{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_68611/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_68611","id":"gutenberg_68611","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68611","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Science"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                          Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nItalics are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character as _italic_. Superscripted\ncharacters are prefixed with \u2018^\u2019 and delimited by \u2018{ }\u2019.\n\nFootnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are\nreferenced.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n                      SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD\n\n                         LOWELL LECTURES, 1925\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n[Illustration]\n\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                  NEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO . DALLAS\n                        ATLANTA . SAN FRANCISCO\n\n                       CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS\n                                 LONDON\n\n                         MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.\n                       BOMBAY . CALCUTTA . MADRAS\n\n                 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD.\n                                TORONTO\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                                SCIENCE\n                          AND THE MODERN WORLD\n\n\n\n\n                         LOWELL LECTURES, 1925\n\n\n\n\n                                   BY\n                         ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD\n          F.R.S., Sc.D. (Cambridge), Hon. D.Sc. (Manchester),\n                        Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews)\n\n        FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE\n           AND PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                           =New York=\n                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                                  1925\n                         _All rights reserved_\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n                            COPYRIGHT, 1925.\n                       BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.\n\n                                  ---\n\n                          Set up and printed.\n                        Published October, 1925.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n               PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY\n                      THE FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                                   TO\n                             MY COLLEAGUES,\n                           PAST AND PRESENT,\n                    WHOSE FRIENDSHIP IS INSPIRATION.\n\n\n\n\n                           TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n    CHAPTER                                                     PAGE\n\n         I. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE                          1\n\n        II. MATHEMATICS AS AN ELEMENT IN THE HISTORY OF           28\n            THOUGHT\n\n       III. THE CENTURY OF GENIUS                                 55\n\n        IV. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY                                80\n\n         V. THE ROMANTIC REACTION                                105\n\n        VI. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY                               134\n\n       VII. RELATIVITY                                           160\n\n      VIII. THE QUANTUM THEORY                                   181\n\n        IX. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY                               193\n\n         X. ABSTRACTION                                          219\n\n        XI. GOD                                                  242\n\n       XII. RELIGION AND SCIENCE                                 252\n\n      XIII. REQUISITES FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS                       270\n\n\n\n\n                                PREFACE\n\n\nThe present book embodies a study of some aspects of Western culture\nduring the past three centuries, in so far as it has been influenced by\nthe development of science. This study has been guided by the conviction\nthat the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which\nis, in fact, dominant in the educated sections of the communities in\nquestion. There may be more than one such scheme, corresponding to\ncultural divisions. The various human interests which suggest\ncosmologies, and also are influenced by them, are science, aesthetics,\nethics, religion. In every age each of these topics suggests a view of\nthe world. In so far as the same set of people are swayed by all, or\nmore than one, of these interests, their effective outlook will be the\njoint production from these sources. But each age has it dominant\npreoccupation; and, during the three centuries in question, the\ncosmology derived from science has been asserting itself at the expense\nof older points of view with their origins elsewhere. Men can be\nprovincial in time, as well as in place. We may ask ourselves whether\nthe scientific mentality of the modern world in the immediate past is\nnot a successful example of such provincial limitation.\n\nPhilosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of cosmologies. It is\nits function to harmonise, refashion, and justify divergent intuitions\nas to the nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the\nultimate ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence in\nshaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is to render explicit,\nand\u2014so far as may be\u2014efficient, a process which otherwise is\nunconsciously performed without rational tests.\n\nBearing this in mind, I have avoided the introduction of a variety of\nabstruse detail respecting scientific advance. What is wanted, and what\nI have striven after, is a sympathetic study of main ideas as seen from\nthe inside. If my view of the function of philosophy is correct, it is\nthe most effective of all the intellectual pursuits. It builds\ncathedrals before the workmen have moved a stone, and it destroys them\nbefore the elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect of\nthe buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent:\u2014and the\nspiritual precedes the material. Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie\ndormant for ages; and then, almost suddenly as it were, mankind finds\nthat they have embodied themselves in institutions.\n\nThis book in the main consists of a set of eight Lowell Lectures\ndelivered in the February of 1925. These lectures with some slight\nexpansion, and the subdivision of one lecture into Chapters VII and\nVIII, are here printed as delivered. But some additional matter has\nbeen added, so as to complete the thought of the book on a scale which\ncould not be included within that lecture course. Of this new matter,\nthe second chapter\u2014\u2018Mathematics as an Element in the History of\nThought\u2019\u2014was delivered as a lecture before the Mathematical Society of\nBrown University, Providence, R. I.; and the twelfth chapter\u2014\u2018Religion\nand Science\u2019\u2014formed an address delivered in the Phillips Brooks House\nat Harvard, and is to be published in the August number of the\n_Atlantic Monthly_ of this year (1925). The tenth and eleventh\nchapters\u2014\u2018Abstraction\u2019 and \u2018God\u2019\u2014are additions which now appear for\nthe first time. But the book represents one train of thought, and the\nantecedent utilisation of some of its contents is a subsidiary point.\n\nThere has been no occasion in the text to make detailed reference to\nLloyd Morgan\u2019s _Emergent Evolution_ or to Alexander\u2019s _Space, Time and\nDeity_. It will be obvious to readers that I have found them very\nsuggestive. I am especially indebted to Alexander\u2019s great work. The wide\nscope of the present book makes it impossible to acknowledge in detail\nthe various sources of information or of ideas. The book is the product\nof thought and reading in past years, which were not undertaken with any\nanticipation of utilisation for the present purpose. Accordingly it\nwould now be impossible for me to give reference to my sources for\ndetails, even if it were desirable so to do. But there is no need: the\nfacts which are relied upon are simple and well known. On the\nphilosophical side, any consideration of epistemology has been entirely\nexcluded. It would have been impossible to discuss that topic without\nupsetting the whole balance of the work. The key to the book is the\nsense of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent philosophy.\n\nMy most grateful thanks are due to my colleague Mr. Raphael Demos for\nreading the proofs and for the suggestion of many improvements in\nexpression.\n\n  Harvard University,\n    June 29, 1925.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                         SCIENCE AND THE MODERN\n                                 WORLD\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER I\n\n                     THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE\n\n\nThe progress of civilisation is not wholly a uniform drift towards\nbetter things. It may perhaps wear this aspect if we map it on a scale\nwhich is large enough. But such broad views obscure the details on which\nrest our whole understanding of the process. New epochs emerge with\ncomparative suddenness, if we have regard to the scores of thousands of\nyears throughout which the complete history extends. Secluded races\nsuddenly take their places in the main stream of events: technological\ndiscoveries transform the mechanism of human life: a primitive art\nquickly flowers into full satisfaction of some aesthetic craving: great\nreligions in their crusading youth spread through the nations the peace\nof Heaven and the sword of the Lord.\n\nThe sixteenth century of our era saw the disruption of Western\nChristianity and the rise of modern science. It was an age of ferment.\nNothing was settled, though much was opened\u2014new worlds and new ideas. In\nscience, Copernicus and Vesalius may be chosen as representative\nfigures: they typify the new cosmology and the scientific emphasis on\ndirect observation. Giordano Bruno was the martyr; but the cause for\nwhich he suffered was not that of science, but that of free imaginative\nspeculation. His death in the year 1600 ushered in the first century of\nmodern science in the strict sense of the term. In his execution there\nwas an unconscious symbolism: for the subsequent tone of scientific\nthought has contained distrust of his type of general speculativeness.\nThe Reformation, for all its importance, may be considered as a domestic\naffair of the European races. Even the Christianity of the East viewed\nit with profound disengagement. Furthermore, such disruptions are no new\nphenomena in the history of Christianity or of other religions. When we\nproject this great revolution upon the whole history of the Christian\nChurch, we cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle into human\nlife. For good or for evil, it was a great transformation of religion;\nbut it was not the coming of religion. It did not itself claim to be so.\nReformers maintained that they were only restoring what had been\nforgotten.\n\nIt is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science. In every way it\ncontrasts with the contemporary religious movement. The Reformation was\na popular uprising, and for a century and a half drenched Europe in\nblood. The beginnings of the scientific movement were confined to a\nminority among the intellectual \u00e9lite. In a generation which saw the\nThirty Years\u2019 War and remembered Alva in the Netherlands, the worst that\nhappened to men of science was that Galileo suffered an honourable\ndetention and a mild reproof, before dying peacefully in his bed. The\nway in which the persecution of Galileo has been remembered is a tribute\nto the quiet commencement of the most intimate change in outlook which\nthe human race had yet encountered. Since a babe was born in a manger,\nit may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened with so little\nstir.\n\nThe thesis which these lectures will illustrate is that this quiet\ngrowth of science has practically recoloured our mentality so that modes\nof thought which in former times were exceptional, are now broadly\nspread through the educated world. This new colouring of ways of thought\nhad been proceeding slowly for many ages in the European peoples. At\nlast it issued in the rapid development of science; and has thereby\nstrengthened itself by its most obvious application. The new mentality\nis more important even than the new science and the new technology. It\nhas altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the imaginative\ncontents of our minds; so that now the old stimuli provoke a new\nresponse. Perhaps my metaphor of a new colour is too strong. What I mean\nis just that slightest change of tone which yet makes all the\ndifference. This is exactly illustrated by a sentence from a published\nletter of that adorable genius, William James. When he was finishing his\ngreat treatise on the _Principles of Psychology_, he wrote to his\nbrother Henry James, \u2018I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of\nirreducible and stubborn facts.\u2019\n\nThis new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and passionate interest in\nthe relation of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts.\nAll the world over and at all times there have been practical men,\nabsorbed in \u2018irreducible and stubborn facts\u2019: all the world over and at\nall times there have been men of philosophic temperament who have been\nabsorbed in the weaving of general principles. It is this union of\npassionate interest in the detailed facts with equal devotion to\nabstract generalisation which forms the novelty in our present society.\nPreviously it had appeared sporadically and as if by chance. This\nbalance of mind has now become part of the tradition which infects\ncultivated thought. It is the salt which keeps life sweet. The main\nbusiness of universities is to transmit this tradition as a widespread\ninheritance from generation to generation.\n\nAnother contrast which singles out science from among the European\nmovements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is its\nuniversality. Modern science was born in Europe, but its home is the\nwhole world. In the last two centuries there has been a long and\nconfused impact of Western modes upon the civilisation of Asia. The wise\nmen of the East have been puzzling, and are puzzling, as to what may be\nthe regulative secret of life which can be passed from West to East\nwithout the wanton destruction of their own inheritance which they so\nrightly prize. More and more it is becoming evident that what the West\ncan most readily give to the East is its science and its scientific\noutlook. This is transferable from country to country, and from race to\nrace, wherever there is a rational society.\n\nIn this course of lectures I shall not discuss the details of scientific\ndiscovery. My theme is the energising of a state of mind in the modern\nworld, its broad generalisations, and its impact upon other spiritual\nforces. There are two ways of reading history, forwards and backwards.\nIn the history of thought, we require both methods. A climate of\nopinion\u2014to use the happy phrase of a seventeenth century writer\u2014requires\nfor its understanding the consideration of its antecedents and its\nissues. Accordingly in this lecture I shall consider some of the\nantecedents of our modern approach to the investigation of nature.\n\nIn the first place, there can be no living science unless there is a\nwidespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an _Order of\nThings_, and, in particular, of an _Order of Nature_. I have used the\nword _instinctive_ advisedly. It does not matter what men say in words,\nso long as their activities are controlled by settled instincts. The\nwords may ultimately destroy the instincts. But until this has occurred,\nwords do not count. This remark is important in respect to the history\nof scientific thought. For we shall find that since the time of Hume,\nthe fashionable scientific philosophy has been such as to deny the\nrationality of science. This conclusion lies upon the surface of Hume\u2019s\nphilosophy. Take, for example, the following passage from Section IV of\nhis _Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding_:\n\n  \u201cIn a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It\n  could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause; and the first\n  invention or conception of it, _\u00e0 priori_, must be entirely\n  arbitrary.\u201d\n\nIf the cause in itself discloses no information as to the effect, so\nthat the first invention of it must be _entirely_ arbitrary, it follows\nat once that science is impossible, except in the sense of establishing\n_entirely arbitrary_ connections which are not warranted by anything\nintrinsic to the natures either of causes or effects. Some variant of\nHume\u2019s philosophy has generally prevailed among men of science. But\nscientific faith has risen to the occasion, and has tacitly removed the\nphilosophic mountain.\n\nIn view of this strange contradiction in scientific thought, it is of\nthe first importance to consider the antecedents of a faith which is\nimpervious to the demand for a consistent rationality. We have therefore\nto trace the rise of the instinctive faith that there is an Order of\nNature which can be traced in every detailed occurrence.\n\nOf course we all share in this faith, and we therefore believe that the\nreason for the faith is our apprehension of its truth. But the formation\nof a general idea\u2014such as the idea of the Order of Nature\u2014, and the\ngrasp of its importance, and the observation of its exemplification in a\nvariety of occasions are by no means the necessary consequences of the\ntruth of the idea in question. Familiar things happen, and mankind does\nnot bother about them. It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the\nanalysis of the obvious. Accordingly I wish to consider the stages in\nwhich this analysis became explicit, and finally became unalterably\nimpressed upon the educated minds of Western Europe.\n\nObviously, the main recurrences of life are too insistent to escape the\nnotice of the least rational of humans; and even before the dawn of\nrationality, they have impressed themselves upon the instincts of\nanimals. It is unnecessary to labour the point, that in broad outline\ncertain general states of nature recur, and that our very natures have\nadapted themselves to such repetitions.\n\nBut there is a complementary fact which is equally true and equally\nobvious:\u2014nothing ever really recurs in exact detail. No two days are\nidentical, no two winters. What has gone, has gone forever. Accordingly\nthe practical philosophy of mankind has been to expect the broad\nrecurrences, and to accept the details as emanating from the inscrutable\nwomb of things, beyond the ken of rationality. Men expected the sun to\nrise, but the wind bloweth where it listeth.\n\nCertainly from the classical Greek civilisation onwards there have been\nmen, and indeed groups of men, who have placed themselves beyond this\nacceptance of an ultimate irrationality. Such men have endeavoured to\nexplain all phenomena as the outcome of an order of things which extends\nto every detail. Geniuses such as Aristotle, or Archimedes, or Roger\nBacon, must have been endowed with the full scientific mentality, which\ninstinctively holds that all things great and small are conceivable as\nexemplifications of general principles which reign throughout the\nnatural order.\n\nBut until the close of the Middle Ages the general educated public did\nnot feel that intimate conviction, and that detailed interest, in such\nan idea, so as to lead to an unceasing supply of men, with ability and\nopportunity adequate to maintain a coordinated search for the discovery\nof these hypothetical principles. Either people were doubtful about the\nexistence of such principles, or were doubtful about any success in\nfinding them, or took no interest in thinking about them, or were\noblivious to their practical importance when found. For whatever reason,\nsearch was languid, if we have regard to the opportunities of a high\ncivilisation and the length of time concerned. Why did the pace suddenly\nquicken in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? At the close of the\nMiddle Ages a new mentality discloses itself. Invention stimulated\nthought, thought quickened physical speculation, Greek manuscripts\ndisclosed what the ancients had discovered. Finally although in the year\n1500 Europe knew less than Archimedes who died in the year 212 B. C.,\nyet in the year 1700, Newton\u2019s _Principia_ had been written and the\nworld was well started on the modern epoch.\n\nThere have been great civilisations in which the peculiar balance of\nmind required for science has only fitfully appeared and has produced\nthe feeblest result. For example, the more we know of Chinese art, of\nChinese literature, and of the Chinese philosophy of life, the more we\nadmire the heights to which that civilization attained. For thousands of\nyears, there have been in China acute and learned men patiently devoting\ntheir lives to study. Having regard to the span of time, and to the\npopulation concerned, China forms the largest volume of civilisation\nwhich the world has seen. There is no reason to doubt the intrinsic\ncapacity of individual Chinamen for the pursuit of science. And yet\nChinese science is practically negligible. There is no reason to believe\nthat China if left to itself would have ever produced any progress in\nscience. The same may be said of India. Furthermore, if the Persians had\nenslaved the Greeks, there is no definite ground for belief that science\nwould have flourished in Europe. The Romans showed no particular\noriginality in that line. Even as it was, the Greeks, though they\nfounded the movement, did not sustain it with the concentrated interest\nwhich modern Europe has shown. I am not alluding to the last few\ngenerations of the European peoples on both sides of the ocean; I mean\nthe smaller Europe of the Reformation period, distracted as it was with\nwars and religious disputes. Consider the world of the eastern\nMediterranean, from Sicily to western Asia, during the period of about\n1400 years from the death of Archimedes [in 212 B. C.] to the irruption\nof the Tartars. There were wars and revolutions and large changes of\nreligion: but nothing much worse than the wars of the sixteenth and\nseventeenth centuries throughout Europe. There was a great and wealthy\ncivilisation, Pagan, Christian, Mahometan. In that period a great deal\nwas added to science. But on the whole the progress was slow and\nwavering; and, except in mathematics, the men of the Renaissance\npractically started from the position which Archimedes had reached.\nThere had been some progress in medicine and some progress in astronomy.\nBut the total advance was very little compared to the marvellous success\nof the seventeenth century. For example, compare the progress of\nscientific knowledge from the year 1560, just before the births of\nGalileo and of Kepler, up to the year 1700, when Newton was in the\nheight of his fame, with the progress in the ancient period, already\nmentioned, exactly ten times as long.\n\nNevertheless, Greece was the mother of Europe; and it is to Greece that\nwe must look in order to find the origin of our modern ideas. We all\nknow that on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean there was a very\nflourishing school of Ionian philosophers, deeply interested in theories\nconcerning nature. Their ideas have been transmitted to us, enriched by\nthe genius of Plato and Aristotle. But, with the exception of Aristotle,\nand it is a large exception, this school of thought had not attained to\nthe complete scientific mentality. In some ways, it was better. The\nGreek genius was philosophical, lucid and logical. The men of this group\nwere primarily asking philosophical questions. What is the substratum of\nnature? Is it fire, or earth, or water, or some combination of any two,\nor of all three? Or is it a mere flux, not reducible to some static\nmaterial? Mathematics interested them mightily. They invented its\ngenerality, analysed its premises, and made notable discoveries of\ntheorems by a rigid adherence to deductive reasoning. Their minds were\ninfected with an eager generality. They demanded clear, bold ideas, and\nstrict reasoning from them. All this was excellent; it was genius; it\nwas ideal preparatory work. But it was not science as we understand it.\nThe patience of minute observation was not nearly so prominent. Their\ngenius was not so apt for the state of imaginative muddled suspense\nwhich precedes successful inductive generalisation. They were lucid\nthinkers and bold reasoners.\n\nOf course there were exceptions, and at the very top: for example,\nAristotle and Archimedes. Also for patient observation, there were the\nastronomers. There was a mathematical lucidity about the stars, and a\nfascination about the small numerable band of run-a-way planets.\n\nEvery philosophy is tinged with the colouring of some secret imaginative\nbackground, which never emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning.\nThe Greek view of nature, at least that cosmology transmitted from them\nto later ages, was essentially dramatic. It is not necessarily wrong for\nthis reason: but it was overwhelmingly dramatic. It thus conceived\nnature as articulated in the way of a work of dramatic art, for the\nexemplification of general ideas converging to an end. Nature was\ndifferentiated so as to provide its proper end for each thing. There was\nthe centre of the universe as the end of motion for those things which\nare heavy, and the celestial spheres as the end of motion for those\nthings whose natures lead them upwards. The celestial spheres were for\nthings which are impassible and ingenerable, the lower regions for\nthings impassible and generable. Nature was a drama in which each thing\nplayed its part.\n\nI do not say that this is a view to which Aristotle would have\nsubscribed without severe reservations, in fact without the sort of\nreservations which we ourselves would make. But it was the view which\nsubsequent Greek thought extracted from Aristotle and passed on to the\nMiddle Ages. The effect of such an imaginative setting for nature was to\ndamp down the historical spirit. For it was the end which seemed\nilluminating, so why bother about the beginning? The Reformation and the\nscientific movement were two aspects of the historical revolt which was\nthe dominant intellectual movement of the later Renaissance. The appeal\nto the origins of Christianity, and Francis Bacon\u2019s appeal to efficient\ncauses as against final causes, were two sides of one movement of\nthought. Also for this reason Galileo and his adversaries were at\nhopeless cross purposes, as can be seen from his _Dialogues on the Two\nSystems of the World_.\n\nGalileo keeps harping on how things happen, whereas his adversaries had\na complete theory as to why things happen. Unfortunately the two\ntheories did not bring out the same results. Galileo insists upon\n\u2018irreducible and stubborn facts,\u2019 and Simplicius, his opponent, brings\nforward reasons, completely satisfactory, at least to himself. It is a\ngreat mistake to conceive this historical revolt as an appeal to reason.\nOn the contrary, it was through and through an anti-intellectualist\nmovement. It was the return to the contemplation of brute fact; and it\nwas based on a recoil from the inflexible rationality of medieval\nthought. In making this statement I am merely summarising what at the\ntime the adherents of the old r\u00e9gime themselves asserted. For example,\nin the fourth book of Father Paul Sarpi\u2019s _History of the Council of\nTrent_, you will find that in the year 1551 the Papal Legates who\npresided over the Council ordered: \u2018That the Divines ought to confirm\ntheir opinions with the holy Scripture, Traditions of the Apostles,\nsacred and approved Councils, and by the Constitutions and Authorities\nof the holy Fathers; that they ought to use brevity, and avoid\nsuperfluous and unprofitable questions, and perverse contentions....\nThis order did not please the Italian Divines; who said it was a novity,\nand a condemning of School-Divinity, which, in all difficulties, _useth\nreason_, and because it was not lawful [_i.e._, by this decree] to treat\nas St. Thomas [Aquinas], St. Bonaventure, and other famous men did.\u2019\n\nIt is impossible not to feel sympathy with these Italian divines,\nmaintaining the lost cause of unbridled rationalism. They were deserted\non all hands. The Protestants were in full revolt against them. The\nPapacy failed to support them, and the Bishops of the Council could not\neven understand them. For a few sentences below the foregoing quotation,\nwe read: \u2018Though many complained here-of [_i.e._, of the Decree], yet it\nprevailed but little, because generally the Fathers [_i.e._, the\nBishops] desired to hear men speak with intelligible terms, not\nabstrusely, as in the matter of Justification, and others already\nhandled.\u2019\n\nPoor belated medievalists! When they used reason they were not even\nintelligible to the ruling powers of their epoch. It will take centuries\nbefore stubborn facts are reducible by reason, and meanwhile the\npendulum swings slowly and heavily to the extreme of the historical\nmethod.\n\nForty-three years after the Italian divines had written this memorial,\nRichard Hooker in his famous _Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity_ makes\nexactly the same complaint of his Puritan adversaries.[1] Hooker\u2019s\nbalanced thought\u2014from which the appellation \u2018The Judicious Hooker\u2019 is\nderived\u2014, and his diffuse style, which is the vehicle of such thought,\nmake his writings singularly unfit for the process of summarising by a\nshort, pointed quotation. But, in the section referred to, he reproaches\nhis opponents with _Their Disparagement of Reason_; and in support of\nhis own position definitely refers to \u2018The greatest amongst the\nschool-divines,\u2019 by which designation I presume that he refers to St.\nThomas Aquinas.\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n  _Cf._ Book III, Section VIII.\n\nHooker\u2019s _Ecclesiastical Polity_ was published just before Sarpi\u2019s\n_Council of Trent_. Accordingly there was complete independence between\nthe two works. But both the Italian divines of 1551, and Hooker at the\nend of that century testify to the anti-rationalist trend of thought at\nthat epoch, and in this respect contrast their own age with the epoch of\nscholasticism.\n\nThis reaction was undoubtedly a very necessary corrective to the\nunguarded rationalism of the Middle Ages. But reactions run to extremes.\nAccordingly, although one outcome of this reaction was the birth of\nmodern science, yet we must remember that science thereby inherited the\nbias of thought to which it owes its origin.\n\nThe effect of Greek dramatic literature was many-sided so far as\nconcerns the various ways in which it indirectly affected medieval\nthought. The pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists\ntoday, are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles,\nEuripides. Their vision of fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a\ntragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by\nscience. Fate in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern\nthought. The absorbing interest in the particular heroic incidents, as\nan example and a verification of the workings of fate, reappears in our\nepoch as concentration of interest on the crucial experiments. It was my\ngood fortune to be present at the meeting of the Royal Society in London\nwhen the Astronomer Royal for England announced that the photographic\nplates of the famous eclipse, as measured by his colleagues in Greenwich\nObservatory, had verified the prediction of Einstein that rays of light\nare bent as they pass in the neighbourhood of the sun. The whole\natmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the Greek drama: we\nwere the chorus commenting on the decree of destiny as disclosed in the\ndevelopment of a supreme incident. There was dramatic quality in the\nvery staging:\u2014the traditional ceremonial, and in the background the\npicture of Newton to remind us that the greatest of scientific\ngeneralisations was now, after more than two centuries, to receive its\nfirst modification. Nor was the personal interest wanting: a great\nadventure in thought had at length come safe to shore.\n\nLet me here remind you that the essence of dramatic tragedy is not\nunhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of\nthings. This inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms\nof human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is\nonly by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the\ndrama. This remorseless inevitableness is what pervades scientific\nthought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fate.\n\nThe conception of the moral order in the Greek plays was certainly not a\ndiscovery of the dramatists. It must have passed into the literary\ntradition from the general serious opinion of the times. But in finding\nthis magnificent expression, it thereby deepened the stream of thought\nfrom which it arose. The spectacle of a moral order was impressed upon\nthe imagination of classical civilisation.\n\nThe time came when that great society decayed, and Europe passed into\nthe Middle Ages. The direct influence of Greek literature vanished. But\nthe concept of the moral order and of the order of nature had enshrined\nitself in the Stoic philosophy. For example, Lecky in his _History of\nEuropean Morals_ tells us \u2018Seneca maintains that the Divinity has\ndetermined all things by an inexorable law of destiny, which He has\ndecreed, but which He Himself obeys.\u2019 But the most effective way in\nwhich the Stoics influenced the mentality of the Middle Ages was by the\ndiffused sense of order which arose from Roman law. Again to quote\nLecky, \u2018The Roman legislation was in a two-fold manner the child of\nphilosophy. It was in the first place formed upon the philosophical\nmodel, for, instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to the\nexisting requirements of society, it laid down abstract principles of\nright to which it endeavoured to conform; and, in the next place, these\nprinciples were borrowed directly from Stoicism.\u2019 In spite of the actual\nanarchy throughout large regions in Europe after the collapse of the\nEmpire, the sense of legal order always haunted the racial memories of\nthe Imperial populations. Also the Western Church was always there as a\nliving embodiment of the traditions of Imperial rule.\n\nIt is important to notice that this legal impress upon medieval\ncivilisation was not in the form of a few wise precepts which should\npermeate conduct. It was the conception of a definite articulated system\nwhich defines the legality of the detailed structure of social organism,\nand of the detailed way in which it should function. There was nothing\nvague. It was not a question of admirable maxims, but of definite\nprocedure to put things right and to keep them there. The Middle Ages\nformed one long training of the intellect of Western Europe in the sense\nof order. There may have been some deficiency in respect to practice.\nBut the idea never for a moment lost its grip. It was pre\u00ebminently an\nepoch of orderly thought, rationalist through and through. The very\nanarchy quickened the sense for coherent system; just as the modern\nanarchy of Europe has stimulated the intellectual vision of a League of\nNations.\n\nBut for science something more is wanted than a general sense of the\norder in things. It needs but a sentence to point out how the habit of\ndefinite exact thought was implanted in the European mind by the long\ndominance of scholastic logic and scholastic divinity. The habit\nremained after the philosophy had been repudiated, the priceless habit\nof looking for an exact point and of sticking to it when found. Galileo\nowes more to Aristotle than appears on the surface of his _Dialogues_:\nhe owes to him his clear head and his analytic mind.\n\nI do not think, however, that I have even yet brought out the greatest\ncontribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement.\nI mean the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be\ncorrelated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner,\nexemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible\nlabours of scientists would be without hope. It is this instinctive\nconviction, vividly poised before the imagination, which is the motive\npower of research:\u2014that there is a secret, a secret which can be\nunveiled. How has this conviction been so vividly implanted on the\nEuropean mind?\n\nWhen we compare this tone of thought in Europe with the attitude of\nother civilisations when left to themselves, there seems but one source\nfor its origin. It must come from the medieval insistence on the\nrationality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and\nwith the rationality of a Greek philosopher. Every detail was supervised\nand ordered: the search into nature could only result in the vindication\nof the faith in rationality. Remember that I am not talking of the\nexplicit beliefs of a few individuals. What I mean is the impress on the\nEuropean mind arising from the unquestioned faith of centuries. By this\nI mean the instinctive tone of thought and not a mere creed of words.\n\nIn Asia, the conceptions of God were of a being who was either too\narbitrary or too impersonal for such ideas to have much effect on\ninstinctive habits of mind. Any definite occurrence might be due to the\nfiat of an irrational despot, or might issue from some impersonal,\ninscrutable origin of things. There was not the same confidence as in\nthe intelligible rationality of a personal being. I am not arguing that\nthe European trust in the scrutability of nature was logically justified\neven by its own theology. My only point is to understand how it arose.\nMy explanation is that the faith in the possibility of science,\ngenerated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory,\nis an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.\n\nBut science is not merely the outcome of instinctive faith. It also\nrequires an active interest in the simple occurrences of life for their\nown sake.\n\nThis qualification \u2018for their own sake\u2019 is important. The first phase of\nthe Middle Ages was an age of symbolism. It was an age of vast ideas,\nand of primitive technique. There was little to be done with nature,\nexcept to coin a hard living from it. But there were realms of thought\nto be explored, realms of philosophy and realms of theology. Primitive\nart could symbolise those ideas which filled all thoughtful minds. The\nfirst phase of medieval art has a haunting charm beyond compare: its own\nintrinsic quality is enhanced by the fact that its message, which\nstretched beyond art\u2019s own self-justification of aesthetic achievement,\nwas the symbolism of things lying behind nature itself. In this symbolic\nphase, medieval art energised in nature as its medium, but pointed to\nanother world.\n\nIn order to understand the contrast between these early Middle Ages and\nthe atmosphere required by the scientific mentality, we should compare\nthe sixth century in Italy with the sixteenth century. In both centuries\nthe Italian genius was laying the foundations of a new epoch. The\nhistory of the three centuries preceding the earlier period, despite the\npromise for the future introduced by the rise of Christianity, is\noverwhelmingly infected by the sense of the decline of civilisation. In\neach generation something has been lost. As we read the records, we are\nhaunted by the shadow of the coming barbarism. There are great men, with\nfine achievements in action or in thought. But their total effect is\nmerely for some short time to arrest the general decline. In the sixth\ncentury we are, so far as Italy is concerned, at the lowest point of the\ncurve. But in that century every action is laying the foundation for the\ntremendous rise of the new European civilisation. In the background the\nByzantine Empire, under Justinian, in three ways determined the\ncharacter of the early Middle Ages in Western Europe. In the first\nplace, its armies, under Belisarius and Narses, cleared Italy from the\nGothic domination. In this way, the stage was freed for the exercise of\nthe old Italian genius for creating organisations which shall be\nprotective of ideals of cultural activity. It is impossible not to\nsympathise with the Goths: yet there can be no doubt but that a thousand\nyears of the Papacy were infinitely more valuable for Europe than any\neffects derivable from a well-established Gothic kingdom of Italy.\n\nIn the second place, the codification of the Roman law established the\nideal of legality which dominated the sociological thought of Europe in\nthe succeeding centuries. Law is both an engine for government, and a\ncondition restraining government. The canon law of the Church, and the\ncivil law of the State, owe to Justinian\u2019s lawyers their influence on\nthe development of Europe. They established in the Western mind the\nideal that an authority should be at once lawful, and law-enforcing, and\nshould in itself exhibit a rationally adjusted system of organisation.\nThe sixth century in Italy gave the initial exhibition of the way in\nwhich the impress of these ideas was fostered by contact with the\nByzantine Empire.\n\nThirdly, in the non-political spheres of art and learning Constantinople\nexhibited a standard of realised achievement which, partly by the\nimpulse to direct imitation, and partly by the indirect inspiration\narising from the mere knowledge that such things existed, acted as a\nperpetual spur to Western culture. The wisdom of the Byzantines, as it\nstood in the imagination of the first phase of medieval mentality, and\nthe wisdom of the Egyptians as it stood in the imagination of the early\nGreeks, played analogous r\u00f4les. Probably the actual knowledge of these\nrespective wisdoms was, in either case, about as much as was good for\nthe recipients. They knew enough to know the sort of standards which are\nattainable, and not enough to be fettered by static and traditional ways\nof thought. Accordingly, in both cases men went ahead on their own and\ndid better. No account of the rise of the European scientific mentality\ncan omit some notice of this influence of the Byzantine civilisation in\nthe background. In the sixth century there is a crisis in the history of\nthe relations between the Byzantines and the West; and this crisis is to\nbe contrasted with the influence of Greek literature on European thought\nin the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The two outstanding men, who\nin the Italy of the sixth century laid the foundations of the future,\nwere St. Benedict and Gregory the Great. By reference to them, we can at\nonce see how absolutely in ruins was the approach to the scientific\nmentality which had been attained by the Greeks. We are at the zero\npoint of scientific temperature. But the life-work of Gregory and of\nBenedict contributed elements to the reconstruction of Europe which\nsecured that this reconstruction, when it arrived, should include a more\neffective scientific mentality than that of the ancient world. The\nGreeks were over-theoretical. For them science was an offshoot of\nphilosophy. Gregory and Benedict were practical men, with an eye for the\nimportance of ordinary things; and they combined this practical\ntemperament with their religious and cultural activities. In particular,\nwe owe it to St. Benedict that the monasteries were the homes of\npractical agriculturalists, as well as of saints and of artists and of\nmen of learning. The alliance of science with technology, by which\nlearning is kept in contact with irreducible and stubborn facts, owes\nmuch to the practical bent of the early Benedictines. Modern science\nderives from Rome as well as from Greece, and this Roman strain explains\nits gain in an energy of thought kept closely in contact with the world\nof facts.\n\nBut the influence of this contact between the monasteries and the facts\nof nature showed itself first in art. The rise of Naturalism in the\nlater Middle Ages was the entry into the European mind of the final\ningredient necessary for the rise of science. It was the rise of\ninterest in natural objects, and in natural occurrences, for their own\nsakes. The natural foliage of a district was sculptured in\nout-of-the-way spots of the later buildings, merely as exhibiting\ndelight in those familiar objects. The whole atmosphere of every art\nexhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of the things which lie\naround us. The craftsmen who executed the late medieval decorative\nsculpture, Giotto, Chaucer, Wordsworth, Walt Whitman, and, at the\npresent day, the New England poet Robert Frost, are all akin to each\nother in this respect. The simple immediate facts are the topics of\ninterest, and these reappear in the thought of science as the\n\u2018irreducible stubborn facts.\u2019\n\nThe mind of Europe was now prepared for its new venture of thought. It\nis unnecessary to tell in detail the various incidents which marked the\nrise of science: the growth of wealth and leisure; the expansion of\nuniversities; the invention of printing; the taking of Constantinople;\nCopernicus; Vasco da Gama; Columbus; the telescope. The soil, the\nclimate, the seeds, were there, and the forest grew. Science has never\nshaken off the impress of its origin in the historical revolt of the\nlater Renaissance. It has remained predominantly an anti-rationalistic\nmovement, based upon a na\u00efve faith. What reasoning it has wanted, has\nbeen borrowed from mathematics which is a surviving relic of Greek\nrationalism, following the deductive method. Science repudiates\nphilosophy. In other words, it has never cared to justify its faith or\nto explain its meanings; and has remained blandly indifferent to its\nrefutation by Hume.\n\nOf course the historical revolt was fully justified. It was wanted. It\nwas more than wanted: it was an absolute necessity for healthy progress.\nThe world required centuries of contemplation of irreducible and\nstubborn facts. It is difficult for men to do more than one thing at a\ntime, and that was the sort of thing they had to do after the\nrationalistic orgy of the Middle Ages. It was a very sensible reaction;\nbut it was not a protest on behalf of reason.\n\nThere is, however, a Nemesis which waits upon those who deliberately\navoid avenues of knowledge. Oliver Cromwell\u2019s cry echoes down the ages,\n\u2018My brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink you that\nyou may be mistaken.\u2019\n\nThe progress of science has now reached a turning point. The stable\nfoundations of physics have broken up: also for the first time\nphysiology is asserting itself as an effective body of knowledge, as\ndistinct from a scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought\nare becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether,\nelectricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern,\nfunction, all require reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking\nabout a mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by\nmechanics?\n\nThe truth is that science started its modern career by taking over ideas\nderived from the weakest side of the philosophies of Aristotle\u2019s\nsuccessors. In some respects it was a happy choice. It enabled the\nknowledge of the seventeenth century to be formularised so far as\nphysics and chemistry were concerned, with a completeness which has\nlasted to the present time. But the progress of biology and psychology\nhas probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths.\nIf science is not to degenerate into a medley of _ad hoc_ hypotheses, it\nmust become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism of\nits own foundations.\n\nIn the succeeding lectures of this course, I shall trace the successes\nand the failures of the particular conceptions of cosmology with which\nthe European intellect has clothed itself in the last three centuries.\nGeneral climates of opinion persist for periods of about two to three\ngenerations, that is to say, for periods of sixty to a hundred years.\nThere are also shorter waves of thought, which play on the surface of\nthe tidal movement. We shall find, therefore, transformations in the\nEuropean outlook, slowly modifying the successive centuries. There\npersists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed scientific\ncosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute\nmatter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of\nconfigurations. In itself such a material is senseless, valueless,\npurposeless. It just does what it does do, following a fixed routine\nimposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its\nbeing. It is this assumption that I call \u2018scientific materialism.\u2019 Also\nit is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited\nto the scientific situation at which we have now arrived. It is not\nwrong, if properly construed. If we confine ourselves to certain types\nof facts, abstracted from the complete circumstances in which they\noccur, the materialistic assumption expresses these facts to perfection.\nBut when we pass beyond the abstraction, either by more subtle\nemployment of our senses, or by the request for meanings and for\ncoherence of thoughts, the scheme breaks down at once. The narrow\nefficiency of the scheme was the very cause of its supreme\nmethodological success. For it directed attention to just those groups\nof facts which, in the state of knowledge then existing, required\ninvestigation.\n\nThe success of the scheme has adversely affected the various currents of\nEuropean thought. The historical revolt was anti-rationalistic, because\nthe rationalism of the scholastics required a sharp correction by\ncontact with brute fact. But the revival of philosophy in the hands of\nDescartes and his successors was entirely coloured in its development by\nthe acceptance of the scientific cosmology at its face value. The\nsuccess of their ultimate ideas confirmed scientists in their refusal to\nmodify them as the result of an enquiry into their rationality. Every\nphilosophy was bound in some way or other to swallow them whole. Also\nthe example of science affected other regions of thought. The historical\nrevolt has thus been exaggerated into the exclusion of philosophy from\nits proper r\u00f4le of harmonising the various abstractions of\nmethodological thought. Thought is abstract; and the intolerant use of\nabstractions is the major vice of the intellect. This vice is not wholly\ncorrected by the recurrence to concrete experience. For after all, you\nneed only attend to those aspects of your concrete experience which lie\nwithin some limited scheme. There are two methods for the purification\nof ideas. One of them is dispassionate observation by means of the\nbodily senses. But observation is selection. Accordingly, it is\ndifficult to transcend a scheme of abstraction whose success is\nsufficiently wide. The other method is by comparing the various schemes\nof abstraction which are well founded in our various types of\nexperience. This comparison takes the form of satisfying the demands of\nthe Italian scholastic divines whom Paul Sarpi mentioned. They asked\nthat _reason_ should be used. Faith in reason is the trust that the\nultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere\narbitrariness. It is the faith that at the base of things we shall not\nfind mere arbitrary mystery. The faith in the order of nature which has\nmade possible the growth of science is a particular example of a deeper\nfaith. This faith cannot be justified by any inductive generalisation.\nIt springs from direct inspection of the nature of things as disclosed\nin our own immediate present experience. There is no parting from your\nown shadow. To experience this faith is to know that in being ourselves\nwe are more than ourselves: to know that our experience, dim and\nfragmentary as it is, yet sounds the utmost depths of reality: to know\nthat detached details merely in order to be themselves demand that they\nshould find themselves in a system of things: to know that this system\nincludes the harmony of logical rationality, and the harmony of\naesthetic achievement: to know that, while the harmony of logic lies\nupon the universe as an iron necessity, the aesthetic harmony stands\nbefore it as a living ideal moulding the general flux in its broken\nprogress towards finer, subtler issues.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER II\n\n                      MATHEMATICS AS AN ELEMENT IN\n                         THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT\n\n\nThe science of Pure Mathematics, in its modern developments, may claim\nto be the most original creation of the human spirit. Another claimant\nfor this position is music. But we will put aside all rivals, and\nconsider the ground on which such a claim can be made for mathematics.\nThe originality of mathematics consists in the fact that in mathematical\nscience connections between things are exhibited which, apart from the\nagency of human reason, are extremely unobvious. Thus the ideas, now in\nthe minds of contemporary mathematicians, lie very remote from any\nnotions which can be immediately derived by perception through the\nsenses; unless indeed it be perception stimulated and guided by\nantecedent mathematical knowledge. This is the thesis which I proceed to\nexemplify.\n\nSuppose we project our imaginations backwards through many thousands of\nyears, and endeavour to realise the simple-mindedness of even the\ngreatest intellects in those early societies. Abstract ideas which to us\nare immediately obvious must have been, for them, matters only of the\nmost dim apprehension. For example take the question of number. We think\nof the number \u2018five\u2019 as applying to appropriate groups of any entities\nwhatsoever\u2014to five fishes, five children, five apples, five days. Thus\nin considering the relations of the number \u2018five\u2019 to the number \u2018three,\u2019\nwe are thinking of two groups of things, one with five members and the\nother with three members. But we are entirely abstracting from any\nconsideration of any particular entities, or even of any particular\nsorts of entities, which go to make up the membership of either of the\ntwo groups. We are merely thinking of those relationships between those\ntwo groups which are entirely independent of the individual essences of\nany of the members of either group. This is a very remarkable feat of\nabstraction; and it must have taken ages for the human race to rise to\nit. During a long period, groups of fishes will have been compared to\neach other in respect to their multiplicity, and groups of days to each\nother. But the first man who noticed the analogy between a group of\nseven fishes and a group of seven days made a notable advance in the\nhistory of thought. He was the first man who entertained a concept\nbelonging to the science of pure mathematics. At that moment it must\nhave been impossible for him to divine the complexity and subtlety of\nthese abstract mathematical ideas which were waiting for discovery. Nor\ncould he have guessed that these notions would exert a widespread\nfascination in each succeeding generation. There is an erroneous\nliterary tradition which represents the love of mathematics as a\nmonomania confined to a few eccentrics in each generation. But be this\nas it may, it would have been impossible to anticipate the pleasure\nderivable from a type of abstract thinking which had no counterpart in\nthe then-existing society. Thirdly, the tremendous future effect of\nmathematical knowledge on the lives of men, on their daily avocations,\non their habitual thoughts, on the organization of society, must have\nbeen even more completely shrouded from the foresight of those early\nthinkers. Even now there is a very wavering grasp of the true position\nof mathematics as an element in the history of thought. I will not go so\nfar as to say that to construct a history of thought without profound\nstudy of the mathematical ideas of successive epochs is like omitting\nHamlet from the play which is named after him. That would be claiming\ntoo much. But it is certainly analogous to cutting out the part of\nOphelia. This simile is singularly exact. For Ophelia is quite essential\nto the play, she is very charming,\u2014and a little mad. Let us grant that\nthe pursuit of mathematics is a divine madness of the human spirit, a\nrefuge from the goading urgency of contingent happenings.\n\nWhen we think of mathematics, we have in our mind a science devoted to\nthe exploration of number, quantity, geometry, and in modern times also\nincluding investigation into yet more abstract concepts of order, and\ninto analogous types of purely logical relations. The point of\nmathematics is that in it we have always got rid of the particular\ninstance, and even of any particular sorts of entities. So that for\nexample, no mathematical truths apply merely to fish, or merely to\nstones, or merely to colours. So long as you are dealing with pure\nmathematics, you are in the realm of complete and absolute abstraction.\nAll you assert is, that reason insists on the admission that, if any\nentities whatever have any relations which satisfy such-and-such purely\nabstract conditions, then they must have other relations which satisfy\nother purely abstract conditions.\n\nMathematics is thought moving in the sphere of complete abstraction from\nany particular instance of what it is talking about. So far is this view\nof mathematics from being obvious, that we can easily assure ourselves\nthat it is not, even now, generally understood. For example, it is\nhabitually thought that the certainty of mathematics is a reason for the\ncertainty of our geometrical knowledge of the space of the physical\nuniverse. This is a delusion which has vitiated much philosophy in the\npast, and some philosophy in the present. This question of geometry is a\ntest case of some urgency. There are certain alternative sets of purely\nabstract conditions possible for the relationships of groups of\nunspecified entities, which I will call _geometrical conditions_. I give\nthem this name because of their general analogy to those conditions,\nwhich we believe to hold respecting the particular geometrical relations\nof things observed by us in our direct perception of nature. So far as\nour observations are concerned, we are not quite accurate enough to be\ncertain of the exact conditions regulating the things we come across in\nnature. But we can by a slight stretch of hypothesis identify these\nobserved conditions with some one set of the purely abstract geometrical\nconditions. In doing so, we make a particular determination of the group\nof unspecified entities which are the _relata_ in the abstract science.\nIn the pure mathematics of geometrical relationships, we say that, if\n_any_ group of entities enjoy _any_ relationships among its members\nsatisfying _this_ set of abstract geometrical conditions, then\nsuch-and-such additional abstract conditions must also hold for such\nrelationships. But when we come to physical space, we say that some\ndefinitely observed group of physical entities enjoys some definitely\nobserved relationships among its members which do satisfy this\nabove-mentioned set of abstract geometrical conditions. We thence\nconclude that the additional relationships which we concluded to hold in\n_any_ such case, must therefore hold in _this particular_ case.\n\nThe certainty of mathematics depends upon its complete abstract\ngenerality. But we can have no _\u00e0 priori_ certainty that we are right in\nbelieving that the observed entities in the concrete universe form a\nparticular instance of what falls under our general reasoning. To take\nanother example from arithmetic. It is a general abstract truth of pure\nmathematics that any group of forty entities can be subdivided into two\ngroups of twenty entities. We are therefore justified in concluding that\na particular group of apples which we believe to contain forty members\ncan be subdivided into two groups of apples of which each contains\ntwenty members. But there always remains the possibility that we have\nmiscounted the big group; so that, when we come in practice to subdivide\nit, we shall find that one of the two heaps has an apple too few or an\napple too many.\n\nAccordingly, in criticising an argument based upon the application of\nmathematics to particular matters of fact, there are always three\nprocesses to be kept perfectly distinct in our minds. We must first scan\nthe purely mathematical reasoning to make sure that there are no mere\nslips in it\u2014no casual illogicalities due to mental failure. Any\nmathematician knows from bitter experience that, in first elaborating a\ntrain of reasoning, it is very easy to commit a slight error which yet\nmakes all the difference. But when a piece of mathematics has been\nrevised, and has been before the expert world for some time, the chance\nof a casual error is almost negligible. The next process is to make\nquite certain of all the abstract conditions which have been presupposed\nto hold. This is the determination of the abstract premises from which\nthe mathematical reasoning proceeds. This is a matter of considerable\ndifficulty. In the past quite remarkable oversights have been made, and\nhave been accepted by generations of the greatest mathematicians. The\nchief danger is that of oversight, namely, tacitly to introduce some\ncondition, which it is natural for us to presuppose, but which in fact\nneed not always be holding. There is another opposite oversight in this\nconnection which does not lead to error, but only to lack of\nsimplification. It is very easy to think that more postulated conditions\nare required than is in fact the case. In other words, we may think that\nsome abstract postulate is necessary which is in fact capable of being\nproved from the other postulates that we have already on hand. The only\neffects of this excess of abstract postulates are to diminish our\naesthetic pleasure in the mathematical reasoning, and to give us more\ntrouble when we come to the third process of criticism.\n\nThis third process of criticism is that of verifying that our abstract\npostulates hold for the particular case in question. It is in respect to\nthis process of verification for the particular case that all the\ntrouble arises. In some simple instances, such as the counting of forty\napples, we can with a little care arrive at practical certainty. But in\ngeneral, with more complex instances, complete certainty is\nunattainable. Volumes, libraries of volumes, have been written on the\nsubject. It is the battle ground of rival philosophers. There are two\ndistinct questions involved. There are particular definite things\nobserved, and we have to make sure that the relations between these\nthings really do obey certain definite exact abstract conditions. There\nis great room for error here. The exact observational methods of science\nare all contrivances for limiting these erroneous conclusions as to\ndirect matters of fact. But another question arises. The things directly\nobserved are, almost always, only samples. We want to conclude that the\nabstract conditions, which hold for the samples, also hold for all other\nentities which, for some reason or other, appear to us to be of the same\nsort. This process of reasoning from the sample to the whole species is\nInduction. The theory of Induction is the despair of philosophy\u2014and yet\nall our activities are based upon it. Anyhow, in criticising a\nmathematical conclusion as to a particular matter of fact, the real\ndifficulties consist in finding out the abstract assumptions involved,\nand in estimating the evidence for their applicability to the particular\ncase in hand.\n\nIt often happens, therefore, that in criticising a learned book of\napplied mathematics, or a memoir, one\u2019s whole trouble is with the first\nchapter, or even with the first page. For it is there, at the very\noutset, where the author will probably be found to slip in his\nassumptions. Farther, the trouble is not with what the author does say,\nbut with what he does not say. Also it is not with what he knows he has\nassumed, but with what he has unconsciously assumed. We do not doubt the\nauthor\u2019s honesty. It is his perspicacity which we are criticising. Each\ngeneration criticises the unconscious assumptions made by its parents.\nIt may assent to them, but it brings them out in the open.\n\nThe history of the development of language illustrates this point. It is\na history of the progressive analysis of ideas. Latin and Greek were\ninflected languages. This means that they express an unanalyzed complex\nof ideas by the mere modification of a word; whereas in English, for\nexample, we use prepositions and auxiliary verbs to drag into the open\nthe whole bundle of ideas involved. For certain forms of literary\nart,\u2014though not always\u2014the compact absorption of auxiliary ideas into\nthe main word may be an advantage. But in a language such as English\nthere is the overwhelming gain in explicitness. This increased\nexplicitness is a more complete exhibition of the various abstractions\ninvolved in the complex idea which is the meaning of the sentence.\n\nBy comparison with language, we can now see what is the function in\nthought which is performed by pure mathematics. It is a resolute attempt\nto go the whole way in the direction of complete analysis, so as to\nseparate the elements of mere matter of fact from the purely abstract\nconditions which they exemplify.\n\nThe habit of such analysis enlightens every act of the functioning of\nthe human mind. It first (by isolating it) emphasizes the direct\naesthetic appreciation of the content of experience. This direct\nappreciation means an apprehension of what this experience is in itself\nin its own particular essence, including its immediate concrete values.\nThis is a question of direct experience, dependent upon sensitive\nsubtlety. There is then the abstraction of the particular entities\ninvolved, viewed in themselves, and as apart from that particular\noccasion of experience in which we are then apprehending them. Lastly\nthere is the further apprehension of the absolutely general conditions\nsatisfied by the particular relations of those entities as in that\nexperience. These conditions gain their generality from the fact that\nthey are expressible without reference to those particular relations or\nto those particular relata which occur in that particular occasion of\nexperience. They are conditions which might hold for an indefinite\nvariety of other occasions, involving other entities and other relations\nbetween them. Thus these conditions are perfectly general because they\nrefer to no particular occasion, and to no particular entities (such as\ngreen, or blue, or trees) which enter into a variety of occasions, and\nto no particular relationships between such entities.\n\nThere is, however, a limitation to be made to the generality of\nmathematics; it is a qualification which applies equally to all general\nstatements. No statement, except one, can be made respecting any remote\noccasion which enters into no relationship with the immediate occasion\nso as to form a constitutive element of the essence of that immediate\noccasion. By the \u2018immediate occasion\u2019 I mean that occasion which\ninvolves as an ingredient the individual act of judgment in question.\nThe one excepted statement is,\u2014If anything out of relationship, then\ncomplete ignorance as to it. Here by \u2018ignorance,\u2019 I mean _ignorance_;\naccordingly no advice can be given as to how to expect it, or to treat\nit, in \u2018practice\u2019 or in any other way. Either we know something of the\nremote occasion by the cognition which is itself an element of the\nimmediate occasion, or we know nothing. Accordingly the full universe,\ndisclosed for every variety of experience, is a universe in which every\ndetail enters into its proper relationship with the immediate occasion.\nThe generality of mathematics is the most complete generality consistent\nwith the community of occasions which constitutes our metaphysical\nsituation.\n\nIt is further to be noticed that the particular entities require these\ngeneral conditions for their ingression into any occasions; but the same\ngeneral conditions may be required by many types of particular entities.\nThis fact, that the general conditions transcend any one set of\nparticular entities, is the ground for the entry into mathematics, and\ninto mathematical logic, of the notion of the \u2018variable.\u2019 It is by the\nemployment of this notion that general conditions are investigated\nwithout any specification of particular entities. This irrelevance of\nthe particular entities has not been generally understood: for example,\nthe shape-iness of shapes, _e.g._, circularity and sphericity and\ncubicality as in actual experience, do not enter into the geometrical\nreasoning.\n\nThe exercise of logical reason is always concerned with these absolutely\ngeneral conditions. In its broadest sense, the discovery of mathematics\nis the discovery that the totality of these general abstract conditions,\nwhich are concurrently applicable to the relationships among the\nentities of any one concrete occasion, are themselves inter-connected in\nthe manner of a pattern with a key to it. This pattern of relationships\namong general abstract conditions is imposed alike on external reality,\nand on our abstract representations of it, by the general necessity that\nevery thing must be just its own individual self, with its own\nindividual way of differing from everything else. This is nothing else\nthan the necessity of abstract logic, which is the presupposition\ninvolved in the very fact of interrelated existence as disclosed in each\nimmediate occasion of experience.\n\nThe key to the pattern means this fact:\u2014that from a select set of those\ngeneral conditions, exemplified in any one and the same occasion, a\npattern involving an infinite variety of other such conditions, also\nexemplified in the same occasion, can be developed by the pure exercise\nof abstract logic. Any such select set is called the set of postulates,\nor premises, from which the reasoning proceeds. The reasoning is nothing\nelse than the exhibition of the whole pattern of general conditions\ninvolved in the pattern derived from the selected postulates.\n\nThe harmony of the logical reason, which divines the complete pattern as\ninvolved in the postulates, is the most general aesthetic property\narising from the mere fact of concurrent existence in the unity of one\noccasion. Wherever there is a unity of occasion there is thereby\nestablished an aesthetic relationship between the general conditions\ninvolved in that occasion. This aesthetic relationship is that which is\ndivined in the exercise of rationality. Whatever falls within that\nrelationship is thereby exemplified in that occasion; whatever falls\nwithout that relationship is thereby excluded from exemplification in\nthat occasion. The complete pattern of general conditions, thus\nexemplified, is determined by any one of many select sets of these\nconditions. These key sets are sets of equivalent postulates. This\nreasonable harmony of being, which is required for the unity of a\ncomplex occasion, together with the completeness of the realisation (in\nthat occasion) of all that is involved in its logical harmony, is the\nprimary article of metaphysical doctrine. It means that for things to be\ntogether involves that they are reasonably together. This means that\nthought can penetrate into every occasion of fact, so that by\ncomprehending its key conditions, the whole complex of its pattern of\nconditions lies open before it. It comes to this:\u2014provided we know\nsomething which is perfectly general about the elements in any occasion,\nwe can then know an indefinite number of other equally general concepts\nwhich must also be exemplified in that same occasion. The logical\nharmony involved in the unity of an occasion is both exclusive and\ninclusive. The occasion must exclude the inharmonious, and it must\ninclude the harmonious.\n\nPythagoras was the first man who had any grasp of the full sweep of this\ngeneral principle. He lived in the sixth century before Christ. Our\nknowledge of him is fragmentary. But we know some points which establish\nhis greatness in the history of thought. He insisted on the importance\nof the utmost generality in reasoning, and he divined the importance of\nnumber as an aid to the construction of any representation of the\nconditions involved in the order of nature. We know also that he studied\ngeometry, and discovered the general proof of the remarkable theorem\nabout right-angled triangles. The formation of the Pythagorean\nBrotherhood, and the mysterious rumours as to its rites and its\ninfluence, afford some evidence that Pythagoras divined, however dimly,\nthe possible importance of mathematics in the formation of science. On\nthe side of philosophy he started a discussion which has agitated\nthinkers ever since. He asked, \u2018What is the status of mathematical\nentities, such as numbers for example, in the realm of things?\u2019 The\nnumber \u2018two,\u2019 for example, is in some sense exempt from the flux of time\nand the necessity of position in space. Yet it is involved in the real\nworld. The same considerations apply to geometrical notions\u2014to circular\nshape, for example. Pythagoras is said to have taught that the\nmathematical entities, such as numbers and shapes, were the ultimate\nstuff out of which the real entities of our perceptual experience are\nconstructed. As thus boldly stated, the idea seems crude, and indeed\nsilly. But undoubtedly, he had hit upon a philosophical notion of\nconsiderable importance; a notion which has a long history, and which\nhas moved the minds of men, and has even entered into Christian\ntheology. About a thousand years separate the Athanasian Creed from\nPythagoras, and about two thousand four hundred years separate\nPythagoras from Hegel. Yet for all these distances in time, the\nimportance of definite number in the constitution of the Divine Nature,\nand the concept of the real world as exhibiting the evolution of an\nidea, can both be traced back to the train of thought set going by\nPythagoras.\n\nThe importance of an individual thinker owes something to chance. For it\ndepends upon the fate of his ideas in the minds of his successors. In\nthis respect Pythagoras was fortunate. His philosophical speculations\nreach us through the mind of Plato. The Platonic world of ideas is the\nrefined, revised form of the Pythagorean doctrine that number lies at\nthe base of the real world. Owing to the Greek mode of representing\nnumbers by patterns of dots, the notions of number and of geometrical\nconfiguration are less separated than with us. Also Pythagoras, without\ndoubt, included the shape-iness of shape, which is an impure\nmathematical entity. So to-day, when Einstein and his followers proclaim\nthat physical facts, such as gravitation, are to be construed as\nexhibitions of local peculiarities of spatio-temporal properties, they\nare following the pure Pythagorean tradition. In a sense, Plato and\nPythagoras stand nearer to modern physical science than does Aristotle.\nThe two former were mathematicians, whereas Aristotle was the son of a\ndoctor, though of course he was not thereby ignorant of mathematics. The\npractical counsel to be derived from Pythagoras, is to measure, and thus\nto express quality in terms of numerically determined quantity. But the\nbiological sciences, then and till our own time, have been\noverwhelmingly classificatory. Accordingly, Aristotle by his Logic\nthrows the emphasis on classification. The popularity of Aristotelian\nLogic retarded the advance of physical science throughout the Middle\nAges. If only the schoolmen had measured instead of classifying, how\nmuch they might have learnt!\n\nClassification is a halfway house between the immediate concreteness of\nthe individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical\nnotions. The species take account of the specific character, and the\ngenera of the generic character. But in the procedure of relating\nmathematical notions to the facts of nature, by counting, by\nmeasurement, and by geometrical relations, and by types of order, the\nrational contemplation is lifted from the incomplete abstractions\ninvolved in definite species and genera, to the complete, abstractions\nof mathematics. Classification is necessary. But unless you can progress\nfrom classification to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you\nvery far.\n\nBetween the epoch which stretches from Pythagoras to Plato and the epoch\ncomprised in the seventeenth century of the modern world nearly two\nthousand years elapsed. In this long interval mathematics had made\nimmense strides. Geometry had gained the study of conic sections and\ntrigonometry; the method of exhaustion had almost anticipated the\nintegral calculus; and above all the Arabic arithmetical notation and\nalgebra had been contributed by Asiatic thought. But the progress was on\ntechnical lines. Mathematics, as a formative element in the development\nof philosophy, never, during this long period, recovered from its\ndeposition at the hands of Aristotle. Some of the old ideas derived from\nthe Pythagorean-Platonic epoch lingered on, and can be traced among the\nPlatonic influences which shaped the first period of evolution of\nChristian theology. But philosophy received no fresh inspiration from\nthe steady advance of mathematical science. In the seventeenth century\nthe influence of Aristotle was at its lowest, and mathematics recovered\nthe importance of its earlier period. It was an age of great physicists\nand great philosophers; and the physicists and philosophers were alike\nmathematicians. The exception of John Locke should be made; although he\nwas greatly influenced by the Newtonian circle of the Royal Society. In\nthe age of Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, and Leibniz, mathematics\nwas an influence of the first magnitude in the formation of philosophic\nideas. But the mathematics, which now emerged into prominence, was a\nvery different science from the mathematics of the earlier epoch. It had\ngained in generality, and had started upon its almost incredible modern\ncareer of piling subtlety of generalization upon subtlety of\ngeneralization; and of finding, with each growth of complexity, some new\napplication, either to physical science, or to philosophic thought. The\nArabic notation had equipped the science with almost perfect technical\nefficiency in the manipulation of numbers. This relief from a struggle\nwith arithmetical details (as instanced, for example, in the Egyptian\narithmetic of B. C. 1600) gave room for a development which had already\nbeen faintly anticipated in later Greek mathematics. Algebra now came\nupon the scene, and algebra is a generalisation of arithmetic. In the\nsame way as the notion of number abstracted from reference to any one\nparticular set of entities, so in algebra abstraction is made from the\nnotion of any particular numbers. Just as the number \u20185\u2019 refers\nimpartially to any group of five entities, so in algebra the letters are\nused to refer impartially to any number, with the proviso that each\nletter is to refer to the same number throughout the same context of its\nemployment.\n\nThis usage was first employed in equations, which are methods of asking\ncomplicated arithmetical questions. In this connection, the letters\nrepresenting numbers were termed \u2018unknowns.\u2019 But equations soon\nsuggested a new idea, that, namely, of a function of one or more general\nsymbols, these symbols being letters representing any numbers. In this\nemployment the algebraic letters are called the \u2018arguments\u2019 of the\nfunction, or sometimes they are called the \u2018variables.\u2019 Then, for\ninstance, if an angle is represented by an algebraical letter, as\nstanding for its numerical measure in terms of a given unit,\nTrigonometry is absorbed into this new algebra. Algebra thus develops\ninto the general science of analysis in which we consider the properties\nof various functions of undetermined arguments. Finally the particular\nfunctions, such as the trigonometrical functions, and the logarithmic\nfunctions, and the algebraic functions, are generalised into the idea of\n\u2018any function.\u2019 Too large a generalisation leads to mere barrenness. It\nis the large generalisation, limited by a happy particularity, which is\nthe fruitful conception. For instance the idea of any _continuous_\nfunction, whereby the limitation of continuity is introduced, is the\nfruitful idea which has led to most of the important applications. This\nrise of algebraic analysis was concurrent with Descartes\u2019 discovery of\nanalytical geometry, and then with the invention of the infinitesimal\ncalculus by Newton and Leibniz. Truly, Pythagoras, if he could have\nforeseen the issue of the train of thought which he had set going would\nhave felt himself fully justified in his brotherhood with its excitement\nof mysterious rites.\n\nThe point which I now want to make is that this dominance of the idea of\nfunctionality in the abstract sphere of mathematics found itself\nreflected in the order of nature under the guise of mathematically\nexpressed laws of nature. Apart from this progress of mathematics, the\nseventeenth century developments of science would have been impossible.\nMathematics supplied the background of imaginative thought with which\nthe men of science approached the observation of nature. Galileo\nproduced formulae, Descartes produced formulae, Huyghens produced\nformulae, Newton produced formulae.\n\nAs a particular example of the effect of the abstract development of\nmathematics upon the science of those times, consider the notion of\nperiodicity. The general recurrences of things are very obvious in our\nordinary experience. Days recur, lunar phases recur, the seasons of the\nyear recur, rotating bodies recur to their old positions, beats of the\nheart recur, breathing recurs. On every side, we are met by recurrence.\nApart from recurrence, knowledge would be impossible; for nothing could\nbe referred to our past experience. Also, apart from some regularity of\nrecurrence, measurement would be impossible. In our experience, as we\ngain the idea of exactness, recurrence is fundamental.\n\nIn the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the theory of periodicity\ntook a fundamental place in science. Kepler divined a law connecting the\nmajor axes of the planetary orbits with the periods in which the planets\nrespectively described their orbits: Galileo observed the periodic\nvibrations of pendulums: Newton explained sound as being due to the\ndisturbance of air by the passage through it of periodic waves of\ncondensation and rarefaction: Huyghens explained light as being due to\nthe transverse waves of vibration of a subtle ether: Mersenne connected\nthe period of the vibration of a violin string with its density,\ntension, and length. The birth of modern physics depended upon the\napplication of the abstract idea of periodicity to a variety of concrete\ninstances. But this would have been impossible, unless mathematicians\nhad already worked out in the abstract the various abstract ideas which\ncluster round the notions of periodicity. The science of trigonometry\narose from that of the relations of the angles of a right-angled\ntriangle, to the ratios between the sides and hypotenuse of the\ntriangle. Then, under the influence of the newly discovered mathematical\nscience of the analysis of functions, it broadened out into the study of\nthe simple abstract periodic functions which these ratios exemplify.\nThus trigonometry became completely abstract; and in thus becoming\nabstract, it became useful. It illuminated the underlying analogy\nbetween sets of utterly diverse physical phenomena; and at the same time\nit supplied the weapons by which any one such set could have its various\nfeatures analysed and related to each other.[2]\n\nNothing is more impressive than the fact that, as mathematics withdrew\nincreasingly into the upper regions of ever greater extremes of abstract\nthought, it returned back to earth with a corresponding growth of\nimportance for the analysis of concrete fact. The history of the\nseventeenth century science reads as though it were some vivid dream of\nPlato or Pythagoras. In this characteristic the seventeenth century was\nonly the forerunner of its successors.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n  For a more detailed consideration of the nature and function of pure\n  mathematics _cf._ my _Introduction to Mathematics_, Home University\n  Library, Williams and Norgate, London.\n\nThe paradox is now fully established that the utmost abstractions are\nthe true weapons with which to control our thought of concrete fact. As\nthe result of the prominence of mathematicians in the seventeenth\ncentury, the eighteenth century was mathematically minded, more\nespecially where French influence predominated. An exception must be\nmade of the English empiricism derived from Locke. Outside France,\nNewton\u2019s direct influence on philosophy is best seen in Kant, and not in\nHume.\n\nIn the nineteenth century, the general influence of mathematics waned.\nThe romantic movement in literature, and the idealistic movement in\nphilosophy were not the products of mathematical minds. Also, even in\nscience, the growth of geology, of zoology, and of the biological\nsciences generally, was in each case entirely disconnected from any\nreference to mathematics. The chief scientific excitement of the century\nwas the Darwinian theory of evolution. Accordingly, mathematicians were\nin the background, so far as the general thought of that age was\nconcerned. But this does not mean that mathematics was being neglected,\nor even that it was uninfluential. During the nineteenth century pure\nmathematics made almost as much progress as during all the preceding\ncenturies from Pythagoras onwards. Of course progress was easier,\nbecause the technique had been perfected. But allowing for that, the\nchange in mathematics between the years 1800 and 1900 is very\nremarkable. If we add in the previous hundred years, and take the two\ncenturies preceding the present time, one is almost tempted to date the\nfoundation of mathematics somewhere in the last quarter of the\nseventeenth century. The period of the discovery of the elements\nstretches from Pythagoras to Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, and the\ndeveloped science has been created during the last two hundred and fifty\nyears. This is not a boast as to the superior genius of the modern\nworld; for it is harder to discover the elements than to develop the\nscience.\n\nThroughout the nineteenth century, the influence of the science was its\ninfluence on dynamics and physics, and thence derivatively on\nengineering and chemistry. It is difficult to overrate its indirect\ninfluence on human life through the medium of these sciences. But there\nwas no direct influence of mathematics upon the general thought of the\nage.\n\nIn reviewing this rapid sketch of the influence of mathematics\nthroughout European history, we see that it had two great periods of\ndirect influence upon general thought, both periods lasting for about\ntwo hundred years. The first period was that stretching from Pythagoras\nto Plato, when the possibility of the science, and its general\ncharacter, first dawned upon the Grecian thinkers. The second period\ncomprised the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of our modern epoch.\nBoth periods had certain common characteristics. In the earlier, as in\nthe later period, the general categories of thought in many spheres of\nhuman interest, were in a state of disintegration. In the age of\nPythagoras, the unconscious Paganism, with its traditional clothing of\nbeautiful ritual and of magical rites, was passing into a new phase\nunder two influences. There were waves of religious enthusiasm, seeking\ndirect enlightenment into the secret depths of being; and at the\nopposite pole, there was the awakening of critical analytical thought,\nprobing with cool dispassionateness into ultimate meanings. In both\ninfluences, so diverse in their outcome, there was one common element\u2014an\nawakened curiosity, and a movement towards the reconstruction of\ntraditional ways. The pagan mysteries may be compared to the Puritan\nreaction and to the Catholic reaction; critical scientific interest was\nalike in both epochs, though with minor differences of substantial\nimportance.\n\nIn each age, the earlier stages were placed in periods of rising\nprosperity, and of new opportunities. In this respect, they differed\nfrom the period of gradual declension in the second and third centuries\nwhen Christianity was advancing to the conquest of the Roman world. It\nis only in a period, fortunate both in its opportunities for\ndisengagement from the immediate pressure of circumstances, and in its\neager curiosity, that the Age-Spirit can undertake any direct revision\nof those final abstractions which lie hidden in the more concrete\nconcepts from which the serious thought of an age takes its start. In\nthe rare periods when this task can be undertaken, mathematics becomes\nrelevant to philosophy. For mathematics is the science of the most\ncomplete abstractions to which the human mind can attain.\n\nThe parallel between the two epochs must not be pressed too far. The\nmodern world is larger and more complex than the ancient civilization\nround the shores of the Mediterranean, or even than that of the Europe\nwhich sent Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers across the ocean. We cannot\nnow explain our age by some simple formula which becomes dominant and\nwill then be laid to rest for a thousand years. Thus the temporary\nsubmergence of the mathematical mentality from the time of Rousseau\nonwards appears already to be at an end. We are entering upon an age of\nreconstruction, in religion, in science, and in political thought. Such\nages, if they are to avoid mere ignorant oscillation between extremes,\nmust seek truth in its ultimate depths. There can be no vision of this\ndepth of truth apart from a philosophy which takes full account of those\nultimate abstractions, whose interconnections it is the business of\nmathematics to explore.\n\nIn order to explain exactly how mathematics is gaining in general\nimportance at the present time, let us start from a particular\nscientific perplexity and consider the notions to which we are naturally\nled by some attempt to unravel its difficulties. At present physics is\ntroubled by the quantum theory. I need not now explain[3] what this\ntheory is, to those who are not already familiar with it. But the point\nis that one of the most hopeful lines of explanation is to assume that\nan electron does not continuously traverse its path in space. The\nalternative notion as to its mode of existence is that it appears at a\nseries of discrete positions in space which it occupies for successive\ndurations of time. It is as though an automobile moving at the average\nrate of thirty miles an hour along a road, did not traverse the road\ncontinuously; but appeared successively at the successive milestones,\nremaining for two minutes at each milestone.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n  _Cf._ Chapter VIII.\n\nIn the first place there is required the purely technical use of\nmathematics to determine whether this conception does in fact explain\nthe many perplexing characteristics of the quantum theory. If the notion\nsurvives this test, undoubtedly physics will adopt it. So far the\nquestion is purely one for mathematics and physical science to settle\nbetween them, on the basis of mathematical calculations and physical\nobservations.\n\nBut now a problem is handed over to the philosophers. This discontinuous\nexistence in space, thus assigned to electrons, is very unlike the\ncontinuous existence of material entities which we habitually assume as\nobvious. The electron seems to be borrowing the character which some\npeople have assigned to the Mahatmas of Tibet. These electrons, with the\ncorrelative protons, are now conceived as being the fundamental entities\nout of which the material bodies of ordinary experience are composed.\nAccordingly, if this explanation is allowed, we have to revise all our\nnotions of the ultimate character of material existence. For when we\npenetrate to these final entities, this startling discontinuity of\nspatial existence discloses itself.\n\nThere is no difficulty in explaining the paradox, if we consent to apply\nto the apparently steady undifferentiated endurance of matter the same\nprinciples as those now accepted for sound and light. A steadily\nsounding note is explained as the outcome of vibrations in the air: a\nsteady colour is explained as the outcome of vibrations in ether. If we\nexplain the steady endurance of matter on the same principle, we shall\nconceive each primordial element as a vibratory ebb and flow of an\nunderlying energy, or activity. Suppose we keep to the physical idea of\nenergy: then each primordial element will be an organized system of\nvibratory streaming of energy. Accordingly there will be a definite\nperiod associated with each element; and within that period the\nstream-system will sway from one stationary maximum to another\nstationary maximum,\u2014or, taking a metaphor from the ocean tides, the\nsystem will sway from one high tide to another high tide. This system,\nforming the primordial element, is nothing at any instant. It requires\nits whole period in which to manifest itself. In an analogous way, a\nnote of music is nothing at an instant, but it also requires its whole\nperiod in which to manifest itself.\n\nAccordingly, in asking where the primordial element is, we must settle\non its average position at the centre of each period. If we divide time\ninto smaller elements, the vibratory system as one electronic entity has\nno existence. The path in space of such a vibratory entity\u2014where the\nentity is _constituted by_ the vibrations\u2014must be represented by a\nseries of detached positions in space, analogously to the automobile\nwhich is found at successive milestones and at nowhere between.\n\nWe first must ask whether there is any evidence to associate the quantum\ntheory with vibration. This question is immediately answered in the\naffirmative. The whole theory centres round the radiant energy from an\natom, and is intimately associated with the periods of the radiant\nwave-systems. It seems, therefore, that the hypothesis of essentially\nvibratory existence is the most hopeful way of explaining the paradox of\nthe discontinuous orbit.\n\nIn the second place, a new problem is now placed before philosophers and\nphysicists, if we entertain the hypothesis that the ultimate elements of\nmatter are in their essence vibratory. By this I mean that apart from\nbeing a periodic system, such an element would have no existence. With\nthis hypothesis we have to ask, what are the ingredients which form the\nvibratory organism. We have already got rid of the matter with its\nappearance of undifferentiated endurance. Apart from some metaphysical\ncompulsion, there is no reason to provide another more subtle stuff to\ntake the place of the matter which has just been explained away. The\nfield is now open for the introduction of some new doctrine of organism\nwhich may take the place of the materialism with which, since the\nseventeenth century, science has saddled philosophy. It must be\nremembered that the physicists\u2019 energy is obviously an abstraction. The\nconcrete fact, which is the organism, must be a complete expression of\nthe character of a real occurrence. Such a displacement of scientific\nmaterialism, if it ever takes place, cannot fail to have important\nconsequences in every field of thought.\n\nFinally, our last reflection must be, that we have in the end come back\nto a version of the doctrine of old Pythagoras, from whom mathematics,\nand mathematical physics, took their rise. He discovered the importance\nof dealing with abstractions; and in particular directed attention to\nnumber as characterizing the periodicities of notes of music. The\nimportance of the abstract idea of periodicity was thus present at the\nvery beginning both of mathematics and of European philosophy.\n\nIn the seventeenth century, the birth of modern science required a new\nmathematics, more fully equipped for the purpose of analysing the\ncharacteristics of vibratory existence. And now in the twentieth century\nwe find physicists largely engaged in analysing the periodicities of\natoms. Truly, Pythagoras in founding European philosophy and European\nmathematics, endowed them with the luckiest of lucky guesses\u2014or, was it\na flash of divine genius, penetrating to the inmost nature of things?\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER III\n\n                         THE CENTURY OF GENIUS\n\n\nThe previous chapters were devoted to the antecedent conditions which\nprepared the soil for the scientific outburst of the seventeenth\ncentury. They traced the various elements of thought and instinctive\nbelief, from their first efflorescence in the classical civilisation of\nthe ancient world, through the transformations which they underwent in\nthe Middle Ages, up to the historical revolt of the sixteenth century.\nThree main factors arrested attention,\u2014the rise of mathematics, the\ninstinctive belief in a detailed order of nature, and the unbridled\nrationalism of the thought of the later Middle Ages. By this rationalism\nI mean the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a\nmetaphysical analysis of the nature of things, which would thereby\ndetermine how things acted and functioned. The historical revolt was the\ndefinite abandonment of this method in favour of the study of the\nempirical facts of antecedents and consequences. In religion, it meant\nthe appeal to the origins of Christianity; and in science it meant the\nappeal to experiment and the inductive method of reasoning.\n\nA brief, and sufficiently accurate, description of the intellectual life\nof the European races during the succeeding two centuries and a quarter\nup to our own times is that they have been living upon the accumulated\ncapital of ideas provided for them by the genius of the seventeenth\ncentury. The men of this epoch inherited a ferment of ideas attendant\nupon the historical revolt of the sixteenth century, and they bequeathed\nformed systems of thought touching every aspect of human life. It is the\none century which consistently, and throughout the whole range of human\nactivities, provided intellectual genius adequate for the greatness of\nits occasions. The crowded stage of this hundred years is indicated by\nthe coincidences which mark its literary annals. At its dawn Bacon\u2019s\n_Advancement of Learning_ and Cervantes\u2019 _Don Quixote_ were published in\nthe same year (1605), as though the epoch would introduce itself with a\nforward and a backward glance. The first quarto edition of _Hamlet_\nappeared in the preceding year, and a slightly variant edition in the\nsame year. Finally Shakespeare and Cervantes died on the same day, April\n23, 1616. In the spring of this same year Harvey is believed to have\nfirst expounded his theory of the circulation of the blood in a course\nof lectures before the College of Physicians in London. Newton was born\nin the year that Galileo died (1642), exactly one hundred years after\nthe publication of Copernicus\u2019 _De Revolutionibus_. One year earlier\nDescartes published his _Meditationes_ and two years later his\n_Principia Philosophiae_. There simply was not time for the century to\nspace out nicely its notable events concerning men of genius.\n\nI cannot now enter upon a chronicle of the various stages of\nintellectual advance included within this epoch. It is too large a topic\nfor one lecture, and would obscure the ideas which it is my purpose to\ndevelop. A mere rough catalogue of some names will be sufficient, names\nof men who published to the world important work within these limits of\ntime: Francis Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal,\nHuyghens, Boyle, Newton, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz. I have limited the\nlist to the sacred number of twelve, a number much too small to be\nproperly representative. For example, there is only one Italian there,\nwhereas Italy could have filled the list from its own ranks. Again\nHarvey is the only biologist, and also there are too many Englishmen.\nThis latter defect is partly due to the fact that the lecturer is\nEnglish, and that he is lecturing to an audience which, equally with\nhim, owns this English century. If he had been Dutch, there would have\nbeen too many Dutchmen; if Italian, too many Italians; and if French,\ntoo many Frenchmen. The unhappy Thirty Years\u2019 War was devastating\nGermany; but every other country looks back to this century as an epoch\nwhich witnessed some culmination of its genius. Certainly this was a\ngreat period of English thought; as at a later time Voltaire impressed\nupon France.\n\nThe omission of physiologists, other than Harvey, also requires\nexplanation. There were, of course, great advances in biology within the\ncentury, chiefly associated with Italy and the University of Padua. But\nmy purpose is to trace the philosophic outlook, derived from science and\npresupposed by science, and to estimate some of its effects on the\ngeneral climate of each age. Now the scientific philosophy of this age\nwas dominated by physics; so as to be the most obvious rendering, in\nterms of general ideas, of the state of physical knowledge of that age\nand of the two succeeding centuries. As a matter of fact, these concepts\nare very unsuited to biology; and set for it an insoluble problem of\nmatter and life and organism, with which biologists are now wrestling.\nBut the science of living organisms is only now coming to a growth\nadequate to impress its conceptions upon philosophy. The last half\ncentury before the present time has witnessed unsuccessful attempts to\nimpress biological notions upon the materialism of the seventeenth\ncentury. However this success be estimated, it is certain that the root\nideas of the seventeenth century were derived from the school of thought\nwhich produced Galileo, Huyghens and Newton, and not from the\nphysiologists of Padua. One unsolved problem of thought, so far as it\nderives from this period, is to be formulated thus: Given configurations\nof matter with locomotion in space as assigned by physical laws, to\naccount for living organisms.\n\nMy discussion of the epoch will be best introduced by a quotation from\nFrancis Bacon, which forms the opening of Section (or \u2018Century\u2019) IX of\nhis _Natural History_, I mean his _Silva Silvarum_. We are told in the\ncontemporary memoir by his chaplain, Dr. Rawley, that this work was\ncomposed in the last five years of his life, so it must be dated between\n1620 and 1626. The quotation runs thus:\n\n\u201cIt is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense,\nyet they have perception; for when one body is applied to another, there\nis a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude\nor expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body be alterant or\naltered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies\nwould be like one to another. And sometimes this perception, in some\nkind of bodies, is far more subtile than sense; so that sense is but a\ndull thing in comparison of it: we see a weatherglass will find the\nleast difference of the weather in heat or cold, when we find it not.\nAnd this perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon the\ntouch; as when the loadstone draweth iron; or flame naphtha of Babylon,\na great distance off. It is therefore a subject of a very noble enquiry,\nto enquire of the more subtile perceptions; for it is another key to\nopen nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes better. And besides, it\nis a principal means of natural divination; for that which in these\nperceptions appeareth early, in the great effects cometh long after.\u201d\n\nThere are a great many points of interest about this quotation, some of\nwhich will emerge into importance in succeeding lectures. In the first\nplace, note the careful way in which Bacon discriminates between\n_perception_, or _taking account of_, on the one hand, and _sense_, or\n_cognitive experience_, on the other hand. In this respect Bacon is\noutside the physical line of thought which finally dominated the\ncentury. Later on, people thought of passive matter which was operated\non externally by forces. I believe Bacon\u2019s line of thought to have\nexpressed a more fundamental truth than do the materialistic concepts\nwhich were then being shaped as adequate for physics. We are now so used\nto the materialistic way of looking at things, which has been rooted in\nour literature by the genius of the seventeenth century, that it is with\nsome difficulty that we understand the possibility of another mode of\napproach to the problems of nature.\n\nIn the particular instance of the quotation which I have just made, the\nwhole passage and the context in which it is embedded, are permeated\nthrough and through by the experimental method, that is to say, by\nattention to \u2018irreducible and stubborn facts\u2019, and by the inductive\nmethod of eliciting general laws. Another unsolved problem which has\nbeen bequeathed to us by the seventeenth century is the rational\njustification of this method of Induction. The explicit realisation of\nthe antithesis between the deductive rationalism of the scholastics and\nthe inductive observational methods of the moderns must chiefly be\nascribed to Bacon; though, of course, it was implicit in the mind of\nGalileo and of all the men of science of those times. But Bacon was one\nof the earliest of the whole group, and also had the most direct\napprehension of the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was\nin progress. Perhaps the man who most completely anticipated both Bacon\nand the whole modern point of view was the artist Leonardo Da Vinci, who\nlived almost exactly a century before Bacon. Leonardo also illustrates\nthe theory which I was advancing in my last lecture, that the rise of\nnaturalistic art was an important ingredient in the formation of our\nscientific mentality. Indeed, Leonardo was more completely a man of\nscience than was Bacon. The practice of naturalistic art is more akin to\nthe practice of physics, chemistry and biology than is the practice of\nlaw. We all remember the saying of Bacon\u2019s contemporary, Harvey, the\ndiscoverer of the circulation of the blood, that Bacon \u2018wrote of science\nlike a Lord Chancellor.\u2019 But at the beginning of the modern period Da\nVinci and Bacon stand together as illustrating the various strains which\nhave combined to form the modern world, namely, legal mentality and the\npatient observational habits of the naturalistic artists.\n\nIn the passage which I have quoted from Bacon\u2019s writings there is no\nexplicit mention of the method of inductive reasoning. It is unnecessary\nfor me to prove to you by any quotations that the enforcement of the\nimportance of this method, and of the importance, to the welfare of\nmankind, of the secrets of nature to be thus discovered, was one of the\nmain themes to which Bacon devoted himself in his writings. Induction\nhas proved to be a somewhat more complex process than Bacon anticipated.\nHe had in his mind the belief that with a sufficient care in the\ncollection of instances the general law would stand out of itself. We\nknow now, and probably Harvey knew then, that this is a very inadequate\naccount of the processes which issue in scientific generalisations. But\nwhen you have made all the requisite deductions, Bacon remains as one of\nthe great builders who constructed the mind of the modern world.\n\nThe special difficulties raised by induction emerged in the eighteenth\ncentury, as the result of Hume\u2019s criticism. But Bacon was one of the\nprophets of the historical revolt, which deserted the method of\nunrelieved rationalism, and rushed into the other extreme of basing all\nfruitful knowledge upon inference from particular occasions in the past\nto particular occasions in the future. I do not wish to throw any doubt\nupon the validity of induction, when it has been properly guarded. My\npoint is, that the very baffling task of applying reason to elicit the\ngeneral characteristics of the immediate occasion, as set before us in\ndirect cognition, is a necessary preliminary, if we are to justify\ninduction; unless indeed we are content to base it upon our vague\ninstinct that of course it is all right. Either there is something about\nthe immediate occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the\nfuture, or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to memory and\ninduction. It is impossible to over-emphasise the point that the key to\nthe process of induction, as used either in science or in our ordinary\nlife, is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate\noccasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. It is in respect to our\ngrasp of the character of these occasions in their concreteness that the\nmodern developments of physiology and of psychology are of critical\nimportance. I shall illustrate this point in my subsequent lectures. We\nfind ourselves amid insoluble difficulties when we substitute for this\nconcrete occasion a mere abstract in which we only consider material\nobjects in a flux of configurations in time and space. It is quite\nobvious that such objects can tell us only that they are where they are.\n\nAccordingly, we must recur to the method of the school-divinity as\nexplained by the Italian medievalists whom I quoted in the first\nlecture. We must observe the immediate occasion, and _use reason_ to\nelicit a general description of its nature. Induction presupposes\nmetaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism.\nYou cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till\nyour metaphysics has assured you that there _is_ a history to appeal to;\nand likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of\nknowledge that there _is_ a future already subjected to some\ndeterminations. The difficulty is to make sense of either of these\nideas. But unless you have done so, you have made nonsense of induction.\n\nYou will observe that I do not hold Induction to be in its essence the\nderivation of general laws. It is the divination of some characteristics\nof a particular future from the known characteristics of a particular\npast. The wider assumption of general laws holding for all cognisable\noccasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach to this limited\nknowledge. All we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall\ndetermine a particular community of occasions, which are in some\nrespects mutually qualified by reason of their inclusion within that\nsame community. That community of occasions considered in physical\nscience is the set of happenings which fit on to each other\u2014as we say\u2014in\na common space-time, so that we can trace the transitions from one to\nthe other. Accordingly, we refer to _the_ common space-time indicated in\nour immediate occasion of knowledge. Inductive reasoning proceeds from\nthe particular occasion to the particular community of occasions, and\nfrom the particular community to relations between particular occasions\nwithin that community. Until we have taken into account other scientific\nconcepts, it is impossible to carry the discussion of induction further\nthan this preliminary conclusion.\n\nThe third point to notice about this quotation from Bacon is the purely\nqualitative character of the statements made in it. In this respect\nBacon completely missed the tonality which lay behind the success of\nseventeenth century science. Science was becoming, and has remained,\nprimarily quantitative. Search for measurable elements among your\nphenomena, and then search for relations between these measures of\nphysical quantities. Bacon ignores this rule of science. For example, in\nthe quotation given he speaks of action at a distance; but he is\nthinking qualitatively and not quantitatively. We cannot ask that he\nshould anticipate his younger contemporary Galileo, or his distant\nsuccessor Newton. But he gives no hint that there should be a search for\nquantities. Perhaps he was misled by the current logical doctrines which\nhad come down from Aristotle. For, in effect, these doctrines said to\nthe physicist \u2018_classify_\u2019 when they should have said \u2018_measure_.\u2019\n\nBy the end of the century physics had been founded on a satisfactory\nbasis of measurement. The final and adequate exposition was given by\nNewton. The common measurable element of _mass_ was discerned as\ncharacterising all bodies in different amounts. Bodies which are\napparently identical in substance, shape, and size have very\napproximately the same mass: the closer the identity, the nearer the\nequality. The force acting on a body, whether by touch or by action at a\ndistance, was [in effect] defined as being equal to the mass of the body\nmultiplied by the rate of change of the body\u2019s velocity, so far as this\nrate of change is produced by that force. In this way the force is\ndiscerned by its effect on the motion of the body. The question now\narises whether this conception of the magnitude of a force leads to the\ndiscovery of simple quantitative laws involving the alternative\ndetermination of forces by circumstances of the configuration of\nsubstances and of their physical characters. The Newtonian conception\nhas been brilliantly successful in surviving this test throughout the\nwhole modern period. Its first triumph was the law of gravitation. Its\ncumulative triumph has been the whole development of dynamical\nastronomy, of engineering, and of physics.\n\nThis subject of the formation of the three laws of motion and of the law\nof gravitation deserves critical attention. The whole development of\nthought occupied exactly two generations. It commenced with Galileo and\nended with Newton\u2019s _Principia_; and Newton was born in the year that\nGalileo died. Also the lives of Descartes and Huyghens fall within the\nperiod occupied by these great terminal figures. The issue of the\ncombined labours of these four men has some right to be considered as\nthe greatest single intellectual success which mankind has achieved. In\nestimating its size, we must consider the completeness of its range. It\nconstructs for us a vision of the material universe, and it enables us\nto calculate the minutest detail of a particular occurrence. Galileo\ntook the first step in hitting on the right line of thought. He noted\nthat the critical point to attend to was not the motion of bodies but\nthe changes of their motions. Galileo\u2019s discovery is formularised by\nNewton in his first law of motion:\u2014\u201cEvery body continues in its state of\nrest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, except so far as it may\nbe compelled by force to change that state.\u201d\n\nThis formula contains the repudiation of a belief which had blocked the\nprogress of physics for two thousand years. It also deals with a\nfundamental concept which is essential to scientific theory; I mean, the\nconcept of an ideally isolated system. This conception embodies a\nfundamental character of things, without which science, or indeed any\nknowledge on the part of finite intellects, would be impossible. The\n\u2018isolated\u2019 system is not a solipsist system, apart from which there\nwould be nonentity. It is isolated as within the universe. This means\nthat there are truths respecting this system which require reference\nonly to the remainder of things by way of a uniform systematic scheme of\nrelationships. Thus the conception of an isolated system is not the\nconception of substantial independence from the remainder of things, but\nof freedom from casual contingent dependence upon detailed items within\nthe rest of the universe. Further, this freedom from casual dependence\nis required only in respect to certain abstract characteristics which\nattach to the isolated system, and not in respect to the system in its\nfull concreteness.\n\nThe first law of motion asks what is to be said of a dynamically\nisolated system so far as concerns its motion as a whole, abstracting\nfrom its orientation and its internal arrangement of parts. Aristotle\nsaid that you must conceive such a system to be at rest. Galileo added\nthat the state of rest is only a particular case, and that the general\nstatement is \u2018either in a state of rest, or of uniform motion in a\nstraight line.\u2019 Accordingly, an Aristotelean would conceive the forces\narising from the reaction of alien bodies as being quantitatively\nmeasurable in terms of the velocity they sustain, and as directively\ndetermined by the direction of that velocity; while the Galilean would\ndirect attention to the magnitude of the acceleration and to its\ndirection. This difference is illustrated by contrasting Kepler and\nNewton. They both speculated as to the forces sustaining the planets in\ntheir orbits. Kepler looked for tangential forces pushing the planets\nalong, whereas Newton looked for radial forces diverting the directions\nof the planets\u2019 motions.\n\nInstead of dwelling upon the mistake which Aristotle made, it is more\nprofitable to emphasise the justification which he had for it, if we\nconsider the obvious facts of our experience. All the motions which\nenter into our normal everyday experience cease unless they are\nevidently sustained from the outside. Apparently, therefore, the sound\nempiricist must devote his attention to this question of the sustenance\nof motion. We here hit upon one of the dangers of unimaginative\nempiricism. The seventeenth century exhibits another example of this\nsame danger; and, of all people in the world, Newton fell into it.\nHuyghens had produced the wave theory of light. But this theory failed\nto account for the most obvious facts about light as in our ordinary\nexperience, namely, that shadows cast by obstructing objects are defined\nby rectilinear rays. Accordingly, Newton rejected this theory and\nadopted the corpuscular theory which completely explained shadows. Since\nthen both theories have had their periods of triumph. At the present\nmoment the scientific world is seeking for a combination of the two.\nThese examples illustrate the danger of refusing to entertain an idea\nbecause of its failure to explain one of the most obvious facts in the\nsubject matter in question. If you have had your attention directed to\nthe novelties in thought in your own lifetime, you will have observed\nthat almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness\nwhen they are first produced.\n\nReturning to the laws of motion, it is noticeable that no reason was\nproduced in the seventeenth century for the Galilean as distinct from\nthe Aristotelian position. It was an ultimate fact. When in the course\nof these lectures we come to the modern period, we shall see that the\ntheory of relativity throws complete light on this question; but only by\nrearranging our whole ideas as to space and time.\n\nIt remained for Newton to direct attention to _mass_ as a physical\nquantity inherent in the nature of a material body. Mass remained\npermanent during all changes of motion. But the proof of the permanence\nof mass amid chemical transformations had to wait for Lavoisier, a\ncentury later. Newton\u2019s next task was to find some estimate of the\nmagnitude of the alien force in terms of the mass of the body and of its\nacceleration. He here had a stroke of luck. For, from the point of view\nof a mathematician, the simplest possible law, namely the product of the\ntwo, proved to be the successful one. Again the modern relativity theory\nmodifies this extreme simplicity. But luckily for science the delicate\nexperiments of the physicists of to-day were not then known, or even\npossible. Accordingly, the world was given the two centuries which it\nrequired in order to digest Newton\u2019s laws of motion.\n\nHaving regard to this triumph, can we wonder that scientists placed\ntheir ultimate principles upon a materialistic basis, and thereafter\nceased to worry about philosophy? We shall grasp the course of thought,\nif we understand exactly what this basis is, and what difficulties it\nfinally involves. When you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch,\ndo not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions\nwhich its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will\nbe some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant\nsystems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions\nappear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because\nno other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these\nassumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are\npossible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the\nepoch.\n\nOne such assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the\nmodern period. It is embodied in the conception which is supposed to\nexpress the most concrete aspect of nature. The Ionian philosophers\nasked, What is nature made of? The answer is couched in terms of stuff,\nor matter, or material,\u2014the particular name chosen is indifferent\u2014which\nhas the property of simple location in space and time, or, if you adopt\nthe more modern ideas, in space-time. What I mean by matter, or\nmaterial, is anything which has this property of _simple location_. By\nsimple location I mean one major characteristic which refers equally\nboth to space and to time, and other minor characteristics which are\ndiverse as between space and time.\n\nThe characteristic common both to space and time is that material can be\nsaid to be _here_ in space and _here_ in time, or _here_ in space-time,\nin a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation\nany reference to other regions of space-time. Curiously enough this\ncharacter of simple location holds whether we look on a region of\nspace-time as determined absolutely or relatively. For if a region is\nmerely a way of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities,\nthen this characteristic, which I call simple location, is that material\ncan be said to have just these relations of position to the other\nentities without requiring for its explanation any reference to other\nregions constituted by analogous relations of position to the same\nentities. In fact, as soon as you have settled, however you do settle,\nwhat you mean by a definite place in space-time, you can adequately\nstate the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying\nthat it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location is\nconcerned, there is nothing more to be said on the subject.\n\nThere are, however, some subordinate explanations to be made which bring\nin the minor characteristics which I have already mentioned. First, as\nregards time, if material has existed during any period, it has equally\nbeen in existence during any portion of that period. In other words,\ndividing the time does not divide the material. Secondly, in respect to\nspace, dividing the volume does divide the material. Accordingly, if\nmaterial exists throughout a volume, there will be less of that material\ndistributed through any definite half of that volume. It is from this\nproperty that there arises our notion of density at a point of space.\nAnyone who talks about density is not assimilating time and space to the\nextent that some extremists of the modern school of relativists very\nrashly desire. For the division of time functions, in respect to\nmaterial, quite differently from the division of space.\n\nFurthermore, this fact that the material is indifferent to the division\nof time leads to the conclusion that the lapse of time is an accident,\nrather than of the essence, of the material. The material is fully\nitself in any sub-period however short. Thus the transition of time has\nnothing to do with the character of the material. The material is\nequally itself at an instant of time. Here an instant of time is\nconceived as in itself without transition, since the temporal transition\nis the succession of instants.\n\nThe answer, therefore, which the seventeenth century gave to the ancient\nquestion of the Ionian thinkers, \u2018What is the world made of?\u2019 was that\nthe world is a succession of instantaneous configurations of matter,\u2014or\nof material, if you wish to include stuff more subtle than ordinary\nmatter, the ether for example.\n\nWe cannot wonder that science rested content with this assumption as to\nthe fundamental elements of nature. The great forces of nature, such as\ngravitation, were entirely determined by the configurations of masses.\nThus the configurations determined their own changes, so that the circle\nof scientific thought was completely closed. This is the famous\nmechanistic theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever since the\nseventeenth century. It is the orthodox creed of physical science.\nFurthermore, the creed justified itself by the pragmatic test. It\nworked. Physicists took no more interest in philosophy. They emphasized\nthe anti-rationalism of the Historical Revolt. But the difficulties of\nthis theory of materialistic mechanism very soon became apparent. The\nhistory of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is\ngoverned by the fact that the world had got hold of a general idea which\nit could neither live with nor live without.\n\nThis simple location of instantaneous material configurations is what\nBergson has protested against, so far as it concerns time and so far as\nit is taken to be the fundamental fact of concrete nature. He calls it a\ndistortion of nature due to the intellectual \u2018spatialisation\u2019 of things.\nI agree with Bergson in his protest: but I do not agree that such\ndistortion is a vice necessary to the intellectual apprehension of\nnature. I shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to show that this\nspatialisation is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise\nof very abstract logical constructions. There is an error; but it is\nmerely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete.\nIt is an example of what I will call the \u2018Fallacy of Misplaced\nConcreteness.\u2019 This fallacy is the occasion of great confusion in\nphilosophy. It is not necessary for the intellect to fall into the trap,\nthough in this example there has been a very general tendency to do so.\n\nIt is at once evident that the concept of simple location is going to\nmake great difficulties for induction. For, if in the location of\nconfigurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no\ninherent reference to any other times, past or future, it immediately\nfollows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any\nother period. Accordingly, induction is not based on anything which can\nbe observed as inherent in nature. Thus we cannot look to nature for the\njustification of our belief in any law such as the law of gravitation.\nIn other words, the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere\nobservation of nature. For there is nothing in the present fact which\ninherently refers either to the past or to the future. It looks,\ntherefore, as though memory, as well as induction, would fail to find\nany justification within nature itself.\n\nI have been anticipating the course of future thought, and have been\nrepeating Hume\u2019s argument. This train of thought follows so immediately\nfrom the consideration of simple location, that we cannot wait for the\neighteenth century before considering it. The only wonder is that the\nworld did in fact wait for Hume before noting the difficulty. Also it\nillustrates the anti-rationalism of the scientific public that, when\nHume did appear, it was only the religious implications of his\nphilosophy which attracted attention. This was because the clergy were\nin principle rationalists, whereas the men of science were content with\na simple faith in the order of nature. Hume himself remarks, no doubt\nscoffingly, \u2018Our holy religion is founded on faith.\u2019 This attitude\nsatisfied the Royal Society but not the Church. It also satisfied Hume\nand has satisfied subsequent empiricists.\n\nThere is another presupposition of thought which must be put beside the\ntheory of simple location. I mean the two correlative categories of\nSubstance and quality. There is, however this difference. There were\ndifferent theories as to the adequate description of the status of\nspace. But whatever its status, no one had any doubt but that the\nconnection with space enjoyed by entities, which are said to be in\nspace, is that of simple location. We may put this shortly by saying\nthat it was tacitly assumed that space is the locus of simple locations.\nWhatever is in space is _simpliciter_ in some definite portion of space.\nBut in respect to substance and quality the leading minds of the\nseventeenth century were definitely perplexed; though, with their usual\ngenius, they at once constructed a theory which was adequate for their\nimmediate purposes.\n\nOf course, substance and quality, as well as simple location, are the\nmost natural ideas for the human mind. It is the way in which we think\nof things, and without these ways of thinking we could not get our ideas\nstraight for daily use. There is no doubt about this. The only question\nis, How concretely are we thinking when we consider nature under these\nconceptions? My point will be, that we are presenting ourselves with\nsimplified editions of immediate matters of fact. When we examine the\nprimary elements of these simplified editions, we shall find that they\nare in truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical\nconstructions of a high degree of abstraction. Of course, as a point of\nindividual psychology, we get at the ideas by the rough and ready method\nof suppressing what appear to be irrelevant details. But when we attempt\nto justify this suppression of irrelevance, we find that, though there\nare entities left corresponding to the entities we talk about, yet these\nentities are of a high degree of abstraction.\n\nThus I hold that substance and quality afford another instance of the\nfallacy of misplaced concreteness. Let us consider how the notions of\nsubstance and quality arise. We observe an object as an entity with\ncertain characteristics. Furthermore, each individual entity is\napprehended through its characteristics. For example, we observe a body;\nthere is something about it which we note. Perhaps, it is hard, and\nblue, and round, and noisy. We observe something which possesses these\nqualities: apart from these qualities we do not observe anything at all.\nAccordingly, the entity is the substratum, or substance, of which we\npredicate qualities. Some of the qualities are essential, so that apart\nfrom them the entity would not be itself; while other qualities are\naccidental and changeable. In respect to material bodies, the qualities\nof having a quantitative mass, and of simple location somewhere, were\nheld by John Locke at the close of the seventeenth century to be\nessential qualities. Of course, the location was changeable, and the\nunchangeability of mass was merely an experimental fact except for some\nextremists.\n\nSo far, so good. But when we pass to blueness and noisiness a new\nsituation has to be faced. In the first place, the body may not be\nalways blue, or noisy. We have already allowed for this by our theory of\naccidental qualities, which for the moment we may accept as adequate.\nBut in the second place, the seventeenth century exposed a real\ndifficulty. The great physicists elaborated transmission theories of\nlight and sound, based upon their materialistic views of nature. There\nwere two hypotheses as to light: either it was transmitted by the\nvibratory waves of a materialistic ether, or\u2014according to Newton\u2014it was\ntransmitted by the motion of incredibly small corpuscles of some subtle\nmatter. We all know that the wave theory of Huyghens held the field\nduring the nineteenth century, and that at present physicists are\nendeavouring to explain some obscure circumstances attending radiation\nby a combination of both theories. But whatever theory you choose, there\nis no light or colour as a fact in external nature. There is merely\nmotion of material. Again, when the light enters your eyes and falls on\nthe retina, there is merely motion of material. Then your nerves are\naffected and your brain is affected, and again this is merely motion of\nmaterial. The same line of argument holds for sound, substituting waves\nin the air for waves in the ether, and ears for eyes.\n\nWe then ask in what sense are blueness and noisiness qualities of the\nbody. By analogous reasoning, we also ask in what sense is its scent a\nquality of the rose.\n\nGalileo considered this question, and at once pointed out that, apart\nfrom eyes, ears, or noses, there would be no colours, sounds, or smells.\nDescartes and Locke elaborated a theory of primary and secondary\nqualities. For example, Descartes in his \u2018Sixth Meditation\u2019 says:[4]\n\u201cAnd indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colours, sounds, odours,\ntastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are in the\nbodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain\nvarieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like\nthem;....\u201d\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n  Translation by Professor John Veitch.\n\nAlso in his _Principles of Philosophy_, he says: \u201cThat by our senses we\nknow nothing of external objects beyond their figure [or situation],\nmagnitude, and motion.\u201d\n\nLocke, writing with a knowledge of Newtonian dynamics, places mass among\nthe primary qualities of bodies. In short, he elaborates a theory of\nprimary and secondary qualities in accordance with the state of physical\nscience at the close of the seventeenth century. The primary qualities\nare the essential qualities of substances whose spatio-temporal\nrelationships constitute nature. The orderliness of these relationships\nconstitutes nature. The orderliness of these relationships constitutes\nthe order of nature. The occurrences of nature are in some way\napprehended by minds, which are associated with living bodies.\nPrimarily, the mental apprehension is aroused by the occurrences in\ncertain parts of the correlated body, the occurrences in the brain, for\ninstance. But the mind in apprehending also experiences sensations\nwhich, properly speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. These\nsensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies\nin external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities\nwhich in reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact are\npurely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which should\nin truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent: the\nnightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. The poets are\nentirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and\nshould turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of\nthe human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless,\ncolourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.\n\nHowever you disguise it, this is the practical outcome of the\ncharacteristic scientific philosophy which closed the seventeenth\ncentury.\n\nIn the first place, we must note its astounding efficiency as a system\nof concepts for the organisation of scientific research. In this\nrespect, it is fully worthy of the genius of the century which produced\nit. It has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific studies\never since. It is still reigning. Every university in the world\norganises itself in accordance with it. No alternative system of\norganising the pursuit of scientific truth has been suggested. It is not\nonly reigning, but it is without a rival.\n\nAnd yet\u2014it is quite unbelievable. This conception of the universe is\nsurely framed in terms of high abstractions, and the paradox only arises\nbecause we have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities.\n\nNo picture, however generalised, of the achievements of scientific\nthought in this century can omit the advance in mathematics. Here as\nelsewhere the genius of the epoch made itself evident. Three great\nFrenchmen, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, initiated the modern period in\ngeometry. Another Frenchman, Fermat, laid the foundations of modern\nanalysis, and all but perfected the methods of the differential\ncalculus. Newton and Leibniz, between them, actually did create the\ndifferential calculus as a practical method of mathematical reasoning.\nWhen the century ended, mathematics as an instrument for application to\nphysical problems was well established in something of its modern\nproficiency. Modern pure mathematics, if we except geometry, was in its\ninfancy, and had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to make\nin the nineteenth century. But the mathematical physicist had appeared,\nbringing with him the type of mind which was to rule the scientific\nworld in the next century. It was to be the age of \u2018Victorious\nAnalysis.\u2019\n\nThe seventeenth century had finally produced a scheme of scientific\nthought framed by mathematicians, for the use of mathematicians. The\ngreat characteristic of the mathematical mind is its capacity for\ndealing with abstractions; and for eliciting from them clear-cut\ndemonstrative trains of reasoning, entirely satisfactory so long as it\nis those abstractions which you want to think about. The enormous\nsuccess of the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand\n_matter_ with its _simple location_ in space and time, and on the other\nhand _mind_, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not interfering, has\nfoisted onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete\nrendering of fact.\n\nThereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It has oscillated in a\ncomplex manner between three extremes. There are the dualists, who\naccept matter and mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of\nmonists, those who put mind inside matter, and those who put matter\ninside mind. But this juggling with abstractions can never overcome the\ninherent confusion introduced by the ascription of _misplaced\nconcreteness_ to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER IV\n\n                         THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY\n\n\nIn so far as the intellectual climates of different epochs can be\ncontrasted, the eighteenth century in Europe was the complete antithesis\nto the Middle Ages. The contrast is symbolised by the difference between\nthe cathedral of Chartres and the Parisian salons, where D\u2019Alembert\nconversed with Voltaire. The Middle Ages were haunted with the desire to\nrationalise the infinite: the men of the eighteenth century rationalised\nthe social life of modern communities, and based their sociological\ntheories on an appeal to the facts of nature. The earlier period was the\nage of faith, based upon reason. In the later period, they let sleeping\ndogs lie: it was the age of reason, based upon faith. To illustrate my\nmeaning:\u2014St. Anselm would have been distressed if he had failed to find\na convincing argument for the existence of God, and on this argument he\nbased his edifice of faith, whereas Hume based his _Dissertation on the\nNatural History of Religion_ upon his faith in the order of nature. In\ncomparing these epochs it is well to remember that reason can err, and\nthat faith may be misplaced.\n\nIn my previous lecture I traced the evolution, during the seventeenth\ncentury, of the scheme of scientific ideas which has dominated thought\never since. It involves a fundamental duality, with _material_ on the\none hand, and on the other hand _mind_. In between there lie the\nconcepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous reality,\ninteraction, order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel\nof the whole system.\n\nI also expressed my conviction that if we desired to obtain a more\nfundamental expression of the concrete character of natural fact, the\nelement in this scheme which we should first criticise is the concept of\n_simple location_. In view therefore of the importance which this idea\nwill assume in these lectures, I will repeat the meaning which I have\nattached to this phrase. To say that a bit of matter has _simple\nlocation_ means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, it is\nadequate to state that it is where it is, in a definite finite region of\nspace, and throughout a definite finite duration of time, apart from any\nessential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other\nregions of space and to other durations of time. Again, this concept of\nsimple location is independent of the controversy between the absolutist\nand the relativist views of space or of time. So long as any theory of\nspace, or of time, can give a meaning, either absolute or relative, to\nthe idea of a definite region of space, and of a definite duration of\ntime, the idea of simple location has a perfectly definite meaning. This\nidea is the very foundation of the seventeenth century scheme of nature.\nApart from it, the scheme is incapable of expression. I shall argue that\namong the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our immediate\nexperience, there is no element whatever which possesses this character\nof simple location. It does not follow, however, that the science of the\nseventeenth century was simply wrong. I hold that by a process of\nconstructive abstraction we can arrive at abstractions which are the\nsimply-located bits of material, and at other abstractions which are the\nminds included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly, the real error is\nan example of what I have termed: The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.\n\nThe advantage of confining attention to a definite group of\nabstractions, is that you confine your thoughts to clear-cut definite\nthings, with clear-cut definite relations. Accordingly, if you have a\nlogical head, you can deduce a variety of conclusions respecting the\nrelationships between these abstract entities. Furthermore, if the\nabstractions are well-founded, that is to say, if they do not abstract\nfrom everything that is important in experience, the scientific thought\nwhich confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a variety of\nimportant truths relating to our experience of nature. We all know those\nclear-cut trenchant intellects, immovably encased in a hard shell of\nabstractions. They hold you to their abstractions by the sheer grip of\npersonality.\n\nThe disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions,\nhowever well-founded, is that, by the nature of the case, you have\nabstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded\nthings are important in your experience, your modes of thought are not\nfitted to deal with them. You cannot think without abstractions;\naccordingly, it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically\nrevising your _modes_ of abstraction. It is here that philosophy finds\nits niche as essential to the healthy progress of society. It is the\ncritic of abstractions. A civilisation which cannot burst through its\ncurrent abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period\nof progress. An active school of philosophy is quite as important for\nthe locomotion of ideas, as is an active school of railway engineers for\nthe locomotion of fuel.\n\nSometimes it happens that the service rendered by philosophy is entirely\nobscured by the astonishing success of a scheme of abstractions in\nexpressing the dominant interests of an epoch. This is exactly what\nhappened during the eighteenth century. _Les philosophes_ were not\nphilosophers. They were men of genius, clear-headed and acute, who\napplied the seventeenth century group of scientific abstractions to the\nanalysis of the unbounded universe. Their triumph, in respect to the\ncircle of ideas mainly interesting to their contemporaries, was\noverwhelming. Whatever did not fit into their scheme was ignored,\nderided, disbelieved. Their hatred of Gothic architecture symbolises\ntheir lack of sympathy with dim perspectives. It was the age of reason,\nhealthy, manly, upstanding reason; but, of one-eyed reason, deficient in\nits vision of depth. We cannot overrate the debt of gratitude which we\nowe to these men. For a thousand years Europe had been a prey to\nintolerant, intolerable visionaries. The common sense of the eighteenth\ncentury, its grasp of the obvious facts of human suffering, and of the\nobvious demands of human nature, acted on the world like a bath of moral\ncleansing. Voltaire must have the credit, that he hated injustice, he\nhated cruelty, he hated senseless repression, and he hated hocus-pocus.\nFurthermore, when he saw them, he knew them. In these supreme virtues,\nhe was typical of his century, on its better side. But if men cannot\nlive on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants. The age\nhad its limitations; yet we cannot understand the passion with which\nsome of its main positions are still defended, especially in the schools\nof science, unless we do full justice to its positive achievements. The\nseventeenth century scheme of concepts was proving a perfect instrument\nfor research.\n\nThis triumph of materialism was chiefly in the sciences of rational\ndynamics, physics, and chemistry. So far as dynamics and physics were\nconcerned, progress was in the form of direct developments of the main\nideas of the previous epoch. Nothing fundamentally new was introduced,\nbut there was an immense detailed development. Special case after\nspecial case was unravelled. It was as though the very Heavens were\nbeing opened, on a set plan. In the second half of the century,\nLavoisier practically founded chemistry on its present basis. He\nintroduced into it the principle that no material is lost or gained in\nany chemical transformations. This was the last success of materialistic\nthought, which has not ultimately proved to be double-edged. Chemical\nscience now only waited for the atomic theory, in the next century.\n\nIn this century the notion of the mechanical explanation of all the\nprocesses of nature finally hardened into a dogma of science. The notion\nwon through on its merits by reason of an almost miraculous series of\ntriumphs achieved by the mathematical physicists, culminating in the\n_M\u00e9chanique Analytique_ of Lagrange, which was published in 1787.\nNewton\u2019s _Principia_ was published in 1687, so that exactly one hundred\nyears separates the two great books. This century contains the first\nperiod of mathematical physics of the modern type. The publication of\nClerk Maxwell\u2019s _Electricity and Magnetism_ in 1873 marks the close of\nthe second period. Each of these three books introduces new horizons of\nthought affecting everything which comes after them.\n\nIn considering the various topics to which mankind has bent its\nsystematic thought, it is impossible not to be struck with the unequal\ndistribution of ability among the different fields. In almost all\nsubjects there are a few outstanding names. For it requires genius to\ncreate a subject as a distinct topic for thought. But in the case of\nmany topics, after a good beginning very relevant to its immediate\noccasion, the subsequent development appears as a weak series of\nflounderings, so that the whole subject gradually loses its grip on the\nevolution of thought. It was far otherwise with mathematical physics.\nThe more you study this subject, the more you will find yourself\nastonished by the almost incredible triumphs of intellect which it\nexhibits. The great mathematical physicists of the eighteenth and first\nfew years of the nineteenth century, most of them French, are a case in\npoint: Maupertuis, Clairaut, D\u2019Alembert, Lagrange, Laplace, Fourier,\nform a series of names, such that each recalls to mind some achievement\nof the first rank. When Carlyle, as the mouthpiece of the subsequent\nRomantic Age, scoffingly terms the period the Age of Victorious\nAnalysis, and mocks at Maupertuis as a \u2018sublimish gentleman in a white\nperiwig,\u2019 he only exhibits the narrow side of the Romanticists whom he\nis then voicing.\n\nIt is impossible to explain intelligently, in a short time and without\ntechnicalities, the details of the progress made by this school. I will,\nhowever, endeavour to explain the main point of a joint achievement of\nMaupertuis and Lagrange. Their results, in conjunction with some\nsubsequent mathematical methods due to two great German mathematicians\nof the first half of the nineteenth century, Gauss and Riemann, have\nrecently proved themselves to be the preparatory work necessary for the\nnew ideas which Herz and Einstein have introduced into mathematical\nphysics. Also they inspired some of the best ideas in Clerk Maxwell\u2019s\ntreatise, already mentioned in this lecture.\n\nThey aimed at discovering something more fundamental and more general\nthan Newton\u2019s laws of motion which were discussed in the previous\nlecture. They wanted to find some wider ideas, and in the case of\nLagrange some more general means of mathematical exposition. It was an\nambitious enterprise, and they were completely successful. Maupertuis\nlived in the first half of the eighteenth century, and Lagrange\u2019s active\nlife lay in its second half. We find in Maupertuis a tinge of the\ntheologic age which preceded his birth. He started with the idea that\nthe whole path of a material particle between any limits of time must\nachieve some perfection worthy of the providence of God. There are two\npoints of interest in this motive principle. In the first place, it\nillustrates the thesis which I was urging in my first lecture that the\nway in which the medieval church had impressed on Europe the notion of\nthe detailed providence of a rational personal God was one of the\nfactors by which the trust in the order of nature had been generated. In\nthe second place, though we are now all convinced that such modes of\nthought are of no direct use in detailed scientific enquiry, Maupertuis\u2019\nsuccess in this particular case shows that almost any idea which jogs\nyou out of your current abstractions may be better than nothing. In the\npresent case what the idea in question did for Maupertuis was to lead\nhim to enquire what general property of the path as a whole could be\ndeduced from Newton\u2019s laws of motion. Undoubtedly this was a very\nsensible procedure whatever one\u2019s theological notions. Also his general\nidea led him to conceive that the property found would be a quantitative\nsum, such that any slight deviation from the path would increase it. In\nthis supposition he was generalising Newton\u2019s first law of motion. For\nan isolated particle takes the shortest route with uniform velocity. So\nMaupertuis conjectured that a particle travelling through a field of\nforce would realise the least possible amount of some quantity. He\ndiscovered such a quantity and called it the integral action between the\ntime limits considered. In modern phraseology it is the sum through\nsuccessive small lapses of time of the difference between the kinetic\nand potential energies of the particle at each successive instant. This\naction, therefore, has to do with the interchange between the energy\narising from motion and the energy arising from position. Maupertuis had\ndiscovered the famous theorem of least action. Maupertuis was not quite\nof the first rank in comparison with such a man as Lagrange. In his\nhands and in those of his immediate successors, his principle did not\nassume any dominating importance. Lagrange put the same question on a\nwider basis so as to make its answer relevant to actual procedure in the\ndevelopment of dynamics. His Principle of Virtual Work as applied to\nsystems in motion is in effect Maupertuis\u2019 principle conceived as\napplying at each instant of the path of the system. But Lagrange saw\nfurther than Maupertuis. He grasped that he had gained a method of\nstating dynamical truths in a way which is perfectly indifferent to the\nparticular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of\nthe various parts of the system. Accordingly, he went on to deduce\nequations of motion which are equally applicable whatever quantitative\nmeasurements have been made, provided that they are adequate to fix\npositions. The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is\nsuch that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious\nsymbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the\nSupreme Reason at the base of all things. Later Herz\u2014inventor of\nelectromagnetic waves\u2014based mechanics on the idea of every particle\ntraversing the shortest path open to it under the circumstances\nconstraining its motion; and finally Einstein, by the use of the\ngeometrical theories of Gauss and Riemann, showed that these\ncircumstances could be construed as being inherent in the character of\nspace-time itself. Such, in barest outline, is the story of dynamics\nfrom Galileo to Einstein.\n\nMeanwhile Galvani and Volta lived and made their electric discoveries;\nand the biological sciences slowly gathered their material, but still\nwaited for dominating ideas. Psychology, also, was beginning to\ndisengage itself from its dependence on general philosophy. This\nindependent growth of psychology was the ultimate result of its\ninvocation by John Locke as a critic of metaphysical licence. All the\nsciences dealing with life were still in an elementary observational\nstage, in which classification and direct description were dominant. So\nfar the scheme of abstractions was adequate to the occasion.\n\nIn the realm of practice, the age which produced enlightened rulers,\nsuch as the Emperor Joseph of the House of Hapsburg, Frederick the\nGreat, Walpole, the great Lord Chatham, George Washington, cannot be\nsaid to have failed. Especially when to these rulers, it adds the\ninvention of parliamentary cabinet government in England, of federal\npresidential government in the United States, and of the humanitarian\nprinciples of the French Revolution. Also in technology it produced the\nsteam-engine, and thereby ushered in a new era of civilisation.\nUndoubtedly, as a practical age the eighteenth century was a success. If\nyou had asked one of the wisest and most typical of its ancestors, who\njust saw its commencement, I mean John Locke, what he expected from it,\nhe would hardly have pitched his hopes higher than its actual\nachievements.\n\nIn developing a criticism of the scientific scheme of the eighteenth\ncentury, I must first give my main reason for ignoring nineteenth\ncentury idealism\u2014I am speaking of the philosophic idealism which finds\nthe ultimate meaning of reality in mentality that is fully cognitive.\nThis idealistic school, as hitherto developed, has been too much\ndivorced from the scientific outlook. It has swallowed the scientific\nscheme in its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts of\nnature, and has then explained it as being an idea in the ultimate\nmentality. In the case of absolute idealism, the world of nature is just\none of the ideas, somehow differentiating the unity of the Absolute: in\nthe case of pluralistic idealism involving monadic mentalities, this\nworld is the greatest common measure of the various ideas which\ndifferentiate the various mental unities of the various monads. But,\nhowever you take it, these idealistic schools have conspicuously failed\nto connect, in any organic fashion, the fact of nature with their\nidealistic philosophies. So far as concerns what will be said in these\nlectures, your ultimate outlook may be realistic or idealistic. My point\nis that a further stage of provisional realism is required in which the\nscientific scheme is recast, and founded upon the ultimate concept of\n_organism_.\n\nIn outline, my procedure is to start from the analysis of the status of\nspace and of time, or in modern phraseology, the status of space-time.\nThere are two characters of either. Things are separated by space, and\nare separated by time: but they are also together in space, and together\nin time, even if they be not contemporaneous. I will call these\ncharacters the \u2018_separative_\u2019 and the \u2018_prehensive_\u2019 characters of\nspace-time. There is yet a third character of space-time. Everything\nwhich is in space receives a definite limitation of some sort, so that\nin a sense it has just that shape which it does have and no other, also\nin some sense it is just in this place and in no other. Analogously for\ntime, a thing endures during a certain period, and through no other\nperiod. I will call this the \u2018_modal_\u2019 character of space-time. It is\nevident that the modal character taken by itself gives rise to the idea\nof simple location. But it must be conjoined with the separative and\nprehensive characters.\n\nFor simplicity of thought, I will first speak of space only, and will\nafterwards extend the same treatment to time.\n\nThe volume is the most concrete element of space. But the separative\ncharacter of space, analyses a volume into sub-volumes, and so on\nindefinitely. Accordingly, taking the separative character in isolation,\nwe should infer that a volume is a mere multiplicity of non-voluminous\nelements, of points in fact. But it is the unity of volume which is the\nultimate fact of experience, for example, the voluminous space of this\nhall. This hall as a mere multiplicity of points is a construction of\nthe logical imagination.\n\nAccordingly, the prime fact is the prehensive unity of volume, and this\nunity is mitigated or limited by the separated unities of the\ninnumerable contained parts. We have a prehensive unity, which is yet\nheld apart as an aggregate of contained parts. But the prehensive unity\nof the volume is not the unity of a mere logical aggregate of parts. The\nparts form an ordered aggregate, in the sense that each part is\nsomething from the standpoint of every other part, and also from the\nsame standpoint every other part is something in relation to it. Thus if\nA and B and C are volumes of space, B has an aspect from the standpoint\nof A, and so has C, and so has the relationship of B and C. This aspect\nof B from A is of the essence of A. The volumes of space have no\nindependent existence. They are only entities as within the totality;\nyou cannot extract them from their environment without destruction of\ntheir very essence. Accordingly, I will say that the aspect of B from A\nis the _mode_ in which B enters into the composition of A. This is the\nmodal character of space, that the prehensive unity of A is the\nprehension into unity of the aspects of all other volumes from the\nstandpoint of A. The shape of a volume is the formula from which the\ntotality of its aspects can be derived. Thus the shape of a volume is\nmore abstract than its aspects. It is evident that I can use Leibniz\u2019s\nlanguage, and say that every volume mirrors in itself every other volume\nin space.\n\nExactly analogous considerations hold with respect to durations in time.\nAn instant of time, without duration, is an imaginative logical\nconstruction. Also each duration of time mirrors in itself all temporal\ndurations.\n\nBut in two ways I have introduced a false simplicity. In the first\nplace, I should have conjoined space and time, and conducted my\nexplanation in respect to four-dimensional regions of space-time. I have\nnothing to add in the way of explanation. In your minds, substitute such\nfour-dimensional regions for the spatial volumes of the previous\nexplanations.\n\nSecondly, my explanation has involved itself in a vicious circle. For I\nhave made the prehensive unity of the region A to consist of the\nprehensive unification of the modal presences in A of other regions.\nThis difficulty arises because space-time cannot in reality be\nconsidered as a self-subsistent entity. It is an abstraction, and its\nexplanation requires reference to that from which it has been extracted.\nSpace-time is the specification of certain general characters of events\nand of their mutual ordering. This recurrence to concrete fact brings me\nback to the eighteenth century, and indeed to Francis Bacon in the\nseventeenth century. We have to consider the development in those\nepochs, of the criticism of the reigning scientific scheme.\n\nNo epoch is homogeneous; whatever you may have assigned as the dominant\nnote of a considerable period, it will always be possible to produce\nmen, and great men, belonging to the same time, who exhibit themselves\nas antagonistic to the tone of their age. This is certainly the case\nwith the eighteenth century. For example, the names of John Wesley and\nof Rousseau must have occurred to you while I was drawing the character\nof that time. But I do not want to speak of them, or of others. The man,\nwhose ideas I must consider at some length, is Bishop Berkeley. Quite at\nthe commencement of the epoch, he made all the right criticisms, at\nleast in principle. It would be untrue to say that he produced no\neffect. He was a famous man. The wife of George II was one of the few\nqueens who, in any country, have been clever enough, and wise enough, to\npatronise learning judiciously; accordingly, Berkeley was made a bishop,\nin days when bishops in Great Britain were relatively far greater men\nthan they are now. Also, what was more important than his bishopric,\nHume studied him, and developed one side of his philosophy in a way\nwhich might have disturbed the ghost of the great ecclesiastic. Then\nKant studied Hume. So, to say that Berkeley was uninfluential during the\ncentury, would certainly be absurd. But all the same, he failed to\naffect the main stream of scientific thought. It flowed on as if he had\nnever written. Its general success made it impervious to criticism, then\nand since. The world of science has always remained perfectly satisfied\nwith its peculiar abstractions. They work, and that is sufficient for\nit.\n\nThe point before us is that this scientific field of thought is now, in\nthe twentieth century, too narrow for the concrete facts which are\nbefore it for analysis. This is true even in physics, and is more\nespecially urgent in the biological sciences. Thus, in order to\nunderstand the difficulties of modern scientific thought and also its\nreactions on the modern world, we should have in our minds some\nconception of a wider field of abstraction, a more concrete analysis,\nwhich shall stand nearer to the complete concreteness of our intuitive\nexperience. Such an analysis should find in itself a niche for the\nconcepts of matter and spirit, as abstractions in terms of which much of\nour physical experience can be interpreted. It is in the search for this\nwider basis for scientific thought that Berkeley is so important. He\nlaunched his criticism shortly after the schools of Newton and Locke had\ncompleted their work, and laid his finger exactly on the weak spots\nwhich they had left. I do not propose to consider either the subjective\nidealism which has been derived from him, or the schools of development\nwhich trace their descent from Hume and Kant respectively. My point will\nbe that\u2014whatever the final metaphysics you may adopt\u2014there is another\nline of development embedded in Berkeley, pointing to the analysis which\nwe are in search of. Berkeley overlooked it, partly by reason of the\nover-intellectualism of philosophers, and partly by his haste to have\nrecourse to an idealism with its objectivity grounded in the mind of\nGod. You will remember that I have already stated that the key of the\nproblem lies in the notion of simple location. Berkeley, in effect,\ncriticises this notion. He also raises the question, What do we mean by\nthings being realised in the world of nature?\n\nIn Sections 23 and 24 of his _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Berkeley\ngives his answer to this latter question. I will quote some detached\nsentences from those Sections:\n\n\u201c23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine\ntrees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and\nnobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty\nin it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your\nmind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time\nomitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them?...\u201d\n\n\u201cWhen we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we\nare all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind _taking\nno notice of itself_, is deluded to think it can and does conceive\nbodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same\ntime they are apprehended by or exist in itself....\u201d\n\n\u201c24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to\nknow whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the\n_absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the\nmind_. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct\ncontradiction, or else nothing at all....\u201d\n\nAgain there is a very remarkable passage in Section 10, of the fourth\nDialogue of Berkeley\u2019s _Alciphron_. I have already quoted it, at greater\nlength, in my _Principles of Natural Knowledge_:\n\n\u201c_Euphranor._ Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern the doors, window and\nbattlements of that same castle?\n\n_Alciphron._ I cannot. At this distance it seems only a small round\ntower.\n\n_Euph._ But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round\ntower, but a large square building with battlements and turrets, which\nit seems you do not see.\n\n_Alc_. What will you infer from thence?\n\n_Euph._ I would infer that the very object which you strictly and\nproperly perceive by sight is not that thing which is several miles\ndistant.\n\n_Alc._ Why so?\n\n_Euph._ Because a little round object is one thing, and a great square\nobject is another. Is it not so?...\u201d\n\nSome analogous examples concerning a planet and a cloud are then cited\nin the dialogue, and this passage finally concludes with:\n\n\u201c_Euphranor._ Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the\nplanet, nor the cloud, _which you see here_, are those real ones which\nyou suppose exist at a distance?\u201d\n\nIt is made explicit in the first passage, already quoted, that Berkeley\nhimself adopts an extreme idealistic interpretation. For him mind is the\nonly absolute reality, and the unity of nature is the unity of ideas in\nthe mind of God. Personally, I think that Berkeley\u2019s solution of the\nmetaphysical problem raises difficulties not less than those which he\npoints out as arising from a realistic interpretation of the scientific\nscheme. There is, however, another possible line of thought, which\nenables us to adopt anyhow an attitude of provisional realism, and to\nwiden the scientific scheme in a way which is useful for science itself.\n\nI recur to the passage from Francis Bacon\u2019s _Natural History_, already\nquoted in the previous lecture:\n\n\u201cIt is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense,\nyet they have perception: ... and whether the body be alterant or\naltered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies\nwould be alike one to another....\u201d\n\nAlso in the previous lecture I construed _perception_ (as used by Bacon)\nas meaning _taking account_ of the essential character of the thing\nperceived, and I construed _sense_ as meaning _cognition_. We certainly\ndo take account of things of which at the time we have no explicit\ncognition. We can even have a cognitive memory of the taking account,\nwithout having had a contemporaneous cognition. Also, as Bacon points\nout by his statement, \u201c... for else all bodies would be alike one to\nanother,\u201d it is evidently some element of the essential character which\nwe take account of, namely something on which diversity is founded and\nnot mere bare logical diversity.\n\nThe word \u2018_perceive_\u2019 is, in our common usage, shot through and through\nwith the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word\n\u2018_apprehension_\u2019, even with the adjective _cognitive_ omitted. I will\nuse the word \u2018_prehension_\u2019 for _uncognitive apprehension_: by this I\nmean _apprehension_ which may or or may not be cognitive. Now take\nEuphranor\u2019s last remark:\n\n\u201cIs it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the planet, nor\nthe cloud, _which you see here_, are those real ones which you suppose\nexist at distance?\u201d Accordingly, there is a prehension, _here_ in this\nplace, of things which have a reference to _other_ places.\n\nNow go back to Berkeley\u2019s sentences, quoted from his _Principles of\nHuman Knowledge_. He contends that what constitutes the realisation of\nnatural entities is the being perceived within the unity of mind.\n\nWe can substitute the concept, that the realisation is a gathering of\nthings into the unity of a prehension; and that what is thereby realised\nis the prehension, and not the things. This unity of a prehension\ndefines itself as a _here_ and a _now_, and the things so gathered into\nthe grasped unity have essential reference to other places and other\ntimes. For Berkeley\u2019s _mind_, I substitute a process of prehensive\nunification. In order to make intelligible this concept of the\nprogressive realisation of natural occurrences, considerable expansion\nis required, and confrontation with its actual implications in terms of\nconcrete experience. This will be the task of the subsequent lectures.\nIn the first place, note that the idea of simple location has gone. The\nthings which are grasped into a realised unity, here and now, are not\nthe castle, the cloud, and the planet simply in themselves; but they are\nthe castle, the cloud, and the planet from the standpoint, in space and\ntime, of the prehensive unification. In other words, it is the\nperspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of the\nunification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud,\nand the planet which are grasped into unity here. You will remember that\nthe idea of perspectives is quite familiar in philosophy. It was\nintroduced by Leibniz, in the notion of his monads mirroring\nperspectives of the universe. I am using the same notion, only I am\ntoning down his monads into the unified events in space and time. In\nsome ways, there is a greater analogy with Spinoza\u2019s modes; that is why\nI use the terms \u2018_mode_\u2019 and \u2018_modal_.\u2019 In the analogy with Spinoza, his\none substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation\nindividualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. Thus,\nconcrete fact is process. Its primary analysis is into underlying\nactivity of prehension, and into realised prehensive events. Each event\nis an individual matter of fact issuing from an individualisation of the\nsubstrate activity. But individualisation does not mean substantial\nindependence.\n\nAn entity of which we become aware in sense perception is the terminus\nof our act of perception. I will call such an entity, a\n\u2018_sense-object_\u2019. For example, green of a definite shade is a\nsense-object; so is a sound of definite quality and pitch; and so is a\ndefinite scent; and a definite quality of touch. The way in which such\nan entity is related to space during a definite lapse of time is\ncomplex. I will say that a sense-object has \u2018_ingression_\u2019 into\nspace-time. The cognitive perception of a sense-object is the awareness\nof the prehensive unification (into a standpoint A) of various modes of\nvarious sense-objects, including the sense-object in question. The\nstandpoint A is, of course, a region of space-time; that is to say, it\nis a volume of space through a duration of time. But as one entity, this\nstandpoint is a unit of realised experience. A mode of a sense-object at\nA (as abstracted from the sense-object whose relationship to A the mode\nis conditioning) is the aspect from A of some other region B. Thus the\nsense-object is present in A with the mode of location in B. Thus if\ngreen be the sense-object in question, green is not simply at A where it\nis being perceived, nor is it simply at B where it is perceived as\nlocated; but it is present at A with the mode of location in B. There is\nno particular mystery about this. You have only got to look into a\nmirror and to see the image in it of some green leaves behind your back.\nFor you at A there will be green; but not green simply at A where you\nare. The green at A will be green with the mode of having location at\nthe image of the leaf behind the mirror. Then turn round and look at the\nleaf. You are now perceiving the green in the same way as you did\nbefore, except that now the green has the mode of being located in the\nactual leaf. I am merely describing what we do perceive: we are aware of\ngreen as being one element in a prehensive unification of sense-objects;\neach sense-object, and among them green, having its particular mode,\nwhich is expressible as location elsewhere. There are various types of\nmodal location. For example, sound is voluminous: it fills a hall, and\nso sometimes does diffused colour. But the modal location of a colour\nmay be that of being the remote boundary of a volume, as for example the\ncolours on the walls of a room. Thus primarily space-time is the locus\nof the modal ingression of sense-objects. This is the reason why space\nand time (if for simplicity we disjoin them) are given in their\nentireties. For each volume of space, or each lapse of time, includes in\nits essence aspects of all volumes of space, or of all lapses of time.\nThe difficulties of philosophy in respect to space and time are founded\non the error of considering them as primarily the loci of simple\nlocations. Perception is simply the cognition of prehensive unification;\nor more shortly, perception is cognition of prehension. The actual world\nis a manifold of prehensions; and a \u2018prehension\u2019 is a \u2018prehensive\noccasion\u2019; and a prehensive occasion is the most concrete finite entity,\nconceived as what it is in itself and for itself, and not as from its\naspect in the essence of another such occasion. Prehensive unification\nmight be said to have simple location in its volume A. But this would be\na mere tautology. For space and time are simply abstractions from the\ntotality of prehensive unifications as mutually patterned in each other.\nThus a prehension has simple location at the volume A in the same way as\nthat in which a man\u2019s face fits on to the smile which spreads over it.\nThere is, so far as we have gone, more sense in saying that an act of\nperception has simple location; for it may be conceived as being simply\nat the cognised prehension.\n\nThere are more entities involved in nature than the mere sense-objects,\nso far considered. But, allowing for the necessity of revision\nconsequent on a more complete point of view, we can frame our answer to\nBerkeley\u2019s question as to the character of the reality to be assigned to\nnature. He states it to be the reality of ideas in mind. A complete\nmetaphysic which has attained to some notion of mind, and to some notion\nof ideas, may perhaps ultimately adopt that view. It is unnecessary for\nthe purpose of these lectures to ask such a fundamental question. We can\nbe content with a provisional realism in which nature is conceived as a\ncomplex of prehensive unifications. Space and time exhibit the general\nscheme of interlocked relations of these prehensions. You cannot tear\nany one of them out of its context. Yet each one of them within its\ncontext has all the reality that attaches to the whole complex.\nConversely, the totality has the same reality as each prehension; for\neach prehension unifies the modalities to be ascribed, from its\nstandpoint, to every part of the whole. A prehension is a process of\nunifying. Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive development,\nnecessarily transitional from prehension to prehension. What is achieved\nis thereby passed beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of\nitself present to prehensions which lie beyond it.\n\nThus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the\nprocess. It is nonsense to ask if the colour red is real. The colour red\nis ingredient in the process of realisation. The realities of nature are\nthe prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in nature.\n\nNow that we have cleared space and time from the taint of simple\nlocation, we may partially abandon the awkward term prehension. This\nterm was introduced to signify the essential unity of an event, namely,\nthe event as one entity, and not as a mere assemblage of parts or of\ningredients. It is necessary to understand that space-time is nothing\nelse than a system of pulling together of assemblages into unities. But\nthe word _event_ just means one of these spatio-temporal unities.\nAccordingly, it may be used instead of the term \u2018prehension\u2019 as meaning\nthe thing prehended.\n\nAn event has contemporaries. This means that an event mirrors within\nitself the modes of its contemporaries as a display of immediate\nachievement. An event has a past. This means that an event mirrors\nwithin itself the modes of its predecessors, as memories which are fused\ninto its own content. An event has a future. This means that an event\nmirrors within itself such aspects as the future throws back onto the\npresent, or, in other words, as the present has determined concerning\nthe future. Thus an event has anticipation:\n\n         \u201cThe prophetic soul\n         Of the wide world dreaming on things to come.\u201d [cvii]\n\nThese conclusions are essential for any form of realism. For there is in\nthe world for our cognisance, memory of the past, immediacy of\nrealisation, and indication of things to come.\n\nIn this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that of the scientific\nscheme of thought, I have started from our own psychological field, as\nit stands for our cognition. I take it for what it claims to be: the\nself-knowledge of our bodily event. I mean the total event, and not the\ninspection of the details of the body. This self-knowledge discloses a\nprehensive unification of modal presences of entities beyond itself. I\ngeneralise by the use of the principle that this total bodily event is\non the same level as all other events, except for an unusual complexity\nand stability of inherent pattern. The strength of the theory of\nmaterialistic mechanism has been the demand, that no arbitrary breaks be\nintroduced into nature, to eke out the collapse of an explanation. I\naccept this principle. But if you start from the immediate facts of our\npsychological experience, as surely an empiricist should begin, you are\nat once led to the organic conception of nature of which the description\nhas been commenced in this lecture.\n\nIt is the defect of the eighteenth century scientific scheme that it\nprovides none of the elements which compose the immediate psychological\nexperiences of mankind. Nor does it provide any elementary trace of the\norganic unity of a whole, from which the organic unities of electrons,\nprotons, molecules, and living bodies can emerge. According to that\nscheme, there is no reason in the nature of things why portions of\nmaterial should have any physical relations to each other. Let us grant\nthat we cannot hope to be able to discern the laws of nature to be\nnecessary. But we can hope to see that it is necessary that there should\nbe an order of nature. The concept of the order of nature is bound up\nwith the concept of nature as the locus of organisms in process of\ndevelopment.\n\n  NOTE. In connection with the latter portion of this chapter a sentence\n  from Descartes\u2019 \u2018Reply to Objections ... against the Meditations\u2019 is\n  interesting:\u2014\u201cHence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself\n  existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky,\n  but objectively, _i.e._, in the way in which objects are wont to exist\n  in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than\n  that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that\n  account mere nothing, as I have already said.\u201d [Reply to Objections I,\n  Translation by Haldane and Ross, vol. ii, p. 10.] I find difficulty in\n  reconciling this theory of ideas (with which I agree) with other parts\n  of the Cartesian philosophy.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER V\n\n                         THE ROMANTIC REACTION\n\n\nMy last lecture described the influence upon the eighteenth century of\nthe narrow and efficient scheme of scientific concepts which it had\ninherited from its predecessor. That scheme was the product of a\nmentality which found the Augustinian theology extremely congenial. The\nProtestant Calvinism and the Catholic Jansenism exhibited man as\nhelpless to co-operate with Irresistible Grace: the contemporary scheme\nof science exhibited man as helpless to co-operate with the irresistable\nmechanism of nature. The mechanism of God and the mechanism of matter\nwere the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and clear logical\nintellect. Also the seventeenth century had genius, and cleared the\nworld of muddled thought. The eighteenth century continued the work of\nclearance, with ruthless efficiency. The scientific scheme has lasted\nlonger than the theological scheme. Mankind soon lost interest in\nIrresistible Grace; but it quickly appreciated the competent engineering\nwhich was due to science. Also in the first quarter of the eighteenth\ncentury, George Berkeley launched his philosophical criticism against\nthe whole basis of the system. He failed to disturb the dominant current\nof thought. In my last lecture I developed a parallel line of argument,\nwhich would lead to a system of thought basing nature upon the concept\nof organism, and not upon the concept of matter. In the present lecture,\nI propose in the first place to consider how the concrete educated\nthought of men has viewed this opposition of mechanism and organism. It\nis in literature that the concrete outlook of humanity receives its\nexpression. Accordingly it is to literature that we must look,\nparticularly in its more concrete forms, namely in poetry and in drama,\nif we hope to discover the inward thoughts of a generation.\n\nWe quickly find that the Western peoples exhibit on a colossal scale a\npeculiarity which is popularly supposed to be more especially\ncharacteristic of the Chinese. Surprise is often expressed that a\nChinaman can be of two religions, a Confucian for some occasions and a\nBuddhist for other occasions. Whether this is true of China I do not\nknow; nor do I know whether, if true, these two attitudes are really\ninconsistent. But there can be no doubt that an analogous fact is true\nof the West, and that the two attitudes involved are inconsistent. A\nscientific realism, based on mechanism, is conjoined with an unwavering\nbelief in the world of men and of the higher animals as being composed\nof self-determining organisms. This radical inconsistency at the basis\nof modern thought accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in\nour civilisation. It would be going too far to say that it distracts\nthought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the inconsistency lurking in the\nbackground. After all, the men of the Middle Ages were in pursuit of an\nexcellency of which we have nearly forgotten the existence. They set\nbefore themselves the ideal of the attainment of a harmony of the\nunderstanding. We are content with superficial orderings from diverse\narbitrary starting points. For instance, the enterprises produced by the\nindividualistic energy of the European peoples presupposes physical\nactions directed to final causes. But the science which is employed in\ntheir development is based on a philosophy which asserts that physical\ncausation is supreme, and which disjoins the physical cause from the\nfinal end. It is not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction here\ninvolved. It is the fact, however you gloze it over with phrases. Of\ncourse, we find in the eighteenth century Paley\u2019s famous argument, that\nmechanism presupposes a God who is the author of nature. But even before\nPaley put the argument into its final form, Hume had written the retort,\nthat the God whom you will find will be the sort of God who makes that\nmechanism. In other words, that mechanism can, at most, presuppose a\nmechanic, and not merely _a_ mechanic but _its_ mechanic. The only way\nof mitigating mechanism is by the discovery that it is not mechanism.\n\nWhen we leave apologetic theology, and come to ordinary literature, we\nfind, as we might expect, that the scientific outlook is in general\nsimply ignored. So far as the mass of literature is concerned, science\nmight never have been heard of. Until recently nearly all writers have\nbeen soaked in classical and renaissance literature. For the most part,\nneither philosophy nor science interested them, and their minds were\ntrained to ignore it.\n\nThere are exceptions to this sweeping statement; and, even if we confine\nourselves to English literature, they concern some of the greatest\nnames; also the indirect influence of science has been considerable.\n\nA side light on this distracting inconsistency in modern thought is\nobtained by examining some of those great serious poems in English\nliterature, whose general scale gives them a didactic character. The\nrelevant poems are Milton\u2019s _Paradise Lost_, Pope\u2019s _Essay on Man_,\nWordsworth\u2019s _Excursion_, Tennyson\u2019s _In Memoriam_. Milton, though he is\nwriting after the Restoration, voices the theological aspect of the\nearlier portion of his century, untouched by the influence of the\nscientific materialism. Pope\u2019s poem represents the effect on popular\nthought of the intervening sixty years which includes the first period\nof assured triumph for the scientific movement. Wordsworth in his whole\nbeing expresses a conscious reaction against the mentality of the\neighteenth century. This mentality means nothing else than the\nacceptance of the scientific ideas at their full face value. Wordsworth\nwas not bothered by any intellectual antagonism. What moved him was a\nmoral repulsion. He felt that something had been left out, and that what\nhad been left out comprised everything that was most important. Tennyson\nis the mouthpiece of the attempts of the waning romantic movement in the\nsecond quarter of the nineteenth century to come to terms with science.\nBy this time the two elements in modern thought had disclosed their\nfundamental divergence by their jarring interpretations of the course of\nnature and the life of man. Tennyson stands in this poem as the perfect\nexample of the distraction which I have already mentioned. There are\nopposing visions of the world, and both of them command his assent by\nappeals to ultimate intuitions from which there seems no escape.\nTennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty. It is the problem of\nmechanism which appalls him,\n\n              \u201c\u2018The stars,\u2019 she whispers, \u2018blindly run.\u2019\u201d\n\nThis line states starkly the whole philosophic problem implicit in the\npoem. Each molecule blindly runs. The human body is a collection of\nmolecules. Therefore, the human body blindly runs, and therefore there\ncan be no individual responsibility for the actions of the body. If you\nonce accept that the molecule is definitely determined to be what it is,\nindependently of any determination by reason of the total organism of\nthe body, and if you further admit that the blind run is settled by the\ngeneral mechanical laws, there can be no escape from this conclusion.\nBut mental experiences are derivative from the actions of the body,\nincluding of course its internal behaviour. Accordingly, the sole\nfunction of the mind is to have at least some of its experiences settled\nfor it, and to add such others as may be open to it independently of the\nbody\u2019s motions, internal and external.\n\nThere are then two possible theories as to the mind. You can either deny\nthat it can supply for itself any experiences other than those provided\nfor it by the body, or you can admit them.\n\nIf you refuse to admit the additional experiences, then all individual\nmoral responsibility is swept away. If you do admit them, then a human\nbeing may be responsible for the state of his mind though he has no\nresponsibility for the actions of his body. The enfeeblement of thought\nin the modern world is illustrated by the way in which this plain issue\nis avoided in Tennyson\u2019s poem. There is something kept in the\nbackground, a skeleton in the cupboard. He touches on almost every\nreligious and scientific problem, but carefully avoids more than a\npassing allusion to this one.\n\nThis very problem was in full debate at the date of the poem. John\nStuart Mill was maintaining his doctrine of determinism. In this\ndoctrine volitions are determined by motives, and motives are\nexpressible in terms of antecedent conditions including states of mind\nas well as states of the body.\n\nIt is obvious that this doctrine affords no escape from the dilemma\npresented by a thoroughgoing mechanism. For if the volition affects the\nstate of the body, then the molecules in the body do not blindly run. If\nthe volition does not affect the state of the body, the mind is still\nleft in its uncomfortable position.\n\nMill\u2019s doctrine is generally accepted, especially among scientists, as\nthough in some way it allowed you to accept the extreme doctrine of\nmaterialistic mechanism, and yet mitigated its unbelievable\nconsequences. It does nothing of the sort. Either the bodily molecules\nblindly run, or they do not. If they do blindly run, the mental states\nare irrelevant in discussing the bodily actions.\n\nI have stated the arguments concisely, because in truth the issue is a\nvery simple one. Prolonged discussion is merely a source of confusion.\nThe question as to the metaphysical status of molecules does not come\nin. The statement that they are mere formulae has no bearing on the\nargument. For presumably the formulae mean something. If they mean\nnothing, the whole mechanical doctrine is likewise without meaning, and\nthe question drops. But if the formulae mean anything, the argument\napplies to exactly what they do mean. The traditional way of evading the\ndifficulty\u2014other than the simple way of ignoring it\u2014is to have recourse\nto some form of what is now termed \u2018vitalism.\u2019 This doctrine is really a\ncompromise. It allows a free run to mechanism throughout the whole of\ninanimate nature, and holds that the mechanism is partially mitigated\nwithin living bodies. I feel that this theory is an unsatisfactory\ncompromise. The gap between living and dead matter is too vague and\nproblematical to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption, which\ninvolves an essential dualism somewhere.\n\nThe doctrine which I am maintaining is that the whole concept of\nmaterialism only applies to very abstract entities, the products of\nlogical discernment. The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so\nthat the plan of the _whole_ influences the very characters of the\nvarious subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the case of an\nanimal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and\nthus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the\nultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an\nelectron within a living body is different from an electron outside it,\nby reason of the plan of the body. The electron blindly runs either\nwithin or without the body; but it runs within the body in accordance\nwith its character within the body; that is to say, in accordance with\nthe general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state.\nBut this principle of modification is perfectly general throughout\nnature, and represents no property peculiar to living bodies. In\nsubsequent lectures it will be explained that this doctrine involves the\nabandonment of the traditional scientific materialism, and the\nsubstitution of an alternative doctrine of organism.\n\nI shall not discuss Mill\u2019s determinism, as it lies outside the scheme of\nthese lectures. The foregoing discussion has been directed to secure\nthat either determinism or free will shall have some relevance,\nunhampered by the difficulties introduced by materialistic mechanism, or\nby the compromise of vitalism. I would term the doctrine of these\nlectures, the theory of _organic mechanism_. In this theory, the\nmolecules may blindly run in accordance with the general laws, but the\nmolecules differ in their intrinsic characters according to the general\norganic plans of the situations in which they find themselves.\n\nThe discrepancy between the materialistic mechanism of science and the\nmoral intuitions, which are presupposed in the concrete affairs of life,\nonly gradually assumed its true importance as the centuries advanced.\nThe different tones of the successive epochs to which the poems, already\nmentioned, belong are curiously reflected in their opening passages.\nMilton ends his introduction with the prayer,\n\n               \u201cThat to the height of this great argument\n               I may assert eternal Providence,\n               And justify the ways of God to men.\u201d\n\nTo judge from many modern writers on Milton, we might imagine that the\n_Paradise Lost_ and the _Paradise Regained_ were written as a series of\nexperiments in blank verse. This was certainly not Milton\u2019s view of his\nwork. To \u2018justify the ways of God to men\u2019 was very much his main object.\nHe recurs to the same idea in the _Samson Agonistes_,\n\n                       \u201cJust are the ways of God\n                       And justifiable to men;\u201d\n\nWe note the assured volume of confidence, untroubled by the coming\nscientific avalanche. The actual date of the publication of the\n_Paradise Lost_ lies just beyond the epoch to which it belongs. It is\nthe swansong of a passing world of untroubled certitude.\n\nA comparison between Pope\u2019s _Essay on Man_ and the _Paradise Lost_\nexhibits the change of tone in English thought in the fifty or sixty\nyears which separate the age of Milton from the age of Pope. Milton\naddresses his poem to God, Pope\u2019s poem is addressed to Lord Bolingbroke,\n\n              \u201cAwake, my St. John! leave all meaner things\n              To low ambition and the pride of kings.\n              Let us (since life can little more supply\n              Than just to look about us and to die)\n              Expatiate free o\u2019er all this scene of man;\n              A mighty maze! but not without a plan;\u201d\n\nCompare the jaunty assurance of Pope,\n\n                \u201cA mighty maze! but not without a plan.\u201d\n\nwith Milton\u2019s\n\n                       \u201cJust are the ways of God\n                       And justifiable to men;\u201d\n\nBut the real point to notice is that Pope as well as Milton was\nuntroubled by the great perplexity which haunts the modern world. The\nclue which Milton followed was to dwell on the ways of God in dealings\nwith man. Two generations later we find Pope equally confident that the\nenlightened methods of modern science provided a plan adequate as a map\nof the \u2018mighty maze.\u2019\n\nWordsworth\u2019s _Excursion_ is the next English poem on the same subject. A\nprose preface tells us that it is a fragment of a larger projected work,\ndescribed as \u2018A philosophical poem containing views of Man, Nature, and\nSociety.\u2019\n\nVery characteristically the poem begins with the line,\n\n             \u201c\u2019Twas summer, and the sun had mounted high:\u201d\n\nThus the romantic reaction started neither with God nor with Lord\nBolingbroke, but with nature. We are here witnessing a conscious\nreaction against the whole tone of the eighteenth century. That century\napproached nature with the abstract analysis of science, whereas\nWordsworth opposes to the scientific abstractions his full concrete\nexperience.\n\nA generation of religious revival and of scientific advance lies between\nthe _Excursion_ and Tennyson\u2019s _In Memoriam_. The earlier poets had\nsolved the perplexity by ignoring it. That course was not open to\nTennyson. Accordingly his poem begins thus:\n\n                 \u201cStrong Son of God, immortal Love,\n                 Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,\n                 By faith, and faith alone, embrace,\n                 Believing where we cannot prove;\u201d\n\nThe note of perplexity is struck at once. The nineteenth century has\nbeen a perplexed century, in a sense which is not true of any of its\npredecessors of the modern period. In the earlier times there were\nopposing camps, bitterly at variance on questions which they deemed\nfundamental. But, except for a few stragglers, either camp was\nwhole-hearted. The importance of Tennyson\u2019s poem lies in the fact that\nit exactly expressed the character of its period. Each individual was\ndivided against himself. In the earlier times, the deep thinkers were\nthe clear thinkers,\u2014Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz. They knew\nexactly what they meant and said it. In the nineteenth century, some of\nthe deeper thinkers among theologians and philosophers were muddled\nthinkers. Their assent was claimed by incompatible doctrines; and their\nefforts at reconciliation produced inevitable confusion.\n\nMatthew Arnold, even more than Tennyson, was the poet who expressed this\nmood of individual distraction which was so characteristic of this\ncentury. Compare with _In Memoriam_ the closing lines of Arnold\u2019s _Dover\nBeach_:\n\n           \u201cAnd we are here as on a darkling plain\n           Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,\n           Where ignorant armies clash by night.\u201d\n\nCardinal Newman in his _Apologia pro Vit\u00e2 Su\u00e2_ mentions it as a\npeculiarity of Pusey, the great Anglican ecclesiastic, \u201cHe was haunted\nby no intellectual perplexities.\u201d In this respect Pusey recalls Milton,\nPope, Wordsworth, as in contrast with Tennyson, Clough, Matthew Arnold,\nand Newman himself.\n\nSo far as concerns English literature we find, as might be anticipated,\nthe most interesting criticism of the thoughts of science among the\nleaders of the romantic reaction which accompanied and succeeded the\nepoch of the French Revolution. In English literature, the deepest\nthinkers of this school were Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Shelley. Keats\nis an example of literature untouched by science. We may neglect\nColeridge\u2019s attempt at an explicit philosophical formulation. It was\ninfluential in his own generation; but in these lectures it is my object\nonly to mention those elements of the thought of the past which stand\nfor all time. Even with this limitation, only a selection is possible.\nFor our purposes Coleridge is only important by his influence on\nWordsworth. Thus Wordsworth and Shelley remain.\n\nWordsworth was passionately absorbed in nature. It has been said of\nSpinoza, that he was drunk with God. It is equally true that Wordsworth\nwas drunk with nature. But he was a thoughtful, well-read man, with\nphilosophical interests, and sane even to the point of prosiness. In\naddition, he was a genius. He weakens his evidence by his dislike of\nscience. We all remember his scorn of the poor man whom he somewhat\nhastily accuses of peeping and botanising on his mother\u2019s grave. Passage\nafter passage could be quoted from him, expressing this repulsion. In\nthis respect, his characteristic thought can be summed up in his phrase,\n\u2018We murder to dissect.\u2019\n\nIn this latter passage, he discloses the intellectual basis of his\ncriticism of science. He alleges against science its absorption in\nabstractions. His consistent theme is that the important facts of nature\nelude the scientific method. It is important therefore to ask, what\nWordsworth found in nature that failed to receive expression in science.\nI ask this question in the interest of science itself; for one main\nposition in these lectures is a protest against the idea that the\nabstractions of science are irreformable and unalterable. Now it is\nemphatically not the case that Wordsworth hands over inorganic matter to\nthe mercy of science, and concentrates on the faith that in the living\norganism there is some element that science cannot analyse. Of course he\nrecognises, what no one doubts, that in some sense living things are\ndifferent from lifeless things. But that is not his main point. It is\nthe brooding presence of the hills which haunts him. His theme is nature\n_in solido_, that is to say, he dwells on that mysterious presence of\nsurrounding things, which imposes itself on any separate element that we\nset up as an individual for its own sake. He always grasps the whole of\nnature as involved in the tonality of the particular instance. That is\nwhy he laughs with the daffodils, and finds in the primrose \u201cthoughts\ntoo deep for terms.\u201d\n\nWordsworth\u2019s greatest poem is, by far, the first book of _The Prelude_.\nIt is pervaded by this sense of the haunting presences of nature. A\nseries of magnificent passages, too long for quotation, express this\nidea. Of course, Wordsworth is a poet writing a poem, and is not\nconcerned with dry philosophical statements. But it would hardly be\npossible to express more clearly a feeling for nature, as exhibiting\nentwined prehensive unities, each suffused with modal presences of\nothers:\n\n             \u201cYe Presences of Nature in the sky\n             And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills!\n             And Souls of lonely places! can I think\n             A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed\n             Such ministry, when ye through many a year\n             Haunting me thus among my boyish sports,\n             On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills,\n             Impressed upon all forms the characters\n             Of danger or desire; and thus did make\n             The surface of the universal earth\n             With triumph and delight, with hope and fear,\n             Work like a sea?...\u201d\n\nIn thus citing Wordsworth, the point which I wish to make is that we\nforget how strained and paradoxical is the view of nature which modern\nscience imposes on our thoughts. Wordsworth, to the height of genius,\nexpresses the concrete facts of our apprehension, facts which are\ndistorted in the scientific analysis. Is it not possible that the\nstandardised concepts of science are only valid within narrow\nlimitations, perhaps too narrow for science itself?\n\nShelley\u2019s attitude to science was at the opposite pole to that of\nWordsworth. He loved it, and is never tired of expressing in poetry the\nthoughts which it suggests. It symbolises to him joy, and peace, and\nillumination. What the hills were to the youth of Wordsworth, a chemical\nlaboratory was to Shelley. It is unfortunate that Shelley\u2019s literary\ncritics have, in this respect, so little of Shelley in their own\nmentality. They tend to treat as a casual oddity of Shelley\u2019s nature\nwhat was, in fact, part of the main structure of his mind, permeating\nhis poetry through and through. If Shelley had been born a hundred years\nlater, the twentieth century would have seen a Newton among chemists.\n\nFor the sake of estimating the value of Shelley\u2019s evidence it is\nimportant to realise this absorption of his mind in scientific ideas. It\ncan be illustrated by lyric after lyric. I will choose one poem only,\nthe fourth act of his _Prometheus Unbound_. The Earth and the Moon\nconverse together in the language of accurate science. Physical\nexperiments guide his imagery. For example, the Earth\u2019s exclamation,\n\n             \u201cThe vaporous exultation not to be confined!\u201d\n\nis the poetic transcript of \u2018the expansive force of gases,\u2019 as it is\ntermed in books on science. Again, take the Earth\u2019s stanza,\n\n      \u201cI spin beneath my pyramid of night,\n      Which points into the heavens,\u2014dreaming delight,\n      Murmuring victorious joy in my enchanted sleep;\n      As a youth lulled in love-dreams faintly sighing,\n      Under the shadow of his beauty lying,\n      Which round his rest a watch of light and warmth doth keep.\u201d\n\nThis stanza could only have been written by someone with a definite\ngeometrical diagram before his inward eye\u2014a diagram which it has often\nbeen my business to demonstrate to mathematical classes. As evidence,\nnote especially the last line which gives poetical imagery to the light\nsurrounding night\u2019s pyramid. This idea could not occur to anyone without\nthe diagram. But the whole poem and other poems are permeated with\ntouches of this kind.\n\nNow the poet, so sympathetic with science, so absorbed in its ideas, can\nsimply make nothing of the doctrine of secondary qualities which is\nfundamental to its concepts. For Shelley nature retains its beauty and\nits colour. Shelley\u2019s nature is in its essence a nature of organisms,\nfunctioning with the full content of our perceptual experience. We are\nso used to ignoring the implications of orthodox scientific doctrine,\nthat it is difficult to make evident the criticism upon it which is\nthereby implied. If anybody could have treated it seriously, Shelley\nwould have done so.\n\nFurthermore Shelley is entirely at one with Wordsworth as to the\ninterfusing of the Presence in nature. Here is the opening stanza of his\npoem entitled _Mont Blanc_:\n\n           \u201cThe everlasting universe of Things\n           Flows through the Mind, and rolls its rapid waves,\n           Now dark\u2014now glittering\u2014now reflecting gloom\u2014\n           Now lending splendour, where from secret springs\n           The source of human thought its tribute brings\n           Of waters,\u2014with a sound but half its own,\n           Such as a feeble brook will oft assume\n           In the wild woods, among the Mountains lone,\n           Where waterfalls around it leap for ever,\n           Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river\n           Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves.\u201d\n\nShelley has written these lines with explicit reference to some form of\nidealism, Kantian or Berkeleyan or Platonic. But however you construe\nhim, he is here an emphatic witness to a prehensive unification as\nconstituting the very being of nature.\n\nBerkeley, Wordsworth, Shelley are representative of the intuitive\nrefusal seriously to accept the abstract materialism of science.\n\nThere is an interesting difference in the treatment of nature by\nWordsworth and by Shelley, which brings forward the exact questions we\nhave got to think about. Shelley thinks of nature as changing,\ndissolving, transforming as it were at a fairy\u2019s touch. The leaves fly\nbefore the West Wind\n\n                \u201cLike ghosts from an enchanter fleeing.\u201d\n\nIn his poem _The Cloud_ it is the transformations of water which excite\nhis imagination. The subject of the poem is the endless, eternal,\nelusive change of things:\n\n                      \u201cI change but I cannot die.\u201d\n\nThis is one aspect of nature, its elusive change: a change not merely to\nbe expressed by locomotion, but a change of inward character. This is\nwhere Shelley places his emphasis, on the change of what cannot die.\n\nWordsworth was born among hills; hills mostly barren of trees, and thus\nshowing the minimum of change with the seasons. He was haunted by the\nenormous permanences of nature. For him change is an incident which\nshoots across a background of endurance,\n\n                   \u201cBreaking the silence of the seas\n                   Among the farthest Hebrides.\u201d\n\nEvery scheme for the analysis of nature has to face these two facts,\n_change_ and _endurance_. There is yet a third fact to be placed by it,\n_eternality_, I will call it. The mountain endures. But when after ages\nit has been worn away, it has gone. If a replica arises, it is yet a new\nmountain. A colour is eternal. It haunts time like a spirit. It comes\nand it goes. But where it comes, it is the same colour. It neither\nsurvives nor does it live. It appears when it is wanted. The mountain\nhas to time and space a different relation from that which colour has.\nIn the previous lecture, I was chiefly considering the relation to\nspace-time of things which, in my sense of the term, are eternal. It was\nnecessary to do so before we can pass to the consideration of the things\nwhich endure.\n\nAlso we must recollect the basis of our procedure. I hold that\nphilosophy is the critic of abstractions. Its function is the double\none, first of harmonising them by assigning to them their right relative\nstatus as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by direct\ncomparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe, and thereby\npromoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought. It is in\nrespect to this comparison that the testimony of great poets is of such\nimportance. Their survival is evidence that they express deep intuitions\nof mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete fact.\nPhilosophy is not one among the sciences with its own little scheme of\nabstractions which it works away at perfecting and improving. It is the\nsurvey of sciences, with the special objects of their harmony, and of\ntheir completion. It brings to this task, not only the evidence of the\nseparate sciences, but also its own appeal to concrete experience. It\nconfronts the sciences with concrete fact.\n\nThe literature of the nineteenth century, especially its English poetic\nliterature, is a witness to the discord between the aesthetic intuitions\nof mankind and the mechanism of science. Shelley brings vividly before\nus the elusiveness of the eternal objects of sense as they haunt the\nchange which infects underlying organisms. Wordsworth is the poet of\nnature as being the field of enduring permanences carrying within\nthemselves a message of tremendous significance. The eternal objects are\nalso there for him,\n\n              \u201cThe light that never was, on sea or land.\u201d\n\nBoth Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness that nature cannot\nbe divorced from its aesthetic values; and that these values arise from\nthe cumulation, in some sense, of the brooding presence of the whole\nonto its various parts. Thus we gain from the poets the doctrine that a\nphilosophy of nature must concern itself at least with these five\nnotions: change, value, eternal objects, endurance, organism,\ninterfusion.\n\nWe see that the literary romantic movement at the beginning of the\nnineteenth century, just as much as Berkeley\u2019s philosophical idealistic\nmovement a hundred years earlier, refused to be confined within the\nmaterialistic concepts of the orthodox scientific theory. We know also\nthat when in these lectures we come to the twentieth century, we shall\nfind a movement in science itself to reorganise its concepts, driven\nthereto by its own intrinsic development.\n\nIt is, however, impossible to proceed until we have settled whether\nthis refashioning of ideas is to be carried out on an objectivist\nbasis or on a subjectivist basis. By a subjectivist basis I mean the\nbelief that the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome of\nthe perceptive peculiarities of the subject enjoying the experience.\nIn other words, I mean that for this theory what is perceived is not a\npartial vision of a complex of things generally independent of that\nact of cognition; but that it merely is the expression of the\nindividual peculiarities of the cognitive act. Accordingly what is\ncommon to the multiplicity of cognitive acts is the ratiocination\nconnected with them. Thus, though there is a common world of thought\nassociated with our sense-perceptions, there is no common world to\nthink about. What we do think about is a common conceptual world\napplying indifferently to our individual experiences which are\nstrictly personal to ourselves. Such a conceptual world will\nultimately find its complete expression in the equations of applied\nmathematics. This is the extreme subjectivist position. There is of\ncourse the half-way house of those who believe that our perceptual\nexperience does tell us of a common objective world; but that the\nthings perceived are merely the outcome for us of this world, and are\nnot _in themselves_ elements in the common world itself.\n\nAlso there is the objectivist position. This creed is that the actual\nelements perceived by our senses are _in themselves_ the elements of a\ncommon world; and that this world is a complex of things, including\nindeed our acts of cognition, but transcending them. According to this\npoint of view the things experienced are to be distinguished from our\nknowledge of them. So far as there is dependence, the _things_ pave the\nway for the _cognition_, rather than _vice versa_. But the point is that\nthe actual things experienced enter into a common world which transcends\nknowledge, though it includes knowledge. The intermediate subjectivists\nwould hold that the things experienced only indirectly enter into the\ncommon world by reason of their dependence on the subject who is\ncognising. The objectivist holds that the things experienced and the\ncognisant subject enter into the common world on equal terms. In these\nlectures I am giving the outline of what I consider to be the essentials\nof an objectivist philosophy adapted to the requirement of science and\nto the concrete experience of mankind. Apart from the detailed criticism\nof the difficulties raised by subjectivism in any form, my broad reasons\nfor distrusting it are three in number. One reason arises from the\ndirect interrogation of our perceptive experience. It appears from this\ninterrogation that we are _within_ a world of colours, sounds, and other\nsense-objects, related in space and time to enduring objects such as\nstones, trees, and human bodies. We seem to be ourselves elements of\nthis world in the same sense as are the other things which we perceive.\nBut the subjectivist, even the moderate intermediate subjectivist, makes\nthis world, as thus described, depend on us, in a way which directly\ntraverses our na\u00efve experience. I hold that the ultimate appeal is to\nna\u00efve experience and that is why I lay such stress on the evidence of\npoetry. My point is, that in our sense-experience we know away from and\nbeyond our own personality; whereas the subjectivist holds that in such\nexperience we merely know about our own personality. Even the\nintermediate subjectivist places our personality between the world we\nknow of and the common world which he admits. The world we know of is\nfor him the internal strain of our personality under the stress of the\ncommon world which lies behind.\n\nMy second reason for distrusting subjectivism is based on the particular\ncontent of experience. Our historical knowledge tells us of ages in the\npast when, so far as we can see, no living being existed on earth. Again\nit also tells us of countless star-systems, whose detailed history\nremains beyond our ken. Consider even the moon and the earth. What is\ngoing on within the interior of the earth, and on the far side of the\nmoon! Our perceptions lead us to infer that there is something happening\nin the stars, something happening within the earth, and something\nhappening on the far side of the moon. Also they tell us that in remote\nages there were things happening. But all these things which it appears\ncertainly happened, are either unknown in detail, or else are\nreconstructed by inferential evidence. In the face of this content of\nour personal experience, it is difficult to believe that the experienced\nworld is an attribute of our own personality. My third reason is based\nupon the instinct for action. Just as sense-perception seems to give\nknowledge of what lies beyond individuality, so action seems to issue in\nan instinct for self-transcendence. The activity passes beyond self into\nthe known transcendent world. It is here that final ends are of\nimportance. For it is not activity urged from behind, which passes out\ninto the veiled world of the intermediate subjectivist. It is activity\ndirected to determinate ends in the known world; and yet it is activity\ntranscending self and it is activity within the known world. It follows\ntherefore that the world, as known, transcends the subject which is\ncognisant of it.\n\nThe subjectivist position has been popular among those who have been\nengaged in giving a philosophical interpretation to the recent theories\nof relativity in physical science. The dependence of the world of sense\non the individual percipient seems an easy mode of expressing the\nmeanings involved. Of course, with the exception of those who are\ncontent with themselves as forming the entire universe, solitary amid\nnothing, everyone wants to struggle back to some sort of objectivist\nposition. I do not understand how a common world of thought can be\nestablished in the absence of a common world of sense. I will not argue\nthis point in detail; but in the absence of a transcendence of thought,\nor a transcendence of the world of sense, it is difficult to see how the\nsubjectivist is to divest himself of his solitariness. Nor does the\nintermediate subjectivist appear to get any help from his unknown world\nin the background.\n\nThe distinction between realism and idealism does not coincide with that\nbetween objectivism and subjectivism. Both realists and idealists can\nstart from an objective standpoint. They may both agree that the world\ndisclosed in sense-perception is a common world, transcending the\nindividual percipient. But the objective idealist, when he comes to\nanalyse what the reality of this world involves, finds that cognitive\nmentality is in some way inextricably concerned in every detail. This\nposition the realist denies. Accordingly these two classes of\nobjectivists do not part company till they have arrived at the ultimate\nproblem of metaphysics. There is a great deal which they share in\ncommon. This is why, in my last lecture, I said that I adopted a\nposition of provisional realism.\n\nIn the past, the objectivist position has been distorted by the supposed\nnecessity of accepting the classical scientific materialism, with its\ndoctrine of simple location. This has necessitated the doctrine of\nsecondary and primary qualities. Thus the secondary qualities, such as\nthe sense-objects, are dealt with on subjectivist principles. This is a\nhalf-hearted position which falls an easy prey to subjectivist\ncriticism.\n\nIf we are to include the secondary qualities in the common world, a very\ndrastic reorganisation of our fundamental concepts is necessary. It is\nan evident fact of experience that our apprehensions of the external\nworld depend absolutely on the occurrences within the human body. By\nplaying appropriate tricks on the body a man can be got to perceive, or\nnot to perceive, almost anything. Some people express themselves as\nthough bodies, brains, and nerves were the only real things in an\nentirely imaginary world. In other words, they treat bodies on\nobjectivist principles, and the rest of the world on subjectivist\nprinciples. This will not do; especially, when we remember that it is\nthe experimenter\u2019s perception of another person\u2019s body which is in\nquestion as evidence.\n\nBut we have to admit that the body is the organism whose states regulate\nour cognisance of the world. The unity of the perceptual field therefore\nmust be a unity of bodily experience. In being aware of the bodily\nexperience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the whole\nspatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life. This is the\nsolution of the problem which I gave in my last lecture. I will not\nrepeat myself now, except to remind you that my theory involves the\nentire abandonment of the notion that simple location is the primary way\nin which things are involved in space-time. In a certain sense,\neverything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an\naspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatio-temporal\nstandpoint mirrors the world.\n\nIf you try to imagine this doctrine in terms of our conventional views\nof space and time, which presuppose simple location, it is a great\nparadox. But if you think of it in terms of our na\u00efve experience, it is\na mere transcript of the obvious facts. You are in a certain place\nperceiving things. Your perception takes place where you are, and is\nentirely dependent on how your body is functioning. But this functioning\nof the body in one place, exhibits for your cognisance an aspect of the\ndistant environment, fading away into the general knowledge that there\nare things beyond. If this cognisance conveys knowledge of a\ntranscendent world, it must be because the event which is the bodily\nlife unifies in itself aspects of the universe.\n\nThis is a doctrine extremely consonant with the vivid expression of\npersonal experience which we find in the nature-poetry of imaginative\nwriters such as Wordsworth or Shelley. The brooding, immediate presences\nof things are an obsession to Wordsworth. What the theory does do is to\nedge cognitive mentality away from being the necessary substratum of the\nunity of experience. That unity is now placed in the unity of an event.\nAccompanying this unity, there may or there may not be cognition.\n\nAt this point we come back to the great question which was posed before\nus by our examination of the evidence afforded by the poetic insight of\nWordsworth and Shelley. This single question has expanded into a group\nof questions. What are enduring things, as distinguished from the\neternal objects, such as colour and shape? How are they possible? What\nis their status and meaning in the universe? It comes to this: What is\nthe status of the enduring stability of the order of nature? There is\nthe summary answer, which refers nature to some greater reality standing\nbehind it. This reality occurs in the history of thought under many\nnames, The Absolute, Brahma, The Order of Heaven, God. The delineation\nof final metaphysical truth is no part of this lecture. My point is that\nany summary conclusion jumping from our conviction of the existence of\nsuch an order of nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate\nreality which, in some unexplained way, is to be appealed to for the\nremoval of perplexity, constitutes the great refusal of rationality to\nassert its rights. We have to search whether nature does not in its very\nbeing show itself as self-explanatory. By this I mean, that the sheer\nstatement, of what things are, may contain elements explanatory of why\nthings are. Such elements may be expected to refer to depths beyond\nanything which we can grasp with a clear apprehension. In a sense, all\nexplanation must end in an ultimate arbitrariness. My demand is, that\nthe ultimate arbitrariness of matter of fact from which our formulation\nstarts should disclose the same general principles of reality, which we\ndimly discern as stretching away into regions beyond our explicit powers\nof discernment. Nature exhibits itself as exemplifying a philosophy of\nthe evolution of organisms subject to determinate conditions. Examples\nof such conditions are the dimensions of space, the laws of nature, the\ndeterminate enduring entities, such as atoms and electrons, which\nexemplify these laws. But the very nature of these entities, the very\nnature of their spatiality and temporality, should exhibit the\narbitrariness of these conditions as the outcome of a wider evolution\nbeyond nature itself, and within which nature is but a limited mode.\n\nOne all-pervasive fact, inherent in the very character of what is real\nis the transition of things, the passage one to another. This passage is\nnot a mere linear procession of discrete entities. However we fix a\ndeterminate entity, there is always a narrower determination of\nsomething which is presupposed in our first choice. Also there is always\na wider determination into which our first choice fades by transition\nbeyond itself. The general aspect of nature is that of evolutionary\nexpansiveness. These unities, which I call events, are the emergence\ninto actuality of something. How are we to characterise the something\nwhich thus emerges? The name \u2018_event_\u2019 given to such a unity, draws\nattention to the inherent transitoriness, combined with the actual\nunity. But this abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterise what\nthe fact of the reality of an event is in itself. A moment\u2019s thought\nshows us that no one idea can in itself be sufficient. For every idea\nwhich finds its significance in each event must represent something\nwhich contributes to what realisation is in itself. Thus no one word can\nbe adequate. But conversely, nothing must be left out. Remembering the\npoetic rendering of our concrete experience, we see at once that the\nelement of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an end in\nitself, of being something which is for its own sake, must not be\nomitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual\nsomething. \u2018Value\u2019 is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an\nevent. Value is an element which permeates through and through the\npoetic view of nature. We have only to transfer to the very texture of\nrealisation in itself that value which we recognise so readily in terms\nof human life. This is the secret of Wordsworth\u2019s worship of nature.\nRealization therefore is in itself the attainment of value. But there is\nno such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of limitation. The\ndefinite finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping of\nattainment; apart from such shaping into individual matter of fact there\nis no attainment. The mere fusion of all that there is would be the\nnonentity of indefiniteness. The salvation of reality is its obstinate,\nirreducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are limited to be no other\nthan themselves. Neither science, nor art, nor creative action can tear\nitself away from obstinate, irreducible, limited facts. The endurance of\nthings has its significance in the self-retention of that which imposes\nitself as a definite attainment for its own sake. That which endures is\nlimited, obstructive, intolerant, infecting its environment with its own\naspects. But it is not self-sufficient. The aspects of all things enter\ninto its very nature. It is only itself as drawing together into its own\nlimitation the larger whole in which it finds itself. Conversely it is\nonly itself by lending its aspects to this same environment in which it\nfinds itself. The problem of evolution is the development of enduring\nharmonies of enduring shapes of value, which merge into higher\nattainments of things beyond themselves. Aesthetic attainment is\ninterwoven in the texture of realisation. The endurance of an entity\nrepresents the attainment of a limited aesthetic success, though if we\nlook beyond it to its external effects, it may represent an aesthetic\nfailure. Even within itself, it may represent the conflict between a\nlower success and a higher failure. The conflict is the presage of\ndisruption.\n\nThe further discussion of the nature of enduring objects and of the\nconditions they require will be relevant to the consideration of the\ndoctrine of evolution which dominated the latter half of the nineteenth\ncentury. The point which in this lecture I have endeavoured to make\nclear is that the nature-poetry of the romantic revival was a protest on\nbehalf of the organic view of nature, and also a protest against the\nexclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact. In this aspect of\nit, the romantic movement may be conceived as a revival of Berkeley\u2019s\nprotest which had been launched a hundred years earlier. The romantic\nreaction was a protest on behalf of value.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER VI\n\n                         THE NINETEENTH CENTURY\n\n\nMy previous lecture was occupied with the comparison of the\nnature-poetry of the romantic movement in England with the materialistic\nscientific philosophy inherited from the eighteenth century. It noted\nthe entire disagreement of the two movements of thought. The lecture\nalso continued the endeavour to outline an objectivist philosophy,\ncapable of bridging the gap between science and that fundamental\nintuition of mankind which finds its expression in poetry and its\npractical exemplification in the presuppositions of daily life. As the\nnineteenth century passed on, the romantic movement died down. It did\nnot die away, but it lost its clear unity of tidal stream, and dispersed\nitself into many estuaries as it coalesced with other human interests.\nThe faith of the century was derived from three sources: one source was\nthe romantic movement, showing itself in religious revival, in art, and\nin political aspiration: another source was the gathering advance of\nscience which opened avenues of thought: the third source was the\nadvance in technology which completely changed the conditions of human\nlife.\n\nEach of these springs of faith had its origin in the previous period.\nThe French Revolution itself was the first child of romanticism in the\nform in which it tinged Rousseau. James Watt obtained his patent for his\nsteam-engine in 1769. The scientific advance was the glory of France and\nof French influence, throughout the same century.\n\nAlso even during this earlier period, the streams interacted, coalesced,\nand antagonised each other. But it was not until the nineteenth century\nthat the threefold movement came to that full development and peculiar\nbalance characteristic of the sixty years following the battle of\nWaterloo.\n\nWhat is peculiar and new to the century, differentiating it from all its\npredecessors, is its technology. It was not merely the introduction of\nsome great isolated inventions. It is impossible not to feel that\nsomething more than that was involved. For example, writing was a\ngreater invention than the steam-engine. But in tracing the continuous\nhistory of the growth of writing we find an immense difference from that\nof the steam-engine. We must, of course, put aside minor and sporadic\nanticipations of both; and confine attention to the periods of their\neffective elaboration. The scale of time is so absolutely disparate. For\nthe steam-engine, we may give about a hundred years; for writing, the\ntime period is of the order of a thousand years. Further, when writing\nwas finally popularised, the world was not then expecting the next step\nin technology. The process of change was slow, unconscious, and\nunexpected.\n\nIn the nineteenth century, the process became quick, conscious, and\nexpected. The earlier half of the century was the period in which this\nnew attitude to change was first established and enjoyed. It was a\npeculiar period of hope, in the sense in which, sixty or seventy years\nlater, we can now detect a note of disillusionment, or at least of\nanxiety.\n\nThe greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the invention of\nthe method of invention. A new method entered into life. In order to\nunderstand our epoch, we can neglect all the details of change, such as\nrailways, telegraphs, radios, spinning machines, synthetic dyes. We must\nconcentrate on the method in itself; that is the real novelty, which has\nbroken up the foundations of the old civilisation. The prophecy of\nFrancis Bacon has now been fulfilled; and man, who at times dreamt of\nhimself as a little lower than the angels, has submitted to become the\nservant and the minister of nature. It still remains to be seen whether\nthe same actor can play both parts.\n\nThe whole change has arisen from the new scientific information.\nScience, conceived not so much in its principles as in its results, is\nan obvious storehouse of ideas for utilisation. But, if we are to\nunderstand what happened during the century, the analogy of a mine is\nbetter than that of a storehouse. Also, it is a great mistake to think\nthat the bare scientific idea is the required invention, so that it has\nonly to be picked up and used. An intense period of imaginative design\nlies between. One element in the new method is just the discovery of how\nto set about bridging the gap between the scientific ideas, and the\nultimate product. It is a process of disciplined attack upon one\ndifficulty after another.\n\nThe possibilities of modern technology were first in practice realised\nin England, by the energy of a prosperous middle class. Accordingly, the\nindustrial revolution started there. But the Germans explicitly realised\nthe methods by which the deeper veins in the mine of science could be\nreached. They abolished haphazard methods of scholarship. In their\ntechnological schools and universities progress did not have to wait for\nthe occasional genius, or the occasional lucky thought. Their feats of\nscholarship during the nineteenth century were the admiration of the\nworld. This discipline of knowledge applies beyond technology to pure\nscience, and beyond science to general scholarship. It represents the\nchange from amateurs to professionals.\n\nThere have always been people who devoted their lives to definite\nregions of thought. In particular, lawyers and the clergy of the\nChristian churches form obvious examples of such specialism. But the\nfull self-conscious realisation of the power of professionalism in\nknowledge in all its departments, and of the way to produce the\nprofessionals, and of the importance of knowledge to the advance of\ntechnology, and of the methods by which abstract knowledge can be\nconnected with technology, and of the boundless possibilities of\ntechnological advance,\u2014the realisation of all these things was first\ncompletely attained in the nineteenth century; and among the various\ncountries, chiefly in Germany.\n\nIn the past human life was lived in a bullock cart; in the future it\nwill be lived in an aeroplane; and the change of speed amounts to a\ndifference in quality.\n\nThe transformation of the field of knowledge, which has been thus\neffected, has not been wholly a gain. At least, there are dangers\nimplicit in it, although the increase of efficiency is undeniable. The\ndiscussion of various effects on social life arising from the new\nsituation is reserved for my last lecture. For the present it is\nsufficient to note that this novel situation of disciplined progress is\nthe setting within which the thought of the century developed.\n\nIn the period considered four great novel ideas were introduced into\ntheoretical science. Of course, it is possible to show good cause for\nincreasing my list far beyond the number _four_. But I am keeping to\nideas which, if taken in their broadest signification, are vital to\nmodern attempts at reconstructing the foundations of physical science.\n\nTwo of these ideas are antithetical, and I will consider them together.\nWe are not concerned with details, but with ultimate influences on\nthought. One of the ideas is that of a field of physical activity\npervading all space, even where there is an apparent vacuum. This notion\nhad occurred to many people, under many forms. We remember the medieval\naxiom, nature abhors a vacuum. Also, Descartes\u2019 vortices at one time, in\nthe seventeenth century, seemed as if established among scientific\nassumptions. Newton believed that gravitation was caused by something\nhappening in a medium. But, on the whole, in the eighteenth century\nnothing was made of any of these ideas. The passage of light was\nexplained in Newton\u2019s fashion by the flight of minute corpuscles, which\nof course left room for a vacuum. Mathematical physicists were far too\nbusy deducing the consequences of the theory of gravitation to bother\nmuch about the causes; nor did they know where to look, if they had\ntroubled themselves over the question. There were speculations, but\ntheir importance was not great. Accordingly, when the nineteenth century\nopened, the notion of physical occurrences pervading all space held no\neffective place in science. It was revived from two sources. The\nundulatory theory of light triumphed, thanks to Thomas Young and\nFresnel. This demands that there shall be something throughout space\nwhich can undulate. Accordingly, the ether was produced, as a sort of\nall pervading subtle material. Again the theory of electromagnetism\nfinally, in Clerk Maxwell\u2019s hands, assumed a shape in which it demanded\nthat there should be electromagnetic occurrences throughout all space.\nMaxwell\u2019s complete theory was not shaped until the eighteen-seventies.\nBut it had been prepared for by many great men, Amp\u00e8re, Oersted,\nFaraday. In accordance with the current materialistic outlook, these\nelectromagnetic occurrences also required a material in which to happen.\nSo again the ether was requisitioned. Then Maxwell, as the immediate\nfirst-fruits of his theory, demonstrated that the waves of light were\nmerely waves of his electromagnetic occurrences. Accordingly, the theory\nof electromagnetism swallowed up the theory of light. It was a great\nsimplification, and no one doubts its truth. But it had one unfortunate\neffect so far as materialism was concerned. For, whereas quite a simple\nsort of elastic ether sufficed for light when taken by itself, the\nelectromagnetic ether has to be endowed with just those properties\nnecessary for the production of the electromagnetic occurrences. In\nfact, it becomes a mere name for the material which is postulated to\nunderlie these occurrences. If you do not happen to hold the\nmetaphysical theory which makes you postulate such an ether, you can\ndiscard it. For it has no independent vitality.\n\nThus in the seventies of the last century, some main physical sciences\nwere established on a basis which presupposed the idea of _continuity_.\nOn the other hand, the idea of _atomicity_ had been introduced by John\nDalton, to complete Lavoisier\u2019s work on the foundation of chemistry.\nThis is the second great notion. Ordinary matter was conceived as\natomic: electromagnetic effects were conceived as arising from a\ncontinuous field.\n\nThere was no contradiction. In the first place, the notions are\nantithetical; but, apart from special embodiments, are not logically\ncontradictory. Secondly, they were applied to different regions of\nscience, one to chemistry, and the other to electromagnetism. And, as\nyet, there were but faint signs of coalescence between the two.\n\nThe notion of matter as atomic has a long history. Democritus and\nLucretius will at once occur to your minds. In speaking of these ideas\nas novel, I merely mean _relatively novel_, having regard to the\nsettlement of ideas which formed the efficient basis of science\nthroughout the eighteenth century. In considering the history of\nthought, it is necessary to distinguish the real stream, determining a\nperiod, from ineffectual thoughts casually entertained. In the\neighteenth century every well-educated man read Lucretius, and\nentertained ideas about atoms. But John Dalton made them efficient in\nthe stream of science; and in this function of efficiency atomicity was\na new idea.\n\nThe influence of atomicity was not limited to chemistry. The living cell\nis to biology what the electron and the proton are to physics. Apart\nfrom cells and from aggregates of cells there are no biological\nphenomena. The cell theory was introduced into biology contemporaneously\nwith, and independently of, Dalton\u2019s atomic theory. The two theories are\nindependent exemplifications of the same idea of \u2018atomism.\u2019 The\nbiological cell theory was a gradual growth, and a mere list of dates\nand names illustrates the fact that the biological sciences, as\neffective schemes of thought, are barely one hundred years old. Bich\u00e2t\nin 1801 elaborated a tissue theory: Johannes M\u00fcller in 1835 described\n\u2018cells\u2019 and demonstrated facts concerning their nature and relations:\nSchleiden in 1838 and Schwann in 1839 finally established their\nfundamental character. Thus by 1840 both biology and chemistry were\nestablished on an atomic basis. The final triumph of atomism had to wait\nfor the arrival of electrons at the end of the century. The importance\nof the imaginative background is illustrated by the fact that nearly\nhalf a century after Dalton had done his work, another chemist, Louis\nPasteur, carried over these same ideas of atomicity still further into\nthe region of biology. The cell theory and Pasteur\u2019s work were in some\nrespects more revolutionary than that of Dalton. For they introduced the\nnotion of _organism_ into the world of minute beings. There had been a\ntendency to treat the atom as an ultimate entity, capable only of\nexternal relations. This attitude of mind was breaking down under the\ninfluence of Mendeleef\u2019s periodic law. But Pasteur showed the decisive\nimportance of the idea of organism at the stage of infinitesimal\nmagnitude. The astronomers had shown us how big is the universe. The\nchemists and biologists teach us how small it is. There is in modern\nscientific practice a famous standard of length. It is rather small: to\nobtain it, you must divide a centimetre into one hundred million parts,\nand take one of them. Pasteur\u2019s organisms are a good deal bigger than\nthis length. In connection with atoms, we now know that there are\norganisms for which such distances are uncomfortably great.\n\nThe remaining pair of new ideas to be ascribed to this epoch are both of\nthem connected with the notion of transition or change. They are the\ndoctrine of the conservation of energy, and the doctrine of evolution.\n\nThe doctrine of energy has to do with the notion of quantitative\npermanence underlying change. The doctrine of evolution has to do with\nthe emergence of novel organisms as the outcome of change. The theory of\nenergy lies in the province of physics. The theory of evolution lies\nmainly in the province of biology, although it had previously been\ntouched upon by Kant and Laplace in connection with the formation of\nsuns and planets.\n\nThe convergent effect of the new power for scientific advance, which\nresulted from these four ideas, transformed the middle period of the\ncentury into an orgy of scientific triumph. Clear-sighted men, of the\nsort who are so clearly wrong, now proclaimed that the secrets of the\nphysical universe were finally disclosed. If only you ignored everything\nwhich refused to come into line, your powers of explanation were\nunlimited. On the other side, muddle-headed men muddled themselves into\nthe most indefensible positions. Learned dogmatism, conjoined with\nignorance of the crucial facts, suffered a heavy defeat from the\nscientific advocates of new ways. Thus to the excitement derived from\ntechnological revolution, there was now added the excitement arising\nfrom the vistas disclosed by scientific theory. Both the material and\nthe spiritual bases of social life were in process of transformation.\nWhen the century entered upon its last quarter, its three sources of\ninspiration, the romantic, the technological, and the scientific had\ndone their work.\n\nThen, almost suddenly, a pause occurred; and in its last twenty years\nthe century closed with one of the dullest stages of thought since the\ntime of the First Crusade. It was an echo of the eighteenth century,\nlacking Voltaire and the reckless grace of the French aristocrats. The\nperiod was efficient, dull, and half-hearted. It celebrated the triumph\nof the professional man.\n\nBut looking backwards upon this time of pause, we can now discern signs\nof change. In the first place, the modern conditions of systematic\nresearch prevent absolute stagnation. In every branch of science, there\nwas effective progress, indeed rapid progress, although it was confined\nsomewhat strictly within the accepted ideas of each branch. It was an\nage of successful scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed by much thought\nbeyond the conventions.\n\nIn the second place, we can now see that the adequacy of scientific\nmaterialism as a scheme of thought for the use of science was\nendangered. The conservation of energy provided a new type of\nquantitative permanence. It is true that energy could be construed as\nsomething subsidiary to matter. But, anyhow, the notion of _mass_ was\nlosing its unique preeminence as being the one final permanent quantity.\nLater on, we find the relations of mass and energy inverted; so that\nmass now becomes the name for a quantity of energy considered in\nrelation to some of its dynamical effects. This train of thought leads\nto the notion of energy being fundamental, thus displacing matter from\nthat position. But energy is merely the name for the quantitative aspect\nof a structure of happenings; in short, it depends on the notion of the\nfunctioning of an organism. The question is, can we define an organism\nwithout recurrence to the concept of matter in simple location? We must,\nlater on, consider this point in more detail.\n\nThe same relegation of matter to the background occurs in connection\nwith the electromagnetic fields. The modern theory presupposes\nhappenings in that field which are divorced from immediate dependence\nupon matter. It is usual to provide an ether as a substratum. But the\nether does not really enter into the theory. Thus again the notion of\nmaterial loses its fundamental position. Also, the atom is transforming\nitself into an organism; and finally the evolution theory is nothing\nelse than the analysis of the conditions for the formation and survival\nof various types of organisms. In truth, one most significant fact of\nthis later period is the advance in biological sciences. These sciences\nare essentially sciences concerning organisms. During the epoch in\nquestion, and indeed also at the present moment, the prestige of the\nmore perfect scientific form belongs to the physical sciences.\nAccordingly, biology apes the manners of physics. It is orthodox to\nhold, that there is nothing in biology but what is physical mechanism\nunder somewhat complex circumstances.\n\nOne difficulty in this position is the present confusion as to the\nfoundational concepts of physical science. This same difficulty also\nattaches to the opposed doctrine of vitalism. For, in this later theory,\nthe fact of mechanism is accepted\u2014I mean, mechanism based upon\nmaterialism\u2014and an additional vital control is introduced to explain the\nactions of living bodies. It cannot be too clearly understood that the\nvarious physical laws which appear to apply to the behaviour of atoms\nare not mutually consistent as at present formulated. The appeal to\nmechanism on behalf of biology was in its origin an appeal to the\nwell-attested self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis\nof all natural phenomena. But at present there is no such system of\nconcepts.\n\nScience is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical, nor\npurely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the\nstudy of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of the\nsmaller organisms. There is another difference between the two divisions\nof science. The organisms of biology include as ingredients the smaller\norganisms of physics; but there is at present no evidence that the\nsmaller of the physical organisms can be analysed into component\norganisms. It may be so. But anyhow we are faced with the question as to\nwhether there are not primary organisms which are incapable of further\nanalysis. It seems very unlikely that there should be any infinite\nregress in nature. Accordingly, a theory of science which discards\nmaterialism must answer the question as to the character of these\nprimary entities. There can be only one answer on this basis. We must\nstart with the event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence. An\nevent has to do with all that there is, and in particular with all other\nevents. This interfusion of events is effected by the aspects of those\neternal objects, such as colours, sounds, scents, geometrical\ncharacters, which are required for nature and are not emergent from it.\nSuch an eternal object will be an ingredient of one event under the\nguise, or aspect, of qualifying another event. There is a reciprocity of\naspects, and there are patterns of aspects. Each event corresponds to\ntwo such patterns; namely, the pattern of aspects of other events which\nit grasps into its own unity, and the pattern of its aspects which other\nevents severally grasp into their unities. Accordingly, a\nnon-materialistic philosophy of nature will identify a primary organism\nas being the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped in the\nunity of a real event. Such a pattern will also include the aspects of\nthe event in question as grasped in other events, whereby those other\nevents receive a modification, or partial determination. There is thus\nan intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event, namely, the event as\nin its own prehension, and the event as in the prehension of other\nevents. The concept of an organism includes, therefore, the concept of\nthe interaction of organisms. The ordinary scientific ideas of\ntransmission and continuity are, relatively speaking, details concerning\nthe empirically observed characters of these patterns throughout space\nand time. The position here maintained is that the relationships of an\nevent are internal, so far as concerns the event itself; that is to say,\nthat they are constitutive of what the event is in itself.\n\nAlso in the previous lecture, we arrived at the notion that an actual\nevent is an achievement for its own sake, a grasping of diverse\nentities into a value by reason of their real togetherness in that\npattern, to the exclusion of other entities. It is not the mere\nlogical togetherness of merely diverse things. For in that case, to\nmodify Bacon\u2019s words, \u201call eternal objects would be alike one to\nanother.\u201d This reality means that each intrinsic essence, that is to\nsay, what each eternal object is in itself, becomes relevant to the\none limited value emergent in the guise of the event. But values\ndiffer in importance. Thus though each event is necessary for the\ncommunity of events, the weight of its contribution is determined by\nsomething intrinsic in itself. We have now to discuss what that\nproperty is. Empirical observation shows that it is the property which\nwe may call indifferently _retention_, _endurance_ or _reiteration_.\nThis property amounts to the recovery, on behalf of value amid the\ntransitoriness of reality, of the self-identity which is also enjoyed\nby the primary eternal objects. The reiteration of a particular shape\n(or formation) of value within an event occurs when the event as a\nwhole repeats some shape which is also exhibited by each one of a\nsuccession of its parts. Thus however you analyse the event according\nto the flux of its parts through time, there is the same\nthing-for-its-own-sake standing before you. Thus the event, in its own\nintrinsic reality, mirrors in itself, as derived from its own parts,\naspects of the same patterned value as it realises in its complete\nself. It thus realises itself under the guise of an enduring\nindividual entity, with a life history contained within itself.\nFurthermore, the extrinsic reality of such an event, as mirrored in\nother events, takes this same form of an enduring individuality; only\nin this case, the individuality is implanted as a reiteration of\naspects of itself in the alien events composing the environment.\n\nThe total temporal duration of such an event bearing an enduring\npattern, constitutes its specious present. Within this specious present\nthe event realises itself as a totality, and also in so doing realises\nitself as grouping together a number of aspects of its own temporal\nparts. One and the same pattern is realised in the total event, and is\nexhibited by each of these various parts through an aspect of each part\ngrasped into the togetherness of the total event. Also, the earlier\nlife-history of the same pattern is exhibited by its aspects in this\ntotal event. There is, thus, in this event a memory of the antecedent\nlife-history of its own dominant pattern, as having formed an element of\nvalue in its own antecedent environment. This concrete prehension, from\nwithin, of the life-history of an enduring fact is analysable into two\nabstractions, of which one is the enduring entity which has emerged as a\nreal matter of fact to be taken account of by other things, and the\nother is the individualised embodiment of the underlying energy of\nrealisation.\n\nThe consideration of the general flux of events leads to this analysis\ninto an underlying eternal energy in whose nature there stands an\nenvisagement of the realm of all eternal objects. Such an envisagement\nis the ground of the individualised thoughts which emerge as\nthought-aspects grasped within the life-history of the subtler and more\ncomplex enduring patterns. Also in the nature of the eternal activity\nthere must stand an envisagement of all values to be obtained by a real\ntogetherness of eternal objects, as envisaged in ideal situations. Such\nideal situations, apart from any reality, are devoid of intrinsic value,\nbut are valuable as elements in purpose. The individualised prehension\ninto individual events of aspects of these ideal situations takes the\nform of individualised thoughts, and as such has intrinsic value. Thus\nvalue arises because there is now a real togetherness of the ideal\naspects, as in thought, with the actual aspects, as in process of\noccurrence. Accordingly no value is to be ascribed to the underlying\nactivity as divorced from the matter-of-fact events of the real world.\n\nFinally, to sum up this train of thought, the underlying activity, as\nconceived apart from the fact of realisation, has three types of\nenvisagement. These are: first, the envisagement of eternal objects;\nsecondly, the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the\nsynthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, the envisagement of the actual\nmatter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is\nachievable by the addition of the future. But in abstraction from\nactuality, the eternal activity is divorced from value. For the\nactuality is the value. The individual perception arising from enduring\nobjects will vary in its individual depth and width according to the way\nin which the pattern dominates its own route. It may represent the\nfaintest ripple differentiating the general substrate energy; or, in the\nother extreme, it may rise to conscious thought, which includes poising\nbefore self-conscious judgment the abstract possibilities of value\ninherent in various situations of ideal togetherness. The intermediate\ncases will group round the individual perception as envisaging (without\nself-consciousness) that one immediate possibility of attainment which\nrepresents the closest analogy to its own immediate past, having regard\nto the actual aspects which are there for prehension. The laws of\nphysics represent the harmonised adjustment of development which results\nfrom this unique principle of determination. Thus dynamics is dominated\nby a principle of least action, whose detailed character has to be\nlearnt from observation.\n\nThe atomic material entities which are considered in physical science\nare merely these individual enduring entities, conceived in abstraction\nfrom everything except what concerns their mutual interplay in\ndetermining each other\u2019s historical routes of life-history. Such\nentities are partially formed by the inheritance of aspects from their\nown past. But they are also partially formed by the aspects of other\nevents forming their environments. The laws of physics are the laws\ndeclaring how the entities mutually react among themselves. For physics\nthese laws are arbitrary, because that science has abstracted from what\nthe entities are in themselves. We have seen that this fact of what the\nentities are in themselves is liable to modification by their\nenvironments. Accordingly, the assumption that no modification of these\nlaws is to be looked for in environments, which have any striking\ndifference from the environments for which the laws have been observed\nto hold, is very unsafe. The physical entities may be modified in very\nessential ways, so far as these laws are concerned. It is even possible\nthat they may be developed into individualities of more fundamental\ntypes, with wider embodiment of envisagement. Such envisagement might\nreach to the attainment of the poising of alternative values with\nexercise of choice lying outside the physical laws, and expressible only\nin terms of purpose. Apart from such remote possibilities, it remains an\nimmediate deduction that an individual entity, whose own life-history is\na part within the life-history of some larger, deeper, more complete\npattern, is liable to have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its\nown being, and to experience modifications of that larger pattern\nreflected in itself as modifications of its own being. This is the\ntheory of organic mechanism.\n\nAccording to this theory the evolution of laws of nature is concurrent\nwith the evolution of enduring pattern. For the general state of the\nuniverse, as it now is, partly determines the very essences of the\nentities whose modes of functioning these laws express. The general\nprinciple is that in a new environment there is an evolution of the old\nentities into new forms.\n\nThis rapid outline of a thoroughgoing organic theory of nature enables\nus to understand the chief requisites of the doctrine of evolution. The\nmain work, proceeding during this pause at the end of the nineteenth\ncentury, was the absorption of this doctrine as guiding the methodology\nof all branches of science. By a blindness which is almost judicial as\nbeing a penalty affixed to hasty, superficial thinking, many religious\nthinkers opposed the new doctrine; although, in truth, a thoroughgoing\nevolutionary philosophy is inconsistent with materialism. The aboriginal\nstuff, or material, from which a materialistic philosophy starts is\nincapable of evolution. This material is in itself the ultimate\nsubstance. Evolution, on the materialistic theory, is reduced to the\nr\u00f4le of being another word for the description of the changes of the\nexternal relations between portions of matter. There is nothing to\nevolve, because one set of external relations is as good as any other\nset of external relations. There can merely be change, purposeless and\nunprogressive. But the whole point of the modern doctrine is the\nevolution of the complex organisms from antecedent states of less\ncomplex organisms. The doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of\norganism as fundamental for nature. It also requires an underlying\nactivity\u2014a substantial activity\u2014expressing itself in individual\nembodiments, and evolving in achievements of organism. The organism is a\nunit of emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal\nobjects, emerging for its own sake.\n\nThus in the process of analysing the character of nature in itself, we\nfind that the emergence of organisms depends on a selective activity\nwhich is akin to purpose. The point is that the enduring organisms are\nnow the outcome of evolution; and that, beyond these organisms, there is\nnothing else that endures. On the materialistic theory, there is\nmaterial\u2014such as matter or electricity\u2014which endures. On the organic\ntheory, the only endurances are structures of activity, and the\nstructures are evolved.\n\nEnduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal process; whereas\neternal things are the elements required for the very being of the\nprocess. We can give a precise definition of endurance in this way: Let\nan event A be pervaded by an enduring structural pattern. Then A can be\nexhaustively subdivided into a temporal succession of events. Let B be\nany part of A, which is obtained by picking out any one of the events\nbelonging to a series which thus subdivides A. Then the enduring pattern\nis a pattern of aspects within the complete pattern prehended into the\nunity of A, and it is also a pattern within the complete pattern\nprehended into the unity of any temporal slice of A, such as B. For\nexample, a molecule is a pattern exhibited in an event of one minute,\nand of any second of that minute. It is obvious that such an enduring\npattern may be of more, or of less, importance. It may express some\nslight fact connecting the underlying activities thus individualised; or\nit may express some very close connection. If the pattern which endures\nis merely derived from the direct aspects of the external environment,\nmirrored in the standpoints of the various parts, then the endurance is\nan extrinsic fact of slight importance. But if the enduring pattern is\nwholly derived from the direct aspects of the various temporal sections\nof the event in question, then the endurance is an important intrinsic\nfact. It expresses a certain unity of character uniting the underlying\nindividualised activities. There is then an enduring object with a\ncertain unity for itself and for the rest of nature. Let us use the term\nphysical endurance to express endurance of this type. Then physical\nendurance is the process of continuously inheriting a certain identity\nof character transmitted throughout a historical route of events. This\ncharacter belongs to the whole route, and to every event of the route.\nThis is the exact property of material. If it has existed for ten\nminutes, it has existed during every minute of the ten minutes, and\nduring every second of every minute. Only if you take _material_ to be\nfundamental, this property of endurance is an arbitrary fact at the base\nof the order of nature; but if you take _organism_ to be fundamental,\nthis property is the result of evolution.\n\nIt looks at first sight, as if a physical object, with its process of\ninheritance from itself, were independent of the environment. But such a\nconclusion is not justified. For let B and C be two successive slices in\nthe life of such an object, such that C succeeds B. Then the enduring\npattern in C is inherited from B, and from other analogous antecedent\nparts of its life. It is transmitted through B to C. But what is\ntransmitted to C is the complete pattern of aspects derived from such\nevents as B. These complete patterns include the influence of the\nenvironment on B, and on the other antecedent parts of the life of the\nobject. Thus the complete aspects of the antecedent life are inherited\nas the partial pattern which endures throughout all the various periods\nof the life. Thus a favourable environment is essential to the\nmaintenance of a physical object.\n\nNature, as we know it, comprises enormous permanences. There are the\npermanences of ordinary matter. The molecules within the oldest rocks\nknown to geologists may have existed unchanged for over a thousand\nmillion years, not only unchanged in themselves, but unchanged in their\nrelative dispositions to each other. In that length of time the number\nof pulsations of a molecule vibrating with the frequency of yellow\nsodium light would be about 16.3 \u00d7 10^{22} = 163,000 \u00d7 (10^6)\u00b3. Until\nrecently, an atom was apparently indestructible. We know better now. But\nthe indestructible atom has been succeeded by the apparently\nindestructible electron and the indestructible proton.\n\nAnother fact to be explained is the great similarity of these\npractically indestructible objects. All electrons are very similar to\neach other. We need not outrun the evidence, and say that they are\nidentical; but our powers of observation cannot detect any differences.\nAnalogously, all hydrogen nuclei are alike. Also we note the great\nnumbers of these analogous objects. There are throngs of them. It seems\nas though a certain similarity were a favourable condition for\nendurance. Common sense also suggests this conclusion. If organisms are\nto survive, they must work together.\n\nAccordingly, the key to the mechanism of evolution is the necessity for\nthe evolution of a favourable environment, conjointly with the evolution\nof any specific type of enduring organisms of great permanence. Any\nphysical object which by its influence deteriorates its environment,\ncommits suicide.\n\nOne of the simplest ways of evolving a favourable environment\nconcurrently with the development of the individual organism, is that\nthe influence of each organism on the environment should be favourable\nto the _endurance_ of other organisms of the same type. Further, if the\norganism also favours the _development_ of other organisms of the same\ntype, you have then obtained a mechanism of evolution adapted to produce\nthe observed state of large multitudes of analogous entities, with high\npowers of endurance. For the environment automatically develops with the\nspecies, and the species with the environment.\n\nThe first question to ask is, whether there is any direct evidence for\nsuch a mechanism for the evolution of enduring organisms. In surveying\nnature, we must remember that there are not only basic organisms whose\ningredients are merely aspects of eternal objects. There are also\norganisms of organisms. Suppose for the moment and for the sake of\nsimplicity, we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and hydrogen\nnuclei are such basic organisms. Then the atoms, and the molecules, are\norganisms of a higher type, which also represent a compact definite\norganic unity. But when we come to the larger aggregations of matter,\nthe organic unity fades into the background. It appears to be but faint\nand elementary. It is there; but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It\nis a mere aggregation of effects. When we come to living beings, the\ndefiniteness of pattern is recovered, and the organic character again\nrises into prominence. Accordingly, the characteristic laws of inorganic\nmatter are mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused\naggregates. So far are they from throwing light on the ultimate nature\nof things, that they blur and obliterate the individual characters of\nthe individual organisms. If we wish to throw light upon the facts\nrelating to organisms, we must study either the individual molecules and\nelectrons, or the individual living beings. In between we find\ncomparative confusion. Now the difficulty of studying the individual\nmolecule is that we know so little about its life history. We cannot\nkeep an individual under continuous observation. In general, we deal\nwith them in large aggregates. So far as individuals are concerned,\nsometimes with difficulty a great experimenter throws, so to speak, a\nflash light on one of them, and just observes one type of instantaneous\neffect. Accordingly, the history of the functioning of individual\nmolecules, or electrons, is largely hidden from us.\n\nBut in the case of living beings, we can trace the history of\nindividuals. We now find exactly the mechanism which is here demanded.\nIn the first place, there is the propagation of the species from members\nof the same species. There is also the careful provision of the\nfavourable environment for the endurance of the family, the race, or the\nseed in the fruit.\n\nIt is evident, however, that I have explained the evolutionary mechanism\nin terms which are far too simple. We find associated species of living\nthings, providing for each other a favourable environment. Thus just as\nthe members of the same species mutually favour each other, so do\nmembers of associated species. We find the rudimentary fact of\nassociation in the existence of the two species, electrons and hydrogen\nnuclei. The simplicity of the dual association, and the apparent absence\nof competition from other antagonistic species accounts for the massive\nendurance which we find among them.\n\nThere are thus two sides to the machinery involved in the development of\nnature. On one side, there is a given environment with organisms\nadapting themselves to it. The scientific materialism of the epoch in\nquestion emphasised this aspect. From this point of view, there is a\ngiven amount of material, and only a limited number of organisms can\ntake advantage of it. The givenness of the environment dominates\neverything. Accordingly, the last words of science appeared to be the\nStruggle for Existence, and Natural Selection. Darwin\u2019s own writings are\nfor all time a model of refusal to go beyond the direct evidence, and of\ncareful retention of every possible hypothesis. But those virtues were\nnot so conspicuous in his followers, and still less in his\ncamp-followers. The imagination of European sociologists and publicists\nwas stained by exclusive attention to this aspect of conflicting\ninterests. The idea prevailed that there was a peculiar strong-minded\nrealism in discarding ethical considerations in the determination of the\nconduct of commercial and national interests.\n\nThe other side of the evolutionary machinery, the neglected side, is\nexpressed by the word _creativeness_. The organisms can create their own\nenvironment. For this purpose, the single organism is almost helpless.\nThe adequate forces require societies of co\u00f6perating organisms. But with\nsuch co\u00f6peration and in proportion to the effort put forward, the\nenvironment has a plasticity which alters the whole ethical aspect of\nevolution.\n\nIn the immediate past, and at present, a muddled state of mind is\nprevalent. The increased plasticity of the environment for mankind,\nresulting from the advances in scientific technology, is being construed\nin terms of habits of thought which find their justification in the\ntheory of a fixed environment.\n\nThe riddle of the universe is not so simple. There is the aspect of\npermanence in which a given type of attainment is endlessly repeated for\nits own sake; and there is the aspect of transition to other things,\u2014it\nmay be of higher worth, and it may be of lower worth. Also there are its\naspects of struggle and of friendly help. But romantic ruthlessness is\nno nearer to real politics, than is romantic self-abnegation.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER VII\n\n                               RELATIVITY\n\n\nIn the previous lectures of this course we have considered the\nantecedent conditions which led up to the scientific movement, and have\ntraced the progress of thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth\ncentury. In the nineteenth century this history falls into three parts,\nso far as it is to be grouped around science. These divisions are, the\ncontact between the romantic movement and science, the development of\ntechnology and physics in the earlier part of the century, and lastly\nthe theory of evolution combined with the general advance of the\nbiological sciences.\n\nThe dominating note of the whole period of three centuries is that the\ndoctrine of materialism afforded an adequate basis for the concepts of\nscience. It was practically unquestioned. When undulations were wanted,\nan ether was supplied, in order to perform the duties of an undulatory\nmaterial. To show the full assumption thus involved, I have sketched in\noutline an alternative doctrine of an organic theory of nature. In the\nlast lecture it was pointed out that the biological developments, the\ndoctrine of evolution, the doctrine of energy, and the molecular\ntheories were rapidly undermining the adequacy of the orthodox\nmaterialism. But until the close of the century no one drew that\nconclusion. Materialism reigned supreme.\n\nThe note of the present epoch is that so many complexities have\ndeveloped regarding material, space, time, and energy, that the simple\nsecurity of the old orthodox assumptions has vanished. It is obvious\nthat they will not do as Newton left them, or even as Clerk Maxwell left\nthem. There must be a reorganization. The new situation in the thought\nof to-day arises from the fact that scientific theory is outrunning\ncommon sense. The settlement as inherited by the eighteenth century was\na triumph of organised common sense. It had got rid of medieval\nphantasies, and of Cartesian vortices. As a result it gave full reign to\nits anti-rationalistic tendencies derived from the historical revolt of\nthe Reformation period. It grounded itself upon what every plain man\ncould see with his own eyes, or with a microscope of moderate power. It\nmeasured the obvious things to be measured, and it generalised the\nobvious things to be generalised. For example, it generalised the\nordinary notions of weight and massiveness. The eighteenth century\nopened with the quiet confidence that at last nonsense had been got rid\nof. To-day we are at the opposite pole of thought. Heaven knows what\nseeming nonsense may not to-morrow be demonstrated truth. We have\nrecaptured some of the tone of the early nineteenth century, only on a\nhigher imaginative level.\n\nThe reason why we are on a higher imaginative level is not because we\nhave finer imagination, but because we have better instruments. In\nscience, the most important thing that has happened during the last\nforty years is the advance in instrumental design. This advance is\npartly due to a few men of genius such as Michelson and the German\nopticians. It is also due to the progress of technological processes of\nmanufacture, particularly in the region of metallurgy. The designer has\nnow at his disposal a variety of material of differing physical\nproperties. He can thus depend upon obtaining the material he desires;\nand it can be ground to the shapes he desires, within very narrow limits\nof tolerance. These instruments have put thought onto a new level. A\nfresh instrument serves the same purpose as foreign travel; it shows\nthings in unusual combinations. The gain is more than a mere addition;\nit is a transformation. The advance in experimental ingenuity is,\nperhaps, also due to the larger proportion of national ability which now\nflows into scientific pursuits. Anyhow, whatever be the cause, subtle\nand ingenious experiments have abounded within the last generation. The\nresult is, that a great deal of information has been accumulated in\nregions of nature very far removed from the ordinary experience of\nmankind.\n\nTwo famous experiments, one devised by Galileo at the outset of the\nscientific movement, and the other by Michelson with the aid of his\nfamous interferometer, first carried out in 1881, and repeated in 1887\nand 1905, illustrate the assertions I have made. Galileo dropped heavy\nbodies from the top of the leaning tower of Pisa, and demonstrated that\nbodies of different weights, if released simultaneously, would reach the\nearth together. So far as experimental skill, and delicacy of apparatus\nwere concerned, this experiment could have been made at any time within\nthe preceding five thousand years. The ideas involved merely concerned\nweight and speed of travel, ideas which are familiar in ordinary life.\nThe whole set of ideas might have been familiar to the family of King\nMinos of Crete, as they dropped pebbles into the sea from high\nbattlements rising from the shore. We cannot too carefully realise that\nscience started with the organisation of ordinary experiences. It was in\nthis way that it coalesced so readily with the anti-rationalistic bias\nof the historical revolt. It was not asking for ultimate meanings. It\nconfined itself to investigating the connections regulating the\nsuccession of obvious occurrences.\n\nMichelson\u2019s experiment could not have been made earlier than it was. It\nrequired the general advance in technology, and Michelson\u2019s experimental\ngenius. It concerns the determination of the earth\u2019s motion through the\nether, and it assumes that light consists of waves of vibration\nadvancing at a fixed rate through the ether in any direction. Also, of\ncourse, the earth is moving through the ether, and Michelson\u2019s apparatus\nis moving with the earth. In the centre of the apparatus a ray of light\nis divided so that one half-ray goes in one direction _along_ the\napparatus through a given distance, and is reflected back to the centre\nby a mirror in the apparatus. The other half-ray goes the same distance\n_across_ the apparatus in a direction at right angles to the former ray,\nand it also is reflected back to the centre. These reunited rays are\nthen reflected onto a screen in the apparatus. If precautions are taken,\nyou will see interference bands; namely bands of blackness where the\ncrests of the waves of one ray have filled up the troughs of the other\nrays, owing to a minute difference in the lengths of paths of the two\nhalf-rays, up to certain parts of the screens. These differences in\nlength will be affected by the motion of the earth. For it is the\nlengths of the paths in the ether which count. Thus, since the apparatus\nis moving with the earth, the path of one half-ray will be disturbed by\nthe motion in a different manner from the path of the other half-ray.\nThink of yourself as moving in a railway carriage, first along the train\nand then across the train; and mark out your paths on the railway track\nwhich in this analogy corresponds to the ether. Now the motion of the\nearth is very slow compared to that of light. Thus in the analogy you\nmust think of the train almost at a standstill, and of yourself as\nmoving very quickly.\n\nIn the experiment this effect of the earth\u2019s motion would affect the\npositions on the screen of the interference bands. Also if you turn the\napparatus round, through a right-angle, the effect of the earth\u2019s motion\non the two half-rays will be interchanged, and the positions of the\ninterference bands would be shifted. We can calculate the small shift\nwhich should result owing to the earth\u2019s motion round the sun. Also to\nthis effect, we have to add that due to the sun\u2019s motion through the\nether. The delicacy of the instrument can be tested, and it can be\nproved that these effects of shifting are large enough to be observed by\nit. Now the point is, that nothing was observed. There was no shifting\nas you turned the instrument round.\n\nThe conclusion is either that the earth is always stationary in the\nether, or that there is something wrong with the fundamental principles\non which the interpretation of the experiment relies. It is obvious\nthat, in this experiment, we are very far away from the thoughts and the\ngames of the children of King Minos. The ideas of an ether, of waves in\nit, of interference, of the motion of the earth through the ether, and\nof Michelson\u2019s interferometer, are remote from ordinary experience. But\nremote as they are, they are simple and obvious compared to the accepted\nexplanation of the nugatory result of the experiment.\n\nThe ground of the explanation is that the ideas of space and of time\nemployed in science are too simple-minded, and must be modified. This\nconclusion is a direct challenge to common sense, because the earlier\nscience had only refined upon the ordinary notions of ordinary people.\nSuch a radical reorganization of ideas would not have been adopted,\nunless it had also been supported by many other observations which we\nneed not enter upon. Some form of the relativity theory seems to be the\nsimplest way of explaining a large number of facts which otherwise would\neach require some _ad hoc_ explanation. The theory, therefore, does not\nmerely depend upon the experiments which led to its origination.\n\nThe central point of the explanation is that every instrument, such as\nMichelson\u2019s apparatus as used in the experiment, necessarily records the\nvelocity of light as having one and the same definite speed relatively\nto it. I mean that an interferometer in a comet and an interferometer on\nthe earth would necessarily bring out the velocity of light, relatively\nto themselves, as at the same value. This is an obvious paradox, since\nthe light moves with a definite velocity through the ether. Accordingly\ntwo bodies, the earth and the comet, moving with unequal velocities\nthrough the ether, might be expected to have different velocities\nrelatively to rays of light. For example, consider two cars on a road,\nmoving at ten and twenty miles an hour respectively, and being passed by\nanother car at fifty miles an hour. The rapid car will pass one of the\ntwo cars at the relative velocity of forty miles per hour, and the other\nat the rate of thirty miles per hour. The allegation as to light is\nthat, if we substituted a ray of light for the rapid car, the velocity\nof the light along the roadway would be exactly the same as its velocity\nrelatively to either of the two cars which it overtakes. The velocity of\nlight is immensely large, being about three hundred thousand kilometres\nper second. We must have notions as to space and time such that just\nthis velocity has this peculiar character. It follows that all our\nnotions of relative velocity must be recast. But these notions are the\nimmediate outcome of our habitual notions as to space and time. So we\ncome back to the position, that there has been something overlooked in\nthe current expositions of what we mean by space and of what we mean by\ntime.\n\nNow our habitual fundamental assumption is that there is a unique\nmeaning to be given to space and a unique meaning to be given to time,\nso that whatever meaning is given to spatial relations in respect to the\ninstrument on the earth, the same meaning must be given to them in\nrespect to the instrument on the comet, and the same meaning for an\ninstrument at rest in the ether. In the theory of relativity, this is\ndenied. As far as concerns space, there is no difficulty in agreeing, if\nyou think of the obvious facts of relative motion. But even here the\nchange in meaning has to go further than would be sanctioned by common\nsense. Also the same demand is made for time; so that the relative\ndating of events and the lapses of time between them are to be reckoned\nas different for the instrument on the earth, for the instrument in the\ncomet, and for the instrument at rest in the ether. This is a greater\nstrain on our credulity. We need not probe the question further than the\nconclusion that for the earth and for the comet spatiality and\ntemporality are each to have different meanings amid different\nconditions, such as those presented by the earth and the comet.\nAccordingly velocity has different meanings for the two bodies. Thus the\nmodern scientific assumption is that if anything has the speed of light\nby reference to any one meaning of space and time, then it has the same\nspeed according to any other meaning of space and time.\n\nThis is a heavy blow at the classical scientific materialism, which\npresupposes a definite present instant at which all matter is\nsimultaneously real. In the modern theory there is no such unique\npresent instant. You can find a meaning for the notion of the\nsimultaneous instant throughout all nature, but it will be a different\nmeaning for different notions of temporality.\n\nThere has been a tendency to give an extreme subjectivist interpretation\nto this new doctrine. I mean that the relativity of space and time has\nbeen construed as though it were dependent on the choice of the\nobserver. It is perfectly legitimate to bring in the observer, if he\nfacilitates explanations. But it is the observer\u2019s body that we want,\nand not his mind. Even this body is only useful as an example of a very\nfamiliar form of apparatus. On the whole, it is better to concentrate\nattention on Michelson\u2019s interferometer, and to leave Michelson\u2019s body\nand Michelson\u2019s mind out of the picture. The question is, why did the\ninterferometer have black bands on its screen, and why did not these\nbands slightly shift as the instrument turned. The new relativity\nassociates space and time with an intimacy not hitherto contemplated;\nand presupposes that their separation in concrete fact can be achieved\nby alternative modes of abstraction, yielding alternative meanings. But\neach mode of abstraction is directing attention to something which is in\nnature; and thereby is isolating it for the purpose of contemplation.\nThe fact relevant to experiment, is the relevance of the interferometer\nto just one among the many alternative systems of these spatio-temporal\nrelations which hold between natural entities.\n\nWhat we must now ask of philosophy is to give us an interpretation of\nthe status in nature of space and time, so that the possibility of\nalternative meanings is preserved. These lectures are not suited for the\nelaboration of details; but there is no difficulty in pointing out where\nto look for the origin of the discrimination between space and time. I\nam presupposing the organic theory of nature, which I have outlined as a\nbasis for a thoroughgoing objectivism.\n\nAn event is the grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects. The\neffectiveness of an event beyond itself arises from the aspects of\nitself which go to form the prehended unities of other events. Except\nfor the systematic aspects of geometrical shape, this effectiveness is\ntrivial, if the mirrored pattern attaches merely to the event as one\nwhole. If the pattern endures throughout the successive parts of the\nevent, and also exhibits itself in the whole, so that the event is the\nlife history of the pattern, then in virtue of that enduring pattern the\nevent gains in external effectiveness. For its own effectiveness is\nre\u00ebnforced by the analogous aspects of all its successive parts. The\nevent constitutes a patterned value with a permanence inherent\nthroughout its own parts; and by reason of this inherent endurance the\nevent is important for the modification of its environment.\n\nIt is in this endurance of pattern that time differentiates itself from\nspace. The pattern is spatially _now_; and this temporal determination\nconstitutes its relation to each partial event. For it is reproduced in\nthis temporal succession of these spatial parts of its own life. I mean\nthat this particular rule of temporal order allows the pattern to be\nreproduced in each temporal slice of its history. So to speak, each\nenduring object discovers in nature and requires from nature a principle\ndiscriminating space from time. Apart from the fact of an enduring\npattern this principle might be there, but it would be latent and\ntrivial. Thus the importance of space as against time, and of time as\nagainst space, has developed with the development of enduring organisms.\nEnduring objects are significant of a differentiation of space from time\nin respect to the patterns ingredient within events; and conversely the\ndifferentiation of space from time in the patterns ingredient within\nevents expresses the patience of the community of events for enduring\nobjects. There might be the community without objects, but there could\nnot be the enduring objects without the community with its peculiar\npatience for them.\n\nIt is very necessary that this point should not be misunderstood.\nEndurance means that a pattern which is exhibited in the prehension of\none event is also exhibited in the prehension of those of its parts\nwhich are discriminated by a certain rule. It is not true that any part\nof the whole event will yield the same pattern as does the whole. For\nexample, consider the total bodily pattern exhibited in the life of a\nhuman body during one minute. One of the thumbs during the same minute\nis part of the whole bodily event. But the pattern of this part is the\npattern of the thumb, and is not the pattern of the whole body. Thus\nendurance requires a definite rule for obtaining the parts. In the above\nexample, we know at once what the rule is: You must take the life of the\nwhole body during any portion of that same minute; for example, during a\nsecond or a tenth of a second. In other words, the meaning of endurance\npresupposes a meaning for the lapse of time within the spatio-temporal\ncontinuum.\n\nThe question now arises whether all enduring objects discover the same\nprinciple of differentiation of space from time; or even whether at\ndifferent stages of its own life-history one object may not vary in its\nspatio-temporal discrimination. Up till a few years ago, everyone\nunhesitatingly assumed that there was only one such principle to be\ndiscovered. Accordingly, in dealing with one object, time would have\nexactly the same meaning in reference to endurance as in dealing with\nthe endurance of another object. It would also follow then that spatial\nrelations would have one unique meaning. But now it seems that the\nobserved effectiveness of objects can only be explained by assuming that\nobjects in a state of motion relatively to each other are utilising, for\ntheir endurance, meanings of space and of time which are not identical\nfrom one object to another. Every enduring object is to be conceived as\nat rest in its own proper space, and in motion throughout any space\ndefined in a way which is not that inherent in its peculiar endurance.\nIf two objects are mutually at rest, they are utilising the same\nmeanings of space and of time for the purposes of expressing their\nendurance; if in relative motion, the spaces and times differ. It\nfollows that, if we can conceive a body at one stage of its life history\nas in motion relatively to itself at another stage, then the body at\nthese two stages is utilising diverse meanings of space, and\ncorrelatively diverse meanings of time.\n\nIn an organic philosophy of nature there is nothing to decide between\nthe old hypothesis of the uniqueness of the time discrimination and the\nnew hypothesis of its multiplicity. It is purely a matter for evidence\ndrawn from observations.[5]\n\nFootnote 5:\n\n  _Cf._ my _Principles of Natural Knowledge_, Sec. 52:3.\n\nIn an earlier lecture, I said that an event had contemporaries. It is an\ninteresting question whether, on the new hypothesis, such a statement\ncan be made without the qualification of a reference to a definite\nspace-time system. It is possible to do so, in the sense that in _some_\ntime-system or other the two events are simultaneous. In other\ntime-systems the two contemporary events will not be simultaneous,\nthough they may overlap. Analogously one event will precede another\nwithout qualification, if in _every_ time-system this precedence occurs.\nIt is evident that if we start from a given event A, other events in\ngeneral are divided into two sets, namely, those which without\nqualification are contemporaneous with A and those which either precede\nor succeed A. But there will be a set left over, namely, those events\nwhich bound the two sets. There we have a critical case. You will\nremember that we have a critical velocity to account for, namely the\ntheoretical velocity of light _in vacuo_.[6] Also you will remember that\nthe utilisation of different spatio-temporal systems means the relative\nmotion of objects. When we analyse this critical relation of a special\nset of events to any given event A, we find the explanation of the\ncritical velocity which we require. I am suppressing all details. It is\nevident that exactness of statement must be introduced by the\nintroduction of points, and lines, and instants. Also that the origin of\ngeometry requires discussion; for example, the measurement of lengths,\nthe straightness of lines, and the flatness of planes, and\nperpendicularity. I have endeavoured to carry out these investigations\nin some earlier books, under the heading of the theory of extensive\nabstraction; but they are too technical for the present occasion.\n\nFootnote 6:\n\n  This is not the velocity of light in a gravitational field or in a\n  medium of molecules and electrons.\n\nIf there be no one definite meaning to the geometrical relations of\ndistance, it is evident that the law of gravitation needs restatement.\nFor the formula expressing that law is that two particles attract each\nother in proportion to the product of their masses and the inverse\nsquare of their distances. This enunciation tacitly assumes that there\nis one definite meaning to be ascribed to the instant at which the\nattraction is considered, and also one definite meaning to be ascribed\nto _distance_. But distance is a purely spatial notion, so that in the\nnew doctrine, there are an indefinite number of such meanings according\nto the space-time system which you adopt. If the two particles are\nrelatively at rest, then we might be content with the space-time systems\nwhich they are both utilising. Unfortunately this suggestion gives no\nhint as to procedure when they are not mutually at rest. It is,\ntherefore, necessary to reformulate the law in a way which does not\npresuppose any particular space-time system. Einstein has done this.\nNaturally the result is more complicated. He introduced into\nmathematical physics certain methods of pure mathematics which render\nthe formulae independent of the particular systems of measurement\nadopted. The new formula introduces various small effects which are\nabsent in Newton\u2019s law. But for the major effects Newton\u2019s law and\nEinstein\u2019s law agree. Now these extra effects of Einstein\u2019s law serve to\nexplain irregularities of the planet Mercury\u2019s orbit which by Newton\u2019s\nlaw were inexplicable. This is a strong confirmation of the new theory.\nCuriously enough, there is more than one alternative formula, based on\nthe new theory of multiple space-time systems, having the property of\nembodying Newton\u2019s law and in addition of explaining the peculiarities\nof Mercury\u2019s motion. The only method of selection between them is to\nwait for experimental evidence respecting those effects on which the\nformulae differ. Nature is probably quite indifferent to the aesthetic\npreferences of mathematicians.\n\nIt only remains to add that Einstein would probably reject the theory of\nmultiple space-time systems which I have been expounding to you. He\nwould interpret his formula in terms of contortions in space-time which\nalter the invariance theory for measure properties, and of the proper\ntimes of each historical route. His mode of statement has the greater\nmathematical simplicity, and only allows of one law of gravitation,\nexcluding the alternatives. But, for myself, I cannot reconcile it with\nthe given facts of our experience as to simultaneity, and spatial\narrangement. There are also other difficulties of a more abstract\ncharacter.\n\nThe theory of the relationship between events at which we have now\narrived is based first upon the doctrine that the relatednesses of an\nevent are all internal relations, so far as concerns that event, though\nnot necessarily so far as concerns the other relata. For example, the\neternal objects, thus involved, are externally related to events. This\ninternal relatedness is the reason why an event can be found only just\nwhere it is and how it is,\u2014that is to say, in just one definite set of\nrelationships. For each relationship enters into the essence of the\nevent; so that, apart from that relationship, the event would not be\nitself. This is what is meant by the very notion of internal relations.\nIt has been usual, indeed universal, to hold that spatio-temporal\nrelationships are external. This doctrine is what is here denied.\n\nThe conception of internal relatedness involves the analysis of the\nevent into two factors, one the underlying substantial activity of\nindividualisation, and the other the complex of aspects\u2014that is to say,\nthe complex of relatednesses as entering into the essence of the given\nevent\u2014which are unified by this individualised activity. In other words,\nthe concept of internal relations requires the concept of substance as\nthe activity synthesising the relationships into its emergent character.\nThe event is what it is, by reason of the unification in itself of a\nmultiplicity of relationships. The general scheme of these mutual\nrelationships is an abstraction which presupposes each event as an\nindependent entity, which it is not, and asks what remnant of these\nformative relationships is then left in the guise of external\nrelationships. The scheme of relationships as thus impartially expressed\nbecomes the scheme of a complex of events variously related as wholes to\nparts and as joint parts within some one whole. Even here, the internal\nrelationship forces itself on our attention; for the part evidently is\nconstitutive of the whole. Also an isolated event which has lost its\nstatus in any complex of events is equally excluded by the very nature\nof an event. So the whole is evidently constitutive of the part. Thus\nthe internal character of the relationship really shows through this\nimpartial scheme of abstract external relations.\n\nBut this exhibition of the actual universe as extensive and divisible\nhas left out the distinction between space and time. It has in fact left\nout the process of realisation, which is the adjustment of the synthetic\nactivities by virtue of which the various events become their realised\nselves. This adjustment is thus the adjustment of the underlying active\nsubstances whereby these substances exhibit themselves as the\nindividualisations or modes of Spinoza\u2019s one substance. This adjustment\nis what introduces temporal process.\n\nThus, in some sense, time, in its character of the adjustment of the\nprocess of synthetic realisation, extends beyond the spatio-temporal\ncontinuum of nature.[7] There is no necessity that temporal process, in\nthis sense, should be constituted by one single series of linear\nsuccession. Accordingly, in order to satisfy the present demands of\nscientific hypothesis, we introduce the metaphysical hypothesis that\nthis is not the case. We do assume (basing ourselves upon direct\nobservation), however, that temporal process of realisation can be\nanalysed into a group of linear serial processes. Each of these linear\nseries is a space-time system. In support of this assumption of definite\nserial processes, we appeal: (1) to the immediate presentation through\nthe senses of an extended universe beyond ourselves and _simultaneous_\nwith ourselves, (2) to the intellectual apprehension of a meaning to the\nquestion which asks what is _now immediately happening_ in regions\nbeyond the cognisance of our senses, (3) to the analysis of what is\ninvolved in the _endurance_ of emergent objects. This endurance of\nobjects involves the display of a pattern as now realised. This display\nis the display of a pattern as inherent in an event, but also as\nexhibiting a temporal slice of nature as lending aspects to eternal\nobjects (or, equally, of eternal objects as lending aspects to events).\nThe pattern is spatialised in a whole duration for the benefit of the\nevent into whose essence the pattern enters. The event is part of the\nduration, _i.e._, is part of what is exhibited in the aspects inherent\nin itself; and conversely the duration is the whole of nature\nsimultaneous with the event, in that sense of simultaneity. Thus an\nevent in realising itself displays a pattern, and this pattern requires\na definite duration determined by a definite meaning of simultaneity.\nEach such meaning of simultaneity relates the pattern as thus displayed\nto one definite space-time system. The actuality of the space-time\nsystems is constituted by the realisation of pattern; but it is inherent\nin the general scheme of events as constituting its patience for the\ntemporal process of realisation.\n\nFootnote 7:\n\n  _Cf._ my _Concept of Nature_, Ch. III.\n\nNotice that the pattern requires a duration involving a definite lapse\nof time, and not merely an instantaneous moment. Such a moment is more\nabstract, in that it merely denotes a certain relation of contiguity\nbetween the concrete events. Thus a duration is spatialised; and by\n\u2018spatialised\u2019 is meant that the duration is the field for the realised\npattern constituting the character of the event. A duration, as the\nfield of the pattern realised in the actualisation of one of its\ncontained events, is an epoch, _i.e._, an arrest. Endurance is the\nrepetition of the pattern in successive events. Thus endurance requires\na succession of durations, each exhibiting the pattern. In this account\n\u2018time\u2019 has been separated from \u2018extension\u2019 and from the \u2018divisibility\u2019\nwhich arises from the character of spatio-temporal extension\u2019.\nAccordingly we must not proceed to conceive time as another form of\nextensiveness. Time is sheer succession of epochal durations. But the\nentities which succeed each other in this account are durations. The\nduration is that which is required for the realisation of a pattern in\nthe given event. Thus the divisibility and extensiveness is within the\ngiven duration. The epochal duration is not realised _via_ its\n_successive_ divisible parts, but is given _with_ its parts. In this\nway, the objection which Zeno might make to the joint validity of two\npassages from Kant\u2019s _Critique of Pure Reason_ is met by abandoning the\nearlier of the two passages. I refer to passages from the section \u2018Of\nthe Axioms of Intuition\u2019; the earlier from the subsection on _Extensive\nQuantity_, and the latter from the subsection on _Intensive Quantity_\nwhere considerations respecting quantity in general, extensive and\nintensive, are summed up. The earlier passage runs thus:[8]\n\nFootnote 8:\n\n  Max M\u00fcller\u2019s translation.\n\n\u201cI call an extensive quantity that in which the representation of the\nwhole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts, _and\ntherefore necessarily preceded by it_.[9] I cannot represent to myself\nany line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that\nis, without producing all its parts one after the other, starting from a\ngiven point, and thus, first of all, drawing its intuition. The same\napplies to every, even the smallest portion of time. I can only think in\nit the successive progress from one moment to another, thus producing in\nthe end, by all the portions of time, and their addition, a definite\nquantity of time.\u201d\n\nFootnote 9:\n\n  Italics mine, and also in the second passage.\n\nThe second passage runs thus:\n\n\u201cThis peculiar property of quantities that no part of them is the\nsmallest possible part (no part indivisible) is called continuity. Time\nand space are quanta continua, because there is no part of them that is\nnot enclosed between limits (points and moments), _no part that is not\nitself again a space or a time. Space consists of spaces only, time of\ntimes. Points and moments are only limits_, mere places of limitation,\nand as places _presupposing always_ those intuitions which they are\nmeant to limit or to determine. Mere places or parts that might be given\nbefore space or time, could never be compounded into space or time.\u201d\n\nI am in complete agreement with the second extract if \u2018time and space\u2019\nis the extensive continuum; but it is inconsistent with its predecessor.\nFor Zeno would object that a vicious infinite regress is involved. Every\npart of time involves some smaller part of itself, and so on. Also this\nseries regresses backwards ultimately to nothing; since the initial\nmoment is without duration and merely marks the relation of contiguity\nto an earlier time. Thus time is impossible, if the two extracts are\nboth adhered to. I accept the later, and reject the earlier, passage.\nRealisation is the becoming of time in the field of extension. Extension\nis the complex of events, _qu\u00e2_ their potentialities. In realisation the\npotentiality becomes actuality. But the potential pattern requires a\nduration; and the duration must be exhibited as an epochal whole, by the\nrealisation of the pattern. Thus time is the succession of elements in\nthemselves divisible and contiguous. A duration, in becoming temporal,\nthereby incurs realisation in respect to some enduring object.\nTemporalisation is realisation. Temporalisation is not another\ncontinuous process. It is an atomic succession. Thus time is atomic\n(_i.e._, epochal), though what is temporalised is divisible. This\ndoctrine follows from the doctrine of events, and of the nature of\nenduring objects. In the next chapter we must consider its relevance to\nthe quantum theory of recent science.\n\nIt is to be noted that this doctrine of the epochal character of time\ndoes not depend on the modern doctrine of relativity, and holds\nequally\u2014and indeed, more simply\u2014if this doctrine be abandoned. It does\ndepend on the analysis of the intrinsic character of an event,\nconsidered as the most concrete finite entity.\n\nIn reviewing this argument, note first that the second quotation from\nKant, on which it is based, does not depend on any peculiar Kantian\ndoctrine. The latter of the two is in agreement with Plato as against\nAristotle.[10] In the second place, the argument assumes that Zeno\nunderstated his argument. He should have urged it against the current\nnotion of time in itself, and not against motion, which involves\nrelations between time and space. For, what becomes has duration. But no\nduration can become until a smaller duration (part of the former) has\nantecedently come into being [Kant\u2019s earlier statement]. The same\nargument applies to this smaller duration, and so on. Also the infinite\nregress of these durations converges to nothing\u2014and even on the\nAristotelian view there is no first moment. Accordingly time would be an\nirrational notion. Thirdly, in the epochal theory Zeno\u2019s difficulty is\nmet by conceiving temporalisation as the realisation of a complete\norganism. This organism is an event holding in its essence its\nspatio-temporal relationships (both within itself, and beyond itself)\nthroughout the spatio-temporal continuum.\n\nFootnote 10:\n\n  _Cf._ \u2018Euclid in Greek,\u2019 by Sir T. L. Heath, Camb. Univ. Press, in a\n  note on Points.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER VIII\n\n                           THE QUANTUM THEORY\n\n\nThe theory of relativity has justly excited a great amount of public\nattention. But, for all its importance, it has not been the topic which\nhas chiefly absorbed the recent interest of physicists. Without question\nthat position is held by the quantum theory. The point of interest in\nthis theory is that, according to it, some effects which appear\nessentially capable of gradual increase or gradual diminution are in\nreality to be increased or decreased only by certain definite jumps. It\nis as though you could walk at three miles per hour or at four miles per\nhour, but not at three and a half miles per hour.\n\nThe effects in question are concerned with the radiation of light from a\nmolecule which has been excited by some collision. Light consists of\nwaves of vibration in the electromagnetic field. After a complete wave\nhas passed a given point everything at that point is restored to its\noriginal state and is ready for the next wave which follows on. Picture\nto yourselves the waves on the ocean, and reckon from crest to crest of\nsuccessive waves. The number of waves which pass a given point in one\nsecond is called the frequency of that system of waves. A system of\nlight-waves of definite frequency corresponds to a definite colour in\nthe spectrum. Now a molecule, when excited, vibrates with a certain\nnumber of definite frequencies. In other words, there are a definite set\nof modes of vibration of the molecule, and each mode of vibration has\none definite frequency. Each mode of vibration can stir up in the\nelectromagnetic field waves of its own frequency. These waves carry away\nthe energy of the vibration; so that finally (when such waves are in\nbeing) the molecule loses the energy of its excitement and the waves\ncease. Thus a molecule can radiate light of certain definite colours,\nthat is to say, of certain definite frequencies.\n\nYou would think that each mode of vibration could be excited to any\nintensity, so that the energy carried away by light of that frequency\ncould be of any amount. But this is not the case. There appear to be\ncertain minimum amounts of energy which cannot be subdivided. The case\nis analogous to that of a citizen of the United States who, in paying\nhis debts in the currency of his country, cannot subdivide a cent so as\nto correspond to some minute subdivision of the goods obtained. The cent\ncorresponds to the minimum quantity of the light energy, and the goods\nobtained correspond to the energy of the exciting cause. This exciting\ncause is either strong enough to procure the emission of one cent of\nenergy, or fails to procure the emission of any energy whatsoever. In\nany case the molecule will only emit an integral number of cents of\nenergy. There is a further peculiarity which we can illustrate by\nbringing an Englishman onto the scene. He pays his debts in English\ncurrency, and his smallest unit is a farthing which differs in value\nfrom the cent. The farthing is in fact about half a cent, to a very\nrough approximation. In the molecule, different modes of vibration have\ndifferent frequencies. Compare each mode to a nation. One mode\ncorresponds to the United States, and another mode corresponds to\nEngland. One mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number of\ncents, so that a cent of energy is the least it can pay out; whereas the\nother mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number of\nfarthings, so that a farthing of energy is the least that it can pay\nout. Also a rule can be found to tell us the relative value of the cent\nof energy of one mode to the farthing of energy of another mode. The\nrule is childishly simple: Each smallest coin of energy has a value in\nstrict proportion to the frequency belonging to that mode. By this rule,\nand comparing farthings with cents, the frequency of an American would\nbe about twice that of an Englishman. In other words, the American would\ndo about twice as many things in a second as an Englishman. I must leave\nyou to judge whether this corresponds to the reputed characters of the\ntwo nations. Also I suggest that there are merits attaching to both ends\nof the solar spectrum. Sometimes you want red light and sometimes violet\nlight.\n\nThere has been, I hope, no great difficulty in comprehending what the\nquantum theory asserts about molecules. The perplexity arises from the\neffort to fit the theory into the current scientific picture of what is\ngoing on in the molecule or atom.\n\nIt has been the basis of the materialistic theory, that the happenings\nof nature are to be explained in terms of the locomotion of material. In\naccordance with this principle, the waves of light were explained in\nterms of the locomotion of a material ether, and the internal happenings\nof a molecule are now explained in terms of the locomotion of separate\nmaterial parts. In respect to waves of light, the material ether has\nretreated to an indeterminate position in the background, and is rarely\ntalked about. But the principle is unquestioned as regards its\napplication to the atom. For example a neutral hydrogen atom is assumed\nto consist of at least two lumps of material; one lump is the nucleus\nconsisting of a material called positive electricity, and the other is a\nsingle electron which is negative electricity. The nucleus shows signs\nof being complex, and of being subdivisible into smaller lumps, some of\npositive electricity and others electronic. The assumption is, that\nwhatever vibration takes place in the atom is to be attributed to the\nvibratory locomotion of some bit of material, detachable from the\nremainder. The difficulty with the quantum theory is that, on this\nhypothesis, we have to picture the atom as providing a limited number of\ndefinite grooves, which are the sole tracks along which vibration can\ntake place, whereas the classical scientific picture provides none of\nthese grooves. The quantum theory wants trolley-cars with a limited\nnumber of routes, and the scientific picture provides horses galloping\nover prairies. The result is that the physical doctrine of the atom has\ngot into a state which is strongly suggestive of the epicycles of\nastronomy before Copernicus.\n\nOn the organic theory of nature there are two sorts of vibrations which\nradically differ from each other. There is vibratory locomotion, and\nthere is vibratory organic deformation; and the conditions for the two\ntypes of change are of a different character. In other words, there is\nvibratory locomotion of a given pattern as one whole, and there is\nvibratory change of pattern.\n\nA complete organism in the organic theory is what corresponds to a bit\nof material on the materialistic theory. There will be a primary genus,\ncomprising a number of species of organisms, such that each primary\norganism, belonging to a species of the primary genus, is not\ndecomposable into subordinate organisms. I will call any organism of the\nprimary genus a primate. There may be different species of primates.\n\nIt must be kept in mind that we are dealing with the abstractions of\nphysics. Accordingly, we are not thinking of what a primate is in\nitself, as a pattern arising from the prehension of the concrete\naspects; nor are we thinking of what a primate is for its environment,\nin respect to its concrete aspects prehended therein. We are thinking of\nthese various aspects merely in so far as their effects on patterns and\non locomotion are expressible in spatio-temporal terms. Accordingly, in\nthe language of physics, the aspects of a primate are merely its\ncontributions to the electromagnetic field. This is in fact exactly what\nwe know of electrons and protons. An electron for us is merely the\npattern of its aspects in its environment, so far as those aspects are\nrelevant to the electromagnetic field.\n\nNow in discussing the theory of relativity, we saw that the relative\nmotion of two primates means simply that their organic patterns are\nutilising diverse space-time systems. If two primates do not continue\neither mutually at rest, or mutually in uniform relative motion, at\nleast one of them is changing its intrinsic space-time system. The laws\nof motion express the conditions under which these changes of space-time\nsystems are effected. The conditions for vibratory _locomotion_ are\nfounded upon these general laws of motion.\n\nBut it is possible that certain species of primates are apt to go to\npieces under conditions which lead them to effect changes of space-time\nsystems. Such species would only experience a long range of endurance,\nif they had succeeded in forming a favourable association among primates\nof different species, such that in this association the tendency to\ncollapse is neutralised by the environment of the association. We can\nimagine the atomic nucleus as composed of a large number of primates of\ndiffering species, and perhaps with many primates of the same species,\nthe whole association being such as to favour stability. An example of\nsuch an association is afforded by the association of a positive nucleus\nwith negative electrons to obtain a neutral atom. The neutral atom is\nthereby shielded from any electric field which would otherwise produce\nchanges in the space-time system of the atom.\n\nThe requirements of physics now suggest an idea which is very consonant\nwith the organic philosophical theory. I put it in the form of a\nquestion: Has our organic theory of endurance been tainted by the\nmaterialistic theory in so far as it assumes without question that\nendurance must mean undifferentiated sameness throughout the\nlife-history concerned? Perhaps you noticed that (in a previous chapter)\nI used the word \u2018reiteration\u2019 as a synonym of \u2018endurance.\u2019 It obviously\nis not quite synonymous in its meaning; and now I want to suggest that\n_reiteration_ where it differs from _endurance_ is more nearly what the\norganic theory requires. The difference is very analogous to that\nbetween the Galileans and the Aristotelians: Aristotle said \u2018rest\u2019 where\nGalileo added \u2018or uniform motion in a straight line.\u2019 Thus in the\norganic theory, a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated sameness\nthrough time. The pattern may be essentially one of aesthetic contrasts\nrequiring a lapse of time for its unfolding. A tune is an example of\nsuch a pattern. Thus the endurance of the pattern now means the\nreiteration of its succession of contrasts. This is obviously the most\ngeneral notion of endurance on the organic theory, and \u2018reiteration\u2019 is\nperhaps the word which expresses it with most directness. But when we\ntranslate this notion into the abstractions of physics, it at once\nbecomes the technical notion of \u2018vibration.\u2019 This vibration is not the\nvibratory locomotion: it is the vibration of organic deformation. There\nare certain indications in modern physics that for the r\u00f4le of\ncorpuscular organisms at the base of the physical field, we require\nvibratory entities. Such corpuscles would be the corpuscles detected as\nexpelled from the nuclei of atoms, which then dissolve into waves of\nlight. We may conjecture that such a corpuscular body has no great\nstability of endurance, when in isolation. Accordingly, an unfavourable\nenvironment leading to rapid changes in its proper space-time system,\nthat is to say, an environment jolting it into violent accelerations,\ncauses the corpuscles to go to pieces and dissolve into light-waves of\nthe same period of vibration.\n\nA proton, and perhaps an electron, would be an association of such\nprimates, superposed on each other, with their frequencies and spatial\ndimensions so arranged as to promote the stability of the complex\norganism, when jolted into accelerations of locomotion. The conditions\nfor stability would give the associations of periods possible for\nprotons. The expulsion of a primate would come from a jolt which leads\nthe proton either to settle down into an alternative association, or to\ngenerate a new primate by the aid of the energy received.\n\nA primate must be associated with a definite frequency of vibratory\norganic deformation so that when it goes to pieces it dissolves into\nlight waves of the same frequency, which then carry off all its average\nenergy. It is quite easy (as a particular hypothesis) to imagine\nstationary vibrations of the electromagnetic field of definite\nfrequency, and directed radially to and from a centre, which, in\naccordance with the accepted electromagnetic laws, would consist of a\nvibratory spherical nucleus satisfying one set of conditions and a\nvibratory external field satisfying another set of conditions. This is\nan example of vibratory organic deformation. Further [on this particular\nhypothesis], there are two ways of determining the subsidiary conditions\nso as to satisfy the ordinary requirements of mathematical physics. The\ntotal energy, according to one of these ways, would satisfy the quantum\ncondition; so that it consists of an integral number of units or cents,\nwhich are such that the cent of energy of any primate is proportional to\nits frequency. I have not worked out the conditions for stability or for\na stable association. I have mentioned the particular hypothesis by way\nof showing by example that the organic theory of nature affords\npossibilities for the reconsideration of ultimate physical laws, which\nare not open to the opposed materialistic theory.\n\nIn this particular hypothesis of vibratory primates, the Maxwellian\nequations are supposed to hold throughout all space, including the\ninterior of a proton. They express the laws governing the vibratory\nproduction and absorption of energy. The whole process for each primate\nissues in a certain average energy characteristic of the primate, and\nproportional to its mass. In fact the energy is the mass. There are\nvibratory radial streams of energy, both without and within a primate.\nWithin the primate, there are vibratory distributions of electric\ndensity. On the materialistic theory such density marks the presence of\nmaterial: on the organic theory of vibration, it marks the vibratory\nproduction of energy. Such production is restricted to the interior of\nthe primate.\n\nAll science must start with some assumptions as to the ultimate analysis\nof the facts with which it deals. These assumptions are justified partly\nby their adherence to the types of occurrence of which we are directly\nconscious, and partly by their success in representing the observed\nfacts with a certain generality, devoid of _ad hoc_ suppositions. The\ngeneral theory of the vibration of primates, which I have outlined, is\nmerely given as an example of the sort of possibilities which the\norganic theory leaves open for physical science. The point is that it\nadds the possibility of organic deformation to that of mere locomotion.\nLight waves form one great example of organic deformation.\n\nAt any epoch the assumptions of a science are giving way, when they\nexhibit symptoms of the epicyclic state from which astronomy was rescued\nin the sixteenth century. Physical science is now exhibiting such\nsymptoms. In order to reconsider its foundations, it must recur to a\nmore concrete view of the character of real things, and must conceive\nits fundamental notions as abstractions derived from this direct\nintuition. It is in this way that it surveys the general possibilities\nof revision which are open to it.\n\nThe discontinuities introduced by the quantum theory require revision of\nphysical concepts in order to meet them. In particular, it has been\npointed out that some theory of discontinuous existence is required.\nWhat is asked from such a theory, is that an orbit of an electron can be\nregarded as a series of detached positions, and not as a continuous\nline.\n\nThe theory of a primate or a vibrating pattern, given above, together\nwith the distinction between temporality and extensiveness in the\nprevious chapter, yields exactly this result. It will be remembered that\nthe continuity of the complex of events arises from the relationships of\nextensiveness; whereas the temporality arises from the realisation in a\nsubject-event of a pattern which requires for its display that the whole\nof a duration be spatialised (_i.e._, arrested), as given by its aspects\nin the event. Thus realization proceeds _vi\u00e2_ a succession of epochal\ndurations; and the continuous transition, _i.e._, the organic\ndeformation, is within the duration which is already given. The\nvibratory organic deformation is in fact the reiteration of the pattern.\nOne complete period defines the duration required for the complete\npattern. Thus the primate is realised atomically in a succession of\ndurations, each duration to be measured from one maximum to another.\nAccordingly, so far as the primate as one enduring whole entity is to be\ntaken account of, it is to be assigned to these durations successively.\nIf it is considered as one thing, its orbit is to be diagrammatically\nexhibited by a series of detached dots. Thus the locomotion of the\nprimate is discontinuous in space and time. If we go below the quanta of\ntime which are the successive vibratory periods of the primate, we find\na succession of vibratory electromagnetic fields, each stationary in the\nspace-time of its own duration. Each of these fields exhibits a single\ncomplete period of the electromagnetic vibration which constitutes the\nprimate. This vibration is not to be thought of as the becoming of\nreality; it is what the primate is in one of its discontinuous\nrealisations. Also the successive durations in which the primate is\nrealised are contiguous; it follows that the life history of the primate\ncan be exhibited as being the continuous development of occurrences in\nthe electromagnetic field. But these occurrences enter into realisation\nas whole atomic blocks, occupying definite periods of time.\n\nThere is no need to conceive that time is atomic in the sense that all\npatterns must be realised in the same successive durations. In the first\nplace, even if the periods were the same in the case of two primates,\nthe durations of realisation may not be the same. In other words, the\ntwo primates may be out of phase. Also if the periods are different, the\natomism of any one duration of one primate is necessarily subdivided by\nthe boundary moments of durations of the other primate.\n\nThe laws of the locomotion of primates express under what conditions any\nprimate will change its space-time system.\n\nIt is unnecessary to pursue this conception further. The justification\nof the concept of vibratory existence must be purely experimental. The\npoint illustrated by this example is that the cosmological outlook,\nwhich is here adopted, is perfectly consistent with the demands for\ndiscontinuity which have been urged from the side of physics. Also if\nthis concept of temporalisation as a successive realisation of epochal\ndurations be adopted, the difficulty of Zeno is evaded. The particular\nform, which has been given here to this concept, is purely for that\npurpose of illustration and must necessarily require recasting before it\ncan be adapted to the results of experimental physics.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER IX\n\n                         SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nIn the present lecture, it is my object to consider some reactions of\nscience upon the stream of philosophic thought during the modern\ncenturies with which we are concerned. I shall make no attempt to\ncompress a history of modern philosophy within the limits of one\nlecture. We shall merely consider some contacts between science and\nphilosophy, in so far as they lie within the scheme of thought which it\nis the purpose of these lectures to develop. For this reason the whole\nof the great German idealistic movement will be ignored, as being out of\neffective touch with its contemporary science so far as reciprocal\nmodification of concepts is concerned. Kant, from whom this movement\ntook its rise, was saturated with Newtonian physics, and with the ideas\nof the great French physicists\u2014such as Clairaut,[11] for instance\u2014who\ndeveloped the Newtonian ideas. But the philosophers who developed the\nKantian school of thought, or who transformed it into Hegelianism,\neither lacked Kant\u2019s background of scientific knowledge, or lacked his\npotentiality of becoming a great physicist if philosophy had not\nabsorbed his main energies.\n\nFootnote 11:\n\n  _Cf._ the curious evidence of Kant\u2019s scientific reading in the\n  _Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Second Analogy of\n  Experience_, where he refers to the phenomenon of capillary action.\n  This is an unnecessarily complex illustration; a book resting on a\n  table would have equally well sufficed. But the subject had just been\n  adequately treated for the first time by Clairaut in an appendix to\n  his _Figure of the Earth_. Kant evidently had read this appendix, and\n  his mind was full of it.\n\nThe origin of modern philosophy is analogous to that of science, and is\ncontemporaneous. The general trend of its development was settled in the\nseventeenth century, partly at the hands of the same men who established\nthe scientific principles. This settlement of purpose followed upon a\ntransitional period dating from the fifteenth century. There was in fact\na general movement of European mentality, which carried along with its\nstream, religion, science and philosophy. It may shortly be\ncharacterised as being the direct recurrence to the original sources of\nGreek inspiration on the part of men whose spiritual shape had been\nderived from inheritance from the Middle Ages. There was therefore no\nrevival of Greek mentality. Epochs do not rise from the dead. The\nprinciples of aesthetics and of reason, which animated the Greek\ncivilisation, were reclothed in a modern mentality. Between the two\nthere lay other religions, other systems of law, other anarchies, and\nother racial inheritances, dividing the living from the dead.\n\nPhilosophy is peculiarly sensitive to such differences. For, whereas you\ncan make a replica of an ancient statue, there is no possible replica of\nan ancient state of mind. There can be no nearer approximation than that\nwhich a masquerade bears to real life. There may be understanding of the\npast, but there is a difference between the modern and the ancient\nreactions to the same stimuli.\n\nIn the particular case of philosophy, the distinction in tonality lies\non the surface. Modern philosophy is tinged with subjectivism, as\nagainst the objective attitude of the ancients. The same change is to be\nseen in religion. In the early history of the Christian Church, the\ntheological interest centred in discussions on the nature of God, the\nmeaning of the Incarnation, and apocalyptic forecasts of the ultimate\nfate of the world. At the Reformation, the Church was torn asunder by\ndissension as to the individual experiences of believers in respect to\njustification. The individual subject of experience had been substituted\nfor the total drama of all reality. Luther asked, \u2018How am I justified?\u2019;\nmodern philosophers have asked, \u2018How do I have knowledge?\u2019 The emphasis\nlies upon the subject of experience. This change of standpoint is the\nwork of Christianity in its pastoral aspect of shepherding the company\nof believers. For century after century it insisted upon the infinite\nworth of the individual human soul. Accordingly, to the instinctive\negotism of physical desires, it has superadded an instinctive feeling of\njustification for an egotism of intellectual outlook. Every human being\nis the natural guardian of his own importance. Without a doubt, this\nmodern direction of attention emphasises truths of the highest value.\nFor example, in the field of practical life, it has abolished slavery,\nand has impressed upon the popular imagination the primary rights of\nmankind.\n\nDescartes, in his _Discourse on Method_, and in his _Meditations_,\ndiscloses with great clearness the general conceptions which have since\ninfluenced modern philosophy. There is a subject receiving experience:\nin the _Discourse_ this subject is always mentioned in the first person,\nthat is to say, as being Descartes himself. Descartes starts with\nhimself as being a mentality, which in virtue of its consciousness of\nits own inherent presentations of sense and of thought, is thereby\nconscious of its own existence as a unit entity. The subsequent history\nof philosophy revolves round the Cartesian formulation of the primary\ndatum. The ancient world takes its stand upon the drama of the Universe,\nthe modern world upon the inward drama of the Soul. Descartes, in his\n_Meditations_, expressly grounds the existence of this inward drama upon\nthe possibility of error. There may be no correspondence with objective\nfact, and thus there must be a soul with activities whose reality is\npurely derivative from itself. For example, here is a quotation[12] from\n_Meditation II_: \u201cBut it will be said that these presentations are\nfalse, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At all events it is certain\nthat I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be\nfalse, and this is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire),\nwhich is nothing else than thinking. From this I begin to know what I am\nwith somewhat greater clearness and distinctness than heretofore.\u201d Again\nin _Meditation III_: \u201c...; for, as I before remarked, although the\nthings which I perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from\nme, I am nevertheless assured that those modes of consciousness which I\ncall perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as they are modes of\nconsciousness, exist in me.\u201d\n\nFootnote 12:\n\n  Quoted from Veitch\u2019s translation.\n\nThe objectivism of the medieval and the ancient worlds passed over into\nscience. Nature is there conceived as for itself, with its own mutual\nreactions. Under the recent influence of relativity, there has been a\ntendency towards subjectivist formulations. But, apart from this recent\nexception, nature, in scientific thought, has had its laws formulated\nwithout any reference to dependence on individual observers. There is,\nhowever, this difference between the older and the later attitudes\ntowards science. The anti-rationalism of the moderns has checked any\nattempt to harmonise the ultimate concepts of science with ideas drawn\nfrom a more concrete survey of the whole of reality. The material, the\nspace, the time, the various laws concerning the transition of material\nconfigurations, are taken as ultimate stubborn facts, not to be tampered\nwith.\n\nThe effect of this antagonism to philosophy has been equally unfortunate\nboth for philosophy and for science. In this lecture we are concerned\nwith philosophy. Philosophers are rationalists. They are seeking to go\nbehind stubborn and irreducible facts: they wish to explain in the light\nof universal principles the mutual reference between the various details\nentering into the flux of things. Also, they seek such principles as\nwill eliminate mere arbitrariness; so that, whatever portion of fact is\nassumed or given, the existence of the remainder of things shall satisfy\nsome demand of rationality. They demand meaning. In the words of Henry\nSidgwick[13]\u2014\u201cIt is the primary aim of philosophy to unify completely,\nbring into clear coherence, all departments of rational thought, and\nthis aim cannot be realised by any philosophy that leaves out of its\nview the important body of judgments and reasonings which form the\nsubject matter of ethics.\u201d Accordingly, the bias towards history on the\npart of the physical and social sciences with their refusal to\nrationalise below some ultimate mechanism, has pushed philosophy out of\nthe effective currents of modern life. It has lost its proper r\u00f4le as a\nconstant critic of partial formulations. It has retreated into the\nsubjectivist sphere of mind, by reason of its expulsion by science from\nthe objectivist sphere of matter. Thus the evolution of thought in the\nseventeenth century co\u00f6perated with the enhanced sense of individual\npersonality derived from the Middle Ages. We see Descartes taking his\nstand upon his own ultimate mind, which his philosophy assures him of;\nand asking about its relations to the ultimate matter\u2014exemplified, in\nthe second _Meditation_, by the human body and a lump of wax\u2014which his\nscience assumes. There is Aaron\u2019s rod, and the magicians\u2019 serpents; and\nthe only question for philosophy is, which swallows which; or whether,\nas Descartes thought, they all lived happily together. In this stream of\nthought are to be found Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. Two great names lie\noutside this list, Spinoza and Leibniz. But there is a certain isolation\nof both of them in respect to their philosophical influence so far as\nscience is concerned; as though they had strayed to extremes which lie\noutside the boundaries of safe philosophy, Spinoza by retaining older\nways of thought, and Leibniz by the novelty of his monads.\n\nFootnote 13:\n\n  _Cf._ _Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir_, Appendix I.\n\nThe history of philosophy runs curiously parallel to that of science. In\nthe case of both, the seventeenth century set the stage for its two\nsuccessors. But with the twentieth century a new act commences. It is an\nexaggeration to attribute a general change in a climate of thought to\nany one piece of writing, or to any one author. No doubt Descartes only\nexpressed definitely and in decisive form what was already in the air of\nhis period. Analogously, in attributing to William James the\ninauguration of a new stage in philosophy, we should be neglecting other\ninfluences of his time. But, admitting this, there still remains a\ncertain fitness in contrasting his essay, _Does Consciousness Exist_,\npublished in 1904, with Descartes\u2019 _Discourse on Method_, published in\n1637. James clears the stage of the old paraphernalia; or rather he\nentirely alters its lighting. Take for example these two sentences from\nhis essay: \u201cTo deny plumply that \u2018consciousness\u2019 exists seems so absurd\non the face of it\u2014for undeniably \u2018thoughts\u2019 do exist\u2014that I fear some\nreaders will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that\nI mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist\nmost emphatically that it does stand for a function.\u201d\n\nThe scientific materialism and the Cartesian Ego were both challenged at\nthe same moment, one by science and the other by philosophy, as\nrepresented by William James with his psychological antecedents; and the\ndouble challenge marks the end of a period which lasted for about two\nhundred and fifty years. Of course, \u2018matter\u2019 and \u2018consciousness\u2019 both\nexpress something so evident in ordinary experience that any philosophy\nmust provide some things which answer to their respective meanings. But\nthe point is that, in respect to both of them, the seventeenth century\nsettlement was infected with a presupposition which is now challenged.\nJames denies that consciousness is an entity, but admits that it is a\nfunction. The discrimination between an entity and a function is\ntherefore vital to the understanding of the challenge which James is\nadvancing against the older modes of thought. In the essay in question,\nthe character which James assigns to consciousness is fully discussed.\nBut he does not unambiguously explain what he means by the notion of an\nentity, which he refuses to apply to consciousness. In the sentence\nwhich immediately follows the one which I have already quoted, he says:\n\n\u201cThere is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted\nwith that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts\nof them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts\nperform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is\ninvoked. That function is _knowing_. \u2018Consciousness\u2019 is supposed\nnecessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get\nreported, are known.\u201d\n\nThus James is denying that consciousness is a \u2018stuff.\u2019\n\nThe term \u2018entity,\u2019 or even that of \u2018stuff,\u2019 does not fully tell its own\ntale. The notion of \u2018entity\u2019 is so general that it may be taken to mean\nanything that can be thought about. You cannot think of mere nothing;\nand the something which is an object of thought may be called an entity.\nIn this sense, a function is an entity. Obviously, this is not what\nJames had in his mind.\n\nIn agreement with the organic theory of nature which I have been\ntentatively putting forward in these lectures, I shall for my own\npurposes construe James as denying exactly what Descartes asserts in his\n_Discourse_ and his _Meditations_. Descartes discriminates two species\nof entities, _matter_ and _soul_. The essence of matter is spatial\nextension; the essence of soul is its cogitation, in the full sense\nwhich Descartes assigns to the word \u2018_cogitare_.\u2019 For example, in\nSection Fifty-three of Part I of his _Principles of Philosophy_, he\nenunciates: \u201cThat of every substance there is one principal attribute,\nas thinking of the mind, extension of the body.\u201d In the earlier,\nFifty-first Section, Descartes states: \u201cBy substance we can conceive\nnothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need\nof nothing beyond itself in order to its existence.\u201d Furthermore, later\non, Descartes says: \u201cFor example, because any substance which ceases to\nendure ceases also to exist, duration is not distinct from substance\nexcept in thought;....\u201d Thus we conclude that, for Descartes, minds and\nbodies exist in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond\nthemselves individually (God only excepted, as being the foundation of\nall things); that both minds and bodies endure, because without\nendurance they would cease to exist; that spatial extension is the\nessential attribute of bodies; and that cogitation is the essential\nattribute of minds.\n\nIt is difficult to praise too highly the genius exhibited by Descartes\nin the complete sections of his _Principles_ which deal with these\nquestions. It is worthy of the century in which he writes, and of the\nclearness of the French intellect. Descartes in his distinction between\ntime and duration, and in his way of grounding time upon motion, and in\nhis close relation between matter and extension, anticipates, as far as\nit was possible at his epoch, modern notions suggested by the doctrine\nof relativity, or by some aspects of Bergson\u2019s doctrine of the\ngeneration of things. But the fundamental principles are so set out as\nto presuppose independently existing substances with simple location in\na community of temporal durations, and, in the case of bodies, with\nsimple location in the community of spatial extensions. Those principles\nlead straight to the theory of a materialistic, mechanistic nature,\nsurveyed by cogitating minds. After the close of the seventeenth\ncentury, science took charge of the materialistic nature, and philosophy\ntook charge of the cogitating minds. Some schools of philosophy admitted\nan ultimate dualism; and the various idealistic schools claimed that\nnature was merely the chief example of the cogitations of minds. But all\nschools admitted the Cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements of\nnature. I am excluding Spinoza and Leibniz from these statements as to\nthe main stream of modern philosophy, as derivative from Descartes;\nthough of course they were influenced by him, and in their turn\ninfluenced philosophers. I am thinking mainly of the effective contacts\nbetween science and philosophy.\n\nThis division of territory between science and philosophy was not a\nsimple business; and in fact it illustrated the weakness of the whole\ncut-and-dried presupposition upon which it rested. We are aware of\nnature as an interplay of bodies, colours, sounds, scents, tastes,\ntouches and other various bodily feelings, displayed as in space, in\npatterns of mutual separation by intervening volumes, and of individual\nshape. Also the whole is a flux, changing with the lapse of time. This\nsystematic totality is disclosed to us as one complex of things. But the\nseventeenth century dualism cuts straight across it. The objective world\nof science was confined to mere spatial material with simple location in\nspace and time, and subjected to definite rules as to its locomotion.\nThe subjective world of philosophy annexed the colours, sounds, scents,\ntastes, touches, bodily feelings, as forming the subjective content of\nthe cogitations of the individual minds. Both worlds shared in the\ngeneral flux; but time, as measured, is assigned by Descartes to the\ncogitations of the observer\u2019s mind. There is obviously one fatal\nweakness to this scheme. The cogitations of mind exhibit themselves as\nholding up entities, such as colours for instance, before the mind as\nthe termini of contemplation. But in this theory these colours are,\nafter all, merely the furniture of the mind. Accordingly, the mind seems\nto be confined to its own private world of cogitations. The\nsubject-object conformation of experience in its entirety lies within\nthe mind as one of its private passions. This conclusion from the\nCartesian data is the starting point from which Berkeley, Hume, and Kant\ndeveloped their respective systems. And, antecedently to them, it was\nthe point upon which Locke concentrated as being the vital question.\nThus the question as to how any knowledge is obtained of the truly\nobjective world of science becomes a problem of the first magnitude.\nDescartes states that the objective body is perceived by the intellect.\nHe says (_Meditation II_): \u201cI must, therefore, admit that I cannot even\ncomprehend by imagination what the piece of wax is, and that it is the\nmind alone which perceives it. I speak of one piece in particular; for,\nas to wax in general, this is still more evident. But what is the piece\nof wax that can be perceived only by the mind?... The perception of it\nis neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, and never was\neither of these, though it might formerly seem so, but is simply an\n_intuition_ (_inspectio_) of the mind,....\u201d It must be noted that the\nLatin word \u2018inspectio\u2019 is associated in its classical use with the\nnotion of theory as opposed to practice.\n\nThe two great preoccupations of modern philosophy now lie clearly before\nus. The study of mind divides into psychology, or the study of mental\nfunctionings as considered in themselves and in their mutual relations,\nand into epistemology, or the theory of the knowledge of a common\nobjective world. In other words, there is the study of the cogitations,\n_qu\u00e2_ passions of the mind, and their study _qu\u00e2_ leading to an\ninspection (_intuition_) of an objective world. This is a very uneasy\ndivision, giving rise to a host of perplexities whose consideration has\noccupied the intervening centuries.\n\nAs long as men thought in terms of physical notions for the objective\nworld and of mentality for the subjective world, the setting out of the\nproblem, as achieved by Descartes, sufficed as a starting point. But the\nbalance has been upset by the rise of physiology. In the seventeenth\ncentury men passed from the study of physics to the study of philosophy.\nTowards the end of the nineteenth century, notably in Germany, men\npassed from the study of physiology to the study of psychology. The\nchange in tone has been decisive. Of course, in the earlier period the\nintervention of the human body was fully considered, for example, by\nDescartes in Part V of the \u2018_Discourse on Method_.\u2019 But the\nphysiological instinct had not been developed. In considering the human\nbody, Descartes thought with the outfit of a physicist; whereas the\nmodern psychologists are clothed with the mentalities of medical\nphysiologists. The career of William James is an example of this change\nin standpoint. He also possessed the clear, incisive genius which could\nstate in a flash the exact point at issue.\n\nThe reason why I have put Descartes and James in close juxtaposition is\nnow evident. Neither philosopher finished an epoch by a final solution\nof a problem. Their great merit is of the opposite sort. They each of\nthem open an epoch by their clear formulation of terms in which thought\ncould profitably express itself at particular stages of knowledge, one\nfor the seventeenth century, the other for the twentieth century. In\nthis respect, they are both to be contrasted with St. Thomas Aquinas,\nwho expressed the culmination of Aristotelian scholasticism.\n\nIn many ways neither Descartes nor James were the most characteristic\nphilosophers of their respective epochs. I should be disposed to ascribe\nthese positions to Locke and to Bergson respectively, at least so far as\nconcerns their relations to the science of their times. Locke developed\nthe lines of thought which kept philosophy on the move; for example he\nemphasized the appeal to psychology. He initiated the age of\nepoch-making enquiries into urgent problems of limited scope.\nUndoubtedly, in so doing, he infected philosophy with something of the\nanti-rationalism of science. But the very groundwork of a fruitful\nmethodology is to start from those clear postulates which must be held\nto be ultimate so far as concerns the occasion in question. The\ncriticism of such methodological postulates is thus reserved for another\nopportunity. Locke discovered that the philosophical situation\nbequeathed by Descartes involved the problems of epistemology and\npsychology.\n\nBergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of\nphysiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static\nmaterialism of the seventeenth century. His protest against\nspatialisation is a protest against taking the Newtonian conception of\nnature as being anything except a high abstraction. His so-called\nanti-intellectualism should be construed in this sense. In some respects\nhe recurs to Descartes; but the recurrence is accompanied with an\ninstinctive grasp of modern biology.\n\nThere is another reason for associating Locke and Bergson. The germ of\nan organic theory of nature is to be found in Locke. His most recent\nexpositor, Professor Gibson,[14] states that Locke\u2019s way of conceiving\nthe identity of self-consciousness \u2018like that of a living organism,\ninvolves a genuine transcending of the mechanical view of nature and of\nmind, embodied in the composition theory.\u2019 But it is to be noticed that\nin the first place Locke wavers in his grasp of this position; and in\nthe second place, what is more important still, he only applies his idea\nto self-consciousness. The physiological attitude has not yet\nestablished itself. The effect of physiology was to put mind back into\nnature. The neurologist traces first the effect of stimuli along the\nbodily nerves, then integration at nerve centres, and finally the rise\nof a projective reference beyond the body with a resulting motor\nefficacy in renewed nervous excitement. In biochemistry, the delicate\nadjustment of the chemical composition of the parts to the preservation\nof the whole organism is detected. Thus the mental cognition is seen as\nthe reflective experience of a totality, reporting for itself what it is\nin itself as one unit occurrence. This unit is the integration of the\nsum of its partial happenings, but it is not their numerical aggregate.\nIt has its own unity as an event. This total unity, considered as an\nentity for its own sake, is the prehension into unity of the patterned\naspects of the universe of events. Its knowledge of itself arises from\nits own relevance to the things of which it prehends the aspects. It\nknows the world as a system of mutual relevance, and thus sees itself as\nmirrored in other things. These other things include more especially the\nvarious parts of its own body.\n\nFootnote 14:\n\n  _Cf._ his book, _Locke\u2019s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical\n  Relations_, Camb. Univ. Press, 1917.\n\nIt is important to discriminate the bodily pattern, which endures, from\nthe bodily event, which is pervaded by the enduring pattern, and from\nthe parts of the bodily event. The parts of the bodily event are\nthemselves pervaded by their own enduring patterns, which form elements\nin the bodily pattern. The parts of the body are really portions of the\nenvironment of the total bodily event, but so related that their mutual\naspects, each in the other, are peculiarly effective in modifying the\npattern of either. This arises from the intimate character of the\nrelation of whole to part. Thus the body is a portion of the environment\nfor the part, and the part is a portion of the environment for the body;\nonly they are peculiarly sensitive, each to modifications of the other.\nThis sensitiveness is so arranged that the part adjusts itself to\npreserve the stability of the pattern of the body. It is a particular\nexample of the favourable environment shielding the organism. The\nrelation of part to whole has the special reciprocity associated with\nthe notion of organism, in which the part is for the whole; but this\nrelation reigns throughout nature and does not start with the special\ncase of the higher organisms.\n\nFurther, viewing the question as a matter of chemistry, there is no need\nto construe the actions of each molecule in a living body by its\nexclusive particular reference to the pattern of the complete living\norganism. It is true that each molecule is affected by the aspect of\nthis pattern as mirrored in it, so as to be otherwise than what it would\nhave been if placed elsewhere. In the same way, under some circumstances\nan electron may be a sphere, and under other circumstances an egg-shaped\nvolume. The mode of approach to the problem, so far as science is\nconcerned, is merely to ask if molecules exhibit in living bodies\nproperties which are not to be observed amid inorganic surroundings. In\nthe same way, in a magnetic field soft iron exhibits magnetic properties\nwhich are in abeyance elsewhere. The prompt self-preservative actions of\nliving bodies, and our experience of the physical actions of our bodies\nfollowing the determinations of will, suggest the modification of\nmolecules in the body as the result of the total pattern. It seems\npossible that there may be physical laws expressing the modification of\nthe ultimate basic organisms when they form part of higher organisms\nwith adequate compactness of pattern. It would, however, be entirely in\nconsonance with the empirically observed action of environments, if the\ndirect effects of aspects as between the whole body and its parts were\nnegligible. We should expect transmission. In this way the modification\nof total pattern would transmit itself by means of a series of\nmodifications of a descending series of parts, so that finally the\nmodification of the cell changes its aspect in the molecule, thus\neffecting a corresponding alteration in the molecule,\u2014or in some subtler\nentity. Thus the question for physiology is the question of the physics\nof molecules in cells of different characters.\n\nWe can now see the relation of psychology to physiology and to physics.\nThe private psychological field is merely the event considered from its\nown standpoint. The unity of this field is the unity of the event. But\nit is the event as one entity, and not the event as a sum of parts. The\nrelations of the parts, to each other and to the whole, are their\naspects, each in the other. A body for an external observer is the\naggregate of the aspects for him of the body as a whole, and also of the\nbody as a sum of parts. For the external observer the aspects of shape\nand of sense-objects are dominant, at least for cognition. But we must\nalso allow for the possibility that we can detect in ourselves direct\naspects of the mentalities of higher organisms. The claim that the\ncognition of alien mentalities must necessarily be by means of indirect\ninferences from aspects of shape and of sense-objects is wholly\nunwarranted by this philosophy of organism. The fundamental principle is\nthat whatever merges into actuality, implants its aspects in every\nindividual event.\n\nFurther, even for self-cognition, the aspects of the parts of our own\nbodies partly take the form of aspects of shape, and of sense-objects.\nBut that part of the bodily event, in respect to which the cognitive\nmentality is associated, is for itself the unit psychological field. Its\ningredients are not referent to the event itself; they are aspects of\nwhat lies beyond that event. Thus the self-knowledge inherent in the\nbodily event is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity, whose\ningredients involve all reality beyond itself, restricted under the\nlimitation of its pattern of aspects. Thus we know ourselves as a\nfunction of unification of a plurality of things which are other than\nourselves. Cognition discloses an event as being an activity, organising\na real togetherness of alien things. But this psychological field does\nnot depend on its cognition; so that this field is still a unit event as\nabstracted from its self-cognition.\n\nAccordingly, consciousness will be the function of knowing. But what is\nknown is already a prehension of aspects of the one real universe. These\naspects are aspects of other events as mutually modifying, each the\nothers. In the pattern of aspects they stand in their pattern of mutual\nrelatedness.\n\nThe aboriginal data in terms of which the pattern weaves itself are the\naspects of shapes, of sense-objects, and of other eternal objects whose\nself-identity is not dependent on the flux of things. Wherever such\nobjects have ingression into the general flux, they interpret events,\neach to the other. They are here in the perceiver; but, as perceived by\nhim, they convey for him something of the total flux which is beyond\nhimself. The subject-object relation takes its origin in the double r\u00f4le\nof these eternal objects. They are modifications of the subject, but\nonly in their character of conveying aspects of other subjects in the\ncommunity of the universe. Thus no individual subject can have\nindependent reality, since it is a prehension of limited aspects of\nsubjects other than itself.\n\nThe technical phrase \u2018subject-object\u2019 is a bad term for the fundamental\nsituation disclosed in experience. It is really reminiscent of the\nAristotelian \u2018subject-predicate.\u2019 It already presupposes the\nmetaphysical doctrine of diverse subjects qualified by their private\npredicates. This is the doctrine of subjects with private worlds of\nexperience. If this be granted, there is no escape from solipsism. The\npoint is that the phrase \u2018subject-object\u2019 indicates a fundamental entity\nunderlying the objects. Thus the \u2018objects,\u2019 as thus conceived, are\nmerely the ghosts of Aristotelian predicates. The primary situation\ndisclosed in cognitive experience is \u2018ego-object amid objects.\u2019 By this\nI mean that the primary fact is an impartial world transcending the\n\u2018here-now\u2019 which marks the ego-object, and transcending the \u2018now\u2019 which\nis the spatial world of simultaneous realisation. It is a world also\nincluding the actuality of the past, and the limited potentiality of the\nfuture, together with the complete world of abstract potentiality, the\nrealm of eternal objects, which transcends, and finds exemplification in\nand comparison with, the actual course of realisation. The ego-object,\nas consciousness here-now, is conscious of its experient essence as\nconstituted by its internal relatedness to the world of realities, and\nto the world of ideas. But the ego-object, in being thus constituted, is\nwithin the world of realities, and exhibits itself as an organism\nrequiring the ingression of ideas for the purpose of this status among\nrealities. This question of consciousness must be reserved for treatment\non another occasion.\n\nThe point to be made for the purposes of the present discussion is that\na philosophy of nature as organic must start at the opposite end to that\nrequisite for a materialistic philosophy. The materialistic starting\npoint is from independently existing substances, matter and mind. The\nmatter suffers modifications of its external relations of locomotion,\nand the mind suffers modifications of its contemplated objects. There\nare, in this materialistic theory, two sorts of independent substances,\neach qualified by their appropriate passions. The organic starting point\nis from the analysis of process as the realisation of events disposed in\nan interlocked community. The event is the unit of things real. The\nemergent enduring pattern is the stabilisation of the emergent\nachievement so as to become a fact which retains its identity throughout\nthe process. It will be noted that endurance is not primarily the\nproperty of enduring beyond itself, but of enduring within itself. I\nmean that endurance is the property of finding its pattern reproduced in\nthe temporal parts of the total event. It is in this sense that a total\nevent carries an enduring pattern. There is an intrinsic value identical\nfor the whole and for its succession of parts. Cognition is the\nemergence, into some measure of individualised reality, of the general\nsubstratum of activity, poising before itself possibility, actuality,\nand purpose.\n\nIt is equally possible to arrive at this organic conception of the world\nif we start from the fundamental notions of modern physics, instead of,\nas above, from psychology and physiology. In fact by reason of my own\nstudies in mathematics and mathematical physics, I did in fact arrive at\nmy convictions in this way. Mathematical physics presumes in the first\nplace an electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and time. The\nlaws which condition this field are nothing else than the conditions\nobserved by the general activity of the flux of the world, as it\nindividualises itself in the events. In physics, there is an\nabstraction. The science ignores what anything is in itself. Its\nentities are merely considered in respect to their extrinsic reality,\nthat is to say, in respect to their aspects in other things. But the\nabstraction reaches even further than that; for it is only the aspects\nin other things, as modifying the spatio-temporal specifications of the\nlife histories of those other things, which count. The intrinsic reality\nof the observer comes in: I mean what the observer is for himself is\nappealed to. For example, the fact that he will see red or blue enters\ninto scientific statements. But the red which the observer sees does not\nin truth enter into science. What is relevant is merely the bare\ndiversity of the observer\u2019s red experiences from all of his other\nexperiences. Accordingly, the intrinsic character of the observer is\nmerely relevant in order to fix the self-identical individuality of the\nphysical entities. These entities are only considered as agencies in\nfixing the routes in space and in time of the life histories of enduring\nentities.\n\nThe phraseology of physics is derived from the materialistic ideas of\nthe seventeenth century. But we find that, even in its extreme\nabstraction, what it is really presupposing is the organic theory of\naspects as explained above. First, consider any event in empty space\nwhere the word \u2018empty\u2019 means devoid of electrons, or protons, or of any\nother form of electric charge. Such an event has three r\u00f4les in physics.\nIn the first place, it is the actual scene of an adventure of energy,\neither as its _habitat_ or as the locus of a particular stream of\nenergy: anyhow, in this r\u00f4le the energy is there, either as located in\nspace during the time considered, or as streaming through space.\n\nIn its second r\u00f4le, the event is a necessary link in the pattern of\ntransmission, by which the character of every event receives some\nmodification from the character of every other event.\n\nIn its third r\u00f4le, the event is the repository of a possibility, as to\nwhat would happen to an electric charge, either by way of deformation or\nof locomotion, if it should have happened to be there.\n\nIf we modify our assumption by considering an event which includes in\nitself a portion of the life-history of an electric charge, then the\nanalysis of its three r\u00f4les still remains; except that the possibility\nembodied in the third r\u00f4le is now transformed into an actuality. In this\nreplacement of possibility by actuality, we obtain the distinction\nbetween empty and occupied events.\n\nRecurring to the empty events, we note the deficiency in them of\nindividuality of intrinsic content. Considering the first r\u00f4le of an\nempty event, as being a _habitat_ of energy, we note that there is no\nindividual discrimination of an individual bit of energy, either as\nstatically located, or as an element in the stream. There is simply a\nquantitative determination of activity, without individualisation of the\nactivity in itself. This lack of individualisation is still more evident\nin the second and third r\u00f4les. An empty event is something in itself,\nbut it fails to realise a stable individuality of content. So far as its\ncontent is concerned, the empty event is one realised element in a\ngeneral scheme of organised activity.\n\nSome qualification is required when the empty event is the scene of the\ntransmission of a definite train of recurrent wave-forms. There is now a\ndefinite pattern which remains permanent in the event. We find here the\nfirst faint trace of enduring individuality. But it is individuality\nwithout the faintest capture of originality: for it is merely a\npermanence arising solely from the implication of the event in a larger\nscheme of patterning.\n\nTurning now to the examination of an occupied event, the electron has a\ndeterminate individuality. It can be traced throughout its life-history\nthrough a variety of events. A collection of electrons, together with\nthe analogous atomic charges of positive electricity, forms a body such\nas we ordinarily perceive. The simplest body of this kind is a molecule,\nand a set of molecules forms a lump of ordinary matter, such as a chair,\nor a stone. Thus a charge of electricity is the mark of individuality of\ncontent, as additional to the individuality of an event in itself. This\nindividuality of content is the strong point of the materialistic\ndoctrine.\n\nIt can, however, be equally well explained on the theory of organism.\nWhen we look into the function of the electric charge, we note that its\nr\u00f4le is to mark the origination of a pattern which is transmitted\nthrough space and time. It is the key of some particular pattern. For\nexample, the field of force in any event is to be constructed by\nattention to the adventures of electrons and protons, and so also are\nthe streams and distributions of energy. Further, the electric waves\nfind their origin in the vibratory adventures of these charges. Thus the\ntransmitted pattern is to be conceived as the flux of aspects throughout\nspace and time derived from the life history of the atomic charge. The\nindividualisation of the charge arises by a conjunction of two\ncharacters, in the first place by the continued identity of its mode of\nfunctioning as a key for the determination of a diffusion of pattern;\nand, in the second place, by the unity and continuity of its life\nhistory.\n\nWe may conclude, therefore, that the organic theory represents directly\nwhat physics actually does assume respecting its ultimate entities. We\nalso notice the complete futility of these entities, if they are\nconceived as fully concrete individuals. So far as physics is concerned,\nthey are wholly occupied in moving each other about, and they have no\nreality outside this function. In particular for physics, there is no\nintrinsic reality.\n\nIt is obvious that the basing of philosophy upon the presupposition of\norganism must be traced back to Leibniz.[15] His monads are for him the\nultimately real entities. But he retained the Cartesian substances with\ntheir qualifying passions, as also equally expressing for him the final\ncharacterisation of real things. Accordingly for him there was no\nconcrete reality of internal relations. He had therefore on his hands\ntwo distinct points of view. One was that the final real entity is an\norganising activity, fusing ingredients into a unity, so that this unity\nis the reality. The other point of view is that the final real entities\nare substances supporting qualities. The first point of view depends\nupon the acceptance of internal relations binding together all reality.\nThe latter is inconsistent with the reality of such relations. To\ncombine these two points of view, his monads were therefore windowless;\nand their passions merely mirrored the universe by the divine\narrangement of a pre\u00ebstablished harmony. This system thus presupposed an\naggregate of independent entities. He did not discriminate the event, as\nthe unit of experience, from the enduring organism as its stabilisation\ninto importance, and from the cognitive organism as expressing an\nincreased completeness of individualisation. Nor did he admit the\nmany-termed relations, relating sense-data to various events in diverse\nways. These many-termed relations are in fact the perspectives which\nLeibniz does admit, but only on the condition that they are purely\nqualities of the organising monads. The difficulty really arises from\nthe unquestioned acceptance of the notion of simple location as\nfundamental for space and time, and from the acceptance of the notion of\nindependent individual substance as fundamental for a real entity. The\nonly road open to Leibniz was thus the same as that later taken by\nBerkeley [in a prevalent interpretation of his meaning], namely an\nappeal to a _Deux ex machin\u00e2_ who was capable of rising superior to the\ndifficulties of metaphysics.\n\nFootnote 15:\n\n  _Cf._ Bertrand Russell, _The Philosophy of Leibniz_, for the\n  suggestion of this line of thought.\n\nIn the same way as Descartes introduced the tradition of thought which\nkept subsequent philosophy in some measure of contact with the\nscientific movement, so Leibniz introduced the alternative tradition\nthat the entities, which are the ultimate actual things, are in some\nsense procedures of organisation. This tradition has been the foundation\nof the great achievements of German philosophy. Kant reflected the two\ntraditions, one upon the other. Kant was a scientist, but the schools\nderivative from Kant have had but slight effect on the mentality of the\nscientific world. It should be the task of the philosophical schools of\nthis century to bring together the two streams into an expression of the\nworld-picture derived from science, and thereby end the divorce of\nscience from the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER X\n\n                              ABSTRACTION\n\n\nIn the previous chapters I have been examining the reactions of the\nscientific movement upon the deeper issues which have occupied modern\nthinkers. No one man, no limited society of men, and no one epoch can\nthink of everything at once. Accordingly for the sake of eliciting the\nvarious impacts of science upon thought, the topic has been treated\nhistorically. In this retrospect I have kept in mind that the ultimate\nissue of the whole story is the patent dissolution of the comfortable\nscheme of scientific materialism which has dominated the three centuries\nunder review. Accordingly various schools of criticism of the dominant\nopinions have been stressed; and I have endeavoured to outline an\nalternative cosmological doctrine, which shall be wide enough to include\nwhat is fundamental both for science and for its critics. In this\nalternative scheme, the notion of material, as fundamental, has been\nreplaced by that of organic synthesis. But the approach has always been\nfrom the consideration of the actual intricacies of scientific thought,\nand of the peculiar perplexities which it suggests.\n\nIn the present chapter, and in the immediately succeeding chapter, we\nwill forget the peculiar problems of modern science, and will put\nourselves at the standpoint of a dispassionate consideration of the\nnature of things, antecedently to any special investigation into their\ndetails. Such a standpoint is termed \u2018metaphysical.\u2019 Accordingly those\nreaders who find metaphysics, even in two slight chapters, irksome, will\ndo well to proceed at once to the Chapter on \u2018Religion and Science,\u2019\nwhich resumes the topic of the impact of science on modern thought.\n\nThese metaphysical chapters are purely descriptive. Their justification\nis to be sought, (i) in our direct knowledge of the actual occasions\nwhich compose our immediate experience, and (ii) in their success as\nforming a basis for harmonising our systematised accounts of various\ntypes of experience, and (iii) in their success as providing the\nconcepts in terms of which an epistemology can be framed. By (iii) I\nmean that an account of the general character of what we know must\nenable us to frame an account of how knowledge is possible as an adjunct\nwithin things known.\n\nIn any occasion of cognition, that which is known is an actual occasion\nof experience, as diversified[16] by reference to a realm of entities\nwhich transcend that immediate occasion in that they have analogous or\ndifferent connections with other occasions of experience. For example a\ndefinite shade of red may, in the immediate occasion, be implicated with\nthe shape of sphericity in some definite way. But that shade of red, and\nthat spherical shape, exhibit themselves as transcending that occasion,\nin that either of them has other relationships to other occasions. Also,\napart from the actual occurrence of the same things in other occasions,\nevery actual occasion is set within a realm of alternative\ninterconnected entities. This realm is disclosed by all the untrue\npropositions which can be predicated significantly of that occasion. It\nis the realm of alternative suggestions, whose foothold in actuality\ntranscends each actual occasion. The real relevance of untrue\npropositions for each actual occasion is disclosed by art, romance, and\nby criticism in reference to ideals. It is the foundation of the\nmetaphysical position which I am maintaining that the understanding of\nactuality requires a reference to ideality. The two realms are\nintrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation. The truth\nthat some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue may\nexpress the vital truth as to the aesthetic achievement. It expresses\nthe \u2018great refusal\u2019 which is its primary characteristic. An event is\ndecisive in proportion to the importance (for it) of its untrue\npropositions: their relevance to the event cannot be dissociated from\nwhat the event is in itself by way of achievement. These transcendent\nentities have been termed \u2018universals.\u2019 I prefer to use the term\n\u2018eternal objects,\u2019 in order to disengage myself from presuppositions\nwhich cling to the former term owing to its prolonged philosophical\nhistory. Eternal objects are thus, in their nature, abstract. By\n\u2018abstract\u2019 I mean that what an eternal object is in itself\u2014that is to\nsay, its essence\u2014is comprehensible without reference to some one\nparticular occasion of experience. To be abstract is to transcend\nparticular concrete occasions of actual happening. But to transcend an\nactual occasion does not mean being disconnected from it. On the\ncontrary, I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection\nwith each such occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into that\noccasion. Thus an eternal object is to be comprehended by acquaintance\nwith (i) its particular individuality, (ii) its general relationships to\nother eternal objects as apt for realisation in actual occasions, and\n(iii) the general principle which expresses its ingression in particular\nactual occasions.\n\nFootnote 16:\n\n  _Cf._ my _Principles of Natural Knowledge_, Ch. V, Sec. 13.\n\nThese three headings express two principles. The first principle is that\neach eternal object is an individual which, in its own peculiar fashion,\nis what it is. This particular individuality is the individual essence\nof the object, and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself.\nThus the individual essence is merely the essence considered in respect\nto its uniqueness. Further, the essence of an eternal object is merely\nthe eternal object considered as adding its own unique contribution to\neach actual occasion. This unique contribution is identical for all such\noccasions in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of\ningression is just its identical self. But it varies from one occasion\nto another in respect to the differences of its modes of ingression.\nThus the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a\npossibility for an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to its\ncharacter by how these possibilities are actualised for that occasion.\nThus actualisation is a selection among possibilities. More accurately,\nit is a selection issuing in a gradation of possibilities in respect to\ntheir realisation in that occasion. This conclusion brings us to the\nsecond metaphysical principle: An eternal object, considered as an\nabstract entity, cannot be divorced from its reference to other eternal\nobjects, and from its reference to actuality generally; though it is\ndisconnected from its actual modes of ingression into definitive actual\noccasions. This principle is expressed by the statement that each\neternal object has a \u2018relational essence.\u2019 This relational essence\ndetermines how it is possible for the object to have ingression into\nactual occasions.\n\nIn other words: If _A_ be an eternal object, then what _A_ is in itself\ninvolves _A\u2019s_ status in the universe, and _A_ cannot be divorced from\nthis status. In the essence of _A_ there stands a determinateness as to\nthe relationships of _A_ to other eternal objects, and an\nindeterminateness as to the relationships of _A_ to actual occasions.\nSince the relationships of _A_ to other eternal objects stand\ndeterminately in the essence of _A_, it follows that they are internal\nrelations. I mean by this that these relationships are constitutive of\n_A_; for an entity which stands in internal relations has no being as an\nentity not in these relations. In other words, once with internal\nrelations, always with internal relations. The internal relationships of\n_A_ conjointly form its significance.\n\nAgain an entity cannot stand in external relations unless in its essence\nthere stands an indeterminateness which is its patience for such\nexternal relations. The meaning of the term \u2018possibility\u2019 as applied to\n_A_ is simply that there stands in the essence of _A_ a patience for\nrelationships to actual occasions. The relationships of _A_ to an actual\noccasion are simply how the eternal relationships of _A_ to other\neternal objects are graded as to their realisation in that occasion.\n\nThus the general principle which expresses _A\u2019s_ ingression in the\nparticular actual occasion \u03b1 is the indeterminateness which stands in\nthe essence of _A_ as to its ingression into \u03b1, and is the\ndeterminateness which stands in the essence of \u03b1 as to the ingression of\n_\u0391_ into \u03b1. Thus the synthetic prehension, which is \u03b1, is the solution\nof the indeterminateness of _\u0391_ into the determinateness of \u03b1.\nAccordingly the relationship between _\u0391_ and \u03b1 is external as regards\n_\u0391_, and is internal as regards \u03b1. Every actual occasion \u03b1 is the\nsolution of all modalities into actual categorical ingressions: truth\nand falsehood take the place of possibility. The complete ingression of\n_\u0391_ into \u03b1 is expressed by all the true propositions which are about\nboth _\u0391_ and \u03b1, and also\u2014it may be\u2014about other things.\n\nThe determinate relatedness of the eternal object _\u0391_ to every other\neternal object is how _\u0391_ is systematically and by the necessity of its\nnature related to every other eternal object. Such relatedness\nrepresents a possibility for realisation. But a relationship is a fact\nwhich concerns all the implicated relata, and cannot be isolated as if\ninvolving only one of the relata. Accordingly there is a general fact of\nsystematic mutual relatedness which is inherent in the character of\npossibility. The realm of eternal objects is properly described as a\n\u2018realm,\u2019 because each eternal object has its status in this general\nsystematic complex of mutual relatedness.\n\nIn respect to the ingression of _\u0391_ into an actual occasion \u03b1, the\nmutual relationships of _\u0391_ to other eternal objects, as thus graded in\nrealisation, require for their expression a reference to the status of\n_\u0391_ and of the other eternal objects in the spatio-temporal\nrelationship. Also this status is not expressible (for this purpose)\nwithout a reference to the status of \u03b1 and of other actual occasions in\nthe same spatio-temporal relationship. Accordingly the spatio-temporal\nrelationship, in terms of which the actual course of events is to be\nexpressed, is nothing else than a selective limitation within the\ngeneral systematic relationships among eternal objects. By \u2018limitation,\u2019\nas applied to the spatio-temporal continuum, I mean those matter-of-fact\ndeterminations\u2014such as the three dimensions of space, and the four\ndimensions of the spatio-temporal continuum\u2014which are inherent in the\nactual course of events, but which present themselves as arbitrary in\nrespect to a more abstract possibility. The consideration of these\ngeneral limitations at the base of actual things, as distinct from the\nlimitations peculiar to each actual occasion, will be more fully resumed\nin the chapter on \u2018God.\u2019\n\nFurther, the status of all possibility in reference to actuality\nrequires a reference to this spatio-temporal continuum. In any\nparticular consideration of a possibility we may conceive this continuum\nto be transcended. But in so far as there is any definite reference to\nactuality, the definite _how_ of transcendence of that spatio-temporal\ncontinuum is required. Thus primarily the spatio-temporal continuum is a\nlocus of relational possibility, selected from the more general realm of\nsystematic relationship. This limited locus of relational possibility\nexpresses one limitation of possibility inherent in the general system\nof the process of realisation. Whatever possibility is generally\ncoherent with that system falls within this limitation. Also whatever is\nabstractedly possible in relation to the general course of events\u2014as\ndistinct from the particular limitations introduced by particular\noccasions\u2014pervades the spatio-temporal continuum in every alternative\nspatial situation and at all alternative times.\n\nFundamentally, the spatio-temporal continuum is the general system of\nrelatedness of all possibilities, in so far as that system is limited by\nits relevance to the general fact of actuality. Also it is inherent in\nthe nature of possibility that it should include this relevance to\nactuality. For possibility is that in which there stands achievability,\nabstracted from achievement.\n\nIt has already been emphasised that an actual occasion is to be\nconceived as a limitation; and that this process of limitation can be\nstill further characterised as a gradation. This characteristic of an\nactual occasion (\u03b1, say) requires further elucidation: An\nindeterminateness stands in the essence of any eternal object (_\u0391_,\nsay). The actual occasion \u03b1 synthesises in itself every eternal object;\nand, in so doing, it includes the _complete_ determinate relatedness of\n_\u0391_ to every other eternal object, or set of eternal objects. This\nsynthesis is a limitation of realisation but _not_ of content. Each\nrelationship preserves its inherent self-identity. But grades of entry\ninto this synthesis are inherent in each actual occasion, such as \u03b1.\nThese grades can be expressed only as relevance of value. This relevance\nof value varies\u2014as comparing different occasions\u2014in grade from the\ninclusion of the individual essence of _\u0391_ as an element in the\naesthetic synthesis (in some grade of inclusion) to the lowest grade\nwhich is the exclusion of the individual essence of _\u0391_ as an element in\nthe aesthetic synthesis. In so far as it stands in this lowest grade,\nevery determinate relationship of _\u0391_ is merely ingredient in the\noccasion in respect to the determinate _how_ this relationship is an\nunfulfilled alternative, not contributing any aesthetic value, except as\nforming an element in the systematic substratum of unfulfilled content.\nIn a higher grade, it may remain unfulfilled, but be aesthetically\nrelevant.\n\nThus _A_, conceived merely in respect to its relationships to other\neternal objects, is \u2018_A_ conceived as _not-being_\u2019; where \u2018not-being\u2019\nmeans \u2018abstracted from the determinate fact of inclusions in, and\nexclusions from, actual events.\u2019 Also \u2018_A_ as _not-being_ in respect to\na definite occasion \u03b1\u2019 means that _A_ in all its determinate\nrelationships is excluded from \u03b1. Again \u2018_A_ as _being_ in respect to \u03b1\u2019\nmeans that _A_ in some of its determinate relationships is included in\n\u03b1. But there can be no occasion which includes _A_ in all its\ndeterminate relationships; for some of these relationships are\ncontraries. Thus, in regard to excluded relationships, _A_ will be\n_not-being_ in \u03b1, even when in regard to other relationships _A_ will be\n_being_ in \u03b1. In this sense, every occasion is a synthesis of _being_\nand _not-being_. Furthermore, though some eternal objects are\nsynthesised in an occasion \u03b1 merely _qu\u00e2 not-being_, each eternal object\nwhich is synthesised _qu\u00e2 being_ is also synthesised _qu\u00e2 not-being_.\n\u2018_Being_\u2019 here means \u2018individually effective in the aesthetic\nsynthesis.\u2019 Also the \u2018aesthetic synthesis\u2019 is the \u2018experient synthesis\u2019\nviewed as self-creative, under the limitations laid upon it by its\ninternal relatedness to all other actual occasions. We thus\nconclude\u2014what has already been stated above\u2014that the general fact of the\nsynthetic prehension of all eternal objects into every occasion wears\nthe double aspect of the indeterminate relatedness of each eternal\nobject to occasions generally, and of its determinate relatedness to\neach particular occasion. This statement summarises the account of how\nexternal relations are possible. But the account depends upon\ndisengaging the spatio-temporal continuum from its mere implication in\nactual occasions\u2014according to the usual explanation\u2014and upon exhibiting\nit in its origin from the general nature of abstract possibility, as\nlimited by the general character of the actual course of events.\n\nThe difficulty which arises in respect to internal relations is to\nexplain how any particular truth is possible. In so far as there are\ninternal relations, everything must depend upon everything else. But if\nthis be the case, we cannot know about anything till we equally know\neverything else. Apparently, therefore, we are under the necessity of\nsaying everything at once. This supposed necessity is palpably untrue.\nAccordingly it is incumbent on us to explain how there can be internal\nrelations, seeing that we admit finite truths.\n\nSince actual occasions are selections from the realm of possibilities,\nthe ultimate explanation of how actual occasions have the general\ncharacter which they do have, must lie in an analysis of the general\ncharacter of the realm of possibility.\n\nThe _analytical character_ of the realm of eternal objects is the\nprimary metaphysical truth concerning it. By this character it is meant\nthat the status of any eternal object _A_ in this realm is capable of\nanalysis into an indefinite number of subordinate relationships of\nlimited scope. For example if _B_ and _C_ are two other eternal objects,\nthen there is some perfectly definite relationship _R(A, B, C)_ which\ninvolves _A, B, C_ only, as to require the mention of no other definite\neternal objects in the capacity of relata. Of course, the relationship\n_R(A, B, C)_ may involve subordinate relationships which are themselves\neternal objects, and _R(A, B, C)_ is also itself an eternal object. Also\nthere will be other relationships which in the same sense involve only\n_A, B, C_. We have now to examine how, having regard to the internal\nrelatedness of eternal objects, this limited relationship _R(A, B, C)_\nis possible.\n\nThe reason for the existence of finite relationships in the realm of\neternal objects is that relationships of these objects among themselves\nare entirely unselective, and are systematically complete. We are\ndiscussing possibility; so that every relationship which is possible is\nthereby in the realm of possibility. Every such relationship of each\neternal object is founded upon the perfectly definite status of that\nobject as a relatum in the general scheme of relationships. This\ndefinite status is what I have termed the \u2018relational essence\u2019 of the\nobject. This relational essence is determinable by reference to that\nobject alone, and does not require reference to any other objects,\nexcept those which are specifically involved in its individual essence\nwhen that essence is complex (as will be explained immediately). The\nmeaning of the words \u2018any\u2019 and \u2018some\u2019 springs from this principle\u2014that\nis to say, the meaning of the \u2018variable\u2019 in logic. The whole principle\nis that a particular determination can be made of the _how_ of some\ndefinite relationship of a definite eternal object _A_ to a definite\nfinite number _n_ of other eternal objects, _without_ any determination\nof the other _n_ objects, X1, X2, ... Xn, except that they have, each of\nthem, the requisite status to play their respective parts in that\nmultiple relationship. This principle depends on the fact that the\nrelational essence of an eternal object is not unique to that object.\nThe mere relational essence of each eternal object determines the\ncomplete uniform scheme of relational essences, since each object stands\ninternally in all its possible relationships. Thus the realm of\npossibility provides a uniform scheme of relationships among finite sets\nof eternal objects; and all eternal objects stand in all such\nrelationships, so far as the status of each permits.\n\nAccordingly the relationships (as in possibility) do not involve the\nindividual essences of the eternal objects; they involve _any_ eternal\nobjects as relata, subject to the proviso that these relata have the\nrequisite relational essences. [It is this proviso which, automatically\nand by the nature of the case, limits the \u2018any\u2019 of the phrase \u2018any\neternal objects.\u2019] This principle is the principle of the _Isolation of\nEternal Objects_ in the realm of possibility. The eternal objects are\nisolated, because their relationships as possibilities are expressible\nwithout reference to their respective individual essences. In contrast\nto the realm of possibility, the inclusion of eternal objects within an\nactual occasion means that in respect to some of their possible\nrelationships there is a togetherness of their individual essences. This\nrealised togetherness is the achievement of an emergent value\ndefined\u2014or, shaped\u2014by the definite eternal relatedness in respect to\nwhich the real togetherness is achieved. Thus the eternal relatedness is\nthe form\u2014the \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\u2014; the emergent actual occasion is the _superject_ of\ninformed value; value, as abstracted from any particular superject, is\nthe abstract matter\u2014the \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u2014which is common to all actual occasions; and\nthe synthetic activity which prehends valueless possibility into\nsuperjicient informed value is the substantial activity. This\nsubstantial activity is that which is omitted in any analysis of the\nstatic factors in the metaphysical situation. The analysed elements of\nthe situation are the attributes of the substantial activity.\n\nThe difficulty inherent in the concept of finite internal relations\namong eternal objects is thus evaded by two metaphysical principles, (i)\nthat the relationships of any eternal object _A_, considered as\nconstitutive of _A_, merely involve other eternal objects as bare relata\nwithout reference to their individual essences, and (ii) that the\ndivisibility of the general relationship of _A_ into a multiplicity of\nfinite relationships of _A_ stands therefore in the essence of that\neternal object. The second principle obviously depends upon the first.\nTo understand _A_ is to understand the _how_ of a general scheme of\nrelationship. This scheme of relationship does not require the\nindividual uniqueness of the other relata for its comprehension. This\nscheme also discloses itself as being analysable into a multiplicity of\nlimited relationships which have their own individuality and yet at the\nsame time presupposes the total relationship within possibility. In\nrespect to actuality there is first the general limitation of\nrelationships, which reduces this general unlimited scheme to the four\ndimensional spatio-temporal scheme. This spatio-temporal scheme is, so\nto speak, the greatest common measure of the schemes of relationship (as\nlimited by actuality) inherent in all the eternal objects. By this it is\nmeant that, _how_ select relationships of an eternal object (_A_) are\nrealised in any actual occasion, is always explicable by expressing the\nstatus of _A_ in respect to this spatio-temporal scheme, and by\nexpressing in this scheme the relationship of the actual occasion to\nother actual occasions. A definite finite relationship involving the\ndefinite eternal objects of a limited set of such objects is itself an\neternal object: it is those eternal objects as in that relationship. I\nwill call such an eternal object \u2018complex.\u2019 The eternal objects which\nare the relata in a complex eternal object will be called the\n\u2018components\u2019 of that eternal object. Also if any of these relata are\nthemselves complex, their components will be called \u2018derivative\ncomponents\u2019 of the original complex object. Also the components of\nderivative components will also be called derivative components of the\noriginal object. Thus the complexity of an eternal object means its\nanalysability into a relationship of component eternal objects. Also the\nanalysis of the general scheme of relatedness of eternal objects means\nits exhibition as a multiplicity of complex eternal objects. An eternal\nobject, such as a definite shade of green, which cannot be analysed into\na relationship of components, will be called \u2018simple.\u2019\n\nWe can now explain how the analytical character of the realm of eternal\nobjects allows of an analysis of that realm into grades.\n\nIn the lowest grade of eternal objects are to be placed those objects\nwhose individual essences are simple. This is the grade of zero\ncomplexity. Next consider any set of such objects, finite or infinite as\nto the number of its members. For example, consider the set of three\neternal objects _A, B, C_, of which none is complex. Let us write _R(A,\nB, C)_ for some definite possible relatedness of _A, B, C_. To take a\nsimple example, _A, B, C_ may be three definite colours with the\nspatio-temporal relatedness to each other of three faces of a regular\ntetrahedron, anywhere at any time. Then _R(A, B, C)_ is another eternal\nobject of the lowest complex grade. Analogously there are eternal\nobjects of successively higher grades. In respect to any complex eternal\nobject, _S(D1, D2, ... Dn)_, the eternal objects _D1, ... Dn_, whose\nindividual essences are constitutive of the individual essence of _S(D1,\n... Dn)_, are called the components of _S(D1, ... Dn)_. It is obvious\nthat the grade of complexity to be ascribed to _S(D1, ... Dn)_ is to be\ntaken as one above the highest grade of complexity to be found among its\ncomponents.\n\nThere is thus an analysis of the realm of possibility into simple\neternal objects, and into various grades of complex eternal objects. A\ncomplex eternal object is an abstract situation. There is a double sense\nof \u2018abstraction,\u2019 in regard to the abstraction of _definite_ eternal\nobjects, _i.e._, non-mathematical abstraction. There is abstraction from\nactuality, and abstraction from possibility. For example, _A_ and _R(A,\nB, C)_ are both abstractions from the realm of possibility. Note that\n_A_ must mean _A_ in all its possible relationships, and among them\n_R(A, B, C)_. Also _R(A, B, C)_ means _R(A, B, C)_ in all its\nrelationships. But this meaning of _R(A, B, C)_ excludes other\nrelationships into which _A_ can enter. Hence _A_ as in _R(A, B, C)_ is\nmore abstract than _A simpliciter_. Thus as we pass from the grade of\nsimple eternal objects to higher and higher grades of complexity, we are\nindulging in higher grades of abstraction from the realm of possibility.\n\nWe can now conceive the successive stages of a definite progress towards\nsome assigned mode of abstraction from the realm of possibility,\ninvolving a progress (in thought) through successive grades of\nincreasing complexity. I will call any such route of progress \u2018an\nabstractive hierarchy.\u2019 Any abstractive hierarchy, finite or infinite,\nis based upon some definite group of simple eternal objects. This group\nwill be called the \u2018base\u2019 of the hierarchy. Thus the base of an\nabstractive hierarchy is a set of objects of zero complexity. The formal\ndefinition of an abstractive hierarchy is as follows:\n\nAn \u2018abstractive hierarchy based upon _g_,\u2019 where _g_ is a group of\nsimple eternal objects, is a set of eternal objects which satisfy the\nfollowing conditions,\n\n(i) the members of _g_ belong to it, and are the only simple eternal\nobjects in the hierarchy,\n\n(ii) the components of any complex eternal object in the hierarchy are\nalso members of the hierarchy, and\n\n(iii) any set of eternal objects belonging to the hierarchy, whether all\nof the same grade or whether differing among themselves as to grade, are\njointly among the components or derivative components of at least one\neternal object which also belongs to the hierarchy.\n\nIt is to be noticed that the components of an eternal object are\nnecessarily of a lower grade of complexity than itself. Accordingly any\nmember of such a hierarchy, which is of the first grade of complexity,\ncan have as components only members of the group _g_; and any member of\nthe second grade can have as components only members of the first grade,\nand members of _g_; and so on for the higher grades.\n\nThe third condition to be satisfied by an abstractive hierarchy will be\ncalled the condition of connexity. Thus an abstractive hierarchy springs\nfrom its base; it includes every successive grade from its base either\nindefinitely onwards, or to its maximum grade; and it is \u2018connected\u2019 by\nthe reappearance (in a higher grade) of any set of its members belonging\nto lower grades, in the function of a set of components or derivative\ncomponents of at least one member of the hierarchy.\n\nAn abstractive hierarchy is called \u2018finite\u2019 if it stops at a finite\ngrade of complexity. It is called \u2018infinite\u2019 if it includes members\nbelonging respectively to all degrees of complexity.\n\nIt is to be noted that the base of an abstractive hierarchy may contain\nany number of members, finite or infinite. Further, the infinity of the\nnumber of the members of the base has nothing to do with the question as\nto whether the hierarchy be finite or infinite.\n\nA finite abstractive hierarchy will, by definition, possess a grade of\nmaximum complexity. It is characteristic of this grade that a member of\nit is a component of no other eternal object belonging to any grade of\nthe hierarchy. Also it is evident that this grade of maximum complexity\nmust possess only one member; for otherwise the condition of connexity\nwould not be satisfied. Conversely any complex eternal object defines a\nfinite abstractive hierarchy to be discovered by a process of analysis.\nThis complex eternal object from which we start will be called the\n\u2018vertex\u2019 of the abstractive hierarchy: it is the sole member of the\ngrade of maximum complexity. In the first stage of the analysis we\nobtain the components of the vertex. These components may be of varying\ncomplexity; but there must be among them at least one member whose\ncomplexity is of a grade one lower than that of the vertex. A grade\nwhich is one lower than that of a given eternal object will be called\nthe \u2018proximate grade\u2019 for that object. We take then those components of\nthe vertex which belong to its proximate grade; and as the second stage\nwe analyse them into their components. Among these components there must\nbe some belonging to the proximate grade for the objects thus analysed.\nAdd to them the components of the vertex which also belong to this grade\nof \u2018second proximation\u2019 from the vertex; and, at the third stage analyse\nas before. We thus find objects belonging to the grade of third\nproximation from the vertex; and we add to them the components belonging\nto this grade, which have been left over from the preceding stages of\nthe analysis. We proceed in this way through successive stages, till we\nreach the grade of simple objects. This grade forms the base of the\nhierarchy.\n\nIt is to be noted that in dealing with hierarchies we are entirely\nwithin the realm of possibility. Accordingly the eternal objects are\ndevoid of real togetherness: they remain within their \u2018isolation.\u2019\n\nThe logical instrument which Aristotle used for the analysis of actual\nfact into more abstract elements was that of classification into species\nand genera. This instrument has its overwhelmingly important application\nfor science in its preparatory stages. But its use in metaphysical\ndescription distorts the true vision of the metaphysical situation. The\nuse of the term \u2018universal\u2019 is intimately connected with this\nAristotelian analysis: the term has been broadened of late; but still it\nsuggests that classificatory analysis. For this reason I have avoided\nit.\n\nIn any actual occasion \u03b1, there will be a group _g_ of simple eternal\nobjects which are ingredient in that group in the most concrete mode.\nThis complete ingredience in an occasion, so as to yield the most\ncomplete fusion of individual essence with other eternal objects in the\nformation of the individual emergent occasion, is evidently of its own\nkind and cannot be defined in terms of anything else. But it has a\npeculiar characteristic which necessarily attaches to it. This\ncharacteristic is that there is an _infinite_ abstractive hierarchy\nbased upon _g_ which is such that all its members are equally involved\nin this complete inclusion in \u03b1.\n\nThe existence of such an infinite abstractive hierarchy is what is meant\nby the statement that it is impossible to complete the description of an\nactual occasion by means of concepts. I will call this infinite\nabstractive hierarchy which is associated with \u03b1 \u2018the associated\nhierarchy of \u03b1.\u2019 It is also what is meant by the notion of the\nconnectedness of an actual occasion. This connectedness of an occasion\nis necessary for its synthetic unity and for its intelligibility. There\nis a connected hierarchy of concepts applicable to the occasion,\nincluding concepts of all degrees of complexity. Also in the actual\noccasion, the individual essences of the eternal objects involved in\nthese complex concepts achieve an aesthetic synthesis, productive of the\noccasion as an experience for its own sake. This associated hierarchy is\nthe shape, or pattern, or form, of the occasion in so far as the\noccasion is constituted of what enters into its full realisation.\n\nSome confusion of thought has been caused by the fact that abstraction\nfrom possibility runs in the opposite direction to an abstraction from\nactuality, so far as degree of abstractness is concerned. For evidently\nin describing an actual occasion \u03b1, we are nearer to the total concrete\nfact when we describe \u03b1 by predicating of it some member of its\nassociated hierarchy, which is of a high grade of complexity. We have\nthen said more about \u03b1. Thus, with a high grade of complexity we gain in\napproach to the full concreteness of \u03b1, and with a low grade we lose in\nthis approach. Accordingly the simple eternal objects represent the\nextreme of abstraction from an actual occasion; whereas simple eternal\nobjects represent the minimum of abstraction from the realm of\npossibility. It will, I think, be found that, when a high degree of\nabstraction is spoken of, abstraction from the realm of possibility is\nwhat is usually meant\u2014in other words, an elaborate logical construction.\n\nSo far I have merely been considering an actual occasion on the side of\nits full concreteness. It is this side of the occasion in virtue of\nwhich it is an event in nature. But a natural event, in this sense of\nthe term, is only an abstraction from a complete actual occasion. A\ncomplete occasion includes that which in cognitive experience takes the\nform of memory, anticipation, imagination, and thought. These elements\nin an experient occasion are also modes of inclusion of complex eternal\nobjects in the synthetic prehension, as elements in the emergent value.\nThey differ from the concreteness of full inclusion. In a sense this\ndifference is inexplicable; for each mode of inclusion is of its own\nkind, not to be explained in terms of anything else. But there is a\ncommon difference which discriminates these modes of inclusion from the\nfull concrete ingression which has been discussed. This _differentia_ is\n_abruptness_. By \u2018abruptness\u2019 I mean that what is remembered, or\nanticipated, or imagined, or thought, is exhausted by a finite complex\nconcept. In each case there is one finite eternal object prehended\nwithin the occasion as the vertex of a finite hierarchy. This breaking\noff from an actual illimitability is what in any occasion marks off that\nwhich is termed mental from that which belongs to the physical event to\nwhich the mental functioning is referred.\n\nIn general there seems to be some loss of vividness in the apprehension\nof the eternal objects concerned: for example, Hume speaks of \u2018faint\ncopies.\u2019 But this faintness seems to be a very unsafe ground for\ndifferentiation. Often things realised in thought are more vivid than\nthe same things in inattentive physical experience. But the things\napprehended as mental are always subject to the condition that we come\nto a stop when we attempt to explore ever higher grades of complexity in\ntheir realised relationships. We always find that we have thought of\njust this\u2014whatever it may be\u2014and of no more. There is a limitation which\nbreaks off the finite concept from the higher grades of illimitable\ncomplexity.\n\nThus an actual occasion is a prehension of one infinite hierarchy (its\nassociated hierarchy) together with various finite hierarchies. The\nsynthesis into the occasion of the infinite hierarchy is according to\nits specific mode of realisation, and that of the finite hierarchies is\naccording to various other specific modes of realisation. There is one\nmetaphysical principle which is essential for the rational coherence of\nthis account of the general character of an experient occasion. I call\nthis principle, \u2018The Translucency of Realisation.\u2019 By this I mean that\nany eternal object is just itself in whatever mode of realisation it is\ninvolved. There can be no distortion of the individual essence without\nthereby producing a different eternal object. In the essence of each\neternal object there stands an indeterminateness which expresses its\nindifferent patience for any mode of ingression into any actual\noccasion. Thus in cognitive experience, there can be the cognition of\nthe same eternal object as in the same occasion having ingression with\nimplication in more than one grade of realisation. Thus the translucency\nof realisation, and the possible multiplicity of modes of ingression\ninto the same occasion, together form the foundation for the\ncorrespondence theory of truth.\n\nIn this account of an actual occasion in terms of its connection with\nthe realm of eternal objects, we have gone back to the train of thought\nin our second chapter, where the nature of mathematics was discussed.\nThe idea, ascribed to Pythagoras, has been amplified, and put forward as\nthe first chapter in metaphysics. The next chapter is concerned with the\npuzzling fact that there is an actual course of events which is in\nitself a limited fact, in that metaphysically speaking it might have\nbeen otherwise. But other metaphysical investigations are omitted; for\nexample, epistemology, and the classification of some elements in the\nunfathomable wealth of the field of possibility. This last topic brings\nmetaphysics in sight of the special topics of the various sciences.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER XI\n\n                                  GOD\n\n\nAristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the\nintroduction of a Prime Mover\u2014God. This, for two reasons, is an\nimportant fact in the history of metaphysics. In the first place if we\nare to accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician,\nhaving regard to genius of insight, to general equipment in knowledge,\nand to the stimulus of his metaphysical ancestry, we must choose\nAristotle. Secondly, in his consideration of this metaphysical question\nhe was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European metaphysician\nof first rate importance for whom this claim can be made. After\nAristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence\nmetaphysical conclusions. The Jews dispersed, first willingly and then\nforcibly, and the Judaic-Alexandrian school arose. Then Christianity\nclosely followed by Mahometanism, intervened. The Greek gods who\nsurrounded Aristotle were subordinate metaphysical entities, well within\nnature. Accordingly on the subject of his Prime Mover, he would have no\nmotive, except to follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever\nit led him. It did not lead him very far towards the production of a God\navailable for religious purposes. It may be doubted whether any properly\ngeneral metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other\nconsiderations, get much further than Aristotle. But his conclusion does\nrepresent a first step without which no evidence on a narrower\nexperiential basis can be of much avail in shaping the conception. For\nnothing, within any limited type of experience, can give intelligence to\nshape our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless\nthe general character of things requires that there be such an entity.\n\nThe phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aristotle\u2019s thought was enmeshed\nin the details of an erroneous physics and an erroneous cosmology. In\nAristotle\u2019s physics special causes were required to sustain the motions\nof material things. These could easily be fitted into his system,\nprovided that the general cosmic motions could be sustained. For then in\nrelation to the general working system, each thing could be provided\nwith its true end. Hence the necessity for a Prime Mover who sustains\nthe motions of the spheres on which depend the adjustment of things.\nTo-day we repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian\ncosmology, so that the exact form of the above argument manifestly\nfails. But if our general metaphysics is in any way similar to that\noutlined in the previous chapter, an analogous metaphysical problem\narises which can be solved only in an analogous fashion. In the place of\nAristotle\u2019s God as Prime Mover, we require God as the Principle of\nConcretion. This position can be substantiated only by the discussion of\nthe general implication of the course of actual occasions,\u2014that is to\nsay, of the process of realisation.\n\nWe conceive actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable\npossibility. Eternal objects inform actual occasions with hierarchic\npatterns, included and excluded in every variety of discrimination.\nAnother view of the same truth is that every actual occasion is a\nlimitation imposed on possibility, and that by virtue of this\nlimitation the particular value of that shaped togetherness of things\nemerges. In this way we express how a single occasion is to be viewed\nin terms of possibility, and how possibility is to be viewed in terms\nof a single actual occasion. But there are no single occasions, in the\nsense of isolated occasions. Actuality is through and through\ntogetherness\u2014togetherness of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and\ntogetherness of all actual occasions. It is my task in this chapter to\ndescribe the unity of actual occasions. The previous chapter centered\nits interest in the abstract: the present chapter deals with the\nconcrete, _i.e._, that which has grown together.\n\nConsider an occasion \u03b1:\u2014we have to enumerate how other actual occasions\nare in \u03b1, in the sense that their relationships with \u03b1 are constitutive\nof the essence of \u03b1. What \u03b1 is in itself, is that it is a unit of\nrealised experience; accordingly we ask how other occasions are in the\nexperience which is \u03b1. Also for the present I am excluding cognitive\nexperience. The complete answer to this question is, that the\nrelationships among actual occasions are as unfathomable in their\nvariety of type as are those among eternal objects in the realm of\nabstraction. But there are fundamental types of such relationships in\nterms of which the whole complex variety can find its description.\n\nA preliminary for the understanding of these types of entry (of one\noccasion into the essence of another) is to note that they are involved\nin the modes of realisation of abstractive hierarchies, discussed in the\nprevious chapter. The spatio-temporal relationships, involved in those\nhierarchies as realised in \u03b1, have all a definition in terms of \u03b1 and of\nthe occasions entrant in \u03b1. Thus the entrant occasions lend their\naspects to the hierarchies, and thereby convert spatio-temporal\nmodalities into categorical determinations; and the hierarchies lend\ntheir forms to the occasions and thereby limit the entrant occasions to\nbeing entrant only under those forms. Thus in the same way (as seen in\nthe previous chapter) that every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal\nobjects under the limitation of gradations of actuality, so every\noccasion is a synthesis of all occasions under the limitation of\ngradations of types of entry. Each occasion synthesises the totality of\ncontent under its own limitations of mode.\n\nIn respect to these types of internal relationship between \u03b1 and other\noccasions, these other occasions (as constitutive of \u03b1) can be\nclassified in many alternative ways. These are all concerned with\ndifferent definitions of past, present, and future. It has been usual in\nphilosophy to assume that these various definitions must necessarily be\nequivalent. The present state of opinion in physical science\nconclusively shows that this assumption is without metaphysical\njustification, even though any such discrimination may be found to be\nunnecessary for physical science. This question has already been dealt\nwith in the chapter on Relativity. But the physical theory of relativity\ntouches only the fringe of the various theories which are metaphysically\ntenable. It is important for my argument to insist upon the unbounded\nfreedom within which the actual is a unique categorical determination.\n\nEvery actual occasion exhibits itself as a process: it is a\nbecomingness. In so disclosing itself, it places itself as one among a\nmultiplicity of other occasions, without which it could not be itself.\nIt also defines itself as a particular individual achievement, focussing\nin its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal objects.\n\nAny one occasion \u03b1 issues from other occasions which collectively form\nits _past_. It displays for itself other occasions which collectively\nform its _present_. It is in respect to its associated hierarchy, as\ndisplayed in this immediate present, that an occasion finds its own\noriginality. It is that display which is its own contribution to the\noutput of actuality. It may be conditioned, and even completely\ndetermined by the past from which it issues. But its display in the\npresent under those conditions is what directly emerges from its\nprehensive activity. The occasion \u03b1 also holds within itself an\nindetermination in the form of a future, which has partial determination\nby reason of its inclusion in \u03b1 and also has determinate spatio-temporal\nrelatedness to \u03b1 and to actual occasions of the past from \u03b1 and of the\npresent for \u03b1.\n\nThis future is a synthesis in \u03b1 of eternal objects as not-being and as\nrequiring the passage from \u03b1 to other individualisations (with\ndeterminate spatio-temporal relations to \u03b1) in which not-being becomes\nbeing.\n\nThere is also in \u03b1 what, in the previous chapter, I have termed the\n\u2018abrupt\u2019 realisation of finite eternal objects. This abrupt realisation\nrequires _either_ a reference of the basic objects of the finite\nhierarchy to determinate occasions other than \u03b1 (as their situations),\nin past, present, future; _or_ requires a realisation of these eternal\nobjects in determinate relationships, but under the aspect of exemption\nfrom inclusion in the spatio-temporal scheme of relatedness between\nactual occasions. This abrupt synthesis of eternal objects in each\noccasion is the inclusion in actuality of the analytical character of\nthe realm of eternality. This inclusion has those limited gradations of\nactuality which characterise every occasion by reason of its essential\nlimitation. It is this realised extension of eternal relatedness beyond\nthe mutual relatedness of the actual occasions, which prehends into each\noccasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this abrupt\nrealisation the \u2018graded envisagement\u2019 which each occasion prehends into\nits synthesis. This graded envisagement is how the actual includes what\n(in one sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement.\nIt is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion.\nBy it, fact is confronted with alternatives.\n\nThis general concept, of an event as a process whose outcome is a unit\nof experience, points to the analysis of an event into (i) substantial\nactivity, (ii) conditioned potentialities which are there for synthesis,\nand (iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis. The unity of all actual\noccasions forbids the analysis of substantial activities into\nindependent entities. Each individual activity is nothing but the mode\nin which the general activity is individualised by the imposed\nconditions. The envisagement which enters into the synthesis is also a\ncharacter which conditions the synthesising activity. The general\nactivity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal\nobjects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which\nunderlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. There\nis nothing with which to compare it: it is Spinoza\u2019s one infinite\nsubstance. Its attributes are its character of individualisation into a\nmultiplicity of modes, and the realm of eternal objects which are\nvariously synthesised in these modes. Thus eternal possibility and modal\ndifferentiation into individual multiplicity are the attributes of the\none substance. In fact each general element of the metaphysical\nsituation is an attribute of the substantial activity.\n\nYet another element in the metaphysical situation is disclosed by the\nconsideration that the general attribute of modality is limited. This\nelement must rank as an attribute of the substantial activity. In its\nnature each mode is limited, so as not to be other modes. But, beyond\nthese limitations of particulars, the general modal individualisation is\nlimited in two ways: In the first place it is an actual course of\nevents, which might be otherwise so far as concerns eternal possibility,\nbut _is_ that course. This limitation takes three forms, (i) the special\nlogical relations which all events must conform to, (ii) the selection\nof relationships to which the events do conform, and (iii) the\nparticularity which infects the course even within those general\nrelationships of logic and causation. Thus this first limitation is a\nlimitation of antecedent selection. So far as the general metaphysical\nsituation is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate modal\npluralism apart from logical or other limitation. But there could not\nthen have been these modes, for each mode represents a synthesis of\nactualities which are limited to conform to a standard. We here come to\nthe second way of limitation. Restriction is the price of value. There\ncannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate\nthe acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of\nactivity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values,\nintroducing contraries, grades, and oppositions.\n\nAccording to this argument the fact that there is a process of actual\noccasions, and the fact that the occasions are the emergence of values\nwhich require such limitation, both require that the course of events\nshould have developed amid an antecedent limitation composed of\nconditions, particularisation, and standards of value.\n\nThus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, there is\nrequired a principle of limitation. Some particular _how_ is necessary,\nand some particularisation in the _what_ of matter of fact is necessary.\nThe only alternative to this admission, is to deny the reality of actual\noccasions. Their apparent irrational limitation must be taken as a proof\nof illusion and we must look for reality behind the scene. If we reject\nthis alternative behind the scene, we must provide a ground for\nlimitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial\nactivity. This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can\nbe given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation,\nand His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be\ngiven for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose.\nGod is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No\nreason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the\nground of rationality.\n\nIn this argument the point to notice is, that what is metaphysically\nindeterminate has nevertheless to be categorically determinate. We have\ncome to the limit of rationality. For there is a categorical limitation\nwhich does not spring from any metaphysical reason. There is a\nmetaphysical need for a principle of determination, but there can be no\nmetaphysical reason for what is determined. If there were such a reason,\nthere would be no need for any further principle: for metaphysics would\nalready have provided the determination. The general principle of\nempiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of\nconcretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason. What further\ncan be known about God must be sought in the region of particular\nexperiences, and therefore rests on an empirical basis. In respect to\nthe interpretation of these experiences, mankind have differed\nprofoundly. He has been named respectively, Jehovah, Allah, Brahma,\nFather in Heaven, Order of Heaven, First Cause, Supreme Being, Chance.\nEach name corresponds to a system of thought derived from the\nexperiences of those who have used it.\n\nAmong medieval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the\nreligious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has prevailed of\npaying to Him metaphysical compliments. He has been conceived as the\nfoundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity. If\nthis conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to\ndiscern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then\nthe supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed\nits shortcomings as well as its success. If He be conceived as the\nsupreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide\nthe Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason \u2018within her dominions\nsupreme.\u2019\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER XII\n\n                          RELIGION AND SCIENCE\n\n\nThe difficulty in approaching the question of the relations between\nReligion and Science is, that its elucidation requires that we have in\nour minds some clear idea of what we mean by either of the terms,\n\u2018religion\u2019 and \u2018science.\u2019 Also I wish to speak in the most general way\npossible, and to keep in the background any comparison of particular\ncreeds, scientific or religious. We have got to understand the type of\nconnection which exists between the two spheres, and then to draw some\ndefinite conclusions respecting the existing situation which at present\nconfronts the world.\n\nThe _conflict_ between religion and science is what naturally occurs to\nour minds when we think of this subject. It seems as though, during the\nlast half-century, the results of science and the beliefs of religion\nhad come into a position of frank disagreement, from which there can be\nno escape, except by abandoning either the clear teaching of science, or\nthe clear teaching of religion. This conclusion has been urged by\ncontroversialists on either side. Not by all controversialists, of\ncourse, but by those trenchant intellects which every controversy calls\nout into the open.\n\nThe distress of sensitive minds, and the zeal for truth, and the sense\nof the importance of the issues, must command our sincerest sympathy.\nWhen we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it\nis no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon\nthe decision of this generation as to the relations between them. We\nhave here the two strongest general forces (apart from the mere impulse\nof the various senses) which influence men, and they seem to be set one\nagainst the other\u2014the force of our religious intuitions, and the force\nof our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction.\n\nA great English statesman once advised his countrymen to use large-scale\nmaps, as a preservative against alarms, panics, and general\nmisunderstanding of the true relations between nations. In the same way\nin dealing with the clash between permanent elements of human nature, it\nis well to map our history on a large scale, and to disengage ourselves\nfrom our immediate absorption in the present conflicts. When we do this,\nwe immediately discover two great facts. In the first place, there has\nalways been a conflict between religion and science; and in the second\nplace, both religion and science have always been in a state of\ncontinual development. In the early days of Christianity, there was a\ngeneral belief among Christians that the world was coming to an end in\nthe lifetime of people then living. We can make only indirect inferences\nas to how far this belief was authoritatively proclaimed; but it is\ncertain that it was widely held, and that it formed an impressive part\nof the popular religious doctrine. The belief proved itself to be\nmistaken, and Christian doctrine adjusted itself to the change. Again in\nthe early Church individual theologians very confidently deduced from\nthe Bible opinions concerning the nature of the physical universe. In\nthe year A. D. 535, a monk named Cosmas[17] wrote a book which he\nentitled, _Christian Topography_. He was a travelled man who had visited\nIndia and Ethiopia; and finally he lived in a monastery at Alexandria,\nwhich was then a great centre of culture. In this book, basing himself\nupon the direct meaning of Biblical texts as construed by him in a\nliteral fashion, he denied the existence of the antipodes, and asserted\nthat the world is a flat parallelogram whose length is double its\nbreadth.\n\nFootnote 17:\n\n  _Cf._ Lecky\u2019s _The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe_, Ch.\n  III.\n\nIn the seventeenth century the doctrine of the motion of the earth was\ncondemned by a Catholic tribunal. A hundred years ago the extension of\ntime demanded by geological science distressed religious people,\nProtestant and Catholic. And to-day the doctrine of evolution is an\nequal stumbling-block. These are only a few instances illustrating a\ngeneral fact.\n\nBut all our ideas will be in a wrong perspective if we think that this\nrecurring perplexity was confined to contradictions between religion and\nscience; and that in these controversies religion was always wrong, and\nthat science was always right. The true facts of the case are very much\nmore complex, and refuse to be summarised in these simple terms.\n\nTheology itself exhibits exactly the same character of gradual\ndevelopment, arising from an aspect of conflict between its own proper\nideas. This fact is a commonplace to theologians, but is often obscured\nin the stress of controversy. I do not wish to overstate my case; so I\nwill confine myself to Roman Catholic writers. In the seventeenth\ncentury a learned Jesuit, Father Petavius, showed that the theologians\nof the first three centuries of Christianity made use of phrases and\nstatements which since the fifth century would be condemned as\nheretical. Also Cardinal Newman devoted a treatise to the discussion of\nthe development of doctrine. He wrote it before he became a great Roman\nCatholic ecclesiastic; but throughout his life, it was never retracted\nand continually reissued.\n\nScience is even more changeable than theology. No man of science could\nsubscribe without qualification to Galileo\u2019s beliefs, or to Newton\u2019s\nbeliefs, or to all his own scientific beliefs of ten years ago.\n\nIn both regions of thought, additions, distinctions, and modifications\nhave been introduced. So that now, even when the same assertion is made\nto-day as was made a thousand, or fifteen hundred years ago, it is made\nsubject to limitations or expansions of meaning, which were not\ncontemplated at the earlier epoch. We are told by logicians that a\nproposition must be either true or false, and that there is no middle\nterm. But in practice, we may know that a proposition expresses an\nimportant truth, but that it is subject to limitations and\nqualifications which at present remain undiscovered. It is a general\nfeature of our knowledge, that we are insistently aware of important\ntruths; and yet that the only formulations of these truths which we are\nable to make presuppose a general standpoint of conceptions which may\nhave to be modified. I will give you two illustrations, both from\nscience: Galileo said that the earth moves and that the sun is fixed;\nthe Inquisition said that the earth is fixed and the sun moves; and\nNewtonian astronomers, adopting an absolute theory of space, said that\nboth the sun and the earth move. But now we say that any one of these\nthree statements is equally true, provided that you have fixed your\nsense of \u2018rest\u2019 and \u2018motion\u2019 in the way required by the statement\nadopted. At the date of Galileo\u2019s controversy with the Inquisition,\nGalileo\u2019s way of stating the facts was, beyond question, the fruitful\nprocedure for the sake of scientific research. But in itself it was not\nmore true than the formulation of the Inquisition. But at that time the\nmodern concepts of relative motion were in nobody\u2019s mind; so that the\nstatements were made in ignorance of the qualifications required for\ntheir more perfect truth. Yet this question of the motions of the earth\nand the sun expresses a real fact in the universe; and all sides had got\nhold of important truths concerning it. But with the knowledge of those\ntimes, the truths appeared to be inconsistent.\n\nAgain I will give you another example taken from the state of modern\nphysical science. Since the time of Newton and Huyghens in the\nseventeenth century there have been two theories as to the physical\nnature of light. Newton\u2019s theory was that a beam of light consists of a\nstream of very minute particles, or corpuscles, and that we have the\nsensation of light when these corpuscles strike the retinas of our eyes.\nHuyghens\u2019 theory was that light consists of very minute waves of\ntrembling in an all-pervading ether, and that these waves are travelling\nalong a beam of light. The two theories are contradictory. In the\neighteenth century Newton\u2019s theory was believed, in the nineteenth\ncentury Huyghens\u2019 theory was believed. To-day there is one large group\nof phenomena which can be explained only on the wave theory, and another\nlarge group which can be explained only on the corpuscular theory.\nScientists have to leave it at that, and wait for the future, in the\nhope of attaining some wider vision which reconciles both.\n\nWe should apply these same principles to the questions in which there is\na variance between science and religion. We would believe nothing in\neither sphere of thought which does not appear to us to be certified by\nsolid reasons based upon the critical research either of ourselves or of\ncompetent authorities. But granting that we have honestly taken this\nprecaution, a clash between the two on points of detail where they\noverlap should not lead us hastily to abandon doctrines for which we\nhave solid evidence. It may be that we are more interested in one set of\ndoctrines than in the other. But, if we have any sense of perspective\nand of the history of thought, we shall wait and refrain from mutual\nanathemas.\n\nWe should wait: but we should not wait passively, or in despair. The\nclash is a sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives\nwithin which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle\nscience will be found.\n\nIn one sense, therefore, the conflict between science and religion is a\nslight matter which has been unduly emphasised. A mere logical\ncontradiction cannot in itself point to more than the necessity of some\nreadjustments, possibly of a very minor character on both sides.\nRemember the widely different aspects of events which are dealt with in\nscience and in religion respectively. Science is concerned with the\ngeneral conditions which are observed to regulate physical phenomena;\nwhereas religion is wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral and\naesthetic values. On the one side there is the law of gravitation, and\non the other the contemplation of the beauty of holiness. What one side\nsees, the other misses; and vice versa.\n\nConsider, for example, the lives of John Wesley and of Saint Francis of\nAssisi. For physical science you have in these lives merely ordinary\nexamples of the operation of the principles of physiological chemistry,\nand of the dynamics of nervous reactions: for religion you have lives of\nthe most profound significance in the history of the world. Can you be\nsurprised that, in the absence of a perfect and complete phrasing of the\nprinciples of science and of the principles of religion which apply to\nthese specific cases, the accounts of these lives from these divergent\nstandpoints should involve discrepancies? It would be a miracle if it\nwere not so.\n\nIt would, however, be missing the point to think that we need not\ntrouble ourselves about the conflict between science and religion. In an\nintellectual age there can be no active interest which puts aside all\nhope of a vision of the harmony of truth. To acquiesce in discrepancy is\ndestructive of candour, and of moral cleanliness. It belongs to the\nself-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final\nunravelment. If you check that impulse, you will get no religion and no\nscience from an awakened thoughtfulness. The important question is, In\nwhat spirit are we going to face the issue? There we come to something\nabsolutely vital.\n\nA clash of doctrines is not a disaster\u2014it is an opportunity. I will\nexplain my meaning by some illustrations from science. The weight of an\natom of nitrogen was well known. Also it was an established scientific\ndoctrine that the average weight of such atoms in any considerable mass\nwill be always the same. Two experimenters, the late Lord Rayleigh and\nthe late Sir William Ramsay, found that if they obtained nitrogen by two\ndifferent methods, each equally effective for that purpose, they always\nobserved a persistent slight difference between the average weights of\nthe atoms in the two cases. Now I ask you, would it have been rational\nof these men to have despaired because of this conflict between chemical\ntheory and scientific observation? Suppose that for some reason the\nchemical doctrine had been highly prized throughout some district as the\nfoundation of its social order:\u2014would it have been wise, would it have\nbeen candid, would it have been moral, to forbid the disclosure of the\nfact that the experiments produced discordant results? Or, on the other\nhand, should Sir William Ramsay and Lord Rayleigh have proclaimed that\nchemical theory was now a detected delusion? We see at once that either\nof these ways would have been a method of facing the issue in an\nentirely wrong spirit. What Rayleigh and Ramsay did do was this: They at\nonce perceived that they had hit upon a line of investigation which\nwould disclose some subtlety of chemical theory that had hitherto eluded\nobservation. The discrepancy was not a disaster: it was an opportunity\nto increase the sweep of chemical knowledge. You all know the end of the\nstory: finally argon was discovered, a new chemical element which had\nlurked undetected, mixed with the nitrogen. But the story has a sequel\nwhich forms my second illustration. This discovery drew attention to the\nimportance of observing accurately minute differences in chemical\nsubstances as obtained by different methods. Further researches of the\nmost careful accuracy were undertaken. Finally another physicist, F. W.\nAston, working in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge in England,\ndiscovered that even the same element might assume two or more distinct\nforms, termed _isotopes_, and that the law of the constancy of average\natomic weight holds for each of these forms, but as between the\ndifferent isotopes differs slightly. The research has effected a great\nstride in the power of chemical theory, far transcending in importance\nthe discovery of argon from which it originated. The moral of these\nstories lies on the surface, and I will leave to you their application\nto the case of religion and science.\n\nIn formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a defeat: but in the\nevolution of real knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards\na victory. This is one great reason for the utmost toleration of variety\nof opinion. Once and forever, this duty of toleration has been summed up\nin the words, \u2018Let both grow together until the harvest.\u2019 The failure of\nChristians to act up to this precept, of the highest authority, is one\nof the curiosities of religious history. But we have not yet exhausted\nthe discussion of the moral temper required for the pursuit of truth.\nThere are short cuts leading merely to an illusory success. It is easy\nenough to find a theory, logically harmonious and with important\napplications in the region of fact, provided that you are content to\ndisregard half your evidence. Every age produces people with clear\nlogical intellects, and with the most praiseworthy grasp of the\nimportance of some sphere of human experience, who have elaborated, or\ninherited, a scheme of thought which exactly fits those experiences\nwhich claim their interest. Such people are apt resolutely to ignore, or\nto explain away, all evidence which confuses their scheme with\ncontradictory instances. What they cannot fit in is for them nonsense.\nAn unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account is\nthe only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of\nfashionable opinion. This advice seems so easy, and is in fact so\ndifficult to follow.\n\nOne reason for this difficulty is that we cannot think first and act\nafterwards. From the moment of birth we are immersed in action, and can\nonly fitfully guide it by taking thought. We have, therefore, in various\nspheres of experience to adopt those ideas which seem to work within\nthose spheres. It is absolutely necessary to trust to ideas which are\ngenerally adequate, even though we know that there are subtleties and\ndistinctions beyond our ken. Also apart from the necessities of action,\nwe cannot even keep before our minds the whole evidence except under the\nguise of doctrines which are incompletely harmonised. We cannot think in\nterms of an indefinite multiplicity of detail; our evidence can acquire\nits proper importance only if it comes before us marshalled by general\nideas. These ideas we inherit\u2014they form the tradition of our\ncivilisation. Such traditional ideas are never static. They are either\nfading into meaningless formulae, or are gaining power by the new lights\nthrown by a more delicate apprehension. They are transformed by the urge\nof critical reason, by the vivid evidence of emotional experience, and\nby the cold certainties of scientific perception. One fact is certain,\nyou cannot keep them still. No generation can merely reproduce its\nancestors. You may preserve the life in a flux of form, or preserve the\nform amid an ebb of life. But you cannot permanently enclose the same\nlife in the same mould.\n\nThe present state of religion among the European races illustrates the\nstatements which I have been making. The phenomena are mixed. There have\nbeen reactions and revivals. But on the whole, during many generations,\nthere has been a gradual decay of religious influence in European\ncivilisation. Each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor,\nand each period of slackness a lower depth. The average curve marks a\nsteady fall in religious tone. In some countries the interest in\nreligion is higher than in others. But in those countries where the\ninterest is relatively high, it still falls as the generations pass.\nReligion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to\nembellish a comfortable life. A great historical movement on this scale\nresults from the convergence of many causes. I wish to suggest two of\nthem which lie within the scope of this chapter for consideration.\n\nIn the first place for over two centuries religion has been on the\ndefensive, and on a weak defensive. The period has been one of\nunprecedented intellectual progress. In this way a series of novel\nsituations have been produced for thought. Each such occasion has found\nthe religious thinkers unprepared. Something, which has been proclaimed\nto be vital, has finally, after struggle, distress, and anathema, been\nmodified and otherwise interpreted. The next generation of religious\napologists then congratulates the religious world on the deeper insight\nwhich has been gained. The result of the continued repetition of this\nundignified retreat, during many generations, has at last almost\nentirely destroyed the intellectual authority of religious thinkers.\nConsider this contrast: when Darwin or Einstein proclaim theories which\nmodify our ideas, it is a triumph for science. We do not go about saying\nthat there is another defeat for science, because its old ideas have\nbeen abandoned. We know that another step of scientific insight has been\ngained.\n\nReligion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the\nsame spirit as does science. Its principles may be eternal, but the\nexpression of those principles requires continual development. This\nevolution of religion is in the main a disengagement of its own proper\nideas from the adventitious notions which have crept into it by reason\nof the expression of its own ideas in terms of the imaginative picture\nof the world entertained in previous ages. Such a release of religion\nfrom the bonds of imperfect science is all to the good. It stresses its\nown genuine message. The great point to be kept in mind is that normally\nan advance in science will show that statements of various religious\nbeliefs require some sort of modification. It may be that they have to\nbe expanded or explained, or indeed entirely restated. If the religion\nis a sound expression of truth, this modification will only exhibit more\nadequately the exact point which is of importance. This process is a\ngain. In so far, therefore, as any religion has any contact with\nphysical facts, it is to be expected that the point of view of those\nfacts must be continually modified as scientific knowledge advances. In\nthis way, the exact relevance of these facts for religious thought will\ngrow more and more clear. The progress of science must result in the\nunceasing modification of religious thought, to the great advantage of\nreligion.\n\nThe religious controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries\nput theologians into a most unfortunate state of mind. They were always\nattacking and defending. They pictured themselves as the garrison of a\nfort surrounded by hostile forces. All such pictures express\nhalf-truths. That is why they are so popular. But they are dangerous.\nThis particular picture fostered a pugnacious party spirit which really\nexpresses an ultimate lack of faith. They dared not modify, because they\nshirked the task of disengaging their spiritual message from the\nassociations of a particular imagery.\n\nLet me explain myself by an example. In the early medieval times, Heaven\nwas in the sky, and Hell was underground; volcanoes were the jaws of\nHell. I do not assert that these beliefs entered into the official\nformulations: but they did enter into the popular understanding of the\ngeneral doctrines of Heaven and Hell. These notions were what everyone\nthought to be implied by the doctrine of the future state. They entered\ninto the explanations of the most influential exponents of Christian\nbelief. For example, they occur in the _Dialogues_ of Pope Gregory,[18]\nthe Great, a man whose high official position is surpassed only by the\nmagnitude of his services to humanity. I am not saying what we ought to\nbelieve about the future state. But whatever be the right doctrine, in\nthis instance the clash between religion and science, which has\nrelegated the earth to the position of a second-rate planet attached to\na second-rate sun, has been greatly to the benefit of the spirituality\nof religion by dispersing these medieval fancies.\n\nFootnote 18:\n\n  _Cf._ Gregorovius\u2019 _History of Rome in the Middle Ages_, Book III, Ch.\n  III, Vol. II, English Trans.\n\nAnother way of looking at this question of the evolution of religious\nthought is to note that any verbal form of statement which has been\nbefore the world for some time discloses ambiguities; and that often\nsuch ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning. The effective\nsense in which a doctrine has been held in the past cannot be determined\nby the mere logical analysis of verbal statements, made in ignorance of\nthe logical trap. You have to take into account the whole reaction of\nhuman nature to the scheme of thought. This reaction is of a mixed\ncharacter, including elements of emotion derived from our lower natures.\nIt is here that the impersonal criticism of science and of philosophy\ncomes to the aid of religious evolution. Example after example can be\ngiven of this motive force in development. For example, the logical\ndifficulties inherent in the doctrine of the moral cleansing of human\nnature by the power of religion rent Christianity in the days of\nPelagius and Augustine\u2014that is to say, at the beginning of the fifth\ncentury. Echoes of that controversy still linger in theology.\n\nSo far, my point has been this: that religion is the expression of one\ntype of fundamental experiences of mankind: that religious thought\ndevelops into an increasing accuracy of expression, disengaged from\nadventitious imagery: that the interaction between religion and science\nis one great factor in promoting this development.\n\nI now come to my second reason for the modern fading of interest in\nreligion. This involves the ultimate question which I stated in my\nopening sentences. We have to know what we mean by religion. The\nchurches, in their presentation of their answers to this query, have put\nforward aspects of religion which are expressed in terms either suited\nto the emotional reactions of bygone times or directed to excite modern\nemotional interests of a nonreligious character. What I mean under the\nfirst heading is that religious appeal is directed partly to excite that\ninstinctive fear of the wrath of a tyrant which was inbred in the\nunhappy populations of the arbitrary empires of the ancient world, and\nin particular to excite that fear of an all-powerful arbitrary tyrant\nbehind the unknown forces of nature. This appeal to the ready instinct\nof brute fear is losing its force. It lacks any directness of response,\nbecause modern science and modern conditions of life have taught us to\nmeet occasions of apprehension by a critical analysis of their causes\nand conditions. Religion is the reaction of human nature to its search\nfor God. The presentation of God under the aspect of power awakens every\nmodern instinct of critical reaction. This is fatal; for religion\ncollapses unless its main positions command immediacy of assent. In this\nrespect the old phraseology is at variance with the psychology of modern\ncivilisations. This change in psychology is largely due to science, and\nis one of the chief ways in which the advance of science has weakened\nthe hold of the old religious forms of expression. The nonreligious\nmotive which has entered into modern religious thought is the desire for\na comfortable organisation of modern society. Religion has been\npresented as valuable for the ordering of life. Its claims have been\nrested upon its function as a sanction to right conduct. Also the\npurpose of right conduct quickly degenerates into the formation of\npleasing social relations. We have here a subtle degradation of\nreligious ideas, following upon their gradual purification under the\ninfluence of keener ethical intuitions. Conduct is a by-product of\nreligion\u2014an inevitable by-product, but not the main point. Every great\nreligious teacher has revolted against the presentation of religion as a\nmere sanction of rules of conduct. Saint Paul denounced the Law, and\nPuritan divines spoke of the filthy rags of righteousness. The\ninsistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour.\nAbove and beyond all things, the religious life is not a research after\ncomfort. I must now state, in all diffidence, what I conceive to be the\nessential character of the religious spirit.\n\nReligion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and\nwithin, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real,\nand yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility,\nand yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to\nall that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession\nis the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the\nultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.\n\nThe immediate reaction of human nature to the religious vision is\nworship. Religion has emerged into human experience mixed with the\ncrudest fancies of barbaric imagination. Gradually, slowly, steadily the\nvision recurs in history under nobler form and with clearer expression.\nIt is the one element in human experience which persistently shows an\nupward trend. It fades and then recurs. But when it renews its force, it\nrecurs with an added richness and purity of content. The fact of the\nreligious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one\nground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional\nenjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of\ntransient experience.\n\nThe vision claims nothing but worship; and worship is a surrender to the\nclaim for assimilation, urged with the motive force of mutual love. The\nvision never overrules. It is always there, and it has the power of love\npresenting the one purpose whose fulfilment is eternal harmony. Such\norder as we find in nature is never force\u2014it presents itself as the one\nharmonious adjustment of complex detail. Evil is the brute motive force\nof fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal vision. Evil is\noverruling, retarding, hurting. The power of God is the worship He\ninspires. That religion is strong which in its ritual and its modes of\nthought evokes an apprehension of the commanding vision. The worship of\nGod is not a rule of safety\u2014it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight\nafter the unattainable. The death of religion comes with the repression\nof the high hope of adventure.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER XIII\n\n                     REQUISITES FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS\n\n\nIt has been the purpose of these lectures to analyse the reactions of\nscience in forming that background of instinctive ideas which control\nthe activities of successive generations. Such a background takes the\nform of a certain vague philosophy as to the last word about things,\nwhen all is said. The three centuries, which form the epoch of modern\nscience, have revolved round the ideas of _God_, _mind_, _matter_, and\nalso of _space_ and _time_ in their characters of expressing _simple\nlocation_ for matter. Philosophy has on the whole emphasised _mind_, and\nhas thus been out of touch with science during the two latter centuries.\nBut it is creeping back into its old importance owing to the rise of\npsychology and its alliance with physiology. Also, this rehabilitation\nof philosophy has been facilitated by the recent breakdown of the\nseventeenth century settlement of the principles of physical science.\nBut, until that collapse, science seated itself securely upon the\nconcepts of matter, space, time, and latterly, of energy. Also there\nwere arbitrary laws of nature determining locomotion. They were\nempirically observed, but for some obscure reason were known to be\nuniversal. Anyone who in practice or theory disregarded them was\ndenounced with unsparing vigour. This position on the part of scientists\nwas pure bluff, if one may credit them with believing their own\nstatements. For their current philosophy completely failed to justify\nthe assumption that the immediate knowledge inherent in any present\noccasion throws any light either on its past, or its future.\n\nI have also sketched an alternative philosophy of science in which\n_organism_ takes the place of _matter_. For this purpose, the mind\ninvolved in the materialist theory dissolves into a function of\norganism. The psychological field then exhibits what an event is in\nitself. Our bodily event is an unusually complex type of organism and\nconsequently includes cognition. Further, space and time, in their most\nconcrete signification, become the locus of events. An organism is the\nrealisation of a definite shape of value. The emergence of some actual\nvalue depends on limitation which excludes neutralising cross-lights.\nThus an event is a matter of fact which by reason of its limitation is a\nvalue for itself; but by reason of its very nature it also requires the\nwhole universe in order to be itself.\n\nImportance depends on endurance. Endurance is the retention through time\nof an achievement of value. What endures is identity of pattern,\nself-inherited. Endurance requires the favourable environment. The whole\nof science revolves round this question of enduring organisms.\n\nThe general influence of science at the present moment can be analysed\nunder the headings: General Conceptions Respecting the Universe,\nTechnological Applications, Professionalism in Knowledge, Influence of\nBiological Doctrines on the Motives of Conduct. I have endeavoured in\nthe preceding lectures to give a glimpse of these points. It lies within\nthe scope of this concluding lecture to consider the reaction of science\nupon some problems confronting civilised societies.\n\nThe general conceptions introduced by science into modern thought cannot\nbe separated from the philosophical situation as expressed by Descartes.\nI mean the assumption of bodies and minds as independent individual\nsubstances, each existing in its own right apart from any necessary\nreference to each other. Such a conception was very concordant with the\nindividualism which had issued from the moral discipline of the Middle\nAges. But, though the easy reception of the idea is thus explained, the\nderivation in itself rests upon a confusion, very natural but none the\nless unfortunate. The moral discipline had emphasized the intrinsic\nvalue of the individual entity. This emphasis had put the notions of the\nindividual and of its experiences into the foreground of thought. At\nthis point the confusion commences. The emergent individual value of\neach entity is transformed into the independent substantial existence of\neach entity, which is a very different notion.\n\nI do not mean to say that Descartes made this logical, or rather\nillogical, transition, in the form of explicit reasoning. Far from it.\nWhat he did, was first to concentrate upon his own conscious\nexperiences, as being facts within the independent world of his own\nmentality. He was led to speculate in this way by the current emphasis\nupon the individual value of his total self. He implicitly transformed\nthis emergent individual value, inherent in the very fact of his own\nreality, into a private world of passions, or modes, of independent\nsubstance.\n\nAlso the independence ascribed to bodily substances carried them away\nfrom the realm of values altogether. They degenerated into a mechanism\nentirely valueless, except as suggestive of an external ingenuity. The\nheavens had lost the glory of God. This state of mind is illustrated in\nthe recoil of Protestantism from aesthetic effects dependent upon a\nmaterial medium. It was taken to lead to an ascription of value to what\nis in itself valueless. This recoil was already in full strength\nantecedently to Descartes. Accordingly, the Cartesian scientific\ndoctrine of bits of matter, bare of intrinsic value, was merely a\nformulation, in explicit terms, of a doctrine which was current before\nits entrance into scientific thought or Cartesian philosophy. Probably\nthis doctrine was latent in the scholastic philosophy, but it did not\nlead to its consequences till it met with the mentality of northern\nEurope in the sixteenth century. But science, as equipped by Descartes,\ngave stability and intellectual status to a point of view which has had\nvery mixed effects upon the moral presuppositions of modern communities.\nIts good effects arose from its efficiency as a method for scientific\nresearches within those limited regions which were then best suited for\nexploration. The result was a general clearing of the European mind away\nfrom the stains left upon it by the hysteria of remote barbaric ages.\nThis was all to the good, and was most completely exemplified in the\neighteenth century.\n\nBut in the nineteenth century, when society was undergoing\ntransformation into the manufacturing system, the bad effects of these\ndoctrines have been very fatal. The doctrine of minds, as independent\nsubstances, leads directly not merely to private worlds of experience,\nbut also to private worlds of morals. The moral intuitions can be held\nto apply only to the strictly private world of psychological experience.\nAccordingly, self-respect, and the making the most of your own\nindividual opportunities, together constituted the efficient morality of\nthe leaders among the industrialists of that period. The western world\nis now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the three previous\ngenerations.\n\nAlso the assumption of the bare valuelessness of mere matter led to a\nlack of reverence in the treatment of natural or artistic beauty. Just\nwhen the urbanisation of the western world was entering upon its state\nof rapid development, and when the most delicate, anxious consideration\nof the aesthetic qualities of the new material environment was\nrequisite, the doctrine of the irrelevance of such ideas was at its\nheight. In the most advanced industrial countries, art was treated as a\nfrivolity. A striking example of this state of mind in the middle of the\nnineteenth century is to be seen in London where the marvellous beauty\nof the estuary of the Thames, as it curves through the city, is wantonly\ndefaced by the Charing Cross railway bridge, constructed apart from any\nreference to aesthetic values.\n\nThe two evils are: one, the ignoration of the true relation of each\norganism to its environment; and the other, the habit of ignoring the\nintrinsic worth of the environment which must be allowed its weight in\nany consideration of final ends.\n\nAnother great fact confronting the modern world is the discovery of the\nmethod of training professionals, who specialise in particular regions\nof thought and thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge within\ntheir respective limitations of subject. In consequence of the success\nof this professionalising of knowledge, there are two points to be kept\nin mind, which differentiate our present age from the past. In the first\nplace, the rate of progress is such that an individual human being, of\nordinary length of life, will be called upon to face novel situations\nwhich find no parallel in his past. The fixed person for the fixed\nduties, who in older societies was such a godsend, in the future will be\na public danger. In the second place, the modern professionalism in\nknowledge works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual\nsphere is concerned. The modern chemist is likely to be weak in zoology,\nweaker still in his general knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and\ncompletely ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English\nversification. It is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient\nhistory. Of course I am speaking of general tendencies; for chemists are\nno worse than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars.\nEffective knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported by a\nrestricted acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it.\n\nThis situation has its dangers. It produces minds in a groove. Each\nprofession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now to\nbe mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of\nabstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the\nabstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is\npaid. But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the\ncomprehension of human life. Thus in the modern world, the celibacy of\nthe medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the\nintellect which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the\ncomplete facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, or merely a\nlawyer. People have lives outside their professions or their businesses.\nBut the point is the restraint of serious thought within a groove. The\nremainder of life is treated superficially, with the imperfect\ncategories of thought derived from one profession.\n\nThe dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great,\nparticularly in our democratic societies. The directive force of reason\nis weakened. The leading intellects lack balance. They see this set of\ncircumstances, or that set; but not both sets together. The task of\nco\u00f6rdination is left to those who lack either the force or the character\nto succeed in some definite career. In short, the specialised functions\nof the community are performed better and more progressively, but the\ngeneralised direction lacks vision. The progressiveness in detail only\nadds to the danger produced by the feebleness of co\u00f6rdination.\n\nThis criticism of modern life applies throughout, in whatever sense you\nconstrue the meaning of a community. It holds if you apply it to a\nnation, a city, a district, an institution, a family, or even to an\nindividual. There is a development of particular abstractions, and a\ncontraction of concrete appreciation. The whole is lost in one of its\naspects. It is not necessary for my point that I should maintain that\nour directive wisdom, either as individuals or as communities, is less\nnow than in the past. Perhaps it has slightly improved. But the novel\npace of progress requires a greater force of direction if disasters are\nto be avoided. The point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth\ncentury were in the direction of professionalism, so that we are left\nwith no expansion of wisdom and with greater need of it.\n\nWisdom is the fruit of a balanced development. It is this balanced\ngrowth of individuality which it should be the aim of education to\nsecure. The most useful discoveries for the immediate future would\nconcern the furtherance of this aim without detriment to the necessary\nintellectual professionalism.\n\nMy own criticism of our traditional educational methods is that they are\nfar too much occupied with intellectual analysis, and with the\nacquirement of formularised information. What I mean is, that we neglect\nto strengthen habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in\ntheir full interplay of emergent values, and that we merely emphasise\nabstract formulations which ignore this aspect of the interplay of\ndiverse values.\n\nIn every country the problem of the balance of the general and\nspecialist education is under consideration. I cannot speak with\nfirst-hand knowledge of any country but my own. I know that there, among\npractical educationalists, there is considerable dissatisfaction with\nthe existing practice. Also, the adaptation of the whole system to the\nneeds of a democratic community is very far from being solved. I do not\nthink that the secret of the solution lies in terms of the antithesis\nbetween thoroughness in special knowledge and general knowledge of a\nslighter character. The make-weight which balances the thoroughness of\nthe specialist intellectual training should be of a radically different\nkind from purely intellectual analytical knowledge. At present our\neducation combines a thorough study of a few abstractions, with a\nslighter study of a larger number of abstractions. We are too\nexclusively bookish in our scholastic routine. The general training\nshould aim at eliciting our concrete apprehensions, and should satisfy\nthe itch of youth to be doing something. There should be some analysis\neven here, but only just enough to illustrate the ways of thinking in\ndiverse spheres. In the Garden of Eden Adam saw the animals before he\nnamed them: in the traditional system, children named the animals before\nthey saw them.\n\nThere is no easy single solution of the practical difficulties of\neducation. We can, however, guide ourselves by a certain simplicity in\nits general theory. The student should concentrate within a limited\nfield. Such concentration should include all practical and intellectual\nacquirements requisite for that concentration. This is the ordinary\nprocedure; and, in respect to it, I should be inclined even to increase\nthe facilities for concentration rather than to diminish them. With the\nconcentration there are associated certain subsidiary studies, such as\nlanguages for science. Such a scheme of professional training should be\ndirected to a clear end congenial to the student. It is not necessary to\nelaborate the qualifications of these statements. Such a training must,\nof course, have the width requisite for its end. But its design should\nnot be complicated by the consideration of other ends. This professional\ntraining can only touch one side of education. Its centre of gravity\nlies in the intellect, and its chief tool is the printed book. The\ncentre of gravity of the other side of training should lie in intuition\nwithout an analytical divorce from the total environment. Its object is\nimmediate apprehension with the minimum of eviscerating analysis. The\ntype of generality, which above all is wanted, is the appreciation of\nvariety of value. I mean an aesthetic growth. There is something between\nthe gross specialised values of the mere practical man, and the thin\nspecialised values of the mere scholar. Both types have missed\nsomething; and if you add together the two sets of values, you do not\nobtain the missing elements. What is wanted is an appreciation of the\ninfinite variety of vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper\nenvironment. When you understand all about the sun and all about the\natmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth, you may still miss\nthe radiance of the sunset. There is no substitute for the direct\nperception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality. We\nwant concrete fact with a high light thrown on what is relevant to its\npreciousness.\n\nWhat I mean is art and aesthetic education. It is, however, art in such\na general sense of the term that I hardly like to call it by that name.\nArt is a special example. What we want is to draw out habits of\naesthetic apprehension. According to the metaphysical doctrine which I\nhave been developing, to do so is to increase the depth of\nindividuality. The analysis of reality indicates the two factors,\nactivity emerging into individualised aesthetic value. Also the emergent\nvalue is the measure of the individualisation of the activity. We must\nfoster the creative initiative towards the maintenance of objective\nvalues. You will not obtain the apprehension without the initiative, or\nthe initiative without the apprehension. As soon as you get towards the\nconcrete, you cannot exclude action. Sensitiveness without impulse\nspells decadence, and impulse without sensitiveness spells brutality. I\nam using the word \u201csensitiveness\u201d in its most general signification, so\nas to include apprehension of what lies beyond oneself; that is to say,\nsensitiveness to all the facts of the case. Thus \u201cart\u201d in the general\nsense which I require is any selection by which the concrete facts are\nso arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are\nrealisable by them. For example, the mere disposing of the human body\nand the eyesight so as to get a good view of a sunset is a simple form\nof artistic selection. The habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid\nvalues.\n\nBut, in this sense, art concerns more than sunsets. A factory, with its\nmachinery, its community of operatives, its social service to the\ngeneral population, its dependence upon organising and designing genius,\nits potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stock is\nan organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values. What we want to train\nis the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness. It is\nvery arguable that the science of political economy, as studied in its\nfirst period after the death of Adam Smith (1790), did more harm than\ngood. It destroyed many economic fallacies, and taught how to think\nabout the economic revolution then in progress. But it riveted on men a\ncertain set of abstractions which were disastrous in their influence on\nmodern mentality. It de-humanised industry. This is only one example of\na general danger inherent in modern science. Its methodological\nprocedure is exclusive and intolerant, and rightly so. It fixes\nattention on a definite group of abstractions, neglects everything else,\nand elicits every scrap of information and theory which is relevant to\nwhat it has retained. This method is triumphant, provided that the\nabstractions are judicious. But, however triumphant, the triumph is\nwithin limits. The neglect of these limits leads to disastrous\noversights. The anti-rationalism of science is partly justified, as a\npreservation of its useful methodology; it is partly mere irrational\nprejudice. Modern professionalism is the training of minds to conform to\nthe methodology. The historical revolt of the seventeenth century, and\nthe earlier reaction towards naturalism, were examples of transcending\nthe abstractions which fascinated educated society in the Middle Ages.\nThese early ages had an ideal of rationalism, but they failed in its\npursuit. For they neglected to note that the methodology of reasoning\nrequires the limitations involved in the abstract. Accordingly, the true\nrationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete\nin search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a\nform of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at a particular set\nof abstractions. This was the case with science.\n\nThere are two principles inherent in the very nature of things,\nrecurring in some particular embodiments whatever field we explore\u2014the\nspirit of change, and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing\nreal without both. Mere change without conservation is a passage from\nnothing to nothing. Its final integration yields mere transient\nnon-entity. Mere conservation without change cannot conserve. For after\nall, there is a flux of circumstance, and the freshness of being\nevaporates under mere repetition. The character of existent reality is\ncomposed of organisms enduring through the flux of things. The low type\nof organisms have achieved a self-identity dominating their whole\nphysical life. Electrons, molecules, crystals, belong to this type. They\nexhibit a massive and complete sameness. In the higher types, where life\nappears, there is greater complexity. Thus, though there is a complex,\nenduring pattern, it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total\nfact. In a sense, the self-identity of a human being is more abstract\nthan that of a crystal. It is the life of the spirit. It relates rather\nto the individualisation of the creative activity; so that the changing\ncircumstances received from the environment, are differentiated from the\nliving personality, and are thought of as forming its perceived field.\nIn truth, the field of perception and the perceiving mind are\nabstractions which, in the concrete, combine into the successive bodily\nevents. The psychological field, as restricted to sense-objects and\npassing emotions, is the minor permanence, barely rescued from the\nnonentity of mere change; and the mind is the major permanence,\npermeating that complete field, whose endurance is the living soul. But\nthe soul would wither without fertilisation from its transient\nexperiences. The secret of the higher organisms lies in their two grades\nof permanences. By this means the freshness of the environment is\nabsorbed into the permanence of the soul. The changing environment is no\nlonger, by reason of its variety, an enemy to the endurance of the\norganism. The pattern of the higher organism has retreated into the\nrecesses of the individualised activity. It has become a uniform way of\ndealing with circumstances; and this way is only strengthened by having\na proper variety of circumstances to deal with.\n\nThis fertilisation of the soul is the reason for the necessity of art. A\nstatic value, however serious and important, becomes unendurable by its\nappalling monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release into\nchange. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. The transitions of\nhumour, wit, irreverence, play, sleep, and\u2014above all\u2014of art are\nnecessary for it. Great art is the arrangement of the environment so as\nto provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values. Human beings\nrequire something which absorbs them for a time, something out of the\nroutine which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide life, except\nin the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, the great art is more\nthan a transient refreshment. It is something which adds to the\npermanent richness of the soul\u2019s self-attainment. It justifies itself\nboth by its immediate enjoyment, and also by its discipline of the\ninmost being. Its discipline is not distinct from enjoyment, but by\nreason of it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realisation of\nvalues extending beyond its former self. This element of transition in\nart is shown by the restlessness exhibited in its history. An epoch gets\nsaturated by the masterpieces of any one style. Something new must be\ndiscovered. The human being wanders on. Yet there is a balance in\nthings. Mere change before the attainment of adequacy of achievement,\neither in quality or output, is destructive of greatness. But the\nimportance of a living art, which moves on and yet leaves its permanent\nmark, can hardly be exaggerated.\n\nIn regard to the aesthetic needs of civilised society the reactions of\nscience have so far been unfortunate. Its materialistic basis has\ndirected attention to _things_ as opposed to _values_. The antithesis is\na false one, if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at the\nabstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced emphasis coalesced\nwith the abstractions of political economy, which are in fact the\nabstractions in terms of which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus\nall thought concerned with social organisation expressed itself in terms\nof material things and of capital. Ultimate values were excluded. They\nwere politely bowed to, and then handed over to the clergy to be kept\nfor Sundays. A creed of competitive business morality was evolved, in\nsome respects curiously high; but entirely devoid of consideration for\nthe value of human life. The workmen were conceived as mere hands, drawn\nfrom the pool of labour. To God\u2019s question, men gave the answer of\nCain\u2014\u201cAm I my brother\u2019s keeper?\u201d; and they incurred Cain\u2019s guilt. This\nwas the atmosphere in which the industrial revolution was accomplished\nin England, and to a large extent elsewhere. The internal history of\nEngland during the last half century has been an endeavour slowly and\npainfully to undo the evils wrought in the first stage of the new epoch.\nIt may be that civilisation will never recover from the bad climate\nwhich enveloped the introduction of machinery. This climate pervaded the\nwhole commercial system of the progressive northern European races. It\nwas partly the result of the aesthetic errors of Protestantism and\npartly the result of scientific materialism, and partly the result of\nthe natural greed of mankind, and partly the result of the abstractions\nof political economy. An illustration of my point is to be found in\nMacaulay\u2019s Essay criticising Southey\u2019s _Colloquies on Society_. It was\nwritten in 1830. Now Macaulay was a very favourable example of men\nliving at that date, or at any date. He had genius; he was kind-hearted,\nhonourable, and a reformer. This is the extract:\u2014\u201cWe are told, that our\nage has invented atrocities beyond the imagination of our fathers; that\nsociety has been brought into a state compared with which extermination\nwould be a blessing; and all because the dwellings of cotton-spinners\nare naked and rectangular. Mr. Southey has found out a way he tells us,\nin which the effects of manufactures and agriculture may be compared.\nAnd what is this way? To stand on a hill, to look at a cottage and a\nfactory, and to see which is the prettier.\u201d\n\nSouthey seems to have said many silly things in his book; but, so far as\nthis extract is concerned, he could make a good case for himself if he\nreturned to earth after the lapse of nearly a century. The evils of the\nearly industrial system are now a commonplace of knowledge. The point\nwhich I am insisting on is the stone-blind eye with which even the best\nmen of that time regarded the importance of aesthetics in a nation\u2019s\nlife. I do not believe that we have as yet nearly achieved the right\nestimate. A contributory cause, of substantial efficacy to produce this\ndisastrous error, was the scientific creed that matter in motion is the\none concrete reality in nature; so that aesthetic values form an\nadventitious, irrelevant addition.\n\nThere is another side to this picture of the possibilities of decadence.\nAt the present moment a discussion is raging as to the future of\ncivilisation in the novel circumstances of rapid scientific and\ntechnological advance. The evils of the future have been diagnosed in\nvarious ways, the loss of religious faith, the malignant use of material\npower, the degradation attending a differential birth rate favouring the\nlower types of humanity, the suppression of aesthetic creativeness.\nWithout doubt, these are all evils, dangerous and threatening. But they\nare not new. From the dawn of history, mankind has always been losing\nits religious faith, has always suffered from the malignant use of\nmaterial power, has always suffered from the infertility of its best\nintellectual types, has always witnessed the periodical decadence of\nart. In the reign of the Egyptian king, Tutankhamen, there was raging a\ndesperate religious struggle between Modernists and Fundamentalists; the\ncave pictures exhibit a phase of delicate aesthetic achievement as\nsuperseded by a period of comparative vulgarity; the religious leaders,\nthe great thinkers, the great poets and authors, the whole clerical\ncaste in the Middle Ages, have been notably infertile; finally, if we\nattend to what actually has happened in the past, and disregard romantic\nvisions of democracies, aristocracies, kings, generals, armies, and\nmerchants, material power has generally been wielded with blindness,\nobstinacy and selfishness, often with brutal malignancy. And yet,\nmankind has progressed. Even if you take a tiny oasis of peculiar\nexcellence, the type of modern man who would have most chance of\nhappiness in ancient Greece at its best period is probably (as now) an\naverage professional heavy-weight boxer, and not an average Greek\nscholar from Oxford or Germany. Indeed, the main use of the Oxford\nscholar would have been his capability of writing an ode in\nglorification of the boxer. Nothing does more harm in unnerving men for\ntheir duties in the present, than the attention devoted to the points of\nexcellence in the past as compared with the average failure of the\npresent day.\n\nBut, after all, there have been real periods of decadence; and at the\npresent time, as at other epochs, society is decaying, and there is need\nfor preservative action. Professionals are not new to the world. But in\nthe past, professionals have formed unprogressive castes. The point is\nthat professionalism has now been mated with progress. The world is now\nfaced with a self-evolving system, which it cannot stop. There are\ndangers and advantages in this situation. It is obvious that the gain in\nmaterial power affords opportunity for social betterment. If mankind can\nrise to the occasion, there lies in front a golden age of beneficent\ncreativeness. But material power in itself is ethically neutral. It can\nequally well work in the wrong direction. The problem is not how to\nproduce great men, but how to produce great societies. The great society\nwill put up the men for the occasions. The materialistic philosophy\nemphasised the given quantity of material, and thence derivatively the\ngiven nature of the environment. It thus operated most unfortunately\nupon the social conscience of mankind. For it directed almost exclusive\nattention to the aspect of struggle for existence in a fixed\nenvironment. To a large extent the environment is fixed, and to this\nextent there is a struggle for existence. It is folly to look at the\nuniverse through rose-tinted spectacles. We must admit the struggle. The\nquestion is, who is to be eliminated. In so far as we are educators, we\nhave to have clear ideas upon that point; for it settles the type to be\nproduced and the practical ethics to be inculcated.\n\nBut during the last three generations, the exclusive direction of\nattention to this aspect of things has been a disaster of the first\nmagnitude. The watchwords of the nineteenth century have been, struggle\nfor existence, competition, class warfare, commercial antagonism between\nnations, military warfare. The struggle for existence has been construed\ninto the gospel of hate. The full conclusion to be drawn from a\nphilosophy of evolution is fortunately of a more balanced character.\nSuccessful organisms modify their environment. Those organisms are\nsuccessful which modify their environments so as to assist each other.\nThis law is exemplified in nature on a vast scale. For example, the\nNorth American Indians accepted their environment, with the result that\na scanty population barely succeeded in maintaining themselves over the\nwhole continent. The European races when they arrived in the same\ncontinent pursued an opposite policy. They at once co\u00f6perated in\nmodifying their environment. The result is that a population more than\ntwenty times that of the Indian population now occupies the same\nterritory, and the continent is not yet full. Again, there are\nassociations of different species which mutually co\u00f6perate. This\ndifferentiation of species is exhibited in the simplest physical\nentities, such as the association between electrons and positive nuclei,\nand in the whole realm of animate nature. The trees in a Brazilian\nforest depend upon the association of various species of organisms, each\nof which is mutually dependent on the other species. A single tree by\nitself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of shifting\ncircumstances. The wind stunts it: the variations in temperature check\nits foliage: the rains denude its soil: its leaves are blown away and\nare lost for the purpose of fertilisation. You may obtain individual\nspecimens of fine trees either in exceptional circumstances, or where\nhuman cultivation has intervened. But in nature the normal way in which\ntrees flourish is by their association in a forest. Each tree may lose\nsomething of its individual perfection of growth, but they mutually\nassist each other in preserving the conditions for survival. The soil is\npreserved and shaded; and the microbes necessary for its fertility are\nneither scorched, nor frozen, nor washed away. A forest is the triumph\nof the organisation of mutually dependent species. Further a species of\nmicrobes which kills the forest, also exterminates itself. Again the two\nsexes exhibit the same advantage of differentiation. In the history of\nthe world, the prize has not gone to those species which specialised in\nmethods of violence, or even in defensive armour. In fact, nature began\nwith producing animals encased in hard shells for defence against the\nills of life. It also experimented in size. But smaller animals, without\nexternal armour, warm-blooded, sensitive, and alert, have cleared these\nmonsters off the face of the earth. Also, the lions and tigers are not\nthe successful species. There is something in the ready use of force\nwhich defeats its own object. Its main defect is that it bars\nco\u00f6peration. Every organism requires an environment of friends, partly\nto shield it from violent changes, and partly to supply it with its\nwants. The Gospel of Force is incompatible with a social life. By\n_force_, I mean _antagonism_ in its most general sense.\n\nAlmost equally dangerous is the Gospel of Uniformity. The differences\nbetween the nations and races of mankind are required to preserve the\nconditions under which higher development is possible. One main factor\nin the upward trend of animal life has been the power of wandering.\nPerhaps this is why the armour-plated monsters fared badly. They could\nnot wander. Animals wander into new conditions. They have to adapt\nthemselves or die. Mankind has wandered from the trees to the plains,\nfrom the plains to the seacoast, from climate to climate, from continent\nto continent, and from habit of life to habit of life. When man ceases\nto wander, he will cease to ascend in the scale of being. Physical\nwandering is still important, but greater still is the power of man\u2019s\nspiritual adventures\u2014adventures of thought, adventures of passionate\nfeeling, adventures of aesthetic experience. A diversification among\nhuman communities is essential for the provision of the incentive and\nmaterial for the Odyssey of the human spirit. Other nations of different\nhabits are not enemies: they are godsends. Men require of their\nneighbours something sufficiently akin to be understood, something\nsufficiently different to provoke attention, and something great enough\nto command admiration. We must not expect, however, all the virtues. We\nshould even be satisfied if there is something odd enough to be\ninteresting.\n\nModern science has imposed on humanity the necessity for wandering. Its\nprogressive thought and its progressive technology make the transition\nthrough time, from generation to generation, a true migration into\nuncharted seas of adventure. The very benefit of wandering is that it is\ndangerous and needs skill to avert evils. We must expect, therefore,\nthat the future will disclose dangers. It is the business of the future\nto be dangerous; and it is among the merits of science that it equips\nthe future for its duties. The prosperous middle classes, who ruled the\nnineteenth century, placed an excessive value upon placidity of\nexistence. They refused to face the necessities for social reform\nimposed by the new industrial system, and they are now refusing to face\nthe necessities for intellectual reform imposed by the new knowledge.\nThe middle class pessimism over the future of the world comes from a\nconfusion between civilisation and security. In the immediate future\nthere will be less security than in the immediate past, less stability.\nIt must be admitted that there is a degree of instability which is\ninconsistent with civilisation. But, on the whole, the great ages have\nbeen unstable ages.\n\nI have endeavoured in these lectures to give a record of a great\nadventure in the region of thought. It was shared in by all the races of\nwestern Europe. It developed with the slowness of a mass movement. Half\na century is its unit of time. The tale is the epic of an episode in the\nmanifestation of reason. It tells how a particular direction of reason\nemerges in a race by the long preparation of antecedent epochs, how\nafter its birth its subject-matter gradually unfolds itself, how it\nattains its triumphs, how its influence moulds the very springs of\naction of mankind, and finally how at its moment of supreme success its\nlimitations disclose themselves and call for a renewed exercise of the\ncreative imagination. The moral of the tale is the power of reason, its\ndecisive influence on the life of humanity. The great conquerors, from\nAlexander to Caesar, and from Caesar to Napoleon, influenced profoundly\nthe lives of subsequent generations. But the total effect of this\ninfluence shrinks to insignificance, if compared to the entire\ntransformation of human habits and human mentality produced by the long\nline of men of thought from Thales to the present day, men individually\npowerless, but ultimately the rulers of the world.\n\n\n\n\n                                 INDEX\n\nThe numbers refer to pages; and \u2018_e.s._\u2019 stands for \u2018_et seqq._\u2019, where\nthe reference is to the succeeding pages of the chapter in question.\n\n Abruptness (in Ingression), 239.\n Absolute, The, 129.\n Abstract, 221.\n Abstraction, 233, _e.s._\n Abstraction (in Mathematics), 28, _e.s._\n Abstractive Hierarchy, 234, _e.s._\n Acceleration, 66.\n Actualisation, 222.\n Adam Smith, 280.\n Aeschylus, 14.\n Alexander, S., _preface_.\n Algebra, 42, 44.\n Alva, 2.\n Amp\u00e8re, 139.\n Analytical Character (Eternal Objects), 228.\n Anselm, St., 80.\n \u2018Any,\u2019 229.\n Aquinas, Thomas, 12, 13, 205.\n Arabic Arithmetical Notation, 42.\n Archimedes, 7, 8, 9, 10.\n Arguments (of functions), 44.\n Aristotle, 7, _e.s._; 41, 42; 64, _e.s._; 180, 187; 236, _e.s._\n Arnold, Matthew, 115.\n Art, 279, _e.s._\n Art, Medieval, 18, _e.s._\n Aspect, 98; 146, _e.s._\n Associated Hierarchy, 237.\n Aston, F. W., 260.\n Atom, 140, 144.\n Augustine, Saint, 266.\n\n Bacon, Francis, 11; 56, _e.s._; 92, 136.\n Bacon, Roger, 7.\n Base of Abstractive Hierarchy, 235.\n Being, 227.\n Belisarius, 19.\n Benedict, Saint, 21.\n Bergson, 72; 202, _e.s._\n Berkeley, George, 93, _e.s._; 105, 120, 198.\n Bich\u00e2t, 141.\n Biology, 58, 88, 144.\n Bonaventure, Saint, 12.\n Boyle, Robert, 57.\n Brown University, _Preface_.\n Bruno, Giordano, 1.\n Byzantine Empire, 19.\n\n Carlyle, 85.\n Cervantes, 56.\n Change, 121.\n Chaucer, 22.\n China, 8, 106.\n Clairaut, 85, 193.\n Classification, 41, _e.s._\n Clough, A. H., 115.\n Cognition, 97.\n Coleridge, 115, 116.\n Columbus, 22, 49.\n Complex Eternal Objects, 232.\n Components, 232.\n Conic Sections, 42.\n Connexity (of a Hierarchy), 235.\n Connectedness (of an occasion), 237.\n Conservation of Energy, 142, _e.s._\n Continuity, 140.\n Copernicus, 1, 22, 56, 184.\n Cosmas, 254.\n Cromwell, Oliver, 23.\n\n D\u2019Alembert, 80, 85.\n Dalton, John, 140, 141.\n Da Vinci, Leonardo, 60.\n Darwin, 263.\n Democritus, 140.\n Demos, R., _Preface_.\n Density, 70, 189.\n Desargues, 78.\n Descartes, 25; 43, _e.s._; 56, 57; 104; 115; 195, _e.s._; 272.\n Determinism, 110.\n Differential Calculus, 78.\n Discontinuous Existence, 51; 190, _e.s._\n Distance, 173.\n Divinity, Scholastic, 17.\n Divisibility, 177.\n\n Education, 277, _e.s._\n Egyptians, 20, 43.\n Einstein, 14, 41, 86, 88; 173, _e.s._; 263.\n Electron, 50, _e.s._; 111, _e.s._; 185, _e.s._\n Empty Events, 214.\n Endurance, 121; 147, _e.s._; 169, _e.s._; 186, _e.s._; 212.\n Endurance, Vibratory, 51.\n Energy, Physical, 51, _e.s._\n Environment, 155, _e.s._\n Envisagement, 148, _e.s._\n Epochs, 177.\n Epochal Durations, 192.\n Essence, 175.\n Eternal Objects, 121, _e.s._; 146, _e.s._; 221, _e.s._\n Ether, 184.\n Euripides, 14.\n Event, 102; 168, _e.s._\n Evolution, 130; 142, _e.s._\n Exhaustion, Method of, 42.\n Extension, 177.\n Extensive Quantity, 178.\n External Relations, 223, _e.s._\n Extrinsic Reality, 146.\n\n Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, 72, _e.s._; 82.\n Faraday, 139.\n Fate, 14.\n Fermat, 78.\n Finite Abstractive Hierarchy, 235.\n Form, 230.\n Force, 64, _e.s._\n Fourier, 85.\n Francis of Assisi, 258.\n Frederick, the Great, 89.\n Frequency, 181, _e.s._\n Fresnel, 139.\n Frost, Robert, 22.\n Future, 245, _e.s._\n\n Galileo, 2, _e.s._; 43, 45; 56, _e.s._; 88, 162, 187; 255, _e.s._\n Galvani, 88.\n Gauss, 86, 88.\n Geometry, 31, _e.s._\n George II, 93.\n Germany, 57.\n Gibson, 206.\n God, 17, 86, 129; 242, _e.s._\n Gradation of Envisagement, 247.\n Gravitation, 65, 172.\n Greece, 8, _e.s._\n Gregorovius, 265.\n Giotto, 22.\n Gregory, The Great, 21, 265.\n\n Harvey, 56, 57.\n Heath, Sir T. L., 180.\n Hegel, 40.\n Herz, 86, 88.\n Historical Revolt, 11, _e.s._; 55, 150.\n Hooker, Richard, 13.\n Hume, 5, 47, 61, 73; 80, _e.s._; 107, 198.\n Huyghens, 45; 57, _e.s._; 256.\n\n Idealism, 89; 127, _e.s._\n Immediate Occasion, 36, _e.s._; 62.\n Individual Essence, 222, _e.s._\n Induction, 34; 60, _e.s._\n Infinite Abstractive Hierarchy, 235.\n Ingression, 99, _e.s._; 222.\n Integral Calculus, 42.\n Internal Relations, 175; 223, _e.s._\n Intrinsic Reality, 146.\n Invention, 136, _e.s._\n Ionian Philosophers, 9.\n Irresistible Grace, 105.\n Isolated Systems, 66.\n Isolation of Eternal Objects, 230.\n Isotopes, 260.\n Italy, 57.\n\n James, Henry, 3.\n James, William, 3; 199, _e.s._\n Joseph, Hapsburgh Emperor, 89.\n Justinian, 19, 20.\n\n Kant, 47; 93, _e.s._; 116, 142, 178; 193, _e.s._\n Kepler, 9, 45, 57, 67.\n\n Lagrange, 84, _e.s._\n Laplace, 85, 142.\n Lavoisier, 84, 146.\n Law, Roman, 16.\n Laws of Nature, 45, 150.\n Least Action, 87, 150.\n Lecky, 15, 16, 254.\n Leibniz, 43, 44, 48, 57, 92, 115; 198, _e.s._\n Life, 58.\n Limitation, 225, _e.s._\n Lloyd Morgan, _Preface_.\n Location, Simple, 69, _e.s._; 81, _e.s._; 95.\n Locke, John, 43, 47; 57, _e.s._; 89, 94, 115, 198.\n Locomotion, Vibratory, 184, _e.s._\n Logic, Abstract, 37, _e.s._\n Logic, Scholastic, 17.\n Lucretius, 140.\n\n Macaulay, 285.\n Milton, 108, _e.s._\n Mind, 79.\n Mass, 64, _e.s._; 144.\n Mathematics, 10, 23; 28, _e.s._\n Mathematics, Applied, 34, _e.s._\n Matter, 24, 94, 58, 144.\n Matter (philosophical), 231.\n Maupertuis, 85, _e.s._\n Max M\u00fcller, 178.\n Maxwell, Clerk, 85, _e.s._; 139, _e.s._; 161.\n Mechanical Explanation, 23.\n Mechanism, 107, _e.s._\n Mechanistic Theory, 71.\n Memory, 73.\n Mersenne, 46.\n Michelson, 162, _e.s._\n Mill, John Stuart, 110.\n Modal Character of Space, 90, _e.s._\n Modal Limitation, 248, _e.s._\n Mode, 99.\n Moral Responsibility, 109, _e.s._\n Motion, Laws of, 65, _e.s._\n M\u00fcller, Johannes, 141.\n\n Narses, 19.\n Natural Selection, 158.\n Naturalism in Art, 22.\n Newman, John Henry, 115, 255.\n Newton, 8, 9, 15; 43, _e.s._; 58, _e.s._; 84, _e.s._; 161; 255, _e.s._\n Not-Being, 227.\n\n Objectivism, 124, _e.s._\n Occasions, Community of, 63.\n Occupied Events, 215.\n Oersted, 139.\n Order of Nature, 5, _e.s._; 39, _e.s._; 55.\n Organic Mechanism, 112, 151.\n Organism, 51, _e.s._; 58, 90; 105, _e.s._; 111, _e.s._; 145; 185,\n    _e.s._; 209.\n\n Padua, University of, 57, 58.\n Paley, 107.\n Papacy, 13, 20.\n Pascal, 57, 78.\n Past, 245, _e.s._\n Pasteur, Louis, 141, _e.s._\n Pelagius, 266.\n Perception, 101.\n Periodic Law (Mendele\u00ebf), 141.\n Periodicity, 45, _e.s._\n Perspective, 98.\n Petavius, 255.\n Philosophy, 122.\n Physical Field, 138.\n Physics, 57.\n Plato, 10; 41, _e.s._; 180.\n Pope, Alexander, 108, _e.s._\n Possibility, 223.\n Prehension, 97, _e.s._; 207.\n Prehensive Character of Space, 90, _e.s._\n Present, 245, _e.s._\n Primary Qualities, 76.\n Primate, 185, _e.s._\n Prime Mover, 242, _e.s._\n Primordial Element, 51, _e.s._\n Process, 102.\n Professionalism, 271, _e.s._\n Proton, 51, _e.s._; 185, _e.s._\n Psychology, 88, 103.\n Pusey, 115.\n Pythagoras, 39, _e.s._; 240.\n\n Quality, 73, _e.s._\n Quantum Theory, 50; 181, _e.s._\n\n Rationalism, 12, _e.s._; 55.\n Ramsay, Sir William, 259.\n Rawley, Dr., 58.\n Rayleigh, Lord, 259.\n Realism, 127, _e.s._\n Reformation, 11.\n Reiteration, 147; 186, _e.s._\n Relational Essence, 223, _e.s._\n Relativity, 68; 165, _e.s._\n Retention, 147.\n Riemann, 86, 88.\n Romans, 8.\n Roman Law, 20.\n Rome, 21.\n Rousseau, 50, 93, 135.\n Royal Society, 43, 73.\n Russell, Bertrand, 216.\n\n Sarpi, Paul, 12, 26.\n Schleiden, 141.\n Schwann, 141.\n Scientific Materialism, 24, 25.\n Scientific Movement, 11.\n Secondary Qualities, 76, 127.\n Seneca, 15.\n Sense-Object, 99.\n Separative Character of Space, 90, _e.s._\n Shakespeare, 56.\n Shape, 92.\n Shelley, 116, _e.s._\n Sidgwick, Henry, 197.\n Simple Eternal Objects, 232.\n Simple Location, 69, _e.s._; 81, _e.s._; 95; 127, _e.s._; 217.\n Simultaneity, 174.\n \u2018Some,\u2019 229.\n Southey, 285.\n Space, Physical, 32.\n Spatialisation, 72, 175, 206.\n Specious Present, 148.\n Spinoza, 43, 57, 99, 115, 116, 175, 198, 248.\n Sophocles, 14.\n Standpoint, 99, _e.s._\n Stoicism, 16.\n Struggle for Existence, 158.\n Subjectivism, 123, _e.s._\n Substance, 73, _e.s._; 175.\n Substantial Activity, 152, 174, 231.\n Superject, 230.\n Synthetic Prehension, 224, _e.s._\n\n Technology, 135, _e.s._\n Temporalisation, 179.\n Tennyson, 108, _e.s._\n Time, 169, _e.s._\n Tragedy, 15.\n Translucency of Realisation, 240.\n Trent, Council of, 12.\n Trigonometry, 42.\n True Propositions, 224.\n\n Unknowns (in Mathematics), 44.\n Universals, 221.\n Untrue Propositions, 221.\n\n Value, 123, _e.s._; 226, 249.\n Variable, The, 37, _e.s._; 229.\n Vasco da Gama, 22.\n Velocity, 64, _e.s._; 165, _e.s._\n Vertex of Abstractive Hierarchy, 236.\n Vesalius, 1.\n Vibration, 186, _e.s._\n Vibratory Organic Deformation, 184, _e.s._\n Virtual Work, 88.\n Vitalism, 111, _e.s._; 145.\n Volta, 88.\n Voltaire, 57; 80, _e.s._; 143.\n\n Walpole, 89.\n Washington, George, 89.\n Watt, James, 135.\n Wesley, John, 93.\n Whitman, Walt, 22.\n Wordsworth, 22; 108, _e.s._\n\n Young, Thomas, 139.\n\n Zeno, 178, 179, 192.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n                           Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nThe printer employed the diaeresis in words like \u2018co\u00f6rdination\u2019 or\n\u2018co\u00f6peration\u2019. On p. 157, the first syllable of \u2018co\u00f6perating\u2019 fell on\nthe line break, and the word was hyphenated as \u2018co-operating\u2019, since the\ndiaeresis was not needed. The word has been joined here and the\ndiaeresis employed as \u2018co\u00f6perating\u2019.\n\nThe following words appear both with and without a hyphen: to-day,\nnon-entity, half-way, inter-connected, non-entity.\n\nErrors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been corrected, and\nare noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.\n\n 20.10  restraining g[i/o]vernment.                        Replaced.\n 21.31  is kept in contact w[ti/it]h                       Transposed.\n 57.30  Now the scientific philosop[h]y                    Inserted.\n 69.9   no other way of putting[s] things                  Removed.\n 77.6   these relationships constitute[s] nature.          Added.\n 157.20 societies of c[o-/\u00f6]perating organisms.            Replaced.\n 160.8  These divis[i]ons are                              Inserted.\n 176.3  extends beyond[s] the spatio-temporal continuum    Removed.\n 177.6  by the reali[z/s]ation of pattern                  Consistency.\n 177.25 character of spatio-temporal [of ]extension        Removed.\n 183.5  radiate its energy i[s/n] an integral number       Replaced.\n 195.4  history of the Christi[o/a]n Church                Replaced.\n 195.7  apocalyptic forecast[e]s                           Removed.\n 202.21 This divis[i]on of territory                       Inserted.\n 213.10 what anything is in i[t]self.                      Inserted.\n 245.27 even [al]though any such discrimination            Removed.\n 274.14 its sta[k/t]e of rapid development                 Replaced.\n 276.17 The task of co\u00f6[r]dination is left                 Inserted.\n 279.22 What I mean is art [(]and aesthetic education.     Removed.\n 288.33 mutually co\u00f6[o]perate.                             Removed.\n 290.3  it bars co\u00f6[o]peration.                            Removed.","title":"Science and the modern world","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":80145}