{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_6920/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_6920","id":"gutenberg_6920","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/6920","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Life","Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome, 121-180","Stoics"],"text":"[Illustration]\n\n\n\n\nThe Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus\n\n\n\n\nLONG\u2019S TRANSLATION\n\nEDITED BY EDWIN GINN\n\n\n\n\nContents\n\n PREFACE\n BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH\n THE THOUGHTS\n PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS\n GENERAL INDEX\n\n\n\n\n[TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE: All the footnotes have been moved to the end of\nthe text. I have also relabeled the book headings; [I., II., \u2026 XI.] has\nbeen changed to [BOOK I., BOOK II., \u2026 BOOK XI.] at the start of each\nSection. I have also added a \u201c1.\u201d before the first \u201cthought\u201d in each\nBOOK.]\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nPerhaps some may question the wisdom of putting out the Thoughts of\nMarcus Aurelius Antoninus to be used as a Reader by children in the\nschools. It may appear to them better suited to the mature mind. The\nprinciple, however, that has governed us in selecting reading for the\nyoung has been to secure the best that we could find in all ages for\ngrown-up people. The milk and water diet provided for \u201cmy dear\nchildren\u201d is not especially complimentary to them. They like to be\ntreated like little men and women, capable of appreciating a good\nthing. One finds in this royal philosopher a rare generosity, sweetness\nand humility, qualities alike suited to all ages.\n\nAdopting the philosopher\u2019s robe at twelve, he remains a student all his\nlife. The precepts that he would give for the government of others, he\nhas practised upon himself. In his time, as in ours, there were good\nphysicians for the mind and body, who could make wise prescriptions for\nthe government of their neighbors, but were unable to apply them to\nthemselves. The faults of our fellows are so numerous and so easy to\ncure that one is readily tempted to become the physician, while our own\nfaults are so few and so unimportant that it is hardly worth while to\ngive any attention to them. Hence we have a multitude of physicians for\nhumanity in general, and a scarcity of individual healers.\n\nIt was the doctrine of Marcus Aurelius that most of the ills of life\ncome to us from our own imagination, that it was not in the power of\nothers seriously to interfere with the calm, temperate life of an\nindividual, and that when a fellow being did anything to us that seemed\nunjust he was acting in ignorance, and that instead of stirring up\nanger within us it should stir our pity for him. Oftentimes by careful\nself-examination we should find that the fault was more our own than\nthat of our fellow, and our sufferings were rather from our own\nopinions than from anything real. The circle of man\u2019s knowledge is very\nlimited, and the largest circles do not wholly include the smallest.\nThey are intersecting and the segment common to any two is very small.\nWhatever lies outside this space does not exist for both. Hence arise\ninnumerable contests. The man having the largest intelligence ought to\nbe very generous to the other. Being thankful that he has been blessed\nin so many ways, he should do all in his power to enlighten his less\nfavored fellow, rather than be angry with him on account of his\nmisfortune. Is he not sufficiently punished in being denied the light?\n\nAssisting his uncle in the government of the great Roman Empire at\nseventeen, it was his aim constantly to restrain the power of the\nstrong and to assist the weak. He studied the laws of his country, not\nfor wisdom alone, but that he might make them more beneficial to his\npeople. All his life he tried to bring his fellows to a higher level,\nand to think charitably of each other. Occupying himself a palace he\nlived simply, like other men. It was his greatest delight to retire to\nhis country home and there, dwelling among his books, to meditate upon\nthe great problems of life. He claimed that a man\u2019s life should be\nvalued according to the value of the things to which he gave his\nattention. If his whole thought was given to clothing, feeding and\nhousing himself comfortably, he should be valued like other well-housed\nand well-fed animals. He would, however, derive the greatest pleasure\nand benefit in this life by acting in accordance with reason, which\ndemands of every human being that his highest faculties should govern\nall the rest, and that each should see to it that he treated his fellow\nkindly and generously and that if he could not assist him to a higher\nlevel he should at least not stand in his way. When he speaks of the\nshortness of time and the value of fame, riches and power, for which\nmen strive in this world, he speaks not from the standpoint of one who\nwould wish to obtain these things, but as a Roman emperor enjoying the\nhighest honors that man might expect to attain in this world. He\ncertainly was in a position to speak intelligently concerning these\nmatters, and his opinions ought to have weight with the coming\ngenerations. Children may not prefer to read such thoughts; perhaps the\nmajority of children do not prefer the Bible to other books. Still, we\nall think it is well for them to be obliged to read it. Perhaps\nrequiring the use of such literature in the schools might be as\nvaluable as the adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing of\ninterminable numbers, the memorizing of all the capes, bays and rivers\nin the world, and the dates of all the battles that have occurred since\nthe creation of man. We should strive to stimulate the thinking powers\nof children, leading them to form wise judgments concerning the\nimportant things of life, without catering too much to their own wishes\nat an age when they cannot form an intelligent opinion of what is best\nfor themselves.\n\nAt our first reading of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, we\nmarked many sentences that appeared to us specially good; in the\nsecond, twice as many more. Where all is good it is hard to emphasize,\nbut we will cite just one of his reflections, as illustrating the trend\nof his mind: \u201cI have often wondered,\u201d he says, \u201chow it is that every\nman loves himself more than all the rest of men, and yet sets less\nvalue on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others.\u201d\n\nWe have given Long\u2019s translation of the Thoughts complete, as published\nby Messrs. Little, Brown & Co., but we have omitted some unimportant\nportions of the biography and philosophy in the interest of space and\neconomy. We have also given the philosophy in a supplement, thinking it\nbetter that it should come after the Thoughts themselves. We shall\nissue a pocket edition on very thin paper for the convenience of such\nas wish to make a special study of the work. We also propose to issue a\nsimilar edition of the writings of Epictetus.\n\nEDWIN GINN.\n\n\nJanuary 20, 1893.\n\n\n\n\nBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.\n\n\nM. Antoninus, the son of Annius Verus and Domitia Calvilla, was born at\nRome, A.D. 121. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married Faustina, the\nsister of Annius Verus, and was consequently the uncle of M. Antoninus.\nWhen Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and declared him his successor in\nthe empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus and M.\nAntoninus, generally called M. Aurelius Antoninus.\n\nThe youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (I. 17)\nthat he had good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good\nteachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything\ngood. He had the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and\nadoptive father, Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his work (I.\n16; VI. 30) the virtues of this excellent man and prudent ruler. Like\nmany young Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric.\nThere are letters extant showing the great affection of the pupil for\nthe master, and the master\u2019s great hopes of his industrious pupil.\n\nWhen he was eleven years old he assumed the dress of philosophers,\nsomething plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most\nlaborious, abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. He\nabandoned poetry and rhetoric for philosophy, and attached himself to\nthe sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, which\nwas a useful preparation for the high place which he was designed to\nfill. We must suppose that he learned the Roman discipline of arms,\nwhich was a necessary part of the education of a man who afterwards led\nhis troops to battle against a warlike race.\n\nAntoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers, and\nthe obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he\nspeaks of what he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or\nself- praise, if we look carelessly at the way in which he has\nexpressed himself; but if anyone draws this conclusion, he will be\nmistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate the merits of his several\nteachers, what they taught, and what a pupil might learn from them.\nBesides, this book, like the eleven other books, was for his own use;\nand if we may trust the note at the end of the first book, it was\nwritten during one of M. Antoninus\u2019 campaigns against the Quadi, at a\ntime when the commemoration of the virtues of his illustrious teachers\nmight remind him of their lessons and the practical uses which he might\nderive from them.\n\nAmong his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson\nof Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by himself\n(I. 9). His favorite teacher was Rusticus (I. 7), a philosopher, and\nalso a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the\nadviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are\ndestined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about\nthem, their companions and teachers; and I do not know any example of a\nyoung prince having had an education which can be compared with that of\nM. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their\nacquirements and their character will hardly be collected again; and as\nto the pupil, we have not had one like him since.\n\nHadrian died in July, A.D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M.\nAntoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably\nabout A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in A.D. 147. He received\nfrom his adoptive father the title of Caesar, and was associated with\nhim in the administration of the state. The father and the adopted son\nlived together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a\ndutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him.\n\nAntoninus Pius died A.D. 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M.\nAntoninus to take the sole administration of the empire, but he\nassociated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius\nCommodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first\ntime had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, and\nunworthy of his station. Antoninus however bore with him, and it is\nsaid that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect\ndue to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived\ntogether in peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus\ngiving to Verus for wife his daughter Lucilla.\n\nThe reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which\nVerus was sent to command; but he did nothing, and the success that was\nobtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was\ndue to his generals. This Parthian war ended in A.D. 165. Aurelius and\nVerus had a triumph (A.D. 166) for the victories in the East. A\npestilence followed, which carried off great numbers in Rome and Italy,\nand spread to the west of Europe.\n\nThe north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the\nAlps from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic.\nThese barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations\nhad attempted near three hundred years before; and the rest of the life\nof Antoninus, with some intervals, was employed in driving back the\ninvaders. In A.D. 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered\nthe state alone.\n\nDuring the German wars Antoninus resided for three years on the Danube\nat Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and almost\ndestroyed in their retreat across the Danube; and in A.D. 174 the\nemperor gained a great victory over the Quadi.\n\nIn A.D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skilful Roman commander who\nwas at the head of the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself\nAugustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so\nthe rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his\ntreatment of the family and the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to\nthe Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is extant.\n\nAntoninus set out for the East on hearing of Cassius\u2019 revolt. Though he\nappears to have returned to Rome in A.D. 174, he went back to prosecute\nthe war against the Germans, and it is probable that he marched direct\nto the East from the German war. His wife Faustina, who accompanied him\ninto Asia, died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief\nof her husband. Capitolinus, who has written the life of Antoninus, and\nalso Dion Cassius accuse the empress of scandalous infidelity to her\nhusband and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus\neither knew it not or pretended not to know it. Nothing is so common as\nsuch malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is\nfull of them. Antoninus loved his wife, and he says that she was\n\u201cobedient, affectionate, and simple.\u201d The same scandal had been spread\nabout Faustina\u2019s mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was\nperfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death\nin a letter to Fronto that he would rather have lived in exile with his\nwife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who\nwould give their wives a better character than these two emperors.\nCapitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to\ntell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. Dion Cassius, the\nmost malignant of historians, always reports and perhaps he believed\nany scandal against anybody.\n\nAntoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return\nto Italy through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries.\nIt was the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites\nof the age, and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We\ncannot conclude from this that he was a superstitious man, though we\nmight perhaps do so if his book did not show that he was not. But this\nis only one among many instances that a ruler\u2019s public acts do not\nalways prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly\noppose even the superstitions of his people; and though he may wish\nthat they were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by\noffending their prejudices.\n\nAntoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, perhaps for\nsome German victories, A.D. 176. In the following year Commodus was\nassociated with his father in the empire, and took the name of\nAugustus. This year A.D. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical history.\nAttalus and others were put to death at Lyon for their adherence to the\nChristian religion. The evidence of this persecution is a letter\npreserved by Eusebius. It contains a very particular description of the\ntortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, and it states that\nwhile the persecution was going on, Attalus, a Christian and a Roman\ncitizen, was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the\namphitheatre; but the governor ordered him to be reserved, with the\nrest who were in prison, until he had received instructions from the\nemperor. Many had been tortured before the governor thought of applying\nto Antoninus. The imperial rescript, says the letter, was that the\nChristians should be punished, but if they would deny their faith, they\nmust be released. On this the work began again. The Christians who were\nRoman citizens were beheaded; the rest were exposed to the wild beasts\nin the amphitheatre.\n\nThe war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted\nduring the visit of Antoninus to the East, and on his return the\nemperor again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people\nwere defeated in a great battle A.D. 179. During this campaign the\nemperor was seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the\ncamp, A.D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus\nwas with him. The body, or the ashes probably, of the emperor were\ncarried to Rome, and he received the honor of deification. Those who\ncould afford it had his statue or bust; and when Capitolinus wrote,\nmany people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or\nhousehold deities. He was in a manner made a saint. Commodus erected to\nthe memory of his father the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza\nColonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line\nround the shaft commemorate the victories of Antoninus over the\nMarcomanni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain which\nrefreshed the Roman soldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue\nof Antoninus was placed on the capital of the column, but it was\nremoved at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put\nin the place by Pope Sixtus the fifth.\n\nIn order to form a proper notion of the condition of the Christians\nunder M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan\u2019s time. When the younger\nPliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those\nparts, and the worshippers of the old religion were falling off. The\ntemples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no\npurchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who were interested in the\nmaintenance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in\ndanger. Christians of both sexes and of all ages were brought before\nthe governor, who did not know what to do with them. He could come to\nno other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be\nChristians and persevered in their religion ought to be punished; if\nfor nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. He found no crimes\nproved against the Christians, and he could only characterize their\nreligion as a depraved and extravagant superstition, which might be\nstopped if the people were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny\nwrote this in a letter to Trajan. He asked for the emperor\u2019s\ndirections, because he did not know what to do. He remarks that he had\nnever been engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, and that\naccordingly he did not know what to inquire about or how far to inquire\nand punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine into a\nman\u2019s profession of Christianity and to punish him for it. Trajan\u2019s\nrescript is extant. He approved of the governor\u2019s judgment in the\nmatter, but he said that no search must be made after the Christians;\nif a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he must not\nbe punished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian and confirmed\nhis denial by showing his reverence to the heathen gods. He added that\nno notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such things were\nof bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both motives of\nmercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little notice of\nthe Christians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it were\npossible. Trajan\u2019s rescript is the first legislative act of the head of\nthe Roman state with reference to Christianity, which is known to us.\nIt does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed under his\nreign.\n\nIn the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the Roman\ngovernment to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the\nhostility of the common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces\nwere willing to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of\nthe heathen community, who looked on the Christians as atheists. The\nJews too, who were settled all over the Roman Empire, were as hostile\nto the Christians as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian begin\nthe Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling\ntowards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius\nFundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin\u2019s\nfirst Apology, instructs the governor that innocent people must not be\ntroubled, and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from\nthem; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form, and\nno attention must be paid to popular clamors; when Christians were\nregularly prosecuted and convicted of illegal acts, they must be\npunished according to their deserts; and false accusers also must be\npunished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published rescripts to the\nsame effect. The terms of Hadrian\u2019s rescript seem very favorable to the\nChristians; but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only\nto be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no\nmeaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor\u2019s\nadvice. The real purpose of the rescript is that Christians must be\npunished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their\nrenunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion.\n\nIn the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new\nbelief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion\nurged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions\nof the Christian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus\nrepresents the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial\norders. Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the\nproperty of others, used these orders as a means of robbing those who\nwere doing no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered\nanything so unjust; and if the last order was really not from the\nemperor, the Christians entreat him not to give them up to their\nenemies. We conclude from this that there were at least imperial\nrescripts or constitutions of M. Antoninus which were made the\nfoundation of these persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was now\na crime and punished, unless the accused denied their religion. Then\ncome the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modern critics place in\nA.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The governors of\nthe provinces under M. Antoninus might have found enough even in\nTrajan\u2019s rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the\nfanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, even if they\nwere unwilling. But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all\nthe heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that they plainly maintained\nthat all the heathen religions were false. The Christians thus declared\nwar against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe\nthat this was a declaration of hostility against the Roman government,\nwhich tolerated all the various forms of superstition that existed in\nthe empire, and could not consistently tolerate another religion, which\ndeclared that all the rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies\nof the empire only a worship of devils.\n\nIf we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman\nemperors attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their\nprinciple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which\nJustin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that\nhe tells the truth; how far popular clamor and riots went in this\nmatter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians\u2014for there\nwere many such\u2014contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side\nand to imbitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new\nreligion. Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified,\nand what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but the fact is\ncertain that in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were\nin open hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus\u2019 rule men\nwere put to death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the\npreface to his fifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of\nAntoninus\u2019 reign, in some parts of the world, the persecution of the\nChristians became more violent, and that it proceeded from the populace\nin the cities; and he adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that we\nmay infer from what took place in a single nation that myriads of\nmartyrs were made in the habitable earth. The nation which he alludes\nto is Gallia; and he then proceeds to give the letter of the churches\nof Vienna and Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true\ncause of the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that\nboth governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with these\ndisturbances. How far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceedings\nwe do not know, for the historical records of his reign are very\ndefective. He did not make the rule against the Christians, for Trajan\ndid that; and if we admit that he would have been willing to let the\nChristians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in his power, for it\nwould be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited\nauthority which some modern sovereigns have had. His power was limited\nby certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the precedents\nof his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an active\npersecutor, for there is no evidence that he was, though it is certain\nthat he had no good opinion of the Christians, as appears from his own\nwords. But he knew nothing of them except their hostility to the Roman\nreligion, and he probably thought that they were dangerous to the\nstate, notwithstanding the professions false or true of some of the\nApologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair not to\nstate all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and\nsubsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I\nadmitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether\nclear from the charge of even allowing any persecutions; but as I seek\nthe truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him to bear whatever\nblame is his due. I add that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not\nderive any of his ethical principles from a religion of which he knew\nnothing.\n\nThere is no doubt that the Emperor\u2019s Reflections\u2014or his Meditations, as\nthey are generally named\u2014is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks\nof himself, his family, and his teachers; and in other books he\nmentions himself.\n\nIt is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as\nthe occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it\nis no improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him\nwritten with his own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man\nwould use the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his\nmost secret thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the\nbook for his son Commodus, who however had no taste for his father\u2019s\nphilosophy.\n\nThe last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in\nSimplicius\u2019 Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was\nnot a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a\ntime when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really\nreligious man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the\nDeity which no Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to\nSimplicius, a period of about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy\nformed the characters of some of the best and greatest men. A man\u2019s\ngreatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor\nyet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated with the\nmeanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high\nplaces, and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man\u2019s true greatness\nlies in the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a\njust estimate of himself and everything else, on frequent\nself-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows to\nbe right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not,\nabout what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do\nthat which he thinks and says and does.\n\n\n\n\nTHE THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I.\n\n\n1. From my grandfather Verus [I learned] good morals and the government\nof my temper.\n\n2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a\nmanly character.\n\n3. From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from\nevil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my\nway of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.\n\n4. From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools,\nand to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things\na man should spend liberally.\n\n5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party\nat the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or\nthe Scutarius at the gladiators\u2019 fights; from him too I learned\nendurance of labor, and to want little, and to work with my own hands,\nand not to meddle with other people\u2019s affairs, and not to be ready to\nlisten to slander.\n\n6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to\ngive credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about\nincantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not\nto breed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to\nsuch things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become\nintimate with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius,\nthen of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my\nyouth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of\nthe kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.\n\n7. From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required\nimprovement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray\nto sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to\ndelivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a\nman who practices much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to\nmake a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine\nwriting; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to\ndo other things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity,\nlike the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and\nwith respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong,\nto be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they\nhave shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not\nto be satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily\nto give my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him\nfor being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he\ncommunicated to me out of his own collection.\n\n8. From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness\nof purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except\nto reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion\nof the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in a\nliving example that the same man can be both most resolute and\nyielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had\nbefore my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his\nskill in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his\nmerits; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are\nesteemed favors, without being either humbled by them or letting them\npass unnoticed.\n\n9. From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family\ngoverned in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to\nnature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after\nthe interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those\nwho form opinions without consideration: he had the power of readily\naccommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more\nagreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly\nvenerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both\nof discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the\nprinciples necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other\npassion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most\naffectionate; and he could express approbation without noisy display,\nand he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.\n\n10. From Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and\nnot in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or\nsolecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce\nthe very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of\nanswer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing\nitself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.\n\n11. From Fronto I learned to observe what envy and duplicity and\nhypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are\ncalled Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.\n\n12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity\nto say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor\ncontinually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to\nthose with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.\n\n13. From Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even\nif he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him to\nhis usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as it\nis reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children truly.\n\n14. From my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to\nlove justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,\nCato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in\nwhich there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard\nto equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly\ngovernment which respects most of all the freedom of the governed; I\nlearned from him also consistency and undeviating steadiness in my\nregard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to\nothers readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am\nloved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his\nopinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends\nhad no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was\nquite plain.\n\n15. From Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by\nanything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness;\nand a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity,\nand to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that\neverybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in all that he\ndid he never had any bad intention; and he never showed amazement and\nsurprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing a thing,\nnor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his\nvexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious.\nHe was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to forgive,\nand was free from all falsehood; and he presented the appearance of a\nman who could not be diverted from right, rather than of a man who had\nbeen improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he\nwas despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man.\nHe had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.\n\n16. In my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable\nresolution in the things which he had determined after due\ndeliberation; and no vain-glory in those things which men call honors;\nand a love of labor and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to\nthose who had anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating\nfirmness in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a\nknowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action\nand for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for\nboys; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he\nreleased his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend\nhim of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to\naccompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him\nthe same. I observed, too, his habit of careful inquiry in all matters\nof deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his\ninvestigation through being satisfied with appearances which first\npresent themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends,\nand not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his\naffection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to\nforesee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without\ndisplay; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery;\nand to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the\nadministration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the\nexpenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for such\nconduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor\ndid he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering\nthe populace; but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and\nnever any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things\nwhich conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune\ngives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without\nexcusing himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without\naffectation, and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one\ncould ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred]\nflippant slave or a pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a man\nripe, perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and other men\u2019s\naffairs. Besides this, he honored those who were true philosophers, and\nhe did not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was\nhe easily led by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made\nhimself agreeable without any offensive affectation. He took a\nreasonable care of his body\u2019s health, not as one who was greatly\nattached to life, nor out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in\na careless way, but so that through his own attention he very seldom\nstood in need of the physician\u2019s art or of medicine or external\napplications. He was most ready to give without envy to those who\npossessed any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or\nknowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave\nthem his help, that each might enjoy reputation according to his\ndeserts; and he always acted conformably to the institutions of his\ncountry, without showing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was\nnot fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same\nplaces, and to employ himself about the same things; and after his\nparoxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his\nusual occupations. His secrets were not many, but very few and very\nrare, and these only about public matters; and he showed prudence and\neconomy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction\nof public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such things,\nfor he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the\nreputation which is got by a man\u2019s acts. He did not take the bath at\nunseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious\nabout what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, nor\nabout the beauty of his slaves.[1] His dress came from Lorium, his\nvilla on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.[2] We know how he\nbehaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and\nsuch was all his behavior. There was in him nothing harsh, nor\nimplacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the\nsweating point; but he examined all things severally, as if he had\nabundance of time, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously\nand consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of\nSocrates, that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those\nthings which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy\nwithout excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to be\nsober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and\ninvincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.\n\n17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good\nparents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen\nand friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that\nI was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a\ndisposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do\nsomething of this kind; but, through their favor, there never was such\na concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am\nthankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my\ngrandfather\u2019s concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth,\nand that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season,\nbut even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a\nfather who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to\nthe knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without\nwanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues,\nand such-like show; but that it is in such a man\u2019s power to bring\nhimself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for\nthis reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with\nrespect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a\nmanner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a\nbrother, who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance\nover myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect and\naffection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body;\nthat I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other\nstudies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I\nhad seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place\nthose who brought me up in the station of honor, which they seemed to\ndesire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some other\ntime after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius,\nRusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about\nliving according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that,\nso far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and\ninspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to\nnature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and\nthrough not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost\nsay, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in\nsuch a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or\nTheodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was\ncured, and though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I never did\nanything of which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my\nmother\u2019s fate to die young, she spent the last years of her life with\nme; that, whenever I wished to help any man in his need, or on any\nother occasion, I was never told that I had not the means of doing it;\nand that to myself the same necessity never happened, to receive\nanything from another; that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so\naffectionate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good masters for\nmy children; and that remedies have been shown to me by dreams, both\nothers, and against bloodspitting and giddiness \u2026; and that, when I had\nan inclination to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any\nsophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of histories], or\nin the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the\ninvestigation of appearances in the heavens; for all these things\nrequire the help of the gods and fortune.\n\nAmong the Quadi at the Granua.[3]\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II.\n\n\nBegin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody,\nthe ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these\nthings happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and\nevil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful,\nand of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong,\nthat it is akin to me, not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that\nit participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of\nthe divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can\nfix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate\nhim. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like\neyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one\nanother, then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one\nanother to be vexed and to turn away.\n\n2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the\nruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is\nnot allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is\nblood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and\narteries. See the breath also, what kind of a thing it is; air, and not\nalways the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The\nthird, then, is the ruling part, consider thus: Thou art an old man; no\nlonger let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a\npuppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dissatisfied with thy\npresent lot, or shrink from the future.\n\n3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That which is from\nfortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and\ninvolution with the things which are ordered by providence. From thence\nall things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for\nthe advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that\nis good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings,\nand what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved,\nas by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things\ncompounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee;\nlet them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after\nbooks, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and\nfrom thy heart thankful to the gods.\n\n4. Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how\noften thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not\nuse it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art now a\npart, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an\nefflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost\nnot use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou\nwilt go, and it will never return.\n\n5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou\nhast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection,\nand freedom, and justice, and to give thyself relief from all other\nthoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief if thou dost every act of\nthy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and\npassionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and\nself-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to\nthee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold\nof, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the\nexistence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing\nmore from him who observes these things.\n\n6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no\nlonger have the opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man\u2019s life is\nsufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences\nnot itself, but places thy felicity in the souls of others.\n\n7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give\nthyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled\naround. But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other\nway; for those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by\ntheir activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every\nmovement, and, in a word, all their thoughts.\n\n8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has\nseldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the\nmovements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.\n\n9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,\nand what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind\nof a part it is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who\nhinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are\naccording to the nature of which thou art a part.\n\n10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts\u2014such a comparison as\none would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind\u2014says,\nlike a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through\ndesire are more blamable than those which are committed through anger.\nFor he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a\ncertain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through\ndesire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more\nintemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly, then, and in a\nway worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed\nwith pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed with pain;\nand on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first\nwronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is\nmoved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing\nsomething by desire.\n\n11. Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very\nmoment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from\namong men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the\ngods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or\nif they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live\nin a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they\ndo exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the\nmeans in man\u2019s power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as\nto the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for\nthis also, that it should be altogether in a man\u2019s power not to fall\ninto it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a\nman\u2019s life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having the\nknowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things,\nis it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor\nis it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want\nof power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen\nindiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and\nlife, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,\u2014all these things equally\nhappen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better\nnor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.\n\n12. How quickly all things disappear,\u2014in the universe the bodies\nthemselves, but in time the remembrance of them. What is the nature of\nall sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the bait\nof pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame;\nhow worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead\nthey are,\u2014all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to\nobserve. To observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give\nreputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in\nitself, and by the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their\nparts all the things which present themselves to the imagination in it,\nhe will then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of\nnature; and if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a\nchild. This, however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is\nalso a thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too\nhow man comes near to the Deity, and by what part of him, and when this\npart of man is so disposed (VI. 28).\n\n13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a\nround, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,\nand seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbors, without\nperceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him,\nand to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in\nkeeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction\nwith what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit\nveneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be dear\nto us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move\nour pity by reason of men\u2019s ignorance of good and bad; this defect\nbeing not less than that which deprives us of the power of\ndistinguishing things that are white and black.\n\n14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand years, and as\nmany times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any\nother life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this\nwhich he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the\nsame. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is\nnot the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere moment.\nFor a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has\nnot, how can any one take this from him? These two things then thou\nmust bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of like\nforms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference\nwhether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years, or two\nhundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver\nand he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the\nonly thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is\nthe only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he\nhas it not.\n\n15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic\nMonimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a\nman receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.\n\n16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it\nbecomes an abscess, and, as it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as\nit can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of\nourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other\nthings are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to\nitself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with\nthe intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are\nangry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is\noverpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and\ndoes or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows\nany act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does\nanything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being\nright that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end;\nand the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of\nthe most ancient city and polity.\n\n17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux,\nand the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject\nto putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and\nfame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything\nwhich belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is\na dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger\u2019s sojourn, and\nafter\u2014fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a\nman? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping\nthe daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to\npains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely\nand with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man\u2019s doing or not\ndoing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that\nis allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he\nhimself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as\nbeing nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every\nliving being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements\nthemselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man\nhave any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the\nelements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is\naccording to nature.\n\nThis in Carnuntum.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III.\n\n\n1. We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away\nand a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken\ninto the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite\nuncertain whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for\nthe comprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation\nwhich strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For\nif he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and\nimagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will\nnot fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the\nmeasure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and\nconsidering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever\nelse of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,\u2014all this is\nalready extinguished. We must make haste, then, not only because we are\ndaily nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and\nthe understanding of them cease first.\n\n2. We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the\nthings which are produced according to nature contain something\npleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts\nare split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a\ncertain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker\u2019s art, are\nbeautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for\neating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in\nthe ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness\nadds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down,\nand the lion\u2019s eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of\nwild boars, and many other things,\u2014though they are far from being\nbeautiful if a man should examine them severally,\u2014still, because they\nare consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help to\nadorn them, and they please the mind; so that if a man should have a\nfeeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are\nproduced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow by\nway of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner\ndisposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real\ngaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which\npainters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and an\nold man he will be able to see a certain maturity and comeliness; and\nthe attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to look on\nwith chaste eyes; and many such things will present themselves, not\npleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar\nwith Nature and her works.\n\n3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died.\nThe Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them\ntoo. Alexander and Pompeius and Caius Caesar, after so often completely\ndestroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten\nthousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from\nlife. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration of\nthe universe, was filled with water internally and died smeared all\nover with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed\nSocrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the\nvoyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life,\nthere is no want of gods, not even there; but if to a state without\nsensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be\na slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves\nit is superior: for the one is intelligence and deity; the other is\nearth and corruption.\n\n4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others,\nwhen thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility.\nFor thou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast\nsuch thoughts as these,\u2014What is such a person doing, and why, and what\nis he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving,\nand whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from the observation\nof our own ruling power. We ought then to check in the series of our\nthoughts everything that is without a purpose and useless, but most of\nall the over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a man should use\nhimself to think of those things only about which if one should\nsuddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with perfect openness\nthou mightest immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words\nit should be plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent,\nand such as befits a social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts\nabout pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or\nenvy and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst blush if\nthou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is\nsuch, and no longer delays being among the number of the best, is like\na priest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is\nplanted within him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure,\nunharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a\nfighter in the noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any\npassion, dyed deep with justice, accepting with all his soul everything\nwhich happens and is assigned to him as his portion; and not often, nor\nyet without great necessity and for the general interest, imagining\nwhat another says, or does, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to\nhimself that he makes the matter for his activity; and he constantly\nthinks of that which is allotted to himself out of the sum total of\nthings, and he makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his\nown portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man is\ncarried along with him and carries him along with it. And he remembers\nalso that every rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for\nall men is according to man\u2019s nature; and a man should hold on to the\nopinion not of all, but of those only who confessedly live according to\nnature. But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what\nkind of men they are both at home and from home, both by night and by\nday, and what they are, and with what men they live an impure life.\nAccordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes from such\nmen, since they are not even satisfied with themselves.\n\n5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest,\nnor without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied\nornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words,\nor busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in\nthee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and\nengaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken\nhis post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life,\nand ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man\u2019s\ntestimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor the\ntranquillity which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be\nkept erect by others.\n\n6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth,\ntemperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own\nmind\u2019s self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do\naccording to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to\nthee without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better than\nis, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found\nto be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than the Deity\nwhich is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy\nappetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates\nsaid, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has\nsubmitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest\neverything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to\nnothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou\nwilt no longer without distraction be able to give the preference to\nthat good thing which is thy proper possession and thy own; for it is\nnot right that anything of any other kind, such as praise from the\nmany, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition\nwith that which is rationally and politically [or practically] good.\nAll these things, even though they may seem to adapt themselves [to the\nbetter things] in a small degree, obtain the superiority all at once,\nand carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the\nbetter, and hold to it.\u2014But that which is useful is the better.\u2014Well,\nthen, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if\nit is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy\njudgment without arrogance: only take care that thou makest the inquiry\nby a sure method.\n\n7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel\nthee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man,\nto suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which\nneeds walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything else\nhis own intelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts\nno tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much\ncompany; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either\npursuing or flying from [death]; but whether for a longer or a shorter\ntime he shall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all:\nfor even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he\nwere going to do anything else which can be done with decency and\norder; taking care of this only all through life, that his thoughts\nturn not away from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and\na member of a civil community.\n\n8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no\ncorrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his\nlife incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who\nleaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there\nis in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to\nother things], nor yet detached [from other things], nothing worthy of\nblame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.\n\n9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it\nentirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any\nopinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational\nanimal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, and\nfriendship towards men, and obedience to the gods.\n\n10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few;\nand besides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time,\nwhich is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is\neither past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man\nlives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too\nthe longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a\nsuccession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know\nnot even themselves, much less him who died long ago.\n\n11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:\nMake for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is\npresented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is\nin its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell\nthyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has\nbeen compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so\nproductive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically\nand truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always\nto look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe\nthis is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value\neverything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to\nman, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities\nare like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and\nhow long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an\nimpression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to it,\nsuch as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity,\ncontentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should\nsay: This comes from god; and this is according to the apportionment\nand spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and\nchance; and this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and\npartner, one who knows not, however, what is according to his nature.\nBut I know; for this reason I behave towards him according to the\nnatural law of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At the same\ntime, however, in things indifferent I attempt to ascertain the value\nof each.\n\n12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right\nreason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to\ndistract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be\nbound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting\nnothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity\naccording to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound\nwhich thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is\nable to prevent this.\n\n13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for\ncases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles\nready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing\neverything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which\nunites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do\nanything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a\nreference to things divine; nor the contrary.\n\n14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own\nmemoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the\nselections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age. Hasten\nthen to the end which thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle\nhopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it\nis in thy power.\n\n15. They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing,\nsowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this\nis not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.\n\n16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the\nsoul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the\nimpressions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals;\nto be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild beasts and\nto men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a\nNero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the things which\nappear suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods,\nand who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have\nshut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have\nmentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be\npleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is\nspun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his\nbreast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it\ntranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything\ncontrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if\nall men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and contented\nlife, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from\nthe way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come\npure, tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly\nreconciled to his lot.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV.\n\n\n1. That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so\naffected with respect to the events which happen, that it always easily\nadapts itself to that which is possible and is presented to it. For it\nrequires no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under\ncertain conditions, however; and it makes a material for itself out of\nthat which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by\nwhich a small light would have been extinguished: but when the fire is\nstrong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on\nit, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.\n\n2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according\nto the perfect principles of art.\n\n3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,\nand mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much.\nBut this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is\nin thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For\nnowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man\nretire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such\nthoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect\ntranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the\ngood ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this\nretreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and\nfundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be\nsufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free\nfrom all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with\nwhat art thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind\nthis conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that\nto endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily;\nand consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred,\nand fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet\nat last.\u2014But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned\nto thee out of the universe.\u2014Recall to thy recollection this\nalternative; either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous\nconcurrence of things]; or remember the arguments by which it has been\nproved that the world is a kind of political community [and be quiet at\nlast].\u2014But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon\nthee.\u2014Consider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath,\nwhether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart\nand discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast\nheard and assented to about pain and pleasure [and be quiet at\nlast].\u2014But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment\nthee.\u2014See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of\ninfinite time on each side of [the present], and the emptiness of\napplause, and the changeableness and want of judgment in those who\npretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space within which it\nis circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole earth is a\npoint, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are\nthere in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.\n\nThis then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy\nown, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and\nlook at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal.\nBut among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let\nthere be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the\nsoul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our perturbations\ncome only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these\nthings which thou seest, change immediately and will no longer be; and\nconstantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already\nwitnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.\n\n4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of\nwhich we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is\nthe reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is\nso, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens;\nif this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is\nso, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common\npolitical community will any one say that the whole human race are\nmembers? And from thence, from this common political community comes\nalso our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our\ncapacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a\nportion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from\nanother element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar\nsource (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also\nreturns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from\nsome source.\n\n5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; composition out\nof the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether\nnot a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary\nto [the nature of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason\nof our constitution.\n\n6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it\nis a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not\nallow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind,\nthat within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon\nnot even your names will be left behind.\n\n7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint,\n\u201cI have been harmed.\u201d Take away the complaint, \u201cI have been harmed,\u201d\nand the harm is taken away.\n\n8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make\nhis life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from\nwithin.\n\n9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled\nto do this.\n\n10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou\nobservest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with\nrespect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to\nwhat is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing\nits value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou dost, do\nit in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which\na man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action.\n\n11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee\nwrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are\nin truth.\n\n12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one to\ndo only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may\nsuggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there\nis any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion.\nBut this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion,\nas of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it\nappears pleasant or brings reputation.\n\n13. Hast thou reason? I have.\u2014Why then dost not thou use it? For if\nthis does its own work, what else dost thou wish?\n\n14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which\nproduced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal\nprinciple by transmutation.\n\n15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before,\nanother falls after; but it makes no difference.\n\n16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now\na beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the\nworship of reason.\n\n17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death\nhangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.\n\n18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his\nneighbor says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that\nit may be just and pure; or, as Agathon says, look not round at the\ndepraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without\ndeviating from it.\n\n19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider\nthat every one of those who remember him will himself also die very\nsoon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole\nremembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through\nmen who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will\nremember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal,\nwhat then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but\nwhat is it to the living. What is praise, except indeed so far as it\nhas a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of\nnature, clinging to something else\u2026.\n\n20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself,\nand terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither\nworse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this\nalso of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for\nexample, material things and works of art. That which is really\nbeautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than\ntruth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is\nbeautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a\nthing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? or\ngold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?\n\n21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from\neternity?\u2014But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have\nbeen buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these\nbodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their\ndissolution make room for other dead bodies, so the souls which are\nremoved into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and\ndiffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal\nintelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh\nsouls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man\nmight give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must\nnot only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also\nof the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other\nanimals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in\nthe bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth\nreceives them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood,\nand the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.\n\nWhat is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division\ninto that which is material and that which is the cause of form [the\nformal].\n\n22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to\njustice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty\nof comprehension [or understanding].\n\n23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O\nUniverse. Nothing for me is too early or too late, which is in due time\nfor thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature:\nfrom thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things\nreturn. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say,\nDear city of Zeus?\n\n24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou\nwouldst be tranquil.\u2014But consider if it would not be better to say, Do\nwhat is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is\nnaturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only\nthe tranquillity which comes from doing well, but also that which comes\nfrom doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do\nbeing unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure\nand less uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a man should ask\nhimself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take\naway not only unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus\nsuperfluous acts will not follow after.\n\n25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is\nsatisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own\njust acts and benevolent disposition.\n\n26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb\nthyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to\nhimself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well:\nout of the universe from the beginning everything which happens has\nbeen apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short.\nThou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice.\nBe sober in thy relaxation.\n\n27. Either it is a well-arranged universe[4] or a chaos huddled\ntogether, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in\nthee, and disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so\nseparated and diffused and sympathetic.\n\n28. A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character,\nbestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent,\ntyrannical.\n\n29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in\nit, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it.\nHe is a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts\nthe eyes of the understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and\nhas not from himself all things which are useful for life. He is an\nabscess on the universe who withdraws and separates himself from the\nreason of our common nature through being displeased with the things\nwhich happen, for the same nature produces this, and has produced thee\ntoo: he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who tears his own soul\nfrom that of reasonable animals, which is one.\n\n30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a\nbook: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I\nabide by reason\u2014and I do not get the means of living out of my\nlearning, and I abide [by my reason].\n\n31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be\ncontent with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has\nintrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making\nthyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.\n\n32. Consider for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all\nthese things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying,\nwarring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering,\nobstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die,\ngrumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring\nconsulship, kingly power. Well, then, that life of these people no\nlonger exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all\nis the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other\nepochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great\nefforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou\nshouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting\nthemselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance\nwith their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be\ncontent with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the\nattention given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For\nthus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller\nmatters no further than is fit.\n\n33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also\nthe names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner\nantiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after\nalso Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus.\nFor all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete\noblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a\nwondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their\nbreath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the\nmatter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then\nis that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one\nthing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a\ndisposition which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as\nusual, as flowing from a principle and source of the same kind.\n\n34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing\nher to spin thy thread into whatever thing she pleases.\n\n35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that\nwhich is remembered.\n\n36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and\naccustom thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves\nnothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new\nthings like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of\nthat which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast\ninto the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.\n\n37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from\nperturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things,\nnor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in\nacting justly.\n\n38. Examine men\u2019s ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind\nof things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.\n\n39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of\nanother; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering.\nWhere is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the\npower of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form\n[such] opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it,\nthe poor body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness,\nnevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these things be\nquiet; that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which\ncan happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens\nequally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives\naccording to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to\nnature.\n\n40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one\nsubstance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to\none perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all\nthings act with one movement; and how all things are the co-operating\ncauses of all things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning\nof the thread and the contexture of the web.\n\n41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to\nsay (I. C. 19).\n\n42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things\nto subsist in consequence of change.\n\n43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a\nviolent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried\naway, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away\ntoo.\n\n44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose\nin spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and\ncalumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them.\n\n45. In the series of things, those which follow are always aptly fitted\nto those which have gone before: for this series is not like a mere\nenumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence,\nbut it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are\narranged together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence\nexhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship (VI.\n38; VII. 9; VII. 75, note).\n\n46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth\nis to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the\ndeath of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who\nforgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with\nwhich they are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs\nthe universe; and the things which they daily meet with seem to them\nstrange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were\nasleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that we ought\nnot, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and\nspeak as we have been taught.\n\n47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on\nthe day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on\nthe third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree\nmean- spirited; for how small is the difference. So think it no great\nthing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than\nto-morrow.\n\n48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often\ncontracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers\nafter predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how\nmany philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how\nmany heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used\ntheir power over men\u2019s lives with terrible insolence, as if they were\nimmortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice\nand Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the\nreckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after\nburying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him; and all\nthis in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and\nworthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus,\nto-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space\nof time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, just as\nan olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it,\nand thanking the tree on which it grew.\n\n49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break,\nbut it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.\n\nUnhappy am I because this has happened to me? Not so, but happy am I,\nthough this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain,\nneither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing\nas this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have\ncontinued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a\nmisfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in all cases call\nthat a man\u2019s misfortune which is not a deviation from man\u2019s nature? And\ndoes a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man\u2019s nature, when it\nis not contrary to the will of man\u2019s nature? Well, thou knowest the\nwill of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from\nbeing just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against\ninconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having\nmodesty, freedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man\u2019s\nnature obtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion\nwhich leads thee to vexation to apply this principle: not that this is\na misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.\n\n50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death,\nto pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more\nthen have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they\nlie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus,\nLepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be\nburied, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval\nis small [between birth and death]; and consider with how much trouble,\nand in company with what sort of people, and in what a feeble body this\ninterval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of\nany value. For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the\ntime which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity\nthen what is the difference between him who lives three days and him\nwho lives three generations?\n\n51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural:\naccordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest\nreason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare, and\nall artifice and ostentatious display.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK V.\n\n\n1. In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be\npresent,\u2014I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I\ndissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for\nwhich I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to\nlie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm?\u2014But this is more\npleasant.\u2014Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for\naction or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little\nbirds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order\ntheir several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the\nwork of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is\naccording to thy nature?\u2014But it is necessary to take rest also.\u2014It is\nnecessary. However, Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed\nbounds to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds,\nbeyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou\nstoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for\nif thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who\nlove their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed\nand without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner\nvalues the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of\nmoney values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And\nsuch men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither\nto eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care\nfor. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and\nless worthy of thy labor?\n\n2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is\ntroublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquillity.\n\n3. Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit\nfor thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any\npeople nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said,\ndo not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their\npeculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which\nthings do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature\nand the common nature; and the way of both is one.\n\n4. I go through the things which happen according to nature until I\nshall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of\nwhich I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my\nfather collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the\nmilk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food\nand drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many\npurposes.\n\n5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.\u2014Be it so:\nbut there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not\nformed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are\naltogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor,\naversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things,\nbenevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling,\nmagnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately\nable to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and\nunfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark? or\nart thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to\nmurmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy\npoor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to\nbe so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou mightest have\nbeen delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst\nbe charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must\nexert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking\npleasure in thy dulness.\n\n6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it\ndown to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do\nthis, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and\nhe knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what\nhe has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks\nfor nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a\nhorse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when\nit has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not\ncall out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as\na vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.\u2014Must a man then\nbe one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing\nit?\u2014Yes.\u2014But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a\nman is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social\nanimal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to\nwish that his social partner also should perceive it.\u2014It is true what\nthou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said: and\nfor this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before,\nfor even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt\nchoose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for\nthis reason thou wilt omit any social act.\n\n7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the\nploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.\u2014In truth we ought\nnot to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble\nfashion.\n\n8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius\nprescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or\ngoing without shoes, so we must understand it when it is said, That the\nnature of the universe prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation,\nor loss, or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed\nmeans something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing\nadapted to procure health; and in the second case it means, That which\nhappens to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably\nto his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are\nsuitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the\npyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in\nsome kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony].\nAnd as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as\nit is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to\nbe such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant\nunderstand what I mean; for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought\nthis to such a person.\u2014This then was brought and this was prescribed to\nhim. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which\nAesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his\nprescriptions are disagreeable, but we, accept them in the hope of\nhealth. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the\ncommon nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same\nkind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it\nseem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the\nuniverse and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For\nhe would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were\nnot useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever\nit may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is\ndirected by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with\nthat which happens to thee, the one, because it was done for thee and\nprescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally\nfrom the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other,\nbecause even that which comes severally to every man is to the power\nwhich administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay\neven of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is\nmutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction\nand the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost\ncut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and\nin a manner triest to put anything out of the way.\n\n9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost\nnot succeed in doing everything according to right principles, but when\nthou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part\nof what thou dost is consistent with man\u2019s nature, and love this to\nwhich thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a\nmaster, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge\nand egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For\nthus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it. And\nremember that philosophy requires only the things which thy nature\nrequires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according\nto nature.\u2014It may be objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this\n[which I am doing]?\u2014But is not this the very reason why pleasure\ndeceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,\nequanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable\nthan wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy\ncourse of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and\nknowledge?\n\n10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to\nphilosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether\nunintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult\nto understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man\nwho never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,\nand consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may\nbe in the possession of a filthy wretch or a robber. Then turn to the\nmorals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure\neven the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly\nable to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt, and in so\nconstant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of\nthings moved, what there is worth being highly prized, or even an\nobject of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is\na man\u2019s duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural\ndissolution, and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these\nprinciples only: the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not\nconformable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in\nmy power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no\nman who will compel me to this.\n\n11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must\nask myself this question, and inquire, What have I now in this part of\nme which they call the ruling principle? and whose soul have I\nnow,\u2014that of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a\ntyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?\n\n12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may\nlearn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as\nbeing really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he\nwould not after having first conceived these endure to listen to\nanything which should not be in harmony with what is really good. But\nif a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the\nmany to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable\nthat which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive\nthe difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and\nwould not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it\nis said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as\nsaid fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think\nthose things to be good, to which after their first conception in the\nmind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied,\u2014that he who\nhas them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.\n\n13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them\nwill perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence\nout of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change\ninto some part of the universe, and that again will change into another\npart of the universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a\nchange I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the\nother direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the\nuniverse is administered according to definite periods [of revolution].\n\n14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are\nsufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from\na first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the\nend which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are\nnamed Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they\nproceed by the right road.\n\n15. None of these things ought to be called a man\u2019s which do not belong\nto a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man\u2019s nature\npromise them, nor are they the means of man\u2019s nature attaining its end.\nNeither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that\nwhich aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids\ntowards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things\ndid belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and\nto set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who\nshowed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted\nhimself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But\nnow the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other\nthings like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more\npatiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better\nman.\n\n16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character\nof thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a\ncontinuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a\nman can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a\npalace; well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,\nconsider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for\nthis it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its\nend is in that towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there\nalso is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now the good for the\nreasonable animal is society; for that we are made for society has been\nshown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exists for the sake of\nthe superior? But the things which have life are superior to those\nwhich have not life, and of those which have life the superior are\nthose which have reason.\n\n17. To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that\nthe bad should not do something of this kind.\n\n18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to\nbear. The same things happen to another, and either because he does not\nsee that they have happened, or because he would show a great spirit,\nhe is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and\nconceit should be stronger than wisdom.\n\n19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor\nhave they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:\nbut the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgments it\nmay think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which\npresent themselves to it.\n\n20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do\ngood to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves\nobstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which\nare indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it\nis true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to\nmy effects and disposition, which have the power of acting\nconditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes every\nhindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance\nis made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the\nroad helps us on this road.\n\n21. Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that\nwhich makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like\nmanner also reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the\nsame kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of\neverything else is this, and thy life is directed by this.\n\n22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen.\nIn the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state\nis not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed,\nthou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him\nwhere his error is.\n\n23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and\ndisappear, both the things which are and the things which are produced.\nFor substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities\nof things are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite\nvarieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And\nconsider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past\nand of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a\nfool who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes\nhimself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time.\n\n24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small\nportion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible\ninterval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by\ndestiny, and how small a part of it thou art.\n\n25. Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own\ndisposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature\nwills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.\n\n26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by\nthe movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it\nnot unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those\naffects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by\nvirtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is\nall one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is\nnatural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the\nopinion that it is either good or bad.\n\n27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly\nshows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is\nassigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which\nZeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of\nhimself. And this is every man\u2019s understanding and reason.\n\n28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? art thou angry with\nhim whose mouth smells foul? What good will this anger do thee? He has\nsuch a mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an\nemanation must come from such things; but the man has reason, it will\nbe said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he\noffends; I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast\nreason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him\nhis error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and\nthere is no need of anger.\n\n29. As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, \u2026 so it is in thy\npower to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out of\nlife, yet so as if them wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and\nI quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as\nnothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall\nhinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is\naccording to the nature of the rational and social animal.\n\n30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made\nthe inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the\nsuperior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated,\nco-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has\nbrought together into concord with one another the things which are the\nbest.\n\n31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren,\nchildren, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy\nfriends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto\nbehaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee,\u2014\n\n\u201cNever has wronged a man in deed or word.\u201d\n\n\nAnd call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through,\nand how many things thou hast been able to endure and that the history\nof thy life is now complete and thy service is ended; and how many\nbeautiful things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou\nhast despised; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned;\nand to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.\n\n32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and\nknowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows\nbeginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance,\nand through all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the\nuniverse.\n\n33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a\nname or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things\nwhich are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and\n[like] little dogs biting one another, and little children quarrelling,\nlaughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and\njustice and truth are fled\n\nUp to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.\n          HESIOD, _Works, etc_. v. 197.\n\n\nWhat then is there which still detains thee here, if the objects of\nsense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of\nperception are dull and easily receive false impressions, and the poor\nsoul itself is an exhalation from blood? But to have good repute amid\nsuch a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in\ntranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to\nanother state? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what\nelse than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men,\nand to practice tolerance and self-restraint; but as to everything\nwhich is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember\nthat this is neither thine nor in thy power.\n\n34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou\ncanst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These\ntwo things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man,\nand to the soul of every rational being: not to be hindered by another;\nand to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the\npractice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.\n\n35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness,\nand the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it, and\nwhat is the harm to the common weal?\n\n36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of\nthings, but give help [to all] according to thy ability and their\nfitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are\nindifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage; for it is a bad habit.\nBut as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child\u2019s\ntop, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.\n\nWhen thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what\nthese things are?\u2014Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these\npeople\u2014wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things? I was once a\nfortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.\u2014But fortunate means that\na man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is\ngood disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VI.\n\n\n1. The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the\nreason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it\nhas no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed\nby it. But all things are made and perfected according to this reason.\n\n2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if\nthou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with\nsleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing\nsomething else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we\ndie: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in\nhand (vi. 22, 28).\n\n3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its\nvalue escape thee.\n\n4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to\nvapor, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.\n\n5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what\nit does, and on what material it works.\n\n6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the wrong-\ndoer].\n\n7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one\nsocial act to another social act, thinking of God.\n\n8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and\nwhile it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also\nmakes everything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills.\n\n9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is\naccomplished; for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature\nthat each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally\ncomprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature,\nor a nature external and independent of this (XL 1; VI. 40; VIII. 50).\n\n10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of\nthings, and a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If\nthen it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous\ncombination of things and such a disorder? and why do I care about\nanything else than how I shall at last become earth? and why am I\ndisturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do?\nBut if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I\ntrust in him who governs (IV. 27).\n\n11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a\nmanner, quickly return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune\nlonger than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over\nthe harmony by continually recurring to it.\n\n12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou\nwouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst\nconstantly return to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to\nthee stepmother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose\nin her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to\nthee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.\n\n13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the\nimpression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead\nbody of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a\nlittle grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep\u2019s wool dyed with\nthe blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they\nreach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind\nof things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through\nlife, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our\napprobation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness\nand strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward\nshow is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most\nsure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then\nthat it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates\nhimself.\n\n14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to\nobjects of the most general kind, those which are held together by\ncohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees,\nvines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little\nmore reasonable, are referred to the things which are held together by\na living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men\nwho are still more instructed are the things which are held together by\na rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as\nit is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or\nsimply rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who\nvalues a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life,\nregards nothing else except this; and above all things he keeps his\nsoul in a condition and in an activity comformable to reason and social\nlife, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same\nkind as himself.\n\n15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying\nout of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already\nextinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world,\njust as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the\ninfinite duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there\nis no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a\nman would set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in\nlove with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed\nout of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man,\nlike the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For\nsuch as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back,\nwhich we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole\nrespiratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and\nthe day before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst\nfirst draw it.\n\n16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor\nrespiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the\nreceiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved\nby desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being\nnourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and\nparting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being\nvalued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we\nvalue the clapping of tongues; for the praise which comes from the many\nis a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this\nworthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This,\nin my opinion: to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to\nthy proper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts\nlead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made\nshould be adapted to the work for which it has been made; and both the\nvine planter who looks after the vine, and the horsebreaker, and he who\ntrains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of\nyouth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and\nthe teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else.\nWilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou wilt be\nneither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without\npassion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious\nof those who can take away those things, and plot against those who\nhave that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be\naltogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things;\nand besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence\nand honor thy own mind will make thee content with thyself, and in\nharmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising\nall that they give and have ordered.\n\n17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the\nmotion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and\nadvancing by a way hardly observed, it goes happily on its road.\n\n18. How strangely men act! They will not praise those who are living at\nthe same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised\nby posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see, this\nthey set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou\nshouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not\npraise thee.\n\n19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think\nthat it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and\nconformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself\ntoo.\n\n20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with\nhis nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well,\nwe neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we\nsuspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our\nguard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but\nwe quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behavior be\nin all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in those\nwho are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I\nsaid, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.\n\n21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think\nor act rightly, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no\nman was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and\nignorance.\n\n22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either\nthings without life, or things without reason, or things that have\nrambled and know not the way.\n\n23. As to the animals which have no reason, and generally all things\nand objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make\nuse of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human\nbeings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all\noccasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length\nof time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are\nsufficient.\n\n24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the\nsame state; for either they were received among the same seminal\nprinciples of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the\natoms.\n\n25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in\neach of us,\u2014things which concern the body and things which concern the\nsoul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all\nthings which come into existence in that which is the one and all,\nwhich we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.\n\n26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name\nAntoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter\neach letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt\nthou not go on with composure and number every letter? Just so then in\nthis life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts.\nThese it is thy duty to observe, and without being disturbed or showing\nanger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish\nthat which is set before thee.\n\n27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which\nappear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet\nin a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed\nbecause they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things\nbecause they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable\nto them.\u2014But it is not so.\u2014Teach them then, and show them without being\nangry.\n\n28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of\nthe pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the\ndiscursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh\n(II. 12).\n\n29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life,\nwhen thy body does not give way.\n\n30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not\ndyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple,\ngood, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a\nworshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper\nacts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee.\nReverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one\nfruit of this terrene life,\u2014a pious disposition and social acts. Do\neverything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every\nact which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things,\nand his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness,\nand his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things;\nand how he would never let anything pass without having first most\ncarefully examined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with\nthose who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he\ndid nothing in a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how\nexact an examiner of manners and actions he was; and not given to\nreproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how\nlittle he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants;\nand how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his\nsparing diet to hold out to the evening; and his firmness and\nuniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech\nin those who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when\nany man showed him anything better; and how religious he was without\nsuperstition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest have as good a\nconscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had.\n\n31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou\nhast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only\ndreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the\nthings about thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams].\n\n32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all\nthings are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But\nto the understanding those things only are indifferent which are not\nthe works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its\nown activity, all these are in its power. And of these however only\nthose which are done with reference to the present; for as to the\nfuture and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the\npresent indifferent.\n\n33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is\ncontrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot\u2019s work and the\nhand the hand\u2019s. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor\ncontrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the\nlabor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.\n\n34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides,\ntyrants.\n\n35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up\nto a certain point to those who are not skilled in their\ncraft,\u2014nevertheless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their\nart, and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the\narchitect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the\nprinciples] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is\ncommon to him and the gods?\n\n36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe; all the sea a drop in\nthe universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time\nis a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable.\nAll things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either\ndirectly preceding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion\u2019s\ngaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a\nthorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not\nthen imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost\nvenerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all (VII. 75).\n\n37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which\nhas taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time\nwithout end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.\n\n38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe\nand their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are\nimplicated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one\nanother; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by\nvirtue of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of\nthe substance (ix. 1).\n\n39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and\nthe men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it\ntruly [sincerely].\n\n40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has\nbeen made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the\nthings which are held together by nature there is within, and there\nabides in, them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit\nto reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act\naccording to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to\nintelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to\nit are in conformity to intelligence.\n\n41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt\nsuppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if\nsuch a bad thing befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, thou\nwilt not blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of\nthe misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely\nto be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice because we make a\ndifference between these things [because we do not regard these things\nas indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which are in our\npower to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding\nfault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.\n\n42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and\ndesign, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they\nare asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are\nlaborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the\nuniverse. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those\nco-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who\ntry to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of\nsuch men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what\nkind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will\ncertainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some\npart of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end.\nBut be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the\nplay, which Chrysippus speaks of.\n\n43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius\nthe work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to\neach of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together to\nthe same end?\n\n44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which\nmust happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even\nto imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why\nshould they have any desire towards that? for what advantage would\nresult to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object\nof their providence? But if they have not determined about me\nindividually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least,\nand the things which happen by way of sequence in this general\narrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with\nthem. But if they determine about nothing,\u2014which it is wicked to\nbelieve, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor\nswear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were\npresent and lived with us,\u2014but if however the gods determine about none\nof the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself,\nand I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to\nevery man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But\nmy nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I\nam Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The\nthings then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me.\n\n45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the\nuniversal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this\nalso as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is\nprofitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word\nprofitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the\nmiddle kind [neither good nor bad].\n\n46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the\ncontinual sight of the same things, and the uniformity make the\nspectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things\nabove, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?\n\n47. Think continually that all kinds of men and men of all kinds of\npursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down\neven to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to\nthe other kinds [of men]. To that place then we must remove, where\nthere are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers,\nHeraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so\nmany generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus,\nHipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great\nminds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the\nperishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like\nhim. As to all these consider that they have long been in the dust.\nWhat harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names are\naltogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy\nlife in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars\nand unjust men.\n\n48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those\nwho live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty\nof another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality\nof a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the\nvirtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with\nus and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible.\nWherefore we must keep them before us.\n\n49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only so\nmany litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou\nmust live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied\nwith the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be\ncontent with the time.\n\n50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will,\nwhen the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by\nusing force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and\ntranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the\nexercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a\nreservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do\nimpossibilities. What then didst thou desire?\u2014Some such effort as\nthis.\u2014But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast\nmoved are [not] accomplished.\n\n51. He who loves fame considers another man\u2019s activity to be his own\ngood; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has\nunderstanding considers his own acts to be his own good.\n\n52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be\ndisturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to\nform our judgments.\n\n53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another,\nand as much as it is possible, be in the speaker\u2019s mind.\n\n54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the\nbee.\n\n55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the sick the doctor, would they\nlisten to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of\nthose in the ship, or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?\n\n56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone\nout of it.\n\n57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad\ndogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine\nthing. Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has\nless power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is\nbitten by a mad dog?\n\n58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy\nown nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the\nuniversal nature.\n\n59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what\nobjects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things,\nand how many it has covered already.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VII.\n\n\n1. What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the\noccasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that\nwhich thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the\nsame things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the\nmiddle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are\nfilled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and\nshort-lived.\n\n2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impression [thoughts]\nwhich correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power\ncontinuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that\nopinion about anything which I ought to have. If I can, why am I\ndisturbed? The things which are external to my mind have no relation at\nall to my mind.\u2014Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest\nerect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as\nthou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the recovery of\nthy life.\n\n3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep,\nherds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of\nbread into fishponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings\nabout of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings\u2014[all alike].\nIt is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and\nnot a proud air; to understand however that every man is worth just so\nmuch as the things are worth about which he busies himself.\n\n4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement\nthou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see\nimmediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully\nwhat is the thing signified.\n\n5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient,\nI use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature.\nBut if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and\ngive way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some\nreason why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to\nhelp me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is\nnow fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either by\nmyself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to\nthat which is useful and well suited to society.\n\n6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to\noblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long\nbeen dead.\n\n7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty\nlike a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou\ncanst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of\nanother it is possible?\n\n8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if\nit shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou\nusest for present things.\n\n9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy;\nand there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For\nthings have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same\nuniverse [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and\none god who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, [one]\ncommon reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed\nthere is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same\nstock and participate in the same reason.\n\n10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole;\nand everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the\nuniversal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed\nin time.\n\n11. To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and\naccording to reason.\n\n12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (III. 5).\n\n13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in\none, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have\nbeen constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of this will\nbe more apparent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a\nmember of the system of rational beings. But if thou sayest that thou\nart a part, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does\nnot yet delight thee for its own sake; thou still dost it barely as a\nthing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself.\n\n14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the\neffects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if\nthey choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil,\nam not injured. And it is in my power not to think so.\n\n15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the gold,\nor the emerald, or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any one\ndoes or says, I must be emerald and keep my color.\n\n16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not\nfrighten itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten\nor pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own\nopinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if\nit can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But\nthe soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has\ncompletely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will\nsuffer nothing, for it will never deviate into such a judgment. The\nleading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for\nitself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded,\nif it does not disturb and impede itself.\n\n17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then\nart thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the\ngods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come\naccording to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.\n\n18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without\nchange? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal\nnature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change?\nand canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And\ncan anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost\nthou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and\nequally necessary for the universal nature?\n\n19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all\nbodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating\nwith the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a\nChrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already\nswallowed up! And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to\nevery man and thing (V. 23; VI. 15).\n\n20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the\nconstitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not\nallow, or what it does not allow now.\n\n21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness\nof thee by all.\n\n22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this\nhappens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen,\nand that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that\nsoon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done\nthee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was\nbefore.\n\n23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were\nwax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the\nmaterial for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each\nof these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship\nfor the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being\nfastened together (VIII. 50).\n\n24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often\nassumed,[5] the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is\nso completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all.\nTry to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For\nif even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is\nthere for living any longer?\n\n25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which\nthou seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and\nagain other things from the substance of them, in order that the world\nmay be ever new (XII. 23).\n\n26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what\nopinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen\nthis, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For\neither thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or\nanother thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But\nif thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more\nreadily be well disposed to him who is in error.\n\n27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but\nof the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how\neagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the\nsame time, however, take care that thou dost not through being so\npleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be\ndisturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them.\n\n28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this\nnature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and\nso secures tranquillity.\n\n29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine\nthyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or\nto another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal]\nand the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done\nby a man stay there where the wrong was done (VIII. 29).\n\n30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter\ninto the things that are doing and the things which do them (VII. 4).\n\n31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, and with indifference\ntowards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind.\nFollow God. The poet says that law rules all\u2014And it is enough to\nremember that law rules all.\n\n32. About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into\natoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change.\n\n33. About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that\nwhich lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own\ntranquillity by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not\nmade worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they\ncan, give their opinion about it.\n\n34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe\nwhat they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of\nthings they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one\nanother hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before\nare soon covered by those which come after.\n\n35. From Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of\nall time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to\nthink that human life is anything great? It is not possible, he\nsaid.\u2014Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.\u2014Certainly\nnot.\n\n36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused.\n\n37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to\nregulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not\nto be regulated and composed by itself.\n\n38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought\nabout it.\n\n39. To the immortal gods and us give joy.\n\n40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn. One man is born;\nanother dies.\n\n41. If gods care not for me and for my children, There is a reason for\nit.\n\n42. For the good is with me, and the just.\n\n43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.\n\n44. From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is\nthis: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for\nanything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and\nshould not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is\ndoing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man.\n\n45. For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed\nhimself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a\ncommander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the\nhazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything\nelse, before the baseness [of deserting his post].\n\n46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good\nis not something different from saving and being saved; for as to a man\nliving such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider\nif this is not a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts: and there\nmust be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust\nthem to the Deity and believe what the women say, that no man can\nescape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the\ntime that he has to live.\n\n47. Look around at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going\nalong with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements\ninto one another, for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene\nlife.\n\n48. This is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about\nmen should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some\nhigher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies,\nagricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the\ncourts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians,\nfeasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly\ncombination of contraries.\n\n49. Consider the past,\u2014such great changes of political supremacies;\nthou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will\ncertainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should\ndeviate from the order of the things which take place now; accordingly\nto have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have\ncontemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?\n\n50.\n\nThat which has grown from the earth to the earth,\nBut that which has sprung from heavenly seed,\nBack to the heavenly realms returns.\n\n\nThis is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or\na similar dispersion of the unsentient elements.\n\n51.\n\nWith food and drinks and cunning magic arts\nTurning the channel\u2019s course to \u2019scape from death.\nThe breeze which heaven has sent\nWe must endure, and toil without complaining.\n\n\n52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not\nmore social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that\nhappens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his\nneighbors.\n\n53. Where any work can be clone conformably to the reason which is\ncommon to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are\nable to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and\nproceeds according to our constitution, there no harm is to be\nsuspected.\n\n54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce\nin thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about\nthee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing\nshall steal into them without being well examined.\n\n55. Do not look around thee to discover other men\u2019s ruling principles,\nbut look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the\nuniversal nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own\nnature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being\nought to do that which is according to its constitution; and all other\nthings have been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as\namong irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but\nthe rational for the sake of one another.\n\nThe prime principle then in man\u2019s constitution is the social. And the\nsecond is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,\u2014for it is the\npeculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe\nitself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses\nor of the appetites, for both are animal; but the intelligent motion\nclaims superiority, and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the\nothers. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of\nthem. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from\nerror and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to\nthese things go straight on, and it has what is its own.\n\n56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to\nthe present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is\nallowed thee.\n\n57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of\nthy destiny. For what is more suitable?\n\n58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the\nsame things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as\nstrange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?\nNowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way; and why\ndost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to\nthose who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou\nnot altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things\nwhich happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will\nbe a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and\nresolve to be a good man in every act which thou dost: and remember\u2026.\n\n59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever\nbubble up, if thou wilt ever dig.\n\n60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in\nmotion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining\nin it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be\nrequired also in the whole body. But all these things should be\nobserved without affectation.\n\n61. The art of life is more like the wrestler\u2019s art than the dancer\u2019s,\nin respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets\nwhich are sudden and unexpected.\n\n62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to\nhave, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt\nneither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their\napprobation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and\nappetites.\n\n63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of\ntruth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and\ntemperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most\nnecessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more\ngentle towards all.\n\n64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no\ndishonor in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for\nit does not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence\nis rational or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains\nlet this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable\nnor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if\nthou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that\nwe do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are\nthe same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched\nby heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented\nabout any of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to\npain.\n\n65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards men.\n\n66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to\nSocrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death,\nand disputed more skilfully with the Sophists, and passed the night in\nthe cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon\nof Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked\nin a swaggering way in the streets\u2014though as to this fact one may have\ngreat doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a\nsoul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content\nwith being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly\nvexed on account of men\u2019s villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to\nany man\u2019s ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his\nshare out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor\nallowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the\nmiserable flesh.\n\n67. Nature has not so mingled [the intelligence] with the composition\nof the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing\nthyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy\nown; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as\nsuch by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that\nvery little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because\nthou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the\nknowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being\nboth free and modest, and social and obedient to God.\n\n68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest\ntranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as\nmuch as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members\nof this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders\nthe mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in\ntranquillity and in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a\nready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the\njudgment may say to the thing which falls under its observation: This\nthou art in substance [reality], though in men\u2019s opinion thou mayest\nappear to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that which\nfalls under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me\nthat which presents itself is always a material for virtue both\nrational and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which\nbelongs to man or God. For everything which happens has a relationship\neither to God or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but\nusual and apt matter to work on.\n\n69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing\nevery day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor\ntorpid nor playing the hypocrite.\n\n70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a\ntime they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of\nthem bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways.\nBut thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring\nthe bad, and this too when thou art one of them?\n\n71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,\nwhich is indeed possible, but to fly from other men\u2019s badness, which is\nimpossible.\n\n72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be\nneither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to\nitself.\n\n73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why\ndost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do,\neither to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a\nreturn?\n\n74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to\nact according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is\nuseful by doing it to others.\n\n75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either\neverything that takes place comes by way of consequence or\n[continuity]; or even the chief things towards which the ruling power\nof the universe directs its own movement are governed by no rational\nprinciple. If this is remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in\nmany things (vi. 44; ix. 28).\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VIII.\n\n\n1. This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty\nfame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy\nlife, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher;\nbut both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far\nfrom philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no\nlonger easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy\nplan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the\nmatter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to others],\nand be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as\nthy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else\ndistract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without\nhaving found happiness anywhere,\u2014not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor\nin reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In\ndoing what man\u2019s nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he\nhas principles from which come his affects and his acts. What\nprinciples? Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that there\nis nothing good for man which does not make him just, temperate, manly,\nfree; and that there is nothing bad which does not do the contrary to\nwhat has been mentioned.\n\n2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect\nto me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is\ngone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an\nintelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the\nsame law with God?\n\n3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with\nDiogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with\nthings, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling\nprinciples of these men were the same [or conformable to their\npursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for,\nand to how many things were they slaves!\n\n4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even\nthough thou shouldst burst.\n\n5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are\naccording to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou\nwilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next\nplace, having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and\nat the same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and\nwhat man\u2019s nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as\nit seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and\nwith modesty and without hypocrisy.\n\n6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,\u2014to remove to that\nplace the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away\nhence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not\nfear anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; but the\ndistribution of them still remains the same.\n\n7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well;\nand a rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it\nassents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its\nmovements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and\naversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is\nsatisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature.\nFor of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as the\nnature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in\nthe plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not\nperception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of\nman is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is\nintelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions\nand according to its worth, times, substance, cause [form], activity\nand incident. But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared\nwith any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all\nthe parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts\ntogether of another.\n\n8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure\n[or ability] to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to\npleasure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame,\nand not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care\nfor them.\n\n9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or\nwith thy own (V. 16).\n\n10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something\nuseful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the\nperfect good man should look after it. But no such man would ever\nrepent of having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither\ngood nor useful.\n\n11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution! What is\nits substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And\nwhat is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?\n\n12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is\naccording to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform\nsocial acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But\nthat which is according to each individual\u2019s nature is also more\npeculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also\nmore agreeable (V. 1).\n\n13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every\nimpression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic,\nand of Dialectic.\n\n14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What\nopinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to\npleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and\nignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem\nnothing wonderful or strange to me if he does such and such things; and\nI shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.\n\n15. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree\nproduces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and\nsuch things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the\nhelmsman it is a shame to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the\nwind is unfavorable.\n\n16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects\nthy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy\nerror. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to\nthy own movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own\nunderstanding too.\n\n17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? but if it is\nin the power of another, whom dost thou blame,\u2014the atoms [chance] or\nthe gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst,\ncorrect [that which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do this,\ncorrect at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this,\nof what use is it to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done\nwithout a purpose.\n\n18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays\nhere, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts,\nwhich are elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too\nchange, and they murmur not.\n\n19. Everything exists for some end,\u2014a horse, a vine. Why dost thou\nwonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of\nthe gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou,\u2014to enjoy\npleasure? See if common sense allows this.\n\n20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the\nbeginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball.\nWhat good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to\ncome down, or even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble\nwhile it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be\nsaid of a light also.\n\n21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is;\nand when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it\nis diseased.\n\nShort lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer\nand the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world;\nand not even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and the\nwhole earth too is a point.\n\n22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion\nor an act or a word. Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest\nrather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day.\n\n23. Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind.\nDoes anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and\nthe source of all things, from which all that happens is derived.\n\n24. Such as bathing appears to thee,\u2014oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water,\nall things disgusting,\u2014so is every part of life and everything.\n\n25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus\ndie, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then\nEpitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died.\nSuch is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And\nthose sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where\nare they,\u2014for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the\nPlatonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them? All ephemeral, dead\nlong ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time,\nand others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have\ndisappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little\ncompound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be\nextinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere.\n\n26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it\nis a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise\nthe movements of the senses, to form a just judgment of plausible\nappearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of\nthe things which happen in it.\n\n27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one\nto the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from\nwhich all things come to all; and the third to those who live with\nthee.\n\n28. Pain is either an evil to the body\u2014then let the body say what it\nthinks of it\u2014or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to\nmaintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain\nis an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is\nwithin, and no evil ascends so high.\n\n29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: Now it is in\nmy power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any\nperturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their\nnature, and I use each according to its value.\u2014Remember this power\nwhich thou hast from nature.\n\n30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be,\nappropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse.\n\n31. Augustus\u2019 court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister,\nAgrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Maecenas, physicians, and\nsacrificing priests,\u2014the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest,\nnot considering the death of a single man [but of a whole race], as of\nthe Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs,\u2014The last of his\nrace. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that they\nmight leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must be\nthe last. Again, here consider the death of a whole race.\n\n32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if\nevery act does its duty as far as is possible, be content; and no one\nis able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.\u2014But\nsomething external will stand in the way.\u2014Nothing will stand in the way\nof thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.\u2014But perhaps some\nother active power will be hindered.\u2014Well, but by acquiescing in the\nhindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is\nallowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee\nin place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to\nthis ordering of which we are speaking.\n\n33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be ready to\nlet it go.\n\n34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying\nanywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself,\nas far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates\nhimself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast\ndetached thyself from the natural unity,\u2014for thou wast made by nature a\npart, but now thou hast cut thyself off,\u2014yet here there is this\nbeautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself.\nGod has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and\ncut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which\nhe has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be\nseparated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he\nhas allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a\npart.\n\n35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being\nall the other powers that it has, so we have received from it this\npower also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its\npredestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it,\nand makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is\nable to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such\npurposes as it may have designed.\n\n36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let\nnot thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou\nmayest expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What\nis there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt\nbe ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the\nfuture nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is\nreduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest\nthy mind if it is unable to hold out against even this.\n\n37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does\nChaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That would be\nridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be\nconscious of it? and if the dead were conscious would they be pleased?\nand if they were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in\nthe order of destiny that these persons too should first become old\nwomen and old men and then die? What then would those do after these\nwere dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.\n\n38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the\nphilosopher.\n\n39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is\nopposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of\npleasure, and that is temperance.\n\n40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give\nthee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.\u2014Who is this\nself?\u2014The reason.\u2014But I am not reason.\u2014Be it so. Let then the reason\nitself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let\nit have its own opinion about itself (VII. 16).\n\n41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal\nnature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the\nanimal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an\nevil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance\nto the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all\nthese things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure effect\nthee? The senses will look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in\nthy efforts towards an object? If indeed thou wast making this effort\nabsolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly\nthis obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But\nif thou takest [into consideration] the usual course of things, thou\nhast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which\nare proper to the understanding no other man is used to impede, for\nneither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way.\nWhen it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere (XI, 12).\n\n42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never\nintentionally given pain even to another.\n\n43. Different things delight different people; but it is my delight to\nkeep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man\nor from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and\nreceiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its\nvalue.\n\n44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who\nrather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after\ntime will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both\nare mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after\ntime utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?\n\n45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my\ndivine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act\nconformably to its proper constitution. Is this [change of place]\nsufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse then it was,\ndepressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find\nwhich is sufficient reason for this?\n\n46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to\nan ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine\nwhich is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is\nnot proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is\nusual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature\nbrings nothing which may not be borne by thee.\n\n47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that\ndisturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to\nwipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition\ngives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even\nif thou art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing\nwhich seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than\ncomplain?\u2014But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?\u2014Do not be\ngrieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on\nthee.\u2014But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done.\u2014Take\nthy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in\nfull activity, and well pleased too with the things which are\nobstacles.\n\n48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected\nit is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not\nchoose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it\nbe when it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and\ndeliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a\ncitadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge\nand for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an\nignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is\nunhappy.\n\n49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report.\nSuppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks\nill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured,\nthat has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but\nthat he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first\nappearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing\nhappens to thee. Or rather add something like a man who knows\neverything that happens in the world.\n\n50. A cucumber is bitter\u2014Throw it away.\u2014There are briers in the\nroad\u2014Turn aside from them.\u2014This is enough. Do not add, And why were\nsuch things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who\nis acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter\nand shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their\nworkshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet\nthey have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings,\nand the universal nature has no external space; but the wondrous part\nof her art is that though she has circumscribed herself, everything\nwithin her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she\nchanges into herself, and again makes other new things from these very\nsame, so that she requires neither substance from without nor wants a\nplace into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then\nwith her own space, and her own matter, and her own art.\n\n51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without\nmethod, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul\ninward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to\nhave no leisure.\n\nSuppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then\ncan these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise,\nsober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure\nspring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water;\nand if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse\nthem and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt\nthou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well]? By forming\nthyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity, and\nmodesty.\n\n52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is.\nAnd he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not\nknow who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one\nof these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself.\nWhat then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of\nthose who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who\nthey are?\n\n53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice\nevery hour? Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please\nhimself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything\nthat he does?\n\n54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which\nsurrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with\nthe intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power\nis no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is\nwilling to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to\nrespire it.\n\n55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and\nparticularly the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is\nonly harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as\nsoon as he shall choose.\n\n56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as\nindifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made\nespecially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each\nof us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbor\u2019s wickedness would\nbe my harm, which God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may\nnot depend on another.\n\n57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it\nis diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension:\nAccordingly its rays are called Extensions because they are extended.\nBut one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the\nsun\u2019s light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for\nit is extended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets\nwith any solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air\nbeyond; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall\noff. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the\nunderstanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an\nextension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with\nthe obstacles which are in its way; nor yet fall down, but be fixed,\nand enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of\nthe illumination, if it does not admit it.\n\n58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a\ndifferent kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation,\nneither wilt thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind\nof sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou\nwilt not cease to live.\n\n59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with\nthem.\n\n60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind\nindeed, both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about\ninquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object.\n\n61. Enter into every man\u2019s ruling faculty; and also let every other man\nenter into thine.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IX.\n\n\n1. He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature\nhas made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one\nanother according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one\nanother, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety\ntowards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety\nto the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things\nthat are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come\ninto existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, and\nis the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies\nintentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by\ndeceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at\nvariance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the\norder by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights\nagainst it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth,\nfor he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he\nis not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who\npursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of\nimpiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the\nuniversal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the\ngood contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the\nenjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure,\nbut the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain.\nAnd further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of\nsome of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is\nimpiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice,\nand this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards\nwhich the universal nature is equally affected,\u2014for it would not have\nmade both, unless it was equally affected towards both,\u2014towards these\nthey who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and\nequally affected. With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death\nand life, or honor and dishonor, which the universal nature employs\nequally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting\nimpiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally,\ninstead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in\ncontinuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a\ncertain original movement of Providence, according to which it moved\nfrom a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having conceived\ncertain principles of the things which were to be, and having\ndetermined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such like\nsuccessions (VII. 75).\n\n2. It would be a man\u2019s happiest lot to depart from mankind without\nhaving had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride.\nHowever, to breathe out one\u2019s life when a man has had enough of these\nthings is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined\nto abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from\nthis pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a\npestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of\nthis atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence\nof animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of\nmen so far as they are men.\n\n3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is\none of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young\nand to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have\nteeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to\nbring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of\nthy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent\nwith the character of a reflecting man,\u2014to be neither careless nor\nimpatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as\none of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when\nthe child shall come out of thy wife\u2019s womb, so be ready for the time\nwhen thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest\nalso a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be\nmade best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou\nart going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul\nwill no longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with\nmen, but it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently;\nand yet to remember that thy departure will not be from men who have\nthe same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be\nany, which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life,\u2014to be\npermitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves.\nBut now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the\ndiscordance of those who live together, so that thou mayest say, Come\nquick, O death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself.\n\n4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly\nacts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.\n\n5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he\nwho does a certain thing.\n\n6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present\nconduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of\ncontentment with everything which happens\u2014that is enough.\n\n7. Wipe out imagination: check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the\nruling faculty in its own power.\n\n8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but\namong reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as\nthere is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we\nsee by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty\nof vision and all that have life.\n\n9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all\nmove towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything\nwhich is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid\nflows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the\nsame, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the\napplication of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the\nelemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the\nfire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry is\neasily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is\na hindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which\nparticipates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner\ntowards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more.\nFor so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in\nthe same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused\nwith that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of\nreason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of\nyoung birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are\nsouls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert\nitself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been\nobserved in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals\nthere are political communities and friendships, and families and\nmeetings of people; and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the\nthings which are still superior, even though they are separated from\none another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent\nto the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which\nare separated. See, then, what now takes place; for only intelligent\nanimals have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in\nthem alone the property of flowing together is not seen. But still,\nthough men strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by\nit, for their nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I\nsay, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything\nearthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing, than a man\naltogether separated from other men.\n\n10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper\nseasons each produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these\nterms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces\nfruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other\nthings of the same kind as reason itself.\n\n11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if\nthou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this\npurpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some\npurposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind\nthey are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?\n\n12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be\npitied or admired: but direct thy will to one thing only,\u2014to put\nthyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.\n\n13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all\ntrouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.\n\n14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in\ntime, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in\nthe time of those whom we have buried.\n\n15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither\nknowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it,\nthen, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.\n\n16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the\nrational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in\npassivity but in activity.\n\n17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,\nnor indeed any good to have been carried up (VIII. 20).\n\n18. Penetrate inwards into men\u2019s leading principles, and thou wilt see\nwhat judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of\nthemselves.\n\n19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous\nmutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole\nuniverse too.\n\n20. It is thy duty to leave another man\u2019s wrongful act there where it\nis (VII. 29; IX. 38).\n\n21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and\nin a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the\nconsideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy\nmanhood, thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is\nthis anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy\ngrandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under\nthy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and\nterminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner,\nthen, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole\nlife a thing to be afraid of.\n\n22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe\nand that of thy neighbor: thy own that thou mayst make it just; and\nthat of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part;\nand that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted\nignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that\nhis ruling faculty is akin to thine.\n\n23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let\nevery act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of\nthine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social\nend, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and\nit is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a\nman acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.\n\n24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits\ncarrying about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is\nexhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead strikes our\neyes more clearly.\n\n25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it\naltogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then\ndetermine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is\nnaturally made to endure.\n\n26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented\nwith thy ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted\nby nature to do. But enough [of this].\n\n27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee\nanything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and\nsee what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no\nreason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion\nabout thee. However, thou must be well disposed towards them, for by\nnature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by\ndreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they\nset a value.\n\n28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down\nfrom age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in\nmotion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content\nwith that which is the result of its activity: or it puts itself in\nmotion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in a manner;\nor indivisible elements are the origin of all things.\u2014In a word, if\nthere is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be\ngoverned by it (VI. 44; VII. 75).\n\nSoon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and\nthe things also which result from change will continue to change\nforever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes\nand transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and\ntheir rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable (XII.\n21).\n\n29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything\nalong with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are\nengaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the\nphilosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now\nrequires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look\nabout thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato\u2019s\nRepublic: but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and\nconsider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men\u2019s\nopinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the\nslavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell\nme of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They\nthemselves shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature\nrequired, and trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like\ntragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and\nmodest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and\npride.\n\n30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their\ncountless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms\nand calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live\ntogether, and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden\ntime, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now\nlived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and\nhow many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising\nthee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is\nof any value, nor reputation, nor anything else.\n\n31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things\nwhich come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the\nthings done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be\nmovement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is\naccording to thy nature.\n\n32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those\nwhich disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt\nthen gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe\nin thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing\nthe rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from\nbirth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as\nthe equally boundless time after dissolution!\n\n33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been\nspectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who\ndies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition\nwith him who died prematurely.\n\n34. What are these men\u2019s leading principles, and about what kind of\nthings are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and\nhonor? Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they\nthink that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an\nidea!\n\n35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights\nin change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and\nfrom eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time\nwithout end. What, then, dost thou say,\u2014that all things have been and\nall things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in\nso many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned\nto be bound in never ceasing evil (IV. 45; VII. 88)?\n\n36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything:\nwater, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of\nthe earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits\nof hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same\nkind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing\nof the same kind, changing from this to that.\n\n37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why\nart thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is\nit the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it.\nBut besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become\nat last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these\nthings for a hundred years or three.\n\n38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has\nnot done wrong.\n\n39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come\ntogether as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what\nis done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and\nnothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou\ndisturbed? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou\ncorrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast,\ndost thou herd and feed with the rest?\n\n40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they\nhave no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why\ndost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any\nof the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things\nwhich thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray\nthat any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if\nthey can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes.\nBut perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed them in thy power. Well,\nthen, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than\nto desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who\nhas told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things which are\nin our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see.\nOne man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou\npray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus:\nHow shall I be released from this? Another prays: How shall I not\ndesire to be released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little\nson? Thou thus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn\nthy prayers this way, and see what comes.\n\n41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my\nbodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those\nwho visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as\nbefore, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating\nin such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from\nperturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give\nthe physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they\nwere doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do,\nthen, the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in\nany other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events\nthat may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant\nman or with one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools\nof philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing\nand on the instrument by which thou dost it.\n\n42. When thou art offended with any man\u2019s shameless conduct,\nimmediately ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men\nshould not be in the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require\nwhat is impossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men who\nmust of necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be\npresent to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man,\nand of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that\nthou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men\nshould not exist, thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every\none individually. It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when\nthe occasion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to\nevery wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against\nthe stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other\npower. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching\nthe man who is gone astray; for every man who errs misses his object\nand is gone astray. Besides, wherein hast thou been injured? For thou\nwilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has\ndone anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that which is\nevil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what\nharm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been\ninstructed does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou\nshouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a\nman to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason\nto suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and yet\nthou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most of all\nwhen thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself.\nFor the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a\nman who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when\nconferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in\nsuch way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what\nmore dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? art thou not\ncontent that thou hast done something comformable to thy nature, and\ndost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a\nrecompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these members\nare formed for a particular purpose, and by working according to their\nseveral constitutions obtain what is their own; so also as man is\nformed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done anything\nbenevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has\nacted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK X.\n\n\n1. Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and\nnaked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou\nnever enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never\nbe full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor\ndesiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of\npleasures? nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer\nenjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom\nthou mayest live in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy\npresent condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt\nthou convince thyself that thou hast everything, and that it comes from\nthe gods, that everything is well for thee, and will be well whatever\nshall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of\nthe perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which\ngenerates and holds together all things, and contains and embraces all\nthings which are dissolved for the production of other like things?\nWilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods\nand men as neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned\nby them?\n\n2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by\nnature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou\nart a living being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must\nobserve what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And\nall this thou mayest allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a\nrational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal\nis consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules,\nthen, and trouble thyself about nothing else.\n\n3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art\nformed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to\nbear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by\nnature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by\nnature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not\nformed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after\nit has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature\nto bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion\nto make it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy\ninterest or thy duty to do this.\n\n4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error.\nBut if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.\n\n5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all\neternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the\nthread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it (III. II; IV.\n26).\n\n6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a\nsystem], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole\nwhich is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related\nto the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering\nthis, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the\nthings which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is\ninjurious to the part if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the\nwhole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures\nindeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has\nthis principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any\nexternal cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering,\nthen, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with\neverything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately\nrelated to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do\nnothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which\nare of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to\nthe common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these\nthings are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest\nobserve that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of\naction which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, and is content\nwith whatever the state may assign to him.\n\n7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally\ncomprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be\nunderstood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is\nnaturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would\nnot continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to\nchange and constituted so as to perish in various ways, For whether did\nNature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of\nherself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into\nevil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these\nsuppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the\nterm Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things\nas natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time\nthat the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and\nat the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were\nhappening contrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things\nis into those things of which each thing is composed. For there is\neither a dispersion of the elements out of which everything has been\ncompounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy\nto the aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal\nreason, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed\nby eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part\nbelongs to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its\naccretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the\nfood and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received [the\naccretion], changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. Hut\nsuppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very\nmuch with that other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change],\nthis is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.\n\n8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a\nman of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change\nthese names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them.\nAnd remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a\ndiscriminating attention to every several thing, and freedom from\nnegligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the\nthings which are assigned to thee by the common nature; and that\nMagnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the\npleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor\nthing called fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou\nmaintainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring\nto be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and\nwilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast\nhitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is\nthe character of a very stupid man and one over-fond of his life, and\nlike those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts who, though covered\nwith wounds and gore, still entreat to be kept to the following day,\nthough they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and\nbites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names: and\nif thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to\ncertain islands of the Happy. But if thou shalt perceive that thou\nfallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously\ninto some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once\nfrom life, not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty,\nafter doing this one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have\ngone out of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these\nnames, it will greatly help thee if thou rememberest the gods, and that\nthey wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be\nmade like themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work\nof a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a\ndog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does\nthe work of a man is a man.\n\n9. Mimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those\nholy principles of thine. How many things without studying nature dost\nthou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to\nlook on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power of\ndealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty\nis exercised, and the confidence which comes from the knowledge of each\nseveral thing is maintained without showing it, but yet not concealed.\nFor when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and when the\nknowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance, and\nwhat place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist,\nand of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who\nare able both to give it and take it away?\n\n10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has\ncaught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a\nnet, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has\ntaken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these\nrobbers, if thou examinest their opinions?\n\n11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into\none another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about\nthis part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce\nmagnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he\nmust, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave\neverything here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his\nactions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the\nuniversal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him\nor do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented\nwith these two things,\u2014with acting justly in what he now does, and\nbeing satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all\ndistracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to\naccomplish the straight course through the law, and by accomplishing\nthe straight course to follow God.\n\n12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to\ninquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way\ncontent, without turning back: but if thou dost not see clear, stop and\ntake the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on\naccording to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which\nappears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou\ndost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason\nin all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also\ncheerful and collected.\n\n13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep whether it\nwill make any difference to thee if another does what is just and\nright. It will make no difference (VI. 32; VIII. 55).\n\nThou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs\nin bestowing their praise or blame on others are such as they are at\nbed and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what\nthey avoid, and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob,\nnot with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of\nwhich there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth,\nlaw, a good daemon [happiness] (VII. 17)?\n\n14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is\ninstructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou\nwilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently, and well pleased\nwith her.\n\n15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a\nmountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here,\nif he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [political\ncommunity]. Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according\nto nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is\nbetter than to live thus [as men do].\n\n16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought\nto be, but be such.\n\n17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of\nsubstance, and consider that all individual things as to substance are\na grain of a fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet.\n\n18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in\ndissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion,\nor that everything is so constituted by nature as to die.\n\n19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating,\neasing themselves, and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when\nthey are imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their\nelevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and\nfor what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition\nthey will be.\n\n20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature\nbrings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings\nit.\n\n21. \u201cThe earth loves the shower\u201d; and \u201cthe solemn ether loves\u201d; and the\nuniverse loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the\nuniverse, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that\n\u201cthis or that loves [is wont] to be produced\u201d?\n\n22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it,\nor thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying\nand hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is\nnothing. Be of good cheer, then.\n\n23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like\nany other; and that all things here are the same with things on the top\nof a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be.\nFor thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a\ncity as in a shepherd\u2019s fold on a mountain. [The three last words are\nomitted in the translation.]\n\n24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what nature am I now\nmaking it? and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of\nunderstanding? is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? is it\nmelted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with\nit?\n\n25. He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master,\nand he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or\nangry or afraid, is dissatisfied because something has been or is or\nshall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all things,\nand he is Law and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who fears\nor is grieved or is angry is a runaway.\n\n26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause\ntakes it, and labors on it and makes a child. What a thing from such a\nmaterial! Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and\nthen another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in\nfine, life and strength and other things; how many and how strange!\nObserve then the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and\nsee the power just as we see the power which carries things downwards\nand upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly (VII. 75).\n\n27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time\npast also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And\nplace before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form,\nwhatever thou hast learned from thy experience or from older history;\nfor example, the whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of\nAntoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus; for\nall those were such dramas as we see now, only with different actors.\n\n28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be\nlike a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.\n\nLike this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in\nwhich we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it\ngiven to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a\nnecessity imposed on all.\n\n29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and\nask thyself if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of\nthis.\n\n30. When thou art offended at any man\u2019s fault, forthwith turn to\nthyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for\nexample, in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit\nof reputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly\nforget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is\ncompelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away\nfrom him the compulsion.\n\n31. When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches\nor Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or\nSilvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and\nwhen thou hast seen Xenophon, think of Crito or Severus, and when thou\nhast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the case of\nevery one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind,\nWhere then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For thus\ncontinuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at\nall; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has once\nchanged will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But\nthou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou\nnot content to pass through this short time in an orderly way? What\nmatter and opportunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding? For what\nelse are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it has\nviewed carefully and by examination into their nature the things which\nhappen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have made these things\nthy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes all things its own,\nas the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of everything that\nis thrown into it.\n\n32. Let it not be in any man\u2019s power to say truly of thee that thou art\nnot simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar whoever\nshall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in\nthy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and\nsimple? Do thou only determine to live no longer unless thou shalt be\nsuch. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou art not\nsuch.\n\n33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or\nsaid in the way most conformable to reason? For whatever this may be,\nit is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that\nthou art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in\nsuch a condition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such\nshall be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented to\nthee, the doing of the things which are conformable to man\u2019s\nconstitution; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything\nwhich it is in his power to do according to his own nature. And it is\nin his power everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move\neverywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to\nanything else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, for\nthe things which check them and stand in the way are many. But\nintelligence and reason are able to go through everything that opposes\nthem, and in such manner as they are formed by nature and as they\nchoose. Place before thy eyes this facility with which the reason will\nbe carried through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards,\nas a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing further.\nFor all other obstacles either affect the body only, which is a dead\nthing; or, except through opinion and the yielding of the reason\nitself, they do not crush nor do any harm of any kind; for if they did,\nhe who felt it would immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all\nthings which have a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to\nany of them, that which is so affected becomes consequently worse; but\nin the like case, a man becomes both better, if one may say so, and\nmore worthy of praise by making a right use of these accidents. And\nfinally remember that nothing harms him who is really a citizen, which\ndoes not harm the state; nor yet does anything harm the state, which\ndoes not harm law [order]; and of these things which are called\nmisfortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law does not\nharm either state or citizen.\n\n34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest\nprecept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he\nshould be free from grief and fear. For example,\u2014\n\n\u201cLeaves, some the wind scatters on the ground\u2014\nSo is the race of men.\u201d\n\n\nLeaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out\nas if they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the\ncontrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like\nmanner, are those who shall receive and transmit a man\u2019s fame to\nafter-times. For all such things as these \u201care produced in the season\nof spring,\u201d as the poet says; then the wind casts them down; then the\nforest produces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is\ncommon to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as\nif they would be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes;\nand him who has attended thee to thy grave another will soon lament.\n\n35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I\nwish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And\nthe healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that\ncan be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with\nrespect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which\nit is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought\nto be prepared for everything which happens; but that which says, Let\nmy dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may do, is an\neye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft things.\n\n36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he\nis dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose\nthat he was a good and wise man, will there not be at last some one to\nsay to himself, Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from this\nschoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I\nperceived that he tacitly condemns us.\u2014This is what is said of a good\nman. But in our own case how many other things are there for which\nthere are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider this,\nthen, when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by\nreflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my\nassociates in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared,\nthemselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little\nadvantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a longer stay here? Do\nnot however for this reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but\npreserving thy own character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and\non the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies\na quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the body, such\nalso ought thy departure from men to be, for nature united thee to them\nand associated thee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am\nseparated as from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without\ncompulsion; for this, too, is one of the things according to nature.\n\n37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything\nbeing done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is\nthis man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first.\n\n38. Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is\nhidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if\none may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the\nvessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached\nabout it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that\nthey grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts\nwithout the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver\u2019s\nshuttle, and the writer\u2019s pen, and the driver\u2019s whip.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK XI.\n\n\n1. These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself,\nanalyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which\nit bears itself enjoys,\u2014for the fruits of plants and that in animals\nwhich corresponds to fruits others enjoy,\u2014it obtains its own end,\nwherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a\nplay and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete if\nanything cuts it short; but in every part, and where-ever it may be\nstopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so\nthat it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the\nwhole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and\nit extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and\ncomprehends the periodical renovation of all things, and it comprehends\nthat those who come after us will see nothing new, nor have those\nbefore us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is forty years\nold, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the\nuniformity that prevails all things which have been and all that will\nbe. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of one\u2019s\nneighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself,\nwhich is also the property of Law. Thus then right reason differs not\nat all from the reason of justice.\n\n2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the\npancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its\nseveral sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by\nthis; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in\nthe matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do\nthe same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all\nthings, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply\nthyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to value\nthem little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.\n\n3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be\nseparated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or\ndispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a\nman\u2019s own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,\nbut considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another,\nwithout tragic show.\n\n4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had\nmy reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop\n[doing such good].\n\n5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well\nexcept by general principles, some about the nature of the universe,\nand others about the proper constitution of man?\n\n6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding\nmen of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to\nnature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with\nwhat is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which\ntakes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be\naccomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out, \u201cO\nCithaeron.\u201d And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic\nwriters, of which kind is the following especially:\u2014\n\n\u201cMe and my children if the gods neglect,\nThis has its reason too.\u201d\n\n\nAnd again,\u2014\n\n\u201cWe must not chafe and fret at that which happens.\u201d\n\n\nAnd,\u2014\n\n\u201cLife\u2019s harvest reap like the wheat\u2019s fruitful ear.\u201d\n\n\nAnd other things of the same kind.\n\nAfter tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial\nfreedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in\nreminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes\nused to take from these writers.\n\nBut as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and\nagain, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually\nsank down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said\neven by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such\npoetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look?\n\n7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life\nso well suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest\nto be.\n\n8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut\noff from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from\nanother man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a\nbranch, another cuts it off; but a man by his own act separates himself\nfrom his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he\ndoes not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the\nwhole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who\nframed society, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is\nnear to us, and again to become a part which helps to make up the\nwhole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes\nit difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and\nto be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from\nthe first grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one\nlife with it, is not like that which after being cut off is then\ningrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners mean when they\nsay that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it has not the\nsame mind with it.\n\n9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding\naccording to right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy\nproper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent\nfeelings towards them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not\nonly in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the\nmatter of gentleness to those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble\nthee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to\nbe diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear; for\nboth are equally deserters from their post,\u2014the man who does it through\nfear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman\nand a friend.\n\n10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate\nthe natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most\nperfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of\nthe skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of\nthe superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed,\nhence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have\ntheir foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care\nfor middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and\ncareless and changeable (V. 16, 30; VII. 55).\n\n11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of\nwhich disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy\njudgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou\nwilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.\n\n12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is\nneither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor\ndispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees\nthe truth,\u2014the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself\n(VIII. 41, 45; XII. 3).\n\n13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But\nI will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything\ndeserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I\nwill be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even\nhim his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my\nendurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless\nindeed he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such,\nand a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with\nanything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now\ndoing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that\nwhich at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since\nthou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is for the\ncommon advantage may be done in some way?\n\n14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to\nraise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.\n\n15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal\nwith thee in a fair way!\u2014What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion\nto give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought\nto be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man\u2019s character is, he\nimmediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith\nreads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good\nought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander\nas soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But\nthe affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing is more\ndisgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this\nmost of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things\nin the eyes, and there is no mistaking.\n\n16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be\nindifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be\nindifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all\ntogether, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an\nopinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain\nimmovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them,\nand, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not\nto write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments\nhave imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if\nwe remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and\nthen life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in\ndoing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in\nthem and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek\nwhat is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if\nit bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his own good.\n\n17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and\ninto what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has\nchanged, and that it will sustain no harm.\n\n18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my\nrelation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another\nrespect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a\nbull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from\nthis: If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all\nthings: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the\nsuperior, and these for the sake of one another (II. 1; IX. 39; V. 16;\nIII. 4).\n\nSecond, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so\nforth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions\nthey are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what\nthey do (VIII. 14; IX. 34).\n\nThird, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be\ndispleased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so\ninvoluntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly\ndeprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power\nof behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are\npained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a\nword wrong-doers to their neighbors (VII. 62, 63; II. 1; VII. 26; VIII.\n29).\n\nFourth, consider that thou also dost many things wrong, and that thou\nart a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain\nfaults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either\nthrough cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean\nmotive, thou dost abstain from such faults (I. 17).\n\nFifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are\ndoing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference\nto circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable\nhim to pass a correct judgment on another man\u2019s acts (IX. 38; IV. 51).\n\nSixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man\u2019s life is\nonly a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (VII.\n58; IV. 48).\n\nSeventh, that it is not men\u2019s acts which disturb us, for those acts\nhave their foundation in men\u2019s ruling principles, but it is our own\nopinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve\nto dismiss thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous,\nand thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By\nreflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for\nunless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity\ndo many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (V. 25;\nVII. 16).\n\nEighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and\nvexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we\nare angry and vexed (IV. 39, 49; VII. 24).\n\nNinth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine,\nand not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most\nviolent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition\ntowards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him\nand calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to\ndo thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature\nfor something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art\ninjuring thyself, my child.\u2014And show him with gentle tact and by\ngeneral principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he\ndoes, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And\nthou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of\nreproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and\nnot as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may\nadmire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present\u2026.[6]\n\nRemember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift\nfrom the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But\nthou must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed at them, for\nboth are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to\nthee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not\nmanly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to\nhuman nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these\nqualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who\nis subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in\nwhich a man\u2019s mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same\ndegree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a\ncharacteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain\nand he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.\n\nBut if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the\n[Muses, Apollo], and it is this,\u2014that to expect bad men not to do wrong\nis madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to\nallow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any\nwrong, is irrational and tyrannical.\n\n19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty\nagainst which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou\nhast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each\noccasion thus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy\nsocial union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real\nthoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things\nfor a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when\nthou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of\nthe diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less\nhonorable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross\npleasures (IV. 24; II. 16).\n\n20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,\nthough by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to\nthe disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the\ncompound mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee\nand the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up\nand occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner\nthen the elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been\nfixed in any place, perforce they remain there until again the\nuniversal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then\nstrange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and\ndiscontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but\nonly those things which are comformable to its nature: still it does\nnot submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the movement\ntowards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is\nnothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also\nwhen the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens,\nthen too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and\nreverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these\nqualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment\nwith the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior to acts of\njustice.\n\n21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be\none and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not\nenough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as\nthere is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or\nother are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some\ncertain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so\nalso ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a\ncommon kind [social] and political. For he who directs all his own\nefforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will\nalways be the same.\n\n22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm\nand trepidation of the town mouse.[7]\n\n23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of\nLamiae,\u2014bugbears to frighten children.\n\n24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in\nthe shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.\n\n25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying,\nIt is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I\nwould not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.\n\n26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] there was this precept,\nconstantly to think of some one of the men of former times who\npractised virtue.\n\n27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we\nmay be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things\nand in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of\ntheir purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.\n\n28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,\nafter Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates\nsaid to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when\nthey saw him dressed thus.\n\n29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down\nrules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules\nthyself. Much more is this so in life.\n\n30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.\n\n\n31. And my heart laughed within.\n     _Odyssey_, IX. 413.\n\n\n32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.\n     HESIOD, _Works and Days_, 184.\n\n\n33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman\u2019s act: such is he who\nlooks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, III. 24,\n87).\n\n34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to\nhimself, \u201cTo-morrow perchance thou wilt die.\u201d\u2014But those are words of\nbad omen.\u2014\u201cNo word is a word of bad omen,\u201d said Epictetus, \u201cwhich\nexpresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad\nomen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped\u201d (Epictetus, III. 24,\n88).\n\n35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are changes,\nnot into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus,\nIII. 24).\n\n36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus III. 22, 105).\n\n37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with\nrespect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must\nbe careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be\nconsistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of\nthe object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away\nfrom it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with\nrespect to any of the things which are not in our power.\n\n38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but\nabout being mad or not.\n\n39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or\nirrational?\u2014souls of rational men.\u2014Of what rational men, sound or\nunsound?\u2014Sound.\u2014Why then do you not seek for them?\u2014Because we have\nthem.\u2014Why then do you fight and quarrel?\n\n\n\n\nBOOK XII.\n\n\n1. All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous\nroad thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And\nthis means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the\nfuture to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety\nand justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content with the\nlot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee\nfor it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always speak the truth\nfreely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to\nlaw and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man\u2019s\nwickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations\nof the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will\nlook to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be\nnear to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect\nonly thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt\nbe afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou\nshalt fear never to have begun to live according to nature,\u2014then thou\nwilt be a man worthy of the universe which hast produced thee, and thou\nwilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things\nwhich happen daily as if they were something unexpected, and not to be\ndependent on this or that.\n\n2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the\nmaterial vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual\npart alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been\nderived from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself\nto do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who\nregards not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble\nhimself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like\nexternals and show.\n\n3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a\nlittle breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine,\nso far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is\nproperly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is,\nfrom thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou\nhast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee\nbecause they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee\nor in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body,\nis attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external\ncircumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt\nfrom the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is\njust and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt\nseparate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached\nto it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and\nof time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles\u2019 sphere,\n\n\u201cAll round and in its joyous rest reposing\u201d;\n\n\nand if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is,\nthe present,\u2014then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which\nremains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations,\nnobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee]\n(II. 13, 17; III. 5, 6; XI. 12).\n\n4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more\nthan all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of\nhimself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher\nshould present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to\ndesign nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it,\nhe could not endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have\nwe to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think\nof ourselves.\n\n5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well\nand benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some\nmen, and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most\ncommunion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious\nobservances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have\nonce died should never exist again, but should be completely\nextinguished?\n\nBut if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,\nthe gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be\npossible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it\nso. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou\nconvinced that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of\nthyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we\nshould not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent\nand most just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything\nin the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and\nirrationally.\n\n6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of\naccomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all\nother things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously\nthan the right hand; for it has been practised in this.\n\n7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be\nwhen he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the\nboundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.\n\n8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their\ncoverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what\npleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his\nuneasiness; how no man is hindered by another; that everything is\nopinion.\n\n9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the\npancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the\nsword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand,\nand needs to do nothing else than use it.\n\n10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form,\nand purpose.\n\n11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve,\nand to accept all that God may give him.\n\n12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought\nto blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or\ninvoluntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.\nConsequently we should blame nobody (II. 11, 12, 13; VII. 62; VIII. 17,\n18).\n\n13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at\nanything which happens in life.\n\n14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind\nprovidence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director\n(IV. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou\nresist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be\npropitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if\nthere is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a\ntempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if\nthe tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor\nbreath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not\ncarry away.\n\n15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until\nit is extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and justice\nand temperance be extinguished [before thy death]?\n\n16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say],\nHow then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done\nwrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is\nlike tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad\nman do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree bear\njuice in the figs, and infants cry, and the horse neigh, and whatever\nelse must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such a\ncharacter? If then thou art irritable, cure this man\u2019s disposition.\n\n17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it.\n[For let thy efforts be\u2014]\n\n18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for\nthee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the\nmaterial, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.\n\n19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more\ndivine than the things which cause the various effects, and as it were\npull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,\u2014is it fear, or\nsuspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (V. 11)?\n\n20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,\nmake thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.\n\n21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will\nany of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are\nnow living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned\nand to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may\nexist (IX. 28).\n\n22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.\nTake away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who\nhas doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and\na waveless bay.\n\n23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its\nproper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done\nthis act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has\nceased. In like manner then the whole which consists of all the acts,\nwhich is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for\nthis reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series\nat the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and\nthe limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of\nman, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the\nwhole universe continues ever young and perfect. And everything which\nis useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the\ntermination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it\nshameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to\nthe general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and\nprofitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is\nmoved by the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and\nmoved towards the same things in his mind.\n\n24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things\nwhich thou dost do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as\nJustice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee\nfrom without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to\nprovidence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence.\nSecond, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its\nreceiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back\nof the same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into\nwhat things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised\nup above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe\nthe variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst\nsee at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around\nin the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be\nraised up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and\nshortness of duration. Are these things to be proud of?\n\n25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from\ncasting it away?\n\n26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this,\nthat all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten\nthis, that a man\u2019s wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou\nhast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so\nand will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too,\nhow close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it\nis a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And\nthou hast forgotten this too, that every man\u2019s intelligence is a god\nand is an efflux of the Deity; and forgotten this, that nothing is a\nman\u2019s own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from\nthe Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou\nhast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses\nonly this.\n\n27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained\ngreatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the\ngreatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then\nthink where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a\ntale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this\nsort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in\nhis gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and\nVelius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager\npursuit of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything\nis after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it\nis for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself\njust, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all\nsimplicity: for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the\nmost intolerable of all.\n\n28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou\ncomprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the\nfirst place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[8] in the second\nplace, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus\nthen with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of\ntheir power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate\nthem.\n\n29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what\nit is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy\nsoul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy\nlife by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the\nsmallest intervals between?\n\n30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls,\nmountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,\nthough it is distributed among countless bodies which have their\nseveral qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among\ninfinite natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals].\nThere is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in\nthe things which have been mentioned, all the other parts, such as\nthose which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no\nfellowship: and yet even these parts the intelligent principle holds\ntogether and the gravitation towards the same. But intellect in a\npeculiar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, and combines\nwith it, and the feeling for communion is not interrupted.\n\n31. What dost thou wish,\u2014to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to\nhave sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to\nuse thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems\nto thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all\nthese things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and\nGod. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled\nbecause by death a man will be deprived of the other things.\n\n32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned\nto every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how\nsmall a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the\nuniversal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou\ncreepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except\nto act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common\nnature brings.\n\n33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in\nthis. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or\nnot, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.\n\n34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death,\nthat even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still\nhave despised it.\n\n35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to\nwhom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts\nconformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether\nhe contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time,\u2014for this man\nneither is death a terrible thing (II. 7; VI. 23; X. 20; XII. 23).\n\n36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world]; what\ndifference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? for\nthat which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the\nhardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away\nfrom the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a\npraetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.\u2014\u201cBut I\nhave not finished the five acts, but only three of them.\u201d\u2014Thou sayest\nwell, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be\na complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its\ncomposition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of\nneither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is\nsatisfied.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.\n\n\nIt has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value\nwhen it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his\nsuccessors were well suited to the gravity and practical good sense of\nthe Romans; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a\nman, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died\nconsistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says\nCicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not for the\npurpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life\nconformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death\nof Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic\nphilosophy which could console and support the followers of the old\nreligion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There\nwere even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a\ngood conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man\u2019s\nexistence. Such were Paetus Thrasca, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C.\nMusonius Rufus, and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic\nlanguage and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they\nmight have been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero\u2019s\nbloody reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant\nDomitian and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian. His\nbest precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced\nin his finest verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language.\n\nThe best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek\nslave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to\nRome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the\nfreedman of his unworthy master, Epaphroditus. Like other great\nteachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to his grateful pupil\nArrian for what we have of Epictetus\u2019 discourses. Arrian wrote eight\nbooks of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four remain and\nsome fragments. We have also from Arrian\u2019s hand the small Enchiridion\nor Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a valuable\ncommentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in the time of\nthe emperor Justinian.\n\nAntoninus in his first book (I. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates\nhis obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by\nJunius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also\nin other passages (IV. 41; XI 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of\nEpictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best\nauthority for the explanation of the philosophical language of\nAntoninus and the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the two\nphilosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to his\nhearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple manner.\nAntoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short,\nunconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.[9]\n\nThe want of arrangement in the original and of connection among the\nnumerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of the\nlanguage and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the\nwriter\u2019s own ideas,\u2014besides all this, there is occasionally an apparent\ncontradiction in the emperor\u2019s thoughts, as if his principles were\nsometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who\nleads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at\nhome and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind\nat ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not\nbeen tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might\nturn out to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude\nrealities of human existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations\nfrom men who have not worked and suffered may be read, but they will be\nforgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the\nteacher has not lived the \u201clife of an apostle,\u201d and been ready to die\n\u201cthe death of a martyr.\u201d \u201cNot in passivity (the passive affects) but in\nactivity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just\nas his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity\u201d (IX.\n16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he\nfollowed a laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him\nabove all want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately\nas the poorest philosopher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that\nhe always had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as\nhe had been with his servile station. But Antoninus after his accession\nto the empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an\nempire which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold\nmountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may imagine,\nthough we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the\ntroubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the world\u2019s\nbusiness on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and\nthe certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he\nwishes.\n\nIn the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and\nwith the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily\ncomprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to\nsupport him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of\nweakness; but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again\nfrom their depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus\ndoes. The emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in\nhis Epistle is of the same mind; that the world is full of envious,\njealous, malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out\nof it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he\nholds most firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they\nare evidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men\nhad to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor\nremark it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging\nway, that the emperor\u2019s reflections show that he had need of\nconsolation and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his\ndeath. True that he did need comfort and support, and we see how he\nfound it. He constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the\nuniverse is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must\nconform to that order which he cannot change, that whatever the Deity\nhas done is good, that all mankind are a man\u2019s brethren, that he must\nlove and cherish them and try to make them better, even those who would\ndo him harm. This is his conclusion (II. 17): \u201cWhat then is that which\nis able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this\nconsists in keeping the divinity within a man free from violence and\nunharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a\npurpose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of\nanother man\u2019s doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all\nthat happens and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever\nit is, from whence he himself came; and finally waiting for death with\na cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dissolution of the\nelements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no\nharm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into\nanother, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and\ndissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is according to\nnature; and nothing is evil that is according to nature.\u201d\n\nThe Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe,\nof its government, and of the relation of man\u2019s nature to both. He\nnames the universe (VI. 1), \u201cthe universal substance,\u201d and he adds that\n\u201creason\u201d governs the universe. He also (VI. 9) uses the terms\n\u201cuniversal nature\u201d or \u201cnature of the universe.\u201d He (VI. 25) calls the\nuniverse \u201cthe one and all, which we name Cosmos or Order.\u201d If he ever\nseems to use these general terms as significant of the All, of all that\nman can in any way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions\nplainly distinguishes between Matter, Material things, and Cause,\nOrigin, Reason. This is conformable to Zeno\u2019s doctrine that there are\ntwo original principles of all things, that which acts and that which\nis acted upon. That which is acted on is the formless matter: that\nwhich acts is the reason, God, who is eternal and operates through all\nmatter, and produces all things. So Antoninus (V. 32) speaks of the\nreason which pervades all substance, and through all time by fixed\nperiods (revolutions) administers the universe. God is eternal, and\nMatter is eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but he is not\nsaid to have created matter. According to this view, which is as old as\nAnaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter.\nThis doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of the existence\nboth of matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with\nthe insoluble question of the origin and nature of matter. Antoninus\nalso assumes a beginning of things, as we now know them; but his\nlanguage is sometimes very obscure.\n\nMatter consists of elemental parts of which all material objects are\nmade. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe,\naccording to Antoninus\u2019 expression (IV. 36), \u201cloves nothing so much as\nto change the things which are, and to make new things like them. For\neverything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be.\nBut thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or\ninto a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.\u201d All things then are in\na constant flux and change: some things are dissolved into the\nelements, others come in their places; and so the \u201cwhole universe\ncontinues ever young and perfect.\u201d\n\nWhen we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call\ngravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their\nresolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their\ngeneration, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death,\nwe observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of\nexperience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and\ninvariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of\nphenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an\ninfinite progression,\u2014and such change is conceivable,\u2014we have not\ndiscovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and\nsequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved\naccording to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order,\nsome variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is\nalso conceivable that such changes have taken place,\u2014changes in the\norder of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to\ncall them, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that our\nknowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance\nthe phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must\nbe imperfect.\n\nWe do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than\nwhen we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use\nthe terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct\nmeaning to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all\nmisunderstanding. But the case is different when we speak of causes and\neffects as of Things. All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks\ncalled them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular\norder, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in\nthe series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of\nthe series, or that something else will appear after the phenomenon\nwhich has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so\nthe series in its progression may be modified or totally changed. Cause\nand effect then mean nothing in the sequence of natural phenomena\nbeyond what I have said; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause,\nas some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is in that which\nis the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which will\nbe forever. Thus the word Creation may have a real sense if we consider\nit as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of\nnatural phenomena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at\na certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause, and an\nabandonment of all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to\nthe other words that people may use, is absolutely absurd.\n\nMan being conscious that he is a spiritual power or an intellectual\npower, or that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that\nhe has it,\u2014for I wish simply to state a fact,\u2014from this power which he\nhas in himself, he is led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is\na greater power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole\nuniverse as the intellect pervades man.\n\nGod exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that\nthe soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like\nanimals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have\nlife and what we call instincts or natural principles of action: but\nthe rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent soul.\nAntoninus insists on this continually: God is in man, and so we must\nconstantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is only in this way\nthat we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is\nin a sense a portion of the divinity, and the soul alone has any\ncommunication with the Deity; for as he says (XII. 2): \u201cWith his\nintellectual part alone God touches the intelligence only which has\nflowed and been derived from himself into these bodies.\u201d In fact he\nsays that which is hidden within a man is life, that is the man\nhimself. All the rest is vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which\nthe living man, the real man, uses for the purpose of his present\nexistence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to\nrespire; and so for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent\npower, which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free\nas the air (VIII. 54). It is by living a divine life that man\napproaches to a knowledge of the divinity. It is by following the\ndivinity within, as Antoninus calls it, that man comes nearest to the\nDeity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect agreement\nwith his internal guide. \u201cLive with the gods. And he does live with the\ngods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with\nthat which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon wishes,\nwhich Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, and a\nportion of himself. And this daemon is every man\u2019s understanding and\nreason\u201d (V. 27).\n\nThere is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior\nfaculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. A man must\nreverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we\nmust reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must\nreverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is\nof like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (V. 21).\n\nAntoninus speaks of a man\u2019s condemnation of himself when the diviner\npart within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honorable\nand to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures.\n\nAntoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any\nmore than he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has no\nspeculations on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his\nfashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand. He was\nsatisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can\nonly have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this\nimperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is within him,\nand keeping it pure.\n\nFrom all that has been said, it follows that the universe is\nadministered by the Providence of God and that all things are wisely\nordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or\nstates different possible theories of the constitution and government\nof the universe; but he always recurs to his fundamental principle;\nthat if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also admit that he\norders all things wisely and well (IV. 27; VI. 1; IX. 28; XII. 5).\n\nBut if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what\nwe call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is\nevil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, \u201cwhat we\ncall evil,\u201d we have partly anticipated the emperor\u2019s answer. We see and\nfeel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we\nlive, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human\nrace is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as our\nreason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and\nconnected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the\nuniverse of things is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and\nis governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive\nanything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole\n(VII. 55; X. 6).\n\nEverything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We\nmight imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and\nyet the whole would still subsist \u201cever young and perfect.\u201d\n\nAll things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms appear. All living\nthings undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an\nevil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and\nman suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by\nhis intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the\nlargest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls\nhis brothers. Antoninus says, (VIII. 55) \u201cGenerally, wickedness does no\nharm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one\nman] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in\nhis power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose.\u201d The first\npart of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole\ncan sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the\nStoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our\npower. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But\nthis is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does\nwrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is\nevil in the wrong- doer. Antoninus (XI. 18) gives many excellent\nprecepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are\npractical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons\nmay be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of\nGod as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in\nAntoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and\nprovidence of God because of the moral disorder and suffering which are\nin the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the\nsupposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He\nsays if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been\notherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise (XII. 5). His\nconviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the government of the\nworld is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in\nthe order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those\nwho would conclude from them against the being and government of God\nconclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the\nmaterial world, a constitution, a system, a relation of parts to one\nanother and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the\nconstitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for\nsome end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and\nthe end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant, or\nthe animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its\nchanges and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a\nfixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their\nuses and leave successors to take their place. So man has a corporeal\nand intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and on\nthe whole man performs these uses, dies, and leaves other men in his\nplace. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the natural\nstate of man,\u2014the state for which his nature fits him, and society\namidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists; and\nperhaps we may say that the history of the past and our present\nknowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish,\nand that order, its governing principle may be more firmly established.\nAs order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to deviations real or\napparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole nature of things, that\nwhich we call disorder or evil, as it seems to us, does not in any way\nalter the fact of the general constitution of things having a nature or\nfixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder that\norder is not the rule, for the existence of order both physical and\nmoral is proved by daily experience and all past experience. We cannot\nconceive how the order of the universe is maintained: we cannot even\nconceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor how we\nperform the simplest movements of the body, nor how we grow and think\nand act, though we know many of the conditions which are necessary for\nall these functions. Knowing nothing then of the unseen power which\nacts in ourselves except by what is done, we know nothing of the power\nwhich acts through what we call all time and all space; but seeing that\nthere is a nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is\nconformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal\nNature has a cause which operates continually, and that we are totally\nunable to speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils\nwhich we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected\nfrom all that Antoninus has said.\n\nThe origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam that Zeus\nhas two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and\nthat he gives to men out of each according to his pleasure; and so we\nmust be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the Greek\ncommentators asks how must we reconcile this doctrine with what we find\nin the first book of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, \u201cMen\nsay that evil comes to them from us, but they bring it on themselves\nthrough their own folly.\u201d The answer is plain enough even to the Greek\ncommentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately\nto their several characters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that men do\nattribute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it falsely, for\nthey are the cause of their own sorrows.\n\nEpictetus in his Enchiridion makes short work of the question of evil.\nHe says, \u201cAs a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so\nneither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.\u201d This will\nappear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus,\nbut he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark\nin order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence\nEpictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his purpose shall\nfail. Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of evil,\nas he expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the\nconstitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of evil in\nthe constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius\nargues, but evil would be good.\n\nOne passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the\nemperor could say: \u201cTo go from among men, if there are gods, is not a\nthing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but\nif indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human\naffairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or\ndevoid of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for\nhuman things, and they have put all the means in man\u2019s power to enable\nhim not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was\nanything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should\nbe altogether in a man\u2019s power not to fall into it. But that which does\nnot make a man worse, how can it make a man\u2019s life worse? But neither\nthrough ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard\nagainst or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the\nuniverse has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so\ngreat a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that\ngood and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad.\nBut death certainly and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,\nall these things equally happen to good and bad men, being things which\nmake us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor\nevil.\u201d\n\nThe Ethical part of Antoninus\u2019 Philosophy follows from his general\nprinciples. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to\nNature, both a man\u2019s own nature and the nature of the universe. Bishop\nButler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they spoke\nof living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained,\nas he has explained it and as they understood it, it is, \u201ca manner of\nspeaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly\njust and true.\u201d To live according to Nature is to live according to a\nman\u2019s whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to reverence the\ndivinity within him as the governor of all his actions. \u201cTo the\nrational animal the same act is according to nature and according to\nreason.\u201d That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary\nto nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to\nsome part of man\u2019s nature, or it could not be done. Man is made for\naction, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses\nof their nature, so man must do his (V. 1).\n\nMan must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to\nthe nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a\npolitical community he must direct his life and actions with reference\nto those among whom, and for whom, among other purposes, he lives. A\nman must not retire into solitude and cut himself off from his\nfellow-men. He must be ever active to do his part in the great whole.\nAll men are his kin, not only in blood, but still more by participating\nin the same intelligence and by being a portion of the same divinity. A\nman cannot really be injured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can\nmake him bad, and he must not be angry with them nor hate them: \u201cFor we\nare made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like\nthe rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then\nis contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed\nand to turn away\u201d (II. 1).\n\nFurther he says: \u201cTake pleasure in one thing, and rest in it in passing\nfrom one social act to another social act, thinking of God\u201d (VI. 7).\nAgain: \u201cLove mankind. Follow God\u201d (VI. 31). It is the characteristic of\nthe rational soul for a man to love his neighbor (XI. 1). Antoninus\nteaches in various passages the forgiveness of injuries, and we know\nthat he also practiced what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that \u201cthis\ndivine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to\nbe met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept\nof Christianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any\nother single virtue.\u201d The practise of this precept is the most\ndifficult of all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid\ntowards following it. When we are injured, we feel anger and\nresentment, and the feeling is natural, just, and useful for the\nconservation of society. It is useful that wrong-doers should feel the\nnatural consequences of their actions, among which is the\ndisapprobation of society and the resentment of him who is wronged. But\nrevenge, in the proper sense of that word, must not be practiced. \u201cThe\nbest way of avenging thyself,\u201d says the emperor, \u201cis not to become\nlike, the wrongdoer.\u201d It is plain by this that he does not mean that we\nshould in any case practise revenge; but he says to those who talk of\nrevenging wrongs, \u201cBe not like him who has done the wrong. When a man\nhas done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about\ngood or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt\npity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry\u201d (VII. 26). Antoninus\nwould not deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and\nresentment, for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the\nnature of the man\u2019s mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have\npity instead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul\u2019s\nadvice to be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is\nnot a recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a\nnatural passion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us\ninto sin. In short the emperor\u2019s doctrine about wrongful acts is this:\nwrong-doers do not know what good and bad are: they offend out of\nignorance, and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this\nkind of ignorance will never be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought\nnot to be admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, there may be\ngrievous injuries, such as it is in a man\u2019s power to forgive without\nharm to society; and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies\nknow not what they do, he is acting in the spirit of the sublime\nprayer, \u201cFather, forgive them, for they know not what they do.\u201d\n\nThe emperor\u2019s moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which\nteaches a man to look directly to his own happiness, though a man\u2019s\nhappiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought\nto do. A man must live conformably to the universal nature, which\nmeans, as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man\u2019s\nactions must be conformable to his true relations to all other human\nbeings, both as a citizen of a political community and as a member of\nthe whole human family. This implies, and he often expresses it in the\nmost forcible language, that a man\u2019s words and action, so far as they\naffect others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their\nconsistency with the conservation and the interests of the particular\nsociety of which he is a member, and of the whole human race. To live\nconformably to such a rule, a man must use his rational faculties in\norder to discern clearly the consequences and full effect of all his\nactions and of the actions of others: he must not live a life of\ncontemplation and reflection only, though he must often retire within\nhimself to calm and purify his soul by thought, but he must mingle in\nthe work of man and be a fellow-laborer for the general good.\n\nA man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all\nhis energies to it; of course a good object (II. 7). He who has not one\nobject or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his\nlife (XI. 21). Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means\nof \u201creducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the\nelecting and propounding unto a man\u2019s self good and virtuous ends of\nhis life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to\nattain.\u201d He is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this when he\nwas young and has had the opportunities; but the emperor seeing well\nthat a man cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to\ndo it when he can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun.\nHe who can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be\ntrue to them, cannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and\nthe universal interest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a\nthing is not good for the hive, it is not good for the bee (VI. 54).\n\nOne passage may end this matter. \u201cIf the gods have determined about me\nand about the things which must happen to me, they have determined\nwell, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought;\nand as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that?\nFor what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole,\nwhich is the special object of their providence? But if they have not\ndetermined about me individually, they have certainly determined about\nthe whole at least; and the things which happen by way of sequence in\nthis general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be\ncontent with them. But if they determine about nothing\u2014which it is\nwicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor\npray nor swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods\nwere present and lived with us; but if however the gods determine about\nnone of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about\nmyself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is\nuseful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and\nnature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country,\nso far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the\nworld.\u201d\n\nIt would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor\u2019s\nopinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his\nunderstanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. The\npassages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are\nin no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before\nhe will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If\nwe analyze all other things, we find how insufficient they are for\nhuman life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is\nindivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot\nbe considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult\nto explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in\nsuch a way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more\nconsists of parts than man\u2019s intelligence does; and yet we speak of\nvarious intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the\nvarious powers which man\u2019s intellect shows by his works. In the same\nway we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical\nsense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to\npractise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as\nmuch as man\u2019s nature is capable of.\n\nThe prime principle in man\u2019s constitution is social. The next in order\nis not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not\nconformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is\nfreedom from error and from deception. \u201cLet then the ruling principle\nholding fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own\u201d\n(VII. 53). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis\nof all the rest (X. 11), and this had been said long before his time.\n\nIt is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice\nas a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in\nconformity to this disposition; but experience shows that men\u2019s notions\nabout justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with\nthe true notion of justice. The emperor\u2019s notion of justice is clear\nenough, but not practical enough for all mankind. \u201cLet there be freedom\nfrom perturbations with respect to the things which come from the\nexternal cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue\nof the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action\nterminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy\nnature\u201d (IX. 31). In another place (IX. 1) he says that \u201che who acts\nunjustly acts impiously,\u201d which follows of course from all that he says\nin various places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and\nas a means to virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in\nindifferent things weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is\nas great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as\nshowing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to\nconsequences. He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must\nnot pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head,\nbut he must exhibit his justice in act.\n\nThe Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful and\nsome ugly, and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as they are\nugly so they are evil, or bad (II. 1). All these things, good and evil,\nare in our power, absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say; in\na manner only, as those who would not depart altogether from common\nsense would say; practically they are to a great degree in the power of\nsome persons and in some circumstances, but in a small degree only in\nother persons and in other circumstances. The Stoics maintain man\u2019s\nfree will as to the things which are in his power; for as to the things\nwhich are out of his power, free will terminating in action is of\ncourse excluded by the very terms of the expression. I hardly know if\nwe can discover exactly Antoninus\u2019 notion of the free will of man, nor\nis the question worth the inquiry. What he does mean and does say is\nintelligible. All the things which are not in our power are\nindifferent: they are neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life,\nhealth, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and death. Life and death are\nall men\u2019s portion. Health, wealth, power, disease, and poverty happen\nto men, indifferently to the good and to the bad; to those who live\naccording to nature and to those who do not. \u201cLife,\u201d says the emperor,\n\u201cis a warfare and a stranger\u2019s sojourn, and after fame is oblivion\u201d\n(II. 17). After speaking of those men who have disturbed the world and\nthen died, and of the death of philosophers such as Heraclitus, and\nDemocritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of Socrates whom other lice\n(his enemies) destroyed, he says: \u201cWhat means all this? Thou hast\nembarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out.\nIf indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there.\nBut if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by\npains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as much\ninferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is\nintelligence and Deity; the other is earth and corruption\u201d (III. 3). It\nis not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never beginning\nto live according to nature (XII. 1). Every man should live in such a\nway as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing\nelse. He should live such a life that he shall always be ready for\ndeath, and shall depart content when the summons comes. For what is\ndeath? \u201cA cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the\npulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive\nmovements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh\u201d (VI. 28).\nDeath is such as generation is, a mystery of nature (IV. 5). In another\npassage (IX. 3), the exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful, he\nspeaks of the child which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at\ndeath leaves its envelope.\n\nAntoninus\u2019 opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His\ndoctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does\nnot perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The\nopinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides;\nwhat comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven,\nthe divinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in\nAntoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be\nconscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of\nclay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have\nrested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and\nconsistent with the university of things.\n\nNor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine,\nwhich some Stoics practiced,\u2014the anticipating the regular course of\nnature by a man\u2019s own act. The reader will find some passages in which\nthis is touched on, and he may make of them what he can. But there are\npassages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end\npatiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with\nall his best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot\nand do useful acts as long as he lives. He should not therefore abridge\nthe time of his usefulness by his own act.\n\nHappiness was not the direct object of a Stoic\u2019s life. There is no rule\nof life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own\nhappiness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are\nonly seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the\nstrongest that they have. The end of a man is, as already explained, to\nlive conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness,\ntranquillity of mind, and contentment (III. 12; VIII 2). As a means of\nliving conformably to nature he must study the four chief virtues, each\nof which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge of good and\nevil; justice, or the giving to every man his due; fortitude, or the\nenduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is moderation in all\nthings. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic obtained all\nthat he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, and he\nwas satisfied with that.\n\nEpictetus and Antoninus both by precept and example labored to improve\nthemselves and others; and if we discover imperfections in their\nteaching, we must still honor these great men who attempted to show\nthat there is in man\u2019s nature and in the constitution of things\nsufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult enough to\nlive as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live in such a\nway as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate degree\nthe power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct; and if all\nmen cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and religion, it\nis at least worth while to give them good reasons for as much as they\ncan be persuaded to accept.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n [1] This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain.\n\n [2] Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there Antoninus\n was brought up, and he died there. This also is corrupt.\n\n [3] This is corrupt.\n\n [4] Antoninus here uses the word \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 both in the sense of the\n Universe and of Order; and it is difficult to express his meaning.\n\n [5] This is corrupt.\n\n [6] It appears that there is a defect in the text here.\n\n [7] The story is told by Horace in his Satires and by others since,\n but not better.\n\n [8] \u201cSeen even with the eyes.\u201d It is supposed that this may be\n explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living\n being (IV. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (VIII. 19). But\n the emperor may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he\n afterwards states it, because we see what they do; as we know that man\n has intellectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other\n way do we know it.\n\n [9] The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,\u2014Physic, Ethic, and\n Logic (VIII. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by\n Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but\n these philosophers placed the three divisions in the following\n order,\u2014Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this division\n was made before Zeno\u2019s time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero\n remarks. Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower\n sense of that word.\n    Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, and made\n    six,\u2014Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic;\n    Physic and Theology. This division was merely for practical use,\n    for all Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or\n    Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is\n    considered only as an instrument which is to be used for the other\n    divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic\n    doctrines and of their modifications would require a volume. My\n    object is to explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they\n    can be collected from his book.\n    According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go\n    together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of\n    the nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity,\n    and of his government of the universe. This division or subdivision\n    is not formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed,\n    there is no method in his book; but it is virtually contained in\n    it.\n    Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the\n    principles of morals and the study of the constitution of civil\n    society; and undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two\n    parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic; for though the two\n    are intimately connected, they are also very distinct, and many\n    questions can only be properly discussed by carefully observing the\n    distinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject is\n    Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to his own conduct in\n    life as a man and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his\n    doctrines about man\u2019s nature, the Universal Nature, and the\n    relation of every man to everything else. It is therefore\n    intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the nature of\n    Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He advises\n    us to examine well all the impressions on our minds and to form a\n    right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire\n    into the meaning of words, and so far to apply Dialectic; but he\n    has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy\n    is in substance purely moral and practical. He says, \u201cConstantly\n    and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every Impression on the\n    soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of\n    Dialectic\u201d: which is only another way of telling us to examine the\n    impression in every possible way. In another passage (III. 11) he\n    says, \u201cTo the aids which have been mentioned, let this one still be\n    added: make for thyself a definition or description of the object\n    which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a\n    thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete\n    entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the\n    things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be\n    resolved.\u201d Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which\n    Antoninus accordingly employed as a means towards establishing his\n    Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles.","title":"Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":59520}