains the water at the height requisite\nto submerge the entrance to its dwelling by building a dam of mud,\nlogs, and sticks across the stream at a point below the site of its\nhabitation. The predatory wasp _Pompilius_ is endowed with surgical\nart, that suggests a knowledge of anatomy, inasmuch as it first disarms\nand afterwards paralyzes its formidable prey, the _Lycosa_ or black\nTarantula. Another predatory wasp, the _Stizus ruficornis_, disables\nMantids in a similar fashion. One of the American Pompilids, the black\nwasp _Priocnemis flavicornis_, is an adept in the art of navigation,\nsince it adopts the principle of the French hydroglissia (an air-driven\nboat which skims the water under the propulsion of an aeroplane\npropeller). This insect tows a huge black spider several times its own\nsize and too heavy to be carried, propelling its prey with buzzing\nwings along the open waterway, and leaving behind a miniature wake\nlike that of a steamer. It thus avoids the obstacles of the dense\nvegetation, and saves time and energy in transporting the huge carcass\nof its paralyzed quarry to the haven of its distant burrow. Spiders\nlike the _Epeira_, for example, are endowed with the mathematical\nability of constructing their webs on the patterns of the logarithmic\nspiral of Jacques Bernouilli (1654-1705), a curve which it took _man_\ncenturies to discover. The dog infested with parasitic tapeworms\n(_Taenia_) evinces a seeming knowledge of pharmaceutics, seeing that it\nwill avidly devour Common Wormwood (_Artemisia absynthium_), an herb\nwhich it never touches otherwise.\n\n    [14] J. Henri Fabre and Erich Wasmann, S.J., have formulated\n    very sound and critical views on the subject of instinct. The\n    works of these authors are now available in English. (_Cf._\n    de Mattos\u2019 translation of the _Souvenirs etymologiques_: \u201cThe\n    Mason Bees,\u201d Ch. VII; \u201cThe Bramble Bees,\u201d Ch. VI; \u201cThe Hunting\n    Wasps,\u201d Chs. IX, X, XX; _cf._ also Wasmann\u2019s _Instinct and\n    Intelligence_, and _Psychology of Ants and of Higher Animals_,\n    Engl. translation by Gummersbach.)\n\nIn all these cases, however, as we have previously remarked, the\nillusion of intelligence is due to the combination of teleology or\nobjective purposiveness with sentient consciousness. But teleology\nis nothing more than a material expression of intelligence, not to\nbe confounded with subjective intelligence, which is its causal\nprinciple. When the cells of the iris of the eye of a larval salamander\nregenerate the lens in its typical perfection, after the latter has\nbeen experimentally destroyed, we behold a process that is objectively,\nbut not subjectively, intelligent. In like manner the instinctive\nacts of an animal are teleological or objectively purposive, but do\nnot proceed from an intelligence _inherent in the animal_, any more\nthan the intelligent soliloquy delivered by a phonograph proceeds\nfrom a conscious intelligence inherent in the disc. In the animal,\nsentient consciousness is associated with this teleology or objective\npurposiveness, but such consciousness is only aware of what can be\nsensed, and is, therefore, _unconscious of purpose_, that is, of the\nsupersensible link, which connects a means with an end. \u201cInstinct,\u201d\nto cite the words of Wm. James, \u201cis usually defined as the faculty of\nacting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight\nof the ends, and without previous education in the performance.\u201d\n(\u201cPrinciples of Psychology,\u201d vol. II, c. xxiv, p. 383.) Hence the\nunconscious and objective purposiveness, which the human mind discerns\nin the instinctive behavior of brutes, is manifestative, not of an\nintelligence within the animal itself, but only of the infinite\nintelligence of the First Cause or Creator, Who imposed these laws\nreplete with wisdom upon the animal kingdom, and of the finite\nintelligence of man, who is capable of recognizing the Divine purpose\nexpressed, not only in the instincts of animals, but in all the telic\nphenomena of nature. Such marvels are not the fortuitous result of\nunco\u00f6rdinated contingencies. Behind these correlated teleologies\nof the visible universe there is a Supreme Intelligence, which has\n\u201cordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.\u201d (_Wisdom_:\nXI, 21.) \u201cAnd this universal geometry,\u201d says Fabre, in allusion to the\nmathematics of the Epeira\u2019s web, \u201ctells of an Universal Geometrician,\nwhose divine compass has measured all things. I prefer that, as an\nexplanation of the logarithmic curve of the Ammonite and the Epeira,\nto the Worm screwing up the tip of its tail. It may not perhaps be in\naccordance with latter-day teaching, but it takes a loftier flight.\u201d\n(\u201cLife of the Spider,\u201d p. 400.)\n\nBut, though the teleology of instinct is wonderful in the extreme, the\nelement of psychic regulation is so subordinate and restricted, that,\nfar from postulating _intelligent_ control, certain scientists go so\nfar as to deny even _sentient_ control, in the case of instinctive\nbehavior. Animals, in their opinion, are nothing more than \u201creflex\nmachines,\u201d a view which coincides with that of Descartes, who regarded\nanimals as unconscious automatons. \u201cThe instincts,\u201d says Pawlow, \u201care\nalso reflexes but more complex.\u201d (_Science_, Nov. 9, 1923, p. 359.) The\nlate Jacques Loeb was a protagonist of the view that instincts are\nsimply _metachronic chain-reflexes_, in which one elementary process\nreleases another, each preceding phase terminating in the production\nof the succeeding phase, until the entire gamut of concatenated arcs\nhas been traversed. Hence, John B. Watson, the Behaviorist disciple\nof Loeb, defines instinct as \u201ca combination of congenital responses\nunfolding serially under appropriate stimulation.\u201d\n\nBut, if Darwinian anthropomorphism sins by excess, Loeb\u2019s mechanism\nsins by defect, and fails to account for the indubitable variability of\ninstinctive behavior. For, however fixed and stereotyped such behavior\nmay be, it manifests unmistakable adaptation to external circumstances\nand emergencies, as well as subordination to the general physiological\ncondition of the organism, phenomena that exclude the idea of fatal\npredetermination according to the fixed pattern of a determinate series\nof reflex arcs. As Jennings has shown, synaptic co\u00f6rdination in the\nneural mechanism cannot be more than a partial factor in determining\nserial responses. The state of the organism as a whole must also be\ntaken into account. (Cf. \u201cBehavior of the Lower Organisms,\u201d p. 251.)\nThus an earthworm may turn to the right simply because it has just\nturned to the left, but this so-called \u201cchain-reflex\u201d does not involve\nan invariable and inevitable sequence of events, since the earthworm\nmay turn twice or thrice to the left, before the second reaction of\nturning to the right comes into play. Any animal, when sated, will\nreact differently to a food stimulus than it will when it is starved,\nby reason of its altered organic condition. We have something more,\ntherefore, to reckon with than a mere system of reflexes released by a\nsimple physical stimulus.\n\nThe second type of variability manifested by instinct is its capacity\nfor complex and continuous adjustment to variable environmental\ncircumstances. Thus predatory animals, such as wasps, crabs, spiders,\nand carnivorous mammals, accommodate themselves appropriately and\nuninterruptedly to the changing and unforeseeable movements of the\nprey they are engaged in stalking, giving evidence in this way of the\nregulation of their hunting instincts by sensory impressions. Whether\nthis element of psychic control is based upon object-perception,\nor simple sensation, and whether it involves a sensual impulse, or\nis merely sensori-motor, we have, naturally, no direct means of\nascertaining. But the presence of some sort of sensory regulation is\nevident enough, _e.g._ in the prompt and unerring flight of vultures\nto distant carrion. Moreover, there is a close analogy between our\nsense organs and those of an animal. Particularly, in the case of the\nhigher animals, the resemblance of the sense organs and nervous system\nto our own is extremely close, so much so that even the localization\nof sensory and motor centers in the brain is practically identical in\ndogs, apes, and men. Moreover, the animals make analogous use of their\nsense organs, orientating them and accommodating them for perception,\nand using them to inspect strange objects, etc., _e.g._ they turn\ntheir eyes, prick up their ears, snuff the wind, etc. Again, analogous\nmotor and emotional effects result from the stimulation of their sense\norgans, and brutes make emotional displays of anger, exultation, fear,\netc., similar to our own. Hence it is to be presumed that they have\nsimilar sensuous experiences. The analogy, however, must not be pressed\nfurther than the external manifestations warrant. With brute animals,\nthe manifestations in question are confined exclusively to phenomena of\nthe sensuous order.\n\nAnother indication of sensory control is found in the repair-work\nperformed by animals endowed with the constructive instinct. C. F.\nSchroeder, for instance, experimenting on certain caterpillars, found\nthat they repaired their weaving, whenever it was disturbed by the\nexperimenter. Fabre, too, discovered that a Mason-bee would plaster\nup holes or clefts marring the integrity of its cell, provided that\nthe bee was actually engaged in the process of plastering at the time,\nand provided that the experimenter inflicted the damage at the level,\nand within the area, of the construction work on which the bee was\nthen engaged. In a word, if the damage inflicted could be repaired by\na simple continuation or extension of its actual work of the moment,\nthe bee was able to cope with the emergency. There are other ways,\ntoo, in which the animal adapts its constructive instincts to external\ncircumstance. Fabre tells us that the Bramble-bee _Osmia_, which builds\na train of partitioned cells in snail shells or in hollow reeds, will\nvictual first and then plaster in a partition, if the reed be narrow,\nbut will first plaster a partition, and then introduce honey and\npollen through a hole left unclosed in the partition, whenever the\nreed is of greater diameter. This reversal of the procedure according\nto the exigencies of the external situation does not suggest the\nchain-reflex of Loeb. (Cf. \u201cThe Bramble-Bee,\u201d pp. 214-217.) Another\nkind of adaptation of instinct to external circumstances consists in\nthe economical omission of the initial step of a serial construction,\nin cases where the environmental conditions provide a ready-made\nequivalent. \u201cThe silkworm,\u201d says Driesch, \u201cis said not to form its\nweb of silk if it is cultivated in a box containing tulle, and some\nspecies of bees which normally construct tunnels do not do so if they\nfind one ready made in the ground, they then only perform their second\ninstinctive act: separating the tunnel into single cells.\u201d (\u201cScience &\nPhil. of the Organism,\u201d vol. II, p. 47.)\n\nDriesch\u2019s analysis of the constructive instinct shows that these\nfacts of adaptation or regulation fit in with the idea of sensory\ncontrol rather than with that of a chain-reflex. In the supposition\nthat the successive stages of instinctive construction are due to a\nchain-reflex, consisting of a series of elementary motor reactions\n_a_, _b_, _c_, etc., in which _a_ produces the external work A and,\non terminating, releases _b_, which, in turn, produces external work\nB and releases _c_, etc., clearly _b_ could never appear before _a_,\nand the sight of A ready-made would not inhibit _a_, nor would the\nremoval of A defer the advent of _b_. In other words, regulation\nwould be impossible. But, if we suppose that not the elemental act\n_a_, but rather the sensory perception of A, the first state of the\nexternal construction, is the stimulus to _b_ and, consequently, to the\nproduction of the second state of construction B, then we understand\nwhy _b_ is released independently of _a_, when, for example, an\ninsect discovers a ready-made substitute for A, the initial step in\nits construction, and we also understand why, in cases of accidental\ndamage resulting in the total or partial removal of A, the reaction\n_b_ is deferred and the reaction _a_ prolonged, until the repair or\nreconstruction of A is complete; for, in this supposition, the addition\nof A will inhibit _a_ and release _b_, whereas the subtraction of A\nwill inhibit the appearance of _b_ and consequently defer B, until the\nstate of construction A, the sight of which is the stimulus to _b_, is\ncomplete. The fact of regulation, therefore, entails _sensory_ control\nof the serial responses involved in the constructive instinct. Hence,\nas H. P. Weld of Cornell expresses it: \u201cWe may safely assume that even\nin the lowest forms of animal life some sort of sensory experience\nreleases the (instinctive) disposition and to an extent determines the\nsubsequent course of action.\u201d (Encycl. Am., v. 15, p. 168.)\n\nBut it would be going to the opposite extreme to interpret these\nadjustments of instinct to external contingencies as evidence of\n_intelligent_ regulation. The animal\u2019s ability, for example, to\nrepair accidental damage to a construction, which instinct impels\nit to build, is rigidly limited to repairs that can be accomplished\nby a simple continuation of the actual and normal occupation of\nthe moment. If, however, the damage affects an already completed\nportion of the instinctive structure, and its present occupation is\ncapable of continuance, the animal is impotent to relinquish this\nactual occupation of the moment, in order to cope with the emergency.\nSuppose, for illustration, that the instinctive operations _a_ and _b_\nare finished and the animal is in the _c_-stage of its instinctive\nperformance, then, if the damage is inflicted in the A-portion of the\nstructure, and _c_ can be continued independently of A, the animal\ncannot relinquish _c_ and return to _a_, in order to restore the\nmarred integrity of A. This shows that the animal is guided, in its\nrepair-work, by _sense_, which is bound to the here and now, and not\nby intelligence, which is an abstractive faculty that emancipates from\nthe actual and concrete present, and enables the possessor to hark back\nto the past of its performance, should necessity require. Thus Fabre\nfound that the Mason-bee, after it had turned from building to the\nforaging of honey and pollen, would no longer repair holes pricked in\nits cell, but suffered the latter to become a veritable vessel of the\nDana\u00efdes, which it vainly strove to fill with its liquid provender.\nThough the holes affected portions extremely close to the topmost\nlayer of masonry, and although it frequently sounded and explored\nthese unaccustomed holes with its antenn\u00e6, it took no steps to check\nthe escape of the honey and pollen by recurring to its mason craft of\nearlier stages. And, finally, when it did resume the plasterer\u2019s trade\nin constructing a lid for the cell, it would spare no mortar to plug\nthe gaping breaches in the walls of its cell, but deposited its egg in\na chamber drained of honey, and then proceeded to perform the useless\nwork of closing with futile diligence _only the topmost aperture_ in\nthis much perforated dwelling. Obviously, therefore, the bee failed\nto perceive the connection which existed between these breaches and\nthe escape of the honey, and it was unable to apply its instinctive\nbuilding skill to _new uses_ by abstraction from the definite\nconnection, in which the latter is normally operative.\n\nSense, therefore, and not intelligence, is the regulatory principle\nof instinct. To recognize causal and telic relationships is the\nprerogative of a superorganic intelligence. The transcendental link\nby which a useful means is referred to an ulterior end is something\nthat cannot be _sensed_, but only _understood_. An animal, therefore,\nacts _toward_ an end, not _on account of_ an end. Nature, however,\nhas compensated for this ignorance by implanting in each species of\nanimal a special teleological disposition, by reason of which objects\nand actions, which are, under normal conditions, objectively useful\nto the individual, or the species, become invested for the animal\nwith a subjective aspect of agreeableness, while objects and actions,\nwhich are normally harmful, are invested with a subjective aspect\nof repulsiveness. The qualities of serviceableness and pleasantness\n_happen_, so far as the animal is concerned, to be united in one\nand the same concrete object or action, but the animal is only\naware of the pleasantness, which appeals to its senses, and not of\nthe serviceableness, which does not. Thus, in the example already\ncited, the dog suffering from tapeworms eats the herb known as Common\nWormwood, not because it is aware of the remedial efficacy of the herb,\nbut simply because the odor and flavor of the plant appeal to the\nanimal in its actual morbid condition, ceasing to do so, however, when\nthe latter regains the state of health. How different is the action\nof the man whose blood is infected with malarial parasites and who\ntakes quinine, not because the bitter taste of the alkaloid appeals\nto his palate, but solely because he has his future cure explicitly\nin view! \u201cFinally,\u201d says Weld, \u201cthe more we learn about instincts the\nmore apparent it becomes that the situations from which they proceed\nare meaningful, but we need not suppose that the organism is aware of\nthe meaning. The chick in the egg feels (we may only guess as to its\nnature) a vague discomfort, and the complicated reaction by which it\nmakes its egress from the shell is released.\u201d (Encycl. Am., v. 15, p.\n169.)\n\nRecapitulating, then, we may define instinct as a psycho-organic\npropensity, not acquired by education or experience, but congenital\nby inheritance and identical in all members of the same zo\u00f6logical\nspecies, having as its physical basis the specific nervous organization\nof the animal and as its psychic basis a teleological co\u00f6rdination\nof the cognitive, emotional, and motor functions, in virtue of\nwhich, given the proper physiological state of the organism and the\npresence of an appropriate environmental stimulus, an animal, without\nconsciousness of purpose, is impelled to the inception, and regulated\nin the performance, of complicated behavior which is sensually\ngratifying and, under normal circumstances, simultaneously beneficial\nto the individual, or the race.\n\nInstinctive acts are performed without previous experience or training\non the part of the animal, and are, nevertheless, at least in the\nmajority of cases, _perfect in their first performance_. A few, like\nthe pecking-instinct of young chickens, are slightly improvable through\nsentient experience, _e.g._ the young chick, at first undiscriminating\nin the choice of the particles which it picks up, learns later by\nassociative memory to distinguish what is tasty and edible from what\nis disagreeable and inedible, but, for the most part, the perfection\nof instinctive acts is independent of prior experience. Hence instinct\nis entirely different from human reason, which, in the solution of\nproblems, is compelled to begin with reflection upon the data furnished\nby previous experience, or education. The animal, however, in its\ninstinctive operations, without pausing to investigate, deliberate,\nor calculate, proceeds unhesitatingly on the very first occasion\nto a prompt and perfect solution of its problems. Hence, without\nstudy, consultation, planning, or previous apprenticeship of any\nsort, and in the complete absence of experimental knowledge, that\nmight serve as matter for reflection or as a basis for inference, the\nanimal is able to solve intricate problems in engineering, geometry,\nanatomy, pharmaceutics, etc., which the combined intelligence of\nmankind required centuries upon centuries of schooling, research, and\nreflection in order to solve. Of two things, therefore, one: either\nthese actions do not proceed from an intelligent principle inherent in\nthe animal; or they do, and in that case we are compelled to recognize\nin brute animals _an intelligence superior to our own_, because they\naccomplish deftly and without effort ingenious feats that human\nreason cannot duplicate, save clumsily and at the price of prolonged\ndiscipline and incessant drudgery. \u201cPerhaps the strongest reason,\u201d says\nan anonymous writer, \u201cfor not regarding the activities of instinct\nas intelligent is that in such enormously complex sequences of action\nas, for instance, the emperor moth carries out in the preparing of an\nescape-opening for itself on its completing the larval and passing\ninto the imago state, the intelligence needed would be so great that\nit could not be limited to this single activity, and yet it is so\nlimited.\u201d[15]\n\n    [15] Cf. Nelson\u2019s Encyclopedia, v. 6, p. 452.\n\nIntelligence is essentially a _generalizing_ and _abstracting_ power;\nhence, from its very nature, it could not be _limited to a single\nactivity_. Bestial instincts, however, though frequently so amazingly\ncomplex and ingeniously purposive as to seem the fruit of profound\nmeditation, are, nevertheless, confined exclusively to this or that\ndeterminate ability. They operate within narrow and pre\u00ebstablished\ngrooves, from which they never swerve to any appreciable degree,\nbeing but little modifiable or perfectible by experience. Bees always\nconstruct hexagonal cells, spiders stick to the logarithmic spiral,\nand beavers never attempt to put their engineering skill to new uses.\nInstincts have but little pliancy, their regularity and uniformity\nbeing such as to make the instinctive abilities definitely predictable\nin the case of any given species of animal. Now, the distinctive mark\nof intelligence is _versatility_, that is, aptitude for many things\nwithout determinate restriction to this or that. A man who is expert\nin one art may, by reason of his intelligence, be equally proficient\nin a dozen others. The biologist may be a competent chemist, and the\nastronomer an excellent physicist. Michel Angelo was a sculptor, a\nfrescoer, a painter, an anatomist, an engineer, and an architect,\nwhile Leonardo da Vinci had even more arts to his credit. To predict\nbefore birth the precise form that a man\u2019s ability will take is an\nimpossibility. Certain aptitudes, such as a musical gift, are no doubt\ninherited, but it is an inheritance which imposes no rigid necessity\nupon inheriter; since he is free to neglect this native talent, and to\ndevelop others for which he has no special innate aptitude. With man,\nthe fashion in clothing and the styles of architecture vary from day\nto day. The brute, however, never emerges from the rut of instinct,\nand each generation of a given animal species monotonously reproduces\nthe history of the previous generation. Man, on the contrary, is\ncapable of indefinite _progress_, as the march of human cultures\nand civilizations shows. Gregarious animals are restricted by their\ninstincts to determinate types of aggregation, as we see in the case of\nants and bees. Hence these insect communities are unacquainted with our\nsanguinary revolutions which overturn monarchies in favor of republics,\nor set up dictatorships in place of democracies; for, fortunately or\nunfortunately, as one may choose to regard it, man is not limited to\none form of government rather than another.\n\nAnimals, then, notwithstanding their wonderful instincts, are\ndeficient in precisely that quality which is the unique criterion of\nintelligence, namely, versatility. Each species has but one stereotyped\nability, outside of which it is woefully stupid and inefficient. \u201cSo\nlong,\u201d says Fabre, \u201cas its circumstances are normal the insect\u2019s\nactions are calculated most rationally in view of the object to be\nattained\u201d (\u201cThe Mason-Bees,\u201d p. 167), but let the circumstances\ncease to be normal, let them vary never so little from those which\nordinarily obtain, and the animal is helpless, while its instinctive\npredisposition becomes, not merely futile, but often positively\ndetrimental. Thus the instinct, which should, in the normal course of\nevents, guide night-flying moths to the white flowers that contain\nthe life-sustaining nectar of their nocturnal banquets, proves\ntheir undoing, when they come into contact with the white lights of\nartificial illumination. In fact, the fatal fondness of the moth for\nthe candle flame has become in all languages a proverb for the folly of\ncourting one\u2019s own destruction.\n\nThe animal may employ an exquisitely efficient method in accomplishing\nits instinctive work, but is absolutely impotent to apply this\ningenious method to more than one determinate purpose. Man, however,\nis not so restricted. He varies at will both his aims and his\nmethods. He can adapt the _same means_ (a pocketknife, for instance)\nto _different ends_, and, conversely, he can obtain the _same end_\nby the use of _different means_ (_e.g._ communicate by mail, or\ntelegraph, or radio). Man, in a word, is _emancipated from limitation\nto the singular and the concrete_ by virtue of his unique prerogative,\nreason, or intelligence, the power that enables him _to generalize\nfrom the particular and to abstract from the concrete_. This is\nthe secret of his unlimited versatility. This is the basis of his\ncapacity for progress. This is the root of his freedom; for his\nwill seeks happiness in general, happiness in the abstract, and is\nnot, therefore, compelled to choose any particular form or concrete\nembodiment of happiness, such as this or that style of architecture,\nthis or that form of government, this or that kind of clothing, etc.,\netc. Teleology is but a material expression of intelligence, and may,\ntherefore, occur in things destitute of intelligence, but versatility\nis the inseparable concomitant and infallible sign of an inherent and\nautonomous intelligence. Lacking this quality, instinct, however telic,\nis obviously not intelligence.\n\nAnother indication of the fact that no intelligence lies behind\nthe instinctive behavior of brutes is manifest from their evident\n_unconsciousness of purpose_. That the animal is ignorant of the\npurpose implied in its own instinctive actions appears from the fact\nthat it will carry out these operations with futile diligence and\nexactitude, even when, through accident, the purpose is conspicuously\nabsent. Thus the hen deprived of her eggs will, nevertheless, continue\nthe now futile process of incubation for twenty-one days, or longer,\ndespite the fact that her obstinacy in maintaining the straw of the\nempty nest at a temperature of 104\u00b0 F. serves no useful purpose\nwhatever. She cannot but sense the absence of the eggs; she has not,\nhowever, the intelligence to realize that incubation without eggs is\nvain. The connection between the latter and the former is something\nthat mere sense cannot apprehend. Hence the hen is not troubled by\nthe purposelessness of her performance. Fabre gives many examples\nof this futile persistence in instinctive operations, despite their\ncomplete frustration. Alluding to the outcome of his experiments on\nthe Mason-wasp _Pelapaeus_, he says: \u201cThe Mason bees, the Caterpillar\nof the Great Peacock Moth, and many others, when subjected to similar\ntests, are guilty of the same illogical behaviour: they continue, in\nthe normal order, their series of industrious actions, though accident\nhas now rendered them all useless. Just like millstones unable to cease\nrevolving though there be no corn left to grind, let them once be given\nthe compelling power and they will continue to perform their task\ndespite its futility.\u201d (\u201cBramble Bees,\u201d pp. 192, 193.)\n\nThe instance cited by Dr. H. D. Schmidt is an excellent illustration\nof this inability of an animal to appreciate either the utility or\nfutility of its instinctive behavior. Having described the instinct\nof squirrels to bury nuts by ramming them into the ground with their\nteeth, and then using their paws to cover them with earth, he continues\nas follows: \u201cNow, as regards the young squirrel, which, of course,\nnever had been present at the burial of a nut, I observed that, after\nhaving eaten a number of hickory nuts to appease its appetite, it\nwould take one between its teeth, then sit upright and listen in all\ndirections. Finding all right, it would scratch upon the smooth blanket\non which I was playing with it as if to make a hole, then hammer with\nthe nut between its teeth upon the blanket, and finally perform all the\nmotions required to fill up a hole\u2014_in the air_; after which it would\njump away, leaving the nut, of course, uncovered.\u201d (_Transactions of\nthe Am. Neurological Ass\u2019n_, 1875, vol. I, p. 129\u2014italics his.) This\nwhole pantomime of purposeless gesticulations, from the useless \u201cStop,\nlook and listen!\u201d down to the final desertion of the uncovered nut, is\noverwhelming evidence of the fact that the brute is destitute of any\nrational faculty capable of recognizing the telic aspect of its own\ninstinctive conduct.\n\nThe claim is sometimes made that certain forms of animal behavior\nare not unconsciously, but _consciously_, telic. Bouvier, for\nexample, claims that in the rare cases of the _use of tools_ among\nthe Arthropoda, we have evidence of the existence of intelligent\ninventiveness of a rudimentary kind. Thus the crab _Melia_ carries a\nsea-anemone in its chela as a weapon wherewith to sting its prey into a\ncondition of paralysis. The leaf-cutting ants of India and Brazil use\ntheir own thread-spinning larv\u00e6 as tools for cementing together the\nmaterials out of which their nests are constructed. The predatory wasp\n_Ammophila urnaria_ uses a pebble to tamp the filling of its burrow.\nAccording to the Wheelers (cf. _Science_, May 30, 1924, p. 486), the\nhunting wasp _Sphex_ (_Ammophila_) _gryphus_ (Sm.) makes similar use\nof a pebble. As Bouvier notes, however, this use of tools appears \u201cto\nbe rather exceptional ..., showing itself only in the primitive state\nconsisting of the use of foreign bodies as implements.\u201d (Smithson.\nInst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 456.) Moreover, the animals in question\nare limited to a concretely determinate kind of tool, which their\nenvironment supplies ready-made. Such a use of implements _does not\npresuppose any power of abstraction and generalization_. In fact, the\npresence of such a power is expressly excluded by the consideration\nthat the animal\u2019s so-called \u201cinventiveness\u201d is confined exclusively to\n_one particularized manifestation_.\n\nAt times the behavior of animals so closely simulates the consciously\ntelic or intelligent conduct of men, that only severely critical\nmethods enable us to discriminate between them. An experiment, which\nErich Wasmann, S.J., performed upon ants will serve to illustrate this\npoint. In one of his glass nests, Father Wasmann constructed an island\nof sand surrounded by a moat filled with water. He then removed from\ntheir \u201cnursery\u201d a certain number of the ant larv\u00e6 and placed them on\nthe island. Thereupon the ants were observed to build a bridge of sand\nacross the moat \u201cfor the purpose,\u201d apparently, of rescuing the marooned\nlarv\u00e6. Such behavior seemed to imply an intelligent ordination of a\nmeans to an end. Wasmann\u2019s second experiment, however, proved this\ninference to be wholly unwarranted; for, when he excavated a hole in\nthe sand of the nest and filled it with water, the ants, stimulated\nby what to them was the disagreeable dampness of the marginal sand,\nwere impelled to perform the reflex act of kicking about in the sand.\nThis impulse persisted until all traces of the hole, the dampness and\nthe water had been buried under a carpet of drier sand. Then, and then\nonly, was the aforesaid impulse inhibited. Applying these results to\nthe interpretation of the first experiment, we see that the \u201cbuilding\nof a bridge\u201d in the first experiment was not intentional, but merely\nan accidental result of a kicking-reflex, with damp sand acting as\na stimulator. Once the moat was bridged, however, the ants happened\nto find the larv\u00e6, and were then impelled by instinct to carry the\nlarv\u00e6 to their proper place in the nest. To see in such an incident a\nplanned and premeditated rescue of the marooned larv\u00e6 would be grossly\nanthropomorphic. Nevertheless, had only the first experiment been\nperformed, such an anthropomorphic interpretation would have seemed\nfully justified, and it was only by an appropriate variation of the\nconditions of the original experiment that this false interpretation\ncould be definitively excluded.\n\nConsciously telic behavior is distinguishable from unconsciously\ntelic conduct only to the extent that it implies an agent endowed\nwith the power of abstraction. Unless an agent can vary radically the\nspecificity of the procedure, whereby it attains a given end, the\npurposiveness of its behavior is no evidence of its intelligence.\n\u201cAmong animals,\u201d says Bergson, \u201cinvention is never more than a\nvariation on the theme of routine. Locked up as it is within the habits\nof its species, the animal succeeds no doubt in broadening these by\nindividual initiative; but its escape from automatism is momentary\nonly, just long enough to create a new automatism; the gates of its\nprison close as soon as they are opened; dragging the chain merely\nlengthens it. Only with man does consciousness break the chain.\u201d (Cf.\nSmithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1918, p. 457.)\n\nIn vain, then, do our Darwinian humanizers of the brute exalt instinct\nat the expense of intelligence. Their attempt to reduce to a difference\nof degree the difference of kind that separates the irrational from\nthe rational, fails all along the line. Indeed, far from being able to\naccount for the appearance of intelligence in the world, transformistic\ntheories are impotent to account for so much as the development of\ninstinct, all forms of the evolutionary theory, the Lamarckian, the\nDarwinian, the De-Vriesian, etc., being equally inadequate to the task\nof explaining the origin of animal instincts.\n\nThe complex instinctive behavior of predatory wasps, for example, is\nabsolutely essential for the preservation of their respective races,\nand yet these indispensable instincts are completely useless in any\nother than the _perfect state_. From their very nature, therefore,\nthey do not admit of _gradual development_. The law of all, or none,\nholds here. \u201cInstinct developed by degrees,\u201d says Fabre, \u201cis flagrantly\nimpossible. The art of preparing the larva\u2019s provisions allows none\nbut masters, and suffers no apprentices; the Wasp must excel in it\nfrom the outset or leave the thing alone.\u201d (\u201cThe Hunting Wasps,\u201d p.\n403.) To be useful at all, the instinctive operation must possess an\nindivisible perfection, which cannot be partitioned into degrees.\nThe _Pompilius_ (_Calicurgus_), for instance, must, under penalty of\ninstant death, take the preliminary precaution to sting into inaction\nthe ganglion that controls the poison forceps of her formidable prey,\nthe Black Tarantula (_Lycosa_), before she proceeds to paralyze it\nby stabbing its thoracic ganglion. The slightest imperfection or\nshortcoming in her surgery would be irretrievably disastrous. Such an\ninstinct never existed in an imperfect form. The first wasp to possess\nit must have been an expert, or she would never have lived to serve the\nlimp body of the huge spider as living provender for her tiny grub.\n\u201cThe first to come to grips with the Tarantula,\u201d says Fabre, \u201chad an\nunerring knowledge of her dangerous surgery. The least hesitation, the\nslightest speculation, and she was lost. The first teacher would also\nhave been the last, with no disciples to take up her art and perfect\nit.\u201d (\u201cBramble Bees,\u201d p. 354.)\n\nAnother hunting wasp, the Hairy Ammophila, subdues a large caterpillar\ninto a state of coma by pricking with its sting nine of the ventral\nganglia, while it spares the cervical ganglion, merely compressing\nthe latter with its mandibles, so as not to destroy life altogether.\nThis nice discrimination rules out Loeb\u2019s hypothesis of a so-called\n\u201cchemotaxis.\u201d As a result of this elaborate surgical operation, the\npower of movement is suppressed in every segment, and the tiny larva\nof the wasp emerging from the egg laid on the ventral surface of the\ncaterpillar can devour this huge living, but motionless, victim in\npeace and safety. Dead meat would not agree with the larva, and any\nmovement of the caterpillar would be fatal to the delicate grub. To\neliminate these contingencies, the Wasp\u2019s surgery must be perfect\nfrom the very outset. \u201cThere is,\u201d says Fabre, \u201cno _via media_, no\nhalf success. Either the caterpillar is treated according to rule and\nthe Wasp and its family is perpetuated; or else the victim is only\npartially paralyzed and the Wasp\u2019s offspring dies in the egg. Yielding\nto the inexorable logic of things, we will have to admit that the\nfirst Hairy Ammophila, after capturing a Grey Worm to feed her larva,\noperated on the patient by the exact method in use today.\u201d (\u201cThe\nHunting Wasps,\u201d pp. 403, 404.)\n\nCertain meticulous critics of our day cite the fact of the diffusion\nof the poison as indicating that the surgery of the hunting wasps need\nnot be so perfectly accommodated to the nervous system of their prey,\nand they attempt in this way to discredit Fabre as having failed to\ntake the occurrence of diffusion into account. A careful reading of\nhis works, however, will serve to vindicate him in this respect. In a\nchapter on the poison of the bee, for instance, we read: \u201cThe local\neffect is diffused. This diffusion, which might well take place in the\nvictims of the predatory insects, plays no part in the latter\u2019s method\nof operation. The egg, which will be laid immediately afterwards,\ndemands the complete inertia of the prey from the outset. Hence all the\nnerve-centers that govern locomotion must be numbed instantaneously\nby the virus.\u201d (\u201cBramble Bees,\u201d p. 347.) Bouvier, therefore, very\njustly remarks: \u201cAfter all, when Fabre\u2019s work is examined there is no\ntrouble in seeing that none of these details escaped him. He never\ndisputed the paralytic action of the poison inoculated by the insect,\nand the wonderful researches by the Peckhams on the Pompilids, which\nhunt Lycosids, have clearly established the fact that the thrusts of\nthe sting given by the predatory insect produce two different kinds\nof paralysis, one functional, and often temporary, resulting from the\naction of the venom, the other structural and persistent, produced by\nthe dart which more or less injures the nervous centers.\u201d (Smithson.\nInst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 594.)\n\nIn the case of predatory insects, therefore, the instinct must be\n_perfect at the outset_, or survival is impossible. For the origin\nof such instincts, Darwinism, which stresses the _gradualness_ of\nevolutionary progress, has no explanation that will hold water.\nLamarckism, which sees in _acquired habits_ transmitted by inheritance,\nthe origin of instinct, the \u201cmemory of the race,\u201d is equally at a\nloss to account for these instincts. The formation of habits requires\n_practice_ and _repetition_. The predatory insect must be perfect at\nthe start, and yet it only exercises its remarkable instinct _once a\nyear_. Where is the practice and reiteration requisite for canalizing\nits nervous system into the conduction-paths of habit? How did one\nparticular set of rarely performed acts happen to gain precedence over\nall others, and to be alone successful in stamping themselves indelibly\nupon the nerve plasm as habits, and upon the germ plasm as instincts?\nDe-Vriesianism, which would make the acquisition and perfecting of\ninstinct dependent upon the rare and accidental contingency of a\n_fortuitous mutation_, is even more objectionable. These instincts are\nvital to the insect. If their acquisition and improvement depend upon\nthe lucky chance of a series of favorable mutations, its prospects of\nsurvival are nil; for it cannot afford to wait at all. \u201cIn order to\nlive,\u201d says Fabre, \u201cwe all require the conditions that enable us to\nlive: this is a truth worthy of the famous axioms of La Palice. The\npredatory insects live by their talent. If they do not possess it to\nperfection, their race is lost.\u201d (\u201cBramble Bees,\u201d p. 364.)\n\nRecently, there has been a revival of Lamarckism hitherto regarded\nas defunct. Guyer, Kammerer, and Pawlow profess to find factual\njustification for it, and Bouvier adopts it in his \u201cLa vie psychique\ndes insectes\u201d (1918), to account for the origin of instinct. Of the\nalleged facts of Kammerer and Guyer, we have spoken in a previous\nchapter. Here we shall content ourselves with few remarks on the\nexperiments of Ivan Pawlow, as being especially relevant to the subject\nunder consideration. The Russian physiologist has experimented on\nwhite mice, and claims that the mice of the fifth generation learned\nto answer a dinner bell in the space of five lessons, whereas their\nancestors of the first generation had required a hundred lessons to\nanswer the same signal. Hence he concludes: \u201cThe latest experiments ...\nshow that conditioned reflexes, _i.e._, the highest nervous activity,\nare inherited.\u201d (_Science_, Nov. 9, 1923, p. 360.) His results,\nhowever, do not tally with those recently obtained by E. C. MacDowell\nof the Carnegie Institution, by H. G. Bragg, and by E. M. Vicari of\nColumbia. MacDowell found that white rats trained in a circular maze\ndid not improve in their susceptibility to training from generation to\ngeneration. \u201cChildren from trained parents,\u201d he says, \u201cor from trained\nparents and grandparents, take as long to learn the maze habit as the\nfirst generation used.\u201d (_Science_, March 28, 1924, p. 303.) Having\ncited the similar results of Bragg, who experimented with white mice,\nhe concludes: \u201cThe results are in full accord with those given above;\nthey indicate that the training of the ancestors did not facilitate the\nlearning of the descendants.\u201d (_Ibidem._) E. M. Vicari, using a simple\nmaze and white rats, obtained the same results. \u201cIt seems clear,\u201d she\nsays, \u201cthat the latter generations have not been aided by the training\nof their ancestors.\u201d (_Ibidem._)\n\nBouvier\u2019s conception, then, that the automatisms of instinct originate\nas automatisms of acquired habit, the latter being appropriated\nby inheritance, still stands in need of reliable experimental\nconfirmation. Moreover, a theory of this sort could never account,\nas Weismann points out, for such phenomena as the specific instincts\nof worker bees, which are _excluded from propagation_. Nor can the\ntheory explain, as originating in acquired _habit_, those instinctive\noperations of enormous complexity, like the complicated method of\nemergence employed by the larva of the emperor moth, which only occur\n_once in a lifetime_, and could not, therefore, fasten themselves on\nthe organism as a _habit_.\n\nAn evolutionary origin of instinct, however, though extremely\nimprobable, is, at any rate, not absolutely inconceivable. Its\nteleology, as we have seen, does not imply inherent intelligence, but\nis explicable as an innate law involving appropriate co\u00f6rdination\nof the sensory, emotional, and motor functions, all of which are\nintrinsically dependent on the organism. But intelligence, as we\nhave seen, is a superorganic power, having its source in a spiritual\nprinciple, that, from the very nature of things, cannot be evolved from\nmatter. Human reason, therefore, owes its origin, not to any evolution\nof the human body, but to the creation of the human soul, which is the\nsource and subject of that unique prerogative of man, namely: the power\nof abstract thought.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER III\n\n                     THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN BODY\n\n\nIn an article published August 31, 1895, in the _New York Freeman\u2019s\nJournal_, the late Rev. J. A. Zahm gave expression to the following\nopinion: \u201cThe evolution of the body of man from some inferior animal\nand its subsequent endowment in this body by God of a rational soul is\nantagonistic to no dogma of faith and may be shown to be in harmony\nwith the teachings of St. Thomas.\u201d The scriptural and theological\naspect of this view need not concern us here, our sole purpose being\nto evaluate it from a purely scientific standpoint. Once evolutionary\nthought takes cognizance of the fact that the human soul is a spiritual\nprinciple underivable from mere matter, once it acknowledges the\nimmediate creation of the human soul, and professes to do no more\nthan account for the origin of man\u2019s animal _body_, that moment is it\nshorn of its materialistic implications; but what, we may ask, are the\nfoundations of such an hypothesis in the realm of scientific fact?\n\nThe writer must confess that he cannot fathom the mentality of those\nwho accept the evolutionary explanation, so far as plant and animal\norganisms are concerned, but proceed to draw the line when it comes to\napplying it to the human body. For if one (to borrow Du Bois-Reymond\u2019s\nexpression) \u201cgives so much as his little finger to\u201d the evolutional\nargument from organic homology, he must end, in so far as he is\nconsistent, in acknowledging as incontestable its obvious application\nto man. The only choice which sound logic can sanction is between\nfixism and a thoroughgoing system of transformism, which does not\nexempt the human body from the scope of the evolutionary explanation.\nIndeed, the theory of evolution itself stands or falls upon this issue;\nfor, if structures so strikingly similar as the skeletons of a man\nand an ape, respectively, have originated from two distinct ancestral\nstocks, then in no case at all is the inference of common descent\nfrom structural resemblance a legitimate procedure. In other words,\nif the homologies existent between the human and simian organisms are\nexplicable on some other basis than that of common ancestry, then\nall organic homologies are so explicable, and the whole evolutionary\nargument collapses.\n\n\n                     \u00a7 1. Two Theories of Descent\n\nTwo theories have been formulated regarding the alleged bestial\norigin of the human body: (1) the theory of lineal descent from some\nknown species (living or fossil) of ape or monkey; (2) the theory of\ncollateral descent from a hypothetical bestial ancestor common to apes\nand men. The theory of lineal descent is that to which Darwin himself\nstands committed. This theory, however, soon fell into disrepute among\nscientists, who came to prefer the theory of collateral descent,\nalthough signs of a return to the older theory are not wanting in our\nday. At all events, Darwin came out flatly in favor of the monkey\norigin of man. This, it is true, has been indignantly denied by loyal\npartisans anxious to exonerate their idol from the reproach of having\nadvanced a crude and now obsolete theory of human descent. But Darwin\u2019s\nown words speak for themselves: \u201cThe Simiadae,\u201d he says, \u201cthen branched\noff into two great stems, the New World and Old World monkeys; and from\nthe latter, at a remote period of time, Man, the wonder and glory of\nthe Universe, proceeded.\u201d (\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d 2nd ed., ch. VI, pp. 220,\n221.) Note that he does not say \u201cprobably\u201d; his language is not the\nlanguage of hypothesis, but of categorical affirmation.\n\nThe theory, however, which is most generally favored at the present\ntime holds that, assuming the universality of the evolutionary\nprocess, all existing types must be of equal antiquity, and none prior\nor ancestral to any other. Hence it regards man, not as the direct\ndescendant of any known type of ape, but as the offspring of an as yet\nundiscovered Tertiary ancestor, from which men and apes have diverged\nin two distinct lines of descent. \u201c_Monkeys, apes, and men_,\u201d says\nConklin, \u201c_have descended from some common but at present extinct\nancestor_. Existing apes and monkeys are collateral relatives of man\nbut not his ancestors; his cousins but not his parents.... The human\nbranch diverged from the anthropoid stock not less than two million\nyears ago, and since that time man has been evolving in the direction\nrepresented by existing human races, while the apes have been evolving\nin the direction represented by existing anthropoids. During all this\ntime men and apes have been growing more and more unlike and conversely\nthe farther back we go, the more we should find them converging until\nthey meet in a common stock which should be intermediate between these\ntwo stocks.\u201d (\u201cEvolution and the Bible,\u201d pp. 12, 13\u2014italics his.)\n\nBarnum Brown\u2019s recent discovery of three jaws of the fossil ape\n_Dryopithecus_ in the Siwalik Hills of India has, as previously\nintimated, resulted in a return on the part of certain scientists,\n_e.g._ Wm. K. Gregory and Dudley J. Morton, to views that more nearly\napproximate those of Charles Darwin. According to these men, the fossil\nanthropoid _Dryopithecus_ is to be regarded as the common ancestor of\nmen, chimpanzees, and gorillas. (Cf. _Science_, April 25, 1924, Suppl.\nXII.)\n\nMany considerations, however, militate against the direct derivation\nof man\u2019s bodily frame from any known species of ape, whether living\nor fossil. Dana has pointed out that, as regards the mechanism of\nlocomotion, man belongs to a more primitive type than the ape.\nThe earliest and lowest type of vertebrates are the fish, and\nthese, according to the above-mentioned author, are _urosthenic_\n(tail-strong), inasmuch as they propel themselves by means of their\ntails. Next in point of organization and time came the _merosthenic_\nvertebrates, which have their strength concentrated in the hind-limbs,\n_e.g._ reptiles like the dinosaurs. In the last place come the\n_prosthenic_ vertebrates, whose strength is concentrated in the\nfore-limbs, _e.g._ the carnivora and apes. Now man belongs to the\n_merosthenic_ type, and his mode of progression, therefore, is more\nprimitive than that of apes, which are _prosthenic_, all anthropoid\napes, such as the gorilla, the chimpanzee, the orang-utan and the\ngibbon having longer fore-limbs than hind-limbs.\n\nThe striking anatomical differences between apes and men, though not\nof sufficient importance to exclude the possibility of collateral\nrelationship, are so many solid arguments against the theory of\ndirect descent. We will content ourselves with a mere enumeration of\nthese differences. In the ape, the cranium has a protruding muzzle\nand powerful jaws equipped with projecting canine teeth, but the\nbrain-case is comparatively small; in man, on the contrary, the facial\ndevelopment is insignificant and the teeth are small and vertical,\nwhile the brain-case is enormous in size, having at least twice the\ncapacity of that of an ape. \u201cThe face of man,\u201d to quote Ranke, \u201cslides,\nas it were, down from the forehead and appears as an appendix to the\nfront half of the skull. But the gorilla\u2019s face, on the contrary,\nprotrudes from the skull, which in turn slides almost entirely backward\nfrom the face. By a cross-cut one may sever the whole face from the\nskull, except a very small part near the sockets, without being forced\nto open up the interior of the skull. It is only on account of its\nprotruding, strongly developed lower parts that the skull-cap of the\nanimal can simulate a kind of human face.\u201d (\u201cDer Mensch,\u201d vol. II,\np. 401.) These differences may be summarized by saying that the head\nof the ape is specialized for mastication and defense, whereas the\nhead of man is specialized for psychic functions. Again, as we have\nseen, the fore-limbs of the ape are long, and its hind-limbs short,\nthe extremities of both the latter and the former being specialized\nprimarily for prehension and only secondarily for progression. This\nis due to the ape\u2019s adaptation to arboreal life. In man, however,\nthe arms are short and specialized for prehension alone, while the\nlegs are long and terminate in broad plantigrade feet specialized for\nprogression alone. Man, consequently, is not adapted to arboreal life.\nIn the ape, the spine has a single curve, and the occipital foramen\n(the aperture through which the spinal cord enters the brain-case)\nis eccentrically located in the floor of the cranial box; in man,\nthe spine has a double curve, and the occipital foramen is centrally\nlocated, both features being in adaptation to the upright posture\npeculiar to man\u2014\u201c_die zentralle Lage dieser Oeffnung_,\u201d says Ranke\nalluding to the occipital foramen of man, \u201c_in der Sch\u00e4delbasis ist\nf\u00fcr den Menschensch\u00e4del im Unterschied gegen den Tiersch\u00e4del eine in\nhohem Masse typische_.\u201d (\u201cDer Mensch,\u201d vol. I, p. 378.) In the ape,\ntherefore, the vertebr\u00e6 have an adaptation producing convexity of the\nback, precluding a normal upright posture, and enforcing progression\non all fours. It has, moreover, powerful muscles at the back of the\nneck to carry the head in the horizontal position necessitated by this\nmode of progression. In man \u201cthe skull has the occipital condyles\nplaced within the middle fifth, in adaptation to the vertical position\nof the spine\u201d (Nicholson), the spinal cord enters the cranial box at\na perpendicular, and the head balances on the spinal column as on a\npivot, all of which ensures the erect posture and bipedal progression\nin man. There are, moreover, no neck muscles to support the head in any\nother than the vertical position. There are many other differences,\nbesides: the ape, for example, has no chin, while in man there is a\nmarked mental protuberance; man has a slender waist, but the ape has a\nbarrel-like torso without any waist; the ape has huge bony ridges for\nthe attachment of muscles, _e.g._ the sagittal crest, the superciliary\nridges, etc., while in man such features are practically absent.\n\nRanke has given a very good summary of the chief anatomical differences\nbetween man and the anthropoid apes: \u201cThe gorilla\u2019s head leaning\nforward, hangs down from the spinal column, and his chinless snout,\nequipped with powerful teeth, touches the breastbone. Man\u2019s head\nis round, and resting on a free neck, balances unrestrained upon\nthe spinal column. The gorilla\u2019s body, without a waist, swells out\nbarrel-shaped, and when straightened up finds no sufficient support on\nthe pelvis; the back-bone, tailless as in man, but almost straight,\nloses itself without nape or neck formation properly so-called in the\nrear part of the head and without protuberance of the gluteal region\nin the flat thighs. Man\u2019s body is slightly molded, like an hour-glass,\nthe chest and abdomen meeting to form a waist where they are narrowest;\nthe abdominal viscera are perfectly supported in the pelvis as in a\nplate; and elegance is decidedly gained by the double S-line, which,\ncurving alternately convex and concave, passes from the crown through\nthe neck and nape, down the back to the base of the spine and the\ngluteal region. The normal position of the gorilla shows us a plump,\nbear-like trunk, carried by short, crooked legs and by arms which serve\nas crutches and touch the ground with the knuckles of the turned-in\nfingers. The posture of the body is perfectly straight in man, it rests\non the legs as on columns when he stands upright, and his hands hang\ndown on both sides always ready for use. The gorilla is thickly covered\nwith hair, while man\u2019s body on the whole is naked.\u201d (_Op. cit._, vol.\nII, p. 213.)\n\nIn conclusion, we may say that, while there is a general resemblance\nbetween the human body and that of an anthropoid ape, there is,\nlikewise, a particular divergence\u2014\u201cthere is no bone, be it ever so\nsmall, nay, not even the smallest particle of a bone, in which the\ngeneral agreement in structure and function would pass over into real\nidentity.\u201d (Ranke, _op. cit._, vol. I, p. 437.) Hence Virchow declares\nthat \u201cthe differences between man and monkey are so wide that almost\nany fragment is sufficient to diagnose them.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1889, p. 566.) These differences are so considerable as to preclude the\npossibility of a _direct_ genealogical connection between man and any\nknown type of ape or monkey\u2014\u201cThe testimony of comparative anatomy,\u201d to\nquote Bum\u00fcller, \u201cis decidedly against the theory of man\u2019s descent from\nthe ape.\u201d (\u201cMensch oder Affe?\u201d p. 59.) Ranke has somewhere called man\na brain-animal, and this sums up the chief difference, which marks off\nthe human body from all bestial organisms. In the ape the brain weighs\nonly 100th part of the weight of its body, whereas in man the brain has\na weight equivalent to the 37th part of the weight of the human body.\nThe cranial capacity of the largest apes ranges from 500 to 600 c.cm.,\nwhile the average cranial capacity in man is 1500 c.cm. Moreover, the\nhuman brain is far more extensively convoluted within the brain-case\nthan that of an ape, so much so that the surface or cortical area of\nthe human brain is four times as great as that of the ape\u2019s brain.\nThus Wundt, in his \u201cGrundz\u00fcge der physiologischen Psychologie,\u201d cites\nH. Wagner as assigning to man a brain surface of from 2,196 to 1,877\nsq. cm., but a cortical area of only 535 sq. cm. in the case of an\norang-outang. (Cf. English Translation by Titchener, vol. I, p. 286.)\n\nAnother difficulty in the way of the Darwinian theory of direct\ndescent is the fact that the best counterparts of human anatomy\nare not found united in any one species of ape or monkey, but are\nscattered throughout a large number of species. \u201cReturning to the\nold discussion,\u201d says Thomas Dwight, \u201cas to which ape can boast of\nthe closest resemblance to man, Kohlbrugge brings before us Aeby\u2019s\nforgotten book on the skull of man and apes. His measurements show that\nthe form nearest to man among apes is the gibbon, or long-armed ape,\nbut that the South American monkey _Crysothrix_ is nearer still. Aeby\nrecognized what modern anatomists have forgotten or wilfully ignored:\nthat any system of descent is inadequate which does not recognize that\nthe type of man is not in any one organ, but in all the physical and\npsychological features. He declared that while we are far from having\nthis universal knowledge, we have learned enough about the various\nparts of the body to make it impossible for us to sketch any plan\nof descent. \u2018It almost seems as if every part had its own line of\ndescent, different from that of others.\u2019 ... Kohlbrugge now introduces\nHaacke, who denies any relationship between man and apes, the latter\nbeing instances of one-sided development. He even dares to declare\nanyone who speaks of an intermediate form between man and apes to be\nignorant of the laws of development governing the race history of\nmammals. He believes man came from some lemuroid form, which may have\ndescended from the insectivora.\u201d (\u201cThoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,\u201d\npp. 188-190.)\n\nAll known types, then, of apes and monkeys are too specialized to have\nbeen in the direct line of human descent. Man, as Kohlbrugge ironically\nremarks, appears to have come from an ancestor much more like himself\nthan any species of ape we know of. Moreover, no species of apes or\nmonkeys monopolizes the honors of closest resemblance to man. In many\npoints, the South American monkeys, though more primitive than the\nanthropoid apes, are more similar to man than the latter.\n\n\n                    \u00a7 2. Embryological Resemblances\n\nMuch has been made of the so-called biogenetic law as an argument\nfor the bestial origin of mankind. This theory of the embryological\nrecapitulation of racial history was first formulated by Fritz M\u00fcller.\nHaeckel, however, was the one who exploited it most extensively,\nand who exalted it to the status of \u201cthe fundamental law of\nbiogenesis.\u201d[16] The latter\u2019s statement of the principle is as follows:\n\u201c_Die Ontogenesis ist die Palingenesis der Phylogenesis_.\u201d\u2014Ontogeny\n(the development of the individual) is a recapitulation of phylogeny\n(the development of the race). For a long time this law was received\nwith uncritical credulity by the scientific world, but enthusiasm\ndiminished when more careful studies made it clear that the line of\ndescent suggested by embryology did not agree with what was inferred\nfrom comparative anatomy and the sequence of fossil forms. Besides,\nit was manifest that certain organs in embryos were distinctively\n_embryonic_ and could never have functioned in adult forms, _e.g._ the\nyolk sac and the amnion. \u201cIt was recognized,\u201d says T. H. Morgan, \u201cthat\nmany embryonic stages could not possibly represent ancestral animals. A\nyoung fish with a huge yolk sac attached could scarcely ever have led a\nhappy, free life as an adult individual. Such stages were interpreted,\nhowever, as _embryonic_ additions to the original ancestral type. The\nembryo had done something on its own account. In some animals the\nyoung have structures that attach them to the mother, as does the\nplacenta of mammals. In other cases the young develop membranes about\nthemselves\u2014like the amnion of the chick and the mammal\u2014that would have\nshut off an adult animal from all intercourse with the outside world.\nHundreds of such embryonic structures are known to embryologists. These\nwere explained as adaptations and as falsifications of the ancestral\nrecords.\u201d (\u201cCritique of the Theory of Evolution,\u201d pp. 16, 17.)\n\n    [16] Haeckel\u2019s \u201cBiogenetisches Grundgesetz,\u201d which he\n    formulates thus: \u201c_Die Ontogenie (Keimesgeschichte) ist eine\n    kurze Wiederholung der Phylogenie (Stammesgeschichte)_,\u201d 1874.\n\nThe result has been that this so-called law has fallen into general\ndisrepute among scientists, especially as a means of reconstructing\nthe phylogeny of modern organisms. It is recognized, of course, that\ncomparative embryology can furnish embryological homologies analogous\nto the homologies of comparative anatomy, but it is now generally\nacknowledged that the view, which regards the embryological process\nas an abridged repetition of the various states through which the\nspecies has passed in its evolutionary career must be definitively\nabandoned, and that, as a general law of organic development, the\nbiogenetic principle has been thoroughly discredited. \u201cThis law,\u201d says\nKarl Vogt of Geneva, \u201cwhich I long held as well-founded, is absolutely\nand radically false. Attentive study of embryology shows us, in fact,\nthat embryos have their own conditions suitable to themselves, and very\ndifferent from those of adults.\u201d (Quoted by Quatrefages De Breau, in\nhis \u201cLes Emules de Darwin,\u201d vol. II, p. 13.) \u201cThere can no longer be\nquestion,\u201d says Prof. M. Caullery of the Sorbonne, \u201cof systematically\nregarding individual development as a repetition of the history of the\nstock. This conclusion results from the very progress made under the\ninspiration received from this imaginary law, the law of biogenesis.\u201d\n(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 325.)\n\nThis collapse of the biogenetic law has tumbled into ruins the\nelaborate superstructure of genealogy which Haeckel had reared upon it.\nHis series of thirty stages extending from the fictitious \u201ccytodes\u201d\nup to man, inclusively, is even more worthless today than it was when\nDu Bois-Reymond made his ironic comment: \u201cMan\u2019s pedigree, as drawn up\nby Haeckel, is worth about as much as is that of Homer\u2019s heroes for\ncritical historians.\u201d (_Revue Scientifique_, 1877, I, p. 1101.) Haeckel\ntried in vain to save his discredited law by means of the expedient\nof _c\u00e6nogenesis_, that is, \u201cthe falsification of the ancestral record\n(palingenesis).\u201d That Nature should be guilty of \u201cfalsification\u201d is an\nhypothesis not to be lightly entertained, and it is more credible, as\nWasmann remarks, to assume that Haeckel, and not Nature, is the real\nfalsifier, inasmuch as he has misrepresented Nature in his \u201cfundamental\nbiogenetic law.\u201d C\u00e6nogenesis is a very convenient device. One can\nalternate at will between _c\u00e6nogenesis_ and _palingenesis_, just\nas, in comparative anatomy, one can alternate capriciously between\n_convergence_ and _homology_, on the general understanding of its\nbeing a case of: \u201cHeads, I win; tails, you lose\u201d\u2014certainly, there is\nno _objective_ consideration to restrain us in such procedure. \u201cSuch\nweapons as C\u00e6nogenesis and Convergence,\u201d says Kohlbrugge (in his \u201cDie\nMorphologische Abstammung des Menschen,\u201d 1908) \u201care unfortunately so\nshaped that anyone can use them when they suit him, or throw them\naside when they do not. They show, therefore, in the prettiest way the\nuncertainty even now of the construction of the theory of descent.\nAs soon as we go into details it leaves us in the lurch; it was only\nwhile our knowledge was small that everything seemed to fit together\nin most beautiful order.\u201d (Quoted by Dwight in \u201cThoughts of a Catholic\nAnatomist,\u201d p. 187.)\n\nIt is undeniable, indeed, that in many cases the young of higher\nanimals pass through stages in which they bear at least a superficial\nresemblance to adult stages in inferior and less complex organisms.\nObviously, however, there cannot be any direct derivation of the\n_embryonic_ features of one organism from the _adult_ characters of\nanother organism. This preposterous implication of the M\u00fcller-Haeckel\nLaw must, as Morgan points out, be entirely eliminated, before it\ncan merit serious consideration. Referring to the spiral cleavage\nexhibited by annelid, planarian and molluscan eggs, Morgan says:\n\u201cIt has been found that the cleavage pattern has the same general\narrangement in the early stages of flat worms, annelids and molluscs.\nObviously these stages have never been adult ancestors, and obviously\nif their resemblance has any meaning at all, it is that each group has\nretained the same general plan of cleavage possessed by their common\nancestor.... Perhaps someone will say, \u2018Well! is not this all that\nwe have contended for! Have you not reached the old conclusion in a\nroundabout way?\u2019 I think not. To my mind there is a wide difference\nbetween the old statement that the higher animals living today have the\noriginal adult stages telescoped into their embryos, and the statement\nthat the resemblance between certain characters in the embryos of\nhigher animals and corresponding stages in the embryos of lower animals\nis most plausibly explained by the assumption that they have descended\nfrom the same ancestors, and that their common structures are embryonic\nsurvivals.\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 22, 23.)\n\nAfter this admission, however, nothing remains of the law of\n\u201crecapitulation\u201d except simple embryological homology comparable, in\nevery sense, to adult homology, and adding nothing essentially new\nto the latter argument for evolution. It is, therefore, ridiculous\nfor evolutionists to speak of _branchial_ (gill) arches and clefts in\nman. The visceral or pharyngeal arches and grooves appearing in the\nhuman embryo are unquestionably homologous with the genuine branchial\narches and clefts in a fish embryo. In the latter, however, the grooves\nbecome real clefts through perforation, while the arches become the\nlamell\u00e6 of the permanent gills, thus adapting the animal to aquatic\nrespiration. It is, accordingly, perfectly legitimate to refer to these\nembryonic structures in the young fish as gill arches and gill clefts.\nIn man, however, the corresponding embryonic structures develop into\nthe oral cavity, auditory meatus, ossicles of the ear, the mandible,\nthe lower lip, the tongue, the cheek, the hyoid bone, the styloid\nprocess, the thymus, the thyroid and tracheal cartilages, etc. There is\nno perforation of the grooves, and the arches develop into something\nquite different than branchial lamell\u00e6. Hence the correct name for\nthese structures in the human embryo is _pharyngeal_ (visceral) arches\nand grooves, their superficial resemblance to the embryonic structures\nin the fish embryo being no justification for calling them branchial.\nIn short, the mere fact that certain embryonic structures in the\nyoung fish (homologous to the pharyngeal arches and grooves in the\nhuman embryo) develop into the permanent gills of the adult fish, is\nno more significant than the association of homology with divergent\npreadaptations, which is of quite general occurrence among adult\nvertebrate types. In all such cases, we have instances of fundamentally\nidentical structures, diverted, as it were, to entirely different\npurposes or functions (_e.g._ the arm of a man and the flipper of a\nwhale). Hence the argument drawn from embryological homology is no\nmore cogent than the argument drawn from the homologies of comparative\nanatomy, which we have already discussed in a previous chapter. The\nmisuse of the term _branchial_, to prejudge matters in their own\nfavor, is in keeping with the customary policy of evolutionists. It is\nintended, naturally, to convey the impression that man, in the course\nof his evolution, has passed through a fish-like stage. At bottom,\nhowever, it is nothing more than a verbal subterfuge, that need not\ndetain us further.\n\nThe theory of embryological recapitulation is often applied to man,\nwith a view to establishing the doctrine of his bestial ancestry. We\nhave seen one instance of this application, and we shall consider\none other, for the purpose of illustrating more fully the principles\ninvolved. The claim is made by evolutionists, that man must have\npassed through a fish or amphibian stage, because, in common with all\nother mammals, he exhibits, during his embryological development, a\ntypical fish (or, if you prefer, amphibian) kidney, which subsequently\natrophies, only to be replaced by the characteristic mammalian kidney.\nThe human embryo, therefore, repeats the history of our race, which\nmust have passed through a fish-like stage in the remote past. In\nconsequence of this phenomenon, therefore, it is inferred that man must\nhave had fish-like ancestors. Let us pause, however, to analyze the\nfacts upon which this inference is based.\n\nIn annelids, like the earthworm, the nephridia or excretory tubules\nare arranged segmentally, one pair to each somite. In vertebrates,\nhowever, the nephridial tubules, instead of developing in regular\nsequence from before backwards, develop in three batches, one behind\nthe other, the anterior batch being called the _pronephros_, the middle\none, the _mesonephros_ and the posterior one, the _metanephros_. This,\naccording to J. Graham Kerr, holds true not only of the amniotic\nvertebrates (reptiles, birds, and mammals) but also, with a certain\nreservation, of the anamniotic vertebrates (fishes and amphibians).\n\u201cIn many of the lower Vertebrates,\u201d says this author, \u201cthere is no\nseparation between the mesonephros and metanephros, the two forming one\ncontinuous structure which acts as the functional kidney. Such a type\nof renal organ consisting of the series of tubules corresponding to\nmesonephros together with metanephros may conveniently be termed the\nopisthonephros.\u201d (\u201cTextbook of Embryology,\u201d II\u2014Vertebrata, p. 221.) If\nwe accept this view, it is not quite accurate to regard the mesonephros\nin man as a homologue of the _opisthonephros_ of a fish, seeing that\nthe latter is composed not only of mesonephridia (mesonephric tubules),\nbut also of metanephridia (metanephric tubules). A brief description\nof the three nephridial systems of vertebrate embryos will serve to\nfurther clarify their interrelationship.\n\n(1) _The pronephric system_: This consists of a collection of tubules\ncalled the pronephros, and a pronephric duct leading to the cloaca,\nor terminal portion of the alimentary canal. The pronephros is a\nfunctional organ in the frog tadpole and other larval amphibia. It\nis also found in a few teleosts, where it is said to persist as a\nfunctional organ in the adult. In other fishes, however, and in all\nhigher forms the pronephros atrophies and becomes reduced to a few\nrudiments.[17]\n\n    [17] The objection may be raised that a purely embryonic organ\n    like the pronephros, which is functional in but few vertebrate\n    adults and which originates in vertebrate embryos only to\n    undergo atrophy, can have no other explanation than that of\n    \u201crecapitulation.\u201d The objection, however, fails to take into\n    account the possibility of the organ being serviceable to\n    the _embryo_, in which it may be a provisory solution of the\n    excretory problem and not a vestige of past ancestry.\n\n(2) _The mesonephric system_: This consists of a collection of\nnephridial tubules called the mesonephros (Wolffian body). The tubules\nof the mesonephros do not develop any duct of their own, but utilize\nthe posterior portion of the pronephric duct, the said tubules becoming\nsecondarily connected with this duct in a region posterior to the\npronephridia (tubules of the pronephros). The pronephric tubules\ntogether with the anterior portion of the pronephric duct then atrophy,\nwhile the persisting posterior portion of this duct receives the name\nof mesonephric or Wolffian duct. The duct in question still terminates\nin the cloaca, and serves, in the male, the combined function of a\nurinary and spermatic duct; but, in the female, a special oviduct (the\nM\u00fcllerian duct) is superadded because of the large size of the eggs to\nbe transmitted, the Wolffian or mesonephric duct subserving only the\nurinary function. The mesonephros is functional in mammalian embryos,\nbut atrophies and disappears coincidently with the development of the\npermanent kidney. The same is true of amniotic vertebrates generally,\nexcept that in the case of reptiles the mesonephros persists for a\nfew months after hatching in the adult, the definitive kidney of the\nadult being reinforced during that interval by the still functional\nmesonephros. In anamniotic vertebrates, however, no separation exists\nbetween the mesonephros and the metanephros, the two forming one\ncontinuous structure, the opisthonephros, which acts as the functional\nkidney of the adult.\n\n(3) _The metanephric system_: In the amniotic vertebrates the\nmesonephros and metanephros are distinct, the former being functional\nin embryos and in adult reptiles (for a few months after hatching),\nwhile the metanephros becomes the definitive kidney of the adult. The\nmetanephros is a collection of nephridial tubules provided with a\nspecial urinary duct called the ureter, which empties into the bladder\n(not the cloaca). The Wolffian or mesonephric duct is retained as a\nsperm duct in the male (of amniotic vertebrates), but becomes vestigial\nin the female. Only a certain number of the nephridial tubules of the\nembryonic metanephros are taken over to form part of the permanent or\nadult kidney (in mammals, birds, and reptiles).\n\nIf, then, as we have previously observed, we follow Kerr in regarding\nthe fish kidney, not as a simple mesonephros, but as an opisthonephros\n(_i.e._ a combination of mesonephros and metanephros), there is no\nwarrant for interpreting the embryonic mesonephros of man and mammals\ngenerally as the fish-kidney stage. But waiving this consideration, and\nassuming, for the sake of argument, that the fish kidney is a perfect\nhomologue of the human mesonephros, the mere fact of the adoption by\nthe human embryo of a temporary solution of its excretory problem\nsimilar to the permanent solution of that problem adopted by the fish,\nwould not, of itself, imply the common ancestry of men and fishes.\nSuch a coincidence would be fully explicable as a case of convergent\nadaptation occurring in the interest of embryonic economy.\n\nIt is, indeed, a well-known fact that larval and embryonic organisms\nare often obliged to defer temporarily the construction of the more\ncomplex structures of adult life, and to improvise simpler substitutes\nfor use until such a time as they have accumulated a sufficient reserve\nof energy and materials to complete the work of their more elaborate\nadult organization. The young starfish, for example, arising as it does\nfrom an egg but scantily supplied with yolk, is forced, from the very\noutset, to shift for itself, in coping with the food-getting problem.\nUnder stress of this necessity, it economizes its slender resources\nby constructing the extremely simple digestive and motor apparatus\ncharacteristic of the larva in its bilaterally-symmetrical _Bipinnaria_\nstage, and postponing the development of the radially-symmetrical\nstructure characteristic of the adult stage, until it has stored up the\nwherewithal to complete its metamorphosis.\n\nFrom this viewpoint, there is no difficulty in understanding why\n_temporary_ solutions of the excretory problem should precede the\n_definitive_ solution of this problem in mammalian embryos. The problem\nof excretion is urgent from the outset, and its demands increase with\nthe growth of the embryo. It is only natural, then, that a series of\nimprovised structures should be resorted to, in a case of this kind;\nand, since these temporary solutions of the excretory problem must,\nof necessity, be as simple as possible, it should not be in the least\nsurprising to find them coinciding with the permanent solutions adopted\nby inferior organisms less complexly organized than the mammals.\nHence the bare fact of resemblance between the transitory embryonic\nkidney of a mammal and the permanent adult kidney of a fish would\nhave no atavistic significance. We know of innumerable cases in which\nan identical adaptation occurs in genetically unrelated organisms.\nThe cephalopod mollusc _Nautilus_, for example, solves the problem\nof light-perception in the identical manner in which it is solved by\nthe vertebrates. This mollusc has the perfect vertebrate type of eye,\nincluding the lens and all other parts down to the minutest detail.\nThe fact, however, that the mollusc solves its problem by using the\nstereotyped solution found in vertebrates rather than by developing a\ncompound eye analogous to the type found among arthropods, is wholly\ndestitute of genetic significance. In fact, the genetic interpretation\nis positively rejected by the evolutionists, who interpret the\noccurrence of similar eyes in molluscs and vertebrates as an instance\nof \u201caccidental convergence.\u201d Even assuming, then, what Kerr denies,\nnamely, a perfect parallelism between the mesonephros of the human\nembryo and the permanent kidney of an adult fish, the alleged fact that\nthe human embryo temporarily adopts the same type of solution for its\nexcretory problem as the one permanently employed by the fish would not\nin itself be a proof of our descent from a fish-like ancestor.\n\nIn fact, not only is embryological homology of no greater value\nthan adult homology as an argument for evolution, but it is, on\nthe contrary, considerably inferior to the latter, as regards\ncogency. _Differentiation_ pertains to the final or _adult_ stage of\norganisms. Embryonic structures, inasmuch as they are undeveloped and\nundifferentiated, present for that very reason an appearance of crude\nand superficial similarity. \u201cMost of what is generally ascribed to\nthe action of the so-called biogenetic law,\u201d says T. Garbowski, \u201cis\nerroneously ascribed to it, since all things that are undeveloped and\nincomplete must be more or less alike.\u201d (\u201cMorphogenetische Studien,\u201d\nJena, 1903.) When we consider the fact that the metazoa have all a\nsimilar unicellular origin, are subject to uniform morphogenetic laws,\nand are frequently exposed to analogous environmental conditions\ndemanding similar adaptations, it is not at all surprising that\nthey should present many points of resemblance (both in their\nembryonic and their adult morphology) which are not referable to any\nparticular line of descent. At all events, these resemblances are\nfar too general in their extension to enable us to specify the type\nof ancestor responsible therefor. More especially is this true of\nembryological homologies, which are practically valueless as basis for\nreconstructing the phylogeny of any type. \u201cThat certain phenomena,\u201d\nsays Oskar Hertwig, \u201crecur with great regularity and uniformity in\nthe development of different species of animals, is due chiefly to the\nfact that under all circumstances they supply the necessary condition\nunder which alone the next higher stage in ontogeny (embryological\ndevelopment) can be produced.\u201d (\u201cAllgemeine Biologie,\u201d 1906, p.\n595.) The same author, therefore, proposes to revamp Haeckel\u2019s\n\u201cbiogenetisches Grundgesetz\u201d as follows: \u201cWe must leave out the words\n\u2018recapitulation of forms of extinct ancestors\u2019 and substitute for them\n\u2018repetition of forms regularly occurring in organic development, and\nadvancing from the simple to the more complex.\u2019\u201d (_Op. cit._, p. 593.)\n\nFinally, when applied to the problem of man\u2019s alleged genetic\nconnection with the ape, the biogenetic principle proves the exact\nreverse of what the Darwinians desire; for as a matter of fact the\nyoung apes resemble man much more closely in the shape of the skull\nand facial features than do the adult animals. Inasmuch, therefore, as\nthe ape, in its earlier development, reveals a more marked resemblance\nto man than is present in its later stages, it follows, according\nto the \u201cbiogenetic law,\u201d that man is the ancestor of the ape. This,\nhowever, is inadmissible, seeing that the ape is by no means a more\nrecent type than man. Consequently, as applied to man, the Haeckelian\nprinciple leads to a preposterous conclusion, and thereby manifests\nits worthlessness as a clue to phylogeny. Julius Kollmann, it is true,\ngives serious attention to this likeness between young apes and men,\nand makes it the basis of his scheme of human evolution. \u201cKollmann,\u201d\nsays Dwight, \u201cstarts from the fact that the head of a young ape is very\nmuch more like that of a child than the head of an old ape is like that\nof a man. He holds that the likeness of the skull of a very young ape\nis so great that there must be a family relationship. He believes that\nsome differentiation, some favorable variation, must occur in the body\nof the mother and so a somewhat higher skull is transmitted to the\noffspring and is perpetuated. Concerning which Kohlbrugge remarks that\n\u2018thus the first men were developed, not from the adult, but from the\nembryonic forms of the anthropoids whose more favorable form of skull\nthey managed to preserve in further growth.\u2019 ... Schwalbe makes the\ntelling criticism of these views of Kollmann that much the same thing\nmight be said of the heads of embryonic animals in general that is said\nof those of apes, and that thus mammals might be said to have come from\na more man-like ancestor.\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 186, 187.) All of which\ngoes to show that the \u201cbiogenetic law\u201d is more misleading than helpful\nin settling the question of human phylogeny.\n\n\n                        \u00a7 3. Rudimentary Organs\n\nDarwin attached great importance to the existence in man of so-called\nrudimentary organs, which he regarded as convincing evidence of man\u2019s\ndescent from the lower forms of animal life. Nineteenth century\nscience, being ignorant of the functional purpose served by many\norgans, arbitrarily pronounced them to be useless organs, and chose,\nin consequence, to regard them all as the atrophied and (wholly or\npartially) functionless remnants of organs that were formerly developed\nand fully functional in remote ancestors of the race. Darwin borrowed\nthis argument from Lamarck. It may be stated thus: Undeveloped and\nfunctionless organs are atrophied organs. But atrophy is the result of\ndisuse. Now disuse presupposes former use. Consequently, rudimentary\norgans were at one time developed and functioning, viz. in the remote\nancestors of the race. Since, therefore, these selfsame organs are\ndeveloped and functional in the lower forms of life, it follows that\nthe higher forms, in which these organs are reduced and functionless,\nare descended from forms similar to those in which said organs are\ndeveloped and fully functional.\n\nThis argument, however, fairly bristles with assumptions that are not\nonly wholly unwarranted, but utterly at variance with actual facts.\nIn the first place, it wrongly assumes that all reduced organs are\nfunctionless, and, conversely, that all functionless organs are\natrophied or reduced. Facts, however, prove the contrary; for we find\nfrequent instances of reduced organs which function, and, _vice versa_,\nof well-developed organs which are functionless. The tail, for example,\nin cats, dogs, and certain Catarrhine monkeys, though it discharges\nneither the prehensile function that makes it useful in the Platyrrhine\nmonkey, nor the protective function that makes it useful to horses and\ncattle in warding off flies, is, nevertheless, despite its inutility\nor absence of function, a quite fully developed organ. Conversely, the\nreduced or undeveloped fin-like wings of the penguin are by no means\nfunctionless, since they enable this bird to swim through the water\nwith great facility.\n\nTo save his argument from this antagonism of the facts, Darwin resorts\nto the ingenious expedient of distinguishing between _rudimentary_\norgans and _nascent_ organs. Rudimentary organs are undeveloped organs,\nwhich are wholly, or partially, useless. They have had a past, but have\nno future. Nascent organs, on the contrary, are undeveloped organs,\nwhich \u201care of high service to their possessors\u201d (\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d\nch. I, p. 28, 2nd ed.). They \u201care capable of further development\u201d\n(_ibidem_), and have, therefore, a future before them. He gives the\nfollowing examples of rudimentary organs: \u201cRudimentary organs ...\nare either quite useless, such as teeth which never cut through the\ngums, or almost useless, such as the wings of an ostrich, which serve\nmerely as sails.\u201d (\u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d 6th ed., ch. XIV, p. 469.)\nAs an example of a nascent organ, he gives the mammary glands of the\noviparous Duckbill: \u201cThe mammary glands of the Ornithorhynchus may be\nconsidered, in comparison with the udders of a cow, as in a nascent\ncondition.\u201d (_Op. cit._, ch. XIV, p. 470.)\n\nDarwin admits that it is hard to apply this distinction in the\nconcrete: \u201cIt is, however, often difficult to distinguish between\nrudimentary and nascent organs; for we can judge only by analogy\nwhether a part is capable of further development, in which case alone\nit deserves to be called nascent.\u201d (_Op. cit._, ch. XIV, p. 469.)\nFor Darwin \u201cjudging by analogy\u201d meant judging on the assumption that\nevolution has really taken place; for he describes rudimentary organs\nas being \u201cof such slight service that we can hardly suppose that they\nwere developed under the conditions which now exist.\u201d (\u201cDescent of\nMan,\u201d ch. I, p. 29.)\n\nHe is somewhat perplexed about applying this distinction to the\npenguin: \u201cThe wing of the penguin,\u201d he admits, \u201cis of high service,\nacting as a fin; it may, therefore, represent the nascent state: not\nthat I believe this to be the case; it is more probably a reduced\norgan, modified for a new function.\u201d (\u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d 6th ed., ch.\nXIV, pp. 469, 470.) In other words, there is scarcely any objective\nconsideration by which the validity of this distinction can be checked\nup in practice. Like homology and convergence, like palingenesis and\nc\u00e6nogensis, the distinction between rudimentary and nascent organs is\na convenient device, which can be arbitrarily manipulated according to\nthe necessities of a preconceived theory. It is \u201cscientific\u201d sanction\nfor the privilege of blowing hot and cold with the same breath.\n\nThe assumption that atrophy and reduction are the inevitable\nconsequence of disuse, or diminution of use, in so far as this\ndecreases the flow of nourishing blood to unexercised parts, is\ncertainly erroneous. Yet Darwin made it the premise of his argument\nfrom so-called rudimentary organs. \u201cThe term \u2018disuse\u2019 does not relate,\u201d\nhe informs us, \u201cmerely to lessened action of muscles, but includes a\ndiminished flow of blood to the part or organ, from being subjected\nto fewer alternations of pressure, or from being in any way less\nhabitually active.\u201d (\u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d 6th ed., p. 469.) As a matter\nof fact, however, we have many instances in which use has failed to\ndevelop and disuse to reduce organs in certain types of animals. As\nan example in point, we may cite the case of right-handedness among\nhuman beings. From time immemorial, the generality of mankind have\nconsistently used the right hand in preference to the left, without\nany atrophy or reduction of the left hand, or over-development of the\nright hand, resulting from this racial practice. \u201cThe superiority of\none hand,\u201d says G. Elliot Smith, \u201cis as old as mankind.\u201d (Smithson.\nInst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 570.) It is true that only about 6,000 years\nof human existence are known to history, but, if one accepts the most\nconservative estimates of glaciologists, man has had a much longer\nprehistory, the lowest estimates for the age of man being approximately\n30,000 years. Thus W. J. Sollas tells us that the Glacial period, in\nwhich man first appeared, came to an end about 7,000 years ago, and\nthat the men buried at Chapelle-aux-Saints in France lived about 25,000\nyears ago. His figures agree with those of C. F. Wright, who bases\nhis calculations on the Niagara Gorge. The Niagara River is one of\nthe postglacial streams, and the time required to cut its gorge has\nbeen calculated as 7,000 years. Gerard De Geer, the Swedish scientist,\ngives 20,000 years ago as the end of glacial and the commencement of\nrecent or postglacial time. He bases his estimates on the sediments of\nthe Yoldia Sea in Sweden. His method consists in the actual counting\nof certain seasonally-laminated clay layers, presumably left behind\nby the receding ice sheet of the continental glacier. The melting is\nregistered by annual deposition, in which the thinner layers of finer\nsand from the winter flows alternate with thicker layers of coarser\nmaterial from the summer flows. In warm years, the layers are thicker,\nin colder years they are thinner, so that these laminated Pleistocene\nclays constitute a thermographic as well as a chronological record. De\nGeer began his study of Pleistocene clays in 1878, and in 1920 he led\nan expedition to the United States, for the purpose of extending his\nresearches. (Cf. _Science_, Sept. 24, 1920, pp. 284-286.) At that time,\nhe claimed to have worked out the chronology of the past 12,000 years.\nHis figure of 20,000 years for postglacial time, while very displeasing\nto that reckless foe of scientific caution and conservatism, Henry\nFairfield Osborn, tallies very well with the estimates of Sollas and\nWright. H. Obermaier, basing his computation on Croll\u2019s theory that\nglaciation is caused by variations in the eccentricity of the earth\u2019s\norbit about the sun, which would bring about protracted winters in the\nhemisphere having winter, when the earth was farthest from the sun\n(with consequent accumulation of ice), gives 30,000 years ago as the\ndate of the first appearance of man on earth. Father Hugues Obermaier,\nit may be noted, like Abb\u00e9 Henri Breuil, is one of the foremost\nauthorities on the subject of prehistoric Man. Both are Catholic\npriests.\n\nAll such computations of the age of man are, of course, uncertain and\ntheoretical. Evolutionists calculate it in hundreds of thousands,\nand even millions, of years. After giving such a table of recklessly\ntremendous figures, Osborn has the hypocritical meticulosity to add\nthat, for the sake of _precision_ (save the mark!) the nineteen hundred\nand some odd years of the Christian era should be added to his figures.\nBut, even according to the most conservative scientific estimates,\nas we have seen, man is said to have been in existence for 30,000\nyears, and the prevalence of right-handedness among men is as old as\nthe human race. One would expect, then, to find modern man equipped\nwith a gigantic right arm and a dwarfed left arm. In other words, man\nshould exhibit a condition comparable to that of a lobster, which has\none large and one small chela. Yet, in spite of the fact that the\ncomparative inaction of the human left hand is supposed to have endured\nthroughout a period of, at least, 30,000 years, this state of affairs\nhas not resulted in the faintest trace of atrophy or retrogression.\nBones, muscles, tendons, ligaments, nerves, blood vessels, and all\nparts are of equal size in both arms and both hands. Excessive exercise\nmay overdevelop the musculature of the right arm, but this is an\nindividual and acquired adaptation, which is never transmitted to\nthe offspring, _e.g._ the child of a blacksmith does not inherit the\nmuscular hypertrophy of his father. Disuse, therefore, has not the\nefficacy which Lamarck and Darwin ascribed to it.\n\nIn fine, it must be recognized, once for all, that organisms are\nnot-molded on a Lamarckian basis of use, nor yet on a Darwinian\nbasis of selected utility. Expediency, in other words, is not the\nsole governing principle of the organic world. Neither instinctive\nhabitude nor the struggle for existence succeeds in forcing structural\nadaptation of a predictable nature. Animals with different organic\nstructure have the same instincts, _e.g._ monkeys with, and without,\nprehensile tails alike dwell in trees; while animals having the same\norganic structure may have different instincts, _e.g._ the rabbit,\nwhich burrows, and the hare, which does not, are practically identical\nin anatomical structure. Again, some animals are highly specialized for\na function, which other animals perform without specialized organs, as\nis instanced in the case of moles, which possess a special burrowing\napparatus, and prairie-dogs, which burrow without a specialized\napparatus. Any system of evolution, which ignores the internal or\nhereditary factors of organic life and strives to explain all in terms\nof the environmental factors, encounters an insuperable obstacle in\nthis remorseless resistance of conflicting facts.\n\nAnother flaw in the Darwinian argument from rudimentary organs is\nthat it confounds, in many cases, _apparent_, with _real_ inutility\n(or absence of function). Darwin and his followers frequently argued\nout of their ignorance, and falsely concluded that an organ was\ndestitute of a function, merely because _they_ had failed to discover\nits utility. Large numbers, accordingly, of highly serviceable organs\nwere catalogued as vestigial or rudimentary, simply because nineteenth\ncentury science did not comprehend their indubitable utility. With the\nadvance of present-day physiology, this list of \u201cuseless organs\u201d is\nbeing rapidly depleted, so that the scientific days of the rudimentary\norgan appear to be numbered. At any rate, in arbitrarily pronouncing\nmany important and functioning organs to be useless vestiges of a\nformer stage in the history of the race, the Darwinians were not the\nfriends of Science, but rather its reactionary enemies, inasmuch as\nthey sought to discourage further investigation by their dogmatic\ndecision that there was no function to be found. In so doing, however,\nthey were merely exploiting the ignorance of their times in the\ninterest of a preconceived theory, which whetted their appetite for\ndiscovering, at all costs, the presence in man of functionless organs.\n\nTheir anxiety in this direction led them to consider the whole group\nof organs constituting a most important regulatory and co\u00f6rdinative\nsystem in man and other vertebrates as so many useless vestigial\norgans. This system is called the _cryptorhetic system_ and is made of\ninternally-secreting, ductless glands, now called _endocrine glands_.\nThese glands generate and instill into the blood stream certain\nchemical substances called _hormones_, which, diffusing in the blood,\nproduce immediate stimulatory, and remote metabolic effects on special\norgans distant from the endocrine gland, in which the particular\nhormone is elaborated. As examples of such endocrine glands, we may\nmention the pineal gland (epiphysis), the pituitary body (hypophysis),\nthe thyroid glands, the parathyroids, the islelets of Langerhans, the\nadrenal bodies (suprarenal capsules), and the interstitial cells of the\ngonads. The importance of these alleged useless organs is now known to\nbe paramount. Death, for instance, will immediately ensue in man and\nother animals, upon extirpation of the adrenal bodies.\n\nThe late Robert Wiedersheim, it will be remembered, declared the\npineal gland or epiphysis to be the surviving vestige of a \u201cthird\neye\u201d inherited from a former ancestor, in whom it opened between the\nparietal bones of the skull, like the median or _pineal eye_ of certain\nlizards, the socket of which is the parietal foramen formed in the\ninterparietal suture. If the argument is based on homology alone,\nthen the coincidence in position between the human epiphysis and the\nmedian optic nerve of the lizards in question has the ordinary force\nof the evolutionary argument from homology. But when one attempts to\nreduce the epiphysis to the status of a useless vestigial rudiment,\nhe is in open conflict with facts; for the pineal body is, in reality,\nan endocrine gland generating and dispersing a hormone, which is\nvery important for the regulation of growth in general and of sexual\ndevelopment in particular. Hence this tiny organ in the diencephalic\nroof, no larger than a grain of wheat, is not a functionless rudiment,\nbut an important functioning organ of the cryptorhetic system. We have\nno ground, therefore, on this score for inferring that our pineal gland\nfunctioned in former ancestors as a median eye comparable to that of\nthe cyclops Polyphemus of Homeric fame.\n\nIn like manner, the pituitary body or hypophysis, which in man is a\nsmall organ about the size of a cherry, situated at the base of the\nbrain, buried in the floor of the skull, and lying just behind the\noptic chiasma, was formerly rated as a rudimentary organ. It was, in\nfact, regarded as the vestigial remnant of a former connection between\nthe neural and alimentary canals, reminiscent of the invertebrate\nstage. \u201cThe phylogenetic explanation of this organ generally accepted,\u201d\nsays Albert P. Mathews, \u201cis that formerly the neural canal connected\nat this point with the alimentary canal. A probable and almost the\nonly explanation of this, though an explanation almost universally\nrejected by zo\u00f6logists, is that of Gaskell, who has maintained that\nthe vertebrate alimentary canal is a new structure, and that the old\ninvertebrate canal is the present neural canal. The infundibulum,\non this view, would correspond to the old invertebrate \u0153sophagus,\nthe ventricle of the thalamus to the invertebrate stomach, and the\ncanal originally connected posteriorly with the anus. The anterior\nlobe of the pituitary body could then correspond to some glandular\nadjunct of the invertebrate canal, and the nervous part to a portion\nof the original circum\u0153sophageal nervous ring of the invertebrates.\u201d\n(\u201cPhysiological Chemistry,\u201d 2nd ed., 1916, pp. 641, 642.)\n\nThis elaborate piece of evolutionary contortion calls for no comment\nhere. We are only interested in the fact that this wild and weird\nspeculation was originally inspired by the false assumption that\nthe hypophysis was a functionless organ. As a matter of fact, it\nis the source of two important hormones. The one generated in its\nanterior lobe is _tethelin_, a metabolic hormone, which promotes the\ngrowth of the body in general and of the bony tissue in particular.\nHypertrophy and overfunction of this gland produces giantism, or\nacromegaly (enlargement of hands, feet, and skull), while atrophy and\nunderfunction of the anterior lobe results in infantilism, acromikria\n(diminution of extremities, _i. e._ hands, feet, head), obesity, and\ngenital dystrophy (_i. e._ suppression of secondary sexual characters).\nThe posterior lobe of the pituitary body constitutes, with the _pars\nintermedia_, a second endocrine gland, which generates a stimulatory\nhormone called _pituitrin_. This hormone stimulates unstriated muscle\nto contract, and thereby regulates the discharge of secretions from\nvarious glands of the body, _e. g._ the mammary glands, bladder,\netc. Hence the hypophysis, far from being a useless organ, is an\nindispensable one. Moreover, it is an integral and important part of\nthe cryptorhetic system.\n\nThe same story may be repeated of the thyroid glands. These consist\nof two lobes located on either side of the windpipe, just below the\nlarynx (Adam\u2019s apple), and joined together across the windpipe by a\nnarrow band or isthmus of their own substance. Gaskell homologized\nthem with a gland in scorpions, and Mathew says that, if his surmise\nis correct, \u201cthe thyroid represents an accessory sexual organ of the\ninvertebrate.\u201d (_Op. cit._, p. 654.) They are, however, endocrine\nglands, that generate a hormone known as _thyroxin_, which regulates\nthe body-temperature, growth of the body in general, and of the nervous\nsystem in particular, etc., etc. Atrophy or extirpation of these glands\ncauses cretinism in the young and myxoedema in adults. Without a\nsufficient supply of this hormone, the normal exercise of mental powers\nin human beings is impossible. The organ, therefore, is far from being\na useless vestige of what was formerly useful.\n\nGeorge Howard Parker, the Zo\u00f6logist of Harvard, sums up the case\nagainst the Darwinian interpretation of the endocrine glands as\nfollows: \u201cThe extent to which hormones control the body is only just\nbeginning to be appreciated. For a long time anatomists have recognized\nin the higher animals, including man, a number of so-called ductless\nglands, such as the thyroid gland, the pineal gland, the hypophysis,\nthe adrenal bodies, and so forth. These have often been passed over as\nunimportant functionless organs whose presence was to be explained as\nan inheritance from some remote ancestor. But such a conception is far\nfrom correct. If the thyroids are removed from a dog, death follows in\nfrom one to four weeks. If the adrenal bodies are excised, the animal\ndies in from two to three days. Such results show beyond doubt that at\nleast some of these organs are of vital importance, and more recent\nstudies have demonstrated that most of them produce substances which\nhave all the properties of hormones.\u201d (\u201cBiology and Social Problems,\u201d\n1914, pp. 43, 44.)\n\nEven the _vermiform appendix_ of the c\u00e6cum, which since Darwin\u2019s time\nhas served as a classic example of a rudimentary organ in man, is, in\nreality, not a functionless organ. Darwin, however, was of opinion\nthat it was not only useless, but positively harmful. \u201cWith respect to\nthe alimentary canal,\u201d he says, \u201cI have met with an account of only a\nsingle rudiment, namely, the vermiform appendage of the c\u00e6cum. ... Not\nonly is it useless, but it is sometimes the cause of death, of which\nfact I have lately heard two instances. This is due to small hard\nbodies, such as seeds, entering the passage and causing inflammation.\u201d\n(\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d 2nd ed., ch. I, pp. 39, 40.) The idea that seeds\ncause appendicitis is, of course, an exploded superstition, the hard\nbodies sometimes found in the appendix being fecal concretions and not\nseeds\u2014\u201cThe old idea,\u201d says Dr. John B. Deaver, \u201cthat foreign bodies,\nsuch as grape seeds, are the cause of the disease, has been disproved.\u201d\n(Encycl. Americana, vol. 2, p. 76.) What is more germane to the point\nat issue, however, is that Darwin erred in denying the utility of the\nvermiform appendix. For, although this organ does not discharge in man\nthe important function which its homologue discharges in grain-eating\nbirds and also in herbivorous mammals, it subserves the secondary\nfunction of lubricating the intestines by means of a secretion from its\nmuciparous glands.\n\nDarwin gives the _semilunar fold_ as another instance of a vestigial\norgan, claiming that it is a persistent rudiment of a former third\neyelid or _membrana nictitans_, such as we find in birds. \u201cThe\nnictitating membrane, or third eyelid,\u201d he says, \u201cwith its accessory\nmuscles and other structures, is especially well developed in birds,\nand is of much functional importance to them, as it can be rapidly\ndrawn across the whole eyeball. It is found in some reptiles and\namphibians, and in certain fishes as in sharks. It is fairly well\ndeveloped in the two lower divisions of the mammalian series, namely,\nin the monotremata and marsupials, and in some higher mammals, as in\nthe walrus. But in man, the quadrumana, and most other mammals, it\nexists, as is admitted by all anatomists, as a mere rudiment, called\nthe semilunar fold.\u201d (_Op. cit._, ch. I, pp. 35, 36.) Here Darwin is\ncertainly wrong about his facts; for the so-called third eyelid is\nnot well developed in the two lower divisions of the mammalian series\n(_i.e._ the monotremes and the marsupials) nor in any other mammalian\ntype. \u201cWith but few exceptions,\u201d says Remy Perrier, \u201cthe third eyelid\nis not so complete as among the birds; (in the mammals) it never\ncovers the entire eye. For the rest, it is not really perceptible\nexcept in certain types, like the dog, the ruminants, and, still more\nso, the horse. In the rest (of the mammals) it is less developed.\u201d\n(\u201cElements d\u2019anatomie compar\u00e9e,\u201d Paris, 1893, p. 1137.) Moreover,\nDarwin\u2019s suggestion leaves us at sea as to the ancestor, from whom\nour \u201crudimentary third eyelid\u201d has been inherited. His mention of\nbirds as having a well developed third eyelid is not very helpful,\nbecause all evolutionists agree in excluding the birds from our line of\ndescent. The reptiles are more promising candidates for the position\nof ancestors, but, as no trace of a third eyelid could possibly be\nleft behind in the imperfect record of the fossiliferous rocks (soft\nparts like this having but slight chance of preservation), we do not\nreally _know_ whether the pal\u00e6ozoic reptiles possessed this particular\nfeature, or not. Nor can we argue from analogy and induction, because\nnot _all_ modern reptiles are equipped with third eyelids. Hence the\nparticular group of pal\u00e6ozoic reptiles, which are supposed to have been\nour progenitors, may not have possessed any third eyelid to bequeath to\nus in the reduced and rudimentary form of the plica semilunaris. If it\nbe replied, that they _must_ have had this feature, because otherwise\nwe would have no ancestor from whom we could inherit our semilunar\nfold, it is obvious that such argumentation assumes the very point\nwhich it ought to prove, namely: the actuality of evolution. Rudiments\nare supposed to be a proof for evolution, and not, _vice versa_,\nevolution a proof for rudiments.\n\nFinally, the basic assumption of Darwin that the semilunar fold is\ndestitute of function is incorrect; for this crescent-shaped fold\nsituated in the inner or nasal corner of the eye of man and other\nmammals serves to regulate the flow of the lubricating lacrimal fluid\n(which we call tears). True this function is secondary compared with\nthe more important function discharged by the nictitating membrane in\nbirds. In the latter, the third eyelid is a pearly-white (sometimes\ntransparent) membrane placed internal to the real eyelids, on the\ninner side of the eye, over whose surface it can be drawn like a\ncurtain to shield the organ from excessive light, or irritating dust;\nnevertheless, the regulation of the flow of lacrimal humor is a real\nfunction, and it is therefore entirely false to speak of the semilunar\nfold as a functionless rudiment.\n\nThe _coccyx_ is likewise cited by Darwin as an example of an inherited\nrudiment in man. \u201cIn man,\u201d he says, \u201cthe os coccyx, together with\ncertain other vertebr\u00e6 hereafter to be described, though functionless\nas a tail, plainly represents this part in other vertebrate animals.\u201d\n(_Op. cit._, ch. I, p. 42.) That it serves no purpose _as a tail_,\nmay be readily admitted, but that it serves no purpose _whatever_, is\nquite another matter. As a matter of fact, it serves for the attachment\nof several small muscles, whose functioning would be impossible in the\nabsence of this bone. Darwin himself concedes this; for he confesses\nthat the four vertebr\u00e6 of the coccyx \u201care furnished with some small\nmuscles.\u201d (_Ibidem._) We may, therefore, admit the homology between the\nhuman coccyx and the tails of other vertebrates, without being forced\nto regard the latter as a useless vestigial organ. It may be objected\nthat the attachment of these muscles might have been provided for in\na manner more in harmony with our ideas of symmetry. To this we reply\nthat Helmholtz criticized the human eye for similar reasons, when he\nsaid that he would remand to his workshop for correction an optical\ninstrument so flawed with defects as the human eye. But, after all,\nit was by the use of these selfsame imperfect eyes that Helmholtz was\nenabled to detect the flaws of which he complained. When man shall\nhave fully fathomed the difficulties and obstructions with which\norganic morphogeny has to contend in performing its wonderful work,\nand shall have arrived at an elementary knowledge of the general laws\nof morphogenetic mechanics, he will be more inclined to admire than\nto criticize. It is a mistake to imagine that the finite works of the\nCreator must be perfect from _every_ viewpoint. It suffices that they\nare perfect with respect to the particular _purpose_ which they serve,\nand this purpose must not be narrowly estimated from the standpoint of\nthe created work itself, but from that of its position in the universal\nscheme of creation. All such partial views as the Helmholtzian one are\nfalse views.\n\nAnother consideration which Darwin and his partisans have failed\nto take into account is the possibility of an _ontogenetic_, as\nwell as a phylogenetic, explanation of rudimentary organs. That is\nto say, rudimentary organs might, so far as _a priori_ reasons are\nconcerned, be the now useless vestiges of organs formerly developed\nand functional _in the f\u0153tus_, and need not necessarily be interpreted\nas traces of organs that functioned formerly in remote racial\nancestors. That there should be such things as special f\u0153tal organs,\nwhich atrophy in later adult life, is a possibility that ought not to\nexcite surprise. During its uterine existence, the f\u0153tus is subject\nto peculiar conditions of life, very different from those which\nprevail in the case of adult organisms\u2014_e.g._ respiration and the\ndigestive process are suspended, and there is a totally different kind\nof circulation. What, then, more natural than that the f\u0153tus should\nrequire special organs to adapt it to these special conditions of\nuterine life? Such organs, while useful and functional in the earlier\nstages of embryonic development, will, so soon as birth and maturity\nintroduce new conditions of life, become superfluous, and therefore\ndoomed, in the interest of organic economy, to ultimate atrophy and\ndegeneration, until nothing is left of them but vestigial remnants.\n\nThe thymus may be cited as a probable instance of such an organ.\nThis organ, which is located in front of the heart and behind the\nbreastbone, in the region between the two lungs, consists, at the\nperiod of its greatest development in man, of a two-lobed structure,\n5 cm. long and 4 cm. wide, with a thickness of 6 mm. and a maximum\nweight of 35 grams. It is supplied with numerous lymphoid cells, which\nare aggregated to form lymphoid follicles (_cf._ Gray\u2019s \u201cAnatomy,\u201d\n20th ed., 1918, pp. 1273, 1274; Burton-Opitz\u2019 \u201cPhysiology,\u201d 1920,\np. 964). This organ is a transitory one, well developed at birth,\nbut degenerating, according to some authors, after the second year\nof life (_cf._ Starling\u2019s \u201cPhysiology,\u201d 3rd ed., 1920, p. 1245);\naccording to others, however, not until the period of full maturity,\nnamely, puberty. (_Cf._ Gray\u2019s \u201cAnatomy,\u201d _loc. cit._) W. H. Howell\ncites both opinions, without venturing to decide the matter (_cf._\nhis \u201cPhysiology,\u201d 8th ed., 1921, pp. 869, 870). It was at one time\nclassified as a rudimentary or functionless organ. Later on, however,\nit was thought by certain observers to be an endocrine gland, yielding\na secretion important for the growth of young mammals. This took it\nout of the class of useless vestigial organs, but the recent discovery\nthat it is indispensable to birds as furnishing a secretion necessary\nfor the formation of the tertiary envelopes (egg membrane and shell)\nof their eggs, has tended to revive the idea of its being a vestigial\norgan inherited from the lower vertebrates.\n\nThus Dr. Oscar Riddle, while admitting that the thymus gland in\nman has some influence on the growth of the bones, contends that\nthe newly-discovered function of this gland in birds is much more\nimportant, since without it none of the vertebrates, excepting mammals,\ncould reproduce their young. \u201cIt thus becomes clear,\u201d he says, \u201cthat\nthough the thymus is almost without use in the human being, it is in\nfact a sort of \u2018mother of the race.\u2019 The higher animals could not have\ncome into existence without it. For even while our ancestors lived in\nthe water, it was the thymus of these ancestors which made possible the\nproduction of the egg-envelopes within which the young were cradled and\nprotected until they were ready for an independent life.\u201d (_Science_,\nDec. 28, 1923, Suppl. XIII, XIV.)\n\nThis conclusion, however, is far too hasty. For, even if we disregard\nas negligible the minor function, that Riddle assigns to the thymus\nin man, there remains another possibility, which H. H. Wilder takes\ninto account, namely, that the thymus may, in certain cases, be\na temporary substitute for the lymphatic vessels. Having called\nattention to certain determinate channels found in some of the lower\nvertebrates, he tells us that these \u201ccan well be utilized as adjuncts\nof the lymphatic system until their function can be supplied by\ndefinite lymphatic vessels.\u201d He then resumes his discussion of the\nlymph nodules in mammals as follows: \u201cAside from the solitary and\naggregated nodules, both of which appear to be centers of origin of\nlymphocytes, there are numerous other places in which the cellular\nconstituents of the blood are developed. Many of these, as in the case\nof the aggregated nodules of the intestines, are developed within\nthe wall of the alimentary canal and are therefore endodermic in\norigin. These include the tonsils, the _thymus_, and thyroid glands,\nthe associated epithelial bodies, and, perhaps, the spleen.... In\ntheir function as formative nidi for the cellular elements of the\nblood these organs form physiologically important auxiliaries to the\nvascular system as a whole, but belong elsewhere in their anatomical\ndevelopmental affinities.\u201d (\u201cHistory of the Human Body,\u201d 2nd ed., 1923,\np. 395\u2014italics mine.)\n\nThis being the case, it is much more reasonable to interpret the thymus\nas an ontogenetic (embryonic), rather than a phylogenetic (racial)\nrudiment. It has been observed that, in the case of reptiles which\nlack definite lymphatic glands (which function in man as formative\ncenters of lymphocytes or white blood corpuscles), the thymus is\nextraordinarily developed and abounds in lymphoid cells. It has also\nbeen observed that the formation of lymphocytes in the lymphatic\nglands is regulated by the digestive process; for, after digestion,\nthe activity of these glands increases and the formation of leucocytes\nis accelerated. Since, then, the lymphatic glands appear to require\nthe stimulus of the digestive process to incite them to action, it\nis clear that in the f\u0153tus, which lacks the digestive process, the\nlymphatic glands will not be stimulated to action, and that the task\nof furnishing lymphocytes will devolve upon the thymus. After birth,\nthe digestive process commences and the lymphatic glands become active\nin response to this stimulus. As the function of forming lymphocytes\nis transferred from the thymus to the lymphatic glands, the former is\ngradually deprived of its importance, and, in the interest of organic\neconomy, it begins to atrophy, until, at the end of the child\u2019s second\nyear, or, at latest, when the child has reached sexual maturity,\nnothing but a reduced vestige remains of this once functional organ.\n\u201cThe thymus,\u201d says Starling, \u201cforms two large masses in the anterior\nmediastinum which in man grow up to the second year of life and then\nrapidly diminish, so that only traces are to be found at puberty. It\ncontains a large amount of lymphatic tissue and is therefore often\nassociated with the lymphatic glands as the seat of the formation of\nlymph corpuscles.... In certain cases of arrested development or of\ngeneral weakness in young people, the thymus has been found to be\npersistent.\u201d (\u201cPhysiology,\u201d 3rd ed., 1920, p. 1245.)\n\nIn the light of these facts, it is utterly unreasonable to regard the\nthymus as a practically useless rudiment inherited from the lower\nvertebrates. \u201cThat they have an important function in the young\nanimal,\u201d says Albert Mathews, \u201ccan hardly be doubted.\u201d (\u201cPhysiological\nChemistry,\u201d 1916, p. 675.) In fact, the peculiar nature of their\ndevelopment in the young and their atrophy in the adult forces such a\nconclusion upon us. The thymus, therefore, is, in all probability, an\nontogenetic, and not a phylogenetic, rudiment. It might conceivably be\nexploited as a biogenetic recapitulation of a reptilian stage in man,\njust as the so-called fish-kidney of the human embryo is exploited for\nevolutionary interpretation. The principles by which such a view may be\nrefuted have been given previously. But, in any case, it is folly to\ninterpret the thymus as a rudiment in the racial, rather than embryonic\nsense. Moreover, the possibility of an ontogenetic interpretation\nof rudiments must not be restricted to the thymus, but must be\naccepted as a general and legitimate alternative for the phylogenetic\ninterpretation.\n\nIn the last place, it remains for us to consider the Darwinian\nargument, based upon so-called rudimentary organs, from the standpoint\nof the science of genetics. Darwin, as we have remarked elsewhere,\nwas ignorant of the non-inheritability of those inconstant individual\nvariations now known as fluctuations. He was somewhat perplexed, when\nProfessor L. Meyer pointed out the extreme variability in position\nof the \u201cprojecting point\u201d on the margin of the human ear, but he\nstill clung to his original contention that this \u201cblunt point\u201d was a\nsurviving vestige of the apex of the pointed ears found in donkeys and\nhorses, etc. \u201cNevertheless,\u201d he says, \u201cin some cases my original view,\nthat the points are vestiges of the tips of formerly erect and pointed\nears, still seems to be probable.\u201d (\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d 2nd ed., ch. I,\np. 34.) Darwin, as Ranke points out, was mistaken in homologizing his\nfamous \u201ctubercule\u201d with the apex of bestial ears. \u201cThe acute extremity\nof the pointed animal ear,\u201d says this author, \u201cdoes not correspond to\nthis prominence designated by Darwin, but to the vertex of the helix.\u201d\n(\u201cDer Mensch,\u201d II, p. 39.) The feature in question is, moreover, a mere\nfluctuation due to the degree of development attained by the cartilage:\nhence its variability in different human beings. In very extreme cases,\nfluctuations of this sort, may be important enough to constitute an\n_anomaly_, and, as anomalies are often interpreted as atavisms and\nreversions to a primitive type, it may be well to advert to this\nsubject here.\n\nDwight has an excellent chapter on anatomical variations and anomalies.\n(_Cf._ \u201cThoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,\u201d 1911, ch. IX.) He tells us\nthat \u201ca thigh bone a little more bent, an ear a little more pointed,\na nose a little more projecting ... a little more or a little less\nof anything you please\u2014this is variation.\u201d \u201cAn anatomical anomaly,\u201d\nhe says, \u201cis some peculiarity of any part of the body which cannot\nbe expressed in terms of more or less, but is distinctly new.\u201d He\ndivides the latter into two classes, namely: those which consist in the\nrepetition of one or more elements in a series, _e.g._ the occurrence\nof supernumerary legs in an insect, and those which consist in the\nsuppression of one or more elements in a series, _e.g._ the occurrence\nof eleven pairs of ribs in a man. Variations and anomalies are\nfluctuational or mutational, according as they are based on changes in\nthe soma alone, or on changes in the germ plasm. Variations, however,\nare more likely to be non-inheritable fluctuations, and anomalies to\nbe inheritable mutations. We shall speak of the latter presently. In\nthe meantime we may note that the main trouble with interpreting these\nanatomical irregularities as \u201creversive\u201d or \u201catavistic\u201d is that they\nwould connect man with all sorts of quite impossible lines of descent.\n\u201cIn my early days of anatomy,\u201d says Dwight, \u201cI thought that I must\nbe very ignorant, because I could not understand how the occasional\nappearance in man of a peculiarity of some animal outside of any\nconceivable line of descent could be called a reversion, as it soon\nbecame the custom to call it.... It was only later that I grasped the\nfact that the reason I could not understand these things was that there\nwas nothing to understand. It was sham science from beginning to end.\u201d\n(_Op. cit._, p. 209.) By way of anomaly, almost any human peculiarity\ncan occur in animals, and, conversely, any bestial peculiarity in\nman, but the resemblance to man of an animal outside of the alleged\nline of human descent represents a grave difficulty for the theory of\nevolution, and not an argument in its favor.\n\nThe human body is certainly not a _mosaic of heterogenetic organs_,\n_i.e._ a complex of structures inherited from any and every sort of\nanimal, whether extant or extinct; for such a vast number and variety\nof ancestors could not possibly have co\u00f6perated to produce man. Prof.\nD. Carazzi, in his Address of Inauguration in the Chair of Zo\u00f6logy\nand Comparative Anatomy at the University of Padua, Jan. 20, 1906,\nexcoriated with scathing irony the sham Darwinian science, of which\nDwight complains. \u201cBut even in the serious works of pure science,\u201d says\nthe Italian zo\u00f6logist, \u201cwe read, for example, that the over-development\nof the postauricular muscles sometimes observed in man is an atavistic\nreminiscence of the muscles of the helix of the ear of the horse and\nthe ass. And so far so good, because it gives evidence of great modesty\nin recognizing as our ancestors those well-deserving and long-eared\nquadrupeds. But this is not all; there appear at times in a woman one\nor more anomalous mammary glands below the pectoral ones; and here,\ntoo, they insist on explaining the anomaly as a reversion to type,\nthat is, as an atavistic reminiscence of the numerous mammary glands\npossessed by different lower mammals; the bitch, for example....\n\n\u201cBut the supernumerary mammary glands are not a reversion to type;\nanomalous mammary glands may appear upon the median line, upon\nthe deltoid, and even upon the knee, regions far-distant from the\n\u2018milk-line.\u2019 So with regard to the postauricular muscles we must\nsay that according to the laws of Darwinism the cases of anomalous\ndevelopment are not interpretable as reversions to type. All these\nfeatures are not phylogenetic reminiscences, but anomalies of\ndevelopment, of such a nature that, if we should wish to make use of\nthem for establishing the line of human descent, we would have to say\nthat man descends from the swine, from the solipeds and even from the\ncetaceans, returning, namely, to the old conception of lineal descent,\nthat is, to Buffon\u2019s idea of the concatenation of creatures.\u201d (\u201cTeorie\ne critiche nella moderna biologia,\u201d 1906.)\n\nDarwin\u2019s doctrine, however, on the origin and significance of\nrudimentary organs has been damaged by genetic analysis in a yet\nmore serious fashion. In fact, with the discovery that anomalous\n_suppression_ and anomalous _duplication_ of organs may result from\n_factorial mutation_, this Darwinian conception received what is\ntantamount to its deathblow. Darwin, it will be remembered, was\nconvinced that the regression of organs was brought about by \u201cincreased\ndisuse controlled by natural selection.\u201d (Cf. \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d 6th\ned., ch. V.) Such phenomena, he thought, as the suppression of wings\nin the Apteryx and the reduction of wings in running birds, arose from\ntheir \u201cinhabiting ocean islands,\u201d where they \u201chave not been exposed to\nthe attacks of beasts, and consequently lost the power of using their\nwings for flight.\u201d (\u201cDescent of Man,\u201d 6th ed., ch. I, p. 32.) In some\ncases, he believed that disuse and natural selection had co\u00f6perated\n_ex aequo_ to produce results of this nature, _e.g._ the reduction of\nthe eyes in the mole and in Ctenomys; for this reduction, he claims,\nhas some selection-value, inasmuch as reduction of the eyes, adhesion\nof the lids, and covering with hair tends to protect the unused and\nuseless eye against inflammation. In other cases, however, he is\ninclined to discount the idea that suppression of organs is an \u201ceffect\nof long-continued disuse,\u201d and to regard the phenomenon as \u201cwholly, or\nmainly, due to natural selection,\u201d _e.g._ in the case of the wingless\nbeetles of the island of Madeira. \u201cFor during successive generations,\u201d\nhe reasons, \u201ceach individual beetle which flew least, either from its\nwings having been ever so little less developed or from indolent habit,\nwill have had the best chance of surviving from not being blown out\nto sea; and, on the other hand, those beetles which most readily took\nto flight would oftenest have been blown to sea, and thus destroyed.\u201d\nIn a third class of instances, however, he assigns the principal r\u00f4le\nto disuse, _e.g._ in the case of the blind animals \u201cwhich inhabit\nthe caves of Carniola and Kentucky, because,\u201d as he tells us, \u201cit is\ndifficult to imagine that eyes, though useless, could be injurious\nto animals living in darkness.\u201d Hence he concludes that, as the\nobliteration of eyes has no selection-value, under the circumstances\nprevailing in dark caves, \u201ctheir loss may be attributed to disuse.\u201d\n(Cf. \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d 6th ed., ch. V, pp. 128-133.)\n\nMorgan\u2019s comment on these elaborate speculations of Darwin is very\ncaustic and concise. Referring to factorial mutations, which give rise\nto races of flies having _supernumerary_ and _vestigial_ organs, he\nsays: \u201cIn contrast to the last case, where a character is doubled, is\nthe next one in which the eyes are lost. This change took place at a\nsingle step. All the flies of this stock, however, cannot be said to be\neyeless, since many of them show pieces of eye\u2014indeed the variation is\nso wide that the eye may even appear like a normal eye unless carefully\nexamined. Formerly we were taught that eyeless animals arose in caves.\nThis case shows that they may also arise suddenly in glass milk\nbottles, by a change in a single factor.\n\n\u201cI may recall in this connection that wingless flies also arose in\nour cultures by a single mutation. We used to be told that wingless\ninsects occurred on desert islands because those insects that had the\nbest developed wings were blown out to sea. Whether this is true or\nnot, I will not pretend to say, but at any rate wingless insects may\nalso arise, not through a slow process of elimination, but at a single\nstep.\u201d (\u201cA Critique of the Theory of Evolution,\u201d 1916, pp. 66, 67.)\n\nIn directing attention to the fact that a permanent and inheritable\nreduction of organs to the vestigial state can result from mutation,\nwe do not, of course, intend to exclude the possible occurrence of\nsomatic atrophy due to lack of exercise rather than to germinal change.\nThus the blind species of animals in caves may, in some instances,\nbe persistently blind, because of the persistent darkness of the\nenvironment in which they live, and not by reason of any inherited\nfactor for blindness. Darwin gives one such instance, namely, that\nof the cave rat _Neotoma_. To test such cases, the blind animals\nwould have to be bred in an illuminated environment. If, under this\ncondition, they failed to develop normal eyes, the blindness would be\ndue to a germinal factor, and would be inherited in an illumined, no\nless than a dark, environment.\n\nIn any case, a mutation which suppresses a character is not, as we\nhave seen, a specific change, but merely one of the varietal order,\nwhich does not result in the production of a genuine new species. The\nfactorial mutant with a vestigial wing or eye belongs to the same\nspecies as its wild or normal parent stock. Moreover, neither disuse\nnor natural selection has the slightest power to induce mutations\nof this kind. If mutation be the cause of the blindness of cave\nanimals, then their presence in such caves must be accounted for by\nsupposing that they migrated thither because they found in the cave a\nmost suitable environment for safety, foraging, etc. Darkness alone,\nhowever, could never induce germinal, but, at most, merely somatic\nblindness. The Lamarckian factor of disuse and the Darwinian factor of\nselection have been definitely discredited as agents which could bring\nabout hereditarily-transmissible modifications.\n\n\n                           \u00a7 4. Fossil Links\n\nAll efforts, then, to establish, by means of anatomical and\nembryological homologies, the lineal descent of man from any known\ntype of monkey or ape have ended in ignominious failure. Comparative\nanatomy and embryology can, at most, only furnish grounds for extremely\nvague and indefinite speculations regarding the descent of man, but\nthey can never become a basis for specific conclusions with respect\nto the phylogeny of _Homo sapiens_. Every known form of ape, whether\nextant or extinct, is, as we have seen, far too specialized in its\nadaptation to arboreal life to pass muster as a feasible ancestor. The\nonly conceivable manner in which the human body could be related to\nsimian stock is by way of collateral descent, and the only means of\nproving such descent is to adduce a series of intermediate fossil types\nconnecting modern men and modern apes with this alleged common ancestor\nof both. \u201cThe ascent (_sic_) of man as one of the Primates,\u201d says Henry\nFairfield Osborn, \u201cwas parallel with that of the families of apes. Man\nhas a long line of ancestry of his own, perhaps two million or more\nyears in length. He is not descended from any known form of ape either\nliving or fossil.\u201d (_The Ill. London News_, Jan. 8, 1921, p. 40.)\n\nThis theory of a hypothetical primate ancestor of man, which is\nsupposed to have inhabited the earth during the earlier part of the\nTertiary period, and to have presented a more man-like appearance than\nany known type of ape, was first propounded by Karl Snell in 1863. It\nwas popularized at the beginning of the present century by Klaatsch,\nwho saw in it a means of escape from the absurdities and perplexities\nof the theory of lineal descent\u2014\u201cthe less,\u201d says the latter, \u201can ape\nhas changed from its original form, just so much the more human it\nappears.\u201d This saying is revamped by Kohlbrugge to read: \u201cMan comes\nfrom an original form much more like himself than any existing ape.\u201d\nKohlbrugge\u2019s comment is as follows: \u201cThe line of descent of man thus\nreceives on the side of the primates a quite different form from its\nprevious-one. Such new hypotheses as those of Hubrecht and Klaatsch\nseem, therefore, fortunate for nature-philosophers, because evolution\nalways failed us when we compared known forms in their details, and led\nus only to confusion. But if one works with such distant hypothetical\nancestors, one escapes much disillusioning.\u201d (Quoted by Dwight, _op.\ncit._, p. 195.)\n\nOne thing, at any rate, is certain, namely: that we do not possess any\nfossils of this primitive \u201clarge brained, erectly walking primate,\u201d\nwho is alleged to have roamed the earth during the eocene or oligocene\nepoch. The Foxhall Man, whose culture Osborn ascribes to the Upper\nPliocene, is far too recent, and, what is worse, far too intelligent,\nto be this Tertiary Ancestor. The _Pithecanthropus erectus_, likewise,\nis excluded for reasons which we shall presently consider. Meanwhile,\nlet it be noted, that we have Osborn\u2019s assurance for the fact that we\nare descended from a brainy and upright oligocene ancestor, as yet,\nhowever, undiscovered.\n\nBut the situation is more hopeful, if we hark back to a still more\nremote period, whose remains are so scarce and fragmentary, as to\neliminate the possibility of embarrassment arising from intractable\ndetails. \u201cBack of this,\u201d says Osborn, \u201c ... was a prehuman arboreal\nstage.\u201d (_Loc. cit._) Here, then, we are back again in the same old rut\nof tree-climbing simian ancestry, whence we thought to have escaped\nby abandoning the theory of lineal descent; and, before we have time\nto speculate upon how we got there, Prof. Wm. Gregory of the American\nMuseum is summoned by Osborn to present us with specimens of this\nprehuman arboreal stage. This expert, it would seem, favored up till\nthe year 1923 the fossil jaw of the _Propliopithecus_ as representing\nthe common root, whence the human race diverged, on one side, and the\nraces of anthropoid apes, on the other. (Cf. Osborn\u2019s _Museum-leaflet_\nof 1923 on \u201cThe Hall of the Age of Man,\u201d p. 29.) On April 14, 1923,\nhowever, Gregory announced the deposition of _Propliopithecus_ and\nthe enthronement of the jaw of _Dryopithecus_. This sudden accession\nof _Dryopithecus_ to the post of common ancestor of apes and men was\ndue to the discovery by Dr. Barnum Brown of three fossil jaws of\n_Dryopithecus_ in the Miocene deposits of the Siwalik beds in northern\nIndia. By some rapturous coincidence, the three jaws in question happen\nto come from three successive \u201chorizons,\u201d and to be representative\nof just three different stages in the evolution of _Dryopithecus_.\nDoctor Gregory finds, moreover, that the patterns of the minute cracks\nand furrows on the surviving molar teeth correspond to those on the\nsurface of the enamels of modern ape and human teeth. Hence, with\nthat ephemeral infallibility, which is characteristic of authorities\nlike Doctor Gregory, and which is proof against all discouragement\nby reason of past blunders, the one who told us but a year ago that\nthe cusps of all the teeth of _Propliopithecus_ \u201care exactly such\nas would be expected in the common starting point for the divergent\nlines leading to the gibbons, to the higher apes, and to man\u201d (_loc.\ncit._), now tells us that both we and the apes have inherited our teeth\nfrom _Dryopithecus_, who had heretofore remained neglected on the\nside-lines. In 1923, apparently, Dr. Gregory was unimpressed with the\ncrown patterns of _Dryopithecus_, whose jaw he then excluded from the\ndirect human line. (Cf. _Museum-leaflet_, p. 5.) Now, however, that\nthe new discoveries have brought _Dryopithecus_ into the limelight,\nand, particularly because these jaws were found in _Miocene_ deposits,\nGregory has shifted his favor from _Propliopithecus_ to _Dryopithecus_.\n(Cf. _Science_, April 25, 1924, suppl. XIII.)\n\nWhen pal\u00e6ontologists are obliged to do a _volte face_ of this sort,\none ought not to scoff. One ought to be an optimist, and eschew above\nall the spirit of the English statesman, who, on hearing a learned\nlecture by Pearson on the question of whether Man was descended from\nhylobatic, or troglodytic stock, was guilty of the following piece\nof impatience: \u201cI am not particularly interested in the descent of\nman ... this scientific pursuit of the dead bones of the past does\nnot seem to me a very useful way of spending life. I am accustomed\nto this mode of study; learned volumes have been written in Sanscrit\nto explain the conjunction of the two vowels \u2018a\u2019 and \u2018u\u2019. It is very\nlearned, very ingenious, but not very helpful.... I am not concerned\nwith my genealogy so much as with my future. Our intellects can be more\nadvantageously employed than in finding our diversity from the ape....\nThere may be no spirit, no soul; there is no proof of their existence.\nIf that is so, let us do away with shams and live like animals. If, on\nthe other hand, there is a soul to be looked after, let us all strain\nour nerves to the task; there is no use in digging into the sands of\ntime for the skeletons of the past; build your man for the future.\u201d\n(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1921, pp. 432, 433.) It is to be hoped,\nhowever, that this reactionary spirit is confined to the few, and\nthat the accession of this new primitive ancestor will be hailed with\ngeneral satisfaction. At any rate, we can wish him well, and trust that\nthe fossilized jaw of _Dryopithecus_ will not lose caste so speedily as\nthat of _Propliopithecus_.\n\n_Propliopithecus_, or _Dryopithecus_? Hylobatic, or troglodytic\naffinities? Such questions are scarcely the pivots on which the\nworld is turned! Nevertheless, we rejoice that Doctor Gregory has\nagain settled the former problem (provisorily, at least) to his own\nsatisfaction. More important, however, than that of the dentition of\n_Dryopithecus_, is the crucial question of whether or not Pal\u00e6ontology\nis able to furnish evidence of man\u2019s genetic continuity with this\nprimitive pithecoid root. Certainly, no effort has been spared to\nprocure the much desired proofs of our reputed bestial ancestry. The\nTertiary deposits of Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and the oceanic\nislands have been diligently ransacked for fossil facts that would\nbe susceptible to an evolutionary interpretation. The aprioristic\ncriterion that all large-brained men are recent, and all small-brained\nmen with recessive chins are necessarily ancient, has always been\nemployed in evaluating the fossil evidence. Notwithstanding all\nendeavors, however, to bring about the consummation so devoutly\ndesired, the facts discovered not only fail to support the theory of\ncollateral descent, but actually militate against it. For assuming that\nman and the anthropoid apes constitute two distinct lines of evolution\nbranching out from common Tertiary or pre-Tertiary stock, pal\u00e6ontology\nshould be able to show numerous intermediate fossil forms, not alone\nfor the lateral branch of the apes, but also, and especially, for the\nlateral line connecting modern men with the common root of the primate\ntree. But it is precisely in this latter respect that the fossil\nevidence for collateral descent fails most egregiously. Pal\u00e6ontology\nknows of many fossil genera and species of apes and lemurs, that might\nconceivably represent links in a genetic chain connecting modern\nmonkeys with Tertiary stock, but it has yet to discover so much as a\nsingle fossil species, much less a fossil genus, intermediate between\nman, as we know him, and this alleged Tertiary ancestor common to apes\nand men.\n\nNot even catastrophism can be invoked to save this irremediable\nsituation; for any catastrophe that would have swept away the human\nlinks would likewise have swept away the ape links. The presence of\nmany genera and species of fossil apes, in contrast to the absence\nof any fossil genus or species of man distinct from _Homo sapiens_,\nis irreconcilable with the theory of collateral descent. Such is the\ndilemma proposed to the upholders of this theory by Wasmann, in the\n10th chapter of his \u201cDie Moderne Biologie\u201d (3rd edition, 1906), a\ndilemma, from which, as we shall see, their every attempt to extricate\nthemselves has failed most signally.\n\n\u201cBut what,\u201d asked Wasmann, \u201chas pal\u00e6ontology to say concerning this\nquestion? It tells us that, up to the present, no connecting link\nbetween man and the ape has been found; and, indeed, according to\nthe theory of Klaatsch, it is absurd to speak of a link of direct\nconnection between these two forms, but it tells us much more than\nthis. It shows us, on the basis of the results of the most recent\nresearch, that we know the genealogical tree of the various apes, a\ntree very rich in species, which extends from the present as far back\nas the hypothetical primitive form assigned to the earliest part of\nthe Tertiary period; and, in fact, in Zittel\u2019s work, \u201cGrundz\u00fcge der\nPal\u00e4ontologie\u201d (1895), not less than thirty genera of fossil Pro-simi\u00e6\nand eighteen genera of genuine fossil apes are enumerated, the which\nhave been entombed in those strata of the earth that intervene between\nthe Lower Eocene and the Alluvial epoch, but between this hypothetical\nprimitive form and man of the present time we do not find a single\nconnecting link. _The entire genealogical tree of man does not show so\nmuch as one fossil genus, or even one fossil species._\u201d (_Op. cit._,\nitalics his.) A brief consideration of the principal fossil remains, in\nwhich certain pal\u00e6ontologists profess to see evidence of a transition\nbetween man and the primitive pithecoid stock, will serve to verify\nWasmann\u2019s statement, and will reveal the fact that all the alleged\nconnecting links are distinctly human, or purely simian, or merely\nmismated combinations of human and simian remains.\n\n(1) _Pithecanthropus erectus_: In 1891 Eug\u00e8ne Dubois, a Dutch army\nsurgeon, discovered in Java, at Trinil, in the Ngawa district of\nthe Madiun Residency, a calvarium (skull-cap), 2 upper molars and a\nfemur, in the central part of an old river bed. The four fragments,\nhowever, were not all found in the same year, because the advent of\nthe rainy season compelled him to suspend the work of excavation.\n\u201cThe teeth,\u201d to quote Dubois himself, \u201cwere distant from the skull\nfrom one to, at most, three meters; the femur was fifteen meters (50\nfeet) away.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1898, p. 447.) Dubois judged\nthe lapilli stratum, in which the bones were found, to be older than\nthe Pleistocene, and older, perhaps, than the most recent zones of the\n_Pliocene_ series. \u201cThe Trinil ape-man,\u201d says Osborn, \u201c ... is the\nfirst of the conundrums of human ancestry. Is the Trinil race prehuman\nor not?\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 40.) Certainly, Lower Pleistocene, or Upper\nPliocene represents too late a time for the appearance of the upright\nprimate, whence we are said to have sprung. Even Miocene would be too\nlate a date for our alleged divergence from the primitive arboreal\nstock.\n\nOf the capacity of the calvarium, Dubois says: \u201cI found the\nabove-mentioned cavity measured 550 c.cm. The cast of the cavity of\nthe Neanderthal skull taken to the same plane measures 750 c.cm.\u201d\n(_Loc. cit._, p. 450, footnote.) His first estimate of the total\ncranial capacity of _Pithecanthropus_ was 1000 c.cm., but, later on,\nwhen he decided to reconstruct the skull on the basis of the cranium\nof a gibbon (_Hylobates agilis_) rather than that of a chimpanzee\n(_Troglodytes niger_), he reduced his estimate of the cranial capacity\nto 900 c.cm. Recently, it is rumored, he has increased the latter\nestimate, as a sequel to his having removed by means of a dentist\u2019s\ntool all the siliceous matter adhering to the skull-cap. As regards\nshape, the calvarium seems to resemble most closely the cranial vault\nof gibbon. This similarity, as we have seen, led Dubois to reconstruct\nthe skull on hylobatic lines\u2014\u201cthe skull of Hylobates agilis,\u201d says\nDubois, \u201c ... strikingly resembles that of Pithecanthropus.\u201d (_Loc.\ncit._, p. 450, footnote.) The craniologist Macnamara, it is true,\nclaims that the skull-cap most closely approximates the Troglodyte\ntype. Speaking of the calvarium of Pithecanthropus, the latter says:\n\u201cThe cranium of an average adult male chimpanzee and the Java cranium\nare so closely related that I believe them to belong to the same family\nof animals\u2014_i.e._ to the true apes.\u201d (_Archiv. f\u00fcr Anthropologie_,\nXXVIII, 1903, pp. 349-360.) The large cranial capacity, however,\nwould seem to favor Dubois\u2019 interpretation, seeing that gibbons have,\nin proportion to their bodies, twice as large a brain as the huge\nTroglodyte apes, namely, the chimpanzee and the gorilla. The maximum\ncranial capacity for any ape is from 500 to 600 c.cm. Hence, with 900\nc.cm. of cranial capacity estimated by Dubois, the Pithecanthropus\nstands midway between the ape and the Neanderthal Man, a human\ndwarf, whose cranial capacity Huxley estimated at 1,236 c.cm. This\nconsideration, however, does not of itself entitle the Pithecanthropus\nto be regarded as a connecting link between man and the anthropoid\napes. In all such comparisons, it is the _relative_, and not the\n_absolute_, size of the brain, which is important. The elephant for\nexample, has as large a brain as a man, but the elephant\u2019s brain\nis small, in comparison to its huge body. The brain of a mouse is\ninsignificant, as regards absolute size, but, considered in relation to\nthe size of the mouse\u2019s body, it is as large as, if not larger than,\nthat of an elephant, and hence the elephant, for all the absolute\nmagnitude of its brain, is no more \u201cintelligent\u201d than a mouse. As\nwe have already seen, man\u2019s brain is unique, not for its absolute\nsize, but for its weight and enormous cortical surface, considered\nwith reference to the comparatively small organism controlled by the\nbrain in question. It is this excess in size which manifests the\nspecialization of the human brain for psychic functions. The Weddas,\na dwarf race of Ceylon, have a far smaller cranial capacity than the\nNeanderthal Man, their average cranial capacity being 960 c.cm., but\nthey are _human pigmies_, whereas the Pithecanthropus, according to\nRichard Hertwig, was a _giant ape_. \u201cThe fragments,\u201d says Hertwig,\n\u201cwere regarded by some as belonging to a connecting link between apes\nand man, _Pithecanthropus erectus Dubois_; by others they were thought\nto be the remains of genuine apes, and by others those of genuine\nmen. The opinion that is most probably correct is that the fragments\nbelonged to an anthropoid ape of extraordinary size and enormous\ncranial capacity.\u201d (\u201cLehrbuch der Zoologie,\u201d 7th ed.)\n\nProf. J. H. McGregor essays to make a gradational series out of\nconjectural brain casts of a large ape, the Pithecanthropus and the\nNeanderthal Man, in the ratio of 6: 9: 12, this ratio being based\nupon the estimated cranial capacities of the skulls in question.\nIn a previous chapter, we have seen that such symmetrically graded\nseries have little force as an argument for common descent. In the\npresent instance, however, the gradation gives a wrong impression of\nthe real state of affairs. If Doctor McGregor had taken into account\nthe all-important consideration of relative size, he would not have\nbeen able to construct this misleading series. This consideration,\nhowever, did not escape Dubois himself, and in his paper of Dec. 14,\n1896, before the Berlin Anthropological Society, he confessed that a\ngigantic ape of hylobatic type would have a cranial capacity close to\nthat of Pithecanthropus, even if we suppose it to have been no taller\nthan a man. (Cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1898, p. 350.) The admission\nis all the more significant in view of the fact that Dubois was then\nendeavoring to exclude the possibility of regarding Pithecanthropus as\nan anthropoid ape.\n\nThe teeth, according to Dubois, are unlike the teeth of either\nmen or apes, but according to Virchow and Hrdli\u010dka, they are more\nape-like than human. The femur, though unquestionably man-like, might\nconceivably belong to an ape of the gibbon type, inasmuch as the\nupright posture is more normal to the long-armed gibbon than to any\nother anthropoid ape, and its thighbone, for this reason, bears the\nclosest resemblance to that of man. According to the \u201cText-Book of\nZo\u00f6logy\u201d by Parker and Haswell, the gibbon is the only ape that can\nwalk erectly, which it does, not like other apes, with the fore-limbs\nused as crutches, but balanced exclusively upon its hind-limbs, with\nits long arms dangling to the ground\u2014\u201cThe Gibbons can walk in an\nupright position without the assistance of the fore-limbs; in the\nothers, though, in progression on the surface of the ground, the\nbody may be held in a semi-erect position with the weight resting on\nthe hind-limbs, yet the assistance of the long fore-limbs acting as\ncrutches is necessary to enable the animal to swing itself along.\u201d\n(_Op. cit._, 3rd ed., 1921, vol. II, p. 494.) The Javanese femur is\nrounder than in man, and is, in this, as well as other respects, more\nakin to the thighbone of the gibbon. \u201cAfter examining hundreds of\nhuman femora,\u201d says Dubois, \u201cManouvrier could find only two that had\na somewhat similar shape. It is therefore a very rare form in man.\nWith the gibbon a similar form normally occurs.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, pp.\n456, 457.) Whether the thighbone really belonged to an erectly walking\nanimal has not yet been definitely settled. To decide this matter, it\nwould be necessary to apply the Walkhoff x-ray method, which determines\nthe mode of progression from the arrangement of the bone fibers in\nfrontal, or other, sections from the femur. This test, however, has\nnot hitherto been made. Nor should the significance of the fact that\nthe thighbone was found at a distance of some _fifty feet away_ from\nthe skull-cap be overlooked, seeing that this fact destroys, once and\nfor all, any possibility of _certainty_ that both belonged to the same\nanimal.\n\nIn conclusion, therefore, we may say that the remains of\nPithecanthropus are so scanty, fragmentary, and doubtful, as to\npreclude a reliable verdict on their true significance. As Virchow\npointed out, the determination of their correct taxonomic position is\nimpossible, in the absence of a complete skeleton. Meanwhile, the most\nprobable opinion is that they represent the remains of a giant ape of\nthe hylobatic type. In other words, the Pithecanthropus belongs to the\ngenealogical tree of the apes, and not to that of man. In fact, he\nhas been excluded from the direct line of human descent by Schwalbe,\nAlsberg, Kollmann, Haacke, Hubrecht, Klaatsch, and all the foremost\nprotagonists of the theory of collateral descent. (Cf. Dwight, _op.\ncit._, ch. VIII.) Professor McGregor\u2019s series consisting of an ape, the\nPithecanthropus, Homo neanderthalensis, and the Cr\u00f4-Magnon Man fails\nas an argument, not only for the general reason we have discussed in\nour third chapter, but also for two special reasons, namely: (1) that\nhe completely ignores the chronological question of the comparative\nage of the fossils in his series, and (2) that he has neglected to\ntake into account the consideration of the body-brain ratio. For as\nProf. G. Grant MacCurdy puts it, \u201cWe must distinguish between relative\n(cranial) capacity and absolute capacity.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for\n1909, p. 575.) In justice to Professor McGregor, however, it should be\nnoted that he proposes his interpretation in a purely provisory and\ntentative sense, and does not dogmatize after the fashion of Osborn and\nGregory.\n\nAfter the year 1896, Dubois appears to have withdrawn the relics of\nPithecanthropus from further inspection on the part of scientific\nmen, and to have kept them securely locked up in his safe at\nHaarlem, Holland. (Cf. _Science_, June 15, 1923, suppl. VIII.)\nSince all existing casts of the skull-cap of Pithecanthropus are\ninaccurate, according to the measurements originally given by Dubois,\nanthropologists were anxious to have access to bones, in order to\nverify his figures and to obtain better casts. (Cf. Hrdli\u010dka, Smithson.\nInst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 498.) His obstinate refusal, therefore, to\nplace the Javanese remains at the disposal of scientists was bitterly\nresented by the latter. Some of them accused him of having become\n\u201creactionary\u201d and \u201corthodox\u201d in his later years, and others went so\nfar as to impugn his good faith in the matter of the discovery. (Cf.\nW. H. Ballou\u2019s article, _North American Review_, April, 1922.) A\nwriter in _Science_ says: \u201cIt has been rumored that he was influenced\nby religious bigotry\u201d and refers to the bones as a \u201cskeleton in the\ncloset.\u201d (Cf. _loc. cit._) Dubois\u2019 own explanation, however, was\nthat he wished to publish his own finds first. Recently, he seems to\nhave yielded to pressure in the matter, since he permitted Hrdli\u010dka,\nMcGregor, and others to examine the fragments of Pithecanthropus. (Cf.\n_Science_, Aug. 17, 1923, Suppl. VIII.) Meanwhile, too, his opinion\nhas changed with reference to these bones, which he now regards as\nthe remains of a large ape of the hylobatic type, and not of a form\nintermediate between men and apes. This opinion is, in all likelihood,\nthe correct one.\n\n(2) _The Heidelberg Man_: In a quarry near Mauer in the Elsenz Valley,\nGermany, on Oct. 21, 1907, a workman engaged in excavating drove his\nshovel into a fossilized human jaw, severing it into two pieces. Herr\nJoseph R\u00f6sch, the owner of the quarry, immediately telegraphed the news\nof the find to Prof. Otto Schoetensack of the neighboring University\nof Heidelberg. The Professor arrived on the scene the following day,\nand \u201conce he got hold of the specimen, he would no more let it out of\nhis possession.\u201d (Cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 510.) He took\nit back with him to Heidelberg, where he cleaned and repaired it. The\ncrowns of four of the teeth broken by the workman\u2019s shovel were never\nrecovered. The Heidelberg jaw was found at a depth of about 79 feet\nbelow the surface (24.1 meters). Fossil bones of Elephas antiquus,\nRhinoceros etruscus, Felis leo fossilis, etc., are said to have been\ndiscovered at the same level. The layer in which it was found has been\nclassed by some as Middle Pleistocene, by others as Early Quaternary;\nfor \u201cthere seems to be some uncertainty as to the exact subdivision of\nthe period to which it should be attributed.\u201d (Hrdli\u010dka, _loc. cit._,\np. 516.) No other part of the skeleton except the jaw was discovered.\n\nThe teeth are of the normal human pattern, being small and vertical.\nProf. Arthur Keith says they have the same shape as those of the\nspecimen found at Spy. The jaw has an ape-like appearance, due to\nthe extreme recessiveness of the chin. It is also remarkable for its\nmassiveness and the broadness of the ascending rami. Its anomalous\ncharacter is indicated by the manifest disproportion between the\npowerful jaw and the insignificant teeth. \u201cOne is impressed,\u201d says\nProf. George Grant MacCurdy of Yale, \u201cby the relative smallness of\nthe teeth as compared with the massive jaw in the case of _Homo\nheidelbergensis_.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, p. 570.) \u201cWhy so\nmassive a jaw,\u201d says the late Professor Dwight, former anatomist at\nHarvard, \u201cshould have such inefficient teeth is hard to explain, for\nthe very strength of the jaw implies the fitness of corresponding\nteeth. Either it is an anomaly or the jaw of some aberrant species of\nape.\u201d (_Op. cit._, p. 164.) This fact alone destroys its evidential\nforce; for, by way of anomaly, almost any sort of feature can appear in\napes and men, that is, human characters in apes and simian characters\nin man. \u201cThus it is certain,\u201d says Dwight, \u201cthat animal features of\nthe most diverse kinds appear in man apparently without rhyme or\nreason, and also that they appear in precisely the same way in animals\nfar removed from those in which they are normal. It is hopeless to\ntry to account for them by inheritance; and to call them instances of\nconvergence does not help matters.\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 230, 231.)\n\nKramberger, however, claims that, with the exception of the\nextremely recessive chin, the features of the Heidelberg jaw are\napproximated by those which are normal in the modern Eskimo skull.\n(Cf. _Sitzungbericht der Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften_, 1909.)\nProf. J. H. McGregor holds similar views. He claims that the greater\nuse of the jaw in uncivilized peoples, who must masticate tough foods,\ntends to accentuate and increase the recessiveness of the chin. It\nis also possible that the backward sloping of the chin may have been\nintensified in certain primitive races or varieties of the human\nspecies as a result of factorial mutation. We would not, however, be\njustified in segregating a distinct human species on the basis of minor\ndifferences, such as the protuberance or recessiveness of chins. On\nthe whole, we are hopelessly at sea with reference to the significance\nof the Heidelberg mandible. Taxonomic allocation must be grounded on\nsomething more than a jaw, otherwise it amounts to nothing more than a\npiece of capricious speculation.\n\n(3) _Eoanthropus Dawsoni_: Dec. 18, 1912, is memorable with\nevolutionary anthropologists as the day on which Charles Dawson\nannounced his discovery of the famous Dawn Man. The period of discovery\nextended from the years prior to 1911 up to Aug. 30, 1913, when the\ncanine tooth was found by Father Teilhard de Chardin. The locality\nwas Piltdown Common, Sussex, in England. The fragments recovered were\nan imperfect cranium, part of the mandible, and the above-mentioned\ncanine tooth. The stratified Piltdown gravel, which Dawson assigns to\nthe Lower Pleistocene or Glacial epoch, had been much disturbed by\nworkmen, \u201cwho were digging the gravel for small repairs.\u201d (Dawson.)\nThe discoverer first found a fragment of a parietal bone. Then several\nyears later, after the gravels had been considerably rainwashed, he\nrecovered other fragments of the skull. All parts of the skeletal\nremains are said to have been found within a radius of several yards\nfrom the site of the initial discovery. The skull was reconstructed by\nDr. A. Smith Woodward and deposited in the British Museum of Natural\nHistory at South Kensington. Eoliths were found in the same gravel as\nthe skull.\n\nOf the skull, according to Woodward, four parts remain, which, however,\nwere integrated from nine fragments of bone. \u201cThe human remains,\u201d he\nsays, \u201ccomprise the greater part of a brain-case and one ramus of\nthe mandible, with two lower molars.\u201d Of Woodward\u2019s reconstruction,\nKeith tells us that \u201can approach to symmetry and a correct adjustment\nof parts came only after many experimental reconstructions\u201d (cf.\n\u201cAntiquity of Man,\u201d p. 364), and he also remarks that, when Woodward\nundertook to \u201creplace the missing points of the jaws, the incisor\nand canine teeth, he followed simian rather than human lines.\u201d (_Op.\ncit._, p. 324.) Here we may be permitted to observe that, even apart\nfrom the distorting influence of preconceived theories, this business\nof reconstruction is a rather dubious procedure. The absence of parts\nand the inevitable modification introduced by the use of cement\nemployed to make the fragments cohere make accurate reconstruction\nan impossibility. The fact that Woodward assigned to the _lower_ jaw\na tooth which Gerrit Miller of the United States Museum assigns to\nthe _upper_ jaw, may well give pause to those credulous persons, who\nbelieve that pal\u00e6ontologists can reliably reconstruct a whole cranium\nor skeleton from the minutest fragments. Sometimes, apparently, the\n\u201cexperts\u201d are at sea even over so simple a question as the proper\nallocation of a tooth.\n\nWoodward, however, was fully satisfied with his own artistic work on\nEoanthropus; for he says: \u201cWhile the skull, indeed, is evidently human,\nonly approaching a lower grade in certain characters of the brain, in\nthe attachment for the neck, the extent of the temporal muscles and\nin the probable size of the face, the mandible appears to be almost\nprecisely that of an ape, with nothing human except the molar teeth.\u201d\n(Cf. Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, pp. 505, 506.) Of the cranial\ncapacity Woodward gives the following estimate: \u201cThe capacity of the\nbrain-case cannot, of course, be exactly determined; but measurements\nboth by millet seed and water show that it must have been at least\n1,070 cc., while a consideration of the missing parts suggests that\nit may have been a little more (note the parsimoniousness of this\nconcession!). It therefore agrees closely with the capacity of the\nGibraltar skull, as determined by Professor Keith, and equals that of\nthe lowest skulls of the existing Australians. It is much below the\nMousterian skulls from Spy and La Chapelle-aux-Saints.\u201d (_Loc. cit._,\np. 505.)\n\nWhere Doctor Woodward came to grief, however, was in his failure to\ndiscern the obvious disproportion between the mismated cranium and\nmandible. As a matter of fact, the mandible is older than the skull\nand belongs to a fossil ape, whereas the cranium is more recent and\nis conspicuously human. Woodward, however, was blissfully unconscious\nof this m\u00e9salliance. What there is of the lower jaw, he assures us,\n\u201cshows the same mineralized condition as the skull\u201d and \u201ccorresponds\nsufficiently well in size to be referred to the same individual without\nany hesitation.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 506.)\n\nFor this he was roundly taken to task by Prof. David Waterston in an\naddress delivered by the latter before the London Geological Society,\nDec., 1912. _Nature_, the English scientific weekly, reports this\ncriticism as follows: \u201cTo refer the mandible and the cranium to the\nsame individual would be equivalent to articulating a chimpanzee\nfoot with the bones of a human thigh and leg.\u201d Prof. J. H. McGregor\nof Columbia, though he followed Woodward in modeling the head of\nEoanthropus now exhibited in \u201cThe Hall of the Age of Man,\u201d told the\nwriter that he believed the jaw and the skull to be misfits. Recently,\nHrdli\u010dka has come out strongly for the separation of the mandible\nfrom the cranium, insisting that the former is _older_ and on the\norder of the jaw of the fossil ape _Dryopithecus_, while the skull\nis less antique and indubitably human. The following abstract of\nHrdli\u010dka\u2019s view is given in _Science_, May 4, 1923: \u201cDr. Hrdli\u010dka,\u201d\nwe read, \u201cholds that the Piltdown jaw is much older than the skull\nfound near it and to which it had been supposed to belong.\u201d (Cf.\nsuppl. X.) Hrdli\u010dka asserts that, from the standpoint of dentition,\nthere is a striking resemblance between the Piltdown jaw and that of\nthe extinct ape _Dryopithecus rhenanus_. He comments, in fact, on\n\u201cthe close relation of the Piltdown molars to some of the Miocene or\nearly Pliocene human-like teeth of this fossil ape.\u201d (_Ibidem._) Still\nother authorities, however, have claimed that the jaw was that of a\nchimpanzee.\n\nTo conclude, therefore, the Eoanthropus Dawsoni is an invention, and\nnot a discovery, an artistic creation, not a specimen. Anyone can\ncombine a simian mandible with a human cranium, and, if the discovery\nof a connecting link entails no more than this, then there is no reason\nwhy evidence of human evolution should not be turned out wholesale.\n\n(4) _The Neanderthal Man_ (No. 1): The remains of the famous\nNeanderthal Man were found in August, 1856, by two laborers at work\nin the Feldhofer Grotte, a small cave about 100 feet from the D\u00fcssel\nriver, near Hochdal in Germany. This cave is located at the entrance\nof the Neanderthal gorge in Westphalia, at a height of 60 feet above\nthe bottom of the valley. No competent scientist, however, saw the\nbones _in situ_. Both the bones and the loam, in which they were\nentombed, had been thrown out of the cave and partly precipitated into\nthe ravine, long before the scientists arrived. Indeed, the scientific\ndiscoverer, Dr. C. Fuhlrott, did not come upon the scene until several\nweeks later. It was then too late to determine the age of the bones\ngeologically and stratigraphically, and no petrigraphic examination of\nthe loam was made. The cave, which is about 25 meters above the level\nof the river, communicates by crevices with the surface, so that it\nis possible that the bones and the loam, which covered the floor of\nthe cave, may have been washed in from without. Fuhlrott recovered a\nskull-cap, two femurs, both humeri, both uln\u00e6 (almost complete), the\nright radius, the left pelvic bone, a fragment of the right scapula,\nfive pieces of rib, and the right clavicle. (Cf. Hugues Obermaier\u2019s\narticle, Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1906, pp. 394, 395.) \u201cWhether they\n(the bones) were really in the Alluvial loam,\u201d says Virchow, \u201cno one\nsaw.... The whole importance of the Neanderthal skull consists in\nthe honor ascribed to it from the very beginning, of having rested\nin the Alluvial loam, which was formed at the time of the early\nmammals.\u201d (Quoted by Ranke, \u201cDer Mensch,\u201d II, p. 485.) We know nothing,\ntherefore, regarding the age of the fragmentary skeleton; for, as\nObermaier says: \u201cIt is certain that its exact age is in no way defined,\neither geologically or stratigraphically.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 395.)\n\nThe remains are no less enigmatic from the anthropological standpoint.\nFor while no doubt has been raised as to their human character,\nthey have given rise to at least a dozen conflicting opinions. Thus\nProfessor Clemont of Bonn pronounced the remains in question to be\nthose of a Mongolian Cossack shot by snipers in 1814, and cast by his\nslayers into the Feldhofer Grotte. The same verdict had been given by\nL. Meyer in 1864. C. Carter Blake (1864) and Karl Vogt (1863) declared\nthe skull to be that of an idiot. J. Barnard Davis (1864) claimed that\nit had been artificially deformed by early obliteration of the cranial\nsutures. Pruner-Bey (1863) said that it was the skull of an ancient\nCelt or German; R. Wagner (1864), that it belonged to an ancient\nHollander; Rudolf Virchow, that the remains were those of a primitive\nFrieslander. Prof. G. Schwalbe of Strassburg erected it into a new\n_genus_ of the _Anthropid\u00e6_ in 1901. In 1904, however, he repented of\nhis rashness and contented himself with calling it a distinct human\n_species_, namely, _Homo primigenius_, in contradistinction to _Homo\nsapiens_ (modern man). As we shall see presently, however, it is not a\ndistinct species, but, at most, an ancient _variety_ or _subspecies_\n(race) of the species _Homo sapiens_, differing from modern Europeans\nonly in the degree that Polynesians, Mongolians, and Hottentots differ\nfrom them, that is, within the limits of the one and only human\nspecies. Other opinions might be cited (cf. Hrdli\u010dka, Smithson. Inst.\nRpt. for 1913, p. 518, and H. Muckermann\u2019s \u201cDarwinism and Evolution,\u201d\n1906, pp. 63, 64), but the number and variety of the foregoing bear\nample testimony to the uncertain and ambiguous character of the remains.\n\nThe skull is that of a low, perhaps, degenerate, type of humanity. The\nfacial and basal parts of the skull are missing. Hence we are not sure\nof the prognathism shown in McGregor\u2019s reconstruction. The skull has,\nhowever, a retreating forehead, prominent brow ridges and a sloping\nocciput. Yet, in spite of the fact that it is of a very low type, it\nis indubitably human. \u201cIn no sense,\u201d says Huxley, \u201ccan the Neanderthal\nbones be regarded as the remains of a human being intermediate between\nmen and apes.\u201d (\u201cEvidence of Man\u2019s Place in Nature,\u201d Humb. ed., p.\n253.) D. Schaaffhausen makes the same confession\u2014\u201cIn making this\ndiscovery,\u201d he owns, \u201cwe have not found the missing link.\u201d (\u201cDer\nNeanderthaler Fund,\u201d p. 49.) The cranial capacity of the Neanderthal\nskull, as we have seen, is 1,236 c.cm., which is practically the same\nas that of the average European woman of today. In size it exceeds,\nbut in shape it resembles, the dolichocephalic skull of the modern\nAustralian, being itself a dolichocephalic cranium. Huxley called\nattention to this resemblance, and Macnamara, after comparing it with\na large number of such skulls, reaches this conclusion: \u201cThe average\ncranial capacity of these selected 36 skulls (namely, of Australian\nand Tasmanian blacks) is even less than that of the Neanderthal group,\nbut in shape some of these two groups are closely related.\u201d (_Archiv.\nf\u00fcr Anthropologie_, XXVIII, 1903, p. 358.) Schwalbe\u2019s opinion that the\nNeanderthal Man constitutes a distinct species, though its author has\nsince abandoned it (cf. Wasmann\u2019s \u201cModern Biology,\u201d Eng. ed., 1910, p.\n506), will be considered later, viz. after we have discussed the Men of\nSpy, Krapina and Le Moustier, all of whom have been assigned to the\nNeanderthal group.\n\n(5) _Neanderthal Man_ (No. 2): This specimen is said to be more recent\nthan No. 1. Its discoverers were Rautert, Klaatsch, and Koenen. It\nconsists of a human skeleton without a skull. It was found buried in\nthe loess at a depth of 50 centimeters. This loess had been washed\ninto the ruined cave, where the relics were found, subsequently to its\ndeposition on the plateau above. The bones were most probably washed\ninto the cave along with the loess, which fills the remnant of the\ndestroyed cave. The upper plateau of the region is covered with the\nsame loess. The site of the second discovery was 200 meters to the west\nof the Neanderthal Cave (_i.e._ the Feldhofer Grotte). The bones were\neither washed into the broken cave, or buried there later. We have no\nindication whatever of their age.\n\n(6) _The Man of La Naulette_: In 1866, Andr\u00e9 Dupont found in the\ncavern of La Naulette, valley of the Lesse, Belgium, a fossil lower\njaw, or rather, the fragment of a lower jaw, associated with remains\nof the mammoth and rhinoceros. The fragment was sufficient to show the\ndentition, and to indicate the absence of a chin. \u201cIts kinship with the\nman of Neanderthal,\u201d remarks Professor MacCurdy very na\u00efvely, \u201cwhose\nlower jaw could not be found, was evident. It tended to legitimatize\nthe latter, which hitherto had failed of general recognition.\u201d\n(Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909, p. 572.)\n\n(7) _The Men of Spy_: In June of 1886 two nearly complete skeletons,\nprobably of a woman and a man, were discovered by Messrs. Marcel\nde Puydt and Maximin Lohest in a terrace fronting a cave at Spy in\nthe Province of Namur, Belgium, 47\u00bd feet above the shallow bed of\nthe stream Orneau. The bones were found at a depth of 13 feet below\nthe surface of the terrace. The remains were associated with bones\nof the rhinoceros (_Rhinoceros tichorhinus_), the mammoth (_Elephas\nprimigenius_), and the great bear (_Ursus spelaeus_). There were also\nstone implements indicating Mousterian industry, and the position of\none of the skeletons shows that the bodies were buried by friends.\nThe present valley of the Orneau was almost completely formed at the\ntime of the burial. The exact age of the bones cannot be determined\nnor can these cave deposits be correlated with the river drift and the\nloess. The cultural evidences are said to be Mousterian, and Mousterian\nculture is assigned by Obermaier to the Fourth, or last, Glacial period.\n\nProf. Julien Fraipont of the University of Li\u00e9ge announced the\ndiscovery of these pal\u00e6olithic skeletons Aug. 16, 1886. Skeleton No.\n1 has weaker bones and is thought to be that of a woman; No. 2 shows\nsigns of strong musculature and is evidently that of a man. Of No. 1\nwe have the cranial vault, two portions of the upper jaw (with five\nmolars and four other teeth), a nearly complete mandible with all the\nteeth, a left clavicle, a right humerus, the shaft of the left humerus,\na left radius, the heads of two uln\u00e6, a nearly complete right femur,\na complete left tibia, and the right os calcis. Of No. 2 we have the\nvault of the skull, two portions of the maxilla with teeth, loose teeth\nbelonging to lower jaw, fragments of the scapul\u00e6, the left clavicle,\nimperfect humeri, the shaft of the right radius, a left femur, the\nleft os calcis, and the left astragalus. The separation of the bones,\nhowever, is not yet satisfactory. The jaw of No. 1 is well-preserved,\nexcept in the region of the coronoids and condyles, which makes any\nposition we may give it more or less arbitrary. The skull of this\nspecimen is almost the replica of the Neanderthal skull, except that\nthe forehead is lower and more sloping. But No. 1 has a trace of chin\nprominence and in this it resembles modern skulls. No. 2 has a higher\nforehead and the cranial vault is higher and more spacious.\n\nIn both skeletons the radius and femur show a peculiar curvature,\nand in both, too, the arms and legs must have been very short. Hence\nthe men of Spy are described as having been only partially erect,\nand as having had bowed thighs and bent knees. The source of this\nmodification, however, is not a surviving pithecoid atavism, but a\nnon-inheritable adaptation acquired through the habitual attitude or\nposture maintained in stalking game\u2014\u201cNow we know,\u201d says Dwight, \u201cthat\nthis feature, which is certainly an ape-like one, implies simply\nthat the race was one of those with the habit of \u2018squatting,\u2019 which\nimplies that the body hangs from the knees, not touching the ground\nfor hours together. As a matter of course we look for this in savage\ntribes.\u201d (\u201cThoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,\u201d p. 168.) The same may\nbe said of the receding chin, which, as we have seen, is also an\nacquired adaptation. The same, finally, is true of the prominent brow\nridges, which are not pithecoid, but are, as Klaatsch has pointed out,\nrelated to the size of the eye sockets, and consequently the result\nof an adaptation of early pal\u00e6olithic man to the life of a hunter, a\nnatural sequel of the very marked development of his sense of sight.\nSimilar brow ridges, though not quite so prominent, occur among modern\nAustralian blacks.\n\nNor are the remains as typically Neanderthaloid as Keith and others\n(who wish to see in pal\u00e6olithic men a distinct human species) could\ndesire. No. 1, as we have seen, though almost a replica of the\nNeanderthal skull-cap, has a trace of chin prominence in the mandible.\nNo. 2, though the chin is recessive, has a higher forehead and higher\nand more spacious cranial vault than the Neanderthal Man. \u201cOn the\nwhole,\u201d says Hrdli\u010dka, \u201cit may be said that No. 2, while in some\nrespects still very primitive, represents morphologically a decided\nstep from the Neanderthaloid to the present-day type of the human\ncranium.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 525.)\n\n(8) _The Men of Krapina_: In the cave, or rather rock shelter, of\nKrapina, in northern Croatia, beside the small stream Kaprinica which\nnow flows 82 feet below the cave, K. Gorjanovi\u010d-Kramberger, Professor\nof geology and pal\u00e6ontology at the University of Zagreb, found, in\nthe year 1899, ten or twelve skulls in fragments, a large number of\nteeth, and many other defective parts of skeletons. All told, they\nrepresent at least fourteen different individuals. The bones are in\na bad state of preservation, and show traces of burning, some of them\nbeing calcined. The bones were associated with objects of Mousterian\nindustry, and bones of extinct animals such as _Rhinoceros merckii_,\n_Ursus spelaeus_, _Bos primigenius_, etc. The aforesaid Rhinoceros is\nan older type than the _Rhinoceros tichorhinus_ associated with the men\nof Spy, and implies a hot climate, wherein the _Rhinoceros merckii_\nmanaged to persist for a longer time than in the north. Hence the\nremains are thought to belong to the last Interglacial period.\n\nIn general, the bones show the same racial characteristics as those of\nNeanderthal and Spy, though they are said to be of a perceptibly more\nmodern type than the latter. They were men of short stature and strong\nmuscular development. \u201cThe crania,\u201d says Hrdli\u010dka, \u201cwere of good size\nexternally, but the brain cavities were probably below the present\naverage. The vault of the skull was of good length and at the same\ntime fairly broad, so that the cephalic index, at least in some of the\nindividuals, was more elevated than usual in the crania of early man.\u201d\n(_Loc. cit._, pp. 530, 531.) The reader must take Hrdli\u010dka\u2019s use of\nthe word \u201cusual\u201d with \u201cthe grain of salt\u201d necessitated in view of the\nscanty number of specimens whence such inductive generalizations are\nderived. The pronounced and complete supraorbital arcs characteristic\nof the Neanderthaloid type occur in this group also, though in a less\nmarked manner. The stone implements are evidence of the intelligence of\nthese men.\n\n(9) _The Le Moustier Man_: This specimen, _Homo mousteriensis\nHauseri_, was found by Prof. O. Hauser in the \u201clower Moustier Cave\u201d\nat Le Moustier in the valley of the V\u00e9z\u00e8re, Department of Dordogne in\nFrance, during the March of 1908. It consists of the complete skull\nand other skeletal parts of a youth of about 15 years. At this age,\nthe sex cannot be determined from the bones alone. Obermaier assigns\nthese bones to the Fourth Glacial period. Prof. George Grant MacCurdy\u2019s\nanthropological evaluation is the following: \u201cThe race characters ...\nare not so distinct (_i.e._ at the age of 15 years) as they would be at\nfull maturity; but they point unmistakably to the type of Neanderthal,\nSpy, and Krapina\u2014the so-called _Homo primigenius_ which now also\nbecomes _Homo mousteriensis_. It was a rather stocky type, robust and\nof a low stature. The arms and legs were relatively short, especially\nthe forearm and from the knee down, as is the case among the Eskimo.\nApe-like characters are noticeable in the curvature of the radius and\nof the femur, the latter being also rounder in section than is the case\nwith _Homo sapiens_. In the retreating forehead, prominent brow ridges,\nand prognathism (_i.e._ projection of the jaws) it is approached to\nsome extent by the modern Australian. The industry associated with\nthis skeleton is that typical of the Mousterian epoch.\u201d (_Loc. cit._,\np. 573.) As we have already seen, the so-called ape-like features are\nsimply acquired adaptations to the hunter\u2019s life, and, if inheritable\ncharacters, they do not exceed the limits of a varietal mutation.\nThat the Mousterian men were endowed with the same intelligence as\nourselves, appears from the evidences of solemn burial which surround\nthe remains of this youth of 15 years, and prove, as Klaatsch points\nout, that these men of the Glacial period were persuaded of their\nown immortality. The head reclined on a pillow of earth, which still\nretains the impression of the youth\u2019s cheek, the body having been laid\non its side. Around the corpse are the best examples of the stone\nimplements of the period, the parents having buried their choicest\npossession with the corpse of their son.\n\n(10) _The La Chapelle Man_: On August 3, 1908, the Abb\u00e9s J. and A.\nBouyssonie and L. Bardon, assisted by Paul Bouyssonie (a younger\nbrother of the first two), discovered pal\u00e6olithic human remains,\nwhich are also assigned to the Neanderthal group. The locality\nof the discovery was the village of La Chapelle-aux-Saints, 22\nkilometers south of the town of Brive, in the department of Corr\u00e8ze,\nin southern France. In the side of a moderate elevation, 200 yards\nsouth of the aforesaid village, and beyond the left bank of a small\nstream, the Sourdoire, there is a cave now known as the Cave of\nLa Chapelle-aux-Saints. It was here, on the above-mentioned date,\nthat the priests discovered the bones of a human skeleton surrounded\nby unmistakable evidences of solemn burial. \u201cThe body lay on its\nback, with the head to the westward, the latter being surrounded by\nstones.... About the body were many flakes of quartz and flint, some\nfragments of ochre, broken animal bones, etc.\u201d (Hrdli\u010dka.) Another\ntoken of burial is the rectangular pit, in which the remains were\nfound. It is sunk to a depth of 30 to 40 centimeters in the floor of\nthe cavern.\n\n\u201cThey (the remains) were covered,\u201d says Prof. G. G. MacCurdy, \u201cby a\ndeposit intact 30 to 40 centimeters thick, consisting of a magma of\nbone, of stone implements, and of clay. The stone implements belong to\na pure Mousterian industry. While some pieces suggest a vague survival\nof Acheulian implements (_i.e._ from the cool latter half of the Third\nInterglacial period), others presage the coming of the Aurignacian\n(close of last Glacial period). Directly over the human skull were the\nfoot bones, still in connection, of a bison\u2014proof that the piece had\nbeen placed there with the flesh still on, and proof, too, that the\ndeposit had not been disturbed. Two hearths were noted also, and the\nfact that there were no implements of bone, the industry differing in\nthis respect from that of La Quina and Petit-Puymoyen (Charente), as\nwell as at Wildkirchli, Switzerland.\n\n\u201cThe human bones include the cranium and lower jaw (broken, but the\npieces nearly all present and easily replaced in exact position), a\nfew vertebr\u00e6 and long bones, several ribs, phalanges, and metacarpals,\nclavicle, astragalus, calcaneum, parts of scaphoid, ilium, and sacrum.\nThe ensemble denotes an individual of the male sex whose height was\nabout 1.60 meters. The condition of the sutures and of the jaws proves\nthe skull to be that of an old man. The cranium is dolichocephalic,\nwith an index of 75. It is said to be flatter in the frontal region\nthan those of Neanderthal and Spy.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 574.)\n\nThe associated remains of fossil animals comprise the horse, reindeer,\nbison, _Rhinoceros tichorinus_, etc., and, according to Hrdli\u010dka,\n\u201cindicate that the deposits date from somewhere near the middle of the\nglacial epoch.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 539.) The discoverers turned over the\nskeleton to Marcellin Boule of the Paris Museum of Natural History\nfor cleaning and reconstruction. It is the _first instance_ of a\npal\u00e6olithic man, in which _the basal parts_ of the skull, including the\nforamen magnum, were recovered. Professor Boule estimates the cranial\ncapacity as being something between 1,600 and 1,620 c.cm. He found the\nlower part of the face to be prognathic, but not excessively so, the\nvault like the Neanderthal cranium, but larger, the occiput broad and\nprotruding, the supraorbital arch prominent and complete, the nasal\nprocess broad, the forehead low, and the mandible stout and chinless,\nthough not sloping backward at the symphysis.\n\nAlluding to the rectangular burial pit in the cave, Hrdli\u010dka remarks:\n\u201cThe depression was clearly made by the primitive inhabitants or\nvisitors of the cave for the body and the whole represents very\nplainly a regular burial, the most ancient intentional burial thus far\ndiscovered.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1913, p. 539.)\n\nThe specimens of Neanderthal, Spy, La Naulette, Krapina, Le Moustier\nand La Chapelle, as we have seen, are the principal remains said to\nrepresent the Neanderthal type, which, according to Keith and others,\nis a distinct human species. As Aurignacian Man (assigned to the close\nof the \u201cOld Stone Age,\u201d or Glacial epoch), including the Grimaldi or\nNegroid as well as the Cr\u00f4-Magnon type, are universally acknowledged\nto belong to the species _Homo sapiens_, we need not discuss them\nhere. The same holds true, _a fortiori_, of Neolithic races such as\nthe Solutreans and the Magdalenians. The main issue for the present is\nwhether or not the Neanderthal type represents a _distinct species_ of\nhuman being.\n\nAnent this question, Professor MacCurdy has the following: \u201cBoule\nestimated the capacity of the Chapelle-aux-Saints skull according to\nthe formul\u00e6 of Manouvrier, of Lee, and of Beddoe, obtaining results\nthat varied between 1,570 and 1,750 cubic centimeters. By the use of\nmillet and of shot an average capacity of 1,626 was obtained. Judging\nfrom these figures the capacity of the crania of Neanderthal and Spy\nhas been underestimated by Schaaffhausen, Huxley, and Schwalbe. By its\ncranial capacity, therefore, the Neanderthal race belongs easily in\nthe class of _Homo sapiens_. But we must distinguish between relative\ncapacity and absolute capacity. In modern man, where the transverse\nand antero-posterior diameters are the same as in the skull of La\nChapelle-aux-Saints, the vertical diameter would be much greater, which\nwould increase the capacity to 1,800 cubic centimeters and even to\n1,900 cubic centimeters. Such voluminous modern crania are very rare.\nThus Bismarck, with horizontal cranial diameters scarcely greater than\nin the man of La Chapelle-aux-Saints, is said to have had a cranial\ncapacity of 1,965 cubic centimeters.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1909,\np. 575.)\n\nAs for the structural features which are alleged to constitute a\n_specific difference_ between the Neanderthal type and modern man,\n_v.g._ the prominent brow ridges, prognathism, retreating forehead,\nreceding chin, etc., all of these occur, albeit in a lesser degree, in\nmodern Australian blacks, who are universally acknowledged to belong\nto the species _Homo sapiens_. Moreover, there is much _fluctuation_,\nas Kramberger has shown from the examination of an enormous number\nof modern and fossil skulls, in both the Neanderthal and the modern\ntype; that is to say, Neanderthaloid features occur in modern skulls\nand, conversely, modern features occur in the skulls of _Homo\nneanderthalensis_ (cf. \u201cBiolog. Zentralblatt,\u201d 1905, p. 810; and\nWasmann\u2019s \u201cModern Biology,\u201d Eng. ed., pp. 472, 473).\n\nAll the differences between modern and pal\u00e6olithic man are explicable,\npartly upon the basis of _acquired adaptation_, inasmuch as the\nprimitive mode of life pursued by the latter entailed the formation\nof body-modifying habits very different from our present customs\nand habits (viz. those of our modern civilized life). But these\nmodifications, not being inheritable, passed away with the passing of\nthe habits that gave rise to them. In part, however, the differences\nmay be due to heritable _mutations_, which gave rise to new _races_ or\n_varieties_ or _subspecies_, such as Indo-Europeans, Mongolians, and\nNegroes. And, if the evolutionary pal\u00e6ontologist insists on magnifying\ncharacters that are well within the scope of mere factorial mutation\ninto a specific difference, we shall reply, with Bateson and Morgan,\nby denying his competence to pronounce on taxonomic questions, without\nconsulting the verdict of the geneticist. Without breeding tests,\nthe criterions of intersterility and longevity cannot be applied,\nand breeding tests are impossible in the case of fossils. As for an\n_a priori_ verdict, no modern geneticist, if called upon to give his\nopinion, would concede that the differences which divide the modern and\nthe Neanderthal types of men exceed the limits of factorial mutations,\nor of natural varieties within the same species. Here, then, it is\na case of the wish being father to the thought. So anxious are the\nmaterialistic evolutionists to secure evidence of a connection between\nman and the brute, that no pretext is too insignificant to serve as\nwarrant for recognizing an \u201cintermediate species.\u201d\n\nEven waiving this point, however, there is no evidence at all that the\nNeanderthal type is ancestral to the Cr\u00f4-Magnon type. Both of these\nraces must have migrated into Europe from the east or the south, and\nwe have no proof whatever of genetic relationship between them. True,\nattempts have been made to capitalize the fact that the Neanderthal\nrace was represented by specimens discovered in what were alleged to\nbe the older deposits of the Glacial epoch, but we have seen that\nthe evidences of antiquity are very precarious in the case of these\nNeanderthaloid skeletons. Time-scales based on extinct species and\ncharacteristic stone implements, etc., are always satisfactory to\nevolutionists, because they can _date_ their fossils and arch\u00e6ological\ncultures _according to the theory of evolution_, but, for one whose\nconfidence in the \u201creality\u201d of evolution is not so great, these\npal\u00e6ontological chronometers are open to grave suspicion.\n\nIf the horizon levels are not too finely graded, the difficulty\nof accepting such a time-scale is not excessive. Hence we might\nbe prepared to accept the chronometric value of the division of\nfossiliferous rocks into Groups, such as the Pal\u00e6ozoic, the Mesozoic,\nand the C\u00e6nozoic, even though we are assured by Grabau that this\ntime-scale is \u201cbased on the changes of life, with the result that\nfossils alone determine whether a formation belongs to one or the\nother of these great divisions\u201d (\u201cPrinciples of Stratigraphy,\u201d p.\n1103), but when it comes to projecting an elaborate scheme of levels\nor horizons into Pleistocene deposits on the dubious basis of index\nfossils and \u201cindustries,\u201d our credulity is not equal to the demands\nthat are made upon it. And this is particularly true with reference\nto fossil men. Man has the geologically unfortunate habit of _burying\nhis dead_. Other fossils have been entombed on the spot where they\ndied, and therefore belong where we find them. But it is otherwise with\nman. In Hilo, Hawaii, the writer heard of a Kanaka, who was buried\nto a depth of 80 feet, having stipulated this sort of burial through\na special disposition in his will. His purpose, in so doing, was to\npreclude the possibility of his bones ever being disturbed by a plough\nor other instrument. Nor have we any right to assume that indications\nof burial will always be present in a case of this nature. We may, on\nthe contrary, assume it as a general rule that human remains are always\nmore recent than the formations in which they are found.\n\nBe that as it may, the evidences for the antiquity of the\nNeanderthaloid man prove, at most, that he was prior to the Cr\u00f4-Magnon\nman in Europe, but they do not prove that the former was prior to the\nlatter absolutely. Things may, for all we know, have been just the\nreverse in Asia. Hence we have no ground for regarding the Man of\nNeanderthal as ancestral to the race of artists, who frescoed the caves\nof France and Spain. In fact, to the unprejudiced mind the Neanderthal\ntype conveys the impression of a race on the downward path of\ndegeneration rather than an embodiment of the promise of better things.\n\u201cThere is another view,\u201d says Dwight, \u201c ... though it is so at variance\nwith the Zeitgeist that little is heard of it. May it not be that many\nlow forms of man, archaic as well as contemporary, are degenerate\nraces? We are told everything about progress; but decline is put aside.\nIt is impossible to construct a tolerable scheme of ascent among the\nraces of man; but cannot dark points be made light by this theory of\ndegeneration? One of the most obscure, and to me most attractive of\nquestions, is the wiping out of old civilizations. That it has occurred\nrepeatedly, and on very extensive scales, is as certain as any fact in\nhistory. Why is it not reasonable to believe that bodily degeneration\ntook place in those fallen from a higher estate, who, half-starved and\ndegraded, returned to savagery? Moreover, the workings of the soul\nwould be hampered by a degenerating brain. For my part I believe the\nNeanderthal man to be a specimen of a race, not arrested in its upward\nclimb, but thrown down from a higher position.\u201d (_Op. cit._, pp. 169,\n170.)\n\nThe view, however, that the Neanderthaloid type had degenerated from\na previous higher human type was not at all in accord with the then\nprevalent opinion that this type was far more ancient than any other.\nAnd Dwight himself admitted the force of the \u201cobjection ... that the\nNeanderthal race was an excessively old one and that skeletons of the\nhigher race which, according to the view which I have offered, must\nhave existed at the same time as the degenerate ones, are still to be\ndiscovered.\u201d (_Op. cit._, p. 170.) In fact, the Neanderthal ancestry\nof the present human race was so generally accepted that, in the very\nyear in which Dwight\u2019s book appeared, Sir Arthur Keith declared: \u201cThe\nNeanderthal type represents the stock from which all modern races have\narisen.\u201d Time, however, as Dr. James Walsh remarked (_America_, Dec.\n15, 1917, pp. 230, 231), has triumphantly vindicated the expectations\nof Professor Dwight. For in his latest book, \u201cThe Antiquity of Man\u201d\n(1916), Sir Arthur Keith has a chapter of Conclusions, in which the\nfollowing recantation appears: \u201cWe were compelled to admit,\u201d he owns,\n\u201cthat men of the modern type had been in existence long before the\nNeanderthal type.\u201d\n\nBut, even if it were true that savagery preceded civilization in\nEurope, such could not have been the case everywhere; for it is\ncertain that civilization and culture of a comparatively high order\nwere imported into Europe before the close of the Old Stone Age. The\nHungarian Lake-dwellings show that culture of a high type existed\nin the New Stone Age. These two ages are regarded as prehistoric in\nEurope, though in America the Stone Age belongs to history. It is\nalso possible that in Europe much of the Stone Age was co\u00ebval with\nthe history of civilized nations, and that it may be coincident with,\ninstead of prior to, the Bronze Age, which seems to have begun in\nEgypt, and which belongs unquestionably to history. And here we may\nbe permitted to remark that history gives the lie to the evolutionary\nconceit that civilized man has arisen from a primitive state of\nbarbarism. History begins almost contemporaneously in many different\ncenters, such as Egypt, Babylonia, Chaldea, China, and Crete, about\n5,000 or 6,000 years ago, and, as far back as history goes, we find\nthe record of high civilizations existing side by side with a co\u00ebval\nbarbarism. Barbarism is historically a state of degeneration and\nstagnation, and history knows of no instance of a people sunk in\nbarbarism elevating itself by its own efforts to higher stages of\ncivilization. Always civilization has been imposed upon barbarians\nfrom without. Savages, so far as history knows them, have never become\ncivilized, save through the intervention of some contemporary civilized\nnation. History is one long refutation of the Darwinian theory of\nconstant and inevitable progress. The progress of civilization is not\nsubsequent, but prior, or parallel, to the retrogression of barbarism.\n\nThat savagery and barbarism represent a _degenerate_, rather than\na _primitive_, state, is proved by the fact that savage tribes, in\ngeneral, despite their brutish degradation, possess languages too\nperfectly elaborated and systematized to be accounted for by the mental\nattainments of the men who now use them, languages which testify\nunmistakably to the superior intellectual and cultural level of their\ncivilized ancestors, to whom the initial construction of such marvelous\nmeans of communication was due. \u201cIt is indeed one of the paradoxes\nof linguistic science,\u201d says Dr. Edwin Sapir, in a lecture delivered\nApril 1, 1911, at the University of Pennsylvania, \u201cthat some of the\nmost complexly organized languages are spoken by so-called primitive\npeoples, while, on the other hand, not a few languages of relatively\nsimple structure are found among peoples of considerable advance in\nculture. Relatively to the modern inhabitants of England, to cite but\none instance out of an indefinitely large number, the Eskimos must be\nconsidered as rather limited in cultural development. Yet there is just\nas little doubt that in complexity of form the Eskimo language goes far\nbeyond English. I wish merely to indicate that, however we may indulge\nin speaking of primitive man, of a primitive language in the true sense\nof the word we find nowhere a trace.\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912,\np. 573.) Pierre Duponceau makes a similar observation with reference\nto the logical and orderly organization of the Indian languages: \u201cThe\ndialects of the Indian tribes,\u201d he says, \u201cappear to be the work of\nphilosophers rather than of savages.\u201d (Cited by F. A. Tholuck, \u201cVerm.\nSchr.,\u201d ii, p. 260.)\n\nIt was considerations of this sort which led the great philologist Max\nM\u00fcller to ridicule Darwin\u2019s conception of primitive man as a savage.\n\u201cAs far as we can trace the footsteps of man,\u201d he writes, \u201ceven on the\nlowest strata of history, we see that the Divine gift of a sound and\nsober intellect belonged to him from the very first; and the idea of\nhumanity emerging slowly from the depths of an animal brutality can\nnever be maintained again in our century. The earliest work of art\nwrought by the human mind\u2014more ancient than any literary document, and\nprior even to the first whisperings of tradition\u2014the human language,\nforms one uninterrupted chain, from the first dawn of history down\nto our own times. We still speak the language of the first ancestors\nof our race; and this language with its wonderful structures, bears\nwitness against such gratuitous theories. The formation of language,\nthe composition of roots, the gradual discrimination of meanings, the\nsystematic elaboration of grammatic forms\u2014all this working which we can\nsee under the surface of our own speech attests from the very first\nthe presence of a rational mind, of an artist as great at least as his\nwork.\u201d (\u201cEssays,\u201d vol. I, p. 306.) History and philology are far more\nsolid and certain as a basis for inference than are \u201cindex fossils\u201d and\nprehistoric arch\u00e6ology; and the lesson taught by history and philology\nis that primitive man was not a savage, but a cultured being endowed\nwith an intellect equal, if not superior, to our own.\n\nBut, even if we grant the priority, which evolutionists claim for the\nOld Stone Age, there are not absent even from that cultural level\nevident tokens of artistic genius and high intellectual gifts. Speaking\nof the pictures in the caves of Altamira, of Marsoulas in the Haute\nGaronne, and of Fonte de Gaume in the Dordogne, the arch\u00e6ologist\nSir Arthur Evans says: \u201cThese primeval frescoes display not only\nconsummate mastery of natural design, but an extraordinary technical\nresource. Apart from the charcoal used in certain outlines, the chief\ncoloring matter was red and yellow ochre, mortars and palettes for the\npreparation of which have come to light. In single animals the tints\nvaried from black to dark and ruddy brown or brilliant orange, and so,\nby fine gradations, to paler nuances, obtained by scraping and washing.\nOutlines and details are brought out by white incised lines, and the\nartists availed themselves with great skill of the reliefs afforded by\nconvexities of the rock surface. But the greatest marvel of all is\nthat such polychrome masterpieces as the bisons, standing and couchant,\nor with limbs huddled together, of the Altamira Cave, were executed\non the ceilings of inner vaults and galleries where the light of day\nhas never penetrated. Nowhere is there any trace of smoke, and it is\nclear that great progress in the art of artificial illumination had\nalready been made. We know that stone lamps, decorated in one case\nwith the engraved head of an ibex, were already in existence. Such was\nthe level of artistic attainment in southwestern Europe, at a modest\nestimate, some 10,000 years earlier than the most ancient monuments\nof Egypt or Chald\u00e6a!\u201d (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1916, pp. 429, 430.)\nWhile reaffirming our distrust of the undocumented chronology of\n\u201cprehistory,\u201d we cite these examples of pal\u00e6olithic art as a proof of\nthe fact that everywhere the manifestation of man\u2019s physical presence\ncoincides with the manifestation of his intelligence, and that neither\nin history nor in prehistory have we any evidence of the existence of\na bestial or irrational man preceding _Homo sapiens_, as we know him\ntoday. It is interesting to note in this connection that a certain J.\nTaylor claims to have found a prehistoric engraving of a mastodon on a\nbone found in a rock shelter known as Jacobs\u2019 Cavern in Missouri (cf.\n_Science_, Oct. 14, 1921, p. 357). Incidents of this sort must needs\ndampen the enthusiasm of those who are overeager to believe in the\nenormous antiquity of the Old Stone Age in Europe.\n\n(11) _The Rhodesian Man_: In 1921 a human skull was found by miners\nin the \u201cBone Cave\u201d of the Broken Hill Mine in southern Rhodesia. It\nwas associated with human and animal bones, as well as very crude\ninstruments (knives and scrapers) in flint and quartz. It was found\nat a depth of 60 feet below the surface. The lower jaw was missing,\nand has not been recovered. It was sent to the British Museum, South\nKensington, where it is now preserved. Doctor Smith-Woodward has\nexamined and described it. \u201cThe skull is in some features the most\nprimitive one that has ever been found; at the same time it has many\npoints of resemblance to (or even identity with) that of modern man.\u201d\n(_Science_, Feb. 3, 1922, p. 129.) The face is intact. The forehead is\nlow, and the brow ridges are more pronounced than in any known fossil\nhuman skull. The prognathism of the upper jaw is very accentuated.\nThe cranium is very flat on top and broad in the back. \u201cIts total\ncapacity is surprisingly large. At least one prominent authority\nthinks that this man had quite as much gray matter as the average\nmodern man.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, pp. 129, 130.) Woodward, however, estimates\nthe cranial capacity of this skull as 1280 c.cm. The neck must have\nhad powerful muscles. The nasal bone is prominent and Neanderthaloid\nin character. \u201cThe wisdom tooth is reduced in size\u2014another point in\ncommon with modern man and never found before in a fossil skull.\u201d\n(_Ibidem._) The palate and the teeth in general are like those of\nexisting men. The femur is not curved like that of the Neanderthal\nman\u2014\u201cIn contrast to the Neanderthal man who is supposed to have walked\nin a crouching position (because of the rather curved femur and other\nbits of evidence), this man is believed to have maintained the upright\nposition, because the femur is relatively straight and when fitted to\nthe tibia (which was also found) presents a perfectly good, straight\nleg.\u201d (_Ibidem._) According to the writer we have quoted, Dr. Elliot\nSmith entertained hopes that the Rhodesian man might represent the\n\u201cmissing link\u201d in man\u2019s ancestry, leaving the Neanderthal man as an\noffshoot from the main ancestral trunk. No comment is necessary. The\nskull may be a pathological specimen, but, in any case, it is evidently\nhuman as regards its cranial capacity. The remains, moreover, serve\nto emphasize the _fluctuational_ character of the so-called _Homo\nprimigenius_ type, being a mixture of modern and Neanderthaloid\nfeatures. They are not fossilized and present a recent appearance.\nHence, as B. Windle suggests, they may have fallen into the cave\nthrough a crack, and may be modern rather than prehistoric.\n\n(12) _The Foxhall Man_: This is the earliest known prehistoric man.\nHe is known to us, however, only through \u201chis flint instruments\npartly burned with fire, found near the little hamlet of Foxhall, near\nNorwich, on the east coast of England. These flints, discovered in\n1921, constitute the first proofs that man of sufficient intelligence\nto make a variety of flint implements and to use fire existed in\nBritain at the close of the Age of Mammals; this is the first true\nTertiary man ever found.\u201d (Osborn: _Guide-leaflet_ to \u201cThe Hall of the\nAge of Man,\u201d 2nd ed., 1923, p. 9.) Osborn assigns the twelve kinds\nof flint instruments typical of the Foxhallian culture to the Upper\nPliocene epoch. R. A. Macalister, however, denies that the deposits are\nTertiary. Abb\u00e9 Henri Breuil\u2019s verdict was undecided. In any case, the\nFoxhallian culture proves that the earliest of prehistoric men were\nintelligent like ourselves.\n\n_Summa summarum_: So far as science knows, only one human species\nhas ever existed on the earth, and that is _Homo sapiens_. All the\nalleged connecting links between men and apes are found, on careful\nexamination, to be illusory. When not wholly ambiguous in view of their\ninadequate preservation and fragmentary character, they are (as regards\nboth mind and body) distinctly human, like the Neanderthal man, or they\nare purely simian, like the Pithecanthropus, or they are heterogeneous\ncombinations of human and simian bones, like the Eoanthropus\nDawsoni.[18] \u201cWith absolute certainty,\u201d says Hugues Obermaier, \u201cwe can\nonly say that man of the Quaternary period differed in no essential\nrespect from man of the present day. In no way did he go beyond the\nlimits of variation of the normal human body.\u201d (\u201cThe Oldest Remains of\nthe Human Body, etc.,\u201d Vienna, 1905.) The so-called _Homo primigenius_,\ntherefore, is not a distinct species of human being, but merely an\nancient race that is, at most, a distinct variety or subspecies of man.\nIn spite of tireless searching, no traces of a bestial, irrational\nman have been discovered. Indeed, man whom nature has left naked,\ndefenseless, unarmed with natural weapons, and deficient in instinct,\nhas no other resource than his reason and could never have survived\nwithout it. To imagine primitive man in a condition analogous to that\nof the idiot is preposterous. \u201cFor other animals,\u201d says St. Thomas of\nAquin, \u201cnature has prepared food, garments of fur, means of defense,\nsuch as teeth, horns, and hoofs, or at least swiftness in flight. But\nman is so constituted that, none of these things having been prepared\nfor him by nature, reason is given him in their stead, reason by which\nthrough his handiwork he is enabled to prepare all these things....\nMoreover, in other animals there is inborn a certain natural economy\nrespecting those things which are useful or hurtful, as the lamb by\nnature knows the wolf to be its enemy. Some animals also by natural\ninstinct are aware of the medicinal properties of herbs and of other\nthings which are necessary for life. Man, however, has a natural\nknowledge of these things which are necessary for life only in general,\nas being able to arrive at the knowledge of the particular necessities\nof human life by way of inference from general principles.\u201d (\u201cDe regim.\nprinc.,\u201d l. I, c. I.) As a matter of fact, man is never found apart\nfrom evidences of his intelligence. The Neanderthaloid race, with their\nsolemn burials and implements of bone and stone, exemplify this truth\nno less than the pal\u00e6olithic artists of the Cave of Altamira.\n\n    [18] See Addenda.\n\n\u00a7 5. The Edict of the American Association\n\nIn the Cincinnati meeting (1923-1924) of the American Association\nfor the Advancement of Science, a number of resolutions were passed\nregarding the subject of evolution. True, the session in which these\nresolutions were passed was but sparsely attended, and packed, for the\nmost part, with the ultra-partisans of transformism. Nevertheless, it\nis to be regretted that the dignity of this eminent and distinguished\nbody was so unfittingly compromised by the fulmination of rhetorical\nanathemas against W. J. Bryan and his Round Head adherents. Among\nthe resolutions, of which we have spoken, the following dictatorial\nproclamation occurs: \u201c_The evidences in favor of the evolution of man\nare sufficient to convince every scientist in the world._\u201d\n\nThis authoritative decree is both rash and intolerant. The\nresolution-committee of the American Association is by no means\ninfallible, and, in the absence of infallibility, no group of men\nshould be so unmindful of their own limitations as to strive to make\ntheir subjective views binding upon others. Scientific questions are\nnot settled by authority, but exclusively by means of irresistible\nevidence, which is certainly absent in the present case. Moreover,\nthe declaration in question is untrue; for many of the foremost\npal\u00e6ontologists and anthropologists of the day confess their complete\nignorance, as scientists, with respect to the origin of man.\n\nDr. Clark Wissler, for example, who is the Curator-in-Chief of the\nAnthropological section of the American Museum of Natural History\nin New York City, made, in the course of an interview published in\nthe _New York American_ of April 2, 1918, the following statement:\n\u201cMan, like the horse or elephant, just happened anyhow, so far as has\nbeen discovered yet. As far as science has discovered, there always\nwas a man\u2014some not so developed, but still human beings in all their\nfunctions, much as we are today.\u201d Asked by the reporter, whether this\ndid not favor the idea of an abrupt, unheralded appearance of man on\nearth, Doctor Wissler replied: \u201cMan came out of a blue sky as far as\nwe have been able to delve back.\u201d Fearing lest the reporter might have\nsensationalized his words, the writer took occasion to question the\nlearned anthropologist on the subject during the Pan Pacific Conference\nheld at Honolulu, Hawaii (Aug. 2-20, 1920). His answer was that the\nforegoing citations were substantially correct.\n\nThe same verdict is given by the great pal\u00e6ontologist, Prof. W.\nBranco, Director of the Institute of Geology and Pal\u00e6ontology at the\nUniversity of Berlin. In his discourse on \u201cFossil Man\u201d delivered\nAugust 16, 1901, before the Fifth International Zo\u00f6logical Congress\nat Berlin, Branco said, with reference to the origin of man:\n\u201cPal\u00e6ontology tells us nothing on the subject\u2014it knows no ancestors\nof man.\u201d The well-known pal\u00e6ontologist Karl A. von Zittel reached\nthe same conclusion. He says somewhere (probably in his \u201cGrundz\u00fcge\nder Pal\u00e4ontologie\u201d): \u201cSuch material as this (the discovered remains\nof fossil men) throws no light upon the question of race and descent.\nAll the human bones of determinable age that have come down to us\nfrom the European Diluvium, as well as all the skulls discovered in\ncaves, are identified by their size, shape, and capacity as belonging\nto _Homo sapiens_, and are fine specimens of their kind. They do not\nby any means fill up the gap between man and the ape.\u201d Joseph Le\nConte repeats the identical refrain. In the revised Fairchild edition\n(1903) of his \u201cElements of Geology\u201d we read: \u201cThe earliest men yet\nfound are in no sense connecting links between man and ape. They are\ndistinctly human.\u201d (Ch. VI, p. 638.) Replying to Haeckel, who in his\n\u201cWeltr\u00e4tsel\u201d proclaims man\u2019s descent from pithecoid primates to be\n_an historical fact_, J. Reinke, the biologist of Kiel, declares: \u201cWe\nare merely having dust thrown in our eyes when we read in a widely\ncirculated book by Ernst Haeckel the following words: \u2018That man is\nimmediately descended from apes, and more remotely from a long line of\nlower vertebrates, remains established as an indubitable historic fact,\nfraught with important consequences.\u2019 It is absurd to speak of anything\nas a fact when experience lends it no support.\u201d (\u201cHaeckel\u2019s Monism\nand Its Supporters,\u201d Leipzig, 1907, p. 6.) The sum-total, in fact,\nof scientific knowledge concerning the origin of the human body is\ncontained in the saying of the geologist, Sir Wm. Dawson, President of\nMcGill University: \u201cI know nothing about the origin of man, except what\nI am told in the Scripture\u2014that God created him. I do not know anything\nmore than that, and I do not know of anyone who does.\u201d\n\nIn view of this uncertainty and ignorance regarding the origin of the\nhuman body, it is extremely unethical to strive to impose the theory\nof man\u2019s bestial origin by the sheer weight of scientific authority\nand prestige. Conscientious scientists would never venture to abuse\nin such a fashion the confidence which the people at large place in\ntheir assurances. Hence those who respect their honor and dignity as\nscientists should refrain from dogmatizing on the undemonstrated animal\norigin of man, however much they may personally fancy this theory. \u201cWe\ncannot teach,\u201d says Virchow, \u201cnor can we regard as one of the results\nof scientific research, the doctrine that man is descended from the ape\nor from any other animal.\u201d (\u201cThe Liberty of Science,\u201d p. 30, et seq.)\nAnd Professor Reinke of Kiel concludes: \u201cThe only statement consistent\nwith her dignity, that Science can make, is to say that she knows\nnothing about the origin of man.\u201d (_Der T\u00fcrmer_, V, Oct., 1902, Part I,\np. 13.)\n\nA slave, we are told (Tertul., _Apolog._ 33), rode in the triumphal\nchariot of the Roman conqueror, to whisper ever and anon in his ear:\n_Hominem memento te!_\u2014\u201cRemember that thou art a man!\u201d It is unfortunate\nthat no similar warning is sounded when the tone of scientific\nindividuals or organizations threatens to become unduly imperious\nand intolerant. This tendency, however, to forget limitations and to\nusurp the prerogative of infallibility is sometimes rebuked by other\nreminders. The writer recalls an instance, which happened in connection\nwith the Pan Pacific Conference at Honolulu during the August of 1920.\n\nThe Conference was attended by illustrious scientists from every\nland bordering upon the Pacific. After the preliminary sessions,\nthe delegates paid a visit to the famous volcano of Kilauea. Doctor\nT. A. Jaggar, Jr., vulcanologist and Director of the United States\nObservatory at Kilauea, acted as guide, the writer himself being one\nof the party. In the course of our tour of inspection, we came to the\nextinct volcano of Kenakakoe. There a number of volcanic bombs, some\nshattered and some intact, were pointed out to us. For the benefit of\nreaders, who may not know, I may state that a volcanic bomb originates\nas a fragment of foreign material, _e.g._ a stone, which, falling into\na volcano, becomes coated with an external shell of lava. In addition\nto the bombs, certain holes in the soil were shown to us, which Doctor\nJaggar, evidently under the influence of military imagery suggested by\nthe then recent European War, described as \u201cshell-craters\u201d dug by the\naforesaid volcanic bombs.\n\nDoctor Jaggar accounted for the bombs and craters by a very ingenious\ntheory. In 1790, he said, the year in which Kamehameha I was contending\nwith Keoua for the mastery of the large island of Hawaii, the only\nexplosive eruption of Kilauea known to history occurred, and it was\nduring this eruption (which destroyed part of Keoua\u2019s army) that the\nbombs found at Kenakakoe were ejected from the above-mentioned volcano.\nIt was then, we were informed, that these bombs hurtling through the\nair in giant trajectories from Kilauea struck the ground and scooped\nout the \u201cshell-craters\u201d at Kenakakoe. Some of them, it appeared, did\nnot remain in the craters, but rebounded to strike again on the rocks\nbeyond. Of the latter, part were shattered, while others withstood the\nforce of the second impact. The whole party was much impressed by the\ngrandeur of this vivid description, and some of the scientists were at\ngreat pains to photograph the craters as awe-inspiring vestiges of the\nmighty bombardment wrought in times past by Nature\u2019s volcanic artillery.\n\nWhen I returned to Hilo, I happened to mention to Brother Matthias\nNewell some misgivings which I had felt concerning the size and\nappearance of the so-called \u201cshell-craters.\u201d Brother Newell, a member\nof the Marist Congregation and quite a scientist in his way, is famous\nin the Islands as the discoverer of a fungus, by which the Japanese\nBeetle, a local pest, has been largely exterminated. For several years,\nprior to the advent of Doctor Jaggar and the United States Observatory,\nhe had studied extensively the famous volcano on the slopes of Mauna\nLoa. On hearing my narrative of the foregoing incident, Brother Newell\nwas curious to know the exact locality, and burst into a hearty laugh\nas soon as I mentioned Kenakakoe. He himself, he told me, in company\nwith Brother Henry, had frequently dug for bombs at Kenakakoe. When\nsuccessful in their quest, the two were wont to carry the volcanic\nbomb to the rocks, and to break it open for the purpose of examining\nthe inner core. Some of the bombs, however, escaped this fate through\nbeing too resistent to the hammer. The holes, needless to say, were not\n\u201cshell-craters\u201d scooped by volcanic bombs, but ordinary excavations dug\nby prosaic spades. Such was the simple basis of fact upon which the\nelaborate superstructure of Jaggar\u2019s theory had been reared! Though\nJaggar was, in a sense, entirely blameless, his theory was pure fiction\nfrom start to finish. No scientist present, however, took exception to\nit. On the contrary, all of them appeared perfectly satisfied with his\npseudoscientific explanation.\n\nIf the foregoing incident conveys any lesson, it is this, that neither\nsingly nor collectively are scientists exempt from error, especially\nwhen they deal with a remote past, which no one has observed. The\nattempt to reconstruct the past by means of inference alone produces,\nnot history, but romance. Doctor Gregory\u2019s genealogy of Man displayed\nin the American Museum is quite as much the fruit of imagination as\nJaggar\u2019s Kilauean fantasy. The sham pedigree bears like witness to the\ningenuity of the human mind, but, if anyone is tempted by its false\nshow of science to take it seriously, let him think of the bombs of\nKenakakoe.\n\n\n\n\n                               AFTERWORD\n\n\nWith the close of the nineteenth century the hour hand of biological\nscience had completed another revolution. One after another, the\nclassic systems of evolution had passed into the discard, as its\nremorseless progress registered their doom. The last of these systems,\nDe-Vriesianism, enjoyed a meteoric vogue in the first years of the\npresent century, but it, too, has gone into eclipse with the rise of\nrediscovered Mendelism. Notwithstanding all these reverses, however,\nthe evolutionary theory still continues to number a host of steadfast\nadherents.\n\nSome of its partisans uphold it upon antiquated grounds. Culturally\nspeaking, such men still live in the days of Darwin, and fail to\nrealize that much water has passed under the bridge since then. It\nhas other protagonists, however, who are thoroughly conversant with\nmodern data, and fully aware, in consequence, of the inadequacy of\nall existent formulations of the evolutional hypothesis. Minds of the\nlatter type are proof, apparently, against any sort of disillusionment,\nand it is manifest that their attitude is determined by some\nconsideration other than the actual results of research.\n\nThis other consideration is monistic metaphysics. In defect of\nfactual confirmation, evolution is demonstrated aprioristically\nfrom the principle of the minimum. The scope of this methodological\nprinciple is to simplify or unify causation by dispensing with all\nthat is superfluous in the way of explanation. In olden days, it went\nby the name of Occam\u2019s Razor and was worded thus: _Entia non sunt\nmultiplicanda praeter necessitatem_\u2014\u201cThings are not to be multiplied\nwithout necessity.\u201d Evolution meets the requirements of this principle.\nIt simplifies the problem of organic origins by reducing the number of\nancestors to a minimum. Therefore, argues the evolutionist, evolution\nmust be true.\n\nAs an empirical rule, the principle of the minimum is, no doubt,\nessential to the scientific method. To erect it into a metaphysical\naxiom, however, is preposterous; for _simple_ explanations are\nnot necessarily _true_ explanations. In the r\u00f4le of aprioristic\nmetaphysics, the principle of continuity is destructive, and tends\nto plane down everything to the dead level of materialistic monism.\nFor those who transcendentalize it, it becomes the principle \u201cthat\neverything is \u2018nothing but\u2019 something else, probably inferior to it.\u201d\n(Santayana.) To assert continuity, they are driven to deny, or, at\nleast, to leave unexplained and inexplicable, the obvious novelty\nthat emerges at each higher level of the cosmic scale. And thus it\ncomes to pass that intelligence is pronounced to be nothing but\nsense, and sense to be nothing but physiology, and physiology to be\nnothing but chemistry, and chemistry to be nothing but mechanics,\nuntil this philosophical nihilism weeps at last for want of further\nopportunities of devastation. Its exponents have an intense horror for\nabrupt transitions, and resent the discovery of anything that defies\nresolution into terms of mass and motion.\n\nEvolution smooths the path for monism of this type by transforming\nnature\u2019s staircase into an inclined plane of imperceptible ascent.\nHence Dewey refers to evolution as a \u201cclinching proof\u201d of the\ncontinuity hypothecated by the monist. For the latter, there is no\nhierarchy of values, and all essential distinctions are abolished; for\nhim nothing is unique and everything is equally important. He affirms\nthe democracy of facts and is blind to all perspective in nature. He\nis, in short, the enemy of all beauty, all spirituality, all culture,\nall morality, and all religion. He substitutes neurons for the soul,\nand enthrones Natural Selection in the place of the Creator. He sets\nup, in a word, the ideal of \u201can animalistic man and a mechanistic\nuniverse,\u201d and offers us evolution as a demonstration of this \u201cideal.\u201d\n\nVernon Kellogg objects to our indictment. \u201cThe evolutionist,\u201d he says,\n\u201cdoes not like being called a bad man. He does not like being posted\nas an enemy of poetry and faith and religion. He does not like being\ndefined as crassly materialist, a man exclusively of the earth earthy.\u201d\n(_Atlantic Monthly_, April 24, 1924, p. 490.) Apart from their object,\nthe likes or dislikes of an evolutionist are a matter of indifference.\nWhat we want to know is whether his dislike is merely for the names, or\nwhether it extends to the reality denoted by these names. Human nature\nhas a weakness for euphemisms. Men may \u201cwant the game without the\nname,\u201d particularly when, deservedly or undeservedly, the name happens\nto have an offensive connotation.\n\nThere are, no doubt, evolutionists who mingle enough dualism with their\nphilosophy to mitigate the most objectionable aspects of its basic\nmonism. In so doing, however, they are governed by considerations that\nare wholly extraneous to evolutionary thought. Indeed, if we take\nKellogg\u2019s words at their face value (that is, in a sense which he\nwould probably disclaim), it is in spite of his philosophy that the\nevolutionist is a spiritualist. \u201cAnd just as religion and cheating,\u201d\nreasons Kellogg, \u201ccan apparently be compassed in one man, so can one\nman be both evolutionist and idealist.\u201d (_Loc. cit._, p. 490.) If this\ncomparison holds true, the evolutionist can be an idealist only to the\nextent that he is inconsistent or hypocritical, since under no other\nsupposition could piety and crime co\u00ebxist in one and the same person.\n\nBe that as it may, the majority of evolutionists are avowed mechanists\nand materialists, in all that concerns the explanation of natural\nphenomena. \u201cThat there may be God who has put his Spirit into men\u201d\n(Kellogg, _ibid._, p. 491), they are condescendingly willing to\nconcede. And small credit to them for this; for who can _disprove_ the\nexistence of God, or the spirituality of the human soul? Nevertheless,\nit is impossible, they maintain, to be _certain_ on these subjects.\nNatural science is in their eyes the only form of human knowledge that\nhas any objective validity. Proofs of human spirituality they denounce\nas _metaphysical_, and metaphysics is for them synonymous with \u201csuch\nstuff as dreams are made of,\u201d unworthy to be mentioned in the same\nbreath with physical science\u2014\u201cEs gibt f\u00fcr uns kein anderes Erkennen als\ndas mechanische, ... Nur mechanisch begreifen ist Wissenschaft.\u201d (Du\nBois-Reymond.)\n\nIn practice, therefore, if not in theory, the tendency of evolution\nhas been to unspiritualize and dereligionize the philosophy of its\nadherents, a tendency which is strikingly exemplified in one of its\ngreatest exponents, Charles Darwin himself. The English naturalist\nbegan his scientific career as a theist and a spiritualist. He ended\nit as an agnostic and a materialist. His evolutionary philosophy was,\nby his own confession, responsible for the transformation. \u201cWhen thus\nreflecting,\u201d he says, \u201cI feel compelled to look to a first cause\nhaving an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man,\nand I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my\nmind about the time, as far as I remember, when I wrote the \u2018Origin\nof Species\u2019; and it is since that time that it has very gradually,\nwith many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, can\nthe mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a\nmind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when\nit draws such grand conclusions? I can not pretend to throw the least\nlight on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all\nthings is insoluble by us; and I, for one, must be content to remain an\nAgnostic.\u201d (\u201cThe Life and Letters of Charles Darwin,\u201d edited by Francis\nDarwin, 1887, vol. I, p. 282.)\n\nDarwin likewise exemplifies in his own person the destructive\ninfluence exercised upon the \u00e6sthetic sense by exclusive adherence to\nthe monistic viewpoint. Having alluded in his autobiography to his\nformer predilection for poetry, music, and the beauties of nature,\nhe continues as follows: \u201cBut now for many years I cannot endure to\nread a line of poetry: I have tried lately to read Shakespeare, and\nfound that it nauseated me. I have also lost my taste for pictures and\nmusic.... I retain some taste for fine scenery, but it does not cause\nme the exquisite delight which it formerly did.... My mind seems to\nhave become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large\ncollections of facts; ... if I had to live my life again, I would have\nmade it a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least\nevery week; for perhaps the parts of my brain now atrophied would have\nbeen kept alive through use. The loss of these tastes is a loss of\nhappiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more\nprobably to the moral character by enfeebling the emotional part of our\nnature.\u201d (_Op. cit._, vol. I, pp. 81, 82.)\n\nEvolution, we repeat, has brought us materialistic monism, in whose\nbarren soil nor faith, nor idealism, nor morality, nor poesy, nor art,\nnor any of the finer things of life can thrive. To its dystelic and\natomistic view, Nature has ceased to be the vicar of God, and material\nthings are no longer sacramental symbols of eternal verities. It denies\nall design in Nature, and dismembers all beauty into meaningless\nfragments. It is so deeply engrossed in the contemplation of parts,\nthat it has forgotten that there is any such thing as a whole. The rose\nand the bird-of-paradise are not ineffable messages from God to man;\nthey are but accidental aggregates of colloidal molecules fortuitously\nassembled in the perpetual, yet aimless, flux of evolving matter.\n\nFrom the standpoint of the moral and sociological consequences,\nhowever, the gravest count against evolution is the seeming support\nwhich this theory has given to the monistic conception of an\nanimalistic man. Darwin\u2019s doctrine on the bestial origin of man\nbrought no other gain to natural science than the addition of one more\nunverified and unverifiable hypothesis to its already extensive stock\nof unfounded speculations. It did, however, work irreparable harm to\nmillions of unlearned and credulous persons, whose childlike confidence\nthe unscrupulous expounders of this doctrine have not hesitated to\nabuse. The exaggerations and misrepresentations of the latter met\nwith an all too ready credence on the part of those who were not\ncompetent to discriminate between theory and fact. The sequel has been\na wholesale abandonment of religious and moral convictions, which has\nruined the lives and blighted the happiness of countless victims.\n\nHas it been worth while, we may well ask of the propounders of this\ntheory, to sacrifice so much in exchange for so little? The solid gain\nto natural science has been negligible, but the consequences of the\nblow unfairly dealt to morals and religion are incalculable and beyond\nthe possibility of repair. \u201cMorals and Religion,\u201d says Newman, \u201care not\nrepresented to the intelligence of the world by intimations and notices\nstrong and obvious such as those which are the foundation of physical\nscience.... Instead of being obtruded on our notice, so that we cannot\npossibly overlook them, they are the dictates either of Conscience or\nof Faith. They are faint shadows and tracings, certain indeed, but\ndelicate, fragile, and almost evanescent, which the mind recognizes at\none time, not at another, discerns when it is calm, loses when it is\nin agitation. The reflection of sky and mountains in the lake is proof\nthat sky and mountains are around it, but the twilight or the mist or\nthe sudden thunderstorm hurries away the beautiful image, which leaves\nbehind it no memorial of what it was.... How easily can we be talked\nout of our clearest views of duty; how does this or that moral precept\ncrumble into nothing when we rudely handle it! How does the fear of sin\npass off from us, as quickly as the glow of modesty dies away from the\ncountenance! and then we say \u2018It is all superstition.\u2019 However, after a\ntime, we look around, and then to our surprise we see, as before, the\nsame law of duty, the same moral precepts, the same protest against\nsin, appearing over against us, in their old places, as if they had\nnever been brushed away, like the Divine handwriting upon the wall at\nthe banquet.\u201d (\u201cIdea of a University,\u201d pp. 513-515.)\n\nHad evolutionary enthusiasts adhered more strictly to the facts, had\nthey proceeded in the spirit of scientific caution, had they shown,\nin fact, even so much as a common regard for the simple truth, the\n\u201cprogress of science\u201d would not have been achieved at the expense\nof morals and religion. As it is, this so-called progress has left\nbehind a wake of destruction in the shape of undermined convictions,\nblasted lives, crimes, misery, despair, and suicide. It has, in short,\ncontributed largely to the present sinister and undeserved triumph of\nMaterialism, Agnosticism, and Pessimism, which John Talbot Smith has so\nfittingly characterized as the three D\u2019s of dirt, doubt, and despair. A\nlittle less sensationalism, a little more conscientiousness, a little\nmore of that admirable quality, scientific caution, and the concord of\nfaith and reason would have become a truism instead of a problem. But\nsuch regrets are vain. The evil effects are here to stay, and nothing\ncan undo the past.\n\nIf man is but a higher kind of brute, if he has no unique, immortal\nprinciple within him, if his free will is an illusion, if his conduct\nis the necessary resultant of chemical reactions occurring in his\nprotoplasm, if he is nothing more than an automaton of flesh, a mere\ndecaying organism which is the sport of all the blind physical forces\nand stimuli playing upon it, if he has no prospect of a future life\nof retribution, if he is unaccountable to any higher authority,\nDivine or human, then morality ceases to have a meaning, right and\nwrong lose their significance, virtue and vice are all the same. The\nconstancy of the martyr and the patriotism of the fallen soldier become\nunintelligible folly, while a heartless and infamous sensualism preying\nvulturelike upon the carrion of human misery and corruption is to be\nreckoned the highest expression of wisdom and efficiency. The grandest\nideals that have inspired enthusiasm and devotion in human breasts are\nbut idle dreams and worthless delusions. From a world which accepts\nthis degraded view of human nature all heroism and chivalry must vanish\nutterly; for it will recognize no loftier incentives to action than\npleasure and love of self.\n\nSuch doctrines, too, are essentially antisocial. They destroy the very\nfoundation of altruism. To seek immortality in the effects of one\u2019s\nunselfish deeds becomes ridiculous. For what assurance can we have\nthat the fruits of our sacrifice will be acceptable to a progressive\nposterity, or what difference will our self-denial make, when the whole\nhuman species shall have become extinct on the desolate surface of a\ndying world? Without an adequate motivation for altruism, however, the\nexistence of society becomes impossible, since self-interest is not\na feasible substitute. To urge the observance of social laws on the\nground that they protect person, life, and property, will hardly appeal\nto men who have no possessions to be protected nor a comfortable life\nto be prolonged. Yet the major portion of mankind are in this category.\nFor such the laws can mean nothing more than artificial corruptions, of\nthe natural and primitive order of things introduced for the special\nbenefit of the rich and powerful.\n\nUnder circumstances of this sort, no plea avails to silence the heralds\nof revolt. If there is no future life for the righting of present\ninjustices, then naught remains but to terminate the prosperity of the\nwicked here and now. If there is no heaven for man beyond the grave,\nthen it behooves everyone to get all the enjoyment he can out of the\npresent life. It is high time, therefore, that this earthly heaven\nof mankind should cease to be monopolized by a few coupon-holding\ncapitalists and become, instead, the property of the expropriated\nproletariat. Anarchy and Socialism are the consequences which the logic\nof the situation inexorably portends. The starving swine must hurl\ntheir bloated brethren from the trough that the latter have heretofore\nreserved for themselves. The sequel, of course, can be none other\nthan the complete disintegration of civilization and its ultimate\ndisappearance in a hideous vortex of carnage, rapine, and barbarity.\n\nNor is this prognosis based on pure conjecture. In proportion as these\npernicious doctrines have gained ground, modern society has become\ninfected with the virus of animalism, egoism, and perfidy; expediency\nhas been substituted for honor; and purity has been replaced by\nprophylaxis. One could not, of course, expect to see a universal and\nthoroughgoing application of these principles in the concrete. The\nmaterialistic view of human nature is horribly unnatural, and, in\npractice, would be quite unbearable. Natural human goodness and even\nthe mere instinct of self-preservation militate against a reduction\nto the concrete of this inhuman conception, and these tend, in real\nlife, to mitigate the evil effects of its acceptance. Nevertheless,\nthe actual consequences resulting from the spread of evolutionary\nprinciples are so conspicuous and appalling as to leave no doubt\nwhatever of the deadly nature of this philosophy.\n\nMarxian Socialism has been called \u201cscientific\u201d for no other reason than\nthat it is based upon materialistic evolution, and this scientific\nsocialism has brought upon modern Russia a reign of terror, which\neclipses that of France in the bloodiest days of the Revolution.\nEleanor Marx, it will be remembered, after falling a victim to her\nfather\u2019s teachings regarding \u201cfree love,\u201d committed suicide. The same\nconfession of failure has been made by two recent editors of the\nsocialist _Appeal to Reason_ (J. W. Wayland and J. O. Welday), both\nof whom committed suicide. These are but a few of the many instances\nthat might be cited to show that the life philosophy inculcated by\nmaterialistic evolution is so intolerably unnatural and revolting that\nneither society nor the individual can survive within the lethal shadow\nof its baleful influence.\n\nBut may not the extreme materialism and pessimism of this view be\npeculiar to the sordid and joyless outlook of the social malcontent?\nDoes not evolutionary thought conduce to something finer and more\nhopeful in the case of the progressive and optimistic liberal? Vain\nhope! We cannot console ourselves with any delusions on this score.\nLiberalism proclaims the emancipation of humanity from all authority,\nand the rejection of a future life of retribution is the indispensable\npremise of the doctrine that makes man a law unto himself. Hence,\nwherever Liberalism controls the tongues of educators, the human\nsoul becomes a myth, religion a superstition, and immortality\nan anodyne for mental weaklings. Strong-minded truth-seekers are\nadvised to abandon these irrational beliefs, and to adopt the \u201cNew\nReligion,\u201d which dispenses once for all with God and the hereafter.\n\u201cThe new religion,\u201d says Charles Eliot, ex-President of Harvard,\n\u201cwill not attempt to reconcile people to present ills by the promise\nof future compensation. I believe that the advent of just freedom\nhas been delayed for centuries by such promises. Prevention will be\nthe watchword of the new religion, and a skillful surgeon will be\none of its ministers. It cannot supply consolation as offered by old\nreligions, but it will reduce the need of consolation.\u201d (\u201cThe New\nReligion.\u201d)\n\nAgain, it may be objected that evolutionists, for all their\nagnosticism and materialism, frequently put Christians to shame by\ntheir irreproachably upright and moral lives. That they sometimes\nsucceed in doing this cannot be gainsaid. But they do so because they\nborrow their moral standards from Christianity, and do not follow\nthe logical consequences of their own principles. Their morality,\ntherefore, is parasitic, as Balfour has wisely observed, and it will\nsoon die out when the social environment shall have been sufficiently\nde-Christianized. \u201cEat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die,\u201d\nis their proper philosophy of life, only they have not the courage\nof their convictions. For the rest, their philosophical convictions\nhave nothing in common with the moral standards which they actually\nobserve. In fact, not only does the monism of evolutionary science\nfail to motivate the Christian code of morals, but it is radically and\nirreconcilably opposed to all that Christianity stands for. Hartmann, a\nmodern philosopher, notes with grim satisfaction the clash of the two\nviewpoints, and predicts (with what, perhaps, is premature assurance)\nthe ultimate triumph of \u201cmodern progress.\u201d \u201cMany there are,\u201d he tells\nus, \u201cwho speak and write of the struggle of civilization, but few there\nare who realize that this struggle is the last desperate stand of the\nChristian ideal before its final disappearance from the world, and\nthat modern civilization is prepared to resort to any means rather\nthan relinquish those things, which it has won at the cost of such\ngreat toil. For modern civilization and Christianity are antagonistic\nto each other, and it is therefore inevitable that one give place to\nthe other. Modern progress can acknowledge no God save one immanent to\nthe world and opposed to the transcendent God of Christian revelation,\nnor other morality save only that true kind whose source is the human\nwill determining itself by itself and becoming a law unto itself.\u201d\n(\u201cReligion de l\u2019avernir.\u201d)\n\nThe World War has done much to dampen the ardor of those who looked\nforward with enthusiasm to the millennium of a purely scientific\nreligion. In this spectacular lesson they have learned that science can\ndestroy as well as build. They have come to see that biology, physics,\nand chemistry are morally colorless, and that we must go outside the\nrealm of natural science when we are in quest of that which can give\nmeaning to our lives and noble inspiration to our conduct. When science\nsupersedes religion, the result is always disillusionment following in\nthe wreck-strewn wake of moral and physical disaster.\n\n    Grave little manikins digging in the slime\n    Intent upon the old game of \u2018Once-upon-a-time.\u2019\n    Other little manikins engaged with things-to-come,\n    Building up the sand-heap called Millennium.\n                            (_Theodore MacManus_)\n\nRecently, the chancellor of a great university has seen fit publicly\nto disclaim, in the name of his institution, all responsibility for\na crime committed by two members of the student body. The young men\ninvolved in this affair had performed an experimental murder. The\nexperimenters, it would seem, were unable to discriminate between man\nand beast. They had been taught by their professors that scientific\npsychology dispenses with the soul, and that the difference\nbetween men and brutes is one of degree only, and not of kind. Even\nthat negligible distinction, they were told, had been bridged by\nevolution. In the sequel, the young men failed, apparently, to see\nwhy vivisection, which was right in the case of animals, should be\nwrong in the case of human beings. Their astounding obtuseness on this\nparticular point was, of course, exceedingly regrettable and hard to\nunderstand. Yet, somehow, one cannot help thinking but that their\neducation was largely responsible for it.\n\nIn the startling crime of these students, modern educators will\nfind much food for serious thought. It should give pause to those,\nespecially, who have been overzealous in popularizing the Darwinian\nconception of human nature. Let men of this type reflect upon what\nslender grounds their dogmatism rests, and let them then weigh well the\ngravity of the responsibility, which they incur. Tuccimei summarizes\nfor them, in the following terms, the nature and extent of their\naccountability:\n\n\u201cThis perverse determination to place man and brutes in the same\ncategory, interests me not so much from the scriptural standpoint\nas for reasons moral and social. Science, as the more moderate of\nour adversaries have told us often enough, does not assail religion,\nbut proceeds on its way regardless of the consequences. And the\nconsequences we see only too plainly, now that the evolutionary\nphilosophy has invaded every branch of knowledge and walk of life,\nand has seeped down among the ignorant and turbulent masses. These\nconsequences are known as socialism and anarchy. The protagonists of\nthe new philosophy strove to repudiate them at first: but now many of\ntheir number have laid aside even this pretense. Socialistic doctrines\nare based exclusively upon our assumed kinship with the brutes, and the\nleaders of militant socialism have inscribed on the frontispieces of\ntheir books the chain fatally logical and terribly true of three names,\nDarwin, Spencer, Marx.\n\n\u201cIn truth, our common origin with the brutes being taken for granted,\nwhy should we not enjoy in common with them the right to gratify\nevery instinct? Social inequalities are the product of laws and\nconventionalities willed by the rich and powerful. In the natural and\nprimitive state of things they did not exist; why not proceed then to a\ngeneral leveling of the existing social order?\n\n\u201cSuch an origin of the human race being assumed, the existence of the\nsoul and a future life becomes a myth invented by the priests of the\nvarious religions. With this inconvenient restraint removed, there\nremains no alternative save to aspire to the acquisition of all the\npleasures of life; and for him who lacks the wherewithal to procure\nthem for himself there remains no other recourse than to seek them by\nmeans of violence or strategy. Hence anarchy. In this supposition,\nmorality no longer possesses that sole, true, and efficacious sanction\nwhich religion alone can furnish; it amounts to nothing more than the\nresultant of the evolution of the individual\u2019s perfections and their\nco\u00f6rdination to the well-being of his race and of society. But if, by\nreason of retarded evolution, the social instincts have not progressed\nto the point of repressing the individual or egoistic instincts,\nwhat guilt will there be in the delinquent who lapses into the most\natrocious crimes? Hence free will is another myth that positive\npsychology and the science of moral statistics have already been at\npains to explode.\n\n\u201cAnd behold the suffering, the unfortunate, and the dying deprived of\ntheir sole consolation, the last hope which faith held out to them,\nand society reduced to an inferno of desperadoes and suicides! I could\ngo on showing in this way, to what a pass the evolutionistic theories\nbring society and the individual.\u201d (\u201cLa teoria dell\u2019 evoluzione e le\nsue applicazioni,\u201d p. 46.)\n\n\n\n\n                               GLOSSARY\n\n\n    _Abiogenesis_: The discredited hypothesis that life may\n    originate spontaneously in lifeless matter, _i.e._, apart from\n    the influence of living matter.\n\n    _Adaptation_: (1) The reciprocal aptitude of organism and\n    environment for each other; (2) a structure, modification of\n    structure, or behavioristic response enabling the organism to\n    solve a special problem imposed by the environment; (3) the\n    process by which the organism\u2019s adjustment to the environment\n    is brought about.\n\n    _Allelomorphs_: Genes located opposite each other on homologous\n    chromosomes and representing contrasting characters; they\n    are separated during meiosis according to the Mendelian\n    law of segregation, _e.g._ the genes for red and white\n    in Four o\u2019clocks which when united give rise to pink, and\n    when segregated, to red and white flowers respectively, are\n    allelomorphs of each other.\n\n    _Alluvial_: Pertaining to the Alluvium, which consists of\n    fresh-water deposits of the Pleistocene and Recent series, to\n    be distinguished from the Diluvium which consists of older\n    Pleistocene formations.\n\n    _Amino-acids_: The chemical building-stones of the\n    proteins\u2014organic acids containing one or more amino-groups\n    (\u2014NH\u2082) in place of hydrogen, _e.g._, amino-acetic acid,\n    CH\u2082\u00b7NH\u2082\u00b7COOH.\n\n    _Amnion_: A membranous bag which encloses the embryo in\n    higher vertebrates. The lower vertebrates, namely, fishes\n    and amphibia, have no amnion and are termed \u201canamniotic.\u201d\n    The reptiles, birds, and mammals which possess it are termed\n    amniotic vertebrates.\n\n    _Amphioxus_: The most simply organized animal having a\n    dorsal notochord. It is classified among the Acrania in\n    contradistinction to the craniate Chordates which make up the\n    bulk of the vertebrates.\n\n    _Angiosperms_: The higher plants, which have their seeds\n    enclosed in seed-vessels.\n\n    _Anthropoid Apes_: Apes of the family SIMIID\u00c6, which approach\n    man most closely in their organization, namely, the chimpanzee,\n    the gorilla, the gibbon, and orang-utan.\n\n    _Antibody_: Chemical substances produced in the blood in\n    reaction to the injection of antigens or toxic substances and\n    capable of counteracting or neutralizing said substance. Such\n    antibodies are specific for determinate antigens.\n\n    _Antigen_: Any substance that causes the production of special\n    antibodies in the blood of susceptible animals, after one or\n    several injections.\n\n    _Arthropods_: The phylum of exoskeletal invertebrates\n    comprising crustaceans, arachnida, insects, etc.\n\n    _Atavism_: The resemblance to an ancestor more distant than the\n    parents.\n\n    _Automatism_: A spontaneous action, not in response to\n    recognizable stimuli.\n\n\n    _Basichromatin_: That portion of a cell\u2019s nuclear network which\n    contains nuclein and is deeply stained by basic dyes.\n\n    _Biparental_: Derived from two progenitors, _i.e._, a father\n    and mother.\n\n    _Brachiopods_: Invertebrate animals bearing a superficial\n    resemblance to bivalve molluscs, but belonging to a totally\n    different group\u2014lamp shells.\n\n\n    _Cambrian_: The \u201coldest\u201d system of the Pal\u00e6ozoic group of\n    fossiliferous rocks.\n\n    _Carbohydrates_: The sugars, starches, etc.,\u2014polyhydric\n    alcohols with aldehydic or ketonic groups, and acetals of same,\n    etc.\n\n    _Catalyst_: A substance which accelerates a chemical reaction\n    without permanently participating in it, being left over\n    unchanged at the end of the process.\n\n    _Centriole_: The centrioles or central bodies are the foci of\n    mitotic division in animal cells, as well as the source of\n    the kinetic elements developed by such cells. They are minute\n    bodies usually located within a larger sphere known as the\n    centrosome or centrosphere. They do not occur in the cells of\n    the higher plants.\n\n    _Cephalopods_: A class of molluscs in which the foot is\n    developed into a headlike structure with eyes and a circle of\n    arms, _e.g._, the octopus, the cuttlefish, the squid, and the\n    nautilus.\n\n    _Ceratites_: A genus of extinct cephalopods having a coiled\n    shell and crooked sutures.\n\n    _Character_: An external feature or sensible property of an\n    organism. It is the joint product of germinal factors (genes)\n    and environmental influences.\n\n    _Chlorophyll_: The green pigment formed in the chloroplasts\n    (green plastids) of plant cells. It is a diester of phytyl\n    and methyl alcohols with the tribasic acid, chlorophyllin,\n    one of whose carboxyls is esterified with methyl alcohol, a\n    second with phytol, while the third is otherwise engaged.\n    Chlorophyllin is a tribasic acid consisting of the\n    chlorophyllic chromogen group (containing magnesium) joined to\n    three carboxyl groups.\n\n    _Chondriosomes_: Cytoplasmic granules rodlike, threadlike,\n    or spherical in form, which often appear to divide on the\n    mitotic spindle, and are therefore credited with the power of\n    independent growth and division. The chondriosomes of embryonic\n    tissues are thought to be the original sources of the plastids,\n    the fibrill\u00e6, and certain metaplastic granules.\n\n    _Chordates_: The phylum of animals whose primary axial skeleton\n    consists temporarily or permanently of a notochord.\n\n    _Chromatin_: Same as basichromatin.\n\n    _Chromosomes_: The short threads or rodlike bodies into which\n    the basichromatin of the cell-nucleus is aggregated during\n    mitosis\u2014each chromosome is segmented into granules called\n    chromomeres\u2014in its submicroscopic structure it consists\n    of chain or linear series of genes (hereditary factors)\n    representing characters linked together in heredity,\n    each single chromosome being termed, on this account, a\n    \u201clinkage-group\u201d by geneticists.\n\n    _Ciliate_: A protozoan whose motor-apparatus consists of cilia,\n    _i. e._, hairlike protoplasmic projections capable of rapid and\n    co\u00f6rdinated vibratile movement.\n\n    _Cloaca_: A common passageway through which the intestine,\n    kidneys, and sex organs discharge their products,\u2014it occurs in\n    certain fishes, in amphibia, reptiles, and birds, and in a few\n    mammals.\n\n    _Coccyx_: Lower extremity of the vertebral column in man.\n\n    _Colloids_: Insoluble gumlike substances, which will not\n    diffuse through organic membranes.\n\n    _Commensalism_: The harmonious cohabitation of two organisms\n    belonging to different species, where the relation is not\n    necessarily beneficial nor necessarily harmful to either.\n\n    _Crossover_: The exchange or reciprocal transfer of whole\n    blocks of genes from one homologous chromosome to the\n    other, which sometimes occurs in synapsis, probably at the\n    strepsinema-stage.\n\n    _Crystalloids_: Soluble substances, which usually form crystals\n    and readily diffuse through organic membranes.\n\n    _Cyst_: A protective envelope formed around an organism during\n    period of rest.\n\n    _Cytode_: The non-nucleated cell hypothecated by Haeckel.\n\n    _Cyptoplasm_: The cell-body or extranuclear protoplasm of a\n    cell.\n\n\n    _Endomixis_: A process of nuclear reorganization among the\n    protozoa, which does not require the co\u00f6peration of two cells\n    as in conjugation (amphimixis).\n\n    _Endoskeleton_: An internal living skeleton providing\n    support and protection (as well as organs of movement, in\n    the bone-levers to which the muscles are attached)\u2014it is\n    characteristic of the vertebrates.\n\n    _Enzymes_: Organic catalysts, _i. e._, complex chemical\n    substances formed by organisms and serving to accelerate\n    chemical processes taking place in said organisms, _e. g._,\n    the digestive enzymes, which accelerate the hydrolysis of\n    starches, fats, and proteins.\n\n    _Epigenesis_: Development of the embryo by differentiation of\n    previously undifferentiated protoplasm.\n\n\n    _Fats_: Esters of the higher fatty or organic acids (such as\n    stearic, palmitic, and oleic) esterified with the trihydric\n    alcohol glycerine (glycerol).\n\n\n    _Gamete_: A reproductive cell specialized for syngamy, _i.e._,\n    for union with a complementary germ cell, their union giving\n    rise to a synthetic cell known as a zygote.\n\n    _Ganglion_: An aggregate of nerve-cells consisting mainly of\n    neural cell-bodies together with supporting cells.\n\n    _Ganoids_: Fishes covered with enameled bony scales, and now,\n    for the most part, extinct.\n\n    _Gene_: A factor or infinitesimal element in a nuclear thread\n    or chromosome, the latter being a linear aggregate of such\n    factors, each having definite specificity and manifesting\n    itself in the external character which develops from it.\n\n    _Genotype_: The total assemblage of germinal factors\n    transmitted by a given species of organism, that is, the\n    complete complex of genes synthesized in the zygote and\n    perpetuated by equation-divisions in the somatic cells. Hence\n    the basic germinal or hereditary constitution of an organism or\n    group of organisms.\n\n    _Germ Cells_: Cells specialized for reproduction as contrasted\n    with other vital functions, _e.g._, spores and gametes.\n\n    _Germ-plasm_: The material basis of inheritance.\n\n    _Glacial Epoch_: After the close of the Tertiary period,\n    Europe and North America are said to have been covered with\n    vast ice sheets known as continental glaciers (the result of\n    great climatic changes in the Northern hemisphere). As the\n    weather varied these ice sheets advanced and retreated, the\n    retreats corresponding to the so-called Interglacial intervals.\n    Four Glacial and three Interglacial stages are distinguished,\n    and it was during the Second and Third of these Interglacial\n    stages that Pal\u00e6olithic Man is alleged to have entered Europe.\n     _Golgi Bodies_: A cytoplasmic apparatus consisting, in its\n    localized form, of a network, and, in its dispersed form,\n    of scattered granules. It appears to divide on the mitotic\n    spindle, and seems to have some important function connected\n    with secretion.\n\n\n    _Habitat_: The locality in which a given animal or plant\n    normally lives.\n\n    _Hallux_: The great toe, opposable in the ape, but not in man.\n\n    _Heredity_: \u201cThe appearance in offspring of characters whose\n    differential causes are in the germ cells\u201d (Conklin).\n\n    _Heterozygous_: Hybrid,\u2014the condition in which the chromosomal\n    genes paired by syngamy in the zygote are unlike.\n\n    _Homologous Chromosomes_: Corresponding chromosomes of the\n    same synaptic pair, being of paternal and maternal origin\n    respectively.\n\n    _Homozygous_: Pure,\u2014the condition in which the chromosomal\n    genes paired in the zygote by syngamy are alike.\n\n    _Hormone_: An internal secretion elaborated in the endocrine\n    or ductless glands and diffused in the blood stream for the\n    purpose of influencing the activities or metabolism of parts of\n    the organism at a distance from the source of the hormone, _e.\n    g._, secretin, gastrin, adrenalin, etc.\n\n    _Hydrotheca_: The cuplike extension of the perisarc (skeletal\n    sheath) surrounding the hypostome (oral cone) and tentacles of\n    certain polyps.\n\n    _Hyloblatic_: Resembling the gibbon.\n\n\n    _Lemurs_: Four-handed animals allied to the Insectivora, with\n    curved nostrils and a claw instead of a nail on the first\n    finger of the rear hands.\n\n    _Lethals_: A genetical term for hereditary factors (genes)\n    which cause the death of the gametes or the zygotes that\n    contain them. In the case of zygotes, death results from the\n    homozygous, but not from the heterzygous, condition.\n\n    _Linin_: Same as oxychromatin.\n\n    _Litopterna_: A suborder of extinct ungulate mammals from the\n    Miocene and Pliocene of South America resembling horses or\n    llamas.  _Mammals_: Vertebrate animals which suckle their\n    young after birth.\n\n    _Meiosis_: The process whereby the chromosomes of synaptic\n    pairs (in the primary o\u00f6cyte or spermatocyte) are separated\n    in such a way that the resulting gametes (eggs, or sperms)\n    receive a haploid (halved) number of unpaired chromosomes,\n    instead of the diploid (double) number of paired chromosomes\n    characteristic of the zygote and the somatic cells of the\n    species.\n\n    _Metista_: Animals and plants normally multicellular and having\n    their cells differentiated into at least two distinct layers or\n    tissues\u2014the Metazoans and Metaphytes.\n\n    _Mitosis_: Typical cell-division, whose mechanism consists of\n    the spindle-fibers, and whose scope is to secure an exactly\n    equal partition of the single components of the nucleus of the\n    dividing cell between the two resultant daughter-cells.\n\n    _Monism_: A system of thought which holds that there is but one\n    substance, either mind (idealistic subjectivism), or matter\n    (objectivistic materialism),\u2014or else a substance that is\n    neither mind nor matter, but is the substantial ground of both.\n    Idealistic monism regards mind as the sole reality and matter\n    as its product. Materialistic monism regards matter as the sole\n    reality and mind as its product.\n\n\n    _Neolithic_: Pertaining to the Young-Stone Age, that is, to\n    prehistoric man of Post-glacial time. The implements of the\n    latter are of polished stone. The Young-Stone Age is said to\n    have begun about 7,000 years B.C., and to have ended with the\n    Copper Culture about 2,000 B.C. The Bronze Age, which followed\n    it, belongs to history.\n\n    _Neurone_: The nerve-cell with all its processes, consisting,\n    therefore, of the nucleated cell-body, the axone or discharging\n    fiber, and the dentrites or receiving fibers.\n\n\n    _O\u00f6lites_: An English term for the Jurassic, or middle system\n    of the Mesozoic group of fossiliferous rocks.\n\n    _Ontogeny_: The embryological development of the individual.\n    _Opposable_: A term applied to the thumb or great toe when they\n    are capable of being placed with their tips opposite to those\n    of the other digits.\n\n    _Organelle_: Literally, a \u201cminiature organ,\u201d _i.e._, one of\n    the living components of a cell as distinguished from the\n    metaplastic or non-living inclusions.\n\n    _Oxychromatin_: That portion of the nuclear network which\n    stains with acidic dyes, the finer nuclear reticulum in which\n    the coarser strands of basichromatin appear to be suspended.\n\n\n    _Pal\u00e6olithic_: Belonging to the Old-Stone Age, which\n    corresponds to the latter half of the Glacial or Pleistocene\n    epoch. It is alleged to be the second period of prehistoric man\n    (following the Eolithic) and is characterized by implements\n    of unpolished stone shaped from flint by the chipping off of\n    flakes of the latter substance.\n\n    _Pal\u00e6ontology_: The science of fossil organisms.\n\n    _Pal\u00e6ozoic_: A term applied to the second group of\n    fossiliferous rocks, following the earliest, or Proterozoic,\n    group, and preceding the Mesozoic group. It comprises the\n    Cambrian, Ordovician, Devonian, Silurian, and Carboniferous\n    systems, and its sediments are the first that contain\n    well-preserved fossils.\n\n    _Parasitism_: A condition in which one organism (the parasite)\n    residing in, or upon, another species of organism (the host)\n    lives at its expense, the relation being detrimental to the\n    latter.\n\n    _Parthenogenesis_: The production of offspring from\n    unfertilized eggs.\n\n    _Phenotype_: The sum-total of external characters by whose\n    enumeration an organism is described\u2014the somatic or expressed\n    characters of an organism (or group of organisms) as\n    distinguished from those that are merely potential in the germ\n    cells.\n\n    _Phylogeny_: Developmental history of the race, the\n    hypothetical evolutionary history of the race, in\n    contradistinction to the embryological development of\n    the individual (ontogeny).  _Phylum_: A term used in\n    classification to denote any primary group of the plant or\n    animal kingdom.\n\n    _Plantigrade_: Walking on the whole sole of the foot, like\n    bears.\n\n    _Plastids_: Permanent organelles or living components of the\n    cellular cytoplasm, _e.g._, chloroplasts, leucoplasts, etc.\n\n    _Pleistocene_: The lower series of the Quaternary system of\n    fossiliferous rocks. It corresponds to the so-called Glacial\n    epoch, and extends from the close of the Tertiary period\n    (system) to the dawn of the Recent or Historical epoch.\n\n    _Polar Cell_: A synonym for polar body, or policyte. The\n    polar bodies are minute abortive cells given off by the egg\n    undergoing meiosis. Into them are shunted the chromosomes\n    which the egg discards in its process of nuclear reduction\n    (maturation).\n\n    _Pr\u00e6formation_: Theory that the egg contains a complete\n    miniature of the organism into which it develops.\n\n    _Prehension_: Grasping, catching hold.\n\n    _Progression_: Advancing movement, locomotion.\n\n    _Pro-simi\u00e6_: The lemurs as distinguished from genuine apes\n    (Simi\u00e6).\n\n    _Protista_: Animals or plants which are normally unicellular\n    and which when multicellular show no differentiation into\n    tissues\u2014the Protozoans and Protophytes.\n\n    _Protoplasm_: Living matter.\n\n\n    _Receptor_: An organ specialized to receive stimuli, _e.g._, a\n    sense-organ.\n\n\n    _Sedimentary_: A term applied to rocks which originated as\n    sediments deposited under water.\n\n    _Serum_: Watery portion of the blood, the plasma.\n\n    _Somatic Cells_: Vegetative cells not especially set aside by\n    the organism for reproductive purposes, _e.g._, tissue-cells.\n\n    _Somite_: One of the uniform segments of the longitudinal\n    series into which a metameric organism (such as an earthworm)\n    is partitioned.\n\n    _Spermatist_: An old term applied to one who held that the\n    animal embryo was produced entirely by the male parent.\n    _Spore_: A single cell, incapable of syngamy, but capable of\n    giving rise to a new individual without the sexual process.\n\n    _Symbiosis_: The obligatory association of two organisms of\n    different species for mutual benefit.\n\n    _Synapsis_: Union in pairs of corresponding (homologous)\n    chromosomes of opposite parental origin as a preliminary to\n    their separation in meiosis.\n\n    _Systematist_: An expert in classification (systematics), _i.\n    e._, a taxonomist.\n\n\n    _Taxonomy_: The science of classification.\n\n    _Tertiary Period_: A geological time-division corresponding to\n    the rock-system that comprises the greater part of the Cenozoic\n    group. It is made up of four series, namely, the Eocene,\n    Oligocene, Miocene, and Pliocene. Its close marks the beginning\n    of the Glacial or Pleistocene epoch.\n\n    _Tissue_: A layer of uniform cells specialized for the same\n    function.\n\n    _Tissue Cell_: One of the somatic cells of which a tissue is\n    composed.\n\n    _Troglodytic_: Resembling the chimpanzee and the gorilla.\n\n\n    _Woods Hole_: The seat of the Marine Biological Laboratory. It\n    is a watering-place on the New England coast opposite Martha\u2019s\n    Vineyard.\n\n\n    _Zygote_: The synthetic cell formed by the union of two gametes\n    and giving rise by division either to a new multicellular\n    organism, or to a rejuvenated cycle of unicellular forms.\n\n\n\n\n                           INDEX TO AUTHORS\n\n\n    Adami, J. G., 57.\n\n    Aeby, Christoph Theod., 274.\n\n    \u00c6sop, 246.\n\n    Alsberg, Moritz, 317.\n\n    Altman, Richard, 141.\n\n    Aquinas, St. Thomas, 32, 73, 268, 343.\n\n    Aristotle, 133, 155, 172, 174, 192, 196, 197, 200, 202, 214, 215,\n      227, 230.\n\n    Armstrong, H. E., 190.\n\n    Arrh\u00e9nius, Svante, 166, 167, 182, 183, 184.\n\n    Augustine, St., 32, 73, 74, 75.\n\n\n    Bach, Alexis, 145, 146.\n\n    Bacon, Francis, 86, 87.\n\n    Bagg, H. J., 266.\n\n    Balfour, Arthur James, 358.\n\n    Ballou, W. H., 318.\n\n    Bardon, L., 330.\n\n    Bastian, Charlton, 165.\n\n    Bateson, Wm., 1, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 28, 30, 43, 44,\n      73, 84, 85, 88, 145, 146, 334.\n\n    Bather, F. A., 3, 40, 76, 77, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93.\n\n    Baudlisch, Oscar, 148.\n\n    Baur, E., 88.\n\n    Beddoe, 333.\n\n    Bergson, Henri, 262.\n\n    Bernouilli, Jacques, 248.\n\n    Bey, Pruner-, 324.\n\n    Binet, Alfred, 220.\n\n    Biot, Jean Baptiste, 135.\n\n    Blackwelder, Eliot, 117.\n\n    Blake, C. Carter, 324.\n\n    Blakeslee, Albert F., 17, 21, 22, 23.\n\n    Blanford, Wm. Thomas, 95.\n\n    Boule, Marcellin, 332.\n\n\n    Bouvier, E. L., 239, 260, 261, 265.\n\n    Bouyssonie, A. J. & P., 330.\n\n    Boveri, Th., 139.\n\n    Branco, W., 344.\n\n    Breuil, Abb\u00e9 Henri, 290, 342.\n\n    Brown, Barnum, 270, 310.\n\n    Bryan, Wm. Jennings, 1, 343.\n\n    Buffon, C. L., 305.\n\n    B\u00fchler, Karl, 218, 220.\n\n    Bum\u00fcller, J., 273, 274.\n\n    Burroughs, John, 244.\n\n    Burton-Opitz, Russel, 299.\n\n\n    Calkins, Gary N., 39, 40, 161.\n\n    Campbell, Marius Robinson, 107 note\n\n    Carazzi, D., 304.\n\n    Castle, W. E., 43.\n\n    Caullery, Maurice, 12, 28, 29, 277.\n\n    Chamberlain, T. C., 125.\n\n    Chetverikov, S. S., 115, 116.\n\n    Chiesa, Luigi, 210.\n\n    Clausen, Roy Elwood, 26.\n\n    Clemont, 324.\n\n    Clifford, Wm. Kingdon, 237.\n\n    Cohn, Ferd. Jul., 182.\n\n    Coleman, Arthur P., 113, 114, 115.\n\n    Comte, (Isidore) Auguste, 225, 226.\n\n    Conklin, E. G., 270.\n\n    Copernicus, Nicholas, XII, XIII.\n\n    Coulter, John Merle, 24.\n\n    Creighton, J. E., 238.\n\n    Croll, James, 290.\n\n    Crookes, Sir Wm., 183.\n\n    Cuvier, Georges, 67, 72, 76, 90, 91, 102.\n\n\n    Dana, James Dwight, 111, 114, 117, 270.\n\n\n    Darwin, Charles, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 24, 30, 32, 65, 68, 75, 81, 152,\n      191, 194, 236, 238, 245, 246, 269, 277, 286, 287, 288, 290, 295,\n      296, 297, 298, 302, 305, 307, 338, 349, 352, 353, 360.\n\n    Da Vinci, Leonardo, 257.\n\n    Davis, Bradley Moore, 25, 26, 27, 28.\n\n    Davis, J. Barnard, 324.\n\n    Dawson, Sir John William, 345.\n\n    Dawson, Charles, 320.\n\n    Deaver, J. B., 295.\n\n    De Chardin, Teilhard, 320.\n\n    De Geer, Gerard, 289.\n\n    Delage, Yves, 127, 150, 151.\n\n    De Mattos, Alexander Teixeira, 247 note.\n\n    De Puydt, Marcel, 326.\n\n    Descartes, Ren\u00e9, 172, 197, 198, 202, 231, 249.\n\n    De Vires, Hugo, 16, 17, 20.\n\n    Dewey, John, 350.\n\n    Dorlodot, Canon Henri de, XII, 31, 34, 47, 70, 74.\n\n    Dreisch, Hans, 12, 70, 172, 174, 190, 202, 244, 252.\n\n    Dubois, Eug\u00e8ne, 313, 314, 316, 318.\n\n    Du Bois-Reymond, Emil, 11, 268, 277, 352.\n\n    Dumas, Jean Baptiste, 135.\n\n    Duponceau, Pierre \u00c9tienne, 338.\n\n    Dupont, Andr\u00e9 Hubert, 326.\n\n    Dwight, Thomas, 36, 51, 59, 274, 275, 278, 285, 303, 304, 309, 319,\n      320, 328, 336, 337.\n\n\n    Ecclesiastes, 192.\n\n    Ehrlich, Paul, 57.\n\n    Eimer, Th., 7.\n\n    Eliot, Charles W., 358.\n\n    Evans, Sir Arthur, 339.\n\n    Ezekiel, 89.\n\n\n    Fabre, J. H., 240, 247 note, 249, 251, 252, 254, 258, 260, 263, 264,\n      265, 266.\n\n    Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 149.\n\n\n    Fenton, Henry John H., 146.\n\n    Fischer, Emil, 145.\n\n    Fleischmann, Albert, 12.\n\n    Flemming, W., 137.\n\n    Fontaine, T., 208.\n\n    Fraipont, Julien, 327.\n\n    Fuhlrott, C., 323.\n\n\n    Galiani, 11.\n\n    Galilei, Galileo, XII, XIII.\n\n    Garbowski, Thad., 284.\n\n    Gaskell, Walter Holbrook, 293, 294.\n\n    Gatenby, J. B., 140.\n\n    Geikie, Sir Archibald, 96, 97, 107 note.\n\n    Gerard, John, S.J., 82.\n\n    Goodrich, Edwin S., 15, 62.\n\n    Goodspeed, T. H., 26.\n\n    Grabau, Amadeus, Wm., 335.\n\n    Grassi, B., 66.\n\n    Gray, Henry, 299.\n\n    Gregory, W. K., 270, 309, 310, 311, 318, 348.\n\n    Grignard, Victor, 209.\n\n    Gruender, Hubert, 233 note.\n\n    Gummersbach, Joseph, 247 note.\n\n    Guyer, M. F., 15, 266.\n\n\n    Haacke, Joh. Wilh., 275, 317.\n\n    Haeckel, Ernest, 33, 48, 89, 138, 186, 237, 275, 277, 278, 345.\n\n    Hamann, Joh. Georg, 149.\n\n    Handlirsch, Anton, 115.\n\n    Hartmann, Karl Robert Eduard von, 358.\n\n    Harvey, William, 155.\n\n    Haswell, Wm. A., 316, 317.\n\n    Hauser, O., 329.\n\n    Hayes, Charles Willard, 107 note.\n\n    Heilprin, Angelo, 120, 121.\n\n    Heim, Albert, 107 note.\n\n    Helmholtz, Herman von, 182, 298.\n\n    Henderson, Lawrence J., 6, 153, 175, 176, 179.\n\n    Hertwig, Oskar, 284.\n\n    Hertwig, Richard, 315.\n\n    Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 127.\n\n\n    Holworth, Sir Henry, 98.\n\n    Horace, 54, 109.\n\n    Howe, John Allen, 104, 105.\n\n    Howell, Wm. H. 299.\n\n    Hrdli\u010dka, A., 316, 318, 319, 322, 323, 325, 328, 329, 331, 332.\n\n    Hubrecht, Ambrosius Arnold William, 309, 317.\n\n    Hume, David, 198.\n\n    Huxley, Thomas H., 20, 67, 76, 98, 111 note, 236, 237, 314, 325, 333.\n\n\n    Jaggar, T. A., Jr., 346, 347, 348.\n\n    James, William, 205, 206, 212, 249.\n\n    Jennings, H. S., 250.\n\n    Johnson, Dr. George, XVI.\n\n    Jordan, David Starr, 4, 18, 28.\n\n    J\u00f6rgensen, J., 146, 147.\n\n    Judd, J. W., 94.\n\n\n    Kammerer, Paul, 14, 266.\n\n    Kant, Immanuel, 198.\n\n    Keen, W. W., 48.\n\n    Keith, Arthur, 319, 322, 328, 332, 336, 337.\n\n    Kellogg, Vernon I., 46 note, 53 note, 350, 351.\n\n    Kerr, J. Graham, 280, 282, 284.\n\n    Keyser, C. J., 204.\n\n    Kidd, F., 146.\n\n    Klaatsch, A., 308, 309, 312, 317, 326, 328, 330.\n\n    Koenen, C., 326.\n\n    Kofoid, Charles A., 118, 162.\n\n    Kohlbrugge, J. H. F., 274, 275, 277, 285, 308.\n\n    K\u00f6lliker, Rudolph Albert, 7.\n\n    Kollman, Julius, 285, 286, 317.\n\n    Kramberger, K. Gorjanovi\u0107, 320, 333.\n\n\n    Lamarck, Jean Baptiste, 8, 9, 16, 30, 32, 65, 286, 290.\n\n    Lankester, E. Ray, 186.\n\n    Laplace, Pierre Simon, 181.\n\n    Lebedeff, 183.\n\n    Le Conte, Joseph N., 345.\n\n    Lee, 333.\n\n    Leydig, Franz, 137.\n\n    Linn\u00e9, Carl von, 4.\n\n    Loeb, Jacques, 159, 249, 250, 252, 264.\n\n    Lohest, Maximin, 326.\n\n    Lotsy, J. P., 25.\n\n    Lucretius, 30.\n\n    Lull, Richard S., 115.\n\n\n    Macalister, R. A. S., 342.\n\n    MacCurdy, George Grant, 317, 326, 329, 331, 332.\n\n    MacDowell, E. C., 266.\n\n    MacManus, T., 359.\n\n    Macnamara, N. C., 314, 325.\n\n    Manouvrier, L., 316, 333.\n\n    Marx, Karl, 360.\n\n    Mathews, Albert, 293, 294, 302.\n\n    Maxwell, J. Clerk, 183.\n\n    McCann, Alfred W., 31, 32, 33, 34, 47, 50, 51.\n\n    McConnell, R. G., 107, note, 109.\n\n    McGregor, J. H., 315, 316, 317, 320, 322.\n\n    Melanchthon, Phillip, 197.\n\n    Mendel, Gregor Johann, 3, 24, 27, 28, 32.\n\n    Mendel\u00e9ef, Dimitri Ivanovitch, 56.\n\n    Mercier, D\u00e9sir\u00e9 Cardinal, 204, 205, 208.\n\n    Meyer, Ludwig, 302, 324.\n\n    Michael Angelo, 257.\n\n    Miller, Arthur M., 97, 98.\n\n    Miller, Gerrit, 321.\n\n    Minchin, E. A., 5.\n\n    Moore, Benjamin F., 150, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170.\n\n    Morgan, C. Lloyd, 233 note, 234 note, 237.\n\n    Morgan, Thomas Hunt, 12, 16, 36, 44, 64, 85, 86, 88, 89, 276, 278,\n      306, 334.\n\n    Morton, Dudley J., 270.\n\n    Muckermann, H., S.J., 325.\n\n    M\u00fcller, Fritz, 48, 275, 278.\n\n    M\u00fcller, Max, 338.\n\n\n    N\u00e4geli, Karl Wilhelm, 7, 186.\n\n    Newman, John Henry, 354.\n\n    Newell, Bro. Matthias, 347.\n\n    Newton, Sir Isaac, XIII.\n\n    Nicholson, Henry Alleyne, 97, 272.\n\n    Nicomachus, 196.\n\n\n    Obermaier, Hugues, 289, 290, 324, 327, 329, 342.\n\n    Occam, William of, 67, 349.\n\n    Osborn, Henry Fairfield, 2, 33, 65, 70, 76, 88, 89, 90, 170, 289,\n      290, 309, 318, 342.\n\n\n    Paley, William, 11.\n\n    Parker, G. H., 9, 233 note, 295.\n\n    Parker, T. Jeffery, 316, 317.\n\n    Pasteur, Louis, 135, 181.\n\n    Paulsen, Friederich, 206.\n\n    Pawlow, Ivan, 242, 249, 266.\n\n    Pearson, Karl, 310.\n\n    Peckham, Geo. W. and Eliz. G., 265.\n\n    Perrier, Remy, 296.\n\n    Pfizenmayer, E., 91, 92.\n\n    Pictet, Am\u00e9, 143.\n\n    Pirrson, L. V., 107 note, 109.\n\n    Plato, 172, 197.\n\n    Poulton, Edward B., 186.\n\n    Price, George McCready, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 120.\n\n    Price, T. S., 167.\n\n\n    Quatrefages De Breau, Jean Louis Armand de, 276.\n\n\n    Ranke, J., 271, 272, 273, 274, 324.\n\n    Rautert, 326.\n\n    Ray, John, 5, 20.\n\n    Redi, Francesco, 134, 136, 137.\n\n    Reinke, J., 345, 346.\n\n    Renner, O., 16.\n\n    Richter, Herm. Eberh., 182.\n\n    Riddle, Oscar, 300.\n\n    Robinson, James Harvey, 190, 194, 195, 236.\n\n    R\u00f6sch, Joseph, 318.\n\n    Rothpletz, Aug., 107 note.\n\n    Russell, Bertrand, 204.\n\n\n    Santayana, George, 350.\n\n    Sapir, Edward, 338.\n\n    Schaaffhausen, D., 150, 325, 333.\n\n    Sch\u00e4fer, E. A., 58, 165, 179, 184, 185.\n\n    Schleiden, Matthias J., 136.\n\n    Schmidt, H. D., 260.\n\n    Schoetensack, Otto, 318, 319.\n\n    Schroeder, Ch. F., 251.\n\n    Schuchert, Charles, 97, 98, 104 note, 106, 109, 110.\n\n    Schultze, F. E., 218.\n\n    Schultze, Max, 137, 138.\n\n    Schwalbe, Gust. Alb., 286, 317, 324, 325, 333.\n\n    Schwann, Theodor, 136.\n\n    Scott, Wm. B., 78, 96, 103, 119, 120.\n\n    Sedgwick, A., 95.\n\n    Sellars, R. W., 233 note.\n\n    Sewall, Anna, 236.\n\n    Smith, G. Elliot, 289, 341.\n\n    Smith, John Talbot, 355.\n\n    Smith, William, 102.\n\n    Snell, Karl, 308.\n\n    Sollas, W. J., 289.\n\n    Spallanzani, Lazzaro, 134, 136.\n\n    Spencer, Herbert, 10, 12, 98, 102, 103, 148, 166, 179, 360.\n\n    Starling, Ernest H., 57, 299, 301.\n\n    Stockard, Charles R., 62.\n\n    Stoll, A., 146.\n\n\n    Taylor, J., 340.\n\n    Tertullian, 346.\n\n    Thayer, Wm. Sydney, 135.\n\n    Tholuck, Fried. Aug., 338.\n\n    Thompson, Sir Wm., 182.\n\n    Thorndyke, Edward L., 237.\n\n    Tilden, Sir Wm., 151, 192.\n\n    Titchener, Edward Bradford, 205, 209, 274.\n\n    Tredgold, A. F., 15 note.\n\n    Tuccimei, Giuseppe, XIII, 360, 361.\n\n    Tyndall, John, 149.\n\n\n    Vallisnieri, Antonio, 134.\n\n    Van Loon, Hendrick Willem, 190.\n\n    Vegard, Lars, 183 note.\n\n    Vicari, E. M., 266, 267.\n\n    Virchow, Rudolph, 137, 273, 316, 317, 324, 346.\n\n    Vogt, Carl, 276, 324.\n\n\n    Waagen, W., 16 note.\n\n    Warner, H., 274.\n\n    Walkhoff, O., 317.\n\n    Walsh, James J., 336.\n\n    Ward, James, 163.\n\n    Wasmann, Erich, S.J., XII, 11, 33, 46, 47, 48, 49, 49 note, 67, 70,\n      134, 247 note, 261, 262, 277, 312, 313, 325, 333.\n\n    Waterston, David, 322.\n\n    Watson, John B., 198, 204, 250.\n\n    Wayland, John Walter, 357.\n\n    Weismann, August, 10, 13, 16, 25, 65, 186, 267.\n\n    Weber, Ernest Heinrich, 227.\n\n    Weld, H. P., 253, 255.\n\n    Welday, J. O., 357.\n\n    Wells, H. G., 1, 33, 190.\n\n    Wenstrup, Edward, O.S.B., XVI.\n\n    Werner, Abraham Gottlob, 99, 102, 103.\n\n    Wheeler, Geo. C. and Esther H., 261.\n\n    Wiedersheim, Robert, 292.\n\n    Wilder, Harris Hawthorne, 300, 301.\n\n    Williams, H. S., 96.\n\n    Willis, Bailey, 107 note.\n\n    Willst\u00e4tter, R., 146, 147.\n\n    Wilson, Edmund B., 6, 12, 13, 140, 141, 143, 160, 164, 168, 170,\n      200, 201, 211.\n\n    Windle, Bertram C. A., 134, 341.\n\n    Wirth, Edmund J., 205.\n\n    Wissler, Clark, 344.\n\n    Woodruff, Lorande Loss, 39, 115.\n\n    Woods, Henry, 77, 78, 79, 80, 86, 118, 119.\n\n    Woodward, A. Smith, 321, 322, 340, 341.\n\n    Woodworth, Robert S., 198.\n\n    Wright, C. F., 289.\n\n    Wundt, Wilhelm, 197, 205, 206, 209, 212, 236, 237, 238.\n\n\n    Zahm, J. A., 268.\n\n    Zeno, 226.\n\n    Zittel, Karl A. von, 313, 345.\n\n\n\n\n                           INDEX OF SUBJECTS\n\n\n    Abiogenesis, 131, 135, 136, 142, 160, 165, 167, 179, 183, 186;\n      \u201cnew theory\u201d of, 165;\n      \u201cold theory\u201d of, 165;\n      \u201cphilosophical\u201d proof of, 186\n\n    Absence of function, real, 291;\n      apparent, 291\n\n    Abstract concept, 219\n\n    Abstraction, 221, 224, 254, 261, 262;\n      of active intellect predispositive, 221;\n      of intellect, potential, cognitive, 221;\n      power of, 261, 262;\n      process of, 221, 224\n\n    Abstract thought, 215, 267;\n      has soul as its exclusive agent and subject, 215;\n      not same as imagery, 215;\n      unique prerogative of man, 267\n\n    Acids, butyric, 159;\n      carbonic, 145;\n      fatty, 145;\n      formic, 145\n\n    Acromegaly, 294\n\n    Acromikria, 294\n\n    Act, 199\n\n    Action, 174, 175, 176, 177, 215, 216;\n      agent of, 176;\n      an expression of entity, 125, 216;\n      chemical, 175;\n      effect of, 176, 177;\n      electrical, 176;\n      energy-content of, 174;\n      immanent, defined, 177;\n      mechanical, 175;\n      physical, 175;\n      reflexive, 177;\n      subject of, 176;\n      transitive, 174, 177;\n      defined, 177;\n      vital, 175\n\n    Active intellect, 220, 221\n\n    Activity, organic cannot escape physical determinism, 232\n\n    Adaptation, 7, 8, 9, 16, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 124, 250, 290, 291,\n      328;\n      acquired, 8, 9, 16, 45, 290, 328, 333\n        \u2014not inheritable, 9;\n      innate (inherited), 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 124;\n      of instinctive behavior to emergencies, 250;\n      structural, 291\n\n    Additive properties, 233 _note_\n\n    Adjustments, 204\n\n    Adolescence, 155\n\n    Adrenal bodies, 292, 295\n\n    Adults, 276\n\n    Aeschna grandis L., 115\n\n    Aftermath of evolutionary propaganda, 360\n\n    Agametes, 156\n\n    Agamic, 156\n\n    Agent, 171, 177\n\n    Age of Man, 289, 290\n\n    Agnosticism, 352, 355, 358;\n      parasitic, 358\n\n    Agulhas, Lost Land of, 114\n\n    Alberta, 108\n\n    Albumen, living and dead, 144\n\n    Alcohol, methyl, 147;\n      phytyl, 147\n\n    Aldehyde, 145, 148\n\n    Aldol condensation, 145\n\n    Allelomorphic, 42\n\n    Allocation, taxonomic, 320\n\n    Alluvial epoch, 313;\n      loam, 324\n\n    Alpha Centauri, 184\n\n    Alps, 109\n\n    Altamira, caves of, 339, 340, 343\n\n    Alternating personalities, 211;\n      psychopathic condition, 211\n\n    Altruism, 355, 356;\n      without adequate motivation, 356\n\n    Amboceptors, 57\n\n    American Association for Advancement of Science, 343, 344;\n      Edict of, 343\n\n    Ammonites, 84, 86, 249;\n      intergradence in, 84\n\n    Ammonium cyanate, 173\n\n    Ammophila, 264\n\n    Ammophila gryphus, 261\n\n    Ammophila urnaria, 261\n\n    Amnion, 276\n\n    Am\u0153ba albida, 159\n\n    Amphibia, 61, 281, 296\n\n    Amphioxus, 60, 161\n\n    Analogous organs, 35, 36, 61\n\n    Analogy, 35, 59, 60;\n      convergent, 61\n\n    Analysis, 144;\n      chemical, 144;\n      physical, 144\n\n    Anarchy, 355, 360\n\n    Anatomists, 296\n\n    Anatomy, 196, 208, 276, 277, 303, 308;\n      comparative, 276, 277, 308;\n      of consciousness, attempted by Associationists, 208\n\n    Ancestors, 55, 59, 76, 82, 83, 92, 95, 115, 270, 280, 296, 304, 308,\n      309, 317, 349;\n      collateral, 76;\n      common, 55, 59, 83, 92, 269, 270, 278, 308;\n      direct, 76;\n      hypothetical, 308, 309, 317;\n      necessary priority of, 82, 83;\n      of man, 298\n        \u2014alleged to be fish-like, 280;\n      tertiary, 270\n\n    Ancestry, 92, 280;\n      entails antecedence in time, 92;\n      of man, 280\n\n    Ancitherium, 76\n\n    Angiosperms, 72, 73\n\n    Animal, 242, 249, 307;\n      appetite, gratification of, 242;\n      as \u201creflex machines,\u201d 249;\n      cave, 307\n\n    Animalism, 365\n\n    Animalistic man, 350, 352\n\n    Animality of man, not a modern discovery, 191, 192\n\n    Animism, 197, 198\n\n    Anisogametes, 157, 158\n\n    Anisogamy, 157, 158\n\n    Annelida, 117, 278, 280\n\n    Anomalies, 112, 303, 305, 319, 320;\n      anatomical, fluctuational, 303;\n      mutational, 303;\n      of spatial distributions, 112\n\n    Antagonism, 358;\n      between modern progress and Christian ideal, 358\n\n    Anthropomorphism, 236, 246, 250, 262;\n      Darwinian, 236, 250\n\n    Anthropologists, 318, 344;\n      foremost ones confess their ignorance regarding origin of man, 344\n\n    Antibodies, 14, 15\n\n    Antigen, 15\n\n    Antirrhinum, majus and molle, 88\n\n    Anti-vivisectionists, 236\n\n    Ants, 261, 262; leaf-cutting, 261\n\n    Ape, 245, 270, 272, 275, 285, 308, 309, 311, 314, 315, 316, 317, 345;\n      anthropoid, 270, 271, 272, 275, 309, 315, 317;\n      cranial capacity, 314;\n      descended from man-like ancestor, 285;\n      descent from, not a doctrine of science, 345;\n      embryonic skull of, 285;\n      foot of, 50, 51\n        \u2014a hand functionally but not structurally, 50, 51;\n      fossil, 308, 313;\n      giant, geneological tree of, 315;\n      higher, 311;\n      its cranium, 271;\n      large, 315;\n      living, 308\n\n    Ape-like features, acquired adaptation, 330\n\n    Appalachians, 107\n\n    Appetite, 221, 235, 241;\n      rational, 221;\n      sensual, 235, 241\n\n    Appendicitis, 295\n\n    Appendix, vermiform, 295, 296;\n      useful, 296\n\n    Apple-tree, 6, 88, 161\n\n    Apterix, 305\n\n    Arbacia punctulata, 159\n\n    Arboreal life, 271, 308\n\n    Arca, 118\n\n    Arch\u00e6an, 104, 117;\n      record, damaged condition of, 117\n\n    Arch\u00e6ology, prehistoric, 339\n\n    Arch\u00e6opteryx, 86\n\n    Arch\u00e6ozoic, 104, 148;\n      times alleged to have been more favorable to origin of life, 148\n\n    Argument, 226;\n      no avail against fact, 226\n\n    Art, pal\u00e6olithic, 340\n\n    Artefacts, 154\n\n    Artemia salina, 159\n\n    Artemisia absynthium, 248\n\n    Arthropoda, 61, 119, 261, 284\n\n    Artificial illumination, 340\n\n    Artistic attainment, high level of, 340\n\n    Artists, pal\u00e6olithic, 335\n\n    Asia, 335\n\n    Ass, 5, 81, 304\n\n    Assimilation, 143\n\n    Association, 208, 235, 241, 242\n\n    Associationists, 208, 236\n\n    Astarte, 118\n\n    Asteroidea, 121, 122\n\n    Atavism, 303, 304\n\n    Atlantis, 114\n\n    Atmosphere, 148, 181, 183;\n      coronal of sun, 183;\n      formerly richer in carbon dioxide, 148;\n      of earth, 183\n\n    Atoms, 58, 144, 162, 165, 167, 170, 202;\n      structure of, 58\n\n    Atrophy, 285, 286, 288, 294, 299, 301, 302, 307;\n      due to misuse, 288;\n      somatic, 307\n\n    Attention, 208\n\n    Audist, 219\n\n    Aurignacian Man, 332\n\n    Aurora borealis, 183, 183 _note_, 184 _note_\n\n    Australian, 321, 325, 328, 330, 333;\n      blacks, 325, 333\n        \u2014modern, have brow ridges, 328;\n      modern, 325, 330;\n      skull of, 321\n\n    Author of Nature, 193\n\n    Autogamy, 158, 159, 161\n\n    Automatisms, 238, 240, 262;\n      teleological, 240\n\n    Automixis, 161\n\n    Autonomy, 174, 202;\n      dynamic, 174;\n      vital, 202\n\n    Axiom, 223, 224;\n      of reception, 223, 224\n\n    Axon, 213\n\n    Azoic bottom, 125\n\n\n    Babylonia, 337\n\n    Bacteria, 135, 138, 183, 183 _note_\n\n    Barbarism, 337;\n      historically a state of degeneration and stagnation, 337;\n      not a primitive condition, 337;\n      no instance of spontaneous emergence from, 337\n\n    Bacteriologists, 183\n\n    Baltic Sea, 104, 105\n\n    Banana, 162\n\n    Basichromatin, 139\n\n    Bear Grass quarries, 106\n\n    Beaver, 247, 257\n\n    Bedding plane, 106\n\n    Bees, 257\n\n    Beetles, wingless, 306\n\n    Behavior, 249, 254, 255, 260, 261, 262, 263;\n      instinctive, 249, 254, 255, 260\n        \u2014objectively useful, 254, 255\n        \u2014subjectively agreeable, 254, 255;\n      concursively telic, 260-262;\n      consciously telic, _i.\u202fe._, intelligent 262;\n      unconcursively telic, 262;\n      must be perfect from outstart, 263\n\n    Behaviorism, degeneration of psychology into, 198\n\n    Behaviorists, 204, 250\n\n    Bestial man, 340, 342;\n      impossible, 340;\n      no traces of, 342\n\n    Bestial origin, 345, 352;\n      of man, 352;\n      of man, theory of, 345\n\n    Bestial soul, 114, 194, 213, 214, 234;\n      an emergent of matter, 194, 234 _note_\n        \u2014not a product of physicochemical action, 194;\n      exists in the interest of the organism, 214;\n      incomplete complement of matter, 213;\n      material but not corporeal, 194, 214;\n      operates only in conjunction with organism, 213;\n      perishes with dissolution of organism, 213\n\n    Bible, 127\n\n    Biochemists, 179\n\n    Biogenetic Law, 48, 275, 276, 277, 278, 283, 285\n\n    Biologists, 2, 3, 11, 19, 29, 53 _note_, 190, 200, 257\n\n    Biology, xiv, 24, 196, 197, 205\n\n    Bion, 170, 171\n\n    Biophysicists, 179\n\n    Bipinnaria, 283\n\n    \u201cBiotic energy,\u201d 170\n\n    Bird of Paradise, 154, 353\n\n    Birds, 282, 296, 297\n\n    Bison, 331, 332\n\n    \u201cBlack Beauty,\u201d 236\n\n    Blackberries, 25\n\n    Blindness, germinal and somatic, 306\n\n    Blue-green Alg\u00e6, 138, 149, 181\n\n    Body, 198\n\n    Bone cave, 340\n\n    Bone fibres, 317\n\n    Bos primigenius, 329\n\n    Botany, 31, 55\n\n    Brachiopoda, 117, 118, 120\n\n    Bradypus, 52\n\n    Brain, 274, 315, 316;\n      human, 274\n        \u2014convolutions of, 274;\n      relative and absolute size of, 315;\n      relative size of, 316;\n      simian, 274\n\n    Brain case, 272\n\n    Brain cavities, below modern average, 329\n\n    Brain-fag, due to imaginative, not to intellectual activity, 228,\n      229, 230;\n      follows mere memorizing, 229\n\n    Branchial arches and clefts, 278, 279\n\n    Branchial lamell\u00e6, 279\n\n    Breasts, supernumerary, 304\n\n    Broken Hill Mine, 340\n\n    Bronze Age, historic, 337\n\n    Brow ridges, 328, 330, 333, 341;\n      most pronounced of any human specimen, 341\n\n    Brute, 213, 233, 235, 236, 360;\n      destitute of freedom, morality, responsibility, 233;\n      its psychic functions, all organic, 213;\n      lumination of, 236;\n      our common origin with, 360\n\n    Budding, 156\n\n    Burial, 330, 335;\n      deep, 335;\n      makes age of bones uncertain, 335;\n      solemn, indicates belief in immortality, 330\n\n    Butyric acid, 159\n\n\n    C\u00e6cum, 295\n\n    C\u00e6nogenesis, 277, 288\n\n    C\u00e6nozoic, 118, 119, 335\n\n    Calcium hydroxide, 145\n\n    Calicurgus, 263\n\n    Cambrian, 99, 100, 104, 105, 110, 116, 117, 118, 125;\n      Lower, 117;\n      terranes below, 125;\n      youthful appearance of, 104, 105\n\n    Canadian Shield, 104 _note_\n\n    Canadian survey, 108\n\n    Canal, alimentary, 293, 295, 301;\n      neural, 293\n\n    Canalization, 265\n\n    Carbohydrates, 145, 148;\n      production of, by plants, 145-148\u2014not a synthesis,\n      146-148\u2014analogous to process in animals, 146, 147\n\n    Carbon dioxide, 145-147\n\n    Carboniferous, 73, 92, 115, 118;\n      Lower, 92;\n      Upper, 115\n\n    Carnivora, 271\n\n    Catarrhine monkeys, 287\n\n    Catastrophes, 72, 182;\n      cosmic, 182\n\n    Catastophism, 67, 68, 98, 312;\n      new, 98\n\n    Caterpillar, 260, 264\n\n    Cats, 284\n\n    Causation, active and efficient, 171, 172\n\n    Cave rat, 307\n\n\n    Caves, 335, 336;\n      of France and Spain, 335, 336;\n      of Spain, 336\n\n    Cell-division, 59, 137, 138, 139, 155, 162, 163\n\n    Cell, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 155, 165, 168, 202, 301;\n      definition of, 137;\n      a multimolecule, 165;\n      cannot originate through exclusive agency of physicochemical\n        energies, 142;\n      fundamental unit of organization, 136;\n      germ, 156;\n      simplest of organic units capable of independent existence, 138;\n      simplest of organisms, 147;\n      somatic, 156;\n      submicroscopical components of, 141;\n      simplest form of organic life, 142;\n      vital, 142;\n      sperm, 137\n\n    Cell Theory, 136\n\n    Cellular continuity, 137, 141;\n      Fifth article of, 141;\n      Law of, 141\n\n    Centaur, constellation of, 184\n\n    Centers, sensory and motor, 251\n\n    Central neurones, 213, 222;\n      purpose of, 222\n\n    Centrioles, 140\n\n    Cephalic index, 329\n\n    Ceratites, 86\n\n    Ceratodus, 119\n\n    Cerebral cortex, 206, 213, 221, 222\n\n    Cerebral neurones, 222;\n      an extended receptor not proportioned to dematerialized abstract\n        objects, 222\n\n    Cerebrospinal system, 213\n\n    Certainty, 124, 125;\n      based on objective necessity, 124;\n      scientific, 125\n\n    Ceylon, 315\n\n    Chain-reflex, 250, 252\n\n    Chaldea, 337, 340\n\n    Chalk, 79, 86\n\n    Chance, 11, 151-154;\n      impotent to produce effect so complicatedly telic as an organism,\n        151;\n      its efficacy and impotence, 151-154\n\n    Change, adaptive, 53 _note_;\n      germinal, 42, 43, 68, 307;\n      kinds of, 42;\n      somatic, 68;\n      specific, 7, 23, 68, 88, 89, 307;\n      varietal, 7, 68, 88\n\n    Characters (somatic or external), 5, 6, 17, 18, 41, 62, 63, 87, 88,\n      121, 122, 278, 306, 334;\n      definition of, 41;\n      duplication and suppression of, 306;\n      embryonic not derived from adult, 278;\n      homologous and adaptational, 62, 63, 121\n        \u2014distinction has no experimental basis, 62;\n      \u201cinherited\u201d and \u201cacquired,\u201d 41\n\n    Chapelle-aux-Saintes, 288, 331;\n      Cave of, remains, 331;\n      remains, 228\n\n    Chela, 61, 261;\n      of lobster and African scorpion, 61\n\n    Chemical analysis, 143, 144, 216;\n      destroys life, 143, 144\n\n    Chemical synthesis of living matter possible, 142, 144\n\n    Chemist, 151;\n      guiding intelligence of need in synthesis of organic compounds,\n        151;\n      necessity of regulation, 151\n\n    Chemistry, 142, 350;\n      physical, 142\n\n    Chemotaxis, 264\n\n    Chick, 255\n\n    Chimaeroids, 119\n\n    Chimpanzee, 33, 270, 314, 323\n\n    Chin, 319, 320, 328;\n      may be accentuated by a mutation, 320;\n      prominence in Spy No. 1, 328;\n      recessive, 320;\n      recessiveness of the, 319;\n      recessiveness and protuberance of, 320;\n      recessiveness, an acquired adaptation, 320;\n      receding, acquired, 328\n\n    China, 110, 337\n\n    Chinless mandible, not sloping backward, 332\n\n    Chlorophyll, 62, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 154;\n      chromogen group of, 148;\n      chromogen complex, 148;\n      colloidal solution of, 145;\n      not a \u201csensitizer\u201d like Eosin, 147, 148;\n      regenerated from H\u2082O and CO\u2082, 147, 148;\n      \u201csensitizer,\u201d 145\n\n    Chondriosomes, 140\n\n    Christianity, 359\n\n    Chromatin, 138, 139\n\n    Chromiole, 138\n\n    Chromosomes, 17, 21, 27, 44, 45, 139, 141, 157, 158, 159;\n      diploid number normal, 159;\n      diploid number of, 157, 158, 159;\n      duplication of, 17, 21, 44, 45;\n      haploid number of, 157, 158, 159;\n      homologous,\n    17, 21;\n      random assortment of, 27\n\n    Chronology, 98;\n      lithic, 98;\n      principles of, 98\n\n    Chronometer, pal\u00e6ontological, 135\n\n    Chrysothrix, 274\n\n    Cidaris, 119\n\n    Ciliate, 163\n\n    Circumstances, environmental, 250-252\n\n    Civilization, old, destruction of, 336\n\n    Classes, 37\n\n    Classification, taxonomic, not historical, 112\n\n    Clays, Pleistocene, 289\n\n    Cleavage, 154, 159\n\n    Cloaca, 281\n\n    Coccyx, alleged rudiment of former tail, 297;\n      serves purpose, 298\n\n    Cockroaches, 115\n\n    Coelenterates, 78, 118\n\n    Coexistence of impressions, not a companion of them, 208\n\n    Cognitive intellect, 220, 221\n\n    Colloid systems, aggregates, not units, 168\n\n    Colloidal, 141, 170;\n      substances, 141;\n      systems not analogous to organisms, 170\n\n    Colloids, 166-169;\n      hydrophilic, 168, 169\n\n    Columns, continental and submarine, 114\n\n    Commanchian period, 72\n\n    Commensal, 46\n\n    Commensalism, 52\n\n    Common stock, 39\n\n    Comparative anatomy, 279, 304\n\n    Complexity, \u201cLaw\u201d of, 166, 167\n\n    Components, 138, 139, 141, 142, 168;\n      cytoplasmic and nuclear, 138, 139;\n      of cell, 141\n        \u2014self-perpetuating, 168;\n      of protoplasmic system, 141\n\n    Compounds, organic, 142\n\n    Concepts, 219, 220, 221, 247;\n      abstract and general, 220, 247;\n      rational, 247\n\n    Conceptual thought, 219, 222, 223;\n      concerned with the reality of essence, 219;\n      excludes materiality\n    from its specific agent and receptive subject, 222;\n      not communicated to organism, 223;\n      subject in soul alone, 223\n\n    Conduction path, 265\n\n    Condyles, occipital, 272\n\n    Conformity, 105, 107, 110;\n      \u201cdeceptive,\u201d 105, 110;\n      normal significance of, 105;\n      \u201cupside-down,\u201d 107\n\n    Conjugation, 157, 161\n\n    Consciousness, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 211, 235, 238, 240,\n      248, 262;\n      and unconsciousness, 198;\n      attests existence superficially variable but radically unchangeable\n        subject of mental life, 206;\n      attests persistence of our personal identity, 211;\n      dependence of all science upon, 204;\n      etymology of, 205, 206;\n      its testimony to the reality of the ego, 205;\n      organic and spiritual, 199;\n      phenomenal, 198;\n      sentient, 235, 238, 240, 248;\n      testimony of, 208\n\n    Constructions, complex and systematic, not producible by accident,\n      53, 154\n\n    Consolation, 358, 361;\n      destroyed, 361;\n      eliminated, 358\n\n    Contamination of media, 135\n\n    Contiguity, 241, 242;\n      association of, 241;\n      law of, 241, 242\n\n    Continents, 113, 114;\n      permanence of, 114\n\n    Continuity, 350;\n      destructive as metaphysics, 350;\n      leads to materialistic monism, 350;\n      principles of, 350;\n      nuclear, 137\n\n    Control, 236, 251-253;\n      intelligent, 253;\n      psychic, 251;\n      rational and moral, 236;\n      sensory, 251-253\n\n    Consequences\u2014socialism, anarchy, despair, 360\n\n    Convergence, 10, 36, 58, 59, 61, 63, 77, 78, 79, 80, 277, 283, 284,\n      287;\n      kinds of 77\n\n    Corpuscular, 174\n\n    Correlation, 90, 91, 93, 99, 101, 111;\n      Cuvier\u2019s Law of, 90, 91;\n      stratigraphic, 93, 96, 99, 101, 111\n\n    Cortical, 294, 315;\n      area, 274;\n      surface, 315\n\n\n    Cosmic scale, 350;\n      Cosmogony, 181, 185\n\n    Cosmopolitan species, 73\n\n    Cosmozoa, 182\n\n    Cranial box, 272\n\n    Cranial capacity, 274, 315, 317, 322, 325, 332, 341;\n      absolute, 332;\n      human, 341;\n      large, 341;\n      of man and ape compared, 274;\n      relative, 317, 332\n\n    Cranial vault, more spacious in Spy No. 2, 327\n\n    Cranium, 118, 271, 321, 325, 328, 329, 331, 333, 337, 341;\n      dolichocephalic, 325, 331;\n      flat on top, broad in back, 341;\n      modern, 333;\n      human, 328;\n      of ape, 271;\n      of man, 271;\n      not subsequent to barbarism, 337;\n      Spy, 331\n\n    Creation, 67, 72, 186, 187;\n      defined, 187;\n      new, 67, 72;\n      simultaneous or recessive, 72\n\n    Creationism, 55\n\n    Creator, 72, 249, 298, 350\n\n    Credulous persons misled, 353\n\n    Cretaceous, 100, 104, 108, 109, 111, 118;\n      shales, 109\n\n    Crete, 337\n\n    Cretinism, 294\n\n    Cries, 246;\n      emotional, 246;\n      instinctive, 246\n\n    Crinoids, 119\n\n    Crossing, 4, 5, 19-21, 25-28, 88;\n      interspecific, 19-21, 26, 27;\n      intervarietal, 19, 20, 27, 28;\n      does not produce \u201cnew species,\u201d 25-28\n\n    Crossover, 17, 26, 42\n\n    Crust, terrestrial, 113\n\n    Crustaceans, 117\n\n    Cryptorhetic system, 292-294\n\n    Crystalloids, 144\n\n    Crystals, 153\n\n    Crystal units, 144, 165\n\n    Ctenomys, 305\n\n    Cultures, 135, 309, 317;\n      sterilized and a\u00ebrated, 135\n\n    Curved femur, acquired adaptation, 328\n\n    Cycads, 118\n\n    Cycas, 118\n\n    Cysts, 134\n\n    Cytodes, 138, 179, 207\n\n    Cytologist, 136, 141\n\n\n    Cytology, 137\n\n    Cytoplasm, 137-139, 141;\n      of eggs differentiated, 141\n\n    Cytoplasmic components self-perpetuating, 139\n\n    Cytosome, 140\n\n\n    Darwinism, 1, 5, 6, 16, 24, 29, 30, 32, 78, 79, 85, 263, 265, 285,\n      291, 325;\n      contradicted by history, 337;\n      obsolete theory, 29, 30, 349\n\n    Datura stramonium, 21, 22, 23\n\n    Death, 156\n\n    Deceptive conformities, 98\n\n    Deep sea bottoms, 113\n\n    Degeneracy, 15, 15 _note_, 18, 336\n\n    Degradation of energy, 162, 163, 180;\n      implies beginning of life, 180;\n      law of, 162, 163\n\n    Delitzch, 118\n\n    Dependence, 217, 218, 221, 231;\n      direct, of psycho-organic functions on organism, 231;\n      incompatible with spirituality, 218;\n      intrinsic on matter, 218;\n      objective, not subjective, 221\n\n    Descent, 67, 80, 87, 88, 267, 269, 274, 277, 284, 305, 308, 310,\n      312, 315, 317, 345;\n      collateral, 269, 308, 312, 317\n        \u2014of man, 308, 317\n        \u2014theory of, 269, 312;\n      common, 269, 315\n        \u2014reference of, 269;\n      direct, Darwin\u2019s theory of, 274;\n      from ape, theory of, 274;\n      human, 317, 345\n        \u2014from pithecoid primates, not a historical fact, 345\n        \u2014theory of, 269;\n      lineal, 269, 305, 308, 309, 317\n        \u2014a chain of creatures, 305\n        \u2014from ape, theory of, 269\n        \u2014upheld by Darwin, 269;\n      of man, 308, 310;\n      theory of, 80, 277\n\n    Deterioration of organism does not always involve deterioration of\n      superorganic powers, 230\n\n    Devonian, 62, 99, 103, 106;\n      Middle, 106\n\n    De-Vriesianism, 23, 24, 29, 263, 265, 266, 349\n\n    Diester, phytyl-methyl, 147\n\n    Differences, 9, 12, 13, 16, 28, 37, 46, 81, 82, 84, 86, 89, 121,\n      171, 236, 237, 271, 272, 273, 320, 331, 333, 334, 359;\n      anatomical, between\n      Homo primigenius and Homo sapiens, 331, 334\n        \u2014between man and ape, 271-273;\n      between living and lifeless, 171;\n      fluctuational, 121;\n      generic, 37, 46, 82, 84, 86;\n      individual, 16\n        \u2014alleged summation of, 9, 20, 29;\n      major, 9, 37, 46, 320\n        \u2014relative and absolute, 37;\n      minor, 9, 37, 46, 320;\n      mutational, 121, 334;\n      ordinal, 46;\n      psychological, between man and brute, 236, 237, 359, 360\n        \u2014amount to a distinction of kind, 236, 237, 359, 360;\n      specific, 12, 13, 28, 37, 46, 81, 84, 86, 333, 334;\n      varietal, 46\n\n    Differential threshold, law of, 227\n\n    Differentiation, 284\n\n    Diffusion of venom, 264, 265\n\n    Digestion, stimulates lymphatic glands, 301\n\n    Dileptus gigas, 138, 174\n\n    Diluvium, European, 345\n\n    Dinoflagellata, 118\n\n    Dinosaurs, 100, 271\n\n    Diphasic, 134\n\n    Diploid forms, 44, 45, 47\n\n    Dipnoan, 119\n\n    Diptera, 48, 49\n\n    Discernment, 240\n\n    Discina, 118\n\n    Disconformity, non-evident, 105\n\n    Discrimination, 208\n\n    Discursive analysis, 243, 244\n\n    Disease germs, 141, 169, 170, 216;\n      invisible, identified by the pathological effects, 216;\n      submicroscopic, 141, 169, 170\n\n    Disintegration, atomic, 163\n\n    Dispersing medium, 168\n\n    Dissociation, 235, 242\n\n    Distributed nucleus, 138\n\n    Distribution, 92, 99, 100, 112, 113, 115;\n      chronological, 92;\n      geographical, hard to distinguish from chronological, 99, 100;\n      of plants and animals, 115;\n      spatial, anomalies of, 112, 113\n\n    Disuse, 286, 288, 290, 305, 306;\n      effects, alleged of, 288\n\n    Divergence, 9, 36, 39, 57\n\n    Divine action, vivifying matter, not a miracle, 187, 188\n\n\n    Dog, 248, 255, 287\n\n    Dogmatism, evolutionary, 360\n\n    Dolphins, 80\n\n    Domination of intellect and will over organic powers, 235\n\n    Doubt, \u201cscientific,\u201d 198\n\n    Dragonflies, 115\n\n    Drone, 158\n\n    Drosophila, 17, 18, 19, 27, 85, 86;\n      melanogaster, 85, 86\n        \u2014gradations in eye-color, wing-length and pigmentation of, 85, 86\n\n    Dryopithecus, 270, 310, 311, 323, 345;\n      dentition of, 311, rhenanus, teeth, human-like, 323\n\n    Dualism, 174, 198, 199, 231, 233, 234, 351;\n      conscious and unconscious, of Descartes, 198;\n      hylomorphic, 174, 198, 231;\n      of emergence and resistance, 233, 234 _note_;\n      of potency and act, 199;\n      psychic and physical, of Descartes, 198;\n      psychophysical, 198, 231\n\n    Duckbill, 287\n\n    Duplication, 44, 45, 305;\n      chromosomal, 44, 45;\n      of organs, 305\n\n    Dynamic, 206\n\n\n    Ear, 302, 304;\n      helix of, 304\n\n    Earth columns, 113\n\n    Earthworm, 250, 280\n\n    East Indies, 118\n\n    Echinodermata, 119, 121, 122\n\n    Education, 245, 256, 360;\n      responsible, 360\n\n    Educator, modern, 360\n\n    Effect, 176, 177\n\n    Eggs, 134, 156, 158, 159, 160, 255, 259, 278, 283;\n      of sea urchin, 159, 160;\n      unfertilized, 158;\n      reduced, 158;\n      unreduced, 158\n\n    Ego, 209, 210, 224;\n      the, 209, 210;\n      the thinking, 224\n\n    Egoism, 256\n\n    Egypt, 115, 337, 340\n\n    Electrolytes, 168\n\n    Electronic theory, 56\n\n    Electrons, 163, 174\n\n    Elements, radioactive, 180\n\n    Elephants, 111, 115, 315;\n      brain of, 315;\n      Siberian, sudden extinction of, 111\n\n\n    Elephas:\n      antiquus, 317;\n      primigenius, 326\n\n    Embryologists, 136\n\n    Embryology, 141, 275, 276, 308;\n      comparative, 276;\n      experimental, 141\n\n    Embryonic additions, 276\n\n    Embryos, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281;\n      alleged fish-like stage of, 279, 280;\n      human, 278, 280, 283;\n      mammalian, 281, 283;\n      vertebrate, 281\n\n    Emergents, 233 _note_, 234 _note_\n\n    Energy-content, 174\n\n    Emotion, 214, 231, 246, 247;\n      functions of sensual appetite, 247;\n      a psycho-organic function, 214;\n      organic function, 231\n\n    Emperor moth, 267\n\n    Emulsifier, 169\n\n    Emulsion, 139, 168\n\n    Encasement, 3, 4\n\n    Encystment, 162\n\n    End, 254, 259\n\n    Endocrine glands, 292-295, 298;\n      not functionless, 295\n\n    Endomixis, 161, 162, 163, 178\n\n    Endoskeletal, 36\n\n    Energy, 172, 174;\n      content, 174;\n      defined, 172;\n      kinetic and potential, 172\n\n    Energy-environment, 168\n\n    Enlightenment, 244, 245\n\n    Entelechy, 172-175, 199, 200, 202, 210;\n      definition of, 200;\n      Aristotelian sense perverted by Driesch, 172;\n      a constant in living units, a variant in inorganic units, 175,\n        200, 202, 210;\n      common to inorganic units and living organisms, 173, 174;\n      consubstantial with matter, 202;\n      entitive, not dynamic, 172, 201;\n      equivalent to static affinity or structural valence, 173;\n      inorganic, 174;\n      not an agent but a specifying type, 201\n\n    Entitive, 206\n\n    Environment, 6-9, 12-15, 42, 46, 152, 153, 174, 180-182, 261, 307;\n      cosmic, of life, 180, 181;\n      internal, 14, 15;\n      not a mechanism for molding organisms, 152, 153\n\n    Environmental conditions, 15, 16, 68, 123, 284\n\n    Environmental stimulus, 255\n\n    Enzymes, 143\n\n    Eoanthropus, 320, 322, 323, 342;\n      a combination of simian and human remains, 342;\n      Dawsoni, 320-323, 342;\n      jaw older than cranium, 322\n\n    Eocene, 115, 309, 313, 317;\n      Lower, 313;\n      Middle, 115\n\n    Eoliths, 154, 321\n\n    Eosin, a sensitizer, 147\n\n    Epeira, 248, 249\n\n    Epicyclic subterfuges, 110\n\n    Epigenesis, 3, 4\n\n    Epiphysis, 292\n\n    Equus, 5, 95, 113;\n      American and European, 113;\n      asinus, 5;\n      caballus, 5\n\n    Erosion, 105, 109\n\n    Eskimo, 330, 338;\n      language more complex than English, 338\n\n    Euphemisms, 351\n\n    Europe, 112, 113, 335\n\n    Eurypterids, 117\n\n    Events, 208\n\n    Evolution (active and passive) of life from inorganic matter, 132,\n      133\n\n    Evolution (alleged) of human soul, 194, 195, 268, 352\n\n    Evolution (alleged) of human body, 268, 309, 343\n\n    Evolution, xi-xiv, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 17, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29, 31, 32,\n      34, 43, 44, 45, 63, 66, 70, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 86, 90,\n      92, 97, 105, 116, 117, 123, 124, 125, 131, 193, 194, 267, 268,\n      291, 297, 304, 309, 325, 335, 339, 349-361;\n      aspects, moral and social, of, 353-361;\n      causes of, 2, 6;\n      evidence for, experimental, 3, 7, 8, 17, 28\n        \u2014inferential or circumstantial, 3, 8, 125\n        \u2014genetical, 8, 18, 28, 29\n        \u2014zoological, 8, 34, 66, 76\n        \u2014pal\u00e6ontological, 3, 8, 66, 74-76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 92, 97, 105,\n           126;\n      fact of, 2, 86, 124, 126;\n      heliocentric theory not on a par with, xii, xiii, law of, 1, 123;\n      monistic basis of, 349-353;\n      necessary as hypothesis, not as\n    dogma, xi;\n      senses of, 2, 74, 75, 131;\n      spirit not a product of, 193, 194, 268;\n      systems of, 1, 29, 31, 349;\n      Augustinian, 32, 74, 75;\n      Batesonian, 18-21, 43, 44, 79;\n      monophyletic, 69, 70, 116, 117;\n      polyphyletic, 70;\n      progressive, 44, 45, 116\n\n    Evolutionary thought, crisis in, 3, 29\n\n    Evolutionists, 279\n\n    Exoskeletal, 36\n\n    Expediency, 291\n\n    Experience, 238, 241, 253, 256;\n      learning by, 241;\n      sensory, 238, 253\n\n    Experimentation, 197\n\n    Eye, 60, 205, 217, 283, 298;\n      a corporal element intrinsic to the visual sense, 217;\n      an example of convergence, 60;\n      constituent part of agent and subject of vision, 217;\n      human, defective, 298;\n      not replaced by telescope, 205;\n      vertebrate type of, 283\n\n\n    Factorial, complex, 45\n\n    Factors, germinal (genetic, hereditary), 5, 6, 15, 17, 18, 19, 41,\n      42, 44, 45, 68, 122, 151, 152, 174, 207, 291\n        \u2014diagnosis of, 122\n        \u2014fractionation of, 19\n        \u2014positive and inhibitive, 19;\n      environmental, 6, 41, 42, 68, 151, 152, 174, 207, 291\n        \u2014blind, 151, 152\n        \u2014of disuse and selection, 207\n\n    Facts, 205;\n      former cannot be formulated except with reference to ego, 205;\n      in terms denoting or connoting ego, 205;\n      intramental and extramental, 205\n\n    \u201cFalsifications\u201d of ancestral records, 276\n\n    Families, 37, 58;\n      chemical, 58\n\n    Family-tree, evolutionary, 58\n\n    Fats, 145\n\n    Faulting, 107, 108;\n      horizontal and vertical, 108;\n      \u201cLow angle,\u201d 107, 108;\n      normal, 108\n\n    Fay\u00fbm, the, 115\n\n    Feldhofer Grotte, 323, 324, 326\n\n    Felis leo fossilis, 319\n\n    Femur, 313, 316, 317, 324, 327, 330, 341;\n      not curved as in Neanderthal type, 341;\n      shows curvature, 327, 330\n\n    Ferns, 118\n\n    Fertilization, 42, 157, 159, 160\n\n    Filiation, 75\n\n    Finality, immanent law of, 174\n\n    First causes, 52, 71, 249\n\n    Fishes, 61, 270, 276, 279, 283, 296;\n      adult, 279, 283;\n      embryo of, 279\n\n    Fish-kidney, 302\n\n    Fission, binary, 156, 161;\n      unequal, 156;\n      multiple, 156\n\n    Fixism, 4, 32, 52, 69, 70, 72, 75, 119, 124, 268;\n      unable to furnish \u201cnatural\u201d explanation of homology, 52;\n      uniformitarian, 69\n\n    Flat worms, 278\n\n    Flies, 134\n\n    Fluctuants, 87\n\n    Fluctuations, 10, 16, 29, 302, 333;\n      cause of, 10, 16;\n      instance of, 16;\n      non-inheritable, 10, 16\n\n    F\u0153tal life, special conditions of, 299\n\n    F\u0153tus, 301\n\n    Fonte de Gaume, 339\n\n    Foot-and-mouth disease, germ of, 183 _note_\n\n    Foramnifera, 118\n\n    Force, 172, 176;\n      defined, 172;\n      no special vital, 176\n\n    Forehead, 328, 330, 341;\n      higher, 328;\n      low, 341;\n      retreating, 330\n\n    Formaldehyde, 145-148;\n      not first step in origin of life nor in photosynthesis, 145-147\n\n    Formaldehyde-hypothesis, 145-148\n\n    Formaldoxime, 148\n\n    Formations, fossiliferous, 105\n\n    Formations, geological, 75, 84, 93, 95, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 118,\n      119, 126;\n      time-value of, 84\n\n    Formed bodies of cell, self-perpetuating, 168\n\n    Formose, 145\n\n    Forms, 246, 275, 276, 312;\n      fossil, sequence of, 276\n        \u2014intermediate, 312;\n      grammatical, 246;\n      intermediate, none between man and apes, 275\n\n    Fortuitous result, 249\n\n    Fossil bones, 319\n\n    Fossil facts, 311\n\n    Fossiliferous stratification, universality of, 102\n\n    Fossil remains, human, 213\n\n    Fossils, 3, 81, 87, 88, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107,\n      110, 111, 112, 118, 309, 317, 334, 335;\n      dated by theory of descent, 334;\n      evade experimental breeding tests, 87, 88, 334;\n      no invariable sequence of, 99, 102;\n      reconstructed, 88;\n      still \u201cmedals of Creation,\u201d 94;\n      time-value problematic, 98, 100, 101, 107, 110, 111, 112, 335\n\n    Foxhall Man, 309, 341, 342;\n      alleged to be Tertiary, 309, 341, 342;\n      flint implements prove intelligence of, 342;\n      no fossils of, 342\n\n    Freedom, human, 232;\n      of will, 232\n\n    Free will, a myth, 360, 361\n\n    Frescoes, 339, 340;\n      polychrome, 340;\n      primeval, 339, 340\n\n    Frog, 64, 281;\n      tadpole, 281\n\n    Fruit-flies, eyeless, 306;\n      vestigial, 306;\n      wingless, 306\n\n    Functions, 215, 216, 241, 276;\n      extrinsically dependent on organism, 215, 216;\n      sensitivo-nervous, 241;\n      superorganic, 215\n\n    Fundulus, 62\n\n    Future life, 354, 361;\n      a myth, 361;\n      of retribution, 354\n\n\n    Gametes, 13, 14, 25, 156, 157, 158, 159;\n      production of, 25;\n      specialization of, for kinetic and trophic functions, 157, 158\n\n    Ganoids, 119, 120\n\n    Gar pike, 119\n\n    Gastrula, 159\n\n    Gelation, 168\n\n    Gemmation, 156\n\n    Geneology, 95, 113, 348;\n      hypothetical, 113;\n      of horse, 95;\n      of man, 348\n\n    Geneological tree of man, 348\n\n    Genera, 3, 4, 37, 78, 80, 81, 86, 92, 119, 312, 313;\n      fossil, 3, 4, 78, 80, 81, 86, 312, 313\n\n    Generalization, power of, 261\n\n    Generation, univocal and equivocal, 68, 69\n\n    Genes, 17, 18, 19, 25, 27, 42, 43, 44, 45, 79, 141, 162;\n      inhibitive, 18, 19, 42, 79, 162\n\n    Genetic cellular continuity, law of, no exception to, 163, 164\n\n    Genetic continuity, 142, 160, 165, 311;\n      fivefold law of, 142;\n      law of, 136, 160\n        \u2014may not prevail in submicroscopic world, 165\n\n    Geneticists, 89, 334\n\n    Genetics, 2, 3, 24, 36, 46 _note_, 56, 82, 88, 89, 121, 126, 141,\n      302, 305, 334\n\n    Genital distrophy, 294\n\n    Genotype, 5, 41, 43, 123\n\n    Geodesists, 114\n\n    Geological column, 106, 117, 125, 126\n\n    Geological record, 72, 80-84, 92, 106, 111, 120, 125, 126, 127, 297;\n      damaged, 92;\n      enigmatic, 126, 127;\n      incomplete, 72, 80, 106;\n      incompleteness assumed to explain absence of intermediates, 83;\n      time-value presupposes its completeness, 82, 83, 111\n\n    Geologists, 100, 102, 113, 114, 117, 125, 181\n\n    Geology, xiv, 98, 107, 111, 117;\n      can only prove local order of succession, 111\n\n    Germ, 13, 155, 156, 182;\n      multicellular and unicellular, 155, 156\n\n    Germ cells, 13, 14, 16, 156, 157, 163\n\n    Germ plasm, 14, 25, 26, 41, 42, 45, 265, 303\n\n    Germ tract, 14\n\n    Germinal constitution, 87, 123\n\n    Gerrymandering, geological, 116\n\n    Giantism, 44, 294\n\n    Gibbon, 271, 274, 310, 314, 316\n\n    Gibraltar skull, 322\n\n    Gill arches and clefts, 278, 279\n\n    Gills, 70, 279;\n      permanent, 279\n\n    Glacial, 104 _note_, 289, 320, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334;\n      deposits, 104 _note_;\n      epoch, 320, 332, 334\n        \u2014middle of, 332\n        \u2014close of, 332;\n      period, 289, 327, 329, 330, 331\n        \u2014fourth or last, 327, 329\n        \u2014close of, 331\n\n    Glaciation, 290\n\n    Glacier, continental, 287, 289\n\n    Glacier National Park, 108\n\n    Glaciologists, 289\n\n    Glands, 296, 304;\n      muciparous, 296;\n      supernumerary mammary, 304\n\n    Glaurus overthrust, 107\n\n    Globigerina, 118\n\n    Glucose, 145\n\n    Gluteal region, 273\n\n    Glyceraldehyde, 145\n\n    God, 180, 351;\n      admitted as hypothetical, 351;\n      Author of Life, 180;\n      impossible to prove existence of, 351\n\n    Golgi bodies, 140\n\n    Gonads, interstitial cells of, 292\n\n    Gondwana Land, 114, 115\n\n    Gorilla, 51, 270, 271, 272, 273, 314;\n      face of, 271;\n      skull of, 271\n\n    Gradation, 82, 87, 315;\n      morphological, 82;\n      of forms, 87;\n      series, 315;\n      temporal succession, 82\n\n    Gradual approximation, dogma of, 110\n\n    Grammar, \u201cscientific\u201d revision of, 205\n\n    Graptolites, 78, 100\n\n    Great Peacock Moth, 260\n\n    Grey Worm, 246\n\n    Grignard reaction, 209\n\n    Groups, 335\n\n    Gryphaea, 79\n\n    Guest, 49, 53\n\n\n    Habit, 8, 265, 266, 267, 291, 328, 333, 334;\n      automatisms of, alleged to be source of instinct, 267;\n      body-modifying, 333\n        \u2014of squatting, 328;\n      modern, 334\n\n    Habitat, 99, 112, 182\n\n    H\u00e6moglobin, 148\n\n    Hallucinations, 235\n\n    Hallux, human, 50;\n      simian, 50\n\n    Halogens, 58\n\n    Haptophores, 57\n\n    Heidelberg Man, 318, 319, 320;\n      jaw anomalous, 319, 320\n\n    Hen, 259, 260\n\n\n    Heredity, 5, 39, 54, 88;\n      alleged cause of homology, 39;\n      biparental, 5\n\n    Heterogametes, 158\n\n    Hererogamy, 158\n\n    Hererozygous, 25, 26, 27\n\n    Histogenesis, 59\n\n    History, 337, 338, 339;\n      contradicts evolutionary assumption, 337, 338;\n      dawn of, 337;\n      proves primitive man to have been civilized, not barbaric, 339\n\n    Hom\u0153omorphy, heterogenetic, 79\n\n    Homology, 8, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 60, 61, 63,\n      64, 65, 77, 268, 276, 277, 278, 279, 284, 287, 292, 298, 308;\n      definition of, 35;\n      anatomical, 276, 279, 284, 308;\n      application to man, 34, 51, 268;\n      disguised by external diversity, 48;\n      embryological, 48, 278, 279, 284, 308;\n      evolutionary argument from, 34, 47 _note_, 48, 54, 63, 64, 65, 268,\n        292;\n      genetic explanation of, 39, 40, 47\n\n    Homologous organs, 35, 61\n\n    Homo neanderthalensis, 333\n\n    Homo primigenius, 323, 330, 333, 334, 341, 342;\n      a variety, not a distinct species, 342;\n      same as Homo Mousteriensis, 330;\n      type, fluctional nature of, 341\n\n    Homo sapiens, 325, 330, 332, 333, 340, 342, 345;\n      only human species, 342\n\n    Homozygous, 25, 27\n\n    Horizon, 93, 94, 125, 310, 335;\n      level, 335;\n      stratigraphical, 93, 94;\n      stratigraphic, 125, 310, 335\n\n    Hormones 14, 292, 294, 295\n\n    Horse, 5, 78, 81, 82, 304, 332\n\n    Host, 49, 53\n\n    Hottentots, 325\n\n    Human, 224, 227, 256, 335, 341, 342, 345, 352;\n      fossils all belong to the species, Homo sapiens, 345;\n      mind\n        \u2014alleged to be of animal extraction, 352\n        \u2014reflects, 224\n        \u2014spiritual, 227;\n      reason, 256;\n      remains more ancient than formations in which they are found, 335\n\n    Human body, 267, 304, 345;\n      evolution of, 267;\n      ignorance and uncertainty regarding origin, 345;\n      not a mosaic of heterogenetic organs, 304;\n      origin of, 345\n\n    Humanization of brute, subjective, 238\n\n    Humanizers of brute, Darwinian, 263\n\n    Human language attests reality of ego, 205\n\n    Human nature, 360;\n      Darwinian conception of, 360\n        \u2014evils of popularizing it, 360\n\n    Human Soul, 193, 194, 202, 203, 210, 213, 214, 215, 216, 225, 231,\n      232, 233, 267, 268;\n      could only originate by creation, 267;\n      creation of, 193, 267;\n      discarnate, 202, 214\n        \u2014not a complete person or nature, 202;\n      exists for its own sake, 215;\n      immortal, 193;\n      intrinsically independent of organism, 202, 215, 225;\n      not an emergent of matter, 194\n        \u2014alone active in superorganic functions, 202, 214, 216;\n      same as mind, 203;\n      simplicity of, 210\n        \u2014not to be confounded with spirituality of, 210;\n      spirituality of, 193, 203, 214, 215, 216, 231, 232, 233, 233 _note_,\n        268\n        \u2014proofs of, 214, 215, 216, 231\n        \u2014from rational thought and volition, 231, 232, 233, 233 _note_;\n      substantiality of, 210;\n      underivable from matter, 268\n\n    Hunter, life of, 328, 330\n\n    Hyaloplasm, 139, 141\n\n    Hybridism, constant, 25\n\n    Hybridization, 16, 26, 88;\n      interspecific and intervarietal, 26\n\n    Hybrids, 4, 5, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 84, 85, 87;\n      interspecific, sterile, 4, 5, 26, 27;\n      invarietal, 19, 20, 27, 28;\n      as intermediates, 84, 85\n\n    Hydrang, 44\n\n    Hydrogen, 175;\n      liquid, 184 _note_\n\n    Hydroglissia, 248\n\n    Hydrosol, 169\n\n    Hydrosphere, 113, 181\n\n    Hydrotheca, 78\n\n    Hydroxylamine, 148\n\n    Hyrozoa erroneously classified, 122\n\n    Hylobatic, 314, 316, 317, 318;\n      type, 318\n\n    Hylomorphic dualism, 198\n\n    Hylomorphic vitalism, does not discourage experimental analysis of\n      life, 201\n\n    Hylomorphism, 174\n\n    Hypogamete, 158\n\n    Hypertrophy, 289, 290, 294;\n      due to use, 289\n\n    Hypophysis, 292, 293, 294, 295;\n      not functionless, 294\n\n\n    Ice Age, 98\n\n    Ichthyosaurs, 80\n\n    Igneous masses, not basal, 125\n\n    Illusions, 235\n\n    Imageless thought, sense of term, 219\n\n    Imagery, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 221, 228, 229, 241, 243;\n      a function of the living cerebral cortex, 221;\n      association of, 241;\n      cerebral, 218;\n      concrete, 220, 221;\n      different in different persons, 219;\n      distributed by abnormal state of cortex, 221;\n      motor, 214;\n      neurographic, 243;\n      represents only superficial and exterior properties, 219;\n      rigid, correlated with metabolic process at work in cerebral\n        cortex, 228, 229;\n      rigidly proportioned underlying neurogram, 215;\n      sensible, presupposed by thought and volition, 221;\n      shows corresponding degrees of integrity and intensity, 229;\n      sporadic and fragmentary, 229;\n      tactile, 214\n\n    Imagination, 213, 221, 222, 228, 229, 231;\n      cerebral sense, 222, 228, 229;\n      its normal exercise depends on physiological normality of cerebral\n        cortex, 221;\n      organic function, 231\n\n    Imaginative activity, 229\n\n    Immortality, considered an anodyne, 358\n\n    Immunity, 57\n\n    Immutibility, 50, 52\n\n    Impenetrability, 225;\n      of matter, law of, 225;\n      reflection opposed to, 225\n\n    Improvised structures, 281 _note_, 283\n\n    Incubation, purposeless, 259\n\n    Independent Assortment, Law of, 27\n\n    Index fossils, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,\n      112, 335, 339;\n      basis of stratigraphic correlation, 93, 94;\n      an arbitrary and elastic criterion, 94, 95;\n      final court of appeal, 93, 96, 97, 335;\n      in conflict with physical and stratigraphic evidence, 100, 104-112\n\n    India, 114\n\n    Indian dialects, work of philosophers, 338\n\n    Indian Ocean, 114, 115\n\n    Individuation, 220, 224;\n      concrete, 224\n\n    Indo-Europeans, 334\n\n    Industry, Mousterian, 326, 327, 329, 330, 331;\n      Acheulean, 331;\n      Aurignacian, 331\n\n    Inertia, defined, 174\n\n    Infusion, 193;\n      not supernatural, 193;\n      of spirit into matter, not a miracle, 193\n\n    Infantilism, 294\n\n    Inference, 221, 240;\n      mediate, 221\n\n    Infundibulum, 293\n\n    Infusoria, supposed abiogenetic origin of, 134\n\n    Inheritance, 2, 8, 9, 24, 27, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45, 56, 57, 62, 63,\n      64, 75, 160, 294, 320;\n      definition of, 41;\n      biparental, 160;\n      chemical theory of, 57;\n      laws of, 2, 24, 27, 42;\n      similifying process, 40, 45\n        \u2014not only one, 56\n        \u2014also said to diversify, 63, 64;\n      variable, 75\n\n    Inhibition, 242, 252\n\n    Initial vivification, 133;\n      act, 133;\n      of matter required a formative, 133;\n      rather than creative, 133\n\n    Inquilines, 46\n\n    Insectivora, 275\n\n    Insects, 225, 307;\n      evolutionary diminuendo of, 116;\n      wingless, 307\n\n    Instinct, 238, 240, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256, 257, 259,\n      263, 264, 265, 267, 291, 343, 361;\n      defined, 255, 256;\n      James\u2019 definition of,\n    249;\n      according to external circumstances, 250-252;\n      according to physiological state of organism, 250;\n      adjustment of, 250, 252;\n      constructive, 251;\n      effective only under normal circumstances 258;\n      evolutionary origin of, 267\n        \u2014improbable, 267;\n      fixity of, 258;\n      improbability of, 267;\n      its regulatory principal sense, 254;\n      not gradually acquired, 263, 264;\n      not intelligence, 254;\n      only slightly undefiable, 256;\n      origin of, 263;\n      psychic regulation of, 249;\n      requires no apprenticeship, 256;\n      teleology of, 249;\n      telic, 259;\n      variability of, 250\n\n    Instinctive acts, 256\n\n    Instruction, 244, 245\n\n    Instrumentation, 197\n\n    Intellect, 220, 221, 224, 226-230, 339;\n      active, 220, 221;\n      activity of, 221;\n      cognitive, 220, 221;\n      conscious of its own operations, 226, 227;\n      indirectly dependent on physiological condition of cortex, 221;\n      its immaterial nature, 224;\n      objectively dependent on organic activity of imagination, 221;\n      not bound to material organ, 226;\n      not debilitated by intense thinking, 227, 228;\n      not incapacitated but invigorated by intense thinking, 228;\n      not regulated by physiological vicissitude, 229;\n      not subject to metabolic laws, 230;\n      rooted in a spiritual principle, 227;\n      superorganic nature of, 227\n\n    Intellectual, 228, 229, 230;\n      activity may reach highest points of concentration and intensity\n        without involving commensurate fatigue on part of organism, 228\n\n    Intelligence, 239-241, 243, 245, 247, 248, 249, 254, 256, 257, 259,\n      262, 263, 267, 329, 330, 340, 343, 350;\n      definition of, 239;\n      autonomous, 259;\n      a generalizing and abstracting power, 257;\n      \u201cbestial,\u201d 245, 247, 257;\n      conscious, 240;\n      deceptive semblance of, 240, 241;\n      Divine, 249;\n      etymology of, 239;\n      finite, 249;\n      genuine, 240, 241;\n      infinite, 248, 249;\n      incapable of being evolved from matter, 267;\n      inherent, 249, 256, 259, 267;\n      of worker bees, 267;\n      subjective or inherent, 248, 249;\n      used to denote power of profiting by experience, 239, 240\n\n    Intensity, 227, 230;\n      does not increase in same proportion as intensity of stimulus, 227;\n      may reach maximum with involving corresponding fatigue, 230;\n      of thought does not follow fluctuations of neural metabolism, 230\n\n    Interactionism, 206\n\n    Interaction, three types of, 175\n\n    Interglacial period, 329;\n      last, 329\n\n    Intergradation, 87\n\n    Intergradence, 84-87;\n      may indicate hybridism, 84, 85;\n      no argument for common ancestry, 84-86;\n      of mutants genetically independent, 85, 86\n\n    Intergradents, 85, 86;\n      hybrid, 85, 86;\n      mutational, 85, 86;\n      specific, 85, 86\n\n    Interjections, negligible part of human language, 247\n\n    Interpretation, ontogenetic, an alternative for phylogenetic, 302\n\n    Intervals, 105;\n      lost, unrepresented by deposition, erosion or disturbance, 105\n\n    Intravitous staining, 143\n\n    Introspection, 204, 205, 212, 225;\n      does not create personality, 212;\n      impossible to a material organ, 225\n\n    Intrusions, igneous, 125\n\n    Invertebrate, 293, 294;\n      stage, 293, 294\n\n    Involution, 160\n\n    Iron, 148\n\n    Irrational man unknown either to history or prehistory, 340\n\n    Islands, 153\n\n    Islets of Langerhans, 292\n\n    Isobares, 172\n\n    Isogametes, 157\n\n    Isogamy, 157\n\n    Isomers, 173\n\n    Isostacy, 113, 114\n\n    Isostatic equilibrium, 114\n\n\n    Jacob\u2019s Cavern, in Missouri, 340\n\n    Java, 313\n\n    Jaw, 331, 340;\n      lower, 331;\n      lower missing, 340\n\n    Jimson Weed, 21, 22\n\n    Judgment, 207, 220\n\n    Jupiter, 184\n\n    Jura, 103\n\n    Jura, European, 96, 106\n\n    Jurassic, 117\n\n\n    Kena Kakoe, 346-348;\n      extinct volcano, 346\n\n    Kidney, 280-283;\n      adult, 282;\n      embryonic, 283;\n      fish, 280, 282;\n      mammalian, 280;\n      permanent, 281, 284\n\n    Kiluea, observatory at volcano of, 346\n\n    Kingdom, animal, 249\n\n    Kleistogamy, 159\n\n    Knowledge, 190, 191, 221, 256;\n      conceptional, 221;\n      experimental, 256;\n      technical, absence of, does not always disqualify, 190, 191\n\n    Krapina, 330, 332;\n      type of, 330\n\n\n    Laboratory syntheses differ from those occurring in organism, 150\n\n    La Chapelle-aux-Saints remains, 232, 330-333\n\n    Lamarckism, 6, 7, 13, 15, 16, 24, 29, 46 _note_, 53, 67, 78, 79,\n      263, 265, 266, 291;\n      recent revival of, 266\n\n    Lamps, 340\n\n    La Naulette remains, 326, 332;\n      alleged to be distinct species, 332;\n      absence of chin, 326;\n      allied to Neanderthal type, 326\n\n    Land bridges, 112\n\n    Language, 245, 246, 247, 330, 338, 339;\n      descriptive, conceptual and articulate, 246, 247;\n      first step in formation of, 245;\n      formation of, presupposes an artist as great as his works, 339;\n      human, 246, 247;\n      indicative, emotional and articulate, 247, 256;\n      of animals, 245,\n    246, 247;\n      of savage races point to former civilization, 330\n\n    La Quina, industry of, 331\n\n    Law, definition of, 166, 167\n\n    Law of Weber, 227\n\n    \u201cLearning\u201d of animals, 243\n\n    Le Moustier, 329, 332;\n      remains, 322, 326, 329, 330\n\n    Lemuroids, 275\n\n    Lemurs, 312\n\n    Lepontine Alps, 109\n\n    Lethals, balanced, 25-28\n\n    Lias, 119\n\n    Liberalism, 257\n\n    Life, 133, 142, 144, 145, 154, 165, 176, 177, 181, 182, 186, 187,\n      188, 203;\n      organic, definition of, 176, 177;\n      active cause of extramundane, 181, 182;\n      alleges submicroscopical units of, 165;\n      Author of, 186, 187;\n      conscious, 203;\n      initiation of, not a creation, 186, 187\n        \u2014not a miracle, 187, 188\n        \u2014not supernatural, 187, 188;\n      integrating and formative principle of, 144;\n      metabolic, sentient and rational, 203;\n      more than a chemical problem, 142;\n      origin of, 133\n      chemical hypothesis, 145\n        \u2014not a problem of translation, 182;\n      spontaneous origin of, 154\n\n    Life-cycle, 69, 112, 138, 155, 156, 160\n\n    Lima, 118\n\n    Limit of microscopic vision, 140\n\n    Limulus polyphemus, 119\n\n    Lingula, 118\n\n    Linin, 139\n\n    Links, 84, 86, 312, 313, 315, 323, 341, 342;\n      connecting, 315, 323\n        \u2014between men and apes, 312;\n      connecting, so called are (a) human, (b) simian, (c) mixed\n        remains, 342;\n      generic and ordinal, insufficient, 86;\n      \u201cmissing,\u201d 341;\n      specific, minimum, 86;\n      transitional, 84\n        \u2014none between man and apes, 313\n\n    Linkage groups, 17\n\n    Lithosphere, 113, 114, 181\n\n    Litopterna, 78\n\n    Living beings derive their matter from inorganic world, 123\n\n\n    Living matter, 143, 171;\n      its uniqueness, a simple fact, 171;\n      maintains its specific type, 143\n\n    Lizards, 292\n\n    Loess, 326, 327\n\n    Logarithmic spiral, 248\n\n    Locomotion, mechanism of, 270\n\n    Logic, 198, 220, 245;\n      of scepticism, 198;\n      of thought, escapes our imagery, 220;\n      saltatory, 245\n\n    Loss, 352, 353;\n      of artistic taste by Darwin, 352, 353\n\n    Lucina, 118\n\n    Lumpers, 37\n\n    Lumping, 121\n\n    Lychnis diurna and vespertina, 84\n\n    Lycosa, 247, 263\n\n    Lycosids, 247, 263-265\n\n    Lymphatic glands, stimulated by digestive process, 301\n\n    Lymphatic system, adjuncts of, 300\n\n    Lymphatic vessels, 300\n\n    Lymph nodules, 300\n\n    Lymphocytes, 300, 301\n\n    Lymphoid cells, follicle, 299\n\n\n    Macrogamete, 157, 158\n\n    Macrosomes, 139\n\n    Madeira, 306\n\n    Magalenians, 332\n\n    Maggots, 134\n\n    Magnesium, 146, 147, 148\n\n    Mammal, 46, 59, 60, 72, 73, 100, 115, 116, 275, 280, 282, 283,\n      296, 304, 324, 342;\n      age of, 342;\n      early, 324;\n      evolutionary \u201ccrescendo\u201d of, 116\n\n    Mammalian stock, 82\n\n    Mammoth, 91, 115, 326\n\n    Man, 192, 193, 212, 236, 271, 290, 340, 341, 343;\n      bestial, 340;\n      brutalization of, 236;\n      destitute of instincts, 343;\n      face of, 27;\n      indications of his physical presence always accomplished by signs\n        of intelligence, 340;\n      left defenceless by nature, 343;\n      modern, 341;\n      more than a decaying organism, 212;\n      never found apart from evidence of his intelligence, 343;\n      physically helpless, 343;\n      skull of, 271;\n      unique\n    in his soul, not in his body, 192, 193\n\n    Mantids, 247\n\n    Marattia, 118\n\n    Mars, 184\n\n    Marsoulas, caves of, 339\n\n    Marsupial, 114, 296\n\n    Mason bee, 251, 254, 260\n\n    Mastodons, 115, 340;\n      \u201cprehistoric,\u201d engraving of, 340\n\n    Material, 193, 194, 207, 214;\n      functions, 214;\n      organism co\u00f6perates intrinsically in organic substrate, 224;\n      sense of term, 193, 194;\n      substance, inaccessible to senses, 207\n\n    Materialism, 178, 199, 212, 214, 236, 352, 355, 357, 358, 361;\n      a purely academic philosophy, 211;\n      attempt to gloss over, 207;\n      Darwinian, 236;\n      evolutionary, 360, 361;\n      its destructive effect on religion, ideals and morality, 361;\n      parasitic, 358\n\n    Materialistic, 207, 351-356, 357;\n      philosophy ignores active r\u00f4le of mind, 207;\n      view of human nature unnatural and intolerable\u2014complete and\n        consistent application impossible, 357;\n      view make morality unthinkable\u2014antisocial, 351-356\n\n    Material organ cannot be effected by the supersensible, 222\n\n    Matterhorn, 109\n\n    Materialist, 230\n\n    Materialists, many evolutionists are avowed, 351\n\n    Matter, 71, 173, 174, 179, 181, 186, 194, 199, 200, 204, 210;\n      a constant in inorganic units, 175;\n      a source of indeterminism, 71;\n      a variant in living organisms, 175;\n      constant in chemical reactions, variant in metabolism, 199, 200,\n        210;\n      does not coincide with sum total of reality, 186;\n      initial vivification of, due to supermaterial agency, 179;\n      inorganic, 181;\n      not more real than mind, 204;\n      notions of, 200;\n      ponderable and imponderable, 194\n\n    Maturity, 155\n\n    Mauer, 318\n\n    Mayflies, 115\n\n    Means, 254, 259\n\n    Measles, invisible germ of, 169\n\n    Mechanics, 350\n\n    Mechanism, 153, 154, 171, 179, 250;\n      environmental, 153;\n      teleological but simple, 153, 154\n\n    Mechanist, 58, 200, 204, 351;\n      many evolutionists are avowed, 351\n\n    Mechanistic universe, 350\n\n    Media, 136\n\n    Medium, vibrant, 213\n\n    Meganeura monyi Brogn, 115\n\n    Meiosis, 25, 42, 157\n\n    Melia, 261\n\n    Melocrinidae, 92\n\n    Membrana nictitans, 296, 297;\n      not functionless, 297\n\n    Memory, 213, 238, 242, 243;\n      associative, 238;\n      sensitive, 242, 243;\n      sentiment, 238, 242\n\n    Men, 318, 325, 328, 329;\n      and apes, link between, 318\n      \u2014intermediate between, 318;\n      fossil, 325;\n      of Krapina, 325, 328, 329\n\n    Mendelism, 3, 24, 25, 26, 28, 42, 46, _note_, 57, 349\n\n    Mental protuberance, 272\n\n    Mental states, 205\n\n    Merosthenic, 270\n\n    Mesonephric duct, 281, 282\n\n    Mesonephros, 280, 281, 282, 284\n\n    Mesozoic, 73, 104 _note_, 118, 119, 335;\n      lowest series of, 119;\n      middle system of, 119\n\n    Metabolism, 57, 139, 210, 211, 227, 228;\n      destructive and constructive, 137\n\n    Metagenesis, 122\n\n    Metamorphosis, 123, 283\n\n    Metamorphism, 89, 126;\n      of rocks, 126\n\n    Metanephros, 280, 282\n\n    Metaphysical, 351\n\n    Metaphysics, 152, 185, 231, 349, 350, 351, 352;\n      Epicurian, 152;\n      monistic, 349;\n      vs. physical science, 352\n\n    Metaphytes, 136\n\n    Metazoa, 118\n\n    Metazoans, 136, 170, 284\n\n    Meteorites, 182, 183\n\n\n    Metista, 5, 59, 136, 156, 157, 159, 163\n\n    Microgamete, 158\n\n    Microns, 183\n\n    Micro\u00f6rganism, 169, 183\n\n    Microsomes, 139\n\n    Migrations, 72, 76, 112\n\n    Millennium, 358\n\n    Mimicry, 246\n\n    Mind, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 211, 222, 223, 249;\n      active and passive, 207;\n      apprehends material objects under dematerialized form, 223;\n      a substance, 207;\n      connotation of, 203;\n      cannot utilize co\u00f6peration of material organ in abstract\n        conceptions, 223;\n      frame of, 211;\n      human, 249;\n      of man alleged to be of animal extraction, 195, 196;\n      phenomenalistic notion of, 209;\n      science of, 197;\n      states of, not less real than states of matter, 204;\n      noumenal, 198\n\n    Minimum, 238, 349, 350;\n      an empirical rule, not an axiom, 350;\n      principle of, 238, 349, 350\n\n    Miocene, 95, 310, 323;\n      Upper, 95\n\n    Miracle, definition of, 187\n\n    Miraculous, 69, 351-356, 357\n\n    Mitachondria, 140\n\n    Mitosis, 59, 138, 139, 155\n\n    Modification, 7, 41, 42, 45, 46, 51, 77, 80, 123, 307, 327, 334;\n      adaptive, 45, 46, 51, 80;\n      environmentally-induced, 123;\n      heritable, 42, 45, 307;\n      non-inheritable, 334;\n      parallel, 77, 80;\n      product of variation, 41;\n      of specific magnitude, 7;\n      of varietal magnitude, 7\n\n    Moeritherium, 115\n\n    Molars, 313, 322;\n      teeth, 322\n\n    Mole, 36, 80, 291, 305\n\n    Mole-cricket, 36, 80\n\n    Molecule, 57, 58, 143, 144, 162, 167, 170, 175, 202, 203;\n      biophoric, 57;\n      complex, 202;\n      complex endothermic, 162;\n      living and dead, 143;\n      structure of, 58\n\n    Molluscs, 117, 118, 119, 123, 278, 283\n\n    Mongolian, 324, 325, 334;\n      cossack, 324\n\n\n    Monism, 350, 351, 352, 359;\n      destructive of culture, spirituality, morality, 350;\n      fail to motivate Christian morality, 358;\n      makes God immanent in world, 359;\n      makes will law unto itself, 359;\n      materialistic, 350, 352\n\n    Monist, 350\n\n    Monistic view vitiates artistic taste, 352\n\n    Monkey, 270, 275\n\n    Monomolecules, 165;\n      are not units, 165\n\n    Monotremeta, 296\n\n    Montana, 107 _note_\n\n    Moral consequences of failure to discriminate, 360\n\n    Morality, 354, 360;\n      evolutionary conception of, 360\n\n    Motor-verbalist, 219\n\n    Morphogenetic forces, 58, 284;\n      Laws, uniform, 284\n\n    Morphogeny, organic, 298\n\n    Morphology, embryonic and adult, 284\n\n    Mountain columns, 113\n\n    Mountains, 113, 153\n\n    Mouse, brain of, 315\n\n    Moustier Cave, 329\n\n    Movements, 241, 242;\n      reflex, 242;\n      spontaneous, 241, 242.\n\n    Mule, 5\n\n    M\u00fcllerian duct, 281\n\n    Multimolecule, 58, 144, 162, 165, 166, 168, 170, 179;\n      are not units, 165;\n      colloidal, 166;\n      crystalloidal, 165, 166;\n      not a link between molecules and cells, 179;\n      structure of, 58\n\n    Murder, as an experiment, 359\n\n    Muscles, 298\n\n    Mutants, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 87;\n      chromosomal, 17, 21, 22, 23\n      \u2014balanced and unbalanced, 21, 22\n      \u2014balance, odd and even, 22\n      \u2014status as \u201cnew species\u201d not established, 23;\n      factorial, 17, 18, 19, 20;\n      pseudo, 17, 27\n\n    Mutation, 16, 16 _note_, 26, 42, 86, 88, 122, 265, 303, 305, 307,\n      334;\n      changes of loss, 18, 43;\n      chromosomal, 17, 42, 44, 45, 88;\n      factorial,\n    19, 20, 42, 44, 45, 88, 305, 334\n      \u2014a varietal, not a specific change; fortuitous, 265;\n      heritable, 16, 303, 334;\n      pseudo, 17, 42, 88\n\n    Mutation, 16, 20, 46;\n      Theory, 16, 20\n\n    Myx\u0153dema, 294\n\n\n    Nahun beds, 95\n\n    Natural explanations, 69, 70\n\n    Naturalism borrows moral standards, 358\n\n    Natural process, 69, 74\n\n    Natural science, 186\n\n    Natural Selection, 9, 11, 12, 13, 29, 30, 152, 153, 305, 306, 350;\n      a theory of chance, 11, 350;\n      has no positive efficacy, 153;\n      theory has impeded progress of science, 13\n\n    Nature, 151, 185;\n      inorganic impotent to duplicate even laboratory synthesis, not\n        to speak of vital phenomena, 151\n      \u2014lacks means of self-vivification, 185;\n      not automatic, 151\n\n    Nautilus, 118, 283\n\n    Neanderthal, 314, 315, 317, 325, 326, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 335,\n      337, 342;\n      bone, show some racial characteristics, 329;\n      cranium, 331, 332\n      \u2014capacity underestimated, 333, not ancestral to Cro-Magnon type, 335;\n      not more ancient than modern type, 337;\n      remains, 325, 332\n      \u2014human, 325;\n      skull, cranial capacity of, 314, 325;\n      type of, 330, 332\n\n    Neanderthal Man, 314, 315, 317, 323, 326, 341, 342;\n      distinctly human, 342;\n      a dwarf, 314;\n      No. 1, 323, 326;\n      divided opinion on, 324;\n      No. 2, skeleton, 326\n      \u2014skull missing, 326\n\n    Neanderthal type, 326, 330, 332, 333, 334, 336;\n      alleged to be distinct species, 332;\n      alleged to be more ancient, 334;\n      degenerate, 336;\n      differences, 334;\n      race, 334;\n      no longer considered oldest type, 336\n\n    Neanderthaloid, 328, 333, 341, 343;\n      characteristics occur in modern skulls, 333;\n      race, 343;\n      skulls, modern features occur in, 333\n\n    Nebular, hypothesis, 181\n\n    Negroes, 334\n\n    Neo-Darwinism, 10\n\n    Neo-Kantian, 203, 219;\n      phenomenalist, 203\n\n    Neo-Lamarkism, 10, 12, 15\n\n    Neolithic, 332\n\n    Neontologists, 76\n\n    Neotoma, 307\n\n    Neo-vitalism, 171, 201, 202;\n      postulates a unique force, an agent \u201csui generis,\u201d 171\n\n    Neo-vitalists, 58, 200, 201;\n      regard vital principle as force \u201csui generis,\u201d a unique agent,\n        200, 201\n\n    Nephridia, 280\n\n    Neptune, 184\n\n    Nerve plasm, 265\n\n    Neurograms, 213, 214, 222;\n      extended, 222;\n      imprinted on neurons, 213, 214;\n      objects capable of stimulating an extended organ, 222;\n      objects of, endowed with concrete properties, 222;\n      proportioned to stimuli, 222;\n      physical basis of imagery, 214, 222\n\n    Neurons, 213, 222, 350;\n      sensory and central, 213;\n      utility of sensory, 222\n\n    New names for fossil duplicates of modern species, 119, 120\n\n    New Stone Age, prehistoric, 337\n\n    Nihilism, philosophical, 350\n\n    Nitrogen snow, 183 _note_;\n      reddish light of, 184 _note_\n\n    Non-cosmopolitan species, 283\n\n    Non-enents, 309\n\n    Non-opposability of human hallux, 50\n\n    Non-phenomenon or substance, 209\n\n    Non-specialist, when disqualified and when not, 189-191\n\n    Non-viable, 25\n\n    Novelty, emergent, 350\n\n    Nuclear components, self-perpetuating, 139\n\n    Nuclear reorganization, 155, 160, 161, 162;\n      a restorative process,\n    155, 161;\n      means of rejuvenation, 161;\n      none in somatogenic reproduction, 160;\n      periodic, 162;\n      primitive, 162\n\n    Nuclear sap, 139\n\n    Nucleus, 137, 138, 161;\n      cellular, 138;\n      daughter, 161;\n      distributed, 138;\n      germinal, 161;\n      parent, 161\n\n    Nucula, 118\n\n    Nutrition, a reflexive activity, 175\n\n\n    Object, 217, 223, 224;\n      concurrence of, extrinsic, 217;\n      indicated spiritual nature of mind, 224;\n      (material) abstract, made of representation, 224;\n      of abstract thought, incapable of making impressions or leaving\n        records on material receptors, 223\n\n    Occipital foramen, 272\n\n    Occiput, broad, 332\n\n    Ocean beds, elevation of, 114, 115\n\n    Ocean bottoms, 113-115\n\n    Ocean floor, 115\n\n    Octopus, 64\n\n    \u0152nothera, 16, 17, 27, 28;\n      gigas, 17;\n      Lamarkiana, 27, 28\n\n    \u0152sophagus, invertebrate, 293\n\n    Old Stone Age, 332, 337, 339, 340;\n      class of, 332;\n      prehistoric, 337\n\n    Oligocene, 309, 317\n\n    Onion-coat, 99, 102, 103, 109;\n      a convenient device, 109;\n      Alpine, 109;\n      hypothesis of, 102, 103\n      \u2014\u201ctranscendental form of,\u201d 102;\n      lithological and biological, 102;\n      mineral envelopes, 102;\n      theory, 99\n\n    Ontogeny, 39, 79, 275, 285\n\n    O\u00f6lites, 79\n\n    Opisthonephros, 280, 282\n\n    Opposability of simian hallux, 50\n\n    Opposition, 218, 219, 234, 235;\n      between imagery and thought, 218, 219;\n      between psycho-organic and spiritual activity, 234, 235;\n      entails distinction, 235\n\n    Orang-utan, 33, 271\n\n    Orders, 37\n\n    Organ, 222, 226, 276, 286, 287, 288, 292, 298, 300, 303;\n      embryonic, 276;\n      functionless, 286, 287, 292;\n      incapable of reflection, 226;\n      material, cannot be effected by the supersensible, 222;\n      nascent and rudimentary, 287, 288;\n      distinction, arbitrary, 288;\n      reduced, 286, 287;\n      vestigial, 292, 300, 303;\n      useless, 286\n\n    Organelles, 139\n\n    Organic activity, rigidly regulated by metabolism, 228\n\n    Organic functions, 203, 213, 215;\n      agent and subject of, not soul alone, 203;\n      not only functions in man, 215\n\n    Organic substances, 149, 150;\n      laboratory synthesis of, 149, 150;\n      not to confounded with living or organized substances, 150\n\n    Organisms, 154, 155, 163, 201, 202, 203, 246;\n      a product of the law of Complexity, 167;\n      multicellular, 155;\n      none subcellular, 154;\n      of some species, syntonic, 246;\n      participates as coefficient factor in physiological and sensory\n        functions, 203;\n      soul-informed, 203;\n      unicellular, 154, 163\n\n    Organization, 143, 150;\n      elude art of chemist, 150\n\n    Order, 209;\n      ideal, phenomenalists confuse it with real order of things, 209;\n      real, of things, 209\n\n    Ordivician, 111\n\n    Orientation of forces, centrifugal and centripetal, 179\n\n    Origins, 71, 83, 161, 220, 221, 360;\n      biparental, 161;\n      common, 81\n      \u2014of man and brute, 360;\n      organic, need not be unified in space but should be in time, 71;\n      of concepts, 220, 221\n\n    Orneau, river, 326;\n      valley, 327\n\n    Ornithorhynchus, 59, 287\n\n    Ornithosaurs, 80\n\n    Orthogenesis, 6, 7, 46 _note_, 53;\n      cannot explain adaptation, 53\n\n    Osmia, 252\n\n    Outcrop, 93\n\n    Overthrust, 98, 107, 110;\n      a triumph of modern research, 107\n\n    Ovists, 160\n\n    Oximes, 148\n\n    Oxychromatin, 139\n\n    Oysters, 79\n\n\n    Pal\u00e6obotany, 117\n\n    Pal\u00e6olithic, 327, 328, 330, 333, 343;\n      artists, 343;\n      human remains, 330;\n      man, 328, 333\n\n    Pal\u00e6ontological argument, 66-127;\n      defects in, 75, 124;\n      in abstract, 66-75;\n      in concrete, 75-127;\n      a theoretical construction, 126\n\n    Pal\u00e6ontological evidence, 3, 8, 66, 74-80, 83, 89, 97, 105, 107,\n      124, 311, 312;\n      imperfection of, 89;\n      rated as outweighing physical evidence, 97, 107\n\n    Pal\u00e6ontological pedigrees, 3, 76, 78, 81, 82, 84, 126;\n      definition of, 81;\n      of horse, 76, 78, 81, 82, 126;\n      camel, 126,\n      and elephant, 126\n\n    Pal\u00e6ontologists, 76, 86, 87, 88, 91, 119, 190, 310, 313, 321, 334,\n      344;\n      incompetent to decide questions of specific origin or\n        distinction, 87, 88, 89, 334\n\n    Pal\u00e6ontology, 3, 82, 83, 88, 92, 95, 96, 114, 119, 126, 195, 311,\n      312, 313, 344;\n      facts of, 83, 195;\n      ignorant concerning origin of man, 344;\n      orthodox, 95, 96, 119\n\n    Pal\u00e6otherium, 76\n\n    Pal\u00e6ozoic, 73, 108, 117, 118, 124 _note_, 125, 335\n\n    Palingenesis, 277, 288\n\n    Pan-Pacific Conferences, 344, 346\n\n    Panspermia, 182\n\n    Parallelism, 57, 58;\n      _vs._ divergence, 57\n\n    Param\u0153cium, 138, 161, 178;\n      aurelia, 138\n\n    Parasites, 46, 53\n\n    Parasitism, 52\n\n    Parathyroids, 292\n\n    Parent cell, 156\n\n    Parthenogenesis, 158, 159, 160, 162;\n      artificial, 159, 160\n      \u2014not violation of law of genetic continuity, 159, 160\n\n    Pathology, 141\n\n    Patient, 176, 177\n\n    Pear-tree, 6, 88\n\n    Pebrine, 44\n\n    Pecking instinct of chicks, 256\n\n    Pecten, 118\n\n    Pedigrees, of genera, 84\n\n    Pelop\u00e6us, 260\n\n    Penguin, wings of, 287\n\n    Pentacrinus, 119\n\n    Perception, 208, 212, 253;\n      an act of, 208;\n      of personality, not personality, 212;\n      sensory, 253\n\n    Percepts, objective, 235;\n      sensory, 219\n\n    Periodicity, 56;\n      of elements, 56;\n      families of elements, 56\n\n    Peri Psyches, Aristotle\u2019s, 196, 197, 215\n\n    Perissodactyla, 78\n\n    Permian, 104, 118\n\n    Persistence, 116, 119, 123;\n      cannot be subsumed under same principles as transmutations, 123;\n      its significance intensified by current theories, 123;\n      of types, 119;\n      of unchanged types, 116\n\n    Persistent types, generic and specific, 123\n\n    Personal identity, sense of, 212\n\n    Personality, 205, 211, 212, 238;\n      a unitary and uniform reality, 212;\n      alternating, 211;\n      based on unchanging principle, 212;\n      perception of, 212\n\n    Pessimism, 355, 357\n\n    Petit-Puymoyen, industry of, 331\n\n    Ph\u00e6ophytin, 147\n\n    Pharyngeal arches and clefts, 278, 279\n\n    Phase, reversal of, 168, 169\n\n    Phenomena, 208, 209;\n      phenomenalists\u2019 substantialization of, 209\n\n    Phenomenalism, 207, 208, 211, 212;\n      a purely academic philosophy, 211;\n      identifies mind with \u201cthought stream,\u201d 212\n\n    Phenomenalistic school, 206\n\n    Phenomenalists, 203, 205, 206, 207;\n      inconsistently admit of physical phenomena while denying subject\n        of psychic phenomena, 206, 207\n\n    Phenotype, 5, 19, 25, 27, 41, 43, 68, 123\n\n    Philology, 339;\n      proves primitive man to have been civilized, not barbaric, 339\n\n    Philosophers, 220\n\n    Philosophy, 189, 190, 195;\n      in r\u00f4le of critic, 189;\n      in r\u00f4le of sycophant,\n    190;\n      materialistic, 195;\n      relation to science, 189\n\n    Phonetic elements, 246\n\n    Photosynthesis, 146\n\n    Phycocyanin, 149\n\n    Phylogeny, 39, 80, 122, 275, 276, 284, 285, 308;\n      human, 285, 308;\n      pal\u00e6ontological, 115\n\n    Phylum, 37, 38, 69, 116\n\n    Physical impressions, 213\n\n    Physical science, 352, 354\n\n    Physicochemical action, reducible to interaction between unequally\n      energized masses and particles, 175\n\n    Physicochemical forces, executive factors in vital operations, 201\n\n    Physiology, 350\n\n    Phytol, 147\n\n    Picotee sweet pea, 19\n\n    Piltdown skull, 320\n\n    Pineal eye, 292\n\n    Pineal gland, 292, 293, 295;\n      not functionless, 293\n\n    Pioneer colonies, 110\n\n    Pithecanthropus, distinctly simian, 342\n\n    Pithecanthropus erectus, 309, 313-318, 342;\n      cranial capacity of, 314;\n      a giant ape, 315;\n      existing casts inaccurate, 318\n\n    Pituitary body, 292, 293\n\n    Pituitrin, 294\n\n    Placenta, 276\n\n    Planarian, 278\n\n    Planetesimal, hypothesis, 181\n\n    Plantigrade, 272\n\n    Plastids, 139, 141\n\n    Platycrinidae, 92\n\n    Platyrhine monkeys, 287\n\n    Pleistocene, 78, 100, 104, 313, 319, 320, 325;\n      Lower, 313, 320;\n      Middle, 319\n\n    Pleurotomaria, 118\n\n    Plica, semilunaris, 297\n\n    Pliocene, 78, 95, 309, 313, 317, 323;\n      Upper, 309, 313, 317\n\n    Pluteus, 159\n\n    Polar body, second, 159\n\n    Polariscope, 144\n\n    Polymorphism, 122\n\n    Polynesians, 325\n\n    Polynuclear condition, 138\n\n    Polyphemus, the Cyclops, 293\n\n    Pompilids, 247, 248, 263, 264\n\n    Pompilius, 247, 261\n\n    Popular trust not to be abused, 345, 346\n\n    Postauricular muscles, 304, 305\n\n    Post-glacial time, 289\n\n    Preadaptations, 46, 47, 52, 53, 63, 124, 279;\n      adventitious appearance of, 46, 47;\n      divergent, 279;\n      entail modifications of specific magnitude, 47;\n      evolution as \u201cnatural explanation\u201d of, 53;\n      inherited, 47\n\n    Pre-Cambrian, 100, 116, 118, 125;\n      terranes, 125\n      \u2014extension great, 125\n\n    Preformation, 3, 160\n\n    Prehension, 50, 271, 272\n\n    Prehistoric, 337\n\n    Prehuman, arboreal stage, 309, 217\n\n    Presupposition, latent in materialistic logic, 186\n\n    Pre-tertiary, 312\n\n    Primates, 308\n\n    Primitive man, 338, 342, 343;\n      not irrational, 342, 343;\n      not a savage, 338\n\n    Primula, 19\n\n    Principles, 171, 172;\n      entitive and dynamic, 171, 172\n\n    Priocnemis, flavicornis, 248\n\n    Priority, 76;\n      a \u201csine qua non\u201d condition of ancestry, 76\n\n    Process, 206, 209, 225;\n      divorced from agents, 209;\n      of reflection entails identity of observer and observed, 225;\n      subjectless and sourceless, of phenomenalists, 206\n\n    Prognathic face, 332\n\n    Prognathism, 325, 330, 333, 341;\n      of upper jaw accentuated, 341\n\n    \u201cProgress,\u201d 355, 359;\n      modern, 359;\n      of science, 355\n\n    Progression, 50, 271, 272, 317;\n      bipedal, 272;\n      modes of, 271, 317\n\n    Prehistory, undocumented, unreliable, 340\n\n    Pronephric duct, 281\n\n    Pronephros, 280, 281 _note_\n\n    Prophylaxis, 356\n\n\n    Propliopithecus, 309, 311\n\n    Prosthenic, 271\n\n    Protein, 140, 144, 145, 147, 151;\n      multimolecule of, 140\n\n    Proterotheres, 78\n\n    Proterotheriid\u00e6, 78\n\n    Proterozoic, 104 _note_, 117\n\n    Protista, 5, 59, 136, 138, 156, 157, 163;\n      polynuclear condition not rare among, 138\n\n    Protoplasm, 141, 143, 144, 151, 160, 161, 175, 181;\n      dead, 143;\n      how reinvigorated, 160, 161;\n      invisible structure, 141;\n      not a chemical compound but a complex system, 142, 143;\n      persistent specificity of, 144;\n      ultramicroscopic structure of, 143;\n      visible, a picture of, 141\n\n    Protococcus, 151;\n      viridis, 151\n\n    Protons, 103, 174\n\n    Protophytes, 135, 136\n\n    Protoplasmic architecture, 174\n\n    Protozoa, 117, 118, 135, 136, 170\n\n    Psyche, 179, 200\n\n    Psychic, 198, 205, 230, 233;\n      and physical dualism of Descartes, 198;\n      functions, 205, 233\n      \u2014of organic type, 233;\n      states, correlated with organic states, 230\n\n    Psychology, 196, 197, 198, 204, 205, 208, 211, 235, 236, 361;\n      alone competent to pronounce origin of man, 196;\n      as science of behavior, 198;\n      human, 235;\n      positive, 361;\n      reveals psychic activities as modification of abiding ego, 205;\n      sole science that studies man on his distinctively human side, 196;\n      vulgar, 236;\n      without a soul, 208, 236\n\n    Psychophysical, 198, 206, 236;\n      dualism, 198;\n      parallelism, 206, 236\n\n    Psychosis, 213, 235, 255, organic, 213, 235\n      \u2014has for agent and recipient the psycho-organic composite, 213;\n      psycho-organic, 255\n\n    Physiological process not reducible to mere physicochemical\n      reaction, 199\n\n    Potency, 199\n\n    Purpose, 11, 249, 255, 258, 259, 298;\n      Divine, 249;\n      unconscious of, 255, 259\n\n    Purposiveness, 248, 249, 262;\n      no intelligence, 262;\n      objective, 248, 249;\n      unconscious, 248\n\n\n    Quadrumana, 296\n\n    Qasr-el-Sagha, 115\n\n    Quaternary, 98, 319;\n      Early, 319\n\n\n    Races, 334, 342\n\n    Radiation, pressure of, 183\n\n    Radioactive elements, 56\n\n    Radio-activity, 118\n\n    Radiolaria, 118\n\n    Radiometer, 183\n\n    Radius, shows curvature, 327\n\n    Ragweed, 16\n\n    Raft of Red River, 154\n\n    Random Assortment, 27, 42;\n      of chromosomes, 27\n\n    Ratio, body-brain, 317\n\n    Rays, 119\n\n    Reactants, 209\n\n    Reaction, 243, 252;\n      elementary, motor, 252;\n      historical basis of 243\n\n    Reaction-systems, 26, 204\n\n    Reason, 235, 240, 244, 245, 259, 267, 343;\n      not evolved, 267;\n      sole means of human preservation, 343;\n      superorganic power of, 244, 245\n\n    Reasoning, 207, 220\n\n    Recapitulation, 48, 275, 278, 279, 285;\n      embryonic, 48, 275, 278, 279\n\n    Receptors, 57, 213, 222;\n      extended, necessary to perceive material stimuli, 222\n\n    Recessive chin, 311\n\n    Recognition, 207\n\n    Recombination, 27, 42;\n      chromosomal, 27;\n      factorial, 27\n\n    Reconstructions, 89, 90, 92, 321;\n      of fossil skulls, 321;\n      psychological motivation of, 89, 90;\n      scientific, 89, 90, 92\n\n    Recuperation, autonomous, 163\n\n    \u201cRecurrent faunas,\u201d 110\n\n    Reduction, 42, 157\n\n    Reflection, 224, 225, 226, 240, 256;\n      a fact, 225, 226;\n      alleged impossibility of, 225;\n      only possible to spiritual agent, 224;\n      undeniable fact of, 225\n\n    Reflexes, innate and conditioned, 238\n\n    Reflexion, 225\n\n    Reflexive orientation, 174, 176;\n      of energies, no living being, 176;\n      of forces in living organism, 174;\n      in living being, 201\n\n    Regression of organ, 305\n\n    Regulation, 253;\n      intelligent, 253;\n      sensory, 253\n\n    Rejuvenation, 155, 161, 163;\n      three kinds of, 161\n\n    Rejuvenescence, 160, 161, 162\n\n    Reign of Terror, 357;\n      French, 357;\n      Russian, 357\n\n    Reindeer, 332\n\n    Re-integration of atoms, impossible, 163\n\n    Relationships, 254;\n      causal and telic, 254;\n      supersensible, 254\n\n    Religion, 354, 361;\n      only sanction of morality, 361\n\n    Remains, Javanese, 318\n\n    Repair-work, 251, 252\n\n    Reproduction, 5, 24, 25, 26, 56, 68, 69, 137, 141, 156, 157, 158,\n      159, 161;\n      biparental (bisexual), 24, 158;\n      cytogenic, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161;\n      link between life-cycles, 156;\n      nonsexual, 156\u2014three kinds of, 156, 157;\n      reducible to cell-division, 163;\n      sexual, 25, 156, 157\n      \u2014autosexual, 158, 159\n      \u2014bisexual, 158\n      \u2014unisexual, 158\n      somatogenic, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161\n      \u2014limited, 161\n      \u2014no rejuvenation in, 161\n\n    Reptiles, 61, 80, 281, 282, 296, 301;\n      flying, 80;\n      pal\u00e6ozoic and modern, 296\n\n    Resemblance, 38, 54, 58, 63, 79, 80, 284, 340, 341;\n      compatible with separate ancestry, 63, 80\n      \u2014even specific, does not entail common origin, 79, 80;\n      family, 54, 56;\n      generic, 38, 56;\n      heterogenetic, 80;\n      ordinal, 56;\n      phyletic, 56;\n      specific, 38, 56, 79;\n      to modern man, 340, 341\n\n    Responsibility, 232, 360, 361;\n      harmful consequences, 360;\n      implies mastery of will over its own actions, 232;\n      of evolutionary propagandists, 360, 361\n\n    Resultants, 233 _note_, 234 _note_\n\n    Resurrection, natural basis of, 202\n\n    Reversion, 17, 303, 304, 305;\n      to type, 305\n\n    Rhinoceros etruscus, 319;\n      merckii, 329;\n      tichorhinus, 326, 329, 332\n\n    Rhodesian Man, 340, 341;\n      may be modern, 341\n\n    Rhynchonella, 118\n\n    Right-handedness, human, 288;\n      duration of, 290\n\n    River drift, 327\n\n    Rocks, 66, 93, 96, 103, 104, 107, 118, 120, 181, 297, 335;\n      composition and mineral contents disregarded in classification, 96;\n      crystalline, 104, 181;\n      fossiliferous, 104, 107, 118, 181, 279, 335;\n      European classification of, 107;\n      groups of, 120;\n      igneous, 181;\n      metamorphic, 104;\n      sedimentary, 66, 93, 96, 107, 181;\n      systems of, 103\n\n    Rubidium, isotopes of, 173\n\n    Rudiment, 293, 297, 301, 302;\n      ontogenetic, 301, 302;\n      phylogenetic, 301, 302\n\n    Rudimentary, 299\n\n    Rudimentary organs, 286, 291, 293, 298, 305;\n      criticism of, 286;\n      evolutionary argument from, 286;\n      ontogenetic explanation of, 298;\n      phylogenetic, 298\n      \u2014explanation of, 286\n\n    Running birds, 114, 305\n\n\n    S-R bonds, 204\n\n    Salamander, 248\n\n    Saurians, 60\n\n    Savagery, not prior to civilization, 337\n\n    Savages, descended from civilized ancestry not vice versa, 338\n\n    Scandinavia, 110\n\n    Scepticism, 198\n      logic of, 198\n\n    Scholastics, 191, 225\n\n    Scholastic, theory of origin of concepts, 220\n\n    Science, 188, 304, 359;\n      as religion, 359;\n      gives no heed to consequences, 360;\n      its attitude towards philosophy, 188;\n      sham, 304\n\n    Scientists, 344, 348;\n      many not satisfied with \u201cevidence\u201d for human evolution, 344;\n      fallibility of, 348\n\n    Scientific questions, decided by evidence, not by authority, 344\n\n    Scotland, 107\n\n    Sea-anemone, 261\n\n    Sea floor, 113\n\n    Sea-urchin, 119, 140;\n      egg of, 140\n\n    Second causes, 52, 71;\n      efficacy finite, 71\n\n    Sediment, 93, 103, 125;\n      primordial, 125;\n      universal layer of, 103\n\n    Seedlings, 161\n\n    Segregation, 25\n\n    Selection, 11, 12, 13, 65, 152, 153, 306;\n      artificial, 152\n      \u2014not on a par with natural selection, 152;\n      intelligent and fortuitous, 152, 153;\n      principle, 11, 12, 13, 65;\n      values, 306\n\n    Self, 205\n\n    Self-fertilization, 159\n\n    Self-observation, 224, 225;\n      impossible for an organ, 226;\n      power of, cannot reside in material organ, 224, 225;\n      requires a spiritual principle, 225\n\n    Self-regulation, 174, 176, 179\n\n    Self-sacrifice, rendered meaningless, 356\n\n    Semilunar fold, 296, 297\n\n    Senescence, 26, 157, 160, 162;\n      an inherent tendency of living matter, 160;\n      tendency practically if not actually universal, 162\n\n    Sensationists, 218\n\n    Sensations, 209, 227, 242;\n      intensity of, 227\n\n    Sense, 204, 227, 228, 235, 254, 350;\n      debilitated by powerful stimulus, 227;\n      external, 204;\n      organic nature of, 227;\n      their power of reaction temporarily inhibited by process of\n        repair, 227, 228\n\n    Sense organs, 213, 251\n\n    Sense-perception, 199, 203, 214, 219, 220, 227, 231, 235;\n      a brain function 199;\n      a psycho-organic function, 214;\n      concerned with factual reality of existence, 219;\n      involves a decomposition of neural tissue, 227;\n      not independent of body, 227;\n      organic function, 203\n\n    Sensibility, organic, 244, 245\n\n    Sensori-motor, 251\n\n    Sensory functions of the nervous system, 199\n\n    Sensual appetites, exhaustible, 232\n\n    Sensual emotion, organic function, 203\n\n    Sequence, 100, 107, 108;\n      inverted or \u201cwrong,\u201d 107, 108;\n      no invariable order of, 100;\n      of fossiliferous strata, 100;\n      \u201cwrong,\u201d 107, 107 _note_\n\n    Serum, 15\n\n    Sexual (gametic) incompatibility, 4, 5, 19, 20, 21\n\n    Sharks, 80, 119, 296\n\n    \u201cShell-craters,\u201d 347\n\n    Shoots, 160\n\n    Sight, 217;\n      intrinsic dependence on eye, 217;\n      extrinsic dependence on object, 217\n\n    Silurian, 92, 106, 111, 118;\n      Middle, 92, 106\n\n    Simia satyrus, 32\n\n    Simple explanations not necessarily true, 350\n\n    Siwalik beds, 95, 310\n\n    Skeleton, 60, 61, 331;\n      human, 331\n\n    Skulls, 328, 329, 331, 333, 340, 341;\n      fossil, 33, 341;\n      human, 331\n\n    Skull cap, 271, 313, 314, 324, 328\n\n    Sleep, would interrupt process of relaying consciousness from\n      thought to thought, 212, 213\n\n    Sloth, 52\n\n    Snapdragon, 88\n\n    Social inequalities, artificial laws for benefit of rich, 361\n\n    Socialism, 357, 360;\n      Marxian, 357;\n      Scientific, 357\n\n    Sodium, 165, 166;\n      bromide, 165;\n      chloride, 165, 166;\n      iodide, 165\n\n    Solemn burial, 331, 332, 343;\n      most ancient instances, 332\n\n    Solutreans, 333\n\n    Soma, 13, 59, 303\n\n    Somatella, 59\n\n    Somatic cells, 13, 14, 17, 136, 156, 163\n\n    Somites, 280\n\n    Sophism, Comte\u2019s like that of Zeno, 226\n\n    Soul, 172, 179, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206,\n      209, 210, 211, 216, 268, 311, 350, 361;\n      definition of, 200;\n      a \u201cformative power\u201d and \u201cintegrating\u201d and unifying principle, 200,\n        211;\n      a vital entelechy, 210;\n      as revealed in biology and psychology, 205;\n      consubstantial with matter, 202;\n      differs in kind, not merely in degree from bestial soul, 194;\n      discarded by Descartes, 197;\n      discarded by scientific psychology, 359;\n      formal principle of life, 203;\n      functional, 203, 206, 209\n      \u2014cannot be primary principle of life, 206;\n      name, not reality of, rejected, 200;\n      not a complete entity, 201;\n      primary ground of life, 206;\n      rejected in dynamic, not in entitive sense, 200, 201;\n      spiritual, not a product of evolution, 193, 216, 268\n      \u2014originates by a creative act, 193, 268;\n      subject of psychology, 197;\n      subsistent in man, 202;\n      substantial, 203, 209;\n      term alleged to be meaningless, 200\n\n    Specialism, advantages and disadvantages of, 189\n\n    Species, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17, 19, 26, 37, 38, 74, 75, 78, 80, 83, 84,\n      86, 87, 110, 111, 112, 119, 120-123, 131, 157, 256, 257, 312, 313,\n      320, 334, 342;\n      definition of, 4;\n      change of, 4, 6;\n      differentiation and multiplication of, 131;\n      difficulty of distinguishing, 120-123;\n      elementary, 17;\n      extinct and extant, 120-123, 334;\n      extinct, precarious basis for time-scale, 334;\n      formation as contrasted with transformation of, 74, 75, 131;\n      fossil, 3, 4, 83, 92, 120, 122, 312, 313;\n      intermediate,\n    absence of, 80, 83, 84, 334;\n      intersterility of, 4, 5, 26, 38;\n      only one human, 342;\n      persistent, 123;\n      syngamy, an essential requisite of, 5\n\n    Species-by-species method, 87\n\n    Spectral analysis of constitution of sun, 216\n\n    Spectroscope, 144\n\n    Speech, bestial, 245, 246\n\n    Sperm, 156, 158, 159, 160;\n      activation by means of, 159\n\n    Spermists, 160\n\n    Sphex gryphus (Sm), 261\n\n    Spiders, 257\n\n    Spiral cleavage, 278\n\n    Spirit, 194, 311;\n      definition of, 194\n\n    Spiritual, 206\n\n    Spiritualism, 202, 230, 231;\n      Aristotelian, 230, 231\n      \u2014admits direct dependence of lower psychic functions on organism,\n        230\n      \u2014admits indirect dependence of higher psychic functions upon\n        organism, 231;\n      Cartesian, 230;\n      destroyed by facts of physiological psychology, 230;\n      hylomorphic, 202;\n      of Aristotle, 202;\n      psychophysical of Descartes, 202, 203\n\n    Spirituality, 203, 351;\n      excludes co-agency of organism, 203;\n      of human soul, 351\n\n    Spiritual representations, 221\n\n    Spleen, 301\n\n    Splitters, 37\n\n    Splitting, 121\n\n    Spontaneous generation, 131, 132, 133, 136, 142, 148, 149, 167,\n      179, 182, 185, 186;\n      defined, 131-133;\n      antiquity of, 133;\n      old and new exception of, 167;\n      philosophical \u201cproof\u201d of, 185\n\n    Spontogenesis, an outlawed hypothesis, 164\n\n    Spores, 134, 136, 156, 181;\n      bacterial, 181\n\n    Sporulation, 156, 157\n\n    Springopora, 118\n\n    Spy, 329, 330, 333;\n      bones, 329;\n      crania, capacity underestimated, 330\n\n    Spy remains, 319, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 332;\n      skeletons of No. 1 and No. 2, 327\n\n    Squatting, a habit of savage races, 328\n\n    Squirrel, 260\n\n    Starfish, 140, 154, 382;\n      egg of, 140;\n      symmetry of, 154\n\n    States, 203, 208;\n      conscious or psychic, 203, 208;\n      mental, active and passive, 208;\n      of matter, not more real, 203\n\n    Statistics, moral, 361\n\n    Stems, 160\n\n    Stentor, 174\n\n    Sterility, interspecific, 5, 21, 38\n\n    Sterilization, 134, 135\n\n    Stimulators, 243\n\n    Stimulus, 227, 228\n\n    Stizus ruficornis, 247\n\n    Stock, 310, 311;\n      hylobatic and troglodyte, 310, 311;\n      pithecoid, 311\n\n    Stone implements, 329, 331, 334, 340, 342;\n      characteristic, unsafe basis for time-scale, 334\n\n    Stratification, 102;\n      scheme of, universal, 102;\n      synchronous deposition of, different in mineral content, 102\n\n    Stratigraphers, 106\n\n    Stratigraphic, 101, 102, 107;\n      continuity, 101;\n      facts, 107;\n      horizons, 101;\n      sequence, 101\n        \u2014invariable order of, 102\n\n    Stratigraphy, 93\n\n    Strata, 66, 83, 87, 92-96, 102, 103,108, 109, 116, 119, 120, 125;\n      classification of, 103;\n      concrete sequence of, 109;\n      dated by fossils and fossils by strata, 94;\n      fossiliferous, 92, 96, 102, 109, 116, 119\n        \u2014classification of, 119\n        \u2014European classification of, 102;\n      how characterized, 96;\n      intervening, skipped, 120;\n      mineral, 102;\n      substitution of fossiliferous for lithological, 103;\n      substitution of fossiliferous for mineral, 103;\n      wrong order of, 108;\n      \u201cyounger\u201d and \u201colder,\u201d 108, 116\n\n    Strontium, isotopes of, 173\n\n    Structures, 122, 284;\n      constant and adaptive, 122;\n      distinction influenced by personal equation, 122;\n      embryonic, undifferentiated, 284;\n      homologous and adaptive, 122\n\n    Struggles for existence, 291\n\n    Sturgeons, 119\n\n    Sub-arch\u00e6an beginnings of life impenetrable, 126\n\n    Subject, 205, 207, 208;\n      abiding, of our thoughts, feelings and desires, 205;\n      active, 208;\n      of thought, active, 207\n\n    Subjective abstractions, phenomenalist objectivation of, 209\n\n    Subjectless thought, an abstraction, 209\n\n    Submicron, 140, 183 _note_\n\n    Submicroscopic dimensions, no obstacle to manifestation of vital\n      phenomena, 170\n\n    Submicroscopic organisms show genetic continuity, reproductiveness\n      and typical vital power, 169, 170\n\n    Subspecies, 334, 342\n\n    Substages, 96, 103\n\n    Substance, 209\n\n    Substantial composite of body and soul, 203\n\n    Succession, 75, 76;\n      to be distinguished from filiation, 75;\n      not descent, 75, 76\n\n    Sunlight, once richer in actinic rays, 148\n\n    Superciliary ridges, 272\n\n    Superorganic, 240\n\n    Superorganic functions, 214, 227;\n      have soul as their exclusive agent and recipient, 214\n\n    Superorganic functions, soul alone active cause and receptive\n      subject, 203\n\n    Supernatural, 186, 187;\n      defined, 187\n\n    Supernumerary, 303, 304, 306;\n      mammary glands, 304;\n      organs, 303, 304\n\n    Superposition, 93, 101, 111;\n      as a criterion of comparative antiquity, 93;\n      criterion of, confined to local areas, 101\n      \u2014not available\n    for correlation of strata in different localities, 101;\n      only safe means of distinguishing between spatial and\n        chronological distribution, 101, 111;\n      restricted to local areas, 93\n\n    Suppression of organs, 305\n\n    Sweden, 289\n\n    Syllogisms, of no avail against facts, 226\n\n    Symbiosis, 52, 124\n\n    Symbiotes, 46, 53\n\n    Synapsis, 17, 25\n\n    Syngamy, 5, 25, 156, 157-161;\n      essential to biparental inheritance, 160;\n      means of rejuvenation, 161;\n      qualification of a true species, 5\n\n    Synthesis, chemical, spontaneous and artificial, 151, 152\n\n    Systems, 96, 101, 141, 142, 151;\n      colloidal, 142;\n      complete polyphasic, 142;\n      how determined, 96;\n      of rocks, 96;\n      of strata, 101;\n      polyphasic, 141;\n      protoplasmic, 141, 142;\n      simple, 151\n\n    Systematist, 46, 121\n\n\n    Tactisms, 204\n\n    Tactualist, 219\n\n    Taenia, 248\n\n    Taiga, 91\n\n    Tarantula, 247, 263\n\n    Tasmanian blacks, 325\n\n    Tautomerism, 202\n\n    Taxonomic questions, 334\n\n    Taxonomist, 128\n\n    Taxonomy, 36, 37, 38, 77, 101, 121, 122, 123, 320;\n      fossil, 101, 122\n      \u2014basis of correlation, 101\n      \u2014arbitrary and unreliable, 122;\n      homology, basis of, 36;\n      influence of pal\u00e6ontology, 77;\n      need of revision in, 121, 123\n\n    Teleological, 225\n\n    Teleology, 154, 240, 248, 249, 259, 267;\n      a material expression of intelligence, 259;\n      does not entail vibrant intelligence, 259;\n      its combination with sentient consciousness, 240;\n      of organisms, 154;\n      of artefacts, 154;\n      psychic\n    implication of, 154;\n      unconscious, 240\n\n    Teleosts, 120\n\n    Telic, 150, 249;\n      phenomena of nature, 249\n\n    Terebratulina, striata, 118, 120;\n      caput serpentis, 118\n\n    Termitomyia, 46\n\n    Termitoxenia Heimi, 48\n\n    Tertiary, 72, 82, 99, 100, 104, 109, 111, 112, 113, 118, 154, 270,\n      308, 311;\n      ancestor, 312;\n      Man, 154\n\n    Tertiary envelopes of eggs, 300\n\n    Tethelin, 294\n\n    Tethys, 109\n\n    Tetraploid race, 23, 45;\n      origin of, not yet observed, 23\n\n    Tetraploidy, 22, 23, 44\n\n    Thigh, bone, 316, 317\n\n    Third eyelid, 296, 297\n\n    Third Interglacial Period, latter half of, 331\n\n    Thoatherium, 78\n\n    Thought, 218-222, 227, 229, 230, 233;\n      and imagery, concomitant but incommensurable, 219;\n      digs below phenomenal surface, 219;\n      distinguished from imagery, 218, 219;\n      intellectual, steady, lucid and continuous, 229;\n      not function of material organism, 233;\n      power does not always degenerate with old age, 230;\n      presupposes imagery, 221;\n      proceeds with complete ease after initial exertion of\n        imagination, 229;\n      rational, 222, 224, 231, 233\n        \u2014has spiritual soul for source and subject, 233\n        \u2014reflective, 224\n        \u2014spiritual, 222\n        \u2014superorganic function of, 231;\n      reflective, a superorganic function, 227;\n      requires substrate of sensible images, 220\n        \u2014on which it is objectively dependent, 222;\n      some in all individuals, 219;\n      spiritual, 222;\n      untranslatable into adequate imagery, 219\n\n    Thrust faults, 107\n\n    Thrust planes like bedding planes, 108\n\n    Thymus, 299, 300, 301, 302;\n      an ontogenetic rudiment, 301, 302\n\n    Thyroid glands, 292, 294, 295, 301\n\n    Thyroxin, 294\n\n    Time-value, 75, 82, 83, 84, 95, 96, 101;\n      of geological formations, dubious, 75;\n      of index fossils, 95, 96\n        \u2014affords no basis for scientific certainty, 101\n\n    Tissue, lymphatic, 301\n\n    Tissue cells, 13, 14, 136, 156\n\n    Tonsils, 301\n\n    Tools, use of, by animals, 261\n\n    Trachelocerca, 138\n\n    Training, 244, 245, 256\n\n    Transformism, 3, 4, 6, 16, 24, 25, 32, 40, 43, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59,\n      61, 67, 69-72, 75, 80, 84, 109, 117, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131, 263,\n      268, 343;\n      definition of, 3;\n      impotent to explain origin of intelligence, 216, 233 _note_, 263;\n      interpretation, not corollary, of fossil facts, 126;\n      monophyletic, 69, 70;\n      \u201cnatural\u201d explanation of homology, 52;\n      proofs for, empirical, aphoristic, and aposterioristic, 55, 56;\n      rests on personal belief rather than on facts, 127;\n      ultra-partisans of, 343;\n      unconcerned with origin of life, 131;\n      unifies origins in time, but not in space, 69\n\n    Transformist, 38\n\n    Transmutation, 6, 28, 35, 40, 50, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73, 123, 193\n\n    Trial and error, 241, 243\n\n    Triassic, 118, 119\n\n    Trilobites, 100, 117\n\n    Triploidy, 21, 22\n\n    Troglodyte, 34, 50, 314,\n      type, 314\n\n    Troglodytes niger, 33, 314\n\n    Tropisms, 204\n\n    Tubercule of Darwin, not homologous with apex of horse\u2019s ear, 303\n\n    Tubers, 160\n\n    Tubules, nephridial or excretory, 280\n\n    Types, 54, 55, 66, 83, 84, 92, 116-120, 123, 124, 141, 328, 329,\n      334, 335, 336;\n      Ancestral, 92, 117, 276;\n      annectant, 92;\n      approximation in, 66;\n      common ancestral, 83;\n      Cr\u00f4-Magnon, 332, 334, 335;\n      no evidence of its descent from Neanderthal\n    type, 334;\n      generalized, 54, 55, 81, 84;\n      are abstractions, 54, 55;\n      generic, 116, 117;\n      persistence of, 118, 123;\n      Grimaldi, 332;\n      intergradent, 83;\n      invertebrate, 117;\n      modern, 116, 120, 334;\n      Neanderthaloid, 329, 335;\n      persistent, 116;\n      persistence of, 119;\n      phyletic, 116, 117;\n      permanence of, 118;\n      specific, 116, 141\n      \u2014persistence of, 118, 123;\n      fossil doctrine of their invariable sequence, 104, 312\n\n\n    Ultramicron, 144, 168;\n      destitute of reproductive power, 168;\n      may not be natural unit, 168;\n      of colloidal solutions, 168\n\n    Ultramicroscope, 140, 144;\n      limit of, 140\n\n    Ultraspiritualism of Descartes, 199, 202\n\n    Ultra-violet rays, 148, 184\n\n    Unchange, not explained by theory of exchange, 123\n\n    Understanding, 235\n\n    Ungulates, 78, 82;\n      fossil, 82\n\n    Uniformitarianism, 67, 68\n\n    Uniformity of nature, 149, 186;\n      only justification for reconstruction of the past, 149;\n      principle of, 169\n\n    Union of soul and body, according to Descartes, 198, 199\n\n    Units, 144, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 170, 174-177, 199-201;\n      difference between, 170;\n      inorganic, 144, 163, 166, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 201\n      \u2014and living, 170, 175-177\n      \u2014incapable of other than transitive action, 174, 177;\n      living and non-living, 199, 200;\n      natural, 168;\n      new, of life to be discovered, 167;\n      of nature, non-living, 162, 163\n\n    Universe, Stone Book of, 127\n\n    Uranium, 146\n\n    Urea, 173\n\n    Ureter, 282\n\n    Uroleptus mobilis, 138, 161\n\n    Urosthenic, 270\n\n    Ursus spelaeus, 326, 329\n\n    Use, 291\n\n    Utility, 291\n\n\n    Valence, 165;\n      atomic, 165;\n      molecular (residual), 165\n\n    Variation, 9, 18, 40, 41, 42, 45, 63, 64, 88, 303;\n      agencies of, 42;\n      cause of modification, 41;\n      converges and diverges, 63, 64;\n      fluctuational, 9, 303;\n      heritable, 42;\n      intra-specific, 43;\n      mutational, a change of loss, 18;\n      non-inheritable, 42;\n      process of diversifying, 40, 45;\n      trans-specific, 43, 88\n        \u2014no experimental evidence of, 45\n\n    Varieties, 334, 342\n\n    Vault, 329, 332\n\n    Vegetarians, 236\n\n    Versatility, 257, 258, 259;\n      distinctive mark of intelligence, 257, 258\n\n    Vertebr\u00e6, 279\n\n    Vertebrate, 60\n\n    Vertebrata, 119, 270, 271, 279-284, 292, 297, 300, 302;\n      amniotic, 280-282;\n      anamniotic, 280, 282\n\n    Vestigial remnants, 299\n\n    Viability, 4, 5, 25, 26, 43, 44\n\n    Vibration, 209;\n      pure, 209;\n      without vibrant medium, 209\n\n    Vinegar fly, 19, 85\n\n    Violet, 25, 159\n\n    Visceral arches and clefts, 278, 279\n\n    Visualist, 219\n\n    Vital activity, 201\n\n    Vital continuity, 134, 139, 155;\n      genetic, first article of, 134;\n      law of, 134, 155;\n      law of, 139;\n      its fourth article, 139\n\n    Vital force, no special, 201\n\n    Vitality, 150;\n      eludes art of chemist, 150\n\n    Vital principle, 172, 200, 203;\n      as defined by Neo-Vitalists, 172;\n      entitive, not dynamic, 172;\n      term alleged to be meaningless, 200;\n      term in disfavor, 200\n\n    Vivisection, 360\n\n    Volcanic bombs, 346-348\n\n    Volition, 221, 231, 233;\n      not function of the material organism, 233;\n      presupposes conception, 221;\n      rational, has spiritual soul for source and subject, 233;\n      rational, superorganic, 231\n\n\n    Walrus, 296\n\n    Wasp, predatory, 247, 263\n\n    Weddas, cranial capacity of, 315\n\n    Weight, 315\n\n    Whale, 35, 46, 60, 279;\n      flipper of, 35, 60, 279\n\n    White Leghorns, 19\n\n    Wild Kirchli, industry of, 331\n\n    Will, 221, 232, 235;\n      insatiable, 232;\n      of man, free, 232;\n      self-determining or reflexive, 232;\n      superior to sensual appetite, 235\n\n    Wing venation, 49 _note_, 49\n\n    Wisconsin, Cambrian sediments of, 105\n\n    Wolffian duct, 281, 282\n\n    Woods Hole, 23, 42, 47\n\n    World War, 359\n\n    Worm, 249\n\n    Wormwood, 248, 255;\n      common, 255\n\n    W\u00fcrtzburg, School of, 219\n\n\n    X-rays, 144, 317\n\n\n    Yoldia Sea, 289\n\n    Yolk-sac, 276\n\n\n    Zamia, 118\n\n    Zebra, 81\n\n    Zones, stratigraphic, 96, 103, 106;\n      zo\u00f6geographical, 99\n\n    Zo\u00f6logists, 66, 77\n\n    Zo\u00f6logy, 35, 37, 55, 126, 304\n\n    Zo\u00f6psychologists, 240\n\n    Zygote, 25, 136, 156-158","title":"The case against evolution","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":139790}